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# ***JPRS Report***

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***Military Affairs***

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# Central Eurasia Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-92-027

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22 July 1992

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## CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

### There Was a Nuclear Explosion in the Donbass

92UM1263A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
27 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Nikolay Lisovenko from Yenakiyevo, Donetsk Oblast]

[Text] A discussion is going on among the people in the Donbass, and particularly in Yenakiyevo, on the subject of whether or not a nuclear explosion was set off in Donetsk Oblast and whether or not this has anything to do with the relatively heightened radiation level in a number of miners' cities.

Our correspondent succeeded in learning that an explosion of a nuclear charge with a yield equivalent to 333 tons of TNT was set off at noon on 16 September 1979 one kilometer deep in the Yunkom coal mine of the Ordzhonikidzevsk Production Association

Although this occurred in the very center of Europe, although the test was conducted right beneath the town of Yunokomunarovsk and, moreover, all its residents were evacuated for a half-day, the full truth of what was happening was known only to a very narrow circle of people, the majority of whom prefer to hold their tongues even now because they are bound by a "signature of nondivulgence."

Just what goals were pursued in the course of the secret experiment?

There were several. The Moscow Mining Institute imeni A. Skochinskiy initiated the action. At one time its scientists had determined one important feature: Sakhalin coal mines were "degasified" after an earthquake, i.e., the mine gas methane, the age-old enemy of miners around the world, disappeared from them for a certain period. A concept originated according to which the gas is driven out of the seams along fissures and fractures that newly appear as a result of the earthquake, and they become safe to work.

To check their hypothesis, the scientists decided to agitate the depths in the Donbass as well, and for this they chose Yunkom, the most dangerous mine for gas-dynamic phenomena, where surprise ejections of gases, coal and even rock occurred now and then, always threatening the life and health of miners.

The creators of nuclear weapons from the mysterious city of Arzamas-16 also were deeply interested in the experiment. All of them held high ranks and came to Yenakiyevo so often and in such numbers that it was necessary to build a special five-story dormitory for them.

Civil Defense also showed interest in the experiment, as an opportunity had appeared for it to work out in practice an option for evacuating the populace from an entire town.

In short, as was usual for us at that time, the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers adopted a joint decree, and the machine moved forward...

They made a special drive in the mine from the 826 meter level, at the end of which they made a blind chamber for the "bomb." In the spirit of the best traditions, they first lowered into the mine a mockup of the article which looked like a charge and checked its passage to the destination.

An appropriate cover story was concocted for the simple folk—a CD exercise allegedly would be held and everyone was to leave the city for a half-day, avoiding panic to the maximum extent. One August night a gift from Arzamas was delivered to the mine, a cylinder three meters long and with a diameter not over 80 cm. In looking at it, one of the technicians who previously had agreed to accompany the "article" to the chamber flatly refused—his nerves gave out. Then Anatoliy Sushko volunteered to drag the bomb into place in his stead. He had to drag it in the literal sense of the word. The people were harnessed into straps and, like Volga boatmen, slowly pulled a special cart with the cylinder resting on it. Mine Director Vasilii Repetskiy went in front, and security (armed of course) also went with them. They delivered the "cigar" to the chamber and immediately walled up the entrance. Then for almost a month they plugged up the drift leading to the "bomb" with concrete. Evacuation of 8,000 residents of Yunokomunarovsk began on Sunday at 0600 hours and all Yunkom miners had been removed by 0900. After pouring a glass of vodka and placing it on his director's desk, Vasilii Repetskiy left the office at 1100; he subsequently defended a candidate's dissertation on the effect of high-power explosions on the gas volume in coal seams.

At a radio signal from Moscow at 1200 hours, the "article" received the appropriate pulse and the ground in Yenakiyevo shuddered hollowly. Small cracks crept along walls in several small houses and sensors registered soil oscillations within a radius of six kilometers. A portrait of Lenin fell in the office of the Yunkom Mine party organizer...

Those were the visible results of the experiment.

Dosimeter operators immediately began taking samples of the air, soil, mine atmosphere, and mine water. The instruments indicated the important thing, that the radiation level did not change, which meant the "article" had functioned in accordance with the assignment—with its terrible temperature and pressure, it forced apart the rock, liquefied it and created something in the earth resembling a large, hollow bubble vitrified from within.

In the opinion of Ministry of Medium Machine-Building nuclear specialists, it had turned out to be completely airtight, and it was proposed to open it after a lengthy time with a special borehole to avoid a radiation leak (by the way, this has not been done even today, but only for the prosaic reason that few participants of the experiment remain and there is even less money).

On the day following the explosion, all miners of the Yunkom Mine went to work in an organized manner. By the way, they still showed no anxiousness—the gas monitors noted that coal seams of Ninth and Mazurka were giving off almost no methane. That had never happened before.

The scientists rejoiced because the Sakhalin effect had found scientific confirmation in this experiment, although, by the way, the drop in gas volume turned out to be short-lived.

The military, it seems, also were satisfied—the westernmost explosion in Europe permitted them to answer many questions of interest. And simple folk continued to know nothing, satisfied by one more cover story.

After the Chernobyl disaster and minor unrests of 1989-1992, the Yenakiyevo people demanded that they be told the whole truth about the nuclear experiment, for the level of natural radiation in the city sometimes was exceeded by three-four times.

Minchernobyl [Ministry for Protection of the Population from the Aftermath of Chernobyl], Gospromatomnadzor [State Inspectorate of the Nuclear Power Industry] and the public health service assure city-dwellers that the Yunkom "article" had no effect whatsoever on the radiation situation in the region, as attested by radiological monitoring data received regularly from the explosion zone for 13 years.

The people refuse to believe these departments. At the request of the city executive committee, the Ukrainian Ministry of Geology recently performed a survey of all 120 km<sup>2</sup> of Yenakiyevo territory and discovered a number of spots on it, the appearance of which can be connected with Chernobyl, and with the overall technogenic situation, and with the "Yunkom factor."

"Take a look," says Valeriy Burtsev, chief of the Yenakiyevo State Environmental Protection Inspectorate, "Small spots are scattered over our city everywhere, but Yunokom-munarovsk was outlined as one solid radiation spot. I connect it with the nuclear test."

Many, probably even the majority of city residents, agree with Burtsev. But engineers, physicians, and associates of various scientific research institutes decisively refute this viewpoint. Who is correct will soon be answered by data of two expert appraisals conducted at the same time independently of each other by authoritative capital commissions by assignment of the city executive committee. Thank God that scientists now are able to distinguish the unburned fragments of Chernobyl nuclei from the atoms which gave off their energy during the old explosion. So we do not have long to wait.

### Poor Progress of Spring Draft in Russia

92UM1267A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jul 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Viktor Litovkin: "Servicemen's Protection Decree Foundering, Says Servicemen's Committee Chairman; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] It appears that the spring call-up plan for induction of youths into the Russian Army will not be accomplished. Based on last year's results, this year will see only 40 percent of those eligible passing through the gates of Army units. The 1991 intake was 60 percent, according to Anatoliy Alekseyev, who is chairman of the Committee on Affairs of Servicemen and Their Dependents of the Russian government.

The intake of inductees in the Transbaykal, Volga-Ural, and Leningrad Military Districts went somewhat beyond the halfway mark, but the figure for the Siberian Military District was less than that. Ninety-five percent of youths in Moscow were sent their notices to report to the induction station, but only 40 percent are actually to experience military service. About 5,000 men failed to report to the induction stations.

A. Alekseyev sees as the major factors hindering the induction effort a disinclination on the part of youths for the

service and attempts to employ any device to avoid carrying out their military obligation. He feels that the poor showing of the present induction effort is due to a combination of immaturity of the youths; an understandable desire on the part of mothers to keep their sons away from troubles that beset soldiers, such as hazing, loss of life, and bodily harm; and ineffectual performance by law enforcement agencies in the struggle for observance of Russian laws.

Of 5,000 cases of draft dodging in Moscow, criminal charges have been brought against 550 men, resulting in nine convictions.

The committee chairman pointed out that military commissariat draft boards possess extremely poor qualifications. Their faulty performance is the cause of continued acceptance of ill youths incapable of carrying out military duties. The latter are the ones most likely to fall victim to mockery, abuse, and accidents.

"Every fourth or fifth inductee must subsequently be subjected to medical fitness examination in a troop unit," said Alekseyev. "The reason for that is that the medical examining board at the induction station fails to notice or "does not care to notice" the presence of a latent or manifest illness of a young man, one which renders him incapable of carrying out his duties in a conscientious manner."

Alekseyev said that his committee intends to protect the interests and rights of the man in uniform. He stated that this protection will go beyond men in the Army and Navy, that it will include members of the MVD, Ministry of Security, Border Service, Railway Troops, and military construction troops. In 18 months there were five efforts made to reform and split up the committee, with an attempt to place it under the Ministry of Defense, but the committee was able to prove that by remaining independent, positioned only within the government of Russia, could it be capable of operating effectively.

What does the committee chairman believe must be done to cure the disease infecting the Army?

As a start, by setting the Army onto a clearly legal basis. Alekseyev said that they wrote a draft law providing financial compensation to parents, wives, and children of servicemen killed in line of duty in peacetime. Servicemen received insurance coverage only as of 1 January 1991. After 3 September 1945, the number of fatalities amounted to more than 300,000 men in the Army, Navy, and troops of the MVD, KGB, and other paramilitary organizations.

The committee maintains that decedents' relatives, who often lose their sole breadwinner, should receive compensation of at least 50,000 rubles, as indexed to the 1991 level. Even this amount of money does not resolve the problem.

For example, the compensation granted in the USA is 50,000, but this is the amount in dollars. In other countries, parents and other relatives are entitled to rent-free housing for life. Our state should bear its due share of responsibility for the life and health of a soldier assigned to a duty, particularly to a "hot spot," since this should be considered equivalent to wartime service.

Incidentally, such laws are already in force in Ukraine; it is time for Russia to catch up.

Alekseyev feels that something else that would improve the Army's status would be to create normal and civilized conditions for soldiers to carry out their duties, with conversion of the Armed Forces to a professional basis.

He believes that the above is not a problem solvable in one year's time. In addition, the committee recommends a more active implementation of service on a combined approach, such that completion of Armed Forces reductions will see an Army consisting only of men who look upon service as a calling.

Now for the third practical item occupying the committee's attention. This involves turning over to the Army the housing built with the latter's money. The military housing indebtedness situation in Russia now amounts to 1,256,632 square feet. The amount turned over last year was a mere 38,256 square meters, that is, only 3 percent of that called for in the plan.

In a number of oblasts, such as that of Kaliningrad, Moscow, Vladimir, Chita, Khakass, and Krasnodar Kray, officers and warrant officers were not assigned a single meter of quarters. In talks the president of Russia intends to hold in the near future with heads of local administrations, Boris Yeltsin will employ this data as his primary guidance as he takes up the matter of housing for servicemen.

The committee chairman said that it is unfortunate that the President's February Decree on Measures Granting Increased Social Protection of Servicemen and Persons Discharged from the Armed Forces is not enjoying implementation. He also explained that the committee intends to make full use of the authority granted it by the government to insure complete implementation of the decree.

### CIS: POLICY

#### Russian Resolution on Actions Against Armed Forces

92UM1223A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 4 Jul 92 p 4

[Resolution of Russian Federation Government No 407 of 20 June 1992 signed in Moscow by Ye. Gaydar: "On Measures for Stopping Actions Against Russian Federation Armed Forces"]

[Text] Aggressive acts against Russian Armed Forces formations, units and subunits, including attacks, shootings, and the seizure of weapons, hostages, combat equipment and military property have spread. There have been victims among servicemen and their families. These actions are a violation of rules of international law.

To ensure Russia's defense capability and security and the life and health of servicemen and their families, the Russian Federation Government resolves:

In case of an unprovoked armed attack on Russian Armed Forces military units, posts and other installations and against servicemen and their families and in furtherance of the right to self-defense, commanders of Russian Armed Forces formations, units and subunits on the territory of states of the former USSR are to take adequate steps to stop such aggressive actions, including firing on the attackers.

[Signed] Ye. GAYDAR

### CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

#### Specifications, Performance Capabilities of MiG-31

92UM1216A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 Jul 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Andryushkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The MiG-31: A Long-Range Fighter-Interceptor"]

[Text] The Experimental Design Office imeni A.I. Mikoyan helped protect the fatherland for more than 50 years. Together with the Moscow and Nizhegorodskiy aircraft plants it produced more than 50,000 MiG fighters. At the present time the Nizhegorodskiy plant is producing the MiG-31, the world's best fighter-interceptor. This is a two-seat (for pilot and navigator-operator), fourth-generation aircraft which meets the great requirements set for fighter-interceptors. The aircraft has an extremely broad range of combat capabilities. The MiG-31 is designed for destroying maneuvering air targets at high and low altitudes from the forward or the rear hemisphere. Its radar system is capable of detecting targets in good and bad weather, both in free space and against the background of earth. Special equipment reliably protects the fighter-interceptor from radioelectronic countermeasures.

The aircraft is equipped with two D-30F6 turbofan engines with afterburners. The economical operation of the power unit enables the MiG-31 fighter-interceptor to cover vast areas lacking an extensive network of airfields and air-monitoring ground facilities against enemy fire. The MiG-31 can successfully counter attacks from the air, including those involving cruise missiles and strategic bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft in ground-hugging flight or in the stratosphere.

A high-temperature, high-compression engine allows for large flying speeds near earth with good economy.

"No other country on earth has aircraft engines which operate in these modes," says Rostislav Apoltosovich Belyakov, general designer at the OKB (Experimental Design Office) imeni A.I. Mikoyan. "The aircraft, which weighs more than 40 tonnes at an altitude of 17,000 meters, develops speeds of up to 3,000 kilometers per hour. An air target will not get away from the MiG-31."

The performance of combat missions is assured by the aircraft's unique weapon control system. For the first time in world aircraft design the MiG-31 is equipped with airborne radar (BRLS) with a phased antenna array and a radioelectronic scanning beam. The BRLS can lock onto and track up to 10 different air targets within a space bounded by a solid angle of plus or minus 70 degrees for azimuth (on the horizontal plane) and plus 70 degrees to minus 60 degrees for angle of elevation (on the vertical plane). The fighter-interceptor can fire for effect simultaneously at four targets, either against the background of earth or in free space, flying on various courses, at various altitudes and at various speeds. The American F-14D long-range fighter-interceptor, as an example, can also attack 4-6 targets, but within a limited sector of air space. It is inferior to the MiG also in many other respects.

The aircraft's tactical capabilities were considerably increased with the installation of a thermal direction finder,


which makes it possible to detect and track targets from infrared emissions. The tactical situation indicator provides the crew with all the information necessary for combat. A group of four MiG-31s, one of them the leader and the other three wingmen, can exchange information from surveillance within a zone up to 800 kilometers wide at the front, assign targets among themselves and transmit information on the air situation to the leader of another group. All of this is done in secrecy, in automatic mode. The MiG-31 can guide up to three MiG-23s, MiG-25s, MiG-29s or Su-27s to a target without the latter activating their radar (see diagram).

In the process of testing the MiG-31 fighter-interceptor on very long flights, it was flown in the northern latitudes, on the Murmansk-North Pole-Chukotka route. The MiG-31 performed the flight of more than 8,000 kilometers with two aerial refuelings in 8 hours 40 minutes.

For a long time our countrymen knew nothing about this unique aircraft, designed for protecting the air borders of the motherland. The appearance of the MiG-31 in the Air Defense Forces was immediately detected abroad and properly assessed, however. Flights along the Russian border by American SR-71 strategic reconnaissance aircraft were halted, for example. And when, three years ago, Valeriy Menitskiy, honored test pilot and chief pilot for the OKB imeni A.I. Mikoyan, demonstrated the MiG-31 in the air over Paris (the air show at Le Bourget), the Western experts tipped their hats, as they say, as a sign of respect for the creativity of the Russian aircraft designers. May that thought continue to fly!

**Main Tactical and Technical Data for MiG-31**

Crew	2
Maximum weight, kg	46,200
Top speed, km/h	3,000
near earth	1,500
Service ceiling, m	20,000
Rate of climb with 4 missiles, min	8.0
Range without refueling, km	3,000
Intercept lines:	
—at supersonic speed, km	720
—at subsonic speed, km	1,400
—at subsonic speed with aerial refueling	2,200
Flight time with refueling, h	up to 7
Take-off distance, m	1,200
Landing distance (with brake parachute), m	800
Engine	2 D-30F6s
Armament suite includes	
—air-to-air guided missiles:	
4 long range missiles	
2 medium range missiles	
4 short range missiles	
—6-barrel 23-mm gun with none-link feed and rate of fire of 6,000 rounds/min	



- Key:
- 1. Attack Team
  - 2. Leader
  - 3. Tanker
  - 4. Wingman
  - 5. Data link

## CIS: NAVAL FORCES

### Reactions to Yeltsin's Ship Renaming Decree

92UM1225B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 8 Jul 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Gundarov in the "Fact from Our Life" column: "What Difference in the Name?"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The 21 May issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA informed its readers of the decree of the president of Russia on renaming a number of Naval ships. From now on, the nuclear-propelled heavy missile cruisers [TRKRs] Kirov and Kalinin of the Northern Fleet will be known as the Admiral Ushakov and the Admiral Nakhimov.

There was an Admiral Nakhimov cruiser back in the time of the Workers and Peasants Red Navy. However, since that was the fleet of the workers and peasants, someone decided he did not like the name of the Smolensk nobleman—Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov, and in 1922 her name was changed to the Chervona Ukraina. Also unlucky was another admiral from the nobility: Mikhail Petrovich Lazarev. In 1926, the name this ship carried on her sides was changed to the Krasnyy Kavkaz. The decree of the president of Russia gave the name Admiral Lazarev to replace the Frunze of the TRKR of the Pacific Fleet. Many fellow citizens of ours are accepting the new names with appreciation and approval. This however is not true in all cases.

"In carrying out the order issued by the Navy Main Staff, we have submitted suggestions on renaming of ships that have been known by names associated with party congresses, such as the '26th CPSU Congress' of the nuclear submarine," said Vice Admiral Vladimir Kuznetsov, chief of the Organization and Mobilization Directorate of the Northern Fleet during my visit there. "The decision we received was not what we expected. It instead was a directive calling for renaming 13 ships carrying names making a reference to the Komsomol, such as the Chelyabinsk Komsomolets. I learned of the renaming of the nuclear-powered missile cruisers by reading the newspaper."

A matter as simple as renaming a Naval fighting ship turns out to involve the combat readiness of the Navy, and plans for combat training, ship repair, and material and technical provisioning. As explained to me by Captain 1st Rank Vasilii Miroshnichenko, chief engineer of the Naval Ship Repair Yard in Murmansk, not every shipbuilding facility manufactures and welds the letters onto the side of a ship. For example, the Murmansk people do not possess the necessary experience or the associated equipment. The name of a ship cannot be changed in a month or so—in some cases not even in one year. For example, a decision was made several years ago to rename the aircraft-carrying cruiser Baku. The steel letters of the old name were removed, but making the letters for the new name—Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet Gorshkov, was not found possible. Every one of the sizable letters weighed about three centners, costing 2,500 rubles before the recent price rise.

"The price quoted by the ship repair yard in Nikolayev for making three sets of letters to be placed on the sides and stern, weighing a total of 40 tonnes, was 250,000 rubles in the price current as of the first quarter of 1992," said

Captain 1st Rank Vasilii Zagray, deputy chief of the Northern Fleet's Technical Directorate in our conversation.

And the above does not include the cost of welding on the letters, which would cost at least 100,000 rubles. Add to that the expenses associated with sailing the ship around Europe to get her to the yard, the costs of anchorage and service, and you arrive at a figure of six digits. Official data indicate that the amount of ship repairs to be accomplished in 1992 will not exceed the 27-percent mark. Taking combat craft in dire need of repairs off the repair schedule and turning their repair berths over to ships in active service would be equivalent to discharging ill patients from a hospital so that their beds could be taken over by healthy people.

It is possible that pragmatism associated with the resolution of this kind of problem will not be to everyone's liking and approval. For example, some of the people with whom I spoke brought up another factor—purely human and moral—which appears to me demands consideration.

"I feel that the name Kirov for the cruiser should not be changed," was what Senior Lieutenant Gennadiy Sinelnikov, group commander, said to me in our talk aboard the ship. He has seen four years of service there.

The above opinion is shared by the vast majority of the ship's officers and warrant officers. They were unanimous in drawing up an appeal to the president requesting that no change be made in the ship's name. The seamen gave as the reason for their action the fact that the nuclear-powered Kirov inherited her name from the celebrated gun-armed cruiser.

Also writing a letter to Russian President Boris Yeltsin were veterans—seamen, petty officers, warrant officers, officers, and admirals, who had served aboard the gun-armed Kirov and fought aboard her during the Great Patriotic War, from the first day the last. They wrote that the cruiser's crew did nothing to bring shame upon the honor and dignity of the sailors serving in the glorious Russian Navy.

Also visiting the Kirov during my stay there was a group of instructors and students from the General Staff Military Academy. I asked those visitors from Moscow the question: What did they think about renaming of ships?

"I have nothing against modern ships carrying the names of celebrated Russian admirals. However, in my view, it is new ships which should be given new names. Relative to existing names of ships, I can say that that is a part of the history of the Navy," said Captain 1st Rank Viktor Shatalin, a senior instructor in the academy, holder of the qualifications of candidate of military sciences and reader.

"We of course intend to implement the decree. However, I must admit that the forthcoming task is something I will not enjoy. It seems to me that the matter of ship renaming should be done on a case-by-case basis," said Vice Admiral Kuznetsov, whose job it will be to carry out the name change decree by virtue of his duties.

It is not a good idea to hold in total disregard opinions such as those mentioned above. As a matter of fact, a ship's name in the minds of people after a time loses its association with the name of a person. Seamen say the Kirov, but they do not think of S. M. Kostrikov, who went by the party name of Kirov, when they refer to the nuclear-powered missile

cruiser. That is something that is an integral part of a ship. Ships are similar to people, in that they are born, grow old, and die. A ship is assigned a name long before she slides down the building ways. By tradition, a plate bearing the name of a ship is attached to the frame of an infant ship before the "skeleton" takes on sides, decks, and a superstructure. This tradition is considerably older than the name proper and is more conservative than political tastes and whims.

Meanwhile, at anchor in the Severomorsk roadstead in her proud beauty is the Kalinin; while moored to the dock is the Kirov. Seamen in the normal course of their duties still refer to them by the names attached to their sides. However, in documents the ships go by their new names. How complicated everything has become in our everyday life!

### Profile of Crimea Naval Base Commander R-Adm Tsubin

92UM1259A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
15 Jul 92 First edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vladimir Pasyakin under the rubric "The Army and Navy—the People": "They Whistle Like Bullets Near One's Temple"]

[Text] The army and navy are experiencing difficult times. A series of orchestrated political explosions which have occurred in the former Union republics have dispersed the armed forces onto different sides of the national borders erected. In a number of states attempts are still being made to draw Russian servicemen into dangerous political games and national conflicts. Things are especially difficult today for the officer corps, the backbone of the army and navy. In the situation of psychological and physical pressure to which the officers and their families are subjected every day and every hour, however, the best qualities of the Russian military—steadfastness, stamina and personal courage—are shining through more and more brilliantly.

In January 1992 the Poti garrison of the Black Sea Fleet was repeatedly subjected to attacks by Georgian armed formations. During one of them Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Tsubin, squadron commander, Captain 2nd Rank Petr Chernyatevich, his deputy for personnel, and Captain 2nd Rank Mikhail Shestopalov, deputy chief of rear services, came face to face with a group of attackers attempting to carry off semiautomatic rifles and pistols taken from a weapon rack. The time of the raid was carefully calculated. It was lunch time, and only a small number of service personnel remained in the building. The militants did not expect them to resist. The restraint of the servicemen (we know that at that time there were numerous instructions "not to use weapons to do harm," "to maintain neutrality," "not to succumb to provocation") were taken by the attackers as a sign of weakness. The impunity had finally brought the assailants to the headquarters. The previous "scenario," in which no resistance was expected, suddenly fell apart, however.

Driving up to the headquarters, Tsubin and Chernyatevich began climbing the stairs to the second floor. Shestopalov stayed below and began exchanging fire with those who had broken into the headquarters for weapons. Inside the building Tsubin engaged in a struggle with one assailant and was wounded in the arm but still disarmed the latter.

Instantly handing a captured pistol to Chernyatevich, he cut down one of the attackers with his own pistol. Chernyatevich also opened fire. The squadron commander wounded another assailant. Dropping a sack of semiautomatic weapons and taking cover behind the dead bodies, the attackers concentrated their fire on Tsubin. He received two more wounds, one after another. The bleeding Tsubin continued the battle until the assailants had been driven from the territory, however.

Major Med Service V. Sushko, staff doctor, bandaged Tsubin, but surgery was needed immediately. Sr Lieutenant Med Service Pavel Pimenov, a surgeon, and a nurse arrived at the headquarters approximately an hour later. The office had been set up as far as possible for the operation by that time. Tsubin, grimacing with pain, continued to enquire about the situation in town and on the squadron's ships and vessels, and issued instructions for reinforcing the headquarters' defense. And they were not issued in vain....

The two-hour operation, during which one bullet was extracted (the other wounds went all the way through) was completed at 17:00. At 18:00 the attackers launched a second attack. A MAZ-trailer rammed the gate and was ready to discharge an armed landing force. The attackers encountered a well-organized defense by the sailors, however, who put grenades and firearms into play. After reporting to Admiral I. Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, the squadron commander phoned his wife and told her as calmly as he could (he even attempted to joke) that he had been wounded. Had it been possible, he would have kept the news from her, but he knew that Galina Nikolayevna would soon learn of it from others.

Aleksandr Sergeevich himself did not know that he faced a second operation. The next morning he was taken to the air garrison at Meria, then flown by helicopter to Kacha. From there he was driven to Sevastopol, where he found himself on the operating table again.

I was far from Tsubin's only visitor in the hospital the day after the operation. This is what I was told by Captain 1st Rank Viktor Apishev of the Poti training center:

"They have transferred Aleksandr Sergeevich to Poti as squadron commander with a big future. The squadron's area of responsibility stretches from Batumi to Pitsunda and contains a large number of posts scattered along the entire coastline. He visited every one of them—and more than once. He does not like to sit in an office at all. If one were to name his dominant feature, it would probably be determination. Also his ability to foresee things and to assume responsibility for decisions. You will recall that it was a very difficult time in Poti. A vigorous foraging for weapons had begun. And the arms dump was guarded by a paramilitary force, people fairly peaceable. I. Tsubin made an important decision on his own: to remove the weapons immediately to an escort vessel, which was taken out to sea and anchored there. It was as though the squadron commander had looked into a crystal ball. An attack on the dump soon followed."

They say that the military make poor politicians. If what was occurring in Poti at that time and what is still occurring in many regions of the former USSR is politics, then the military are finding their way in it very well. The politics, based on forceful methods of resolving problems, has

become a feverish and bloody foraging for weapons, technical and other military equipment and ammunition from military arsenals. Tsubin understood that back in 1989, during the Abkhasian events. He says that the situation became simply intolerable for military personnel during the presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The squadron saw that it was pointless to call for reason and common sense, to warn that lawlessness would not be tolerated. And he took steps to see that the weapons did not fall into the hands of the extremists.

This was the case when militants, intoxicated by the impunity with which they had attacked a small border outpost near the settlement of Kulevki, headed for Captain 3rd Rank Safar Radzhabov's division. The squadron commander foresaw this development, however, and ordered the ships to be taken out to sea and an all-round defense of the subunit's territory to be set up.

It was the case when extremists fell upon the squadron radio-receiving station to capture the expensive equipment. They miscalculated here as well, however. At the squadron commander's order it was dismantled and removed ahead of them.

One can trace in the light of these events squadron commander Tsubin's resolve and preparedness, growing by the day, personally to take up a weapon and stand in the path of people robbing the military, as the latter stood by silently with clinched teeth.

Tsubin did not return to Poti, although he was prepared to do so. Not yet recovered from the three wounds, however, he was offered the position of chief of staff of the Crimean Naval Base by the fleet commander. A very complicated situation had developed in the formation by that time. The taking of the Ukrainian oath, in secret and not sanctioned by the fleet's command element, was underway. It is never easy to fit into a new situation. But what must it have been like for Tsubin, when what was essentially a split on national grounds occurred in the formation and the explosive situation threatened to develop into a serious conflict? Furthermore, one cannot see into the soul of everyone. Tsubin found himself once again in a very rigid confluence of events. Things might have been different if he and Rear Admiral B. Kozhin, base commander, had been on the same wave length. The great difficulty and perhaps the tragedy of the situation lay in the fact that Kozhin had already chosen a different path, without advertising his choice. When the president of Ukraine appointed Kozhin commander of the Navy of Ukraine, the burden of commanding the base was assumed by Tsubin at the order of the Black Sea Fleet commander. He immediately sensed concealed resistance to his orders by the officers, including staff officers, who had taken the Ukrainian oath.

It was due only to Tsubin's experience and stamina that no incidents occurred at the base during that period, with the situation stretched tight as a drum, even though the formation was put onto a heightened state of readiness and hundreds of armed people were on the move in the territory.

Today, when certain garrisons of the Russian army and navy are still within a ring of fire, the example of officers such as Tsubin gives them confidence that the military will live through the difficult times with dignity.

**INCIDENTALLY;** Captain 1st Rank Tsubin was recently promoted to rear admiral. The editors join in offering congratulations.

**Russia To Own 78 Percent of Black Sea Fleet**  
*92UM1262A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*  
*in Russian 3 Jul 92 p 1*

[Article by Aleksandr Pilat: "Once the Russian Flag Is Hoisted, It Will Never Come Down: Admiral Kasatonov Views the Statement by the Ukrainian Navy Commander in the Same Light as a Story by Zhvanetskiy"]

[Text] Admiral Igor Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, announced at a press conference in Sevastopol that Russia considered it necessary to own 78 percent of all the Black Sea ships; 22 percent are to be left for the Ukrainian Navy. The position of Ukraine has remained unchanged: It should retain all the ships deployed on its territory, which constitutes 90 percent. According to Admiral Kasatonov the main issue now is to bring these two figures into "agreement." The commander emphasized that "the talks will be lengthy, very lengthy, probably. A third party, such as Georgia, or a fourth may also appear. It will be a most difficult process, which is going to proceed at the governmental level." Kasatonov added that he was going to obey the orders of Marshal Shaposhnikov and Admiral Chernavin only, until a concrete decision was made: "But whichever direction events may take, the concept of 'a single Black Sea Fleet' no longer exists."

In his response to the question about the Navy having pledged allegiance to Ukraine, Kasatonov said that he had a negative view of the ceremony, and cited an occasion when warrant officers of a ship under the command of Captain 3rd Rank Timur Suleymanov were transferred to the reserve by him and officers were removed from their positions because they had pledged allegiance to Ukraine. "I will be doing the same in the future," said Kasatonov. The admiral labelled the Ukrainian Navy organizational structures "an enemy organization" and accused them of tapping his telephones and conducting surveillance of his house and car. "This is the former special department of the Black Sea Fleet, now taken over by Ukraine," he clarified.

With respect to the change of flags on the Black Sea ships, the admiral declared: "There is a Navy tradition: Once hoisted, the Russian flag can never come down."

A statement by Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin, commander of the Ukrainian Navy, was distributed at the press conference. It states that the Ukrainian Navy is being formed on the basis of some Black Sea forces. It includes primarily infrastructure with navy ship and aircraft bases, command and communications control stations, hydrography and navigation systems, materials and equipment and other supply services. The specific ship composition will be determined at future meetings of groups of experts and commissions. The Russian Fleet in the region will be based on a part of the Black Sea fleet with an additional operational and tactical force, or an operational squadron. Its numerical composition will be determined during talks. This Russian force on the territory of Ukraine will enjoy a temporary status on a contractual basis.

When asked what he thought about this statement, Kasatonov told journalists: "The same as I think about Zhvanetskiy's [author of humorous, nonsensical stories] stories. This will never happen."

### Sinking of Submarine-574 Part III

92UM1264A IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Jul 92  
Morning Edition p 8

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Nikolay Burbyga, under the rubric: "IZVESTIYA Investigation": "Submarine from 'Cemetery' Bay: Gangsters Impede the CIA"]

[Text] (Continuation. For the initial portions, see No's 154-155)

While the Soviet command authorities were thinking about whether or not the Americans would risk salvaging the submarine, the Americans were not sitting idly by. A short time passed and suddenly there was a sensational report: "The U.S. CIA has salvaged a sunken Soviet submarine from the bottom of the Pacific Ocean." The USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] was the first to respond, having sent the United States a note: "In violation of international legal norms, your services, have clandestinely salvaged our submarine and so on and so forth."

The U.S. State Department retorted: "But you did not announce the loss of your submarine. Consequently, according to the norms of International Maritime Law—this is no one's property..."

Then the USSR MID sent a second note: "You have violated the eternal rest of the dead seamen and have desecrated their fraternal grave..."

The U.S. State Department: "Nothing of the sort. The dead seamen were buried at sea according to all of the rules that are customary in the Soviet Navy. We are sending you a copy of the film..."

"After that," recalled Rear Admiral Shtyrov, "our international lawyers and diplomats were silent because there was nothing to say. The period of threatening instructions from Moscow had arrived: task combat ships and send them on constant patrol in the area of the loss of Submarine-574 and prevent the continuation of American operations there, right up to bombardment of the area..."

"Why this precaution? The Americans had certainly extracted practically everything that interested them..."

"This was actually a delayed reaction from our side. And still, as it later became known, the Americans did not attain their primary goal: the encipherment documents did not end up in their hands. The reason turned out to be unexpected both for the Americans and for us. The fact is that Submarine-574 Commander Captain 1st Class Vladimir Kobzar was a tall man. He had to sleep doubled up in his commander's state room. Once, when the submarine was at the plant, he made an agreement with the engineer-builder for the encipherment station to be moved to the missile compartment to thus widen the commander's state room. I sought out that engineer and he confirmed the fact that the encipherment station had been moved. So, having only partially resolved the task, the Americans planned to also salvage the aft section later.

However, a theft occurred at the firm's administrative offices. The text of the secret contract ended up in the hands of criminals among other documents. Having obtained that document, the criminals began to blackmail the firm's leadership, threatening to make the contract public in the event that their terms were not satisfied. CIA Director William Colby immediately became involved and, through THE LOS ANGELES TIMES newspaper (February 8, 1975), appealed to the leaders of the mass media and to the editorial staffs of major newspapers to maintain silence on issues associated with ensuring the national security. However, the famous American Journalist Jack Anderson, under the pretext of tax violations allegedly permitted by the firm that had built the Glomar Explorer, published an article in the NEW YORK TIMES (March 18, 1975) and thereby put an end to the silence.

A storm broke... And only our newspapers maintained a deathly silence.

Soon after the scandal with Operation Jennifer, its main moving spirits left the scene: CIA Director W. Colby was relieved of his post, Billionaire H. Hughes died, and R. Nixon was forced to retire as a result of the Watergate matter.

"How many dead Soviet submariners did the Americans manage to extract?"

"I think that nearly all of the personnel who had been relieved from watch were in the first and second compartments at the moment of the disaster. As far as I know, one officer was identified of those who were extracted. Obviously that was the BCh [Department] 3 (torpedo compartment) commander because the torpedo operating manual turned out to be right alongside him.

"The Americans even managed to determine the age and nationality of the dead seamen. As has already been said, the recovered crewmembers were reburied at sea by U.S. Navy representatives according to the ritual that is customary in the Soviet Navy with the playing of the USSR Anthem and the burial was recorded on color film that established residence in the CIA's annals."

"And yet, Anatoliy Tikhonovich, what could have happened to our submarine on March 8, 1968?"

"That question does not give me peace even today... I think that our submarine was rammed by the Swordfish, a Skate-Class nuclear submarine that was following it.

"Prior to the collision, our Submarine-574 was running under RDP [snorkel] and was deaf due to the diesel's noise. The collision occurred on the evening of March 8. Presumably, the nuclear submarine maneuvered dangerously at close distances and dove under ours. A collision occurred. Submarine-574 went to the bottom and the American submarine arrived at Yokosuka Naval Base (Japan) three days later with its conning tower fairwater forward section crushed. The Swordfish underwent cosmetic repair at night and left the base. I had information that a written agreement on strict compliance with secrecy about the accident was obtained from the crew of the American submarine. And there's more: it is the fact of the collision of the submarines that permitted the Americans to know the location of the loss of our submarine with great accuracy. Soon the bathyscaphe Trieste-2, which was studying the area, determined

the precise coordinates and external condition of the submarine. The Americans hid the fact of the collision in order to shield the commander of Swordfish from the charge of intentional destruction of the Soviet submarine."

And here is Navy Chief Navigator Rear Admiral V. Aleksin's opinion:

"I do not exclude the fact that our submarine managed to end up under the ramming blow of a military or civilian surface ship. But still in my opinion the most probable cause was a collision with another submarine. I thought this for the first time at the end of October 1968 when I learned that the disfigured U.S. Navy nuclear submarine Swordfish had arrived at the Japanese port of Yokosuka in March of that year.

"In the spring of 1970, our nuclear submarine and the U.S. nuclear submarine Tautog collided while submerged at a military training range off the coast of Kamchatka. The blow was inflicted from the right side of the deck into the rear stabilizer and caused more than a one meter dent of this solid structure into the outer hull. At the same time and in the same area off Kamchatka, the U.S. Navy submarine Pintado's keel traversed our nuclear submarine's missile hatches. In both cases, the collisions occurred while our submarines were changing course or depth.

"In general, over the 20-year period from 1967 to 1986, these collisions occurred frequently—nearly annually. In my opinion, we cannot call all of these cases intentional because they are equally lethal for both submarines. This sooner attests to the inadequacies in sonar surveillance systems both of the U.S. Navy's nuclear submarines and ours and also about inadequacies in the level of personnel training and the organization of service of some submarines or other.

One more thing: When I looked at foreign articles on Operation Jennifer, I learned that Submarine-574 lay on the bottom at even keel and almost without listing prior to being salvaged. And a narrow and deep hole gaped, as if from the blow of an enormous hammer along the hull's entire height, in the area of the bulkhead between the second and third compartments in the outer hull from the left side of the submarine. There undoubtedly was a similar breach in the submarine's pressure hull. No retractable devices were salvaged. Therefore, the collision occurred while submerged.

(To be continued)

### Scrap Metal, Old Ships Going to Waste in Harbors

92UM1225A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Jul 92 First edition p 1

[Article by Captain 1st Rank A. Pilipchuk; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak; and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA unofficial correspondent Captain 2nd Rank V. Gundarov: "Hundreds of Delisted Ships Rusting at Docks, Losses Amount to Millions"]

[Text] Each one of us writing this article has had an opportunity at one time or another to spend some time aboard the BPK [large antisubmarine vessel] Kronshtadt of the Northern Fleet. We saw her passing through the "three stages of life of the BPK"—her fighting youth and mature years, which took place during the 1970s and 1980s, then

the inevitable ageing process. The last time the Kronshtadt set out for deep waters was in October of 1989.

In April of last year, shortage of funds for repairing the ship led to her being removed from the Navy's list. Her hull and superstructure no longer showed any signs of life; some rats ran to and fro close to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent as he walked the lifeless ship from forecandle to quarterdeck for his last farewell. Nevertheless, this large assemblage of metals consisting of the best types of domestic steel continues to occupy space at the dock alongside fighting ships, using up Navy personnel efforts and funds to keep her afloat. To do more than that—docking, conversion, preparation for towing to a place of sale, there is no money. (A sum of one million rubles would be required.) There are delays in scrapping several other large surface ships that have been "retired."

Even more acute in the NF [Northern Fleet] is the problem of cutting up nuclear submarines. In the striving several decades ago to create a powerful "hidden" fleet, no one thought of setting up a branched infrastructure for scrapping SSNs [nuclear powered attack submarines] taken off the Navy's list. Subsequent events, which sped up the natural course of time, moved us much more quickly into the future. Vice Admiral Ye. Rogachev, NF directorate chief, told us that only after the signing of SALT I were combat-ready SSNs, craft possessing considerable tactical and technical characteristics, removed from service. The second group of SSNs taken off the list consisted of first-generation ships that required repairs that in the middle of the 1980s would have run as high as 80 percent of the total cost of ship repair. The third group consisted of craft that had served in the active fleet less than 20 years; there are no funds to maintain them in a combat-ready status.

We are just now coming to the realization that disarmament and reduction of the Army and Navy can cost about as much as the process of armament. Let us keep in mind that this is only the beginning of these processes. The directorate chief told us that this year the several dozen SSNs awaiting disassembly will be joined by somewhat more than another dozen units. Directorate specialists point out with emphasis that this is taking place in the absence of a state scrap program and special funding. Someone must be deeply convinced that a nuclear vessel taken off the list is "not worth a straw." In this connection, maintenance of a single delisted SSN cost 8 million rubles last year, while this year the cost soared by a factor of six or seven. As of January of this year, the Navy has not been provided funds for this purpose.

"You cannot get something for nothing"—that is an old saying. Last year the NF worked up a proposal relative to implementing a nontraditional approach to scrapping a SSN. This idea involves cost recovery and combining the efforts of the Navy, repair yards, and state and commercial structures. Estimates were computed by the Central Design Bureau for Maritime Technology, Rubin. Calculators went into operation in NF Staff and the Navy Main Staff. Finance agencies of several levels put the calculations through the "review" process. The conclusions indicated that scrapping of the third nuclear vessel would not cost the state a single kopeck, while the Navy after sale of the equipment and metal would realize a profit of 13.6 million rubles, based on 1991 prices. However, this experiment,

which was to involve only three delisted SSNs out of the large number of nuclear craft that are "falling apart" at their storage places, never did see the light of day, since the commander in chief of the CIS OVS [Unified Armed Forces] issued an order in April of this year prohibiting the conduct of commercial activities in units, large units, and military installations.

There can be no argument that the Army and Navy should serve Mars, the god of war, not Mercury, the god of commerce. In addition, in nature there are no easy solutions to difficult problems, tempting though it may be to think so. There is a possibility that the computations made by the St. Petersburg people and NF personnel are flawed. The Navy has other proposals to resolve the problem, in a way which would save jobs in shipbuilding and ship repair enterprises, with the state receiving reimbursement for some of the funds expended in construction of the ships: by recovery of their base costs. It would be possible to do without state budget "injections" for scrapping efforts. There would also be no difficulties appearing for the Navy, which would not have the problem of confronting the "woods" and "greens" relative to social programs. Under the new economic conditions, these proposals would meet with local approval, since the approach would be one of consideration and flexibility. It is our view that today's state should be decidedly monopolistic in only one area—that of watching over its own interests, which in turn are the interests of Russians. And it should make it possible for enterprising people to serve Russia.

Let us shift our attention away from the shores of the Barents Sea to the beaches of the Baltic. This is where about 15 undersea craft have recently lowered their Navy flag for the last time. Their future is in doubt. You can see the masts and superstructures of the sinking ships in one of the harbors where some of the fleet's forces are based. Many Baltic Sea Fleet people with whom we had a chance to converse said the same thing as the Northern Fleet people: What is needed is a state program designed to scrap and sell delisted ships, with commercial structures participating in the program. In this connection, they pointed out with great emphasis that past sales of materiel went for pitifully low prices, with no tangible benefit to social needs of the Baltic Sea Fleet.

We could also include here in our discussion the shores of the Pacific Ocean, Black and Caspian Seas, the Gulf of Finland, and the Amur. However, we will have to be satisfied with figures published in the USA in April of this year. (Unfortunately, it is extremely problematic to obtain figures of this kind in our country.) The USSR and the CIS have delisted in the last five years about 400 ships of various classes; presently sinking into the waters in CIS ports are 265 former fighting ships.

The economic benefits slipping through our fingers may be expressed as a definite sum of money. However, there are other ways in which this can be measured. For example, some storage places are collecting nuclear craft with reactors aboard that constitute "delayed-action mines" as far as the environment is concerned. And another thing. During the time that a ship is undergoing the disassembly process and awaiting docking for conversion, the officers and warrant officers—the backbone of the Russian Navy—are losing experience and their skills.

The gravity of the problem is considerable, imposing a substantial burden on the Navy and the entire country. That is why we—the writers of this article—decided to once more bring it to the attention of the state. (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has brought up this subject several times in the past.)

### **'Worthiest' Senior Naval Officers Receive Promotions**

*PM1407184192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 14 Jul 92 p 3*

[Captain First Rank A. Pilipchuk report from the Navy Main Personnel Directorate under the "Direct Line" rubric: "The Number of Admirals' Posts Is Being Cut. But There Are Still Admirals in the Navy"]

[Text] On the eve of Navy Day a group of naval officers and admirals was awarded their next military rank. Was this a case of pre-holiday "shooting stars"? When you look at the list of seamen in the Russian president's decree and the Russian Federation defense minister's order, you realize that the military labor of the worthiest people has been marked. Commander of the Northern Fleet O. Yerofeyev has become a three-star admiral. First Deputy Fleet Commander B. Yerebin and Chief of Staff I. Naletov have become vice admirals. The Northern Fleet is the buttress of Russia's naval power, and its command has enormous responsibility to protect the fleet's forces at a difficult time and maintain the necessary level of combat readiness. Incidentally, certain commanders of the most combat-capable formations—V. Reshetov and V. Bezkorovayniy—have been awarded the rank of vice-admiral.

The number of admirals and generals has increased. Captains First Rank A. Brazhnik and V. Dobroskochenko, commanders of large units of Northern Fleet surface ships, have become rear admirals. I have known them since their days as lieutenants and have been on many sea voyages with them. They have devoted over 20 years to service afloat.

News from the shores of the Black Sea: Captain First Rank A. Tsubin—commander of the Crimean Naval Base—has become a rear admiral. In Poti in January of this year he stood with weapon in hand in the path of some thugs who were trying to steal weapons from the unit. He received three wounds. Tsubin also remained wholly faithful to his oath in April, when some officers in the Crimean Naval Base swore the oath of allegiance to Ukraine. And news from the Baltic shores. Colonel I. Chernykh, commander of the coastal troops division, has been awarded the rank of major general. This officer, who was taken hostage by the Lithuanian authorities, was recognized by the whole country at that time.

I was told in the Navy Main Personnel Directorate that the number of admiral's posts in the Navy has been reduced significantly and this process is continuing. This is no doubt as it should be. But the new ranks for officers and admirals in the Navy testify to the fact that Russia has not forgotten military seamen and intends to seriously develop its Navy.

### Profile, Technical Data of Sovremenny-Class Destroyers

92UM1270B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 16 Jul 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank Gennadiy Stupin: "The Most Sovremenny [Modern] Destroyer—The Sovremenny"]

[Text] The Sovremenny-Class destroyer was envisioned as a missile-artillery amphibious assault support ship with a displacement of nearly 5,000 tonnes. But the desire to "task" it to carry out more universal functions which permitted the ship to operate not only as part of a formation but also independently appeared in the process of operation. Naturally, displacement increased somewhat and weaponry was added on board. But the Sovremenny-Class destroyer did not lose the main thing—it became, in the opinion not only of our but also of many foreign experts, one of the most seaworthy, maneuverable and perfect destroyers, based on ship architecture. Abroad, it is frequently called a light cruiser.

The Sovremenny's mission is fire support of amphibious assaults, anti-aircraft and anti-ship defense of ships and transports, and destruction of enemy surface ships, combatant craft, and amphibious assault craft. The ship has become a multiple-series production ship—15 destroyers have already entered the Naval inventory. It was designed in St. Petersburg, at Professor V. Yukhnin's collective (Chief Designer I. Rubis). The destroyers are also built in the city on the Neva, at the North Wharf. Ten years—that was the ship's path from the preliminary design tasks (1970) until turnover of the head order (1980). And as of today work has not ceased on improving it. Several dozen innovations have already been introduced during the last 12 years. So, the communications systems, radio-technical equipment, and navigation equipment have been significantly improved on the Bezudernyy (which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA recently wrote about), the 14th in the line.

These latest destroyers are serving under the difficult conditions of the North and Pacific Oceans.

#### Sovremenny Class Destroyer Technical Specifications

1. Standard displacement—approximately 6,500 tonnes  
Total displacement—approximately 8,000 tonnes
2. Dimensions (in meters)  
Greatest length—over 150  
Greatest width—over 17  
Average draft at full displacement—6
3. Full speed—over 30 knots (approximately 60 kph)  
Operating-economical speed—approximately 20 knots (over 30 kph)
4. OEKh [operating-economical speed] sailing range—approximately 5,000 miles (more than 9,000 km)
5. Endurance based on provisions—30 days
6. Crew—approximately 350 men.
7. Main power plant, steam-turbine, twin screw, total output—approximately 100,000 horse power

#### 8. Weaponry

- a) artillery and strike:
  - 130 mm universal artillery system consisting of two twin mounted guns;
  - a missile system with two four-missile launchers;
- b) anti-aircraft:
  - missile system consisting of two launchers;
  - a 30 mm artillery complex consisting of four automatic guns;
- c) antisubmarine and anti-torpedo:
  - two dual-tube 53 mm torpedo systems;
  - two six-barreled depth charge launchers;
- d) sonar:
  - a sonar system;
- e) radio-technical:
  - a detection and target designation radar system;
  - a detection and target designation radio-technical system; and,
- f) electronic countermeasures systems.

### CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

#### Official on Future Reorganization of Military Press

92UM1260A Moscow SYN OTECHESTVA in Russian  
No 27, 3 Jul 92 p 4

[Interview with Colonel Aleksandr Viktorovich Yakubovskiy, chief of Mass Media Department of Committee for Work with Personnel, by SYN OTECHESTVA correspondent, date, place and occasion not specified, under rubric "With One Column": "The Future Is With Such a Press!"]

[Text] In our correspondent's conversation with Colonel Aleksandr Yakubovskiy, chief of the Mass Media Department of the Committee for Work with Personnel, the talk is about the present and future of the Russian Armed Forces press.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Viktorovich, it would seem we will not be dissembling if we call the military press the face of the Armed Forces, the channel of glasnost and democratization, a very important means of informing society about the Army, and the Army about society. In your view, what must the Russian Army press be like?

[Yakubovskiy] Independent. Objective. Competent. Strong. Capable of constituting worthy competition for other publications in the information market. In my view the aggregate of those qualities is the heart of the concept of reorganizing the military mass media system.

At the present time 16 military journals, the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the weekly SYN OTECHESTVA, 17 district, group and fleet newspapers, 12 Army and flotilla newspapers, and around 100 large-circulation newspapers are published in Armed Forces under Russian jurisdiction. Their one-time circulation does not exceed 1.5 million copies. There also is Radio Volga and over 700 non-T/O television and radio centers. Some 1,200 officer-journalists work in all editorial offices.

**[Correspondent]** Is this a large or small amount for the Russian Armed Forces, which now have a numerical strength of around three million?

**[Yakubovskiy]** Here is a comparison instead of an answer. Over 1,400 military publications (including 400 journals) with a one-time circulation of 12 million copies are published in the United States, and there are more than 300 radio and television stations, for which over 3,000 radio programs and television films are prepared annually.

We can do nothing but envy this. The fact is that present realities and competition in the information market revealed so many shortcomings in the work of the military press of a legal, financial and organizational nature that certain structures are proposing to considerably reduce the number of Army journals and newspapers. In their opinion, this is the most cardinal path of reorganization. A very weighty argument is advanced here: large expenditures. It has been calculated that as a result of increased prices on paper and polygraphic materials and increased Ministry of Communications expenses for organizing the dissemination, dispatching, forwarding and delivering of the periodical press, expenses for publishing the military mass media will double as a minimum in 1992.

These are no small amounts, but it is impossible to identify a mechanical decrease in the number of newspapers and journals with cardinal measures for their organization. This is well attested to by the closing of the journals ZNAMENOSSETS and SOVETSKOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE three years ago. By the way, the circulation of ZNAMENOSSETS at that time was around 380,000 copies and the journal was in demand with warrant officers, petty officers and sergeants. It was they who were deprived of their publication.

**[Correspondent]** Nevertheless, funds allocated for upkeep of the Armed Forces continue to be reduced. In this situation the mechanism of financing the military mass media must be thought through in a most thorough manner.

**[Yakubovskiy]** Not just that. It is important to resolve all legal and organizational problems without delay. How should this be manifested?

First of all, the activity of the military mass media must be brought into line with Russian legislation, newspapers and journals must be reregistered, and a Minister of Defense order prepared "On the Mass Media and Editorial-Publishing Activity."

Secondly, all expenditures for the military mass media should be allocated to a single Ministry of Defense budget item. By the way, that is just how it was done in Byelarus. Determine the number of military journals and newspapers for the transition period based on allotted funds and the new Armed Forces structure.

Thirdly, set up an expert commission for substantiating the advisability of publishing, reprofiling or closing existing military publications and opening new newspapers and journals.

Fourthly, it is necessary to outfit the military mass media with modern editorial-publishing systems which will permit

cardinally changing journalists' working conditions, accelerating the process of publishing newspapers and journals, and determining optimum size of editorial offices.

I am convinced the military mass media system must be reorganized on a legal basis. The methodology and principles of reducing forces and the central apparatus cannot be automatically extended to editorial collectives.

The following figures attest to the inadmissibility of such measures. More than 60 newspapers of large strategic formations, formations and separate units, 26 Army post newspapers, and 27 air and naval base newspapers are published and 10 radio studios and over 100 television studios also operate for U.S. forces stationed in Europe.

The military press is the face of the Armed Forces, the channel of glasnost and democratization, a very important means of informing society about the Army and the Army about society. At the same time, the proclaimed thesis that society must know everything about the Armed Forces needs not so much theoretical substantiation as practical implementation. For example, how will society know everything about its Army if there is no unified system of information in the Armed Forces, there is no centralized press service, there is no adjusted interworking among the information structures existing in various military department entities, there is an insufficient number of specialists in information work, and there is no modern technical base for collecting, generalizing, disseminating and protecting information?

The reduction in the number of military newspapers and journals which certain structures plan to carry out under the flag of reorganization is caused above all by a lack of desire to resolve all legal, financial and organizational-creative problems in the work of editorial collectives. It is simpler to reduce, as attested by documents which were visaed just a few months ago at a rather high level. But it is not taken into account here that the threat of reduction hovered over the smallest category of specialists, officer-journalists. There are only 1,200 of them, i.e., even fewer than generals.

**[Correspondent]** You spoke about the U.S. Armed Forces mass media, but a story about the military press of the Army and Navy of Czarist Russia probably would generate no less interest in our readers.

**[Yakubovskiy]** The most typical feature of Czarist Russia's military press was the striking diversity of publications. For example, 413 military newspapers and journals were published in Russia from 1702 through 1916. Each cadet corps and school, and there were 29 of them, published their own journals. Often cadets were their editors. Journals of officers' economic societies were published.

Illustrated publications were put out especially for the soldiers, among them the journals CHTENIYE DLYA SOLDAT, SOLDATSKAYA BESEDA, RODINA, VITYAZ and ILYA MUROMETS. They contained conversations on spiritual-moral themes, biographies of famous Russian figures, stories, essays, descriptions of soldiers' military exploits, as well as articles of a general educational nature. Even digests of soldiers' compositions were published.

In 1914 alone 113 military publications were put out, including 82 journals and 31 newspapers.

[Correspondent] Perhaps it makes sense to use this rich experience, naturally with consideration of present realities, in reorganizing the existing military mass media system of Russia's rebirth?

[Yakubovskiy] On a structural plane, Russia's military press can consist of mass, official-information, and specialized publications.

I believe it advisable to include among mass publications the newspapers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and SYN OTECHESTVA, the journals SOVETSKIY VOIN, ARMIYA and ARMIYA I KULTURA, and district, fleet and regional newspapers which can function on cofounding principles.

It apparently makes sense to publish official information-reference publications at the discretion of existing military command and control entities. They can be central (such as ARMEYSKIYE NOVOSTI), regional and unit publications. Publications of this type can include bulletins and heralds intended for promptly informing servicemen.

The journals VOYENNAYA MYSL, VOYENNY VESTNIK, AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, VOYENNO-MEDITSINSKIY ZHURNAL and others can be included above all among the specialized military publications. A sports journal cries to be included in the "ammunition clip" of publications of this type. It is not for now, but it is very much needed so that questions of physical training and sports coverage in the Armed Forces gain a stable, system-oriented nature.

The question of establishing a unified system of Armed Forces television and radio broadcasting has been posed repeatedly for several years. Feasibility studies and proposals for the table of organization structure were prepared, but another long-term construction projected resulted in the end. We are faced with one more paradox. Television centers function successfully in units, aboard ships, on posts and in military educational institutions. They operate separately, with no authorized creative associates. This new thing for the Army and Navy lives thanks to the energy and persistence of enthusiasts. Figuratively speaking, the Army and Navy television and radio broadcasting system has legs and a body, but the head is absent. A Russian Ministry of Defense Central Television and Radio Studio is very necessary now. Preliminary calculations show that no additional funds are needed to establish it; it is only necessary to consolidate already existing scattered structures, which will permit making more productive, economic use of allocated materiel.

The question of setting up a military information agency also can be resolved in approximately the very same manner.

The Russian Army needs a military press which will become a component part of the state information system and will function in accordance with generally recognized legal rules. The future is with a military press!

### Military Helping With Harvest

924A1569A Moscow TRUD in Russian 14 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by V. Bobrenev, Colonel of Justice, Moscow: "Soldier Petrovich Brings In The Grain; Military Commissariats Are Becoming Agricultural Departments"]

[Text] The busy harvest season is approaching. What has been for us a "battle," continues to remain so. And what kind of a battle can it be without soldiers? A decree, a resolution, and the voyenkomats [military commissariats] throughout the country distributed notices to thousands who long ago attained the age of a soldier. The suppliers of military equipment clutch their heads in dismay: 20,000 motor vehicles to be prepared for the harvest operations, and spare parts and fuel to be made available—this is no laughing matter.

And indeed only a few people are aware that the army's involvement in agricultural shipments causes the country to sustain tremendous losses each year. For example, in 1991 these losses amounted to approximately 100 million rubles in accordance with the old price system. Overall, the money earned by the military drivers and reservists was not sufficient even for covering one half of the expenditures required for the formation and maintenance of the motorized battalions. Today, in connection with the increase in prices, especially for fuel, and it follows for the rail movement of the motorized battalions from their permanent locations to the fields, the accounting of expenditures will be carried out in the billions. It is easy to imagine the cost for moving railroad trains bearing thousands of motor vehicles from the Far East to Saratov or Volgograd Oblast. While enroute, several million rubles' worth of food goods are consumed. When the loading and unloading operations are taken into account, the journey from Vladivostock to Saratov lasts from 10 to 12 days. And the same length of time is required for the return trip.

The presidential decree on the call-up of reserves is mandatory for all without exception in every region of Russia. What is hindering the staffing of the harvest formations, using the resources of those areas in which they are to be employed? Local leaders are hindering the call-up of reserve drivers for the motorized battalions in all areas. Their position is clear: it is easier to solve their own problems at the expense of the newly arrived and there is less responsibility. This is particularly true in view of the fact that expenses associated with the provision and maintenance of military workers are reimbursed not from the oblast or kray, but rather from the state budget.

It actually develops that nobody is responsible for the reserves. The staffing of the motorized battalions is entrusted to the mobilization organs of the Ministry of Defense, and the maintenance of discipline and order in them—to their command and headquarters. The chief concern of the voyenkomats—to carry out the orders handed down from on high regarding the call-up and to ensure that the required number of reserve drivers join in the operations. Who are they, are they capable of operating trucks and will they carry out their duties in a conscientious or poor manner—the voyenkomats are not troubled by any of these questions. Nobody holds them responsible in this regard. Thus it turns out that among the "partisans," as they are referred to by the soldiers, one repeatedly finds malicious

drunkards, violators of labor discipline and even those who no longer have a driver's license. Last year, approximately 5,000 reservists were discharged from motorized battalions for disciplinary reasons. They were released when their presence could no longer be tolerated. There is even danger—it looks as if a great misfortune is about to burst forth.

In 1991, 71 crimes were committed and 82 individuals perished in military formations during the harvest operations. The ratio of wrongdoers—regular military personnel or reservists—was roughly the same.

One chronic "virgin land" problem is that of imperfections in the legal norms. Legislation governing military service provides only for two types of assemblies for reservists—training and testing. The harvesting of crops is not included in either of these types. This is believed to be a necessary, temporary and episodic phenomenon. And following the completion of every harvest season, the statement is made that this was the "last time." But then summer approaches and everything starts all over again from the beginning.

The law contains no norms governing who can be called up for harvesting the crops and who can be excused. Naturally, the leaders of enterprises and institutions are by no means interested in losing an intelligent driver for several months. There is no mechanism for providing compensation for the salary paid to a reservist during his absence. Everything is dependent upon the relationship established between the leader of an enterprise and the rayvoyenkom [rayon military commissar]. Either the chief or the reservist made the decision not to participate in the harvest work. He did not join the formation. Is it necessary to mention the probability of the various types of abuses that can arise during the course of solving the question of a call-up for harvest operations.

The draft law on obligatory military service, with detailed regulation of the rules for a call-up and for carrying out the harvest work, was at one time prepared and presented to the Supreme Soviet of the former USSR. But it was not adopted—there was not enough time. It appeared that the Russian Parliament was in no hurry to deal with this problem. Everything is proceeding in accordance with the system established long ago—nothing is changing. People wearing the military uniform are traveling over the country's roads and nobody is the wiser—are they military personnel or civilians? And the only demand placed upon them from the standpoint of discipline derives from a commander's swearing or from appeals to human conscience. Thus if a disguised "soldier" is not pleased with the situation—he will turn his back on his military commander and return home. And no disciplinary measures will be employed against him.

Not only the commanders, but also the "partisans" have no rights. They were called-up in violation of the law and thus formally they are not soldiers. That is, insurance and other military benefits are not extended to them. There is a complete absence of social protection.

It is high time for a decision to be made by the legislators: if the army is to be used in the future for carrying out certain national economic tasks, such as transporting crops, then the work should be placed on a normative-legal basis, with the establishment of a certain status for the reservists and also appropriate rights and obligations. If this is not to be

done, then other forms for providing assistance to farmers must be legalized. For example, temporary duty for drivers in harvest formations, endorsed by labor legislation, with all of the attendant legal norms.

There is still one unresolved problem—organizing the work of "grain" troops. In the headquarters of the motorized battalion leadership, headed by General S. Boromolov, just as in the past a preference is being shown for solving all questions through the Ministry of Agriculture for Russia and its subordinate structures at the oblast and rayon levels. And yet today they are no longer commanding agricultural enterprises. The kolkhozes and sovkhoses, based upon their requirements, decide how many vehicles they need from the side, and how many they require overall. Indeed, having turned to the military for assistance, a farm must display complete concern for them, including the provision of housing, organizing food services, supplying fuel and others. In accordance with the current prices, this is becoming the overhead, especially when one realizes that the transport workers do not have too much work. For example, in 1991 the motor vehicle idle time amounted to 973,000 machine days. That is, 10,000 trucks were not needed.

This then is the cost to the state of overcautiousness by the local chiefs—determining the transport requirements "by eye," with a reserve. And indeed this can be eliminated. The work needs only to be set up on a civil-legal basis and to conclude agreements not with oblast officials but rather with the kolkhozes and sovkhoses.

This year, in order to avoid idle time, the commanders of motorized battalions have finally decided to conclude agreements for the transporting of all types of freight in the interests of agriculture. This will reduce the amount of idle time.

And the last point. Many responsible officials are engaged in directing harvest formations. Among them there are no less than a dozen generals who are responsible for ensuring discipline and order within the motorized battalions and for preventing infringements of the law. It cannot be said that they do not visit the work places. Only such trips make little sense. And indeed there are problems which a platoon or company chief is incapable of solving.

### **Main Motor-Vehicle Directorate Exhibition Near Moscow**

*92UM1257A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
14 Jul 92 First edition pp 1,2*

[Interview with Colonel-General N. Zazulin, chief of the Main Technical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, by Lieutenant-Colonel O. Vladikin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Mobility and Maneuverability: To a Great Extent the Motor Vehicles Give the Troops These Qualities"]

[Text] Around 70 different models of military vehicles were displayed last week at the testing facility of one of the scientific research institutes near Moscow. This event would not have stood out in any way, perhaps, had the promoter, the Main Motor-Vehicle Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the RF [Russian Federation], not invited representatives of the Russian government, leaders of industry and high officials of the armed forces to view the exhibit. The exhibit was seen

by V. Glukhikh, first deputy minister of industry of the RF, I. Materov, deputy minister of economics of the RF, R. Karachurin, general director of the Department of Motor-Vehicle Machine-Building of the RF, V. Nikolayenko, first deputy general director of the Department of the Defense Industry of the RF, Colonel-General M. Kolesnikov, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the RF, Colonel-General V. Mironov, chief of the Main Armament Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the RF, and others.

Since the visitors indicated a serious interest in the models on display, our correspondent attempted to learn first-hand the goal of those arranging the undertaking. He posed this question to Colonel-General N. Zazulin, chief of the Main Technical Directorate.

[Zazulin] The main thing we wanted to accomplish in setting up the equipment demonstration was to point out to the government of Russia and the leaders of industry the role which the motor vehicle plays in the modern army and in maintaining a high level of combat readiness. After all, more than half of the motor-vehicle pool in the forces is made up of basic chassis for various weapon systems and special military equipment. Another 20% of our vehicles, even though nothing is mounted on them, are purely army models, since they were designed to fill military orders for use precisely in field conditions.

The demand for these vehicles will become even greater in the future. The Russian army is expected to become smaller but mobile and maneuverable. This cannot be accomplished without the motor vehicle. In such branches of the armed forces as the Strategic Missile Troops and the PVO [Air Defense Forces] 100% of the mobile weapon systems are based on motor-vehicle chassis.

We also need to consider the fact that the Agreement on the Limitation of Conventional Weapons in Europe calls for a reduction in the number of armored combat vehicles. The proportion of wheeled, unarmored equipment will increase for this reason.

[Vladykin] But no one ever denied the great importance of motor vehicles in the military. Has something changed recently?

[Zazulin] Basically, no, but the processes occurring in the country have created conflicts and contradictions which have called into question the further improvement of the technical level of the Russian army's motor-vehicle pool. If we do not overcome these and find ways to resolve the matter, by the year 2000 we shall find ourselves in a situation like the one in 1984 when the state program for the development of the motor-vehicle pool of the armed forces was introduced. In other words, we shall regress a decade and a half in this large and important matter.

[Vladykin] What, specifically, could bring about such a regression?

[Zazulin] The armed forces of the former union had more than 1.5 million motor vehicles. A third of that pool remained outside of Russia after the USSR ceased to exist and the sovereign republics began splitting up its army. In addition, 24 of 55 of the Ministry of Defense's repair enterprises were left outside of Russia, some of which had unique fields of specialization and were the only ones capable of restoring certain models of equipment. Naturally,

these and other similar factors had a negative effect on the structural makeup of Russia's motor-vehicle pool and are complicating its operation and servicing.

We are looking for ways to re-specialize certain Russian plants to make up for the lost facilities, of course. It will take time to achieve what we have planned, however.

The armed forces suffered the greatest detriment from the loss of guaranteed shipments from the Kremenchug and Minsk motor-vehicle plants, which produced tractors for large trucks for the military. They were used as irreplaceable bases for certain missile systems, for example, which are like nothing else in the world. Suffice it to say that Iraq, which purchased them in the past, did not lose a single unit during the Persian Gulf conflict. The vehicles, which have good mobility and maneuverability, proved invulnerable even to the ultramodern American detection and destruction facilities.

It is a big problem to replace the chassis of these systems. Cooperation is apparently being established on a new basis with the Minsk people, to be sure. The Russian Federation and Byelarus have begun cooperating in the area of military equipment. This is being worked out for individual areas. The needed mutual understanding has not been achieved with Ukraine, however. Only a temporary agreement for the current year on the observance of mutual interests in this area is being observed. The matter of settling accounts for reciprocal shipments is becoming more and more acute, however. Kiev is demanding absolutely outrageous prices for its products.

[Vladykin] And it goes without saying that Russia's Ministry of Defense does not have extra money....

[Zazulin] Not just extra money. It does not have even what is absolutely essential right now. Less than one third of the needed amount has been allocated for our repair plants. How are they to survive?

We have brought up another objective of the display of motor vehicles. We have something to lose by not bolstering the military motor-vehicle pool with an infusion of money for development. Around 90% of our vehicles are superior to their foreign counterparts with respect to cross-country performance, range and simplicity of operation and maintenance. They are, however, somewhat inferior with respect to materials-intensiveness and adaptation for operating on diesel fuel. A breakthrough is taking shape even here, however. We just need funds to set up regular production.

We demonstrated in our exhibit that some new and improved models of motor vehicles are practically ready to go into production. They include modifications of the well-known GAZ-66, ZIL-131, UAZ-469 and other vehicles. And the wheeled prime movers produced by the Kurgan and Bryansk motor-vehicle plants are absolutely unique. Nothing like them is produced even in the USA.

In general I would like to say that joint creative work between the Main Technical Directorate and the motor-vehicle industry has always served as a sort of motive force behind the nation's entire motor-vehicle industry and will no doubt continue to do so for a long time. Vehicles are being developed to meet our very rigid, long-term technical specifications, on the basis of which the mass production of civilian models is beginning. The GAZ-53 is being produced

with assemblies from the GAZ-66, for example, and the ZIL-131 has breathed new life into the ZIL-130, which is in widespread use. And so, we need to do everything possible to see that this know-how, accumulated over the years, is not lost and that the unique assembly lines do not cease to exist due to lack of orders.

### Property Question on WGF Withdrawal Examined

92UM1272A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
16 Jul 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Mikhail Makhlin: "A Salvo Against Our Own: Why Compromise Russian Entrepreneurs Who Are Helping the WGF To Comply With the Troop Withdrawal Schedule and To Maintain Combat Readiness?"]

[Text] There is no need to once again especially stress that the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces [WGF] from Germany is proceeding under difficult conditions. There are many problems. One of them is military property which it is either impossible or disadvantageous to take to Russia in a material context. The sale of this property locally is the most optimal variation. However, it seems that this process has become a real Klondike for shadow economy businessmen and for simply shady individuals both from the Russian and from the German sides.

And here we think the desire of three newspapers that are printed in Moscow to impart glasnost to outrageous cases of squandering national property and the army's material base that was created at taxpayer expense was dictated by a noble goal. I don't see any need to cast a shadow on my writer-colleagues or to cite the names of the newspapers, articles or their authors. All the more so that they based their articles on information from official agencies.

Meanwhile, some information required, in my view, detailed verification. So, in all three articles "Moseniko-Invest" Russian-Swiss Joint Venture figures as a malefactor "that caused 1.5 million marks worth of damage to the country". I don't know how it turned out in the other cases but in this case the newspaper salvo turned out to be, putting it mildly, inaccurate.

A million and a half Deutsch Marks is nearly \$1 million. This is an enormous amount of money in recalculation at the market exchange rate. But in a rule-of-law state, only a court can determine the amount of damage or the sentence. There was neither a court nor an investigation with regard to "Moseniko-Invest". And the main thing is that there was also no damage. But just what then provoked the attack against the redoubts of the joint venture?

The joint venture that was founded three years ago is involved in the design and construction of various facilities in Russia (foreign participation was also needed to do this), the sale of military property, including abroad, and also consultative and intermediary services in the sphere of East-West trade-commercial relations, in accordance with its own charter tasks. And, I need to say that all of this is turning out to be of very, very great benefit for the founders, who, as we know, own the profit from the joint venture's activities.

Just who are they? The CIS Unified Armed Forces Committee for Trade and Everyday Services, the State Foreign

Economic Company for the Export and Import of Arms and Military Equipment ("Spetsvneshtekhnika"), Rosagrokhim's "Agropromkhim" Production Association, "Intourist Holding Company's" Foreign Tourism Company, and others. The Swiss side was represented by the firm "Eniko S.A. Holding" which owns just 30.5 percent of the charter fund. Thanks to "Moseniko-Invest's" activities, new hotels are already operating in Naberezhnyye Chelny and Chisinau, and a number of other facilities. A high-class hotel, at a cost of several tens of millions of dollars, is being prepared for operation in the Moscow suburb of Dolgoprudnyy. The Russian Ministry of Defense has received more than \$20 million from the joint venture, including for the sale of military property, mainly motor vehicle fuel in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The experience accumulated by "Moseniko-Invest", including during the withdrawal of the Central Group of Forces and the Southern Group of Forces, determined the selection made by the Russian MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] Main Technical Administration when they issued powers of attorney for the sale of diesel fuel from WGF depots for the benefit of the Ministry of Defense. To the uninitiated, this selection may seem to be quite strange. At that moment, foreign firms had literally besieged the WGF POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants] service with proposals which, at first glance, appeared to be extremely enticing. They promised 400 marks per tonne of diesel fuel. "Moseniko-Invest" and "Desseniko", its German affiliate, purchase that same commodity for a total of 270-280 marks (in the articles, they erroneously cite 255 marks per tonne). One of the first deals concerned the sale of 10,000 tonnes of diesel fuel. People who are familiar with arithmetic have calculated:  $400 - 255 = 145$ . Multiply by 10,000 and that is 1.5 million. And did "Moseniko-Invest" (or rather the joint venture's founder) receive yet another 100,000 marks commission for this?

Alas, this arithmetic does not have anything in common with either the higher mathematics of foreign trade or with common sense. The Erdel Bulletin that is published in Germany regularly publishes petroleum product quotes on the markets of the European countries. The fantastic, in the opinions of the experts, price of 400 marks was nowhere to be found on or near the date of the contract signing, except in January-February 1991 when petroleum products nearly doubled in price due to the events in the Persian Gulf.

Let's also take into account that our diesel fuel does not meet European standards, primarily due to ecological requirements. Therefore, the purchaser must ship it for reprocessing and bear additional expenditures. There are also substantial transportation costs. Besides purchasing the diesel fuel, you also need to haul it from WGF depots. And there are also the workers' salaries.

But that is not all. According to German laws on the sale of diesel fuel, kindly send 654 marks per tonne for the so-called mineral tax to the treasury. Plus a 14 percent customs duty. "Moseniko-Invest" First Deputy General Director V. Gorshkov, who signed the contract, acquainted me with these fine points.

Now let's compile all of these fragments that remain of the compromising articles and statements. Well, there is no way—just you try!—that it turns out to be 1.17 marks per

liter (diesel fuel is shipped to FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] filling stations at that price) if you pay 400 marks per tonne.

But did they pay that? Not hardly. For example, based on WGF Fuel Supply Department Chief Colonel L. Starovoytov's conclusion, not a penny has been received from the firm Malik and Co. This company, like other companies that promised a fantastic price, ended up in the field of view of FRG law enforcement organs. German lawyers have grounds to think that the 400 mark diesel fuel purchasers wanted to ship it to the pumps without refining it or paying taxes and customs duties.

Isn't really a spicy situation: an investigation is occurring in the FRG with regard to the legality of the deals at a price of 400 marks per tonne and at the same time in Russia they are labeling with shame those who respect the laws of their own and of a foreign country.

"Through 'Desseniko'," said Colonel L. Starovoytov, "we are not only freeing ourselves in a timely manner of depots in order not to disrupt the troop withdrawal schedule but we are also receiving aviation kerosene which is in extremely short supply in exchange for diesel fuel, the reserves of which were large. And this allows us to at least somehow support training flights and to maintain the combat readiness of the air force. Deliveries have been precisely organized. At the present time, we have even received more kerosene than they have hauled away diesel fuel.

So who needed to use illegal methods to undermine "Moseniko-Invest's" prestige, while revealing the holy of

holies of commerce, the secret of a deal and its core—the price, and one that is incorrect? It was enough to get in contact with the WGF or, what was simpler, to visit number 22 Malaya Kommunisticheskaya Street in Moscow where "Moseniko-Invest" is located, as the Ministry of Defense Central Financial and Rocket Fuel Directorates workers did in order to verify surreptitiously received information. But no one visited, no one talked with the joint venture's associates. The TsFU [Central Finance Directorate] and the TsRTG [Central Rocket Propellant and Fuel Directorate] did not detect anything suspicious in this deal.

Colonel L. Starovoytov is convinced that Russian lawyers and journalists were misled by "Moseniko-Invest's" Western competitors. Joint Venture General Director Vladimir Rakhmanin does not agree with that.

He thinks that "this work was too crude. I sense the signature of those who have not reconciled themselves to the transformations in society and in the army, those who initially bungled the determination of the super-rapid withdrawal of troops, almost like a fire sale, due to which the country has lost billions of dollars and now they are secretly attempting to throw a wrench in the works where we are managing to attain real positive results. Fortunately, "Moseniko" has an adequate reserve of durability in the sense of the trust of partners. For now the organized campaign of persecution and compromise has not had an impact on the joint venture's activities. Otherwise, this would be a question of real damage to the country which has received many millions.

**INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES****Russian-Ukrainian Agreement on Officer Corps**

92UM1235A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
26 Jun 92 p 1

[Text of agreement]

[Text]

**Agreement on the Organization of Training for the Officer Corps, Procedure for Transfer (Postings) and Discharge of Personnel From the Officer Corps and Warrant Officers**

The Russian Federation and Ukraine, hereinafter the "Agreeing Parties," taking into account their mutual vested interest in coordinating issues connected with the training, transfer (posting) and discharge of individuals in the officer corps and warrant officers, have agreed to the following:

**Article 1**

The Agreeing Parties will implement coordinated measures aimed at supporting the training and transfer (posting) of individuals in the officer corps and warrant officers, as well as their discharge from military service, in accordance with the legislation of the participating nations of this Agreement.

**Article 2**

The Agreeing Parties acknowledge the necessity of further utilization of the military educational institutions for the purpose of training the officer corps to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces, the Border Troops and other military formations of Russia and Ukraine. The training of military cadres will be accomplished as of 1992 by the military educational institutions of the participating nations by requisitions on a contract basis.

**Article 3**

The Agreeing Parties acknowledge the necessity of granting cadets and attendees the right to continue and complete training at the military educational institutions they entered before the signing of this Agreement without charge, and with the full completion of the teaching programs.

The Agreeing Parties are obligated to implement the exchange of cadets who have expressed a desire to be transferred from military educational institutions of Russia to the military educational institutions of Ukraine, and vice versa, in accordance with the legislation of the nations participating in the Agreement.

**Article 4**

The Agreeing Parties are obligated to accept all of the graduates of the military educational institutions who came to study before the signing of this Agreement who have expressed the desire and have grounds, in accordance with prevailing legislation, to complete their service in the Armed Forces of the chosen nation participating in this Agreement.

The conferring of the first officer rank to individuals who have expressed the desire to complete military service after completion of military educational institutions in the Armed Forces, Border Troops or other military formations

of the nations participating in this Agreement is performed by the heads of the corresponding ministries and agencies of Russia and Ukraine.

**Article 5**

The Agreeing Parties are obligated to implement, within a month from the day of signing of this Agreement, the exchange of objective information on the quantity of servicemen-citizens of the participating nations who are completing service in the Armed Forces, Border Troops and other military formations of Russia and Ukraine who have the right, and have expressed the desire, to be transferred to the other participating nation in this Agreement for the completion of further service.

**Article 6**

The transfer (posting) of individuals in the officer corps and warrant officers who have expressed the desire to be transferred for the further completion of military service from the Armed Forces and Border Troops, as well as other military formations, of Ukraine and vice versa, is performed by decision of the senior officers of the military structures of the corresponding states after the receipt of consent (request) from one of the Agreeing Parties.

Any pressure whatsoever on servicemen or the diminishment of their rights and liberties in connection with the decision made on a transfer must be ruled out.

**Article 7**

The Agreeing Parties are obligated to send all documents accounting for the individuals in the officer corps and warrant officers removed from the rolls of the Armed Forces, Border Troops and other military formations of Russia and Ukraine, and who have expressed a desire to move to a permanent place of residence from Russia to Ukraine and vice versa accordingly, to the Cadres Directorate of the corresponding ministries and agencies of the participating nations.

The Agreeing Parties are obligated not to impede servicemen in their selection of a place of residence in discharge from military service.

The discharge from military service of individuals in the officer corps and warrant officers who are selecting new places of residence after discharge is performed by orders from the officials where the servicemen are completing their service and in accordance with the prevailing legislation of the nations participating in the Agreement.

The removal of the indicated servicemen from the personnel rolls and their sending to the selected place of residence is made after their complete settlement.

**Article 8**

The Agreeing Parties take upon themselves the expenses connected with the movement of the servicemen for the completion of further military service or to a permanent place of residence, including the provision of passage and transfer documents, in the nations participating in this Agreement and guarantee the mutual receiving, servicing and support of air and motor transport involved in the movement of servicemen, the members of their families and their household effects.

The Russian Federation is obligated to furnish fully, in accordance with the law of ownership, hard-currency monetary upkeep for servicemen earlier sent on special duty from units stationed on the territory of Ukraine and who have expressed the desire to complete their further service in the Armed Forces, Border Troops and other military formations of Ukraine.

#### Article 9

The Agreeing Parties are obligated:

- to assist in devising mutually acceptable solutions for the exchange of housing among servicemen between the nations;
- to use the hard-currency appropriations allocated by Germany for the construction of housing for servicemen being withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces as determined by separate agreement between the Agreeing Parties.

#### Article 10

This agreement does not abrogate agreements reached earlier between the Chief Cadres Directorate of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on the organization of training for the officer corps, the procedure for the transfer (posting) and discharge of individuals in the officer corps and warrant officers.

The Agreement takes effect from the moment of its signing.

Completed in the city of Dagomys on 23 Jun 92.

[Signed] *Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation General Army P. Grachev*  
*Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General K. Morozov*

#### Question of 14th Army Maintaining Neutrality

92UM1226A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Jul 92 First edition pp 1,2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Colonel V. Zhitarenko: "Besieged Garrisons: Difficult Neutrality Situation of 14th Army in Dniester Area Conflict"]

[Text] I jotted down the following: Azimuth, 51; Range, 30; Elevation, one mil; Speed, ... Those were the data echoed into the receiver by Colonel G. Dobryanskiy. Then he blurted out a nonregulation command: Shoot!

Ten seconds or so passed, after which the battery commander reported: "Burst on elevation of 3 mils; target on screen split into two parts; target destruction assumed."

"What do you mean by assumed? Was it destroyed or not?"

It seemed that the voice of the chief of the 14th Army PVO [Air Defense] does at times exhibit irritation. But there was no real reason to be irritated, since it was too cloudy to permit visual observation of the launch results. It appeared that the target was one of the latest MiG-29s, one which had made a penetration on its way to the petroleum installation in the area of Blizhnyy Khutor. Some nice little "gift" the Moldovan side obtained as a result of "privatization" of the previously unified Army. Now there was something with which to bomb the Dniester area and deliver a punch to the 14th Army, to boot. However, even if the target were

destroyed but fell to earth beyond the limits of the left bank, woe to the battery commander—Colonel Dobryanskiy—for doing something as terrible as hitting a difficult target!

The telephone rang, and Dobryanskiy had to furnish an explanation about the cloudy conditions, the superaircraft operating from "there," etc.

Another battery command post came on the air: "Azimuth, 11..."

A repetition of the same thing, the same as yesterday and the day before that. Starting in the morning, penetrations made by single fighters capable of carrying bombs and rockets. Then it was night, but this time the radars indicated a "mass bombing assault" on Tiraspol and Bendery consisting of several dozen aircraft—helicopters, judging by the low speeds. However, Dobryanskiy guessed the kind of trick that was being played and decided not to launch any missiles at all, for the enemy had employed air balloons to release corner reflectors. That incidentally had been accomplished from Ukrainian territory. It was subsequently determined that a Romanian An-24 had flown over that territory, supposedly in error—and had been chased out of the Ukrainian sky by local interceptors, but not before it was able to drop the decoys, which an easterly wind carried straight to Tiraspol. Radiosondes were found and brought to the PVO command post in the morning. So that the adversary is not an easy one to beat. He is—Oh!—so smart, so that you, Dobryanskiy, better figure out what to do; try to think of a way to protect the Dniester area residents and the garrisons of the 14th from continued bombings!

"Azimuth, 47..."

The enemy's principal mission was to blow up the petroleum installation located at Blizhnyy Khutor. This would deprive the entire left bank and the Army of fuel, cause fires in Tiraspol, incite the city's residents to panic. Then Bendery, Parkany and other populated places are subjected to more raids. Is it by mere accident that Russian garrisons are stationed there? That is another reason for Dobryanskiy's explicit order: Shoot them down!

Reports coming out of Chisinau stated that a combat helicopter made a difficult landing there, with its 42 punctures and a crew that required immediate admittance to hospital. Word has it that an antenna delivered to headquarters of the 14th that came from "that side" belongs to the MiG-29 that had been shot down. That is the word, but Dobryanskiy had no "absolute" proof that his combat action had been so effective. The proof may be indirect, but there is one thing that can be said with certainty: not a single hit was made on a facility during the time the Army PVO was in action.

"Personnel have not slept for six days. Permission granted to organize rest periods in shifts?" was a question I heard coming out of the receiver.

"Are you also asking me to issue orders from here as to when your subordinates are to eat their meals?" asked Dobryanskiy, once more losing his patience. No one knows the last time he got some shut-eye. But he does treat the officers under his command kindly. This, in spite of the fact that here, at the PVO command post, there is no end to telephone ringing, reports, orders.

I noted that the radio sets in other sections and services of Army headquarters would tune into "Dobryanskiy's frequency" from time to time; it appeared that the besieged garrison was under a great amount of pressure, with only the PVO doing something about the situation.

The vociferous campaign issuing forth from Chisinau relative to the "14th Army of Occupation" provides no answer to the question: Who forced this Army to make preparations for actual combat? And for its PVO subunits to employ missiles?

Who else but the Moldovan side dispatched a raiding party against the Tiraspol Airport, where Warrant Officer Yu. Babkin was killed in a firefight as he was guarding an aircraft parking area? Who else but that side fired upon a vehicle and wounded Major V. Kozlov, who was trying to break out of the unit? Was in not in the besieged Bendery fortress that Warrant Officer H. Gaytsev was wounded? The writer of this article, located there in those days, after 19 June, saw all kinds of reports coming in virtually every hour: Private Krivoruchko wounded by mortar projectile rounds hitting the chemical protection barracks; Private Klepikov, in the mess hall of the same area; Private Kuznetsov of a float bridge regiment wounded in the Tiraspol garrison; Warrant Officer Prikhochenko and Private Korostylev taken hostage in Bendery, etc. The list could be doubled, even tripled. The impression created is that the Moldovan side did its utmost to provoke the 14th Army into taking some responsive action. Until it achieved its aim. However, nerves are presently on edge.

I would say that it takes quite a bit of self-control for commanders of units and subunits to watch shells and mortar projectiles heading straight for them and toward their subordinates, all the while heeding the voice of reason rather than of the emotions, since giving in to the impulse to engage in a full-scale firefight with the Moldovan Army would threaten to engulf all of Europe in flames. That is why they unflinchingly observed the neutrality order. It is difficult for me to imagine the self-restraint required, while being "in the dark" about what has happened to your family after the bloody fight initiated by the Moldovan Army in Bendery; after the latter's aircraft attacked the Tiraspol bridge; uncomplainingly carrying out one's duties related to "reminding the garrison officers and soldiers of the requirement for not taking counteraction." One who is "in the dark" but who does the "reminding" is Lieutenant Colonel N. Strus, who is unit deputy commander for work with personnel. Yes, someone did lift his spirits by telling him that he thought he saw the officer's family among the refugees, but did that person say that merely to provide some comfort? The lieutenant colonel decided to take decisive action: He reported to his superior for the purpose of cancelling an order—one already cut—transferring him out of the Dniester area. Now he cannot imagine any duty station other than where he is located, so that he can struggle against evil.

And so, does the 14th Army engage in combat activity or not? After my visit to Tiraspol, I read in the KOMSOMOL-SKAYA PRAVDA that "there was no truth to the reports that the PVO is firing at Moldovan aircraft." I would have believed it, had I not spent half the day at Dobryanskiy's command point and not seen the missile launch near

Parkany. Why bury one's head in the sand? It is not better to admit that the 14th has no recourse but to fire at aircraft carrying death?

The Army does engage in activities, since the wounded must be rescued, and the military hospital accepts persons other than military. Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service V. Pomerantsevskiy, the former medical services chief at the hospital, who even after receiving his discharge order remained at his post, was weary as he cited for me the statistics of admissions after actions: From the Army units there were only eight; but there were 30 Guardsmen, 24 Cossacks, 27 Home Guard members. Another influx of wounded was admitted into the city hospital. Pomerantsev made no mention of any military men who may have been included in the admissions, since, in wartime, who separates the victims into "ours" and "theirs"?

The Army does engage in activities, for the raiding parties present a danger to city streets as well as garrisons, which is why the military commandant is on guard.

The Army assisted in evacuating the residents after the genocide perpetrated by the Moldovan invaders in Bendery. It provided transportation. The Army set up field kitchens for persons remaining in the city, since Bendery was threatened with hunger.

In the final third of June, the Army stepped up its efforts to effect more rapid removal of ammunition from the Tiraspol garrison to a safer location. In the existing situation, the residents of Tiraspol had no idea of what misfortune could befall them if even only one aircraft from Chisinau would have reached the depot. Headquarters of the 14th did realize the danger, which incidentally was another reason to engage aerial targets.

Things are being said and written to the effect that some officers of the 14th participated in combat activities that took place in June, siding with Dniester area residents. All my attempts to ascertain the facts produced nothing. Why should anyone admit to participating? The order called for maintaining neutrality! Stories in circulation had it that there was a standard 59th Division crew in a disabled and totally destroyed tank, now partially covered over, located at the Bendery bridge. What actually happened was that it was Guardsmen manning the tank, which was one of the eight that had been seized on the 20 June by women, thousands of whom surrounded and picketed the 175th Motorized Rifle Regiment, after which they overran the vehicle pool.

Rumor also has it that it was the 59th Division's artillery that subjected Moldovan Army columns to an artillery barrage as the latter moved rapidly in the direction of Bendery. However, the protectors of the Dniester area—Guardsmen, Cossacks—possess their own artillery.

Finally, also going around is the story that the only saving grace of the command personnel of the Guards and Home Guard is the hurried removal of many officers from the 14th the evening before, and even during, the conflicts, with the order allegedly coming "directly from Moscow." The story even went so far as to cite names: I. Moskoglo and V. Kapitan. What I determined was that these engineer officers had been discharged into the reserve long before that time; that they had served for a considerable length of time in the

fire service. They both died in June. The Dniester area people referred to them as "our heroes," and he who knows how the majority of local residents feel about the 14th Army understands the why and wherefore.

The 14th Army's neutrality was perceived here to be nothing less than betrayal of the local populace.

The picketing of the 59th Division continued long after the eight tanks were seized. It was not even necessary for the thousands of women to kneel on the ground. It would have been sufficient for merely one of them to do so, holding an icon, making her "Soldier, protect us!" appeal. A woman wearing a pitiful kerchief and glasses, kneeling there for an hour, two hours, perhaps even five hours, with cannon fire still resounding from the direction of Bendery.

There apparently is some truth to the belief that there would have been far fewer casualties in Bendery had the 14th received orders to put an end to the bloodshed. But the Army received no such orders—through no fault of its own, and having Russia drawn into a large-scale war without orders would have placed the Army into the category of anarchic freebooters. What I am saying here, incidentally, actually has to do with "high level" politics. My purpose here is to restrict myself to what I personally saw on that piece of the earth—in blockaded Dniester area, at the besieged garrisons of the Russian Army.

One thing with which I definitely disagree is what some articles published in Russian newspapers and some television programs have said in the last few days: More references to "total inactivity" of the 14th on the one hand, and "excessive independence" of Major General A. Lebed, its new commander, on the other.

The matter as I see it is quite different: It is one of a changing situation involving the besieged garrisons in the area.

[Photos not reproduced; common caption reads as follows: The Moldovan Army was not sparing of ammunition in its storming of Bendery or of its peaceful residents, for that matter, with a large number of them treated by field hospitals such as this one—set up in a bus—as shown in the photos. - Translator]

#### **Russian Statement on Attack on Russian Troops in Armenia**

*92UM1261A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jul 92 p 1*

["Statement by the Government of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] On 10 July 1992 in the city of Kumayri (Leninakan) an Armenian armed group of bandits attacked a motorized convoy of the airborne troop brigade of the Russian Armed Forces en route to its station in the city of Kutaisi. As a result of this attack, five Russian servicemen died in the line of duty.

On behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs resolutely protests this monstrous crime. The Russian military procuracy is tasked, by agreement with the Armenian side, with direct participation in the investigation.

The Government of the Russian Federation takes into account the fact that the Government of the Republic of Armenia has denounced this criminal act and expressed its consent to the Russian military procuracy's participation in the investigation.

The Government of the Russian Federation expects of the Armenian side a full investigation and the punishment of the guilty parties; in the event this does not take place, it will bring into question the future fulfillment by the Russian side of the agreements it has previously signed with the Republic of Armenia.

Following the government's instruction, the command of the Armed Forces of Russia has put the Russian military units and subunits on an increased level of readiness with the purpose of fending off any new attacks on military objects and threats to the life, honor, and dignity of Russian servicemen and members of their families.

The Government of the Russian Federation expresses its sincere condolences to the families and relatives of the slain soldiers.

[Dated] Moscow, 12 July 1992

### **UKRAINE**

#### **Firm Donates Money for Construction of Accommodations for Servicemen**

*92UM1252B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 16 Jun 92 p 1*

[Article from the Editorial Staff of the newspaper NARODNAYA ARMIYA: "A Gift from the Construction Workers of Ivano-Frankovsk to the Soldiers of Ukraine"]

[Text] The editors of NARODNAYA ARMIYA have received many documents showing the ever-increasing attention of the Ukrainian people to their Armed Forces which are presently living through a difficult period of their development.

Recently we received yet another interesting document, a copy of a payment authorization for 200,000 rubles earmarked for the construction of housing for servicemen. Such a charitable action had been made by the State Construction-Installation Firm Ivano-Frankovskstroy [Ivano-Frankovsk Construction] of the Ukrainian State Construction Corporation Ukrstroy [Ukrainian Construction]. The firm's General Director M. Melnik in a letter to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov states that the Ivano-Frankovskstroy collective had decided to work an extra day-off and the earned money was to be transferred to build housing for the servicemen. In addition, the firm had made available one apartment for officers returning from other CIS states to Ukraine.

We at the editorial offices (where incidentally, one-half of us journalist officers is also without an apartment) with understandable excitement became acquainted with the arriving documents. Of course, the gift contribution will not resolve the housing problem. Nevertheless, it is very pleasant to experience such a noble attitude by the rank-and-file Ukrainian workers to us, the servicemen. We join in the words of sincere gratitude voiced by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense to the collective of the Ivano-Frankovskstroy Firm.

We shall describe the labor activities of the firm on the pages of NARODNAYA ARMIYA as in the next few days our correspondents will travel to Ivano-Frankovsk.

### Military Trade Union Conference on Social Protection of Workers

92UM1252A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
16 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by P. Dotsenko, member of the Presidium of the Council of the Trade Union for Workers in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and V. Titenko, head of the Organizational Department of the Trade Union Council: "The Most Important Function is Defending the Interests of the People"]

[Text] The trade union bodies, in carrying out their protective function, proceed from the primacy of the interests of the workers over the interests of the administration and the state as a whole, relying on the provisions of the laws and enforceable enactments. This was again demonstrated by the Council of the Trade Union for the Workers in the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the enlarged session of its Plenum which discussed two main problems—ensuring a just wage and a draft agreement between the Ministry of Defense and the Trade Union Council.

The Trade Union of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is fighting so that, under the conditions of inflation, the increase in prices for the main consumer goods should be compensated for on the basis of a just income indexation. Recently there has been an increased flow of complaints and requests from the workers on the question of unjust wages and sent to the Trade Union Council and the Financial Administration. One of the reasons for the increase in complaints from the workers of the KECh [billeting unit] in the Carpathian MD has been, for example, the serious mistakes in drawing up the staff schedules and the lack of attention on the part of the officials at the district Billeting Directorate to the needs and requests of the people. As a consequence of this there has been an explosion of social tension in the designated labor collectives. This has been expressed in just indignation and in the sending of a delegation to the superior state bodies and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for voicing a protest. Conversation at the Trade Union Council with the members of the designated delegation have convinced us that the rights and interests of the workers in the military sphere can be defended only by the Ministry of Defense and the Trade Union for the Workers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The Chief of the Department of Labor and Wages under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, N. Lukyanchuk, gave a report at the session of the Trade Union Council Presidium. He provided information on the decree of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers on increasing the wages of employees of the troop units, enterprises, organizations and institutions operating on estimated-budget financing. This enforceable enactment as of 1 May of the current year introduced a coefficient of 2.25. At the same time the question was settled of equalizing the wage level for the army workers in comparison with the workers in analogous professions (positions) in civilian collectives by introducing a coefficient of 5.

Thus, by the joint efforts of the trade union bodies with the Command of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, a definite step ahead has been taken to defend the social interests of

the Armed Forces employees under the conditions of the military reform and the transition to market relations.

The adopted decree has instructed the Presidium of the Trade Union Council to increase its work in the area of further improving wages for the employees of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

A working commission has been set up headed by G. Kirey, the deputy chairman of the Trade Union Council, for completing the work together with the commission of the Ministry of Defense. It was recommended that the draft decree include the following important questions: increasing the length of vacations; paying compensation for travelling and living in the contaminated Chernobyl zones; improving the supply of special clothing and other problems which touch on the rights and interests of the employees.

A major result of the work done by the Constituent Congress of the Trade Unions for Workers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was the organizational solidarity of the trade union movement on the basis of the unity of actions to defend the socioeconomic and labor interests of the workers. This can be seen from the transfer of the new trade union organizations to the Trade Union Council. The Presidium took the decision to accept for providing trade union services for the Academy imeni Govorov and the 408th Military Hospital as well as certain troop units of the Ukrainian Navy.

Pursuant to the Congress decisions, they have abolished the trade union territorial committee of the Kiev MD and the trade union council of the Ukrainian Ground Forces. All of this will make it possible to improve the operating style of the trade union bodies in directing the primary trade union organizations. At the next council plenum they will also examine and approve a renewed trade union structure.

The presidium also heard information from the Chairman of the Council of the Trade Union for the Workers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces D. Miroshnichenko on the council's work after the trade union's constituent congress. Among the major measures, the following were mentioned:

- broadening of contacts of the Trade Union Council with the leadership of the nation, the government and the Armed Forces. This was expressed in the preparations for a roundtable on the problems of the trade union movement with the participation of the Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk, the governmental bodies, the Ministry of Defense and the major trade union bodies;
- upon a decision of the Council Presidium, at present trade union meetings are being held in the primary organizations on the results of the congress with delegates from the trade union forum giving reports at these;
- the council took part in a conference on social security held in the town of Uzhgorod;
- significant work has been done by the Trade Union Council on preparing such important documents as the agreement between the Ministry of Defense and the Trade Union Council as well as the draft order of the Ukrainian minister of Defense on the Trade Union Employees of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. At the time that the given article was being written, it was learned that this order had been signed on 2 June 1992 with the number 89.

### Development of Ukraine's State Borders

92UM1237A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
26 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by Candidates of Historical Sciences Vasily Boyechko, Oksana Ganzha and Boris Zakharchuk, staff members of the Institute of the History of Ukraine of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, from GOLOS UKRAYINA: "The State Borders of Ukraine"]

[Excerpts] Borders are an integral trait of any state. They are a mandatory element that facilitates the formation of a unified state-territorial organism. A state cannot ensure its sovereign right to organize its own political and socio-economic system without clearly defined and well-defended borders.

The history of the formation of the state borders of Ukraine is closely linked, on the one hand, with the ethnic settling of Ukrainians and, on the other, with the conception and emergence of Ukrainian statehood. [passage omitted]

The changes in the borders of Ukraine in the postwar period have chiefly been connected with the transfer of the Crimea to it. In order to understand the reasons for such a "generous gift" on the part of the Supreme Soviets of the RSFSR and USSR, one must turn to the history of the Crimea during the Soviet period. The Crimean ASSR was created as part of the RSFSR on 18 Oct 21. There were more than 720,000 people of 59 nationalities living in it. They included 51.5 percent Russians and Ukrainians, 25 percent Crimean Tatars, 6.8 percent Jews, 5.9 percent Germans and 9.9 percent representatives of other nationalities. The task of resurrecting the economy, which had been destroyed by the civil war, faced the government of the new republic. But the Crimean ASSR was unable to do this with its own powers. Considerable capital investments were required. The RSFSR was in no hurry to do this. The Presidium of the TsIK [Central Executive Committee] of the Crimean ASSR, in its search for sources to supplement its state budget, on 6 Mar 23 considered the question of the northern borders and unilaterally decided to annex to the Crimea 10 volosts from the Genichesk and Dnieper uyezds of Ukraine. Without having an opportunity to quote that document, we will nonetheless dwell on the main arguments of the desired "annexation" that are cited in a report note sent by the Commission on Issues of the Administrative and Economic Regionalization of the Crimea to the VUTsIK [All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee] in November of 1928. The first argument is the fact that the aforementioned uyezds had used to be a part of the Tavriisk Guberniya and, in the opinion of the authors of the report, was closely tied economically with the Crimea. They themselves refute this, however, in the next sentence: "...and while during the period of hunger (having in mind the hunger of 1921-23) the actual gravitation of the portions of the indicated uyezds to the Crimea was not sufficiently observed, with the permanent elimination of the hunger this gravitation, as in the past, will become stronger and more insistent." There were later references to the necessity of a stable source for the

local budget with the aim of upholding the reputation of the Crimea as the All-Russian Sanatorium (obviously at the expense of the grain-producing uyezds of Ukraine and the salt fields of the Genichesk gulf—*Authors*). The next argument should have hit the mark without reservation: "...the low population of the Crimea," the report emphasizes, "poses somewhat of an apprehension pertaining to drafting into the army." So then, undermining the defensive capability of the Soviet Union, no more and no less. The report, along with the almost ultimatum-like demands of the authors, was trying to make the case that tearing away these territories from Ukraine would be a good thing for it too, since at the time, through increasing the length of the border with the Crimea, it would be able to obtain more imported goods from the peninsula. The Crimean authorities of the time, despite such *démarches*, were unable to obtain the Ukrainian territories they so desired.

The military operations and German occupation during World War II were a considerable blow to the economy of the Crimea, and ultimate devastation was caused by the displacement of the indigenous population—the Crimean Tatars—in 1944. Doctor of Legal Sciences Professor V. Butkevich gave a convincing picture of the economic ruin of the Crimea in the postwar period in a series of articles published at the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992 in LITERATURNYA UKRAYINA. We would only note that at the beginning of 1954 the sowed areas of the Crimea had declined by 70,000 hectares. The harvest of melons and gourds, vegetables, potatoes and tobacco had declined compared to the prewar period. Most agricultural machinery was in terrible condition, unrepaired and unable to go out to the fields. They were short some 1,100 tractors. The grain sowing plan was not fulfilled. The Crimean Oblast had a shortfall of more than six million rubles of taxes in 1954. The domestic sphere was extremely neglected. There were only 34 bread shops on the whole peninsula. There were not enough hospitals, nurseries and kindergartens or schools. This testified irrefutably to the fact that the RSFSR could not offer the necessary aid—material, technical and financial—to the Crimean Oblast. Under these conditions the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the UkSSR Supreme Soviet made the decision to transfer the Crimea to Ukraine. There is the gift from the "generous Ukrainian" N. Khrushchev to his native Ukraine on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of its reunification with Russia. Although some contemporary politicians are trying to see the "gift" as what it later became. Today they would very much like it back.

The disintegration of the USSR and the proclamation of independence have transformed Ukraine into a real subject of international law. Its territorial boundaries, which were conclusively formulated during the time of existence of the UkSSR, have been transformed into the boundaries of an independent state in accordance with international principles of legal succession. Their inviolability is guaranteed by international law, and the Helsinki accord in particular. Any attempt to review those borders on the part of anyone is a threat not only to the stability of the building of an independent Ukraine, but also to all of the processes of peace in Europe.

## ARMS TRADE

### Sergeyev Comment on Arms Market in Russia

92UM1222A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 7 Jul 92 p 4

[Article by N. Sergeyev: "Plundered Arsenal: Why the Underground Arms Market is Prospering"]

[Text] In any city market you can buy an army assault rifle, pistol or grenade without ceremony. Even rocket launchers and tanks are being stolen from military units. There are more and more criminal barrels in the hands of "boyeviks" and mafiosi of all levels. To what does this lead?

The underground arms market today devours everything from a Nagant revolver dug up at the site of past battles by "black pathfinders" to a machinegun of the latest modification. "Boyeviks" of one of the Moscow groupings used a rocket launcher in the latest "sorting-out." Driving up to the office of their enemies on Rustaveli Street in broad daylight, they fired the rocket launcher at it through the window of a high-speed "eight." The "Intercept" plan implemented by operations services of Petrovka 38 produced nothing: the bandits dissolved in the city of many millions.

In another case a killer was apprehended in Ramenskoye after another "sorting-out" with a Kalashnikov. It was determined that the assault rifle had been brought from Novosibirsk Oblast especially for performing this "piece-work." Several months have gone by since then and it can be said with confidence that now there is no need to carry a barrel from Siberia for such an operation. The criminal world's saturation with combat weapons has grown by many times.

...The shortage of an assault rifle was discovered in the settlement of Kubinka. It was established that the chief of one of the unit services had taken weapons from the depot repeatedly without authorization. Ammunition, battle noise simulators and signal flares were found during a search of his place. In that same month a soldier stole two machineguns from an APC (!) in a military unit in the settlement of Mosrentgen, which he then sold to the director of a small enterprise. Assault rifles, a carbine, pistols and ammunition were stolen from a military unit depot in Balashikhinskiy Rayon of Podmoskovye...

In late May a shortage of 15 assault rifles and six pistols was discovered at the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School training center depot. Criminal investigation associates apprehended cadets, who admitted that they had pulled down a brick wall of the depot while on guard duty and had stolen the weapons for resale. Fortunately all stolen barrels were found.

There are tens of thousands of small arms barrels—so-called emergency supplies—stored in enormous military depots. An inventory is taken approximately once a decade in the arsenals. They are guarded by warrant officers with very modest (and for present times ridiculous) pay. Even if the disappearance of weapons is discovered sooner or later, it will simply be impossible to follow the trail to the end, just as it is impossible to imagine the present scale of weapon thefts in the Army if only approximately. This information is carefully concealed, since criminal cases are being conducted by the military procuracy, which sacredly protects

the honor of the uniform. Only the most unbelievable scandals become known, such as the one which happened in Likhovitsy: no less than 640 Tokarev Tula pistols disappeared from the depot!

How many illegal weapons are in people's hands now? No one will name a precise figure, and not even because it increases by several hundreds each day. It is simply that no one can or wants to tell the truth about the scale of this calamity. But the fact is, killers, bandits, robbers and "boyeviks" are being armed. In the best case they are bodyguards and businessmen frightened by the debauch of crime. Weapons do not fall into the hands of law-abiding citizens, and not just because they respect the law; they simply cannot afford them.

According to Russian MVD data, there are now some 10,000 barrels of rifled arms being hunted. But this figure, we repeat, does not conform to the real state of affairs. A combat weapon definitely is part of the gentleman's wardrobe of any stern lad today. Militia associates recently prevented "diplomatic talks" of two criminal groupings in the Skazka Restaurant at the 42nd km post of the Yaroslavl Highway. Three Tokarev Tula pistols, a Browning pistol, revolver, assault rifle, sawed-off shotgun, three homemade devices for firing small-caliber cartridges and even a German crossbow were confiscated from the bandits.

But never mind the gathering of two bands! Recently I took part in a night raid on the Central Market together with associates of a department of the Moscow Office of Criminal Investigation for Fighting Especially Dangerous Criminal Groupings. Three sawed-off shotguns, two revolvers, 18 live grenades and ammunition were confiscated in just one cafe, the "On Tsvetnoy Boulevard," where two Azerbaijanis were holding a warm conversation with a pair of painted blondes.

The USSR has crumbled. Today we live in a new country with different political and economic relations. Probably the only thing left for us from the great power is the army of many millions. According to official statistics, people of more than 100 nationalities serve in it. Today military subunits are being torn by ethnic strifes and mass desertion. Officers, at one time the nobility and pride of the country, now receive less than cleaning women in the Moscow Subway. They are taken hostage in exchange for terrorist "boyeviks," they are disarmed, and they are insulted. Everyday troubles add to their humiliations and hopelessness of service. Families who just yesterday had been well off and had a roof over their heads have been transformed into aliens and occupiers or even enemies. Under these conditions officers simply are in no condition to keep an eye on the safekeeping of weapons.

The number of weapon thefts in Army subunits in the Transcaucasus has grown by more than threefold in comparison with 1990! Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Chechnya long ago became major arsenals of stolen weapons or of weapons taken by force from the military. And the Army command is incapable of doing anything even with documentary confirmation of this. And is it really only the Army command?

Everyone remembers the case of the seizure of a bus with 23 passengers by armed bandits in Mineralnyye Vody. The criminals threatened to burn altogether innocent people

alive if their demands were not fulfilled, and their demands were to enable them to escape in Chechnya. And the best Russian MVD forces, the renowned Alpha, were forced to retreat. The bandits' names are known, as is their location, but it is impossible to "get" them for now.

According to theatrical laws, a weapon that has appeared on the stage must fire. The present situation long has resembled a theater of the absurd. Guns now fire before the curtain rises.

### **Economist Akimov Argues Case for Arms Exports**

*PM1007154692 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 10 Jul 92 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences Sergey Akimov, plus editorial postscript, under the rubric "Conversion": "If People Are Buying Weapons, Someone Has To Sell Them"]

[Text] Today, when the question "to be or not to be" has to be answered for our defense complex, the problem of evaluating the expediency of exporting our country's arms is very acute. On the one hand, the Russian leadership has apparently recognized the importance of these exports in extricating the country's economy from the crisis, as recent statements by President B.N. Yeltsin and members of the government attest. On the other hand, certain public circles are actively advocating that this form of business be restricted, expressing an extremely negative attitude to it.

For instance, A.V. Yablokov, Russian Federation state counselor on policy in the sphere of ecology and health care, notes that "the large-scale trade in weapons lessens incentives to convert weapons production and only prolongs the agony of the militarized economy" (IZVESTIYA, 23 April 1992). Ye. Aleksandrov, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Professor V. Kolbin stress that exporting the output of our defense sector "feeds conflicts" (IZVESTIYA, 16 June 1992) and is therefore inhumane. Furthermore, the authors add, excessive weapons sales have led to a situation where these weapons start being fired against their own people.

These arguments are entirely justified in the global international context. But in relation to the country's internal problems, a number of significant points have not been taken into account here. After all, exportation is a multifaceted process, and in order to assess its expediency it is necessary to take into account various factors—military, political, and economic.

As for military-political factors, arms sales and the creation of a reliable support system to ensure its proper functioning enable supplier states to strengthen their positions in various regions of the world in accordance with their national interests.

From the economic viewpoint the fulfillment of export orders is an important means of maintaining the optimum workload in the military industry, preserving employment, and obtaining additional currency, as well as reducing expenditure on the acquisition of weapons for the national armed forces.

This is particularly relevant to our defense industry, whose capacities exceed our own army's requirements; which was

historically the focus of the best intellectual and technological resources; and which finds itself in a critical position due to an ill-considered "disarmament" campaign and drastic restrictions on state finance. One might have hoped that the crisis itself would push our defense sector toward large-scale conversion. But conversion needs vast resources, which are not available. However, the necessary depth of conversion has yet to be determined, in the absence of a Russian military doctrine. In these circumstances large-scale conversion could undermine the country's defense sufficiency, yet the situation today is marked by instability and armed conflicts in "hot spots" both in the CIS and worldwide.

Therefore the most rational solution today is the effective exportation of our arms, and this must, of course, be carried out taking into account all national commitments and international accords. We must soberly recognize that the output of the Russian defense sector belongs to that small group of items which, like raw materials and energy resources, are in high demand on the world market. Selling it sensibly could help resolve the problems of the military-industrial complex itself, and of the country's economy as a whole.

It is no accident that in virtually all the leading Western countries very keen attention is devoted to building up the export potential of the military industry. Weapons exports are regarded as a very important means of maintaining the industry's potential. Even in the period of disarmament. Thus, in the United States in the current decade the proportion of total military output that goes for export will increase to 20-25 percent, compared with 11 percent in 1982-1988. In Britain the proportion of military output exported is reaching 25-35 percent; in France it is 40 percent, in Italy 57 percent, and in the FRG 20-25 percent. Even in peaceful Austria and Switzerland, which are centers of disarmament talks, 85 percent and 25 percent respectively of the military output produced in those countries is exported.

Nor should we reject the realities. It should be admitted that these inhumane exports are determined by demand on the international market. It should be realized that unilaterally refusing to sell weapons will not set an example for the many other suppliers, it will only exacerbate our own position. Russia's place will be taken by competitors. In fact, this is already happening. The ending of our deliveries to Libya is being compensated for by an increase in exports of Chinese weapons to that country; in Finland and the East European countries Soviet models of arms are beginning to be replaced by Western—mainly American—models. This turn of events is leading to economic losses for us, and also to an expansion of the presence of leading Western countries in regions directly adjacent to Russia. Along with our own weapons, Romanian weapons are widely used in Moldova, and Iranian and Turkish weapons in Transcaucasia.

The problem of restricting the proliferation of weapons in the world, which rightly worries the world public, can only be tackled on a joint basis, taking into account the opinion of both producers and consumers. And if Western countries are really so worried about the militarized nature of our economy, they should take an active part in financing Russian conversion programs. Otherwise the production

and export of high-tech defense products should be seen as our speciality within the framework of the international division of labor.

The main thing, where this problem is concerned, is not to allow uncontrolled and unregulated arms exports, which could undermine Russia's prestige in the world and damage its national interests. It is therefore necessary as soon as possible to draw up a normative base clearly regulating all aspects of activity in the sphere of the weapons trade, formulate a state policy defining the main priorities, and in general create a well-oiled mechanism of state monitoring of this difficult form of business. [Akimov ends]

From the editorial office: In publishing this article we realize that other views of the problem of the weapons trade exist, some of them diametrically opposed. However, in today's world there is obviously no wholly satisfactory solution to this problem. It can only be a question of minimizing the inevitable costs. And here every authoritative opinion is certainly useful—whether “for” or “against.”

### World Acceptance of Arms Quality Seen Leading to Greater Profit

924C1892A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 28, 8 Jul 92 p 10

[Article by Andrey Filippov; date and place not given: “Let Us Stamp the ‘Kalashnikov’ Too! Our Light Pistol Cartridge Exchanged for ‘Panasonic’ in West European Countries”]

[Text] This fall, as expected, Russia will join the Brussels Convention on the mutual recognition of test stamps on hand firearms. A testing station was created in June at the shooting range in Mytishchi, the State Certification Center, whose activity is expected to bring Russia a minimum of 2 million dollars a year.

Where does the money come from? The fact is that to this day we have been selling foreign dealers the famous hunting guns, the “Tulochka” and “Izhevka,” which are instantly snatched up in Western gun shops, at so-called incentive prices: about 50-70 dollars apiece. A little while later, they are displayed to buyers in the West, but are more expensive by a factor of ten. The same story goes for target pistols and cartridges, which comprise no small item in our small-arms export (hundreds of thousands of rifles and pistols a year). The capitalists raised the prices, because our arms, after arrival from Russia, passed a comprehensive quality test at their experimental stations. The stamp of the Brussels Convention is received only after this. We have been paying 2 million dollars annually for these tests.

The commissioning of the testing station in Mytishchi will leave these millions in Russia. Moreover, recognition of the Moscow stamp by 20 member countries of the Brussels Convention sharply raises the price for our hunting shot-guns and rifles in the world. One rifle will cost about a thousand dollars on the average. The director of the Permanent Bureau of the Permanent International Commission on Testing of Hand Firearms (PMK), Mr. Mario Tsenti, who visited the arms plants near Moscow and the shooting range at the start of June, was satisfied with the level of technology and with the fact that the regime associates did not prevent him from “seeing what he wanted,” even places where, until last year, the powder was secret. It must be said,

the quality of this powder in the world is rated so highly, that a member of the USSR shooting team was once offered a Panasonic videocassette recorder for one pistol cartridge.

Will the new price of the small-arms be reflected in the material position of the workers who produce them? A. Averin, first deputy chairman of Gosstandart of Russia, believes that the basic share of the currency receipts for the arms should go to those who produce them, in particular, the Klimovskiy Stamping Plant and other enterprises in the Department of the Defense Industry, and 14 percent of the currency—to the Russian budget.

The arms were sold at incentive prices because the secrecy at the production plants did not enable us to join the Brussels Convention. Receiving the right to stamp small-arms is the first step for many Russian goods, not just for arms, into the civilized international market.

Now specialists at Gosstandart of Russia are having difficulty answering the question of how many millions of dollars the right to stamp Kalashnikov assault rifles, Makarov pistols, machine guns, tanks, submarines, and so forth will bring Russia...

### DEFENSE INDUSTRY

#### Avtomaika Head on Conversion Problems

PM1407155092 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET  
in Swedish 12 Jul 92 (NARINGSGLIV SECTION) p 3

[Report on interview with Avtomatika head Nikolay Semichatov by Mats Thoren in Yekaterinburg; no date given]

[Text] Yekaterinburg—Not even one of Russia's most advanced electronics enterprises, Avtomatika, is succeeding in attracting Western companies into cooperation and investment. In the absence of state support cooperation with the West is the last hope of acquiring the resources for new and profitable production. Now an enterprise that was once the pride of the Soviet Union is threatened with extinction.

Nikolay Semichatov is head of Avtomatika in Yekaterinburg—one of Russia's most technology-intensive industries. His office is cluttered with citations for achievements in the Soviet space program. Membership of the Academy of Sciences confirms that Semichatov belongs to the old empire's absolute technical and industrial elite.

Now he does not know how he is to find the money for his 14,000 employees' wages after the summer. Moscow has left him to sort out his enterprise's future alone.

A sense of tragedy can be sensed in the eyes of the old engineer as he broods under the portrait of Lenin.

“We have to find orders which will pay immediately. For because of the policies pursued in the past we have no capital saved up. On 31 December every year we always received the necessary funds from Moscow for the coming year. Last year we received nothing.”

A decision to cut personnel by 30 percent has already been made. For many employees their summer vacations will be compulsorily extended.

“Unfortunately people in Moscow seem to think that enterprises should manage the conversion to civilian production alone. In reality it is obvious that investment is needed. If

we are to begin new production we have to have money until we start to receive payment. Today all of Russian industry is without start-up capital."

His disappointment is easy to understand. For many years he has worked loyally to meet the country's need for advanced military systems. Now this high standard of technology is no longer needed. Avtomatika's only customer, the state, has abandoned it, without leaving any transitional funds. The new civilian customers to which the enterprise is forced to turn have neither demand nor purchasing power.

He stands helplessly by as he watches his life's work ruined—the enterprise for which he has worked since 1953. He can discern no policy for industry.

It is possible to borrow money on the open market, but with annual interest rates of between 40 and 80 percent borrowing is out of the question apart from very short-term loans.

Nor do Avtomatika's customers have any money.

"Only the producers of raw materials are earning any money today."

Avtomatika's component costs have increased several times over. The enterprise's own production costs and taxation have also increased, but to a lesser extent. The final price of goods is too high for the customers, Semichatov said. Even the toys, which now account for 40 percent of production, remain unsold.

"A toy costs the same as a kilo of sausage. An easy choice for the customers, as times are today."

In Semichatov's view, the transition to civilian production—conversion—has not been handled well.

"We started too late. If we had begun 6 to 7 years ago, when military production began to decline, we could have managed with small reinvestments and could have had a planned and controlled conversion."

Semichatov wants advanced cooperation projects with Western companies, or production under license or simple assembly work. That is the only salvation. Avtomatika can make tailor-made semiconductor circuits, component assembly on thick film, printed circuit cards, metering apparatus, microwave ovens, radio electronics, and much more besides.

But as yet there are no cooperation projects.

"Western companies are much too cautious. By acting in this way they are losing existing chances."

Semichatov showed me a so-called microsystem: several silicon circuits, microprocessors and memories, mounted on the same semiconductor material in a small box.

Microsystems are a general technique with which it is possible to build matchbox-sized computers and to mount these in robust and space-saving capsules—for use in aircraft and missiles, but also in industry. It is also expected that they will be found in the cars of the future. Microsystems are an example of how the Soviet Union got round the ban on high technology to the East imposed throughout the postwar period by Cocom, the Western control organization.

"Cocom did not allow us to import this sort of thing, but I can reveal that we have been producing it for 12 years.

"Several Western companies have looked at our product. Siemens admitted that our standards were higher than theirs, so this is not self-praise. We have able people in Russia too."

Semichatov resists the idea that this proud company will be forced to become a subcontractor supplying individual products.

"We want cooperation between equal partners. Together we could develop products which do not exist in the West. Sophisticated software, digital communications systems, fiber optics, satellite navigation, bank automation.

"But it seems that they are afraid of our products," he sighed. "They do not want the competition. And this is an important cause of the difficulties in finding cooperation with the West. IBM wanted to make 10-year-old 286 processors. We said, 'No, thank you. Let us make 486's instead.'"

Avtomatika's staff were among those who nominated Boris Yeltsin as presidential candidate. Yeltsin was born in Yekaterinburg which is completely dominated by the defense industry. He worked in the town for most of his life and was therefore seen by the Avtomatika staff as the defense industry's candidate in the elections.

"We support the developments toward democracy and have supported Yeltsin in this. But we cannot support him when his policies lead to the decline of industry," Semichatov said.

Has he lost the support of the defense industry?

"I do not think that the fall in Yeltsin's popularity is due to reactions within the defense industry. Decline is just as great in other branches of industry."

### Chief Designer of PVO Radar Systems Interviewed

92UM1256A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
14 Jul 92 First edition p 2

[Interview with Yuriy Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov, chief designer of ground-based search radar systems, by Lieutenant-Colonel N. Poroskov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Zone of Responsibility"]

[Text] From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA file: Yu Kuznetsov was born in 1935 in Krasnoyarsk Kray. He graduated from the radio electronics school at the Tomsk Polytechnic Institute. He served as chief of a laboratory and a department, as director of the Scientific Institute of Measuring Instruments and general director of a scientific production association. He has been chief designer at the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Radio Electronics since 1987.

He is a candidate of technical sciences and holder of the Lenin Prize. He has been awarded two orders of the Labor Red Banner and medals.

Not until years after the Great Patriotic War were we able to give due credit to those who produced the equipment and weapons which made our military strong. Articles in the press

about those who design, test and perfect the modern combat equipment are rare. The aviation is perhaps the only real exception.

We hope that the rubric "The Defense Industry: People and Problems" will help to open many doors which were closed for many years with a lock of secrecy and to name names new to the reader.

Today our correspondent speaks with Yuriy Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov, chief designer of ground-based search radar systems.

[Poroskov] Yuriy Aleksandrovich, you are being introduced to the general public for the first time today. What do your duties include?

[Kuznetsov] I am in charge of the complex of scientific-research and experimental design work on ground-based search radar systems for PVO [air defense] and its coordination.

[Poroskov] You personally participated in the development of PVO radar systems now in operation and were the main designer of the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system. Much has been said and written about the latter, incidentally, its features being compared with those of the American Patriot.

[Kuznetsov] The Patriot and the S-300 do not have the same complement of components. The S-300 was designed for use within a unified data support system and is totally autonomous—the Patriot is not—which gives the system greater survivability. The press and television gave unwarranted advertising to the Patriot. But think about the television clips made during the events in the Persian Gulf. A Patriot would strike a Scud, but the missile would continue to fly and strike its target, and its warhead would explode. In this case the Scud was not destroyed but accomplished its combat mission. Fairly effective against aerodynamic targets, the Patriot is not very effective against ballistic missiles such as the Scud.

**KRASNAYA ZVEZDA information:** The latest modification, the S-300B, has an inertial in-flight guidance system and active guidance in the final phase of the flight path. The missile's warhead has controlled action (controlled detonation). This produces an effect which, with uncontrolled detonation, would require increasing the weight of the warhead 15 times over. There is nothing else like this system in the world.

[Poroskov] But does our nation have superiority in radar?

[Kuznetsov] We are not behind at the level of concepts. The lag begins with the experimental design work and especially with the start-up of regular production. What are the causes? Poor technical production support, poor organization of the national economy....

We have achieved good results in the designing of mobile radar systems on a single, self-propelled transport unit, to express it in technical terms. They can be deployed from the march in five minutes and packed up in the same amount of time. They can operate entirely autonomously, which significantly enhances their effectiveness. They also have modern features, including protection against jamming.

We have traditionally devoted a great deal of attention to the development of radar systems in the very high-frequency

band of radio waves, and we have superiority in this area. Such radars practically do not react to clouds and other meteorological formations.

[Poroskov] And they have advantages for working with the "invisible" Stealth. Could you go into this in detail?

[Kuznetsov] One of the factors contributing to the Stealth's "invisibility" is the aircraft's shape, which reflects signals very little. When using the very high-frequency band the size of the aircraft is comparable to the wave length, and it loses its significance. Then there is a second factor, the radio-absorbing covering, or coating. For the very high-frequency band this significantly increases the weight of the aircraft.

[Poroskov] But even though the Americans knew about our development of radar in this range, they still continued the program.

[Kuznetsov] In the first place, we are talking only about the mission of detection. Once detected, however, a target has to be destroyed by guiding a missile or shell to it. Accuracy in this can only be provided with shorter radio waves. The same is true of airborne detection equipment. The Stealth's detectability is therefore substantially lower for this kind of equipment.

In the second place, radar in the very high-frequency band does not always meet the requirements for accuracy and resistance to jamming, and is therefore used together with shorter-wave radar. And the combined target-designating capabilities for use against the Stealth will be lower than for conventional targets.

[Poroskov] What can be used against "invisible" aircraft today?

[Kuznetsov] "Invisible" is too strong a term. It is more valid to speak not of a multifold reduction of detection range but of a percentage or tenths of a percentage, depending upon the type of aircraft and the radar's radio-wave range.

[Poroskov] Can one conclude, then, that the Stealth technology is not sufficiently effective?

[Kuznetsov] No. In the first place, cruise missiles can employ this technology, which have an effective reflecting surface (EOP) considerably smaller than that of planes. In the second place, the Stealth can operate under the cover of interference generated from remote facilities. Stealth technology thus poses additional difficulties for PVO.

Signals in the super-wide band, including video signals, are used as a countermeasure against the Stealth. In addition, the Stealth deflects signals considerably more to the side than back in the direction from which they come. It can therefore be detected from the sides instead of from the point of radiation. We therefore have multipositional radar, that is, dispersed transmitting and receiving positions. Direct resolution is also possible by enhancing the capabilities of the radar system and the power of its emissions.

[Poroskov] Your radar systems are used not only in the military.

[Kuznetsov] Indeed. Civilians must also have data support on the air situation. For controlling air traffic, among other things. A project is presently underway to develop a single, integrated radar support system. The importance of the project and its anticipated effect put it into the category of

projects of state importance. The data from the radar systems will be used and are already being used by both military and civilian consumers. Incidentally, the same radar systems are used by both civilian and military services. The P-37 radar system, for example, is used in PVO, the air force and the civilian air fleet.

[Poroskov] It is no secret that our radar systems are being sold abroad. How have they performed, specifically in regional conflicts?

[Kuznetsov] Only our old equipment—the P-12, P-37 and the like—has been used in military operations. It is not adequately automated or resistant to jamming. It does not have large capabilities in a situation of massed attacks and jamming. Iraq practically did not counter reconnaissance or neutralize or shoot down generators of interference. The other side had reliable information on Iraq's PVO, since foreign countries which were a part of the international forces had helped to make it into a single, integrated system.

[Poroskov] You seem to be suggesting that in order for the equipment to be used effectively, we must not just sell the items individually but combine them into a PVO system. Just exactly what?

[Kuznetsov] Several types of radar systems, the automation equipment, means of delivery: anti-aircraft missile systems, fighter aircraft. We must provide for their interaction, their adaptation to jamming, complete coverage of their detection zones, and so forth.

[Poroskov] What has prevented you from doing just that?

[Kuznetsov] Excessive secrecy. We did not sell our best models and cheated ourselves by not generating good publicity. The West is not afraid to reveal secrets, proceeding from the premise that they already have the item and it will take others a long time to produce it even after reading the advertising prospectus. It is cheaper for them to buy it themselves. Our staying out of the weapons market will not reduce the overall sales volume, because other countries will take our place. We are suffering economic losses. And these are defensive weapons.

[Poroskov] How are things going for the chief designer today?

[Kuznetsov] Things are difficult. While just recently there was annual financing, now it is only quarterly. We have to borrow from the bank, but the interest is not provided for in the price.... And then, half of the output is for civilian consumption at many enterprises even now.

As of right now it is not known how many radar systems will be shipped in 1993. We do not yet have the contracts. And the complete cycle for producing a modern radar system takes around a year. The situation is serious. Outlays for NIOKR [scientific research and experimental design work] are declining. We could suffer irremediable losses of scientific and technological capability. Weapons programs should have the status of state programs, with guaranteed financing.

Today only the Russian Federation can provide itself with radar systems. The continuation of cooperation is advantageous even for it, however.

[Poroskov] And in conclusion, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, a few words about the prospects for target detection.

[Kuznetsov] Radar will be the main method in the very near future. The radar systems have to be improved, however, since low-altitude, ground-hugging targets, tactical ballistic and cruise missiles, maneuvering warheads and so forth already exist. There is also powerful counteraction to PVO radar: various kinds of jamming, antiradar missiles, decoys which simulate targets....

The foreign experts predict that the radar system at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century—technical terms are unavoidable here—will consist of an active, phased antenna array with digital beam generators and a digital computer system for forming and processing signals, adaptation to jamming, and control of the radar's functioning. They foresee among the nontraditional systems multipositional radar systems, radar concealed from radio reconnaissance, with a low power-flow density in space, and so forth.

[Poroskov] What are the conditions for implementing these projects?

[Kuznetsov] A state approach to the defense industry.

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