


JPRS-TAC-93-012
3 June 1993



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

Arms Control

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

19980115 075

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-93-012

CONTENTS

3 June 1993

CHINA

- Foreign Minister Qian Holds News Conference in Seoul 27 May [XINHUA, 27 May 93] 1

EAST ASIA

JAPAN

- Tokyo, Moscow To Negotiate Nuclear Disarmament Panel [KYODO, 25 May 93] 2

NORTH KOREA

- Pyongyang Press Lashes Out at UN, U.S. 2
UN Resolution Called 'Unjustifiable Act' [KCNA, 22 May 93] 2
U.S. Nuclear Control Director Criticized
[Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 21 May 93] 3

LAOS

- Laos Becomes Member of Antichemical Weapons Pact [Vitthayou Hengsat Radio, 20 May 93] 3

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

ISRAEL

- Israeli Press on Arab-Israeli Arms Control Talks in Washington 4
'Security and Military Measures' [Israel TV, 18 May 93] 4
Israeli Negotiator Interviewed [Qol Yisra'el, 18 May 93] 4
Pre-Talks Poll on Israeli Nuclear Program [Y. Kaspi; 'AL HAMISHMAR, 18 May 93] 4
Israeli Sources Report Progress [HA'ARETZ, 20 May 93] 5
Israeli Press Reports Syrian Disarmament Demands
[S. Schiffer; YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 20 May 93] 5

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

GENERAL

- Ukrainian Press Accuses U.S. Ambassador of Pressuring Kiev
[Y. Holets; SAMOSTIYNA UKRAYINA, 30 Apr 93] 7
Ukrainian Report on Talbott's Visit [UNIAR, 10 May 93] 7
Technology Commission Head on Disarmament
[Prof. Y. A. Yashin interview; ROSSIYA, No 17, 21 Apr 93] 8
Russian Statement on INF Anniversary [S. Staroselskiy, L. Timofeyev; ITAR-TASS, 28 May 93] . 9
Kazakh 'Experts' on Nuclear Arms Policy
[K. Abuseitov, M. Laumulin; AZIYA INTERNATIONAL WEEKLY, No 10, Mar 93] 9
Notice to Readers 12

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

- Russian Critiques of START II 12
Commentary Says Treaty Serves U.S. Interests
[O. Cherkovets; FEDERATSIYA, No 57, 25 May 93] 12
Academic Urges Curb on 'Precision Weapons'
[V. Serbenyuk; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 May 93] 12
'Analytic Review' Offered [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, 26 May 93] 13

Ukrainian Official on Talks With U.S. Senators in Washington [Kiev Radio, 25 May 93]	14
Ukrainian Leaders Discuss Nuclear Retention	15
Chornovil on Security Issues [V. Chornovil speech; VYSOKYY ZAMOK, 24 Apr 93]	15
Parliamentarians Vote for De Jure Nuclear Status [V. Zaynetdinov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 20 May 93]	15
Party Leader for Retention [B. Sverdlov; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 26 May 93]	16
Ukrainian Peace Groups Support Disarmament [HOLOS UKRAYINY; 26 May 93]	16
Russian Senior Officer Assails Ukrainian Nuclear Arms Stance [Maj. Gen. V. Belous; FEDERATSIYA, 15 May 93]	16
French Report on Russian Nuclear Submarine Destruction [LE MONDE, 18 May 93]	18

SDI, SPACE ARMS, GLOBAL DEFENSE

Russian Television on Space Defense Systems	19
Highlights of 'Secret Space—Part 1' [Moscow TV, 15 May 93]	19
Transcript of Program [Moscow TV, 15 May 93]	21
Russian Space Developments	25
Launch of 'Military' Spacecraft [V. Romanenkova; ITAR-TASS, 19 May 93]	25
New Cosmodrome [SEGODNYA, No 18, 21 May 93]	25
Russian Space Forces Develop New 'Superlight' Rocket Booster [S. Ivanov; ITAR-TASS, 27 May 93]	25

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Inspectors To Monitor Ukrainian Compliance [Kiev Radio, 18 May 93]	26
Lithuania and Russia Negotiate Troop Withdrawal	26
Landsbergis Against Further Talks [BNS, 15 May 93]	26
Russia's Grachev to Vilnius for Talks [ELTA NEWS BULLETIN, No 245, 18 May 93]	26
Meets With President Brazauskas [BNS, 19 May 93]	27
'Compromise' Under Consideration [BNS, 19 May 93]	27
Russian Negotiator Says Talks 'Rather Difficult' [BNS, 19 May 93]	27
Defense Ministers Announce Date [BNS, 20 May 93]	27
Fifty-five Percent of Troops, Equipment Already Withdrawn [BNS, 22 May 93]	28
New Round of Russia-Latvia Talks on Troop Withdrawal	29
Russian Evacuation Schedule Offered [BNS, 18 May 93]	29
Riga Cannot Accept Offer [BNS, 18 May 93]	29
Russia's Grachev Makes Another Offer [BNS, 19 May 93]	30
Russian Delegate Proclaims 'Feasible Results' [BNS, 22 May 93]	30
Border Guards Leaving [BNS, 28 May 93]	31

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Destruction of Chemical Weapons Near Udmurtia Planned [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 26 May 93]	31
Russia Grapples With CW Disarmament Issues	31
Experts Debate Destruction and Conversion [A. Peslyak; Moscow TV, 15 May 93]	31
International Conference Opens in Moscow 19 May [S. Ostanin; ITAR-TASS, 19 May 93]	31
Yeltsin Sends Message [ROSSIYSKIY VESTI, 19 May 93]	31
Further on Conference [M. Aleksandridi, Y. Kovalenko; Moscow TV, 19 May 93]	32
Legislation Discussed [S. Ostanin; ITAR-TASS, 20 May 93]	32
Roundup of Issues [S. Ostanin; ITAR-TASS, 21 May 93]	33
Conference Ends [A. Dolgikh; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 May 93]	33
Russia Chemical Weapons Expert Charged With Disclosing State Secrets	34
Preliminary Investigation [V. Rudnev; IZVESTIYA, 20 May 93]	34
Interview With Scientist [V. S. Mirzayanov interview; MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, No 22, 30 May 93]	34

WEAPONS CONVERSION

Russian Generals Discuss Defense Production Conversion [S. Ostanin; ITAR-TASS, 27 May 93] 36
Russian Commentary on Superpower Weapons Conversion
[V. Kozyakov; Moscow Radio, 18 May 93] 37

WEST EUROPE

FRANCE

Paris Paper on Revised U.S. Star Wars Program [LE MONDE, 15 May 93] 38
France Orders Third Nuclear Submarine [AFP, 27 May 93] 38

Foreign Minister Qian Holds News Conference in Seoul 27 May

*OW2705135193 Beijing XINHUA in English
1335 GMT 27 May 93*

[Excerpt] Seoul, May 27 (XINHUA)—Visiting Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said here Thursday that China and South Korea have identical views on many international issues and his visit to Seoul is successful.

The concrete result of his current visit is the signing of the ocean shipping agreement between the two countries, Qian said at a press conference.

Qian arrived here Wednesday [26 May] for a four-day visit to South Korea. He is the highest Chinese official to visit Seoul since the two countries established diplomatic relations last August. [passage omitted]

Turning to Pyongyang's nuclear issue, the Chinese vice-premier said that China has been opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and supports the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) should be resolved in negotiations between the DPRK and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the DPRK and the United States and the DPRK and South Korea, he pointed out.

On March 12, the DPRK announced that it was quitting the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) to protect its interest and sovereignty. The departure is to take effect on June 12.

Qian said that China opposes using the method of pressure and sanctions to solve Pyongyang's nuclear issue and does not favor the submission of the issue to the United Nations Security Council.

JAPAN

Tokyo, Moscow To Negotiate Nuclear Disarmament Panel

OW2505105793 Tokyo KYODO in English 1001 GMT 25 May 93

[Text] Tokyo, May 25 KYODO—Japan and Russia have started discussing the establishment of a bilateral committee that will administer 100 million dollars in grants from Japan to help Russia get rid of nuclear weapons and waste, government sources said Tuesday [25 May].

Tokyo wants the denuclearization committee to take up work by June, prior to the July 7 to 9 Tokyo summit of the Group of Seven (G-7) major industrialized nations, they said. The committee will focus on technological cooperation to build nuclear waste storage sites and reprocessing facilities in Russia.

Russia cited the lack of storage and reprocessing facilities on land or delay in their construction as reasons it continued nuclear dumping at sea. Moscow said the dumping of liquid radioactive waste, such as coolants from nuclear reactors or rocket fuel from intercontinental ballistic missiles, will continue at least until 1997. The rockets will be destroyed in large numbers over several years in accordance with disarmament agreements.

The committee will work out concrete projects to enhance Russia's storing and reprocessing capacity to put an end to the radioactive pollution of the sea. It also will decide Japan's share in financing the different measures.

All projects will be financed through the 100 million dollar aid package Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa announced at a G-7 foreign and finance ministers meeting in April in Tokyo.

Decades-long dumping of radioactive substances in the seas close to Japan was disclosed only recently in a Russian Government report, adding another controversial issue to Russia-Japan relations already strained by an unresolved territorial dispute.

The report said nuclear waste was dumped into the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and an area southeast of Kamchatka from late 1959 to 1992. Two nuclear reactors also were dumped in the sea of Japan, the report said.

Japan and Russia agreed in a first two-day joint working group session from May 11 to 12 in Moscow to carry out a joint survey to investigate the impact of nuclear waste dumping on the marine environment. They also agreed to speed up exchange of data and reports concerning nuclear dumping at sea.

NORTH KOREA

Pyongyang Press Lashes Out at UN, U.S.**UN Resolution Called 'Unjustifiable Act'**

SK2205052193 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0440 GMT 22 May 93

["UN Must Not Be Tool for Arbitrary Practice of Superpower"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 22 (KCNA)—The arbitrary practice and privileges of imperialism must not be tolerated at the United Nations and the UN Security Council must not be abused for the scheme of a superpower to infringe on the sovereignty of other countries, stresses NODONG SINMUN today.

The author of the article says:

The United States recently had an unreasonable "resolution" adopted, contravening the UN charter and the mission of the Security Council, by raising "nuclear suspicion" against the DPRK, a non-nuclear peaceful state. This is an unjustifiable act that fully conflicts with the mission of the UN Security Council which should serve for defence of international justice and peace.

The adoption of the "resolution" is unjustifiable in that the United States, the offender in the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula, initiated its draft and forced its passage.

It is not the DPRK but the U.S. pursuing a dominationist policy as a nuclear power that is responsible for the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula. But, the United States, craftily taking advantage of its position of the only superpower in the world and its permanent membership in the UN Security Council, reversed black and white and fabricated the unreasonable "resolution" at the Security Council, incriminating the DPRK, the victim.

The adoption of the "resolution" is unjustifiable also in that the UN Security Council blocks negotiation today, though it called for it in the "statement" of its president only yesterday.

Even after declaring our withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, we promoted negotiation with the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency and actively worked to solve the problem through talks with the United States, the party responsible for the problem.

At this time, the United States negated the position of the UN Security Council encouraging negotiation and manipulated it to adopt the unreasonable "resolution."

Such abnormal developments in the UN arena these days are attributable to the arrogant ambition of the United States for world domination to lord it over as the "sole leader of the world" after the end of the cold war.

It is also because some countries play the role of hand-raising machine and servants of the United States, yielding to its policy of strength.

U.S. Nuclear Control Director Criticized

SK2205092693 *Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0026 GMT 21 May 93*

[NODONG SINMUN 21 May commentary: "Insidious Attempt"]

[Text] A strange idea about nuclear inspection is gaining ground in the United States: that responsibility for nuclear inspection should be transferred from the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] to the UN Security Council, which has the means to enforce its decision.

Paul Leventhal, director of the Nuclear Control Institute, a U.S. civilian research institute, and others have said this, stating that the nuclear inspection system stipulated in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] is clearly vulnerable. An insidious attempt is lurking behind this contention.

It is a well known fact that the IAEA Secretariat is being manipulated by the United States. As followers of the United States, some IAEA Secretariat officials [ilbugye-chung] lost their impartiality and went so far as to adopt a resolution on special inspections [tukpyol sachal] against us.

Having reduced the IAEA Secretariat to its plaything, the United States now seeks to freely use the UN Security Council for its insidious political aims and has already begun to manipulate it. The unreasonable resolution adopted on 11 May regarding our nuclear problem is typical of this manipulation.

Our republic's decision to withdraw from the NPT concerns our legitimate sovereignty. Therefore, no one can make a fuss about this.

A basic mission of the UN Security Council is to discuss actions that wreck world peace and security and to prevent these actions. Our withdrawal from the NPT is just, taken as a step to defend national sovereignty and the supreme interests of the country, not to wreck world peace or to threaten the security of other countries.

It is not we who are attempting to threaten world peace and security and destroy the independence of other countries, but the United States. The United States was the first country to produce nuclear weapons, has the largest stock of them, and is the country that poses a

grave nuclear threat to our republic, a nonnuclear country, by abusing the IAEA Charter, the NPT, and even the safeguards accord.

If the UN Security Council is to be fair, it must discuss the criminal acts of the United States, the assailant, not us, the victim, and punish it as it deserves. However, the United States is pulling the wires of the UN Security Council so that it will reverse the identity of assailant and victim.

What the United States is doing to us today it can do to other nonnuclear states tomorrow if the UN Security Council takes responsibility for nuclear inspection. Is that not correct?

Some IAEA Secretariat officials and some members of the UN Security Council must ponder the grave consequences that might arise from following the United States.

The UN Security Council and the IAEA Secretariat should not play into the hands of the superpower but adhere to its principles of international justice and impartiality in keeping with their missions. If they do, they will win the trust of peace-loving people around the world.

LAOS

Laos Becomes Member of Antichemical Weapons Pact

BK2005021493 *Vientiane Vitthayou Hengsat Radio Network in Lao 0000 GMT 20 May 93*

[Text] A report from the Foreign Affairs Ministry said that on 12 May at the UN Headquarters in New York, the United States, Mrs. Kannika, charge d'affaires of the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR] at the United Nations, representing the Lao Government, signed the Antichemical Weapons Treaty to make Laos a member country of the treaty. The treaty prohibits the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and stipulates that such weapons be destroyed.

The signing of the treaty by the Lao envoy reaffirms the sincere support of the LPDR to the spirit and substance of the treaty. It is well known that in the past as well as in the present, the LPDR Government has never had any chemical weapons in its possession and has never used nor will ever use such dangerous weapons. At present, 144 countries have signed the treaty and three of them have already given ratification to it. The LPDR will consider ratifying this treaty on an appropriate occasion in the future.

ISRAEL

Israeli Press on Arab-Israeli Arms Control Talks in Washington**'Security and Military Measures'**

TA1805175693 Jerusalem Israel Television Network in Arabic 1630 GMT 18 May 93

[Text] Israel will propose to the Arab states a series of security and military measures aimed at building mutual confidence and preventing a deteriorating security situation stemming from misunderstanding. Israel will also propose the exchange of information prior to staged military maneuvers and exercises. Our political affairs correspondent Shlomo Ganor reports that these proposals will be presented by the Israeli delegation to the multilateral talks arms control negotiations, which are to begin today in Washington. Moreover, Israel will propose that the Middle East region be declared a nuclear-free zone after peace agreements are reached between the Arab states and Israel.

Israeli Negotiator Interviewed

TA1805173793 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew 1605 GMT 18 May 93

[Text] The Middle East multilateral talks on regional security and arms control have opened in Washington. Among the 21 countries participating in the deliberations, are the Palestinians, who are being represented for the first time. With the opening of the talks, our correspondent Arye Golan interviewed David 'Ivri, Defense Ministry director general and head of the Israeli delegation.

[Begin recording] 'Ivri: It has been about eight months since the Moscow meeting, which was quite good. Many preparations have been made during that time together with the serious efforts invested by the cosponsors—the United States and Russia. The main issues being raised are confidence-building measures and our visions of the long-term future. We hope the proposals will be approved by the forum. We have definitely come up with a constructive approach in order to advance matters, and I hope that is what will happen.

Golan: You still hope that despite the fact that the ninth round of bilateral talks ended in failure late last week?

'Ivri: I cannot refer to the bilateral talks because I am not adequately informed about them. I hope there will be two separate tracks although I am sure that they cannot be totally separated. I think the preparations will give us a chance to make progress.

Golan: Can you tell us in more detail where progress can be made and what differences, if any, exist?

'Ivri: No, it is too early to talk about that. That is why we are attending the talks.

Golan: Is there proper coordination with the Americans?

'Ivri: There is coordination with everybody. We are working hard to coordinate with all the groups, and to prepare things in such a way that the talks will be effective.

Golan: One last question, what do you think of Egypt's demand that Israel must first commit itself to getting rid of its nuclear weapons before there are any further deliberations on disarmament.

'Ivri: I do not think that is the point, because what we are trying to do is to find areas of cooperation and a consensus in the region, and not to jump further ahead.

Golan: And that is possible?

'Ivri: That is what everybody, not only we, are trying to achieve. [end recording]

Pre-Talks Poll on Israeli Nuclear Program

TA1805141393 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 18 May 93 p 2

[Report by Yo'av Kaspi]

[Text] Some 53 percent of Israelis believe that Israel should not use nuclear weapons against Arab states even in a situation of despair resulting from an all-out war which can endanger the state, according to a new survey conducted by Professor Asher Ariane of the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.

The poll also shows that 33 percent claim that the use of nuclear weapons is unjustified under any circumstances.

In an earlier poll conducted in 1991, after the Gulf war, 88 percent claimed that the use of nuclear weapons is justified under certain circumstances, and only 12 percent claimed that the use of such weapons is unjustified in any circumstances. In 1986, on the other hand, 66 percent said that the use of nuclear weapons is unjustified under any circumstances.

Some 71 percent of the public claims that Israel has to keep secret the issue of nuclear development, while 29 percent claim that Israel should make known its nuclear capability in order to deter the Arab states. In a poll conducted six years ago, 87 percent said that Israel has to keep its nuclear capability a secret.

Some 91 percent responded in the affirmative to the question whether Israel should develop nuclear arms, compared to only 78 percent in 1987. In the poll conducted in January 1986, some 92 percent of Israelis said they believe that Israel has a nuclear capability. Some 54 percent are sure it does, and 38 percent think so, but are not sure. That question was not asked in the latest survey.

Dr. Yehuda Ben-Me'ir, a senior researcher at the center, who presented the data to 'AL HAMISHMAR, said that the conclusions to be drawn from the survey are that in

general the official nuclear policy of all Israeli Governments has wide-ranging support among the Israeli public, which believes that Israel must develop a nuclear capability and keep it secret.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the Israeli public, like all other Western states, has a deep, and even irrational, repulsion to the very idea of using nuclear weapons. The Israeli public, Dr. Ben-Me'ir said, believes that it is advisable for us to have such weapons, but is wary of using them.

Israeli Sources Report Progress

TA2005103393 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
20 May 93 p A1

[Text] The discussions of the working group on arms control and regional security, currently taking place in Washington within the framework of the multilateral talks, are characterized by progress and a businesslike atmosphere. This was reported last night by Israeli sources in Washington. The sources added that the working group was "more tangibly" engaged in examining various ways to implement the confidence-building measures already discussed at the previous round of talks in Moscow.

They said that the group may already establish subcommittees during this round of talks, in order to discuss the possibility of implementing these steps in four major fields: the establishment of a regional coordination center, exchanges of information on planned military maneuvers, the establishment of mechanisms to handle aerial and maritime accidents which occur in hostile territory, and the creation of "regional trust" through overt diplomatic steps. The Israeli delegation to the talks presented several working papers dealing with ways to implement the confidence-building measures, as well as a document detailing Israel's conception of the long-term goals of the process of arms control and regional security in the Middle East.

At the opening of the talks, the Israeli delegation, headed by Defense Ministry Director General David 'Ivri, protested the absence of several countries from the region, especially Syria and Libya. On the other hand, the Israelis welcomed the Palestinian delegation to the working group. It is participating in the discussions for the first time. Israeli sources reported that at the outset of the talks, the Palestinian delegation submitted a working paper with points for discussion within the framework of the bilateral negotiations.

The contents of the Palestinian working paper were not published, but a press statement by the delegation revealed several tough positions. Among other things, the Palestinian statement linked the need to establish a Palestinian state, a halt to human rights violations in the territories, and the beginning of a dialogue with the PLO with the aim of the working group's discussions: the reduced danger of military escalation in the Middle East, together with regional arms control.

The Palestinian statement expressed fear about the "destabilizing ramifications of the Israeli nuclear weapons plan." The statement claimed that the plan "continues to constitute one of the most glaring threats" to regional peace. The Palestinians issued a call to turn the Middle East "into a region free from weapons of mass destruction" and, on the more immediate level, urged all warring parties in the region to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which Israel has not signed.

[Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew on 20 May in a page 10 report by Ron Ben-Yishay reports that "yesterday, Israel and several Arab countries submitted detailed documents with their conception of 'the vision of regional security arrangements' in the Middle East.

["These are the major points in the Israeli document:

["—The goal of the negotiations is to attain relations of full peace between all the countries in the region.

["—Peace will comprise normalization of relations and open borders between all the countries.

["—The quantities of weapons and the size of the army of each country in the region will be limited to the minimum required for its defense.

["—After peace is established according to the aforementioned principles, Israel will work together with the other countries in the region to eliminate all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons from the Middle East.

["—The next round of talks on regional security will be held in September, apparently in Moscow.

["David 'Ivri, the director general of the Defense Ministry, who also heads the Israeli delegation to the negotiations, yesterday noted the businesslike atmosphere at the talks, which focused on the U.S. proposal for a mechanism of 'confidence-building measures' that will reduce the threat of hostilities in the region.

["Eytan Bentzur, the Foreign Ministry's representative on the Israeli delegation, said that he expected progress on this track to be faster than on the others."]

Israeli Press Reports Syrian Disarmament Demands

TA2005081493 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 20 May 93 pp 1, 15

[Report by political correspondent Shim'on Schiffer]

[Text] Syria is demanding that Israel divest itself of its nuclear option and subject its installations to international supervision as a condition for normalization between the two countries. This demand was raised by Dr. Muwaffaq al-'Allaf, head of the Syrian delegation to the negotiations in Washington.

In a roundup sent to the prime minister and the foreign minister, Professor Itamar Rabinovich, Israel's ambassador in Washington and head of the Israeli delegation to the talks with the Syrians, writes that the political level in Jerusalem will be called upon to discuss the issue. Nevertheless, Rabinovich recommends to Jerusalem's decisionmakers to wait with their decision until al-Asad agrees to comply with the Israeli demand to spell out his perception of the nature of the future peace with Israel.

It further transpires from reports arriving in Jerusalem about the latest round of talks that Syria is demanding that Israel halt the construction of electric power stations on the Golan Heights.

[A report by 'Aqiva Eldar and news agencies on pages A1 and A8 of Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew on 20 May adds: "European diplomats told an Israeli official this week that after Israel undertakes to give Syria back 'all of its territories,' Syria will offer 'all of peace.'"]

GENERAL

Ukrainian Press Accuses U.S. Ambassador of Pressuring Kiev

WS1405110493 Kiev SAMOSTIYNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 30 Apr 93 p 4

[Article by Yaroslav Holets: "Ambassador Popadyuk Exerts Pressure on Ukraine, Showing Ignorance in History"]

[Text] U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Roman Popadyuk held a news conference two weeks ago, and a couple of days ago he published an article in URYADOVYY KURYER. The reasons for such lively publishing activity on the side of Mr. Popadyuk are plain to see. He is actively and honestly pursuing the policy of his bosses, which is aimed at forcing Ukraine into eliminating its nuclear arms as soon as possible, and thus bringing Ukraine to her knees. This position of our state would suit the wishes of both Russia and the United States. Neither of them cares for a strong Ukraine. Russia has its own reasons, and they are known—it wants to drive Ukraine back into the imperial swamp. With regard to the United States, it prefers to deal with Russia alone.

The U.S. Administration would like Ukraine to become some amorphous state structure, the banana-republic type (which, in our part of the world is rather a beet republic). Official Washington, which once supported national movements in the former USSR by word of mouth, does not care about the young state's trials and tribulations. Once, the United States earned dividends on this policy, and prospective presidents received the votes of ethnic Ukrainians living there. Today "independent" U.S. mass media and "independent" political leaders have joined forces in depicting our state as a nuclear monster threatening the entire world. They even blame us for the Chernobyl accident, forgetting that this tragedy was brought to us by the bolshevik empire.

Such an attitude toward a state and a people who have, in fact, lived through a nuclear war, is not quite tolerant, to put it mildly. It is also devoid of common sense, and does not stand up to criticism. In other words, the fig leaves of American democracy are falling down like faded leaves.

In URYADOVYY KURYER, Ambassador Popadyuk recalls that Ukraine has been granted membership in the CSCE and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This is true. However, according to the ambassador we must now pay for this by ratifying the START treaty and joining the Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty.

With regard to financial support, Mr. Popadyuk says that the United States has promised to grant Ukraine \$175 million for the elimination of its nuclear arms. This is a tremendous sum for the man in the street, but quite a miserable one for a large-scale undertaking. Mr. Popadyuk, I think, knows what this money can buy—very little, indeed. Speaking at the news conference, the

ambassador ironically pointed out that this is the sum President Kravchuk applied for, and added that "the bargaining is on" and "someone here cannot count well." Perhaps Ukraine has not learned yet how to count millions of dollars. It has never eliminated missiles. But if there are such wholehearted people in the U.S. Administration, why did they not hint that \$175 million was only enough to build a small factory? However, it is easier to blame others.

Thus, whipping up Ukraine and driving it into giving up its nuclear potential, Mr. Popadyuk says that democratic changes and economic reforms, and not arms, are a decisive factor for Ukrainian stability. At the same time, the U.S. diplomat emphasizes that Russia and the United States can guarantee Ukraine's security. With regard to Russian guarantees, we have heard enough fairy tales. In the course of history, neither the Moscow State nor the Russian Empire ever kept any of their promises. With regard to the United States, we are not one-horse town residents devoid of any information. We have grounds to doubt the sincerity of the U.S. intentions. At the same time, let us not forget (and, as the "holy father," Mr. Ambassador must know it) that both Russia and Western neighbors have territorial claims to Ukraine. Let us not be naive, and let us keep in mind that Hungary is nurturing hopes to revive itself within the framework of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire (this would meet the expectations of the West).

Roman Popadyuk has been writing and saying that he knows the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Either he is cheating or he does not know the Ukrainian history at all. The most reliable Ukrainian history studies published in the West testify that developed economic relations and democratic institutions could not guarantee security, and did not prevent the Moscow State from enslaving Ukraine after the so-called Pereyaslav agreements in the middle of the 17th century.

Medieval travelers considered Ukraine to be a highly developed European state. Such is history. History teaches us; not Mr. Popadyuk.

There is one more thing—Mr. Popadyuk is a servant of two masters. His first master is the Ukrainian nation, because he is a Ukrainian. His other master are his U.S. bosses. The Ukrainian spirit in him is subdued by Washington officials, whose policy is mainly directed against Ukraine. This explains the sources of the ambassador's unfair game called by him "an independent exchange of ideas." It is not a fair exchange, as soon as its aim is to apply systematic pressure on Ukraine.

Ukrainian Report on Talbott's Visit

WS1205084493 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1422 GMT 10 May 93 (Tentative)

[All names and titles as received]

[Text] Kiev, 10 May—The two-day visit in Ukraine by a U.S. delegation headed by U.S. Ambassador-at-Large

Strobe Talbott was concluded with a press conference held at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry press center. The U.S. delegation included Ms. Tobi Haiti, managing director of the National Security Council; Admiral William Studeman, CIA deputy director; Brigadier General James Rylie; Graham Ellison, U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary; and others. [passage omitted] The composition of the delegation points to its significance. Some observers, however, noted that none of the Ukrainian officials met the delegation on the day of its arrival.

At the press conference, Strobe Talbott said he had a 40-minute conversation with the Ukrainian head Leonid Kravchuk. Mr. Talbott delivered a letter from the U.S. President Bill Clinton which says the United States is intent on expanding bilateral relations with Ukraine. An agreement was reached with President Kravchuk to create a U.S.-Ukrainian charter that will determine relations between Ukraine and the United States.

The delegation members met with Ukrainian Defense Minister Morozov, Vice Prime Minister Pynzennyk, Supreme Council Deputy Chairman Durdynets, and Foreign Minister Zlenko.

"The visit shows that Ukraine and the U.S. have turned over a new page in their mutual relations," summarized U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Strobe Talbott.

While answering question, the ambassador declared that a preliminary agreement had been reached on a number of issues. Ukraine has accepted the idea of establishing a committee on military issues and a military conversion group.

Borys Tarasyuk, Ukrainian deputy foreign minister, said that since the two sides agreed that their present mutual relations were unsatisfactory, some steps were considered that could alter the situation.

Concluding the press conference, Strobe Talbott noted that he had received confirmation that Ukraine will fulfill its international commitments as regards the non-nuclear status. He emphasized, however, that this is not the only field of our cooperation.

Technology Commission Head on Disarmament

934K1153A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 17,
21 Apr 93 p 12

[Interview with Professor Yuriy Alekseyevich Yashin, chairman of the State Commission on Technology under the President of Russia, by Andrey Pavlov; place and date not given: "Now We Can Talk About It: We Need To 'Close' Technologies, Not Cities."]

[Excerpt] Yuriy Alekseyevich Yashin. Sixty-three years old, doctor of technical sciences, professor, recipient of the USSR State Prize. Studied all his life: high school, artillery school, then engineering and commanding officer department of the Dzerzhinskiy Academy. In

1985 graduated from the General Staff Academy. Occupied a long list of positions—from squad commander to USSR deputy minister of defense, and ranks—from lieutenant to army general. Currently chairman of the State Commission on Technology under the President of Russia. The following interview with Yashin is the first in the Russian press. Also published for the first time is such a detailed conversation about problems falling within the competence of the State Commission on Technology. [passage omitted]

Pavlov: To the best of my knowledge, information is indeed the main field of your activity?

Yashin: In the old times our organization was called the USSR State Technical Commission for Information Protection and was engaged in protecting information from leaking out through technical channels, mainly in the military arena. Today our functions have been expanded, and we also cover politics, economics, ecology, and science. One of the State Commission on Technology's main tasks is the creation of conditions to ensure communication with the "world" and use of the information resources Russia possesses, but not to the detriment of the state. The second important task is the creation of favorable conditions to transfer into the civilian sector of the economy the enormous intellectual wealth accumulated in the military-technical field. Naturally, through a smooth legal mechanism. [passage omitted]

In this respect, if we look at the problem from the standpoint of a professional, various interesting nuances come up. For instance, treaties on strategic offensive arms reductions deal with technological quantities. And only indirectly with quality. Why am I emphasizing this particular point? The Americans have superiority in space-based surveillance. I can show you the plans for the development of U.S. means of space intelligence. The curve goes up sharply. What for? To monitor compliance with the START treaty; to maintain surveillance of the areas where our missiles used to be positioned? Probably for that reason, too. But look: As an appendix to the treaty we supply the coordinates of the launch system with a precision of up to one minute. This is first. Second: At each point of control—factory, navy or missile base—there will be inspection groups capable of going where no "space eye" can reach. Why then also beef up surveillance from "above"? I am absolutely convinced: To monitor not the group that is being taken out of action but the one that is remaining. And first and foremost, to monitor mobile intercontinental missile systems, submarines, etc. The advantage of a mobile system over checkboard emplacement is higher survivability. If a system can be constantly monitored, what kind of survivability does it have?

There are 36 military surveillance satellites flying over our heads today. Their number will increase with each year. For instance, recently P. Joxe, while still in his capacity as French minister of defense, said that the republic's government should devote the same attention

to the build-up of a satellite system in the nineties as it did to the creation of independent nuclear forces in the sixties. Our scientists calculated that with compliance with the START treaty and the planned increase in American space surveillance, the combat effectiveness of our remaining group will decrease by almost one-quarter.

Pavlov: So what is the solution? Not to disarm? Or sign a treaty on a reduction in intelligence activities?

Yashin: No. The point is parity. It is necessary for the volume and quality of intelligence information on both sides to be the same. We need to gradually come to the same level, using our space devices and theirs on a "shared" basis. We have asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs several times to at least bring this up as an issue for discussion. Alas! [passage omitted]

Pavlov: How many personnel does your agency have?

Yashin: We are not an agency; we are a collegium organ of administration under the president of the Russian Federation. The State Commission on Technology includes 19 competent members—in the rank of ministers and first deputies—from the Ministries of Security, Economy, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Science, and Justice; the Academy of Sciences; the Central Bank of Russia; and so on. We try to stay away as much as possible from a rigid centralization that makes the system overly conservative; we redistribute our functions at the federal, regional, industry, and scientific-production level and delegate certain powers to resolve the most important issues at the local level. All of the above makes the system of information protection flexible and provides a guarantee of its democratization.

Russian Statement on INF Anniversary

*LD2805153893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1449 GMT 28 May 93*

[By ITAR-TASS dipomatic correspondents Sergey Staroselskiy and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow May 28 TASS— The Soviet-American treaty on the destruction of intermediate and shorter-range missiles will be five years old on June 1.

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Sergey Yastzhembzskiy told a briefing here on Friday that it is the first and the only operating treaty providing not for restraining the arms race but for the elimination of a whole class of mass destruction weapons by the two sides.

The spokesman noted that missiles to be eliminated in compliance with the treaty (1,846 Soviet and 846 American rockets) were destroyed by June 1, 1991. However, he stressed, the treaty does not end here.

The document was concluded for all times and gives a firm guarantee that systems banned by the treaty will be removed from the nuclear missile arsenals of the sides for good.

The spokesman added that the treaty provides for a 10-year period of inspections, giving a chance to the sides to become convinced that contractual obligations are observed even after the actual destruction of missiles.

The diplomat said that the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States signed a decision after the Soviet Union's collapse to participate in the treaty.

Work is now in progress on some documents, on which (after their signing) the implementation of the treaty under new conditions will be based.

Kazakh 'Experts' on Nuclear Arms Policy

*93WC0075A Almaty AZIYA INTERNATIONAL
WEEKLY in Russian No 10, Mar 93 p 3*

[Article by Kayrat Abuseitov and Murat Laumulin, experts from Strategic Research Center (KIMEP): "Farewell to Arms? Nuclear Kazakhstan's Political Moves Have Resulted in a Stalemate. Are There Other Options?"]

[Text] The collapse of the Soviet Union created a paradoxical situation in which four nuclear states took the place of one nuclear superpower—the USSR. The West, especially the United States, saw this as a factor promoting instability and the restoration of the earlier threat to its security.

The main purpose of U.S. policy since the end of 1991 has been the elimination of the potential threat. The United States felt that this could be accomplished in the following manner: All nuclear arms would be transferred from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to Russia for their subsequent elimination in line with the START I Treaty (and then START II), and these republics—which were already sovereign states—would become party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear states.

There are two sides to Kazakhstan's present position in world nuclear policy: military and economic. Let us take a look at the first of these. There are two distinct phases here. The first phase—from 1989 to 1991—was distinguished by strong anti-nuclear feelings and the struggle to stop the nuclear tests on the test range in Semipalatinsk, to turn Kazakhstan into a nuclear-free zone (the 1990 Declaration of Independence), and to close the nuclear test site (August 1991). The second phase began at the end of 1991 and has been distinguished by the attempts of the upper echelons of the government in Kazakhstan to remain under Russia's nuclear umbrella, a possible reluctance to give up nuclear weapons, the attempt to retain at least partial control over them, and

the tendency toward the maximum use (economic and political) of the dividends generated by the Soviet nuclear legacy.

The signing of the Lisbon protocol on 23 May 1992 was an important event. At that time Kazakhstan pledged to become party to the Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. This also extended the IAEA safeguards to the nuclear installations in Kazakhstan.

At the same time, however, the leaders of Kazakhstan demanded guarantees of the security of its nuclear-free status from Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France, and the PRC. In 1992 members of political circles in the West began to suspect that Kazakhstan did not want to give up the nuclear weapons of the former USSR within its territory.

The suspicions grew stronger after N. Nazarbayev made several statements in the first months of 1992. The commotion over the "sale" of several warheads to Iran was used as leverage to verify Kazakhstan's willingness to abide by agreements. Kazakhstan's diplomatic maneuvers in May and June 1992 continued the earlier tendency on a higher level. N. Nazarbayev explained that Kazakhstan's point of view was colored by the fact that the CIS was establishing a united strategic force, and the republic still had nuclear weapons under a united command.

When Kazakhstan becomes party to the Nonproliferation Treaty, it will become involved in the political conflicts that have been brewing for a long time between countries dissatisfied with the conditions that seem unfair to them because they have put the nuclear big five into a privileged position. The near-nuclear states, which number around 20 according to various estimates, doubt the ability and desire of the members of the nuclear club to guarantee their security. These tendencies could lead to serious debates and disagreements at the 1995 conference, when the treaty expires, and could put its renewal in question. It is highly improbable that Kazakhstan will have worked out a clear position of its own on this matter by that time. Its policy will depend on the behavior of its closest nuclear partner—Russia.

The West is equally disturbed by the chaotic and uncontrolled spread of nuclear resources, technology, and specialists. In June 1992 the *BOSTON GLOBE*, an American newspaper, published a series of articles about the "Nuclear Marketplace." They underscored the danger of uncontrolled leaks of fissionable materials and nuclear technology from the CIS and Eastern Europe and mentioned two channels of proliferation: commercial and political. The CIS republics would be motivated to use the first of these channels by the critical state of the economy, and the second by the principles of political solidarity (the articles exaggerated the influence of the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism and Muslim solidarity and the willingness of the Central Asian states to collaborate with Islamic regimes in the development of an atomic bomb). The newspaper also said that Soviet

nuclear scientists were already actively involved in nuclear projects in the Near and Middle East in large numbers. The Islamic countries suspected of recruiting Soviet scientists were chosen by the news media from among the regimes most objectionable to the West: Libya, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Syria, and Algeria. What lay behind the tumult of these reports? It is interesting that their numbers increased in February-March 1992—i.e., during the period when Kazakhstan was trying to formulate an independent position on the question of its own nuclear status, and when Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics were taking their first steps in the uranium market.

The increased activity of the Central Asian states in the nuclear market after the beginning of 1992 was the reason for the West's worries about the unrestricted proliferation of nuclear components. Kazakhstan's potential partners could have been India, which needed heavy water and raw materials for its RBMK and VVER reactors, and Pakistan, with which joint projects in the development of nuclear technology were already being discussed last March. Both states are among the so-called threshold or near-nuclear countries and have refused to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. The potential buyers of Kazakhstan's uranium might include South Korea, especially now that Korean experts from the Economics Institute have acknowledged that Seoul's contracts with the United States and France have put it in an awkward position. Cooperation with Japan would be desirable because it promises a chance to acquire advanced technology. Japan has considerable experience in developing earthquake-proof technology for nuclear power plants, training operators for these plants, and building special reactors for the destruction of plutonium from nuclear warheads.

Kazakhstan has great potential for the development of a peaceful nuclear program. Specialists have estimated that Kazakhstan is capable of producing over 3,000 metric tons of uranium-238 each year. In view of the fact that the production units for the concentration of uranium stayed in Russia, the republic would have to establish its own infrastructure, and this would be impossible without the help of highly developed countries. France, where more than half of all energy needs are covered by nuclear power plants, would be the most logical partner in this sphere. The first steps in this direction were already taken when President Nazarbayev visited France in fall 1992.

Therefore, the guidelines for Kazakhstan's future nuclear policy in the peaceful use of the atom are quite distinct: It must be independent, economically effective, and strategically sound and must meet all of the requirements that will be set for Kazakhstan as a member of the IAEA and a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty. The issue of the nuclear weapons within the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan is much more complex. The common opinion is that Kazakhstan became a player in the nuclear game after the collapse of the USSR with the rights of a de facto nuclear state. This is somewhat

inaccurate, however. The republic has not had any control over the weapons within its territory for a single second. Therefore, all of the commotion over Kazakhstan's arsenal was only a political game, and Kazakhstan was forced to accept the rules of this game in order to enjoy a temporary advantage in the international arena. Any discussion of Kazakhstan's own nuclear policy, however, would be naive, to say the very least. This was well known to two of the actual players—the United States and Russia—when they made the other republics the hostages of their own bilateral decisions. In principle, the SALT I and SALT II agreements seem ideal from the standpoint of eventual disarmament, but the realities of world politics are much more severe and will necessitate adjustments in the implementation of the agreements.

Western analysts and experts on nonproliferation, especially the Americans, are extremely interested in Kazakhstan's political moves in this sphere. A year ago, for example, R. Gottemuller, then a RAND Corporation expert and now President Clinton's adviser on national security, tried to predict Kazakhstan's policy on its nuclear weapons and came up with three probable scenarios. She tried to assess the potential threat to the United States in each specific case. Her predictions coincided with an analysis conducted at the Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies (Monterey, California), where nonproliferation has been the subject of intensive research. This analysis also discussed three possible alternatives. The first, which would agree completely with the U.S. approach, would be the unconditional observance of the START I and START II treaties, the removal of all nuclear weapons from republic territory, and their destruction. The second possibility reflects the uncertainty of the situation since the disintegration of the USSR and predicts joint command and control of the strategic arsenal by Russia and Kazakhstan. The third would leave the strategic nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, but with the status of Russian military bases and under Moscow's complete control. According to W. Potter, the head of the nuclear and missile research project in the international research institute in Monterey, in 1992 it appeared that Kazakhstan would try to exercise all three of these options (in a specific sequence) to decide the future of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

As far as Kazakhstan is concerned, the removal of the Soviet strategic potential from its territory would make the young state effectively powerless in the midst of the turbulent processes occurring in Central Asia: the growing economic and military strength of some states and destabilization of others, the revival of old border disputes, the separatist movements, and the threats of ethnic conflicts and religious wars. The elimination of even a weapon as destabilizing as the MIRV'ed ICBM (the SS-18 in Kazakhstan) would cause the situation in the region to become even more unstable from the geopolitical standpoint. This could also affect the security of Russia, which would lose the whole defense network that was established in Asia when the USSR was

still in existence. Nevertheless, SALT I and SALT II are realities, and the United States and Russia could insist on compliance with decisions they made behind the backs of the other republics.

In contrast to Ukraine, for which the possession of part of the former Soviet Union's nuclear strength is primarily a matter of prestige, Kazakhstan must view this as, figuratively speaking, a matter of life and death. What can the republic do in this situation, which seems to be a stalemate?

Kazakhstan can and must base its nuclear policy on the requirements of its own security and the vital interests of its own people. In this context, it must take several successive steps, which will ultimately combine to make up a long-range policy. First of all, during the process of signing and ratifying SALT I and SALT II, it should insist that they stipulate gradual elimination and equitable quotas for all parties to the treaties (Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan should eliminate, or surrender for elimination, quantities of weapons representing equivalent percentages of each party's total potential). Second, Kazakhstan should request the deletion or revision of the stipulation regarding the destruction of empty silos and thereby retain this infrastructure as its own property, not subject to the jurisdiction of the originators of the agreements. The third and most important point is that, in the presence of favorable political conditions (the stabilization of Russia's foreign policy and its announcement of realistic foreign policy objectives), Kazakhstan should strive to forge a close military-political union and strategic alliance with its neighbor, envisaging the deployment of nuclear weapons not covered by the Soviet-American agreements of 1987-93 within Kazakhstan's territory. These could be single-warhead ICBM's of the new class, which are not as destabilizing as the MIRV'ed ICBM's but could serve as a strong deterrent. After the proper modifications, they could be deployed in the old SS-18 silos. There is no question that Kazakhstan would remain a non-nuclear state and that Russia would retain ownership rights to these missiles and the power to control them. This would also improve Russia's strategic position and enhance its political influence.

This would be similar to the relationship between the United States and the FRG in the era of Soviet-American confrontation. Kazakhstan's security would be restored by the presence of foreign (Russian) military bases on its territory, but it could pursue a completely independent policy, including policy in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as a full-fledged party to international agreements and the Nonproliferation Treaty. If today's politicians in Kazakhstan could achieve this, our descendants will have much less difficulty solving many of our state's future security problems, because they are the ones, as the leader of one neighboring state has said, that will have to carry the burden of all of today's territorial disputes.

Notice to Readers*Editorial Report*

[Editorial Report] An FBIS survey of biographic information culled from foreign press is currently available to consumers of the Arms Control Report. Entitled 'Russia/Ukraine: Identification of Arms Control Officials,' this item can be ordered by calling the Arms Control Report editor on (703) 733-6454.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS**Russian Critiques of START II****Commentary Says Treaty Serves U.S. Interests**

MK2505124093 *Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian*
No 57, 25 May 93 (Signed to Press 24 May 93) p 7

[Oleg Cherkovets commentary: "It Serves the National Interests of... America"]

[Text] Is the recently signed treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons (START-2) between Russia and the United States really "a historic success," as some people are inclined to call it? The reduction of the two sides' nuclear arsenals by two-thirds is the key numerical side to the treaty that really looks impressive. It is essential, however, to look more carefully at the qualitative side to the proposed cuts.

According to Iona Andronov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee, "all the land-based intercontinental missiles with multiple warheads" are to be banned under the treaty, but land-based ICBM's of this type account for 70 percent of our arsenal against slightly more than 20 percent in the United States, while 60 percent of U.S. multi-warhead missiles are submarine-based! It turns out that we are losing nearly all our arsenal of such missiles, and the opposite side only one-half.

This is where the euphoria over "the historic breakthrough to the future," "the salvation of mankind," and other similar epithets that some politicians and journalists are in advance giving this document, ends. It is time to call a spade a spade: We may as well not see this future at all. This idea is harshly phrased, but justifiably so: national security, the security of a state are harsh things in the first place and, like Voland's [a name of the Devil in Mikhail Bulgakov's novel "The Master and Margarita"] famous salmon, may only be of "first-degree freshness" or reliability. That is to say, they are either reliably protected or not protected at all. In world politics, like in economic relations, everyone has the right and duty to take care of the national interests of his country and his people. Naturally, not at the expense of other countries or peoples. But, not vice versa, either. Relying only on your partner's word of honor without receiving guarantees for the future is a disastrous path for both a merchant and a politician.

The thing is that the dismantlement of the multi-warhead ICBM's by the Russian side is not simply "a large concession." Subject to reductions on our side are all the available heavy, silo-based SS-18 missiles with multiple warheads—from six to ten on each of them. It is well known that it is these multi-warhead weapons—the pride of our strategic forces—that the United States and its allies feared and continue to fear now. And it is not pride or the terrifying name of the "Satan" that matter, all this is much more complex and important. Owing precisely to their multiple-strike capability, SS-18's cannot be recognized by the U.S. ABM system. In other words, they can achieve precisely what our nuclear weapons were created and upgraded for—the ineluctability of a counterstrike, which has for dozens of years deterred potential aggressors, and provide a guarantee to the rest of the world as to the impossibility of yet another "large-scale war."

The entry into force of START-2 deprives us of this guarantee. Let us recall the words of Deputy Iona Andronov. The approximately equal quantities of nuclear weapons left at the disposal of Russia and the United States are by no means equal in qualitative terms. The notorious SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), should it be fully deployed by the United States (and U.S. assurances that it gave up the idea of creating it are clearly not enough here), will intercept all the multi-warhead missiles we are left with as soon as they approach America—however hard we may try to increase the number of submarine-based missiles. We, on the contrary, will be unable to match this with regard to U.S. missiles launched from sea-based or air-based missile-armed craft: Our counter-strike doctrine in the event of a possible aggression, as is well known, called for a different "tack." Under START-2, we are voluntarily relinquishing this "tack." Furthermore, we do not get anything in exchange except "the word of honor." Isn't the risk too great?

... It has been reported in the press that George Bush, pointing to the successful signing of START-2, said to his loyalists during the last days of his presidency that the implementation of this treaty would guarantee the future without fear for the United States. It seems this is really so. The treaty indeed serves the national interests of ... America.

Academic Urges Curb on 'Precision Weapons'

PM2105145193 *Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 13 May 93 p 3

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Vasily Serbenyuk: "In Getting Rid of One Monster, Will We Not Engender Another?"]

[Text] I am following the polemics surrounding the START-II Treaty with interest. The convincing arguments used by the treaty's supporters have in many cases removed the doubts and fears spread in society by the document's opponents. But, in my view, the polemics

would be more effective if analysis of a number of the problems raised were more specific and comprehensive.

Few people now doubt that implementation of the START-II Treaty will be a direct continuation of the process of reducing strategic weapons. But just how logical are the steps in this direction stipulated by the treaty? What is the reasoning behind them?

I cannot help but compare the way in which the two treaties, START-I and START-II, were drawn up.

Work on the former took more than five years and coincided with a period of reasonable stability both in our society and in the Armed Forces. It involved a large number of specialists in various fields, who highlighted all aspects of the treaty in fine detail. Drawing up the provisions of the START-II Treaty took just one year. But this was a far more complex period—a time of deepening economic and political crisis in our society, reform of the Russian Armed Forces, and elaboration of Russia's military doctrine. It seems that in these conditions we relied no longer on experts' opinions, but on politicians' perspicacity and diplomats' flexibility.

This cannot but be a cause for concern. The nature of the debate that has developed is also worrying. The arguments used by the high-profile specialists involved do not so much substantiate the objectivity of the treaty as a whole as seek to prove the need for its individual provisions.

In this connection I should like to express my own opinions—without claiming infallibility, of course—on some of the theories put forward by Lieutenant General A. Politsyn in his article "Why Our Country Needs the START-II Treaty" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 March 1993).

I share the author's idea that the treaty affects our people's fundamental political, social, military, and economic interests. But let us consider, for example, the connection between the treaty and the state's general policy of safeguarding strategic stability and national security.

Drawing up agreements like the START-II Treaty requires knowledge of military doctrines and analysis of the military-political situation in the world, the combat potential of strategic weapons systems, and so forth. However, Russia still does not have a military doctrine, and neither A. Politsyn nor other authors have conducted an in-depth, scientific analysis of the contemporary situation, instead confining themselves to general considerations. Perhaps only the question of the combat potential of strategic weapons systems has been seriously considered in a number of articles by Professor Ye. Volkov, such as his article "The START-II Treaty and the Country's Security" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 January 1993). The considerations he puts forward make it possible to claim that the number of strategic offensive

weapons that Russia will have under the START-II Treaty will be sufficient to maintain stability and safeguard our own security.

Perhaps this is the most important point. There can be no doubt, in fact, if you consider the treaty from the viewpoint of containing the threat of a nuclear war. But there are also other threats. In particular, the world community is becoming increasingly aware of the danger of precision weapons with conventional warheads which, in terms of their effect, are virtually indistinguishable from nuclear weapons.

In this connection, in my opinion, we must not only seek to prove that our country needs this treaty—which I personally do not doubt—but also try to extend its provisions to precision weapons with conventional warheads, which are getting closer to strategic weapons in terms of their potential. Even if this is not done now, but when preparing the draft of a START-III Treaty, the realization will give ordinary people a sense of security—and a sense of national security, in particular. Then the shortcomings inherent in START-II—such as the United States' right not to reduce the number of its heavy bombers to 100 but to adapt them for non-nuclear purposes—will not arouse any particular objections. If any other approach is taken, the START-II Treaty, although restricting the nuclear monster, could contribute to the appearance of a new monster in the shape of precision weapons, which, in my view, would be no less dangerous for mankind.

Everyone must feel confident that the decision to ratify the START-II Treaty will be made in a considered, timely fashion and that the nature of the treaty will be determined not so much by our current difficulties as by an awareness of the need to further deepen the process of reducing strategic weapons in their broad interpretation.

'Analytic Review' Offered

*PM2705085193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 26 May 93 p 7*

[Excerpt from "analytical review" of START II Treaty: "START II Increases Our Security"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] A group of scientists led by Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Rogov, deputy director of the United States and Canada Institute, has prepared an analytical review of the Treaty on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms [START II], which will be submitted to the Russian Supreme Soviet. The editorial office is publishing one section of this review.

It is fairly clear today that any arms cuts, particularly such wide-ranging cuts as those envisaged by the START II Treaty, not only do not promise a short-term economic impact but, on the contrary, sometimes involve additional expense. We have to decommission and cut back around 40 submarines, around 1,500 ballistic missiles, and over 7,000 warheads. Compared with the

terms of the START I Treaty, an additional 1,500-2,000 warheads [boyezaryady] must be cut back. Obviously, carrying out this work over a period of 8-10 years is an extremely costly business.

However, a whole range of other longer-term considerations should be borne in mind when assessing the economic costs of the START II Treaty. It is necessary to take into consideration the fundamental point that for Russia the enshrined quotas will mainly be attained by natural wastage of weapons that have outlived their guaranteed service life. According to existing data, 74 SS-18 ICBM's (including 26 in Kazakhstan) and 92 SS-24 ICBM's (including 46 in Ukraine) are to be decommissioned early. It must be borne in mind that over 2,000 missiles are to be decommissioned in the period under review because they have outlived their guaranteed service life. In addition, during the same period, around 450 SS-25 ICBM's and around 300 submarine-launched ballistic missiles will need a mid-life update [neobkhodimo budet dostroit]. But even for those missiles that we will have to decommission early, this expenditure should not be considered a net loss since the saving on operational costs will be considerable.

It can be concluded that a large proportion of the money that Russia will have to spend on dismantling and destroying nuclear arms in connection with the START II Treaty during this period would have been spent anyway, whereas the material and financial resources that would have been expended on maintaining today's levels of strategic offensive arms can be considered the direct positive economic return from the treaty,

The treaty allows a fairly sizeable number of ICBM's to be destroyed by being used as space launch vehicles. This use promises an extremely large economic return. Russia is today faced with the extremely urgent task of creating a modern infrastructure and above all modernizing information and communications systems. One of the most promising avenues in the development of this sector is the creation of low-orbit satellite systems. Throughout the world one of the main factors holding back the development of systems of this kind remains the high cost of putting such satellites into near-earth orbits. The use of decommissioned ICBM's, primarily our heavy missiles, for this purpose could be an important factor enabling Russia to make a breakthrough in this area, ultimately providing an economic return far in excess of all the costs involved in the strategic offensive arms cuts.

Apart from the obvious impact on Russian-U.S. relations, this agreement has a whole range of other positive elements.

It will effectively be the first agreement that really brings about strategic offensive arms cuts, not only quantitative but also qualitative cuts (in terms of combat effectiveness indicators). As already pointed out, the new treaty enshrines a new structure for nuclear deterrence in

keeping with the changed political situation and the developing partnership relations between Russia and the United States.

The START II Treaty establishes and enshrines approximate parity between Russia and the United States—with 3,000-3,500 warheads each. That is 8-10 times more than those of such great powers as China, France, and Britain.

Thus, even after cutting strategic arms by a factor of three in comparison with the current level and by a factor of two in comparison with the START I Treaty, we will still keep approximate parity with the strongest power in the world.

This is very important in terms of our retaining a worthy place in the system of international relations. Until we have revived our economic might, the strategic nuclear forces will help us to guarantee our national security for the transitional period at least. Incidentally, that will enable us to cut back the conventional armed forces, which swallow over 90 percent of military expenditure.

The agreement will act as a base to involve the other nuclear powers more actively in the reduction process and should also be an important factor in reinforcing the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Last, one of the most important aspects of this agreement is the fact that it creates a clear international-legal context for the elimination by the year 2003 of all nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan and Ukraine (since all the weapons deployed there are MIRVed ICBM's). At any rate any maneuvers made by these countries' leaderships on questions pertaining to the future of the former USSR's nuclear weapons deployed there pose a direct threat to the implementation of START II and should meet with a quite clear, negative response from the United States and other countries of the world community.

The treaty creates preconditions for the most speedy clarification of the problem of the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy. The START II Treaty's main political importance is that it clearly makes Russia the sole heir to the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

Ukrainian Official on Talks With U.S. Senators in Washington

LD2505191393 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1300 GMT 25 May 93

[Excerpt] Dmytro Pavlychko, head of Ukraine's Supreme Council Commission for Foreign Affairs, has completed his week-long trip to the United States and Canada. He gave an interview to an UKRINFORM correspondent before leaving New York. The purpose of this visit, Pavlychko noted, was first of all to hold meetings in Washington, specifically in the Senate and the U.S. Congress.

Conversations were held with well known Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. I used to meet with them in Kiev before, and I noticed back then that the mood has changed concerning the attitude in the United States toward Ukraine. This time I presented to them the opinion of a certain group of Ukrainian deputies who are involved in the preparation for the ratification of the START Treaty and are working out Ukraine's stance on joining the Nuclear Arms Non-Proliferation Treaty. [passage omitted]

Ukrainian Leaders Discuss Nuclear Retention

Chornovil on Security Issues

934K1106A Lvov VYSOKYY ZAMOK in Ukrainian
24 Apr 93 pp 1-2

[Rukh-press report on speech by Vyacheslav Chornovil, chairman of the People's Rukh, at the Fourth Congress of Ukrainian Officers; place and date not given: "We Know What To Protect and Defend."]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

First. The reform of the Ukrainian Armed Forces should be carried out on the basis of adopting a new military doctrine (possibly, not a rigorously inflexible doctrine, but we must adopt a concept). [passage omitted] So it appears that we need nuclear weapons in order to restrain the West, and that is all.... I do not idealize NATO at all: It is a military bloc of a certain group of states, and—as is usual in such cases—they have created it for their own interests. Certainly we must not be dependent upon it or anyone else. But why was there such a confusion of accents here?

And so, on this matter too we must ask ourselves the following question: Where would it be better for us to look—to the East or to the West? But, really, we must look first and foremost to ourselves.

We must also make careful distinctions in the matter of nuclear weapons. I fear that—under pressure from America and Russia—our leaders and our Supreme Soviet deputies will capitulate and proceed to a unilateral disarmament—a step which would be fatally dangerous for our young state. Apropos of this, certain statements on this matter by the president and other high persons in the government cannot be called—unfortunately—anything other than capitulationist. Rukh's stance with regard to this issue is clear, and we have expressed it unequivocally: The START I Treaty can be ratified only after forthright discussions and certain stipulations providing for sufficient material compensation, as well as Russia's obligation—guaranteed by the West—regarding the inviolability and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Nuclear missile installations which remain after the implementation of START I (and certainly quite a few of them have remained) can in no case be transferred to Russia, but must be eliminated only in a parallel fashion with the reduction of such potential by all the nuclear states. The Lisbon

Protocol is not worth ratifying, whereas the matter of ratifying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty must be fundamentally and thoroughly reviewed (as to whether it is favorable for us to ratify it or not) only if we have the status of a nuclear state.

Possibly it was feasible for us to make our former declarations about Ukraine's neutrality back when we were still a colony. By the way, Ukraine's neutral status is not just the idle notion of one state; nobody assigned it to us, nor will anyone give it to us. And we must think about whether or not it is favorable for us. And thus we must not be in too much of a hurry to form a bloc with the nonnuclear states (I have already spoken about this matter). [passage omitted]

Parliamentarians Vote for De Jure Nuclear Status

PM2105134993 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 93 p 2

[Vladimir Zaynetdinov report: "Hands Off My Button!"]

[Text] Kiev—A total of 243 Ukrainian Supreme Soviet deputies have backed a categorical statement in parliament: that the republic should be deemed a de jure nuclear power. The "ringleaders" of this demarche were representatives of Rukh [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroika].

Recently they have persistently tried to force the Supreme Soviet to resolve in their favor the issue of fully transferring the CIS Armed Forces' nuclear weapons to Ukrainian ownership. Observers believe that, having secured nuclear status for Ukraine, Rukh will make a dramatic bid for power.

Despite the partial split in the movement, its position in the republic's parliament and at local level is very strong. There are Rukh offices in every oblast, and also in Crimea and Sevastopol. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil is untroubled by the fact that the most of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet is pro-communist. "But we, the minority, guide this majority," Chornovil stated in an interview with your KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent.

In fact Rukh forced the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet to sign the Declaration on Sovereignty and refuse to ratify the CIS Charter. Under extremely heavy pressure from Rukh's parliamentary faction, the ban on the Communist Party has remained in place. Under pressure from Rukh deputies, the Ukrainian parliament has not ratified the START-I Treaty or the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Rukh, unlike many political parties, is not adopting an extreme nationalist stance, which means that it is more sympathetically received in eastern Ukraine. A recent sociological poll revealed, among other things, that the Ukrainian Socialist Party—the only officially registered pro-communist organization—is supported by no more

than two percent of the population, whereas Rukh is preferred by 22 percent. If Rukh comes to power, nobody knows what steps the new Ukrainian leaders will take.

Party Leader for Retention

PM2705100993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 May 93 First Edition p 7

[Boris Sverdlov report: "Spring Trills"]

[Text] Stepan Khmara is by no means always allowed to speak at Ukrainian Supreme Soviet sessions. Many parliamentarians are already fed up with his lectures. On the other hand, when addressing ordinary citizens, he tirelessly hones his oratory. And, judging from his recent meeting with the people of Kiev, he has no problems in that department. Only with his ideas... See for yourselves.

"The democrats have allowed the president (L. Kravchuk) to get Ukraine involved in a new cabal—the CIS—thereby doing great psychological harm to a people who have barely tasted freedom yet... It has even reached the point where the president and the Supreme Soviet are thinking of giving up our nuclear status! This would be crazy—if we had no nuclear weapons the world community would not care what happened to us. Other countries need Ukraine to scrap its nuclear weapons in order to be able to plunder our national wealth with impunity..."

Prior to this meeting, Stepan Ilkovich, in the opinion of journalists on KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI [Kiev Records], had been very reminiscent of a real revolutionary. M. Goryn, leader of the Ukrainian Republican Party, was no less categorical in his judgments at the party's latest congress. Touching on relations with Russia, he stated: "An independent and strong Ukrainian power is the guarantor of stability on the European continent. It is Ukraine, which lies between Russia and West Europe, that should be an insuperable barrier to Muscovite expansionism..."

"Only an immediate withdrawal from the CIS and the creation of a strong alliance with Poland, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Balkan countries will make it possible to balance East and West."

Both proposals were greeted with applause. [Stepan Khmara is the chairman of the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party. His party's outlook is best described as nationalist. Ed.]

Ukrainian Peace Groups Support Disarmament

AU2705110493 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
26 May 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "For Nonnuclear Integrity"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Peace Council and the Ukrainian Peace Fund have issued a statement declaring their

unconditional support for the efforts of the United Nations, the Committee of Nongovernmental Organizations for Disarmament, and of other peace-making organizations of the world that aim to achieve global disarmament proceeding from the principles of world-wide security. The statement expresses a firm determination to stand up for the three nonnuclear principles that were set forth by the Declaration of Ukraine's State Sovereignty: "Not to accept, not to manufacture, and not to purchase nuclear weapons." The Peace Council and Peace Fund called upon parliament to ratify START-1 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as this would lead to an improvement in the internal political climate and to a relaxation of tension in international relations.

Russian Senior Officer Assails Ukrainian Nuclear Arms Stance

93WC0074A Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian
No 53, 15 May 93

[Article by Maj. Gen. Vladimir Belous, head of the Military Policy Research Sector under the Committee of Scientists for Global Security, and candidate of technical sciences: "They Have Not Yet Mellowed..."]

[Text] Late last year at the initiative of the Swedish Parliament Stockholm was the site of the International Conference on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Accidental Nuclear Conflict. General attention was attracted to a speech by prominent American expert M. Intriligator, who presented a scale of priorities with regard to threats to the nuclear non-proliferation system. Heading that list were the nuclear weapons of Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

In the course of discussion Kazakhstan's representative was able to present a number of convincing facts attesting to his republic's policy of disarmament. At the same time harsh criticism was levelled at Ukraine's position, and the subsequent discussion conclusively demonstrated that the world community will never tolerate its nuclear ambitions, nor will it permit the emergence of a sixth nuclear state. The evolution of Ukrainian leaders' views on the issue of the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory, which has been ongoing since Ukraine proclaimed its state independence right up to the present day, is a classic example of political juggling and a failure to understand the realities that exist in the world today.

Recently its parliament has with all seriousness been debating various legal maneuvers that would permit the republic to become a member of the nuclear club. Assertions are being made that under the 1978 Vienna Convention on Legal Succession Ukraine does in fact have every right to inherit the former USSR's nuclear status. In addition, it has been stated that the republic is in effect already a nuclear state and that there exist no

international legal acts that would bar it from establishing that status *de jure*—and that Ukraine's nuclear weapons-free status as proclaimed in its July 1990 Declaration of Independence and subsequent international pledges signed by its president represent nothing more than political statements of intention.

A statement issued by the Russian Government on 5 April expressed serious concern over complication of the situation surrounding nuclear weapons located in Ukraine. The negotiations being conducted by delegations from Moscow and Kiev have essentially come to an impasse.

Wherein lies the danger of Kiev's policy? Why is world public opinion so unyielding with regard to its nuclear ambitions?

This is primarily due to the fact that the tremendous destructive power contained in the nuclear warheads deployed on strategic launchers makes the boundary between peace and war very fragile and undependable.

One of the most important documents regulating relations between states in this area is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The treaty, which has been signed by over 150 states, expires in 1995, and currently preparations being made for an international conference devoted to the subsequent fate of the document are in their final stages. A major of states favor extension of the treaty. However, a number of countries regard it as discriminatory and are willing to put up a fight at the conference.

As is well known, the nuclear states are those which carried out nuclear weapons tests prior to 1 January 1967: the United States, the USSR (now Russia), England, France and the PRC. Other countries have signed the treaty as non-nuclear countries. By signing it, those countries sacrifice a portion of their sovereignty in order to strengthen peace and international security. And that is quite well-founded: the results of mathematical modeling of the world situation indicate that if the number of nuclear states were to expand to seven or eight the probability of a suicidal conflict would increase several times over.

Against this backdrop the position taken by Kiev—saying that it desires a non-nuclear status yet in fact engaging in various maneuvers to legitimize its possession of nuclear weapons—looks particularly unseemly. Some analysts have flatly stated that Kiev's maneuvers played a significant role in the decision by the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to unilaterally abrogate the treaty. Seeing the example of Ukraine, which the world community has since February 1992 been vainly attempting to bring to its senses, Pyongyang became convinced that warnings were the only sanctions it would face. Furthermore, Ukraine's nuclear policy is aimed at gaining certain political and economic dividends. And it is a well-known fact that a bad example is contagious.

Kiev's nuclear arsenal, 1,240 nuclear warheads on ICBMs and 600 warheads carried by bombers, would automatically make the republic number three in the world nuclear weapons hierarchy. This would result in a marked destabilization of the strategic situation and the arms race in the other nuclear countries and would prompt "threshold" states to secretly manufacture such weapons.

It can be predicted with a great deal of probability that if Kiev does not fulfill its obligation to eliminate all the nuclear weapons temporarily in its possession by 1997, then the fate of the Non-Proliferation Treaty could be very problematic.

Indeed, if Ukraine is allowed to do this, then why not India and Pakistan, Brazil and Argentina, Libya and Iraq as well?

There is one other problem connected with nuclear weapons. In the former Soviet Union the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons went hand in hand with creation of the entire essential infrastructure and a reliable nuclear safety system which was given priority from the very start. The USSR painstakingly and with great difficulty developed a system that successfully combined scientific-technical and organizational measures with a high degree of implementation discipline. As a result, over a period of over 40 years there was not a single case of an accidental nuclear warhead detonation, even one that did not involve a chain reaction. There were two such incidents in the United States.

The situation worsened markedly with the collapse of the USSR. The unified security system was destroyed and functional communications were disrupted, with some links in the system lost.

Russia was in a somewhat better position. Its territory contains all the enterprises that produce weapons-grade fissionable materials, the plants that assemble, disassemble and regularly service nuclear weapons, and the design bureaus and research institutes active in this field. This makes it possible to ensure a high degree of reliability and safety in connection with Russia's nuclear weapons, as well as those located in Kazakhstan and Belarus. Appropriate agreements that are being successfully implemented have been concluded with those countries.

The situation with Ukraine is completely different. Ukraine has declared the nuclear weapons deployed in its territory to be its property. Illegal actions such as that prevent Russian experts from being able to carry out required servicing and replacement of nuclear warheads.

Their guaranteed service life, depending on the model, is 10-15 years.

At the present time a significant portion of the warheads in question have already exceeded their guaranteed service life. Moreover, delays in scheduled maintenance work on them and their strategic launchers has further

reduced these weapons' reliability and safety. Disruption of the maintenance schedule for nuclear missiles has become commonplace in Ukraine. For example, the Pervomayskaya Division has 40 SS-24 launch vehicles; of these, 16 have been in service 8-10 months beyond their planned service life. At the 20 launch sites under that same division automated security and defense systems have been out of commission for a long period of time, facilitating penetration of the sites by intruders. The list of examples goes on.

The republic's leaders regard nuclear weapons primarily as a political tool, not realizing that they are a thing of extremely great potential danger. According to experts, the likelihood of the accidental triggering of a single nuclear weapon if all planned maintenance work is done on it, is between 10^{-5} and 10^{-6} annually. However, if there is disruption of the regular service schedule this figure could decrease by one or two magnitudes. That means that considering the total number of warheads (approximately 1,800) the probability of the accidental triggering of at least one nuclear warhead over a period of one or two years is very high. This gives the impression that in Kiev's pursuit of the nuclear phantom no thought was given to the possibility of that tragic outcome.

Due to this type of unilateral actions by the Ukrainian leadership there is also a growing threat of accidental nuclear conflict resulting from unsanctioned actions by personnel.

As is well known, the republic has established a "Center for the Administrative Control of Ukrainian Defense Ministry Strategic Nuclear Forces," and that center has command of the 43rd Missile Army and the 46th Air Army, as well as nuclear technical support units.

The officers on duty at command posts are subordinate to Kiev, but operational orders originate in Moscow.

A by no means rhetorical question: what would those officers do and whose orders would they obey in an extreme situation, something against which we have no guarantee? This type of dual command creates the threat of unsanctioned, mistaken or accidental actions with unpredictable consequences.

Nor has Kiev given serious thought to possible cases of nuclear terrorism, something that cannot be ruled out in view of the current wave of nationalism, particularly in the republic's western oblasts.

The decreased reliability of security at nuclear forces launch sites and sites where nuclear warheads are stored, plus the manning of the units in question with Ukrainian citizens exclusively, are creating the proper conditions for possible penetration by intruders. By utilizing bribery, deception or threats they could gain access to nuclear weapons, with the most dire consequences.

Kiev's assurances that it is renouncing possession of nuclear weapons are accompanied by numerous conditions, and one can only be amazed at the ingenuity demonstrated by Ukrainian politicians in order to camouflage their true objectives.

Among those conditions are special guarantees of security and territorial integrity, the absence of political or economic pressure, compensation for the fissionable materials contained in the warheads, economic assistance from the West for the purpose of disarmament (\$1.5-2.5 billion), guarantees that all the nuclear weapons removed from Ukraine will be dismantled, etc. And that is just for starters: the Ukrainian leadership is unwilling to part with them, as was convincingly demonstrated by the republic Supreme Soviet's condemnation of the START I Treaty.

It appears that the time has come when the world community must take collective measures of a political, diplomatic and economic nature to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation system, increase security, improve the international climate and increase mutual trust and predictability. There is no reasonable alternative on this issue.

French Report on Russian Nuclear Submarine Destruction

*PM1905113693 Paris LE MONDE in French
18 May 93 p 27*

[Unattributed report: "Russia's Destruction of Its Nuclear Submarines Exceeds Competence of Its Shipyards"]

[Text] In addition to 45 conventional submarines, Russia is to dismantle 53 nuclear submarines and the 96 reactors embarked on them for their propulsion. This operation exceeds Russia's existing capabilities in this sphere and raises even more problems for the country than keeping these units in service.

This is the opinion expressed by Commander Jean-Louis Vichot of the Navy Center for Higher Education in the specialist publication *MARINE* of the Central Association of Navy Reserve Officers. This dismantling—which will have to avoid any risk of accident or pollution—is "a real challenge" and one of the main problems "now facing the leadership of the military-industrial complex" in the new Russia.

A complete list of the nuclear submarines concerned is published for the first time—strategic missile-launching vessels and attack submarines. Most of these units are more than 20 years old on average.

For instance, 13 Yankee submarines (the NATO code-name), in other words 26 reactors, are destined for demolition: They carry ballistic or aerodynamic missiles (the former Soviet version of the Cruise missile). Similarly, there are plans to destroy five Echo I submarines in the short term, which means 10 reactors, and 13 Echo II

submarines, which means 26 reactors: these are launch platforms for aerodynamic missiles.

Then, 10 Charlie 1 submarines, in other words 10 reactors, are to be dismantled: these are submarines which launch aerodynamic missiles. Finally, 12 November submarines, in other words 24 reactors, will have to go: These are torpedo-firing nuclear attack submarines designed one year after the American Nautilus.

If we refer to the former Soviet submarine fleet which was still in service last year, the dismantling process which is to be carried out affects three fourths of the vessels with conventional propulsion (diesel/electric) and a little less than 40 percent of nuclear-propelled submarines.

According to Commander Vichot, the main problem is the capability of shipyards in Russia to carry out the work they will be asked to do. Four shipyards: in Severodvinsk (near Arkhangelsk), in Sudomekh (near St. Petersburg), in Nizhniy-Novgorod (formerly Gorkiy) and, finally, in Komsomolsk-na-Amure, have built submarines in the past.

In view of the fact that numerous ecological considerations have since had the result of slowing down or even closing some installations "only the Severodvinsk shipyard will be able, in the near future, to definitely carry out the dismantling operations" planned.

Severodvinsk, which started building submarines in 1942 after the loss of the Leningrad shipyards, is the biggest submarine shipyard in the world. But, so far, production capacity has fallen by half, probably "because of supply problems and the departure of a number of highly skilled workers."

"This is one of the main problems facing the leadership of the Russian military and industrial complex," the French officer writes. "They lack everything, financial resources, of course, but also know-how, materials, and even skilled workers who are deserting the shipyards.... We should not be indifferent to these problems. Of course, a disaster on the scale of Chernobyl will not be repeated with the naval propulsion reactors. But one or several accidents could cause considerable pollution," with the possible repercussions which any accident in Russia would have on international opinion.

SDI, SPACE ARMS, GLOBAL DEFENSE

Russian Television on Space Defense Systems

Highlights of 'Secret Space—Part 1'

LD1505133093

[Editorial Report] Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian at 0750 GMT on 15 May

broadcasts its 30-minute "Red Space" program entitled "Secret Space—Part 1," which is about space defense systems.

The program begins in the Kometa Central Science Production Association, a space research center. A variety of unidentified equipment is shown.

Academician Anatoliy Savin, the general designer and general director of the center, is interviewed in which explains that for the past thirty years he has been working in the sphere of rocket guided weapons and space surveillance systems. These have now become most important from the point of view of supporting the strategic balance and thus preventing nuclear war, he said.


The program flashes back briefly over the growth of the nuclear threat in recent decades. The scientists who are interviewed during the program are then flashed up in succession, together with captions. Some scientists are shown at work, more apparatus is shown.

The program recaps on the accumulation of weapons in the Cold War years, showing archive pictures. It says that in spite of the recent changes in strategy, the quantity and power of existing weapons is still great, and the nuclear danger remains. So surveillance and monitoring of all these matters is still very much on the agenda. Unique global surveillance systems have been developed in Russia to envisage all situations and enemy actions and warn of a nuclear strike.

The narrator says that five global systems form the basis of resources for supporting the strategic balance: the first is a global system of constant surveillance over missile dangerous areas of the earth's surface. The video shows explanatory diagrams, and pictures of equipment for receiving satellite data. Chief designer Konstantin Vlasko-Vlasov explains the system in general terms, while the video shows aerial pictures and pictures of satellite equipment.

The second system, the narrator continues, is a system for detecting falling warheads, guiding anti-ballistic missiles toward them and destroying them. An example is the American Patriot system, or Russia's S300 missiles. The video shows these systems in action.

The narrator then describes various aspects of a single global surveillance system, designed to monitor surface, naval, and air sites. A system for monitoring the sea from space allows the world's oceans to be surveyed in all conditions, the narrator says. This is carried out by a remote control satellite apparatus. A second system monitors dangerous underwater areas. Chief designer of this system Sergey Mishukov explains the principle of this system, adding that it has great possibilities for peaceful application as well. The video shows aerial pictures and shots of equipment and personnel receiving satellite data, as well as various archive pictures of naval facilities.



Anatoliy Savin, Director of the Kometa Space Research Center

The narrator says that new methods for detecting anomalous underwater phenomena have important applications in oceanography and ecology as well. Professor Valeriy Bondur, a chief designer in the Kometa Association, shows the new equipment in action, and the video shows scientists studying computer data gathered by the new system. The narrator also adds that economic difficulties have prevented the underwater surveillance system from being properly implemented so far.

A system for monitoring strategic aviation aircraft, the narrator says, is also being held back by economic difficulties. He explains briefly the use of detailed land surveillance systems, including photographic, optical, and electronic, and radio technical satellites. The video shows a variety of receiving equipment.


A system for influencing space installations has been developed and is functioning, the narrator continues. Its purpose is to detect and strike [porazheniye] military installations in space. The video shows diagrams of how the system works. It is the first of its kind.

The fifth and final system, the narrator says, is intended for action in conditions of war. It should monitor the

consequences of the direct use of weapons of mass destruction. Its technical resources also allow the detection of radioactivity levels and effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In peacetime the system can be used to solve ecological problems and monitor emergencies. The video shows aerial pictures of craters and scientists analyzing radiation levels and working from computer data.

Over archive military pictures and more pictures of scientists, the narrator poses the question of whether all this equipment is still needed in the new world situation.

Chief system designer Leonid Legezov says the effective use of space systems during the war in Iraq indicated that it is. He says the role of space research would have to change. In particular there are interesting ideas connected with removal of dangerous debris from space. The narrator adds that ecological projects are already being developed under the Sirius Program. He goes on to outline a number of other conversion applications, and chief designer of the sea monitoring system Gleb Zotov explains other economic applications of this system. The



Computer graphic of the Russian early-warning satellite system from the "Secret Space-Part 1" program.

program ends with reflections on Russia's changing role in the world, over assorted archive military pictures and news clips.

The process of rapprochement with the West is irreversible, the narrator says, however, opposition to this remains on both sides, obstructing genuine legal parity. Ukraine refuses to ratify START I and give up its nuclear weapons. The present Russian Parliament will not ratify START II. However, moves toward consensus and peace continue, the program concludes.

Transcript of Program

PM2105104193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0750 GMT 15 May 93

[From the "Secret Space" (Part I) television documentary premiere broadcast in the "Red Space" series, which is a VideoCosmos coproduction between Ostankino TV Science Programs Studio and Rudy Inc. Film+Video Canada: Video report on space defense systems; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Excerpts] [075000] "Red Space" series introduction over music.

[075100] [German Sedov, identified in the credits as the narrator, over view of Earth and title "Secret Space" Part I [in English] Scriptwriter German Sedov and producer Nikolay Temnov present the film "Secret Space" Part I. [video show rocket being trundled to launchpad and in flight]

[075130] [video shows man opening a series of heavy metal doors over spooky sounds]

[075144] [Sedov] How should one describe this system of doors? Perhaps simply as a "vestibule," or perhaps rather as a system of air-locks, which would be more accurate since, without closing the first door, you cannot open the next.

It is an intricate, clever system, just like everything else here—complicated and veiled in secrecy. Even these

doors are a means of countering the technical facilities of foreign intelligence. After all, the current potential of intelligence services enables them to register the whole range of electromagnetic modes, and thus they might be able to identify the type of the equipment which is being tested behind these doors, and its purpose, and that would be simply intolerable. This system of doors, walls, and other insulating material is protecting this "kitchen" from foreign ears and evil eyes.

In allowing us to enter, this system of locks has, for the first time, admitted us where unauthorized persons have never been admitted. Like you, we cast our eyes around to see what it is all about, and naturally, we understood nothing, initially...

Once again breaking new ground, we set foot in the office of the most important man here, and we are the first to show and name him—Academician Anatoliy Ivanovich Savin, general designer and general director ["Kometa" Central Science-and-Production Association]. [video shows heavy metal doors being opened, laboratory equipment, Academician Savin in his office] [075312]

[075313 thru 075549 passage omitted—interview with Savin, about his wartime work in artillery design. He says that over the past 30 years he has been working in the sphere of guided missile weapons and space surveillance systems, helping to maintain the strategic balance; Sedov utters generalities about the nuclear danger over archive footage]

[075550] [Sedov over exterior of "Kometa" Central Science-and-Production Association and closeup of its signboard] But just as war is initially born in people's minds, the means of defense also originate there. Thus science took up forward positions in the implementation of this simple, common-sense idea. Our leading brains and highly skilled specialists were gathered at scientific research centers to translate the concepts of specific means of defense into reality. [video shows photographs of scientists with appropriate captions: "A.I. Savin, "Kometa" Central Science-and-Production Association general director and general designer; K.A. Vlasko-Vlasov, system chief designer; V.G. Bondur, Central Science-and-Production Association chief designer; L.S. Legezo, system chief designer; G.F. Zotov, system chief designer; S.A. Mishukov, system chief designer"]

[075631] [Sedov over video of laboratory equipment] How many hours of excruciating hard work in scientists' studies, design bureaus, laboratories, and workshops it took to define and elaborate the basic and long-term measures and devise the equipment capable of averting a global catastrophe.

[075652] [Savin to camera] The strategy which we have relied on all these years, the strategy which has, essentially, prevented war is the strategy known as the "retaliatory counterstrike strategy." It is based on maintaining the minimum quantity of weapons sufficient to inflict irreparable damage on the enemy, thus restraining him from resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.

[075723] [Sedov over video of truck-mounted missiles] The opposing sides did not arrive at this stance right away. The logic of the military on both sides, and of the politicians too, dictated a purely arithmetical approach—"the more weapons I have, the stronger I am." This resulted in an unbridled arms race, and everyone is well aware where that led. Specialists describe this approach as the "No. 1 Strategy." The strategy which Academician Savin has just outlined is known as the "No. 2 Strategy." However, even under the "No. 2 Strategy" the quantity of weapons, their destructive force and effectiveness are so great that, one way or another, the danger remains. It is true that the results of international talks, and the documents which have been drawn up, inspire hope of peaceful coexistence.


However, the superiority of the U.S. side in nuclear-equipped submarines, for example, does not allow us to rest. For this reason surveillance and monitoring of all these matters is still very much on the agenda. Unique global surveillance systems have been developed in Russia which envisage all possible and even almost impossible scenarios of enemy actions and guarantee advance warning of nuclear strikes, and consequently also your security and mine.

[Savin to camera] This is the area in which experts specializing in global information-and-control [informatsionno-upravlyayushchiye] systems and intelligence-gathering systems are working. The role of these systems is constantly growing. In view of this, our enterprise and all our specialists, who are perfectly aware of their task, are concentrating their efforts on the solution of problems which will make it possible to make these systems even more effective and to nip in the bud the intentions of people who would like to unleash war on the basis of the No. 1 Strategy.

[075949] [Sedov over video of radoms in woods, computer graphics, uniformed officer at work front of a screen at ground station] As mentioned before, these systems are extremely complex and extensive. Describing them would require not just a lot of time, but also specialized knowledge. We will therefore confine ourselves to very general terms only.

Five global systems form the basis of the means for maintaining the strategic balance. The first is a global system for the constant surveillance of areas on the Earth's surface which pose a missile threat. With the help of remote equipment, it is possible to obtain pictures from space of specific areas of the Earth in various spectral bands. These data are received at ground stations where full automatic processing of vast flows of information takes place and the necessary decisions are taken, all in a matter of seconds. To illustrate the operation of this system, its chief designer, Konstantin Aleksandrovich Vlasko-Vlasov, cites a number of concrete examples.

[Vlasko-Vlasov to camera interspersed with video of Shuttle explosion and pictures of a test range] We



Computer image of a Russian space defense satellite weapon from the "Secret Space-Part 1" program.

watched the Shuttle accident in the United States, we watched the Shuttle being launched and explode. We saw it very clearly as it happened, in real time, as they say. We have seen all sorts of operations when firings were staged which had not been notified. We observed them, we knew what was going on. We know where test ranges are located [video illustrates], we know where areas posing a missile threat are located.

[Sedov] Your system is so sophisticated that nothing can be concealed, no secret plans, no secret actions?

[Vlasko-Vlasov] Our surveillance is fairly global, and even if someone should go mad suddenly and take a rash step I believe that nothing terrible would happen, because other facilities are immediately put in a state of combat readiness ensuring the protection of our country against such unexpected occurrences. [080156]


[080158 thru 080214—Aviabank commercial]

[08216] [Sedov over video of missile launch] The second system is a system for detecting incoming warheads, targeting ABM missiles on them, and destroying

them. The comparable U.S. Patriot system is inferior to our S-300 system. [video shows systems in action over music]

[080304] The unified global surveillance system is designed to monitor ground, sea, and air targets. It includes a maritime monitoring system which ensures all-weather observations of the surface of the world ocean. This is carried out by means of remote equipment, both active and passive remote equipment, installed aboard satellites. Information is transmitted to ground data reception and processing stations. The second component of the unified global system is the system for covering the situation in the world ocean. Its task is to identify dangerous objects in the depths of the ocean. The system comprises various sources of information, an analysis center, and regional centers for data processing and generalization. The system's chief designer, Sergey Aleksandrovich Mishukov, will give you a number of explanations.

[Mishukov to camera and over video of system in action] Covering the situation well means knowing the position of ships at any point in time. As is known, the latest



Computer image of a Russian space defense satellite weapon firing on an incoming enemy missile from the "Secret Space-Part 1" program.

accords between the Russian and U.S. Presidents are characterized by the fact that a substantial proportion of both countries' nuclear potential is based on submarines. The importance of this system will therefore obviously grow as time goes on.

In addition I would like to say that this system, although it was designed for military needs, naturally also has colossal conversion potential, that is to say potential for the civilian economy.

[080458] [Sedov] The most complex task in the system for covering the situation is the problem of identifying anomalous phenomena in the ocean depths. The methods and technical facilities developed in the process of creating this system can be successfully used for oceanographic and ecological purposes. Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor Valeriy Grigoryevich Bondur, who is the ["Kometa"] association's chief designer, will give you a few details.

[Bondur] Imagine that we are aboard a space station. Through the porthole we see the surface of the world ocean. We are moving, we are flying over the vast

expanses of the ocean. Visually it is not possible to detect any disturbances. With the help of the methods which we have developed we change this picture into a two-dimensional frequency spectrum [illustrated on a TV screen].

[Sedov] And this information is transmitted from the spacecraft...?

[Bondur] Yes, this information is transmitted to a ground station.

[Sedov] In real time?

[Bondur] Yes, in real time.

[Sedov over video of equipment] What you see here is a mockup of the onboard equipment [inscription reads: "Spektr-RM (BARS)] which by means of a laser beam creates the aforementioned dimensional spectrum, while a powerful computer identifies the parameters of an anomaly in the sea [video shows system in action].

We have acquainted ourselves with only a small part of this complex, which has already undergone comprehensive tests. The results were excellent. Although the system for covering the situation in the world ocean already exists, it has not yet been widely adopted. Its introduction is being hampered by economic difficulties. This is also the reason why the system for the surveillance of strategic aviation aircraft is not yet in practical use, although it is no less important. The unified global system also includes detailed-observation systems, which include photographic, optoelectronic, and radio-technical satellites. Their purpose is to detect heightened radio-exchange activity and relocation of ground forces, tank columns, and other combat hardware. Detailed-observation satellites make it possible to obtain pictures with a resolution down to tens of centimeters.

A space target action system has been developed for the purpose of detecting and destroying military facilities deployed in space. It is operational. [video shows computer graphics]

[Savin over video of a wall chart depicting a satellite going around the Earth followed by computer graphics of action on the satellite] Here is the satellite which is the subject of our study. What we need to do now is to get ourselves to the precise location where it has appeared and to take the requisite action. It must be noted that this is a unique system which no one else has as yet.

[O80831] [Sedov over video of a mushroom cloud] Now to the fifth and last system. It is intended for action in conditions of war. It is designed to monitor the consequences of the use of mass destruction weapons. Its technical facilities also make it possible to ascertain the level of radioactive contamination and the effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In peacetime the system can be used successfully for dealing with ecological problems and monitoring emergency situations and natural disasters.

Even this rather cursory outline goes some way to illustrate the shape and significance of the facilities for maintaining the strategic balance. It is not difficult to imagine how much all this costs. [080919]

[080920 thru 081707—passage omitted—mainly justifying this expenditure as illustrated by Iraq war, extolling peaceful uses of this equipment, noting outstanding problems such as Ukraine's refusal to ratify START I and Russian parliament's unwillingness to ratify START II, U.S. stance on this, and concluding that the strategy of peace is advancing nonetheless—over a miscellany of mainly archive footage].

Russian Space Developments

Launch of 'Military' Spacecraft

LD1905081393 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
0654 GMT 19 May 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS—The Russian Defence Ministry will launch a military "Resource-F-2" spacecraft by a "Soyuz" booster from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in the Russian north on May 21, TASS learned from the press centre of the space forces.

The aim of the launch is to "study resources of the earth," according to the press centre which added that the craft will work in space for a year.

New Cosmodrome

MK2105114693 Moscow *SEGODNYA in Russian*
No 18, 21 May 93 (Signed to Press 20 May) p 2

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Provincial News" compiled from INTERFAX, RIA-"NOVOSTI," and POSTFACTUM agencies]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk—Russia's new cosmodrome will probably be located somewhere on the vast territory of the kray, reports the Krasnoyarsk weekly *SVOY GOLOS* [Our Own Voice] citing a source close to military circles.

Russian Space Forces Develop New 'Superlight' Rocket Booster

LD2705123193 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1124 GMT 27 May 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* string correspondent Semen Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow May 27 TASS—The creation of a multi-purpose mobile rocket-space complex "START" will make Russia the only space power possessing a classical superlight booster, according to Russian space forces which are going to present the invention on Friday.

It was for the first time in the history of the military-industrial complex that the creation of the booster was not financed by the state.

The START uses the technologies of the solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic SS-25 missile and of the "Topol" missile complex commissioned in the Russian strategic forces and produced at the Votkinsk machine-building plant.

Experts say that test trials and launches were a positive experience. Some 50 SS-25 missiles and prototypes were launched, as well as over 200 medium-range SS-20 missiles, eliminated under the Russian-U.S. agreement of 1988 on medium and short-range missiles.

The "START" allows to place into low circular orbits at altitudes ranging from 300 to 1,000 kilometres space satellites weighing up to one tonne and 7.2 cubic metres in volume on orders from state and commercial ventures. The satellites may be used for space communication, remote sounding and ecological monitoring of the earth.

Two months ago the strategic missile forces launched an experimental "START-1" booster which placed into orbit a satellite weighing 260 kilogrammes.

Experts are convinced that test trials completely proved the correctness of technical design. The advantages of the new booster is that it can be quickly transported to a necessary launching site, the use of solid fuel makes it easy to handle, high reliability is ensured during pre-start preparations and the flight.

It is also of importance that the "START" is produced only by Russian enterprises which will reconstruct decommissioned missiles into the new superlight boosters.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Inspectors To Monitor Ukrainian Compliance

LD1905154993 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 18 May 93

[Text] This 18-21 May, a Greek-U.S. group of inspectors is working in Ukraine to observe the fulfillment of the conventional arms reduction treaty by the Ukrainian side. This is not the first inspection of such a nature carried out within the Armed Forces of our state. All previous inspections confirmed that Ukraine has a responsible attitude toward the fulfillment of all the articles of the treaty.

Lithuania and Russia Negotiate Troop Withdrawal

Landsbergis Against Further Talks

WS1705093893 Tallinn BNS in English 1218 GMT 15 May 93

[Text] Vilnius, May 14, BNS—Vytautas Landsbergis, leader of the rightist opposition, said Lithuania may not hold talks on the status of Russian troops that are still on Lithuanian territory.

The status of these troops "is clear since January 17, 1992, when an agreement was reached with the Russian president," Landsbergis says in a statement circulated Friday.

Landsbergis says "these are withdrawing troops and no other status of their legalization are impossible." In addition, the statement notes that all military installations are Lithuania's property.

As reported, Boris Gromov, Russian vice minister of defense, said recently that the status of Russian troops, the future of some strategic military installations and problems of Russian reserve officers in Lithuania will be discussed during Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's visit in Lithuania.

Grachev will come to Lithuania May 16-18. Estonian and Latvian defense ministers will be present in Lithuania at that time, as well.

Landsbergis says a special question that the Russian defense minister has to ask are actions of "unprecedented arrogance - military training, carried out in April, to examine the possibility of occupying the independent Baltic states in two days.

"Such projects and actions confirm the need to withdraw the Russian army finally and according to the schedule."

Information about Gromov's public utterances reached Landsbergis in Strasbourg.

Russia's Grachev to Vilnius for Talks

WS1905092793 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1504 GMT 18 May 93

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No 245]

[Text] 18 May 1993—A two-day visit of Russian Defence Minister and the army's general Pavel Grachev begins today in Lithuania. High-placed military officials and a few Deputy Ministers come with Mr Grachev. Pavel Grachev's visit was planned for last Sunday but it was put off. The official reasons for that have not been stated. The press centre at Russian Defence Ministry has been reported as saying to ELTA's correspondent that the Minister was busy consulting the Russian government. Unconfirmed sources report that the Minister had not made up his mind by that time whether to meet with Latvian and Estonian Defence Ministers. Lithuanian Defence Minister Audrius Butkevicius acted as a mediator of this meeting in Vilnius. Pavel Grachev confirmed yesterday at a press conference in Moscow that he would meet with in Vilnius with Latvian and Estonian Defence Ministers "on their request". Mr. Grachev said yesterday at the press conference that during his visit "issues linked with the withdrawal of the Russian army and compensations for the property which would be left behind should be discussed". He hopes that the treaty regulating these issues will be signed. The problems linked with the withdrawal of the Russian army were discussed at the beginning of May by the expert panels from Lithuanian and Russian Defence Ministries. They arrived at the conclusion that technical possibilities exist to withdraw the Russian army till August 31 this year, as it was planned by the agreement signed last autumn by Pavel Grachev and Audrius Butkevicius. Lithuania demands that the property of the Russian army be left by way of compensation for what was destroyed by Russians in 1940. During the first hours of his official visit Pavel Grachev met with the Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas. Then he left for Kaunas where Russian army forces and plants for the repair of military tanks and helicopters are located. In Kaunas, Pavel Grachev will meet with the leading officials of the North-West army. There are 12 thousand Russian military men at present in Lithuania.

Meets With President Brazauskas

*WS1905092193 Tallinn BNS in English 0638 GMT
19 May 93*

[Text] Vilnius, May 18, BNS—Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has described results of his meeting with Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas as “lacking difficulties,” Lithuanian president’s adviser for foreign policy Justas Paleckis told BNS.

He said that “politicians, state delegations for talks between Lithuania and Russia will have a lot of work to do” in order to resolve a number of questions.

Paleckis said that there are certain difficulties regarding the signing of a political agreement on the withdrawal of the army. He noted that Brazauskas had stressed his readiness to sign the agreement proposed for signing in September, 1992, in Moscow. The Russian side then refused to sign it. The Lithuanian president believes that the problem can be resolved only in the framework of Lithuanian laws. That is why some of the proposals and wishes of the Russian side “are simply hard to implement”.

The Lithuanian presidential adviser said that, as it was noted at the meeting, the Lithuanian side is ready for compromise, but on the condition that the Russian side will follow the same way.

‘Compromise’ Under Consideration

*WS1905091693 Tallinn BNS in English 0638 GMT
19 May 93*

[Text] Vilnius, May 18, BNS—Despite existing administrative difficulties, Russia has no intention of procrastinating over the withdrawal of its troops from Lithuania, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has said in Vilnius.

Nevertheless, he told journalists after a meeting with President Algirdas Brazauskas that Russia “might fail to comply with the agreed times (before August 31 this year). According to him, there are not enough railway cars to remove the substantial quantities of ammunition to Russia.

“A compromise is already taking shape. I believe that we will announce it at the end of my visit here,” Grachev said.

Russia’s defense minister told reporters that he had asked President Brazauskas to discuss with President Yeltsin the feasibility of signing as soon as possible a fundamental political agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania.

According to Grachev, he also discussed with the Lithuanian president ways to ensure social security for ex-servicemen living locally, the joint use of plants for repairing military hardware, weapons and aviation equipment, and the possibility of selling some equipment and munitions to Lithuania. They also discussed

the possibility of Lithuanian aid to Russian builders in putting up housing for the returning servicemen.

The minister noted “a great striving for cooperation” displayed by Lithuania’s president and military leaders.

With reference to his upcoming talks with his Latvian and Estonian counterparts Grachev said that “these will be purely protocol meetings.” He intends to use them to voice his ministry’s attitude to “vital issues,” such as the need to sign documents that would provide legal substantiation for the withdrawal of troops.

Unless these documents are signed in the near future, the issue of troops withdrawal from Estonia and Latvia will remain open, said Grachev.

Russian Negotiator Says Talks ‘Rather Difficult’

*WS1905124793 Tallinn BNS in English 1102 GMT
19 May 93*

[Text] Vilnius, May 19, BNS—The Lithuanian-Russian negotiations are proceeding at a rather difficult pace, said Russian negotiator Viktor Isakov after the first day of talks in Vilnius.

“Pressing terms” have thrown a monkey wrench into the discussions, he said. “We would like to observe these terms of Russian forces withdrawal.”

But both sides need to agree on the basic text for the army’s withdrawal, said Isakov, and the leaders of the two countries need to sign the agreement as soon as possible.

Talks between the two countries resumed Tuesday after several months of silence. During that time Lithuania elected its new parliament and president, and restructured its negotiating team for talks with Russia.

Lithuanian negotiator Vigiljus Bulovas agreed that the talks were rather complex, and noted that experts are more fruitful at their negotiations. Bulovas predicts that the two groups should reach an agreement Wednesday.

The key problem in the talks, said Lithuanian delegation member Nikolai Medvedyev, stems from the Soviet Union’s initial presence in Lithuania in 1940. Is that interpreted as an act of aggression or annexation, asked Medvedyev.

While Medvedyev concedes that Lithuania does not intend to accuse Russia’s present leadership of things that happened then, as a legal successor of the former Soviet Union, Russia should also assume some responsibility as well.

Defense Ministers Announce Date

*WS2005120193 Tallinn BNS in English 0710 GMT
20 May 93*

[Text] Vilnius, May 19, BNS—The schedule of the Russian army withdrawal from Lithuania will be observed and troops will pull out before Aug. 31, the

Lithuanian and Russian defense ministers announced at a joint press conference in Vilnius Wednesday.

Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev said that the withdrawal schedule, signed in Moscow Sept. 8, was carefully discussed during his visit in Lithuania. 18 military issues were discussed all in all. He said "we did not touch upon the political problems of the main agreement—the status, the presence and the withdrawal of Russian troops. They must be solved on presidential level."

Grachev said the problem of handing over military installations of the Russian army has been settled. The Russian troops will hand over all military installations on Lithuanian territory in accordance with the acts drawn up. The acts will then be submitted to government commissions which will determine the prices and mutual settlements.

Russia also agreed to sell and to hand over some of its weapons, munitions and military equipment. Russia would sell this from its arsenals in Lithuania. However, due to the fact that Russia's defense institutions are not allowed to sell arms, both ministers worked out a draft resolution of the Russian prime minister to allow the trade. Grachev said he hopes that the Russian premier will sign the resolution in the near future.

Both ministers discussed the possibility to create two military joint-ventures - a tank-repair factory and a helicopter-repair factory, both in Kaunas. A final decision will be made on governmental level.

The ministers held a separate discussion on the withdrawal of some artillery depots and equipment of navy units. Grachev said Russia will probably be unable to pull out such great amounts of ammunition before Aug. 31 due to shortage of railroad cars. The ministers agreed that several Russian soldiers would remain at the depots for loading work in such case. The depots would be guarded by Lithuanian armed forces.

An agreement was reached on the sequence of handing over military airports. An airport in Siauliai is undergoing such procedures already. An airport in Panevezys will be handed over before July 1. One more airport in Kazlu Ruda will be handed over before Aug. 31. The ministers also agreed that the navigation equipment of the airport in Siauliai will be sold to Lithuania.

Agreements were also reached that Russia will hand over several tons of explosives to liquidate artillery shells and mines which remain on military training grounds. The hand over of fuel reservoirs and ammunition depots was discussed, as well.

The ministers reached an agreement on the exchange of military attaches.

Grachev said that Russia welcomes Lithuania's willingness to assist the building of apartments for the Russian

servicemen in the Kaliningrad region. Lithuanian builders will participate if financing is received from western countries.

An agreement was reached that Lithuania would get back its training airplanes, as well as training and hunting rifles, confiscated by the Soviet troops during the January 1991 events.

Both ministers signed a protocol on the agreements reached.

Grachev said Russia's military doctrine does not include a separate paragraph, saying that Russia would defend its citizens in other countries.

He said the doctrine is purely defensive. Russia will have 1.5 million men in its armed forces by 1995. The army of the former Soviet Union had around 4.5 million soldiers.

Grachev said that the Baltics are not threatened as an attack objective or as an aggressor. "The defense of interests of the Russian speaking population in other states is a political problem and it is with the competence of the Foreign Ministry."

Grachev said that Audrius Butkevicius, Lithuania's defense minister, presented a list of weapons and equipment that Lithuania is willing to buy from Russia. This issue as well as the issue of settlements will be discussed on governmental level. "Like to all other states - this will be sold for world market prices."

The Russian minister said that a dialog with Estonia and Latvia is still impossible. Grachev said they "categorically demand an immediate troop withdrawal before legal documents are ready." He said that the suspension of the pull out from Latvia and Estonia will continue until state leaders conclude a general accord and until a withdrawal schedule is worked out.

Grachev said there is a possibility that the main political agreement on troop withdrawal from Lithuania may be signed after August 31. He said the document was not signed in Moscow last September because "somebody made certain corrections at the last moment due to unknown reasons." The Russian minister said these corrections were of categorical nature, however he did not specify which side had made them.

Butkevicius said the political agreement should be signed before Aug. 31 "in a form acceptable to both states." He said Grachev contributed greatly to the organization of a speedy withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania and found solutions to a number of technical problems.

Fifty-five Percent of Troops, Equipment Already Withdrawn

*WS2505084993 Tallinn BNS in English 1605 GMT
22 May 93*

[Text] Vilnius, May 22, BNS—Col. Gen. Leonid Mayorov, commander of Russia's North-Western Group of

Forces, reported to BNS correspondent that 55 percent of personnel and military equipment stationed in the Lithuanian republic had been withdrawn from the republic, while on the whole, the strength of forces withdrawn from the Baltic states did not exceed 40 percent. The discrepancy is growing because withdrawal of troops from Latvia and Estonia has been suspended.

At the same time the general noted that military trains are still making their way from the Baltics to Russia. However, they are only exporting ammunitions. In Mayorov's words, a great number of ammunition accumulated on the territory of the Baltic states after the second world war. He reported that today about 22,000 tons of ammunitions are kept at only one depot in Lithuania. There are not enough soldiers to load the ammunitions and Russia will be able to export all ammunitions not earlier than August 1994, says Mayorov.

Out of 800 cars with ammunitions to be exported only from Lithuania only two cars are loaded with shells destined for destruction due to "aging." All the rest will be used by Russia - for firing training, in particular.

Mayorov added that Russia had preserved its strategic sites only on Latvia's territory. These sites represent a modern warning system in case of a missile strike and it can be used in the interests both of Russia and of the whole world, said the general. However, we fail to force Latvia to agree in order to jointly use these sites, the commander underlined.

Mayorov believes that not all problems related to withdrawal of forces have been solved. The major one concerns construction of dwellings. "But we can say that Lithuania solves these problems more productively than Latvia and Estonia,—says the NWGF commander—Lithuania's leadership understands that it is necessary to render assistance to Russia as concerns accommodations and construction of living conditions for servicemen withdrawn from its territory." That is why the parties observe the schedule of troop withdrawal signed last year and have determined the final pull-out date: August 31, 1993.

And quite on the contrary, the Russian President was forced to make a statement with respect to Latvia and Estonia on suspension of forces withdrawal from their territories. Mayorov noted that these Baltic states do not wish to assist Russia in accommodation of the units destined to be withdrawn from their territory.

Moreover, several statements of Estonia's leaders call Russian forces "occupation" ones and this hinders the search for compromises.

New Round of Russia-Latvia Talks on Troop Withdrawal

Russian Evacuation Schedule Offered

*WS2005122893 Tallinn BNS in English 1936 GMT
18 May 93*

[Text] Riga, May 18, BNS—Latvian and Russian military officials met for another round of talks in Jurmala May 18 to discuss further possibilities of pulling out Russian troops from Latvia.

During the negotiations the Russian delegation proposed the group consider the vacating terms for several military installations separately. The bases in question included the Skrunda radar station, the Zvaigznite air space reconnaissance center at Ventspils and the Liepaja navy base. Head of the Russian delegation Sergey Zotov said that Russia could complete its move from these sites within 5-10 years.

The Russian Baltic Fleet Command has already submitted a schedule for the fleet's withdrawal, setting the deadline for 1994. In addition, the air-space reconnaissance center and the radar station could be disbanded within shorter period than Zotov suggests, said Ilgonis Upmalis, head of the Latvian bureau controlling the Russian army withdrawal. In his view, Russia is self-importantly and unilaterally deciding on the pullout deadline.

Janis Dinevich, head of the Latvian delegation, said that Latvia will stand its ground and demand the complete Russian army withdrawal by the end of 1993.

Speaking about the general deadlines of the troop pullout, Russia says it's ready to draft a schedule provided the army stay in Latvia is extended to 1994 and Latvia secures social welfare for militaries and retired officers.

Due to slow relocation process the Cekule and Garkalne ammunition depot sites can be vacated not earlier than 1994, said a Russian representative. Ilgonis Upmalis confirmed this information.

Latvia suggested that the majority of troops be redeployed by August 1994 and the ammunition depots be vacated later.

In an interview to journalists Sergey Zotov said he had expected that Latvians would be more forthcoming to suggest the deadline for the army withdrawal and would come up with social welfare proposals for militaries and retired officers.

Riga Cannot Accept Offer

*WS1905122993 Tallinn BNS in English 1504 GMT
18 May 93*

[Text] Riga, May 18, BNS—The withdrawal of the Russian troops from Latvia could be completed some time next year, head of the Russian delegation Sergey

Zotov said during the opening session of the Russian-Latvian interstate talks, which resumed in Jurmala Monday.

But, Latvia cannot accept this offer: in compliance with a parliamentary directive the process must be completed this year.

Chief Latvian delegate Janis Dinevics says the talks could result in signing a few interstate pacts. But, it would have been more convenient to sign a whole package of documents at one time, said Dinevics. Dinevics has the authority to sign all pacts that were initialed during the previous round of talks.

Zotov, however, is authorized to sign only two of the 11 documents, said Latvian delegation member Ilgonis Upmalis.

Latvia proposed signing several agreements regulating the operation of Russian military installations in Latvia until the troops are withdrawn and problems are settled.

Russia has no conceptual objections regarding the proposal, Zotov said. The documents can be signed during next round of talks in Moscow in late May or early June.

Another project under discussion today was a Latvian-Russian cooperation agreement on operating major oil pipelines, unofficial sources told BNS.

Russia's Grachev Makes Another Offer

*WS1905092293 Tallinn BNS in English 0638 GMT
19 May 93*

[Text] Vilnius, May 18, BNS—Russia is prepared to pull its troops out of Latvia before the end of 1994 if an inter-governmental accord is available, Pavel Grachev, Russian Defense Minister, said when he met with his Latvian counterpart Talavs Jundzis in Vilnius Tuesday. The Russian minister said that a schedule of the withdrawal will be dictated by the overall agreement.

Grachev noted that as the head of a defense agency he would like to pull all Russian troops back to Russia as soon as possible "in order to build its armed forces in a normal way." He thinks, however, that the pull out is obstructed by unwillingness of the Latvian leadership to conclude an appropriate accord while insisting on negotiating a 1993 schedule of withdrawal.

In the afternoon Pavel Grachev arrived in Kaunas where he met with commanders of the Russian units stationed in Lithuania and managers of defense factories there.

Russian Delegate Proclaims 'Feasible Results'

*WS2505084793 Tallinn BNS in English 1605 GMT
22 May 93*

[Text] Riga, May 22, BNS—After a year of finalizing positions and preparing documents, the Russo-Latvian negotiations have produced "feasible results." This

statement was made by the head of the Russian delegation, Sergey Zotov, at a press conference devoted to the current round of talks in Jurmala Yesterday.

As was reported before, the two sides signed agreements on setting up joint ventures on the basis of Russian works in Estonia, non-visa entry to Latvia for Russian servicemen and their families, using the post, communications and radio frequencies by the Russian troops withdrawn from Latvia.

The head of the Latvian delegation, State Minister Janis Dinevics positively assessed the current round of negotiations which, in his words, "developed a mechanism for the withdrawal of troops."

According to Zotov, the sides failed to reach an agreement over the final withdrawal deadline. The talks focused on Russian-proposed variant which envisions pulling out the troops in 1994. However, the Latvian side categorically disagreed with preserving Russian strategic objects in Latvia.

Latvia attempts to use "the language of ultimatums" in its bid to press Russia to revise the troops withdrawal deadline 1994, Zotov said.

Zotov says Russia has once surrendered to Latvian demands in August 1992, when it agreed to fix the pullout deadline in 1994.

The Latvian ultimative attitudes made Russia to bind the troops withdrawal to several preconditions, Zotov said.

Zotov says he hopes Latvia will change its stance to lead a constructive dialogue over the withdrawal deadlines soon.

Head of the Latvian delegation Janis Dinevics says no agreements were reached regarding the withdrawal deadlines because Russia demands to preserve its three top significant military installations on the Latvian soil.

Russia refuses to dismantle the Skundra radar installation, insists on retaining its radar station in Skundra for 10 years, the Ventspils Cosmic Communication Center—an intelligence object in Venstpils for six years and a naval port in Liepaja for five years.

Commenting on the Latvian parliament's categorical demand the troops be pulled out within 1993, Zotov said: "The parliament may pass any documents it likes. But it is unacceptable for the Russian side when it is addressed in the language of ultimatum and dictate."

Acute discussions arose over social guarantees for servicemen and their families including military pensioners, especially the problem of granting compensations for housing of those leaving Latvia.

The two countries reached an agreement to sign 5 accords regarding the withdrawal of troops and 1 on other issues during the next round of negotiations.

Border Guards Leaving

*WS2805142193 Tallinn BNS in English 1044 GMT
28 May 93*

[Text] Riga, May 28, BNS—The Head of the State Service Ventspils District Department Imants Kurts told BNS that the last column of Russian border guards will leave the Ventspils district in the first half of June. All cites of the unit have already been turned over to a Latvian border guard brigade.

After that eight Russian military units will remain in the district, says Imants Kurts.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Destruction of Chemical Weapons Near Udmurtia Planned

*PM2705113393 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 26 May 93 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Mustard Gas on the Roadside"]

[Text] There are 7,700 tonnes of liquid toxins (such as lewisite, mustard gas, and lewisite-mustard gas compounds) stockpiled in Russia. This was announced by German Frizorger of the Udmurt Council of Ministers staff. He noted that the bulk of these toxins (6,400 tonnes) are located in the city of Kambarka (Udmurtia). Owing to the transportation difficulties the Russian Government plans to set up facilities to destroy the toxins near the city itself.

Russia Grapples With CW Disarmament Issues

Experts Debate Destruction and Conversion

*LD1505190993 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1600 GMT 15 May 93*

[Video report by correspondent A. Peslyak; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Experts from a variety of ministries and members of the public spent two days tackling the question of how to destroy 40,000 tonnes of mustard gas, lewisite, and substances containing phosphorus, which will now never be used in weapons bringing death by chemical means, because the international convention signed by Russia commits us to destroying all our stocks, restructuring our industrial base, and setting up a system to monitor all this. [video shows conference in progress]

Fortunately, we have never had any chemical explosions or terrible leaks, but where are we to destroy these things—at dumps or factories, or should we find somewhere new and build everything from scratch, which will require both money and staff? Although decades of work on chemical weapons have provided a strong scientific and organizational base, we now have to convert it

without dispersing it. Most importantly, when transporting and destroying tanks, containers, and warheads we must guarantee absolutely the health of those working and living nearby and protect both people and the environment. After making preparations, we shall embark on this in one and a half years. [video shows interior and exterior views of chemical plant; cuts to show Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Chemical Weapons Committee under the president of the Russian Federation, being interviewed]

[Kuntsevich] However, the program cannot begin to function until all aspects have been agreed with the local authorities and the public.

International Conference Opens in Moscow 19 May

*LD1905122993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1155 GMT 19 May 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergei Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS—A comprehensive programme for a stage-by-stage elimination of chemical weapons in Russia is one of central subjects of discussion at the first international chemical disarmament conference that opened here on Wednesday. It is being attended by more than 100 foreign scientists, political and public figures, diplomats, representatives of business and industrial communities.

Recommendations which will be worked out during discussion will help Russia implement its comprehensive programme for the elimination of chemical weapons, a spokesman at the chemical and biological conversion committee under the president of Russia told ITAR-TASS.

The Russian federation is known to have signed a convention banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons in Paris on January 13, this year. In keeping with its obligations, the Russian side is to eliminate 45 percent of the stockpiles of toxic agents by the year 2004 during the first phase of chemical disarmament.

Various problems concerning the elimination of toxic agents, the conversion of military chemical production plants, and procedures for the monitoring and inspection of compliance with the convention are also to be considered at the three day conference.

Yeltsin Sends Message

*PM1905150393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 19 May 93 p 2*

[Unattributed report on Yeltsin message to Moscow International Conference On Chemical Disarmament: "Moscow Forum for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] The first Moscow International Conference on Chemical Disarmament started work in Moscow today. It will examine political, scientific-technical, socio-economic, and legal questions pertaining to the destruction of chemical weapons, conversion of military-chemical production, and procedures for monitoring and inspecting the observance of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The conference will be attended by more than 100 foreign political and public diplomats and military experts and also by representatives of leading Western firms.

Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin has sent the following greetings to the conference participants and guests:

Esteemed Conference Participants and Guests!

I cordially welcome you, eminent politicians and public figures, scientists, diplomats, representatives of business circles, and military experts from many countries of the world, to Moscow this spring and the first International Conference on Chemical Disarmament.

The beginning of this year was marked by an important international event of great historical significance. As you know, a global Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction was signed in Paris 13 January 1993. Russia chose to sign the convention. So far 142 countries have subscribed to this unique political document in the disarmament sphere. So the first real step has been taken on the path to a noble goal—ridding mankind of the threat of one of the most perfidious types of weapons of mass destruction.

The next step in this sphere will be the unconditional implementation of the convention by the states that are party to this international accord. It is a difficult task for Russia. Its solution will require a considerable material outlay, to be precise: more than one-half of the expenditure on all types of disarmament and the mobilization of all Russia's intellectual and spiritual powers. We also hope to secure the maximum support of the world community countries committed to the destruction of chemical arsenals.

In the solution of such a complex and multifaceted task, guaranteeing the safety of human beings and protecting the environment will be the main priorities.

The way to do this is to ensure close and open cooperation and a joint quest for the wisest scientific-technical, ecological, and organizational solutions leading to the effective implementation of the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

I express profound confidence that the first Moscow International Conference on Questions of Chemical Disarmament will find a productive amalgam of the existing

approaches to this problem and confirm the world community's resolve to save mankind from chemical weapons.

There is no other way.

I wish you success in your work.

Further on Conference

LD1905123793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1100 GMT 19 May 93

[Video report by Mikhail Aleksandriddi, Yuriy Kovalenko; from the Novosti newscast]

[text] Representatives of more than 20 countries who have gathered in Moscow to attend the International Conference on Chemical Disarmament will take three days to discuss various aspects of this problem. It is an acute problem for Russia, not only because 40,000 tonnes of poisonous substances are on its territory, but also because more than a half of all disarmament expenditure will be required to destroy chemical weapons. This is noted in a message of greeting, sent by Boris Yeltsin to the participants in the Conference. It is Yeltsin's view that the implementation of the tasks provided for in the Paris convention banning chemical weapons is possible only under a close and open international cooperation. Only such cooperation is capable of stopping the vicious circle of mankind stockpiling arsenals with which to kill itself. The Moscow Conference is an attempt to provide an answer to the question of how this is to be done. [video shows conference participants]

Legislation Discussed

LD2105020593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1855 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow May 20 TASS—"The success of a comprehensive programme for stage-by-stage elimination of chemical weapons in Russia will much depend on efficient legislation, which is yet being worked out," Vladislav Malyshev, secretary of the organizing committee of the international conference on chemical disarmament, told ITAR-TASS at the President Hotel on Thursday.

In his opinion, Russia will have to work out mechanisms for implementation of laws. It is not the government, but local authorities that should put forward an initiative to place facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons in their regions, Malyshev said. He believes that the campaign will begin when applications to mount these facilities are submitted by local authorities to the committee for problems of conversion of chemical and biological weapons under the Russian president, which means that the struggle to win the public opinion will begin.

Malyshev said that at today's session the attention of Russian scientists focused on the experience of their American colleagues to develop contacts and information exchange with public organisations and with the "green" movement, in particular.

On Friday, the participants in the conference will discuss problems of destroying poisonous substances and taking them under control, and medical and ecological aspects of the destruction of chemical weapons.

An address is expected to be made at the end of the conference to leaders and public figures of states which signed a convention on banning the development, production, stockpiling and the use of chemical weapons and their elimination.

Roundup of Issues

*LD2105142393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1320 GMT 21 May 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—The first international conference on chemical disarmament has completed here today.

The three-days discussion at Moscow's President Hotel attracted over 100 scientists and representatives of business and industrial communities from 25 states.

Head of the U.S. International Disarmament and Conversion Center Coel Olson told ITAR-TASS the conference was useful, as its participants exchanged opinion on a broad range of chemical disarmament problems.

In his opinion, legislation on chemical disarmament should be quickly elaborated, otherwise the industry will fail to meet the requirements of chemical disarmament programs envisaged by the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Speaking of control over the convention implementation, Olson said the inspection will be permanent and take an indefinite period of time on condition of further commercial interest of the chemical industry. He said short-term working relations between foreign and Russian enterprises are possible.

Head of the UN group of chemical and biological arms experts and Swedish chemist Johan Santesson told ITAR-TASS representatives of countries, which do not have chemical arms, attended the conference because the chemical disarmament problem can be solved on a global scale only with collective efforts of the international community.

Speaking of the work in Iraq of a UN expert team he headed, Santesson said UN experience of chemical inspection can be used in future. In his opinion, it would be expedient to form small teams of experts to include

not only specialists in toxic agents' destruction but also sociologists and psychologists.

Exchange of experience was good for all conference participants, secretary of the conference organizational committee Vladislav Malyshev told ITAR-TASS. A number of states, including the United States and Germany, expressed their readiness to render economic assistance to chemical disarmament in Russia.

In Malyshev's words, conference participants abstained from the adoption of an appeal to heads and public figures in states- signatories of the convention. It is not because their opinions differ, but because "some discussion participants did not consider themselves competent to adopt the appeal," said Malyshev.

Conference Ends

*PM2505153193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 May 93 p 2*

[Aleksandr Dolgikh report: "Ridding the World of Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] The First Moscow International Conference on Chemical Weapons has ended in the capital's President Hotel. Its participants were scientists, politicians, military men, and industrialists from many countries. They examined political, scientific, technical, socioeconomic, and legal questions of the destruction of chemical weapons, the conversion of military production processes, and procedures for verification and inspection activity with regard to compliance with convention pledges.

Some 500 billion rubles and \$500 million—this is what it is expected to cost to destroy Russian stocks of chemical weapons. It is clear that it will be extremely difficult for our country to cope with this task on its own. Assistance will therefore be needed from the world community, it was pointed out at the conference.

The specialists examined a number of proposed projects for the destruction of chemical weapons. The chief criterion is how safe any particular solution is for people and the environment. Unique techniques have now been developed in Russia for the efficient detoxification of toxins, which can subsequently be used to produce various materials. Lewisite, for example, is a source product for the production of a particularly pure metallic arsenic used in electronics. In this connection the Committee on Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the Russian Federation president believes, not without grounds, that businessmen—both Russian and foreign—can be involved in the process of elimination.

It is proposed that the destruction of the stocks of Russian chemical weapons will begin in 1997.

Russia Chemical Weapons Expert Charged With Disclosing State Secrets

Preliminary Investigation

*PM2505144693 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 May 93 First Edition p 6*

[Valeriy Rudnev report: "Chemical Weapons Secrets in Materials of Criminal Case and in Reports of International Conference"]

[Text] On 19 May a strange coincidence brought together two disparate events, which were, however, united by a single topic—the problem of destroying chemical weapons.

This was the last day of the investigation into the case of Dr. of Chemical Sciences Vil Mirzayanov, former employee of the State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, accused by Russian state security of divulging a state secret about the production of combat toxins. This day also saw the opening in Moscow of the First International Conference on Chemical Disarmament, whose decisions, according to Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich, will assist Russia in fulfilling its program for the destruction of toxins.

We have written repeatedly about the progress of the investigation into V. Mirzayanov's case. The last time we reported that the chemical scientist would not be familiarized with the secret normative acts on whose basis criminal proceedings were being instituted. Mirzayanov lodged a protest in that regard and refused to answer the investigator's questions.

Much has changed since then. Mirzayanov has continued publicly exposing the military-chemical complex and its deviations from international accords on chemical disarmament. The scientist has been awarded the prestigious prize of the U.S. Cavallo charitable foundation for his courage—his warning of the menacing danger enshrined in the development of new types of combat toxins (the prize will be presented in Washington 9 June). A committee of U.S. scientists has asked the president and the general prosecutor of Russia to protect Mirzayanov from prosecution by investigative organs. Finally, the courageous chemical scientist received an invitation to the Moscow International Conference on Chemical Disarmament.

What about the criminal case? On 13 May Mirzayanov was shown the final version of the charge—he had "reported to a number of persons and published in the press data which he had learned during work at the State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry relating to the creation of a new toxin in the said institute and the development of binary weapons on its basis, at the same time divulging top-secret information constituting a state secret about the latest achievements in the sphere of science and technology (the results of scientific research in the interests of the country's defense), which make it possible to enhance the potential

of existing arms (ammunition), and also about the thrust and the results of applied scientific research work on the creation of binary weapons, which is being done in the interests of the country's defense."

On 17 May Mirzayanov and Aleksandr Asnis, his attorney, were told of the ending of the preliminary investigation and were shown all the materials of the criminal case so as to familiarize themselves with them.

Commenting on these materials, Mirzayanov declared: The charge is built on a one-sided assessment by experts invited from the system of the military-chemical complex. Even they admitted, however, that my public statements entailed no adverse consequences for Russia's defense capability. At the same time a number of experts in the case insist that the information divulged by the accused constitutes a state secret. But two experts—General Vadim Smirnitkiy and Colonel Nikolay Chugunov—hold a dissenting opinion: Mirzayanov did not transgress the bounds of state secrecy laid down in normative acts.

Among the other material circumstances which influenced the investigative organs' decision Mirzayanov named secret government decrees and departmental instructions. According to the accused, they are imperfect and permit an arbitrary interpretation of his actions. But the Russian Federation Government decree of 30 March 1993, which was adopted after the preliminary investigation was already in train, makes a substantial correction to them. "You get the impression," Mirzayanov commented, "that the government decision was adopted specially for my case. It was adopted in order to facilitate the task of the investigation and to put me in the dock. My case is designed to intimidate democratically minded scientists in our country. The decision of the Security Ministry's investigative organs discredits our state's policy in the eyes of the world community."

Attorney Asnis' comment was brief: Mirzayanov's guilt has not been proven. I am counting on a fair decision by the court.

Interview With Scientist

*MK2705115493 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 22, 30 May 93 (Signed to Press 25 May)
pp C10, 11*

[Interview with V. S. Mirzayanov, doctor of chemical sciences charged with disclosing state secrets, by Leonard Nikishin, published in the "Court" column: "Disarmament or Modernization?" date, place not given—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] **Nikishin:** Vil Sultanovich, what charge has been leveled against you?

Mirzayanov: Frankly, I was surprised by its wording. In fact, a totally new charge has been leveled against me. Up to now I have been charged with revealing state secrets about the links between the developers and producers of

chemical weapons, that is to say, between the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Defense Chemical Technology and the related plants, as well as information concerning the links between the developers and the testing sites. These charges were dropped, but in their place a new charge was formulated (in the presence of prosecutor V. Buyvolov), that I have disclosed information constituting state secrets "in the sphere of the latest scientific and technical advances in the interests of the country's defense." In addition, I, in the opinion of the prosecutors, have also divulged information "about the directions of R&D work in the interests of national defense," in other words, about the creation of binary weapons. Experts say that my information corresponds to reality, since a new substance has been created—and on its basis a binary chemical weapon. The indictment is based on the provisions under paragraph 56 of the "Provisional List of Information Constituting State Secrets," which went into effect as of 1 January 1993.

This paragraph talks about "the results of targeted R&D programs" that constitute a state secret.

The prosecutors point out that I have revealed absolutely secret information to Professor Lev Fedorov, and that in conjunction with him we have published these data in MN and also reported them to a BALTIMORE SUN correspondent and published an article in that newspaper.

We also read the list of state secrets of 1980 and the departmental list of state secrets of the Petrochemical Industry Ministry of 1991.

Nikishin: But Russia has signed an international convention on stopping the development, production, and testing of chemical weapons. They only have to be destroyed step by step. What possible state secrets could be involved then?

Mirzayanov: Why are you surprised? Security Ministry investigator Shkarin at an interrogation on 13 May suddenly showed me and my lawyer the 30 May 1993 Council of Ministers decree signed by Chernomyrdin which said that information about research projects on chemical weapons, their makeup, and technology that were conducted earlier are referred to as state secrets. It was this decree that was used by the experts since the "Lists" do not contain a single word about poisonous substances or chemical weapons. Colonel Funygin, an expert from the general staff, tried to prove, however, that the word "ammunition" contained there incorporates chemical weapons, but this assertion holds no water.

Nikishin: Excuse me, but how is it possible to accuse you of revealing information in September 1992 based on a Council of Ministers decree of March 1993? This is pure nonsense....

Mirzayanov: That was precisely why it was adopted. You do not understand? Now the experts on my "case" are saying that this decree "clarifies" paragraph 56 of the "Provisional List."

Of course, I lodged a protest on that count, but is it my personal fate that is involved here? This is a total discrediting of Russia in the eyes of the world community! A legal foundation is being created for a new spiral of chemical armaments. The question arises: How is it possible to destroy chemical weapons if everything that has been done so far is declared a state secret?

I am ready to go to prison if only people in this country and the world community understand what they are dealing with: our military chemical complex is not even thinking of disarming itself—it only wants to get rid of the old junk.

Nikishin: Only recently, however, an international conference on chemical disarmament was held in Moscow and was welcomed by the president himself. Did you and Professor Fedorov take part in it?

Mirzayanov: You must be joking.... IZVESTIYA made a mistake in this case. B. Garrett from the United States, a member of the organizing committee of that conference, came out with the initiative to invite Professor Fedorov and myself so as to give us the floor. The top generals rejected that initiative out of hand: "That would not be conducive to the smooth running of the process." Nonetheless on 20 May Sebia Hawkins, a coordinator from the U.S. Greenpeace Pacific movement, told the conference that she would not be able to leave Moscow with a clear conscience without protesting the arrest and persecution of Vil Mirzayanov. And imagine, one U.S. delegate was concerned whether that statement was not too sharp....

Nikishin: I remember how carefully the West was picking and choosing words to express protests to Brezhnev and his entourage over the harassment of dissidents....

Mirzayanov: Of course, as far as our generals are concerned, it is like trying to get blood out of a stone. Valeriy Menshikov, a member of the organizing committee and deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet committee on ecology, also interceded on my behalf and also met with a unanimous rebuff. This is hardly surprising, given that the organizing committee included chiefs of main directorates, generals, such scientists as Kabachnik and Fokin, who received Lenin Prizes for developing chemical weapons (the actual work, however, was done by other people).

Yet I am not sorry since no really serious problems were discussed at the conference—it looked more like a show.

Nikishin: And yet clearly the "chemistry" generals are enjoying full support of the Russian Government....

Mirzayanov: Yes, I also think so now. In the past I had some illusions. I have the impression that it is not

Yeltsin who controls them, but they control him. Otherwise why would put his authority at risk?

Nikishin: Presumably, there are some "ulterior" considerations involved here?

Mirzayanov: There certainly are. There is a kind of "agreement" between the military-chemical complexes of the United States and Russia. The Americans employed in the military-industrial complex have found themselves out of job, and they need orders. At this point our generals raised the clamor about Russia's not being able to cope with destroying the chemical weapons on its own and that it would need at least \$600 million to do so. They intend to get this sum from the United States via Yeltsin. And the chances are that they will get it since the money will go for orders for the U.S. military-industrial complex to work out technology to eliminate chemical weapons in this country. But this "elimination," as conceived by the generals (in Cheboksary, for instance, there is a plant producing phosphorous-organic pesticides), would make it possible to preserve and upgrade the production of binary chemical weapons. This is the aim—to finance the dismantling of obsolete stocks and to continue manufacturing binary weapons....

We have something to work on; we have developed a new substance whose formula is being kept secret from the "outsiders," and there are semi-finished products. And who can oversee all this? Now do you understand the meaning of the 30 March 1993 Russian Council of Ministers decree?

Nikishin: Have you familiarized yourself with the case file?

Mirzayanov: I have not even begun yet. A whole mass of problems are involved. Most of the documents cited are classified. In the course of the investigation several times more has been "disclosed" than I have "divulged." The "lists" that I was shown are also top secret. And they are extremely comprehensive. They say, for example, that information about the nuclear capacity of the world's leading powers is top secret! Under these regulations any person could be imprisoned for any reason. Moreover, they contain an addition: "And for other actions." In sum, total arbitrariness.

I also noticed manipulation in working with the experts. The above-mentioned paragraph 56 of "The List" talks about "targeted programs." Yet the experts struck these words out, leaving in only the phrase "research projects." But even washing the glassware in chemical laboratories could be subsumed under "research." Why was the reference to "targeted programs" omitted? Because none of the experts has ever seen any of these targeted programs. I demanded: Prove to me that what I have written in MN coincides with what is said about targeted programs, and add that to the file. What kind of expert examination would that be without this then?

Nikishin: Is there really nothing else except your personal courage that could be set against the omnipotence of the "chemistry generals"?

Mirzayanov: I have had contacts with Aleksey Yablokov, the president's adviser on ecology, and I took part in preparing the presidential statement of 20 April this year on problems of dismantling chemical weapons. Yet this document does not address many fundamental issues, especially insofar as the security of destroying chemical weapons is concerned. My aim was to pacify the population of the Volga region, Chuvashia, Udmurtia, and Tataria, but it has not been achieved. [Mirzayanov ends]

The president's statement of 20 April says: "Mountains of the now useless and dangerous chemical weapons is the heavy legacy of our past. Russia must get rid of it in the interests of its own security and in the interests of the security of the entire world." Esteemed Mr. President, what is Vil Mirzayanov going to be tried for then? Recently the scientist has been awarded a prize by the American Cavallo Foundation "For Moral Courage" as a tribute to his contribution to the struggle for eliminating chemical weapons. The presentation ceremony is to take place in Washington on 9 June. But to whom will it be presented?

Vil Mirzayanov himself, who is under investigation, may not leave Moscow. At the same time his wife, who was planning to attend the ceremony in the United States, has been refused a foreign passport. Just like in the good old days.... [For additional information on this topic, see the *Arms Control Report of 19 May 1993, page 48. Ed.*]

WEAPONS CONVERSION

Russian Generals Discuss Defense Production Conversion

*LD2705153393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1509 GMT 27 May 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow May 27 TASS—The actual effect of conversion of Russia's defence industry to peaceful purposes is far below its potential, participants in the congress devoted to the strategy of military production said in the final document—the congress' declaration addressed to the Russian president and the country's leadership.

The congress was organized by the Military Academy of the Russian General Staff, and its declaration took into account recommendations and proposals put forth by more than 160 participants in the plenary sessions and conferences which were held within the framework of the international forum "World Experience and the Russian Economy," ITAR-TASS was told by the congress organizing committee expert Nikolay Mamonov.

According to Mamonov, Russia needs a better thought-out concept of its defence industry and the use of the resources of the armed forces in the interests of the national economy.

Mamonov also said that "the state has distanced itself from active support and management of conversion." He complained that "narrow departmental approaches are a brake," which hampers the solution of specific problems.

Russian Commentary on Superpower Weapons Conversion

LD1805194393 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 18 May 93

[Announcer-read Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Excerpt] The problems that are being widely discussed in the United States during President Bill Clinton's current tour of the country include conversion of military production. Similar problems receive primary attention also in Russia. More on the subject from our observer Vladislav Kozyakov:

I would call the process of conversion one of the fruit of the post Cold War period, Vladislav Kozyakov writes. And although it's created a lot of problems in many countries in the final analysis conversion promises a lot of benefits to the nation. This is natural since it provides for the rechannelling of huge resources of industrial and intellectual potential from arms manufacture to the manufacture of civilian products.

Although Americans are concerned with such matters as the need of retraining personnel, changing priorities in

production and scientific research, Russians are confronted with the same problems but on a larger scale.

Here are some estimates made by experts: for example, Russia plans to reduce military production within five years by about five percent of its GNP [gross national product] annually as compared to 0.5 percent a year in the United States. This means that scale of conversion in Russia will be 10 times more and consequently it will be much more difficult for it to resolve all the problems involved.

There's another example as well. The United States has set itself the task of securing about \$20 billion within five years to support companies transferring to civilian production. In Russia industries lost more than 60 percent of their military orders last year alone. Since the government had no funds to regear them to civilian production only six percent of industrial capacities were converted.

Yet despite all the difference in scale and rates of conversion in Russia and in the United States the two countries have much in common in the field.

First of all both want to see the process gather momentum. Both are interested in bilateral cooperation in the sphere. In Russia and in the United States experts are preparing concrete proposals on this score. And what's especially important is the establishment of increasingly broader contacts between scientists, heads of factories and research centers in both countries. [passage omitted]

No matter how serious the problems of conversion are international cooperation is capable of facilitating their solution and cooperation between Russia and the United States will probably still keep its word [as heard] in this new and complicated undertaking.

FRANCE

Paris Paper on Revised U.S. Star Wars Program

*PM1805095293 Paris LE MONDE in French
15 May 93 p1*

[Editorial: "Return to Earth"]

[Text] Everybody was aware that George Bush and Bill Clinton had very different views on the future of the Reagan "star wars" program in the United States. The former was an avowed supporter of it, although he had slowed down its development for budgetary reasons. The latter had expressed such reservations during his election campaign that it was suspected that the days of the American project for an antimissile shield in space in its original form were numbered.

This has now happened: The Pentagon is adopting a "soft" version which consists of installing on the ground or, if necessary, embarking on ships, missiles which can intercept other missiles to protect North American territory or soldiers deployed abroad from a threat which is less sophisticated, less intense, and less traditional than the one which existed in the days of the "Cold War" between East and West.

"We owe 20 percent of our losses in the Gulf War to a single missile," General Malcolm O'Neill, head of the space "shield" project in its original form, said recently, referring to the firing—which failed to be intercepted—of an Iraqi Scud missile on the American base of Dhahran which killed 28 people on 25 February 1991. A report by John Hopkins University commissioned by the U.S. air force established that the anti-Saddam Husayn coalition's air attacks succeeded in demoralizing the Iraqi army but that they had destroyed "few or even none" of the mobile Scud missile launchers.

So, the new potential enemy has been designated—states throughout the world which are sufficiently rich and clever to secretly procure—playing on the rivalry and complicity of the big powers—weapons which are technologically rudimentary but militarily effective, like tactical ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. The 1987 international Missile Technology Control Regime which regulates the export of such weapons, did not prevent China—condemned by Washington at the beginning of May—from supplying M-11 missiles to Pakistan.

With a view to this proliferation, the United States has chosen to come back to earth. On the basis of existing weapons linked to detection satellites, the Pentagon wishes to deploy a network of missiles, at two levels, which are capable of intercepting offensive missiles at high altitude or fired over a short range. This is the new National Missile Defense program in which Israel has been involved.

Meeting in Rome last April, French, German, and Italian officials urged the Western European Union to do the same for Community defense. In Paris this week the French defense minister revived that initiative, invoking a concept of deterrence which aims to be based on the development of a shield and the modernization of a nuclear panoply.

France Orders Third Nuclear Submarine

*AU2705151693 Paris AFP in English 1506 GMT
27 May 93*

[Text] Paris, May 27 (AFP)—France has ordered construction of a third new generation, missile-launching nuclear submarine, Defence Minister Francois Leotard announced Thursday.

The new sub, named the Vigilant, will be operational in 2001 and will carry the new surface-to-surface M45 missile, Leotard told parliament.

A first sub in the series, the Triumphant, will be operational in 1996 and will be launched this summer. The second, the Temeraire, should be operational in 1998.

The 1991 cost of the subs was nine billion francs (1.6 billion dollars) each, on the basis of a total order of five vessels. The figure has since been reduced to four.

The development and industrial cost of the whole programme was estimated at 89 billion francs (16 million dollars) in 1991.

Leotard also said the land army would be cut by 45,000 men to 225,000 by 1997. French forces of 2,400 men, their families and support civilians would be withdrawn from Berlin, a submarine base closed in Lorient, west France, and an air base shut down at Nimes, in the south.

Two conventional Daphne submarines will be transferred from Lorient to the Mediterranean base of Toulon and four of the Agosta type to Brest, Leotard said.


NTIS
ATTN PROCESS 103

5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD VA

N

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

22161



This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.