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Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-92-033 *2 September 1992*

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CIA/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Volgograd Oblast Draft Office Head Interviewed

92UM1408A Volgograd VOLGOGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jun 92 pp 1,3

[Interview with Volgograd Oblast Military Commissar Major-General Mikhail Fedorovich Atamanchuk by VOLGOGRADSKAYA PRAVDA Non-Staff Correspondent A. Dobrushin: "Military Commissariats: Quite a Few Problems in Their Work Today"]

[Text] Rumors are circulating throughout the city that, they say, military commissariats will soon be resubordinated to the local organs of power. Are they rumors? But maybe they are true? If yes, then how much will the structure of military commissariats be changed? Questions, questions... And then still repeal of residence passes... They say, everyone is accustomed to the fact that the accounting of persons with a military obligation is based on it. How can it be if it will lose force? Or take training assemblies. Who says that their participants will receive temporary assignments and who assures them—this is repeatedly returning to the same subject.

Our non-staff correspondent asked Volgograd Oblast Military Commissar Major-General M.F. Atamanchuk to clear it up.

[Dobrushin] Mikhail Fedorovich, so are these rumors about the resubordination of the military commissariat?

[Atamanchuk] Today's life is changing like the bits of glass in a kaleidoscope. So, the military-political department and the Party organizations have been eliminated in the oblast military commissariat and a new department for educational work has been introduced. As for the resubordination that you are talking about, that version was advanced by the former chief of the General Staff of the CIS Countries Armed Forces. And to this day it remains the version because if we resort to so-called conversion, we can make quite a few mistakes. That same rayon military commissariat has its own specific features. Here, say, we cannot get by without military specialists in the solution of many problems that concern conscription of young men into the army. For example, there are none in the rayon administrations and there enough things there without "our brother"...

[Dobrushin] And how is it with regard to the repeal of residence passes?

[Atamanchuk] Its mechanism has still not been worked out. Obviously, it will be gradual and it encompasses a number of Russian Federation territories. Even here we have quite a bit to provide for. Say, when you repeal the residence pass of a person with a military obligation, it turns out that he is released from the need to "deal" with the ZhEU [Housing Operation Directorate], housing administrations, etc. What can you do? Who will begin to control the place of residence of those former soldiers and report changes? Or how will it be with those who have arrived from another city and decided to settle in ours? By way of illustration, we need to place the latter on the military registration and that same registration and reservations inspector cannot conduct this operation—he doesn't have a residence pass!

[Dobrushin] What's the solution?

[Atamanchuk] In my opinion (incidentally, many officers talked about this at the oblast military commissariats' scientific-practical conference that took place), enterprise military registration workers should assume the primary work load here.

[Dobrushin] Is there another way?

[Atamanchuk] There is. It is the replacement of obsolete orders and instructions. Take, say, the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Instruction (currently in force) on the procedure for conducting military registration at enterprises. If you persistently follow it, the rayon military commissariat plainly cannot request that the lackadaisical stop disrupting military registration work.

[Dobrushin] But what about the fine?...

[Atamanchuk] What kind of fine is it: the "fined" enterprise leader is obliged to pay a total of just 35-50 rubles. Right now, is that really money! Take that sum and increase it ten times. And send it not to a commercial bank account (as it has been written) but to the rayon military commissariat account—then this is another matter. The military commissariat's fund would increase and greater opportunities would appear for it to use the accumulated funds for material incentives of workers, building repair, etc.

[Dobrushin] But maybe, it will be that way?

[Atamanchuk] Maybe. But if not? No changes have yet been made to that USSR Armed Forces General Staff Instruction. And this is affecting, for example, the registration of people with a military obligation who are working at cooperatives and at small enterprises. There is no specific law which would define the functions of its conduct. That is why the former soldiers and sergeants there are "neglected". Try to notify them according to the command for mobilization... And that is already a minus of Volgograd Garrison's combat readiness.

[Dobrushin] How are you going to, as they say, wiggle out of this situation?

[Atamanchuk] In a different way. An appeal was formulated in the name of the rayon administration head at Voroshilov Rayon Military Commissariat which stated: we suggest that cooperatives and small enterprises not be registered if they are not obligated to conduct military registration work. The rayon administration gave the "go ahead" to do that. And things took a turn for the better...

[Dobrushin] Incidentally, about entrepreneurship. We all know that their own lessors have appeared at some rayon military commissariats...

[Atamanchuk] There are also such cases. So, they leased a room at a Soviet rayon military commissariat to cooperators. The income from this "deal" resulted in a large financial profit.

[Dobrushin] Are there other sources for improving the material situation of rayon military commissariats?

[Atamanchuk] There are. One of them is in the distribution of the rayon administration budget. Otherwise we have to request money from, say, the local authorities to pay working groups for the creation of Pamyat [Memory] books. Although there is an oblast administration order and they should allocate them there without being reminded. But then again, finances "sing romances" not only with regard to military commissariats but also with regard to enterprises. So, very few of the leaders are lavish in their payments of military registration workers who carry it out by holding down a second job along with their own authorized position. And who of the leadership even pays them a ruble. Isn't that why many of them, as planned inspections of military commissariats indicate, work in a slipshod manner which enter extremely undesirable deficiencies into military registration of "reservists", some of them in the interruption (and also in the absence) of lists to change data on persons with a military obligation. This especially perceptibly impacts on their notification for a period of training assemblies.

[Dobrushin] It is no secret that assemblies occur frequently for the sake of "check marks" in a plan because even their organization "is deficient", reservists (or as the people call them "partisans" move, as they say, in a shabby manner and are not fed in the best manner, and so forth).

[Atamanchuk] Unfortunately, there are such reservists.

[Dobrushin] Isn't it worthwhile to make an adjustment to the so called material aspect of the organization of training assemblies as a result of that?

[Atamanchuk] It is worthwhile and the sooner the better. But then again, we don't need to wait for precious orders from Moscow—we can resolve everything locally. Say, the oblast administration is entirely able to help military subunits where "reservists" are being sent to retrain and to improve their everyday living conditions. To do this, for example, we can task trading enterprises to conduct the sale of food products at reduced prices during training time. It would be good to also think about pay increases, including for cooperators. They are totally dependent on their own founders. They will want (as it is being done at state enterprises) to pay persons with a military obligation 100 percent of the average salary, families will make ends meet in the absence of the breadwinner, no—we will have a shortage of funds under conditions of price liberalization. Moreover, the founders of cooperatives, as a rule, hire another worker as a result of the loss of their worker for training assemblies. So, after "field training", the reservist has to find himself another "job".

And take drafting people with a military obligation to gather the harvest. It is not for the mountains that the Russian government decision was made: render assistance to rural dwellers primarily by using "reservists". Was that decision discussed in the oblast, city, or rayons? Or are they once again hoping for the old forms of manning virgin land subunits—to call up people through the military commissariat registration notices? If so, nothing good will come of it because registration notices have not had legal force for a long time. And a good salary can also have its weighty say. Establish it throughout the enterprises and you won't have to notify anyone: the people themselves will come to the military commissariats.

[Dobrushin] Your view on the conscription of young men into the army right now, when many obsolete traditions are changing?

[Atamanchuk] We need to grant more rights to military commissariats. It is more evident locally what, say, our city needs...

[Dobrushin] You have in mind the manning of construction subunits from among local lads that caused a sensation?

[Atamanchuk] Precisely that. I have strived (and repeatedly!) for the oblsoviet to authorize manning subunits that would assist the city to fulfill its construction plan. Imagine how many new apartments Volgograd residents would obtain, including military. We planned to replenish internal troops subunits using draftees who reside in various rayons of Volgograd. The procedure in the oblast is not anything to rave about and they are still not meeting us halfway.

[Dobrushin] What can you do?

[Atamanchuk] We are attempting to change the obsolete procedure. It is not turning out—we are approaching higher levels. Naturally, with the assistance of the local authorities because the soldier is not alone in the field.

Volgograd Oblast Resolution on Servicemen's Protection

92UM1408B Volgograd VOLGOGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jun 92 p 1

[Volgograd Oblsoviet Resolution, signed by Oblsoviet Chairman A.G. Morozov: "In Support of Orphaned Parents"]

[Text] After discussion of the proposal of the deputy's commission that was created based on a decision of the 11th Session of the Volgograd Oblsoviet of People's Deputies on the issue of legal and social protection of the families of compulsory service military personnel who

have died in the army during peacetime, the Small Soviet of the Volgograd Oblast Soviet of People's has resolved:

1. To designate a deputy's investigation with the commission proceeding to the scene of the death with the mandatory participation of the Oblast Soviet deputy from the electoral district from which the deceased was drafted for each case of death or serious injury in the army in peacetime of servicemen who have been drafted from Volgograd Oblast.

2. To request a second time that Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman R.I. Khasbulatov and Russian Federation Procurator General Stepankov resolve the issue of transferring cases of the deaths of Volgograd compulsory service military personnel to the Volgograd Oblast Procuracy.

3. To create a permanently functioning deputy's group to monitor the course of the Volgograd Oblast Procuracy criminal affairs investigation on the death of servicemen in peacetime.

4. Until the Supreme Soviet and Russian President make a decision on the legal and social protection of the families of servicemen who have died in the army in peacetime, regardless of the causes of death: the head of oblast administration ensures the manufacture and erection of headstones on the graves of deceased servicemen. Reimburse parents who have installed headstones for the expenses in the amount up to 10,000 rubles; grant a lump-sum allowance through the social protection organs (Alikov) in the amount of 30 minimum wage payments to parents of compulsory service military personnel who permanently reside in Volgograd Oblast and whose sons were drafted into the army from Volgograd Oblast or from other territories where they went to study from Volgograd Oblast and who died in the army in peacetime; the social protection administration will establish the procedures for granting allowances within a month; and, the oblast finance administration (Paretskiy) will provide for the allocation of funds to the social protection organs from the oblast budget by increasing income over expenditures for these goals.

Compensate the expenditures of the oblast budget and conduct an accounting of the lump-sum allowances granted to the parents of deceased servicemen in the event that federal organs adopt similar norms and allocate the appropriate resources.

It has also been decided to expand the benefits provided for the parents and families of servicemen who have died in the army while carrying out their official duties (free travel on common user buses and city electrical transportation (trams and trolley buses), free issuance of medication for ambulatory treatment, and a 50 percent discount on housing and utility payments and on the payment of electrical and heating energy) to the parents and families of all servicemen who have died in the army in peacetime; submit a legislative initiative to amend pension legislation to the Russian Supreme Soviet that provides for monthly payments to the parents and families of servicemen who have died in the army in peacetime and a proposal to accelerate adoption of decisions on the demands set forth by the "Orphaned Parents" and "Soldiers' Mothers of Russia" movements.

The decision was signed by Oblsoviet Chairman A.G. Morozov.

Historic Links Between Church, Army

92UM1385A Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 13-14, Jul 92 (signed to press 2 Jul 92) pp 1-5

[Interview with Colonel M.G. Vinitskovskiy, candidate of philosophical sciences: "Religion and the Army: History and the Present Day"; date and place of interview and interviewer's name not given]

[Text] **One characteristic feature of the present life of our society and army is the increased interest in religion, the activation of its role in solving many social and spiritual problems, and the use of the church's beneficial potential in working with people. The tendency toward the deatheization of the state and its structures, including the armed forces, is becoming increasingly obvious. We asked Colonel M. G. Vinitskovskiy, candidate of philosophical sciences, to express his viewpoint on this problem.**

The results of sociological studies attest to a growing number of believers among inductees. In particular, the share of believers among representatives of the Slavic nations is as high as 12-15 percent, and among representatives of the Turkic nations it is as high as 40 percent.

This article is recommended to students undergoing training in the humanities and social sciences for study of the subject "Society, the Army and the Church."

[Interviewer] Mikhail Grigoryevich, to what, in your view, is the increase in the role of religion and the church due?

[Vinitskovskiy] Religion has amassed and preserved immense experience in the moral development of humanity; it concentrates moral values that have undergone many centuries of "natural selection." The millenniums-long path that the church has traversed provides numerous examples of its useful social activity in difficult years for the state and the army and in times of troubles, when it has proved capable of generating ideas that unite society and contribute to its revival.

[Interviewer] In addition, religion has deep roots in the history of the Russian state and its army.

[Vinitskovskiy] Yes, unquestionably. From the moment of Kievan Rus's adoption of Christianity at the end of the 10th century, Eastern Orthodoxy becomes the state religion. Right away church figures begin to take active part in the country's affairs and the formation of society's moral principles, and the church's connection with the Russian military becomes traditional. This was no

accidental phenomenon—in those times religion served as, for all intents and purposes, the only means of upbringing, of the development of the individual's spiritual forces, and of the enhancement of the army's moral potential. The fact that the Russian army was opposed by states having different official religions also played no small role in enhancing the church's significance and influence.

At critical moments in Russian history, religion was always a cementing principle that united the nation. Saint Sergiy Radonezhskiy blessed Dmitriy Donskoy and his troops for their military exploit in the battle of Kulikovo Field, the victory in which began Rus's liberation from the Mongol-Tatar yoke.

During the period of grave troubles, Germogen, patriarch of Moscow and all Rus, entered into implacable opposition to those who were seeking nothing but personal gain in the people's suffering. In his oral sermons and written messages disseminated from Moscow, he called on the people to defend the faith and the fatherland. The establishment of a holiday in honor of the appearance of the icon of the Holy Mother known as the Kazan Madonna is associated with his work. In 1612 this icon entered a Moscow that had been liberated from foreigners along with the troops of Dmitriy Pozharskiy. Two hundred years later this relic was carried before the troops on the day of the Battle of Borodino as a reminder of the glory of Russian arms.

In developing a regular army and navy, Peter I relied on the support of the clergy. He introduced the office of ship priest, who was under the jurisdiction of the local diocese, on the staffs of naval vessels. And under Emperor Paul I a special military clergy administration headed by a chief field priest was established. In 1890 management of the army and navy's churches and clergy was entrusted to a presbyter of the military and naval clergy.

By the start of World War I the structure of agencies for the religious training of servicemen in the Russian army had assumed its final form. It was headed by a archpresbyter with the rank of lieutenant general, to whom ecclesiastical administration was subordinate. Priests served on all units all the way down to and including the battalion level. Their duties included holding talks, giving readings and sermons, and confessing the servicemen. A clergyman was responsible for managing he evacuation of dead and wounded from the battlefield, taking part in funerals, and maintaining communications with the soldiers' families and friends. More than 1,200 priests were given state decorations for heroism during World War I.

[Interviewer] And how did relations between the army and the church develop during the post-October period of our history?

[Vinitskovskiy] The beginning of this period was a tragedy for the church and many clergymen. The implacably aggressive atheism that was adopted by the workers' and peasants' state resulted in the destruction of many churches (take as just one example the church of Christ the Savior, which was financed by public donations and built to commemorate the victory over Napoleon), unwarranted acts of repression against members of the clergy, the effort to forcibly remove religious views from the mind of the people, and the persecution of believers.

A new point of crisis in our history, the war against fascism, forced an appeal to the people's spiritual and historical roots. Stalin, who himself had begun but not completed seminary, well understood and made use of the mobilizing and unifying force of religion. The war was declared to be a patriotic and holy war. The names of Aleksandr Nevskiy Dmitriy Donskoy, A. Suvorov and M. Kutuzov—military leaders who had fought "for faith and the fatherland"—were revived.

The church also provided material support to the fight of the whole people against enemy. Thus, from 9 January 1942 to 1 April 1944 it collected 7 billion rubles, not counting valuables and precious items. The church collected warm clothing and gifts for soldiers and officers and sent them to the front, provided assistance in rearing orphans, and took part in the restoration of regions of the country liberated from the invaders.

The postwar period, however, was characterized by the denigration of the church's role in our society's life. The ideological dogmas implanted in the mass mind placed a unique interpretation on people's freedom of belief. The only true position regarding God was considered atheism. Scholarly research drew bold conclusions concerning the steady destruction of the social roots of religion and reduction of the number of believers. Church agencies found themselves under the covert patronage on the KGB. Servicemen who were believers experienced constant pressure on the part of the political agencies and party and Komsomol organizations.

[Interviewer] In literally the past year fundamentally new political and social conditions have been established in our country. What changes in the spiritual life of society and the army have they led to, and what has changed in the state's stand on religion and the church?

[Vinitskovskiy] The collapse of the totalitarian state and of its administrative-command system with its "dominant" ideology has created a situation in which a kind of ideological vacuum has formed in the mass mind. The spiritual values of socialism, which failed to withstand the test of time and were not reinforced materially, have proved to be destroyed. The ideas of primitive commercialism and pragmatism and egoistic principles have rushed into the vacuums in people's minds. On the one hand, the liberation of the individual from obsolete dogmas has emancipated people and created conditions for the realization of the individual's talents and satisfaction of his needs and interests. On the other hand, the system of upbringing has been destroyed, moral norms

have been upset, and freedom has come to be understood as irresponsibility and general permissiveness.

This situation is forcing us today to seek new spiritual guidelines, ideals and purposes of activity. It is especially important to accomplish this objective within the army and navy in view of the special significance of military service, the purpose of which is to ensure the peoples' security and the preservation of peace on earth.

Religion can pay a positive role in the spiritual revival of society and the armed forces, and of the morale of servicemen. In this connection, one should keep in mind that it would be wrong to turn its role in the process of shaping the character of the defender of the fatherland into an absolute. Religion is capable of performing its salutary functions only in combination with all the potential of creative forces: the historical experience of each people, universal human moral values, the cultural legacy, the traditions of the Russian army, everything positive in terms of character development that was accumulated in the Soviet Armed Forces, and the study and use of foreign experience.

At the same time, religion may play a relatively independent role in the process of shaping the military man's character by virtue of its specific features and forms and methods of influencing the man in uniform.

[Interviewer] And how can the question of giving religious servicemen the opportunity to take part in religious services, attend places of worship, and communicate with clergymen be resolved?

[Vinitskovskiy] Here we must proceed from the premise that service in the armed forces places certain restrictions on individual freedom, including the right to perform religious duties. After all, in the army the interests of combat readiness, discipline and organization get top priority. It would be unrealistic, for example, to give an orthodox Muslim time to perform his five daily prayers, to allow the Christian to observe the seven-week Lent, or to let the Jew refuse to consume pork in their food. The mandatory granting of permission to believers to go to town to attend church might arouse hostility among their atheistic comrades who were forced to do guard duty or internal-service duty for them on holidays and days off in such cases.

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Early Retirement for Officers

92UM1372B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Jul 92 p 1

[ITAR-TASS report under the rubric "Voices: 300,000": "Reserve Officers"]

[Text] Officers in the Russian army can take early retirement at their own desire. A law passed yesterday by the parliament allows this.

Retirement is granted to officers who have served a total of at least five years in officer positions.

Description of Concealment of USSR Defense Budget

92UM1327A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 29, 19 Jul 92 pp 14-15

[Article by Igor Stadnik under the rubric "Investigation": "Parkbank: We Hid the Military Budget There"]

[Text] Today everyone knows that the actual figure for the Soviet Union's defense outlays was several times greater than the figures of 17, 19 or 20 billion rubles published in the newspapers. It was believed that no one knew the precise amount, however. Mikhail Gorbachev himself, when he presented the complete figure for the military budget for the first time, complained that it was very difficult to do this because expenditures were spread out among the budgets of the most diverse ministries.

There was a place, however, where all of the military finances were brought together and combined into one and from where they were sent out to contractors, the military plants. It was the so-called Inventory Department of Gosbank (Parkbank). Even the West's intelligence agencies, which published approximate figures every year for our military expenditures based on indirect data, never learned of its true role. This is not surprising, because no more than 50 people knew of its existence. Even in the Central Finance Directorate (TsFU), to which Parkbank is subordinate, only a few officials were aware of what the "Second Department of the Directorate for Special Operations," as Parkbank was known within the TsFU, did. The secrecy was increased by the fact that it was located in a building adjoining the "Aquarium," the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.

The bank was set up in 1978, and the best military financial experts were brought in to staff it. Prior to that payment for weapons production was made through the Directorate of Cash Disposition of the Budget of the Moscow Division of Gosbank. The capacity of its staff officials for keeping their mouths shut was apparently not highly regarded in military circles, however. And they managed to get their own "slush fund" established.

Parkbank performed its job successfully, concealing the military budget as long as the politicians wanted. The need for its supersecret work disappeared when the actual military expenditures were published. The supersecrecy remained, however. Bank workers absolutely refused to answer any questions, citing the terrible criminal liability for revealing military secrets. Even the bank's location and its telephone numbers are kept strictly secret.

There is still something to hide at Parkbank. From themselves, however, rather than from outsiders. The fact is that while our enormous military machine is

associated only with expenditures, it also has its own revenues: in the past, from the military trade organizations, military workshops and enterprises of the Ministry of Defense; today, from various commercial undertakings. Veniamin Sokolov, chairmen of the Russian Parliament's Budget Subcommittee, feels that "these revenues have never been monitored by any civilian authority. We have established a monitoring and auditing directorate. It is now examining the Ministry of Education. At some point it will get around also to the military...."

The Supreme Soviet approves a budget in net figures, which only specifies expenditures. The concept of a budget in gross figures, which also takes revenues into account is foreign to us. Aleksandr Piskunov, deputy chairman of the Parliament's Commission on Defense, says that "the army's income has become the question of the day in the commission. The military assure us that there are no special revenues. We know that this is not so, however."

The Central Bank, of which Parkbank is officially a subdivision, has no control over it. The TsB [Central Bank] included the secret bank's balance in its accounting for the first time in May, but basically little has changed. During its entire 14 years of existence, Parkbank has never been audited. Officially considered a part of the state banking system, it has fallen away from the latter and exists in its own, unique autonomous realm.

The luxury of the marshals' dachas was a popular subject during the restructuring years. In fact, however, they required no funds from the budget. The army's extrabudgetary revenues, monitored by no one, were enough. The mansions are still springing up today. Incidentally, Petr Shved, head of the Directorate for Special Operations of the TsFU, is the treasurer for a dacha community under construction for generals at Nikolo-Uryupino. Lt Gen Vasiliy Vorobyev, director of the TsFU and his immediate superior, is building a dacha there. The Military Exchange Section (VBS), a firm set up by the 11 heads of the CIS Glavkomat [Main Commissariat] planned to conduct its financial activities, selling off military property, under the lid of Parkbank's secrecy (See MOSKOVSKIY NOVOSTI, Nos 14 and 16).

Parkbank is subordinate to its own client, the TsFU. This is contrary to all economic laws, since it violates the basic rule of credit and finance that banks must be independent. Given the total secrecy of operations performed in the murky water of the period of transition to a market economy, Parkbank is becoming a potential "gold mine."

For several months in a row the TsFU has attempted to force through the Supreme Soviet a decision to give it control over yet another banking structure involving the army, Gosbank's Directorate of Field Institutions. Unlike Parkbank, it has divisions throughout the country and conducts its operations in cash, one of the major shortages today. It would be difficult to detect any higher strategic interests here, but self-interests can be figured in fairly easily.

At the beginning of June Central Bank sent our instructions to reduce the degree of secrecy in the Inventory (Park) Division down to the level of "For official Use Only." The military are ignoring the instructions, however. They are the true bosses of their bank.

Questions Raised About Karakozov Appointment

92UM1372A Moscow KURANTY in Russian
No 137 (402), 21 Jul 92 p 5

[Article by Oleg Surovtsev under the rubric "Our Daily Life": "Farewell, Weapons on the Cheap"]

[Text] **In October of last year Ye. Shaposhnikov appointed G. Karakozov, his neighbor on the ladder up and formerly chief of rear services of the Long-Range Aviation, as chief of the Main Trade Directorate of the CIS Ministry of Defense. Within a very short time the commander-in-chief's protege had turned the military trade system into a structure through which deals detrimental to the state were effected. Now, according to our information, Karakozov is preparing to occupy the same post in the armed forces of Russia. If the appointment takes place, our army could find itself missing not only large amounts of money, but also a significant portion of its arsenal. As they say: "Farewell, weapons on the cheap...."?**

As soon as Karakozov became head of the military trade directorate of the CIS Ministry of Defense he began molding it in his own image, and he immediately released old-hand Ye. Kruglov into the reserve. Prior to the arrival of the "new broom," this 50—year-old major general had been first deputy chairman of the main trade directorate. Even A. Smirnov, deputy chief military prosecutor, who had become accustomed to a lot of things, was upset by the illegal, early discharge of the general suddenly in disfavor. Smirnov's protests and his appeal to Shaposhnikov had no effect, however.

Karakozov made a great effort to have Kruglov removed, even arranging a denunciation of the latter in the spirit of Stalinist times. It brought out pro-Russian tendencies in the major general to be banished and claimed that he had encouraged people to switch from the CIS army to the haven of the Russian Federation's armed forces being formed. The following fact was also cited: Kruglov had been seen several times at the entrance to the White House. It was this "compromising fact" which served as grounds for releasing him into the reserve. In addition, Karakozov demanded that the chief of the personnel department of the main military trade directorate conduct a full investigation of the "traitor" and learn whom he had visited in the White House, with whom he had spoken....

Following the purge in the military trade system (and Kruglov was not the only victim), the new director

surrounded himself with people "loyal" to him and in record time turned the directorate into a structure for squandering state funds.

Both KURANTY and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA have informed their readers about how the arsenal of the once-powerful armed forces is being sold off right and left. It was Karakozov with whom Shaposhnikov lightly created most-favored status for the open, joint-stock company Rekont. This firm became famous for its deals with the trade directorate of the Western Group of Forces and foreign companies of Asia and the Near East. Products of the latter, not in demand on the world market, were acquired by our hucksters in shoulder-boards at world prices. The deals were arranged through third nations, bypassing the territory of the CIS.

That same Rekont sold equipment and weapons from the forces withdrawn from Western Europe. Officials with the Western Group also engaged actively in this. The proceeds from the transactions frequently ended up in the pockets of middlemen, while our own state suffered losses amounting to millions of Marks. Karakozov was behind this as well, indulging in this kind of plunder of the people's wealth. He also knew that currency designated for setting up personnel of the garrisons withdrawn from abroad was going into foreign banks.

It was he who helped Shaposhnikov acquire almost 200,000 rubles worth of imported furniture through proxies. The media reported on this purchase by the commander-in-chief, but almost no one discussed Karakozov's role in the dirty business. They either considered him to be a small fry or did not have adequate information, but they did not attach any significance to this individual. They should have. He is one of those unassuming cardinals who, if given even a little bit of power, can engineer any kind of palace coup.

If, in the days immediately ahead, honorable people in the Russian Ministry of Defense do not give some thought to just who is who and do not make a thorough study of the commercial activities of the Shaposhnikov-Karakozov tandem, but permit the latter's appointment to the post of director of the Military Trade Directorate of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces, our army will suffer. It could find itself without an arsenal, and the treasure could be without money.

Veteran Writes of Poverty-Stricken Condition

92UM1372C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Jul 92 p 2

[Letter from Yu. Korenkov, settlement of Sertolovo Larino, Leningrad Oblast: "At the Brink of Survival"]

[Text] I too am sending out an SOS. The fact is that we officers of the former Soviet Army have been placed onto the brink of poverty and survival. I am a major in the reserve. I received a pension of 344 rubles until 1992, and my wife and I could live decently on this. I now receive 1,377 rubles. My wife worked 20 years and receives a pension of 1,000 rubles. But how expensive everything is. The pensions are enough for food for half a month.

I was drafted into the Red Army at the age of 17. I did not crawl out of the trenches for a year. I was seriously wounded and shell-shocked. I served in the armed forces 35 years and am a war veteran. Now I find myself among the impoverished. My savings are worth nothing now. They would not even buy a coffin.

Before they took power, the "democrats" were screaming about consumer abundance from every corner. Now we hear not a peep from them.

Please print my letter. Let the deputies raise this issue for the government in the parliament. Please help us. I beg of you, help us.

Deputy Defense Minister on Socioeconomic Problems in Military

92UM1377A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Aug 92 First edition pp 1,3

[Interview with Russian Federation Deputy Ministry of Defense Colonel-General Vladimir Mikhaylovich Toporov by an unidentified KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "With Concern for Those Who Serve the Homeland: Russian Federation Deputy Ministry of Defense Colonel-General V.M. Toporov Answers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Questions"]

[Text]

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, the letters to the editor have recently begun to change, optimistic letters are more frequently encountered, and people are noting definite progress in the resolution of Armed Forces social problems. How do you yourself assess the situation in the social sphere in the army and in the navy?

[Toporov] Under conditions of the implementation of the state strategic policy toward reduction of the Armed Forces and military expenditures, ensuring reliable social protection of servicemen and their families has become one of the main tasks for the president of Russia, the government and the Ministry of Defense. Development of the modern, highly effective, small in number Russian Armed Forces is hardly possible without that.

It is no secret that social issues in the army have been resolved based on the residual principle over the course of the last several decades. The half-hearted nature of the measures taken, the limitations of resources, and the absence of precise and long-term programs to improve the military infrastructure frequently not only did not provide the desired results but, on the contrary, worsened the situation. As a result, today we have many sore points, first of all housing and available barracks and utilities in the northern regions, the Arctic, at small PVO [Air Defense] subunits and at remote military garrisons.

Yes and the social problems of troops and naval forces have also been exposed at favorable—from the geographic and ecological point of view—locations. They are especially urgently making themselves known under conditions of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the countries of Eastern Europe, Mongolia and certain CIS countries. And we frequently have to start from a bare field, from scratch.

But let's take the issues of financial security of servicemen and the salaries paid to them. Until recently, the stimulation of military labor which frequently entails a risk to life, residing at garrisons that are far from cultural centers, non- standard work days, and other not always romantic features of service, have been carried out through stingy bonuses of 10-12 rubles no more frequently than once every five years. The salary level of servicemen has consistently lagged behind the salaries of many categories of specialists of the national economy. And only right now is the situation really changing.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Tell me, what is the essence of those changes?

[Toporov] A year has not yet passed since the disposition of Russian Federation Presidential Order No 28, dated 28 August 1991, on providing social guarantees to servicemen that serves as a reminder to everyone. During that time, nearly two dozen decisions have been made at the governmental level on various issues of social protection of servicemen. Salaries have been repeatedly increased for servicemen. They have been released from payment of income taxes. A number of new payments have been introduced that stimulate the intensification and quality of military service. A number of questions on food and clothing supply have been resolved. The pay level has been increased for those who serve at remote locations and at locations with unfavorable climates. A salary increase for years served has been established for army and naval warrant officers and for extended service military personnel. Benefits have been expanded for servicemen and their families who are performing difficult duties under combat or close to those conditions. The amount of monetary compensation to leasing housing has been increased for servicemen without apartments. Salary payments have been introduced for the military ranks of extended military service sergeants and first sergeants. Since 1 August 1992, the decision that was made in June to increase salaries based on military ranks is being carried out. Salaries total R500 per month for a sergeant, R1,000 for a warrant officer, R2,100 for a captain, and R,2700 for a colonel. Now these salaries actually mean something and can stimulate the performance of duty and its quality.

I cited these decisions in order to stress their variety and weightiness. At the same time, I am deeply convinced that it is still early to talk about reliable social protection of servicemen at this time. Too many unresolved social problems have accumulated in the army.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Obviously, the housing problem remains the most urgent. What is the Ministry of Defense undertaking after the fundamental conversation at the 21 July 1992 session with the participation of the Russian Federation President?

[Toporov] Yes, the issue of providing housing to servicemen remains one the most urgent and timely. The number of servicemen without apartments has been stated repeatedly. The government and the Ministry of Defense are striving to do everything possible to accelerate the construction of housing. We need to build more than 240,000 apartments for servicemen who are leaving the groups of forces, the CIS states and other hot "regions". The fact that the local organs of state power are very slowly repaying their housing debt to the army is complicating the situation. There is a chronic shortage of resources for housing construction.

The 21 July 1992 Presidential Decree "On additional Measures for Financing the Construction and Acquisition of Housing for Servicemen" provided for the additional allocation of funds from the budget to the Ministry of Defense for construction of a total of 2.9 million square meters of housing in 1992 and in the first six months of 1993 in the army and in the navy and 2.1 million square meters for servicemen who have been released from military service. They plan to introduce no less than 60 percent of this housing in 1992. The executive organs of power of republics, krays, and oblasts have been tasked to allocate apartment buildings and individual apartments for sale based on Ministry of Defense requests. They have provided for the enlistment of the personal resources of servicemen, in foreign hard currency, who are serving in the groups of forces to pay for housing.

A great deal of significance is being imparted to cooperative and individual forms of housing construction. Acceleration of these forms of construction has been called upon to facilitate the decision on rendering free-of-charge financial assistance to servicemen, who have joined ZhSK [Housing Construction Cooperatives] or who are carrying out the construction of individual homes, in the amount of 75 percentage of the cost of an apartment or bank credit obtained for the construction of a home. There is one more innovation: when the loan is repaid, the amount of interest for the use of the credit that has been established by the bank will be partially repaid. The length of uninterrupted, impeccable service that provides the right to financial assistance is now not 15 but 10 years which will permit a larger number of servicemen to take advantage of this benefit.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And what issues associated with housing construction still require a solution?

[Toporov] There are also quite a few of those. We need appropriations for housing construction to be directly allocated to executive ruling organs of republics in the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, autonomous formations, the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg for their

intended purpose in order to accelerate the rates of housing construction with the participation of the local authorities for individuals who have been released from military service and also for the resettlement from military garrisons of those persons who have lost contact with the Ministry of Defense.

We are also concerned about the slow rates of the initiation of construction of individual homes for servicemen. We might as well admit that frequently that construction is being delayed due to slip-ups with the allocation of plots of land, obtaining credit at the bank, the impossibility of obtaining needed construction materials, and high interest rates for the use of credit. There haven't yet been any decisions on the issues of the future fate of housing that belongs to persons who have been released from the Armed Forces from the territories of the Baltic states, the Transcaucasus, and from a number of CIS countries who have expressed a desire to move to Russia. In our opinion, we need to find a civilized form of apartment exchange at the intergovernmental level within the former Union or the former republics can pay compensation to these individuals an amount equal to the cost of a cooperative apartment of equal value at the selected place of residence.

We will continue to work on these and other issues in order to remove the housing problem from the agenda. Today, we are finding understanding and support from the President and the Government of Russia in the solution of these issues.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Military service, as you know, entails moving and frequent change of residence. As a rule, officers and warrant officers perform their duties far from their homes. And you yourself know that the prices for tickets and the shipment of household goods is nearly astronomical. What steps is the Ministry of Defense taking to provide servicemen with a solution of these problems?

[Toporov] The appropriate services had already begun to get involved with this really important problem on the threshold of price liberalization. The Russian Government supported us. A large portion of the questions on passage have been eliminated. During an in-service transfer, servicemen can transport their household goods at government expense in a five-tonne container for up to a family of three people and, if the family is larger, in two five-tonne containers. A substantial innovation is the fact that we now pay for the delivery of household goods from the portal to the shipping station and from the destination station to the portal. When servicemen are traveling on leave from remote locations or to those locations, we pay for the transportation of his family members under the same conditions as the servicemen. The right to passage and shipment of personal property to the selected place of residence will be preserved for five years from the date of release for persons who have been released from service. We are also working on other issues. For example, I don't understand why servicemen have to pay customs duties at their own expense when they are transferred while in the service. It would be appropriate to grant the right of free passage to other locations to the servicemen's family members while on leave, service at some of them is not only not simpler but frequently quite a bit more difficult.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Compulsory state personal insurance is being examined among the effective measures for social protection of servicemen. However, the situation in the country has substantially changed since the time that insurance was introduced. The price increases for goods and services is leading to the provision of established insurance amounts. Is this issue being worked?

[Toporov] Yes, that is one of the problems that requires an immediate solution. Today, mandatory state personal insurance is based on a governmental decree of the former USSR. According to the Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Independent States Member-States that was concluded on 15 May 1992, this issue is regulated by the laws of the appropriate Commonwealth member-state. Proposals have been prepared for submission to the Russian Government while considering the experience of organizing insurance in the Ministry of Defense. Draft documents provide for the increase of the amount of insurance compensation since it is obvious that today the payments of R5,000-25,000 that were established two years ago do not provide an adequate measure of compensation for damages when insured events occur. To protect insured sums from inflation, we propose determining them in a multiple ratio to salaries and wages. It is also important to bring the insurance payment closer to the insured event since people who have found themselves in a difficult situation, as a rule, urgently need money and they have to wait six months until the will is unsealed, and our proposals on the payment of insured sums for an insured events have also been directed at doing that. We plan to introduce a number of other new factors into insurance.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Military pensioners have found themselves in an unenviable position with the drastic prices increases. Tell me, how is the situation being changed right now?

[Toporov] The difficulty of the situation in the country, the continuing price increases, and also the increase of servicemen's salaries that recently occurred have resulted in a significant rupture in the level of pension support of servicemen who have been previously released from service in contrast to servicemen who have recently been released, whose pensions are calculated based on increased salaries.

The need to take decisive steps has become even more obvious since 1 May 1992 after the recalculation of previously awarded pensions to pensioners among workers and employees based upon "contemporary" salaries which has resulted in a drastic change of the ratio of the amounts of "civilian" and "military" pensions that had developed in favor of the former. Ministry of

Defense pensioners, many of whom are disabled veterans or veterans of war, have found themselves in a significantly worse situation that cannot be recognized as normal.

In the middle of July, the Russian Federation Presidential Decree on the recalculation of pensions of military pensioners based on "contemporary" salaries took place, beginning on 1 August 1992. As a result, the level of pension support is significantly increasing for more than 800,000 veterans and their family members who reside in Russia and who conscientiously served the Homeland but who are now on deserved relaxation. It is also important that it provides for the periodic review of pensions when salaries increase for those servicemen who are now on military service which will permit us to totally ensure social justice with regard to veterans—servicemen, regardless of in which period they were released from service.

As a result of the creation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the draft Law on pension support of individual officers, army and naval warrant officers, extended service military personnel and their families that was prepared by the Russian Ministry of Defense and other ministries and departments for submission to the Supreme Soviet is being reviewed at the present time in government organs. The draft was developed with reference to the Law on State Pensions for Citizens of Russia. Certain standards that are prescribed by laws that were developed in the other Commonwealth states that are directed at increasing the social protection of this category of citizens were taken into account.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But how will veterans of the Armed Forces of the former Union live in the other CIS states?

[Toporov] The former republics have now become sovereign states and the veterans live according to their laws. While understanding the importance of the issues of pension support of servicemen and their families who reside on the territories of the sovereign states, the Commonwealth member-state governments signed an appropriate agreement on 15 May 1992 at Tashkent. They assumed the obligation, at the expense of their budgets and based on the standards of domestic law and prior to adoption of such—according to the standards that were in effect in the Union, to provide pensions to military pensioners who reside on their territories.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Many servicemen associate the provision of social guarantees for themselves with the adoption of the Law "On the Status and Social Guarantees of Servicemen", the draft of which published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for discussion. What work is being conducted on it right now at the Ministry of Defense? What problems are the organs that are responsible for ensuring the social protection of servicemen working on right now?

[Toporov] Right now intensive work is being done to put the finishing touches on the draft law. The draft was painstakingly reviewed at the Ministry of Defense. Comments and proposals on it were sent to the Supreme Soviet Committee for Social Protection of Servicemen. On the whole, we think that the draft is targeted on the future. It reliably protects the interests of the overwhelming portion of servicemen. However, individual provisions of the draft need to be made more precise and that is natural since there were no such laws in the Russian Army.

At the same time, a careful study of the issues associated with the establishment of an adequate level of salaries of servicemen who are serving under combat conditions or similar conditions is occurring with the appropriate competent organs. Proposals have been prepared on the transfer of military builders to the position of servicemen. Proposals are being prepared on the problems of maintenance of servicemen's children in preschool institutions and some others.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that the issues of social protection of servicemen are inseparable from the other tasks associated with the creation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Their resolution will certainly be associated with the success of Russian reform and with the creation of the required economic conditions in the country. Much also depends on the organs of military administration, staffs, commanders and senior commanders, and on the competent and professional actions of all officials without exception who are involved with the economy of the Armed Forces and the rational utilization of everything that is allocated for the needs of defense.

As a result, I would like to request that all Armed Forces servicemen—while resolving the problems of everyday life and activities of the ground and naval forces—not forget about the economic aspect of the matter and to more widely use internal sources to solve social needs, to display initiative and enterprise on the issues associated with the utilization of material and financial resources. Right now, we simply can't get by without this approach to the matter.

Soldiers' Mothers' Leader Seeks Prosecutions

92UM1394A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 92 p 2

[Interview with Lyubov Lymar chairwoman of the Movement Soldiers' Mothers of Russia, by Denis Baranets: "The Mothers Weep"]

[Text] Pushkin Square is a conspicuous place. The young people like to make dates for here. Here almost constantly there is music, the fountain plays happily and laughter rings out. Recently the mood was quite different with hundreds of black kerchiefs, tearful eyes of the women, half-faded pictures of deceased soldiers and photos of their mutilated bodies, heart-rending posters...

The PRAVDA correspondent met with the chairwoman of the Movement Soldiers' Mothers of Russia, Lyubov Lymar.

[Baranets] Lyubov Mikhkaylovna [Lymar], in the press release distributed on the eve of the demonstration, you again demand prosecution for the murders of the servicemen and the holding of the guilty parties liable. Do you feel that as before nothing is being done?

[Lymar] Yes, I do. Virtually all the investigations are being falsified, and repeat investigations are not being given proper authorization at the Russian Procuracy. Yes, a presidential commission has been established on the given question. It has also been raised by the current minister of defense, but nothing has changed. Coffins continue to come in from the units. Parliament has not passed a law on liability for the life of servicemen.

[Baranets] One of your demands is the payment of monetary compensation for those killed in the army according to international standards. What does this specifically mean?

[Lymar] In every civilized society, in the event of the death of a serviceman, compensation is paid to his relatives or family. Many of our mothers, in losing the provider, are on the brink of death from starvation. It is essential to establish a real financial liability of the state for the military man. The bureaucrats have been drawing things out for a long time debating who should pay for this. Finally a decree was adopted on insurance in the event of the death of a serviceman with a settlement of 25,000 rubles. But after this decree, all cases of death have been reduced by the investigatory bodies to "suicide"...

[Baranets] You also are demanding the retirement of the Russian General Procurator Stepankov. On what grounds?

[Lymar] Stenankov's retirement would be one of the ways of getting our cause off dead center. After the work of the presidential commission, about 40 criminal cases were forwarded to the Russian Procuracy. For these the commission lifted the previously taken decisions. More than a year has passed and not one criminal case has been settled. They did not even return my son's head. We have every reason to assert that the Russian Procuracy headed by the general procurator is the main falsifier of the murders. Everything is being reduced to suicides.

[Baranets] Do you see a way out of the situation in changing officials?

[Lymar] Not in changing them but rather in punishing the guilty. And this should be done primarily by the military procurators. But even recently the chief military procurator was the first deputy general procurator. Military justice at present is financed from the budget of the Ministry of Defense. This also leads to the concealing of crimes.

[Baranets] But certainly, as far as I know, the military procuracy has been moved now to the civilian one. But you are still demanding its elimination.

[Lymar] Not much has changed.

[Baranets] The Mothers' Movement is demanding the granting of amnesty to soldiers and sailors who have left their troop units for reasons of threats to their lives and health. But certainly this provides a justification for any person who desires to get free of military obligation to quit his troop unit.

[Lymar] There are just a few of those. But hundreds of fellows have saved their lives and there is no other way. Article 14 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code (on the defense of human rights) does not apply in the Army, on the other hand Article 246 On Absence From a Troop Unit Without Leave works at full tilt. The fellows are deserting due to the intolerable conditions in the units. Otherwise from where would we be getting 40,000 zinc-lined coffins a year?

[Baranets] Are you absolutely certain of the accuracy of those data?

[Lymar] Absolutely. They are from reliable sources. The current leadership of the nation and the army is not ready for positive changes. The Law on Universal Military Service is criminal and militaristic.

[Baranets] Lyubov Mikhaylovna, you call the law "criminal and militaristic. But certainly the Supreme Soviet passed it.

[Lymar] We are a militaristic nation. And our laws "work" for this nation. From childhood a person is militarized. And this is called "instilling a love for the army."

[Baranets] What is bad about this true, patriotic love? In the army a man learns to defend the fatherland...

[Lymar] Soldier are killed in the army.

[Baranets] Not all of them.

[Lymar] As before many are being killed. This is why all our actions are aimed at stopping the conveyor of death. We are fighting. Recently on Slavyansk Square we were dispersed by special troops. I have been attacked twice. Our 15-day hunger strike has been ignored. We have realized that the "okay" for all these actions have been given by the supreme authorities of the nation. After Pushkin Square we intend to make a protest march by the embassies (we are around 200 persons). Then we shall begin to picket the Russian Procuracy with a following hunger strike.

[Baranets] Do you feel that it is to your credit that soon there will be no one to serve in the army? Mothers have always blessed their sons to serve in the army...

[Lymar] To serve, yes... But we will not bless their deaths...

[Editorial comment] ...This was the conversation. One can understand the unabating grief of the mothers of the killed soldiers. One can understand their many just demands and appeals for aid. But certainly one cannot agree with the excessive categoricalness of certain appeals or the vehemence of individual conclusions. These certainly come from impotence, from the purely female understanding of the social problem. But it is time to understand these people and help them.

CIS: POLICY

CIS Forces 'Internal Service' Manual Explained

92UM1387A Tashkent VATANPARVAR in Russian 7 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel M. Shevchenko, director of a group for the development of general-military manuals: "To The Soldier, Who Lives by His Service..."]

[Text] **By 7 May 1992 Order No 180 of the Commander in Chief of the United Armed Forces, four temporary all-military manuals of the United Armed Forces are being introduced as of 1 August: an Internal Service Manual, a Disciplinary Manual, A Manual for Garrison and Guard Duties, and a Drill Manual. Manuals are a treasure trove of knowledge of military life, and therefore their study has long been considered an extremely important duty for people who have dedicated themselves to military service. Even back in olden times it was said: "Oh soldier, who lives by your service, read your manual before going to sleep, and upon rising from sleep, read your manual assiduously." Today we are publishing an article on the specific features of the Internal Service Manual.**

The Internal Service Manual consists of three parts containing 12 chapters. Since many questions pertaining to the social protection of military personnel and guarantees of its realization were not legally codified, and more than 400 were regulated by administrative acts and other ordinances other than actual laws, now in the first part of the manual this situation has been rectified. For the first time a set of measures to create a reliable mechanism for the legal and social protection of military personnel has been set forth in concrete fashion. This, in particular, is stated in the chapter "The Rights, Duties and Responsibility of Military Personnel."

For the first time it has been stated that military personnel, in carrying out the duties of military service and, when necessary, in off-duty time, have the right to keep and bear arms, and the procedures for using them have also been defined. The use of a weapon is usually preceded by a warning about such use. One may also be used without warning. These situations are enumerated in the manual.

Special attention has been devoted lately to the wording, "a commander's (superior's) order is law for his subordinates." It emphasizes the importance of unquestioning obedience as a principle of relations between a commanding officer and his subordinates. But it is imprecise from the legal standpoint and has therefore been eliminated from the manual.

The idea of the impermissibility of obeying so-called criminal orders did not go through, either. In that case, any order may be called into doubt. In a combat situation that is intolerable. Deciding whether an order is criminal or not is a procurator's job. A section titled "The Order (Command) and the Procedures For Issuing and Carrying It Out. The Initiative of Military Personnel" is devoted to this problem.

An order is a commander's (or superior's) instructions to a subordinate. It sets forth certain provisions and demands for the performance of certain actions and the observance of established rules and procedures.

It is clarified that for the direct superior for all members of a regiment (or battalion or company) is the commanding officer of the unit (or subunit) and his first deputies. That is the way things were during the Great Patriotic War and up until 1960. The term "private first class" has been replaced by "senior soldier," which is analogous to the rank of "senior sailor" in the navy.

A number of provisions for the improvement of the living conditions of personnel are included in the chapter "The Billeting of Military Personnel." Thus, the sanitation norm for the billeting of inductees in barracks is set at no less than 12 cubic meters of air. Incidentally, this norm is 12-15 cubic meters in the U.S. Army and 12-14 cubic meters in the British Army.

Procedures for the storage of weapons and ammunition are clarified. Rooms for their storage must be under constant, 24-hour guard. Electronic alarm signals from the rooms in which they are kept lead to the regimental dutyman's station. These and other measures increase the reliability of the storage of weapons and munitions.

The manual includes a new section titled "Environmental Protection." Its provisions reflect the importance of this problem. They also fill gaps in servicemen's knowledge and make up for their lack of experience with regard to such matters.

The chapter titled "The Allocation of Time and Daily Procedures" has been substantially reworked and fundamentally new provisions have been added to it. Specific norms have been set for the allocation of the duty time of all categories of military personnel. For officers, warrant officers, inductees and female military personnel, the concept of "regulation of duty time" has been introduced for the first time.

The manual clarifies the conducting of the evening parade. It states that "during the evening parade personnel sing drill songs as part of their units." This ritual is simple and, at the same time, profound in content. Song was always a great unifying force for the military collective.

Provisions on the granting of leave to military personnel from the site of their units have been revised. It has been established, for example, that leave is granted to an inductee as a reward for up to 24 hours on Saturday and holidays. The granting of leave on work days is also authorized. With the battalion commander's permission, the manual states, a company commander may grant leave for a valid reason to a soldier or sergeant on any day of the week. This is done after training exercises until sunset, or until morning of the following day. However, the length of the leave should be such that it ends no later than two hours before the start of exercises.

One of the main components of troops' daily work is the performance of daily duty detail. A whole chapter, appropriately titled "Daily Duty Detail," is devoted to this. It contains substantial additions. These include the guarding of personnel during rest, monitoring of the situation in the unit, and the taking of timely action to prevent violations of the law.

A fundamentally new provision has been introduced on the possibility of arming the company dutyman and motor pool orderly with an assault rifle or carbine. In handling and using weapons, these persons are guided by the provisions on guard duty.

The duties of persons on daily duty detail have been clarified. Thus, upon receiving an alarm signal, a regiment's dutyman is supposed to "direct the movement of units to assembly points" until the arrival of the regiment's commander, his deputies and other officers of the unit.

A company dutyman also has additional duties. For example, he is supposed to see that the alarm signals for weapons storage rooms are maintained in working order. The procedures for his actions in the event that a violation of established regulations for relations among military personnel occurs in the unit are also clarified. In the event of any sort of incident in the company and "the violation of regulations established in the manuals for relations between soldiers and sergeants in the regiment," he is "to take immediate steps to establish order...."

The chapter on the preservation and improvement of the health of military personnel has been completely revised. It reveals how the good health of personnel is to be attained and points out the role of commanders and of each serviceman and their responsibility for this.

One of the most important tasks and one of the biggest in terms of the time required and number of military personnel involved is alert duty. A new chapter titled "Alert Duty (Alert Service)" contains general provisions regarding the organization and conduct of this type of military activity. Alert duty is the accomplishment performance of a military task. It is carried out by the forces and equipment designated from units and subunits for this purpose. They include combat crews and combat-support and service equipment.

In the navy alert service is equated with alert duty. It represents the highest form of maintaining the fleet's combat readiness in peacetime.

The chapters setting forth the specific features of internal service in motor pools and in the case of troops' deployment on test ranges and in camps, and while in transit have undergone considerable changes. The requirements for the preparation of drivers for a run have been raised. It is stipulated that machines are released from a motor pool with drivers who have undergone a pre-run medical examination . The duties of a column commander (or vehicle commander) have been clarified and precise regulations given for their activities.

For the first time, the basic goal of troops' deployment in field camps has been spelled out. This is done in order, "under conditions that approximate battle situations as closely as possible, to raise the level of the field training of personnel and improve their physical preparedness for the performance of their military duty."

Appendices to the manual have also undergone substantial changes in structure and content. Some appendices, such as "Regulations on the USSR Defense Minister's Banner for Courage and Military Valor," have been eliminated, and some have been combined. Thus seven appendices from the previous manual have now been combined into one. It is now called: "Forms of Documents Used in a Company." Seven new appendices have been included. The vast majority of them have already been tested in practice as military rituals that play a great role in soldiers' aesthetic and moral training. That pertains, for example, to such appendices as "A Military Unit's Annual Holiday," "Procedures for Presenting Arms and Military Equipment to Personnel," and "Procedures for Seeing Off Military Personnel Transferred to the Reserves or Discharged."

The appendices open with "Regulations on the Procedures for Administration of the Military Oath." They contain the additional indication that reservists to whom the military oath has not been previously administered and female military personnel are to take the oath following their induction in the headquarters of their unit under the direction of the commanding officer.

Various additions and changes have been made in all of the former appendices that remain in the manual. For example, the "List of Military Ranks of Military Personnel of the Armed Services" states that all military titles are subdivided into troop and naval personnel. Such concepts as "private personnel" [ryadovoy sostav], "sergeant and petty-officer personnel" [serzhantskiy i starshinskiy sostav] and "warrant-officer personnel" [sostav praporshchikov i michmanov] have also been introduced.

The army is a special social organism. Law and the order hold sway here. And the articles of the manual we have examined are directed toward fulfillment of the requirements of internal service in the strictly organized actions of all military personnel. Precisely organized internal

service develops punctuality, conscientiousness, independence and responsibility in personnel.

From the editors: We believe that the basic provisions of the all-military manuals of the CIS Unified Armed Forces could provide the basis for laws governing the army life of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

MI-24 Helicopter Stats, Performance Reviewed

92UM1404A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Valentin Rudenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Mi-24: The Rotary-Wing Brother of Infantry"]

[Text] "The idea of creating the combat helicopter," says Academician Marat Nikolayevich Tishchenko, a general designer at the Experimental Design Bureau imeni M.L. Mil in the recent past, "came to us recently. But the proposals to arm Mi-1 and Mi-4 helicopters, which Mikhail Leontyevich Mil made to the Ministry of Defense, were not supported, above all by the minister, Marshal R.Ya. Malinovskiy. Only in 1967 did the Military Technical Council of the Ministry of Defense finally make the decision on creating a combat helicopter. By that time, as we know, the U.S. Army already had the two-seater Cobra combat helicopter."

The Mi-24 was developed parallel with preparations for its series production. This saved a considerable amount of time. The prototype of this new helicopter made its first takeoff in 1969, and units began receiving it in 1971.

The helicopter proved to be a success. This was the most effective and most powerful helicopter in the world right up until the end of the 1970's. It had better armor than all others and was the fastest. An absolute speed record of 367 km/hr was set in one version of the Mi-24 and held up about 10 years.

The crew cabin for a squad of motorized riflemen (8 men) was a fundamental distinction of the Mi-24 from western helicopters.

Initially, the Mi-24 crew included two people: the pilot and weapons operator. Now it has a three-man crew: pilot, pilot-operator, and flight mechanic, whose position is in the assault troops crew cabin.

Performance Characteristics of the Mi-24

Takeoff weight, kg:	
normal	11,200
maximum	12,000
Commercial load, kg	1,500
Maximum weight of slung load, kg	2,400
Maximum flight speed, km/hr	335
Cruise speed, km/hr	270
Ceiling, meters:	
hover	1,750
service	4,500
Operational flight range, km:	
with main tanks	500
with auxiliary tanks	1,000
Maximum airborne time, hours	4
TVZ-117 engines, hp	2 x 2200

The helicopter was continuously upgraded and modernized, to include the addition of missiles. Initially, the Mi-24 was armed with four subsonic Falang antitank with manual control (later with a semiautomatic control system). Now the helicopter has supersonic Shturm antitank missiles. The machinegun-cannon armament has changed. The first Mi-24's had a single-barrelled machinegun. Then they were armed with a four-barrelled units of 12.7-mm machineguns. Now a 23-mm cannon on a mobile mount is installed on them.

There are 132 unguided rockets housed in four pods. They can be fired in a salvo or one at a time. It is also possible to hang pods with 80-mm rockets, machineguns or grenade launchers, or two or four aviation bombs with a total weight of 500 kg.

The Mi-24 is equipped with special systems for protection against heat-seeking missiles.

Up to now, the engines installed on the Mi-24 rank among the best in the world for specific and weight characteristics. They were developed by the Leningrad Experimental Design Bureau imeni V.Ya. Klimov under the direction of general designer Sergey Petrovich Izotov.

The Mi-24 is capable of accomplishing the most diverse missions: destroying enemy tanks; assaulting enemy fire positions and strongpoints; escorting assault transport helicopters and waging air-to-air combat; adjusting artillery fire; dropping small assault subunits and reconnaissance parties into the enemy rear area; conducting radiation and chemical reconnaissance; and evacuating from the battlefield.

The helicopter has been tested in the fire of many wars and military conflicts (Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Angola, Mozambique, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Ethiopia), where it has proven itself to be a reliable means of fire support for ground forces.

The Mi-24 is no longer being produced, but it will remain in service for a long time until it is replaced by helicopters which we will talk about in the future.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Development of Be-200 Amphibious Aircraft

92UM1319A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Dmitriy Slobodnyanyuk under the rubric "In the Government": "An Aircraft Is Being Developed Which Has No Equals"]

[Text] The other day Ye. Gaydar signed a special government decree on the creation of the Be-200 amphibious aircraft. In accordance with the document around 300 million rubles will be spent on the development of the amphibious aircraft this year, not considering funds previously allocated. During the next 20 years, the government plans to spend another 1.5 billion rubles on this program through the Ministry of Industry. Today, when many sectors are at the brink of bankruptcy, this kind of government concern for the development of an aircraft might seem somewhat strange to some people.

V. Kravchuk, vice president of the firm Heavy Planes and Helicopters, which was recently separated from the aviation department of the Ministry of Industry, agreed to comment on the situation. According to him, the nation's existing Be-12 and A-40 ASW amphibious aircraft are unsuitable, unfortunately, for use in the civilian economy. And there is a great need for them. The Be-200, which is in the final stages of development, is an all-purpose aircraft with no equals in the world. It is designed for extinguishing fires, hauling cargo and passengers in island and coastal areas, performing rescue operations at sea and patrolling the 200-mile commercial zone. In short, its regular production is eagerly awaited by the border troops, fire fighters and rescue workers. In addition, several Greek companies are very interested in this project and have even gone into debt to set up the joint Deta Aer enterprise with the Russian side. According to V. Kravchuk, around 200 of these aircraft will be needed for extinguishing forest fires in the Mediterranean area within the next few years.

The veteran of the aviation industry explained to a ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent the fact that the development of the Be-200 is a conversion program is another aspect of the matter. Its implementation will make it possible to save from shutdown and ruin such giants of our military aircraft industry as the Taganrog Scientific and Technological Aviation Center and the Irkutsk Aircraft Plant, which until recently produced the well-known Su-27 bombers.

It is planned to complete the development of the base model and turn out several test units by the end of next year. Flight tests are scheduled to start in 1994. The program is to be completed in 1996.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Naval Maintenance Chief Interviewed

92UM1388A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 4, April 92 pp 50-52

[Nuclear submarine maintenance chief Ye. Romanov interviewed by Captain First Rank B. Tyurin: "Weapons and Equipment: Retiring Nuclear Powered Submarines—How Long Will It Take?"]

[Text] **An interview with Captain First Rank Ye. Romanov, chief of the comprehensive maintenance department for nuclear powered submarines of the Navy's Main Maintenance and Repair Directorate.**

[Tyurin] Yevgeniy Grigoryevich, please tell how the problem of salvaging the navy's nuclear powered vessels is being solved today.

[Romanov] The Navy has now been left to deal with this problem one on one, so to speak. Why? This task has yet to be assigned to naval shipyards, and their capacity fails to meet requirements for ensuring the prompt salvaging of nuclear powered submarines or even for preparing them to be scrapped. In addition, there are other circumstances that compound this problem: Salvaging nuclear powered vessels requires that the nuclear fuel and other radioactive wastes be removed, which in turn makes it necessary to have special storage facilities and equipment that are still in very short supply in the navy.

[Tyurin] From what you have said, it is clear that retiring nuclear powered submarines is being done in a systematic fashion. In other words, the number of such ships that has accumulated today will be joined by more in the foreseeable future. Just what kind of vessels are these nuclear powered ships, what is their technical condition and what is being done with them given the difficulties with docking facilities?

[Romanov] For the most part, the nuclear powered submarines that are now being retired or that will be retired in the near future are first-generation vessels whose construction and placement in naval service took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s. They are missile and multipurpose (or "purely" torpedo) nuclear powered submarines. The oldest of them are submarines of the Leninskiy Komsomol type (pr [possibly design] 627) that were placed in service in 1958 and subsequent years. Strictly speaking, the problem of salvaging nuclear powered submarines in our navy arose in the mid-1980s and precisely with submarines of this generation. What characterizes the nuclear powered submarines that we are retiring from the navy? Above all, their unsatisfactory technical condition (which is the main reason for retiring them). This condition is characterized by the fact that when these ships are afloat at their moorings, they require a set of labor-intensive measures to ensure their viability. In particular, these measures are necessitated by corrosion damage to their hulls and, as a result, the loss of hermetic sealing of the main ballast tanks, which

we constantly have to "fill with compressed air" on our own. Such ships invariably require a skeleton maintenance crew. In addition, extremely worn electrical equipment also requires heightened attention in order to eliminate fire and explosion hazards on such ships.

Based on the results of interdepartmental commissions in the Northern and Pacific Ocean fleets in 1990 and 1991, the Navy drew up timetables for docking written-off vessels, but just how they will be met at a time of reduced appropriations for defense needs and for the navy in particular is something that only time will tell. In the meantime, we see the solution to the problem in undertaking efforts as soon as possible to salvage the submarines at naval and industrial plants.

As for the nuclear and radiation safety of maintaining these ships, we have taken a number of steps, in conjunction with the designers and producer shipyards, that allow us to say that the safety of retired nuclear powered submarines is being ensured today in full measure, especially given the presence of skeleton maintenance crews on them. These crews are properly monitoring the condition of the power-generating units and maintaining the required normal level of the radiation situation on the vessels.

[Tyurin] What is the outlook for efforts to salvage the submarines and to prepare them for prolonged storage afloat? Have such efforts already been made in the various fleets?

[Romanov] Yes, we are making such efforts already. However, we plan to reduce their scope this year, since carrying out these plans requires considerable financial investments. Yet no such funds have yet been appropriated specifically for the Navy. And so we have carried out this work at the expense of fleet maintenance—to be more precise, at the expense of ships that are in service and whose technical combat readiness requires regularly scheduled maintainence work and docking.

It must be borne in mind that in 1991, the Navy Main Maintenance and Repair Directorate's department for comprehensive maintenance of nuclear powered submarines, in conjunction with relevant ministries and agencies of the then USSR, drew up a special program for retiring nuclear powered submarines. The program was put into effect by resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers. But the most important question—that of allocating the special funds—was never resolved during the existence of the Union or subsequently, even though the program was supposed to be "operative" in 1991.

In January of this year, Navy Commander Admiral V. Chernavin, together with Russian Minister of Industry Yu. Titkin, visited shipyards in Severodvinsk, where they became acquainted with the current state of affairs with respect to the builders of our nuclear powered fleet. This problem was also raised there, among others. On the commander's return, we received an order to rework the program with due regard for the formation of new structures based on the former union ministries and agencies that had passed to Russian jurisdiction. In my opinion, however, this too fails to solve the main problem—will the Russian government appropriate the needed funds to carry out the aforementioned program?

I would also add the following: We know full well that given the conditions in which our country finds itself, there are no extra funds, and the required funds, if they are nonetheless appropriated, will be taken from the taxpayer's pocket. But unless we start implementing the program in the near future, the situation will grow more complex from one year to the next—and precisely from the standpoint of the ecological situation at various sites. If, on the other hand, we start carrying out the program, the number of written-off nuclear powered submarines afloat will start declining by 1996 and 1997!

[Tyurin] And here we have finally come to one of the most pressing and urgent issues at a national level—that of ecology. Please explain, Yevgeniy Grigoryevich, in more detail exactly what kind of ecological problems arise in connection with salvaging and scrapping nuclear powered ships.

[Romanov] At the national level, this is the problem of problems, in our opinion. The trouble is that Russia (like, incidentally, the USSR before it) has no single approach to solving the problem of dealing with radioactive wastes. Each agency that has such special wastes has resolved and continues to resolve all issues associated with their destruction on its own. It cannot be said that no efforts to formulate common views and positions among the relevant parties have been made. A state program for dealing with radioactive wastes in 1991-1995 and for the period up to the year 2005 was drafted in 1991. But it could not be implemented by the Union leadership. The problem remained, and now the Russian State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry, by order of the Russian government, is to draw up a similar program this year. Captain First Rank A. Tsubannikov, an associate of our department, took part in drafting the program on behalf of the navy. However, our proposals were not taken into account as the program was being created, for "conceptually" this program too presupposes a departmental approach to dealing with radioactive wastes.

In our opinion, the state program must provide for the creation of a special branch charged with carrying out measures to collect, package, transport, process, and then bury wastes and spent nuclear materials. This branch should have at its disposal the necessary capacity for processing such wastes, as well as regional burial sites for interring the remaining products of that processing.

In addition, we believe that solving this problem at a "state" level also requires that we take foreign experience into account—for example, US experience! There, as I understand it, under the framework of an ecological program, the Department of Energy, which has jurisdiction over enterprises of the military nuclear complex,

will in 1992 begin developing and putting to use fundamentally new technologies for the system of storing and dealing with radioactive wastes. The federal budget appropriates more than $30 billion for this up till 1996! Plans call for the program to be carried out in conjunction with the Federal Environmental Protection Agency and with state governments, under the overall supervision of the US Department of Energy.

[Tyurin] Thank you for taking part in our discussion. We will continue to discuss this problem on our journal's pages in the future. We also invite representatives of the navy to take part in this dialogue, as well as representatives of related civilian agencies and organizations that have a vital interest in its positive resolution.

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INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Kozhin Denies Violation of Black Sea Accord

92UM1323A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jul 92 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Skachko under the rubric "Ukraine": "Who Is Violating the Dagomys Agreements?"]

[Text]

Two Press Conferences in Sevastopol

Admiral Igor Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin, commander of the Ukrainian Navy, have held press conferences in Sevastopol.

The press conferences were devoted to events of recent days surrounding the taking of the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine on 10 July by eight officers and warrant officers and 14 seamen at the Sevastopol Garrison commandant's office.

Many politicians believe that the confrontation began earlier, when Kasatonov announced at a press conference at the beginning of the month that he regards the Ukrainian army and navy as hostile. The admiral attempted to describe that hostility by stating that Ukraine's naval forces were unilaterally violating the agreement signed at Dagomys on 23 June 1992.

Kasatonov's main accusation was that the command element of the Ukrainian Navy is encouraging the personnel of Black Sea Fleet ships and units to take the Ukrainian oath. Furthermore, according to the admiral, the very procedure for taking the oath has changed, "going from an underground process to coercion."

According to Kasatonov, servicemen are being induced to take the oath by both military and civilian officials of Ukraine, and the Security Service has become actively involved. "A real danger of the seizure of command posts of units and formations of the Black Sea Fleet has arisen," he said.

He called the taking of the oath by the garrison of the Sevastopol military commandant's office perturbing and declared that the entire process was directed by Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov.

Boris Kozhin began his press conference with the following: "Only one standpoint should be taken for assessing events in the Black Sea Fleet today: that there is an Independent Ukraine, which has now been recognized by 120 nations of the world." Kozhin went on to say that the Ukrainian Navy has in no way violated the Dagomys Accord but is operating in complete accordance with Ukrainian laws on military matters. Russia, on the other hand, and specifically the command element of the Black Sea Fleet, is permitting actions which are a violation of the Dagomys Agreement. According to Kozhin, the procedure for manning fleet units and ships is being violated by bringing in draftees from Russia. Kozhin stated that draftees are being loaded into the holds of ships at Novorossiysk and transported in the night to Ukraine. Their total number exceeded 4,000 men as of May 1992 instead of the 2,500 specified in preliminary agreements. In addition, the fleet's command element is taking repressive actions against officers and enlisted men who have taken the oath to Ukraine.

Russians Removing Military Equipment From Georgia

92UM1323C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jul 92 p 1

[Interfaks report under the rubric "In Brief": "Georgia Displeased With Removal"]

[Text] The press center of the Georgian Ministry of Defense has reported that Russian troops stationed in Georgia are urgently removing weapons and equipment from the republic. Il-76 military transports are making as many as 20 flights a day.

Georgia is the only republic of the former USSR which has not received its share of the Soviet army's weapons and property. The command element of the Transcaucasus Military District has stated more than once that part of the weapons will be turned over to Georgia only after it has signed an agreement with Russia.

Latvia Still Not Informed of Fire on Military Test Site

92UM1323B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Jul 92 p 6

[NEGA report under the rubric "In Brief": "Who Set the Test Site on Fire?"]

[Text] Latvia's Extraordinary Government Commission has not received the conclusion of the military on the cause of the fire at the Adazi Test Range, even though an agreement was reached on the matter last week with the command element of the Northwest Group of Russian Forces. State Minister Yanis Dinevich, head of Latvia's Extraordinary Commission reported this. He stated that he could not understand these actions on the part of the command element of the Northwest Group of Forces. They can only be regarded as an attempt to stall for time.

Over Seventy Russian Soldiers Killed in Attacks on Military Storehouses

92UM1382A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jul 92 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Armenia"]

[Text] According to a report from the news agency Noyan Topan there have been 127 armed attacks on

military units in Azerbaijan and 77 Russian servicemen have been killed in recent months.

The agency reports that these numbers have been confirmed by General Kondratyev, Russian deputy minister of defense. There was no reaction from the Russian leadership to a single one of these attacks. Furthermore, the Russian 4th Army transferred a large batch of weapons to Azerbaijan last month.

The Noyan Topan report notes that in the past six months there have been two attacks on Russian military personnel in Armenia, at Aterk and Gumry, after which Russia issued a statement to Armenia's leadership and a state commission was sent to the site of the incident.

Weapons Thefts Spur Crime, Conflict

92UM1403A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Aug 92 p 1

[Interview with Major-General Yu. Kudinov, representative of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, by Lieutenant-Colonel Ivan Sas of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Press Center; place and date not given: "Weapons Should Not 'Roam' Throughout the Country; The Law Needs To Begin Working for This"]

[Text] **Recently at one of the Moscow train stations, an unfamiliar person came up to the author of these lines and asked how to get to the Procuracy of Russia. However, he did not pay much attention to the directions. There was a troubled look in his eyes. "You all need to be taken to the dock," he maliciously remarked.**

Gradually it became clear what was going on. It turned out that the stranger together with his son had brought up from the south some goods that were in short supply. At one of the stations in the North Caucasus, people with assault rifles came into the car. They went through the passengers' baggage and took everything of value. They brutally beat up the man's son, who tried to resist. "Read what they write," he shook the paper in front of my face. "You, the Army, are supplying these bands with weapons. That means you are also criminals."

It was with this incident that I began my conversation with Major-General Yu. Kudinov, representative of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

[Kudinov] It is a difficult topic, but I think that a person knowing the situation and the roots of the problem would never have made such accusations against the army. The fact that a large number of weapons are "roaming" throughout the country is an indisputable fact. But let us begin the conversation by citing another fact. In this number of weapons, only one-third come from the army, although it is the army that has the greatest stocks of these weapons. What does this say? First of all, it says that the army has been able to protect its weapons against massive encroachments better than others possessors weapons. But this fact is kept quiet for some reason.

[Sas] Still, the absolute figures of the loss of weapons from army arsenals are fairly high. At a recent press conference, you yourself cited one of the figures: during six months of this year, the Russian Army lost about 25,000 pieces...

[Kudinov] Let us try to look at what is behind these figures. Geography itself already says a great deal. Let us take small arms. During seven months of this year, 10,675 pieces were stolen in Azerbaijan. By comparison, 103 pieces were stolen during this same period in the vast space of Central Russia, Siberia, and the Far East.

I don't think explanations are even required here: the losses occur where the political situation is unstable, where combat operations are being conducted, and where tension is heightened over troops under the jurisdiction of Russia.

[Sas] I often hear: What kind of troops are they if they cannot even protect their own weapons or themselves?

[Kudinov] In order to understand everything, one must, pardon the bluntness, be in their shoes. An analysis of the extraordinary events associated with the seizure of weapons shows that in the absolute majority of cases, our servicemen encountered so-called non-standard situations that you will not find in any regulation. Even if the law allows you to pull the trigger, you will not do this. In many cases you have to make one of two choices—either bloodshed or seizure of weapons. And I need to mention another thing. In the units stationed in the Transcaucasus, there were quite a few servicemen of local nationalities. The leak of official information took place mainly through them, and some of them embarked on the path of betrayal and treason in critical situations. This is a fact you cannot escape.

[Sas] It seems that lately the tactics of the hunters of weapons in the same Transcaucasus have begun to "suffer" from monotony—armed raids on units, guards, and so forth have become prevalent. Put frankly, it is a path that is risky and provides no guarantees. But they follow this path. In your opinion, why?

[Kudinov] First of all, there is a huge demand for weapons in this region. Weapons provide both money and power, and all the rest. Here, as they say, it is either do or die. Judge for yourself the scale of this phenomenon. In seven months of this year in the Transcaucasus alone, about 500 attacks were made on installations of Russian troops (95 percent of them to seize weapons, ammunition, or military equipment). As a result, 69 of our servicemen died and more than 150 were wounded.

Secondly, the attackers have virtually no fear that any measures will be undertaken against them by local authorities. We have repeatedly requested that the leadership of the Transcaucasian states put a stop to the

illegal actions of the extremists. In response we heard either vague promises or excuses that the attack was made by unknown forces not under the control of the government.

[Sas] When the well-known Resolution No 407 of the Russian Government, dated 20 June of this year, appeared, many skeptically regarded it as the "101st Chinese warning."

[Kudinov] But it did play a very large role and created a legal basis for armed protection of military installations. Let us recall the attack on the artillery regiment guard in Yerevan on 7 July. The attackers left with nothing, after losing three killed and two wounded. On 23 July, there was an attack on a combat vehicle park of a Russian artillery regiment in Baku. The skirmish did not last 30 minutes. Again there were losses among the attackers: nine bandits were arrested, and 11 assault rifles and three pistols were recaptured. I will emphasize that in both cases there were no losses on our side.

It looks as though this has taken away the desire of many of them to use force. Look how abruptly the picture is changing. Whereas there were 34 attacks on Russian units in June, as a result of which 466 weapons were stolen, 21 servicemen were killed, and 24 were wounded, in July this statistic looks totally different—15 attacks, 88 pieces stolen, and seven servicemen killed and four wounded.

[Sas] We also cannot ignore another phenomenon: some servicemen are involved in the losses of weapons...

[Kudinov] Unfortunately, there are also people in the army who in difficult material and living conditions are unable to resist the temptation of getting rich quick by selling weapons. One out of every five thefts is committed by the collusion of criminals with servicemen. One out of every two convicted for this (punishment here is practically inevitable) broke the law for the purpose of making money. More than 30 percent of the thefts of weapons are committed by compulsory-service servicemen who came into the army to get weapons. Of course, this intention was given not by the tenderhearted mothers and grandmothers but by the criminals.

The officers who have sullied themselves by such deeds are few. But there can be no excuse for them.

[Sas] What do you think of the articles on this topic?

[Kudinov] It varies. If you take them as a whole, the overall trend is alarming. In my view, instead of actively pursuing the idea of "Farewell, weapons!" the mass media is patiently inuring their readers to the thought of "Long live weapons!" They say we should not be afraid of "universal arming of the people." On the contrary, they say that we should legalize the sale of weapons, from which crime will even decline. This is a most dangerous idea for our society. The West cannot be blamed here; there democratic traditions became firmly established long ago, and the authority structures are strong. In our country, a few rash steps only increase the tension.

Much in the articles is journalistic superficiality and elementary negligence. We recently held a press conference on this topic. The next day, I read what was written about it and was horrified. In some newspapers it was heaped up! I understand that in this most difficult problem it is difficult to investigate everything immediately and spread the emphasis. There must be objectiveness and an unbiased approach.

[Sas] What does the immediate future hold in store for us?

[Kudinov] I am convinced that we will be able to reduce sharply the loss of weapons from the Russian Army. But the influx of weapons into the criminal sphere will continue from other sources that are quite difficult to block.

Dushanbe Commander on Army Involvement in Factional Conflict

92UM1381A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by Oleg Panfilov under the rubric "Tajikistan": "Two Versions of the 'One-Day War'"]

[Text]

Russian Troops Again at Center of Attention

Major-General Mukhriddin Ashurov, garrison chief and commander of the 201st Division of the Russian Armed Forces, held a press conference at the headquarters of the Dushanbe Garrison.

Denying that Russian servicemen stationed in Tajikistan used fire arms during the incident of 27 June in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast, General Ashurov offered his version of events. According to him, at 05:30 on 27 June up to 1,000 supporters of the opposition began an offensive from the Turkmenistan Sovkhoz into the area of the fourth section of the Sovkhoz imeni Kuybyshev. They were opposed by 700 men supported by Kulyab formations. The UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] of the Kurgan-Tyube Oblast Executive Committee was informed of the clash shortly after it occurred, and two BTRs [armored personnel carriers] of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and one BTR with an officer from the Kurgan-Tyube military unit were dispatched to the area of the shooting.

The general asserts that the combat equipment was acting as a barrier between the opposing sides but was shelled by the opposition formations. An opposition BTR was knocked out of action by the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment]. When the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] subunit began to be surrounded, one tank and two BTRs were summoned from the military unit. During the evacuation of the OMON subunit Lieutenant-Colonel Salomat Shoyev, chief of the

OBKhSS [Section for Campaign Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property] of the Kurgan-Tyube Oblast UVD, was wounded. Maj Korzhenevskiy, assistant military prosecutor at the garrison, denies that the military employed weapons. Furthermore, according to him, the machine gun in one BTR was broken, a fact allegedly confirmed by witnesses who saw spider webs over the gun, and four cases of ammunition were returned unused to the unit. In answer to a question from a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent as to why a tank was used to ram three civilian vehicles one after another, one of them a milk truck, General Ashurov said that the vehicles were blocking the road. When asked why an ambulance, a taxi and a mosque were shelled, the general said that this was done by opposition troops to make it appear that the military were to blame for it all. General Ashurov is convinced that the clash was a prepared operation. He accused Davlat Usmon, deputy prime minister in the Tajik government, Shodmon Yusuf, chairman of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and Colonel Dzhurabek Aminov, deputy chairman of the republic's National Security Committee, of inflaming passions around the Russian troops. Nonetheless, no answer was received as to why only homes in an opposition community were looted and burned or why combat operations were conducted only on the territory of that same opposition community.

"There was no justification for the slaughter by MVD troops and the Russian military." is the position taken by Colonel Dzhurabek Aminov, deputy chairman of the republic's National Security Committee. He rejects out of hand the version of an attempted attack on the settlement by opposition formations under the control of Kulyab forces. Furthermore, the opposition BTR and people leaving by vehicle were shot from behind, and there was no need for this. In fact, in the opinion of Colonel Aminov, tensions had been escalating for two days prior to the clash. Opposition groupings had taken up a defense of their community when the shelling began early on the morning of 27 June. The BTR of the Russian forces, on the other hand, was shooting to kill. In general, Colonel Aminov maintains that both regiments, the one stationed at Kulyab and the one at Kurgan-Tyube, should be withdrawn immediately, since the troops are inclined against the opposition forces and democratic reforms in Tajikistan. "I would prefer," Colonel Aminov said," that some general named Ivanov and not General Ashurov be the garrison chief and commander of the 201 Division, someone who would think about the army and not about supporting President Nabiyev." Colonel Aminov also maintains that the extensive sale of weapons and ammunition is occurring from the territory of the military units and that Major-General Mukhriddin Ashurov is involved in political intrigue. According to the National Security Committee of Tajikistan, around 30 people were killed in the shooting, but the figure could be considerably higher. When asked by the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent about recent events in Kulyab, Colonel Shurov replied that it was possibly an attempted coup. On 27 July, when an agreement was signed in Khorog by leaders of the political parties, movements and various armed groupings in Kulyab, Said Salimov, head of the self-defense detachment, was replaced. In the opinion of Colonel Aminov, this individual managed to bring order to the issue of weapons and rules for carrying them within the first few weeks following his appointment as head of the self-defense detachment. He also prevented mass killings at Kulyab and in the oblast. Langari Langariyev, former regular officer in the internal troops, now occupies his position.

Soldier Responsible for Explosion at Military Supply Depot to Be Prosecuted

92UM1383A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Aug 92 Morning edition p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Viktor Litovkin: "A Soldier Is Guilty; Russia Will Pay."]

[Text] Yerevan—**The completion of the preliminary investigation into the explosions and fire which occurred at ammunition dumps of a motorized-rifle division of the 7th Army in the settlement of Balzovit, near Yerevan, has been announced in the capital of Armenia. This was reported to the editors by our correspondent Sergey Bablumyan, citing Vagarshak Bardanyan, military prosecutor at the Yerevan Garrison.**

Remember that the depots contained shells for 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers, 120-mm mortars and 100-mm antiaircraft guns (more than 180,000, located in the open), as well as ammunition for rocket launchers, rounds for PZRKs [antiaircraft missile systems] and Strela ZRKs [antiaircraft missile systems], ammunition for grenade launchers....

The resulting fire, exploding ammunition and fragments which flew hundreds and thousands of meters through the air made it necessary to evacuate the population of the city of Abovyan and residents of Sovetskiy and Arabkirskiy rayons in the republic's capital. Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan cut short a visit to Greece and returned home at once. Nearby buildings and structures suffered enormous damage, and several civilians were wounded.

Anatoliy Korotkov, acting chief of the investigative directorate of the Main Directorate of the General Procuracy of Russia, has reported to the editors that Pvt Z. Khaytmatov, a serviceman in the 7th Yerevan Army, has been found guilty of the tragedy at Balzovit.

The joint investigation by Armenian and Russian specialists has established the fact that on that ill-fated night in April sentry Khaytmatov was patrolling his route, the perimeter of the depot grounds, when suddenly he heard a noise in the area of some stacks of 100-mm antiaircraft shells. It turned out to be a box blown down by the wind, but the soldier thought that it was criminals stealing the shells.

Against guard duty regulations, he fired toward the stacks and a bullet struck one of the shells. The rest you know....

The 7th Army suffered a loss of 23 million rubles as a result of the explosions. Armenia's national economy lost 863 million. The soldier will never pay for the disaster, of course, not to mention the subsequent political, moral and psychological harm to relations between Russia and Armenia. Naturally, the federation will have to assume the entire cost of indemnification for the loss.

According to the legal experts, Pvt Khaytmatov—who will be tried under Article 255 of the Criminal Code of Russia—stands accused of violating regulations for the performance of garrison and guard duty and of negligent destruction of military and civilian property. This carries a sentence of 1 to 10 years....

Army Patrols Demand Rules of Engagement From Authorities in Dniester Region

92UM1382C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Aug 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "The Dniester Region: The Military Are Dissatisfied"]

[Text] The commandant's office of the Dniester region and Tiraspol intends to withdraw from establishing order in the city because it lacks proper authority and regulations governing its activities. The command element of the 14th Army has issued the Dniester region authorities an ultimatum: either appropriate standards are enacted or else the military patrols will limit themselves to performing garrison duty. If a compromise is not found, the Tiraspol residents may find themselves one on one with excesses committed by numerous armed formations, which have already been christened "the third force" locally.

Belarus Says Black Sea Fleet Accord Violates CIS Treaty

92UM1400C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Aug 92 p 1

[Article by Igor Sinyakevich: "Shushkevich Has the Nazarbayev Syndrome"]

[Text] The dispute over the Black Sea Fleet seemed hopeless. The impression was created that just a little more and Admiral Chernavin would utter the fatal words: "You will go to no one." However, the ships of the Black Sea Fleet were unable to repeat the feat of the legendary cruiser Varyag: they were granted a three-year "sentence deferment." As a result of the Yalta meeting of the two leaders, such a close Russian-Ukrainian rapprochement took place that Yeltsin and Kravchuk not only began using the familiar form of address but also agreed to a diumvirate over the Black Sea Fleet.

According to a strange law, the fewer the parties involved in negotiations, the easier the most complicated problems are resolved. If three presidents getting together at the Belovezhskiy Forest safely "buried" the Union, why can't two presidents meeting on the shores of the Crimea agree on a temporary solution to another difficult problem in order to create conditions for an amicable division of more substantial property than tons of floating metal? But when you begin rejoicing over shifting from confrontation to mutual understanding, it unexpectedly turns out that not all the parties concerned were invited to the negotiations. But in the first instance, Nazarbayev was invited to sign the Belovezhskiy Accords, unintentionally depriving him of the opportunity to participate in their discussion. The consequences are known. The situation with Shushkevich's reaction to the Yalta decisions of Yeltsin and Kravchuk is similar.

As NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has already reported, an extraordinary meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus, chaired by Stanislav Shushkevich, who interrupted his vacation, was held on 6 August and adopted a statement. The document states: "Individual provisions of the agreement in question are contrary to agreements concluded within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (specifically, the provision of Article 1, which calls for dividing up the Black Sea Fleet between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and Article 3, according to which the Black Sea Fleet leaves the CIS Combined Armed Forces and is subordinate directly to the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, are actually contrary to the essence of the agreements between member-states of the CIS on strategic forces of 30 December 1991, on the status of strategic forces of 14 February 1992, on Combined Armed Forces for the transitional period of 20 March 1992, and on legal fundamentals of the activities of the CIS Combined Armed Forces of 20 March 1992). "The Republic of Belarus, as a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States and a depository of documents adopted within the framework of the CIS, notes that decisions on fundamental questions are under the jurisdiction of authorized bodies of the CIS and must be considered by the Council of Heads of Member-States of the Commonwealth." Commenting on his statement, Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus, said in particular: "We make no claims on the Black Sea Fleet, but we believe it is necessary to find a property solution to this issue, since we and other member-states of the CIS have a share in creating and equipping this and other fleets. In the opinion of members of the Presidium, which I completely endorse, it would be necessary to coordinate this step by Russia and Ukraine ahead of time with those who are full-fledged members of the Commonwealth."

It is not likely that such a sharp reaction by Shushkevich was the result of the Belarusian leader's personal ambitions. He is notable for modesty that is not characteristic for politicians of such a rank (he arrived at the above-mentioned meeting from his garden plot, which he

received when he was a university professor and on which he is completing, without the help of workers, construction of a private summer cottage, having refused a state mansion). More likely, such a response to the the Yalta Accords was caused by a natural concern that the two most powerful powers of the CIS, finding mutual understanding, will begin to ignore the interests of the other participants in the Commonwealth. Suddenly, after the fleet, will Yeltsin and Kravchuk divide into two all the rest of the legacy of the Soviet empire, beginning with the embassy mansions and ending with spheres of influence? But whereas the entire Muslim half of the former Union was behind Nazarbayev, who was offended by the three Slavic leaders last December, so far no one is behind the Belarusian leader other than his own republic. And a uniting of the efforts of the small countries of the CIS against possible diktat of Ukraine and Russia is not likely in the future due to the considerable difference of interests. In any event, the reconciliation of Moscow and Kiev may prove to be just as dangerous for the existence of the CIS as the dispute between them.

It is curious that the statement of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus hits the Russian-Belarusian military agreements signed on 20 July in Moscow by Yegor Gaydar and Vycheslav Kebich. Specifically, the agreement on strategic forces temporarily stationed on the territory of the Republic of Belarus calls for transferring to the jurisdiction of Russia units and large units previously considered as part of the CIS Combined Armed Forces. This was done, as in the case with the Black Sea Fleet, without prior consultation with other countries of the CIS. It is difficult to say if the initiators of the statements of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet are undermining the Russian-Belarusian accords unintentionally or deliberately. At least it is known that Shushkevich reacted to them more coolly than Kebich and characterized the latter's words about the "beginning of a confederation" as the "premier's personal opinion."

Russians Accused of Aiding Abkhaz Forces

92UM1393A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Aug p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Corresondent Vladimir Yermolin: "Blood Has Been Shed in Sukhumi. Vacationers From Russia Have Paid With Their Lives. For What?"]

[Text] First of all about the main thing, the most sorrowful: as a result of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, people are dying. There are also Russian among the victims such as Lt Col Sergey Katkov, Mar (Res) Mikhail Khomenko and the wife of a serviceman, the 18-year-old Mariya Stanovskikh. They all had come to Sukhumi on vacation. Death found them on the territory of the Russian Air Defense Troops sanitorium. One of the projectiles launched from an Alazan launcher exploded directly in the ward... Wounded were Capt Sergey Kharitonov, Sr Lt Vyacheslav Kozlov and Capt Vladimir Stanovskikh (the husband of the deceased Mariya Stanovskikh), and Maksim Kostylkov, 17 years of age and the son of a serviceman.

As we were informed by Col Med Serv Viktor Bessmertnyy, in the morning of 17 August, the last 120 vacationers had departed from the Sukhumi vacation homes for Gudauta guarded by Russian airborne troops.

In Sukhumi, judging from the information, the looters and criminals still consider themselves the victors. There is only one consolation and that is that bullets do not whistle down the streets and shells are not exploding. But anyone can understand what a terrible picture this southern town presents packed at the peak of the vacation season with vacationers and then its territory is invaded by armed subunits of the Georgian Army. Five tanks, over 20 units of armor, artillery and more than 2,000 guardsmen in a single hour turned the peaceful city into a military firing range. They also attacked from the air. According to the data of the RIA, TWO BOMBS WERE DROPPED IN THE AREA OF THE AIRPORT.

We shall not repeat the details of the reasons which are certainly known to our readers for the armed action undertaken upon a decision of the Georgian State Council. The Georgian side feels that the main forces of the Zviadists have taken cover on the territory of Abkhazia and there was no other way to protect the rail lines. The Abkhazia Supreme Council has viewed the incursion as an occupation the aim of which is to destroy the Republic of Abkhazia and eliminate its sovereignty. As of now, one thing is perfectly obvious: the Georgia of Shevardnadze, like the Georgia of Gamsakhurdiya, cannot survive without violence, without bloodshed in settling its national territorial problems. Even the very operation of bringing troops into Sukhumi and as a whole into the territory of Abkhazia is reminescent in its military aspects to the invasion of Tskhinval by the Georgian Zviadist fighters in January 1991.

With all understanding for the difficult position of Eduard Shevardnadze who has been forced to oppose the unabating centers of terrorism by the Zviadist and at the same time control the "sore points" of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is difficult to agree with the need for such a massive military operation which would clearly involve victims. Nor could Tbilisi predict the response of the Abkhaz leadership and the republic's population which in the last year or two has experienced every sort of violation of sovereignty and every sort of pressure from the Georgian Center. All this leads one to the idea that the national guardsmen this time were to give a lesson in obedience not so much to the unbending supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdiya as to the Abkhaz Parliament headed by its leader Vladislav Ardzinba.

However, as has happened several times now, as soon as the flames broke out, it was Russia and its Army which were burned. On 14 August, as has been established, a

group of persons of Abkhaz nationality broke into the Russian military compound in Gudauta. Weapons were demanded under the threat of harm to the serviceman families. In fact, along with the plundering of the arsenal (about 1,000 guns were seized) there was a basic piracy with arson. The most brazen criminal act. And immediately in Tbilisi in front of the building of the Transcacasus MD, a crowd assembles with angry shouts against the Russian Army with "supplying the Abkhaz bandits with weapons." And somehow "in this context," on 16 August, the Deputy Chairman of the Georgia State Council Dzhaba Ioselivni, in speaking on the local television, announced that "among the members of the organized bands operating in the west of Georgia, there are also officers from the Russia Army." As to who these officers might be or were they in fact servicemen of the Russian Army, no proof whatsoever was offered. But the Georgian TV viewer received slanted information.

This time Russia is seemingly ready to demonstrate its complete recovery from the "1989 Tbilisi syndrome," when the fear of political hysteria has forced it to turn the other cheek, having had the first one hit. First of all, the Russian Minister of Defense, Army Gen Pavel Grachev in a telegram to Eduard Shevardnadze and the Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba, demanded the inviolability of the Russian troops stationed on the territory of Abkhazia. An evacuation of the vacationers at the Sukhumi vacation homes was effectively carried out. As we were informed by the Commander of the Airborne Troops, Col Gen Yevgeniy Podkolzin, on 16 August an airborne regiment was moved from Gyandzha to Gudauta (the commander of this unit is Lt Col Ye. Demin and the representative of the Airborne Troops is Maj Gen A. Sigutkin). Its task is to guard the facilities of the Russian Army, to provide aid to the serviceman families, to the hospitals and vacation homes, and to support the evacuation. On 17 August, the regiment was at full strength in Gudauta. There were no known incidents related to its appearance in the town.

The Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Adm Igor Kasatonov, told us that a detachment of ships and vessels of the fleet had been dispatched to Sukhumi in order to help anyone who wanted to leave this town which had suddenly become a frontline installation. Incidentally, this was the first action of the "combined fleet," and Adm Kasatonov felt it necessary to point out that the Ukrainian side found it "tough sledding" in making the decision and the providing of quick aid was almost bogged down in reaching agreements.

The life of the Russians who by the whim of fate have ended up in such a dangerous exchange of fire at present have attracted the attention of not only the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. A declaration of the Russian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] has been issued. It, in particular, states that some 4,324 persons have already been evacuated from the danger zone. But there is also a harsh note when it states that the Russian side, the MID announces, "will not...remain impassive when the life of Russian citizens is threatened and it will protect their safety and dignity."

Judging from the last information, a political solution of the conflict which has erupted is possible. We can only wish this for the Georgian and Abkhaz peoples. But the victims will not be brought back to life.

"While previously I doubted the correctness of the decision taken by us," stated Eduard Shevardnadze at a session of the State Council on 15 August, "but now I am more than certain that we made the correct step."

And so, the policy of Shevardnadze has opened the count for human victims.

14th Army Commander Effectively Deals with 'Third Force'

92UM1393B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Aug p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Col Vladimir Zhitarenko, from the Dniester Region, August: "The Barriers of Gen Lebed, or A Necessary Clarification for Understanding the Role of the 'Third Force" Operating in Bendery"]

[Text] Much has been written and said about the unpredictability and spontaneity of this force. Supposedly it sows death and destruction in the city, but no matter whom you ask—certainly a third is a third—and is not subordinate either to Chisinau or Tiraspol, and it does what it wants...

I began to have serious doubts about this in July when the truce agreement had already come into force, but mortar shelling in the town continued and began literally upon command after 2200 hours. It ended near morning by 0400 hours. The shelling was very accurate. I shared my doubts with the Commander of the 14th Army, Gen A. Lebed.

"Drive along our 16 posts set up in the city and you will be certain that your doubts are not ill-founded!"

It is usually felt that the 14th Army has intervened into the operations. How should such intervention be understood? If it was aimed at halting the bloodshed, then they intervened and in the most decisive manner. These posts are proof of this.

They have even been called "Lebed barriers." Until the very entry of the peace-keeping forces into the city, these barriers for an entire 10 days did not allow the opposing sides and—why should we not mention this—the "third force" linked to them, to use the full force of the weapons and the equipment. As they say, the barriers tied their hands.

Post No 7. This is by the Friendship Movie Theater. It was a a hotly-contested area. The houses are pockmarked by bullets and shells. As a result of the fire from the Dniester Republic forces. And from here the Moldovan

volunteers began their fire at the city center from mortars. There was a firing position by house No 132 on Kommunisticheskaya Street. With the onset of darkness they rolled the barrels up here and from the "fixed" point they fired successfully and accurately.

The commander of the 183d Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 14th Army put his armored personnel carrier and a group headed by Sr Lt O. Bash precisely at the "fixed" point. With the start of night, the mortar troops again rolled their weapons up here but they departed quickly as they were impeded by the proximity of the personnel carrier from the Russian Army.

During the following days, deep inside the very house No 132, the Moldovan volunteers armed a mortar and aimed the barrel at the Russian personnel carrier. But they were not able to frighten them off as the post stood silently but threateningly...

It was the others who took to their heels. In the presence of Russian servicemen, the edak [translation unknown] simply executed one of the volunteers, a certain Vasya, a Russian fellow, Valeriy Shevelev. They did not like, don't you see, the entries in his passport... Across the road, in house 127, lived Mikhail Sergeyevich Ponomarev and his father-in-law was an officer in the Russian Army. They carried out a pogrom in the house and began with desecrating the lieutenant's photographs.

Post No 5. This is at the intersection of Moskovskaya and Dzerzhinskiy Streets. On the one side the Cossacks have dug themselves in, while on the other, toward the maternity home, snipers moved up at night from a special police detachment [OPON]. There were not only automatic bursts but also the grenades were flying densely, lying unexploded on the grass. The officer in charge of the post, Sr Sgt Anatoliy Golovan advised me not to take a step to the right or left.

Post No 17 monitored the intersection of Dzherzhinskiy and Komsomolskaya Streets. Over there were the guardsmen and the militia and over here were the volunteers, the carabineers and the OPON. Every night it sounded like a fireworks show. The post member Pvt Aleksandr Valko was wounded by shrapnel. Both sides had more than enough ammunition. The officer in charge of the post, WO [praporshchik] Anatoliy Perev escorted me through the deserted classrooms of the School imeni A.S. Pushkin. The Moldovan side had been firing from the school windows as there were thousands of cartidges on the floor and scores of grenade rounds.

Post No 4. By the firehouse close to the railroad station. The police had taken shelter behind the brick walls from the fire of the Cossack formation, while the subordinates of the officer in charge of the post, Sr Lt Aleksandr Pinchukov, were positioned beneath these walls and every night the sky came alive in a sea of fire. In addition, the surrounding orchard had been mined. In my presence an inhabitant of Benerdy was blown up on a mine. The personnel of the post, even on this tiny heel of land which on all sides was surrounded by the black smoke of death, was able to hold out 10 days...

What does it mean "to hold out"?

The main thing, as has been said already, is to prevent aimed firing from the guns and mortars. And there were "fixed" firing positions not only near the Friendship Movie House, as according to the intelligence data of the 14th Army, these were in seven rayons of the town and the "Lebed barriers" were in front of all of them.

Secondly, it was essential with maximum reliability to establish which of the opposing sides was the first to open fire in order that the appropriate measures could be taken subsequently. The commander of the 14th Army stated these measures bluntly and loudly. They would be applied to all initiators of the firing. In this context we cannot help but mention the fate of the batallion of the Dniester Region Guard which was under the command of the lamentably well known Lt Col Yuriy Kostenko. The posts of the 14th Army repeatedly had recorded violations of the truce conditions by the batallion. It was sealed off and disarmed. Precisely by the subordinates of Gen Lebed.

In all of this, the posts in no instance should open fire themselves. What has this cost?

"The OPON forces were firing at us constantly, and the bullets flew overhead. Yesterday the post was approached by two of the MTLB [acronym unknown], and about an infantry platoon was preparing for the attack. They decided against this as they clearly knew what retaliatory measures would be undertaken..." This from the officer in charge of the post on Kosmonavtov Street, Lt Sergey Ivashinenko.

"A sniper from those garages over there fired at me. The bullet went through two gypsum-block partitions," said Sgt Yevgeniyi Tyunin from the post on top of the house on Leningradskaya Street. "But that was the only round as something frightened off the sniper..."

Now one can say what it was.

In the event of an attack on the posts or their shelling from the heavy weapons, the commander of the Russian Army has warned that he will use the divisional artillery ready to hit targets at any range. The commander of the southern wing of the Moldovan Army was also notified in no uncertain terms: his headquarters near Kaushan had been registered.

There they knew that Gen Lebed was not one to waste words.

Again and again I have tried to understand the meaning of those days in the life of Bendery. I leave to the international lawyers the possibility of analyzing the decision of the army commander directly or indirectly to intervene in the dramatic events. But from the viewpoint of simple logic, in my opinion, it is indisputable that the

death of many peaceful persons was prevented as well as the further destruction of the town's enterprises.

Moreover, a base has been prepared for the secure introduction of the tripartite peace-keeping forces into the conflict zone. At present many are seemingly amazed as the fire immediately died out with the introduction of these forces into Bendery. However, let us not forget that the fire was extinguished gradually. Over 10 entire days. By the 16 posts of the 14th Army. By their iron restraint, steadfastness and by their clear example: Look, we are not firing, and only in this way can peace and tranquility be established in this land!

Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed again assumed enormous responsibility. Again he appeared to many as a model of independence and an understanding of the situation here. Incidentally, neither the Dniester Republic nor the Moldovan side saw what happened as a notorious "violation of the neutrality of the Russian Army." Moreover, both sides did not protest when during the most difficult days Lebel put into action another six additional posts above the 16 posts agreed upon by them.

I am relating this not for the sake of stating an accomplished fact. I feel that the experience of the army commander can be of service to politicians and to the military in other "hot" regions, where as before blood is flowing and where a so-called "third force" bloodily makes itself felt.

It is not a question of how this force is called, rather it is important to "get a feeling for it." It is scarcely possible to do this without a clear understanding of its role and the roots which "feed it." Sufficient intelligence is essential. Also dependable men who are prepared to carry out the given mission, such as those the reader will see in the photo [not reproduced here]. This is the very post No 17 which had been "combed" by bullets...

Finally, this cannot be done without the courage of the person who takes a decision tested out in all regards and who does not retreat from it, but steadily implements it.

Bendery has proven this. By the experience of Gen Lebed.

UKRAINE

Official Denies Plan To Sell Varyag to China

92UM1400B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Aug 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Is the Varyag Being Sold or Not?"]

[Text] An expert of the Main Staff of the Russian Navy has denied a report in the Japanese press that Ukraine is willing to sell to China the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Varyag.

"Acquisition of a ship such as the Varyag is unreasonable for any state, even the richest," noted the expert. "Only Russia can afford to maintain heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers of the Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov and Varyag class, having created all the necessary elements of a coastal infrastructure and producing about 80 percent of their equipment, hardware, and weapon systems, including carrier-based aircraft and helicopters."

Military experts from China indeed did visit the Nikolayevsk Shipyards where the Varyag is located. "However, for the above reasons, things went no farther than inspecting the ship," the expert told an ITAR-TASS correspondent.

Nevertheless, the Japanese press continues to report otherwise. The Japanese newspaper SANKEI SHIMBUN reported yesterday that Ukraine still plans to sell the Varyag to China for $2.4 billion.

"China has already decided to purchase 24 Su-27 aircraft in Russia. With the acquisition of an aircraft carrier now, the might of the Chinese Navy will increase sharply," reports SANKEI SHIMBUN.

Pay Rates for Noncoms, Officers

92UM1412A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 13 Aug 92 p 1

[Decree No 420, Issued by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers at Kiev, Dated 28 July 1992 [in Ukrainian]: "On Increasing the Pay Rates for the Higher Ranks of Military-Service Personnel, and Those of Special Ranks From the Commissioned Officers"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers hereby **decrees** the following:

1. Beginning on 1 August, the higher ranks of the military-service enlisted personnel, and the special ranks from the commissioned officers shall be paid in accordance with Appendicies No 1 and No 2.

The indicated pay rates shall be implemented within the parameters of the budgetary allocations established for 1992.

2. It shall also be recognized that the following components take effect as of 1 August 1992: Paragraph Three, Point 2 of Decree No 100, issued by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and dated 20 February 1992, as well as Paragraph Three, Point 1 of Decree No 161, issued by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and dated 31 March 1992 on the partial pay rates of noncoms, with the exception of noncoms who have enlisted for a definite (fixed) period of service.

[Signed] V. Fokin, prime minister, Ukraine
V. Pekhota, minister, Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers

Appendix No 1 to Decree No 420, Issued by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, Dated 28 July 1992

Pay Scale for Noncoms and Officers

Rank	Pay Rate (karb/mo)
Junior Sergeant, Petty Officer 2nd Class	500
Sergeant, Petty Officer 1st Class	600
Senior Sergeant, Chief Petty Officer	700
Ranking NCO, Chief Ship's Petty Officer	800
Warrant Officer	1000
Senior Warrant Officer	1100
Junior Lieutenant	1500
Lieutenant	1700
Senior Lieutenant	1900
Captain, Captain-Lieutenant	2100
Major, Captain 3rd Rank	2300
Lieutenant Colonel, Captain 2nd Rank	2500
Colonel, Captain 1st Rank	2700
Major General, Rear Admiral	3200
Lieutenant General, Vice Admiral	3500
Colonel General, Admiral	3800
General of the Army	4100

With the exception of sergeants and senior military-service personnel in term-type service, the monetary remuneration shall be confirmed by the president of Ukraine.

[Signed] V. Pekhota, minister, Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers

Appendix No 2 to Decree No 420, Issued by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, Dated 28 July 1992

Pay Scale for Special Ranks of Command Staff in the Internal Affairs Organs

Special Rank	Pay Rate (karb/mo)
Junior Sergeant of Police, Junior Sergeant of Internal Service	500
Sergeant of Police, Sergeant of Internal Service	600
Senior Sergeant of Police, Senior Sergeant of Internal Service	700
Ranking NCO of Police, Ranking NCO of Internal Service	800
Warrant Officer of Police, Warrant Officer of Internal Service	1000
Senior Warrant Officer of Police, Senior Warrant Officer of Internal Service	1100
Junior Lieutenant of Police, Junior Lieutenant of Internal Service	1500
Lieutenant of Police, Lieutenant of Internal Service	1700
Senior Lieutenant of Police, Senior Lieutenant of Internal Service	1900
Captain of Police, Captain of Internal Service	2100
Major of Police, Major of Internal Service	2300
Lieutenant Colonel of Police, Lieutenant Colonel of Internal Service	2500
Colonel of Police, Colonel of Internal Service	2700
Major General of Police, Major General of Internal Service	3200
Lieutenant General of Police, Lieutenant General of Internal Service	3500
Colonel General of Internal Service	3800

[Signed] V. Pekhota, minister, Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers

Ukraine Officers Union Opposes Strengthening of Officer Assemblies

92UM1393D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Aug p 3

[Article by Vladimir Bogdanovskiy: "From Lvov: The Officer Assemblies Are Still Operating in the Carpathian MD, but the Ukrainian Officers Union Wants to Eliminate Them"]

[Text] The officer assembly has been held for the staff and headquarters of the Carpathian MD and soon the district officer assembly will be held. It is assumed that the officer assemblies will become permanent social organizations. But the Executive Committee of the Lvov Organization of the Ukrainian Officers Union has felt that the holding of such assemblies is nothing more than the "restoring of the structure of the former Imperial Army."

The published appeal to the officers of the Carpathian MD and to the citizens of Ukraine states that the resumption of the officer assemblies is a desire on the part of individual generals and officers and former political workers to exercise control and apply pressure to the officer community and to introduce a split and confusion. In the opinion of the Executive Committee, the initiative for holding the officer assemblies derives from the Committee on the Social Protection of Servicemen under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and which would like to have its own "pocket" organization.

The Executive Committee is being supported by the Deputy Representative of the Ukrainian President, Vera Lyaskovskaya. Incidentally, this is not surprising. At one time, when the position of the deputy chairman of the Lvov Oblast Council was eliminated, Vera Lyaskovskaya actually was unemployed, but coming to her defense was the...Ukrainian Officers Union. How could she not support the "loyal officers" now?! So, in her opinion, a decisive "no" must be said to the officer assemblies of the Carpathian MD.

BELARUS

Military's Anticorruption Drive Examined

92UN1980A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 35, 26 Aug 92 p 2

[Report by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staff correspondent for Belarus Anatoliy Kozlovich, Minsk: "Massive Cleansing of the Uniforms: The Republic of Belarus' Ministry of Defense Started a War on Corruption, and the Latter Wavered..."]

[Text] **A public war probably could have been avoided had not three lieutenant colonels showed up at the republican television offices with the horrible truth about financial and economic machinations in the ranks of the Red Banner Belarus Military District (now defunct). At first, the war was against these lieutenant colonels and their confederates. As it usually is, this war was a quiet, mean, and triumphant one that has thrown the truth-seekers out of the military ranks. But one cannot win a war against facts; the press widely spread them around.**

The newly created Belarus military department long maintained silence in the face of attacks by the press, and now finally the Ministry of Defense has officially acknowledged: "Despite the fact that money-grubbing, theft, fraud, and abuse of official position for the purpose of personal enrichment by certain generals and officers in the military acquired considerable dimensions, the law enforcement organs have been able to generally stabilize the situation and uncover many unlawful facts."

The republic Ministry of Defense is planning to "conduct before 15 September of this year certification of all officials in positions of responsibility for material values, to develop a statute on the material answerability for material damages inflicted, and to prohibit members of the military to participate in the activities of commercial organizations."

Criminal charges have been brought against 75 people. Eleven generals and officers, including Lieutenant General S. Rumyantsev, former commander of the Fifth Guard Tank Army, are slated to be transferred to reserves before the completion of the criminal investigation.

This will be a hard-fought war—provided, of course, it is not a fencing of words but rather a real war. It is of interest to know the person who has been appointed to lead the clean-up crusade. The name of one of the leaders is Major General V. Uskhopchik. Recollections come to mind: Vilnius...the television center... blood.... Yes, it is the same former commandant of the Vilnius garrison. He was harbored from the Lithuanians' wrath in Belarus, where he was given a division. Just recently Uskhopchik has been transferred to Bobruysk—to the army. Which brings one to the conclusion that the Ministry of Defense has no doubts about the honor of his own uniform.

BALTIC STATES

Commander Protests Government Military Service Time Limits

92UN1956B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Aug 92 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Estonia"]

[Text] The subunit commander of the rescue regiment in the Estonian Defense Forces, Tarmo Lepik, told correspondents that in the event that the republic government does not change its decision of 3 August on shortening the length of regular service in the Estonian Army to 12 months, his unit would begin a sit-down strike.

"In essence, the government's decision is logical, but in the current situation I personally am against it as such a decree should be drawn up in different legislative enactments. This decision cannot be given retroactive force, as otherwise the Army would remain without soldiers. I am also against releasing the young studying in VUZes from military service as this would lead to the establishing of a worker-peasant army," stated the Chief of the Main Staff of the Defense Forces, Col Ants Laaneots.

Col Laaneots said that there can be no question of any strikes in the Estonian Army.

CAUCASIAN STATES

13 Servicemen Killed in Georgia This Year

92UM1323D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jul 92 p 3

[Report under the rubric "NEGA Reports": "Georgia"]

[Text] During the first half of the year 13 servicemen have been killed and 14 servicemen or members of their families have been wounded on Georgian territory as a result of armed attacks.

Four of them died during the January events in Tbilisi, five in Gori, two in Tskhinvalskiy Rayon, and two more were attacked.

At the same time the district headquarters has reported that the number of attacks on servicemen in Georgia has dropped perceptibly from the 1991 level.

Turkey Denies Military Advisers in Azerbaijan

92UM1323E Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jul 92 p 1

[NEGA report: "Statement by Turkish Ambassador"]

[Text] Altan Karamanoglu, Turkey's ambassador to Azerbaijan, labeled as instigative statements by the Armenians that officers from the Turkish army took part on the side of the Azerbaijani armed forces in the combat operations in Nagorno-Karabakh.

"I repeat once again that there is not a single servicemen of the Turkish army in Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan's national self-defense forces," the Turkish ambassador stated at a meeting with journalists.

Azerbaijan Said To Be in Violation of Conventional Forces Treaty

92UM1400A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Aug 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Vladimir Mukhin, ARMIYA correspondent: "The Russian Army Is Hastily Abandoning Azerbaijan (But, Apparently, Not All Slavic Servicemen Will Arrive at the 'Promised Land'"]

[Text] Inspired by the Agreement on the Principles and Procedure for Implementing the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty signed on 15 May in Tashkent at a meeting of the heads of state of the CIS, Azerbaijan is concluding a "victorious offensive" on the Russian Army units stationed on its territory. The leadership of the Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense, ignoring the schedule for transferring combat equipment and arms of the Transcaucasian Military District that was agreed upon and designed for up to the end of 1995, has already in a "voluntary-forced" manner "privatized" from the Russian troops all units and subunits of the 295th and 23d motorized rifle divisions, the 23d Military Ship Repair Yard, the 14th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 60th Motorized Rifle Division, as well as all airfields, hospitals, organizations of quarters and utilities units and logistics, and the majority of depots with supplies and military technical equipment of the 4th Combined-Arms Army. To date, the republic's Ministry of Defense has transferred more than 230 tanks, about 300 armored transport vehicles (armored reconnaissance vehicles) and 330 infantry fighting vehicles, 175 artillery pieces, about 130 mortars, 33 Grad (GM-21) mounts, and nearly 2,000 machineguns.

All this is more than enough to talk about fulfillment by Azerbaijan and Russia of the understandings reached in Tashkent on conditions of dividing up part of the military inheritance of the former USSR. But stimulated by the war in Nargorno-Karabakh, local authorities and the national army are demanding the transfer of all combat equipment and arms of the Transcaucasian Military District stationed on the republic's territory. From all appearances, quite soon they will get possession of the majority of what the 75th and 60th motorized rifle divisions, for the time being under the subordination of the district, have in their possession. These divisions' level of manning with compulsory-service personnel is very low. For the most part, all the important installations are being guarded by officers. It is not likely that they will be able to use their own forces to load (say, aircraft) and move all the remaining "unprivatized" combat equipment and arms to Russia.

The continuing attacks by armed fighters, supply difficulties, and unrest associated with the evacuation of families give officers a sense of hopelessness. Ukraine and Belarus have already "taken away" from the Transcaucasian region all those wishing to leave for the homeland of their fellow countrymen. In essence, only Russians remain in the ranks of the 4th Army.

But before leaving for Russia, an officer must find a shipping container and send it for a considerable amount of money to some populated area where he has relatives or where he assumes he will serve. Personal property is sent by rail from Baku and several "civilized" cities over a long risky journey. Air bridges have been organized from Gyandzha and Nakhichevan. Hundreds of families are waiting for their turn, encamped under the muzzles of the Azeri fighters guarding the airfields. But at the airfields of Russia, they are not especially waiting for the military. Unloading again on the runways, the officers rush to search for containers to continue the "marathon to uncertainty."

All this sharply contrasts to what the "emissaries" from the Azeri army are promising the Russian officers to go over to the republic's armed forces (more accurately, the semblance of these forces). The terms of hire are most varied. One can sign a contract to serve in the national army for three months, one year, or longer. And one can be "recruited" as a tank gunner for only a week for "an operation" in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Or you can "work" for a month or two as part of combined officer crews. The "wages" are up to 50,000 rubles per month. Plus, if a contract is signed for participation "in combat operations" for a term of more than one year, they promise "to provide" an officer an apartment not only on the territory of Azerbaijan but also in other republics of the CIS.

It cannot be said that there are very many wishing to work in this manner, but it is not ruled out that if there is a delay in shipping officers' families back to Russia, the number of "volunteers" may increase. What will move them?

Here is how Colonel Yu. Khvostikov, personnel assistant of the 4th Army, commented on this situation: "People are in a desperate situation. If they are detained, they use blackmail, bribery, promises, and other means to force the officers to fight in Karabakh. And they are becoming outcasts in Russia and aliens here." Thus, back on 13 May, a commander of a reconnaissance company, Lieutenant A. Yermakov, deserted a guarded Russian troop installation near Baku on a tank with a full battle stowage. It is hard to say how many "dollars" he received for this, but it is known for certain that he was fatally wounded while participating in combat operations in Nagorno-Karabakh recently. The same fate befell Senior Lieutenant Levkovich and Major A. Elkin. They both left behind families with young children. But there will be no benefits from the Armed Forces of Russia for the orphans. You see, their dads were no longer servicemen in the Russian Army.

In just the last five months, 153 officers have deserted units of the 4th Army. Some left for home in search of a better lot. But some... If you consider that the 4th Army has a fairly large number (over 100) of officers' families who do not have in Russia even a temporary place to stay or even leave their things, it is not hard to presume that the Azeri Army has a pretty good potential for possible qualified military specialists (and maybe even cannon fodder—however you want to put it!).

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Provisions of Government Measures for 'Social Protection' of Servicemen Explained

92UM1399C Dushanbe NARODNAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by R. Atayev, military procurator: "What Are Servicemen's Rights to Housing"]

[Text] **R. Atayev, military procurator, gives a legal commentary on individual points of the Decree of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan "On Urgent Measures To Increase Social Protection of Servicemen and Individuals Discharged from Military Service," dated 20 May 1992.**

The need to explain this decree results from the numerous appeals to the military procuracy by servicemen and individuals discharged from military service. It involves housing issues. Thus, paragraph 4 gives city and rayon executive committees the right to transfer free of charge the ownership of occupied quarters in houses of the state and departmental housing fund to officer personnel, warrant officers, and extended-service military personnel who have served 20 calendar years or more; war veterans discharged from military service for age, illness, reduction in force, or limited state of health and having 20 or more calendar years of service; soldier-internationalists (including those presently on active duty); family members of servicemen who were killed or died as a result of wounds, shell-shock, serious injury, or service-related ailment.

The requirements of paragraph 4 of the decree also apply to reserve officers who have or had at the time of discharge from the army into the reserve 20 or more calendar years of service.

Tajikistan Sets Pay for Troops

92UM1399D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Aug 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Pay for Tajik Military"]

[Text] Tajikistan's Cabinet of Ministers has set the level of pay and allowances for servicemen: junior sergeant—500 rubles [R]; warrant officer—R1000; lieutenant—R1700; major—R2300; colonel—R2700; major-general—R3200; lieutenant-general—R3500; colonel-general—R3800.

Uzbek Minister of Defense Designated

92UM1381B Tashkent VATAN PAVAR in Russian 7 Jul 92 p 1

[Decree of the President of Uzbekistan on the Appointment of Comrade R.U. Akhmedov as Minister of Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan]

[Text] Comrade Rustam Urmanovich Akhmedov is appointed Minister of Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan and relieved of his duties as Minister for Defense Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Uzbekistan I. Karimov
Tashkent, 3 July 1992

Uzbeks Create Defense Ministry

92UM1381C Tashkent VATAN PAVAR in Russian 7 Jul 92 p 1

[Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Conversion of the Ministry for Defense Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan]

[Text] In accordance with the Law on Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan and as a result of the disbandment and cessation of operations of the Directorate of the Turkestan Military District:

1. The Ministry for Defense Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan is converted to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

2. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan is to pass a decree on this matter within a period of one month.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Uzbekistan I. Karimov
Tashkent
3 July 1992

Training of Officers in Uzbekistan Stresses Multi-National Army

92UM1381E Tashkent VATAN PAVAR in Russian 7 Jul 92 p 3

[Lesson plan under the rubric "A View of the Problem": "To Assist Instructors of Groups for Social-Humanitarian Studies for Officers and Warrant Officers"]

[Text] Subject: Taking Into Account Traditions, Customs and National Psychological Characteristics in the Service Process

Time: 2 hours

Method: classroom group

CLASS STRUCTURE

1. Introduction by instructor, 10-15 minutes

At the beginning of 1992 the formation of the armed forces was begun as an inseparable part of an independent state, one which determines its sovereignty and internal stability and the country's place and importance in the modern world. The decree passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Uzbekistan on 14 January 1992 is the legal basis for their existence.

The establishment of our own armed forces is helping us rid ourselves of old, obsolete forms and structures in the military system and of the extensive methods of their organizational development. The army is being renewed as a social institution and brought into conformity with the contemporary tasks involved in ensuring reliably security for the republic.

The objective process of a growth of national self-awareness on the part of many nationalities and ethnic groups and the passage of a number of legislative enactments by the sovereign states, including ours, on service by citizens within their territory, have produced a stable trend toward an increase in the number of servicemen of the indigenous nationality. Percentage-wise they now make up 90%. Almost all of the units and formations over which the Republic of Uzbekistan has assumed jurisdiction are **mononational**. (The instructor must underscore this reality of today in the organizational development of the armed forces.)

The ranks of the armed forces include fightingmen of other nationalities and ethnic groups residing in the Republic of Uzbekistan, however.

Facts: According to the Goskomstat [State Statistical Administration] the population of the Republic of Uzbekistan was 21.1 million at the beginning of 1992.

Fifty-nine percent of the population lives in rural areas; 41% in the cities. The annual rate of growth of the population is 2.7%. There are 14.9 million Uzbeks in the republic, 1.7 million Russians, 931,000 Tajiks, 808,000 Kazakhs, 467,000 Tatars, 411,000 Kara-Kalpaks, 188,000 Crimean Tatars, 282,000 Koreans, 176,000 Kirghiz, 154,000 Ukrainians, 123,000 Turkmens, 106,000 Turks, 65,000 Jews, 51,000 Armenians, 44,000 Azerbaijanis, and others. A total of 121 ethnic groups are represented in the republic.

When they discuss the multiethnicity of the military collectives, commanders and their deputies for personnel should therefore devote unweakened attention to the problem of solidifying the military collectives and to the thorough study of the traditions, customs, language and specific national psychological features of those peoples with representatives serving in the units and subunits. Experience has shown that success in resolving this problem depends upon their competence in matters of psychology and pedagogy. (It is further recommended that the instructor explain the individual national features of the mentality, the traditions and customs of those ethnic groups with members serving in the unit or subunit. We recommend that the pamphlet "The Customs, Traditions and Morals of Peoples of the Union Republics and Certain Recommendations for Taking These Into Account in Indoctrinational Praxis," published in 1989, be used for this purpose. We are careful to take a thoroughly considered, tactical, individual approach to the use of this material.)

When the instructor discusses the national-psychological features of the servicemen it is recommended that he pose the following problem to the students: Inadequate attention has been given to matters of ethnic and national psychology. At the present time an attempt is being made to "psychologize" the matter. Its resolution lies in great part in the socioeconomic sphere, however. The military press has printed and continues to print articles containing specific recommendations for commanders and their deputies for personnel based on the following premise: **Every serviceman possesses certain national psychological features, according to his ethnic linkage.** There are differences in the intellectual, emotional and volitional features stemming from this in fightingmen of different nationalities. Fightingmen of one nationality are more patient and reasonable and less given to explosive, emotional conduct. This applies mainly to individuals drafted from the Baltic region and Siberia. Those drafted from the Transcaucasus and Central Asia are more emotional and have a heightened sense of national self-awareness, pride and so forth. This brings up the question of who should be considered to be the agents of national and psychological features. Those with a certain nationality indicated on their passports? Or should place of induction not be taken into account? What about those who are ethnic Russians but were born and reside in Uzbekistan, as an example?

We believe that singling out such national features as a given is a common conception. We feel that a different approach would be more acceptable, based on the premise that **the specific features of the conduct and activities of people depend primarily upon the social conditions and the national traditions in which they are formed.** (During the time designated for discussion, it is recommended that the instructor discuss these two views and explain which of them is more appropriate today, and why.)

When discussing the traditions, customs and morals of servicemen of different nationalities, it must always be borne in mind that religion is having an increasing influence upon the young people today. Many of them have participated in unofficial organizations of various persuasions. **Fact:** At the present time there are around 350 unofficial associations and organizations with various orientations in the republic, most of which idealize the national morals, customs and culture of their people.

There are various religious organizations in Uzbekistan, including the Clerical Board of Mavera-un-Nahr Moslems, the Tashkent and Central Asian Diocesan Board of the Russian Orthodox Church, the All-Union Eparchial

Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists, the Eparchial Union of Seventh-Day Adventists of Uzbekistan, and others.

The board has two educational institutions for training clergymen for all the regions of the CIS (the Mir-Arab Medrese in the city of Bukhara and the Tashkent Islamic Institute). An Islamic newspaper, ISLOM NURI (Beam of Islam) has been published in the Republic of Uzbekistan since April 1990. (It is recommended that the instructor then discuss the main religious holidays and rites of the nationalities represented in the unit and problems of international relations as described in the monthly bulletin ISTORIYA, NRAVY, OBYCHAI, PROBLEMY MEZHNATSIONALYKH OTNOSHENIY, No. 4, 1989).

All of this sets for the commanders and their deputies for personnel the task of constantly and painstakingly studying the morals, language, customs and national-psychological features of those nations represented by servicemen in their units and subunits, and of performing purposeful indoctrinational work with them on this basis.

2. Moving on, it is valuable to present a scientific report on "The Psychological Structure of the Fightingman's Personality." (10-15 minutes).

Preparation of the report should be assigned to the best prepared and most experienced student.

3. The remainder of the class time should be devoted to discussion of the report, relating it to the life of the subunit, and to an exchange of experience in international communication.

The following topics should be covered:

—how the officers study the customs, traditions, national-psychological and moral qualities of their subordinates;

—reliance on the positive in the indoctrination of the fightingmen, the correct application of disciplinary praxis as an essential condition for success in the indoctrinational work performed with the personnel;

—the commander's authority and what it consists of; how the officer's personal example helps to solidify the military collective;

—how the commander and his deputy for personnel work with "positive" and "negative' leaders in the subunit;

—regulation order in the subunit, respectful treatments of colleagues as an essential condition for strengthening military discipline and achieving good results in the combat training;

—the work of selecting, training and indoctrinating junior commanders; stress on the NCO corps in the process of solidifying the military collective.

4. Summation of the class (5 minutes)

Note. This material is also recommended for use in the sociohumanitarian training of enlisted men during preparations for subject No. 11: "It is the duty of every serviceman to know the history, respect the traditions, morals and customs of peoples of Uzbekistan and to bear the title of defender of the homeland in a worthy manner."

Reading List

"Obychai, traditsii, nravy narodov soyuznykh respublik i nekotoryye rekomendatsii po ikh uchetu v vospitatelnoy praktike" [The Customs, Traditions and Morals of Peoples of the Union Republics and Certain Recommendations for Taking them Into Account in the Indoctrinational Praxis," 1989.

"Ofitser i vospitaniye kultury mezhnatsionalnogo obshcheniya v voinskom kolletive" [The Officer and Indoctrination in the Culture of International Communication in the Military Collective], 1989.

"Religious Rites and Holidays" in YEZHEMESYACHNYY BYULLETEN, No. 4, 1989.

"Voyennaya pedagogika i psikhologiya" [military Pedagogy and psychology], Voyenizdat, 1986.

VOYENNAYA MYSL, No 1, 1990.llg

Personnel Section of Ministry for Defense Affairs of Republic of Uzbekistan

Uzbek Personnel Officers on Combat Readiness

92UM1381D Tashkent VATAN PAVAR in Russian 24 Jul 92 p 1

[Report: "Priority—to the Strengthening of Military Discipline"]

[Text] **The personnel section of the Ministry for Defense Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan conducted a conference of deputy unit commanders for personnel of the Tashkent and Chirchik garrisons. They discussed a broad range of issues in all areas of the work and defined priority tasks for the further strengthening of military discipline.**

Speaking at the conference were Lt Col A. Rashidov, deputy minister of defense for personnel, Col F. Bakin, section chief, and section officers L. Makhmudov, A. Mirzoyev, D. Panaret and R. Garayev.

It was indicated at the conference that maintaining the combat readiness and fighting efficiency at a level providing protection of the southern CIS borders within the borders of the Republic of Uzbekistan should be regarded as the main task in the summer training of the personnel.

All of this work must be conducted according to a plan. Each unit and separate battalion must have a long-term plan (six months), and a plan for strengthening military

discipline (six months). Each battalion and company must have a monthly work plan. The emphasis should be on individual indoctrinational work with all categories of personnel.

It is recommended that the following be reflected in the long-term plan:

—the implementation of measures to ensure social and legal protection for servicemen and their families;

—measures to keep the personnel at a high moral and psychological level and to ensure fulfillment of the tasks involved in maintaining combat readiness and combat training;

—activities devoted to information and communication with state and public agencies;

—culture and leisure-time activities;

—work to be performed with the personnel.

The public-political work must be conducted in strict accordance with the order issued by the Minister for Defense Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan on 10 February 1992. It is recommended that the study of the state language of the Republic of Uzbekistan be included within the hours allocated for work with the officer corps.

The first hour of classes for the enlisted men must be devoted to the study of the language of international communication.

Methods recommendations and plans will be printed up for all of the subjects in the social-humane training at the Ministry for Defense Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In connection with this it is recommended that all deputy unit commanders for personnel and heads of groups for social-humane training conduct extensive explanatory work toward arrangements for additional subscriptions to the newspaper for the second half of 1992.

The mastering of the next level of military skills must be monitored constantly. Unjustifiable delays must be ruled out.

Lt Col A. Kazachek addressed the conference on the strengthening of military discipline.

Uzbekistan Borders with Afghanistan Increasingly Violated

92UM1399A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by Valentin Astafyev: "From Termez: Border Guards Engage in Fighting Increasingly Often"]

[Text] It seems we have already begun to become accustomed to the constant violations of the Tajik-Afghan border. But as is reported from the Public Relations Center of the National Security Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan, incidents of violations of Uzbekistan's state border on the Amudarya River have become more frequent. Basically, the purpose of these violations is to cut down trees, hunt, procure licorice on the territory of off-limit islands of Uzbekistan, and also steal fuel and lubricants, spare parts, and personal items of residents of the republic working at national economic installations beyond the line of engineering and technical structures of the Border Troops.

The leadership of the Border Troops of the Republic of Uzbekistan have repeatedly raised the issue before the representatives of Afghanistan that the violations of Uzbekistan's border are increasing and being committed by armed people who use their weapons against the border guards increasingly often. However, the administration of the neighboring side has been unable to take the necessary steps to normalize the border situation. The violations have not stopped, and the violators' actions have taken on an organized and more harsh nature.

Thus, at 1840 hours local on 5 August, in full view of the border guard detachment, a group of five people armed with assault rifles violated the border of the Republic of Uzbekistan after conducting preliminary reconnaissance of one of the national economic installations. In response to a warning by the border guards, the violators opened fire on them from two machineguns on a nearby island. Forced to engage in battle, the border guards destroyed the five violators and suppressed the fire positions of their accomplices. The border guards did not have any losses.

Military School Opens in Uzbekistan

92UM1393E Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Aug p 3

[Article from ITAR—TASS: "From Fergana: The First Military School Is Opened in Uzbekistan"]

[Text] Yesterday's eighth graders have crossed the threshold of the first military school [lyceum] in Uzbekistan. It has been been established in Fergana on the basis of the former republic special boarding school for a thorough study of the Russian language and increased military physical culture training. At present the students will master Arabic and English. Having obtained a secondary education, the students will continue training in the military VUZes of the republic and the CIS nations and they will become a reserve officer corps for the Uzbekistan National Guard.

Preference in admission to the school is to be given to orphans and to students with a good knowledge of English. There are also advantages for fellows from rural localities and members of large families.

MOLDOVA

Leader of 'Third Force' in Dniester Killed in Custody

92UM1323F Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Jul 92 p 3

[Report under the rubric "Moldova"; Moldova-Press-RIA-NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: "The Murder of Colonel Kostenko"]

[Text] **An arrested battalion commander of the Dniester Guard has died under unexplained circumstances.**

Moldova-Press reports that around 16:00 hours Yuriy Kostenko, under arrest in the building housing the Tiraspol city police (under Dniester region authorities) was killed under unexplained circumstances. It was previously explained that Colonel Kostenko, commander of a battalion of the Smirnov Guard in Bendery, had opened fire on Moldovan police formations, the Dniester region guards and civilian residents.

The report states that on Sunday (the day before the murder) Colonel Kostenko made the following statement at a meeting with 14th Army leaders and journalists: "I will tell everything in court pertaining to my actions, and it will become clear to the judges that I was only partly to blame for everything which was done. I was only following orders from superiors." Moldova-Press officials have reported that there is a taped recording of Kostenko's statement. Boris Luchik, acting procurator for the Dniester Republic, confirmed the facts of the murder.

At the present time 40 more of Kostenko's subordinates are jailed.

The RIA has reported certain details of the murder. According to Boris Luchik, during the night of 16 July Colonel Vladimir Bogdanov, Tiraspol police chief, turned Colonel Kostenko over "to one of the law-enforcement agencies" for an expert investigation. This was done without the consent of the procurator's office. From all indications the vehicle in which Kostenko was traveling was shelled by unknown persons. Two of Kostenko's military escorts were wounded. A body, assumed to be that of Kostenko, was found later in the burned vehicle.

Boris Luchik also reported that Kostenko had beaten, tortured and personally shot and killed both policemen and his own subordinates, systematically ignoring orders from his command element. Following his arrest more than 2 million rubles worth of perfumes, footwear and other items clearly from cooperative stores were found in one of his "official apartments."

Weapons Proliferate as a Result of Fighting in 'Hot Spots'

92UM1382B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent Vadim Ogurtsov: "Explosion at a Discotheque"]

[Text] Things were going along as usual at the discotheque in Azov. One simple melody followed another. In fact, though, no one was interested in any musical refinements. At the fateful moment the discotheque was catching its breath with half-hearted conversations, promising glances, uncouth jokes and the usual showing-off for one another. Suddenly there was a blast, someone screamed, and people leapt away from a spot where bodies lay writhing. Eight people were wounded, two of them seriously, and six had to be hospitalized.

An investigation showed that a 12-year-old minor had tried to enter the discotheque. He called himself a Cossack and boasted that he was a "Dniester man." When his peers failed to take him seriously, he left, apparently had another nip for extra "heroism" and returned with a pistol and a grenade. Without any talk he removed the pin and tossed the grenade into the crowd of youth standing around.

Incidents involving weapons brought in from the Dniester region are becoming more and more frequent. In Morozovsk a Cossack tossed a grenade into the military commissariat. Another was explaining how one operates, when he killed himself and wounded a comrade. A third sold a pistol and was killed by that very same weapon soon thereafter.

Despite the large number of "souvenir firearms" confiscated by the police, the trade in them continues. Furthermore, while protesting against the "completely unbridled Caucasians," the Cossacks frequently sell their Moldovan trophies precisely to them, since the former pay without any bargaining. All of this is in a situation in which Cossack groups are insisting that they be officially authorized to carry firearms. The oblast ataman directorate of the Don Army is maintaining an impervious silence on the matter. As though it does not bear responsibility for the tragedies occurring in the "military-like amusements" of the Cossack youth.

ARMS TRADE

Taiwan Unlikely To Take Up MiG-29 Offer

PM2708152192 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Aug 92 p 3

[Report by A. Kabannikov: "Taiwan Lost in Contemplation of MiG's"]

[Text] Beijing—Reports have appeared in the Taiwanese press that Russia has offered Taipei 540 MiG-29 fighters. In the words of the local UNITED EVENING NEWS, these aircraft were originally designed for sale to Iraq.

Taiwan has been trying for decades to restore its military air forces.

It is possible that Russia, experiencing a severe shortage of hard currency, has no time to consider the political consequences. It cannot be ruled out either that Taipei needed the MiG scandal simply to shake up its indecisive allies. Disappointed by the hesitations of the United States, Taiwan turned to France, offering to buy 120 "Mirages" for $7.2 billion. Enchanted by this sum, but also looking over their shoulders at China, the French have been conducting debates over this deal for several months already. Impatient Taipei has threatened to buy hardware from Israel. And now it has presented the French with a new competitor—Moscow. It would appear that MiG's would accelerate the modernization of the Taiwanese Armed Forces, but all the signs suggest that this will not benefit Russia. For the chairman of the Taiwan Military Command Authority has stated that Taiwan is unlikely to respond to Russia's offer.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Col-Gen Galkin on Conversion, Problems of Armor Directorate

92UM1361A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian No 89 (403), 9 May 92 p 3

[Interview with Colonel-General A.A. Galkin, chief of the Main Armor Directorate of the CIS armed forces, by Ruslan Lynev: "Tanks: Conversion and Problems"]

[Text] **I spoke with Colonel-General A.A. Galkin, chief of the Main Armor Directorate of the CIS armed forces, about problems of the conversion in tank building and about prospects for the repair or salvaging of old tanks.**

Anyone who would expect the interviewee to be an intimidating, somber figure, as befitting the position, would be mistaken. The general is athletic and youthful. He speaks with confidence and to the point. Personally, I found him to be simply charming.

I began our interview by mentioning the fact that several years ago IZVESTIYA had carried a photograph of two women with gas cutting torches cutting up the hull of a tank, preparing it for its final journey, so to speak, to the furnace. The author of this article attempted to make out in the brief caption to the photograph large prospects for the civilian employment of tanks; in quarries, in lumber procurement operations, for extinguishing fires, in geological surveys. And it is simply impossible to get to the oil and gas of Siberia and the North without special vehicles.

[Galkin] All of that is valid. It is far more complex, however.

In 1989 our nation initiated a unilateral reduction of 10,000 tanks. This proved to be difficult, however. Why? Because the technical and organizational aspects proved to be more difficult than it all appeared on paper. The technology for cutting up tanks and other equipment into parts of the needed sizes was simply lacking. In addition, cutting requires oxygen, acetylene and special areas. In short, substantial outlays. Who should bear these costs? Who should handle the matter in general? That has still not been determined.

We therefore on our own asked the Leningrad Scientific Institute of Transport Equipment, the Moscow Scientific Research Institute of Steel and the Academy imeni Dzherzhinskiy to develop less labor-intensive methods of cutting up the equipment—specifically, a line-guided blast. The blasting method proved to be far more effective than cutting. It requires special sites, however, which are presently being set up. Once again, this takes time and money. We are dealing not with dozens but thousands of tanks, after all.

[Lynev] Why not find a buyer abroad or in our own economic structures and let them have the headache?

[Galkin] We tried to sell them. We were immediately accused of weakening our defenses—and by those who had called upon us to sell them just before that. I have to cite the following example. There was a considerable quantity of tracks and mine-clearing attachments for the old S-2 and S-3 tanks in Kaliningrad Oblast. We had no use for them. They are not even accepted for the furnace because of their high manganese content. We had barely prepared them to be sold, when the Vremya program tore us to bits for being wasteful. I telephoned Nenashev, explained things and told him that we had a license. He said that he understood, that there would be an apology. We waited for the apology, but instead TsT [Central Television] dealt us another blow a month later. We do not need that.

If the equipment is sold to businessmen, it will end up abroad—and at the price of scrap metal. For one thing, we have instructions from Russian President B. Yeltsin that armor steel is not to go abroad. In the second place, how can we send even scrap metal abroad, when our metallurgical plants are about to come to a halt at any time for lack of it. No, this matter has to be arranged in a more solid manner.

[Lynev] It would be difficult to disagree with that.

I once had a conversation with a Western economist, a former fellow countryman of ours, who explained that the higher level of our defense industry could not "pull" all of the other sectors up to a decent level, since, he alleged, in the technical respect it lags far behind the world level, especially the American level, a fact made particularly evident by the fighting in the Near East.

[Galkin] I think that the person with whom you spoke was not entirely in the know. In fact, he was not in the know at all. Permit me to cite the most recent example. Comparative tests of the infantry combat vehicles of the world's leading nations were recently conducted in the Near East. The tests demonstrated that our BMPs [combat infantry vehicles] were superior, and this was acknowledged by everyone.

[Lynev] But did some of the countries not submit obviously obsolete and cheap equipment?

[Galkin] Yes, some did. They even submitted equipment from the '50s, and they only lost prestige as leading tank-building nations as a result. On the other hand, I can give you an example from the Persian Gulf. Husayn had our 20- or 30-year-old tanks. The Americans sent their latest models. Despite this, were there battles in which our tanks lost? There were not. Available information shows that our tanks in Syria's armed forces repeatedly executed long marches of up to 1,500 km without breakdowns or malfunctions. The Americans, however, who were closer to the theater of military operations, had to deploy an entire system for repairing their equipment, which was not adapted for operating in the high temperatures and dust, and this put their gas-turbine engines out of action.

With respect to our modern tanks, they are better protected against guided projectiles and can destroy targets at distances of 4-5 km, whereas those of our former enemies do not have this kind of weapons. Is their engine more powerful? Yes, but ours are equal with respect to specific power per ton of weight. Everyone knows that, including the Americans. Our customers know it, of course.

Our tank building always developed on its own path, outstripping world development. Our tanks began to be equipped with automatic loaders and guided weapons back in the '70s. History has validated the technical decisions chosen. The NATO nations are now being forced to do these things, but with a lag of 25 years. I must state as confirmation of this the fact that the Western world has not reduced its outlays for developing tanks for the year 2000 by a single cent. Neither tank exports nor mobilizational capabilities have been reduced at all. It is the same for the Americans as it was five years ago, 80,000 tanks a year; for NATO as a whole, 110,000. And this in a situation in which NATO has been preserved, as it were, while the Warsaw Pact no longer exists.

Where we do indeed lag behind the West in tank design is the creation of comfort for the crews. Ours do not have air conditioners, and foreign buyers have to add an air-conditioning system to our tanks. We too are presently working on this.

[Lynev] And what about the conversion in light of what you have said?

[Galkin] Large-scale conversion was planned for this troop arm back then, three years ago, and this was set forth in a government decree. It involved a dozen and a half branches. Lumber procurers, gas- and oil-industry workers, fire fighters, geologists and others announced that they were prepared to buy. The cumbersome system of ordering assembly parts for the future civilian tanks began to operate through Sovmin [Council of Ministers], MOP [Ministry of Defense industry] and Gosplan. But where are that Sovmin, MOP and Gosplan today? Where is that system—albeit cumbersome, but at least producing some kind of results? What was set up to replace them?

Our designers have already developed and industry has mastered the production of 16 civilian models. They all have derated engines, which increases their engine life. The armor has been removed from all of them, of course. They have been converted into a prime mover and a vehicle which can extinguish fires in gas and oil wells with a stream through a special nozzle. There are BTRs [infantry combat vehicles] for cash-collecting agents and mobile electric-power plants. There are models which make it easy to repair LEPs [electric power lines] in difficult terrain. There are special vehicles for clearing away rubble from disasters on rail lines. After Chernobyl we built a system of machines which could have helped localize the effects of the accident. Some of these models have been displayed at the VDNKh [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy]. They evoked interest also at an exhibition in Bologna, Italy.

What does this interest promise? On the world market 160,000 dollars U.S. are offered for a BTR converted from a combat to a special vehicle. Plus paying for servicing. Converted to money/weight, this amounts to 5,000-7,000 dollars per ton, which is less expensive than specialized equipment like the famous Caterpillars, but still a considerable amount of money.

It is true that there is no Sovmin, Gosplan or MOP today. There are concerns, associations and departments, however. The tank-building enterprises are establishing direct ties with them, and yesterday's tanks are acquiring new specialties there. The main thing, however, is the fact that the armor directorate is helping them find clients. Interestingly, three years ago the heads of the branches generously indicated orders for 12,000 of the converted vehicles. The real number turned out to be far more modest. While the combined order is 1,500 machines this year, it will exceed 2,000 this very next year. That is a real order, though. Backed by real money. And our telephone, 296-43-03, is never silent. Unfortunately, the money acquired from foreign sales cannot be used by the GBTU [Main Armor Directorate] or the CIS

armed forces for the technical development and retooling of tank repair enterprises of the Russian Federation, for resolving social and cultural problems and improving living conditions or for paying incentives to their workers.

As far as the tank-repair plants are concerned, not one of them has shut down today precisely because of the revenues from the conversion. In addition to the new, civilian "tanks," the plants are producing dacha cabins, garages, tools, rubber items for Zhigulis and the equipment for automatic brick-production lines.

Thanks to the conversion, we have been able to maintain both the collectives and military production at the proper level. We have established subsidiary farms and stores. We have experienced no loss of workers anywhere in the defense industry. It has been totally self-supporting since 1988. We spent a year and a half preparing for the transition. Economic training was arranged for all the directors and chief specialists.

At this point it occurred to me that our civilian structures could learn some new approaches in life from the military.

But let us not delude ourselves. In general, the military are restructuring just like everyone else. The conversion frequently proceeds without any visible program and is limited to the establishment of new structures. A Center for Enforcing the Fulfillment of Agreements has been set up within the general-purpose forces, for example, although under the Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe the GBTU handles the practical problems involved in the elimination and salvaging of armored equipment, just as other client directorates of the armed forces handle these matters for other kinds of weapons and equipment.

The general has two sons. One of them has followed his heritage and serves as an officer in the tank troops. The other, the youngest, is still in school. He is a staunch pacifist and wants to become a lawyer or an economist.

But that is another subject.... We shall end the interview on a note which I cannot call joyful, but I can say that hope of improvement is better than the burden of the past.

Ukrainian Machine-Building Minister Antonov interviewed

92UM1362A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 23 Jun 92 p 2

[Interview with Viktor Ivanovich Antonov, Ukrainian minister of machine building, the military-industrial complex and conversion, by correspondent Yuriy Kornev under the rubric "The Military-Industrial Complex in the Prism of Economics and Politics": "On Conversion, on the Times, on Himself"]

[Text] **An era consists of the people who personify it. One of the most powerful empires in human history, the USSR, has collapsed like a house of cards. One of the Soviet Union's greatest achievements still lives, however. The military-industrial complex. All of the best things the nation had to offer—people, technology, land, resources, scientific capability—were devoted to it. They did not spare the funds to "protect the conquests of Great October." People did not have enough to eat, lived in communal flats, dressed in whatever they could find, but they "strengthened the nation's defense."**

Let us be honest: the VPK [military-industrial complex] of the former Soviet Union did not just frighten (and still frightens) the entire world. It made an enormous contribution to the destruction of fascism by peoples of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. It forced the West to seek new approaches to the fate of the world.

Nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the space program and exploration of the ocean depths, Sergey Korolev, Andrey Sakharov, Oskar Paton and Oleg Antonov.... These also represent the VPK.

Today 14 independent states occupy one sixth of the planet. Ukraine has the second largest military industry after Russia. And one of the brightest "stars" in our VPK is Viktor Antonov. Let us hear what this well-known organizer of the defense industry, scientist, holder of the State Prize and now a minister, has to say.

[Kornev] Viktor Ivanovich, what does Ukraine's VPK consist of?

[Antonov] It has 700 plants and more than a million highly skilled workers, engineers and technicians. We have modern machine tools, equipment and technologies. We build missiles and space equipment, aircraft and ships. We produce equipment for radio reconnaissance and radio counteraction, shells, all sorts of liquid and solid fuels, and a great deal more. This is the former VPK. Now these are plants of Ukraine, which produce military equipment wholly or in part.

[Kornev] In the past that would have been considered a very important inheritance. Today it is just the opposite. What are we to do with this enormous treasure, which has now become a heavy, frequently unneeded burden?

[Antonov] I shall answer your question with a question. What are we to do, for example, with a destroyer on whose construction 800 million rubles has already been spent and which will cost another several billion rubles to complete within the next few years—and this at current prices? Add to this the problems of materials and equipment supply and manning in a situation of an economy out of balance, and disintegrating economic ties between our shipbuilding plant and 2,500 enterprises of the former USSR. The only possible decision was made: to salvage the unfinished ship—that is, to cut it up for scrap. It was necessary to salvage the ship also because our docks are occupied by unfinished ships and there is nowhere to start the construction of civilian vessels. The plants have to be converted to civilian production. They have to build dry-cargo ships, trawlers, ships for hauling passenger cars and container ships. At

other plants we shall build patrol boats, small frigates and hydrofoils for guarding the coastline.

[Kornev] Are there any figures for how much the conversion of Ukraine's VPK to civilian production will cost?

[Antonov] We need to spend 140 million rubles for this purpose in 1992. Due to a lack of funds, however, we plan to spend only 30 million. What is this money being spent on? Primarily on the social needs of the workers: wages, retraining and advanced training, benefits and social services. After that, it will go for writing off goods, unfinished production and finished products which cannot be used for civilian purposes. Finally, for the most important purpose of the restructuring: the respecializing of military industry for the production of consumer goods. These figures do not include the cost of converting scientific organizations which service the VPK to the development of civilian projects. The ministry has already worked out 216 national programs.

Assistance from the capitalist nations is one possible source of financing of the conversion. I believe that we have a right to expect that. Did the USA not call upon us over the years to disarm and reduce the level of military confrontation? Now we have begun to do that. I believe that the halting of the arms race in the former USSR freed billions of dollars in the USA alone, and some of that could be shared with the CIS.

[Kornev] Overnight Ukraine became a world power with a huge VPK. Three years or so ago it seemed to us that it would be very easy to make frying pans instead of spaceships. We have now seen that this is not so. But perhaps it would be better for Ukraine to continue producing weapons and sell them abroad? Perhaps it would be better to sell weapons and buy frying pans with the proceeds?

[Antonov] We are a civilized state, and it is somehow not fitting for us to engage directly in the business of war.

[Kornev] But all civilized nations do this, even though they consider themselves to be humane.

[Antonov] Yes, that is true. And I feel that in the case of a country such as India, which the former Soviet Union traditionally provided with sets of military equipment, including naval ships with all the "trimmings," Ukraine should continue the tradition for those kinds of equipment previously produced at its plants. There is a proposal from China to produce certain spare parts for the old equipment. And we shall do that. We shall not build an economy and business on the basis of military production, however. That is one thing. In the second place, this is the most modern area of the former USSR's military industry with respect to equipment level, recently constructed fixed capital, skilled workers and engineers. We therefore feel that they should be used for manufacturing equipment and putting more goods into the market. This is our most important task.

[Kornev] But this task was also set for the initial period of the restructuring. The conversion went nowhere with this concept, however, even though M. Gorbachev had hoped very much that this would make it possible rapidly to saturate the market with various goods.

[Antonov] Yes, but no one was reducing outlays on the army in the process. Now, when we have seen that for one ruble of wages we receive 10 kopecks worth of consumer goods for the market, that inflation is rising while production volumes drop, we understand more acutely that without backing the ruble or a future grivna with commodities, any sort of improvement of the economy is out of the question. If we do not do this, life will simply come to a halt.

[Kornev] What can you say about prospects for joint-stock ventures and privatization of the defense branches?

[Antonov] More than half of 700 Ukrainian enterprises can be privatized. Not all of them, however. For the foreseeable future I see such plants as the Arsenal in Kiev and the Yuzhmash in Dnepropetrovsk as state enterprises if there are units in the Ukrainian armed forces outfitted with our military equipment. We have many radioelectronic plants which could be privatized today. Plants of the former Ministry of Food-Processing Equipment and Light Industry which became a part of the VPK could be sold to private parties right now.

[Kornev] What is the future of your ministry? Does it plan to become some sort of corporation handling the VPK and conversion?

[Antonov] I have no direct influence upon or relationship to industry today. Our ministry is purely a state agency, which performs three tasks: restructuring of the branch, filling state orders for military equipment and coordinating the national program for the technical reequipment of other branches—metallurgy, the APK [agro-industrial complex] and public health. But all of this is to be effected by means of economic levers: taxes, credit rates, financing for science out of the budget. I neither appoint nor remove directors, nor do I provide the materials. And if associations are formed—if four plants join together to manufacture a modern tractor, for example—they are doing it for themselves.

[Kornev] Viktor Ivanovich, in your opinion when will Ukraine's VPK begin to produce a real return for the republic's civilian population?

[Antonov] I believe that we should feel the effects of the first moves this year. We plan to increase consumer goods production by a third. We plan to increase considerably the output of medical equipment, equipment for the agro-industrial complex and household appliances.

We have concluded agreements with South Korea, Germany and Italy. We need initial capital in dollars right now, and we do not have it. The Topaz plant in Donetsk

has mastered the production of video tape-recorders. It needs 48 million dollars, and it will produce almost a half-billion rubles worth. It will subsequently achieve a volume of more than 2 billion rubles. It needs the proper equipment, though, but does not have that amount in currency.

[Kornev] Then what kind of conversion is possible with the influence of the dollar?

[Antonov] If India, as an example, does in fact purchase spare parts and components from us for weapons it has already bought, we can use these funds to acquire part of the needed equipment. There is also the export program and the possibility of obtaining foreign loans for our business plans.

[Kornev] Are talks underway with the former CEMA [Council for Economic Mutual Assistance] countries on our providing them with weapons in exchange for their convertible currency or for dollar?

[Antonov] There are proposals, but we have not gotten around directly to these matters.

[Kornev] Are there concrete plans for Western nations to take part in the conversion of Ukraine's VPK?

[Antonov] There is an International Fund for Conversion of the Former USSR. It was co-founded by the U.S. Pension Fund, General Motors and other large companies. This fund is considering our proposals for loans for mastering production of the TU-334 aircraft at the Kiev Aviation Plant to be sold on the world market. This aircraft can carry 100 passengers and has a range of 2,500 km. It is precisely the aircraft which the world market lacks.

This fund also plans to allocate 300 million dollars for the development of a ceramic engine by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The program is directed by Academician F.I. Trefilov. In addition, we submitted another 15 proposals to the fund for inventions and innovations which do not exist in the world market.

There are some interesting proposals in shipbuilding. A big financier named Rappoport from Switzerland and the Pepisco company want to help convert our wharfs and then sell their products jointly. There are interesting proposals from the EEC and business circles in the FRG, Canada, Australia and other countries. There is a lot of interest, and we are therefore considering these proposals on a competitive basis.

[Kornev] Do you not think that people in the west are talking so much about conversion because they fear competition in arms production from the CIS states?

[Antonov] That applies not just to military equipment but to the economy in general. They are apprehensive. We could compete successfully right today in the civilian space arena, sending up commercial satellites. We do see clear opposition from the Western market in this area, however. We shall not soon succeed in entering the world market with our missiles and other capabilities.

[Kornev] Viktor Ivanovich, has there been discussion with the CIS states regarding Ukraine's becoming an arms supplier for them? Whether or not they want that sort of thing in Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and the Baltic area, for now it is more profitable for Ukraine to buy weapons from Russia than in the West.

[Antonov] I want to stress once again the fact that it is not in our plans to sell weapons to any aggressive country. The former republics of the USSR are a different matter. This is reasonable and moral. We need to retain our overall VPK. Not the entire system, of course, but in some reduced form. This was discussed at the latest meeting of heads of CIS states held in Kiev on 20 March of this year. An economic agreement between Ukraine and Russia was signed at the ministerial level at the beginning of April.

Ukraine's institutes and plants have created some unique military systems. Ukraine will not need many of them, since we have announced that we are eliminating nuclear missiles. They will be used in Russia. Our republic does not produce machine guns, semi-automatic rifles, carbines or pistols, however. And these are essential to the Ukrainian army, the National Guard and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. We could acquire them from Russia.

[Kornev] And does Ukraine make overcoats, service blouses and footwear?

[Antonov] It did produce all of this. But the cloth and other materials were provided by Russia.

[Kornev] Have you calculated how much it will cost to replace the insignia on the shoulder-boards and the military uniform with the symbols of the Ukrainian army?

[Antonov] It is going to cost a lot. We have not dealt with this matter in our ministry.

[Kornev] You have great prestige and extensive ties as organizer of the military industry in all the former republics of the former USSR. Are you using this to the benefit of Ukraine?

[Antonov] Yes. I have discussed these matters more than once with S. Shakhrayev, who was responsible for matters pertaining to the VPK in President Yeltsin's administration, with Vice Premier Ye. Gaydar and Russia's Minister of Industry V. Titkin. The latter and I signed an agreement on scientific research work and industrial production on 7 April.

[Kornev] In Russia they are reacting painfully to the possibility that Ukraine might purchase weapons in the West. Is this a real problem or are some politicians using it to exacerbate relations with Russia?

[Antonov] I believe it is the latter. Personally, unhealthy political relations with Russia do not appeal to me. More than once high-ranking Russian officials have said unpleasant things about Ukraine. We then have to smooth things out at the middle state level. I have the feeling that my Russian colleagues also dislike this kind of emotional outbursts. With respect to your question, Ukraine will buy small arms from Russia but is interested in setting up its own production. I believe that it is far more profitable than buying them in Czechoslovakia, as an example. This depends upon the existence of good political and economic relations between the states, of course.

Zhukovskiy Airshow Reviewed

Aircraft on View at Exhibition

92UM1407A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Aug 92 p 1

[Article by Sergey Prokopenko and Aleksandr Manushkin: "The First Airshow at Zhukovskiy—Hopefully Not the Last"]

[Text] "In sum, all this is Russia," the words uttered by Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy at the opening ceremony of the Moscow Airshow-92 accurately and capaciously reflect the essence of our first domestic aerospace exhibition.

Competition, market, integration, however no longer within the framework of CEMA—these terms still not customary for many disclose the trends in domestic aircraft building, which still has to gain strength.

First of all, and this immediately catches the eye, today's exhibition is primarily a parade of producers. In addition to the displays of the leading designer collectives, products from more than 100 various enterprises are presented, and not only aviation enterprises but also other defense sectors.

The exhibition, Russian in spirit, also reflects our increasingly stronger ties with other aviation powers. For example, work is being done to install American-made Pratt and Whitney engines and Collins avionics on the new IL-96M aircraft of the Ilyushin firm. The new Tu-204 aircraft of the ANTK imeni A.N. Tupolev has been given "Rolls Royce" thrust. This will enable our aircraft to compete more successfully on the world market.

Incidentally, in addition to the already well-known Il-96, Il-114, and Il-76, the S.V. Ilyushin Experimental Design Bureau also exhibited for the first time several aircraft up to now unknown to a wide circle of people. These are the "offspring of conversion"—the four-seater Il-103, also having a western-made engine, and the new Il-102 ground-attack aircraft.

Certainly, one of the "hits" of the exhibition will be a new aircraft from the VNTK imeni N.I. Kamov—the single-seater Ka-50 combat helicopter. We asked Venniamin Kasyannikov, deputy general designer of the VNTK imeni N.I. Kamov, to tell us about the exhibits of the helicopter builders:

"Inasmuch as this is the first Russian exhibition, we tried to put our best foot forward and exhibit, in addition to aircraft already in operation, those which are being developed. On the open area, visitors will see the Ka-26 helicopter workhorse that has been flying for more than 20 years already. Incidentally, the Ka-26 is the only Soviet helicopter that has a certificate for American airworthiness standards. This is also a certificate of quality. We are also showing new modifications of this helicopter. These are the Ka-126, on which a French engine can be installed at the customer's desire.

"And the Ka-226, equipped with two American-made Allison gas-turbine engines. This helicopter is in great demand, particularly in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region."

But winged machines are not the only interesting thing at the exhibition. Not everyone, apparently, will pay attention, say, to the Elat meteorological system, which is capable of combating fog, ice formation on the runway, heavy crosswinds, cloud cover, and lightning. It has been proven in practice that it is able to affect the level of pollution of the atmosphere in a large industrial center and much else. There is nothing like it in the world.

About 90 foreign companies sent representatives to the Moscow Airshow-92. They are all ready to cooperate with us. For example, the American Westinghouse Electric Corporation in a consortium with several leading aviation firms of the West presented program packages for modernizing organization of the air traffic control system in Russia. It is no secret that the existing system does not enable us to support so-called great-circle routes for overflight of transnational aircraft of the leading foreign airlines. You see, any country collects an air navigation fee in foreign currency for supporting such flights. On our territory, which comprises one-sixth of the globe, experts estimate that these fees could bring in $3 million each week...

The main impression of Moscow Airshow-92 is that the leading directions of our science and technology are still able to develop and are abundant in fresh thought. Russia's potential, even in today's difficult times, is very high. The number of innovations represented at the exhibition convinces one of this. The question is: Will they be claimed? I asked Aleksandr Pavlov, first deputy general director of the foreign economic state association Aviaeksport, about this:

"You can count on your fingers the major producers of aviation equipment in the world. Russia is rightfully among them. The market demand for our aircraft will remain. Until recently, our aircraft were purchased by many airlines of Eastern European countries. Now the demand has dropped. But this is a temporary phenomenon, and the laws of economics and the market, I am

sure, will prevail over the political situation. One also cannot rule out airlines of the so-called near frontier. We will also be able to satisfy their needs for aviation equipment. The expanding cooperation of our aircraft building companies with the leading western aviation firms will enable our aircraft and helicopters to compete on the broader international market."

The exhibition at Zhukovskiy has a business purpose. But the thousands and thousands of visitors who travel to the previously closed city to view the exhibits and observe the skill of the pilots will undoubtedly experience a sense of pride in their homeland and be convinced: we have something to show and there is someone to do this in a fitting manner.

Highlights of Airshow Reviewed

92UM1407B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Aug 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "This Awaits You at Zhukovskiy, Tushino, and Monino"]

[Text] **Taking into account our readers' wishes, we are telling what spectators will see during the celebration of Air Fleet Day at the airfield at Tushino and in the near-Moscow cities of Zhukovskiy and Monino.**

Zhukovskiy. The first Russian aviation and space exhibition Moscow Airshow-92 is being held here. Some 192 organizations from the CIS countries and 82 foreign firms are represented here. The exhibition is open on 14 August for specialists and representatives of the press. But on Saturday and Sunday its doors will be open to a wide circle of visitors, true, for a fee.

How to get to the airshow? By electric train from the Vykhino subway station to the Otdykh station (platform). Additional electric trains are scheduled for Saturday and Sunday. At Zhukovskiy, go from the platform to the Flight Research Institute by route bus No 2. In addition, additional expresses are scheduled.

Tushino. The aviation celebration dedicated to Air Fleet Day will open here at 10:00 AM on 16 August. It is organized by the Russian Air Force, the National Flying Club imeni V. Chkalov, the Defense Sports and Technical Organization of the Russian Federation, and the prefecture of the Northwest Administrative District of Moscow.

The program, which is scheduled for three hours, will involve aerobatic flying by the Russian Warriors in Su-27 fighters and the Swifts in MIG-29 fighters. Demonstration flights by tactical, strategic, and transport aviation in Tu-160, Tu-22, Su-25, An-124, Ruslan, and Il-78 aircraft are scheduled. There will be performances by helicopter pilots and aviation sportsmen.

Directions: to the Tushinskaya subway station or by electric train to the Tushino platform of the Rizhskiy Route. Free entrance.

Monino. A day earlier, on 15 August, an aviation celebration will take place at the base of the Air Academy imeni Yu. Gagarin and the Air Force Museum. The aviation presentation at Monino Airfield involving aircraft of the Russian Defense Sports and Technical Society is scheduled to begin at 10:30 AM. The doors to the museum, which contains unique specimens of prewar aircraft, aircraft of the Great Patriotic War, and also postwar aircraft, will open for visitors at 10:00 AM.

The program for the celebration includes demonstration performances by model airplane enthusiasts, individual and group flying in airplanes and helicopters, low-altitude parachute jumps, a mass paradrop, and so forth.

Entry to the airfield is free.

Directions: by bus No 322 "Moscow-Noginsk" from the Izmaylovskiy Park subway station to the Yuzhnyye Vorota stop. By electric train from Yaroslavskiy Station to Monino.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Outlook for Restructuring of NATO

92UM1390A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Kostin: "What Will NATO Be Like by the End of the Century"]

[Text] The chain of structural changes in NATO began right after the North Atlantic Alliance adopted a new strategic concept which shifted the emphasis in its military policy from global confrontation with the former USSR and its Warsaw Treaty allies to "counteracting risks in many directions". The Military Committee and the Committee for Military Planning of that organization developed and implemented a series of measures directed at bringing the bloc's command structures into conformity with today's realities. The changes primarily affected the areas of responsibility of the allied commands in the European theaters of military operations (TVDs) and the command and control system and structure of the NATO Allied Armed Forces in Europe.

A decision was made to review the TVD borders as a result of the change of NATO's geostrategic position on the European continent that was caused by the unification of Germany, the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the countries of Eastern Europe. Specifically, they plan to include the territory of the German land of Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark, and the Baltic Straits zone in the southwestern portion of the Baltic Sea, which is located in the Northern European TVD at the present time, in the Central European Theater of Military Operations. At the same time, it provides for the transformation of the Northern European TVD into the Northwestern TVD and for the location of the headquarters of

the allied armed forces high command in that theater at Northwood (Great Britain). The territories of Norway and Great Britain, the water areas of the North and Norwegian Seas and also the English Channel zone will be in the area of responsibility of the NATO Allied Armed Forces high command in the Northwestern TVD.

While considering the planned innovations in slicing up the European TVDs and the impending substantial reduction of troops, they plan to reorganize the bloc's Allied Armed Forces leadership system by eliminating intermediate command and control elements and by reducing command and headquarters authorized personnel strength. Specifically, they propose eliminating NATO Allied Armed Forces main command in the English Channel strait and the Baltic straits zone and also to disband the Allied Armed Forces commands and staffs in Northern and Southern Norway, having created a unified command in Norway to replace the latter.

In the Central European TVD, they plan to eliminate the commands and staffs of the Northern and Central groups of armies and to form a unified ground troops command in the theater based on them. Furthermore, 2nd and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces are subject to elimination with the resubordination of their division-sized and smaller units directly to NATO Allied Air Force Command in the Central European TVD. Minimal changes will take place in the Southern European TVD where the command and staff of the allied ground forces in the southern portion of the TVD will be eliminated with the subsequent transfer of their functions to the leadership of the Italian armed forces.

Along with changes to the structure of command and control organs, they propose reducing them. For example, they plan to reduce personnel strength by 10 percent at NATO Allied Armed Forces Supreme Command Headquarters in Europe. Furthermore, by 1994 they plan to reduce expenditures for the maintenance of personnel by 25 percent at NATO headquarters in Europe. However, only four of 34 of its generals will leave due to the opposition that has arisen from the Allied Armed Forces Headquarters highest military officials.

By the middle 1990's, the structure of NATO Allied Armed Forces general purpose forces will substantially change. In accordance with the tenets of the new coalition military strategy, it has been recognized as advisable to have four primary components:

—immediate reaction forces consisting of seven reinforced battalions with a total strength of up to 15,000 men;

—rapid reaction forces with a strength of approximately 100,000 men consisting of ground (4-5 divisions), air (an air wing—100 tactical aviation aircraft), and naval (a NATO Allied Naval task force in the Mediterranean Sea) elements;

—main defensive forces (six multinational army corps and one German corps); and,

—reinforcement troops (the divisions that arrive from the North American continent and also those divisions allocated by France and Spain will form the foundation of these forces if a large-scale military conflict breaks out in Europe).

The rapid deployment forces will become the fundamentally new component of this structure. Their presence will permit the bloc's military-political leadership to effectively react to each case of the emergence of a crisis situation, while sending into the assigned area the appropriate detail of men and equipment and, if necessary, to carry out the gradual buildup of its military presence in any region of the world.

But no matter how far the process of reforming NATO's command and troop structures go, two things are unwavering for the bloc—the American military presence in Europe and the American general at the head of the allied armed forces. And despite the fact that recently the countries of the North Atlantic bloc are increasingly discussing the prospect of designating a representative of some other country to that post, the matter has not gone beyond conversations.

On the whole, the content and direction of the measures being conducted by the NATO leadership attest to its intention to implement thorough reform of the bloc's Allied Armed Forces by the end of the century, while concentrating the main efforts on the creation of small, highly-mobile regular troops and increasing the effectiveness of their command and control by eliminating intermediate elements and through greater centralization.

SECURITY SERVICES

Tajik Border Troops Arrest Border Violators

92UM1399B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Aug 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Borders Not Peaceful"]

[Text] The situation on the borders of the commonwealth remains difficult. In the past week alone, 15 armed violators were arrested on the sector of the Pyandzh Border Guard Detachment of the Central Asian Border Guard District for trying to sneak into Tajikistan from Afghanistan in four groups. In two of the cases, the violators were forcibly arrested. More than 20 small arms and many grenades and other ammunition were confiscated from them.

On Monday in Yerevan, a group seized a motor vehicle of the Transcaucasian Border Guard District. The officer in charge and the driver of the vehicle were released.

Between 7 and 9 August, border guards of Russia together with customs agents prevented the illegal export

of one ton of copper and 35 kg of nickel into Estonia on the St. Petersburg-Pskov axis. One pistol and ammunition was confiscated from tourists.

Clashes Between Border Troops, Tajiks Increase

92UM1393C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by Salokhiddin Ergashev, TIA Khovar—TASS Correspondent: "From Dushanbe: The Violators of the Frontier Have Retreated, Leaving the Border Troops with a Bag of Money"]

[Text] The situation on the Tajik-Afghan border remains complicated. Last Sunday there was the fifth armed clash during the last week between the border detachments and violators of the state frontier. As a rule, these are citizens of Tajikistan who are returning back from Afghanistan with a large amount of weapons.

During the last clash, the violators, having retreated to the territory of Afghanistan, left the border troops...a bag stuffed with money. As the correspondent of the Khovar Agency was informed at the Directorate for the Operations Group of the Central Asian Border District, the bag contained about 265,000 rubles. Possibly the violators correctly reasoned that their life was still more precious than the money. And, as the border troops have asserted, the rubles are not counterfeit and in good condition.

However, the violators have not calmed down. After the failure of their crossing, they twice opened fire at the border detachment from the Afghan bank.

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