


JPRS-EER-92-037  
26 MARCH 1992



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

**DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED**

### **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**

**Approved for public release;  
Distribution Unlimited**

REPRODUCED BY  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

19980120 060

# East Europe

JPRS-EER-92-037

## CONTENTS

26 March 1992

### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Social Democrats Protest Treaty With FRG [LIDOVE NOVINY 3 Mar]	1
Markus Says Slovak Alliance With CIS Possible [TELEGRAF 5 Feb]	3
Ivan Carnogursky's Idea of Common State [HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 30 Jan]	3
Dienstbier Characterizes OH as Centrist Party [INFORUM 26 Feb]	6
Klaus Explains Importance of Political Right [CESKY DENIK 3 Mar]	7
Note on Meciar's Rapprochement With Dubcek [LIDOVE NOVINY 19 Feb]	8
Benda on Implication of Possible Leftist Victory [VEREJNOST 2 Mar]	8
Warning Against Fundamentalism in Politics [LIDOVE NOVINY 3 Mar]	9
Czech Writer's Portrait of Contemporary Ruthenia [LITERARNI NOVINY 15 Jan]	9
Overview of Current Czech Newspapers [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 28 Feb]	11
New Direction in State Schools Urged [LIDOVE NOVINY 3 Mar]	12

### HUNGARY

'Judge Scandal' Probe Called 'Anti-MDF' [NEPSZABADSAG 24 Feb]	14
SZDSZ: Independence of Judiciary Threatened [MAGYAR HIRLAP 25 Feb]	14
FIDESZ Member Calls Torgyan Faction Legitimate [NEPSZABADSAG 25 Feb]	15
Effort To Centralize Local Authority Criticized [FIGYELO 5 Mar]	15
Privatization Minister Szabo on Tasks, Opposition [NEPSZABADSAG 29 Feb]	16
Land Law Modification in Preparation [NEPSZABADSAG 28 Feb]	20
Restitution Claimants, Cooperatives Vie for Land [NEPSZABADSAG 28 Feb]	20

### POLAND

Kaczynski on Political Climate, Coalitions [PRAWO I ZYCIE 22 Feb]	22
POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 23-29 Feb [29 Feb]	24

### ROMANIA

PSM Blasted, Democratic Left Union Gains Noted [DIMINEATA 29 Feb-1 Mar]	26
Corruption Charges Against Mayor-Elect Halaicu [AZI 29 Feb]	27

### YUGOSLAVIA

Macedonian Deputy Prime Minister on Economy [NOVA MAKEDONIJA 12 Mar]	29
Slovene Car Import Quota Established [DNEVNIK 13 Mar]	30

### **Social Democrats Protest Treaty With FRG**

92CH0380A Prague *LIDOVE NOVINY* in Czech  
3 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Dalibor Plichta, Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party: "What Is Not in the Treaty"]

[Text] While, in connection with preparation of the Czechoslovak-German treaty, there has been loud and plentiful talk on the part of the Germans about rights where there cannot be any talk of them, we are tiptoeing around rights as if we were afraid of waking them up, even though it is our position, which is more than solid. This is the case in the question of the lack of validity of the Munich agreement and also in the question of property that is not covered by the treaty.

An example of such German arguments that are not supported by the law is the claim of the German farmers that the CSR [Czechoslovak Republic] was not in a state of war with Germany and thus has no rights to reparations. What are the facts? A state of war between the CSR and Germany and its satellite countries was declared by the Czechoslovak Government in exile on 16 December 1941. The start of the war was established by a note to the allies of 17 September 1938 when the Sudendeutscher Freikorps [Sudeten German Free Corps], directed by officers of the Wehrmacht, began its armed operations on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The CSR, as a victim of German aggression, came out of World War II as one of the victorious powers fighting alongside the allies of the democratic camp, participated as such in the postwar organization of the peace, and is therefore also a signatory of the agreement on reparations from Germany. Our claims for not only reparations, but also for the property of Germans on our territory, also rest on this agreement.

### **Reparations Claims**

The agreement on reparations from Germany of 21 December 1945, which took international effect on 21 January 1946, is valid for the 19 countries (including the CSR) which were granted reparations from the Western occupation zones of Germany in accordance with the procedural arrangements of the three victorious powers. They established the share of the individual countries in the reparations claims against Germany in accordance with what expenditures the countries had in prosecuting the war, what losses they suffered, and what contribution they made in the fight against Germany. Among other things, this agreement also specifically laid out the concept of German property by its provisions in Part I, Article 6, paragraph A empowering the signatory states to confiscate German enemy property on their territory and to include it in accounting for their share of reparations.

Because the Munich agreement was invalid right from the start, the Reich regulations by which Czech citizens of German nationality were granted German citizenship

are also invalid. (They acquired this only with publication of the FRG law on settling the question of state citizenship of 22 February 1955.) The property of Germans in our border regions was therefore confiscated in accordance with the applicable law as the property of Czech citizens. This took place mainly by Decree of the President of the Republic No. 108/1945 relating to those persons who "identifying themselves with Hitler's program and his willing adherents, took upon themselves the responsibility for the crimes that committed by them...and answer for the damage caused by them." There was no confiscation of the property of Germans who remained true to the republic, did not commit offenses against the Czech and Slovak peoples, participated in the fight to liberate the republic, or suffered under the Nazi terror. It also was not a matter of collective punishment, but rather one of acting only against those who actively took part in the Nazi's criminal program, for which over 90 percent of the Sudeten Germans voted in 1938 (in the last general elections in the CSR before the war).

The reparations agreement set up the mutual legal relationships only between the victorious allies. Germany only acknowledged its consequences (the same as all the actions of the Control Council for Germany), by Article 3, Part VI of the treaty between the FRG and the three Western great powers of 26 May 1952 on settling questions arising from the war and the occupation. The FRG by this gave up claims to the title of confiscated German property for purposes of reparations or for initiating a state of war. By this treaty, the FRG further took on the obligation not to allow claims or complaints against persons who acquired or took over property on the basis of the measures carried out in accordance with Part I, Article 6 of the reparations agreement. Article 5 of the cited agreement of 26 May 1952 thus obligated the FRG to compensate the previous owners of the property which was affected by the above measures.

The FRG carried out the obligations of this treaty and paid compensation to the dislocated Germans for their property left behind as confiscated material in the CSR. They have thus already been compensated for it.

Final arrangements for the reparations claims were supposed to be made as part of the peace treaty with Germany. However, this is no longer counted on and even the Western powers have renounced their own claims against Germany. Our application for reparations from Germany is therefore also just a theoretical question.

But by the treaty on reparations the victorious powers did task Germany with settling debts from the period before the Second World War, as well as their outstanding nonreparations claims. For this purpose, the three Western powers called a conference in London in 1952 in which the FRG also participated. The result was the "Treaty on German Foreign Debts" of 27 February 1953 which resolves compensation of all these claims. But because only those countries which had diplomatic

relations with the FRG could be a party to the London agreement, the CSR could not participate in it. Now, however, there is nothing blocking the path for the CSFR to sign on to that agreement and thus to create the prerequisite for satisfying its claims, as was recommended to us by the Germans themselves after establishing Czechoslovak-German diplomatic relations.

### Compensating the Victims of Persecution

As far as the obligations of Germany to settle claims for persecution (as arising from the Agreement on Reparations of 21 December 1945), the FRG carried this out with its own laws. But they are of a discriminatory nature. They satisfy mainly the victims of Nazism from among their own ranks and exclude the possibility of compensating the citizens of states which did not have diplomatic relations with the FRG (thus also Czechoslovakia).

However, the FRG negotiated bilateral agreements on general compensation with a number of countries. As part of this agreement, it paid Israel compensation amounting to 3.45 billion German marks and a total of one billion marks to 11 other countries. After normalizing relations with Hungary, it offered the sum of 300 million marks as compensation of its claims. In 1975 it negotiated two agreements with the Polish People's Republic, one on social security by which it agreed to provide 1.3 billion marks in compensation, and another on a favorable credit of one billion marks for a period of 20 years at two percent interest with the provision that this be considered as a certain form of general compensation of the Polish claims for persecution. Czechoslovakia was the only country which was not offered anything as compensation.

The CSR Government put forward our persecution and nonreparations claims against the FRG through the representative office of the United States in Prague by a note on 19 December 1966 and proposed the opening of official negotiations on them. The FRG Government did not answer this note in which the Czechoslovak claims were spelled out. Direct discussions of them came only after discussions on establishing diplomatic relations. Later we several time pressed our claims both by diplomatic channels and by personal representatives at various levels within the negotiations of cooperation in various areas. At all these opportunities, the West Germans persisted in the positions expressed by their representatives at the negotiations on the Treaty on Mutual Relations of 1973. As far as compensating Czechoslovak citizens totally based in the "Reich," the FRG Government from the first referred the resolution of those questions to the appropriate German concerns. According to the latest information, the Bonn government now refuses compensation of those so totally based, considering their claims as having lapsed.

The new Czechoslovak-German treaty does not speak to our legal property claims in the actual text of the treaty. From the formal legal standpoint and in keeping with

common practice with treaties, it is possible for that matter to be dealt with in an annex letter, which of course must be fully in accord with our applicable law and also with international treaties which have been negotiated and by which the FRG is also bound.

### Munich and the Legal Code

The invalid nature of the Munich agreement of 29 September 1939 negotiated by France, Italy, Germany, and Great Britain under the threat and use of force would also supposed to be expressed in another accompanying letter. This was the agreement that was the basis for the occupation of our border territory and connected with the forced expulsion of the Czechoslovak population and the confiscation of their property, as well as the property of the Czechoslovak state.

The Czechoslovak state never recognized the Munich agreement, not having participated in its negotiation, and also was never bound by it under international law. (Involvement in its execution was a result of the state of affairs forced on it by the circumstances.) The fact of international legal continuity of the CSR was given further expression by our government by, among other things, the promulgation of constitutional decree No. 11/1944 by which all regulations under the occupation were denied validity on the territory of the CSR.

The prohibition of the threat of force and the use of force in international relations was recognized as the norm for international law long before the Munich agreement. It was already embodied in the Briand-Kellog Pact of 1928. Therefore, when it was also affirmed that the Munich agreement was made under the threat of force, its signatories (with the exception of Germany) annulled it effective "ex tunc" ["from that time"]. It was on just this example of the Munich agreement that the prohibition on the use of force was included in the Vienna Treaty on treaty law of 1969 as well. In its Article 52, it states explicitly: "A treaty which was made under the threat of force or with the use of force, violating the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, is null and void." That means that it is invalid right from its inception and it is necessary to look on it as if it had never been negotiated. It is therefore only logical that after the Vienna Treaty became valid, Italy and France also confirmed the invalid nature of the Munich agreement right from the beginning in the meaning of the treaty, as we signed treaties with those countries last year similar to the one that we are now concluding with Germany.

In regard to the fact that both the CSFR and the FRG signed on to the Vienna treaty and it became binding for both states, the pertinent provision of the preamble of the initialed Czechoslovak-German treaty concerning the Munich agreement is therefore in conflict with the legal codes of both countries.

This fact must also be decisive for the Federal Assembly as well, if our highest legislative body does not want to

consciously violate the binding norms of common international law, placed above the norms of domestic law, which became an integral part of our legal code. This fact does not allow it to express approval of the treaty.

In conclusion, it is certainly useful to remember that the Nuremberg war crimes trials also expressed itself unambiguously on Munich, on the Nazi attack on the CSR, on its occupation, and on the part of the Heinlein Germans in those crimes.

This is the legal situation and the historical truth. They should not be forgotten in negotiating the treaty.

#### **Markus Says Slovak Alliance With CIS Possible**

92CH0386B Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 5 Feb 92  
p 11

["Excerpt" from MOSCOW NEWS: "Slovak Bridge"]

[Text] "The geographic center of Europe lies 200 kilometers north-east of Bratislava. There, in the small town of Krahulie u Kremnice, by St. John's Church, we, Slovaks, want to establish an international center of European countries, where every year political leaders of our continent could meet," journalist Peter Strelinger told me.

"Not only is the geographic center of Europe here, we want to exert every effort to become one of the centers of the renascent family of Slavs," continued P. Strelinger compellingly. He proposes to establish the journal SLOVANE, in whose first issue he wants to publish discussions with presidents of all the Slavic countries. The idea of Pan-Slavism is popular again. The problem lies elsewhere. Slovakia itself does not have its own president.

The chairman of Matica Slovenska, Jozef Markus, received me in front of the wooden beams of his house in the small town of Dolany. "A federation and domination of one nation over another should not and cannot exist here any longer. There are not too many alternatives of what the future state setup can be: either a confederation, or the creation of two independent states—Bohemia and Slovakia.

"It is important to understand one thing: Czechoslovakia, that is not a country composed of two parts. It is composed of two orientations, and that influences politics, economy, culture. We belong to the European East, the Slavic world. The Czechs, they are 'Slavic Germans.' We often tell our Czech colleagues that insufficient attention to traditions and differences is dangerous because it leads to the proliferation of tendencies to Germanize and Americanize. Today, the idea of Czechoslovakism has no future in our republic.

"I do not rule out some form of alliance of Slovakia with the CIS," added Markus in conclusion.

#### **Ivan Carnogursky's Idea of Common State**

92CH0354A Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY  
in Slovak 30 Jan 92 p 4

[Interview with Ivan Carnogursky, first deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council, by Oldrich Zabochnik; place and date not given: "I Am Against the Breakup of the State"]

[Text] Among the top politicians there are people who do not bask in the warmth of continuous publicity and popularity, but whose influence on the development of matters, so to speak from the other viewpoint, is indisputable. One such person on the Bratislava political scene is the first vice chairman of the SNR [Slovak National Council], Ivan Carnogursky, from whom we requested an interview.

[Zabochnik] Do you think that the current emancipation movement in Slovakia can cool off and dissolve into nothing as some people would like?

[Carnogursky] It is naive to imagine that today's Slovakia can somehow again be redirected. That will not happen, in part because of what we could call a genetic characteristic of the Slovaks, who are capable of putting up resistance to something even before they actually know why. And a second point: If someone in economic and state contacts wanted to just get into things in Ruanda or Guinea or another such country, he would also run into a certain resistance there. There are capable local individuals in those countries who say to themselves "why should I let someone else put conditions on me when I can do it myself?" We do not justify this by saying it is better economically this way, but that is how it is. The Czechs still do not want to take this problem into consideration. I think that this is to their own detriment.

[Zabochnik] In Bratislava I more than once ran into the feelings and opinions that lack of Czech understanding of Slovakia is connected with the continuing lack of appreciation or even underrating of Slovakia. Do you see it the same way?

[Carnogursky] I would not call it underrating. The Czechs are aware what it is about. They know that they have a substantially better organized economy thanks to the fact that they had its center in Prague. The unitarian state was for many long years managed in a directive manner from the center, which created relationships and an entire system which shifted quality and the ability to manage, organize, and make decisions in the direction of the Czech lands. This cannot be so easily overcome in one year or even 10. But the Czechs are making one mistake. It is a national, managerial, and economic mistake that they do not know how to transform their advantage with more of an eye for the future, a little more forward looking. Such behavior causes blockage of other contacts and of further development and cooperation. It can result in not only complete loss of today's advantage, but even its change into a disadvantage. The

Czechs are making a basic mistake in the matter in politics as well. They are carrying their attitude, which at this time is justifiable and still has a basis, into politics. Really, they have the levers of power in their hands and do not want to give them up or to accept a decision. But this provokes an overall political development leading up to a critical point which can very rapidly come in March of this year.

[Zabojnik] What, in your opinion, can take place at such a critical moment?

[Carnogursky] The interminable hindrances, reservations, and conditions for a political solution to Czech-Slovak cooperation, say by means of a treaty, could lead to such a situation in Slovakia where we say "That's it; we do not have anything else to discuss and we are letting go the gangplank." I am not saying that it would be the wise thing for the Slovaks to do, but the present Czech attitude strengthens the position of those Slovaks who never think in terms of development, cooperation, and some kind of better relations. They think in terms of political positions of power and of pushing their own. They exploit this Czech attitude in order to demonstrate that they are the only ones who know how to deal with it. They simply cut it down and chop it up, declaring themselves for setting up a Slovak state with a president as well.

[Zabojnik] But despite all this it sounds more utopian than realistic, doesn't it?

[Carnogursky] Unfortunately, it is not a utopian dream, but could take place very rapidly. The people are cutting themselves off as well from everything that has taken place in history from Bila Hora [the Battle of White Mountain, 8 November 1620] up through the protectorate [under the Nazi occupation] and communism. Despite Hungarianization and the Austrian and German influences, for 1,000 years there was no barrier created between these two peoples. These two peoples cooperated uniquely in Europe. And now they are supposed to get stuck on some primitive point and create a barrier which will have to be overcome again after other generations have passed, or perhaps not even then?

[Zabojnik] Those political groups in Slovakia which speak openly about its independence emphasize that the Slovaks in such a case will overcome all obstacles and problems with their patriotic euphoria. How do you see this point?

[Carnogursky] You will not solve things just with patriotic euphoria. With today's complex economic conditions, we support the federation with a budget of 130 billion. About 90 billion to 100 billion is for common expenses which we would have to share equitably between the Czech and Slovak Republics for defense, foreign representation, various international commitments, etc. But actually running the federation, this monster that devours paper and that somehow manages things and represents us domestically and outside the country, that costs us about 30 billion korunas [Kcs]

annually. It is about 10 billion for the Slovaks and 20 billion for the Czechs. If Slovakia had these billions available just for its own economic development, that would be just the amount which would take us nicely through the first year. I am not afraid that there would be some kind of economic collapse here and they know that very well in the Czech lands also. But in the Czech lands they will not have their 20 billion just for themselves since the center is there and they would have to keep it going somehow, even if running on empty. It would cost them something before they would find some other use for it, before they could make a museum or a restaurant out of it. For the Czechs, it is more convenient at this time to deal with 130 billion. I am not afraid that Slovakia would come out of such a change in bad shape economically for another reason as well. What looks bad for Slovakia for the future is currently advantageous. Slovakia would have fewer problems selling semifinished goods of copper or aluminum than the Czech Republic would have with its finished products.

[Zabojnik] Do you think that there are other motives than economic and political ones which prevent the Czechs from understanding the current Slovak reality?

[Carnogursky] In the Czech nature there is something of a long-term degenerative effect, excessive persistence, in the relationship of the national consciousness to some facts. The Czech character obviously has a lot of difficulty in being able to give up a myth or some idea and to start a new myth. In a people of 10 millions, there have always been plenty of people who would shout "long live Hitler" while other people were putting up resistance. There were plenty of people who later shouted "long live the CPCZ [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia]," while others did all they could to bring down the CPCZ. And they are all Czechs. So everyone carries their own history within themselves, including their conservative persistence and inflexibility. I ask you: why are Mr. Adamec and the whole gang of Czech Communists capable today, when it must be clear to every child that their ideology has been totally corrupted and discredited, of puffing themselves up in flowery speeches and accusing the other side of the failures. A great deal of persistence is also necessary for this, perhaps also from the standpoint of Czechs thinking things over, for someone to speak out about this phenomenon. It does not seem to me to be entirely normal and reasonable. Unfortunately, the Czechs are also this way. I do not connect this with anything other than a mentality which does not know how to deal with a new trend in a flexible way and holds on to power up to the last moment.

[Zabojnik] The attempt to work out the freest position for Slovakia can be distinguished in Bratislava, I would say, along party lines. The KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] has come in for criticism more than once that they are not very committed on a basis of nationality. Do you agree with that viewpoint?

[Carnogursky] The KDH tries to take a long-term view of the development of its nation and territory in context

with both the past and the future. We do not want to make just primitive decisions of heads or tails. It is obviously for this reason that we appear too conservative or even resistant to Slovak development. This can even be incomprehensible for some people. According to the critics, our incomprehensibility is found in the fact that we should have joined the camp of the hotheads and by now a sovereign Slovak Republic with complete statehood would have been declared. But I guarantee you that there would also have been very strong and sharp internal unrest here as well. The Slovaks would have started conflicts among themselves: the communists with the noncommunists, Hungarians with Slovaks, Lutherans with Catholics, Greek Catholics with Orthodox. An uncontrolled social movement, when it is simply given free rein, is very dangerous. A situation like that in Croatia could very easily occur in Slovakia as well. I maintain that it would already have happened if the realistically thinking wing of the Slovak politicians had gone over to the side of the radicals.

[Zabojnik] Can one say, then, that patience is the basic orientation of the KDH's strategy and tactics?

[Carnogursky] The people who are active in politics within the KDH are quite closely identified with their backgrounds, the generation and society in which they grew up. This background is in itself not very combative and is not very radical. It is a background which rather has a leaning toward a thousand years of patience than to any one-year revolution. This is in God knows what kind of political philosophy. For millions of people, a revolutionary approach in the past did not bear the expected fruits. And while it temporarily meant something, in the long term all revolutionary effects level off, are lost, and are forgotten. The people have within themselves something that is more valuable and longer lasting. The Slovaks survived for those thousands of years not because they had a king or because they had Stur, Hlinka, Tisa, or anybody else. The Slovaks survived simply because of their national characteristics. And the Czechs also survived for the same reasons. These two peoples have something in themselves that, even if we do not want to be aware of it, should not just be tossed overboard, like table scraps, into the sea. These two peoples are wiser than that, for example, in their politics.

[Zabojnik] To what degree, in your opinion, is or is not the revival of a number of national states in Europe a model for Slovakia?

[Carnogursky] We cannot ignore the developments around us. We in the KDH are following them and they are also being reflected in the SNR. I have myself prevented many steps so that the reflection of those outside developments does not start an avalanche of radicalization of the situation in Slovakia. I think that is all to the good, but the overall trend here is logical and Slovakia will complete its statehood. There is no point in talking about it. It is just a matter of being able to preserve the continuity of our cooperation while completing Czech and Slovak statehood. I think that fully

achieving statehood will take place very rapidly. The intelligence of these two peoples should be demonstrated by the process being given a form in which we will mutually gain, so that we will not destroy our heritage from after the totalitarian regime by developing in the Balkan manner. That which was acquired only during those 40 years can make it possible to get up to the level of Austrian or Italy relatively rapidly.

[Zabojnik] Are you in favor of ending the country of Czechoslovakia? And how do you see the situation could develop as a result?

[Carnogursky] I am against the country breaking up because that would harm both republics. Just to achieve full Slovak statehood does not mean breaking apart the Czech-Slovak cooperation. So far we have not achieved the basic primary statehood of these two nations. As long as we do not achieve it, we will still have to deal with this tension. We must simply make the Slovaks responsible for the solving of their own economic problems and the Czechs responsible for their problems. If someone suffers from a guardianship complex, then we regret it. They must forget about it and that means Mr. Klaus and Mr. Dlouhy and the other politicians. An earthquake may hit them on the political scene, but they will surely find a place as Czech politicians and will make their contribution to the Czech economy. They will always have to ask about problems of the Czechoslovak economy in Bratislava as well. Personally, I think that if the Czechs do not bungle it, the Slovaks will be able to get through the transformation of the unitarian Czechoslovak Republic into a new state union of two truly sovereign republics. When all is said and done, Mr. Klaus does not want to perform his guardianship in Humenný. In Humenný they have to either prove that they can do it or they fail, and the same goes for the entire Slovak economy. I would be happier if we concentrated exclusively on the economic problems of Slovakia because this is what bothers me.

[Zabojnik] What do you have in mind specifically?

[Carnogursky] The entire postcommunist stage is distinguished by a certain feature which in the West they underrate and are not aware of. Some kind of a fiction has been created that there cannot exist a normally thinking person who would have been able somehow to make peace with and coexist in a totalitarian regime. They assumed that as soon as a society got rid of totalitarianism it would at the same moment begin to behave just like them and would want democracy and everything that goes with it. But these gentlemen did not take into account the fact that communism was not some kind of imaginary totalitarianism, but a quite well thought out and organized system based on the majority being controlled by a minority at all levels of society. The totalitarian methods did not mean that they just imprisoned or murdered people. The totalitarian methods consisted of the fact that a foreman or team leader in a small group of people who were digging in a mine could become team leader only if the party allowed him to. The

cancer of the party's power spread through the entire fabric of society so that even now we have not been able to separate it thoroughly. Since a half million people in Slovakia were right in the party and they all had their children, families, and relatives, it makes up a total of one-third of the working population.

[Zabojnik] Alright. But this the well-known circumstances of the state of our society; what do you make of it?

[Carnogursky] It means that this is an important political moment. Not all the people that were connected with the former regime are in the opposition and political opponents. They have to be seen primarily as people. I must say, unfortunately, that even the KDH in this regard is not, God knows, very Christian because it makes a distinction: these people were communists, these were the mafia, and therefore we now have to keep our hands away from these people so as not to dirty them. The perception of the rest of the population is even worse. It is the natural reaction to the communists, who tried to defend themselves until the last moment. This is obvious not only in Slovakia, but also in Poland and Hungary. What will happen in the former Soviet Union, God alone knows. A structure is forming of people who will maintain their own small grouping or clan at any price and are furthermore in opposition to the rest of society. Even in Slovakia there is unfortunately this phenomenon which cannot be overcome in a month or a year. Whatever is popular in the eyes of the public is exploited by the clans to maintain themselves in power. After being suppressed for 40 years, nationalism is now attractive and today the communists are nationalists. The most nationalistic is the SNS [Slovak National Party], even though we know that it was founded by just those people who a month before November 1989 would not have let the word "nation" come out of their mouths. When they had then to say of themselves that they were Slovaks, they would look all around four times to make sure that nobody was listening. It is just these people who now are pushing the most nationalistic policies.

[Zabojnik] What do you make of this further for the specific political situation in Slovakia?

[Carnogursky] The socialist aspects which persist in our society can have the effect that the election results of these parties and their groupings will be more surprising or pleasing than would be expected under normal circumstances. As far as our movement is concerned, the KDH is willing and capable of cooperating with everyone who is aware that this state and this nation need to develop. The KDH will have difficulty cooperating with people who because of their own personal lack of qualities are not capable of seeing the state and the nation, but who will quickly want to take control of something and start to dictate to us. In the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] there is unfortunately the problem of their leaders, who are showing themselves to be too socialistic and Bolshevik. This causes fear and mistrust, while you will not find a single

point in the programs of the HZDS or the SDL [Party of Democratic Left] or the SNS which would not be acceptable. Everyone supports democracy, the development of Slovakia, the nation, and Christianity as well. There are thus no barriers in the programs. Rather it can be the political barriers of the people who stand behind these programs.

[Zabojnik] Despite everything, do you or do you not have fears about the future of Slovakia?

[Carnogursky] I do not have any fears. Slovakia has survived all possible political waves. Each period by its particular conditions brings to the surface its own Tuks, Machs, Kubals, Baciliks, Salgovices, and Sirokys. But despite such figures, we cannot say that the Slovak nation has not developed, that Slovak politics did not develop, or that the state lagged in its statehood. The Slovak nation will also overcome this period, no matter who might be in favor of it.

#### **Dienstbier Characterizes OH as Centrist Party**

92CH0382C Prague INFORUM in Czech 26 Feb 92  
pp 8-9

[Article by Jiri Dienstbier, federal minister of foreign affairs and chairman of the Civic Movement: "The Intelligibility of Politics"]

[Text] We are constantly talking about how the political parties and movements come across. The main political spectrum can be divided into three groups. If we leave out the communists, who are unable to rid themselves of their compromised name and the Sladkovists or other extremists, many smaller parties can be included in the basic types.

The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Social Democrats are considered to come across well. ODS designates itself as rightist and the party of the market economy, the Social Democrats as leftist and the party of social issues. They place themselves at the margin of the political spectrum, and in a certain sense they are not wrong. To elevate a certain aspect above all else, to detach it from the multiplicity of life, is always misleading. We have had enough experience with the demagoguery on social certainties, but history taught us that even a well-meant simplification, whether it concerns the market, social certainties, or ecology, does not help to achieve a goal. A simplification is, of course, more easily understood than an effort to balance out all the aspects of human activity, which is the basis of the success of today's Western civilization. Particularly here, where whole generations grew up with black and white optics. Someone already said that for every problem there is a clear, quick, simple, bad solution.

The Civic Movement (OH) and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) are trying by various means to bring about a balanced transformation. OH and ODA are therefore considered to come across less clearly and



according to the polls have a smaller percentage of votes at this time than parties which offer simplifications.

ODA groups together interesting, although notably different personalities. Part of the public, to the extent that it understands ODA at all, most likely perceives it as a group of outstanding intellectuals. Some are considered to be rightist, some conservative, others liberal.

The OH which considers itself to be the liberal forum of free democrats, also has outstanding personalities in the governments and the parliaments. But the public evaluates them positively or negatively in their governmental functions, not as representatives of the OH. Who actually knows that Dagmar Buresova, Jan Sokol, Martin Bursik, ministers Dobrovsky, Tomas Sokol, Bojar, Miller, Vavrousek, Stepova, Vrba, Horalek, and others are members or adherents of the Civic Movement?

OH, ODA, and ODS, being the heirs to the Civic Forum (OF) program, bear most of the responsibility for carrying out the transformation policy. However, in the parliament the deputies' clubs of ODS, and sometimes also of ODA, occasionally act as if their ministers were not members of the government coalition. Thus the main burden of systematically supporting the governments rests on the shoulders of the Civic Movement. There are exceptions on all sides, of course, but the OH representatives have most consistently subordinated their partisan interests to the general interest of welding the state together. They have devoted all their energies to fulfilling their ministerial, parliamentary, and other functions in harmony with the program on whose basis they were chosen. They have made the effort to engage in real everyday politics, bridge over conflicts, and look for such compromises that would lead to feasible solutions. That is certainly less easy to read than simple slogans and positions.

This is not a rebuke to the others, nor is it self-praise by the OH, but a statement about the different roles of the Civic Forum. One reason it broke apart was that the broad common framework no longer suited some of its components. I am convinced that the breakup was premature, because we have not yet fully carried out the OF program, we have not created a functioning democratic state, we have not finished the work necessary to guarantee the political and economic transformation. If some felt the need to differentiate themselves as rightist, leftist, or otherwise, that was legitimate. The difference, however, lies in the view whether to place greater emphasis on building the state or on building the parties.

OH will continue to keep the working of the state and its structuring as the basis of its program, and that includes the election program. Liberalism is based on the freedom of an individual to engage in entrepreneurship, on the respect for man and human rights, on self-government and the minimization of the state's role. Market economy is not an unrestrained market. It is a serious task that cannot be taken lightly. Privatization means solid, not speculative, entrepreneurship, and by no

stretch of the imagination a Watergate. Social market economy is not a support for sluggards but a fair chance for the industrious. Culture and education are not the icing on the cake, but the need of every man as well as the source of economic success. Only superb education and skills will guarantee us a decent living standard, of which clean air is a part.

That is the kind of understanding we need to promote to counter the simplified psychologies of the right and the left. The June elections will show how far the most important transformation, the transformation of souls and minds, has progressed. Even in the parties on the left and the right it is possible by indicating preferences to choose people who think more about their fellow citizens than about their ideological slogans. We shall be in fact choosing between two main models. One is a confrontation between the right and the left. The other one is a confrontation of the sense for moderation, decency, toleration, and democracy with both extremes. Despite the years of totalitarianism, we still belong to the cultured nations. I therefore believe in a satisfactory result that will further strengthen our nascent democracy.

#### **Klaus Explains Importance of Political Right**

92CH0382B Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 3 Mar 92  
p 2

[Guest commentary by Vaclav Klaus, federal minister of finance: "Voter Responsibility"—first three paragraphs are CESKY DENIK introduction]

[Text] On 12 February 1992, CESKY DENIK published an article by Josef Kudlacek under the title "And After the Summer, Again, Left Foot Forward...?"

The article expresses the following viewpoint: "If in the June elections the right wins in the Czech lands at a ratio of roughly 5:4, and in Slovakia the left at a ratio of 4:1 (as is strongly indicated by all recent polls), under the current parliamentary mechanism it would mean only one thing: after June of this year, the Federal Assembly will be dominated by the left. According to Meciar's recent speech in Prague, it will be precisely he who will choose his partner on the Czech political scene after the elections. If these assumptions come to pass, the only way to prevent a return to socialism will be the independence of the Czech Republic—obviously by means of a referendum. Given the present stalemated situation it can be expected with certainty that nothing substantial will be changed in the state setup before the elections."

In this connection, the author asked Czech politicians these questions: Are they ready for such an outcome, and are they able, or willing, to admit the possibility of such an outcome?

The response of Vaclav Klaus, federal minister of finance: The outcome that you suggested in your question is possible, but definitely not the only one possible. We, the party which I represent as well as I personally, are trying to do all we can so that the postelection

distribution of forces will be more favorable than what is indicated by the current public opinion polls. In our opinion, that would require a successful completion of the great social and economic changes which we initiated. The alternative would be chaos and a balkanization of our state. To my mind, that is precisely why the upcoming elections are more important than the elections of 1990.

The entry of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) on the Slovak political stage is one of the ways in which we want to prevent the developments you suggested from taking place. To that end, it is necessary to exert every effort to preserve the unity of the proreform, nonleftist forces in the Czech Republic. There must be no destructive pre-election fighting among them, because we must concentrate all our efforts on defending the democratic development and its successful progress. That is why ODS has been trying since its inception to push through the integration of the Czech right. In that respect, a great responsibility will fall not only on the politicians, but on the voters of the rightist parties themselves. Every voter should, in view of the high cut-off clause, think very carefully whether to give his vote to a small party, taking the risk that his vote will be forfeited.

But to answer your second question: If, despite all our efforts, the situation, to my mind really unlikely, were to arise in which we would have to choose between the restoration of socialism in our country and its breakup, then I would make every effort to ensure that the citizens of the Czech Republic are able to decide such an issue by a form of public vote, a referendum.

#### **Note on Meciar's Rapprochement With Dubcek**

92CH0385A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Slovak  
19 Feb 92 p 3

[Commentary by Ivan Hoffman: "Meciar and Dubcek"]

[Text] I have no idea how it could ever occur to me (albeit for a fleeting moment) that Dubcek could get angry with Meciar. After all, that could lead to unforeseeable, unfathomable consequences! It is axiomatic that Dubcek will not be angry with Meciar. He will wait judiciously and then forgive him at the proper time. For that Meciar will tactfully show his gratitude to him by placing Dubcek's people on the ballots of the HZDS [Movement For a Democratic Slovakia]. Slovakia will sigh in relief when one morning it will see an election poster showing its favorites engaged in friendly conversation; then it will begin its ceremonial march to the polls. In unity is strength.

Of course, it is hardly irrelevant how much information will be found about the "doctor" in the committee for defense and security at the Slovak National Council. The more evidence there is, the more the nationalists, unionists, or the "Trnava initiators" on the HZDS ballots will have to step back and the better will be the spots there for the Obroda [Revival]. On the other hand, the coalition politicians are snickering in vain at Meciar's followers,

and a groundless panic is spreading among Meciar's people. Dubcek will not be a spoiler. He knows full well that Meciar will not suffer because of his past adventures in Slovakia.

The decisive point is that these two need one another. Without Meciar Dubcek has no chance to top off his political career in a dignified way. Without Dubcek Meciar would find it hard to gain at least some foreign favors, and a sovereign, supreme, one-member Slovak confederation will need those foreign favors. Not everything can be bought for T-702 tanks, someone must sign international treaties of friendship and cooperation, and it is not without importance what kind of a president will Slovakia have.

I am not writing about these self-evident facts of "high politics" because I am bored and have nothing else to do. I have reached the sad conclusion that Slovakia today needs Meciar so that in the future it can get rid of Meciarism—in other words, of an illusion that somebody will "put everything in order" for our citizens, that somebody will "get them jobs," and that somebody will be their stand-in and "fight to earn Slovakia a good name in the world." It seems inevitable that first the majority of Slovakia's citizens must elect a leader who will bring them to an economic collapse and international isolation, so that on the basis of such experiences they will realize that they must act in a mature way. I think that Dubcek will be very helpful on that enlightening road on which Meciar will lead the nation to a catastrophe.

#### **Benda on Implication of Possible Leftist Victory**

92CH0385B Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak  
2 Mar 92 p 1

[Interview with Vaclav Benda, chairman of the Christian Democratic Party, by Alena Gottweisova; place and date not given: "The Federation Is Not a Bargaining Club"—first paragraph is VEREJNOST introduction]

[Text] At the current stage in deliberations about the constitutional arrangement of the CSFR, positions of all political parties are becoming crystallized. The proponents of independence for both republics are actively involved, as are those who promote a common state. We discussed these and other problems with a mathematician, philosopher, one of the first signatories of Charter 77, deputy of the Federal Assembly and chairman of the Christian Democratic Party.

[Benda] I think that the most crucial crisis in our relations has been overcome and that time works in favor of a common state. However, certain dangers are present here. First of all, it is the problem of the three sections in the Constitution. I am afraid that the parties will not change their standpoints and that the Federal Assembly will remain dysfunctional. However, a critical situation may arise after the elections. We presume that the right-wing democratic forces in the Czech Republic will win, though possibly by a slight margin. If the

national-socialist forces in Slovakia will win by a landslide, and, if the Federal Government is leftist, there is a danger of attempts to overturn the whole republic. In that case, we would prefer independent republics. The future of our common state as well as of the entire Central Europe will be decided in Slovakia.

[Gottweisova] How does the Christian Democratic Party view the common state?

[Benda] The essential task calls for a division of sovereignties. If the republics will have their sovereignty, then the federation must also have sovereignty. It cannot be a mere bargaining club that makes one decision after another. If it is not a sovereign federation with a constitution and a government, then it is not a common state.

[Gottweisova] You proceed from Christian principles as do also J. Carnogursky and the Christian Democratic Movement. What fundamental differences are there between you?

[Benda] A fundamental difference is that we have turned into a party with unambiguous, crystal-clear ideology. The Christian Democratic Movement still has factions and trends and that spawns problems. Another difference is in our attitude to a common state. We are aiming at a civic concept and at a regional system, while the Christian Democratic Movement postulates the national principle. Nevertheless, our main difference is ideological—the KDH sees the greatest menace in Western liberalism. Despite all its shortcomings, we consider ourselves part of the West. We reject all messianistic tendencies and efforts to act as a bridge between the corrupt West and the pure East; people do tread on bridges quite a lot. We have already had that experience and it resulted in a catastrophe.

[Gottweisova] What is your attitude to the demands for across-the-board publication of the results of lustrations in conjunction with lustration scandals?

[Benda] The problem is—either they are published in accordance with the law, or they will be published gradually as scandals before every election. There cannot be any coverup. In our view the scandal mongering must be prevented; that is the only cure that can help our society.

### Warning Against Fundamentalism in Politics

92CH0382A Prague *LIDOVE NOVINY* in Czech  
3 Mar 92 p 1

[Guest commentary by Jan Sokol, Civic Movement: "Exotic Disease"]

[Text] We have no problem agreeing that fundamentalism mixes with democracy like water with oil. But our people, of course, mostly think of it as some kind of exotic disease that runs rampant far away in the countries of the imams and the ayatollahs, something like sleeping sickness, which does not affect us. That, of

course, is a mistake. Fundamentalism is an effort to subordinate all politics to some fundamental idea, other than the ideas of freedom, rights, and humanity. Communism, in the days of its youthful vigor, came very close to it.

A democratic rule of the majority is possible only where and only as long as the minority goes along with it. Many important issues cannot be decided by voting, because those who are outvoted will not reconcile themselves to it. The shipwrecked on an iceberg cannot democratically decide whom to eat the next day. The Czechs cannot decide by voting that the Slovaks are not a nation, the Serbs cannot abolish the Croats, and the Catholics cannot vote to close the Protestants' churches and visa versa. Therefore democratic politics must walk on tiptoes where such issues are concerned and treat them very carefully.

In contrast, a fundamentalist is a person who systematically drags into politics issues that cannot be decided by voting. Issues, for which people laid down their lives and on which no compromise is possible. For instance, the issue of national identity and the fear of losing it is behind every instance of nationalism. Similarly religion, one's homeland, and other serious matters. A fundamentalist sooner or later unfailingly shows his colors, because his arguments are stained with spilled blood. But, as Nietzsche once wrote, "blood is the worst of arguments."

Brezhnev used the lives of World War II soldiers to justify the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and in Iran they put up fountains of blood in their squares. Where no blood was spilled, a fundamentalist will bandy about strong words which at least smell of blood: treason, genocide, fascism. Also, to brand something "Bolshevik" is enough for some hotheads to surmount any argument, so that there is no need to be concerned with the question whether something really is Bolshevik. As long as it remains only a discussion, nothing much happens. But when in this connection some people start calling for "another revolution," I must ask: What in fact is Bolshevism, if not precisely a call for a revolution against a legitimate democratic government?

Therefore, watch out for this disease, which begins with strong words and can often end precisely with what it began with—real blood.

### Czech Writer's Portrait of Contemporary Ruthenia

92CH0355A Prague *LITERARNI NOVINY* in Czech  
15 Jan 92 p 13

[Article by Agata Pilatova: "A Revival During a Time of Threats in Subcarpathian Ruthenia"]

[Text] The trip is only 1,000 kilometers in length, and suddenly and without warning we feel like we are in a scene out of F.L. Vek. There are cars going by and you feel the proximity of missile bases (which the Soviet empire built as far away from the big cities as possible so that the country would be well protected without the top

brass being threatened); aircraft land and take off at the Uzhgorod airport and the Carpathian forests are being cut down by the most modern of power saws. That is, they are being plundered. Everything is properly in its own place and there is no doubt that this is the end of the 20th century. But despite this, Subcarpathian Ruthenia is undergoing its own revival. And possibly a territorial one as well, by which we mean that it is awakening the entire land.

So, how many times does this make? In the middle of the last century, the clergyman, revivalist, and poet Alexander Duchnovic called out, "Subcarpathian Ruthenians, shake off your deep sleep!" At that time it looked as if there would really be an awakening. The Ruthenian revivalists had joined up with the Czech national movement, participated in the Slovak congress in Prague, and left behind here touching leaflets in verse about the need for unity of the Slovak peoples. Schools teaching in the Ruthenian language were opened and the educated Greek Catholic clergy spread enlightenment and national consciousness.

But today we perhaps already know enough about the course of politics in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, as there has been a lot written about it in recent months. Let us rather follow up on the wonderful revival which reminds one so much of that of Jirasek and Vek for the Czechs. Recently at the Uzhgorod University there was a discussion by Ukrainian men of science, who were artfully invited to just that place, as to whether it is possible to consider the Ruthenians as a people. They easily answered it for themselves: more than one of them had done their master's or doctorate on the ingenious demonstration of the linguistic, territorial, or cultural unity of the Ruthenians with the Ukrainians. "The Ruthenians have always been part of the Ukrainian people," resolved the participants of the symposium. The "always" was, of course, deliberate since some people still remember how they had to change their nationality, so to speak, overnight as demanded by the Soviet agencies. That was 45 years ago and at roughly the same time many of the Greek Catholics reregistered, likewise "voluntarily," from Greek Catholics to the Orthodox Church.

But surprise, they did not get used to it. Recently they have somehow ceased to be content. And not too long ago they finally pushed through permission for the church of their fathers and began to fight for recognition of the Ruthenian nationality. (Which is why they held the scientific conference in Uzhgorod!) The revival is proceeding slowly, even though it is going somewhat faster since the failed coup in Moscow.

It has become busy in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Some of the intellectuals of that region, the ones who have not been totally Ukrainianized, are reluctantly asking themselves whether it is worth it. The enthusiasts are not meditating on it and are not afraid to exert their authority in an attempt to restore the nationality, to purge the language, and to establish the unique nature of

the culture. They are resolved lament the certainty of being, what else, the hinterland of Ukrainia. In the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians and elsewhere they spend their time in organizing cultural activities, writing articles, discussions. But they are taking a risk since it is not at all certain how things will work out and the militancy of Ukrainian nationalism is well known.

A professor at the Uzhgorod University, the mathematician Stepan Brodi, who is also a noted musician, arranges discussions with the students about Ruthenian questions, sings Ruthenian songs, and organizes literary evenings. One of these was devoted to the revivalist and clergyman Alexandr Pavlovic. Touching songs from the last century were heard and young people presented some folk dances. "We will sow, we will plow, and our grandsons will reap the harvest..." recited the narrator and the full, although not very large, hall of the Uzhgorod puppet theater enthusiastically applauded Pavlovic's simple verses. It seemed to me that not even the grandmothers in shawls, nor the young people, nor the properly dressed people of middle age—doctors, teachers, workers, and journalists—who were present wish to leave the question of their nation up to the grandsons. This would take much too long. I do not know, perhaps I actually succumbed to the revivalist atmosphere of the evening or the obvious optimism of Professor Brodi, who direct the program, conferred, sang as part of it, and even shined for a while; however, I am convinced that each such evening changes the question of the Ruthenian nation to a greater and greater certainty.

Recently there was a great response to the article "I Am a Ruthenian and My Son Is a Ruthenian" by the poet Volodimir Fedinisinec. He writes his passionate proclaiming declaration (as well as his poetry) in Ukrainian, but what else could he learn in school? But he is one of those who is working on a Ruthenian grammar book. Part of the poetry that he publishes (lately at his own expense) comes from the Ruthenian folk literature, for example, from ballads. He devotes many of his poems to the natural scene of his native land and to the town "above the Uho River" in which he lives and they are found also in the wonderful verses of the common citizen's poetry, especially in the recent years of the loosening of restrictions under perestroika. However, he now publishes mainly articles which because of his own unambiguous declarations on Ruthenian nationality are unacceptable for some Carpathian papers. It is therefore necessary that a banner for freedom of expression also wave alongside the national flag.

Let the collection of appointed men of science say what they will; the Ruthenian question hangs in the air and fills the mass media. Some papers praise the Ruthenians, others not so much, and some keep neutral and stick to informational facts. (The Russian publications have been particularly sympathetic recently because the Russian part of the population sees its allies to be the Ruthenians, rather than the Ukrainians....) During the

autumn weeks, the television carried two extensive discussions on the "Ruthenian question" with representatives of the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians sitting at the round table in each. The somewhat nervous and aggressive moderator interrupted these speakers, but it did not help her much since the participants in the discussion were prepared and adroit. And they had more right on their side.

One of the television discussions was opened by a quite charming woman with the somewhat unexpected remark, "I would like right at the start to give praise to God. I feel that it is necessary." This was Klara Baloghova, the artistic director of the State Subcarpathian Artistic Song and Dance Ensemble, a choreographer of world renown. Her ensemble has for years played, sung, and danced so to speak in disguise; all the Ruthenian numbers had Ukrainian titles.... "You cannot know how much it always bothered me, but what good would some protest do? Actually I have done the same thing all my life and that is to serve Ruthenian culture. Everyone knows just the same what nationality we were and whose songs they were." Will anyone reproach her for the disguise? Klara taught Ruthenian "kolomyjky" and Hungarian "czardasz" dances to dancers all over the world and her ensemble took part in the Exhibition in Prague in August of this year. Even the Czech Ministry of Culture had to invite her if they wanted to please the Ruthenians living in Bohemia and to support their revival in the former evil empire.

I saw a picture of unhappy people standing around costumed dancers. And another on which the Crucifixion has barbed wire wound around it. On another canvas titled "Fall of the Empire" there was a broken classical column. And right beside, a wonderfully depressing threesome of pictures painted as the funeral of the vineyards. (When the so-called "dry law" was in effect under the Soviets, the grape growers had to destroy the vineyards with their own hands. Who knows if this was a matter of deliberate Ligachev sabotage and the destruction of the wine growers as a class, actually also the destruction of a certain independent agricultural way of life. Or was it simply just resounding stupidity?) At that time they also mercilessly destroyed the vineyards in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The painter Volodimir Mikita captured this in his sad series of illustrations on philosophical themes and pensive landscapes of the Subcarpathian countryside. Mikita got as far as Moscow with his paintings and had an exhibition there as the first ever Carpathian Russian artist. He tried not to paint "Soviet themes" and surprisingly he succeeded overall, even during the years of deep stagnation. It is possible that they understood his Ruthenians to be working subjects or did not recognize themselves in the allegorical canvases.

"But simply no one would exhibit my barbed-wire Christs and thoughts about crossing thresholds not previously reached. And the nationalists were calling for social and national themes," the artist corrects my error.

He is also an activist in the Ruthenian Society and convinces me that "the Ruthenian national culture does exist," that it is possible to determine what it is, to define it, and obviously to spread it. The melancholy quiet countryside, a person with a pensive appearance, the special mournful quiet of nature, the unostentatious, but all the greater for it, beauty of the human constructions, the huddled little wooden houses, as if they expect a disaster. As if they counted on one. The beauty and poverty of the land at the foot of the Carpathian Mountains and its dignified humility. "They say that the Ruthenians are passive. I would say rather that they are peaceful and moderate...."

But sometimes beneath the surface of quiet there are words and deeds already gathering. They increase with each cultural evening in the halls and with each note of the musicians and picture of the artists. There are more of them in the booklets and the articles in the newspapers and they increase with the demonstrations for a sovereign Carpathian republic. This demand was first announced at a meeting this year in August in Mukachevo. It came from the mouth of the writer Vasili Socka, the chairman of the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians, whose Ruthenian sounds like a little song or sometimes also like a whole chorus.

Postscript: At the same time that the referendum on independence was taking place in Ukraine (1 December 1991), the citizens of Subcarpathian Ruthenia were finally also able to answer their own question put directly to them as to whether they want autonomy within the framework of an independent Ukraine. Whether they want "self-administering status" to use the expression employed for this action. Almost 80 percent of the voters opted for autonomy. Perhaps someone will soon try to reduce the importance of the results of this referendum, to distort its meaning, or to disclaim the way it was conducted as irregular. But the facts are indisputable, as is known. People finally have been able to express themselves, even if it was in a very restricted form.

#### Overview of Current Czech Newspapers

92CH0362A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE in German 28 Feb 92 p 17

[Article by Jacqueline Henard: "No Foreign Partner Desired by RUDE PRAVO: A Report on Developments on the Czechoslovak Newspaper Scene"—first paragraph is FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE introduction]

[Text] On the Czechoslovak newspaper scene, which accompanies the opening of the country to foreign capital with mixed feelings and occasional hysterical tones, only a few partnerships have thus far been concluded with foreign publishers, in contrast to developments in Hungary. The largest and most influential newspaper continues to be RUDE PRAVO, the former central organ of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Today, it is "independent," that is to say, above all, that

it has freed itself from the structures of the disintegrated party and has neither found nor taken on any foreign participation. The editorial staff is essentially unchanged. Its ranks repeatedly present articles on "German capital imperialism."

The first independent newspaper in postcommunist Czechoslovakia is older than the "velvet revolution" in a double sense: first, LIDOVE NOVINY has a connection, both with respect to its title and its quality, to the most renowned Czech-language Prague newspaper from previous times; second, the most noted dissidents of the country had reestablished its traditions as far back as 1988 with a samisdat journal which bore the same title. In the first "official" issue of December 1989, such men as Vaclav Havel and Jiri Dienstbier bid readers farewell on their way into politics. LIDOVE NOVINY once more became a daily. The editorial offices moved into a run-down office building on Wenceslas Square. Through its commentaries and supplements, the newspaper soon became the most important daily in the country. Meanwhile, bad words can be heard in Prague: "I subscribe to LIDOVE NOVINY and then also take a normal newspaper, so that I might know what is going on." The editors frequently bet on highly independent accents, commentaries lag events by three days. Circulation is hanging between 135,000 and 155,000 copies. There is a shortage of advertisers who are able to pay. Nevertheless, the editor in chief says the newspaper is making a profit; in contrast to previous times, the editorial staff is no longer fundamentally closed against a foreign partner. But it is said such a partner would not hold a majority position.

The largest newspaper in Czechoslovakia is RUDE PRAVO, with circulation running between 340,000 and 570,000 copies. Its chief editor recently said in an interview with journalist and film director Radek John that his newspaper did not need any foreign partner. He said that a modern text processing facility was financed with a loan. RUDE PRAVO is among the most consistent critics of the market-oriented economic reform. If Germany or other similar traditional topics do not happen to be involved, the tone of the articles is frequently pleasantly quiet. The paper is popular with kiosk vendors, who are tied to the quasi-monopolistic Postal Newspaper Service; there are few returns. The editorial staff of MLADA FRONTA DNES, the turned-around youth party paper, occupies rooms of the former [German-language] PRAGER TAGEBLATT. MLADA FRONTA DNES is the second largest newspaper. Its circulation ranges between 360,000 and 470,000 copies. The chief editor is Karel Hvizdala, who had lived in Germany for a long time as an emigre. He has taken on a French minority stockholder—the Socpresse, which also publishes FIGARO. Also in a conversation with John, Hvizdala says that they had encountered a "technological barrier." They were unable to achieve the goal of having 32 pages on weekdays and 64 pages on Saturday as a result of a shortage of printing capacity. The French had intended to take care of distribution and the advertising business.

Two newspapers, which are new and thus far still somewhat faceless, are close to two new political groupings: TELEGRAF (Vaclav Klaus) and CESKY DENNIK (Jiri Dienstbier, Pavel Rychetsky). A curious newspaper is the METROPOLITAN; one can repeatedly hear it said in Prague that its establishment is backed by "communist money from the Crimean Mafia." Its circulation is in the vicinity of 40,000 copies. Long queues are often to be seen in front of SPIGL vendor stands (circulation 300,000). Its attractiveness lies in horror and sex reports. Because of its local reporting, the Prague evening daily VECERNI PRAHA (circulation 175,000) is popular. It is owned by Czechoslovak private entrepreneur Fidelis Schlee. He is not looking for a partner: "Nowadays, everyone in this country is ready to bow down low before a foreigner with a pretty business card—not I."

PROFIT (circulation 100,000), an economics journal owned by the Swiss Ringier Verlag [publishing house], addresses private entrepreneurs and anyone who wants to become rich. Its director, Michael Voracek, says that in a partnership with a foreigner capital is less important than the other working style, something a Czech is not capable of on his own. The old established HOSPODARSKE NOVINY (circulation 150,000) continues to be the official economic policy newspaper. It is owned by an Economica AG, headed by former government spokesman Pavel. Some time ago, the French chain, Euroexpansion, took over one-half of the business share. Finally, the weekly RESPEKT (circulation 70,000) is rich in influence, but small. Its editorial staff includes the most interesting young reporters. They still do not have any firm opinion regarding foreign capital and a possible partnership with a Western publishing house. "We must first learn what that means."

### New Direction in State Schools Urged

92CH0381A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
3 Mar 92 p 3

[Commentary by Oldrich Botlik, member of the Association of Alternate Education, IDEA: "Patent of Tolerance"]

[Text] Unlike Minister Vopenka, I regard the six—actually, seven, if we count his own project—mutually incompatible concepts of the future type of Czech schools as a very worthwhile result because it demonstrates the differences in opinions about schools as well as about what the students should gain from it. A team of specific persons stands behind each program which is endorsed by large groups of citizens, while others select only what they like from every project.

Should we now try to find out which concept is supported by the majority and then force it upon all the rest? Or should we look for such general rules of the game that even the proponents of minority views may enjoy the same rights to be educated in accordance with their ideas as the majority, be they parents or teachers? In other words, does it make any sense whatsoever that the

minority must conform to the majority in the state educational system? Why are we always looking for the one and only best solution when there is no such thing?

The minister's projects do not deal with this key problem at all, although the main problem of Czech schools is concealed precisely behind it. Our students do not need the certificate of literacy he proposes. They need schools that at long last would begin to develop their individual talents and respect each student's unique qualities. Instead, upon some officials' orders, all children are still bent in the same direction—with the wind. Many state schools do nothing more than fill the heads of their students with information that someone considers essential. No radical change can take place until those schools, too, learn and are able or compelled to pay attention to their students' unique skills, talents, and personal goals. Only then may they diversify and improve what they have to offer.

We agree that our educational system can be transformed step by step and not in one leap. While the minister wants to take the first step himself, the NEMES group, the authors of the program for the development of special education, Professor Kotasek's team, and the IDEA [Association for Alternate Education] propose that the public play the leading role in shaping the structure of Czech schools. Parents, teachers and other experts, employers, chambers of commerce, public associations, counties, churches, communities, and, in fact, anyone should express at all times their thoughts about

education and affect the structure of individual state schools. If that cannot be done, then we should organize schools that would compete under specific and equal conditions. Thus, the bureaucrats will be deprived of most of their influence and power which will return to the hands of our citizens and to the parliament. It is quite obvious that the minister should not make decisions about the future of education—though he must prepare the groundwork for them—just as the minister of economy does not make decisions about the economic reform; his deputies do that.

This is an example how the new legislative and economic framework of our educational system may look: The parliament will adopt a "patent of tolerance" for the sector of education, which will legalize both the right to pursue various concepts of education and training and their systems, as well as their equality before the state. At the same time, it will define in detail the rights and obligations of all parties, including the so called targeted standards, if it considers them desirable.

Four teams of authors have proposed a tolerant, constructive and truly democratic concept which protects the right of the minorities. I see its model, for example, in Denmark. However, the minister's project ignores the role of the parliament, although we now very urgently need a radically different legal revision of the teaching and learning systems. Minister Petr Vopenka has greatly underrated the significance, urgency and difficulty of the most important task before him.



**'Judge Scandal' Probe Called 'Anti-MDF'**

92CH0377D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
24 Feb 92 p 4

[Article by T. Janos Rac: "Debrecen Hungarian Democratic Forum on the Judge Scandal"]

[Text] As reported in our Saturday issue, Dr. Laszlo Sal, the deputy president of the Hajdu-Bihar County Court, announced that a representative of the local Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] organization had asked him to apply for the position of the president of the county court.

The MDF Hajdu-Bihar County Board and Debrecen presidium felt it necessary to issue a statement objecting to the contents of Thursday's all-judicial conference and to the press that reported this event. A press conference convened to release the statement expressing the MDF organization's objection to the press turned largely into a press review. We quote from the statement: "Deputy President Laszlo Sal's words and his anti-MDF article concerning the judicial conference—carried on the first page of the local press—prove that in defending his commitment to the MDF, a nominee has created public support for the incumbent president of the county court without providing evidence. In our view, the presence of the press during the evaluation of applications was inconsistent with law. The statements of Deputy President Laszlo Sal and the newspaper article did not reflect an expectation for judicial independence; instead, they served to agitate against the MDF, and to render impossible from the outset any candidate, who, aside from the incumbent president, dared to apply for the position."

An argument evolved at the press briefing between chief spokesman MDF National Assembly Representative Lukacs Szabo and the NAPLO reporter as a result of the statement. The representative regarded the article as incorrect, while the journalist claimed that the material originated from the MTI news agency. The MTI reporter stressed that all he had conveyed were things said at the conference.

When asked about the MDF organization's view of Janos Brodi's actions—the person claimed to have represented the MDF and the minister of justice when he requested Laszlo Sal to submit an application—they replied that no one had asked Brodi to do such a thing. Subsequently the MDF organization promised a public investigation of the case.

We asked Dr. Laszlo Sal's view of the MDF position.

"I do not wish to react to that," he replied. "By doing so I would be walking into the political alley. My action was intended to keep politics outside the walls of the court."

**SZDSZ: Independence of Judiciary Threatened**

92CH0377E Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 25 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by P.SZ.: "Hack: The Danger Presented by This Case Is That Even the Semblance of Judicial Independence Is Missing"]

[Text] Acting on behalf of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] group of representatives, Peter Hack forwarded a letter to National Assembly President Gyorgy Szabad relative to the scandal that erupted within the Hajdu-Bihar County body of judges. In remarks delivered before the parliament resumed its agenda, the SZDSZ representative called for an urgent investigation of the case.

"We have expressed the need for judicial independence and nonpartisanship in the course of the roundtable negotiations as well as part of the law on political parties," Hack responded to our question. "We wanted to make certain that the judiciary remained immune to political influence. In addition to the Hajdu-Bihar County scandals we are aware of specific cases in which judges had been approached in some way. All I can say at this time is that two counties East of the Tisza River are involved. One cannot rule out the possibility that additional cases of this nature become public. Local MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] leaders and, in part, National Assembly representatives claiming to act on behalf of the minister of justice have paid visits to judges persuading them to submit applications for leadership posts: They attempted to run quasi-opposition candidates from the party. I signaled this threat at the SZDSZ conservative union press conference two weeks ago, even though the case was uncertain at the time. Four judges have thus far confirmed having been contacted. This is very dangerous because citizens lose their confidence if the perfect semblance [as published] of judicial independence is missing. If a suspicion to the effect that leading judges are handpicked by the government prevails, the populace will have no confidence that the law has prevailed in cases arising between citizens and the state. We would like the National Assembly Committee on the Constitution to conduct public investigations of these matters, and it would be beneficial for the government to state very clearly that it did not provide such directions ever to anyone, and that they do not intend to influence court decisions on political grounds. The 'ball' is now in the National Assembly president's court; failing to order an investigation would be a very one-sided action, because the truth was revealed as a result of a lengthy investigation when Lukacs Szabo's parliamentary immunity was suspended in Debrecen. At this time Lukacs Szabo may be suspected of having abused his representative mandate; accordingly, this matter should be investigated at least as vigorously as the earlier incident, based on fairness. Unless this takes place, the president will have cast doubt on the independence of the judiciary. Incidentally, at the MDF press briefing, Lukacs Szabo should have denied the fact that embezzlement had



taken place, but instead of doing so, he held the press and the judges responsible. I regard this as scandalous, because in their days the communists used the same arguments to explain the influence they exerted on courts.

"The fact that such a thing has happened is scandalous."

### **FIDESZ Member Calls Torgyan Faction Legitimate**

92CH0377A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
25 Feb 92 p 4

[Article by J.T.K.: "Torgyan Faction Legitimate, According to Janos Ader"]

[Text] Emese Ugrin's announcement yesterday that a Smallholders Party [FKgP] parliamentary faction had been established has transcended the joint position taken by the Rules Committee and the Committee on the Constitution, according to Janos Ader. The FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] representative told this newspaper that this had been the missing link the committees used to support their arguments that Pasztor's faction was the only faction that could be recognized as one that represented legal continuity. Henceforth the question is this: Which faction should be regarded as the FKgP faction? The two committees evaded this question. In deciding this issue we must set aside our political sentiments and assessment of Torgyan and must start out from the standpoint of clear constitutional law and the House Rules.

The essence of these rules is that only the representatives of a party are authorized to form a parliamentary faction of a party. Since all members of Pasztor's faction have been barred from the FKgP—and whether this has taken place in a legitimate way is another question—we must state that Torgyan's faction is entitled to represent the FKgP in parliament. This is the legal situation today, irrespective of what we think of Torgyan and his political conduct. A highly significant issue of constitutional law like this must be decided in the abstract from Torgyan's person. Should the size of the Torgyan faction drop below 10 persons, the party's faction would cease, but there would be persons authorized to represent the party in parliament, according to Ader. These people would not be able to form a faction, but could form a group of representatives; alternatively they could join the independents. This, however, would not necessarily mean that the Pasztor faction could automatically take over the place of the FKgP's representative group.

Two solutions would produce a clear situation. The Pasztor team could either establish a new party, or could use legitimate means to regain control over the management of the party, the FIDESZ representative and member of the National Assembly Committee on the Constitution said.

### **Effort To Centralize Local Authority Criticized**

92CH0401A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian  
5 Mar 92 pp 1, 21

[Article by rg: "Fire Power Concentrated at the Budapest Local Government"—excerpt from a document prepared by the legal and control division of the Office of the Lord Mayor]

[Text] One wonders whether government decrees concerning certain local governmental authorities published in the 28 January issue of MAGYAR KOZLONY had been politically motivated, calculated from a financial standpoint, or aimed at dividing Budapest perhaps, or if they had been promulgated in error.

The 10 government decrees established the still-unsettled authorities [of local governments] based on relevant law. As Budapest Chief City Clerk Peter Szegvari explains, the first problem is that the creator of these decrees has not consulted with anyone, has not sought the views of anyone, and has disregarded not only the local governments but also the Office of the Regional Prefects and some of the ministries, all of which learned about the decrees from MAGYAR KOZLONY.

All concerned organizations were totally unprepared, and these legal provisions could create major problems in the near future. For example, instead of a single Lost and Found Office in Budapest, there have to be 23 such offices. The various districts could grant routing permits for special vehicles independently, without consulting with each other; thus, it is conceivable that the Budapest government prohibits the passage of certain vehicles on main thoroughfares while districts authorize such passage on side roads. The government decree deprives local governments of certain regulatory authorities, as a result of which they are unable to perform some of their significant duties. This situation exists, for example, in regard to public welfare (see box below), as well as with respect to the protection of nature and the environment, building supervision, traffic, and water. The functional scope of these matters includes a number of tasks to be performed primarily by local governments, but they will not be able to perform these because the decrees simply transferred the related authorities and jurisdictions to the state. The Office of Regional Prefects has been assigned to exercise several of these authorities.

Politics have been mixed with property interests in this instance, according to the Budapest chief city clerk. For example, in Budapest the Pest County Office of the Regional Prefect has received management rights over an office space at City Hall of 4,600 square meters. That office has a right to requisition space only for functions verified as having previously been performed by a former council or local government organization. Thus, if as a result of these functions these offices are able to increase their staffs from 80-90 persons to 460 persons, they will also be entitled to the larger space. From this standpoint the decrees have not been promulgated accidentally, the chief city clerk said.

Insofar as Budapest is concerned, the decrees simply forgot about Budapest's special situation, i.e., that it is an entirely different settlement than all the rest, in part because it has 2 million residents and in part because 23 adjunct autonomous local governments operate within the city. In Budapest's case, the creator of these decrees provided only for the districts; functions have been established only for the districts even in cases where the districts might not be able to perform such functions. It serves no purpose if the city has jurisdiction over certain matters but the districts have the related authority, such as in the case of defining nature conservation areas, the maintenance and operation of special public roads, and the closing of noisy plants or service establishments. Requirements related to the uniform cityscape and to architectural unity cannot be enforced either as long as building construction supervision is under the authority of district clerks.

The Budapest local government intends to appeal to the government to discontinue these contradictions and is initiating action to change these decrees. The appeal will be based in part on the Constitution and in part on the Local Government Law. As a last resort, the city intends to petition the Constitutional Court, because the Constitution provides that the scope of authority and jurisdiction of local governments can only be changed by law.

According to Lord Mayor Gabor Demszky, the government decrees manifest a previously voiced intent to decentralize and to divide, i.e., to weaken Budapest. The creators of the decrees have endeavored to enforce this intent excessively, as a result of dumb and coarse action.

One should not be oblivious to the fact that these decrees are coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior, and the regional prefects receive their directions from that ministry.

**[Box, p 21]**

"Paragraph 11 of Government Decree No. 22 of 28 January 1992 establishes the public welfare authorities and jurisdictions of local government mayors and clerks, as well as of the regional prefects. It is detrimental from the standpoint of local governments. According to the Local Government Law, social welfare service delivery is a basic function of local governments; it is the duty of local governments to establish the required institutions and to ensure the functioning of such institutions. Based on Budapest law, the maintenance, development, and delivery of health care and social welfare services over and above the basic service provisions is the function of the Budapest local government.

"Despite the above, the decree assigns the authority to appoint the social welfare administrator to the regional prefect. Relevant legal provisions define the functions of the social welfare administrator as providing professional direction to, and exercising professional supervision over social welfare centers. A similar authority has

been established with respect to the professional direction of social welfare homes, rehabilitation facilities, and institutions designed to protect youth.

"According to the above, the government decree grants authority that involves professional direction to regional prefects. This is inconsistent with Law No. 65 of 1990 and Law No. 90 of 1990 concerning the legal status, office, and certain functions of regional prefects. Both laws authorize the regional prefect to control the legality of action taken by local governments, and delegates certain state administrative authorities within limits specified by law. Quite naturally, these authorities of the regional prefect must not infringe upon local governmental authority either, as such authority has been defined in the local government law, the law concerning mayors (lord mayors), or in government decrees promulgated under the authority of laws.

"These provisions violate authorities granted to local governments by law, and thus conflict with the right guaranteed in Paragraph 43, Section 2 of the Constitution according to which 'The rights and duties of local autonomous governing bodies shall be established by law. The legitimate exercise of the rights of local autonomous governing bodies shall enjoy judicial protection, local autonomous governing bodies may turn to the Constitutional Court for the protection of their rights.'

"We recommend that amendments [to the decree] be proposed; short of that, we will seek judicial review."

**Privatization Minister Szabo on Tasks, Opposition**

*92CH0373A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
29 Feb 92 p 17*

[Interview with Tamas Szabo, minister without portfolio, by Katalin Bossanyi; place and date not given: "The Opposition Is Raising Specters"]

[Text] After fierce skirmishing—at least on the government's part—the debates on privatization strategy, on the proportions of state-owned assets, and on the mode of their administration are over. New privatization bills will soon be introduced in parliament. Following their passage, the AVRT [State Property Trust Corporation] will be formed, and many people believe that it could become a new center of power. About the sensitive interactions between the economy and power I interviewed Tamas Szabo, the minister without portfolio who is in charge of privatization and is also a deputy president of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum].

[Bossanyi] Last May, as chairman of the committee elaborating the government's privatization strategy, you made a statement to our paper. At that time you seemed to be advocating a compromise in the dispute between the Ministry of Finance and the AVU [State Property Agency] over the approach to privatization. But now, as "a third person who profits by the quarrel between others," you are in charge of privatization.

[Szabo] This idea of "a third person who profits by the quarrel between others" is preposterous. What we have here is the evolution of the thinking on the AVU's role in privatization, the proportions of state-owned assets, and the mode of their administration; as well as on who should be the ultimate owner of state assets. It was suggested that we ought to operate the AVU merely as a privatizing agency and form a separate institution for the administration of state assets. Next, the standpoint prevailed in the professional debates that in the administration of state assets a distinction must be made between permanent state assets, and the business assets that could be privatized quickly but in which the state will temporarily maintain a majority interest. Then it was proposed that we establish a new holding institution, and finally that it operate as a corporation—i.e., according to the laws of the market. Within all this there were also debates on numerous professional questions, which I regard as quite natural in an area so uncharted as privatization.

[Bossanyi] Considering that privatization is now headed by a person of ministerial rank who also belongs in the upper levels of the MDF hierarchy, the uninitiated would be justified in assuming that, in addition to professional questions, also the questions of power have been decided.

[Szabo] I would not think so. I would be more inclined to emphasize the continuity within the cabinet. After all, a minister without portfolio was responsible for privatization even before me. Now there has been merely a minor correction within the cabinet: the administration of other, likewise separate, areas has been split off from privatization. At the same time, the supervision of privatization has been strengthened, in view of its importance.

[Bossanyi] This minor correction leads to where you are overseeing the AVU and will also be representing the state in the AVRT that is to be formed.

[Szabo] The former follows from my mandate as minister within the state administration. The latter can only be inferred. If parliament passes the privatization bills, the government might decide in that sense.

[Bossanyi] What does your mandate as minister call for?

[Szabo] I am responsible for implementing the government's privatization strategy, and for the coordination of work relating to its implementation. I oversee the AVU, and—I wish to emphasize: If and when parliament so decides—I will be setting up the new AVRT.

[Bossanyi] Up to now the assets-policy directives determined the course of privatization. Since last September, however, parliament has been holding out the prospect of adopting new directives. Why is that in the government's interest?

[Szabo] The way I see it, the fact that we do not yet have assets-policy directives in force can be attributed exclusively to parliament's self-motion. But once the privatization laws are enacted, the assets-policy directives will have a different function than up to now. That is my personal opinion. The laws, among other things, will set the course of privatization for the long term, determine the AVU's role, and specify the mode of administering state assets. Therefore the directives will actually have to confine themselves only to implementation. Naturally, we will decide in the directives the use to which the annual proceeds from privatization are to be put.

[Bossanyi] There was sharp debate within the cabinet on that issue as well. What is your standpoint on the use of the proceeds from privatization?

[Szabo] In that respect I regard the current year as exceptional and hope that this is the last year when the proceeds from privatization are used also to reduce the current budget deficit.

[Bossanyi] Does that mean that next year it will already be possible to plow back into the economy the entire proceeds from privatization?

[Szabo] The priorities of the tasks must be decided. My professional opinion is that repayment of the domestic debt does not necessarily have to be given priority. There are numerous techniques for plowing back the proceeds. Unfortunately, the market mechanisms have not yet evolved which could ensure that the proceeds are channeled to the right place.

[Bossanyi] When can parliament's decision on the privatization bills be expected?

[Szabo] To my knowledge, the National Assembly's legislative program expects a vote on the bills in April.

[Bossanyi] The government's Program of National Renewal also states that privatization is a concern of the entire nation. Specifically in the interest of a broader consensus, have you not considered requiring passage by a two-thirds vote for this legislative package?

[Szabo] I would consider such a requirement entirely unwarranted.

[Bossanyi] Let us revert to the division of labor between the AVU and the new AVRT. Will both organizations be authorized to exercise the state's rights as owner, to administer state assets and to privatize them?

[Szabo] The AVU's primary task is privatization. It has to be vested with authority to exercise the state's rights as owner and to privatize, because privatization is not a process that can be completed overnight. The main function of the AVRT, on the other hand, is the administration of permanent state assets. But because we intend to privatize a certain proportion of state assets, we will assign the AVRT such functions as well. I might add that establishing the two institutions is typically a decentralization measure that creates competition

between the privatizers and the administrators of state assets. At the same time, nothing is carved in stone. There will be an interchange of individual assets also between the two institutions. The law provides that the AVRT must periodically review the scope of permanent state assets and estimate anew their proportion. Like the AVU, also the AVRT will employ accounting, appraiser and perhaps also management-consulting firms. But the possibility is not excluded that in some instances the AVRT may entrust to the AVU also the privatization of permanent state assets.

[Bossanyi] You call it competition. But the opposition and also nonpartisan experts regard it as concentration of monopoly power. Many people believe that establishing the AVRT will mean the creation of a new center of power. What do you say to that?

[Szabo] I would like to emphasize that the desirable proportion of state assets, their scope and mode of administration are determined in every advanced market economy in the world. When we decided in favor of the corporation as our form of organization, we relied to a large extent on the recommendations of the World Bank and on the PHARE program's aspirations [PHARE is the EC's aid program to the countries in East Europe]. It is essential that we do not intend to create yet another administrative agency, but are seeking a market solution also for this task. Austria, Italy, and Spain have several such holding corporations, and for the most part they are operating successfully. For that very reason I regard the concerns you just mentioned merely as a mistaken preconception, and a part of the attempts to influence political public opinion. The government is nationalizing, centralizing, and concentrating power—these are empty phrases that our opponents are unable to substantiate with facts.

[Bossanyi] The basis of the political concerns is that mostly people close to the MDF have been appointed to the AVU's board of directors and to your staff as well.

[Szabo] In parliamentary democracies, a certain political orientation gains power in free election. There is political government, if you like. Therefore, I do not think that the question you put to me is relevant. In the case of the AVU's board of directors, moreover, the point is merely that several vacancies have arisen. I am now considering ways of attracting players in the capital market to that body.

[Bossanyi] Do you have the banks and the stock exchange in mind?

[Szabo] Just the stock exchange.

[Bossanyi] The accusation of one-sided political commitment would be eased if, for example, the prime minister were to appoint independent and highly respected experts to the AVRT's supervisory board and board of directors. Obviously, you will be suggesting names to him. Have you any specific candidates in mind as yet?

[Szabo] No, I am still thinking about whom to recommend.

[Bossanyi] Are you at least willing to reveal whether the selection will be based on professional, branch or perhaps political considerations?

[Szabo] We are still in the process of gathering comments and reaching agreement.

[Bossanyi] I assume that someone other than you will be the general manager of the AVRT.

[Szabo] It will have an appointed general manager, and also a board of directors and a supervisory board, in accordance with the Law on Business Associations. Its staff will be very small. We are now recruiting the best available experts.

[Bossanyi] It has already been decided that you wish to retain as permanent state assets 25 percent of all business assets. That will affect about 200 enterprises. However, bargaining with the ministries concerned is still continuing. What is your opinion of this debate?

[Szabo] That is not a debate, merely professional groundwork. Most of all, it is not a question of prestige, nor of squabbling for power among the competent ministries. I expected the ministries to lobby more strongly, I must admit. But that is not what has been happening. The law offers more than just [state] ownership of the largest public utilities. We have to find the most suitable form.

[Bossanyi] What will happen to the state's bank shares after privatization?

[Szabo] They will be transferred to the AVRT.

[Bossanyi] According to experts, the mandatory transformation of enterprises into companies by the end of the year will affect as many as 600 to 800 enterprises. Will the AVRT control the shares and stakes in the firms that have been transformed into companies?

[Szabo] First, to make them more accessible to potential investors and to domestic small investors in particular, the enterprises will be transformed into companies by a state administrative act. Then the companies will be assigned to either the AVU or the AVRT, depending on how quickly they can be privatized.

[Bossanyi] Will this burst of transformations into companies not lead to devaluation? After all, we have already seen that a substantial capital loss occurs in the course of privatization.

[Szabo] In relation to what are we talking about devaluation or a capital loss? Transition to a market economy has produced an enormous market [capitalization] loss, not a capital loss. The two must not be confused. The obsolete technology and partially also the quality of management reduce the value of the assets that can be privatized. Regrettably, the two together are the price of privatization.

[Bossanyi] And in the course of the mandatory transformation of enterprises into companies it will be possible to get rid of the "obsolete" managements as well?

[Szabo] You cannot mean that question seriously! We are not preparing any such campaign. If we wanted to replace the circle of enterprise managers, the AVU could do that even tomorrow: by placing the enterprises under direct state administration, and by appointing privatization commissioners in place of the directors. But the AVU avails itself of this possibility only when it has been proven that the management is obstructing privatization. Incidentally, my opinion of domestic managers is not generally unfavorable. The managers' ability to compete must be improved through management training, and not by waging political campaigns. To make managers out of enterprise directors will require time and professional mechanisms as well.

[Bossanyi] If I understood you correctly, then through the mandatory transformation of enterprises into companies you intend to give domestic capitalists of far more modest means a slight edge over foreign investors.

[Szabo] One can arrive at that conclusion only through a considerable jump in logical reasoning. I regard the influx of foreign capital as very desirable. At the same time I find that there is no universal recipe for stimulating the formation of new capitalist strata. I think that supervision by private owners is the most important. In addition to privatization, therefore, the emergence of more sole proprietorships and business associations is the most important market-forming force.

[Bossanyi] Mr. Minister, do you find that the eminent representatives of domestic capital are beginning to present their bill to the government and to the MDF in the course of privatization?

[Szabo] There is nothing to bill for, and nobody to present the bill to. I do not think that the now emerging petite bourgeoisie is siding with any particular political force. On the other hand, our economic results are being recognized as a stabilizing factor. Or perhaps you are sorry to see that the petit bourgeois are not turning against us?

[Bossanyi] What I am inquiring about is support, not opposition. The general experience is that, sooner or later, the holders of economic power will want to influence political power as well.

[Szabo] In Hungary things are still happening the other way around, for it was not the economy that "created" politics. Otherwise I would regard it as normal in a market economy that the new capitalist groups want to gain political influence as well. But for that the process of embourgeoisement and the new entrepreneurial stratum are not yet sufficiently strong in Hungary.

[Bossanyi] Is that why we have a patronage system?

[Szabo] That is prejudice or tilting with windmills. The usual raising of scepters. There is no question of a

patronage system. That method is not even feasible under market conditions. But the government cannot be reproached for entrusting an important task to an expert who is in sympathy with its policies.

[Bossanyi] If to an expert, then there is really nothing for which the government could be called to account. But if to a commissar....

[Szabo] People hate that expression, but it is cherished by those who want to sling mud at us. Let me cite a personal example. When I was appointed state secretary at the Ministry of Finance, the liberal press shrilled in branding me a commissar. And when my present appointment was announced, the liberal press interpreted it to mean that henceforth fiscal and monetary considerations would dominate privatization. Is that not a contradiction? Incidentally, I come from the school of hard knocks and know from experience what it means to be an entrepreneur. Therefore my approach to the economic processes is a pragmatic one and I do not let myself be carried away by my emotions.

[Bossanyi] Yet it is rumored that you are maintaining very close relations with members of the Monopoly Group. Or is that rumor false?

[Szabo] I have close friends among them and appreciate what they are doing in the interest of fair competition. But on professional issues I form my own standpoints independently.

[Bossanyi] What do you say to the rumors that, through available privatization techniques, you could "preserve" as much as 2 billion forints if you wished; for the support of the MDF, for instance?

[Szabo] I regard as nonsense the rumors being spread by the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats].

[Bossanyi] Do you confirm or deny that an opportunity to do so does exist?

[Szabo] I will neither confirm nor deny it, because the oversight of legality, the market, and public scrutiny prevent anyone from resorting to such methods.

[Bossanyi] Let me give you an example of how this could be done, quite legally. An accounting firm you commission pays a kickback from its higher fee, into a politically favored fund.

[Szabo] What comes to mind in such cases is that usually the persons who do evil are the ones who think evil of others.

[Bossanyi] But there have been examples of large state enterprises providing financial assistance to newspapers that support the government. Is that proper? After all, public money is involved.

[Szabo] I think you will find business circles behind the most diverse political organs. They are sponsoring even the opposition press! I do not see anything objectionable

in that. On the other hand, it would be important to regulate unambiguously such flows of funds, and to subject them to public scrutiny. That is my opinion also of sponsoring political parties.

[Bossanyi] Do you still maintain your earlier standpoint that the proportion of state-owned assets in the competitive sphere can and must be reduced to less than 50 percent by 1994?

[Szabo] We will adhere to the principal directions of our privatization strategy, and not to rigidly interpreted percentages. Naturally, I too am aware of the many problems and pitfalls in conjunction with the changes in ownership. I too am concerned that acceleration might sweep us into some sort of Dutch auction by the state, specifically because of the market [capitalization] loss. In spite of the problems, however, I think we are proceeding in the right direction. Basically we have set the principal tendencies correctly.

#### Land Law Modification in Preparation

92CH0378C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
28 Feb 92 p 5

[Article by I.Cs.: "Land Law To Be Amended; Auctions Close on 31 March"]

[Text] Many details remain to be clarified with respect to the Compensation Law, the Interim Cooperative Law, and the Cooperative Law. Ministry of Agriculture officials travel throughout the country to inform professionals at cooperatives concerning the practical implementation of these laws.

Ministerial Division Chief Laszlo Jojart addressed the issue of local government land requisitioning at the Kecskemet House of Cooperatives yesterday. He did so because in recent weeks cooperatives have been flooded with letters from local governments asserting claims for the transfer the ownership of state-owned land [managed by cooperatives] to local governments. Most of these lands, however, have already been transferred under cooperative ownership during the past decades. Thus, local governments have no right to assert claims regarding such land. On the other hand, cooperatives throughout the country still manage 170,000 hectares of state-owned land, of which they could designate tracts of land to be auctioned for compensation purposes. Only part of the 170,000 hectares of land that remains unsold after the conclusion of auctions (31 March 1993 [as published]) may become local government property. Jojart mentioned the fact that the Constitutional Court has decided a few days ago that legal entities were not eligible for compensation.

Jojart announced that the Ministry of Agriculture has prepared amendments to the land law. These are expected to be submitted to the government next week. Among the more significant changes he mentioned the introduction of the proportionate share-leasehold concept to avoid a need to divide into parcels 3.4 million

hectares of land after transferring cooperative lands into private ownership. Owners choosing to leave their land under common use within the cooperative will be entitled to receive fees based on the leasehold of their proportionate share.

Persons who own small or large parcels of land in several cooperatives may request the land office to combine such parcels into a single tract of land, thus avoiding the fragmentation of land.

#### Restitution Claimants, Cooperatives Vie for Land

92CH0378B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
28 Feb 92 p 5

[Article by P.Cz.: "Bottom View of Compensation; Not Enough Land or Too Many Claimants?"]

[Text] Quite a few agricultural producer cooperatives are unable to comprehend notices they receive from county damage claims settlement offices. In many places compensation claims amount to a larger gold crown value than the gold crown value of the land that may be set aside for this purpose. Compensation offices assert that no legal recourse exists because the notices they provide cannot be challenged in court. The producer cooperatives view this matter differently.

While cooperatives do not dispute the validity of Compensation Law provisions as those apply to them, they recognize that the damage claims settlement offices are incapable of controlling within the given time frame the legitimacy and extent of land compensation claims received. All they are asking for is that regional compensation offices report to them the summaries of data sheets these offices are able to verify, and not the summaries of properly or improperly completed data sheets they receive.

Dr. Laszlo Filipisz, head of the MOSZ [National Association of Agricultural Producers and Cooperatives] secretariat feels certain that if compensation decisions were made on the basis of claims that have been verified and presumed to be accurate, it would turn out that the claims were greater and that the land was not insufficient.

Filipisz chose the Badacsonytomaj cooperative's case as an example from among a series of indications received from throughout the country. The common property within this farm has a 3,259 gold crown value, of this the value the land redeemed under the law is worth 1,000 gold crowns. Fifty percent of this may be retained as part of the land bank established for cooperative members. The cooperative has purchased land worth 2,259 gold crowns, and this land is not subject to distribution in the framework of compensation. In contrast, the notice received from the county damage claims settlement office refers to compensation claims worth 4,993 gold

crowns; this, perhaps, is no coincidence because Badacsonytomaj is a resort area.

This situation is also characteristic in areas surrounding large cities. Presumably, there will not be enough land available in these areas either, because people residing in these settlements who have acquired compensation vouchers in their own right may also enter bids at land auctions organized pursuant to the Compensation Law.

True, in such cases the value of land would increase in the course of bidding, except that one can find more compensation vouchers in cities than land, according to Filipsz. Irrespective of the data contained in the notices, land segregated and designated for the purpose of compensation remains the property of cooperatives until new owners are found. Under present conditions, such land remains cooperative property in the form of yet another nuisance.

**Kaczynski on Political Climate, Coalitions**

92EP0258A Warsaw *PRAWO I ZYCIE* in Polish No 8,  
22 Feb 92 p 1, 7

[Interview with Lech Kaczynski, president of Supreme Chamber of Control, by Zdzislaw Zaryczny; place and date not given: "Fighter"]

[Text] [Zaryczny] You will surely remember your first official congratulations for a long time. Vice Marshal of the Sejm Henryk Bak, presiding over the deliberations, wished you success in your service to the Polish People's Republic....

[Kaczynski] Such slips of the tongue still happen.

[Zaryczny] Then things became less festive. President Walesa, in a television appearance, questioned your competence for the position of president of the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK).

[Kaczynski] I don't think that the president has at his disposal some group of his own with great experience in the area of state auditing. Unless he wants to turn to the people of the old system. That's all as far as his answer to the question of whether, with my qualifications, I can manage at NIK. On the other hand, I am amazed by the persistence of the TV reporter, who clearly wanted to provoke commentary unfavorable toward me.

[Zaryczny] You still attach importance to the president's opinions, when many other politicians ignore them more and more often. In the corridors of the Sejm they even say that Lech Walesa reminds one of the British queen—he rules, but does not govern....

[Kaczynski] I don't think so at all.

[Zaryczny] The fact is that the president does not, despite various expectations, show initiative lately.

[Kaczynski] The president can function effectively only when he stands at the head of a certain political arrangement that directs the state. Lech Walesa had every chance to stand at the head of such an arrangement. He chose, however, his closest collaborators, with Mr. Wachowski in the lead role; I regard this—and I will always repeat this—as deeply injurious to the state.

[Zaryczny] The lengthening impasse concerning NIK was also threatening to the state. One could say that this time, the Sejm had to choose a president [of NIK]. They chose you, despite the fact that many deputies feared that in this way they would inadvertently become involved in the disagreement between the Center Accord [PC] and the prime minister.

[Kaczynski] There was even a theory that I invented the whole affair with authorized representatives of the prime minister just to strengthen my position as a candidate for chief of NIK. Of course, this is absolute nonsense. I noticed, however, that deputies who voted for me were divided among those who were 100-percent certain that my brother and I were right in this matter—because of a

good knowledge of the subject—and those who were not certain. Well I am ready to repeat a thousand times that no politician, no political groups can force me to say anything but that this was all common lies and trickery. Authorized representatives, indeed!

[Zaryczny] At a press conference, however, the prime minister denied that he had given the Kaczynski brothers formal authorization for discussions on broadening the government coalition. It's all very strange.

[Kaczynski] Not to me. But the time has not yet come to say everything completely openly. And, if I become chief of NIK, it will certainly not be me who will speak of it. Though after the president's statement, and before the Senate's decision, the matter is still in suspension.

[Zaryczny] In any case, you played the election battle in the Sejm with style. Is it true that in the intermission after the second round of voting your brother met with Bronislaw Geremek and Waldemar Pawlak to agree on certain actions?

[Kaczynski] My brother met with Pawlak, and I talked with Geremek, Pawlak, and Piotr Kownacki.

[Zaryczny] That is probably how the rumors came about that you came to an agreement as follows: Kaczynski, president; Kownacki, first vice president; and that the whole game was only to check who is loyal, and with whom one can make a deal, etc.

[Kaczynski] I deny that rumor. Kownacki wanted to fight, and had a chance of victory.

[Zaryczny] Then what were those meetings for?

[Kaczynski] Ask the organizers. As far as I'm concerned, I was invited to a conversation with Geremek, with whom I myself wanted to talk, by my colleagues from the Democratic Union [UD]. There, I found myself in a particular situation; I could have withdrawn, but I did not see any particular reasons to do so.

[Zaryczny] Anyway, speculations began in the corridors of the Sejm about the chances for a "reformist center," which would be made up of the UD, the PC, and the liberals. Your election by the votes of just those parties was, according to this hypothesis, the groundwork for the construction of a "bloc of three."

[Kaczynski] There is no "bloc of three," at least as I understand it. There was simply an attempt to broaden the coalition, the next in a succession, you might say, of acts of good faith by the PC toward the Olszewski government, which we created, after all. Of course, we were aware that such a move would bring costs not only in personal concessions in the government—which is natural in politics—but also programmatic concessions, especially in the area of the economic program. And the only way to achieve that goal is by striking compromises. It was only an aim on our part. But the press, with its "facts," immediately "created" a new coalition, which still does not exist, and which may not come into being



at all. For the arrangement of the "bloc of three" is not an easy arrangement to build.

[Zaryczny] Judging by the results of voting, UD deputies seem to be ready to discuss this "bloc."

[Kaczynski] I don't know. Ask the UD about that. I think that there is no unity on this matter over there.

[Zaryczny] I noticed. Tadeusz Mazowiecki voted against you to the end, while Bronislaw Geremek, Jacek Kuron, Jan Rokita, and others voted for you.

[Kaczynski] Some people one knows—shorter or longer, better or worse, but one knows them. And others one does not know. Besides, if one knows someone, then one could have had more or less friendly relations with them at one time. These are all things that are very important for politicians.

[Zaryczny] The Liberal Democratic Congress supported you decisively from the beginning. This probably removes all reticence?

[Kaczynski] The liberals have their convention in a few days. I don't think that they would undertake some shocking about-face.

[Zaryczny] It is a paradox that the idea of the "bloc of three" might have the greatest trouble in the PC. Observers have pointed out, for example, that Wojciech Wlodarczyk, chief of the Office of Council of Ministers, voted against you—the only one from the PC Parliamentary Caucus.

[Kaczynski] I know about this. Mr. Wlodarczyk is a representative of the [Citizens'] Committees and their ideas, which I regard as an aberration.

[Zaryczny] It's not just that. For some time the press has been writing about a breakup in the PC.

[Kaczynski] Excuse me, I'm sorry to speak of it, but objective information about our party is still a rare occurrence. I'll give an example: In how many newspapers did the statement of the PC Parliamentary Caucus, in which we protested about lies and asked the prime minister to recall Marcin Gugulski from the function of government spokesman, appear? And this was a very important statement for the PC, and very sharply worded; it was approved in the caucus by a vote of 26 to 5. Few yet know about this, but at that same meeting, a motion to invite Prime Minister Olszewski to the caucus was rejected, and by a significant majority.

[Zaryczny] How should one understand that rejection?

[Kaczynski] Thus: Since the prime minister plays such games, there is simply nothing to discuss with him as a partner.

[Zaryczny] You understand that if a wall grows up between the Olszewski government and the PC, both the government and the PC might suffer a defeat?

[Kaczynski] Even if this is so, even if that wall does grow up, it will be the work of the prime minister, and of his advisers like Mr. Wlodarczyk, alone.

[Zaryczny] The Christian National Alliance [ZChN] is no longer your chief rival?

[Kaczynski] No, we want alliance with the ZChN. If there is to be an alliance with the UD, then it must also be with the ZChN. This is clear even from the arithmetics of [representation in] the Sejm.

[Zaryczny] That could be a difficult equation.

[Kaczynski] You know, in today's situation, with such a varied political arena, everything is realistic.

[Zaryczny] Recent days have entangled the political situation even more.

[Kaczynski] For sure. The prospects for broadening the coalition are unclear. It's unknown what individual parties will do—how they will behave during the debate in the Sejm, planned for 26-28 February on the government's principles of socioeconomic policy. There could be some surprises.

[Zaryczny] The Senate will also gather at the end of February to decide whether or not to accept your election as president of NIK. A year ago, you worked in the president's chancellery as minister for national security affairs; then you aspired to the positions of minister of national defense, and chief of the Office of Council of Ministers. I'm curious how you will manage at NIK?

[Kaczynski] I don't know. Since I have undertaken it, I will try. I don't at all claim that it will end in success. But I think that no one has such guarantees. If, for example, Zbyszek Romaszewski had a chance at victory, we would have supported him.

[Zaryczny] Administration of NIK requires political neutrality. Your brother will thus lose his closest partner in the working out of complex deals.

[Kaczynski] Yes, you're right. After assuming this position I will not be able to play a direct role in politics.

[Zaryczny] One can interpret this in various ways, but in the political arena, which these days is crawling with "boys in white socks," you and your brother are surely among the tough players, the fighters. There is just one doubt: You two are conducting some very complicated personal arrangements, and arranging some fine deals, but then, when the win is so close, someone snatches the fruits of victory from under your nose at the last moment.

[Kaczynski] We probably aren't able to wager. The whole time my brother especially wagered on someone else, not on himself, and didn't come out too well for it. Of course, in the case of Lech Walesa it is clear that he was

our candidate, and it would be silly even to mention it. However, it did happen several times the way you say. I must admit it.

[Zaryczny] Perhaps you will now simply wager on each other?

[Kaczynski] We shall see. There are things in politics that it would seem are clear, but they are not always possible.

[Zaryczny] Thank you.

### **POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 23-29 Feb**

92EP0251A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 9,  
29 Feb 92 p 2

[Excerpts]

#### **National News**

[passage omitted] After the party convention, Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, told journalists: "The plans of the government's economic policy are compatible with our proposals. We are happy that the government agrees with us, but we are afraid that intragovernment disputes may ruin the best intentions." The convention announced that the Social Democrats will form a "shadow cabinet" and, according to Kwasniewski, Leszek Balcerowicz should become president of the National Bank of Poland. It was announced that the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland has about 60,000 members, including 784 council members, 37 deputies, and two senators. [passage omitted]

Professor Andrzej Zoll, the chairman of the State Election Commission, told *SLOWO POWSZECHNE* that only two election committees have met all the formal and substantive requirements so that their reports can be accepted without reservation. They are the National Election Committee of the Christian-Social Movement "Alliance" (RCh-SP "P") and the Election Committee of the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD). According to the rules, expenses of a little more than 100 million zlotys [Z] per candidate for the Sejm and Z33 million for the Senate were allowed. In only one case was the rate exceeded (senate candidate K. Chrodecki, Z45 million). A candidate for the Sejm from the Peasant Accord (PL) spent the most, Z91 million, and a senate candidate of the Democratic Union (UD) spent Z22 million.

"Is the situation in my country going in the wrong or right direction?" Was the question posed by a survey done by the Gallup poll in the postcommunist countries. It turns out that Poles are the most pessimistic (58 percent—the situation is moving in the wrong direction, 20 percent in the right direction), in the former USSR, excluding Russia, the numbers are 42 and 39 percent, and for Russians, 39 and 33 percent. Then come the Hungarians, 47 and 32 percent. Albanians are the most optimistic about the developments in their situation—13 and 65 percent. In *GAZETA WYBORCZA*, former Prime Minister J.K. Bielecki comments on the survey:

"Dissatisfaction is the historical characteristic of Poles that permits them to find all the difficulties possible. One can think about life in categories of threats; one can think of it also in categories of opportunities. I do not think that all Poles look upon the future so pessimistically."

Cardinal Jozef Glemp, primate of Poland, told the Lithuanian press agency ELTA: "We should mutually forgive each other. We have pursued such a path with the Germans; we are entering such a path with the Ukrainians. And we, priests, can contribute to bringing our peoples closer together."

"What feelings does Jan Olszewski arouse?" the Public Opinion Research Center asked at the beginning of February. Among the nine responses offered, the respondents most frequently chose hope (51 percent), respect (34), trust (32), fear (32). Mistrust was mentioned by 18 percent of the respondents; dislike, by 8 percent. Of the respondents, 55 percent declared they were satisfied that J. Olszewski is prime minister; 25 percent said the reverse.

Mercedes are to be assembled in Poland. A contract between the firm, its representative Sobieslaw Zasada Ltd., and Military Factory No. 1 in Lodz has been signed. The contract covers the 1835 truck and the 308D light truck. Assembly of the 200D and 250D cars for use as taxis and ambulances is also planned.

Polish religiosity according to a study by the Pallotinum Institute for the Sociology of Religion and the Central Office of Statistics done in the summer of 1991, according to *SPOLECZENSTWO I ZYCIE*: strong believers, 10 percent; believers, 79.9 percent; nonbelievers 1.3 percent; practicing, 95.1 percent (there is 5.1 percent more of these than believers), including regularly, 52.4 percent; irregularly, 31.5 percent. In the belief of the existence of God, 84.4 percent; in a reward or punishment after death, 63.4 percent; in the existence of hell, 46.6 percent; absolutely would not allow an abortion, 36.7 percent; divorce, 43.7 percent; adultery, 72.9 percent. No more than 15 percent of Catholics in Poland attaches importance to deepening their religiosity. [passage omitted]

Marek Edelman, the last living member of the command staff of the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto, a cardiologist, sent an open letter to the prime minister and the ministers of internal affairs and justice on the nationalistic "rally" of the groups led by B. Tejkowski: "The lack of a reaction by the government and society to these events arouse my greatest concern.... The participants in the incidents in Zgorzelec must be punished in accordance with the law."

As a result of an extraordinary appeal by the prosecutor general, the Supreme Court acquitted the activists of the National-Democratic League, a secret nationalist organization sentenced in 1961 for forming a union whose existence was to remain a secret from the authorities (Article 236 of the criminal code) to sentences varying

from a dozen or so months to two years imprisonment. Acquitted were: Jozef Kossecki, a former activist of the PZPR [Polish United Worker's Party dissolved on 28 January 1990] ("I joined in order to conduct participant observation and to support the Polish wing, and to fight the traitors"), today a deputy chairman of Party "X"; Przemyslaw Gorny, a retiree; Janusz Krzyzewski, deputy minister in the current government; Henryk Klata, a deputy of the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN); and the lawyers Marian Baranski and Zbigniew Kwiecien. M. Baranski has demanded a trial of the traitors, especially those of "privileged minorities." [passage omitted]

The former deputy ministers of the Ministry of National Defense—Jozef Baryla, Zbigniew Nowak, Mieczyslaw Obiedzinski, Florian Siwicki, Tadeusz Tuczapski, and Eugeniusz Molczyk—have submitted a declaration that none of them cooperated with the CIA. The declaration is associated with the celebrated article in TIME that one of the deputies of the minister of national defense after the introduction of martial law secretly provided information to the CIA. The signatories think that the report in TIME is an "insinuation defaming their honor."

Sixteen deputies from various clubs have asked the Sejm marshal to recall Henryk Bak, who "was unable to control the hall or to substantively direct the debate and voting." [passage omitted]

#### Who's News

Janusz Zaorski, the president of the Radio and Television Committee, has removed Jacek Schoen from the position of head of the Krakow television center. Schoen declared on GAZETA KRAKOWSKA that one week earlier, the president in the presence of an adviser of Prime Minister J. Olszewski, Krzysztof Wyszowski, a former journalist for TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC, paid him a visit and said that he must release two journalists and "accept and advance representatives of the parties of the governing coalition." "I did not want to agree with that." In Krakow, 58 artists and intellectuals signed a protest against the methods of personnel changes at Krakow television. Among the signatories are Jozefa Hannelowa, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Stefan Jurczak (chairman of the Solidarity region), Stanislaw Lem, Jerzy Nowosielski, Krzysztof Penderecki, and Father Jozef Tischner. Prof. Karol Lutkowski resigned from the position of minister of finance. He declared that the decision was caused by differences of opinion regarding economic and financial strategy and not political reasons. [passage omitted]

#### Opinions

[passage omitted]

**Prof. Jadwiga Staniszkis, sociologist:**

*(Interviewed by Ryszard Rybus, GAZETA KRAKOWSKA 7 February 1992)*

[Staniszkis] I was among those supporting Walesa. I am surprised that he does not understand his own power. It is not true he does not have any. He does not use its institutional aspects and overestimates its personal aspects. The transformation of the system is a process and not a happening. Unfortunately, until now the president's role has been destabilizing. Moreover, the 20-person office, which deals with God knows what, has an annual budget equal to the sum spent of the preservation of monuments in the entire country....

**Jacek Kuron, deputy:**

*(Interviewed by Wlodzimierz Filipek, DZIENNIK POZNANSKI 14 February 1992)*

[Filipek] One hears that the end of the Walesa era is approaching.

[Kuron] If someone wishes a deepening of the disintegration, then we lack presidential elections. That is a threat. I think that Walesa knows that the war above was unnecessary. But that is far from announcing the end of Walesa. Especially as those who are eager for this type of declaration are the ones who not long ago supported him. And I do not understand this game. It is necessary to strengthen the president's authority in a way so that he is not drawn into party games. I think that cooperation of the three prime ministers with the president is a good idea. But it is necessary to avoid giving this cooperation any party form.

**Prof. Tadeusz Zielinski, ombudsman for citizens' rights:**

*(Interviewed by Anna Wiszniewska, DZIENNIK POLSKI 5 February 1992)*

[Wiszniewska] A new proposed law prohibiting abortion is to be introduced in the Sejm. Do you think that this law violates the rights of women?

[Zielinski] I am and have been absolutely opposed to punishing women who want to have an abortion; that is a question of their conscience. One also cannot force a doctor to act contrary to his conscience, both when he does not want to perform an abortion as well as when he wants to help a woman. Everyone whose rights are violated can ask the ombudsman for help; only the ombudsman himself cannot stand up for himself.

# PSM Blasted, Democratic Left Union Gains Noted

92BA0623B Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian  
29 Feb-1 Mar 92 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Cornel Nica, president of the Romanian Socialist Democratic Party, by Virgil Anastasia; place and date not given: "Socialist Workers Party Does Not Belong to the Democratic Left Union"]

[Text] [Anastasia] Your party belongs to the USD [Democratic Left Union]. Did you participate in the local elections separately within that union?

[Nica] I have explained on other occasions what the reasons were for founding the USD and the intention of participating in the elections in that form. In general, I tried to submit lists in the name of the USD, but I also had to propose 12 lists independently as an independent party. The difficulties that I encountered are already known because the PSM [Socialist Workers Party] was not legally registered. Due to the dishonesty of the PSM leadership, the USD's lists were rejected in 22 counties.

[Anastasia] Please give us the details.

[Nica] I will sum up the successive actions in order to make it understood how it came to this situation, and I accuse the PSM leadership of working to divert the interests of the democratic left and accordingly those of the electorate. And so I inquired before the USD was founded whether the PSM had a judicial decision to be founded. Messrs. Verdet and Pele replied in the affirmative, stating that they had no problems of any kind. During the proceedings of the coordinating council they started interminable arguments by maintaining that the PSM was legally founded, that questioning the legality of the PSM was a liberal maneuver, and that we had to take united action to defend it, and it was clear that they accused us of betrayal because we did not understand that we were fighting together against the law. We blocked any proposal to determine the electoral strategy and prepare the posters. Determination and filing of the USD abbreviation were intentionally delayed until the last day. At the same time Mr. Verdet (as he admitted later, giving the explanation that he was handicapped) ordered the PSM's electoral symbol (the Sun) to be filed in the districts as a probable reminder of the Democratic Bloc, controlled by the communists (parenthetically speaking, it is known that after these elections the communists filled the jails with the former allies. The maneuver did not succeed this time, although Mr. Verdet almost fell in love with our headquarters, where he probably even dreamed of presiding). Up to the last moment (9 January 1992) the PSM leadership kept insisting that they had a legal right to participate in the elections, and they informed their branches to that effect.

As a result the lists were annulled in the 23 counties where they bore the signatures of PSM representatives.

I do not want anyone to have relations with such people, who display Muscovite dogmatism and who, at the age they have reached, seem to be primarily interested in securing a calm and prosperous old age. It was hard for them to understand that the PSM cannot participate in elections.

I want to stipulate that the PSM does not belong to the USD because the PSM was not legally founded at the time the union was formed, and therefore their representative's signature is null and void. If the PSM speaks in the name of the USD, our party reserves its right to take legal action against it.

[Anastasia] But what results were obtained in the elections under those circumstances?

[Nica] As far as I know now, the USD won 249 positions as councilors and five as mayors. I would make special mention of Galati municipality, where the USD candidate was elected mayor. It is unquestionably to the credit of the local organization, which could nominate a popular candidate, and that counted very heavily.

Independently, the PSDR [Romanian Socialist Democratic Party] won 12 mandates for the 12 lists that it filed, a result that clearly indicates that our party enjoys prestige among the voters. We consider those results unsatisfactory, although three disturbing factors should be allowed for in evaluating them.

1. The effort made by the PSM leadership to diminish and divert the cause of the USD in every particular.

2. The confusion of our party (PSDR) with the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSDR), headed by Mr. Cunesco. We asked Mr. Cunesco to go back to the title under which it was originally registered and which moreover the historical party (PCD [Christian Democratic Party]) that he claims to represent is also called.

3. The large number of absentees (approximately 5 million), who probably would have preferred the social democratic option if we had been more convincing.

[Anastasia] Nevertheless it seems that your party did not make itself sufficiently clear.

[Nica] It is our fault too, but it is also a situation that is considered in a general way. I want to specify that the PSDR was the third party legally registered in postrevolutionary Romania. It is a modern, European party designed upon the model of the PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party], the PSF [French Socialist Party] and the PSMS [Swiss Labor Party] and not upon the Muscovite model as various opinions would have it in a tendentious way, I believe.

The PSDR recognizes and is founded upon the Declaration of Principles of the Socialist International. Actually, the social democratic movement was born as the fruit of the real situations and the seeds of economic evolution from the start of the modern era, being based upon live realities and not upon wisdom gathered from books and

treatises on scientific socialism. Through its political procedure and program, the PSDR draws its vigor from the tradition of the social democratic movement in Romania, and it is defined as a party open to all those who militate for a democratic society based upon political pluralism, abolition of any kind of extremism, and constitutional democratic structures. Unfortunately a bitter battle is being fought in the world today and especially in Romania against social democracy by equating it with communism. The existence and free expression of socialist parties within the legal state are objective necessities and a sine qua non for the manifestation of unrestricted political pluralism.

A system of political pluralism without democratic socialist parties is a monopartite pluralism ... that will inevitably lead to a political dictatorship. The first symptoms of a dictatorship are political incrimination of some by those who may be guilty themselves, labeling of social democratic parties as neocommunist ones, attacks in the press upon political figures, ignoring or even sacrificing national interests, etc.

It is a major principle of our party's policy to draw a clear line at communism, extremist practices, and hegemonist-totalitarian trends, which have done so much harm to our progress, which has undergone three dictatorships imposed by forces outside the nation in the last 50 years.

Attempts to disparage socialist parties are harmful not only to the parties in question but also to democracy as a whole.

A political balance inevitably requires the existence of parties of both the left and the right but with centrist trends when it is a question of the interests of our unified national state.

The maturing of our own social democratic movement is not a uniform process of short duration based solely on political declarations and incidental electoral propaganda.

Political capital is accumulated over time and is not equal to the number of voters who vote for you.

Political construction is accomplished on the slippery ground of acquisition of citizens by those who want power at any price, including that of converting some trade unions into drive belts for the policies of opposition parties.

These considerations require our party to aspire to unity of action with all political and professional forces interested in creating a social market economy in which free enterprise, economic democracy and socioeconomic protection are the foundations of unrestricted manifestation of social democracy.

[Anastasia] Are there any vestiges of Marxism in your party's doctrine?

[Nica] History has refuted the Marxist theory and the practices promoted in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the aggravated class struggle. We do not equate the honest, democratic, and clear political struggle with a class struggle carried to the point of insurrection and political violence in order to gain power in a state. The right to govern is won only through free and democratic elections and by maintaining unrestricted political pluralism.

We are political adversaries of the rightist parties but not their enemies. We will never write a bill in which we request outlawing any parties like the PNL, PAC, and PNT-cd [National Liberal Party, Civic Alliance Party, and National Peasant Christian Democratic Party].

[Anastasia] And so you are for coexistence on the political chessboard of the country....

[Nica] We think coexistence of political parties requires cooperation, honest confrontation and delimitation, and not the exclusion of some of them from the political game. The electorate's support of any party's policy can be evaluated only by means of a multitude of sociopolitical factors.

To be sure, maligning a political force in an electoral campaign may get you more votes for the time being, but sooner or later a backlash sets in because of a loss in credibility. Later on political consolidation and regrouping of a party is more difficult than the effort to maintain a constant influence among the citizens.

We intend to militate for social justice, human dignity, democracy and abolition of arrogance by promoting a sincere policy. Our motto is "Well-Being for All."

### **Corruption Charges Against Mayor-Elect Halaicu** *92BA0623A Bucharest AZI in Romanian 29 Feb 92 p 2*

[Article by Dan Mihalachi: "No Four Years for Him!"]

[Text] The local elections are over, and the National Salvation Front [FSN] won them in the great majority of county seats. Yet there are a number of municipalities that will be governed by the Democratic Convention, namely Bucharest, Brasov, Timisoara, and Ploiesti. Knowing the doubtful quality of the people advanced by the device, many supporters of the Front and also as many plain people are concerned whether we should support these elected persons for four years regardless of how things turn out and even if the new administration proves incapable.

I do not think there are any grounds for concern. In the first place the newly elected mayors cannot do whatever they want to because local autonomy does not mean disregard of the laws in force. There are prefects appointed by the government who have the right according to the Law on Local Administration to rule upon the legality of measures adopted by the local

councils and by mayors. These measures or decisions can even be suspended if they do not conform to the current regulations.

In the second place, even though they are elected for four years, the mayors are not nailed down. They can be suspended. Even if we assume that the CD [Democratic Convention] mayors have good intentions, and perhaps we should not doubt it at all, does anyone believe that a man who stole cartridges from a military unit, a man who proved unworthy to govern a county police directorate (we appointed Mr. Viorel Oancea), will be able to govern a city honorably? Or does anyone believe that Mr. Crin Halaicu who, according to what his colleagues in the service say, knew how to operate in order to procure materials and funds for his enterprise and who is accordingly a man with lasting connections with the Mafia in City Hall, will not be tempted to perpetuate

that corrupt system in spite of his pompous declarations? Let us not forget that the newly elected persons owe heavy debts to their political friends and especially to their sponsors, and it is hard to believe that they are going to pay those debts out of their own pockets. Therefore I think they will soon give us sufficient reasons for applying Article 46 of the Law on Local Administration, the article that says, "The prefect can order suspension of the mayor from office during a judicial investigation."

And so what is to be done? In the first place, let us all go and vote in the general elections so that the next government (including the prefects) will be that of the National Salvation Front. And second, let us watch the newly elected persons to see if they stray from the right path. And then....

### Macedonian Deputy Prime Minister on Economy

92BA0678A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA  
in Macedonian 12 Mar 92 p 2

[Interview with Jovan Andonov, Macedonian deputy prime minister, by Sasho Novevski; place and date not given: "Patiently Building Our Own Future"—first paragraph is NOVA MAKEDONIJA introduction]

[Text] The as-yet-undefined monetary policy is the most essential element in building the consistent macroeconomic policy of a country. Strikes are no solution. I expect a relaxation in the rigid political behavior of Serbia and Greece. I am prepared to yield my job to anyone who will develop a high-quality program, says Jovan Andonov, deputy prime minister.

The Macedonian economy is in a very difficult situation. Simple production is even doubtful because economic relations with the former republics have been broken, for political reasons; several countries have imposed blockades, and supplies of raw and processing materials are scarce; and there is a shortage of foreign currency to meet even most basic needs. Under circumstances in which many of the long and most urgently awaited laws of vital importance to the economy have not been passed, the reactions of managers and the broad public are becoming increasingly strong. All of this was a topic for discussion with Jovan Andonov, Macedonian deputy prime minister, who is also in charge of the economy and of whom we asked a few questions we deemed to be of key importance in the efforts to mitigate the effects of the unfavorable conditions.

#### Numerous Limiting Factors

[Novevski] For an entire year, the Macedonian government economists have called for adopting a concept for "work rules" for the new conditions and relations. Recently, a new macroeconomic policy program for the year was drafted. However, once again displeasure is voiced because of inconsistent decisions included in that document. What are your views on this topic?

[Andonov] The elements of macroeconomic policy were defined and accepted by the government. However, we must point out that these elements, in their entirety, could not be defined and meet the complaints of economic managers because of several objective and restrictive factors. The first reason is the as-yet-undefined monetary policy of Macedonia, which is one of the most essential elements in developing a consistent macroeconomic policy for the country. Adding to this the problems involving banks and improving their condition and the problem of production, and marked by a continuing drop in the physical volume of output, an undefined market, the inability of the economy to export, and, on the other hand, the objective dependence of the economy on imports and the permanently anemic nature of the economic subjects, my view is that we lack the possibility of consistently defining our economic policy.

Justifiably, added to this is the impossibility of assessing foreign financial aid because of the familiar political conditions. This would make clear to anyone the reasons for which it is truly difficult to formulate a policy of economic development. Still, even under these conditions and restrictions, the Ministry of Development was able to formulate the concept adopted by the government, which will be submitted to the Assembly for consideration.

[Novevski] Could such arguments be rejected by the Macedonian enterprises?

[Andonov] Considering the current conditions in our country, I believe that the solution lies exclusively in attention to work, organization of the collectives, and disciplined implementation of all tasks that were set down for the chain of production. This is mandatory. In no case does the solution lie in strikes, and I emphasize that, if such manifestations of discontent continue, they will lead the young Macedonian state to a catastrophe, to a precipice from which we shall be unable to extricate ourselves.

[Novevski] But does the government have an answer to the way the economy and the citizens can exist with such blockades, a trade war, inflation, and the enormous increase in the prices of raw and other materials and basic food products?

[Andonov] If we look at the situation somewhat more optimistically, I am convinced that we have in our Republic a sufficient number of capable people, most of whom are true managers who do a good job in maintaining production on the level possible. But let me give you a specific answer: Objectively, we can say that there has been a relaxation in the stubbornness of the Greek political authorities, and I believe that the situation with supplying the economy with basic energy carriers is not as critical as it was some 10 days ago, when the government was forced to use Republic reserves in order not to interrupt production. I furthermore believe that there has been relaxation on the part of the Serbian leadership, and, if it continues to implement what we recently agreed upon in Belgrade, I believe that this would greatly facilitate the work of the collectives, both ours and theirs. Furthermore, we must note that the government has also taken other positive steps to facilitate supplies to enterprises of raw and other materials.

As to public consumption, we know that the necessary steps were taken for the free import of food products. We expect this to help in controlling delirious price increases. In this respect, I believe that the management of production organizations could do a great deal to lower prices. They must stop raising prices and abstain from unrealistic demands and from fishing in muddy waters. Nor should we ignore the fact that a certain portion of the inflation is being imported from the other republics of the former Yugoslavia, above all because we

have no control over the money printing press in Topcider, where we are being charged our share of the cost of the war.

### The NBJ Has Turned Off the Tap

[Novevski] It is clear that the influx of dinars in Macedonia has been reduced, as confirmed by the small amounts of cash in dinars available to the collectives and the obvious shortage of cash in our banks. There are those who link this to the announced imminent monetary declaration of independence of the Republic. Actually, what are we talking about?

[Andonov] We are talking about something about that I believe the person most competent to answer is the governor of the NBM [Macedonian National Bank]. To the best of my knowledge, however, the reason for the scarcity of dinars is the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBJ]. It has unilaterally limited the sending of dinars to Macedonia.

[Novevski] Foreign capital remains the only alternative for enabling the Macedonian economy to leave disinvestment behind. Could we expect foreign exchange without passing a law on foreign investments, and is the passing of such a law the only obstacle?

[Andonov] I am confident that the passing of such a law is no problem, and we are prepared to share the profits with foreigners if that is what you are asking. To begin with, however, someone should agree to bring his money to Macedonia. We may all be saying that capital has no borders, that it has no feelings, and that the moment it finds fertile soil it will immediately go to it, and the foreigner will see to it that profits are steadily rising. The reason that no interest has been shown in investing in our country is familiar, when we look at the harm and the political and other instability that developed as a result of the war waged in our immediate neighborhood. My personal impression is that Macedonia has all the necessary attractions for foreign investment. However, the most likely reason is that people are waiting for international recognition precisely by the countries that are prepared to invest in our country. I expect that this recognition of Macedonia by the international community will take place on 7 April and, following this, within the shortest possible time, the government will start negotiations with other governments, aimed at finding a broader resolution to our crisis. Other than that, we must soon pass a law not only on foreign investments and concessions but also on the tax system to provide facilities for foreign capital investments.

[Novevski] What must the Macedonian government do on the level of intergovernmental discussions about economic cooperation with the former republics?

[Andonov] We know what has been accomplished so far. What is new is that we have reached a "provisional agreement" for meetings with the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the end of this week. We shall most

probably reach an overall agreement with it for economic cooperation. We signed agreements with Slovenia, and we shall do the same with Croatia in the immediate future. Therefore, only Serbia and Montenegro remain, as far as changing their rigid political relations is concerned. Personally, for example, I have pressed for quite some time to resume contacts with the deputy prime minister of Montenegro. So far I have been unsuccessful, but I hope that, after reaching an agreement with Serbia, it would be normal to establish economic cooperation with that republic, as well.

### "I Do Not Accept Unsubstantiated Criticism"

[Novevski] Of late, criticism of the government and some of its members and even of the president of Macedonia, coming from all parts, has become more frequent. You are being criticized for everything by some parties and private citizens; the way problems are being resolved is being questioned, and resignations are being demanded. What is your view concerning such criticism?

[Andonov] The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia should consider themselves lucky to have Gligorov as president of sovereign and independent Macedonia, and I am convinced that they are. He is an experienced politician and an exceptionally good economic expert, with a market-reform orientation, and it would be difficult to find any errors in his work.

As to the prime minister and the other members of the government, I believe that they have done everything possible to help in the organization of the new system and in stabilizing economic affairs, within the limit of objective possibilities. That is why I believe that criticism for the sake of criticism, as well as nihilistic views voiced by some parties and individuals, can only gravely harm all the effort made by the government and the entire Republic leadership, along with the parliament, to preserve the peace and come out of the economic crisis faster. Furthermore, I believe that a great share of the criticism voiced by the political parties is nothing but an effort to find a way to increase their political rating. Therefore, I feel free to state that, personally, I am prepared (and I believe that the other members of the government are, too) to yield my job at any time to anyone who can come up with a program that would guarantee a resolution of the crisis and the well-being of the citizens of our state. Naturally, I am also a parent, and I would be happy if someone who could ensure a better future for my children would take my job.

### Slovene Car Import Quota Established

92BA0664A Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 13 Mar 92  
p 24

[Article by Boris Lenic: "End of Private Car Imports"—first paragraph is DNEVNIK introduction]

[Text] A quota of 10,000 vehicles for official importers, and more, will have to be covered by exports; with the



new measure, the Slovene government wants to protect the domestic automobile industry.

Ljubljana, 13 Mar—It is all over for private imports of automobiles, and official representatives of foreign factories have received a (small) import quota; they will be able to import more automobiles if they export parts for the automobile industry in exchange for their value.

This is the essence of a decree by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that will (probably) see the light of day in the next official gazette. The decree on the conditions for importing passenger cars and trucks is nothing more than protection of the domestic automobile industry, as we have already reported in DNEVNIK. Of course, this provision is most opposed by the exclusive representatives of foreign producers, and the president of their association, Borut Rezar, says: "Instead of protecting Zastava, which we fought against for years—along with Revoz and Cimos—now they will protect domestic factories in the same way."

A month ago, the government economic committee adopted a decision in principle that the kind of protectionist policy should be introduced in the automobile industry that would "permit Slovene industry to work, develop, and participate in international flows"! It was noted at a special interagency coordination meeting that it was not possible to ensure a linkage between imports

of automobiles and exports of automobile components, and consequently they decided on a quota.

This year, that quota is 10,000 passenger cars (the official importers are afraid that this will even be retroactive to 1 January 1992), but according to current analyses, the representatives should sell twice that many foreign cars this year. Consequently, export coverage will be needed for half of these cars. During the next few years, the amount is to increase by one-tenth of the cars newly registered during the past year. For trucks, the quota is 15 percent of the vehicles of this type that were registered last year.

For good consignees, as we have sometimes called them, the measure will not be any particular obstacle. They are already exporting a great deal, without any state obligation, and covering their automobile imports. Others, whose exports to date have otherwise not been a daily business, are not complaining about bidirectional trade either. What is bad is more that we want to go to Europe with an obsolete method of administrative management. We are obviously repeating the former Yugoslav practice that we criticized so much. In addition to numerous private firms that sometimes imported automobiles in strange ways (without guarantees, spare parts, etc.), "family" purchases of cars abroad are now banned too. Individual imports are only possible for the handicapped, returnees, and foreign citizens.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

#### SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.