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


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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Central Eurasia**

***Military Affairs***



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# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-92-010

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18 March 1992

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## CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

### Bylaws of CIS Veterans Organization

92UM0635A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 5,  
Feb 92 pp 8-9

[Unattributed article: "Bylaws: Coalition (Union) of Independent States Veterans Organizations"]

[Text]

### I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The Coalition (Union) of Independent States Veterans Organizations, hereinafter referred to as the Coalition, is an international voluntary public association of independent pensioned veterans organizations of independent states, interstate and regional associations of veterans of war, labor, and the Armed Forces, and of other establishments of pensioned veterans who have joined the Coalition on a basis of unity and commonality of veterans interests for the purpose of consolidating the veterans movement to render an active influence on positive processes of social development, to protect the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights and freedoms of veterans, and to assure the latter a position of dignity in society. The Coalition is the legal successor to the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans.

2. The constituent organizations of the Coalition possess their own bylaws and enjoy equality and independence with respect to the organization and prosecution of their internal affairs, and with respect to their association with other public associations. They may join the Coalition as a federation, confederation, or associate member.

3. The activity of the Coalition, as provided for by these Bylaws, rests on a basis of voluntary participation, equality of participants, self-government, legality, and openness. The Coalition's member organizations, in their fulfilling of functions as set down in their respective bylaws, do acknowledge and observe the requirements posed by the Coalition's Bylaws, proceeding on a basis of mutual consent and cooperation to formulate ties to other veterans establishments and public associations of citizens.

4. The Coalition operates independently of all political parties and movements to work with organs of state and administrative control, and with religious and other organizations which advocate democratic change.

### II. PURPOSE AND TASKS

5. The Coalition (Union) of Veterans Organizations:

—promotes common interests of veterans of war, labor, and the Armed Forces in the protection of social and civil rights of pensioners. Its activity is geared to the consolidation of the peoples of the Commonwealth of

Independent States, and to the preservation and development of a unified economic entity, and to social, legal, and cultural guarantees for veterans;

—participates in developing and presenting proposals and programs dealing with the interests of the elderly, without regard for their place of residence; strives to improve the pension and social security system; renders tangible assistance to Coalition members in furtherance of their right to legislative initiative relative to problems of pensioned veterans;

—promotes development of contacts between veterans and broad utilization of aggregate experience acquired by veterans organizations; renders support via practical and procedural guidance in the development and implementation of measures related to cooperation with veterans organizations at the interrepublic and international levels; participates in organizing and conducting conferences, seminars, exchanges of experience, and liaison, and in other joint measures;

—works to create conditions favorable to providing pensioners with suitable employment and to efficient operation of manufacturing and creative cooperatives, comradeships, small and joint enterprises, and the Veteran associations; renders assistance to enterprises employing veterans and the disabled; organizes charitable activities;

—represents, via the Coordinating Council, veterans associations in their relations with interstate, regional, and mass movements, and with trade unions, women's youth organizations, voluntary societies, creative unions, welfare foundations, and other public associations in the furtherance of their capabilities with respect to improving the living conditions of pensioned veterans, satisfying the latter's professional and amateur needs, developing artistic creativity, and carrying out cultural, educational, and health activities;

—renders assistance in the organization of an acceptable level of care for the elderly, in improving conditions in nursing homes, and in bettering hospital treatments;

—utilizes the mass media to disseminate information on the activity of veterans organizations and lives of the elderly; provides for television broadcasts dealing with topical aspects of problems faced by veterans; employs the Veteran publishing office to publish information on the older generation;

—coordinates public activities of member organizations and their participation in combined patriotic and humanitarian actions; takes a part in efforts devoted to memorializing fallen defenders of the Motherland, preserving historical and cultural monuments, and creating the "Book of Remembrance";

—unites the efforts of veterans organizations directed toward strengthening the peace, furtherance of friendship between peoples, protecting the rights of man,

supporting a reliable defense and security of the Commonwealth of Independent States; participates in endowing the rising generation with patriotic and international understanding;

- establishes and develops ties and cooperation with national and international associations of pensioners, war veterans, Armed Forces veterans, and all elderly people, for the purpose of broad utilization of positive experience of social security and protection of the interests and rights of the older generation.

International ties are set up by the Coalition and by member veterans organizations both independently and jointly, on a basis of mutual agreement.

### III. STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP

6. The Coalition unites independent veterans organizations of the independent states, organizations of war veterans, and veterans of the Armed Forces. The Coalition is open to membership for interstate professional, branch, regional, and other associations of veterans which share and honor the purpose and tasks of the Coalition as set forth in these Bylaws.

Acceptance into the Coalition is exclusively on a voluntary basis on the part of an independent veterans association, which submits a written application, prepared by the association's highest elective body, to a Coalition conference or plenary session of the Coordinating Council. Application for membership is considered approved, if more than half the Coordinating Council or conference delegates cast a positive vote. Coalition members reserve the right to withdraw from the Coalition by following the procedure decided on by the organizations comprising the Coalition.

Primary organizations constitute the basis of the veterans movement. Matters of membership status of individual veterans, and the kind, amount, and method of payment of dues are to be decided by Coalition member organizations themselves, as specified in their particular bylaws.

7. The activity of the Coalition encompasses the areas of the independent states in which there are functioning veterans organizations which are members of the Coalition.

8. The independent organizations which comprise the membership of the Coalition:

- exert all efforts of veterans and their organizations to promote unification as a natural desire to strengthen ties between themselves and effect joint attempts to accomplish common tasks and render mutual assistance;
- exhibit mutual solidarity in the defense of the rights and interests of veterans of war, labor, the Armed Forces, and of internationalist soldiers;

- represent their organizations in elective governing bodies of the Coalition, by furnishing delegates for participation in the work of these bodies; submit proposals and drafts of documents dealing with affairs of veterans examination at conferences and by Coalition elective bodies;

- operate independently or in concert with the Coordinating Council to establish and develop ties to veterans' organizations of states and to national and international associations of the elderly, veterans, and pensioners;

- protect their rights and interests in the coordinating structures of the Coalition of Independent States via the Coalition Council of Veterans Organizations;

- enjoy the right to monitor the activity of Coalition elective bodies via their representatives, and of requesting the Coordinating Council to furnish pertinent information on any matter;

- possess the privilege of contacting the Coordinating Council on any question relating to the activity of the organization: to be granted a consultation; to obtain information on the experience gained by veterans organizations; to receive assistance and support in their work.

Coalition member organizations exercise their prerogatives on the local level via exclusive interaction and cooperation with the respective veterans councils of the independent states.

### IV. JURISDICTION AND FORMATION OF GOVERNING BODIES

9. The highest organ of the Coalition is the conference, which is convened at least once every 5 years. An extraordinary session can be convened by resolution of the Coordinating Council or by vote of two-thirds of the Coalition member organizations. The amount of representation at the conference and the delegate selection procedure are arrived at by action of the Coordinating Council.

10. The Coalition conference:

- hears reports on the activity of the Coordinating Council and the Auditing Commission, and makes suitable resolutions;
- determines the goals and future tasks of the Coalition;
- approves and if necessary enters corrections and changes into the Coalition Bylaws and Auditing Commission statute;
- confirms the credentials of Coordinating Council members delegated to the latter by Coalition veterans organizations;
- approves, by direct representation, the membership of the Coordinating Council and Auditing Commission, which in their plenary sessions vote for a chairman,

deputy chairmen, and executive secretary of the Coordinating Council, chairman of the Auditing Commission, and secretary of the commission;

—votes for representatives of state organs and public organizations to fill the position of member(s) of the Coordinating Council.

In the period between conferences, delegation of Coalition member organization representatives to the Coordinating Council is to be carried out by plenum and elective bodies; representatives of state structures and public organizations are to be selected by Coordinating Council plenum. The representatives are to be recalled and replaced in the same manner;

—considers other items relating to the activity of the Coalition as the need arises.

11. The conference is considered empowered, if it draws an attendance of at least two-thirds of the delegates selected, with the latter representing at least two-thirds of the organizations comprising the Coalition membership.

The conference may include, as consultative voices, Coordinating Committee and Auditing Commission members who are not selected as delegates.

12. In the period between conferences, the Coordinating Council is to be considered as the fully-authorized governing body of the Coalition. It is convened in its plenums by resolution of the presidium or by request of at least one-third of the members of the Coordinating Council, with its session to be held at least once every 6 months. The position of plenum chairman is to be filled on a rotating basis by council chairmen of Coalition member veterans organizations.

#### **The Coordinating Council:**

—functions inside the country and in the international sphere in the name of the Council of Veterans Organizations;

—operates at its level and within the limits of its powers, as set forth in Article 5 of these Bylaws, to coordinate the activity of Coalition member organizations in the implementation of conference resolutions and combined programs intended to improve the living conditions of veterans;

—works in concert with Coalition member organizations to submit to the Coalition of Independent States coordinating bodies proposals dealing with social protection of veterans; counters instances of infringement of veterans' rights and interests;

—promotes veterans' interests by collaborating with public associations and movements, the mass media, and other structures;

—enters into the Bylaws (by two-third's vote, with subsequent approval by conference) necessary changes

and addenda which are not related to the purpose and tasks of the Coalition or the rights and obligations of its members;

—represents the Coalition in its dealings with national and international associations of the elderly on questions common to all Coalition members, and functions in concert with Coalition member organizations in international dealings;

—renders veterans organizations procedural, organizational, and legal assistance; carries out international meetings and seminars dealing with exchange of experiences gained by veterans organizations, questions of social protection of veterans, and training of the veterans aktiv;

—publishes the newspaper VETERAN;

—employs its own fund and other sources of funds to carry out works of charity for the benefit of needy and solitary veterans of advanced age.

13. Normal functioning of the Coordinating Council is assured by constituting at its plenum the Council Presidium to serve for a period of 5 years, with the latter to consist of the council chairman, deputy chairmen, executive secretary, and chairman of Coalition member veteran organizations, editor-in-chief of the newspaper VETERAN, and certain other members of the Coordinating Council. The size of the presidium is to be determined by the Coordinating Council. The presidium's sessions are to be convened at least once every 3 months and are to be considered vested with full authority if attended by at least two-thirds of its membership. In the event a presidium member cannot attend a session, the respective Coalition member organization possesses the right of sending to the session another representative from the members of the Coordinating Council, with the substitute endowed with the right of casting a vote.

14. In the period between conferences, the Coordinating Council chairman, his deputy, and the executive secretary may be released from their positions by vote of at least half the Coalition member organizations or on the initiative of the Coordinating Council proper. This action is to be considered resolved if voted for by at least two-thirds of Coordinating Council members. The abovementioned persons may request release from their respective positions by submitting a request to this effect for simple majority vote by the Coordinating Council.

#### **15. The Coordinating Council presidium:**

—convenes Coordinating Council plenums;

—organizes the routine work of the Coordinating Council;

—forms public commissions, selecting members of the latter from Coordinating Council membership and the veterans aktiv, to conduct work in the major fields of

activity of the Coordinating Committee and organizes this work; confirms and releases chairmen of said commissions;

- approves the structure and personnel of the Coordinating Council apparatus;
- decides questions relating to publishing, finances, and administration of Coordinating Council activity;
- confirms the editor-in-chief of the newspaper VETERAN and director of the publishing office.

16. The Coordinating Council presidium is to act on the basis of collective leadership to prohibit the adoption of resolutions and actions which lie beyond the purview of Council duties as set forth in the Bylaws; it is also to prohibit decisions made by individual officials of the Coalition Council relating to the jurisdiction of the Coordinating Council or of the presidium.

#### V. FINANCES AND PROPERTY

17. The financial resources of the Coalition are to consist of percentage contributions from Coalition member organizations, voluntary offerings by state and administrative agencies, public organizations, and individual persons; proceeds from lotteries, exhibitions, sports and other events; revenue from interstate manufacturing, economic, and publishing activities both within and without the country; and other financial and material sources and securities not prohibited by law.

Veterans councils of all levels are entitled to voluntary determination of sums of monies to be deducted from their treasuries for the benefit of the Coalition Coordinating Council in its furtherance of stated activities.

The Coalition is to establish a veterans fund. The Coalition may possess its own buildings, structures, equipment, transportation vehicles, office equipment, supplies, and property of a cultural, educational, and other nature necessary to conduct its activities as specified in these Bylaws. Coalition property may also include publishing and other enterprises and charitable institutions set up with funds furnished by veterans and their organizations.

#### VI. LEGAL STATUS

18. The Coalition of Veterans Organizations constitutes a juridical person, as such possessing the right to open its own bank accounts, including one of foreign currency, to operate its own publishing facility, and enjoy the use of its own emblem and letterhead.

The Coalition Coordinating Council is to be located in the city of Moscow.

#### VII. TERMINATION OF COALITION ACTIVITY

19. The existence of the Coalition may be terminated by conference resolution passed by at least two-thirds of the delegates.

The Coalition's property if so decided by conference vote would be disposed of as specified in these Bylaws.

20. The Coalition is to be abolished by court order in the circumstances and manner provided for by the law.

These Bylaws are approved by Conference of the Independent States Veterans Organizations Coalition (Union) as of 18 December 1991, with registry in the Ministry of Justice, Russian Federation, as of 16 January 1992.

#### Survey Data on Economic Plight of Officers' Families

92UM0693B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 20 Feb 92 p 6

[Article by Vladimir Mukhin of the journal ARMIYA especially for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, under rubric "Army": "Service Is Service, But One Has To Live! Officers and Warrant Officers of the Former Soviet Army Are Actively Moonlighting"]

[Text] Disintegration of the Union, inflation, and social-economic instability in society negatively affected the material situation of the majority of servicemen and their families. An increase in officer and warrant officer pay (which, by the way, continues to be 1.5-2 times less than corresponding salaries for personnel of the Russian MVD and AFB [Federal Security Agency]) does not compensate for the increase in prices on basic kinds of food products and manufactured goods. And what kind of pay increase is it if today's tank platoon commander, for example, receives as much as a typist working in law-protection agencies?

In particular, data of a sociological study conducted by associates of the journal ARMIYA and students of the Armed Forces Humanitarian Academy in Moscow and Turkestan military districts as well as in certain units of the Internal Security Forces serve as graphic confirmation of the acuteness of everyday social problems of servicemen's families (around 500 officers and warrant officers were surveyed).

Presence of Cultural and Household Articles in an Officer Family (at Company and Battery Commander Level, as a Percentage of All Surveyed in Formation "X")

	Have*	Would Like To Have, But No Opportunity To Purchase	No Money To Purchase
Color television	27.3 (48)	41.8	30.8
Black-and-white television	58.2 (56)	9.1	7.2
Tape recorder	67.3 (50)	14.5	14.5
Video tape recorder	1.8	32.7	56.4
Car	3.6 (19)	29.1	63.3
Refrigerator	78.2 (96)	16.4	3.6
Vacuum cleaner	54.5 (61)	32.7	3.6
Washing machine	65.4 (79)	27.3	5.5

\*Similar data of the USSR State Committee for Statistics are given in parentheses on workers and employees having the above household items as of 1989.

As we see, the standard of living of a company-level officer's family is lower than for workers and employees in many indicators. It should also be taken into account here that 53 percent of the wives of company and battery commanders have a higher (or incomplete higher) education and that professions most prevalent among women are physicians, teachers and economists, i.e., professions with a relatively high wage. As a rule, however, they are not required on military posts in large numbers. Hence the statistics that only 18 percent of women work in their specialty and 20 percent do not work at all.

They do not work not only because there are no jobs, but also because there is nowhere to put a child—only every third person surveyed was able to place a son or daughter in kindergarten and 40 percent are on waiting lists.

Possibly for the first time in the post-October era we see a situation where, in violation of existing orders forbidding them to work in civilian establishments, a certain portion of officers and warrant officers of what was once the most powerful and combat-effective Army in the world are sweeping streets, unloading railcars, and working as watchmen, janitors, night tutors in dormitories and so on.

Survey data indicate that it is basically officers and warrant officers with more than four days off a month and no subordinate personnel who are engaged in moonlighting. As a rule, these are staff and directorate personnel, students or instructors of military academies and schools, and scientific personnel. For the most part the moonlighters' duty stations are in large cities where servicemen have housing difficulties (which means the families of officers and warrant officers have to rent apartments and pay a lot of money for them).

Over 41 percent of those surveyed responded in the questionnaires that they are performing heavy, monotonous, unskilled physical labor; 35 percent stated that they are moonlighting in the small business area or work as middlemen (various brokers and so on); 15 percent

are engaged in individual labor activity; and only 6 percent are engaged in intellectual labor.

It cannot be said that the most negligent officers and warrant officers have become addicted to underground work. Among moonlighters, over 90 percent of servicemen have served in the Army from 5 to 15 years and only 4 percent of them have official punishments, while every other person has served without censure at all. Over 40 percent of those surveyed love their main profession and moonlight out of necessity. Despite material difficulties, they do not plan to leave the Army, but deem it necessary to seek opportunities for additional earnings in the future as well if their financial problems are not solved (over 60 percent of responses).

Every other person surveyed pointed out that he finds an opportunity to moonlight in the time set aside for primary duty. Only 60 percent of servicemen moonlight on days off. Over 80 percent of those surveyed do not conceal from colleagues that they have work on the side. But in the course of the survey not one introduced himself, agreeing only to an anonymous interview.

#### Moscow Civil Defense Conference

92UM0693A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 28 Feb 92 p 8

[Article by Marina Ryklina: "And So They United!"]

[Text] The first conference of Deputy Military District Commanders for Civil Defense, Chairmen of territorial and departmental commissions for emergencies, and chiefs of CD staffs of republics in the Russian Federation and of krais and oblasts was held in Moscow. Three hundred delegates assembled from the entire country and over half were representatives of CD departments and structures. Only Chechnya and Yakutiya ignored the forum.

In opening the conference, S. Shoygu, chairman of the State Committee for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Mopping Up in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters,



emphasized that establishment of a unified system for warning and mopping up in the aftermath of accidents and natural disasters still is far from completed. The establishment of regional centers has begun; nine already exist as of today. In addition to Moscow and St. Petersburg, they function in Samara, Rostov-on-Don, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Chita and Khabarovsk. The boundaries of these regions basically coincide with the boundaries of the seven military districts on the territory of Russia.

Shoygu believes that establishment of a unified coordinating center for problems of emergencies is a need that matured long ago. In just the past year and the beginning of this year, over 600 accidents occurred in Russia in which 16,000 persons suffered and 1,100 died. The material damage from them exceeded one billion rubles. In Shoygu's view, CD Troops, which now are subordinate to the State Committee for Emergencies, must devote 70 percent of their activity to strictly peaceful tasks.

The maximum numerical strength of the Committee's central apparatus also was established in a recent B. Yeltsin ukase.

#### **Gadrut Border Outpost Attacked**

*92UM0664C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 92 p 1*

[ITAR-TASS report under the rubric "On the Telegraph Line": Another Attack. And Once Again Successful"]

[Text] A fierce attack was waged on one of the gates of the Gadrut border detachment of the Transcaucasian Border District Tuesday evening. An ITAR-TASS correspondent was told today by the Committee for Protection of the State Border that 50 fighting men armed with automatic weapons seized two sentries and forced their way into the room where the weapons are stored. The attackers took 14 automatic weapons, a machine gun, and a manual grenade thrower. The sentries were released.

#### **Cossack Border Troops Created in Maritime Kray**

*92UM0664B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 92 p 1*

[Article by Colonel V. Usoltsev: "From Khabarovsk. Cossacks Take Up Their Old Work—Guarding the Border. Special Border Troops Created For This"]

[Text] As with troops everywhere, the border guards do not have enough men. The soldiers have to do service, as they say, for themselves and for somebody else. The Cossacks have decided to rectify the situation, recalling their old "trade"—guarding the border of the Russian state. In Maritime Kray they have already created the first Cossack border troop, in which more than 30 officers and warrant officers have expressed a desire to

serve. The idea was supported by the command of the Pacific Ocean Border District.

Now the Cossacks' relay baton has been taken by the Far Eastern Border District. "Even now the residents of the Cossack camps and the border villages of Khabarovsk Kray are participating on a public basis in protecting the border along the Amur and Ussur," Stanislav Protsenko, ataman of the Union of Ussuri Cossacks, told a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

#### **Soldiers Tell Why They Deserted**

*92UM0700A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 92 p 2*

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Mamchur, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Soldiers Are Running Away from the Army... Where To? Where From? Why?"]

[Text] Soldiers' greatcoats, sailors' pea-jackets, peaked service caps, and caps with earflaps, with and without stars. Stern officers. Sincere do-gooders. Visitors, petitioners, soldiers' mothers...

Lefortovo. An assembly station for servicemen. To put it more simply, a place to which soldiers and sergeants who deserted their military units are flown, driven, and marched. Since time immemorial people have called them deserters and treated them accordingly. But Lieutenant Colonel V. Kobayev, acting chief of the station, warns: A person can be called a deserter only after an appropriate court decision. So we will refrain from such sharp wording and agree that we are talking about people who leave their units of their own free will. For the sake of brevity—we are talking about fugitives.

Since July of last year, when the station was established, about 1,250 such people have gone through it. On the day of our visit, 66 arrived.

Why, to where, and from where do they flee (do not return to their unit)?

Private A. Nefadov: "The regiment is deployed in Azerbaijan. I was hit by bullets twice. I was saved by the bullet-proof vest. On whose behalf and why should I risk my neck?" Private I. Dorokhin: "I am also from the Transcaucasus. All personnel on leave, except those who live in the area, do not go back. Well, my mother did not let me go..." Junior Sergeant F. Kim: "And I myself decided not to return there." Junior Sergeant V. Safonov: "The unit is stationed in Termez. Among the soldiers there are two of us who are Russians. It became unbearable to serve..." Private N. (he asked that his last name not be mentioned): "They beat me up." Private M. Sakhbnazarov: "I am Tajik, and I was told to take the Ukrainian oath. So I left." Private A. Lesov: "I am married, and my mother is alone. I wrote a request—but they did not release me. Well, I..." Seaman S. Popkov: "I cleared out of Riga. I do not like the sanitation there (he laughs)..."

Captain V. Kalkayev, the deputy chief, conducted a brief poll at the assembly station. According to his calculations, the main flow of "guests" comes from the Transcaucasus, from the Northern Caucasus, and from the Baltics. In second position are those who left their units in connection with intolerable conditions of service, mockery and humiliation, health reasons, family circumstances, and the like, regardless of geography. Closing out this far from complete list are those who refused to take an oath to Ukraine.

This "breakdown" on the whole was confirmed by officials of the Main Military Procuracy and the General Staff, who had far more developed statistics available to them. They added: Together with the above, there are no less impressive flows in the opposite, so to say, direction—to Ukraine, Central Asia, the Transcaucasus...

However different the reasons that prompted soldier and sergeant to leave their military unit and start on a long journey, one trend can be seen: to be closer to home at any price. It amounts to a situation that is anecdotal.

Son serves in the Army. Mama lives alone and grows flowers. Mama has to go to the hospital. Who will water the flowers? For mama, such a question does not exist. She travels for 1,00 kilometers and brings her some home, without thinking it necessary at least to inform the commander. The flowers are saved. But for the son, for his unauthorized departure from the unit, there "looms" somewhere about five years in the colony. Mama is indignant, and she is ready to attack the United Nations: Why is her child here? What does "unauthorized" mean, when she, the mother, took him home herself?!

...An old farmer will never understand what his offspring is charged with. So, he left the unit. Well, after all, he did not run to the enemy, but home—to work on the land. Did the head of the Russian parliament not say on television that it is certainly necessary to exempt children of farmers from service?

Thus, what is the total number of soldiers who "flee" on the scale of the armed forces? Attempts to acquire official data were not crowned with success, but even if this is secret, it is obvious. Assembly stations similar to Lefortovo exist in each of the military services, in the districts, and in the fleets. Even if the "indices" of the latter are reduced to a maximum, you automatically come to the conclusion that in a half year desertions from companies, battalions, and regiments amount numerically to no less than a fully manned motorized rifle division.

This is what has already been happening: A soldier runs away, an officer, and sometimes more than one, is sent in pursuit. Even today they are travelling around the countries of the Commonwealth looking for him.

I became acquainted with Major V. Kolchev in the same Lefortovo assembly station. He serves in Krivoy Rog, but already for more than a week he has been knocking about hotels in the capital: This time, a Muscovite ran

away from the regiment. A senior lieutenant was sent out after him, but in two weeks he came to grief. Then the regimental commander fitted Kolchev out for the road. He turned over the personal file of the fugitive and ordered strictly: Do not return until Private O. Kuznetsov is attached to some Army organization.

The officer found the soldier. And he found a vacancy for him right here in a fire station in Moscow. He took Olezhka by the hand and brought him to the commander to be looked over: Will you take him? We will take him, he says, but where is his uniform? Did he throw it away. Let him buy one. We will put him on the fire-fighting pump. But how much time do you need to get yourself properly ready, Vladimir Aleksandrovich asks Oleg. Two days, the serviceman answers clearly.

In two days, they talk over the phone.

"Did you buy it?"

"No."

"Why?"

"My mother did not order me!"

The major, sitting in Lefortovo, breaks into a shout: Call the militia detail, the rascal has to be brought to court! The officers sympathize with the major. And the women representatives of the committee of soldiers' mothers sympathize. The assembly stations had their beginning in their own apartments. The mama do-gooders got to see a lot of things, and in the last year they changed considerably.

"Among the lads, there are quite a few who are sick and suffering. But there are many with whom communications literally drive you crazy," admits Flera Malikovka Salikhovskaya who, with her friends, spends a lot of time at the center...

They feel sorry for the major. They pour water from a carafe. They calm him: What militia? What court? After all, besides us and your commander, no one needs this. Understand? No one!

...But meanwhile, in the corridor, a group of officers of one of the Moscow area surface-to-air missile regiments is conducting agitation work. What brought them here?

"In autumn, in place of the 120 who were discharged we were sent four draftees," explains Lieutenant Colonel V. Mayorov, deputy commander of the regiment. "Then we had to 'call up' all of the women in the garrison who were able to put on epaulets. But women cannot service equipment and perform alert duty, and the officer forces are limited. In the spring 100 more persons were discharged. This is the end. And so we are gathering up the fugitives and refuseniks wherever we can..."

The workers at the assembly station warned the guests: Of all of the complaints of their "patients," only one-third are confirmed in a checkup. Every eighth one

already runs away from here, because they do not want to serve anywhere or anyone at all. But the missilemen could not retreat: Behind them is Moscow.

"Son, will you come and serve with us?" a lieutenant colonel who is smart in appearance and neat as a pin asks a soldier who is unduly familiar and almost with his hands in his pockets. "It is not far from here. You can go home during leave..."

"You are most likely located in some forest?" snorts the soldier.

"Well, you yourself know that you cannot set up a missile complex on a central square," says the officer, as if apologizing.

"It is not to my liking. There are no fools..."

The conversation is over. The lieutenant colonel continues moving on:

"Son, will you come serve with us? It is not far..."

No matter how painful, the time came to admit the inevitable, but today it is even obvious: Right after the state, the Army could fall apart as well.

The day before yesterday Baltic residents were "let out" of the company, yesterday it was Moldavians, and today everyone can leave who has been summoned by presidents, by mamas, papas, aunts, and uncles, and then perhaps such a company can only mockingly be called a military unit.

If there were rocket projectiles in the location of the regiment and it, bleeding to death, was deprived of the ability to defend not the fatherland but itself by virtue, as is usually said, of political realities, this regiment, I will be so bold as to suggest, will no longer be a real regiment, for there is a limit to military humiliation among men, after which something ensues that bears no relationship to the concept of the "Army."

And if a soldier leaves this or another regiment located in a "hot spot" today or tomorrow, who will stop him? Who and what will prompt him to return? But if it is possible to leave a "hot spot," then why not any other spot?

According to data of the Main Military Procuracy, criminal charges are being brought against up to several thousand soldiers absent without leave and deserters. Nevertheless, many fugitives remain practically unpunished.

"This is understandable," believes Colonel of Justice Smertin, chief of the legislative department of the Main Military Procuracy. "At least because when the state collapses, the law enforcement institutions also disintegrate. Military procurators in large measure only file criminal charges, but the militia has practically turned away from its work in the search for those who evade military service. But our Army never had competent preliminary investigators or a professional investigative

service. Moreover, even if powerful structures were established, for example, for the kind of military police existing in foreign armies, this would hardly resolve the problem at the present time.

For the time being, the Commonwealth will not adopt final and unambiguous political decisions on the Armed Forces as long as an end is not put to legal nihilism; no efforts will have the needed effect.

Nevertheless, order and discipline have to be established in military formations on CIS territory. It seems that this can be done only through the common efforts of the heads of states, the command authorities, and the Ministry of Defense. After all, the concern is a common one, despite the differences.

As indicated by our not so remote history, the bacilli of anarchy and general permissiveness are spreading with the speed of an epidemic, with no regard for borders, and are capable of reducing regular regiments and divisions to the level of a crowd. The return path is thorny and long. If we dawdle over this question for a long time it is entirely possible that we will end up dividing not the mighty inheritance of an army that was once the largest in the world but its pitiful, disorganized, and demoralized fragments.

## CIS: POLICY

### Stolyarov on Press Treatment of Military

92UM0637A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 22 Feb 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Nikolay Stolyarov, assistant CinC, chairman of Committee for Work with Personnel, Commonwealth of Independent States Armed Forces: "Proudly and Hopefully About Our Army"; uncaptioned photograph included]

[Text] *It seems a paradox for some that the Army continues to maintain its integrity in a society that has divided almost everything into parts that can be divided. Yes, despite everything, we still have a relatively intact Army for now. A rather stable "unified Army space" is being preserved: a subject of irritation for some, a hope for stability of existence for others, and the final refuge of the idea of a great Motherland for still others... Meanwhile, the Army itself also is attempting to understand what it has become and what it must be in the new, uncustomary and so uncertain world.*

Let us ponder: Do we have the previous Army? Judge for yourself. Like other institutions of our society, the Army went halfway to meet the values proclaimed by perestroika: new political and social thinking, the individual's release from the yoke of totalitarian statehood, and the priority of economic freedoms.

Forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan without any kind of resistance from the Army. The Warsaw bloc self-liquidated relatively painlessly. The Army also

received the reunification of Germany relatively calmly and took interest in beginning to form a new system of mutual relations with NATO.

The very same percentage of the population in the Army as in all society voted for Yeltsin and all other presidents. And although the Army initially joined actively in the new political life and military persons everywhere advanced their candidacy in elections of new authorities, it nevertheless began actual elimination of party entities before government decisions were received. The elimination of political entities went calmly. The need for reducing the Army with an improvement of qualitative characteristics and professionalization was received by servicemen with understanding.

Like a diligent pupil, the Army began learning new relationships with society, in the final account presenting the civilian population with the preferential right of resolving problems of authority and the political system. Tragic consequences of the Army's provoked involvement in political conflicts in the Baltic, Georgia and Azerbaijan removed it almost once and for all from the system of clarification of relationships among political groupings and from the system of regulation of political and national self-determination processes.

Society today is frightened by military dictatorship. One might ask where such a dictatorship is to come from if military people have approached the foundation of truth (although not right away and not at once): that civilian life has its own internal, inherent forces for coping with an unhappy course of political processes. Today, in having taken a political elimination-of-illiteracy course together with society (not in political classes), the Army realizes that secular society certainly will overcome the contradictions and incompetent management, will find methods for transforming itself and will find the necessary managing forces without including in these processes regular Army forces intended for accomplishing other missions.

The Army now has progressed so far in the direction of depoliticization—this was also confirmed by the All-Service Officers Meeting of 17 January—that it has become capable of placing itself above the political conjuncture and current pragmatism of transient civil authorities. Today it is practically impossible to draw it into internal political, ethnic or any other kind of conflicts. In this it has approached the civilized model of an army adopted in leading world countries. As proof, no matter what may be said about it, the officer makeup of the All-Service Meeting did not allow itself to be drawn into futile political discussions, let alone political actions, either by ultra-radicals or by conservatives.

Meditation and swift reaction to innovation have become inherent to the Army.

Those who have braved political leadership today also should ponder this. And it would be worthwhile above all considering the fact that the Army consists not of guns, missiles and cruisers, but of people and destinies,

of all our children and loved ones, that it is an inalienable part of its society, and that it thinks and feels and is happy and suffers just as society does.

In short, society has become different. This being the case, could the Army remain the same? And the fact that it continues to retain vital force—possibly a bit more than society itself—is fully natural, for society prepared it for this.

Let us ponder anew what kind of Army we need today. Civilized society needs an Army which would meet the standard of a modern Army suitable for accomplishing supermissions such as those which arose in the Persian Gulf. And today it makes sense only for that kind of Army to exist in the world. Anything else is the purest form of entourage and architectural embellishment for some kind of private state system.

But a very complicated qualitative leap must be made to create such an Army: reducing it while integrating all its foremost elements, professionalizing, outfitting with the latest computer equipment, and converting existing material and intellectual potentials into a system of coordinates of newest high technologies.

It is quite obvious that such a task is not within the capability of an individual republic, albeit one that has declared itself to be an independent state.

But a question often follows such reasoning: "Why is an Army needed at all?" It must be admitted that the question is supremely legitimate. Doubts as to the need for an Army are not without grounds. The world has changed so much that it already has become **unprofitable to conquer** someone for the sake of seizing natural resources. It is easier to buy them. This is why the previous Union republics which declared themselves states are in such a euphoria of freedom. They have ceased to require the defensive function and consequently seemingly also any other function of the parent country. But everywhere in them there is the desire to "furnish" the phenomenon of independence with Army trappings. Moreover it is customarily thought that "armed detachments of people" are a necessary condition for any power. True, this is a mistake. From now on, government itself will defend itself exclusively by authority alone, which is measured approximately identically by all expenditures of society, including the military expenditure, specifically by the **results of proclaimed intentions**. I repeat, by the results, i.e., by real, actually felt concern for people and their fundamental interests.

And here is one more question in this connection: Does a unified, indivisible Army meet the security interests of people living on the territory of the former Union (how difficult it is to become accustomed to this phrase)? It would appear the answer is yes. And despite the fact that centrifugal forces already have drawn the Union Army into the process of disintegration, even more important circumstances remain, in connection with which the Army still will preserve unity.

**First**—in its aggregate expression, the Soviet Army represents a **supercomplex** system which is practically impossible to divide and dismantle quickly and without major material losses. I emphasize that it is practically impossible, even for Galina Starovoytova.

**Second**—the most far-sighted presidents have inherent doubts: Will they also not lose in something else except the Army by tearing their armed forces from a unified Army space with its high military-technological characteristics? Useful doubts.

**Third**—only with a high-technology Army that is **combat-effective** according to modern yardsticks (possible only with integrated efforts) is it possible to enter into a system of international **collective security** which is faced with missions of preventing the creep of nuclear weapons and growth of aggressiveness of barbarous, unpredictable regimes. But the fact is, there are many such regimes now.

The country's past is our own past, but we are behaving as if none of us has anything to do with the past and are not its creators.

Take the country's nuclear shield. No matter how much you address blame for its thoughtless creation to the past government and past Army leadership, you will not diminish or simplify the problem.

Our arsenals contain imperfect and unreliable warheads which previously met the highest demands of safety, but now do not. In principle, destruction of nuclear munitions is a most complex operation with which only highly rated specialists can be entrusted. They as well as all people who work with this object today are experiencing enormous moral and material burdens and their mental state is not adequate to the responsibility. Moreover, discipline and self-discipline unavoidably decline in the Army if it ceases to be valued in society.

In connection with all these reasons, in addition to all else, the **danger of an accidental explosion** also has increased.

Our country represented a system of systems (as did any other country, by the way). In splintering the country we did not simply cut up its geographic or economic space, we destroyed systems: the economic system is experiencing shock and the political system is in an amorphous state. All this also is not without danger, but it stands no comparison with what danger we "free" when we destroy "power systems" with their deadly filling.

The "two-tiered" structure of the Army question, in light of which the Army is viewed both as a "backward system" and a "shrinking system" and also as a structure of the Commonwealth and simultaneously of each individual state, is extraordinarily complex for resolution. The feeling is constantly present that we have decided to play with fire in the direct meaning of this word. We want to try to dismantle a "dangerous military supersystem" under conditions of social jolting.

On Sunday, 16 February, TV presented Marshal Shaposhnikov as the man of the week on the "Results" program. But in what context? He outplayed all presidents, imposed his own will on them, and dictates conditions...

It is not he who dictates conditions, however, but cruel necessity.

Dismemberment of the Army will occur against a very specific external and internal background. Externally, the dismantling of the Soviet Army will decorate the "escort fleet" of the following processes:

- An upgrading of technologies of NATO armies;
- A growth of military potential of the pan-Islamic world;
- Economic and geopolitical regrouping on the enormous expanse of the Asiatic continent capable of initiating dangerous dissension in the Turkic-Slavic world in the Asiatic USSR;
- The desire of known and still unknown small states to possess nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction.

The internal aspect consists of no less incendiary processes:

- A buildup of danger because of the inevitable lowering of the level for monitoring the status, storage, and technical serviceability of the nuclear potential; and of the level of professionalism of actions to reduce and destroy nuclear weapons;
- Technical and human displacements promising colossal damage to the economy and ecology—not in the least as a result of the squandering of military equipment;
- A worsening of the general economic situation, to the stabilization of which an integral Army could make its contribution.

And this entire aggregate of factors, so to speak, is not the fruit of nostalgic imagination, but reality, a reality with which serious politicians must reckon. But alas, strong economic ties and close unions are no obstacle, common lines of communication are no concern, and a common energy network is nothing in the matter of a "democratic dismemberment" of the country. But the Army sees much in a different way specifically because **its integrity is determined technically and technologically** and any kind of pretensions to power are deeply alien to it. It does not lose its head and does not even experience slight giddiness from the thought of power. Not bleared by ambitious-power upheavals, its awareness precisely tracks the gross contradictions in what is occurring. The Army is endlessly surprised by the general blindness that has set in for some unknown reason.

And specifically...

Republics have separated but steadfastly seek a formula of unification, inasmuch as all absolutely understand the importance of integration. The large hosts of apparatchiks are engaged in clarifying relationships concerning innumerable, infinite issues that as a rule are immaterial today. And this when a multitude of problems have accumulated in absolutely all republics, where the economic situation may enter an impasse once and for all without their resolution by joint efforts.

Where is common sense? Where is the economy of forces so necessary for restoring the undermined economy? Yes, the Army is guilty for its large numbers—it took and still takes much money from the budget, and it is ready to reduce and transfuse forces into the national economy. But from what bounties comes this squandering of personnel and capital? These endless congresses, trips, commissions, subcommissions, dissolutions of structures and piling on of new ones, movements, currents, meetings, sessions and... discoveries of America.

Last year an already almost disintegrated USSR, which even so existed very conditionally, could pass fully for a transition model to that new thing that would have crystallized in time: the life of republics and other relatively independent formations could have been implemented according to the formula "As few close ties as possible and as few obligations as possible." The transition to full independence of sovereigns or their unification on a new basis would have been done integrally, without doing violence to the historical process.

But how zealously specifically the SMI [the media] tries to prove to us that the Soviet Union's disintegration is a historical inevitability and that in its place is one historical reality, the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]! But the understanding is maturing more and more in society—an understanding which invariably existed in the Army—that the disintegration of our state, a state which is not without detriment, which is supercentralized and which is overcomplex but which is a historical state, is an anti-historical process. As of today, the USSR appears in the mass awareness as much more realistic than the CIS.

People who are far from politics do not understand in principle the present manipulations with the country. Although they voted for independence of republics, the majority of them in no way assumed that independence would signify a break with the Motherland in which they long ago became accustomed to live and in which almost every person has loved ones in the most varied corners of the Soviet Union—now called "former." The word "former" emerges somberly from the world of utility refuse, half-rotten trash, and the junkman's vocal coloring. Its use with respect to the Motherland, which each one in fact "nursed when it was half-dead," is insulting, disgraceful and degrading—and conjunctural to the highest degree.

The mass media brought it and introduced it to our awareness long before the Minsk turning point. It was encountered in newspapers everywhere already a year ago. Freed from the CPSU's ideological yoke, the independent mass media remained true to traditions. They turned themselves into an independent sector of politics. If one takes a careful look, it is easy to note that all our destructive changes, called "historical inevitability," were cut out and sewn according to the "SMI model."

The Union was still living and seeking the best form of its multinational and political consensus, but the most popular newspapers had already determined it to be former. Today the result has been achieved, unexpected for the masses, painful for the country's foremost intelligentsia. I never will forget the downcast, surprised face of Academician Likhachev when his arguments for the Union were not heard by the deputies, who seemingly had become deaf. Fiery speeches were given no heed. It was some kind of trance.

The very same mechanism also was used for our brainwashing in the case of Gorbachev, the country's first president. The SMI was first to sentence him. The KGB also was "reformed" before my eyes, also according to the "SMI model." What will be said in the newspapers today already was being carried out tomorrow by a Bakatin, a State Council and deputies who again were as if blinded.

Now the "SMI model" is aimed at the Army. Newspapers exaggerate the problem of a military coup. And I would not begin to emphasize the problem of the evil power of the SMI—we all love to read newspapers and are sincerely happy over the emancipation of the press. But then I saw how the "SMI model" began to work to fan the "Russia-Ukraine" conflict and was horrified. War between us is impossible! But there are the most chilling forecasts in the newspapers. A conflict of Ukraine and Russia already is being presented as a precondition for a very large European war in which Germany will support Ukraine and America will support Russia. I do not believe any of this devilry. But up until now almost all the "SMI models" have "worked"—these are toys cleaner than atomic ones! This is not simply stupid; this is almost a crime, gentlemen journalists, to pass off the inability of Ukrainian and Russian leaders to come to an agreement with each other as the precursor of a Russian-Ukrainian war. Better we also should have asked ourselves the question: Will Ukrainian and Russian subjects, who are becoming weak from poor nutrition, lack of money and physical wear of clothing, have anything in which to go to war? Peoples of Ukraine and Russia never **WILL BE ABLE** to fight each other if only because they have no reason to delve into "purity of race." I recall that Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev was from Kiev, Leonid Ilich Brezhnev from Dnepropetrovsk, and Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev says he is half Ukrainian. Even though you force Ukrainian military units to swear allegiance to Ukraine another hundred times, they will not carry out an order for war against Russian troops, just as Russian units will not do so. It

will be easier for them to come to an agreement on changing rulers than to begin to fight.

So pardon me, better let us give the appearance that this is very serious—two states, two armies, two peoples—but leave the subject of war in peace. And let there be more humor with respect to all our “divorces” in the state sense. Here the might of the SMI also would work to its own benefit.

Peoples and nations, many generations of whom created a strong state capable of upward flight, rarely quarrel with each other. Political clans and mafia associations quarrel, and they specifically use the factor of nationalism in order to obtain personal benefit for themselves by inciting war and a national-ambition stir among the population.

But peoples and parliaments must know that **the Army is not at all in favor of returning to the past.** It is for sensible reforms, market mechanisms, enterprise, farming, and new political and economic relations. It wishes to see sensible rulers at the helm of power who would not harm the people; let them seek increasingly effective means of development. The Army will not accept one thing—senseless disintegration of the homeland.

If the USSR's dismantling really had gone on within a historically expedient state of affairs, then who would have objected to it? But the independence of peoples, which has as its basis the cult of nationalism and an ignoring of the determinant of economic integration, promises nothing except total economic ruin, and in fact is “pseudoindependence.”

Yes, in its totality Army awareness today is the staunchest bearer of the idea of a unified and great Motherland. And today, on the day of their holiday, military people do not plan to impose it by force, but are proud of the fact that they never betrayed the **Motherland**, to which they swore allegiance once and for all, for any promises. They also will not betray it today when it is so ill and so needs help.

The Army hopes it will have the self-control to await the time when peoples who are again united and have achieved prosperity will say thank-you to it for its long-suffering nature, nonuse of weapons, principle, common sense, love for the Motherland and faithful service to it under the colors of historical accomplishments of the renowned Russian and entire Soviet Army.

Congratulations to you, dear friends, on the holiday!

### **CIS Crisis Force Proposed**

*92UM0760A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 5 Mar 92 p 2*

[Unattributed Article; “Kazakhstan President's Statement”]

[Text] In connection with events in Nagorno-Karabakh, Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev came forward March

4th with a statement, in which he pointed out that the tragic development of an armed conflict could have a negative effect on the evolution of the entire socio-political situation in Zakavkaz and North Kavkaz, turn the region into a source of international tension, and create a precedent for the uncontrollable spread of conflict in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].

With the aim of stopping further bloodshed and containing the Karabakh conflict, Nazarbayev conducted negotiations with the president of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutalibov, and the president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, as well as with CIS Air Force Chief of Staff V. Samsonov. As a result of the negotiations, Nazarbayev came to the conclusion that it was necessary for the CIS Chiefs of State Council to adopt a resolution regarding: an immediate cease fire and the removal of blockades from roads and supply lines; a temporary halt on processes to create armed forces in each individual CIS state in a demonstration of good will and peaceful aspirations; the immediate initiation of work on forming special peace-keeping forces to serve in crisis regions of the CIS that are subordinate to the Commonwealth Chiefs of State Council (the republic of Kazakhstan has proposed a plan for creating these forces); supporting CSCE [Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe] peace-keeping efforts; and calling for Commonwealth members to direct their representatives to take part in mediation groups working to bring the conflict under control.

### **CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES**

#### **Kravchuk Addresses Uzin Pilots**

*92UM0741A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 Mar 92 p 2*

[Article by Colonel A. Polyakov: “What Sort of Pilot Does not Fly? But There Already Has not Been any Fuel at the Notorious Uzin Division for an Entire Month...”]

[Text] Three weeks ago, military pilots of a strategic division deployed in the Ukrainian City of Uzin stirred up public opinion and roused politicians and the command authorities. Some of the personnel of two regiments took the oath of loyalty to Ukraine.

We need to note that the correct decisions were found in that situation. The Ukrainian Minister of Defense and the long range aviation command authorities found the required mutual understanding. President L. Kravchuk sent a special appeal to the personnel of the two regiments. He assured the pilots that Ukraine guarantees them social protection but at the same time confirmed the need for the division to remain in the previous structures and be subordinate to the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] OVS [Allied Armed Forces] Commander-in-Chief and to carry out the missions defined for it.

Soon it was announced via republic television that the officers in Uzin who had taken the Ukrainian oath were being released into the reserve and, moreover, without pensions. They said that is how the command authority is keeping its word to not take repressive measures against the oath-takers.

And here I am once again in Uzin. It turns out that many people had heard about that report here. They are amazed. They are at a loss.

"No officer or warrant officer from our unit who took the oath has been released into the reserve or retired without a pension against their will," said Tanker Regimental Commander Colonel A. Kuznetsov, who was the initiator of the oath taking.

Col V. Vinokurov, commander of the second regiment, confirmed that same thing. They are attempting to do everything in the division so that no misunderstandings arise around taking the oath.

"Soon after the oath taking, Col Vinokurov assembled us and strictly warned that there should not even be any friendly jokes in this regard," said Detachment Commander Major G. Demushkin. "And we are grateful to him that the regiment has not been divided into two camps..."

Although that possibility has not been excluded. And not only in the bomber regiment. For example, in the neighboring crew which Major S. Katayev commands, three officers took the oath and the fourth refused to do so.

"We have agreed to even go to the Far East," said Captains V. Karasev and S. Novikov, members of that crew. "But we are also not condemning those who have sworn to Ukraine. They have their own apartments here for which they waited half of their lives. And right now, see for yourself, that is the kind of time we are living in..."

So, in recent years, much has changed and for far from the better.

"I recently arrived in the homeland and did not believe my eyes," Col V. Vinokurov told me painfully. "My school classmate has a beautiful apartment, works at a cooperative, and has acquired a personal 'Volga' after seven years in prison for a group crime. Has he really given as much to the Homeland as I or any of my fellow servicemen or subordinates?..."

No matter how much I talked with pilots in the division, they almost all talked about the fact that the politicians perform such loops in which pilots end up in a spin. And yet the aviators are prepared to perform their duties, despite either their unclear futures or the presence of two oaths in one unit. Only they must not be involved with rumors. The aircraft, both bombers and tankers, have been idle for nearly a month. There is no fuel. When I was at the division, three aircraft with several crews on board flew to Russia to an airfield where there still is fuel and where they can perform flying training.

"A pilot, like a musician, needs constant and regular training," said Deputy Division Commander Military Pilot 1st Class Col V. Maskayev. "And we have already not been flying for a month."

And although the commanders are attempting to fill training time with ground training, what good is it to be a pilot who does not fly? The customary rhythmic of combat training has been violated and an unenthusiastic spirit permeates the ranks of the "strategic pilots" and their best regiments.

Yes, the covered aircraft have come to a standstill on the hard stands...

#### INCIDENTALLY:

**UZIN (Kiev Oblast), March 6.** (Ukrinform Correspondent Nikolay Zaika—TASS): By order of CIS Allied Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, Major-General of Aviation Mikhail Bashkirov, commander of the "mutinous" air division, has been relieved of duty, deleted from the rolls of CIS Allied Armed Forces personnel, and his personal file has been transferred to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Through this same order, Deputy Division Commander for Rear Services Col Yuriy Skabkin and Assistant Division Commander for Personnel Col Aleksandr Pakhomovskiy have been released into the reserve. The justifications were not indicated in the order.

This decision conflicts with the Ukrainian President's position which was formulated in a letter to division personnel. Leonid Kravchuk assured the aviators: "Our State will strive to do everything to prevent cases of persecution of officials and personnel who have taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine."

#### Divisive Situation in Uzin Air Unit Chronicled

*92UM0742A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
27 Feb 92 pp 1,2*

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel N. Gorenko: "The Line of Honor: Strategic Aviation: Before and After Taking the Oath to Ukraine"]

[Text] Uzin, Kiev Oblast: 67 percent of the personnel of the heavy bomber aviation unit commanded by Major-General M. Bashkirov have taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine.

I think that both the politicians, the highest leadership of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Long Range Aviation, and we, the journalists, have turned more than once to this precedent. Because the fact of the oath consisted of something more than simply the aspect of the oath. The personnel of a strategic division have taken the oath. And this signifies that the process of state-political thinking is going a great distance. It is becoming



not simply a theoretical formula but a way of thinking and action for thousands of people, in this case people standing near missiles.

History does not have an analogy. And we could have talked about "mutinous Uzin" beforehand. But, it seems to me, that it did not happen. A much too difficult and unusual situation developed at the division prior to February 13—the day of the oath taking. The too twisted, steep situation that is just like a line is being maintained in the division collective even today. Considering this, it would hardly be appropriate to describe the story in a telegraphic-sensational style: live, not mythical people, have become involved in it...

But it would hardly be permissible to be silent about the memorable fact: "Strategic pilots" have taken the oath...

Therefore, today, two weeks later, when passions have somewhat subsided, I will describe the details and motives for the oath-taking in an unbiased manner and the fact that hundreds of aviators stand behind the deed who, if I can characterize them figuratively, we can call their line of honor...

Major-General of Aviation Mikhail Mikhaylovich Bashkirov is 44 years old and, according to the unanimous opinion of practically everyone with whom I talked about him, is characterized as a talented and promising commander. For example, the commander of the air army, of which Bashkirov's division is a part, told me an interesting detail: the general had been regarded as a candidate for the position of chief of staff—first deputy commander. He has been commanding the division for three years. He graduated from the military academy and from the General Staff Academy. He is intelligent, astute, and bold. That same Army Commander Lieutenant-General Boris Afanasyevich Konstantinov said: "You need to have strength and bravery in order to undertake that and then withstand the pressure..." This fact indicates Bashkirov's mind and political astuteness. Speaking at a meeting between the President of Ukraine and the military district's highest military leadership, he, while talking to the politicians, expressed the thought: Quit dividing the nuclear buttons, I have more of them than any president...

**This was an appeal to not draw the army into the vortex of political intrigue.**

Alas, he was either not heard or completely understood by the CIS Long Range Aviation's highest leadership. Orders and instructions, the contents of which contradicted state policy of Ukraine and republic law, arrived at the division in January and February...

On January 17, instruction (order) number 42(9)24 arrived from Acting Long Range Aviation Chief of Staff Major-General of Aviation Kalmykov to transfer one IL-76 aircraft to Engels.

On January 28, order No. 42(3)28 arrived from CIS Long Range Aviation Commander Colonel-General I.

Kalugin on the transfer of another five aircraft, this time IL-78's, to Engels. These are transport aircraft that are used as tankers for aerial refueling of military aircraft.

On February 5, an order arrived, signed by the CIS first deputy long range aviation commander, to transfer 18 motor vehicles to Tver...

Division personnel think that the long range aviation command authorities, under the guise of verifying combat readiness, have set as their goal the transfer of the entire division to Russian territory which was not caused by the need to change operational-strategic plans...

The long range aviation leadership unilaterally decided to remove the aircraft and motor vehicles which violated the Ukrainian Defense Council decision on terminating military unit strength reductions, including shipping (withdrawing) equipment beyond the borders of Ukraine. Division personnel have assessed these actions as the involvement of the division leadership and all aviators in the process of ignoring the laws of Ukraine, the decision of the Ukrainian Defense Council, and the orders of the President of Ukraine.

On leave since February 4 and while remaining informed about the situation in the division, Division Commander M. Bashkirov returned to duty on February 13. They reported to him: the regiment that Col Kuznetsov commands conducted a personnel assembly and decided to take the oath of loyalty to Ukraine. The people decided as follows: the transfer to the jurisdiction of Ukraine will put an end to the supremacy [vlastovaniye] of the orders of the CIS Long Range Aviation highest leadership which contradict the laws of Ukraine.

What should the division commander have done in that situation: take the regiment by the hand? Bashkirov called a meeting. The division leadership considered it possible and advisable in the situation that was developing to take the oath and to transfer to the jurisdiction of Ukraine. And that is what was done.

It was impossible to delay any further the fundamental resolution of the conflict situation with the army and CIS DA [Long Range Aviation] leadership. On February 10, they barely managed to prevent the transfer of aircraft: using the zonal air traffic control center. And consider how and at what cost! The center reported to the division commander that not a single aircraft would leave the borders of Ukraine: one of the regiment's fighter aircraft was brought to the appropriate level of combat readiness and the strip alert section of a PVO [Air Defense] unit received the appropriate orders...

**One could smell gunpowder in the air.**

Both General M. Bashkirov and all of those personnel who were part of the 67 percent who have currently taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine have found themselves in a situation under which both fulfillment of the orders of the CIS aviation command authorities and their nonfulfillment entail criminal liability

from one side or the other. The procurator visited the unit. He warned M. Bashkirov that he would be criminally liable for not carrying out the Ukrainian Presidential Decree prohibiting the shipment of equipment beyond the borders of the republic and also for failing to carry out the Ukrainian Minister of Defense order on this. Specifically, the minister's order states that **the shipment or movement of military equipment, weapons, ammunition, and materiel beyond the borders of Ukraine can only be carried out in accordance with a Ukrainian Minister of Defense order and that "orders on these issues that originate from the former USSR Ministry of Defense are illegal and are not subject to execution."**

These are the primary reasons and details why the CIS strategic forces aviators took the oath.

And what about the other side: how do the army and CIS Long Range Aviation command authorities assess the situation?

During our first meeting, Army Commander Lieutenant-General of Aviation B. Konstantinov characterized what had occurred as "defying explanation." He assessed the motives that guided General M. Bashkirov as "not subject to normal logic." He also said that what had occurred was totally unexpected: Major-General of Aviation M. Bashkirov was considered to be a general who was most loyal to CIS interests...

Essentially, the army commander stated that, first of all, **the ferrying of aircraft to Russia had not been planned.** The aircraft aerial refueling regiment also services a combat regiment deployed on Russian territory. According to its combat mission, they plan to use the Russian bomber regiment without aerial refueling. However, these issues were envisioned as being worked out according to the combat training program. Therefore, they had also previously carried out similar redeployments. The army commander stressed that there were no intentions to "hijack aircraft."

Secondly, General B. Konstantinov explained that, as the commander, he has the right, in accordance with the Agreement on CIS Strategic Forces, to order aircraft subordinate to him without reporting operational scenarios or mobilization plans to subordinates, but to simply issue orders.

My second meeting with the army commander occurred after he and CIS Long Range Aviation Commander Colonel-General of Aviation I. Kalugin visited the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and they had more than a two-hour conversation with Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov.

Boris Afanasyevich Konstantinov commented on the results of the meeting as follows.

"We primarily discussed how to stop the withdrawal of vehicles and various types of equipment beyond the borders of Ukraine without the approval of the Ministry of Defense. We achieved a mutual understanding on this

issue. Further, to prevent, under any circumstances, any discrimination whatsoever against personnel according to whether or not they had taken the oath. Taking the oath does not mean that a servicemen henceforth does not serve in the strategic forces. Or the contrary: not taking the oath does not mean that a man must be removed from his post...

"We agreed on the creation of a division reform plan by the end of 1994. We achieved an agreement that the division will remain in the previous structure and in the division subordination until that time..."

I also posed this question to CIS Long Range Aviation Commander Colonel-General of Aviation I. Kalugin: How will General Bashkirov's fate be resolved? On February 14, Igor Mikhaylovich Kalugin removed Bashkirov from fulfilling his duties and ordered the preparation of documents for Bashkirov's release...

The commander stated:

"An unambiguous decision has not taken shape. I am conducting conversations on this issue. I have talked with the Ukrainian Minister of Defense. Right now, I am consulting with the Air Force leadership with a subsequent report to Commander-in-Chief Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov. The tranquility of the personnel is the determining factor for me right now, so that any sort of removal or retention in a position does not impact events so that they become complicated once again."

Those are the commentaries.

I did not ask the previously mentioned question by chance. Today, very many personnel in the division are troubled by the thought: **Will the CIS Armed Forces command authorities not undertake some sort of persecution for taking the oath, despite the statements prohibiting discrimination?** This alarm, in particular, is heard in the appeal of division personnel to the President of Ukraine. It states: "Personnel believe that, by placing the division under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, you will prevent persecution by the central leadership of all personnel who have taken the oath and you will remove moral tension in military collectives and in their families."

The Ukrainian President, as stated in his response, perceived the appeal "with deep understanding." **Ukraine guarantees the rights and freedoms of all citizens who are performing service on its territory,** stressed the President's response. **"The units of your division are under the protection of the laws of Ukraine and you are full citizens of Ukraine..."**

At the same time, the President wrote: **division units will carry out CIS strategic forces missions.**

This circumstance places a high moral responsibility on the CIS Air Force leadership. Persecution and reprisals should not take place. The commanders talked about their prohibition. There is an agreement with the Ukrainian Minister of Defense. An understanding of the political nature of the situation has been achieved.

The line of honor of the "Bashkirovites," as they now call the oath takers, must not be broken...

### Ukrainian Troops Remove Blockade of Uzin Airfield

92UM0716A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian 29 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer under the rubric "The Army": "The New Military Leadership in Kiev Has Tested its Newly-Sworn-in Army"]

[Text] The Ukrainian National Guard was formed out of the former internal troops, and it was necessary to open Ukrainian language schools for the personnel. Servicemen of various nationalities are being taught the language.

New converts are always exceedingly zealous in their new faith. The Ukrainian Officers' Union, headed by Col Martirosyan, former people's deputy of the USSR, is striving successfully to see that the Ukrainian oath is taken in various units of the former Soviet army, including the strategic forces, which remain under a unified command under the Minsk Agreement.

A crisis developed on 13 January at the long-range air base at Uzin, where a regiment of Tu-95 MS heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles (21 aircraft, 168 nuclear weapons) and a regiment of Il-78 aircraft (flying tankers) are based. Maj Gen Avn Bashkirov, commander of the division uniting these regiments, and a considerable number of other officers took the Ukrainian oath. The division was removed from the command of the long-range air headquarters and therefore also that of commander in chief Shaposhnikov, to whom the President of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] had transferred command of all nuclear forces.

Today, according to Col Gen Igor Kalugin, commander of the long-range air force (DA), the situation has been normalized somewhat. General Bashkirov has been relieved of his command and placed under the command of the Kiev defense ministry. Two of his deputies have also been removed from their positions. A new division commander is to be designated soon, but will the officers who have taken the Ukrainian oath serve under him? More importantly, how will the new Ukrainian military command conduct itself?

At the height of the Uzin crisis, it has been learned from officers serving in Ukraine, the Kiev defense ministry ordered units of the division based at Belaya Tserkov to move up to Uzin and block the runway with military equipment. It was apparently feared that some of the aircraft would fly to Russia (most of the pilots and navigators in the bomber regiment had refused to take the oath to Ukraine). Gen Kalugin, long-range air commander, who was at Uzin at that time, confirmed the fact that equipment of ground troops (Ukrainian) had been moved onto the territory of the strategic air base and deployed along the runways. As nearly as one can judge, the troops had been ordered to cut off the runway if there were an attempt to take off.

At this point it is difficult to consider all the consequences of a possible confrontation, which, fortunately, did not take place. And the consequences could have been irreparable. The destruction of a Tu-95 MS fully armed with live ammunition could have resulted in contamination of the area with plutonium (a metal both radioactive and extremely toxic).

All that is now over. Following talks with Kiev, according to Gen Kalugin, the Ukrainian troops were withdrawn from Uzin. It is more than possible, however, that Kiev will attempt to use armed force to resolve various, specific political problems again in the future.

Luckily, there is little likelihood of a "big" war between Russia and Ukraine, however. Even purely technical factors make this so. The formations of armed forces of the former USSR are for now directed outward and not inward. The most powerful grouping of forces on the territory of the Russian Federation is stationed in the Far East, on the Chinese border (another powerful "Russian" group of forces is billeted in Germany). The "Ukrainian" troops are, in turn, directed toward Eastern and Central Europe (the Carpathian district is the most powerful). There are no people in uniform on the Ukrainian-Russian border right now, only GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] personnel playing at a customs war.

Any significant movement of forces and equipment to the new border, to the center of the Russian plain, would take years and involve enormous cost. Given the current economic disarray, it could take not just years but even decades. Thank God, a "Yugoslav scenario" on the Russian plain is impossible for now. Tensions in Russian-Ukrainian relations can only increase, however, as long as the Ukrainian army, being strengthened by the day, is opposed by an amorphous and increasingly less battleworthy army of a nonexistent state formation (the CIS) ultimately subordinate to the Council of Presidents, in which the Ukraine can block any decision. Formations lacking a state banner cannot be battleworthy, and they generate respect in no one. Consequently, they can not be guarantors of peace and stability. Further delay with the establishment of a Russian army can ultimately result in disaster.

### Fate of Strategic Forces, Weapons Viewed

92UM0682A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
14 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Maj Gen G.V. Zhivitsa, acting chief of the Main Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: "Only on a Legal Basis"]

[Text] The future of personnel and facilities of strategic forces units will be decided only on a legal basis following the withdrawal of nuclear weapons.

A nonnuclear Ukraine. Today these are not just words but an objective reality. I would point out, however, that only the first steps have been taken on the path to the

complete liberation of Ukrainian land from the deadly weapons. Ahead lies a lot of responsible work. And this is understood well by everyone involved in the removal of nuclear ammunition to sites for its dismantling and destruction or who will be involved in this work in the future. Furthermore, they take into account the fact that this complex operation will entail a number of serious difficulties. They see the demolition of nuclear ammunition and missile systems and the transportation of nuclear ammunition components as one of them; determination of the future of many servicemen, upon whom peace and tranquility on the planet depend, as a second; a third.... But let us take a look at the first two, because they are mentioned most frequently in letters from and statements by people affected in one way or another by the subject of our discussion.

With respect to the technical aspect of the matter—removing the warheads, readying them for shipment, and much more—no major problems are foreseen. Let us hope that the procedure worked out over a period of years for moving the nuclear charges will not break down one last time and will make it possible to accomplish the historic mission on schedule. And that schedule is the following. All tactical nuclear weapons are to be shipped out by July of this year, all the strategic weapons by the end of 1994.

It will be far more difficult to deal with the people, who until recently had not thought seriously about where the service might take them tomorrow or a year from now. Their families were also at peace. And then suddenly, some of them were told their units would exist another year; others, a year and a half. An individual in this situation cannot help becoming tormented by such questions as "What will become of me when the subunit is disbanded?" and "Will I not be asked to leave the military?" When they come up with no answers, they begin performing their duties out of inertia alone and, naturally, not producing the proper results. In this situation the commanders have to work hard to maintain good morale in subordinates, particularly those who man the missile control panels day and night.

The officers and warrant officers are troubled about more than just their personal fate. Every day, when they see the fine installations and equipment, the highly developed system of roads and much, much more, they wonder what is to become of all this. Will the destruction trend so fashionable of late not get the upper hand? Incidentally, such questions are being asked not just by the military, but also by the leaders of those rayons and oblasts in which the units of strategic forces are stationed. When they can find no answers, they frequently address the questions to the President, the Parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers or the Minister of Defense of Ukraine.

For example, Prime Minister Fokin and Col Gen K.P. Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine, recently received a letter from Comrade S.Ya. Guselnikov,

chairman of the Khmel'nitskiy Oblast Executive Committee, expressing his concern and that of the formation command element about making prudent use of the materiel, real estate and individual weapons following the removal of the nuclear weapons. Following up on the letter, Lt Col V. Reznikov traveled to the site and familiarized himself in detail with the situation. And the situation is as follows.

At this point nothing is being dismantled or hauled out of the oblast or the republic. The missilemen engage in their scheduled training, stand alert duty and perform technical servicing on the missile systems. Under the agreement concluded between the former Union and the USA, this formation is not included on the list of strategic forces subject to reduction. Until recently the personnel therefore calmly engaged in the performance of their duties and carried out their assigned missions. Not every officer had peace of mind, to be sure. Many of them—more than 80, to be precise—are on the list of those without housing. You should not be surprised at this. The apartment problem has not bypassed even the servicemen who have been considered and continue to be considered as belonging to the elite of the armed forces, those who, when they were written about, were discussed only in rosy colors. It turns out, however, that the masters of the nuclear weapons differ little from officers in the other military branches and troop arms. Like the tankmen, motorized riflemen, sailors and signalmen, they are stationed in unfamiliar parts for years on end and rent housing at exorbitant prices.

Now, following the announcement that Ukraine will be nonnuclear, another problem has been added to this far-from-simple problem: uncertainty that every officer and warrant officer will be permitted to serve out his established term. It is not difficult to imagine the mood of the missilemen as they go on duty or what they think about while they are at the command posts. They are thinking about that apartment, about an unemployed wife and their possible imminent discharge into the reserve. Frankly, the situation is alarming, and one cannot mobilize the personnel to work well and motivate them to demonstrate their former persistence, self-discipline and organization with appeals, persuasion and promises alone. The situation needs to be clarified.

What would I want to say to Maj Gen R. Karimov's subordinates about this? First of all, I would remind them that the position taken by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine toward the officers and warrant officers serving in units and subunits to be reduced corresponds fully to the Law on Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Families, which is itself unique and has no equal in the legal praxis of other states. Under this law not a single servicemen may be discharged from the armed forces without a pension and housing.

And this is not the only guarantees provided by Ukrainian law. We also have to mention the fact that these benefits apply not just to military personnel in the armed

forces of Ukraine, but also to personnel in other forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States stationed inside our state.

One cannot understand the position of either the military or the oblast and rayon leaders who have sounded the alarm about the future use of structures, communication lines, electric power plants, refrigeration units and helicopter pads for civilian purposes. They had a reason for sounding the alarm. The veterans of this formation, old-timers in the oblast, remember well how the equipment at obsolete complexes was broken up and destroyed in the '60s. And no one asked anyone. The effort to keep everything in strict secrecy prevailed.

In order to prevent the same thing from happening 30 years later, a commission consisting of reserve officers, participants in the construction of the facilities and local authorities was set up under the oblast executive committee. Its main purpose is to prevent the ruining or pilfering of military equipment and property, to see that prudent civilian use is made of everything built in the past at considerable expense. And there is something to transfer to civilian use, something which can serve the state. I have already mentioned the fact that the missile sites have a highly developed network of roads, all sorts of storage facilities and structures which can be put to purely civilian use without any special difficulty. I would add to this the fact that enterprising people with the state's interests in mind have an equal interest in the computer center, underground installations, large power plants....

Many proposals are being submitted today on what this unit can be turned into after it is disbanded. In some circles, for example, there is talk of using some of the launch vehicles for commercial purposes. And these are not illusions about a (Nyu-Vasyuka). There is practically everything here for launching missiles with peaceful payloads. I can personally see a dual benefit from this. In the first place, there could be significant earnings, including [foreign] currency, and in the second place, we could put to work servicing and operating the missiles complexes officers who will in the near future have to ask themselves whether they should continue serving in the military.

Equally tempting is the idea of using the large underground installations as storage facilities for various materials.

The availability of warehouse space, power plants and access roads to them opens up for the agricultural workers—and not just them—interesting prospects for the storage of crops and the establishment of small enterprises for processing them.

There are more realistic proposals as well. For example, the oblast executive committee is asking the entirely reasonable question of whether it makes sense to invest funds to provide a certain rayon with a telephone system when the military have built a reliable communication system. Would it not be better to wait a year or two and

inherit this system, using this money in the meantime for other purposes? Does that make sense? Absolutely. The only problem is that the local authorities and economic planners are not confident that after the formation is disbanded they can legally acquire the communication cables, switchboard equipment and other facilities. And all because no decision has been made yet on what can and what cannot be turned over to the national economy. The mechanism, so to speak, for transferring the military facilities has not been worked out. So long as this is the case all sorts of rumors will circulate. Among other things, idle tongues have recently spread the allegation that higher headquarters has vetoed the transfer of all real estate and other property and will eventually sell it through the exchange. Oblast authorities are upset at this prospect. Just who, if not they, have a complete moral right to at least a small portion of that which was built with their assistance?

Incidentally, even now the oblast is not leaving the military to deal with their difficulties alone. It is providing them with everything necessary, especially food and goods, even though it has its own problems with these things.

I would like to say in conclusion that the materials and equipment base of the formation of strategic forces does have a future. It is important only to make prudent and intelligent use of all its assets, bearing the approaching market situation in mind. What to turn over, how, and to whom? The answers to these questions must be provided by a commission made up of representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, local authorities and the formation's command element. Otherwise, we cannot avoid errors and miscalculations in this enormous job. That is one thing. In the second place, by helping to resolve disputes the commission could reduce tensions both in the military collectives and among the civilian population and provide real assistance in the resolution of many social problems.

### CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

#### Lt Gen Pavlov on Performance, Specifications of 'Hokum' Helicopter

*92UM0688A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
3 Mar 92 First Edition p 2*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major S. Prokopenko, with commentary by Lieutenant General of Aviation V. Pavlov, commander of Ground Forces Army Aviation, HSU, Honored Military Pilot of the USSR: "Helicopter Scientific-Technical Complex imeni N. I. Kamov Presents the 'Hokum': Helicopter-Werewolf"]

[Text] Such is the nature of any combat equipment: it forces its creators to strive for superiority over already known models by giving a craft new qualities which broaden its tactical capabilities. The experience of American forces' combat operations in Vietnam prompted the

United States to develop the AH-63 and AH-64 combat helicopters on a competitive basis. And in this period our domestic helicopter builders were carrying on active research into possibilities of creating combat helicopters of different configurations: coaxial or side-by-side.

As a result of this research the Experimental Design Bureau imeni N. I. Kamov completed the preliminary design of an Army combat helicopter which NATO later codenamed "Hokum"—Werewolf [sic]. Although this design was viewed as an alternative to the AH-64 helicopter, according to its developers' concept it was not supposed to copy the Apache design. Moreover, they made their own attempt to give their vision the combat helicopter role in modern battle.

The Hokum made its maiden flight on 27 July 1982. The combat craft is made with a coaxial configuration, but this is not simply the calling-card of the Helicopter Scientific-Technical Complex imeni N. I. Kamov; it is a means of achieving the goal in the helicopter-weapon-man complex.

In contrast to American AH-64 Apache helicopters and its main competitor, the Mi-28, the Hokum is flown by one pilot. Only the craft's training version is an exception, providing for a tandem accommodation of cadet and instructor.

Thus the Hokum became the first domestic single-place attack helicopter. Its lot is to battle ground troops on the battlefield. Soviet forces' combat operations in Afghanistan enabled the correctness of characteristics put into the craft to be evaluated to a certain extent. In particular, the Afghanistan experience confirmed the need for combat helicopters to have high maneuverability, particularly the capability of changing flight direction abruptly and suddenly, even in the opposite direction, while maintaining an exceptionally small radius in a 360 degree banked turn; to have a rate of climb supporting the negotiation of mountain slopes open to the enemy at a high flight speed; and to have a hover ceiling of at least 4,000 m.

All these conditions were taken into account in creating the new combat craft.

Another distinguishing feature of the Hokum is a fully armored cockpit protecting the pilot against small arms with a caliber of up to 20 mm.

The helicopter's armament has an appreciable effect on shaping its design appearance. An important factor was the use of the 2A42 30-mm tank gun with selective feed on the Hokum. Unprecedented accuracy of fire is provided because of an original design solution of attaching the gun turret to the fuselage power section near the helicopter's center of gravity. Other kinds of armament include antitank projectiles and free-flight rockets on the wing panels. There can be up to 16 ATGM's and up to 80 80-mm free-flight projectiles accommodated on outer hardpoints. The helicopter has a total of four weapon suspension points.

The aiming and flying system enables one crew member to fly the helicopter and control firing of all kinds of

weapons. All current flight and system status information is shown on work consoles and in the pilot display system. There also are provisions for work modes where information is received from reconnaissance helicopters over the radio channel.

The Hokum also does not give ground specialists much trouble. The helicopter was designed especially to facilitate its off-airfield preparation. Weapon and electronic system servicing, fueling and arming are done from the ground, the power plant is serviced from cowling ladders, and main rotors are serviced from the fuselage upper surface. Hinges not requiring lubrication have been introduced in all movable joints, including on the main rotor. A system to protect engines and blades from erosion also is provided.

The design of the helicopter's systems provides for its combat employment with a lengthy separation of over two weeks from main bases.

The Hokum can be transported by Il-76 aircraft partially disassembled. The possibility of its independent rebasing over long distances also is provided. The helicopter has special pods secured at weapon suspension points for these purposes.

Thus the Hokum represents a new generation of combat helicopters capable of considerably expanding the potential of Army aviation and ensuring high combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

#### Basic Performance Characteristics:

Maximum flight speed (in flat dive)	350 km/hr
Maximum g-load	3
Hover ceiling (outside of ground effect)	4,000 m
Vertical rate of climb at altitude of 2,500 m	10 m/sec [first digit illegible]
Main rotor diameter	14.5 m [first digit illegible]
Length of helicopter with rotating rotors	16 m
<b>ARMAMENT</b>	
<b>ATGM</b>	
—Launch range	8-10 km [last digit partially legible]
—Armor penetration	900 mm with dynamic protection
—Guidance system	Laser
<b>Gun</b>	
—Caliber	30 mm
—Feed	Selective
—Number of projectiles	Up to 500
<b>Free-flight rockets</b>	
—Caliber	80 mm
—Number in packs	Up to 80

Use of other kinds of interchangeable weapons is possible.

**Commentary by Lieutenant General of Aviation V. Pavlov, commander of Ground Forces Army Aviation, HSU, Honored Military Pilot of the USSR:**

The Hokum is a fundamentally new combat helicopter, such as in its saturation with electronic and automatic equipment. An ejection seat, a very important means of crew survival, has been installed in it for the first time. At the same time, this is the first domestic multipurpose helicopter with one crew member, which of course has its pros and cons. The fact is, we have become accustomed to the fact that flying, searching for and detecting targets, vectoring, and destroying targets was done by two crew members up until now. An already specific stereotype of dual control—pilot and operator—was developed here, and naturally after this it will be rather difficult to fall out of the habit of it. But—and I would like to emphasize this—the equipment installed in this helicopter permits accomplishing the full set of missions by one pilot. Everything will depend on his degree of preparedness and training.

The fact that installed gear permits nap-of-the-earth flying also can be included among the merits of this craft. There is altitude stabilization and target memory.

The Hokum is very effective in operating from ambushes. The wind practically does not affect it. The craft is capable of maneuvering rapidly with a 180 degree transition in direction of movement, turning the cockpit in flight, and executing lateral displacements with a speed of more than 100 km/hr. All these qualities in combination with the latest flying, aiming and navigation equipment place the helicopter among new-generation craft in its capabilities, in its maneuverability and in the power of its weapons.

I wish to make special mention of the latter. The weapon complex provided in the helicopter permits fighting all kinds of combat equipment on the battlefield, and laser beam guidance of weapons permits engaging armored targets with supreme accuracy.

Of course, the helicopter builders did everything dependent on them: they created an excellent combat craft and mastered its series production. Now a great deal will depend on the funds which will be allocated to us for purchasing the combat equipment.

## CIS: NAVAL FORCES

### Yearly Summary of Northern Fleet Counterintelligence Activities

92UM0649A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 24 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Sergey Nagayev, reporting from Severomorsk, Murmansk and Moscow: "Spies: The Fishing Season is Continuing and This is Both Good and Correct"]

[Text] Please don't think that any irony is meant in the title. It must be understood literally for it is a question of the work of our military counterintelligence and among its basic tasks is actually the combating of spies or, if you like, foreign intelligence agents.

...I was not expecting to attend the conference of the Military Counterintelligence (VKR) Department for the Northern Fleet devoted to summing up the results of last year's operational and service activities, rather I was just lucky. Never before had correspondents been admitted to such events.

It is pleasant to note that all the speakers were very frank. Including the Head of Military Counterintelligence for the Northern Fleet, Rear Adm Vladimir Fokin in whose words, last year in comparison with 1990, the total amount of data received by the information retrieval system declined by almost double for certain important areas. Here they gave the names of superiors who organized work poorly and the numbers of the subunits where VKR activities were strongly reduced. However, we feel, the issue was not this.

The reason for such a situation is characteristic not only for counterintelligence but also for the entire Northern Fleet. I am certain that I would make no mistake if I also said the Armed Forces. Having visited the camps and base settlements of the naval formations and having spoken with the officers, warrant officers ["michman"] and sailors on the ships, I, as they say, was struck dumb by how deeply an attitude of futility has taken hold here. And these are men in control of the most powerful weapons.

No, no one is crying in his peacoat; on the contrary they are cheerful. But a fact remains a fact that with the breakdown of the former Soviet Union and seemingly the already too long competition among the CIS nations over who can more easily "break off" a piece of the military pie, the sailors are steadily being overcome by a complex of their own uselessness.

We would not like the impression to be gained that here everyone is literally sunk in complete despondency and has abandoned service. The combat ships as before are maintaining the required readiness and can, as they should, at any moment set to sea for carrying out a mission, that is, for defending you and me. This is largely the result of military counterintelligence which as before "runs down" "the other sides'" agents and spies and also sends out, you can be sure, its own sources to the corresponding departments of other states. Incidentally, the latter, in the words of the counterintelligence workers, since a certain time have intensified their intelligence activities. Understandably this curiosity on the part, for example, of Finland, Norway and other countries neighboring on the Northern Fleet can be explained by their fears over the unstable situation in the former USSR. However, for our VKR such facts are

merely grounds to exert themselves and its co-workers view the scrutiny of the foreigner's glance in a purely professional manner.

Recently the work of the foreign special services at the same time has been made significantly easier due to the greater openness of our society, to the simplifying of tourist and other trips across the frontier and the accessibility of cities and areas previously closed to foreigners. Certainly the counterintelligence workers understand the necessity of this process and are endeavoring to maintain the former level of security for state naval secrets under the changed conditions.

Generally speaking, VKR is concerned with anything that can become a problem for the combat readiness of the naval ships and in this sense it would be hard to even list the variations of danger which the counterintelligence agents prevent. For instance, last year, the VKR co-workers thwarted the distribution of drugs on one of the ships engaged in the transporting and storing of nuclear ballistic missiles.

"These were several servicemen who got together in their leisure time and relaxed by smoking hashish," related the Chief of the Counterintelligence Department for the Auxiliary Fleet, Capt 2d Rank Aleksandr Filimonov. "One of them, incidentally, was directly involved with the nuclear weapons. God only knows what he might have done in a drugged state."

Instances of drug use, in the words of Filimonov, were also discovered on certain other ships. However, this involved only a few individuals and now with pernicious constancy in the Northern Fleet, this has become much easier since there has been a strong decline in the number of inductees from the Central Asian Republics. Basically for understandable reasons it was they who got stoned on "grass."

Certainly the counterintelligence agents spend the lion's share of their time on carrying out tasks inherent to only their specialty. But "along the way," they are also engaged in combating theft and other general criminal offenses. And theft, in the admission of the VKR workers themselves, is now becoming a rather widespread phenomenon here. And it is understandable why as in the Fleet there are men serving who are not isolated from prices, shortages and other joys of our everyday life.

Of the recent such crimes detected by the VKR, for example, there was the theft of 100 kilograms of mercury from one of the search-and-rescue facilities not far from Murmansk. The evil-doers wanted to "swipe" the entire supply—about three tons—at the facility and sell it but they did not succeed. Incidentally, they would have made a bundle had they succeeded in this deal as one gram of the phosphorus-containing mercury is worth 25 rubles on the black market.

In principle the prevention of such crimes should be the concern of the military police. Of course, if this police

existed. But because of the lack of such, these functions are being assumed by counterintelligence.

As anywhere else, with the spread and even the cultivating (not so much by the mass information media as by the very conditions of life) of mercantile attitudes in society, there has been an increase in the number of those who are willing not only to "privatize" state property but also those trading in state secrets. In a word, counterintelligence has its work cut out for it. But it is doing this virtually...outside the law.

The problem is that VKR, regardless of its specific military nature, is a component part of the state security bodies. As a result of the events which followed after August 1991, after the abolishing of the Soviet Union, the laws and other enforceable enactments governing the activities of this service ceased to exist. The only guiding documents for the VKR co-workers are now the telegrams from the Center urging restraint and calmness. The counterintelligence workers have already had to deal in the recent past with such messages, only then the documents which replaced the law (even an existing one) were telegrams from the CPSU Central Committee. As the counterintelligence workers admit, such a situation greatly impedes work, and like air we breathe, they need a clear law which is publically ratified and accessible to any citizen and which would finally clarify the currently hazy limits to the competence of VKR.

The counterintelligence workers have grown tired of the ambiguity and the social problems (the low standard of living after the rise in prices, poor food supply, the shortage of schools and nurseries for children and so forth) characteristic of the military life in the entire Northern Fleet. And this is fraught with definite consequences. If one speaks about the Northern Fleet sailors generally, there have already been instances of disobedience by entire collectives of combat ships and refusals to set to sea until the ultimatums are carried out to improve life.

As for counterintelligence, regardless of the discussions about international collaboration, friendship and affection, it continues to check the foreign special services and continues to carry out its duty, ensuring the secrecy of military technology and equipment and providing for the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. However you look at it, the world as before is far from perfect...

#### **CIS Alleges Ukraine Counterintelligence Effort Against Fleet**

*92UM0715A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 29 Feb 92 p 1*

[Report by unidentified correspondent under the "Top Secret" rubric: "Black Sea Fleet Counterintelligence Against Fleet Command?"]

[Text] NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has in its possession the text of a memorandum sent to Moscow by one of the representatives of the Black Sea Command. We publish



**this document, which is another evidence of the seriousness of the current situation, in a slightly abridged form.**

...Since December, the Black Sea Fleet is dealing with its regular tasks while under constant pressure of nationalistic circles in the Ukraine Ministry of Defense and its Supreme Soviet.

Despite the agreements between the heads of state in regard to the Black Sea Fleet, the Ministry of Defense is attempting to run the fleet, sending it daily various orders and instructions, the latest of them containing direct threats of personal responsibility for noncompliance. Through the press and speeches of high-ranking officials, including the president of Ukraine, public opinion is being rallied against the fleet commander and his deputies personally as the main culprits in creating a difficult morale and psychological climate in the fleet.

The situation has considerably worsened since former special departments, the military procuracy, and the military tribunal were transferred under Ukrainian jurisdiction.

Essentially, the activities of the fleet command and those of commanders of formations and units have been subjected to total surveillance, telephone taps, inspection of correspondence, and collection of compromising materials, all of the above being immediately reported to appropriate Ukrainian organs; that is, actual operational agent work is being conducted at all levels of the fleet command chain.

All these actions find support among all the "mistreated," nationalist-minded officers—mainly those being transferred to the reserves—and all those seeking an opportunity to grab a position, rank, and honors in the Ukrainian army, that is, for all this work there is a constituency and a basis.

There emerged a situation that is unnatural for a civilized military organism and has no precedent in world practice: Instead of providing assistance, counterintelligence is conducting a direct, most active struggle against the fleet command and officers loyal to the Navy, and virtually spies on them.

In defiance of the agreement and existing laws, the officers of the special department in Sevastopol and various emissaries from the security service in Kiev are conducting a propaganda campaign in favor of taking an oath of allegiance to Ukraine. This campaign is conducted primarily in clandestine fashion, by using dirty methods involving various promises of high-level positions and large salaries in the event of taking the oath. We periodically receive reports that here and there, in small groups (or individually), taking the oath to Ukraine does take place. This figure across the fleet is currently no more than one percent. There is an intensive search for candidates for the position of fleet commander. It is known with certainty that the minister of defense and his aides have discussed this topic with Vice Admiral Oleynik (Pacific Fleet), Rear Admiral

Ryzhenko (Baltic Fleet), and Rear Admiral Manchenko and Rear Admiral Cherbyshkov (Black Sea Fleet).

In this connection the issue should be raised with the heads of states, with the following points:

1. On the creation of a special committee under the commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces, to whom special departments in formations, groups, and units that are part of the CIS should be subordinated.
2. On ceasing the unlawful subversive activities of the Ukraine emissaries (security service officers) in CIS formations.
3. On retirement provisions for the servicemen serving in CIS formations and upon transfer to reserves staying in Ukraine or other states, who are not taking the oath of allegiance to the people of those states.
4. In an extreme situation, to provide protection for the military council and the officers who have remained loyal to only one oath.
5. To resolve the issue of fleet financing by all interested countries in the Commonwealth, not just Ukraine.

### CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

#### Baykonur Construction Units 'Disturbances' Reported

92UM0666A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
27 Feb 92 p 3

[Statements by Judicial Service Major A. Nemkin, deputy military prosecutor of the garrison, and Major General A. Zavyalov, head of a commission, recorded by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent A. Ladin: "Disturbances in Military Construction Units. Many Demands of the Soldiers Are Just"]

[Text] Leninsk—Disturbances which entailed serious consequences have occurred in the last few days in military construction units accomplishing their tasks at the Baykonur space launch complex. Judicial Service Major A. Nemkin, deputy military prosecutor of the garrison, communicated details of the events which took place to a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

On the night of 23-24 February, a large group of military construction personnel—about 100 strong—gained possession of several trucks and arrived at the office of the military commandant in order to set free their fellow servicemen who were confined there for breaches of disciplinary regulations. The guard detail was forced to fire warning shots.

Subsequently, the disorderly individuals committed other violations of law as well: They attempted to ransack warehouses and set fire to three barracks. Three corpses were found at the site of the fire.

On 24 February, a rally with the participation of military construction personnel was held at Tyuratam station. Various demands were made concerning arrangements for service, social and living conditions, and other problems. In the opinion of the deputy military prosecutor of the garrison, who personally witnessed some of the events of the last day, representatives of informal public organizations were present among the military construction personnel.

The command of the garrison and of the military construction units met with participants in the disturbances.

A government commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan headed by Republic of Kazakhstan State Counselor Yu. Khitrin and a commission headed by Major General A. Zavyalov have been working at the Baykonur space launch complex since 25 February.

A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent approached Major General A. Zavyalov with a request to evaluate the events. He said the following:

"I consider some of the demands made by servicemen just. It has already been resolved that 700-800 individuals who are in poor health or whose family situation is difficult, and who are not used for work in the units, be granted short-term leaves for a visit home. At our request, the Republic of Kazakhstan Government assigned transport aircraft to provide transportation for those on leave. During this period of time, we will try to resolve acute issues of living conditions for the personnel. With the help of the leadership of the republic, the military construction personnel have already been paid. Measures have been taken to improve meals."

As Major General A. Zavyalov said, the situation in the military construction units of the Baykonur space launch complex has stabilized since 26 February.

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

### Friction Between Soviet Army, Estonian Home Guard

92UM0620A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT  
in Finnish 27 Jan 92 p C3

[Article by Jukka Rislakki: "Russian and Estonian Soldiers Had 'Real Bullets in Their Guns'"]

[Text] Tallinn—Estonian Home Guardsmen and Russian soldiers confronted one another in a threatening way in Central Estonia last week. The soldiers even had "real bullets in their guns," the Estonian news media reported on Sunday. The Baltic Military District commander issued Estonia a warning because of the incident.

It became clear during negotiations with the commander of the military district in Riga on the weekend that all of the former Soviet Army troops in the Baltic countries are now the responsibility of Russia.

Next Tuesday a delegation from Moscow will be arriving in Tallinn to discuss the withdrawal of the troops from Estonia. According to Russian representatives, it will take at least two to three years to send the soldiers home.

### They Want Weapons for Own Army

Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar said on the radio on Saturday that there was nearly an armed clash when a group of Rapla Home Guardsmen and an armed policeman went to the Kohila Air Defense Base to relieve the soldiers of their weapons.

The Home Guard took seriously the Estonian parliament's decision reached last week that Soviet Army weapons and property in Estonia belong to Estonia. Estonia wants the weapons for its own army, which is in the process of being organized.

### Weapons Guarded in Tartu

The garrison commander notified Tallinn that armed Estonians were trying to penetrate the base. Weapons and ammunition were displayed. Negotiators from Tallinn who had rushed to the scene relieved the tension of the "siege situation."

The Home Guard has also taken "control" of the air base at Tartu. Practically speaking, this probably means that they will guard the weapons in the event that an attempt is made to take them back to Russia.

Estonian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ants Laaneots urged that the bases be placed under this kind of control and he does not appear to have anything against the unofficial participation of the Home Guard organization either.

### Commander Warned Them of Serious Consequences

Baltic Military District commander Col. Gen. Valeriy Mironov warned [the Estonians] that the soldiers are armed and that "unilateral actions" may lead to serious consequences. According to Mironov, the Baltic countries do not automatically have the right to obtain or buy the troops' weapons or buildings constructed after 1940.

According to the Estonian Ministry of Interior, the removal of the troops from Estonia has begun. Two bases have already been vacated and only guard details have been left on them. The War College in Tallinn has been practically closed down. Only the last class is left.

### 128,000 Soldiers in Baltic Countries

During the negotiations in Riga it was confirmed that there are 128,000 soldiers in the Baltic countries, 41,000 of them officers for whom housing has to be found.

The Baltic countries are demanding that the troops be withdrawn as soon as possible and that they be removed from the Baltic capitals immediately.

### Nagorno-Karabakh Regiment Faces Mounting Casualties

92UM0661A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
27 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Major K. Litvinov and Senior Lieutenant V. Denisov: "366th Regiment Again under Fire. Attempts Being Made To Involve Army in the Karabakh Conflict"]

[Text] For several days now, the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment, which is deployed in Stepanakert (Khankendy), is undergoing fire, and primarily from the direction of Susha. The number of rounds that fell on the territory of the regiment passed a hundred long ago. There are killed and wounded. Here, during a shelling on 25 February, Private Vladimir Semeykin died (date of birth in 1973, a native of the Cossack village of Ilinskaya in Krasnodar Krai). Several days earlier, as we have already reported, Private Aleksandr Kovalev died of wounds.

The regiment is practically cut off from the outside world. It is possible to get to it only from the direction of Azerbaijan, but the roads are controlled by subunits of the national army. Only one route remains—air. And until recently, cargoes and people were delivered here by helicopter. But in the current situation, when there is the usual thick fog for this time of the year, landing a helicopter on the regimental pad is impossible. And those roads that are not controlled by the Azerbaijani side, are mined. For this reason, it is impossible to transport even the dead and wounded from the regiment, explained Colonel Vasily Belchenko, a representative of the staff of the ZakVO [Transcaucasus Military District].

The command authority of the district allowed the regiment to return fire for fire, but the motorized infantrymen have not used this right even once. Why? One of us asked this question of Lieutenant General Sufiyan Beppayev, ZakVO deputy commander. In his words, in the first incident, the shelling literally stopped for several minutes before the moment when the 366 MSP [Motorized Rifle Regiment] was ready to deliver a retaliatory strike. In the second case, as Beppayev said, a heavy fog interfered. And the lieutenant general and other officials from district headquarters categorically reject the report of some mass media that the servicemen of the 366th MSP allegedly opened return fire. But people's patience, of course, is not infinite. Among the officers, we will not conceal the fact that dissatisfaction is growing, and that they are demanding a shift to decisive actions.

Thus, in any case, the regiment has ended up in the epicenter of events that unfolded in Nagorno-Karabakh. And this is not accidental. Azerbaijan insists on its immediate withdrawal. For example, Rakhim Kaziyev, a member of the Azerbaijani parliament and commander of the defense of Susha, declared long ago that he "views the presence of the motorized rifle regiment in Khankendy as a means of pressure on independent Azerbaijan." Baku is also demanding the discharge of all servicemen of Armenian nationality (this is mainly warrant officers), giving as justification the fact that they are helping Armenian militants with arms and ammunition. So, that is the situation.

But, theoretically, there is no other way. There is a war in Karabakh. Yesterday, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA explained how the Azerbaijani side "privatized" several combat helicopters of the PVO [Air Defense Troops] of the CIS. And here is new information that we received. Azerbaijani helicopter pilots on 19 February conducted the first combat sortie and delivered a missile strike on fixed fire positions of the Armenian militants in the village of Karadagly.

In its turn, the Armenian side is categorically against the withdrawal of the motorized infantrymen. This is the justification: The people are afraid to remain face to face with armed Azerbaijani formations. It is sufficient to say that, since the beginning of this year, already more than a hundred persons have perished in the region. Just in one day, when more than 200 rocket rounds were fired from Grad launchers on the city, 17 persons died and 30 were wounded in Stepanakert (Khankendy).

As is known, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, the commander in chief of the OVS [Unified Armed Forces] of the CIS, announced intentions to withdraw the 366th MSP from Karabakh, and he affirmed his position once more while speaking to the Russian parliament.

At the same time, Lieutenant General Beppayev expressed himself against the pullout of the regiment at the present time. This opinion is also held by Lieutenant General Yuriy Grekov, the first deputy commander of the troops of the district. In the opinion of the ZakVO

leadership, the regiment, with its presence alone, at least somewhat stabilizes the situation in the region, and there can be a discussion of its withdrawal only in the event that the Karabakh problem will be resolved politically.

But, in the meantime, the clashing sides prefer mutual attacks to a constructive dialogue. Thus, the Supreme Soviet of Armenia has appealed to the world community with a statement that accuses Azerbaijan of genocide with respect to the native population of Karabakh. The Azerbaijani parliament responded with accusations of Armenian cruelty, and also with respect to a peaceful population. At the same time, both Baku and Yerevan cite the dozens who were killed and wounded in the zone of conflict.

Also, the attempts to draw the army into the bloody dissension are not accidental. And the 366th regiment has found itself in the epicenter of unforeseen events.

#### INCIDENTALLY...

The report on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, which was prepared by the special information mission of the CSCE, will be the main theme of discussion at the seventh meeting of the committee of senior officials of the CSCE states. As was reported to a correspondent of RIA by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSFR, the conference will be held on 27-28 February in Cernin Palace in Prague.

## UKRAINE

### Ukraine Rear Services Chief Interviewed

92UM0686A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
12 Feb 92 p 1

[Interview with Colonel G. Avdeyev, acting deputy Ukrainian minister of defense for rear services, by Major S. Nagoryanskiy, correspondent for NARODNAYA ARMIYA: "You Don't Feed a Soldier with Politics"]

[Text] You can have a blockage of the intestine from overeating. But what might happen with the mass of information which is "stuffed" into us each day? All the more as this information is often heated up in the old political fat. And this is true for what comes via the central mass information media about Ukraine and its Armed Forces. "Let us tell the people the truth," proposed the Acting Deputy Ukrainian Minister of Defense for Rear Services, Col G. Avdeyev. So our correspondent called on him in his office.

[Avdeyev] People in the other sovereign republics may gain the impression that the "damned Khokhols" [Ukrainians] are rolling in fat or are putting up walls, said Grigoriy Grigoryevich [Avdeyev], that they are leaving the former Union without sugar and are making an easy life for themselves...

[Nagoryanskiy] Or even that we are armed to the teeth here and are trying to get our hands on strategic weapons. What a political storm has been created over the Black Sea Fleet.

[Avdeyev] Well, I shall come back to the Fleet a little later and for now I will deal with the legal aspects of the events concerning the Ukrainian Armed Forces. We can count 3 January as their unique birthday, when, on the basis of the Minsk agreements, we set out to realize our right to establish our own army. Yet all the documents and agreements had been worked out and set forward by us much sooner. For instance, on 7 September of last year, the order was signed of the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council on the procedure for moving the troops formations and military schools on the territory of our state and out of it. One of the points stated here that control over the execution of the given decree was to be entrusted to the Ministry of Defense. We, in our turn, proposed to the former central bodies that all questions be carried out exclusively on a consensual basis. The first "papers" were sent to the General Staff even when Army Gen Lobov was in charge of it.

[Nagoryanskiy] I could imagine the reaction from the Moscow superiors when "some little Kiev" sent them some proposals...

[Avdeyev] Actually it was almost an insult for them. The former subordinates were proposing a collaboration of equals. For this reason, we did not receive replies to our proposals. But we still have to live. The men must be fed, clothed and shod. You cannot fill them up with politics.

[Nagoryanskiy] Grigoriy Grigoryevich, what specifically was proposed by our side?

[Avdeyev] First of all, to put under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense, all property which was to be sent out of the republic. I mean what was always to be sent to the Center under the previously signed agreements...

[Nagoryanskiy] And the Center on the basis of this would allocate what we needed?

[Avdeyev] Quite right. But our proposals were ignored. Here is a typical example. The former central food depots are located in one of our garrisons. Incidentally, they are almost 100 percent supplied with Ukrainian resources. Moscow demanded that we provide 345 railway cars to ship out the required supplies. And this was at a time when the Ukrainian Supreme Council legally had been given the right to dispose of the military supplies in the national interest! Certainly we did not supply the railcars. Then the Center tried to ship out the supplies by round-about means.

[Nagoryanskiy] Recently information has come in that military property is being sent out of Ukraine.

[Avdeyev] I would not say that there had been much of this. But there has been some. They tried illegally to divert some things from the Stryy Garrison. But we took measures in time. In truth, the smart fellows there tried

to cheat us, using one of the aviation units. But this did not work for them. Literally a day or two ago a major from the reserves from Melitopol arrived and told us how they were trying to send military equipment out from there.

[Nagoryanskiy] The Center is clearly not pleased with the position of the "independents."

[Avdeyev] If it were only limited to disgruntlement... Something else is much worse: measures have been taken to blockade the deliveries of various equipment, property and so forth. In December, together with the VOSO [Military Railroads] Administration, we agreed on the shipping of freight both into the Ukraine and out of it. But on 6 January, a document appeared over the signature of Gen Avralev. I can quote its drift: "Pursuant to the instruction of the chief of the General Staff...to halt the loading of the military freight under the plan of the Ministry of Defense and the plans of the national economic suppliers to recipients located on the Ukrainian Railroads."

[Nagoryanskiy] And in fact did nothing arrive?

[Avdeyev] We were able to reach terms about some things such as the delivery of apartment construction materials and supplies. In January, the corresponding protocol was signed on the principles of interaction during the transitional period.

[Nagoryanskiy] We might just as well get angry and also "shut off" the oxygen, that is, halt the delivery of freight to the Center.

[Avdeyev] But we are civilized people... I must state officially that we have dispatched in full everything that was due the CIS units, including aviation, missile and for the Black Sea Fleet. Here are a few figures to substantiate this. We delivered 4,600 tons of fuel and lubricating materials, including 500 tons of motor vehicle gasoline and 4,100 tons of diesel fuel, and 10 tons of oils and lubricants. No fuel has been received from the CIS for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to compensate for the outlay. We certainly were counting on the corresponding supplies from Russia and Belorussia. Fine, the Center does not want to supply just any sort of product or supplies for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. But why do they "forget" about the military schools located in our state? Let me recall that there are 33 of them. The majority of young lieutenants returns to the countries of the Commonwealth. Let us begin with the fact that they must be clothed. But how? The deliveries of raw materials have been stopped. Certain enterprises which fill our orders are on the brink of shutting down and some have already shut.

[Nagoryanskiy] Personally I have the impression that in the central personnel of the CIS Armed Forces even now they cannot accept the fact that the Ukrainian Army is a reality and that we are a sovereign state. This is the source of the dictating of terms, the instructions and complaints.

[Avdeyev] Unfortunately, you are right. One example, and a recent one. A telegram arrived from Moscow in the districts with orders to send the representatives of the military sovkhoses to Russia where an assembly would be held at the Prokhladnoye farm... I don't want to exaggerate, but this, in the long and short of things, is interference into the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

[Nagoryanskiy] Did some go to these assemblies...

[Avdeyev] Unfortunately yes, from the Odessa and Carpathian Districts. It appears that in some spots they continue to live in the old style. Or possibly as before they fear the Center which no longer exists for Ukraine.

[Nagoryanskiy] Now, Grigoriy Grigoryevich, let us return to the Black Sea Fleet. Recently the press announced that both Kiev and Moscow had provided finances for its support. Which party gave more and which less? What will the deliveries include and through which channels will they go?

[Avdeyev] We have allocated over 350 million rubles for the first quarter and Russia has provided 250 million. Here the amount from Moscow is earmarked solely for the pay of personnel. I would like to go back a bit. Last year the Center failed to supply us with a great deal. For example, the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet failed to receive 96,000 bedsheets, 10,000 cloth sailor pants, 7,000 pairs of Russian leather boots, 80,000 pairs of cotton socks, 8,000 sets of warm underwear and 26,000 meters of suiting. In November, the Fleet received 95 percent of the mazut from the Center. But in December, nothing at all was supplied except the mazut, and this included no medical supplies. Forgive me, but just where is the concern for this "age-old Russian Fleet" and which has all our ears ringing?

[Nagoryanskiy] Might it not happen that the Black Sea Fleet sailors may soon end up with nothing to wear, nothing to eat and no medicines?

[Avdeyev] That would not happen. We have organized cooperation with the Fleet's rear services. As much as we can, we shall make up for those losses, although this will not be so easy. There is a number of difficulties.

[Nagoryanskiy] At present everyone feels these. Everyone needs help.

[Avdeyev] This is well understood in the rear services of the Ministry of Defense. Politics is politics but life has its own demands. The well-being of our state depends to a large degree upon how well our service works in this difficult period for the state. I would not like to give any solemn assurances. I could put my foot in it here. Nevertheless I will say that the rear services will do everything so that the Ukrainian Armed Forces be, as they say, full, clothed and shod.

### **Kravchuk Aid Discusses Servicemen's Rights with Officers**

*92UM0750B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
27 Feb 92 p 1*

[Article by Lt Col V. Ovsyanikov: "From the Odessa MD—Meetings with the Representative of the Ukrainian President"]

[Text] The Assistant of the Ukrainian President for Military Questions, Lt Gen Boris Ivanovich Sharikov, has visited a number of the garrisons in the Odessa MD and has become acquainted with the life and service of the servicemen as well as the moral and psychological situation in the collectives.

At the meetings, Boris Ivanovich described the situation in Ukraine and the economic and foreign policy situation. He also asked the officers to voice their opinion on the occurring events. What concerns the men at present—this was the main question of his trip.

Officers Derevyakin, Bezborodov, Nikolayev, Tarakanov, Kharitonenko, Lyashenko and Rakushin reported what the situation was in their units with the taking of the military oath, dwelling in detail on the reasons and motives of those who had not yet taken the final decision. As became clear, here it was not a question of any political or national ambitions, but simply due to bad information, the men at times heeded the rumors and incorrect interpretations of one or another provision of the laws. Because of this, the officers do not always know their rights and their prospects for further service and life.

The President's assistant gave separate attention to the service of the soldiers and sergeants who had been called up last autumn from Ukraine. As was reported by the Deputy Commander for Personnel Work, Lt Col Starovoytov, there were problems in this question as well. Dismissal from military service which has become widespread in recent years and the desire of individual fellows to serve closer to home or not serve at all have been felt in the actions of certain soldiers. While previously such actions were justified by the fact that they wanted to defend Ukraine in the ranks of its Armed Forces, now they are endeavoring to find a place not far from their parents.

Unfortunately, for now there are no legal grounds for preventing such actions, and this complicates the work with the young men. There have been instances when the parents themselves bring back their sons to the unit. This is what happened, for example, with the father of Pvt Vitaliy Dushanin.

Lt Gen B. Sharikov also visited the officers' mess at one of the garrisons and was interested in the meal conditions and the cost of the dishes.

Those eating in the officers' mess related that they spent an average of two-thirds of their pay on breakfasts, lunches and dinners.

In the conversations they also touched on the problems of combat training which has undergone changes because of the fuel shortage and the lack of individual specialists. The questions were also raised of providing help to the agricultural workers in planting.

### Problems Connected with Military Budget Viewed

92UM0675A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
14 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by V. Smirnov: "Discussing Ukraine Pending Legislation: A Military Budget with a False Bottom?"]

[Text] I await each new piece of draft legislation, hoping that it will be better in its conceptual approach compared to the previous laws. Most of all, I hope that it will be imbued with the market philosophy, i.e., that it will contain rules which our society is preparing to observe. The arrival of the market with its attributes is not something that will be instantaneous, of course. After all, even the law is designed to last several years. And so, everything in the civilian and the military spheres should be tailored to serve a single purpose.

I unfortunately deceive myself every single time by expecting to see something progressive in draft legislation. Not even a hint of a pleasant surprise is offered by the Ukraine Law on Universal Military Obligation and Military Service. What it does is promote the previous approaches of hiding some military expenditures (rendering these hidden financing) by shifting them onto the shoulders of enterprises, organizations, and ispolkoms of local soviets.

Being that this is the old system of actions which has undergone frequent and severe but obviously insufficient criticism, it is clear that the writers of the legislation have not subjected the draft to expert review by representatives of the governmental and nongovernmental sectors of the economy. For without exhaustive analysis by various specialists, including those of civilian status, this kind of document should never be permitted to see the light of day. It is definitely not of departmental caliber. Many articles in the draft bear some kind of direct relationship to the interests and activity of enterprises, organizations, and other civilian structures in various branches of the economy which bear no direct relationship to the Army. Only in an initial and cursory reading does it appear that the draft law is restricted to the military. Reality indicates otherwise. A case in point is Article 13, "Rights and Obligations of Citizens Subject to Pre-Draft Training."

It is not my intention to question the value of pre-draft training of youths—a point that should be stressed in the legislation—but this, in my view, should be done in a way that does not have a negative impact on the work of producers of products. Our production figures are unimpressive at that, and they continue to decrease. That is to say, the organization of the country's defense construction and manufacturing should be at certain reasonable

limits, with compensation offered to enterprises (organizations) if the latter are to contribute toward defense construction. The question is: Is such an arrangement provided for in the abovementioned article of the draft law? I quote the first item:

Citizens subject to pre-draft military training in defense and sports camps, training organizations, organizations of the Ukraine Defense Assistance Society, and trade organizations offering training with time away from the regular job, are entitled to retention of their jobs, with an average monthly wage paid by the particular employer, for the entire time said citizens are occupied with their training duties, including travel time to and from the place of training (session).

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations—regardless of their type of ownership—employing the abovementioned citizens are to provide compensation for expenses incurred incidental to rental of housing for the period of training and/or session, and to the cost of travel to and from the location of training (session).

As we can see, no time limits are set for duration of the training. Everything is designed to benefit the agencies providing the training (session). Since they pay nothing to offset the expenses incurred by citizens, they can hardly be expected to offer first-rate training (sessions) that would be very brief but full of high-quality instructional content. That is one aspect of the problem.

We have had a long history of incompetent management of the economy. There is plenty of evidence to that effect. Nevertheless, rigid administrative control continues to exist; the above cited text bears witness to that. Enterprises could be ordered so as to prohibit their uttering a word of protest and have their workers take leave of absence for training (sessions) as long as necessary, of course. It is even possible to design the law to obligate them to pay compensation for expenses on the counts of wages, housing rental, and for travel to and from place of training (session). This kind of dictate (the correct term to use here, since no provision is made for compensation by the government) is entirely out of tune with the concept of independence of enterprises inherent in a market system. Enterprises (organizations) would comply, of course. What choice would they have? But let us look ahead to try to see what this could lead to. We must also take into account the reality of the enormous and overly cumbersome contributions levied on enterprises by the budget: social security, 61 percent; added costs, 28 percent; employment fund, 3 percent; Chernobyl fund, 19 percent.

It is the above contributions that constitute monies for military construction. Nevertheless, direct financing of defense from the budget is not entirely satisfactory to someone. Once more we are giving the go-ahead to the flawed "keeping of two sets of books," that is, we have in the state's budget expenditures related directly to defense and indirect (hidden) military expenditures. Why is it necessary to do that if we are building a

civilized society? Given that training for military service is necessary, let the related expenditures constitute a separate item in the military budget. And let this item be the one that supplies monies for pre-draft military training in defense and sports health camps, training organizations, and Ukraine Defense Assistance Societies. This kind of approach should become the rule and be written into the law.

Let us have a look at what will happen if this provision is not included, that is, if the situation remains as set forth in Article 13. An employer will "come up with" money with which to pay a citizen for his stay at training (session). However, the money will be immediately added to the prices charged for goods and services supplied by the particular enterprise (organization). There should be no doubt about that. The producer will simply "jack up" his prices, regardless of how much a patriot of his fatherland he considers himself to be, if placed into this kind of uncivilized position. And what would be the consequence?

The writers of the draft law in shifting the burden of certain expenses of pre-draft training onto enterprises (organizations) would appear to have done this for the benefit of the taxpayer. The defense budget would appear to be smaller, but it as we know is a derivative of taxes exacted. However, they failed to take into account the fact that the taxpayer will still lay out the money that was "saved" as he pays the higher price for goods and services. Is it not better to come right out with it and inform the taxpayer of what universal military service will cost him?

However, this is not the end of the negative aspects associated with the first item of Article 13. If common sense does not prevail and the law will be passed as written, entrepreneurs will undoubtedly take countermeasures. They—being pragmatists—in contradistinction to the military are quite good at counting money. In this light, they know full well that the purchasing power of our average citizen is not unlimited (even in the case of those who possess savings). To keep from "jacking up" prices, they recognize, as far as their facility (organization) is concerned, as "personae non grata" those persons (including potential workers) whose age and situation are such as to render them subject to pre-draft training. Also to be taken into account here is another not insignificant thought. Unemployment in the state is unavoidable. Therefore, the labor pool will be considerable. There is reason to believe that conditions will generally not favor young people standing at the threshold of adulthood. You may say what you wish, but feelings alone—no matter how strong—will not help. It is necessary to write into law items which will be conducive to employment of youths who must undergo pre-draft training. This as yet has not been addressed at all.

Also ignorant of reality is Item 2 of Article 13. It reads as follows:

Unemployed youths called to acquire a technical military specialty are to be compensated by executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies located in the youths' area of residence for expenses incidental to rental of housing and cost of travel to and from the location of this training.

What source will our poor ispolkoms of local soviets tap to obtain money? Even now they are in no position to pay acceptable salaries to teachers and physicians, who are constantly threatening to go on strike. On top of that, the above expenses would descend as a heavy burden on the poor local budget. Where is the ispolkom to obtain monies to cover expenditures for citizens subject to pre-draft training?

We have looked at a single article, perhaps the smallest in the draft legislation. But it raises many questions, all of which are unanswered. This is the strange logic of this aspect of this most important document, one that determines the right and obligations of citizens subject to pre-draft training. And it endows enterprises, organizations, and ispolkoms of local soviets with no rights whatsoever. The only role they play is discharging their obligations relative to paying compensation for expenses incurred by citizens subject to pre-draft training (sessions). This kind of disestablishment of rights, previously ineffective, would be nothing less than counterproductive in a market economy. Should it continue to be promoted, let alone written into law? Ignoring the capabilities of the economy, this fiscal policy cannot result in anything positive. Therefore, one can be sure in advance that pre-draft training of citizens will not progress to a new and higher level of quality. Thus, would it not be better to reject this outmoded scheme completely and find a system that would not saddle enterprises with this quittance, one that would encourage proper pre-draft training?

**Problems, Role of Military Commissariat Viewed**  
*92UM0727A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian*  
*21 Feb 92 p 1*

[Article by Lt Col P. Kaduchenko, Kharkov City Rayon military commissar: "What Kind of Military Commissariat?"; first paragraph is NARODNAYA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel P. Kaduchenko, rayon military commissar, city of Kharkov, offers his thoughts on the role and functions of the military commissariat in the structure of the Ukraine's Armed Forces.

Local military control agencies have been in existence since 7 April 1918. An enormous amount of experience has been acquired since that time. In this connection, there is an increasing number of problems standing in the way of efficient operation of the agencies. The formation of the Ukraine's Armed Forces is proceeding at full speed. It would be quite desirable that the changes



not bypass the military commissariats—as happened so many times in the past—to degenerate into something purely cosmetic in nature.

In order for this element to function normally, it is necessary that military reform very seriously include the resolution of problems associated with local military control agencies.

Most pressing is the problem of personnel.

Take the case of training of the motorized rifle platoon commander, a process of four years' duration. The officer becomes a real professional only after serving at least two years of line duty.

And what about the situation in military commissariats? We are assigned officers possessing some kind of physical limitation disqualifying them for line duty. Their responsibility consists largely of reporting to the military commissariat twice a year at call-up time and daily wearing of an off-duty uniform.

In this connection, the incoming officer is greeted by an enormous work load and a heap of papers about which he knows nothing. His fund of knowledge and practical skills are but of little help to him in his new assignment. In a word, he must start at the very beginning. The work load leaves him no time to study. The two-week training session held at district headquarters for officers newly assigned to military commissariats does nothing to resolve the problem of professional training. Only an insignificant number of workers has attended the central courses offered in Saratov. However, even the six months of training provided only the bare essentials. Anything beyond that, questions related to the existence, interpretation, and application of laws, and a large number of fine points, was not taken up. The commander training program and many guidance documents have become so outdated that they have lost touch with reality.

A consequence of the above was decades of military commissariat staffing by generations of the self-taught.

It was a plus if an officer would start in at the bottom, take an interest in the work, study independently, and receive recognition and appreciation, thus growing in capability. He could after six or seven years become a professional.

In the case of officers assigned to leadership positions directly from line duty, assignees exhibiting a serious frame of mind for an extended period of time would take on a multitude of difficulties. For the military commissar's job can be learned only by starting at the bottom.

I believe that there has long been a need for establishing a suitable school or academic department that would offer solid training in, among other subjects, theoretical and practical aspects of operations common to all sections of the rayon military commissariat, military law, and guidance documents (with civilian aspects taught by a legal scholar), all associated with a rear services type of

military instruction. I would not go so far as to say that each worker should possess fluency in the state language, know the customs and traditions of the people of the Ukraine, and wield a basic knowledge of teaching, psychology, political science, etc. It would be advisable to enlist the aid of experienced military commissariat workers to draw up the program of instruction.

It would be wise to appoint to section chief positions warrant officers instead of officers. Why not restructure a warrant officer school so that it can train personnel for assignment to military commissariats? One possibility would be to offer the military commissariat the opportunity of selecting from the pool of draftees those candidates possessing the necessary education and apartment housing. Upon graduating from the warrant officer school, they could work in a single specialty for a period of 20 to 25 years, without the service progression typical of commissioned officers. It would be necessary to assure quality performance of such a professional by establishing a system of rewards.

Since the major involvement of the rayon military commissariat was with the mobilization and induction operations, appointment to positions could be as follows: to the position of rayon military commissar, from the latter's deputy slot, exclusively; to the position of deputy, by selection from a pool of commissioned officers possessing at least one year of service in a section involved with mobilization and induction work.

In the case of category 4 and 5 rayon military commissariats, the assignment procedure would be similar, with differences necessitated by their particular personnel structure.

Not less important is the problem of the absence of a legal basis for military commissariat operation. The commissariat's present operation is based on a host of largely obsolete documents.

The Ukraine Law on Universal Military Obligation and Military Service presently under examination once more takes us back to past times in certain areas. For example, there is no point to hoping for improvement if the local budget and enterprise funds are made to bear the costs of call-up, mobilization, and training sessions. The public health system simply cannot bear the brunt of year-round support of the induction station medical board. The most modest estimates have it that the 1991 outlay for this activity in our rayon amounted to 40,000 rubles.

The hourly cost of operating a bus to bring in youths is presently 104 rubles.

Enterprises refuse to pay the wages of persons called to training sessions. Their reasoning is simple: They pay taxes to the state so that it can fill its needs, so let it go ahead and take care of people who are pulled away from their jobs.

The military call-up has long ceased to be a general state task; it has become a task levied exclusively on military

commissariats. This being the situation, it is up to us to seek out new reserves, employ new ways and means to do our work, utilize personal contacts, etc. All the better if local organs of authority are sympathetic to our needs. In this connection, the military commissariat was allotted more than 300,000 rubles for 30 months to conduct its operations, thanks to the firm stand taken by Rayon Ispolkom Chairman Ivan Petrovich Dan'kevich.

On the other hand, I can cite many examples of other rayon military commissariats where section chiefs in doing their duty must suffer humiliation and become dependent on managers of organs of authority and enterprises.

The law should require that military commissariats be provided with total funding by the Ukraine Ministry of Defense. All aspects should be covered: pay for temporary custodial personnel; salary for the medical board; operating and repair costs of motor vehicles; and wages of draft-eligible men for the period of their stay at training sessions in military units. Otherwise, our defensive capability will continue to exist only on paper, that is, thousands of youths will continue to dodge the draft; draft-eligible men, fail to heed their notices; enterprise managers, ignore the mobilization task requirement.

Many problems are associated with work that has to do with war veterans, "Afghans," and persons involved with clean-up operations subsequent to the Chernobyl AES [Atomic Power Station] accident. This is another case where it is necessary to listen to a large number of criticisms, sometimes even insults, due to the state's lack of elementary foresight. One can only hope that henceforth the Parliament and Government of the sovereign Ukraine will not pass laws and issue decrees that do not have financial backing.

I have also heard it said that military commissariats have no interest in veterans and "Afghans," that they are slow to provide benefits. In this regard, one has only to make a careful reading of the pertinent documentation to realize that the military commissariat's functions are limited to the registration, filling out, and issuing of documents.

I take the opportunity of bringing up here a sensitive matter, that of burial, with rendering of military honors.

Someone, at one time, decided that the military commissariat is to be charged with making arrangements for this kind of burial. This is a sacred matter; no one denies it or shies away from it. Nevertheless, let us have a hard look at the problem.

The military commissariat is visited by grief-stricken relatives of a deceased serviceman. We direct them to the komendatura, which arranges for a military band and honor guard and assigns a burial plot.

Right away there are problems: No coffin is available nor can one be ordered; there is no upholstery fabric for the

coffin; wreaths cannot be purchased; food dishes for the funeral repast are unobtainable. Still, the demands are levied on us.

Furthermore, I—a military commissar—in my moral obligation go ahead and ask someone to donate lumber; talk someone into making a coffin; and ask someone else to give us whatever else is required. It seems to me that this is one area in which the state should manifest elementary decency. There are two solutions: setting up on large posts at the billeting office (komendatura, military commissariat) a special subsection and providing it with all necessities, or informing the state's citizens in an open manner that the state does not make arrangements for funerals, that its functions are limited to providing a military band and a platoon of soldiers. At least that would be the honest thing to do.

We have a host of other problems. They have to do with chronically understaffed offices struggling under the work load; provision of transportation, communications, automation and computer equipment; development of uniform documentation; and many others.

To find solutions to the above problems and acquire the capability of quick adaptability to changes in the life of the state, it is necessary to organize a special research group within the Ministry of Defense. It should be staffed by military commissariat personnel possessing high professional qualifications.

In conclusion, I would like to bring up another problem which has existed for a long time.

Military commissariats employ a large number of civilian personnel, who were formally referred to as "Soviet Army civilians." They—largely women—shoulder the lion's share of a little noticed but heavy and thankless work load. Successful accomplishment of the work depends as much upon them as upon military personnel. Developments have reached the point where these priceless toilers of ours are constantly made to suffer economically. This is especially true if a comparison is made with similar workers in civilian institutions. They earn less by a factor of two and a half and more compared with the civilian economy. They are unable to earn a second income, the same as we, incidentally. They cannot gain admittance to sanatoria, dispensaries, rest centers, and pioneer camps for their children, as a rule. And this on top of overly long work days, large work loads, and extreme pressure. They are called out on alert, on their leave days, and on holidays. The typists' situation is especially pitiful. They in addition receive little time off.

It is high time to do away with all the above instances of unfairness and introduce a system of suitable rewards. This would doubtlessly result in better returns.

**Conference on Ukrainian Security Viewed**

92UM0696A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
25 Feb 92 p 2

[Report by *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* correspondent V. Bolodurin: "Ukraine Is Fated to Have Peaceful Relations With Russia"]

[Text]

**From the International Conference on Ukraine's Security**

In one of his interviews Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk said, with his innate sarcasm, something like the following: "Prior to our independence Ukraine answered for only 7% of the common Union economy, and the thinking of the republic's leadership was at the same 7% level. It therefore did not concern itself with our national security."

Everything has now changed. The state's independence has prompted us to think more broadly, on a bigger scale. Extremely urgent matters are coming to the fore. One of them is the foreign political aspect of Ukraine's security. This was the subject of an international conference held in Kiev and arranged by the innovative political center with assistance from the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Supreme Soviet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Participating in the conference were deputies, members of the government, experts and scientific workers of Ukraine, as well as their counterparts from scientific institutions of the USA, Great Britain, France, Spain, Czechoslovakia and most of the sovereign states from the former republics of the USSR.

The conference was opened by Yevgeniy Marchuk, chairman of the National Security Service of Ukraine. He said that Ukraine's national security system collapsed along with the Union. The young state was left without reliable defense structures. This motivated us to begin the urgent establishment of our own armed forces, national guard and border troops.

Ye. Marchuk noted that only Ukraine has passed laws protecting servicemen serving on its territory. These laws form the legal foundation on which the armed forces are being built.

Nikolay Mikhailchenko, political adviser to the President of Ukraine, took this idea further. He refuted the assertion made in the mass media that the Ukraine is a militaristic state which is being turned into a dangerous neighbor by its plans for establishing its own armed forces.

"We are asked the question: Whom is Ukraine planning to fight as it establishes an army?"

"No one," we answer. "If no one attacks us, of course."

"We also have a question, however: Whom is Russia planning to fight as it gathers enormous forces to its banner and lays claim to all four fleets and to the nuclear

weapons? And this despite the statement by its leaders that the USA is no longer a potential enemy of Russia. We therefore have to ask ourselves where this enormous power will be aimed."

The political adviser to the President of Ukraine told those present precisely and unequivocally that no self-respecting state can permit its political structures to be without military protection.

Ukraine makes no territorial claims on any country. However, it will permit no one to dictate terms to it or to encroach upon its territorial integrity.

N. Mikhailchenko said that Ukraine's national security will use only its own forces. He mentioned the Cossack "sea gulls" which furrowed the waves near the walls of Constantinopol. This was intended as an illustration of the Ukrainians' right to the Black Sea Fleet.

Discussion of the topic of the day then got underway.

Relations between Ukraine and Russia were brought up in every speech. And this is perfectly understandable. Everyone is interested in how the two independent powers will arrive at complete mutual understanding.

Judging from the speeches delivered at the conference, prickly Russian nationalism is unacceptable to Ukraine. It stands out so clearly that it can be discerned without difficulty at every step. Russia has declared itself the legal successor to all the political structures of the former Center, taken over the gold reserves left from the USSR and decided at its own discretion the fate of embassies in various countries, and claims the right to control all the naval forces.

"What else can be expected from Russia? Its imperial structures will apparently be strengthened. This will affect also its sense of grandeur more and more perceptibly, which is already unacceptable in Ukraine and will become altogether intolerable as the Ukrainian state acquires military power. What then? Open confrontation?"

I anticipated a response to this question, and one was forthcoming. The sober thinking of scholar and professor Valentin Korolko put everything in its place, as they say. Before he spoke, the discussion of Ukraine's national security was inclining rapidly toward affirmation of the need for us to keep ourselves apart, to remain as far as possible away from our neighbor with its imperial obtrusiveness and to rely on our own capabilities. And then, suddenly, I hear: "Ukraine is fated to have peaceful relations with Russia."

To this thought, which had the ring of a revelation, the professor added a summation of the entire discussion of Ukraine's national security. He said that the concept of state security is closely linked to the concept of geopolitics. That is, before building any kind of plans for defense, one must objectively assess the circumstances in which the state finds itself. Ukraine in this case. It is coming into being at a time when the geopolitical map

has already been drawn. No matter how clever we try to be, Russia, a large nuclear power, will always be our neighbor.

We have only one choice: to resolve all controversial issues in a civilized manner, through talks. Only in this case are peaceful, friendly relations with Russia in store for us.

Someone rightly commented: "Let none of our foreign guests get the impression that the Slaves cannot live without the concept of an enemy. We are not talking about an exacerbation of tensions in relations with Russia. And anyone who might want to see the Russians and Ukrainians go head to head will be disappointed. The peoples will not permit it.

It was acknowledged that the economic policy of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] is presently made in Russia. The initiative of its leaders is outstripping the efforts of contiguous states, and its role as flagship is forcing the others to travel in Russia's wake. This cannot but irritate Ukraine's economists.

Something else: The young states are presently at the stage of dividing up property. Historically, it has not been possible for even the wisest of people to avoid conflicts in such cases. We, however, are going to have to be wiser than our ancient ancestors and prevent serious discord between the fraternal peoples.

I shall not attempt to predict what machinery or technology Ukraine's scientists will develop for guaranteeing the security of the sovereign state. I know, however, that good, respectful relations between neighbors has always been the most reliable guarantee of peace.

And let us not forget that Russia, as Henry Kissinger said (IZVESTIYA, 3 February 1991), will always play an important role in international relations and in U.S. foreign policy, and will occupy the leading position in Commonwealth policy. However, Russia must do this without overstepping its own borders and in complete conformity with those democratic institutions which it has helped to establish.

#### **Kiev Official on Military Housing in Region**

*92UM0697A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
25 Feb 92 p 1*

[Interview with Col Aleksandr Danilovich Shkurupiy, chief of the Kiev Rayon Billeting Unit, by Maj S. Nagoryanskiy under the rubric "An Important Interview": "If Only There Were an Apartment..."]

[Text] "I am prepared for any difficulties. I am prepared to pay any price. I am prepared for anything. If only you would give me an apartment...." This is the acknowledgment we heard from a lieutenant colonel when he came once more to the housing group of the Kiev Rayon Billeting Unit. And once more he was told with sympathy: ""Be patient for a while yet. You are not the only one in

that situation." And just how many people are there who lack apartments at the Kiev Garrison right now? This was the question with which we began our interview with Aleksandr Danilovich Shkurupiy, chief of the Kiev Rayon billeting unit.

[Shkurupiy] A total of 4,840 officers, warrant officers and employees. Unfortunately, the number of those living without a roof over their head is growing by the year.

[Nagoryanskiy] Is the number actually going to increase this year as well?

[Shkurupiy] I do not want to give anyone false hopes. Particularly at this time, when a great deal can change in a year or a month, even a day. There is hope, however, that we will receive quite a few apartments in '92. This is what the figures tell us. Last year the capital's city executive committee allocated 33,600 square meters of apartment space for us. This was 18,000 square meters less than called for by the plan. It was caused by the fact that Kiev's construction organizations proved incapable of applying the funds allocated. And how could they in the situation of overall shortages? Our portion, that is, the amount spent to build those 33,600 square meters, was 48 million rubles. And this was at the old prices. Each square meter cost 1,200 rubles. This includes the direct cost of the housing plus that spent on the construction of schools, kindergartens, stores and so forth.

[Nagoryanskiy] The cost of housing—I am not speaking of construction materials—has risen sharply. Is there not going to be a shortage of funds this year? And will the waiting list then increase?

[Shkurupiy] Good lord, no! According to the most approximate calculations it will decrease. In '92 we have concluded an agreement with the Kiev city executive committee for 95,000 square meters. Compare that with the figure of 33,600 for last year. Of this 95,000, 90,000 will go for housing for the military and the other 5,000 will be used for resettling from closed posts personnel who are no longer connected with the Ministry of Defense. This has always been a problem. And not just for our garrison. People would be discharged but continue to live where they were. Others would come to replace them on the job. In order to resolve this problem at Gostomel, for example, two 70-unit apartment buildings will be built at Irpen. The people will be resettled there.

[Nagoryanskiy] Aleksandr Danilovich, you mentioned 90,000 square meters. Will this go exclusively to those who do not have apartments of their own?

[Shkurupiy] No, 3% of this housing will be allocated to provide better housing for some people.

[Nagoryanskiy] But is it fair to provide some people with new apartments as an improvement when thousands have no apartment at all?

[Shkurupiy] In the first place, there are laws which, among other things, govern the procedure in this matter. And we have no right to raise any kind of obstacles. For your information, in Kiev housing conditions will be improved for those families which have less than 7.5 square meters per member (the figure was 5 meters until recently). In the second place, previously, when the waiting list was shorter and more apartments were being allocated, the proportion of those moving into better housing was far greater. Today, I repeat, the figure is 3%. That is not such a large figure.

[Nagoryanskiy] Now let us talk about preferential lists. How many of these are there?

[Shkurupiy] I want to say right off that there are not as many as the experts calculate. People with the appropriate medical certification are legally entitled to housing out of turn. Then there are the "Afghaners." A third group includes the Chernobyl people.

[Nagoryanskiy] And how much sooner do those with preferential status receive housing?

[Shkurupiy] While those people who went onto the general waiting list in 1986 are receiving apartments today, let us say, those placed onto the preferential list in 1988 are receiving them.

[Nagoryanskiy] And who receives a place of his own sooner, the "Afghaners," the Chernobyl people or those with a certified illness?

[Shkurupiy] I am glad you asked that question. In fact, there are numerous false rumors surrounding it. They say that the billeting unit issues apartments first to those to whom it is expedient to give them. We have lists for each group entitled to priority. And we distribute the allocations evenly.

[Nagoryanskiy] Aleksandr Danilovich, be honest. Do some people try to get onto the preferential waiting lists by devious means?

[Shkurupiy] Unfortunately, yes. It is not particularly difficult for us to detect them however. You know that we are not novices in this matter. Certain comrades received housing out of turn at a previous garrison, for example, but they lose their priority status at the new station. This is written into the law.

[Nagoryanskiy] I share your optimism, Aleksandr Danilovich. And may God grant that many people receive housing this year. I cannot help thinking about the following though. As a result of the military reduction, a certain part of the servicemen—I have in mind natives of Kiev—will be discharged into the reserve. They will retain their housing, of course. This means that our housing pool will lose, so to speak, many thousands of square meters. That is one thing. Another is that new people will come from the former Union republics to continue their service in Ukraine, including Kiev. It is difficult to say how many. Are those 95,000 square meters not going to be a drop in the bucket?

[Shkurupiy] As far as I know, whether or not an officer or warrant officer has an apartment is taken into account for deciding all the cadre problems, including those involving a move to Kiev. This is frequently the deciding factor. I realize this means that less than the very best people may be left to serve as a result of this approach. But what are we to do...?

[Nagoryanskiy] You mentioned those who will be discharged as part of the reduction. What if they have no housing?

[Shkurupiy] We have firm instructions on this matter. An individual is not supposed to be discharged until he has an apartment.

[Nagoryanskiy] We know, however, how orders and laws, and particularly instructions, can be violated. Our editorial mail contains many letters asking such as who can give the personnel a 100% guarantee that they will not be discharged without an apartment.

[Shkurupiy] I fully understand the people's uncertainty. If only observance of the law depended solely upon the billeting unit. We constantly encounter situations which show that the laws have not been adequately worked out from the economic standpoint. This includes laws having to do with housing.

[Nagoryanskiy] Particularly since construction organizations and not we ourselves are ordinarily the ones doing the building. I refer primarily to housing construction. We do not have adequate military capabilities of our own, so to speak. Incidentally, just what are these capabilities? More precisely, these possibilities?

[Shkurupiy] Let me show you with some figures. If everything goes well, the military construction workers will release approximately 280 apartments this year. These include a 94-apartment building on Krasnozvezdnaya Street and a 96-apartment building on Tupolev. In addition the city is building us a 90-apartment building, but military construction workers will do all of the finishing work.

[Nagoryanskiy] Aleksandr Danilovich, would it not make sense to build one or two small-family dormitories? As many as our resources permit? No matter what, servicemen without housing are going to be transferred to Kiev. Where are they to live? Are they to lay out many hundreds of rubles for private housing? I am not even speaking of those who have been renting housing in the capital for several years. Some petty landlords demand hard currency for it....

[Shkurupiy] You mentioned dormitories.... There is no simple answer to the question of whether to build them or regular housing. We need both. This is what I can say about the issue, however. We know that there are foreigners studying at military schools. As a result of all sorts of developments, some of them have departed and more will do so. And they have been living in nice dormitories. People without apartments could be moved

into them for a time. We are working out this matter. Particularly since we recently lost one of our few dormitories, the one located not far from the billeting unit. This building was turned over to a memorial complex honoring the Great Patriotic War. What is more, the document was signed at the very highest level, and all our efforts to stand up for ourselves were in vain. As a result 60 bachelors and 26 families are finding themselves on the street (most of them are our workers).

[Nagoryanskiy] There you have the answer to our question about observance of the law.

[Shkurupiy] I am almost certain that these people will not be left to face their troubles alone, however. I do not want to get ahead of myself, but their eviction has already been reconsidered.

[Nagoryanskiy] Previously apartments were let under contract at least. People were replaced and went abroad or to other districts. Incidentally, is there a possibility of moving into such an apartment today?

[Shkurupiy] Insignificantly small. Last year only 12 people surrendered housing under a contract. In 1987 the number was 245.

[Nagoryanskiy] There are no available apartments and no dormitories. Would it not be better to join a housing construction cooperative?

[Shkurupiy] It is difficult to give an unqualified answer to this question. Previously, in order to get on the waiting list of a housing construction cooperative one had to have spent at least 5 years on a regular list. This restriction has now been lifted. Waiting lists are being reduced at approximately the same rate for our housing and for a cooperative. It all depends upon which moves more rapidly, the city or the cooperative. Plus a hundred other factors. One cannot advise people what to do in a few words. However, I would like to advise the NARODNAYA ARMIYA readers carefully to read the laws and all sorts of decrees and documents dealing with the matter of apartments. This will prepare you the better to get your bearings and stand up for your rights.

[Nagoryanskiy] Aleksandr Danilovich, could you at least answer the most typical questions from the readers in your newspaper? Once a month, let us say? Or as the need arises?

[Shkurupiy] With pleasure.

[Nagoryanskiy] It is a pleasure to wrap up the interview on that note. Thank you.

### **Thirteen Thousand Ukrainian Servicemen Request Transfer**

*92UM0750A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
26 Feb 92 p 1*

[Article by Maj G. Klyuchikov, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent: "Return the Soldiers to the Motherland"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has received over 13,000 requests from servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine to return to serve in the motherland. Nor has the line grown any shorter at the reception offices of the Ministry of Defense, with hundreds of officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"] who have been sent by their comrades arriving in Kiev in order to describe the difficult situation in which the citizens of our state serving outside it have found themselves.

The regular Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Officers Union was devoted to this problem.

"We have assembled," stated Sr Lt (Res) S. Rudyuk, "in order to show our determination to defend the rights of those 412,000 servicemen and the 800,000 members of their families who at present are outside Ukraine. Of these numbers, around 5,000 are serving in the Transcaucasus and 3,000 in the Baltic. There is information that in Azerbaijan, the servicemen are being forced to take the oath of loyalty to the people of this state, thereby involving them in the fratricidal conflict. At the same time, the CIS governments are slow in resolving this question. At the last meeting of the heads of state in Minsk, the question of the return of servicemen to their motherland was not even raised. The return of the servicemen is a matter of our honor."

Lt O. Garmazi from Nakhichevan and Col V. Fedyrko from Estonia, using vivid examples, illustrated the situation of lawlessness and desperation in which our fellow citizens found themselves in the "hot spots."

Also strongly voicing their opinion were the representatives of the Ukrainian Soldiers' Mothers Committee. They demanded the immediate return of their sons and that they not be held hostage in a political struggle foreign to us.

In summing up the speeches by the executive committee members, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Officers Union, Col V. Martirosyan, said that in the current complex situation, the members of the union are obliged to show that they as before are a social organization the authority of which has a marked influence on the process of establishing an independent state and its Armed Forces. The Union decisively favors the return home of the servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens. For this purpose a plan has been worked out and this envisages the setting up of a mechanism contributing to a resolution of the problem.

"If the state does not have the funds for this," said Vilen Arutyunovich [Martirosyan], "we are prepared to collect them. I do not think that the people will hold back the money if it means helping fellow citizens who have suffered misfortune. If a problem of housing arises, then for the time being, the returning families of the servicemen can be allocated a portion of the dormitories at the military schools. But this problem must be settled immediately."

The question of personnel policy in the Ukrainian Armed Forces was not on the executive committee's agenda, but it arose logically in the course of discussing the situation of the servicemen who are stationed outside the motherland.

The situation is a strange one. On the one hand, tens of thousands of patriotic officers cannot return to Ukraine to take an active part in the organizing of its Armed Forces, while on the other, 25 percent of the officers who are serving on its territory have refused to take the oath of loyalty to its people. Here a good number of the officers in this category not only are continuing to carry out their official duties but also hold high command posts and to a significant degree determine the atmosphere in the troop collectives.

Those present at the plenum gave a number of examples of how certain officers prevent their subordinates from taking the oath and dismiss them under far-fetched pretexts.

The Chief of the CIS Military Counterintelligence Directorate, Col A. Skopalskiy, produced actual documents which showed the setting up of illegal organizations among the servicemen with the aim of preventing the forming of Ukraine's own army. There were numerous instances of the dismissal of patriotic officers, the illegal sale of military supplies and personal enrichment at state expense.

The members of the Ukrainian Officers Union have no desire to begin dividing fellow servicemen into friend or foe. But is it possible to fully trust those who have refused to take the oath to the Ukrainian people? In the opinion of an absolute majority of those attending the executive committee session, the case of the hijacking of the six aircraft and the theft of the military colors was a persuasive answer to the question.

Unfortunately, as the executive committee members pointed out, in certain troop units they are still pouring the old structures into the new forms. Rather responsible posts have been filled by persons who recently persecuted the servicemen who favored the setting up of our own Armed Forces.

Participating in the work of the SOU [Ukrainian Officers Union] Plenum was the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Col Gen K. Morozov. The importance of the problems raised caused him, regardless of his enormous workload, to hear out fully all the speakers.

In replying to the numerous questions, Konstantin Petrovich [Morozov] stressed that he was fully aware that his appointment to the post could not have come about without the support of a majority of the public organizations, including the SOU. For this reason, he considers himself reportable to them. The minister is always grateful to receive both concrete help as well as critical comments. His work is made easier in such a situation.

"I completely favor the quickest return of the servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens to their motherland," he said, "and I feel my full responsibility for a positive resolution to this question. Here a great deal depends upon the carrying out of the state housing construction program. Here as well the SOU has a major role to play as it could organize the collection of data on the servicemen serving outside Ukraine."

The minister supported the initiative of setting up on the district staffs groups which would be responsible for bringing back this serviceman category.

As for the question of appointments to command positions, the position of the minister of defense on this matter was as follows: from the very outset he has worked solely with those who voluntarily offered their aid and made every effort to achieve the common goal. There is no reason not to trust such men. At the same time the minister of defense admitted that not all 100 percent of the appointments had been flawless. But the personnel errors made would be immediately rectified.

In conclusion Col Gen K. Morozov said:

"Yes, there have been errors, there have been miscalculations, but there has not been the betrayal of our cause, there has not been a deviation from the general line. We have reached this view in full awareness of the implications and we shall defend it unswervingly."

#### **Lvov Military School Chief To Be Discharged**

92UM0660A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy under the rubric "From Lvov": "Former Military School Will Find Its Use But Its Chief Is Being Made To Resign"]

[Text] A commission from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense was working in Lvov last week. The commission was studying the feasibility of converting the former military and political school (presently the Lvov Military Institute of Culture) into an educational establishment for training personnel for the Ukrainian Army. They concluded optimistically that the military school would continue to function. In the nearest future, the school will conduct reevaluation of its teachers and commanding officers. Certain judgment has been already passed, however. According to the statement made by V. Chornovil, chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet, school chief Major General I. Pushkov should not plan to remain at his post. A recommendation will be made to have him discharged into the reserves. The reason cited for the action is the fact that nobody from the garrison but the cadets of the former political school, headed by their commander and carrying red banners, came to a rally and spoke against the dismantling of the downtown statue of V.I. Lenin.

### Deserters Want To Serve In Ukraine

92UM0660A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Captain A. Veklich under the rubric "From Kemerovo": "Soldiers Are Being Taken Away"]

[Text] Several days ago, one of the Kemerovo Garrison units received a telephone call from the father of Private N. Bean, who had failed to report to his unit after leave. (Three soldiers were granted leaves in connection with visits by their parents). The parents gave their assurances to the unit commander that their sons would definitely return to the unit at the time indicated in their leave applications. However, none of the three showed up in his units either the next day or two days later. Private Bean's father told the unit commander on the phone that any search for his son, or for Privates V. Drus and A. Slasnyy, would be fruitless. The soldiers have already gone to the recruit depot in the city of Kiev and they are going to continue their service in the Ukrainian Army.

The stream of deserters is also strong in other regions of the former Union and the Kemerovo Garrison has to accept them now. This flow has been also initiated by the soldiers' parents and they have the same reasons—people do not want to serve in the army of a different state.

I talked to officer V. Ksanf, assistant unit commander for personnel, and he explained to me that, unfortunately, commanders did not dare issue weapons or military hardware to the majority of these soldiers because, even at their new stations, they showed themselves in less than favorable light. Some of them have managed to desert their army several times already. Given the present shortage of personnel, these people create tensions in military units; there is nobody to do routine and guard duty, to do maintenance of hardware; combat training schedules are being disrupted.

### Legislation Requested to Enable Servicemen to Return Home

92UM0747A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
29 Feb 92 p 2

[Article from Ukrinform: "Soldiers Must Be Returned to Ukraine"]

[Text] Today some 80 percent of the soldiers serving in Ukraine have also taken an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people. Many reserve officers also swore allegiance to Ukraine. We see in this a manifestation of the very highest self-consciousness and civic patriotism.

The Democratic Party of Ukraine received such a request from representatives of soldiers and citizens serving in Azerbaijan. The Moscow Society of Ukrainian Officers also appealed to the party with a similar request.

After studying all the circumstances, the Presidium of the National Council of the Democratic Party of

Ukraine came to the conclusion that the demands of Ukrainian officers are legal and just. It therefore asks the Ukrainian parliament and president to urgently adopt statutes satisfying the demands of Ukrainian soldiers serving outside their homeland. To this end, the Democratic Party of Ukraine proposes that soldiers should be placed under the protection of the Ukrainian State; intergovernmental agreements concerning reciprocal officer exchanges and organized, voluntary resettlement of soldiers of Ukrainian citizenship to Ukraine should be concluded with the appropriate country's governments; having been guaranteed legal protection, financial security and the ability to return to their homelands, students of military schools should be allowed to complete their studies.

First and foremost, it is proposed that soldiers be returned from the Republic of Azerbaijan, which is in fact at war with Armenia, as soon as possible or else those who are Ukrainian citizens will become participants in this war. They must therefore immediately be granted non-combatant status.

### Lvov Military Institute Chief Fired

02UM0750C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 10 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Col Ye. Bogdanovskiy: "From Lvov: A More Valid Reason Has Been Found for the Dismissal of Gen I. Pushnov, But the District Personnel Bodies Know Nothing of This"]

[Text] Regardless of the fact that the Chief of the Lvov Military Culture Institute (the former Military Political School) has taken the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people, he has been discharged into the reserves. The reason for this was that the institute's officer candidates headed by the chief went to one of the demonstrations with red banners and were against the disassembly of the monument to V. Lenin in the center of the city.

But soon this reason began to seem quite shaky and had begun to cause doubt among those in power. A representative commission from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense was sent to the institution of learning. Having discovered a shortage, the commission petitioned for the dismissal of the Chief of the Military Culture Institute, Maj Gen I. Pushnov. The order for this was quickly signed by the Ukrainian minister of defense.

The same fate befell Pushnov's first deputy, Col V. Boykov. He had not taken the Ukrainian oath and evidently for this reason was accused of not doing his job. In the opinion of his fellow servicemen, this does not correspond to the actual facts.

It is interesting that the personnel body of the Carpathian MD as yet knows nothing of these hastily taken decisions.



## BALTIC STATES

### Organization of Estonian Military Viewed

92UM0711A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 21 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Lushchin: "You Joined as a Volunteer? The Estonian Army Is in the Formation Stage"]

[Text]

#### Estonia

An army, as is known, is one of the principal attributes of a state, supporting and ensuring its sovereignty. And while Estonia did not go the way of Costa Rica, where in 1948 it was constitutionally prohibited from maintaining armed forces, problems of manning the new national army are emerging. The previous system of the draft and the training of servicemen, which existed here for almost 50 years, collapsed with the breakup of the central organs of administration and the acquisition de jure of Estonian independence. But what has come to replace it?

Operating in Estonia today are a chief of staff of national defense and the city and uyezd [district] committees that are subordinate to him. They are supposed to provide for the training, education, and manning of the national army, which will reach 10-13,000 persons in the future. However, this figure represents the numerical strength of the future Estonian Army in peacetime under conditions of a full cadre-professional and material-technical support. But now, when the processes of forming national armed forces are just beginning, and there is an absence of an appropriate material and technical base, the Army's requirements for a regular and conscript complement is much more modest.

Thus, for example, at the end of last year and the beginning of this year more than 100 persons with 1973-1974 dates of birth were drafted into the service (for this same period, more than 300 were sent to serve in the Soviet Army.) The draftees were assigned to perform service in the defense of the state border, to prisoner escort troops that guard places of confinement, and to the police regiment deployed in Tallinn. They all face 18 months of service.

This autumn draft also did not avoid certain breakdowns that were caused by the reorganization of the state structure, the lack of coordination of their mutual actions, and the general lowering of the prestige of Army service. Thus, about 30 percent of the draftees simply ignored the callup papers that arrived, believing "sacred duty" to be immaterial, or they put it off for a time that was more convenient. Previously, the "Law on Universal Military Service Obligation" would go into effect, but in the absence of this the state from time to time places its hopes on a high moral-political level of the draft contingent. A more fascinating situation occurred with the recruits who were sent to perform service near Tallinn.

This military reinforcement unit, after arriving at the place of deployment, saw completely unfurnished barracks with broken windows, and decided to disband itself.

But all of this is the excess of a reconstruction period. An intense discussion is going on now in the defense commission of the Estonian Republic on the "Law on Defense." The law should give a legal basis to the existence of a national army, to the development of its structure, and to a determination of the rights and duties of parts of the population subject to military law.

Possessing initial information, it is possible to predict the main positions of the anticipated law. The Estonian Army, apparently, will be built on a mixed basis: a contract for the officer and noncommissioned officer staff and universal military service obligations for draftee soldiers. The minimum contract period is three years. Given the absence of a specially trained officer corps, officers of the former Soviet Army are now being brought in. They are presented with two requirements: knowledge of the Estonian language and loyalty with respect to the laws of the Estonian Republic. On the basis of the former Tallinn military-political school of the construction troops, for which negotiations are now under way with Russia to transfer it to the jurisdiction of the Estonian Republic, Estonia plans in the future to establish its own educational institution for the training of command personnel according to arm of service. It is planned in the future to establish a small navy and air force (there are now only helicopters) for patrolling and border security. It is expected that the school will open next year. After graduation cadets will receive military ranks that existed in Estonia up to 1940.

For students of VUZ's [higher educational institutions], military departments will open where training will be voluntary. Those who complete the training will be given officer ranks in the reserve. Of course, those youths who do not want to learn military science within the walls of their alma mater will have to become acquainted with it after graduation from the VUZ for 12 months as a private. Present officers of the reserve who receive an officer's rank in the Soviet Army can sleep and work in peace—today's requirements of the Estonian Army do not apply to them for the present.

Draftees, according to the draft law, can expect 18 months of service in one of the three arms of service or border guards on the territory of Estonia. After completion of compulsory service, they are granted the preference of completing the contract. Those who are not citizens of the Estonian Republic are given the opportunity to join the Estonian Army on contract or be called to Army auxiliary services. However, this question today is the haziest, inasmuch as the attitude towards this of those states whose citizens these people now are, based on their nationality, is absolutely unclear.

### Latvia Protests Military Actions

92UM0769A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 6 Mar 92 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Latvia"]

[Text] The Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared two memorandums of protest directed at the Russian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] in connection with several, in the opinion of the Latvian government agency, violations in the procedure for troops of the former USSR to reside and operate within the territory of the republic.

The first protest was made in connection with incidents in which a directive signed in October, 1991, was not carried out. In accordance with this directive all military servicemembers are subject to discharge from the army who express such a desire and were drafted from the Baltic states. The Latvian MID is disseminating information concerning incidents in which the discharge of servicemembers has been delayed. In the memorandum of protest, the Latvian side is requesting that the Russian MID report these facts to the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Combined Armed Forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov.

In the second memorandum a protest is made against an order issued by CIS Air Force Commander Deynekin, in accordance with which civilian flight paths in Latvian air space were temporarily restricted. The Latvian side did not consent to this order, and republic officials were only informed of it shortly before it went into force. In the memorandum of protest it says: "This type of action on the part of VVS [Air Force] leadership not only disorganizes the work of air traffic control services and creates a threat to the safety of pilots, but also contradicts an agreement, which stipulates that all matters concerning troops of the former CIS are to be reconciled with Latvia."

### Latvia Changes Exchange Rules For Servicemen's Apartments

92UM0769B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 11 Mar 92 p 2

[Unattributed Article; "Housing Exchange Authorized For Military Servicemembers. At Last"]

[Text] Changes were made by a Latvian government resolution in the previously established procedure for using housing assigned to military servicemembers. The changes, in essence, will make it so that under certain conditions, official status will not apply to the housing of servicemembers. This will primarily concern those incidents in which an exchange is made for apartments

outside of the republic with persons who held legal citizenship status in the Latvian Republic before June 17, 1940. Servicemembers also have the right to conduct similar exchanges with the direct descendents of the aforementioned parties.

### Lithuania Wants Control of Border Troops

92UM0664A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
27 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Captain Second Rank B. Gromak: "From Klaypeda. The Question of Transferring the Border Control Point Can Be Resolved Only in Negotiations. Otherwise Conflicts Are Possible"]

[Text] The Chief of the Klaypeda border control point, Colonel Igor Kirichenko, was told that the leaders of the Lithuanian border troops and coast guard intend to take over the Palanga border detachment and other facilities. In principle the border guards of the CIS have no objection to having Lithuania guard its own borders, but they cannot take over the military compounds and posts without the appropriate order.

But who can give this order? All the CIS troops stationed in the Baltic states except for the border guards have been under Russia's jurisdiction. In any case the question of transferring the border troops must be considered at the interstate level. And since these problems are not being resolved, all kinds of conflicts are possible. Incidentally, they are already occurring. On Sunday, when a crowd of people organized by the local Sajudis chapter tried to invade the border detachment of the Klaypeda-Mukran Ferry Crossing, the guard on duty, acting on orders, fired a warning shot into the air... All right, there were no victims.

Here is what Colonel Vladimir Korkots told KRASNAYA ZVEZDA:

"The Chief of the Border Guard of the Lithuanian Republic, Stanchijas, and the chief of the coast guard detachment, Lichis, are still at the ferry crossing. We have assigned them a special room where they are now. The representative of our Baltic border district, Major General Kostenko, has spoken with them. He stated that the complex of issues regarding guarding the borders in the Baltic states would be discussed at the level of the president of Russia. 'That does not suit us,' responded the representatives of the Lithuanian border guard. 'We will take our own measures.' In a word, conflicts are possible."

It is difficult to describe what is taking place with the border guards of the former USSR in Lithuania. Especially from a legal standpoint. But one thing is clear: Any conflicts among people with weapons in their hands promise dire consequences. We must remember that.

## ARMS TRADE

### Rumors of Possible SU-27 Sale to Iran

92UM0730A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY  
KOMSOMOLET in Russian 29 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Whom Will the SU-27's Threaten?"]

[Text] The SU-27, the world's best interceptor aircraft, possibly is being sold from Georgia to Iran. Such troubling rumors persistently circulate in corridors of the heads of the aviation industry and aircraft export.

We were told in the Design Bureau imeni Sukhoy that if this is taking place, it is only by bypassing the Design Bureau and is altogether underground.

One of the heads of the structure handling aircraft export declared that although his department is not engaged in selling military equipment (and consequently he has no documents regarding this), he was informed of this "verbally."

If the "verbal" reports are correct, then it appears the "export" of the most modern weapons from a number of republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States essentially is not being monitored. What the presence of the SU-27 in militant Eastern regimes may lead to is clear to everyone.

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

### Russia Seen Failing To Exploit Singapore Airshow

PM0403152192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 3 Mar 92 p 3

[M. Makhlin report: "Confusion at Singapore Airshow: Has Russia Capitulated?"]

[Text] Singapore—Throughout last week the attention of the entire aviation world was focused on Singapore. The largest airshow after France's Le Bourget and Britain's Farnborough, and held every two years, it largely determines the prospects for economic, military, and other ties in Southeast Asia and the entire Asia-Pacific region.

As has already been reported, Russia's aviation industry was very modestly represented in Singapore. After the show opened, an An-124 Ruslan landed at Changi Airport. It was built by the Ulyanovsk Aviation Complex, and even it was appearing under the auspices of the "Antonov Airlines" Ukrainian-British joint venture. Although it did provide some backup for the Il-96-300 airliner and the A-40 Albatross seaplane, whose job it was to represent the Russian aviation industry at this international show.

During the demonstration flights it has to be said that Singapore's skies belonged to Western pilots. However pretty the Albatross was, since it had no stretch of water

for takeoff and landing, it could not compete with the F/A-18 and F-16 fighters. We were not the dominant force in the air as regards helicopters either.

We repeatedly heard military and civil pilots, businessmen, and colleagues from other countries' aviation press ask perplexedly: Why has Russia relinquished the vast opportunities afforded by the Singapore Airshow, allowing competitors to step in without a fight? After all, the dates for the show were known long ago. If savings had to be made, then fighters, helicopters, lightplanes, and mockups of ground equipment could have been sent by sea. Moreover, practice shows that airshows do not restrict themselves to the subject mentioned in their name.

"In my view, the commercial thrust of the Singapore Airshow has a political subtext. Particularly if you take account of the situation emerging in Southeast Asia," Colonel General of Aviation V. Potapov, chief of Naval Aviation, who was present here, believes. "Old but still relevant warplanes and ground-support helicopters were displayed alongside civil equipment which was also not new. Our MiG's and Sukhoi's would undoubtedly have caused a sensation yet again. I was impressed by the vast array of lightweight, medium-sized, and heavy weaponry and munitions on sale. There are plenty of similar 'exhibits' at our Armed Forces' storage depots. And it is no secret that we lack the manpower and material resources to allow these arsenals to function normally. As for the aircraft and helicopters held in reserve, they will simply decay in 18 months' or two years' time unless they are properly looked after. Needless to say, we should have been making every effort to sell them on the foreign market and channel the funds raised into saving our existing technical skills—which will be lost without appropriations—and into completing the entire cycle for the introduction of new-generation aircraft, from research and development to series production."

I would like to think that this experienced military pilot's words will be heeded by those on whom the future of the aircraft industry and aviation depend—while it is still capable of competing in the international arena. It was a good thing that the show was attended by Yuriy Tarasyuk, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Industry and Power Committee's Conversion Subcommittee, and by other Russian people's deputies. Of course, it is better to see something once than to hear entreaties about aid 100 times—all the more so on the eve of the adoption of the law on conversion.

The participation of representative air squadrons of the former USSR was not forgotten at previous international airshows. This participation also played a definite role in this show's commercial results. Two days before the end of the show (it closed Sunday, 1 March) "Aviaeksport" alone had concluded contracts worth some \$20 million. That is an impressive sum, given the market rate of the ruble. But if we take account of the fact that the baseline

price of a single MiG-29 fighter without weapons systems is more than the sum total of all our contracts, then it is reasonable to talk of lost opportunities rather than profits earned.

In the opinion of Vladimir Laptev, president of the Russian Aviation Trading House who simultaneously heads a light-aircraft firm under the Russian Aviaprom Union, the recent press reports about the sale of military aircraft to a number of countries do not square with reality. And they gave patently low prices.

Unfortunately, there are not many actual cases of the other kind. Admittedly, collectives at aviation experimental design bureaus and series-production plants, recently united in the Russian Aviaprom Union, have set up their own trading house, which has obtained permission to sell the MiG-29, MiG-31, and the Su-27. Intensive talks have been under way in Singapore about possible export shipments of these aircraft and of the Albatross.

There was a presentation in Singapore on the "Ila-92" airshow scheduled for June in Germany. This time it will be held in Berlin instead of in Hannover, as usual. What role will we play in this show?

#### **French Delegation Discusses Military-Industrial Issues in Ukraine, Belarus**

*92UM0740A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 92 Morning edition p 4*

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Yuriy Kovalenko, Paris: "Paris Proposes Assistance to our Military-Industrial Complex"]

[Text] A French delegation headed by State Secretary for Defense Issues Jacques Melliques, will visit Ukraine and Belarus. It consists of representatives of the general staff, MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], general directorate for arms, and leading industrial groups of France—SNECMA, Thomson, Alcatel, GIAT Industries, Matra, and SNPE, which make up the foundation of its military-industrial complex.

Ukraine and Belarus, notes the newspaper LE MONDE, intend to create their own armed forces and right now they are involved in a search for assistance, specifically, for conversion. In so doing, due to the enormous economic problems they face, they cannot refuse to export arms.

Recently, Paris has already repeatedly stated its readiness to cooperate with our military-industrial complex. At the end of last year, when the Soviet Union still existed, the leaders of major French companies met with representatives of native defense complex firms in Moscow. At that time, they discussed conversion and the creation of joint ventures. Furthermore, the French are ready to work with our experts on implementing a series of joint projects. Specifically, they are the development of new generation military transport aircraft within the

framework of the European Euroflag concern, and also the new civilian supersonic aircraft, etc.

After the disintegration of the Union, the French decided to continue these talks with the individual CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] member-republics. Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe has already recently visited Russia.

Paris, in Pierre Joxe's words, is ready to build turn key plants on CIS territory for dismantling and "decontaminating" nuclear warheads under conditions of complete safety. Each such plant, at a cost of approximately one billion francs, will be able to "process" an average of 250 warheads per year.

### **MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS**

#### **Discussion of U.S. ICBM's**

*92UM0676A Moscow TEKHNKA I VOORUZHENIYE in Russian No 11, Nov 91 pp 36-38*

[Article by Lt Col V. Kobayakov, candidate of technical sciences: "U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles"]

[Text] The composition of U.S. strategic offensive forces (SOF) includes land-based strategic missiles, missiles located on nuclear-powered submarines, and strategic aviation. The bulk of the land-based SOF grouping comprises 1,000 Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and MX intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's], which carry about 20 percent of the total number of nuclear weapons of the U.S. Armed Forces. In the opinion of American military experts, the primary advantage of these missiles is their efficiency and high effectiveness in performing strategic missions. Suffice it to say that the technical readiness time of ICBM's, that is, from the time between launch equipment activation and launch, is approximately 30 seconds. Flight time when firing over intercontinental distances (over 8,000 km) is 25-40 minutes. The yield of nuclear weapons and accuracy of delivering them to the targets are such, for example, that they enable one MX missile, in the absence of countermeasures, to hit with a high degree of probability up to 10 diverse targets (including super-hardened) located tens and even hundreds of kilometers apart.

The Minuteman II is a three-stage solid-propellant missile with a tandem configuration (with sequential positioning of the stages). It is equipped with a single nuclear warhead with a yield of 1-2 megatons (TNT equivalent). It is 18.2 meters long and has a launch weight of 31.8 tons. All of the missile stages are of different caliber.

The first stage includes a solid-propellant main propulsion rocket engine and tail section. The rocket engine case is made of high-strength steel. Its upper plate is welded to the cylindrical shroud, and the nozzle plate is connected to it by means of a conical threaded connection. The engine with four nozzles has 91 tons of thrust.

The solid propellant charge, consisting of a copolymer of butadiene and acrylic acid, ammonium perchlorate, and aluminum powder, is fastened to the case. The tail section is cone-shaped. The direction of flight is regulated by deflection of the supercritical portion of the nozzle using individual hydraulic cylinders.

The second stage consists of a solid-propellant rocket engine and the adapter section. The engine casing is made of a titanium alloy. One stationary nozzle is partially recessed into the casing. The engine's thrust is approximately 32 tons. The propellant is a mixture of polyurethane and ammonium perchlorate. The cone-shaped adapter section serves as a link between the first and second stages. It also houses the nozzle unit of the second-stage engine with elements of the thrust vector control system.

Flight control in the process of operation of the Minuteman II's second stage over the pitch and yaw channels is done by thrust vector deflection of the main propulsion engine by injecting liquid freon into the supercritical nozzle through four groups of orifices. Roll flight control takes place using a self-contained gas generator system.

The third stage is similar in design to the second, the difference being that the main propulsion engine has a fiberglass casing. In addition, orifices of the thrust cut-off system are mounted on its upper plate. This makes it possible to vary the parameters of the end of the boost phase of flight (distance, altitude, and angle of departure) and, consequently, the launch range within a fairly wide range. The engine with four nozzles develops 16 tons of thrust.

Flight control of the missile in the phase of operation of the third stage is accomplished by deflection of the supercritical portion of the nozzles. Staging and separation of the missile's front section are accomplished by the "cold" method by braking of the previous stage.

Initially, a MK-11B single reentry vehicle was installed on the Minuteman II. Later, it was replaced with the more improved MK-11C. According to available data in the foreign press, Minuteman II missiles with both types of warheads are on alert. To increase the probability of penetrating enemy antiballistic-missile [ABM] defenses, the missile is equipped with decoy targets. The Minuteman II is equipped with a self-contained inertial control system based on an onboard digital computer, which makes it possible prior to launch to retarget it remotely to one or several targets, information which has been input into the control system in advance.

The Minuteman III missile began entering service in 1970. It is a modification of the Minuteman II and, in the opinion of American experts, has a number of advantages over it. The main ones are a higher firing accuracy, the presence of more effective means of penetrating an ABM system, and command and control and retargeting system, and less vulnerability of operational sites.

It is a solid-propellant, three-stage missile with successive connection of the stages. It is equipped with a multiple reentry vehicle with a nuclear warhead. Its launch weight is about 35 tons.

The first and second stages of the Minuteman III are virtually identical to those of the Minuteman II. The third stage has larger dimensions and is equipped with a solid-propellant engine, the power characteristics of which are better than that of the Minuteman II. This has made it possible to increase the payload weight with some increase in the missile's launch weight.

A solid-propellant rocket engine has been installed on the third stage of the Minuteman III. Its casing is made of fiberglass. The engine has 16 tons of thrust and has one stationary nozzle. The solid propellant consists of a copolymer of butadiene and acrylonitrile, ammonium perchlorate, and aluminum powder. The propellant charge is secured to the casing of the solid-propellant rocket engine. The engine is equipped with a thrust cut-off system. During operation of the third stage, pitch and yaw control is by injection of liquid into the supercritical portion of the nozzle, and roll control is by using special jet propulsion nozzles.

The flight control system of the Minuteman III missile is housed in a cylindrical compartment under the front section. It is self-contained, inertial, and operates continuously during alert. The latter has made it possible to increase substantially the combat readiness of the missiles. Structurally, it includes two units which provide flight control before and after separation of the reentry vehicle.

The Minuteman III is one of the first strategic missiles equipped with a MIRVed (Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle) multiple reentry vehicle. MIRVed warheads have unguided warhead-carrying reentry vehicles that are individually vectored to the target. Therefore, in addition to the warhead-carrying reentry vehicle and components of the ABM penetration system, they include a so-called MIRV stage, designed for guiding each warhead-carrying reentry vehicle to the appropriate target and building the required battle formation. To improve the aerodynamic shape, the warhead is covered with a nose cone.

Originally, the missile was equipped with the MK-12 reentry vehicle, which had three warheads with a yield of about 0.17 megatons, a set of passive decoy targets, and a MIRV stage with a propulsion system.

On some of the Minuteman III missiles, the MK-12 reentry vehicles were later replaced with the more improved MK-12A, which have the same dimensions and also consist of three warheads. However, each of the warheads has a nuclear yield of 0.35 megatons (i.e., twice as much), and the firing accuracy has been increased to a circular error probable [CEP] of 180 meters by improving the control and guidance system. Thus, the combat capabilities of the missile were increased substantially in the modernization process. According to

estimates of American experts, when using the MK-12 reentry vehicle, the probability of hitting an enemy missile in the launch silo that is hardened at the rate of 42 kg/cm<sup>2</sup> will be 0.51 (i.e., approximately 2 missiles are needed for 1 target to guarantee its destruction), and the probability for a silo hardened at a rate of 370 kg/cm<sup>2</sup> is 0.15 (up to 7 missiles for 1 target). For the MK-12A these figures are 0.76 and 0.35, respectively.

The MIRV stage propulsion system consists of a liquid-propellant main propulsion engine situated along the longitudinal axis of the reentry vehicle and 10 attitude control engines located along the periphery. The liquid-propellant main propulsion engine has 136 kg of thrust, is made of beryllium, and is gimballed. The auxiliary engines are stationary. Six of them, each with 10.4 kg of thrust, provide pitch and yaw attitude control; four of them, each with 8.2 kg of thrust, provide roll attitude control. Monomethylhydrazine (combustible) and nitrogen tetroxide (oxidizer) serve as components of the rocket propellant used both in the main and auxiliary rocket engines. It has a propellant-pressurized feed system using compressed helium. The latter is stored in a titanium sphere-cylinder, and the combustible and oxidizer are contained in two double-walled steel cylinders. The propulsion system is ampulized.

The MIRV stage has a self-contained post boost control system (PBCS). Its electronic equipment is protected against the kill mechanisms of a nuclear burst.

The aerodynamic fairing is discarded after the missile passes through the dense layers of the atmosphere by means of a special solid-propellant rocket engine located in its nose section. The nose section detonation system activates after separation of all the warhead-carrying reentry vehicles, breaking its casing into several dozen parts. This provides additional interference for enemy ABM information devices and increases the likelihood of penetration of enemy ABM defenses.

In the process of creating the Minuteman ICBM, several possible variants of its basing were considered. In particular, it was proposed to place the missile on rail launchers, aircraft, floating platforms, and toroidal-shaped dirigibles. In the end, preference was given to underground (silo) hardened launchers equipped with a shock-absorbing system. The distance between the silos is from 5 to 15 km. They are 3.66 meters in diameter and 24.4 or 27.4 meters deep, depending on the type of shock-absorbing system used. On the top, each silo is covered with a special protective device (door) 1.4 meters thick. The door is mounted on rails and is moved prior to launch. The protection of a missile in such a launcher varies from 85 to 155 kg/cm<sup>2</sup>, depending on the type of ground and the underlying rock and also on the extent the concrete is reinforced with steel and impregnated with epoxy resin.

Organizationally, U.S. Air Force units equipped with Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBM's are combined into wings, each of which includes several 50-missile

squadrons. A squadron, in turn, consists of five 10-missile flights. Each flight has a hardened launch control post, where combat crews are on continuous alert duty. In the late 1980's, the U.S. strategic forces began receiving the MX missile, which is considered the latest generation and is the most improved of the existing U.S. ICBM's. The MX is a three-stage solid-propellant missile. Its stages, which are equal in diameter, are connected sequentially. The missile is equipped with a MIRVed warhead. The launch weight is 87 tons, length is 21.5 meters, and diameter is 2.34 meters. The standard variant of the MX has a warhead with 10 warhead-carrying reentry vehicles. With a launch weight of nearly half that of the Titan II ICBM that was removed from the inventory, it carries roughly the same payload weight. The outer surface of the MX airframe has a special coating designed to protect the missile from erosion caused by dust and dirt formations raised by the nuclear burst.

The missile's first stage consists of the main propulsion engine and tail section. The solid-propellant rocket engine has a so-called cocoon configuration—with the center rotating nozzle partially embedded in the combustion chamber. The casings of the engines of all stages are made of a Kevlar-based composite material by the winding method with epoxy impregnation.

Pitch and yaw flight control of the missile during operation of the first stage is accomplished by means of a rotating controlling nozzle, previously used on the Trident-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile. It is mounted on an elastic support hinge. A special self-contained pneumo-hydraulic drive is used to deflect it (plus or minus 6 degrees). It consists of a cartridge-pressure accumulator, a turbopump assembly, and pitch and yaw control drives.

The second stage of the MX missile includes the main propulsion solid-propellant rocket engine and the connecting section between the first and second stages. The second stage solid-propellant rocket engine has a cocoon design—with the center rotating nozzle partially embedded in the combustion chamber. A distinguishing feature of this engine is the presence of a sliding nozzle head, making it possible to increase considerably the expansion of the nozzle (the ratio of the areas of its outlet and throat sections) and, accordingly, the engine thrust. Pitch and yaw flight control is done similar to the first stage (plus or minus 6 degrees).

The connecting section between the first and second stages is made of aluminum alloy to shield the equipment. This is because inside the section on the nozzle unit of the second-stage engine are mounted two diametrically situated self-contained units for roll control of the missile during operation of the first and second stages. Each unit has a cartridge-pressure accumulator and control nozzles. After MIRV separation of the second and third stages, the connecting section is jettisoned.

The missile's third stage also consists of a main propulsion solid-propellant rocket engine and a connecting section. The solid-propellant rocket engine has a central rotating nozzle, partially embedded in the combustion chamber, with a sliding nozzle head. The degree of nozzle expansion is 68. Instead of the third stage of the thrust cut-off system used on the Minuteman missile, the MX missile uses a system that ensures complete total burn-out of the propellant, which increases the range. Pitch and yaw flight control of the missile during operation of the third stage is accomplished by deflection (plus or minus 3 degrees) of the rotating control nozzle.

Besides the 10 warhead-carrying reentry vehicles, the warhead of the MX has a MIRV stage which carries the platform and equipment for penetration of ABM defenses. All these components are covered by an aerodynamic fairing made of titanium alloy and having a triple taper. It is jettisoned by means of a solid-propellant rocket engine located in the nose section. The MIRV stage includes a propulsion system and missile control and guidance system. This distinguishes the MX from the Minuteman, which has a separate control and guidance section connected to the MIRV stage. The propulsion system of the MIRV stage consists of the main (sustainer) liquid-propellant rocket engine and eight liquid-propellant attitude control rocket engines, which operate on a mixture of monomethylhydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide. The system for feeding rocket propellant components into the combustion chambers is a pressurized system (compressed helium). The main engine is gimballed and can deviate plus or minus 15 degrees in two mutually perpendicular planes. The attitude control engines are made of beryllium, which is noted for its comparatively low specific weight and high heat conductivity. Two of them provide pitch control, two provide yaw control, and the rest provide roll control.

The MX missiles use warheads with a nuclear yield of 0.6 megatons and are equipped with a vortex engine. The equipment for penetrating ABM defenses includes decoys and chaff.

The missile control and guidance system equipment is housed in a detachable canister. This significantly simplifies the process of replacing its malfunctioning components, since it does not require disconnecting the missile's nose section. The operating mode of the equipment is continuous.

The MX is housed in a launch canister made of a graphite fiber-based composite material. It weighs approximately 10 tons and is 24.4 meters long and 2.44 meters in diameter. The missile is launched from the canister by means of a cartridge-pressure accumulator. Its design is such that the gas charges emanating in the combustion process mix with water. The mixture of gas, water, and steam obtained in this manner provide the energy necessary to eject the missile to the required altitude. In addition, it has a comparatively low temperature, which precludes the possibility of damaging the missile or spontaneous ignition of the propellant charge of the first-stage engine. The casing of the cartridge-pressure accumulator is made of steel. Its total weight, including the water, is about 3.2 tons.

When selecting the method of basing the missile, experts examined up to 30 different launcher variants. In addition to the above-mentioned methods, they studied the possibility of placing the MX in super-deep silos and a variant of using a large number of hardened shelters for one missile. In the end, it was decided to install the first batch of 50 missiles in converted Minuteman silos in place of the missiles of that type taken off alert. The final decision on basing the second group of 50 missiles, according to data available in the foreign press, has not been made. The rail variant is considered the most likely: 25 combat trains with two railroad launchers on each train.

As far as the prospects for development of armament of the land-based component of the U.S. strategic forces is concerned, besides searching for a basing method for 50 MX missiles, the new Midgetman missile system is being developed. It is planned use mobile ground-basing on transporter-launchers. This is a solid-fuel, single-warhead missile with a launch weight of up to 17 tons. In addition, U.S. experts are studying the possibility of modernizing the Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBM's. It is assumed that they may remain on alert duty for up to another 20 years.

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