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# **Central Eurasia**

***Military Affairs***

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# Central Eurasia Military Affairs

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5 August 1992

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## CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

### Dubynin on 1981 Intervention Plans, Current Pullout Talks

92UM1309A Moscow NEW TIMES INTERNATIONAL  
in English No 27, Jul 92 pp 26-27

[Interview in Warsaw by NEW TIMES Warsaw correspondent Rudolf Borecki with Colonel-General Viktor Dubynin, Russian Armed Forces' chief of staff and First Deputy Defense Minister—date not given; first two paragraphs are NEW TIMES INTERNATIONAL introduction]

[Text] The Commander of the Northern Group troops of the CIS, Colonel-General Victor Dubynin, flew out of Warsaw newly assigned as the head of the Armed Forces Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defence of Russia. Before departing for Moscow he gave an interview to the NEW TIMES correspondent in Warsaw, Rudolf Borecki.

The last few weeks the name Victor Dubynin has appeared often in Polish newspapers. They pointed out that he stood out because of his decisiveness, good judgement, independent thinking and openness. Compared to the gray-green ranks of his faceless colleagues, the "general-occupier" began to seem remarkable to the Poles.

[NEW TIMES] I admit I'm at a loss as to how to address you: I don't think "Comrade General" is said any more—and I haven't got used to saying "Mr. General" yet. Can I just call you Victor Petrovich, like in civilian life?

General (laughs): Sure!

[N.T.] You've become a renowned person in Poland. And it's not at all typical for Poles to have anything good to say about a foreign occupying general. I think the main thing here was the courageous act of lifting the heavy curtain concealing the truth about 1981. What made you—the first and only one—to do so?

[Victor Dubynin] It should be said, first of all, that there were more and more attacks on the Polish leadership of that time, mainly on Wojciech Jaruzelski. It was as if he was the whole problem. The unfairness of the unfounded criticism of the Polish leadership is the first reason that compelled me to tell the truth. The second, and probably more important, was the desire to clear up the truth which had long been hushed up.

In 1981, the plan was that if the Polish leadership didn't do anything decisive in order to maintain the stability of the system and keep order in the country, then military measures would be resorted to. I'm not asserting here that military force would necessarily have been used. More likely the presence of the army alone was thought to be enough to stabilize the situation in the country. In other words, by the very fact of its being there...

[N.T.] On Polish territory?

[V.D.] Yes, on Polish territory... and not to allow the growing activity of Solidarnosc to change the existing system in a region that was strategically important to us.

[N.T.] What were you in the army at that time?

[V.D.] I was the commander of a tank division in the Belarus Military District which was stationed not far from Minsk.

[N.T.] As commander of a division, did you receive any orders, instructions or at least signals about the preparation of military operations against Poland?

[V.D.] (he thinks the question over and doesn't say anything for quite a while). Well, I think the time has come to tell about it. Preparations were under way. The division was getting ready. Moreover, I myself did the planning... At any rate, the array of the units, their organization and path of advance were worked out. For my division too. I knew the assignment, I knew those regions where we would go and I knew all the populated areas which we were to occupy.

[N.T.] Where would you have been? Where would your tanks have gone?

[V.D.] An area southward of Warsaw.

[N.T.] The acknowledgement that the Soviet Union planned a large-scale operation to pacify Poland (in the spirit of the "fraternal assistance" which was shown to Czechoslovakia in 1968) costs dearly. For this is not a rumour, but the word of a direct participant, who worked out the plan and would have carried it out. The conception of "limited sovereignty" of the countries of the socialist bloc in 1981 would have inevitably led to a bloody tragedy. Knowing Poland and the Poles, I can say that without any reservations. Let's get back to the current problems. All are interested in your recent visit to President Lech Walesa. What did you discuss with him?

[V.D.] We talked about how to withdraw all of the troops from Poland. In the course of signing a package of documents in Moscow concerning military affairs, documents that had already been initialled by the way, an absolutely unforeseen circumstance arose.

[N.T.] You have in mind the coded message Lech Walesa received from the former prime minister Jan Olszewski just a couple of hours before he was to sign the agreement...

[V.D.] The message contained a demand to change some points concerning finances in the joint protocol...

[N.T.] According to the Polish press, President Walesa's visit to Moscow was almost cancelled on account of it...

[V.D.] Yes, the divergence between the document that was to be signed and the demands of the prime minister was very great. The new version which the Polish side hurriedly proposed was; I could say, not in our interests.

The Russian side, especially President Yeltsin, manifesting good will, was ready to make concessions, actually big concessions in order to sign all the treaties, including the documents about the army. But, and I think this is important, the Polish side assured us that it would assist in every possible way to create a good climate for withdrawal of the army and for the resettlement of the soldiers. President Walesa told me that he would go to the rich West and hold out his hat in order to get the money for the construction of housing for our soldiers. And Poland would provide the work force and the building materials. The President assured us that not one soldier leaving Poland would have to live in a tent or train car.

We also asked that a number of objects that we were vacating be made afterwards into joint Polish-Russian enterprises, and the revenues from their safe and consequent activity be used to build housing. This point was also in the initialled document. But this was what the prime minister was objecting to in the coded message to Lech Walesa. Therefore I had made a visit to the President to clear up all these knotty issues. The hour-long talk was friendly, President Walesa understood our doubts and assured us that he would do everything so that not a single soldier of ours thought badly about Poland and the Polish people. Lech Walesa promised our President just as he had told me during our meeting in Belweder, that he would do everything in his power to facilitate creating joint enterprises and not only on the territories where our military bases had been, but all over Poland, especially where there was a work force.

[N.T.] You, as the Polish mass media noted, apologized to the President for 4-odd decades of our military presence...

[V.D.] The Polish press somewhat twisted my words. In some papers I read that General Dubynin had come to President Walesa in order to apologize for our troops being there for 47 years... The goal of my visit, as I have already said, was not that. Actually, the President urged me to make a statement to the Polish people. And I was totally sincere when I said: "When the last soldier leaves Poland, the Russian side can say only one thing—thanks, dear citizens of Poland, for putting up with us for 47 years. Over that long time there were good moments, but there were also tragic ones: highway incidents, accidental explosions, aircraft falls, polluted land and forest fires. A lot happened, so thank you for being so patient." That's what I really said.

[N.T.] What's your mood now as you return home?

[V.D.] I thank the President of Russia for having so much faith in me. Now my task is to create a new structure of the Armed Forces Staff in a short time. It won't be large, but it must be powerful, functional and contemporary. It must work out the new military doctrine of the Russian state and the conception of a new army as soon as possible. Our army mustn't be a burden on the country or the people. And at the same time, the

people should be confident that the army is capable of defending them from any aggressor. Though we don't see any state as having aggressive intentions towards us now, the army, as an attribute of the state and its defender, must remain at a very high level. Then it is possible to talk with any state as an equal. However, some politicians abroad now treat us as a second- and even third-rate nation.

[N.T.] If you don't mind, I have one last question. What do you think the fate of the Chief Intelligence Department (GRU) should be? As far as I know, it was very active, especially in times of peace.

[V.D.] I think that the GRU should remain. As long as there is an army, it should have its own intelligence service. We must be on top of things. We should know about the army in any state, and what it is doing, and if it is poised, then against whom? We mustn't allow a 1941.

#### Report on Experimental Women's Army Company *92UM1305A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jul 92 First edition p 4*

[Article by Major Aleksandr Zotov: A Women's Company: Still Experimental; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] In existence since the spring of 1990 is the suburban Moscow Warrant Officer School, an experimental women's company which is the only one of its kind in the Russian Armed Forces. Our correspondents spent some time in the subunit. Their report follows.

We entered the company area. The first thing we noticed was the exceptional cleanliness of the barracks. We saw several women there. Some were wearing athletic clothing, others, a robe, watching television. They were enjoying their scheduled free time. They live in rooms, with three or four beds to each room. They use a kitchen provided with electric ranges and refrigerators. The women are granted a short mandatory leave on Saturdays and Sundays; otherwise, everything else is the same as that in the case of men.

In the gymnastics section we saw something quite unusual: a member of the "weak" sex was training her biceps on an exercise machine. Incidentally, this is an activity for devotees. In addition to that, there are timed cross-country running, drill, and daily details for everyone.

"It takes all the energy out of us," said Private L. Krasnoutsckaya. "On our free time we sleep as much as we can, instead of going somewhere."

What is it that attracts the girls to difficult military labor? The students said that they like the romance of the service, the settled way of life, and the chance of acquiring a career. A number of them make no secret of

the fact that they are swayed by the economic advantages. After all, each student is paid about 4,000 rubles, with other guaranteed benefits, and this on the threshold of the coming unemployment the country is to suffer.

Yes, members of the fair sex are becoming more numerous in the Armed Forces. According to comments made by troops in field units, the women are remarkable for their high sense of responsibility, attention to detail, and punctuality. We heard the same kind of comment made by Lieutenant-Colonel S. Kirillov, chief of the school, in speaking about his students:

"They make better progress than our men; there are also more category-rated specialists. The women often spend their free time in the evenings studying on their own initiative."

There are valid reasons for the increasing suggestions relative to reestablishing women's subunits, which were abolished in the past. However, this idea does have quite a few opponents, such as persons concerned with morality in military collectives. Sergey Petrovich explained the situation:

"Anything can and does happen, of course. However, my young ladies typically do not engage in immoral behavior. What comes naturally should not be an object of shame. For example, we have five to eight women get married in the training period (six months). We recently had two women become pregnant. We were forced to drop them from the rolls, of course."

The uniformed young ladies graduating from the school are sent to serve in communications troops in all branches of the Armed Forces, particularly the Ground Troops, stationed in highly varied areas. Virtually all of them are offered their choice of assignment.

As we can see, the women's company experiment is a success. But it has remained as an experiment for two years. The obstacle here is the absence of official endorsement. In fact, we have yet to see a single document rendering service by women official. No mention is made of this in the regulations on warrant officer schools and service proper.

Knowledge of the important role played by females in military service in Western countries is widespread. It is sufficient to say that in the USA there are more than 220,000, with 34,000 of the latter holding officer status. In our Armed Forces, there are only a few hundred female officers, while Army and Navy warrant officers number about 17,000 total.

This is obviously something to think about.

## CIS:POLICY

### Shaposhnikov Describes Proposed Main Command Structure

*92UM1285A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Jul 92 Evening Edition p 2*

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Viktor Litovkin: "The Joint Armed Forces Main Commissariat Keeps No Secrets From Us"]

[Text] The Agreement on Organizing the Activity of the Commonwealth Combined Armed Forces Main Command was approved among other very important documents at a session of the Council of Heads of CIS Member States. Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov told about it at a meeting with journalists. IZVESTIYA received a detailed diagram of the Main Commissariat organization.

The Council of Heads of State, to which the CinC CIS Combined Armed Forces, Council of Heads of Governments and Council of Ministers of Defense are subordinate, became its supreme political entity. Ministers of defense are deputy commanders-in-chief of the Combined Armed Forces. These people will develop and implement Commonwealth military policy; develop and realize a collective security concept, military doctrine and nuclear strategy; and resolve other military organizational development problems.

In Marshal Shaposhnikov's words, the Glavkomat's [Main Command's] primary mission will be to ensure reliable, centralized command and unified control of strategic forces on the territory of four independent states, to upgrade their structures, and to fulfill the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty.

What Glavkomat entities will carry out this mission above all? They are the Nuclear Planning Committee, which includes the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff of the CIS Combined Armed Forces, the Commander of Strategic Forces, and the ministers of defense of the countries on whose territory nuclear weapons are located as well as of those states which signed the Collective Security Treaty. And of course, the task of centralized command and control of the Strategic Forces will be accomplished by their Commander, General of the Army Yuriy Maksimov.

The Strategic Missile Troops, the Aviation and the Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces, the Missile Space Defense Forces, Directorates of the Chief of Space Forces, the 12th Main Directorate (nuclear-technical affairs), as well as strategic and operational intelligence personnel and equipment are subordinate to General Maksimov. By the way, as Marshal Shaposhnikov stated in response to a question from the IZVESTIYA military reviewer, despite existing differences, strategic missile units located on the territory of Ukraine are under

Moscow's centralized control, although this does not signify that they are "closed" to leaders of the sovereign state.

Another very important mission of the CIS Combined Armed Forces Glavkomat will be to take coordinated, timely steps to prevent local conflicts on outer CIS borders and within the CIS. Special forces are being established for this. Their makeup and structure still have to be approved at a meeting of ministers of defense, ministers of foreign affairs, and commanders of Border Guard Troops planned for 16 July in Tashkent. But their Commander already is known today—he is Deputy CinC CIS Combined Armed Forces Colonel-General Boris Pyankov. Their first area of employment also is known—Pridnestrovye.

The CIS Combined Armed Forces' Staff above all will handle coordination of efforts by Commonwealth leaders to ensure collective security, Armed Forces reform, development of basic doctrinal provisions and development of recommendations for the Council of Heads of State. The staff's makeup will include the Committee of Chiefs of Staff of Commonwealth States, Military Force Generation and Armed Forces Training, Military-Technical, Manpower Acquisition and Cadres, and Rear Service Support committees also will work on these same problems.

It is common knowledge that Colonel-General Viktor Samsonov has been approved as CIS Combined Armed Forces Chief of Staff. A number of directorates and

sectors are subordinate to him, among them Operational; Organizational-mobilization; Information-intelligence; Communications, Automatic Command and Control Equipment, and Electronic Warfare; Operational Rear Services and Transport Movements...


A Servicemen's Rights Committee, which is the reorganized Coordinating Committee of the Officer Conferences, also will be part of the CIS Combined Armed Forces Glavkomat. A Press Center, Public Information Center, and other services also are provided; one can become familiar with them from the diagram.

The main question is the Glavkomat's numerical strength. In the experts' words, it does not exceed a figure of 300 officers. To be more exact, 29 generals, 253 officers, 19 warrant officers, and 85 workers and employees will serve in it, a total of around 400 persons.

These figures naturally are not comparable with the numerical strength of the former USSR Ministry of Defense. The count there was hundreds of generals and several thousand officers. It is difficult to compare the present Glavkomat even with the command element of the Moscow or Belorussian districts, where there were 2-2.5 times more officers and 3-4 times more employees. Even the command element of the former Warsaw Pact, in whose building on Leningradskiy prospekt the CIS Combined Armed Forces headquarters now is located, was approximately twice the size of the Glavkomat.

It would appear that the present Glavkomat structure can be deemed optimum and flexible, but it is still early to judge the effectiveness of its work. Time will give an assessment of it.

CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES





**CIS: GROUND TROOPS**

**Communicators: In Order to Withstand Enemy Electronic Surveillance**

924C1783A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK  
in Russian No 5, May 91 pp 59-62

[Article by Reserve Lieutenant Colonel N. Domnitskiy: "Communicators: In Order to Withstand Enemy Electronic Surveillance"]

[Text] Experience indicates that, while deploying communications hubs and microwave-relay and tropospheric communications links, communicators frequently select positions for transmitters without considering the screening properties of the terrain. It happens that transmitters operate at full power without a special need. And due to these omissions, the enemy, using electronic surveillance systems with sufficiently high accuracy, can easily discover the deployment location of the command post. Judge for yourself.

We all know: the antenna radiation patterns of microwave-relay transmitters and tropospheric scatter transmitters have a quite significant level not only of the main but also of the side and rear lobes. Consequently, if you do not take effective protection measures, the probability of detection of a transmitter by its electromagnetic radiation is substantially increased.


You can "deceive" enemy electronic surveillance by skillfully selecting positions for radiating devices. Then the level of the antenna radiation pattern's rear and side lobes will be decreased. Furthermore, you need to use (where this is possible) reduced (optimal) transmitter output. Of course, while observing the assigned standards for circuit noise protection of a specific terminal device. This article is about how best to do that.

When the enemy is conducting electronic surveillance from aircraft, our transmitter's signal level at his receiver's point of entry is changed by the random law. Therefore, direction finding of transmitters based on their emissions is probabilistic in nature and obeys the well-known Laplace's Law of Functions (See Fig. 1).

$$P_d = P\left(\frac{P_c}{P_m} > K\right) = F\left(x = \frac{Z - \Delta Z - K}{\sigma_z}\right) \quad (1)$$

where

Figure 1.



$P_c$  is the probability of detection of the transmitter's electromagnetic radiation;

$x$  is the argument of the Laplace's function  $F(x)$ ;

$Z = P_c - P_m$  is the variance of signal and noise levels at the electronic surveillance receiver's point of entry, in decibels;

$\Delta Z$  is the additional reduction of the signal level due to the utilization of terrain screening features or the reduction of transmitter output, in decibels;

$K$  is the required increase of the signal level over the noise level in the receiver being used for direction finding. Normally  $K = 10$  db;

$\sigma_z$  is the root-mean-square signal deviation at the receiver point of entry (statistically defined,  $\sigma_z = 10$  db).

Figure 2. Radio Relay Transmitter Antenna Radiation Pattern Main Lobe





Figure 3. Radio Relay Transmitter—Probability of Detection of Side Lobes and Rear Lobe



In turn, the variance in signal and noise levels is determined according to the formula

$$P_o - P_m = 10 \lg P_{nep} - G_{nep} - G_{np} - \eta_{nep} - \eta_{np} - 122 - 20 \lg \frac{L_p}{\lambda} - P_m, (2)$$

where  $P_{nep}$  is the microwave-relay (tropospheric) transmitter output, in watts;

$G_{nep}$ ,  $G_{np}$  are the antenna gain coefficients for the microwave-relay (tropospheric) transmitter and the electronic surveillance receiver, in decibels;

$\eta_{nep}$ ,  $\eta_{np}$ —microwave-relay (tropospheric) transmitter and electronic surveillance receiver waveguide interference, in decibels;

$L_p$  is the distance at which electronic surveillance is being conducted, in kilometers;

$\lambda$ —microwave-relay (tropospheric) transmitter wavelength, in centimeters;

$P_m$  noise level at the electronic surveillance receiver point of entry which is determined by an expression in decibels.

$$P_m = -204 + 10 \lg \Delta f n (3)$$

where  $\Delta f$  is the frequency spectrum, in hertz;  $n$  is the receiver noise coefficient.

The receiver noise level, calculated according to formula 3, is normally in the range of -135 ÷ -150(db) and will be used that way in calculations in the future.

Program 1

Address	Command	Code	Address	Command	Code	Address	Command	Code
00	Π→x0	60	12	—	11	24	—	11
01	Flg	17	13	Π→x5	65	25	Π→x7	67
02	1	01	14	Π→x6	66	26	—	11
03	0	00	15	÷	13	27	Π→x8	68
04	x	12	16	Flg	17	28	—	11
05	Π→x1	61	17	2	02	29	Π→xA	6—
06	+	10	18	0	00	30	—	11
07	Π→x2	62	19	x	12	31	Π→X9	69
08	+	10	20	1	01	32	÷	13
09	Π→x3	63	21	2	02	33	S/P	50
10	—	11	22	2	02	34	BP	51
11	Π→x4	64	23	+	10	35	00	00

It is advisable to carry out the computation of the argument of Laplace function  $F(x)$  for determining the probability of detecting a transmitter's electromagnetic radiation ( $P_o$ ) using the MK-52, MK-56, or MK-61 microcalculators according to formulas 1 or 2 in the following sequence:

—press the "F" and "PRG" keys, enter Program 1 and then press the "F", "AVT" and "V/O" keys;

—enter the initial data:  $P_{nep}$  "x→Π" 0;  $G_{nep}$  "x→Π" 1;  $G_{np}$  "x→Π" 2;  $\eta_{nep}$  "x→Π" 3;  $\eta_{np}$  "x→Π" 4;  $L_p$  "x→Π" 5;  $\lambda$  "x→Π" 6;  $P_m$  "x→Π" 7;  $K$  "x→Π" 8;  $\sigma_z$  "x→Π" 9;  $\Delta Z$  "x→Π" A;

—press the S/P key, and record the results of the computations (the value of  $x$ ).

If new data have appeared, you only need to perform the two last items. Then determine the probability of detection ( $P_o$ ) of the transmitter's radiation using the found argument of  $x$  using the graph in Figure 1. Let's demonstrate this using this example.

Graphs of the probability of detection of the radiation of microwave-relay transmitters with a low number of channels are presented in Figures 2 and 3. Take the initial data:  $P_{nep} = 50$  watts,  $G_{nep} = 10$  db ( $G_{nep}$  BL [side

lobes] = -5 db,  $G_{nep}$  ZL [rear lobe] = -11 db);  $G_{np}$  = 5 db;  $\eta_{nep}$  = 3 db;  $\eta_{np}$  = 1 db;  $\lambda$  = 170 cm;  $P_m$  = -144 db.

Here the distance at which the electronic surveillance is being conducted and the additional reduction of the signal level due to the screening impact of the terrain or to reduction of the transmitter output are the variables. Let's consider that  $L_p$  = 60 kilometers and  $\Delta Z$  = 30 db.

To check the accuracy of the operation of Program 1, let's input numerical values of the found values and as a result, we will obtain the argument  $x = 1.9$ .  $P_e = F(1.9) = 0.97$  corresponds to it on the graph (see Figure 1).

Figure 4. Tropospheric Transmitter Antenna Radiation Pattern Main Lobe






Figure 5. Tropospheric Transmitter—Probability of Detection of Side Lobes and Rear Lobe



We can determine the probability of detection of the radiation of a tropospheric transmitter if we use the graphs which are depicted in Figures 4 and 5, and take the following constant initial data:

$P_{nep}$  = 600 watts;  $G_{nep}$  = 38 db ( $G_{nep}$  BL = 0.5 db,  $G_{nep}$  ZL = -4 db);  $G_{np}$  = 20 db;  $\eta_{nep}$  = 3 db;  $\eta_{np}$  = 3 db;  $\lambda$  = 7 cm;  $P_m$  = -140 db.

The calculation of the screening action of the terrain on the operation of radiating devices may introduce some difficulties. Therefore, Let's examine that issue in more detail.

We all know that the additional interference that terrain can introduce is calculated according to the formula

$\Delta Z = 7(1+V)$ , where  $0V \leq 2 \cdot 12.95 + 20 \lg V$  with  $V_2$ , (4) where parameter

$$V = \Delta h \sqrt{\frac{2(D_1 + D_2)}{\lambda D_1 D_2}}; \quad (5)$$

$\Delta h$ —is the height of the screening obstacle from the level of the height of the microwave-relay (tropospheric) transmitter antenna to its peak, in meters;

$D_1$ —is the distance from the transmitter antenna to the peak of the obstacle, in meters;

$D_2$ —is the distance from the peak of the obstacle to its base, in meters; and,

$\lambda$ —is the transmitter wavelength, in meters.

The initial data for calculating the parameter  $V$  is determined according to a topographical map while selecting the microwave-relay (tropospheric) transmitter position and does not cause any particular difficulties (See Figure 6). We must note that a forest is an obstacle for radio waves if it is thick and is several hundred meters long. For example, the interference it introduces at the frequencies of 200, 1,000, 3,000 (MHz) totals 0.08,

0.25, 0.5 (db per meter), respectively. In winter, the forest tract decreases its impact by approximately a factor of two.

It takes a considerable amount of time to manually calculate the value for  $\Delta Z$  according to formulas 4 and 5. Therefore, we suggest using a microcalculator for which Program 2 has been prepared.

Programming and calculating on a PMK (programmable microcalculator) is conducted as follows:

—press the “F” and “PRG” keys, input Program 2, and then press the “F”, “AVT”, and “V/O” keys;

—enter the initial data:  $D_1$  “x→Π” 1;  $D_2$  “x→Π” 2;  $\Delta h$  “x→Π” A;  $\lambda$  “x→Π” B;—press the S/P key and record the result of the computations.

To enter new data, you need to carry out the operations, beginning with the 2nd item.

Program 2

Address	Command	Code	Address	Command	Code	Address	Command	Code
00	Π→x1	61	14	x→ΠO	40	28	Flg	17
01	Π→x2	62	15	2	02	29	2	02
02	+	10	16	—	11	30	0	00
03	2	02	17	Fx0	51	31	x	12
04	x	12	18	27	27	32	1	01
05	Π→xV	6L	19	Π→x0	60	33	2	02
06	Π→x1	61	20	1	01	34	.	0—
07	x	12	21	+	10	35	9	09
08	Π→x2	62	22	7	07	36	5	05
09	x	12	23	x	12	37	+	10
10	÷	13	24	S/P	50	38	S/P	50
11	F square root symbol	21	25	BP	51	39	BP	51
12	Π→xA	6—	26	00	00	40	00	00
13	x	12	27	Π→x0	60			

In order to become convinced of the accuracy of the operation of Program 2, you can, by way of illustration, insert the following numerical values:

$D_1 = 200$  meters;  $D_2 = 100$  meters;  $\Delta h = 65$  meters; and,  $\lambda = 0.07$  meters.

The microcalculator must produce the result— $\Delta Z = 45.5$  db.

In conclusion, we must point out that, while using this method and while proceeding from the specific technical data of microwave-relay and tropospheric transmitters, and also of the terrain, we can calculate beforehand and construct a graph to determine the probability of detecting radiation from communications systems. During field exercises, we need to strive to the maximum extent possible to reduce transmitters  $P_e$ . However, it is important to remember: we need to use the results of the calculations carefully and not to the detriment of communications support.

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**Telegraphic Communications Center in Operation**  
92UM1224A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK  
in Russian No 9, Sep 91 pp 68-70

[Article by Guards Captain Yu. Pyatkin, Baltic Military District]

[Text] “Comrade Guards Warrant Officer! Why is there still no communications with the Don signal center?” The voice of communications duty officer Guards Major A. Nikiforov sounded dry and irritated. Equipment van chief A. Polishchuk was an experienced specialist, but Nikiforov’s question took him aback. It seemed he had done everything as prescribed in working up the telegraph channel and had turned it over for operation on time. But that’s what happens.

Aleksandr called up the telegrapher over loudspeaker communications and here learned there was communications with the subscriber, but of poor quality. That meant it was impossible to transmit the simulated combat load—there could be distortion of characters, particularly digital characters, on reception. Polishchuk did not begin lecturing the young soldier who had not reported the trouble to him on time. He quickly took the channel for a local check and saw there was great distortion.

He queried the radio operators—everything was normal with them. Then Polishchuk realized that the ET1-69 electronic telegraph meter probably was at fault. Precisely—one of its switches was not in the necessary position. After putting it in place and adjusting the channel, the equipment van chief reported to Major

Nikiforov that communications with the Don signal center was stable. He also mentioned the mistake which had been made.

It is not the first year I have commanded a telegraphic communications center. Some experience in operating it has been gained in performing various combat training tasks. It is about this I will try to tell.

It is common knowledge that successful operation of the telegraphic communications center depends largely on its placement on the terrain. We use linear and nonlinear methods of deploying the center (depending on situation and relief). We prefer the latter, in which revealing signs of the signal center as a whole and the telegraphic communications center in particular strike the eye least. At the same time, it is possible to make maximum use of protective features of the terrain and preclude destruction of a large number of equipment vans with one munition.

True, with a nonlinear disposition of equipment vans, the distance between groups of vehicles is rather great. This means there has to be more connecting cable as well.

But that is not yet everything. In connection with a transfer of the subscriber net to a four-wire arrangement, the length of lines also increased, which required an increased amount of lead-in/junction cable and consequently more time to deploy the telegraphic communications center. But here too there is a solution: first, optimum placement of equipment vans and groups with respect to each other; second, replacement of several low-capacity cables such as PTRK 5x2 and PTRK 10x2 with one of greater capacity (PTRK 20x2) between equipment vans and on certain links; and third, developing and introducing a timetable for performing a job sequence.

I usually receive the mission to set up the telegraphic communications center from the signal center chief after the column arrives in the designated area, but it also happens where I receive it by radio during the march. On site it remains only to clarify boundaries for positioning equipment vans.

Then I assign the task to my subordinates. I hand equipment van chiefs diagram-orders and indicate the variant for positioning equipment vans; directions for routing lead-in, junction, subscriber and power cables; locations of other signal center elements, and other matters. After all appointed persons precisely understand the mission received I report the work that has been done to the signal center chief.

At the "Begin deployment!" signal given by the signal center chief, equipment vans move up to indicated places from the column and personnel begin work with weapons and protective gear. They fulfill different narrative problems in the course of the work.

It should be noted that all soldiers take part in setting up the telegraphic communications center. Since we too have had a chronic shortage of personnel lately, it is necessary for both officers and warrant officers to perform tasks not inherent to them. Today there is simply no other solution. The amount of work is rather great, and so in practices each specialist not only rehearses his own operations, but also masters related ones, which is very difficult to do. On the other hand, subordinates successfully cope with assigned tasks in exercises. In particular, senior commanders have noted more than once the confident actions of guardsmen Senior Warrant Officer V. Onishchuk, Warrant Officer A. Polishchuk, Senior Sergeant G. Kulishov, sergeants G. Gevorkyan and V. Danilov, and privates A. Vashchenko, S. Vyan-skul, D. Gurtovoy, N. Korotkin and others.

The following amount of work is usually done in deploying equipment vans: auger-type grounds are prepared; line lead-ins are prepared for receiving circuits and communications lines, figuring on full capacity; junction, keying and subscriber lines and power cables are deployed and rung through; and distribution panels are prepared for operation. Then motors are started on the power-supply sets and voltage is supplied to the equipment vans; power is connected and the apparatus and measuring devices are tested locally; channels are tuned and adjusted, then handed over (or received) for operation; and necessary documentation is kept.

Here it is apropos to direct attention to the following point. If one takes a careless attitude toward the operation of evaluating and testing electrical cable, subsequently the entire telegraphic communications center can be de-energized. For example, driver-electrician Private S. Buglak once connected power cables from the equipment vans to the distribution panels without having checked them. After some time one of the cables "shorted out."

Furthermore, it sometimes happens that one of the telegraphers or special gear technicians adjusts the telegraph sets, for example, in an inferior way out of negligence, and it is necessary to spend valuable time remedying the mistakes made when the need arises to transmit messages. It would appear that the most important operations must be monitored either by combat post chiefs or by officers.

Communications with subscribers is established at the command of the signal center duty officer according to diagram-orders present at the telegraphic communications center and at each combat post. Taking into account that this phase is very complex, I usually direct actions of combat post duty team members right from the P-245 telegraph distributing frame. From here it is possible not only to monitor how things are going for subordinates, but also to check channel quality. It is no simple matter to cope with this work due to its large volume. By the way, judge for yourselves.

As an example let us consider the scheme for passage of a telegraph channel formed with the help of radio-relay equipment (see figure). After setting up communications with the subscriber, the radio-relay station technician turns over the broadband channel to the P-303 OB multiplexing gear. Audio frequency channels are formed here. One of them (tested and adjusted) is passed over to the telegraph distributing frame. Then it goes through the switching unit to the P-327 secondary multiplexing gear, where it is converted to a telegraph channel and is again turned over to the terminal gear through the switching unit.


Thus there are many places where additional distortion can enter a channel. It can even simply "break" because of incorrect distributing frame connections and not reach its destination. To prevent this, each specialist is obligated to act competently and attentively at his combat post.

Much also depends on duty officers of component centers at a signal center, for in case of any hitches in constituting a particular channel, they above all are obligated to quickly estimate the situation and find the sections in which a malfunction is possible.

In my view, organization of duty plays a role of no small importance in the functioning of a telegraphic communications center. Because of today's personnel shortage we are barely recruiting soldiers for two shifts. They perform duty based on demands of the corresponding manual. I would like to note that lately we have been using duty team member instructions of a somewhat different form than is recommended for us (see below). What the soldier is to do, such as in receiving telegraph information, is written out by minutes and seconds. This helps him act quickly and confidently in a particular situation.

In conclusion I will note that for now not everything is going smoothly for us in handing over communications from one position to another and in displacing from one area to another, and management of the telegraphic communications center is being resolved with difficulty. We hope articles on these problems will appear in VOYENNNY VESTNIK.

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
**EXTRACT**

from instructions to BP-120 duty team member (variant)

**In receiving important telegraphic information**

On receiving a proposal from the subscriber station to support receipt of important telegraphic information:

1. Turn on automatic attachment on receiving telegraph set.  
Turn on signal for upcoming receipt of especially important telegraphic information.
2. Transmit confirmation to subscriber station on readiness to receive telegraphic information.
3. Ensure receipt of telegraphic information.  
Paste up tape with address and indicator groups of telegraphic information on blank sheet.
4. Check quality of perforated tape.
5. Transmit confirmation on receipt time of telegraphic information to subscriber station.  
Turn on signal for end of reception of important telegraphic information.
6. Fill out telegraphic information sheet.
7. Make entry in operator log about receipt of telegraphic information.
8. See that filled-in sheet with perforated tape of telegraphic information is delivered to traffic office (or to the transmission link)

**Development of Command and Control Systems**

92UM1224B Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK  
in Russian No 9, Sep 91 pp 78-81

[Part III of article from foreign press materials by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Murakhovskiy under rubric "Military Affairs Abroad"]

[Text]

**Part III. Attention to Small Subunits**

In the opinion of western military experts, the ground forces opposing each other in the center of Europe have been undergoing substantial changes since the late 1970's. First of all, the main burden of organizing and conducting combined-arms combat has shifted from division to brigade level and partially also to the battalion level. Secondly, there is a growing number of

subordinate subunits in all command and control entities. Consequently, organizing interworking among them becomes more complicated.

The Bundeswehr was the pioneer among European armies in restructuring the troop organizational structure in accordance with new demands. It is common knowledge that the concept it adopted of establishing mixed subunits initially generated an ambivalent reaction in NATO partners, but in the opinion of the Bundeswehr command, it is already clear now that these structures have withstood the test of time and fully justified themselves. At the same time, their introduction engendered problems in command and control of the mixed personnel and equipment which appeared in small subunits.

Thus, the German specialists' view on armed forces development differs somewhat from the opinion of their American colleagues. Its essence can be expressed by the slogan: "Attention to small subunits." The Bundeswehr

believes that the automated command and control systems (HEROS, ACCS and so on) which are operational or are being developed are oriented toward use only on brigade, division and corps staffs. Therefore, fire support, intelligence and other subsystems included in them support receipt and processing of data "within themselves," so to speak, but the information goes to subunits by the traditional method.

The situation really has changed little up to now in battalions, companies and platoons: as before, the majority of situation data is collected independently, usually within the bounds of an area limited to line-of-sight. Some experts view further development of the table of organization structure of troops and military equipment in an inseparable link with an improvement in controllability. This should not be understood only as a strengthening of control. The principal task is to ease the commander's work in receiving, processing and distributing information. A cost-effectiveness analysis shows that investments in this component lead to a growth of combat might enormously swifter than investments in other components (mobility, fire plan and so on).

Decentralization is the leading direction of the new view of automated command and control systems. It implies that the subunit commander must obtain information directly from primary sources operating in his zone of responsibility without awaiting it from the senior commander. Above all this relates to data on the enemy, terrain, weather, friendly forces' makeup and methods of operations, and command and control equipment.

War experience shows that messages transmitted in battle often are erroneous, incomplete, obsolete and even unreliable, and the military hierarchy often is violated in planning. As a result, weapons are positioned where their firepower is effective without regard to convenience of command and control. But interworking of mixed forces above all requires precise coordination of fire and maneuver. Up until now this has been done by radio, telephone, sound and optical communications. Technical command and control equipment reflects the alignment of troop structures, and as a result coordination communications is at the very least unreliable.

Now it is obvious that command and control based on personal observation and a handwritten order is obsolete. Use of radio communication also appears problematical in maneuverable, fluid battle. Studies in Bundeswehr exercises have shown that 80-90 percent of overall traffic time on battalion and company commanders' radio nets is taken up by callsigns, pauses, repetitions and confirmations.


The IFIS (Integriertes Führungs-und-Informationssystem)—integrated command and control and information system—is being developed in the FRG to fundamentally improve the situation involving automation in subunits; its basic elements are shown in Fig. 1. It is intended for mechanized, tank and antitank forces. In

developing specifications for the IFIS they proceeded from the fact that in battle the platoon, company or battalion commander in an IFV (tank, ATGM system) often has to simultaneously transmit his own instructions, receive an order from the senior commander and control the crew. In addition to this, it is vitally important to exchange information with neighbors, with troops operating ahead, and with aircraft and artillery.


Using navigation gear based on laser gyroscopes, the system permits accurately determining the fighting vehicle location, movement direction, surveillance sector and sector of fire. The display shows the tactical situation, terrain, target coordinates, and textual and graphic messages (see Fig. 2). The laser rangefinder serves the fire control system, navigation gear and display. The electronic unit processes all incoming and outgoing information. Radio communications basically operate in a data communication mode (digital messages).

IFIS operation is organized in two modes. In the first—"situation"—the commander controls fire and maneuver. For example, in a fire concentration it is enough for the platoon commander to mark the target on the display and press the button with the "concentration" symbol. Data automatically go to the other tanks or IFV's, their weapons are laid in the direction indicated, and range of fire is input to the sights. Fire distribution, transfer and so on are done in a similar manner. These same data can be transmitted to the senior commander or directly to artillery subunits.

The situation is estimated and further actions are planned in the "terrain" mode. The digital (electronic) map permits setting any scale and showing terrain passability for specific equipment, dead ground, concealed approaches and much more. Data on the enemy and friendly forces are plotted on it to the full extent or only in the subunit's zone of responsibility.








An electro-optical all-around observation system (day and night modes) is situated in the upper part of the display. Target designation commands, direction of advance and so on are output to that system's field of view.

The automated command and control system in question functions in separate data communication nets of platoon, company and battalion (see Fig. 3). To avoid duplication, the principle of exchanging data "on request" is used. In other words, not all information goes to the higher commander, but only that which he determines to be necessary. In addition, those data are transmitted from the subunit which are deemed necessary. Coordination communications is organized among adjacent subunits and combat arms and those operating in front. In the assessments of German military specialists, full IFIS deployment with the troops will occur no earlier than the year 2000.

#### Automation of the soldier?

It is of course not a question of introducing electrodes to the brain or of genetic breeding of killer robots, as modern science fiction depicts it. Automation at the



level of the individual soldier is based on the latest achievements of technology.

In particular, the United States is continuing to develop improved arms and gear for the infantryman under a program adopted in 1989. The principal tasks are to improve the "capability to kill" as well as "the soldier's survivability and effectiveness on the battlefield." A qualitatively new approach to creating small arms and individual electronic equipment is envisaged.

A prototype of the set is known as IIFS (Integrated Infantry Fighting System). It includes individual modular apparatus, arms and gear for fighting and protection (see Fig. 4). A microprocessor and the display it services are the principal element in the new development (see Fig. 5).

Thus in the not-too-distant future the American soldier will be able to independently maintain radio communications, receive target designations in an automated mode, record reconnaissance information on a video tape recorder and transmit it, and lay weapons on a laser beam essentially without aiming (as usually understood). Moreover, if necessary he will be reliably isolated from an atmosphere contaminated by toxic agents and protected by body armor made of light, strong kevlar-2.

In the far term it is proposed to combine the IIFS with automated command and control systems. Here the author's imagination passes and he sends readers wishing to learn details to the American science fiction film "Alien," where such a weapon is shown in action (with the most sorry results, by the way).





Fig. 4. Selected elements of the set:

Key:

- |                                      |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| 1. Video camera                      | 8. Kevlar-2 helmet                                 |
| 2. Exchangeable camouflage sheets    | 9. Display   |
| 3. Microcomputer                     | 10. Protective mask outlet valve and drinking tube |
| 4. Easily detachable shoulder straps | 11. Protective mask container                      |
| 5. Kevlar-2 body armor               | 12. Filters  |
| 6. Self-retractable protective mask  | 13. Protective mask                                |
| 7. Microphone                        | 14. Transceiver                                    |

Fig. 5. Display screen:



Key:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Enemy ground surveillance radar emission detector with indicator of its bearing | 5. Actual date and time                 |
| 2. Distance to target  | 6. Video camera operation indicator     |
| 3. Video tape recorder screen  | 7. Target azimuth                       |
| 4. Video recording date and time   | 8. Night sight indicator                |
|  | 9. Radiation level                      |
|  | 10. Signal that toxic agents are in use |

Certain elements of future command and control systems underwent a test on the sands of the Arabian Peninsula. It is widely known that the command element of anti-Iraqi coalition forces had stable communications with the United States, where Operation Desert Storm planning questions were rehearsed on the highest staffs on high-capacity computers. A less well known fact is that the smooth-running logistic support conveyer, without which the Americans' success would have been inconceivable, operated in a fully automated mode from the U.S. Army Support Command to a brigade somewhere in Dhahran.

The Synchras tactical-level communications system operated at full intensity for the first time in a combat situation. It is noted that there were essentially no malfunctions during around 7,000 hours of operation. The NAVSTAR global navigation system proved its effectiveness. Army subunits down to and including company successfully oriented themselves in the desert with its help.

But Desert Storm raised not just the dust of enthusiastic responses; it also laid bare serious problems. One was touched on in the article: concentrating efforts on automating command and control at the highest echelons does not produce the desired effect—everything remains the same below on the battlefield. It was not without reason that American friendly fire losses were around 40 persons. The fact is, Iraq did not use EW nor did it deliver strikes against command and control facilities...

What has been said confirms convincingly that automation should begin below, at those levels whose commanders themselves see the battlefield, i.e., at a minimum in the platoon and company. Otherwise everything will resemble a housewife's attempt to use a computer to cope with a kitchen equipped only with pots and oven prongs.

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## CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### Strategic Bomber Crashes, Narrowly Avoids Gomel

PM0308111692 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian

1 Aug 92 Morning Edition p 8

[Mikhail Shimanskiy report: "Pilot Died, But He Managed To Turn Aircraft Away From City"]

[Excerpt] A long-range strategic bomber has crashed in the vicinity of the Byelarusian city of Gomel. It fell on houses...

The Tu-22 was manned by commander Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor Oskin, navigator Major Nikolay Ivanov, and squadron commander Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Stepchenkov.

At an altitude of 900 meters [m] the aircraft's starboard engine failed. Then the port engine followed suit. There was a fire on board. The crew lost radio contact with the traffic control center.

"Instructions say," Unit Commander Colonel Sergey Razin said, "that when both engines fail in these aircraft at an altitude of no more than 4,000m, the crew should immediately leave the aircraft. That is clear-cut. But at that time the bomber was over Novo-Belitsa, a densely populated area of Gomel..."

The crew did not obey instructions. Turning the aircraft away from the city, the pilots saw that it might crash on an oil tank. So, they diverted it. But the heavy machine was effectively out of control!

When the pilots saw that they had done everything that they could and that the falling aircraft posed no threat to anyone or anything on the ground, they ejected. Navigator Nikolay Ivanov left the aircraft at an altitude of 450m. Squadron commander Aleksandr Stepchenkov ejected at an altitude of 400m. But crew commander Viktor Oskin did not have enough height...

The aircraft plunged into the ground 96m from the railroad and 400m from the petroleum storage center. [passage omitted]

## CIS: NAVAL FORCES

### Yeltsin Approves Statute on Navy Flags

PM2707112192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian

23 Jul 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by Nikoily Burbyga: "New Symbols for Russian Navy"]

[Text] On 21 July Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin approved the statute on new Russian Navy symbols.

The historic Russian Andreyevskiy flag was approved as the main flag (national ensign at the flagstaff), together with the jack (identification flag of first- and second-class ships), and new personal flags.

### Operations of Hydrographic Service in Pacific

92UM1270A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
16 Jul 92 First edition p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents Captain 3rd Rank Sergey Makaryevskiy and Captain-Lieutenant Anatoliy Ivanov: "Darkness Will Set On the Sea Lanes if the Government Doesn't Take Urgent Measures"]

[Text] The Pacific Ocean Fleet Hydrographic Service maintains more than 100 lighthouses, thousands of river beacons, buoys, leading beacons and floating barriers that have been scattered on the coast and islands from Mys Dezhnev to Peter the Great Bay. Seamen of the

passenger and merchant fleets, military seamen and fishermen, ships of science and industry, yachtsmen and the owners of personal ships use the region's single navigational infrastructure as a guiding light. The language of the navigational equipment's systems is the international language "Esperanto", which insures the reliability of navigation for foreign mariners on the sea lanes that connect the Russian Far East with abroad (the port of Vladivostok has been opened since January 1992). But today it seems as if a "navigational" twilight is gathering over the Far Eastern seamen.

As Fleet Hydrographic Service Deputy Chief Captain 1st Rank M. Suslonov and Navigation Equipment Department Deputy Chief Captain 1st Rank V. Kolegin reported, the service did not receive nary a ruble for capital construction for 1991-1992 and 640,000 rubles have been allocated for capital repair of the Far Eastern Seas navigational equipment for the current year. For comparison: R261,000 at the old prices was expended for recent repairs of just the Skryplev Lighthouse that was constructed in 1889. Shipunskiy Lighthouse, that was already illuminating the path of seamen in 1937, has never been repaired in 55 years. Last year, it was included in the major overhaul title list but resources were not found. A total of 20 percent of the lighthouses and up to 50 percent of the navigation equipment systems need repair in Russia's Pacific Ocean region. And money is also needed for their daily maintenance and for routine maintenance.

Kamchatka Hydrographic Region Deputy Chief Captain 2nd Rank A. Gafiatuln said:

"Our region's gigantic management sector from Chukotka to Magadan is deteriorating before our very eyes. The crisis is so profound that none of the expert-hydrographers will be surprised if total darkness falls on the sea lanes if not today then tomorrow..."

There is no hint of exaggeration in his words. During the last three years, the fleet's Hydrographic Service has been experiencing a shortage of everything—light optical devices, lighthouse light bulbs, calcium carbide, and energy sources. No, not only ordinary paint but, what is even more artificial, special fluorescent paint to cover navigation signs. The matter has been reduced to the point that the hydrographers have been forced to use coastal electrical transmission lines and wind-powered devices as energy sources. That is where they are available. But if they are not?

Today the risk of navigation is increasing as a result of the fact that effectiveness in the assessments of the hydrographic situation in the Pacific Ocean region is being lost today—the hydrographic ships to which this task has been assigned frequently spend a lot of time tied up at the dock. The reason: a shortage of fuel and low maintenance and material support. Captain 2nd Rank Gafiatuln said that the "youngest" hydrographic ship on Kamchatka is 20 years old. It is in the same rank with 40 year-old veterans. Naturally, no one is even breathing

a word about new ships since they understand that it is unrealistic for the time being.

The Hydrographic Service has always depended on people who are dedicated heart and soul to their profession. But the spirit of romance of today's life is already being knocked out of the most hardy. Kamchatka Region Deputy Chief for MTO [Material and Technical Support] Captain 2nd Rank V. Zaslavchin said:

"The Hydrographic Service on Kamchatka is unable to recruit an adequate number of people for work at lighthouses since it cannot supply them with food, special clothing, POL [Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants], or a decent salary. This year people are receiving a little bit more than half of the food needed and it is provided free of charge to lighthouse keepers. They have not brought meat to some places for three years. There is no hermetically-sealed food—potatoes, butter, cheese, bread, or zwieback. And many lighthouse keepers live, think about it, on bare cliffs, in a severe climate, and they have contact with the mainland once or twice per year..."

Recently Russkaya Koshka Lighthouse became depopulated and Region Chief Captain 1st Rank I. Anuchin was compelled to send officers and seamen there instead of the civilian lighthouse keepers he had counted on.

"We are not attempting to intentionally dramatize the situation—the facts themselves at times sound dramatic. The source of the Hydrographic Service's disastrous situation in the so enormous and complicated, for navigation, ocean region of Russia is understandable. Today the majority of our state's structures are in a similar situation. We are not talking about reasons but about a vital need: to not extinguish the guiding stars which, along with the heavenly bodies, indicate the way to seamen. Our ancestors did not spare money for navigational support. When modern equipment was needed at Petrovskiy Lighthouse in 1846 "to illuminate with lamps instead of with fire wood," the Transport Baykal was sent with beacon refractors from Kronstadt to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. This was from the understanding that many countries grow fat from maritime trade. We believe that Russia will also have profitable eastern ports-'Ganzas'. Are many resources needed to do that? And where do we get them?"

Capital investment from the state budget totaled R28,695,000 for the development of Far Eastern port navigational equipment in 1986-1990, including more than R15 million at the expense of the Ministry of Defense, R4 million at the expense of the Ministry of Merchant Fleet, R3.2 million at the expense of the Ministry of the Fishing Industry, nearly R5 million at the expense of the Ministry of the Gas Industry, and R1.5 million at the expense of the Ministry of Geology. You will agree that it is not such an enormous amount of money to make ends meet for those times. The prospective plan for 1991-2000 provides for the sum of R70,213,000. Whom could this number surprise today? But there is only R640,000 for this.

The people in the Pacific Ocean Hydrographic Service see several ways for a partial solution to the crisis. Already today foreign ships that are entering the open port of Vladivostok are conscientiously paying lighthouse dues in hard currency. But the resources are going to Moscow. In civilized countries, lighthouse dues from their own and foreign seamen for the use of navigational equipment system go to the port captain and to those who are directly concerned about them—to the hydrographers. Pacific Ocean hydrographers do not have a single kopek from such naval "whales" as Far Eastern Maritime Steamship Line, Dalryba, and other organizations. Just like it does not have a cent from such "subscribers" who use their labor.

Russia was and remains a major naval power. The seas feed and protect it. We will also protect our seas from the advance of twilight.

**FROM THE EDITORIAL STAFF:** The difficulties which the hydrographers in the Pacific Ocean are experiencing today have not bypassed their northern and western colleagues. For example, political nuances are being added to the economic difficulties in the Baltic. Some of the stations that support navigation have turned out to be on the territory of sovereign states (Estonia and Latvia). Suffice it to say that today nearly 45 percent of the Baltic Sea coastal zone is not being controlled by radio navigation stations. In essence, Russian hydrographers have to reconfigure the navigational safety support system (a similar situation has developed for Russia in the Caspian). Will resources be found to do this? But today they are also needed to support navigation in Russia's enormous Arctic theater. You don't need to be an expert to determine under what unbelievably difficult conditions Polar lighthouse keepers have to work.

### CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

#### Rodionov on Role of General Staff Academy in Training Security Cadres

92UM1265A *Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI*  
in *Russian* 2 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel-General Igor Rodionov, chief, General Staff Academy: "The Security Requirement: Possible Threats to Russia's National Interests"]

[Text] The disintegration of the Soviet Union and appearance on the world map of the Commonwealth of Independent States with its various approaches to assuring its sovereignty and security have attached considerable significance to the problem of security of the Russian Federation and raised the matter of searching for new approaches to the resolution of this problem.

It is obvious that the Russian Federation, as one of the largest states of the world, will become involved in all levels of security—at the international, regional, and national levels—and in all structural elements of this

security: the political, economic, military (defense), social, ecological, informational, internal political, and others.

Regardless of the areas or elements of security involved, all efforts must be directed toward assuring the vitally important interests of Russia, her independence, territorial integrity, political stability, and possibility of stable socio-economic development of society.

Exactly what are these problems that must be resolved in the area of political, economic, military, ecological, and other elements entering into the country's security?

In the area of political security, we could list in its most general form: the creation of conditions on the global, regional, and domestic scales which would tend to promote peaceful development of the Russian Federation, conditions that would not permit the appearance of a political, economic, military, or other dictate on the part of any state or coalition tending to restrict the country's national interests; prevention of war in any of its manifestations; preclusion of political isolation of the country from the world community; inhibition of formation of military and political unions directed against Russia; and participation in existing and creation of new international and regional organizations that would further the cause of world peace and stability of the world community. Those are the most general questions, but by no means the only ones, which are associated with the country's political security.

One of the central aspects relating to the resolution of political security problems, including development of a security concept, involves the evaluation and forecasting of existing and potential threats to the state's interests. The identification and delineation of threats constitutes one of the most urgent theoretical and practical tasks which if not resolved will render impossible the development of a political and military strategy and of a military doctrine and the setting of goals for construction of the Armed Forces, including the conduct of military reform.

In speaking of political security, it is necessary to take distinct note of the fact that in the new international situation, which is characterized by a cessation of global confrontation of the two military-political blocs, still in existence are differences in political and economic interests of the various countries; still to remain now and into the future are conflicting territorial and other claims. Not to be ruled out is the possibility that development of the global situation may become such as to initiate a change in the political course followed by the various countries, with some of the latter attempting to resolve their economic, demographic, and other problems by means of force or economic pressure.

The economic stability of the state is the condition whereby the country's economy will be capable of providing the Armed Forces and the population with all

necessities in wartime, and assuring the country's viability and capability of functioning in a time of hostilities, including security of the economy proper in peacetime; and the capability of supplying the country with adequate amounts of society's vital necessities in the event of economic, financial, and other pressures generated from without and of actions of destructive forces produced within the country.

The above is associated with the development of wartime production capacities and their optimum distribution throughout the country; with maintaining the necessary level of mobilization capacities, resources and strategic reserves; and with the deployment and use of the latter in a time of threat and with initiation of hostilities.

Importance attaches to the drafting and implementation of measures "insuring" the national economy against takeover by transnational companies, and to preventing biased development of industry and agriculture.

Military security, as one of the fundamental components of Russia's security, will continue to occupy its highly important position in the near and more distant future. Mankind has not supplanted a violent civilization with a nonviolent one. Many causes of initiating a war and military conflict, and the associated forces and weapons, have not passed out of existence.

The state's security policy should be forged on the basis of an appreciation of policies actually followed by world society. As long as the danger of war and military conflict continue to exist in the world, Russia's military security must necessarily be taken into consideration in the practical activities of the leadership and all the country's people.

Constituting the principal context of measures intended to assure the military security of the Russian Federation and the other Commonwealth countries under the present conditions are the conduct of military reform; reorganization of the Army and Navy on a new technical basis in accordance with the changing conditions; withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe and Mongolia back and beyond the state borders; carrying out strategic, operational, and mobilization planning in line with the new geopolitical conditions; creation, on our own territory, of necessary groups of troops, forces, and strategic reserves to counter possible aggression, which continues to exist; and provision of military service and military diligence.

Ecological security of the environment, as an element of the country's security, is acquiring increasing significance under existing conditions. The ecological consequences of unwise and irresponsible treatment of natural resources has been restricted to theoretical discussions, whereas now the danger of careless and irresponsible attitudes relative to man's environment manifests itself in a graphic manner in the Urals, the Aral Sea area, in Belarus, Ukraine, Moscow, and in many other cities and

areas of Russia. The ecological danger has become comparable with the military danger. Inept handling of this threat can generate irreversible consequences not only for the country itself, but also for human lives.

Growing in significance under present conditions is information security, whereby television, radio, and the press can mobilize the people to overcome difficulties, or, conversely, they can demoralize society, sowing seeds of uncertainty and hopelessness. The mass media have indeed become the fourth power of the state. They can distort the true picture of reality to exert a damaging influence on the country's security.

Cardinal issues bearing on security and defense are taken up in Russia and in the other Commonwealth states in parliaments and the respective committees. However, this is an area in which many people's deputies and their apparatus do not possess the theoretical background and practical experience relative to security and defense.

Training of cadres in a comprehensive and unified manner that would encompass all areas of the country's security is essentially nonexistent. Whatever training is available is split up according to department and uncoordinated. That is why it is necessary to organize a special approach to the training of highly qualified specialists who would be able to devise integrated solutions to issues of the country's security and defense, while keeping in mind the goal of the activity these people are to pursue in the apparatus of the President, Supreme Soviet, Security Council, and in the military, economic, foreign policy, military-political departments and organizations.

In a position to assume the above activity is the Armed Forces General Staff Academy of the Russian Federation, which has been involved to a degree greater than other educational institutions in problems of cadre training for application to the country's defense. It could become a true scientific center, one which could devise a general theory of security and defense; it could undertake a comprehensive investigation into the problems and development of scientific concepts in this area, with a view toward practical application. This end could be pursued by establishing in the security and defense Academy two departments and a scientific research center. The first department (that of national security) would train civilian (primarily) as well as military specialists, with the training designed for subsequent application in legislative and executive bodies. Major emphasis in the program would be accorded to teaching a general theory of security; geopolitics and international relations; general and military economics and economic security; law; military construction; and a mandatory course in military art as applied to domestic policy, and to information and ecological security.

The second department could continue to train cadres to assume positions in the senior echelons of the Armed Forces. The purely military studies (of a strategic and operational nature) could be supplemented by offering—

in the necessary depth—other aspects of national security (geopolitics, international relations, law, economy, domestic policy, ecology, and other topics relating to state security).

The scientific research center could be staffed to advantage by leading military and civilian scientists qualified to explore existing and new approaches to the country's security and defense. The principal activities of joint research that could be carried out in this area by the civilian and military scientists would involve the development of a general theory of security as a science; and the integration of applied aspects of political, military, economic, technical, historical, psychological, and other sciences, and of their methods, forms, and applications, with a view toward advancing the cause of security for the individual, society, and the state.

The training of cadres possessing expertise in the resolution of highly complex problems of the country's security should be approached on the basis of a deep concern for the future, not by consideration of the needs of the present, important though the latter may be. With the foregoing as guidance, reconfiguration of the General Staff Academy of the Russian Federation Armed Forces would assume its position as a cornerstone in the creation of a new system of cadre training and in this area of activity, which is one of undisputed significance for Russia.

#### Defense Official on Family Benefits for Servicemen

92UM1282B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 21 Jul 92 First edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel V. Rudik, deputy chief, Laborer and White Collar Labor and Pay Directorate: "Family Benefits in the Army and Navy"; place and date not given]

[Text]

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In their many years of receiving letters from readers, the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA often gave the same reply to various questions and requests from servicemen's wives: "Not covered in the law." Legislation presently being passed does relate to the problems and particulars of their lives. Is that not so, Viktor Antonovich?

[Rudik] Yes, indeed. Just recently there have been passed a number of acts of legislation bearing directly on social issues. Examples are the decrees concerning length of service relative to pension entitlement of servicemen's wives and to time off from work. Now there is another benefit which I believe will meet with the warm approval of many persons. It is no secret that the families of servicemen must repeat several times the procedure of packing up to move to a new location and leaving a place to which they have become highly accustomed.

And so, now entitled to severance pay are wives of officers, warrant officers of the Army and Navy, and conscripts who must leave their place of work due to transfer of the husband. The pay amount has been set as the average salary the wife receives for two months of work.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Who is to make the disbursement, and what is the legal basis?

[Rudik] The finance agency of the husband's duty station, irrespective of the wife's place of employment. This is set down by Resolution of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation dated 22 June 1992 and by Russian Ministry of Defense Order No 54 dated 30 June 1992.

The order requires that the serviceman's unit provide him with a standard form attesting to the transfer, and with a blank form for entering the wife's average salary. The latter document is then filled out by the enterprise the wife is leaving, after which the wife is handed this document along with her labor book. The average salary is calculated for the two months preceding the wife's departure. In the case of a work period of less than two months, the amount is figured on the basis of the actual length of time worked.

To be granted the benefit, the serviceman submits his request through his chain of command, with the aforementioned proof of transfer and labor book attached. The documents must necessarily be accompanied by the statement: "(Wife) released at her own request in connection with husband's change of duty station."

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What can be done if for any reason it is not possible to obtain the severance pay at the last duty station?

[Rudik] It is paid by the new duty station. For this to be possible, however, it is necessary to furnish documentary proof that the severance pay has not been received. I might add here that this payment is made in rubles in units located beyond the borders of Russia.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Viktor Antonovich! How is the issue of leave for the serviceman's wife handled?

[Rudik] At the present time, wives of military cadres can—if they so wish—take an annual paid leave at the same time as the husband. In this case, the wife submits at the place of her employment a certificate stating the amount of time the husband is to receive for his leave. This certificate is issued to servicemen in units, organizations and installations of the Ministry of Defense. In the event the wife's leave time is shorter than that of her husband, she can, if necessary, take additional leave, but this at her own expense. All this is set down in the Russian Federation Presidential Decree No 28-rp, Improved Social Protection of Servicemen on Duty in the Territory of the RSFSR, and in Russian Governmental Decree No 585.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Does this benefit extend to all wives, or only to those who work for the Ministry of Defense?

[Rudik] To all who work for the Ministry of Defense and for civilian institutions, but only if located on Russian Federation territory. The decree imposes this obligation on governments of republics within the Federation, executive agencies, ministries, departments, concerns, associations, institutions, enterprises, and organizations, which are to grant servicemen's wives an annual leave, to be taken concurrently with the leave of the husbands.

### **Chief Military Procurator Panichev on Tasks, Objectives**

*92UM1282A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jul 92 First edition*

[Interview with Chief Military Procurator Valentin Nikolayevich Panichev, by Major Ivan Ivanyuk: "Investigations a Matter for Experts, But Few Available"; place and date not given]

[Text]

#### **A Profile of Valentin Nikolayevich Panichev**

He was born in 1941 in Vologda Oblast. After graduating from school, he took a job in an experimental aircraft plant. In 1967 he graduated from the Law Department of the Leningrad State University; since that time he has been employed in procuracy agencies. He has worked as a procurator in Pskov and Rostov Oblasts. He holds the status of legal adviser, 3rd class.

In the spring of this year, Valentin Panichev was appointed Main Directorate chief, Russian Federation, to supervise the observance of laws in the Armed Forces, as chief military procurator.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Valentin Nikolayevich, according to comments we have heard, your favorite activity is organizing investigative work. Indeed, all a person need do is recall the sensational "Rostov affairs" and the case of the search for maniacal killer Chikatilo. Now, all of a sudden, your present appointment. After having occupied this post for three months, can you say something about whether that kind of experience is needed to serve as chief military procurator?

[Panichev] It is difficult for me to say what played an important role in my appointment. I have never served in the Army and have had no dealings with it. The Procurator General of Russia in a conversation we had told me that the military procuracy is to be reorganized, a task that must be approached with no preconceived ideas or convictions.

In the field of view then and now, of course, is more than investigative work in the Armed Forces, even though this certainly is a most pressing problem. The point here is that military investigators become involved in looking into a wide range of criminal matters, into all manner of

incidents, including suicides. This results in an accumulation of 30 to 40 cases to be handled by a single investigator at the same time. I have already had a chance to spend some time visiting many districts, fleets, and garrisons, and I can say that the military procuracy offices are staffed largely by highly qualified and conscientious specialists. However, I know by my past experience that this kind of work load lies beyond the bounds of human abilities.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] You will agree with me when I say that a mother whose son is killed or maimed in the Army is not concerned with whether or not military procuracy workers have the time to conduct exhaustive investigations. What the mother wants is an objective and thorough investigation, with the guilty punished.

[Panichev] I have met with parents of the deceased and spokespersons from committees of soldiers' mothers and possess firsthand knowledge of their pain and suffering. I might add here that the voice of reason often prevails over their emotions, even though the latter are very powerful. However, we receive fewer complaints about how the military procuracy may be shutting its eyes to facts and hiding things; we are receiving more suggestions for effecting improvements. People see for themselves that military procurators are in short supply, that the material base and equipment available leave something to be desired.

However, I now know for certain that the above is not the main cause of some investigations that are poorly conducted. The Armed Forces suffer from a total absence of a qualified investigative service, of an operational criminal investigation service on the order of the OBKhSS [Section for Struggle Against Embezzlement of Property]. Usually the first to arrive on the scene is a unit investigating officer, someone who possesses neither legal training nor experience. In a situation requiring a skillful and scrupulous approach, he at times acts the same as a bull in a china shop. We even come across instances where attempts are made to brush an investigation aside, so as not to wash dirty linen in public, so to speak. This kind of situation imposes great difficulties on procuracy personnel in their attempt to gather the true facts. It is often necessary to resort to the use of investigative techniques merely to establish that which an investigating officer could see with his own eyes and could document at the scene of the crime. Specialists know that this is extremely difficult, and sometimes impossible, to do.

As for myself, I find it difficult to imagine how the system was capable of functioning in the first place. It is unfortunate that these problems have been ignored in the recently passed Russian procuracy law.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Valentin Nikolayevich, but you are taking some measures to improve the situation.

[Panichev] We are, of course. However, let us not forget that our principal task is to exercise supervision over the observance of the law in the Armed Forces. In this



connection, with the low level of knowledgeability on the part of unit commanders and the extremely understaffed legal service in the Army and Navy, there certainly is more than enough work to do. Of 70,000 complaints the procuracy received last year, 29,000 of them involved illegal acts committed by officials—twice as many as the previous year.

Nonetheless, as I have said, we are compelled to improve investigative work. We will double the size of the investigative group in the central apparatus, so that it will be in a position to take up the investigation of especially difficult cases. An order that has been drafted would require the assignment of the most experienced investigator to a case involving a death, entrusting nothing to investigative agencies.

We have also resolved the problem of permitting the mother of a deceased son or spokesperson of the committee of soldiers' mothers to be present at the post-mortem examination. That is something which they have been demanding for some time. I personally feel that this constitutes too severe a trial for a mother, who even without that is overcome with grief. We have also proposed the creation of a special service, something on the order of military police, which would take on an operational and manhunt function in line units. It is our view that these measures could exert a substantial influence on the crime situation existing in the Armed Forces. The situation there is quite serious, the same as throughout the country.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Also proposed was something else: doing away completely with the military procuracy. The reason given was the procuracy's excessive dependence on the Ministry of Defense. How did you react to that particular suggestion?

[Panichev] I believe that the Military Procuracy agencies did indeed depend on the Ministry of Defense. This could be seen in the so-called prearrangement procedure [institut soglasheniya] that existed for decades. What that meant was a military procurator was required to make a prearrangement with a superior officer before he could bring criminal charges against a serviceman who committed a crime.

Since the above Union law was not mentioned in the press, it was not known to the general public. However, on this point I must give my predecessors their due credit, for they worked long and hard to do something about the situation. The law was abolished as of 12 April 1989. Also in existence was the so-called telephone law, and the dependence-connected privileges relative to apartment and automobile availability. However, this was also true in the case of territorial procuracy agencies. That was how the entire country lived. Now we must all work together to overcome that less-than-desireable heritage, so that we can build a law-governed state in the foreseeable future.

Concerning the suggestion of eliminating the military procuracy, it seems to me that this amounts to one of the

"simple solutions" that are nothing short of harmful, since this under the present conditions would leave no one to resolve problems relating to enforcement of legality in the Army. That is nothing more than a way for us to lose qualified cadres.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What kind of cadre changes have taken place in military procuracy agencies?

[Panichev] Speaking of the central apparatus, some generals requested or were handed a discharge into the reserve, while others are still on active duty. There generally have been substantial changes in top positions. That is not one of our problem areas.

Personnel changes which are indeed causing problems for us involve the large number of requests for discharge from the Armed Forces being submitted by military procuracy officers. We have received 90 requests to date. There has been a sharp decline in prestige of military service in general, and, in particular, in law enforcement agency service. In addition, the work loads are quite large and the compensation poor, even now with the pay raise.

The trouble is, the present system of training jurists is poor; it cannot supply field units with specialists in the qualitative and quantitative aspects. We presently are short by more than 200 officers. Just about the same number are facing discharge in the near future. If we were to add up our estimated "losses," this figure would amount to a considerable percentage of the total number of personnel. Even that is not the full extent of the problem: A survey indicates that a majority of students—graduating from the Military Institute, which is the place for training investigators for military procuracy agencies—has expressed a desire to obtain a discharge from the Army.

And so, the situation is quite serious, and we are taking all the measures we can to stabilize it. As for the future, we have raised the question of establishing a special institute of law.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Several times during our conversation you have been called away to answer telephone calls coming from "hot spots"—particularly the Transcaucasus, and you, Valentin Nikolayevich, have had to make immediate decisions on problems. Unless it is classified, what is the nature of the calls?

I do not care to go into detail explaining about how the very lives of our personnel are at risk in areas where weapons carry so much weight, with military procuracy personnel being fired upon and taken hostage. From the legal standpoint, however, the main difficulty lies in the fact that Russia has taken under its jurisdiction the troops—and this includes the military procuracy offices—stationed in the Baltics and Transcaucasus, but with their legal status still undetermined and an absence of bilateral agreements. This is the source of a large number of problems that could have been prevented.

For example, on the soil of Transcaucasian states there have been many instances of attacks on servicemen and theft of weapons and equipment. Whatever evidence was gathered was turned over by our military procurators to local procuracy agencies, where it was merely put aside. Letters bearing the signature of Russian Procurator General V. Stepankov's signature have been sent to the procurators general of the states involved requesting the application of legal measures on the basis of the facts provided. The question of exhaustive investigations was also put forth.

In my opinion, these relations between the independent states should be subject to strict regulation. The first step in that direction has already been taken. The Agreement on Law Enforcement Agencies in the Combined Armed Forces and Armed Forces of the Commonwealth Member States was signed during the May meeting held in Tashkent. An important aspect is that all the military law enforcement agencies are to remain organized as they have been in the past, and that they will service all military units, regardless of whether they may be Russian, national, or strategic.

Also in preparation are plans to insure that the independent states will in the future exercise cooperation on matters of legislative improvements and on other matters in the interests of coordinating legal policy and law enforcement practice. I believe that this constitutes a very important step in forming a unified system of military law for the CIS.

#### **Chairman on Function of Committee on Servicemen's Affairs**

*92UM1302A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 Jul 92 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Anatoliy Alekseyev, chairman of the Committee on the Affairs of Servicemen and the Members of Their Families, by Anatoliy Stasovskiy of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Each Gets Through the Army in his Own Way"]

[Text] *From the "KZ File": A. Alekseyev was born in Pskov Oblast on 1 Jan 50. He completed the Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy in 1972. He served 12 years in the Pacific Fleet. He was transferred to Kronshtadt in 1984 as an instructor at a school for naval technicians, where he was elected a people's deputy of Russia in 1990. He is a captain 3rd rank.*

*He worked as Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Verification of the Causes of Death and Injury of Servicemen and Military Construction Workers and the Protection of Their Legal Rights and Interests.*

*Today he is Chairman of the Committee on the Affairs of Servicemen and the Members of Their Families in the government of the Russian Federation.*

[Stasovskiy] Anatoliy Alekseyevich, the attitude toward the work of your committee in military circles is, to put

it mildly, equivocal. Sometimes you even draw the fire of criticism onto yourself. Here is a concrete example. The newspaper IZVESTIYA recently presented figures you cited on the call-up into the Russian Army. On the basis of them you concluded that the call-up had been upset. Specialists from the Russian General Staff categorically disagree with that. They cite totally different values. How can this be explained?

[Alekseyev] I should acknowledge that a disjuncture really does exist here. I was saying in my interview that only 40 percent of the draftees had left for the field so far. That information was transmitted to us on official channels. A month passed after that data was received, however. The state of affairs, as well as the numbers, changed. Today we have on hand trustworthy data that the plan for the call-up has been fulfilled in many of the military districts of the Russian armed forces. Some 90-95 percent of the planned levels have been drafted across the Russian Federation overall, as far as we know.

[Stasovskiy] Today a large number of organizations have taken on the protection of the servicemen and members of their families. How then does your committee differ from other organizations and what, in your opinion, are its principal functions?

[Alekseyev] The main thing in the work of the committee is a constant analysis by our committee of the observance of the rights of servicemen and the members of their families, and analysis of the causes of the death of servicemen in peacetime. Not a single other organization for the social protection of the military, in my view, today takes on this work, which I would boldly call very tough and even dirty.

Special commissions to check out the causes of death and injury in the armed forces are being created on the basis of our committee. Such a commission, composed of competent specialists, for example, recently left for Kronshtadt. Quite a few violations of legal order were discovered that had led to the deaths of two sailors. There are violations in the performance of the investigation. I feel that cases where the death of a serviceman is tried to be presented by every means possible as the result of an unfortunate confluence of circumstances, suicide etc. are still quite frequent in the army and the navy.

Our capabilities have been expanded considerably since the approval of the committee by a decree of the government of Russia. Today we have become extra-departmental, independent, first and foremost from military structures and organizations. That is, I think, a very serious point.

If we are talking about functions, they could be combined into several general units. The first is the set of problems connected with officers and warrant officers and the members of their families. The second is problems connected with conscript servicemen and the draft youth. The third set of problems is one of the most difficult. I have already been talking about them. They

are connected with the death of servicemen. The last is socio-economic, scientific and analytical problems.

[Stasovskiy] Your committee analyzes the causes of deaths of servicemen during peacetime. What is the mechanism of that work?

[Alekseyev] The committee does not have the right of inquiry. We engage in verifying the objectivity and completeness of the investigation of the causes of death of soldiers or sailors, obtaining primary information from letters of complaint that come to us and other state institutions. Our legal scholars check whether this or that case was conducted and closed properly. Where necessary we go to the General Procuracy of Russia and petition that they review specific cases or that the inquiry be renewed. All of the subsequent work is performed under our monitoring in interaction with the former Chief Military Procuracy, which has been transformed into the Chief Directorate for Oversight of the Fulfillment of Laws in the Armed Forces today. It is pleasing that the contacts set up with the head of that directorate, Valentin Nikolayevich Panichev, are good ones.

[Stasovskiy] It would seem that everyone understands the importance of the social problems of servicemen, but often that is unfortunately only in word. There have already been so many promises, declarations and decrees, say, on the housing problem alone...

[Alekseyev] Everything here, in my opinion, comes up against the lack of a streamlined mechanism for the realization of decrees. A unified state program is needed that would provide for such a mechanism. The very first collegium of our committee, which was held recently, was therefore directed toward the development of such a state program. There were many interesting proposals from competent people from the ministries of defense, economics, finance, social protection of the population and representatives of the border and internal-service troops.

[Stasovskiy] The committee that you head has been reformed five times, or else even disbanded. What caused that, in your opinion?

[Alekseyev] I have already been saying that we are a very inconvenient organization. A great deal explains that.

One may recall that as long ago as 1990 our commission (as the committee used to be called) requested 107 criminal cases on which there had been protests and complaints from the parents of the servicemen. The Chief Military Procurator was not even able to submit all of those cases. The commission reviewed only 96 of them. The members of the commission—and these were trained and prestigious people—came to the conclusion that 92 of the 96 had to be repeated.

Who likes that outcome? All the dogs were turned loose on us at once, quite naturally...

[Stasovskiy] Do you link with that circumstance the story with the awarding of the rank of captain 1st class to you out of turn, and then the cancellation of the decision?

[Alekseyev] I do not want to talk about that subject. I admit that I did not realize at first all the damage to the situation with the awarding of that military rank. It is more important to me today that we are able to preserve the committee and prove the expediency of its existence.

[Stasovskiy] One of the tasks of the committee is to unify the efforts of a host of organizations that have the aim of social protection of the military. But you confirm herein that they create a reputation for themselves at the expense of promises. With whom do you want to combine your efforts?

[Alekseyev] Speaking of the coordination of efforts, essential contact has been established first of all with those ministries and agencies on which the adoption of the state program of social and legal protection for the servicemen depends. We could tack on some public organizations—the Union of Officers, the Council of Parents of Servicemen of Russia, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the military trade union, the Military for Democracy...

The chief misfortune is that we have lost a great deal of time in the fight for survival. It is thus too early to speak today of some unified endeavor of organizations that would defend the rights of the military. Moreover, there is opposition. The ambitiousness of extremely specific leaders who are ready to forgo and neglect the interests of the common cause for the sake of some immediate advantages. It turns out that the main thing for them is to be constantly in view, at the crest of political and public life. And it does not matter by what means that is attained.

[Stasovskiy] Anatoliy Alekseyevich, you are a military man but, strange as it may be, it is namely you and your committee that have been and are debunking the romantic aura surrounding military service...

[Alekseyev] There is, of course, a measure of truth in that. But we cannot cease to inform the government and the public about the state of affairs in the army and navy.

### **Problems Facing Military Trade Network Examined**

*92UM1330A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jul 92 First edition p 2*

[Interview with Colonel Eduard Ivanovich Khorevich, first deputy chairman of the Committee for Trade and Personal Services of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Petr Altunin under the rubric "A Topical Interview": "Does the Military Trade Organization Have it Easy in the Market Situation?"]

[Text] Commerce, including military trade, is perhaps today the area in which one senses intimately the growth of the market, the leaps and zigzags in this difficult process. Like a mirror it reflects the current sick economy, social policy and the daily routine.

[Altunin] "Eduard Ivanovich," I began the interview with Colonel E. Khorevich, first deputy chairman for Trade and Personal Services [torgovle i bytovomy obsluzhivaniye] of the CIS Combined Armed Forces, "military trade today, as in the past, is an arena of fervent passions. The distribution of scarce goods, the lines, complaints about unfairness...."

[Khorevich] Just imagine, the picture has changed since 2 January of this year. Passions have cooled in any case. I believe that the unprecedented prices were the main factor.

[Altunin] At the same time the mass media are still firing a lot of critical shots at the military trade system. Quite recently the newspaper KURANTY announced that Lieutenant-General Aviation G. Karakozov, appointed Chief of the Main Trade Directorate in October of last year, has "turned the military trade system into a structure through which deals costing the state are made...."

[Khorevich] I think that before making such statements, one should at the very least have reliable facts and not operate with exaggerated statements such as "deals are made through third nations, bypassing CIS territory," as one reads in KURANTY. Interestingly, the journalist who makes such "sensational" discoveries has never visited us. He could at least have learned that it was Lieutenant-General Aviation G. Karakozov himself who, upon taking charge, brought up before the command element of the CIS OVS [Combined Armed Forces] and law-enforcement agencies the matter of thoroughly reviewing all previously concluded contracts, as well as cases involving violations and abuses in the Western Group of Forces.

Immediately following the article in KURANTY there was a joint meeting of directorate officers and employees, and 90 percent of those present expressed support for Lieutenant-General Aviation G. Karakozov. They also requested that a civil suit be brought against KURANTY.

[Altunin] I recently learned that you have carried out some structural reforms....

[Khorevich] Yes, there has been a reorganization. It included the Main Trade Directorate. The latter was changed into the Committee for Trade and Personal Services, it had a 30% cut in personnel and its functions were altered. Instead of distributing centralized funds allocated by Gosplan and the Ministry of Trade, it now seeks commodity resources to meet the needs of the army and navy itself, and it is maintained not with deductions from the revenues of the directorates of military districts and fleets, as in the past, but through its own commercial activities. The committee's commercial

agency procured goods totalling more than 2 billion rubles during the first quarter alone.

[Altunin] Then why is it that pop-eyed Russian nesting dolls, foreign belts and chewing gum occupy a prominent place in the stores, just as they did a year ago, while an officer cannot buy ordinary trousers, boots or even cotton socks?

[Khorevich] Our situation is the same as that of the nation as a whole. And we know the causes. The disintegration of the former Union, the continuing economic isolation of the Commonwealth countries and the erection of trade barriers—all of this is having an extremely negative effect in the area of trade and personal services. In addition, the governments in Moldova, the Transcaucasus and even Ukraine are unilaterally taking over military trade agencies without the agreement of the command element of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. A ban has been placed upon banking operations by the military trade organizations, which has practically paralyzed their functioning and placed the servicemen serviced by these military trade organizations into an extremely difficult situation. There have also been attempts to take over our facilities. I want to report, primarily for those who would live off the stocks of the military trade system outside the closed military posts, that by decision of the President of Russia and the Directorate of State Property of the Russian Federation, military trade organizations are federal property and are not subject to privatization.

[Altunin] What is your biggest "headache"? Traditionally, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, washing machines... have been in shortest supply.

[Khorevich] One of the greatest quandaries of the so-called market economy is the fact that even now, despite very high prices, it is difficult to buy these goods. For one thing, production is dropping due to monopolies by the producers and a breakdown of business ties.

In the second place, the goods you mentioned, which were recently in short supply, are not selling because of the sky-high prices and are stagnating in warehouses of the military trade system. This results in a shortage of circulating capital, particularly in the small military trade organizations.

[Altunin] And what is the situation with respect to passenger cars?

[Khorevich] The plan called for us to receive 25% of last year's quantity of Zhigulis, but we have yet to receive any. We have taken this matter to the government and even the president. The latest explanation is that this year Zhigulis will be allotted to trade organizations only to pay off debts for agricultural products received, as well as to the owners of special-purpose checking accounts and deposits, and to winners of cash-and-product lotteries and holders of bonds.

The situation involving Moskvich automobiles is simpler. We sold 420 vehicles during the first quarter. It

should be born in mind, however, that, for one thing, the plant demands prepayment and, in the second place, with all the mark-ups the price of a Moskvich also comes to almost a half-million rubles.

When we assess the situation as a whole, we see that the structure of demand has changed. People are giving priority not to manufactured goods but to food items.

[Altunin] And what is the situation of the military trade system in this respect?

[Khorevich] In terms of physical volume we are not selling less than last year. The assortment has deteriorated, however. There is a shortage of cheese, eggs and sugar.

We are not sitting around doing nothing, of course. We are building shops for processing fruits and vegetables in various areas, including Maykop, and a fish-processing plant on Sakhalin, and we are continuing to develop subsidiary farms.

We need to give due credit to the Russian government, which has adopted a decision to provide a centralized food supply system for servicemen and their families in order to avoid the "ebbs" and "flows" of the market.

[Altunin] I know that you held fairs in the past. Are you still holding them?

[Khorevich] We are, despite all the difficulties. At wholesale fairs held in Moscow and Tashkent in February, for example, contracts were concluded for the same amount of fruit and vegetable products from the 1992 harvest as last year. At a grocery fair in Ulyanovsk we procured enough confectionery items and canned goods to fill all the requisitions of military trade organizations in the Far North.

We have purchased 451 million rubles worth of nonfood items from foreign companies this year. An order has been placed with India for 130 million rubles worth of military products.

[Altunin] What sort of aid does the military trade system need today?

[Khorevich] Procurement volumes in the domestic market could be increased considerably by concluding barter deals. We are asked for used lumber, metal, motor vehicles and equipment, and other technical military property in exchange for goods. Unfortunately, the military trade organizations do not have these things. I would therefore like to take advantage of this opportunity to ask the district and fleet commanders for precisely this kind of help.

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

### Grachev, Mironov Discuss Disposition of Bolgrad Airborne Division

92UM1317A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
1 Jul 92 p 1

[Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Vyacheslav Voronkov, chief of the Odessa Military District Press Center: "Bolgrad: Let the Officers Decide the Division's Fate"]

[Text] Last Friday delegations from the Russian and Ukrainian ministries of defense met in Bolgrad in Odessa Oblast. The main subject of the talks was the fate of the Bolgrad Airborne Division. The military delegations were headed by Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine, and General of the Army Pavel Grachev, minister of defense of Russia.

The first to land at the division airfield was the plane carrying a delegation from the Odessa Military District headed by Lieutenant-General Vitaliy Radetskiy, district commander. There is a diplomatic explanation, so to speak, for this. The division is based in the Odessa Military District, and its "boss," figuratively speaking, should greet the guests.

The second to land, Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine, gave the first interview right at the aircraft steps. In answer to the question "What will be the main subject of the talks, and what can be expected from them?" the Ukrainian minister of defense said the following: "The leading subject will unquestionably be the fate of division officers, warrant officers, NCOs and soldiers. I regard this meeting as an extension of the talks in Dagomys, where, as you know, significant agreement was achieved between Russia and Ukraine.

Our position remains unchanged," Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov commented. "As a sovereign, independent state with its own military doctrine, the Ukraine is building its own armed forces to accomplish the missions assigned to them. This meeting will be yet another step on the path toward the establishment of the Ukrainian armed forces."

General of the Army Pavel Grachev answered this question in the following way. "We have reached a preliminary agreement that the officers, as the backbone of any military collective, will make their own choice and decide in which army they are to continue serving, Russian or Ukrainian."

The military delegations departed directly from the airfield for the disposition of an airborne regiment, where they were to meet with the division officer corps.

The Bolgrad Airborne Division is a premier formation of the Airborne Troops.

Year after year it achieves good results in the combat training. The officers' corps is distinguished by the

highest level of professionalism, skill, valor and determination. Most of the officers passed through the crucible of Afghanistan, and Major-General Valeriy Vostrotnin, division commander, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

In his address to the division officers, Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov, defense minister of Ukraine, stressed the fact that he had always had a very high regard for the division's combat training. With respect to the Bolgrad Airborne Division, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine adopted a decision unprecedented in history: to allow each officer to decide where he will continue his service, in Russia or Ukraine. Furthermore, those officers who do not want to serve in Ukraine will not be constrained in any way. In addition, the government and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will take all possible steps to see that their transfer to Russia is made in an organized manner. For this purpose it is planned to use the military transport aviation to haul the personal belongings and the families of the officers. The officers are being seen off formally, with military honors.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine said that no pressure or coercion will be applied to a single officer who has expressed a desire to continue his service in Russia. He went on to tell about the prospects for airborne units of the armed forces of Ukraine.

General of the Army Pavel Grachev commented in his address that there are housing problems in the area of Voronezh and Borisoglebsk, where the division subunits withdrawn from Ukraine will be stationed, and that it will probably be several years before they are resolved. The Russian Minister of Defense said that this meeting is actually an extension of the Dagomys process and that he is happy to be establishing such friendly relations with his Ukrainian colleague.

There is still time to think about the decision. The General of the Army pointed out, however, that the choice must be made this year. The ministers of defense then answered questions from the officers. Among other things, the latter wanted to know what country would keep the division's fighting colors, how the military equipment would be "divided," what the prospects for advancement in the service would be for those who remain in Ukraine, what would become of the airfield and whether the division's airborne regiments in Russia would retain their actual and honorary names.

The commanders of the airborne regiments briefed the ministers of defense on the predicted outcome of the officers' choice. Around 60% of them plan to return to Russia, and 40% are prepared to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. They also suggested the following plan for the division's withdrawal to Russia. "Forward" detachments would be sent to Russia to prepare the materials and equipment base and build housing for the officers. This preparatory phase, they felt, would take two years. They also voiced complaints about the local authorities, who had created obstacles to

the exchange of coupons for rubles for officers going on leave or temporary duty in Russia. Ivan Makedonskiy, representative of the president of Ukraine in Bolgradskiy Rayon, was present and promised there in the auditorium that this problem would cease to exist literally the following day, that a thousand rubles plus the cost of the ticket would be exchanged for each family member. Incidentally, the position of the local authorities with respect to the division is clear, that it serves as a guarantee of peace and security in the region.

Talks on the division's future will continue.

### Presence of Mercenaries in Current Regional Conflicts Outlined

#### Introduction

924C1944A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 29, 15 Jul 92 p 11

[Unattributed introduction to a group of articles: "Soldiers of Fortune"]

[Text] *"Wild geese." "Dogs of war." "Soldiers of fortune." This is a list of euphemisms describing, in the West, the notion of "mercenary soldiers," a list which is far from complete.*

*"Volunteers." "Fighters for the national idea." "Patriots." This is how participants in various illegal paramilitary formations who have come here to fight are called in the territory of the former USSR at present, because the word "mercenary" grates on the people's ears in Transcaucasia, Moldova, the Dniester region, Crimea, and other hot spots.*

*No matter how flowery the metaphor, the essence of the phenomenon of "mercenary soldiers" remains the same both in the West and in our country, because ultimately, it does not matter, from the point of view of morality, in the name of what a person is prepared to kill and to be killed in someone else's land: money or the lofty national interests of those on whose side he is fighting.*

#### Armenia

924C1944B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 29, 15 Jul 92 p 11

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent Iosif Verdiyanyan: "Armenia: The Fame of Garibaldi and the Complex of Herostates"]

[Text] Yerevan—Who is fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh? The press is having a field day with fabrications about the participation of representatives of the emigre community and even... Negroes on the side of Armenian self-defense detachments. Is this the case?

In a conversation with a LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent, Manvel Sarkisyan, the permanent representative of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in Armenia, said: "Indeed, several Lithuanian volunteers do fight within the ranks of the people's militia of

Nagorno-Karabakh. They were brought to our long-suffering land by the lofty idea of the national-liberation struggle of Armenians in Karabakh. Recently, Nikolay Kichmar, a member of the Organizational Committee of the International Congress on Human Rights, which operates within the CSCE framework, and a representative of the Ukrainian Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka], died a valiant death during the battle of Shusha. He was buried in Yerevan on the Hill of Glory with all honors.

"Participation of Negroes, or Western and Middle Eastern Armenians, in fighting on the side of the Armenian armed formations is a bluff of the Azerbaijan propaganda. There is no documentary proof of this. However, here are the facts: Aleksey Anatolyevich Shpyrev, pilot of an Mi-24 combat helicopter; born in Sverdlovsk Oblast; military rank of Major. His aircraft was downed; he bailed out with a parachute, and died. They found \$300 in the dead man's pocket—such is the price of a member of a punitive expedition recruited by the army of Azerbaijan.

"Another example. Lieutenant Aleksandr Alekseyevich Kotov; fought within the ranks of the Azerbaijani OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment]; Commander of the 5th Platoon, Military Unit No. 47517. He was recruited for a sizable monetary reward. He met his inglorious death in Shaumyanovskiy Rayon of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

"Up to 100 mercenaries, mainly Russian servicemen, were killed last week in Shaumyanovskiy and Mardakertskiy rayons. Karabakh will submit the pictures and documents of the dead mercenaries, recruited from the 4th Army and the 23d Division of the CIS Unified Armed Forces which are deployed in Karabakh, to an international organization; they will also be transferred to the unfortunate families.

"By now, it is public knowledge that CIS officers and soldiers serving in Gyandzha went to Nagorno-Karabakh 'to make money' on days off. This has already been reported by Moscow newspapers. As well-informed sources maintain, the authorities of Azerbaijan pay the mercenaries 15,000 rubles [R] per hour.

"The day is not far away when the black book of crimes will be compiled which will be richly illustrated with the portraits of mercenaries who met with their shameful deaths in the land of Karabakh."

#### Azerbaijan

924C1944C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 29, 15 Jul 92 p 11

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Azerbaijan staff correspondent Elmira Akhundova: "Azerbaijan: Risk Premium"]

[Text] Baku—The national armed forces of Azerbaijan are being formed under extreme conditions. After all, a

real war is underway in the territory of the republic. This is why the leaders of the Ministry of Defense consider recruiting professional military specialists to the units of the national army one of their main tasks. To this end, a Supreme Soviet decree was adopted, according to which considerable social preferences are granted to officers who wish to transfer to service in the National Army of Azerbaijan: respectable pay, continuous length of service, large retirement benefits awarded for the entire length of service in the ranks of the Soviet Army, and subsequently the national army.

According to First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel N. Sadykov, at present up to 800 Russian-speaking officers from the Transcaucasus Military District already serve with the units of the National Army.

"These are mainly indigenous citizens of the republic or those who have worked here for many years. All of them have established themselves; they have nice apartments, second homes, parcels of land. Naturally, they are not too eager to pick up from their old locations and go away into the unknown."

I asked Colonel Sadykov about the functions which these officers perform in the National Army of Azerbaijan.

"Some of them work in the Ministry of Defense or teach in military schools. Others conduct military training of draftees and reservists. Still others volunteer for duty in the combat zone. At present, many military specialists of Russian, Ukrainian, and other nationalities serve in areas adjacent to the front. However, they are not officers of the CIS United Armed Forces, as some mass media maintain, but individuals who have officially transferred to serve in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the republic and have taken an oath. Service on a contractual basis is also being introduced in the armed forces of the Republic."

Leyla Yunusova, chief of the Republic Ministry of Defense's Information and Analysis Center, said: "By the way, the Armenian side has been using mercenary forces and armaments from foreign countries in the Karabakh conflict for a long time. For example, Armenians from Lebanon no longer conceal the fact that they are assisting the people from Karabakh, training and instructing their soldiers. Several days ago, they picked up on the battlefield the ID's of female snipers who fought for the Armenian side. The first and last names of the snipers and their addresses in Paris (!) were indicated on the ID's."

At present, those who express their wish to serve in the Armed Forces of the republic are primarily interested in high wages, good housing and services, and social provisions for their families. These were precisely the points enumerated in a letter to the republic leadership by the commander of one of the regiments deployed in the territory of Azerbaijan. He agreed to transfer, together with the entire regiment, to the National Army of

Azerbaijan if these points were accepted. Well, this is understandable—the payment for mortal risk should be commensurate.

### Georgia

924C1944D Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 29, 15 Jul 92 p 11

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Georgia staff correspondent Mikhail Yeligulashvili: "Georgia: The Afghan Brigade"]

[Text] Tbilisi—They will receive neither money nor special benefits. They will not end up here by responding to a newspaper advertisement or with a referral from an employment service. Nonetheless, they may be considered mercenaries, provided of course that we do not interpret this word as pejorative.

A rapid deployment brigade consisting of Afghan veterans was "thought up" at the founding congress of the Russian Afgantsy [Afghan veterans] Party. A delegation of the Georgian Union of Afghan Veterans was also among the guests of the congress. Perhaps, the union leader Nodar Giorgadze should be considered the godfather of the brigade that does not exist yet. The concept was developed collectively from then on. Afghan veterans who were beginning to get bored in the absence of extreme situations liked it.

The leaders of Georgia, Russia, and North Ossetia grasped at the idea of the Afghan veteran brigade as if at a straw. They began to talk about it as virtually the only force capable of keeping apart the belligerent parties in all the crumbling places of the former inviolable Union, primarily in the Caucasus.

It is no accident that as soon as one week after the congress in Moscow, when the grand assembly in Tbilisi was signaled, the leaders of the unions of Afghan veterans from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, and North Ossetia arrived there, and in addition to them, leaders from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Moscow... The issue of creating a paramilitary formation on the pattern of UN forces was considered in detail during the meetings between Shevardnadze and Galazov, and later Shevardnadze and Yeltsin. Decisions were made to the effect that, since a rapid deployment detachment was being created, it should be appropriately financed, outfitted, and armed—at the most modern, supreme level. The president of Russia promised that the Ministry of Defense of his republic would participate actively in the creation of the Afghan brigade, and would assist both with financing and armament. On the other hand, the Afghan veterans themselves, who will carry out this plan directly, resolved at the first meeting in Tbilisi that the Afghan veterans of Georgia would become the foundation of the detachment; however, participation quotas for Afghan veterans from Russia and North Ossetia, Armenia and Azerbaijan would be distributed on a completely equal basis...



The issue of command and subordination has not been resolved yet: The detachment will be subordinated either to the government of one of the interested parties, or the top brass of the army, or some kind of a united committee... It appears to me, personally, that one more scenario cannot be ruled out. The brigade of Afghan veterans may suddenly turn out to be completely autonomous, both in terms of its status and in essence, and will be guided only by its own ideas of truth and justice. Meanwhile, 500 men who have been through a war (this is precisely what the initial strength of the detachment is expected to be) are a formidable force which will not be very easy to control if it gets out of control.

In the opinion of Nodar Giogadze, between a month and a month and a half will be needed to resolve organizational issues and, as he put it, to restore combat condition. Subsequently, the brigade of Afghan veterans will embark on action in Tskhinvali...

### Ukraine

924C1944E Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 29, 15 Jul 92 p 11

[Article by S.K.: "Ukraine: Are the Boys Playing War?"]

[Text] Kiev—Volunteers to go to Crimea are signing up in downtown Kiev, in Museum Lane, where the headquarters of the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) is located. There is no dearth of those wishing to try the luck of the "soldier of fortune": students, workers, physicians, for the most part, young people. They are welcome to come and sign up, all the more so because the procedure of joining the ranks of volunteers is extremely simple: The future "soldier" [published in Ukrainian] states his military occupation specialty, the reserve military rank as entered in the military service card, the size of footwear, clothing, gas mask, and so on. Thereafter, he may go and continue to study, work, or treat patients. When X-hour comes, he will be notified, driven to the right place, outfitted, and issued weapons.

It should be noted that the guys from the Ukrainian National Assembly are as serious as can be, despite what at first glance appears to be "playing war." This is an extreme right, anti-Semitic, and pro-Fascist organization which has offered the slogan "Ukraine for Ukrainians!" Virtually no major political party or sociopolitical organization has anything to do with UNA, to say nothing of the official power structure. Nonetheless, this organization exists successfully and is well financed by someone, judging by the fact that it already has experience in dispatching the "soldiers of fortune" to a zone of conflict. It is so well financed that several dozen soldiers of the Ukrainian National Self-Defense Forces (UNSO) set up under the UNA were dispatched to defend Ukrainian interests on the left bank, in the Dniester region.

Understandably, if, God forbid, this happens after all, the volunteers recruited by the UNA will not at all go to the Crimea as classical "soldiers of fortune" who fight for money rather than because they are sensitive to the

national interests of one of the warring parties. A majority of those who are enlisting "for the Crimean war" are doing so primarily for idealistic considerations: Crimea is Ukrainian land!

Nonetheless, the authorities of neither the city nor the republic are responding in any way to the fact that an illegal paramilitary formation is being openly created in the capital of Ukraine. The Procuracy is also silent. Only the Crimean separatists are not silent. In response to the actions of the UNA, local national-patriots are forming their own self-defense detachments, for which "soldiers of fortune" are signing up in precisely the same manner. They have also been ordered to wait for X-hour.

### Dniester Region

924C1944F Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 29, 15 Jul 92 p 11

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Dubossary special correspondent Yefim Bershin: "Dniester: For a Bowl of Soup"]

[Text] Dubossary—In the Dniester region, they are fond of telling you a story about a marksman who came from faraway Chukotka to help them. First off, he removed from his gun an optical sight for which he had absolutely no use. Subsequently, he chose a position, and began looking out for the enemy. Apparently, he did not have to wait long. A branch stirred suspiciously on one of the poplars on the opposite bank of the Dniester, and the Chukcha fired. He was very much surprised when a woman with a gun clutched in her hands fell from the tree. Apparently, people from the Dniester region try to confirm with this story their suppositions that female Latvian snipers are fighting for the Moldovan side, which still has not been officially proven.

Whether this is true or not, it is already known that "outsiders" fight on both banks of the Dniester.

Vladimir Rylyakov, chairman of the Defense Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Dniester region, said that it is proposed that those who come to help the Dniester region sign a contract and join the guard. According to the contract, they are entitled to free meals and literally until very recently, R1,750. At present, volunteers are paid R3,000 in conjunction with price increases. Understandably, they could earn more at home, at their work stations. All the more so, since a majority of the Don and Kuban Cossacks have signed no contracts at all, since they do not wish to be subordinated to anyone. They fought for the chow, for a bowl of soup.

I think that those coming here may be divided into two categories. The first consists of those who genuinely consider the residents of the Dniester region victims of an aggression and strive to help them in their hour of need. As far as the second group is concerned, it consists of a more dangerous contingent of people who try to divide the residents of the Dniester region along ethnic lines. As is known, the Dniester region is a republic with

many ethnic groups, in which there are approximately equal numbers of Moldovans, Ukrainians, and Russians, and in addition, there are a good number of Germans, Jews, Bulgarians, and representatives of other nationalities. There have never been ethnic problems in this region. However, as it has turned out, the Cossacks from the Kuban and the Don came to protect specifically Russians. Various "patriotic" organizations in various cities of Russia also call for protecting Russians in the Dniester region. Meanwhile, Russians account for 22 percent in the area. The Cossacks were withdrawn. However, combat groups of the Ukrainian National Assembly have now arrived to protect Ukrainians, specifically Ukrainians, who account for 26 percent in the area. Should they expect defenders from Bulgaria, Germany, and Israel?

### Sides Produce Contradictory Versions of Tallinn Incident

PM0308142992 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 92 p 1

[G. Sapozhnikova report: "Appearances Can Be Deceptive. Details of Tallinn Incident"]

[Text] The essence of the firefight which excited Tallinn on Monday became clear at yesterday's press conference by Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, who said: "This incident has shocked the Danish Government. All this again confirms the need for the Russian troops' earliest possible withdrawal from Estonia."

In accordance with the classical rules for the development of a conflict, the two versions of what happened completely contradict one another. It is the Estonian side's view that Russian soldiers attacked a company of Estonia's Defense Forces which had arrived to take over the military vehicle park.

It is the Russians' view that this was the latest in a series of armed attempts to seize a Baltic Fleet vehicle park, which in a couple of weeks will automatically go to Estonia. The Estonian Defense Forces' fighters took the unit commander hostage. When reinforcements arrived on the orders of Baltic Fleet Commander Admiral Yegorov, the Estonian soldiers opened fire. And they were the first to do so. As a result, an officer of the Russian Army and a guard from the Republican Internal Security Guards received bullet wounds. There were fewer losses on the Estonian side—one person received a broken nose, there were three fractured skulls, but on the other hand moral damage was inflicted—the Russians gave the Estonian fighters a beating, stood them up along a fence, and stripped them (something which, let us note, does the Russian Army no credit).

A mass of unanswered questions still remains. The Estonian side asserts that its fighters did not carry loaded assault rifles and point to the Russians, claiming that they had fired at their own men. At the same time there are witnesses to the fact that it was actually one Estonian guy who started to fire at human targets first.

It is also difficult to determine who actually inflicted the bullet wounds, if you take into consideration that the Estonian combat soldiers use weapons which were confiscated from the Russian Army some time ago.

...You know what is the saddest thing in this whole story? The fact that the television pictures do not make it clear who your own men are and who is the enemy—both Russians and Estonians are dressed in identical green fatigues. Let alone the failure to realize in your own heart who are your own men and who are your enemies.

### Stop Press

At the request of Prime Minister Tiit Vähi, Estonian Republic Deputy Foreign Minister E. Liimets telephoned O. Popovich, the Russian Federation's charge d'affaires ad interim in Estonia, and informed him that the Estonian Defense Forces' actions to seize the military facilities have been recognized as a mistake, in connection with which the Estonian Government expresses its regret.

## UKRAINE

### Sharikov's Past Reviewed, Officers' Union Expresses Distrust

92UM1231A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
3 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel Vladimir Mulyava, Colonel (Militia) Grigoriy Omelchenko, and Major-General Yuriy Prokofyev: "Who Is This 'Adviser' of the President?"]

[Text] In a Russian dictionary the word "sovetsnik" [adviser, counselor] means "One who advises, gives advice."

Naturally (for the civilized world) the advice and consultation should be given by not only competent and highly professional, but also decent, honest specialists. This is particularly true when the President seeks advice and the fate of the people and the state often depends upon his decisions.

One of the advisers (on military questions) of the President of independent Ukraine is the former specialist on the "Concise Course of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)]," Lt Gen B.I. Sharikov.

### Biographic Information

Boris Ivanovich Sharikov, born in 1936, a native of Stavropol Kray and a Russian. In 1976, by correspondence, he completed the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin and in 1982, the Social Sciences Academy under the CPSU Central Committee.

Service career: signals platoon commander for one year and one month. Then intensive Komsomol and party activities in the Soviet Army political bodies: secretary of the battalion Komsomol organization, senior instructor for Komsomol work in the army, assistant

chief of a political department for Komsomol work, deputy regimental commander for political affairs, deputy chief of a political department, chief of a divisional political department, first deputy chief of the army political department, chief of the army political department, first deputy chief of the district political directorate, and chief of the military political directorate of the Central Group of Forces. In the designated positions Sharikov served an average of from 18 months to 3 years.

From 9 April through 28 November 1991, he was the chief of the Military Political Directorate of the Kiev MD. After the abolishment of the political bodies in the army, Sharikov was assigned as the commander of the Kiev MD and then was appointed...assistant to the President for military affairs.

Having arrived in Kiev, Boris Ivanovich joined actively in the sociopolitical and sociomercenary life.

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Here are a few, possibly not the most vivid, fragments from his life. On 27-28 July 1991, the Constituent Congress of the Democratic Officers was held in Kiev, and this congress formed the social organization of the Ukrainian Officers' Union [SOU]. The chief goal which the SOU set for itself was the following: 1) the creation of Ukraine's own Armed Forces on the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty, by a legal Parliamentary path, on the principles of reasonable sufficiency, professionalism and not under any party's control; 2) the building of an independent, democratic state under the law—Ukraine.

In order to prevent the holding of the congress, a multipronged attack was carried out on the most different levels. The generals of the Kiev MD particularly distinguished themselves as did the Head of the Political Directorate Sharikov, personally.

On the eve of the congress, Gens Sharikov and Kalinin demanded that the then First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council I. Plyushcha not only ban the congress but also institute criminal proceedings against the Chairman of the Organizing Committee V. Mulyava and his assistants for an attempt to split the Soviet Army and undermine the Soviet Union. Sharikov was categorically against the establishing of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Many of the chauvinistically inclined generals threatened to "drown the congress delegates in the Dnieper..."

When threats did not work, upon instruction from the Kiev MD Political Directorate, a delegation of "fighters on the ideological front" was sent to the congress, and this was given the task of thwarting the congress or channeling its course toward the establishing of "united and indivisible USSR Armed Forces, defending the ideas of the Communist Party and countering the nascent separatism among the democratic officers."

Early in the morning (at around 0400 hours) on 19 August 1991, a conference of the military council was held at the headquarters of the Kiev MD under the leadership of Varennikov, one of the organizers of the plot. Participating in the work of the military council were the district commander Col Gen Chechevatov, Lt Gen Sharikov, Lt Gen Kurdakov, the former First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Gurenko and other council members who worked out a plan of measures to support the decisions of the GKChP [State Committee for the Emergency] for introducing a state of emergency in Ukraine and a curfew. For these purposes the district troops were sent coded telegrams with the appropriate instructions. In their positions the troops were brought to a full combat alert... (KOZA, 27 Sep 92).

The Chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Kiev MD VPU [Military Political Directorate], Col N. Gusarov (a subordinate of Sharikov's), openly declared in his interview with the newspaper VECHERNIY KIYEV (20 Aug 91): "In the instructions sent to the district troops, the personnel were to concentrate on maximum vigilance. It was essential to explain to the citizens that the army was subordinate to Union laws and the USSR Constitution, and to the decrees and decisions of the GKChP."

At 0640 hours on 19 August, according to the assertion of K. Masik, he was phoned at home by L. Kravchuk and informed that a state of emergency had been introduced, that the troops were being called in and, in his opinion, a military coup was possible. Kravchuk asked that he come to the Cabinet of Ministers and at 0900 hours go meet Varennikov who had arrived in Kiev... S. Gurenko was already in the office of L. Kravchuk. Three minutes later Varennikov appeared with Chechevatov, the commander of the Kiev MD, and Sharikov, a member of the military council.

Varennikov demanded the carrying out of Decree No 1 of the GKChP: the restricting of transport traffic, inspections and, where we felt this necessary, the imposing of a curfew, while in Western Ukraine a state of emergency was to be introduced. Varennikov stated that if there was confusion in the execution of the orders of the GKChP and if emergency measures were not taken (let us remember that Gens Chechevatov and Sharikov had arrived with him.—Authors), the troops which were on combat alert would be used, even to the point of bloodshed...

Listening to these threats addressed to L. Kravchuk and the Ukrainian people, Chechevatov and Sharikov tacitly agreed with the former deputy minister of defense of the former USSR who promised bloodshed for our people...

**From the Statement of the Commission of the Sociopsychological Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense**

On 24 April 1992, in an inspection of military unit 28312, on its territory they discovered unreported military property and equipment, namely a ODAZ-828 semi-trailer and a dacha-type house.

The designated property had arrived in the troop unit from the Central Group of Forces [CGF] on 24 May 1991 by rail (waybill No 963932) under the name "supply freight" (freight weight was 7,000 kilograms) in two railroad cars and escorted by a guard who traveled in a separate car.

The initial dispatcher of the freight from the CGF was the field postal unit 14394 (waybill 489).

Upon arrival on 12 May 1991 at Mukachevo Station of the Lvov Railroad, the freight was transloaded by the forces of the 294th Headquarters of the Central Transloading Base, and then to Kiev-Svyatoshchino Station it travelled as dispatched from unit 71175 (Mukachevo) to the recipient's address, the military unit 28312 (Kiev).

Upon arrival at Svyatoshchino Station, on 24 May 1991, the freight was unloaded by the forces of Unit 28312, delivered to the unit's territory and accepted for storage without internal inspection, since the windows and doors of the semi and the dacha-type house had been sealed and were locked.

The freight was not entered in the equipment accounting ledger.

[End of statement]

According to the explanations of the commander of unit 28312, Lt Col N. Tushchenko, and his deputy, the semi and the dacha house belonged to the former chief of the former Kiev MD Political Directorate, Lt Gen B. Sharikov who in verbal orders had instructed the commander of Unit 28312 to accept the freight, organize its unloading, transporting and storage on the unit's territory.

During their storage (May 1991—April 1992), the semi and the dacha house were repeatedly inspected and checked by Sr WO [praporshchik] N. Rushchak (remember this name), Sharikov's special messenger, as well as by the President's "adviser" himself.

Sharikov, in the presence of the members of the commission, representatives of the SOU and the Deputy of the Kiev City Council V. Roshchin, confirmed that the semi and the dacha house were his property and purchased during the period of his service in the CGF at one of the troop units. He presented bills of 24 April 1991 on paying for the dacha house for a total of 505 rubles and 24 kopecks at the field State Bank facility of the CGF (PUG-34720) as well as statements from the Hradec Billeting Office of the CGF of 15 Feb 1991 on the writing off and disassembly of the dacha house according to the Soviet-Czech Protocol of Agreements on the CGF.

#### Commission statement

The initial cost of the dacha house was 4,850 rubles (in the prices before their rise). The percentage of usability according to the statement was 68. However only 11 percent was paid for, with an actually good state of the dacha house which in terms of usability was approaching

100 percent. But even 68 percent usability would be a total of 3,298 rubles and not the 505 rubles and 24 kopecks paid by Sharikov.

[End of statement.]

Sharikov did not submit any supporting documents for the semi. According to his explanation, the given semi had been given to him in 1990, as written off equipment, by the Chief of the Equipment and Printing Department of the WGF [Western Group of Forces], Col V. Masonovets. Then the semi was transported to the CGF as military freight. The semi is in good conditions and is fit for use. One can only wonder how it could have been written off.

Masonovets who "gave" the state property to Sharikov is currently serving in the WGF.

Sharikov offered the semi for the use of the Commission at its discretion and did not make any claim of ownership to it.

Sharikov did not submit any documents showing payment for the rail shipment of personal effects—the dacha house and the semi.

With Sharikov's agreement, an external examination was made of the contents of the semi and the dacha house. In the semi were up to 4 cubic meters of sawn lumber and 2 cubic meters of wood chipborad. In the dacha house were upholstered chairs covered with semiwool blankets, a wardrobe, an air conditioner, a desk and other packed effects which, in Sharikov's explanation, belonged to him.

On the day that the Commission began its work (10 April), Sharikov's special messenger Sr WO N. Rushchak paid the bookkeeping office of Unit 28312 a total of 450 rubles for storing the personal effects of the President's "adviser" on the unit's territory from January through May 1992, and then mysteriously disappeared from Kiev.

#### From the Commission's Conclusion

Considering that documents were not submitted showing payment for the cost of transporting the dacha house by rail and shipping was carried out as military "supply freight," the given fact must be considered a violation and it must be described as the use by Col Gen B. Sharikov of his official position for private gain.

Due to Sharikov's lack of supporting documents for the ODAZ-828 semi, it is to be considered military supply freight.

To retain in the authorized manner from Sharikov the cost of transporting by rail in a military train over the route CGF—Kiev-Svyatoshchino Station the unpaid-for personnel effects in an amount of 7,000 kilogram considering the materials handling services and the existing rules of payment for international transporting.

Within a one-month period, to demand that Sharikov pay for the storage at Unit 28312 of the personal effects belonging to him from May through December 1991, inclusively.

**From the Statement-Report on the Results of the Inspection of Units 28312 and 804 of the Military Plant:**

On 16 August 1991, a written request was sent from the Foreign Economic Association Kosmos (Tashkent) to the former chief of the Kiev MD Political Directorate B. Sharikov for accepting freight with a total volume of up to 25 tonnes from the Frunze and Tashkent Railroad Stations as well as storage at warehouses assigned to him in Kiev.

[End of statement.]

The name of nature of the freight was not disclosed. The freight, according to the letter, was destined for the WGF units.

On the same day (16 August 1991), Sharikov, having reviewed the request, imposed his resolution: "To Comrade V.M. Les. Assume control over the arrival of the freight, meet it, accept it and house it. Signed: Sharikov."

**Statement**

Col V.M. Les is the acting chief of the Equipment and Printing Center of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and previously worked in the former Political Directorate of the Kiev MD which was headed by Sharikov.

[End of statement.]

On 27 August 1991, the commander of Unit 28312 (where Sharikov had stored the dacha house and semi) received a written request No 237 from the All-Union Scientific Research Center for the Development and Operation of the Experimental AIUS-AGRORESOURCES System (Tashkent Affiliate) with an analogous request to accept for storage freight for carrying out a joint program together with Unit 48251 which was located in the WGF. The client guaranteed payment for the unloading, loading and storage.

An interesting detail: on both requests of the Foreign Economic Association Kosmos and the All-Union Scientific Research Center was the signature of the same person, the director G. Madaliyeva.

According to the waybill, the name of the freight was "Rare Earth Elements" with the notation: "Attention!!! In handling the product observe particular care." The total value of the freight was 5,461,000 rubles.

On 13 September 1991, a representative of Unit 48251 (WGF) under authorization No 173 received a portion of the freight totaling 188 boxes for independent delivery to the WGF.

On 8 October 1991, the KamAZ-53212 truck with the military registration number 70-71 DN (WGF) removed the remaining (251) boxes using the same authorization.

Up to now the client has not made payment for the materials handling work or for the storage of the freight. However, requests to the client for payment for services have not been submitted by the Commander of Unit 28312 N. Tushchenko and B. Sharikov.

The further fate of the freight and its actual destination are not known because it was sent on to the WGF.

The Commission was dubious about the fact of providing gratis aid to the Kosmos Association (Tashkent), bypassing the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR and the Commander of the Kiev MD Chechevatov, as well the questions of an appeal directly to Sharikov for help and mediation in the storage and transporting of a civilian organization's freight to German territory.

Under Sharikov's order, Unit 28312 is currently storing a Volga GAZ-31 car which belongs to Col V. Masonovets who is serving in the WGF. This is the same Masonovets who, according to Sharikov's statement, gave him the ODAZ-828 semi in 1990.

The former special messenger of Sharikov's, Sr WO Rushchak who mysteriously disappeared from Kiev has surfaced...abroad, in the WGF, where he is serving in the position of regimental instructor. The materials of the inspection show just how he got there.

In May 1991, Rushchak arrived from the CGF, where he had been constantly serving under Sharikov, for further service in the Kiev MD and again was appointed as Sharikov's special messenger. Because of the disbanding of the Political Directorate, the special messenger by Order No 01-PM of 14 January 1992, was sent to the Chief of the Kiev Signals School, Col K. Panasik (one of the other members in Sharikov's "clan".) Rushchak turned up once at the school on 30 January 1992, when he submitted his orders to the Personnel Department and had a meeting with Panasik, with whom he had served in the CGF, and where Sharikov had been the chief of the Political Directorate.

By the order of the school chief No 46 of 30 January 1992, Rushchak was assigned to a training process support battalion but he has never been seen here.

In February-April 1992, Rushchak turned up several times at the well-known military unit to check on the proper storage of Sharikov's personal effects.

Rushchak arrived in the WGF after paying for the storage of Sharikov's property at the unit (10 April 1992), carrying Panasik's order No 3/128 of 14 April 1992. The order gives the Order of the Kiev MD Commander No 011 of 18 January 1992 as the grounds for the transfer from the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the WGF. There was an excerpt from this order. In actuality the designated order was not issued and is false. In serving in the WGF in the position of regimental

instructor, Rushchak at the same time is on the rolls of the Signals School. It should also be noted that on 18 January 1992, Rushchak took the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people.

After returning in May of last year from the CGF, Rushchak did not turn in his foreign service passport at the new place of service (Kiev MD) and in April 1992, used it for crossing the state frontiers in getting to the WGF.

According to the explanation of the former chief of the Kiev MD OMU Maj Gen A. Pletenets and the employee of the directorate V. Miroshin, the grounds for issuing Rushchak a visa for crossing the frontier was the orders from Panasik and repeated "telephone requests" from Sharikov.

The proper paper for issuing a visa in a foreign passport to leave for a foreign state was missing for Rushchak and no one had drawn it up. The note on the issuing of the visa in Rushchak's foreign passport was made by Miroshin and it was approved by the signature of Gen Pletenets under the verbal orders of Sharikov who was already at work as the President's "adviser."

#### From the Commission Conclusion.

Sr WO N. Rushchak was transferred for further service in the WGF from the Ukrainian Armed Forces without proper permission, not having the legal grounds for this.

The commission of the designated violations was abetted by Lt Gen B. Sharikov who, in taking advantage of his official position in his new post (assistant to the President), repeatedly "requested" that Maj Gen A. Pletenets send M. Rushchak who had taken the military oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people on official business and draw up documents for crossing the frontier. This was irrespective of the fact that in January 1992, the WGF had sent an official refusal for his transfer...

[End of statement.]

By the order of the Minister of Defense of the former USSR, Ye. Shaposhnikov, No 01219 of 10 October 1991, the former chief of the Signals Department of the CGF Staff, Col K. Panasik, a fellow serviceman of Sharikov's in the CGF, was appointed to the post of chief of the Kiev Higher Military Engineer Signals Schools.

One can judge just what the friend and fellow officer of the President's "adviser" has been able to accomplish in the six months of filling the new post from the facts established by the Commission of the Military Education Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

From the first days on the job, Panasik has repeatedly stated that the school will never be Ukrainian and has shown unconcealed sarcasm over the very idea of establishing the Ukrainian Armed Forces. His actions were the equivalent to the position of Sharikov.

An analysis of the telephone bills of the ZAS [Foreign Telephone Exchange] shows that Panasik maintained regular close contacts with the leadership of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. At the same time he had virtually no contact with the Military Education Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and to which the school is subordinate; he ignored it.

During the time of Panasik's leadership of the school, the morale of the personnel has been described by the Commission as unstable, the state of military discipline, organization and order has deteriorated significantly. In the first quarter of the current year, 42 major infractions have been committed with the dominant violation being the consumption of alcoholic beverages and the committing of infractions because of this. Crime has increased among the officer candidates.

The school chief Panasik, his deputy Col V. Siverskiy and the Chief of the Support Battalion, Maj S. Golubin have repeatedly violated established procedures for the sale of motor vehicle equipment, for the leasing of military equipment and warehouse capacity. Panasik dismissed the public control commission for the operation of the military trade store. He personally has distributed scarce commodities.

At the beginning of 1992, the school command, under the order of the military unit 93623, sold 15 vehicles to outside persons, bypassing the Commercial Center of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. This was a major violation of the demands of the Decree of the Ukrainian President No 28 and the Order of the Minister of Defense No 5. The Ukrainian Armed Forces suffered enormous material loss (running into millions of rubles).

According to Order No 25/3 1548 (the signature of the Commander of Unit 93623, Col G. Dronnin is forged), there are listed as sold to the Public Dining Combine Mashinostroitel [Machine Builder] (Dnepropetrovsk) the following: five ZIL-131 chassis and 8 Ural-375 chassis. In actuality, instead of the chassis they have sold sided trucks. No certificates of appraisal and technical state were drawn up for the individual vehicles.

In the aim of concealing the diverting of the vehicles to Dnepropetrovsk, the Chief of the Line Department, Lt Col V. Demidov, upon Panasik's orders, falsified Paragraph 3 of the Order of the School Chief No 95 of 2 May 1992, and from which information was removed on the sending of personnel to Dnepropetrovsk. In actuality an officer and four warrant officers were sent to Dnepropetrovsk to deliver the motor equipment. But travel orders were not issued to them, and their expenses were not paid. The material costs for the trip of the KamAZ (1,100 km) and UAZ (910 km) vehicles were not recovered.

On 30 December 1991, under Panasik's instructions, by payment authorization No 615 (initial. D/Zh-5446) the URTK transferred to the GAZ [Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Plant] Center for the Kiev ATO [Vehicle Technical Department], a sum of 31,000 rubles for purchasing the

bodies for Volga cars. During the period of the Commission's work (the end of March 1992), the bodies had not arrived at the school and the money had not been returned.

On 12 February, upon Panasik's orders, some 2,300 liters of AI-93 gasoline were dispatched to the Korostyshev Elektropribor [Electrical Instrument] Plant for "temporary use."

On 19 February 1992, under written orders from Panasik, 8 tons of diesel fuel were issued to the Irpen Progress Combine (waybill No 499).

On 21 March 1992, upon Panasik's orders and in violation of the Regulation of Institutions of Higher Learning, the 311th Training Group from the school was taken out of its planned exercises and sent to carry out economic work at the Maloye Slavutich Enterprise. The officer candidates did not receive pay for the work done. Transport costs were not reimbursed.

Under the leadership of Col Panasik, together with workers from the Kiev MD Automobile Service, two Ural diesel vehicles and 15 cable layers were readied for sale outside Ukraine. Prior to this the Firm Vostokinvestmore [Eastern Maritime Investment] (Vladivostok) had transferred a total of 126,000 rubles to the account of Unit 93623 and 708,000 rubles for the cable layers to the account of Unit 55334; this equipment they endeavored to sell after the ban on their sale.

It was only the intervention of Col N. Gonnar which prevented the realization of these illegal deals.

At the time of the inspection, at the school they discovered sitting under the open sky 5 GAZ-66 (PAK-65) vehicles belonging to the District Officer Club without any papers having been drawn up for this action. At the site of their former storage (garages at the Officer Club) were the vehicles of private individuals, including the Volga-GAZ-31 belonging to the President's "adviser" Sharikov. (Incidentally, prior to the increase in prices, Deputy Sharikov had purchased on 29 December 1991 a VAZ-2109 vehicle which by warrant had been received by O. Babayev, identification card KU No 066181 of 5 July 1986.)

From the results of the inspection, the school Chief Panasik by an order of the Ukrainian minister of defense was dismissed from the position held with his subsequent discharge into the reserves.

The newspaper of the Baltic MD ZA RODINU (27 November 1988) in its article "A Zone Beyond Criticism" wrote of the selfish abuses of Panasik at that time. But having highly-placed patrons in the person of Sharikov and others, the colonel continued to wrack havoc in advancing in service.

Materials on the mercenary and other abuses committed by Panasik and other officials at the Kiev Signals School were sent by secret mail to the Ukrainian Procurator (init. No 150/08 of 8 April 1992). The materials were

received by the procuracy employee Belik. Regardless of the fact that they were addressed to the General Procurator V. Shishkin personally, they did not reach him (or his first deputy Yu. Gaysinskiy).

With the help of Sharikov to whom Panasik had turned with a petition over his discharge, the inspection materials ended upon in the district military procuracy and which is headed by Maj Gen Just Frolov. The "legalist in striped trousers" had been reputed at one time as an ardent defender of the "united and indivisible Soviet Army" (he was among the first together with the former Commander of the Kiev MD Chechevatov to go to the well-known January sabbath—the all-Army assembly—to save the USSR Armed Forces). But prior to this he was able to prove himself as the "savior" of many Kiev MD officials who had sullied themselves in corruption and mercenary abuses. This has been described in detail in the mass information media (NARODNAYA ARMIYA of 20 December 1991, NEZAVISIMOST of 20 March 1992 and others). But the general of justice as before stands on guard over the "nomenklatura legality." We shall inform our readers what decision he takes on the materials of the mercenary abuses of Panasik.

In order that the "mysterious story" not go on without evidence on the mercenary abuses of the President's adviser Sharikov, one of the authors of this article (G. Omelchenko) on 13 May 1992 presented this to the General Procurator V. Shishkin and his First Deputy Yu. Gaysinskiy. Moreover, copies of the designated materials were sent to the administration of the Ukrainian President and to the security service.

The ardent concern shown by Sharikov to save Panasik can be explained not only by the similarity of their self-serving misdeeds, by the joint service and so forth. According to a statement from the inspection of the health facilities in the support battalion of the Military Signals School, where Panasik was the chief, it has been established that in the sauna of the facilities from December 1991, every Saturday Col Panasik, Lt Gen Sharikov and certain other "pro-Moscow" generals used to take the steam.

The generals obtained the health services gratis. Who might pay for the used water, steam and electric power was of no concern to the generals. According to a statement by the commission members who conducted the inspection "conditions for discussing the questions of the sale of motor vehicles were normal."

Here are a few more lines for the sociopolitical portrait of the fan of free saunas and characterizing the diverse activities of the President's "adviser."

From the explanation of Pvt S.: "On 26 February 1992, I was summoned by Lt Gen Sharikov to pick him up in civilian clothes from the former building of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and upon his instruction we were driving to his dacha in Pushcha-Voditsa. On Stetsenko Street in passing a ZIL-130 car No 60-20, I hit its left rear wheel. The driver of the ZIL and Gen Sharikov

began to argue. The general threatened the driver that he would take measures as a deputy of the Ukrainian Supreme Council. But when things reached the point of summoning a representative of the GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] the general left the scene of the accident..."

From the explanation of V.: "...At approximately 2000 hours on 26 February 1992, I, together with the driver M. who was behind the wheel of the ZIL-130 vehicle, License 60-20, and the driver of the bus which we were servicing were returning to the ATP [maintenance depot]. Upon making a turn, I felt a strong blow in the rear of the vehicle. We stopped and, getting out from the car, saw a military UAZ-469. Emerging from it were the soldier driver and a person in civilian clothing who immediately hurled himself at us with threats and insults... We replied that the GAI would come and investigate who was drunk. After these words he immediately turned around and quickly walked to the bus stop and after several minutes took a No 30 bus toward Pushcha-Voditsa. There were witnesses whose names we took, who saw this event and heard how the deputy shouted at us..."

During the years of the Great Patriotic and Afghan Wars, soldiers frequently covered their commanders and saved their lives. In peacetime, the deputy-general, frightened by the accident, abandoned the soldier late during a winter's night and hurried off to his dacha... What is this: cowardice? Indifference? Or something else?

On 6-7 May 1992, in Kiev a conference was held of the Ukrainian Officers' Union for the military education system. Present at the conference were 312 delegates from 32 VUZes, 2 academies, 74 military chairs, 4 NIU [scientific research schools], 64 training centers representing the more than 200,000-strong faculty of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Among them are 123 doctors of sciences and 2,230 candidates of sciences. The conference participants approved an Appeal to the President, to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, L. Kravchuk. In particular in Point 6 of the Appeal, it is stated: "The Conference expressed its distrust of your assistant for military affairs, Lt Gen Sharikov, as a military specialist who does not have the authority and respect among the servicemen, who has discredited the rank of general, who has fought against the democratic movement for the independence of Ukraine and the creation of its Armed Forces, who defends the interests of Russia, who has repeatedly committed various abuses and does not provide you with objective information."

The given point, like the entire Appeal, was adopted unanimously. An analogous decision had been approved by the Third SOU Congress.

Sharikov's incompetence was again confirmed by a conference held on 26 May 1992 on military education questions and by the report prepared by it on 15 May

and forwarded to the President on the ways for forming the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The natural question arises: "What can such 'Sharikov advisers' and their ilk give in advice and are they necessary to an independent Ukraine? Who will reply?"

[Signed] Col Vladimir Mulyava, chief of the Sociopsychological Service of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, member of the Collegium of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and candidate of philosophical sciences.

Col (Milizia) Grigoriy Omelchenko, chairman of the SOU and candidate of legal sciences.

Maj Gen Yuriy Prokovyev, chief of the Military Education Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, candidate of pedagogical sciences.

P.S. An investigation is being carried out on other instances of abuse by Sharikov and the results of these will be announced.

#### Chief of Medical Directorate Col Tsyganok Interviewed

92UM1258A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian*  
19 Jun 92 p 1

[Interview with Colonel of Medical Services Georgiy Vasilyevich Tsyganok, chief of the Military Medical Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, by Pavel Goshchko, *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* correspondent, under the rubric "First Interview in the New Position": "The Establishment of the Medical Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Is Underway"]

[Text] By order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel of Medical Services G. Tsyganok has been appointed Chief of the Military Medical Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Georgiy Vasilyevich was born into a peasant family in Uzin in Belotserkovskiy Rayon, Kiev Oblast. He began his military career (after graduating from the Kiev Medical Institute) in the Far East as chief of a medical aid post. He subsequently served as chief of the medical service of a regiment, a formation and an army, as chief of the School of Advanced Training for Doctors at the Kiev Medical Institute, as deputy chief and Chief of Medical Services of the Kiev Military District. He completed the school of management at the Medical Academy imeni S.M. Kirov.

G. Tsyganok was a participant in the Afghan events and helped in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster. He has been awarded the orders of the Red Star and For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR, 3rd degree, and the Emblem of Honor. He is an honored doctor of Ukraine and an outstanding health-care worker.



[Goshchko] Georgiy Vasilyevich, this interview is being conducted on the eve of Medical Worker's Day. Are there any special events to commemorate the traditional holiday this year?

[Tsyganok] Absolutely. The military medical workers are celebrating it in a new situation and in a new capacity. The formation of our own armed forces, firmly announced and now being implemented, demanded the establishment of a proper system of independent medical support and brought the military medical service a number of totally different tasks which it had never before performed.

[Goshchko] Just what are they?

[Tsyganok] Let us start with the fact that we have a military medical service of the armed forces of Ukraine, which did not exist previously. There were medical services of the three military districts, the Black Sea Fleet and other large operational formations, and a number of separate medical units and installations. But these were all independent formations with weak horizontal ties and directed in a centralized manner from Moscow.

We had to set up an administrative organ, the brain of the service, which would perform the functions, first of all, of exercising direct administrative and operational control over these forces and, secondly, of setting up through them the actual medical service of the armed forces of Ukraine. This important and extremely difficult task involving a great deal of responsibility was assigned to the medical service team of the Directorate of Rear Services of the Kiev Military District.

[Goshchko] And how did it handle the task?

[Tsyganok] I can say without bragging, it did a good job. It also provided the foundation for forming the Military Medical Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Another important area of this work is one of establishing a system of preventive medical facilities meeting our needs, reorganizing them qualitatively and quantitatively, and bringing them up to the level of modern achievements in medical science.

[Goshchko] What is being done to achieve this?

[Tsyganok] A working group directed by Colonel of Medical Services Vladimir Belyy, chief surgeon of Ukraine, honored doctor of Ukraine, professor and doctor of medical services, Colonel of Medical Services Nikolay Vovkodav, chief therapist and honored doctor of Ukraine, and Colonel of Medical Services Anton Lyutskevich, chief of the 1st Department of the VMU [Military Medical Directorate], has worked hard to arrive at the optimal staffs for the hospitals and health clinics and to distribute these in accordance with the territorial system of medical support for the troops. The main, basic difference from the existing situation lies in the fact that larger, 300-400-bed, multi-specialized hospitals capable of providing the main types of specialized

medical aid locally are to be established by reducing and consolidating the numerous, small garrison hospitals we now have.

[Goshchko] Georgiy Vasilyevich, are the district units and installations of the medical service expected to be reorganized. If so, specifically which ones?

[Tsyganok] The status of the Kiev District Military Hospital, for example, will soon be raised. It is to be reorganized as the Main Military Clinical Hospital of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We hope that the meritorious team headed by Colonel of Medical Service Aleksandr Kozachenok will justify the faith shown in it.

It is planned to establish the Central Health Clinic of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine out of the 41st Military Health Clinic—that is, an establishment which is to incorporate all the best things accumulated in world praxis and our own in the area of out-patient diagnosis and treatment.

Everything I have said fully applies also to the 147th Military Stomatology Clinic. Unfortunately, this team is having to work in very cramped conditions.

[Goshchko] Are any new preventive medical procedures planned for the victims of the Chernobyl disaster?

[Tsyganok] By way of implementing the Order of Ukraine on the Status of and Social Protection for Citizens in this Group, a lot of work is presently being performed under the supervision of Colonel of Medical Service Valeriy Barkevich, chief toxicologist and radiologist for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, to compile a register of those who suffered as a result of the accident. Its main purpose is to establish a long-term, automated, personal record of personnel of the armed forces of Ukraine who helped in the mop-up following the Chernobyl disaster and their families.

The minister of defense of Ukraine has prepared a draft law on medical certification and the establishment of a causal linkage for the illnesses of servicemen who were in the area of the ChAES [Chernobyl Nuclear-Power Plant].

[Goshchko] How does this draft law differ from documents issued by the former Central Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the former Union?

[Tsyganok] In the first place, it precisely defines the certification procedure. And—this is particularly important—it ultimately works for and not against the victim. It also defines the certification procedure for former servicemen who participated in the testing of nuclear weapons or suffered as a result of other nuclear accidents.

The writing of a new Statute on Medical Certification in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is presently being completed to see that the health needs of the young generation of our country's citizens are met and to improve the manning of the armed forces by providing them with

personnel in good health. It will make more rigid demands of the state of health both of those about to enter the armed forces and those already serving.

[Goshchko] How are you resolving problems involved in providing sanatoria and health resort facilities for servicemen and their families, blue- and white-collar workers?

[Tsyganok] Right now we have an adequate number of military health and vacation facilities located in the various climatic zones of Ukraine: in the Crimea, the Carpathians and the middle belt. This is enabling us considerably to increase the percentage of people with access to sanatoria and resorts.

[Goshchko] Georgiy Vasilyevich, is the drastic rise in prices for food, energy, municipal and other services not going to entail an increase in the cost of passes to sanatoria and resorts?

[Tsyganok] Precisely.

[Goshchko] I know that aid in paying for passes is available for military personnel and their families, blue- and white-collar workers. Could you briefly describe it.

[Tsyganok] Generals, admirals, officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers in the ranks of the armed forces of Ukraine, generals, admirals and officers released into the reserve or retirement with 20 years of service or more, as well as those released into the reserve or retirement for medical reasons with a pension from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, regardless of length of service, pay 25% of the total cost of passes, and their families pay 50% of the cost of theirs. Blue- and white-collar workers pay 30%.

Free passes are issued to heroes of the Soviet Union, heroes of socialist labor, individuals awarded the Order of Glory, any of the three degrees, the Order For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR, any of the three degrees, those who have become ill or suffered radiation sickness due to the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear-Power Plant, those for whom a causal linkage has been established between a disability and the Chernobyl disaster, and those who helped in 1986 and 1987 to mop up following the accident at the ChAES. The same benefits are provided for the disabled in groups I or II among retired military personnel of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Free passes are provided for children's sanatoria and TB sanatoria.

With respect to social protection of servicemen, the minister of defense of Ukraine has adopted a decision, and every officer, seagoing or shore-based warrant officer is paid the amount earned for one basic pay period, as a rule, upon departing on leave or for treatment.

[Goshchko] Preventive work is an important and urgent job of the medical service. What is being done in this area?

[Tsyganok] Workers with sanitation and epidemiological establishments and laboratories have the coordinating role in this matter. Colonel of Medical Service Vladimir Pashkovich, chief sanitary inspector for the Ministry of Defense, Lt Colonel of Medical Service Vladimir Voronenko, Maj Med Service Sergey Cherepanov and Ministry of Defense employees Lyubov Kravtsova and Sergey Prigorovskiy are working in a new way, with a sense of responsibility and a desire to improve the monitoring of the ecological situation in Ukraine. The process of improving the preventive work is based on raising the level of the specialist's professional training and individual responsibility for the assigned job.

[Goshchko] What problems concern you most?

[Tsyganok] There is no simple answer to this question, because, as they say, no matter what you tackle, it is all important and essential. Take just the matter of providing the medical units and installations with the necessary supplies and equipment. Without them it is practically impossible successfully to accomplish the tasks facing the medical service. Unfortunately, due to the breakdown in economical and commercial ties among the CIS states, a difficult situation has developed within the military medical-supply system. As a result, the medical-supply department of the VMU [Military Medical Directorate] of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, which is headed by Colonel of Medical Service Petr Sirota, candidate of pharmaceutical sciences, cannot predict when or what supplies will be coming from industry. I would like to note that Maj Gen Ivan Ivanovich Shtopenko and his subordinates are helping us greatly to accomplish our missions in the situation of the country's conversion to a market economy and the predominance of contractual prices and accounts.

[Goshchko] Georgiy Vasilyevich, how is the personnel problem being resolved?

[Tsyganok] To be honest, it occupies a special place in the work of the medical service. Thousands of military doctors, citizens of Ukraine, are serving outside the homeland, and today they have to answer the questions: Whom and where to serve? Where and how to live, and on what? The Military Medical Directorate is taking all possible steps to gain the return of our fellow countrymen who are officers or warrant officers of the medical service from other CIS states and to find employment for them here.

The process of establishing the new medical support system for the armed forces in Ukraine requires certain outlays of effort, funds and time. Despite all the difficulties, however, the independent military medical service of the independent state's young armed forces is fulfilling and will continue to fulfill its sacred duty to protect the health of our fightingmen honorably and selflessly.

[Goshchko] Georgiy Vasilyevich, thank you very much for providing so much information for our newspaper's readers.

[Tsyganok] Happy holiday, medical workers!

### Rear Services Chief Avdeyev Interviewed

92UM1239B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
25 Jun 92 p 1

[Interview with Ukrainian Armed Forces' Rear Services Deputy Chief Major-General Grigoriy Grigoryevich Avdeyev by Major A. Murakhovskiy, senior officer of the press service of the Ukraine Ministry of Defense: "The Rear Services Help Us"]

[Text]

[Murakhovskiy] What problems are troubling the Ukraine armed forces today, and how are they being solved?

[Avdeyev] There are lots of problems. First, ties have not yet been restored with other regions, and there has still not been any incoming material. We are thus using reserves that were created on the territory of Ukraine. Today we have to solve first and foremost the problem of logistical support for the armed forces, and the question of the placement and receipt of orders must be resolved. A version for the creation of a Main Directorate or Rear Service Support under the Cabinet of Ministers or under the Ministry of Resources of Ukraine has been worked out in general.

[Murakhovskiy] How are the servicemen of Ukraine being supplied with clothing and related gear, anyway?

[Avdeyev] I will say straight out that raw materials used to come to us under centralized procedures. Today about 70 percent of the enterprises in light industry that were sewing uniforms for the army are without work. The rear services have thus had to solve two problems at once—one is to provide the servicemen with uniforms, and the other is to provide work for the enterprises. We are thus seeking first and foremost not finished products, but rather the raw materials to solve the problem of uniform supply.

[Murakhovskiy] The Ukrainian army, as we know, will have its own uniform in the future. What is being done for that, are there any concrete movements?

[Avdeyev] We are negotiating today with the Czechs for raw materials, but the quality of the fabric they are offering us is not very suitable. We are negotiating with the Indians, and we are just about at the stage of making a decision on the supply of fabric in a broad assortment and excellent quality, and moreover in the shortest possible time.

But we should also not take off the agenda the question of restoring ties with Russia, and especially with the textile enterprises around Moscow and Ivanovo, which will supply us with military fabric.

[Murakhovskiy] Where is the manufacture of the uniforms for the servicemen of the Ukrainian army being planned?

[Avdeyev] At woolen mills, where our military orders have been partially placed. Sufficient monetary resources have been allocated from the budget for this purpose.

[Murakhovskiy] The question of money for the needs of the Ministry of Defense is not all that painless nonetheless. It is no accident that there is a Commercial Center operating in our military agency, after all. What is its efficiency factor?

[Avdeyev] I would like to note, first of all, that the Commercial Center as a structure is only just being born. The Statute on it has not been approved, and the standard organization and equipment are being refined. The point is that the principal task of the center at first was to erect a solid barrier to the reselling of military hardware by some commanders at understated prices. And that was happening, after all. Some officers gained from that. The Commercial Center has managed that task. Although one still sometimes encounters abuses as before.

We understand very well that you can't sell forever. You have to create something. Put money into circulation.

And there is another aspect of the monetary problem. Ferrous, non-ferrous and even precious metals are lying about here literally under foot. No one gathers them up or turns them over in the army. We have accumulated a great deal among the troops. There are no enterprises in Ukraine today that are capable of reprocessing wastes containing precious metals. We have been working on this issue with the national bank since October, but it remains an open one. I would put it this way—the list of enterprises that could receive precious metals has already been determined, but they do not yet have the equipment for processing them. Everything had left for Russia before this. So we had to create a Department for Precious and Non-Ferrous Metals in the Commercial Center. It has not been ruled out that we will soon create a joint enterprise for processing them. We hope that our German friends, with whom we have been negotiating recently, will help us in that undertaking as well.

We have also created a Department for Commercial Shipping...

We are solving many problems thanks to the Commercial Center. The transshipment yards in Mukachevo and Vladimir-Volynskiy that had been working for Moscow have been working for us since January 1. What's more, we have been able to see that money for work performed by those transshipment yards was transferred.

A most serious problem was solved by the Commercial Center of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense regarding the Black Sea Fleet—Novikon-Zyuyd, which had been created by Moscow and was essentially occupied with

carrying off the fleet, has been disbanded. The Ukraina-Novikon center has now been created, and is still the sole structure in the Crimea that is impeding the carrying off of the material assets there. Even Admiral Kasatonov gave his consent to collaboration with that organization.

[Murakhovskiy] I wonder how the Novikon-Ukraina enterprise is collaborating with the Black Sea Fleet if the political and legal status of the fleet has not yet been resolved? We are relegating it to the CIS out of habit...

[Avdeyev] Ukraina-Novikon is an independent commercial structure that was created by the Commercial Center of the Ukraine Ministry of Defense and the Moscow firm of Novikon, and is a commercial structure of the Navy. Novikon, I would note, has invested about 60 million rubles in our joint enterprise.

[Murakhovskiy] And what is our share of participation?

[Avdeyev] Our matériel and real estate, and not our money, were "invested." And it is implicit in the situation that all of the profits that Ukraina-Novikon will receive will go for the development of the Crimea, for the social needs of the sailors and officers of the Black Sea Fleet and other servicemen completing service on the territory of Ukraine.

I will say more. A commission on conversion has been created by decree of the President of Ukraine in Sevastopol. It includes the Minister of Defense. Questions of conversion in Sevastopol are also implemented by Ukraina-Novikon. These include the infrastructure of the city, improvements in the ecological situation, the development of the railroads, the construction of housing and the like.

[Murakhovskiy] The Commercial Center of the Ministry of Defense probably already has some hard-currency receipts?

[Avdeyev] Yes, the Commercial Center has ruble and hard-currency accounts. Its chief task, after all, is to get money for unsolved social problems in the army and the navy, especially for the construction of housing. The situation is most acute on this plane, since before cutting back the armed forces it is necessary to provide the servicemen with apartments. Housing construction this year, meanwhile, is lagging appreciably behind the rate of prior years. Many officers who could have already been discharged into the reserves are continuing to be paid. We cannot discharge them, because they have not been provided with housing.

There is hard currency, if not all that much. But we cannot dispose of it as we would like. Comrade Saliy does not want to sell us housing for hard currency, because he is planning to get profits from that for the social development of the city. But we do not yet have any opportunities to share that hard currency.

[Murakhovskiy] Perhaps it would make sense to invest the hard currency in some business and get good profits from it?

[Avdeyev] A good businessman would undoubtedly act that way.

According to existing law, 50 percent of the hard-currency coming to enterprises and organizations must be transferred to the state fund. The Ministry of Defense has requested that that situation be abolished with regard to the armed forces. It makes no difference if that money is pumped from one pocket to another if a common task is being resolved, after all. But the issue has not been resolved, and in view of the fact that we have not transferred several million dollars to the account of the state, our hard-currency account has been frozen. We are forced either to give over half of the hard currency or we cannot use it.

[Murakhovskiy] A difficult situation took shape last year in the army with the provision of foodstuffs for the personnel. Those difficulties were not felt in the unit, however, thanks to the efforts of the rear-services workers in the units. How do matters stand this year?

[Avdeyev] Funds were determined and local suppliers were allocated in 1992. The military sovkhoses have been given the dedicated task of supplying the troops. We have twenty of them, including one naval one. They are entirely contained within the agricultural department of the Ministry of Defense. We have been monitoring, for example, the sowing campaign. We have been giving every aid to our own military farm workers and civilian workers. What is more, an affiliate of the Commercial Center has been opened on the Agronomic Exchange, where military matériel and hardware is being sold under the slogan "the army to the town."

The army really is helping the towns. Our servicemen, for example, are engaged in driving agricultural machinery—about two thousand vehicles from the Likhachev plant on the territory of Ukraine—through the intercession of the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of Defense has even taken it upon itself the obligation to store the machinery temporarily in its own warehouses until the harvest rush.

[Murakhovskiy] Does that mean that one may be seeing our servicemen behind the wheel of agricultural machinery during the harvesting time?

[Avdeyev] The sending of military drivers to the harvest is not planned as yet, but that variation is possible and a special directive from the minister of defense has even been envisaged.

[Murakhovskiy] Grigoriy Grigoryevich, let us return once again in our discussion to the work of the Commercial Center. Do you feel that its appearance in the structure of the armed forces of Ukraine is a necessity?

[Avdeyev] I would emphasize once again that the supply bodies of the Ministry of Defense are operating on a commercial basis. That is the behest of the times. Not everyone understands that, unfortunately, and they feel that people are engaging in illegal operations. In order to

dispel such gossip, I hope that NARODNAYA ARMIYA will not skimp on newspaper space and will publish the Statute on the Commercial Center itself and relate its work in more detail in the future.

### Commercial Use of Ukrainian Military Air Transport

92UM1293A Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian  
30 May 92 p 2

[Article by unidentified Ukrinform correspondent, Kiev, 28 May 1992: "Helping the Ukrainian Economy"]

[Text] Help has appeared for the national economy. From now on, enterprises and organizations of ministries and departments, and ispolkoms [executive committees] of local Soviets of People's Deputies can count on the Ukrainian Armed Forces Military Transport Aviation. The Republic Ministry of Defense made that decision.

Fulfillment of air transport movements is envisioned according to direct contracts that have been concluded between commanders of aviation units and customers with the authorization of the appropriate senior commanders. Flights that are going the same way will also be used to deliver cargoes.

According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service press release, 25 percent of the money that is received for paid air transport movements will go to the state budget and 75 percent will be placed at the disposal of the Air Force commander to finance the construction of housing, for aircraft maintenance, social development and other needs.

### Commentary Calls for Reorganizing Structure of Officers' Union

92UM1258B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
19 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by Col V. Pilipchuk, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Officers' Union, under the rubric "Is the Situation in the Ukrainian Officers' Union Unstable?": "Avoid New Errors"]

[Text] As of today the situation in the SOU [Ukrainian Officers' Union] is unstable, even explosive. I believe that right now there is an urgent need to reorganize its structure.

In order to avoid new errors and blunders, we must thoroughly study the job we have already done. The SOU structure which existed prior to the 3rd congress did not fully enable us to unite and consolidate the intellectual capacity of the officer corps in Ukraine. The organization's forms and methods of work frequently consisted solely in pointing out deficiencies. No results were to be seen from the actual work. Decisions of the congresses were not implemented.

The authoritarian methods of the SOU leadership inhibited initiative on the part of the rank-and-file members and scared many patriotic-minded and progressive-thinking officers away from the organization.

Issues pertaining to the establishment of the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces of Ukraine were decided by an separate group of SOU members without proper support from the leadership. Matters of interaction with public organizations, democratic parties and the deputy corps of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine were overlooked.

I would like to point out the main strategic and tactical issues of the SOU program at the present stage.

Previous experience has shown that, given the present SOU structure, the oblast organizations are not in a position to influence the combat training and daily life of the military. Incompetence in the resolution of matters pertaining to the vital functioning of the units and subunits is affecting personnel policy in the Ukrainian military, to which the oblast and rayon organizations actually do not have access. A large number of tactical blunders, particularly in assessing the situation, are minimizing results in the main areas of the SOU's work.

Functionaries in the oblast organizations are incompetent, since they are out of touch with the life of the military collectives, and they attempt to interfere in the work of commanders and chiefs. This situation will not only not bring about a strengthening of organization and order in the armed forces but will ruin all the military units, even the newly formed ones.

It would be a mistake, however, to assign many matters to the oblast organizations alone. Degrading relations between the SOU organizations and patriotic-minded officers among the command and supervisory personnel are creating havoc with the organizational development of the armed forces of Ukraine.

Also important is the fact that the SOU leadership in general is extremely poorly prepared to carry out the struggle to establish our military in the new situation. Its members have a low level of personal training and a poor conception of the urgent tasks and national problems facing Ukraine. The ideas of a rebirth of the nation and of building a new, federative Ukraine and new armed forces are alien to many people. These people have only one goal: to adapt and survive. They disguise their personal interests with high-sounding slogans. And it is our job to keep these bogus patriots not just out of the leadership but even out of the ranks of the SOU.

The primary organizations at the place of residence, service or work of the servicemen are the foundation of the organization. Primary organizations are formed and organizationally united into rayon and oblast organizations with respect to place of residence and into organizations of military units, formations and large formations with respect to place of service or work.

Changes have to be made in the SOU Charter to demand that state and military secrecy be maintained. Otherwise, the union cannot exist in the military situation. Matters pertaining to the vital functioning and the combat training of the troops must not be discussed outside the military unit or formation. SOU structures in the military units, formations and large formations absolutely must interact with representatives of the oblast organizations and with authorized agents in the oblasts from the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Families under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. In the interim between congresses the SOU organizations of oblasts, individual military units, formations and large formations and of military installations are directed by the SOU executive committee in Kiev.

Within the military structures the SOU organizations should have a status not conflicting with the vital functioning of the military units, and they should join forces with the oblast SOU organizations in legal and social matters. In all other matters, particularly those pertaining to the combat training of the troops, they should be guided by those special articles in the SOU Charter which govern their activities.

We have an obligation to eliminate those deficiencies which existed in the former military structures and flourished in the totalitarian state. Having a branched network of SOU organizations makes it easier to combat negative phenomena and to organize social and legal aid and protection for the officers of Ukraine's new military.

In the military collectives SOU must publicize laws pertaining to the development of the military, devoting special attention to the Law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Article 11), which specifies that the military-political indoctrination of servicemen must be based on the national historical traditions.

The functioning of the SOU in the military is designed to support the efforts of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to promote reliable protection of the Ukraine's state sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.

We shall continue to help the minister of defense in every way to develop the armed forces of Ukraine by working out a creative, scientific approach to the specific areas of development of the branches of armed forces and troops arms.

#### **Operation of Military Judicial Service**

92UM1236A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
26 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel of Justice Aleksandr Bokov, deputy chief of the Legal Department of the Administrative Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: "The Law Should Reign Supreme—*The Judicial Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine—The Reality*"]

[Text] *The Minister of Defense of Ukraine issued the order "The Judicial (Legal) Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine" on 14 Mar 92, by which the statute on this service is approved.*

It is noteworthy that the activity of namely the judicial service has been regulated by one of the first. That would seem to be no accident. They are structured and function, as follows from the law "The Armed Forces of Ukraine," on the basis of the supremacy of the law and the guaranteed social and legal protection of servicemen. These principles are codified in a whole series of legislation that constitutes the legal foundation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They have also been reflected in the order cited. The deputy ministers of defense, chiefs of the directorates of the Ministry of Defense and the Main Staff of the Armed Forces and the commanding generals of the military districts have been ordered to ensure the reinforcement of the legality and correct application of the orders of the Minister of Defense in the staffs, military units, institutions, military educational establishments, enterprises and organizations subordinate to them, and to ensure the observance of legality in the preparation and issue of orders, directives and other standard documents.

This requirement of the Minister of Defense is an important and timely one under conditions of the reformation of the armed forces and the adoption of a host of standard documents by the higher bodies of state power and administration. It could prove to be just good intentions, however, if a mechanism for its realization is not provided for.

**The judicial service among the troops, in my opinion, could and should become that mechanism or, at least, a decisive part of it. The rule according to which this service is organized in the directorates of the Ministry of Defense, at the Main Staff of the Armed Forces and its directorates and services, in the directorates and services of the military districts, operational commands and in the fleet, formations and task forces, regiments and subunits equivalent to them, military educational establishments and institutions of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has thus been codified for that purpose in the Statute on the Judicial Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.**

**The Judicial Service consists of judicial (legal) departments, groups, senior legal services officers and legal services officers. The overall supervision of the judicial service of the armed forces of Ukraine is exercised by the Administrative Directorate of the Ministry of Defense through its Legal Department, the chief of which is the Chief of the Judicial Service and the main legal services officer of the Ministry of Defense.**

The sphere of activity of the judicial service in the armed forces of Ukraine is thus considerably broader than the existing one, which corresponds to the experience of foreign armies, whose large formations have 10-15 judge advocates. They will be working today in the subunits and institutions whose commanders or chiefs are making

a host of decisions every day connected with the practical realization of legal norms pertaining to various aspects of the life and activity of the troops, including the rights and legal interests of servicemen and the members of their families.

Civilian employees will be serving in the position of legal officers in detached battalions and subunits equivalent to them. The positions will be occupied by officers in regiments and larger military formations.

**The following principal duties are charged to the officers and civilian employees of the judicial service by order of the Minister of Defense:**

- verification of the conformity of draft orders and other legal documents being issued by the commander of the military unit or chief of the institution to the prevailing legislation, orders and directives of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, and his signing off on those legal documents;
- provision of consultations on legal issues arising in the activity of a military unit or institution;
- participation in the development and implementation of measures in the military unit or institution to reinforce legality and military, labor, financial and contract discipline;
- preparation of proposals for the abrogation of orders by a commander or chief or individual clauses that have *de facto* become ineffective;
- submission of information on changes and additions to legislation, orders and directives;
- assurance of legality in the concluding of contracts and the signature of draft contracts; and
- the holding of legal or arbitration hearings under the authority of the commander or chief.

In disclosing the tasks of the Judicial Service, one should dwell in particular on the role of the service in legal support for the economic activity of the command of military units and the administration of institutions, organizations and enterprises of the Ministry of Defense.

A large quantity of legislation has been promulgated recently in the Republic that is called upon to consolidate and develop the transformations in economic life, and many outdated norms, departmental regulations and instructions have been abolished. The sphere of activity of contract relations has expanded considerably, and the role of complaints and claims work is increasing, under the conditions of the formation of a new mechanism of economic operation and new forms and methods for the management of the economy.

Commanders and supervisors must understand that a draft contract may be signed only after it is signed by the legal officer, who should pay attention to the reflection in the draft contract of all existing conditions essential

for the suitable fulfillment of obligations under the contract and the completeness and clarity of the exposition of the text of the contract.

The judicial service has been entrusted with rendering legal assistance to subunits of an institution in complaints work, consulting with the workers of an institution on issues of the formulation and submission of complaints and claims against suppliers and manufacturers. The legal officers are obligated to study the state of complaints work and make proposals to improve them, and they should make the appropriate suggestions to the command or the leadership of the institution when omissions in this work are revealed.

The workers of the judicial service represent under stipulated procedure the interests of the military formations, institutions, organizations and enterprises in court and arbitration, as well as in other bodies, when legal issues are being considered.

We are naturally concerned with the question of whether the workers of the judicial service who are part of a military unit or institution and are subordinate to a commander or chief will be able to perform effectively such a diversity of duties to ensure legality. The fact that many commanders and chiefs at various levels with extensive authority often intentionally ignore the requirements of the laws, explaining their actions with good intentions, is no secret. Other officials simply do not know the requirements of legislation and, what is especially intolerable, do not wish to know them.

The Statute on the Judicial Service, in order to settle this issue, includes a regulation according to which the officers and civilian employees of this service do not sign off on the drafts of orders and other documents of a legal nature if the drafts submitted contradict prevailing legislation or the orders of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, and they provide explanations or conclusions on legal procedure for the settlement of rudimentary issues that are the basis for the incorporation of changes and additions to those drafts.

The proper execution of their duties by the workers of the judicial service, in my opinion, is guaranteed and codified in the Statute by the rule for designating for the position of legal officers only individuals who have higher legal education. It has also been established that officers of the judicial service may not be charged with duties that are not stipulated by the Statute (assignment to details, sentry duty and the like).

This issue requires particular attention. The officers in the legal service in some units, by the will of the commander, are actually transformed into permanent investigating officers systematically pursuing various types of administrative investigations. That practice does not conform to the Statute on Judicial Service and can be employed only in exceptional cases. Consultations with the legal officers on the legitimacy of this or

that decision on the materials of an inquest or an administrative investigation, however, are not only permissible but obligatory.

The work of the Legal Department of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is headed by Lieutenant Colonel Justice P. Kozyr, with majors of justice V. Bazov and Yu. Materov serving there as well along with specialist S. Torgonskaya. Our small collective has been working with that composition since January. The department has, over that time, signed off on dozens of draft orders and directives of a legal nature (regulations, statutes, instructions, agreements, contracts) that required careful analysis. Some of the drafts were returned for refinements, and recommendations were made on them.

Three draft orders of the Minister of Defense have been prepared with the direct participation of the Legal Department. Of particular significance, in my opinion, is Order No. 8 of 31 Jan 92, "The Application in the Armed Forces of Ukraine of Standard Documents of the Higher Bodies of State Power and Administration of Ukraine," in accordance with which the agencies of military administration and the heads of organizations, institutions and enterprises of the Ministry of Defense are obligated to apply standard documents of state bodies that have entered into force regardless of their announcement as orders by the Minister of Defense. The anti-legal and fallacious practice of applying legislation among the troops only after its announcement as an order by the Minister of Defense has been curtailed as a result.

A great deal has been done in the Administrative Directorate of the Ministry of Defense to circulate and pass along standard documents to the troops in execution of this order.

The officers of the legal department have taken part in work on drafts of the laws on "Universal Military Obligation and Military Service," "Pension Support for Servicemen and Workers of the Internal Affairs Bodies of Ukraine," "Immigration," "Civil Defense" and others, prepared a draft Agreement of the Member Nations of the CIS on Law-enforcement Bodies Supporting the Strategic Forces and rendered legal assistance to a group developing new military regulations.

The necessity of studying and resolving in practice the question of the training of military legal officers, supporting them with the latest standard materials, organizing an exchange of experience, conducting seminars and methodological-training assemblies has arisen with regard to the planned expansion of the number of workers in the judicial service. The publication of a composite alphabetical subject index of the orders and directives of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine is planned by the end of the year. The necessity has arisen even now for the reference work on legislation for the servicemen of the armed forces of Ukraine that we intend to publish.

## BALTIC STATES

### Estonian Leaders Call for Strong Army

92UN1753D Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT  
in English 26 Jun-2 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Tarmu Tammerk]

[Text] Against the background of worsening relations with Russia, government leaders in Estonia have overcome their hesitation in defence matters, and endorsed the formation of a strong army. As the last Baltic state to do so, Estonia on June 18 acquired a defence minister who, however, is in charge of just two battalions (both of elite forces) and an almost non-existent ministry.

In a controversial vote, and after several failed attempts to do so, parliament confirmed Ulo Uluots as the country's defence minister. An Independent Democrat member of the reform communists' faction, Mr. Uluots has been criticised by nationalist MPs for his opposition to giving the franchise to exile Estonians and for having no experience in military matters.

Meanwhile, President Arnold Rüütel has called for the creation of a strong army which "would not let the events of 1940 happen again." Speaking at a ceremony awarding the first military ranks to Estonian officers on June 23, Mr. Rüütel said Estonia was worried by Russia's doctrine of "close foreign countries," meaning countries that belong to Russia's sphere of influence. "The present situation is dangerous both for us and our neighbours," he said, referring to Estonia's scanty defence forces and the growing perception of a threat from Russia.

Speaking at another ceremony on June 23, celebrated in Estonia as Victory Day to mark the victory of Estonian forces at Vonnu in 1919 over German forces in the War of Independence, Prime Minister Tiit Vähi also reiterated calls for the formation of proper armed forces. "Fifty-three years ago the Estonians had arms but lacked international support. Today, we have very few arms but the international support is there."

These two Victory Day speeches by Estonian leaders mark a departure from the low key statements on the country's defence. Government critics have long been demanding the establishment of a defence ministry, something that neighbouring Latvia and Lithuania did several months ago. Western politicians too have been suggesting that Estonia has more urgent priorities than establishing armed forces, which would inevitably be overwhelmed in the event of a conflict with the only conceivable adversary. Nationalist politicians for their part say that the existence of self-defence forces acts a trip wire, and could deter at least limited aggression from the east.



## CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

**Progress in Forming Uzbek National Army**

92UM1271A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
16 Jul 92 First edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Valentin Astafyev in the "National Armies: A Look Inside" column: "Some Still Dream of Naval Infantry"]

[Text] Are officers and warrant officers sent by the Motherland—the former Union—to serve in places far from where they grew up serving there because of some wrong they committed? We hear statements issuing from high tribunes to the effect that no one will be forgotten, that every person will find a place and a job. How does this work out in practice? Persons who wish to leave Uzbekistan for some other republic are forced to find their own way out, by begging for a piece of paper stating that there is a place willing to accept them. Very few persons are so fortunate as to be able to do so.

Fortunately, the manner in which the republic is constructing its Armed Forces provides hope for the resolution of this problem.

Quite a few officers and warrant officers have made the decision to continue their service in Uzbekistan's Army. This includes persons who were born and grew up in the republic, acquired a family, a place to live, and friends. Another positive factor in this regard is the multiethnic nature of the Armed Forces being established in the republic. Lending interest here is the fact—reported by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA—that the first General of the Uzbek Army appointed to that rank by decree of the Republic of Uzbekistan, was a Russian: Vladimir Pilyugin, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff.

What kind of military policy is sovereign Uzbekistan pursuing? What does it possess in the way of Armed Forces?

It may be said that the republic's leadership was very much in favor of the idea of unified Armed Forces of the CIS. Only when the process of creating national armies in other republics became irreversible did Uzbekistan feel compelled to take the path of forming its own Army, taking under its jurisdiction the large units, units, and installations of the Turkestan Military District and Border Troops located on republic soil. At the meeting of heads of CIS defense ministries held in Tashkent in May of this year, R. Akhmedov, presently a Lieutenant-General, then Republic of Uzbekistan Minister for Defense Affairs, made the following statement: "Relative to the prospects of military cooperation and the CIS, the position of Uzbekistan is as follows: We are in favor of a fruitful and equal cooperation within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States. A positive aspect here is that the unified leadership—an item on

which we have come to an agreement—will consist of representatives from states that are members of the Combined Armed Forces."

Starting with the very decision to organize its own Armed Forces and extending to this present day, Uzbekistan's position in the military area is abundantly clear: The republic is to pursue a policy of peace, with no intention of waging war with anyone; the Army is needed solely to protect the sovereignty of the state and accomplish missions related to collective security within the framework of the CIS. The foregoing was stressed a number of times at various levels by Uzbekistan President I. Karimov.

The foregoing is the basis for building the Armed Forces, which are to be small in size, mobile, and capable of providing security for the state and people.

The difficult process of forming the Army is now under way. Progressing concurrently with the creation of combat-ready units and large units is military legislation. Already completed are drafts of the Law on Defense, the Law on Armed Forces, the Law on Universal Military Obligation and Military Service, the Law on Status of Servicemen and Their Social and Legal Protection, and, in addition, the draft Law on Alternative (Labor) Service. The draft laws are slated for discussion in a session of the republic's Supreme Council to be held in the near future. As explained to me by Colonel A. Khalmatov, first deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces, who took part in writing the drafts, the Law on Universal Military Obligation and Military Service will govern the Army's daily routine. The law will include everything, from conferring of military rank to discharge into the reserve.

"We made a definite attempt to retain the best of everything contained in the former documents," said Arslan Khalmatov, "and we introduced many new items, while keeping the existing benefits for servicemen and their dependents. Our officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted personnel will lose nothing; on the contrary, the level of their social protection will be raised."

Minister for Defense Matters Lieutenant-General R. Akhmedov said that 70 percent of youths that were called up for military service in Uzbekistan are presently serving in military units. Inductees are to serve on republic soil only; service beyond the republic's borders, although not excluded, will be possible only on a strictly voluntary basis.

The republic is not experiencing any appreciable amount of difficulty in drafting of conscripts, even though a liberalization of categories of persons entitled to deferment and to exclusion from the draft has been effected (sufficient draft-eligible resources are available in the republic), but this is not true in the case of officer cadres. Russian-speaking officers performing their service on republic soil comprise in excess of 70 percent of the total number of commissioned personnel. A great deal of effort is being exerted to station in the motherland

Uzbek officers who wish to serve in Uzbekistan. Several thousand Uzbek officers are presently performing their duty as cadre in armies of the Commonwealth countries. Some of them have already returned to the republic.

The Army is training its own cadres in three higher military schools located in Uzbekistan. About 20 percent of this year's graduates will join the ranks of the republic's Armed Forces. The amount of instruction available in the schools is limited; the training is restricted to combined arms, armor, and motor transportation, but in time the number of military specialties will be enlarged. For the time being, a number of specialists will study in military schools of other states on a mutually advantageous basis.

Uzbekistan's Armed Forces are to be built on a multi-ethnic basis. Officers and warrant officers who are not of indigenous origin and who for one reason or another are not in a position to leave Uzbekistan will be able to continue their service in the republic. Everyone receives equal treatment. However, since there is an appreciation of the concern many officers and warrant officers are experiencing relative to their future, the Ministry of Defense Matters is working on the problem of eventually placing them in other republics and districts, with transfer of all their benefits. This kind of resolution of the future service problem faced by servicemen who find themselves in the present situation through no fault of their own would be fair, but this would require understanding and agreement on the part of other states.

Sensitive areas prompting officers to do quite a bit of thinking about their future are that of taking the oath of allegiance and the state language requirement. These problems are approached in various ways in the CIS states. In the Uzbek Army, in contradistinction to other armies, these problems are not of major importance. Officers are not required to take another oath of allegiance.

Now about the language. For the time being, the language in common use in the Army of Uzbekistan is Russian. Plans call for making a gradual change to the state language: Uzbek. The Army will have its own manuals and regulations.

Officers and warrant officers who intend to remain in the Uzbek Army are well aware of the fact that this process is natural and fair. People living on the soil of a particular state have an obligation to know the language of that country. For this reason, all persons who are not fluent in Uzbek are taking up serious study of the language. Courses are being organized in the Ministry for Defense Matters and in military units; self-study books and Russian-Uzbek conversation manuals can be seen lying on the desks of many staff officers.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense Matters is continuing to be actively planning the organizational structure of the Armed Forces, while the summer training period has commenced in units and subunits. I recently had a talk with unit commander Colonel V. Rychkov. He

pointed out that soldiers are not seeing many changes in their routine. Service and combat training continue as before, with the exception of problems associated with certain aspects of provisioning. These however are natural difficulties peculiar to a period of transition.

*The present call-up to induction stations is nearing completion. As usual, there are quite a few applicants for the Airborne Forces. Gennadiy Petrov and Aleksandr Krivonos from Chirchik have requested assignment to the National Guard. There are some persons who would prefer to perform their duty close to home, regardless of the kind of troops to which they would be assigned. There are however few cases of this kind.*

*In conversations with inductees and in their moods, one senses a distinct feeling of friendship and internationalism, something which always was typical in Uzbekistan. Statements issued by the republic's defense establishment regarding the creation of the kind of armed forces that would be capable of offering a guarantee of Uzbekistan's sovereignty and work with the OVS [Unified Armed Forces] to provide CIS member states with collective security are taken seriously in the republic, and they find support in the youths' desire to discharge their military obligation to the Motherland in an honorable manner.*

*For example, expressing a desire to serve in the Western Group of Forces are Tokhir Tolipov, Elmurat Vaymusinov, and Davlet Mambetov. Although offered an opportunity to serve in the border Amu Darya Riverine Flotilla, Kakhram Syzdykov is resolute in his intention to be assigned to the Naval Infantry of the Pacific Ocean Fleet. That kind of service constitutes an old tradition followed by graduates of the Tashkent Naval School.*

*As we can see, good traditions engendered by the friendship existing between our peoples are in evidence.*

## MOLDOVA

### Radical 'Third Force' Works to Prevent Stability on Both Sides of Dniester

92UM1303A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 22 Jul 92 pp 1, 7

[Article by ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy, special for ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, under the rubric "A Heated Topic": "On Both Sides of the Dniester"]

[Text] *The process of political settlement of the conflict in the Dniester region, begun at the initiative of the presidents of Russia and Moldova, has resurrected hopes for peace in Moldova both among the simple folk and among sober-thinking politicians. Mircea Snegur stated with conviction the other day in an interview with Italian television that "the war in the Dniester region will end soon, and the population of both sides of the Dniester will begin to live in peace and mutual understanding."*

Not everyone shares the president's optimism, however. Today, when the entry of peacemaking forces is on the agenda, people who know the situation well are afraid that the soldiers creating the separation corridor will be shot in the back, and moreover from both sides. These fears, unfortunately, are finding confirmation. Despite the orders that have been given to cease fire, shots and explosions still ring out, albeit more rarely, and people are dying. The sides continue to accuse each other of violating the truce, and are talking more and more about some "third force"—some terrorist groups that have gotten out of control.

And that is not just the fruit of conjecture. Such a group under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kostenko was neutralized in Bendery on July 16. Its commander, who is accused of murders of both Moldovan police and his own people—Guards soldiers of the Dniester region—was arrested, escaped his guards and then, according to some data, was caught; his fate, however, has not been reliably established.

There are such groups on the other side as well. The local police detained a sabotage group with a battle that was headed by officers of the Moldovan intelligence service recently in Chadyr-Lunga. Its members were arranging sabotage in the Dniester region and in the region where the Gagauz live.

Provocations on the part of fighters that have gotten out of the control of the authorities are a manifestation of the deeply layered opposition to the restoration of peace on Moldovan soil. The forces that form the two opposing poles of political tensions have no vested interest in it. They are, on the one hand, the leaders of the National Christian-Democratic Front of Moldova and, on the other, the most uncompromising leaders of the Dniester region. The two irreconcilable forces are ultimately pursuing the same aim—the destruction of the independent state of Moldova.

The leaders of the national front are aware of the fact that their intention to achieve the unification of Moldova with Romania is difficult to achieve, first and foremost because it is not supported by an absolute majority of the indigenous inhabitants of Moldova. In that situation they see one way of realizing their aim, which could be phrased as "the worse, the better." The tactics of the front consist of not permitting any stabilization or internal easing of tensions. The calculations are evidently based on the fact that, having grown tired of unbearable conditions of existence, the rank-and-file Moldovan will exclaim, "Go ahead with Romania, go ahead with anybody, just let this nightmare end!"

The kindling of warfare allows the front to "stay afloat" and increases the chances that a "historic unification" of the right bank of Moldova with Romania will be proclaimed under conditions of direct confrontation with Russia, total destruction and dictatorship—most likely without the mutinous Dniester region and Gagauzia. It is far from accidental that the leaders of the front forgo

about their differences with the president, and zealously supported a tough policy toward the Dniester region during the recent worsening of the conflict. But Mircea Snegur and Boris Yeltsin had only to take the first steps for a cease fire and the peaceful settlement of the conflict when the front burst out with sharp criticism directed at him, practically accusing him of treason. This was moreover done even before the announcement of any details of the agreement.

The activists of the front, of course—and they are both in the forefront and in the special groups formed by the minister of national security—are not repudiating their positions. Everything will probably be done to prolong the war to a "victorious end." And that means that the "Lebanonization" of Moldova and its dismembering will occur.

Some observers feel that this division, as paradoxical as it may seem, suits the leaders of the Dniester region. In the event that the war continues and right-bank Moldova re-unites with Romania, they will become the "saviors of the Dniester region from the Romanian yoke."

Returning to the origins of the conflict surrounding the Dniester region, commentators note that the desire of official Chisinau to be united with Romania is far from at the foundation of it—only the leaders of the Popular Front were insisting on that. The mistake of the Moldovan leaders was evidently something else—they did not discern the real problems of the region, populated for historical reasons by Russified Moldovans, Ukrainians and Russians, in the demand of Tiraspol. The quite widespread "anti-Romanian" sentiments and the lack of acceptance of many of the changes in Chisinau, of course, required a special approach and painstaking work.

Attempts instead followed to restore order in the mutinous Dniester region and Gagauzia by force, which ultimately played into the hands of certain forces in Tiraspol and Komrat and strengthened their reputation even more among the local inhabitants. The crude propaganda campaign unleashed in the Chisinau mass media was truly a "dubious service" to the leaders of Moldova. The inflating of the question of unification with Romania and inflaming of jingoistic patriotic and anti-Russian sentiments, along with the unconcealed tendentious description of the events in the Dniester region with an abundance of unprintable expressions addressed to the "separatists," had the reverse effect, and only reinforced their position.

The weight of these errors, grave mutual accusations and thousands of victims, in my opinion, has virtually canceled out the possibility of compromise between the current leadership of Moldova and the Dniester region. Even if Chisinau were to make the next set of concessions, Tiraspol would come forward—as has happened more than once already—with new and unfulfillable demands. The recent declaration by Igor Smirnov on the policy of full independence for the Dniester region and

the rejection of the proposal by Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy to discuss the political status of the Left Bank in the Moldovan parliament are testimony to this.

Will the new government of national concord now being created in Chisinau find common language with the people of common sense in Tiraspol and restore peace in Moldova? Much here—and the sober politicians on both sides of the Dniester understand this—depends on the dialogue of Moldova and Russia.

#### Notes From a Russian Observer Officer in Dniester Region

92UM1314A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 Jul 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Vyrvich: "We Have Done Everything to Make the Guns Fall Silent"]

[Text] Today we are starting to publish pages from the diary of Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Vyrvich, the commander of a motorized rifle battalion. From 28 May through 22 June, he was part of the unified military observers from Russia in the town of Bendery, and from 22 June through 8 July, in the operations group in Tiraspol and from 8 July through 13 July on the Koshnitskiy bridgehead as part of the forces to disengage the armed formations in the Dniester Region. During all this time, he kept a diary.

In publishing these notes, we have not endeavored to place any political accents or to make any definite judgments. This material is the truth about the conflict in the Dniester Region, a truth which is ordinary and thereby amazing in its exceptionalness for all of us who have not experienced such a misfortune.

The pages of the diary possibly are only partially designed for a broad audience. We feel they are more directed at the politicians. Why? Possibly this evidence of a Russian Army worker who has been tossed about by fate will help to understand that we must move decisively from talks to immediate actions.

With the agreement of the officer, we have chosen the most interesting and indicative of his rather detailed diary notes. These are the arrival of the observers from Russia in the Dniester Region, an ordinary day in their service, the fight for Bendery and the events at the Koshnitskiy bridgehead.

I have a rule that I have made up: "Every professional military man in his life should have his 'Afghanistan,' not on the political level but from the viewpoint of testing himself under extreme conditions so he can snap into action. A month ago, I agreed to travel to Moldova in the observer group and support the peaceful settlement of the Dniester conflict under the leadership of the observers from the UN. And so, the day before yesterday, on 22 May, the order arrived for alert number one to leave for Bendery. Instead of leave I had to get

ready to leave quickly for the "hot spot." In remembering the old rule (even from the time of serving in Czechoslovakia) "If you are going to the range for a week, prepare for a month," I made up my mind to prepare for at least a half-year.

And so here we were, the three of us officers from one garrison: myself, Captain Aleksandr Rafalskiy and Major Vladimir Zadorozhnyy on the morning of 24 May 1992, leaving by train for Moscow, planning by the 27 of May, via Moscow and Odessa, to make our way to the final destination of our route, to the headquarters of the disengagement forces in Bendery.

Bendery greeted us with a rapidly lowering dusk, with several tracers flying from the left bank to the right, a curfew and patrols at the intersections of the roads. We were also awaited by a vehicle with the UN emblem on the hood and doors. There was the same emblem on the cap of an unknown officer with a tricolor embroidered Russian flag on his chest. Several minutes later we entered the Dniester Hotel, where, in the words of the floorlady, representatives had been arriving for several days from Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Russia preparing to keep apart the armed groupings...

7 June. Bendery.

A summer Sunday evening. The echoes of a Saturday-Sunday wedding which still was going on, regardless of the fact that the weddings were becoming quieter, although on the sidewalk there still was a smiling crowd with plates and wine in their hands and inviting us to drink to the health of the young people.

The UAZ vehicle with a group of military observers moved slowly through the city. Following the route of the third—our—post. There were five men in the vehicle. In accord with the quadrilateral agreement, the observation post consisted of a Moldovan, a Romanian, a Russian and an Ukrainian. The fifth was the driver.

With gestures we turned down the insistent offers to drink to the health of the young people: "Thanks," "Muldumesk," "We can't we are on duty." Our assault rifles rested on our knees and the magazines with cartridges were inserted. Our armored vests were nearby.

Evening was coming on. The traffic was lightening. Fewer and fewer people on the streets. The town was growing quiet. The curfew was approaching.

Outside the windows of the vehicle, the streets of a typical green southern town rolled passed. Each of us sitting in the vehicle was familiar with these side streets whether in the south of Ukraine or Russia or in Romania. Attractive, carved fences and gates. Quiet. Unusual for a warm evening in the southern city. The people were leaving for home in groups, more often in couples. It is not recommended to walk alone here in the evening.

At 2115 hours, we drive up to the rural council on the western outskirts of the town. Here is one of the telephone contact points on our route. We talk with the officer on duty and learn all is calm.

In the city the curfew is from 2200 hours in the evening to 0600 hours in the morning. The driving of vehicles and the presence of people in the streets are prohibited. In the apprehending of vehicles the fine is 2,000 rubles and if people are apprehended it is 1,000 rubles.

We drive up to the post of the GAI [State Automobile Inspectorate]. On duty here are two policemen and one militiaman. They have the same tasks. And the same nationality. They are all Moldavians.

The policemen offer us tea. Over the radio they are informed that in the area of Varnitsa, someone was firing from a moving Zhiguley. This is in the zone of responsibility of the neighboring second post.

We drive out of town. Here, at the beginning of a cornfield, lies our westernmost observation post. From far off comes the sound of an artillery round and then a second one... Most likely they are firing at the Koshnitskiy bridgehead. We don't hear the explosions...

"Probably blank," comments our driver.

"Yes," one of us agrees, "a blank or a dud is all the same."

We smile tensely. At an interval of every 1 or 2 minutes, we could count 5 weapons rounds...

2300 hours. The second post. On the northern edge of the town, the silence is broken by burst of automatic rifle fire.

"It is an attack!" shouted someone from the police post.

An explosion rang out.

"They are firing a grenade launcher," said the same policeman, clearly turning to the observer officers. The policemen opened fire toward the river, into the darkness...

The main question which the observers should answer with the occurrence of an exchange of fire is who started it? In the given instance, the first bullets whistled over the police post. Hence, the guardsmen started it.

But the first rounds clearly had not come from the other side of the river, but from the right bank, that is, where the first police position ran. And there could not be any question of an attack here. The explosion was not at all like a grenade launcher round, as the police wanted us to believe. A provocation?

Out of the darkness there emerged a man in a police uniform.

"Was that you who threw the grenade?" he was asked by the observer from Russia, Lieutenant-Colonel Sergey Fokin.

"Yes, so that they would be frightened..."

In response to the fire of the police, on the opposite bank of the Dniester, bursts of individual fire flashed. An exchange of fire across the Dniester had started. It was becoming dangerous at the post. One by one the observers ran across to the shelter and behind which was the vehicle. We radioed the message on the exchange of fire to the duty officer at the hotel...

In the morning in the wrap-up summary, Radio Dniester Region stated that "During the night of 7-8 June on the Bendery sector in the region of the village of Bychok, the positions of the guardsmen were fired on from small arms." Radio Moldova accused the Dniester fighters of opening fire...

(To be continued).

### Notes From a Russian Observer Officer in Dniester Region, Part II

92UM1331A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jul 92 First edition p 2

[Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Vyrvich: "We Are Doing Everything Possible to Silence the Weapons"]

[Text] It was Friday, the day before the weekend. Preparations for graduation ceremonies were in full swing in many of the city's schools. There was an announcement at the entrance to our hotel stating that there would be a concert by the Chervona Kalina ensemble on the outdoor stage in the park at 18:00 on 19 June.

The city went about its usual, peaceful life. Reports that the situation was calm came in from observation posts and from the routes.

Observer officers on the off-duty shift were scattered among the hotel rooms, watching television. Some of them were sitting in the park, waiting for the concert to begin. Several individuals had gone for a walk around the city. They included Lieutenant-Colonel Sergey Bondarev.

Around 17:00 he noticed a car stop across from the printing office. Two Guardsmen got out and entered the printing office. Ten or so armed people immediately rushed out of the city police department located next to the printing office and headed for the car. The policeman in front, indicating the seriousness of his intentions by firing a round into the air with his assault rifle, ordered the driver and a Guardsman remaining in the vehicle to drop their weapons and get out of the car. Another group of policemen ran into the printing office.

Upon hearing the shooting, a group of Guardsmen rushed to the rescue from nearby posts. An exchange of fire ensued.

Sergey Bondarev immediately phoned the hotel. We radioed observers at the 3rd post to come to the city police department at once.

At 17:30 the 3rd post reported that the police were getting the worst of it on Dzerzhinskiy Street near the police department. Twenty minutes later observers reported that the police and Guardsmen were blockading the city police department, demanding the release of the Guardsmen held in the printing office.

The firing intensified. Two Guardsmen were killed. Soon after that another bullet cut down Valeriy Vozdvizhenskiy, cameraman for the Bendery cable television network. He had gone to the area of the incident to prepare for the next program.

Literally a half-hour later an exchange of fire began in the area of the bridge over the Dniester.

The concert by the Chervona Kalina ensemble was in full swing. Suddenly a grenade exploded at the edge of the park, 200 meters or so from the concert crowd, followed by a round from a machine gun. The audience and participants in the concert scattered in all directions. Old people, women and children rushed past us, screaming and crying.

At 18:40 a report came in that a vehicle column was on the move toward Bendery from the direction of Kaushany. Officers in one of the 14th Army units also phoned. They had been observing the movement of a large column of vehicles from the north: 10 KamAZ vehicles with mortars, 10 MTL-Bs, six tanks and five howitzers on trailers.

We soon heard the rumble of engines, then loud artillery rounds. This was the tanks which had entered the city opening fire. The attack was supported also by machine guns on armored personnel carriers and antiaircraft guns mounted on tracked carriers.

This appeal was periodically broadcast over the city radio network by the city's defense council: "All members of work detachments of enterprises and establishments report at once to your enterprises and await further instructions." Plant horns and sirens were periodically turned on.

At 19:00 a Chisinau-Odessa diesel train approached Bendery. It stopped just before the signal, and hundreds of armed opposition members left the cars and headed for the city. Fires broke out. A filling station caught fire, then an electric light bulb plant. The firing declined into individual shots and rounds in various parts of the city, now dying down, now flaring up with new force.

Around 20:00 about 20 Cossacks and their Ataman fought their way across the bridge from Tiraspol to help. They were soon at the building housing the city executive committee, which was guarded by only 10 men.

At 23:00 three armored personnel carriers of the opposition reached the city soviet and opened fire upon the

building with machine guns. Grenade throwers and snipers were positioned in buildings around the city executive committee.

A group of Cossacks succeeded in making several raids and putting out of action one armored personnel carrier on the square before the city executive committee, followed by three more. Two of them were knocked out of action by Cossack Oleg Otinger, a German by origin. Two Cossacks were killed in the raids, including Otinger, and two were seriously wounded.

A message from the military commissariat was found on one of the volunteers killed. It had been given to him at 07:00 on 19 June. The provocation and the capture of the printing office began at 17:00 that same day. Does this mean that there had been advance preparations for the bloody battle in Bendery?

The observer teams, with the exception of the one in the park, were forced to enter the hotel and take shelter behind its walls in the first-floor corridor. The observer officers in the park were cut off from the rest. The road between the park and the hotel was under fire not only from machine guns, but also from an antiaircraft gun.

When personnel carriers came up even with hotel, I looked them over from the third-floor balcony. On one of them the word "Moldova" was written in large letters. The first MTL-B carried a twin-barrel antiaircraft gun; a mounted grenade launcher was set up on the second.

For more than two hours the three observers (two from Russia and one Moldovan) lay in the park, hidden in the grass among the trees, before they were able to make their way across the road and take shelter in the hotel.

The telephone system continued to function in the city despite the difficult situation. The Bendery communications center was held by a platoon of Guardsmen. All attempts—first by volunteers and then by the opposition—to deprive the city of communications were unsuccessful.

By midnight the shooting had subsided in the city. Both the attackers and the defenders were dressed for the most part in the same uniform, and it was difficult to distinguish friends from foes in the darkness of the night.

Pogroms and looting began in the city in that relative calm. Almost all of the stores and the bank were looted during the night. Suitcases, knapsacks, armored personnel carriers and tanks were stuffed with women's clothing, radio equipment and the range of items from commercial stores.

At 04:12 on 20 June the storming of the building housing the city executive committee was renewed. A tank moved onto the square and fired two direct rounds at the building.

By 04:45 the city was almost entirely in the hands of troops of the Moldovan army and MVD [Ministry of

Internal Affairs]. Isolated pockets of resistance (the executive committee, the workers' committee, the Guardsmen's barracks, the first-aid station and Kindergarten No. 22) were blockaded.

At 05:15 the executive committee—more precisely, the city's defense headquarters—was offered an opportunity to remove the women and children under a white flag.

At 05:20 tanks and personnel carriers moved up to the bridge across the Dniester, drove back a roadblock set up by the Guardsmen and captured the bridge. The shooting shifted to the left bank of the river.

At this point a report was transmitted over the local radio that the bridge had been captured by the opposition and that forces were forming up there to enlarge the bridgehead and move against Tiraspol.

At 05:40 an attempt was made to lift the blockade of Bendery. Several tanks moved up to the bridge over the Dniester, which had been "captured" by women of Tiraspol from the 14th Army toward morning. Members of the home guard were at the controls. The tanks did not succeed in moving into the city at once, however. They were met with direct fire from antitank guns. The first tank forced its way through to the right bank and reached a crossroad near the GAI [State Motor-Vehicle Inspectorate] post, where it was put out of action.

At 09:30 Guardsmen reached the bridge once again. Their BRDM [Armored reconnaissance/patrol vehicle] moved to the fore and halted before some concrete blocks cutting off the entrance onto the bridge from the Tiraspol side. A direct hit ignited a bus parked near the bridge and serving as a shelter from bad weather for policemen guarding the bridge. The bridge became shrouded in black smoke.

During those hours all of us were interested in learning Russia's reaction to the events of the previous night. On a television set in the hall of the first floor a Saturday program of entertainment was being shown on the first channel, Ostankino, however. A Radio Truba program was broadcasting puns on the subject of automobiles. The glass in the windows rattled from shots fired by a tank parked nearby.

It seems that even in war there are sounds more terrible than the sounds of shots and explosions. About noon the entire hotel was roused and disturbed by a woman screaming from a five-story building next to our hotel. It was later learned that this was a 16-year-old girl whose father had been killed before her eyes. He and two others had been struck by rounds from an armored personnel carrier as they crossed the street. After the girl's father fell onto the street, he was run over by a tank.

At 1620 hours two T-64 tanks swept across the bridge into Bendery under the cover of an antiaircraft gun. Perforating the area ahead of them with 125-mm shells, the tanks rushed across to the right bank. Another tank drove onto the bridge behind them but halted midway

and began emitting smoke. A bullet had pierced one of the external fuel tanks and set the tank afire. Only an experienced crew could have done what was then observed by us and seen and recorded by a Moldovan television cameraman located on the roof of a neighboring building.

The tank moved backward, swung about at the edge of the bridge, engaged its thermal smoke generating equipment and withdrew full-speed toward Parkany under the smoke screen. The fuel from the tank's damaged fuel tank rapidly contributed to the thermal smoke screen, and both the tank and the crew were saved.

It was 2020 hours. When Cossacks begin an attack they do not yell "Charge!" They go into battle yelling "Willingly!" Cossacks alone did not save the city, however. Guardsmen, home guardsmen and local residents soon joined them

By 2300 hours the main opposition forces and the national army of Moldova had been driven out of the city center. There were still several pockets of resistance in the city, however, such as the city police department, adjacent apartment buildings, a women's dormitory, the city prison, the Druzhba movie theater.... The defense of these facilities was fairly competently arranged, and all approaches to them were covered by fire.

Toward midnight of 20 June the shooting had died down somewhat, but everyone knew that it would be renewed come morning.

(To be continued.)

### Notes From a Russian Observer Officer in Dniester Region, Part III

92UM1334A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Jul 92 First edition p 2

[Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Vyrvich: "We Did Everything Possible to Silence the Weapons"; Final segment. Continued from 28 and 30 July issues of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA]

[Text] It is 12 July, the Cosnita staging area....

After a cease-fire was agreed upon and the mortars, artillery and armored equipment had been withdrawn from the fire positions and assembled in prearranged areas, we military observers were dispatched to the equipment assembly areas and command posts on both sides of the Dniester. I was assigned to the Cosnita command post on the Moldovan side.

In my lifetime I have slept in hotels, dormitories, barracks, tents and dugouts, but I have never before slept under the open sky. Now, here on Moldovan soil, I am doing just that.

The headquarters of the Cosnita staging area, where I am located, has been housed in the building of a kindergarten for the 5th day now.

In the corner of the room, beneath some exercise bars, are stacked children's toys, from which the antennae of several Romanian-made portable radios protrude.

At 08:00 I meet as usual with observers in the equipment assembly areas: the village of Pirita and 5 miles south of Starrye Dubossary. Under the agreement the area is monitored by officers from the 14th Army and Dniester region Guardsmen. There are no problems. The Moldovan side is strictly observing all the provisions of the agreement. For the 5th day now all of the MTL-Bs, armored personnel carriers, 152-mm howitzers, mortars, antiaircraft systems and Alazan launchers from the staging area have been parked in columns pointing toward Chisinau. Only small arms are left at the positions, but they have not been fired in four days.

At 10:00 I travel to the positions of the First Battalion, defending the right flank of the bridgehead under the command of a battalion commander and former commander of a reconnaissance company in Afghanistan.

I talk with the soldiers. They have been fed up with it all for a long time now. They ask whether they will all soon be released to go home, whether it is true that the equipment on the other side has been withdrawn into the interior and why Alazan missiles were launched this morning from the direction of the Guardsmen.

At 11:10 the chairman of the Dorotskoye rural soviet drives up and confirms the fact:

"Yes, this morning two Alazan missiles did in fact land in some gardens on the edge of the village."

The village has taken a heavy beating. It is caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. The Guardsmen's trenches pass along the eastern outskirts; those of the police are on the western side of the village. A total of 230 of the 1,150 homes in the village have suffered from the shelling.

I promise them that no more Alazans will be fired. Yesterday officer observers did in fact spot the launcher at the Guardsmen's positions. When I return to headquarters I will have to radio Grigoriopol to check on the situation and have the Alazan removed to the assembly area for equipment and heavy armaments.

At 17:30 Col Anatoliy Kochug and I depart for Pirita. The equipment is parked in columns. All is normal. The soldiers are sitting or lying around or leaning against the vehicles without their weapons. This makes any unauthorized firing less likely.

At 18:30 we spot an MTL-B heading toward the Dniester along a garden beyond a field in which the rye has been mowed but not yet harvested. This is clearly a deserter from a column. We set out in pursuit in our Uazik and about 15 minutes later stop the prime mover at the river. At the order "Everyone over here!" four half-naked, drunk volunteers emerge from the personnel carrier.

While Col Anatoliy Kochug questions them near the vehicle, I help a fifth drunken "fighter" crawl out. He was hiding in the interior of the personnel carrier and, like the others, can barely stand up.

Two of them hold assault rifles.

We explain to them that they will either sink the vehicle in the Dniester or provoke the Guardsmen into a conflict. And combat operations will start up again in the staging area.

One of the volunteers grasps his assault rifle, inserts a round into the chamber, yells "Stop!" and points the rifle at us. He then places the barrel against his chin and asks: "Am I a troublemaker?" It is clear from his look that he fully intends to shoot himself.

"Now, just hold on! You have nothing to do with it," I say, trying as coolly and convincingly as possible to calm him down.

Kochug throws his assault rifle onto the ground and says:

"Calm down. You are not a troublemaker. Drop your rifle."

The man begins to lower the rifle, but as soon as we take a step toward him, he presses the trigger and fires a long round. The bullets trace a semicircle above our heads. Losing his balance, the rifleman falls. This gives us enough time to grab the assault rifle.

After returning the personnel carrier to the column, we silently return to headquarters. Just what are we to one another? Enemies? Comrades-in-arms? Or perhaps brothers in misfortune?

At 23:00 I am talking with Lieutenant-Colonel Sergey Fokin, a comrade. Upon leaving Bendery, he and the crew of an R-142 radio unit—a senior warrant officer, a driver and a signalman—were stopped at a volunteers' post and ordered to dig their own graves.

It is difficult to say what saved them from death. Was it Sergey's restraint and self-possession? His request that they shoot him but not touch the young soldiers? The remnants of common sense in the drunken volunteers at the post and the awareness that shooting a lieutenant colonel with a white band and the image of the Russian flag on his sleeve would bring problems?

On the morning of 13 July we members of the first wave of observers depart for Tiraspol by helicopter. From there we will set out for our stations. Our mission is completed. We have been replaced by officers of the 14th Army.

### **Peacekeeping Forces Arrive in Dniester Region**

*92UM1334B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 31 Jul 92 First edition p 1*

[Report by Anatoliy Stasovskiy: "Peacekeeping Forces Take up Positions in the Dniester Region"]



[Text] At 10:00 residents of the city and nearby villages assembled on the bridge across the Dniester which links Bendery and the left bank. They gathered to greet peacekeeping subunits from Russia. The first column did not appear on the bridge until 17:00, however. And all that time the people waited impatiently. Then the meeting took place. There were tears of joy, flowers....

Military transports carrying signal equipment and signalmen were the first to land on Dniester region soil. Airborne troops from the Tula Airborne Division arrived at 16:30. A train carrying three battalions of Russia's Ground Forces is also en route to the Dniester region. The editors received this information from the press center of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense.

The plans call for the rest of the subunits of Russian peacekeeping forces to arrive in Tiraspol throughout the day on 30 July, strictly according to schedule.

The information service of the Supreme Soviet of the PMR [Dniester-Moldovan Republic] has informed us that a dividing line has been established along the

Cosnita and Kochiyersk staging areas. According to the press service, the peacekeeping forces will be commanded by Russian General Eduard Vorobyev. We have also learned the names of some of the commanders of airborne subunits from Russia. They are lieutenant-colonels Aleksandr Kobelev, Nikolay Mayorov and Aleksandr Mishchanin, and Major Sergey Khomenko.

The delay with the formation of our peacekeeping battalions in Moldova is due to the fact that circumstances are more difficult than were previously encountered. I would mention the fact that the Moldovan subunits will not include military personnel who took part in the armed conflict in the Dniester region.

According to RIA reports, Moldova's embassy in Moscow has confirmed the fact that the Moldovan side does not agree to the demand of the Dniester Republic that their battalions be deployed on the right bank of the Dniester. At the same time a report that Moldova had proposed setting up mixed forces and not separate Russian, Moldovan and Dniester region formations in the security zone was refuted.

## ARMS TRADE

### Practical Advantages of Foreign Arms Sales

92UM1288A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 10 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences Sergey Aki-  
mov: "If They Buy Arms, We Need to Sell Them"]

[Text] Today when we have to answer the question about "whether or not our defense complex will exist", the problem of assessing the advisability of exporting domestically-produced arms is very acute. On the one hand, it seems that the Russian leadership has admitted the importance of arms sales for bringing the country's economy out of the crisis, to which President B.N. Yeltsin's and members of the government's recent statements attest. On the other hand, certain social circles are aggressively advocating the restriction of this type of business while expressing an extremely negative attitude toward it.

For example, Russian Federation State Advisor for Policy in the Sphere of Ecology and Health Protection A.V. Yablokov notes that "large-scale arms sales weaken the incentive toward conversion of arms production and only continues the death throes of the militarized economy" (IZVESTIYA, 23 April 1992). RAN [Russian Academy of Sciences] Corresponding Member Ye. Aleksandrov and Professor V. Kolbin stress that the export of products of our defense industry "feeds conflicts" (IZVESTIYA, 16 June 1992) and therefore it is inhumane. Furthermore, the authors add that excessive arms sales have resulted in a situation when the arms are beginning to shoot at our own people.

These arguments are entirely justified in a global international context. But a number of vital factors are not taken into account here with regard to the country's domestic problems. Arms exports are a multifaceted process and we need to consider various factors—military, political and economic—to assess their advisability.

As for the military-political factors, the sale of arms and the creation of a reliable system to support its functioning permits arms-supplying states to consolidate their positions in various regions of the world in accordance with their national interests.

From the economic point of view, the fulfillment of export orders serves as an important means of maintaining an optimal workload for military industry, maintenance of employment, receipt of additional hard currency resources, and also the reduction of expenditures for the acquisition of arms for the national armed forces.

This is especially relevant for our defense industry whose output exceeds the needs of our own army and in which the best intellectual and technological resources were historically concentrated and which has found itself in a

critical situation due to its hasty "disarmament" campaign and drastic restriction of state financing. We would like to hope that it is the crisis that will prompt our defense industry toward large-scale conversion. However, it requires enormous resources and there are none. However, its required depth has still not been determined since Russia has no military doctrine. Under these conditions, large-scale conversion can undermine the country's defensive sufficiency and the contemporary situation is notable for its instability and the armed conflicts in "hot spots" both in the CIS and on the entire planet.

Therefore, today the effective export of our arms, which, of course, it is necessary to conduct while considering all national obligations and international agreements, is precisely the most rational decision. We must soberly recognize that the production of the Russian defense industry belongs to that small group of manufactured items which, along with raw materials and energy resources, enjoy high demand on the world market. The rational sale of arms can help to resolve problems both of our own military-industrial complex and of the country's economy as a whole.

It is not by accident that practically all of the leading countries of the West devote the most intent attention to the expansion of their military industry's export capabilities. Arms exports are viewed as the most important way to maintain its potential, including in the period of disarmament. So, in the United States during the current decade, the portion of exports of military products in the total volume of its output is increasing to 20-25 percent as compared to 11 percent in 1982-1988. In Great Britain, the ratio of exports in military production is reaching 25-35 percent, in France—40 percent, in Italy—57 percent and, in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]—20-25 percent. And even in peaceful Austria and Switzerland, which are the centers for disarmament negotiations, 85 and 25 percent, respectively, of the military production produced in these countries goes toward exports.

We should also not reject reality. We must admit that this inhumane export is determined by the demand on the international market. We must understand that a unilateral refusal to sell arms will not be an example for the other numerous suppliers but will only worsen our own position. Our competitors will rapidly occupy Russia's positions. Actually, that is already occurring. The cessation of our deliveries to Libya is being compensated for by an increase of exports of Chinese arms to that country; Soviet models of arms are beginning to be replaced by Western arms, primarily American, in Finland and the countries of Eastern Europe. This development of events is resulting in economic losses for us and also to the expansion of the presence of the leading countries of the West in areas that directly border Russia. Romanian arms are being widely used along with domestically-produced arms in Moldova and Iranian and Turkish weapons are being used in the Transcaucasus.

We can resolve the problem of restricting the proliferation of weapons in the world, that validly worries world society, only on a joint basis, while considering the opinion of both the producers and the consumers. And if the countries of the West are actually so strongly concerned about the militarization of our economy, they should actively participate in financing Russian conversion programs. Otherwise, we must consider the production and export of highly technological domestically-produced defense products our specialty within the international division of labor.

The main thing in this problem—is to prevent the uncontrolled and unregulated export of arms which may undermine Russia's prestige in the world and inflict damage to its national interests. Therefore, we need to formulate a normative base as soon as possible that precisely regulates all aspects of activity in the sphere of arms sales, develop a state policy that defines the basic priorities in general, and create a finely tuned mechanism of state control of these complicated types of business.

**From the editorial staff.** While publishing this article, we understand that other views exist on the problem of the arms trade, including opposite views. However, obviously in today's world it generally does not have a satisfactory solution. This can only be a question of reducing the inevitable costs to a minimum. And here each competent opinion is certainly useful—both "pro" and "con".

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

### Fokin Expresses Support for Survival of 'Yuzhmash'

92UM1289A Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian  
29 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* Correspondent V. Nikitchenko, Dnepropetrovsk: "'Yuzhmash' Will not Die, Stated Prime Minister V.P. Fokin While Visiting Dnepropetrovsk Association's 'Yuzhnyy Machine Tool Plant'"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Prime Minister's arrival at one of the largest subdivisions for the manufacture of spacecraft was needed like air. Having found itself in an extremely difficult situation as a result of conversion, the association's many thousand-person collective is literally suffocating and is losing not only its former glory but also its high-class specialists.

Vitold Pavlovich Fokin and the ministers who arrived with him visited the enterprise for the first time and were literally stunned by its output. This is not only "Zenit" rockets and other rocket equipment. This is heavy-duty tractor production. This is the famous microwave stoves, children's bicycles, simulators, and "Mriya" kitchen

machines. Today "Yuzhmash" manufactures over two dozen brands of goods for the people. But that is extremely little.

Association General Director L.D. Kuchma, Presidential Representative to Dnepropetrovsk Oblast P.I. Lazarenko, and other officials who accompanied the delegation from Kiev showed them everything that they make and told them about what "Yuzhmash" workers are capable of making.

One of the directions is the production of trolley buses. Several of these vehicles have already been produced here and the Prime Minister along with the delegation became convinced of their reliability. In a short interview with journalists, Vitold Pavlovich said: "I am glad that I visited the enterprise and I regret that I did not manage to do that earlier. The plant is unique. Having this production potential, sovereign Ukraine will certainly stand on its feet. Now we need to comprehend everything and do everything possible so that 'Yuzhmash's' second birth occurs as an enterprise that operates not in the military complex but in Ukraine's national economy."

### Tomsk-7 Faces Environmental, Economic Ills

92WN0656A Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*  
in Russian 14 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by A. Chelnokov: "Tomsk-7, What the Film 'The Resident's Mistake' Did Not Tell About"]

[Text] The flashing lights of the GAI [State Automotive Inspectorate] did not allow us to pass the long column, which consisted entirely of closed vans with the inscriptions "Furniture," "Produce," "Incubated Eggs"—in short, everything that they write on ordinary vans that are hauling furniture, produce, and eggs. With just this difference, that ordinary vans do not move in columns of 30 vehicles on intercity trunk highways and, especially, accompanied by a menacing militia escort.

We guessed that the covered vehicles, especially with the militia, may be bringing to Tomsk unenriched uranium or something more biting and more radioactive. More specifically, not to Tomsk but to Tomsk-7, a city that is a relative of Arzamas-16, Chelyabinsk-65, and Krasnoyarsk-26.

### A Monster

Recently one of our readers, with the tone of a person who is exposing a defect, telephoned and asked:

"Does the gentleman correspondent know that Tomsk-7 has sent 10 kilograms of plutonium to Canada?"

"Is that right?!"

"It is!...For ten million dollars."

A few days later another woman reader, who could hardly contain herself, telephoned: I have not made up

my mind whether to expose the Tomsk-7 authorities who made a secret deal with the French firm Kozhem [transliterated], which wanted to bury nuclear waste in Siberian forests.

Tomsk, a city of 100,000 that is within 10-15 kilometers of Tomsk's half-million people, is obligated to Lavrentiy Beriya for its appearance in the world. It was precisely his finger that, at the start of 1949, jabbed at the blue streak of the Tom River on a map of Siberia, at a picturesque place where a pioneer camp or a vacation house would stand....But the superpower needed super-weapons, and there was not a better spot than the Siberian wilderness, so that nuclear production would be concealed from diversionists and enemies of the people. The archtotalitarian regime built at a superrapid pace, and in the summer of 1955 the first reactor—code-named Ivan-1—was started up. The Siberian Chemical Combine, which soon became the largest secret nuclear station in the country, also was started here. Around it arose a city with two names: Seversk and Tomsk-7.

Not so long ago, back in 1990, the official Soviet data did not mention either the SKhK [Siberian Chemical Combine], or Tomsk-7, or Seversk. The knowledgeable reader probably will recall the film, "The Resident's Mistake," where the crafty enemy spy cheats a Soviet youth, who is chasing after easy money, and gives him a trifling task: in a certain part of the Soviet country, sit down on the bank of the stream and, as if passing by, accidentally collect some river water in a little flask and a little soil in a jar.

Surprising as it may be, the film, in which the viewer is told, knowingly or unknowingly, that nuclear production is accompanied by radioactive contamination of the environment, appeared on the screen. The viewer does not notice anything....

But for the first time, official tests in the Tomsk-7 area plunged local society into shock. A certain French laboratory with a complicated name established that the radiation level in the soil close to the aqueduct that goes to Tomsk-7 and into the Tom river was 300 microroentgens per hour (20-fold the natural level). An anomalously high content of cobalt-58, chromium-51, zinc-65, manganese-54, iron-59, and scandium-56, and what was absolutely outright plutonium (Pu-238, Pu-242, and Pu-239/240) was observed in the soil. The report about the forecast of Vanga, who saw a future explosion at Tomsk's reactor No 5, poured oil on the flame. Tomsk was on the verge of panic.

But soon it became known: close to Tomsk-7 were at least 8 water reservoirs and basins with moderately active and low-level waste that totaled more than 8 million cubic meters in volume; up to 42,000 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste per day were thrown into the Tom River; 175 cubic meters of waste were pumped hourly into subsurface horizons at a depth of

345-370 meters; and for 1992, the overall figure for pumped effluent was more than 32-33 million cubic meters.

In addition, after the accident at the ChAES [Chernobylskaya AES], people were found who had set themselves the task of comparing the drinking water in Tomsk, the left tributary of the Prilyat, and the Kiev reservoir. They compared....They observed that the cesium-137 concentration in the underground waters of the Tomsk water intake was not lower than in the zones that were victims of the accident....

The Tomsk-7 city newspaper not so long ago took aim with a large number of articles in which former staff workers of the combine told about past discharges not only of waste but of finished product—plutonium-239 and uranium-235. Former senior foreman of the OTK [technical inspection section] Anatoliy Strapshin asserted that nuclear materials of the SKhK that had been thrown into the reservoir and burial grounds were deliberately underreported and concealed by the combine's management, with the knowledge of the ministry, KGB bodies, and the CPSU gorkom and obkom.

#### The Chocolate City

When the bus arrived from Tomsk Oblast, all the passengers, except for mothers with nursing children, were required to get off and walk through the checkpoint. After a check in a special cubicle, the bus pulled up to the stop on that side in order to take the people along the streets of Tomsk-7. This is called the "regime" here. The concept incorporates a triple cordon of protection at the plants, and four rows of barbed wire, a footprint-monitoring belt, and guard towers around the city, the plant, and the sanitary zone. The area within the barbed wire covered several hundred square kilometers and, it was said, the guards can fire without any warning when violators of this border are observed....

The streets are clean here. You hardly ever meet a drunk here, although many deny this, saying that a Tomsk-7 resident is not fool enough to drink and get bit, it is just that the unkind memory of the former "master" of the oblast, Ye. K. Ligachev, lives on. Prior to his departure for Union circuits he fought against drunkenness throughout the oblast and with such fire that nowadays, throughout all of Tomskiy Kray, you do not look for vodka-liquor or wine production. Everything has been created for an absolutely autonomous existence here: it has its private plots, its own electricity, its own heating, one small food industry, and even theaters—musical comedies and puppet shows—and these are their own.

Before restructuring, Seversk's residents were called nothing else but "chocolates," alluding to their somewhat unsocialistic, full life. Even on the day that we arrived here, the city had received humanitarian help from Norway. It was brought in by those same vans from Novosibirsk: the aid had come by IL-76 aircraft, but the chief of the Tomsk Airport would not risk receiving such a huge thing at his place—vehicles had to be driven to

the Novosibirsk port of Tolmachevo, where, it is said, even two Boeings can land at the same time.

Foreigners demanded their good-will trips to secret facilities. They were courteously refused because of considerations of preserving state secrets. But the foreigners did not give up and, as a last trump card, they laid out recollections of Arzamas-16, where the Minister for Nuclear Power himself, who accompanied Yeltsin, had promised them a familiarization walk about Tomsk-7 facilities. The ministry had to be called. They thought about it there and grudgingly authorized the trip. A minimum one....

### The Combine

"Railroad ties of old wood, from which the time of radioactive discharges and their amount can be determined, were sent to the Committee for the Ecology."

"Malefactors removed two wheels from a vehicle parked in one of the lots...."

"Glass containers—jars worth a total of about one and a half thousand rubles—were taken from the basement of one of the apartment houses...."

These were events that occurred in Tomsk-7 on the day of our arrival.

Previously, when we lived in a superpower, the word "defense" was understood to mean something like reinforced concrete, something solid, which served as a subject of special pride for each Soviet. Right now, while we are living in the CIS, defense has begun to constrain our movements. Like steel armor on a soldier who has come to a formal dance where the mazaruka is performed. "The defense object"—something worse—has been transformed entirely into some good-for-nothing industry, whose production base long, long ago should have been, if not baby carriages, then at least cast-iron stewing pans or frying pans.

The Siberian Chemical Combine itself is not at all a defense object. Yes, for sure it is a detriment to surrounding nature and the population of West Siberia, although SKhK workers are quick to assert that pollutants from the combine are minimal. Yes, there is plutonium, which, despite all the reduction of armaments, continues to be produced here. There is also the probability, although minimal, of an accident, in comparison with which Chernobyl could appear as innocuous as a fisherman's campfire on the Pripyat....All this is enough to fight furiously for elimination of the combine. If, of course, one closes his eyes to the fact that the SKhK possesses a technology for enriching and obtaining the world's purest uranium, which is unique and unlikely to be found elsewhere. And the notorious French firm Kozhem, not entirely out of philanthropy or a desire to savor Siberian exotica, turned here 20 years ago with a proposal to conclude a multibillion contract with a Russian combine that is located in some forgotten god-forsaken place.

One can fight for a closing of the combine if one forgets that the heat that its reactors generate for 40 percent of the buildings of the oblast city of Tomsk is still extremely important for Siberia. Heat which, incidentally, is not sufficient for Tomsk-7 itself, whose heating conduits are warmed by an ordinary TETs. They say that during the past winter, when Kemerovo's miners were fighting for a rise in their standard of living, no one supplied coal and their freezing compatriots at Tomsk-7 sat with temperatures of plus 10 degrees in apartments and institutions, at a time when people in the oblast city of Tomsk were not afraid to open their small hinged window openings, even during bitter cold.

It is practically impossible to reconfigure nuclear production—this means that the facilities that produce plutonium are to be subjected to mothballing without restoration—which simply means destruction. As I was told, the program of disarmament, which proposed to dismantle nuclear warheads, will not affect the chemical combine directly, since it was not envisioned that processes convertible to turning out plutonium would be engaged in here.

I confess that I reacted with disbelief to the latter assertion, because I knew already that a reservoir will be built in Tomsk-7 for storing our warheads that have been removed from combat alert, for which purpose the Americans are allocating a total of \$400 million. Life is being changed lightninglike, and right now, as I write these lines, it is a generally known fact that warheads are being stored in Tomsk-7. Then every combine worker, be it the director, G. Khandorin, or simply an operating engineer, will deny heatedly the existence of any agreements on this account. So this is what we find here: the local "greens" think that almost all nuclear workers are enemies and liars, while the nuclear workers consider the journalists to be enemy spies....

However, even the "greens" at the combine can be distinguished by their tints: it is said that there are "light greens" and "dark greens"....The "dark" ones are those who fight for almost a return to the stone age and certainly for the destruction of everything that even in the slightest is connected with the atom. The "light" ones are those who recognize the necessity for the construction and operation of AES's but without harm to the environment.

The "facility" has turned out to be an "iron" candidate for shutdown and mothballing in August of this year. A dual-purpose reactor—this is one that both produces the basic product and also fills the role of an AST [nuclear heat-supply plant]—had been placed in a squat building. People in white polyester coveralls met us. While we were zigzagging along corridors, passageways, and stairs, I was extremely and persistently interested in how the matter of the nuclear workers' health is handled. They looked at me strangely but, understanding what disturbed me, they said, do not worry, human passions are not alien to us....

They told me: you wash your hands here after visiting the restroom, and I, in accordance with work safety, did so. In order to avoid misunderstanding...For this same purpose, a personal dosimeter was fastened to the chest of each worker at the reactor. Here the attitude towards the word "caught," which is a frightful one for you and me, seemingly is one of calmness, the attitude that, let us say, the miner has toward the coal dust jammed into his skin pores. Certainly it is justified—for it is impossible to live and work in constant fear of irradiation. Although, they say, the sapper makes a mistake when he stops being afraid....

They leave on pension at age 50, and there is still another feature that is unusual for the country: one does not find pilferers here—the product is too dangerous, control is too strict, and the dosimeters at the checkpoint are too sensitive.

#### Qadhdhafi Got Tired of Waiting

The explosion at Chernobyl took not only the lives and health of many people, it left hundreds of thousands of nuclear specialists without any prospects. And this also is a tragedy, since if you are an unemployed teacher or physician you have the opportunity if worst comes to worst to engage in partial practice. If you are an unemployed nuclear worker your case is difficult, it is not possible to speak about any partial practice—for you the straight road leads only to sewage workers....

Tomsk is a city of students. It is more of a student city than Moscow, Leningrad, and Novosibirsk combined, since the ratio of students to the city population here is two or three times greater. Thanks to the SKhK, the social status of the students who are preparing themselves to work at the nuclear installations in Tomsk is, perhaps, greater than in any city of the CIS. Alas, right now the road to Tomsk has been closed for them since the shutdown of two reactors, and the combine's personnel policy has been defined by the motto, "Release them all, do not let anyone in." And sometimes they have to be released not just in accordance with their own wishes....

It happened the next morning. After visiting the third reactor, I was lucky to meet 29-year old engineer Sergey Vubarev and 57-year old deputy shift chief Yuriy Viktorovich Gudkin. Both were among those for whom further work in their specialty will not be encouraging after shutdown of the third reactor. Both by no means look happy, although Gudkin told me that he is not specially worried—he is at the pensioner's age, but Serega actually is at a dead end.

"Imagine, Serezha, that you are not facing a correspondent but a colonel of the Lebanese Army. Fantasize that he says to you, a man without a future, the following: 'You will have a cottage in Lebanon, \$5,000 per month, and a contract for five years. The work, it stands to reason, is in your specialty—plutonium. Do you agree?'"

"I am afraid that I'd say 'yes'."

That's right! Incidentally, earlier I had managed to hear an unofficial conversation at the combine:

"An atomic bomb for Lebanon? Yes, we can jury-rig one for them in a year, just pay us!"

And when I ventured to doubt what I had heard, they brought up fairly cogent arguments:

"It took Stalin and Kurchatov six years in the forties to create a nuclear weapon. Now it is the nineties. Brains can be bought, and a reactor also: It is not necessary to build one. There are oil dollars. As for discipline....Qadhdhafi, as is well known, is no better than Stalin...."

And even Doctor of Engineering Sciences and combine General Director Gennadiy Petrovich Khandorin, giving me an interview, said that he cannot be 100-percent sure about his subordinates. At present, leaving the country under contract is practically impossible for them. What about later?...

But at present we are on the verge of losing a generation of nuclear specialists. And without them we will be transformed into a Burkina-Faso with a nuclear potential—simply a Burkina-Faso that is big, cold, bitter, and forced to start everything all over again. From Stalin?...

#### Farewell, Arms

When the disarmament business entered the practical stage, I had occasion to visit the Sary-Ozekh proving ground, where our tactical-operational OTR-23 missiles were destroyed under the monitoring of American specialists. The military men nearly cried, watching the column of flame and smoke that were left of the weapons which they had cared for and built and that were considered the last word in domestic missile technology. Today, nuclear "defense objects" are in the same position....

They, the representatives of nuclear "defense objects," like all normal people, are for the liquidation of nuclear arms. But today, when a politician subscribes to an agreement with former opponents about reducing some type of weapon or other, do the nuclear workers think about what the one who puts his signature on the agreement is relying upon? For, while destroying nuclear weapons reserves of the second generation, those same Americans are working strenuously to create a third generation—a guided operation that does not destroy the environment and is capable of destroying targets both on earth and in outer space. What for? In answering this question, each one is free to fantasize in accordance with his own talents.

We are beginning to get accustomed to defeats, be it a game of our unsung, flagless football team or a fiasco in the competition for geopolitical domination. Already they are saying that a filling humiliation is better than a destitute independence. Well, for some, perhaps....But not for you and me. Because we do not endure humiliation for long. The whole historic experience of Russia proves it. And unless we endure, we make a mess of

things, because we have become accustomed to flying into a temper with scandal and blows with both friends and those who are not friends.

Tomsk-7 was created and it exists, not for poisoning your life and mine. It helped us to be citizens of a great, albeit destitute, state. And this is not such a little thing.

#### **When the Issue Was Being Composed**

The situation at the Krasnoyarsk Mining and Chemical Combine, where plutonium is produced for nuclear

weapons, has begun again. A prestrike status, caused by the lack of cash in the city, has been announced here.

For April everyone was issued R3,000 [R], and for May R2,000, and then only to half of the collective.

"We can rid ourselves of a second Chernobyl," enterprise director Valeriy Lebedev told the ITAR-TASS correspondent. "A shift that tends a nuclear reactor and is irritated by living disorders can be unpredictable in its actions."

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