


JPRS-TAC-93-005
18 March 1993



JPRS Report



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Envoy to UN on Reforming Disarmament Machinery

*OW0903025993 Beijing XINHUA in English 0235 GMT
9 Mar 93*

[Text] United Nations, March 8 (XINHUA)—China stressed here Monday [8 March] that reform of the international arms control and disarmament machinery must strengthen and increase the role of such existing machinery.

Chen Jian, acting permanent representative for China to the UN, told the First Committee (Political and Security) of the General Assembly that concrete reform measures "shall be decided on only on the basis of common deliberation by all the countries concerned."

Concerning reform measures, Chen said that because disarmament affects the security of all countries, every country has the right to participate on an equal footing in discussions and negotiations on disarmament.

Such participation should be without respect to a country's geographic location, size, strength or development level.

In view of circumstances in the developing countries, he said, "reform measures ought to involve exercise of this right."

On involvement by the Security Council in disarmament, Chen said that deliberation and negotiation on arms control and disarmament issues should be conducted primarily via existing UN disarmament machinery, so as not to distract from the work of the council which is burdened with other issues.

He said the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the sole global negotiating body for multi-lateral disarmament, plays an irreplaceable role, and reform of the Geneva Conference should be decided on by itself.

The General Assembly last year had mandated the first committee to re-assess the function of UN disarmament machinery, which is composed of the First Committee, Disarmament Commission and Conference on Disarmament. Each of these bodies is supported by the Secretariat's Office for Disarmament Affairs.

During the 5-day session, the Committee will discuss a report by the UN secretary-general entitled, "New Dimensions for Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era," as well as the reform and effectiveness of existing disarmament machinery.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS**Arab League Aide Calls Signing CW Treaty
'Risky'**

*NC0803142993 Cairo MENA in English
1318 GMT 8 Mar 93*

[Text] Cairo, 8 Mar (MENA)—Israel has more than 200 nuclear [war]heads and missiles that can reach Arab capitals, 'Adnan 'Imran, Arab League assistant secretary general for political affairs, said today.

Forcing Arab states to sign the treaty on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons [CW] would be a risky act, given the fact that Israel's stockpile of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is overlooked, 'Imran said

The Arabs believe that the Middle East should be rendered free from all weapons of mass destruction, he said.

Arabs are beset by the Israeli nuclear threat, the Arab League official added.

GENERAL

Kozyrev Letter to Butrus-Ghali on Russian 'Main Priorities'

Seeks 'Effective Strategy'

LD0503072193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0716 GMT 5 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Igor Shubin]

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has sent a letter to U.N. Secretary General Butrus-Ghali in which Kozyrev highly assessed Butrus-Ghali's report "on new dimensions in weapons control and disarmament in the epoch after the end of the cold war" and Butrus-Ghali's proposals to increase efforts in weapons control and improve multilateral disarmament mechanisms.

The letter contains Russia's position on main priorities of disarmament problems under new conditions.

The letter points out that the task of implementing previously reached large-scale agreements is the main direction in this field. According to the letter, the fulfillment of commitments under these agreements costs Russia an amount of money exceeding national incomes of some rather developed countries. Therefore it is important to have an efficient strategy of international partnership for practical liquidation of armaments and conversion of military industries.

At the same time the world community could encourage steps taken by states to attract investments into conversion and high technology industries.

The strengthening of the existing regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its key treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has a great significance as well. Russia has confirmed its readiness to begin talks on the problem of control and tests of nuclear weapons.

The letter suggests that methods of weapons control be included into a broad context of international security, including in the sphere of prevention and settlement of regional conflicts. In this connection Russia suggests that the United Nations adopt a kind of "a codex of conduct" of parties involved in ethnic conflicts. The Russian side believes that a number of functions of the U.N. Security Council in the framework of the U.N. Charter should be brought up to date with the aim of liquidating dangerous crises.

Concrete measures on practical implementation of ideas contained in the "disarmament" report by the U.N. secretary general are expected to be discussed at the session of the first committee of the U.N. General Assembly which is to resume its work in New York next week.

Criticizes Ukrainian Nuclear Stance

LD0403175593 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 4 Mar 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has sent a message to the UN secretary general in which he states that Russia is seriously concerned that some countries—he is referring to Ukraine—are making accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty subject to additional conditions and are representing this step as a sort of concession to the international community for which it should be paid.

As the document notes, when Russia's and the United States' nuclear weapons are being radically reduced, the world community has the right to expect that the other nuclear powers—Great Britain, France, and China—will join in nuclear disarmament in the foreseeable future.

Silence at the nuclear test sites of Russia, the United States, and France creates a favorable situation for resolving the problem of banning nuclear tests. Russia confirms its readiness to participate in the immediate future in drawing up an international treaty on the total banning of nuclear tests, the message notes.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Further on Ukrainian Discussion of START I, NPT Adherence

Deputy Defense Minister Comments

934K0295A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 7, Feb 93 p 4

[Interview with Colonel General Ivan Vasylyevych Bizhan, first deputy minister of defense of Ukraine, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent D. Makarov; place and date not given: "The Army of Ukraine Is Not an Army of Ukrainians"]

[Excerpts] *Until his appointment to the position of first deputy minister of defense of Ukraine, Colonel General Ivan Vasylyevych Bizhan held the promising position of deputy chief of the Operations Administration of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, but to everyone's surprise he left for Kiev to begin to build the Army of Ukraine. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent D. Makarov speaks with him. [passage omitted]*

Makarov: Some people think Ukraine was in too much of a hurry to declare itself a nuclear power. Up to this point, strategic weapons have served as an instrument for deterring aggression and, taking into account the possible territorial claims on Ukraine from the neighboring states, it could continue to play this role.

Bizhan: As early as 1990, the republic Supreme Soviet adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty, where it is written that Ukraine would be a nonnuclear state in the

future. Now President Kravchuk has sent documents to the Supreme Soviet for consideration of the START (SNV) Treaty.

At the beginning of 1992, when the question of the composition of strategic nuclear forces arose, Ukraine was prepared to include nuclear weapons and systems for servicing them and end the problem there. But then it was suggested to us that these forces might include even motorized infantry divisions and all aircraft, including military transport, as well as the Black Sea Fleet. And then came statements to the effect that the Black Sea Fleet had been, was, and would be Russian, and soon there followed the same kinds of statements about the Crimea and Sevastopol. One gets the impression that someone in Russia is forgetting about the Helsinki Final Act, which guarantees the permanence of borders in Europe. Therefore when agreeing to the destruction of nuclear weapons on our territory, we had to guarantee the integrity of Ukraine.

The problem of compensating Ukraine for the cost of the nuclear weapons also deserves a fair solution. For all the weapons were created by the common labor of the USSR, including the people of Ukraine. [passage omitted]

Deputy Foreign Minister Comments

934K0459A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
17 Feb 93 p 6

[Interview with Boris Tarasyuk, deputy foreign minister of Ukraine and chairman of the National Disarmament Committee, by GOLOS UKRAINY observer Vladimir Skachko; place and date not given: "Ukraine Is Not Hagglng Anything Out of Anyone"]

[Text] As we all know, the question of ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and of Ukraine's affiliation to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is on the agenda of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine seventh session. That is, the deputies have to resolve a problem which in recent months has become in the world a topic on everyone's lips upon mention of the name of our state.

The situation that has taken shape around this question and all the conditions of its solution are described by Boris Tarasyuk, deputy foreign minister of Ukraine and chairman of the National Disarmament Committee.

Skachko: Do you know the correlation in parliament between nuclear doves and nuclear hawks?

Tarasyuk: It is known that there is in parliament a group of deputies which is opposed to ratification of the START I Treaty and affiliation to the NPT and which is against Ukraine's nonnuclear status in general. But no one has conducted a serious poll on these problems, and for this reason it would not be right to speak of the numerical correlation of supporters and opponents of these documents. I believe that it is possible to speak of the existence of an active group of deputies which is studying this matter, whereas the vast majority of deputies have yet to determine their position.

Skachko: As we all know, the main consequence of your visit to Washington 6-8 January of this year was confirmation of the readiness of the United States to grant Ukraine written guarantees of its security in the event of ratification of the START I Treaty and affiliation to the NPT. On the other hand, various media are maintaining that the American side does not understand the kind of security guarantees Ukraine is demanding. How can you explain this?

Tarasyuk: When we speak of a guarantee of Ukraine's security on the part of the nuclear states, this question is not new for Washington officials, for we have been conducting the corresponding negotiations since last April. And we see the security guarantees as follows: In the event of Ukraine's ratification of the START I Treaty and affiliation to the NPT as a nonnuclear state, the most important question for it would be national security. Ukraine is a young state, which is going through the period of formation of the principal institutions of statehood, of the armed forces included. We still cannot maintain today that Ukraine has established armed forces—they are in the re-formation and formation phase. Our military-industrial complex, which was an inalienable part of the military-industrial complex of the former USSR, is in the same state. In addition, Ukraine is not a member of any military-political bloc nor can it be, as it has proclaimed its nonbloc character. In this situation the question of the safeguarding of national security arises. Particularly with regard for the fact that calls for a revision of borders are being heard and territorial claims are being made in neighboring countries. The mission of our foreign policy, therefore, is to guarantee the external conditions of security. We believe that Ukraine's security may be based not only on the existence of its own armed forces but also on Ukraine's participation in the corresponding international structures. We regard as the most promising the creation of an all-European security system, the initiative in respect to which Ukraine has presented at the forum of cooperation in the sphere of security which is taking place at this time in Vienna. Ukraine's initiative has found many supporters, and we are today preparing a substantiated document which will afford an opportunity for a deeper understanding of our position in the creation of this system. If it is created, it will be a dependable guarantee of the security not only of Ukraine but of other European countries too, particularly the participants in the former Warsaw Pact. The so-called security vacuum that has come about in East and Central Europe is forcing these states to seek their own paths of security, and Ukraine is not alone in its endeavors. Guarantees as a state with every right to be nuclear, as an equal successor of the former USSR, but itself wishing to be nonnuclear, are essential for us also.

Skachko: But it is said that in 1968 the world's nuclear states, aware of their responsibility for maintaining peace and tranquillity on the planet, even then guaranteed all other countries' security. It is being asked, therefore: What else does Ukraine want?

Tarasyuk: Yes, these guarantees were afforded. But, first, in 1968 Ukraine did not exist as an independent state.

Second, the guarantees were accorded by a permanent member of the UN Security Council which does not exist today, namely, the USSR. Russia, which was authorized to occupy this seat, has not confirmed these guarantees. At the same time, on the other hand, some of its political circles are today making territorial claims against Ukraine at a high level. It is for this reason that we are today demanding guarantees of our security from all the nuclear states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council, which, according to the UN Charter, are entrusted with special responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the world. We already have today draft documents on guarantees from the United States, Britain, and Russia. The Russian version, unfortunately, cannot satisfy us, and for this reason we are now waiting for the statement of B. Yeltsin, president of Russia, which he made in the course of his recent meeting in Moscow with our president to be materialized in the corresponding document.

The document on guarantees of Ukraine's security should specify three main points. First, exclusion of the possibility of aggression against Ukraine on the part of the nuclear states using either nuclear or conventional arms. Second, nonuse of economic pressure on Ukraine for the purpose of achieving economic or political ends. Third, unconditional recognition of and respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of the present borders of Ukraine.

Skachko: What can you say concerning the recent Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Irpen, near Kiev, on Ukraine obtaining from Russia compensation for Ukraine's nuclear weapons?

Tarasjuk: We need to resolve the main problem—what the terms of the dismantling and destruction of the warheads will be—since Ukraine considers itself the owner of these physical components of the weapons and is concerned to obtain, for example, uranium, not weapons-grade but industrial, of a lower concentration suitable as fuel for Ukraine's nuclear power stations, or the monetary equivalent of the value of this uranium. It is a question not only of compensation for the warheads of the strategic nuclear weapons which we still have but also for the warheads of tactical weapons withdrawn to Russia back last spring. It was to this that the first, Irpen, round of negotiations, which was initiated by Ukraine, incidentally, was devoted. We hope that at the end of February there will be a second round of these negotiations also for the positions and views set forth in Irpen by both parties revealed differences on this issue. And for this reason time for an analysis and the possible mutual adjustment of positions is needed.

Another problem of the Irpen negotiations was maintenance of the nuclear safety of the strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine. It is essential for this to provide for operational work within the framework of originator's servicing and maintenance of the nuclear missile batteries by those who assembled these batteries. Ukraine is sometimes rebuked for, it is alleged, preventing such servicing. This is not true. On the contrary, Ukraine has an interest in warranty maintenance being performed according to the

same schedules and to the same extent as specified prior to this. In addition, the warranty safety margin of some batteries is coming to an end, and we are talking about a real nuclear threat from these missiles not only to Ukraine.

Skachko: You do not think that Russia, taking its time over originator's servicing, is acting according to the principle: If you cannot do it yourself, give the missiles to us as quickly as possible?

Tarasjuk: I am accustomed to dealing only with the official viewpoint of the opposite side, if I know it. But I do not exclude the possibility of this being the Russian side's hidden position.

Skachko: And what can you say about the fact that the following opinion is held in the world currently: Ukraine is deliberately dragging out ratification and making the rounds, trying to bargain for itself as much cash as possible in exchange for the nuclear missiles in order to use the funds not on the missiles but for the economy?

Tarasjuk: This opinion is without foundation. Ukraine is not trying to haggle anything out of anyone but proceeding from the fact that the program of the dismantling of the nuclear missile batteries requires substantial funds, the allocation of which under the conditions of economic crisis is not nor could it be today the Ukrainian Government's main priority. We simply do not have such money.

During contacts with our overseas partners, therefore, we are not haggling over some specific sum but attempting to explain that we are looking for some assistance which would afford us an opportunity to eliminate on schedule the nuclear weapons following the Supreme Soviet's ratification of the START I Treaty. And it is a question, what is more, of this financial assistance being used for a specific purpose—only for the destruction of the nuclear batteries and the solution of attendant questions. We are trying, in addition, to explain that the rate of destruction of the nuclear weapons will depend directly on the existence of the material and technical resources.

In Washington we once again expressed gratitude to the United States for its intention to allocate \$175 million, but emphasized that the amount of the necessary spending on the destruction of the nuclear weapons was far greater.

Skachko: What should this amount be?

Tarasjuk: We cannot cite a figure today since even certain techniques of the destruction process are lacking. They have still to be devised. And the money should be counted on the strength of the technology, not the other way about.

Realizing that funding the programs of the destruction of the nuclear missile batteries ourselves is beyond us at this time, President L. Kravchuk recently put forward at the World Economic Forum in Davos the idea of the creation of an International Nuclear Disarmament Fund, which would afford a real opportunity for all interested states to associate themselves with financial assistance in the elimination of nuclear weapons. This should be a goal-oriented

fund, of whose assistance any state aspiring to rid itself of nuclear potential could avail itself.

Skachko: Could you comment on L. Kravchuk's words in Davos to the effect that some states are pursuing a double policy: on the one hand demanding nuclear disarmament, on the other, helping with technology, raw material, and so forth the so-called threshold states, which could manufacture their own nuclear weapons?

Tarasjuk: I support these words. In addition, I have confirmation on the part of foreign diplomats of facts of the double game. There are in the world currently approximately 10 states which are in the threshold of the manufacture of their own atomic bomb or, as many experts confidently believe, already have such in their arsenals. All this has happened thanks either to the good offices or direct help on the part of this nuclear power or the other by means of enormous financial injections and military and technical help. This is an exclusively double policy, particularly in respect to Ukraine, which does not have legal obligations as yet but people are already pressuring it in this respect and accusing it of a breach of commitments. At the same time, on the other hand, they are helping someone else create atomic bombs. Ukraine is abiding strictly by its international commitments and has simultaneously to determine its policy on the basis of its national interests and with regard for the trend of world development. No one but itself will cater for the interests of national security, and for this reason we are obliged to rely only on our own forces. I am convinced that the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine will adopt a decision that will be wise and correct and will correspond to the interests of its people.

Skachko: What are Ukraine's further steps and plans in the context of nuclear disarmament?

Tarasjuk: The plan of the creation of a research center on these issues in Kiev with the participation of Ukraine, the United States, Sweden, and Canada is being discussed at this time, and we are at the stage of development of the final documents. Consultations on disarmament and arms control with Herr J. Holik, representative of the FRG Government, have been held. These consultations began last September in Bonn. I hope that the visit of Foreign Minister A. Zlenko to Washington will take place in February, during which all questions of the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons will be discussed, in particular. Our delegation is working actively at the above-mentioned Vienna forum on cooperation in the security sphere.

Nuclear Disarmament Difficulties Emphasized

934K0433A Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
24 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Bakayev, board member of the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine, under the rubric "Topically": "Nuclear Disarmament: A Gordian Knot of Problems"]

[Text] One of the most urgent problems, going beyond the bounds of the narrow political interests of the politicians, is the stance of Ukraine relative to the nuclear-missile

potential left to it as the legacy of the super-militarized empire. The problem is an equivocal one, not given to superficial and hasty solutions.

Ukraine has taken the first steps toward the community of civilized nations under the slogan of a nuclear-free status. That aspiration, which has received the support of an absolute majority of the Ukrainian people and the universal approval of other countries, remains a desired—and in principle attainable—prospect. Ukraine should, under favorable conditions, enter the 21st century without a single nuclear warhead on its territory. But the practical realization of that aim has encountered a series of extremely complex and currently difficult-to-resolve problems since the very beginning.

Having achieved independent statehood, Ukraine as a constituent element of the former USSR and participant in the Vienna Convention has gained the legal right to own all of the material assets located on its territory, including nuclear weapons. It has, that is, become a full-fledged participant in the corresponding international agreements pertaining to the whole circle of problems of nuclear disarmament. As a young independent state affirming its geopolitical and economic interests, on the other hand, it should dispose of existing resources most efficiently and, of course, guarantee its own security. Even the hypothetical instantaneous elimination of the 176 missile systems along with the launch silos—each of which is worth millions of dollars, by the way—is unrealistic due to the lack of the appropriate technical conditions. It is well known that we learned how to create these weapons pretty well, but we have not the slightest experience in destroying them.

A simple and rapid method of getting rid of the burden of nuclear weapons, it would seem, is being proposed to us—transfer them to Russia for subsequent destruction. But, if I may, why should we hand over assets of many billions, in the creation of which the people of Ukraine invested enormous labor and no few resources, for nothing? The good will of the Ukrainian people will be consigned to colossal losses, it turns out, suitable compensation for which is still under great doubt.

Our country, proceeding from military-political and diplomatic prudence, should be prepared to resort to the systematic achievement of its nuclear-free status under one inalienable condition—the full-fledged financial and technical support of all parties concerned. Our economy will be unable to "pull" such a load in the prevailing situation without that help. Calculations show that the destruction of nuclear weapons will in no way cost less, and may cost more, than their creation.

Yes, the United States has promised to allot Ukraine 175 million dollars to support the work to destroy the missiles, but one can give a real evaluation of that contribution with the aid of an eloquent example: the safe transport of just a tanker with one of the components of missile fuel will cost 4 to 6 million dollars. If one also takes into account the

inevitable expenses for the resolution of the social issues accompanying nuclear disarmament—job placement for the personnel cut back, their provision with housing and much more—the picture becomes entirely clear.

But even if the problems cited above are solvable in principle with the achievement of mutually acceptable agreements, the ecological situation that has taken shape here completely rules out hasty and rushed nuclear disarmament. Professionals know very well that the elimination work entails considerably more danger than say, start-up operations. It is namely for that reason that the program of nuclear disarmament of Ukraine should envisage a broad range of measures to reduce to a minimum the consequences of possible non-standard, or the more so emergency, situations in the dismantling, neutralization, salvaging and destruction of the missile systems, their components and the missile fuel.

It is well known that the Ministry of the Environment of Ukraine has developed recently developed a program of ecological reform that devotes considerable attention to ensuring nuclear and radiation safety. A real reorganization of the apparatus of the ministry has already been carried out, and highly qualified specialists in the realm of radiology and chemistry have been brought in, in order to raise the effectiveness of that work. Close interaction is being arranged with the Ministry of Defense, the appropriate scientific and production organizations and the Ministry of Health of Ukraine. Steadfast attention is being devoted to studying the experience of those foreign countries where nuclear and radiation safety are priorities of national security. We will obviously have to have a tightly regulated legal and standards basis, a high technological level and, naturally, responsibility in order to achieve the status of a nuclear-free power. We do not have the right to repeat the tragic mistakes of the recent past.

Foreign, Defense Ministers Visit Missile Base

LD0403214793 Kiev Ukrayinske Telebachennya Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 4 Mar 93

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Ukraine at present is considered to be occupying the world's third place in terms of the concentration of nuclear weapons on its territory, next to the United States and Russia. [passage omitted]

Two ministers of Ukraine, Konstyantyn Morozov and Anatoliy Zlenko, flew together today to a nuclear installation. Our correspondent Mykola Kanishevskyy reports:

[Kanishevskyy] Even if anyone is of the opinion that to get rid of the nuclear potential and at the same time to become a nuclear-free state is so very simple, this opinion is very erroneous. This is not a simple matter at all. Should Ukraine be eliminating nuclear weapons, it will not be done at the expense of our state.

This can well sum up today's meetings between Minister of Defense Konstyantyn Morozov and Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoliy Zlenko, on the one hand, and many specialists of the strategic missile forces unit deployed in Pervomaysk, on the other.

The ministers visited a command post of the missile regiment, examined its technological and combat status, inspected launching systems, familiarized themselves with conditions of the storage of nuclear warheads, and had a meeting with the personnel of the unit.

Meanwhile, we were interested in how authentic Moscow newspaper reports on the technological state of nuclear weapons in Ukraine were.

[Begin Morozov recording] Today I had an opportunity to examine these issues directly, both when inspecting military hardware and when communicating with the officers, and when directly examining the situation in the very shelters in question.

Well, these issues are not as acute as they could be artificially presented now. There is a large number of grave issues in connection with the first of the main issues, that of ownership. As soon as the issue of ownership is settled between Ukraine and Russia, a very large number of issues will be settled.

Today Ukraine is ready to propose its own draft, and we only insist on the fact that valuable material contained in the nuclear weapons themselves should be owned by a state. [end recording]

Experts View Legal Aspects

LD0603102893 Kiev UKRIFORM in Russian 2135 GMT 5 Mar 93

[Text] To take into account Ukraine's vital interests, Ukraine, as a sovereign state, is free to choose its nuclear policy, in the legal respect. Experts of a deputies working group, set up by the presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine for ratification of the START I Treaty, have reached this conclusion.

Speaking today at the first open hearing of political and legal aspects of the international treaties on disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, in which representatives from the corps of deputies and Ukrainian and foreign journalists took part, they noted that Ukraine has unilaterally taken some obligations on itself in this respect, as a result of political decisions.

The parliamentarians and experts emphasized that the problem of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament has turned into a means of international blackmail for a number of states. The discriminatory essence of certain clauses of the Lisbon agreement for Ukraine, and many shortcomings of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, were also noted. The treaties ought to be signed taking into account Ukraine's vital interests, with guarantees of its security and economic compensation, the speakers pointed out.

Open hearings will also be held on issues of military policy in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, its ecological aspects, and technical and social problems.

Parliamentary Hearings on START I

MK1103090493 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in *Russian* 10 Mar 93 p 3

[Vladimir Skachko report: "Ukraine's Nuclear Status"]

[Text]

Nothing Is Clear Yet

The republic's Supreme Soviet has held the first public hearings of a deputies' special working group, attended by specialists and experts, on drafting documents required for the Ukraine parliament's ratification of the START I treaty and Ukraine's joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Ukrainian Environment Minister Yuriy Kostenko, head of the special working group, said that the hearings were open because of the importance attached to the problem under discussion, and also because of Parliament Speaker Ivan Plyushch's statement that the parliament would hold a closed meeting after 16 March to deliberate on the question of whether the deputies were prepared to ratify the treaties. Kostenko said that political infighting over this problem has stepped up involving various forces, often approaching the subject from completely different positions. It can be said that there is not a single significant political grouping left in Ukraine that unequivocally supports the ratification of START I and the accession to NPT. According to Yuriy Kostenko, the public hearings have only confirmed that although START I ratification and Ukraine's joining the NPT are possible, they will not mean that Ukraine will start immediately implementing the Lisbon Protocol of 23 May 1992, but that Ukraine may ratify START I and join NPT as a nuclear state.

The hearings were devoted to the definition of political and legal aspects of Ukraine's actions with regard to nuclear weapons. Professor Petr Martynenko, the very first expert speaker, said that consideration of the problem should be based not on legal but on political arguments as to the advisability of ratification, and should also focus on laying down conditions for the ratification that would guarantee Ukraine as a nuclear state all the rights of a subject of international law and international relations. In Martynenko's view, the international legal system does not have a single direct action provision that would prohibit any state in the world from having nuclear weapons or from liquidating existing ones. According to Martynenko and other experts, under the Vienna convention on legal succession of 1978, Ukraine is a full owner of the nuclear weapons it has inherited from the former USSR, and the question of Ukraine's liquidation of them and their non-proliferation should be regulated not by international law in general but by specific interstate treaties. Ukraine will have such treaties only after it ratifies START I and joins the NPT, Martynenko said. He also cited the Declaration on Ukraine's State Sovereignty of 16 July 1990, where its future nuclear-free status was defined not as a provision of state law but only as a political statement of intent and the final aim of the state's evolution. In conclusion, Martynenko called on the deputies to proceed from the fact that

at present Ukraine, according to its status, is virtually a nuclear state, and said that while discussing START I and the accession to the NPT it was the nonproliferation of nuclear arms to Ukraine that should be debated, but Ukraine's nuclear disarmament along with other countries of the world. In addition, Martynenko said that Ukraine should take over all the obligations of a nuclear state to the extent of the former USSR's and ratify START I, while making one reservation: namely, that it would only disarm itself jointly with the other legal successors of the former USSR and would not ratify the Lisbon Protocol, because Article 5 of the protocol was advantageous for the United States and Russia alone and because it ignored the fact that Ukraine is a nuclear state. As for accession to the NPT, Martynenko suggested that it be postponed until political aspects of nuclear disarmament in general are finally clarified and Ukraine receives guarantees that are more reliable than the nuclear states' political commitments, and is recognized as a nuclear state with all the ensuing consequences.

The public hearings ended without making any official recommendations and will be resumed. Their prevailing mood, however, revealed serious changes in Ukraine's policy regarding nuclear weapons. Many people are inclined to view these changes as a result of the other nuclear states' sluggishness in paying Ukraine tangibly for its nuclear complexes. Ukraine itself, according to the deputies, wishes to receive assistance in a much greater amount, than the \$175 million offered by the United States, and earlier than was initially agreed.

Getting a definitive idea about Ukraine's stance toward nuclear weapons may be possible after the next parliamentary hearings on the subject are held. The highest-ranking statesmen have not yet spoken their minds in that regard, evidently awaiting international reaction.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister on START II, Nonproliferation

PM0403143693 Madrid ABC in Spanish
2 Mar 93 pp 38-39

[Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov by Isabel San Sebastian in Madrid; date not given]

[Excerpt] Madrid—[passage omitted] **San Sebastian:** Has the threat of a nuclear holocaust disappeared altogether?

Berdennikov: I would say that it has diminished considerably, because the START II agreement signed with the United States has made a huge contribution toward eliminating the threat of a first strike, but I cannot say that it has disappeared, because as long as there are nuclear weapons the danger of a holocaust will exist.

San Sebastian: What will the next step be?

Berdennikov: The next step is to put these agreements into practice. Then there is also, of course, a serious problem of nuclear proliferation and our top priority must be to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty's period of validity indefinitely if possible.

San Sebastian: Is this proliferation problem due exclusively to the breakup of the former Soviet Union's arsenal between various independent republics, or are there other countries?

Berdennikov: Unfortunately there are many other nuclear or quasi-nuclear nations: India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, South Africa...

San Sebastian: What about Iraq?

Berdennikov: It certainly achieved an alarming degree of nuclear development, which seems to have been neutralized.

San Sebastian: Are there still any nuclear missiles in Russia aimed at Western cities?

Berdennikov: Are there still any missiles in the West aimed at Russian cities? The answer is yes. If we take the mutual assured destruction (MAD) theory which has been operative until now, then it is a good thing, from a deterrent viewpoint, that missiles should be aimed at cities, although the first strike is never directed against them but against arms depots.

San Sebastian: I deduce from your answer that, despite the change of atmosphere in Russian-U.S. relations, the disarmament talks are not exactly governed by mutual trust...

Berdennikov: Of course. There are things we do not know and which cannot be verified, and we have not yet gotten as far as accepting our opponent's word... Building trust is something which takes time. We proposed to the Americans to remove the programs from all the missiles, so that they would not be aimed at any target, but we received no reply.

San Sebastian: Is the interpretation that the START II Treaty favors the United States in terms of both quantity and quality correct?

Berdennikov: That was also the interpretation given by certain reactionary circles in Russia and it is absolutely incorrect. The treaty is very balanced and does not give anybody an advantage; it provides for a common ceiling both for the total number of missile warheads and for the number of submarine-launched warheads.

San Sebastian: Does START II mean that other nuclear powers such as Britain or China will gain more importance and influence by keeping their arsenals intact while the United States and Russia reduce theirs?

Berdennikov: START II means that at some point, in the not too distant future, those countries will have to join the disarmament process, because the differences between the nuclear powers are no longer as deep as they were. Henceforth nobody will be able to make much further progress without bringing all the players into the game.

San Sebastian: How much pressure has Washington put on Moscow, making the granting of economic and financial aid conditional upon the signing of this and other disarmament agreements?

Berdennikov: During negotiations, this issue never arose and the price of cuts was never discussed. Disarmament is something which interests us as much as the Americans, and we never talked about selling arms; what we did discuss was the possibility of the West offering us help in destroying our arsenals.

San Sebastian: Will Russia be able to meet the cost involved in this process, in spite of its crisis?

Berdennikov: Currently we have to invest some 20 billion rubles a year to maintain our nuclear arsenal, and after the treaty that cost will decrease by about 25 percent, which shows that it can be done, although it will not be easy.

San Sebastian: What will happen to the gigantic Soviet military industry?

Berdennikov: We are facing a very urgent and complex conversion program, since state demand for weapons has dropped dramatically.

San Sebastian: President Yeltsin has often complained about the resistance of the old regime's bureaucracy, which is boycotting his economic reforms. Does the same problem exist in the military sphere?

Berdennikov: We have never had such good relations with the military as we have now. A spectacular change has taken place in this group's attitude, and the main engineer of this change has been Defense Minister General Grachev.

San Sebastian: Have they accepted a drastic reduction in their sphere of power and influence?

Berdennikov: Absolutely. They have also played a fundamental role in the disarmament negotiations. They understood that it was irrational for our country to maintain such a nuclear force—totally unnecessary if you think that a man can only die once and that it is consequently absurd to build up the ability to kill him 10 times—and they also began to see that such a disproportionate arsenal undermines their own prestige and credibility. They accepted and backed the need to make room for a more rational defense policy of nonconfrontation with the West and of cutting arsenals—not just nuclear but also conventional—as well as limiting human resources to a maximum of 1.5 million men.

San Sebastian: Does the risk of a coup d'etat still exist?

Berdennikov: I do not see any such risk. Of course there is strong opposition from communist and nationalist groups, but they do not have the ability to organize a coup.

San Sebastian: If Yeltsin finally loses his battle against these forces, will any Russian Government fulfill the terms of the START II Treaty?

Berdennikov: I do not know. If the treaty is ratified by parliament, it will be a commitment made by the Russian nation, not by its government, but you never know what may happen in a situation of that sort.

San Sebastian: Will the treaty be ratified in parliament?

Berdennikov: We are doing what we can, although I will not conceal from you the fact that there is strong opposition based on precisely the interpretation which you mentioned previously. Only a few days ago the self-proclaimed National Salvation Front—an amalgamation of communists and nationalists—officially made known its position against ratifying the treaty, alleging that it is a gift to the Americans.

San Sebastian: What would the consequences be if this treaty were not to be ratified?

Berdennikov: It would be a catastrophe for Russia. It would lead to an uncontrolled escalation of weapons which we cannot afford; to the relaunching of programs like the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "star wars," which we cannot afford. The Soviet Union fell precisely because it could not afford "star wars" and the arms race against the West.

San Sebastian: Can Russia guarantee that other nuclear republics, such as Ukraine which has not ratified START I, or Kazakhstan, will follow the path marked out by START II?

Berdennikov: We have concluded the Lisbon Protocol in which they all undertake to become nonnuclear states as soon as possible and to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We are now explaining to the governments of these republics that it is in their interest to fulfill the international agreements they have signed, otherwise the problem will not be Russia's but the whole world's.

San Sebastian: Is there any risk of nuclear confrontation between neighboring former Soviet republics?

Berdennikov: The risk is practically zero, not only because we get on together a lot better than that, but also because only Russia can be a nuclear power and possesses the necessary nuclear industry. If Ukraine were to decide to go nuclear, it would have to start from scratch.

San Sebastian: It could always use the weapons it has in its territory...

Berdennikov: Nuclear weapons do not last forever; their longest life span is 10 years. Also, the weapons' command and control system is the same as that in the former Soviet Union; in other words, it is totally centralized in Moscow. Only Moscow can press the "nuclear button."

San Sebastian: So does Moscow have total and absolute control over not only the strategic but also the tactical nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union? Is there any danger, however remote, of "leaks" or "losses" of nuclear weapons of any kind?

Berdennikov: The answers are yes and no respectively.

Russian Parliament Hearings on START II Ratification

Foreign, Defense Ministries Back Treaty

*PM0503110593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Mar 93 First Edition p 4*

[Article by Stanislav Kondrashov: "Tough Choice of the Times"]

[Text] On 2 March, 2 months after Boris Yeltsin and George Bush signed the START II Treaty, parliamentary hearings began in Moscow's White House on its ratification. It is believed that they will last at least 2 months with intervals in the order of 2 weeks. It is intended to subject the treaty to the most comprehensive analysis possible with the participation of all departments involved and of every kind of expert and even the U.S. Senate, which has been sent a request for cooperation.

Delivering the report, Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev immediately ruled out "a priori agreement or disagreement" with the treaty and, as may easily be guessed, almost immediately proved to be right. On the first day of the hearings the defense of the treaty was businesslike and unexcited and criticism was quite calm. Both sides, as is always the case, appealed for a sense of realism, but from different ends, each with a different understanding of the pressure of circumstances which Russia now feels.

The Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry, represented by Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of General Staff, presented a unified front in defense of the treaty. They were opposed by critics from the people's deputies. The day of limbering up showed that the opposition recognizes the idea of far-reaching nuclear reductions but believes that in its present form the treaty does not accord with Russia's national interests, deprives it of parity with the Americans and of great-power status, and from the viewpoint of economic expenditure on nuclear armament means, as Boris Tarasov, a representative of the "Russian Unity" bloc, put it, "a return to the era of exhausting superprojects." His forecast of "hundreds of trillions of rubles" on the disarmament race is fantastic but it is obvious that the question of expense will be a key one at the hearings and the president and government will have to provide thorough assessments and commitments.

Bringing the critics down to earth, the chief of General Staff advised them not to ask "whether there is life on Mars" when a "catastrophe" prepared by the Supreme Soviet is advancing on the Russian Armed Forces. By the fall the borders will be undefended, there will be no one to guard nuclear establishments, and 0.5 million Russian prisoners will escape because the convoy troops will have disappeared if the law "on military service obligation and military service" comes into force, whereby, the chief of General Staff believes, only 6 percent of the total number of young men of draft age will be drafted twice a year.

Also with a view to bringing the critics down to earth General Kolesnikov seized on the question, touched on by Kozyrev, of the "ambivalent position" of Ukraine, which

is in no hurry to fulfill the commitments made by President Kravchuk on advancing toward nonnuclear status. He said that Russia, the only nuclear heir to the Soviet Union, "has virtually lost control" over the security of over 1,000 nuclear warheads in Ukraine and that the level of their gamma radiation is now 1,000 times greater than the Russian level.

This is, *inter alia*, an argument in favor of the treaty, which decides the problem of Ukraine's nuclear status by abolishing nuclear weapons on its territory and giving the United States the incentive to restrain and not rouse (as Kozyrev put it) Ukraine's possible nuclear ambitions.

Of course, the general argument in favor of the treaty is the end to the era of global confrontation and the emergence of a new dynamic of partnership with the West. The alternative would be unilateral nuclear disarmament or, even worse, a return to nuclear confrontation. But the general argument is too general. Answering accusations of haste in drafting the START II Treaty, the Russian foreign minister, for all his usual reluctance to mention his Soviet predecessors, stressed that it is "90 percent based" on the START I Treaty signed by Gorbachev and Bush in the summer of 1991. Delaying the new treaty would also block "the new agenda" with President Clinton's administration. As we know, this agenda was outlined in rough form in Geneva with Secretary of State Christopher and obviously will determine the framework for the two presidents' April meeting.

Among the critics were Iona Andronov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet committee for international affairs, and Andrey Golovin, head of the Change-New Policy centrist faction. Deputy Vitaliy Sevastyanov saw in the treaty "an economic burden round the country's neck for the next 10 years." Nikolay Ryabov, who chaired the first session, rightly noted that so far (everyone is to blame!) there are no specific elaborations of the Russian Federation's nuclear military policy which would bring together three essentials—the reduction of nuclear weapons, their existence as a key element of deterrence, and the maintenance of the regime of their nonproliferation.

Not without wit and sense is the argument of Nikolay Pavlov, from the ranks of the "intransigents," about the postcommunist syndrome of Russian diplomacy—"doing what it did before but completely the other way round." On that plane he accused the Foreign Ministry of the "Utopian" nature of its idea of the prospects of partnership with America. Well, starry-eyed idealism is as much a characteristic of Russian liberals as pragmatism is of Americans... both liberal and conservative. And life is quick to teach lessons curing us of it one way or another. Something else is also clear: Our conservatives—and they are not alone—are mentally submerged in our recent superpower past and that too gives rise to illusions, although of a different kind, while today's realities of complete collapse dictate a tough choice of the least of many evils.

For instance, they pine over the heavy multiple warheaded SS-18 ballistic missiles, which were the main component of

the Russian nuclear triad and which, under the treaty, are subject to destruction. An inescapable yearning: How much was put into those missiles! But after all the "breaking" of the triad's structure must nonetheless take place—with the treaty or without it—since the guaranteed useful life of these missiles expires in 10 years. And is their modification necessary and within the powers of the new Russia?

The first day of the hearings revealed the weakness of the critics. They displayed no specific alternative counterprograms or even amendments, whose introduction the START II Treaty does allow.

Among the military experts who spoke Lieutenant General Ananiy Politsyn, who has served most of his career in the missile forces, made an impression. By 2003, when the treaty's commitments should be fulfilled, he announced, of 10 types of missile systems Russia will have only two left—the others will have become outdated and it is impossible to "freeze" them, to preserve them, not destroying them for economy's sake. The general announced that under the new conditions when creating new combat systems it is with great difficulty that we achieve the cooperation of 500-600 enterprises, whereas before it was possible to put tens of thousands in action.

And so, without claiming the status of a nuclear superpower, Russia must remain a great nuclear power, since that is essential for its security and for acquiring a new place in the world. In that sense it is entirely possible to find a majority agreement, both in society and in parliament. It is harder but no less essential to combine this postulate with another—cut your coat according to your cloth. Officials and experts will obviously have to do a lot of work at the parliamentary hearings to prove that it is here that the level of 3,000-3,500 strategic offensive nuclear warheads allowed by the treaty applies.

Further on Official Testimony

*PM0503162493 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Mar 93 First Edition p 1*

[Aleksandr Linkov report under the "Parliamentary Hearings" rubric: "How Many Missiles Do We Need?"]

[Text] Parliamentary hearings on the START II Treaty have opened in the Russian Supreme Soviet. They are being held once every 2 weeks and will last approximately 2 months.

Speaking at the hearings' opening, Nikolay Ryabov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, indicated that the world community had succeeded in stabilizing the nuclear weapons process by freezing their increase. However, the effective period of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons runs out in 1995. In the meantime the number of countries which are providing themselves with such weapons or which may have them in the near future is increasing. This is why it is necessary to extend the treaty's effective period, and all five nuclear powers should take the same stance as the agreement's guarantors.

N. Ryabov emphasized that as the Supreme Soviet attaches very great significance to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, it is planning to hold an exchange of opinions with U.S. congressional committees on a wide range of issues concerning nuclear weapons. He also reminded us that the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies recognized that it is necessary for the country to have nuclear weapons in its arsenal as the most important means of preventing potential aggression against Russia. However, the Russian Federation's nuclear policy at the moment lacks fundamental principles. Therefore, in the process of the hearings on the START II Treaty, it is expedient not only to examine questions of its ratification but also to put forward for discussion the basic premises of the Russian Federation's nuclear and military policy.

In his speech, Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev outlined in some detail how necessary the START II Treaty signed 3 January of this year is. In his opinion present-day realities, whereby the political situation in the world has fundamentally changed, binds us to this. That the agreement was reached so quickly was explained by the fact that the document in question is directly linked to and based on the START I Treaty which has already been ratified. The minister is firmly convinced that Russia's interests have not been affected; it can only benefit. At the same time Kozyrev was negative in his appraisal of the actions of Ukraine, which is showing inconsistency in questions of nuclear arms reduction.

Appearing at the hearings, Chief of General Staff M. Kolesnikov turned his attention to this, saying that even now people in Ukraine are seriously concerned about the condition of the munitions being stored there, as they do not know what to do with them and are insisting on assistance from Russian specialists.

Far from all those present in the hall were optimistic about the START II Treaty. For example, I. Andronov, deputy chairman of the parliamentary Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties, drew the attention of the hearings' participants to a number of the document's provisions which in his opinion put Russia at a disadvantage. By way of an example, I. Andronov singled out the memorandum which inventories the actual arms being cut. Of its nine pages, seven are absolutely blank, and will be completed as implementation takes place. But what will be put in these blank pages? We do not know. Doubt was also expressed about the Russian side destroying multiple warheads on land-based missiles, when the American side is keeping those based on submarines. I. Andronov emphasized that a majority in parliament is in favor of ratifying the treaty, but until everything is entirely clear, this can hardly be expected to happen.

Further Russian Commentaries Critical of START II

U.S. Policies Said Destabilizing

93WC0031A Moscow DEN in Russian
No 5, 1-7 Feb 93 pp 1, 4

[Article by DEN Analysis Center: "Why Are Skokov and Grachev Opposed to the 'Survivability' of Our Missiles?"]

[Text] ...An old, almost forgotten story is recalled in connection with the debate which has flared up in connection with the START II Treaty.

Belarus and Ukraine formerly accommodated our SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. Old, very heavy, and immobile. They operated on liquid fuel and oxygen, and for this reason a launch took at least several hours. Although they had only one warhead, and inaccurate, it was very powerful and "dirty" (that is, one which contaminated the area hit abundantly with radiation).

Then some bright sparks thought of replacing these missiles with the SS-20. Mobile and solid fuel-powered (that is, launchable immediately), each missile had three warheads of accurate targeting.

The old missiles were clearly retaliatory-strike, "massive retribution" weapons. They were meaningless as attack weapons (what point was there in "pulverizing" cities on enemy territory). But the SS-20s with their precision warheads could very successfully be used against command posts, the army communications system, defense centers and so forth, that is, for a first "neutralizing" strike.

What followed the deployment of the SS-20s is well known. The NATO members' decision to create "Eurostrategic" weapons, the attempts to deploy in the European theater neutron warheads and the deployment of Pershings. Then, according to the logic of things, negotiations culminating in a "global zero" in terms of intermediate-range missiles.

As a result, where we had defensive nuclear weapons, there is nothing.

This whole story has been told here for one purpose—drawing a historical parallel.

And this is it. At the start of the ABM and SALT talks with the Americans we tried to persuade them that "cluster warheads" should not be developed and deployed. Washington, however, was preoccupied with the idea of sharply increasing, thanks to superiority in technology, given the same quantity of missiles (delivery systems), the quantity of warheads ("multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles"—MIRVs).

We failed to persuade them. The United States' conviction that, thanks to a spurt in technology, it could achieve decisive superiority to us told yet again. It always had this conviction, and it persists to this day. In response we also had to manufacture missiles which could carry many warheads. Technically the "ideal" such retaliatory-strike weapon was the SS-18 ("36" according to our classification). Powerful missiles, each of which carries up to 10 warheads. Thanks to the fact that they are silo-based, these systems were designed and deployed as retaliatory-strike weapons. Even though their preparation for launch takes longer than the solid-fuel weapons, they stand in reinforced concrete silos with a thick steel roof. Even an American nuclear attack held no terrors for them—after all, the American warheads with their targeting accuracy of

that time could not hit the silo directly, and this structure withstood perfectly well an attack several hundred meters away.

The situation changed fundamentally when the Americans developed and began to deploy highly accurate warheads, which were targeted with an accuracy of 50 meters and less. No silo would withstand this attack.

Our heavy missiles, accordingly, immediately became destabilizing weapons and continue to be ranked in this category still. The arithmetic here is simple: If the Americans have the opportunity, launching one warhead and destroying one silo, to take out 10 of our warheads (that is, to put out of action by an attack with a small portion of their warheads the bulk of our nuclear potential), the USSR had only two possibilities: either to expect that the SS-18s would be used as first-strike weapons or to introduce an extremely risky "launch-on-warning" system (as soon as a signal warning of an enemy missile attack was received, our missiles would be launched automatically).

As of when American submarines and Minutemen were armed with these same missiles, the SS-18s (and all our other multiple-warhead missiles, aside from the latest mobile ones) had "dangerous and destabilizing weapons" status.

This matter is, as always, very simply resolved—such weapons must be destroyed, which we will do with enthusiasm in accordance with the START I and START II treaties.

But just a minute, gentlemen! In the case of the SS-20s the party guilty of deploying destabilizing weapons (the USSR) eliminated them. In the case of the SS-18s there is not one but two "culprits": not only the USSR, which was pulled into the creation of multiple-warhead systems (and not first, incidentally, but after the Americans), but also the United States, which armed itself with precision warheads. Even were we to eliminate all our multiple-warhead missiles, what is more, the Trident warheads would, in any event, remain destabilizing weapons—they are in terms of all their parameters intended primarily for a spot "surgical" strike against military targets.

In this connection the question: Did the high contracting parties discuss this problem at all?

One has the disturbing impression that the parties were after two different goals (and each achieved its goal). For the Americans: a significant reduction in our nuclear potential (and its restructuring such that the greater part of our warheads in fact prove "inoperative"); a reduction in their own potential with minimum economic losses. For those to whom, unfortunately, negotiations on our side were entrusted the main and sole aim was realizing a "framework agreement," which came like a bolt from the blue after the sensational Bush-Yeltsin *tete-a-tete* last summer, and announcing another "epoch-making step."

Only given this assumption is it clear why the Americans insisted, and we agreed, that we not logically undertake the simplest measure—"unloading" our heavy missiles to one

warhead. Had these been negotiations of two equal parties, Russia would have been obliged to defend this option to the end (and not only in respect to some of the SS-19s), and the United States, to agree to this. Only this assumption makes it possible to understand why, according to the treaty, we have to build so many new ICBMs.

There are two further important questions also. Both concern the same problem as the question of the SS-18—Trident duet. This is a question of the survivability of the delivery system. If the delivery system (or its warheads) may be destroyed by a first strike (or on approach), this delivery system is a destabilizing weapon. But, again, not a destabilizing weapon in itself but destabilizing on account of the fact that the enemy, thanks to his deliberate military-technical policy, is developing and deploying systems for successfully attacking delivery systems and warheads.

The first question: antisubmarine [ASW] defense. This needs to be seriously discussed if we (more precisely, those who negotiated on our country's behalf) have for some reason or other decided to put the main emphasis in our triad on sea-based platforms. It is impossible to grasp the logic of the person who on the one hand declares that half our warheads should be on submarines (for these are, allegedly, the most dependable and safe weapons) and, on the other, is almost completely terminating the alert status of SSBNs, "pinning" them to base, where they are simply a very tempting target, and issues a statement to the effect that the construction of submarines with us will be completely terminated (thank God, our sailors immediately disavowed this statement of the president so the incident is, apparently, over).

It is believed that missile-firing submarines sailing at a depth of 200 meters and more in the oceans are invulnerable. And this is, indeed, the case—in respect to American submarines, which leave Bangor and the East Coast of the States, after which they "dissolve" in the ocean—and also in respect to our submarines, which, upon moving from the Kola peninsula, dive beneath a shield of ice (the noise of the grinding ice prevents hydrophones and sonars operating normally).

But it is well known that the United States has for several decades been working actively on antisubmarine defenses, that is, on increasing the possibilities of the accurate plotting and destruction of our missile-firing submarines. And they have achieved a good deal here. It was not without reason, after all, that the USSR so actively posed the question of the need for the creation of zones free of antisubmarine defense—if only in the immediate vicinity of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. This has been a very vigorous demand of our sailors, and they have been and are absolutely right. The last occasion this issue was raised, apparently, was before Kozyrev, when he "met the populace" in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

He should understand, it would seem, that if there are American weapons capable of putting out of action the potential for a retaliatory nuclear strike, these weapons are destabilizing. And, what is oddest of all: No agonizing sacrifices are required for a solution of this problem, after

all. It is necessary simply to seek from the Americans a minimum degree of honesty. They do not, after all, have to make any dramatic reductions. It is necessary simply to terminate ASW defense in a limited area of the oceans (merely in the Sea of Okhotsk and in a zone from Petropavlovsk to the Sea of Okhotsk, say).

Without a solution of this question, strategic stability is unattainable. Without a solution of this question the States will in a short time be saying: Your SSBN warheads in the Pacific are destabilizing. Scrap your submarines. You may build new ones here—those that we cannot detect. And you can simply scrap them without any compensation. And they would be absolutely right. There would be nothing for it but for us to scrap the existing submarines (and each such boat costs the Americans almost \$5 billion, incidentally) and build new ones, even more costly, deep-water, silent and fast and in a large quantity because the ideal here would not be the Typhoon, which has 400 warheads, but the “one platform (submarine)—one warhead” principle.

And the second big problem encompassing all parts of the triad (ICBMs, submarine-based missiles, and heavy bombers) is the ABM problem. How many times has it already been said (when we and the Americans had almost 30,000 warheads each even) that an appreciable reduction in the number of warheads makes the creation of territorial ABM defense absolutely impermissible!

And what are we seeing? Deputy Foreign Minister Berdennikov declares without a shadow of doubt: The ABM Treaty banning the deployment of ABM defenses is in effect, as before. We look at the text of the treaty. It is recorded that not only the “deployment” (that is, preparations for operational use) but also the “manufacture” and “testing” and even the “development” of these systems are prohibited. Are we, consequently, simply closing our eyes and permitting the Americans, in violation of the treaty, to make ABM defenses (except for the final step—putting them on alert status)? Such an “interpretation,” if you’ll forgive the expression, is what: feeble-mindedness or “cunning”?

Or do these people really believe Reagan’s old promise that America would at some stage be prepared to share ABM secrets with the world? But, after all, the Bush administration displayed, it would seem, a big... hm, well, “finger” in response to Yeltsin’s joint development proposal. Or are they taking on trust the Americans’ words to the effect that they are now approaching ABM defenses differently and will develop not a full-scale shield against thousands of warheads but an inferior one—against the warheads of Iraq and the like?

The START II Treaty cannot be ratified with such a “hole” in the ABM question. It should be bolstered by ABM accords—either in the plane of confirmation of its original (textual) interpretation or in the plane of the mutual supervision, observation, and use of the results of research or by something else.

It is essential to make clear at once that as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, the opposition is prepared for the most radical reductions. The concept of “parity” in the form in which it was interpreted with us—as arithmetical equality—was utterly senseless. Parity now is when each side has the possibility upon a retaliatory strike of inflicting unacceptable damage on the enemy. Therefore, provided that our retaliatory-strike weapons have a dependable degree of survivability, there could even be far fewer of them than the American weapons numerically. This would be no tragedy. But only provided that the survivability of the basic components of the triad are secured.

But can we speak of such reductions now, when the alert status in the air of our heavy bombers in the Arctic sector and the alert status of the missile-firing submarines have been practically terminated and the silos are in the sights of American precision warheads?

...Unfortunately, we have to draw the unequivocal conclusion that both Grachev and Skokov undoubtedly know that as a result of realization of the START I and START II treaties the survivability of the Soviet strategic triad will be conclusively undermined.

Seen as ‘Catastrophe for Russia’

PM0903155593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Mar 93 p 7

[Interview with Captain First Rank of the Reserve Anatoliy Gorbachev by Andrey Vasilyev under the rubric “To Disarm, but Sensibly”; place and date not given: “From the Nuclear Abyss to Catastrophe for Russia—That Is Where the START II Treaty Is Leading, Captain First Rank of the Reserve Anatoliy Gorbachev Believes”—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] In the mid-1980’s, A.N. Gorbachev, commander of a guided-missile strategic patrol submarine [raketnyy podvodnyy kreysler strategicheskogo naznacheniya], carried out an independent analysis of the state of the USSR Navy and brought the inauspicious results to the KGB. “At one time I refused to be your undercover agent, but today I cannot remain silent,” he said to the fearsome department. “If my conclusions are correct, let them be taken to the top, and if this is all slander, then take me to court.”

For a year specialists studied the results of his labor, then acknowledged them to be objective and forwarded them to V. Chebrikov. Through him, the information on the state of the navy was passed on to M. Gorbachev. In 1990 a plan for the modernization [rekonstruktsiya] of the navy was announced to B. Yeltsin. But A. Gorbachev’s conclusions did not produce any effect.

Vasilyev: Well, as a former “hawk,” as you are now generally called, it is appropriate for you to be opposed to the reduction of nuclear weapons, isn’t it?

Gorbachev: Well, that is not quite how it is. In order to understand the full danger of the nuclear race you would

probably have to become commander of a nuclear submarine carrying 16 ballistic nuclear missiles comparable to thousands of the American bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But it is precisely my knowledge that enables me to state authoritatively today: Unilateral disarmament makes the world a more dangerous place.

Vasilyev: If you do not deny the need for nuclear disarmament, then how do you see this process?

Gorbachev: I see it as a phased process. A responsible and honest process, neither to the detriment nor to the advantage of any individual country. It would be most advisable to travel any farther down this path under the auspices of the United Nations—in particular, to form an independent commission of experts, as well as an international court, which would rule out the possibility of infringing the rights of or giving priority to specific nuclear powers, as well as the unscrupulousness of politicians.

Vasilyev: Where do you see the danger in disarmament on the basis of START II?

Gorbachev: The latest treaty gives most of the residual nuclear potential (1,750 warheads out of 3,000-3,500) to the navies. In this way, the navies get the main responsibility for the national security of their countries. Is the Russian Navy capable of justifying these hopes? No. We are familiar with the opinion of professionals who believe that the airborne and land-based strategic potentials will be six to seven times smaller than the American potential. The U.S. Navy is 12 times stronger than the Russian Navy, while in terms of submarines the ratio is 1:8, of surface ships—1:10, and of naval aviation—1:18.

Given that our missile-armed submarines are under particularly intense surveillance by NATO antisubmarine warfare [ASW] forces and systems, the capacity of the Russian nuclear missile submarine systems for implementing their strategic potential is a whole order of magnitude lower than it is for those of the United States.

Vasilyev: What you are saying is at variance with the viewpoint of high-ranking military figures, who have always maintained that we have the best navy... What, in your opinion, lies behind such a striking lag?

Gorbachev: First and foremost, the noise generated by the majority of our submarines is between six and 50 times greater than the noise level of American submarines. This indicator alone reduces the combat effectiveness of our nuclear submarines to zero. Ask any specialist and he will answer: "A submarine with such a noise level is a target." For a number of years I worked on a commission under the Main Command of the USSR Navy. We analyzed the status of Soviet submarines' undetectability. I can testify that between 1967 and 1983 all our strategic missile-armed submarines were detected one way or another and could have been destroyed even before they had launched their first missile, and without having any idea of the loss of their own undetectability.

Unsatisfactory acoustics, an extremely outdated level of electronic warfare systems, poor protection against low-flying missiles and particularly against the ASW weaponry of NATO submarines have simply made a laughingstock of our submarines. This too is no secret to those in power.

I will cite only one example concerning naval aviation: The total search capability of a Soviet ASW airplane is inferior to the corresponding U.S. airplane by a factor of 200-plus.

Vasilyev: You can convince me. But how can the Russian leadership be convinced that a mistake has been made and that it needs to be corrected? How can it be proved that what we have here is a manifest strengthening of the United States? And to my mind this is dangerous for the whole world.

Gorbachev: Only by means of the facts. They are known to the Russian leadership and to top military officials. But here are some new facts for the Russian people:

1. The United States and NATO as a whole have a highly efficient hydroacoustic early warning system for detecting our missile-armed submarines throughout the world's oceans. We do not have such a system, and we cannot have one primarily because of Russia's military-geographic conditions. And this means that we simply have nothing with which to detect U.S. submarines. Need it be said that merely the conventional missile weaponry of these submarines is sufficient to punish Russia without response in the same way Iraq was punished?

2. The United States and its NATO allies have an ultra-long-range early warning radar for detecting launches of our ballistic missiles. This system encircles Russia from Norway and Britain in the west to Alaska and Japan in the east. We do not have such a system. In light of the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, we will not have one in the future either.

3. Without being in the least embarrassed, the United States is continuing to develop the SDI system. There is no doubt that within 10-15 years this system will be extremely effective against Russia's remaining nuclear potential. And we do not have such an antimissile system. And judging by the way our military-industrial complex is being destroyed to please the United States, there will not be one at all. SDI alone will reduce our remaining strategic potential to zero.

4. The considerable strategic nuclear potential of Britain and France may only hypothetically be separated from the corresponding U.S. potential. Does Russia have such a reserve of strategic nuclear potential? No. Judging by the way the United States and its allies are putting pressure on Ukraine and Kazakhstan, there is no way you can speak of the parity of the United States and Russia.

5. U.S. nuclear submarines alone account for many hundreds of high-precision nuclear-armed Tomahawk-type cruise missiles with a range of fire of up to 3,000 km. Of course this is a very real strategic weapon, particularly inasmuch as its low-noise delivery vehicles are practically invulnerable to our navy.

Incidentally, merely on U.S. submarines there are enough such "tactical" missiles to destroy all the main installations and cities on Russia's territory and take it out of a war. Does it need to be said that, in event of such completely possible conditions, U.S. territory will again escape the impact of a single bomb or a single missile. It is pertinent to say that even the conventional components of such missiles (there are over 3,000 Tomahawks among the weaponry of U.S. submarines and airplanes) may bring Russia to the brink of defeat.

Someone will rightly object that we have such missiles in our arsenal, too. Yes, such missiles have appeared in our arsenal, and again as a result of our chasing the United States. But in order for our excessively noisy nuclear-powered vessels to reach their launch stations, thousands of miles will have to be covered within the range of U.S. deep-sea hydrophones, with virtually a zero chance of success. So that in this case, too, there is a clear increase in the unilateral advantage of the United States.

Vasilyev: The two latest treaties between the USSR and the United States and the United States and Russia decrease the quantitative aspect of the strategic potentials from 15,000-16,000 warheads to 3,000-3,500. A five-fold reduction! You will agree that this is a different, lower level of nuclear threat to mankind....

Gorbachev: Let us start with the fact that no less than 3,000 of the U.S. warheads which are indisputably strategic will be guaranteed to reach their targets on our territory. At the same time, given all the facts we have cited, Russia cannot count on more than 300-350 nuclear weapons. A 10-fold advantage for the United States! Russia's 300-350 more or less real strategic nuclear weapons are even fewer than what Britain and France have separately in their arsenals, never mind China's strategic potential.

Yes, a significant proportion of the United States' so-called tactical nuclear weapons are, nevertheless, essentially strategic. Plus the fact that by and large the strategic potential of the U.S. allies is on one and the same side. Consequently, there is no question of any comparable reduction in strength.

Something else is also clear to everyone who reads the treaty attentively, and particularly to a professional: The United States is mainly reducing only what has clearly become obsolete. Nuclear missile systems and complexes are already being replaced or will be replaced by less vulnerable ones. And to a significant extent (if not fully) this restores the present strategic potential. Without any treaties at all the United States would cut the obsolete, worn-out missile submarines of the 1960's and 1970's and replace them with the more durable Trident-2 nuclear missile submarine system.

Who can fail to realize that the future of U.S. strategic aviation lies with the high-speed, ultra-long-range bomber which is invisible to radar and is worth any number of the obsolete airplanes?

If you read the 3 January 1993 treaty attentively, and consult the military who have served alongside the country's nuclear potential, then you will realize that it meets the national security needs of anyone but Russia. Only a gullible person could hope that with the nuclear games being played into one goal [pri yadernykh igrakh v odni vorota] the world will become a safer place than it used to be. Let us be totally honest: It was the USSR which restrained the United States from geopolitical aggression, and it was never the military monster or the empire of evil that the now triumphant U.S. imperialism actually was and still is. For example: Of the 12 basic forms of modern weaponry during the period 1940-1980 10 were created for the first time by the United States. Does this not show graphically who is the guilty party?!

Vasilyev: Does this mean that you believe that, in order to maintain the parity of the former USSR, Ukraine and Kazakhstan must remain nuclear powers?

Gorbachev: That is correct. Not just to maintain the world nuclear equilibrium, but also in order to promote the more accelerated nuclear disarmament of the whole world community. If these states maintain their nuclear potentials, this does not mean proliferation of nuclear weapons at all, it means maintenance of the status quo in the world's military-political equilibrium. In a word, the future world bandit is getting stronger in every respect, knocking Russia off its feet and treading it as yet invisibly into the dirt. But what will things be like then, when a real monster will acquire the full freedom to punish the whole world?

Vasilyev: How do you see strategic nuclear cooperation among Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan in the period before the total nuclear disarmament of the world community?

Gorbachev: Common sense dictates unified nuclear planning, production, and management with mutual responsibility at just as high a level as the Western allies have among themselves. No one has the right to deprive Ukraine and Kazakhstan of their state dignity, though, or to conduct talks on nuclear disarmament behind their backs. Tell me, would Britain and France allow the United States to conduct talks on the reduction of their national nuclear arsenals? Never.

Vasilyev: Has the time not come to make an assessment of START II, not just in the Russian Supreme Soviet but also in the Constitutional Court?

Gorbachev: It is high time. But on condition that the Constitutional Court will serve only the Constitution and no one else. While Russia's Supreme Soviet must adopt a responsible approach to the country's national security and prevent it being brought down to a level whereby the United States will start punishing us like they did Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Libya, Lebanon, and Iraq.

Russian-Ukrainian Polemics Over START Implementation Continue

Kozyrev Statements Criticized

OW0403153093 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1509 GMT 4 Mar 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, and Igor Porshnev; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Thursday [4 March] Boris Tarasyuk, Ukraine's deputy Foreign Minister, expressed his disagreement with the point of view of the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev who said that "influential circles in Kiev ambiguously view the START-I Treaty." In his interview with our Interfax correspondent he said that Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk had proposed that the republic's Supreme Soviet ratify the START-I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol and join the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty). "It is unclear, what ambiguity they are talking about," said the deputy minister.

As it is known, at the parliamentary hearings in the Russian Supreme Soviet on March 3, Andrey Kozyrev spoke of Moscow's growing concern due to Kiev's "ambiguous" attitude towards the START-I Treaty.

Tarasyuk also rejected another supposition voiced by the Russian Foreign Minister, who was reported saying that Kiev is undertaking "certain steps to establish control over nuclear weapons" stationed on Ukraine's territory. "I do not know what Kozyrev means,—Tarasyuk said. But I can say for sure that we adhere to the position determined by the Presidents of the four "nuclear republics" of the former Soviet Union in their Alma-Ata and Minsk agreements. According to this position, strategic offensive nuclear forces are under operative control of the CIS strategic forces' Joint command. As before, we support this status for the strategic forces stationed on our territory. At the same time Tarasyuk underlined: "Naturally, attempts to change this status make us to seriously assess the status of the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine."

He reported that the plenary session of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet could "shortly" consider the START-I Treaty, however, he rejected the idea of making any prognosis concerning the time of its ratification.

According to Tarasyuk, the ratification process is being aggravated by "the delay" in solving two issues, namely, "on granting security guarantees to Ukraine" and "on mutually acceptable agreements concerning the dismantlement and destruction of nuclear warheads" stationed on Ukrainian territory. Moscow and Kiev have not reached an agreement on these issues, the deputy minister said. "It is quite obvious that they directly influence the adoption of a final decision (on START-I and NPT—Interfax) by the Ukrainian parliament," he emphasized.

Tarasuyk pointed out that the atmosphere of Russian-Ukrainian relations can also directly influence how the

Ukrainian parliament considers START-I Treaty, and possibly, "even the outcome" of the voting.

Moscow Blames Kiev for 'No Progress'

OW0503153393 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1521 GMT 5 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] No progress was made during the Russian-Ukrainian talks on March 2 and 3 on ways of ensuring the security of strategic offensive weapons, temporarily located in Ukraine, and on the implementation of the START-I treaty, says the Russian Foreign Ministry's press-release summing up the results of the talks.

The press-release also says that the talks were a failure because Kiev lays claims on the nuclear warheads and refuses to create conditions for Russian experts to provide for security of the nuclear warheads at an adequate level.

The Russian delegation proposed specific measures of ensuring the security of the strategic offensive weapons, temporarily stationed in Ukraine. They suggested, among other things, that before August 1, 1993, all target designation programs be removed from the nuclear delivery capabilities; that before August 1, 1994, the inter-continental ballistic warheads and their guidance systems be moved to the centralized pre-plant facilities for their subsequent disassembly and that before August 1, 1993, the long-range cruise missiles for heavy bombers be transferred into a lower state of combat alert and moved to Russia for subsequent disassembly.

The Russian Foreign Ministry's press release goes on to state that despite its earlier-assumed commitments, the Ukrainian delegation did not suggest any specific ideas on the Memorandum on Understanding to the Russian side. Meanwhile, this is the key document for Ukraine with regard to the implementation of the main provision of the START-I Treaty and Lisbon agreements. Moreover, the Ukrainian delegation refused to discuss this issue during the talks, says the document.

Prior to the Moscow round of talks, the Russian delegation gave Ukraine materials on the utilization of nuclear warheads, and the draft agreement on the issue. "The delegations finalized the draft agreement with due account taken of the practical aspects of the utilization of fissile nuclear materials in the Ukrainian economy," says the Russian Foreign Ministry's press-release.

The two parties also coordinated the draft agreement on supervision over strategic missile complexes, located on their territories. This draft agreement is to be signed by the two countries' prime ministers.

The next round of talks is likely to be held in Kiev.

Ukrainian Minister Condemns Russian Stand

*LD0703142493 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 7 Mar 93*

[Text] The press center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine has issued a statement by Yuriy Kostenko, minister of environmental protection, head of the delegation of Ukraine at the negotiations with the delegation of the Russian Federation. In particular, the statement reads as follows:

In spite of the fact that accord was reached at the level of the heads of delegations on restraint in elucidating the differences that arose in the course of the negotiations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation issued a report on negotiations between the delegations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation on a wide range of issues in connection with the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine, on 5 March of this year.

In connection with the fact that this report interprets in a one-sided way, far from reality, both the contents and subject of the negotiations and the problematic issues to be settled at them, as well as the very course of the negotiations, I deem it necessary to state as follows, the statement notes:

1. A proposal to hold negotiations with the Russian Federation on issues of guaranteeing the nuclear and ecological safety of the strategic forces deployed on the territory of Ukraine was made by the Ukrainian side as early as at the beginning of last year.

The Russian side continuously evaded discussing specific facts of the issue of holding these negotiations.

A response to the latest appeal by the Ukrainian side in this connection was only received by us two months after the appeal had been made.

Meanwhile, Russian structures responsible for the nuclear and ecological safety of nuclear warheads knowingly did not perform periodic servicing, which was to guarantee their reliable and unproblematic operation.

The aim of this policy is absolutely clear, and it was openly declared at the latest round of negotiations in Moscow.

This is to compel Ukraine to recognize the strategic nuclear forces on its territory as belonging to Russia, as well as to recognize Russia's right of ownership of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, with all the negative consequences affecting Ukraine, including its economy.

2. The first and second rounds of negotiations demonstrated the readiness of the two sides' experts to reach agreement between themselves, in particular with respect to the search for specific mechanisms for using nuclear material, which is released after the destruction of nuclear weapons, acceptable to Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

Reaching accord is being hindered by the political position of the delegation of the Russian Federation on issues of the ownership of nuclear weapons' components, and of the

status of the strategic nuclear forces deployed on the territory of Ukraine, being issues of principle.

3. The fundamental differences in Ukraine's and the Russian Federation's positions at the negotiations are as follows:

Ukraine, from considerations of principle, cannot agree to the presence of foreign forces on its territory, whereas this is exactly what the Russian Federation insists on.

As is known, under the Minsk agreement of 30 December 1991, the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine only operationally were put under the Unified Command of the Strategic Forces of the CIS, and any attempts by Russia to alter this situation are legally groundless.

The second fundamental difference is that the Russian side seeks to compel Ukraine as one of the legal successors of the former Soviet Union to relinquish its right of ownership of nuclear components of the weapons deployed on its territory.

Thus, this is a consistent policy by the Russian Federation, aimed at transferring the strategic forces on the territory of Ukraine to the jurisdiction of Russia and at appropriating Ukraine's stocks of materials and capital equipment, which have never been handed over to the Russian Federation.

4. An extremely serious issue at the negotiations is that of the right of ownership, and of the further use of nuclear material released from tactical warheads, removed from the territory of Ukraine to the Russian Federation in the spring of 1992 to be dismantled and destroyed.

Ukraine has never relinquished its right of ownership of this material, and insists on settling the issue of its use, together with the issue of the use of strategic warheads.

The Russian delegation ignores this just demand by the Ukrainian side, referring to instructions received from the former's political leadership, which naturally affected the atmosphere of the negotiations.

5. As early as after the first round of negotiations, a policy, by the Russian side, to use the mass media to achieve its real aim also became obvious to everybody.

It is not by chance that the article "Second Chernobyl Developing at Ukraine's Missile Silos" appeared in the newspaper IZVESTIYA.

After the second round of negotiations, the Russian side issued the tendentious and one-sided statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, mentioned above.

In fact, the assessment of the negotiations by Pavel Grachev, minister of defense of the Russian Federation, was negative, with their failure also forecast by him, as early as at the beginning of the second round of negotiations, at a news conference in Moscow.

The Ukrainian side cannot but regard this as pressure, with the purpose of being granted unilateral concessions by Ukraine.

6. Since June 1992, the Ukrainian side has been proposing to hold negotiations with the Russian side on concluding a memorandum on the division of limitations and restrictions imposed by the Strategic Nuclear Arms Treaty [as heard] on the former USSR's strategic offensive arms.

It was envisaged by Article Two of the Lisbon Protocol that this accord be reached between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. The Ukrainian side was ready to hold relevant negotiations on a quadrilateral basis. Any other decision would show disrespect for the other sovereign states.

But the delegation of Russia firmly insisted that the discussion of the text of the memorandum proposed by it be held just on a bilateral basis, in spite of the fact that provision was made for the memorandum to be signed by four states.

7. The Ukrainian side is prepared to continue negotiations in a constructive spirit with the purpose of concluding the relevant agreements as soon as possible.

These agreements must ensure the reliable maintenance and manufacturer's inspection [avtorskyy nahlyad] of strategic nuclear arms deployed both in Ukraine and in the Russian Federation; settle issues of the further use of all the components of strategic and tactical nuclear warheads; and ensure the normal functioning of the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine.

Sets Conditions for Continuing Talks

LD0803131493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian
1000 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] Yuriy Kostenko, Ukraine minister of environmental protection, says the leader of the Russian delegation at the negotiations on the fate of strategic weapons on Ukraine territory, in an interview with Western journalists on 5 March, absolutely incorrectly interpreted the position of the Ukrainian delegation. Yuriy Kostenko said in an interview with the ANI news agency that the Ukrainian delegation does not refuse to participate in future negotiations, but it requires from its colleagues specific and more precise definitions as to what issues of strategic nuclear weapons will be discussed during the next round of negotiations. The Ukrainian minister said some questions that the Russian delegation wants to discuss are not well-timed.

I would like to remind you of the position of Russia on this problem: Russia wants Ukraine to confirm unequivocally its readiness to become a nonnuclear state, as promised during the conclusion of the relevant treaty with the United States and other states.

Russian Diplomat: Kiev Wants To Have Nuclear Arms

OW1003145993 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1434 GMT 10 Mar 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dimitriy Voskoboinikov, Igor Porshnev; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] There is an impression that Ukraine is changing its attitude to nuclear weapons: it wants to possess them, a highranking Russian diplomat told INTERFAX. He qualified the charges of Yuriy Kostenko, chief Ukrainian negotiator at the talks with Russia, who accused Moscow of attempting to "appropriate Ukrainian material values," that is nuclear forces deployed on Ukrainian territory, as "absolutely ungrounded, tendentious and misconstrued." Ukraine, the diplomat explained, has not ratified a single "basic agreement" on strategic nuclear arms; it isn't bound by anything even formally. The diplomat also said that Ukraine "hasn't paid a kopeck to Marshal Shaposhnikov." In other words, it has not contributed funds to the upkeep of the joint CIS armed forces.

Ukraine Scientists Propose New 'Nuclear-Free Club'

AU0803153693 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
5 Mar 93 pp 6, 8

["Memorandum for Those Politicians, Scientists, Public Figures, and Experts Who Participate in Formulating State Nuclear Policy: Disarming, But in a Sensible Way," signed by Dmytro Vydrin, director of the International Institute of Global and Regional Security; Leonid Tupchiyenko, general director of the Innovation Center for Political Sciences; and Oleh Bodruk and Eduard Lysytsyn, leading scientists at the World Economy and International Relations Institute; issued in Kiev on 12 February]

[Text] We specialists in problems of global and regional security, while considering Ukraine's official position on its nuclear status as being generally correct, are, at the same time, alarmed by the shortcomings in the mechanism for achieving a nuclear-free future and also by individual mistakes that unfortunately have been and still are being made in the process of implementing the aforementioned intentions.

In accordance with our firm convictions, Ukraine must not ask for guarantees for its security, but, as a potential initiator and leader of the movement toward a nuclear-free future, it must obtain such guarantees from the world community.

The movement initiated by our state is not strictly Ukrainian, but constitutes a real international issue. Its success or failure depends upon those "rules of the game" that are elaborated (with the indispensable participation of those states that are genuinely prepared to proceed to achieving a nuclear-free status) and adhered to by the world community.

Convinced of the effectiveness and promising nature of this particular approach, we decided to appeal to political and public figures, scientists, and experts who play a part in formulating the nuclear policy of their states; we are expounding this appeal for the Ukrainian public.

Having achieved the great treasure—independence—Ukraine bears high responsibility for the independent choice of its road. It must also make its choice regarding its nuclear future. It might seem that the choice is simple: The moral position, the economic situation, and the promises given to the world community unambiguously guarantee our country's future nuclear-free status.

However, we would like this to be a voluntarily answer given as a manifestation of the will and conviction of the majority of our citizens. It must also be reinforced by convincing proof of its rationality and by the confidence on the part of politicians and experts that it will, undoubtedly, be for the benefit of Ukraine and of the entire world community. In our opinion, today, there is no such will, conviction, or confidence.

The nuclear policy of the superpowers, which is overbearing, coercive, arrogant, and didactical, cannot but put us on our guard.

We are fully aware of and share their anxiety regarding nuclear safety in the world. We can readily understand their desire to take the entire responsibility for this safety exclusively upon themselves. We also fully understand and share the impatience of the superpowers regarding the reduction in the number of nuclear states.

However, it is difficult to understand the persistent pressure and coercion under which Ukraine has had to make its consecutive, meaningful, and consistent steps toward a nuclear-free status.

While understanding the messianistic aspirations of the superpowers, we expect them to realize that they do not make the choice for us, but the choice is being made by our independent state. The significance of our choice is largely determined by our own insight and good will and by our own, and not somebody else's, responsibility for the security of the world.

For example, in the present conditions, it might and would have been, temporarily, to the world's advantage if Ukraine had shown servility and hastened to be obedient. However, in our opinion, such a position does not conform to the new prospects in the development of the world community.

Now that the split [rozdvoyennist] in the world has been overcome, a situation has taken shape in which the nuclear superpowers, having joined interests, may impose their conditions and geopolitical rules upon the rest of the countries. The possibility of such diktat contradicts the idea of integrity in interstate relations and has a corrupting effect upon the superpowers.

We should not allow a contradiction to arise between the democratic essence of the superpowers and the undemocratic content of international policy. It is precisely upon democracy that the nations that have embarked upon the road of free development are pinning their hopes for the future.

We Ukrainian scientists and experts in this problem, looking upon the liberation of the world from nuclear weapons not only as a great political, but also as a great moral objective, hope that there will be no masters and servants, no bosses and subordinates, and no big and younger "brothers" in the world's movement toward nuclear security.

Further progress in the process of nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation calls for new approaches to be devised on the basis of a fundamentally different coordination mechanism.

For the purpose of demonopolizing the process of achieving nuclear safety, we find the following steps worthwhile:

1. The creation of a "nuclear-free club" made up of states that already possess nuclear status or are on the threshold of achieving it, but voluntarily renounce doing so. It is precisely such countries that, having realized the absurdity of possessing nuclear weapons in the contemporary world, would be able to speed up the process of nuclear disarmament and become equal partners or opponents of the superpowers in this cause.

2. The creation of an assembly of the "nuclear-free club" with a corresponding representation in the United Nations, something that will make it possible to recognize and unify the status of the members of the given club in the world community and their benefits and security guarantees. This is necessary to encourage new states to join the club.

3. The creation of a permanently functioning international institute to deal with problems of a nuclear-free future. This institution, gathering independent experts who enjoy a high international reputation, could elaborate the best possible international political and legal framework for progressing toward a nuclear-free future. It could also offer a professional assessment of the position occupied by those states that hamper nuclear disarmament in the world and that are striving to use their nuclear status to achieve, in addition to security guarantees, also their own political and economic advantages, thereby doing harm to nuclear-free states for the purpose of discriminating against the latter.

The above issues could be discussed at the conference that the United Nations is planning to hold in Kiev (Ukraine).

[Signed] Dmytro Vydrin, director of the International Institute of Global and Regional Security

Leonid Tupchiyenko, general director of the Innovation Center for Political Sciences

Oleh Bodruk and

Eduard Lysytsyn, leading scientists at the World Economy and International Relations Institute
[Dated] Kiev, 12 February 1993

Japan To Assist Russia in Destroying ICBM Liquid Fuel

*LD0903134493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1322 GMT 9 Mar 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Kutakhov]

[Text] Tokyo March 9 TASS—Japan intends to assist Russia in destroying liquid fuel from intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM] to be scrapped in compliance with the Russian-American treaty on the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons (START-2).

The well-informed YOMIURI newspaper reports this Tuesday that Tokyo plans to send a group of specialists to Russia in April who will determine what measures are necessary to destroy the fuel.

The Japanese government intends to announce its decision on this issue at the G-7 summit to be held in Tokyo this July.

The newspaper notes that, according to Western experts, there are some 100,000 tons of very toxic ICBM liquid fuel in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Japanese specialists believe that the total cost to build and operate fuel storages may amount to 5.5 billion yen.

Therefore, they believe, the quick destruction of fuel from disassembled ballistic missiles will be the most acceptable version.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Further Reports on Belarusian Implementation of CFE

Tanks Converted for Civilian Use

*PM0803100593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Feb 93 First Edition p 4*

[Mikhail Shimanskiy report: "Dismantling of Tanks Brings Not Just Losses"]

[Text] The Tank Repair Plant No. 140 in the Belarusian town of Borisovo, a plant previously off limits not only to visitors but also to outsiders in general, recently became known throughout Europe. This is where armored vehicles of the former Belorussian Military District—infantry fighting vehicles and tanks—are being destroyed. Work is proceeding in accordance with the international Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE].

It is no secret that the Belorussian Military District, which had the highest level of equipment in the former USSR, had an especially large quantity of armored equipment, furthermore, of the most modern type. Now the republic needs to dispose of it. True, under the terms of the CFE treaty it can convert over 2,000 units of various types of armored vehicles for the needs of the national economy.

It is those vehicles which are being dismantled at plant No. 140 in Borisovo. In December last year a special military inspection team monitoring the elimination of conventional weapons registered the destruction of the first infantry fighting vehicles here.

Now the destruction of T-62 tanks has begun. By 4 March 24 of them will have been dismantled. I talked with Vladimir Sakach, chief of the Borisovo plant.

"The work is proceeding and will continue to proceed according to the prescribed schedule and in accordance with the conditions and deadlines of the CFE Treaty," he said. "We have developed a special technique for dismantling the armored vehicles, created a good material and technical base for it, and have trained experienced specialists. All the specialists have remarked on the precision and good organization of this process.

"After refitting, we turn the tanks into high-powered tractors," Sakach said. "They are intended for use in agriculture and will be used in feed procurement. Kolkhoz chairmen have already seen them at work and are very satisfied with them: They like the uncomplicated design and the relatively low cost. The plant has received many orders. Approximately 150 tanks will be converted into tractors.

"The infantry fighting vehicles," the director said, "will also be used elsewhere. Infantry fighting vehicles have exceptional off-road capability. We are using those qualities to turn them into forest fire-fighting vehicles which can overcome any obstacles blocking the way to the fire in places which are usually inaccessible to people and other equipment. We have received orders for these machines from the Russian Federation's airborne forestry protection service. We have already supplied them with 15 machines and are preparing to send another 20."

Last Tanks of 76th Division Removed

*WS0503091593 Minsk Radio Minsk Network
in Belarusian 0400 GMT 5 Mar 93*

[Text] An echelon carrying the last tanks of the 76th Guards Armor Division, deployed in Brest, headed for one of the Borisov plants. The fate of the 31 tanks will be the same as that of the preceding 283. They will be destroyed and sent for recasting. This process is being carried out in accordance with the treaty on conventional arms reduction in Europe [CFE], and with the resolution of the Republic's Supreme Soviet and government on the reduction of the national Army.

Russians 'Shocked' by Estonian Troop Withdrawal Proposals

MK0603161793 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 Mar 93 p 3

[Unattributed report under the headline: "Estonia"]

[Text] At the Estonian-Russian interstate negotiations the Estonian delegation has advanced a new draft document concerning the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Estonia, and also the status of their presence there.

"Our delegation has been shocked by the move made by the Estonian side over the issue of the Russian troop withdrawal, which undoes all the work accomplished so far," Vasilij Svirin, head of the Russian delegation and ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, said. According to him, the treaty was 90-percent ready and had been coordinated with the Estonian and Russian delegations.

According to Estonian delegation chairman Juri Luik, the former draft treaty had been characterized by general political declarations that could be interpreted in rather conflicting ways. The new document from the Estonian side concretizes and legally clarifies the previous agreement and defines the sides' obligations.

Western Group Commander on Withdrawal Problems

LD0803141593

[Editorial Report] Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian at 1543 GMT on 7 March carries a 9-minute interview with Colonel General Matvey Prokofyevich Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces [WGF], by an unidentified correspondent; the place and date of the interview are not given.

The interview starts with the general's views on what makes a real man. Asked if one can be a real man if one has nowhere to live, Col. Gen. Burlakov first talks about his personal experience and then turns to the Western Group of Forces. He says: "Before the reunification of Germany in October 1990, the Group numbered 546,000, including 340,000 servicemen, some 200,000 family members, and blue- and white-collar workers. There were 92,000 kids, of whom 51,000 were schoolchildren. The Group consisted of six armies, with 111,000 items of equipment and arms. The Group had accumulated material resources worth 2.5 million [word indistinct]. Initial plans involved withdrawal to Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states. But later, after the break up of the Union and the transfer of the Group to Russian jurisdiction, the Group changed those plans so that the main units had to withdraw to Russian territory. I made these alterations along the following lines: 30 or 25 percent every year from 1991 till 1993, and about 15 percent in 1994. We are concerned about the fact that in two years we have withdrawn 31,500 families of officers and warrant officers to Russian territory without housing for them. You know that troops from the near abroad [states that used to be part of the USSR] as well as those from the far abroad are being pulled back to Russian

territory. Therefore, the resettlement of our Group is, I believe, a heavy burden for the Russian state at present. So we count more on a program involving 7.8 billion German marks allocated by the German side for resettlement. Of those officers who were withdrawn to Ukraine, 48 percent received housing by 1992, whereas in Belarus they have built housing for 134 percent—for future withdrawals, you know how it was planned."

Noting that once again it is Russian officers who are at a disadvantage, Col. Gen. Burlakov continues: "In Bonn on 27 January, a session of the joint Russian-German commission was held. I am its cochairman from the Russian side. I put this issue before the Germans: to allocate as much money as possible in 1993, in order to build at least 20,000 to 22,000 apartments this year. More precisely, the construction of all 18 settlements [gorodok] that are to be built on Russian territory should begin this year, to be commissioned by the end of this year or the first half of next year. In a joint statement by President Yeltsin and Chancellor Kohl, the Group has been set a task of speeding up the withdrawal by four months. But at present the rate of the Russian troop withdrawal is nine times higher than the rate of resettlement. This is an abnormality, and we have to fight against it. Well, the German side said it was ready to fund the 1993 program. Now much depends on the Russian side."

The general spells out what steps he expects Russia's leadership to take, adding: "Using officers' private savings as well as the special monies not passing through the budget of the Group, we bought 1,280 apartments last year. In all, we plan to buy about 10,000 flats. We have 10,000 officers with 20 or more years of service behind them. They are entitled to pensions, and can be retired when the cuts in the Armed Forces take place." These people are our prime concern, the general says. Permission has been received to purchase apartments, with officers themselves paying 25 percent. Burlakov goes on to say that he has met with good understanding from the leadership of Stavropol Kray, Leningrad Oblast, St. Petersburg, Moscow Oblast, Nizhniy Novgorod, and Voronezh Oblast. But in Ulyuanovsk Oblast, the leadership refused to sell apartments.

Turning to allegations of financial malpractice, Burlakov says: "We are often criticized for selling out everything, allegedly to fill our pockets. But we do not actually sell anything ourselves. No officer in the Group is involved in sales." He goes on to say that servicemen are doing preparatory work, sorting out scrap metal, etc, while contracts are signed by the commission. Burlakov adds: "We do have a Trade Directorate, it is called the Directorate of the Western Group of Forces, but it is not accountable to us in financial and commercial matters. Unknown to us, they have been involved in transactions at the instruction of the Main Trade Directorate in Moscow, and there has been some malpractice. But I repeat that we do not sell anything. Are there breaches of the rules? Yes, indeed. But this sort of thing happens in every state." Burlakov concludes by saying that the Group has always exposed all offenders itself, and that no outside commission has ever discovered any cover up.

NUCLEAR TESTING

STERN Story on Russian Resumption of Testing Denied

PM0403141993 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 93 p 3

[A. Golovanov report: "Rumors Surrounding Novaya Zemlya"]

[Text] As reported by Radio Warsaw, the latest issue of the German weekly STERN carries a report on a secret directive by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Atomic Energy. It talks about the start of preparations for the resumption of nuclear weapons tests on the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago. The magazine allegedly received a copy of the presidential document from its own sources. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's editorial office turned for explanations to those "circles" where the leak of information occurred.

"We have seen no such edict," Anatoliy Krasikov, leader of the president's press service, said. "We receive all documents from the head of state's personal office as soon as they are signed by him."

"Has this question been discussed in the president's entourage?"

"I heard about this story the day before yesterday (that is to say, 1 March—KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent's note), when I was telephoned and told that the magazine was carrying such an item."

The Russian president's administration knows nothing about any instruction or directive by Boris Yeltsin. However, 10 days ago our correspondent was refused entry to the Novaya Zemlya test range....

Russian Defense Ministry Denies Development of Tectonic Weapons

LD1003190393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1815 GMT 10 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunaiskiy]

[Text] Moscow March 10 TASS—"No experiments on targeted nuclear explosions with the aim of creating tectonic weapons were conducted and are being conducted in the system of the Russian Defence Ministry," officials of the Russian Defence Ministry declared. The statement was made following recent mass media reports alleging that research was going on in the interests of the Russian Defence Ministry to create the so-called tectonic weapons and that experiments were made to imitate earthquakes in different regions of the world with the help of nuclear explosions.

Officials from the Russian Defence Ministry told ITAR-TASS that some media reports alleged that a seismic laboratory belonging to the Russian Defence Ministry and stationed in Eshery (Abkhazia) was one of the important centres for the development of tectonic weapons. Reports

alleged that one of the reasons why Russian troops had not been withdrawn from Abkhazia is that the laboratory is of particular importance and its dismantling would cause colossal damage.

The statement said that there are absolutely no grounds for linking the withdrawal of Russian troops to the importance of the seismic laboratory. The personnel of the laboratory was evacuated in October, 1992, while its equipment was practically destroyed as a result of military clashes between Abkhazian and Georgian armed formations. A laboratory's basement several metres deep and intended for the installation of seismic meters was the hardest hit, the statement said.

Similar laboratories existing in the Russian Defence Ministry make up a system of control over underground tests of nuclear weapons, the statement pointed out.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Further Commentary on Mirzayanov CW Secrets Case

Contrast With Baltic CW Dumping

93WC0032A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 4, 24 Jan 93 p 10a

[Article by Leonard Nikishin: "Poisonous Fruits of Poisoned Policy"]

[Text] On 13-15 January in Paris, representatives from 115 states held a ceremonial signing of a convention on banning chemical weapons and on their destruction. The signature of the representative from Russia also appears at the end of this convention. Henceforth we shall not develop, produce, store or utilize chemical weapons. And if someone has doubts of this, we are obliged to allow foreign inspectors to conduct verification "anywhere, at any time, without the right of refusal."

When one thinks about the "Mirzayanov case" (see MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No 38, 1992), one cannot help but recall the recount by Ilya Erenburg about a man sentenced in September of 1941 by a special conference of the NKVD [People's Commissariat on Internal Affairs] to 5 years of imprisonment for... "anti-German sentiments." "It is difficult to imagine," wrote Erenburg, "the Hitlerites were tearing toward Moscow, the newspapers were writing about the 'knight-dogs,' while some bureaucrat in the state security service was calmly formulating a case which had been undertaken back in the times of the Soviet-German Pact."

But the analogy here, it seems, is only an outward one. In Mirzayanov's case the matter was more serious. In the article, "Poisoned Politics," the community was told of the existence of a rift between the delegations of high politicians and the real activity of the military-chemical branch of our VPK [military-industrial complex], which they themselves had sanctioned. And although, as we see, this was recounted in a more than timely manner, no one

thanked Mirzayanov for this. On the contrary, they decided to teach him a lesson (and others as well, using him as the example). And in this vindictive blindness, they do not even want to consider the extremely negative reaction of the world community.

In fact, however, it could not have been otherwise, since the "pillars of the VPK," who had piled up tens of thousands of tonnes of toxic substances in the country, who had ruined the environment and inflicted harm upon the health of many people, now became the main proponents of ridding us of their "products." Naturally, they are vitally interested in concealing from the world the results of their former actions.

These are not simply words. The editors of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI are in possession of a document born within the depths of the CPSU Central Committee and bearing until quite recently the seal of "Top Secret."

This reference, prepared in 1989 by officials of the Central Committee apparatus, testifies to the practice of burying hundreds of thousands of tonnes of toxic substances in the Baltic Sea. *"I consider it expedient to perform additional burial of outdated chemical weapons produced in 1954-1962 at the locations of the old burial sites used in 1989-1990. The overall weight of the weapons subject to recycling is 112,523 tonnes."* So that, by comparison, this 40,000 tonnes of toxic substances which we must destroy seems small... Not to mention the 189 tonnes of cyanide—that foul stuff which we "presented" to the Baltic peoples, there is a huge amount of yperite [mustard gas], which is not specified in the program for destruction of chemical weapons which is today being reviewed by the Russian Supreme Soviet. As Professor Lev Fedorov noted, this is already not a chemical, but an ecological weapon, directed against the entire world.

It also follows from the document that General Kuntsevich, the current chairman of the Russian President's Committee on Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons and also, of course, one of the main participants in the ceremony in Paris, had been informed of the burials of toxic substances in the Baltic Sea in 1989-1990.

Perhaps the Ministry of Security should leave Mirzayanov alone and conduct an entirely different investigation?

Mirzayanov's Lawyer Seeks Dismissal

93WC0032B Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 4, 24 Jan 93 p 10a

[Article by Natalya Gevorkyan: "The 'Mirzayanov Case' Is Not Closed, Although We Have Officially Rejected Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] "The investigators could now close the case on the basis of Article 6 of the RSFSR Criminal Procedural Code, i.e., due to changed circumstances," believes lawyer Aleksandr Asnis, who is defending our author Vil Mirzayanov.

Let us remember: The state security agencies considered Mirzayanov's article in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI on Russia's dishonest policy in the sphere of chemical weapons to be a divulgence of state secrets, which they are currently trying to prove. Now, however, after Russia's signing of the convention on chemical disarmament, this sphere, it would seem, is altogether deleted from the list of our state secrets. This is what the lawyer was referring to when he spoke of changed circumstances. Nevertheless, the investigation continues, supported by the old list of secrets ratified by a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The most awkward thing in the situation which has arisen is the fact that neither Mirzayanov nor his lawyer Asnis have been shown the decree or the list of secrets, because they are... secret. It seems the investigative agencies are not embarrassed by the fact that they are capable of throwing a person in prison with reference to a document which he has never seen with his own eyes. But then, in their time Mirzayanov and hundreds of thousands of his colleagues in the closed institutes, "boxes", etc., gave their signature of non-divulgence, also without familiarization with the list of what specifically they were promising not to divulge.

All this is at the same time both absurd and sad, since it places the investigative agencies, on one hand, and the person under investigation and the defense, on the other, under unequal conditions.

The investigation, without further ado, set for itself the goal of determining whether the information publicized by Mirzayanov falls under the list of secrets. If so, then he is guilty, regardless of whether his publication inflicted any harm upon the interests of the state or not. The position of the defense, however, is different. It is demanding that the investigative organs show proof of inflicted harm—upon the defense capability or upon state security.

This question may be answered by experts. The investigation appointed its own experts, primarily "secrets men" from the interested departments. Mirzayanov and the defense submitted their own list of experts. Out of six candidates, the investigators rejected five: Not only chemists, but also Academician Arbanov, KGB General Kalugin and Petr Nikulin, who up until recently had been the first deputy chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security Institute of Security Problems. The latter may be considered a victim in the Mirzayanov case, since his effort to express his point of view on the problems of state secrets as applied to the incident with Mirzayanov ended for him in retirement, not of his own choosing.

For the present day, the following situation has arisen: All petitions by the one under investigation and the defense regarding the make-up of the panel of experts and the circle of questions which they must answer are being rejected. Their requests to familiarize themselves with the Council of Ministers decree and its ratified sectorial secrets list have been ignored. As a result, Mirzayanov has refused to answer questions and sign investigative documents. His lawyer Asnis is determined to defend his client, of whose innocence he is

convinced. However, in his words, he holds no illusions regarding the objectivity of this investigation.

Russian Military CW Research, Destruction Programs Described

*93WC0030A Moscow MEGAPOLIS-EXPRESS
in Russian No 5, 3 Feb 93 p 13*

[Article by Lidiya Malash: "A Less Than Wholehearted Disarmament"]

[Text] At the parliament hearings in the White House, the Comprehensive Program of Phased Destruction of Chemical Weapons in Russia, developed by the Committee for Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention Problems under the president of the Russian Federation together with the Ministry of Defense, was judged negatively by experts and representatives from the regions. This does not mean at all, however, that the decision on the issue is final. There is a real danger that during the process of discussion and approval of the program by the Supreme Soviet, we will see increased activities on the part of the deputy lobby representing the military-industrial complex, who want to destroy a certain part of chemical weapons without destroying the idea of producing toxic substances.

Moscow, Kineshma, and From There On, Everywhere....

The Bolshevik Government developed an interest in chemical weapons as early as in the beginning of 1920's. Having signed an agreement with Germany on assistance in organizing its production and sharing experience in practical applications, the Soviets opened the first enterprise for production of iprit in the city of Trotsk (currently Chapayevsk, Samara Oblast). Over the years of Soviet power, the largest chemical weapons production plants were built mostly in the Volga region: Kineshma, Dzerzhinsk, Cheboksary, Saratov, Volgograd. Moscow is another major military-chemical center (five so-called plants plus a testing site). Chemical weapons storage facilities are located in Penza, Udmurtia, and in Bryansk and Kurgan Oblasts. This, of course, is not all.

The main military-chemical testing site had its beginnings not far from the borough of Podosinki in Saratov Oblast, which eventually grew into today's Shikhany (Volsk-18). This is the site of the Central Scientific-Research and Testing Institute of the Ministry of Defense's Chemical Troops (TsNIIKhV MO). Attached to it is a testing site occupying more than 400 square kilometers. The institute conducts testing of all prototypes of chemical weapons. Specialists believe that this is where the prototype of the binary chemical bomb was tested. Also in Shikhany is the Volsk branch of the Central Scientific-Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology, not too long ago renamed the State Institute for Organic Synthesis Technologies (GITOS), where the technology for destruction of chemical weapons is being developed. It has its own experimental plant and its own chemical and technical storage facilities.

Shikhany and Novocheboksarsk are slated to become the two primary sites for the destruction of chemical weapons.

It has been decided to transfer here from military bases (in particular, from Kambarka and Kizner in the Udmurt Republic and Shchuchye, Kurgan Oblast) several tonnes of lewisite in storage containers, as well as most toxic phosphororganic toxic substances. The technology for destroying them involved utilization and burning of waste. Shikhany is to become a huge dump for hazardous substances. For this purpose, a dump where they will be buried is being built. All of this is part of the Comprehensive Program, whose author is military Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich.

Man Is a Cheap Raw Material

One can hardly speak of morality in military matters. Especially when dealing with "secret" matters. Hidden under the shroud of military and state secrets, however, often are crimes against man and humanity. Biological experiments on mice and rats are commonplace. Alas, they cannot present a complete picture of toxic substances' effect on the organism. The animals that are considered closest to humans by their physiological reactions are pigs and monkeys. Experimenting on them is considered costly and troublesome, however. The conclusion: The cheapest raw material for experiments is man. Such experiments were conducted in Shikhany in the summer of 1982. One of the participants in these tests was Vladimir Petrenko. He was one of the test subjects.

"I was summoned by department chief Colonel Suchkov," Petrenko tells his story. "He said that it was necessary to conduct a series of tests—to find out how the protective measures affect humans. He suggested that I volunteer, since I was a young Communist. I agreed—I was promised complete safety, after all. In this way 30-40 people were selected, in groups of two. This was at Kuntsevich's order; Colonel Smirnov was the person immediately in charge of testing. The experiments lasted a week. After that I felt terrible and realized that I had been affected by toxic substances. I ended up in Burdenko Hospital, but for quite a while I could not get out of my father-commanders which substances exactly I had been subjected to. It turned out that it was VX—a gas...."

Military Academician Kuntsevich reported "upstairs" that the testing of toxic substances had been successful, and continued his scientific work. Major Petrenko, despite medical contraindications, was sent from 29 May until 16 July 1986 as a "liquidator" to Chernobyl. Others on whom toxic substances had been tested in the past also were sent to the zone. The officers carried out this order, too. Over the first post-Chernobyl year, however, several people from among the Shikhany "liquidators" died, and two committed suicide. Vladimir Petrenko has been medically diagnosed with 10 chronic illnesses acquired as a result of exemplary service in the Chemical Troops. He was not permitted to serve until full pension, though. He was transferred to the reserves as a part of personnel reductions.

Some military specialists maintain that such experiments on people are unavoidable, as is the destruction of nature in the area where modern weapons are tested. They say that both Americans and the French have conducted similar experiments. Perhaps this is so. Still, when a person gives to the military machine his health, and sometimes his life, this must be somehow compensated for. The Soviet version of "compensation" is to finish the person off with an even greater "testing" dosage—after all, he has nothing to lose. In essence, this is a typical trick of the criminal world—remove a witness because he knows too much.

"A Military Man Through and Through." This Says It All

The world wants to walk away from war. The military are forced to submit to this will, but still try to outwit each other in every possible way by "stripping" their opponents while keeping a "strategic stash" themselves. When the UN General Assembly adopted the draft of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Elimination Convention, the Committee on Convention Problems, headed by Kuntsevich, together with the Ministry of Defense and other agencies, quickly developed the Comprehensive Program. It deals, however, not with the principle of protecting the environment and the individual, but only with the technology for the destruction of 40,000 tonnes of toxic substances stored in seven specialized arsenals of the Russian Ministry of Defense. (According to the former director of the Cheboksary branch of the GS NIIOKhT, Vladimir Shcherbak, the total volume of toxic substances produced is nine times greater). This is actually the point of the ploy on the part of the military: Since the accumulation of chemical weapons has been excessive and it is not safe to store it, we need to get rid as quickly as possible of the old ones and develop new, more powerful types. For instance, the already-mentioned VX toxin, which is 45,000 times more toxic than phosgene.

Knowing fully well where "weakness" of the document lies, Kuntsevich has bypassed the Ministry of Ecology and the Ministry of Health. He even ignored the "special opinion" of the Russian Ministry of Security that "a decision on where to build and operate the facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons and on their transportation must be made only upon concurrence of local organs of power and the public." The head of the Saratov Oblast administration, Yuriy Belykh (whom Kuntsevich carelessly called Sedykh), was simply informed by an official letter from the latter that Shikhany was to be the site for the construction of facilities for processing and utilizing toxic substances.

Kuntsevich was 100 percent certain that he would succeed in his undertaking. After all, ignoring the fact that the document did not have attached to it a positive assessment by the state ecological expert commission, Ruslan Khasbulatov on 26 October 1992 passed the Supreme Soviet Presidium's decision on the Comprehensive Program, thereby de facto approving it. Two days earlier, the academician wrote a letter to the president: "Esteemed Boris

Nikolayevich! The work on the draft Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons has been completed. The draft has been submitted to the UN General Assembly for consideration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia reports that 138 states have declared their willingness to join the draft resolution as co-authors. So far Russia has not issued such a statement, which puts it in isolation and causes it to lose political points. Said delay is the result of the absence of the approval of the program of phased elimination of chemical weapons in Russia and its targeted financing.... A draft of this program has been developed...." And further on: "In the current situation it appears expedient to announce your approval in principle of this program...." On 10 November Yeltsin sends an official letter to Academician Kuntsevich and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev with a single word: "Agreed."

The "riot" was started by the regions. The Supreme Soviet of Chuvashia passed a decision to ban destruction of chemical weapons and placement of the corresponding facilities on its territory. In Udmurtia, residents of the city of Kambarka, where a supply of lewisite is stored, held protest rallies. The parliament of Tatarstan intends to ban transportation of chemical weapons through the territory of the republic. Deputies of the Volsk City Soviet object to turning Shikhany, Volsk, Rybnyy, and Balakovo into an immense testing site. This was the formal pretext for holding the hearings in the Russian parliament.

According to the conclusion of experts, Kuntsevich's program does not envisage the 15-kilometer sanitary-protection zones. It does not go into the issues of solid waste disposal. There is no risk assessment with respect to transportation of toxic substances by our already accident-prone railroads. It would also make sense to listen to the opinion of Stanislav Petrov, Russia's Chemical Troops chief, who believes that at this point we do not possess the technology for the safe destruction of chemical weapons. Finally, the program financing contains a rather strange ratio: The elimination of chemical weapons on the territory of Russia by itself is estimated to cost 340 billion rubles (in 1991 prices), while \$543 million is allocated for "inspection activities." At the same time, \$10 million could not be found to purchase imported devices to monitor the state of the environment. (For comparison: Americans estimate the cost of their program of destruction of chemical weapons at \$10 billion. Their inspection activities "cost" \$2 billion.)


Very soon, at the instigation of the military industry and with the blessing of the authorities, we could have our own chemical Chernobyl. And it is unlikely that Academician Kuntsevich would be held responsible. After all, at first glance his mission has such a peaceloving, almost Sakharov-like appearance, with the idea of saving humanity from self-destruction. The only difference is in the extent of the morality possessed by the persons in question, the sincerity of their motives. In his interview to ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA on 11 November of last year, Kuntsevich explains that despite the ban on chemical weapons, scientific research and testing in this field is permitted. Russia, he says, did not assume unilateral

obligations in this respect and is clean in the eyes of the world community. For all practical purposes, the academician thereby admits that he has been and remains a military man, whose thinking remains strictly within departmental boundaries. Two months later in Paris, however, the signing of an international convention banning the development of chemical weapons has begun. What will the general say now?

In the words of Doctor of Chemical Sciences Lev Fedorov, "We answer for our deeds not to the Americans but to our own future generations." [begin box]

MEGAPOLIS-EXPRESS DOSSIER

Anatoliy Kuntsevich, a lieutenant general, academician. Shikhany is where he started. For 10 years, he headed the TsNIIKKhV MO. His name is included in the Chemists Reference Book, which contains information on the leading world scientists. In 1987 he officially declared that production of chemical weapons in the USSR had been suspended. In 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev awarded him the Lenin Prize for the creation of binary chemical weapons—the most powerful in the world. Kuntsevich currently heads the Committee for Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention Problems under the president.



MEGAPOLIS-EXPRESS DOSSIER

Vladimir Petrenko, major (reserves). Having graduated in 1981 from the Saratov Chemical Protection Military School, he came to work for the TsNIIKHV MO. In the course of his service in the institute, was executive in charge and had conducted four state tests of experimental prototypes of means of decontamination and deactivation. For eight years worked in especially hazardous conditions. Currently a deputy of the Volsk City Soviet, chairman of the subcommission on ecology.[end box]

Russian CW Convention Acceptance Scored

PM0903100193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Mar 93 p 3

[Article by Viktor Kaysyn: "American Time Machine"]

[Text] The Convention on Chemical Weapons was adopted in Paris recently. A. Kozyrev was among the first to sign the document although Russia does not have a single establishment for the destruction of chemical weapons [CW]. The noble aspiration manifested in the convention could only be welcomed were it not for one "but": It would be a good idea to give technical backup to the very complex chemical-technological problem, since the destruction of chemical weapons could threaten Russia with ecological disasters.

But was there any need for such haste? Let's think. The 1925 Geneva protocol on banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons was ratified by the Soviet Union in April 1928. Two stipulations were made here. First, the USSR stated it did not consider itself bound by the Geneva protocol if it is a case of an armed conflict with a state which has not signed this document. Second, if chemical or bacteriological weapons are used against our country. Consequently the USSR at the time retained only the right to a retaliatory strike. The overwhelming majority (about 130) of the states acceded to the Geneva protocol with similar stipulations. Thus chemical weapons were excluded from the list of means of warfare. It is true that the protocol did not impose any restrictions on the production or accumulation of reserves and their stockpiling. For that reason many countries have such weapons, viewing them as a means of security, as a guarantee of the use of appropriate measures in response to enemy actions.

It may confidently be said that this factor has played its part. Since the Geneva protocol entered into force no widespread use of chemical weapons has been recorded in the world. Even Hitler did not resolve to resort to them, although Germany in the forties possessed large stocks of chemical weapons. Moreover, even then Germany had toxins like "tabun" and sarin had been synthesized under laboratory conditions and later "soman" was obtained—no one in the world had toxins of this kind.

Nor did the United States use chemical weapons during the Vietnam war. It is true that in Vietnam extensive use was made of temporarily incapacitating substances, so-called policing means, but they are a long way from

chemical weapons. Incidentally, the United States ratified the Geneva protocol only after the Vietnam war, in 1975.

As for the Soviet Union, it has never used chemical weapons anywhere.

In 1992 President B. Yeltsin stated that the Russian Federation renounces all stipulations made by the Soviet Union when signing the protocol in 1925. Consequently, Russia has ruled out chemical weapons from its arsenal of means of armed struggle. Incidentally, in 1987 our country completely stopped the production of these terrible weapons.

Well, it would seem that we can only rejoice, but what to do with what has already been produced? Destroy it, of course, but I repeat: This problem cannot be taken up suddenly. Even specialists find it hard to name a figure for expenditure on the destruction of chemical weapons, but according to their estimates excessive haste in destroying these weapons will cost the country five times more than their production. At 1991 figures that figure is set at 10 billion rubles, not counting expenditure on constructing the necessary establishments, and these funds have to be used not in the remote future sometime, as people try to persuade us, but as early as 1997. Will the empty Russian coffers withstand that? The reader knows the answer well.

But the United States will incur expenses on destruction, I hear the objection. That is true. But why does it welcome the convention as a national holiday? Count it up. The United States stopped the creation of its chemical weapons stocks in 1967 and has stockpiled about 30,000 tonnes. The USSR stopped in 1987, that is 20 years later. Consequently, U.S. shells have been in the depots for 26 years now. Over this time the systems for the use of shells have become obsolete and the guarantee term of their storage is running out. Sooner or later the question of their destruction had to arise. Incidentally, at one time Soviet specialists envied the Americans because the latter produced thin-walled shells, which made them light and large, and they contained twice as much chemical weapons as the Soviet shells.

Now history has dotted the "i's." The United States' thin-walled shells have been laying around for 26 years and their storage is becoming dangerous. The United States has set about matters without haste and in a considered manner: It has constructed the necessary establishments, adopted laws, and drafted technical documentation. Experimental installations have been created a long way from population centers, in Utah, and they have embarked on running in the technical process.

We can only bow down to such farsightedness on the part of the U.S. diplomats, who have been able to turn a domestic problem into a problem of international importance and achieve the signing of a convention, thus annulling the 1925 Geneva protocol and delivering a painful blow to the budgets of several states. It would seem that if the Geneva protocol were to be updated, if additional agreements on control and destruction were to be adopted with regard to it—then all would be well, as they say. The

world would be guaranteed against the use of chemical weapons. But the United States has had its problems—technical problems which have become political and international, that is, they have become our problems too.

In conclusion it should be noted that the convention is a document of 173 pages printed in small script. It contains everything relating to chemical weapons but contains no clear definition of what “the development of chemical weapons” means. On the other hand the terms “establishment for the production,” “organization for banning,” “processing,” and “consumption” are defined quite clearly.

The conclusion which one cannot help drawing in this connection is a frightening one: Existing stocks of obsolete chemical weapons will be subject to destruction yet the convention does not contain a word about the development of new ones! Perhaps precisely because under the convention only existing establishments for their storage, production, and destruction are inspected. In brief, present-day chemical weapons are inspected and that resolves the United States’ technical problems. While Russia—and not at the best time for it—has been brought up against problems which it would have had to find out about only in 2019.

In brief, it is surprising that the U.S. president has not rewarded all his diplomats and specialists who prepared the convention. And Minister Kozyrev too, “for services to America.” Actually, perhaps that is what he will do.

NUCLEAR-FREE & PEACE ZONES

Tatarstan Proclaimed Free of Mass Destruction Weapons

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0934 GMT 6 Mar 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Sorokin]

[Text] Kazan March 6 TASS—A session of the Tatar parliament ended its work with the adoption of a budget for the current year. President Mintimer Shaymiyev described it as “the creative regime budget,” which envisages a further development of agriculture, the stabilisation of industry, the speeding up of military conversion and reliable social protection of citizens.

People’s deputies adopted a special resolution, which proclaims Tatarstan a “zone free of mass destruction weapons”. The republic pledged neither to produce, nor to stockpile, nor to bring in mass destruction weapons, and to ban the transit transportation of chemical weapons across Tatarstan to the areas of their destruction.


The parliament decided as well to reorganise the state management system. For the first time ever, the republican Committees for Film-Making, and for the Affairs of Children and Young People, as well as Ministries of Communications and Ecology were created.

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