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JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
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DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

19980120 049

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

Central Eurasia Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-92-011

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1 April 1992

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Withdrawal From Lithuania Begins

92UM0701A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by unidentified KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and ITAR-TASS correspondents, under the rubric: "Direct Line: Yesterday KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and ITAR-TASS Correspondents Transmitted from Vilnius": "The Troop Withdrawal from the Lithuanian Republic Has Begun"]

[Text] The withdrawal of the army of the former Soviet Union from the territory of the Lithuanian Republic began on March 3, at 10:40 hours local time. A column of 37 combat vehicles, that had been transported from the Vilnius area several days ago, drove out through the gates of the military garrison into the suburbs of the Lithuanian capital.

A farewell ceremony with the military unit banner took place at Visoryay in which the Northwestern Group of Forces commander and Russian Federation Authorized Representative on Issues of the Army Withdrawal from the Baltic States Colonel-General Valeriy Mironov participated. While answering journalists' questions, he said that this was the first unit to depart Lithuanian territory and the schedule of the future withdrawal and the completion date of this process "must be determined at interstate negotiations." The issue on chattels and real estate must also be decided in precisely that manner.

Uzbekistan Appeals for Restraint Among Servicemen

92UM0712A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent transmitted yesterday from Tashkent under rubric "Direct Line": "Addressing Uzbekistan Soldiers, Respected Elders Call for Self-Control and Prudence"]

[Text] The Uzbekistan Republic Supreme Soviet's Committee on State and Public Security, Defense and Servicemen's Social Protection adopted an appeal to all Uzbekistan soldiers performing duty in independent states of the Commonwealth.

"Dear sons," it states, "we understand that your service in this troubling time is many times more difficult. We turn to you with the following wish: the fate of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States has not been resolved once and for all and appropriate laws on military questions have not been adopted for now; do not discredit your republic, strengthen the authority of independent Uzbekistan by honest, conscientious service. Courageously endure difficulties, conscientiously fulfill requirements of regulations and commanders' orders, do not violate military

discipline, strengthen the bonds of military fraternity and international comradeship."

The special attention of Uzbekistan soldiers was directed to the impermissibility of going AWOL. It is emphasized that fathers and mothers, relatives and respected gray-haired elders hope that the emissaries of Uzbekistan will not stain themselves with any unworthy acts, will help each other, and will not take the path of infractions under the influence of various rumors. All problems that arise must be resolved together with commanders and officers in charge, and they must converse with their colleagues only in a language of friendship and mutual respect.

The address to the Uzbekistan soldiers was signed by Uzbekistan Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium Member V. Niyazmatov and Minister for Defense Affairs R. Akhmedov.

Statistics on Female Service Personnel

92UM0758B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "It Is Even Harder for a Woman Than a Man in the Shoulder Boards"]

[Text] A briefing was held for Russian and foreign journalists on March 5 at the Committee for Personnel Operations of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. It was conducted by the chairman of the committee, Major-General Aviation Nikolay Stolyarov.

Interesting figures were made public at the briefing. It turns out that we have 657 female officers among three and a half million servicemen. They include one colonel, 16 lieutenant colonels, 92 majors, 330 captains and 218 lieutenants and senior lieutenants. The United States, with two million servicemen, has 224,745 female servicemen, of whom 34,777 are officers. There are 82,000 serving with the ground troops, 74,000 in the Air Force and 59,500 in the Navy. They even have 9,000 in the Marines. There are six female American generals, and one rear admiral is also a woman. We have no such achievements here. It is true that there are only 219 female servicemen in the FRG, of whom 169 are officers.

Some 26 percent of our female servicemen have completed military institutes or majors at civilian higher educational institutions, but women are not accepted at the military service schools and they serve only as translators, physicians and communications personnel. In the United States they occupy virtually the same positions in the military ranks as men. There were many women among the soldiers taking part in the war in the Persian Gulf. So in our army, as in the country, there is still a very long way to go in the equality of men and women.

It is not easy to be an officer's wife in our world either. Seventy percent of them have higher or specialized

secondary education, but very few of them are working. There are 220,000 unemployed among officers' wives, of whom 105,000 are in Russia. An absolute majority of the children on military garrisons—two thirds—do not attend kindergartens.

Officers' Strike Threatens Baikonur Launch

92UM0758D Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent Ye. Dotsuk, Alma-Ata: "The Liftoff Will Take Place at Any Pay Rate," with note from O. Volkov, "And at the Same Time.."]

[Text] According to information coming to the editors, the situation at Baikonur has become inflamed once again. The construction-battalion agitation had scarcely subsided (the head of the Chief Military-Construction Directorate at Baikonur, Major-General Chukhrov, has been relieved of his duties) when the joint launch with the Germans to the Mir orbital station projected for March 17 was threatened with disruption. The officers who are to make this launch have announced their decision to strike. The reasons, according to a report from the Aziyapress Agency, are the lack of everyday amenities and the poor organization of the work and service.

Only the highest military officials are accustomed to serving in comfort at Baikonur. There is a special snack bar, comfortable cottages and even a special warm bathroom for them.

The young officer corps, by designating the strike on namely the day of the flight, are in essence trying to force the authorities to occupy themselves with the solution of their problems immediately. The military have evidently already received some guarantees, since nothing has been officially reported on any postponement of the launch.

And at the Same Time...

The preparations for the joint flight are continuing, it has been reported to us at the Flight Control Center near Moscow, and happily without any excesses. The Center is also experiencing far from the best of times, but a session of the coordinating commission that was held on Monday decided not to strike at the time of the launch.—O. Volkov

Beloretsk Facility Said To Be Bunker for 'Leadership'

PM1703095392 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 92 p 2

[Professor M. Safarov report: "...And Some Need Bunkers"]

[Text] Almost every region in our militarized and secrecy-obsessed country has its own little secret.

Take, for example, the settlement of Tatly and the facility marked on the map as the "Beloretsk-15" nature reserve and, a little further on, the city of Solnechniy and "Beloretsk-16." Very few people in the republic know that major changes in the very geography of Bashkortostan are connected with the appearance of these facilities: The construction of the Beloretsk-Karlaman railroad (204 km), the Beloretsk-Ufa highway (224 km), and the small towns of Tatly and Solnechniy with 30,000 residents each.

We are well into 1992. The whole world already knows that "Chelyabinsk-65" stands for the "Mayak" Combine designed to produce nuclear weapons. To this very day, however, nobody knows exactly what "Beloretsk-15" and "Beloretsk-16" are.

At last, the facility's leader himself—General L. Tsirkunov—decided to brief the "over-curious". Leonid Akimovich is a military construction worker. What does this mean? It means that when he is working he is a construction worker, and when he is acting as spokesman he is a general. Which means that he has a greater commitment to secrecy than to accuracy of information; "If anybody thinks it possible that uranium could be buried here in our region, then as a specialist I declare that this cannot be." A strong argument!

Fine, maybe not uranium. But what? M. Shakirov, former first secretary of the Bashkir CPSU Oblast Party Committee, answered this question in December last year: The construction of an underground shelter for the USSR leadership in case of war began over 15 years ago beneath Beloretsk.

It is clear that several billion rubles have been pumped over the last few years into constructing an underground facility and corresponding infrastructure in the South Ural mountains, and that a collective of skilled workers and engineering and technical staff was hauled in to do this. The amazing thing is that the work began under Brezhnev, gained momentum under Gorbachev, and is continuing under Yeltsin as if nothing has happened.

Discussion of Changes in New Regulations

92UM0793A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel B. Kononchuk: "Discipline Is Not Being Abolished"]

[Text] Judging from the draft of the Interim Disciplinary Regulations of the Combined Armed Forces, only the approaches to tightening it are changing.

The reader is of course interested primarily in what is new in the draft regulations. Everything is new. Even the components of firm military discipline are seen today differently from before. The regulations have been supplemented with a statement that high discipline is attained "by creating, in the military unit, an atmosphere of high responsibility and pride for one's military

collective, by maintaining internal order, through efficient organization, and by participation of all personnel in combat training." The truth of this premise is supported by the experience of the forces.

The next item. The draft regulations specify that activities of a commander (chief) associated with maintaining discipline are evaluated not on the basis of the number of disciplinary actions taken but in relation to how precisely he observes the laws and military regulations and how completely he employs his disciplinary power and carries out his duties with the purposes of establishing order and preventing disciplinary violations. Not one violator must escape responsibility; at the same time, not one innocent person should be punished.

It is emphasized that a commander (chief) who fails to create the necessary conditions for observance of regulations and the requirements of military discipline, and who fails to take steps to restore such conditions, bears responsibility for this. At the same time he does not bear responsibility for crimes, misdemeanors, and transgressions of subordinates that are not directly caused by his actions.

New items have appeared in the section "Incentives Applied to Privates, Seamen, Sergeants and Petty Officers." An incentive that had not existed previously is introduced for servicemen in their first compulsory term of service—permission for one extra day pass from the location of the military unit, or to shore from a ship. Sergeants and petty officers may be awarded a promotion in rank one step above that foreseen by the positions they occupy as a means of raising their authority.

Considering that first-term servicemen will be granted up to 20 days' leave during their time of service, it has been deemed suitable to increase, as an incentive, the duration of mandatory leave by up to five days.

The rights of commanders to employ incentives have been expanded. Thus, squad commanders and platoon deputy commanders are granted the right to allow first-term sergeants and petty officers one additional extra leave from the military unit's location or shore leave from a ship on days and at times established by the commander of the military unit. A company (classification 4 ship) commander is additionally granted the right to communicate exemplary fulfillment of military duty by a first-term serviceman and the incentives he has received to his home or place of former employment (study), while a battalion (classification 3 ship) commander may also award certificates to first-term servicemen.

A new kind of incentive has been introduced into the section "Incentives Applied to Shore-Based and Seagoing Warrant Officers"—early promotion of shore-based and seagoing warrant officers to the ranks of senior shore-based and senior seagoing warrant officer.

New kinds of incentives have appeared for officers—"entry of the names of officers in the Honor Roll of the

military unit (ship)" and "promotion in rank one step above the rank foreseen for the official position occupied." I feel that this is a good stimulus in service.

The procedure for applying incentives is being changed. It is noted that certificates, valuable gifts or money, photographic portraits of servicemen taken before the military unit's unfurled Colors (Ensign) and excellent service chest badges are presented to servicemen as a rule simultaneously with announcement of a commendation order. The way it is today, an incentive may be announced, but it might not be presented.

Some commanders (chiefs) still hold the belief that discipline can be tightened not through organizational and educational work, or by establishing proper order, but by applying stiffer, punitive measures. The law, and consequently the regulations as well, must not be a means of vengeance. This is why the public plays a great role in the effort to tighten discipline. The chapter "Disciplinary Punishments" contains the provision that transgressions of servicemen may be discussed at officer assemblies and at general assemblies not only on the basis of the commander's decision but also in response to a petition from the public.

The regulations define new kinds of disciplinary punishments imposed upon first-term servicemen and upon persons serving on the basis of a contract. Thus, first-term privates and seamen may be assigned to extra work details—up to five details. Work on any day of the week, during free time prior to taps, is foreseen. Why only in daytime? This makes it possible to ensure fulfillment of the order of the day, and to prevent violations of military discipline.

The duration of one detail must not exceed four hours in one day.

Discharge into the reserves prior to expiration of the term of service is foreseen as a disciplinary punishment for privates and seamen serving on a contract. The same punishments imposed on extended-service servicemen are also imposed on sergeants and petty officers.

Servicewomen can now be discharged from active service prior to expiration of the term of service as well.

Now regarding the rights of commanders (chiefs) to impose disciplinary punishments on subordinates: A battalion (classification 3 ship) commander may place privates, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers under arrest for up to seven days. A sergeant or petty officer may be demoted by a commander (chief) having the right to promote him. The time spent by a first-term serviceman in the guardhouse is taken into account when he is granted his compulsory leave, if the punishment is not rescinded over the course of a year. Leave is reduced by the number of days in the guardhouse. In this case the leave must not be less than half of the established time.

Arrest and detention of officers in the guardhouse is not foreseen, since arrest does not facilitate enhancement of

their honor and merit. A decrease in the maximum term of arrest from 10 to five days is foreseen for shore-based and seagoing warrant officers, and a decrease from 10 to seven days is foreseen for extended-service servicemen. The same term of arrest is also imposed on privates, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers serving on contracts. The disciplinary punishment "warning of insufficiency in service" is applied once during the time of service of a shore-based (seagoing) warrant officer or officer in the position he occupies. A demotion in position should follow subsequently.

The draft regulations establish a new procedure of imposing disciplinary punishments. They specify that an investigation must precede a decision by a commander (chief) to impose disciplinary punishment. It is conducted for the purposes of identifying the culprits and revealing the causes and conditions that led to the offense. The commander (chief) conducts the hearing. He must keep in mind that a punishment must be imposed one day but not more than 10 days after the day the offense became known. This makes it possible to avoid hasty and rash decision.

The chapter "On Proposals, Applications, and Complaints" has been revised. Servicemen may now submit proposals, applications, and complaints to organs of military justice and other organs of state government. It is specified that a serviceman who files a complaint is not released from fulfilling orders and his official duties. The presently effective provision prohibiting a serviceman from complaining of the strictness of disciplinary punishment, even if the commander (chief) had not exceeded the disciplinary powers granted to him, is rescinded.

In order to exclude repeat complaints the chapter has been supplemented with the following provision: "Proposals, applications, and complaints are considered to be resolved if all issues they raise have been examined, the necessary measures have been implemented in relation to them, and exhaustive responses corresponding to effective legislation have been given."

There are also other new things in the draft that will in my opinion help to tighten military discipline and the combat readiness of the forces.

CIS: POLICY

Gen Army Kobets on 'Future of Armed Forces'

92UM0807A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 1, Jan 92 pp C2-1

[Interview with Army General K. Kobets, state defense adviser for RSFSR, by members of mass media: "The Future of the Armed Forces"]

[Text] Army General K. Kobets, state defense adviser for the RSFSR, reflects on the future of the armed forces.

This conversation with representatives of the mass media, in which a VOYENNYE ZNANIYA correspondent took part, occurred on 22 October 1991 at the TsDZh [Central Journalists' Club] in Moscow. In his answers to questions about the forthcoming military reform, Gen K. Kobets is, of course, expressing his own point of view. By the time this issue of the magazine comes out, it is possible that other decisions will have been made on certain problems. Life is life, after all. You, our respected readers, have or will have an opportunity to compare them.

This is what Army General K. Kobets had to say:

[Kobets] The situation in the nation and in the world has changed drastically since the well-known events of August 1991. A situation has developed which makes it possible to consider security issues within the framework of a unified system of collective security, which I would call a three-level system:

1. National security within the immediate borders of the geophysical space in which you and I live;
2. Soviet-European collective security;
3. A Soviet-European-American collective security system.

Like the USA and practically all the countries of Europe, we feel that our army presently has no immediate enemies and no adversaries in the civilized world. This is the starting point for defining the approach to military reform from the military-political point of view.

It follows that since there is no adversary and no enemy in the world—we do not see any—there is no need to form operational-strategic groupings from sea to sea as we are accustomed to doing based on the doctrine we called defensive.

[Question] Then why do we need armed forces at all?

[Kobets] In order to response to the degree of risk.

[Question] From where?

[Kobets] From practically all nations. It must be reduced to naught.

Since we are moving toward a Soviet-American-European system of collective security, the doctrine must also be different. What should it be? We have hypothetically named it the DOCTRINE OF PREVENTING WAR. And since this doctrine is being proclaimed, the makeup of the armed forces must also be altered on the basis of an assessment of the foreign political situation.

[Question] We now have a new internal domestic political situation, however. A number of republics have adopted declarations of independence and sovereignty, and expressed a desire to have their own armed forces. Now what should the approach be?

[Kobets] One thing is clear. Everything pertaining to the strategic deterrence forces capable of preventing the employment of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction must for all practical purposes be inseparable. And we should have forces which make it clear to a possible enemy, one with "big muscles," that he will not achieve political objectives with military means. Our nation, of course, must know that it has adequate forces at a minimal level for responding appropriately.

We cannot even think about any sort of strategic parity. This would destroy the national economy. The economy will not stand the pressure. We have to seek new approaches.

The functioning of the strategic deterrence forces (strategic intelligence, antisatellite and antimissile defense systems, and strategic nuclear forces) within the republics must be defined by appropriate normative enactments in the interest of collective, primarily national, security.

If the republics decide to establish their own armed forces, we would suggest that a treaty on a DEFENSE ALLIANCE be signed, and they (the armed forces) should be governed by these five principles:

1. Unified operational-strategic planning;
2. Since we have a single military science and a single military art, we should also have a single personnel training system;
3. A single material and technical support system; the weapons in all the republics are identical, and the ammunition should be the same; the fuel for the aircraft and tanks should be the same, and so forth;
4. A single system of financing;
5. A single system of troop command and control.

These are the principles on the basis of which we could discuss the functioning of the armed forces, although even today one can say that this will cost the republics very dearly.

We therefore say that while basically preserving the principle of unity, there could be ground and other forces in the interim stage, but this will depend upon how promptly and competently we succeed in preparing and signing an agreement on a defense alliance. As you can see, the strategic aspect of our approach to military reform is based on an assessment of the foreign and the domestic political situations in the nation. This is what I would call the first component.

The second is economic. We need to decide what is adequate economically to maintain the nation's defense as a whole, the criteria for defining this adequacy, what the military-industrial, or defense, complex will be, and how the conversion system will fit into a common, integrated economic system.

The third component involves providing social and legal guarantees for the servicemen, both regular and those released into the reserve or retirement. We need to establish a package of normative enactments which would see the young person through from predraft training through maturity to old age, and provide for the latter. We still have to work out such a system.

Finally, the fourth component is the actual reform of the armed forces. The military reform is not a matter for the Ministry of Defense alone. It is a job for the entire society, that is a national, a state task. I underscore the fact that only a fourth of this directly involves the actual reform of the armed forces.

Who should conduct the reform? It is obvious that the armed forces themselves cannot prepare the concept for reform, and all the more, could not implement it. We must enlist the best minds and representatives of the public, apply the experience of all civilized countries which have carried out reforms at one time or another in their own way, adopt all the best and least expensive things and apply them with the greatest possible effect.

What would be the schedule for all this? This is the plan: report what has been worked out to the State Council of the USSR by 10 November 1991; arrive at some agreement with the republics and define the measures necessary; put the finishing touches on the documents within a month and then go into action. We must have openness in this matter, of course, to avoid mistakes.

[Question] Has the process of military reform already begun?

[Kobets] We can already see elements of the different components. We have already begun the reorganization of the central apparatus. It includes the abolishment of military-political structures as independent agencies in the army and navy, their separation from party affiliation, the ratification of a number of documents on social guarantees for the personnel, and other things.

[Question] Respected Konstantin Ivanovich, how do you see the military training of the youth prior to military service in the future (within the framework of the military reform)? Predraft training of the youth has actually been abolished in Russia without properly replacing the NVP [initial military training], since, in my opinion, a few dozen hours of optional training will produce little.

[Kobets] Unfortunately, that is true. **PREDRAFT TRAINING OF THE YOUTH IS NECESSARY. WE WILL TRAIN THE YOUTH.** The documents are already being worked out. I believe that the decision adopted on predraft training of the youth by the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR was made in haste and will be rescinded as part of the military reform.

[Question] And how is it planned to man the nation's armed forces?

[Kobets] Four manning principles have been defined: a professional army, hired volunteers, service under contract, and a draft. As you can see, we put the draft into fourth place.

Can we abandon the draft today? Of course not. After all, the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty has not yet been rescinded.

We are also considering the matter of alternative service. Can it be resolved right now? Once again, the answer is no. And for that very same reason. Such service cannot be introduced without a law on the matter.

There are also numerous other problems pertaining to the implementation of the military reform. Since the nation's Supreme Soviet has not yet reviewed the (entire package), we shall strive to gain passage of individual laws, first and foremost those on universal military duty, the performance of military service, and so forth.

During the discussion Gen K. Kobets brought up yet another problem, very important and interesting, I believe. He told about the economic activities of army units and subunits.

[Kobets] I was recently in Spain and signed a number of important contracts: for the Spanish to build 45,000-60,000 apartments (the number depending upon how things go) with 90 square meters per service family over a two to three year period; for the construction of roads in the Nonchernozem area (18 of our brigades will build those which the region needs most urgently right now); for the erection of facilities for storing, processing and transporting food products, for which purpose Spanish-French firms will modify and equip with refrigeration units 30,000-37,000 Soviet military trucks. Spain will provide us with food with its own credit and out of the fund of the European Community countries, which will be hauled by Soviet military air transports and stored at military bases.

The army will help the society with the technical outfitting of agriculture, the protection of its property, and so forth. In short, the economic activities of the army to help the people of which it is a part has already begun.

The interview ended. The main conclusion we journalists derived from it is that the military reform will soon go into full swing.

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Stolyarov on Role of Army in New State

92UM0669A Moscow SYN OTECHESTVA in Russian No 8, Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Nikolay Stolyarov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief; Chairman, Committee for Work with Personnel, CIS United Armed Forces: "The Last Refuge: Long Live the Army!"]

[Text]

We Still Celebrate Your Holiday

It may seem paradoxical to some people that the Army has remained in one piece in a society that has split up almost everything it can. Yes, in spite of everything, we still have a more or less integral Army. A "single Army space" continues to exist. It is a source of irritation for some, a hope of a stable existence for others, and the last refuge of the idea of a great Motherland for still others. At the same time, the Army itself is also attempting to understand what it has become and what it should become in such an uncertain world.

The Army and Society

The thought comes to mind: Is our Army still the same? Judge for yourself. The Army, the same as other institutions of our society, has gone along with the values put forth by perestroika: new political and social thinking; emancipation of the individual from the yoke of a totalitarian state; and priority of economic freedoms.

The Army offered no resistance whatsoever to the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact took place rather painlessly. The Army accepted the reunification of Germany relatively calmly and started with interest to establish a new system of ties to NATO.

Votes cast for Yeltsin and all the other presidents comprised the same percentage as in the rest of society. The Army was quick to take up the new political life; military personnel came out in great numbers to announce their candidacies for positions in the new system; and it initiated actual departyization ahead of the implementation of governmental decisions. The abolishment of political organs took place in a peaceful manner. The need to reduce the Army and at the same time improve quality and institute professionalism was sympathetically received by servicemen.

The Army—the same as a diligent school child—went ahead to learn how to form new ties to society, in effect leaving it up to the civilian population the right to resolve problems of the system and the political machine. The tragic consequences of the Army's forced participation in the political conflicts in the Baltics, Georgia, and Azerbaijan almost removed the Army from the system of clarifying the relations between the political groups, from the system of regulating the processes of political and national self-determination.

The Army was also successful in passing the test of 19-21 August. One recalls how in Foros a formerly frightening and inaccessible minister, one who had seemed to become bent with the heavy burden of what had been done, asked timidly and sheepishly, "What was being said around Gorbachev concerning the Army?" "We have an excellent Army!" he replied. And, God knows,

every word in the reply is nothing but the truth, if we are to speak of the people whose difficult lot it is to serve the Fatherland.

Now attempts are being made to frighten society with claims of a military dictatorship. What is to produce it, if military personnel—not all of them at the same time—have embraced the truth: the civilian sector has its own internal, inherent forces which it can employ to cope with an unfavorable course of political events.

Our Army—and this has been substantiated by the All-Army Officers Assembly of 17 January—has made so much progress toward depoliticization that it has become capable of rising above the political juncture and the running pragmatism of the transitory civilian authorities. It is now virtually impossible to involve the Army in internal political, national, or any other conflicts. In this respect it has moved toward becoming a civilized model of an army, the kind typical of the world's leading countries.

Deep thinking and fast reaction to changing conditions have become a hallmark of the Army.

Those who venture to seek political leadership would do well to realize that the Army consists not of guns, missiles, and cruisers, but of people and their future, of your and my children, friends and relatives, that it is an integral part of our society, that it thinks and feels, that it suffers joy and pain the same as that society.

The Army and Armies

Let us think again about it: What kind of army do we need today? A civilized society needs an army which would measure up to the standard of a modern army, one suitable for resolving supertasks, such as those that arose in the Persian Gulf. That is the only kind of army that makes sense in today's world. Any other kind would be a mere sham, an architectural embellishment of some kind of private statehood.

To create that kind of army, however, it is necessary to make a highly complex jump in quality: effecting reductions, integrating in this process all the army's progressive elements; introducing professionalism; implementing the latest computer technology; and converting the available material and intellectual potentials into a system of coordinates for the latest high technologies.

It is completely clear that this kind of task lies beyond the capability of any one republic, even one which has declared itself to be an independent state.

However, the above kind of thinking often draws the question: "Why is an army needed at all?" It must be admitted that the question is a good one—in the highest degree. Doubts related to the need for an army are not groundless. The world has changed to such an extent that the idea of achieving victory over someone for the sake of seizing natural resources has become unprofitable. Resources can be purchased. That is the kind of euphoria engulfing the former Union republics that have declared

themselves to be states. They no longer have a need for the defensive, therefore any other kind of function, of a mother country. But they insist on "surrounding" the phenomenon of independence with an army attribute. On top of that, the usual thinking is that "armed detachments of people" constitute one of the necessary conditions of a power. Really, that is a mistake. The power from now on will defend itself exclusively with its own authority, which all strata of society, including the military, measure in approximately the same way: by the results of announced intentions.

In this connection, another question applies here: Would people living in the area of the former Union (how difficult to become accustomed to that term) have their security interests served by a unified, integral army? It appears they would. And in spite of the fact that centrifugal forces have involved the Union military in the disintegration process, there are other, more important, circumstances tending to promote unity of the Army.

First, the Soviet Army in its aggregate form constitutes a super-complex system, one which is virtually impossible to divide and dismantle without suffering large material losses. I repeat: virtually impossible. Even for Galina Starovoytova.

Second, the more forward-looking presidents are beset by doubts: Might they not lose in another way, something other than an army, if they go ahead and pull their armed forces out of a single army space, with the latter's high technology characteristics? Useful doubts.

Third, only with an army that is combat-ready by modern standards, a high technology army, one that can be made only by combined efforts, is it possible to join a system of international collective security.

The country's past is our own past. We act as if none of us has anything to do with the past, as if it were not we who created it.

Take the country's nuclear shield. Regardless of how much blame for its mindless creation is laid on the former government and former army leadership, the problem is not diminished or simplified. The entire "beauty" and gloominess of the nuclear potential belongs to you and me, dear contemporaries.

In our arsenals there are faulty and unreliable munitions which previously satisfied the highest demands of security, but they do not do so now. The destruction of nuclear munitions is a fundamentally complex operation which can be entrusted only to highly qualified specialists. They, and all people who work in this area, are carrying enormous ethical and material burdens; their psychological condition is not adequate to reality.

Because of all the above factors, in addition to others, the danger of accidental explosion has arisen.

Our country, the same as all others, incidentally, was a system of systems. We in dividing the country have not simply split up its geographic and economic space; we

have destroyed the systems, for the economic system is being rocked, while the political system has become amorphous. These things are not harmless, but they present a weak comparison with the danger we are "liberating" when we destroy the "power systems" with their death-dealing capability. The complacency with which we approach the crushing of the Army as a macrosystem and its built-in even more complex and dangerous system of nuclear weapons is intolerable.

The feeling persists that we have decided to play with fire in the literal sense of the term. We wish to attempt to dismantle the "dangerous military supersystem" in an environment of social shake-up. As if the civil danger caused by destruction of the economic macrosystem—something we all have personally felt—were not enough for us. Someone evidently wishes to see "it" crash.

The Army and the "MIM" Phenomenon

The 16 February television program "Itogi" featured Marshal Shaposhnikov as the man of the week. But in what light? One of outperforming all presidents, imposing his will upon them, dictating conditions.

But it is not he who is dictating conditions; it is raw necessity.

Dismemberment of the Army will proceed in a very specific internal and external environment. Externally, dismantling of the Soviet Army will be associated with an "array" of processes:

- improvement of NATO armies technologies;
- growth in military potential of the Pan-Islamic world;
- economic and geopolitical regroupings in an enormous area of the Asian continent, with the capability of triggering dangerous discord in the Turkish-Slavic world in the Asian part of the USSR;
- attempts on the part of known and yet unknown small countries to acquire nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction.

The internal plan consists of processes just as much of a conflagrant nature:

- increased danger due to inevitable deterioration in level of control of the presence, storage, and technical condition of nuclear potential, and in quality of professional actions related to the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons;
- technical and personnel dislocations threatening to cause enormous harm to the economy and ecology, with a leading cause being senseless discarding of military equipment;
- deterioration in the general economic situation, stabilization of which could be aided by an integral army.

The above aggregate of factors, so to speak, is not the fruit of a nostalgic imagination, but is rather a reality. It

is a reality with which politicians must deal. But alas! As far as "democratic dismemberment" of the country is concerned, cohesion and bonds are no obstacle; simple lines of communication of no concern; a unified energy system nothing at all. In this connection, the Army sees things another way, since its integrity is subject to technical and technological factors, and claims to power are something it finds foreign to itself. The Army is endlessly amazed at the general blindness that descends who knows whence.

Indeed.

The republics have split up, but are constantly searching for a unification formula, for they all possess an excellent understanding of the value of integration. Hosts of apparatchiks are attempting to find answers to numerous, endless, debatable, and presently immaterial—as a rule—questions. And this at a time when all republics are beset by a multitude of problems that require joint efforts to resolve to prevent the economic situation from reaching a possible dead end.

Is there any common sense being applied? Where is an economy of forces so necessary to restore the disrupted economy? Yes, the Army with its numbers is guilty: it required much money and still requires much money from the budget; but it is willing to undergo reduction and let forces be drawn off into the national economy. But whence this generosity for throwing away forces and capital? What about those endless meetings, travels, commissions, subcommittees, dismantling of structures and slapping together of new ones, movements, currents, encounters, sessions, and discoveries of America in general?

In the past year, the already disintegrating USSR, which existed only conditionally at that, could have become a transitional model in preparation for a new one, one that could have eventually taken shape.

However, the MIM [mass information media] are trying hard to convince us that the disintegration of the Soviet Union is an historic inevitability, that it is supplanted by an historic reality: the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]! However, society is coming to realize something that has been firmly entrenched in the Army: the disintegration of our faulty, supercentralized, overly complex, but historical state is an antihistorical process.

People who do not become involved with politics generally see no meaning in the present manipulations of the country. They may have voted for independence of the republics, but the majority had no idea that independence would come to mean breaking with the Motherland with which they had long become accustomed to live and in which virtually everyone has friends and relatives in the most diverse corners of the Soviet Union, the latter now referred to by the term "former."

The above term was introduced to our consciousness by the MIM long before the Minsk shift. The newspapers started to use it as long as one year ago. The independent

mass information media, freed from the ideological yoke of the CPSU, remained true to their traditions. They turned into a separate branch of politics.

The Union was still alive, searching for a better form of its multiethnic political consensus, but the most popular newspapers consigned it to the past. They attained their goal, one unexpected by the masses, one painful to the country's forward-thinking intelligentsia. I shall never forget the distraught and amazed Academician Likhachev as his arguments for the Union fell on the deaf ears of deputies. The impassioned pleas of Tsipko, Migranyan, Yakovlev, and Yavlinskiy, and the reasoned arguments of Sobchak and Popov in favor of the Union were also ignored. A stupefying situation.

The same technique of twisting our thinking was used in the case of Gorbachev. The country's first President. The MIM were the first to condemn him. They now "care not to" make any remarks critical of the presidents of the republics. But what mounds of verbal garbage they heaped upon Gorbachev. And they brought him down.

I watched as the KGB was also "reformed." Also along the lines of the MIM model. What they said one day was made a reality the next day by the seemingly blind Bakatin, Gossovet, and deputies.

The MIM model has its sights set on the Army. The newspapers keep bringing up the topic of a military takeover. Far be it from me to accuse the MIM of wielding harmful power, for we all like to read newspapers and are genuinely happy about the emancipation of the press. However, I watched how the MIM model started to exacerbate the "Russia-Ukraine" conflict and was horrified. There cannot be a war between us! But newspapers are making the most chilling predictions.

The above is not just foolish; it borders on being a crime, kind journalists, treating the inability of leaders of the Ukraine and Russia of coming to an agreement as a preliminary to initiation of a Russo-Ukrainian War. Better that they ask themselves and us a question: Will Ukrainian and Russian subjects be able to go to war if they are weak from poor nutrition, lack of money, and worn-out clothing? The peoples of the Ukraine and Russia will never **BE ABLE** to wage war on each other since, at the very least, they refuse to become involved in questions of "purity of race." It would be easier for them to get together on replacing the rulers than starting a war. The Army and the Future Society

Peoples and nations in which many generations have worked to create a strong and viable state seldom quarrel with each other. Fights are started by political clans and Mafia associations; they are the ones that employ the nationalism factor to initiate a war and agitate nationalistic ambitions among the population to gain personal advantage.

In this connection, peoples and parliaments should realize that the Army is definitely not in favor of a return to the past. It stands for reasonable reforms, market mechanisms,

entrepreneurship, private farming, and new political and economic arrangements. It wishes to see sensible rulers at the helm, the kind that would do the people no harm. And let them keep searching for more effective ways to make progress. The Army will not accept one thing: mindless disintegration of the Fatherland.

If dismantling of the USSR were to take place on an actual historical basis, few would express disapproval. However, independence of peoples which has as a basis a cult of nationalism and ignorance as determinants of economic integration can bring nothing but an economic crash and amount to "pseudoindependence."

Yes, the Army conscience in its aggregate is today the most stable proponent of the idea of a unified and great Motherland. And the military on this their holiday have no intention of imposing the Army by means of force, but rather take pride in the fact that they have never been tempted to betray the Motherland to which they have sworn their allegiance now and forever. They will not betray her even now, a time when she is ailing and is in desperate need of assistance.

The Army hopes that it will possess sufficient endurance until the time when the newly united and prosperous peoples will thank it for its endless patience, non-use of weapons, adherence to principles, common sense, love for the Motherland, and loyal service under the combat banners of historical deeds won by the renowned Russian and the entire Soviet military.

(The author is donating his fee for writing this article to the account of the Interrepublic Fund for Humanitarian Assistance to Servicemen, Zashchitnik Otechestva.)

Stolyarov Notes Possible Use of Force To Free Hostages

92UM0799B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 12 Mar 92 p 4

[Article by V. Makarov: "Officers Held Hostage"]

[Text] Today one cannot believe official authorities. This is evidenced by the fact that 10 officers of the headquarters of a surface-to-air missile brigade stationed in the city of Artik (Armenia) were invited to the city soviet under the pretext of a meeting on 8 March and were taken hostage.

This was followed by an attack on the brigade's positions. Armed extremists sealed off the military installation and for 10 hours fired on it from rooftops and motor vehicles. Lieutenant V. Mishchenko and Private A. Kotov were killed and others wounded. On 9 March, the terrorists put forth an ultimatum: within two days give them a large amount of ammunition for small arms and artillery, including for BM-21 "Grad" rocket launchers. Otherwise the hostages would be killed.

As Major-General of Aviation N. Stolyarov, chairman of the Committee for Working with Personnel of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, stated at a briefing, everything possible is being done to free the hostages by using political methods exclusively. If this does not produce results, the possibility of using armed force is not ruled out. In addition, in the words of General Stolyarov, there is hope that in the very near future a decision will be made on the total withdrawal of Armenian units and subunits from this region.

This is perhaps the first time during the years of the conflict in Transcaucasia that an official statement by the leadership of the armed forces has sounded so decisive and harsh.

It was stated at the briefing that if the captured officers were not released by the end of 10 March, the areas where the bandit formations are believed to be located will be sealed off by troops. When this issue was being made up, the Directorate of Information of the Commander in Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces informed us that the blockade had not been accomplished and the hostages had not been released.

Major-General of Aviation Stolyarov, together with representatives of the officer public and of the Committee of Mothers of Soldiers, departed by aircraft for Armenia...

At the Eleventh Hour

The President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, promised that the hostages would be turned over on 11 March by official means. By decision of the chief of the General Staff, ITAR-TASS reported that this mission has been entrusted to N. Stolyarov.

Lobov: 'Russia Needs Its Own Army'

92UM0756A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 8, Feb 92 p 4

[Article by Doctor of Military Sciences Professor Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov under the rubric "Point of View": "The Sacred Right of Russia"]

[Text] The results of the meeting of the heads of state of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] on February 14 in Minsk is at the center of attention of politicians, experts, the mass media and the whole world community today. And that is due not only to the heightened interest in the future dynamic of the development of the Commonwealth, but also by the untying of the knot of extremely complex military problems that occupied an important place in the course of the discussions. Today we can see quite distinctly that if we have been able to move forward appreciably in certain areas, dead-end situations have still been created in others, to the resolution of which no little time will have to be devoted. Since the process of transformation of the once-unified defensive institution of the former USSR into new structures—both those common to the majority of subjects of the Commonwealth and those that are still

exclusively for a few—is restricted in scope and uncommonly streamlined in substance. Here the situation suggests that it is very important not to tarry in making the fundamental military-political decisions on which the developmental stability of the new community overall, and each of the states in the CIS in particular, depends first and foremost.

One such decision, in my opinion, has objectively become urgent. Russia has today been placed objectively into conditions in which it must have its own army. All of us are witnesses to the emergence (or restoration) of Russian statehood under new historical conditions (largely the same processes are also transpiring in the other countries of the Commonwealth). But a Russian army is not yet among the most important elements of this statehood. RF [Russian Federation] President B. Yeltsin, as is well known, has noted that both he and the government do not yet see the necessity of forming their own armed forces. And that if the need for them should arise at some time, it would be a forced step. The public had still received such statements with understanding comparatively recently—Russia was seemingly giving all to understand that it was not pleased by the disintegrative processes in the sphere of common defense, but at the same time it did not intend to slow them with the "imperial energy" for which it had reproached other political leaders of the "nearby foreign lands" more than once already. Russia, as we all well know, openly acknowledges the right of each of the members of the Commonwealth to its own army. That is its own right as well, to the same extent.

It is well known to all that Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine have already done a great deal to form their own armies, and are continuing to augment their efforts in that area. They moreover refused, at the last meeting in Minsk, to sign any agreements whatsoever on a unified command over the conventional armed forces. Ukraine moreover favors independent strategic forces with separate command. Russia itself proposes a variation where the strategic forces are a part of the combined armed forces of the CIS and are subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the combined forces. Serious differences have arisen regarding the list of the branches of service and individual units that are included in the strategic forces, the rights of the states to those forces and the nuclear weapons on their territory, financing etc. So a completely paradoxical situation arises herein—there are enormous ground and naval contingents under the jurisdiction of Russia, there are troops financed from the RF budget, there are finally military districts, fleets, training and other institutions on its territory, but it does not have its own armed forces. An enormous state saturated with military structures proves to be covered by a defensive shield that simultaneously both belongs to it and, seemingly, does not.

I will be direct and candid: under conditions of the collapse of economic ties and a sharp decline in industrial production and the standard of living for the

Russian population, it is especially difficult to bear the burden of military spending whose scope is incomparable with any other member of the Commonwealth. And if we do not take determined and well thought-out steps today in the direction of forming our own army (naturally including in its system both those mechanisms operative today and the "new" ones of the armed forces of the CIS), then a further slowdown could be negatively reflected, either directly or indirectly, in the economic reforms and give rise to new seats of social tensions both in the country and in the military collectives. The birth (or resurrection) of a Russian national army, in my opinion, could loose a host of military-political, military-economic, social and other problems that have arisen at the current stage of activity of the Commonwealth.

The financing of national armed forces is evaluated in far from unequivocal fashion among society—from support to complete repudiation. Many pose the question thus: for whose sake are national armies being created, with whom do they intend to fight? One also often hears opinions such as national military contingents, as they say, carry the danger of the appearance of interethnic warfare. That danger undoubtedly exists, all the more so today, when the most complex process of fixing the members of the Commonwealth within historically extant borders is underway, and internecine warfare is being waged openly among them. Add here also the still unresolved issue of the division of military matériel, arms, a host of installations and entire military formations. And the large numbers of human victims, of course, can in no way be justified. And when they say to us that, after all, "that never used to happen," that "it would be good to live in the old way," then an observer who can see only the visible portion of the iceberg could get the opinion that national armed formations—and not an artlessly pursued policy of interethnic relations—was the heart of the evil. I have always felt and still feel that when people are unable to come to agreement in diplomatic, political language, they inevitably shift to the language of weapons. This "argument" is the most antihuman, and the criminal is the first to use it to prove his "rightness."

But we, in creating own own national armies, should finally be freed from this stereotype, provoking social consciousness to the fact that "there are still militaries, and the danger of war still exists." Russia, like the other members of the Commonwealth, needs its own armed forces entirely for defense, the defense of their its independence, sovereignty, the integrity of national territories and the freedom of its own peoples, and moreover only in a case where someone is encroaching on them. And only that. They have an excellent saying in the Caucasus—"The dagger that you may never have to take out of its sheath you should carry your whole life just the same."

Those who are more or less well acquainted with my ideas on the organizational development of the armed forces under contemporary conditions could say, "Wait a minute, not very long ago you, Vladimir Nikolayevich,

held quite different views, and ferociously defended the unity of the defensive bodies of the former Union." Yes, that is so. But can anyone really object that the military-political situation here was completely different quite recently? Few could have supposed that it would take such a sharp turn, putting the defensive establishment into fundamentally new conditions heretofore unknown.

The process of disintegration of a once-unified military organism is becoming more and more irreversible, actively following on the heels of the political. Each member of the Commonwealth itself, as is well known, is free to choose the form of its own participation in it. And if, on the one hand, the logic of reason suggests the functional necessity of common military structures for the Commonwealth, the lack of a legislatively codified defense organization for Russia creates a certain status vacuum across an enormous expanse, on the other hand, putting some other members of the community, as it were "equivalent" to it, in a not quite clear situation at the same time. Here, of course, it is possible to argue about something else—whether it is better or worse, for example, when Russia does not insist on its own army when it is more inclined at a given moment toward defensive integration with those who are part of the Commonwealth. But one thing seems completely indisputable—Russian statehood, like any other, looks like nonsense without its own most important institution—the institution of defense. Without that, like it or not, the army structures that are part of the armed forces of the CIS have the nature, I would not fear to say, of a distinctive kind of military commune, each resident of which pretends to independence on a political and economic plane, but at the same time has his own—albeit formal—lock on his own door anyway.

Not so long ago, taking part in a television program, I came out wholly concretely on this score that in order for the CIS to be more sound, we first have to disunify. I had in mind military structures as well, of course. It was exceedingly typical that the conclusion elicited a flood of puzzlement even among many experienced professionals. I had to hear out some serious criticism. But that did not shake my current stance. I am sure today that any artificial holding of the members of the Commonwealth within the framework of a unified defense mechanism is, to a certain extent, violence against common sense. Any defensive organization on such a scale is most solid only when it is the conscious result of an understanding of the general socio-political, economic and defensive laws of integrative processes, not only by the presidents and governments, but also by all of the peoples who desire such integration. Otherwise we will have direct or indirect reproaches, as we did, for the "imperial center," for "pressure from above," for the "old Union" etc.

The long years of a totalitarian regime have accustomed us to the feeling of the herd instinct. Ukraine begins to create its own army, and the grumbling starts—for what? How come? Where do they see an enemy? Wouldn't it be better for them not to "thrust themselves forward"? But permit me to say that we live in a different world today,

and who would feel it smart to give, say, Argentina advice on what army to have or what coalition to enter into? We have before us an independent and sovereign state that is not now controlled from the Kremlin or from Staraya Ploshchad. Russia, it seems to me, is still waiting for a clearer situation so as to discern the clear probable outlines of the "predicted" army on its horizon, waiting while the neighbors are acting left and right. And that is a dangerous waiting. The hour has come. We should never wait for anyone or equate ourselves to anyone. Hundreds of thousands of military people are waiting for a decision that is objectively dictated by the logic of the prevailing situation, by the historical moment. And the sooner we start to do this, the faster we will pass by the interval of time when political and economic decisions are greatly outstripping military ones, creating an uncomfortable existence for an enormous segment of society.

During my time as the Chief of the General Staff, by the way, we were studying a version of the development of events where Russia comes inevitably to face the necessity of having its own armed forces. Hundreds of scientific studies, calculations, proposals, orders and plans for organizationally authorized structures have been preserved to this day, and which could be utilized successfully today to launch an enormous amount of comprehensive activity for the organizational development of a Russian army. This accumulated potential should not go for naught. It must be combined correctly with the enormous amount of considerations, projects, plans and proposals that already exist or are being developed by devoted like thinkers. It would be advisable to bring that work to the governmental level through certain structures. It would be appropriate to have a businesslike and dynamically run competition of the best ideas, concepts, plans etc. The importance of the matter requires mandatory reliance on the collective intellectual might of professionals. It is completely obvious that a concrete task will have to be skillfully accomplished—the organic inclusion of the Russian armed forces into the internal and international "political atmosphere," the finding of the most expedient variations for solving military-economic, social and legal problems and, most importantly, the reckoning up in advance of the possible consequences of the decisions being made in literally every area. We know very well where shortsightedness and weak forecasting can lead, based on the example of the "war of the oaths." We must envisage, ahead of time, all possible variations of the development of events at literally all levels of the army structures.

The insistent necessity already exists, in my opinion, of forming and putting into action a Ministry of Defense and a General (or Main) Staff for a Russian army in the near future, which would take in hand in operative fashion the command and control of the new defensive organism, interacting closely with the government of the RF and the special committees of the Russian Parliament occupied with defense issues. This would make it largely possible to lessen the work of the CIS Main

Command, giving it the opportunity to concentrate its efforts on resolving the issues delegated to it by those participants of the Commonwealth that acknowledged the necessity of a unified command at the recent meeting in Minsk. The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of Russia, on the other hand, could be switched over to the resolution of the enormous circle of issues that are dictated entirely by the military interests of the RF at the current phase of development of the Commonwealth. The logic of the situation itself dictates the necessity of namely such an approach.

I agree absolutely with the opinions of the Russian members of the government that the Ministry of Defense of the RF does not have to be headed by a military person, or that he could be a primary figure there just in a transitional stage. During the present time interval, when political decisions are coming to be the focus first and foremost, it seems that it would be expedient for the ministry to be headed by an experienced and prestigious politician or a military professional possessing a broad range of political views of the situation. And the General Staff, formulated of military professionals able to take on the whole gravity of the burden connected with the practical realization of the tasks defined by the temporary political and military leadership, should be his reliable support.

Today our Russian military house is in need of the most rapid straightening out and the most precise delimitation of tasks among the structures that will be playing various functional roles, both directly in the system of national armed forces and in the common armed forces of the CIS. Life itself persistently dictates that Russia define its primary priorities in the whole infrastructure of the activity of its defensive organization in operative fashion—from an inventory of what it has on hand to the operational development of a national military doctrine. It is namely a Russian military doctrine, by the way, that should become a kind of generator for the impending transformations in the national defense sphere. It is namely Russia, in my opinion, for which the time has come to put in a significant word, and which could in the future play not only the role of a point of reference, but also a powerful integrator within the framework of the organization of joint defense by those subjects of the CIS that stand with the RF in similar positions.

The creation of a Russian national army meets the historical requirement of restoring our rich domestic military traditions and re-animating precious principles of the succession of martial generations of the past and present. This also fully meets the tasks of global policy for the restoration of Russian statehood and the development of lofty and shining patriotic feelings and national self-awareness among people.

In these notes I have naturally not posed for myself the task of considering in broad and detailed fashion all of the objectively urgent preconditions for the creation of a Russian armed forces. I have limited myself only to the topics that have, in my opinion, paramount importance.

I do not consider my own considerations and conclusions—I especially want to emphasize this, as I have always done in such cases—to be the truth of last resort. But today I am unshakably convinced of one thing nonetheless—Russia needs its own army. And let no one regard that as some militarist-nationalist spirit. The fate of our Fatherland—in service to which and in defense of which Russian warriors have seen the highest sense of their existence since time immemorial—is very dear to us. Russia, like any nation on Earth, has the full right to be concerned with its own reliable protection. No one can ever deprive it of that right.

Finance Chief Answers Questions on Military Budget

92UM0799A Moscow SYN OTECHESTVA in Russian
14 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Lt-Gen V.V. Vorobyev, chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the CIS Armed Forces, by SYN OTECHESTVA correspondent in Minsk; date not given: "The Priority Is for Social Programs"]

[Text] Life more and more persistently is bringing us to the need to become independently economists and financial experts. Chaos and political and social confusion, naturally, are depressing. What are we to do? There is only one thing left—count only on ourselves. There is another thing—rely on the wisdom of the statesmen we elected so our life would become better instead of worse.

They are the ones who will gather today in Minsk to resolve many of the problems that are urgent for the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and for each of us. This includes the problem of the Armed Forces of the states of the Commonwealth.

But while the leaders meet, the Army and Navy exist and carry out their missions. That means that someone is financing their activities, and someone is planning how this will take place in the near future.

That is precisely why on the eve of the meeting in Minsk, the editorial office of SYN OTECHESTVA [S.O.] asked Lieutenant-General V.V. Vorobyev, chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the CIS Armed Forces, to answer a few questions that interest our readers. The first question we asked Vasilii Vasilyevich, naturally, was about how the military department's budget was and is being formed and how involved were specialists of the armed forces, specifically of the Central Finance Directorate, in compiling the budget?

[Vorobyev] Formation of the military budget for 1992 is inseparably linked to the changes taking place in the political and economic life of our society.

Despite the complex and largely uncertain situation, the draft military budget for 1992 was drawn up in advance back in August 1991 and submitted to the competent

representative bodies. After that, the draft budget was repeatedly revised in connection with the predicted changes in prices and rates.

The Central Finance Directorate played one of the leading roles in this process. It was involved in forecasting forthcoming defense spending, taking into account crisis phenomena in the economy, summarizing and analyzing estimates submitted by the branches of the armed forces and main and central directorates, and putting them into a single document—the military budget itself.

[S.O.] What basic expenditure items does this budget provide for and what has been given priority?

[Vorobyev] The military budget has its own inherent structure. Its main sections are: maintainin the Army and Navy; payment for armament, military equipment, and property; payment for scientific and technical products; capital investments; service pensions; and special expenditures.

As far as priorities in the structure of the military budget are concerned, they are determined by the military doctrine, the foreign and domestic situation, and the policy being carried out in these conditions. Typical features of military budgets of recent years are a decrease in the percentage of spending for procurement of arms and military equipment and an increase in spending for maintaining the Army and Navy, solving social problems, and improving material support of servicemen and their family members. That is to say, the social orientation of our defense budget is becoming increasingly more distinct. To corroborate this, I will say that about 70 percent of the amount of defense expenditures approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation for the first quarter of 1992 will go to the social sphere.

[S.O.] As we know, the military has been authorized to engage in commercial activities. In your view, what specifically can servicemen and individual military collectives engage in? How will this affect the military budget? Are special documents being prepared concerning this?

[Vorobyev] First of all, I would like to say that commercial activities in the armed forces were never the end in itself. This function is uncharacteristic of the Army and Navy and is mainly the result of economic problems. The financial difficulties being experienced by the states of the Commonwealth and the significant cuts in defense spending, against the background of the worsening of social problems of servicemen, resulted in the need to look for sources of self-financing for the needs of the Army and Navy forces.

The most significant items of such additional revenues to the allocated budget appropriations are the funds being received from the sale of hardware and military-technical equipment being freed in connection with reductions in the armed forces. In connection with the fact that accomplishing these tasks last year directly

through military units, institutions, and organizations did not prove worthwhile and had an adverse effect on the organization of combat training, in 1992 the functions of selling hardware and equipment have been entrusted to the Commercial Center created in the armed forces. This approach will give "commerce" a professional orientation, ensure the required effectiveness of transactions, and, on the whole, should have a favorable effect on combat readiness of Army and Navy forces.

Additional sources of financing military expenditures include funds received by military units from providing paid services to organizations and private parties. Last year, for example, the volume of such services amounted to more than 470 million rubles.

Our military educational institutions have broad opportunities for self-financing. Scientific research subunits are functioning successfully on cost-accounting principles in a number of military academies and schools. A portion of the revenue from the sale of their scientific and technical product is used to develop the material and technical base of these institutions.

In connection with the radical changes in the country's political and economic life today, an entire series of normative acts governing various aspects of activities in the armed forces are being revised. The drafts of these documents, in addition to other aspects of the legal status of servicemen, are also reflecting questions of participation by these individuals in commercial activities.

[S.O.] In all likelihood, prices will continue to rise. How will this factor be taken into account in order to keep the defenders of the homeland and veterans of the armed forces from living below the poverty level?

[Vorobyev] The problem of social protection of servicemen is indeed very relevant today. Liberalization of prices has made these questions more acute. Unlike workers in the production sphere, servicemen, being in state service, are deprived of the opportunity to improve their material situation through additional work. In these conditions, the normal functioning of the armed forces and accomplishment of the tasks facing them depend on the timely resolution of social problems in the Army and Navy.

The steps taken last year and this year, involving raising military pay and allowances, granting income tax privileges, increasing the norms of monetary compensation to those without an apartment for sub-leasing housing, and introducing food rations for officers, have helped somewhat to reduce social tension in the military collectives. However, it would be wrong to say that all the necessary conditions have already been created for the painless adaptation of servicemen, military pensioners, and their family members to market relations. So many problems have accumulated here, unfortunately, that for now we are unable to resolve them immediately while still in the most acute economic crisis which has embraced the states of our Commonwealth.

Concerning compensation measures with respect to servicemen in connection with the continuing increases in prices, we plan to implement them on general principles of indexing the incomes of the sovereign republics' population. Specifically, this year we plan to review on a regular basis (at least quarterly) the amount of pay, taking into account the consumer price index and the wage index of industrial workers. For military pensioners, beginning in 1992, pensions will be revised, taking into account changes in the material security of individuals on active duty.

[S.O.] How are the sovereign member-states of the CIS fulfilling their obligations for joint financing of the armed forces?

[Vorobyev] Unfortunately, this questions remains open. Up to now, the member-states of the Commonwealth have not made any commitments to finance the CIS Armed Forces. Only the Russian Federation has sought the opportunity and financed the armed forces for the first quarter of 1992 using funds from its own budget.

After encountering the problem of making up the military budget in the absence of a union budget as a centralized fund for financing state expenditures, the Main Command of the Armed Forces proposed making up a single defense budget on the principle of shared participation of all member-states of the Commonwealth in accordance with an integrated indicator of this participation based on population and produced national income. These proposals were sent to the parliaments of the CIS member-states.

Taking into account that today the Commonwealth states simply cannot manage without a unified defense budget, the Main Command of the Armed Forces has prepared a draft agreement between the states on making up a unified defense budget and the procedure for financing the armed forces. The basis of this agreement should be the principle of shared participation of the members of each independent state in financing defense. We hope that this draft agreement will be considered and adopted at the meeting of the heads of state of the Commonwealth in Minsk.

Call for Division of Armed Forces

*92UM0762A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Mar 92 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Colonel O. Belkov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor of General Staff Military Academy under rubric "Viewpoint": "New Armies for New States?"]

[Text] Today it is already obvious to everyone that the USSR's military heritage has ended up in the center of

deep contradictions which not only disturb the coordination of actions by independent states of the Commonwealth, but also make the possibility of preserving the Commonwealth questionable. This situation essentially is natural. With the breakup of the Union, the existence of its Armed Forces in the previous form appears to be nonsense. Moreover, the new independent states which arose in place of former Union republics see in the Armed Forces a certain threat to themselves. "The military," says Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk worriedly, for example, "thereby will concentrate a most terrible force and will lead you by the hand to where none of you want to go."

Hence in some cases the former Soviet Army is represented as an occupation force and its immediate withdrawal is demanded. In other cases obstacles are placed in the path of combat service and training and of all troop vital activities by decisions of state authorities. In still other cases military units are "nationalized" and transferred to the jurisdiction of new authorities by one-sided decisions without preliminary permission. One can approve or condemn a position according to which troops stationed on the territory of sovereign states must be subordinate to their presidents, but such are the realities.

The development of events led to where what was until quite recently a natural form of military organizational development began to be perceived as unnatural, which strictly speaking was reflected in documents of the Minsk meeting of heads of Commonwealth states on 14 February. And as the logic of events deprived us of the prospect of preserving unified Armed Forces and creating "full-fledged" Joint Armed Forces within the former USSR, it is necessary to get our bearings in the new situation. Evidently the time has come to support General of the Army K. Kobets, who declared: "Russia has its own state interests and will defend them by force or the possibility of its use." And it is also time to rid ourselves of many stereotypes and dogmas which were applied in our military organizational development up until recently.

It would appear that the idea of a unified strategic or unified defense space remains one such stereotype. This term already is vulnerable because at the present time state, legal, political and moral foundations and the motives for military activity are being eroded: defending a space is not at all the very same as defending a country, the Motherland. Just what is a "unified defense space" in general? The fact is, there is no definition of it anywhere. And both theory and practice suffer when a journalistically successful expression is substituted for a scientific category and becomes a tool of politics.

Leaving aside the question of strategic nuclear forces (which in my view requires separate consideration), it can be said that many elements of modern times do not fit within the concept of a unified defense space. Here are just a few facts. In one case military doctrine is worked out according to which an independent state

cannot be a member of any kind of political, military-political or military bloc. In another case the president declares in advance the impossibility of coming to an agreement on military questions with his colleagues in the Commonwealth of Independent States. In a third case, two members of the Commonwealth waging an undeclared war with each other count on the assistance of third countries and already are receiving it. In breaking ties with each other, republics of the former Union try to enter into regional groupings, thereby ending up in other "spaces" outside Commonwealth limits. Organizational development of national armies is planned to be carried out with the involvement of outside advisers, and specialists for them are to be trained abroad...

Even if these are individual facts which do not form a strict system, it seems to me they serve as a warning that a unified defense space is only a desired goal. Peoples of the Commonwealth, however, do not need an ideal form, but an optimum solution which would provide maximum possible cooperation of sovereign states. The path to this lies through compromises by all parties. They are the imperative of the time, since authors reflecting on the choice of the future of the Armed Forces also should not forget the possibility of the opposition of national armies and the formation of hostile military coalitions out of them, including with third countries. It is not a question of whether or not such a prospect is realistic, what is important is that it is theoretically possible. Consequently, the justification of any solutions and measures is determined above all by how they prevent movement to such a dangerous turn of events and not by the probability of preserving maximum similarity with the past in a new military organization.

Evidently one should also consider the practice of military organizational development springing up in the independent states from this viewpoint. The mass media and official documents customarily link its prospects with the accomplishment of military reform, delays in which are explained by almost all difficulties in the defense sphere. How substantiated is this?

It is often said now that we are experiencing a second Russian revolution. Let us assume so, but it is common knowledge that in 1917 the Army ceased to exist along with the state, although its cadre makeup, resources and many elements of the organization were used in creating the White Guard, the Red Army and troop units of other colorations. Only the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army emerged from the Revolution rather strong for those times, but no one takes it into his head to view its establishment as the result of a reform of prerevolutionary Russia's Armed Forces.

In 1991 the Soviet superstate ceased to exist. None of its heirs and successors has the unilateral right or is capable of reforming Armed Forces which have become "ownerless." At the same time, not one independent state can mechanically absorb the Soviet Army or a part thereof. Organizational development of new armies of new states

essentially is unfolding on the territory of the former Union. Demands for military reform, acutely necessary before December 1991, have lost any pertinence under these conditions. They have become empty, since the "reform train" already has departed and the problem is being transferred to a completely different plane. The task now is to seek those ways of transforming the USSR Armed Forces into independent armies of independent states which would not engender new conflicts, would not permit violating good-neighbor relationships and cooperation among them, and would not contradict international legal rules.

I would like to emphasize three points in this connection. First of all, establishment of unconstitutional force elements causes concern and alarm whether it be the home guard, fedayeen, carabinieri or guardsmen. There should be no military structures in any state which have arisen apart from, let alone despite, the will of the government. Led by different, including rival, political forces, they are capable of provoking internal national and interethnic armed conflicts. Meanwhile, as already stated, even states are not insured against mistakes and deformations in the military sphere. Inspired by a national idea, armies created by them can turn into a tool not only for protecting lawful national interests, but also for realizing egotistical national claims and nationalistic ambitions.

Secondly, any innovations on an organizational-practical plane should be preceded by political decisions backed up on a mandatory basis by contractual interstate measures and national legislation. The Minsk meeting has led only to barely perceptible progress in this direction for now.

Today, in my view, the task is to develop a principle of division of the Armed Forces by mutual agreement that is common to and mandatory for all countries of the Commonwealth. A rule according to which each state "takes" that which was on its territory because of geo-strategic factors which were in effect when the USSR and Warsaw Pact existed does not hold up to criticism. By the way, when right after hastily transferring forces to their jurisdiction, people announce their upcoming considerable reduction and the sell-off of combat equipment, an almost rhetorical question arises: is "nationalization" of armed forces a realization of the people's fundamental interests which matured long ago in the area of their military security or is it satisfaction of politicians' immediate ambitions? It is necessary to seek those forms and time periods for dividing up common military property which would permit parting without offense and opposition.

In addition, all transformations in the military sphere must be carried out on the basis of the priority of individual rights. World and domestic experience convinces us that troop combat readiness and the country's defensive capability depend directly on the personnel's interested attitude toward performing their duty and on the prestige of military service in society. No one has the right to ignore the pain and anxiety of servicemen over their situation or their resolve to defend their honor,

dignity and right to normal conditions of duty and life. This means special measures are needed so as not to turn them into a self-organizing force ready to enter into independent struggle to defend their interests. Lately this problem seems to be finding understanding among politicians, as attested by a number of documents signed in Minsk, as well as by one-sided measures concerning legal and social guarantees for servicemen.

Thirdly, the state's military doctrine determines the objective and program of military organizational development. Without it, all military policy inevitably acquires the nature of improvisation. In this connection it is difficult to justify postponements in drawing up and adopting military doctrines by each Commonwealth state. Their training on a professional level with the involvement of competent military specialists would permit unfolding the work with a view toward the long term. The presence of officially accepted national military doctrines would enable taking the next step—comparing them and coordinating them among all interested Commonwealth states and developing forms of their military coordination answering the present moment.

Domestic history knows five levels or forms of military cooperation: military-political agreement of goals and positions of allies, strategic coordination of independent armies, operational subordination of national troops to a unified command element, tactical-level liaison and coordination of military force elements, and organizational unity of multinational armed forces with separate or joint performance of duty by soldiers of different nationalities.

Which of these forms or combination of them will be given preference is a special question. One thing is clear: if different forms of state ties of peoples are permissible, then their military cooperation also should not necessarily be arranged according to a single scheme. But any of its variations presume generally accepted principles and standards voluntarily accepted by and mandatory for all Commonwealth members. Without this, compatibility of actions in the security sphere will turn into empty declarations.

Russia's Defense Committee Considers Civilian Minister, Republican Army

*92UM0802A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Mar 92 First Edition p 1*

[Article by ITAR-TASS correspondent R. Zadunayskiy: "Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Examines Document Package"]

[Text] "We now have a unique opportunity, a unique chance to put the military department and the Army under civilian and parliamentary control. Such a chance must not be missed." Colonel General Dmitriy Volkogonov, the Russian president's state adviser on

defense issues, declared this at a meeting of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security.

The meeting, which was led by committee chairman Sergey Stepashin, was attended by representatives of Russia's State Committee for Defense Issues, the Main Legal Administration, parliament, and experts. Draft documents written by the Russian Federation State Committee for Defense Issues and the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security concerning the establishment of a civilian Ministry of Defense, a Republican Army, and a Russian military policy in Russia were examined and approved. A decision was made to draft a Russian parliament decree on the establishment of a civilian defense ministry. These documents will be submitted to the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Soviet and the 26 March session of parliament for examination and approval.

In an interview with this ITAR-TASS correspondent, Colonel Vitaliy Kovalevskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences and department chief of the Russian Federation State Committee for Defense Issues, said that during the committee meeting the opinion was stated that together with deciding to establish Russian Armed Forces it is necessary to announce that all military formations and military facilities of the Armed Forces of the former Union are to be placed under Russian jurisdiction, with the exception of those stationed in Ukraine. Some participants of the meeting, by the way, cautioned against such a step. He also noted that a package of documents prepared by the Main Command of CIS Combined Armed Forces for the forthcoming CIS summit talks was discussed.

Russian Government Resolution on Servicemen's Compensation

92UM0797A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Mar 92 First Edition p 1

[Russian Federation Government Resolution No. 155, signed by B. Yeltsin, March 4, 1992, Moscow: "After Minsk, Officers Are Displaying Patience and Want to be Heard in Kiev: Russian Federation Government Resolution No. 155, dated March 4, 1992, Moscow, 'On Armed Forces Servicemen's Salaries'"]

[Text] In execution of Russian Federation Presidential Decree No. 154, dated February 19, 1992, "On Measures to Increase Social Protection of Servicemen and Individuals Who Have Been Released From Military Service", the Russian Federation Government resolves:

1. To approve:

- the amounts of salaries of Armed Forces officers for basic typical positions (salary amounts are designated in appendices to the resolution), and
- the amounts of salaries for Armed Forces army and naval warrant officers and extended service personnel for basic

typical positions (salary amounts are designated in appendices to the resolution).

2. To task the Allied Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief to determine the amounts of salaries for specific servicemen's positions while proceeding based on the salaries approved by this resolution for primary typical positions.

3. To pay salaries to Armed Forces servicemen (other than compulsory service personnel) according to military rank with regard to the amounts of salaries for special ranks stipulated for appropriate categories of individuals of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs leadership personnel.

To pay extended service personnel additional types of monetary compensation and allowances in amounts employed in calculations for warrant officers.

4. To pay army and naval warrant officers and extended service personnel a percentage increase for years served in amounts prescribed for officer personnel.

To calculate a percentage increase for years served in the salary of warrant officers and extended service personnel from which their pensions are calculated and salaries and to calculate a percentage increase for years served in salaries for extended service personnel according to military rank.

To grant the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Allied Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief the right to determine the procedures for calculating years served for payment of a percentage increase, with regard to the procedures prescribed for officer personnel, for warrant officers and extended service personnel.

5. To calculate service time for servicemen, rank and file and command personnel of internal affairs organs in the appropriate ministries and departments during the transition to the Armed Forces (including those transferred prior to adoption of this resolution) in years served for payment of a percentage increase.

6. To repeal the restrictions for maximum amounts of monetary awards for special service conditions for personnel who perform alert duty and sea pay to servicemen of ships (boats, small surface vessels) assigned to a campaign.

7. To prescribe payment to servicemen of monetary compensation for skill qualification in the amount of up to 10 percent of approved salary, depending on the categories of servicemen and the skill level and skill category they attain.

8. To double existing amounts of additional types of monetary compensation of an incentive nature prescribed for servicemen in rubles, including lump sum monetary awards, for parachute jumps, for scuba diving, for performing alert duty, and also additions for special conditions of service.

9. To extend the force of this resolution to officers, warrant officers and extended service personnel of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, the Federal Government Communications and Information Agency under the Russian Federation President, the Committee for Defense of the State Border, railroad troops, the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs internal troops, the Russian Federation Main Administration of Special Construction, and also those personnel performing military service in other Russian Federation ministries, departments, organizations, and institutions.

10. To put this resolution into force as of February 1, 1992.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Possible Redeployment Prompts Uzin Actions

92UM0771A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
22 Feb 92 p 13

[Article by Nikolay Zaika, Ukrinform correspondent:
"The Uzin 'Revolt'"]

[Text] On 13 February Ukraine's airmen experienced yet another extraordinary occurrence. Personnel of a heavy bomber division based in the city of Uzin in Kiev Oblast, which was a part of the strategic forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], refused to subordinate itself to the center and began in stages to take the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine.

In the meantime the staffs of the air army at Smolensk and the long-range aviation in Moscow could see the intransigence of Gen M. Bashkirov, division commander, and began developing a plan for redeploying the entire division. Among other things it was planned to disband the formation's command structure and attach its regiments to other air units. There was a small appendage to these plans: "Bear in mind," one telegram from the commander in chief of the VVS [Air Forces] stated, "we cannot guarantee to provide for the needs of the servicemen and their families." To put it more concisely and clearly, the center was concerned primarily about the equipment and not at all about the people.

There are 5,000 people, no more and no less, at the Uzin Garrison, and they need a roof over their heads. They need work, a school, children's facilities and so forth. Col Gen Avn Petr Deynekin, commander in chief of the Air Forces, could not guarantee these things.

As we know, however, the soldier is at ease when his rear area is secured. In this case something else was happening. And the garrison began to "rumble." All the more, since the center was stepping up the pressure. The division command element learned of the redeployment on 13 February from unofficial but perfectly reliable sources. It was not difficult for the professionals to guess

what this meant: take the aircraft up and... redeploy. In anticipation of this outcome, two armored recovery vehicles and a vehicle with a long-range radio were hastily summoned from a motorized rifle division deployed nearby. On the morning of the 13th the equipment was deployed alongside the runway in a state of readiness to block it off.

The division commander returned from a temporary duty assignment that same day. As it approached the Kharkov zone the aircraft on which General Bashkirov was a passenger lost an engine. In the emergency Maj Vladimir Boyko, aircraft commander, requested permission from the air army's command post to land at the nearest airfield, that is, at Uzin, and not continue on to Smolensk along the original flight route. The reply was an order from Lt Gen Avn Boris Konstantinov, army commander, not to alter the route. By some means or another, however, (Bashkirov knew what was happening in the division and what awaited him at Smolensk) Boyko succeeded in getting authorization through the Kiev Zone Flight Control Center to land at Uzin. Orders went out from the command post to detain the aircraft when it landed.

When Gen Bashkirov landed at his own base, the garrison resembled a disturbed beehive. People were spontaneously heading for the officers' club. An "unsanctioned" officers' meeting had been held there that evening, at which the participants approved a decision to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine and place themselves under its jurisdiction in order to avoid further arbitrary acts on the part of the command element of the air army and the long-range aviation. That very evening the new oath was taken by the division command element, led by its commander, and by personnel of the refueling regiment.

The army commander and two of his deputies rushed to the "rebel" division the following day. During a 3-hour officers' meeting the generals attempted to pacify the "rebels." They did not succeed, however, and the administration of the oath resumed immediately following the meeting. Regarding the division commander as the main culprit in what had occurred, Col Gen Avn Igor Kalugin, long-range air commander, made the decision to relieve Bashkirov of his post and discharge him into the reserve for reasons of service incompatibility. Nor did the commander of the air army lag behind his superior. With one stroke he discharged 14 warrant officers from the division's command element for the same reasons.

Bashkirov was unemployed for only 7 hours and 4 minutes, to be sure. At the instruction of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk the order discharging him was rescinded. The warrant officers, however, had to wait more than 24 hours, until the air army's chief of staff rectified the army commander's order, for a happy ending to their situation.

At exactly 11:00 on 13 February the regiment came to attention in rigid alignment. Also present were the

families of the officers and representatives from other military collectives. Somewhat off to the side stood a modest group of those who had decided not to take the oath. Yes, there were those who did not take the oath. And they had important reasons. Some of them had their roots in Russia; others had apartments there; yet others hoped to advance more rapidly in the service somewhere else.

The units fighting colors were paraded out, and the formal ceremony began.

From recent reports: Personnel in a regiment of another long-range air division deployed in Ukraine have also taken the oath of loyalty to its people.

Journalists Tour Nuclear Weapon Storage Site

924P0103A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
18 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Major V. Knysh, correspondent: "Strangers Don't Enter Here: A Trip to a Nuclear Weapon Storage Site"]

[Text] An exception is made for foreign journalists. Our correspondent was among them.

We were coming to the conclusion of the sixth hour of the journey when at the end of an enormous snow-covered field, bisected by a narrow asphalt road, there appeared a gate of the customary color. Army standard. Only all similarity ended with this. Two officers and a warrant officer entered the bus. All were armed. A major wearing the arm band of a unit duty officer demanded a passport. Mamada-san fumbled in the pocket of his down jacket, pulling out into the light of day the red leather passport of a citizen of the Country of the Rising Sun, with hieroglyphs and a seal embossed on the cover. Beyond the ugly rust-spotted gate we were "awaited" by a tactical nuclear weapon storage site. Or simply, an "IKS" base.

And now a slight digression. A filming group from the Japanese commercial television company Nihon Denpa Nyus [transliteration] numbering four persons (one of them the combined producer and director, Hiroshi Mamada) and their entourage (with a NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent among them) received the OK from all of the appropriate authorities to visit and film the IKS base. You must agree that this is a rare bit of luck for a rank-and-file representative of this country's mass media.

The work of checking the documents and comparing names of passports with a list compiled earlier came to an end. Anxiety in the eyes of my foreign colleagues (will they let us in, or won't they?) was supplanted by the greatest impatience and curiosity. All literally had their noses pressed against the windows. Would everything they had fantasized during the long journey be really true?

Exactly so and in no way, using army jargon. Following the strict inspection the "familiar" gate opened and the duty sergeant gave a lazy salute. We were met in the commander's office by a stern lieutenant colonel. Among those whose work is as dangerous as it is difficult, this very important person was the type specimen.

But all jokes aside, this person (who turned out, by the way, to be a very communicative and pleasant speaker) confirmed his importance by his actions. Over the course of an hour he held our fate literally "by a thread," as he deliberated (by telephone) with one of his own whether or not we were to be admitted into the heart of the IKS base—the nuclear ammunition storage site.

On the television screen we see the reception given to our seamen (the crew of a sailing vessel), who had sailed to the Japanese islands along a route "blazed" by their ancestors in distant revolutionary times aboard the frigate "Pallada". An impressive spectacle: music, dancing, flocks of Japanese girls mingling graciously with our clearly receptive lads.

A commotion in the commander's office. The cameraman—the most unperturbable of the Japanese visitors—suddenly began talking fast and gesturing toward the screen. He had recognized, it seems, his native island of Hokkaido. He was trying to communicate this in English. By the way, if you want to communicate something to the Japanese, all you need is English.

Time flew by swiftly. Nerves were strained. The Japanese were saying something about symbolism. Look at how we greet yours, but when it's your turn to greet us, look what happens! Shouldn't you reciprocate in kind?

They were right. Thawed, the lieutenant colonel finally gave his OK, long-awaited and approved several times over. Then we were literally swept out of the commander's office. Colonel Valeriy Kruglov, commander of the IKS base (it's no secret that the Japanese filmed and interviewed him—Author's note) was taken somewhat aback by such a reception. Oh well, you can understand our ways.

The first security zone. A gate, a checkpoint manned by a duty officer, and our group diminished by two (Japanese). From here on, they had to work at reduced strength. We went through this "no-man's land," in which the unit's soldiers are still permitted, and disappeared into the "winter" garden. To the right of the fence, a field. To the left, a confidence course. In front, barbed wire stretched over posts along the entire perimeter of the security zone. The square fenced by the barbed wire was impressive. This was the route of travel taken by sentries from the security subunit. But not yet the base itself. Though already in an area where, as the song goes, "birds don't sing and trees don't grow."

Finally one more iron gate tended by a sentry, a permanent gun position and the "bureau of passes," where

special passes are issued to local officers working at the base (and only to them). We enter timidly, though of course under official escort.

A tree-covered "hill" occupies the center of the grounds. It looks like an ordinary grove. But this "hill" is man-made. It is in fact the visible part of the site at which menacing and terrifying weapons of deterrence—tactical nuclear warheads—are stored. If you were to look at it from above, naturally you won't see anything. This is despite the fact that the camouflage and concealment are simple and unimpressive (as would be true with the real thing). As is the security, by the way: a barbed wire fence of not unusual height, and latches and store-bought locks on the gate. But let's not pick on "details." The security here is conscientious and vigilant. Such that strangers don't enter here.

"You're absolutely right. Moreover, many of ours don't go in either," Senior Lieutenant Dmitriy Nesterov satisfied my curiosity. "Only officers from the maintenance group. Others won't dare. Even out of curiosity. Which, by the way, no one lacks here."

A huge underground "bomb shelter." The first door (from the back), weighing around 9 tons, is opened by two persons with difficulty. I tried putting my shoulder to it—it didn't even budge. The next door is of exactly the same kind. Next a narrow winding maze of a corridor with doors in its walls. We walked along it in single file. And finally we wound up in the storage facility's enormous hall, almost as tall as a three-story house. An underground one. It is here that the nuclear warheads of tactical missiles are stored in side compartments (rooms with steel doors). The Japanese were given exactly 5 minutes to take their pictures.

And now about the most important thing. The storage facility was devoid of its contents. The nuclear goodies had been removed. In accordance with the spirit and letter of intergovernment agreements reached in Minsk and the status adopted by the Ukraine as a zone free of nuclear weapons. Such that our land is now one IKS base less (something that can be said with certainty). Now "toothless," on the whole the base is not at all terrifying. Such that "all cities can sleep soundly...."

The road back seemed shorter to us. And of course, more pleasant. Jokes and laughter could be heard. Tension had subsided. The representatives of a people that had experienced the nightmare of preventive nuclear strikes, which transformed Hiroshima and Nagasaki into ashes, grew more relaxed. Though they didn't conceal the fact that they were very much afraid of what would happen if these weapons ended up without a caretaker and uncontrollable. There were rumors, they said, that someone had already tried to "privatize" such ammunition somewhere in Siberia. But now they can see for themselves that they were nothing but stories told to children. If of course things are organized everywhere else as they are at this IKS base.

The commander is modest: "We are not the exception but the rule." Quite right. Only in our country people are always thought of last. Or to put it more accurately, they're not taken into account at all. Here is what Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Purygin, one of the veterans of not only the base but of the special forces in general, had to say:

"I've been with these forces since I was a lieutenant. When it comes to protective overalls, they're a joke. And what's more, it wasn't until 1987 that we received order to follow order No 284, issued in 1983 (also not a secret.—Author's note), stating that we were to keep track of the permissible exposure dose, and so on."

"Show him, Dmitriy," he turned to Senior Lieutenant Nesterov, "what we're talking about."

The latter agreeably pulled a manifold sheet out of his ID wallet. One of the types of personal radiation dose accounting forms. Blank, of course. No one has had the time to do anything with them yet. And why fill them out? Judge for yourself: The compensation is laughable—20 percent of your salary, but not more than 38 rubles. Plus up to 9 days extra leave (at the discretion of the unit commander, of course). That's all you get for exposure to the hazard. Is it worth it, then, to go through all of the paperwork to calculate the dose, and so on? Here they don't think it is. Now and in days gone by, the subject of exposure does not exist.

But the IKS base exists. And the security system is as irreproachable as ever. For much longer? The commander did not offer an affirmative reply. You can understand why. Guarding an empty place slowly dampens your ardor. Moreover qualified officer specialists are slipping away. And they require an exceptionally high security clearance. Also, every 5 years they have to confirm their class rating. Meaning that the future is foggy and unknown. No one is making any plans (even short-term). They have to be realistic about it all.

Are they really not joyful and relieved that this most dangerous phase of their service has come to an end? It varies. But several officers admitted that they feel no special delight in the departure of the "articles." Caring for their "child" was to them the purpose of their lives. A beloved purpose, I might add.

Can we really condemn them for their frankness? Each person has the right to his own point of view on the processes occurring today. Even if it is at odds with the majority opinion. It is each person's right to "try on" the present day and see how it fits. For some it fits well, while for others....

But this is still not the place for shop talk. Even at the holiday table. Even after a few snorts. The wives don't have to nag their husbands to leave it in the office. There is no reason to. The wives of officers of the IKS base are not permitted to know the nature of the kind of work their husbands do. Even now. But they do anyway. As we know, you can't deceive a woman's heart.

Such is the way they serve.

Odessa MD Missile Brigade Ponders It's Future

92UM0788B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
4 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* correspondent:
"Uncertainty: Problems of a Missile Brigade"]

[Text] It has been officially reported that all tactical nuclear weapons will be removed from Ukraine by July of this year. This article is about the situation of one of the missile brigades in the Odessa Military District.

Perhaps the term uncertainly most accurately describes the entire atmosphere in the military collective. What is to be removed: nuclear warheads, delivery systems, launchers, personnel or everything together? These questions have not yet been answered. And no matter where the conversation turns, one way or another it always comes down to this, even though outwardly life goes on. Scheduled classes are held as usual. There is a certain degree of conditionality even here, however. There is not enough fuel, and this clearly makes it difficult to do all the practical activities. Theory is studied in the classrooms and some things are practiced at the pool. None of this is reinforced with the main thing, however—practical experience. The training of junior specialists is slowed by this, and the commanders are losing their skills. Officer Aleksandr Bondarevskiy, for example, has taken prizes in competitions in the Ground Forces and has received awards at the highest level more than once. Even now he looks for every opportunity to polish up his skills and train his subordinates. But does one achieve much using horse-and-buggy methods, as the missilemen say? Particularly since the new recruits are untrained.

There are no subunits for training specialists for these forces in Ukraine. Last fall recruits were not sent out of the republic for training. This means that there will be no replacements for those being released in the spring. And not just them. For the second and third periods now they have been requesting to be stationed there from where they were drafted, in other states of the Commonwealth. Most of them have not taken the oath of loyalty to the Ukraine's people.

Ukrainians are also returning from other areas, of course. Until the system has been precisely arranged, however, it is mostly deserters who will be joining us. And this group, as officer Konstantin Derevyakin, chief of staff, commented, is extremely unreliable. Most of the 12 soldiers who recently joined us from the assembly center are potential violators of military discipline who have spent time in the guardhouse more than once for consuming alcohol. Now, once again, they state that they do not want to serve. Some of them have deserted again.

The officers are all graduates of military schools located in Russia. Their friends and families are there. All of them want to serve out their terms conscientiously and then return home, of course. Once again there are

questions, however. Will they be able to exchange apartments? Are there guarantees that they can obtain apartments in the community chosen as their permanent place of residence in another state of the Commonwealth?

And all of this uncertainty in the situation is superimposed upon the usual problems of all servicemen: housing, personal services, supplies.... They are building housing on the post, for example, when many apartments are occupied by retirees, people no longer connected with the military. Their eviction is proceeding extremely slowly. We have calculated that if this housing were built at the nearby rayon center, many things could be resolved. The housing vacated would be enough for all the officers, and pensioners would not be wandering around the post with nothing to do. They could find jobs in the city.

The garrison command element would not have to wrack their brains about how to resolve the problem of providing water for the increased housing pool and services for the garrison's ever-increasing population.

The people have hope, however, that the gloomy winter days will be followed by spring, and on 20 March some things will at last be cleared up in Kiev.

Divided Allegiance in Missile Division

92UM0789B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
6 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Major Aleksey Trubitsyn: "Signing Agreements Under Duress? Servicemen Pledge Allegiance to the Ukraine in the Strategic Missile Forces"]

[Text] **CHRONICLE OF EVENTS:** On the morning of 10 February reserve servicemen took the oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine in Lutsk's Theater Square. It was discovered later that there were regular officers and warrant officers from Major General Nikolay Vladimirovich Yudin's missile division among them. Next day the commander passed on an order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Troops dismissing the "culprits" from the CIS Armed Forces.

Local newspapers eagerly offered space to the "rebels," and in the evening of 11 February Captain A. Frantsev, who was one of those who took the oath and who organized this act, presented a statement from the Volyn Oblast Officers Union on oblast television.

The content of the statement was basically that laws adopted by the Ukrainian parliament regarding the state's independence, development of its own armed forces, the nature of service, and so on (they were listed) are the basis on which all servicemen of units located in the republic desiring to do so can take the oath. "Are these decisions and documents not enough to allow subunits to take the oath?" the petitioners asked General Yudin, readers, and television viewers.

On 12 February the newspaper NARODNAYA TRIBUNA published the article "Blazhenchuk Swears, Yudin Objects" attempting to create the impression that the division commander was pitting himself against the chairman of the oblast soviet, who was one of the first to take the oath (he is a reserve lieutenant colonel).

Does this mean that everyone is marching in step with the music, as they say, except for one general who is out of step? And why is it necessary to ask a commander's permission to take an oath before one's own people?

Alas, it is not all as simple as may appear at first glance. Until recently the division that has been under the command of Major General Yudin for the last five years was armed with nuclear weapons—RSD-10 (SS-20 according to the NATO classification) missiles, the last of which was destroyed in April 1991 in compliance with the well known treaty between the USSR and the U.S. on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. From that moment on, the military collective in a sense found itself in suspended animation.

"At first we were promised new equipment," said Colonel V. Gavrilchenko, the division's chief engineer, "and they even sent us several dozen specialists for it, but after that they all seemed to forget about us."

Let me note that prior to disarmament the division was the best in the Strategic Missile Forces, evidence of which can be found in its honorary "Sevastopol" title, its orders of Lenin and Kutuzov, second degree, its high indicators in combat training and discipline, and the well organized life of its servicemen. It would be sufficient to say that the number of officers and warrant officers without housing is two to three times lower than in other divisions of the same profile, and even that number was larger than usual because of the arrival of officers ahead of the promised equipment.

As of 1 January 1991 the units had 16 percent outstanding and 78 percent good combat subunits. A little less than 80 percent of the officers were high-class specialists.

I am citing these data in order for the reader to understand the emotional state of the people, who had been considered elite but who were lowered from high summits of glory, and of being needed, into an atmosphere of a completely opposite kind.

When they asked how they were to make a living in the future, military authorities in Moscow basically answered this: Wait for instructions, we will not forget you.

However, swift development of the political situation in the Ukraine and the well known decisions to create the armed forces and establish a nuclear-free state made their impression on the minds of the servicemen. It became more and more obvious to them that the division would hardly receive any new weapons. They placed great hopes on a meeting with Leonid Makarovich

Kravchuk in November during his campaign for the Ukrainian presidency. But he did not provide any comprehensive solutions either, promising in parting only to remember the voting missile men.

In the meantime passions gradually grew hotter in the collective. The orders and instructions regarding the swearing of allegiance also made their imprint upon the confusion reigning over subordination. Moscow demanded allegiance to Russia, and then the CIS, while Kiev demanded allegiance to the Ukraine.

"In the end it seemed that the 'bosses' finally reached a decision," noted Colonel V. Ufimtsev, division deputy commander and personnel department chief, "that only young soldiers would take the CIS oath."

But in the meantime other collectives serving with this unit in Lutsk Garrison began taking oaths of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine in great numbers. The overwhelming majority of the servicemen supported the idea that the state should establish its own armed forces. As did, by the way, the people of the city.

And the people were not completely certain why a unit stationed within the city limits was reluctant to swear allegiance to the Ukraine. What was the matter?

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS: On 4 February the oblast newspaper VOLYN carried an interview with Major General N. Yudin, in which the division commander gave the following answer regarding the oath: "If the corresponding decision were to be made, most of the division's personnel would take it."

Today the general's enemies are accusing him of supposedly breaking his promise, made in a newspaper, that he would not take action against subordinates who decide to swear allegiance to their people.

Only the incompetent can accuse the commander of dismissing those officers and warrant officers. As we know, such matters are the prerogative of the army commander, the commander in chief of the forces.

Even so, Yudin never made such a promise, either orally or in writing. He said that swearing or not swearing allegiance is the concern of each officer, and that this was not an area in which prohibitions could be imposed.

From an interview with Captain A. Frantsev:

"I wrote a formal request to be able to swear allegiance to my people, and I submitted it through channels to Colonel Diksan. He drafted a petition, and on returning from the division commander he said that this would be my own personal business, but if I did, I would have to leave the CIS forces."

In other words Frantsev and the others knew what they were getting into. But either they did not believe the seriousness of the warnings, or they counted on protection from the Ukrainian Officers Union, of which they are members, or they were pursuing far-reaching goals.

As far as the Volyn and Lutsk chapters of the Officers Union are concerned, their leaders, Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) A. Zakharchuk and Major (Reserve) N. Kinash visited division headquarters on the eve of the rebellion.

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS: On 5 February lieutenant colonels (reserve) A. Vityuk and V. Skrynits met with the division commander for an hour and a half. Major General Yudin and Colonel Ufimtsev attempted to persuade the visitors that the path they had selected, and onto which they were prodding the officers, was wrong, and they showed them documents signed by the heads of the CIS countries, including President L. Kravchuk, spelling out who would take what oath, and how.

But this was not the reason why the delegates from the local Officers Union organization came here. Viktor Petrovich Skrynits expressed the goal of their campaign as follows: "We told him (the division commander—A.T.) that there are people wishing to take the oath, and that they will take it no matter what pressures they might face."

I am not about to get into a discussion of the authority for making such statements borne by representatives of—let me emphasize—a public organization here. This is a topic of separate discussion. Something else is interesting here: how the former officers and union activists feel about the act of taking the oath.

"To me it's like being accepted to membership in the Cossacks," Zakharchuk admitted. "Remember, like in the movie. Do you believe in God? Cross yourself, and you're one of us."

Why, then, was the commander's permission needed? Perhaps as a means of once again trying to compromise General Yudin, a deputy to the oblast soviet and chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, Legality, and Order?

The appeal of the local Officers Union mentioned above ends with a direct statement: "To whom do we turn in order to protect ourselves from tyranny when the chairman of the oblast soviet's human rights commission, General Yudin, engages in unlawful actions?"

But in what way is the division commander to blame?

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

366th to Be Deactivated

92UM0758C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 7 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by V. Filin: "The 366th Regiment Will Be Disbanded"]

[Text] There are now no servicemen from the 366th Regiment in Stepanakert itself, as was reported to us at a directorate of the Transbaykal Military District, and one may be assured of this, insofar as the fighting groups there have succeeded in burning down one of the barracks at the

former location of the regiment. There are no more than 100 men from the unit with their combat vehicles remaining, of which the most substantial are ten tanks—four of which, it is true, are not in working order. They are located in the suburbs of Stepanakert. The remaining servicemen with some of the combat vehicles, including some wounded, have been withdrawn by air to neutral territory.

The commanding general of the district, Colonel-General Patrikeyev, said in reply to a request to comment on the situation that the military have proved yet again to be the hostages of poorly thought-out actions by the politicians, and that everything depends on whether they—the politicians—will ultimately be able to come to agreement. As for the regiment itself, all of the remnants of it will be redeployed from Karabakh to neutral territory in the next day or two, and the regiment as a military entity will be disbanded. Steps will moreover be taken to seek out deserters, as well as stolen military vehicles and weapons.

Airborne Unit Offers to Guard USSR Congress

92UM0752A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Mar 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel P. Chernenko from Minsk under rubric "Direct Line: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents Transmitted Yesterday": "Will Airborne Personnel Guard the USSR Council of People's Deputies?"]

[Text] It was declared at a meeting of deputies of the oblast Soviet in Vitebsk that the Vitebsk Airborne Division officers are ready to guard the USSR Council of People's Deputies if it should be held in their city. The idea of holding such a meeting belonged to a group of 12 deputies of the former Union and Belarus. The opinion expressed was as follows: if Moscow puts obstacles in the way of holding the USSR Council of People's Deputies, we are ready to hold it in Vitebsk. Allegedly airborne officers promised to assume responsibility for the forum's security.

Are they in fact ready for this? I addressed this question to Division Commander Colonel Grigoriy Kalabukhov.

"This is another canard," said the division commander. "Division officers learned from the newspapers of their agreement to guard the Congress should it be held. This is nothing more than an attempt to draw the Army into political games and worsen servicemen's relationships with the people of Belarus."

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Comments on Development of Yak-141

92UM0766A Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 9, Sep 91 pp c2-1

[Interview with OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni A.S. Yakovlev Deputy Chief Designer Konstantin Popovich by KRYLYA RODINY correspondent Valeriy Ageyev: "A Sensation at Le Bourget"]

[Text] *The Soviet exhibition with the Il-96-300, Il-114, Tu-204, Yak42E and AN-74 passenger aircraft, the Su-26M and Yak-55 sport aircraft and the MiG-31 military aircraft, along with the amphibious A-40, was exceedingly popular at the 39th International Air and Space Show at Le Bourget. A model of the vertical takeoff and landing [VTOL] Yak-141 from the OKB imeni A.S. Yakovlev, which had only just lost its "Top Secret" stamp, however, was a true sensation.*

Why was this model so interesting to Western businessmen, pilots and aviation specialists? That was the first question from our correspondent Valeriy Ageyev to a participant in the exhibition, OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni A.S. Yakovlev Deputy Chief Designer Konstantin Popovich.

[K. Popovich] We were unfortunately able to bring only a model, a video of the testing and flight of the new fighter and some advertising prospectuses to the show... The interest in it is understandable, however. The Yak-141 is a vertical takeoff and landing aircraft intended for the interception of airborne targets, the waging of close-range fighting and for carrying out strikes against ground and surface naval targets. It can be operated from takeoff and landing sites with restricted dimensions, as well as from ships. It can take off either vertically or with a short takeoff run. The landing is also vertical or with a short runout. The automatic flight control system supports manual, director or automatic control from takeoff to landing at any time of day and under various weather conditions at any geographical latitude. The weapons-control system includes a multimode radar with a unified indicator system, and supports the performance of missions using various types of weaponry. The armaments are a 30mm cannon, guided missiles and non-guided ordnance located on wing racks.

The ejection system provides for the automatic rescue of the pilot in vertical or transitional flight modes.

The power plant is a combined one, consisting of an R-79 lift and cruising engine (general designer V. Kobchenko) and two RD lift engines (general designer A. Novikov).

[V. Ageyev] And for how long was all this kept secret?

[K. Popovich] The building of the first flight model of the Yak-141 was completed in 1986. The first flights took place a year later. The fighter, notwithstanding the difficulties in refining the power plant, has turned out to be very successful. Twelve world records for acceleration and achievement of maximum altitude with a load of one and two tons with vertical takeoff and landing have been set in it. These records were recorded by the commissars of the FAI international organization and were transmitted for approval. The Yak-141 outstripped the analogous Harrier aircraft by almost ten seconds in the time to gain an altitude of 12 kilometers! This record achievement was moreover established during the warm season and with a load of one ton, while the Harrier took off without a load and during the winter, when the air density is the greatest—that is, under the most favorable conditions for the operation of the power plant.

[V. Ageyev] This craft was conceived as a "continuation" of the Yak-38?

[K. Popovich] The Yak-141 was conceived at the start of design engineering as a multirole ship-based aircraft. It then became clear during the process of flight testing, however, that it could be operated without major refinements from concrete and asphalt strips, that it could be used for close support for ground forces. The length of takeoff with a short run with maximum load was just 120 meters! The length of the landing runout did not exceed 250 meters, and the speed of landing approach was 80-90 km/hr. This fighter would be considerably more effective than any analogous one due to its high sortie rate as a consequence of the possibility of basing it at restricted sites close to the front lines.

The characteristics of the new Yak-141, as you see, speak for themselves. You can moreover evaluate them by looking at the table of basic data on the fighter. We displayed it at Le Bourget. Yes, there is no such fighter anywhere in the world yet. It is not for nothing that there was applause at the 39th Air Show after the showing of the video on the Yak-141 and the presentation of the general designer of our OKB, Aleksandr Dondukov. The preparation for series production of the Yak-141, however, has halted despite the international recognition and the unique flight data. The funds for its manufacture are not provided for. All of the work is being done at the expense of profits from the sale of other aircraft of the OKB. Skilled experts have said more than once that such a fighter is needed anyway, but the question of financing has not been resolved anyway even though we have potential buyers abroad—India, Italy, Argentina. They have their own aircraft carriers there, but not their own vertical takeoff and landing planes.

Such things have happened before in our country, where we lagged far behind in the realm of aviation due to the incompetence of our leaders. We must not repeat the mistakes of the past! The smart person learns from others' mistakes, after all, and the fool from his own.¹

Basic Data on the Yak-141

Maximum takeoff mass in takeoff with short run, kg	19,500
Mass of load on external racks, kg	2,600
Maximum flight speed, km/hr	1,800
Service ceiling, meters	more than 15,000
Flight range, km:	
—with vertical takeoff	1,400
—with short takeoff	2,100
Aircraft length, meters	18.3
Wingspan, meters:	
—deployed	10.1
—folded	5.9
Aircraft height, meters	5.0

Footnote

1. It would be a mistake to reject this direction for aviation in our country, it being our national esteem.

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Article Celebrates Long-Range Aviation

92UM0803A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Mar 92 First edition p 1

[Article by Col A. Andryushkov, cosmonaut-researcher and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "On a Long-Range Flight: The Daily Routine of Strategic Aviation"]

[Text] Long-range strategic aviation occupies a special place among all the branches of aviation. Fate itself gave it this privilege. The very first decrees on creation of the Red Army demanded attention to heavy aviation. And it developed, winning prestige.

And not simply that—from the percale and wood aircraft to the supersonic Tu-160's. The courage of the front-line generation of long-range aviators will not be forgotten. There are not enough words to tell how many times long-range aviation has been renamed and reorganized.

Surpassing time, long-range aviation aircraft were coming into being in the design bureaus of Tupolev, Petlyakov, Ilyushin, and Myasishchev. Their aircraft waited at the airfields. Those people who were at the helm of long-range aviation hastened to place each new aircraft in service: Lieutenant-General of Aviation I. Proskurov, Chief Marshal of Aviation A. Golovanov, Colonel-General of Aviation V. Reshetnikov, and Colonel-General of Aviation P. Deynekin. Some types of aircraft were in service for decades, and not because there was nothing with which to upgrade them. This fact attests to the high degree of reliability of the equipment.

"Of course, we have enough problems," says Major-General of Aviation Puzanov, commander of a strategic aviation large unit. "For example, I am convinced that aircraft get old on the ground, not in the air..."

Aleksandr Ivanovich has 3,740 flying hours in strategic aircraft. Together with the Tu-16 and Tu-95 aircraft, he has served his enter life in areas with climate conditions of heightened severity. Life beyond the Urals and visits by high-level commissions hardened him and taught him not to wait for help from elsewhere, but to cope with all the difficulties with his own forces.

"With our people," Puzanov say of the large unit's aviators, "we can carry out any mission. Casual people do not linger in strategic aviation." He removes his hat, but keeps his overcoat on. It is just as cold in the general's office as it is in the classroom building, where crews prepare for flights, as it is in his own apartment, where in the winter his family lives in a temperature of 12 degrees. It is apparent from these mundane, earthly inconveniences, the division commander is ill at ease with strangers. But I know such is the fate of many

aviation commanders. In the air they are aces, masters of the situation; on the ground they are prisoners of instructions, dependent upon headquarters and institutions far removed from the life of aviation, including strategic aviation.

But it lives! It lives because it is needed. But some people do not understand this; it is a pity...

PVO Unit Begins Pullout from Vilnius

92UM0712B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 92 p 5

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak: "The Slav Woman's Farewell' Sounds..."]

[Text] On this March day a cold, penetrating wind blew, engines of the powerful KrAZ trucks gave out a strained roar, and wives and children of those leaving the unit disposition on the edge of Vilnius furtively wept. A surface-to-air missile battalion of an air defense unit which had performed missions of guarding the Republic's air borders for a lengthy time was first to leave the sovereign state's territory in accordance with an understanding between the Russian Federation and Lithuania. Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Ryzhkov's subordinates became history against all expectations and through the will of politicians.

All this generates complicated feelings, and they also are equivocal ones for Lithuanians.

The battalion is not simply "departing." The officers and warrant officers also have a sea of personal problems. Six persons submitted requests to be discharged to the reserve and one to be transferred to serve in the Ukrainian Army. And Lieutenant Sergey Luchkin, married to a local girl, is remaining in Lithuania. Senior Lieutenant Ivan Kalyuzhnyy also found himself a job here. Battalion Chief of Staff Major Gennadiy Timchenko intended to go to his parents in Stavropol Oblast. Captain Yuriy Yeliseyev, wearer of eight orders of Near Eastern states, decided to head for Ryazan Oblast with his family...

And what awaits the unit at the new location?

The "Slav Woman's Farewell" is heard...

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Kasatonov, Deputies Discuss Fleet

92UM0755B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Mar 92 p 4

[Unattributed Article; "Negotiations In Sevastopol Regarding the Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] In Sevastopol negotiations were concluded between Ukrainian Supreme Council deputies visiting the city, and the Black Sea Fleet commander, Admiral Kasatonov. Problems of cooperation between the central government of the republic and the fleet were discussed,

including the supply of food goods to the sailors. The Sevastopol division of the Republic Movement of the Crimea picketed the headquarters where the negotiations were being held in an effort to effect changes in the positions of the Ukrainian delegation in regard to the Black Sea Fleet.

As reported by Sevastopol City Soviet Deputy Aleksandr Kruglov, the Ukraine blocked the delivery of foodstuffs to both the city and the fleet. In his words, city mayor Ivan Yermakov stated at a session that the Ukrainian Soviet of Ministers had warned him in writing: As long as the problem with the fleet remains, the republic will not supply food to the sailors. In the opinion of a military medic in the Black Sea Fleet who wished to remain anonymous, reports that the city had been blocked off by the Ukraine were only rumors.

Kasatonov: Fleet Belongs to Legal Successor of USSR

92UM0791B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Vera Kuznetsova: "We Will Wait Until the 20th"]

[Text] After talks with the official delegation from Kiev, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Kasatonov, stated at a press conference that the conciliation commission of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] discussing the status of the fleet is again deadlocked. As far as the admiral's position is concerned, it remains the same, but with a small clarification: until a political decision is made. What kind of a decision is still the question. However, it is clear that there must be at least two signatures on the decision—Yeltsin and Kravchuk. Incidentally, Nikolay Tsert, a member of the Parliamentary Commission on Defense and Security of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, expressed the same position on behalf of the official delegation of Ukraine that arrived in Sevastopol to study the military and political situation, the structure of the fleet, and also the social and legal status of the seamen.

Emphasizing that a dual oath for seamen is impossible and that the fleet must not be divided up at all, Admiral Kasatonov stated that the allegiance should go to the legal successor of the USSR.

Meanwhile, the officers of the Black Sea Fleet are waiting for their fate to be decided. Many of them do not want to leave to serve in the North or in other republics, especially since Kiev is promising to provide them with good living conditions and social protection in Sevastopol. Nikolay Tsert believes that these guarantees plus a political decision on 20 March at the meeting of the heads of state of the CIS in Kiev will provide an opportunity for a calm way out of the conflict situation existing today in the Black Sea Fleet.

Impact of Ukraine Separation on Naval Education

92UM0692A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Naval Educational Institutions Deputy Chief Rear-Admiral Boris Mikhaylovich Komarov by Senior Lieutenant V. Fatigarov: "Do Not Be Discouraged, Naval Cadets?"]

[Text] Until its chaotic disintegration, the Union had a powerful navy and far-flung network of naval educational institutions. Today the navy is living through one of the most difficult periods in its nearly 300-year history. It is sufficient to recall the difficult situation in the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets and the Caspian Flotilla. Today, universal attention is constantly attracted to it. But another problem is left in the shadow of this big problem and that is the fate of the higher naval school. This was the topic of discussion with Naval Educational Institutions Deputy Chief Rear-Admiral B. Komarov.

[Fatigarov] Boris Mikhaylovich, certification of higher naval schools was completed last year. What are the results of this work?

[Komarov] All eleven of the Navy's higher naval schools were subjected to a comprehensive inspection. I will cite some of the resulting facts and figures. Today VVMUZ's [higher naval educational institutions] are, on average, 98 percent staffed with professors-teachers. More than 850 graduate students work at the schools. Engineering schools, the VVMU [Higher Naval School] imeni Frunze and the VVMURE [Higher Naval Electronics School] imeni Popov have created their own science schools which are making a notable contribution to naval science. On the whole, all of the institutions are satisfactorily equipped from the point of view of the organization and conduct of the educational process and the condition and content of educational facilities. During the certification process, the greatest conformity between the level of knowledge and the degree of training was noted in engineering specialties, especially in nuclear power, electronics, mathematics, ASU [automated control systems] programming software, that is, in scientific-intensive specialties. At the same time, a certain lag is being observed in the level of training on general scientific and general engineering disciplines. These are the achievements and problems in the broadest outlines.

[Fatigarov] That is if they are viewed from the position of yesterday. Today, the top priority is, say, problems not of a methodological but rather of a political nature.

[Komarov] Four schools have turned out to be outside the borders of Russia—the Black Sea Higher Naval School imeni Nakhimov, the Sevastopol Higher Naval Engineering School, the Kiev Higher Naval School, and the Caspian Higher Naval Command School. Today, it is difficult to predict their fate. Ukraine is demanding that we "cede" Kiev VVMU which, incidentally, has been intensively re-equipped to train sociology teachers and psychologists for the Navy. The Kiev-Mogilev Secular

Academy is being reborn on school grounds. The university administration has been designated and the presentation of the academy already occurred in October 1991. As far as I know, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense VUZ [higher educational institution] Directorate Chief has posed the question as follows: after the graduating class completes its studies, "do what you like with the rest." School Chief Rear-Admiral A. Korovin has reported that there is a preliminary agreement with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for the remaining three classes to complete their studies on the territory where the living quarters, mess hall, and some laboratories are currently located. The school's facilities and the training craft division—the republic is expressing its right to all of this. As for the two Sevastopol schools—the pride of our Navy—they are preparing cadres for the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Navy for the time being. And this is the only proper decision, considering the uniqueness of these educational institutions. We all know that the VVMU imeni Nakhimov is the only Naval school that prepares specialists who maintain all of our existing types of missile platforms. But there are no schools like the Sevastopol Engineering School to train specialists to service nuclear power plants on submarines. These two most important directions in the modern naval school have been developed and improved over decades. Whereas we know the Republic Ministry of Defense's plans in the future are to create one school for training officers of all specialties for the Ukrainian Navy based on the two schools. It is difficult to say anything definite about the prospects for the Caspian Flotilla. For now, it is training cadres for the CIS. But tomorrow? Dual power has actually developed in the directorate of the above-named schools.

[Fatigarov] This uncertainty is obviously having an impact on the student drop out process?

[Komarov] Today the cadet drop-out rate for all classes is reaching an average of 28 percent for the training cycle. Many junior officers are also attempting to leave and are leaving the navy. The basis of this process—is uncertainty about service conditions, low salaries, and the lack of social protection. Today, uncertainty in the fate of the Armed Forces and lack of faith in politicians is prompting people toward this decision.

[Fatigarov] Is it also possible that we do not need so many schools? Many countries that have strong navies nevertheless get by with one or two special educational institutions.

[Komarov] We must not forget that a totally different naval force officer manning system has developed there. For example, in the United States, some officers are graduates of various universities and colleges and are attracted to the armed forces by high salaries and prestigious service and enjoy respect in the eyes of their fellow countrymen. As for the number of our schools, calculations that have been performed for the needs of the CIS Navy attest to the fact that for now we need to preserve all existing command and engineering schools.

[Fatigarov] What fate awaits high officer classes and the naval academy that are located in Saint Petersburg?

[Komarov] I hope that the VMA [Naval Academy] will continue its work and that the officer classes, as a future link in the chain of uninterrupted naval education, will be developed even further.

[Fatigarov] We know that the Nakhimov School in Saint Petersburg, in spite of everything, cannot accept all of those who desire to enter even in our days...

[Komarov] There have been requests from Vladivostok to organize a Nakhimov school there. But we can only talk about that in the event resources are found. And there are precisely none.

Northern Fleet Helicopter Crash

92UM0806A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Mar 92 p 6

[Postfaktum report under the rubric "An Accident":
"Search Underway for Airmen in Barents Sea Following
Military Helicopter Crash"]

[Text] Rescue efforts continue at the site of a K-27 helicopter crash. At 21:41 on 26 February a K-27 PS (search and rescue) helicopter of the Northern Fleet Air Force crashed and sank in the Barents Sea, 13 kilometers southwest of Kildin Island in water 240 meters deep. Aboard the helicopter, in addition to the crew members, were seven airmen on their way to the large ASW ship Simferopol to perform practice flights for piloting techniques: night take-offs and landings on the ship's deck. The practice flights were to have been conducted according to a flight schedule.

On the landing approach, 400 meters from the Simferopol, the helicopter banked to the left, dropped abruptly, fell into the water and sank.

The headquarters of the Northern Fleet reports that Maj Sergey Gorbachev, helicopter navigator, Maj Mikhail Alekseyev, instructor-pilot, and Capt Aleksandr Sukonin were sent up from the Simferopol during the rescue effort. All the airmen on the helicopter were wearing naval life-saving suits. The Northern Fleet's rescue vessel German Titov and seaward defense ships are presently in the area of the disaster. They are continuing to search for the sunk helicopter and the airmen.

The bottom at the site of the helicopter's loss is being searched with deep-water search equipment from the rescue vessel German Titov.

R-Adm Aleksin Details Sub Collision

92UM0738A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Feb 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Navy Chief Navigator Rear-Admiral Valeriy Ivanovich Aleksin under the rubric "A Specialist's Opinion": "The Hunt for 'Red February'?—Once More on the Collision of Two Nuclear-Powered Submarines"]

[Text] *The underwater collision of a nuclear submarine from the Northern Fleet with the American submarine Baton Rouge in the territorial waters of Russia has elicited quite a bit of gossip around the world. Both the political and the strictly navigational aspects of the incident at sea have been commented on in all ways. The WASHINGTON POST newspaper, for instance, has placed the blame for the unsuccessful maneuvering entirely on our commander. A number of domestic publications have put out official versions of what happened with "suicidal" editorial postscripts that "It cannot be ruled out that our commander decided entirely deliberately to give the American a 'shove,'" "...The Russian captain could have freely decided to display the right of ownership so as to take his foreign guests down a peg."*

The American submarine has reached its own shores these days. The mass media have not let this fact go by, and gave the floor to the members of the crew. The question of whether it was in the territorial waters of Russia is being puffed up again as before. Today KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is giving the chief navigator of the Navy, Rear-Admiral Valeriy Ivanovich Aleksin, the opportunity to express his own point of view on the circumstances and consequences of the collision in the Barents Sea based on an analysis, in his professional capacity, of all the data that is known as of today. Rear-Admiral Aleksin has served on nuclear submarines in the Navy for 16 years. It is interesting to note that he completed the Kennedy School of Government (a school of state administration) at Harvard University in 1991.

Collisions between American submarines and ours occurred almost every year from 1967 through 1986. No such incidents had been recorded in recent years right up until 11 Feb 92. It is absurd to feel that the collision of the two underwater giants with hundreds of crew members could be intentional on either side, something that could be conceived only by a person who has read a lot of "Hunt for Red October"-type literature by Tom Clancy. It is namely under the influence of this work of "political seascape" that this reasoning has appeared in our press: "In sweeping the water areas the boats proceed toward a head-on collision until one of them turns aside."

In the estimation of American specialists who have analyzed the reasons for collisions of U.S. Navy submarines while underwater, the principal ones are imperfections in the sonar gear, drawbacks in the organization of service and the level of training of the personnel. We share that point of view.

The majority of collisions of our submarines with American ones have occurred far from our shores, in the

so-called intended area of operations (combat patrol) or on the passages to them. And almost all of them have occurred a few minutes after a change in course or depth of submergence (or both of those parameters simultaneously) by our submarines. That is what happened on February 11 of this year. This was only the first time there had been a collision with a U.S. Navy submarine in the Northern Fleet in the combat-training area, which is located in our territorial waters. The sonar of the American submarine lost our submarine after a course change. There were moreover several fishing vessels in the region, and the noise of their screws were similar to those of the submarine. The commander of the Baton Rouge decided to go up to periscope depth to investigate the situation. He started up at about 2008 hours Moscow time, thereby creating a situation where both vessels were in the "dead zones" of the sonar equipment. Our boat moreover proved to be underneath. Convinced by the absence of extraneous noises, Captain 2nd Rank Igor Lokot began to go up from safe depth at 2013 hours for a previously planned communications session with shore. Rapidly traversing the depth hazardous for a ramming attack, the commander prepared to raise the periscope when at 2016 hours the collision occurred. Captain 2nd Rank Lokot, guided by the appropriate naval documents, turned away from the unknown target to a safe depth. After inspecting the compartments and with the observance of all safety measures, the commander went to the surface and, establishing communications with the captains of the fishing trawlers, inquired in accordance with maritime laws whether any of them required assistance. The commander of the Baton Rouge left our territorial waters by the fastest route and, after a few minutes, reported a collision with a Russian submarine. The discrepancy in the determination of the coordinates of the collision point was less than one kilometer for both commanders.

Such is the picture of the incident that I have established on the basis of studying all of the available data, personal experience in serving on a submarine and experience in investigating many navigational accidents. The causes of the collision, however, are much broader. First of all, the American nuclear submarine had violated the territorial waters of Russia, the status of which is defined by the Law On the State Borders of the USSR and the USSR Council of Ministers decree defining the List of Geographical Coordinates defining the position of the base-lines for readings of territorial waters. All of these documents (and they have not been abrogated) have been duly announced in the Navigational Notices to Mariners and are on board the Baton Rouge. A multitude of instances where submarines of the U.S. Navy and the NATO countries have penetrated into our waters for reconnaissance purposes are nonetheless known to us. The reaction to what happened from U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was typical—he declared that he was not surprised by the incident in the Barents Sea and saw no reason to make any changes in the nature of

U.S. naval operations. He acknowledged that several submarines are operating off the northern shores of Russia, constituting an important element of American security, and that he, the secretary, saw no reason to feel that any fundamental problem existed here that would require changes in U.S. policy.

I should say with all authority that eighteen to twenty submarines, by and large Los Angeles class submarines (including the Baton Rouge) with Tomahawk cruise missiles (range of 2,500 km [kilometers] able to hit targets with nuclear warheads deep in our territory—and not just “a few submarines”—are operating off our shores. We have meanwhile cut back more than three-fold the number of our submarines with ballistic missiles in combat-patrol areas off the U.S. coast over the last five years—there is currently not a single one of our submarines there. The United States today is keeping up to twenty-three boats with Poseidon and Trident ballistic missiles, aimed at the territory of the former USSR, in combat-patrol areas in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Continuing the discussion of the reasons for the collision of the two submarines, it must be stated, secondly, that the commander of the Baton Rouge committed an unsanctioned entry into our combat-training area that was not dictated by any insurmountable force, and where there was another boat, thereby creating the danger of a collision (the actions of two or more submarines in one area is done in all navies of the world only according to a unified concept of operations and plan, with the mandatory observance of safety measures in time, place and depth of submergence of those boats). The collision as the result of the neglect of these measures, devised over many years of practice, did not result in one, or even two, underwater “Chernobyls” only by pure chance. And that would be an ecological catastrophe that would have affected the countries of Scandinavia, the Baltic and Russia.

So a real reduction in confrontation at sea, restriction of naval activity and mutually coordinated and planned cutbacks in the U.S. Navy and our own Navy are an essential in order to avert or substantially reduce the possibility of such incidents in the future, and to put an end to the Cold War in deed rather than just in word. This process, which has barely started, is taking on a unilateral nature today, in my opinion. The peaceful initiatives of Russian President B. Yeltsin are being backed up by concrete deeds, while the activity of the American Navy is continuing in the same amount today as ten years ago. This is the view of a sailor, and it is for our politicians to draw the conclusions.

Further Details on Barents Sea Sub Collision

92UM0692B *Moscow TRUD in Russian* 29 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by ITAR-TASS Military Issues Commentator A. Naryshkin: “Fortunately, Ramming Was Avoided: Experts Think the U.S. Submarine Commander Maneuvered Dangerously and Ineptly”]

[Text] “Today there is not a single Northern Fleet nuclear submarine performing combat alert in direct proximity to the coast of the United States. At the same time, we constantly record the presence of American missile submarines in our northern waters,” stated Northern Fleet Press Center Chief Captain 2nd Rank A. Veledeyev in an interview with an ITAR-TASS commentator.

While commenting on the collision of the two submarines in the Barents Sea on February 11, Veledeyev noted that according to data from CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Navy Chief Navigator Rear-Admiral Valeriy Aleksin, during the period from 1967 to 1986, that is, for 20 years, similar incidents with the participation of American and Soviet submarines occurred nearly every year. There were no such incidents in the five years following 1986, but then the circumstances of the February incident were unique: this was the first time a collision with a U.S. Navy submarine occurred in a combat training range in our territorial waters. This last circumstance has been precisely ascertained and is not subject to doubt: all the documents, including maps of the maneuvers and instrument readings which permit, with a high degree of accuracy (within one second) determination of the latitude and longitude of the collision site, are at Northern Fleet Headquarters. The press center head indicated that the collision site is in the depth of our territorial waters, nearly five nautical miles from their outer boundary.

None of these collisions, including the most recent, should be considered premeditated since they would probably be equally disastrous for both parties. Therefore, the assertion that appeared in the press that the commander of our nuclear submarine, Igor Lokot, “rammed” the American submarine is totally unsubstantiated. If our submarine had struck at another angle, our seamen would not have been able to return to base. But then again, the same fate could have befallen the Americans: in the event of serious depressurization, both submarines would have been lost in less than a minute and, naturally, no one would have been able to shut off the reactors. And there are torpedoes with nuclear warheads aboard the two submarines and also “Tomahawk” nuclear missiles on the Baton Rouge.

While responding to the question of why our seamen did not detect the Baton Rouge beforehand, Captain 2nd Rank Veledeyev said, “Judging by the conclusions of fleet analysts, the Americans were observing our submarine, which is a sufficiently modern and interesting object for study, while maneuvering on stern angles of approach and in an acoustical dead zone. Furthermore, a Russian fishing trawler was in the collision area and the Americans quite successfully masked themselves in its noise. Under these conditions and while considering the complex hydrology of the Barents Sea, it was extremely difficult to “get a fix” on the foreign submarine.

“If something similar had occurred abeam of Norfolk or any other U.S. Naval base, the next day there would

already have been demands in Congress to double appropriations to the naval programs and to increase the combat alert posture off their coasts. The issue of who is to blame for the collision is being intensely fanned in our press. It is absurd. But if the question is being raised in that context, I must say that, in the opinion of our experts, the American commander maneuvered dangerously and ineptly. His level of professional training is obviously not as high as is customarily thought of American military seamen," concluded Aleksandr Veledeyev.

Naval Aviation Subunit Leaves Lithuania

92UM0796A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Mar 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak: "The Forgotten Battalion, or how Baltic Fleet Aviators Left Lithuania"]

[Text] The March 3 withdrawal of a surface-to-air missile battalion, that was deployed near Vilnius, from Lithuania to Russia was widely covered in the mass media. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA also covered this event. But at the same time, a Baltic Fleet Air Force battalion commanded by Major Aleksandr Mikhaylov routinely left the environs of Plunge.

The aviators hauled food (they had to leave behind 10 tons of potatoes—there wasn't any room) in two vehicles and they themselves left in a third vehicle. They drove away, abandoning barracks, warehouses, a mess hall, club, bath, medical facility, etc., on a 141 hectare area. That is, that which had been created over many years using the peoples' resources. A warehouse full of chemical equipment, a tractor, ZIL-131 and ZIL-157 trucks, a road grader, and other equipment were also left on garrison territory.

But do not rush to accuse the battalion commander of bungling. Major Mikhaylov did everything. Even that which was beyond his strength. But then Mikhaylov's commanders...

You get the impression that they simply became confused in this situation. Otherwise how do you explain that not a single Baltic Fleet Headquarters or Fleet Aviation representative has visited Mikhaylov's garrison since November 1991?

Already in November, having heard about the impending withdrawal of the battalion, Lithuanian entrepreneurs proposed to Mikhaylov that he sell them some of the buildings and equipment for a tidy sum. The people at the top did not give the major the "O.K." Experts think that they could have built housing for officers at the new location with that money.

At the end of January 1992, the battalion commander appealed to Fleet Food Services Chief Colonel Nikolay Kirse: Make a decision on the removal of the mess hall

equipment and refrigerator. The inspector arrived, inspected, and left. In a word, all of the equipment remained in Lithuania.

The Lithuanians thwarted Mikhaylov's attempts to relocate the equipment to Kaliningrad Oblast. The Plunge military commandant ordered the battalion to be blockaded and armed guards were posted at all intersections to prevent the withdrawal of equipment.

National defense department representatives acted based on government decisions. They acquainted the commander with the document.

"They fined us like wolves," the battalion commander told me. "And they avenged for our persistence."

They recouped their losses on Company Commander Senior Lieutenant Yevgeniy Zaytsev. On February 28, the battalion commander sent Zaytsev to prepare the required documents but they shoved the officer into a dark room and savagely beat him at the department of the local commissariat.

And on March 2, five men from the Plunge Commissariat and 12 armed guards arrived at the battalion's location. They came to take the equipment. A bit later, the Klaypeda National Defense Zone Commissar arrived from Klaypeda and gave the battalion commander an ultimatum: "Either you leave by sundown tomorrow or we will use force." The battalion did not even have a pistol in its inventory...

I visited the location where the battalion is currently setting up. It is surrounded by mud and an uninhabitable field. But people are working day and night. A neighboring unit has given shelter to the sailors and the officers and warrant officers are living in trailers. They are first of all building what they left behind in Lithuania: warehouses for vehicles and equipment. The families are in Plunge for now and no one is being promised housing in the near future. "Russia is great but we have nowhere to go," bitterly noted one officer...

What will happen to the equipment and buildings abandoned by the battalion in Lithuania? As they informed me in Plunge, several variations are being examined: dismantle everything and sell it; sell all of the land and buildings at auction; or sell it piecemeal to businessmen. As you can see, in any case the Lithuanian authorities have won.

Are we really that rich? Or is the Russian government indifferent to the fact that they are so brazenly privatizing its real estate and chattels?

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Finland's Puolimatka building Housing in Shaikovka for Air Forces

92UM0641A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT
in Finnish 4 Feb 92 pp D 1-2

[Article by Esko Nurmi: "A Soldiers Town Far From
Anywhere"]

[Text] The first town for returning soldiers is being built
quickly in Shaikovka. The families of those returning
from East Germany still have to live as extras in other
people's homes.

The Turkish construction worker pulls his cap down so
as to cover more of his head. Snow is falling, driven by
the wind. One cubic meter of concrete after another is
transformed into a basic cell in the framework of the
building. The construction site is in Shaikovka, in the
middle of Russia and thus, remote from anywhere.

Puolimatka International, subsidiary of the Novera con-
solidation, is constructing homes for Russian air force
officers together with the Turkish firm, Mesa. Changes
in the world order caused the officers to leave East
Germany.

Shaikovka is the first town to be built for military
personnel returning to Russia. German money is
financing the construction of 36 such towns in the
former Soviet land. They will provide 36,000 residential
units together with basic services. The cost is 7.8 billion
German marks, which is over 21 billion markkaa in
Finnish money. Germany consented to provide the
funds in order to hasten the departure of the troops.

The German marks are being used only to cover the costs
of housing for soldiers returning from one country only.
The total number of returning Soviet soldiers, conscripts
included, is close to a million.

The pace of construction in Shaikovka is fierce. The
minimum work week has become 10 hours a day for six
days a week. Many are content with one day off per
month.

On the best day over 600 cubic meters of concrete were
poured. The basic frame of a five-story building con-
taining 60 residential units is erected in a week. The
town will consist of 19 such buildings and buildings
housing service functions. There will be over 1,000
homes here and more than five times that many resi-
dents, since large families are still common in Russia.

The future residents are at a nearby air force base
awaiting the completion of the project.

No airplanes can be seen. Jets make an appearance
across the sky about once a week. A shortage of fuel
helps ward off the noise nuisance.

At the Start There Was Nothing

The construction is a little behind schedule. Approxi-
mately 500 housing units should have been ready at the
start of the year but initial negotiation stretched on and
on. The first cubic meter of concrete was poured five and
a half months ago. The first residents should be moving
in next week and the last of them about the time that
summer begins.

Construction was started on an empty field. The bar-
racks that were originally at the Kostamus construction
site were brought here from St. Petersburg. Electricity is
provided by diesel-fueled generators. Wells had to be
drilled since the water supply that had been promised by
the customer was not provided.

"When its wet, this ground will not hold up anything.
Equipment kept sinking down to the axles time after
time," the supervisor of the project, Markku Auvinen
relates.

From 1,000 Kilometers Away

Auvinen has been on construction projects abroad for
about 20 years. He is not easily frightened. The Gennadi
Yanayev junta was feeling their oats on the morning that
Auvinen left for Shaikovka. "My wife brought me to the
airport and we were listening to the news. My wife
wondered if it was smart to go at all. I told her: That is
such a big country that it can always handle one coup
d'etat."

Construction materials are brought to Shaikovka over
great distances. At least the sand for the concrete can be
obtained from close by, from the river bottom. The
cement comes from near Moscow over a distance of 300
km. The coarser gravel for the concrete is hauled more
than 1000 km by train all the way from Karelia.

"There is a saying that three things still operate in Russia
and one of these is the railway system. But there is no
depending on that either anymore," says Auvinen.

Under the socialist system the transporting of materials
cost virtually nothing. Then overnight the freight charges
rose hundredfold. Fortunately the biggest orders for the
Shaikovka project had been arranged before the price
increase and under terms that specified payment upon
delivery.

"Over here you always have to order more than you
actually need. Of course it just might happen that you get
everything you asked for, but that risk is, luckily, pretty
small in this country."

At the gate of the construction site all loads are weighed,
even the sand. Losses are kept at a moderate level.

The Joining of the Expensive and Inexpensive

The precast front wall elements are brought from a Finnish-Estonian factory in Estonia. There will be 1,500 truckloads in all. A week is not long enough for a truck to make even two trips.

The doors, windows and kitchen cabinets, for example, are coming from Finland. The main impact of the Finns is, however, in the planning and supervision.

Of the 149 million German marks, equivalent to about 400 million markkaa, in contractors' fees a little more than one-third will find its way to Finland, estimates manager Jukka Nykanen of Puolimatka, Inc. The competitiveness of Finnish construction materials has been better than expected.

There are only 65 Finns at the construction site. There are about 500 Turks and Turkish Kurds combined. There are also roughly that many Estonians and Russians there.

The Turks pour the concrete. Even the forms are from Turkey. Many of the Estonians are on the finishing jobs.

The Germans and Russians award the soldiers' town construction contracts by taking internationally competitive bids, although they show a slight favoritism toward the source of the money, Germany. The combination of Puolimatka and the Turkish PEM was low bidder on two of the four jobs considered on the first round and they were awarded the contract on one of these two.

The collaboration was agreed upon already before there was any knowledge about the soldiers' town. "We figured that the strengths of the most and least expensive countries in Europe could be combined in the USSR marketplace. We reached a settlement," the operations chief of Puolimatka, Veikko Kauppila, relates.

A Turkish worker costs only one-tenth of what a Finnish worker does. This comparison includes social security, lodging costs, and travel costs for trips home. These items significantly add to the cost of a Finnish worker.

Familiar Style of Cluster Architecture

In the second round of bids Haka, Inc., received a construction contract in Belarus. Haka's workers will primarily be Belorussian and Russian. The basic principle of Finnish construction exports is now that the labor force will be obtained from inexpensive countries.

"We are not familiar with conditions in Russia nor with construction during the winter," the Turkish site foreman, Hassan Can Yavuz, says to explain his firm's agreement to the collaboration.

He considers the quality of the housing to be good but he is troubled by the monotony of the site. "Regrettably I am an architect by training."

"At the beginning of the project the draftsmen had their French curves taken away," jokes manager Nykanen. The use of straight line rulers was intended to lead to

savings in time and costs. The cost of one square meter of dwelling in Shaikovka will be about 3,500 markkaa.

Residences Meet Finnish Housing Loan Standards

"These meet Finnish housing loan standards. The locals have seen this kind of quality in magazine pictures if at all," project chief Markku Auvinen says inside the model unit.

And, indeed, the two bedroom apartment looks like it was taken out of a Finnish interior decorating magazine. The textiles are in harmony and the table has been set with Arabia tableware. The apartment itself is standard Shaikovski, however. The wallpaper, vinyl flooring and built in furnishings are exactly the same kind as the other units will also get. The apartment has a pleasant aspect.

The Russians would have wanted hardwood parquet flooring instead of the linoleum. The hardwood would probably not have lasted, however, since the hurried pace of construction will not allow the poured concrete to lose sufficient moisture prior to the installment of the flooring.

There is no reason to complain about the work of the Estonian painters and flooring installers. They leave no ugly seams caused by sloppy workmanship.

The kitchen is better than in new Russian housing generally. The upper cabinets are extra. The material is the familiar synthetic surfaced chipboard. Above the single, stainless steel sink is a cabinet for drying dishes, a feature that has been called a Finnish innovation. The stove is by Stromberg. There is an American-style refrigerator/freezer in one corner of the model unit, but that is not part of the standard package. The entry will have a special, upper storage space for storing cabbage.

There are no clothes closets but the cloakroom is spacious. The shelves were not in the contract but Auvinen felt: "...they have to be added or else the residents will damage the sheetrock walls when nailing up shelves."

The bathroom does not impress a Finn one way or another. It has a long tub. There is no tile; the walls and floor are covered with a vinyl surface. The water closet is separate from the bathroom.

There will be no television antenna jungles on the roofs at Shaikovka. Each building will have a shared antenna. Wires will also be drawn through the walls for a central radio system.

The majority of the units have two or three bedrooms. The floorplans are a bit maze-like. It seems like many square meters are wasted in the shared entries between four bedroom units. These entries are separated from the stairwell by a fire door. Russians typically store bicycles, skis, kicksleds etc. in middle entries.

There are no elevators. According to standards a five story building does not need elevators.

People Will Be Pleased That Everything Is Done

Alexander Yermakov is the overall superintendent of the construction site. His education is in construction economics and he represents the "basic construction division of the housing utilization governing board of the Moscow army region.

"The people will be pleased that the houses will be fully finished. Any lacking implements would be hard to obtain under present conditions," he says.

The cooperation between superintendent and contractor has been good even though "no construction project is entirely free of problems." Yermakov's biggest worry at present is to assure the flow of water, electricity and heat to the buildings so that otherwise ready homes would not be left vacant because of the lack of these. These are the responsibility of the customer. The contractor will try to help effect at least a temporary solution to the problems.

The assigning of the residences is in progress. According to Yermakov the assigning is being handled by the deputy commander of the Shaikovka Air Base.

Yermakov feels that "high-ranking military men" have not thought enough about family living conditions at Shaikovka. The officers will be employed at the air base but half of the wives are still without jobs. A clothing mill 20 km away in the town of Kirov may establish a branch plant in Shaikovka.

Gardening for household use is assured, however. "Twenty hectares have been set aside for that. The families can grow vegetables and fruit," observes Yermakov.

All the Problems of an Isolated Military Community

Yermakov does not know what part of Germany the residents will be coming from. All he knows is that they are air force officers.

The construction technical consultant sent by Germany, Friedrich Knittel, on the other hand says: "They will be coming along with their Mig-25 planes from Kothen, which is near Halle."

At the present the families of these officers are living as extras in the homes of other families at the Shaikovka air base. They have brought Western goods with them, including Mercedes Benzes and German marks.

According to Knittel the situation at the air base is tense. "I do not know if the commander was serious when he said that those who have been at the base a long time will get the new housing while the newcomers will be given the old housing."

Knittel finds nothing to criticize in the technical aspects of the construction. The experienced consultant is concerned, however, about the social implications. He feels that isolated Shaikovka is not the right place to put a big community.

"It would have been better to disperse the resettling, to, for example, help by giving building materials for free so that the Russians could have built houses close to older communities."

I Won't Mind Even If It Gets Colder Here

Truck driver Muhittin Ozer is from Istanbul. The Turks came to Shaikovka by bus. The ride lasted three days. "I won't mind even if it gets colder here," Ozer says about the Russian weather. The Turks had been told about 40 below zero temperatures to scare them and thus the 25 below that is so far the record is mild by comparison.

"The equipment is good," he says. The Finns found it a bit amusing when the Turks put on all their clothing when the first cold snap hit and were thereby almost unable to move.

The Turkish specialty at the construction site is the pouring of concrete for the building framework. This means long workdays and seven of these every week for most of them.

Ozer says he passes the free time at the barracks by reading, for example. The Turks are satisfied with the housing arrangements even though the bunking density is three times as high for the Turks as it is for the Finns—six Turks sleep in one barracks room of just a few square meters.

Only a few of the Turks, some of the supervisory personnel, speak other languages than their mother tongue. Nevertheless, Ozer does not feel that there are language problems. "We help communications with our hands."

Hands are not used for fighting; there has been no trouble between the nationalities. "When there is no free time there are no free time problems either," is the way the management expresses it.

It Is Good That At Least Some People Will Get Housing

Pipefitter Peeter Raven is threading pipe in the sheet metal building. He has come to Shaikovka from Tallinn, but is a Russian.

"It is good that at least those coming from Germany get good housing. They are presently living in very tight quarters and awkward situations and are used to better conditions," he says.

Raven does not see any need for envy even though housing shortages are universal throughout the former USSR.

His comment on his pay meets international standards: "It could be better." Just the same, he does not seem to be dissatisfied. He works for a combination of firms known as Tasma which is subcontracting for Saimaan Putkityo Inc.

A working community made up of many nationalities does not present problems according to Raven. "Each does his own job."

The workdays are long but otherwise there is nothing unusual about the work pace. One has a chance to see and learn modern methods and materials at the construction site and Raven considers that to be a valuable experience.

Krivoy Rog Military Housing Opens

*92UM0749E Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
26 Feb 92 p 2*

[Article by Majors O. Vachayev and I. Bilinskiy: "Not For Our Guests..."]

[Text] What does our new resident do upon receiving the keys to an apartment in a new building? Actually, repairs start in order to correct the flaws left by the builders, he must go out and get an electric stove or mixer taps in the bathroom which had mysteriously disappeared immediately after the house had been opened... But seemingly the people who have already moved in or who are waiting their turn on the lists for housing in the 9-story buildings which have gone up in the settlement of Vsebratskiy on the outskirts of Krivoy Rog will be deprived of such a "happy" opportunity.

The "guilty parties" are known here. They are the European Construction Firm Maculan Hofman from Austria and the assisting Slovak construction organization Pozemnya Stavby. It was they who in competitive bidding won the right to build the housing for the serviceman families from the division withdrawn from Germany. NARODNAYA ARMIYA has already written about the pace of construction.

The first 600 "turnkey" apartments, as promised, were completed at the end of 1991. The second series of 468 apartments are being completed at the very time that these lines are being written. In each of March and April, some 216 families will correspondingly receive new housing. By the end of the year, the sociocultural and utility facilities will be completed and the mere listing of these could set some to trembling in excitement: a school (with a swimming pool), a nursery (with a swimming pool), a polyclinic, a shopping center, an automatic telephone exchange and so forth. Incidentally, the food store has already opened. And work is in fully swing at the other projects.

How are things going for those who have been the first fortunate ones to receive the "imported" home? This was the question we asked ourselves in setting out to an already complete 9-story building. And...as they say, we ran right into the wall, or more accurate, the door. We had to press the buttons of the annunciator before the door opened.

Here we were in the 3-room apartment of Guards Lt Col V. Dudnikov. Since Vladimir Sergeevich [Dudnikov]

was not at home, his wife Natalya Borisovna kindly consented to show us around the apartment. Next to the entry was a strange looking telephone (the annunciator) with an ordinary telephone dial. Then came a spacious hall with a built-in double-door closet (to the ceiling). Through the hall one could pass into the rooms, the bathroom, the toilet and the kitchen. In the kitchen was everything a housewife could need: a drying cabinet with ventilating pipes, a standing sink and a gas stove. The stove had an exhaust fan and light. Incidentally there was also ventilating in the bathroom.

There was no need to ask the housewife whether she liked all of this. The fate of the Dudnikov family was similar to many others: they had moved through the large and small garrisons, and had lived where they had to. In Krivoy Rog they had lived for a time in the Lastochka Pioneer Camp and which was familiar to many officers and their wives. Later they had occupied two rooms in a family dormitory...

They had moved in here precisely at New Year's, on 31 December. And they are here to stay. The head of the family is being discharged into the reserves, the children—Artem and Nada—are schoolchildren, and Natalya Borisovna is busy as a housewife.

But let us continue our journey through the apartment. We should describe those details which for understandable reasons are novel. Take such a marvel: the door frames are made from metal and are laminated to the wood, while the ceilings are completely smooth as are the walls. Over the windows are special devices which make it possible to lower light fabric shades against the sun. In the toilet and bathroom the walls are Dutch tile in order to make cleaning easier for the housewife. The list of discoveries could be extended...

The standard square meters for the living area of a 3-room apartment is not so great, some 36.6 square meters (the Ministry of Defense of the former Union was on an economy trip). But the meticulous new residents with measuring tape in hand did their own calculations. They had some 44 square meters.

We left the hospitable apartment of the Dudnikovs and in the immediate and literal sense we were thrown back into our own lives. Across the street a food store had been opened for the inhabitants of the microrayon. But business, as we say only in our country, is going on out the back door. The reason is that the space has not yet been accepted. The representatives of the internal affairs bodies had beat a hasty retreat. The problem was that the store was equipped with three different alarm systems which went off, as they say, when a cat ran across the floor. And not one of them conformed to our obsolete State Standards. And there were no grids on the windows as there should be...

Generally speaking there is much that is surprising and contrasting at the construction site and around it. My own observations were that I did not see a single idle construction worker or piece of equipment. There are

smoking breaks, in carefully using a shovel. And then the neat quarters of the worker dormitories with the satellite communications dishes rising over them. And then there is their own store where from time to time curious inhabitants of the military camp pay a visit and see for themselves how we have fallen behind in culture and pace of life. Are so few of us really enterprising and thinking? When shall we become such and when shall we not distress our associates but rather make them happy?

Incidentally, Makulan is not only building the compound but is also taking an active part in providing humanitarian aid. For New Year's and in February, the firm provided (gratis) some 600 packets of children's food, groats, chocolate, milk and juices for the large and needy families.

...You will agree that it is a fine thing to serve and see your own home rising before your very eyes! It is no accident that the officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"] want to serve here. And one of the authors of this report, himself without an apartment, honestly admitted that he was envious.

Military Units' Accounts Frozen

*PM1303154792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Mar 92 p 3*

[Captain Second Rank V. Gromak report under "Direct Line" rubric: "Is a Blockade Awaiting the Military? Russian Government Has the Answer"]

[Text] Klaipeda—The Bank of Lithuania has decided to end transactions with military units financed through State Bank field institutions. Consequently, all military units' accounts have been frozen and they cannot transfer money to pay organizations for food, public utilities, and electricity.

Faced with this, enterprises and organizations in Klaipeda have refused to make deals with military units. The water authorities have officially informed the commander of the Baltic Fleet Coastal Defense division that they are cutting off the military units' water supply as of 12 March, and the domestic services combine is refusing to accept laundry.

This is a no-win situation, so to speak.

"The water has not been cut off today," Colonel Ivan Chernykh, commander of the division guard, told me. "Following lengthy talks, we reached an agreement that everything would be left as it is until the end of the month. Yesterday we sent five vehicles with an armed escort to the city's organizations to settle accounts in cash. But where are we to get all the money from?! After all, the laundry alone now costs 80,000..."

So, thanks to the efforts of the division command, the blockade of the military was successfully averted for a certain period of time. But is this a solution? And is there a way out of the prevailing situation in general? Evidently this question must be answered by the CIS troops High Command and the Russian Government, which has taken the Baltic Fleet forces in the Baltic region under its jurisdiction.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES**Shaposhnikov Offers Return of L-29s to Kyrgyzstan***92UM0731A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Mar 92 p 3*

[Article by K. Bayalinov under the rubric "The Republics": "Bishkek: Better If the Planes Had Not Flown"]

[Text] On Thursday twelve L-39 trainer aircraft took off from the military airfield near the capital of Kyrgyzstan and crossed the borders of the republic. Their course ran across the territory of Kazakhstan and was to end in the Russian city of Barnaul.

The reaction was stormy in the republic's parliament. The deputies relieved the commander of the flight unit, General V. Belotskiy, of his duties (even though formally they did not have that right) and, in order to avoid further losses of aircraft, decreed that subunits of internal-service troops be sent to airfields and military units stationed on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. The military airfields were surrounded by military *spetsnaz* troops by evening.

While the military were intimidating each other with weapons and suffering from nerves, the politicians were seeking the possibility of a compromise. One was found on Sunday. Marshal Shaposhnikov promised to return the aircraft to Kyrgyzstan. The blockade of the military installations was lifted.

The Kyrgyz side, as is now becoming clear, was informed of the planned transfer of the aircraft several days before the incident.

The incident with the aircraft has complicated the relations of the military with the leadership of the republic. It has also, in the eyes of many parliamentarians, cast a shadow over bilateral ties with Russia. Although formally Russia had nothing to do with it.

Some cooling has been noted nonetheless. A large delegation of politicians, economists and businessmen (140 people) is arriving in Kyrgyzstan today from Turkey.

They will clearly be welcomed a little bit more cordially this time than before...

Border Guard Trainees Clash With Russian Youths*92UN0908B Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian 21 Jan 92 p 2*

[Report by Remigijus Barauskas: "The Cadets' March on Snieckus"]

[Text] As reported by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, on January 18, at the Snieckus township, soldiers of the National Defense border guard service training center came to blows with local youths.

According to the chief of staff of the training center, A. Baravykas, around 7:40 PM on that day two groups of local youths (Russian speakers) began quarrelling next to the "Ezerynas" trade center. The Lithuanian cadets (about 10-15 people) tried to calm down the hotheads, but then both groups unexpectedly attacked them.

The cadets dashed back to their unit and told their friends about the brawl. A decision was made, according to Baravykas, "to rebuff the Russians so that they would not beat the Lithuanians." Some 250 soldiers (about 400, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs) marched from the unit to Snieckus. By that time, the whole police sub-unit of Snieckus (about 80 people) had been activated. The policemen met with the commanders of the National Defense border guard training center at the "Ezerynas" trade center and jointly agreed that the soldiers would return to their unit. Incidents were avoided.

The commissar of the Snieckus police sub-unit, inspector I. Alekseyev, mentioned rumors circulating in the township that the soldiers had badly beaten up five youths. Yet nobody officially approached the police or the medical institutions. According to I. Alekseyev, the police and commanders of the training center yesterday came to an agreement to start joint patrols of policemen and cadets in the township. Government commissioner A. Lapenas, police commissioner inspector I. Alekseyev, the procurator and other officials plan to visit the above-mentioned training center on Thursday. They will probably try to enlighten the cadets on the problems of East Lithuania and on their responsibility for similar military feats.

Military Lessons of Nagorno-Karabakh Viewed*92UM0751A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 92 First Edition pp 1, 3*

[Article by Major K. Litvinov: "Regiment Withdrawn From Karabakh. Time to Learn Lessons"]

[Text] The 366th Motorized-Rifle Regiment, previously stationed in Stepanakert (Khankendi), finally left Nagorno-Karabakh. The personnel basically are in Vaziani, Georgia.

Now it is already possible to clarify more or less objectively all episodes which arose during the regiment's withdrawal. The regimental command made the decision for dispersal after a shelling by Azerbaijani "Grad" [multiple rocket launchers] from the direction of Shusha on 23 February, when servicemen died.

Commenting on the situation which arose at that time, Transcaucasus Military District Deputy Commander Lieutenant-General Sufiyon Beppayev told our correspondent that although Regimental Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Yuriy Zarvigorov was ordered to withdraw only the 1st Motorized-Rifle Battalion, he sent all three battalions into the concentration area, but reported to district headquarters that he had withdrawn only one

battalion. The Lieutenant-General called these actions arbitrariness which cost dearly. Soon all battalions were blockaded by Karabakh Self-Defense Forces fighters. Beppayev described Zarvigorov in a negative fashion; moreover, he now "refuses to serve and in all likelihood will be discharged from the Army."

When the regiment received the order for restationing from Nagorno-Karabakh, the first column of combat equipment was forced to set up camp near Ballydzhi (6 km from Stepanakert), and airborne personnel who arrived from Gyandzha had to repel an attack by armed units. An airborne sergeant was killed, shot in the head in one of the night skirmishes.

At the same time, the following also occurred.

Major Seyran Oganyan, commander of the 2nd Motorized-Rifle Battalion, withdrew the battalion to the designated area, but then returned to the military post and did not appear again. It is assumed that he now is in one of the Karabakh Self-Defense Forces detachments. If this is confirmed, one word is appropriate here—treason. But in a conversation with the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Regimental Chief of Staff Lieutenant-Colonel Sergey Kraule suggested not hanging labels on the battalion commander for now.

The Chief of Staff asserts that warrant officers of Armenian nationality "remained in the regiment, with some exceptions." He also categorically denies rumors that the regiment was divided into two parts: pro-Azerbaijani and pro-Armenian.

The regiment's withdrawal from Stepanakert prompts reflection. The 366th Motorized-Rifle Regiment was essentially cut off from the division main body. Were any of the opposing sides to have imposed combat operations on it, then it would have been very difficult for the military, if only because the ammunition was... in Agdam. By Lieutenant-Colonel Kraule's admission, the regiment barely had enough ammunition for neutralizing firing positions located on the outskirts of Shusha. The regiment began answering when it began to be shelled by armed Azerbaijani units and it was already intolerable.

Again, diesel fuel was delivered from Tbilisi. Roads were cut off and supply was by air, but in the last 2-3 weeks helicopters coming in for a landing began to be fired on from the direction of Shusha. Now for simple arithmetic. The daily fuel expenditure in the regiment is 3.5 tons and one helicopter at the most could carry 2 tons. And so figure and estimate it. Kraule asserts that in general there was a catastrophic situation with fuel right before the withdrawal.

The regiment's officers received reports of certain mass media about events in Stepanakert with bewilderment. In the conversation Lieutenant-Colonel Kraule uttered: "I do not believe a single word of television."

He can be understood. For example, there was information that one of the opposing sides forced Private Panteleyev to go over to it. Sergey Frantsevich summoned the private: "Who is forcing you?" In response there was a puzzled shrug of the shoulders and an embarrassed smile. To where and how could they draw Panteleyev if he goes on detail every six hours (that is the specific nature of his service) and consequently is constantly before the officers' eyes?

And what is the worth of information about ten corpses of this regiment's servicemen who allegedly fought on the side of one of the Karabakh armed groupings? After this announcement representatives of higher headquarters arrived and everyone together looked for these corpses for two days. They did not find them, nor could they. Yes, there were ten soldiers who deserted and ended up in the combat zone, but not one of them "fought" and in time they were returned to the regiment. But the rock had been tossed and the ripples started...

Just what fate awaits the 366th Motorized-Rifle Regiment? KRASNAYA ZVEZDA already informed that it most likely will be disbanded. Now this is confirmed. Lieutenant-General Beppayev in particular told the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent that the district is awaiting an order for disbanding the regiment.

BY THE WAY:

The situation on both sides of the front became sharply aggravated after the retirement of Azerbaijan President Ayaz Mutalibov, who still was inclined toward a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh crisis. It is typical that attempts again are being seen to draw Commonwealth of Independent States troops into the conflict and make them hostages of the interethnic slaughter.

Thus at around 1700 hours on 8 March an attack was made on a local garrison in the populated point of Artik near Yerevan. Around 60 fighters took part in the attack. Lieutenant V. Mishchenko and Private A. Kotov died as a result of the exchange of fire. Senior Lieutenant V. Orekhov and Senior Lieutenant A. Tuliyeve were seriously wounded. Eight officers were taken hostage.

Continuing Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh Expected

92US0266A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Feb 92 pp 1, 2

["Opinion" by Pavel Felgengauer: "Prospects of a War of Attrition: The Military-Strategic Balance in the Region Will Inevitably Entail a Protracted War"]

[Text] At the beginning of January the Azerbaijani Army launched one further offensive from the Agdam area, but was thrown back with losses. The fighting has once more assumed a trench-warfare nature: ambushes, small-scale skirmishes, and the shelling of cities and villages. It has once again proved impossible to solve the Karabakh problem just like that.

According to estimates by informed observers, the Azerbaijani Army and the OMON [Special Purpose Militia] detachments currently have up to 20,000 men and several hundred units of armored equipment, including tanks. The Nagornyy Karabakh self-defense force consists of fairly well trained detachments (dzhokat) which have come to the area of combat operations from Armenia for two to three months (then rotation and recreation) and more numerous, but less well trained and armed, local inhabitants. Armenia does not formally have an army but, in the event of a general mobilization, the Armenian side could, judging by certain indirect indications, put up forces commensurate with the Azerbaijanis in terms of numbers.

The actual combat confrontations, for that matter, occur mostly at the level of battalions (on each side), under-strength, what is more.

Azerbaijan has been late in embarking on the creation of its own national army and is developing military organization extremely inefficiently. The large OMON force, which was formed earlier, is not, for that matter, operating that much better than the army, which was formed from volunteers. Military experts have an extremely low opinion of the combat possibilities of the Azerbaijani units: an efficient army cannot be improvised in a few months. Nor are volunteers inspired by the national idea and a certain preponderance in arms sufficient for an appreciable success.

Armenian territory is separated from Karabakh by a cordon of Soviet (Russian?) forces: a motorized rifle division deployed in security detachments along the border, which serves as a considerable obstacle to large-scale penetration by Armenian detachments of the territory of Nagornyy Karabakh. However, attempts to disarm small individual security detachments have become more frequent of late—the Azerbaijanis need weapons. If the armed buffer between the republics ultimately disappears (the troops are taken out of harm's way), a confrontation between the Armenian armed forces and the Azerbaijani Army would be inevitable. And if the Nagorno-Karabakh self-defense force finds itself in a truly desperate situation and a direct threat to Stepanakert looms, a full-blown interrepublic war will be inevitable.

The Azerbaijani Army currently could not be fighting any worse, but neither does the Karabakh self-defense force have either the forces or possibilities for a decisive offensive. Becoming engaged in fighting, sustaining losses and falling back, the Azerbaijani Army is learning to fight and, it has to be thought, will ultimately have learned some things. The soldiers who survive will become veterans who know how to fight, and the combat capability of the units will gradually grow. After all, Azerbaijan is potentially stronger both in terms of the number of inhabitants and economically. But for successful combat operations in the mountains, particularly for a decisive offensive under conditions of inadequate (relatively) fire support and given the absence of aviation, a first-rate infantry is required, and raising truly

offensive units takes years. But in the course of a real war this process could be speeded up considerably.

The Armenian armed forces are currently, in the estimation of Armenian intelligence, considerably stronger than the Azerbaijani Army. The Armenian formations are superior to their Azerbaijani counterparts organizationally and in terms of combat capability. Armenia began to develop a military organization earlier and has done it, it has to be thought, more successfully. The Azerbaijani leadership, meanwhile, was hoping that the Soviet armed forces and the interior forces would do all the "dirty work" and "solve" the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh. Things did come to this in July-August 1991, and under the conditions of a state of emergency in the USSR the Karabakh problem would have been "solved." But the August putsch failed, the interior forces were withdrawn from Karabakh, the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District are now truly neutral, and the parties have been left to their own devices.

The Armenian Army is best trained for fighting "guerilla" style: infiltration of the dispositions of the enemy's force, ambushes, and so forth. When (and if) things come to a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Armenian Army will undoubtedly be attended by success, at least in the first months of the fighting. A ground corridor between Karabakh and Armenia proper will be created. Shusha and, possibly, Agdam will most likely be taken, but a further offensive is unlikely. The next, perfectly obvious, strategic target is Gyandzha, but the headquarters of two Soviet divisions (motorized rifle and airborne), which could intervene in the fighting, if provoked, are stationed there. In addition, considerable losses, which would be extremely painful for Armenian society, are inevitable in offensive operations.

Thus outbursts of fighting will in the coming years alternate, as previously, with long, fruitless negotiations with general mediation (UN, NATO, CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], Russia, Turkey, and so forth). The potential of Azerbaijan is, as already said, splendid since the correlation of forces will gradually change to its advantage, but decisive victory will not come soon—many years of effort, thousands of casualties, and billions of rubles will be required.

But "peace" in the Transcaucasus could be established earlier also were some outside force to take it up. The Soviet forces billeted in the region are keeping a close watch on the parties' actions and movements and know where they are grouped and their movements and supply depots at each particular moment in time (in the past six months the assignment of the airborne division stationed in Gyandzha has been reconnaissance operations exclusively, with no intervention in events). Given the appropriate order, they could, experts estimate, completely smash both "armies" confronting one another in Karabakh in a few days. But the order will not be given. Not, in any event, until Russia has come to grips with

problems which are closer to it and more important in North Caucasus, the Crimea, Ukraine, and so forth. As a result the Transcaucasus is open to the political, and perhaps not only political, intervention of two old rivals: Turkey and Iran.

Turkey is stronger both militarily and economically, but, as a member of NATO and a candidate for entry into the EC, it is acting (and will continue to act) extremely cautiously, using diplomatic and economic channels to influence the republics of the Transcaucasus. Iran is prepared for more precipitate action, particularly if fighting begins in Nakhichevan Oblast, but the southern front with Iraq is still the main one for Tehran. The supply of small arms and ammunition may be expected, but hardly anything more serious inasmuch as Iran itself is a major arms importer and is dependent on Russia: It needs constant supplies of spares for the Soviet aircraft. In addition, the new Iranian leadership (Khomeini's successors) is less disposed to foreign policy adventures than the former leadership.

There is every reason to believe that outside forces (Turkey, Iran, Russia) will also in the coming years balance one another so the "war of attrition" in the Transcaucasus will most likely continue indefinitely—until the parties' truly total attrition.

Ukrainians Concerned over Fate of Soldiers in Azerbaijan

92UM0791A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
6 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by the Office of Social and Legal Problems: "The Fate of the Sons of Ukraine Is the Fate of Ukraine Itself"]

[Text] The questions servicemen were asking several months ago, for protection against whom and for what are the national armed forces being created, are being given specific answers recently in Armenia and Azerbaijan. For confrontation with the opposing side.

Though the conflict has not yet developed into war according to the rules of operational art and though it is limited to exchanges of fire and mutual destruction of villages and towns, what is taking place cannot be called anything but war. For war, as we know, it is necessary to have competent, trained troops. In turn, commanders make them such. In Azerbaijan, for example, they understand this well. Do you need confirmation? Certainly.

A group of parents whose sons were supposed to graduate from the Baku Higher Combined-Arms Command School this year visited the editorial office. However, in the situation that has developed, the school has been forced to change its location—it cannot endlessly risk the lives of people who by the will of fate have found themselves in an area of interethnic conflicts. The school is moving to Vladikavkaz. It would seem reasonable. But no. The Azerbaijani side has its own view on this account. After announcing the creation of its own armed forces, Baku

"suddenly" encountered the problem of a lack of a sufficient number of officer personnel, personnel capable of professionally training servicemen. Then the gaze of the politicians turned to the graduates of the Baku Higher Combined-Arms Command School and, what is particularly noteworthy, to the Ukrainian graduates. A new playing of the nationality card began. Russia does not need you, Ukraine has abandoned you—the officer candidates heard these and similar maxims almost every day. What follows from all this? It is all very simple. It is being suggested to the future lieutenants to become instructors already today to train the nucleus of the future national army. After promotion and conclusion of contracts to serve in the Azerbaijani Army, they are promised apartments, cars, and pay more than double the amount set by B.N. Yeltsin in Russia. It is also understood that they will spare no money for creating a regular army in Azerbaijan (particularly in today's conditions). But a question arises: What do the Ukrainian lads have to do with this? Hasn't enough Slavic blood been sprinkled over the rocky spurs of the Caucasus Mountains? Is it necessary now to draw these, in essence, mentally immature kids as a third force into a bloody conflict that is alien to them? The answers to these questions, in my view, are clear. At the same time, just understanding the essence of what is taking place is not enough. Both the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense must speak loudly and with weight. And Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk himself, I think, cannot remain on the sidelines in this instance. And not even because it involves our children—part of a young state is at stake, a state, if it is truly civilized, that does not ignore the fates of its citizens, no matter where they are located and no matter how many there are. Therefore, we very much believe that in the near future we will hear how the issue has been decided and, perhaps, the fate of the graduates of the Baku Higher Combined-Arms Command School, your and our fellow countrymen.

Azerbaijan Accused of Paying CIS Troops To Fight Armenians

92UM0785A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 12 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Armen Khanbabayan: "Opinion"]

[Text] The curious details that have become known concerning the recent two days of fighting for the regional center of Askeran in Nagorno-Karabakh make it possible to speak of the nuances of development of the chronic conflict. Specifically, the Internal Affairs Administration of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic established that, in addition to the 2,000 infantrymen of the national army, about 30 tanks, armored personnel vehicles, and armored transport vehicles of the 23d Motorized Rifle Division, 4th Army, of the troops of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] participated in the attack on Askeran on Azerbaijan's side. Intercepts of radio conversations between the crews confirm that servicemen of the CIS were driving the

vehicles. Whereas before soldiers and commanders of the former Soviet Army took part in fighting against the Armenian self-defense forces at the direct orders of their chiefs, now their activities have a different reason—high fees which the Azerbaijani authorities are paying, according to Armenian sources, for the “work” of professional driver-mechanics and artillery gunners. At the same time, the families of those officers and NCO’s who do not have enough enthusiasm are being subjected to great pressure.

On the other hand, subunits of the Gyandzhinskiy Airborne Assault Division, brought into the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic for the withdrawal of the 366th Regiment from Stepanakert, not only performed their direct mission, but also actively interfered with the transfer of Armenian self-defense detachments from the capital of Karabakh to the area of the Azerbaijani attack.

Today there is no direct evidence to confirm that all this is being done at the direction of the top military leadership. But then this is a symptom. It indicates that the institution of mercenary soldiery is ceasing to be something exotic for the military and political reality of the Commonwealth. For the time being, the heads of the sovereign states are puzzled over how, in conditions of the collapse of the army, to prevent the drain of combat specialists abroad, and the military themselves are starting to look for ways to use their professional skills. Their uncertain status also contributes to this. Many of the new states, above all Russia, have not yet officially announced the creation of their own armed forces. Therefore, the people do not know whom they are serving and prefer to hire themselves out where they pay the most. It cannot be ruled out that mercenary soldiery will soon spread not only to Karabakh but also to other regions of the former Soviet Union, where there is a demand for domestic “wild geese.” Therefore, the creation of national armies of the countries of the Commonwealth becomes an extremely urgent task. Russia’s obvious opposition to such an approach is explained by its desire for de facto preservation of common armed forces and control over them. But there is less and less chance of it doing this, and the sooner the person with the rifle knows whom he is serving and to whom he is subordinate, the more quickly one of the principal factors destabilizing social and political life will disappear.

Caucasus Troop Pullout Continues

*92UM0786D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Mar 92 p 3*

[Article by Major P. Litvinov, under the rubric: “Direct Line: Yesterday KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and ITAR-TASS Correspondents Transmitted”: “From the Transcaucasus Military District: The Withdrawal of Army Security Detachments Is Difficult and It Is Even More Difficult To Retake Captured Equipment and To Free Hostages”]

[Text] The withdrawal of army security detachments from the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan is taking place under extremely difficult and unfavorable conditions, especially near the populated areas of Goris and Lachin. Here security detachments have been blockaded by local inhabitants with demands to not withdraw the security detachments (people are afraid of being left face to face with the guerrillas). Or they are requesting that weapons and equipment be transferred to local self-defense detachments.

We have managed to lift the blockades from the security detachments only at the cost of difficult and prolonged negotiations. As of today, nine 7th Army security detachments and eight 4th Army security detachments have still not been withdrawn.

In due course, the Transcaucasus Military District commander requested that the appropriate state structures provide a legal assessment of illegal acts of seizure of weapons at units deployed on the territory of Transcaucasian republics. But all of these appeals have gone unheeded. And now here is the result: theft of equipment is becoming massive in nature. In the area of Sharkhor, Azeri guerrillas seized eight tanks. Of them, six were recaptured and later destroyed by army subunits.

Last Saturday one more officer—Tank Regiment Battalion Commander Major Igor Kolodiy—was added to the list of victims. The officer was traveling in a truck on official business. He was stopped and shot at point-blank range. The driver was released.

On Friday March 13, guerrillas seized as hostages Acting Tank Regiment Commander Lieutenant Colonel V. Kalashnikov and Combat Engineer Company Commander Senior Lieutenant V. Burayev. The hostages were immediately released after the categorical demands of Military District Commander Colonel-General V. Patrikeyev. This occurred at 21:00 local time.

Lithuanian “Radical Forces” Demand Troop Pullout Acceleration

*92UM0786A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Mar 92 Morning edition p 1*

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Nikolay Lashkevich, Vilnius: “The Troop Withdrawal From Lithuania Has Begun But No One Knows When It Will End”]

[Text] “Former Soviet troops must be withdrawn from Lithuania and from the other Baltic states,”—NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner stated this at a press conference at the Lithuanian parliament.

He spent precisely 24 hours in Lithuania and the troop withdrawal was one of the primary topics at almost every meeting with leaders. While answering your correspondent’s question on how, in his opinion, this issue should be resolved and what kind of withdrawal mechanism there can be, he stressed that the political aspects and

principles of the withdrawal cannot be a topic of negotiations since Lithuania is an independent state and in this case the political solution is clear—the troops must withdraw.

Judging by M. Woerner's statements, NATO has focused so intently on this problem because the North Atlantic Alliance has a vested interest in the stability of the Baltic region and in the peaceful resolution of conflict situations. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of increasingly new hotbeds of armed confrontation obviously must alarm NATO. And although Lithuania still has a long way to go to attain membership in NATO, local observers think that the West cannot regard with indifference a threat to the independence of the Baltic states if such a real threat suddenly appears.

Lithuania is afraid to provide any grounds which could be used to drag out the troop withdrawal process. And this is precisely the most painful problem on today's political agenda. In Lithuania, voices of certain national-radicals are ever more loudly calling for and advising unilateral "activation" of this process while obviously alluding to the Transcaucasian scenario if it is impossible to come to an agreement in a civilized manner. We need to hope that the leaders of the two republics are taking into account the danger of such a turn of events. Negotiations between them on the troop withdrawals are making fair to middling progress for the time being.

This uncertainty of positions and the vagueness of the withdrawal plans, while creating the preconditions for activation of radical political forces in Lithuania (the Kaunas Officers Club was arbitrarily seized last week), also do not instill optimism in servicemen who do not have the slightest idea of when and to where they will be withdrawn and what living conditions await them at their new deployment location, etc.

Soon two months will have passed since the day of the first meeting of the Lithuanian and Russian delegations who were resolving troop withdrawal issues. How long do we have to wait for the next decision?

UKRAINE

Ukraine Official Discusses Minsk Military Agreements

92UM0775A Kiev VECHERNIY KIEV in Russian
18 Feb 92 p 1

[Interview with Col L.Ye. Utkin, acting deputy minister for armaments of Ukraine, by VECHERNIY KIEV correspondent under the rubric "Minsk: What Was Decided": "It Does no Harm to Want"]

[Text] Col L.Ye. Utkin, acting deputy minister for armaments of Ukraine, was a member of the panel of experts

which worked out the draft agreements on military matters signed in Minsk by the heads of state of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. Our correspondent talked with him.

[Correspondent] Leonid Yevgenyevich, briefly, what was the climate in which the experts performed their work?

[Utkin] I shall say right off that our delegation found a common language and paths of interaction with the specialists of practically all the states. And if not for the behavior of representatives of former structures of the former Ministry of Defense of the USSR in the person of Col Gen Pyankov, Mar Shaposhnikov's current deputy, and people like him, work on the documents would have proceeded much more rapidly and productively.

[Correspondent] And what form did this take?

[Utkin] Comrade Shaposhnikov himself set the example. At the very first meeting with the delegations he wanted to arrange things as though he were dealing not with authorized agents of the armed forces of independent states but with subordinates whom he had assembled for a regular service briefing.

This was not the main thing, however. He pushed through and pressed upon us the idea of some sort of joint armed forces (OVS) of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], as though we could proceed only from that angle as we set about working out the agreements.

[Correspondent] But that is nothing other than a return to the old ways, to the "Yazov" structures. Once again, a center, dictation....

[Utkin] Precisely. The "leaders" from the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the CIS achieved nothing, however. The work of the experts culminated with the achievement of an entire package of agreements, which were signed by the heads of state.

[Correspondent] If possible, name one of them.

[Utkin] One is called the Agreement on Principles for Providing the Armed Forces of Member States of the Commonwealth with weapons, equipment and materiel, and the Organization of Production Operations at Repair Enterprises and Scientific Research and Experimental Design Work.

[Correspondent] What other agreements were signed in Minsk?

[Utkin] Agreements on rear services, on social protection for servicemen, on the status of the strategic forces, and others.

[Correspondent] Speaking of the strategic forces, who will maintain them, and until when?

[Utkin] These forces are to remain on Ukrainian territory until 31 December 1994. Our republic will maintain them on a shared basis with the other CIS states.

[Correspondent] Did the experts discuss the future of officers who are citizens of Ukraine but are serving outside Ukraine and want to return home?

[Utkin] Yes, this issue was raised. A data bank is presently being compiled for an exchange.

[Correspondent] What do you think of the flight out of Khmel'nitskiy Oblast by the crews of six aircraft, even taking the fighting colors with them?

[Utkin] Permit me to read Article 5 of the aforementioned agreement. It states: "Weapons and equipment belonging to the Strategic Forces of the Commonwealth and the armed forces of the Commonwealth states may not be unilaterally transferred to a new command, re-assigned or privatized while located at repair enterprises outside the state. Decisions unilaterally adopted on such matters are null and void."

As you can see, this refers to equipment under repair. If it ends up for whatever reasons on the territory of another state, it must unquestionably be returned.

Kiev Official on Call-Up

*92UM0775B Kiev VECHERNIY KIEV in Russian
18 Feb 92 p 1*

[Interview with Col Konstantin Kalistratovich Khrol, military commissar of Kiev, by VECHERNIY KIEV correspondent Anatolii Smetanin under the rubric "VK Dossier": "Just Who Is to Protect Kiev?"]

[Text] Col Konstantin Kalistratovich Khrol has been appointed military commissar of Kiev. Our correspondent spoke with him.

[Smetanin] Konstantin Kalistratovich, how did the fall draft go?

[Khrol] I shall be frank. It took place under the most difficult circumstances. We fulfilled the plan by 88%. Despite the fact that our associates, police agencies and even the procuracy were enlisted for the job, only 10 of 100 draftees notified appeared at the military commissariats.

[Smetanin] Many of them were afraid they would be serving outside Ukraine. When the decision was adopted not to send draftees outside the republic—I know this for certain—the flow of new recruits did not increase, but actually decreased....

[Khrol] You are right. With respect to this year's draft, it has not yet been decided whether to conduct it once or twice. The preliminary plan is to draft the youth only in the fall and for a term of 18 months.

[Smetanin] What are the tasks of the city's military commissariats today?

[Khrol] The main task is to register all citizens who have turned 17 years of age. I can say that this work is picking up speed. The military commissariats receive and speak with approximately 30 young men a day. During these

meetings we determine their state of health, learn the reasons for deferments if such are requested, find out who wants to enter a military school and estimate who is to be assigned to which forces.

[Smetanin] And what do they want?

[Khrol] It is difficult to say right now, but last year's situation is alarming us once again. The draftees do not want to report to the military commissariats. And some of those who do report demand to serve in Kiev, practically in the rayon where they live, in order, I believe, to be able to run home in the evening, to take a shower.... We cannot accept this kind of demanding attitude toward the performance of their sacred duty to protect the homeland. In this case, who is going to stand guard over the borders and the tranquility of the people of Ukraine? Or have feelings such as patriotism already been effaced from the hearts of the young people, their parents and school teachers?

For our part, we are going to step up our efforts and do everything possible to see that the draftees do not forget that they are men, and it is their duty—as long as the times demand it—to become soldiers and honorably serve out the prescribed term in our Ukrainian army. We hope that the mass media will support us.

Former Kiev MD Commander Implicated in Scandal

*92UM0743A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
19 Feb 92 p 3*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel of Militia G. Omelchenko, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Officers Union: "For Whose Needs Did Chechevatov Hide the Toyotas?"]

[Text] After the republic's mass media reported "imprisonment" of Japanese Toyotas in Kiev by Colonel-General V. Chechevatov, former Commander of the Kiev Military District, who allegedly intended to take possession of them, readers sent many requests to the editor's office of NARODNAYA ARMIYA and to the few newspapers that now circulate throughout all of the Ukraine for further details on this story.

It took us a little while to find one of the most active participants of this act of "imprisonment"—Lieutenant-Colonel of Militia Grigoriy Omelchenko, one of our former writers. He has been extremely busy all of these days as a candidate for Ukrainian people's deputy for Zaluzhnyy Election District No 7, Kiev. The election is to take place on 1 March, and he has been meeting with voters. Nonetheless the request by readers has been fulfilled. A brief description of the election platform of the people's deputy candidate, for whom many of our readers will be voting, is published concurrently [omitted from the translation].

What do you think is the price of a new Japanese Toyota automobile in Soviet wooden rubles seeing their last days in the Ukraine? Don't be so quick to apply the rate of exchange of rubles for American dollars or Japanese yen. There is another rate of exchange established by Colonel-General V. Chechevatov, former commander of the Kiev Military District. But more about that later.

According to Colonel E. Karchmarchik, chief of the construction directorate of the Kiev Military District, two new Japanese Toyotas were received for the needs of the Kiev Military District in exchange for new Ural automobiles that were just as new (they had just rolled off of the conveyer) in May or June of last year in the town of Chuna, Krasnoyarsk Kray on orders of the district's leadership.

Having traveled around 6,000-7,000 kilometers under their own power, the Toyotas reached Kiev uneventfully. For half a year both vehicles were stored first on district territory and then at Military Motor Pool No 513 located at 90/1, Pobeda Prospect.

In mid-January military servicemen suddenly discovered that one of them had disappeared unexpectedly without its license plates, leaving no trace behind. But as they say, you can't have smoke without fire. Two servicemen (we are withholding their names for the moment) came to the Ukrainian Officers Union and told what they knew about the mysterious disappearance of the Toyotas. When asked why they didn't take their information to the district's military procurator, the officers replied that they did not trust the procurator, Major-General of Justice A. Frolov, because according to documented facts at their disposal, on several previous occasions he had covered for shady deals involving misappropriations and self-interested and other abuses by the district's generals, including Chechevatov himself. In the words of the officers the district's leadership in turn left justice officers alone. There is a considerable amount of substantial evidence of this. Here is just one fact: Lieutenant-General V. Osokin gave Frolov a new vehicle without any red tape in trade for a broken-down procuracy vehicle. Here's an interesting detail: Osokin, who was doing quite well in building dachas and obtaining motor vehicles for himself and his sons, had his eyes on a high post in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

On Monday, 3 February Kiev City Soviet Deputy V. Roshchin, associates of the State Motor Vehicle Inspection and of the Military Counterintelligence Department of the Ukrainian SNB [State Security Service] and representatives of the public accompanied me in a search for the missing Toyota. We found it where it had been well-hidden by General Chechevatov. There is a street by the name of Yagolnaya on the outskirts of Kiev, where the hospital of the Ukrainian border troops is located behind a high barbed wire fence. There is a garage behind various outbuildings on the territory of the hospital. In this garage, in the far left corner, in a cage made from welded wire mesh, with a large lock on the

door, there stood the hidden Japanese "beauty" of a dark blue color—the color of a raven's wings.

Next to the garage our group discovered mounds of hidden bricks and construction materials. There were no repairs underway at the hospital at this time, by the way.

Hospital chief Colonel Ye. Zolotoboyev explained to us that in late December of last year General A. Borisov telephoned from the border troops directorate (telephone privileges are still alive and well here!) and ordered him to find room within territory under his jurisdiction in which to store a Japanese motor vehicle. He naturally could not refuse such an order. The Toyota was driven over some time around 10-12 January. No one presented any documents on the motor vehicle, and no one asked for them.

Colonel V. Kolyada, chief of the hospital's materials and equipment supply department, and the garage chief added to what their superior said, explaining that a Colonel Voloshenko had in fact driven the Toyota to the hospital garage on the indicated days and parked it there himself. A few days later Chechevatov came to the hospital together with Bubnov, chief of the armored equipment department. The commander gave orders to enclose the vehicle in a metal cage and demanded that steps be taken to make sure that the Toyota did not receive a single scratch.

Welder V. Torgunskiy carried out the instructions. After this the vehicle was parked in the metal cage and locked in. Chechevatov took the keys to the Toyota and the lock. As he left he gave orders to keep a close watch on the vehicle. The colonel general obviously knew that he would soon be parting with his commander's chair. And so he was preparing for this ahead of time.

The Toyota we discovered had no license plates, the chassis number was 8007000580, and the engine number was 0017763. At the time of its inspection the speedometer showed that the vehicle had been driven a total of 31434 kilometers. Consequently someone had managed to put over 20,000 kilometers on the Toyota on Ukrainian roads.

Colonel Karchmarchik and Lieutenant-Colonel Toporov explained that the Toyota had been driven out of Kiev on several occasions, including two or three times to Cherkassy Oblast. Turn special attention to this oblast.

According to documents submitted by Karchmarchik (they were video-taped) the Toyota hidden in the hospital garage had supposedly been sold already to the Borisfen Association in Kanev, Cherkassy Oblast for R55,000 (?). In the Colonel's words, Chechevatov had personally given orders to sell the Toyota for precisely this amount. Now you know Chechevatov's exchange rate of rubles for dollars, if you consider that the cost of this Toyota model is around \$50,000-55,000.

According to assertions made by Karchmarchik and Toporov the vehicle sold was not transferred to Borisfen

for the reason that this association supposedly did not have its own company seal yet, and therefore there was nothing with which to attest the Toyota's transfer certificate. One other "mystery." This time it has to do with the sealess Borisfen.

Karchmarchik naturally could not furnish the necessary documents (a customs certificate on the imported Japanese vehicles, the plant documents on them, and others) for the purchase of this and the second Toyota at the forestry enterprise in Krasnoyarsk Kray. The colonel asserted that only a purchase-sale contract had been drafted for these vehicles, and that the former owner had given him no other documents. It seems as if he was not interested in how the Toyota got from Japan to Krasnoyarsk Kray at the time the purchase documents were filled out.

Such are the naive explanations of a military builder who had managed to climb to the rank of a colonel.

Nor was Karchmarchik able to explain why the hidden Toyota had still not been registered.

The second Toyota is in storage at Military Motor Pool No 513, and it bears a license number of 32-29 MO. The chassis number is 8007000627, and the engine number is 0018549. At the time of inspection the speedometer read 21,700 kilometers. Motor pool workers reported that this Toyota was to be sold to one of the deputies of the former commander.

On the day of discovery of the missing Toyota its careful guardian, who displayed a fatherly concern for its safety away from human eyes, also surfaced. That evening Colonel-General Chechevatov telephoned from the Transbaykal, giving strict orders to his especially close friend and "agent" Colonel Karchmarchik to get the Toyota out of the hospital garage, using any excuse to do so. It is evident that Chechevatov still feels himself to be the commander of the Kiev Military District, and certain colonels his faithful servants. Later that evening Karchmarchik made an attempt to carry out the order. But the diligent colonel probably forgot that he is now living and serving (for the moment) in an independent Ukraine, where everyone must follow only Ukrainian laws, and carry out the orders of government and administration agencies of the Ukraine, rather than those of Transbaykal generals.

We forwarded the materials of the inspection to the procurator's office, which will clear up all of the details of the case of Chechevatov's Toyota.

And now a postscript. Chechevatov had acquired considerable experience in buying and selling motor vehicles in Kiev. One can only imagine the story behind the sale of the government ZIL that we had admired earlier in November parades in the Ukrainian capital! But that's a subject for another article.

Organization to Train Demobilized Officers

92UM0718A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
20 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent V. Bolodurin under the rubric "For the Issue": "A Monkey Wrench Into the Works"]

[Text] We know that the reorganization of the armed forces of Ukraine involves a considerable reduction of their numerical strength. Where are the energetic and professionally trained young officers to turn when they are asked to leave the military service?

While the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is only thinking about the problem of finding employment for those being released into the reserve, the Temp Interbranch Scientific and Technological Center and the Galician Bank have jointly demonstrated initiative and set up manager-training courses, assuming all the expenses themselves.

On 1 February 1992 215 reserve officers (and officers about to be released) began training at the Institute of Political Science and Social Management. In five months they would have become good specialists, had an impediment not been placed in their way all of a sudden.

The other day representatives of Kiev State University [KGU] and the Ministry of Higher Education and a bailiff came to reclaim a building placed at the disposal of KGU by a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

"It is sad that the interests of those officers who had begun the training are not being taken into account," says Temp chairman V. Bakunin. "It is very easy to disband the group, but no one wants to bother looking after the military personnel."

Reserve Capt Vladimir Malyuga and Sr Lt Aleksandr Brylev spoke with great regret about what has happened.

"We will protest it," they announced, speaking for all the students in the courses.

We have learned that they have already filed a complaint with the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

Do our deputies have the understanding and sensitivity to look after the military personnel, with action and not just in the form of lip service, to prevent a good initiative for the employment of those being released into the reserve from being ruined?

'Commercial Center' Director Interviewed

92UM0718B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
20 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Lt Col Georgiy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov, acting general director of the Commercial Center of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, by a NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent, under the rubric "On the

Approaches to a Market": "A Commercial Center Has Been Set up Under the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine"]

[Text] Social protection for servicemen requires extremely substantial financial and material resources. Military property, real estate and equipment offer great possibilities for accomplishing this. The Commercial Center was set up under the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to oversee the sale of these assets and to see that efficient use is made of the proceeds.

Our correspondent met with Lt Col Georgiy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov, acting general director of the Commercial Center, and asked him to tell in detail about the prospects for this newly established structure.

[Correspondent] Why was it necessary to establish the Commercial Center under the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine?

[Kuznetsov] The National Security Service and the Ministry of Defense have received and continue to receive many alarming reports of the selling-off of military supplies, equipment and weapons belonging to the armed forces of Ukraine.

The activities of the Nevikon-Zyuyd company of Sevastopol is a conspicuous example of this. Members of the Black Sea Fleet's higher command element have helped with its organization and promoted its extensive operations in the units and subunits. Without producing anything at all, this company has fairly smoothly set up an operation to exact super-profits by buying property and equipment at clearance prices, without the knowledge of the Ministry of Defense, and selling it on the exchange at commercial prices.

It needs to be pointed out that not a ruble of these profits obtained from the illegal sale of property of the armed forces of Ukraine has gone into their coffers.

I could mention many other organizations which have taken advantage of the slogan of social protection for servicemen presently in vogue and begun setting up various joint-stock companies without bothering to coordinate this with the Ministry of Defense.

Personally, I am not against joint-stock companies, exchanges, joint or small enterprises. In such a complex and rigidly centralized system as the Ministry of Defense such activities should at the very least be directed and monitored by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. And it is not a matter of wanting to have all newly emerged businessmen stand at attention in formation on the part of the military leadership. Only the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has complete information on the needs of the armed forces today and in the distant future. It is our ministry which is authorized to specify what kinds of equipment may be sold into the civilian economy, and how much.

Furthermore, surprisingly, we have to demonstrate to certain businessmen in shoulder boards that the Ministry of Defense is the one to decide how the profits from such transactions are to be used.

[Correspondent] What will be the operating principles of the Commercial Center?

[Kuznetsov] We shall perform our job in strict accordance with the Statute on the Commercial Activities of the Center, laws of Ukraine, orders and directives from the minister of defense on this matter.

The functioning of the Commercial Center is monitored by a monitoring council headed by the minister of defense. The council members also include his deputies. Only this council is authorized to specify what portion of the profits will be used to fund which programs.

[Correspondent] What does the Commercial Center's leadership see as their main missions and areas of work?

[Kuznetsov] The main mission is to serve as middleman in the sale of excess military equipment, weapons and property. The proceeds from this will be used for the construction of housing for servicemen and in the area of production, and will be invested in joint enterprises for profit. It is planned to invest funds also in small production enterprises, at which officers and warrant officers released into the reserve will be given priority for employment.

Part of the profit will be used as incentives for military units offering the equipment for sale. The unit commander must have an incentive to prepare the equipment for sale by making it commercially attractive.

Social, construction, production and scientific programs are presently being developed, on the implementation of which the Commercial Center plans to spend the main funds.

[Correspondent] But according to the recently passed Law on Social Protection for Servicemen and Their Families we are not authorized to engage in commercial activities. To what extent does your participation in these activities conform to the law?

[Kuznetsov] Officers are indeed forbidden to engage in commerce. We are a component of the government military structure, however. We are not authorized to be co-founders of any enterprises. And we have no share in the Commercial Center's statutory fund. Absolutely all profits go to the Ministry of Defense. This is why we are not violating the letter of the law in performing our service duties within the structure of the Commercial Center.

[Correspondent] And one last question. What problems are coming up in connection with the establishment of the Commercial Center?

[Kuznetsov] We do not have a shortage of problems. We are acutely in need of a building suitable for our operation. The staff is inadequate, and we are not authorized to spend money not yet earned to maintain it. We have to build a computer base as soon as possible, and establish close contacts with our own and foreign companies. In short, we are up to our ears in work. We took on this heavy burden ourselves, however, and we shall make every effort to get it off and running. Those who follow us will have it easier.

Roundtable Discussion Views Military Issues

AU0603125992 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU
in Ukrainian 20 Feb 92 pp 1,2

[Roundtable discussion involving Ukrainian military and political figures at the ZA VILNU UKRAYINU editor in chief's office in Lvov; date not given: "The Army of Ukraine: At the Beginning of a New Road"]

[Text] After leaders of major industrial enterprises visited the popular newspaper to discuss the economic situation and the strategy of survival in the conditions of the transition to market relations, their seats at the "round table" in the editor in chief's office were occupied by representatives of sovereign Ukraine's Armed Forces from the Carpathian Military District and the National Guard. The participants in the conversation included Lieutenant-General Valeriy Stepanov, Commander of the Carpathian Military District; Major-General Volodymyr Antonets, Commander of the Air Forces; Colonel Serhiy Chetverov, Commander of the Iron [Zalizna] Division; Colonel Volodymyr Lysenko, Deputy Commander of the Lvov Border Troops Detachment; Colonel Volodymyr Petenko, Chief of the Ukrainian National Guard Directorate for Combat and Special Training; Colonel Yaroslav Yaniv, Commander of the Fifth Guards division; Major Petro Kostyuk, Chief of the National Guard Administration's Department for Educational and Information Services; Stepan Davymuka, first deputy chairman of the Lvov Oblast Executive Committee; and Vira Lyaskovska, deputy chairman of the Oblast Executive Committee. The conversation was presided over by Vasyl Baziv, editor in chief of ZA VILNU UKRAYINU.

[Baziv] Today, the army theme is a priority one for our newspaper, just like the Army in general is a priority matter in the development of the Ukrainian state. It must be pointed out openly: At different times, we wrote differently about the Army. However, it was not due to the subjective attitude of journalists, but to the place occupied by the army in the course of the Ukrainian national liberation revolution.

We are pleased that the thesis that we have consistently proclaimed has come true: The army must be outside politics and subordinate to the government elected by the people.

We could start with a review of the situation that has taken shape within the troops in the course of taking the

oath of allegiance to Ukraine, because this is the first important stage in the creation of the Armed Forces.

[Davymuka] The idea of the creation of our own Armed Forces fought its way through with difficulty; this took a long time and was not simple. Do you remember the Supreme Council debate at the beginning? This idea in the Declaration of State Sovereignty was first officially voiced as a right of the Ukrainian people and sounded quite indecisive. We must do justice to the Supreme Council, which, as the situation developed further, has shown consistency, wisdom, and resoluteness in implementing this idea. I would like to point out that this is, perhaps, the only example when an extremely complicated problem was being resolved ahead of schedule and in a concerted manner. This is a very important aspect. At the regional level, we have always wanted reforms in the army from above only, so that their burden would not have fallen on the military units and the personnel.

[Stepanov] The right to create our own armed forces was obtained at the conference of the heads of states that was held in Minsk at the end of the last year. The realization of this right for Ukraine started on 3 January 1992. Based on the agreement on the Armed Forces and Border Troops, the decrees issued by the Supreme Council chairman and then by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Minister of Defense Kostyantyn Morozov, the formation of the Armed Forces began. The ground troops began taking the military oath on 12 January and, on a broad scale, it started on 18 January. Approximately 80 percent of the officers and warrant officers and about 60 percent of sergeants and soldiers in compulsory service took the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. Not everywhere was this process painless. This was due to the fact that the Army was and is now multinational and that among those who serve in it, apart from Ukrainians, there are also representatives of Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Belarus, and Russia. Among my close assistants, everybody swore the oath of allegiance, with the exception of the first deputy who had signed an obligation. All Army commanders and almost all commanders of formations also took the oath. The first deputy still holds his post.

The Supreme Council will decide the question of the numerical size of the Armed Forces, and we will decide locally in which way to restructure the army to make it combat ready and ready at any moment to come to the defense of our borders and our people.

In view of the fact that the Carpathian Military District is in a special situation and has four state borders—with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary—this, it must be said, places upon us special obligations regarding educating and training the troops. We will take all measures to see to it that the troops stationed on the territory of the Carpathian Military District could properly defend the interests of Ukraine.

[Baziv] Is your predecessor General Skokov now in Lvov?

[Stepanov] Yes, he is in Lvov, but I am the Acting Commander of the District. Viktor Vasylyovych is staying here as a guest....

[Antonets] Our personnel continued to take the oath until 30 January. **By now, 72 percent of officers and 94 percent of warrant officers have taken oaths—these are largely local residents** and there are no special problems. The greatest problems that arise concern soldiers—only 56 percent of them have taken the oath. The thing is that the collectives are extremely multinational. Regarding that 72 percent, this does not mean that 28 percent refused to take the oath. No, only 13 percent did not express such a desire, while the rest were sick or were away on commission or on vacation.

Nobody is asking anymore whether the independent Ukrainian state needs to have its own army. The Army is necessary, it will exist, and it has already been created. However, with the taking of the oath of allegiance, everything just starts.

What should be done with those officers who have not taken the oath? A decision was adopted that the department of personnel (so far within the VPS [expansion unknown]) will send our Army the lists of those officers who want to serve in Ukraine and I, on my part, will send them the lists of those who want to leave Ukraine. This work was begun, but then incomprehensible commands began to come, and it stopped. Nothing was clear, there were hesitations, hopes were pinned upon the Minsk meeting, and so on. Meanwhile, it is known to me that, in Khabarovsk, there are 900 applications from aviation officers who want to serve in Ukraine, 400—in Transbaykal region, 400—in St. Petersburg, and so on.

The situation is worse regarding rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants. At first there were 2,600 soldiers who refused to take the oath. Since that time 600 persons expressed a wish to complete their Army service here without going anywhere else. Therefore, about 2,000 soldiers need to be sent away because they have not taken the oath of allegiance and do not want to serve here. These are largely people from Central Asia and Transcaucasus; a small number were called to arms from the territory of Russia and other republics. There was an agreement to send them away in exchange for those who do not take the oath of allegiance to the CIS or Russia, but when it came to the implementation, we received an instruction from Moscow not to do any changes because this, as they put it, is against the law, undermines combat readiness, and destroys the system of cadres training, mobilization possibilities, and so on. Thus, there still are people among our military leaders who believe that we, here in Ukraine, act improperly. It appears that they contemplate a possibility of returning to single Armed Forces, something that is out of the question. I think that these people simply do not understand what is taking place in political reality....

[Baziv] There can never be a single Armed Forces, because there will never be an empire within the borders

of the former USSR. Never, because there is no force in the world that would be able to put together what used to be called the Soviet Union.

[Chetverov] We gathered in our division for a conference so that officers themselves, without any orders, could determine their attitude toward taking the oath. I, as the commander of the division, stated that I was in favor of taking the oath of allegiance to Ukraine, but no pressure at all should be exerted upon anyone and everybody was expected to take his decision independently. Sixty percent of the division took the oath. Regarding the remaining 40 percent, the reason is the same: They are representatives of Central Asia, Transcaucasus, Russia, and so on.

If an Azerbaijani has not taken the oath of allegiance to Ukraine—is it good or bad? I think that it is normal. We spoke to them frankly, and the talks were approximately of this content. You will return to Azerbaijan and will take an oath of allegiance to your people? —Yes, I will. Do you expect your close comrade, for example, a Ukrainian, to also respect this law and this custom? —Yes, I do. Then you, too, please show respect for what is going on around you here on the Ukrainian land.... We achieved understanding.

Of course, there were problems. For example, there appeared officers in our Army who, after taking the oath, somewhat lowered their activity and the willingness to work, even though they had signed the contract.

The Ukrainian Army has a legal basis, and we must resolve the practical question of numerical strength. It is absolutely necessary to transfer those who have refused to take the oath. Today, they are already inferior soldiers. They are in no mood to shoot, drive army vehicles, or undergo proper training. It is also possible to understand the officers: Why should they train a person who will leave this country in another week or month?

We have now found ourselves in the conditions of a very limited supply of fuel and oil materials; our financial possibilities are very poor; we cannot use up too much munition, and the maintenance of military technology is very difficult. Therefore, reorganization must be done as quickly as possible—the sooner the Ukrainian soldiers return here, the better for the cause.

I am in favor of granting the divisions the right to send small groups—about 10 or 15 servicemen at a time—to their own republics. The question of officers must also be resolved bilaterally.

[Lysenko] Border guards have specific problems. Until recently, we were at the border with fraternal countries, and we had to deal with everything that had not been detected at the previous stage. Now we must strengthen the border even with Moldova, which has opened its border with Romania. Besides, people arrived here mainly to complete their military service, and therefore, for example, a major is in charge of a company or of the communications services.

Nowhere in Ukraine are there places for training border guards, even though almost all of our children go to study at schools for border guards. Rumors reach us from Moscow that they will serve in Armenia or in Georgia. There are only three such schools: Two in Moscow and one in Alma-Ata.

We need to change a lot of things. For example, there is such a paradoxical situation: Kryuchkov is in prison, but his instructions continue to be effective. Only about two years ago we were referred to as conquerors, and now it will take a long time to convince people that this is not so. Moreover, when there were Young Pioneer and Komsomol organizations, some work was conducted with them, and they assisted the border guards. Nobody is doing that now. The Ukrainian school has not yet found its way to the border.

[Yaniv] The history of the National Guard began to be written on 4 November 1990, and in western Ukraine it came to life on 19 December 1991. The taking of the oath was a festive occasion for us, and no questions arose. Eighteen percent of Russians took the oath of allegiance to Ukraine. There were also Ossetians and Georgians.

Our main task is the protection of Ukraine's constitutional structure. We have been working on this since the very first day. Our training center is very small, and we hope that the commander will help us. We have received much assistance from local oblast, city, and even rayon councils. We have not remained indebted to them, either. For example, we now help protect public order in Lvov. There already are many heroic episodes in the life of the guardsmen: A robber was detained and a human life saved.

We will soon receive new uniforms, so far [we wear?] "Afghan" ones. The new uniform is very beautiful—it uses patterns of other armies of civilized states.

Among other things, the Guard conducts educational work and assists in taking oaths by reservists. The task is as follows: The guardsman must become a model and constitute an elite.

[Petenko] The Guard is getting support at different levels, and there are attempts to assist it, but this proceeds slower than we would like it to proceed. The main cause here is the policy toward Ukraine and the military formations in Ukraine on the part of the leadership of the former Union. Only 24 percent of officers who were born in Ukraine were kept on Ukrainian land. The internal troops that have provided a basis for the creation of the National Guard have only 10 percent Ukrainian-born officers. There are no problems concerning taking the oath in the Guard, because if a person refuses to take the oath, he automatically cannot become a guard. There are many dedicated Russians who also work well.

The material base of the Internal Troops cannot serve as the basis for the Guard. You know quite well that it is

only with an area greater than 3000 hectares that there may be talk of a military center. Then it is possible to train soldiers, but now our structure is close to that of a motorized rifle regiment.

[Baziv] It is hard to disagree with Serhiy Oleksiyovych's [Chetverov's] statement to the effect that a soldier without an oath is not a soldier upon whom the state may rely. If you have not taken the oath, you must return home. I quite agree with the commander of the Iron Division who says that an understanding of this situation must be "as firm as iron." Therefore, we will have to face social problems associated with redeployment and other factors. We must not forget that the Ukrainian Army is going to be smaller that the subunits of the Soviet Army stationed in Ukraine. Well, the return of the troops from Europe.... The army will not be able to resolve these problems without coordination with the supreme and local authorities.

[Davymuka] Of course, the present situation requires a more concerted coordination with the Army, first and foremost, regarding drafting, provision of the Army with foodstuffs, housing, and so on. There are many problems associated with control and ecology. Similarly to our economy, which was oriented toward the entire Union, the military units were oriented toward a certain structure, and this generated additional problems.

We in the Oblast Executive Committee are literally choking under the burden of applications from officers requesting to be transferred to our oblast. However, as we hear, these problems are being resolved with great difficulty. The situation regarding the budget is also quite complicated, and we are compelled to halt construction, two-thirds of which was the responsibility of the Oblast Executive Committee. This will undoubtedly affect the provision of officers with housing. The elaboration of a joint decision by the city and oblast executive committees, on the one hand, and the military council, on the other, is nearing completion. There exist problems involving conversion and the reorientation of production. We have four very good repair enterprises employing skilled workers, and they must be kept. It was decided in Kiev to register our tank-building plant both as a plant and a military unit....

[Lyaskovska] In connection with the fact that Lvov is a headquarters city, the executive committee has to tackle problems that concern all those oblasts that are within the Carpathian Military District. Soldiers from all over Ukraine and from other countries return here, and we have no right to give more attention to residents of Lvov than to them. We realize that the Army is now in serious need of moral and material support. We must relieve the social tension due to the return of soldiers. We have good contacts that enable us to maintain ties directly with units and not via the district headquarters or the commandant's office. Unfortunately, we have done almost nothing to help the officers. There was only a tentative agreement with Valeriy Mykolayovych [Stepanov]. A

legal group that will include cadre officers and operations officials (having at their disposal a computerized data bank on officers' migration) must be created. Of course, the flow "toward us" will be much stronger than "away from us."

We must not wait for circulars sent from above. Whatever we do today will be assimilated tomorrow in other districts, just as was the case before. It must be admitted that high officials in the Carpathian Military District are very slow in moving; apparently, they are afraid to show initiative.

All apartments that are left by officers who do not want to swear allegiance must be reserved for the Army and not put on the general waiting list. They must be reserved for those who return to Ukraine after wandering throughout the "immense motherland" [preceding two words published in Russian].

[Baziv] In my opinion, it would be worthwhile to create a coordination and information organ in which both the government and the Army would be represented, an organ that would tackle all socioeconomic problems of the Army. Incidentally, it would be a good idea if civilians became members of the Military Council; once, this was the case of first secretaries of oblast committees....

[Stepanov] When I was an Army commander, our executive committee chairman was a member of the Army's Military Council.

[Lyaskovska] If there was one such representative in the Army, there must be at least three in the district council....

[Stepanov] It is not only the Armed Forces that are being formed, but laws, too.

There are still no statutes, but a working group has already been created to deal with this. Major-General Kondratenko, my deputy, is its leader. I think that we will have our own statutes this year.

[Kostyuk] As a young state that has just been born, we are confronted with two cardinal problems: economic and military. It is, perhaps, easier to resolve the former, because the economy knows no borders, and every person has his specific interest in it. Do we, today, have an Army in the full meaning of this word? No, we do not. We have people who have sworn allegiance to Ukraine. General Antonets aptly pointed out that everything is just starting. However, on the scale of the entire state, we do not have a single organ that would make forecasts.

It is necessary to create, without delay, a Ukrainian military institute that will have departments teaching various military disciplines. We do not even know how much time we are given to build our own Army and from which side it is more expedient to get down to this work. The press, the radio, and the television almost ignore the military topics....

[Petenko] To this day, we bashfully keep silent about whom we, after all, consider to be our adversary. We still

have no military doctrine. If we ask ourselves a question of how military forces of any country are created, then the pinpointing of a potential adversary and of his military potential must take precedence and only after that a military doctrine must be created. The bashful silence may, perhaps, be accounted for by the fact that, psychologically, we do not find the courage to admit: it is not only from the West that we may expect the offensive by an economic and political adversary. However, this is my personal opinion. Consequently, we must start from a military doctrine—then it will be easier to resolve other questions of the development of our Armed Forces.

I quite agree. It is very difficult to create an army, particularly its officers corps. Our attitude toward Lenin is now quite critical, but we must admit that he was right in some things. In particular, this refers to his work on the Capri [kapriyska] school in which he wrote that everything depends on educators. The outlook of the "educators" who are in charge of preparing our army has remained almost unchanged. I, therefore, believe that we must, first of all, introduce changes at the upper levels of the military hierarchy. What do I have in mind? Recently, a new person was appointed Commander of the Carpathian Military District. What is the Carpathian Military District? This is, perhaps, half of the entire Ukrainian Army. Why does the district not emerge as an initiator in the elaboration of new army statutes or even of a military doctrine? It has a fully formed headquarters and wonderful officers, whereas our Ministry of Defense has just begun to be formed. I think that the minister of defense would not object to such initiatives.

[Baziv] It seems to me that the doctrine follows from the political situation and from the state's specifically expressed national interest. Frankly speaking, over the two and one-half months of the existence of our state, it has not yet explicitly manifested its national interest. What are our state's foreign policy principles? There are none. We know from everyday life that our relations with Russia are complicated and that this is, largely, not our fault. We are also joining common European processes. On what basis? On the basis of a satellite or a second-rate country or on an equal basis? We expect (I believe that the question of the Black Sea Fleet will be resolved in our favor) to have certain interests in the Middle East as a European state that is second largest after Russia. We are not indifferent to the development of events in the Arab world. We must remember that we will probably have common military interests with Russia regarding China, on so on. Therefore, a new geopolitical situation is taking shape. However, it has not yet been reflected in the Ukrainian state's external policy from which our military doctrine must crystallize. However, our military geopolitical strategists must also think over these problems jointly with civilian politicians.

[Davymuka] Two complexes are at work here: On the one hand, Russia cannot give up its imperial thinking,

and, on the other, Ukraine cannot get rid of its inferiority complex. This is particularly felt in our relations with various international organizations; ties with them is the shortest way to the broad world. In fact, Ukraine has not established proper relations with them. Some of these organizations specialize in military questions: They offer expertise and advice on the creation or reorganization of an army, and so on. It would not, therefore, be a bad idea to make use of their services and experience.

[Petenko] The best war is the one that is won even before it starts. After all, the entire state policy must be oriented toward this. To be able to at least hope for such an outcome, it is necessary to form new military-political alliances.

You see how Russia is opposed to the creation of Ukraine's own Armed Forces. Before I arrived in Lvov, I had to work with officers of the Kiev Military District over documents that arrived from Moscow and that dealt with the meeting of CIS presidents. According to them, 60 percent of all troops that are stationed in Ukraine belong to the strategic forces. If we also take into account international agreements that ban the concentration of troops greater than present on certain territories, then almost nothing remains for Ukraine's own army. In other words, every paragraph of the aforementioned Moscow documents contains some reservation aimed at maintaining the dependence of Ukraine on CIS and at depriving our state of the possibility to withdraw from the military alliance in 1994.

Let us now think. Who will attack us? Hungary or Czechoslovakia, which have everything? Or maybe that neighbor who is hungrier than we are? Let us look in the opposite direction: Why are the Poles reinforcing their borders with Ukraine? Because they believe that we are much worse off than they are and that we may want their bread. However, we have our own bread, and, therefore, we must see to it that it remains protected from possible attempts of those who are hungrier than we are. After all, this has become a rule: He who forgets his own history must live it through again....

[Antonets] Of course, the formulation of the question on the military doctrine is perfectly justified. However, what must it be like? This is a very serious question. To be able to talk of a military doctrine, we must divide this notion into two constituent parts: political and military-technological. The political part of the doctrine is the prerogative for the country's higher political leadership. Regarding the military-technological part, it determines, first and foremost, trends of the development of the Armed Forces, directions of military training, and so on. Can we now build Ukrainian Armed Forces precisely in the given direction, if no suitable conditions have been created for this?

First, it is certainly necessary to send home those people who refused to swear allegiance to Ukraine, for one reason or another.

Second (and this is a very important point that we are hushing up more bashfully than we do others), there are quite a number of officers in our Army, senior officers, from colonels on up, who swore allegiance only because in Ukraine they have good apartments, summer houses, garages, and so on. They have long dreamed of serving here and achieved this by the end of their career. That is why they are ready to take any oath just to maintain the achieved "goal." Therefore, as we proceed to building our national Armed Forces, it is necessary to resolve these two questions. Then, possibly, the military doctrine will be what Ukraine needs.

[Stepanov] I want to add to what Volodymyr Mykhaylovych [Antonets] said that the doctrine has a strictly military aspect, in addition to the political and technological one. A certain transitional period is necessary for the creation of our own Armed Forces. It is true that the troops have been re-subordinated, but this is not enough. It is necessary to create new structures and change the doctrine not only proceeding from the awareness of who is our potential adversary. We the military must be real professionals ready for action in various situations and conditions, not excluding extreme ones that may be expected from any direction.

[Baziv] Generally speaking, it seems to me that the political leadership of Ukraine occupies an excessively pacifist position. Disarmament, disarmament, and again disarmament. Is the United States in a hurry to disarm? We cannot observe any disarmament in Western Europe—not even in the case of our closest neighbors. It seems to us that the whole world will take an awful liking to us if we declare that we have become nuclear-free, submachine gun-free, and tank-free, and will remain here with bows [and arrows]; we think that everybody will support the Ukrainian state for this....

To the last moment, I hesitated whether to publish the article "Wise Tactics or a Premature Step" that was sent to us from Canada by Lyubomyr Lutsyuk, professor in the Department of Politics and Economics of the Royal Military School. The main thesis of his material is this: while being the world's third largest nuclear state, Ukraine is absolutely wrong to deprive itself of the status of a nuclear state. This is wrong, indeed. It is necessary to declare one's striving to become a nuclear-free state, but do this in the context of the entire world. Yes, we are ready to disarm, but do so together with the United States, China, and other countries and on the conditions that Baghdad, Islamabad, and others will not arm themselves. Therefore, the policy pursued by Kravchuk in this sphere is not a trump, but rather an Achilles' heel of his policy.

[Petenko] We must not be so sure that our tragic history will never recur. We must prepare Ukraine for defense and not for aggression. I understand this perfectly well. I also realize that, tomorrow, the control of all affairs may no longer be in the hands of Yeltsin, but, for example, in those of Zhirinovskiy [Russian Liberal Democratic Party

leader]. Therefore, I consider the French concept of deterrence about which the world first heard back in 1954 to still be topical.

[Baziv] In politics, the territory and the size of the population are of utmost importance. However, let us take India as an example. Possessing a large territory and population, it plays a rather minor role in the world politics. On the other hand, let us look at Great Britain or France—countries that are much smaller in terms of the above parameters. Let us admit that the place that they occupy in the world is not only due to their economic potential, but, to a large extent, to the availability of a nuclear potential. This is a weighty political factor. It must not be used in the struggle against another state, but to compel the other side to regard you as an equal partner at the negotiating table. If we rid ourselves of this factor, we will at once and voluntarily assign ourselves the role of a second-rate state in the world geopolitics. [Stepanov] Of course, it is difficult to discuss the decision of the supreme leadership. I personally also believe that the powerful weapons at our disposal are a stabilizing factor.

[Davymuka] There is no doubt that nuclear weapons are a stabilizing factor in the relatively unstable region in which we live. This statement is justified both regarding the newly created states that used to constitute the USSR and regarding European states.

[Baziv] A possible expansion of the nuclear-free corridor from Moscow to Paris will automatically transform all the countries within this corridor into a high-risk zone.

[Davymuka] Where are the guarantees that the nuclear weapons now taken to Russia, allegedly for destruction, will not, after all, remain weapons that are aimed against us? We do not have a reliable system of control....

[Stepanov] Reduction of nuclear weapons must proceed on a par with others—simultaneously with them and not unilaterally.

[Baziv] One has an impression that we continue to be hostages to the following stereotype: As though now, when we have no communism, the Western world will fall into our arms. Wishful thinking! Humanism is no more than a beautiful word. The world is primarily guided by its own national interests. Stability in the world is a balance of these interests. That is why an economically stable Ukraine, yet another competitor on the European territory, may not answer the interests of Great Britain, France, or Germany. We must not entertain illusions that they will literally “shower” their gifts, humanitarian aid, or anything else upon us. They will not let us starve to death, but they will never do anything to help us rise to their level. This is how the world is built, this is an objective fact, and, therefore, it is an extremely dangerous trend now—to underestimate the role of the Army.

[Antonets] I agree with you: It is too soon for us to become pacifists. The known history of mankind runs to

5,000 years. Out of this long period of time, only for 227 years was mankind able to live without war. We need to have an army for as long as the probability of war remains. If now, at our level, we are not sure in our definition of a potential adversary, this does not signify that this adversary does not exist. The threat of a nuclear war has not been dispelled and, for that reason, by voluntarily renouncing our nuclear weapons, we place ourselves in a dangerous situation.

[Baziv] Machiavellian principles prevail now in the world politics, principles that express social Darwinism and not humanism—in short, the following principles triumph: The fittest survives; he who is strong is right; and he who is strong wins. We are making ourselves weak and are proud of it....

I will even say more. It seems to me that events will develop in such a way that it will be desirable for the West to maintain Ukraine as a strong military state. Why? Russia that is also an empire is on the eve of serious inter-ethnic cataclysms. The West will want to have such a reliable buffer as Ukraine between Russia and Europe.

[Chetverov] To begin with, we must not be guided by the policy of one day. We will not forgive either Ukrainian or Russian politicians if no military alliance is established between our countries. Even from a purely geographical point of view, we are destined to be allies. We must proceed from a possibility that, sooner or later, the Russian political establishment will get rid of its imperial traits that do not only annoy Ukrainians but many Russians, too. That is why the present alignment of forces and the realities must not be taken as a foundation for the development of a national army. We realize our responsibility before the future generations and, for that reason, once we started this development, we must create a strong modern army. A modern army must not renounce the most modern of the available weapons.

[Stepanov] Generally speaking, I do not understand how one may be afraid to possess nuclear weapons and, at the same time, not be afraid to exploit nuclear power plants. The level of danger is identical in both cases....

[Baziv] Thus, we have touched upon and discussed a range of extremely important and topical questions. The majority of us have manifested a common position, and this attests to the integral nature of military aspects and their nationwide significance. To conclude the “round-table” discussion, I would again like to thank all those present for their participation in this meeting and assure our esteemed military guests that our newspaper will continue to do everything to resolve questions discussed by us here as quickly as possible and to the best advantage.

I want to present Valeriy Mykolayovych Stepanov, commander of the Carpathian Military District with “A History of the Ukrainian Army” published by the famous Ukrainian publisher Ivan Tyktor. This book has collected and generalized invaluable experience from the

times of princes to the Ukrainian Resurrection Army. This experience must become a foundation for the development of a modern Ukrainian Army.

Arguments for Ukrainian Nuclear Force

92UM0772A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
22 Feb 92 p 12

[Article by Viktor Mironchenko and Nikolay Prokopenko under the rubric "The Society": "The Nonnuclear Choice: Boon or Mistake?"]

[Text]

"Legal Succession" the Russian Way

One is also disturbed by the fact that the most modern equipment—aircraft, tanks, ships—is being removed from Ukraine under various pretexts. And it is all going to Russia, going there whence the predatory colonizer has visited us more than once. The self-proclaimed "legal successor" to the former empire is arming itself at our expense. But where is the guarantee that the imperial ambitions of the "legal successor" will not prevail and it will not turn these weapons against peoples who have chosen the path of independence and self-determined development?

The behavior of the "legal successor" shows open and profound contempt for any sort of legal standards. Russia is behaving as though there had been no one in the Union except it, as though the concept of Union property had not even existed. For it the partners in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] exist only to share the debts of the former Union. It is arbitrarily and unceremoniously privatizing common gold and diamond reserves, international assets, embassies, radio and television, information agencies and all the Union institutions on its territory.

With respect to the army and navy, Russia would like to assume authority not just over the military districts on its territory but also those located in other sovereign states, to force all the enlisted men and officers to take the oath of loyalty to Russia. And all of this is being done calmly, confidently, with impunity, without any counteraction on the part of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Strangely, public opinion in Ukraine, first and foremost our press, is reacting fairly apathetically to all these manifestations of imperial policy. An appeal to the Russian colleagues to halt the anti-Ukraine campaign is submitted for approval at a congress of Ukrainian journalists. And what happens? The proposal is not supported, and the appeal is not approved. It is therefore not surprising that the president of Ukraine himself was forced to rebuff the attacks by Russian chauvinists. The president, and not the journalists, who are required by their profession to guard the sovereignty of their people!

Just What Has History Taught Us?

How can we be lulled by the fact that we are ignoring history's lessons?

The first was given to us by the Russians following the death of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy, when they violated a fair and equal agreement. Gradually, step by step, the czarist government eliminated all the rights and liberties of the Ukrainian people, turning the peasants into serfs and Zaporozhskaya Sech, the last bulwark of armed defense of the people, into ruins. The free and independent state then became the target of economic and military expansion for Russian imperialism. The easy victory inspired the predator. It grew strong at the expense of its victims and began new wars of predation. The descendants of once freedom-loving Cossacks became the Mamluks of the imperial army and a means of enslaving their own people.

We were given the second lesson in 1918, when, at M. Grushevskiy's insistence, we demobilized the million-man army. The reasoning was the following. Just why do we need the army when we are for peace, when we do not want to fight and do not intend to attack anyone. The fatal nature of this error became particularly clear on 28 April 1918, when a platoon of German soldiers burst into the Central Rada and ordered all the deputies to put their hands up.

And are we not making the same kind of mistake today in declaring that Ukraine will be "nonnuclear, not be a member of a bloc, be a democratic and neutral country"? In the face of aggressive encroachments and patted soothingly on the back from overseas, the Ukraine is attempting to rid itself of nuclear missiles as rapidly as possible. Why should we have them, goes the reasoning, when the peaceful atom has given us so much misery? Once again there are peace-loving assertions, and once again we vow that we do not intend to attack anyone.

In the meantime nuclear warheads are being removed from Ukraine ahead of schedule. And where are they being taken? Once again, to Russia, making our eternal enslaver even more powerful and capable. At the same time we are establishing the National Guard and the army, which will be armed with far from modern equipment. Our "Russian brothers" have long since quietly privatized the modern equipment and removed it from Ukraine.

Just tell us, who would say that it is a judicious military policy which deprives the young Ukrainian state of a modern nuclear-missile shield and is resulting in the establishment of a multi-thousand-man army without modern weapons? Why should we give up nuclear missiles, when we have at our disposal nuclear mines, large missile production plants, skilled workers and engineers, and officers trained to handle the most modern weapons? Is that not like the actions of some imaginary state which has stocks of powder but is giving away its firearms to a neighboring kingdom and leaving only spears for itself?

Have we truly learned nothing from history? Do we really want to leave ourselves completely defenseless before our northern neighbor, which is even now not concealing its intentions toward the "naive rustics"? Does anyone actually believe that we will be protected by the Americans, the Germans or the French, or by their joint forces? They really protected us in 1918, didn't they? It will be the same thing again, should things turn serious.

Only one thing, strength, counts in international affairs and interstate relations. If we are strong, if our army's arsenal includes a nuclear-missile capability, we will be respected, given consideration and treated with friendliness. Without such weapons Ukraine will be a second-class state, a testing ground for economic expansion for all the developed countries, and we shall once again become dependent—this time economically.

It is not just a matter of the powerful embrace of the Russian bear, however. Look around. In what kind of world, what kind of geopolitical context, does the reborn Ukraine find itself? The territorial claims made of us—on the pages of the irresponsible press for now: Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovakian and Hungarian—are no secret. In addition to Russia, Turkey too may lay claim to the Crimea. Except for Belarus, it seems, we do not have a single neighbor who has not laid claim in one form or another to a tasty Ukrainian morsel.

Who can ensure that tomorrow these claims will not develop to the state level? Who then is going to guarantee Ukraine's protection in a world broken up into military blocs and saturated with nuclear weapons? What might the present short-sighted nonnuclear strategy and the policy of hasty disarmament oriented more toward serving foreign states than its own interests, and the policy of destroying or dismantling the nuclear shield into which Ukraine has invested its intellectual, economic and ecological assets mean for Ukraine?

The Parliament's Mistake

We have to admit that the Ukrainian Parliament committed a serious strategic error in announcing that Ukraine would be nonnuclear. This was clearly premature in view of the fact that we do not have a real national army and the formation of such will take 10-15 years. Now we have no right to complain about either our president or the minister of defense, because they are implementing the will of the parliament and following the course outlined, which objectively leads to the camp of states which are incapable of defending themselves and seek protection beneath the nuclear-missile umbrella of military blocs and groupings.

Strangely, not a single other important decision today, a time of the development of an independent Ukraine, has been made with such ease and with such lack of resistance as the one on Ukraine's nonnuclear status. Everyone—the leftists and right-wingers, the democrats and the partycrats—has been amazingly unanimous and united on this. There was no discussion whatsoever

either in the parliament or in the press, which is demonstrating with obvious satisfaction its ability to bring up matters of more secondary importance for discussion. This is obviously the effect of an abnormal apprehension syndrome, a fear that we might truly want to be strong.

The fact that symptoms of this syndrome are manifested in speeches and statements of Ukraine's highest officials is revealing. "...It is the goal of Ukraine, which has the world's third largest nuclear capability," President L. Kravchuk announces from the speaker's platform of the Ukrainian congress, "to become a nonnuclear state." That sounds very noble, you will agree. Let us take a closer look at the logic of the speech. "...We are forming our own armed forces exclusively for Ukraine's needs, to protect its borders and national interests." But is the existence of nuclear weapons in France, England, Russian and the USA in conflict with the national defense needs of those states? With the protection of their borders and national interests? "And we reject any insinuations," Leonid Kravchuk went on to say, "that would depict Ukraine as a state with militaristic intentions." But what about Ukraine's legitimate intentions to establish its own army, like any other state? Are these not militaristic, that is, military, aspects of their policy? The fact that they do not necessarily indicate aggressive intentions is another matter.

The Sober View of a Ukrainian in London

One Ukrainian—not here in Ukraine, to be sure, but in London—wrote an extremely interesting analysis titled "A Nonnuclear Ukraine: Pros and Cons," which was published in our NARODNAYA GAZETA (a Rukh publication). Author I. Gerashchenko employs neither classified figures nor stunning facts. His pen is guided by common sense and sober considerations.

Let us try to grasp what Igor Gerashchenko is saying: "...if we cannot live on a nonnuclear planet, no matter how much we want that," the author says at the very beginning of the article, "let us think about how we can live more safely on this planet." The author then considers several aspects of this problem.

The military aspect: "Up to now not a single state which possesses nuclear weapons has experienced a serious attack.... The presence of nuclear weapons is not just a restraining factor. It also permits the nation to reduce its defense outlays." You will agree that this is the most expedient plan of military development and national security for our state, which is just getting onto its feet in a situation of economic decline. The author goes on to consider the hypothetical possibility of atomic blackmail against Ukraine by some dictatorial regime.

"Would a nonnuclear Ukraine not have to turn to the 'great Russian brother' for help"? Bogdan Khmelniitskiy once did this, and the help carried a heavy price."

The call to reject nuclear weapons is therefore to some extent like calling for the removal of all locks from the

doors, as though everyone would be so touched by this that thieves would not bother such a house.

From the economic standpoint, I. Gerashchenko points out that Ukraine is a producer of uranium ore and will unquestionably sell it. If it should decide to join the Common Market, it would be unable to do so for 20 years without nuclear weapons. "Nuclear nations have neither economic nor military terms dictated to them—that is just not done" our well-wisher in London rightly points out. Nonnuclear countries are not exactly handled with kid gloves, however. A sad but true fact."

The legal aspect of this problem provides absolute justification for Ukraine's claims to a share in the nuclear inheritance left by the deceased Union, since a considerable part of the former USSR's nuclear arsenal was produced with Ukrainian ore, and the Ukrainians both made an economic contribution and contributed their labor directly to production of the nuclear warheads. This legacy not only has a destructive capability but also cost hundreds of billions of dollars. "How about first taking our share of the nuclear arsenal and then calmly deciding what to do with it?"

Finally, the political aspect: "The assertion that it is advantageous for the country to have a nuclear influence in the world is axiomatic. Ukraine's situation in this respect is not very good. The vast majority of people in the world simply do not know about it or believe that Ukrainians are "the same as ethnic Russians."

Just how does the possession of a nuclear capability affect political clout? The author illustrates the answer to this question by comparing Italy with Great Britain. "Italy is ahead in many respects (national income, standard of living, the spiritual realm) but lags perceptibly behind in political influence in the world. Why is this? To put it quite simply, Great Britain is a nuclear state, while Italy is not."

This is the conclusion drawn by Igor Gerashchenko of London: "...Bearing these factors in mind, the real situation in the world is this. A nation capable of producing nuclear weapons will do so sooner or later. If Ukraine's present leaders decline our legal share of the nuclear arsenal—and to the benefit of Russia at that—then either we or our children will have to build one anew, spend billions in the process. This is the kind of world we live in."

What Should We Do?

With all these considerations in mind, the government should immediately halt the demolition of Ukraine's nuclear shield. These weapons are a guarantee of the young state's peace and independence.

We should carefully study Europe's experience for establishing our own army. And that experience shows that the existence of nuclear weapons is not only a deterrent but that it also permits a country to reduce its outlays on defense.

Furthermore, in general, where else would a state voluntarily haul powerful weapons to a neighboring country whose leader considers aloud the possibility of an exchange of nuclear strikes?

One has the impression that in making the decision on nonnuclear status the Ukrainian Parliament and the current Ukrainian leadership are prepared to consider the interests of anyone at all—Russia, the other partners in the CIS, neighboring states of Eastern and Western Europe, the United States of America. They fail to take into consideration and remain silent about only one thing: the national interests of the young Ukrainian state, its security needs, its economic and strategic military interests.

What practical steps must be taken to rectify the situation? In our opinion, in the face of the territorial encroachments, the perfidious statements, threats and blackmail, the president of Ukraine should first of all declare a moratorium on the removal and the dismantling of nuclear weapons. Parliamentary hearings should then be conducted on the matter of Ukraine's nuclear status. The possibility of making this problem the subject of a national referendum is not ruled out.

Official Assures Military Retirees

*92UM0746A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
29 Feb 92 p 3*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel (res) V. Kirillov, correspondent: "Don't Worry, Dear Retirees!"]

[Text] "Dear editor! A decree of the Ukrainian President in December 1991 established the minimum pension for citizens receiving assistance from social welfare agencies. But ours has remained the same. I for example receive the same thing I did last year, 237 rubles. This is almost twice less than the minimum! After paying for my apartment and utilities I was left with R167. How can one live for a month on this, when a bucket of potatoes costs R120? That's not to mention anything else.

"Consider how much the press, radio and television have been jabbering about social protection of former servicemen! Where is it now?

"I served in the USSR Armed Forces for 25 years. And the pension awarded to me by the Ministry of Defense was quite sufficient. Now, however, I don't even get the subsistence minimum. Tens of thousands of people who had given their best years to the motherland are in the same position.

"Your answer would be that the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet is presently discussing the Law on Pensions for Military Servicemen, including retired and reserve servicemen. Yes, it is. For the second month. And while they're talking, retired persons are barely making ends meet.

"Respectfully, Major (Reserve) A. Shepel"

Our editor's office receives such letters every day. There is nothing surprising in this. So-called liberalization (to be honest, another increase in prices) has shocked all strata of our society, including retired persons of the former Union's Ministry of Defense. What troubles them the most? Naturally the questions they ask are varied. But they are almost the same in content: All want to know when pensions will be recomputed, and on the basis of what law.

In order to obtain qualified answers we turned to Lieutenant Colonel V. Tsipovyaz, Kiev's deputy military commissar for social welfare.

"Before answering these questions let me take you on a tour," Vladimir Ivanovich suggested. "Take a look at what the department's associates are doing now."

What I saw during this little tour is difficult to transmit in words. Associates of the pension support department of the city's military commissariat are working today at an exceptionally intense pace, never leaving their desks. Folders containing personal files are stacked in the direct sense of the word in every office I looked into (getting into them was close to impossible).

"We have about 50,000 retired persons on record," Vladimir Ivanovich explained. "Imagine the volume of work that must be done just to recompute the pensions. And in short time at that. And God forbid that a mistake is made—each personal file, after all, represents a living person whom we have no moral right to offend, especially when pensions are involved. And mistakes must not slip by, even if they total only a kopeck."

Recomputing pensions is a very laborious process. It's not something that you can do in a single sitting. But as with all Ukrainian citizens, retired persons have to live not on yesterday's but on today's income. They also need to eat every day, after all. And now that prices have risen astronomically, it is naturally impossible to live on a pension that had been awarded previously.

"You noted correctly that recomputing pensions takes more than just a single week or even a single month. This is why we decided to increase the amount paid to all categories of retired persons by a factor of three," Vladimir Ivanovich continued. "Speaking in military terminology, we need to protect them somehow, after all, from an invasion by prices along the entire front."

This is doubtlessly the most sensible decision in the given situation, where the Ukrainian law on pension support to former servicemen has not yet been adopted. It should be noted in this connection that many of our readers are very curious why the Ukrainian parliament is so slow in resolving this matter. All of this creates many difficulties for associates of the pension support department of the city's military commissariat.

"After the law is adopted we will have to recompute the pensions once again," said Vladimir Ivanovich. "I feel sorry for the workers—they will have double the load."

Lieutenant-Colonel V. Tsipovyaz informed me that for the time being, pensions are being recomputed on the basis of the old law. However, the calculations are based on the monetary allowance established as of 1 January 1992.

It would seem that everything is clear: No one will be forgotten. The recomputation will affect all categories of retired servicemen. Everyone will receive a healthy increase in their pension, including war veterans and invalids, and the families of deceased servicemen. Retired persons were themselves persuaded of this when they received triple their pension in February. And after the recomputation, this sum will become even larger.

But retired persons are such a hair-splitting people: They want to know everything from A to Z. And so they clog up the thresholds of the offices of the city military commissariat, paying no attention to notices posted at the building entrance asking them not to bother the workers and to take all of their pension questions directly to the rayon military commissariats at their places of residence.

Associates of the Pension Support Department of the City Military Commissariat hold nothing against these visitors, even though they clutter up the offices with no effort at maintaining order. And none of the workers even give the appearance that these visitors are disturbing the work rhythm and creating tension in the reception room. They carefully and scrupulously analyze the problem of each visitor. I was persuaded of this with my own eyes as I observed the work of P. Pilipenko and N. Tereshchenko, assistant chiefs of the Pension Support Department.

These days much depends on the efficiency of comrades I. Tsokol and Yu. Prisyazhnyuk, who work in the archives. These women perform their duties excellently: They quickly find the needed personal file and provide the necessary information.

"There are difficulties, of course," said Polina Vasilyevna. "You have probably noticed that visitors who not only ask us to explain how pensions are recomputed but also demand that we carry out this procedure in their presence cause us a great deal of trouble. This is something we simply cannot do. First of all it is difficult to find a particular personal file at any given moment. Second, it is easy to make mistakes when recomputing pensions under such pressure."

Yes, it is hard to work with retired persons. You offer one explanation after another, and they keep on with their demands. While I was there, several people literally attacked Polina Vasilyevna and Natalya Alekseyevna, keeping them from uttering even a single word.

"There is no doubt that most retired persons correctly understand the situation as it has evolved," Lieutenant-Colonel V. Tsipovyaz said. "But there are also those among them who do not understand the difficulties of our work in the present stage. Being unsatisfied with the

answers they receive in the reception room, they come to me and even to the military commissar regarding the most elementary questions, ones which could have been answered in the rayon military commissariats. Don't misunderstand me: We do not turn visitors away, but we want them to allow us to work normally, and to recompute the pensions quickly and well."

I spent two hours in the city military commissariat. During this time Lieutenant Colonel V. Tspovyaz and his associates dealt with dozens of visitors. They asked them about many matters. And all without exception received the necessary documents and good answers.

"Perhaps after this article is published the work of our associates will become a little easier," said Lieutenant Colonel K. Khrol, the military commissar of the Ukrainian capital. "I would like to reassure retirees: Don't worry, we will not forget any of you, we will carry out the recomputation, and we will communicate the necessary data to the rayon military commissariats. Relax."

To conclude, let me say something to Major (Reserve) A. Shepel, whose letter we published above. Dear Andrey Pavlovich! We understand your concern that the Ukrainian parliament is slow in adopting the law on pension support to servicemen. Hopefully they will approve it soon. And as far as your pension is concerned, you can certainly rest easy: It will be recomputed for you, and you will get everything you're entitled to.

Aid for Ukrainian Servicemen in Baltics Arrives

92UM0749C Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
28 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Don't Blacken Good Deeds"]

[Text] In the issue of the newspaper of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet STRAZH BALTIKI of 11 February 1992, materials were published under the title: "Humanitarian Aid—Ukrainian Style." In the article, Lt A. Manyutin informed the readers that the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Col Gen K. Morozov, has provided humanitarian aid for the children of officers of Ukrainian nationality who were serving in the Tallinn Garrison.

After the distribution of some eight tons of food, the article went on to report, a meeting was held for the Ukrainian officers by representatives of the Ukrainian minister of defense. However, before opening the meeting, the representative of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense stated that "the Ukrainian Army does not need political workers and for this reason the former political officers could leave the club of the garrison hospital where the meeting was held."

"Humanitarian aid is always a good thing," exclaimed a correspondent. "But why is this more reminiscent of a poultry come-on?"

Our correspondent met with the Chairman of the Committee for the Question of Social Protection of Servicemen under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, Col Vilen Arutyunovich Martyrosyan and asked him to comment on the given material.

"Actually, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense did provide food aid for the families of servicemen serving on Estonian territory. A military transport aircraft carried food from Kiev to Tartu and then this was transported to Tallinn.

"The charitable action was caused by the awkward situation which had developed around the servicemen and the members of their families in the Tallinn Garrison. We had been repeatedly informed of this by members of the Ukrainian Officers Union, in requesting support for those in need.

"And such aid was provided by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. But these products were destined not for the officers of Ukrainian nationality but for all the servicemen who were citizens of Ukraine. Please note this fundamental distinction. We are endeavoring to support the servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine without distinction in terms of nationality, service, territorial or any other feature.

"Ukraine has already proven with sufficient persuasiveness that not the slightest discrimination of persons by nationality will be permitted on its territory. For in our state there are of 12 million persons of non-Ukrainian nationality. All of them are citizens with full rights. Moreover, many of them hold key posts in our government. For example, the prime minister, the procurator general and the minister of defense are Russian. And I am an Armenian. Nevertheless the Ukrainian people have shown us the confidence and promoted us to high positions.

"However, it appears that someone wants very much to blacken a good deed and disparage the role of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. On behalf of the Ukrainian Officers Union, I would like to urge the servicemen of all nationalities to stop playing the nationality card. This is immoral. If you can do good and strengthen the friendship between people of different nationalities, then spare no effort to do so. But if you have neither the desire nor strength to do this, then it would be better not to interfere."

American Delegation Visits Kiev Tank School

92UM0749A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
28 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Novikov: "Completely Nonsecret...An American Force Has Landed"]

[Text] On the eve of Armed Forces Day, the Kiev VTIU [Kiev Higher Tank Engineer School] for the first time

was visited by a group of American military specialists headed by one of the U.S. Deputy Secretaries of Defense, Mr. Wolfowitz.

The landing by such a highly placed American "assault force" was of a peaceful and even a friendly nature. This is why the Chief of the school, Major-General A. Shapov-
alov, met the guests, if not with bread and salt, then at least in a Christian manner, in a friendly manner, with open arms.

"Who issued you a 'visa'?" I asked a tall, grey-haired man in uniform and who spoke Russian fluently.

"We were invited by the Mayor of Moscow, Popov. In taking advantage of the occasion, we visited Ukraine," explained the U.S. Brigadier General.

The guests studied with interest the outstanding training facilities for the tank troops and carefully examined the mock-ups of individual assemblies of the armored equipment.

I will not take it upon myself to judge strictly our excessive openness (and this we could do), but this time alone nothing was concealed from our foreign guests.

Moreover, in contrast to the cadets in the U.S. military colleges, we are rather humane. For example, the young fellows are prohibited from having a family until the completion of school (under a contract).

"That is somewhat even unfair," said the Brigadier General Hoven [transliteration], voicing his opinion. "Some must sleep in the barracks and others with a woman."

The school chief also admitted that the officer candidates with families increased the already high percentage of various problems. On the other hand, it was a pleasure to hear from the mouth of the Chief of the Military Education Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Col Yu. Prokofyev (he is now a Major-General), that "five former GDR citizens who completed our school have passed the competitive exams and have been admitted to serve in the Bundeswehr."

Yes, the people often say that "a firm of sweepers does not knit." And this is also the case of the KVTIU. Here they continue to train students from Third World countries. Only those from the former socialist countries have left. The hope for their return has not been lost. Certainly the faculty has not lost its former repute.

Officers Not Taking Oath Serve on Temporary Contract

92UM0744A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
19 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent, Major Trubitsyn: "Not a Matter of Nationality"]

[Text] A review by military pilot A. Volkov entitled "Permission to Fly on the Basis of Nationality" appeared in the 14 February KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The author asserts that in Ukraine, officers who have not taken the oath are barred from flying.

I do not want to call this fact into question. (As is well known, the Army has more than enough varieties of overcautious individuals.) But I will be able to establish something else—that pilots who have not taken an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people but have signed a temporary agreement are fully continuing their military studies, for example, in the TransCarpathian Military District. A few days ago I visited the aviation regiment whose chief of staff is Colonel V. Kirilenko. Eighteen pilots, including the regimental commander and his deputy for flight training, did not take the oath in this regiment; yet they all ascend into the heavens together with their fellow servicemen.

At one time, says Vasilii Yakovlevich, we also argued about whether officers could be fully trusted, but the army commander settled the dispute in their favor. Unfounded distrust of people is fraught with unforeseen consequences.

Why, for example, are we not to trust Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Sergeevich Derban, the regiment's sole expert marksman pilot. No, he did not take the oath, but only because—as he wrote in a formal statement—he desires to continue his service in his native Belarus.

As to [the reference about doing things] "on the basis of nationality," not only Ukrainians but also Russians and representatives of other nationalities in the regiment took the oath. As underscored by Lt. Col. Kirilenko, the overwhelming majority of the unit's pilots and navigators [also did].

I will note that our conversation took place the day that news [was released] about the flight of six SU-24M front-level bombers from Starokonstantinov in Khmel-nitskaya Oblast to Shatalovo (Podmoskove). This, by the way, attests to the fact that pilots were allowed to fly although they did not take the oath. The unit's officers condemned their transgression which has created a dangerous precedent. And regardless of what motives induced them to hijack aircraft and, moreover, to steal the regimental colors, there can be no excuse or pardon for those whom I will be so bold as to call criminals.

By their actions they subverted trust in those pilots who did not take the oath but gave their word to honorably serve Ukraine. Whether they wanted to or not, they aroused suspicion towards the latter.

I do not know what the decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defense will be; however, one cannot rule out that those who have not taken the oath will be barred from flying. Though in this regard it is already simply inappropriate to allude to nationality.

True, there is hope that the sky pirates (for lack of a better word) will appear in court to keep others from stirring up trouble in the emerging armies of the independent states. At that point, the [aforementioned] decision may also be different.

Officers Threaten Missile Troops Taking Ukrainian Oath

92UM0704A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
22 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Major A. Murakhovskiy, Vinnitsa—Kiev: "In Defiance of Pressure: Strategic Missile Troops in Vinnitsa Have Taken the Oath of Loyalty to the People of Ukraine"]

[Text] Assistant Battalion Commander for Personnel Major V. Shishko telephoned one of his subordinates late in the evening. He said that military school of engineer cadets doubted that they would be able to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine tomorrow due to pressure from Battalion Commander Lieutenant-Colonel V. Zvyagintsev. Major Shishko hurried to the subunit.

He was met at the threshold by the commander who, with metal in his voice, warned: it is not worthwhile to confuse the people and in general he should not even appear at the subunit. The war of words did not result in a mutual understanding...

The majority of servicemen were enthusiastic about the news that the solemn ritual for taking the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine would occur on February 16 at Vilnius Garrison. The first of them had already sworn to their state on January 26. But still the missile troops had become agitated. And with good reason. On the one hand, they had been defined as part of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces. On the other hand, they were convinced that they must swear an oath of loyalty not to the faceless Commonwealth, but to their own people. Moreover, they had been subjected to fierce pressure from the command authority of the unit and of the former center, especially in recent days. Lieutenant-General V. Mikhtyuk, Major-General V. Gerasimov, and Colonel I. Kokarev from the RVSN [Strategic Missile Troops] Main Staff, having specially arrived from Moscow, repeatedly threatened reprisals against those who would swear to Ukraine. School Head Colonel P. Rak was in agreement. And Battalion Commander Lieutenant-Colonel V. Zvyagintsev stated that those servicemen who took the oath would be placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief and he himself would decide the issue of their release from the armed forces. They said that either the Commander-in-Chief himself or "your Ukrainian Minister of Defense" would sign the order on this.

Nevertheless, in the morning, a group of missileers set out for Vinnitsa. An army vehicle, from which an enraged Lieutenant-Colonel V. Zvyagintsev jumped out, blocked their path on Barskiy Highway.

"You cannot return to the unit. All of you will be dropped from its rolls," he snapped and, to frighten them even more, he immediately arrested and drove off with Deputy Platoon Commander Cadet R. Polishchuk.

Despite the threats that were pouring forth as if from the horn of plenty, the future missile launcher driver-mechanics crammed themselves into a bus... Officers also went to take the oath with Cadets V. Tsibor from Mukachev, V. Gunyaga from Poltavshchina, Junior Sergeant A. Shvets from Donetsk, and many others. Major Shishko was also among them.

RVSN Subunit Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Yu. Proskurko also led his subordinates to take the oath.

"Ukraine has the right to a part of the strategic deterrent forces," Lieutenant-Colonel Proskurko is convinced. "And we missile troops, as citizens of Ukraine, think that no one has the right to interfere and all the more to forbid us to swear to our native country."

Representatives of the various branches and services of the Armed Forces stood at attention in the army formation. Leaders of social organizations and movements arrived to share the joy of the celebration with the soldiers. Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Committee on the Social Protection of Servicemen Chairman Col V. Martirosyan specially arrived from Kiev.

The solemn ritual began with the singing of the national hymn "Shche ne vmerla Ukraina" [hymn title in Ukrainian]. Father Miroslav of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church from Zhmerinka and Father Mikhail of the Greco-Catholic Church from Ternopol consecrated the banner and blessed the soldiers on the sacred duty for defense of Ukraine.

While they were taking the oath, I was interested in what city residents thought about what was occurring.

Valentin Snitsar, a 10th grade student at Vinnitsa Middle School No. 1:

"Quite honestly, previously I did not want to serve. But today I caught myself thinking that I would willingly enter the Ukrainian Army."

Klemen Dzinzilovskiy, Great Patriotic War veteran:

"The process is quite logical. And I just do not agree with someone taking the oath with our soldiers who simply is indifferent to the fate of Ukraine."

Tatyana Zhuk, music school teacher and mother of two sons:

"Of course, I want my children to serve in the Ukrainian Army because I have a reverent attitude toward swearing an oath of loyalty to our people. I pray for only one thing—that nothing should cause a fratricidal war."

From the conversations, and there were quite a few of them, I understood that people do not have objective information on the issues of Ukrainian Armed Forces

structural development. And servicemen do not even know that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has its own print organ... One officer honestly admitted that "thanks to" a certain commander he feels less Ukrainian in Ukraine than when he served in Transbaykal.

The information blockade serves as fertile ground for the blossoming of various trends of an extremist-nationalist bent that call for planting the blue and yellow flag on the ruins of St. Petersburg and on the ruins of the Kremlin. One can only imagine how complicated it was in that situation for Union of Ukrainian Officers Ispolkom [executive committee] Oblast Organization Chairman Retired Col A. Nizhnik, who acted as the initiator and organizer for conducting the solemn oath taking ritual at Vinnitsa Garrison, to avoid provocations.

"This is an historic event for the city and oblast," this is how Col V. Martirosyan assessed what had occurred. One must agree with this assessment. Especially if you consider that behind the cadre military in the ranks of those who took the oath stood Gorsovet [city soviet] Deputy and Ukrainian National Club President A. Makhlay, Rukh [Popular Movement of Ukraine] Kray Organization Leader S. Vovk, and many other Vinnitsa residents and guests of the city and also those people who are in the reserves.

When the solemn ritual was completed, toasts to the glory of Ukraine rang out over the square for a long time yet.

Airborne Unit Takes Ukrainian Oath

*92UM0749D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
26 Feb 92 p 2*

[Article by Lt Col V. Voronkov, chief of the Press Center at the Odessa MD: "They Have Switched to Ukrainian Jurisdiction"]

[Text] The deputies from the Nikolayev Oblast Soviet headed by the Deputy Chairman A. Koval recently visited the settlement of Bolshaya Korenikha. An unusual event had caused them to do this. The personnel of a brigade under Moscow's control had decided to take the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people and to move under Ukrainian jurisdiction.

What had caused this? The straw which broke the camel's back was the orders from Moscow to remove from the unit 20 trucks with 2,000 parachutes from the emergency stores and dispatch them to Ryazan.

Incidentally, the discussions to take the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people had been under way a long time in the brigade. But the officers lacked information on the measures of the Ukrainian government related to defense questions. Upon assignment from the officer personnel, Capt Ivashishin was sent to Kiev where he obtained the necessary information at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Upon his return, he began to inform the personnel of this.

These actions were not to the liking of the brigade's commander, Col A. Loginov, and he came to blows with Ivashishin. Regardless of all this, the personnel stood their ground.

The ceremonious event, unfortunately, was held outside the unit's gates.

The airborne troops took the oath under the Ukrainian state flag. The first to take the oath were the men in the subunit under the command of Lt Col Bondarevskiy.

At the same time the Commander of the Odessa MD, Lt Gen V. Radetskiy, demanded that all officials refrain from putting any pressure on the persons desiring or not desiring to take the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people. He reemphasized that this was a matter of conscience and honor for each serviceman and no pressure was to be permitted on the individual in this question.

Servicemen Not Taking Oath To Leave Kiev MD

*92UM0749B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Mar 92 p 3*

[Unattributed article: "If You Don't Want To Take the Oath, Then Leave!"]

[Text] Prior to 15 March of the current year, all the servicemen in the Kiev MD who have not taken the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people will leave the republic. As was announced by the district Press Center, of the 5,000 men who refused to take the Ukrainian oath, over 1,000 men have already left for Russia and the other CIS countries. The servicemen who wish to serve out their stipulated time in their troop collectives on Ukrainian territory will be allowed to do so.

Kiev MD Commander on Social Protection of Troops

*92UM0788A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
3 Mar 92 p 1*

[Report by Col Mikhail Vertushkov, chief of Kiev MD press center: "In the Kiev MD Military Council"]

[Text] At the recommendation of the Ukrainian minister of defense a session of the district military council was held to discuss the subject "On the Work of Military Councils, Commanders and Staffs to Provide Social Protection for Servicemen in Connection With the District's Reorganization."

The report by Lt Gen Valentin Boriskin, commander of the Kiev Military District, and the speeches by colonels Nikolay Motorin and Eduard Karchmarchik, and others stressed the fact that the rapid political, social, scientific and military changes occurring in the period we are living through are having a significant effect upon all

aspects of army life. The profound economic crisis and the drop in public production are inflicting painful blows upon the men in uniform.

The housing problem is especially acute. The numbers of those without apartments are growing despite enormous efforts by the military construction workers. The following figures were cited. While the number of officers and warrant officers without apartments was 20,500 at the beginning of 1991, it stood at 21,500 as of 1 January 1992.

Mention was made of the extensive indebtedness of local authorities of the oblasts in which the district is located with respect to the allocation of housing for the families of servicemen. With a plan calling for 146,400 square meters of housing in 1991, only 70,500, or 48%, was actually received.

This year the situation is being further complicated by financial problems and a drastic (15- to 30-fold) increase in the cost of fuel and lubricants, construction and other materials. While 1 million rubles was enough, figuratively speaking, for a 70-apartment building in the past, it is barely enough to lay the foundation today.

The reduction of the officer corps is another extremely acute problem for district troops. Today the Kiev MD commander has 1,536 officers under his command. Many of them do not have places they can call their own. The commander directed special attention to the need to take an entirely individual approach to each person discharged and the need for commanders, staffs, personnel agencies and medical establishments to work in unity to accomplish this complex task.

With respect to the extremely low pay of district servicemen, blue- and white-collar employees, Lt Gen Valentin Boriskin reported on steps being taken by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in this matter. A directive increasing the wages of district blue- and white-collar workers was read. They will increase by a factor of 4-5 compared with 1 January 1991.

A decree passed by the district military council on the subject discussed was sent to the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers and the minister of defense of Ukraine.

Rukh Delegation Promises Better Living Conditions for Black Sea Fleet

92UM0703A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Captain Second Rank V. Pasyakin: "Whether a Prayer Service or a Rally: Leaflets, Political Slogans..."]

[Text] Sevastopol—A large group of Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika] adherents paid a visit to Sevastopol. They met with the mayor of the city and obtained authorization to conduct a prayer service, which took place Sunday next to the Black Sea Fleet

Museum. Leaflets and newspapers were distributed at the service calling for creation of a Ukrainian Fleet and for Black Sea Fleet officers to serve in it.

Published in one of the leaflets was the declaration of the Ukrainian National Assembly "On the Ethnic Composition of the Black Sea Fleet," which states in part: "The Ukrainian National Assembly is enraptured by the ultimate Russian impudence with which the Moscow government, with three fleets at its disposal, is whipping up hysterics just because the Ukraine desires to have one."

The appeal to "Messrs. Officers of the Fleet" states: "Ukraine is in a position to provide you salaries and apartments, your wives—jobs, your children—kindergartens and schools. Already this is more than Russia is just now promising to give you, and in the future you will have all of it on a world scale. Ukraine has already stabilized itself as a state, while in Russia ultimate collapse of the fleet, poverty, hunger, and war await you.

"Messrs. Officers of the Fleet, for 200 years the flag of St. Andrew covered the rottenness of the Russian empire. Now they want to use it to cover the idiocy of the CIS."

The Rukh representatives attempted to conduct a rally but their noisy action did not meet with success. The "Rukhers" withdrew from Sevastopol in two launches under the banner of the Ukrainian Navy.

France Offers Aid In National Guard Formation

92UM0755A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Mar 92 p 3

[Unattributed Article; "Ukraine"]

[Text] During an official visit to the Ukraine, French Secretary of State for Defense Affairs Jacques Mellick offered to provide assistance to President Leonid Kravchuk in forming a republic national guard. "Work, organizational, and operational methods" of the French gendarmery could be used as a foundation. The plan to render assistance also provides for an exchange of know-how between French and Ukrainian guardsmen.

During the course of Mellick's visit questions were also discussed regarding the transformation of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex to produce nonmilitary goods. The Ukrainian president remarked that his country will sell conventional weaponry to other countries to finance the return of Ukrainian troops to their homeland.

National Guard Breaks Security Taboos in Relations With Press

92UM0789A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 7 Mar 92 p 1

[Interview with Guards Colonel Vladimir Ivanovich Mokhov, Ukrainian National Guard deputy commander

for the press service, by press service correspondent Vera Valerko; place and date not given: "Open to the Press"]

[Text] It was not that long ago that much of the life of the armed forces of the former Union was shrouded in secrecy, and totally inaccessible to journalists and readers. Almost two-thirds of the long list used by press censorship organizations was comprised of prohibitions on army topics. Establishment of an independent Ukraine introduced its positive corrections, and made the National Guard open and accessible.

Recently the press service of the National Guard commander has been receiving many requests to explain what exactly the limits of this openness are, and what can be written about without fearing the consequences.

Our correspondent Vera Valerko asked Guards Colonel Vladimir Ivanovich Mokhov, Ukrainian National Guard deputy commander for the press service, to answer the questions of the mass media.

[Mokhov] Yes, it is true that the National Guard is much more open than its predecessor—the internal troops. Eloquent evidence of this can be found in at least this fact: The road into units of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was shut tight to correspondents, especially foreign ones, and the department was vigilantly protected from leaks of undesirable information under the excuse of secrecy. With the birth of the Ukrainian National Guard foreign journalists as well as delegations consisting of politicians, scientists, and servicemen have become our regular visitors.

The doors are open to all, because we well understand the enormous interest existing in the world in the National Guard. VESTNIK NATSIONALNOY GWARDII UKRAINY—a special publication for the mass media—is distributed weekly with the purpose of fully satisfying the needs of newspapers and radio.

[Valerko] Does this mean that the National Guard may be written about openly today?

[Mokhov] Referring to divisions, regiments, and separate battalions of the National Guard by their code names is permitted in publicly accessible resources of the mass media. For example, "National Guard Troop Unit 4101." But in this case we request that the true number of the unit not be stated.

The location of the Main Directorate of the commander of the Ukrainian National Guard and the locations of divisions, regiments, and separate battalions in all oblast centers, Simferopol, and large industrial cities are also open.

We have no objections if newspapers write, for example, "the division located in Kiev," "the regiment located in Donetsk," "the separate battalion located in Mariupol."

All officials listed in special references that will be distributed to editor's offices may be referred to by their positions, ranks, and names without any restrictions.

If questions or doubts arise, I advise journalists to refer to the press service of the National Guard, where they can receive qualified consultation or assistance in organizing their materials.

Servicemen's Parents Express Concern

92UM0795A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
10 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent Vasily Goshko: "What Fate Awaits Their Sons?"]

[Text] Let me say right away that the editor's office receives many letters on this topic. The anxiety felt by parents regarding the fate of their sons serving in the Army in these complex times of ours is understandable. It is of course difficult to respond to all of them all at once, which is why I will dwell on what in my opinion are the most typical questions asked of the newspaper.

"When the Ukrainian people voted for their state's independence," writes Ilya Andreyevich Yurkevich from Kiev, "everyone thought that the time had come when the people would themselves be the masters of their land...." An overwhelming majority lived with this hope, and each of us sees tomorrow in an entirely different light from today. But it seems to me that in this desire we fail to account for the one most important thing: Will we manage to renew everything as quickly as we would wish? To be honest, hardly. And I can hardly agree with your thesis, Ilya Andreyevich, in which you assert that "...we thought that people of a different orientation would appear, but it has turned out that most of the bureaucrats are still in their places, and they are doing everything the old way, if not worse..."

In order that the reader understand what brought about this discussion, let me say that Ilya Andreyevich Yurkevich's son, a senior lieutenant, was transferred a year ago to Smolensk from the Western Group of Forces. With the breakup of the USSR he decided to continue serving in the people's army of Ukraine. From the moment the officer breathed word of this he became the target of ethnic slurs, and was called a traitor to the motherland. "Traitor to what motherland," Yurkevich the elder asks, "the one that used to be?"

Nothing has come of the transfer so far. But is Yurkevich the younger the only one to have found himself in such an unenviable situation? No, not the only one. It can be reported that the desire to serve in the Ukrainian army has been declared by over 310,000 officers and warrant officers located outside their native land. Where are we to find all the housing needed to accommodate their families?

By the way, even without this the housing shortage is catastrophic at the moment. In an interview with NARODNAYA ARMIYA, Major General Dmitriy Rudkovskiy emphasized that the Ukrainian Government is taking decisive steps to solve this urgent problem at least to some extent.

Well, as far as the oath is concerned, officers and warrant officers are coming to Kiev from other regions in order to take it. It was just last week that a precedent was set when 25 servicemen arrived from Azerbaijan to take the oath.

But I think that it would be wrong to go to the extreme and assert that only those officers who were born in the Ukraine could serve in our army. What about a person who is Ukrainian by nationality but was born, for example, in the Altay? What then?

The content of a letter from N. Glavachev, who lives and works in Zmiyev, Kharkov Oblast, is similar. His son, also a senior lieutenant, is serving with the marine infantry in the Baltics. He also dreams of returning to Ukraine.

My duties often take me to the Permit Office of the Main Headquarters of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. Each day there are lines of officers here trying to gain access to the personnel office in order to learn their fate. Once I got to talking with a lieutenant colonel with chemical troop emblems on his lapels. As it turned out, he had been serving 20 years near Tashkent, while he himself was a native of Lvov. He wanted a transfer to Ukraine. He does not have his own apartment. Nor would he be able to stay with relatives. What was he advised to do? Obtain a letter of transfer from a unit prepared to accept him. Then the matter of future service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces would be resolved positively.

Which means, my dear reader, that the editor's office cannot offer any advice on what to do in each specific case. The situation, I repeat, is extremely complex, and aggravated by a large number of unforeseen circumstances. However, in any case you must live with the hope that everything will soon fall in place.

Norwegian To Arrange Sale of Kuznetsov Carrier

92UM0791C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by V. Loskuzov, ITAR-TASS correspondent in Oslo: "Norwegian Will Help Ukraine Sell Aircraft Carrier"]

[Text] Makler Ole-Jakob Libek, known in Norway as the president of the country's hockey league, has agreed to participate in an unusual deal. On behalf of the Ukrainian side, his firm, Libek and Partners, will be involved in selling the unfinished Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov class aircraft-carrying cruiser, which is standing on the building ways of the shipyards in Nikolayev.

This ship, writes AFTENPOSTEN, is to be equipped with a nuclear propulsion plant. Today, if the steel hull were sold as scrap metal, it would be worth an estimated \$300-400 million dollars.

Kiev Group Aids Military Families, Transition to Civilian Life

92UM0773B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
12 Mar 92 p 1

[Interview with Colonel Boris Maslov, deputy of Shevchenkivskiy Rayon Soviet of the city of Kiev, by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Novikov, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent, under the "Urgent!" rubric; place and date not given: "We Will Protect Our Military..."]

[Text] Deputies of Shevchenkivskiy Rayon Soviet of the city of Kiev directed their colleague, Colonel Boris Maslov, to head the effort on social protection for military servicemen and members of their families in the rayon.

Our correspondent met with Boris Stepanovich and asked him to comment on this decision.

[Maslov] In connection with the increased numbers of servicemen being discharged into the reserves, the growth of social problems in society, and implementation of the Ukrainian law "On Social Protection for Servicemen and Members of Their Families," a need has emerged in the soviet and its executive committee to have someone working on this full time. I was the one selected.

[Novikov] What specifically have you managed to get done and what are your plans for the future?

[Maslov] For the first time in the city, as well as in the rayon, we conducted a meeting with widows and mothers of servicemen who were killed in Afghanistan and other regions of the former USSR...

FOR REFERENCE. Over the period 1982-1992, 40 military servicemen who were residents of the rayon were killed: 12 in the Republic of Afghanistan and 28 in the Soviet Army.

[Maslov] A council of the families of rayon servicemen who perished has been established to work on a permanent basis with this category of women. Attending a meeting were Pavel Romanyuk, chairman of Shevchenkivskiy Rayon, Kiev City Council and executive committee, his deputies, officers of the military registration and enlistment office, representatives of the Ukrainian Union of Afghanistan Veterans (internationalist servicemen), representatives of the rayon organization of the Union for Social Protection of Military Servicemen and Members of Their Families, representatives of the republic organization of the Union of Ukrainian Women, Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, and other community organizations.

[Novikov] And is that it for the time being?

[Maslov] No. A coordinating committee of unions of social organizations has been established in the rayon, which is engaged in problems of social protection for

servicemen and their family members. It includes "Afghan vets," veterans of the Armed Forces, and other activists. They have one purpose—to join their efforts in standing up for the rights of these people. Our rayon has a bureau for job placement of officers and warrant officers discharged into the reserves. Special free courses have been organized for them to effect job retraining under conditions of a market economy. There are other plans as well, directed towards providing support to servicemen in their hour of need.

Nunn Delegation in Kiev

92UM0773A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
12 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Nikolay Zaika, UKRINFORM, under the "Following the Event" rubric: "American Senators—Guests of Kiev"]

[Text] A visit to the capital of sovereign Ukraine by a delegation of American senators headed by Sam Nunn, chairman of the U.S. Congress's Senate Armed Forces Committee, has been interesting and useful. The guests were received by Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk, Colonel General Konstantin Morozov, minister of defense, and Viktor Antonov, Ukraine minister of machine-building of the military-industrial complex and conversion, and visited a defense enterprise.

"We are delighted at the position Ukraine has taken, resolutely adhering to the policy of a nonnuclear state," Sam Nunn stated at a press conference convened in Kiev for foreign and Ukrainian journalists. "This is an important example for the entire world." The destruction of nuclear weapons in Ukraine will contribute significantly towards strengthening the agreement on their nonproliferation, in the opinion of the delegation leader. With respect to the question regarding the Black Sea Fleet, Sam Nunn noted that this is being resolved fairly peaceably. Ukraine needs the fleet only to provide security for the coastal zone of an independent state and its territorial waters. It does not intend to pursue any policy whatsoever in the Mediterranean Sea region and has no interest in this zone.

Also addressed at the press conference were problems concerning the distribution of armament among Ukraine, Russia, and other CIS states, reduction of the Armed Forces, conversion of the defense industry, extending credits to Ukraine, and other issues.

BELARUS

Belarus Servicemen's Association fears 'Russian Aggression'

92UM0708A Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 29 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by TRUD Correspondent S. Vaganov, Minsk: "Who Is Turning the 'Pogonya'"]

[Text] On February 26, I read Igor Sinyakevich's report titled "Belorusskie patrioty ne isklyuchayut agreszii s vostoka" [Belarussian Patriots Do not Rule Out Aggression from the East] in *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*. "East" is understood as Russia, "aggression" is understood as aggression, and "Belarussian patriots" is understood as BOV [Belarussian Servicemen's Association].

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA is a rare guest on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. And that's too bad. Otherwise where else can a Belarussian reader, who is well-informed about what the BVO is—the Belarussian Military District, also learn about BOV, or rather the Belarussian Servicemen's Association, or rather a "patriotic movement" which "consists of active duty officers, warrant officers, and soldiers and reserve soldiers." I do not know about the BVO but the BOV, if you believe the author of the article, "considers its primary goal... to be readiness to act in defense of Belarussian statehood and democracy."

Just who threatens Belarussian statehood, which is still being built, and also democracy which in Belarus as, by the way, in the other CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states, according to the big picture, still needs to be established? Of course, Russia where, according to the opinion of BOV Chairman Nikolay Statkevich that was cited in *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*, "the probability of a civil war is great." And what weapons does BOV intend to use to defend itself? "It is possible that we will have to build barricades," said its chairman, revealing a military secret. But a certain "Belarussian patriot" from Kazakhstan stated that "39,000 officers, who are natives of Belarus and who are performing service outside the borders of their homeland, are prepared to act on the side of their native land in the event of Russian aggression against Belarus."

Naturally, all of this is big news. And I am rushing to report it in fear for the Belarus people who may be caught unawares by aggression from the East. Since until now, the people would not dream of such a threat. But maybe, having recovered for itself the ancient "Pogonyia" coat of arms, the people simply forgot to turn the knight depicted on it, who is facing West, to the East? But to do this, obviously, the "patriots" are also uniting so that the people are not forgotten.

Being a purely civilian man and not even being in the reserve, I thought for a long time about whether we have enough "patriots" in military uniform. And it seems to me that I understood. They do not have enough targets and readiness number one. "Our target—communism" has moved out of the cross hairs. The West is for some reason firing not missiles but some sort of vitamins. The East remains—with its eye pressed to the eyepiece, so that, God forbid, you do not let an opportunity slip by for troops to mass on the roads of Smolenshchina...

But still BOV is weak [slaBOVat BOV—a play on words]! Because apparently BOV is issuing appeals to society and to Republic of Belarus state organs in which

they propose that everyone conclude anti-crisis agreements with everyone in the event... of what—we all know.

As the previously mentioned Statkevich reported to the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent, those who expressed a readiness to sign such an agreement include Republic of Belarus Supreme Soviet Chairman S. Shushkevich and Premier V. Kebich. Well here, with all of the difficult relations between Commonwealth-member states, I believe more in the CIS than in a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA interview. The republic leadership, that has made a stake on the gradual untying of the knot of military problems and obliged by a decision of parliament to conduct the matter of constructing a neutral and nuclear-free state, can hardly support the "patriots." It never occurred to "the patriots" that "Pogonya" is not sliding to either the West or to the East on the threshold of the 21st century. It is racing toward the future...

Belarus to Take Over Proving Ground

92UM0787A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel P. Chernenko: "From Minsk: Ranges in Belarus Are Being Turned Over to the National Economy, But This Will not Effect the Intensity of Combat Training for BVO [Belarussian Military District] Soldiers"]

[Text] The total area of land used by units and subunits in the Belarussian Military District [BVO] is 19,610 hectares and now, in accordance with a Belarussian Council of Ministers resolution, it has been transferred to the republic national economy.

Ranges, reserve airfields, training centers, firing ranges, and tank training areas had occupied the areas being released... Specifically, 2,130 hectares of land at the Minsk Training Center are being transferred, 1,200 hectares at Brest, and 5,430 hectares at Dretun. The largest quantity of land was transferred in Minsk and Vitebsk oblasts.

"Actually, the occupied land which the Belarussian Military District is transferring to the Belarus national economy is significant," said Deputy BVO Commander for Combat and Moral-Psychological Training and VUZ's [Higher Educational Institutions] Major-General Vasiliy Demidik. "But, this has not had a negative impact on the intensity of combat training for district unit and subunit personnel."

Belarus Recalls Servicemen from 'Hot Spots'

92UM0787B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Mar 92 p 2

Article by Colonel P. Chernenko: "From Minsk: Belarussian Soldiers Who are Serving in "Hot" Spots Are Being Recalled to The Homeland"]

[Text] Having examined the issue of Belarussian citizens performing military service beyond its borders, the republic Supreme Soviet has adopted a resolution on the recall of compulsory service personnel who have been drafted from Belarussian territory and who are currently serving in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia or Moldova. The reason for this decision is the highly explosive political situation in these regions and the conduct of combat operations between individual formations, as a result of which a threat is being created to the lives of servicemen. More than 2,000 soldiers and sergeants who have been drafted from Belarus are serving in the listed republics.

The issue has also been raised on recalling officers and warrant officers who have been drafted from Belarus. But after Permanent Parliamentary Commission on National Security, Defense and Crime Prevention Issues Chairman Mechislav Grib's speech, who cited convincing arguments that such a decision should not be adopted—there is neither housing nor positions—the question has remained open for the time being.

BALTIC STATES

Baltic Officials Interviewed on Naval Issues

Latvian Official Comments

92UM0777B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 1, Jan 92 (signed to press 28 Jan 92)
pp 11-13

[Interview with Gunar Fritsevich Alksnis, specialist on military questions of Latvian Embassy in Moscow, by A. Aleksandrov, occasion, date and place not specified, under rubric "The Baltic and the Baltic Fleet": "Latvia Will Have Its Own Navy' Declared Mr. Gunar Alksnis, a Specialist in Military Matters of the Latvian Embassy in Moscow"]

[Text] By assignment of the editorial office, TASS and MORSKOY SBORNIK correspondents asked representatives of parliaments and governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to answer a number of questions.

[Aleksandrov] Gunar Fritsevich, could you briefly explain the viewpoint of the Latvian government on military matters?

[Alksnis] With pleasure. That concept basically has been worked out. It takes into account that by virtue of political, economic, geographic and other features of our state, Latvia does not plan to establish and have classic armed forces consisting of four or five branches. But we will try not to allow the presence of military units of foreign states on our territory. We are against the production and adoption of weapons of mass destruction. And we are ready to recognize the concept of eliminating nuclear weapons. We wish to live in peace with all countries. This is why Latvia joined NATO as an associate member, seeing in this one guarantee for collective

security. We believe that we do not and cannot have a specific enemy in peacetime.

Based on those suppositions, we plan the establishment of armed forces made up of three components: defensive forces, internal security forces, and a home guard. The defensive forces are the principal component of the structure. These are the regular forces where service will be performed both under contract as well as based on call-up. We propose to have border guard troops, naval forces, air force, air defense and an insignificant reserve of mobile forces in the regular forces.

[Aleksandrov] What will the naval forces do?

[Alksnis] They are being established for surveillance of the water space, for guarding maritime frontiers, and for monitoring the maritime economic zone. Foiling violators of maritime frontiers and fighting them is their primary mission. Moreover, navymen will perform rescue service in coastal waters and give assistance in accomplishing maritime shipping through republic ports.

I remind you that a third of our borders runs along the sea. This is around 500 km. This is why the republic needs a fleet for its normal existence to support the functioning of commercial sea lanes.

[Aleksandrov] Is Latvia placing any kind of property claims on Russia in connection with the establishment of its own naval forces?

[Alksnis] No, but let us recall what Latvia had in 1940: according to our data, over 30 ships and auxiliary vessels, around 10 ships and small combatants of the border guard service and around another 20 other floating craft of various types.¹ We are not raising the question of allocating ships to us from the Baltic Fleet, but if border guard ships are transferred to us, we will take them. If not, Latvia will be forced to buy them in other countries.

[Aleksandrov] And how will you dispose of real property?

[Alksnis] If there is a small fleet in the republic, then existing installations probably will be used for naval forces and for general purposes, such as to organize assistance for those who send an SOS. But with respect to specific installations, here it is necessary to deal with each one individually. For example, even now we are requesting the Līepaya Naval Base command element to partially free up berths for container transshipment. This is a fair demand, since in recent decades Līepaya has turned almost completely into a military port, which has a negative effect on the economy of Latvia. The port of Ventspils engendered many ecological problems for us.

[Aleksandrov] What will be the makeup of the Latvian naval forces?

[Alksnis] We propose to have 10-12 small ships. These are patrol ships, minesweepers, small destroyers and hydrographic vessels. We are thinking of establishing a

shore repair facility and surveillance, warning and command and control posts. The makeup of naval forces also will include helicopter subunits. We plan to have a total of no more than 20 floating craft of various categories. This is three times fewer than in 1940.

[Aleksandrov] In what time periods will Baltic Fleet forces be withdrawn from the territory of Latvia?

[Alksnis] This is a complicated question. As I already said, in principle we are against basing foreign naval forces on republic soil, but circumstances have shaped up so that there are no opportunities to cut the Gordian knot of problems all at once at a single stroke. It is especially important that this least of all affects the people, who are not guilty of anything. I can assure you that no one will forcibly evict officers and their families from quarters. Sensible, civilized solutions will be found. We propose to make wide use of an exchange of apartments between Latvia and Russia, and such an exchange essentially is already going on. We have lived in friendship with Russia for many years and we hope that this friendship will henceforth be preserved.

Footnotes

1. According to "Jane's Fighting Ships" for 1940 and the "Spravochnik po voyenno-morskim flotam gosudarstv" [Reference on States' Navies] for 1939-1940, the Latvian Navy numbered nine ships and vessels. They included two submarines, the Ronis and the Spidola of 1926 French construction; the Varonis submarine depot ship with a displacement of 250 tons built in 1908; the gunboat Virsaitis (the former German minesweeper M-68 built in 1917); two 255-ton minesweepers, the Viesturs and Imanta of French construction of 1926; the gunnery tender Artillerists with a displacement of 150 tons built in 1910; and two auxiliary vessels, the icebreaker Krisjanis Valdemars and hydrographic vessel Hidrografs. In addition to them, the presence of one border guard patrol ship, the Eglis, was additionally indicated.

Lithuanian Official Comments

92UM0777B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 1, Jan 92 (signed to press 28 Jan 92) pp 11-13

[Interview with Norbortas Vidrinskas, chief of staff of Ministry of National Security of Lithuanian Republic, by S. Bykhun, occasion, date and place not specified: "Lithuania Also Needs Ships"]

[Text]

[Bykhun] How do you look on the stationing of a portion of the USSR Navy on the territory of Latvia over the long term?

[Vidrinskas] The question of the presence of USSR Armed Forces, including naval forces, on the territory of Lithuania already has been raised repeatedly by our

government. The demand is unequivocal: they must be withdrawn from the Lithuanian Republic.

[Bykhun] In what way do you intend to protect your territory from the sea if the USSR Navy is withdrawn?

[Vidrinskas] It is common knowledge that up until 1940 Lithuania had its own Navy. The present day shows that if a state has access to the sea then unquestionably it needs naval units to provide both security for its own territorial waters and control of the economic maritime zone. True, this will be costly, but such preparatory work already is being carried out.

[Bykhun] Is Lithuania capable of establishing its own navy? If yes, then where will the ships be built and the crews trained?

[Vidrinskas] With respect to training crews, above all we must take advantage of the services and experience of former Lithuanian officers who served in the navies of other states.

If we are speaking about building our own combatant ships, however, things are more complicated here, but in principle they can be resolved. The fact is that when the Red Army was introduced to Lithuania in 1940, all combat equipment and armament including ships¹ of the republic went over to its control. Therefore now the logical question would be: Why not return what we had confiscated at one time? As they say, a debt is beautiful in its payment. And it is completely fair if our units would be outfitted gratis with corresponding Soviet military equipment and armament, as happened, for example, with the transfer of the Committee for State Security. Insofar as I know, payment was not demanded for the small arms transferred to Lithuania.

[Bykhun] What will happen with those people who remain in Lithuania after being discharged to the reserve? What rights will they have?

[Vidrinskas] With respect to former Soviet Army and Navy servicemen, many officers really are turning to us, offering their experience and their knowledge. And we believe that serious military structures will not be established without the assistance of professionals. Therefore we now are engaged in registering these people, and a mandate commission under the Ministry of National Security will decide once and for all at the end of the year which of them to accept and which not to accept for service. What is to be done with the citizenship of these servicemen? Evidently this question must be resolved by our republic parliament and government. Difficulties also will arise with language. But we will have different positions. It is one thing when good servicing of machinery is required of a specialist and quite another thing when he must command people. But rights will be the same for all. We intend to proceed not from a person's nationality, but from how he does his work and performs his duties. The criterion for all is the same—professionalism and knowledge of the job.

[Bykhun] If Lithuania insists on expelling the military from the republic, how will their expenses connected with loss of housing and work be compensated?

[Vidrinskas] With respect to housing, this question was discussed in the republic government and the corresponding decree was adopted which grants the owner of an apartment the right to auction it off. For example, if a serviceman has a cooperative apartment, he has the right to arrange an auction and sell it. Costs will include commissions for arranging the auction as well as the amount which was not fully paid for this apartment. If the apartment is a communal apartment, the mechanism is the very same. Dormitories and departmental apartments, for example, are exceptions to these rules. These questions will be decided at the government level, just as will the loss of work.

Footnotes

1. **Reference.** "Jane's Fighting Ships" for 1938, 1939 and 1940 announces that the Lithuanian Navy consisted of only one combatant ship. This was a patrol vessel (according to our references a dispatch boat), the Prezidentas Smetona (former German minesweeper M-59 built in 1917). Her displacement was 500 tons and armament consisted of two three-inch (76-mm) guns and three machineguns.

Estonian Official Comments

92UM0777B Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK* in Russian No 1, Jan 92 (signed to press 28 Jan 92) pp 11-13

[Interview with Captain 3rd Rank Sergey Aleksandrovich Volkov, deputy of Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet, member of Permanent Commission on Foreign Affairs, by A. Anisimov, occasion, date and place not specified: "What If the Ships Leave Tallinn?"]

[Text]

[Anisimov] Sergey Aleksandrovich, at the very beginning of our conversation I would like to clarify what country you are a citizen of.

[Volkev] In fact just recently such a question could have generated a smile, but now it is no laughing matter, as they say. The fact is that I, a member of parliament, do not even have permanent registration in Tallinn. The paradox is that as an officer of armed forces of another, let us put it that way, state, or of the Commonwealth of Independent States of which Estonia is not a part, I continue to remain a member of the host country Supreme Soviet. All four servicemen elected to the parliament at one time continue to perform duties as deputies. For now no one has recommended that we make a choice between service and work in the parliament. I constantly sense that I am needed here to resolve many problems connected both with the stationing of our Army and Navy forces on the territory of Estonia as well as with the establishment of Estonian military units.

[Anisimov] Could you relate in more detail some aspects of these problems?

[Volkov] It is common knowledge that Estonia is demanding the immediate withdrawal of armed forces of units of the former Soviet Union from its land, just as do the other Baltic states. This motto affects national feelings and is supported by many Estonians. But there are questions which either are not being taken into account or no one knows how they can be resolved. In addition, what will happen later also is not being taken into account. I will dwell on the problem of Tallinn Naval Base. Let us imagine that we will leave here tomorrow at full strength. Who will perform hydrographic servicing of the bay and coastal waters? Estonia does not have the equipment or trained personnel for this. Moreover, it is common knowledge that although it consists of scattered and at times small installations such as a surveillance and communications post, in the final account the hydrographic service represents a precisely adjusted system. It can be easily destroyed. And it is difficult to establish it on a bare spot without knowing the specifics. Much time will be spent on this. Well, should shipping in the given area be canceled for a certain time period?

There also are other difficult problems which will inevitably arise with the fleet's departure.

[Anisimov] In fact it seems to the ordinary citizen who does not know all the fine points of problems connected with the fleet's withdrawal that by supporting some one political leader's demand for immediate withdrawal of forces, he is striving to make the republic better...

[Volkov] ...But the result turns out to be the opposite. Moreover, Estonia for now has not acceded to international agreements supporting navigation safety. So as we see, if the republic attempts to fulfill requirements of certain political groupings and does not heed specialists' opinions, this can do irreparable harm to the republic itself. I wish to emphasize that there already is a realization of that threat on the part of the state's leadership. In December 1991 Mr. Ruutel sent me for talks with Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov on all questions connected with the withdrawal of Army and Navy forces. In the conversation the marshal noted in particular that Estonia is approaching a solution to urgent problems in the most constructive, civilized manner.

[Anisimov] And how is the problem of officers, their families and those who went into the reserve being resolved?

[Volkov] The question of citizenship remains very painful for servicemen, reserve officers and their families. Of course, we believe that habitancy qualifications and other articles of the law on citizenship violate human rights. But reality remains as before. The law exists and the government is trying to see that it is carried out. True, there is a desire to alleviate this process. For example, Estonia announced that it is undertaking to build residences in Russia for servicemen. They may leave some officers as advisers for

establishing and training their own military units. It is also planned to issue certain monetary amounts for travel and to permit officers to privatize and then sell housing in order to have funds to purchase new housing outside the republic.

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Baltic Security Issues Raised at Conference

92UN0973G Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT in English 21-27 Feb 92 p 5

[Article by Imbi Hepner: "Baltic security issues raised at conference"]

[Text] Security experts and visitors from Norway, France, Germany, Great Britain, Denmark and the Baltic countries attended a three-day conference on Baltic and Nordic security.

Participants agreed that the Baltic States should join European and world security organisations, but estimates as to when membership might actually begin ranged from years to decades.

During the conference, held in Estonia from February 17-19, participants were brought to the military town of Paldiski in northern Estonia, approximately 40 kilometres west of the capital Tallinn. Paldiski, which is off-limits to anyone without the permission of the Soviet military officials, has always been surrounded by a circle of secrecy.

For years, Soviet officials have denied rumours, that Paldiski is home to a nuclear power plant. Last December the Soviet military officials revealed that, indeed, there are two nuclear reactors. At that time, a few selected government officials and foreign journalists were allowed to take a closer look.

This time, however, no one was allowed to visit the reactor. "No authority," explained the chief of the Paldiski garrison, Admiral Aleksander Olkhovikov. At a miniature press conference in the foyer of the Paldiski nuclear submarine training centre, Admiral Olkhovikov said the nuclear reactors in the town are only for training purposes, adding that they had stopped working in January 1991.

The list of things and objects which do not exist in Paldiski, according to Admiral Olkhovikov includes a naval base (he said there was only a training centre and some sub-divisions), submarines (he said new submarines have left and old ones were taken away as scrap iron), nuclear weapons and nuclear wastelands.

While the visiting security representatives emphasized the importance of integrating Russia into Europe, Estonians considered establishing their own defence units to be a priority because danger from the East still exists, they said. Government adviser Elvo Priks said the first problem to solve is arming the Estonian soldiers.

Member of the council of Estonia Jüri Adams did not rule out the possibility of introducing weapon production in his country.

Estonia Asserts Control over Military Forested Land

92UN0975B Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT in English 28 Feb 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Estonia to take over forests from the army"]

[Text] Negotiations between the Estonian Forestry Department and military officials of the former Soviet Union in control of certain forests in Estonia have come to a standstill as none of the military personnel turned up for the negotiations. In response, the Estonian Forestry Department on February 21 declared that all forests in Estonia under the control and management of the army would become the property of the Republic of Estonia on March 1.

The forests in question are located in northern and southern Estonia (59,000 hectares) and on islands off the northern coast (21,000 hectares), said Aleksander Leemet of the Forestry Department.

The handing over of the forests to the Estonian authorities had been agreed upon at a meeting between the Estonian government and the Soviet Defence Minister Yevgeny Shaposhnikov on September 26, 1991.

Lithuanian Volunteer Defense Service Celebrates First Year

92UN0908A Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian 21 Jan 92 p 2

[Report by Aurimas Kucas: "This Is How the President's Guard Is Born"]

[Text] January 17 marked the first anniversary of the establishment of the Volunteer National Defense Service [SKAT], following a decision of the Supreme Council. A press conference was held on this occasion at the SKAT headquarters, where its commander, Deputy Minister of National Defense J. Gecas and other staff officials answered journalists' questions.

Since its establishment, SKAT has increased 5 times and now has personnel of over 12 thousand people: 84 companies, an aviation unit, an operation detachment; amateur marine and radio companies are now being formed. At present SKAT has 490 permanent employees; the 8 thousand people who have taken the volunteers' oath and signed contracts with this service belong to the active formation of volunteers; and about 4 thousand are volunteer supporters. On the eve of the anniversary, the Government presented the volunteer formation with a nice gift: a decision was made public to arm it with 5 thousand rifles (carbines). Answering

RESPUBLIKA's request for a comment on this governmental decision, the SKAT commanders clarified it by saying that this actually has to do with automatic rifles and automatic carbines. To the question, how much this decree may cost the tax-payers, the officials replied that outlays for state defense should not be scrutinized with a fine tooth comb. A Kalashnikov automatic rifle costs 90-120 dollars on the world market. There are also cheaper weapons, of course. According to SKAT chief of staff J. Gecas, a protection of objects is impossible without weapons; at present, volunteers are guarding 36 energetics facilities alone.

During the press conference, J. Gecas also spoke about conflicts between the volunteer formations and the other state defense services. He acknowledged that friction among different military services has existed since the times of antiquity. "Each service calls itself the most important one," Gecas said. "But if this degenerates into an unhealthy competition, then it's bad."

The talk about SKAT privileges was not unfounded. This was made evident at the SKAT anniversary commemoration on January 18, at the Supreme Council building. V. Landsbergis, Supreme Council Secretary L. Sabutis, the Bishop of Vilnius J. Tunaitis, deputy volunteers E. Zingeris and Z. Slicyte, and deputy prime minister Z. Vaisvila (who arrived late) came to greet the several hundred volunteers who had gathered from all over Lithuania.

Supreme Council Chairman V. Landsbergis thanked the volunteers for the courage and determination they had demonstrated a year ago, and awarded January 13 commemorative medals to 19 volunteers. A total of 349 volunteers were awarded such medals. Meanwhile, only 20 members of the border guard service (there were about 1500 border guards at the Parliament, the TV building, and the TV tower) and only 2 members of the training unit received such medals. Minister A. Butkevicius himself, who made a considerable contribution to the defense of the Parliament, was also left without an award.

Minister of Defense A. Butkevicius, who took part in the anniversary commemoration, congratulated the volunteers with their first anniversary. He remarked that the volunteers, who are continuing the traditions of the Riflemen's Association (Sauliai), can already be called a National Guard. The minister congratulated the lucky recipients, observing that among the "many who were decorated, there are many more of those who did not get any awards." Two of the minister's deputies, the newly appointed chief of the joint staff and commanders of other national defense services, did not take part in this commemoration. Answering a question of RESPUBLIKA, A. Butkevicius said that "there are attempts to create an antagonism between SKAT and the other national defense services." The minister maintained that his goal as a chief is to take equal care of all the national defense services and not to allow them to be used as a political lever.

Deputy Prime Minister Z. Vaisvila completely agreed that the army should not take part in the political struggles. He emphasized that "it is imperative that law be observed and it is very important that we have a legally elected government." In the deputy prime minister's opinion, the January 13 trials were very important for Lithuania. Even greater trials are awaiting it in the future. After all, an undeclared economic blockade against Lithuania has already been started. This was the first time that a high government official evaluated the situation in Georgia: "I will state openly what others do not dare to say: the old nomenklatura is being returned to power in Georgia," the deputy prime minister said. According to him, the elected president of Georgia, Z. Gamsakhurdia, should not have been removed in such a way. The KGB and E. Shevardnadze himself are allegedly participating in the plot against the legally elected government. In his speech, Z. Vaisvila raised a new idea that the Georgian variant might be applied to Lithuania: attempts will be made to incite the public and the armed services against each other. There was talk about possible military coups.

A military formation on the occasion of SKAT's first birthday.

Lithuanian Defense Minister Responds To Political Attacks

92UN0908C Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian
22 Jan 92 p 11

[Interview with Audrius Butkevicius, Lithuania's Minister of National Defense by RESPUBLIKA: "Victory Always Has Many Parents"]

[Text] Lithuania's Minister of National Defense, Audrius Butkevicius, answers the questions of Ramune Sakalauskaite, reporter of RESPUBLIKA.

[RESPUBLIKA] Waving his speech entitled "Has History Really Taught Our Statesmen Nothing?", which he had delivered on December 31, 1991, to the listeners of Studio "R," A. Terleckas asserted on Saturday at the "Sajudis" conference that 5 thousand Lithuanian volunteers were armed only thanks to the LLL [Lithuanian Liberty League]... Upon hearing it, the deputies who are disloyal to the government leaders asked—which one of us will be shot first? What is the minister's opinion?

[Butkevicius] Both A. Terleckas, as "the main supplier of arms to the state," and those who assert that the KA [national defense] system in Lithuania could be used against people who think differently, are wrong. It is one thing to adopt a decision about arming ourselves, but the real purchase of those arms is something different. The accusations that the KA minister is allegedly not buying weapons are strange...

If A. Butkevicius is not buying those weapons, the chairman of the Supreme Council, the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, or the minister of trade could have negotiated arms purchases during any of their

travels. Such ravings are nothing but incitement and forerunners of tensions, and not a real attempt to solve the problem. The desire to use the KA system as a political lever is very dangerous in a clearly politically polarized society. The events in Georgia are an example of what happens when the army becomes politicized. Therefore, when a Supreme Council's deputy (specifically, R. Gajauskaite) is telling the volunteers, in the rhythms of Southern Lithuanian laments, what a pity it is that they have departed from the Parliament and are no more defending her, it is not clear at all who exactly is attacking her.

[RESPUBLIKA] How to prevent Lithuania from becoming another Georgia?

[Butkevicius] This will be the result of the common activity of all of us. A concrete answer does not exist. There must be maximal guarantees for the safeguarding of democracy, democratic elections, representation of all opinions.

Sometimes I clench my teeth as I look at this or that editor, newspaper or politician, who keep spitting charges and accusations of "absurdity." But even they are a certain expression of democracy and we should not even think that it would be possible to suppress it.

[RESPUBLIKA] In the previously mentioned speech, A. Terleckas accused A. Butkevicius of "blindly carrying out his charge" to do everything possible in order to obstruct "the arming of the Lithuanian volunteers." Allegedly, "hundreds of patriotically minded volunteers were expelled from the KA for their political views..." What is your comment on that?

[Butkevicius] I think that dear A. Terleckas is rapidly approaching my own, a physician's, sphere of activity. Although, to tell the truth, in this case I do not have a clear answer to the "perennial" question: who is he—a fool or a provocateur?

[RESPUBLIKA] Recalling the bloody events of January, A. Skucas, chief of the Department of Defense of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic, said: "On January 8, at 2:00 AM, A. Butkevicius promised 200 uniformed volunteers for 7:00 AM, but at the indicated hour and after the attack only 50 volunteers from Kaunas came to our help." What did really happen?

[Butkevicius] I remember that day very well. We received the information about the meeting on January 6. I reported this to V. Landsbergis. He summoned minister M. Misiukonis and ordered him to cordon off the Supreme Council and not to allow demonstrators inside. At that time, the National Defense Department had no legal documents granting it the right to protect public order. But the Presidium of the Supreme Council had issued an order permitting measures to maintain order in case there was an attempt to seize the buildings. I promised to bring over 200 people. We had 100 cadets in Vilnius at that time and they came to the Parliament

building at 6:30 AM. The names of the people who took part in this action will be made available to the state newspaper.

Another 100 people, who had come from Kaunas, were outside. It is strange to see my colleague, Mr. A. Skucas, hurl such undeserved insults at the people of the National Defense system who defended the Parliament building that day. I do not think that this is a coincidence. I completely understand A. Skucas, because victory always has many parents.

[RESPUBLIKA] It seems that a black cat has crossed the path between you and the chief of the Supreme Council's Defense Department, A. Skucas.

[Butkevicius] I have more than once expressed a certain dissatisfaction with A. Skucas' tendentious information concerning my people. At first he was calling the National Defense Department "mafiosi" and bandits. At the time of the public meetings of the "Yedinstvo," we had no system and personnel; there was only the militia and we had to recruit people in a hurry. I used to attend courses in martial self-defense, and therefore I turned to my own people. And they did not disappoint me. Perhaps they were not the most handsome individuals, but they unselfishly abandoned what they were doing, disregarded the dangers of being beaten up or incriminated. They came to work, but later they met up with abuse. I do not want to forgive that. All this has harmed the idea—to attract the largest number of young, strong men, who earlier had no opportunity to apply their wits and strength.

[RESPUBLIKA] Rumors were circulating on New Year's eve that at the time when R. Baltusis, an official of the Ministry of National Defense, was stealing documents from the KGB, listening devices were discovered at C. Jezerskas' home. Is this true?

[Butkevicius] R. Baltusis was not stealing KGB documents and no listening devices were discovered at C. Jezerskas' home. This is sheer bluff. The rumors that sacks full of documents have been piled up at the security building are Ali Baba's tales. The KGB building is not the Supreme Council, which is full of sacks. The KGB documents are being guarded differently. All the talk about the primitive spiriting away of the documents clearly show that they are an attempt to disguise something more serious. Such things are usually done quietly and smoothly.

[RESPUBLIKA] Thank you for the conversation.

Lithuanian Chief of Staff on Future Military Structure

92UN0908D Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian
23 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with Valdas Tutkus, chief of staff of the National Defense Ministry unit, by RESPUBLIKA: "The Army Is Not a Little Toy"]

[Text] Valdas Tutkus, chief of staff of the National Defense Ministry Army unit, is 31 years old. In 1982 he graduated from the Tashkent academy for military commanders. During 1983-1985 he served in Afghanistan and in 1985 he was appointed commander of a training battalion in Turkmenia. From 1989 to 1991 Tutkus studied at the Frunze military academy. Since the summer of 1991, he has been employed by the National Defense Ministry of Lithuania. Lieutenant Colonel Valdas Tutkus answers the questions of Audrius Kutrevicius, a reporter of RESPUBLIKA.

[RESPUBLIKA] People who are not acquainted with military science are not quite sure what the function of the military staff is.

[Tutkus] The staffs of all states are busy planning battle readiness. At present the army of Lithuania consists of the Volunteer National Defense Service [SKAT], a swift reaction unit, and the civil defense and border guard services. We shall also plan actions in response to possible interventions or military conflicts. The joint staff has no decisive voice and follows the orders of the minister and of the ministry college.

[RESPUBLIKA] What branches of the Lithuanian army will be created in the future?

[Tutkus] It appears that a small aviation force will be created. An anti-aircraft defense force should also exist. I think that there could also be a small military fleet, which would control the border defense.

[RESPUBLIKA] Is it true that the military statutes are in most cases translated from the Russian language?

[Tutkus] We have prepared statutes covering internal matters, drill regulation, discipline and general affairs. A part of them have been transcribed (with amendments) from the Soviet army. But these are merely drafts—individual services are proposing their own amendments and we are not yet ready to present them to the Supreme Council for confirmation.

[RESPUBLIKA] In some countries the president is the chief of the army. What do you think about that?

[Tutkus] I think this is good. The army must be led not only by professional military people, but also by politicians who understand internal and foreign policy. The military staff has been created to make it sure that such decisions are correct.

[RESPUBLIKA] The USSR army was used not only for national defense but also for political games. Will this sad practice be repeated in Lithuania?

[Tutkus] I think that this will not happen, because I know what the officers and soldiers are thinking. In my opinion, the army is not a political toy. It guarantees the state's security against external enemies and it must not meddle in political affairs. It must guarantee a peaceful life for the people.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Formation of 1st Armenian Airborne Regiment

92UM0818C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 7

[Unattributed article: "Armenia"]

[Text] The oath of loyalty to the Republic and people has been taken by 120 new recruits from the first military formation of the Armenian Ministry of Defense, the first airborne assault regiment. In this unit which is stationed at the barracks of the former Yerevan Regiment of the USSR MVD a ceremony has been held attended by numerous representatives of the public, deputies and parents of the men and even foreign journalists.

Republic Law on Armed Forces

925D0201A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
31 Oct 91 p 2

[Azerbaijan Republic Law on Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces No 210-XII signed by Azerbaijan Republic President A. Mutalibov in Baku on 9 Oct 91]

[Text]

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. Status of Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces

The Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces are a state armed organization subordinate to the Azerbaijan Republic President and called upon to defend the interests, sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Azerbaijan Republic.

Article 2. Missions of Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces

Missions of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces are as follows:

- defense of the Azerbaijan Republic in case of armed aggression by another state;
- security of important state installations;
- security of Azerbaijan Republic state borders;
- intelligence work to ensure the military security of the Azerbaijan Republic;
- participation, together with law-protection agencies, in preventing terrorist and other subversive acts and in eliminating bandit and other criminal formations;
- participation in implementing a state of emergency announced in accordance with Azerbaijan Republic legislation;
- assistance to state and public establishments as well as to the population in mopping up in the aftermath of natural and ecologic catastrophes, natural disasters and major accidents.

Use of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces in any form against the people of the Azerbaijan Republic, constitutional authorities and administrative entities is a crime punishable by law.

Article 3. Organizational principles of Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces force generation

The Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces are organized in accordance with principles of centralization of leadership, sole command, cadre organization, high military discipline and constant combat readiness.

Article 4. Legal basis of Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces Activity

The Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, this Law, other legislative measures of the Azerbaijan Republic, and Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces regulations and manuals comprise the legal basis of Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces activity.

Article 5. Subordination and Supervision of Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces

The President of the Azerbaijan Republic is Commander-in-Chief of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces.

The Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Defense exercises leadership of Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces formation and force generation; civil defense; organizational and mobilization activities; conscription work; logistical, social-daily life, medical and financial support; and training of officer and enlisted personnel in Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Defense educational institutions, courses and subunits.

The Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Defense exercises immediate leadership of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces. The commander of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces is appointed by the Azerbaijan Republic President.

The Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces are employed by decision of the Commander-in-Chief to carry out missions set forth in Article 2 of this Law.

Article 6. Numerical Strength and Structure of Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces

The numerical strength and structure of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces are established and approved by the Azerbaijan Republic President.

II. FORMATION OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC ARMED FORCES

Article 7 Manning of Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces units and subunits

Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces units and subunits are manned by conscription, voluntarily, and by contract.

Officer manning is on a voluntary basis from among officers who are Azerbaijan Republic citizens in the reserve or on duty in armed forces of other states, with

retention of their previous years served and military ranks, as well as who have completed military educational institutions.

A reserve of mobilization resources is established for bringing the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces up to strength by mobilization and to ensure their wartime needs.

Article 8. Military Obligation of Azerbaijan Republic Citizens

Every male Azerbaijan Republic citizen who has reached age 18 and is fit for service healthwise is obligated to perform active duty in the ranks of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces or reservist active duty training.

Female Azerbaijan Republic citizens in the ages from 18 to 35 who have a medical or other specialized education may consent to be placed on military registration and perform contract service in auxiliary or other subunits of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces.

Persons performing military service take an oath of allegiance to the Azerbaijan Republic, the text of which is approved by the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet.

Article 9. Alternative Service (Labor Obligation)

Male Azerbaijan Republic citizens in ages from 18 to 25 who cannot perform military service, because of their beliefs, perform alternative service (labor obligation) in state labor detachments, in services with a humanitarian direction and in services in the municipal sphere. The term of service is two years.

The procedure for performing this service is established by an appropriate statute approved by the Azerbaijan Republic President.

Article 10. Conscription of Azerbaijan Republic Citizens for First-term Military Service and Alternative Service

The conscription of citizens in necessary numbers for military and alternative service and discharge from its ranks are announced by the Azerbaijan Republic President twice a year and are carried out by the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Defense.

Persons not called up for active duty perform reservist active duty training.

Military reservists and draftees are registered at their place of residence under the procedure established by the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Defense.

Article 11. Draft Commissions

Draft commissions approved by the corresponding Soviet of People's Deputies are established in rayons (cities) to organize the conscription of citizens for first-term military and alternative service and are made up of the following:

—Commission Chairman—chairman or deputy chairman of the rayon (city) Soviet of People's Deputies;

—Deputy Commission Chairman—representative of the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Defense;

—Commission members—physicians and representatives of the rayon or city internal affairs entity, public associations and labor collectives.

Rayon (city) draft Commissions are responsible for the following:

—medical examination of draftees;

—deciding questions of citizen conscription and distribution to Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces units and subunits, as well as questions of deferment or release from conscription;

—selecting candidates who have expressed a desire to enter military educational institutions, and sending them for study.

A Republic Draft Commission is established to direct the rayon or city draft commission and to monitor their activities, with the following composition:

—Commission Chairman—Azerbaijan Republic military commissar;

—Commission members—representatives of the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Health, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Justice as well as representatives of public associations.

The makeup of the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Defense Republic Draft Commission is approved by the Azerbaijan Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

The Republic Draft Commission has the following responsibilities:

—the resolution of disputes over conscription for military service and alternative service of draftees, and deferral or release from conscription;

—the exercise of supervision over the work of rayon and city draft Commissions.

The Commission is obligated to examine issues within ten days in case there is no need to make a special check.

Republic Draft Commission decisions may be appealed in court under the procedure established by the Law.

Article 12. Deferment from conscription for first-term military and alternative service

Deferment from conscription for first-term military and alternative service is granted as follows:

—a. if the draftee is the only son in the family;

—b. if the draftee has a child up to three years of age, or two or more children;

—c. if the draftee is deemed temporarily unfit for military service during a medical examination;

—d. to pupils of secondary schools of general education and specialized technical educational institution not older than 22 years of age;

—e. to students of higher educational institutions;

—f. to post-graduate students.

Article 13. Release from conscription for first-term military and alternative service

The following citizens are released from conscription for first-term military and alternative service in peacetime from among the number of conscriptees;

- a. students of military educational institutions who have taken the full military training course under the reserve officer program and have received officer rank;
- b. those deemed unfit for military service in peacetime because of health, fit on a limited basis in wartime, or unfit for military service with exclusion from military registration;
- c. those who have performed alternative service (labor obligation) in accordance with Article 9 of this Law;
- d. those whose brothers perished or died in a period of performance of military service;
- e. those sentenced by the court to imprisonment;
- f. persons who have performed service in the USSR Armed Forces.

Article 14. Acceptance for Contract Military Service

Azerbaijan Republic citizens from the ages of 18 to 35, who are healthy, are accepted for contract military service from among the following:

- privates and NCO's who have served in the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces;
- privates and NCO's who have served or are now performing service in ranks of the USSR Armed Forces and have served more than 12 months;
- those who have performed reservist active duty training in reserve units with performance of three months of specialized training.

The contract, which specifies the parties' mutual obligation and responsibility, amount of pay, and conditions for rescinding it, is concluded between the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Defense and Azerbaijan Republic citizens.

III. SERVICE IN RANKS OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC ARMED FORCES

Article 15. Maximum Ages for Being on Military Duty

Maximum ages for being on military duty are established as follows:

- 27 years of age for first-term privates, sergeants and senior NCO's and 45 years of age under contract;
- 45 years of age for junior-grade officers;
- 50 years of age for senior-grade officers;
- 55 years for general and flag officers.

Discharge from the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces occurs on reaching maximum age.

Discharge of servicemen prior to the established term of service is authorized for the following reasons:

- state of health;
- family circumstances;
- reduction in force;
- on the basis of a court sentence;

—by one's own wish after five years of service in an officer position.

Article 16. The Terms of Military Service

The terms of military service are established as follows:

- 18 months for privates and sergeants performing first-term military service by conscription and voluntarily, and under contract—as a rule three years with a subsequent extension;
- from 1 to 3 months depending on specialization for persons undergoing training at [reservist] assemblies.

Article 17. Military Ranks

The following military ranks are established to regulate the interrelationships among servicemen and denote their length of service and qualification:

Soldiers Ranks

—Private (Asker)

Sergeants Ranks

—Junior Sergeant

—Sergeant

—Senior NCO [Starshina]

Junior Officers

—Lieutenant

—Senior Lieutenant

—Captain

Senior Officers

—Major

—Lieutenant-Colonel

—Colonel

Higher Officers

—Major-General

—Lieutenant-General

Seamen's Ranks

—Seaman

Petty Officers' Ranks [Starshinskiye]

—Petty Officer 2nd class

—Petty Officer 1st class

—Chief Petty Officer

—Lieutenant

—Senior Lieutenant

—Captain-Lieutenant

—Captain 3rd Rank

—Captain 2nd Rank

—Captain 1st Rank

—Rear-Admiral

—Vice-Admiral

Article 18. Conformity of military ranks to positions held

NCO ranks as a rule conform to the following service responsibilities:

In ground units and subunits of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces:

- Junior Sergeant—squad commander, gunner of tank, gun or combat vehicle
- Sergeant—deputy platoon commander, commander of gun or combat vehicle
- Senior NCO—company or battery senior NCO

In naval units and subunits of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces:

- Petty Officer 2nd Class—squad or battle station commander
- Petty Officer 1st Class—team, group, turret or battery commander of 3rd rank ship
- Chief Petty Officer—team, group, turret or battery commander of 2nd and 1st rank ship

Officer ranks in Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces ground units and subunits as a rule conform to the following official duties:

- Lieutenant—platoon commander
- Senior Lieutenant—platoon commander, deputy commander of company or other equivalent position
- Captain—commander of company, battery or other equivalent position
- Major—deputy battalion (artillery battalion) commander or other equivalent position
- Lieutenant-Colonel—commander of battalion (artillery battalion) or other equivalent position
- Colonel—deputy commander of formation or other equivalent position
- Major-General—commander of formation or other equivalent position
- Lieutenant-General—commander of Armed Forces, Minister of Defense

Officer ranks in Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces naval units and subunits as a rule conform to the following official positions:

- Lieutenant—group or turret officer of a 3rd rank ship
- Senior lieutenant—group or turret officer of a 2nd rank ship
- Captain-Lieutenant—commander of 4th rank ship, battery officer or head of command or staff department of 2nd and 3rd rank ships, group officer of 1st rank ship
- Captain 3rd Rank—commander of 3rd rank ship or of division of 4th rank ships, head of command or staff department of 1st rank ship
- Captain 2nd Rank—commander of 2nd rank ship or of division of 3rd rank ships
- Captain 1st Rank—commander of 1st rank ship or of division of 2nd rank ships
- Rear-Admiral—commander of division of ships, brigade of ships, naval base
- Vice-Admiral—commander of squadron or flotilla

In Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces air units and subunits the conformity of military ranks to positions held is determined by analogy with ground units and subunits.

Article 19. Conferring military ranks

Military ranks are conferred in the sequence established by Article 17 of this Law. The Azerbaijan Republic Minister of Defense confers the first officer rank on cadets who have completed military educational institutions or courses.

Higher ranks are conferred on officers in order of sequence in accordance with Article 18 of this Law, with the following years served in grade:

- Lieutenant at least two years;
- Senior Lieutenant at least three years;
- Captain at least three years;
- Major at least four years;
- Lieutenant-Colonel at least five years;
- Colonel at least two years.

The next military ranks are conferred as follows:

- Junior Sergeant and Sergeant by the unit commander;
- First Sergeant by the formation commander;
- Junior Officer ranks by the Commander of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces;
- Senior officer ranks by the Azerbaijan Republic Minister of Defense;
- General and flag officer ranks by the Azerbaijan Republic President.

Article 20. Deprivation and restoration of military ranks

Deprivation of an officer rank can be accomplished only by court sentence or with loss of Azerbaijan Republic citizenship.

Deprivation of NCO ranks can be accomplished by court sentence as well as under the procedure established by the Disciplinary Regulation.

Restoration of officer rank is accomplished by court decree, and NCO rank by court decree as well as by decision of the higher commander.

Article 21. Appointment to Position

Officers are appointed to official positions and relieved of positions in accordance with Article 18 of this Law as follows:

- Members of the Ministry of Defense Collegium are approved by the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet after discussion in the appropriate Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet Standing Commission;
- The Commander of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces and his deputies, a formation commander, and commanders of a squadron, flotilla and higher are approved by the Azerbaijan Republic President;
- From deputy formation commanders, commanders of a division or brigade of ships or of a naval base to battalion commanders, commanders of 1st and 2nd rank ships, and of divisions of 2nd and 3rd rank ships are approved by the Azerbaijan Republic Minister of Defense;
- From deputy battalion or artillery battalion commanders to company commanders, commanders of a 3rd rank ship or a division of 4th rank ships, and heads of command or staff departments of a 1st rank ship are approved by the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces Commander;
- From deputy company commanders and group and turret officers of a 2nd rank ship to platoon commanders, group and turret officers of a 3rd rank ship, commanders of 4th rank ships, battery officers or command or staff department heads of 2nd and 3rd rank ships and group officers of 1st rank ships are approved by the formation, flotilla or squadron commander.

Sergeants are appointed to official positions and relieved of official duties as follows:

- Junior Sergeants, Sergeants, and Petty Officers 1st and 2nd Class by a battalion commander, commander of a division of ships, or captain of a 1st rank ship;
- Senior NCO's or Chief Petty Officers by the formation, squadron or flotilla commander.

The appointment to positions in Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces air units and subunits is accomplished by analogy under the procedure established by this article.

Article 22. Uniform

In performing duties of military service, servicemen and military reservists on active duty training wear the military uniform with insignia according to military rank and combat arm.

The Azerbaijan Republic President establishes the military uniform and insignia of servicemen. Rules for wearing them are approved by the Azerbaijan Republic Minister of Defense.

Article 23. Assignment to and Conscription from the Reserve

A person on military service is discharged to the reserve with the appearance of one of the circumstances envisaged in points a, b and c of Article 12 or point d of Article 13 of this Law.

In case persons listed in articles 12 and 13 of this Law who were granted deferment from performance of military service will not be called up for military service before age 25, they are assigned to the reserve.

Citizens who have performed military service in ranks of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces or those of another state as well as those who have not been on military service, with the exception of persons not called up for first-term service by virtue of circumstances indicated in point a of Article 12 and in points b and d of Article 13 of this Law, are considered persons subject to conscription from the reserve.

Article 24. Mobilization

In case a threat arises to the security of the state and its citizens or ecologic catastrophes and natural disasters occur, Azerbaijan Republic male citizens from age 18 are mobilized for military service in the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces by a decree of the Azerbaijan Republic President.

IV. SOCIAL GUARANTEES

Article 25. Monetary Payments to Servicemen

Monetary payments to servicemen are established by the Azerbaijan Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 26. Pension Support

The right of servicemen and members of their families to pension support after discharge from military service is guaranteed by the state and established by Azerbaijan Republic legislative measures and by decisions of the Azerbaijan Republic Cabinet of Ministers made in accordance with them.

Article 27. Social Insurance

Servicemen as well as military reservists performing active duty training in the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces are subject to compulsory state insurance from the moment of conscription to (or entry into) military service (or to active duty training) in case of their loss or death, mutilation (wound, contusion), loss of health in a period of performance of duties of military service, or accidents or illnesses connected with performance of military service.

The state guarantees social security to persons who have lost working capacity during performance of military service.

The procedure for and conditions of insurance and amounts of payment of insurance sums are established by the Azerbaijan Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 28. Housing Support

Officers as well as servicemen performing contract service who do not have housing at places where service is performed are provided with official apartments, and in their absence are paid monetary compensation under the procedure established by the Azerbaijan Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

First-term servicemen are accommodated in barracks.

Officers as well as servicemen performing contract service and having 20 years or more of service are provided with permanent housing at the place of choice of permanent residence through local entities of executive authority within three months.

Servicemen performing military service continuously for 15 calendar years or more who have entered into housing construction cooperatives or are constructing or purchasing an individual residence and who have no other permanent housing at their duty stations are given free financial aid in paying off a debt for payment of housing or a bank loan received for constructing or purchasing an individual residence in the amount of 50 percent.

Article 29. Medical support of servicemen

Servicemen as well as military reservists on active duty training have the right to free medical and medicine support.

In the absence of military medical establishments at servicemen's duty stations, free medical assistance is given them in civilian health establishments regardless of their departmental subordination.

Article 30. Servicemen's Leaves

Servicemen are granted regular and short-term leave.

Regular leaves are granted once a year for 45 days to officers, for 30 days to contract servicemen, and for 10 days to first-term privates and sergeants, not counting the time necessary for travel to and from the leave location.

Short-term leaves lasting 10 days are granted to all servicemen for family circumstances, as well as to first-term servicemen as an incentive.

Article 31. Privileges under special conditions

For servicemen participating in combat operations in fulfillment of missions assigned by this Law to the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces, the term of service and monetary payment for one day are tripled.

V. FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 32. Financial and Material Support of Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces

Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces receive financial and material support from funds of the Azerbaijan Republic state budget as well as from voluntary donations by citizens, establishments, organizations and enterprises.

[Signed] **President of the Azerbaijan Republic**
A. MUTALIBOV

City of Baku, 9 October 1991
No 210-XII.

Caucasus Confederacy to Create Own Armed Forces

92UM0818B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Lt Col N. Astashkin: "From Vladikavkaz: The Question of Establishing Their Own Armed Forces Has Been Settled At a Session of the Parliament of the Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples"]

[Text] Recently in Vladikavkaz there was held the 4th Session of the Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples. The session adopted a provision on the armed forces of the Confederation. The Chairman of the Defense Committee Col (Res) Khusan Kashirgov, who gave the report, in particular, pointed out that these armed formations are to be established for ensuring the state sovereignty of the Confederation, for the peaceful resolution of interethnic problems and for protecting the rights and freedoms of the citizens. The armed forces will include motorized rifle, tank and artillery units as well as Air Forces and Air Defense subunits. They are to be organized from males 18-40 years of age on the basis of universal military service and by contract.

The Confederation President, the Docent at the Kabardino-Balkar State University Yuriy Shabov, termed the future armed forces of the Confederation "Blue Troops"

similar to the UN troops and said that they will help to maintain peace and stability in the Northern Caucasus.

However, this act creates, of course, numerous questions.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Nazarbayev Takes Steps to Ensure Military 'Social Protection'

92UM0786C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by K. Borodinov, under the rubric: "Direct Line: Yesterday KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and ITAR-TASS Correspondents Transmitted": "From Alma-Ata: Servicemen in Kazakhstan Are Under the President's Protection"]

[Text] Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev has issued a Decree on measures for social protection of servicemen. He is taking into account the changes that are occurring in the Armed Forces as a result of the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and is called upon to facilitate the provision of social protection of military personnel who are carrying out their duties on the territory of Kazakhstan.

Ministries and departments and heads of oblast and city administrations have been tasked to regularly provide food, logistics resources and also consumer goods to military units. Local administrative organs have been granted the right to allocate plots of land for private farming and gardens and to render assistance to maintain profitable military sovkhozes.

Kyrgyzstan Reacts to Planes' Flight to Russia

92UM0709A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 92
Morning edition p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Aleksandr Ryabushkin, Bishkek: "Twelve Military Aircraft Have Flown From Kyrgyzstan to Barnaul"]

[Text] Twelve L-39 trainer fighter aircraft have flown to the city of Barnaul from a military airfield in Kyrgyzstan.

This report caused a stormy reaction in the hall at the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Soviet session. Many deputies perceived this act as the premeditated theft of military equipment without any concurrence of the republic leadership which naturally affects national security interests. In general, the "Ukrainian Syndrome" is present—this is the opinion of the parliamentarians' excited discussions. Although prior to this incident, no one displayed any special interest toward army subunits or equipment that were deployed on republic territory. Yes and there are not that many troops here and their maintenance would be quite a burden for the local

budget. President A. Akayev has normally talked about a national guard that does not exceed 1,000 men.

In parliament, Major-General V. Belotskiy, Chief of Central Courses for Aviation Cadre Training and Mastery, provided an explanation. He said that the withdrawal of this training unit from the republic was carried out according to plan. Already last year, the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Air Force Commander-in-Chief had decided to disband one of the five training regiments. The appropriate republic leaders had been informed about this beforehand. And, on February 27, according to the order, 12 aircraft took off for the Barnaul Flying School.

The general of aviation's explanations did not convince the parliamentarians but only incited the passions of the up to now peace-loving deputies. Demands were heard to deprive Republic People's Deputy V. Belotskiy of his deputy's immunity and to arrest him. Then and there, in the course of the investigation, it was learned that many people in the republic leadership actually did know about the operation being prepared but they had not made any decisions whatsoever.

The deputies created a commission which will be involved with the investigation of all circumstances of the incident. Vice President F. Kulov announced the introduction of militia and OMON [Special-purpose militia detachments] subunits on the territory of military airfields.

I met with V. Belotskiy. He said that the courses had previously trained 400-500 pilots for foreign countries that were friendly to us and were a military-commercial structure. They were subordinate to and supplied by the USSR Air Force and they were financed by the former Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. Recent events in the world and especially in the country have noticeably weakened the interests of our foreign partners in the school. Problems with finances and supply had acutely arisen. Therefore, the decision was made to disband one regiment.

As for the aircraft themselves, they are ordinary Czech-made "sparka" [trainer] aircraft. In the general's opinion, they have no great military value. All the more so that they are CIS Air Force property—the republic has not yet adopted any legal acts on nationalization of the army.

This is the underlying cause of the entire incident which would not even have been worth mentioning in former times. But today it has special significance for a certain circle of politicians. After the August putsch, there were already attempts in the local parliament to transfer the entire responsibility of the local Central Committee GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] supporters to the military's shoulders. At the time, President A. Akayev headed off that initiative. Right now, one more attempt has been made to unleash an anti-army campaign and to remove generals they do not like in this wave.

Today hurrah patriotism is advantageous for some parliamentarians and members of the new government. They are wonderful grounds to divert the people's attention from the errors and miscalculations in the economy and policy. Many people can boldly set their sights on this populist wave.

Tajikistan Names Defense Advisor

92UM0786B Moscow PATRIOT in Russian
No 10, Mar 92 p 7

[Article by OSO [Defense Assistance Society] Club Director D. Akhmedov: "At the Republic of Tajikistan OSO Central Committee"]

[Text] The Republic of Tajikistan Defense Assistance Society [OSO] Central Committee Plenum occurred which reviewed the organizational issue.

As a result of the appointment of Major-General Bakhram Manonovich Rakhmanov as Republic of Tajikistan President Advisor on Defense Issues, National Security and Law Enforcement Organs—National Guard Commander, the plenum relieved him of the position as Republic OSO Central Committee chairman.

The plenum elected Colonel Farukhiddin Rakhimovich Rakhmanov as Republic of Tajikistan OSO Central Committee chairman.

Uzbekistan Recalls Servicemen in Other Republics

92UM0818A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Major V. Kovalenko: "From Tashkent: Parliament Announces a Spring...Recall"]

[Text] The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Sh. Yuldashev, has signed a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on recalling the servicemen called up from Uzbekistan. The decree has been published in the local press.

In the preamble to the decree, Parliament expresses concern for the life and safety of the soldiers serving in regions where they are working intensely to involve the troop units in resolving nationality conflicts, and where, having declared the establishing of their own armed forces, the republics are endeavoring to nationalize and "privatize" not only the military equipment, but also the personnel and are forcing the men to take a military oath of loyalty to the new sovereign states.

All of this, the decree states, does not ensure the necessary conditions for the service by citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and causes particular concern among parents for their sons, as can be seen from the numerous appeals to the republic Supreme Soviet.

Within a month's time it is proposed to recall the soldiers and sergeants serving on the territories of states which are not members of the CIS (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Georgia) or which are establishing their own armed forces (Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) as well as from the Transcaucasus Military District and the Caspian Flotilla. Citizens of Uzbekistan can serve in these regions under contract. Those servicemen who have served at least 18 months will be discharged into the reserves until the passage of the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan "On Universal Military Service."

The remainder will be sent to make up the troops of the CIS stationed in the Turkestan Military District, the Republic MVD troops and the National Security Service, the brigades of the National Guard as well as, with the agreement of the men, organizing alternative service detachments.

MOLDOVA

Moldovan-Pridnestr Clash Reported

92UM0717A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel N. Mulyar and Captain 2nd Rank O. Odnokolenko: "What Will Happen in Dubossary Tomorrow?"]

[Text] On the morning of 4 March in the press center of the President of the Pridnestrovye Moldovan Republic we were informed that the night as a whole passed quietly. But the result of previous days is sad: six guardsmen and Cossacks died and 25 persons were wounded. The Moldovan side has not yet announced its losses, but it is already obvious that there was fierce fighting in the village of Kochiyery on 3 March, with all kinds of firearms and hand grenades employed. At the very least, several hundred persons took part in it on both sides. The location of the civil defense mechanized regiment became the epicenter of combat operations.

According to a report of Colonel Valeriy Yanayev, chief of 14th Army Operations Group, Army Chief of Staff Major-General Vyacheslav Sitnikov flew into Dubossary by helicopter on 3 March; to get to the regiment's location he had to spend one and a half hours lying under a bombardment. As a result of talks, the regiment's colors and 25 Russian soldiers were evacuated to a combat engineer brigade.

But now, with more complete data it is possible to recreate the events of 2 and 3 March with some accuracy. It turns out that a Moldovan special-purpose police detachment took part in capturing the regiment. The group of Pridnestr guardsmen blockaded on the third floor of the regiment's barracks was small. It was headed by the battalion commander, Pridnestr Guards Major (Reserve) Vasilii Voronkov, an Afghan War veteran. In saving subordinates during the battle, he used his body to cover a grenade which flew into the room and died.

When reinforcements numbering up to 1,000 guardsmen and Cossacks approached Kochiyery from the direction of Dubossary, Voronkov's group managed to break out of encirclement. The situation changed: the Moldovan police themselves were blockaded on the regiment's grounds and in Kochiyery. By order of the command element, regimental commander Lieutenant-Colonel Stepan Batsura, around 10 officers, two warrant officers and two enlisted men remained in the regiment's disposition. They were instructed not to leave the unit in any case, otherwise—evidently the law of war already is entering into force here—it will be considered captured by the Moldovan side.

Our correspondent managed to contact Lieutenant-Colonel Batsura by phone with difficulty. Judging from his tone, he was answering the questions in the presence of officers of the Moldovan special-purpose police detachment. In particular, Stepan Batsura said:

"The night passed relatively calmly, there was no firing. All people have been evacuated to Dubossary. There are several officers, warrant officers and two enlisted men with me. For several days now we have been eating dry rations, but they are coming to an end. To prevent looting, officers and warrant officers have been placed on duty near the homes. I requested the police brigade commander to remove civilians from the unit grounds and seal equipment and property depots to keep what remains from being plundered. We are impatiently awaiting the flight to Moldova of Colonel-General Pyankov and the Commonwealth of Independent States civil defense chief, who must resolve our problem with the presidents of Moldova and Pridnestr ..."

And here is what our correspondent was told by Aleksandr Porozhan, deputy chairman of the Dubossary Gorispolkom:

"The village of Kochiyery and the unit itself are surrounded by forces of the guard, the militia and Cossacks. We are monitoring all exits and entrances, since many police are dressed in civilian clothes. The servicemen's families have been accommodated and fed. One thing is distressing: the police opened fire when the servicemen's wives and children were evacuated by buses. One woman and a child as well as a Kiev newspaper journalist were wounded. There is a tentative understanding between Pridnestr President I. Smirnov and Moldovan President M. Snegur about a meeting. The time and place are now being clarified. We have one demand—the military unit must be cleared of police and the police must be removed to the right bank of the Dniester."

At the end of the conversation Aleksandr Porozhan cautioned that it is impossible to fully trust information being given out by regimental commander Lieutenant-Colonel Stepan Batsura, since he and the servicemen remaining in the regiment are under the muzzles of Moldovan policemen's assault rifles.

According to information received in the 14th Army operations group, Pridnestr guardsmen and Cossacks

taking part in the blockade of the village of Kochiyery have armored equipment. At the same time, a concentration of armed force elements is observed on the right bank of the Dniester. In the assessment of observers, should it be required, Moldova can assemble up to 10,000 volunteers in a short time. Information is coming in that volunteer detachments ready to come to the assistance of Pridnestr also are being formed on the Don.

...Isolated shots are heard. According to local yardsticks, this already is considered fully normal. They say: "It is quiet here for now."

But what will happen tomorrow?

Moldovan-Dnester Talks Begin

92UM0719A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel N. Mulyar and Captain 2nd Rank O. Odnokolenko: "During the Dubossary Events the Army Observed Neutrality, and Again Found Itself Between Two Fires"]

[Text] On 5 March a conciliatory commission which included plenipotentiaries of Moldova and the Pridnestr Republic continued work. Yesterday, based on results of the first session, the sides agreed to a cease-fire and subsequently to fully give up the use of force in resolving issues. Direct two-way communications were established between plenipotentiaries of the Moldovan and Pridnestr delegations, and the procedure for transferring prisoners and withdrawing forces was stipulated.

But as we were informed in the press center of the president of the Pridnestr Moldovan Republic, the armed grouping on the right bank of the Dnestr has not diminished for now. There are 150 APC's concentrated on the Moldovan side at bridges across the Dnestr. A report of the Moldovan MVD Cadres Department, disseminated on 5 March, states that events in Pridnestr "gave a powerful impetus to the patriotic movement among Republic citizens." In response to numerous queries from the population, the Department informs citizens that to join the MVD cadre corps it is necessary to inquire at police departments at the place of residence. It became known that supporters of the Moldovan People's Front assembled at the Republic Parliament on 4 March and demanded that the president issue arms immediately.

It should be noted that, despite the progress in the talks, Tiraspol, like Kishinev, remains on guard. According to an announcement of an informed source close to the President of the Pridnestr Moldovan Republic, each day up to a hundred Cossacks who already are given arms at the place of their arrival arrive in Pridnestr. A certain guardedness in Tiraspol also is caused by the fact that the Moldovan side is keeping data on its losses secret. According to information existing in the press service of the President of the Pridnestr Moldovan Republic,

Moldovan police lost up to 40 killed and wounded, but are not announcing this so as "not to put out the fighting mood."

On 4 March Republic President Mircha Snegur addressed the people of Moldova. He accused certain former Union mass media of attempting to give the conflict an ethnic coloration and "veil the military-communist essence of the pseudo-republic," which is attempting to attract national-patriotic forces of Russia to its side. Snegur condemned the Cossacks' intervention in the conflict and qualified the seizure of weapons by Moldovan police and residents of the village of Kochiyery as a violation of the law.

Pridnestr guardsmen left Kochiyery and the military post following talks between delegations of the conciliation commission. On the evening of 4 March regimental commander Lieutenant-Colonel Stepan Batsura transferred to a combat engineer brigade of the city of Dubossary with a group of officers and warrant officers. The military are emphatically not intervening in the conflict, which became an occasion for Galina Andreyeva, leader of the Women's Movement of Pridnestr, to accuse the 14th Combined-Arms Army command element of treason. At a civil funeral in Tiraspol she declared that she is giving Army Commander Major-General Yuriy Netkachev 48 hours to leave the territory of Pridnestr.

Army Chief of Staff Major Vyacheslav Sitnikov announced that the attitude toward servicemen has changed sharply in Tiraspol and other populated points of Pridnestr over the last two days. Instances of insults to officers have been noted and military vehicles are being detained. As Angelina Ogli, member of a workers' committee of the city of Bendery, declared in a telephone conversation, even without the assistance of the military they do not plan to concede "this last spot of Soviet authority" to anyone. She announced that workers' detachments began to be formed at city enterprises yesterday and all verified people will receive weapons when the hour comes.

Now there is no longer any doubt that the conflict in Pridnestr has gone beyond the bounds of language problems and has acquired a clear-cut political coloration. For now the Army has remained outside politics, but it seems that it will have difficulty doing this.

Dubossary Talks Continue

92UM0754A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel N. Mulyar and Captain 2nd Rank O. Odnokolenko: "A Lull Was Noted in Dubossary, Talks Are Under Way, But Fingers Still Are on Triggers"]

[Text] Another session of the conciliatory commission was held in Bendery on 9 March to examine the situation existing in Pridnestrovye. The sides concluded that they should look into why previously reached understandings

are not working. A decision was made to draw up a timetable and coordinate conditions for a withdrawal of paramilitary units over the next few days. But the special session of the Pridnestrovye Moldovan Republic Parliament continues in Tiraspol. Its subject was dictated by events in Dubossary. According to an informed source, the existing political situation and questions of defense are being discussed in closed sessions and countermeasures will be developed against the so-called banking war unleashed by Moldova.

The situation is stabilizing in the region on the whole. We were informed in the press center of the president of the Pridnestrovye Moldovan Republic that separate brief exchanges of fire were noted, including from heavy-caliber machineguns, on the evening of 9 March and the early morning of 10 March. Guardsmen at posts near the bridges assert that snipers are firing at them from the opposite bank. But there were no killed or wounded during the past 24 hours.

Tension over troops stationed in Pridnestrovye has not abated for now. As stated in a telephone conversation by Colonel Igor Mukabonov, commander of a combat engineer brigade from Dubossary, on the evening of 9 March he received a letter of ultimatum from the women's committee with demands to hand over existing weapons and equipment for arming the city populace; otherwise, it was declared, the women intended to seize the unit. It was explained to us in the Dubossary Gorispolkom, however, that it was not a question of arming the population, but only about reinforcing arms of the Guard and Cossacks.

In commenting on the situation, 14th Army Commander Major General Yuriy Netkachev announced that all approaches to ammunition depots have been mined. Signs announce this, but someone already is attempting to check the "strength" of the mining by sending dogs onto the minefields. Several already have blown up.

As before, participation of Cossacks and volunteers from Romania in the conflict is the center of attention. It was learned that, speaking at a press conference in Rostov-on-Don, Sergey Meshcheryakov, Ataman of the Oblast Union of Don Army Cossacks, declared that the Cossacks were in the conflict zone exclusively of their own free will. In addition, there is an association of Don Cossacks in Dubossary who do not wish to be under Romania, to which they are being forcibly drawn. The involvement of volunteer Cossacks in performing patrol duty at main road intersections and at other important city installations is in his opinion difficult to assess as intervention in the internal affairs of the sovereign republic. Cossacks who are part of Republic Guard subunits are armed with standard small arms—pistols and assault rifles. The Ataman responded as follows to the question of when a return of Don Cossacks to their native farms and stanitsas should be expected: the Cossacks recognized the independence of the Pridnestrovye Moldovan Republic and the lawfulness of its president's election and intend to hold out until the conflict is settled.

The Don Cossacks will leave Pridnestrovye only on guarantee of complete safety of the local population.

Chisinau [Kishinev] and Bucharest for their part categorically deny involvement of Romanian volunteers in combat operations on the side of Moldova and regard such reports as disinformation.

Dnester Parliament Attempts to Engage 14th Army in Struggle

92UM0768A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 92 p 3

[Report by Col N. Mulyar under the rubric "Direct Line"]

[Text] **Yesterday KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents reported from Tiraspol that the situation in the Dnester region remains tense and that the Military Are Catching it for Their Neutrality.**

Despite the agreements reached and the fact that the armed formations have begun to be withdrawn, tensions in the region have not decreased. Authorities in the Dnester region are now focusing their efforts on drawing personnel of the 14th Army over to their side. This was apparently the purpose of an appeal by the Supreme Council of the Dnester region to enlisted men, officers and generals of the army to "help protect the republic," calling upon them to serve as a restraining factor in the confrontation with Moldova.

"The situation has become tense around the army units which are maintaining strict neutrality," Maj Gen Yuriy Netkachev, 14th Army commander, said. "It is especially unpleasant for me. The mass media in the Dnester region refer to me only as "the cad in the general's shoulder boards...."

On the night of 10 March, the commander reported, an attempt was made to attack depots of landmines and demolition materials. A sentry was forced to use his weapon. Two unknowns escaped. At approximately the same time guardsmen in Bendery seized Lt Col Vladimir Manchenko, chief of the army's chemical service. They stopped their vehicle, dragged the lieutenant colonel into a basement, ripped off his shoulder boards and began beating him.

A group of members of the Moldovan parliament left for Moscow for talks on the situation. They appealed to Russia's parliament to settle the issue of the presence of Cossacks on the territory of the Dnester region. Ivan Popov, a member of the delegation from Moldova's parliament, informed a Moldovan Radio reporter: "The Committee on Inter-State and National Relations of the Parliament of Russia received the appeal from Moldova's parliament with "concern and understanding."

Col Gen Boris Pyankov, deputy commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] arrived in Tiraspol on 11 Mar for talks.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

VPK Arsenal Chief Views Conversion Problems

92UM0642A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT
in Finnish 4 Feb 92 p D 2

[Article by Kyosti Karvonen: "St. Petersburg Weapons Industry in Chaos"]

[Text] A jumbled up pile of tiny armored personnel carriers is heaped on a table at the war toy production section of the Arsenal Concern in St. Petersburg. Just like the toy cannons they are sturdily made. The frames are of aluminum. In the West plastic would have sufficed.

The state of the weapons industry, a giant in bygone days, of what used to be the USSR is equally chaotic. The military-industrial complex, called VPK by the Russians, is faced with enormous problems. There is not much demand for its products even on domestic markets.

The conversion of the weapons industry to production of goods for civilians began, so it was said, already during the early years of perestroika, but significant action towards that end was actually minimal. The conversion, as well as chaos, has now gotten a new boost from the breakup of the Soviet state.

"We know how to build a space station, send it into orbit and take care of its maintenance in outer space," comments the executive manager of the 10,000-employee Arsenal Concern, Vyacheslav Petrov. This modern-day version of the cannon factory founded by Peter the Great also knows how to manufacture artillery systems for the navy. "This has become expensive."

The problems of the weapons industry are symbolized by the products of conversion displayed on the bookshelves of Petrov's office. The kettles, samovars, and little, portable gas stoves are of typical Soviet quality. It is the war toys that indicate that the level of skill is highest when it comes to making weapons.

The special status of the weapons industry can be seen in everything. Arsenal is orderly and its departments have a lot of Western technology. The secret department number 21 is producing something connected with space weaponry.

Civilian space technology, on the other hand, is openly displayed. Parts made in small quantities, almost as though they were handicrafts, are of good quality, expensive and almost without demand. Manager Alexander Volodkov says that the warehouse has piles and piles of items that were ordered but not paid for by the state.

For decades the defense industry skimmed the cream of the USSR. Up until the very end, about half of all state expenses were devoted to it. Various enterprises and research facilities all over were more or less connected with weapons development. The VPK provided employment for several million people at the very least.

These millions are still on the payroll but increasingly without a function. Russia has decided to cut weapons purchases to one-eighth of last year's total. This is a cruel shock to the weapons industry since there has not been the time, or ability, or desire to find some compensatory form of production.

The Soviet army and the armies of the other countries in the socialist camp were such good and willing customers that the defense industry never had to worry about something like demand. "We had guaranteed orders for many years ahead," says Anatoly Korolyov, manager of the Almaz shipyards that used to manufacture gunboats.

"No one will reveal the official figures as to what fractional part of industry produced for the weapons sector. In St. Petersburg it was at least 45 percent if not more. The defense industry is an army in itself and it is the cause of instability in St. Petersburg and all of Russia," says Petrov.

Played a Part in the Coup Attempt

The defense industry managers and military leadership were part of the very core of the Communist Party. They made sure that the VPK lacked nothing. This core element played a part in last August's coup attempt and it is not powerless yet today.

"Because of disarmament many enterprises found the going tough. There was dissatisfaction because of cancelled orders. High-ranking members from the VPK participated in the coup attempt. They had counted on getting support from the employees. Some are nostalgic but I cannot understand what it would be that we could return to," says Petrov. He points out that the current mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly Sobtshak, one of the reformists, was the Arsenal nominee.

Arsenal is seeking to alleviate problems by moving toward incorporation. This gigantic organization has now been split into three divisions, each with its own budget: one for consumer goods, another for machinery for civilian use and yet another for weapons production. The first two are profitable. Consumer goods, especially, would sell like hot potatoes if only raw materials could be obtained. The weapons production division is threatened with a loss this year.

Prior to perestroika 90 percent of Arsenal's production was in the defense industry sector but this figure is now down to 40 percent according to Petrov and is going down even lower this year. The consumer goods production department will soon be changed to a share selling corporation and is ready to be transferred to the private sector if only the law would allow it.

Lessons From Capitalism

The VPK has perhaps the best possibilities to adapt to the demands of a market economy. There is still a lot to be learned in, for example, the setting of prices. The

experiences of Almaz in regard to its postconversion products, a buffet table and a pleasure yacht, are examples of this.

Manager in chief Korolyov says that Almaz attempted to sell the chrome-steel framed buffet table in what used to be West Berlin. The price was almost 200 German marks. Then the table was offered for resale to the Swedish firm, Ikea, at a price of 80 German marks. Ikea felt that half that much was an acceptable price.

On domestic markets the table's price during the Soviet tenure was 43 rubles but now the price has already risen to 1,500 rubles. There is such a good demand for it that production has been raised to 50,000 units.

"At various exhibitions abroad we have learned that we were overpricing our products. We made mistakes. When we lowered the price of the yacht by almost half people began buying them. The marketplace corrected us," says Korolyov. "Previously we would just set a price and try to sell it at that."

Capitalism has taught Korolyov lessons also in punctuality and good quality.

"Regrettably we have been accustomed to not keeping our word. You cannot conduct business like that in the West. We have also been accustomed to show our products only on paper. That is not enough for Western businessmen. They demand to see the actual thing," says Korolyov.

There have also been lessons in maintaining the enterprise. Korolyov recalls with a sigh and a smile how Almaz had to "use almost the last of our cash reserves" to buy each worker three pairs of shoes. "We bought Italian shoes. The women felt they were of an average quality."

When the U.S. deputy secretary of defense visited the shipyard he was given a buffet table as a gift and as a symbol of a weapons industry being redirected into peaceful pursuits. The foreign minister of South Africa, on the other hand, was shown the boats. One of the people helping produce them nowadays is a former KGB agent assigned to guard Almaz secrets. When his KGB unit was disbanded he was transferred to productive work.

Chelyabinsk Nuclear Institute Head Interviewed
924P0102A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 10, 8 Mar 92 p 15

[Technical Physics Institute Head Yevgeniy Avrorin interviewed by Dmitriy Yakushkin: "The Bomb, Baker, and Salaries"]

[Text] In recent days, closed cities that are not marked on the maps have been attracting high-ranking politicians.

Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly visited Arzamas-16, and Secretary of State J. Baker is paying a visit to Chelyabinsk-70.

Russia's two main centers for nuclear weapons development have become centers of attention.

What goes on at these strategic installations? A MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent met with Russian Academy of Sciences corresponding member Yevgeniy Avrorin, research director at the Technical Physics Institute in Chelyabinsk-70.

[Yakushkin] Has your institute been declassified?

[Avrorin] Not completely. We still do secret work.

[Yakushkin] And you?

[Avrorin] Prior to 1988 I couldn't go abroad, and there were restrictions on meetings with foreigners. I couldn't say where I worked and on what. Then greater openness gradually came.

[Yakushkin] What is the mood among your institute's employees?

[Avrorin] It's hard. We have to contend with difficult conditions like everywhere else; but in addition, we also have our own problems. Serious nuclear disarmament has gotten under way, and weapons work has undergone sharp reductions. Therefore the institute's financial support is very weak, and there are far fewer orders. There is no money to bring in young researchers, and this means that the institute is rapidly growing older. In general, the psychological state has deteriorated: It used to be felt that we were people the country needed, that its defense depended on us. That helped us. There were also material and psychological incentives—bonuses, titles, and simply attention from the leadership. But now the opposite is true. The press has in effect trampled on us, although it's true that the wave has now subsided. Our activities were depicted as harmful to both the country and humanity. So this transition from a feeling of being vitally needed people to people who are virtually useless is having a negative effect.

[Yakushkin] How many people do you employ?

[Avrorin] Nearly 16,000.

[Yakushkin] How many of your specialists are capable of producing nuclear weapons?

[Avrorin] A few hundred of our employees would be capable of providing substantial assistance in producing nuclear weapons. This does not mean that all of them would have to be taken away simultaneously. Realistically, a few dozen would be required for that purpose, but in any event one would not be sufficient.

[Yakushkin] You have fewer orders, but the institute continues to function. So what are you doing?

[Avrorin] We continue efforts to improve nuclear weapons and to study their effects. Lately we have been working to enhance weapon safety and to devise

methods to destroy them. We are also working on methods to verify implementation of international agreements—for example, to limit the yield of nuclear tests. We currently have a team working at the Nevada test range.

[Yakushkin] Do you look for work on your own?

[Avrorin] We look for work that would be in keeping with our specialty, but sometimes there's not much to choose from. We're forced to take on orders that are not science-intensive but are, on the other hand, economically profitable.

[Yakushkin] For example?

[Avrorin] We made an egg-sorting machine for the Chelyabinsk Poultry Factory. It was a job that needed to be done, and they paid for it—not well, but something nonetheless.

[Yakushkin] What is your opinion of talk that our nuclear scientists could end up in countries like Libya or Iraq?

[Avrorin] Needless to say, I think it's mostly hot air. First, there have been no such proposals, to my knowledge. Second, would our specialists agree? We discussed the probability at our institute. No matter how some might rail against us, our people are nonetheless accustomed to being accountable for their work, and they would hardly be capable of simply going off somewhere in the knowledge that this would do such great harm. It's hard to imagine that this could happen through ignorance. So if we try to model such a person, he would have to be a potential criminal. At the same time, he would have to be a highly skilled specialist. He could not be too old, so that he would still be able-bodied, but nor could he be too young and relatively inexperienced. He cannot have too many close ties with family and friends in this country. When you try to find such a person among our colleagues, you discover that it's rather difficult. I could not propose a candidate.

[Yakushkin] What is the average salary in Chelyabinsk-70 today?

[Avrorin] In December it was 1,000 rubles. But the President promised a fivefold increase in salaries, and I hope that this will be done.

[Yakushkin] What about proposals to go to developed countries?

[Avrorin] We haven't received any proposals for that either as yet, but this is a more complex matter. The question of Western aid to our nuclear scientists is now under discussion. When we met with Baker, we told him that this cannot be a question of benefits or stipends. That would be psychologically unacceptable and ineffective. We need joint projects that would be advantageous for the Western partner and certainly useful to us.

[Yakushkin] Among possible projects, joint development of the Strategic Defense Initiative, with an antiterrorist orientation, has been cited. How realistic is this, in your opinion?

[Avrorin] I have my doubts about that, because SDI involves technologies that are so advanced the Americans would hardly share them with us, if only out of commercial considerations.

[Yakushkin] It may be that we are now entering a period of dealings with the Americans in which, following embraces after decades of estrangement, people will start saying that they are nonetheless "deceiving" us. For your field, this would mean that they have no intention of sharing anything and that, on the contrary, they will make every effort to see that we don't surpass them and assume a proper place.

[Avrorin] We needn't think that they are angels over there. Of course they are pursuing their own interests. If our interests coincide, that's wonderful, that means there's a field for cooperation. If our interests are different, we have to seek compromise. That they could propose types of work that would not be to our advantage is indisputable. There is also the danger of becoming a raw-materials appendage of America. That is a fully realistic possibility if we fail to proceed in an intelligent manner.

[Yakushkin] How did your meeting with Baker go?

[Avrorin] He came directly to the institute, where he met with our specialists. There were 20 people on our side, and he was accompanied by his entourage and American correspondents.

I spoke on two topics: the future of our nuclear weapons and our nuclear specialists. Then Baker spoke, proposing possible forms of assistance and cooperation. Then the journalists were asked to leave, and we held a discussion in a more narrow circle of specific issues relating to weapons: their destruction and safety and the construction of storage facilities for fissionable materials. We showed Baker an area where people work with highly radioactive materials.

[Yakushkin] What are your personal feelings as you look to the future?

[Avrorin] Lately life has given very few grounds for optimism. Perhaps the attention that is now being shown to us on the part of both the Russian leadership and the West will help. I would certainly like to hope so.

Exchange To Sell Military Equipment

92UM0784A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 26 Feb 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Tanks and MIG's Are also an Exchange Commodity"]

[Text] On 18 February, the Military Exchange Section registered on the Konversiya [Conversion] Exchange as a closed joint stock company within the framework of the Ministry of Defense commercial center. The task of this section is to bring army structures to the market.

As a representative of Konversiya told an AEN correspondent, the exchange received a telex from Pakistan with an offer to sell to one of the Pakistani firms aviation instruments, guidance systems, and helicopter spare parts. In his words, 100 MIG-29 fighters are standing ready for sale at one of the airfields near Moscow, and it is only a matter of organizing civilized trade with the involvement of Aviaekspost and other organizations focusing on the international market.

According to data of the analytical department of the Konversiya Exchange, the demand for military equipment of the Commonwealth of Independent States is very high, which is evidenced by the numerous offers coming from former CEMA members and also from the Near and Middle East to purchase MIG's, MI-8 helicopters, T-80 tanks, armored personnel carriers (all with basic loads of ammunition), and small arms. Countries of the West are showing great interest in certain types of arms and military technologies.

In this regard, the question of giving Konversiya the status of an international exchange is being considered. According to experts' calculations, its turnover, which today ranges in the hundreds of millions of rubles, could increase to several billion.

Another variant is also being considered today among the enterprises of the defense complex—they are ready to modify military equipment for civilian consumers, which will make it possible to sell the equipment at higher prices through the system of domestic exchanges.

As far as organizing trades is concerned, Konversiya plans to take as the basis the experience of the RTSB [Russian Commodities and Raw Materials Exchange] in using international standards of exchange activities.

Journalist Visits Nizhniy Lomov Explosives Plant

92UM0672A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 26 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent V. Nedogonov under the rubric "A Report for the Issue": "The Production of Grenades Ended With Fireworks, but the Plant Continues to Live on Top of a Powder Keg"]

[Text] Penza Oblast—A detonator is screwed onto a grenade, a missile or bomb to get it to explode. In the case of an armor-piercing shell the solid casing first has to pierce the tank's armor. Only then is the detonator activated and everything inside blown apart.

This device, pierced by numerous powder ducts, is produced in a small Russian town; the solid antitank

casing with the explosive, in neighboring oblasts. Everything is then put together at a third, less secret place.

The explosives plant was built away from the view of casual observers, in the town of Nizhniy Lomov, out of sight and mind in Russia's wooded middle zone. Any stranger stands out, and a spy would not reach the place unnoticed. The town was encircled with barbed wire, however, similar to Arzamas-16. Why? The nearest railway is 40 kilometers away, and the roads are in such poor condition one would not go far on them in any case.

In the 62 years of the plant's existence in its special shops not a single journalist has visited the place.

The powder mix is hauled to the site in special rail cars on extra-soft springs and then hidden away in underground containers. It is removed from there on a conveyor belt. The people move around silently, in soft-soled slippers and white smocks. The temperature in the shops is kept at a constant level, and the windows are covered with white paint because direct sun rays could destroy the entire plant.

Everything is done manually. A person sits at the conveyor belt, inserting his hands into the armored chamber. If a pinch of the powder should explode, it would at the very least blow off a finger. A larger quantity would kill the person.

The last major explosion occurred during the Great Patriotic War, and several people were killed. Fingers are still being blown off today.

Women—former doctors, kindergarten teachers and kolkhoz workers—sit at the conveyor belt. They regard their safety with a certain fatalism. If they are disabled, they will receive disability pay. If not, that is okay too. They can retire at the age of 45. And they work in a clean environment, with linoleum on the floor.

Of all the military production units, the explosives facility has always hummed along, fueled by war.

The Great Patriotic War gave life to the plant. When it was over, the people were even somewhat at a loss. They began with trepidation to produce aluminum plates and sockets for Godkaf light bulbs.

The cold war set in, and detonator production rose once again.

In the '70s the plant grew rich and built the entire Southwest Microdistrict in the city, with its own central square, club and museum. The Vietnam War could be thanked for this.

The plant had just been modernized when the Afghan War began. Up to the mid-'80s detonator production increased each month.

Most of the enormous shops are empty of people today. The machines, costing up to a half-million rubles each (at

the old prices), have been covered with black slipcovers, and the workers have been placed on early leave.

They could have survived by dismantling all of this equipment and selling it off part by part. They are not permitted to do so, however. The Moscow bosses decided to mothball the facility until better times.

Today there is peace, and they are attempting to mold washing machine bodies out of the same plastic. This is not going well, however. Assembly parts are lacking. In general, the conversion is not working out. No matter what they make, it has some resemblance to a detonator. If they produce fly-swatters, they are 23-caliber. If they make drinking glasses, they are called "Kalibr."

There are already almost 400 unemployed in Nizhniy Lomov. Ivan Lashmakov is one of them. He is the only protester though.

Three years ago Ivan left home for the MBTU imeni Bauman.

His reasoning was simple. A person with two higher degrees would be placed in command without fail, be given an apartment in town and be paid—and a considerable amount. And this was not because Ivan is overly ambitious. He simply had a wife and four children at home.

Everything would have worked out the way he planned, but life changed during the three years he was in school. No one was expecting him. No one intended to give him an apartment or put him in command. What is worse, as soon as Ivan arrived he was handed a blue slip stating: "Notification of discharge due to staff reduction."

If Ivan had grown up in America, he would probably have accepted the news more calmly and headed for the labor exchange to find new employment.

But Ivan was brought up not far off, in the village of Kumak-Nikolskiy, and he therefore filed suit. While the litigation was underway he appointed himself deputy chief of one of the production units.

The difference between Lashmakov and the other unemployed residents of Nizhniy Lomov is that most of them found something else to do. Someone bought a cow. Another planted potatoes. And it turned out that the 60 years spent next to detonators had not eliminated the people's memory of their true destiny, of how their ancestors had lived no more and no fewer than 350 years.

And this is how they lived.

In February 1636 Grand Prince Mikhail Fedorovich ordered his sensible steward Fedor Molov to build Lomovoy Stockade on the river in Temirkovskiy Uyezd.

And so, a border post was established on the high river bank to guard the Russian state.

Later, Kazan Monastery was build nearby, and no one here could recall where had been the ancient Russian quarter, and where the "Mongol-Tatar."

In 1932 Kazan Monastery was blown up, and the bricks were used to build the plant. For the next 60 years it was as though the town did not exist, but the large plant was busy.

Now that the plant has begun to atrophy, the city has raised its head again and begun taking revenge for its years of abasement.

The city has declared war on the plant. An invisible line was drawn along the border of Southwest Microdistrict. Garbage collectors and snow plows turn back when they reach it. The city is endeavoring to draw off part of the plant's electric power supply, raiding the plant store and threatening to evict 50 families from the plant's cooperative apartment building.

Nizhniy Lomov is gradually becoming a healthy organism. Workers (those 400 unemployed) have returned to the kolkhozes, the markets are filled with inexpensive meat and the stores, with milk.

The movie "Tashkent, a Prosperous City" was filmed here 20 years ago. The film was made here, in the first place, because in the '30s a terrible famine actually raged in these parts, and in the second, because the situation was slightly better at the time of the filming, and villages were dying out by the dozens.

A dozen or so households still exist in the village of Staraya [name illegible], for example. An old shack settling into the earth stands there in the midst of the uninhabited area. The Ossetian Slava Alborov lives there. At night he stokes a Russian stove with its warm sleeping benches and sings strange mountain songs. Old women who live in the neighborhood slam their shutters and make the sign of the cross. Sound carries far in the winter twilight.

Alborov is the same age as Lashmakov, whom we have met. He is in charge of a subsidiary farm for the plant. And he himself does not go hungry. He salts meat for the winter in the Ossetian way, and renders lard. In his youth he lived in a mountain village. He loved and was loved. An incident involving the abduction of a bride for some reason ended up in court action and hostility on the part of the parents, however. Slava served his time and did not return home. His brothers and their families now live there.

He dreams of a time when the members of his small brigade will acquire families, build themselves Finnish-style homes and go to visit one another and drink tea.

And if the plant is taken over by weeds, like Sleeping Beauty's kingdom, in anticipation of some war, Alborov will feed the city. Or the monastery, should they decide to rebuild it. Or anyone wanting to be fed.

This is because a normal life will return everything to its natural order, and that which was abnormal is dying out on its own.

A distillery preserved from the 19th century, however, is expanding once again and has even begun production of a unique beverage, Vodopoy Petushok, made with the company's own mixture of herbs.

The kulak farms are also coming to life. At a discotheque in a local club they dance to Titomir and London Boys. The director of an EMZ [electric machinery plant] is traveling to Italy to learn how to make washing machines, irons and bicycle seats. He has three cats at home, and his wife works on that deadly assembly line (which has still not been shut down).

When the director's family gathers for the evening meal they all build their plans for the future. And the future does not seem so very gloomy to them.

There is no war, and that is fine. The production of irons is not working out. So be it.

It has been decided to retool the plant for the production of fireworks equipment.

Each week garlands of festive lights will flash on beneath the roofs of Nizhniy Lomov.

And the children will yell: "Hurrah"!

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

New Polish Military Attache Interviewed

PM1603152792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 12 Mar 92 p 3

[Interview with General Roman Kharmoza [name as transliterated], Polish military, naval, and air attache in Moscow, by Major M. Zheglov: "Military Cooperation Between Russia and Poland—a Question of the Future"; date of interview not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The telephone in the office of General of Brigade Roman Kharmoza never stopped ringing. All he could do was to set the time for meetings. "Old friends, pilots whom I met in Poland," Roman explained. "They have learned that I am in Moscow and want to meet." During his 33 years of service the Polish general landed his aircraft in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia on many occasions. Now he has had to bid farewell to the Air Force and take up his seat as military, naval, and air attache at the Polish Embassy in the Russian Federation.

[Zheglov] Mr. General, following the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, Poland—just like other member states, incidentally—has been faced with elaborating new military doctrines. How has this question been resolved in your country?

[Kharmoza] It is true that in the past few years considerable changes have taken place in Europe, and in particular Central and East Europe. Disarmament is actively under way here, and collaboration between countries is developing.

It is in the light of this that we have elaborated our military doctrine. In its present shape it is purely defensive in character. During its elaboration the Polish Government proceeded from the fact that our own security is closely bound up with European security, with the Helsinki process. Lately Poland has been establishing increasingly close contacts with various West European institutions, and especially NATO, which we regard as the organization responsible for all-European security.

Our military doctrine stipulates that Poland's territorial integrity must be assured primarily by political means. This will be promoted by the development of good-neighborly relations with all states, the conclusion of mutually advantageous bilateral treaties, and the deepening of the processes of disarmament and political understanding.

[Zheglov] Does this mean that we can expect in the near future that Poland will make every effort to join NATO?

[Kharmoza] Reports to this effect keep appearing in certain news media from time to time. As I have already said, Poland is linking its security with all-European security, and that includes NATO. Yet neither the Polish Government nor the Ministry of National Defense has issued any official statement on my country's wish to take a step of this kind in the near future. This is a long-term process, and specific conditions—economic, political, and military conditions—must be created for this.

[Zheglov] It is no secret that the bulk of the Polish Army was until recently concentrated on the country's western and southwestern border. Then it was decided to disperse it throughout the entire territory. Have these measures been completed?

[Kharmoza] As I have said before, we do not view our nearest neighbors as our opponents, and that goes for other countries too. What is more, we seek to establish good political and economic relations with them. At the same time the possibility of the emergence of a threat from outside cannot be ignored. You will agree, it would be rather strange if Poland did not change the deployment of its armed forces. The question might arise: Why are so many troops concentrated on the western border? Especially since, apart from the air force school, there were no other units beyond the Vistula.

Therefore it was decided to concentrate the main grouping in the center of the country. It will be made up essentially of mobile units and combined units. It is planned to establish a fourth defense district. Prior to this there were two districts in the western part of Poland and one in the eastern part. The latter was a reserve district. As for the completion of this process, it has not

even begun yet, broadly speaking. Redeployment requires major financial expenditure.

[Zheglov] New independent states have emerged on Poland's eastern border. How will relations with them be organized, in the military sphere among others?

[Kharmoza] Poland is interested in good relations with all the CIS states. Without preference. Our collaboration with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and others is in its formative stage. For the time being it is mainly a question of trade agreements. But consultations are already under way on questions of the conclusion of fundamental treaties.

The question of cooperation in the military sphere is a question of the near future. The reason is that many states have yet to precisely define their position as regards the creation of their own armed forces. Practical steps in this sphere have so far been taken only in relations with Ukraine, whose Minister of Defense Konstantin Morozov has already visited Poland.

Our cooperation with Russia is at the moment confined to questions connected with the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces. Apart from anything else, Russia does not have its own defense ministry. If it is set up, we will seek to establish good contacts with it, making use of all our past positive experience.

[Zheglov] Are you not afraid that this cooperation might be confined to an exchange of high-level military delegations, while officers and men will be left on the sidelines? After all, in the past the situation was very different...

[Kharmoza] I would not say that in the past everything was perfect in this sphere. I often visited your training facilities. But frequently I only met my colleagues at rallies. I invited my friends several times to visit Poland, but each time your side did not allow them out. It is necessary now to build our contacts in accordance with the principle "from the grass roots upward." Because

peoples feel trust only when there is friendship between individual people rather than their top leaders.

Incidentally, we have not stopped training our officers in your country. There are Polish students at the General Staff Military Academy. And they will come to Moscow next year too. Unfortunately, all your officers have been recalled from Polish academies. Yet this was an excellent opportunity to get to know our people, language, culture, and history.

Polish officers are currently also being trained in the United States, Britain, Germany, and France. And we will continue this in the future. In my opinion this is a good approach—studying everywhere and then generalizing the acquired knowledge at home.

[Zheglov] You have said that cooperation with Russia is confined to questions concerning the pullout of the Northern Group of Forces. Why is the Polish side so insistent that our officers and men leave Poland within such tight deadlines? You as a military man are aware of the difficulties which accompany a redeployment of troops. Furthermore, this stance of the Polish side is not likely to be conducive to strengthening the contacts you mentioned earlier.

[Kharmoza] I believe that it is normal for any independent state not to want to have foreign troops on its territory. The example of Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states bears this out. Essentially, all states' attitude toward this problem is the same. Our government must also take account of the will of the people. The question of the withdrawal of Soviet forces was raised during the election campaign. I understand the complexity of the current situation. Poland is not the only country from where you are withdrawing your troops. But if everyone showed understanding for these difficulties, there would be no movement on this question.

Let us wait for the results of the 14th round of the Polish-Russian talks. In my opinion it will be successful. Whatever happens, we are neighbors.

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