


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15 October 1992



# ***JPRS Report***

# **Near East & South Asia**

***ISRAEL***



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# Near East & South Asia

## ISRAEL

JPRS-NEA-92-135

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## Regional Affairs

### Yemeni Jews on Status, Contacts With Israel

92AE0632A London AL-WASAT in Arabic 24 Aug 92  
pp 22-25

[Article by 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Mu'ayyad: "AL-WASAT Interviews Yemeni Jews in Their Capital"]

[Text] Sa'dah—Several international delegations and notables, some representing international Jewish organizations, have visited Yemen in recent months within the context of an "organized campaign" to persuade Jews living in the Republic to emigrate to Israel. The latest delegation to visit Sanaa was a World Jewish League delegation. This delegation, headed by an American named Lester (Smerca) [as published], spent a week in the Yemeni capital at the beginning of this month to discuss the question of immigration of Yemeni Jews. Its presence was engulfed in secrecy, and its members were in constant contact with the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa to obtain entry visas for Jews wishing to go to the United States. The delegation met representatives of the Jewish community in Yemen, but it has been reported that it did not manage to meet with any Yemeni officials. Informed sources in Sanaa have said that the delegation convinced "just one Jewish family" to leave Yemen for another country, most likely the United States.

But who are Yemen's Jews? What is their number? How do they live and think? What type of relationships do they have with other Yemenis and with the Yemeni authorities? These questions and others are answered by AL-WASAT in this exclusive report from 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Mu'ayyad, its correspondent in Sanaa.

Before Israel was created, there were 70,000 Yemeni Jews, but a large number of them immigrated to Israel or to other countries in the late 1940's and early 1950's. Today, there remains in Yemen a small number of Jews, ranging from 2,000 to 3,500 people.

The biggest gathering of Jews in Yemen is in Sa'dah, 245 km from Sanaa.

Sa'dah is a historical city and one of Yemen's most famous cities because of its Islamic sciences and manuscripts. Sa'dah Governorate's population currently amounts to 1.5 million people. AL-WASAT visited Sa'dah and interviewed a number of representatives of the Jewish community on various affairs and issues. It can be said that Sa'dah is now the capital of Yemen's Jews. We went through the new Sa'dah to the old walled city across the Yemen Gate, one of the old city's three gates. At the gate, we paused before a number of silver-smithing and silver jewelry shops that are owned by Jews. Here, the first link of the dialogue with the Jews began.

The first contact with the Jews was very difficult. A number of them declined to talk to us or to permit us to take their pictures. One of them said: "We have talked

recently to a number of journalists and treated them with respect, but they offended us by distorting our statements." After a long argument and debate, we agreed to hold an afternoon meeting at the shop of a Jew from Sa'dah who promised to get together a number of his community members to talk with us.

It must be said that there are two interesting things about Yemeni Jews:

First, Yemeni Jews, like some other Yemeni citizens, have not been inclined to replace their popular attire with pants and shirts, not even in the cities. What distinguishes Jews from others is no more than the "belt." The Jews here wear a turban wrapped around the head; a zannah, the ordinary robe; a belt around the waist; a vest; and a coat. Some Jews, especially the clergymen, are distinguished by a special vest. It is tantamount to a piece of cloth that is nearly 1 meter long and a half-meter wide. This cloth has an opening, and it sits around the neck like a collar, with the front half flowing down the chest and the rear half flowing down the back.

Second, the names of the Jews are common among the people, such as Yahya, 'Aydah, Sa'id, Sa'd, Salim, and Mu'awwad. Moreover, some names that are considered exclusively Jewish or Christian in some Arab countries are common among Muslims and Jews here, such as Sulayman, Da'ud [or Dawud], Ishaq, Ya'qub, Musa, and Harun.

We went to the designated place that afternoon. It was a shop for selling and repairing traditional jewelry. We sat on the covered floor, with cushions spread around for us to lean on in the well-known Yemeni style.

### Dialogue With Jews

We started the dialogue with a number of representatives of the Jewish community in Sa'dah. The first question we asked was:

[AL-WASAT] Are there contacts currently between Yemeni Jews and Israelis for the purpose of organizing immigration to Tel Aviv?

[Jews] We consider the State of Yemen responsible for us, and we do not condone any contact with any party except through this state. We hear about Zionism, and we hear that it contradicts true Judaism. Yes, a delegation did come here—a delegation of U.S. Jews, not from Israel. None of them talked to us about immigration.

[AL-WASAT] And how about you, don't you want to immigrate to Israel?

[Jews] No. We wish to visit Jerusalem, and there are those among us who wish to go to the United States. A group of us went there recently.

[AL-WASAT] Why?

[Jews] To seek work.

[AL-WASAT] Does this mean that you all wish to immigrate to the United States?

[Jews] No, only some want to immigrate because they have heard that work is available and income is high there. But others do not want to leave the country. [end collective response]

One of them commented: "I, for example, cannot leave this place. If I stay in Sanaa for a single day, I feel uneasy and I do not relax until I return. Just to Sanaa, let alone to Israel."

Another man said: "The Yemeni authorities do not grant us passports with which to travel."

[AL-WASAT] How come, considering that you have said that a number of Jews have gone to the United States?

[Jew] I do not know. I, for example, have applied for a passport but have not gotten approval yet.

[AL-WASAT] You know that travel from Yemen to Israel is banned.

[Jews] Yes, we know this.

[AL-WASAT] Do Jews who are spread over Sa'dah Governorate meet from time to time.

[Jews] We meet at weddings and similar occasions.

[AL-WASAT] Does one individual bring you together in his capacity as the religious or social chief of the community?

[Jews] No, no one person can bring us together because our hearts are as hard as rock.

[AL-WASAT] Do you celebrate weddings as you wish, and how?

[Jews] Yes, we celebrate them as we wish. Our wedding customs are exactly the same as the customs among other Yemenis. Even our wedding procession is the same (with some difference in the words).

[AL-WASAT] And what about dowries?

[Jews] They are very high. They have reached 300,000 riyals. This is a catastrophe that is acceptable to nobody.

[AL-WASAT] And how come you have accepted it?

[Jews] Necessity has its dictates.

[AL-WASAT] How about religious issues, such as marriage contracts, divorce, and worship? Who is in charge of these affairs?

[Jews] The seniors among us, whether in learning or in age, including Sa'id 'Aydah Zarib, Abu-Salim Zarib, and 'Aydah Zarib, as far as marriage and divorce are concerned. As for worship, any of us can lead prayers.

[AL-WASAT] How and where do you perform prayers?

[Jews] We perform them with utter freedom, and nobody ever objects to us or harasses us.

[AL-WASAT] Where?

[Jews] At the prayer place, which is a house where we meet on Saturdays. Yusuf Bak'al [name as published] had expressed his readiness to pay the cost of building us a synagogue here, but we have not been able to do it.

[AL-WASAT] Who is this Yusuf Bak'al?

[Jews] An American Jew who came [visiting] here a few months ago.

[AL-WASAT] In his name or in the name of an organization or an association?

[Jews] We do not know. We did not ask him.

[AL-WASAT] What has prevented its construction?

[Jews] We have been afraid of the zealous followers of the new creed in our religion.

[AL-WASAT] Have you raised this issue with the governorate officials?

[Jews] No.

#### **We Are All Persecuted**

[AL-WASAT] Have you heard what Israel is saying about the conditions of Yemeni Jews, namely that they are persecuted, their rights are undermined, they are denied the right to worship, and some of their women have been kidnapped?

[Jew] (This question aroused a mixture of laughter and condemnation, and one of those present answered it, saying:)

We, the citizens of Yemen, whether from the ranks of the government or of the people, are all persecuted by poverty. There is no other kind of persecution. Yemeni Jews are like the rest of the Yemenis. The only difference is in religion. Our rights are preserved, and we are secure in our homes and our worship rites. Nobody stops us. As for women, no Yemeni could offend a woman, be she Jewish or Muslim, because this is a disgrace. If somebody does such a thing, people get mad at him. I live in a house belonging to al-Naqib (tribe). They charge me no rent, and they have given me and my children full control over the house. Moreover, they supply me with fruits and vegetables (grapes, pomegranates, plums, apricots, zucchini, onions, and tomatoes) from their farms each day. I have restored this house as if it were my own. I tell you frankly that the tribes (he uses the word tribes to denote non-Jews) quarrel and may harm each other, but the Jew has a special status and nobody harms or harasses him. Here, Jews are the neighbors of shaykhs. A shaykh gets enraged [if a Jew is harmed], and his rage does not subside until he gets for the Jew twofold the Jew's right. These Yemeni traditions are deep-rooted among the tribes and the Jews.

[AL-WASAT] Do you pay the shaykh anything in return?

[Jews] No, nothing, because this is a part of the shaykh's task. The inverse is what happens, meaning that the shaykh gives his Jewish neighbors what they may need or request.

[AL-WASAT] What about the jizyah [head tax on non-Muslims] that is paid by Jews? Do you pay it to the government?

[Jews] Yes, we pay it. But it counters the alms tax that Muslims pay each year. We pay no alms tax. Second, it is a small amount that is paid by the head of the family for everybody. Family members are not required to pay anything.

[AL-WASAT] How much is the head of the family required to pay each year?

[Jews] He only pays 75 riyals annually (the entire sum equals nearly 1.5 pounds sterling). Despite this, we cheat the government in paying this small sum.

#### Crafts and Businesses

[AL-WASAT] What is the story of the private Jewish school that we have heard about?

[Jews] A private school for Jews. A U.S. Jewish organization will shoulder its expenses and pay the rent for its premises.

[AL-WASAT] What about teachers and teaching materials?

[Jews] Four Jews from here will teach at the school. They will teach religion and Hebrew from 0800 to 1000. Then a Yemeni teacher (Muslim) from the region will teach the students Arabic and English.

[AL-WASAT] How do you like this school?

[Jews] We teach our children at home. The school is new, and it has produced no benefit yet. What makes us want to emigrate to the United States is to see our children learn and get married.

[AL-WASAT] Do you consider marriage one of the goals of emigration to the United States?

[Jew] Of course. I have six sons. How can I get them married when dowries are so expensive in Yemen?

[AL-WASAT] You have no objection to them marrying American women?

[Jew] Of course not, provided that the woman is Jewish.

[AL-WASAT] What about your businesses and crafts here?

[Jews] Our work and our crafts here, such as blacksmithing, leather working, and silversmithing, were the best. But conditions have changed, and income from these activities has declined greatly. All of these crafts have

ended and they no longer produce any noteworthy benefit, excluding the traditional silver jewelry industry. The reason is that similar imports compete with local industries and people choose imports because they are cheaper. For example, an imported al-Karak (a type of coat made from black sheepskin and embroidered externally with velvet) costs 300 riyals, while a local al-Karak costs 1,000 riyals.

[AL-WASAT] And what is the most profitable local industry now?

[Jews] It is the al-khass (delicate spiny branches of a brush locally called "ghass," from which various kinds of baskets are made). It is in demand abroad. All of our women have taken up this craft, and they produce more income than their husbands.

#### With Sa'dah Governor

To cover all aspects of the matter, we went to the Sa'dah Governorate headquarters to record the opinions of the officials there on some of the issues concerning Jews.

On private schools and the education of Jews, Sa'dah Governor Muhammad 'Ali al-Qayrahi said to AL-WASAT: "This U.S. Jewish organization is working to set up Jewish schools in Sa'dah, Hayran, and Raydah. We have no objection, but we prefer to see them enroll in general education schools to arm themselves with general certificates. It is possible to exempt them from Islamic studies. Private schools will cause them to be isolated from the rest of the citizens."

About their travel to the outside world, the governor said, "Jews, like other citizens, are permitted to go to any place in the world except Israel. A number of them have gone abroad and returned. Four months ago, I met one of them at London Airport while he was on his way back from treatment. We traveled on the same plane."

Deputy Governor Yahya al-Shayif spoke to AL-WASAT, reaffirming what the governor had said. He added: "Delegations came here from the West to familiarize themselves with the conditions of the Jews and to meet with them. They included a delegation from the British House of Commons that was accompanied by the British ambassador in Sanaa. We received and hosted this delegation. Its members saw the conditions of the Jews here, met with the Jews, and listened to them. The delegation returned pleased, and they gave us a gift in the form of a gold medallion from the adviser to the British queen. We have also received a letter of thanks from the British foreign secretary for the facilities we offered the delegation. The delegation asked us to provide the Jews in Sa'dah with a mailbox and telephone lines so that they can have a firm and direct address. We have already given instructions for this be secured for them. We have also given Jews here special attention. We meet with them from time to time to find out what their problems are and to solve them. We have agreed to enroll their sons and daughters in public schools and to exempt them from Islamic studies. We have also asked those of them

who have the ability and the desire to take up government jobs. We facilitate this for them. We have also instructed Social Security to examine their living conditions so that monthly stipends can be allocated for them.

[AL-WASAT] What about building a synagogue for their religious rites?

[Al-Shayif] We have not heard about this, and they have not applied to us for anything of the sort. We do not know that anybody has approved it or prohibited it. Zionist propaganda will not end, and it is based fundamentally on falsehood. By the way, I recall that an American Jew, perhaps a rabbi, came here, met with the Jews, and warned them against Zionism, assuring them that it is in conflict with Judaism.

AL-WASAT also met with Shaykh Husayn Fayid Mujalli, one of the region's chiefs, and asked him about the question of neighborliness. He said, "neighborliness is sacred, and God has urged taking care of the neighbor. The Jew among us is under the shaykh's protection, and nobody can harm him, his property, or his rights. When anything of the sort occurs, and it rarely does, the shaykhs impose 'double and triple' indemnity on the perpetrator. The Jews pay nothing for this protection. Rather, we give them protection because they are neighbors."

#### Change in Syrian Attitude Questioned

92AE0679E Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 18 Sep 92 p 5

[Article by S. Peri: Yehoshu'a Porat and Patrick Sill provide different opinions of Syria's change in attitude; boldface words as published]

[Text] The president of Syria, Hafiz al-Asad, is calling for a "peace of the courageous." Has a true change occurred in the position of the "fox from Damascus," and is he looking for peace? What will we get from the Syrians, and what price will Israel be forced to pay? Two experts, two opinions:

**Professor Yehoshu'a Porat, from the Department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Hebrew University:** I can interpret the "peace of the courageous" only according to the source of the expression. This is a term coined by French president, Charles de Gaulle, for the definition of peace with the Algerian underground, and its meaning is: peace between sworn enemies, in which one of the two sides makes far-reaching concessions.

The Syrians anticipate that Israel will make such a far-reaching concession and will return all of the Golan Heights. In return, they are prepared for a "complete truce." Absolutely no more than this.

It must be understood that nothing has changed with al-Asad. He does not intend to have a peace treaty that would open a new page in relations. He does not propose

open borders or economic cooperation and mutual trade, nor our embassy in Damascus, nor theirs with us.

This is what al-Asad and his subordinates say openly and, as far as I know, it is also what the Syrians proposed in Washington. Therefore, Rabin wants to examine exactly what they mean when they say "peace."

Al-Asad is not using the word "peace" from today or yesterday. It has already appeared with us for 10 years. But the "peace" in the Syrian sense is a watery, indefinable state, that could extend for many generations and does not require conduct that would answer to the expectations of the Israeli public.

In Radio Damascus broadcasts, they claim that the Golan must be returned to Syria on the strength of Resolution 242, without negotiations, and, thus, by itself, "peace will prevail." They also explain that, until 1967 "there was peace" with Israel. That is, they want the Golan and, in exchange, they are willing to give us the situation as it was before 1967.

According to the Syrians, after Israel becomes committed to a retreat from all of the Golan Heights, they will agree to discuss security arrangements. We must pay attention to their demand. They demand bilateral demilitarization: Syria will demilitarize the Golan, and Israel will have to demilitarize the Galilee.

In the existing situation, Israel must wish for an agreement in which the water sources would remain in its hands. There is no need for control over all of the Golan Heights, aside from a 10-kilometer-wide strip east of the Kineret and over the water sources.

In circumstances where the Syrians receive only part of the Golan, in any case they will not agree to a peace treaty, and, in my opinion it is also not worthwhile to ask it of them. A peace treaty with them, in any case, would not be any different than a cease-fire agreement. After all, this is what is also happening with Egypt.

But a cease-fire agreement could stand in place for a very long while, and it would be easier for the Syrians to swallow. Thus, they would not have to break al-Asad's military oath not repeat "Sadat's betrayal."

**British commentator, Patrick Sill, who is close to al-Asad and author of his semiofficial biography:** "Peace of the courageous," from al-Asad's viewpoint, is a peace for which Israel would be willing to pay the price. The formula is simple enough: If Israel is interested in peace, it must withdraw to the 1967 borders and give up the occupied territory. No partial solution will lead to a secure and stable settlement. If they agree only to a partial withdrawal, there will not be a true peace with Syria. A partial withdrawal will lead to a partial settlement.

I know that you are used to calling al-Asad "the fox" and "the shrewd one," and I think that these descriptions are quite an exaggeration. Al-Asad is definitely interested in an honorable peace settlement with Israel, and he has

talked of this since 1974. I do not agree with the determination that a change is occurring with him.

Al-Asad has already been on the seat of power in Damascus for many years. He would like to crown his period of rule with a combined achievement: a return of the Golan Heights and a settlement with Israel. And I say to Prime Minister Rabin: If you want peace with Syria, al-Asad is your partner. There is a basis for a common language between Rabin and al-Asad, and al-Asad also demonstrated this. He knew to propose immediately to Rabin, who has a defense consciousness, the defense arrangements, demilitarization, and the means for the maximum safeguard of the state of Israel's defense.

It is a mistake to think that al-Asad means, in all, a state of cease-fire. We have passed this stage. The region is now ready for much more: open borders, diplomatic relations, recognition of the sovereignty of every country.

After 44 years of hostility, it would not be thinkable to jump from a state of almost war to normal, warm relations. But a situation similar to that of your peace with Egypt could definitely result. If an atmosphere of good will could be created between you and Syria, it would be possible to combine the positive ingredients for the peace treaty ahead of time.

The negotiations agreement is, indeed, very disappointing. But, if the two sides would demonstrate courage and would have a sweep of vision, it will be possible to reach a settlement. And that is the reason that I am very satisfied by the fact that Rabin appointed Professor Itamar Rabinovitz to conduct the negotiations with the Syrians. I know him, he is fair, knowledgeable, and will do much to create a good atmosphere.

I would like to emphasize: The Syrians also understand that they must pay a price. From their viewpoint, there would be open borders with Israel, opening a Syrian embassy in Israel, the end of the Arab embargo, the end to the era of hostility and fighting, and adopting Israel into the Middle Eastern family.

The Syrian public knows well that negotiations are being conducted that could return the Golan Heights and bring about a peace settlement with Israel. The Syrian citizen is addicted to the news, and he follows, listens, and takes an interest. The citizens of Syria also understand the significance of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the destruction of Iraq, and the daily problems. They want to live better lives.

Nevertheless, changes should not be anticipated just yet, while official negotiations are being held. Both sides must play the game carefully, and watch their cards well. The Syrians, one must not forget, have not yet found positive proof that Israel is willing to end the occupation and give up territory.

**Desalination Plan To Increase Jordan River Flow**  
*93AE0014A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Sep 92 p B2*

[Article by Yerah Tal: "Jordan, Israel, and Syria Will Draw From the Kinneret"]

[Text] Avraham Katz-'Oz, head of the Israeli delegation to the water issues working group discussions, announced in Washington last week, at the conclusion of another round of multilateral peace talks, that Israel had consented to the Jordanian request to draw an aberrant amount of water from the Yarmulke, estimated at 3.5 million cubic meters. This step was, indeed, perceived as a powerful gesture on the part of Israel, but in light of the many vicissitudes in the water problem between Israel and her neighbors, it is doubtful if this is a real concession. That water that Israel apparently gave up may never have belonged to her.

In the years 1953-1955 Eric Johnston, President Eisenhower's special envoy, put together a plan for solving the conflict between Israel and her neighbors to the east over the use of the waters of the Jordan River and its sources. According to the Johnston plan, Israel was to receive most of the water she required from the Jordan; the Hashemite Kingdom was to get its water from the Yarmulke; Syria, from the Banias and the Yarmulke; and Lebanon, from the Hatzbani.

In February 1955, Israel accepted the program, but the Arab League postponed its decision and promised to find other solutions for the utilization of the Jordan waters and their distribution. In 1964, when the National Water Carrier was being set up, the Arab summit conference decided to prevent Israel from transferring water from the Sea of Galilee to the Negev. Syria tried to divert the waters of the Banias, and Jordan built the Muhayba dam on the Yarmulke. When the Syrians began their diversion of the Banias, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] began to bomb the work sites and destroy the equipment. Syria was forced to stop the diversion activity, but the tension remained. Increasing border incidents between Israel and Syria against this background continued up until the 1967 war and were among its causes.

Since the conclusion of the war, the Johnston plan has existed in practice with each country using the water sources within its territorial boundaries. But the Jordanians got the short end of the stick. Jordan uses about 25 percent of the waters of the Yarmulke via the eastern 'Ur canal. About 100 to 150 million cubic meters of water on average per year, which constitute the winter floods on the Yarmulke, flow to Jordan and are lost in the Dead Sea. The Jordanians had planned to trap those waters by means of the Maqrin dam, which was planned for the upper Yarmulke, but to this day that dam has not been built because of the veto imposed on it by Israel. The World Bank, which was to have financed the construction of the dam, will not authorize the financing because of the Israeli opposition, and the Jordanians have no

alternate sources of financing. All of this has caused a worsening water crisis in Jordan, to the point of supplying water in several cities for only certain hours each day. Today there is no more water for distribution from the sources of the Jordan.

Jordan demands a revision in the distribution of the sources of the Jordan, the Palestinians demand exclusive control over the waters on the West Bank, and the Syrians demand the waters of the Banias. Israel refuses all of these demands. The gesture announced by Katz-'Oz is like a drop in the sea, which cannot solve the Jordanians' serious water problem. Not just that, but the waters of the Yarmulke, that Israel has apparently given up, are not actually within her territory. Only a small portion of the Yarmulke is in Israeli territory, in the area where the borders of Israel, Syria, and Jordan come together.

Progress in the bilateral discussions with Jordan and the Palestinians, as well as with Syria, depends to a large degree on a solution to the water problem, and that is possible only by developing new water sources in the Jordan Valley.

The Washington Near East Policy Institute recently published two programs for regional cooperation on the water issue in the Middle East, one propounded by Muqtar Hadadin, a Jordanian, and the other, by Shlomo Gur, an Israeli. The Hadadin program talks about digging a canal from Eilat to the Dead Sea that would exploit the differences in elevation (about 400 m) to create energy, while the water would help raise the level of the Dead Sea and perhaps also be used for irrigation. Shlomo Gur's program, which was designed back before the establishment of the State of Israel, is somewhat similar to the Hadadin plan, and in the past Gur had already proposed it to all the Israeli Governments, to the Jordanians, and to the Americans.

The Gur plan talks about sending the waters of the Mediterranean through a canal, from the Gulf of Haifa across the valleys, to a reverse osmosis desalination facility to be set up in the Beyt She'an valley near kibbutz Ma'oz Haim. In Gur's opinion, because of the difference in elevation between the Mediterranean Sea and the Beyt She'an valley (about 400 m) it is possible to save about 60 percent of the energy consumption needed for the desalination process itself. According to him, the potential exists for the desalination of about 1.3 billion cubic meters of water per year, and the desalinated water would flow into the Sea of Galilee and serve as a water source for the countries of the region—first and foremost for Israel and Jordan, and then also for Syria. At the first stage, Gur proposes to desalinate 800 million cubic meters per year at a financial investment of about 3.5 billion dollars, via monies from the World Bank and perhaps also via aid money from the economic powers such as Japan, who have expressed a readiness to assist in furthering peace in the region. Gur suggests that the project be a joint one between Israel and the Kingdom of

Jordan, and they would then determine the implementation phases and the water ceilings to be given to each country. According to him, this is the only possible solution that does not carry with it the baggage of historical claims.

For the Jordanians, who suffer from a severe water shortage, this is the only practical alternative, both from the point of view of the amount of water and from the point of view of the financing possibilities. This is an attractive program for Israel, too, Gur stresses. Israel finds itself today on the threshold of the seawater desalination era, and the desalination industry is very expensive. The increased water that the program would supply would facilitate the restoration and balance of the aquifers along the coastal strip and would prevent a water shortage in Israel.

Unlike the two seas canal program adopted by the Begin Government, the Gur program takes the Jordanians more into account and allows them to enjoy its fruits, as well. "The principle of cooperation is not just a means for achieving economic solutions but is property in the political sphere. Israel could derive political advantage as an intended result of regional planning," says Gur. But he is unhappy about its having been proposed as part of an American document. "Instead of our initiating the proposal of such a program, and thus scoring points in world political opinion and with our neighbors, we left the initiative to the Americans. If we do not take the initiative the Americans will, in the final analysis, force such programs on us, and it is therefore better for us to take the initiative," he says. In his opinion, the announcement by Katz-'Oz on the matter of allowing the Jordanians to draw a larger amount of water from the Yarmulke is nothing but a cover for the lack of initiative and action on the Israeli side.

#### **Gur Proposed, Husayn Added**

Shlomo Gur, about 80, was involved in several of the large Zionist projects in the country. He initiated the design of the National Water Carrier and participated, among other things, in the construction of the Hebrew University on Giv'at Ram, the Tel Aviv campus at Shaykh Munis, and the Israel Museum in Jerusalem. For 50 years he has diligently planned for what he considers the largest project, turning the Jordan valley, between the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea, into a valley of peace with hydroelectric plants, tourist lakes, and ultra-modern desalination facilities that would solve the water problems of Israel and Jordan.

That the Americans should have presented his program is surprising since it has been well-known to decision-makers in Israel since the 'Eshqol Government. In 1965, upon conclusion of the National Water Carrier project, of which Gur was one of the proponents, it seemed that Israel's water problem had come to a final solution. The Six Day War changed that assumption, and Israel found herself holding territories that included the Jordan valley. No one remembered any more that in the original



agreement for water distribution in the north there was also talk of infusing Mediterranean Sea water into the Jordan, so as not to hurt the Dead Sea. The prime minister at the time, Levi 'Eshqol, invited in Gur, who was already known as an expert on large water projects, and spoke with him about developing the Jordan valley as a regional program between Israel and Jordan.

Gur responded to the challenge and put together his program. It was passed along to the American secretary of state, William Rogers, and Rogers passed it on to King Husayn. When the King flew Rogers in his helicopter above the Jordan valley, he told him that he was ready for cooperation with Israel on the development of water sources, in a "no peace, no war" situation. Ya'aqov Herzog, who was then general manager of the prime minister's office, served as the liaison man with the Jordanians, met in London with King Husayn, and talked with him about the program. Yig'al 'Alon continued the contacts with the king in his capacity as foreign minister and deputy prime minister. Thus, a dialogue began between experts from the two countries.

The king's scientific adviser and his staff were invited to working meetings with Gur, some of which took place in his planning office at the University of Tel Aviv and some, in his home. "The Jordanians then stayed in Mishkenot Sha'ananim. Everything was open and a Foreign Ministry representative sat in on the meetings. The king's adviser was a very talented man, and I learned a lot from him. We did not talk about politics," Gur relates. The meetings continued on into the governments of Golda Me'ir and Yitzhaq Rabin.

Two months after the political revolution in 1977, Gur was called in to the new prime minister, Menahem Begin, who wanted to hear details of the program. "Begin made it clear that he did not support the program at that stage, because it was still too early to establish a position vis-a-vis the Jordanians. Nevertheless, he said that he would not stand in the way of its advancement." Responsibility for the project went back to Yig'al 'Alon as chairman of the committee on foreign affairs and defense, and he presented it during the fall session of the Knesset in 1978.

To the central project was added the idea of a deep water port in the 'Arava—a basic idea of the king himself. The king propounded the idea when he met with 'Alon on his yacht at 'Aqaba. He spoke about developing the city and saving it from pollution by boats. A canal 1 km long from the sea to the 'Arava, he argued, would create a new deep water port and open up precious beaches in 'Aqaba and 'Eilat, for tourism. Within this framework Gur checked with the nuclear physicist Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, into the possibility of blasting a canal between the Red Sea and the Dead Sea, using a controlled, underground hydrogen bomb explosion. But such a canal was found to be useless and uneconomical.

Upon the death of 'Alon in 1980, responsibility for the Gur program passed to Yitzhaq Rabin, who replaced

'Alon as head of the foreign affairs and defense committee. The conclusions of the committee with regard to the regional planning project—via a canal from the Mediterranean Sea across the northern valleys to the Jordan—were positive.

Then the two seas program appeared, that proposed a tunnel between the mountains of Judaea and captured the imagination of the politicians. As far as Gur is concerned, who has spent decades checking out the possibilities, that was total foolishness.

The two seas project, in fact, did not come to fruition, but it buried the Gur program for several years, which had seemed to many people to be much more realistic and economical.

### Internal Affairs

#### Law on Meeting With PLO Viewed

##### Law Supported

92AE0642A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
30 Aug 92 p 19

[Article by S. Heraben]

[Text] There are not many people in Israeli politics whose opinions are as close to my heart as Knesset members Professor Na'omi Hazan and Ms. Ya'el Dayan.

There are not many laws in Israel that seem as foolish to me as the law that forbids meetings with members of the PLO. According to this law, it is apparently possible to bring to court an author who exchanges words with his Palestinian colleague, a contractor who comes to a village to gather workers and speaks to the residents—essentially, even a person who buys a kilogram of tomatoes from the stooped-over merchant at the market. The law is poorly worded and does not differentiate between one intention and another, between one circumstance and another, and it is definitely the type of decree that the public cannot abide.

It is also no secret that many politicians, including senior members of Likud, have already met with official representatives of the PLO, secretly and openly, and it could even be claimed that Mr. Shamir, himself, in Madrid, gave authorization for a meeting with the PLO, in sitting with members of the Palestinian delegation.

Whoever says that the law is meaningless is right. These are all good and appropriate reasons to repeal this law, and the sooner the better.

These do not justify, for even one moment, the breaking of the law by two [female] members of the Israeli parliament.

MERETZ voters voted for this party, among other reasons, also because of its clear connection to democratic values. One of the most important values of

democracy is the rule of law, without collusion or sophistry. The law is the common norm for all citizens, and it imposes order over different inclinations, different opinions; it defends the citizen from arbitrariness from every which side. And not by force from above, according to the whim of some absolute ruler, for the laws are created in the Knesset by representatives that the public elected for this purpose. Disobeying the law, on anyone's part, with the argument that they do not like it, constitutes a break of the social balance, a strike against the agreement to accept the precepts of the law, and it gives validation, to all appearances, to breaking the law on the part of their political opponents. Based on the precedent of Prof. Hazan and Ms. Dayan, people on the right may also disobey laws that do not seem right to them, and then, quickly, we would be in Lebanon, if not Sarajevo.

All of this is clear to anyone who voted for MERETZ, or sees himself identifying with the enlightened branch of the Labor Party.

As long as the legal system remains clear of politicizing, like one who is making a fraud of the law and its application, as long as the independence of the legal system and its nondependence on the government are maintained; as long as our judges are professionals and not party heads—no one is permitted to break the law, and even a bad law is a law, until it is repealed by majority agreement in the parliament. *Dura lex sed lex*, said the Romans with a sigh: The law is hard, but it is the law—and they accepted it.

Israeli society, which often behaves as though the country is corrupt and its laws are conditional—if they want them, they uphold them; if they do not want them, they do not uphold them—and find it very difficult to accept solid norms of behavior; even what is called “the democratic reflex” is very often foreign to them. Superficiality is accepted; disobedient conduct, that is, that which was once called shifting barrels, appears to be somewhat attractive. In the worst case, they say, you need to not get caught; that is, the transgressor is not guilty, the publication is guilty—a poor argument by any opinion.

The question is asked, for what purpose have we elected representatives of a party that stands for the rule of law, if those same representatives, themselves members of the parliament who are more obligated to honor it than any other people, are breaking the law with excuses that they are not suitable. Knesset members were elected by power of the law, the government exists by power of the law, and this is the source of their authority. And if we are speaking of a protest, since when does a government protest against itself?

The two Knesset members could have attained permission ahead of time for their meeting with Dr. Nabil Sha'ath. They chose the path against the law, the same stupid, bad law whose days are numbered, and nevertheless, is binding until it is repealed. It would have been preferable, instead of the unconvincing explanations, for

the Knesset members to admit that they erred and that they did not have the patience to wait until a legal way would be found for them for such a meeting: “and who so confesses and forsakes shall obtain mercy.” [Proverbs 28, 13]

### Meaning of Law Clarified

92AE0642B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
1 Sep 92 p 23

[Article by Y. Nahushtan]

[Text] It seems that there is a need to explain to the public what is behind the law called the “law of meetings,” that law that Shulamit Heraben refers to on this page as a “foolish law.” According to the law that forbids meetings with members of the PLO, writes Shulamit Heraben, “it is apparently possible to bring to court an author who exchanges words with his Palestinian colleague...essentially, even a person who buys a kilogram of tomatoes from the stooped-over merchant at the market.”

This is not accurate. The law being referred to is the Order for the Prevention of Terrorism of 1948, which was amended by the Knesset in 1986 with the addition of the passage: “A person, whether he be a citizen or a resident of Israel, who knowingly and without legal authority established contact in Israel or outside of Israel with a person filling a job in administration, council, or another similar branch of an organization which the government has declared, in accordance with Paragraph 8, to be a terrorist organization, or who serves as representative of the stated organization, will be charged with a crime and, upon his conviction, will be liable for up to three years in prison or a fine...”

In the words of explanation for proposing the law to amend the Order for the Prevention of Terrorism, which was presented to the Knesset in July 1985 by the government of Shim'on Peres, it was stated: “Recently, contacts of Israelis with activists or official representatives of terrorist organizations have become more frequent and more numerous. This matter causes serious security and political damage and it cannot be reconciled with.”

As if to strengthen these words, Prime Minister Rabin reprimanded Knesset members Dayan and Hazan, and emphasized the serious damage that their meeting with 'Arafat's senior adviser, Nabil Sha'at, caused to the talks taking place these days with the Palestinians in Washington.

Forbidding contact with the enemy is not merely a formality. It is one of the steps that the country takes in order to defend itself against the security dangers that lie in wait for it. Usually, contact with the enemy is not done in public. Control over it is almost impossible. Essentially, no one knows what is spoken or delivered in these meetings. Therefore, the emphasis in the law has

been placed emphatically on forbidding contact with an enemy, knowing that he is an enemy and without authority of the law.

Israel's elected executive authority is the government. Not the Knesset, not the Knesset members, only the government is authorized to conduct or authorize others to conduct peace talks.

It is worth knowing that without the Order for the Prevention of Terrorism, there is also a serious ban on Israeli citizens and its residents against establishing contact with PLO members. Paragraph 114(a) of the Punishment Code, 1977, determines that: "Whoever knowingly establishes contact with an outside agent and has no reasonable explanation for this, his sentence is 15 years imprisonment."

The one accused of establishing contact with a foreign agent must prove to the court that he did not, nor did he intend, to do anything that would bring harm to the security of the state. If he cannot prove so—he will be convicted by law. This is an extreme deviation from the general law, which assumes that every man is considered innocent as long as it has not been proven in court that he is guilty. This is how strict the legislature is on establishing contact with the enemy.

Those who mock any law are inviting anarchy; whoever determines for himself that some law is "foolish" or does not suit his views and, therefore, does not have to be upheld will bring about destruction of democracy and the ruin of the rule of law.

Instead of knowingly buying tomatoes from PLO agents, it would be better to inform the security authorities about them.

The author is a jurist.

### Commentary on Palestinian State, Confederation

92AE0653B YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
9 Sep 92 p 19

[Commentary by Asher Gati: "Who Is a Fit Partner for a Confederation?"]

[Text] Gavri'el Moked published a proposal for a confederate solution on this page this week, incorporating a fundamental assumption which recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to a state of its own. Without denying the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, reliance on a shaky fundamental assumption cannot constitute a prescription for a stable peace. When national awareness usually develops over many generations, the appearance of a historical curiosity in the creation of a new people within 25 years requires examination.

The Gulf crisis and the position of the Palestinian leadership regarding it exposed the true identity of the Arabs of Israel. No longer two separate people from the two banks of the Jordan—Palestinians and Jordanians—

but one people, with its masses and leaders (including King Husayn) demonstrating their support for the current flagbearer of the Pan-Arab movement. While Zionist-humanist groups are siding with the establishment of a Palestinian state, as a product of their liberal view of the world, it turns out that the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza view themselves as an integral part of the Arab nation, and aspire to its unification under the leadership of the Iraqi ruler.

A public opinion poll held among the Arabs of Israel shows similar positions. As they once supported Nasir, the Palestinians have remained consistent in their Pan-Arab positions, anchored in the Palestinian Covenant. It is possible to understand the importance of the objective of Arab unity by its placement as the first article in the covenant, and in Articles 12-14. It would undoubtedly be more convenient for the peace camp if the PLO, which was established even prior to the capture of the territories (1964), would change these articles of the covenant, as well as the articles calling for the destruction of the State of Israel. But by this, it turns out, the rule takes after the actions.

Since the renewal of Jewish settlement, approximately 100 years ago, the opposition of the Arabs of Israel to our national rights here has been violent in nature. However, after the PLO succeeded in presenting its struggle against us as a struggle for national liberation, this violence has received legitimacy over the past decade ("if they had not been there, they would not have been hurt"), while the Pan-Arab objective is concealed in false propaganda. Those who, in their weakness, buy this propaganda, unknowingly deny our own rights in this country.

While the Palestinians are consistent in their commitment to the Pan-Arab movement, the consistency in the liberal perspective of the Zionist left leads, by its internal logic, to the granting of the right of self-determination not only to the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, but also to the Arabs of the Galilee. They consider themselves "Palestinians," they have a demographic majority (among the permanent population), and they are in an occupied territory (1948-9), that the United Nations Partition Plan of November 29, 1947 designated for the Palestinian state. If, indeed, a Palestinian state will be established in any territory, it will not nullify the claim to the "right of return" of the descendants of the refugees. It will encourage isolationists among the Arabs of the Galilee and the triangle, who also have no desire to be under our rule, to present irredentist annexation demands (as the Sudetan Germans did on the eve of World War II). This will only escalate the conflict to the Balkan form. The "confederate vision" is being realized in Sareyevo—please leave Jerusalem alone!

If there were a Palestinian people with an identity of its own and interests that are not for the purpose of serving the dream of an Arab empire, it would have been possible to arrive at a durable peace with it long ago.

Regretfully, such a people still does not exist, and certainly is not entitled to support for its right to self-determination when it does not recognize the similar right of the Kuwaiti people or the Jewish people—in one half of one percent of the territories controlled by the Arab world.

Instead of Gabri'el Moked and his partners attempting to produce a "kashruth certificate" for the Palestinians, this time in confederate wrappings, it would be better for them to put their Palestinian partners to the dialogue, among them the leadership of the PLO, to the test of truth: the change of the Palestinian covenant, as stated above. The unfortunate meeting law does not prevent them from doing so.

(Dr. Gati is a researcher and lecturer on the subject of the Israeli Arab conflict.)

### Profile of Opposition Minister David Levi

92AE0653D YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
11 Sep 92 pp 2-5

[Interview by Ariella Ringel-Hoffman with David Levi; various dates and places, as mentioned in interview: "Levi Is Waiting for Bibi"]

[Text] Even in a personal conversation, David Levi does not explicitly mention the name of Bibi Netanyahu. In speeches, he says "he" and "others," and each time that he mentions "fireworks," the reference is clear. Netanyahu is Levi's red sheet. Way before the impossible romance between the two of them in the Foreign Ministry, when Levi was the minister, and Netanyahu his deputy. Netanyahu is open, direct, good at cocktail parties. An excellent public relations man on his own behalf, who learned the craft well from the Americans during his years as Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. He looks good in a tie, looks good in jeans and a T-shirt, and he has no problem letting a photographer into the living room to document the family ideal a moment after the ritual circumcision of his son.

For David Levi, this is more difficult. Much more difficult. He is a closed and vulnerable man, but also an experienced fox. He is no less aware than Netanyahu of the value of a photograph in the newspaper. Nonetheless, for years he had difficulty allowing a journalist into his home. Just this week, he opened up his home to us. I do not ever recall seeing him in jeans and a red T-shirt, pouring cold water for himself and his wife Rahel at a shady table in the yard of the house.

Last week, Levi joined the race for the leadership of the Likud (Netanyahu has been running for almost two months already) and he believes that there is also value to the years of experience, the connections, and the deep plowing of places that he knows like the back of his hand. He believes that all of these will bring him into first place.

It will not be easy. Netanyahu, it is said in the Likud, takes the movement from above, with a wide sweep of the hand, collecting a lot all at once. He has a lot of money and a greased mechanism. He knows how it is done in America, how to do it in style. Levi, it is said in his camp, takes the movement from below. He begins at the roots. He arrives at each supporter—one brings one, who brings another.

The element of time, as of now, is not critical. It is estimated in the Likud that the primaries will not be held before February 1993, at best. But the race is already gaining momentum.

Monday in Jerusalem at the Marakesh restaurant. Five in the afternoon. During the entire week that I accompanied Levi, I did not hear him repeat the things that he said there: about the rejection that he experienced, about the alliance against him, about the blow that he received in the panel, about the blow that he received in the sevens. The kick that his people received, the failure in the elections, and the decision to run in the primaries. And this is still without mentioning that he was not even allowed into the Committee for Foreign and Defense Affairs of the Knesset.

Levi spoke for an hour. Perhaps more. But when immediately upon completion, he asked why, if so, he did not leave and form an independent party, he banged on the table. "I do not want to be an ethnic leader," he shouted. "I do not want to. I do not agree. But if someone thinks that he can stand in my way because of my origin, I will fight him to destruction."

Marakesh is a prestigious North African restaurant on King George Street, not far from the Old City. At five in the afternoon, there are already approximately 70 people there, all Jerusalemites. No special transports from Beyt She'an, for example. Outside, the heat is heavy. It does not pass over the Jerusalemites. Inside, the coolness of stone buildings is maintained. The people wait around set tables. The waiters, in black and white, pass around glass trays on a thin stem, with cakes dipped in honey syrup. They pour cold drinks. There is no corner in this restaurant that remains untouched by a decorator. The walls are covered with wooden engravings, lamps are sunken into golden niches.

Levi is a bit late. Before ascending the stage of honor, he shakes the hands of those present, and it is clear that he feels at home here. Edmond Elharar, a lieutenant colonel in the reserves, one of the busier Levi activists over the past two weeks, gives an opening address. At the end of the evening, it will turn out that the host, the owner of the restaurant, Pini Elharar, is his brother. During the week to come, it will also turn out that more than a few internal mobilizations pass through the winding strings of family ties. The acquaintance, in any case, is always very personal.

And this is what Levi says. "There was a trend of real annihilation. Everyone joined together against Levi. If you give a chance to a member from the Levi camp, they

said there, you are creating a hole in the boat. Poor guy, what they did to Robby (Rivlin). They rejected a member from the Upper Galilee, from the confrontation line, because he was with me. They rejected people from the south, from the suburbs of Haifa. And does a person have a chance if he wants to participate in a marathon and they have amputated his leg?

"In my party, the opposition is not an attractive concept, because everyone wants quiet, and everyone wants it to be nice. Slowly, an establishment grew that thought that it was permissible not to hold a convention, not to elect delegates, to paralyze all of the institutions. I did not reconcile with this throughout the years and, ostensibly, I have become a troublemaker to my colleagues."

Bibi Netanyahu coined the term "a new Likud." David Levi speaks of restoring the movement to its pristine splendor. Returning to the good old Likud. The Likud, Levi shouts into the microphone, does not need anything new. What is this, he asks, dragging out the letters, this new thing? This new Likud?

And here comes a little parable. A Moroccan parable. "There once lived a woman and her daughter. And the daughter said, come mother, let us dance and sing, we will look beautiful. Wait, said the mother, until all of the people who knew us before die."

Levi sits on the 12th floor of Metzudat Ze'ev [Likud headquarters in Tel Aviv]. A building with an empty lobby, an elevator that gets stuck, small and ugly corridors leading to small, empty rooms. Devoid of any elegance and ornamentation. Levi gives a little life to the corridor. Until Moshe Arens left, Levi sat in the big room, right across the entrance to the elevator. When Arens left, Levi moved to his room. Those who oppose him like to use the term invasion. The truth is that he filed an orderly request with the director general of the Likud, Asher Kadosh, and moved. Arens' room has one great advantage—the corner in the adjacent corridor, which can be turned into an improvised secretarial office. There is a desk there that has seen better days. Two chairs, more or less of the same vintage, and a telephone. This week, David Elbaz, a veteran activist, sat there. In any case, the telephone calls do not land directly on Levi, and are checked out before he receives them.

As of now, Levi's office is the only one at Likud headquarters in which preparations are being made for the race for the primaries. Netanyahu sits elsewhere. Ari'el Sharon has yet to begin. It is said at Likud headquarters that his camp, if one indeed existed, was crushed in the last elections. In the meantime, Benny Begin, Moshe Katzav and Me'ir Shetrit are only making sounds of candidates. Next to Levi's office sits Sarah Angel, the monumental secretary of Herut. Examination of archive pictures shows that it was almost impossible to close any celebration without finding her next to one of the old men who led the party. First Menahem Begin, then Yitzhaq Shamir. Now, Elbaz makes her a cup of coffee in her office. Someone borrows a newspaper from

her. Angel sits there like a huge address on the wall, more than a hint of what could happen to someone who does not leave the building on time.

Tuesday, just before noon. Tzemah Yishai, formerly the Water Commissioner, and two farmers enter David Levi's office. Levi's appointment schedule is filling up. At least half of the day is devoted to personal appointments of this type. The three present themselves as representatives of the agricultural settlements of the Likud. The meeting lasts for approximately half an hour, and Yishai takes up most of the time. Yishai did not grow up in David Levi's camp. He is from the liberals, and was associated with Moshe Nissim throughout the years, enjoying his patronage. But Tzemah Yishai was not born yesterday, and he knows what Nissim is now worth. So he came to Levi. We need to check what the fate of the moshav settlements will be at the convention, he tells Levi. I want to promise my activists who are running for the convention that they have a chance. Or, more directly, I will see to it that you receive the votes of our people, and you will see to it that our people make it to the convention.

This is Levi's fourth meeting. Already at the middle of the day, all of the appointments deviate from the time framework allotted them. Another matter or two remain. For example, what will be the fate of the debts that the Likud is not paying to the activists who worked for them in the elections. And Levi remembers that a luncheon awaits him outside, and he ends the conversation.

On the bulletin board in the lobby of Metzudat-Ze'ev hangs a festive invitation. In honor of the new year, it is written there, the Tagar group invites the members to a toast and dinner. To form a good, fresh, new atmosphere in the Likud. The guests of honor, according to the invitation, will be Bibi Netanyahu, Moshe Katzav, and Benny Begin.

The Tagar group is comprised of Etzel veterans, what is termed the fighting family. They reached the central committee of the Likud via Katzav's decision, in 1986, to make all of the members of the convention members of the central committee. David Levi is not mentioned in their invitation.

[Ringel-Hoffman] Eli Shetrit, chairman of the group, are you responsible for the invitation?

[Shetrit] That is right.

[Ringel-Hoffman] You speak of creating a good atmosphere, and do not invite Levi?

[Shetrit] That is right. Write that we think that all of the previous leadership must resign, following the defeat. Particularly David Levi, who has a substantial role in what happened. We want a leadership without Levi, without Ari'el Sharon, without Yitzhaq Shamir, without Moshe Arens, and without Moshe Nissim, who are also the fathers of the camps.

[Ringel-Hoffman] If so, why is Me'ir Shetrit not among those invited? Is he also old leadership?

[Shetrit] We cannot invite all of the candidates.

[Ringel-Hoffman] David Levi, are you insulted?

[Levi] After what happened, I expected to see some kind of trend, even ostensibly, toward amendment. We will all have to continue to act together, and what is more befitting than bringing the entire leadership together for a toast.

[Ringel-Hoffman] Including Ari'el Sharon and Yitzhaq Shamir?

[Levi] Certainly. After all, we are speaking of a new atmosphere. And although we are referring to a small and marginal group, as a former builder I know that the margins are indicative of the road.

[Ringel-Hoffman] Will you hold a similar ceremony for the members of your camp?

[Levi] Every year I participate in a ceremony of this type. This year, as well.

[Ringel-Hoffman] By yourself?

[Levi] As far as I am concerned, everyone is welcome.

[Ringel-Hoffman] And will you invite Sharon and Shamir?

[Levi] I am not the national compensator. But I hope that everyone will understand that we have one home, Metzudat Ze'ev, in which we must all operate.

[Ringel-Hoffman] And their names will appear next to yours.

[Levi] I have not thought about that, in the meantime.

David Levi's headquarters sits at 147 Dizengoff Street. Three rooms in a rented flat, a telephone, a few activists manning the place throughout the day. The rent is paid by one of Levi's supporters, who prefers to remain anonymous.

The headquarters is being built slowly. Levi knows the work. He knows how it must ultimately look. Each of the volunteers currently working with Levi has a defined role. Attorney Motti Mish'ani, who was Levi's assistant at the Ministry of Housing, provides legal advice. Rafi Hilava, a colonel in the reserves, a new activist in the camp, is the person in charge of organization. Edmond Elharar is in charge of the schedule, of arranging appointments and meetings. David Elbaz, a builder, is in charge of the logistics. Everything related, as they say there, to moving the mountain from one side to the other.

Ya'aqov Bardogo, a young fellow of 27, currently the director general of the Center for Local Government, is considered the executor in Levi's close environment. Bardogo, with a bachelor's degree in political science and

a second year law student, has been working with Levi for several years. An unofficial assistant, he says, without pay, of course.

Also among his assistants is Micha'el Ratzon, who was a candidate for the Knesset in the last elections, who accompanies Levi to some of the appointments. A large percentage of the leaders of the local municipalities belong to Levi. Personal loyalty. And when Ya'ir Hazan, mayor of 'Ofaqim, for example, was mentioned in one of the articles as a supporter of Bibi Netanyahu, he made an urgent phone call to Levi. And a few days later, he arranged a special visit to 'Ofaqim for David Levi, that included a long series of appointments.

Officially, the only person who receives a salary in Levi's close environment is Tal Rabina. Rabina, 33, owns a firm specializing in political communications. He has been working with Levi since the Madrid conference. Levi then sought to separate the spokespersonship of the ministry from his personal spokespersonship, and Bardogo, who has been working with Rabina for several years at the Center for Local Government, brought him to Levi. Rabina's salary is paid by an element that they term as interested in helping Levi.

Levi's headquarters does not operate only at 147 Dizengoff Street. It spreads out in the field, they say at Metzudat Ze'ev. Throughout the country, Levi's contact people are spread out, directing local headquarters. Such a headquarters operates at the Marakesh restaurant in Jerusalem. Someone donated offices in Jerusalem and in Haifa, with secretarial services. Ze'ev Hartman, a builder, owner of the construction company "Gag La'oleh" [Roof for the Immigrant], from Nazareth, is a veteran supporter of Levi. On Thursday, at the end of the meeting that took place at his home, Hartman announced the opening of a contact office for the residents of Nazareth and the Arabs in the vicinity. He had prepared business cards with the telephone number, and distributed them at the festive opportunity.

Nothing has been finalized by Levi regarding money for the race. They speak of contributions that will arrive from supporters. In the interim, small amounts. But there is no doubt that the big contributors, at least on paper, are already registered. Among them, as I hear it, are people who contributed to Netanyahu, as well. Wealthy people of North African origin are among the exclusive contributors.

Wednesday, six in the evening, traveling to Moshav Yagel. Levi's two sons, Jackie and Shi'mon, are in the Volvo, with Ya'aqov Bardogo. Regarding the car, the story is like this: when some fellow with a talent for public relations from Ashqelon offered, through the press, a Volvo (it ultimately turned out to be a Passat), the family reached a decision. The oldest son, Jackie Levi, sold his car and bought a Volvo. Now, Jackie and Shi'mon, the two sons, take turns driving Levi from place to place.

People are waiting for them at the entrance to Yagel. When the white car approaches, Avraham Yifrah, a veteran Likud supporter, raises his hand. The car stops, they shake hands, and Yifrah leads them all. The meeting takes place at the home of Shalom Biton, a member of the central committee of the Likud. Thirty people are already waiting for Levi there. Maybe a bit more.

Levi wears well-tailored blue slacks, and a white summer shirt, which remains pressed even at the end of the day. He drinks tea with mint leaves, tastes a date filled with nuts, and asks who went to the trouble to prepare them. First of all, he blesses the talented hands of the hostess. I am a part of my people, he says more than once that night, more than twice a day. When he completes his speech and finishes responding to the questions raised by the audience, he is photographed with the guests. One more picture with the hosts, one more picture with the wife of one of the activists. For a moment, he does not look like this is the end of the day, that this is the who-knows-how-many hand that he has shaken.

At Metzudat Ze'ev, they also know that Levi is a part of his people, and that a vote that Levi brings is a vote for him. Not a vote for the primaries, not a floating vote. He works one by one, even when he meets with 300 people. In meetings of this type he is a person full of warmth. Even the requisite routines and gestures do nothing to harm the connection that he creates with people.

At Moshav Yagel, Levi speaks about the need for democracy in the movement. About the only chance for rehabilitation. For the members to return to the gold old Likud, he tells them.

Several hours later on the same day, at Moshav Gamzo, a meeting is organized for him. It looks like a bar mitzvah. Close to three hundred people, seated around white plastic tables, with olives, tehina, pita bread, and salami. A lot of cola and a lot of grapefruit drink. Excellent amplifiers, strings of lights above, and people who came from the entire area.

"I approached Shamir," Levi told them. "I said to him, look what is happening in the party today. Look at the empty headquarters. We need to convene the secretariat, we need to form a team that will take care of what needs taking care of. To pay the people who are owed money. To prepare for the upcoming elections. If you cannot do it, I said to him, then let me. I will do what is necessary. I will do it, I will do it, he said. He promised to do it within a few weeks. In the interim, two weeks have passed and he has not done a thing, and now I hear that he is in Russia, he went for two weeks.

"There are those who say that he is being pressured not to resign, so that Levi will not replace him."

Thursday. Beyt She'an. The older children of Rahel and David Levi were born in the old house that David and Rahel purchased when they got married. Thirty seven square meters, seven people. The younger children were

born in the big house in which they now reside. The house is surrounded with grass. On the tops of small wire pens planted at the end of the lawn stand the peacocks of one of the sons, Eshkol.

The heat in Beyt She'an is exhausting. There is not a drop of wind, and the streets are empty. Beyt She'an, says one of the sons, fills up at night, when everyone comes out to the street to catch a bit of air.

In the afternoon, we go out to the lawn. The sons arrange a table and bring cold drinks and fruit. David Levi is wearing jeans and a cotton shirt, several hours before a convention of activists in Upper Nazareth.

His family arrived to Beyt She'an approximately 40 years ago, at night. David's father, Yosef Levi, was a popular rabbi, the head of a yeshiva in Morocco. Beyt She'an, said one of the Jewish Agency officials, is the gate to paradise. If this is the gate to paradise, wondered the rabbi, what does the gate to hell look like?

Everyone in Beyt She'an knows where Levi lives. It is a matter of minutes to arrive to them. A young fellow in a cut off T-shirt guides us. Say, we ask him, who are the people of Beyt Shemesh going with, David Levi or Bibi Netanyahu? Write, he says, with David Levi, 24 hours a day.

I thought, said Rahel Levi, that after the elections there would be a little quiet. That David would be home more. That he would be able to rest. But we do not see him.

She tells how she met David for the first time on the ship that brought them over from Morocco. In Gibraltar. Afterwards, she remained with her parents in France for another few months, and Levi arrived in Israel. The next time, they met in Beyt She'an. It was hot like it is now, she says, but one becomes accustomed to it.

She gave birth to 12 of David's children. She raised them almost by herself, and it is impossible not to feel the warmth that this house radiates and the very special relationship among the children. All of the sons, at the time, did their army service in combat units. Two of the girls, Ilanit and Orly, are currently serving. In the Lebanon war, when Levi understood faster than his colleagues in the faction what kind of mud the State of Israel was sinking in there, three of his children were serving there.

Eshkol and Ziva are twins. Twenty-three years old, they were born during the week when Levi Eshkol, the former prime minister of Israel, died. Eshkol is Levi's only son who bears the name of an Israeli political leader. Dad had great esteem for him, he says.

Six of the children are already married, and on Thursday, when were were there, the house was also full of grandchildren. One of the granddaughters, a tiny three year old, identifies the approaching car. Grandpa's coming, she screams loudly, Grandpa's coming.

All of the children, except for Esther, the oldest, live in Beyt She'an. And Rahel, as she says, hoped that none of them would go into politics. Except that Jackie, the oldest son, is already in the business. In the last municipal elections, he contended against Shlomo Ben-Lulu in a tempestuous campaign well covered by the media, and lost by a few votes. The faction that he headed was the largest faction in the council, and until the family reconciled with Ben-Lulu, after the last elections, they waged bitter battles. I am constantly warning Jackie that this is not a normal life, says Rahel.

A series of pictures appears on the wall of the family dining room. David Levi on the great wall of China, in a heavy coat. Levi on the porch of the Ministry of Housing, in a Herzl-like pose, overlooking Mount Scopus. Levi with Baker, Levi with Bush. When David worked in the executive committee, she says, he would leave on Sunday morning on the bus to Tel Aviv, which picked up half of the country, and returned on Friday. Sometimes he would manage to get home in the middle of the week, too. And what they did to him, she says, is particularly painful.

Thursday. Night. Weekend. On Friday, there will be another meeting, apparently, early in the morning, and perhaps another one. Levi parts from the host. Just a moment, shouts the hostess, there is another cake in the refrigerator. We will stay and eat, says Levi, as if the week was just beginning, as if he had not been through several appointments each day, as if he had not made the trip that very afternoon from Tel Aviv.

[Ringel-Hoffman] Mr. Levi, what drives you?

[Levi] The situation that our movement has encountered. And since nothing comes easy for me in life, in a situation that others despair, I take off.

[Ringel-Hoffman] And are you not sick of taking off each time anew, from the eighteenth place on the panel, from the defeat in the sevens?

[Levi] There were thoughts like that, but I tell myself—no.

[Ringel-Hoffman] Did not Arens' resignation serve as a sign to you, that perhaps you, too should do the same?

[Levi] It is easier to abandon. When Arens resigned, I said that one cannot resign when the movement is in need of every strength.

[Ringel-Hoffman] But perhaps you, as Eli Shetrit from the Tagar group says, belong to the group that must go home?

[Levi] Shetrit was always anti. And it must not be forgotten that those who gave a hand to defeatist measures, like the Tagar people, cannot come now and demand new criteria. Today, instead of admitting that I was right in my demands, even if this is not so attractive, they attack. I must go, and the Tagar group, eternally fresh, must remain. Prior to 1977, I would search them

out with a flashlight, with a magnifying glass. In the tough days of the party, then, I never saw them at all.

[Ringel-Hoffman] On the night of the elections, when Shamir phoned you and asked that you go together to Metzudat Ze'ev, you did not refuse. The fact is that he was a partner to everything that was done to you in the sevens, not to speak of the Madrid conference.

[Levi] Despite everything that he did, in such an hour of distress, I considered it my obligation to accompany him.

[Ringel-Hoffman] Are you such a gentleman?

[Levi] I think that this is a humane and collegial act, even if I know that it does not hold the warmth implied by real friendship.

[Ringel-Hoffman] Did you pity him?

[Levi] I was not a victor that night either.

[Ringel-Hoffman] Do you have any idea how it happens that every time, there is such an extensive mobilization against you in the leadership of the movement? Sharon joins Arens, and Shamir supports them?

[Levi] This is truly puzzling and incomprehensible, but I have stopped asking myself these questions.

[Ringel-Hoffman] Could it be that it is due to ethnic reasons?

[Levi] I need not provide answers on this matter. I cannot explain this conduct by people.

[Ringel-Hoffman] With your permission, how do you manage with what are termed the David Levi jokes?

[Levi] I do not wish to go into this, but I will merely say that it may be that my ascent in the state realm has been accompanied by a certain suspicion, has been received with a lack of maturity on the part of certain factors in the field. Over time, this has vanished, and I subsequently encountered overwhelming sympathy, as well. It may be that what was then is happening today, as well, with my attempt to reach first place. The higher you ascend, the stronger the winds. But do not forget that I was a climber, and I know how to climb high very well.

[Ringel-Hoffman] And you wish to be the head of the Likud movement and, subsequently, prime minister.

[Levi] Yes.

[Ringel-Hoffman] And if not, will the presidency suffice?

[Levi] That is a very heartwarming proposal. That is a supreme state institution, and I treat the matter with great respect. On the other hand, this must not distract me from what I must do, as I feel that I can do toward the strengthening of my movement. This is my life's work. It is no big deal to preserve something that you receive ready-made. Tasks that you undertake out of faith have special significance.



**NRP Discusses Internal Elections, Party Reform**  
*92AE0633A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 Aug 92*  
*p B2*

[Article by S. Elan: "Talking About a Charismatic Personality"]

[Text] In the National Religious Party [NRP], when they speak of the previous round of internal elections, which took place more than five years ago, everyone is reminded of Ofaqim. According to the customary system in the party, the number of representatives that each branch sends to the conference is determined by the number of functionaries in the settlement. Diligent activists at Ofaqim registered 2,000 functionaries, and thus 21 people went out to represent the development town—as many representatives that were sent by the branches in the big cities. In the Knesset elections, in contrast, the NRP received only some 200 votes at Ofaqim.

In the upcoming internal elections, to be held in March 1993, the work of vote contractors will be much harder. Chairman of Dor Hatz'ir [The Young Generation], Nahum Langenthal, states that, this time, the index for sending delegates to the committee will be determined by taking the average between the number of votes received by the NRP in Knesset elections (or in the local authorities) and the number of Hapo'el Hamizrahi members in the settlement.

This morning, the NRP bureau is convening for a marathon day of discussions at Nir 'Etzyon, in order to prepare draft resolutions in the matter of internal elections and a new membership leader. The party's center is to convene later this month and, to the deep sorrow of many members, they will be making decisions regarding the start of proceedings for electing a new center.

According to the NRP law, the internal elections were supposed to take place even before the Knesset elections. But party executives took great pains to enlist the support of the members of the current center, and they did not want to contend for their positions on the Knesset slate in a new and unknown center. Langenthal, an attorney by profession, tried to fight against the postponement of internal elections. He turned to the movement's supreme court, whose nine members determined that the elections must be held as scheduled. The move-up of Knesset elections enabled the party executives to evade execution of the order.

The main party hurt by this was Emuna, the NRP women's movement, from which, in the current center, there are but a few dozen members. The president of Emuna, Yehudit Hebner, who enjoys wide support in the party, was pushed down to eighth place on the Knesset slate.

In response, the members of Emuna threatened to establish a separate slate that would run for Knesset, and in order to satisfy them, a number of guarantees were given,

the primary one being to hold internal elections within 10 months. But, following the elections, Hebner and Langenthal found out that many in the party demanded that the internal elections be postponed by an additional year and a half, until after the elections for the local authorities.

The primary support for postponing the elections came from the part of local activists. According to NRP custom, the elections are rendered in two envelopes—in one envelope conference members are elected, and in the second, the branch council members. The councils elect party representatives for municipalities and local authorities. Senior members in the branches expressed opposition to the fact that the Knesset slate would be determined in the old center, while they would have to struggle for their places approaching elections for the municipality in the framework of new branch councils. The official complaint was, of course, that the party should dedicate its efforts for the municipal elections, and not to exhaust itself with internal struggles.

New Knesset member [MK], Sha'ul Yahalom, also prefers to hold the internal elections in two more years. According to the accepted explanation, Yahalom is asking for additional time for himself for Knesset activity, in order to establish his position as a contender for leadership.

According to Yahalom, there is nothing personal in his reasoning. In the coming year, he says, Zevulun Hammer and the rest of the senior members must prepare the party for meeting with the opposition. If there were to be internal elections, everyone would be busy with internal affairs, instead of restructuring the party. On account of the meeting with the opposition, it is necessary to reduce the staff, but, according to Yahalom, in a period of internal elections, everyone will keep the activists that are close to him, and no one will be let go.

Yahalom also indicates that, in the party, there is a requirement to elect the candidates for the next Knesset through primaries. In such a case, it will be necessary to take another census approaching the Knesset elections, and the party does not have the money to take two censuses.

The head of the NRP slate, Knesset Member Zevulun Hammer, was also not enthusiastic about going to elections when he is cut off from the focal point of his strength in the Education Ministry. However, Hammer very quickly understood that the postponement of elections would entangle him in a difficult and degrading conflict.

The national secretariat of Emuna and the Council of Religious Students convened and demanded to hold the elections as scheduled. Two days ago, 150 representatives from different sectors of the NRP convened, among them many local activists. They obtained the signatures of one-third of the members of the center demanding it to meet, in order to come to a decision on holding elections.

Even Sha'ul Shiff, the political reporter for Hatzofe, the organ of the party, came out against the intention to postpone the elections. "The impression is," wrote Shiff, "that it is convenient for the center of the NRP not to hold elections, and so its members will be able to continue to rule the party. In the meantime, the party is losing its chances to refresh itself and to bring many new members close to its ranks." Last week, Hammer joined those in support of holding elections now. At the beginning of the week, an announcement was published in Hatzofe, in which it was stated that "MK Hammer is working toward ensuring internal elections in the NRP." It was also stated in the announcement that Hammer is "initiating an interparty campaign in order to ensure that the elections will be held as scheduled."

A source close to Hammer says that the former minister of education reached the conclusion that the NRP will remain, for the time being, in the opposition, because of the government's activities in the territories, East Jerusalem, and in the area of education. Hammer thinks that this is the appropriate time to hold a census and elections, despite the internal contention bound up with them.

According to another source, the publicity over the upcoming sentence of MK Avner Shaki greatly contributed to Hammer's decision to support holding the elections as scheduled. Shaki, who will be dealing with the legal battle this year, is likely to be the big loser in the upcoming elections. On the other hand, Shaki's career has already been mourned for an endless number of times, and he has always proved that the mourning has come too soon.

One of those close to Hammer denies any connection between his change in position and Shaki's sentence. According to him, Shaki's situation is liable to be difficult even if the internal elections were to be postponed until after the sentence. It was not possible to obtain Shaki's reaction.

The election system in the NRP has proven itself to be one that makes it difficult to preserve the interests of the factions [within it]. The Yeager-Previs committee, which was appointed seven years ago to formulate suggestions to restore the party, set up the system. In its framework, the country is divided into a number of regions, each of which sends a number of representatives to the conference. The fact that each one of the representatives was chosen in personal elections limits his loyalty to a faction.

A number of groups hope that their power will strengthen in the upcoming elections, in particular Emuna and Hador Hatz'ir. Nahum Langenthal finds the source of his strength in the thousands of youths who, in the previous elections were still teenagers or children, who joined the party in recent years. Emuna has a difficult problem. Religious women tend to devote much energy to activities in the realm of education and absorption, but most of them do not enjoy dealing with politics.

The question is whether Emuna will succeed this time in giving political expression to its enormous energetic strength.

In the last elections and during coalition negotiations, the NRP proved to the settlers' groups that they are their true representatives. Now that Hatehiya has been wiped off the political map, and Moledet has become entangled in difficult internal struggles, the settlers will want to increase their hold on the NRP. The moderate Mimad people have been complaining for years that the right has conquered the party, and that they have been left without a political home. It appears that this time, as well, they will not succeed in organizing themselves to form a strong power group.

Many activists hope that the general secretary, MK Yitzhaq Levi, and the political secretary, MK Sha'ul Yahalom, will step down for the benefit of other [party] workers who are not Knesset members. Among the candidates mentioned as those likely to take Levi's place are the names of the organization's department head, Alex Kaufman; chairman of the religious teachers' organization, Shmaryahu Ben-Tzur; as well as Nahum Langenthal. There is also talk of the possibility of bringing in a more charismatic personality who is not active on the staff, such as the former general secretary of Bney 'Aqiva', Amnon Shapira, or former minister Yosqa Shapira.

But the NRP [party] workers should not be in a hurry to have their business suits made. Levi and Yahalom are in no hurry to give up their focal points of strength. In response to the question of whether he will leave the position of political secretary, Yahalom says that, in his opinion, the question of dual jobs should be put to a vote at the conference. "If the conference decides against dual jobs, there is no doubt that Levi and I would leave," he promises.

But, if the conference does not decide this way, Yahalom is definitely not obligated to leave. Because no one has any doubts about Yahalom talents for the job, it would not be surprising if he decides to stay on for another term. And it is also worthwhile to remember that, usually, Levi and Yahalom are aligned with one another.

#### Efforts To Draw NRP to Coalition Explained

92AE0626C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 28 Aug 92 p 12

[Article by 'Orli Azulai-Katz]

[Text] Now they are coming out to twist arms. The Labor Party is opening the door to the NRP [National Religious Party] and saying, "Come in." The NRP says, "Yes and no," and dawdles. Its leaders know very well that SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim] might swing around the other way after the holidays and leave the coalition in the wake of an indictment against [Minister Arye] Der'i.

Hayim Ramon told his colleagues this week that SHAS' threat was the only cloud now darkening the coalition's sky and that the NRP is banking on the hope that SHAS will fly the coop so that it will be able to double its price. The NRP has experience in manipulation of this sort. In private conversations, [Prime Minister Yitzhaq] Rabin, for his part, has made clear that he will not wait forever for the NRP crowd. He will hold seats for them at most until the end of the Knesset recess and the holidays. People are standing in the corridors of power with stopwatch in hand to see who will be the first to break.

Rabin originally vowed that the religion portfolio would stay with him but realized very quickly that it was a little difficult to be Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, and Minister of Religious Affairs, too. In a highly surprising move, he appointed 'Uzi Bar'am coordinator of the office of religion—in other words, acting minister but without any formal authority. Rabin announced his intention to make this appointment before he acted. The NRP thought twice and ignored the hint.

Bar'am's connection to religion can be summed up with a statement that he was seen speaking with rabbis in previous coalition negotiations. Apart from that, his wife Ruti kindles Sabbath eve candles because that is what her parents did, and no pork enters their home.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Minister Bar'am, will you now refrain from traveling on the Sabbath?

[Bar'am] I will not drive on the Sabbath in a ministry car.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] And only kosher restaurants?

[Bar'am] I do not look for restaurants just because they are not kosher. Since you will undoubtedly ask me now if I am going to stop ogling beautiful girls, the answer is no. The pious look, too, and do they ever!

In the past, only Hayim Tzadoq among the secular served as Minister of Religion. That was after the consummate ploy when the NRP bolted from the first Rabin government. Today, Tzadoq is about to be appointed chairman of a committee whose task will be to investigate what is done on the religious councils and recommend how to make cuts on them. This committee is like a red flag for the NRP membership, which is glumly following every action taken by a ministry that not long ago was their exclusive stronghold and a center of power for its chief.

Zevulun Hammer was offered the education portfolio during the Shamir administration but preferred the Ministry of Religion. The ministry was considered a big-time portfolio for both its budgets and its power. All the religious councils and rabbinic courts are subject to its authority; that is, all services for women, marriage, divorce, burial, circumcision, and ritual slaughter. In

other words, thousands of patronage positions to dispense to relatives, cronies, others whose wishes are dear to them and, of course, party officials.

As Minister of Religion, Hammer concentrated most of his political power in NRP institutions as a result of his grass roots work. The NRP always zealously guarded this office; its voting public, more than any other, enjoyed the services the ministry provides and the clear connection.

SHAS' Arye Der'i declared during the election campaign that it was necessary to eliminate all the religious councils and transfer religious services to municipal departments. It is difficult to assume that he will now retreat from that proposal. For the first time in the history of the state, a haredi party has won a foothold in the Ministry of Religion. Pursuant to the coalition agreement, a SHAS man, Shim'on Ben-Hayim, was appointed to the post of director-general. From the moment he assumed his post, Ben-Hayim has focused on a single issue: increasing SHAS representation in the ministry's right positions.

Since the last elections, the Rabin Government has sought speedy solutions to political problems. Thus, it has preferred SHAS as a partner over the NRP. The price it has paid is that, for the first time, it has given the haredis a foothold in a nonharedi ministry, where they perform a function not intended for them: they are building haredi strength in sectors that provide services to the general public.

In informal talks held between the NRP and Rabin, its representatives asked him to hold the prize for them, that is, the Ministry of Religion, so they would not have to worry about it, but Rabin could not promise them anything other than that the Ministry would be reserved for them if they joined the coalition.

"The Ministry of Religious Affairs is an ideological bureau," explains Knesset member Sha'ul Yahom of the NRP. "An outsider will not understand that. A secular minister of religion will not be able to uphold the ministry. I will give you an example. The Police Minister abolished the office of department rabbi. If he had been Minister of Religion, he would not have dared do that. What is more, if there had been an observant Minister of Religion, he would not have allowed the Police Minister to do it. And the appointment of a director-general from SHAS, that for me is a most serious matter. SHAS has always wanted to get its hooks into the ministry to make it haredi. Now the Labor Party has given them that. I am very worried."

To bring the NRP into the coalition, the Labor Party performed back-breaking acrobatics. The last offer discussed in the talks between the sides was that Hammer, Avner Shaki and Yig'al Bibi would join the coalition while the rest of the NRP would support the government from outside. That proposal did not earn a response.

Meanwhile, Bar'am rules the ministry, although with less than full authority. His director-general, Ben-Hayim,

flexed his muscles the day Bar'am arrived. Bar'am invited him, together with a group of senior ministry officials, to his office on the seventh floor. That was supposed to be a get-acquainted meeting. Ben-Hayim refused to go upstairs. "Let him come down to me," he said, and waited in his office on the fourth floor. After haggling between their secretaries, the director-general agreed to go up to the minister's office. "I thought that I was director-general without a minister," remarked Ben-Hayim. Bar'am surmised that the stand-off between him and the director-general would persist.

Some days later, Bar'am decided to appoint two advisors, Baruh Leshem, an adviser on media affairs, and Yisra'el Lipel, a former director-general of the ministry and a member of the NRP who had switched some years earlier to the Labor Party along with David Glass. Lipel was regarded as a strong man in the ministry and an expert on all its resources. Bar'am needed someone like that at his side. Ben-Hayim, however, reared up on his hind legs and sought with all his might to torpedo the appointment.

Ben-Hayim contended that Bar'am was not the minister of religion but merely the coordinator and, as such, without authority to appoint himself advisors. To avoid a quarrel, Bar'am took the appointment papers, marched into the Prime Minister's office and got Rabin's signature, making them a sure thing. At the same time, Bar'am had a clear-the-air talk with Rabbi 'Ovadi'a Yosef and Arye Der'i. He told them, in a delicate way, that their director-general—Ben-Hayim—was making trouble. Yosef and Der'i nodded their heads in apparent understanding and several days of workshop quiet followed between the director-general and the minister.

Bar'am began to study the subject and came to the conclusion that the Ministry of Religion needed a shaking-up. He telephoned Germany, where Hayim Tzadoq was on vacation, and asked him to chair a committee which, within 60 days, would present findings on the functioning of the religious councils. The Supreme Court was flooded with petitions submitted by various parties against religious councils around the country operating in violation of the law.

Rabin did not like the idea. He feared an earthquake in the ministry. When he heard that Bar'am intended to bring in Tzadoq, he said no. Bar'am did not give in. He wrote Rabin a note: "I am stunned by your opposition" and so on, and sent it through an emissary. Twenty-four hours later, Rabin stated that he agreed. Next week, when Tzadoq returns home, we shall see the beginning of the quiet revolution that Bar'am is planning for the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

NRP officials, who have been following the new minister's conduct with trepidation, have already warned of a catastrophe. They say that the Labor Party is helping SHAS take control of the ministry, that the day will come when the chief rabbis will be from SHAS, and worse than that: that there may be appointed a chief rabbi who is

non-Zionist and, for example, does not stand in silence for the siren on memorial day. A majority of the body that selects the chief rabbis, as it does officials of high offices, is composed of representatives of the religious establishment, that is, members of the religious councils and city mayors, many of whom are religious. The NRP believes that it is only a matter of months before SHAS members gain control of this apparatus; and then the establishment will take on a decidedly *haredi* hue.

"For the NRP, the religion portfolio is a powerful political instrument. That is how they built their power over the years," says Bar'am. "Now, while I am in charge of the ministry, I am putting the emphasis on something else. First of all, we must come up with a solution to the problem of the Russian Jews, most of whom are unable to prove that they are Jewish. The same goes for the Jews from Ethiopia. I attach great importance to this issue. I also have plans to change the way things are done in other branches of the ministry so that life will be easier for those citizens who depend on its services."

The NRP will need to decide whether or not it is to lose control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. If they remain outside the coalition, Rabin will act after the holidays to name a permanent minister of religion; by all appearances, it will be Bar'am. The NRP, however, has saucer eyes and is now seeking to join the government. It is motivated by more than political reasons. It knows that there is a chance that SHAS will be out, so that the NRP can therefore receive more. Rabin has said that they are making a mistake, but he is not putting pressure on them, just keeping channels open for exchanging ideas in principle. He does not expect that the NRP will announce any dramatic move in the next few days.

In any event, if the NRP remains outside, Bar'am's colleagues in the Labor Party will determine how he builds power through the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Anyone who knows Bar'am knows that he is no neophyte in any aspect of the political game. The Ministry of Tourism is a plum of a job with the aromas of the whole world, but you build links to voters through the Ministry of Religion and its thousands of positions, and Bar'am knows that very well.

#### Call For a Change in the Golan Heights Law

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10 Sep 92 pp 2, 17

[Legal Commentary by Dr. Ze'ev Segel: "A Change in the Golan Heights Law Will Be Necessary"]

[Text] The Golan Heights Law was passed by the fourteenth Knesset in December 1981. The law stipulates that "the law, jurisdiction, and administration of the state shall apply in the territory of the Golan Heights, as described in the appendix."

The appendix to the law includes a map of the Golan Heights. The law, which was passed in all three stages on the same day, stipulates that it applies from the day that

it was passed by the Knesset. The law further authorizes the minister of the interior, upon consultation with the minister of justice, to determine regulations for its implementation.

The law annexed the Golan Heights to Israel. It is binding within the realm of the State of Israel, but not in the international realm. By virtue of the legislation of the Knesset, the territory of the Golan Heights is just like any other territory in the state in terms of Israeli law. In guidelines dated April 1982, Attorney General Yitzhaq Zamir determined that "according to this law, the residents of the Golan Heights are to be treated, for all intents and purposes, like all of the other residents to whom the law of Israel applies, and all of the government ministries must treat them accordingly."

The significance of the law, in terms of Israeli municipal law is that the government of Israel is not authorized to make any concessions regarding the application of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan Heights, without this concession being approved by the Knesset itself, by changing the law that was passed. The change, which can be passed by a regular majority and will bring about the nullification of the law, or a change in the map described in the appendix to the law, chains the cabinet to Knesset legislation.

This is how the fate of the Golan Heights differs from that of Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza strip. According to the law, the government is authorized to decide upon the return of these territories, without requiring the approval of the Knesset. As stated, the situation is different with regard to the Golan Heights.

The need for an amendment in the Golan Heights law, if there is a wish to bring about any change in the legal situation, does not preclude negotiations regarding the possibility of a change in the situation in the future. At the time that the law was passed in the Knesset, Prime Minister Menahem Begin said that there was nothing in the law to prevent peace negotiations. "At the moment that the president of Syria will say that he is willing to conduct negotiations with Israel on a peace treaty," said Begin, "at that moment negotiations on a peace treaty with Israel will commence, and nothing will stand in its way."

Thus, Begin rejected a reservation to the law proposed by MK Amnon Rubenstein, who sought to create an explicit provision in the law determining that it was not intended to prejudice peace negotiations.

Moshe Arens, who then served as chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, said: "...there are those who will claim that the application of the law, jurisdiction, and administration of Israel on the Golan Heights will close options for negotiations. There is no basis for this claim. There are many cases in history in which negotiations were conducted and territory was transferred to different sovereignty, and the fact that the

territory was not administrated by a military administration, but by a civil one, did not prevent the negotiations. If the day will come when there will be a partner for dialogue in Syria, I am certain that this measure will not be what will prevent the negotiations with the government that will exist at that time."

#### Likud 'Silence' on Golan Viewed

92AE0679A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
14 Sep 92 p 23

[Article by A. Papo]

[Text] The Golan Law, which annexed the Heights to the State of Israel, has limped on one foot from the start. Begin organized a vote on the law toward the fourteenth of December 1981, when he sat in a wheelchair after the accident in his home in which his leg was broken. His explanation for the timing of the annexation was that it had to be executed before a retreat from the Sinai was completed, when the Egyptians still had an interest in keeping it quiet along the southern border. The annexation certainly was a reaction to the Syrian domination of Lebanon.

The law limped on one foot, and Rabin will now have to drop it from this foot, too, because legally he is not allowed to make any withdrawal from the Golan without changing the annexation law.

Members of Rabin's coalition today—Shulamit Aloni, 'Uzi Bar'am, Ya'ir Tzaban, with the addition of the Arab communists—voted, at the time, against the law, and this is a clear indication of what will happen now, with the imminent vote in the Knesset to revoke the law which constitutes, as was stated, a precondition for any feasible negotiations for territorial concessions in the Golan Heights.

Two surprising phenomena come to light in this episode of government preparedness to retreat from the Golan, or from part of it. One may be found in Rabin's main statement in the Knesset: "The government will preserve the assets of territorial defense to the greatest possible extent." This is Rabin's entire doctrine, in one sentence, regarding the land of Israel: the doctrine of practical defense alone, which takes the place of the Zionist doctrine, which, in its essence, is the domination of the Jews over the land of Israel.

This change in the philosophy of our existence and dwelling here is decisive, and it influences youth education, settlements, borders. Even the practical Zionism from the school of socialist Zionism maintained the conquest of Israel using the method of "a dunam here, a dunam there/clump after clump of dirt," and was expressed in youth movement songs, such as "Israel, I swore to myself/only to you have I given all of it." But Rabin's doctrine of practical defense concedes all expansion in advance, content with little, with the arbitrary borders of 1948, requiring retreats on all fronts, supposedly based on Begin's relinquishment of the Sinai.

It is true that, in the Sinai, Begin was the first to contribute to the destruction of the Zionist ethos, according to which the borders of the land of Israel are determined by the most distant settlements. With the abandonment of Yamit and the destruction of the Zionist ethos, Begin also caused heartbreak and a surrender of the Zionist will to determine our fate in Israel. Rabin clutched at his deeds as an excuse for the concessions and the beginning of autonomy.

The second surprising phenomenon that reveals itself here is the standstill in the Likud, and the lack of its sufficient reaction. At this time, when the fate of Israel is truly placed in the balance, we do not hear the voice of Shamir's former family: there is no Meridor, no Milo, and no Olmert. Begin's son, too, remains silent, although, according to him, he wants to be prime minister in a dubious monarchical dynasty.

In view of the silence of the princes and the anemic reaction of Likud, which is not even trying to mobilize the public and arouse public opinion, it appears that the princes suit Rabin and Rabin suits them, and that there is no real gap between their views and his. Aside from the reactions of Sharon and Binyamin Netanyahu, there are no serious reactions on the part of Likud to Rabin's actions. Shamir is traveling in Russia, many of his family members are going around America, and Rabin is conceding and returning [territory]. This is what they call in England, "His Majesty's opposition"—infinitely responsible and loyal to the coalition. It is no wonder that Rabin is doing "whatever comes to him."

#### Commentary Calls For Partial Golan Withdrawal

92AE0679D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 18 Sep 92 p 4

[Article by R. Ben-Yeshi]

[Text] The Golan is not holy from a defense standpoint. But, as long as there is a military threat to Israel from the east, Syrian or from another, our military presence on the ground—at least in part of the Golan—is essential to the security of all of Israel.

Since the Golan was captured in '67, Syria's capability to attack has increased hundreds of times over. The Syrians have precise enough ground-to-ground missiles that are capable of reaching all population centers in Israel, and they also have chemical warheads for them. Published data indicate that the number of tanks in Syrian hands alone is greater than the number of tanks in all of the Israel Defense Force's [IDF] armored divisions. Over 1,000 of them are modern T-72 tanks. The Syrian artillery operates hundreds of self-propelling guns; some of the Syrian's ground-to-air missile batteries are mobile and capable of giving an attack force an extremely effective aerial umbrella.

The Syrian dominance of Lebanon and the considerable Syrian force that stays there give the Syrian general staff options of attack maneuvers against northern Israel,

which they did not have in the past. And when the American pressure is removed from Iraq, they will be able to send a number of divisions that would reach the Golan Heights within a matter of days. The Iranians could also increase the Syrian ability to attack in Israeli territory.

Thus, Israel's leaders again cannot be certain—as they had been in the '60's and '70's—that even in the case of a successful Syrian attack they would be able to turn the tide by means of a counterattack that is just as successful.

Full peace with Syria, through total surrender of the Golan, would indeed significantly reduce the potential threat over Israel. However, in parallel with the peace talks, al-Asad continues to purchase and manufacture modern weapons systems and train his army to attack. In this situation, the leaders of Israel must assume that the threat exists and is liable to materialize.

Therefore, even in a state of full peace with Syria, the IDF must be capable of stopping a ground attack from the north and east before the enemy comes down from the Golan Heights or reaches Metula. In addition, Israel must be capable of frustrating a massive flow of ground-to-ground missiles and attack planes over its population centers.

In order to stand up to these two tasks, Israel needs the Hermon, the foothills in the Golan Heights, and the territory to their west. Aside from this narrow strip, which is 7 to 10 kilometers wide, we can give up the rest, at least from a military standpoint.

The Hermon and the foothills are essential, in particular, for purposes of early warning and intelligence. Also, when an Israeli spy satellite navigates through the Middle East skies, it will focus on long-range threats, and it cannot constitute a substitute for the electronic intelligence installations in the Golan Heights. These not only give warning, but also current intelligence on the formation of the enemy's ground forces in the Golan Heights. Intelligence is also essential to thwart the possibility of attack on Israel's population centers.

There are, apparently, alternatives to intelligence installations in the Golan. If, for example, the Americans would be willing to give us interposition, control, and early warning aircraft, such as the AWACS that the Saudis have, or the modern interposition aircraft, J-Star, which was put in action for the first time during the Gulf War, it would definitely be possible to consider conceding the electronic lookouts in the Golan. But, the acquisition of these aircraft and maintaining them in the air for 24 hours per day, 365 days per year, would cost billions of dollars, which the Treasury does not have.

Aside from this, the Syrians have long-range anti-aircraft SA-5 missile launches, for which the heavy warning planes would be easy prey. The AWACS planes also could not constitute an alternative for the electronic observation posts and others, through which the various

types of fire against tanks that attack to the west of Israeli territory would be directed and tracked.

Even if the Americans would finance the solutions to the problems of intelligence and early warning, Israel would still have to find a way to stop the armored forces advancing from the east. Completely demilitarizing the Golan of tanks, armored troop vehicles, and anti-aircraft missile launches is likely to provide a partial solution to this problem. In such a case, the IDF could, if it knew that the enemy is mustering troops against it from the east, go up to the Golan Heights and capture the essential territory in it.

However, as it is known, the main part of the IDF's force are the reserve units. For them, more than a few hours are needed to mobilize, organize, and get up to the Golan Heights. Especially if the mobilization and equipping centers and the roads leading to the Golan were prone to heavy bombardment from missiles and aircraft. At the same time the Syrian army, almost totally comprised of regular formations, could advance and capture essential territory and axes leading down to Israel's territory.

At this stage, only IDF combat planes and helicopters and long-range fire elements could stop the armored masses advancing westward. But, it is doubtful whether that which Israel has now would be sufficient to fully execute this mission.

Thus, even in conditions of total peace a minimal IDF armored force must be held in the Golan Heights, behind deep antitank trenches and mine fields. This formation does not have to be as it is today. In order for it to be able to carry out its mission, it would suffice the IDF to hold

the edges of the Golan Heights, so that tank movement to the other side of the Kineret [Sea of Galilee] would be prevented.

Completely descending from the Golan Heights, as stated above, cannot come into consideration until an extreme change in the Syrian capability to attack us would occur. Such a change could happen, for example, if the Syrians would agree to disband half of its tank force, armored troop vehicles, self-propelling guns, and combat engineering units. In addition, it would have to move its ground-to-ground missiles to a territory further to the north, to a region from which it could not send them across to Israel, and would agree to completely demilitarize the Golan and all of southern Lebanon of heavy weapons.

If this would suit the Syrians and they would agree to international monitoring for execution of the agreement, Israel could agree, militarily, not only to a total IDF withdrawal from the Golan, but, also, to a coinciding demilitarization of the Hula Valley and the Jordan and the eastern part of the Kineret, as al-Asad demanded.

But, at this time, it appears that chances are slim that al-Asad would agree to such a far-reaching arrangement and, therefore, Rabin also cannot accept his demands that all of the Golan be returned to Syrian control.

Nevertheless, authorized sources in Israel estimate that al-Asad would accept an agreement that would preserve his honor. He is likely to agree, for example, to the continuation of an Israeli presence in the Golan if Israel would agree to certain territorial concessions now, and would promise to discuss additional concessions in the future. Thus, everything remains open.

**Cost-of-Living Figures Reported**

92AE0679C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
16 Sep 92 p 21

[Article by N. Doaq]

[Text] The economic leaders have good reason to smile—the August index, which rose by 0.8 percent, indicates that, apparently, we will have a single-digit index. Since the start of the year, the index has risen by only 5.6 percent, and, at this rate, inflation, in the opinion of economists at the Central Bureau of Statistics, will be only 8.5 to 9 percent, in contrast to 18 percent last year.

If there is room to smile about everything related to the rate of inflation, it is the monthly expenditure, which must sustain an average city family, that erases the smile. The amount is 4,490 shekels per month. This is a great deal of money—especially for the 220,000 unemployed.

Why did the August index rise at such a moderate rate this year (for purposes of comparison, last year it rose by 2.1 percent)? The fruit and vegetables indexes, the enemy of the indexes in previous months, declined by 1.2 percent, and end-of-season sales brought down the clothing and footwear index by 2.8 percent. In contrast, the housing index rose by 1.6 percent; maintaining a dwelling rose in price by 0.4 percent, home furnishings and equipment rose in price by 0.5 percent.

The rise in cost of public transportation and flights in Israel and abroad raised the transportation and communications index by 1.6 percent.

The September index (to be published on 15 October) is also expected to rise by about 0.8 percent. Even now, we know of a 0.3 percent rise in the September index due to the rise in public transportation fares, an increase in electricity rates, and a rise in education fees. Approximately another one-half percent will “contribute” to the index as a result of the rise in prices on the eve of the High Holidays.

As stated earlier, fruits and vegetables brought a moderation of the index. Cucumbers decreased in price by 25 percent; cabbage by 11.6 percent; parsley by 5 percent; and grapes by 11.7 percent.

In contrast, beans rose in price by 18 percent, and apples by 11 percent. The highest price increases belong to lemons—29.1 percent—and grapefruit—22.6 percent.

The cost of a visit to a private physician also increased (by 1.4 percent), as did a visit to the dentist (by 1.7 percent). Also increasing were books (by 2.3 percent), home computers (by 1.5 percent), bus rides (by 7.6 percent), and flights abroad (by 2.3 percent).

The Treasury expressed great satisfaction with the index yesterday. Officials there view it as proof that they have taken the proper measures. But, in truth, a large part of

this achievement is the result of the curse of unemployment. When there are 220,000 unemployed, demand decreases and inflation becomes lower.

The low index also indicates that government will apparently persist in the current exchange rate policy and will avoid a devaluation—at least in the near future.

And in the index margins: Employees of the Central Bureau of Statistics are taking a contract with the condition of forfeit. Yesterday, they almost prevented the publication of the index, an action that would have created quite a commotion in the economy, for many payments are tied to the index. In the end, the employees showed responsibility, so they say, and made possible the publication of the data.

However, they continue to protest. It is not fair, they say, that an academic with a master's degree, who prepares the index data, should have to receive monthly income supplements. They promise surprising steps in the future.

**Elsint, CEO Success Explained**

92AE0626B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
25 Aug 92 p 9

[Article by Arye Kiesel on interview with Shmu'el Parag, CEO of Elsint; place and date not given]

[Text] Resistance to accepting the industrialism prize is typical of Shmu'el Parag, who has revived Elsint and raised it from the ruins left by Avraham Suhami, the company's legendary founder. “Elsint was entrusted to a man who is modest, shy, very basic, very pragmatic, lacking even a trace of charisma, very quiet and very wise, extremely logical, not a media personality, who does not know how to speak but does know how to get things done. He is a detail man who gets down to the nitty gritty.” With characteristic terseness, that is how Benny Peled describes Parag, who has served as CEO throughout the brief transition period since Suhami's departure.

The facts back up Peled's assessment. Over the past year, average employee productivity at Elsint has reached \$125,000, compared to \$87,000 five years ago before Parag's appointment. The company has steadily grown, from \$118 million in 1988, when it even recorded an annual loss of \$21 million, to sales totaling \$191 million in 1991, when it posted a net profit of \$17 million.

The Elsint CEO's office does not fit one's expectations of the work area provided the manager of a successful high-tech company. A handful of papers on a wooden desk, two plain paintings and a personal computer. The office projects informality, modesty, and a great deal of hard, dirty work.

Parag won the industrialism prize “as a token of esteem for his contribution to rebuilding Elsint and turning it into one of Israel's successful companies,” in the words



of the prize committee. Both inside and outside the company, everyone agrees: he deserves the prize.

Parag, married and the father of three, was born in Syria 53 years ago. He studied electrical engineering, electronics, and computer science at the Technion and arrived at Elsint in 1972. Climbing the corporate ladder, Parag began his career as the manager of a development project and went on to directing Elsint's subsidiary corporation in the United States. On his return, he was appointed deputy to the company's president and then made president in 1988.

Elsint's history teaches that Parag's rise to the upper ranks was no trivial matter. The company was founded in 1969 by Dr. Avraham Suhami when it was still a division of Elron. Suhami, together with a group of scientists he brought with him from the Technion, developed electronic instruments for taking atomic measurements. After that, Suhami and his whiz kids entered the nuclear medicine field. Until 1983, Elsint rode a wave of success, and Israeli industrial circles regarded Suhami as a wizard. His name opened every economic door in the country and the company outcompeted the world's best.

But Suhami fell victim to his own success. He loved to take risks, until one failed. The step that caused Elsint's collapse was the acquisition of Zonex's marketing network. Zonex was an American company that manufactured and marketed standard x-ray instruments. Suhami believed in the acquisition but, to his misfortune, Zonex went bankrupt. Elsint, which was accustomed to profits, suddenly began to lose money. The accumulated loss that year of \$35 million seemed like the end of the world at the time. Suhami retired and went abroad.

Parag entered the president's office after a transition period under the direction of General (res.) Benny Peled. He reduced the manpower roster by 350 employees while achieving significant growth. Parag fulfilled two objectives: development and marketing. Company sources say that its reputation for service five years ago was so poor that customers became disenchanted. Today, a new "boutique" style reigns. Employees beckon customers

with promises of good service and personal contact. "We listen to customer demands. We have shortened lines of communication. Service is at the top of our list of priorities." Parag is getting ready to raise the hurdle for his company. In an interview with YEDI'OT AHARONOT, he said, "The company must grow and give more to the market. Our success will be measured not by our ability to switch from losses to profit but by what we accomplish. I tell our staff that we must soon reach sales totaling half a billion dollars. And when I say soon, I mean within three to five years."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Is that possible?

[Parag] It is possible and we will do it.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Just how, exactly?

[Parag] We are developing better equipment, managing the company more soundly, making decisions on time, and working with subsidiaries. It is teamwork. Elsint will reach sales of half a billion dollars.

Parag explains the background for his optimism. The world market for simulations, he says, in which giants Toshiba, Hitachi, and General Electric compete, is estimated at \$13.5 billion. Half of the market is still held by the old x-ray. "In such an enormous market, Elsint has only \$190 million in sales this year and \$220 million in projected sales next year. That is a very small share," says a senior Elsint official. "The goal is to introduce our products, including the world's fastest CAT-scan, more aggressively. No other company has developed such a CAT-scan," they boast at Elsint, and no one will have a similar product in the next three, all-important years.

Perhaps because of fear of the past, Elsint is competing in the marketing arena with inferior resources. General Electric, for example, maintains 100 sales offices in the United States. Elsint has just two. The moment the subject of expanding the marketing network comes up for discussion, everyone remembers Suhami, who bought a vast network—and sank with it. Parag's rule is caution: Do not bite off more than you can chew.

**Popeye Missile, Farnborough Air Show Discussed**  
*92AE0626D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 25 Aug 92 p 12*

[Article by Amos Regev]

[Text] The Farnborough Air Show will open on 6 September. The show, which has been held the past two years at London's south-west airport, is the Paris (Laborgia) air exhibition's great rival. Initially, it was intended to showcase the flower of the British aircraft industry. Over the years, however, and with the industry's decline, the fair has become international in every respect—from aircraft to accessories and weapons systems.

Israel is a regular at the Laborgia exhibition but has not put anything on display at Farnborough since the Yom Kippur War. Instead, it has been content to send a team of experts. This year, we will be there, too. "Given the changes around the world and the Middle East, and the altered relations with us, it is very important for Israel to take part in the fair," says Brigadier General Yom-Tov Tamir, who serves as IDF attache and the Defense Ministry's representative in Britain. "We used to think that participation would be a waste of money," says Tamir, "but the atmosphere is different this time. We have the chance to sell not just for local needs but to representatives from all over the world who will be here. It is also a good opportunity to make contacts, send out feelers, and start cooperative ventures."

At Farnborough 1992, the political changes by which former Soviet companies are now searching for western partners will meet the economic slump, which is being felt in stiffer competition among manufacturers—beginning with a shrinking market for war planes and ending with a recession-stricken market for passenger aircraft.

Fewer exhibitors will participate in the fair this year, 650 compared to 800 two years ago. But many more countries are making an appearance. FLIGHT, the British aviation weekly, predicts that this year's attraction will be the massive participation of companies and manufacturers from Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, advanced models of former Soviet planes will be unveiled. Eastern producers will be looking to sell their products unfettered by any political restrictions and will make special efforts to find western partners for various projects.

For example, the "Yakovlev" factory, which turned out the "Yak" line of aircraft, will display for the first time a war plane, the Yak-141, which takes off from short runways and makes vertical landings. This plane, which NATO dubbed the "Freestyle," is to replace the Yak-38, known as the "Frog," which is still to be found on Russian aircraft carriers. The new "Yak" is a supersonic plane and, therefore, more advanced than its counterpart in the west, the British "Harrier." The Yakovlev factory is seeking foreign investors for this project.

The manufacturers of MiG planes will display the MiG M-29, an advanced model of the familiar MiG 29. The

new model features a "fly by wire" system and is judged one of the best combat planes in the world.

Manufacturers of the "Sukhoi" will exhibit a two-seat training version of the Sukhoi-27, which is considered the best Soviet interceptor. This is the model that created a sensation when it performed at the Paris aviation exhibition last year.

The "Kamov" helicopter factory will present the KA-50 "Hokum," a tank-hunter helicopter along the lines, for example, of the "Cobra." The factory is offering a model of the "Hokum" equipped with western systems; the British Air Force is considering buying 130 of these antitank helicopters.

The makers of the "Tupolov" passenger plane will display an improved model of the TU-204, which is comparable to the Boeing 757. Its new features include British Rolls Royce engines. In some ways, the project brings to mind the idea for an Israel-Soviet plane broached two years ago: a Russian fuselage with western engines and technology.

Western Europe, too, has been developing aircraft. The difficulties of the EFA (the European fighter plane), from which Germany has withdrawn, have set back plans for equipping the European air forces. A number of candidates will rise for this "dream opportunity": The Swedish "Griffin" (which was once considered a European competitor to our "Lavi" before we discontinued it); the French "Rafael"; and, of course, the excellent, well-known, and expensive American F-16 and F-18.

It can be expected that all these contestants will fly in the skies above Farnborough to demonstrate their breath-taking abilities in an attempt to capture the attention of prospective buyers.

Last but not least (especially for someone who is managing a trip abroad)—"ordinary" passenger planes. First off, there will be the Airbus-340, the new four-engine model of the European consortium. This plane is competing with long, huge, wide-body American Boeings and McDonnell-Douglases. The Airbus's marketers will certainly be compelled to summon all their talents to make curious customers forget the crash in Nepal some weeks ago (an Airbus, unluckily for them). In addition to the planes themselves, a variety of avionics systems, aerial arms, communications equipment, radars, engines, and other aviation related products will be on display at the fair.

[Box, p 13]

Two defense industries in two booths—that is the entire Israeli presence at the Farnborough aviation fair. The lucky products are Rafa'el's "Popeye" air-to-ground missile and metal flight fittings made by "As'ot Ashqelon," a subsidiary of Israel Military Industries. In recent years, Israel has invested its marketing effort in the Laborgia competition fair in France. This year, Rafa'el decided to make an effort to bring to Britain the product that it thinks the British themselves are likely to buy. Of course, if the opportunity

arises, the "Popeye" will be sold to other states as well. "We are going for broke," they are saying at the arms development authority. The expenses of exhibition are not peanuts and must be a strain given the agency's grim financial situation. The decision to go, however, was a wise one. Rafa'el today has a weapons system of the type many people are talking about but which few manufacturers, if any, can supply "off the shelf."

What, actually, is the "Popeye?" It is an air-to-ground missile launched towards its target on a course determined in advance. While in flight, it receives orders from the plane's weapons systems operator. On a small screen, the weapons operator (on a twin-seat war plane, this is the navigator's assignment) observes a clear picture of the target as the missile approaches. Using a joystick, he makes steering corrections until the missile strikes home with the accuracy of a marksman's rifle.

The maximum range of the missile is 100 km, it is 4.7 meters long and its warhead—the explosive and the detonator apparatus—weighs 350 kg. So far, \$180 million worth of "Popeye" missiles have been sold. According to foreign reports, Britain, learning the main lesson of the Gulf War, is now looking for an air-to-ground missile for its air force. "We think that the market for the 'Popeye' is potentially a large one and are making an effort to give it maximal exposure," says Noah Shahar, Rafa'el's spokesman.

The fact that the Americans have acquired "Popeyes" in not-significant numbers is supposed to grease the way for sales. American officers have praised the missile's capabilities. "You can shoot the 'Popeye' through the window of a house and hit your target. This thing's accuracy is amazing," says an officer of the American Strategic Air Command. Anyone who really thinks that the way to knock out his enemy is to fire a missile through the window of his house will have to part with \$780,000 for the opportunity; that, according to foreign sources, is the retail price of the "Popeye."

The "Popeye" was an attraction at the Paris exhibition last year. Everyone who was anyone—sophisticated Americans, African air force commanders, and South American generals—came to gaze at the Israeli wonder. All of them would like such an accurate weapon and all of them, at a minimum, would like to know what their enemies know about it.

A demonstration tape showing the launch of a "Popeye" towards a target made of wood and cardboard was run on a video player dozens of times at the Paris fair. Everyone was deeply impressed by how the missile went through the window of a house. Because of the missile's weight and size, it can be loaded on large planes, such as the enormous American B-52 strategic bombers, or, alternatively, on war planes such as the "Phantom." FLIGHT weekly contends that Rafa'el is now developing a smaller model (which the Americans call "Have-Lite" as though it were a new diet drink) for use by air forces equipped with lighter planes.

And, as always, customers will be surrounded by all the amenities designed to make their stay a pleasant one: magnificent hospitality rooms with well-stocked bars, superb food, luxurious limousines, and even helicopters serving as a taxi service.

### Commentary Discusses IDF Training Accidents

92AE0626A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
26 Aug 92 p 19

[Article by Gen. (Res.) Shlomo Gazit]

[Text] The recent series of accidents in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] again and again raises troubling questions. What is happening to the IDF, how does it explain and rationalize these recurring mishaps?

Of course, every accident and incident is studied and analyzed, and attempts are made to learn lessons from it. In fact, the commission investigating the training accident in which two Air Force rescue unit soldiers were killed presented its findings this week. But they cannot see the forest for the trees. No one is drawing comprehensive conclusions.

Anyone looking for an explanation for the occasional incidents besetting the IDF cannot ignore the ceaseless, ever-increasing load placed on the army's back. The IDF is like the proverbial camel—since its founding 44 years ago, greater and greater responsibilities have been entrusted to it, it has been worked longer and longer hours, its food and water rations have been steadily reduced, and then, when one final straw is laid on its back and it collapses, we are amazed that this heroic camel of ours cannot bear the weight of a blade of straw.

I have not conducted an exhaustive study of this subject, so I will limit myself here to pointing out only some of the major changes and additional tasks that have been laid on the IDF's shoulders:

- The borders of the state have expanded and been lengthened, which has significance for the element of time. Apart from the question of time, there was a need to establish a system of ground, air, and sea supply requiring full and constant maintenance.
- The IDF has grown in both size and quality. Its armaments and supporting equipment today are infinitely more advanced than those of the past. Maintenance and operation of them are many times more expensive and complex.
- Holding the territories and treatment of the Arab population are increasingly complicated assignments. Dealing with people demands a measure of public sensitivity and the immediate involvement of the highest echelons.
- Handling the Jewish settlers is bound up with the public's political attitudes and cannot be equated with dealing with the Arab population.
- Day-to-day defense assignments have utterly changed over the years. The scope of the forces routinely deployed in these duties leaped dramatically after the

Six-Day War, again after the Yom Kippur War, still again in the wake of the Lebanon War, and yet again, five years ago, with the outbreak of the intifadah. The change is not merely one of scale.

- The 25 years that have passed have created a new dimension of communications trailing and engaging the army system.
- And finally, since the Gulf War, there has been added the heavy burden of home defense, a task which, no longer merely theoretical, has now been placed on the IDF despite all its complications.

A genuine solution will be found only if there are changes in the political facts. A political settlement between Israel and her neighbors could remove a considerable portion of the burden now resting on the IDF's back. This solution, however, is not within our control. Under current conditions, we must search for solutions within our exclusive domain and scope of decision.

The essence of the problem is how to relieve the IDF camel of the burden on its back and to shift the responsibility to someone else.

I do not claim here to propose tested solutions. I have stepped forward to point out the problem. Nonetheless, and primarily for the purpose of illustration, I shall note a possible direction for a solution. The government of Israel must prepare for war by dividing up two different assignments: the front (all the means necessary for winning the war) and the rear (the means and equipment appropriate for dealing with its problems). This homefront authority would receive from the IDF full responsibility for the occupied territories (over both the Arab and the Jewish populations) and for the "homefront command." The IDF would bear the responsibility for guarding the borders during peacetime and war on the ground, in the air, and in the sea.

Each of the tragic accidents befalling us constitutes a red light signaling us that we must remove much of the weight saddling the IDF. We must correctly read these signals and find solutions. If that is not done, if we continue to encumber the IDF, we may find in the not so distant future, God forbid, that our army does not function to its full capacity and it is not at its best in meeting its chief challenge—the confrontation with the enemy beyond the borders.

### Weapons Industry's Problems Discussed

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[Article by A. Egozi]

[Text] The Israeli weapons industry has a problem. We are not speaking of the well-known snare of the war that recently turned into an untypical act. The problem is the way in which the government is treating the industry that is trying to adapt itself to the new situation in the worldwide weapons market.

The crisis is severe and the situation is deteriorating. If emergency measures are not taken, all of the governmental defense industries are liable to be thrown into a situation that will endanger their future. The transition to manufacturing civilian products is not simple and, in this stage, it does not constitute an alternative to the reduction in weapons acquisitions by the Israel Defense Forces [IDF] and by customers abroad.

### A New Guest in the Aeronautical Jungle

The aeronautical exhibition in Franborough, Great Britain, which concluded at the end of the week, demonstrated the Israeli weapons industry's difficult situation. Only two companies made the effort to get there: the Combat Means Development Authority and 'Asot Ashqelon. They made do with small, cost-effective pavilions.

Opposite them the large and experienced ones were stationed: manufacturers of aircraft and aeronautical weapons of destruction from the United States and Europe. This year there is a new guest in the aeronautical jungle—Russia, who is diligently seeking prey with all its might, including products which, not long ago, were considered state secrets there.

In today's market, everyone is in a rage to sell, at almost any price, and our industry is definitely trapped in. Israel could have submitted—and, perhaps, even won—a number of the big proposals which were announced in recent months in different parts of the world. The reason for abstaining from the competition: the defense system is not allowing the industries to reveal their products.

"In the Defense Ministry, there are those who still think in terms of an underground from the prestatehood days," one of the senior employees of the defense industry told me. The problem is stuck here. When Russia generously offers missiles and smart bombs, which, just two years earlier the CIA was prepared to do everything to reveal its very existence, it is difficult to operate under the conditions that the defense system is dictating."

Indeed, it is preferable not to reveal all weapons systems that were developed in Israel, but, without flexibility in [issuing] permits for their disclosure, the industries will not get pulled out of the mud. "If we do not sell, they will buy from others," summarized simply an Israeli expert who visited Franborough, giving examples of the inflexibility that the defense system shows in this area.

### Competition Over Every Center Tail

The industries must reach a situation in which they would be able to approach almost every center in every realm. In the wild weapons market, all of the manufacturers are descending upon every center and every center tail. If Israel is not there, it will disappear from the map. Countries such as Brazil and India established large and sophisticated defense industries. They have joined the traditional weapons manufacturers, the United States and European countries, and the new hot one on the market—Russia.

	1991 Sales Cycle (New Shekels)	1992 Sales Cycle (New Shekels)	1992 Profit/Loss (New Shekels)	Number Employed	Candidates for Layoffs	Problems	Solutions
Aircraft Industry	4 Billion	3.8 Billion	Profit 52 Million	17,000	1500	Weak economic market: cancellation of transactions for sale of Kfirs to Taiwan and Phillipines	Additional cuts in all areas—additional hours, travel abroad, for management, purchase, raw materials
Military Industry	1.3 Billion	1.2 Billion	Loss 57 Million	8000	750	Decline in demand for products, in particular shells and light munitions	Formation of a separate program for each plant. By end of October an all-inclusive plan for the company would be made. Hurtful cutbacks are anticipated
Combat Means Development Authority	1.1 Billion	1.1 Billion	Loss 240 Million	5000	200	Limitations on the export of weapons systems developed for the Israel Defense Forces. Ineffective marketing.	Still awaiting appointment of a director-general and a change in the authority's position from a support unit of the defense ministry to a business organization

In such a saturated market, only the removal of limitations and generous government aid can prevent crises greater than those that are currently harming the domestic weapons manufacturers. But if the prime minister, Yitzhaq Rabin, who also serves as defense minister, would not make way to appoint a director to the Combat Means Development Authority, it is completely clear that salvation for the industries will not come from government.

The weapons manufacturers are prepared for a "compromise": "Not that they would aid us, but that they would also not hinder us," said the same senior employee, who

anticipates an even more difficult period for the industry. In his opinion, additional layoffs are anticipated, as well as a cut in operational expenditures, and an effort to increase exports is anticipated. The suggestion to change over to the manufacture of civilian products (such as the public telephones that the Military Industry is manufacturing) seems to be a good solution at this stage, but very far from reach.

In the opinions of all of the experts, painful steps will be required to prevent the collapse of the Israeli governmental defense industries.

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