


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11 November 1992

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Continued Uncertainty Over 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak

92UM1487A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Sep 92 Morning Edition p 8

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Aleksandr Pashkov, from Yekaterinburg: "The Military Secrets of Anthrax"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA has written repeatedly on the mysterious anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk in 1979, when over 60 persons died. But even now there is no clarity as to the reasons for the tragedy. Who covered up and why and what is the present danger from the secret work on bacteriological weapons? was what our correspondent set out to establish.

Counterintelligence General A. Mironyuk has asserted that the disaster started at the 19th Military Compound, the Microbiological Center of the Ministry of Defense. General Medical Service and Chief of all the secret biological laboratories of the Ministry of Defense V. Yevstigneyev has reported that the reason for the ailments was contaminated animal meat.

After a number of articles in IZVESTIYA, there appeared the sensational edict of the Russian President in which it was officially confirmed that we produced bacteriological weapons and measures had been set which would prevent this in the future.

Recently Ye. Gaydar signed instructions for the start of the reconstruction of the plant producing the anthrax vaccine which had been disassembled in 1985 and from whence, as the supporters of the military version assert, the leak occurred of the anthrax spores. The plant is now engaged in producing civilian products.

Gaydar's instructions do not contradict the Yeltsin edict as the secret laboratory will become strictly peaceful. This will put an end to the confusion and vacillation among the medics in military shoulderboards as many of them are not satisfied with the instability of their material and psychological state. Certainly behind the barbed wire, where the military biologists live, strong scientific forces had been assembled. The graduates from the most prestigious military and civilian VUZes considered it an honor to work here. The men were freed from the characteristic mundane concerns of our life and were provided with the most modern technology and equipment for the interesting work.

However, without answering the main question of where the locus of infection arose in 1979, it is difficult also to assess the government instructions.

Yeltsin's edict undoubtedly is necessary and progressive but all the same bears the imprint of declarativeness. Incidentally the same is true of the corresponding U.S. congressional law with an analogous content.

In banning the production of and work on bacteriological weapons, the legislative enactments do not stop the activities of the military medics which are involved in protection against bacteriological weapons. But it is certainly clear that in working on the means of defense, it is essential to verify the degree of their reliability against the delivery systems. And if there are such, even in small amounts, what prevents them from being produced on a large scale?

The 1972 Geneva Convention banning bacteriological weapons does not set any limits on in what volumes the "testing" substances can exist or what type or how much equipment is needed for their manufacture. In other words, the existing world legal practices make it possible to be engaged in the development of bacteriological weapons.

From reliable sources, it has been learned that our military have visited the secret labs in the U.S. in the same manner that their representatives have been in ours. The military of both countries have not publicized such contacts as in both the U.S. and in Russian they are equally not interested in drawing attention to their activities. Hence, those secrets which are guarded by the barbed-wire fences hold more of a mystery for our own peoples rather than from potential enemies.

To some degree this is explainable. I have seen the German documentary film on the most secret bacteriological labs in the U.S. In the world's most democratic country, as America is called, there are the same problems as in our former totalitarian state.

At the Dugway Proving Grounds of the U.S. Armed Forces in the state of Utah, at Fort Dietrick in Maryland and at the Baker Laboratory, the military are in no rush to reveal the secrets of what they are working on. At the Dugway Proving Grounds the test are carried out on open terrain for obtaining more natural results. The population of the near-by areas is afraid since only mountains serve as the "frontier" between the grounds and Salt Lake City, a city with a million population.

Dr Levett who prior to 1986 was involved in the development of biological weapons for the U.S. Army explained to the German TV journalists why he has now given this up. He feels that the U.S. Army possesses at present the most dangerous agents which can cause vast epidemics. For this reason, Levett is seriously concerned. Physicians from the infectious disease department of the hospital in the million-strong city for many years have been demanding that the Grounds leadership turn over to them a list of the agents which are being tested there. Without any results.

A former worker from the 19th Compound who requested that his name not be given told me that the results of the most interesting experiments later were sent up the chain of command and it is not known how these were used subsequently. "Much that we worked out, should it fall into the hands of unscrupulous persons could cause great losses," this scientist is convinced.

The development of a new, more advanced type of weapon is always shrouded in secrecy and any sorts of things can go on behind this screen. Specialists warn that we are in the presence of the birth of a new such weapon. To some degree the success of the talks for reducing nuclear and conventional weapons is tied to the fact that cheaper and more effective means for destroying people are appearing.

In Russia there are few who know that the "father" of the biological bomb was W. Churchill who organized its industrial production. During the years of World War II, the British military tested the anthrax bacteria on the small Scottish island of Greenough. This island is still dead.

Precisely the absence of an antidote has lessened the interest of the military in bacteriological weapons in the 1960's. Certain experts feel that the signing of the Geneva Convention rather substantiated this fact than it stopped the arms race. At present the situation has changed sharply as the level of science and technology makes it possible to speak seriously of a bacteriological bomb. In the world there are hundreds of laboratories and institutes which are concerned with this problem.

Thus, against the background of the ever more exacerbated but still covert struggle to gain parity in the area of bacteriological weapons in the former Union and abroad, there has been a flood of publications on the events in the spring of 1979 in Sverdlovsk, on the laboratories of the 19th Compound, on analogous ones in Kirov and Zagorsk and on the testing range in the Aral Sea... The military see in this the hand of the CIA which via our public opinion is endeavoring to destroy the already developed potential for producing bacteriological weapons.

It is flattering that our higher-ups have begun to consider public opinion, although certain that is not the crux of the issue. When the censor was abolished, the journalists naturally turned to the secrets of previous years. It is a different matter that in the polemical zeal (and without the help of the CIA), the military were made almost the main enemies of the people. Alas, no one seriously tried to bring out their viewpoint, their reasoning over the events in April 1979 and in particular, the development of bacteriological weapons generally. For the sake of justice, let me point out that the military as well made no great effort to seek out contacts with the press. The "bad" journalists were simply prevented from going anywhere while from the "good" ones they demanded that all their arguments be taken on faith.

Whatever the case, as of today there have been no documents confirming the official "meat" version of the Sverdlovsk tragedy nor the version of an aerosol release of a bacteriological weapon into the atmosphere. Why? All attempts to begin some official investigation have ended with the sloppy collection of information from the same...journalists. The military procurators with whom I

have spoken on this question, clearly do not consider it pertinent as much time has passed and what is the sense of stirring up the old?

But there is a sense! The "meat" version raises the question of the responsibility of those responsible for prophylaxis, the proper state of the slaughterhouses and so forth. After 1979, no one said anything at all about this. The aerosol release means a serious failure in the technology of producing the bacteriological weapons and this should become available to the specialists of all countries. Like the lessons of Chernobyl. It is naive and possibly irresponsible to think that after the issuing of the President's edict, the military medics would halt their "sly" work. The same German documentary film has shown super-equipped laboratories which we could not even dream of. The buildings of Compound 19 simply cannot be compared, so striking is the contrast.

In discussing today the problem of producing the bacteriological weapons, probably it is not worth speaking just about the Russian generals. It is clear that the generals of other countries have not discarded the ideas of developing such weapons. More effective international legal mechanisms are needed which would prevent any country from achieving priority in this dangerous area.

Civilian to Head Military Procuracy

93UM0037B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by ITAR-TASS Correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy, under the rubric: "Direct Line: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and ITAR-TASS Correspondents Transmitted Yesterday": "From Moscow: A Civilian Procurator Headed the Russian Military Procuracy Investigations Directorate"]

[Text] "Demilitarization" of the Military Procuracy, which began with the appointment of a purely civilian person, former Rostov Oblast Procurator Valentin Panichev, to the post of Russian Procuracy Directorate Chief for Supervision of the Execution of Laws in the Armed Forces—Chief Military Procurator, has received its continuation.

So, Russian Procurator General Valentin Stepankov's order has appointed 40 year-old Civilian Lawyer Aleksandr Kuznetsov Deputy Main Military Procurator. He previously performed the duties of Tver Oblast Procurator. Aleksandr Kuznetsov headed one of the most responsible sectors of Russia's Military Procuracy—the investigations directorate—toward which various legal protection organizations direct complaints, specifically, servicemen's parents' organization.

Another of Valentin Stepankov's orders appointed former Military Procurator of the Northern Group of Forces Major-General of Justice Grigoriy Nosov First Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate for Supervision of the Execution of Laws in the Armed Forces—Main Military Procurator.

Status of Subunit in Nurek

93UM0037A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Anatoliy Ladin: "From Dushanbe: Our Subunit at Nurek is in a Blockade as Before. Firing Is Occurring Around It"]

[Text] We have already reported about the guerrilla attack against the Russian motor vehicle column that is heading for Nurek where an independent subunit is deployed. This subunit's Assistant Commander for Personnel Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Dobrorezov talked about the situation of Russian servicemen today in Nurek.

"We don't have communications with them. All of the cables and landline connecting devices have been cut off," he said. "We are already not sending any single motor vehicles from the subunit to Dushanbe because they would have to drive by several of the anti-Nabiyev opposition's armed posts. If there isn't a sufficiently powerful escort detail, they will search and steal from us. If something doesn't 'suit' them, they could also fire at us. Therefore, columns are now only moving under powerful escort. They are assigning assault troops and also soldiers of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division.

"It was easier when there were Kulyab popular, untrained volunteer military forces here. They conducted themselves in a peace-loving and proper manner. Later, about a week and a half ago, anti-Nabiyev groups began to attack. They operated more aggressively. They opened fire with grenade launchers and rifles in the city itself, blew up two bridges, and shot up our column. Two officers who found themselves in the hands of armed people from the opposition were transported to the area of Kafiringan (Ordzhonikidzeabad). There they shot people before their very eyes; the people were only guilty of being from Kulyab.

"I will say it like this," stressed Dobrorezov, "our officers are brave people. And we, as is required by duty and the oath, will carry out our duties until the end. But we expect that the required steps will be taken to ensure normal duty conditions in Tajikistan."

Numbers of Women in Service

93UM0051A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Oct 92 p 4

[Telephone query by R. Salyakhov and response by Russian Ministry of Defense Press Center Associate Robert Bykov, under the rubric: "Briefing for Readers": "How Many Women Are in Uniform?"]

[Text] I read about the experimental women's company for the first time in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. But I have never encountered information about how many women we have in the army and in which branches of service the majority of them serve.

R. Salyakhov Penza

Russian Ministry of Defense Press Center Associate Robert Bykov:

There are nearly 100,000 women in the Russian Armed Forces. More than 1,000 of them are officers.

Approximately 30,000 representatives of the fair sex serve in our Ground Forces. More than 20,000 are in PVO [Air Defense]. Women have proven themselves best of all from a professional point of view as communicators. Incidentally, there are just 169 command specialties open for women. The July 1991 Minister of Defense Directive on the wider recruitment of women into the army is currently in force.

Kasatonov Runs for Seat As People's Deputy

93UM0057B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Anatoliy Borovkov and Oleg Kalinchikov: "From Sochi: One Month Until the Elections! Admiral Igor Kasatonov Is Conducting Meetings with the Voters"]

[Text] As we have already reported, Russian Navy First Deputy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Igor Kasatonov (for now he is performing the duties of Black Sea Fleet Commander) has been nominated by military seamen and residents of Novorossiysk as a candidate for Russian Federation People's Deputy for the 17th National Territorial Electoral District. A vacancy appeared as a result of People's Deputy Vladimir Shumeyko's transfer to a job in the government.

The city of Sochi is also in the electoral district. The candidate for Russian People's Deputy also came here. The admiral also met with journalists and answered their numerous questions. In the admiral's opinion, he, as a people's deputy, could be of great benefit for the residents of the Kuban.

So, exactly a month remains until the elections which occur on 15 November. Admiral Igor Kasatonov is beginning his pre-election meetings with the voters.

'Concern' Voiced at Servicemen's Involvement in Politics

PM2710220392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Oct 92 p 3

[Oleg Odnokolenko and Boris Soldatenko report: "Moscow Seems To Have Gotten Tired of Demonstrations"]

[Text] As was announced beforehand, last Saturday [24 October] was a day of rallies in Russia. According to Federation of Independent Trade Unions press service data, rallies and demonstrations took place in 60 cities in 55 of the country's regions on 24 October. The quite wide geographical spread of the all-Russian protest day organized by the trade unions is probably better evidence of the moods in society than any statistics. But,

contrary to expectations, the largest mass actions did not take place in Moscow by a long shot. The rally in Krasnodar mustered 40,000 participants, and 10,000 people took to the streets in Novorossiysk and Tambov each.

According to data of the capital's Internal Affairs Main Administration public relations center, the nationwide assembly in Moscow organized by the Russian Communist Workers Party mustered no more than 5,000 people, who had with them 100 scarlet flags and 40 antigovernment placards. The assembly's aim, one of the 450,000 leaflets posted up said, is to express no confidence in Boris Yeltsin and approve the draft socialist constitution prepared by Russian Federation People's Deputy Yuriy Slobodkin. By the middle of the day no more than 150,000 people remained in Oktyabrskaya Square, who created no problems for the law and order organs. According to data of the Moscow Internal Affairs Main Administration, the White House defenders rally announced as an alternative rally was even smaller, which is why it did not make the summary reports at all.

The same day saw the public appearance of a new sociopolitical organization—the National Salvation Front—to whose colors, it was announced, both “red” and “white” are being called. Addressing the delegates, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Terekhov, member of the National Salvation Front Organizing Committee and chairman of the Union of Russian Officers, indicated three stages of the National Salvation Front's activity. In his opinion, the first stage—before 1 December—should be “to form the National Salvation Front's administrative structures.” The second stage should be “to set about organizing work, to forge contacts with directors and the military, and to hold two or three press campaigns.” “As regards the third stage, I will not talk about it,” Stanislav Terekhov said. “The third stage will be resolved by methods of force, that much is clear.” In his opinion, this third stage will come in a few months' time....

The previous day a decision on this organization's collective admission to the National Salvation Front was made during the assembly of regional representatives of the Union of Officers. Just in itself this fact cannot fail to cause concern—in any case, the attempts to involve servicemen in politics are continuing.

CIS: POLICY

Presidential Directive on Transfer of Housing Funds

93UM0056B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Oct 92 p 3

[Directive of the President of the Russian Federation:
“On the Transfer to the Ministry of Defense of Russia

Barracks and Housing Funds of Ministries and Departments Freed as a Result of Reorganization of Military Construction Units Subordinate to Them”]

[Text] In order to provide barracks and housing funds to military units, formations, strategic formations, enterprises, institutions, and organizations being relocated to the territory of the Russian Federation:

1. Ministries and departments having military construction units under their subordination, in the event they are disbanded, shall transfer free of charge to the Ministry of Defense of Russia the barracks and housing funds being freed.

2. The State Committee for Property of Russia shall be charged with monitoring implementation of this instruction.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
5 October 1992
No 555-rp

Presidential Directive on Social Protection

93UM0056C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Oct 92 p 3

[Directive of the President of the Russian Federation:
“On Measures for Social Protection of Servicemen, Rank-and-File and Supervisory Personnel of Internal Affairs Agencies, Pensioners Among Them, and Individual Categories of Citizens”]

[Text] 1. Edict No 296 of the President of the RSFSR of 18 December 1991 and edicts of the President of the Russian Federation No 208 of 29 February 1992, No 321 of 31 March 1992, and No 515 of 21 May 1992 on questions of social guarantees and protection of the population shall apply to officers, warrant officers, extended-service personnel, rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of Internal Affairs Agencies, pensioners among them, and unemployed family members of these categories of service members, workers and employees of military units, institutions, military educational institutions, enterprises, and organizations, pupils and students (non-military) of vocational technical and secondary specialized educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense of Russia located on the territory of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the Ministry of Security of Russia, FAPSI [Federal Government Communications and Information Agency], the SVR [Foreign Intelligence Service] of Russia and Main Administration of Protection of the Russian Federation, and also military units, institutions, military-educational institutions, enterprises, and organizations of the Ministry of Defense of Russia located on the territory of the former republics of the USSR that are not part of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Border Troops of the Baltic and Transcaucasus Border Guard districts under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

2. To pay to female service members:

- who are on a partially paid leave, monthly childcare benefits in the amount established for working mothers having a year's length of service until the child reaches the age of one and a half years;
- who are on childcare leave until the child reaches the age of three years, monthly compensation payments in the amount established for mothers employed by enterprises, institutions, and organizations and on childcare leave until the child reaches the age of three years.

3. To establish effective 1 January 1992 for unemployed wives of servicemen (other than compulsory-service personnel) in remote garrisons and areas lacking employment opportunities monthly compensation payments in the amount established for unemployed wives of rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of Internal Affairs agencies.

The procedure and conditions for considering military units, subunits, institutions, military-educational institutions, enterprises, and organizations as being located in remote garrisons and areas lacking employment opportunities for wives of servicemen, rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of Internal Affairs agencies shall be determined by the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of Security of Russia and FAPSI in coordination with the Ministry of Labor of Russia and the Ministry of Finance of Russia.

4. The Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of Security of Russia, FAPSI, the SVR of Russia, and the Main Administration of Protection of the Russian Federation shall ensure the financing of the measures specified by this instruction within the limits of the total appropriations allocated according to estimates of these ministries and departments.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
2 September 1992
No 481-rp

Russian Decree on Length of Service Increments

93UM0057A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Oct 92 p 1

[Russian Federation Government Decree No. 781, signed by B. Yeltsin, 13 October 1992, Moscow: "Russian Federation Government Decree No. 781, 13 October 1992, Moscow 'On the Calculation of Length of Service Increments for Officers for Receipt of Percentage Increases for Years Served as Army and Navy Warrant Officers or Extended Service Military Personnel'"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Government Decrees:

To calculate, beginning from 1 February 1992, length of service increments for officers for payment of a percentage increase for years served as army and navy

warrant officers or extended service military personnel until award of their first officer rank. In the process, recalculations will not be conducted to increase sums paid in the past.

The term of service for payment of a percentage increase for years served to Russian Federation Ministry of Security army and navy warrant officers or extended service military personnel is calculated according to the procedure prescribed for officers.

Conduct expenditures associated with the implementation of this measure in 1992 within the budget appropriations provided for based on the appropriate ministries and departments expenditure estimates for this year.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin

Compensation for Dependent Education

93UM0056A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Oct 92 p 3

[Decree No 758 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 5 October 1992, Moscow: "On Compensation to Service Members for Support of their Children in School and Preschool Institutions"]

[Text] For the purpose of increasing the social protection of service members of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. To authorize the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to use appropriations for maintenance of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, beginning 1 September 1992:

- to reimburse officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation the difference between the cost of supporting children in preschool institutions of enterprises, organizations, institutions, and bodies of executive power and the payment collected from the parents in accordance with legislation in force;

- to pay officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation performing military duty on the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic, Republic of Armenia, Republic of Georgia, Latvian Republic, Lithuanian Republic, Republic of Moldova, and Estonian Republic the costs for instruction of children in school institutions and also for increases in costs of feeding the children in school institutions in the amounts and on terms established in these states.

2. Expenditures in 1992 for the purposes indicated in this decree shall be made within the limits of appropriations allocated according to the estimate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

[Signed] Ye. Gaydar

Russian Federation Law on Defense

93UM0031A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Oct 92 p 4

[Russian Federation Law on Defense]

[Text] The current Law defines the principles and organization of the defense of the Russian Federation, the rights and duties of the bodies of state authority and administration, the local self-governing bodies, the enterprises, institutions, organizations, officials and citizens in the area of defense, the structure and organization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the responsibility for violating Russian Federation legislation on defense questions as well as other standards concerning defense.

Section I. General Provisions**Article 1. Fundamentals of Defense**

The current Law understands by defense a system of political, economic, military, social, legal and other measures to ensure the state's readiness to defend itself against armed attack as well as the actual defense of the population, the territory and the sovereignty of the Russian Federation.

Defense is an element of security and one of the most important functions of the state.

Defense is organized and implemented in accord with international law, the Russian Federation Constitution, the current legislation of the Russian Federation and the military doctrine of the Russian Federation.

For defense, with the use of the means of armed combat, the Russian Federation Armed Forces are to be organized and the military obligation of the Russian Federation citizens is established.

Defense with the employment of means of armed combat can involve the Border Troops, the Internal Troops, the troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, the government communications troops which provide communications for the military command and control bodies, the Russian Federation Railroad Troops, the Civil Defense troops (henceforth other troops) which carry out the tasks in the area of defense as established by the Russian Federation legislation.

The list of troops designated in the current article is exhaustive.

The existence and establishing of different troop formations in the Russian Federation is prosecuted under the law.

Article 2. The Organization of Defense

The organization of defense includes the following:

- legal regulation in the area of defense;
- forecasting and assessing a military threat;
- the elaboration of military policy and military doctrine of the Russian Federation;

- the organizational development, training and maintaining of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in the required readiness as well as the planning of their use;
- the development, production and modernizing of weapons and military equipment;
- the mobilization training of the bodies of state authority and administration, the local self-governing bodies, the enterprises, institutions and organizations, the economy, the territory, lines of communications and the population of the nation;
- the creation of stocks of valuable materials in the state and mobilization reserves;
- planning and implementing measures relating to civil and territorial defense;
- ensuring the keeping of state and military secrets;
- the development of military science;
- coordinating the activities and the bodies of state authority and administration, the local self-governing bodies in the defense area;
- civilian supervision over the defense expenditures and activities of the Russian Ministry of Defense on a level not restricted by the law;
- international collaboration in the aims of collective security and joint defense;
- other measures in the defense area.

Article 3. Russian Federation Legislation on Defense Questions

The Russian Federation legislation on the questions of defense is founded on the Russian Federation Constitution and includes the current Law as well as other laws of the Russian Federation governing the relations involved with the security of the Russian Federation, military obligation and military service, state service which can replace military service (alternative service), the status of servicemen, pension support for persons discharged from military service, the defense budget, civil defense, mobilization, martial law, the purchasing of weapons, the status of the defense enterprise, state secrecy, land tenure and other legislative enactments of the Russian Federation.

The enforceable enactments which existed in the USSR on the question of defense are to maintain their validity in those areas which do not contradict the Russian Federation legislation on defense questions until their complete replacement by the authorized bodies.

Section II. Powers of the Bodies of State Authority and Administration in the Defense Area**Article 4. Powers of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet in the Defense Area**

The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet:

- defines military policy and adopts the main provisions of Russian Federation military doctrine;
- carries out legislative supervision in the area of defense and the sociolegal protection of the servicemen, persons discharged from military service and members of their families;

- approves the text of the Military Oath, the combined arms regulations and the colors and flags of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- reviews and approves article-by-article the defense budget;
- at the request of the Russian Federation President, approves the strength, structure and size of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, it sets the number of official positions in the Russian Federation Armed Forces to be held by generals and admirals;
- sets the military ranks;
- approves the regulations on the order of undergoing military service and the carrying out of state service which replaces military service (alternative service);
- supervises the carrying out of the Russian Federation legislation on the questions of defense;
- approves the appointing of the Russian Federation minister of defense and his deputies, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and his deputies, the commanders of the services, the territorial and functional commands of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- dismisses the Russian Federation minister of defense on the grounds and in the procedures provided by the Russian Federation Constitution;
- ratifies and denounces the international treaties of the Russian Federation on joint defense and military collaboration and on questions of collective security and disarmament;
- takes decisions on the use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces outside the Russian Federation in accord with its international obligations;
- takes decisions on general or partial mobilization, on the introduction and ending of martial law on the entire territory of the Russian Federation or in its individual localities, on declaring a state of war, the establishing and abolishment of the wartime bodies of state authority and administration, the halting of war and the concluding of peace;
- determines the powers of the Russian Federation President on conducting nuclear and other special tests and the employment of nuclear weapons.

The Committee of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet in charge of defense questions:

- examines the draft defense budget and submits its proposals on this to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet;
- discusses the candidacies for positions in the Russian Federation Armed Forces to be filled by generals and admirals and submits its conclusions on them to the Russian Federation President.

Article 5. Powers of the Russian Federation President in the Defense Area

The Russian Federation President:

- is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- presents to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet a draft of the main provision for the military doctrine of the Russian Federation;

- approves the overall concept and plans for organizational development, the plans for the employment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the mobilization plan for the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the mobilization plans for the economy as well as the plans for the training and build-up of mobilization reserves and the effective equipping of the nation's territory in the interests of defense;
- approves the state programs and plans for the development of weapons and military equipment within the limits of the allocated funds;
- sanctions the carrying out of nuclear and other special testing in accord with the testing programs approved by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet;
- with the agreement of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet appoints the Russian Federation minister of defense, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and his deputies, the commanders of the services, territorial and functional commands of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and independently the chiefs of the directorates of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the commanders of the field forces, formations and also dismisses them or accepts their retirement in the proper order;
- awards the military ranks of generals and admirals in the procedures established by the law;
- approves the Regulation on the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- approves the plan for civil defense in the Russian Federation and the Regulation on Territorial Defense;
- approves, at the request of the Russian Federation minister of defense, the plans for the disposition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the other troops, the location of military facilities and facilities to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and nuclear wastes on the territory of the Russian Federation;
- conducts talks and signs international treaties of the Russian Federation on joint defense and military collaboration and on question of collective security and disarmament;
- announces a state of war, general or partial mobilization, martial law on the entire territory of the Russian Federation or in its individual localities in the event of a surprise armed attack on the Russian Federation with the subsequent immediate submission of these questions for review by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet;
- issues orders to the Russian Federation Armed Forces on the conducting of military operations, for the employment of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction within the limits of the powers established by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet;
- puts into effect wartime enforceable enactments and cancels their action; he forms and manages the wartime bodies of state administration in accord with the Russian Federation Law on Martial Law;

—issues edicts on the induction of citizens of the Russian Federation for military service (with an indication as to the number of inductees).

Article 6. Powers of the Russian Federation Government in the Defense Area

The Russian Federation Government:

- bears responsibility of the state of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- directs the activities of the state administrative bodies subordinate to it on defense questions;
- submits to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet proposals on the draft of the defense budget;
- organizes the equipping of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops with weapons and military equipment, their supply with materiel, resources and services in accord with the orders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- ensures the execution of the state programs and plans for weapons development as well as the training of citizens in military registration specialties;
- provides for the creation of the infrastructure of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops;
- determines the procedures for military registration and prepares proposals for the Russian Federation President on the number of Russian Federation citizens to be called up for military service, military assemblies and under mobilization;
- organizes the elaboration and execution of the mobilization plans and assignments, the plans for stockpiling mobilization and state reserves;
- takes decisions on the establishing, restructuring and abolishing of the state defense organizations, the scientific research and experimental design organizations; the military academy, institutes and schools, the military chairs at the higher educational institutions as well as determine the procedure for preparing citizens in the military registration specialties and officer personnel;
- within the limits of the powers granted to it, organizes the carrying out of the obligations contained in the Russian Federation's international treaties on defense questions;
- organizes the work of departmental bodies for the social security of the servicemen, persons discharged from military service and members of their families;
- establishes the benefits for the civilian personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the other troops as well as the workers and employees of the defense enterprises, institutions and organizations depending upon their working conditions;
- determines the organization, tasks and carries out general planning for civil and territorial defense as well as monitoring the fulfillment of the approved plans;
- determines the procedures for the activity and logistic support for the military commissariats;
- establishes the procedures for the transfer, leasing, sale and liquidation of weapons and military equipment, defense facilities and other military property;

- organizes control over the exporting of weapons and military equipment, strategic materials, advanced technologies and dual-purpose products;
- conducts international talks on military questions, defines the confidence-building measures between states and for a reciprocal reduction in the level of the military threat and the establishing of collective security.

Article 7. Powers of the Bodies of State Authority and Administration in the Republics Which Comprise the Russian Federation, the Autonomous Oblast, Autonomous Districts, Krays, Oblasts, the Cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg and the Local Self-Governing in the Defense Region.

The bodies of state authority and administration of the republics comprising the Russian Federation, the autonomous oblast, autonomous districts, krays, oblasts, the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg and the local self-governing bodies in cooperation with the military administrative bodies within the limits of their territory:

- ensure the carrying out of the legislative and other enforceable enactments of the Russian Federation in the defense area and the sociolegal protection of the servicemen, persons discharged from military service and the members of their families;
- conduct measures to prepare the territory and the lines of communications for defense purposes;
- organize the military registration and preparation of the Russian Federation citizens for military service, their induction into military service, military assemblies and under mobilization;
- meet the requirements of the troops formations and institutions of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in the manner set by the legislation and other enforceable enactments in effect on the territory of the Russian Federation;
- carry out the fulfillment of the mobilizational plans and assignments;
- participate in the planning and ensure the carrying out of measures on civil and territorial defense;
- submit to the superior bodies of state authority and administration proposals on improving the organization of defense.

Section III. Duties of the Enterprises, Institutions, Organizations and Citizens of the Russian Federation in the Defense Area

Article 8. Duties of the Enterprises, Institutions and Organizations in the Defense Area

The enterprises, institutions and organizations, regardless of their departmental affiliation and forms of ownership in accord with the legislative and other enforceable enactments of the Russian Federation:

- carry out the contractual obligations and in wartime, the state orders to develop, produce, deliver and repair weapons and military equipment, other military property and resources, on contractual work and the providing of services for the needs of the Russian Federation Armed Services;
- participate in civil defense measures;

- carry out measures envisaged in the mobilization plans and assignments, the plans for the stockpiling of mobilizational and state reserves on a contractual basis, if the law does not make different provision;
- create the necessary conditions for their workers to carry out their military service; the expenditures related to this are recovered by the enterprises, institutions and organizations from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

Article 9. Duties and Rights of the Russian Federation Citizens in the Defense Area

Russian Federation citizens in accord with the law:

- carry out their military duty or volunteer for military service on a contract basis;
- they participate in measures of civil and territorial defense;
- they can establish enterprises and public organizations which help to strengthen defense;
- they make available in wartime for defense needs, upon the demand of the current authorities, buildings, structures, means of transport and other property in their possession, with subsequent compensation for the loss by the state.

The officials, in accord with the position held, are obliged to know and execute their functions on the defense questions, if such are provided by the legislative and other enforceable enactments of the Russian Federation.

Section IV. The Russian Federation Armed Forces

Article 10. The Russian Federation Armed Forces and Their Purpose.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces are a state military organization comprising the basis of defense for the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces have the purpose of repelling aggression and defeating the aggressor as well as for carrying out tasks in accord with the international obligations of the Russian Federation.

The involvement of the units, subunits and other formations of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in carrying out tasks which are not related to their purpose is permitted only on the basis of the law or under a decree of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

Article 11. The Strength of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

The Russian Federation Armed Forces consist of headquarters bodies, field forces, formations, troop units, institutions, military academies, institutes and schools.

A unit of the Russian Federation Armed Forces can be part of the joint armed forces or be under a unified command in accord with the international treaties of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces cannot include units, subunits and other formations the activities of which are not linked to the purpose of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and ensuring their viability.

Article 12. The Manning of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

The manning of the Russian Federation Armed Forces with servicemen is carried out on a volunteer basis, by contract, as well as on the basis of the induction of the Russian Federation citizens for military service according to the extraterritorial principles.

The actual number of servicemen in the Russian Federation Armed Forces in peacetime (without special permission for this from the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet) cannot exceed 1 percent of the size the Russian Federation's population.

Citizens who have reached the age of 60 are not permitted for military service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces are also manned with civilian personnel.

The necessary reserves are set up for the mobilizational deployment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Article 13. Civilian Personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

The official number of civilian personnel in the Russian Federation Armed Forces is set by the Russian Federation Government and the list of the officials to be filled with civilian personnel by the Russian Federation defense minister.

The labor relations of the civilian personnel with the military command, depending upon the position held, are covered by the legislation of the Russian Federation on labor and state service.

The legislative enactments of the Russian Federation on the questions of the labor, wages, pension coverage, social and legal protection or the citizens apply to the civilian personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, regardless of an order on their introduction by the orders of the military command.

The civilian personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces has the right to establish trade unions.

Article 14. Leadership and Command and Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

General leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces is provided by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, the Russian Federation President as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the Government within the limits of their powers as set out by the Russian Federation Constitution and the current law.

Direct leadership over the Russian Federation Armed Forces is provided by the Russian Federation minister of defense through the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. The main body for the immediate command and control of the troops and naval forces in the Russian Federation Armed Forces is the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

The position of the Russian Federation minister of defense, his deputies and other officials in the Russian Federation Armed Forces can be filled by civilians.

The functions of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces are defined by the current Law, by the Regulation on the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The corresponding directorates and services are established for implementing these functions in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Command and control over the services of the Russian Federation Armed Forces are carried out through the corresponding staffs.

Functional and territorial commands can be set up for the command and control of the groupings of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

The official language of the Russian Federation is used for leadership, command and control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and for the training of the personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

The leadership, command and control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in wartime are determined by the corresponding law.

Article 15. Functions of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense

The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense:

- implements policy in the area of the organizational development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in accord with the decisions of the superior bodies of state authority in the Russian Federation;
- participates in working out proposals for the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, the Russian Federation President on military policy and military doctrine for the Russian Federation;
- works out proposals on the draft of the defense budget and submits these to the Russian Federation Government;
- works out drafts of long-term state programs and annual work plans in the interest of ensuring defense;
- coordinates, finances and within the limits of its competence supervises the work being carried out in the interests of defense;
- orders and finances on a contractual basis the scientific research and experimental design work in the defense area, the production and purchase of weapons and military equipment, food, uniforms and other

supplies, material and other resources as well as contracting work and services for the needs of the Russian Federation Armed Services within the limits of the funds allocated for these purposes;

- finances and provides training facilities on a contractual basis for the public organizations providing training of the citizens in the military registration specialties for the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- organizes work on the maintaining of state and military secrets in the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- with the approval of the Committee of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet in charge of defense questions, carries out a personnel policy in the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- provides financial, technical and rear support for the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- in accord with the Russian Federation legislation organizes the standing of military service and ensures the social protection for the servicemen, the civilian personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, persons discharged from military service and members of their families;
- cooperates with the military agencies of other states;
- submits proposals to the Russian Federation Government on the use of the capabilities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in the interest of the socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation;
- organizes military scientific research;
- works out and submits for approval to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet the drafts of combined arms regulations;
- exercises other powers provided in the Regulation of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Article 16. Functions of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

The General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces:

- works out plans for the employment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and mobilizational plans as well as a plan for the effective organizing of the territory of the Russian Federation in the interests of defense;
- works out proposals on the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, on the structure, composition, disposition and tasks of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, for the supply of weapons and military equipment, for the training of military personnel and the defense budget;
- provides day-to-day command and control of the troops and naval forces of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- carries out intelligence activities in the interests of defense and security;
- organizes the mobilizational training and deployment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- maintains the necessary combat readiness of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;

- organizes the day-to-day training of the staffs and troops;
- conducts military scientific research of an operational-strategic nature.

Article 17. Disposition of the Troops and Naval Forces

The troops and naval forces are deployed in accord with the defense tasks and the socioeconomic capabilities of the regions of the Russian Federation.

The deployment plan for the troops and naval forces is worked out by the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, with the approval of the Russian Federation Government, the state administrative bodies of the republics comprising the Russian Federation, the autonomous oblast, the autonomous districts, krays, oblasts, the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg and is approved by the Russian Federation President upon submission of the Russian Federation minister of defense.

Troops and naval forces within the limits of the territories provided for the use of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense can be redeployed by the Russian Federation minister of defense with the agreement of the appropriate bodies of state authority and administration, and within the formations and higher, with the permission of the Russian Federation President.

The deployment of troops and naval forces outside the Russian Federation is permitted only with the sanction of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

Article 18. Restricting of the Activities of Public and Other Organizations and Associations in the Russian Federation Armed Forces

The activities of public and other organizations and associations pursuing political goals as well as the forming of their structure in the Russian Federation Armed Forces are not permitted.

It is not permitted to use the official positions and financial assets of the Russian Federation Armed Forces for setting up the structure and carrying out the activities of any public and other organization and association except for those established by the Russian Federation legislation.

It is prohibited to conduct any political agitation, including election, on the territory of the troop units, formations and institutions of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Article 19. Ensuring Legality in the Russian Federation Armed Forces

Supervision over legality and the investigation of cases on crimes in the Russian Federation Armed Forces are the responsibility of the General Procurator of the Russian Federation and the procuracies subordinate to him.

Legal defense of servicemen and the review of civil and criminal cases in the Russian Federation Armed Forces are provided by the courts.

Section V. The State of War. Martial Law. Mobilization. Territorial Defense. Civil Defense

Article 20. The State of War

A state of war is declared in the event of an armed attack on the Russian Federation by another state or by a group of states.

Wartime begins from the moment of the declaration of the state of war or the actual start of hostilities and this ends with the announcement of the halting of hostilities and their actual halting.

Article 21. Martial Law

Martial law is put into effect on the entire territory of the Russian Federation or the individual localities with the announcement of a state of war as well as with the presence of a direct threat of an armed attack by another state or group of states on the Russian Federation.

The conditions of martial law are defined by the Russian Federation law on martial law.

Article 22. Mobilization

With the declaration of a general or partial mobilization measures are implemented to convert the Russian Federation Armed Forces or their units to a wartime organization and establishment, as well as to convert the enterprises, institutions and organization or parts of them from a peacetime to wartime footing.

The procedure for preparing and carrying out the mobilizational measures is defined by the Russian Federation Law on Mobilization.

Article 23. Civil Defense

Civil defense is organized in the aim of protecting the civilian population and the national economic installations against the dangers arising with military operations.

The tasks and organization of civil defense are determined by the Russian Federation Law on Civil Defense.

Article 24. Territorial Defense

Territorial defense is organized and carried out in the aims of protecting the installations and lines of communications on the territory of the Russian Federation against the actions of the enemy, sabotage and terrorist acts, as well as the establishing and maintaining of the conditions of martial law.

The general tasks and organization of territorial defense are determined by the Russian Federation President.

Section VI. Concluding Provisions**Article 25. The Financing of Defense**

The financing of defense is carried out from the Russian Federation federal budget by allocating funds to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in accord with the Russian Federation Law on the Defense Budget.

The financing of defense expenditures without the agreement of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense is not permitted.

Article 26. International Aspects of Defense

The Russian Federation, in organizing and providing defense, observes the standards of international law, the international treaties and agreements to which it is a party.

Military aid to other states is provided by the Russian Federation on the basis of international treaties to which it is a party. The designated aid and the other types of military-technical collaboration are carried out under the supervision of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

International treaties on defense questions with the participation of the Russian Federation are to be ratified by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

Article 27. Responsibility for Violating the Russian Federation Legislation on Defense Questions

Officials from the bodies of state authority and administration, the local self-governing bodies, the enterprises, institutions and organizations, regardless of their departmental affiliation and forms of ownership, and citizens guilty of the nonperformance of defense duties placed on them or impeding the carrying out of defense tasks bear disciplinary, administrative, civil law or criminal liability in accord with the Russian Federation Legislation.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation,
B. Yeltsin
Moscow,
House of Russian Soviets
24 September 1992
No 3531-1

Decree on Entry into Force of Law on Defense

93UM0031B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Oct 92 p 5

[Decree of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on the Procedure for Putting the Russian Federation Law on Defense into Effect]

[Text] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To put into effect the Russian Federation Law on Defense as of the moment of its publication, with the exception of the following:

Part 2 of Article 12 which will be put into effect on 1 January 1995;

Paragraph 7 of Article 5 as concerns the necessity of agreement by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet for the appointing of the persons designated in the given paragraph and Paragraph 10 of Article 4 which are to come into forces after the amending of the Russian Federation Constitution.

2. The Russian Federation Government, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense are to bring the current enforceable enactments into conformity with the designated law and ensure its execution.

3. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense is to submit to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet a plan for reducing the size of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in accord with the demand of Part 2 of Article 12 of the designated law for the period to 31 December 1994.

4. The Russian Federation Government is to reorganize the troop formations not mentioned in Part 5 of Article 1 of the designated Law, prior to 31 December 1994.

5. The Committee of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on Legislation together with the Committee of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on Defense and Security Questions, in line with the passage of the designated Law, are to prepare a draft Law of the Russian Federation on the Amending and Incorporating of Additions to the Russian Federation Constitution in line with the adoption of the Russian Federation Law on Defense.

6. The corresponding permanent commissions of the chambers and the committees of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, jointly with the Russian Federation Government, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, prior to 1 November 1992, are to prepare and submit for review by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet draft laws on the status of the serviceman, pension coverage for citizens discharged from military service, on the defense budget, on civil defense, mobilization, martial law and state secrecy.

7. Supervision of the carrying out of the current Decree is entrusted to the Committee of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on Defense and Security Questions.

[Signed] Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet
R.I. Khasbulatov
Moscow,
House of the Russian Soviets
24 September 1992
No 3532-1

Decree on Review of Law on Defense

93UM0031C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Oct 92 p 5

[Decree of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on the Repeat Review of the Russian Federation Law on Defense]

[Text] Having reviewed a second time the Russian Federation Law on Defense returned by the Russian Federation President, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decrees:

To accept the submitted text of the Russian Federation Law on Defense with the comments noted by the Russian Federation President and with the editorial changes for clarity.

[Signed] Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet
R.I. Khasbulatov
Moscow,
House of Russian Soviets
24 September 1992
No 3533-1

On Reducing Nuclear Arms

92UM1502A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 7, Jul 92 pp 67-71

[Article by V. Markell: "On Reducing Nuclear Arms"]

[Text] Since the end of World War II, the leadership of our country has constantly advocated limiting, reducing, banning, and destroying nuclear weapons. However, at first the United States only went for negotiations on limiting weapons and on reducing these weapons only after we achieved nuclear parity with them.

The first peak of the nuclear arms race by the United States, which began in the 1960's, began to decline in the 1970's and particularly in the 1980's, which was associated with the massive removal of obsolete weapons systems from the inventory and replacing them with new ones. As was reported in foreign press, in 1983 the yield

of the U.S. nuclear arsenal decreased 75 percent compared to 1960 as a result of this rearmament, and the number of nuclear munitions themselves decreased 25-30 percent. With the renovation of a considerable portion of the U.S. nuclear potential planned for the late 1980's and early 1990's, it was expected that the number of strategic nuclear munitions would be brought to 14,000-15,000 and the number of non-strategic munitions to 17,000. However, the second peak of the nuclear arms race did not take place for known reasons.

However, it should be noted that the Interim Agreement Between the USSR and the USA on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which entered into force for five years beginning in October 1972, already then established aggregate limits for ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) at 2,568 for the USSR and 1,710 for the United States. The USSR's advantage in number of missiles was equalized by the U.S. advantage in missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV).

The Treaty Between the USSR and USA on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed in 1979, in which equal limits were set for each side on the number of strategic delivery vehicles—2,400. The treaty was to be in force until the end of 1985, but the 1979 treaty was never ratified.

The next treaty was signed in July 1991. Table 1 shows the changes in the correlation of components of U.S. strategic offensive forces [SOF] that took place between the signing of the last two treaties in the fiscal years of 1979 and 1991. According to the 1991 plan, the U.S. strategic offensive forces were to include 990 ICBMs, 616 SLBMs, and 215 heavy bombers, not counting the 10-percent active reserve and aircraft with conventional weapons or those performing various research and other work and mothballed. On the day the treaty was signed, the U.S. strategic offensive forces had 10,371 nuclear weapons (not counting reserve), including 2,353 heavy bombers, 2,450 ICBMs, and 5,568 SLBMs. These nuclear munitions could be aimed at approximately 9,000 targets grouped approximately around 3,600 ground zeros with a kill probability of 0.7 and higher.

Table 1

Characteristics	Correlation of SOF Components in 1979 and 1991, percent			Total, 1979/1991
	ICBMs	SLBMs	Heavy Bombers	
Nuclear weapons	23/23	50/54	27/23	over 9,200/10,371
Yield	39/41	11/28	50/31	4,600 megaton/over 2,750 megaton
Nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (regular)	50/54	31/34	19/12	up to 2,110/1,821
Number of delivery vehicles on alert	over 90/over 99	50/over 60	30/up to 20	about 1,400/about 1,400

Notes: 1. Figures rounded off to nearest whole percent.

2. Throw-weight of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs was 3,262 tons in 1979 and 2,361 tons in 1991.

3. In fiscal year 1991, the USA had for SOF 13,000 regular and reserve nuclear weapons, 10,371 of which were in the inventory of regular units.

After many years of negotiations, the Treaty Between the USSR and USA on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed for a term of 15 years.

According to it, seven years after entering into force each side should retain up to 1,600 deployed delivery vehicles and up to 6,000 counted strategic nuclear weapons, of which

a maximum of no more than 4,900 can be on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. The throw-weight of the deployed ICBMs and SLBMs must not exceed 3,600 tons.

The anticipated course of U.S. and USSR strategic arms reductions is shown in Table 2. The cited data on

number of delivery vehicles may change considerably in connection with earlier unforeseen reductions in the number of ICBMs and heavy bombers on the territories of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan or their total withdrawal from these regions.

Table 2

Characteristics	Status as of Date Treaty Signed (31 Jul 91)	Ceiling Specified by Treaty by End of Phase for Each Party			Expected Number of Arms After Mutual Treaty and Unilateral Reductions by the Year 2003, in Russia/USA
		Phase 1 (3 yrs)	Phase 2 (2 yrs)	Phase 3 (2 yrs)	
Total number deployed in USSR/USA:					
ICBM launchers	1,398/1,000	-	-	-	%
SLBM launchers	940/648	-	-	-	%
Heavy bombers	162/574	-	-	-	%
Total:	2,500/2,222	2,100	1,900	1,600	%
Number of nuclear weapons in USSR/USA:					
ICBMs	6,612/2,450	-	-	-	./Up to 500
SLBMs	2,804/5,568	-	-	-	Up to 1,750/Up to 1,750
Heavy bombers	855/2,353	-	-	-	./Up to 1,250
Total:	10,271/10371	9,150	7,950	6,000	Up to 3,000/Up to 3,500
Including nuclear weapons on ICBMs and SLBMs	9,416/8,018	8,050	6,750	4,900	./Up to 2,250

On the whole, the treaty concluded in 1991 has great significance for future peace. But it could have been better for our side. For example, we are losing the invulnerability of part of our nuclear-powered missile submarines and part of our mobile ICBMs, being deprived of the right to place these submarines in underground shelters and being obligated to base deployed mobile ICBM launchers only in certain limited areas and at railroad stations. There are other provisions that are also unfavorable for us. However, we should not forget that any treaty is achieved through compromise on both sides, particularly an agreement concerning the supreme interests of two states—survival in the nuclear age.

In late September-early October 1991, the United States and USSR announced unilateral measures of each side for further nuclear disarmament. Removed from alert were 440 American Minuteman-2 ICBMs (with a single warhead) and 503 Soviet ICBMs (134 of them MIRVed ICBMs). In addition, both countries are ceasing the development of mobile ICBMs, and the USSR is freezing the number of rail-based ICBM launchers (the United States has none).

In 1991-1992, six Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) with 92 launchers for SLBMs are being withdrawn from the force composition, and 11 American SSBNs with 176 launchers for Poseidon SLBMs are being taken off alert with subsequent withdrawal from the force composition.

Forty American and an unannounced number of our heavy bombers with nuclear weapons aboard are being taken off alert at airfields, and both countries are stopping the development of short-range nuclear missiles for heavy bombers.

According to the U.S. strategic nuclear strike plan (SIOP) in effect on 1 October 1991, the number of planned targets has been reduced to 7,000 with a corresponding decrease in the number of designated nuclear burst ground zeros in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other areas of the Eurasian continent. Certainly Muscovites will be interested in knowing that instead of the 120 nuclear munitions aimed at 60 Moscow installations before, now the number of them is somewhat smaller.

At the same time, besides strategic nuclear arms there also exist non-strategic nuclear arms. The distribution of these weapons in the United States in general-purpose forces is shown in Table 3.

Table 3

Armed Service	Weapon System	Number of Nuclear Weapons (including in Europe)	
		1983	1991
Air Force	Aircraft bombs	3,080 (1,735)	Up to 3,375 (1,100)
	Pershing ballistic missiles	295 (295)	-
	Total:	3,375 (2,030)	Up to 3,375 (1,100)
Army	203-mm artillery shells	1,200 (935)	800 (up to 500)*
	155-mm artillery shells	925 (735)	500 (up to 500)*
	Lance operational-tactical missiles	905 (695)	850 (up to 700)*
	Honest John operational-tactical missiles	300 (200)	-
	Nike-Hercules SAMs	745 (690)	-
	Nuclear landmines	605 (370)	-
	Total:	4,680 (3,625)	2,150 (up to 1,650)
Navy	Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles	-	Over 440 (.)
	Aircraft bombs	720 (.)	Over 360 (.)
	Depth bombs	895 (190)	About 800 (.)
	Terrier SAMs	290 (.)	-
	Asroc ASW rockets	575 (.)	-
	Subroc ASW rockets	285 (.)	-
	Total:	2,765 (190)	About 1,600 (.)
	Grand total	10,820 (5,845)	About 7,100 (up to 3,000)

*Subject to destruction.

It is known that U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons are intended for use primarily in forward areas for making strikes against targets in countries of the socialist community or their allies. Therefore, it is most convenient to trace the trend of their build-up and reduction in Europe. In 1954, the Americans made the decision to create in the European Theater of War stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in the amount of 15,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons. This plan was about 50 percent implemented. In 1968, about 7,200 of these munitions were located on the territory of Europe. In 1980, as a result of the withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear weapons, their number decreased to 6,000, and to 4,600 nuclear weapons in 1988 after the next reduction. A further reduction of nuclear arms in Europe took place between 1988 and 1991 in accordance with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-and Shorter-Range Land-Based Missiles, under which the United States destroyed 846 and the USSR 1,846 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

For the most part, the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons of the U.S. Armed Forces, including the Navy, came about through the removal of obsolete weapon systems from service: Lulu depth charges in 1971, nuclear torpedoes in 1977, Talos SAMs in 1980, Terrier SAMs in 1988, and nuclear versions of Asroc and Subroc ASW rockets in 1989-1990.

In September-October 1991, the USA and USSR announced forthcoming reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons. These mutual initiatives basically come down to the following:

Nuclear Weapons of the Ground Forces (Army). The USSR and USA are eliminating all nuclear artillery munitions and nuclear warheads for operational-tactical missiles. The USSR is withdrawing SAM nuclear warheads from the troops, concentrating them at central bases, and is also eliminating some of the SAM nuclear warheads and all nuclear mines (the USA no longer has these nuclear weapon systems). According to estimates published in the West, it will take the Americans from one to three years to remove from service and destroy all 2,150 nuclear weapons of the Army (1,300 artillery shells, including the neutron version, and 850 warheads of the Lance operational-tactical missiles).

Nuclear Weapons of the Air Force. The United States is withdrawing from Europe 50 percent of the nuclear aircraft bombs located there for its forces and NATO troops.

Nuclear Weapons of the Navy. The USSR and USA are removing non-strategic nuclear weapons from surface ships and attack submarines, and also units of carrier- and shore-based aviation, relocating the weapons to depots for centralized storage. True, this is taking place

against the background of a sharp jump by the USA in mastering high-precision naval weapons and methods of getting stable target designation to them, where their priority was prominently demonstrated during the Persian Gulf War. Still, we are eliminating some of these nuclear munitions, and the USA about 50 percent, but primarily the obsolete B57 depth bombs. As far as the nuclear version of the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCM] and the B61 aircraft bombs are concerned, they are concentrated in depots and can be quickly returned to surface ships, aircraft carriers and coastal airfields, and submarines in the event of an emergency. Beginning 1 January 1991, American ships leaving U.S. ports are no longer carrying non-strategic nuclear weapons. Experts expect that removal of these weapons from the ships may be completed in May-June 1992, after the ships previously deployed to forward areas return to U.S. naval bases. The possible time period for dismantling the nuclear munitions being taken out of service is one to three years.

A positive thing is the fact that removing from service various types of non-strategic nuclear munitions that in a number of cases have become an anachronism will lead to a further decrease in the risk of nuclear war. As was reported in foreign press, the United States has already withdrawn its nuclear weapons from South Korea and has begun to withdraw the Army's nuclear weapons from Europe. In the near future we can expect a gradual elimination of the bodies in NATO ground forces for planning the use of these weapons and a reduction of half of the nuclear aircraft bombs in the U.S. Air Forces in Europe. Alert duty for aircraft which carry nuclear weapons in NATO Joint Forces in Europe and patrolling in European waters by U.S. SSBNs activated to implement the SSP plan of the Supreme High Commander of NATO Forces in Europe have been terminated.

In January 1992, the military-political leadership of the United States and the Russian Federation announced new decisions for reducing strategic and non-strategic nuclear arms. The Americans have promised to stop:

- the production of the MX ICBM, W88 nuclear weapons, and Mk-5 warheads for the Trident-2 SLBM;
- the production program for the new Midgetman small ICBM;
- the purchase of the ACM air-launched cruise missile (360 missiles);
- the construction of B-2 bombers, limiting the number being built to 20.

All this will reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the strategic offensive forces from 13,000 (counting reserve) to 5,000. The Russian Federation has promised:

- to terminate the development or modernization program of several types of strategic offensive arms;
- to stop the production of heavy bombers;

—not to build existing types of long-range air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles;

—to cut in half the number of SSBNs on combat patrol;

—to speed up implementation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in July 1991.

With respect to non-strategic nuclear weapons, we announced:

—the termination of production of nuclear charges for tactical missiles, artillery, and mines;

—a plan for eliminating one-third of the sea-launched nuclear weapons, one-half of the SAM nuclear charges, and one-half of the nuclear charges of aircraft bombs.

The elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons will be concluded by the destruction of nuclear charges for tactical missiles and artillery shells in the year 2000, for mines in 1998, for surface-to-air missiles in 1996, and for the Navy in 1995.

Finally, the framed Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the USA on Further Reductions of Strategic Offensive Arms of 16 June 1992 specified that by the end of the seventh year that the treaty of 31 July 1991 has been in effect, each of the countries will have up to 4,250 strategic nuclear weapons (up to 2,160 of that number on SLBMs and up to 1,200 on MIRVed ICBMs, including up to 650 on heavy ICBMs) and up to 3,500 of these weapons by the year 2003 (up to 1,750 of that number on SLBMs), having eliminated all MIRVed ICBMs.

What is the attitude of other members of the "nuclear club" towards the reduction in nuclear weapons?

China, possessing several hundred nuclear munitions, and France, now having up to 550 nuclear weapons, do not plan to decrease their arsenals until the USA and USSR bring their nuclear stockpiles down to a level comparable to that of these countries. Incidentally, in the second half of 1991, France removed the obsolete AN-52 aircraft bombs from service and made the decision to decrease the number of its new Hades operational-tactical missiles from 120 to 40 and to place these missiles in depots and not in artillery units.

Great Britain, who has nearly 500 nuclear weapons stockpiled, announced in late September 1991 the removal of nuclear depth bombs and charges from ships and a reduction of non-strategic nuclear arms by one-half.

Israel, having about 200 nuclear weapons in various states of readiness, does not admit to having this type of weapon of mass destruction and makes no statements about reducing its nuclear potential.

The planned removal from service of approximately 35,000 nuclear munitions (about 13,000 of the existing 20,000 by the USA; about 22,000 of the existing 27,000 by the USSR/CIS/Russian Federation) based on mutual unilateral

commitments can become an important step towards total renunciation of weapons of mass destruction.

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CIS: GROUND TROOPS

New Priorities Set for Ground Forces Air Defense
PM2910130192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Oct 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 2

[Viktor Litovkin report: "Russia's Tactical Air Defense Smashes Cruise Missiles"]

[Text] For the fifth day since 18 October, in the Kazakh steppes roughly 200 km south of Aktyubinsk on the famous Emba state test range, the Russian Army is conducting experimental and research exercises involving tactical air defense facilities using live ammunition for the first time in its new history. The exercises are called "Defense-92." IZVESTIYA's special correspondents attended them.

Russian First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin said: "The aim of our exercises is to evaluate the efficiency of modern air defense facilities used by ground troops of the Army operational and tactical echelon in conflict with ballistic and cruise missiles, high-precision weapons, and long-range manned aircraft as well as to improve the intelligence systems, automated control systems, and weapons which make up the highly automated reconnaissance and support-fire groupings of the mobile forces' air defense."

The combat hardware assembled on the Emba test range by the Russian Army is, indeed, quite impressive. The S-300 V army tactical complex is very similar to the "Russian Patriot," which IZVESTIYA has already reported on, from the country's air defense forces. The "Buk-MI" tactical complex, the "Tor" and "Osa-AKM" tank and motorized infantry division air defense systems, the "Tunguska" regiment antiaircraft self-propelled gun-missile launchers, and the "Igla" platoon complexes also implemented the task alongside this system. They all worked in combination, after setting up a unified antimissile defense in the theater of military operations.

Squadrons of military aircraft crews—made up of roughly 900 men mainly from the Moscow and North Caucasus Military Districts—arrived for the exercises, jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire, so to speak, as they arrived from the potato harvest. They had to work in really quite difficult conditions using ECM facilities. They beat off raids from single, multiple, and mass targets.

What are the results of the fire?

Here are the statistics: A total of 34 artificial targets were launched, made up of simulator ballistic missiles of various classes as well as cruise missiles and fragment

munitions from high-precision weapons and salvo-fire systems. All of them were destroyed in the air. Ammunition expenditure came to 64 missiles, which means a fire efficiency rate of 1.2-1.5 missiles per target.

"Is that a lot?" I asked Colonel Rashid Tagirov, chief of the exercise center.

"Judge for yourselves: During the Gulf War, coalition troops used three or four Patriot missiles for each target on the southern front on the Saudi Arabian front, and Israel used between six and eight. But systems like our S-300 V, Buk-MI, Tor, and Osa actually destroyed all the targets with a single missile."

Nevertheless, exercise leader Andrey Kokoshin was left a little dissatisfied with the results.

"We have systems that are far superior to similar complexes in highly developed countries, and in fact the Tor in general has no rival," he said in an interview for IZVESTIYA. "But at the same time we need to work seriously on developing automated control systems and communications technology and bring them up to contemporary standards. These are the priorities for our scientific-research and experimental-design work and for future military commissions."

The exercises were attended by defense plant directors and military system chief designers. As IZVESTIYA learned, on the strength of the results of the research exercises and with due consideration of observations by users, air defense weapons will be improved and standardized and will be evaluated on the principle of the correlation of cost to combat effectiveness.

But for now the Russian Army is marking its first success. Russia and Kazakhstan are strengthening allied relations, and combat exercises are in progress on the unique test range located on the neighboring state's territory. And ground forces air defense has started to deal with its main task—to learn how to defend the fatherland, and to do this at a modern level.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Kasatonov, Kozhin Interviewed on Future of Black Sea Fleet

93UM0083A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Oct 92 p 2

[Interview with Admiral Igor Vladimirovich Kasatonov and Rear Admiral Boris Borisovich Kozhin by TRUD special correspondent T. Bystrova, occasion, place, and date not given: "The Black Sea Fleet: How Can the Knot Be Untied?"]

[Text] Sevastopol-Moscow—*There is a traditional sports contest in the Navy, a tug-of-war. No matter who wins, friendship wins. For this reason this competition is very popular both among participants and among spectators.*

But when politicians engage in this, there can be victims in addition to participants and spectators.

As fate willed it, highly experienced full Admiral Igor Kasatonov and his former subordinate, Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin, became the first "team captains" in the Black Sea Fleet tug-of-war. What do they themselves think about this protracted opposition?

Admiral I. Kasatonov

[Bystrova] Igor Vladimirovich! You always defended the interests only of the Russian Navy, but the presidents agreed otherwise. How do you feel in this situation?

[Kasatonov] Yes, the presidents spoke about two fleets and that they should be created by dividing the Black Sea Fleet. The division, if one regards it as mechanical, could be carried out simply by issuing a directive: these there, and those here. But there is a very serious military aspect of this question. How will the diminutive fleets of Ukraine and Russia exist when an advantage of the Turkish Navy, say, appears in a theater of military operations and in a strategic sector? This is a very serious fact which demands that all who make decisions take historical responsibility for a new balance of forces.

There is also a problem in that what are in my view destructive forces are planning to divide the Fleet from beginning to end, with the Russian Navy dislodged from Sevastopol and from this region in general.

[Bystrova] Despite the agreements reached, a spontaneous division of the Fleet already has begun, if one considers the very successful attempts of the Ukrainian side to take possession of part of its property...

[Kasatonov] All these actions ended entirely unsuccessfully. For example, the commandant's office remains, as it was, the commandant's office of the Black Sea Fleet. The situation shaped up as follows: literally just before taking the oath former commandant Lieutenant Colonel Zverev purchased a car for R580,000. He was audited and, fearing exposure, took the Ukrainian oath for the total makeup of the commandant's office (except for one officer). Later he announced that he was subordinate only to the Ukrainian Navy. But how can Zverev command the commandant's office if there is not one unit on post except for air defense units, which would be subordinate to Kozhin or Ukraine? Therefore we took them and kicked them out of there.

With respect to the patrol ship, she in fact departed. We were still thinking about whether or not it was necessary to stop her. We decided to let her go. And then total demoralization began there. An officer who had a wife and two children fell overboard and drowned in a drunken orgy. In your opinion, is that success?

[Bystrova] There are very many passions over the Ukrainian oath...

[Kasatonov] Yes, as a matter of fact. It was taken by only two percent of the sailors. This occurred without pressure of any kind. Somewhere it was taken separately. Some servicemen simply left the subunits—there was that element of demoralization.

I would not serve with such people. Now take the young lieutenants—300 persons took the Ukrainian oath and ended up with nothing to do. For two months already they have been studying Ukrainian. They were sent off to Izmail, where they are running around with assault rifles.

[Bystrova] You receive orders from Moscow, but live on Ukrainian soil, and so you should obey Ukrainian laws...

[Kasatonov] We are fulfilling local laws, but we are living more according to naval laws. These laws do not come into contradiction with laws of Ukraine, and I keep a watchful eye on this.

[Bystrova] The question is not quite understandable about the joint command, considering that in the army there always was one-man command...

[Kasatonov] On 23 September there were talks where the Russian side proposed that the commander and chief of staff should be appointed by a consensus of two presidents and the two first deputy commanders by the Ukrainian and Russian sides. But Kiev believed that structures of dual subordination should go right down to the second rank ship. They have not succeeded in agreeing upon anything for now.

[Bystrova] Citizens of Ukraine and Russia serve in the Fleet over which the two states are fighting. In your opinion, how do they feel in this situation?

[Kasatonov] There are no problems at all. According to agreements in Yalta and Dagomys, we accepted 5200 draftees from Russia and around 7000 from Ukraine in the Fleet, preserving parity. The situation is calm.

[Bystrova] Do you have frequent contact with Kozhin? What are your relations?

[Kasatonov] I will phone him and you will see that relations are normal. (He calls and congratulates Kozhin on his birthday.)

[Bystrova] Servicemen receive pay in local currency, but the ruble exchange rate now is higher. Consequently, Russians located here do not receive their fair share to some extent? And I would also like to know why local officers and warrant officers do not receive rations which are being issued to servicemen in Russia. It is tough with food products in the Crimea, and prices are outrageous.

[Kasatonov] I do not think that our people here were done out of their share that much. There is Russian currency in the Fleet, and so we issue a portion of the pay in rubles.

With respect to rations, no one simply wishes to receive them, believing that monetary compensation is more advantageous.

[Bystrova] Not many know that at one time, in 1954, your father assumed command of the Black Sea Fleet, also in times that were difficult for the Fleet, but naturally for other reasons. What do you think? Would your father have approved your actions of today in the present situation?

[Kasatonov] Unequivocally, yes, he would have. By the way, I am sitting in the office which my father occupied at that time.

[Bystrova] And he also sat beneath the portrait of Peter I?

[Kasatonov] That I cannot say. Those were different times.

[Bystrova] Each time has its own portrait?

Rear Admiral B. Kozhin

[Bystrova] Boris Borisovich, insofar as I know, all of your service from lieutenant to rear admiral took place in the Black Sea Fleet, and this evidently played more than a small part in your appointment as commander of Ukraine's naval forces. After this were there not somewhat fewer friends and like-thinkers and added enemies?

[Kozhin] God was merciful. No one turned away from me, and the attitude of colleagues toward me is good, as it was before. And in general I avoid the words "enemy" and "enemies" in every way. Moreover, I will not accept such expressions with respect to people with whom we lived and are living as a single family, with the same joys and sorrows. Unfortunately, the image of the enemy who is here next to us is constantly being imposed on us, including by the press. On 26 September, an article was published in a Moscow newspaper to the effect that Sevastopol naval schools are being forcibly subjected to Ukrainization and are expressing fears that those who did not take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine will be turned out of Ukraine.

First of all, this is a lie. No one forced anyone. Everyone determined their position voluntarily. Around 600 cadets took the Ukrainian oath and approximately 100 persons swore an oath of allegiance to Russia. And secondly, you begin thinking against your will: Why are peoples played off against each other? A citizen of Russia reads such an item and says: "These khokhly [Ukrainians], it turns out, are so vile." A citizen of Ukraine who sees everything here with his own eyes reads it and also will think: "Well, Moscow is giving it! It is passing off lies as the truth." It is time to change these harsh, gloomy articles for a normal dialogue of people who, I am sure, wish to live in peace and friendship.

[Bystrova] But still, the games of politicians with the taking of a second oath are apparent. Imagine the condition of a person placed before the choice of "whom to serve." If he takes an oath of allegiance to Ukraine, he

will be persecuted on the part of the Black Sea Fleet command element, and vice versa.

[Kozhin] And do you have examples of when it is "vice versa"?

[Bystrova] Of course. For example, Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service S. Ageyev refused to take the Ukrainian oath and was relieved of his position in a pilots' health-improvement center.

[Kozhin] I do not have such information for now, but I can make the supposition that it is not a matter of the oath here, but of refusal to obey the laws of Ukraine. There is an agreement under which all units of central subordination located in Ukraine will be transferred to it. An order of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense already has been received on this score. The health-improvement center is one of those establishments. It stands to reason that the transfer process is complicated, but people will not suffer; no one will be left to the mercy of fate. "Relieved" does not yet mean that he has been released or discharged. Moreover, it is provided that if a person has two or three years left to serve until the required length of service to receive benefits, he can conclude an agreement (a contract) with the Ukrainian Navy and serve five years without taking the Ukrainian oath.

The laws of Ukraine are humane, and our strength lies in this.

[Bystrova] What is the numerical strength of the Ukrainian Navy now and how many ships are subordinate to you?

[Kozhin] Several thousand persons for now. We have the ship Slavutich, military units in Odessa and Ochakov, and 300 military school graduates who arrived at the disposal of the Ukrainian Navy. There are crews awaiting newly constructed ships in Kerch and Feodosiya.

[Bystrova] There is talk that the Ukrainian Navy is receiving replacements of hardly the best officers. Undisciplined, poor specialists bearing a grudge are registering as "defectors."

[Kozhin] I answer for my subordinates; whomever I transferred, from executive officers to lieutenants, are all worthy people. Most important, among us there is unity in understanding missions and ways of performing them, a considerate attitude toward each other, and a respectful attitude toward the laws.

[Bystrova] But in your opinion are the actions of SKR-112, which weighed anchor and left for Odessa without the permission of the Black Sea Fleet command element and despite the agreements reached, lawful?

[Kozhin] Here it is important to clarify two points.

First. Three-fourths of the sailors aboard this ship took the oath of allegiance to Ukraine. Do they have the right to do

this? They do. But after this life became impossible for them, they were oppressed and insulted, and their commanders began to be changed. Who will like this? Their patience became exhausted. And so citizens of Ukraine, aboard a ship belonging to Ukraine, under the flag of Ukraine, proceed through territorial waters of that same Ukraine and arrive in a Ukrainian port. And as preventive measures weapons are employed against them as a warning—ahead along the course, it is true. This fact later was modestly hushed up. Are they enemies?

And second. The Ukrainian Navy command has nothing to do with it. This incident is an example of loss of command and control by the Black Sea Fleet command element. With a normal attitude toward people, they would have served industriously with any oath and would have fled nowhere.

[Bystrova] The situation in the Fleet is tense. Evidently joint command is introducing some relaxation. What is your attitude toward this?

[Kozhin] Of course, joint command in itself is an unusual fact. But the fact is, the situation here also shaped up as out of the ordinary. Consequently, it is necessary to develop a mechanism of mutual command and control, revise documents, and build mutual relations differently.

[Bystrova] Does this also concern your personal relations with Kasatonov?

[Kozhin] Igor Vladimirovich bears me a grudge now—I did not consult with him in making the decision to head up the Ukrainian Navy. Well, on the whole relations are on a civilized level. If I have questions, I turn to him. True, they are not being resolved. For example, I asked that young lieutenants be taken aboard ships if only as backups—they have nowhere to serve for now and it is necessary to master the equipment and study the ship. He did not allow it.

[Bystrova] I believe Igor Vladimirovich is not the only person sickened by the idea of a division of the Black Sea Fleet. But what would you have done if the fate of the Black Sea Fleet and simultaneously the Ukrainian Navy depended on you?

[Kozhin] I personally take the position of stably good relations between Russia and Ukraine. This stability does not mean everything today being like yesterday. Stability should mean that these relations become better all the time. What are we dividing? The Black Sea Fleet is only a small part (nine percent) of the entire Navy, which belongs completely to Russia now. And the Black Sea Fleet is an old fleet; the "youngest" ship is 15 years old. Tell me why Russia should not disregard this infinitely small amount, as they say? Will Russia really become poorer and the Ukraine immediately richer from this? No. That is how I understand it.

And so despite certain cadre shifts occurring on one side and being planned on the other side, the Black Sea Fleet "jug-of-war" continues. It seems that there is no objective

umpire in this competition. Perhaps this is natural, because in this case history is the sole impartial arbiter. But today evidently living people, political and military figures, must think seriously about seeing that the present historical period in the life of the glorious Black Sea Fleet does not turn out to be also the most inglorious for it.

Specifications of Tango Hunter-Killer Submarine

93UM0058A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Vasilii Fatigarov: "A Large Torpedo-Armed Submarine with a Diesel Heart"]

[Text] In Leningrad in the 1960's, the design collective headed by Igor Dmitriyevich Spasskiy developed a design for a large torpedo-armed submarine with a diesel-electric propulsion plant which surpassed its predecessors in many indicators and is quite modern even today in terms of armament, power engineering, reliability, and seaworthiness.

Several dozen of these submarines slid down the slipways between 1972 and 1982. Their purpose was to combat enemy submarines, surface ships, and transports using torpedo weapons and minelaying.

The submarine's superstructure and its light hull are intended to increase its seagoing qualities in the surfaced position. At the same time, like fairings, they protect the high-pressure air bottles, valves and ventilation lines of the ballast tanks, steering and capstan gear, and emergency rescue equipment located outside the pressure hull against damage.

The diesel propulsion plant, which includes three 6000-hp diesels, is designed to support surface running, running in the diesel mode under water, and charging the storage battery. The propulsion plant is controlled from a station located in a soundproof enclosure of the compartment. Fuel for the diesels is stored in tanks located both inside and outside the pressure hull.

The 5200-hp main electric propulsion motors support the submarine's underwater running. In addition to them, there are electric cruising motors located in the stern compartment which operate during extended running at slow speeds.

The navigational, radar, sonar, and radio communications gear make it possible to effectively accomplish the missions typical for a submarine of this class. The electronic armament ensures illumination of the surrounding surface and underwater situation and also control of the submarine's weapons. When moving in an above-water position or at periscope depth, the submarine "sees" within the limits of the radio horizon, and sonar armament supports detection and classification of underwater and surface targets and underwater sound communications with friendly submarines and ships. The range of detection and communications is from one to several dozen kilometers, depending on the hydrological conditions.

Specifications and Performance Characteristics of the Large Torpedo-Armed Submarine

1.	Dimensions (in meters):	
	Length	92
	Extreme beam of hull	9
	Draft	7
2.	Normal displacement	about 3000 cubic meters
3.	Top speed:	
	Surfaced	About 16 knots (39 km/hr)
	Submerged	About 12 knots (22 km/hr)
4.	Crew size	Over 60 people
5.	Endurance	Several months
6.	Cruising range	About 13,000 nm (23,400 km)
7.	Armament	6 torpedo tubes

The necessary conditions have been created on the submarine for crew work and rest. All personnel are accommodated in cabins and well-equipped berthing spaces. The submarine has comfortable wardroom and mess facilities. There is also a sick bay.

These submarines perform duty in the Northern and Pacific Ocean fleets.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Rodionov Examines Issue of Technical Support to Armed Forces

92UM1494A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with Colonel-General Igor Rodionov, by Colonel Gennadiy Marinovich KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "On Despondency, Optimism and Guidelines for the Military-Industrial Complex; Or What Sort of Military Technical Policy Do We Need?"]

[Text] The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers know (we wrote about this on 2 June) about the scientific conference on the problems of military security held by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in May. And here at the General Staff Military Academy [VAGSh] which has now become the main military school of Russia they are already preparing for a scientific debate the subject of which will be the problems of technical support for the Armed Forces. What has caused this? By the fact that along with the manifestations of euphoria over the question of the recently demonstrated achievements of domestic airframe building, certain mass information media, politicians and military have fallen into pessimism: supposedly the Russian Army in technical terms has fallen behind not only the former "probable enemies," but also the armies of the former republics. This question started our interview with the Chief of the VAGSh, Colonel-General Igor Rodionov.

[Rodionov] In actuality, said Igor Nikolayevich [Rodionov], our academy is to hold a scientific conference. But this is in no way related to the excessive optimism or despondency about which you speak. The conference will be a logical continuation of the scientific search commenced in May in the area of military organizational development.

The problem was that in examining the ways to realize the Russian military reform, we were forced to proceed from that heritage which we took over from the Union structures.

To a greater degree this concerned the defense sectors of industry. The gigantic defense complex created during the years of the Great Patriotic War, with its main task being the series production of weapons and military equipment in the shortest time and in large amounts, during the period of the Cold War was transformed into an independent organism. Its main goal was the spontaneous development of narrowly specialized monopoly enterprises. In drawing away the best human, raw material and technological resources in the nation, it gradually began to lose a link with the real needs of the Army and Navy. The product range, the development times and the volumes of deliveries were dictated by the monopoly enterprises in the multisectorial defense industry, although in formal terms the Ministry of Defense remained the orderer of the weapons. To put it briefly, the defense industry operated according to the principle "either accept for commissioning what we can do and at the price set by us or you will not receive anything." Here preference remained with the simpler and less scientific-intensive weapons, the development and production of which did not require a certain technical risk. The consequence of such a military technical policy was to be a serious disproportion in the makeup of the weapons and military equipment which significantly reduced the combat effectiveness of the troops and forces as a whole. This involved primarily the gap between the weapons and the means of combat support (communications, ASU [automated control system], intelligence and so forth), a low "proportional amount" of high-precision weapons, a significant standardizing of the weapons with their unjustifiably large numbers and insufficient quality parameters.

As a result, while spending enormous amounts on the development and production of weapons and military equipment, we have actually disarmed the Army and brought the country to ruin. With the existing situation we already actually have fallen behind the most developed countries of the world in military-technical terms. In particular, this is true of the pace of developing and introducing modern models of weapons and military equipment, in terms of the degree of the effectiveness of the weapons control systems and reducing expenditures on their operation.

However, the work of developing our own Armed Forces in Russia is just beginning. Yes, in this a number of difficulties has arisen. But this does not mean, as some

have asserted, that we are doomed to have a new army with old weapons. Pessimism here is both out of place and a presumption.

[Miranovich] Incidentally, let us be fair as this notorious military-industrial complex was not so bad, if we still have, as you yourself have said, promising developments. There are the achievements in airframe building, certain other areas and strategic parity...

[Rodionov] We want to bring this up at the conference. Russia, like, incidentally, the other former Soviet republics which have set out to build their own Armed Forces, needs a realistic military technical policy. The military scientists can and should make their contribution to its elaboration. Realistic means oriented at providing minimally sufficient defense capability for the nation under the conditions of a sharp drop in the Armed Forces and weapons in relying on the most advanced scientific and technical achievements.

[Miranovich] And how do we appear from the viewpoint of a realistic, as you have said, military technical policy now? In other words, what are the initial data for the scientific elaboration of promising directions in this area?

[Rodionov] The range of questions related to the development of a new military technical policy is so broad that the mere listing of them would probably take up an entire newspaper page. Nevertheless, you are correct: you have to start somewhere...

The primary task in this area at the present stage is eliminating the overproduction of obsolete weapons and the lag in the development of promising models by increasing the share of allocations on scientific-research and experimental design work (NIOKR). Analysis indicates that in the NATO countries expenditures on NIOKR have constantly increased, considering the economy as irrelevant. Just over the period from 1985 through the present these have risen from 30 to 45 billion dollars and this is over 10 percent of the military budget. In our nation, the allocations on NIOKR are three-fold less than in the U.S. In particular, less than 70 percent of the actual need was allocated for 1992.

This leads to the curtailing of promising projects close to completion on developing weapons which have no analog and, as a consequence, entails an increase in the already existing scientific-technical lag not only behind the leading foreign nations, but also a number of developing ones.

For example, the cutback in the financing of our promising missile complex (MC) has led to an increase in the dates for its development and production, while at the same time the U.S. already has in service a modern ATACMS MC, while France is completing the development of the ADES MC.

The insufficient financing for the development of high-precision ammunition has led to a lag for the Russian Army of 8-10 years in this area behind the NATO Armed

Forces. An analogous picture is observed in the development of artillery, antitank, anti-aircraft missile weapons, technical intelligence and automated control. All this is felt in a reduction of the combat potential of the formations and units. If a modern motorized rifle division in terms of its capabilities is 20 percent lower than the U.S. mechanized division, this is the result of the planned switch of artillery in the NATO armies to high-precision ammunition. An infantry division in the year 2000 will have double the fire power. The absence in the past of a body which coordinates the orders, although it formally existed, led to a situation where as of now we have a great multiplicity of modifications of the equipment and weapons designed to carry out the same task. In addition the very process of delivering the equipment and weapons became completely unmanageable with the destruction of the internal Union economic ties and structures.

It seems to me in addition that we have delayed with the development of information programs for the Armed Forces.

[Miranovich] Well, it remains to hope on the common sense of those who determine the continuation of promising NIOKR. Incidentally they evidently are themselves concerned about this. But the question is a different one. You have mentioned the development of information programs for the Armed Forces. This term is encountered not so often even in the special literature...

[Rodionov] Yes, this concept is just being introduced into our vocabulary. By the development of information programs for the Armed Forces, we understand the wide-scale obtaining and use of all types of information, in particular, for increasing the effective carrying out of the missions set in the operations by the troops (naval forces). Correct decisions in preparing and conducting an operation cannot be taken without up-to-date and sufficiently complete and reliable information.

At present the capabilities of the equipment and methods for obtaining, processing and using the information have reached a qualitative new level making it possible to not only pose but also successfully carry out the tasks of developing information programs for the Armed Forces. However, for now we still are not provided with a sufficient amount of such equipment and methods. At the same time in modern wars, much is determined by the clash of technical information. Superiority in the methods of obtaining and transmitting information are a most important fact ensuring the success of the operations. One has merely to recall last year's Desert Storm. The multinational forces employed electronic countermeasures equipment, aviation and cruise missiles against command posts, communications centers, and the detection and guidance stations of the Iraqi Air Defense forces. Having destroyed the information processes in the troop and weapon control systems, they won air superiority, they took the initiative and successfully conducted the entire operation in a short time with minimal losses.

[Miranovich] Thus, even from the "sores" pointed out by you, it may be assumed that both the scientists and practical workers involved in the development and implementation of military technical policy have a difficult search ahead. It is one thing to designate a problem but quite something else to find the optimum decision. Do you have any proposals on this question?

[Rodionov] One can talk about the proposals after the conference and which will attract the leading specialists from all the services of the Armed Forces, the branches of arms, the special troops and services. When we add up all the opinions and scientific calculations. As for now I can only share some of my own considerations.

In my view, in the first stage of the military reform, the main thing is: on the basis of restoring strong economic ties with the CIS countries in the military industrial sphere and setting up our own production facilities, to ensure the output of the equipment and materiel necessary for the troops and naval forces. Here the Ministry of Defense should determine the need for military products, be their orderer and finance their development and acquisition through the budget allocated for defense.

We must also resolve the difficult task of unifying and standardizing the weaponry and military equipment. Thus, at one time in the USSR Armed Forces, the military installations employed over 400 types of engines and for operating them this required 250 different types of fuels and lubricants, while for the 21 types of tracked vehicles, they used 17 types of engines, 20 types of tracks, 19 types of rollers and so forth. Such a situation where for 100 models of equipment some 34 different basic chassis are employed, excessively complicates the organization of complete overhauls and maintenance of the weapons and military equipment. At present the list of materiel necessary for the troops, just in terms of the weapons and military equipment is: over 200 types for a battalion, 700 for a regiment, 1,500 for a division, 5,000 for an army and 30,000-40,000 for an army.

[Miranovich] How can we escape from such diversity which, as I understand, does not contribute either to improving product quality, production automation, or increased efficiency in the operation and overhaul of articles, particularly under a combat situation?

[Rodionov] That is not so easy. In my opinion, it is essential to have the following:

1. A limited standard series of artillery calibers with standard ammunition.
2. A "standard" grenade launcher, machine gun, automatic weapon, a small family of various types of vehicles on a standard chassis or base multifuel vehicles with a large range.
3. A "standard" base design for combat and transport aircraft.

4. "One type" within "one class" of surface vessels and submarines, missile complexes and missiles with standard warheads.

5. A "standard" system for command, control and communications in the troops.

Naturally, a number of other measures are also needed.

But in order to have all this, it is essential to have efforts both by the military department as well as the state as a whole. And even with the making of every effort we cannot count on a quick success. Our strategic concepts and corresponding laws are just being worked out. Incidentally a fan of comparisons might recall that in the U.S. a law on military standardization and cataloguing was adopted by Congress in 1952. This made it possible to save over 12 billion dollars. In the opinion of foreign specialists, each dollar spent on standardization provides 10 dollars of savings. Our just formed Ministry of Defense which for the first time has gained the opportunity to dispose of all the funds of the military budget has been forced to act, in essence, under the conditions of "lawlessness."

Without having settled the problem of standardization of the weapons and military equipment, it will be difficult to rebuild the repair facilities of the Armed Forces. And they greatly need this. Certainly Russia, while producing 80-90 percent of the weapons and military equipment, it can be said, does not have modern repair facilities. The basic repair facilities have remained on the territories of the states of the Baltic, Transcaucasus, Ukraine and Belarus. We must create from scratch our own independent repair facilities. The central bodies of the Ministry of Defense should undergo a major reorganization in the aim of creating a specialized structure for directing the technical support for all the armed services of the Armed Forces. In this structure, particular attention should be given to the questions of testing experimental models and working out recommendations on the putting of these into service.

At present the responsibility for the testing of the experimental models rests with the same bodies which were involved in their development, that is, on the general clients and industry. Here there have been very frequent instances of localism and a narrow department approach and this as well leads to the equipping of the Army and Navy with weapons and equipment with low operating indicators and particularly in terms of reliability. As a result the need arises for their systematic modification even in the troops.

In a word, the range of problems which will be discussed by the participants at the conference devoted to our military technical policy, as I have already said, is enormous. We are hopeful that these will be of concern not only to the military scientists and practical workers but also the legislators who are assembling now for the next session of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

Not to be concerned with the supply of the Army and Navy with modern equipment and weapons means to leave Russia with a blunt sword and a shoddy shield.

Chairman of Russian Veterans' Union Interviewed

93UM0014A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Oct 92 p 21

[Interview with Colonel-General (Ret) Grigoriy Yashkin, chairman of the Council of the Union of Russian Federation Armed Forces Veterans, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Sergey Kalinayev: "Before There Was no Such Veterans' Organization"]

[Text] This sociopolitical organization is called the Union of Russian Federation Armed Forces Veterans. The Chairman of its Council, Colonel-General (Ret) Grigoriy Yashkin, answered the questions of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

[Kalinayev] Grigoriy Petrovich [Yashkin], for how long has your organization been in operation and were there analogs of similar structure in the past?

[Yashkin] Let me begin with the last part of the question. Such a veterans' association never existed before although we repeatedly made the corresponding proposals to the power structures. Here we proceeded from the view that the men who had served in the Army were united by particular strength of fraternity and that this was a strength which could bring much that was good to society and the state. However, at that time the Ministry of Defense and the Glavpur [Main Political Directorate] categorically refused to be the founders of our organization and they provided no reasons for their refusal.

But the times have changed little by little. In October 1990, at last there was the constituent conference at which the by-laws were adopted and the leading bodies of our union elected. In the spring of last year, the by-laws were registered by the Ministry of Justice. Let me stress that without the all-round effective support from the Russian Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, this would not have happened.

[Kalinayev] Briefly on the organization structure of the union?

[Yashkin] Our organizations have been established in Russia along territorial lines: rayon, city, oblast (kray) and republic. They join the union on a voluntary basis and under federative principles. The superior leadership body of the union is the conference which is held once every three years. It elects the higher executive body, the Council. It, I would point out in passing, is located in Moscow at No 4 Gogol Boulevard.

[Kalinayev] What are the main tasks that you have set for yourselves?

[Yashkin] In order not to take up time, let me name the commissions operating in our structure and the very names of which provide some idea about the character of

our concerns: for social and legal protection; for assisting the military commissariats in the military patriotic education of the preinduction youth; for economic and production activities; for providing aid in finding jobs and the retraining of veterans and certain others.

[Kalinayev] Could you go into a little more detail on assistance in the use of the vocational capabilities of the veterans and reserve officers in the national economy.

[Yashkin] This is one of the high priority areas, particularly now, during the period of the mass reduction in the army, the crisis phenomena in the economy and the growing unemployment. In order to help the men find their place in civilian life, our organizations on the spot will help create a data bank on the job opportunities in the various regions of Russia. We are analyzing this information, we shall generalize it and make our own proposals to the governmental and legislative bodies. Or to put it more specifically, we are backing, for example, the idea of creating at each military institution of learning courses for the retraining and vocational guidance of the reservists. Possibly these will operate during the evening, but the main thing is that in this instance we can make intelligent use of the excellent training facilities and the skilled faculty.

[Kalinayev] At present in our country, it can be said, educational work with the youth has been allowed to lapse and this "niche" has been taken over by far from the best values of a moral or, more accurately, amoral level. What do you intend to do here and I have in mind primarily the civil, patriotic qualities which have weakened in the conscience of the younger generation?

[Yashkin] I fully agree with you. If now (if in general we have not already missed the boat) we do not give some thought to our fellows, for their aspirations and guidance in life, who will enter army service and who during that dark hour will defend the fatherland? Of course, the task cannot be carried out by our union on its own and here we must have the efforts of all society but we do not intend to walk away from our share of responsibility. Who will direct the young man, as they say, along the true path if not the man who has gone through army schooling and who has recognized in fact what are the shoulder of a friend, loyalty to the masculine purpose as defenders of his and our common home. For this reason, in cooperation with the troops structures, the military commissariats and the public education bodies, we shall restore the age-old glorious traditions and fight against the antiarmy attitudes and particularly against the denigrating of service. Without going into details, we shall operate in the new manner, avoiding the political extremes and former ideological postulates.

[Kalinayev] Lastly, Grigoriy Petrovich, what would you wish to say to those who in the near future will be removing their epaulets?

[Yashkin] In rephrasing the old slogan, I would put it thus: Army and Navy veterans, Unite! Come to us. Become involved in noble undertakings.

Humanitarian Academy to Retrain Officers as Jurists

93UM0052A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Sergey Knyazkov: "Humanitarian Academy Students Can Receive Two Diplomas, Including a Law Diploma"]

[Text] It has been decided to create an officer retraining center based on the Armed Forces Humanitarian Academy, and subsequently it can acquire the status of an international institute. But the main thing is that already right now the students, besides the primary academic diploma, will be able to obtain a law diploma at the center if they so desire.

A trustee council, that will not only participate in the selection of the program of study but will also be involved with financing issues, will head the officer retraining center. Right now the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Border Troops Fund for the Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members that Major-General Arkadiy Baskayev heads will make the primary contribution toward financing the project.

Studies began at the center on 13 October. Seventy five officers, who represent various branches of service, have begun to study here. Congratulating them on this event, Humanitarian Academy Deputy Chief for Sciences Reserve Major-General Nikita Chaldymov stressed that

the academy has the capability to increase the flow of students who intend to obtain a law diploma by a factor of 3-4.

New Research Vessel Raises Andreyevskiy Flag

93UM0052B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Valeriy Gromak: "From Baltiysk: 'Akademik Semenikhin'—A New Baltic Fleet Ship, Seven Feet Under the Keel!"]

[Text] We are already accustomed to speaking and writing about the fact that our navy is falling apart, ships are being written off for scrap and new ones are not being built. But an event of another type has occurred at Baltiysk—a new ship has been dedicated and the Andreyevskiy Flag has been raised on it. The Baltic Auxiliary Fleet has been augmented by a new special physical fields measurement ship. It was named imeni Vladimir Sergeyeich Semenikhin—one of those who is the pride of native science and who worked in the defense industry for many years.

The Academician's Widow, Lyubov Nikolayevna, Vladimir Sergeyeich's friends and fellow workers from the former USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry and a number of scientific research institutes came to the celebration at Baltiysk.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Possible Pardon of Lt Lukin in Azerbaijan Pondered*934C0126D Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 Sep 92 p 1*

[Article by Tunzule Kasumova: "Will Lieutenant Lukin Be Pardoned?"]

[Text] Baku—The death sentence handed down to Lieutenant Yevgeniy Lukin by a military tribunal of the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan has elicited broad reaction, especially in Russia, where the condemned officer holds citizenship.

But first—a short explanation of what happened on that ill-fated September day of 1991. The republic mass media report what occurred as follows: On 7 September last year two Baku youths, Movsumov and Kerimov, met with friends that evening and told them about a quarrel over girls they had had that day with some lads, presumably cadets at the Baku Higher Combined Command Institute. They had allegedly beaten up Movsumov and taken a watch and small chain from him. After thinking it over briefly, the friends—three students and two fellows out of high school—decided to make their way over to the institute and seek out the offenders. Arriving by vehicle at the entry control point, there was no conversation either with the personnel on duty or with cadets who approached them—a scuffle broke out. At this time, someone in the guardroom used the internal phone system to give the command: "Guard to arms! Attack on Post 2." Headed by Lieutenant Lukin, the guard force with automatic weapons at the ready sped to the location of the incident. As the result of a heated confrontation, three of the people who had arrived—Kuliyev, Guseynov, and Aliyev—were shot dead.

In a situation where (in the opinion of members of the military tribunal of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan) there was no sign of any danger to life or limb of the guard force or threat to the security of facilities under their watch, Lieutenant Lukin exceeded his authority by issuing the order to open fire. This is what the court decided, charging Lukin with the death of three citizens.

The sentence handed down by the military tribunal is final and not subject to appeal. However, upon complaint lodged by Lieutenant Lukin's attorney, the case has been taken under review by T. Kerimli, chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet. A pardon for the officer is solely within the jurisdiction of the president of Azerbaijan. And this has in fact been requested by the heads of Russia's law enforcement organs. The request is supported by Boris Yeltsin and Ruslan Khasbulatov. While there is as yet no official response, we may conjecture, however, knowing that Abulfaz Elchibey sees the death penalty in a negative light, a fact he confirmed during his recent meeting with the editors in chief of major Russian newspapers, that a positive decision is likely.

Editor's note: After familiarizing himself with the sentence passed down with regard to Lieutenant Lukin, Valentin Panichev, chief of the Main Directorate for Oversight of the Execution of Laws in the Armed Forces of the Russian Procuracy, informed our correspondent that there were certain legal contradictions in the text of the sentence, and that the court's decision and measure of punishment did not fully correspond with materials of the legal investigation.

As attested to by the INTERFAX agency, one year ago Ye. Lukin, as commander of the guard, and cadets subordinate to him, repulsed an attack by hooligans armed with knives upon the entry control point of the Baku Higher Combined Command Institute...

Unfortunately, the agreement on law enforcement organs which was signed by heads of state in Tashkent provides no protection for the rights of our servicemen residing outside Russia. Practically all rights with respect to their judicial prosecution are transferred to law enforcement organs of the states where the troops are stationed. Thus, the fate and life of the lieutenant depend entirely on the objectivity of Azeri judges. Taking into account the divergence of opinion on assessing Lukin's actions on the part of legal experts of Russia and Azerbaijan, V. Panichev believes it would be advisable for the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan to reexamine the case.

Lt Lukin's Sentence 'Under Review'*93UM0034A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Oct 92 p 1*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents Mikhail Lukanin and Vitaliy Strugovets: "Will Lieutenant Lukin's Life Be Out of Danger?"]

[Text] As Russian Radio transmitted, it is expected that Azerbaijan President Abulfaz Elchibey will sign an edict on a pardon for Russian Lieutenant Yevgeniy Lukin in the near future. We remind you: on 31 August 1992, the Republic of Azerbaijan Supreme Court Military Collegium handed down a death sentence to the officer who was accused of the premeditated murder of three people while carrying out his duties as head of a guard detail.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has come to the lieutenant's defense on three occasions (12, 23 and 24 September). A large number of responses continue to flow into the editorial offices. Our readers are decisively protesting against the cruel sentence that has, in their opinion, clearly political overtones.

As Azerbaijan Embassy to Russia Press Secretary Fuad Gadzhiyev reported to us, actually already on 5 October "Turan" Information Agency, citing informed circles in President Elchibey's office, transmitted information about the edict that is being prepared on a pardon for Yevgeniy Lukin. The President of Azerbaijan's Press Service and the Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense Press Center confirmed this same information to us. However,

in the words of Azerbaijan Republic Military Procurator R. Aliyev whom we contacted by telephone on 9 October, a final decision has still not been made on the Russian officer's fate, although his case is actually under review. R. Aliyev confirmed that Lieutenant Lukin's case had become a topic of negotiations at the highest level.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and its readers hope that the Russian officer's life will be out of danger.

Kyrgyzstan Refuses to Send Troops to Tajikistan

*934C0126C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Oct 92 p 3*

[Article by Anatoliy Ladin: "Kyrgyz Peacemaking Battalion Stays Home. Who Will Help Tajikistan?"]

[Text] Bishkek—The news came as somewhat of a sensation that the 14 October extraordinary session of the republic parliament adopted a decision, through an absolute majority of deputies participating in the voting, not to send to Tajikistan a battalion designated for execution of a peacemaking mission to disengage the warring sides.

In the opinion of Kyrgyz parliamentarians, peacemaking efforts should be carried out not by the Kyrgyz side itself but by all states of the CIS simultaneously. In such an event, this process would be understood properly in Kyrgyzstan and in Tajikistan, as well as in the other CIS states.

Responding to a question of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Speaker of parliament Medetkan Sherimkulov stated that although the session did decide not to send the Kyrgyz battalion to Tajikistan, he did not believe the CIS peacemaking mission in this republic had sputtered out. And this did not at all mean that Kyrgyzstan had conclusively "closed the door" on the question. "We must address something else," he emphasized. "We must consider that an effective path for terminating the bloodshed in Tajikistan has not yet been found. It remains for us to find it."

It is felt that the CIS chiefs of state will not ignore an accomplished fact which gives no cause for optimism. The onset of a long-awaited peace on Tajik soil is perhaps again moving farther away. It is difficult to guess how events overall will develop there in the near future.

Russian Military Action Allegations Noted

*93US0057B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 43, 21 Oct 92*

[Report by Mikhail Yeligulashvili: "Shevardnadze Against General Kondratyev: But Whose Commands Is the Latter Executing?"]

[Text] Tbilisi—"Were it not for Russia's direct military intervention, the conflict would be settled in two or three days." This was what I was told, in different words,

perhaps, by Dzhaba Ioseliani, deputy chairman of the State Council; Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani; and Georgiy Khaindrava, Abkhazian minister of state. The three persons to whom the Georgian authorities have entrusted the overall command of combat operations in Abkhazia. Khaindrava maintains that Russian airborne subunits took part in the taking of Gagra.

A Georgian Su-25 military aircraft was shot down over the sea directly off Sukhumi. The pilot managed to bail out. Georgian intelligence's opinion: "The Abkhazians have no weapons capable of shooting down a Su. And even if they had, they have no specialists of this category. It is simple: The aircraft was shot down by Russian air defenses."

A civilian helicopter carrying peaceful inhabitants, refugees, was hit by a SAM missile. Two persons were killed, five wounded.

The crew managed to drag the aircraft to an airfield and to save the remaining passengers. D. Ioseliani's opinion: "Russian air defense has already declared that it, you see, has placed a ban on flights of Georgian aviation. Any sober-minded person asks: Why is the Russian Army deciding who may fly in Georgian skies, and who not? There is no doubt that the helicopter carrying peaceful inhabitants was hit in execution of this idiotic ban."

A Russian military patrol boat attacked and damaged a Russian research ship. This was the sole ship which, in accordance with a mutual arrangement, had been sharing information on movements at sea with the Georgian side.

E. Shevardnadze said at a news conference: "I was opposed to the appointment of General Kondratyev as Russia's representative in the conflict region. He is known for having back in Tskhinvali ordered Russian combat helicopters to open fire on Georgian positions. But he was appointed all the same. He has for some reason or other taken up position in Gudauta, where the Abkhaz leadership is, which is not that understandable if we are talking about neutrality. And we have information that General Kondratyev is personally taking part in the formulation of plans for military operations against us."

Shevardnadze believes that there is a conspiracy against Georgia. Russian generals and the "Red-Brown forces" which have retained key positions in the Russian leadership and have influence on the Russian parliament, are involved in it, in the opinion of the now elected chairman of the Georgian parliament.

What is happening today in Abkhazia is being called various things in Georgia. But it is increasingly rare that one hears the definition "civil war." "Patriotic war" is used more often.

When the conflict was only just beginning, Georgiy Chanturia, chairman of the National Democratic Party of Georgia, said: "Russia may not be declaring war on

Georgia out loud, but when part of Russia, its constituent republics, invades our territory, does this not mean that it is Russia which is waging war against us?"

201st Motorized-Rifle Division Given Order to Open Fire Without Warning

*93UM0080A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Oct 92 p 3*

[Article by Colonel Anatoliy Ladin and Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Knyazkov: "From Dushanbe: Russian Servicemen Will Open Fire Without Warning in The Event of a Threat to Their Personal Safety"]

[Text] A communique has been disseminated through ITAR-TASS channels that Major-General Mukhriddin Ashurov, commander of the Russian 201st Motorized-Rifle Division that is deployed in Tajikistan, has issued an order to servicemen conducting patrol or guard duty to open fire without warning in the event of a threat to their personal safety. This is associated with the fact that cases of attacks against division servicemen have recently increased.

General Ashurov reported that, on the night of 20 October, unidentified persons attacked Private Viktor Shakhvorostov who was performing guard duty at a military facility. Having beat up the soldier and disarmed him, the criminals escaped in an unknown direction.

And yet unfriendly acts directed at Russian servicemen have not embittered them and steps are being taken to ease the fate of innocent people who are suffering from the bloody conflict of the belligerent sides in Kurgan-Tyube. 201st Motorized-Rifle Regiment Assistant Commander Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Ivlev reported to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA by telephone that nearly 2,000 refugees who left the area of combat operations already in September have gathered in the area of the train station in Kurgan-Tyube. The railroad is paralyzed and therefore people cannot leave the city.

The shortage of food and medicine has become especially acute in recent days. Outbreaks of infectious diseases have been noted. Therefore the 201st division commander has decided to give the refugees food and medicine from his own resources. They have already been delivered to the area where the people without shelter are staying. 191st Motorized-Rifle Regiment doctors have been tasked to render assistance.

UKRAINE

Col-Gen Bizhan Reviews Bishkek Meeting

*93UM0048A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
15 Oct 92 p 1*

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA Correspondent Major Valeriy Korol: "Ukraine Is Fulfilling the Agreement and Often Unilaterally"]

[Text] Ukraine First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan held a press conference. It was devoted to the results of the meeting of the CIS Heads of State in Bishkek and to recent events in the Black Sea Fleet.

As the press has already reported, a number of military cooperation issues were reviewed at the CIS Heads of State and Governments meeting at Bishkek. Specifically, on the fulfillment by the CIS states of the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles, the Treaty On Restricting Antimissile Missile Defense Systems and on the Creation of a Joint Consultative Commission on Disarmament Issues.

Ukraine signed the agreement on fulfilling the USSR and United States treaties, thereby once again confirming that it is a legal successor of the former Union.

During the course of the meeting, CIS states military security concepts issues and the provisions on the CIS Unified Armed Forces High Command were also reviewed and information was also heard on the strategic forces and on the principles of formation of the Russian and Ukrainian navies based on the Black Sea Fleet.

Ukraine did not sign any documents whatsoever on these issues.

Actually, said Colonel-General I. Bizhan, the CIS Unified Armed Forces do not exist as such and it is not known if they will be created at all. Only the unified command of those armed forces exists which, you will agree, are not one and the same.

There are also no unified strategic forces, although the agreement on those forces was signed on 30 December 1991 in Minsk.

CIS Unified Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov also admitted the absence of unified strategic forces when he spoke with information on this issue at the session in Bishkek.

Whose fault is it that the strategic forces have not been created? Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General I. Bizhan thinks that it is Marshal Shaposhnikov who is primarily at fault. Ivan Vasilyevich reminded the journalists present at the press conference that according to the December agreement the strategic forces should have been created by each state determining the lists of units, divisions and armies that would comprise these forces.

In January 1992, Ukraine prepared such a list which included all nuclear weapons that are on its territory. But the CIS Unified Armed Forces commander-in-chief and his staff did not approve the list submitted. And it was proposed to Ukraine that the motorized rifle units, all of the aviation, the Black Sea Fleet, the airborne troops, depots, bases and even military sanatoriums and resort homes (?) be included on that list.

It is quite natural that Ukraine decisively rejected these proposals.

It has taken more than six months and, finally, at Bishkek Marshal Shaposhnikov has proposed that only the complex of nuclear weapons that Ukraine actually had at the beginning of the year be included in the strategic forces.

As a result of the resubordination of the former RVSN [Strategic Missile Forces] headquarters to Russia and the retirement of RVSN Commander General of the Army Maksimov, the leaders of the CIS states that participated in the conference at Bishkek decided to subordinate the nuclear strategic forces to Marshal Shaposhnikov.

Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov then and there submitted a proposal to subordinate all nuclear strategic forces, including those located in Ukraine, to Russia since it, the marshal stated, is the sole legal successor of the former Union according to the Lisbon Protocol and other agreements.

Colonel-General Bizhan said that no agreements whatsoever exist in any document on subordinating the strategic forces to Russia. Therefore, the situation with strategic nuclear weapons remains as before.

The Belarus delegation thought that the Yalta agreements between Ukraine and Russia violate the 30 December 1991 Strategic Forces Treaty and designated the Black Sea Fleet as strategic.

But the Black Sea Fleet, noted Colonel-General I. Bizhan, was never part of the strategic forces. Moreover, on 16 January 1992, at a CIS Heads of State meeting, it was determined that the strategic forces would consist of the navy with the exception of that portion that is part of the Ukrainian and Russian navies. And only the two parties—Ukraine and Russia—should resolve that issue.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who spoke at the meeting, stressed that the Yalta agreement does not violate the previously adopted agreements on strategic forces and he stated that its provisions will be unswervingly observed.

It is worthwhile remembering that Boris Nikolayevich made his statement on 9 October. But on the 10th, that is, the next day, the Russian Ministry of Defense issued an order to prepare nine combat ships for a cruise to the shores of Abkhazia. In the process, it did not request Ukraine's concurrence.

Despite the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's repeated demands to delay carrying out the decision until the issue had been coordinated between the two states at the highest level, the ships departed for Abkhazia. Admiral I. Kasatonov personally led that action.

The Black Sea Fleet is subordinate to two Presidents, Colonel-General I. Bizhan once again reminded us. But as before, the Russian side is attempting to command the

fleet in violation of the treaty. The situation that exists after the Yalta agreements prompts us toward unambiguous conclusions.

Ukraine is ready to carry out its obligations but insists on that same approach by all parties concerned.

At the conclusion of the press conference, Colonel-General I. Bizhan answered the journalists' numerous questions.

Afghan Veterans' Organization Leader Interviewed

*92UM1509A Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 11 Sep 92 p 5*

[Interview with Serhiy Chervonopyskyy, chairman of the Committee of Afghan veterans and veterans of armed conflicts in other foreign countries, by Oleh Oliynyk; place and date not given: "The Past Is With Them"]

[Text] There are 150,000 of them in Ukraine. There are also 3,234 family members of those who perished, 695 orphans. All of them are united by their memory of Afghanistan.

A few months ago, by a decree of the President of Ukraine a Committee of veterans of the war in Afghanistan and armed conflicts in other foreign countries was created. Oleh Oliynyk, the correspondent for URYADOVYY KURYER, interviews its chairman, Serhiy Chervonopyskyy.

[Oliynyk] Because of the social-political shocks, to which we have given generously of our time, the problems of the "Afghan" soldier has most certainly receded into the shadows. But they have not become any less acute for those who cannot leave behind the memory of that war for the mountain passes. How is life now, Serhiy, for all of you, the former "rabble"? Has independent Ukraine become more sympathetic towards you, than once was the "one and only, great, and mighty union"?

[Chervonopyskyy] This is a question with a "false bottom". Life for us, naturally, varies, but let us immediately introduce some clarity: we were not then, nor are we now some sort of reactionary force, as some would like to picture us. Our boys do have a sharpened sense of fairness, a desire to immediately get to the core of a matter -and this, our general trait of extremism, certain forces have tried to use to their advantage. Just a few years ago a party activist proposed the following to me: let's, he said, banish the troublemakers. My reply was definite: no, I will not destroy the "Afghans" to protect the obkoms of the party. Even though, I must say that on the other hand there were also offers to protect meetings and demonstrations. However, we have already been burned once, spent sometime, as it were, in the forefront protecting political interests, and to again drag us into some sort of opposition, -this I am categorically against. I emphasize that particular political viewpoints and sympathies are a different matter. Here, if you please, is

a matter of each person's conscience. But in general all of us uphold the fact that we have a fatherland -Ukraine, and we wish it to become a strong, powerful state, in which life will be good for all of its citizens. We are for constitutional order, for that kind of political system which relies on the free expression of the will of the populace, for the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state. Our positions as an organization can be called centrist, we try to avoid confrontation and displays of social extremism.

There is one more important point that I would like to underline. We are not preparing to become parasites of the government, even though I must painfully admit, in the beginning there were such demands to speak out more loudly so that more might fall our way from the budget coffers. Those times are gone. It is our duty, together with the rest of the nation, to build a strong state. We have already developed not a small amount of experience with independent economic activity. We have our own enterprises, farming among them, we concern ourselves with construction, with horse breeding and with furniture making. The government helped us to start the building of a brick plant with a capacity of 40 million bricks a year. To this I might add, not a single kopek earned locally is transferred here to Kiev, to the central apparatus. All assets, including monetary, go to satisfy the needs of the organizations of veterans of local wars.

[Oliynyk] To the best of my knowledge, all of these affairs were taken care of by the Ukrainian Association of Afghan Veterans. Now we also have a committee -a government structure. What are the goals of its program?

[Chervonopyskyy] Both organizations should complement each other. The committee, in particular, performs the function of executing the laws and decrees concerning the protection of the rights of veterans, the development of a national program for the liquidation of the effects of military conflicts, and the search for prisoners of war.

[Oliynyk] To the point, how many of them, young Ukrainian men, are in that category.

[Chervonopyskyy] Eighteen prisoners of war and 57 who, we think, have vanished without a trace. However, in our work we, naturally, do not distinguish between Ukrainian prisoners of war and those from other countries of the CIS. All of us "Afghans" have a common biography, and we need to rescue all of those who have been left behind there. Even though it may be that the word "rescue" may not apply exactly to today's situation, as not a few of the young men have made their own choice: they have accepted Islam and have married. Even so we should go to each to determine just how final are their decisions. A few days ago we organized a meeting between Hennadiy Ts., who has been in Afghanistan for the past eight years, and his father -let them, however, set their own future destiny.

The question of prisoners of war -this is one of our highest priorities, and it is very good that we can feel in this matter the participation of the president, and leaders of government. At the beginning of the year during the visit of the Ukrainian government delegation to Iran the committee deputy chairman Mykhaylo Hrechko gave to the president of Iran a letter from Leonid Makarevych asking for help in our searches. Afterwards, when the President himself went to Iran, the leader of our coordinating group Valeriy Ablazov was also a member of the delegation and had the opportunity to collect indispensable news about the fate of our prisoners, about the burial places of those who had been lost without a trace. Just wait until the situation in Afghanistan becomes somewhat more stabilized -we will immediately go there and perhaps may be fortunate enough to accomplish more.

[Oliynyk] Serhiy, not so long ago, we were encouraged to regard the soldiers-"Afghans" as carriers of the military-patriotic spirit, they were actively solicited to work with adolescents. Now that the directions of nation building have changed substantially, has this need for your tutoring vanished?

[Chervonopyskyy] And why should it vanish? Should the Ukrainian state do without brave, capable protectors? Should our young boys, tomorrow's soldiers, learn solely through the example of American cinema supermen? No, I am convinced that our experience will still be of use to our youth. Of course, this is carried out through the activities of patriotic clubs, in which adolescents eagerly participate. And so what if, for example, work is carried out in Russian in the "Vulcan" club in Cherkassy, and in Ukrainian in the "Berkut" club in Lviv? We have but one state, belonging to all of us, and the army is one, and we are fulfilling our commitment to it. In Kirovohrad, in the local "spetsnaz", 15 of our veterans serve there, and the leadership is pleased with all of them.

There are, naturally, difficulties with the existence of such clubs, but it has been possible to preserve the founding principle. Traditionally every year now we hold complex competitions among the clubs within Ukraine, and there are people worth watching there.

[Oliynyk] Good, let's return now to the beginning of our conversation. The Afghan veterans, as is known, need special social guarantees from the state. Certain relief was given during the epoch of the USSR, but what legal base exists in Ukraine?

[Chervonopyskyy] Unfortunately, the war did not pass all of us by that simply. There are those who returned disabled with physical defects, while the majority, although seemingly healthy externally, still experienced psychological stress. They killed you, you killed them -this, one does not forget. In America researchers have established evidence of post-Vietnam syndrome ten years after the end of the war. We have a similar scenario. It is reinforced by a low standard of living.

People begin to get sick, some can no longer stand it....Last year in the Kharkiv oblast alone, four of our people committed suicide.

I say this so that others do not accuse us of striving once again to squeeze out the last tear. Such is reality, and we desire only that our problems be acknowledged by society, legalized and resolved with legal help, and not personal sympathy. From this standpoint we regard the legal basis which regulates the status of the veterans of local wars as unfinished. Even today we are making use of Gorbachev's decrees concerning relief for parents and widows of those who perished. We do not have our own decrees. In the legal code of Ukraine concerning social protection of military personnel, adopted this year, there is not a word about veterans-"Afghans", there is not some sort of additional amendment which broadens the provisions of the code to cover us. In some cases they say one thing -in other cases something else. Here you have a gap between the legislators and government officials, and in this space - an actual person with his sores. Last year our Association spent 50,000 rubles and prepared its plan for a legal code concerning the status and social protection of the participants in local wars. However, it did not get any farther than the permanent commission of the Supreme Council, somebody felt, apparently, that we wanted too much. All right, but it is necessary to push this matter further, social pressure, and I know full well the local situations, is building. There already exists a plan for a legal code concerning veterans of war and work, but we are not in agreement with such a variant and are preparing another one. We regard in particular that the status of war veterans and workers should be separated.

[Oliylyk] We don't want to conclude our conversation on a pessimistic note, so at the end I will pose a question which, maybe, is not so timely today. At the first gathering of national deputies of the USSR you ended your speech with the words: "Fatherland. State. Communism. What is your attitude towards these concepts today?"

[Chervonopyskyi] I never deny my own words, and neither will I deny these. For me there is the Fatherland, there is the state, and as for communism - that is faith, conviction, a personal matter for everyone.

[Oliylyk] Thank you for the interview.

New Association for Army Officers To Be Established

*WS0411133692 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian
14 Oct 92 p 5*

[Article by Mykola Zayika: "Christian Association of Officers"]

[Text] One more association, Christian Association of Ukrainian Officers (CAUO), is likely to swell the ranks of about 50 officers' organizations uniting servicemen throughout the world in one association. The new

civilian organization, whose creation was announced by NARODNA ARMIYA, the newspaper of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, will promote the spiritual development of the Ukrainian Army and promulgate Christian values among the servicemen. In addition, the CAUA intends to publish religious and educational literature fostering love for the motherland, promoting scientific research, assisting in the employment of retired servicemen, and extending humanitarian and other type of aid to military families.

High morality, allegiance to the oath to God and the national flag are considered by association members as God's cause. At the same time, the CAUO will make no attempts to forcibly convert other servicemen. According to the representative of the Social and Psychological Department at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, it is only a matter of personal decision for each individual.

According to NARODNA ARMIYA, the constituent conference of the CAUO "God's Cause", is soon to be scheduled.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Armed Forces Chief Calls for National Army

93US0072B Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 25 Sep 92 p 4

[Interview with General Norat Ter Grigoryan, general commander of the Armenian armed forces, by Yerevan YERGIR; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] The creation of a national army and a defense system with modern high standards remains an urgent necessity today more than at any other time because of the need to defend the homeland against aggression by Azerbaijan's regular forces.

Our sister paper, [Yerevan] YERGIR [official press organ of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Armenia], had an interview with General Norat Ter Grigoryan, the general commander of Armenia's armed forces, in connection with the creation of a national army and associated structures and the current status of military conscription. Below is the text of the interview with Ter Grigoryan: [passage omitted]

[Ter Grigoryan] [Interview begins with an answer as published] After I was promoted to the rank of general, they asked me to come to Armenia to help with the creation of a national army. I thought that this work had already begun. The papers wrote that a brigade had already been formed in Armenia. The president [of Armenia] invited me to a meeting and requested my assistance. I decided to tour the country first to see what the people are doing and thinking. First I visited Ardzhvashen. The Azerbaijanis were the aggressors. Until my arrival here I thought that it was Armenian propaganda that portrayed events that way, because the other side claimed that it was the Armenians who attacked first. I

wanted to know who was deceiving whom to decide whether I was being drawn into a political ploy or whether I had to take measures for the defense, independence, honor and dignity of our homeland.

The Azerbaijani tank and artillery positions were scattered around Russian villages and were shelling Armenia. I also noticed that the Azerbaijani firing positions deployed around Ardzvashen were shelling Russian villages in their own territory. Then I visited Goris, Yeghegnadzor and Yeraskh. Everywhere the adversary was the first to attack. Azerbaijan has concentrated all of its forces and is shelling Armenian villages near the border in a systematic and determined manner. This is an old tactic and strategy. They are creating a permanently insecure situation in these settlements by subjecting them to aerial and artillery bombardment and thus forcing the people to leave those areas. It is an effective mode of operation.

[Question] What can be done to stop that?

[Ter Grigoryan] I learned the answer in Afghanistan. We also have the example of Lebanon. We can even look at the example of World War II: Hitler's best divisions could not defeat the heroic people of Yugoslavia during the entire course of the war. In Afghanistan there was continuous war for 10 years, and it was impossible to solve the problem by military means. The situation is the same here. All the problems can be solved only by political means. Political steps must supersede military operations. Even if the people are enslaved, they will wage a guerrilla struggle. Only a fool would try to exploit the territories evacuated by the Armenians. Even if the republic is destroyed and no armed forces are left, it will be the same thing: There will be a guerrilla movement.

[Question] Armenia wants peace, but the other side wishes to realize a unification of the Turkic world over our land. What must we do to overcome the aggression by Turkey and Azerbaijan?

[Ter Grigoryan] Obviously Turkey is a very powerful country. It is a member of NATO, it has a strong army and economy and it has a certain place in the world. The Soviet Union had in fact forgotten about Turkey's existence. We, the military, knew that Turkey is NATO and that any force must be [illegible word]. After all, any aggressive force will eventually show its teeth. Today Turkey has begun showing its teeth.

In these circumstances regular armed forces must have been created [in Armenia] a long time ago. Is this difficult for Armenia? Yes. Economic capabilities and prospects, as well as the disposition of the population, play a great role in this issue. However, a regular army must be created not with an aggressive but a defensive doctrine. This must be a certain mobile force which is trained to overcome any aggressive operations and, when necessary, counterstrike, so that they will not think that this republic is generally poor, helpless, defenseless

and without resolve. That must not be allowed. The enemy must be made to suffer for attacking another state.

[Question] What should the size of such an army be?

[Ter Grigoryan] You know that that is a very serious matter. Even if I had made some calculations in these last few days, I would not tell you. This is a military secret. If I say "one million" Azerbaijan may think that it needs two million men. Therefore let me say this: We need only as many men as is needed to drive back aggression. Do you think that Azerbaijan would be willing to launch an all-out attack? No. They do not have such means. I have worked on such matters on an all-Union scale, and I know who has what means. When a "revolutionary" situation was present in Armenia, they ended the conscription. That was a big mistake. During that time Azerbaijan conducted its conscription by 110 percent.

[Question] Implementing military conscription is a basic problem today. What must be done, and what is blocking it?

[Ter Grigoryan] Until the last few years the military commissariats of Armenia organized the conscription. When restructuring began, they started waging antimilitary propaganda here. They began playing politics, and in the end people lost their respect for the army. Now the moral and psychological environment is such that some people do not want to serve even in their own army. Currently, the chairmen of regional and city councils and the prime minister are responsible for conscription. A conscript must be prepared for military service first at school and then he must specialize in a system similar to DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy]. The prime minister has promised to help on all matters. If only the people and parents could realize that their children have to defend them with their weapons. Instead of conscripting we need to mobilize in an environment of conscription. Some people are saying: Let the people of Ardzvashen defend Ardzvashen. How can one think that way?

[Question] What would you like to add?

[Ter Grigoryan] Together we must perfect what we have and create our national army on the basis of devotion, bravery and wisdom.

Additional Social Protection for Servicemen

93US0049B Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA
in Russian 9 Sep 92 p 2

[Text of enactment: "Enactment of the Government of the Republic of Armenia on Supplementary Measures for the Social Protection of Military Personnel and Fighting Men Who Have Taken Part in Combat Operations in Defense of the Republic and Who as a Consequence of This Have Become Disabled, as well as the Families of Personnel Who Have Lost Their Lives"]

[Text] In execution of the Edict of the President of the Republic of Armenia dated 25 June 1992 entitled Enactment of the Government of the Republic of Armenia on Supplemental Measures for the Social Protection of Military Personnel and Fighting Men Who Have Taken Part in Combat Operations in Defense of the Republic and Who as a Consequence of This Have Become Disabled, as well as the Families of Personnel Who Have Lost Their Lives, the Government of the Republic of Armenia has directed that the families of military personnel and self-defense forces fighting men who have lost their lives shall be granted 100,000 rubles per family, while military personnel and fighting men who have become disabled shall receive benefits as follows: 50,000 rubles for Group 1 disability, 40,000 rubles for Group 2 disability, and 30,000 rubles for Group 3 disability.

This enactment also prescribes a number of additional benefits, including the following:

1. Disabled military personnel and fighting men as well as the families of military personnel and fighting men who have lost their lives shall receive:

- prosthetic and orthopedic devices free of charge and, once each year, travel to and stay at a sanatorium free of charge;
- a 50-percent discount on rent and utilities;
- gratis privatization of apartments;
- installation of a telephone free of charge and without the normal wait, as well as a 50-percent discount on phone subscriber charge;
- for the children of persons in the above-specified categories—a 50-percent discount in fees at school and preschool facilities;
- assistance in obtaining fuel for tenants of buildings without central heating, in the form of a 50-percent rebate on expenditures.

2. Military personnel and fighting men who have taken part in combat operations and become disabled as a consequence shall be entitled to the following:

- free use of all modes of transportation on the territory of the republic, with the exception of taxicabs;
- free medicine on the basis of a doctor's prescription, and free, priority services at state medical facilities.

3. Military personnel and fighting men who have taken part in combat operations shall be entitled to the following:

- free use of urban transit services and public motor transport on the territory of the administrative rayon of residence in a rural locality, with the exception of taxicabs.

Press service of the Government of the Republic of Armenia

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Potential for Civil War in Tajikistan

92UM1494A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Pelts: "Tajikistan: The Fratricidal War Goes On"]

[Text] The hopes which appeared that the situation would stabilize in Kurgan Tyube have not been met. The peace-keeping mission consisting of members of the Government and the Republic Supreme Council has produced virtually no results. The opposing sides were offered a meeting on "neutral" territory at the position of a Russian regiment stationed in Kurgan Tyube. Neither this proposal nor other ones have been accepted. The mutual mistrust and if one puts it directly, the reciprocal hostile attitudes are so strong that for now we must exclude even the attempt to sit down at the peace talks. As was stated by the representatives of the so-called opposition, they will fight until the last Kulyab is driven from the oblast. The opposite side is just as determined and uncompromising. "There will be no peace in our land until the opposition members who have come to power illegally lay down their arms," is how the situation was assessed by one of the leaders of the Kulyab armed formations, Rustam Langariyev.

The messages received during the holiday from Kurgan-Tyube Oblast have confirmed these forecasts. A fierce exchange of fire is continuing in the region of the city. Again people are dying. With each passing day, the situation in Kurgan-Tyube itself becomes more and more complex. According to the last data, the city is virtually without water. Power outages have started. As before, the enterprises are not operating, many stores are closed.

The increase in the armed conflict is also seen from the fact that after the defeat of the posts on Shar-Shar Pass, bloody clashes started in the region of Chomozak Pass. Here even armoured equipment has been used in the course of the fighting. The opposing sides are committing ever new forces to battle. For example, it has been possible to learn that the two BTR [armored personnel carrier] captured in the course of the attack on the Military Chair of Tajik State University are being towed to the region of this pass.

During the night of 20-21 September, groupings from Kulyab broke into the villages of Kofarnagonskiy (Ordzhonikidzeabadskiy) Rayon, however they were later driven out. There are killed and wounded.

The fierceness of the opposing sides causes particular concern. They are ready to take the most extreme measures. Thus, the chief of the Kurgan Tyube Civil Defense Staff and the chief of the city garrison point to the real possibility of sabotage at many of the ecologically dangerous enterprises in the city and oblast. Some

504 tonnes of ammonia and about 100 tonnes of Formalin are at the Vakhsh Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant and this is just 12 km from Kurgan Tyube. Almost 1,500 tonnes of chlorine and 500 tonnes of hydrogen chloride are at the Yavan Tajikkhimprom [Tajik Chemical Industry] Production Association. In the event of an explosion, the ecological disaster would threaten not only Tajikistan but also Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Toxic substances could poison vast territories, even as far as the Aral Sea.

The real prospect of a large-scale civil war in Tajikistan requires emergency and decisive measures. Seemingly everyone is beginning to understand this. The further complicating of the situation in the region has served as grounds for a closed conference of the Presidium of the Tajik Supreme Council with the involvement of the leaders from the law-enforcement bodies. Nothing as yet is known about the results of this meeting, since the journalists were not admitted to the meeting.

Incidentally, the local press, as our Correspondent Anatoliy Ladin has written from a reference to the Khovar Information Agency, has published an appeal from the Chairman of the Republic Supreme Council Akbarsho Iskandarov to the people of Tajikistan. "The crime and illegality have overflowed the cup of patience of the much-suffering Tajik people. The collectives of the enterprises and organizations and persons of different professions and nationalities are demanding that the Supreme Council and the Republic Government stop the evil," states the appeal. Having emphasized that the situation in the republic day by day is becoming ever more complex, he warned the leaders of the opposing armed sides that within four days, from 21 Sep to 24 Sep, they must cease the clashes and bloodshed. Otherwise they will be declared traitors of the nation and force used against them. They will be disarmed and punished according to the law.

A serious warning was given to the leaders of the local authorities. Those who do not carry out the state enactments will be held strictly liable for this.

Kurgan-Tyube: 30 September Status Report

93UM0013A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Oct 92, pp 1, 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Anatoliy Ladin: "Kurgan-Tyube: "The Next Break Before New Clashes?"]

[Text] At first glance, the information coming in from Kurgan-Tyube is promising. After the capture of this oblast center by the supporters of the former president, the situation has been normalized in the city. This was learned by our correspondent who got in touch by telephone with the Chief of Staff of Oblast Civil Defense Lieutenant-Colonel Valeriy Plastinin. He was located at the staff of the motorized rifle regiment stationed in Kurgan-Tyube.

"As of today," the officer emphasized, "the regiment feels significantly more confident. Reinforcements have arrived from Russia. The supporters of the former president are behaving correctly toward the military and the public. Here there are no seas of blood and no thousands of corpses. Little by little the city is returning to a peaceful life. Water and electricity are being supplied. The supporters of the president insist that the power structure in the city has remained as it was before the armed clashes between the opposing sides. The Gorispolkom Chairman Akbarov is already in the city. The Oblispolkom Chairman Kurbanov has still not been found, but he has been offered to resume his duties.

The bank for the last 24 hours has been guarded by Russian servicemen. In the city there is rather a large amount of destruction after the fierce clashes which broke out here last Sunday. The building of the oblispolkom has been completely destroyed, while the building of the city police department has been literally burned to the ground. The building of the oblast internal affairs directorate has been burned down. The roads and bridges, with the exception of the main one, are intact. Damage to housing in the city has been insignificant. The road from Dushanbe to Kurgan-Tyube is open.

The night of 30 September as a whole passed quietly, but in places in the outskirts of the city, individual exchanges of fire could be heard. The blockade around the regiment was removed completely, and now, stressed Lieutenant-Colonel Valeriy Plastinin in conclusion, it is possible to enter the city freely.

Nevertheless, proceeding from the estimates of other sources, as a whole the situation in the region remains extremely complex. The number of persons killed in the recent clashes as yet cannot be precisely established. But there is information that during the clashes between the illegal formations in Tajikistan, at least 5,000 persons have been killed. For eliminating all the consequences of the fighting (this includes hundreds of destroyed residential building, public buildings and production facilities) it will take 10 years. But only under the condition that the armed conflict will be immediately stopped.

Is there any hope for this? It is hard to answer. But even now it is clear that the anti-Nabiyev groupings will scarcely agree easily to the loss of Kurgan-Tyube. As was stated by the Commander of the 201st Rifle Division, Major-General Mukhriddin Ashurov, the opposing sides are running out of ammunition. "We," the general stressed, "will defend our weapons to the last."

On 29 September, the acting President of Tajikistan Akbarsho Iskandarov met with the commander of the 201st Division. Among other questions raised, as it was learned, was how to prevent the theft of military equipment and weapons from the formation's units.

For now the fate is unknown of the servicemen of Uzbek and Tajik nationalities—four officers, a warrant officer ["praporshchik"] and two soldiers, who stole military equipment in the interests of the opposing groupings in

Kurgan-Tyube. They still have not returned to their units. As the representatives of the opposition have stated, there have not been any Russians among the thieves. And none of them, meaning the servicemen of the regiment, has been involved in the clashes in Kurgan-Tyube. As for the stolen equipment, it has virtually all broken down with the exception of one tank the location of which is still unknown.

Soldiers Desert Unit in Tajikistan

*934C0126B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Oct 92 p 3*

[NEGA report: "Tajikistan"]

[Text] Yesterday Tajikistan's NARODNOYE RADIO published a report that seven Russian soldiers have deserted their Russian troop unit in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast.

A regiment of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division of Russian forces is stationed in Kurgan-Tyube.

"We will never return to our unit"—the deserters stated—"since we understand that in southern Tajikistan there are robbers and bandits who wish with their own hands to destroy Russian soldiers, people whose guilt lies only in the fact that they are defending their families, their honor, and their convictions."

Crossing over to the side of local self-defense groups were active-duty soldiers Aleksey Sukhorukov, Oleg

Belousov, Oleg Kozlov, Andrey Alekseyev, Igor Borisov, Aleksandr Prokhorov, and Aleksey Ovchinnikov.

The servicemen assert that prior to being sent to Tajikistan they were informed that they were going to be harvesting potatoes. "Then when we were there, they started hammering it into us that we must fight against the Muslims who have unleashed a fratricidal war in this republic," one of the deserters stated.

Uzbekistan Adopts Law on Alternative Service

934C0126A Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by D. Doronin "Good-Bye Weapon, Hello Shovel!"]

[Text] Uzbekistan has adopted a Law "On Alternative Service."

This is a special type of state service connected with the accomplishment of secondary work requiring little in the way of job skills, or specialized work at enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the economy, including work to eliminate the consequences of accidents, catastrophes, natural disasters, or other emergency situations.

Refusal to engage in active-duty army service is not sufficient to enter alternative service. The right to such service is held by recruits from families consisting of four or more children, in addition to the recruit, under the age of 16, or in cases where a family member has become disabled while performing service.

ARMS TRADE

Consignment of Munitions From Kazan to Armenia Discovered

93UM0038A *Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 4 Sep 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Artillery Shells as Building Materials"]

[Text] A shipment of artillery shells that had been shipped from Kazan to Armenia has been detained in Voronezh. The consignee of the shipment is a construction organization. Five thousand 30 mm artillery shells for a rapid-fire cannon were in rail cars alongside building materials. The shipper is unknown. Coordinators of the Tatarstan parliamentary factions "Soglasie" and "Narodovlastiye" have submitted a demand to the president to provide an explanation in this connection.

Russia Reducing Arms Sales to North Korea

93UM0038C *Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 9 Sep 92 p 2

[RIA [Russian Information Agency] article: "Russia Is Reducing Arms Deliveries to Pyongyang"]

[Text] At the present time, cooperation in the sphere of Russian arms deliveries to North Korea [DPRK] is being reduced, reported Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs ATR [Asia-Pacific Region] First Administration Head Mikhail Belyy. He noted that cooperation with the DPRK in this sphere has been completely transferred to a commercial basis. Favorable terms will no longer be extended to Pyongyang for arms shipments. Therefore, while considering the shortage of hard currency resources being experienced by the DPRK, the volumes of arms being supplied from Russia to North Korea are being reduced. Mikhail Belyy stressed that Russia is not supplying offensive weapons to North Korea.

Weapons Production in Russia Down 68 Percent Over 1991

93UM0038B *Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 9 Sep 92 p 2

[RIA [Russian Information Agency] article: "Weapons Production Will Decrease in Russia"]

[Text] By the end of this year, production of weapons and military equipment in Russia will decrease by 68 percent in contrast to the 1991 level and the ratio of civilian production to the total volume of production of the defense sectors will increase to 80 percent. Russia Ministry of Industry Main Administration Head Yuriy Glybin reported that at the "Konversiya i mezhdunarodnaya sotrudnichestvo" [Conversion and International Cooperation] Conference that opened in Moscow. The leaders of more than 150 of Russia's defense complex

enterprises and organizations, representatives of U.S., French, Finnish, and Swedish firms, and also of UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization] and NATO are participating in it.

Security Council Considers Arms Trade**Critique of Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties**

93UM0016A *Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 30 Sep 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with MVES Deputy Minister Vladimir Shibayev by Pavel Felgengauer; place and date not given: "Everyone in Russia Wants to Trade Arms: The Opinion of Interested Parties. The First Article: The Position of the MVES"]

[Text] The 10 September meeting of the Security Council, in which the matter of President Yeltsin's trip to Japan was resolved, the problem of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries was discussed as well. Minister of Foreign Economic Ties Petr Aven gave a report to the council. The MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties] has been under considerable criticism: Weapon manufacturers (the military-industrial complex) are extremely dissatisfied with what they see as the low rate of arms exports, and with Russia's departure from the old arms markets, which are in no way compensated by any major successes in the new ones. In the meantime the general designers and directors of giant defense plants and associations have considerable possibilities for directly influencing both the government and the president.

On 26 August NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA printed an interview with Admiral Sergey Krasnov, former chief of the Main Technical Directorate (GTU) of the MVES (now known as Spetsvneshtekhnika), which has also subjected the present leadership of the MVES to harsh criticism. Mention of this interview was made, by the way, in meetings of the Security Council. The position of the MVES is explained by Deputy Minister Vladimir Shibayev.

[Shibayev] Admiral Krasnov is a regular employee of the MVES working in the arms trade area. He was one of the executives of the system of military-technical cooperation who understood that they had to work in a new way under the new conditions. Back in late 1991 he proposed reorganizing military-technical cooperation, and there was much that sounded sensible in his proposals. He is doubtlessly a gifted person, but the main goal of his efforts was to establish a single "holding company" under his control—essentially a new arms trade ministry with a typical rigid Soviet pyramidal hierarchy, with him at the top. He would have been accountable only to the country's president. When Petr Aven and his team came over to the MVES, papers that would have taken arms trade out of the control of the system of foreign economic ties and which would have established a new supermonopoly were already awaiting the final approval of the government.

The reorganization proposed by Sergey Krasnov was deemed unacceptable (Minister Aven is a resolute opponent of any monopolization). As a result of lengthy discussions with workers of foreign trade associations and with Krasnov, the charter of the new company was reexamined, and it was to become one of the competing commercial companies in the system of new arms trade regulations. The new charter was submitted to the government with the backing of Minister Petr Aven and myself.

And then as a result of some miracle this charter was substituted in the government administration by a "new" version—essentially the former document, which transferred all arms trade to Admiral Krasnov; our letters of approval were even transferred from one document to the other. There is only one thing that can be said of this: It was a forgery. Krasnov himself was on an official trip to China at this time, and he subsequently denied all complicity in these manipulations.

The forgery was discovered, and the documents were retrieved before they could be approved. Rear Admiral Krasnov decided to move together with his department (the GTU, or Spetsvneshtekhnika) to the offices of Vice President Ruts koy (the corresponding paper was sent to the president's staff under Ruts koy's signature). This was the last straw, and Petr Aven decided to fire Krasnov. This was the moment when the story concerning the KOLO concern surfaced—that secret and rather brazen attempt by the "nomenklatura" to privatize defense industry, in which Admiral Krasnov was involved as well. The problem lay not at all with the assessment Admiral Krasnov gave to his intellectual contribution to the charter fund of KOLO, but in that by the nature of his service and his title, Admiral Krasnov did not have the right to become a stockholder of such a company, according to existing legislation.

[Felgengauer] All right, so Krasnov was fired, and good triumphed once again, but why is the organization of foreign trade in general, and of arms trade in particular, eliciting so much reproach? Why have enterprises of the military-industrial complex found themselves heaped with mountains of weapons no one needs this year?

[Shibayev] Great "credit" for this belongs to Sergey Krasnov: Late last year he announced that he had an opportunity to sell (export) \$7.5 billion worth of Russian-made arms in 1992 (any professional will tell you that this is completely unrealistic under today's conditions). As a result of his actions a state order was placed with state enterprises by the MVES totaling R37.1 billion in 1991 prices.

(In 1991 weapons were very "inexpensive": One MiG-29 fighter cost around R7 million, and an S-300 surface-to-air system cost around R1.5 million, such that 30 billion is truly a gigantic sum.—P. F.)

Enterprises of the military-industrial complex filled the state order, and now they are presenting their bills to the MVES: hundreds of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles,

hundreds (at least) of airplanes (60 MiG-29 fighters manufactured for export are parked at the Lukhovitsy Aircraft Plant), dozens of surface-to-air missile systems and artillery systems, a very large quantity of infantry weapons, and so on. As a result serious conflicts arose between the MVES (the government) and defense industry. The products had been manufactured, but there was no one to pay for them. The workers were left without their wages, and the social and economic situation in the country worsened.

[Felgengauer] Does this mean, then, that defense industry is continuing to manufacture weapons, despite the abrupt decline in purchases by the defense ministry, because of the incorrect actions of just a single rear admiral? Why are the weapons being produced? What percentage of the total state order to defense is represented by the order from the MVES?

[Shibayev] This was of course not the only cause, although the purely business activities of Krasnov, who attempted to monopolize the arms trade system, did help considerably to aggravate the conflicts existing in mutual relations between the MVES, the government and enterprises of the military-industrial complex. Weapons are still being produced because the military-industrial complex is still traveling the old rut, instead of carrying out conversion. This is easier and more comfortable—you don't need to worry your head at all. And as for the share of the MVES in the overall state order placed with defense in 1992, it is 32 percent.

There is no "massacre of professionals" of any sort going on in the system of military-technical cooperation of the MVES. We are presently working with the same team as did the union MVES. We have not had any special lay-offs. Most of our workers are competent, qualified people. However, we do have many problems as well. The GIU [not further identified], the GTU and the arms trade system have generally been a plum assignment, especially for officers. Constant foreign business trips, high wages—both for position and for rank (associates of military trade directorates underwent active military service in the MVES, and they received regular promotions, special promotions for especially successful operations, and government awards). The Soviet arms trade system was deeply classified, and therefore it was beyond scrutiny to a certain degree: It was not hard to conceal some of the commercial and other failures.

By the way, arms trade was itself rather unique: The bulk of the deliveries were made on credit, the loans were not always repaid, and large quantities of weapons were supplied without compensation. Such that the main concern of workers of military technical directorates was drafting enormous numbers of documents (orders, instructions, directives etc.), rather than actual arms trade. The commercial advantage of such trade was not at the top of the list of concerns.

The ranks of the "professional" arms dealers were also filled by the children of highly placed military chiefs and

party functionaries. Admiral Krasnov is among them, by the way. And despite all of the praise he has received for professionalism, this year for example he reached agreement with Iran to convert \$600 million in Iranian hard currency debts (for arms deliveries) into a "civilian" debt in clearing dollars, which resulted in sizable currency losses.

(Sergey Krasnov asserts that in reaching agreement with Iran, he was acting on written instructions from Yegor Gaydar—P. F.).

[Felgengauer] What is the actual status of demonopolization of arms trade today? What manufacturers have been able to open a direct channel into the foreign market?

[Shibayev] Arms manufacturers have now been permitted to independently market their goods and conduct negotiations with potential partners. But we oppose the use of unqualified middlemen. Our specialized foreign trade associations—OBORONEKSPORT, SPETS-VNESHTEKHNIKA and GUSK—are qualified middlemen that will help the manufacturers. We are working together with the manufacturers on advertising, marketing and contracts. Our GUSK association was the basis for establishment of the KONVIMEKS industrial foreign economic corporation together with the League of Defense Enterprises, and it has already begun operating. In addition special mixed groups are being established for certain major projects. In this way, arms manufacturers will learn the art of trading. For example the plant in Tula obtained the right to engage in arms trade independently, albeit in cooperation with the MVES. A multibillion contract for the sale of Su-27 fighters to China is being implemented jointly with the "Sukhoi Company's" general designer Mikhail Simonov. All of the contracts have already been signed by the way, deliveries are proceeding at full speed, and we are already receiving money for these airplanes.

We are establishing good business relations with the MAPO [Moscow Aviation Production Association] imeni Dementyev (the lead "company" for MiG aircraft). Together, we will work out a deal with Malaysia (a project for possible rearmament of the Malaysian air forces with MiG-29 aircraft.—P.F.).

[Felgengauer] Frequent mention is made of MiG-Servis. Are MAPO and MiG-Servis the same "company"?

[Shibayev] No. You can't imagine how many conflicts exist today within the military-industrial complex, including in MAPO. The discord in customs is nothing when compared with the disputes that occur between arms manufacturers and the MVES. In MAPO for example, the production association and testing base (not to mention the engine manufacturers) have conflicts with the lead institute. But we are working together on the Malaysian deal.

[Felgengauer] Has the contract with Malaysia been signed?

[Shibayev] Not yet. Negotiations with Malaysia are actually an example of how not to trade. Everyone who has nothing better to do is trying to get into this deal, beginning with that great Soviet singer.

[Felgengauer] Are you referring to Iosif Kobzon?

[Shibayev] Yes, including him. Everyone is trying to get into this deal, offering themselves as middlemen and delaying final signing of the contract. The Malaysian authorities have been led into a state of total consternation. You can write a book about it. We began work in October of last year. Malaysian representatives visited our plants, testing bases and specialist and flight crew training centers, and they conducted technical negotiations. Our airplanes flew to Malaysia, where they were also subjected to testing and demonstration flights.

We studied the financial possibilities of our partners, analyzed their desires, and prepared a well substantiated business proposal. Malaysia adopted a political decision to purchase the MiG-29s. And this is in the face of stiff competition: The Americans initially offered F-18 Hornets at \$45 million apiece, while the English offered the multipurpose Tornado, and all on leasing terms. We had made preparations for a fundamentally important breakthrough into a market that was completely new to us, and when the contract was ready for signature, "middlemen" converged upon the brokers (a total of 18 different Russian middlemen announced themselves in Malaysia). And at the last minute, the Lukhovitsy Aircraft Assembly Plant, which had 60 MiG-29s in the export modification "on its hands," ordered but not paid for, intruded into the deal.

The plant (Tiktanidi is its director) had already tried to sell these airplanes to Iran through a certain English middleman. It even received assurances that a contract would be signed, but soon after, the middleman disappeared to places unknown. Now it is peddling its own separate offer in Malaysia, and meeting with the prime minister and the defense minister. It would have been punished so severely in any civilized society that it would never dare to try this again, while in our country it is being prompted to interfere. Later on, that singer also travels to Malaysia and makes the rounds of the highest Malaysian authorities. This is even after agreement is reached on the price of the MiG-29s (\$24 million each). Moreover the Americans, who understood the financial possibilities of Malaysia, offered a cheaper airplane—the F-16 Fighting Falcon (the official price proposed to the Malaysians was \$21 million each).

[Felgengauer] Tell me, to what degree does the MVES leadership propose utilizing different intermediary companies, considering that weapons are usually sold in the world commercial market not on the basis of intergovernmental contracts but through intermediaries?

[Shibayev] We are trading directly only with India and China, and we are using various middlemen in all of the other cases. In the planned deal with Malaysia, we are proposing an intergovernmental agreement, but we will

use the services of local consultants and agents in this case, ones who know the local conditions and can provide help in all stages of the negotiations.

Decisions to buy major weapons systems are made throughout the world at the state level. And then specific contracts are signed by authorized state agents. OBOR-ONEKSPORT and SPETSVNESHTEKHNIKA are precisely such middlemen. Nor are we opposed to having qualified, authorized private middlemen participate in drawing up export agreements, on the condition that their legal status is defined. If for example we are approached by an officially registered Peruvian company with an official request, we will work with it.

[Felgengauer] Many (not just Admiral Krasnov) accuse the present leadership of the Russian MVES of essentially reducing arms exports to naught, and the present MVES leadership of incompetency.

[Shibayev] Where, then, are the budget's hard currency receipts coming from? We are offering fundamentally new weapon systems for export. We are actively working to preserve our positions in the old markets and we are effectively breaking our way into new ones, though a number of the "old" markets are in fact closed to us now: The UN Security Council imposed a trade embargo on Iraq, Libya and Yugoslavia. Deliveries to countries of the former Warsaw Pact, and to Third World countries that had formerly been "ideologically close" but are insolvent, have decreased dramatically. But we are still working with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Germany. Also, we are now working in Morocco, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and other countries of this region. Consignments of equipment of truly large size are now being shipped out. Each week we sign contracts (only we don't report this in the press), and we are now frequently selling weapons for cash, which was altogether impossible before.

[Felgengauer] I am eager to believe you, but your position would probably be more persuasive if you were able to communicate some of the details of successful work by the MVES in arms exports.

[Shibayev] The details of the contracts (prices and terms) are a commercial secret, and they probably shouldn't be cited.

But I can say in general that this year, arms trade has in no way been "reduced to naught." We are now at a very good level: We are ahead of last year, and we are certain that we will finish the year off with results that are at least not worse than in 1991, and more likely with results that are even better. Moreover the results should be better not so much in regard to the total volume of shipments as the effectiveness of exports. We hope to give the state considerably more profit (1.6 times more, with approximately the same volume of deliveries). The uncompensated deliveries of military equipment, which had been so frequent before, have been terminated completely. We also understand that we need to increase

our sales volume, but this will require time, and considerable meticulous effort. After all, the present team in the MVES has only been working for nine months.

However, were we to announce the new deals that are to be signed in the immediate future, we would kill them.

Position of League of Defense Enterprises

93UM0016B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "Everyone in Russia Wants to Trade Arms: The Position of Arms Manufacturers Is Presented by League of Defense Enterprises President Aleksandr Shulunov"]

[Text] An interview with MVES Deputy Minister Vladimir Shibayev on issues associated with arms trade was published in the last issue of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (No 188, 30 September 1992). Now, as promised, we offer the other side's point of view, and the comments of a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA reviewer.

The League of Defense Enterprises is a voluntary "public" association. It is supported by deductions from enterprises comprising its membership. The league itself does not engage in commercial activity—as an example, *aktsiznirovaniye* [translation unknown] will be carried out for the GUSK association in the KONVIMEKS concern by the league's founders. The staff of the league's president contains five persons. There are regional representatives. The league is comprised of approximately 700 enterprises and associations. The league's leadership is making an effort to represent the interests of the military-industrial complex in the government and in parliament.

In the words of the president the league's greatest accomplishments include 13 billion recently obtained from Gaydar to increase (index) the wages of workers directly involved in arms production. (Another 40 billion was allocated from conversion assets to workers manufacturing civilian products in the defense establishment).

Everyone says that arms trade is inhumane. On one hand this is true, but after all, arms trade is a necessary evil, and if we don't sell arms, others will, which is specifically what is happening today. We can no longer sell arms like we used to. For example what the Near East needs is not weapons but weapon systems.

And as a result of a recent visit to South Korea by Minister Aleksandr Titkin, it became obvious that Korea does not intend to purchase Russian arms—it possesses American systems, and it has no intention of changing them. However, Korea is interested in our defense technologies.

Matters are especially poor with service, with deliveries of spare parts. It took a year to examine the orders for spare parts, and three years to satisfy them.

Recently, however, the position of the MVES has changed in many ways. The GTU, GIU and GUSK are trying to restructure themselves. We are completing establishment of two joint-stock corporations. One of them (KONVIMEKS) will sell arms, and it is being created jointly with the GUSK; the other will involve itself in service, modernization and spare parts deliveries jointly with the GTU. (Spare parts deliveries should comprise 10-15 percent of weapons deliveries.) It is assumed that this corporation will become transnational in the future.

It is unrealistic for every defense plant to create its own complete foreign trade structure. We need consultation and assistance in negotiations from MVES organizations. Moreover there are many conflicts today between manufacturers and producers. Various commercial structures are being established: Almaz, MiG-Servis etc. I feel that all aspects of the work should be carried out by professionals.

There still are many problems, by the way. In February Petr Aven returned from China and announced "that we will not sell a single Su-27 to China." I bet him a case of champagne that we will. Simonov flew to China and signed the contract. In May the airplanes flew over to China. **(The reference is to two Su-27UB aircraft sold separately from the main deal with China. The fate of the case of champagne, in contrast to that of the fighters, has not yet been determined.—P. F.)**

Arms sales could provide assets for true conversion of the defense establishment, but these hopes have not yet been justified. Today's taxes are such that manufacturers are not very interested in exports. We are in a position to increase the total volume of military-technical cooperation to \$12-14 billion annually. However, this will require us to preserve the better part of our defense potential.

We need to retain the collectives and production procedures, because we do not know what sort of armament we will need in the future. However, something will have to be reduced. And this will require a resolute decision on the part of the Security Council and the Ministry of Defense. We were all given a little from the budget this year. But this is meaningless. It seems as if the government hopes that a market will form spontaneously out of the planned economy within a year. What we need is strategic planning. We need a national industrial policy.

Conclusion

Foreign arms trade, which brought the country enormous profits in the 1980s, is in a crisis. And as usually happens in such cases, interested circles continue to debate the question as to what is to be done and who is to blame.

One would think that the state administration should be able to work out the problem of the specific blame borne by specific officials. As always, matters are worse when it comes to attempts to truly correct the present woeful

situation. But even here, some progress is noticeable. A 1.4 billion (in dollars) contract with China for delivery of Su-27 fighters has been signed and is being implemented successfully; last week India received a multimillion commercial loan that will make it possible to continue its previously contracted purchases of arms from Russia. And obviously, by the way, the main thing is that all participants of the process of foreign economic military-technical cooperation have generally "reached consensus" in the question of the strategic direction of development of military-technical cooperation in Russia.

This direction is a combination of further liberalization of military-technical cooperation (enlarging the number of traders, and accelerating and simplifying bureaucratic procedures), and of greater flexibility in pricing policy and in commercial questions. Such a more-aggressive export policy will doubtless bear its fruits, and sharp deterioration of relations with the USA will doubtlessly be the most noticeable thing.

It appeared to the new democratic Russia that there were no fundamentally implacable conflicts in its interests with the United States, but now they are obviously manifesting themselves. The USA also has a problem with military-technical cooperation, after all: the decline in internal arms purchases and the constantly narrowing international solvent demand for weapons (both are the direct consequences of the successful conclusion of the Cold War). The present scandal concerning submarines for Iran is only the tip of the iceberg of the still-hidden conflicts and rivalries.

The contract to deliver three submarines was signed as much as a year ago. But now all arms deliveries to Iran have been frozen in connection with the fact that Teheran has stopped transferring payments for equipment already delivered. In addition the GTU should have established a system of shore services for these submarines (according to the terms of the same contract), but this work has not been started yet at all. Obviously the main goal of Eagleberger's extremely harsh statement regarding this specific contract is broader—it was an attempt to put Russia "in its place." And this is not the first time. Before this, there was the matter of cryogenic rocket engines for India.

Russians and Americans are colliding ever more frequently and strongly in the same arms markets. President Bush unexpectedly gave permission for delivery of 160 F-16s to Taiwan (violating a policy of many years of not selling the latest arms to the island Chinese Republic) after reports of a possible sale of MiG-29s to Taiwan appeared in the press.

Taiwan did in fact ask for MiG-29 fighters from Russia, but after a few preliminary contacts, Russian officials decided that there were better prospects for military-technical cooperation with mainland China. All the more so because it soon became clear that Taiwan did not even intend to seriously discuss any purchases: Those masters

of Chinese diplomacy simply wished to provoke Washington into a fundamental change in its policy, which is in fact what they accomplished.

In Malaysia, moreover, the Americans have cast doubt upon the almost completed deal, offering the same F-16s with a lower price tag than that of the MiG-29s.

Of course, competition exists precisely for the purpose of ensuring the best terms for the client. However, there are rather influential groups in both Moscow and Washington that would not object strongly if the old flywheel of well-known global confrontation were to once again accelerate—if not to full power, then at least to half of its former rpm. And the possibilities for this are increasing with every day.

1991 Shows Sharp Decline in Arms Exports

93UM0016C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Sep 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "Sharp Reduction in Russian Arms Exports: Official Figures of Military-Technical Cooperation for 1991 Revealed for the First Time"]

[Text] In accordance with an unannounced government decree, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties (MVES) was ordered to publish statistics on Soviet arms exports in 1991 (the Soviet Union had never published such information) in the mass media (in accordance with a resolution of the UN General Assembly). All five permanent members of the UN Security Council also received such information (through official channels).

Total Volumes of Deliveries From the Former USSR in 1991

The total volume of deliveries of the basic types of armament and military equipment was 1.55 billion U.S. dollars (including uncompensated deliveries totaling around 20 million), and it is distributed regionally as follows:

Near East	8%
Middle East	61%
Europe	12%
Africa	1%
Latin America.....	1%
Asia	17%

The total quantity of armament and military equipment on the list determined by the United Nations Conventional Arms Register, without an indication of the country receiving the weapons, is (total units):

Tanks	553
Armored fighting vehicles.....	658
Large-caliber artillery systems	381
Warplanes.....	40
Helicopter gunships.....	1
Surface ships.....	3
Missiles.....	1,783
Air defense systems.....	1

Commentary

The officially published figures obviously require commentary. First of all the figure of \$1.55 billion for the "total volume of deliveries" raises doubt. It is not at all consistent with the total quantity of equipment actually sold, especially if uncompensated deliveries were in fact only 20 million. Just one item—export of 40 airplanes (the USSR supplied MiG-29 fighters to Iran)—should be estimated at not less than \$1 billion (the actual figure is apparently larger). The rest of the deliveries (according to the most conservative estimates) should total an excess of 1 million.

The figure of 20 million annually for uncompensated deliveries also raises doubt. Deliveries of arms and equipment to Najibullah's government in Kabul, which were essentially uncompensated, continued throughout all of 1991. Their volume is estimated by foreign experts at \$300-500 million. That may be an exaggeration, but in any case a figure of 20 million appears not to be serious. (Of course, deliveries to Afghanistan could have been written up "on credit" with a significant discount.)

The compilers of the official data quite deliberately fail to define the geographic boundaries of the "regions," and in particular, they did not explain precisely what the "Middle" East is, and what the "Near" East is, all the more so because a clear, universally recognized division into such geographic regions does not exist. By the way, it may be assumed with sufficient confidence that Iran was the largest recipient of Soviet weapons in 1991.

The "total quantity of armament and military equipment" (in units) is obviously the most interesting, and one would think that this is a dependable part of the published data. By the way, reckoning in units, meters and tonnes has always been the strongest side of Soviet statistics.

But we shouldn't accuse workers of the MVES of intentional distortion of the facts: It has always been extremely difficult to calculate Soviet arms exports in monetary terms (all the more so in dollars), because the question of "prices" has always been extremely confused in Soviet defense economics. Foreign trade statistics in general and arms deliveries in particular have always been expressed (in confidential government references) in the foreign currency equivalent of rubles. However, foreign trade (announced, selling) arms prices, internal Soviet prices, and even the cost of military production were always calculated so arbitrarily that comparing these diverse statistical "rubles" with fully real dollars is a rather difficult thing to do. (According to professionals, a certain completely mythical "total of exports" expressed in dollars was used even in contracts for uncompensated deliveries.)

Moreover, besides the uncompensated deliveries per se, there was also a state system of foreign trade discounts

(rather sizable ones), and it is absolutely incomprehensible as to how to account for them today.

In the 1980s the Soviet Union supplied arms and military equipment abroad averaging 12-13 billion foreign-currency rubles per year (approximately 20 billion in U.S. dollars, if we use the conversion factor of that time, where 1 ruble was worth \$1.60). 1989 was a record year: Deliveries totaled 14.5 billion in foreign-currency rubles (\$23 billion). These figures are astonishing, especially in comparison with the present actual volumes of international financial assistance to the new democratic Russia. However, it should be kept in mind that the foreign-currency ruble is nothing more than an accounting unit: In the record year of 1989, the volume of uncompensated deliveries was 2 billion in foreign-currency rubles (\$3 billion), while deliveries on credit totaled R9 billion (\$14.5 billion), with the larger part of these loans never being repaid.

The structure of "military-technical cooperation" in the 1980s was as follows:

Deliveries	1986-1990	1992, Planned
For cash	33%	78%
On credit	40%	22%
Without compensation and with a discount	7%	-

All of the statistics used in the commentary were obtained from reliable sources in the Russian Federation MVES, and they were corroborated by specialists from other departments of no lesser competency.

A sharp decline in the volume of military-technical cooperation began in 1990 for a number of objective reasons: the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact; United Nations sanctions against the best and richest clients—Iraq and Libya, and so on. However, the total trade level of 1.55 billion in 1991, which signifies a 30-time decrease in the volume of military-technical cooperation in comparison with the average level of the 1980s, is hardly an adequate reflection of the real state of affairs. There are serious grounds for suggesting that the sum of 1.55 billion was arrived at because the rather sizable discounts offered in 1991 were not included in the "total volume of deliveries," and the remainder was converted from foreign-currency rubles into dollars on the basis of the "commercial" exchange rate for the dollar in 1991 (R1 = \$0.60). Such a manipulation does not appear to be entirely correct, inasmuch as practically all deliveries in 1991 were based on long-term intergovernmental agreements, in which prices had been set long before the advent of the "commercial" exchange rate. But the main thing is that this made comparison with previous years altogether difficult.

Meaning that the overall decline in volume of military-technical cooperation in 1991 was not 30-fold, but more likely fourfold or fivefold in comparison with the average level of the past decade. But even this was an extremely serious blow, leading, in addition to a decrease

in oil exports, to bankruptcy of the Bank for Foreign Economic Relations in particular and the USSR in general. After all, if we consider only the "cash" receipts from arms exports (money orders, deliveries of goods, including of oil, during the year after the arms deliveries), then even so, the total amount of receipts in 10 years exceeded \$60 billion. (The actual sum is larger, inasmuch as some of the loans were never repaid.)

Such a sharp decline in the previously flourishing trade, which together with oil exports was able to support a long and relatively innocuous period of "stagnation," could not but lead to serious social and political upheavals. Even today the problem of military-technical cooperation is a cause of serious tension both in the government itself and between the new ("democratic") authorities and the military-industrial complex. This will be discussed in greater detail in a future article.

Trade Minister Reveals Origin of Zenit, Titan Missiles

WS0611133092 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 14 Oct 92 p 4

[Excerpt from article by Victor Shank on an American-Ukrainian industrial exhibition scheduled to take place in Las Vegas 28 November—2 December 1992 "Mriya" Will Land On the U.S. Air Base"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] We have things to trade. First of all, the goods manufactured by the machine-building industry, the military industrial complex, and conversion. In Las Vegas, every third or fourth participant will represent this complex. The minister of the above institution [Ministry of Trade and International Relations], V. Antonov, telling about the conversion, has revealed certain "secrets:" Zenit and Titan type missiles were manufactured in the Ukraine, while the United States is still convinced that they were made in Russia. Americans might also be interested in modern space communication systems developed by Ukrainian scientists because they give away nothing to the best world models, and their cost of production is much lower. [passage omitted]

RSA-Ukrainian Talks on Sale of MIG-29

93UM0095A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Oct 92 p 1

[Unattributed Article: "The RSA is Studying the Possibilities of Purchasing MIG-29 Fighter Aircraft in Ukraine"]

[Text] The RSA [Republic of South Africa] Air Force is conducting negotiations on the possibility of acquiring MIG-29 fighter aircraft in Ukraine, reports WEEKLY MAIL, a Johannesburg weekly. The newspapers associates assert that they have seen secret documents of one of the South African intelligence services from which it follows that the ARMCOR Company, that is involved

with military deals with foreign countries, is studying the issue of purchasing MIG-29 aircraft and complex radar equipment from Kiev.

ARMCOR Public Relations Representative B. Retif refused comment and stated that the company is not releasing details of its deals because the UN embargo on arms shipments to the RSA is still in force. Moreover, the opinion exists in South African information circles that they will hardly succeed in carrying out the MIG-29 purchase due to the drastic reduction of the RSA military budget. It is possible that private companies associated with ARMCOR will be able to acquire the technology to produce the fighter aircraft using resources allocated by the government for scientific research.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Kokoshin on Need for 'National Industrial Policy'

*92UM1510A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
29 Aug 92 p 4*

[Interview with Andrey Kokoshin, Russian Federation first deputy minister of defense and corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, by Andrey Naryshkin, military observer for ITAR-TASS: "The Security of Russia and Its Economic Policy"]

[Text] **Andrey Kokoshin is the Russian Federation first deputy minister of defense and corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is widely known as a specialist in the area of national security, conversion, and the integration of the country into the world economy.**

[Naryshkin] Andrey Afanasyevich [Kokoshin], among the range of problems which you are working on at the Russian Ministry of Defense is the elaboration and implementation of Russia's military-technical policy. I would like to ask you a not very 'convenient' question: where do you see the weak points in the defense sector of Russian industry?

[Kokoshin] In our defense industry and, as a consequence in the Armed Forces of the former USSR, there developed many imbalances which significantly reduced their real combat might, regardless of all the externally impressive quantitative indicators and a good number of outstanding military-technical achievements. For example, in having excellent models of attack weapons, we for many parameters lag in the means of the information support and in command, control and communications systems. The presence of such imbalances in the development of the weapons is the result of the administrative-command system. The analysis run on a whole series of specific situations related to the adopting of decisions important for the development of domestic weapons systems shows that in the past preference was given primarily to impressive "report-intensive" systems. As a result, regardless of the rather major investments and the special programs, our lag increased more

and more, in particular in electronics which at the beginning of the 1960's became critical.

Without our own highly developed microelectronics base, we cannot hope for an overall rise in the nation's industrial and scientific-technical development, or putting Russia's defense capability on a modern level. A rise in microelectronics should become one of the chief elements in a national industrial policy for Russia.

Military-technical policy is a derivative, on the one hand, of the state's military doctrine and the program for the organization development of the Armed Forces, and on the other, operates as a component of general scientific technical and industrial policy.

[Naryshkin] What in your view are the most important components of national industrial policy and its main ideas?

[Kokoshin] It seems to me that this should be a policy for a profound, long-term restructuring not only of industry but also the national economy as a whole, including by creating a modern services sphere. In the immediate future we, as a minimum, must maintain our positions in those areas where they are strong and then focus on those technologies where we still lag behind but which at present determine and will determine industrial might, general national prestige and the influence of society and the state as a whole.

I am convinced that a national industrial policy can become one of the main catalysts for national conciliation and this is being urged for us by both the Russian President and the leadership of the Supreme Soviet. For carrying out an effective national industrial policy, it is essential to have the corresponding attitudes among the broad social masses or, as some of my comrades say, Russian spirit.

[Naryshkin] Does microelectronics mentioned by you relate to the content of national industrial policy?

[Kokoshin] Certainly. The research conducted at our behest and our own capabilities and foreign experience indicate that here we can end up among the world leaders, although this would require a number of years of the most intense efforts and not only technical inventiveness but also commercial. And we must not fear to challenge those who now are far ahead in this sphere. Here the example could be the Japanese who in the 1950's "threw down the gauntlet" to the United States in the area of automobile construction and somewhat later, in electronics where at that time the U.S. was the absolute, indisputable leader.

One of the basic conditions for success in shaping and implementing a national industrial policy I consider to be the providing of support for market-oriented leaders of our emerging industrial corporations. Many of them

have had careers in the defense industry, where traditionally was concentrated first-class personnel of engineers and organizers, where the traditions were strong for fighting for the superior world level of technical achievements.

Precisely such strong leaders can create and are already creating new types of organizations in industry, a sort of diversified industrial corporation with various forms of ownership conforming to the market conditions.

[Naryshkin] At present, as I have learned, you together with the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Industry are working on determining, proceeding from the defense needs, what enterprises can be auctioned off and which are to remain purely state.

[Kokoshin] I should point out that many prominent figures in the defense complex favor the number of state enterprises to be minimal, while defense production should be part of the diversified joint-stock companies.

[Naryshkin] How do you intend to do business with such diversified corporations for whom the main criterion is profit and profitability?

[Kokoshin] The Russian Ministry of Defense is oriented at creating a system of new economic incentives and legal guarantees for a reliable interaction between the client and the suppliers; these would replace the old state orders. This system would take the form of concluding a contract or economic agreement between the Ministry of Defense and its suppliers with the setting of strict, mutual obligations for the parties.

Under the conditions of the arising market relations, the contract should be the main and in the long run the only instrument for managing a defense order. We already have a draft for such a standardized, standard contract and this has still to be worked over in the various state services.

[Naryshkin] At present a significant portion of our defense industry is in a state of conversion and diversification. What additional problems arise in this context?

[Kokoshin] Russia already has a whole series of examples when it has been possible rather quickly to convert defense enterprises to completely different ownership principles. They are confidently increasing the volume of produced civilian products as well as their profitability under the conditions of the general profound economic crisis.

The defense industry is a major burden for our economy and at the same time its enormous reserve (particularly for highly-skilled personnel) and this still has not been effectively used, including as a result of the major shortcomings in the initial plans for conversion.

[Naryshkin] Does the potential of the defense industry give us additional chances to succeed in foreign markets?

[Kokoshin] Our defense industry, when properly focused, is perhaps the main national resource of competitiveness in the area of industrial products (particularly scientific-intensive products) and services.

A number of studies conducted at our request by a series of scientific centers on world markets for high- and medium-level technologies in comparison with the capabilities of industry indicate that many of the conversion defense enterprises have not bad chances for winning a place on these markets, although this will be a significantly more complex matter that was conceived of before by a majority of the leaders of our enterprises.

This applies to a whole series of types of space equipment (primarily to missile construction), to the aviation industry, to a number of areas of shipbuilding, the production of high-quality steels and composite materials, to diverse types of laser equipment, the production of computer software and so forth.

The defense industry has shown not bad results in the production of modern oil-pumping, drilling and other equipment. There are major areas for joint production by Soviet and foreign organization of high quality consumer durables, modern medical equipment and equipment for the food industry and agriculture.

[Naryshkin] Will not the interest be lost in the domestic market which certainly is more important for us?

[Kokoshin] In focusing a significant part of the products from our leading sectors on the overseas market, Russia at the same time in a majority of instances would not find it wise to create strictly export-oriented production, as has been done at one time by the so-called "four dragons" of the Asian countries, but also by Germany, Japan and a number of other countries which have achieved major successes in the economy.

The reason for this is again the presence in Russia and the CIS of an enormous domestic market. But it must not be forgotten that we must fight also for our own domestic market. Generally, it is essential to bear in mind that we cannot get by without serious protectionist measures to defend a number of industrial sectors and agriculture.

[Naryshkin] In addition to purely defense production, a number of sectors has a strategic character. This relates chiefly to energy production. As is known the basis for our export potential is the oil and gas complex. What role do you see for it in the next few years?

[Kokoshin] On the part of the West, the interest in this sector is explained not only by economic considerations. Due to the permanently existing threat of an armed conflict in the Near East, the West is interested in a high level of output and export potential for Russia, both for political and military-political considerations. This circumstance must be given full consideration.

At the same time it must not be felt that this interest will help us negotiate better conditions for the deals. All

serious studies indicate that the significance of these sectors for ensuring our solvency for the foreseeable future will remain crucial. Moreover, it will clearly be hard for us to meet our own domestic needs for raw materials without attracting significant capital and technology from outside. With the correct organizing of things, such a step can substantially increase the extraction of oil from the beds. As is known here we lag substantially behind the international standards.

On the other hand, the hypertrophied development of the fuel and energy complex entails the danger of reinforcing our country as a sort of raw material periphery for the developed world. This is more than unacceptable with the proportional amount of raw material sectors dropping in the world, capital intensiveness is rising while income potential is dropping. In the long-range strategic plan, setting our hopes on these sectors is just as unacceptable for us as the locating of ecological polluting production on Russian territory

[Naryshkin] The task of entering foreign markets is new for our defense industry. Clearly the orientation to resolving domestic problems would presuppose the appropriate organizational structure and would shape definite stereotypes in the approaches to solving the problems. What changes might be required here?

[Kokoshin] The desire to integrate Russia into the world economy and emerge on the markets for superior- and medium-level technologies requires the completely different positing of the question of the optimum sizes of our enterprises and organizations, including the nature of the measures to demonopolize our industry. In order to be competitive on the world markets, we possibly need a different character and different scales of production, its concentration and organization.

[Naryshkin] In the discussion of the prospects for our economic development, much attention has been given to the problems of attracting foreign investments. What are your views on this problem?

[Kokoshin] Under present-day conditions this is becoming an ever-more complicated matter. Regardless of the enormous volumes of our market, its attractiveness for the West has recently begun to decline markedly for many parameters.

In seeking an influx of foreign investments into Russia and in assisting by measures of state control in supporting their profitability, we should at the same time calculate carefully where the foreign exchange injections are most desirable and where unacceptable from the viewpoint of sovereignty and national security.

Advertisement: R423-2A Mobile Radio Relay Station

93UM0120A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 5-6, May-Jun 92 p 77

[Advertisement by Krasnoyarsk "Iskra" PO [Production Association]: "Krasnoyarsk 'Iskra' PO Offers the R423-2A Mobile Tropospheric Radio Relay System"]

[Text] The system supports operation in two communications directions using digital streams of information with rates of up to 240 kbits per second or in one direction at a rate of 480 kbits per second with the organization of up to nine telephone channels.

Technical Specifications

Operating frequency, in Megahertz	4,4325-4,555 and 4,630-4,750
Communications range in the worst month based on meteorological conditions, in kilometers	up to 210
Type of signal separation	frequency (8 frequencies through 2.6 MHz)
Radiating power, in watts	200
Antenna gain coefficient, in db	38
Number of communications directions	2
Type of information transmitted:	
—Digital, at a rate of kbits per second	2.4; 4.8; 9.6; 48; 240; 480
Analog	up to 9 telephone channels
Power supply, in watts	3 X 380
Power consumption, in kilowatts	8
Transportation base	KamAZ-43101

The system is equipped with a 20 kilowatt self-supporting power generator

Our address: "ISKRA" PO [Production Association],
Televizornaya St., Krasnoyarsk, 660028

Telephones: 45-23-26, 45-24-06, Fax: 43-88-75

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State of Armor Industries

92UM1488A Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Sep 92 p 5,
22 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Lepskiy: "Armor"]

[19 Sep 92 p 5]

[Text] Monuments in our unique country were built certainly not to be looked at, let alone be liked. In Soviet times all monuments, as is known, were a means of propaganda and agitation. From the number of metal and stone sculptures put up to a person it was possible to unerringly judge the role and importance of the given personality in the life of the given country and its people.

For example, in terms of the number of monuments to V.I. Lenin, we correctly perceived the ideological bases of our life and felt their permanency. The number of sculptural depictions of Berdyayev, Vernadskiy or Ivan Bunin rightly showed the meager influence of these persons on the daily life of the people.

Incidentally at present there is a monument which in terms of the frequency and range of distribution can rival the sculptural image of V.I. Lenin himself. Do not try to guess the name of this person from stone or metal. It is not a person. It is a tank.

Possibly there is not a single city and maybe even a village where a tank on a pedestal did not stand in splendor. Not the Red Army soldier who carried the entire burden of the war on his shoulders, not the underground partisan, not the Katyusha rocket launchers was to become the ubiquitous symbol of our Victory, our might and our pride. The tank became such a symbol.

Let me say right off that this accurately reflected the role and significance of armor not only in military operations but in all our prewar and postwar life. Precisely the tank inherited the glory of the Budenny cavalry from the times of the Civil War and became the "iron horse" of the Great Patriotic War. Precisely the tank became the visible result of the nation's industrialization and all our Dneprogeses [Dnieper Hydroelectric System], Turksibs [Turkestan Siberian Railroad] and Magnitkas [Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works] worked for it. The T-34 helped determine the outcome of certainly the main battles of the Great Patriotic War. And when the popular young hero sang like a bayan player "Armor is strong and our tanks are fast," we all understood that it was not just a question of tanks...

Even then, before the war, the very word "armor" more and more often was linked with the might of the socialist system and meant a certain invisible but mighty force which was mentioned in a whisper and a pride for which filled the heart of the Soviet patriot. The words easily entered usage. Even now we are not surprised by "theater armor" [reserving of seats; in Russian "bronya" is both armor and reserving] or the "armoring [reserving] of rooms in a hotel, and there are many "armor [reservation] booths"... During the war my father worked at a metallurgical combine. Imagine, this was also termed armor. He was deferred [zabronirovan] from induction to the front as a specialist essential to the military industry. During the postwar years the armor remained unswervingly strong and the tanks fast. During the years of the Cold War every schoolchild knew that the enemy number-one of the Soviet Union was the Americans, we continued intensely to produce tanks as if the tracks could cross the Atlantic in order to raise, in the event of necessity, the Victory flag over the Capitol. Of course we make missiles, submarines and aircraft. But tanks most of all. Why? Well, the tank is an offensive weapon, not a defensive one. "Yes, but you don't knock out an enemy missile from a tank." I asked this question of many of

our military leaders and raised the question in various offices of the Ministry of Defense. In a majority of instances the people shrugged their shoulders, referring to the universality of the armored vehicle, to traditions, and the military plants cranking out tanks. It turns out it was inertia...

Possibly this was the case. However, I proposed that again this was not wrong. The tank was needed. Of course, not for a war with the Americans. I suspect that few of our generals and colonels thought seriously about such a war. (Those who had prepared for such a war seriously would not have allowed foreign aircraft to cross the frontier and land in the heart of the capital.) I feel that the reason lies elsewhere: our fast tanks made good progress over the roads of Eastern Europe. And in this sense they rarely failed the political leadership in Moscow. In 1956, our armor demonstrated its strength in Budapest and in 1968, our tanks were fast on the streets of Prague...

The tanks continued to remain the symbol of the idea which crushed one-sixth of the world. Always, when the imperial power felt a threat, it put into motion its favorite weapon, its own darling child, the tank. This happened finally in August 1991 in Moscow.

But then the putsch was over. America is almost a friend, you can't travel the roads of Eastern Europe in armor and voices are being heard more and more loudly about the conversion of the military industry. And not just voices. There are figures and calculations. Just the storage of one tank by the "mothballing" method costs you and me 1,300 rubles every month in the prices of 1990. At present, this figure would have increased by a 100-fold. Only one-quarter of the entire tank fleet meets the demands of modern combat. Our recent potential enemy, the Americans, over the last three years, have reduced expenditures on tank procurement from \$2,960,000,000 to \$113,000,000. At present tank production in Detroit does not have any state orders... So do we need a tank now? And if not, then why are the nation's tank conveyers continuing to operate? Are the 64,000 armored monsters which we have already produced a small amount?

In order to answer these questions, I went to Omsk, to the Transport Machine Building Plant imeni Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya Production Association. For those who don't still know, this is one of the largest tank plants in the nation.

There were no tickets on free sale to Omsk so I had to purchase one in reserved class.

Sali Aleksandrovich Katyk is the general director of the Omsk Tank Plant. In the director's reception area there was not a single chair and probably it was not pleasant to have a long wait here. Myself, I did not wait a second. At precisely the designated hour the door opened and the boss of the office—a short, compact man with bushy eyebrows—beckoned me in. It seemed to me that nothing had changed in this office since the 1930's. The

old, neat and simple furniture, the desert-like surface of the giant desk. No new-style bagatelles. At times it even seemed to me that out of the heavy ebonite telephone receiver at any moment a voice could be heard with a slight Georgian accent: "Comrade Katyk, report the situation..."

If Sali Aleksandrovich had actually had to "report", things would certainly appear strange. For the first time in all the plant's history, tank production has declined by four-fold. At present Omsk assembles 155 T-80 tanks a year for export and just five under state orders for the Russian Army. It turns out that at one time Katyk reported to the Center on the almost 1,000 assembled "articles" a year. However, the 155 armored vehicles destined for sale for hard currency stand idle as the superior organizations cannot come to terms with the purchaser on the price and the association does not have the right to deal directly with a foreign partner. If you consider that each T-80 tank stuffed with electronics costs approximately 2 million dollars, you can imagine how much the enterprise loses every day.

"The main thing," said Katyk, "is not to let conversion reach the zero mark. That is, a state where the labor collective disintegrates, and the highly skilled workers lose their skills. This is like thawing the engine cooling system when the entire engine must be changed. At present, with the drop in the military orders, we are switching the collective to producing civilian products, we are making washing machines, bottle washing units and valves for pipelines... However this is no salvation. The cost of consumer goods goes higher and higher every day. And hence we do not purchase these goods. The people do not have any money."

"Where lies salvation?" I asked the director.

"In state order," he replied.

"But this would mean that you would again begin to produce 1,000 tanks a year?"

"Yes," replied Katyk, "that's what would happen, but there is no other way out."

Really is there no other way out for the tank plant except to continue to make tanks? What about trying tractors? As was pointed out by the Chairman of the Committee on Conversion Affairs, Mikhail Bazhanov, "the similarity between a tank and a tractor ends with the tracks."

"But certainly we don't need tanks."

"Who told you that?" Katyk replied with a question. "Who knows generally how many weapons we need and what sort? Is it five tanks a year for Russia—how did they arrive at that? Possibly we have an officially approved military doctrine or plan for modernizing the armed forces or a general plan for national security? I know nothing about that. I don't understand why the Russian Army needed five tanks from Omsk and not 25. I cannot figure out why we cannot sell for hard currency

what we already have in an assembled form. The Americans are not afraid to do this. They have an order from Saudi Arabia for 315 tanks. And that is worth \$3,072,000,000. There are even 550 tanks for Egypt. Explain to me why we cannot do the same thing? Our tanks are just as good. Explain why our workers should suffer because of someone's ineptitude or stupidity? We produce world-class products, and for this we received lower wages than at the neighboring civilian enterprises. And this is termed conversion?

It turns out that not so long ago, Katyk sent off a memorandum to the Russian President, where he set out his views on conversion and on how to carry it out. The entire plan of Sali Aleksandrovich rests on three fundamentals. The first is in no instance to grant independence to defense enterprises. This is fatal. The defense industry must not be thrown to the wolves of the market. That would risk losing everything which was built up over the decades. Conversion must be carried out in a centralized manner, from above, in accord with a strict plan. Second, in no instance should we curtail our own military production. No one has given us a guarantee that there will not be another war. For this reason, we should start up weapons production immediately in the eventuality. Third, in any event the tanks must be sold if not for the domestic market then for foreign exchange.

In Katyk's mind there was to be conversion of conversion and the tanks must be made. At the end of our conversation I asked him: "Sali Aleksandrovich, would it not be better and cheaper for the nation to shut down the plant for a year or two, to pay the personnel for two years of leave and during this time convert the lines to other products?" He looked at me as if disappointed. He was thinking, a serious journalist has been sent from Moscow and here we have...

"No," he said, "I believe that the people would have second thoughts. Even now many are beginning to see clearly. So a state order for tanks will be essential. Any other way is impossible, as you understand..."

In 1938, they arrested his father, a brigade leader of loaders at Uralvagonzavod [Urals Railway Car Building Plant] in Nizhniy Tagil. They said that he was a wrecker and enemy of the people. But what could an 8-year-old boy understand here? When they sent off the father by transport, the boy came to accompany him. Enemies of the people were not to be accompanied. The guard hit him with the butt of the rifle. Even now he does not know where his father is buried. Uralvagonzavod became his family and here they began making tanks. He studied there, he worked there and there he became a specialist and later the chief metallurgist. The biographies of the T-34 and Sali Katyk were parallel and similar. For this reason I understood the general director well. However, by that time I also understood something else. Our military industry would never obey economic laws, it was subordinate to the state orders and was completely built on administration. Closely hidden from outside eyes, for decades it was an industrial reserve

supplied first of all with any raw materials, with pre-purchased finished products! The directors of the defense plants were more often than not excellent commanders and soldiers but they were lousy businessmen. And now, when the gates of this reserve have just begun to be opened to the market, each of the directors felt like a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on an ordinary streetcar. To continue to feed our military-industrial complex with state orders on the previous scale would mean to reclose the gates of the reserve tightly, having securely fenced it off from the market and from the normal economy. To deprive it of state orders completely means to disregard the fates of hundreds of thousands of highly skilled workers and engineers. In this Katyk is right.

We said farewell, he went up to his desk, picked up the receiver and ordered that I be allowed to leave. Twice before the exit my documents were checked. I walked through the plant grounds and not without some amazement read attractive slogans and posters about our motherland the USSR and the Soviet people, the builder and creator. Here they have not taken down the slogans, as they have been in no rush to remove the portraits in the offices and the ikonostasis of the Politburo members. The Plant for Transport Machine Building imeni Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya Association has remained secret and hence closed off...

[22 Sep 92 p 2]

[Text] Why do we keep secret what has long been known to any schoolchild in the West? It seems to me that even the greatest boosters of the regime do not believe about the American spies who photographed the T-80 tank through a keyhole. However, the Omsk Tank Plant is closely closed for visits as are Uralvagonzavod in Nizhniy Tagil and the analogous plant in Chelyabinsk, as are scores of entire towns in Russia which are termed "mail boxes." I was told the story of a journalist from a respected Russian newspaper who was not permitted to photograph our missile silo. The reporter with a camera was simply grabbed under the arms and moved farther away from the silo. Do you know how the military leadership later justified their actions? It turned out that at this time an American satellite was engaged in photographing our missile system in order to collect information on the Soviet missiles under the monitoring procedures for carrying out the SALT Treaty. The reporter was removed so that the "American" did not suspect any dirty play.

Comrade Chernov, the deputy director of the Omsk Association for Security also prohibited from photographing. In truth in the assembly shop. Minister Titkin had permitted but Chernov prohibited. And this is the same "secret" T-80 which I have seen any number of times in foreign magazines. "Not permitted!" But possibly it is permitted to them from those magazines...

Then, in the assembly shop of the Omsk Tank Plant I shook my head and softly cried out: "Where is the logic

here, explain to me! Now I understand that there is a logic to the security procedures in our country. And it is in no way a question of the notorious spymania. Those who set the security for our defense plants are perfectly aware that the Western intelligence agencies in one way or another will secure virtually everything they need, and they have not had to make their way through the barbed-wire fences for ages. Probably it is not a question of spies. It is a question of us.

The real budget of the military agencies was carefully concealed from us for many decades, the silent nuclear disaster in the Urals was hidden from us as well as the leaking of the bacteriological contagion in the same region, and only we were kept ignorant of the real size of our Armed Forces. We were not alone in this! The people's deputies and the members of Parliament could not learn the precise figures for our expenditures on defense.

The economist Igor Birman who now lives in America has assumed that the former USSR spent about a quarter of the gross national product on defense. Last year the figures would have been 400 billion rubles. And that is your and my money. When and which of the Soviet generals (incidentally there are more of them in Moscow alone than in the entire U.S. Army) has even asked you and me where they should spend our hard-earned money? In 1989, they produced three-fold more tanks than the Americans. And at the very time that the completely useless armored monsters were left to rust in the rain and snow in our units and formations. I shall not upset you by figures as to how much this money could have purchased in terms of bread, oil, sausages, good footwear and fine children's uniforms, panty hose and dresses.

The dictionary of Vladimir Ivanovich Dal says about armor: "troop armor which in olden times they wore over their clothing." Judging from everything, in time we shall begin to wear our armor not on top but rather instead of normal clothing. Uncontrolled weapons are becoming ruinous for the people. But the military-industrial complex is just as strong as it is out of control. And in order to remain such, it must have the armor of secrecy, and a cap of the strictest state secrecy. So we had reached the heart of the matter. Not much else remained.

Lt Gen (Ret) Oleg Konstantinovich Rogozin who was involved at the Ministry of Defense in long-range planning put it this way to me:

"Even those figures for defense expenditures which you might be able to get your hands on would scarcely be real, since they do not reflect the miracles of the closed defense economy. Judge for yourself: the high-technology SU-27 aircraft for the Ministry of Defense cost 4.5 million rubles. An analogous American aircraft was sold to the Pentagon for 15-17 million dollars, the SU-24 cost us 5 million dollars. Imagine what our military budget would have been if the Ministry of Defense had purchased equipment at real prices.

However, from whence did this cheapness derive? Are our costs that much less than the American? Of course not. Then how did we save? We know where: in the wages of the designers, engineers and workers whose talent, ability and unusual industry and tenacity created this equipment which was just as fine even now as the American, German or the Japanese. The workers and engineers of our defense enterprises received and continue to receive an average of 1,000 (!) fold less than at the U.S. enterprises filling defense orders.

This is what occurred behind the fence of secrecy and why the armor of the state secret was so strong. It carefully concealed from prying eyes the serf-like labor of the workers and the feudal methods of managing the economy. Surprisingly this occurred with actually high technologies, fine equipment and bold ideas. Incidentally, on the bold ideas. When the fathers of developed socialism demanded weapons which surpassed the Western models, they were concerned that our scientists and designers existed in a normal atmosphere devoid of the fumes of ideological dogmas. They realized that, certainly, human creative thought was incompatible with communist prescripts. For this reason the fences of the military-industrial complex at times protected people from the stifling party ideology. Alas, there were not many of them. But precisely due to this, those few maintained a sobriety of criteria, sensible views and clarity of judgement. Sakharov, for example, or Korolev.

Behind the armor of secrecy of the military-industrial complex the Koshcheyev soul of the totalitarian system is securely protected, the idea of an imperial state, strong with missiles and tanks and certainly not rich citizens. The idea of the master state and the serf-citizen. For now this idea is protected by the security fence of the plants, that is, not to see any market, whatever decisions the government took or whatever the laws approved by Parliament. We must find a way to the "eggs in the carton."

How can this be done? First and foremost, I feel, remove the departmental fences of secrecy as there is nothing to conceal from our people when the peoples of the Atlantic bloc have known of this. It is essential that the problems of defense be openly discussed by a civil society.

Here is an example for you. In Moscow they have established the independent civilian organization, the International Conversion Fund. In one of the buildings on Novyy Arbat we met with its vice president, Valeriy Nikolayev.

"The state conversion program," Nikolayev began our conversation, "has no bearing on conversion."

"?..."

"Don't be surprised but that is the case. In accord with this program, the representatives of the military-industrial complex (as is the custom in our country), having received orders to cut back, state: give us 40 billion rubles for creating additional capacity to produce

civilian products and at the same time give us another 32 billion rubles in order to support the scientific-technical developments for consumer goods. As a result, the military industrial complex is demanding 72 billion rubles supposedly for conversion, but in fact for creating new capacity, without having altered the old in any way. And what do they promise us as a result? By 1995 they promise to produce for us some 74 billion rubles of civilian-end products in cost terms. What does this figure mean? What it means is that if some pot plant would sell a billion pots for this amount, the enterprise of the military-industrial complex would provide significantly less since a pot manufactured on high-technology equipment would be incomparably more expensive."

"What you are saying is that the state conversion program in fact does not provide any conversion, but, on the contrary, endeavors to maintain the status quo by every possible means."

"Exactly"

What does your fund offer in this sense?"

"We understand conversion as the complete integration of the defense industry into a normal civilian economy. It is no secret that up to now the cannons, shells and missiles were made in totally closed, like boxes, plants combined into an absolutely closed system representing a completely separate one from the civilian economy. Thus, we actually have two economies in one country. This is our "patented" invention, and this is not found anywhere else in the world. In the U.S., for example, the military orders are filled by completely civilian enterprises, or more precisely, almost every enterprise in America is ready to accept a military order from the state, because each enterprise is technologically advanced, since a high-quality pot for American housewives is considered a question that is just as important as high quality missiles."

I was talking with Nikolayev, but I myself was wondering how it was possible to mix together in a single economic pot the high-tech lines for assembling the parts and systems of modern aircraft, missiles, tanks, high-precision firearms and the technology for producing Ural footwear or, let us assume, Khabarovsk furniture. What will happen when we open the gates separating the high-tech lake from the sea of primitive production? All the same, water must be added to thick sour cream...

But when I shared my doubts with the Russian Minister of Industry, Aleksandr Titkin, he merely nodded.

"There is not enough water to thin that sour cream. The defense industry in our country is 80 percent of all industry. Even now!

So that is how things are. It turns out that our economy has become so militarized that it is fitting to speak not only about the secret defense plants, but also an entire society, a type of state built on a foundation of tanks, missiles and machine guns and erected not on the earth

but on armor. Possibly, conversion of the defense industry is in essence the converting of one type of society into another, this is a change in the system.

That is why the system resists as it is protected from changes by the armor sheets of secrecy...

I asked Minister Titkin if it was possible all the same to make our economy, and hence our society, civilian.

"We are doing that," he replied briefly and gave several examples. "But to speak about fundamental things, the formula is universal, that is, the incorporation of the defense industry in the market system and privatization.

"Privatization? You would allow private owners of defense industries in our country?"

"Of course," Titkin replied, "they exist throughout the world and so they will in our country..."

We shall see. But reality, alas, forces us to both think and speak about something else. At the start of the year, the government reduced defense orders. The taxpayers breathed a sigh of relief. According to the estimates of Vasilii Selyunin, one of our best economists, the government allocated 6.5 billion rubles to pay for military orders in the first quarter of the current year. But what happened was that the military-industrial complex pretended that it "did not notice" the reduction in purchases and made 20 billion rubles of weapons. Don't be difficult, mister reformers, buy. Quite recently it was announced over the radio that the government had increased the military state orders for next year. Does this mean that the reformers have retreated?..

The armor as before is strong.

Partners Sought for Aerospace Conversion

*PM2710162592 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 24 Oct 92 p 3*

[Article by Russian Vice Premier Georgiy Khizha: "Conversion Should Be Civilized"]

[Text] In starting to convert our national defense complex—like other countries, incidentally—we have been encountering many problems. As is well known, we need to invest 1.3 rubles [R] to maintain and convert defense enterprises for every ruble spent on purchases of weapons and military hardware. That is why the conversion program is now being clarified, and I hope that it will be more civilized than the wholesale program we have today.

Of course, a particular role in conversion has been given to the aerospace complex. In the very near future the elaboration of national policy in the conversion sphere should be completed. This will define Russian industry's place and role in world cooperation. Assessing our achievements in various spheres of science and technology, we are striving to construct our national policy in such a way as to occupy a fitting place in the world

market. Developing all high-tech avenues of industry, we must promote the development of the domestic economy.

In 1991 300,000 people were laid off from the defense complex. In 1992 this figure will probably reach 1.5 million. The amount of military output produced in 1992 fell approximately fourfold compared with 1988.

Around 1,300 defense complex enterprise are participating in conversion programs. The depth of conversion at these enterprises is not identical, though. For instance, in missile construction it varies between 26 and 84 percent, and in research and development organizations in this area the range is 15-75 percent.

The main principle governing the work of enterprises undergoing conversion is to use the defense-complex high technology to produce output capable of competing successfully on foreign markets. Six priority avenues for the development of civilian output and consumer goods have been identified. These take account of the resolution of the most important socioeconomic tasks of developing the country's economy—namely, transport and communications, agriculture and the consumer sector, the fuel and energy complex and energy conservation, the chemical and timber complex, and medicine and ecology.

As I have said, we are giving a particular place to the conversion of the aerospace industry, which has always enjoyed the government's attention. Huge funds and intellectual potential have been invested in it, and therefore our task is to make use of all these achievements for peaceful purposes. And not just in our own country, but in the interests of all mankind.

Conversion in the aviation industry is aimed above all at the creation and production of modern passenger and transport aircraft, amphibious aircraft, wing-in-ground-effect craft, light aircraft, and machines with no counterparts worldwide. The aviation industry is capable of expanding Russia's export potential through the series production of the Il-96-300, the Il-114, the Tu-204, the Tu-334, the An-74, the An-38, the Yak-42M, and Mi-38 helicopters. Our aviation design bureaus and enterprises are cooperating with many foreign aviation firms to share production of aviation equipment.

General-purpose capacity that is undergoing conversion at missile and space firms is mainly being reoriented to the production of consumer goods, medical equipment, communications apparatus, and equipment for processing agricultural produce.

At the same time, it is this sector which has a unique scientific and technical potential based on large creative collectives with the most modern research and experimental base and powerful specialized production. Russia has a wide range of launchers capable of placing payloads of up to 100 tonnes in orbit. There is experience in developing long-term space stations and in carrying out

long manned missions. All this could be aimed at the study and exploration of space in the interests of the world community.

Russian scientists are proposing that further work be done on the ICBM's due to be destroyed under the Russo-U.S. START Treaty, and that they be used for commercial spacecraft launches. This would make it possible to develop satellite-based communications and television systems, to obtain particularly pure materials in space, and to resolve other tasks using space technology.

Unfortunately, it is currently impossible for foreign firms to commission these missiles for use in commercial space launches owing to the restrictions brought in at the height of the Cold War under the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] lists on shipments of advanced Western technology to Russia. But our Western partners should realize that any further attempts to limit the penetration of missile and space technology into the international market will not bring them prosperity and will merely impede the development of conversion in Russia.

The development of a worldwide space system for surveying the earth's surface for national economic purposes is highly promising. The first radical step on the road to real conversion will be the adoption of parity measures which ensure the gradual removal of national barriers in the way of access to information from space-based military equipment. Back in August 1992 the Russian Government adopted a resolution allowing it to use for civilian purposes images obtained from military satellites with a line resolution of up to two meters.

One of the most important and humane spheres of the conversion of the aerospace complex is activity aimed at preserving the environment and conditions for human life.

There are now thousands of artificial satellites in orbit around the world. There is an urgent need to examine the question of combating space pollution.

As is well known, cooperation between Russia and European states in the sphere of space research and exploration is expanding. This year there has been a joint Russo-French manned flight on the "Mir" station. Talks on cooperation are being conducted with many countries, and a number of agreements have been signed. Together with the United States we are thinking about joint space programs—specifically, the use of our launch vehicles for international launches.

At a session of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in New York in 1990 our delegation proposed setting up an international space-based environmental monitoring laboratory based on the "Almaz"

station. The UN Committee instructed states to study the question of participating in this program. Meanwhile the second "Almaz" station was already at the final stage of its manufacture, and the program could no longer be reorganized to take account of other states' interests. The station has been working successfully in orbit since March 1991, transmitting information for geologists, oceanologists, geophysicists, cartographers, ecologists, and agricultural and forestry specialists.

The UN recommendations could be implemented on the basis of a third "Almaz" station, by equipping it with apparatus to obtain information in the interest of studying the ecological situation and exploring mineral, raw material, oil, and gas regions, supporting agriculture and the enhancement of soil fertility, providing warnings about accidents and natural disasters, and researching different countries' raw material potential.

The building of the station has already begun. Up to four tonnes of different equipment will be carried on board in a sealed capsule with its own specific microclimate. The station could be launched in 1994-1995. The third "Almaz" will cost around R1 billion to manufacture. The Russian side is interested in international investment in this project and others.

An important problem for us is to develop systems for the permanent automated exchange of information with foreign partners interested in organizing cooperation with Russia in aerospace technology. We have created the basis for the development of such a system. Efforts are now being made to unite a number of Russian data bases into a unified structure that will be compatible through satellite communications with international information channels.

The successful implementation of this project would make it possible to organize an exchange of information on dual-use aerospace technologies and to ensure—under UN control—access to them by third countries which lack these technologies. On the one hand, this would strengthen the United Nations' peacekeeping mission while, on the other, making it harder for military space missile technology to spread uncontrolled among developing countries in the guise of civilian projects.

Russia supports the proposal from the UN Secretariat's Department of Economic and Social Development to set up an international aerospace complex conversion center which would pool the efforts of countries interested in the peaceful use of space within the framework of specific conversion programs. Given the development level of aerospace technologies and the depth of the conversion processes that have been begun in the Russian defense complex, we are proposing that Moscow be chosen as the site for the headquarters of this international center.

**Tula Machine-Building Advertises 30-MM Guns:
AK-306, AO-18L**

93UM0019A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in English
6 Oct 92 p 4

[Text] 30-mm light-duty automatic gun mount is remotely controlled from the optical sighting device (OPU-1) or from the ring sight. It is intended for arming the ships with main mission of:

- annihilation of the antishipping missiles, aircrafts, helicopters, and other enemy air attack means;
- destruction of the small-size seaborne surface targets and firing of buoyant mines;
- annihilation of open manpower and fire emplacements of the enemy on the coast.

Specifications:

Armament	30-mm six-barrel automatic gun AO-18L
Rate of fire	800 to 1,000 shots per minute
Range of fire	4,000 to 5,000 m
Ammunition allowance	500 pcs
Feeding of automatic gun with cartridges	continuous, belt
Maximum angles of traverse deflection	+ over - 180°
Maximum angles of elevation:	
angle of elevation	+85°
angle of depression	-12°
Mass of gun mount (less ammunition and SPTA set)	not over 1,100 kg
Mass of full ammunition allowance (500 cartridges) filled in belt	480 kg
Service life of gun mount regarding to preventive replacement of parts	18,000 shots

30-mm six-barrel anti-aircraft automatic gun intended for arming ship automatic gun mount AK-306.

The automatic gun design employs a circuit of multibarrel weapons with a revolving cluster. The automatic gun operates from a.s. electric drive. Fire is remotely controlled.

Basic Data:

Calibre	30 mm
Rate of fire	750 to 1,000 shots per minute
Muzzle velocity of projectile	900 +10 over -20 m/sec
Mass of automatic gun (less electric drive)	185 kg
Mass of electric drive	85 kg
Recoil force	70 kN
Overall dimensions of automatic gun:	
length	2,166 mm
width	270 mm
height	305 mm
Overall dimensions of electric drive:	
length	553 mm
width	180 mm
height	285 mm
Power of electric drive motor	3.6 kW
Specified life	18,000 shots
Ammunition allowance	500 cartridges
Feeding of automatic gun with cartridges	LH., belt
Type of cartridges	high-explosive-incendiary shell; armour-piercing-incendiary-tracer shell
Charge ignition method	electric
Mass of cartridge	0.88 kg
Supply voltage of automatic gun	27 V DC
Supply voltage of electric drive	380 V AC, 50 Hz
Operating conditons	from +50 C to -40 C

Advertisements for 30-mm Guns: AK-630, AK-630M, AQ-18

93UM0019B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in English
7 Oct 92 p 4

[Text] 30-mm automatic gun mount is remotely controlled from the radar fire control system and from the ring sight (secondary control station). It is intended for arming the ship with the following mission: annihilation of the anti-shiping missile, aircrafts, helicopters and other enemy air attack means; destruction of the small-size seaborne surface targets and firing of buoyant mines; annihilation of open manpower and fire emplacement of the enemy on the coast.

Specifications:

Armament	30-mm six-barrel anti-aircraft automatic gun AO-18
Rate of fire	4,000 to 5,000 shots per minute
Range of fire	4,000 to 5,000 m
Ammunition allowance (located in magazine)	2,000 cartridges
Ammunition allowance (stowed in feed bin)	1,000 cartridges
Feeding of automatic gun with cartridges	continuous, belt
Maximum angles of traverse deflection	+ over - 180° -5
Maximum angles of elevation:	
angle of elevation	58 +2 over -1 -12 + over - 2
Mass of gun mount (less ammunition and units located outside gun mount)	not over 1,000 kg
Mass of units (located outside gun mount)	800 kg
Mass of full ammunition allowance filled in belt	1,918 kg
Cooling of barrel cluster	fluid, independent
Working pressure of operation of automatic gun and pneumatic belt-feed booster	70 - 10 ⁵ Pa
Power	380 V, 50 Hz or 220 V, 400 Hz

30-mm six-barrel anti-aircraft automatic gun is intended for arming ship automatic gun mount AK-630M. The automatic gun design employs a circuit of multibarrel weapons with a revolving cluster. Operation of the automatic mechanisms is based on principle of using the

energy of the powder gases evacuated from the barrels. Fire is remotely controlled.

Basic Data:

Calibre	30 mm
Rate of fire	4,500 to 5,000 shots per minute
Muzzle velocity of projectile	890 +10 over -10 [figures unclear] m/sec
Mass of automatic gun	205 kg
Recoil force	
Overall dimensions:	
length	2,176 mm
width	295 mm
height	336 mm
Specified life	8,000 shots
Ammunition allowance	2,000 cartridges
Type of cartridges	high-explosive-incendiary shell; armour-piercing-incendiary-tracer shell
Charge ignition method	electric
Feeding with cartridges	L.H., belt
Mass of cartridge	0.83 kg
Supply voltage	27 V DC
Pressure of compressed air supplied to pneumatic starter of automatic gun	70 +4 over -5 kgf sg.cm
Operating conditions	from +50 ⁴ C to -40 ⁴ C

Defense Industry Official on Conversion Problems

934P0008A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Oct 92 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Potapov on Interview with Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Konkov, general director, "Kontekh" Corporation; place and date not given: "The Convulsions of Conversion"]

[Text] The "defense people" read PRAVDA and react to items published therein. Reactions to the article by Major General (Ret.) V. Surikov entitled "Disarm, but Intelligently," published in PRAVDA on 21 July 1992 in the International Section started alarm bells ringing from Kaliningrad to Moscow Oblast. Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Konkov, general director of the "Kontekh" Corporation, has approached the problem of disarmament from the viewpoint of the Russian defense complex's participation and the fate of our gifted fellow-countrymen employed in it.

No matter how much garbage has been dumped on our country's defense complex recently, and no matter what kind of monster it has been depicted as, it is high time that we admitted the following facts to ourselves: Every human being has some latent or hidden talent, some unique originality that should be respected by Russia in the present-day, exceedingly pragmatic world; it must be saved or at least coped with. And it is also high time that our leaders wiped those smiles off their faces. After some meetings with our "defense people," this gloomy feeling of mine found some genuine outlines. Russia has possessed and to this day still possesses certain things commensurate only with its intellectual potential, as evolved under the harsh and unique conditions of "defense," things which—yes!—pursued military goals. Nevertheless, such things are part of its flesh and blood. To destroy them now would mean losing Russia for us.

No one in the world is waiting until the time of shocks is finished for us. Roles have already been distributed long ago to everybody in the world economy. We must find out and then explain just what role is being assigned to Russia now and whether we agree with it. And to do this, we must act before it is too late.

The future of our country's "defense people" is connected nowadays with the process which has acquired the name "conversion." This foreign word has quickly gone into circulation here. For the mass of people it signifies: We'll change missiles into saucepans, and then we will begin to live well! By now, to be sure, we have seen that the beautiful words spoken or written by the politicians are not worth as much as the—perhaps dry but vitally important—words of practical people. Conversion was proclaimed by persons who had no precise goals, directions, or mechanisms by which to implement it. But conversion turned out to be not something presented as a gift; it requires funds, programs, and a state-type of approach. People soon became convinced that even the best defense enterprises—which were not equipped to manufacture mass-produced, consumer goods—could not possibly make high-quality and inexpensive products, all the more so in that they were deliberately obsolete.

I admit that I asked the director of "Kontekh" the following question: Can we seriously say now that conversion is taking place in our country? He explained that there is a special law, dated 20 March of the current year. But what is hidden between the lines? What needs to be taken into account?

Our defense-industrial structure is fundamentally different than those abroad. Over there, for example, there are virtually no firms which operate solely for "defense." But in our country there is a narrow specialization due to the hypertrophied growth of "defense" in the past. A second characteristic of ours is a rigorous targeting on the result at any price. And the heavy, defense shield of our fatherland has been forged by thousands of NII's [scientific research institutes], KB's [design bureaus],

experimental, research laboratories and groups, all connected with the institutes under the Academy of Sciences and the system of higher schools.

—Believe me—I was told by my fellow-conversationalist [Konkov]—we built up our ties with scientists in this country not based on their titles at all, but instead strictly on their practical value. Our system attracted people by its scope, its high requirements, and the opportunity to fulfill oneself. And they worked in harmony, finding their own paths and solving what would seem to be unsolvable problems.

Of course, there were also plenty of "buts"—subjectivism in the evaluations of work and frequently in the very tasks assigned. But then, of course, the products, especially nuclear missiles, could not be tested under real-life conditions. And thank God for that! There were failures connected to the projects assigned and with their being shut down. Moreover, even nowadays it cannot be said whether certain decisions were right or wrong. **Such dependence inevitably led to the directors and project managers being too amenable to any orders which came down from above, and this isolated these supervisors from the actual performers.** Those on high solved their own problems, the creative people did well by any standards, and the technicians used to work furiously. Even now, when the upper echelons call for conversion, the reaction at the lower levels is ambiguous. We are still faced with the task of achieving trust and confidence in the policy of conversion.

Indeed, the goal used to be clear, faith was alive, and specific programs were in operation. What about now? How is conversion being carried out? Within the old structures—harmfully and unrealistically. We need to build new structures—but there is neither enough time nor resources. Hopes have been placed on help from the West. But that is naive. No one over there is going to create strong competitors for themselves. For help in saucepan production it is simpler to seek partners in a sphere other than "defense." Perhaps they could help us to dismantle our warheads and reoutfit our assembly-lines. But the elite portion of our unique potential, its "brain," here too remains fundamentally without anything to do. Of course, everything will find its proper place after some time. There is no state without a defensive capability, nor will there be one in the foreseeable future. It is not by chance that a military bloc—the Western European Alliance—is being revived in Western Europe. The Americans cherish their own military-industrial complex, and the Japanese are concerned for their own.... What can be done so that this portion of the Russian intellect may not be wasted or even ruined? Because, of course, the irreversible process has already begun.

There are persons who are ready, willing, and able to work, but so far there is no mobile structure capable of responding flexibly enough to the tasks assigned by the state and the society, capable of activating the extremely

complex mechanism for creating up-to-date technologies. Although a number of our developments are as good as western technologies even in the new sectors. A developer must find an opportunity to provide his potential buyer with models of his equipment. Therefore, we need to have targeted investments for specific programs. **But our present-day policy of conversion at best provides only for squeezing through "wage holes" at budgetary enterprises. The programs are supported neither by investments nor by acceptable credits.** But only programs can provide the intellectual forces of the "defense establishment" with the necessarily high and exacting requirements of the tasks assigned and their social significance.

Herd-type animals do not survive in isolation. Our defense complex belongs precisely to such types of creatures. And its "brain" does not want to be atrophied. At the end of last year a number of organizations which had worked together for a long time in the missile-and-space industry decided to create a corporation—to be named "Kontekh"—based on the words "conversion technology." This was a strictly voluntary business, with its initiative drawn from below. In May the corporation began to live officially, and we've been here since then—V.K. Konkov said with a wry smile.

We need state support—guarantees on investments, representation in a joint-stock form, and support on tax policy. Because, after all, the efforts of yesterday's "defense people" and the present-day "conversionists" are directed at resource-conservation technologies, environmental-protection measures, aimed at attaining the leading edge of technology. Is this really not in the interest of the state? We need support from the ministries of industry, science, and education.... Unfortunately, the papers and documents sent there—my fellow-conversationalist complained—have remained unopened. Of course, they have many problems. But the requests of our "defense people" are modest—just examine their proposals, prepared in an initiatory manner, free of charge. Analyze them, and decide whether they are worth supporting.

The approach taken by our country's intellectuals to conversion is a uniquely original, Russian one. They propose to direct their efforts at solving specific Russian problems—moreover, the most important ones. In the first place, the food problem, our daily bread. We purchase 20-25 million tonnes of grain. But we lose just as much due to the lack of drying facilities and fuel. What if we were to attempt to preserve moist grain? To preserve it hermetically in a nitrogen unit and dry it gradually? There is such a program being worked on at "Kontekh." Nitrogen technology opens up enormous possibilities—whole supplies delivered without drying, spillage, preservation of the products.... That is something which we need and which we can do ourselves. Vyacheslav Nikolayevich told me about many such programs, capable of changing the face of the agroindustrial, logging, and mining complexes, as well as restoring health to the environment of entire regions of our

country. They also have good future prospects for international cooperation. Among these are the space isolation of radioactive wastes from the biosphere, searching for hundreds of thousands of tonnes of German chemical weapons which were dumped into the Baltic Sea by the Allies after World War II, raising them and neutralizing them, as well as the use of destroyed missile silos and the missiles themselves for everyday purposes.

The Russian intellect is still alive. But these days—as never before—it needs help and state aid. Because, you know, intellect dies away when it stops working.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Tkachev Argues for Radical Reduction of Professional Force

93UM0084A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Major Viktor Tkachev under rubric "The Army": "Nuclear Warheads Are the Final Argument of Savages"]

[Text]

On War and Politics

Before preparing troops for something, it is useful to clarify what they need not be prepared for.

Controversy over new military doctrine and its need for the USSR/Russia which began back under "new thinking" has lasted for several years now. With all the diversity of opinions, it is nevertheless possible to single out two different approaches to the very subject of the dispute without yet touching on its content. They can be conditionally designated the "generals'" approach and the "academic" approach accordingly.

In raising the question of military doctrine, generals and officers usually demand "making things clear." This has its logic, which is no stranger to the author. "Military" logic examines transformations in the state and armed forces ideally as reasonable, planned organizational development carried out by a firm reformer's hand. If that is so, work must be preceded by a plan, and the plan must be preceded by clearly formulated goals and a concept of future actions. Hence the demand of military doctrine as a primary guidance document where the goals and concept of armed forces organizational development are set forth. The document must be intelligible, designed for the long term and, finally, approved at the very highest of all possible levels.

Supporters of the "academic" approach—politicians, academicians and analysts unaccustomed to marching in formation—are more familiar with the technology of political decisionmaking. Evidently this is enough to build no illusions regarding the possibility of building anything at all at the national level. The logic of the "academic" approach to the state and its institutions is

more removed, as to a complex, evolving system with its own incompletely understood laws. With that approach it is impossible to build anyone or anything. It remains only "to answer to the conclusions of time" and try to influence processes occurring either "painfully" or "overwhelmingly." Professing the principle of uncertainty in politics, supporters of the "academic" approach fundamentally refuse to formulate a military or any other doctrine, believing it to be quite enough to have foreign-policy and military concepts as working hypotheses in attempts to obtain practically significant results "empirically."

Naturally the author did not write about the two approaches in order to categorically adopt one and reject the other.

I assume it possible to find a stable, reliable foundation for a future edifice called the "national Armed Forces," but first it is necessary to clarify generally where it should be sought.

First of all, we will take as a starting premise the thesis of von Clausewitz that war is a continuation of politics.

We will note here that war can assume a total, entirely unrestricted nature only when victory in it is the immediate goal of survival of a nation and state. Only a totalitarian type of state can wage total war "to win." With the end of the cold war it can be asserted that the epoch of total wars and wars for destruction of a state have been left in the past.

Today one can talk only about a limited conflict, which can last only as long as there is a chance to extract a political dividend from military successes that exceeds political costs of the conflict. From an organizational standpoint, this is one campaign. In our opinion, it is one operation—the first and the last. By virtue of uniqueness—not a "front" and not an "army" operation—it is local and of a varying scale.

Secondly, one can agree that it is stupid to seek political combinations with "interesting military proposals" for Russia today outside the CIS.

And thirdly, the fact that war stems from politics still does not mean that an army is obligated to "result" from probable enemies.

But today in uttering the word "army" one should clearly distinguish the army as an object of military organizational development from an army deployed for combat operations. By the way, the "object of organizational development" is a subject of concern of the Ministry of Defense, and an "object" in a theater of war is the concern of the General Staff.

Thus the General Staff is a "military continuation" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Difficulties" due to an absence of enemies are its difficulties.

On Combat Readiness

Well, what questions can there be here? The army is needed in case of war; consequently, in peacetime it should prepare appropriately to repel possible aggression. The popular opinion on this score is that no matter how stable the peace may be, the army (assume it is compact and professional) must always have one and the same date on calendars—"21 June 1941." Only in this case "can the beloved city sleep calmly" and peace will remain stable.

Beautiful and dialectical. Another statement seems to me to be more correct: "Combat readiness today is the military catastrophe of tomorrow." In order to act "tomorrow at dawn," you must study your enemy. Without an opposing side all your constructions regarding an army ready for battle come tumbling down. It can be constructed only by the method of proceeding "from an enemy." The stereotype of "constant combat readiness" arose as a result of the lengthy confrontation of states and armies under cold war conditions. But the problem is deeper. Confrontation was both the method of the army's existence and a type of armed forces development.

As a method of existence, confrontation requires deployed, battle-ready divisions, already rehearsed operation plans in variants of "playing White" and "playing Black," and the presence of unit and operational supplies.

As a type of development, confrontation is a cycle of reproduction where an armed forces grouping, again deployed and ready for battle, acts as the "end product." In the final account, all processes of "strengthening defense might" are wrapped up in it, beginning with development of specifications and performance characteristics for advanced arms and ending with changes in the table of organization structure of permanent-readiness divisions.

Under confrontation conditions the General Staff naturally holds key positions as the final interested authority on all military problems. In the final account politicians come to it with the question "What army do we need?" specifically because the question "Why is it needed?" is too obvious.

It is obvious that the more detailed you are in preparing for a certain measure, the more moral and material losses you suffer should it not take place. Time and efforts were wasted. Additional efforts are required to eliminate the consequences of previous efforts which proved to be in vain. There are illustrations at every step as applied to the army. In chess, forced fussing about is called "loss of tempo." Under conditions of the scientific-technical revolution "loss of tempo" leads directly to possible military defeat in the future.

Therefore even from a purely military, professional standpoint, before beginning to prepare troops for anything whatsoever as of today, it is enormously more

beneficial to clarify what is unnecessary and even harmful to prepare for due to the danger of "loss of tempo" in the future.

On Military Organizational Development

If no one threatens us on our borders, then it does not make sense to cover them with troops in peacetime. Even the air defense system is not needed for the entire territory as an independent branch of armed forces—National Air Defense.

Installations of the armed forces themselves have been and will be invariable targets for the enemy. The geography of their disposition determines the "military" territory of the state, figuratively speaking. This is what must be sensibly organized and reliably covered by air defense weapons.

This is the first and foremost argument for a "curtailed" existence of the army.

The second argument concerns professionalism. Like any functional system, a professional army constantly must be an "operating army." The "operating army" must be constantly "deployed" somewhere and "fighting" with someone. And the permanent "enemy" for one of its halves can only be its other half. Of course, large-scale maneuvers are a very wasteful thing, but their high price stems largely from the need for major troop movements and damage to territory put to use for maneuvers, i.e., from "overhead expenditures." Therefore for purposes of economy it is also sensible to assemble an army around territories especially allocated for this—"theaters of war"; a few of them, but on the other hand sufficiently large in area.

Thus an army in a curtailed form is several rather large groupings of ground forces, aviation and air defense "deployed" against each other in armed forces training centers and rehearsing there the very latest version of the most probable scenario of their combat employment.

If you correctly assume that "smoldering" conflicts on CIS territory carry the greatest danger for Russia, then you should be concerned with seeing that the Russian Armed Forces can fight irregular units with greatest effectiveness. This means you should place special-purpose troops and their tactics in the center of the future system and around it "wind" support, including denial operations by combined-arms units and "pin-point" strikes by artillery and aviation.

Finally, a genuinely independent defense policy presumes elimination of any possibilities for military blackmail from any side. Strategic nuclear forces presently play a deterrent role, but today who will agree that brandishing a nuclear bomb is a good method of "flexible response"? Nuclear warheads essentially are gradually turning into a useless fetish of national security. It is not precluded that soon it will be fully reasonable to write on them: "Final argument of savages." A gamble on nuclear weapons is becoming a sign of military

weakness to an ever greater degree. It cannot secure a country against political humiliations.

No matter where it might be located, any "functionally complete" contingent of Russian Armed forces should possess sufficient deterrent capability.

And lastly, about the theoretical foundation of military organizational development. What has been said lays no claim to describing military doctrine. In the author's opinion, what has been said permits concluding that military doctrine should not be a "declaration of intentions" of the supreme political leadership in the military area. Military doctrine "simply" should contain the most common, deep-seated provisions of military science as a science of armed conflicts and their evolution. Any serious science has a paradigm. The paradigm of the science of evolution of armed conflicts is military doctrine.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Desert Storm Revisited, or Lessons from the Persian Gulf War

93UM0007A Moscow VESTNIK
PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian
No 7-8, 92 (signed to press 7 Jul 92) pp 36-38

[Article by Major-General I. Losev and Lieutenant-Colonel A. Yakovlevich: "Desert Storm Revisited, or Lessons from the Persian Gulf War"]

[Text] The past war in the Persian Gulf forces us to evaluate the importance of an antiballistic-missile [ABM] defense differently. The special urgency of the ABM problem in the theater of military operations is explained by the fact that dozens of countries already have ballistic missiles or have the technical capabilities to produce them.

Surface-to-surface missiles with a launch range of several dozen to several hundred kilometers have been used repeatedly during local wars and conflicts. Thus, during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Iran made 120 Scud launches, 330 Ogab launches, and five Iran-130 launches. In response, Iraq launched 67 Frog-7 missiles and 361 Scud, El Hussein, and El Abbas operational-tactical missiles.

Ballistic weapons were also used by Egypt, Syria, Libya, South Yemen, and certain other countries. In so doing, no attempts even were noted to organize an ABM defense. Only during Operation Desert Storm did the Americans take the first steps to organize an ABM defense.

As the experience of the Persian Gulf War showed, during the course of repelling Scud missile attacks, the need arose to take additional measures for timely warning of active ABM assets about the threat of an attack. The multinational forces [MNF] used two DSP

satellites, which after the launch of each missile provided information within 120 seconds according to the flare of the operating engine.

The greatest effectiveness of an ABM defense, foreign experts believe, can be achieved by performing a set of measures which include organizing reliable reconnaissance and missile attack warning; timely detection and destruction of flying missiles; and close coordination between ABM defense forces and assets, strike aviation, and missile subunits.

An ABM defense provides for, first of all, destruction of missile systems directly in position areas and, secondly, detection and destruction of missiles in the terminal flight leg.

Missile systems can be combated in position areas by strike aviation and missile units in coordination with the reconnaissance and warning system. However, detection and delivery of strikes against mobile launchers is a quite complicated task. For example, whereas a command post of Iraqi missile forces was destroyed already on 24 January 1991, specially equipped Tornado GR.14 aircraft of Great Britain's Royal Air Force were being used to combat mobile Scud launchers.

RF-4C Phantom aircraft with cameras, an IR linear scanning system, and side-looking radar, F-14, high-altitude TR-1, and RF-5E aircraft were used to conduct aerial reconnaissance of the Scud position areas.

Despite the fact that Iraqi launchers changed positions and launched primarily at night, MNF aviation managed to destroy, as some sources report, 25-30 of them.

To increase the effectiveness of combating Scuds, the MNF used the E-8A JSTARS reconnaissance system,

which provided reconnaissance information to ground missile systems, artillery, and also F-15E aircraft (see diagram).

American experts are carefully studying the results of combating Iraqi mobile missile systems by aviation, the effectiveness of which proved to be quite low. During a five-month period of reconnaissance using space and air assets, the American intelligence services still could not disclose the position areas of Iraqi missile systems and precisely ascertain their number. And this is despite the fact that they are based in only two areas of Iraq.


As the combat operations continued, the United States created a prototype ABM defense system in the theater consisting of ballistic missile launch detection satellites, data processing and transmission systems, and also Patriot SAMs.

As foreign press reports, 10-12 batteries of Patriot SAMs with six launchers each were deployed in the Middle East. The Patriot was also deployed in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Turkish air bases were covered by two Danish batteries, and two batteries of the U.S. Patriot were later added to them. In addition, Hawk and Roland (Germany) subunits were deployed to Turkey.

The Patriot surface-to-air missile system made its debut on 18 January 1991, when from its launch position near Dhahran it intercepted and destroyed at an altitude of 5 km an Iraqi Scud missile launched from a position area near the city of Basra, located approximately 520 km from the point of intercept.

By the end of Operation Desert Storm, a total of about 30 Patriot batteries were concentrated in the theater.

Fire control for the SAM batteries was accomplished from battalion command posts receiving information from an E-3A AWACS aircraft.



The United States attached special importance to using space assets to increase the effectiveness of reconnaissance, communications, command and control, topographic and meteorological support, and damage assessment of various installations on the territory of Iraq and Kuwait. The capabilities of spacecraft to fix the location of surface-to-surface missile launches were demonstrated back during the Iran-Iraq War when satellites recorded 166 ballistic missile launches.

During the Persian Gulf War, data on Scud missile launches and coordinates of their launch positions were received from satellites by the ground station of the U.S. Air Force Space Command at Alice Springs, Australia. Operators of the ground complex of the DSP system received an alarm signal and tracked the launch on television screens. Information was received via communications satellites simultaneously at the Missile Attack Warning Center of the U.S. Space Command at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado Springs. Computers at Alice Springs, Australia, and also at Colorado Springs compared information on the Iraqi missile launch with known characteristics of a Scud missile launch. The computer, then using stereoinformation from two spacecraft, calculated the missile impact zone. The entire process from the moment of launch to determining the target area in Israel or Saudi Arabia took no more than 120 seconds. As a rule, this was enough time to bring the Patriot missile batteries to readiness in a timely manner to repel the attack.

The effectiveness of using Patriot SAMs is unquestionable. There are data that 82 Scud missiles were fired on by Patriot missiles. As a result, 29 were shot down and 13 damaged (four of them blew up in the air).

At the same time, despite the success of the combat employment of Patriot SAMs, the economic indicators cannot be considered acceptable. According to some data, it took at least two Patriots, costing \$0.9 million each, to destroy one Scud missile, costing \$300,000.

Using the Patriot SAMs to combat Scud missiles in the air showed that the final solution to this problem is still quite far off. Above all, timely information on missile launches is needed. The experience of activating the space-based ballistic missile launch detection system with transmission of data to Patriot batteries confirmed the long-range prospects of such an approach. In addition, joint use of the space-based ballistic missile launch detection system and the Patriot SAMs helps popularize the SDI Program considerably, which is presently the largest in the United States.

Judging from foreign press, a process of "reorienting" the SDI Program is under way, whose mission now also includes protecting "American armed forces overseas, friends, and allies" against the growing threat of accidental or intentional ballistic missile launches, from wherever they may originate. There are plans to allocate \$9 billion to organize a theater ABM defense against

tactical ballistic missile attacks. The first steps in this direction have already been taken.

However, as foreign experts indicate, the Patriot SAM can provide only a point defense against strikes by operational-tactical missiles. In the event new-generation missiles appear that have increased accuracy and cluster warheads, a theater ABM defense system with higher combat capabilities than the Patriot SAM system will be required.

According to the results of combat employment of the Patriot SAM system, the U.S. leadership made important decisions concerning the prospects of development of the SDI Program. It is reported that the necessary measures are being carried out to transform the program into a project with less technical risk, envisioning the creation of the Global Protection Against Limited Strike (GPALS) system based on high-altitude antimissile-missiles for defense and 1,000 space-based Brilliant Pebbles interceptors. The Pentagon has already begun implementing the Brilliant Pebbles program. It calls for placing in near-earth orbits 40-60 satellites with a high accuracy of tracking warheads in the intermediate flight phase. Deployment of these satellites will make it possible, experts believe, to create a two-stage ABM system.

To combat penetrating warheads, it is planned to use a modernized Patriot SAM system or the new "Erint" [transliterated] missile. The possibility of using the Arrow ABM system, which is being developed by Tel Aviv and financed by the United States, has not been ruled out.

The new ABM system, providing protection against approximately 100 enemy missiles launched simultaneously, is to be created based on existing works under the SDI Program by the year 2000.

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SECURITY SERVICES

Yeltsin Edict on Social Protection for Internal Troops

93UM0055A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Oct 92 p 5

[Edict of the President of the Russian Federation: "On Measures To Increase Social Protection of Service Members of the Internal Troops, Supervisory and Rank-and-File Personnel of Internal Affairs Agencies, and Their Family Members"]

[Text] To increase the social protection of service members of the Internal Troops, supervisory and rank-and-file personnel of the Internal Affairs agencies, and their family members, I decree:

1. To extend the provisions of paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 8 of Edict No 154 of the President of the Russian Federation of 19 February 1992 "On Measures To Increase Social Protection of Service Members Discharged from Military Service" and paragraph 3 of Edict No 796 of the President of the Russian Federation of 21 July 1992 "On Additional Measures for Financing the Construction and

Acquisition of Housing For Service Members" to supervisory and rank-and-file personnel of Internal Affairs agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

2. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation together with the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation shall ensure payment of pensions to pensioners among former service members of the Internal Troops who reside permanently on the territory of the Estonian Republic, Latvian Republic, and Lithuanian Republic and have acquired the citizenship of these republics until this issue is resolved on an intergovernmental level.

3. To authorize the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation to using savings on estimated expenditures for supporting the ministry:

—to pay for the costs of keeping in child preschool institutions the children of service members of the Internal Troops and of supervisory and rank-and-file personnel of Internal Affairs agencies who have died in the line of duty or died as a result of wounds (injuries);

—to acquire and install tombstones on the graves of service members of the Internal Troops and of supervisory and rank-and-file personnel of Internal Affairs agencies who have died in the line of duty or died as a result of wounds (injuries) in order to immortalize their feats and heroism.

4. The Government of the Russian Federation within two weeks shall adopt decisions:

—on financing housing construction for service members of the Internal Troops and supervisory and rank-and-file personnel of Internal Affairs agencies and their family members in 1993 and subsequent years;

—on the procedure for billeting the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation engaged in providing security for installations with special conditions, especially important installations, and installations on railroad communications routes;

—on increasing the number of medical treatment institutions in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation;

—on developing in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation trade and public catering enterprises.

5. This Edict shall enter into force at the time of its signing.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, the Kremlin
2 October 1992
No 1153

Correction to Interfax Statement on Stepashin Duties

93UM0037C St. Petersburg ST. PETERBURGSKIYE
VEDOMOSTI in Russian 2 Sep 92 p 1

[Russian Ministry of Security St. Petersburg Administration Press Service Statement: "Interfax is Incorrect"]

[Text] On 27 August 1992, the Interfax Agency disseminated a report that Russian Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Chairman S. V. Stepashin planned to totally shift to work in the Russian Ministry of Security in September where he presently occupies the post of deputy minister and chief of the St. Petersburg Administration.

Specifically, the report states: "S. Stepashin said that in the capacity of deputy minister at the Ministry of Security he will carry out coordination of the activities of the Russia's Northwestern Region intelligence services, specifically, manage the work of the Moscow and St. Petersburg MBRF [Russian Federation Ministry of Security]."

We officially state that this part of the information does not correspond to reality. S.V. Stepashin, after leaving the post of committee for defense and security chairman, will remain deputy minister and simultaneously chief of just our directorate.

Russian Ministry of Security St. Petersburg Administration Press Service

Border Troop Commander Discusses Frontier Protection

WS0611133392 Kiev SLOVO in Russian 14 Oct 92 p 1

[Interview with Major General V. Bondar, commander of the Southern Administration of the Ukrainian Border Troops, by Lieutenant S. Astakhov, officer at the Ukrainian Border Troops Press Center: "The Southern Border Is Reliably Protected."]

[Text] It was not easy to meet with the commander of the Southern Administration of the Ukrainian Border Troops. It is not because Major General V. Bondar avoids contacts with journalists. Had he a little spare time, he would have gladly given an interview, but Vladimir Nikolayevich is desperately short of time. There are nearly 2,000 kilometers of the border to protect; half of those—the Moldovan stretch—requires that the commander be present at the newly established frontier posts and checkpoints. Nonetheless, our meeting did take place on the eve of the first anniversary of the Ukrainian Border Troops.

[Astakhov] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, your Southern Administration was established only this year. What was the reason for its creation?

[Bondar] The Ukrainian southern border was left open after Romania and Moldova signed the agreement canceling visa requirements for their citizens. Some time later, an armed conflict broke out in the Dniester region. This is why, on 17 March, Ukrainian President Leonid

Kravchuk issued the Edict on the Protection of the Ukrainian State Border with the Republic of Moldova. Indeed, the State Committee for the Protection of the Ukrainian State Border then began creating the Southern Administration. The goal was to bring the command closer to the field units, and to find a more efficient solution to the issue of servicing and supplying Southern Administration units.

[Astakhov] How would you describe the situation on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border?

[Bondar] As the Dniester conflict is burning out, the situation on the border has substantially stabilized easing public tension and ending the influx of refugees. Ukraine and Moldova have mutual respect for bilateral relations and that has had a beneficial effect on the border.

But this does not mean that border guards' responsibilities are reduced only to checking documents and keeping track of tourists traveling in and out of the country. After the fighting in the Dniester region ended, thousands of firearms were not turned in. There are people who want to smuggle things from Ukraine. At the checkpoints, hundreds of arms were confiscated, including machine-guns, submachine-guns, pistols, hunting rifles, thousands of cartridges, hundreds of knives and gas weapons, and many grenades. In addition, we are maintaining peace in the border areas and guaranteeing law and order. The border guards arrested ten armed groups, and several criminals who terrorized the local population.

[Astakhov] It would not have been possible to set up new frontier posts and establish control over this troublesome stretch of the border in such a short time without help from the local residents.

[Bondar] Correct. Most people understand us and help us as much as they can. For example, inhabitants of Kodyma Krasnooknyanskiy, Razdelnyanskiy, and other oblasts provide our personnel with honey, milk, grapes, and fresh vegetables. Aleksandr Andreyevich Prokopenya, the president's representative in Reni Rayon, personally supervises the construction of the "Nagornaya" frontier post, and promises to do his best to have it ready by 4 November—the Ukrainian Border Troops Day. He also suggested that we share in the construction of an apartment house in the town of Reni, and allot ten apartments to our border guards. The biggest problem now is how to provide financial resources because we are desperately short of money.

Unfortunately, some administrators choose interests of their enterprises and institutions over the interest of the state. For example, in the village of Shershentsy we were charged 28 million rubles [R] for 20-30 year-old former school premises! But the troops are on the state budget, and everyone charging such large sums, is in effect cheating the public.

Here is another fact. The border is starving for means of transportation. Some things we receive from army units. In one such case, our examining commission did not accept a vehicle because it was in a bad condition, but the unit command loaded this "white elephant" on the train and sent it to us anyway. As many as half of the vehicles cannot be salvaged! We do not even have a repair shop.

As you can see, we have a lot of problems. The past months, however, have shown that the creation of the Southern Administration of the Ukrainian Border Troops is justifiable. With the passage of time, when the process of formation ends, and the Administration is given full responsibility, many of the difficulties will be solved much more easily and faster. After all, you yourself can see what needs to be done better.

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