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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Reports on Military-Related Organizations

Officers' Assemblies Organizer Interviewed

92UM0782A Moscow SYN OTECHESTVA in Russian
No 7, Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Petrov, a co-chairman of the Coordinating Council of Officers' Assemblies of the CIS Armed Forces, by a SYN OTECHESTVA correspondent under the rubric "What's New?": "It Is Now a Matter for the Politicians"]

[Text] *Quite a few letters and appeals come to the editors from officers who are troubled by the decisions of the All-Army Officers' Assembly. One appeal in particular from the Officers' Assembly of the Guards Dnovskiy Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 3rd Degree Missile Regiment of the Strategic Missile Forces expresses a proposal, for the period of the meeting of the leaders of the Independent States that opened on February 14 in Minsk to discuss military issues, to recognize as a subject of geopolitics the Coordinating Council of Officers' Assemblies of the CIS Armed Forces. This was a guarantee that the proposals of the officer corps would be reflected in the course of the negotiations. Our correspondent met with one of the co-chairmen of that Coordinating Council, Captain 1st Rank A. Petrov, and asked him to answer a few questions.*

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, many of our readers are interested in the fate of the proposals on social protections for servicemen and the members of their families that were worked out by the Officers' Assembly of the CIS Armed Forces.

[A.M. Petrov] One of the chief tasks of our Coordinating Council is to seek the practical implementation of the decisions and demands of the Officers' Assemblies. The All-Army Officers' Forum, strictly speaking, created the council for that purpose. It will not be easy for us to achieve the aims we have set, of course, if we do not preserve the unity of the officer corps of the former USSR armed forces. We will strive to do so nonetheless.

[Correspondent] What concrete proposals on social protections for servicemen is the council engaged in developing now?

[A.M. Petrov] In the sphere of application of the efforts of the members of our council, everything that was devised by the All-Army Officers' Assembly. That includes proposals on pension support for servicemen, on the procedure for completing service, the status of servicemen and their share in the privatization of former socialist property. You would agree that we also have a right to the latter.

It must also be noted that we are ready to collaborate with all social and state organizations whose activity is connected with questions of social protections for servicemen.

[Correspondent] Has your work been reflected at all in the documents that the delegation headed by the CIS armed forces commander-in-chief is issuing for the negotiations in Minsk?

[A.M. Petrov] The commander-in-chief has attentively studied the package of documents we submitted to him, and what is gratifying is that all of the proposals we prepared for the Minsk negotiations have been taken into account. It is now a matter for the politicians.

[Correspondent] And if you would, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, something about the impending prospects and plans for the work of the council.

[A.M. Petrov] I take the stance that the Coordinating Council is not some administrative body, the essence of the activity of which is the shunting and shuffling of papers. We are not inclined to work in some cushy office in the capital; otherwise we will simply ruin the matter entrusted to us. We try to be among the troops more often, especially in those units that are stationed in the so-called hot spots. The constant gathering of information, analysis of the situation, study of acute social issues and problems on the scene etc.—that is the sphere of our activity.

CIS Veterans' Union Registered

92UM0782B Moscow VETERAN in Russian
No 4, Jan 92 p 2

[Unattributed news item: "The Charter Has Been Registered"]

[Text] The presentation of the certificate of registration of the charter of the Fellowship (Union) of Organizations of Veterans of the Independent States, which was created on 18 Dec 91 at a conference of veterans as the legal successor to the All-Union Organization of Veterans of War and Labor, was held on January 17 at the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.

As of now the Fellowship of Organizations of Veterans has the status of an international association.

The supervisory body of the association is a coordinating council, and its presidium is endowed with the rights of a legal person.

The Charter registration certificate records the principal aims of the Fellowship: the protection of the social and civil rights of veterans, the coordination of the social activity of veterans' organizations, the development and realization of joint programs, the rendering of assistance to retirees and assistance in their acquiring of labor activity within their powers, and the establishment and development of ties with international and national veterans' associations.

Afghan Veterans' Committee

92UM0782C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Feb 92 p 6

[Article by Ilya Kanestri under the rubric "Re-Organization": "The Problem of Afghan Veterans is Being Pulled Apart Among the Sovereign States—The Fate of the Committee for Internationalist Soldiers' Affairs Has Not Yet Been Resolved"]

[Text] The dissolution of all structures of the apparatus of the former president of the USSR, including the Committee for the Affairs of Internationalist Soldiers, was begun on January 2 of this year by decision of Russian President B. Yeltsin. The committee had up until that time remained the only state body of the former USSR that was occupied with the problem of the Afghan veterans. The staffers of the committee are continuing to work despite the fact that the committee is in the stage of disbanding, and they are waiting for a decision by the government of the CIS relative to its future fate.

The question of creating a state body that would be occupied with the problems of the internationalist soldiers was first raised at the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. A Committee for the Affairs of Internationalist Soldiers was created under the USSR Cabinet of Ministers in April of 1991. Colonel R. Aushev was named to head it. The committee later came to be subordinate to M. Gorbachev, and now the fate of the committee has to be decided before March 2. It could be disbanded entirely, and each of the sovereign republics would begin to create their own intrinsic, analogous structures, or it could pass under the jurisdiction of Russia; it could also become a public organization (of which there are now quite many). That would signify, in any case, that the solution of the problems of the soldiers that served in the war will be put off once again.

The Interregional Council for Internationalist Soldiers' Affairs, which was held on 18 Dec 91 in Moscow, came out in favor of the creation of a unified international body. An appeal to the heads of the governments of the independent states on the necessity of the existence of such an international structure was also adopted at the same time. The creation of such a body in the republic would assure its legal continuity in the solution of the problems of Afghan veterans, and would display a readiness to bear responsibility to the people that a state that no longer even exists sent into war at one time. Second, combined efforts would make it possible to resolve issues of the medical and psychological rehabilitation of the people who served in battle. The solution of these problems is possible only with a combination of efforts by all interested parties. And, finally, the most important thing—coordination of the efforts of all the republics of the CIS is essential—is prisoners of war. The problem of prisoners of war and individuals who are missing is effectively not being solved today owing to the lack of unified tactics on the issue. The scattered activity of

various social organizations and private individuals provides no opportunity to pursue a unified policy in negotiations with the mujahedin. The lack of a state policy on resolving this issue also does not permit the achievement of any concrete steps.

Veterans' Groups Merge

92UM0782D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by War Veterans Committee Chairman Marshal Aviation A. Silantyev: "The Veterans Are Uniting"]

[Text] A combined session of the presidium of the Federation of War Veterans and the Interrepublic and Russian Unions of Veterans of the Armed Forces has been held. The decision was made at it that their combination into a unified veterans' organization would be expedient. An organizational committee has been created in this regard.

The newly created veterans' organizations that have been accepted into the Federation of War Veterans are the Ukrainian Union of War Participants, the Altay Kray, North Ossetian Republic, Nizhegorod Oblast and Voronezh City organizations of war veterans and the Moscow Club of Heroes of the Soviet Union and Full Holders of the Order of Glory.

The veterans of war and the armed forces expressed serious concern in connection with the sharp lessening of work to build the memorial monument to the Victory at Poklonnyy Mountain in the city of Moscow, as well as in connection with the unprecedented disrespect and rudeness that was displayed by the mayor of Moscow on February 28 toward the veterans of war.

Moscow House of Veterans Founded

92UM0782E Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Rudenko: "A War Veterans' Hall"]

[Text] The Committee for the Affairs of Internationalist Soldiers, the board of the "War Veterans for Peace" Movement and the Moscow Association of Organizations of Veterans of the War in Afghanistan have come forward with the initiative of creating a Moscow War Veterans Hall in order to attract the attention of state and public organizations to solving the problems of veterans of the Great Patriotic War, internationalist soldiers and the veterans of other military conflicts, creating the essential conditions for the life and labor activity for which they are able and having interchange with comrades-in-arms.

This idea was supported by the heads of a number of ministries and committees of the government of Russia, organizations in the veterans community, the command of the CIS armed forces and representatives of the

Russian Orthodox Church and the international Committee of Muslim Organizations. It also met with understanding from the mayor and government of Moscow, who are seeking out opportunities for transferring a vacant Moscow building for the Veterans Hall.

An initiative organizing committee headed by Major General Aviation (Reserve) V. Mikhaylov was formed in December of last year for the efficient solution of the practical tasks connected with the creation of the Hall.

"We have a great many problems," related Vyacheslav Grigoryevich. "They are unfortunately not becoming any fewer from day to day. But we are not losing our spirit or dropping our hands. We find strength and confidence in the fact that the Veterans Hall will be created in spite of any difficulties, strength and confidence brought to us by an understanding of the usefulness of the cause we have begun and the support of Muscovites, which was visibly demonstrated by them in the course of the recent telethon 'Soldiers of the 20th Century—Against War.'"

I would report, for those who would like to obtain more detailed information on the Moscow War Veterans Hall—and perhaps also to make their own contribution to its creation—that the Committee is accommodated at the address of 103009, Moscow, Pushkinskaya Street, Building 5/6. The telephone number is 923-06-10. Organizations and private individuals may transfer money for the creation of the Hall to business account 700049 of the "War Veterans—For Peace" at the Finistbank AKB, correspondents' account 161804 at the TsOU of the Central Bank of Russia and MFO [interbranch turnover] 299112. The notation "For the War Veterans Hall" should be made on it.

The initiators of this useful undertaking hope that the Hall will unite around itself more than a million veterans living in Moscow and Moscow Oblast. The creation of large social-cultural and rehabilitation-health centers and a funeral service are also planned under its roof. It is shameful to admit this, but there is even often simply no one in our country to bury a veteran without relatives in a humane manner today.

The War Veterans Hall should also contain a hotel, medical station, a shop for the repair of prostheses and orthopedic devices, an auditorium and exhibit hall and a cafeteria where charity lunches could be served. A number of spaces will be earmarked for various veterans clubs.

A multitude of proposals from veterans and public organizations on the establishment of memorial boards here, on which the manes of Muscovites who were Heroes of the Soviet Union and full bearers of the Order of Glory, as well as the wishes to confer upon the Moscow War Veterans Hall the name of the legendary commander Marshal G.K. Zhukov, also seem to be deserving of attention.

Closing this information on such an optimistic note, I hope with all my heart that the war veterans in Moscow will have their own hall. And although I do not believe in signs, I admit that I did knock on wood before putting down the period. So as not to jinx it.

'Shchit' Replaces Chairman

92UM0782F Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Mar 92 p 2

[Interfax news item: "Shchit Union Chairman Relieved of Position"]

[Text] The coordinating council of the Russian Shchit Union to protect servicemen has announced the temporary cessation of the authority of its chairman, Vitaliy Urazhtsev. He has been accused of violating the charter of the organization and an authoritarian style of leadership. The convocation of an extraordinary congress of the Russian Shchit Union has also been convened for 4-5 Apr 92. The leadership of the organization and the right to public statements have been entrusted to the deputy chairman of Shchit, Colonel S. Kudinov.

St. Petersburg Draftees' Protection Committee

92UM0782G Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel V. Streltsov under the rubric "From St. Petersburg": "The Number of Those Protecting Draftees is Increasing. Now it is a Matter of Excellent Service"]

[Text] The "Committee to Protect the Rights of Draftees" has been created in St. Petersburg on the eve of the spring call-up. The Democratic Party of Russia, the Christian-Democratic Union and a number of other parties were the initiators of its formation.

The committee favors the fastest possible adoption by the Russian parliament of the laws on "The Status of the Serviceman," "Defense," "Alternative Service" and other legislation able to protect the rights of the "man with the gun" and give him the opportunity to feel himself a full-fledged member of society during his service as well. The coordinator of the city committee of the Democratic Party of Russia on youth issues, Ivan Fedorov, headed the new public organization.

"We began collaborating with the committee even during the stage of its emergence," said the assistant military commissar of the city for personnel work, Major Otepan Zholovan. "This collaboration is taking place on a purely businesslike basis, since we do not share the political views of many of its members. We feel, however, that it would be incorrect to ignore the voluntary aid that is coming from this public organization in solving the problems that the draftees encounter. By the way, the circle of such public organizations that we are interacting with today on issues of working with the draft contingent has expanded immeasurably, from school

youth associations to religious denominations. And we will undoubtedly be working together in places where we find points of mutual interest."

'Sokols' Union Head Interviewed

92UM0782H Moscow SYN OTECHESTVA in Russian
No 6, Feb 92 p 4

[Interview with Union of Sokols head Nikolay Aleksandrovich Dzhanumov by Yuliya Tovstykh: "We Are Working in the Interests of Russia"]

[Text] *One may often hear of various military-patriotic organizations today. But it looks like few know about the movement of "Sokols" [Falcons], whose Union is headed by a professional pedagogue, former employee of the Moscow City Council of Military-Patriotic Associations and chief of staff of "Rezerv." So then, let's get acquainted with Captain (Reserve) Nikolay Dzhanumov.*

[Yu. Tovstykh] Nikolay Aleksandrovich, what is the Union of "Sokols"?

[N.A. Dzhanumov] This Union existed as far back as pre-revolutionary Russia. Its father was Doctor Miroslav Tyrsh, a Czech by nationality. Tyrsh developed special "Sokol" gymnastics that met many requirements: the development of self-discipline and the ability to act within a collective, and to answer for one's own actions. Those gymnastics were incorporated into the Russian Army in 1906, by the way, so as to raise the level of physical training. They were the most effective ones at the time. The idea of the pre-revolutionary Union was the development of the person in physical and moral harmony. Moreover, the development of each INDIVIDUALLY. And that is an enormous potential charge. So I decided that the resurrection of an organization with such rich historical roots was simply essential.

[Yu. Tovstykh] And what tasks will the new Union be performing?

[N.A. Dzhanumov] Aside from the aforementioned, we will be occupied with uniting the military-patriotic clubs of Moscow. We should have a unified coordinating center. All will also be able to make use of the property that we acquire for this center. Clubs entering the Union of "Sokols," by the way, should meet just one condition—the training in them should be free.

That is fundamental. Children should not pay for the fact that we instill in them a love of the Motherland.

[Yu. Tovstykh] Was the question posed that way in the pre-revolutionary Union?

[N.A. Dzhanumov] Only adults paid in pre-revolutionary Russia. The youth have never paid, even though all may join.

[Yu. Tovstykh] And who is in your Union?

[N.A. Dzhanumov] Today there are seven Moscow clubs and three in the city of Dubna. Each has approximately

30-40 people. Unfortunately we cannot accept any more. Yet. We do not have the financing for it.

[Yu. Tovstykh] Where are you getting the minimum that you have?

[N.A. Dzhanumov] The commercial department created under the Union takes care of that. But its work, it must be said, is isolated. The department does not get money at the expense of the clubs, and of course not from the children. But now the financing of work with the children by state structures has ceased.

[Yu. Tovstykh] What problems are you facing aside from that one?

[N.A. Dzhanumov] Our whole problem consists of the fact that the authorities do not want to help us. You know what struck me most of all? Not one of the candidates in last year's pre-election campaign for the highest office said a single word about the education of the adolescents. The impression is created that there aren't any of them at all. There is not even any support from the military command. And after all, we are trying to resurrect the tradition of the Russian officer corps and make them remember that there is no higher honor than to protect the Homeland.

[Yu. Tovstykh] Nikolay Aleksandrovich, just what attracts adolescents into your program?

[N.A. Dzhanumov] The possibility of self-affirmation. For that they do not have to go to school and beat somebody's face. Their energy finds intelligent and useful expression. In field trips, for example. The boys have to work under extreme conditions too, after all. We would very much like to have contacts with emigré circles and the Orthodox Church, by the way, since only they have preserved the true Russian spirit. They are not infected with Sovietism. I am planning to bring the "Sokols" outside the city in 1992 and to invite the children of emigrés there. Their parents want the children to be raised on Russian soil. So I am offering them my help here. They could perhaps in turn give us some material support. But I want them to understand that I am NOT A BEGGAR. And I do not intend to stand with my hand out wheedling money from the West. We will take help just from a friend.

[Yu. Tovstykh] And your attitude toward today's army?

[N.A. Dzhanumov] My idol is General Skobelev (a fervent adherent of the "Sokols" movement, by the way). He felt it mandatory for himself to go first in battle, because he felt it to be the highest honor to be the first to die for the Homeland. The shame is that we have only a few such officers today. Today's, at least many of them, do not even have a chivalrous attitude toward women. And after all, one can judge the culture of a whole nation from that. So I want to wish our ladies good and strong men who respect women's frailty.

[Yu. Tovstykh] And the boys?

[N.A. Dzhanumov] It does not need to be wished for the boys, everything possible has to be done for them. I can wish for the Union that a Skobelev is still found among the generals, who would take it under his tutelage and become its patron. Only such people can help us. And further that they never forget on high that we are working in the interests of Russia.

[Yu. Tovstikh] And a last thing... What lies in store?

[N.A. Dzhanumov] We are making every effort to organize our own educational institution along the lines of the cadet corps. Orphans will be taught first and foremost. Why namely orphans? We want to break the existing system of beggarly education for mentally backward children at state boarding schools. EVERY student in our cadet corps will receive the attention, care, kindness and warmth that is due a normal child. Our dream is to bring up children abandoned by their parents without an inferiority complex and feeling shortchanged. We want to see that, becoming adults, they are able to create solid families and be engaged in anything—that is, to be full-fledged citizens of Russia who love their Homeland and are able to defend it.

Well then, as they say, God grant it!... One wants to believe that Nikolay Dzhanumov will be able to bring all of his intentions to life this year. The more so as he firmly promised that "We will get the Union on its feet. The absence of help can only slow down this process, but can in no way stave it off..."

OSTO Chief Krylov on Changes to Organization

*92UM0814A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Mar 92 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Colonel-General Yevgeniy Ivanovich Krylov by an unidentified KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, place, date not given, under the rubric: "First Interview in His New Post": "The Defense Society: There Will Be One But What Kind?"]

[Text] The abbreviation DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy of the USSR], that was previously well known to everyone, has faded into the past. It is logical: the society to assist whom? What army, what air force, and what navy? So, there is no DOSAAF. Instead, the Union of Defense Sports-Technical Organizations of the sovereign states [OSTO] was created at the end of last year. What has changed, what goals and tasks has OSTO Union set for itself, how effective is this union and, finally, where does it get its money?

Defense Society Union Central Council Chairman Colonel-General Ye.I. Krylov answers these and other questions posed by our correspondent.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, you are the Defense Sports-Technical Organizations of the Sovereign States Union Central Council Chairman. Far from everyone knows what this organization is about. Please explain.

[Krylov] Last year, the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy (DOSAAF USSR) was transformed into the Defense Sports-Technical Organizations of the Sovereign States Union (OSTO Union). And the DOSAAF Central Committee was reorganized into the OSTO Union Central Council as its successor.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Right now the Armed Forces issue has been sharply raised in society. The CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Heads of State session in Minsk made an attempt to fundamentally resolve it. Tomorrow military problems will be discussed in Kiev. How will they effect the activities of the defense organizations?

[Krylov] Naturally, the resolution of defense society problems is largely being determined through the results of negotiations on defense issues at the highest level. But the defense sports-technical organizations and societies of the independent states that have been created based upon DOSAAF organizations, being essentially social organizations, have a certain independence. They have sufficient reason to combine their efforts.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But really, the defense organizations in each independent state will primarily be the support of their own armed forces. Will it not turn out that OSTO Union Central Organ activities will promote the consolidation of the armed forces of states whose interests, putting it mildly, do not coincide?

[Krylov] Of course, there are problems here and again we need to overcome them together. What can we rely on?

First of all, on the fact that we have strategic deterrent forces and general purpose forces that are the defenders of the interests of the Commonwealth states.

And, secondly, we have a right to count on consolidating mutual understanding and friendship among the peoples of the Commonwealth. And therefore the defense organizations' tasks will be similar both in content and in direction.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] As we all know, one aspect of the defense society activities is educating young people in the spirit of patriotism. The name of the defense society's publishing house and central publishing organ—both are called PATRIOT—expresses that direction. You are a trustee of a theater with that same name. But you well know that this until recently high concept has even recently acquired a negative tinge among some of the people. Under current conditions, what meaning do you include in the concept of "patriotism"?

[Krylov] Yes, some nationalistically-oriented groups of people are clearly manipulating the concepts of "patriotism" and "patriot". We have had occasion to encounter ideological speculation with regard to these high concepts. We are decisively dissociating ourselves from these approaches. In our opinion, everything that is better and that was created by the people, everything that is great, that has been done by them during the course of many centuries of history (we stress: for us including military history), that which people pride themselves on as one of the branches of the immortal tree of world civilization is the foundation of patriotic feelings. In this sense, there is a theme of patriotic pride for sons and daughters of any people.

It is also impossible not to see that the majority of the states of the current Commonwealth are multiethnic. But the Russian Federation is a unique formation in this context. Therefore, under our conditions, peoples' truly patriotic feelings consist of a harmonious combination of ethnic pride and respect for other peoples. Under this approach to the concept of patriotism, there is no place left for either chauvinism, nationalism, or ideological manipulation. The defense sports-technical organization mission is to promote fostering high moral qualities among the younger generation, a readiness to give one's strength and knowledge for the prosperity of the Fatherland and for the protection of its interests. And it is a matter for politicians to ensure such an application of these qualities that it never comes into contradiction with the interests of other peoples and other states.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, that is, so to speak, the spiritual side of the issue. But are there material grounds for unity of action by the defense organizations of the sovereign states?

[Krylov] There are. And quite a few. By way of illustration, take the quite specific and significant matter for the armed forces of each state—training specialists at OSTO training organizations. More than 88 percent of conscripts are trained at defense society schools and clubs in trades that give them the right to drive transport vehicles.

How are we currently organizing their training? Those who will be used to man the troops of each of the independent states—at the expense of republic budget resources, and those called up to serve in the Strategic Deterrent Forces and General Purpose Forces—from the resources earmarked by the Commonwealth states for defense. As you see, we are interdependent here because we cannot get by without the coordination of efforts.

We link the possibility to conclude an interstate agreement on these questions with the impending session of Commonwealth leaders in Kiev. Delay threatens failure for the specialist training plan. We do not need to explain to military people what this signifies for the combat readiness level of the troops.

Another example in favor of real coordination of actions is the need to preserve a single sports space. This is especially important for expensive technical sports.

Of course, combining efforts is no simple matter, but there is no and there cannot be an alternative in our situation. And therefore I believe common sense will prevail.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What organizational forms of joint activities of Commonwealth states defense and sports-technical organizations appear to you to be most preferable?

[Krylov] I have already said that last year DOSAAF was transformed into OSTO Union of the Sovereign States. However, with the formation of the CIS, the question naturally arose with regard to further reorganization. One of the variations being developed is the transformation of the Union into a "Defense, Sports and Technology" Confederation which CIS defense sports and technology organizations would join on a voluntary basis. In so doing, it is possible that there will be no central elective organs. The Commonwealth Defense Sports-Technical Organization chairmen would assume responsibility for the confederation leadership.

Incidentally, the CIS OSTO Chairmen's Council was established at the recent two-day conference of the leaders of the defense sports-technical organizations of the independent states. This is essentially a coordinating advisory organ which cannot, of course, assume the functions of the OSTO Union Central Council and its elected organs during the transition period.

In conclusion, I would like to note that, despite all the complexity of the processes that are occurring in the defense society, there is a sufficiently strong aspiration in it for unification of efforts to strengthen the defense capabilities of the Commonwealth states.

Kotovskiy Garrison 'Ready' to Take Ukraine Oath
92UM0851A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
21 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Lt Col Vyacheslav Voronkov, chief, Press Center, Odessa Military District, in the column "News from the Odessa Military District": "Ready to Take the Oath to the Ukraine"]

[Text] Lieutenant General V. G. Radetskiy, commander of the Red Banner Odessa Military District, has been receiving a large number of letters and telephone calls from Kotovskiy garrison officers and warrant officers and members of their families. The units stationed there are a part of the Strategic Forces and as such are subordinated directly to Moscow.

What is troubling the writers of the letters? What moved them to request a meeting with the district commander?

First and foremost, many officers and warrant officers have decided to take the oath of allegiance to the people

of the Ukraine. However, with the prevailing "information starvation," most of them have been suffering from a lack of information on state and legal acts of legislation related to military construction passed in the Ukraine. Hence a multitude of questions: What will be the future of officers and warrant officers who do not take the oath? How will problems dealing with social and legal protection for servicemen be resolved in the young Ukrainian Army? The situation was rendered even more difficult by the fact that representatives of personnel agencies, including Moscow agencies, including Lieutenant Colonel V. Dvoretzkiy, an officer from the Moscow Personnel Directorate, have used intimidation and blackmail in their attempts to influence officers and warrant officers to change their mind relative to taking the oath of military allegiance to the people of the Ukraine. This has caused righteous indignation, so to speak. The Kotovskiy garrison has been seething; many arguments have become quite heated. This is understandable, since many officers and warrant officers have become deeply rooted in the Ukraine, so to speak, after many years of service in the latter.

The Kotovskiy garrison houses a training center that trains warrant officers to command administrative platoons, KTP [technical control point] chiefs, and senior NCOs. Located next to the center is a school that teaches men to become drivers and specialists of all vehicle categories. The garrison boasts highly modern training facilities. This means that all of this can be employed to train servicemen of the Ukrainian Army.

Excellent facilities have also been set up for the comfort of servicemen and their dependents: There are an officers club, two operating television studios, cable television, and two indoor swimming pools.

The socio-political situation in the Ukraine, military reform of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the legal basis of military construction in the Ukraine were topics discussed by District Commander Lieutenant General V. G. Radetskiy in his talk with officers and warrant officers of the Kotovskiy garrison. It must be admitted that the dialogue was difficult, even unpleasant at times. The district commander was asked a number of questions; they were all problematic. Each question received an honest response. Lieutenant General V. G. Radetskiy made frequent mention of the fact that he was visiting not to agitate the officers and warrant officers into taking the oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine, but rather to tell them the truth about what is being done to create the Ukrainian Army. The garrison's officers and warrant officers liked the convincing and militarily laconic replies furnished by the district commander. Major V. Moiseyev, expressing the consensus, said, "We are ready to take the oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine without delay."

Incidentally, the Ukraine National Guard subunits and the border guard detachment will soon be disbanded in this garrison.

The story of another meeting held on the same day must also be told. A crowd of men and women surrounded the district commander in the visitors room. "We came from Northern Ossetia to get our sons," said one of the women. "We have been waiting for 7 days for the authorities to make a decision. We are told that Moscow is not giving its permission for them to be sent home. We want them to serve out the rest of their term at home, for them to return to the Caucasus as soldiers, not deserters. Just why are we being abused?"

Lieutenant General V. G. Radetskiy then and there made a decision to send men called from Northern Ossetia home, so that they can complete their service there. This decision will definitely put an end to the tension existing in Army collectives.

As the district commander was winding up his visit, word was received that a train carrying the Ukraine National Guard subunits had arrived at the Kotovskiy garrison.

Change Decreed for KGB's Orel Radio School

92UM0862A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Apr 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Col A. Avoronov: "A New Military Institute"]

[Text] An institute has been established by the Decree of the Russian Federation President on the basis of the once supersecret VUZ of the former USSR KGB, the Orel Higher Military Command Signals School imeni M.I. Kalinin.

The military institution of learning which until recently was not mentioned in the open press and in official correspondence was coded with the number of a military unit trained specialists in radio, wire, radio relay, tropospheric and space communications for the State Communications Troops Under the KGB, the Internal Troops and the militia bodies.

The age of this military institute is not great, and last year marked only the 25th anniversary. Established on 31 August 1966 in the town of Bagrationovsk in Kaliningrad Oblast, as a secondary military-technical school, in 1971, it was transformed into a higher one and moved to Orel, further away from the state frontiers and the agents of the foreign special services who were showing an ever-increasing interest in the VUZ.

The change in the name of the VUZ is not merely a change of signs but marks its transition to a new quality. The Decree of the Russian Federation President was preceded by great preparatory work by the education department of the school, by the instructors from all chairs as well as by specialists from the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information Under the Russian Federation President. At present, the

government communications troops and the other structures of the former USSR KGB concerned with communications questions are subordinate to precisely this agency.

As was pointed out by the chief of the new institute, Major-General Vladimir Martynov, while previously the future officers were instructed directly on specific models of communications equipment, and this impeded their transition in further service to new models, at present the officer candidates will receive a strong theoretical grounding which will enable them after graduating from the VUZ to master any scientific innovations independently. It is no secret that government communications employs the most recent achievements of domestic science. It was precisely government communications which for the first time employed the scrambling of telephone conversations, the automatic connecting of long-distance communications, radio communication with motor vehicles, satellite communications with aircraft and much else.

Lt-Gen Khrenov Interviewed on Changes in Uniform

92UM0821A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 92 First edition p 4

[Interview with Lt Gen M. Khrenov, chief of the Central Clothing Supply Directorate of the Joint Armed Forces, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin, under the rubric "The Readers Want to Know": "Are We Going to Dress Differently?"]

[Text] Order No 50, "On Temporary Changes in the Uniform for the Period 1992-1995," was recently signed by the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. We asked Lt Gen M. Khrenov, chief of the Central Clothing Supply Directorate of the Joint Armed Forces, to comment about this.

[Altunin] Mikhail Mikhaylovich, slightly more than six months has gone by since you discussed the new uniform in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and said that the troops would soon have it.

[Khrenov] Yes, the new uniform was approved by the Board of the former Ministry of Defense and other higher authorities. The situation in the country began to change drastically, however. The Union began falling apart, and the economy plunged into a profound crisis. Now it has been decided to put aside the uniform, which is ready even now.—until 1995, the order from the commander in chief states. Urgent changes were made in the existing uniform to reduce its cost without detriment to its quality or attractiveness.

[Altunin] Perhaps we could take advantage of this opportunity, before talking about this "latest" uniform, for you to talk about how things are going with respect to the clothing supply.

[Khrenov] In a word, not very well. In the situation of converting to the market, the enterprises which supply the raw materials and the factories which produce our uniforms have begun worrying only about their own profits. Outlays on defense have been reduced, on the one hand, while prices for everything have soared, on the other.

So now we cannot come near the uniform makers, particularly since state orders are regarded with contempt.

We are not sitting around on our hands, of course. We are seeing the commanders and engaging in talks with the enterprises on the entire technological process. They have their own difficulties, however. Ukraine is not supplying dyes, Uzbekistan is not providing raw cotton, and so forth. The factories are therefore idle. And since the barter system continues to dominate, they demand from us whatever comes into their heads: motor vehicles, sugar and other scarce goods. Even if some of them do accept settlements in money, however, it is also to their advantage. A soldier's overcoat now costs 2,200 rubles, an officer's shirt 350, and rubber-topped boots 1,600. As one wag put it, for the money allocated for dressing an officer we could buy only box-calf boots (the enterprises ask 6,000 rubles for them), shorts and a tie.... The uniform was altered with this in mind.

[Altunin] But by 1995 a lot of water will have gone under the bridge. Might there not be adjustments?

[Khrenov] Absolutely.

[Altunin] Briefly, what is the "ideology" of the current uniform?

[Khrenov] The democratic principle continues to be the main one. The uniform must be attractive and comfortable and must approximate modern lines of clothing and footwear. While in the '20s and '30s, as one recalls, the uniform was distinguished by its simplicity and comfort ("close to the people"), we gradually moved away from these traditions, coming up with as many as a dozen different features in the uniforms of officers and generals, including gold stitching, braid, stripes and so forth.

At the same time the field uniform greatly encumbered the serviceman and was awkward for working on the equipment. And it simply did not justify itself in combat operations—in Afghanistan, for example. In addition, it became necessary to introduce camouflage colors for all categories and to replace the brogans with combat boots. Another feature of the current uniform, unification, stems from this.

[Altunin] So what kind of changes has the uniform undergone?

[Khrenov] The changes are fairly numerous. I shall tell about the main ones. Take the articles of the dress uniform for officers, warrant officers and extended duty personnel: the blouse (as in the past, I would note, with gold-colored shoulder boards), the trousers and service cap will be the color of an ocean wave (while in the VDV [Airborne

Troops] they are not blue) but khaki. At the aviators' request, theirs will be blue. Similar changes, with a slight difference, are being introduced for generals.

The important thing is that the semidress blouses and service caps for officers, warrant officers, generals and extended-duty personnel will be made like the corresponding items of the everyday uniform.

Khaki (black for the Navy) wool garrison caps like the officer's style are being established for generals, admirals, female military personnel and extended-duty personnel (except for the Navy, which will have sailor's caps, and the Airborne Troops, which will have berets). Field service caps are replacing berets for female military personnel and service caps for first-term soldiers and NCOs.

The "papakhas" are being eliminated from the standard clothing supply. They are being replaced with fur caps with earflaps of karakul for generals, beaver lamb for colonels and captains 1st rank.

Dress belts, dress trousers to be worn inside the boots and box-calf boots are being eliminated for all these personnel groups, and standardized accessories are being introduced: without shoulder strap on the everyday and field uniform. When necessary the everyday woolen trousers to be worn inside the boots will be worn with Russian-leather boots.

Insulated boots and spring-and-summer boots (low-top boots) are being introduced for generals, admirals, officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and extended-duty personnel.

The white waist-belts are being abolished for cadets at military schools, extended-duty personnel, Suvorov and Nakhimov students.

[Altunin] The changes in the uniform will obviously necessitate changes in the regulations for wearing it.

[Khrenov] That is perfectly true. For example, with the everyday uniform generals, officers, warrant officers and extended-duty personnel are permitted to wear the following:

- wool field service caps, with the short jacket or shirt for formation and nonformation wear;
- the improved wool jacket (with indented side pockets, with zipper and elastic belt); these jackets are black for navy personnel;
- insulated field jackets (airborne, winter) with the everyday winter uniform and with the summer uniform in cold weather.

In hot weather it is permitted to wear long-sleeved khaki shirts (cream-colored for the Navy) without tie and without the jackets, with top button unbuttoned with the everyday uniform for formation and nonformation wear, and with the summer semidress uniform for extended duty personnel and

cadets at military schools. This uniform may be worn inside service premises at any time of year.

In addition, generals, admirals, officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers may wear the semidress overcoat for formation with the bottom four buttons buttoned and the edges turned back like lapels.

Other, less expensive materials may be used along with gilt tinsel and gold thread for needle-work on uniform articles and the shoulder boards for generals and admirals. In addition, the stitching on the semidress service caps and jackets of generals and on semidress and summer service caps and jackets, dress and semidress jackets, and fur caps with visors for admirals and generals of the Navy is like that on the everyday uniform.

Here are some other significant details. The sleeve insignia indicating the troop arm are being removed from the jackets of warrant officers and female military personnel, as are the gold-colored uniform buttons on the slits of single- and double-breasted overcoats, on the tabs of the cotton and wool single-breasted uniform jacket, and on the quilted jackets of extended-duty personnel. Nor will the letters "SA" be on the shoulder boards of enlisted men.

I can add to this the fact that, in keeping with numerous suggestions from the officer corps, the field uniform will be issued to the officers for their personal use. It was previously issued under inventory and had to be surrendered to a depot after its established period of wear had elapsed.

[Altunin] How will the servicemen be provided with the new uniform articles now? This will probably not be possible right away, will it?

[Khrenov] That is absolutely correct. The items will be provided as they arrive from industry. It is permitted to wear the altered uniform alongside the existing one.

When the commanders of military units and ships, and the chiefs of installations, military training institutions, enterprises and organizations announce the uniform of the day, they must consider the actual conditions for the performance of the combat training missions and the housekeeping tasks, as well as the actual availability of the articles of clothing.

The order also contains the following new provision. Except for extended duty personnel, servicemen are permitted to wear civilian clothing to and from the unit.

I would like to express my confidence that the changes we are making will meet with understanding and support from the servicemen.

Incidentally:

Following is the availability of certain items of clothing at military depots (percentage of the requirement, approximate figures):

- soldiers' overcoats, 100;
- rubber-topped boots, 100;

- woolen fabric, 70;
- striped vests, 70;
- camouflage uniforms, 60;
- three-quarter-length army sheepskin coats, 40;
- sheets, 90;
- lining material, 15.

Kuzbass Official on Efforts to Aid Servicemen

*92UM0819B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 2*

[Interview with Mikhail Kislyuk by Capt A. Beklich:
"The Kuzbass Will Help the Officers"]

[Text] The editors are continuing to monitor on the spot how the Ukase of the Russian President B. Yeltsin is being carried out on measures to strengthen the social protection of servicemen. Many are endeavoring to help and support the army in this difficult time. The administration of Kemerovo Oblast is carrying out precisely such a policy.

The head of the administration M. Kislyuk replies to the questions of our correspondent.

[Beklich] Mikhail Borisovich [Kislyuk], in the Kuzbass miners, metallurgical workers and representatives of a number of other sectors have voiced the need to resolve urgent problems in the socioeconomic sphere. The situation for the troop collectives stationed here is in no way better. How will you be able to delve into the problems of the servicemen?

[Kislyuk] Let me say first that on 29 November of last year, I signed an order on measures for the social protection of the servicemen. This appeared after repeated meetings between the representatives of the oblast administration and the command of the local garrisons and the personnel. A careful study was made of the communal and domestic problems of the servicemen, the problems of providing housing, vital necessities and places for children in the preschool institutions.

We intend to carry out the Ukase of the Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin and are fully aware of the duty to build and allocate housing for the servicemen. Personal responsibility has been established for the officials in those towns and rayons where there are debts owed for proportional participation.

[Beklich] Where have the new accommodations been?

[Kislyuk] In February of the current year, the city of Kemerovo provided four apartments for the local garrison, without waiting for the funds being allocated by the Siberian Military District to be used as part of proportional participation. Upon the decision of the administration heads of a number of towns and rayons of the Kuzbass, at present the local budgets are providing money for compensation payments for the stay of apartmentless

officers and members of their families in hotels and for repairing rooms in dormitories where the servicemen will be temporarily housed.

[Beklich] Might it not turn out that the administration will provide housing on the spot for the officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"] at the expense of those who have been waiting for years for a long-sought apartment?

[Kislyuk] I will not act against my conscience but we must actually on a temporary basis hold back those on the waiting lists. But this is dictated by vital necessity and the solving of the housing problem in the army cannot be deferred. In order to prevent social tension between the servicemen and the local populace, I have signed a letter to the Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin in which the administration requests that centralized funds be allocated totaling 200 million rubles for capital investments. On the Russian scale this is a small figure. According to the estimates of our economists, having used this amount directly for the construction of housing for the military, we will fully supply them with apartments without harming the interests of the other social groups.

I would also add that I keep constantly at hand a list of officers and warrant officers who are serving in the Kuzbass and don't have housing. As they say, I am keeping my fingers on the pulse of things. Moreover, as of 15 April, we plan to supply the servicemen with plots of land for individual construction, the requisite building materials and loans of money. Assistance will be provided in the concluding of contracts with the contracting organizations. The administrative heads of the towns and rayons report to me on the progress made by the first of each month. Supervision over the carrying out of the adopted decisions has been entrusted to the oblast procuracy bodies.

[Beklich] Mikhail Borisovich, according to the commander of the Siberian MD, Col Gen N. Kopylov, closer understanding has been achieved between the oblast's administration and the military command...

[Kislyuk] I would like to stress that attention to the problems and concerns of the servicemen is our policy. The military man in Kemerovo Oblast is given respect and attention and there have not been any instances when someone insulted the servicemen and belittled their human or professional dignity. I say this not because we must draw attention of the people to our next campaign, that is, now everything in the defense of the army, tomorrow everything for the defense of the physicians, teachers and so forth. In our area you will rarely find a man who has not served in the army. On our staff virtually the entire male half has undergone military training.

Literally a few days ago I visited one of the units of the Kemerovo Garrison and a very useful and thorough discussion was held for us. There still are many unsolved problems. For example, at present the officers and warrant officers who serve on the territory of the Kuzbass receive at 15 percent regional coefficient for territorial remoteness, while for the remaining categories of the working population in the oblast this has risen to 30 percent. You might ask what have the military done wrong here?

We are hoping that we can help them, and we have made the appropriate calculations. But the resulting total was such that the oblast budget simply cannot meet it. My opinion is that the question must now be resolved on a higher level.

[Beklich] Mikhail Borisovich, has the oblast administration found an opportunity to employ the experience and knowledge of the officers who have been discharged into the reserves in the interests of the region's economic development?

[Kislyuk] I feel that responsible areas of work can be entrusted to a military man who during long years of service has learned discipline and who possesses a good deal of intellectual potential and experience. However, many of them will need retraining and we, for example, plan to compensate them for the expenses on their training at the marketing school. At present in the oblast the reserve officers are setting up enterprises which will aid their military comrades in development and in individual housing construction. The Kuzbass economy also needs skilled specialists. In a word, I feel that proper employment will be found for men from the Army.

German Firm Builds Servicemen's Apartments

92UM0819A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Major S. Chernous: "Behind the Barbed Wire—The Secrets of Craftsmanship"]

[Text] This installation located in the suburbs of Vladikavkaz is fenced off by barbed wire. At the control post there are strict pass conditions with soldiers carrying weapons and portable radios, while not far off are armored personnel carriers. One might wonder if this is some supersecret project. Not at all, as this is a construction site at which the German firm Philipp Holtzman is building housing for servicemen who are to be moved from the Western Group of Forces.

Things were moving ahead quickly as in a week a floor of the multiapartment cite-cast building was ready.

Basically the workers here are Turkish. The high earnings ensure high labor productivity.

As was related by the leader of the construction project Rolf Dieter:

"We plan to complete the first 480 apartments by 30 April, and by mid June, I think, another 320 new residents will receive their papers. On 15 September, we will complete another 365 apartments. As a whole, we should put up 29 residential buildings and this means 1,156 apartments. We plan to complete construction at the end of April next year. By this time, the microrayon will have a school, two nurseries, a culture club, a polyclinic and a self-service department store."

One minor detail. Vladikavkaz is an area of increased seismicity. For this reason the firm insisted on carrying out major research studies. Our scientists were called in for this purpose. On the basis of the obtained data the construction workers decided to create an extra safety margin. Heavy pile-driving equipment was delivered by air on a Ruslan aircraft. In a few days the builders had sunk additional pilings into the ground. Incidentally, no one is paying the firm for these costs, but its reputation as a reliable contractor is more precious for it than tens of thousands of marks.

"We receive the basic construction materials from the host country. This is crushed rock, sand and cement," said Herr Dieter. "The remaining materials as well as the construction equipment come from abroad. Because of the difficult political situation in the CIS, in order in the future to avoid work stoppages, we have increased the supplies at our warehouses."

The stockpiling here of these countless, in our mind, riches plus the complicated situation in the region explain the fact that the construction site is fenced with barbed wire and a guard has been set. And nearby the military construction workers are struggling to complete the finishing work on a five-story building. They work for a day and then wait five for materials which more and more often must be purchased at fabulous prices on the open exchanges. These materials are stored under the open sky. Moreover, they are easy game for the armed "gleaners" at the construction sites.

Such is life. Inevitably the question arises of whether they made the correct choice in the place for building these fine apartments? Is it not possible that in time these buildings will have to be abandoned, evacuating the servicemen themselves, as was the case in Groznyy?

Officers', Warrant Officers' Pay Held Up

92UM0862B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Apr 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Maj A. Yegorov: "It Won't Be Six Months"]

[Text] What has caused the delay in paying salaries to the officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"] in many units, subunits and institutions? Letters and calls to the editors on this issue have recently, to put it mildly, not been a rarity.

Our correspondent met with the Group Chief from the Organizational-Mobilizational Directorate Under the Main Staff of the Ground Forces, Col A. Solodovnikov, who is directly responsible for the drawing up of the financial documents.

[Solodovnikov] "In order to answer the question," said Col A. Solodovnikov, "there is no need to refer to any stratagems of the bureaucratic corridors. There is one reason for the delay and that is the need to republish the establishments with the official list of adopted changes. The republishing is a colossal job consisting of a chain of labor-intensive measures. Schematically they are as follows: the Central Financial Directorate (TsFU) sends to our directorate a so-called "grid" or "Salary Plan for Officer Personnel of the Formations, Units and Sub-units..." with the new figures which are transferred manually to approximately 2,000 establishments of the headquarters bodies, the formations, units and institutions. One establishment is a book with a volume averaging over 700 pages. Such an operation requires more than a month.

"Then the manuscripts are sent to the print shop where the new establishment-appointment books are printed. As these are finished, they are taken back to the TsFU for verification. This, in turn, is carried out also without any technical aid and also takes more than a month. Only after the checking of each of these hundreds of thousands of figures is the stamp "rated" put on the list. And now it is a document for the unit financial bodies.

"But this is still not all," continued Solodovnikov. "The rated copy must be duplicated at the print shop. This takes 4-6 weeks of work. Then we organize the mailing of the documents to the districts and groups of forces, but this extends over many weeks due to the limits placed on the number of parcels accepted by the courier service on the day of dispatch (because of the limited funds available.— A.Ye.).

"When the mounds of paper finally reach the district staff, the three or four co-workers of the organization and establishment department simply are unable to quickly copy the changes into their own books. As a rule, personnel from the troops is employed in this work. All the same, the 'writing' extends for weeks.

"Thus, up to 5 (!) months pass between the day the decision is taken to increase salaries and the day of the actual receipt of the money. During all this time the men receive 50 percent of what is due them and naturally they 'pick the bureaucrats to pieces.'"

[Yegorov] That means you. Do you feel that they are not right?

[Solodovnikov] "We ourselves are the victims of such a document-handling system. Because we are pulling the entire load. We have repeatedly appealed to the TsFU with a proposal to alter the obsolete procedure. The chief of the directorate turned to the chief of the General Staff. It has almost become laughable. Since September of last

year, we have already republished the establishments three times. The co-workers at the directorate have been turned into clerks and for long periods of time they are removed from their basic duties. We work at night. The print shop is overworked and the documents are being printed in three shifts...

[Yegorov] And what is the solution, Anatoliy Andreyevich [Solodovnikov]?

[Solodovnikov] We must give up the completely unnecessary, grinding repetitive job. (Moreover, it is expensive. According to last year's prices, when, for instance, a 500-sheet package of map paper cost 20 rubles, the total expenditures on delivering the lists to just the staffs of the districts and groups of forces was over 180,000 rubles. Now a package of paper alone costs 141 rubles.— A.Ye.) The commander-in-chief of the CIS Unified Armed Forces has merely to issue by order the very "grid" of the TsFU and which we receive at the very outset of the entire range of measures (the "Salary Plan...") and this essentially standardized document will be distributed directly to the staffs of the districts and groups of forces. And all without any duplicating of the thousands of sheets of documents and establishments! If such a decision were taken, then it would require a maximum of two weeks to enter the changes. The servicemen would receive their increased "pay" in the same month without any procrastination.

Unfortunately, we have not been able to have such a decision taken. On 19 March, the chief of the General Staff again signed the directive to change the establishment salaries... "by republishing the establishments."

CIS: POLICY

Shaposhnikov on Kiev Summit

92UM0839A Moscow TASS-SKRIPT in Russian
No 62, 23 Mar 92 p 1FF

[Stenographic report from TASS-SKRIPT]

[Text] *The TASS-SKRIPT group of stenographic reports offers for your attention a transcript of the press conference of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Unified Armed Forces [OVS] Commander-in-Chief Marshal Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov on the results of the meeting of the heads of state of the Commonwealth in Kiev.*

The press conference was held on 23 Mar 92 at the press center of the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of Russia.

[Moderator] Hello, respected colleagues! Today we are holding a press conference by the Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Marshal Aviation Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov. Alongside him, also long familiar to you, is Valeriy Leonidovich Manilov—the chief of the Information Directorate of the Unified Armed Forces High Command.

Yevgeniy Ivanovich will make an opening statement.

[Shaposhnikov] I welcome you, respected comrades, ladies and gentlemen! It has already become a tradition that, after each meeting of the heads of state of the Commonwealth, I also meet with you, report to you what we have achieved and what we have not achieved, and answer your questions.

I want to say at once that the last meeting of the heads of state in Kiev has dispelled many of the assertions that this would be the last meeting, that the CIS would end its existence at it and so on and so forth. That is gratifying to note, since the heads of state are still approaching in quite responsible and considered fashion both the very fact of the existence of the Commonwealth and those issues that are not being resolved. It naturally could be said that not all issues are being resolved straight away and, unfortunately, a mechanism has not yet been worked out to bring to life those decisions that were made before. This is a painful but natural process, since the Commonwealth is just a few months old and you can't provide for everything in advance or decide everything at once.

I would like to note with satisfaction that the military issues that were submitted for the consideration of the Council of the Heads of State of the Commonwealth were resolved overall, and moreover without the serious, major and sharp debates that occurred at earlier meetings. This testifies first and foremost to the fact that we have gained a certain experience, a Council of the Ministers of Defense of the Commonwealth has been formed in which we work out, as was indicated to you, something like a couple of weeks ahead of time, all of the documents and send them around to the presidents and the government. They become familiar with those documents in advance thereby.

The following documents were thus signed at the last meeting in Kiev:

- an agreement on the authority of the supreme bodies of the Commonwealth of Independent States in defense issues. This document actually sets forth the obligations of the supreme bodies of the Commonwealth—these are the Council of the Heads of State, the Council of the Heads of Government—and the resolution on a main command and a General Staff was confirmed.
- a resolution on the main command of the Unified Armed Forces of the Commonwealth and a statute on the main command of the Unified Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States were also signed.
- an agreement on the legal foundations for the activity of the Unified Armed Forces. A very serious document, it was also signed.
- an agreement on the principles for manpower acquisition in the Unified Armed Forces and the completion of military service in them. We are now on the eve of the spring call-up, and we naturally could not exist any further without that document.

—an agreement on the status of the general-purpose forces of the Unified Armed Forces for the transitional period. A resolution to name a Chief of the General Staff, a commanding general of the strategic forces and a commanding general of the general-purpose forces was also adopted. The Chief of the General Staff of the Unified Armed Forces of the Commonwealth is thus Colonel-General Samsonov, the commanding general of the strategic forces is General Army Maksimov and Colonel-General Semenov has been named commanding general of the general-purpose forces.

An agreement was also adopted on the creation of the Unified Armed Forces of the Commonwealth. This was a separate document. We had not prepared it in advance, but this document was included on the agenda at the suggestion of the Russian Federation and was signed. A very serious document was also worked out and was adopted, true, on the second go-round—an agreement on the principles for providing the armed forces of the Commonwealth with weapons, combat equipment and other material assets of scientific-research and experimental-design work.

That is the package of documents that was considered.

A document that was considered earlier but not signed was not considered—that was on the chattel and real estate of the military. This document was submitted at the level of the Council of Ministers. Then separately, when we began discussing it with Ukraine, we came to no agreement whatsoever, since we have one point of view and they have another. When we got to this document at the Council of the Heads of State of the Commonwealth, I thus made the suggestion that we should elevate the level of discussion of such documents to the Council of the Heads of Governments, since the military could not agree on these issues. These issues must naturally be resolved with the participation of military experts.

Two declarations were also made on the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh on the part of Azerbaijan and on the part of Armenia. A declaration was also made on the situation in the left-bank regions of the Republic of Moldova. That was by the president of Moldova, Mircha Ionych Snegur. An agreement was adopted afterward on the creation of a group of military observers and collective forces to maintain peace in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

So a number of quite serious agreements and resolutions, as I have said, were adopted at the last meeting. Today it is time for them to be solidly and well fulfilled here. That is what I wanted to say to you by way of introduction on the results of the Kiev meeting.

[Question (Japanese NTV television)] Could you disclose in more detail the substance of the document on the authority of the supreme bodies of the CIS on the issue of defense? On the composition of the unified armed forces in particular. It is written there, if my memory does not

betray me, that they consist of strategic and general-purpose forces, as well as the forces of the participating members of the Commonwealth. What does this signify?

[Shaposhnikov] It does not say there, at any rate, what they consist of. What is written there is that the participating states entrust the Council of the Heads of State with certain authorities, rights and obligations on defense issues. It is also written that they take part in devising, say, military doctrine, financing, support and so on and so forth.

The second provision of that document discloses the authority of the Council of the Heads of Governments on these issues. The third provision says that there exists a general command along with a general staff, which are charged with these or those tasks.

[Question (ITAR-TASS)] How many of the documents in the package signed in Kiev have not been ratified by Ukraine? That is the first question. The second is, When will the armed forces of Russia be created?

[Shaposhnikov] I want to say to you that Ukraine actually signed just one document out of those considered at the Kiev meeting—the document on the principles of logistical support and scientific-research and design work. Ukraine did not sign the rest of the documents.

As pertains to the armed forces of Russia, we will act in accordance with the decree of the president of Russia, in which it is written that the Ministry of Defense of Russia is charged with submitting proposals on the armed forces of Russia over the course of a month's time. I thus think that over a month, if we are assiduous, the Ministry of Defense of Russia will work out such a statute, and I think that after a month's time we will be able to talk concretely about this issue.

[Moderator] Go ahead.

[Question] Can you give us some of the details connected with the agreement that you signed in Kiev with the prime minister of the Republic of Moldova, Valeriu Muravschi, and the Moldovan Army?

[Shaposhnikov] I can. You know that in accordance with the Minsk accords on the CIS, each state has the right to create its own armed forces. So then, ah, we have long been holding negotiations with the Republic of Moldova on the division of the armed forces into parts: partly into the constituent units of the armed forces of the CIS and partly the intrinsic armed forces of Moldova. That means that in connection with that agreement we have made the decision that all of the armed forces of the 14th Army that are located on the left bank of the Dniester will be part of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS, and those that are on the right bank of the Dniester—but not all of them, depending on their operational-strategic missions—will be partially transferred to the command of Moldova.

I met in Kiev with Valeriu Muravschi and signed an agreement on what could be transferred to the command

of Moldova, what hardware. We are taking the position here that the agreement on cutbacks in arms and armed forces in Europe has been fulfilled. The Moldovans are now insisting on increasing the quotas that had been set for them earlier.

I have sent Deputy Commander-in-Chief General Pyankov to Chisinau, and he will continue these investigations with the Moldovans in order to bring that document to its final state.

[Question] The special forces that will be created to maintain peace—how realistic is that contingent? When, do you think, will those forces be sent to those places where there are conflicts today, such as Nagorno-Karabakh or the Dniester Republic? Could you tell us in a little more detail about this contingent?

[Shaposhnikov] Yes, I can. Well, we have such armed forces in world practice—the troops of the United Nations—which are currently at any rate displaying an interest, well, the Karabakh crisis and those problems that could exist in the CIS on the grounds of nationalities, among others are intended for the United Nations.

It seems to me that if there is a CIS, then it is perhaps in a way unsuitable to resort to the aid of the United Nations if we are ourselves able, in general, to handle those issues. An initiative was thus put forward at the same time, both by me and by the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev, for the creation of a similar contingent of armed forces. I would like to say to you directly that I would not like to participate personally, so to speak, in the formation or command of these armed forces. This contingent should be outside the armed forces, the immediate armed forces of the CIS, that exist currently. This is something like a special body that is directly subordinate only to the Council of the Heads of State and, under certain conditions and under required procedure—with the consent of the constituent sides—it could be sent in, not for war but to disengage the warring sides, to ensure a political solution to a conflict situation.

So there it is. This contingent could therefore exist, and consist of volunteers, on a contract basis, trained in the principles of airborne assault and equipped with their own light vehicles.

As for the command of the Unified Armed Forces, my personal viewpoint is that I could be satisfied with rendering assistance in training and arming that contingent. The Council of the Heads of State thus adopted a resolution not to charge the military with forming this contingent, but rather the Council of the Heads of Government with the participation of the military.

[Question (“MegaChannel” television channel, Greece)] Mr. Shaposhnikov, please tell us, after the collapse of the USSR many neighboring countries are displaying increased interest in the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. Much is also being written about the position of Turkey. Please tell us, do you have apprehensions regarding

Turkish policy in this region? And how would you act if Turkish troops were to intervene in that conflict? And a second question. If you were the minister of defense of the Ukraine today, what would be your military policy in relation to the CIS?

[Shaposhnikov] An interesting question—what if you were. And what if you were, then? That question... is so non-concrete that one could talk about it a great deal and say nothing. I will therefore try to answer the first question as pertains to just what the vested interests of many neighboring states really are. And I share that interest in general, since blood is being spilled there, peaceable people are being killed. Especially as neighboring states cannot remain uninvolved when they see this, and I understand the position of Iran, the position of Turkey and other countries on whose borders this bloodshed is taking place.

As pertains to the intervention of some third forces in that conflict, I do not grant that in principle, because I think that both the government of Iran and the government of Turkey are taking a quite considered approach to this situation, and the intervention of any third party in the solution of this problem could lead, in general, to the kindling of World War III. I think that is not in the interests of the CIS, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia or Azerbaijan, and, of course, the more so their neighbors.

[Question (CBC, Canadian radio)] Please tell us whether agreement was reached relative to the creation of an international commission on the destruction of nuclear weapons. And was agreement reached between Russia and Ukraine? Is there any possibility of convincing Ukraine to send its tactical nuclear weapons to Russian territory for destruction?

[Shaposhnikov] I want to say that there are possibilities there, and the more so that they have not been exhausted in this incident. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk confirmed this with the words that he is not against the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine to the territory of Russia. He is only in favor of seeing that withdrawal monitored on the part of the other states of the CIS and, possibly, other countries. I do not especially welcome the possibility of other countries, and in relation to the monitoring on the part of the CIS states, and first of all Ukraine, I welcome that with pleasure, and it seems to me that it remains only to conclude an agreement between Ukraine and Russia or other countries of the CIS that have a desire to take part in that process. I see no inescapable situations here, and I do not think that if we send Russia and Ukraine headed at each other at full tilt, the issue can be resolved.

[Question (INDEPENDENT newspaper, London)] To what extent are you troubled by the destruction of the infrastructure of the strategic missile forces? Since the disputes between Russian and Ukraine are affecting the upkeep of the SS-18s and 19s in the silos and the state of the liquid fuel in the missiles.

[Shaposhnikov] We have several agreements on strategic forces among the states of the CIS on whose territory the strategic offensive arms are located. The Minsk meeting of the Heads of State of the Commonwealth before this one led to the fact that each state, at the suggestion of Ukraine, is determining the composition of the strategic forces on its territory. Some frictions have started since then with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on this issue. They have one list and we have another. And as soon as I understood that we would not resolve these issues on a military level, we passed it on to a higher one.

As for the destruction of the infrastructures, you know that there are no such apprehensions as yet, and it seems to me that if we fulfill everything we agreed to before, then by 1994 all of the strategic offensive arms will have been withdrawn from the territory of the Ukraine to the territory of Russia and the question will not come up at all.

[Question of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, please tell us, how much money has Russia allocated to finance the army of the former Union? Some of the republics, as far as I know, are refusing to pay. And a second question. I have heard that the armies of some of the republics are now passing under the jurisdiction of Russia. How can that happen and what military formations will be transferred to Russia?

[Shaposhnikov] These are the decrees of the President of Russia, connected first and foremost with the transfer of some of the military formations located on the territory of other states of the CIS under the jurisdiction of Russia, along with the decree of the President of Russia on the creation of a Ministry of Defense for the future possible creation of our own armed forces—there are several reasons for this. One of them is concealed in your question. The fact is that until recently two states—Russia and Ukraine—were financing the armed forces. Ukraine ceased to finance them as soon as it announced the creation of its own armed forces. Russia finances all the rest and only very recently, literally a few days ago, Moldova made the decision to finance its own armed forces, which will be on its own territory, and Byelarus is currently working out the last directives on this score. I thus want to say that the armed forces are now suffering a budget shortfall due to the fact that only Russia is financing them. That is on the whole. That means that it is probably entirely legitimate on Russia's part to take them under its jurisdiction, since, as they say, whoever pays has the greater rights.

But we are nonetheless undertaking very serious efforts on the score of a unified budget for financing the armed forces. We have determined quotas for the share participation of each state, and we are constantly holding negotiations every month at the level of the ministers of finance of the states and the level of the heads of the governments of the states—and by the way, at the last meeting we even received a letter addressed to that high assembly from the Chairman of the Russian Supreme

Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, with a request to consider questions of financing. But they were unfortunately not considered, and I think it is necessary to start with the simple and move to the complex, *i.e.* at the level of military experts with the participation of economists and financial experts, and then submit it to the Council of the Heads of Governments and the Heads of State for approval.

I think that these issues will be resolved in the near future. Because this way it is simply, maintaining the whole armed forces at the expense of one state or two states... well, it becomes nonsensical in general.

[Question] Can you cite the amount that Russia has allocated for financing the army? I know that it was paid a year ahead.

[Shaposhnikov] Well, if you know it has paid, that means you know how much has been paid. I want to say to you that there is no such concept for the year ahead, comrades. And as opposed to the prior arrangement under which we were working, determined for a year ahead etc., this year has proved to be so complex that only in January have we determined the budget and the contribution of Russia to that budget in January, for the quarter. How much is it? Enough for us, in general. And today we have a deficit due to the fact that the other states have not paid. Russia has paid something on the level of 50 billion.

[Question] I have two questions, if I may. The first—they did not determine in Kiev just what goes into the strategic forces. You have said that that will be resolved at a higher level. Is there now a plan for such meetings, and in what manner, perhaps you know, will this be done at such meetings? And second—doesn't it seem to you that a somewhat unclear situation has arisen, a certain lack of clarity in your relations with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin after he named you the Minister of Defense? I have in mind a lack of clarity along the lines of superiors and subordinates.

[Shaposhnikov] That is a good question, because everything should be clear in the army—who is the superior and who is the subordinate.

On the score of the first question pertaining to the strategic forces. At all previous meetings I have touched on this question in passing. It has been determined that the strategic missile troops, the air forces, the navy, the airborne-assault troops, military-transport aviation, space forces and their support units make up the strategic forces. That is a big list.

Frictions have started for us with Ukraine on the division of those strategic forces. There were no questions in relation to the nuclear-missile assets. Ukraine initially reduced this list to namely the nuclear-missile assets. If the nuclear-missile assets were strategic forces, then all the rest were not. Then at the meeting before last in Minsk, as I have noted here, the following agreement was

written at the suggestion of Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk: that the participating states of the CIS would themselves determine the list of units making up the strategic forces and would coordinate that list with the High Command, the Main Command of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS, and would submit it for the approval of the Council of the Heads of State. You see what a complicated system it is.

We military have a definite understanding—there are operational-strategic missions, there are operational-strategic formations, and depending on those missions we will divide these armed forces into this or that. If a state, and the more so a state such as Ukraine, has independently compiled a list, that list will naturally not coincide with our list. We have spent a great deal of time on why we have presented our own list, they theirs and we ours. But this is not a serious issue, at least because if he agrees with us, we should submit such a list at the level of the Council of Ministers. We did not resolve this issue at the level of the Council of the Ministers of Defense, and this question was put onto the agenda for the Council of the Heads of State. But when we got to it, I set forth just these situations, and then the decision was made at my suggestion to push it a level higher.

Now I think that a government, the more so as Russia now has a Ministry of Defense, and there will consequently be a Minister of Defense and probably not in the capacity of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin but some other individual—that member of the government could consequently, with other members of the government, hold equal negotiations not at the level of military experts, but with the participation of military experts and, thus, I think, this issue could be resolved, although it has many underwater rocks and it will not simply be resolved, because the further we advance the more obstacles we will encounter in resolving just this issue.

As for the second question, who is senior to whom. I asked Boris Nikolayevich that question when this decree was signed. He did not hide from me, by the way, he probably called me first and said he was signing such a decree, and I also asked him: Boris Nikolayevich, you have a Council of Ministers of Defense of the CIS, where I am the chairman etc. But Boris Nikolayevich answered, Yevgeniy Ivanovich, did we have any questions between us that you asked that have not been resolved? I said we did not. Yeltsin: And there won't be any in the future either, since I am delegating one of my deputies for you to the Council of Defense, and he will represent the interests of Russia there. The question was exhausted with that, the more so as probably in the near future, what time that is it is difficult for me to say, but it seems to me that a Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation will be named in the next few months.

[Question (Russian Information Agency)] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, tell us, please, what is the planned attitude of the high command toward the Cossack formations? And

a second question: if you can, the details pertaining to the interception of two of our bombers in the Alaska region. Thank you.

[Shaposhnikov] I want to express my own idea in relation to the Cossack formations directly and concretely. I am against the Cossack formations. Look at what is being done here in the army: there are combined armed forces, they include strategic forces, they include general-purpose forces, the states have their own armed forces that are not part of the Unified armed forces, there are republican guards, and Cossack formations are the last thing we need...

Therefore, as pertains to the Cossacks, I myself am from the Don, from Rostov-na-Donu, and that means that I have had all of the mores, the customs, the beautiful songs, the uniforms and so on and so forth right in front of my eyes since childhood, and I welcome it. That must be resurrected, that must be facilitated, but when we come to armed formations, here things do not suit me at all. I want to say that according to the experience of France and others—that is, other states—they have a tradition that the youth from this or that area are always called up into the same unit in the army, and they complete their service there, and that means that when a young man goes there he can find in the lists, of that unit, in the history of that unit, his own name, his grandfather, his great grandfather, that is, his father and so forth. Something of a similar nature could be done from the point of view of the Cossacks, that is, they could complete service in the same place. Yes, that's right, I've forgotten the question.

[Moderator] The microphone, the microphone.

[Shaposhnikov] In a minute, in minute, there's another question. So, it's not news at all, comrades, I think that you probably and ladies and gentlemen, so, you know about the fact that our ships and the American ones are sometimes circled by aircraft, and airliners that appear, so to speak, in neutral waters, over neutral territory, are circled by these or those other assets, including, ah, aerial ones, and we have never seen any violations at all in this. If there are some, ah, actions or counteractions against such flights, that is so. But there was nothing in this incident, our aircraft were fulfilling their mission, the American fighters were performing theirs. They entered the area of our aircraft, passed on parallel headings and diverged, like ships at sea.

[Question] So, there is nothing to be said about the intercept?

[Shaposhnikov] No, of course not.

[Moderator] Go ahead. Help with the microphones.

[Question] Mr. Marshal, please tell us, the spring call-up for the army is almost upon us, so the discharges into the reserves are also going on accordingly, including sailors of the Black Sea Fleet. Is there a mechanism for replacing

them, and from the territory of which republic will they be replaced? Ukraine or Russia?

[Shaposhnikov] The question now pertains not only to the Black Sea Fleet as such, but also to the other troops and formations located on the territories of, say, the CIS. The fact is that each state in the CIS is currently adopting laws that its youth and the citizens of that republic complete service on its territory. This is complicating the process of military service and call-up, manpower acquisition and so forth. We have thus currently reviewed and already sent to the units the provisions for contract service, in which a person who desires to complete service under contract can serve at any point in the CIS. This is one of the ways of solving this problem. A second, then, is an agreement that young men can also complete service in the strategic forces, ah, actually in the places where they are needed and not according to some national trait. These are the two ways we are trying to solve this problem, although it remains incompletely resolved, we will say.

[Question] I will introduce myself to you, I am probably the sole female representative here who is actually from a branch of the service. We women, there are six or seven of us, we came from Protasovo in Ryazan Oblast. I would like to ask you a question, as we were delegated, they collected money and delegated us. They took us out almost a year ago, a helicopter regiment from Germany. Was the question raised yesterday among you, yesterday at the meeting, as to how the fate of our families will be resolved, after all we were withdrawn to Russia. They are building residential settlements in Byelarus, in Ukraine. How much more will we have to suffer? We went up to the Moscow Military District as well. The meeting was everywhere, and the television was filming, and the radio, but you know that we are in despair, imagine where we have turned up from, finding out that you would have a press conference here.

[Moderator] Well, in principle we're having a press conference, speaking, in general, for the journalists, but I guess we'll have to make an exception.

[Shaposhnikov] Of course, of course, undoubtedly. Since the comrades have come and so forth. So then, the question in relation to these settlements you are talking about, it really has now become a complicated one. It has been complicated by the fact that when we were part of the Soviet Union, everything was submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Ministry of Defense, and this whole thing was resolved. When we broke up into the CIS, we have at present been reviewing all these issues you are talking about. And in Ukraine, a few were built there, and it stopped. All the rest that were planned to be built there are now planned to be built on the territory of Russia. But the Germans, under pressure from Ukraine to a certain extent, have now slowed their appropriations somewhat. They are saying roughly this—you agree among yourselves over there, and then we will determine whom to pay and how much. A special ambassador for special missions of the president of

Russia, the former ambassador to France, Dubinin, has been assigned to the matter and today is occupied with just this very problem. And it seems to me that if Ukraine wants to create its own armed forces on the order of 200,000 men, which it is always talking about, and there are something like 400,000 people in Ukraine now even without the withdrawal of troops from Germany and from the other countries of Eastern Europe, then it naturally makes no sense at all to withdraw troops to the territory of Ukraine. And it does make sense to withdraw them to the territory of Russia. We are thus currently taking the stance that all of the remaining money not used on the territory of Ukraine be used here, on the territory of Russia. First. Second. You know about the decree of the president of Russia that all of the heads of the administrations of the oblasts and krays return all the debts for housing to our servicemen that they owe. Currently the question, when Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was talking about this at an officers' assembly, I want to say to you directly that this whole matter was perceived with some mistrust. And when the decree was signed and I was talking with him, he was saying that people should not think that this was just said any old way, and I wrote the decree in written form for that reason. And he has currently asked for a report from me on where on the territory of Russia what debts exist for a topical discussion with the heads of administration.

I want to say that a great many committees of all sorts have appeared, commissions, some resurrection associations, what the devil, excuse the expression, the informality. Only, excuse me, there are no such offices. And everybody is proclaiming in general that they and only they will save the armed forces from homelessness. I intend literally, at the end of March or perhaps beginning of April, if the congress doesn't interfere, maybe after the congress, having in mind the Russian congress, to assemble all the representatives of these newly created associations and committees. I would invite the Russian leadership, the government and the president. And listen to where we are going. So that our specialists can draw a general picture on the homelessness, in what state these debts are, since it was said there for half a year and more. The question is thus currently at that level.

[Question] An official point of view was expressed at one time in connection with the destruction of the Korean airliner. What is the official point of view today? Is it undergoing any changes or not? The first question. And a second question. How is the ministry of defense pursuing the idea of conversion in the armed forces? Could you cite some projects and, in particular, the possibility of attracting military specialists to these programs?

[Shaposhnikov] On the first question, pertaining to the South Korean Boeing. I want to say that the point of view is not yet changing. We are currently gathering additional materials on this problem. Since, when the change in authority occurred, some are saying the documents are at the ministry of defense, others say they are at the KGB, still others say they are at some institutes, still in some structures, security services and so on. But

I want to put everything in its place. Collect all the documents that exist. And, together with Mr. Kozyrev and others—with Barannikov—put this matter away. And I do not want any dark spots to remain on this issue, as on other issues of our collaboration.

As for conversion. When we started to be engaged in conversion, what style, what party leadership did we have? They just wrote the decree on conversion, and literally two days later they come to check from the CPSU Central Committee, from the defense department, on how conversion was being fulfilled. And it was not being fulfilled in any way at the time. And having currently been occupied with this issue, in my opinion, I will express my own personal viewpoint, how conversion should have been pursued in my view.

The arms that were being produced by the Soviet Union were naturally more than adequate. So. We defended ourselves, sold some etc. Some of the models of our hardware, and especially armored vehicles, aviation hardware, reach the level of international standards and enjoy great demand. So then that hardware that enjoys great demand needed to be made further, not pull anything down. We had to sell it abroad. Using those receipts, make manufacturing lines for the production of consumer goods, and partly to buy purchase consumer goods. And there would not have been any humanitarian aid. In two or three years, in five years maximum, we would have come out of this crisis. And so, to close everything, destroy everything and switch everything over to pots and pans, spoons etc. is of course not suitable. We are truly grateful that in Russia, finally, some kind of center has been created that has begun to be occupied with this problem, naturally with the participation of the high command of the CIS. But we still have a great many shortcomings there as well. Because the specialists have not been selected, we are trying to work together. I have confidence that we will come out of the situation we are currently in, the more so as Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin has affirmed his adherence to the fact that if there is demand for military hardware, there should also be supply.

[Question (RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA)] Today the countries participating in the CIS, as well as those not participating, have claims on weapons, military hardware and combat equipment. Your view and your assessment: are there instances where those weapons or that military hardware will be sold overseas for certain funds, say, hard currency?

[Shaposhnikov] All of the countries of the CIS, and especially those that are creating their own armed forces, have a claim on some share of the arms and combat equipment. I consider this to be a natural desire in general, because it cannot be any other way. If there is a state, there is an independent state, then there are the attributes of that independent state, which are armed forces, military hardware etc. But here we must look at what armed forces are needed by each state. There are,

for instance, several million firearms on the territory of Ukraine. They were created not only for the armed forces of Ukraine and not only for the three military districts on the territory of Ukraine, but also as mobilization resources that came not only from Ukraine, but also from the other union republics of the former Union. And to have claims now on everything that is in Ukraine, it seems to me, is not particularly sound. Because another state, say Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan etc. could also have claims on them. And if we do not negotiate here and split them in some civilized manner, then I cannot rule out the possibility of states selling excess hardware and weapons abroad.

[Question] Mr. Marshal, I would like to know if you could elaborate on what you said earlier. First, you said that there could be a compromise between you and the government of the Ukraine on the score of technical questions. Could you say what those questions are?

You were also talking about the budget for the first three months. Do you mean to say that there will not be enough funds for military needs for the second quarter, and you also said that at the meeting in Kiev a great success was achieved, but after that you cited several examples of the fact that there was insufficient success, that you were unable to reach agreement on strategic forces, on payments to the budget, so then where is the success?

[Shaposhnikov] As pertains to the technical problems, I want to say that they are not between us and Ukraine alone, they exist everywhere. They exist in Azerbaijan, they exist in Moldova, they even exist in the states where they are not creating their own armed forces. These shortcomings are connected with the fact that, say, we are holding some exercises, movements, where we have not reported it to the local authorities, then questions arise. Therefore there is no need to think that if there are some technical issues and contradictions, that there is now an end to everything etc. One must simply think that we need to work better in that regard.

In regard to success or non-success, I want to say that I regard it in general as a success because out of the ten questions actually put forward, nine were resolved and signed. Even if not all. And I therefore also relate this quantitative aspect as success in resolving the military issues at the meeting in Kiev. The stance of Ukraine on military issues has become clearer and more understandable to me as well. That is also a certain success, to a certain extent.

And the largest success is that the legal formulation of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS was completed. That is also of no small importance.

On the budget I would like to say that this does not mean that the second quarter will not be financed here. Simply with the creation of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, with the taking of those armed formations that were being discussed in the decree of the president of Russia under jurisdiction of Russia, it has simply become more

clear-cut and clear who will now be paying for the military budget of the Armed Forces of the CIS.

[Question] I would like to know if you are making any plans for the eventuality that Ukraine leaves the CIS, and if you are developing such plans, then how would the departure of Ukraine—which the leadership of Ukraine feels is a possibility—affect the negotiations, further negotiations on these very problems that still have to be solved? Thank you.

[Shaposhnikov] You are trying to get me to answer for Ukraine to a certain extent. I do not know the plans of Ukraine. And if we have some plans in reply to the departure of Ukraine from the CIS, then I do not intend to share them with anyone at the present time.

[Question] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, a question at the request of our readers. Have you received authority to sign the temporary Regulations, and will they be signed?

[Shaposhnikov] Yes, I have received the authority to sign the temporary Regulations, and they will be instituted in the near future. They still need to be discussed, we have partially published them in our press. We will be discussing them with a regard for the proposals received from the localities at the collegium, and I will sign them with satisfaction. I simply want to say that we are not making any claim to the ultimate truth here via putting these regulations into force. There is a great deal of work that still remains here, but it is, I think, collective work. We simply have too little time now for a reform of the Armed Forces. I more or less sketched out great plans for you at the first meeting here, in this hall. They have been partially fulfilled, and partially not fulfilled. But they have not been fulfilled, in particular, due to the creation of the CIS, and at the present time I personally, and the lion's share of my subordinates at the General Staff, are expending efforts and energy on just these, ah, on the preparations for these CIS summit meetings and so on and so forth. We nonetheless take the same stance on issues of reform that I asserted before.

[Question (Interfax Agency)] I have two questions. The first, Yevgeniy Ivanovich, please tell us how long-lived, do you feel, are the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS? And a second question on that plane. A congress of Germans was recently concluded, and they were actively debating a variation for an exchange between our contingent in Germany and Germans that desire to go to the FRG. Is that variation a realistic one?

[Shaposhnikov] On the first question, in regards to how long the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS will be preserved. What are your own general sentiments on this matter? Positive? Good. Me too. I therefore think that if we are to be guided by the agreements connected with the strategic forces and the general-purpose forces, then they will still exist on the territories of other states. As, for example, the strategic forces that are now on the territory of four states. These are the nuclear-missile forces and other components of the strategic forces on the territory of other states. Consequently, as long as

they are there, there will probably also be a need for a command of the Unified Armed Forces, both in the strategic forces and in the component of the Unified Armed Forces.

Uzbekistan moreover, by the way, has a law there, in Uzbekistan, on the transfer of armed forces to its jurisdiction. But I want to tell you that there is no oath, no extremism. Here is an example of peaceful resolution. Islam Abdukhanevich Karimov is a very constructive person, he showed this while he was chairman at the Kiev meeting and in the resolution of these issues. There was nothing like give them to me, give them to me to subordinate, give them to me and my officers will command, as in Ukraine. None of that. We are calmly resolving all of these issues in civilized fashion, and they are at the same time not refusing—and are even affirming—their own participation in the Unified Command. That is, despite the fact that they are transferring to their jurisdiction, they will nonetheless be part of the unified command.

Kazakhstan does not make any claims on the fact that an armed formation, the 40th Army on its territory in particular, will transfer to its jurisdiction, but they have agreed and will pay, and they are affirming the fact that they will be part of the unified command. I therefore think that the Unified Armed Forces will exist in the near future, and later they will possibly be transformed into some organization along the lines of the Warsaw Pact or NATO.

On the exchange of apartments with Germans. This question is in general somehow not a very serious one. Why? Because we are in general leaving everything there for a certain fee etc. And second, if we are talking about an officer or warrant officer who has been discharged who will be coming here to the territory of the former USSR, where a Volga German, say, had been living before, that is understandable to me. But if he will go as part of a contingent, then it will be scattered across the whole territory of the CIS. I do not intend to change that much.

Then the settlement facilities, the garrisons, there is also a problem.

[Question (VESTI)] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, I have heard that Russia has allocated 250 million rubles to finance the Black Sea Fleet, but Ukraine has frozen that money and is paying the military nothing now. What will happen to that money, and how will Russia proceed in the future?

[Shaposhnikov] Russia made allocations for the upkeep not only of the fleet, that was in January, but for the three military districts as well, at the same time. Intensive negotiations are currently underway between comrades Gaydar and Fokin on returning that money or on a transfer from the districts to the Black Sea Fleet. A mechanism for financing the Black Sea Fleet that is not through the Gosbank of Ukraine is also currently being worked out.

[Question (NEMETSKAYA GAZETA)] A question pertaining to the so-called blue helmets. Namely who in Kiev is against the formation of such an army? And do you feel it possible and useful to create such an army if those who are against it are taking direct part in international conflicts?

[Shaposhnikov] I came out with the proposal to create such armed contingents on February 28. I appealed to all the presidents of the CIS in written form. In general I received support, by and large, from all the presidents. And when the president of Kazakhstan came out with this initiative right in Kiev, everyone supported his proposals in general. Only Ukraine, I believe, did not sign. Yes? They also signed? They signed. Everything is spelled out there roughly as for UN matters. That if both sides request it, that there is agreement on a cease-fire and so on. I therefore affirm once again my adherence to the creation of just such armed forces to maintain the peace in the CIS.

[Moderator] So then, respected colleagues, we are coming to a close. I thank Yevgeniy Ivanovich for his report and you for your attention. All the best.

Stolyarov Reflects on Political Situation of Armed Forces

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[Article by Nikolay Stolyarov, candidate of philosophical sciences: "Is Everything Real Irrational?"]

[Text] The article was written, passed through the editorial office and was submitted for composition several days prior to the "Minsk breakthrough." But doubts arose in the accuracy of our own position. It was thought: is it worthwhile to arouse an already aroused society? Maybe truth is really on the side of those who are advocating disintegration? Three months have passed. The doubts have been thoroughly dispelled. Reality has presented a whole multitude of new arguments and facts. Their clearness and the probability of new ones permitted us to continue the article. However, it is early to close the books on it.

Consensus is Simpler—Harmony is Once Again the Price

According to the tradition that has developed comparatively recently, we call "leftists" those people who reject everything that existed in the country in the era of Communist rule; "rightists"—those people who as before stand for communist reference points of the development of society and reject practically all innovations—from pluralism to private property.

But changes are characteristic to each new span of time. If you look at the matter already from today, then the "leftists" and the "rightists" have been cast aside on the extreme flanks of the political spectrum. Society, which has changed and in many ways matured, has stopped

gravitating from one side to the other. A weighty position, including simultaneously both the traditional culture and innovation, increasingly suits it. And our "leftists" and "rightists" continue to feel as if society is no longer interested in anything besides their disputes and "discoveries".

Our for the time being still united army stands in the face of a large social collapse. And it is valid to suggest that there is the opportunity to make a choice. But the "leftists" and "rightists" continue to view the army inasmuch as the one-track thinking that has entered their flesh and blood prompts them to. For the "leftists," the army is only a large fragment of the imperial state that dares moreover to declare itself in a society that is involved with the gigantic work of the collapse of the foundations of totalitarianism. They see in it only the aggressiveness that originates from the very fact of the presence of arms in its hands.

The tramp of boots on the "leftists" model is the army's form of existence; military personnel arrived at the officers' assembly exclusively in order to frighten society and the Presidents and to proclaim a military dictatorship. And General Stolyarov who was conducting the assembly did everything possible to promote it since he himself is a Communist functionary and he also worked in the KGB. In general, he is a hidden enemy of democracy.

It is being totally consciously forgotten that nearly all of the "leftists" have also left the Communist vanguard and it is their democratic impulses that I had to defend for nearly a year in the position of TsKK [Central Control Commission] Chairman and that together we "stood for the White House" in August and that I received the appointment as KGB deputy chairman from the hands of the leaders of democratic rule.

It is interesting that for the "rightists" I am located in an altogether different spectrum: they say, I did everything at the assembly in order to prevent the officers from placing before the President an ultimatum on the restoration of the USSR and from adopting a threatening resolution.

What can I say here? Yes, the primary mood of the Officers' Assembly was in favor of all sorts of ultimatums. Of the type: Bring all of the Presidents here; discuss the issue about the army only as about the army of the USSR; send the leaders of the army into retirement because they did not defend the USSR and the integrity of the army itself.

It would have been entirely possible to meet them halfway: to send an ultimatum to Leonid Kravchuk, to society, yes and to all the Presidents to instill fear of the army... But that's just the point that the officers themselves well understand that the time for army ultimatums has passed. They already no longer have any value whatsoever. The officer corps has long endured changes along with society and it has always considered itself to be a part of society.

Officers recognize only civilized methods of dealing with others and, consequently, they must be responded to in the same manner. Ultimately, at the January 17th assembly they did not present themselves in such a simple or straight-forward manner as the dilettantes of the extremes of either the one or the other group would have liked. And you do not need to consider the army to be stupider than society. It advocates consensus and integration: political, economic, social, and interethnic. It advocates that the politicians, while taking into account reality, preserve, if not a united, than at least an allied army.

The army views its unity only as a factor of security of a world that is living under conditions of the highest saturation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. The army is not a rubber ball which one can easily throw across onto a lawn where politicians, who are tired from endless current problems, have gathered and are resting. This ball is filled with a lethal filler. A disciplined, organized, well-trained and well-supplied army—is a much greater guarantor of public calm than that in which the syndrome of ethnic and political division and the lack of political and economic protection is consciously introduced.

The army does not accept the aspiration to achieve only the external attributes of democracy behind which stands a large game of political forces and the struggle of ambitions and the highest political tension rather than really effective transformations. The army is appealing to society for consensus. It does not see the differences in the positions of the numerous political parties and movements, if they have any serious significance for the positive results of economic transformations. Results and not intentions, even if good intentions.

Some people assert that the army is actively participating in political games. But this is not so. The army leadership is recommending that servicemen refrain from participation in any types of parties and the overwhelming majority of military personnel are quite consciously following this recommendation.

The army cannot be dangerous if harmony reigns in society. But if the "leftists" and "rightists" continue to increase their differences and confrontation, it will be difficult for the army to stand aside.

Intentions and Reality

They are endlessly appealing to us for realistic thinking. And this is correct. But we constantly accept as reality that which they have proclaimed and we prefer not to take notice of reality itself.

They announced the elimination of the USSR and we immediately consider this to be a reality. Although reality itself resists this and announces something else: at least about the fact that things exist which cannot be immediately destroyed—no matter how much you would like them to be. For example, the army.

They have declared reforms—and they act as if they have become a reality.

They announced the arrival of an era of democracy and everything that we do not consider to be democracy we strike out from reality with a simple denial, confident that life is subordinate only to it.

For some reason, some people who have encountered reality will whine: how bad everything is around us, they do not let us work, and a bright future does not follow them. And here malicious paper arrows fly: in the reviving patriotic movements, in the VPK [military-industrial complex], in the generals, and in the trade unions that do not understand what remarkable ideas are being implemented for the sake of the future itself.

All of this has a name: “democratic sniffing.” Life is a cruel joke so quit complaining. Clumsy persons—always clumsy persons, regardless of which party they join, the Communist, Socialist, “Demrossiya” [Democratic Russia], or Travnin’s very rational party.

Those people who are in power today from the very beginning must have understood that they would have to work not nearly in an artificial social oasis that totally consists of “genius-reformers” and super-bold innovators. But where do you put the stubborn conservatives in their aspiration to preserve the former reality? Yes and is it worthwhile to call all—absolutely all—of reality irrational?

Power—this is a most serious matter which you cannot get on the spur of the moment. A great deal of preliminary preparation and great skills are required. And the capability for very complex analysis is especially important if we want to really provide security for the people and the state—that which in the entire world they are accustomed to calling national security. For the time being, they very often do not consider either the one or the other factor.

Power—this is the production of intended results. But how many times already do we have only the production and even reproduction of intentions. Well with some results—as a rule, negative. And for power, if it wishes to preserve itself, positive results are needed.

So this cannot endlessly continue: to seek the guilty who interfere, who do not understand, who hold back progress... It turns out: again, like before, the guilty are not those people who rule but all sorts of “underdeveloped” and “undefeated.” The conservatives of which there are millions. From the political point of view, they can be called formations. From the civilian point of view—this is significant strata of the population which the authorities transform into their own enemies for entirely no reason.

We need to finally understand that repressive measures are simply inadmissible with regard to them. Then this will already not be democracy. The new authorities need to get along with everyone. All of the country’s citizens

want to work, to have food and clothing and the opportunity to attain a decent position in society. But we are once again hearing ultimatums to the Presidents—Determine whom you are with—with them or with us! Once again this notorious “either-or” and “who is not with us is against us”?

I remember how my deputy for party affairs quite fearlessly acted against me everywhere whenever the opportunity would present itself. And he also organized every possible provocation. To my “threats,” he replied: “But you are a democrat, you will nevertheless not permit yourself to do anything against me!”. Indeed, is this logical? There is no arguing with that.

This is what that means: it is because we are democrats that we have to deal with all of society’s groups and with all interests. I foresee resistance. Be prepared for retaliatory steps that are not to be taken lightly from aroused parties. Resign yourself to the motley of opinions and to criticism directed at you.

Our new authorities, unfortunately, still do not value consensus. Obviously, they do not completely understand that the preliminary condition of any of their efforts, especially if they are to be successful, is at least relative social harmony. There is a mechanism of mutual relations with opponents—they struck once against the conservatives (morally and materially), they managed to drive them from power—hurry to do your business with a rapid practical outcome so that society will not want to turn back. That is how they act throughout the world. In our country, there is once again a Bolshevik sunset—if we have seized power, then we will do what we want. No—you only need to do what advances society along the path of well-being—progress that everyone notices. Everything else will not help.

For now the search for a consensus is not awaited but limbering up a fist has one effect—to frighten everyone who does not agree. But it never lasts for long and, as a rule, produces an effect that is the opposite of what was anticipated.

You need to understand that the society in which you are operating thinks. Yes, it thinks. And dissatisfaction is also increasing with a counter-recoil due to the fact that the Homeland has been lost, there is no great power, an attribute which made us proud, the fact that life is steadily deteriorating, and the fact that crime has clogged all of society’s pores, but who is capable of fighting crime and not only the very bats that are as if specially swept away and scattered.

While Moving Ahead, We Look Back

The Union already has one foot in the grave and the centrifugal waves have already passed the highest wave. Gorbachev attempted to save the state with the New Union Treaty.

If you recall, the first time of its adoption was planned for autumn 1990. Everyone was more or less filled with

faith in the saving role of the New Union Treaty for the country which was already at the stage of semi-disintegration.

My comrade, a professor of history, said at that time: "The treaty will not be signed." And, in fact, its signing was put off until sometime in the new year. Later it was once again delayed—until spring, after the referendum. The referendum voted for the Union. But once again the treaty signing was disrupted, however the quite reassuring Novo-Ogarevo process was begun. Now the professor said: "It will never be signed."

Previously, I had brushed him off but now I was interested: "Why?" He was terse: "History will not sign it." But he nevertheless explained: "The Union will continue to exist even in the event that several republics break off from it but it will cease to exist—if the Union Treaty is signed. The Union of states—is the total collapse of the country and of these newest states."

"And therefore, history opposes it?"

"History opposes it. And it has its defenders on earth. I do not know in which form this will be manifested in each case, but either the existence of the USSR (let us change the meaning of the customary abbreviation and let us break off several republics) or, when all is said and done, Russia as the successor to the USSR are objectively possible."

Meanwhile, the Novo-Ogarevo process was gaining strength and numerous supporters while attaining ever increasing popularity. The matter ultimately reached the signing of the Union Treaty. And the date was designated—August 20.

The Professor has turned out to be correct once again. The tragic, dramatic events of August once again disrupted the treaty. The first "defenders of history"—the heroes of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] arrived. And just what actually occurred? A certain group of high-ranking bureaucrats who were close to Gorbachev, seeing his softness and his unwillingness to argue with the leaders of the republics, decided to do that for him. The group moved Gorbachev aside (for a time or forever, this is how it has already turned out) to prevent the end of the USSR. And this group, if you face the truth, reflected the powerful massive disharmony with the losses of the one great Homeland that lives in the country to this very day. The fact that few people would have wanted to see this very group of long since bankrupt rulers in power—is an altogether different question.

Later in November, the Union Treaty was not initialed in the Gossoviet [State Council]. At that time, already even I thought that not just anybody but history opposed it.

But history has turned out in such a way... President Gorbachev, who always poorly perceived the idea of a confederation, finally agreed to it, although he knew that

a confederation was a fragile formation and could hardly serve as an instrument of restraint of existing contradictions. He knew it but he agreed to it. And this was his last tragic mistake. The grand master of compromise, Gorbachev gambled away too large a wager on it—the country.

It is perfectly clear that today's Russian "triumvirate"—the President, Vice President, and the Supreme Soviet Chairman—cannot repeat Gorbachev's mistake—now with regard to Russia. And it is worthwhile pondering right now—what their guilt for the collapse of the union can turn out to be in the future for the leaders of the republics. Their own peoples can prefer the charges. For example, I was born in Belorussia, I studied in Ukraine, and I live in Russia—and I can never seriously perceive—neither with my mind nor with my heart—the conglomeration of palisades among peoples who are connected by more than a thousand year history. All the more so that today the entire civilized world is striving for the reverse—for integration.

However, the extremely unsympathetic grimaces of the new ideology once again deprive us of any doubt whatsoever with regard to unlimited sovereignization. Is this true? They have taken away, removed, and closed—and what in exchange? They have ignored the March referendum in which the people voted for a joint life within the framework of one state. They have contrasted it with the latest vote for independence in the republics themselves. This certainly was a substantial argument. And naturally the general mood, since March through the summer and autumn, pushed the rejection of the USSR to one side. But the times are changing and we are changing along with them. Today there is once again a different situation. Today the stomach is voting to a great degree. And it is voting for joint, at any rate, economic work.

The Most Vital Need—To Survive

The leaders of the new organization—are certainly unusual personalities. Some are heading for glory... Others think that their personal interests are totally subordinated to the welfare of their own peoples. Still others are ready to consciously distort their souls for the sake of the welfare of others. However, we should not accept the conscientious delusions of some of them as heroism or also as treason. They are sooner victims. M. Gorbachev is correct: "Politicians are the most sinful people of all the damned sinners of the Earth."

But victims of what? Of the national self-consciousness that is connected with extremist nationalism that has grown with the speed of light? Or of the economic naivete of the late awakened civic consciousness of the peoples?

The republics that are located along the borders of the great Russian state who have brought a suit against the USSR for the colonial yoke in the form of secession from it have totally in vain not compared themselves with all of the state's other territories. Regardless of what they

have been called—autonomous republic, autonomous oblast, kray or simply oblast or region of the Urals, center of Russia, or Far East type, etc.—all of them simultaneously with the union republics were driven by the requirements of regionalization and decentralization, at any rate, of economic power. The disintegration of the USSR into Great Russia and the individual states based on the union republics is essentially not resolving a single fundamental problem of the further development of the economy of absolutely all territorial units, regardless of whether they are republics, states, or krays.

The emphasis on colonialism in the 1980's-1990's was already absurd. Real independence of the majority of the vital parameters of the various local areas was needed but in so doing two conditions remained an objective need and precondition in the movement ahead.

First. The economic space must remain integrated and the economy—unified. Whatever kind of independence you want but united. The disorganization of economic ties determined the catastrophic scale of the economic recession absolutely in all regions. The decline of industrial production reached 15 percent per year. In Russia, a production decline of 11 percent was recorded last January in comparison with December, in February—already 17 percent, and commodities exchange declined 53 percent in comparison with January 1991. “More than 90 percent of the population lives on the verge of poverty,” St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak stated recently. The situation is the same everywhere.

Second. For a definite—by agreement—period, all republics and territories of the Soviet-Russian State must leave at least a minimum of ruling and coordinating organs in the center.

What troubles me most of all is the tragic similarity of actions of the new sovereign powers on those “stagnant” powers which also contrary to any logic did not desire to note the lethal indicators of the economic recession (which are always witnesses to the bankruptcy of power) and continued to bend their own already obviously ineffective line.

It is not surprising that Nursultan Nazarbayev, a most weighty and unusually respected politician everywhere in the world and in our country, at all meetings of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] leaders insists on the coordination of actions in the economy and on the creation of neutral unifying structures.

The republics had a choice: sovereignty or secession from the USSR. These are really different things. A very subtle game to obscure these differences has taken place. The primary outcome—secession from the USSR—was concealed in the snares of impressive speeches adorned with all sorts of promises and future benefits, appeals, slogans and exhortations on the value of sovereignty and independence that calculated on the aroused awareness. The support obtained at referendums and in various polls of the ideas of independence were immediately presented as the will of the majority for secession from

the Union. And this logic was imposed with great force on public opinion through the mass media. The “SMI [mass media] phenomenon,” which I had the opportunity to write about a bit earlier, was once again set into motion.

Maybe at that time the leaders and the peoples of the republics did not really believe that, while continuing to be in the Union, they would actually move ahead and emerge from the crisis. They themselves wanted to take steps so that their land would flourish. Well who can oppose such good intentions? However, time has passed. All have obtained the opportunity to become independent states. And the time has come to part with the new illusions.

And here practice—the criterion of truth—has shown that:

—Economic collapse is nearly inevitable due to the “divorce.”

—No one will get their hands on a stable flow of favorable Western investments in the competition for foreign economic promises for each seceded sovereign territory.

—Within the disintegrated Union, no one can offer to the world market in a mutually advantageous manner not only goods that are in demand but also energy and mineral resources. Exports of the commodities-raw materials complex from the “uncooperative ancestral lands” is practically impossible. Obtaining them in a piecemeal form for the world market is economically risky and also ineffective.

—The extremely reduced ability to pay of our formerly united political space is generating a decline and not the anticipated take off of export interests of international major private business. The credit policy of the developed states could stabilize our situation. But it is very difficult for them to depend on the “sovereigns of the day” that are gravitating toward a chain reaction of decline.

—The divided USSR gives each of the “new sovereigns” streams of refugees (our republics—are not ethnic but interethnic amalgamations), growing social poverty and, what is still more dangerous, the erosion of the geography of the native intellect that has developed. This is promoting an unprecedented brain drain to the developed countries.

—A situation is developing when a person's situation increasingly depends on his nationality: a settled way of life requirement is being introduced, a language barrier is rising, and the problem of adopting citizenship is being raised, etc. And this is nothing other than direct infringement of human rights and, for example, reducing citizens of nonnative nationalities to the level of second-rate people who have been compelled to defend their own equal rights. We are observing this in a whole series of former republics.

—Interethnic wars do not yield any political benefits to either side.

No matter what kind of panegyrics they deliver with regard to state independence of the former republics, we still know: secession must be provisional in nature. If convention is removed, serious conflicts right up to military conflicts are inevitable.

It is still not too late to once again ponder the restoration of objective preconditions for implementing effective economic cooperation and building political relations of a consensus type. Life or, one can more honestly say—the need to survive, very insistently demands this.

Disintegration—A Threat to World Security

Western society, having dreamed about the weakening of the USSR for many years and having invested huge resources to undermine its monolithic might, has obtained its long-awaited result today in the form... of the greatest threat to itself.

The disintegration of the USSR, one can say without exaggeration, is a geopolitical catastrophe for the world. In its background, all discussions on the value of independence for some nation or national-territorial amalgamation or other in the USSR appears to be only an instigation toward world catastrophe. It is sufficient to look at the manipulation with nuclear strategic forces in the as of today most independent republic.

President Bush does not tire of repeating that America does not intend to eliminate its intelligence capabilities, the creation of which cost such labors, because there is still an application for them in the world. Yes, there is. And the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the first target of application. No amount of American or European resources will be sufficient for reconnaissance or screening of nuclear proliferation [raspolzaniye] with our total and final collapse. Some commentators even say it like this: We need to consider that the Union is disintegrating not into several Switzerlands but maybe into several Lebanons or Yugoslavias or simply poor countries with a high indicator of economic dependence on the entire world.

If the world does not desire to encounter the extreme intensification of the "nuclear syndrome," it will have to set aside its naivete and sermon with regard to the values of limitless sovereignization in our recent superpower.

Furthermore, while destroying and erasing from the map of the earth the second superpower, the world is nevertheless violating a kind of balance that may provide negative consequences, although they are unclear as of today.

With the disintegration of the Union, the possibility of ecological catastrophes increases. And so the not too effective environmental protection system that existed as an all-union system now, with the division of the country, its effectiveness will be still further reduced and will increase the degree of ecological risk. We did not

choose to be poor: Already right now, for example, in Central Asia, they are attempting to import pesticides that are banned in the West. Is the ecological threat really an ethnic phenomenon?

And crime is an interethnic phenomenon.

The world should fear not only nuclear proliferation, ecological explosions, a new triumph of the drug mafia and a wave of terrorism, but also the assumption of power by superconservative forces. Western analysts must know that the primary concern of these forces is a united Soviet Union. It is impossible to provide a guarantee that a nostalgic syndrome of the "it is unfortunate for the state" type will not turn up in the near future as the seventh powerful factor of change. And on its wave we can obtain precisely the victory of the superconservative forces, although it would be possible to obtain on this wave the universal harmony that is so needed for normal economic operations.

We must not forget that a coordinated campaign of influential forces, that are stubbornly and persistently striving for the disappearance of the USSR from the map of the planet, exists and operates. Both international crime syndicates and the inert riff-raff of the Cold War may also be in them—all with strong finances since they have enormous support in the world.

Yes, right now we are a pitiful example of crumbling disintegration to the world. A thousand-year-old strong power is collapsing like a house of cards. And the main blow was inflicted when the undemocratic center in the country disappeared, when no one intended to impose or force his will on anyone else, when simply coordinated cooperation was required to bring the peoples out of the economic crisis and the state of ecumenical loss. Our descendants will hardly call us intelligent if we continue to stubbornly follow the principle of "either-or" and to perform dizzying somersaults from one extreme to the other: from totalitarian rule—to a state of anarchy, from immediate communization of life—to total isolation. I repeat: integration is just as valuable as independence. The true meaning of the art of administration of public affairs—is to join opposites.

Ivashov on Outcome of Kiev Summit

92UM0823A Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant-General L. Ivashov by B. Badurkin: "Military Satisfied With Summit"]

[Text] As is known, the military group of documents was one of the main groups of documents examined at the Kiev summit of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] heads of state. The discussion of military organizational-development not only took up the most time at the negotiations but also yielded the most perceptible results. Our correspondent asked one of the developers of the documents, Lieutenant-General L. Ivashov, Chief of the Directorate of CIS Unified Armed Forces Affairs, to comment upon them.

[Ivashov] The results of the Kiev summit indicate that the heads of state have begun to seriously take up issues of defense and security. With respect to military organizational-development, the prospect of having their own armies in the near future facilitated an abandonment of the principle of "levelling to their foundations." In the end then, a constructive approach prevailed, first and foremost in the legal sphere. Following Alma Ata, when it was declared that the legal acts of the former USSR were not in effect, the Armed Forces High Command entered into a legal vacuum. Now we know what the questions are and at what level they are to be resolved. The [spheres] of jurisdiction of the High Command Headquarters, governments of the States and their ministries of defense have been divided.

Another serious achievement was the elaboration of principles for providing all the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth with equipment, arms and procedures for financing scientific-research and experimental design work. Henceforth, the Unified Armed Forces will be provided with all necessities according to common plans and at the expense of a military budget. The republican armed forces [will be supported] according to one-time contracts and agreements with defense industry enterprises. Furthermore, it was agreed that equipment sent to other areas for repair will be returned to the legal owner without fail.

[Badurkin] Leonid Grigorevich, the spring call-up will soon begin, but in the military commissariats it is still unclear who is to be summoned, for how long and where they are to be sent.

[Ivashov] Many of these problems have been solved by the signing in Kiev of an agreement on principles of manning the army and navy. A common call-up age and a common term of service—one and a half years in ground units and two in naval units—have been established. Beginning this spring, contractual service will already be introduced alongside mandatory service.

[Badurkin] According to the laws of some states, their draftees may only serve on their territories...

[Ivashov] This remains in effect. But if some fellow suddenly wants to serve in another part of the CIS then local authorities will not stand in the way. This refers to servicemen who have extended as well as "contractual servicemen."

[Badurkin] It was expected that the Kiev summit would resolve the fate of the Black Sea Fleet.

[Ivashov] This question was discussed only at the minister-of-defense level. They once again failed to reach an agreement. Ukraine "began demanding" as much as 83 percent of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet, to include ships equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. [Their demands also extended to] aviation and ground-based missile systems.

[Badurkin] Was it not this that led to Ukraine's decision to stop the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from its territory?

[Ivashov] It is difficult for me to judge the intentions of Ukrainian politicians, but at the meeting of ministers of defense (the day prior to the Kiev summit) a document concerning procedures for movement of nuclear weapons from the territories of Byelarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Russia was prepared and signed. The fact that the Ukrainian delegation changed its position and entered into an agreement on this issue fosters hopes of a favorable resolution to the problem.

[Badurkin] It is possible to agree to anything you like, but if there are no means for implementing the agreements then they will all remain unresolved.

[Ivashov] Unfortunately, the matter of financing the Armed Forces remains unsettled. Although a number of republics agreed to make predetermined deposits for the next quarter, many differences remain. The heads of state therefore charged the governments with examining this problem.

[Badurkin] The Kiev summit is already history. Tashkent lies ahead. What are you preparing for the next summit?

[Ivashov] Eleven documents were already examined at the 13 March summit of heads of government in Moscow. Among [the topics they addressed] were financing of the Unified Armed Forces, provisions for retirement of servicemen, the Baykonur problem, communications arrangements, use of airspace and training of military cadres...

Personnel Committee Briefing on Social Protection for Servicemen

*92UM0811A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Mar 92 p 1*

[Article by Colonel B. Zyubin: "Defenselessness is a Very Precise Word"]

[Text] A briefing devoted to problems of social protection of servicemen was conducted in the Committee on Personnel Affairs of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Unified Armed Forces. But the facts and figures released to journalists allude to the social defenselessness rather [than protection] of those who wear the shoulder boards. Here are some of them.

A sociological opinion poll conducted this March uncovered a very disturbing picture of the general sociological state of servicemen. Thirty percent of those questioned, for example, compare their income with that of a maid, janitor or unskilled laborer. Eighty-eight percent do not perceive themselves as sufficiently protected in social and legal respects. The majority of officers and warrant officers (69 to 79 percent) are not certain that measures announced by the president of the Russian Federation at the All-Army

Officer's Assembly and in the Decree on 19 February of this year will be implemented. Investigation allows one to conclude that "survival" of servicemen's families is currently being ensured not only, and not so much, by monetary accumulations (51 percent of those questioned simply do not have any) and monetary allowances as by stores of food and belongings remaining from better times and by direct aid in food and goods from parents and close relations. Every third family of a serviceman is in distress; among those with many children [the figure is] every second family.

Things are no better with respect to logistical support of the Armed Forces. During the last year, troops were undersupplied by 2 million 283 thousand tons of fuel, some 100 tons of foodstuffs and nearly 700 million rubles (in 1991 prices) worth of property stores. For example, soldiers received 381 thousand fewer sets of uniforms (military jackets, trousers and boots) which constitutes 25.5 percent of what was required. In a word, the defenders of the Motherland are wearing out old clothes. And what more?

Major-General of Aviation N. Stolyarov spoke uneasily about the situation which has arisen. In the Russian Federation alone, there are currently five presidential committees, five Supreme Soviet committees and one governmental committee dealing with problems of social protection of servicemen. Also there exist some 50 public organizations and 25 commercial establishments that have declared as their goal the social protection of servicemen and their families. Their numbers are rapidly growing. But this is more unsettling than gladdening since, as is known, too many cooks spoil the broth.

The Chairman of the Committee on Personnel Affairs underscored that social protection is a multifarious idea that, at a minimum, must include four aspects—citizens must be protected economically, politically and in a legal and moral-ethical respect. Currently there are problems in all of these facets.

N. Stolyarov considers that the development of independent military trade unions within the Armed Forces could particularly eliminate the tension.

Finally, according to this survey, among the fundamental motives spurring officers to submit a request for discharge from the Armed Forces was a reduction in the morale of the men wearing officer's insignia. This [factor] even [ranks] ahead of poor financial and living conditions.

INCIDENTALLY:

At the briefing an announcement was made about a decision to transfer to Moscow students of the Lvov Military Institute of Culture (formerly a military-political school) who did not take an oath of allegiance to Ukraine. They will be completing their studies at the Armed Forces' Military Academy of the Humanities.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Comparison of MI-28 Performance Data

92UM0808A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 8, Aug 1991 (signed to press 12 Aug 91)
pp 8-9

[Article by Col V. Bezborodov: "The Helicopter-Soldier"]

[Text] This article is about the Mi-28. In issue No 10, 1990, the journal wrote about the pre-production prototype. This article is about the basic version of the helicopter.

First, we will try to tell you what caused the appearance of the new helicopter, since our Air Forces have in their inventory the Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, which have given a pretty good account of themselves, have been tested in combat, and modernized in accordance with today's demands on military equipment. However, the time comes when further modification of series-produced equipment becomes inefficient. Meanwhile, specialists in other countries are moving forward, implementing progressive design decisions. We have to do the same.

The experience of employment of the Mi-8, Mi-24, and foreign combat helicopters was carefully analyzed in creating the Mi-28, and the optimum concept was worked up using the "cost-effectiveness" criterion. For example, the fact that in the final variant the helicopter was made using the traditional single-rotor configuration is the result of studying a great number of variants (in particular, designs with two independent twin-finned rotors were studied carefully) and careful selection of the best one.

There were arguments about the crew size: The Mi-28 is a two-seat helicopter, like all the combat helicopters in service in the world. In the opinion of our designers, there is a reason for this. You see, combat helicopters often fly at an altitude of 5-15 meters over irregular terrain and simultaneously search for targets located considerable distances from the helicopter. It is important not only to destroy them, but also to avoid enemy airborne and ground weapons. It is not easy for one crew member to do this, even if modern optical instruments are used and with the most up-to-date electronics.

The pilot's task is to fly the helicopter and use unguided weapons. The navigator-operator's task is to search for, detect, identify, and destroy small targets at maximum distances using precision-guided weapons and cannons and also to navigate.

Ergonomic requirements have been taken into account considerably better in the Mi-28 than its predecessors. For example, the left console, the collective pitch-throttle control lever, and the control lever have controls used in flight; the right consoles have controls necessary

only for flight preparation. Secondary quantitative information on system operation has been virtually eliminated—the crew is informed only of what is needed in combat. Cockpit vision is good. Flying and aiming accuracy has been increased; priorities in use of weapons have been ensured.

The main instrument of the navigator-operator is the surveillance and sighting system mounted on a gyro-stabilized platform with great mobility, which sharply expands the capabilities of instrument search. In the day variant, it has two optical channels with wide and narrow fields of view, as well as a narrow-field optical-TV channel. They are used to accomplish target search and identification, as well as weapon employment.

The surveillance and sighting system is a combined system. Its task is to guide antitank guided missiles and fire the 30-mm cannon. The cannon has the same aimability as the sight and is synchronized with it. The surveillance and sighting system has a built-in laser rangefinder which determines the current distance to the target. This information is fed into the computer of the sight electronic equipment for calculating corrections in the automatic mode when firing from the cannon or unguided rockets. The same rangefinder provides the data necessary to launch guided missiles. The system also affects the controls of an antitank guided missile during it flight to the target.

If the enemy is within visual range, the helicopter pilots fire using the head-up display or the helmet-mounted sight that controls the aimable cannon.

The problem of increasing the helicopter's survivability causes designers much concern. It is solved primarily by using armor plating. But armor is additional weight. Would this not turn the helicopter into a clumsy brontosaurus, deprived of maneuverability and, therefore, even more vulnerable?

A designer thought of truly better protection for the helicopter. The creators of the Mi-28 ensured mutual shielding of units and protection of the more important of them less important. For example, they were able to separate the engines so that the main gearbox fit between them.

The materials and dimensions of the structural members chosen make it possible to avoid immediate catastrophic failure in the event of damage, that is, the crew has time to carry out its mission and return to base. Thus, the main and tail rotor blades are made completely of composite materials with high residual strength. The dimensions and cross-sections of the spars were chosen in such a way that, if hit by bullets and shells of the most likely calibers, would not result in an impermissible loss of strength. Redundancy was widely used for the most important systems, specifically, the control system circuits, which were separated as much as possible. A latex self-sealing liner was used in the fuel tanks.

Armor was used only where it had to be used. For example, the cockpit is protected by lightweight armor with ceramic outer plates, which are easily replaced if damaged, and has armored glazing.

No less attention was given to the helicopter's flight performance. As a result, use of the series-produced TVZ-117 engines of S. Izotov with an upgraded electronic control system turned out to be sufficiently effective. The Mi-28 has a fundamentally new design of main and tail rotor blades and hubs, wobble plate, main gearbox, and a number of other units and systems. Composite materials are also used extensively in the design of the airframe. That is why the helicopter has excellent flying qualities both at extremely low and high altitudes.

Basic Data on the Mi-28 in Comparison with Other Helicopters

Characteristic	Mi-28	Mi-24	AH-64 (USA)
Takeoff weight, kg:			
—normal	10,400	11,200	6,670
—maximum	11,200	11,500	8,000
Maximum combat payload, kg	3,640*	2,700*	1,500
Static ceiling, m	3,600	2,000	3,000
Flight range, km	475	450	370
Maximum speed, km/h	300	320	300
Maximum G-load	-0.5-3.0	1.75	3.5
Crew size	2	2	2
Cannon caliber, mm	30	12.7	30
Aimability of cannon, degrees			
—azimuth	+/-110	+/-60	+/-110
—elevation	+10/-40	+20/-20	+10/-60
Number of guided missiles	16	8	18

*With sighting and armament systems.

Combat is combat, and no one can guarantee that the helicopter will not be shot down. However, if that does happen, everything must be done to save the lives of the crew. How? At extremely low altitudes, for example, you cannot bail out of this type of aircraft. Use ejection? Or a system which would enable the pilots to survive without abandoning the helicopter?

Analysis has shown that there are shortcomings with ejection. Therefore, the Mi-28 has an undercarriage and seats with an increased shock-absorber stroke, as well as a system for pulling the pilots to the seats to create the necessary "preparatory position." Design measures have been taken to prevent the pilots from coming in contact with the controls and interior components in the event of a crash, and also to keep systems and units located outside

the cockpit from ending up inside. They managed to reduce the likelihood of explosion and fire immediately after a crash landing. Sensors and mechanisms activate the recovery system automatically if for some reason they are unable to be activated manually (due to pilot injury, late decision, and so forth). All of the above enables the helicopter pilots to survive if the Mi-28 hits the ground at a vertical speed of up to 12 meters per second and at quite high speeds during side or front impact. Just in case, though, the crew has parachutes.

The designers were also concerned about maintenance of the combat helicopters on the ground in extreme conditions of a front-line situation. First of all, the number of mechanical joint couplings, lubrication points, and nut connections with calibrated tightening, which require periodic inspection and tightening, have been decreased sharply. Many joint couplings have been replaced with fabric and elastic bearings. Second, during inspections and servicing the technicians practically do not need lean-to ladders. The powerplant cowlings and equipment compartment hatches can be opened easily and quickly while standing next to the helicopter. The oil and hydraulic fluid levels in the oil and hydraulic units of the systems can be checked through small window panels. Third, built-in equipment provides for automatic testing during operational types of preparation (pre-flight, between-flight, and post-flight) and makes it easier to troubleshoot onboard equipment.

Undoubtedly, our scientists and designers, engineers, and workers have managed to create a responsive, maneuverable, menacing combat machine that is convenient to maintain. The Mi-28 is a new stage in the development of domestic and world helicopter construction.

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'Abakan' Assault Rifle In Testing

92UM0836A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Mar 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Avoronov: "Our Defense Arsenal: The 'Abakan': Precision Combat Weapon"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for March 13 of this year was the first to publish a report by our correspondent from the Izhmash [Izhevsk Machinery] Production Association about the design bureau that gave birth to the new Abakan automatic weapon, designed by Gennadiy Nikonov. Today we are publishing a report, also for the first time, on the testing of the Abakan at the test range of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate. A few days ago, military journalist Col Aleksey Avoronov became the first of his journalistic colleagues to fire Nikonov's assault rifle.

But first a brief story about the test range itself, which until recently was inaccessible to journalists.

The test range where the Abakan is now being tested is one of the oldest in Russia. It was established on February 24, 1804—the first day of operation of the Provisional Artillery Committee, which conducted the first field tests of artillery guns on Volkovoye field outside St. Petersburg. On November 6, 1856, another institution arose at Volkovoye field—the Naval Artillery Testing Commission, which tested ship artillery. In 1879, the test range was relocated on account of the need to expand it as a testing facility for large-caliber weapons and weapons with increased range. Prominent Russian artillery designers, many known throughout the world, worked at the test range.

Following the establishment of Soviet rule, the test range became the main artillery testing center of the Workers and Peasants Red Army and the country's only facility conducting scientific artillery experiments and acceptance tests of various types of equipment and ammunition. Incidentally, on March 3, 1928, the world's first rocket fueled by a smokeless propellant was tested here. The test range also functioned throughout the years of the Great Patriotic War.

Today the test range approves all land and naval artillery guns, topographical surveying and artillery reconnaissance equipment, firearms, and protective gear for servicemen (such as bullet-proof vests and helmets). The range has also tested such formidable artillery systems as the Akatsiya and Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers and the Grad, Uragan, and Smerch rocket salvo systems.

I visited the test facility where comprehensive testing of the Abakan assault rifle—a new-generation automatic weapon—have been virtually completed. The test technicians' observations are now being summarized and will soon be submitted to the chief weapons production designer at the Izhmash Production Association. After final adjustments are made on the new weapon and it is approved, series production will begin.

I met the people who are testing the weapon, toured their large and sophisticated facilities, and learned their opinions of the new assault rifle. Their comments were extremely flattering.

I requested permission to go up to the firing line myself. And soon I was holding the Abakan in my hands.

I opened fire. Even though it might sound somewhat bombastic, I want to say frankly that the experience was unforgettable. But judge for yourselves.

First, it has minimal recoil. For all practical purposes, you can't feel it on your shoulder. Second, it has an amazing first-round rate of fire: The first two bullets leave the barrel for the target before the weapon starts to

deflect. This significantly increases firing accuracy in comparison with existing models.

This means, in turn, that there is a higher probability of hitting the target on the first shots. One can fire the rifle from any position, even the most unstable one. It's no accident that the specialists believe the Abakan will be supplied first of all to the airborne assault forces and other special units.

I wasn't able to photograph the Abakan—it's time has not yet come. And after final adjustments are made, the assault rifle's outward appearance could undergo changes at the plant. But it seems likely that after the assault rifle is approved, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers will be the first to see its "portrait."

The new weapon's design principles cannot be discussed as yet. After all, "know-how" isn't divulged anywhere in the world. The only thing I can say is that the designer succeeded in employing a principle that science is still considering only in theory.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

PVO's Lt-Gen Dubrov on Control of CIS Air Space

92UM0822A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Mar 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with PVO Radiotechnical Troops Commander Lieutenant General Grigoriy Karpovich Dubrov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major A. Ivanov: "Who Will Be the Pilot in the CIS's Sky?"]

[Text] Even before, when a single Union existed, it was difficult to answer the question of how many bosses the sky has. Because some utilized the air space, others regulated traffic in it, and still others were responsible for errors... The latter often turned out to be the PVO [Air Defense] Troops who were tasked to control air traffic but who were deprived of the capability to totally carry it out due to the various subordinations of departments.

Regulating the activities, so to speak, of all persons who are interested in utilizing air space has become even more complicated under current conditions. Nevertheless the problem is solvable. The creation of a unified automated radar field on CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] territory could become an important step on the path to organizing effective control of air traffic.

Our correspondent met with one of the authors of this proposal—PVO [Air Defense] Radiotechnical Troops Commander Lieutenant-General G. Dubrov and asked him to answer a series of questions.

[Ivanov] As far as I understand it, Grigoriy Karpovich, realization of your proposal will cause a radical breakup of many of the currently existing structures...

[Dubrov] In this case, a breakup is necessary. Because it is a question of artificial barriers. Look at what is happening... Take the Navy, the Ground Troops, and the Air Force—each "scans" its own portion of the sky. Civil aviation technical services also have their own route and airfield radars. And, finally, the PVO Radiotechnical Troops conduct their own radar surveillance. They control 11,000-12,000 aircraft per day in just a 150-kilometer strip over CIS territory. But on the whole the picture is such that sometimes radars of various subordinations sit side by side and operate at full output, creating their own radar fields and "acquiring" only the information they need. That is how we came up with the proposal to unite related systems and to concentrate all of our men and equipment in the same hands to create a unified radar surveillance system.

The realization of our proposals will not require significant material expenditures which is very important today. We painstakingly calculated this and reported to the then still USSR Ministry of Defense and to the country's leadership and, as a result, a decision was made to create a unified automated air space surveillance and control system. It must become a qualitatively new base for the country's Unified Air Traffic Control Service (YeS UVD).

[Ivanov] That is, while beginning to develop a new concept, they have modernized everything on the territory of the former Union? And how is it right now? Say, some state or other also can refuse your services...

[Dubrov] There is no question that our system can be useful for all of the Commonwealth states. There many experts know about our work and, naturally, understand its significance and advantages. I think that the politicians must make their presence felt so that a breakup of the radar system and air traffic control system does not occur in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian systems... It is the reverse task—to integrate them. All states will then take advantage of unified information on a mutually beneficial basis.

[Ivanov] But nevertheless, by way of illustration, what will this system provide to Ukraine? What sense is there for it to join a unified structure if it can create its own, more compact system?

[Dubrov] A small system carries out limited tasks. It is one matter when the state conducts surveillance or controls its own air forces at a range of 300-400 kilometers (this is the detection range of radars) from its own territory. And it is an altogether different matter when the coverage line increases to thousands of kilometers in the entire system because here radar sites and surveillance systems have begun to operate in all of the regions of the Commonwealth.

The required information will be circulated in the unified ASU [Automatic Control System] and transmitted to all consumers. Each CIS country will be able to obtain

information on the air situation both in the interests of air defense and also for controlling the flights of its own aircraft.

If someone does not want to cooperate, there will not be any particular complications with the realization of our research effort. We will only lose one line which others will cover. And a state that does not join the unified system will not be able to obtain adequate information and will thereby only make things worse for itself.

[Ivanov] And who in practice must implement this idea?

[Dubrov] PVO Troops is the general customer—and Proton NPO [Scientific-Production Association] is the general developer. A total of 22 scientific organizations have become involved with this work. The project has been approved and it has been given the "go ahead." Development is being conducted of the air space surveillance and control systems and of also interdepartmental automated applications systems. Right now the working group which I head is involved precisely with coordination work on developing a fragment of the new system. The group consists of scientists and representatives of all of the branches of the Allied Armed Forces and interested civilian organizations. We have already conducted reconnaissance in the northwestern regions. We plan to complete testing of the fragment of the unified automated radar system in 1995.

[Ivanov] But are the time periods not stretched out too much? We have well trained and equipped troops, we have a scientific research effort and, as I understand it, money has been allocated—in a word, everything for a rapid and effective return.

[Dubrov] But the assigned task is also difficult. We need to organize a new automated control system of various departments and levels, elaborate normative-legal documents and organize a significant number of men and equipment into a single whole. And what is more, all of this has to immediately begin operating perfectly. This is quite complicated. Time periods have been scheduled in days and months. And believe me, they are compressed to the maximum extent possible.

[Ivanov] Each new matter, all the more so on a large scale, costs the state a pretty kopek. What is the cost of your idea?

[Dubrov] The system created will fill the treasury with many millions of rubles. We can also yield a profit in hard currency. Judge for yourself. Foreign airline companies are manifesting active interest in organizing international air transit operations using the Commonwealth countries' air space. According to their assessments, the annual profit due to the reduction of route lengths and the increase of safety of flights between the primary centers of Europe, North America, and the Pacific Ocean Zone while using our air space can total \$3 billion. However, serious modernization of the air traffic control system (UVD), primarily in the Trans-Siberian and Far Eastern directions, is required for realization of this commercial potential. One

of the main goals of the planned work to implement the projects of foreign firms for modernization of the air traffic control system is to create transcontinental air routes over the territory of the Commonwealth countries in the shortest possible time periods with minimal expenditures and with high commercial effectiveness.

The availability of a powerful PVO Troops information system, especially in sparsely populated and inaccessible regions of the country, is a vital factor that ensures attainment of the air traffic control structure modernization goals. Thus, while ensuring flight safety on the routes, the troops can jointly carry out military and, let us put it this way, commercial tasks. In short, we will attempt to some degree to cover our own costs and to earn a profit.

[Ivanov] In what Armed Forces service structure will the troops, who carry out the new tasks, exist? Will this not require their withdrawal from the PVO Troops?

[Dubrov] I think that there is no great difference if troops in one state, while carrying out tasks in the interests of defense and air traffic control, are in one service or other of the Armed Forces. The main thing is that they must be an independent specific branch.

Right now it is especially important to maintain the radar system which can be converted to the greatest degree and to carry out the tasks in the interests of defense and air traffic control. During the course of military reform, they are proposing personnel strength reductions and reduction of the number of PVO electronic systems and facilities that are equipped with modern electronic equipment and that have a developed infrastructure—communications, roads, housing, and economic-every day life facilities, including in inaccessible and sparsely populated areas of Siberia, the Far North, and the Far East. These facilities can present significant interest for the national economy and primarily for the development of air traffic control, navigation, and communications. Utilization of the PVO Radiotechnical Troops infrastructure will permit the reduction of material expenditures for improvement of the air traffic control system by R4-4.5 billion.

[Ivanov] So maybe, while considering these very promising prospects, the anticipated reduction of the radiotechnical troops by 30 percent is not so horrible?

[Dubrov] The proposed system will be created not today or tomorrow but the reduction has already begun right now. And that is the danger. We are hastily reducing troops and we will reduce them there where in 2-3 years we will be compelled to create the required radar sites for information support of the new international routes and in the interests of the country's defense. This will require substantial additional expenditures. I think that we need to approach the reduction of radiotechnical troops very carefully, thoughtfully, and while considering the entire complexity of the moment and the prospects for development.

Lt-Gen Tarasenko Comment on Problems of 16th Air Army

92UM0832A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Mar 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col V. Markushin and Col S. Pashayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents, and comments by Lt Gen Avn A. Tarasenko, commander of the Air Force of the Western Group of Forces: "In the Holding Zone: Comments on Problems of the 16th Air Army"]

[Text] "Just why should the combat pilots have it better today? With what kind of income should they thrive at a time when musicians, cosmonauts, doctors and miners, for example, are barely making ends meet? How can there be a "further improvement" against the background of universal decline?" asked those with whom we spoke.

We must admit, we did not expect the discussion with staff specialists of the Air Force of the Western Group of Forces to begin with this kind of rhetorical question. But from now on no matter what the cost. And everyone is convinced to the bottom of his heart that, considering the circumstances, people can suffer only in other, "secondary" branches, that their area of responsibility is under attack "only because of the obvious inconsistency of the higher command."

We came to talk about the combat training of the airmen. That is, about that without which a real pilot ceases to be one within a matter of weeks. Like the higher level in sports, one can maintain his athletic fitness, but skill demands daily, intense work, giving it one's utmost. The calm, rational tone of the officers in the combat training section immediately tuned us in to the wave of objective, not overly emotional analysis of the situation. In general terms it is as the following. The combat training of the airmen has been curtailed for well-known economic reasons, primarily the rigid fuel limitations, as well as the contractual commitments to the Germans regarding the temporary stay of troops in Germany and their planned withdrawal from there. The reality is such that to give all the airmen an opportunity to fly would essentially be to offer it to no one. This is because allowing everyone to fly, but only once or twice a month, would mean taking everyone to the brink of losing his professional skills. What does "an average" of 4 hours and 17 minutes in the air in a two-month period mean to a combat pilot? And this laughable figure was cited to us at 16th Army headquarters. One does not feel like laughing, however, when one compares this to the flight time of American airmen—an average of 30 hours a month.

The contractual "stipulations" would appear to be less damaging for the 16th Air Army. Only in part, however. Last year, for example, the airmen were forbidden to fly at night for four months. This year it is six months, from 15 April to 15 October. In addition, daytime flights end before 18:00, that is, before daylight ends. Or take low-altitude and ground-hugging flights. The Americans

are continuing theirs, including those by entire flights of aircraft at an altitude of 70 meters. This is a closed zone for our airmen. Their bottom flight altitude is 600 meters.

How is the command element of the Air Force of the Western Group of Forces coping with the situation? It has been forced to make difficult, rigid decisions.

In the first place, the number of flights has been reduced for many pilots, many of whom are not flying at all right now, and the number has increased for others at the expense of the former. The consideration was that the promising youth and those Aces who still have a long time to go in the service must be saved no matter what.

In the second place, they began shortening the flights wherever possible, eliminating second passes, combining flight exercises to the greatest possible degree, and curtailing flying with afterburners and flights in difficult weather in order to minimize fuel consumption. That is, the flights are planned not "according to missions" but according to "fuel."

In the third place, the emphasis has been placed upon simulators. The effect from these, however, as we know, is only one fifth that of an actual flight. Relentless use of simulators is presently underway, while our domestic industry is curtailing their production and the output of spare parts for them.

In the fourth place, under an agreement with Moscow, a continuous conveyor of training has been set up for airmen of the Western Group of Forces at our own ranges. One-week temporary duty assignments have accounted for 37% of the entire flight time and 50% of the night flights.

And so, everywhere we have reductions and restrictions. One does not fly far, so to speak, with these. The airmen have not lost hope, however, that they will be able to ensure the combat readiness of formations of the group's air force even in this "emergency" mode.

A regiment of MiG-27 fighter-bombers is stationed at Finsterwalde.

Col I. Novikov, pilot 1st class and assistant regimental commander for personnel:

"It is planned to withdraw the regiment in 1993," he told us. "Garrison life and the combat training are normal for now. One has to stretch it to speak of 'normalcy' of the latter, however. The math is simple and eloquent. The regiment receives 100 tons of kerosene a month, the amount previously allocated for a single flight shift. The average combat training sortie takes around three tons of kerosene, however. Figure it out. You come up with 33 flights for flight personnel of 60 members.

Novikov told us about his latest flight: "I flew to the range, dropped two bombs, fired the guns and two unguided missiles, and practiced low-altitude piloting

techniques in the zone. Four exercises in all, not considering the take-off and landing, of course. It took 35 minutes. God alone knows what it will be like the next time I fly out."

"Is this situation affecting discipline and morale in the regiment?" we inquired.

"Of course. Discipline is generally fairly high, however," the colonel answered confidently. "The incentive system functions flawlessly here, I would say. The personnel are paid with real money, and they value this. The lack of housing in the homeland is depressing, though. Eight out of every ten of our officers do not have a roof over their head there. The officer frequently has to choose between housing and continuing his flight work in the service."

No matter with whom we spoke that day, or where, the discussion always turned to the same thing: kerosene, flights and housing. Col S. Borisyuk, a regimental commander, began with this:

"It pains the soul to think about the fate of the pilots. In every civilized nation the flight personnel are regarded as a real treasure. I would be so bold as to say this on the matter: Loss of skills by flight personnel is a great loss for the state, because it is easier to train a pilot but very difficult to restore lost skills. A real pilot will not actually forget how to fly, of course. It is a matter of how he flies. And then a flight career is a short one. To sum it up, a minimum of three flights a month is the lower threshold which absolutely must not be crossed."

The commander is right, of course. He is also right when he says that the regiment's problems, like those of the entire 16th Air Army, are not localized ones. Pilots arriving from other regions as replacements have had to function under essentially the same conditions. Our entire Air Force is in a holding zone. Will it survive?

Commentary by Lt Gen Avn A. Taraseno, commander of the Air Force of the Western Group of Forces:

The situation is indeed very alarming, if just for the fact that neither we nor the higher military command are in a position to alter it drastically. Political decisions are needed. And in this respect I totally share the point of view put forth the other day by Andrey Kovoshin in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA; "Russia can be protected against external aggression in the new situation only with reformed and highly co-operative branches of the armed forces, compact, mobile and composed of professionals. And the air force is one of the components, of course. Today we cannot be like the miser who is penny-wise and pound-foolish."

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Morozov Appeal to Black Sea Fleet Following Minsk Meeting

92UM0851C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 1

[Appeal by Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov: "Appeal of the Ukraine Minister of Defense to the Men of the Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text]

Respected Comrades!

On 20 March of this year, a Ukrainian delegation submitted to the heads of states a draft plan for turning over a part of the Black Sea Fleet to the Commonwealth Strategic Forces.

The basis for the submission was the agreement reached by the heads of states on 14 February 1992 in Minsk.

The draft offered by the Ukraine was not found acceptable to headquarters representatives of the Commonwealth OVS [Unified Armed Forces], and, as such, was not placed onto the agenda.

The above is an indication of a narrow approach to the Black Sea Fleet problem. The interests of the headquarters do not go beyond the ships, equipment, armament, and other materiel. It demonstrates no interest in resolving problems related to personnel and civilians residing in the area. The Ukraine can and will resolve these problems.

Citizens of the Ukraine performing service in the fleet have a right to allegiance to their people; their will is not to be cast aside in this. They are not to suffer discrimination from any quarter; only our state can protect them.

As of 3 January of this year, the Ukraine is to provide all monies for the pay of all fleet personnel, with funds from the budget. The Ukraine considers the social problems related to Black Sea Fleet personnel as those attendant upon its responsibility.

Areas where fleet units and large units were stationed are beset by serious problems of a social, economic, and ecological nature accumulating over a period of many years, with the result that people residing in those areas are now suffering.

The Ministry of Defense of the former Union chose not to undertake the resolution of above problems, while the Commonwealth OVS authorities find themselves unable to do so. The Ukraine can and will resolve these problems.

The Ukraine is not laying claim to the entire Black Sea Fleet. This state is observing the principle of respect for the rights enjoyed by other states in whose territory the fleet units and large units are based.

In the matter of the armed forces in which the fleet officers, warrant officers, and seamen wish to serve, we consider that prime importance attaches to their choice in serving a definite state and the free exercise of their right to taking an oath of allegiance to the people of that particular state.

In accordance with the 24 August 1991 decree passed by the Ukraine Supreme Council, all military units stationed in the Ukraine come under the jurisdiction of the Ukraine.

The administrative subordination of the fleet to the Ukraine Ministry of Defense will make it possible to effect legal implementation of the Ukraine Law on Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Dependents for the benefit of personnel of the Black Sea Fleet. This will make it possible to resolve in deed not word the problems plaguing cities where the latter live and perform their service; and provide assistance to the citizens of those cities where such help is long overdue.

Ukrainian Delegates in Sevastopol Following Kravchuk Decree on Fleet

92UM0869A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 92 p 1

[Report by Capt 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "From Sevastopol": "Another Attempt to Split up the Black Sea Fleet, This Time by Means of Talks at the Local Level"]

[Text] A Ukrainian delegation headed by Vasilii Durdinets, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, arrived at the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. The delegation included Col Gen Valeriy Gubenko, commander of Ukraine's Border Troops, Lieutenant Generals Ivan Bizhan and Georgiy Zhivitsa, deputy defense ministers, Lt Gen Mikhail Lopatin, commander of the 8th Air Defense Army, Yevgeniy Marchuk, chief of Ukraine's security service, and deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. Its objective was to inform the command element and all fleet personnel of an appeal from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and the Decree On Emergency Measures for the Organizational Development of the Ukrainian Navy, issued by the president of Ukraine. The latter document states, among other things, that all of the fleet's military formations stationed on its territory (with the exception of strategic nuclear forces, which remain under unified control) are subordinate to Ukraine and that the structures of a Ukrainian Navy are to be formed.

At the first working meeting of the visitors with the fleet military council, held in the Sevastopol City Soviet, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, Black Sea Fleet commander spoke for the military council in announcing that the fleet's fate should be decided only in accordance with the agreements reached in Minsk. The fleet's military council is not empowered to engage in any sort of negotiations on the fleet's division or the transfer of part of it to Ukraine. Interference in the fleet's daily life and

a decision to establish parallel structures could undermine the stability of its command and control and result in instability in the region.

The fleet military council appealed to the Commonwealth heads of state to determine the fate of the Black Sea Fleet by political, civilized methods. Any unilateral action, the statement says, will result in exacerbation of relations within the military collectives and undermine the foundation of the military service.

Adm I. Kasatonov said that the fleet military council's position is to preserve the unity of the fleet, which cannot be subjected to a mechanical division.

Paying for 'Varyag' by Public Subscription

92UM0825A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 92 First Edition p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Maryukha, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Is the 'Varyag' to Set to Sea?"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA with the support of its readers has proposed the initiative to complete construction on the aircraft cruiser Varyag on the basis of voluntary subscriptions. The Navy plans to open a bank account.

This idea has long hovered over the insolubility of a whole series of problems relating to the home Navy. This is not a new idea as after the Russo-Japanese War which consumed a larger portion of the Russian Navy, voluntary contributions were used to build a number of the new combat ships, including the finest destroyer for those times, the Novik. At present possibly the heavy aircraft cruiser [TAKR] Varyag will become such a "people's" ship. With each passing day the stack of letters on my desk is growing. And each of them contains not an appeal but rather a demand to open up a bank account for collecting the voluntary contributions for completing the ship the name of which embodies the valor and honor of the entire 300 years of the home Navy.

The governments of the Commonwealth states, writes, for example, V. Kraynikov from the city of Ivanovo, are requesting help from the entire world. For such a ship as the Varyag it is not a shameful thing to request help from our own people. He is echoed by A. Andreychenko from Fastov: "Just what concessions must we make in our national interests? The 4 percent of the gross national product promised for defense will destroy the Army and Navy without a fight. If I were a millionaire, I would give a million, I assure you, for completing the Varyag. But as I am an ordinary man, I am sending in my last pennies. I am also convinced that there are many others like myself."

In actuality there are many such patriots of the Navy who take heart from the naval prestige of the state (even though it is now termed the Commonwealth of States).

And they offer from ten rubles from their meager pension up to 2,000 rubles simultaneously with the subsequent monthly transfer of 100 rubles to the Varyag account, as did the custodian of the history of all the generations of this name in the Fleet, V. Katayev. In September of last year, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article by Viktor Ivanovich [Kitayev] in which he traced the fate of the Varyag ships from 1847 until the present times. But at that time no one even imagined that the storm clouds would be gathering around the last Varyag.

"With the commissioning of the TAKR Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuzu Kuznetsov, we have just finally developed the system for coordinating all the participants in this project. In addition to the Black Sea Shipbuilding Yard, these number some 36 ministries and over 300 enterprises," I was told by the Deputy Chief Designer of the Varyag P. Sokolov. "Now virtually all deliveries have been made for this ship which is approaching 70 percent completion, but the work is being stopped and the ties established with difficulty are being broken..."

"By halting the production of preassembled parts for the aircraft carriers for even a year, it is absolutely impossible to recover the once achieved goals," added A. Chernyshov who is in charge of the construction of the Varyag at the Minsudprom [Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry]. "Even during Khrushchev's time, for example, work was curtailed on the naval gunnery systems and it is only now that their production has become more or less organized."

Of all the problems which inevitably arise with such vast construction, the shipbuilders have named the financial one as the main one. To complete the work on the Varyag, the yard has asked for 5-6 billion rubles in 1992 prices. The amount is clearly overstated, the designers feel, but considering inflation and the increase in costs, this can be taken as a guideline. The money is needed not in the form of a one-shot infusion, but rather apportioned over five years or so. The initial date for completing the work in 1994 is very problematic because of the current stoppages. But this amount is the lesser of two evils.

Currently the shipbuilders intend to begin mothballing the Varyag. There already is a potential buyer for the hull of the Ulyanovsk, the next aircraft carrier in the series, and plans are already being hatched to ready it for sale. But both mothballing and the presale preparations require amounts which at best are commensurate with the expenditures on completing the Varyag and the domestic shipbuilders do not even have any experience in the mothballing of such large objects. With the start of the scraping of newly built ships, the yard will let go at least 10,000 specialists and to replace them with personnel of equal skill will require decades. The designers specialized in aircraft carriers will disperse in much the same manner as the "brain drain" in the nuclear industry. And this chain reaction of collapse will reach

every specific taxpayer. All because the initial approach to resolving the fate of the incomplete ships is wrong.

It has always been less advantageous to sell raw materials (among which one could put at a stretch incomplete projects, including even ones like aircraft carriers) than to deliver a finished product to the market. Our fatherland for many years stubbornly created for itself the image of a raw material fief for the developed countries of the world and now, seemingly, it does not wish to turn from the chosen path. Yes, it is possible to sell the Varyag, as humiliating as this may be for patriotic feelings. But with a complete "turnkey" ship it would be possible to receive as much (and this is backed up with real figures) as to suffice for completing the construction of the Ulyanovsk and launching another Varyag with something left over to provide for the amenities of the crews. With the current state of affairs, the selling price would scarcely cover the expenditures on the already completed work and the presale preparations. The consequences of the sale for the Navy in terms of its destructiveness would be the equivalent of the defeat at Tsushima, that is, the curtailment of the shipbuilding facilities and the natural aging of the ship "fleet" will leave the Navy without combat units. The odd turn of the wheel of history would again place, as was the case in the war at the beginning of the century, a ship with a famous name at the center of events.

Whether the Varyag will be or not be—this is the question of the future of the entire Navy, as well as the prestige of the CIS, mine and your, respected reader, national pride for our fatherland the interests of which cannot be limited to the inland seas but rather require proper defense.

In addition, the completion of the Varyag will lead to the solution of an equally important problem as the building of aircraft carriers. Up to now our deck-based aviation has been given the role of an outcast and of the three aircraft designed for the new TAKR, only one, the Su-27k, is actually at a stage where it can be used from a floating airfield. Whether the Varyag receives its air wings will determine an entire branch of domestic aircraft building, where there are as many problems as there are for the ships.

Over the 300 years of its existence, the domestic fleet has been lost more than once, in combat or out of mismanagement, but each time it has been reborn and has become stronger, affirming the authority of the great seapower but which we have now ceased to be with the collapse of the Union. The taxpayers did not always know where and how their hard-earned money was to be spent. The construction of the Varyag "at the people's expense" will make up for this gap. Then the sons and grandsons of the persons who contributed to the completion of the TAKR will be able to state boldly that parts paid for out of their family budget are operating in the complex ship equipment. Certainly the attitude to such a ship would be different if actually every citizen of the fatherland and all our people would be its master.

Shortage of Funds for Repairs at Foreign Facilities

92UM0863A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Apr 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Capt 2d Rank V. Pasyakin: "When Ships Are Held Hostage"]

[Text] In Yugoslavia, after three years of ship repairs, the tender of the Black Sea Fleet Volga was actually ownerless. The amount owed by the Main Engineering Administration of the collapsed Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties of the former Union for the repairs on the ship was \$17 million. And until this amount is paid, one can only guess about the future of the Volga: either it is to be sold, it will be cut up for scrap or it will be bought.

Incidentally, not only the tender is in such an unenviable role of hostage. In Bulgaria there are seven ships and vessels from the Black Sea Fleet at two ship repair yards of Odessos and Flotskiy Arsenal and work on these has been halted due to the stopping of financing. A visit to Varna has been made by the First Deputy Navy Chief of Staff, Rear Adm Anatoliy Maichenko and the Chief of the Navy Technical Directorate, Rear Adm Aleksandr Aladkin, in order to find the best way for emerging from the situation created.

The question might be asked by someone as why are our ships and vessels being repaired overseas? Would it not be better to do this at home? But the problem is that there simply is not enough of our own repair capacity for the fleet. This is the first thing. Secondly, there is specialization in ship repairs and it is better to overhaul the ship at the manufacturing plant.

"For this reason, Soviet ships and vessels have been repaired in Yugoslavia, Poland, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey," said Rear Adm Aladkin to me. "Even in the best of times, the ship repair facilities at the Black Sea Fleet were only 85 percent of the required."

In Bulgaria, in accord with the Intergovernmental Agreement, since 1971, three ship repair yards (the two at Varna and the Burgas Dragin Nadev) have carried out routine, medium and drydock repairs on the Navy's ships and vessels. During this period some 343 [first digit illegible] units have been overhauled, including: submarines, patrol boats and landing craft, rescue and refrigerator vessels and seagoing tugs. This ship repair system which was oriented to our ships and vessels has now become "plugged up."

Regardless of the fact that the Soviet Union in its time did not carry out its duties to promptly pay for the ship repair work and services, in 1991, the Bulgarian side overhauled 18 vessels totaling \$6,100,000. The debt owed on the rescue vessel Zangezur, for example, is \$63,328, for the tug Orion a balance of \$560,294 remains to be paid. This, however, is only chicken feed in comparison with how much the ships and vessels currently sitting by the yard piers will cost. Thus, the

contract value of the repairs on the submarine with the hull number 574 is 2,600,000 transferable rubles. Actually (now when the work commenced in 1988 is being completed, this is obvious), the cost is 4,650,000 rubles. As of now, we have paid 3,560,000 transferable rubles and \$137,565.

An interesting and, to be frank, mutually advantageous approach has been proposed by the director of the Odessos Yard, Pavel Nedyalko and that it to have the crew earn foreign exchange. Nedyalko is ready to sign a contract according to which the yard will complete the repairs at its own expense, and after this the Kuban and Zolotoy Rog, for example, will be chartered out to earn the necessary money to retire the debt.

The crews of our vessels are ready to conclude such a deal. But who will take (and can they take?) the decision to temporarily charter our vessels?

Seeing us as unreliable partners, the Bulgarian side has been forced to seek out other clients and has already begun to establish contacts with Greece, Yugoslavia and The Netherlands. It may soon happen that in Bulgaria we shall simply lose our ship repair facilities and this will be felt immediately upon the combat readiness of the fleet. We are losing a reliable, old and, what is very important, an advantageous partner (repairs in Bulgaria cost less than in many other countries).

One of the possible approaches which the Directorate of Military Economics under the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense has agreed to look into is to buy from us at its residual value one of the submarines under repair. Another approach has also been proposed. The Black Sea Fleet which has enough search and rescue facilities would raise a sunk Bulgarian vessel from the bottom, and tow it, for instance, to the Kerch Yard for repairs. The cost of the ship-raising and repair work would go to retire our debt.

Proposals have also been made by the commander of the division of our ships and vessels being overhauled in Bulgaria, Capt 1st Rank Vasilii Letu. This, in particular, would involve a reduction in the already small permanent personnel of the division (seven officers).

"We are ready to get by with the minimum," said Vasilii Stepanovich [Letu]. "Thus, expenditures will be reduced on the renting of apartments and officer pay. There would be a significant reduction in the amount for leasing the barracks for the personnel and for the upkeep of storage vessels. This would be almost \$340,000 a year."

Incidentally, it would be possible to also cut back on a part of the crews on the ships and vessels located in Bulgaria. All the more as at present no repairs are being carried out. But the reverse has happened. When the decision was taken to pay the salaries in dollars, "surplus" sailors began migrating here. For example, at the beginning of the repairs there were 70 men on the "Kuban" and now there are 78.

The hostage ships also create a number of problem in providing for the normal activities of the sailors. Particularly acute is the question of the pay for the sailors caused by the freezing of accounts at the former USSR Vneshekonombank [Foreign Economic Bank].

"We have already had a strike on the seagoing tug SB-5 over the nonpayment of salaries," said Mikhail Bykov. "The new interruption in pay will lead to new excesses, even to the sailors going AWOL in Sevastopol. Such tactics could also be picked up by the civilian crews of the auxiliary vessels. What should the military do?"

Understandably the harsh and unnecessary restrictions imposed on the local level do not require intervention from above. But there are questions which cannot be settled even by the Navy Command. Theirs is of a governmental level. For example, there is the paying off of the debts and the eliminating of the very notion of a "hostage ship." There are also other ensuing problems which require governmental intervention. Ship repairs, in the opinion of the Chief of the Navy Technical Directorate, Rear Adm Alakdin, are inseparably tied to the problems of conversion which is now on its last legs.

"The reallocation of orders for consumer goods is forcing the ship repair yards which previously carried out 100 percent Navy orders, for example, the ship repair yard, the collective of which is headed by Capt 1st Rank A. Velichko, to take up the repair of civilian ships at the very time that we are being forced to send our military ships and vessels overseas for repairs," explained A. Aladkin. "But here we should not overlook one such 'detail' and that is that the same volume of repairs costs about 10 percent more at our yards than at the Flotskiy Arsenal in Varna. The problem is that for every 100 million of funds allocated in the budget, approximately 45 million go back in the form of taxes. That is, with one hand the state gives money and with the other takes it back. Hence, the figures which now illustrate the already low military expenditures are actually inflated. For example, in the United States, amounts allocated for repairs are not subject to taxes and the figures are actually realistic."

In Bulgaria, repairs also cost less because of the lower taxation and also due to the lower plant overhead. Incidentally, this is a subject of separate discussion, like the rash conversion of our ship repair facilities. For now we must realize that our total debt to Bulgaria is over \$7 million and considering the other submarine which arrived for overhaul, the paying of salaries to the crews and food expenditures, the costs will be about \$12 million. If no decision is taken on the further fate of the hostage ships (and incidentally not only in Bulgaria), the fleet can be deprived of a part of its ships and the Commonwealth of a part of its fleet.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Rodionov Discusses Problems of Military Education

92UM0804B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Mar 92 First edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Col-Gen Yu. Rodionov, deputy commander in chief for personnel of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Training of Military Personnel: Problems of 'Humanitization'"]

[Text] Colonel-General Yu. Rodionov, deputy commander in chief for personnel of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], continues his conversation with a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA [KZ] correspondent on problems of military education.

[KZ] Comrade colonel-general, one of the continual problems facing military educational institutions is what to teach students and officer cadets. How is this problem being resolved today in our swiftly changing and contradictory world?

[Rodionov] You are right, the problem of the content of instruction is indeed a continual one. It has never lost its relevance, particularly for military educational institutions, which are intended to work for the future and to react in anticipation of all changes in military affairs.

Now military academies and schools are completing the first training year under the new training plans and programs. They have been formed based on the new generation of qualification descriptions developed for all specialties. Beginning this year, we considerably updated not only the list and content of disciplines but also the organization and methods of instruction.

However, life does not stand still. Changes in the military-political situation in the world and on the territory of the CIS, reorganization of the structure of and personnel cuts in the armed forces, development of armament and military equipment—all these things require new changes in the content of operational-tactical and military-technical training already today. This is a natural and continuous process. The chiefs of the military educational institutions have been granted sufficiently broad rights to make such effective adjustments.

But there is one section of training whose content is causing serious concern today. That is the humanities and, in the broader context, making military education as a whole more humane.

[KZ] Yuriy Nikolayevich, lately much is being said and written about 'humanitization' of education. What do you have in mind when you talk about 'humanitization' with reference to our military educational institutions?

[Rodionov] One must bear in mind two parallel and interrelated processes: first, enhancing the role and effectiveness of strictly humanities disciplines and, second, increasing the humanities orientation of all the rest of the educational disciplines. Unfortunately, the very concept of humanities training was until recently intolerably restricted by the framework of social sciences extremely limited by ideology. Analysis shows that even now social disciplines are taught apart from other disciplines of the humanities cycle, including military history.

What do we see as the main purpose of humanities? First of all, it is to form the officer's personality, his overall and military-professional culture. They should give an officer a certain amount of knowledge about man and society, form his world outlook, and help him orient himself in the system of social, political, and legal relations in society. Their task is to instill in students and officer cadets an awareness of civic responsibility, a sense of duty and military honor. And, of course, introduce them to the achievements of universal culture and provide a knowledge of a foreign language.

We must also resolve the question of the composition of humanities disciplines based on this. Thus, in military schools, in addition to studying the fundamentals of philosophy, sociology, politology, and jurisprudence, as well as the fundamentals of economics, we should provide for familiarization with the history and theory of world and domestic culture and the study of foreign languages. For officer cadets, as future officers, it is particularly important to study military history and the history of the fatherland.

Those hours which are now devoted to humanities disciplines are basically sufficient. The task is to use this time reasonably and effectively.

[KZ] A question arises: Are we not overestimating the importance of humanities training? After all, we are training primarily commanders and engineers, and the main thing for them is tactics and equipment.

[Rodionov] On the contrary! We underestimate and, up to now, continue to underestimate the importance of the humanities component of military education. We have lost the traditions of the old Russian Army, when instilling the honor and dignity of an officer, his overall culture, and moral qualities were considered almost the primary task of military educational institutions. In the present conditions of socioeconomic and political instability, when many contradictions in society have become sharply more acute, it is especially important to help officer cadets and students preserve moral reference points and to teach them to analyze the social processes and draw the correct conclusions. This is the primary purpose of social disciplines, which comprise the basis of humanities training. However, it is in their instruction that the most complex, to say the least, critical situation has developed. With the elimination of the department of social sciences of the former Main Political Directorate, we lost the scientific and methods guidance in the

work of the social science departments. The number of humanities disciplines being taught at military educational institutions is increasing. In addition to searching for new content and organizing fundamentally new disciplines, including cultural and logical directions, they often simply "give a new face" to old social science courses under new names. The confusion and helplessness of some social science departments increase the negative attitude of officer cadets and students towards studying social disciplines. There is a desire on the part of supervisors of some schools to reduce the number of hours for studying them.

There are quite a few problems in the teaching of other humanities disciplines. It ends up that there remains practically no call for foreign language in upper classes. As a result, the knowledge received without language practice is lost by the time they graduate.

It is especially bad for military history training in the schools, which always played a paramount role in military-patriotic education of officer cadets and in forming their military-professional world outlook. Military history insufficiently linked to the history of the fatherland and its heroic past and with the development of military thought is being taught today as a simple set of events and facts that are supposed to illustrate the basic tenets of tactics. Now these shortcomings are being corrected. The military educational institutions welcomed with approval and understanding the decision of the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces on intensifying military history training of students and officer cadets.

[KZ] What do you see as the cause of the serious shortcomings that have taken shape in the humanities education of officers?

[Rodionov] There are at least two causes. The first is associated with the position that social science departments and social sciences in the system of military education held for many years. Their special status manifested itself in the isolated nature of scientific and methods guidance of social sciences, in the control of these departments by political bodies alone, and in many other things. This isolation inevitably led to stagnation and dogmatism in instruction, which they became accustomed to and put up with in many social science departments.

Social disciplines, along with operational-tactical, military-technical, and general military disciplines are an integral part of military education. However, supervision of them for many years was artificially split between the Main Political Directorate and the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions. At one time, the special position of the department of social sciences and the special status of social sciences disciplines were justified by the monopoly role of the CPSU Central Committee in forming world outlook and in ideological education of military personnel. But today, after the

decision on removing the political and party aspect from the armed forces, there is no reason to retain this isolation.

The second cause is that humanitization of education requires a radical revision of the content and orientation of the social disciplines. It is necessary to develop and introduce new courses that are oriented to a greater degree on developing the general and military-professional culture of the trainees and on more fully uncovering their individual potential. The task is extremely complex and requires new approaches to teaching and new teaching specialties. However, the composition of instructors in the social sciences departments has remained virtually the same. And there is not a single body sufficiently competent to assume scientific and methods guidance of solving all the problems associated with humanitization of military education.

[KZ] Yuriy Nikolayevich, what is the way out of this predicament?

[Rodionov] There is one way out: to create without delay a department of humanities disciplines under the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions. Charge it with scientific and methods guidance of teaching all humanities disciplines, including social, legal, military-historical, cultural and logical, and foreign languages, as well as organizational and methods guidance in training scientific and teaching personnel, and in training and improving the qualifications of teachers of humanities disciplines.

[KZ] But there is the opinion that it is advisable to have this department under the Committee for Working with Personnel of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

[Rodionov] We have thoroughly analyzed all the pluses and minuses of both variants and consider the proposal to create the department as part of the committee to be totally unacceptable. I am firmly convinced that the department will be able to work effectively only as part of the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions or that body which will be created based on it during the reorganization of the central apparatus of the Joint Armed Forces.

First of all, virtually all the tasks which it is proposed to entrust to the department of humanities disciplines are being carried out today by the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions together with the Main Personnel Directorate with regard to all other sections of training: operational-tactical, military-technical, general scientific, and general military. To create under the committee parallel structures for the sake of one of the types of training, isolated from the system of military education as a whole, is at least inadvisable. If we do this, we have to create departments of operational-tactical and general military disciplines in the General Staff and a department of military-technical disciplines in the staff of the deputy commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, and so forth. That is, we would have to switch to this principle everywhere.

Second, to preserve the unnatural gap we have today in supervision of military education, which existed before 1991, means to return to the previous isolation of social disciplines and to strengthen their special status among other sections of training. It is difficult to explain the aspiration to preserve this isolation in the new conditions as anything more than a desire to revive the obsolete, habitual management structures.

Third, this proposal is contrary to the path which the higher school of the Russian Federation has taken. With the elimination of the USSR State Committee for Education, the Main Administration of Social Sciences is abolished. Scientific and methods guidance of all branches of higher education—natural sciences, technical, and humanities—is concentrated in the hands of the Educational Methods Administration of the Ministry of Science, Higher Education, and Technical Policy. Within it a department of humanities education has been set up which covers the entire complex of humanities disciplines. Thus not only has the special status of social sciences been eliminated, but so has the isolation in guidance of their instruction.

[KZ] Does the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions have the specialists necessary to accomplish these new and very difficult tasks?

[Rodionov] No, it does not have all the necessary specialists. But the Committee for Working with Personnel does not have such a department in ready form either. I repeat: this should not be a department of social and humanities disciplines, as is proposed by the committee; it should not be a rebirth of the department of social sciences. The sphere of its activities must be considerably broader and encompass the entire complex of humanities cycle. The department must be staffed with specialists having scientific and teaching qualifications and experience in teaching all of the new humanities disciplines. In addition to philosophers, sociologists, and politologist, there should also be represented military historians, linguists, and specialists in the field of theory and history of art.

From the prominent scientists and educators in the military educational institutions who are working in these fields, we need to create under the department non-staff scientific and methods commissions for the basic groups of humanities disciplines. The many years of experience of the work of such commission on operational art and tactics, mathematics, foreign languages, and a number of others operating under the Main Administration of Military Educational Institutions have proved their worth. At first, given the shortage of our own specialists in the fields of culture and art, we could enlist the services of scientists and educators from civilian higher educational institutions of culture to work on the commissions as scientific advisers.

Among the priority tasks the department has to accomplish jointly with the scientific and methods commissions should be to develop a unified concept of humanitization of military education and organize retraining of

military educators of the former social sciences departments. Only with this approach will we be able to move from talking about humanization to actually doing something about it.

Shortage of Vehicles for Spring Agricultural Work
92UM0804A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Mar 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Capt 2d Rank V. Kostomarov: "From the Baltic Fleet: the 'Virgin Land' Battalion Will Not Make Roll-Call. There Is No Equipment"]

[Text] The Baltic Fleet is supposed to send exactly 1,000 drivers and 500 vehicles to help the rural area in order to fulfill the recent decree of the President of Russia on measures for organized conduct of spring work and harvesting in 1992.

The control figures were the same last year. However, today the situation has become considerably more complicated. The problem is that before, the manning of "virgin land" (that is what the military call them) companies and platoons took place in all the major fleet garrisons, including in Klaypeda, Liyepaya, and Tallinn. Now the sovereign Baltic states have announced the nationalization of property of the Armed Forces of the former USSR, including motor vehicles.

In the opinion of the deputy chief of the Armored Troops Service Department of the Baltic Fleet, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Bondarchuk, with great difficulty it is possible to assemble three of the required five companies from the territory of Kaliningrad Oblast. It is simply impossible to form "virgin land" subunits in the other garrisons located in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Chief Of Finance Directorate On Russian Social Protection Decree

92UM0834A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Mar 92 First Edition p 1

[CIS Armed Forces Central Finance Directorate Chief V. Vorobyov interviewed by P. Altunin: "Commentary at Readers' Request: By Presidential Decree"]

[Text] On February 9 of this year, the Russian Federation President signed the decree "On Measures to Enhance Social Protection for Servicemen and Persons Discharged From Military Service." On March 4, to implement the decree, the Russian Federation government adopted Resolution No. 155, which took effect on February 1, 1992. That document has been received very favorably in the army and navy, as evidenced by our readers' responses. At the same time, they ask that a number of provisions of the decree and resolution be explained and clarified.

Today this is done by Lieutenant-General V. Vorobyov, chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Central Finance Directorate.

[Altunin] Vasiliy Vasilyevich, one encounters the view, including in letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's editors, that life is hard for everyone of late, not just servicemen, and that their new pay increases will simply be beyond the wherewithal of our ailing economy.

[Vorobyov] We are by no means trying to orient ourselves toward the absolute indices for military pay that exist, for example, in the US, the FRG, Great Britain, and other developed countries. However, there is no doubt but what there are overall relationships in the assessment and public acknowledgement of military service that cannot be ignored if we want to have a modern and highly effective army. I'm referring first of all to the need to maintain pay levels for servicemen in a certain ratio to the labor remuneration of people working in the national economy, and especially with wage levels in the production sphere and in prestigious fields of work.

[Altunin] And what is the situation in this regard?

[Vorobyov] Let me give you a little history. After the war, when the army and navy were shifted to a peacetime footing, a government decision in 1946 reformed the pay system. It is instructive during that difficult period for our country, a platoon commander, for example, earned 130 percent more than a shop head in industry. Subsequently, unfortunately, pay levels for military service fell, and in recent years they have stayed consistently below wages in the national economy. Throughout the post-war period, pay scales for positions and military ranks were increased, for example, for a regiment commander with the rank of colonel by 60 rubles, and for a lieutenant-general commanding an army by 30 rubles. I think these figures speak for themselves.

Only in 1990-1991 was somewhat greater attention paid to the level of material compensation for servicemen. However, this was mostly due to the price increases that began. Even after the decisions taken by the Russian President on increasing pay as of February 1 of this year, it would not be quite correct to say that servicemen are among the highly paid categories of citizens. And this is not to mention how servicemen's pay compares to the earnings of workers at small and leased enterprises, cooperatives, and other commercial structures.

[Altunin] What specifically does the decree do to improve the system of monetary compensation for servicemen?

[Vorobyov] The Russian President's decree sets the salary for lower-ranking positions held by officers at 1,800 rubles. In accordance with this, the Russian government in early March confirmed salary rates for standard officer positions and outlined other measures aimed at improving the monetary compensation system. Average salary rates for officers, warrant offices, and extended-duty servicemen have been increased from 50 to 100 percent. The largest increases have gone to soldiers serving in line units, which is to say to soldiers at the level where combat training takes place and other

tasks associated with maintaining army and navy combat readiness are carried out. Pay for servicemen holding military ranks now approximates the salary rates for special ranks of corresponding categories of personnel in the command echelons of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, which previously had been somewhat higher.

The system of supplementary types of pay that serve as incentives for highly professional training and service in special conditions has undergone development. For example, additional pay for soldiers serving in tank and combat vehicle crews and for parachutists and divers has been increased. These types of service entail increased danger and risk and additional physical and psychological stress. The additional pay takes into account the specific nature of the work; where divers are concerned, for example, it is based on the amount of time spent under water and at what depth and the kind of equipment used.

Pay has been increased for skilled categories of medical personnel. The restriction of maximum amounts of compensation for time spent on combat alert duty and on cruises at sea has been lifted. In the past, additional pay for servicemen with rated skill classifications was set at a rigidly fixed and negligible amount. For example, second-class tank crew officers received 15 rubles, first-class tank crew officers were paid 30 rubles, and a "master" received 50 rubles. Now these amounts are calculated as a percentage of salary, thereby significantly increasing total pay and making it more flexible where setting pay scales is concerned.

For warrant officers and naval warrant officers, a percentage-based additional payment for number of years of service that is similar to that received by officers has been introduced. This also applies to extended-duty servicemen in varying degrees. In addition, salaries have been established for sergeant and senior sergeant ranks. These changes are designed to ensure a uniform approach to evaluating the quantity and quality of service by various categories of military personnel and to establish a standardized payment system.

[Altunin] Could you clarify to what extent the decisions taken by the Russian leadership will affect compulsory-service personnel?

[Vorobyov] The President's decree is very clear on this point. The amount of the one-time cash payment to soldiers, sergeants, and senior sergeants on discharge from active compulsory service is increased from 100 to 500 rubles, and to 2,000 rubles for servicemen who are orphans.

[Altunin] What tax benefits does the Russian President's decree provide to servicemen?

[Vorobyov] The decree reinforces the previous all-union practice of exempting servicemen from paying income tax on their pay, monetary compensation and other additional payments for military service. This measure should dispel the doubts that some servicemen began having during discussion of the draft Russian Federation law "On the Income Tax Levied on Physical Persons" regarding the continuity of that tax benefit in the wake of the USSR's collapse and the suspension of union legislation.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Dniester: Border Tense, Military Supplies Raided

*92UM0812A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Mar 92 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Colonel N. Mulyar, Colonel A. Polyakov and Captain Second Rank V. Urban: "Nobody Knows Which Way the Scales Will Tilt"]

[Text]Moldova: Neither of the opposing sides is able to achieve victory.

Ukraine has hurried to "fence itself off" from the conflict by establishing a special zone along the border.

Chisinau. On 17 March a closed session of the parliament of Moldova discussed means for settling the conflict in Dniester. Speaking [at the session], President Mircha Snegur noted that the government is preparing a plan for reconciling the situation in Dniester. This plan will also provide for protection of the indigenous population in the Levoberezh [Left Bank]. The president urged the deputies to expedite debate of a bill on establishing a national army and of a legislative package pertaining to military doctrine.

Snegur said of the conflict: "We are dealing with a new putsch whose ultimate goal is the dismemberment of Moldova." But in his opinion, neither of the opposing sides in Dniester is in a position to achieve victory through force. He again expressed his support for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Speaking in favor of the establishment of an independent district and a free economic zone in this region, Snegur at the same time categorically insists on preserving the integrity of Moldova.

TIRASPOL. In an RIA interview, Igor Smirnov, President of the Dniester Republic, assessed the situation in Dniester as "extremely complex". Smirnov underscored that Moldova's withdrawal of its units to the right bank might become a starting point for the commencement of negotiations. The President of the Dniester Republic noted that subsequent [to this] the Dniester leadership will be ready to discuss political and economic problems at the negotiating table. Smirnov also underscored Dniester's unflinching devotion to a federative structure for Moldova.

During the night of 17 and 18 March, for the first time in many weeks, shots did not resound along the banks of the Dniester. Both sides decided to stop the bloodletting and come to the negotiating table.

However the lull apparently does not suit everyone. As was reported to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in the 14th Army Headquarters, the attacks are continuing in spite of negotiations to stop the seizure of arms and equipment of military units between General-Colonel Boris Pyanken, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces, and the leadership of Dniester and of the women's movement. Last night in the city of Bendery,

armed guardsmen of the Dniester Republic appeared at a POL depot, disarmed the security guards and made off with a part of the fuel and other stock.

At 2:00 AM civilians blockaded the area of a former civil defense regiment in the village of Kochnery (currently the Moldavian OMON is situated there) and drove away from the depot with a box of radioactive material. Incidentally, they presented an ultimatum—if both sides do not stop shooting, the box will be blown up in Dubossary. Because communications with Dubossary are continually being interrupted, it was not possible to learn the details of this action.

An attack was also conducted against a military unit in the city of Beltsy. Weapons were also seized there, but were returned to the depot with the assistance of Moldavian police.

The very same day, defensive efforts were being conducted in Dniesterov. Radio Tiraspol appealed to residents to join the popular volunteer force. It was announced that registration of volunteers [would begin] as of 8:00 AM. The appeal said that those desiring to register are to come to the assembly point with passport and military service card.

KIEV. On Tuesday, President Leonid Kravchuk signed a special decree for ensuring necessary protection of the border with Moldova and for safeguarding the security of Ukrainian citizens. The frontier troops, Ministry of Internal Affairs, national security service, national guard, and customs service were ordered to strengthen protection of the state border with Moldova, intensify procedures for passage, and ensure security of the peaceful population. A 50-kilometer temporary zone subject to special regulations is being established along the entire border. The executive committees of the frontier regions have been tasked to prepare to receive refugees from Moldova.

A bus with tags from Krasnodar was already stopped in Odessa as it was heading to Moldova. It was carrying some thirty unarmed young men.

Officer Held Hostage in Armenia Tells His Story

*92UM0792A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Mar 92 pp 1, 2*

[Interview with air-defense missile brigade commander Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Reshetnikov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major A. Stasovskiy: "Three Days in Captivity"]

[Text] *Our correspondent discusses the tragic events in the Armenian city of Artik with a recent hostage, air-defense missile brigade commander Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Reshetnikov.*

[A. Stasovskiy] A press conference in Yerevan was shown on Channel 1 of the Ostankino television at which

it was asserted that the military, having in mind yourself and your officers, had offered to sell weapons to the Armenians. It was also declared that the commander of a brigade had come to a unit with a group of fedayeen and promised to give weapons to the fighters. At the brigade, they say, you changed your decision and gave the order to open fire on the fedayeen. How much does that correspond to the true state of affairs?

[V. Reshetnikov] I want to say at once that there was not even any idea among us of an agreement to sell or turn over weapons.

The events actually developed as follows. The chairman of the city soviet, Sergey Babayan, called me up and asked me to come see him on an important matter. I answered that I also wanted to talk to him, and invited him to come to the brigade. The chairman diplomatically declined, however. Then I got into my vehicle and went with my driver to the city soviet, naturally unarmed. There I was given a demand in the form of an ultimatum to hand over a large quantity of weapons and ammunition to the fighters. I refused to accept the ultimatum. I offered to get in touch with our military leadership right from the chairman's office. The Armenians protested, however.

Right there, at the city soviet, the rumor quickly spread that the KPP [checkpoint] duty officer had been removed—the duty was being carried out that day by an Armenian warrant officer—and that Armenian soldiers were not being let into the unit. I offered to go to the brigade and be convinced with my own eyes, as they say, of what was truth and what was fabrication in order to prove that all of this was really a provocation.

I received consent very quickly, to my surprise. But when we were approaching the KPP, it all started. Strictly speaking, as soon as I saw that there was a civilian behind the wheel of my vehicle, and that the fighters had begun to force open the gates and drive their KamAZ trucks onto the grounds of the unit without asking for permission, I understood the seriousness of their intentions and how acute the situation was.

[A. Stasovskiy] You mean to say that before your return to the brigade, no attempts had been made to penetrate onto its territory?

[V. Reshetnikov] The fighters were evidently trying to penetrate the unit unimpeded under the cover of me. When we drove up, there was no one at the brigade KPP except for the duty warrant officer. A crowd of the local population gathered quickly, on the other hand, and was roused energetically by the shouts of armed people. Our own Armenian warrant officers, I noticed, were among those assembled.

I was able to seize the moment when the trouble started at the KPP gate and slip through the checkpoint. The fighters, coming to their senses, started shouting something and released the catches on their automatic rifles. They chased me. There was a fight. I have a memento of that on my face as a result...

Soldiers, who had been watching a film, appeared at that moment from the brigade club near the KPP. They saw that the commander was being beaten up. The siren was turned on right then as well. The soldiers and non-commissioned officers rushed to their duty stations.

I ordered the soldiers not to approach me, so as not to provoke any exacerbation of the situation. They obeyed, but Senior Lieutenant Sergey Parkalov nonetheless rushed the fighters who had twisted my arms and tried to defend me. I shouted at him to go away, but he did not seem to hear. We thus tried to beat them off shoulder to shoulder...

[A. Stasovskiy] How did it turn out that ten people then became hostages?

[V. Reshetnikov] Seventeen rather than ten, if we are to be completely accurate. You ask where they got the rest? The fact is that the homes of the brigade officers are located next to the KPP. Hearing the siren, the officers and warrant officers rushed to the unit for the alarm. Some of them were caught right at the entryways, and others at the KPP.

Then they let seven people go. The rest were by and large senior officers. Six from our brigade and four from a neighboring unit—an army air-defense technical missile base.

[A. Stasovskiy] And where did they hold you then?

[V. Reshetnikov] First they accommodated us not far from the unit in some apartment, which looked like it had been fitted ahead of time with heavy locks and special grates. An armed sentry guarded us constantly. It was namely then that we heard firing, which told us that our people were holding out. Then they moved us and turned us over to another group of fighters. Here they housed us in the cellar of some restaurant.

[A. Stasovskiy] How did they treat you?

[V. Reshetnikov] They gave it to us pretty good when they were capturing us. It does not befit an officer to speak of it, but they beat us with rifle butts and their legs. The officers were not physically mistreated any more afterward. Everything was fine for the first two days, if you don't count the fact that we virtually did not sleep. There were just two beds in the room I was talking about. For the ten of us. We tried to rest in shifts. On the second night we took the mattresses off the beds, and two more got the chance to sleep on the floor.

We stayed awake at night again after our "move" to the cellar. It was just terribly cold in the cellar. The insulated jackets were not even any help.

This was true captivity, and we knew nothing about what the military leadership was undertaking to free us. We were completely cut off from the outside world... The

sole rumor—which was possibly specially passed along to us—was, they said, that two of us had already been killed.

It is noteworthy that we had to encounter falsehoods and deceit at every step. The fighters placed information on March 9 that during the exchange of fire—which, in the opinion of the fedayeen, had naturally been started by the military—two Armenian servicemen had been killed in the brigade, an officer and a soldier. It was also said that the soldier had been killed by an officer from the brigade. We did not believe this. It was later clarified that the Armenian servicemen, and we have four officers and more than seventeen warrant officers and seventy servicemen in the brigade, were all whole and unharmed. Only Russians and Ukrainians had suffered.

The Armenian soldiers, which was unexpected for us, tried to gain favor with the fighters in every way. I am not talking about all of them, but there were instances. One fell upon my deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Kovbasyuk, trying to detain him and calling the fedayeen for help. Another Armenian soldier completely "cut off" communications in the brigade. Or how about this. Some officers and warrant officers were seized by fighters in civilian clothes. So the Armenian soldiers were not shy in giving away who was who.

[A. Stasovskiy] Who, in your opinion, do the armed formations that took the hostages represent?

[V. Reshetnikov] A representative of Armenia told us after we were released that we had been hostages of terrorists from Nagorno-Karabakh. The fedayeen themselves said that they were not subordinate to anyone at all.

But why, then, were Armenian armed formations from, let's say, the city of Artik also operating together with these so-called terrorist groups? It is clear that all of these are fighters battling against the Azeris in Karabakh.

[A. Stasovskiy] Information on some interview of yours with Armenian television was widespread...

[V. Reshetnikov] Yes, before they released us the Armenians stubbornly sought to have us give an interview to local television. There was one aim, it seems to me: take all of us together—the ten officers—and pass us off as victims of the military leadership that had supposedly tossed us to the whims of fate. They were seeking only one thing from us, strictly speaking—that we blame the command for everything that had happened.

For this the officers were brought out of the cellar into the light of day, and tea was organized in the restaurant. We ultimately consented to this interview. On the condition that we would not be hindered from speaking the truth. It is difficult to say now, of course, in what manner that film will appear or already appeared to television viewers. But neither the tea nor the restaurant helped them...

[A. Stasovskiy] Wasn't the chief aim of the fighters—to seize weapons and ammunition—achieved?

[V. Reshetnikov] The officers of the brigade have declared firmly that if, after everything that happened, even one automatic rifle were to be given over to the Armenians, they would immediately cease to perform their official duties. They understand very well that one cannot provide even the slightest of grounds. After the raid on one unit would follow another...

[V. Reshetnikov] The inviolability of the weapons came at a high price. According to available information, an officer and a soldier in the brigade were killed.

[V. Reshetnikov] Lieutenant Mishchenko and driver Private Kotov were killed. Another two officers were wounded. One seriously.

Three fighters were also killed after an exchange of fire with the guard personnel who were preparing to go on duty.

[A. Stasovskiy] Could it be said that the groups of fighters were operating under some deal with the chairman of the city soviet?

[V. Reshetnikov] I will say honestly that we had good relations with the chairman of the city soviet before the incident. Businesslike relations were also maintained with other representatives of the city authorities. It is difficult to talk about suspicions. Especially after the fighters that were guarding us hinted that if the chairman had not sent for me on March 8, it would have been bad for him as well.

[A. Stasovskiy] That means that the city is virtually under the authority of groups of fighters who give orders everywhere to everyone?

[V. Reshetnikov] That is unequivocal. They move about the city in vehicles unimpeded, brandishing weapons. Absolutely no one stops them.

[A. Stasovskiy] Tell me, do you intend to return to the brigade?

[V. Reshetnikov] Undoubtedly. My family is there, the officers and soldiers are there. One of the demands of the Armenian leadership, however, is to relieve me of my post.

[A. Stasovskiy] How do matters stand now? Is the situation in the brigade being monitored?

[V. Reshetnikov] The situation at this moment is being monitored. But no one can say what will happen in the future. The officers and warrant officers, and even the soldiers and non-commissioned officers, are being restrained with difficulty. They are advancing demands—if the attitude toward the military is not radically altered, the unit will have to be withdrawn immediately. This demand, I know, is supported by the

Officers' Assemblies of all the air-defense units of the district. It is impossible to continue to live this way.

At the last minute—Acts of cruelty and extremism in the Transcaucasus are not stopping. Major K. Litvinov has reported to the editors that the commander of an army post, Senior Lieutenant Andrey Moseychuk, was killed on March 12 in a battle with a tank of Azeri fighters who were terrorizing the Armenian village of Aygepar. He has left a widow and two orphan children...

100 Servicemen Unaccounted for in Nagorno-Karabakh

92UM0850A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Senior Lieutenants V. Denisov and V. Russu under the "Transcaucasus Military District Chronicles" rubric]

[Text]

100 Servicemen Missing in Nagorno-Karabakh—Commander Issues Appeal

Colonel General Valeriy Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, wrote a letter to Levon Ter-Petrosyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, informing the latter that more than 100 servicemen are unaccounted for, after the withdrawal of the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Measures taken by the district commander have not provided any positive results. In addition, a number of the missing men may become listed as deserters, with consequences attendant to such classification. The commander also pointed out that the situation is a cause of concern on the part of the servicemen's parents and friends, who persistently petition district headquarters with appeals.

Three Servicemen Missing—Two Others Dead

On 15 February 1992, Colonel Aleksandr Pavlenko, commander of a unit stationed in Armenia, departed from his unit in a UAZ-469, bound for Nakhichevan to visit his family. The vehicle was to take him to the border between the two republics, whence Captain Alfred Idrisov (in charge of the vehicle) and the driver—Vyacheslav Gaykas—were to return to Yerevan. Neither serviceman has been seen since.

According to Colonel Nikolay Khudenko, deputy commander for personnel, 7th Army, the strategic formation authorities contacted Nakhichevan Republic Supreme Mejlis Chairman Geydar Aliyev directly for his intercession in the matter of searching for the missing servicemen. No progress has been made so far.

Incidentally, it was at the end of last year that two servicemen, carrying explosives, were detained in the town of Ordubad by authorities of the Nakhichevan Republic. They were accused of planning and carrying out an act of terrorism. Informed sources have made it

known that both of them died in an isolation chamber in Baku while awaiting completion of investigation. The cause of death was listed as acute cardiac failure.

Combined Military and Militia Patrols to Police Adzhariya—UAF to Limit Participation

The worsening situation in Western Georgia has given rise to rumors circulating in the republic relative to possible employment of Transcaucasus Military District troops to suppress activity by followers of deposed President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

According to Lieutenant General Sufiyam Beppayev, district deputy commander, the Georgia leadership has not requested Russian troop authorities in the area to lend assistance. He believes that the local law enforcement agencies possess sufficient manpower and equipment to impose order and stabilize the situation. In the matter of combined patrolling by servicemen of the Transcaucasus Military District and Adzhariya militia, Lieutenant General Beppayev stated that this measure has been coordinated with the authorities of the Georgian Republic, the Adzhar Republic, and the UAF [Unified Armed Forces] of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. Such a request was made of the district military authorities by the leadership of Abkhaziya.

UKRAINE

Kravchuk Decree on May Conscription

92UM0851D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
24 Mar 92 p 1

[Decree of the President of Ukraine dealing with military discharge and conscription of eligible male citizens of the Ukraine: "Decree of the President of Ukraine"]

[Text] **DISCHARGE INTO THE RESERVE OF SERVICEMEN OF THE UKRAINE ARMED FORCES, UKRAINE NATIONAL GUARD, BORDER TROOPS, INTERNAL TROOPS, AND CIVIL DEFENSE TROOPS UPON COMPLETION OF TERM OF COMPULSORY SERVICE. SCHEDULED CONSCRIPTION OF CITIZENS OF THE UKRAINE FOR ACTIVE SERVICE, MAY - JUNE 1992 PERIOD**

In light of the completion of the terms of compulsory military service and scheduled May - June 1992 call-up of citizens of Ukraine for compulsory service, I do hereby decree:

1. To discharge from the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, Border Troops, Internal Troops, and Civil Defense Troops into the reserve, in the period May - June of 1992, men presently in service who have completed the established term of compulsory military service.

2. To issue a call for the induction into the Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Guard of Ukraine, Border Troops, Internal Troops, and Civil Defense Troops stationed on

STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

Ukraine soil, in the May - June 1992 period, citizens of Ukraine attaining the age of 18 years by the day of call-up who are not entitled to a draft deferment. I also call for the induction of citizens of Ukraine of older draft age no longer entitled to draft deferment.

3. This Decree takes effect on the day of its signing.

[Signed] President of Ukraine
L. KRAVCHUK
Kiev, 23 March 1992

Bashkirov Designated Assistant to Minister of Defense

92UM0843A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
14 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Gorenko: "General Mikhail Bashkirov: 'I Will Not Permit the Looting of Ukraine...'"]

[Text] Uzin—General Bashkirov... The "rebellious" division...

In the last month, hundreds of people have been uttering these words in Ukraine and Russia. A brilliant pilot who has set four world records, intelligent, a charming personality, an officer who graduated from the General Staff Academy during his 41st year, a man with positions and principles, a favorite of the Long Range Aviation and Air Force high command of the former Union—on February 13, Major-General of Aviation Mikhail Bashkirov supported the personnel of his division who had taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine...

And he ended up under very severe psychological and moral pressure. In three weeks, he was twice removed from the position of division commander and documents were twice prepared for his release from the army. They talked with him dozens of times at the highest registers, on the notes of insults, not excluding the word "traitor"—and he firmly and unwaveringly stood his ground: treason—is to hijack aircraft from a sovereign state...

That is to steal, while covering yourself and justifying it by the fact that you are carrying out orders...

General Mikhail Bashkirov set the absolute record of his life this past month: at the critical moment, he selected the side of his subordinates, very well aware that he would lose his brilliant career in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] army. We ponder and value the height and the morality of Bashkirov's deed: they had offered him the post of deputy air army commander with all of the prospects for advancement that flow from such an assignment, but he, at the moment of his subordinates' highest tension, did not reject them, did not retreat, but stood on their side. On February 13, while on leave, General Bashkirov learned that Colonel A. Kuznetsov's regiment had practically

unanimously (90 percent) decided to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. The personnel arrived at this decision, having understood that the orders of the CIS command were nothing other than camouflaged attempts to brazenly steal from Ukraine what belongs to it by right of sovereignty and independence.

Bashkirov supported his soldiers and officers. Bashkirov's purest and most honest soldiers supported him initially while following his example and, having taken the oath right after he did, later did not turn their back on his support.... They call him the rebellious general. I think that if anything rebelled in this man it was his conscience which he could not self-consciously crush under the press of orders from Moscow.

Who has the right to cast stones at the man who said: I will not steal!

The day before yesterday General Mikhail Bashkirov was the guest of the editorial collective and our newspaper's printing house. He came to see the people, the majority of whom spoke out in support of Mikhail Bashkirov in the very first days after February 13. For example, the author of these lines published three articles on Uzin. The meeting turned out to be interesting and cordial. In many ways, the cause of this was—General Bashkirov's charm, internal beauty, and intelligence: he never prepares speeches and he thinks before the eyes of his interlocutors...

Besides the fact that he is a decent man, Mikhail Mikhaylovich is a great patriot of Ukraine. I think that it is due to his decency. He was once in the United States for four days as part of a delegation during a return visit of our strategic forces pilots, there he "flew" in a B-52 simulator, having amazed the Americans with his flying skill and, with all of the American splendor did not become enchanted with the overseas lifestyle. He simply said: "I will never go there again..."

From the editorial offices, General M. Bashkirov drove over to see the Ukrainian Minister of Defense. Colonel-General K. Morozov had made a decision: General M. Bashkirov was assigned as assistant minister of defense with the rights of advisor on issues of the organization of combat training for the air division at the Uzin garrison.

Mikhail Mikhaylovich told me:

"I will not permit the looting of the division or Ukraine..."

Colonels A. Pakhomovskiy and Yu. Skabkin, who had been released into the reserve by orders of the CIS commander, have been assigned as M. Bashkirov's deputies by order of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense.

Justice has triumphed.

CIS Air Commander Puts on 'Performance' at Uzin

92UM0869B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
28 Mar 92 p 1

[Declaration of the Ukrainian Officers' Union]

[Text] On 25 March 1992 Colonel-General P.S. Deynekin came to Uzin in Kiev Oblast by agreement with the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to talk with personnel of the air division. He came as the commander of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Air Force (he was never officially appointed to this post).

In reality it turned out that his visit had nothing to do with a noble goal ordained by a high official. Instead of deciding the service matters troubling the airmen, Colonel-General P.S. Deynekin put on a show right at the airfield, enlisting a number of correspondents from the Russian mass media, who, incidentally, are not accredited in Ukraine.

The discussion at an impromptu, so-called assembly of the personnel consisted mainly of attempts to sow disension based on nationality among officers of the air division and to produce a confrontation between proponents of independent armed forces for Ukraine and supporters of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

Assuming for himself responsibility for deciding the highest level of the tangle of problems in which the status and the fate of the formation and the personnel are interwoven, Colonel-General P.S. Deynekin showed a preference for the unscrupulous methods previously tested in the Transcaucasus and the Baltic region and at other "hot spots" of the former Soviet empire, instead of taking a cautious, wise, politically deliberated approach to the life-shaking issues.

The Ukrainian Officers Union absolutely condemns the activities of chauvinistic, pro-imperial forces within independent Ukraine and calls upon the president as commander in chief of the armed forces and upon Ukraine's minister of defense to protect Major-General M.M. Bashkirov, division commander, who has courageously faced up to the high Moscow officials and set out on a path of loyal service to the people of Ukraine, from psychological terror and persecution on the part of the command element of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

We ask that Colonel-General P.S. Deynekin and travelers like him not be permitted to visit the territory of sovereign Ukraine and take advantage of our people's hospitality to create confrontation in the military collectives and commit other unfriendly acts.

[Signed] Executive Committee
Ukrainian Officer's Union
26 March 1992

Chief of Staff on Military Doctrine, Housing of Troops

92UM0842A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
13 Mar 92 p 1

[Question and answer session with Lieutenant-General G. Zhivits, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as reported by the Press Center of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: "Following the Letter of the Law"]

[Text] During a meeting of the leadership of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense with veterans of the Armed Forces a number of questions were raised concerning problems of military-organizational development and social protection of veterans and servicemen and their families.

Lieutenant-General G. Zhivits, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces answered some of them.

[Question] Why is it necessary to hurriedly change the name of [those units of] the Armed Forces of the USSR stationed in Ukraine to the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

[Zhivits] This is necessary because Ukraine, in fulfilling the will of its people, has made an historic choice and is building a sovereign, democratic state [founded on the rule of] law. [This is being done] in accordance with the Resolution Proclaiming Ukrainian Independence and with the All-Ukrainian Referendum. Ukraine's own Armed Forces must become a trustworthy guarantor of its independence, security, territorial integrity and indivisibility. Since there is no longer a USSR, there are also no Armed Forces of the USSR.

In accordance with the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet's 24 August 1991 "Resolution on Military Units in Ukraine," all military units stationed on its territory were placed under the authority of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

At the same time, there are no grounds for regarding the process by which Ukraine is activating its Armed Forces as hasty. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are being established on the basis of agreements which were signed in Minsk by the heads of the independent states.

[Question] What is the essence of the military doctrine of the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

[Zhivits] There is one important inaccuracy in the question that has been posed. Military doctrine is defined by the state and not by its Armed Forces. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet is approving military doctrine and the system of views on military-organizational development.

[This military doctrine] is characterized by the principle of defensive sufficiency in the development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It is based on the fact that Ukraine does not recognize war as a means of resolving international problems, has no territorial claims against any state, views no people as its enemy, and will never

initiate military actions against any country if it is not itself the target of aggression.

[Question] What is blocking an agreement to maintain common Armed Forces [belonging to] the states of the Commonwealth under the condition that the Council of Presidents functions as their managing and controlling organ and that the Unified Armed Forces' Command, consisting of the representatives of the military Commands of the Commonwealth States, functions as their executive organ?

[Zhivits] Gradually (and with regard for national security factors) Ukraine is realizing its aspiration to be granted, [at some time] in the future, the status of a neutral, non-nuclear state which does not belong to any military coalitions. Therefore, the Ukrainian Armed Forces cannot belong to common CIS Armed Forces. Armed forces are an attribute of the state that bears full responsibility for their activities.

[Question] In building the Soviet Navy, all the republics deposited their shares in accordance with their national income. Having failed to come to an agreement on this issue with the members of the former Union, why was Ukraine the first to demand a part of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet?

[Zhivits] Ukraine did not demand a part of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet; rather, it placed all military units stationed on its territory, including the part of the Navy's forces stationed on Ukrainian territory, under its jurisdiction in accordance with the 24 August 1991 Resolution of the Supreme Soviet. We are now conducting negotiations on this issue along with other CIS states.

Ukraine is a maritime state and must have its own Navy. The position of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defense is that there ought not to be a large or, moreover, nuclear navy in the Black Sea. It is an enclosed area, an enclosed body of water whose exit is controlled by NATO. It is clear that speaking about the might of this navy is nothing other than exaggeration. Ukraine has never declared that it wants to appropriate the entire Black Sea Fleet. We have a right to build our own navy on the basis of those units of the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Ukraine for protection of maritime borders and coastal defense.

[Question] Is it certain that the multinational people of Ukraine will consider the Ukrainian Armed Forces to be at one with the peoples living in Ukraine?

[Zhivits] There is no doubt as to this. As an independent state that proclaimed the establishment of its own Armed Forces, Ukraine proceeded from the fact that national defense is an affair of all the people of Ukraine. This is confirmed by measures which are being taken by the Supreme Soviet and by all the people of Ukraine with respect to social and legal protection of servicemen and their families. It is also confirmed by the readiness of many

servicemen of Ukrainian citizenship from other areas of the Commonwealth to serve the cause of protecting Ukraine.

[Question] Will efforts be made to strengthen cooperation—which is one of the most important factors of defense—between the armies of Ukraine and Russia?

[Zhivits] Undoubtedly. Not only will [such efforts] be made, but negotiations are already being conducted with respect to a number of problems.

[Question] What are the reasons for creating a National Guard?

[Zhivits] The Ukrainian National Guard was created according to Ukrainian legislation. It is not a component part of the Armed Forces but exists as an independent structure.

[Question] Are any structural changes being planned in the organization of military commissariats?

[Zhivits] No structural changes are expected in the military commissariats in the near future.

[Question] What kind of compensation is envisaged for officers living in private apartments?

[Zhivits] As of 1 October 1991 officers, army and navy warrant officers, servicemen who have extended as well as women who have been accepted for active military service as soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers, and who are serving on Ukrainian territory and have not been provided with living space (or dormitories) are being paid monetary compensation for sub-leasing (or leasing) lodging in the amount of actual expenses but no more than: six rubles per day in Kiev; five rubles per day in other cities as well as in regional centers; and three rubles per day in other localities.

The [previously] established amount of monetary compensation for those servicemen who have three or more family members living with them is being increased by 50 percent.

[Question] What are the procedures for paying for public utilities and apartments?

[Zhivits] According to the Ukrainian "Law on Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and their Families" of 20 December 1991, servicemen serving in Ukraine, parents and family members of servicemen who perished, died or were lost [in action] or became invalids while on active duty, are paying 50 percent of the established rates for living space and public utilities (water, gas, electricity and heat) in government housing.

[Question] Are these benefits being extended to officers who have been discharged in other areas [of the CIS]?

[Zhivits] All benefits, including those relating to pension and lodging are equally applicable to servicemen of Ukrainian citizenship who are being transferred to the reserves from other CIS republics. This is provided for

by the Ukrainian "Law on Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and their Families," Article 4 of which states that this law also applies to servicemen of Ukrainian citizenship who are serving outside of Ukraine.

Officer Union on Return of Officers to Ukraine

92UM0844A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian and Ukrainian 17 Mar 92 p 1

[Interview with Retired Colonel Volodymyr Onufriyovych Saladyak by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Novykov: The UUU [Union of Ukrainian Officers] Suggests..."]

[Text] The CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] representatives session is occurring in Kiev on March 20. The rapt attention of the foreign mass media and of social and other organizations of Ukraine are riveted on this event. One of the most acute problems which they propose to examine—is the issue of the return of all servicemen—Ukrainian citizens who are serving outside its borders to their Homeland. Not only state departments but also public organizations have developed their proposals and concepts on the relocation (return) of officers. The Union of Ukrainian Officers is proposing one of them, the most specific.

Our correspondent met with Retired Colonel Volodymyr Saladyak, the author of this concept.

[Novykov] Volodymyr Onufriyovych. They say that you prepared two months ago for this important meeting.

[Saladyak] If I may speak frankly, in the first days of the building of the Armed Forces, our Union put forward a proposal concerning our citizens. We informed our government about this.

[Novykov] What specifically did you propose?

[Saladyak] The command of the Armed Forces which are stationed outside the borders of Ukraine is preparing a large reduction, first of all of servicemen - citizens, who have expressed a desire to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. If the Ukrainian government does not take countermeasures, such a onesided action by Russia could deal a noticeable blow to the economy of our state, because the accepting of hundreds of thousands of servicemen and members of their families at the same time is practically impossible. For that reason it is necessary to immediately conclude an intergovernment accord on the mutual transfer of the above mentioned contingent and the creation of intergovernment, government and local committees for the return of Ukrainian citizens to their homeland, their distribution and employment.

[Novykov] What kind of measures do you anticipate?

[Saladyak] In the interstate accord it is necessary to include the following: financing the transfer of servicemen and the members of their families by their respective governments (or sides), including solving the questions of moving, one-time aid, the payment of

serviceman's pensions, which are subject to reduction (for those eligible for pensions), as well as for those citizens, servicemen of the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union who live in each of the states that are subjects of the agreement. It is necessary to determine the financing of the instruction of students in military educational establishments, who are studying in this or that state, or by agreement are continuing their instruction, as well as the mechanism for the transfer itself, taking into account the military profession and the availability of housing.

[Novykov] Is that all?

[Saladyak] No. It is necessary to quickly create a state committee and state fund for the solution of internal problems of the transfer, obtaining employment and financing of servicemen and their families. The state committee should include representatives of the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Labor, Finance, as well as other ministries which regulate obtaining employment by members of servicemen's families, construction, housing and the granting of credits. Representatives of civic organizations should also take part in this.

[Novykov] What should the state committee examine?

[Saladyak] The number and composition of servicemen and their families who wish to leave Ukraine, the availability of vacant positions by speciality, the number of servicemen who are eligible for pensions, as well as those who are returning and have housing in Ukraine, the possibilities for exchange or purchase (of apartments, buildings), the number of military units, military educational institutions which are subject to reductions (either partial or complete), the utilization of officers' dormitories, barracks, the instructional-material base under the institutions for the retraining of officers who arrive from outside Ukraine (the creation of instructional centers, units, subsections, and other possibilities).

[Novykov] And how will it be with the obtaining of employment?

[Saladyak] It is necessary to create local (oblast, rayon and garrison) committees in order to solve the problem of finding employment and guaranteeing housing for servicemen and their families nearby.

Questions like the expedience and correctness of discharge into the reserves, the filling of vacant positions, the detection of instances of the appointment of officers who are not citizens of Ukraine to vacant positions without the agreement of the local command and committee (the appointment by the administration of cadres from Moscow), should be part of the function of local committees.

[Novykov] Nonetheless, how, in your opinion, should the main problem be solved that bothers officers—citizens of Ukraine. There are more than 300 thousand outside of the borders of Ukraine.

[Saladyak] The resettlement of servicemen that are outside of the borders of Ukraine should proceed parallel with the reduction of the Armed Forces stationed on the territory of Ukraine, the discharge into the reserves of those servicemen as they become eligible for pensions, as well as relying on sending off auditors and students of completed courses to the countries from which they originate.

Glut of Potential Transfers Poses Problems for Ukraine

92UM0816A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Vladykin: "Who Is More Reliable, a Sponsor or GUK?"]

[Text] Officers Who Want To Transfer to Service in the Ukrainian Army Are Resolving This Question for Themselves

From the very first days of this year and to the present, in large headquarters and even directly in military units deployed in Ukraine, a phenomenon could be observed that just several months ago would seem unnatural. In a literal sense, crowds of officers and warrant officers, who came here on leave from all ends of the former Union, are pestering various command offices, and are identifying those regular servicemen who did not take the Ukrainian oath and with whom they could exchange their place of service and positions. In general, the guests are undertaking active efforts to be hired into the armed forces of the new independent state, assuring one and all that they no longer see any other future for themselves in life.

The overwhelming majority of these officers explain their aspirations in the same way. The first one I was able to talk to in the pass office of one of the headquarters in Kiev was Lieutenant Aleksandr Kuzmenko, a helicopter pilot. He explained that at present he is still serving in the Leningrad Military District, in a garrison that always considered itself prestigious among aviators of the former Soviet Army. And, nevertheless, at the start of the year, he tried to go on leave as soon as possible in order to work in earnest on a decision about his transfer to the Ukrainian Army. "But there was nothing else I could do," said Aleksandr, "I am from Ukraine, I grew up here, finished school here, my parents live here, and all of my roots are here. And since the republic has declared its complete independence and has created its own armed forces, then where else should I serve but in them?" Of course, in the meantime, Kuzmenko noted that his young family up to the present time has had rather vague prospects for acquiring an apartment...

Afterwards, I heard similar additions to the patriotic motivation from very many competitors for slots in the Transdnepr, Transcarpathian, and Black Sea area garrisons. No, practically none of them entertain the rosy hope of making arrangements for their families in their

new place of service easily and quickly, in the event they achieve their cherished desire. They all know very well that the Ukrainian Army in a social sense is not in a bit better situation than any other outfit (that separated from or remained in the former structures) of the armed forces of the former USSR. For example, the allotment of housing for servicemen in Kiev who applied for it in 1986 is just now being started. That is, the situation is similar to what is occurring in the large cities of Russia, Kazakhstan, Byelarus, and other regions. But, you will agree, it is not one and the same—after many years of waiting—to acquire, finally, an apartment in Kherson, which is caressed by warm winds, or an apartment in very cold Syktyvkar, even if it is just as good in every way in quality.

But when this circumstance is superimposed on those same national roots about which Lieutenant Kuzmenko was talking, there is almost a 100-percent probability of predicting what choice a majority of the officers who come from Ukraine will make. But right here, a contradiction shows up on the agenda that seriously complicates life, such as both an emerging Ukrainian Army and the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. The flow of migration of servicemen in the direction of Kiev today exceeds by many times the flow in the opposite direction.

One of the reasons for such a distribution lies generally on the surface. It is the very same choice between Syktyvkar and Kherson, but now it also confronts those who already set themselves up in a land of plenty, or, at least, who served for some time and received a real chance of settling down there. Their situation differs favorably even from those who just by right of birth obtain citizenship and a place of service on Ukrainian land. As the saying goes, let well enough alone.

But, another reason became the subject of our discussion with Major General of Aviation V. Gulyayev, chief of the Kiev Higher Military Aviation Engineering School. As Valeriy Vasilyevich mentioned, numerous military VUZ's [higher educational institution] have been located on the territory of Ukraine for a long time. You see, an effort was made most of the time to put them in large cities and in areas of a developed infrastructure. Naturally, until recently, no one even thought of a possible division of the single Union Army. So, it turned out that the share of officers in the armed forces of the USSR who were born and grew up in Ukraine was proportionately high in comparison with those who came from other regions. The young lads preferred to enroll in VUZ's that were near home, and the parents, indeed, inclined them this way. This is very noticeable even in the current component of cadets of the KVVAIU [Red Banner Higher Military Aviation Engineering School].

Now the disproportion that has resulted is being felt even about such a question as the forthcoming distribution of graduates of military schools located in Ukraine. This year, the personnel establishment of the Kiev, Odessa, and Transcarpathian military districts are

frozen and are not subject to any changes. But even they, given their large scale, will hardly be able to take on fully the large detachment of young officers who took the oath of allegiance to the yellow-and-blue banner during training. What then can be said of the future prospect, when the planned significant reduction in the numerical strength of the armed forces of Ukraine starts, and, consequently, a reduction in the ability to absorb personnel.

What is most interesting is that the officers and warrant officers who are able to get a transfer do not harbor any illusions regarding the vacancies in the Ukrainian Army. They are all well informed on the personnel situation. However, each one hopes that things will go well for him. What is more, some consider this very situation to be a positive factor that is favorable to them specifically...

Lieutenants A. Chornogorov and S. Rodin got to Kiev from the Transbaykal Military District. Both are native Russians—one from Chelyabinsk, and the other from Ekaterinburg. Both graduated from the Chelyabinsk Military Motor Vehicle School. In a word, they have no personal relationship to Ukraine. But... fate prepared a "gift" for them—Ukrainian wives. And, so, the national origin of military female companions becomes a trump card for the lieutenants in search of "a place under the sun." It is not counted that the families of one and the other were already allotted separate apartments almost immediately on arrival in the Transbaykal. The latter fact is rejected in general as deserving any kind of positive evaluations. In the Transbaykal, it is said, there are strong frosts in the winter, and there are also regular breakdowns in the supply of water, electric power...

"Russia is an unfathomable country," Chernogorov said to me. "If at some time it will have its own army, then it will retain the worst features of the Soviet Armed Forces, and there will be the same kind of disorder in everything. We decided to head for Ukraine, but, if this does not work out, then we will leave the service entirely."

To tell the truth, the disparaging position of the Russian lads discouraged me so much, that I even considered that to become seriously offended or indignant would be out of place. I only asked:

"But why are you so confident that the Ukrainian Army will quickly become exemplary and faultlessly organized?"

"Well, look at the kind of competition there is among those who want to serve in it. There are a lot to pick from. Of course, not many will succeed. But those who do get in will end up in a really professional army. They will not regret anything."

I do not want in any case to invite unnecessary adversity and difficulties on the Ukrainian armed forces, because some of my recent and current military comrades are serving or will serve there. However, I am compelled to disenchant lieutenants Chernogorov and Rodin. Their exciting dreams do not have a chance of being realized in the foreseeable future. And here is why.

Major General of Aviation Gulyayev reported that in KVVAIU, for example, more than 95 percent of the permanent staff of the school took the Ukrainian oath. Approximately the same kind of index, as it was learned, reflects the state of affairs in practically all military establishments, VUZ's, and military units in Ukraine. Thus, the appearance of a large number of vacant positions is not expected. But there already are a lot of aspirants for those that, nevertheless, will be opened. For the lower positions, I recall, there are graduates of military schools of diverse profiles. For the higher... In the Directorate of Personnel of the Kiev Military District, Colonel V. Kirichenko acquainted me with an impressive figure: Just in the KVO [Kiev Military District] alone there is an overage of about 2,000 officers at the present time. Arrangements also have to be made for them somehow. But the number of overages continues to grow. An analysis of last year's detailing of officers from the groups of forces to the district is being conducted, and servicemen are arriving who were transferred for family reasons by the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Combined Arms Forces of the CIS.

The question is whether it is possible for any of the servicemen to be taken into the Ukrainian Army on an initiative basis. To understand how remote this is, I will cite one more numerical correlation. Judging by the applications of the personnel organs, more than 800 persons want to transfer from the Far Eastern Military District to the Kiev Military District. But only 750 regular servicemen intend to leave the Kiev Military District for places outside Ukraine. However, the list, which was admitted by Colonel Kirichenko, automatically includes all of those who did not take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine. But, realistically, many of them simply would like to continue their service until their imminent pension time and retire without moving away.

I will not begin to deny that, obviously, there are servicemen who were able to reach the desired objective owing to their own perseverance and initiative. I heard of these, but, frankly, I was unable to get to talk to any of them. For various reasons, they refused to meet with a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent. But I observed from the side how such transfers are organized.

I saw in personnel organs colonels who came to intercede for young officers from the DVO [Far Eastern Military District], TurkVO [Turkestan Military District], the MVO [Moscow Military District]... Knowing about the traditional strong ties between cronies in Ukraine, I surmise who, no matter what, will succeed in transferring to the Ukrainian Army. Perhaps this path is justified in its way and is fair. For fathers and sons, aunts and brothers-in-law, it must be assumed, it is better to serve in the same forces. But it is unlikely here that professionalism plays a part as a criterion for the selection of personnel, for which many dreamers yearn. There are other relations at play here.

But for those who unsuccessfully try to realize a cherished wish by a frontal attack, I will report the point of view on the situation that has developed and is held by Colonel V. Melnik, chief of the Personnel Department of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. He thinks that processes like this should be developed gradually and be implemented by stages over a long period. One year is not enough here. For the time being, the Main Directorate of Personnel [GUK] of the CIS Combined Armed Forces and the Directorate of Personnel of the Ground Forces are collecting and processing lists of servicemen from the districts who wish to transfer from one state of the Commonwealth to another...

Ukraine-Moldova Border Under "Special Regime"

92UM0851B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian*
21 Mar 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Special Regime Zone"]

[Text] A representative of Ukraine National Guard headquarters has stated that several Guard subunits, acting in response to a presidential decree, have reported to a special regime zone located on the Ukraine-Republic of Moldova border. Personnel have initiated action relative to the mission of rendering assistance to the border troops in apprehending violators of the state border.

In the second half of the 19th of March, special operational groups took up their positions at points of illegal crossing by groups of armed persons attempting to traverse Ukraine soil.

National Guard units operate in close cooperation with the border troops and internal affairs agencies.

Krivoy Rog Aviation Unit to Change Allegiance to Ukraine

924A0822B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent Sergey Ilchenko under the rubric "Rejoinder": "Why Aircraft for the Miners?"]

[Text] Dnepropetrovsk—A miners' strike of the largest proportions seen in the region of the Krivoy Rog mines has ended.

In autumn of last year L. Kravchuk, candidate for president of Ukraine, met with Krivoy Rog miners prior to the elections and promised to resolve on an equivalent basis the economic issues involving coal miners and iron ore miners. However, the understanding was violated in January. The Krivoy Rog mines for extraction of iron and manganese ore still had no privileges.

Sharply increased prices for meat products turned out to be the last straw. The miners chose the most difficult form of strike—they refused to come up to the surface. Shift after shift of miners descended to the mine face and joined their comrades.

The first result of this action of protest was the resignation of the entire Krivoy Rog Gorispolkom [city executive committee]. The miners hope new officials will turn out to be more honest than the old ones.

Kiev too decided not to exacerbate the conflict with the Krivoy Rog miners. A presidential ukase now frees enterprises engaged in underground ore extraction from the so-called Chernobyl tax, increases their maximum level of profitability by 30 percent, and significantly reduces the tax on income. The miners are permitted to conduct barter transactions for all varieties of goods.

Having lost in one area, the republic administration did not miss an opportunity to gain in another. As if at the demand of striking miners, a division of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] military transport aviation stationed in Krivoy Rog will be included in the composition of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Although just how this will help resolve the problems of the mining region is difficult to understand.

BALTIC STATES

Current State of Lithuania's Armed Forces

92UN1098A Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 20 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by V. Zarovskiy: "Armed With Submachine Guns and Fists"]

[Text] The Lithuanian army has no history. That which happened before the Second World War was long ago and is not that full of valor to make it memorable.

The Lithuanian army has only the present. About two years ago, when talk first began in the republic about the creation of its own armed forces, it was not taken seriously.

The Committee of the Supreme Council for National Defense and the Department of National Defense of Lithuania appeared simultaneously—in March 1990. The reaction to their appearance was uniform: what army when there is not enough money to run the economy. The military did not advertise their activity and no one was interested in them at that time anyway. The volunteers—approximately a hundred people—"guarded state establishments", sat around, read magazines, and watched television. But after the events in January of last year hundreds of strong lads appeared with hunting carbines.

Several companies formed and took the oath by March 1991. The first officers appeared. The Department of National Defense became a ministry. A. Butkevicius, a civilian medical doctor, was appointed minister.

At present Lithuania has its own interior and border troops, as well as a customs and a security service. A motorized infantry brigade with about 2,000 people comprises the

backbone of the army. Armament consists only of submachine guns, and perhaps also fists—there are no tanks, no battalion medical aid stations and armored personnel carriers or any aircraft.

The brigade is deployed in detached battalions in large cities of the republic. Officers are former career military from the Soviet Army, soldiers, and junior commanders who, for the most part, have completed their compulsory service in the Soviet Army, and were selected on a contract basis for three to five years. Their pay is 3,000 rubles per month. Those who entered the service after being called up in the autumn of last year, however, receive 300 rubles.

In the opinion of the brigade commander, Colonel-Lieutenant C. Ezerskas, the units in his charge could be more accurately called rapid deployment forces. The experience of airborne forces of the Soviet Army and their colleagues in England, France, and the USA formed the basis of tactics, strategy and the rest of the military knowledge.

What we saw in the Vilnius "Iron Wolf" battalion, we confess, we liked. Everything is at a high level there: order and discipline as well as physical training. There was also karate, leaps over walls, and negotiation of obstacle courses—and everything was done with enthusiasm.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Future Plans of Sukhoy Design Bureau

92UM0826A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Mar 92 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Deputy Chief Designer, Candidate of Technical Sciences Sergey Vasilyevich Alekseyev, Lead Designer, Candidate of Technical Sciences Leonid Giliardovich Chernov, and Scientific Research Department Chief Vladimir Georgiyevich Yakovlev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel A. Krichevtsov: "Will Pugachev's 'Cobra' Have Competitors?"]

[Text] The quality of the aircraft developed by the Experimental Design Bureau imeni P.O. Sukhoy has always been assessed on the highest scale. Let us recall: SU-7, SU-15, SU-17, SU-24, and SU-25. However, the majority of them were well-known only to experts and operators. Another fate befell the SU-27 fighter-interceptor. In June 1989, its appearance became a sensation at the Le Bourget Aerospace Show. Viktor Pugachev and Yevgeniy Frolov, this firm's test-pilots, demonstrated the aircraft's expanded maneuvering capabilities, tractability, and control to the astonished audience. Specifically, they demonstrated an up to now unknown figure of advanced aerobatic maneuvers which is called by the name of its first performer—the "Pugachev cobra." Today, as before, no foreign aircraft is capable of performing it.

Later the SU-27 and Sport SU-26M confidently competed for a place in the aerospace market in a number of countries of Europe, America, and Asia. Our pilots have established nearly three dozen world records and have achieved many sports victories at competitions in the world and Europe in these aircraft. The art of group flying and the merits of the Sukhoy's were beyond praise even on the day when our military pilots visited Great Britain last autumn. In a word, we have already become accustomed to the loud praise of Sukhoy's super-modern aircraft.

But, they say, the old fame loves new fame. What is the OKB [experimental design bureau] collective working on today and what are they preparing to amaze their fellow countrymen and maybe the world? How will it live under conditions of the continuous problems that have come tumbling down on all of us? A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent requested answers to these and other questions from the very creators of the wonderful aircraft and guests of the editorial staff—Deputy Chief Designer, Candidate of Technical Sciences Sergey Vasilyevich Alekseyev, Lead Designer, Candidate of Technical Sciences Leonid Giliardovich Chernov, and Scientific Research Department Chief Vladimir Georgiyevich Yakovlev.

[Alekseyev] If my colleagues are not opposed, I would answer the very first question as follows: It is becoming increasingly difficult to amaze people because these

wonders have been placed in the mainstream. At the beginning of the century, the take-off of an aircraft was an event, a feat. But now?..

Therefore, we will not think ahead about sensations in the near future. At our OKB, normal planning work on new generation aircraft—both military and civilian—is simply occurring. Naturally, not without difficulties. But we assure you that their effectiveness, reliability, and operating qualities will be a head above those of the already famous aircraft. If I can be a bit more specific, we are developing an aircraft that will not stall: an aircraft capable of returning to its own airfield using an automated instrument landing system in the event of an emergency egress by its pilot. There are also other innovations.

So tomorrow the very much improved SU-27 may turn out to be the grandfather in contrast to the winged innovation of our firm, and competitors will appear for "Pugachev's cobra" who seek not only more romantic names but also unprecedented glory.

In our view, several civilian aircraft developments cause interest. By way of illustration, the S-80 multirole short take-off and landing aircraft and the S-86 super-comfortable administrative aircraft that carries 6-8 passengers. And have we really not been enticed by the design of the S-21 12-passenger supersonic administrative aircraft which we are developing jointly with Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation (United States)? Or take the S-51 future supersonic passenger aircraft that is designed for 50 passengers and for direct flights to any airport of the European Continent.

For our OKB, tomorrow is not only aircraft and helicopters, but also hydrofoils.

[Krichevtsov] What has this to do with ships?

[Yakovlev] We understand your surprise. Meanwhile the OKB imeni Sukhoy never was a narrow-profile enterprise within its sector. The fighter-interceptor and ground attack aircraft, the fighter-bomber and the sports aircraft are on the credit side of our ledger. There was even experience in the development of a strategic bomber. But today the collective's scientific technical potential is such that it is capable of not only developing a wide spectrum of aircraft but also the ship theme. All the more so that many problems of aviation science and technology are closely interwoven with the problems of ship construction.

[Krichevtsov] It would seem that your firm's business is hitting an optimistic note. But are you not afraid that some design bureaus and aircraft plants may be closed after the reduction of the army and navy?

[Yakovlev] We would not want our OKB to end up on that anvil. All the more so that it has already survived elimination once. This occurred according to Stalin's will in 1949. At that time the collective was on a creative upsurge. The design bureau resumed its activities only

after the death of the "father of the people." And today its experts and developers are priceless. We are already doing much of what they are only dreaming of abroad or which they are planning to do in the next 3-5 years.

It is hard to imagine that even some aircraft plants can be closed. Each of them is a unique enterprise. It has been built over the years and the personnel have been formed over decades. It can be destroyed instantaneously.

[Krichevtsov] So, they made off with the aircraft plant a nut and bolt at a time. Later they suddenly remembered: they said, in vain. That has already occurred. How much time and money do we need to restore the enterprises?

[Alekseyev] It is practically impossible to restore a former plant. You can build a new one. But the previous experience and technology will turn out to be lost.

[Chernov] You do not have to go far for an example. There are masters of rare specialties—model makers at every aircraft plant. They make wooden or metal models of the aircraft being produced for wind-tunnel testing. Here we need special skills and instinct.

But not a single VUZ [higher educational institution] trains such experts. They are raised at the plant. And it is important that they pass their experience down from master to pupil and from generation to generation. If this process is interrupted, say, with the elimination of an enterprise, then it is already for a long time. And it is impossible for the time being to replace a model maker with a mathematical device because it will not reproduce the phenomenon of streamlining and the physical processes that occur in a wind tunnel.

[Yakovlev] Or take this illustration on that theme. We received a proposal quite recently from the United States: to rapidly build an exact copy of an ANT-25 aircraft for the 55th anniversary of the flight of Valeriy Chkalov's crew across the North Pole to America. Naturally, for a museum and for a great deal of money. The selection of our OKB was no accident. Pavel Osipovich Sukhoy headed the design effort for this aircraft. So the technologies and experts of the 1930's would be required for the recreation of this aircraft. There are none and even the most modern aircraft plant is incapable of rapidly carrying out this order.

Hence, to the resume: Contrary to the saying "To destroy—not to build, does not require a mind"—we do both the one and the other with our minds.

[Krichevtsov] And still the reduction of the Armed Forces and arms—this is a highway and no other path has been given to us, how do you see the prospects for the OKB imeni Sukhoy?

[Alekseyev] Much here depends on the policy of the Russian state and of the other CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states. If we sell military equipment, then the resources received will go toward preserving the collective's engineering potential and for gradual conversion. Otherwise so-called landslide conversion awaits us.

[Krichevtsov] We have come to the problem which is now on the lips of all defense industry employees. We continually have the opportunity to hear that conversion is either not occurring, is going poorly, or they are taking the ordinary collapse of the defense complex for conversion.

[Yakovlev] Our collective relates calmly to conversion. Everything that has been prescribed from above has been accomplished. We have developed a washing machine, a weighing machine, a washer, and even disc bicycle wheels (based on carbon-plastic) for the country's bicycle sport team.

[Krichevtsov] But is this really conversion? This is sooner some sort of additional assignments.

[Alekseyev] I will say more that we are not certain that these tasks have been fulfilled in the best manner. This is a new business for us.

[Krichevtsov] So would it not be better if you were involved with a business which you know and which you make at the level of world standards, and also higher?

[Yakovlev] That is what we are talking about. We are an aircraft firm and we must first of all create aircraft. Both for ourselves and for sale. Both military and civilian aircraft. This understanding of tasks and our collective's prospects arrived still prior to the officially proclaimed conversion. Our OKB's General Designer Mikhail Petrovich Simonov foresaw the inevitability of the shift from military production to peaceful production. Therefore, the conscious and gradual growth of designers into civilian themes has occurred.

[Chernov] Actually, the prelude of the future conversion was the SU-26 sports aircraft. While beginning to design it in 1988, the OKB clearly understood that it was undertaking a new business but a promising one.

Meanwhile not simply yet another sports aircraft was needed, but one that was capable of withstanding significantly greater operational G-loads that permit it to more fully realize the pilot's physiological capabilities. Yes and they began to build it from fundamentally new composite materials.

And it was developed. The entire USSR team performed for the first time not in "Yaks" but in the SU-26 aerobatic aircraft at the 13th high aerobatics world championship in Great Britain in August 1986. As a result, it won the team championship and the Nesterov Cup and also 16 medals of the 33 won.

[Krichevtsov] Therefore, the conversion of your OKB began painlessly?

[Alekseyev] Oh, if that were so! Serious conversion requires serious resources. Yes and preparation is

needed, and planned programs. These matters are not done just through a command or a desire.

At our OKB, the shift to civilian aircraft is being supported on the enthusiasm of our coworkers. We need to spend the money earned on these aircraft to renew production and to solve social problems. And quite a bit of money is needed.

In the meantime, we recently learned that the 1992 budget appropriations for our OKB have been substantially cut. Therefore, this will also be reflected in the rates of conversion.

[Krichevtsov] There are problems everywhere. We are beginning everything from zero. And if we turn to the experience of the Western countries?

[Yakovlev] The transformation of military production into civilian production signifies the end of the arms race and disarmament. And will you name many countries of that same NATO which are actively conducting precisely this policy? They have a stable military budget, they are not very concerned about resource savings, although they are not building or producing anything superfluous. Therefore, they do not have conversion, and more so landslide conversion, on their agenda.

Moreover Western companies and firms have many plans. They do not want to be restricted by narrow specialization. Say, an entire department of Boeing develops hydrofoils. Others produce, let us assume, tanks and at the same time any type of construction equipment. This permits them to flexibly react to market demands.

[Krichevtsov] Well and they have attained the market. No one can avoid it...

[Alekseyev] It is difficult to learn the ABC's of the market. Yes and the various levels of authority do not have a mutual understanding. For example, our collective has long thought that we need to sell the SU-27 aircraft. And there are those people who wish to purchase it and to pay well. With this money we could not only cheer up the firm but also help the capital. But no, the matter is not resulting in further conversations for now, we are pondering everything for some reason...

Yes, today it is the best fighter-interceptor in the world. But they will make a similar or even a better one tomorrow in the West. Meanwhile, we would also earn our keep. We would develop a new generation aircraft with the money earned.

[Chernov] The situation which has traditionally developed contrary to the laws of the market also does not suit us. As soon as the OKB sends documents to an aircraft plant, then it becomes the sole owner of the aircraft produced. Suddenly they forget that an enormous intellectual labor has been invested in the aircraft which must yield certain dividends to the developers.

Therefore, the time has come to create a single scientific-production complex which would include the OKB and the aircraft plants.

[Alekseyev] We hope that the market will also regulate our salaries. Until now, our salaries do not flow from labor's worth but are determined by eye. It is funny to compare ours with the incomes of American designers. Although our experts are no worse. Yes and our aircraft are valued abroad and it is profitable to sell them. That same SU-26 sells for \$200,000.

At one time, one of my colleagues traveled to the United States. They posed this question to him during a business conversation: "What do you think, how many years do Soviet aircraft designers lag behind American designers in the development of military aircraft?" He thought for a bit and said: "We are five years ahead of you..." "Why?"—amazement followed. "Because we and not you have created the best fighter-interceptor in the world—the SU-27," the guest rationally answered.

Nevertheless, increasing numbers of experts of our science-intensive sector, and of the Sukhoy firm in particular, are leaving for other work. Including into sales—as long as it pays more.

[Krichevtsov] That is sad. We are losing the intellect and national treasure. One would expect, will we find out that our fellow countrymen are following the path of Igor Sikorskiy? The hunt for our nuclear weapons experts is already going on...

[Yakovlev] Our collective still has no grounds for concern. Although I agree that we need to think about this.

My colleagues often perform temporary duty assignments abroad. They see how people live there. But no one has decided to leave forever. Certainly our man is organized in this way: Besides material benefits, he still needs spiritual stimuli and contact with the Homeland and with the roots of his ancestors. Take them away and he will be left an orphan, even if fed and clothed.

[Krichevtsov] And still, if you will need to add additional personnel, where are the sources of them?

[Alekseyev] We are emphasizing work with young people. We have good contact with students of Moscow Aviation Institute and other educational institutions. Incidentally, many of them participated in the development of the SU-26 and, as you see, quite successfully. A glider school has been created in Moscow and an aeroclub in Tula with the assistance of the Sukhoy firm. We are participating in the work of a lycee with an aviation slant. There we are discovering talented young people and we later cultivate personnel from them.

[Krichevtsov] You have discussed in detail the difficulties of entering the market. But does not the very fact of the disintegration of the USSR, the formation of separate states, and the resulting enormous market for sales of your product increase the firm's chances?

[Yakovlev] Only God knows what lies ahead waiting of us. And today only problems are being added.

We planned to live together for centuries. Consequently, we structured both our work and ties on the principles of specialization. Each republic was involved with certain research, development and deliveries of components. But with the beginning of sovereignization and the isolation of the republics and then also regional conflicts, these ties began to collapse. Aircraft plants, OKB's, NII's [Scientific Research Institutes], and test ranges turned out to be on different sides of ethnic cordons. Right now we are conducting negotiations and arguing until we are hoarse, we are sending each other a multitude of requests, and runners are traveling back and forth. As a result, we are losing the most precious thing—time.

[Krichevtsov] Vladimir Georgiyevich just said that America is attempting to acquire an ANT-25 for its museum for a lot of money. But was this legendary aircraft preserved in one of our museums?

[Chernov] Fortunately, yes. But several other aircraft and many test models have been irretrievably lost. Because there was neither a single policy on the preservation of the history of the Air Fleet nor a single museum. If something had been done, then it was only due to the enthusiasm of individual institutions and people. We take our hats off to the Air Force museum in Monino. But it has already been sending distress signals for a long time.

Now, it seems that a fundamental decision has been made at all levels. There will be a national museum of aviation and cosmonautics. It will spread out right near the walls of our OKB, that is, on the territory of the Central Airport imeni Frunze. With time it will be a powerful instrument of patriotic education, a unique seat of culture, and a rest area for Moscow residents and capital guests. Naturally, the museum will need aid and sponsors so that it will not be transformed into some sort of long-term construction project and so that its life is organized on the example of and will resemble the world's best museums.

[Krichevtsov] I am convinced, honored guests, that the very labor of your collective is first of all a deeply patriotic cause. Without people like you, there would be neither aircraft, museums, nor a great aviation power—no matter what you call it—the USSR, the Russian Federation, or the CIS. Thank you for this and for the interesting conversation.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Response to Gareyev Commentary on Doctrine

92UM0813A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Mar 92 First Edition p 2

[Letter from General Staff Military Academy Strategy Department Deputy Chief Major-General A. Skvortsov: "Who Should Approve Military Doctrine?"]

[Text] After the publication of General of the Army M. Gareyev's "Yest li u Rossii svoy interes?" [Does Russia Have Interests of Its Own?] (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 February 1992) the number of letters in which our readers shared their thoughts on the problems of military policy, military reform and military doctrine noticeably increased.

Today, we offer one of them.

I must agree with General of the Army M. Gareyev that it is practically impossible to set forth the entire sum total of a state's views on war, and the methods and techniques for conducting war in the event it cannot be prevented, in some sort of single, document taken separately. And there is no need for it. But nevertheless the absence of an officially adopted, legally reinforced document with a basic code of fundamental doctrinal tenets appears to be intolerable in a democratic rule-of-law state.

Strictly speaking, a "Document on the Warsaw Pact Member-States' Military Doctrine" was adopted at the Berlin session of the Political Consultative Committee in 1987 but not the military doctrine of this bloc. It was the first and, as yet, the only instance in our history of the elaboration, official acceptance, and open publication of the primary, and mainly political, tenets of the coalition of states' military doctrine. And that is its value. At that time, the adoption of this document was a marked event of international life.

Right now, few of the experts involved with military policy and also professional military personnel dispute the need for the existence of a military doctrine of states, the union of states or the commonwealth. There are also no fundamental disagreements with regard to a list of primary problems and issues to which precise, clear answers should be provided in military doctrine. However, the very mechanism of its elaboration, approval, and more accurate definition has, until now in my opinion, not been clearly developed which is having a negative impact on the resolution of many problems of military policy in recent years.

In the contemporary interpretation, military doctrine is a system of officially adopted views on war and its prevention, military structural development, preparation of the country and the Armed Forces to repel possible aggression, and the methods and techniques for conducting combat operations in the event a war is unleashed. I would like to direct your attention to: a system of officially adopted views in a state. In contrast to that, Frunze defined doctrine as a "doctrine [ucheniye] adopted in the army of this state...". Consequently, under contemporary conditions, military doctrine is concerned with all state structures and to a certain extent affects all spheres of vital activity of some country or coalition.

Hence, it follows that military doctrine cannot and must not be elaborated by military experts alone. This work must be legislatively assigned to specific organs of state

rule. Of course, CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] OVS [Unified Armed Forces] Main Headquarters representatives, the General Staff and military scholars must very actively participate in it. But, clearly, the elaboration of military doctrine should nevertheless be conducted either in the National (State) Security Council, in the Defense Council, or in some special organ under the President (head of state). The highest legislative organ should necessarily approve the military doctrine's most important conceptual tenets in the form of a special law.

The adoption of this law is not only possible, but necessary because the basic precepts of military doctrine affect an absolute majority of the ministries, departments, organs and institutes of state power.

Secondly, this law must not at all replace the various regulations and other documents that regulate the lives and activities of the troops and naval forces. It should contain only the basic, most fundamental tenets that affect the political and military-technical aspects of military doctrine. The elaboration of legislative and normative acts will be carried out based on these tenets. These acts are also needed for the stable functioning of the Armed Forces and all activities of the army and navy are structured based on them.

Here, we should note the exceptional importance of the political and strategic goals and missions of the state that are defined beforehand, the prioritized directions of its external and internal policies, and the discovery of primary sources of threats to national (state) security. Military doctrine should flow from the concept of national security and is its organic continuation. But if that is so, then obviously it is advisable to initially create the general, that is, this concept, and then to elaborate a personal—military doctrine based on it. You can become convinced of the results of the reverse sequence through the example of elaborating the military reform concept and Armed Forces reform. We have already been trying for many years to resolve these very complex problems, without having precise final orientation points.

Thirdly, the formulation of a military doctrine as a "system of officially adopted views" without precise instructions concerning at what level and in which form they should be adopted allows easy manipulation of doctrinal precepts in the future if desired. We will not forget that, even in the recent past, individual thoughts and quotations from the speeches or articles of various party and state leaders belonged to the rank of tenets of military doctrine.

Finally, legislative reinforcement of doctrinal tenets should not signify that they will never be changed. We only need to perfect the mechanism to make corrections, additions and changes to military doctrine but, as a rule, which originate from the heads of the political leadership and not from the leaders of the military department. Right now, at this critical stage of the development of

our Fatherland, when the problems of forming military doctrines for each sovereign state and the Commonwealth inevitably arise, we need to consider the mistakes of the past in order to not repeat them once again.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Interview Examines Czechoslovak Military Doctrine

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[Interview with Antonin Rashets, deputy minister of defense of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, by L. Svoboda, OBRANA LIDU correspondent; place and date not given: "How the CSFR's Military Doctrine Is Being Implemented"]

[Text] The content of military doctrines and the situation in the armies of the former Warsaw Pact allies continue to interest readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. At your request, a correspondent of OBRANA LIDU interviewed the deputy minister of defense of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic [CSFR] for social and humanitarian issues, Dr. Antonin Rashets.

[Svoboda] The events of recent years are quickly changing the geopolitical situation in Europe. In countries that at one time were part of the Warsaw Pact, processes are taking place unlike anywhere in the world. In these conditions, I would like to find out what Czechoslovakia sees as the guarantee of its renewed sovereignty?

[Rashets] We are counting on the inviolability of the democratic development in Europe and in the world, and also on the fact that its patterns will lead to creation of a collective European, and later world, security. True, that is still in the relatively distant future.

We have good relations with our neighbors and are consistently concluding treaties with them on friendship and cooperation. We are laying the foundation for cooperation with states in the same stage of democratic development as we are in: with Poland and Hungary. We are sharing experience, getting to know one another better, cooperating in the economic area, and mutually supporting our foreign policy actions. We do not support creating a military bloc, but will cooperate with one another in strengthening each of our state's defense. We also believe that although the time is not right for us to join NATO, this organization is being transformed in the direction of ensuring the security of all democratic countries of Europe.

[Svoboda] The new Czechoslovak military doctrine is based on the principle of defense sufficiency. How is it being implemented?

[Rashets] We are transforming our army from the first echelon of the former Warsaw Pact, having offensive

missions and an organizational structure and command and control corresponding to them, into a defensive army. We are implementing the defense concept by cutting the personnel strength of the armed forces (before, the Czechoslovak Army had a strength of 1.27 percent of the country's population and was one of the largest armies of Europe, unlike neighboring Austria, for example, with its army comprising 0.6 percent of the country's population). In accordance with the results of the Vienna negotiations on disarmament and the Paris Accords, the personnel strength of the Czechoslovak Army will be reduced by 60,000 by 1993, that is, by roughly one-third, and by the year 2000 we would like to reduce army personnel to a level of less than 100,000. In doing this, we are guided by the principle of defense sufficiency: our neighbors should not fear our army, and we do not want to fear a potential attack.

We are orienting ourselves on increasing mobility and modernizing the army. We are redeploying troops throughout the territory of the CSFR, and not just in the western part as was the case before. For example, 38 percent of all personnel of the Czechoslovak Army will be stationed in Slovakia.

We are beginning to make an all-volunteer army: already now some positions of compulsory-service personnel are being shifted to a 2- to 3-year contract. This involves the most complicated specialties such as tank driver-mechanics. Training specialists for these specialties is unprofitable when we switch to 12-month compulsory service beginning in 1998. We want to raise the level of professional training of officers and warrant officers of the Czechoslovak Army by introducing modern forms of instruction and combat training, as well as by creating various systems of service growth, intended both for the short term and for the maximum possible time of service.

It is planned to accomplish more intensively the transition of skilled specialists from civilian life into the army. We want to turn the military profession into a highly skilled profession, suitable for use in civilian life, and thereby attractive for young people, who will know that service in the army, if they return to civilian life, will mean a good recommendation and have certain advantages.

Professionalization will take place gradually: by 1997 some 60 percent and by the year 2000 about 75 percent of army personnel, depending on the state's economic capabilities. We are proceeding from the thesis that moving completely to a professional basis would not be effective for our small country. Therefore, in the future we will continue to count on compulsory-service soldiers and engage in training reserves.

[Svoboda] The process of breaking up Yugoslavia is a serious warning to all multi-ethnic states, including the CSFR. How is the Czechoslovak Army reacting to the disputes between Czech and Slovak representatives concerning the state-legal system?

[Rashets] According to its missions, the Czechoslovak Army acts as the guarantor of statehood and sovereignty, not as a political institution. The federative state is an instrument against external threat to sovereignty; it ensures defense of the entire territory against attack. It is to this end that the redeployment of troops is being conducted in accordance with defense plans (38 percent of the troops are in Slovakia). All this requires a proportional ethnic composition of the army, including in all command positions, a uniform distribution of the training base throughout the country, and so forth.

Ethnic problems in the army are not typical, but rather are the exception, for example, as the result of the activities of the Association of Slovak Servicemen, which unites a small number of people. There are practically no ethnic problems among officer personnel. A sociological study conducted in the air forces, for example, showed that pilots have no "complex" over which republic they are stationed in. Many officers have mixed marriages. This is because the aviation schools are located in Slovakia, where many Czech officer cadets married Slovak women, and the reverse is also true, Slovak graduates have married Czech women while serving in combat units located primarily in Czechy. A comparison with Yugoslavia is hardly legitimate, since we have a totally different history of mutual relations.

[Svoboda] Representatives of the Czechoslovak Army (including you) have established contacts with the armies and leadership of NATO. What do you expect from these mutual visits and talks?

[Rashets] Meetings with representatives of NATO and contacts between soldiers of the Czechoslovak Army and officers and soldiers of armies of NATO countries quickly eliminate estrangement and contribute to the development of mutual trust and cooperation. We are becoming familiar in practice with the methods of combat training and organizational development of the armies of developed democratic states. For example, we learned much about control of the army on the part of society and about training and education of soldiers of the French, German, Dutch, American, and other armies. A number of observations are helping us in the democratic transformation of the army, although the experience gained must be introduced according to our specific conditions, which differ from the conditions of countries with a durable legal system, high economic indicators, and consistent development of the armies.

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