

PTA UPA-91-006
FEBRUARY 1991

Foreign
Broadcast
Information
Service



ANNIVERSARY
1941 - 1991

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

19980113 359

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

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Soviet Union Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-91-006

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Baltics

Swedish Speaker Backs Baltic Independence

91UF0245A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 20 Nov 90 pp 1-2

["Speech by Thage G. Peterson, Speaker of the Swedish Riksdag (Parliament), at Sitting of the Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet"—SOVETSKAYA ESTONIAYA headline]

[Text] Mr. Chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet! Mr. Speaker of the Supreme Soviet! Esteemed deputies! Ladies and gentlemen!

It is my great honor today to address you as a representative of the Swedish Riksdag in the building housing the Estonian Supreme Soviet. My visit to Tallinn is evidence of the interest and assertiveness being displayed by us in Sweden in respect of the Estonian people's aspiration to self-determination and their desire to develop their state independently.

My visit to Estonia is the response to the visit in the spring of the delegation of the Supreme Soviet of Estonia headed by its chairman, Arnold Ruutel, who visited the Swedish Riksdag also. My visit is a natural continuation of the dialogue across the Baltic that has become possible thanks to the new political situation in Europe. The visit by me and our delegation to the Supreme Soviet of Estonia affords us an opportunity to discuss together—as representatives elected by our peoples—the role of parliaments in the shaping of the new Europe and the all-European cooperation growing on the basis of recognition of what may be expressed only by the will of the people expressed at general and free elections.

The durability of the cooperation of Estonia and Sweden is based on a tradition going back many centuries. We have begun to restore the former contacts at all levels. Private individuals, many organizations, communes, churches, businessmen and the cooperative system of Sweden have joined in the development of relations with your country across the Baltic. Development in the Baltic region has become a matter that concerns the entire Swedish people.

Official support on the part of Sweden is growing. It was recently decided that our mission in Tallinn would be increased by one employee, who would deal with questions of information and culture. A few days ago the government decided to expand our mission even further. In consideration of the demands with which we are being confronted by Swedish-Estonian cooperation, an employee responsible for activity in the sphere of cooperation will begin work in Tallinn, at the Swedish mission.

The process of democratization in the Baltic is being accompanied by an increasingly decisive demand for the restoration of independence, which the Baltic states possessed prior to their forcible annexation to the Soviet

Union in 1940. The Supreme Soviet of Estonia adopted a declaration on 30 March that says that the Republic of Estonia will be restored and that the independence of this republic will be achieved by way of direct negotiations with Moscow.

During his spring visit to Sweden, Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Estonia, emphasized that Estonia and the Soviet Union should find a solution by way of dialogue. We, for our part, are endeavoring to keep a close watch on the course of events at the negotiations between the Baltic states and Moscow. In the Foreign Policy Council, of which I am an ex officio member, we often discuss matters concerning Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Against the background of the rapid development of the rest of Europe, it is important that the negotiations that have commenced be conducted without unwarranted interruptions and threats of the application of sanctions or forcible measures. Military pressure methods and threats are contrary also to the intent and wording of the Helsinki Final Act. Sweden supports the Estonian people's aspiration to self-determination. The Estonian people enjoy this right in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. We are looking forward to the day when Estonia's independence is restored.

Although the cold war is already over, this does not mean that all the consequences of the world war have been removed. This will not be the case until the Baltic question is resolved and until freedom has been restored to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as independent and self-sufficient states.

It is gratifying that democratically elected people's representations occupy a central place in the political life of a renewed Europe.

The CSCE summit with the participation of the representatives of the 34 states that participate in the CSCE process begins today in Paris. This meeting has a chance to be the most important for Europe since the so-called Yalta Conference. The CSCE, which has hitherto been a process without a clear-cut organizational framework, will probably as a result of the Paris meeting become an institutionalized system ensuring cooperation and security in Europe.

The spirit of Helsinki is the ideological basis of the peaceful transformation of Europe. For this reason the process of security and cooperation in Europe is of decisive significance for the future of Estonia also. For this reason, we in Sweden have insisted and have worked in the name of special measures being adopted ensuring for Estonia the possibility of following the progress of the CSCE process without the need to be a part of the delegation of another state.

Sweden hopes that the Paris summit will be a step forward along the path of realization of the aspirations of the peoples of the Baltic region to equal participation in European cooperation.

The Northern Countries Council is a suitable forum for contacts between members of parliament of the northern countries and the Baltic. The Northern Countries Council session in Reykjavik decided to send to the Baltic a delegation to confer on possible cooperation. This visit took place a month ago. A basis for further cooperation has now been laid, and Estonia, together with Latvia and Lithuania, has been invited to participate as a guest in the session of the Northern Countries Council in Copenhagen in 1991.

This is a result that I find gratifying, and I consider it logical. The Northern Countries Council is by nature a cultural association. Estonia is in terms of kinship of language, religious ties, and historical affiliation a part of the cultural zone of the European North.

In the period between the two world wars the three Baltic parliaments were members of the Interparliamentary Union. This organization, which may be characterized as a world parliament of parliaments, occupies a central place in the shaping of the opinions of members of parliament on an international scale. Parliaments of sovereign states with national Interparliamentary Union groups may be members of the Interparliamentary Union. As a first step en route to the restoration of Estonia's membership of the Interparliamentary Union, the Union's Swedish group is prepared to actively support the creation of an Estonian national group of the Interparliamentary Union.

Membership of the Council of Europe is a sign of a pluralist, democratic state. Two weeks ago Hungary was the first East and Central European country to once again become a member of the Council of Europe, being the first state of this region to win admittance to an organization of West European cooperation. By spring, in all probability, many East European states will in the course of internal development be ready to also be members of the Council of Europe. We are convinced that the time is not far off when Estonia also will participate in the important work of the Council of Europe.

The search for forms suitable for normal parliamentary work is an unending process. The Swedish Riksdag, which is now 555 years old, is debating constitutional reforms. That which is of mutual interest may be selected from the experience, both good and bad, that we have accumulated. I have, therefore, invited a group of representatives of the Estonian parliament, both politicians and officials, to Stockholm in 1991, as soon as possible, to study more specifically our experience and the way in which this experience is used in the interests of daily political activity.

The past year has shown that we have good opportunities for the development of day-to-day relations. Sea and air traffic has been established between Tallinn and Stockholm. Relations have been established between political parties, enterprises, and organizations of Sweden. The higher school in Karlskrona (Ronnebyu) in southern

Sweden conducts courses in market economics for Estonian businessmen. This educational activity is very important, strengthening the free market economy. New and profitable enterprises ensure economic development and employment and also lead to a rise in the living standard.

We wish to continue along this path and to create new contacts in increasingly new spheres of cooperation. We welcome the opening of an Estonian information office in Stockholm. We can show by daily cooperation that the Baltic has once again become a sea that unites and does not divide.

Mr. Chairman! Mr. Speaker!

The life of states is a mix of epoch-making events and practical day-to-day labor. In both cases parliaments have a central role.

The situation of Estonia and Sweden differs currently, but it is perfectly clear that we can learn a great deal from one another. It is my firm and frank wish that there be within the framework of Swedish-Estonian cooperation unrestricted and open cooperation between the parliaments also. The Swedish parliament and all six parliamentary parties wish for good and close cooperation with the Supreme Soviet of Estonia.

I thank you for the opportunity to address you.

Discussion of Estonian Foreign Policy

Officials Reject Media Criticisms

91UF0235A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
9 Oct 90 p 3

[Statement released by Lennart Meri, Republic of Estonia foreign minister and Endel Lippmaa, Republic of Estonia minister without portfolio; New York and Tallinn Sunday, October 7, 1990: "Estonia's Foreign Policy Is Consistent"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Lennart Meri is currently in New York attending some post-conference events of the European Security and Cooperation Council and has, at least in part, perused the articles about our foreign policies that have appeared in the Estonian media. In this context, it is necessary to reveal the following:

Foreign Minister Lennart Meri and minister without portfolio Endel Lippmaa have, from their very first day in the government, worked in complete accord with each other, with the chairman of the government, and also with the resolutions passed by the Supreme Soviet. Articles that have appeared in the Estonian media recently are indicative of opinions held by representatives of such media or by political forces behind the journalists, and do not in any way reflect the real goals of Estonia's foreign policy which, as the government's program states, is the full and unconditional restoration

of independent statehood to Estonia. The disinformation about Estonia's foreign policy that's now being spread by some journalists for reasons we cannot fathom today, is sure proof of the fact that Estonia's foreign policy is getting close enough to its goal to endanger the forces opposing independence.

There are enough forces opposing independence in both of the superstates, and their sophisticated counter-efforts should neither be underestimated nor tolerated. The Estonian public can be sure that our foreign policy has not been influenced by these forces.

Media Defended

91UF0235B Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
9 Oct 90 p 3

Inquiry signed by five journalists: "Who Stands Behind the Journalists?]"

[Text] In the course of one week, two different statements concerning our media have been made by the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Estonia. The unsigned statement dated October 1 and issued to ETA [Estonian Telegraph Agency] on the official letterhead of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Estonia reads: "Some reviews of the two plus four treaty that have been published in the Estonian media have been inexcusably unprofessional and as such caused some perplexity among governments of states otherwise well disposed to us."

On October 7, a statement released by the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Estonia was aired on Estonian Radio and Estonian Television. It dealt with articles about our foreign policy that had appeared in the Estonian media. The statement bears the signature of Endel Lippmaa, minister without portfolio, and the name of Lennart Meri, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Estonia.

The statement says that: "Articles that have appeared in the Estonian media recently are indicative of opinions held by journalists representing such media or by political forces behind the journalists." It also adds: "There are ample forces opposing independence in both of the superstates, and their sophisticated counter-efforts should neither be underestimated nor tolerated."

In connection with the foregoing we, as journalists who have covered topics touching on the foreign policy of Estonia, would like to ask the following questions:

- What are some of the articles published in the Estonian media that are specifically referred to in the statement of the Foreign Ministry?
- What political forces, those of the two superstates opposing Estonia's independence among them, stand behind which journalist?
- Which governments well disposed to us have been perplexed by articles published in the Estonian media that touch on Estonia's foreign policy?

October 8, 1990

Harri Tiido (EESTI RAADIO), Kalle Muuli (EDASI, EESTI ELU), Toomas H. Liiv (PAEVALEHT), Peep Kala (PAEVALEHT), Peeter Raidla (RAHVA HAAL)

Confusion in Policy Seen

91UF0235C Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
14 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by Peep Kala and Toomas H. Liiv: "Estonia Needs a Concept for Foreign Policy"]

[Text] On Wednesday, the Senate of the U.S. Congress ratified the so-called "Two Plus Four" treaty that was, as we know, signed in Moscow on September 12. A resolution was added to the ratification document that affirms continuation of the U.S. Baltic policy that has been followed up until now.

To quote from the article by minister Endel Lippmaa in the Friday issue of PAEVALEHT titled: "U.S.A. Senate Determined on Wednesday: The Territory of the Baltic States Is Not Part of the Soviet Union": "The addition of such a resolution was not an accidental, undeliberated step, but the result of close cooperation between the U.S. Senate and the leadership of the Republic of Estonia."

On the same day, RAHVA HAAL carried an ETA [Estonian Telegraph Agency] item titled "Lippmaa Stayed Home Because Senate Situation Favorable" that would also merit quoting here:

"Arnold Rüütel and Endel Lippmaa had reportedly received a telephone invitation from the U.S. government a few days ago to meet with president Bush and Secretary of State Baker on October 12. Endel Lippmaa admitted yesterday that there was indeed an opportunity to meet with Bush, but a meeting with the president would have required a very compelling reason." Lippmaa's opinion was that "everything indicated that our objectives were already being met, and even more favorably so, in the Senate."

However, is this reiteration by the U.S. Congress saying that the Baltic states should not be considered part of the Soviet Union really such a major step toward reaching our independence? Such statements have been made repeatedly after World War II. The policies of U.S. post-war administrations have also, at least in words, always denied that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania belong to the Soviet Union.

It is the opinion of these writers that, under the circumstances, it would have been more useful to establish direct contact with the U.S. administration. That would have provided real support for the process of getting out from under Moscow's power. Moreover, the "Two Plus Four" treaty, with its ratification bolstered by the Baltic states resolution that had been a result of close cooperation between the leaderships of U.S.A. and the Republic of Estonia, did actually not touch on the Baltic states at all. The treaty fixes the boundaries of Germany. The only

other state mentioned is **Poland**, whose present border with Germany is considered obligatory.

The "Two Plus Four" Does Not Concern Us

This was also confirmed by Jon R. Purnell, U.S. Consul of the Leningrad Main Consulate at his October 11 meeting in Tallinn with Enn Liimets, deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Estonia. The position of the United States is as follows:

"The 'Two Plus Four' treaty has absolutely no connection to the Baltic states or to the circumstances of their occupation by the Soviet Union. The fate of the Baltic states is a separate matter entirely, and fears that the Baltic states would lose their rights to independence as a result of the signing of this treaty are not founded. The non-recognition policy of the United States remains unchanged by it.

Undoubtedly, one can agree with the position of academician Lippmaa that the interests of big and small states do not coincide. But do we really have reason to see in the U.S. government's position a conspiracy against us?

A completely different matter, however, is the state treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany concluded in Moscow on September 13, Article 2 of which views Europe's boundaries as final. It would have been more logical to try to append the Baltic states resolution to this treaty as it actually deals with the boundaries of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, this can no longer be done, since the Soviet Union-FRG state treaty has been ratified bilaterally.

All Is O.K. in Foreign Policy, Media Meddling?

Recalling last Sunday's article in PAEVALEHT: "Who is Conducting Foreign Policy in Estonia?" and the scathing joint statement that followed bearing the name of Foreign Minister Lennart Meri and the signature of Endel Lippmaa, minister without portfolio, one is reluctant to address, once again, the matter of different lines being followed for Estonia's foreign policy. But it needs to be done just the same. Despite the joint statement of the two ministers, one is left with the impression that differences still exist between the foreign policy lines of individual cabinet members.

When it comes to the so-called Radio Free Europe announcements, that seemed to have been released to the media by the information bureau for the Foreign Ministry, the story is quite simple. As mentioned in our October 7 article, one of the ministers of the Republic of Estonia accused RFE [Radio Free Europe] of being a mouthpiece for the CIA and of protecting the interests of superstates. (The same accusation was levelled against journalists in the Meri-Lippmaa statement).

Discussions with staff members of the Foreign Ministry revealed that RFE only acted as a transmitter, since fax connections from U.S.A to Estonia are next to impossible to get. We also want to offer our apologies to Mr.

Toomas Hendrik Ilves, whom we tried to protect in our previous article on foreign policy, a protection—as it later turned out—he did not need. But if there was a need, it would have been for protection against those in whose opinion the U.S.A. and the CIA are for sure trying to trip up our foreign policy.

Things Snagged in the East, Eastern Minister Looks to the West

Tensions relating to the implementation of economic boundaries have been becoming ever more obvious over the last few days. A location visit to Narva was made this Thursday by minister Artur Kuznetsov and counselor Tiit Nuudi from the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Endel Lippmaa, the Minister for Eastern Affairs, was not there, even though he had cited northeastern Estonia where "an unfavorable situation is developing" *med as one of the reasons for not travelling to the U.S.A. (see ETA announcement in yesterday's RAHVA HAAL.*

There have also been delays with the ratification of the Russia-Estonia treaties, an area that should clearly be the bailiwick of the Minister for Eastern Affairs. However, as our readers may have noticed, for a whole week now we have been running stories from the U.S.A. marked "received through Endel Lippmaa."

When Lennart Meri and Edgar Savisaar—one earlier, the other later—went to the U.S., all journalists started complaining about the lack of information. Looking at it realistically, it is indeed the job of the journalist to obtain the information; the statesmen, however, have the right to withhold such information at their own discretion. (After the Bush-Savisaar meeting the day before yesterday it was quite clear that America's administration *has* taken the course toward actively supporting the Baltic states).

It seems that much more curious, in retrospect, that our Minister for Eastern Affairs preferred behaviour contrary to that of the leader of his cabinet. After all, as a politician, Savisaar refrained from making any comments for a few days before his meeting with Bush.

Aren't we dealing here with a curious race between hoisters of the blue-black-and-white flag? We cannot say anything before the return of Lennart Meri and Edgar Savisaar from New York, but FM's [Foreign Ministry's] first statement regarding media (see October 2 issue of PAEVALEHT) leaves an impression that this is not necessarily the position of the FM. *But, we should not jump to conclusions.*

Supreme Soviet's Foreign Commission Also Demands Clarification

As we mentioned already in Thursday's paper, the Foreign Commission of the Supreme Soviet is also confused about the situation regarding our foreign policy. Tiit Made, deputy chairman of the commission, told PAEVALEHT only the day before yesterday that they have repeatedly asked minister Meri to speak about our

foreign policy concept before the commission. To this day, the minister has not complied. And, indeed, it would be hard for him to talk about a concept (or doctrine) that hasn't even been discussed in the Supreme Soviet.

We should also recall Arnold Rüütel's proposal in the same Thursday paper: to form a permanent task force for solving current problems of foreign policy, which would consist of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister for Eastern Affairs and the Chairman of Supreme Soviet's Commission on Foreign affairs. But that, too, presupposes the existence of a concept. It will also call for splitting up the turf to determine who may, and who will have to do what.

Who, then, is going to create a concept for Estonia's foreign policy?

Estonian Cities Join International Union

91UF0296B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 27 Nov 90 p 3

[Article by P. Kaldoya (ETA): "Union of Estonian Cities Renews Ties"]

[Text] After an interval of half a century, the Union of Estonian Cities is once again participating in the work of the International Union of Local Administrators (IULA). Estonia was represented at an international seminar in Helsinki on 20-23 November by Toomas Mendelson, chairman of the Union of Estonian Cities and mayor of Tartu, and Sulev Laene, government counsel and union secretary.

The delegation met the leaders of the IULA and delivered a personal message from Arnold Ruutel to President Lars Eric Ericsson of the organization and First Secretary Jacek Zapasnik.

Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party's Communist Faction Role Viewed

91UN0691A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 19 Dec 90 p 5

["Digest of Lithuanian Press": Interview with DPTL Communist Faction Leader Stakvilyavichyus, by TIESA Correspondent P. Imbrasas]

[Text] It seems that in the swirl of events of this difficult year now departing, the echos of the Lithuanian CP Congress are gradually dying out. The press has devoted little attention to this event. Nevertheless, we would like to present to digest readers several excerpts from an interview by correspondent Pyatras Imbrasas with Mindaugas Stakvilyavichyus, leader of the communist faction of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party. TIESA printed the interview on 15 December under the title, "Everything in its Own Time."

[Imbrasas] We are accustomed to seeing a nameplate at the entrance to a building. This one symbolically reads: Communist Faction. One can interpret the word "communist" in various ways. What sort of meaning do you attribute to it?

[Stakvilyavichyus] In our times one can find as many slippery words (and unfortunately, people too) as you like, and there is no way of escaping it. Of course many people have no respect for the word "communist," but not everyone. To me, this word is associated with the feeling of collectivism, with an ideal which was never realized, and apparently will not be realized now. But it is dear to me in the sense that I am more a creature of the collective than an individual. For me, collectivism is a very important matter. If one thinks about the people who are, perhaps, downtrodden and persecuted, but who built this building in the name of communism, honestly, and with a lot of effort—it seems that it would not be good to leave them without a name. Therefore, apparently, this name and this title are still needed.

[Imbrasas] It is exceptionally difficult to forecast the future in our time...

[Stakvilyavichyus] Everything depends upon how we live, how we conduct ourselves and to the extent we are flexible. To the extent that we ourselves are flexible and remain on good terms with one another...

[Imbrasas] What sort of advice would you now give on an organizational plane to those who are in doubt, and would like to join the communist faction?

[Stakvilyavichyus] After reregistration, people will have to decide whether they will remain in the Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania [DPTL] or not. We, the initiators of the faction, are also members of the DPTL, and we recognize its Program and Statutes. Therefore, we would like that those who have expressed the desire to remain communists, would not separate themselves too far from the party of A. Brazauskas. It would be worse if some kind of friction or pressure appeared from one side or another. I think that when the DPTL re-registration takes place (apparently before the new year), members of our faction will also re-register at the regional committees of the organization. Those who join the faction will not have to return their present cards for the independent Lithuanian Communist Party—they will be valid. We have plans for specific directions in our activities after registration.

Lithuania's Free Trade Union Future Viewed

91UN0691B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 19 Dec 90 p 5

["Digest of Lithuanian Press": Interview with Free Trade Union Chairman Mariyonas Visakavichyus by POZICIJA Correspondent Vigantas Shvoba]

[Text] "My tongue is sore. Sore from all the talk about the crisis of Lithuania's Free Trade Unions. We are

amazed! We have made a start, but cannot yet see half the work! It has come to pass! The congress has feverishly carried out a revolution in the Palace of Trade Union Councils. Many titles have been changed. They have begun to replace the leaders too." This statement in Issue No. 45 of the weekly, POZICIJA, accompanied what was one of many interviews with Marijonas Visakavichyus in the role of the new chairman of the Conference of Free Trade Unions of Lithuania, by journalist Vigantas Shvoba. The title of the interview promised a great deal: "We Shall Cooperate." Here are several excerpts from the interview:

[Shvoba] ...A worker from the Ionavskiy Production Association "Azotas" to such a post! It would seem that many will be stunned by this metamorphosis. Are you following K. Uoki's path?

[Visakavichyus] Everyone has his own path. I was offered this post already last winter, and in the spring I categorically turned it down. I could not see any promise for the trade unions. On the other hand, I was firmly convinced that there are many people who could carry out this work much better than I.

[Shvoba] And nevertheless, one is curious, why did you decide, and who "persuaded" you to take the wheel of the trade unions into your hands?

[Visakavichyus] The situation is critical! The trade unions could not find a common language with the Supreme Soviet and the government. And my mission, I think, is precisely to find this common language. Why me? Well, perhaps after receiving the mandate of the Deputy of the USSR I have gained a certain amount of experience. I know the mood of the "common people." It is true that the trade unions should be the opposition; but they must also be mediators. In the dramatic situation of today, we should probably be thinking less about strike funds and should be more concerned that there will not be any strikes. Strikes at the present time would be fatal!

[Shvoba] It goes without saying, it would be better if the trade unions would spend less time at the barricades. But, esteemed chairman, with the present structure of this organization, is constructive action possible?

[Visakavichyus] It seems that we have gotten rid of the state muzzle on trade unions. But then to radically change, to destroy the industrial branch structure, for example, is not easy; and it may not be wise. Everything in its own time. In the future, I think that the Confederation Council will be only a coordinating center, and will not be imposing its own will on anyone. We have already made a beginning! Just do not say that someone is hindering the farmers or the journalists from resolving their affairs. On the other hand, cooperation and intercommunication are needed. It is fine, that regional trade union groups are being set up in the rayons. After all, it is strange—that there are several enterprises in one city, but the trade union leaders do not even know one

another! Thus, perhaps there will be a kind of counterweight to self-management, which, one must admit, sometimes tends to be willful also.

[Shvoba] It seems that you, the Honorable M. Visakavichyus, will have to sign a "collective agreement" on cooperation with the Supreme Soviet, with the government. What sort of points must be written in first?

[Visakavichyus] Being caught unawares, I do not want to cast promises about. In general, I shall try not to use such words as, "struggle," or "defend." A lot has been said already: we have talked ourselves out. A person's best shield is—the Law. Well, since we do not yet have a law, there will be quite a few points in the "collective agreement." But we must thoroughly analyze everything, and prepare a program. Right now I do not want to single out any social groups and make empty statements, that we shall strive, we shall devote attention... The students, the lathe operators—everyone has his problems. Trade unions, I am convinced, must be a friendly advisor when laws are being drawn up, and when decisions are being taken, both in the Supreme Soviet and in the Council of Ministers. The people's social situation; price indexing—there are lots of problems, and we must delve deeply into all of them.

Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party's Communist Fraction Role Viewed

*91UN0691C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
19 Dec 90 p 5*

[“Digest of Lithuanian Press”: Interview with Lyaonas Yankauskas by PERMAINOS Correspondent Yurgis Paskochanas]

[Text] Yet another opinion with respect to Lithuania's future—this is how one might characterize the interview with Lyaonas Yankauskas, general director of the "Banga" Lithuanian Television Technical Production Association, by PERMAINOS Correspondent Yuris Paskochinas. It was printed in Issue No. 35 of the weekly, PERMAINOS, under the headline: "Cozy Seats and Lithuanian Diplomacy." We would like to bring a few fragments of this interview to the attention of Digest readers:

[Paskochinas] Today many people have no faith, and are accusing many people for the poor situation which has come to pass. Quite often they bring up the manufacturers. Perhaps you are doing something badly. Do you admit this?

[Yankauskas] Who are the manufacturers today? Who is doing the creating and producing? No one. So several dozen Sajudists from Kaunas get together and wrack their brains, trying to cobble together a program on how to get rid of enterprise directors.

[Paskochinas] Is it possible that the leaders are doing a poor job, are abusing their official positions, and are

putting monkey wrenches into the gears of independence? Then everything is clear. It remains only to approve and support such a program. But perhaps it is another problem, which the workers at the enterprises are talking about too: that the new "operators" are only looking for a cozy spot for themselves, their relatives and their friends.

[Yankauskas] Perhaps after this interview I will be placed on the "blacklist"—for who likes frank talk, or needs another opinion? But I am telling you what I think. It seems to me that a significant portion of the people from the authorities in Lithuania do not care very much about what happens to Lithuania. Their concern—is to occupy a cozy spot, and to get a job for their man.

[Paskochinas] If an incompetent person occupies a cozy seat, we will all suffer from this.

[Yankauskas] I think that those rushing off to the feeding trough do not understand that.

[Paskochinas] Then it only remains to call this an adventure.

[Yankauskas] You could say that. But where is Lithuania? No matter how many eloquent words are spoken—we are for Lithuania. And where is Lithuania right now? All that is left is personal relationships—if you can put the squeeze on somebody, you can get something. This is a tragedy for Lithuania, since the majority are not thinking about her.

[Paskochinas] Would the people of Lithuania, the workers at the enterprises, really lay back their ears and fearfully watch such a situation from the corner?

[Yankauskas] I am afraid that might be the case. Part of the people are apathetic: they do not think about or strive for anything; they just want to withdraw into their shells and live quietly. Part of the people are afraid, and that is why we have such a situation. Take my colleagues, for example—the enterprise directors. Almost all of them understand that bad things are taking place, and that Lithuania is close to a collapse. But who is speaking openly about this? Two or three people. I do not see any prospects if our policies remain as they are right now.

[Paskochinas] But this does not depend upon us alone. I have in mind the Soviet Union and the actions of its leaders with respect to Lithuania.

[Yankauskas] It would be better to look to ourselves. From conversations with the leaders of Western firms I have come to the conclusion that they think we are stupid because of our relationship with the Union. The world is looking at the Soviet Union—how to get raw materials from it, how to sell it their goods, how to do business with the Union. But we are doing the opposite. Foreigners are asking us, why we are running away from (I stress, not "out of" but "from") the Union. After all, that is where the fuel and the raw materials are. They say to me, "Do you hope to get this in Europe? You will get it, but at a much higher price. Therefore, take advantage

of the situation. After all, the Union is going where the whole world is going—raw materials will be sold for foreign exchange [valyuta]. The world will not accept rubles." And lits [Lithuanian money, 1922-40] too: If we were to put them into circulation right now, we would be erecting a cross on the economy of Lithuania.

[Paskochinas] Right now they are encouraging simplified direct ties between the enterprises of Lithuania and enterprises in the Union. But not long ago we ourselves stifled them with limitations on the export of products. Is it possible to restore these ties?

[Yankauskas] We have done ourselves more harm with these limitations than we think. The extended talks about economic ties and trade have tightened the noose. And they have dragged on because for too long we have been spitting on the Kremlin. It is another matter, that there is no diplomat who could tell his partner "No." Our representatives at the talks have stubbornly slammed the doors. We should have left a window through which we might return. How will the world look upon us as future partners? You see, our delegation could say that it withdrew, that it did not slam the door, but withdrew to think. After all we want what is a good result for Lithuania! Here you would not scare anyone...

To our misfortune, from 11 March on we have not had any diplomacy, and we have not left ourselves one single fall-back position, by which we would be able to return to the conference table. To return not as supplicants, but as equal partners.

[Paskochinas] Then what is to be done?

[Yankauskas] In my opinion, the leaders of Lithuania should convene the leaders of the republic's enterprises, who know best where and with whom and how to come to agreement with Union ministries and enterprises on supplies, who have good contacts. But this must not be merely expressing and listening to opinions, from which nothing will change. They should take counsel together and seek a way out. It seems that PERMAINOS advised reading Machiavelli. To read it through and take action. The history of Italy confirms this. Unfortunately, it is not that way with us.

I recall the elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. How many eloquent appeals and promises were heard from the lips of the candidates, and what has been done today? For the majority of the candidates, the main thing was to win the election. And what then?

I believe that God's Judgement will come and everyone will be asked: "What did you do, and how did you save Lithuania?" Will everyone have an answer to this? You cannot fool God. And you see, we could have what we do not have today, plus a tenth part.

Oleynik Comments on Lithuania Events

91UN0728B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
17 Jan 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "On Events in Lithuania: TASS and SELSKAYA ZHIZN Correspondents Report; From Objective Positions"]

[Text] As we know, a delegation of the Federation Council has been in Lithuania. It participated in the work of one of the meetings of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, visited a number of enterprises and scientific institutions, and met with the population. One of these meetings was held in the House of Officers of the Vilnius garrison with the wives of officers and warrant officers. It was not an easy discussion. Many of the people who went up to the podium found it difficult to hold back their tears. And how can they hold them back when elementary civil rights are being shamelessly trampled on in the republic.

"We are living in a totalitarian state," this is how the deputy chairman of the civic committee of the city of Vilnius, Jadwiga Rymarczyk, characterized the current situation in Lithuania.

Many words of indignation were expressed against Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet B. Yeltsin. The speakers asked that he be told that before making any statements he should first think about the Russian people living in the Baltic republics.

After the meeting, the SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent asked B. Oleynik to share his impressions about what he saw in Lithuania.

"If at this time a person were to try to assess the situation from the information on Central Television alone or on the basis of rumors and group statements," said Boris Ilich, "he would be deeply mistaken and could draw hasty conclusions. The situation is beyond serious. What are the ways out of it? It was reported to the USSR president that for the time being we have reached a certain mutual understanding with the Lithuanian legislature. We have reached certain agreements with the army as well. The next level of the discussion should be between the republic government and the USSR president. And we will provide objective information about the events taking place here. We shall provide it from other sources, since the sources in the auditorium are above all emotional. However, I repeat, the situation is more than strained."

RSFSR

RSFSR Draft Constitutions Discussed

91UN0676A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN
in Russian No 1, Jan 91 p 10

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Konyshov: "Two Drafts, Two Policies"]

[Text] A draft Constitution of the Russian Federation prepared by the RSFSR Constitution Commission and

the draft Constitution (Main Law) of the RSFSR prepared by the action group of RSFSR people's deputies "Communists of Russia" were published for discussion (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 24 November 1990). While individual items in these drafts are similar, they reflect different visions of the foundations of the future social and state structure of Russia.

The RF or the RSFSR?

First of all, about the name of the state. Changing it in one draft and preserving the old name in the other are significant in principle. In the draft of the commission, the Russian Federation [RF] is defined as "a sovereign, democratic, and social rule-of-law state" (Article 1.1). In the draft of the group of communists, it is defined as "an all-people's state created by the working people" (Article 1), and it is also stressed that "the RSFSR Constitution affirms a democratic, socialist system." The draft of the Communists combines democratic transformations with adherence to the socialist foundations of society determined by the choice of the people at the inception of the state. For its part, the draft of the commission abandons this continuity. The notions "soviet" and "socialist" are removed from the characterization of our society and the state.

What the Slogans of Pluralism and Equal Rights Conceal

Under the slogan of pluralism and equality of all forms of property, the RF Constitution reduced their entire variety to private property (individual and group) and state property (Article 3.1.3) whereby private property plays the leading role as the foundation of a civic society. The role of state property is reduced to serving the interests of private property, to the function of a social compensator of its costs. The draft of the commission represents denationalization merely as privatization, which is ensured by a special constitutional norm (Article 7.2.1) whereas no norm is envisaged for socializing private property.

While ensuring the plurality and equal rights of forms of property, the draft of the group of Communists openly proclaims the priority of public, primarily people's, property managed by the state and labor collectives as a guarantee of the socialist nature of society (the Preamble, Articles 15 and 16). The entire variety of property forms is recognized: the property of citizens (personal and individual-labor property), collective property, as well as private property (both individual and group) under special regulations (Articles 17, 18, 19), as well as joint property with foreign citizens and organizations (Article 20). Actual progress in ensuring variety in the entire complex of ownership relations on a socialist basis in this draft is noteworthy.

The draft vigorously refutes the notion that excessive centralization and bureaucratization of state property may only be overcome along the lines of privatization.

The participation of labor collectives in both the state management of people's property and the prevalent implementation of people's property in the form of plenipotentiary economic ownership by labor collectives (Articles 16 and 17) is affirmed. Articles guaranteeing the economic freedom of citizens (Article 12), the economic power of the working people (Article 13), and economic justice (Article 14) are new words in the development of democracy.

A Market Economy, but What Kind?

Both drafts proclaim a market economy to be the economic foundation of society. The draft of the commission describes this as "a social market economy" with the prevalence of private property and private entrepreneurship (Articles 1.7, 3.1.8). In the draft of the group of Communists, it is "a market economy with the predominance of public property" (the preamble) and public entrepreneurship.

The market codified in the draft of the commission is a capitalist market of the era of free, small, private entrepreneurship. The emphasis is on privatization, breaking up large-size properties, and the prevalence of the individual form of private property. A primitive, uncontrolled, and small-scale market is being reanimated.

The draft of the group of Communists likewise affirms the rights of individual and group entrepreneurship based on private property within the confines of legal regulation (Article 19). However, it regards as primary the forms of entrepreneurship based on all-people's and collective forms of property as being more in line with the goals of socialism and the needs of a modern, large, organized market.

Finally, the draft of the group of Communists is different in that the economy of the RSFSR is not reduced to a sum of enterprises and individual isolated markets. They are viewed as relatively autonomous subsystems of the joint complex of the national economy and a joint market of both the Russian Federation and the entire Union (Article 22).

Labor and Social Development

The draft of the Constitutional Commission proclaims "free labor and guarantees of social rights" (Article 1.7). Similar provisions are found in the draft of the group of Communists that proclaims "the economic freedom of citizens" (Article 12), "economic" (Article 14) and "social" (Article 23) justice.

However, their interpretations are likewise different. The freedom of labor and social guarantees in the draft of the commission are quite peculiar. The right to work is interpreted merely as an opportunity "to be in control of one's ability to work" (Article 2.5.2). The rights to recreation and to a cap on the duration of the work week, which are found in the current Constitution, are absent. These rights are delegated to special legislation. The right to only free basic education (elementary and incomplete

secondary) is proposed instead of the existing right to all types of free education. Secondary and higher education are merely "encouraged" (Article 2.5.5). Instead of the current, for the most part, free health care for all citizens, there is the mysterious establishment of procedures for the exercise of this right (Article 2.5.6), and instead of the right to a dwelling, there is merely a right to its inviolability (Article 2.3.4).

Therefore, the proclaimed social rights and their guarantees actually eliminate those existing now and switch from a societal and labor basis for social development to a private and capitalist basis.

The draft of the Communists retains all current social rights and envisages a more complete implementation of these rights. Economic freedom is guaranteed primarily by the right of the working people to the means of production and results of labor and participation by citizens and labor collectives in managing enterprises regardless of the form of property. Not only a subsistence minimum for those not working is guaranteed, but also a minimal level of wages for those working (Article 24). The growing well-being and position of a person in society are tied to the results of socially useful labor, rather than an amount of capital. Mass unemployment and exploitation of people by other people are not permissible (Article 14).

A Democracy of the Working People or a Dictatorship of Property Owners?

The predominance of private entrepreneurship in the economy proposed in the commission draft brings about a transfer of power from the working people to private entrepreneurs and property owners. The draft of the commission affirms this transfer; the system of soviets of people's deputies will be eliminated. Instead, a vague parliamentary republic with people's representatives will be established in which some unclear subjects of the Federation in the form of nameless national and regional entities, "federal territories" (Article 4.1.2) and local self-governments with unspecified representative and executive organs of power (Chapter 5.8) will operate as one of the levels. Autonomous units are not even mentioned.

While solicitously affirming "the inalienable natural right to be an owner" (Article 3.1.1), the draft of the commission forgets to assert such a right for labor. While proclaiming "equal rights to access to state service" (Article 2.4.5) and forbidding the operation of political parties in state organs (Article 1.4), the draft lays the foundation for "restrictions on professions."

This system of power with a certain orientation is crowned with the variant of a weak parliament with a strong president (Variant A), which differs from absolute monarchy only in that the term of the president in office is limited. According to the draft, the president is actually the head of legislative and executive power. He forms and heads the government. He nominates the chairman and the members of the Supreme Court, the

Constitutional Court, the general procurator; he is the commander in chief of the armed forces of the country, and so on (Chapter 5.11). This authoritarianism is relaxed but not eliminated in Variant B. Unusual attention to a state of emergency is characteristic: Thirteen articles are devoted to it (Chapter 5.11).

On the contrary, the draft of the group of Communists is aimed primarily at reinforcing and strengthening the power of the workers ("the working people," Article 6). The RSFSR is characterized as "a state of law" (Article 6) in which the soviets of people's deputies are the foundation of the power of the people (Article 5). They are elected by general, equal, and direct vote in territorial, national-territorial, and production districts (Articles 5, 70). The composition of subjects of the federation is determined precisely (republics, autonomous entities—Article 85). It is envisaged that the krais and oblasts of the RSFSR will have equal rights with republics and autonomous units in the financial-economic and sociocultural spheres (Article 85).

Political pluralism, a multiparty system, and equal rights for all political parties and public movements at all enterprises, organizations, and state establishments are ensured. Any activities involving the propagation of social, racial, and national enmity, hatred, and violence are banned (Article 8) rather than individual parties. Strong presidential power is also envisaged, but with a strong parliament and a strong government. It is proposed that the president be elected by the Supreme Soviet (Article 115). However, as we see it, it is hardly expedient to augment the role of the Supreme Soviet in this manner, by depriving the people of an opportunity to elect a president directly.

In the Union or Without It?

The primacy of all-republic laws and the priority of the performance of common federal functions by the federal government are established in the draft of the Constitutional Commission with regard to entities belonging to the Russian Federation whereas, with regard to the Union, the primacy of republic laws is established for some reason. The Russian Federation is seen as not belonging to the Union, and its relations with the Union are actually equated with relations with foreign states. Despite a formal reference to the Union (Article 1.10), monetary, currency, and financial-economic systems independent of the Union are proposed, as well as legislative, executive, judicial, and law-enforcement organs not connected to the Union, its own armed forces, and an independent foreign policy (Article 4.2.2). This runs counter even to international practice where the above functions belong in the jurisdiction of the organs of the entire state (say, in the United States).

The draft is so compiled as if the RF had already left the USSR, is an autonomous, independent state, and the existing USSR Constitution does not apply in it. Only the unclear indications of a transfer of some powers are left for the Union (Article 1.10). This runs counter even

to the Declaration of RSFSR State Sovereignty that was proclaimed within the USSR.

In the draft of the group of Communists, the RSFSR is defined as a sovereign state within the USSR, as part of the unified national-economic complex of the USSR that structures its relations with the Union and belongs to it on the basis of the Union Treaty (Article 22), which has the same citizenship with the USSR (Article 37).

A Referendum Is Necessary

The draft of the Constitutional Commission is built on an eclectic combination of individual provisions of the Constitutions of France, the United States, Italy, Sweden, and other states. They are trying to put this piece of international headgear on the Russian head without taking into account the historical and socioeconomic climate. Under such circumstances, the head—the socioeconomic system—always interferes: They discard it. It is proposed to impose some ideal capitalist system instead. However, apart from the rejection of dismantling socialism by the people, we should also note that all attempts to structure policy on the basis of artificial patterns are doomed to failure.

While taking into account the experience of development in foreign countries, the draft of the group of Communists rests on the firm foundation of the past and the contemporary history of Russia, and searches for ways of future development in renewing and creatively revealing the potential of socialism itself rather than mechanical borrowings. The draft refutes the interpretation of detached proselytizers of capitalism to the effect that there is no alternative to perestroika except for a return to capitalism.

Thus, the drafts of the constitution have clearly set forth two main trends of development. The first one is a return to the capitalist path that was rejected by the people in 1917, the isolation of Russia, and the disintegration of the Union. The other is the renewal of socialism on the path of developing its democratic and humanistic principles, a rebirth of Russia within the framework of a renewed Union. The peoples of Russia are to make a choice between the bourgeois and socialist constitutions. This issue cannot be resolved by the Supreme Soviet or the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies. It may only be resolved by a popular referendum.

Russian Peasants' Party Issues Appeal

91UN0266A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 38, Sep 90 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Proclamation of the Peasants' Party of Russia"]

[Text] September 4, 1990. The Constituent Assembly of the Peasants' Party of Russia.

Fellow citizens!

The country is on the threshold of famine. In the year of an unprecedented, extremely bountiful harvest, the stores in the cities are empty. Our own grain rots by the millions of tons, while we buy the grain of others for gold. This is not a matter of the stupidity of some minister, but rather, the last gasp of the system and retribution for the decades of outrage and violence against the people of the land and against the land itself. As a result of the monstrous social experiment, the Russian countryside is approaching the 21st Century ruined, depopulated and impoverished. The importing of foodstuffs—this is the lifesaver of the Agrogulag [agricultural labor camp system]. No one can feed Russia except its peasants. Enough of saving the kolkhozes—we need to save the people!

At this grim and crucial time, Russia's peasantry announces its return to the political arena and its firm resolve to defend, on its own, by parliamentary means, its own political and economic interests. Therefore, the Peasants' Party of Russia is herewith established.

We are the party for the elimination of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz monopoly in agriculture, the return of the land to the peasants and the full emancipation of the landholders. We are the party for land reform and diversity in the forms of land ownership, with priority given to private ownership of the land and the right to purchase or sell it. We are for equality of economic conditions for all ways of life and honest competition between the state and private sectors, where the consumer, and the consumer alone, is the judge.

We are the party for allowing each peasant to leave the kolkhoz and the sovkhoz with a share of the land and the accumulated production assets and this means we are the party for transforming the command-and-administrative agricultural system into a voluntary union of peasant owners.

We are the party for burial of the surplus-appropriation system in any of its manifestations. No one is to be permitted to dispose of the fruits of the peasants' labor—only equitable contractual relations are tolerable. A free market for industrial goods and agricultural products without distribution and limits on funding!

We are the party for the material and spiritual rebirth of the countryside and the party for protection of the peasant's home, placing at the center of attention the peasant family, its needs, concerns, health and well-being and its equality in society. Free labor on free ground is not the goal, but rather, the means to a fitting life for the Russian farmer.

We have a good memory. We remember who actually wrote the Decree on Land and why October triumphed so easily in a peasant country and we remember also the fraudulent seizure of the land from the peasants as the property of the ruling apparatus; the people will not forget the genocide of the dispossession of the kulaks and of collectivization. A person incapable of learning lessons from the past is doomed to suffer in the future as

well. And, at the same time, the Peasants' Party is open to cooperation with all who are striving for parity in relations between industry and the rural areas, who call for the stopping of nationally dangerous donorship and who are for returning to the countryside what has been stolen and healing the ailing arable land. We declare our direct and active support of the course of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in land reform and will assist the conversion of words into deeds and of good laws into grain and money.

Our party will not be divided into farmer and kolkhoz worker, sovkhoz agronomist and independent peasant, cooperative worker and Rostselmash [Rostov agricultural machinery plant] worker. Ploughman, smith and miller have always worked together closely. Our task is to raise Russia's agricultural production to that world-class level about which the martyrs of the Agrogulag, Vavilov, Chayanov, Tulaykov and millions of others with them, dreamed. Our generation of Russia's people will yet see surplus Russian grain on the markets of this rich planet.

We appeal to those who have left the kolkhozes: peasants and first-generation city dwellers, support the Peasants' Party of Russia in its hour of need! Join our ranks and help the deserted Mother Countryside with sympathy, deeds and rubles! If the people now have a matter which would be the most conciliatory and unifying of all, it is the restoration of the countryside.

In joining in the political affairs of the country, the Peasants' Party of Russia is taking upon itself the burden of responsibility for the future of the people and is prepared to strive for power by legal means. The doors to our party house are open to all. We call on you to join the Peasants' Party of Russia!

For democracy, humanism and for the rebirth of the Russian countryside! For free labor on free ground!

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Difficulties of Reform on Local Level Viewed

91UN0556A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 20 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by Nikolay Andreyev: "Our Dear Soviet Power: Scenes From Life in the Camp of the Victorious Democrats"]

[Text] At a session of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet in Moscow, Deputy Vlasova asked this question: "Has the time not come to release Zaslavskiy from his duties as soviet chairman?"

A day later Zaslavskiy issued a leaflet containing an appeal to the inhabitants of the rayon. In particular, it stated the following: "...We have no time for hesitation and indecision. Every empty day and hour that is lost is fraught with serious consequences..."

"And it is even more impermissible that the third session of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon, which started its work almost a month ago, is now on the brink of total collapse.

"The reasons include lack of a quorum at meetings of the session because of lack of discipline on the part of a number of people's deputies, and deliberate sabotage of the work of the session by another section of the corps of deputies.

"...Because of the imperfections in the existing regulations, some deputies have succeeded in dragging out the session in endless procedural and regulatory discussions that up to now have prevented us from adopting even one single decision of vital importance to the rayon.

"... Without strong power neither the state nor the rayon can exist... A sense of responsibility, reality, and competence—this is what your deputies lack.

"... Only you are capable of recalling the deputies who are hampering adoption of the necessary decisions at this very complicated time in our history."

It is difficult to write this story. I do not have the strength to investigate in a composed manner the collapse of ideas with which I have such sympathy. Moreover, one constantly feels some kind of inner discomfort, because one is laying bare matters and faults of a not very attractive nature, and they are being done by people who are numbered among the democrats.

"These will be 100 days that will shake Oktyabrskiy Rayon," I. Zaslavskiy promised as soon as he was elected rayon soviet chairman. One publication claimed that "his desire to illustrate in practical matters what he has been fighting for in the congresses of the USSR people's deputies has been more than fulfilled—an Augean stable not cleaned out for seven decades requires of Zaslavskiy's team all their effort, mental and physical."

At that time they had great hopes. The overwhelming majority in the rayon soviet was made up of representatives of the "Democratic Russia" bloc. I. Zaslavskiy himself is an appreciable figure in political life. He has defended democratic principles in the social order without stinting himself. He stood with Sakharov at meetings. He is an active figure in the interregional group of deputies. In short, it seemed to many people that Oktyabrskiy Rayon would become a proving ground for the achievements of the democratic form of government. An idyllic, ennobled air reigned over those hopes. Zaslavskiy had everything: the attractive idea of reform, a reliable team, the support of public opinion. So be creative!

And now 200 days of that creativity have passed. There really have been upheavals in the rayon soviet, but upheavals of quite a different kind. Dissent and demarcation—a natural factor in politics. One of the leaders of the Polish Solidarity movement, Adam Michnik, said the following on this score: "After the common struggle against earlier power structures, there follows ineluctably

a struggle for power within the camp of the victors." It did not take the democrats from Oktyabrskiy Rayon long to confirm this conclusion.

In Zaslavskiy's leaflet, what startled me most of all, even made me indignant, was the expression "deliberate sabotage." How well this is known in our Soviet history! And it is also known that it appeared in the bright light of day as soon as leaders started to explain why promised successes and gains had not been made. Sabotage! Everything can be written off to this. And if, moreover, it is "deliberate" then it is possible to declare merciless war against "enemies of the people."

And Zaslavskiy needed an argument that had already been tested. And the bitter sarcasm of history: He accused his own devoted comrades-in-arms of the sin of sabotage. For almost every one of the deputies with whom I spoke invariably attested to me with this acknowledgment: "I went into the soviet under Zaslavskiy." At one session, Deputy Sidorov expressed it thus: "I became a deputy because Zaslavskiy asked me. For six months, drop by drop, Ilya Iosifovich destroyed my faith in him, and from an ardent supporter I have become a vehement opponent."

Naturally, Zaslavskiy does have justification for his present accusatory position. He believes that the economic transformations that he has undertaken and the rapid march toward the market have clashed with the psychological unpreparedness of some deputies. And second, there has been growing resistance from the structures that want to preserve their power. Zaslavskiy has even said that the corps of deputies in the rayon soviet is 150 strong, and that discussion of even the most elementary question takes an enormous amount of time. This is not acting in an immediate manner. And finally, it costs money. It is Zaslavskiy's opinion that many of the deputies who became members of the soviet under the slogan of democracy, have perceived it, in his words, "from positions of the tongue." That is, the deputies (I quote again) "understand democracy as an opportunity to use their tongues. The tongue has become the idol to which we bow in our times. We can sink to a condition in which the country's national emblem should be a huge tongue licking across empty shelves." Very graphic! Zaslavskiy went on to express the thought that power must be reorganized. Specifically, this would turn out as follows: Within the framework of the soviet a small group would be set up to carry out the economic reform.

This, of course, started a conflict. The deputies decided that Zaslavskiy wanted to replace the soviet with the presidium. The rayon soviet presidium set up an administration for community property that was given the right, for example, to auction off premises, receiving a commission of five percent for doing so. Zaslavskiy believes that it is possible in this way to plug the hole in the rayon budget to the tune of 20 million rubles [R]. The deputies have a different opinion. They believe that the soviet chairman and his presidium have usurped power. The deputies want control over where and how assets are

spent. The deputies want to know what use companies based on rayon territory are to the rayon, and why members of the executive committee are on their boards.

The chairman of the rayon soviet commission for public health, G. Markov, told me this: "There were great hopes for changes for the better. During the election campaign I made a placard that read 'Those who are drinking our blood fear us.' When we won in the elections, it seemed that we would really organize life. But something strange happened. The presidium grew along with the executive committee. What was most terrible for me was that a person who stood by Sakharov's side is making it so that we have returned to the past procedures, but in caricature form."

Deputy A. Vlasova worked as an aide to I. Zaslavskiy and so is sure that she can catch his meaning just from a hint. This is her view on the nature of the conflict: "A democrat who comes to power is one person. When he attains power he becomes someone else. When he came here Zaslavskiy made use of democratic instruments—glasnost, collegiality, meetings. But now he is inclined toward authoritarian methods. He finds the corps of deputies burdensome. So he has worked out his pattern: to disperse us. He would like everything to be resolved by a narrow circle."

There are other opinions among the deputies. Deputy V. Ginzburg believes that "the forces that oppose democracy have regrouped and moved onto the offensive. And it is a war not for life, but to the death. And if we suffer defeat it will be a defeat not only for the democratic forces in our rayon."

In a way, everyone is right. Everyone is sincerely worried about democracy and justice. And there is total misunderstanding. Confrontation.

"How HORRIBLE!" explained the stenographer who recorded the course of the dual of words at the third session of the rayon soviet. She was horrified not by the harsh exchanges. The tone of the discussions was intelligent, and the way that one deputy addressed another was exquisitely polite. For example, Deputy Yu. Marenich exclaimed that "this is an elementary apparatus trick, esteemed Ilya Iosifovich!..." Chairman Zaslavskiy said: "Esteemed Yuriy Iosifovich, I would ask you to stop using the terms 'apparatus game' and 'apparatus trick' as applied to me." But there was also frustration. In my presence, for some reason, one deputy reacted sharply to a quite neutral statement: "And for those words, esteemed deputy, I could give you a punch in the mouth."

The stenographer's horror stems more from the vague and sometimes pointless exchanges that the deputies have. The session meeting also left me with a depressing impression. Instinct, whim, insult, and random circumstances have determined the development of action. They started with one thing and jumped to another, and then some tried to analyze the reasons for the resignation of the executive committee deputy chairman. And while

they were dealing with that, there was suddenly a need to set up an ethics commission, and they started to debate why it was necessary and who should be on it. From all this the impression was created that some kind of pathetic inability was being concentrated and gathered, and that no thoughts were being exchanged. It is not happenstance that Zaslavskiy exclaimed: "Ten days, and you have grasped nothing."

It must be said that Chairman Zaslavskiy tried heroically to impart to the session at least some creative features. It was useless! Nor could his mode of behavior—an inscrutable combination of gentleness and firmness—save it.

The horror was also the result of the fact that, in general, the abundance of correct words and sensible proposals led nowhere. Several hours of work, but the result was zero. The simplest matter could generate a wave of arguments, opinions, and resolutions. Surely there is no need to spend R2,000 every day to maintain this kind of debating club. And how many similar clubs are there throughout the country? In past days you could not tune into a television program showing everywhere a deputy at a microphone. As Aleksandr Isayevich wisely said long before perestroyka, in his novel "The First Circle," "... Is it really possible to give people real democracy? I have observed that in any room on even the most trivial of questions—the washing of bowls or the sweeping of a floor—there is an eruption of all shades of opposing opinions." And if a person is not in the room, his gift of oratory flowers in a simple but powerful way.

"How horrible!" The stenographer repeated it. This time it was to describe another scene. A disabled person with no legs wheeled himself into the hall on a platform with little wheels, grabbed a microphone, and started to shout: "I did agitation work for Zaslavskiy... We disabled people voted for him.... But he.... He... Zaslavskiy has taken away our premises, the disabled... In the presidium they have forgotten that we exist. The vegetable base, thank you, used to bring us potatoes and onions and cabbage..." The invalid shouted and shouted. Zaslavskiy looked impassively at the unplanned orator. And the deputies just wandered off—they had just gone into recess.

Events in Oktyabrskiy Rayon cannot be regarded in isolation from the sociopolitical processes in the country. The authorities at all levels are simply falling to pieces. They are falling to pieces because, apart from an excess of words there is no other way in which they can assert themselves. As a result, irritation is building up in society. There is no lack of proposals to disband, dissolve, eliminate, and replace particular organs of power. Such calls come from the right and left, from below and above, and break into the very heart of the power structures themselves.

USSR People's Deputy V. Alksins, who holds military rank, is proposing a drastic program: The USSR Congress of People's Deputies should dissolve itself and all power should be given to a committee of national

salvation. The colonel does not specify who should be on that committee, but he has decisively rejected two candidates—Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

A passionate appeal to change the system existing in the country was heard at a joint plenum of the Russian CP Central Committee and Central Control Commission. It is contained in a plenum resolution that calls on Communists "...to take control of production and distribution, and law and order." This motif appeared unambiguously in the report of the leader of the Russian Communists, Comrade Polozkov: "...At the local level, the idea of setting up public committees of salvation and the defense of socialism is growing.... It would be a good thing if the party committees were the sponsors in this matter." The way in which "this matter" should be handled was concertized in the statements made at the plenum: "Start setting up workers' committees in all the labor collectives as the primary cells of soviet power, and on this basis create workers' soviets at all levels" and "The workers must take control of and safeguard plants and factories, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, institutes and VUZ's [higher educational institutions], transport, and cultural, public health, and educational establishments."

And why is it that these fundamental proposals have been aired? Why Comrade Polozkov has repeatedly promised "to act, act, act."

The activity of many soviets in the country sometimes produces a painful impression. Sometimes they simply lose touch with reality. Everyone thinks that he and only he is the authority, while all the rest are appendages of him. For example, the Krasnopresenskiy Rayon Soviet notified the Supreme Soviet of Russia that it was high time to think about the conditions under which it was leaving the building that it occupied. One of the rayon soviets in Leningrad proclaimed that it owned Nevskiy Prospekt. And here, the Leninskiy Rayon Soviet in the capital asserted a claim to the Almaznyy Fond, which is located on its territory. The position of the authorities today is clearly abnormal. Society is going who knows where, ultimately risking knocking itself in the head. Of late, there has been a very persistent note in the debate on power: Will there be a military coup? In my opinion, this is empty talk. Only that which possesses at least some weight can be turned. And with us, power is a weightless concept. Yes, it has simply been discarded. Some are engaged in explaining relations, while others have transformed power into petty reformism, into a vanity, into loud words, threatening ukases, and ritual incantations. Meanwhile, society has been broken down into opposing groups, and there is no understanding, no unity. And there is, I repeat, no power.

Nevertheless, the soviets that do exist are our last hope. We may dissolve them and disperse them, but we have not mastered new choices. I think that the people will simply not go to the polling stations. At the latest additional elections in Leningrad an average of 21 percent of the voters turned out. The explanation for this is that people have grown tired of elections. Well, this is

not such a hard task: take a voting paper, mark your choice of candidate, put the voting paper into a ballot box. The voter looks at it differently: He cannot give one candidate preference over another; they are all the same; none will make any difference in his life.

The power structure must be changed. A legislature made up of numerous people—the rayon, settlement, city, and oblast legislatures—leads to impasse. There is no such legislature anywhere in the world. Legislative vigils that last for days are simply a waste of time and money and nerves and physical energy. These also do not exist anywhere in the world. It is impossible to live in a country where everyone wants to be a politician and no one wants to work.

And where in the world will you find such deformed power formations—the soviet and its presidium and executive committee? As a result, you cannot understand, strictly speaking, who is wielding the power and who is responsible for what. And who can permit the expensive amusement of having an apparatus, as well as an executive committee? In Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet they spend R7,150 each month, and it is planned to increase this to R16,130. And that is just the wages. Spending costs for the sessions, for premises, for vehicles, for computers are all special items. We see this kind of "living high on the hog" in the soviets everywhere, from Moscow to the most distant outlying district.

I. Zaslavskiy's appeal is not only a gesture of despair. It is also an act of capitulation. The soviet chairman has registered his own inability to manage the rayon. For he has been unable to convince 150 people of the correctness of his ideas and the correctness of his actions. So how can he suppose that he will manage to convince hundreds of thousands? It is not realistic. The more so since on his own admission essentially he has succeeded in doing nothing. An enthusiast could clean out the Augean stables at a stroke. But to build a comfortable life for many, many people requires heroism of another kind. First and foremost, a hard work slog every day.

The revolution in the rayon has not taken place because "some deputies are preventing us." And not because many decisions of the rayon soviet presidium smack of hare-brained schemes and smug complacency. (I cannot resist giving an example. A decision was reached to tear down an enormous 12-storied building on Gagarin Square in order to "improve the social infrastructure up to the level of international standards." The approximate cost was \$2 billion. Understandably, those wanting to do this are still looking to find the money somewhere. But the strange thing is that in the rayon 40 percent of the population lives several families to an apartment, and here we have another comfortable residential building earmarked for demolition).

It is often possible to hear the assertion that we—our society—are not ready for democracy. This is not quite the case. How is it possible to talk in general about readiness or lack of readiness for something that in

reality has not been seen? If we do not know exactly what it is? For us, democracy is the same as avocado—it is a fruit as exotic and as abstract as it is alluring. The tragedy for the democrats is that they have tried to blend and install democratic methods and forms of management in the command administrative system that still exists. Nothing unusual has happened to Zaslavskiy. No matter what the viewpoint he may hold—liberal, democratic, Bolshevik, monarchist—any person who finds himself in a system that has been in place for decades, inevitably acts an administrator—rigid and unbending. Even if that person has fine impulses and good intentions. But, when he is in the system, even if he stands on only a very low rung in the hierarchy, sooner or later he begins to act in accordance with its game rules. He already needs a narrow circle. He demands that his instructions be executed unquestioningly. He knows what is good for people and what is harmful, and God forbid he would have to learn it again. During the session, the rayon council of veterans decided to engage in active protest. In order to “forestall probable acts of hooliganism” the rayon soviet presidium recruited the “Aleks” private security agency. But surely, other, democratic methods could have been found to deal in a dignified way with the veterans’ action.

We can guess how people who have been supplanted from power have exulted over all the above. “Well, you have come to grief with this democracy, have you not? Are you convinced now of the abyss into which the democrats are leading you?” (Naturally, all words beginning with “demo” are used within quotation marks). What can we say to this? So exult. Only do not think that it is holiday time on the street.

This is from times past, when you wielded power and 40 percent of us were living in shared apartments. It is from the past that we have the shortages, the hunger, “economical economics.” It is from the past that we have built the kind of economic machine that operates only by force and fear, and have now been left with something that is neither one thing nor the other.

Other foundations for life are needed. And new power structures.

For me, the failure of the democrats is a personal failure. I would like to look into the causes of this, understand the sources. I think that the democrats themselves did not expect that just by coming to power in some of the soviets that they would show themselves in such an unconvincing light. After the cheerful moods and the bright hopes it is time for bitter disappointment. The hopes have not been realized and the procession of the reform has come to a halt. The cheerful mood has been transformed into a mood of gloom and irony, and is becoming one of despair and extreme bitterness.

How does the democratic politician differ from the democratic dilettante? The politician foresees everything—the old system, the cruel opposition, the inexperienced aides, and the dismantling and disorder in the

country... So if you are a politician you should foresee and make provision for all of this. You come to power, and the responsibility is all yours. Even responsibility for what you and those beside you have not stood. And you cannot justify yourself for anything: things turned out wrong, people interfered, and in general the system is rotten. These are the explanations of the dilettante, the political amateur. You have come to power, so exercise that power. If things go wrong, you go back into the opposition.

It is very complicated to write about all this. And the unfortunate thing is that any word of criticism against the democrats and the public that sympathizes with them is regarded as persecution. But we must talk about this. We must have a clear idea of the processes taking place in society. And of the people who have been called upon to set them to rights.

Western Republics

Agrarian Reform in Moldava Examined

91UN0679A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 5 Dec 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by A. Golya for MOLDOVA-PRESS: “To Conduct Reforms With Regard for the Opinion and Interests of the People”]

[Text] The residents of the villages of Dondushenskiy Rayon met Mircha Ion Snegur, president of the Moldovan SSR and people’s deputy, in accordance with the good old tradition of bread, salt, and live flowers. This was the site of his meeting with the voters of the 703d Sorokskiy territorial electoral district.

During a conversation with the teacher’s collective of the village of Liveden, the president of the republic talked about the legislative activities of the parliaments of the USSR and the Moldovan SSR and about his work in the country’s Council of the Federation. He noted that these days the attention of the republic’s leadership is always focused on problems of the social development of the village, ways to conduct effective agrarian, administrative, and territorial reforms, and the provision of a painless transition to a market economy.

However, this does not mean that problems of the development of culture, art, science, and education are ignored. All tasks must be resolved together. One of the main roles in the difficult process of national restoration and the creation of a civilized state is played by the schools. After all, today’s teachers have to complete an important task—they have to lay the foundation for the training of highly qualified specialists who answer the requirements of the future. Today’s schoolchildren will become managers, programmers, and businessmen and, taking that into account, the teachers need to orient the children toward choosing a career.

Agreeing with this, Olga Kukosh, director of the Liveden village school, said that the teachers are aware of the tasks in front of them. In the school, where 560 school-children study, all problems are resolved with the aid of the local organs of power. However, there are unresolved questions today which go beyond the framework of the local authorities and demand aid from the ministries and the republic's leadership. These include providing new textbooks and materials which respond to contemporary demands, retraining personnel, and, of course, improving the material position of the teachers and the rural intelligentsia who, during the transition to a market, may find themselves in a far from favorable position.

"We are pursuing these problems," said the president. "A Supreme Soviet standing commission on science and education, headed by Professor Petr Soltan, is working hard to solve them, and there are already some results. As for the material position of teachers, an increase in their wages in particular has been stipulated. The administration of the republic is already preparing the appropriate documents." The president also supported the wish of the teachers to change the name of the village of Liveden back to its historical name of Myndyk.

The social problems of the village were a main theme of discussions at a meeting between the president and machine operators of the local kolkhoz Biriuntsa. In the course of a stimulating conversation with his voters, the president stressed that next year the village will be allotted 35 percent more capital investment than in preceding years. This means that significantly more attention will be paid to the construction of roads, consumer and public health facilities, and a program of gasification. All of this will be closely intertwined with the implementation of administrative, territorial, and agrarian reform. But in this instance no one is preparing to move hastily. On the contrary, these reforms, so important for the republic, will only be carried out with regard for the opinions and interests of the people. In conjunction with this, it is also necessary to find effective ways of allotting maximum authority to the local organs of power and conducting privatization, proceeding from principles of social justice.

Expressing their own point of view on these problems, the machine operators stressed that their kolkhoz, headed by Georgiy Kuku, has an annual profit of two million rubles [R], the people work well together, and they wish to continue working together on that farm.

"Agrarian reform should take into account the interests of all sectors of the population, and first and foremost those who till the earth and not just speak ringing phrases about it," emphasized the meeting's participants. "We believe that there is no return and that we must develop new forms, whether that is leaseholding, contracting, or something else. If someone wishes to have more land, that person, of course, should not be hindered. But there are few such people inasmuch as the youth, unfortunately, have been raised differently and

the elderly do not have the strength. Therefore it is advisable to develop collective forms of labor on the land and interest people in teaching the youth and ensuring continuity. Then the mother earth will not be abandoned and we will feed ourselves and the republic."

The village's workers expressed confusion over the fact that the pace of production, so far as they are aware, is hardly falling, but the shelves of the stores are emptying rapidly. Noting that the republic's leadership is also concerned by this problem, the president stressed that some decline in the volume of production is nonetheless occurring in the republic. Another problem is panic buying caused by the most incredible rumors. However, the main reason, believes M.I. Snegur, is sabotage organized by those who deal on the shadow economy, the misdirection, hiding, and unfair distribution of goods, and the actions of some mafia circles in the economy and trade.

The residents of Dondushenskiy Rayon supported the president, citing the following example. The rayon department store was closed the previous evening: The economic police found goods worth about R100,000 hidden away there.

"All this is done with premeditation in order to give rise to dissatisfaction among the population and stir people up against the government and the parliament of the republic," stressed Ion Moraru, chairman of the rayon department of the NFM [Moldovan People's Front], who took a direct part in uncovering the thieving trade employees. Along with the other participants in the meeting, he supported the president's position that to fight such elements more effectively there is a need to establish state control, ratify Gorbachev's presidential edict on the institution of worker control, and adopt other supplementary measures to ensure social protections for the people.

They also called upon parliament to apply the law more strictly with regard to those who by their destructive actions try to dismember the republic and aspire to the creation of new territorial formations in Moldova in an unconstitutional fashion. The contempt of these forces not only for the parliament of the republic but even for USSR President M.S. Gorbachev proves that there is no sense in offering any compromises and concessions to people who do not wish to resolve problems using parliamentary methods and who continue to carry out their separatist plots.

This subject found its logical continuation in the conversation of the republic's president with the residents of the village of Maramonovka. Far more people showed up to take part in the meeting than could be lodged in the meeting hall of the executive committee of the rural soviet. As a result, the meeting was continued later in the Culture House. The villagers who took part stressed that the majority of them are Ukrainians, that people of 11 nationalities live in the village, and that they have always found a common language among them and therefore

condemn those who are pushing the republic into the abyss of interethnic enmity and destabilizing the situation with their hasty actions.

"We need peace and calm. People should always remain people," said the residents of Maramonovka. "We must not become bitter because of consumer disorders. We must respect one another—independent of nationality, party membership, or any other differences."

The president expressed his support for such a position. He talked about the Society of Ukrainian Culture formed recently in Kishinev—its supporters are guided by common sense and constructivism.

Discussing the separatist mood of the leaders of the Left Bank region, the residents of Maramonovka expressed fears in regard to the rumors circulating about the possible unification of Moldova with Romania.

"Time and time again we have officially and privately refuted these groundless rumors, which benefit the destructive forces," answered Mircha Snegur. "And this means that, being sober politicians, we should be guided by the Helsinki accords and other documents concerning the inviolability of borders existing in Europe and, finally, by the Paris Charter signed recently. Unification with any state also contradicts the Declaration on Sovereignty adopted by the parliament of the republic."

The president also stressed that signing a new Union treaty or a treaty of a community of sovereign states is not the simple matter that it seems to some. The draft that was published recently infringes upon the sovereignty of the republic in many ways and is in need of substantial revision and improvement. But even in this important issue a final decision can only be made after a detailed national discussion of the draft with regard for all opinions and interests. One such form of free expression of the people's will could be a referendum on the question, which could be conducted after parliament adopts the law "On a Referendum." As for the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet and the presidential council, they see this document as a treaty of a community of sovereign states based on interstate economic and other horizontal ties. One example cited was that of an agreement concluded with Russia. It was noted that preparations are being made to sign similar documents with the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the Baltic republics. Such cooperation is already achieving results: The republic has succeeded in resolving the problem of a shortage of food grain, and there have been other real benefits from this kind of direct cooperation.

The results of the meetings and conversations that took place in the course of the day were summed up to some degree at the Culture House in the village of Tsaul. The meeting was attended by residents of the various population centers of Dondushenskiy Rayon. In their speeches they raised numerous urgent problems on both a republic and local scale. There was discussion of the construction of housing and improvement of labor conditions, the need to increase wages during the transition

to a market economy, reduction of the bureaucratic administrative and managerial apparatus, the shortage of teachers of the state language, and ecological and other problems.

In his concluding speech the president of Moldova gave exhaustive answers to all the questions raised that day and explained the position of the parliament on each of them as well as his personal point of view on the solution of specific problems. He noted that the deputies of the Supreme Soviet will have to adopt a package of documents on the transition to a market in the very near future. The problems of the individual regions will also be resolved and the state programs that had been mentioned will be implemented. However the local organs of power should also have full say in this: They should show maximum initiative, actively adopt rulings, and not be afraid to assume responsibility.

In a short exclusive interview for the national radio and the MOLDOVA-PRESS Agency, the president of the Moldovan SSR said in particular:

"I am once more convinced of the usefulness of such meetings. People are alarmed by the sociopolitical situation arising in the republic. It should not be said that there is a great difference between the opinions of residents of Moldovan villages and, for instance, Russians and Ukrainians. They all wish to live in peace and harmony and they understand the situation.

"Although in Maramonovka, for example, there were a few more questions raised than elsewhere. For instance, cases of an impolite attitude toward people at the rayon polyclinic, in particular, were raised. I am ashamed for these medical employees—their attitude toward people deserves condemnation. I think that someone should be brought to account for such violations to the degree that great discrepancies exist between the word and the deed and between the law and the way it is put into practice. We must respect the rights of all people. After all, it is a question of the permanent residents of these localities, and the people have always lived in friendship here. I believe that we will resolve these problems, and therefore I wish all to continue living just as amiably as before, to attend weddings together, to go to each other's churches, and to mark other events as a single family.

"On the whole this grand conversation with the voters gave food for thought and prompted many new ideas. The meetings showed that there are also some discrepancies in the opinions of the people and the members of the parliament. It is possible to delay the adoption of some legislative acts and to speed up others. This especially pertains to laws that have substantial influence on the economy of the country and the implementation of effective control over the distribution of goods for our own consumption.

"But on the whole, people approve of the work of the parliament; more of their wishes pertain to administration in any case: Issues of public health, education, construction, and many other things. Attention should

be paid to that. Such meetings should become a compass for the activities of deputies of all levels."

Two Ukrainian Opposition Figures View Union Treaty

91P50060A Moscow TRUD in Russian 7 Dec 90 p 1

[Unattributed article entitled "The Ukrainian Parliament: Two Points Of View"]

[Text] Discussion of the published draft of the Union Treaty was not included in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet agenda. Why did this come about?

H. Altunyan, people's deputy of the Ukrainian SSR and member of the People's Council (an opposition group in the republic parliament) believes that it is too early to discuss the draft and even more to rush to sign the treaty. We still do not know what kind of Ukraine there will be, its laws are still being drawn up. The conditions for its consideration will appear later when the whole package of laws on the governmental-political and economic structure of the republic have been adopted, when the principles of its interrelation with other republics will be clear. And also when, in accord with decree of the Supreme Soviet following the students' hunger strike, a [new] Ukrainian SSR constitution has been adopted.

A no less important cause lies in the present pressure of the center. Lately the law on taxation of the Ukrainian SSR is being debated. However, we can not adopt unambiguous decisions, the presidential decree assigning 40 percent of the profit from joint enterprises to the budget hangs over us like the sword of Damocles. We consider this decree to be poorly thought out, to say the least. In the future he envisions the the draft union treaty as the same kind of dictate of the center. For that very reason it does not enjoy any support in the Ukrainian parliament.

In the opinion of V. Grinev, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the proposed draft treaty would not have evoked any opposition three or four years ago. But now the parliamentary majority and the opposition agree: such a variant of the treaty is senseless. Too many events occurred after this time. The most important ones are the declarations of sovereignty by the republics. If the present variant has been revised, then the revisions are not of a cardinal nature. In essence, it proposes a strengthening of the existing union structures. But its conception of federation does not answer the needs of the present day.

I believe the movement towards a union treaty must start from the basis that is being created today by intergovernment and interstate agreements of the republics. When a "lattice" of direct connections between them appears and it becomes clear that it is necessary to go beyond the bounds of the possibilities of the countries that are concluding agreements, then a reason will appear to talk about the delegation of perogatives to the

center. To act otherwise would mean to not take into consideration the republics with declarations of sovereignty.

It is true that I am not a supporter of the logic of the representatives of the opposition: first, they say, adopt the constitution of the republic, only then let us turn to the Union Treaty. Both one and the other, I believe, should be discussed simultaneously.

Caucasus

Georgian Aide on CSCE Participation

91UF0296A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
1 Dec 90 p 3

[Interview with Tedo Paataashvili, chairman of the Commission on Foreign Relations of the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet, by Muradi Alashvili, parliamentary correspondent: "Georgia: The First Step Has Been Taken Toward a Common European Home"]

[Text] As we know, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Paris came to an end on 21 November. Everyone realized that it was taking place at a turning point in European history. The changes in the Soviet Union, the turbulent events in Eastern Europe, and the unification of Germany erased the postwar division of the continent. A more homogeneous and less ideologized Europe is emerging, and the machinery of Europewide interaction is being developed. This was confirmed by USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who told a correspondent from a Moscow newspaper that "it is probably still too early for a full realization of what happened at the Paris CSCE gathering. This will take time. It is already obvious, however, that Europe has climbed to new heights, from which previously unseen expanses and horizons of cooperation by all of its countries and peoples are visible."

The conference in Paris was extremely representative: In addition to delegates from the 34 countries that signed the "Paris Charter for a New Europe," emissaries from countries on the verge of state independence also attended the gathering.

One of them was Chairman Tedo Paataashvili of the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Commission on Foreign Relations.

This is how he began his account:

[Paataashvili] I must say that, until 17 November, no one even thought of inviting representatives of the union republics to the Paris conference, which was supposed to begin on 19 November. The 45 members of a delegation from the Baltic republics were already in Paris and were actively soliciting permission to attend the conference as the guests of some European country....

Because the Western countries did not want to spoil their relations with the USSR at that time, the Baltic representatives were able to win guest status only because the Soviet Government had no categorical objections to this. On 17 November, however, the situation changed radically. Georgia, where the Communists had suffered a crushing defeat in the elections and National Democratic forces had taken charge of the government, probably played an important part. The central government apparently expected us to take unconstructive, reckless, and unrealistic steps, but the speech Akakiy Asatiani presented in Moscow, explaining our position—not a radical deviation, but the declaration of a transition period in Georgia—was of decisive importance in gaining some positive support for our actions. Therefore, the situation changed on 17 November, and the central government decided to invite representatives from all of the “recalcitrant” republics—the Russian Federation, Moldavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Baltic republics—to Paris. We were invited to accompany the main delegation to the French capital. The members of the official delegation included Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Yazov. We refused to accept this status, however, and we were then invited to go as the honored guests of the USSR Embassy in Paris. We accepted this invitation. The representatives from the Baltic republics already had an invitation from the French Government and naturally declined the center’s proposal. This had certain consequences: On the very first day of the gathering in Paris, the Soviet delegation demanded the removal of the Baltic representatives from the auditorium....

[Alashvili] So you arrived in Paris...and then what happened?

[Paatashvili] I arrived in Paris around noon on 19 November, after this incident had occurred, and knew nothing about it then....

Detailed documents, which had been prepared in advance and only had to be signed, were being discussed at the conference. I had to make a choice: I could either make direct contact with the delegations from different countries, make copies of our documents and pass them out to the representatives of the 34 states participating in the CSCE and to French government officials, or turn the documents over to the organizing committee....

I have to say that the Soviet embassy in Paris operates quite efficiently, and the people there gave me a great deal of attention and tried to help me in every way possible.

My conversations with representatives from different countries took place mainly during the intervals between sessions because all of them were busy when the conference was in session. I also spoke with high-ranking officials from Moscow. The talks were profound and promising, mainly due to Moscow’s familiarity with Georgian politics. I had equally frank conversations with French officials when Georgian emigres helped me make

the arrangements for these official meetings and attended them with me. I was able to make copies of our documents and distribute packages of them to all of the delegations....

[Alashvili] Did you have any official meetings in Paris?

[Paatashvili] Of course. I made an appointment with the president of the European Bureau of the French Foreign Ministry, M. Blot, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and we talked for about two hours. The dialogue was extremely productive from the standpoint of the exchange of information about the positions of both sides, and we discussed many topics. He asked me about the status of our territories and autonomous units. At first I said I could not answer the question in a couple of words, but later, when he said he would give me as much time as I needed, I explained the Georgian Republic Government’s position on this matter in detail.

Later, because I was speaking with a Foreign Ministry official, the question of diplomatic relations between Georgia and France came up. This might sound like an excessively lofty ambition because we are not used to thinking in these terms, but we were told that cooperation would be possible even on the level of an exchange of official delegations as long as the leadership of the USSR was not categorically opposed to this, as it had been in the case of the Baltic republics. I expressed the hope that our cooperation would be possible and that we would exchange official delegations....

The establishment of permanent representations in the two countries were the subject of a separate discussion: They will be established mainly for the purpose of developing economic and cultural ties, but will certainly also perform some diplomatic and political functions. The main obstacle, however, will probably be our limited financial capabilities. We cannot afford to maintain a representative agency in Paris yet, although we might find some way out of this difficulty. We are working on this now.

My second official meeting in Paris was with M. Godinot, the prime minister’s chief counsel, whom I had already met last summer when I accompanied a Georgian National Liberation Movement delegation invited to Paris by a Georgian emigre association there. This time we concentrated on possibilities for economic cooperation and discussed some specific projects. It is true that some interest in cooperation had been expressed in the past, before the national forces took over the government in Georgia, but we opposed it then. Now these relations will be much more productive.

[Alashvili] What does the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Commission on Foreign Relations plan to do in the future?

[Paatashvili] The main reason we went to Paris to attend the conference was to inform the leaders of European states and the United States and Canada of the changes

that are taking place in Georgia and of its hopes for the future and to establish direct contact with the democratic Western countries.

I feel that I completed my mission, although there is no question that all of the work in this field still lies ahead. We realize that if we want the Republic of Georgia's interests to be expressed clearly and precisely abroad and if we want to achieve our goals, we must build the necessary structures for this, and this is the job of our parliament's Commission on Foreign Relations. We have already taken some steps in this direction. We sent a document to a Georgian emigre in France, for example, confirming his authority to represent the interests of our government. He and other Georgians will be responsible for establishing the necessary contacts and making the arrangements for official negotiations in the interest of the Georgian Republic. Other candidates are being chosen for the same mission. I must stress, however, that our commission is primarily interested in cooperation with all of the republics on an equal basis and will probably exchange the appropriate representatives with them.

[Alashvili] You stopped in Moscow on the way back....

[Paatashvili] Yes, I did. When I flew into Moscow on 23 November, I learned that the new chairman of our Council of Ministers, T. Sigua, was there, so I stayed an extra day. I wanted to learn how the goodwill of the central government, which we had sensed in Moscow and in Paris, affected the economic negotiations. Our prime minister's two-day stay in Moscow turned out to be extremely productive. Furthermore, there was tangible proof of this. For example, the officials our prime minister spoke with in Moscow said they had little interest in our politics and were more concerned about economic relations with Georgia.

I also went to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I spoke with some people I had met before I left for Paris and was then given an appointment with Eduard Shevardnadze. My conversation with him lasted for about an hour and was constructive and businesslike. This meeting offered further evidence of the goodwill of this agency and of the minister himself toward Georgia. My fairly long conversation with him left me with the impression that we can expect a normal relationship with Moscow officials.

[Alashvili] Tell me, what kind of documents did you distribute at the conference in Paris?

[Paatashvili] I left Tbilisi on 14 November. For this reason, I could only take the documents and materials we had by that time. They were a message from our parliament to the Paris conference, the political platform of the Round Table coalition, an economic plan, and a copy of THE GEORGIAN MESSENGER, an English-language Georgian newspaper. The people at the conference showed a keen interest in our package.

Therefore, the first steps have been taken in the direction of a common European home, which, we hope, will include several republics in the future. A great deal of time-consuming work lies ahead, and while we are doing this work, we will be ready and willing to cooperate with all forces in the West and the East on an equal and mutually beneficial basis....

Georgia Abolishes South Ossetian Autonomy

9IUS0211A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
12 Dec 90 p 1

[Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet decree passed 11 December 1990 in Tbilisi and signed by Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman: "Georgian Republic Law on Abolition of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast"]

[Text] Separatist forces in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast are trying to usurp state power, infringe the Georgian Republic's territorial integrity, and take a historical and inseparable part of Georgia away from it by means of forming a so-called "South Ossetian Soviet Republic," which is manifestly contrary, not only to the Georgian Republic Constitution, but also to the USSR Constitution and the fundamental norms of international law.

Despite higher Georgian Republic government organs' repeated warnings about the self-styled autonomous oblast government's desisting from unlawful actions, elections of a so-called "South Ossetian Soviet Republic" Supreme Soviet were nevertheless held in the oblast on 9 December, which has created a real danger of Georgian Republic territorial integrity's violation.

Noting that the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was formed in 1922 without regard to the will of the native Georgian population living in the region, and to the detriment of the whole of Georgia's interests, which has been borne out repeatedly during the oblast's period of existence, and noting, as well, that the Ossetian people have their own state organization in the Soviet Union on their historical territory—in North Ossetia—and that only a small part of the Ossetian population residing in the Georgian Republic lives within the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast's confines, where Ossetians have, and will have in the future, all cultural autonomy rights, the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet, pursuant to points 3 and 11, article 104, of the Georgian Republic Constitution, decrees:

1. The South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast shall be abolished.

2. The South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast's Soviet of People's Deputies and its executive and administrative organs—the executive committee and the oblast's other state organs—shall be abolished.

3. The All-Georgia Central Executive Committee and Georgian Soviet of People's Commissars Decree No. 2 of 20 April 1922: "On Organization of the South Ossetian

Autonomous Oblast" and the Georgian SSR law of 12 November 1980: "On the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast" shall be considered as having lost effect.

4. The resolutions previously adopted by higher Georgian Republic government organs about the anticonstitutionality [sic] of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast's transformation into the South Ossetian Soviet Republic by separatist forces shall be sustained.

The so-called "South Ossetian Soviet Republic" elections held on 9 December 1990, and their results, shall be considered invalid by reason of lacking legal force.

5. The Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Commission on Law and Law Enforcement shall present proposals concerning the incorporation of changes into the Georgian Republic's constitution and other legislative acts.

6. The Georgian Republic Council of Ministers shall:

- present proposals to the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet concerning the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast's territorial-administrative organization;
- implement the measures prescribed by law to establish public order in the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast's territory and stop operation of the self-appointed government and its administrative organs;
- bring government decisions into accord with this law.

7. The Georgian Republic's justice administration [prokuratura] shall examine and resolve the issue of the accountability of officials who, in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, failed to comply with decisions of the Georgian Republic's state government organs, grossly violated the rules established by the constitution for the conduct of elections, infringed the Georgian Republic's territorial integrity, and abused the rights accorded to officials by law.

8. This law becomes effective as of the moment of its passage.

Georgia Passes Law on Declaring State of Emergency

91US0240A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
13 Dec 90 pp 1, 3

["Law of the Republic of Georgia on States of Emergency"—ZARYA VOSTOKA headline]

[Text] **Article 1.** A state of emergency is a temporary measure proclaimed in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia and this law in the interests of guaranteeing the safety of citizens during natural disasters, major accidents or catastrophes, epidemics, outbreaks of disease in animals, and also during mass disorders.

The purpose in declaring a state of emergency is to normalize the situation as quickly as possible and restore legality and law and order.

Article 2. In accordance with Article 113 Clause 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, a state of emergency is declared on the territory of the Republic of Georgia by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet and its Presidium.

The Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Presidium provides notification of declaration of a state of emergency in particular localities, and if necessary introduces it at the request of or with the agreement of the highest organ of state power in an autonomous republic. If there is no agreement, a state of emergency is introduced and the decision to do so is immediately submitted to a session of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet for confirmation. Any resolution on the issue is adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of the members of the Soviet.

Only the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet can introduce a state of emergency on all the territory of the Republic of Georgia.

Article 3. When a state of emergency is introduced the reason for reaching that decision and the period and the territorial boundaries of its effect are indicated.

After declaring a state of emergency the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Presidium has the right to lift it before the expiration of the period set, or to extend a state of emergency if the circumstances on which the declaration was based have not been eliminated.

The decision to introduce, extend, or lift a state of emergency goes into effect from the moment that such decision is reached unless specifically stated otherwise, and it is immediately made public.

Article 4. Under the conditions prevailing in a state of emergency, depending on the specific circumstances, organs of state power and control initiate the following measures:

1) strengthening safeguards on public order and objects that insure viability of the population and the functioning of the national economy;

2) temporarily resettling citizens from areas in which it is dangerous to live, with mandatory provision of alternative permanent or temporary housing for them;

3) introducing special regimes for entry and exit of citizens;

4) banning particular citizens from leaving particular localities or their apartments (homes) for a set period of time; evicting those who disrupt public order who are not residents in a particular locality and removing them to their permanent place of residence or outside the boundaries of the locality where a state of emergency has been proclaimed;

5) temporarily confiscating firearms and cold steel and ammunition from citizens, and also removing military training equipment, explosives and radioactive substances and materials, and aggressive chemicals and noxious agents from enterprises, institutions, and organizations;

6) banning gatherings, meetings, street processions, and demonstrations, and also entertainment performances and sports and other mass events;

7) making changes to the plans of enterprises and organizations to produce and deliver output, and establishing a special work regime at enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and also resolving other matters pertaining to their economic activity;

8) appointing and dismissing managers of enterprises, institutions, and organizations; banning the resignation of workers and employees at their own request except for cases of resignation for good reason;

9) using the resources of enterprises, institutions, and organizations to prevent and eliminate the consequences of emergency circumstances;

10) banning strikes;

11) recruiting able-bodied citizens for work at enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and also for cleanup work after emergency circumstances, while maintaining work safety;

12) restricting or banning trade in weapons, aggressive chemicals, and noxious agents, and also alcoholic beverages and substances containing alcohol;

13) imposing quarantines and carrying out other sanitation and antiepidemic measures;

14) restricting or banning the use of copying equipment, and also radio and television transmitting apparatus and audio and video recording equipment; confiscating sound amplification equipment; establishing control over the mass media;

15) introducing special rules for the use of communications;

16) restricting the movement of transport and conducting inspections of it;

17) imposing curfews;

18) halting the activity of political parties, public organizations, mass movements, and independent citizen associations that hamper normalization of a situation;

19) banning the creation and activity of armed formations of citizens not provided for by the legislation of the Republic of Georgia;

20) checking documents at places where citizens gather, and, if circumstances warrant, carrying out personal searches and inspections of articles and transport.

Article 5. The highest organs of state power and control in the Republic of Georgia have the right to rescind any decision by lower organs acting at the local level where a state of emergency has been declared.

Special temporary organs may be formed by the Republic of Georgia Council of Ministers to coordinate work to prevent and clean up after emergency circumstances.

Article 6. During the period of a state of emergency the managers of enterprises, institutions, and organizations have the right in cases of necessity to transfer workers and employees without their agreement to work not covered by a labor contract.

Article 7. During a curfew citizens are forbidden to be on the streets or in other public places without special passes and documents attesting to their identity, or to remain outside their own residence without documents attesting to their identity.

Persons who have violated the procedure as set forth in the first clause of this article are detained by the militia or military patrols until the curfew is lifted, and those who do not have the documents on their persons are detained until their identity has been established, but not for more than three days, and those detained may be subjected to a personal search and items carried with them may also be searched.

Article 8. Violation of the requirements set forth in Clauses 3, 4, 6, 10, and 12 through 16 of Article 4, and also of the requirements set forth in Article 7 Clause 1 of this law shall be subject to administrative penalty in the form of a fine in an amount up to 1,000 rubles [R] or arrest for a period of up to 15 days if the violations do not entail criminal liability in accordance with existing legislation.

Article 9. The spreading of provocative rumors and actions provoking violation of law and order or inciting interethnic dissension, and active hindrance of citizens and officials exercising their lawful rights and obligations, and also persistent disobedience of lawful orders or the demands of an official of the organs of internal affairs, a servicemen, a member of the people's militia, or other persons carrying out official or public duties to maintain public order, or other similar actions violating public order and the tranquillity of citizens, or violations of the rules of administrative supervision committed in places where a state of emergency has been declared are punishable by a fine of up to RI,000 or administrative arrest for a period up to 30 days.

Charge sheets concerning the above violations are drawn up by workers of the organs of internal affairs empowered to do so, or by the commandant's office at the appropriate locality.

Cases involving violations as set forth in Article 8 and Article 9 of this law are dealt with within three days on an individual basis by a people's judge or the chief of an internal affairs organ or his deputy, or by the commandant at the particular location.

Article 10. The leadership of a banned strike under the conditions of a state of emergency, and likewise hindrance of the operation of an enterprise, institution, or organization, is criminally liable and is punished by a fine of up to R10,000 or corrective labor for a term of up to two years, or deprivation of freedom for a period of up to three years.

Article 11. With the permission of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet units of the internal troops of the Republic of Georgia Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Republic of Georgia Committee for State Security, and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, which shall be guided by this law and other legislative enactments, may be recruited to eliminate the consequences of emergency circumstances, maintain public order, and guarantee the safety of citizens.

Article 12. On instructions from the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Presidium, joint operations headquarters may be set up and a commandant appointed for the corresponding locality in order to coordinate actions and leadership of forces recruited to eliminate the consequences of emergency circumstance, and also to organize their interaction.

The commandant issues orders regulating matters pertaining to maintaining a state of emergency within the framework of this law.

Article 13. When a state of emergency is declared, in accordance with a decision of the Republic of Georgia Council of Ministers, specialists needed to clean up after natural disasters, major accidents or catastrophes, epidemics, and outbreaks of disease in animals may be conscripted for a period of up to two months.

Article 14. The Republic of Georgia Supreme Court is given the right in a state of emergency to alter the territorial jurisdiction for citizens and for criminal cases as established by law.

Article 15. Citizens who sustain damages in emergency circumstances either in connection with work to prevent or clean up after the emergency circumstances, are offered accommodations by the appropriate state organs, and also by the enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and are compensated for material damages and provided with assistance in finding employment, and other necessary help.

The conditions and procedure for providing housing, compensation for damages, and necessary assistance are determined by the Republic of Georgia Council of Ministers.

Article 16. In cases in which a state of emergency has been declared and the organs of state power and control

fail to insure the proper exercise of their functions, the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Presidium may introduce an interim form of government.

When this is done the powers of the corresponding organs of state power and control are suspended, and the organ set up by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Presidium or the official appointed by it assumes their functions, and has the following rights:

- to take steps as set forth in Article 4 of this law;
- to suspend the powers of the local organs of control and temporarily carry out their functions;
- to offer proposals on matters relating to state, economic, and sociocultural development to the highest organs of power and control in the Republic of Georgia;
- to subordinate any enterprises, institutions, and organizations located in the locality under procedure determined by the Republic of Georgia Council of Ministers.

Article 17. The Republic of Georgia Foreign Ministry immediately notifies the secretary general of the United Nations of the declaration of a state of emergency and of the lifting of a state of emergency.

Article 18. This law comes into force from the moment it is passed.

**Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman,
Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet;
Tbilisi, 11 December 1990**

State of Emergency Declared in South Ossetia

*91US0211B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
14 Dec 90 p 1*

[Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium decree passed 12 December 1990 in Tbilisi: "Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree on the Declaration of a State of Emergency in City of Tskhinvali and Dzhevskiy Rayon Territory"]

[Text] The Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium notes that the unlawful and criminal actions of separatist forces have reached a climax during recent days in the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, particularly in the city of Tskhinvali; anticonstitutional [sic] elections have been held, a so-called: "South Ossetian Soviet Republic" has been proclaimed, power has been usurped by self-appointed adventurist elements, a threat of the civil peace's disturbance has arisen, and terrorist acts are taking place. Today, three citizens were killed, and three wounded on one of the city of Tskhinvali's main streets by the use of an automatic firearm.

For purposes of protecting the Georgian Republic's sovereignty, ensuring the citizens' safety, restoring lawfulness and law and order, and the earliest possible normalization of the situation, the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, pursuant to point 7, article 113, of the Georgian Republic Constitution, decrees:

1. A state of emergency shall be declared in city of Tskhinvali and Dzhavskiy Rayon territory as of 12 December 1990. The state of emergency's effectiveness shall be prescribed as a period of one month.

2. A curfew shall be instituted in city of Tskhinvali and Dzhavskiy Rayon territory as of 2200 12 December 1990. The curfew's duration shall be prescribed as from 2200 to 0700.

3. The Georgian Republic Minister of Internal Affairs shall appoint and relieve a commandant of the city of Tskhinvali and Dzhavskiy Rayon.

4. Forces of the Georgian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs and Georgian Republic Committee for State Security, and the interior troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs located in the city of Tskhinvali and Dzhavskiy Rayon, who shall be guided by laws and regulations not infringing the Georgian Republic's sovereign rights, as well as by this decree, shall be brought in to ensure the preservation of citizens' rights and public order, the population's safety, and the operation of national-economy facilities.

5. Pursuant to the Georgian Republic Law of 11 December 1990: "On the State of Emergency," Georgian Republic internal affairs and state security organs, interior troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and authorized agents of these shall be accorded the right to take the following actions in the territory indicated in point 1 of this decree:

1) intensify the preservation of public order and both the facilities providing for the population's vital activity and the operation of national-economy facilities;

2) introduce special regulations for the entrance and departure of citizens;

3) forbid private citizens to leave the specified locality and their apartments/houses for the established period, and remove disturbers of public order who are not residents of this locality, at their own expense, to the places of their permanent abode or places beyond the limits of the locality where the state of emergency has been declared;

4) temporarily confiscate the firearms, edged weapons, and ammunition of citizens, as well as the military training equipment, explosive and radioactive substances and materials, and caustic chemical and poisonous substances of enterprises, institutions, and organizations;

5) forbid the holding of meetings, rallies, and street parades and demonstrations, as well as spectator sports and other mass events;

6) make changes in the production and product-delivery plans of enterprises and organizations, establish

special regulations for the operation of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and also resolve other matters of enterprise, institution, and organization economic activity;

7) appoint and dismiss from duty the executives of enterprises, institutions, and organizations; forbid the release of blue- and white-collar workers at their own request, except for cases of release for justifiable reasons;

8) utilize enterprise, institution, and organization resources for the prevention of emergency situations and the cleanup of their aftermaths;

9) forbid the holding of strikes;

10) draft work-capable citizens for work at enterprises and institutions, and in organizations, as well as for cleaning up emergency situations' aftermaths, ensuring the work's safety;

11) limit or forbid trade in weapons, caustic chemicals, and poisonous substances, as well as alcoholic beverages and alcoholic substances;

12) institute a quarantine, and take other imperative public health and anti-epidemic actions;

13) limit or forbid the use of duplicating equipment, as well as radio and television transmitting apparatuses and audio and video recording equipment; confiscate sound-amplifying technical devices; establish control over the mass-information media;

14) institute special regulations for the use of communications;

15) limit the movement of vehicles, and make searches of them;

16) temporarily stop the activity of political parties, public organizations, mass movements, and independent citizens associations hindering the situation's normalization;

17) forbid the creation and activity of armed citizens formations not prescribed by Georgian Republic law;

18) check documents at places of mass gatherings of citizens, and, in the necessary cases—make searches of persons and searches of belongings and vehicles.

6. It is forbidden for citizens to be on the streets or in other public places during the curfew without specially issued passes and documents proving their identity.

7. Persons who commit acts which incite the violation of law and order or inflame international animosity, who spread instigative rumors, or who hinder the exercise by citizens and officials of their legal rights and duties, as well as those who violate state-of-emergency regulations, may be subjected to administrative arrest and detention for a period not exceeding 30 days; and

these persons may be held to administrative or criminal account in accordance with the law.

8. The guarding of rail and other communications shall be instituted, using interior troop forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Georgian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, to ensure the uninterrupted operation of transport.

9. This decree becomes effective as of 2200 12 December 1990, and is effective until the lifting of the state of emergency.

10. The USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR President shall immediately be informed of the state of emergency's declaration.

The Georgian Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall inform the secretary general of the United Nations organization of the state of emergency's declaration, and ask him to send his observers to the Georgian Republic.

Central Asia

Aspects, Consequences of Kazakh Sovereignty Explored at Conference

Academician on Theoretical Aspects

91US0218A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Oct 90 pp 1-2

[Report by Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Academician M. K. Kozybayev at a scientific-theoretical conference in Alma-Ata: "Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of the Conception of the Territorial Integrity of the Kazakh SSR as a Sovereign State"]

[Text] The problems of interethnic relations and observance of the sovereign rights of nations have now gone beyond the framework of purely theoretical research, and have acquired the nature of acute political disputes. The national crisis is a product of the general political and economic crisis in the country, and it is based on the specific conditions of the socioeconomic and political development of individual ethnic groups and regions over the course of a long period of history, including in recent history still fresh in our minds. Nonuniformity of economic, social and cultural development of individual ethnic groups is also aggravated by the soon-to-be adopted market relations, which are unavoidably bringing about certain conflicts of national interests in the economic sphere, and are creating the objective basis for the advent of issues of importance to interethnic relations.

Excessive centralism, the practical manifestations of the cult of personality, and theoretical dogmatism promoted formation of a conception of final resolution of the country's nationality question. As the totalitarian system disappears from the political scene, we observe formation of ethnic blocs possessing a high degree of internal homogeneity; they are in concealed conflict, and thus

they are reviving a situation where social ideology is giving way to ethnic ideology.

The territorial problem is being raised to the forefront in the country in view of a number of factors. It can create the severest difficulties in the political, social and moral spheres, and it can acquire the nature of a confrontation, including in our republic as well.

The principal motives behind these sentiments include the desire to reexamine the ethnogeographic map of Kazakhstan with the objective of redrawing it in favor of contiguous republics, or to establish autonomous entities possessing ideology based on stereotypes of imperial thinking that have entrenched themselves in the consciousness of certain strata of the population. The main argument upon which the reasoning of the initiators of this new separatist effort is based is that the indigenous population—that is, the Kazakhs of the northern and northeastern regions of the republic—make up a minority, while western Kazakhstan had allegedly transformed into an organic part of the RSFSR long ago in economic respects. Let me note that not only their ignorance of the ethnogeography of the Kazakh people—more precisely, of the particular features of formation of the territorial and geographic nomadic community of the past, but also their absolute disregard of the economic, ethnopolitical, moral and ethical interests and the ethnopsychology of the indigenous population are the principal causes compelling them to support this antihumanitarian, essentially antidemocratic idea.

Each time that the discussion turns to the problems of sovereignty, the issue of the republic's boundaries is raised. Such was the case in 1920, 1924 and 1936. The same pattern is being observed now as well. This is hardly an accident. A quite definite pattern can be discerned here, one which may be explained by vestiges of a great-power, imperial consciousness, and by a reluctance to part with the flawed mechanism of supercentralism of all levels of social life, and with existing nondemocratic structures. It is likely that we are observing the same trend today in the various sentiments oriented on autonomy and separatism.

Unfortunately the same trends—great-power and geopolitical trends to be more precise—are also expressed in Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn's recent publication: "How To Put Russia in Order." It evoked an emotional outburst precisely because this famous writer's pen cut like a scalpel into the undefended, painfully vulnerable national worth of many peoples.

Even the most open proponents and defenders of this writer-reformer are compelled to recognize this. Thus Aleksandr Afanasyev, a political reviewer of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, notes: "Some of the advice and arguments of the writer concerning interethnic relations are of course anachronistic, irrelevant or unjust...." While it is not my purpose to stir up passions, I must

nonetheless say something about this "anatomical dismemberment" of a living organism called the Union of Soviet Nations, speaking in the words of Aleksandr Ivanovich Gertsen.

The author's basic premise concerning the well-being and abundance of the past under the father-czar, and the "malevolent Marxist-Leninist utopia" in behalf of which everything was "squandered," everything "was given up," and all were "led to the executioner's block," possesses an openly offensive anti-Soviet orientation, and it would be naive today, under the conditions of the all-embracing crisis, to initiate a war of words on this issue.

The public boiling point is determined today by the atmosphere of interethnic relations, and in opposition to the well known physical law, the more pressure applied to the ethnic feelings of the people the more intensively passions boil. It is precisely this sort of intense pressure that many are now experiencing upon themselves owing to Solzhenitsyn's pamphlet. In the eyes of this person, who was slighted by his motherland, the history of Russia and the USSR and prerevolutionary times are viewed in rainbow colors, while the Soviet period is seen only in black.

To me, a student of the history of the peoples of the USSR, Solzhenitsyn's words concerning a return "to the peaceful coexistence of nations, to that dreamlike absence of ethnic differences that had almost been attained in the last decades of prerevolutionary Russia" are a complete revelation to me.

The writer's idyllic perception of one of the dramatic stages in the country's history is astounding. It is a textbook truth, after all, that the first two decades of the 20th century were marked primarily by a struggle of peoples on the empire's national periphery against the yoke of colonialism. And had Russia's development proceeded in accordance with a different social model—that is, without the victory of the October Revolution, the ideals of equality and liberty of which attracted the rebelling colonies to its side, the state's path of history might have taken a totally different direction, one primarily threatening disintegration into midsized and small national formations, including numerous ethnic enclaves within Russia per se.

Aleksandr Isayevich's great idea is to create a Russian state without "foreigners," to deal with whom "we no longer have either the economic or spiritual strength." The sole exception he makes is in relation to slavnic peoples to whom he pompously refers as "younger brothers"—the Ukrainians, though not "with their distorted, foreign language" of the Western Ukraine, and the Belorussians, though on the condition "that they do not incite narrowminded separatism."

Next in line for his blessing are the minor peoples and nationalities of the Caucasus, "for their faithfulness to the Russian throne" (as if neither Shamil nor Khadzhi-Murat had ever existed). He would allow them to ponder

the question as to "whether or not it would be worthwhile for them to split away." And for the Crimean Tatars, he would allow the possibility for returning to the Crimea, though "without the right of its possession," and so on.

Such would be the ethnic makeup of Russia without its "Central Asian underbelly" and other peripheral republics.

It is the Kazakhs who would receive least of all in this division of space, sovereignty and rights. We find that these people, who have been permitted to flourish "by the communists without reason," were allotted territory haphazardly: Any place visited once a year by "nomadic herds" is part of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan was created, A. I. Solzhenitsyn assures us, out of Southern Siberia, the southern Ural regions and the vast central deserts, which have since been transformed and inhabited by Russians, ZEKs [prisoners] and exiled peoples. And if they dare, let them secede, but only within the narrow southern margin of the republic. Everything is like that old Russian saying: "At the banquet table, when the wine flows free, they're all old chums; in times of anguish and grief, they're nowhere to be found, and they've carried off the silver as well."

So what is it that the Kazakhs did to earn the wrath of this Russian writer from the American state of Vermont? Was it that they took heed of the natural features of the landscape and created a complex annual nomadic cycle in order to protect the thin layer of fertile soil, thus claiming a large area for themselves? Or was it that they became a national minority in their own country, sacrificing their best people, natural treasures and land on the altar of proletarian solidarity, which demanded tribute of ever-larger amounts with every decade?

It is the professional and civic duty of historians to provide a clear answer to ambitious assertions directed both at inflaming interethnic enmity and creating new deformations in the historical reality.

The principal flaw in the attacks of willful slander upon the national history of small nations is violation of the principle of historicism, this cornerstone of any humanitarian research. And in this connection the problem of the republic's territorial integrity must be examined within a concrete historical, spatial and temporal context. But people attempting to create opposition to the region's status as communally owned land are making their point only on the basis of present realities, in which as a result of intensive economic interactions Kazakhstan has acquired a clearly pronounced multiethnic structure, such that the population size of the indigenous ethnic group has gradually fallen below the level of "numerical sufficiency."

In the meantime the life of any ethnic group, as is true by the way of the destiny of the territory associated with it, must be analyzed within the framework of a historical view upon the problem. I will try to characterize the

most important factors responsible for formation and development of the Kazakh ethnic group and its territory.

Kazakh Soviet statehood was the result of Lenin's nationality policy, and consequently the existing territorial boundaries were not the result of any willful decision or beneficent act of the central government; instead, it was the result of recognition of the autochthonous origins of the Kazakhs within the bounds of land they occupied.

In view of its geographical position the territory of Kazakhstan was part and parcel of overall development of the middle zone of the Eurasian continent, which is commonly referred to in the scientific literature as the great steppe zone. Ecological factors operating here predetermined the totally unique forms of adaptation of ethnic groups to the natural environment, and the specific forms of development of ethnic groups, expressed as creation of ethnically unique economic and cultural types of seminomadic and nomadic animal herding. And for nomads, Marx noted, "great uninhabited spaces are the main prerequisite" of economic activities and life. Indigenous Kazakhs did not subjugate or conquer the space which makes up Kazakhstan per se—they lived in it. It was in correspondence with this that their life, economy, culture and ethnopsychology developed. Thus, existing at the crossroads of ancient migration paths from Siberia and the Central Asian steppes to the regions of the Semirechiye and Central Asia and beyond to the south and west, the territory of Kazakhstan played an important role in the historical destiny of the surrounding tribes and nations of the great Eurasian steppe zone.

Looking at the problem of nomadism—that is, a nomadic way of life, we must recognize that it requires deeper analysis of its geographic origins. The still-surviving notion that a nomadic pastoral life is a primitive type of economic and cultural activity encourages some authors—from the mandated leader of the Siberian Kazakh nation Katanayev to USSR People's Deputy Vasilyeva and writer Solzhenitsyn—to reject this economic system as a factor of territorial self-determination. To listen to them, one would think that it was only by deep plowing of the land that man reinforces his claim upon his land. The fact that he "simply" hunted on it for centuries, or moved about it with his animal herds, "doesn't count," since in the opinion of these "neo-progressives," only through farming, defined as a "cultured" form of economic life, could the land be "utilized."

As far as "wild" animal herding is concerned, in its presence the land is fated to belong to no one—that is, a pastoral existence is not perceived as an argument in favor of an ethnic's group bond with its land. Understandably it is useless to debate such opponents, who are hopelessly infected by the virus of stereotypes rejected long ago by science. Nonetheless let me characterize the demographic structure of nomadic Kazakhs and the

scale of their concentration at the eve of the 20th century, because as it turns out, there are still people around who are attempting to discuss complicated things without even an elementary knowledge of the textbook laws of history. I will be citing prerevolutionary publications in this case, which are hard to accuse of prejudice, at least from the aspect of the factual side of the matter.

Thus according to the encyclopedic dictionary written by F. A. Brokgauz and I. A. Yefron (St. Petersburg, 1895, Vol 15), the Kirghiz-Kaysaks (what the Kazakhs were called then) roamed over the vast spaces between the shores of the Volga and the Tarim basin and from the lower reaches of the Amu-Darya to the Irtysh. A significant part of them (over 3 million) were under the dominion of Russia, living within the bounds of Astrakhan Province (200,000 persons of both sexes), in Ural (412,601 persons, or 79 percent of the oblast's entire population), Turgay (338,802 persons), Akmolinsk (341,414 persons, or 73 percent), and Semipalatinsk (547,577 persons, or 90.6 percent) oblasts, in the northern districts of Semirechensk Oblast (600,000), in Syr-Darya Oblast (730,000, or 60 percent of the oblast's population), Amu-Darya Department (40,000), Samarkand Oblast (20,000), and Transcaspian Oblast (over 40,000); in addition a part of the Kirghiz-Kaysaks of Ural and Turgay oblasts (up to 40,000) migrated within the bounds of the Upper Ural, Chelyabinsk and Troitskiy districts of Orenburg Province (the so-called "new line zone").

Several tens of thousands of Kirghiz-Kaysaks were identified as inhabitants of the Khanate of Khiva. In China (Northwestern Mongolia), Kirghiz-Kaysaks occupied the steppe-covered valley of the black Irtysh, the northern slope of the Tarbagatay and Saur ranges and the southern slope of the Altay; some part of them (from the late 1860s) moved to the northern slope and continued their nomadic life along tributaries of the Kobdo River, where they paid rent to the owners of this land—the Urianghad.

As far as the migrations are concerned, the above-cited source notes that they were a product of many centuries of tradition, rather than a search for better pastures: "Kirghiz often left good pastures and migrated hundreds of versts to poorer land. Each family or aul travels the same path from one year to the next, stopping at the same springs and wells at which their ancestors had stopped for hundreds of years previously, and always returning to the same locale for winter. One aul might cross the road of another, or travel behind it, but any attempt to disturb the established order would bring on bloody collisions".

It should be kept in mind that the problem could be understood to any productive extent only within the framework of the conceptions of "cultural interpenetration." In other words in the context of analyzing interactions between contiguous civilizations, regions and ethnic groups. Paradoxical as it may seem, for many long years the history of the Kazakhs was studied in isolation

from the historic destinies of neighboring peoples; moreover they were juxtaposed against them, and the entire diversity of economic and cultural contacts was artificially limited to the framework of relations with Russia.

Even today, in a time when we are working toward natural horizontal ties with our southern neighbors, voices calling "for the rebirth of a certain mythical 'Great Turkestan'" are making themselves heard, as the republic's President N. A. Nazarbayev noted.

In the meantime the problem requires increasingly more comprehensive study of the history of Turkic tribes, their common historical destiny, and establishment of the boundaries of their ethnic territory. Before, you see, the fear of the bugbear of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism blocked all attempts in this direction under the conditions of the existing ideological inquisition.

It has now been proven that the Kazakh ethnic group contains tribes which participated in the development of many Turkic peoples during an entire millennium over an enormous territory from Altay to the Black Sea. It would be sufficient to say that over 100 common tribal names have been discovered within the ethnic division consisting of Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, Turkmens, Kazakhs, Altays, Nogays, Kirghiz and Mongols.

The chronology of formation of the Kazakh nation is a problem that acquires special importance in this connection. It should be noted that over the course of a long period of time, historiographic tradition developed under the hard pressure of ideological control. In its first stage, the Stalinist conception of erasure of ethnic boundaries under socialism stimulated such approaches, which made it possible to avoid the danger of being accused of "bourgeois nationalism." In subsequent times the stilted image of the "elder brother" and the conception of "first among equals" intensified the pressure upon research philosophy.

Owing to the noted factors, the problem acquired a political nature, and was arbitrarily interpreted outside the context of historical truth. A one-dimensional set upon interpretation of local written history through the prism of the history of the dominant nation dropped the polyethnic nature of our common state into oblivion. This also reflected itself in the chronology of the ethnic development of the peoples of our country. The historiography of the Kazakhs experienced the full measure of such pressure as well. In unison with official ideology, it created artificial constructs analogous with the idea of the "messianic role of the dominant ethnic group."

A particular reflection of this was the attempt to compress the chronological reckoning of the development of the Kazakh nation forward to a more recent period of history—the 15th-16th centuries. Prominent scientists—the Russian A. Levshin and the German A. Vamberi—date the consolidation of Turkic-language tribes into the Kazakh nation somewhere in the 9th-10th centuries. The terms "Kazakhia" and "Kazakh" are encountered in the Byzantine and Iranian sources of those times. Soviet

anthropologists V. Ginzburg and N. Zalkind assert the existence of Kazakhs as an anthropological type between the 7th-8th and 12th-14th centuries.

Kh. Salimov, a historian and demographer from Uzbekistan ("The Population of Central Asia," Tashkent, 1975, p 79) believes that Kazakhs appeared in the historical arena in the 11th century. Islam Kabyshev, a historian from the Mongolian People's Republic, proposed the version that Kazakhs consolidated into a nation at the eve of the Mongolian invasion. The same conclusions were often stated by Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Academician A. Kh. Margulan. In all probability the process of consolidation of Turkic-language tribes into a Kazakh nation was close to its conclusion at the eve of the Mongol invasion. It could not have been otherwise. Proto-Kazakhs were known to the Kushan kingdom and Parthia, China, the Arabian caliphate, Kievan Rus, the Bulgarian state and Byzantium.

There is no denying that the Mongol invasion slowed this process down, but it could not stop it. It was of such great proportions and it was so deep that the invaders themselves essentially adopted the language, beliefs and culture of the aborigines of the Kipchak Steppes. The advent of the Kazakh Khanate, which had already evolved into a nation, upon the ruins of the empire of Ghenghis Khan, is proof of this. And it is in this aspect that it would be apparently suitable to activate research.

The modern territorial community of the Kazakh people evolved in the beginning of our millennium. And the Kazakhs and their territory were subjected to incessant invasions by the khanates of Central Asia, Dzhungaria and China from the beginning of this community's formation, but the Kazakh people survived as an ethnic group and maintained a hold on their territory.

The conception of the territorial integrity of the Kazakh SSR as a sovereign state must also be examined from the viewpoint of methodological principles, concreteness of truth, objectivity of understanding, causality, comprehensiveness, completeness of examination and the patterns of the phenomena. In this aspect, a change in scientific approaches is required in relation to the block of questions having to do with inclusion of Kazakhstan in the Russian empire and colonization of the region in association with this. The original thesis that the region joined the Russian empire completely voluntarily found itself incorporated into a wide range of other related topics. In particular, the influence of this factor is obviously present in the telling of the history of colonization. This phenomenon has always been viewed in historiography as only a positive stage. But in the meantime while economic colonization did play a certain role in activating the region's economic life, and the region's culture promoted the spiritual mutual enrichment of peoples, we could hardly see anything positive in religious and military expansion.

Considering the latter, we need to make a more objective assessment of the place and role of the Cossack nation in the region's history. This was a highly specific segment of the population.

According to the assertions of Colonel G. Ye. Katanayev, the mandated ataman of the Siberian Cossack forces, in contrast to the situation of the Don and Yaik Cossacks, who consisted of peasants that had fled serfdom, the ranks of the Siberian Cossacks were replenished "exclusively by czarist ukase and voevod mandate; not only by requisitioning the required people, but also by exile of both criminals and all sorts of prisoners into Siberia.... It became the fate of these people," the author goes on, "to play the difficult and honorable (though not always notable) role of pioneers of various initiatives and measures of the government aimed at exploring, occupying, subjugating, pacifying and developing Siberia's boundless regions and its multilingual population" (emphasis mine—M. K.).

Kazakhstan's annexation to Russia was progressive in terms of its end result. But we cannot pass over czarism's colonial policy in silence either.

This brief tour of the past shows that the territory of the Kazakh republic is the territory of the ethnic group that gave the republic its name.

October 1917 became the watershed in the historic destiny of the Kazakh people. The revolution put an end to territorial division of the region, to the privileges of various estates that excluded the indigenous population, to national and colonial oppression, and to the absence of equality. October opened up the path of reunification of the ethnic group's territory into a single Kazakh Soviet state. V. I. Lenin believed that creation of national state formations was in keeping with the fundamental interests of nations. Vladimir Ilich played an invaluable role in shaping the territory of the Kazakh republic and in reunifying all Kazakh land into a single whole. And the question of national territory was one of the priorities in V. I. Lenin's practical activities: It was not "tenth on the list" as Solzhenitsyn put it, taking another of Lenin's statements out of context.

Lenin decisively and uncompromisingly condemned both petty local interest, provinciality, nationalism and anarchism on one hand, and bureaucratic centralism, totalitarianism, chauvinism and uniformity on the other. He decisively fought attempts to settle international conflicts through bureaucratic means, by compulsion, no matter what its origins. On several occasions his active support of the lawful requirements of "nationals" ensured correct resolution of national problems and was an example of internationalism not only in words but also in deeds.

Following the principle of objectivity of understanding, and its comprehensiveness, we professional historians are obligated not to idealize the relationships of indigenous peoples with neighboring nations and states, while at the same not reducing the relations between nomads

and farmers to that one famous conflict. The historical experience already demonstrated the senselessness of war back then, and the popular masses yearned for peaceful life. In the name of national peace, of creating a renewed Soviet federation, a sovereign Kazakh Soviet state not just in words but in deeds as well, we need to make a deeper and broader investigation of the relationship of Kazakhs to the use of the Great Silk Route, to the organization of international trade in those times, the Turkish phrases that entered Russian language, the toponymy of Kazakhstan, which absorbed both local and foreign names, the epic "Koblandy," the "Tale of Earlier Times" and so on. By focusing on this, we take a dialectical approach to illuminating the history of Kazakhstan. Finally, history possesses sufficient facts to prove that Soviet patriotism and internationalism at the major turning points of the fatherland's history is not a myth but a reality.

Thus the problem of Kazakhstan's territorial integrity is projected in a plane of three temporal dimensions—the past, the present and the future. Within this triad, the historical factor plays the decisive role. It is precisely in this connection that it requires a competent attitude toward itself.

The emergence of scientific knowledge from its dependence upon ideology, including nationally intolerable ideology, primarily requires development of correct methodological approaches, ones which would provide an objective picture of the history and present times of our state.

What the Kazakhstan aspect requires primarily in this regard is that we overcome an age-old disease—dividing history into black and white. This pertains to the interactions between nomadic and settled cultures, which are hardly idyllic in many ways, to the problem of the ethnogenesis of Kazakhs and neighboring peoples, to the particular features of colonization of the steppes together with their open and concealed aspects, to national and territorial divisions created in the Soviet period, and so on.

I recognize quite well that maintaining a dialogue with amateur historians is in many ways a complex and thankless effort, since the debate goes on here at different levels of information, with emphasis not so much on scientific arguments as on fantasies of primarily emotional origin. Nonetheless, historians must not avoid such discussions, since only a healthy scientific basis can impart a constructive, positive nature to them. It is precisely along the path of such meticulous work that we can attain civic harmony—the only thing that can provide the conditions for our state to exist in the future as a legal, democratic, economically and culturally developed component of world civilization.

Historical Aspects Presented

91US0218B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 4 Oct 90 pp 1, 3

[Report by Candidate of Historical Sciences Yu. I. Romanov at a scientific-theoretical conference in Alma-Ata: "Historical Aspects of Formation of the Modern Territory of Kazakhstan"]

[Text] The statement of participants of the meeting of the republic's leadership with representatives of labor collectives in industry, construction, transportation and communications, addressed to the laborers and the entire population of Kazakhstan, contains an appeal to sociologists: to objectively analyze the past of our country and republic, to make a comprehensive analysis of current processes, and to theoretically substantiate predictions for the future.

From this, we can see how enormous is the responsibility laid upon historical science, which has become an active element of sociopolitical life. It is looked to for a way of understanding modern times, of freeing ourselves of the dogmas and stereotypes of Stalinism and stagnation, of reconstructing the truth, and of recapturing our cultural legacy. But there are other appeals as well, in which well known principles are interpreted from the standpoint of group national egoism under the guise of rethinking the past. This has started to manifest itself especially in recent times.

Certain intriguers are trying to capitalize on the process of democratization in order to satisfy their political ambitions, and they are directing their efforts at destabilizing the society and dividing it along social and ethnic lines.

Recent tendencies toward separatism, irresponsible appeals by certain amateur public groups, and central and local publications demanding that the historically evolved borders of the Kazakh SSR be redrawn evoke special concern.

The main argument behind such assertions is like this: The Kazakh population in the northern and northeastern regions of the republic is a minority, and these regions were supposedly included in the Kazakh SSR without justification. Such statements earn condemnation as being contrary to the state sovereignty of the republic, and to historical truth.

The same can also be said for the ideas presented by A. I. Solzhenitsyn in his article "How to Put Russia in Order." His line of reasoning and his proposal to divide the republic's territory are a direct insult to the national worth of Kazakhs, and not of theirs alone. It is his wish to "deprive" Kazakhstan of two-thirds of its land and over half of its population.

Historical science persuasively demonstrated the autochthony of Kazakhs in the republic's present boundaries, while world science has recognized presence of a settled urban and farming civilization in the region since

ancient times in addition to the nomadic population. And this civilization was typical of Kazakh society, being an inherent part of general human culture. The world enthusiastically receives the findings of Kazakhstan archeologists demonstrating the continuity of the material and spiritual culture of the Kazakh people from ancient times to the present.

Archeological evidence and the testimony of Middle Age Arabian and Chinese authors and of numerous Russian and foreign explorers indicate that over the course of many centuries the Kazakhs lived within the same territory that currently composes the republic....

The development of the ethnic territory of the Kazakh people was molded by the influence of the most diverse factors upon the life of the indigenous population of a vast zone of the moderate Eurasian belt. Important among them were the natural habitat and the associated features of the material production of nomadism, as well as migration processes, the nature of social organization of nomadic society, and changes occurring in the international situation at the society's ethnic boundaries.

Archeological evidence demonstrates the continuity of tribal culture from the Bronze Age to the culture of the early nomads (Sakas)—ancestors of the ancient Turkic peoples. They had a part in the ethnogenesis of Turkic-language tribes, and then of the Kazakh people. And attempts to show today that Rudnyy Altay, the Semirechiye and Western Kazakhstan are outside the ethnic territory of the Kazakhs are infinitely distant from historical reality.

Historical science possesses data on settlement of Kazakhs precisely within the present territory of the republic, and their movement under the influence of various factors and interactions. Thus Eastern Kazakhstan for example, which is at the crossroads of ancient migration paths from Siberia and from the central Asian steppes into the Semirechye and Central Asia, played an important role in the destiny of tribes and peoples. The Irtysh, the banks of which were the principal site of economic activity, was the binding link of their natural habitat. Chinese chroniclers reported on the tribes residing in this region and on some events that occurred here in the early part of the first millennium A.D., while ancient Turkic runes provide information on them from the middle of the first millennium. The latter also contain occasional references to the river Irtysh. In the 9th-10th centuries the territory of northern and south-eastern Kazakhstan was within the Kimak state. The capital of the Kimak kagan (king) was located on the middle Irtysh. The Middle-Age scholar Al-Idrisi [transliteration] names 16 Kimak cities, 12 of which are along the Irtysh. The traditional roaming grounds of the Turkic tribes were located seasonally in the Altay and in Irtysh river valleys.

In the early 11th century, political hegemony on the territory from the Altay to Karatau Range passed to the

Kipchak khans, and from 1125 up to the Mongol invasion a strong association existed in Eastern Kazakhstan between Turkic-language Naimans and Kereits inhabiting the mountains and plains of Altay and Tarbagatay and the land of the Irtysh valley. They subsequently became one of the components of the Kazakh ethnic group.

The territory of the middle Irtysh, including its right bank, was associated in the Middle Ages with different peoples and states. In the 13th-17th centuries it was in different states at different times or simultaneously.

This land, as is true of neighboring regions to the south and southeast, was populated from ancient times by representatives of Turkic families, primarily of Kipchak origin. Central, Northern and Eastern Kazakhstan were settled from the Tobol to the Ulatau and Syr-Darya at different times by the Karluks, Kereits, the Merkits and the Onguts [transliterations]. The descendants of Ongut tribes became part of the Kazakh Uak [transliteration] family. The names of Karluk tribes also survived in the Altay, while those of ancient Oguzes survive near the Zaysan. These and many other ethnic groups existed in different states. In their political frameworks, they formed into larger peoples of the feudal era. Similar processes occurred over all territory of Kazakhstan.

A conceptual reexamination is also required of the problem of Kazakhstan's entry into the Russian empire, and the consequences of this. There were elements of voluntary annexation, outright colonial seizure and economic development of territory achieved by violent confiscation of land from the indigenous population. But no matter what means by which annexation was achieved, it led to subsequent introduction of colonial orders on the annexed land, to establishment of colonial oppression and to distortion of the uniqueness of national state development.

In its eastward movement the Russian empire based itself on a Europocentric conception of the world. In this regard its policy did not differ from that of England, France and other colonial powers. What is the essence of this stereotype? It is based on the notion that eastward movement is movement in a vacuum, onto land belonging to no one, and ethnic and state structures encountered in the path of the colonizers were not treated as such by them. Eastern peoples were "wild" in the eyes of the "civilized" conqueror.

Two principal conclusions were made from this. The first: European rules of international law cannot apply to nomadic peoples. Second: Brutality is the sole effective means of communication with them. Intimidation and suppression were supposedly the only language in which one could talk with the "uncivilized" world.

The system for controlling the oppressed peoples was also organized correspondingly. And although it varied within a wide range, on the whole it was based on national oppression and inequality, unification, bureaucratization and russification. The goal of course was to

eliminate the unique features of national life, which was viewed as a potential source of resistance to imperial dominion.

Czarism artificially divided Kazakh land between different imperial administrative formations, and disturbed the integrity of the ethnic territory of the Kazakhs.

Here again mention should be made of one antiscientific, antihumanitarian trend that recently manifested itself, including among historians—that the land that was settled was vacant, belonging to no one. This is essentially a repetition of the assertions of czarist colonial officials, who by this means justified violent confiscation of land from the Kazakh population. It assumed especially wide scope in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

And contrary to the truth, to historical truth, assertions that the land belongs to no one have made their appearance once again. This is what we see in the article by historian V. Kozlov and in other publications. They debate the territorial integrity of the republic with astounding flippancy and even scorn.

The size of the Kazakh population on the right-bank Irtysh is artificially understated, for example: It is reduced to several hundred. But in the meantime statistical sources contain different data. According to the 1920 census the nomadic Kazakh population of the Ust-Kamenogorsk District was 116,000.

According to the 1897 census not hundreds but 24,600 Kazakhs resided on the right-bank Irtysh. And this was even after over 150 years of an active policy by the czarist government to displace them from the right bank and from the land of the Altay mountain okrug. The Kazakhs were deprived of their ancestral lands on the right-bank Irtysh. Moreover it is wrong to compare the numbers of the settled farming and the nomadic population without considering the type of economy. This is a clear methodological mistake.

The year 1917 drastically altered the national situation. The "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia" and other acts of the revolution proclaimed the annihilation of the "prison" of the peoples—the Russian empire, and creation, out of its ruins, of a state based on recognition of the equal rights of all peoples. Respect of the national features of peoples who had formerly had no rights became one of the most important principles of the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state. Lenin and the party saw this as an important means not only of satisfying the aspirations of previously oppressed peoples but also of surmounting the mistrust of the Russian center inherited from the past and of promoting international consciousness and tendencies toward unification.

A federated association must become the source of dynamic development of the economy and culture of each nation. Lenin decisively and uncompromisingly

condemned both petty local interests, provinciality, nationalism and anarchism on one hand, and bureaucratic centralism, totalitarianism, chauvinism and uniformity on the other. He decisively fought attempts to settle international conflicts by bureaucratic means and compulsion.

The Soviet government confirmed the right of the Kazakh people to their national and territorial statehood, and reunification of all land torn away by czarism within the framework of the newly formed Kazakh republic. It was not "without reason" and not "haphazardly" (as A. I. Solzhenitsyn put it), but on the basis of meticulous study of the historical, ethnic and economic aspects that the republic's territory was formed. This was done under the leadership of V. I. Lenin with the participation of chairmen of the soviets of Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Urals and Turkestan, and prominent specialists and scientists. The opinion of local organs was also taken into account in resolving this issue, many things had to be studied in greater detail, different proposals had to be weighed, conflicting opinions had to be heard out, and among the many plans and conclusions, those which were in keeping with the spirit and content of the party's program regarding the nationalities question had to be selected.

In February 1920 the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee sent a circular letter to the party committees of rayons in the Soviet East. It read: "The issue of dividing Muslim tribes into separate Soviet state formations is not meeting any obstacles, evidence of which can be found in the existence of the Turkestan and Bashkir republics and the Kirghiz Revolutionary Committee." It stands to reason that not all of it was a bed of roses. Thus, the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, which displayed clearly separatist tendencies, attempted to keep Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk oblasts out of the Kazakh republic.

The question as to the Siberian boundaries of Kazakhstan was discussed on several occasions by the party Central Committee. On 9-10 August 1920 a conference of all interested institutions and departments was held under the chairmanship of V. I. Lenin at the Presidium of the VTsIK [All-Union Central Executive Committee] in order to discuss issues associated with administering the new Kazakh republic, and with its boundaries and mutual relationships with the Russian Federation. V. I. Lenin argued in behalf of the need for resolving controversial territorial issues and setting boundaries in favor of the Kazakh republic.

After all of the stages of discussion, on 26 August 1920 the Council of People's Commissars and the VTsIK adopted the: "Decree on the Autonomous Kirghiz (Kazakh) Soviet Socialist Republic," which resolved the issues of Kazakhstan's territorial integrity fairly. In 1921, a 10-verst strip of land along the Ural and Irtysh was returned to the Kazakh population by a decree of the Kazakhstan Central Executive Committee.

In Kustanay Province, a faction of leading workers demanded removal of Kustanay District from the Kazakh ASSR and its annexation to Chelyabinsk Province. The Kirghiz bureau of the RKP(b) Central Committee and the Kirghiz Oblast Committee condemned this position. The oblast committee sent a letter to the province's communists explaining the error in the views of the province committee's leaders. The letter pointed out that "removal of Kustanay Province, or more accurately its Russian part, from the Kirghiz Republic...fundamentally contradicts one of the principal objectives of the party and the nationalities question."

In 1924 the Kazakh regions of Turkestan were included in the composition of the Kazakh SSR as a result of Central Asia's division. The process of forming the republic's territory came to an end. The right of self-determination proclaimed by October became a reality to the Kazakh people.

Today's appeals by the initiators of the drive to redraw boundaries are playing into the hands of those who would wish to divide the Union on the basis of nationality, to pit one nation against another, and to prevent unity.

Speaking at the first session of the republic's Supreme Soviet, Kazakh SSR President N. A. Nazarbayev noted: "We must use all available methods and take all decisive practical actions to support civic peace and national harmony. The destiny of Kazakhstan depends on this in many ways, after all."

It is our destiny to live and work together, to strengthen and safeguard the sovereignty of the republic. Only by uniting all healthy forces of society will we be able to solve its most complex problems, strengthen social order and preserve civic peace and harmony.

Kirghiz Presidential Council Member Views Republic's Future

*91US0217A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 7 Dec 90 p 3*

[Interview with Zhumagul Saadanbekov, member of the Kirghiz Presidential Council and chairman of a republic Supreme Soviet standing commission, by unattributed SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA correspondent; place and date not given: "...Considerably More Is at Stake Today Than the Fate of the Republic Party Organization"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Zhumagul Saadanbekov, the results of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Second Session and the election of the republic's first president have been received by the people of Kirghizstan with relief, faith and hope for the future. Do you believe in the power and viability of presidential authority won democratically?

[Saadanbekov] Undoubtedly I do. The process of the acquisition of democracy is complex and agonizing. The

more so in the state in which the country finds itself currently, experiencing economic and political crisis and disintegration.

The establishment of presidential authority in the republic is an indisputable gain of democracy. But the paradox is that this authority will acquire power only via a limitation of...democracy. Of that wrongly understood democracy that, in fact, has led the country to the collapse of discipline, economic chaos, and anarchy and a paralysis of authority. Is it really normal that "parliaments," from the rayon soviet through the Supreme Soviet, are detached from the executive authority and that the rayon soviets are declaring their own "sovereignities" and reversing the decisions of the oblast soviets, while the latter, in turn, are reversing those of the supreme soviets? In a word, friction, at all levels. And this is having a negative effect on the manageability of the oblasts, city, and rayons and the republic as a whole, which is making the crisis aspect even worse. In short, democratic chaos is not in the least better than any other and contains within it a destructive principle.

I would like here to quote the authoritative opinion of the celebrated Russian philosopher Nikolay Berdyayev. I apologize for the length of the quotation, but his words, spoken many decades ago, have a very timely ring: "Democracy is too often understood the wrong way round—it is not made dependent on the inner capacity for self-management and the nature of the people and the personality. And this is a real danger for our future. The Russian people should switch to true self-management. But this transition will depend on the quality of the human material and the capacity for self-management of all of us. This requires exceptional respect for man, the individual, his rights and his self-managing nature. The capacity for self-management cannot be created by any artificial excitements. An aroused crowd in the grip of selfish and malicious instincts is incapable of controlling either itself or others. The crowd and the masses are not democracy. Democracy is the conversion of a chaotic quantity into some self-disciplined quality."

The basis of democracy is the delegation of authority from the top down and vice versa. World civilization has yet to discover any other. With reference to our republic this appears thus: A president possessing real authority delegates his power of command to the chairman of the presidiums of oblast, city, and rayon soviets combining in one person legislative and executive authority. And do we need under these conditions to have two chairmen—of the presidium of the soviet and the executive committee? One's "own parliaments" at city and, particularly, rayon level is, understandably, superfluous also. It is hard to say what the point of them is. After all, they do not engage in law-making.

Incidentally, the militant democrat S. Stankevich, deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, who is known to all, has also reached this conclusion. "Throughout the world," he says, "people have sooner or later arrived at the idea of municipal administration. For

example, in Moscow this could be a city mayoralty or city board, 30-40 persons strong, directly elected by the people, and it could be headed by a mayor, also elected directly. This would be perfectly sufficient for the administration of Moscow.... And at rayon level we should not be carried away by improvisations but should be optimizing the existing structures in every possible way. Electing mobile presidiums and executive committees and endowing them with authority. The most difficult thing is to find competent people, professionals. And let them select their own teams."

[Correspondent] It was observed at the 28th CPSU Congress that "the process of the separation of functions between the party and the soviets is not yet complete." And in our republic it is, as you know, only just beginning. Do you allow that the party committees are trying to hold on to their command authority?

[Saadanbekov] Yes, this process has clearly dragged on with us. The current situation is putting the Communist Party of Kirghizia in the dubious position of unlawful exponent of state-power functions. In addition, it is inevitably nurturing the unhealthy ambitions of certain careerists from the party.

The soviets have acquired power, having won the trust of the electorate, and it belongs to them by law. Why should they cede their authority? All claims to power I consider illegal. That the soviets must master the science and art of prudent cooperation with the party organizations, as with other political forces also, come to that, is another matter.

[Correspondent] The majority of people's deputies of the republic are, like you also, members of the CPSU. Are your actions not aimed at separating the functions of party and state offices, establishing democratic principles of administration and so forth contrary to party discipline and ethics and, let us say, party loyalty?

[Saadanbekov] On the contrary. I and my fellow thinkers are operating consistently in the spirit of the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress. There are undoubtedly among the Communists many who depress us with their extremely orthodox and dogmatic views. It is they who are accusing us of "betrayal" of the party, populism, and other conceivable and inconceivable "sins." It is time to understand that the CPSU has not for a long time been a united political force, in the former bugle and drum sense. So the party discipline of the people's deputies is today, I am convinced, an abstract question. I believe that for the Communist the duty of the people's deputy is above party obligations.

As far as I myself am concerned, I have been and remain a Communist and am obliged for all that I have achieved primarily to the Lenin party. And am fully resolved to share its present difficult situation to the end. Not with hollow incantations about loyalty and devotion but specific deeds in the name of a better life for people, the

attractiveness and significance of the ideas and positions that we champion and the level of intellectual and theoretical preparedness.

In our view, the Communist Party of Kirghizia will strengthen its authority only on the paths of democratization, having emphatically dissociated itself from command administrative functions. Generally, all of us Communists, inhabitants of Kirghizia, should recognize that considerably more is at stake today than the fate of the republic party organization. We are living under conditions of intensifying crisis in all spheres of society. Production is declining, the level of well-being is falling, crime is growing. People are in the grip of anxiety about the future. In this atmosphere it would be disastrous and wrong for the Communist Party of Kirghizia and its directive bodies to cling to the outdated levers of the command administrative system and impede democratic processes. It is time to recognize that the Communist Party of Kirghizia is far from being the "decisive factor," as in the past, and that little in the life of the republic depends on its intraparty organizational and ideological convulsions. It would be better for us to help our president in the speediest strengthening of the entire system of state power, an extension of democratization and a solution of urgent problems. This applies to both the Communists and each citizen.

The situation is now such that, granted all our political sympathies and antipathies, we need to move toward cooperation. The times are most difficult, and there are enough of all kinds of destructive forces as it is. The sole possibility of a stabilization of the situation and way out of the crisis condition is the achievement of consensus and civic harmony based on the extensive dialogue and mutual understanding of all political forces.

[Correspondent] How do you conceive of the possibilities of the achievement of civic harmony in a future sovereign Republic of Kirghizstan and the assurance of equal rights of people of all nationalities?

[Saadanbekov] The vast majority of the peoples of Kirghizstan, profoundly shocked by the Osh tragedy, has understood that the urgent social, economic, and political problems cannot be solved via claims against one another, at the expense of others. We need to restore in the system of interethnic relations that which is primordially healthy, not break it up entirely. Without stability there will be neither foreign capital investments in the economy nor the support of world public opinion. It is probably clear to everyone now that a calm, happy common home cannot be built if some people in it are affronted and harboring malice. And there is today an obvious trend—people are seeking with ever increasing perseverance ways away from confrontation toward interethnic harmony.

The basis, however, of any harmony are not declarations but primarily deeds. If we consistently harmonize the interests of each nation and ethnic group, will we not thereby be creating strong prerequisites for interethnic

peace? After all, the global interests of all inhabitants of Kirghizia, and not just Kirghizia, are common. The impending threat of economic catastrophe, the global food and commodity shortage, the growth of crime and so forth. This truly concerns everyone, regardless of national particularities. Of course, this does not mean that there are no actual differences and that, aside from common, uniform concerns, there may not be anything particular worrying just one group of people—quite numerous, what is more.

[Correspondent] The law on the official language, incidentally, is creating in a certain part of the Russian-speaking population virtually an anxious perception of discrimination....

[Saadanbekov] There is here, I believe, much misunderstanding and, at times, outright speculation. Let us ask ourselves: Do the Kirghiz need such a law? The Kirghiz language was not being oppressed previously, seemingly. But if it was not being used in production and was not helping in work and, crudely put, was not earning its keep, it was, like it or not, being pushed into the domestic sphere and into a passive reserve. Which was what was happening. And where should it develop and acquire full-fledged resonance if not in official soil?

The majority of Russians and people of other nationalities living in Kirghizia are in agreement with this also. They understand that two strata of the population had over the decades taken shape separately from one another in the republic. I sometimes think that there had been a conscious desire to separate them because all policy, language policy included, was geared not to the adaptation of the Russian-speaking population but, on the contrary, to its isolation. And so it is that now, when big changes have begun, these strata are reacting to them differently.

Does the law infringe the rights of the Russian-speaking population? As distinct from that of many republics, our law is profoundly democratic and is based on a 10-year period. The voluntary nature of choice of language is maintained in the spheres of production, tuition, and mass communication. Each individual may apply in Russian to any official institution and teach his children in his native language and in places of the compact residence of the non-Kirghiz population introduce in the workforce internal record-keeping. Of course, certain articles of the law are insufficiently precise and unsupported by a practical official tuition program. Ultimately no law is dogma established once and for all. After we have extricated the Kirghiz language from the current crisis state, the law may well be revised.

[Correspondent] A worrying problem today is the outflow of the Russian-speaking population from the republic. Your opinion on this score?

[Saadanbekov] We live in an era of total migration processes. It is distressing and offensive, but there is a trend in evidence—a tremendous outflow of the population and a brain drain from our country to overseas.

PRAVDA wrote recently: "Polish officials have declared that they and the Scandinavian countries are preparing for an influx of up to 1 million refugees from Russia. Next year could be marked by historic migration flows."

According to figures of the Kirghiz SSR MVD, 10,075 persons had as of 1 November of the current year left the republic to take up permanent residence in other countries. A further 15,099 are applying to leave. Primarily people are traveling to capitalist countries. Some 9,224 former residents of Kirghizstan have taken up residence in the united Germany this year alone, and a further 13,343 wish to go there. Second in terms of popularity is Israel, then come Greece and the United States.

Compared with last year, the emigration process has accelerated two-fold. And with the enactment of the "Entry to and Departure From the USSR" law, according to our assumptions, the number of those wishing to leave the republic will grow ten-fold.

It is not only Russian-speaking people who are leaving but Kirghiz also. An interesting fact: 71,000 Kirghiz have left the republic in the past 10 years, as have 70,000 Russians. So this is not a national problem, in my view. People are inclined to go where life is better, where there is a stable moral and political atmosphere. It is not hard to guess that the difficult situation in the republic that has taken shape in the past 18 months has contributed to the acceleration of the migration of the Russian-speaking population and that the Osh events exerted a particular influence. This is yet another argument in support of the immediate need for economic transformations, patience and tolerance in interethnic relations, friendship and civic harmony. When changes for the better show through in our life, interethnic problems will recede into the background.

I am sure that departure from the republic is for the majority of Russians a tragedy. This is their home, and many have roots here going back centuries. I have today to appeal to a Russian person as a good neighbor if he has thought about leaving: Think again, stay! All today's difficulties are temporary. And we together, hand in hand, shoulder to shoulder, will unfailingly overcome them. Many people are afraid of some kind of discrimination, evidently. There are no grounds for such misgivings, I believe. Recent months have shown clearly that the Kirghiz people have, on the whole, a friendly attitude toward the Russian-speaking population and have absolutely no intention of looking for explanations for their accumulated problems and misfortunes in interethnic relations.

The outflow of the Russian-speaking population is extremely undesirable. This is not only my viewpoint, the vast majority of the people of Kirghizstan thinks this way, as does the government and parliament. It is necessary to formulate strong social, civic, property, and other safeguards to halt this process. Much will depend on how quickly and efficiently we open small businesses and create small enterprises and new jobs, in the villages

particularly. A mass exodus of the youth not only outside of the republic but also into its large cities, to Frunze and the Chuyskaya Valley, is being observed from Kirghizia's Russian-speaking villages. For example, in such large villages of Ak-Suyskiy Rayon as Razdolnoye, Orli-noye, Shapak, and Otradnoye—I was born and raised here, incidentally—I rarely see now not only young people but my contemporaries also. I meet many of them in the city, and they say: "Had there been suitable work, I would never have left."

The Russians in Kirghizia should, of course, develop their language, culture, and traditions. They also need to consolidate on the basis of a recognition of historical community, an aspiration to spirituality and the finding of a fitting place in the coming new life. So the true, deep-lying interests of all people—Kirghiz, Russians, Uzbeks—coincide, in the main.

[Correspondent] We are on the way toward a new Union treaty and the real sovereignty of the republic. What is your position in respect of these problems?

[Saadanbekov] How quickly times change! Just two years ago I was addressing a session of the republic Supreme Soviet and justifying the need for its acquisition of real sovereignty. What a pandemonium of labels and "isms" was raised around me! And today? The proclamation of sovereignty by Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and other republics testifies that this very idea is not the intrigues of some "nationalists" but a natural process of the decentralization of society.

The draft Union treaty has been published. The concept of a renewed federation and the formation of a future Union state has been employed here.

For our republic this is an acceptable approach, on the whole. True, certain aspects of the document require considerable reworking, in my view. First, we do not see in it the actual levers by which the republics might directly exercise foreign economic relations and move toward direct contacts with foreign countries. In short, achieve a certain decentralization of foreign economic activity in their favor. Nor is it clear whether they will be able to subscribe directly to the numerous international conventions and participate in their practical realization.

Second, the draft reflects the core of sovereignty—the security sphere—unilaterally and in a purely military understanding. Yet the main threat to the country's security today is contained in its domestic situation. This includes the possible prospect of economic and technical backwardness, the exacerbation of national relations, the growth of crime, an intensification of the economic crisis and the ongoing paralysis of power. As a result our state, having accumulated a colossal reserve of military power, has found itself extremely vulnerable in respect to internal problems.

The existing mechanisms of the safeguarding of security are not designed, however, for warding off these threats.

The tragic events in Osh and other regions demonstrated how unprepared the country was for the solution of such crises. Consequently, entirely new, radical approaches to these important matters are needed.

And, finally, the draft treaty fails to take account of the starting conditions of the republics joining the Union. This could lead to an imbalance in their equality, particularly upon the transition to market relations. I believe that the instrument of an equalization of starting conditions should be a regional development fund, social and national economic programs financed from all-Union sources and a new structural and investment policy.

[Correspondent] Thank you, Zhumagul Saadanbekov, for the interview. I wish you great success!

Sydykov Claims Osh Conflict Charges Unfounded

*91US0212A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 25 Nov 90 p 3*

[Interview with Osh Oblast Party Committee First Secretary Usen S. Sydykov by Correspondent V. Kim, Osh: "The Accusations Addressed Toward Me Are Unfounded..."]

[Text] Soon after Usen Sydykov's election to the post of party and soviet leader of Osh Oblast, tragic events unfolded here. Many in the republic associate the Osh tragedy with the name of U. Sydykov. And now demands that he retire are being directed toward him. How just are they?

Osh Oblast Party Committee First Secretary U. S. Sydykov, chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, responds to this and a number of other questions from our correspondent.

[Sydykov] Let me say frankly that I have wanted to speak out on this subject for a long time. And not just because some people are still trying to blame me for something I didn't do. I feel that the people must know the whole truth. The truth, only the truth, can heal and quiet troubled souls.

It was with mixed feelings that I moved to Osh. On one hand I was happy to return to the land where I was born, where I grew up and where I worked. On the other hand I understood quite well that working in a leadership post in our anxious times would not be easy—more difficult, at least, than for my predecessors. In this time of perestroyka, sometimes people are uncontrollable. They are absorbed more by making demands than by working diligently. I was ready for the most unexpected situations: for rallies and strikes, for mass processions and demonstrations. For anything you might think of, except for what happened.

[Correspondent] And so, on 20 April you were elected leader of the oblast party organization.

[Sydykov] And literally that same day I was forced to deal with problems evoked by demands of the "Osh Aymagy" movement. From what I know, it was formed in March of this year. Its organizers dreamed of seizing land in the manner of their Frunze peers. Let me make the qualification right away that the movement was not born in a vacuum. It came into being on the soil of extremely acute social problems that have literally swamped many rayons of Osh Oblast, and particularly in regions having a high density of Kirghiz inhabitants. These problems had to be solved immediately. But the authorities remained inactive for many long years. The abscess festered. Adventurists capitalized on this.

On 3 May "Osh Aymagy" demanded a meeting with the oblast's leaders. On that same day the leaders of the movement were received by oblast executive committee chairman Bekbolotov. Later on he communicated the contents of this discussion to me: "Osh Aymagy" demanded land on which to build housing. But as Bekbolotov explained, land would be distributed not only to Kirghiz but to all residents of Osh needing it. Bekbolotov discussed this matter in detail with the republic's Prime Minister Dzhumagulov.

This information was a relief to me. The oblast party committee bureau gave its support to the government measures. A decision was made with Dzhumagulov's consent to allocate 312 hectares of farmland at the Kolkhoz imeni Kalinin as private plots. As you can see, the issue was resolved rather vigorously. Nonetheless, on 16 May we received an openly threatening letter from the leaders of "Osh Aymagy."

[Correspondent] You were disturbed by this?

[Sydykov] Alerted would be a better word. We had before us the examples of Tbilisi, Sumgait, Karabakh and Dushanbe. I knew that we had to act quickly, and without delay. There was even no discussion of punitive measures. But our conciliatory approach was perceived by the young people as weakness.

On 18 May the active party and administrative personnel of the oblast and city held a conference in Osh. It was decided that land would be distributed strictly to enterprises and organizations on the basis of priority. I once again cautioned all participants of the conference that the land had to be given out not just to participants of the "Osh Aymagy" movement alone.

An oblast party conference was held on 26 May. On that same day another threatening message came from the informal group. After this, the oblast party committee conferred far beyond midnight. It was decided that all of the city's administrative executives would take part in the next day's land distribution.

After discussing this matter thoroughly, oblast soviet first deputy chairman Batyrally Sydykov, oblast party committee secretary for agriculture A. Isabayev and I surveyed the hayfields from the air on that same day.

And suddenly it was communicated to us in Dzhahal-Abad that oblast party committee second secretary Davydov had telephoned, and that he very anxiously requested my return to Osh.

We came back immediately. We were dropped off at a school located in the vicinity of the Osh Cotton Association. The leaders and secretaries of the party organizations of a number of the city's enterprises and organizations, many members of the oblast party committee bureau and executives of Kara-Suyskiy Rayon and the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin were waiting for us. Participants of the "Osh Aymagy" movement were nearby.

The discussion between the sides was clearly not progressing, even though in the morning it seemed as if things were going all right. In accordance with our plans, buses arrived here filled with people requiring land plots. They were driven to plots belonging to the Kolkhoz imeni Kalinin. But one of the extremists of the "Osh Aymagy" movement spoiled everything. While people were taking their seats in a bus, he announced: "We aren't going anywhere. We want land here, in the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin." Many supported him. An effort was made to reason with them. But stones were thrown in reply.

[Correspondent] How did you feel about this turn of events?

[Sydykov] I was angered by the treachery. Everything had been agreed upon, you see. The new demands smacked of blackmail. We were simply driven into a corner. But everyone tried to convince me, to persuade me that there was nothing else to do, that ultimately, a conflict would be worse than any concession. And so a concession had to be made. But it was made with a heavy heart. The job of transferring the land of the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin was given to Bekbolotov and the leadership of Kara-Suyskiy Rayon and the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin.

[Correspondent] Does it seem to you that this concession was too great?

[Sydykov] We had no other choice. We conferred, and we decided to take 34 hectares of farmland away from the kolkhoz. Of this amount, 10 hectares were reserved for construction of multistory dwellings. The rest of it was to be transferred to the city's enterprises and organizations. Before leaving, I once again cautioned Bekbolotov, Asanaliyev and other comrades that no discrimination would be tolerated in the apportionment of land. Unfortunately, in their meetings with members of the informal group they did not make this highly important condition clear. The leaders of "Osh Aymagy" naturally perceived our concession as a personal victory. And right then and there, they organized a wild drinking party. In the meantime, a rumor that housing would be built only for the Kirghiz on land of the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin spread quickly through the city.

[Correspondent] It was precisely from this moment that the atmosphere in the city began to grow tense.

[Sydykov] I was totally unsuspecting. On the following day I went to Naukat, where I spent the whole day touring the farms. In the meantime the unrest now spread to the Uzbek part of the population. A spontaneous rally occurred on that same field at the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin. Asanaliyev and Davydov went there immediately. They had to somehow persuade the participants of the rally that no injustices would be allowed. Nonetheless, as subsequent events proved, their words did not reach many of them. The subsequent course of events was predetermined in many ways.

The Uzbek side organized its next rally on 30 May. I was invited. Before I could even get to the microphone thousands of shouting voices filled the field: "Down with Sydykov!" Gathering my wits, I announced to all: "No one is going to get any of this land." But no one was listening to me any longer. Central Committee Secretary Sherimkulov then came up to the microphone. He tried to take up where I left off, explaining that no one had given this land to the "Osh Aymagy" movement. It was being allocated to all labor collectives of the city. But no one was listening any longer to him either. And yet it was with tremendous enthusiasm that the crowd met the appearance of Kulmatov, the oblast's former leader.

[Correspondent] How did he respond to such a reception?

[Sydykov] He appeared to be pleased by it. Still, just two days later he became persuaded that his popularity was not something permanent. He was showered with accusations as well. Though at this rally, only he was allowed to speak. Kulmatov was given a list of 18 demands. I recall being struck by the fact that not one of the demands concerned land.

Meetings with leaders of the city's informal organizations were set up immediately. Both the Kirghiz and the Uzbeks settled on 4 June as the date, though without any sort of collusion. We wanted a later meeting. But we were unable to persuade either of the parties. We managed to talk young Kirghiz into giving up the land in the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin. That left the Uzbeks to deal with.

Soon came the appointed day. Young men from "Osh Aymagy" gathered on the field of discord from early morning. Soon after, they were driven to land of three suburban farms (the Kolkhoz imeni Kalinin, a sovkhos-tekhnikum and Kenesh Sovkhos). The field of the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin was circled by militia. But the young people suddenly began returning. Things began to get out of hand. It was after midday when I was informed of this. Dzhumagulov and I returned to the field right away, and immediately noted that Uzbeks were gathering not far away. A collision between the two groups was becoming evermore probable. To avoid conflict, the militia were asked to disperse the Kirghiz group, since we still had a meeting scheduled with the Uzbeks. Nothing good could be hoped from it. It was then that Dzhumagulov communicated to Frunze that a state of emergency needed to be announced immediately. As I

learned later on, opinions were divided on this account in Frunze. Minister of Internal Affairs was opposed. But Masaliyev insisted on announcing a state of emergency.

[Correspondent] How simple it would have been to avert bloodshed!

[Sydykov] Of course, prompt announcement of a state of emergency would have altered the situation abruptly. But we were hampered by imperfections in the law. In order for a state of emergency to go into effect, there had to be a mass disturbance. That's the way our law reads, paradoxical as it may seem.

[Correspondent] Did Dzhumagulov possess the necessary information about the events in Osh?

[Sydykov] Doubtlessly. He had been in the oblast center since 31 May, and he saw for himself how the situation grew more complicated with every day.

[Correspondent] In the meantime you were warned of the impending danger by Osh Oblast former internal affairs administration chief Tadzhibayev and former KGB administration chief Mameyev.

[Sydykov] Let me make something clear in regard to Mameyev. Tadzhibayev did in fact insist upon announcement of a state of emergency. This was on 2 June. We all felt the approach of catastrophe. Both Tadzhibayev and Mameyev were invited to the oblast party committee in this connection. Mameyev's opinion seemed the most competent to us. On 2 June Mameyev, speaking to Tadzhibayev, said for all to hear: "Don't panic. We shouldn't be in a hurry to commit troops." Witnesses can confirm this. His words gave us cause to relax.

[Correspondent] It turns out, then, that the army could have been committed before the disturbances began. For this to happen, someone in the leadership would have had to take a risk.

[Sydykov] Before the Tbilisi tragedy, this was not an issue.

[Correspondent] Was everyone afraid to take responsibility?

[Sydykov] If I had anything to say about it, I would have acted decisively. But the matter was outside my competency. Only two people in the republic possessed the right to take this step.

[Correspondent] Your story has broadened our understanding of the Osh tragedy. Why did you remain silent before?

[Sydykov] It is easy to explain my silence: No one ever asked me about anything. And I didn't want to be an imposition. The truth was known in a small circle.

[Correspondent] Much was written about your role in the Osh tragedy in the central newspapers.

[Sydykov] The articles were intrepid and even talently written. And they were written 70 percent dependably. As a rule the newspaper accounts were based on facts. And the conclusions seemed true enough. The victims were pitied, and the culprits were labeled. It was all true, save for a few "details." The sad thing is that the authors gave no thought at all to what their sensational articles might lead to. And in some cases the consequences were the most tragic. Journalists juggled facts and figures lightly, forgetting that they represented blood, loss of human life and irretrievable losses. Some of the reports even openly urged revenge. Is such a thing permissible? The objective of some of the writers was but one: to treat the reader to some more sensational news. And that's nothing more than cynicism.

[Correspondent] The conclusion reached in the articles was this: A bloody battle occurred at the connivance of the authorities of Osh Oblast.

[Sydykov] Such conclusions are unfounded and unjust, and they deepened the division between the two peoples. Only outsiders, cold disinterested observers, following the struggle without personal commitment could have written in this way about our tragedy.

[Correspondent] Doesn't it seem to you that the conflict between the authorities of Osh and the central press was no accident? You simply understated the possibilities of the mass media. The side possessing objective information should be interested in making it known.

[Sydykov] Well, you might be right. We kept silent, while those who were able to react faster obligingly fed biased information to reporters. But what is interesting is that in many instances the newspaper articles evoked a backlash among the people. I am referring to the Kirghiz population.

I am deeply certain that the central newspapers helped to polarize opinions and sentiments and to intensify interethnic enmity by certain ill-conceived statements.

[Correspondent] Soon after the June and July events, Asanov, Uzakov, Akimbayev and Sydykov, who headed the party committees and soviets of Uzgenskiy, Kara-Suyskiy and Alayskiy rayons and Osh, were dismissed from their executive posts. The opinion exists that these people should have been punished more strictly.

[Sydykov] I am aware that some are demanding brutal measures in relation to these comrades. But tell me please, what are we going to punish them for? We were within our rights to dismiss them from their posts for failing to justify the trust shown in them. But for what crimes should we punish them? Take for example Aky-lbek Sydykov. From my point of view he is a very competent, thinking executive. No one doubts that he did make some mistakes. He shouldn't have ignored work with informal groups. But who in the republic, or even in the country, had seriously dealt with them even in the recent past?

[Correspondent] The results of such an attitude were found to be deplorable.

[Sydykov] Which is why Sydykov was dismissed from his important party post. But as far as Uzakov, Asanov and Akimbayev are concerned, they are a different case. They behaved shamefully during the days of the tragic events.

[Correspondent] Voices have been raised in the oblast concerning the need for your retirement as well.

[Sydykov] Let's begin by analyzing this: Who is making this demand, and in general, how many people adhere to such an opinion—50, 100, 5,000? I think that the overwhelming majority of the oblast's population will not agree with them. I do of course have my detractors. But who doesn't? The oblast party committee plenum supported me unanimously, and the people's deputies of Osh Oblast are solidly with me. The accusations addressed toward me are unfounded, you see. And anyway, to be honest I'm not afraid of retirement. If necessary, I can go back to work as a shepherd—something I learned in my youth. I'm not afraid of any kind of work, and I can work 20 hours a day. But by my voluntary retirement I wouldn't want to add to the power of those who blame me for something I didn't do.

[Correspondent] Your "iron hand" is legendary among the people. But willful leadership is one of yesterday's excesses.

[Sydykov] I have never shirked work, and I have never permitted those around me to sit about idly. I do not deny that there was a time when I commanded, demanded and compelled. That's the way I learned to do it from my teachers. But then perestroika arrived, and all of us were given a healthy dose of sobriety. We came to understand that we were following far from the best path to our goal. You cannot achieve abundance by force and authoritarianism. The individual must be interested in his work. I came to believe in the advantages of a market economy.

[Correspondent] But aren't the old stereotypes an obstacle to you?

[Sydykov] I'm not the only one that's changing. The people and the entire country are changing as well. The only thing that can change a person is faith. And I have deep faith in perestroika. My self-critical nature can serve as a guarantee of my consistency.

[Correspondent] And finally, how do you assess the situation in the oblast today?

[Sydykov] I would be afraid to say anything categorical. But it seems to me that the situation is improving. And one thing that is very important is that we are being met with understanding on the part of the leadership of Andizhan Oblast and the inhabitants at large. Recently a group of our oblast's leaders were invited to Andizhan to celebrate Agricultural Worker's Day. The trip was satisfying to me. I met with influential people who expressed

a desire to personally assist me in restoring trust between the peoples. The famous singer Sherali should be arriving in Osh soon on a peace mission; he intends to visit Uzgen for this purpose as well.

Turkmen CP Draft Bylaws Published

91US0189A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 9 Dec 90 pp 1- 2

[Draft "Bylaws of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan (Basic Provisions of Organizational and Structural Formation)"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The Communist Party of Turkmenistan is an independent political organization within the CPSU in which citizens living in the Turkmen SSR are united on a voluntary basis. The Communist Party of Turkmenistan sets itself the goal of creatively developing Marxist-Leninist doctrine, applying the achievements of progressive social thought and accumulated experience, and of upholding internationalism to establish a humane, democratic socialist society in the republic. It will seek social justice, show concern for the interests of the citizens of the republic, and advocate the consolidation of all progressive forces.

The Communist Party of Turkmenistan shall be guided in its activity by its own Action Program and Bylaws, formulated in accordance with the Program and Charter of the CPSU.

As a component of Turkmen SSR's political system, the Turkmenistan Communist Party shall operate within the framework of the Constitutions of the USSR and the Turkmen SSR, all-union and republic laws.

I. Members of the Party, Their Rights and Duties

1. Membership in the Communist Party of Turkmenistan is open to citizens of the Turkmenian SSR who have reached the age of 18, accept the Communist Party's program documents, work in a primary party organization, and pay membership dues.

2. A member of the Turkmenistan Communist Party has the right: to raise and freely debate questions of internal and external policy and inner-party life, participate in formulating decisions, enjoy the political support and protection of the party organization in his public activity, elect and be elected to party bodies, be informed of their work, evaluate and criticize any party body and any communist, submit statements and suggestions to party bodies at all levels and expect a response from them, and participate in the work of a party body when it is discussing his proposal or an issue concerning his actions or behavior.

A member of the Turkmenistan Communist Party has the right to participate in the work of public organizations and movements whose activities are conducted in accordance with the Constitutions of the USSR and the

Turkmenian SSR, all-union and republican laws. A communist cannot be a member of other political parties or public organizations whose political platforms contradict the ideas of the party.

3. A member of the Turkmenistan Communist Party is duty bound to raise his political and cultural level, advocate the party's ideas, work for the achievement of its program objectives, carry out party decisions, obey the law and norms of public morality, and show concern for the strengthening and growth of party ranks.

4. Members are accepted to the party on an individual basis upon personal application.

Note: For members of the Leninist Young Communist League of Turkmenistan joining the party, at the discretion of the primary party organization vouchers can be accepted from the respective Komsomol organization.

The decision to grant party membership shall be made by a meeting of the primary party organization and considered valid if passed by more than one-half the communists registered in that organization, except for those who have requested to be relieved from regular work for reasons of health or age and are, for that reason, not present at the party meeting.

A party raykom or gorkom bureau may express justified disagreement with a primary party organization's decision to grant party membership. In that case the decision shall be reviewed and enter into force only after it has been confirmed by the party organization.

A primary party organization may, at its discretion, set a trial period of up to one year for an applicant, and also require vouchers from two communists.

The Turkmenistan Communist Party shall use the same party card as the CPSU. Party membership record-keeping procedures shall be the same as in the CPSU.

A communist who has worked actively in the party for not less than 30 years can, by decision of the primary party organization, be awarded the honorary title, "Veteran of the CPSU."

A communist shall be registered as desired at his place of work, study or residence and with the concurrence of the primary party organization.

If a party member, for reasons of health, age, or family circumstances, is unable to participate fully in party life, his primary party organization may, on the basis of a personal request, waive regular work and payment of membership dues.

5. Party membership may be terminated by decision of the primary party organization on its own initiative or at the suggestion of a superior party body as a consequence of expulsion of a member from the party for actions and behavior incompatible with the CPSU Charter and the Bylaws of the Turkmenistan Communist Party, and also in response to a communist's own request to resign

voluntarily. Resignations from the Turkmenistan Communist Party shall be considered on an individual basis.

A party member who has failed, without valid cause, to pay membership dues for more than three months shall be discussed at a meeting of communists and, if he has lost contact with the primary party organization, expelled from its ranks.

Party members may be subjected to measures of party education and influence in the form of reproof or reprimand for violating party discipline and norms of public morality.

An expelled or reprimanded member has the right to appeal his case within one month to higher party bodies. The appeal shall be examined within not more than two months after it was received.

II. Inner-Party Democracy

6. The Turkmenistan Communist Party exists and acts on the basis of ideological community and party comradeship and the principle of democratic centralism, which ensures self-management in party life, combining the interests of the party and individual communists, the authority of the party masses, and conscious discipline.

7. All organizations of the Turkmenistan Communist Party are independent in running their inner-party affairs and activities. They shall participate in formulating party policy, specific political and socio-economic programs, and areas of ideological-educational work among the working people and the entire population. They shall base their work on the principles of collectivism and personal responsibility, ensure glasnost and openness, the free expression of opinions, comparison of different views and platforms, constructive criticism and self-criticism, and regularly inform the communists and superior party bodies about their activity. Their decisions, insofar as they do not contradict the program objectives of the party and are adopted in the framework of the authority provided by the CPSU Charter and the Bylaws of the Turkmenistan Communist Party, cannot be repealed by superior bodies, except for decisions on personal cases. In the event of differences, any of these bodies has the right to refer to the primary party organizations to resolve the controversial issue.

8. The leading bodies of the party are: the general meeting, conference, and congress. They shall be considered authoritative when attended by more than one-half—two thirds for reports and elections—of the membership of a party organization or of the elected delegates. The leading party bodies shall elect executive bodies (bureaus, committees) and auditing commissions.

Party bodies may set up standing or ad hoc commissions or working groups in their main areas of work, and also make use of other forms of participation of communists and nonmembers in their activities.

9. All leading and executive bodies of the Turkmenistan Communist Party shall be elected by secret ballot. The lists for secret ballot may include any number of candidates. During elections, there shall be no limitation on the number of candidates party members may nominate, including themselves. Those candidates shall be considered elected who have received more than one-half the votes of the CPSU members taking part in the voting at a party meeting, conference, party committee plenum or party congress. The procedure for electing party committees and auditing commissions and delegates to conferences and congresses shall be set by the respective party committee with the participation of the primary organizations, which shall have the right to submit suggestions regarding candidates for membership in superior party bodies and, if necessary, the recall of their representatives from them.

Members of elective bodies at the raykom level and higher may be elected to the same position for not more than two consecutive terms. A party member cannot sit on more than two elective party bodies. **In exceptional cases, proceeding from considerations of the expediency of representation of individual party organizations, their members may be elected simultaneously to three elective bodies of the Turkmen Communist Party.**

The membership of elective party bodies may be reviewed or completely replaced before the end of their terms. The question shall be considered at the demand of party organizations accounting for not less than one-third the members of the respective organization, or at the request of one or all members of the elective body to resign voluntarily.

10. Leading bodies are responsible to the party masses. Party committees and auditing commissions are accountable to the party organizations that formed them, and each member of an elective body reports on his work to the party organization that elected or recommended him.

11. The Communist Party of the republic must have a precise mechanism for preparing, passing and implementing party decisions. When formulating them, party organizations and their bodies must consider all points of view. A decision adopted by the majority is mandatory for all communists. The minority have the right to advocate their positions, up to and including repeat consideration in their organization or in superior bodies, with the legitimacy of those positions determined according to specific results.

At the initiative of leading or executive bodies, as well as at the demand of the respective party organizations uniting no less than one-third of their members, debates and referendums may be conducted on important issues of the activity of the Communist Party or its individual regional party organizations.

If, on the initiative of not less than one-third of the communists, any proposals are submitted to a regional party organization, the corresponding party committee

must consider them within a month's time and express its position on the issues raised.

Decisions of the leading bodies of the CPSU and the Turkmen Communist Party—congresses, conferences, meetings—are mandatory for all party organizations and communists.

Decisions of the Turkmen CP Central Committee and oblast committees are, as a rule, adopted after thorough discussion by party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms, and those of rayon and city party committees and their bureaus—by the primary party organizations concerned, and having been passed they are mandatory for implementation.

12. For the duration of their terms, elective party bodies shall set up a subordinate apparatus which provides informational- analytical, prognostic-sociological, and consultation services. Workers of the party apparatus are subject to labor legislation.

The functions of the apparatus of party committees include coordination of party-political activities, implementation of specific organizational and ideological-political work in party organizations, and direct ties with them.

Staff workers of the party apparatus have the right to take part in the work of committee and bureau sessions and meetings of party organizations and to have access to documents at the disposal of committees and organizations accountable to the given body.

13. Party organizations and committees may publish, at their own expense or jointly with other organizations, newspapers, journals and other materials, set up appropriate editorial offices and TV and radio studios. The party mass media are organs of party organizations and committees, their managers are elected or endorsed at the corresponding party meeting or party committee plenum, conference or congress.

III. Organizational Structure of the Turkmen Communist Party

14. The Communist Party of Turkmenistan is organized according to the territorial-production principle. Its base comprises primary organizations, which are organized at communists' places of work, study or residence. The republican Communist Party structure also includes rayon, city and oblast party organizations.

Party members may, on their own initiative, form councils of secretaries of party organizations, party clubs, theoretical seminars, party veterans councils, and other forms of affiliation of communists according to interests and problems. Although they are not primary party organizations, they may, on the basis of the program principles of the CPSU and Turkmen Communist Party, discuss various issues and formulate their positions on them, and submit proposals and drafts for the consideration of party committees of any level.

It is not permitted to set up factions with their internal discipline within the Turkmen Communist Party, which does not restrict the right of communists to join together on platforms in the course of debate.

15. The Turkmen Communist Party's Bylaws are the basic document that regulates inner-party life. Instructions on the registration of party members, financial affairs and accounting shall be developed on the basis of appropriate documents of the CPSU and endorsed by the Turkmen CP Central Committee.

Primary Party Organizations

16. Primary party organizations shall be set up, when there are not less than three communists, by a decision of their meeting and registered by the corresponding party raykom or gorkom.

Industrial primary party organizations shall be set up by affiliating communists working in the same labor collective or in a production or other association of labor collectives located within one city or rayon.

Territorial primary party organizations may be set up either by affiliating communists residing within a given area or by merging party organizations within a community or residential area.

A primary party organization may, by decision of its general membership meeting, set up party groups and shop party organizations within its structure. They may be given the rights of primary organizations on questions connected with party membership.

Industrial primary party organizations may form territorial shop party organizations or party groups.

Taking into account specific issues and conditions of their activity, primary party organizations shall deal independently with questions of accepting new members and terminating membership; they shall determine their structure, areas and methods of work, schedule and hold meetings, but not less than once every two months, sponsor political actions, conduct their financial and administrative affairs, and develop relations with local governments and public organizations.

The primary party organizations of the Turkmen Communist Party shall implement party decisions, conduct ideological, political and organizational work in labor collectives and among the population in residential neighborhoods. Their tasks are to promote an active socio-economic policy, analyze the situation in labor collectives, propose ways and take active part in overcoming shortcomings and omissions and solving problems of daily life, timely respond to the moods and demands of the working people, and uphold social justice. Primary party organizations must defend communists from unfair treatment, unjustified attacks and give them political and moral support, striving that every communist be responsible for the fate and prestige of his party organization.

Primary party organizations have the right to draft documents in preparation for party congresses, conferences and plenums of party committees and voice their opinions concerning decisions of any party body, which must provide a substantive response. They may submit proposals for recalling communists registered with them or recommended by them from party bodies of all levels.

17. Primary party organizations shall hold meetings (conferences) to elect, for a term of **two-three years**, a party bureau (committee) and its secretary to conduct current work, and also, at the communists' discretion, financial commissions. Party organizations numbering fewer than 15 communists shall elect a secretary of the party organization and his deputy, and party groups shall elect a party group organizer. Their terms shall be determined by the membership meeting, but not longer than two-three years.

Rayon, City and Oblast Organizations of the Turkmen Communist Party

18. Rayon and city party organizations, which directly affiliate primary organizations, constitute the party's basic structural element.

The rayon/city party conference shall elect, for a term of five years, a rayon/city party committee, and also an auditing commission. The rayon/city party committee, taking into account the views of primary organizations, shall convene a plenum to elect a bureau and raykom/gorkom secretaries. Party committees shall hold plenums not less than twice a year.

Party raykoms/gorkoms shall maintain files of communists, coordinate the activities of primary party organizations, helping them to find forms and methods of work that would promote the development of the creative nature of their activity, fuller consideration of the specific features and traditions of their collectives, and the growth of their prestige and influence among the masses. Together with primary party organizations, they shall organize work to implement party policies and decisions in labor collectives and at citizens' places of residence, submit specific socioeconomic, cultural and other problems for the consideration of the public and the authorities, and promote their implementation.

19. An issue of special concern of rayon and city party committees is the improvement of the qualitative makeup of party ranks and their replenishment with fresh forces and active participants in perestroyka. Their functions include profound analytical activity to determine the quality of party replenishments and the trends of change in the makeup of party organizations, as well as the formulation, jointly with secretaries of primary party organizations, of ways to improve the selection of people for the party and work with young communists.

20. Oblast party organizations work within their oblasts to implement party policy and ensure the implementation of decisions adopted by them and superior party

bodies. The oblast party conference elects an appropriate party committee for five-year terms, and also an auditing commission.

The oblast party committee elects at its plenum a bureau and secretaries; it independently determines the structure of its organization and grants the largest primary party organizations party raykom rights on questions of party membership records.

Conferences, and also plenums of rayon, city and oblast party committees, formulate and suggest to government authorities and the population programs for the resolution of political, national, social, economic, ecological and cultural-moral problems in the rayon, city or oblast.

They deal with questions of inner-party life, work with personnel, the budgets of party organizations, and publishing activity. Plenums of party obkoms are held not less than twice a year.

21. Extraordinary party conferences may be convened by decision of rayon, city or oblast party committees or at the demand of party organizations representing not less than one-third the total membership of a given organization.

22. The auditing commissions of rayon, city and oblast party organizations audit the implementation of party budgets and the business activity of party offices, monitor the receipt, accounting and distribution of party membership dues, adherence to established procedures of considering appeals by party organizations and letters and statements by communists and working people. An auditing commission is accountable to the body that elected it and functions independently in accordance with the approved regulations on auditing commissions of rayon, city and oblast party organizations.

23. Commissions comprising members of gorkoms and raykoms, as well as other communists, shall be set up by party committee plenums for various areas of activity, including for purposes of control. The chairmen of party control commissions shall be elected from the membership of party committees and approved at the plenum.

The party control commissions of raykoms, gorkoms and obkoms shall monitor the implementation of the decisions of superior party bodies, resolve questions associated with observing party discipline and public morals by communists, defend the honor and dignity of party members, consider appeals, and prosecute those who stifle criticism and are guilty of various abuses.

24. Resolutions of the Bureau of the Turkmen CP Central Committee concerning oblast, city and rayon party organizations shall be considered with the participation of their representatives. If an oblast, city or rayon party committee does not agree with an adopted resolution it may demand consideration of controversial issues at a plenum of the Turkmen CP Central Committee.

The Highest and Central Bodies of the Turkmen Communist Party

25. The congress is the highest body of the Turkmen Communist Party, and the Central Committee is its central executive body. The Central Committee of the republican Communist Party shall convene regular congresses not less than once in five years. The Central Committee decision to convene a congress, its agenda and norms of representation shall be announced not less than three months prior to the congress. The Central Committee shall publish draft documents on all the main issues to be considered by the congress.

The Central Committee may call an early (extraordinary) congress of the Turkmen Communist Party on its own initiative or at the request of party organizations affiliating not less than one-third of the total number of communists. The representation quotas and procedures for electing delegates to the congress shall be determined by the Central Committee on the basis of suggestions by party committees and primary organizations.

The congress shall be called within a two-months period and considered legitimate if a majority of the oblast, city and rayon party organizations are represented at it.

If the Central Committee fails to convene an early (extraordinary) congress, the organizations that demanded it may form an organizational committee having the rights of Party Central Committee to convene an early (extraordinary) congress.

26. The congress of the Turkmen Communist Party shall:

- consider reports and presentations by the Central Committee, Auditing Commission and other bodies and persons elected by the congress, pass resolutions and give assessments of their work;
- adopt the Turkmen Communist Party's Program and Bylaws, revise and amend them;
- determine the Turkmen Communist Party's policies in the republic's economic, political and cultural life, the organizational and ideological activity of the party, ethnic relations, and the internal and external policies of the Turkmen Communist Party;
- elect the Turkmen Communist Party's Central Committee and Auditing Commission;
- elect the chairman of the Turkmen CP Central Committee and his deputies, simultaneously electing them members of the Bureau of the Turkmen CP Central Committee;
- elect delegates to CPSU congresses.

27. During the period between congresses, the Central Committee of the Turkmen Communist Party may call a republican party conference to discuss pertinent issues of the Turkmen Communist Party's policies and practical activities.

The conference shall be authorized to consider reports of the Turkmen Communist Party's Central Committee

and Auditing Commission about their work, partially (up to one-third during a period between congresses) replenish their membership, take other mandatory decisions for the Turkmen Communist Party, introduce amendments to the Turkmen Communist Party's Action Program and Bylaws.

28. During the time between congresses the Central Committee of the Turkmen Communist Party shall convene not less than two plenary sessions a year and:

- organize implementation of resolutions of Turkmen Communist Party congresses and conferences and CPSU congresses and conferences;
- formulate and submit proposals on the content of domestic and foreign policies to the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmenian SSR;
- determine the action policies of party groups in republican representative bodies;
- formulate and implement the Turkmen Communist Party's personnel policy;
- set up party offices and enterprises and monitor their activity;
- approve the Turkmen Communist Party's budget, its structure, the amount of contributions to it from revenues of local party organizations and enterprises and of subsidies to them from budgetary funds, and endorse reports on implementation of the party budget;
- collaborate with sociopolitical organizations in the republic and represent the Turkmen Communist Party in relations with foreign parties.

29. The Central Committee shall elect the Bureau of the Turkmen CP Central Committee to handle political and organizational questions between plenums and determine its numerical composition.

The Bureau Central Committee shall forward decisions to party organizations on its own behalf. The bureau shall submit draft resolutions on the most important political issues for discussion by primary party organizations, with subsequent endorsement at a plenum of the Turkmen CP Central Committee.

The Central Committee shall elect a Secretariat of the Turkmen CP Central Committee. The Secretariat shall organize the implementation in the party of the resolutions of congresses and conferences of the Turkmen Communist Party and CPSU and their executive bodies and supervise the work of the Turkmen CP Central Committee apparatus.

30. The Turkmen CP Central Committee shall set up commissions in the main areas of its work, including for its monitoring functions.

They shall be constituted at Central Committee plenums from among Central Committee members, as well as other communists approved as advisors or nonstaff

members. The commissions shall be headed by secretaries and other members of the Central Committee elected at a plenum of the Turkmen CP Central Committee.

In its work the Party Control Commission of the Turkmen CP Central Committee shall be guided by the CPSU Charter, bylaws of the Turkmen Communist Party and statutes approved by Turkmen CP Central Committee plenums and shall annually report on its work at a plenum of the Turkmen CP Central Committee. On issues falling within its terms of reference all decisions of the Party Control Commission shall be final and they shall be forwarded to party organizations in its name.

31. Pursuant to the charter of the CPSU, decisions of the CPSU Politburo Central Committee concerning the Turkmen Communist Party shall be considered with the participation of its authorized representatives. If it disagrees with an adopted decision, the Turkmen CP Central Committee shall have the right to demand that the controversial issues be considered at a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee or a joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

IV. Communists in Soviets, Government Agencies, Public Associations

32. The Communist Party of Turkmenistan upholds its right to political leadership in free competition with other sociopolitical forces by formulating and submitting to society its socioeconomic, political and other programs, drawing the masses to the side of the party and into its ranks, pursuing its political line through communists working in local government, state and economic bodies and labor collectives.

It shall field candidates during elections of the President of the republic and peoples deputies of the Turkmenian SSR and local soviets, help them to organize their election campaigns, and work for their election by political means.

Party organizations shall formulate and publish election platforms, recommend members and nonmembers of the party, with their concurrence, for nomination as candidates to run for seats of peoples deputies, and help them to organize election campaigns.

Party organizations may form electoral alliances with other sociopolitical organizations functioning on the basis of, and in compliance with, the Constitutions of the USSR and the Turkmenian SSR and support nonparty candidates for deputy nominated by them.

33. For the purpose of coordinating their actions and implementing the electorate's will and mandates, communists and their supporters elected to Soviets of Peoples Deputies may, for the period of their term, join in party groups, which will collaborate with the appropriate

party committees, receive help and support from them, and take their decisions and recommendations into account.

Communists in Soviets are forbidden to form groups or factions independent of leading party bodies, yet claiming to speak on behalf of the Turkmen Communist Party.

Party groups may elect a bureau or chairman for current work.

34. The Turkmen Communist Party shall collaborate with public forces adhering to positions of democracy and social justice and develop relations with trade union and other public organizations on the basis of political collaboration and respect of different points of view.

Party groups (communist factions) may be set up at congresses and conferences sponsored by public organizations.

35. In their work with the youth, party organizations shall rely on the Leninist Communist Youth League of Turkmenistan [LCYLT] and other republican youth organizations and render them all manner of assistance in their work. Their relations shall be based on the principles of political partnership, common ideology, mutual respect and trust. Party organizations shall involve them in the formulation and implementation of the Turkmen Communist Party's youth policy.

The Turkmen Communist Party regards the LCYLT as its immediate reserve for the replenishment of its ranks.

Members of the elective bodies of youth organizations may take part in considering questions of youth policy in the respective party committees.

36. Primary party organizations and party committees may recommend communists and nonmembers for work in specific areas of government, economic and public activity. Using political methods, they shall promote the election or appointment of communists and nonmembers to appropriate positions, render them support, consider communists' reports about their work, and make public the relevant conclusions and recommendations.

V. The Turkmen Communist Party and Party Organizations of the USSR Armed Forces on the Republic's Territory

37. The activity of party organizations in military units deployed in Turkmenistan shall be based on documents approved by the CPSU Central Committee.

Communists in military units deployed on the republic's territory may elect and be elected to elective bodies of territorial party organizations. Delegates to rayon, city and oblast party conferences, congresses of the Turkmen Communist Party and CPSU, and republican party conferences shall be elected at meetings and conferences

of the communists of military units and formations according to representation quotas determined by territorial party committees.

VI. The Turkmen Communist Party and Communist Parties of Other Soviet Republics and the World Communist Movement

38. The Turkmen Communist Party shall develop its relations with the communist parties of the union republics and parties of socialist orientation in other countries on the basis of the CPSU Program, businesslike cooperation, mutual understanding, party comradeship and solidarity.

VII. Cash Assets and Other Property of the Turkmen Communist Party

39. The activities of the Turkmen Communist Party and its organization are supported by cash, material and technical resources financed by the party's revenues.

The cash assets of the Turkmen Communist Party are derived from membership dues, revenues from publishing, manufacturing and economic activity, voluntary contributions from labor collectives of enterprises, collective farms, state farms and other organizations and individuals, and from other income that does not contradict current legislation.

Monthly membership dues for party members shall be assessed as follows:

For income up to R70 - 10 kopeks

R71-100 - 20 kopeks

R101-150 - 30 kopeks

R151-250 - 1 percent

over R250 - 2 percent.

Working pensioners shall pay separate membership dues according to their pensions and wages.

Disability pensions received by communists shall not be taken into account in assessing membership dues.

40. The Central Committee, oblast, city and rayon party organizations are independent in the disposal of their budgets and in resolving all structural, personnel, business and administrative issues. Budgets and reports on their implementation shall be endorsed at party committee plenums. Profitable business activity by party committees is encouraged, as long as it does not run contrary to the interests of political work.

41. The property of the Turkmen Communist Party is an all-party asset. The Turkmen Communist Party's material assets include buildings, structures, equipment, fixtures, cultural and educational property, cash, enterprises, the party press with incorporated periodical publications and printing presses, as well as other properties required for the functioning of the party.

Party committees shall exercise day-to-day management (ownership, operation, disbursement) of the property of party organizations. To replenish their funds, party committees and organizations may, by themselves or jointly with others, organize business enterprises in accordance with the laws of the republic governing business activity.

The Central Committee of the Turkmen Communist Party, local party committees, and enterprises, offices and organizations of the Turkmen Communist Party have the rights of legal persons and they may delegate their rights to structural subunits. Rights of a legal person may also be accorded to primary party organizations.

The financial activity of primary party organizations, including remuneration of full-time party functionaries, is funded from membership dues. The funded sums may not exceed 50 percent of gross receipts, and the percentage shall be determined annually by financial commissions set up by raykoms, gorkoms and party committees with the rights of raykoms, with the participation of secretaries of primary party organizations.

As a rule, remuneration of full-time functionaries of primary party organizations shall be financed from funds allotted to primary organizations. In cases when such funds are inadequate, instead of having full-time functionaries, party budget funds may be used to supplement the wages of elected officers.

Party committees shall annually inform communists of the state of the party budget and expenditures.

Uzbek Law on Status of People's Deputies Published

*91US0167A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
16 Nov 90 pp 2-3*

[UzSSR Law: "On the Status of UzSSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] In the Uzbek SSR the people exercise state authority through soviets of people's deputies, which are comprised of deputies elected by them. All other state organs are subordinate and accountable to soviets of people's deputies.

I. General Statutes

Article 1: Participation of Deputies in the Exercise of State Authority

Exercise of state authority by a soviet of people's deputies is based upon the initiative-filled and active participation of each deputy in its work.

By participating in the work of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet and local soviets of people's deputies, deputies resolve highly important matters pertaining to state, economic and sociocultural building, pass laws and make other soviet

decisions, and monitor work by state organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations.

In their work deputies express and defend the interests of their constituents, and also take into consideration the economic, cultural, ethnic and other features of the Uzbek SSR, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR or the geographical administration formation within which the deputies exercise their authority.

A deputy conducts his or her work in accordance with the laws of the Uzbek SSR and the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, as well as on the basis of decisions by appropriate soviets of people's deputies and voter instructions, and strives to implement his or her campaign platform.

Article 2: Legislation Governing the Status of Deputies

The status of people's deputies in the Uzbek SSR is determined by the Uzbek SSR Constitution, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Constitution, the present law and other legislation of the Uzbek SSR and the Kara-Kalpak ASSR.

Article 3: Source and Term of Deputies' Authority

A deputy's authority commences on the day of his or her election as an Uzbek SSR people's deputy, Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputy or people's deputy of a local soviet of people's deputy. A credentials commission elected by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet or a local soviet of people's deputies verifies deputies' credentials. A council on presentation of deputies to the credentials commission makes the decision to recognize deputies' credentials, or in the event that election law has been violated to declare the election of individual deputies invalid.

A deputy's authority terminates on the day new people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR, Kara-Kalpak ASSR and local soviets of people's deputies are elected, or under conditions provided for in Article 8 of this law.

The powers of a Uzbek SSR people's deputy may not be transferred to another individual.

Article 4: Combination of Deputy Duties With Performance of Production-Related or Official Duties

As a rule a deputy performs his or her duties concurrently with production-related or official duties.

A Uzbek SSR or Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputy may be exempted from production-related or official duties for the length of time required for performance of his or her duties as deputy.

A Uzbek SSR or Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputy elected to membership on a Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet or Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet permanent commission or committee may be relieved of production-related or official duties by decision of the appropriate

soviet, permanent commission or committee in the form of a transfer for a period of time to be determined by those organs.

Procedures for relieving a people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR or Kara-Kalpak ASSR of production-related or official duties to work in an electoral district, to carry out assignments issued by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet and their organs, or in other cases is to be determined by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet or the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet, as appropriate.

A local soviet deputy may be exempted from production-related or official duties for the purpose of performing the duties of deputy for a period of time and under conditions to be determined by the local soviet in question.

Article 5: Relations Between Deputy and Constituents

A deputy maintains contacts with the constituents and with the collectives and public organizations which nominated him or her as a candidate for deputy, as well as with the collectives of other enterprises, institutions, organizations and state and public organs located within his or her electoral district.

The voters give instructions to their deputies. Deputies strive to carry out these voter instructions.

A deputy is responsible to the voters and is subordinate to them.

A deputy who has not upheld voters' trust can be recalled according to procedures established by law.

Article 6: Relations Between a Deputy and the Soviet and Its Organs

A deputy who is a member of a collective representative organ of state authority possesses a full range of rights guaranteeing him or her active participation in the work of the soviet and the committees, permanent commissions and other organs formed by it; the deputy is responsible to the soviet and carries out the instructions of the soviet and its organs.

The soviet has a right to hear reports from deputies on their work for the soviet and on their compliance with decisions and instructions issued by the soviet and its organs. In the event that a deputy fails to perform his or her duties as a member of the soviet or violates established procedures governing the functioning of a representative organ the deputy's conduct may be considered by the soviet or, at its discretion, by the soviet's presidium or an appropriate soviet commission or committee.

The presidium and executive and management organs of their corresponding soviets of people's deputies render deputies necessary assistance in their work, inform deputies about the activities of the soviet and its organs, about the implementation status of plans (programs) for

economic and social development and realization of voters' instructions and about measures taken in response to critical comments and proposals from deputies, and help deputies study Soviet legislation, the soviet's past experience and public opinion.

Article 7: Deputy Ethics

A Uzbek SSR people's deputy must adhere strictly to standards of ethics and morality. It is intolerable for a deputy to use his or her status to the detriment of the state, society or individual citizens.

In the event a violation of deputy ethics occurs a deputy's conduct may be considered by the appropriate soviet of people's deputies or, at its direction, by the soviet's presidium or a commission or committee of that soviet.

Article 8: Premature Termination of a Deputy's Mandate

A deputy's mandate may be terminated prematurely by decision of the appropriate soviet taken in connection with the election or appointment of the deputy to a post, service in which is under the law incompatible with exercise of the powers of deputy, or in connection with the sentencing by a court of an individual who is a deputy, or in the event that a deputy loses USSR citizenship.

The deputy's mandate may be terminated prematurely by a soviet decision made in connection with the deputy's personal request to resign in view of circumstances which hamper the performance of his or her duties or for other personal reasons.

The mandate of a Uzbek SSR people's deputy shall be terminated in the event that he or she is recalled by the voters according to procedures established by law.

II. The Deputy's Work in a Soviet

Article 9: Deputy Participation in the Work of a Soviet

At sessions of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet and local soviets deputies consider and decide through collective and free discussion highly important issues which have been placed under the jurisdiction of the representative organ of state authority in question.

A deputy is obligated to attend sessions of the soviet and its organs of which he or she is a member and to participate actively in their work. In the event that he or she is unable to attend a session the deputy shall report this either to the soviet presidium or to the chairman, as appropriate.

Presidiums of soviets of people's deputies, and in city (cities under rayon jurisdiction), town and village soviets their chairmen, shall report to deputies in a timely manner and in accordance with established legislation of the Uzbek SSR and the regulations of the soviets in

question concerning the time and place of soviet sessions and the issues to be submitted for deputies' consideration, and shall supply deputies with all the necessary materials in regard to those issues in a timely manner.

Article 10: Rights of a Deputy at Soviet Sessions

A deputy has the right to vote on all matters considered by a session of his or her soviet.

A deputy has the right:

- to elect and be elected by soviet organs;
- to submit matters for consideration by the soviet;
- to make proposals and comments in regard to the agenda, procedures for the consideration of issues under discussion and the issues themselves;
- to submit draft decisions or amendments to them;
- to express opinions on the composition of organs established by the soviet and the candidacies of officials elected, appointed or confirmed by the soviet;
- to participate in debate, make inquiries, ask questions of the speaker and the chairman, demand answers and evaluate those answers;
- to speak in justification of his or her proposals and motives for voting or to give information;
- to submit proposals regarding the hearing of a report from some organ or official under the soviet's jurisdiction or control;
- to raise the issue of confidence in the members of the organs formed or elected by the soviet or in individuals elected, appointed or confirmed by the soviet;
- to propose for the soviet's consideration matters pertaining to monitoring of compliance with Uzbek SSR laws and implementation of the soviet's decisions by state and public organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations located within the soviet's territory;
- to read the texts of his or her speeches as recorded in stenographic reports and minutes of sessions of the soviet and its organs, and to receive texts of speeches which are not intended for publication;
- and to make public citizen appeals which are of public significance.

In regard to a topic of discussion a deputy may submit to the chairman a text of his or her speech, proposals or comments for inclusion in the session minutes.

A deputy who disagrees with a decision by the soviet or its organs has a priority right to set forth his or her dissenting opinion at a session.

A Uzbek SSR people's deputy may not be prosecuted for views expressed during debate and voting on matters considered by the soviet and its organs.

Procedures for exercise of the rights listed above are established by the present law, a regulation of the appropriate soviet and other legislative acts of the Uzbek SSR.

Article 11: The Right of Legislative Initiative for Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak ASSR People's Deputies

A people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR or the Kara-Kalpak ASSR has the right of legislative initiative in the appropriate supreme soviet; this right may be exercised by bringing up the need for drafting of a new law, submission of drafts of new laws for the supreme soviet's consideration, submission of drafts outlining amendments to existing laws, or submission of proposals regarding changes in existing laws.

The right of legislative initiative is to be exercised according to procedures set forth in the laws of the Uzbek SSR and the Kara-Kalpak ASSR.

Article 12: A deputy inquiry is a statement made at a soviet session requesting that state organs and officials provide an official explanation or outline their position on matters of public significance.

A people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR or the Kara-Kalpak ASSR has the right at Supreme Soviet sessions to make inquiries of the Uzbek SSR President, the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet chairman, the governments of the Uzbek SSR and the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, ministers and heads of other state organs formed or elected by either the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet or the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet.

A Uzbek SSR people's deputy also has a right to make inquiries of the heads of enterprises, institutions and organizations which are under all-union jurisdiction yet are located within the republic in regard to matters under the jurisdiction of the Uzbek SSR, and a people's deputy of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR has a right to make inquiries of heads of enterprises, institutions and organizations located in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR which are under republic (Uzbek SSR) jurisdiction in regard to matters under the jurisdiction of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR.

A Uzbek SSR or Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputy may make inquiries of local organs of state authority or administration in accordance with republic legislation.

A local soviet deputy has a right to make inquiries of the soviet presidium, the soviet chairman, the executive committee and the heads of the soviet's departments and administrations, as well as the heads of enterprises, institutions and organizations located within the soviet's territory in regard to matters under the jurisdiction of the soviet in question.

An inquiry may be made by a deputy or group of deputies in written or oral form. An inquiry made in written form shall be read aloud at a soviet session.

A state organ or official to whom an inquiry is addressed is obligated to give an oral or written reply to the inquiry at a soviet session within three days or within another time period established by the soviet. A deputy has a right to give an assessment of the official response to his or her inquiry. A soviet resolution shall be passed in regard to the results of discussion of the inquiry. The

inquiry, the response to it and the soviet resolution adopted as a result shall be made public.

A soviet has a right to require a state organ or official to submit by a deadline to be established by the soviet a statement regarding compliance with the decision made in regard to the deputy's inquiry.

Article 13: Consideration of Proposals and Comments Made by Deputies at Soviet Sessions

Proposals and comments made by deputies at a soviet session or transmitted in written form to the session chairman are to be considered by the soviet and its committees and commissions, or else sent on for consideration by the appropriate state and public organs and officials.

The state and public organs, as well as individual officials, to whom deputies' proposals and comments made at soviet sessions are sent are obligated to consider those proposals and comments and report on their findings within one month directly to the deputy and also to the presidium or soviet chairman, the government and the soviet's executive committee.

Monitoring of consideration and realization of proposals and comments from deputies is carried out either by the soviet's presidium, the soviet's permanent commissions and committees, the government or the soviet's executive committee.

Article 14: Work of a Deputy in Soviet Organs

A deputy who is a member of the soviet's presidium, a committee, permanent commission or other organ of a soviet has a right to submit any matters and proposals for consideration by the aforementioned organs, to participate in preparation of them for consideration and in discussion and decision making in regard to them, and to organize monitoring of implementation of and compliance with decisions made by the soviet and its organs.

A deputy who disagrees with a decision by a soviet organ of which he or she is a member has the right to set forth his or her viewpoint at a soviet session or to report that viewpoint to the chairman in written form.

A Uzbek SSR people's deputy elected to a soviet committee or permanent commission has a full vote in the work of the committee or permanent commission.

A Uzbek SSR people's deputy who is not a member of a committee or permanent commission may attend a session of that committee or permanent commission with a voice but not a vote.

A deputy may be dropped from a committee or commission on account of repeated failure to participate in the work of the committee or commission.

Article 15: Deputy Participation in Inspection of Work by State and Public Organs, Enterprises, Institutions and Organizations Upon Instructions From a Soviet or Its Organs

Upon instructions from the soviet or its organs a deputy may take part in inspection of work by state and public organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations located within the soviet's territory insofar as that work is under the soviet's jurisdiction and if necessary may inspect necessary documents and conduct a deputy's investigation. The deputy shall inform the soviet or its organs of the inspection findings, and shall also inform appropriate state and public organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations and, if necessary, shall make proposals regarding improvement in their work, elimination of the shortcomings discovered, repeal of illegal decisions, and prosecution of individuals guilty of violating state discipline and law.

A deputy has the right to bring up before the soviet and its organs the need to inspect the operations of state and public organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations located within the soviet's territory and to conduct an investigation into any matter, following established procedures.

Article 16: Deputy Investigation

A deputy investigation may be undertaken by decision of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet and their organs or at the initiative of a group of not fewer than 30 Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak people's deputies. All state organs and officials are obligated to render necessary assistance with the conducting of the investigation; at the request of the Uzbek SSR or Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputy or deputies' commission heading the investigation they are obligated to permit free access to information and documents required for objective study of the issue. No one has a right to refuse to provide deputies conducting a deputy investigation with explanations. Refusal to give explanations will result in imposition of penalties prescribed by law.

The findings of the investigation are to be brought to the attention either of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet or the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, and their organs, as appropriate.

III. Deputy Activities in Electoral Districts

Article 17: Deputy Rights in Connection With Work in an Electoral District

In order to exercise their authority in electoral districts deputies have the right:

- to participate in consideration of any matters affecting the vital interests of citizens in electoral districts by state administrative organs; these organs are obligated to inform deputies in a timely manner that they will be considering such matters;

- to inspect at their own initiative, if necessary engaging the services of representatives of state organs, members of the public and people's controllers, evidence regarding violations of laws and the rights and legitimate interests of citizens and organizations or manifestations of red tape and bureaucracy which have come to their attention through appeals from citizens and organizations and other sources, and to obtain the information necessary to do so and demand from the appropriate organs and officials rectification of the violations discovered;
- to conduct meetings and conferences of district voters and meetings with labor collectives and local organs of public organizations and movements;
- to attend meetings of various associations of people's deputies, voters, organs of regional public self-government, meetings of labor collectives, public organizations and movements, and meetings of citizens at their places of residence and military personnel in their military units.

In the Uzbek SSR a people's deputy has a priority right to speak on matters concerning his activities as a deputy in press organs founded by his or her soviet and on television and radio. Editing of material submitted by a deputy without his or her consent is not permitted.

People's deputies in the Uzbek SSR are equal in terms of their right to speak via the mass media.

Article 18: Deputy Duties in Connection With Work in Electoral Districts

In their electoral districts deputies are obligated:

- to regularly inform the public about their work in the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet or local soviets of people's deputies and about fulfillment of plans and programs for economic and social development, soviet decisions and voters' instructions, as well as fulfillment of their own election platforms;
- to take part in implementation of and organization of compliance with laws and decisions by the soviet and its organs;
- to study public opinion, needs and requests, report on them to the soviet and its organs and submit proposals and take other steps to ensure that action is taken in response to them;
- to encourage development of various forms of self-government and social activism among citizens and their involvement in the conducting of state and public affairs.

Article 19: Consideration of Citizens' Proposals, Statements and Complaints by Deputies

According to procedures established by legislation deputies shall consider voters' suggestions, statements and complaints received by them and take steps to ensure that they are resolved in a correct and timely manner; deputies shall regularly meet with citizens in population centers in their electoral districts. A deputy has the right

to invite officials of state and public organizations, enterprises, institutions and organizations located within the soviet's territory to consider citizen suggestions, statements and complaints and to participate personally in their consideration. Officials of state and public organs and organizations are obligated to render deputies assistance in their monitoring activities.

The deputies are studying the reasons and causes of complaints and out of necessity are introducing their proposals in the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR or the Karakalpak autonomous republic, local Councils of Peoples' Deputies, in other government and social organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations.

The deputies have the right to exercise control over the discussion of proposals, requests, and complaints in government and social organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations directed to them and stationed on the territory of the Council and to personally participate in their discussion. Officials of state and social organs and organizations are obliged to render assistance to the deputies in their controlling activities.

Article 20: Deputy Accounting to Voters

A people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR or Kara-Kalpak ASSR is obligated periodically, but not less than once a year, and a people's deputy of a local soviet not less than twice a year, to report to the voters, collectives and public organizations which nominated him or her as a candidate for deputy on his or her work, fulfillment of his or her election platform and voters' instructions, on the work of the soviet and those organs of which the deputy is a member. A deputy's report may be made in response to the demand of a group of constituents of a number established by the appropriate soviet.

Deputies' reports are made at voters' meetings held for this purpose, as well as at conferences of voter delegates from the electoral district in question.

Meetings or conferences held to hear deputy reports make a decision containing voter suggestions and comments to the deputy, with this decision to be made public to the district's voters.

Local organs of authority, public organizations and mass media outlets founded by soviets of people's deputies and public organizations provide coverage of reports by people's deputies in the Uzbek SSR.

Article 21: Assistance to Deputies With Reporting and Meetings With Voters

Voter meetings and conferences held to hear deputies' reports and meetings with deputies shall be convened by soviet presidiums, labor collective councils and organs of public self-government.

A deputy shall be provided with proper conditions for the conducting of reports and meetings with voters. At the deputy's request the presidium or executive council of the appropriate soviet or the administration and public organizations at enterprises, institutions and

organizations shall make meeting rooms available, inform citizens about the time and place of the deputy's report and his or her meetings with voters and reception of individual citizens, and send senior representatives at the invitation of the deputy to attend reception of citizens and other meetings, and shall also take other steps to provide assistance to the deputy in his or her work at the local level.

Informational materials required for reports and speeches shall be provided to the deputy at his or her request by the soviet presidium or executive committee of which he or she is a deputy, as appropriate, or by the presidiums or executive committees of soviets located within the territory of the electoral district.

Article 22: Deputy Participation in Lower-Level Soviets

A deputy has the right to attend with a voice but not a vote the sessions of lower-level soviets and their organs within the territory of the soviet of which he or she is a member.

Article 23: Deputies' Right To Demand Elimination of Legal Violations

When deputies encounter violations of citizens' rights and legally protected interests or other violations of the law they have a right as representatives of state authority to demand that the violations be halted, and if necessary to demand that appropriate organs and officials intervene to prevent the violations in question. A violation can be recorded in a statement prepared either by the deputy or at his or her request by a representative of an appropriate law enforcement or control organ.

Officials of state and public organs, the administration of enterprises, institutions and organizations, as well as members of the militia to whom the deputy's appeal is directed are obligated to take immediate measures to eliminate violations and if necessary to prosecute guilty parties, subsequently informing the deputy of the measures taken. In the event that steps are not taken officials bear disciplinary or criminal responsibility to the extent determined by law.

Article 24: Deputies' Right To Form Deputy Groups and Deputy Clubs

For the purpose of joint efforts in soviets, electoral districts and labor collectives to exercise their authority deputies may on a basis of mutual agreement form both permanent and temporary deputy groups and deputy clubs.

Procedures governing the activities of deputy groups and clubs as well as their rights are defined by the regulations of the appropriate soviet and Uzbek SSR legislative acts governing deputies' activities.

Organization of Work With Voter Instructions

Article 25: Instructions to People's Deputies

Deputy instructions are instructions adopted at meetings with candidates for the post of people's deputy by assemblies and conferences representing a district's voters, with mandatory consideration for the opinion of the candidates themselves. A list of instructions approved shall be included in the minutes of the voters' assembly or conference.

Instructions to Uzbek SSR people's deputies include only those instructions, realization of which falls under the jurisdiction of republic organs, or in the case of Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputies and deputies of local soviets, under the jurisdiction of the autonomous republic or local organs.

A candidate for people's deputy has the right not to accept as a binding instruction any suggestion made by a voters' assembly or conference if it conflicts with his or her election platform or current legislation, which is also reflected in the minutes of the voters' assembly or conference.

Article 26: Summarization and Consideration of Instructions

Summarization and preliminary consideration of instructions to people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR, Kara-Kalpak ASSR and local soviets of people's deputies are carried out by the Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak ASSR supreme soviet presidiums and governments and by the presidiums and executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, as appropriate, with consideration given to the suggestions and comments of committees and permanent commissions under those soviets of people's deputies.

The government of the Uzbek SSR or the Kara-Kalpak ASSR or the executive committee of a local soviet of people's deputies takes the suggestions and comments of committees and permanent commissions under the soviet in question into consideration and submits a condensed plan of measures to carry out voters' instructions to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet or local soviets of people's deputies, as appropriate, for consideration. Soviet of people's deputies make decisions regarding acceptance of instructions for executive action. A soviet has the right to declare (with explanation) certain instructions inappropriate or not feasible in nature.

Soviets of people's deputies take these instructions into consideration in their efforts to develop plans and programs for economic and social development and to create a budget, as well as in their preparation of decisions on other matters. Measures aimed at realization of the instructions are outlined in a special section of plans and budgets.

Article 27: Organization of Instruction Fulfillment

Fulfillment of instructions adopted for executive action by the Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak ASSR supreme soviets and local soviets of people's deputies is ensured by their executive and management organs and other republic and local organs.

Suggestions contained in instructions to candidates who are not elected during election of deputies are to be sent to the appropriate organs and officials so that they can be considered and measures taken. The results of consideration and implementation of these suggestions shall be reported to citizens directly by republic organs and the presidiums of local soviets of people's deputies.

Article 28: Monitoring of Compliance With Instructions

Monitoring of compliance with instructions given to people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR and the Kara-Kalpak ASSR is carried out by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet, their committees and permanent commissions and Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputies, as appropriate; instructions given to local soviet deputies are monitored by the appropriate soviets and their committees, permanent commissions and individual deputies.

Soviets' committees and permanent commissions consider matters pertaining to realization of measures regarding instructions and hear reports from the heads of soviets' executive and management organs and other state organs and officials.

Executive and management organs shall report to soviets of people's deputies not less than once a year regarding the status of implementation of decisions made in regard to instructions.

Article 29: Participation of People's Deputies in Work With Instructions

People's deputies take part in the summarization of instructions and development and discussion of measures to realize them, and also monitor the way those measures are carried out. They inform their constituents of the degree to which their instructions have been carried out.

At the instruction of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet, a local soviet or their organs, and also at his or her own initiative and with the help of specialists if necessary a people's deputy may conduct checks on implementation of voters' instructions. The people's deputy shall then inform the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet, a local soviet or their organs, as well as his or her constituents, of the findings of this investigation.

Article 30: Glasnost in Work With Instructions

Decisions by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet and local soviets of people's deputies based on voter instructions must be made public.

The mass media shall report on the status of implementation of voter instructions.

V. Fundamental Guarantees of Deputies' Work**Article 31: Guarantees of Realization of the Right of Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak ASSR People's Deputies To Legislative Initiative**

The right of Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak ASSR deputies to legislative initiative is guaranteed by:

- mandatory consideration of proposals submitted in the form of legislative initiative at a session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet or the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet, with one of the following decisions to be made: passage of law; decision to begin development of new draft law; routing of proposal to appropriate committees and permanent commissions for further editing; rejection of legislative initiative, with explanation;
- mandatory voting on proposals and amendments to laws submitted by a Uzbek SSR or Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputy.

Article 32: Protection for Deputy Rights, Honor and Dignity

In the Uzbek SSR every deputy is guaranteed proper conditions for unhampered and efficient performance of his duties and protection of his or her rights, honor and dignity.

Persons who infringe upon the honor and dignity of a deputy are subject to administrative or criminal penalties in accordance with the law. Public ridicule of a people's deputy in the Uzbek SSR as well as slander directed at a people's deputy will result in imposition of the penalties prescribed by law.

Officials of state and public organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations which do not perform their obligations to deputies, hamper their work, supply them with false information or violate guarantees governing deputies' activities are subject to disciplinary action up to and including firing, as well as administrative and criminal penalties as prescribed by law.

Any attempt to influence a people's deputy in the Uzbek SSR in any form whatsoever for the purpose of preventing performance of his or her duties as a deputy or ensuring passage of decisions in someone's favor is punishable by law.

Article 33: The Right of a Deputy to Immediate Reception by Officials

On matters pertaining to deputy's duties a deputy has the right to visit any state and official organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations within the soviet's territory without hindrance, upon presentation of his or her deputy's identification, as well as the right to be received immediately by the heads of those organizations and other officials.

Procedures for visits by deputies to organizations whose activities involve state secrets and other secrets protected by law shall be established by law.

Article 34: Officials' Obligations Regarding Consideration of Deputies' Appeals

A deputy has the right to appeal to all state and public organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations and to individual officials in regard to matters connected with deputy duties and to participate in consideration of the issues raised. The aforementioned organs and officials are obligated to give a deputy replies to his or her appeals without delay, or within one month if there is a need for additional study or observation.

Appeals by deputies in regard to the most important issues, including the need to adopt, change or repeal decisions by the organ in question, are subject to consideration by soviet presidiums, soviet executive committees, ministerial boards, state committees and agencies and the government, as appropriate. Deputies should be informed in a timely manner of the date on which these issues will be considered.

Article 35: Provision of Proper Conditions for Exercise of Deputies' Authority

Soviets or other state and public organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations and their officials shall ensure proper conditions for the exercise of deputies' authority.

A soviet's presidium or executive and management organ provides deputies with facilities to enable their participation in the work of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet, a local soviet of people's deputies, their committees and permanent commissions and deputy groups, as well as libraries and archives of soviets, communication facilities, computers and other electronic equipment, organizational help, copying equipment and printing equipment belonging to soviets.

Enterprises, institutions and organizations located in a soviet's territory shall assist deputies in their use of their computer, organizational, copying and printing equipment in the performance of their duties as deputies.

State and public organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations shall assist Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputies in the performance of their duties as deputies in connection with arrangements for

trips within their electoral districts, making transportation available to them and assuring them of priority access to lodging.

The presidiums and executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies shall provide Uzbek SSR people's deputies with separate equipment and a room provided with means of communications so that they may perform their duties as deputies.

A Uzbek SSR people's deputy elected to Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet organs and as a result of this exempted from production-related or official duties who does not have a permanent residence in Tashkent shall be provided with a temporary official residence for the deputy and members of his or her family.

The housing occupied by the deputy and members of his or her family at their place of permanent residence shall be reserved for them during this period of time.

A people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR or Kara-Kalpak ASSR may have volunteer aides for the purpose of maintaining closer ties with the public and having ongoing help with his or her work; such aides may come from the apparatus staff of local soviets.

Procedures governing the activities of Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputies shall be established by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet or the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet, as appropriate.

Article 36: Exemption of Deputies From Production-Related and Official Duties, and Reimbursement for Expenses Incurred Through Work as a Deputy

During Supreme Soviet sessions or sessions of local soviets of people's deputies, as well as at such time as deputies perform their duties in other cases for which provision is made under law, deputies are exempted from performance of production-related or official duties, with all expenses incurred through their work as deputies to be reimbursed out of the appropriate state or local budget.

The cases, procedures and amount of reimbursement to Uzbek SSR people's deputies for expenses incurred in connection with the performance of deputy duties, as well as procedures for granting leave to Uzbek SSR people's deputies who work full-time in the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, shall be determined by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet.

A Uzbek SSR people's deputy who is exempted from performance of production-related and official duties and is transferred to work at the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet or in its organs shall be paid a salary, the size of which is to be determined by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, during the time that he or she is performing deputy duties.

Article 37: Right of Deputies To Obtain Information and Consultation

The soviet presidium or soviet executive committee provides deputies with documents passed by the Supreme Soviet or local soviet of people's deputies, official publications and informational and reference material concerning the soviet and its organs.

The presidium and executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies and other state and public organs and the administration of enterprises, institutions and organizations located within the soviet's territory are obligated to provide a deputy with expert consultation on matters connected with deputy duties if the deputy so requests, and to make available immediately—or if that is not possible within one month's time—the information which the deputy requires.

Procedures for providing information containing state secrets or other legally protected secrets to deputies shall be established by law.

Article 38: Rendering of Legal Assistance to People's Deputies

The presidiums of soviets of people's deputies and their executive and management organs, the administration of enterprises, organizations, scientific and legal institutions, educational institutions and law enforcement organs shall render people's deputies assistance with legal matters which arise in the course of performance of deputy duties.

Article 39: Deputies' Right to Free Transportation

People's deputies of the Uzbek SSR and the Kara-Kalpak ASSR have a right to free transportation on all railroads, modes of motor vehicle transport and airlines within their respective republics and in all forms of urban transport (with the exception of taxis), as well as the right to obtain travel documents without waiting in line.

A deputy of an oblast, rayon, city, urban rayon, town or village soviet has a corresponding right to the use of free motor vehicle transportation which is under republic jurisdiction within his or her oblast, rayon, city, town or village, as well as all forms of urban transportation (with the exception of taxis), and a deputy of an oblast or rayon soviet also has the right to free use of rail transportation.

Procedures and conditions for the free use of transportation by Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputies and local soviet deputies and procedures connected with payment to transportation organizations, as well as conditions for use of deputies' private automobiles in connection with the performance of deputy duties, shall be established by the government of the Uzbek SSR and the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Council of Ministers.

Article 40: Guarantees for the Labor Rights of People's Deputies in the Uzbek SSR and the Rights of People's Deputies From Military Personnel and Other Categories of Citizen Whose Service Is Regulated by Charters and Statutes

During their term of office people's deputies in the Uzbek SSR may not be fired from their jobs at enterprises, institutions or organizations at the initiative of the administration or expelled from a kolkhoz, other cooperative or educational institution or transferred as a disciplinary measure to a lower-paying position without prior consent from the soviet, or between soviet sessions the consent of its presidium.

People's deputies from military personnel and other categories of citizen whose service is regulated by charters and statutes cannot be released from service at the initiative of the administration or command, demoted in rank or position or transferred without their consent. They may not be denied regular promotions in officer's rank or special titles equivalent to officer's rank as stipulated under the terms of their service.

People's deputies who have been exempted from performance of production-related or official duties in order to perform their duties as deputies shall upon completion of their term in office be offered their previous job (post), or if that job is no longer available an equivalent job (post) at the same or, with deputies' consent, at a different enterprise, institution or organization.

Full-time people's deputies from military personnel or other officials whose service is regulated by charters and statutes shall be detached to the soviet while remaining on active military or other service, and upon completion of their terms of full-time work in a soviet or its organs shall be reassigned to the appropriate ministries and agencies to continue their service in their previous position or, with the deputy's consent, in an equal or higher position.

The time spent by people's deputies in full-time work in soviets or their organs exempted from production-related or official duties shall be counted as general and uninterrupted time of service in the previous specialized field of work or service.

Employees hired to fill in for people's deputies during their full-time service in soviets shall be hired on the basis of a limited labor contract which expires upon the return of deputies to their former jobs.

Article 41: Leave for Uzbek SSR People's Deputies

Uzbek SSR people's deputies are granted annual paid leave of 36 working days, with the exception of those cases in which the law makes provision for a longer period of leave.

Procedures for payment of leave time shall be established by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 42: Immunity of Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak ASSR People's Deputies

Uzbek SSR people's deputies may not be prosecuted, arrested or subjected to administrative penalties by a court without the consent of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, or in the period between sessions the consent of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and this should be announced to deputies at a regular session.

Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputies may not be prosecuted, arrested or subjected to administrative penalties by a court within the territory of their autonomous republic or the territory of Uzbek SSR without the consent of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet, or in the period between sessions the consent of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and this should be announced to deputies at a regular session.

A criminal case against a Uzbek SSR people's deputy can be filed solely by the Uzbek SSR Procurator, and against a Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputy solely by the Uzbek SSR Procurator or the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Procurator.

Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputies may not be subpoenaed or detained or their personal items, luggage, vehicles, homes or offices searched.

Article 43: Immunity of People's Deputies on Local Soviets of People's Deputies

Deputies of oblast, rayon, city, urban rayon, town and village soviets of people's deputies may not be prosecuted, arrested or subjected to administrative penalties by a court within the territory of their respective soviets without the consent of the appropriate soviet, or in the period between soviet sessions the consent of their presidiums, and this should be announced to deputies at a regular session.

A criminal case against a deputy of an oblast soviet or Tashkent City Soviet can be filed solely by the procurator of the oblast in question, the city of Tashkent or a higher-level procurator; criminal cases may be filed against deputies of rayon, city, village (aul) or town soviets by the procurator of the appropriate rayon or city or a higher-level procurator.

Article 44: Procedures for Obtaining the Consent of a Soviet To Prosecute a Deputy

In order to obtain the consent of a soviet, or in the period between sessions the consent of its presidium, to prosecute a deputy, carry out arrests of a deputy or impose court-ordered administrative penalties upon a deputy the appropriate procurator shall submit a written request to the soviet in question. This request may also be submitted by a higher-level procurator.

This request shall be submitted prior to the issuing of an indictment against a deputy or sanction for his or her arrest, or prior to the sending of a case involving administrative violations to court.

A higher-level procurator may withdraw a request for consent to prosecute a deputy submitted to a soviet by a lower-level procurator.

The soviet or its presidium shall consider the procurator's request within one month and may ask the procurator for additional materials necessary to resolve the issue raised in the request. The soviet or its presidium shall arrive at a decision with explanation and inform the procurator of that decision within three days. If cause exists the soviet or presidium may reconsider its decision. A deputy has the right to take part in the soviet's or presidium's consideration of his or her immunity status as deputy.

In the event of disagreement with the decision of a local soviet of people's deputies or its presidium a higher-level procurator has the right to appeal to a higher-level soviet requesting that the decision be rescinded and the matter transferred to the appropriate soviet for reconsideration. A rayon or city procurator also has the right to submit a request for repeal of a decision by a village, town or city (city under rayon jurisdiction) soviet and transfer of the matter for reconsideration. If a soviet confirms the original decision the matter may be resolved by the oblast soviet or Tashkent Soviet of People's Deputies at the request of an oblast procurator, the Tashkent city procurator or the republic procurator.

If a procurator's request submitted according to procedures outlined in this article is not considered by a local soviet of people's deputies within one month a higher-level soviet may, at the request of the procurator in question or a higher-level procurator, take steps to ensure that the original request is considered immediately.

The procurator who submitted the request to the soviet is obligated to report to the soviet which gave consent for the prosecution or arrest of a deputy within three days of the conclusion of the case regarding the findings of the investigation or trial.

It is not necessary to obtain the consent of a local soviet of people's deputies to prosecute or arrest a deputy or impose court-ordered administrative penalties on a deputy if the crime or administrative violation of the law was committed by the deputy in question outside the territory of the soviet of which he is a member, or for Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputies outside the territory of the Uzbek SSR, and if the deputy himself is outside that territory. In cases in which at the moment of decision on the question of whether to prosecute or arrest a deputy or impose court-ordered administrative penalties the local soviet deputy is within the territory of the soviet of which he or she is a member, or if a Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputy is within the territory of the Uzbek SSR, consent shall be obtained according to the procedures outlined in this article.

Article 45: Deputy Identification and Deputy Badge

Deputies have deputy identification cards and deputy badges which are issued to them after acknowledgement of their credentials by their soviet. The deputy identification card and deputy badge are to be used by deputies during their terms of office.

Statutes governing identification cards and badges for people's deputies, as well as the forms thereof, are to be established by:

- the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet for Uzbek SSR people's deputies and deputies of local soviets of people's deputies;
- the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet for Kara-Kalpak ASSR people's deputies.

*I. Karimov, Uzbek SSR President,
Tashkent, 31 October 1990*

Better Provision Urged for Russia's Refugees

PM3101151591 Moscow IAN PRES RELEASE
in English 5 Dec 90

[Interview with Mikhail Arutyunov, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet subcommittee for refugee affairs, by Feliks Alekseyev; date, place not specified: "Refugees to Russia. What Is To Be Done?"]

[Text] What makes thousands of people leave their homes? How can this be prevented? How can we help the refugees? Feliks Alekseyev discusses the problem of refugees with Mikhail Arutyunov, people's deputy of the Russian Federation and chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet's subcommittee for refugee affairs.

[M. Arutyunov] the very first epicentres of ethnic conflict which crippled the fates of hundreds of thousands of people were in Transcaucasia, resulting in two floods of refugees - from Azerbaijan to Armenia and from Armenia to Azerbaijan. Upwards of 400,000 people had to leave their homes. Many refugees fled Azerbaijan and headed for Russia. According to official statistics, their number is estimated at 180,000. Between 70 and 80 per cent of the refugees from Azerbaijan are Russians and the rest are mostly Armenians. Some Azerbaijanians in mixed marriages also fell victim to ethnic strife.

The Tuva Autonomous Republic unexpectedly became another epicentre of refugee exodus. The local authorities try to cover up the true scope of the tragedy. But growing crime and inter-ethnic strife have already forced more than 5,000 Russian-language citizens out of Tuva. All of them are over 16 years of age. Judging by many things, this was just the very first wave of refugees. At first the Tuvian refugees settled not far from their homes. But now they resettle farther away, in different regions of Russia.

There are also large groups of Chechen, Ingush, Meskhetian Turkish and Jewish refugees. A troublesome situation has come about in Moldova. There are problems of the same nature in the Baltic republics. The list of tragic developments could be continued. According to modest estimates, between 600,000 and 800,000 refugees are scattered across the country.

[F. Alekseyev] Why such a big span in the estimates—200,000?

[M. Arutyunov] Many of those who leave their homes become roamers in search of shelter and a job. Small wonder that the figures we have at our disposal keep changing all the time.

[F. Alekseyev] Where do you see the causes of the emergence of epicentres of refugee exodus?

[M. Arutyunov] The problems we have and, especially, economic disarray. Though I disagree with those who contend that the economic crisis and daily troubles are the root cause of all other problems. Ethnic conflicts also

flare up in industrialized countries. True, they are not as wide and as cruel as in our country.

When the burden of problems becomes unbearable, a hunt for a scapegoat always begins. And who are better candidates for this role than representatives of a non-ethnic nationality? Organizations and groups which are interested in fanning nationalist hysteria either emerge anew or intensify their activities, the image of the enemy is created and the search for the culprit begins. "Outsiders" may fall victim to strife even if they are not the first generation of a certain ethnic group living in this particular place. Besides, we still have to face the consequences of Stalin's repressive policy of forceful resettlement.

[F. Alekseyev] The press reported that whole work collectives are getting ready to move out of certain regions. How accurate are such reports?

[M. Arutyunov] Indeed, there is a self-styled collective refugee movement. Faced with growing intolerance on the part of the ethnic population and sensing the approaching need to leave, some work collectives in Tuva, the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan which are comprised for the most part of representatives of non-ethnic nationalities, send their "scouts" to various parts of Russia. The "scouts" are to find out where large groups of refugees form one and the same place may settle so as to maintain the relations which tied them together for a long time. Such groups of refugees are prepared to build new settlements provided they are given money, equipment and building materials.

[F. Alekseyev] What legal moves does the Russian Supreme Soviet intend to make to ease the fate of refugees?

[M. Arutyunov] Until very recently the notion of "refugee" seemed not to exist in this country. Government papers called such people "persons who had to leave their places of permanent residence." But the problem has now reached such proportions that we must have a law on the status of the refugee. A draft of such a law has already passed several hearings in parliamentary committees and commissions. It will probably be submitted for consideration by the Russian Supreme Soviet in a short while.

We propose that the term, "refugee," should be applicable to those who have to leave their place of permanent residence for fear for their own or their relatives' health or life because of large-scale disorders and inter-ethnic strife.

The draft also determines the legal status of forced resettlers. This category includes people who leave their place of permanent residence because of psychological pressure brought to bear on them in the form of statements made in the mass media, rallies or meetings, or by adopting discriminatory laws, as well as those who strive to re-unite with members of their families who are recognized as refugees.

Legal guarantees for refugees should be included in the treaties which the Russian Federation concludes with other republics.

[F. Alekseyev] It is obvious that such a law is very necessary. But there should also be a mechanism for giving effective and fast relief aid to people in distress. What is being done in this respect?

[M. Arutyunov] Russia is prepared to take under its wing people who have had to leave their homes. But allocations are needed for this purpose, including from the national fund, as well as material and technical resources. Each of the sovereign constituent republics is to make its contribution to this national fund. I think that in various regions there should be evacuation stations and permanent residence facilities for the psychological rehabilitation of refugees before they are able to decide where they would like to settle more or less permanently. Such an arrangement could be made within the Russian Ministry of Labor. Though, I think that it would be better to create a special state committee of the Russian Federation for refugee affairs. This new organization is to conclude agreements with local Soviets, industrial and other bodies on the construction of housing and enterprises. And of course, the material compensation for losses sustained should be quite impressive.

[F. Alekseyev] Do you think we will be able to arrest the refugee exodus caused by ethnic strife?

[M. Arutyunov] Only a society with a healthy and normally functioning economy opens a way to well-being for all its citizens and can stop the processes which lead to ethnic strife. The sovereign constituent republics of the Soviet Union should create an atmosphere of respect for the rights and traditions of all ethnic groups. This is a job for a whole generation. But we are to lay the groundwork for it right now.

RSFSR Soviet Convenes To Discuss Baltics

*91UN0751A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 22 Jan 91 First Edition p 1*

[Unattributed report on RSFSR Supreme Soviet session: "Russia: Parliament's Position"]

[Text] The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Third Session opened on 21 January, a week earlier than preliminarily scheduled. The reasons for its early convening were, as reported by B.N. Yeltsin, opening the sitting, the complication of the situation in the country and the world, and also the dangerous power vacuum that had formed with the conclusion of the Union session.

The republic Supreme Soviet Presidium recommended the inclusion on the agenda of discussion on the situation in the country and the world and also over 40 bills and decrees on reorganizing the organs of state power and

introducing the office of president of the RSFSR, economic reform, social development and the social protection of the citizens upon transition to the market, realizing the program of revival of the Russian countryside and development of the agro-industrial complex, and legal reform.

At the start of the sitting, RSFSR people's deputies honored by a minute's silence the memory of all those who had died in Lithuania and Latvia.

In the course of the debate on the agenda, deputies' concentrated their attention mainly on the need to discuss the political situation in the country.

Having approved the proposed agenda, the session agreed—initially, at least—with the order of business, whereby plenary sittings of the Supreme Soviet would be held on two days in the week. Three days would be assigned to work in the chambers, committees, and commissions, and on Saturdays it is planned to conduct professional training of the deputies.

B.N. Yeltsin was called to speak. Describing the exacerbation of the situation in the Baltic, he expressed the opinion that on the pretext of rectifying certain mistakes of the young democracies and parliaments of the Baltic republics, particularly in respect to the indigenous population, the virtual ouster of constitutional authorities, which people were attempting to replace with salvation committees, had begun in the country.

Russia, like almost all the republics, has from the very outset at all levels advocated a solution of problems exclusively by political means. The attention, specifically, of the Federation Council was called to the impermissibility of the use of servicemen drafted on RSFSR territory to solve interethnic conflicts and to act against the peaceful population.

It was the current situation that the chairman of the Russian Parliament said was the reason for his trip to Tallinn, his talks with the leaders of the Baltic republics and the statements made there, and the documents that were adopted. Reality, he believes, has shown the ineffectiveness of the hard-line approach to a solution of the problems of the Russian-speaking population. The roots of many of the discriminatory decisions in respect to the Russian-speaking population are to be found in the center's power politics.

The RSFSR leadership supports a different approach, the basis of which is mutual trust, honest dialogue on a firm legal base, and precise mutual commitments. The conclusion of treaties with the republics affords an opportunity for changing the situation.

B.N. Yeltsin formulated some of his conclusions from the current situation. He, in particular, expressed the viewpoint that a change in the policy course of the Union leadership was under way. Of the two versions that allegedly coexisted simultaneously, the line of defense of

the old political system and preservation of its decisive role in the economy and the unitary Union has been chosen.

The change toward an "avowedly reactionary policy course," the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman continued, had its antecedents. The long delay at the start and the imitation of reforms have brought about serious disenchantment in society and engendered distrust of the reforms altogether. There has been disregard for the process of sovereignization of the republics also.

But the attempt to update the totalitarian model with reference to the new conditions has run into serious resistance on the part of the republics. For this reason it is essential to strengthen interrepublic relations and coordinate our policy to the utmost. We need to stabilize the internal situation in the Russian Federation.

A particular direction of the present session will be the formulation of a precise policy line in regard to relations with the center. It is necessary to persuade the Union leadership by word and deed that it is no longer possible today to build the country in a single column and fetter it with a chain. Russia must be a guarantor of democracy.

We, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman said in conclusion, are prepared on all questions to work with the Union leadership. But each step in the direction of reaction and each departure from previous accords should on our part be strictly criticized and made public. The reactionary turnabout has not yet reached the irreversible stage.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Abaza

91UN0541A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 1, Jan 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Probably anyone among us could cite dozens of nationalities of citizens living in the country. However, not everyone could firmly claim to be familiar with the history of one ethnic group or another, its origins, and its specific features. As we begin the publication under a new rubric of brief information about all nations and ethnic groups in the USSR we, naturally, do not claim to be providing full and comprehensive data. We greatly hope, however, that this dictionary will contribute to our knowledge of one-another and make us think more frequently about our own origins.

Self-designation¹: **Abaza** Their neighbors know them by the same ethnonym, with the exception of the Abkhaz, who call them **Ashvy**.

According to the 1979 census² the total number of Abaza was close to 29,000. The Abaza are the native population of the Northern Caucasus. A considerable number of

Abaza also inhabit Turkish territory, where they moved in the first half of the 1860s, and then mixed with the Adygei and the Abkhaz.

The Abaza inhabit quite compactly the upper reaches of the Bolshoy and Malyy Zelenchuk, Kuban and Kuma Rivers, in the following settlements: Apsua, Malo-Abazinskoye, Abaza-Khabl, Novo-Kuvinskoye, Tapanta, Abazakt, Psyzh, Psauha-Dakhe, Karapago, El Burgan, Kubina, Indzhikchukun, Koydan, Krasno-Vostochnoye, Kzyl, and Pogun, and a number of Circassian and Nogay settlements in eastern Adygey.

The Abaza retained their language, which is similar to the Abkhaz and the Kabardin. It belongs to the Adygo-Abkhaz branch of the Caucasian languages. The Abaza language, in turn, is divided into two dialects: **Tapanta** and **Shkarawa**. Phonetically, the Abaza language is one of the most complex among the languages spoken by the peoples in the USSR.

The ancient territory on which the Abaza developed as a separate ethnic group is located northwest of the border of today's Abkhaziya. The process of a merger among neighboring nations, the **Sanig, Abazg, and Apsil** within a single Abkhaz people played a tangible role in the ethnic origins of the Abaza. These ancient ethnic groups participated in the establishment of the Abaza peoples but not to the extent of becoming an integral part of the Abkhaz ethnoses. In the 14th-16th centuries the ancestors of today's Abaza moved to the Northern Caucasus from the territory we named. In the mid-19th century, the Abaza consisted of the Tapanta and Shkarua, who spoke different dialects. In turn, they were subdivided into smaller subgroups. The Abkhaz called the Tapanta **Baskhyag**; the Nogay called them **Alty-Kesek Abaza**, i.e., "six-dale Abaza," after the six tribes into which they had been divided previously. The Tapanta also frequently called them after the names of their former princes: **Loovtsy, Biderdovtsy, Dudarukovtsy, Klychevtsy, Kyachevtsy, and Dzhantemirovtsy**. The Shkarua as well were subdivided into six parts: **Mysylbay, Kyzylbek, Chegrey, Bag, Barakay, and Tam**. It was the Shkarua who migrated to Turkey during the Caucasian War.

The Abaza were famous in the Caucasus as skillful hunters and gatherers of honey. They gradually became outstanding apiculturists, selling honey and wax both to the authorities and on the foreign market. Nonetheless, cattle grazing remained their main occupation.

The Abaza settlements were fortified strongholds within which the individual farmsteads were located, protected by a common wall made of packed clay. The traditional Abaza way of life included many military features which were necessary, considering their troubled history.

In Soviet times the Abaza set up collective farms in which they practiced their traditional occupations. An Abaza written language was created in 1932.

Footnotes

1. i.e., a name as heard in the language of the given ethnic group.

2. For the time being, the editors have no data on the 1989 population census. The moment the new figures are made available we shall publish them without fail.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Abkhaz

91UN0541B *Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 2, Jan 90*
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Apsua**.

According to the 1979 census, there were approximately 94,000 Abkhaz.

The Abkhaz constitute the bulk of the native population of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Approximately 86 percent of all Abkhaz in the USSR live in this Republic. Some Abkhaz may be found in neighboring Adzhariya. Abroad, known as Circassians, Abkhaz live in Turkey, Syria, the United Arab Republic, Iraq, and Jordan.

The Abkhaz language belongs to the Adygo-Abkhaz group of Caucasian languages. It is subdivided into **Bzyb and Abzhui**. The Abkhaz language is similar to that of the Abaza and the language of the North Caucasian Adygei.

Abkhaziya is located between the Big Caucasian Ridge and the Black Sea, bordered by the Psou and Inguri Rivers. It has a variety of climates, ranging from moist subtropical to alpine meadows. The Abkhaz coast is considered a resort area.

The Abkhaz who live on the territory of their republic account for less than one-quarter of its entire population. They co-exist with Georgians, Russians, Armenians, Greeks, and members of other ethnic groups.

According to researchers, the ancestors of the Abkhaz were already known since the 11th century B.C. They are referred to in Assyrian sources as "**Kabeshla**," subsequently mentioned by the ancient authors as "**Absil**."

An entire range of Greek cities—"polys"—appeared on Abkhaz territory starting with the middle of the first millennium B.C. The native population found itself involved in the political events of the world at that time. By the fourth century B.C., however, the Greek towns declined and since that time Abkhaziya took the aspect of a "kingdom," with a king who was a member of the local nobility, as part of the West Georgian Loz state, which was in the Byzantine Empire.

Byzantium helped in the spreading of Christianity in Abkhaziya. In 523 A.D. Christianity became the official Abkhaz religion. For a number of centuries, the Abkhaz

waged fierce wars against Byzantine, Persian, and Arab conquerors. The military tension stimulated the process of consolidation of the Abkhaz tribes, the main role among whom was played by the Abyzgi. After the Arabs were expelled, although retaining officially its rule over Abkhaziya, Byzantium was the first to make a number of concessions which strengthened the autonomy of this country, particularly in the matter of electing its ruler. The first Abkhaz ruler was Leo I; under his successor, Leo II, the country became totally free from Byzantium and united with Western Georgia, forming a single Abkhaz kingdom. That kingdom prospered in the ninth and 10th centuries, after which the power passed into the hands of the Georgian kings. In the 14th-15th centuries, Abkhaziya was part of Sobediano, an independent principality which broke down and, once again, Abkhaziya became independent, ruled by the Shervashid-Chachba princes. At the end of the 15th century, for a period of three years the Abkhaz fell under Turkish rule, in the course of which they suffered terrible casualties. On a number of occasions the Abkhaz, together with the Georgians, rebelled against the foreigners. However, an end to the Turkish yoke was put at the start of the 19th century with the unification with Russia. After that the Abkhaz people no longer lived in constant fear of aggression. As part of Russia, Abkhaziya underwent the peasant reform which was paralleled by a powerful antifeudal movement. The Makhadzhir—the mass resettlement into Turkey of more than 30,000 people—was a tragic page in the history of the Abkhaz peoples; those who remained behind were accused by tsarism of disloyalty to the tsar and the Abkhaz were judged "guilty." This "guilt" was lifted only in 1907.

The Soviet system won in Abkhaziya on 4 March 1921. The Abkhaz Republic was proclaimed in February 1922.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Adygei

91UN0541C *Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 5, Jan 90*
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Adyge**, which is also the name by which they are known to the Kharda and Circassians, who are related to them.

According to the 1979 census, there are about 109,000 Adygei.

The Adygei are among the native populations of the Northern Caucasus and are quite densely settled in the valleys of the Kuban and Laba Rivers and their tributaries, in the area between the estuary lowlands and the foothills. In addition to the Adygey area, Adygei people are found in Tuapsinskiy and Uspenskiya Rayons in Krasnodar Krai. A substantial number of Adygei, accounting for approximately one-half of their total number, live in Turkish cities.

The Adygei language is a member of the Adygo-Abkhaz branch of Caucasian languages, most closely related to the Kabardin language. There now is an Adygei literary language although dialects have been preserved: **Shapsug**, **Bzhedug**, **Temirgoy**, and **Adabkhez**. Another past distinguishing linguistic feature of the Adygei was their use of jargons by a small number of people, in conducting their raids. The Adygei literary language is based on the Temirgoy dialect.

The Adygei developed from a tribe of Natukhai, who lived between the lower reaches of the Kuban and Dzhubga Rivers; the largest group of Adygei were the **Shapsug**, who occupied a territory to the south, between the sea and the Shakh (Maly Shapsug) River and the northern slope of the Big Caucasian Ridge (Bolshoy Shapsug); the **Abadzekh**, who inhabited a large area in the upper reaches of the Psekuls, Belaya, and Laba Rivers; the **Bzhedug**, settled east of the **Shapsug**, along the left bank of the Kuban, opposite today's Krasnodar; the **Khutukai** and **Termigoi**, who lived between the estuaries of the Belaya and Laba Rivers; the **Yerukai**, **Mokosh**, and **Mamheg**, who lived to the south, along the middle reaches of the Laba, and the **Belenei**, who occupied the area along the middle reaches of the Laba, Khodz, and Urup Rivers.

Already in the first half of the 19th century, the total number of Adygei tribes was no less than half a million people. After the Caucasus War, most Adygei emigrated to Turkey while those who remained on their ancient lands became part of the Yekaterinodar and Maykop sections of Kuban Oblast and the Black Sea Guberniya.

As early as 1922, after the revolution and the civil war, the Adygei were given oblast autonomy within borders which were expanded in 1936. In modern Adygey the urban population accounts for one-third of the total. The Adygei themselves account for no more than one-quarter of the entire population.

Since ancient times the Adygei have been grain farmers. They grew millet and barley and, with the development of a market economy, also undertook to grow marketable crops, mainly sunflower and corn. By the middle of the 19th century they had also developed substantial cattle herds.

Toward the end of the 19th century, the Adygey settlements in the Kuban took the aspect of Russian villages. However, they also retained the traditional features of their former housing, including walls and separate premises for horses and cattle, etc.

Folk customs preserved a system of strict respect for elders. Traditionally, husbands and wives never ate together. The father never sat down to eat with his son and women and girls ate in separate premises. If a guest happened to be senior to the master of the house, he sat at the table alone, while the host watched. The Adygei had large families.

The Adygei are Sunni Muslims. They adopted this religion in the 16th century, under Turkish influence.

At the present time, most Adygei are engaged in farming in the oblast's kolkhozes and sovkhoses.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Agul

91UN0541D Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 4, Jan 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Their self-designation is **Agul**. In ordinary speech they frequently identify themselves by village: **Khutul**, **Burkekhan** or **Khoredzh**.

According to the 1979 census there are around 12,000 Agul settled in four gorges in southeastern Dagestan: Aguldere, Khushandere, Kurakhdere, and Khyukdere. More than 20 Agul settlements are located in these gorges.

The Agul language belongs to the Lezgin group of the Dagestan branch of the Caucasian language family.

Currently a substantial number of Agul live in Derbent, Baku, and Makhachkala, where they moved during the Great Patriotic War. For a long period of time the Agul had been the prize in the struggle among different feudal lords. Throughout most of their history they have been divided. Thus, in the 18th century, Aguldere was ruled by the Kazi—the Kumukh khans. At the same time, the Tabasaran Cadi ruled the other Agul settlements. After uniting with the Russian state, all Agul, together with some Lezgin, became part of the Kyurin Khannate, which subsequently became the Kyurin Okrug. The unification of all Agul within a single administrative-territorial unit contributed to their closeness and development of self-awareness. Under the Soviet rule the Agul became part of Kurakhskiy Rayon, the center of which was the Kurakh settlement, which also included Lezgin who lived on said territory. The building of roads which connected Aguldere with the Tpig settlement and the Lezgin Kasumkent settlement was of tremendous importance in developing contacts with the outside world. It should be remembered that the Agul settlements were previously linked to their neighbors only through extremely difficult and dangerous passes and old roads too narrow for two horsemen going in opposite directions to pass. In winter these roads were damaged from rains and landslides, dooming the Agul to total isolation.

The traditional Agul occupation was mountain cattle breeding and, to a minor extent, farming.

Sheep breeding was considered by the Agul a strictly male occupation. The men grazed the sheep and took care of them during the lambing season.

Traditionally, the Agul settlements were located in such a way as to be protected by rocks on all sides. Houses

were built one above the other and a person could move from one farmstead to another through the roofs. Architecturally, the Agul houses were similar to those of other Dagestan peoples. However, whereas among other Dagestani usually the housing was separated into male and female halves, in the Agul they were divided into common housing and a *kunak*, which was the guest wing. The homes were also forts which could withstand a lengthy siege: their windows were narrow and not protected by glass; the entrance on the lower floor was protected; the common fireplace in the center of the house, the smoke of which was drawn through an opening in the roof, and chests, rugs, and copper and silverware of Kubachin and Lak origins were traditional parts of the Agul interior. The Agul traditional dishes were meat, cheese, butter, and bread. Unlike other table manners practiced in the Caucasus, however, no toasts were raised at meals.

In the past, the social system of the Agul was distinguished by their large families consisting of 15 to 20 members. These families were based on parental ties, united in *tokhums*, which were groups of related individuals with their own farmland and hay and pasture grounds and other areas used collectively. The assembly was the supreme power authority of the Agul. In the family the heads of the family had full authority: the old, the fathers, and elder brothers. Despite the subordinate status of women, the Agul had a custom not found in other Dagestan ethnic groups: In cases of divorce even married sisters received one-half of the land and other real estate. The Agul practiced Islam.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Albanians

91UN0541E Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 7, Feb 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Shqipetar**. Albanians living in the USSR rarely use this word in daily life.

Currently there are more than 5,000 Albanians in the USSR.

Little has been preserved of the Albanian language which belongs to a separate group of the Indo-European language family. The Albanian language is distinguished by numerous terms borrowed from Latin, ancient and modern Greek, South Slavic, and Turkic languages. This feature of the Albanian language reflects the complex processes which accompanied its formation.

The Albanians are the descendants of the native population of the western parts of the Balkan peninsula—the **Illyrians and Thracians**. Between the second and fourth centuries B.C., the Albanian lands were part of the Roman Empire. Three centuries of contacts with the Romans had a major influence on all aspects of Albanian culture. Ever since the Roman rule Albania had never

been independent until the turn of the 20th century. Albanians have been consecutively ruled by Byzantium, the Bulgarian Kingdom, the Serbian Kingdom, the Epirus despots, the Anjou Dynasty, the Venetian Republic, and, finally, for 400 years, the Ottoman Empire. It was only with the fall of the Ottoman Empire that Albanian independence was proclaimed in 1912.

The period of Turkish rule was a particularly difficult one for the Albanians. The country was divided into small administrative units with very weak economic interrelations. The oppression of the conquerors forced the Albanian population to take to the mountains. In the first period following the Turkish conquest, cities and valleys became virtually depopulated. The members of the feudal nobility who opposed the Turks were either eliminated or left the country. Those who tried to preserve their land converted to Islam. The peasants as well converted to the Islamic faith, for this relieved them of the tax burden. Conversion to Islam took a particularly mass dimension among the Albanians in the 17th century.

Seventy percent of today's Albanians are Muslims. In fleeing from the persecution of the occupation force, substantial numbers of Albanians emigrated to neighboring countries. The Albanian people developed as a separate ethnic group as early as the 11th century. It was also then that their common name with its variants appeared: "Arvan" for the Byzantines, "Arnaut" for the Turks, and "Arbanasi" for the Slavs, which is the origin of the contemporary term **Albanians**.

A large number of Albanians emigrated to Bulgaria and settled there in several settlements, as early as the 17th-18th centuries. These Albanians were Orthodox Christians, as were the Bulgarians. They also adopted a number of features of traditional Bulgarian culture. Like the native population, they were subject to the unbearable oppression of the Ottoman Turks. Already then, together with Bulgarians and Gagauz, small groups of Albanians moved to Russia. After Bessarabia was united with Russia, at the turn of the 19th century, the Russian government offered the status of permanent residents to people from the Balkans, from which came a real flood of refugees who were settled in territories neighboring those of the Moldavians. They included Albanians—the ancestors of the present Albanians who live in the USSR. The second wave of emigres from the Balkans, who settled in neighboring areas, took place in the 1830s.

After the unsuccessful Crimean War, part of Bessarabia was separated from Russia and, once again, the threat of annihilation hung over Albanians, Bulgarians, and Gagauz. The Russian government decided to grant them shelter in Tauride Guberniya. It is thus that the Albanians, the descendants of the ancient population of the Western Balkans, fearless soldiers who had struggled for the life of their nation for thousands of years, found themselves by the shore of the Azov Sea, where they live to this day, in Odessa Oblast, Ukrainian SSR.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Aleuts

91UN0541F Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 8, Feb 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Unangan**. The word means "coastal population." The name **Aleut** is of Russian origin. It appeared after the Aleut Archipelago was developed by Russian hunters and apparently meant "community," "detachment," or "group," stemming from the Aleut word "Allitkhuk."

According to the 1979 census, there are 546 Aleuts in the USSR. Approximately 7,000 Aleuts live in the United States, on the territory of "Russian America."

The Aleut language belongs to the so-called Eskaleut group, which includes Eskimo. According to some researchers the Aleut language has no relation to any other, having no analogue in the world.

The question of the origin of the Aleuts is difficult to answer. According to most ethnographers, their predecessors came from areas more to the south, somewhere from the lower reaches of the Amur-Sakhalin-Hokkaido area and, in the higher latitudes, had already developed a noted unique culture among the Northern Sea hunters. Until recently, the Aleuts were outstanding navigators and hunters. Aleut inventions include the canoe, on which the fishermen hunted huge animals, such as whales. The entire way of life of the Aleuts was adapted to the seasonal changes in their situation in the foggy islands lying beyond Eurasia and America. The Aleuts had precise knowledge of the time of the appearance of marine animals and fish, the times of ripening of wild-growing plants, the weather features, and a great many other things. The ethnographic study of the Aleuts began with the appearance in the northeast of personnel of the G.I. Shelekhov and A.A. Baranov Company, which developed close ties with the native population. At that time, the nature of relations between Russians and Aleuts was such that even a hundred years later, today's Aleuts have Russian names, profess the Orthodox religion, and consider distant Russia their second homeland. The missionary Innokentiy Veniaminov, who subsequently became the metropolitan of Moscow, was an outstanding worker in the field of Aleut culture. He has left noteworthy descriptions of Aleut culture and compiled a dictionary of the Aleut language. He was the first promoter of the sensible exploitation of the wealth of the islands of the Aleut Archipelago, such as the protection of seal breeding grounds and restricting the hunting of Kamchatka beavers and many other sea mammals. To this day the Aleuts revere his memory.

Within the Russian state, the Aleuts were permanently settled in the Komandirovskiy Islands. The government assigned them the protection of the seal breeding

grounds. The Russian Aleuts have done a great deal to protect seal refuges from poachers: American and Japanese fishermen.

Today, like the entire population of the Komandirovskiy Islands, the Aleuts are concentrated in Nikolskoye Village, which has developed into an urban-type settlement. Outside the islands Aleuts work as high sea captains or scientific workers and teachers, professions unrelated to the sea. To this day, however, the word "Aleut" evokes in the mind a powerful ocean and daring people in small frame and leather canoes sailing toward the horizon.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Altai

91UN0541G Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 9, Feb 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] To this day the Altai tribes remain divided into a northern and a southern group. The northern tribes include Tubalar, Kumandin, and Chelkan; the southern consist of the Altai-Kizhi, Telengit, and Teleut. Usually, the people designated themselves according to their tribal affiliation: **Altai-Kizhi** or **Kumandy** and that is precisely what their neighbors call them.

The 1979 census indicated the existence of around 60,000 Altai living in southwestern Siberia and the Altay mountain country.

The origin of the Altai is extremely complex and related to the merging among elements of different origin: southern Samodi, related to northern ethnic groups, such as the Nenets, Entsy, Selkup, and Nganasan, which are members of the Kettic-speaking groups, relatives of which remain in the middle reaches of the Yenisey and Tibet, and among Turks and Mongols. The most ancient elements here were the Samodi. They retained their language and cultural features as late as the mid-19th century. The Kettic-language components among the Altai are being reconstructed by ethnographers. The ethnic origins of the northern Altai included the Ugor ethnic stratum, related not only to the Siberian Khant and the Mansi but also Hungarians. The Turks, who are the descendants of the ancient Turkic population of the Sayan-Altay region, who settled in this territory between the sixth and eighth centuries, established relations with Mongolians as early as the 13th century and, subsequently, were joined by newly arrived Mongol-speaking groups, in the 16th-17th centuries.

In 1756 the Altai tribes were granted Russian citizenship. Their heterogeneity resulted in designating them by a variety of names: "Back Country Tatars"—Tubalar, Chelkan, and Kumanda; "White, Altai, Mountain, Biy or Frontier Kalmyk"—Altai-Khizi, Telengit, and Teleut. Sometimes the Altai are erroneously called Oyrot.

The Altai are the native population of the Gorno-Altay Autonomous Oblast. They account for around 28 percent of its overall population. Russians are the majority population in the oblast, accounting for some 65 percent, and Kazakhs, approximately five percent.

The Altai engaged mainly in cattle breeding, hunting, and fishing. Their economy was based on raising cattle, horses, sheep, and goats. The high standards of cattle breeding meant superb familiarity with mountain pastures, animal care, folk medicine, and many others, which remain to this day a priceless cultural fund. Although the Altai knew how to prepare food based on dairy products, an essential part of their food was meat of domestic animals and game. Under the Soviet system, a new activity—Siberian deer breeding—was developed. The livestock breeders learned how to breed and raise wild tayga reindeer from which they obtained most valuable unfrozen young horns which are highly valued in pharmacy.

The Altai language is part of the Turkic group of the Altai language family, which includes the languages of more than 25 peoples of the USSR and of many peoples abroad. The biggest groups among them include the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tatars, Azerbaijanis, Turkmens, Kirghiz, Chuvash, and Bashkir, who number into the millions. Turks and Europeans and Uygurs in Asia also speak the languages of the Turkic group.

The Altai written language was developed in the 1940s, based on the Altai-Kizhi dialect.

Many aspects of the traditional culture of livestock breeders and tayga hunters have already disappeared. To this day, however, the people remember their tribal affiliations, which are taken into consideration in marrying. The senior generation worships fire and has maintained the cult of ancestors and also pays homage to the gods of various sites, mountains, rivers, and gorges.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Arabs

91UN0541H Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 10,
Mar 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Arab (Al-Arab)**. They are given the same name by their neighbors as well. The total number of Arabs in our country exceeds 3,500. Most of them live in Kashka-Darya (about one-half), Bukhara (about one-third), and Surkhan-Darya Oblasts (about one-quarter); groups of Arabs, not exceeding 300 people, may be found in Samarkand, Andizhan, Tashkent, and Namagan Oblasts. Individual Arab families live in Fergana and Khorezm Oblasts. In the past, Arabs were much more widespread on Uzbek territory, as confirmed by numerous names of settlements which mean "Arab village," "Arab residence," etc.

There are virtually no written sources concerning the history of Arabs in Central Asia. Based on anthropological data, some scientists have tried to trace the origins of individual Arab groups.

In the past, the Central Asian Arabs spoke a separate dialect of the Arab language, very little of which has been preserved today. It belongs to the Semitic group of Afro-Asian languages. By the middle of the 19th century, Arabs mainly spoke the language of their neighbors—the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks. By the turn of the 20th century, the Arabs lost even more command of their native language. This was encouraged by the conversion of the Uzbek and Tadzhik languages from Arabic to Latin and Cyrillic script. Within that time the reach of the spoken Arab language was reduced in general: religious schools were closed down and so were courts based on the Shariat, the Muslim law, etc. Only 1,750 of the 20,000 Arabs surveyed in 1938 listed Arabic as their native language; in 1959 2,077 listed Arabic as their native language; in 1970, only 900 from a total of 3,500. Arabic is most preserved among the Kashka-Darya group, who inhabit mainly rural areas. The ancient Semitic stratum, similar to the spoken dialects of Syria and Iraq, can be clearly traced in the language of the Kashka-Darya Arabs. This leads to the conclusion that the Central Asian Arabs came from Mesopotamia and the Arab Peninsula.

It can be considered as relatively accurate that Arabs appeared in Central Asia as early as the seventh-eighth centuries, during the rule of Khalif Valid I.

At different times, Arabs migrated to the territory of Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan and, subsequently, coming from Afghanistan and Merva. Arab folklore retains legends according to which their ancestors came precisely from northern Afghanistan, from Hissar, and became livestock breeders. They subsequently settled down and became farmers. Anthropologically, they are divided into two types: short, with long heads and short noses, as the typical representatives of the small "Mediterranean" race, coming from the Arab Peninsula, and a group of a more sharply expressed Semitic type, who came from Mesopotamia.

Arab livestock breeders introduced in Central Asia the raising of karakul sheep which, as it were, were described as "Arab." They also had large herds of kurdyuk sheep and camels. Today they have adopted all the elements of the local farming culture along with the type of housing and the main elements of the clothing of the native population of Central Asia.

The present way of life of the Arabs is little different from life in general in Central Asia. It is more strongly influenced by Muslim customs and laws. Nonetheless, to this day the Arabs have retained certain specific features. For example, they have preserved the ritual of hiring professional criers who pray and cry from the moment someone dies to his burial. People attending the funeral are paid a fee, and aid to the family is provided secretly.

The Arabs are primarily Sunni Muslims.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Armenians

91UN05411 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 11, Mar 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Khay**.

According to the 1979 census there are 4,151,000 Armenians in the USSR. Abroad, Armenians may be found in more than 60 countries, from the Middle East to Australia.

The origin of the Armenians is traced to Neolithic times. Their Indo-European ancestors—the **Arim**—mentioned in Homer's epic, played a noted role in Armenian development. By the turn of the second millennium B.C. they migrated from the Thracian shores to Asia Minor and, subsequently, spread over the territory of Little Armenia, in the 14th-13th centuries B.C. Their country was mentioned in Hittite chronicles as **Armetana**. In the 12th century B.C., following the defeat of the Hittite state by the Phrygians, the ancestors of the Armenians began to mix with Hittite-Nesa, Hurrian, Abkhaz-Adyg, and Kartvel tribes which spoke a language related to all Indo-European languages. At that time, the Assyrian word used to identify the Armenians is similar to the contemporary Georgian name for the Armenians, **Somekh**. The name of the country at that time was **Hayasa-Hate**, which was the basis for the self-designation of the Armenians as **Khay**, and of Armenia as **Khayastan**. Between the 13th and 12th centuries B.C., the Armenian tribes went deep into the Armenian plateau and into northern Mesopotamia, after which a process of consolidation of the Armenian tribes settled in that area began. In the ninth century B.C. the Armenians became part of the Urartu state. By the fourth century B.C. the process of the development of the Armenians as an ethnic group was completed. The Behistun inscription of 521-517 depicts Armenians presenting gifts to the Ahemenide king and the country of Armin is mentioned.

Great Armenia was established by the turn of the first century B.C. In the year 1 A.D. the Romans overthrew the Armenian Artashes Dynasty but the Armenians once again regained their autonomy by the third century A.D. By then Christianity had spread in Armenia, since the year 301. In the third and fourth centuries, Armenia became the arena of wars of conquest between the Sasanians and Rome, which ended in 387 with the division of Great Armenia between Byzantium and Iran.

Armenian statehood was restored once again in the 12th-13th centuries. A number of feudal principalities were established under the supreme authority of the Georgian Bagratids. Once again the economic and cultural prosperity ended in the 13th century with the Tatar-Mongol invasion. In the 16th century, the Tatar-Mongols were replaced by Ottoman Turkey and Saphavid Iran. This marked the beginning of a dark

period of destruction of huge masses of people, cultural decline, and terrible oppression. Together with the other peoples of the Caucasus, the Armenian people waged an uninterrupted war of liberation in the 17th-18th centuries. It was then that a movement for unification with Russia developed. In the first half of the 19th century, as a result of the Russo-Persian and Russo-Turkish wars, a significant portion of Armenia became united with the Russian state, which saved the Armenians from physical destruction, assimilation, and religious persecution. The Armenian Oblast, followed by a separate Erivan Guberniya, were established within the Russian state. Some Armenians remained under Turkish rule in Western Armenia. In 1878, with the San-Stephano Treaty, some groups of Western Armenians became Russian citizens while the Turkish part of Armenia was granted some autonomy. By the end of the century, the Muslim Turks organized a terrible slaughter. More than 300,000 people died. A significant number of people left for Europe and America. As a result of the policy of genocide promoted by the Turkish government toward the Armenians, in 1915-1916 that ethnic group suffered tremendous casualties. More than 1.5 million Armenian people were killed and more than half a million were exiled to the deserts of Mesopotamia, where most of them perished.

The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic was founded in November 1920.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Assyrians

91UN0541A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 12,
Mar 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Aysory, Aturai**.

The Assyrians are the descendants of a most ancient people who developed an outstanding culture and had a tremendous influence on the development of all nations in Asia Minor.

Today's Assyrians speak in the neo-Assyrian (neo-Aramaic) dialect of the Aramaic language. Also spoken by Assyrians are Arabic, Persian, Russian, Georgian, Armenian, and Azeri languages. The Assyrian literary language has two alphabets: **Astrangelo** and **Nestorian**. The Assyrian language belongs to the Semitic group of the Afrasian (Semite-Hamite) language family.

The ancestors of the Assyrians played a major role in the cultural history of the Medieval East. The Aramaic alphabet is the basis of a number of other alphabets, starting with the Pahlevi Middle Persian to the Mongolian and Manchurian scripts. The Arab and, frequently, the Mongol-Turkish conquest led to the assimilation of a

significant percentage of Assyrians. It was only in the inaccessible mountain areas along the Turkish-Iranian border that Assyrians were able to retain their independence and ethnic purity. This situation lasted throughout the Middle Ages and the modern times. Starting with the first quarter of the 19th century, the Assyrians settled in the Transcaucasus.

More than 26,000 Assyrians live in the USSR. Several hundred thousand live in Arab countries.

Most of the Assyrians living in the USSR are the descendants of migrants from the high mountain areas along the Turkish-Iran-Iraq border. Assyrians are among the first followers of Christianity. Assyrian folklore includes legends which link the origin of Jesus Christ to the Assyrians in Nazareth.

Like the Armenian Christian population, the Assyrians experienced in full the Ottoman policy of genocide. They were regularly subject to annihilation. During the period of the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Persian Wars, at the turn of the 19th century, together with the Armenian emigrants, Assyrian families came to the Caucasus. These groups were small. Thus, in the 1830s over a hundred Assyrian families from Iran and the western banks of the Urmi-Rezaiye Lake emigrated to the Russian Empire. These new settlers were compactly settled in the Merkin Kuylasar settlement in what is today Artashatskiy Rayon in Armenia. Currently they account for a considerable portion of the population in the rayon.

Alaverdy Tumayev, who headed this migration, greatly helped the Russian forces as guide and organizer of logistic services. The leader of the freedom-loving Assyrian settlers is also credited with contributing to the success of the 1827 campaign.

In subsequent years, some Assyrian families moved from Kuylasar to Dvin-Aysori or Verin Dvin Village. Latter groups of Assyrians settled in various parts of Armenia and the Transcaucasus.

An especially heavy flood of refugees coming to the Russian state took place during World War I, when once again repressive actions on the part of the Muslim rulers in Turkey and Iran intensified. The settlers who came in the second decade of the 20th century settled in Tbilisi, Moscow, and Petrograd. The Assyrian urban population engaged in a great variety of activities. The rural population lives in compact groups in Armenia, in Verin Dvin, Nerkin Kuylasar, and Gelaysor, Vedinskiy Rayon, and in Arzni, Abovyanskiy Rayon, where it is engaged mainly in viticulture and wine making.

The characteristic features of the material way of life of the Assyrians have been preserved mostly in the rural areas.

Assyrian oral folk stories were strongly influenced by the Kurds. Kurdish legends, songs, and epic poems are popular among Assyrians.

The Assyrian urban population includes a significant stratum of members of the intelligentsia.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Avar

91UN0541A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 3, Jan 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Maarulal**, meaning "mountain people," "mountaineers."

According to the 1979 census, there are approximately 483,000 Avar in the USSR. They are the biggest ethnic group of Dagestan.

The Avar language belongs to the Avaro-Andi-Tsez group of the Dagestan branch of Caucasian languages. In addition to Avar, this group includes the Andi and Tsez languages which are related. The ethnic groups which speak these languages are the **Andi, Botlig, Godoberi, Akhwakh, Bagulal, Chamalal, and Tital** groups (Andi branch), **Tsez (Dido), Khwarshi, Bezheta, Khunzeb, and Khinukh** (Dido or Tsez branch), and the separate **Archi**, whose language is transitional between the Avar and Lezgin language groups. The basis of the Avar literary language is the "military language" which has long been a lingua franca among all related Avar peoples.

The Avar are the native population of the mountainous part of Dagestan: the Khunzakhskiy, Gunidskiy, Gergebilskiy, Gumbetovskiy, Charodinskiy, Botlikhskiy, Tsomadinskiy, Tsuntinskiy, Akhvakhskiy, Kazbekovskiy, and Tlyaratinskiy Rayons. The Avar also inhabit Buynakskiy, Levashinskiy, and Kizilyurtovskiy Rayons, the Kusar settlement in Rutulskiy Rayon, and several rayons in Azerbaijan.

The Avar and their related ethnic groups developed under the conditions of mountain isolation where impassable areas, lack of communicating gorges, and an archaic style of farming resulted in their splitting into small groups.

To this day the ethnic origin of the Avar has not been studied in detail. The ancestors of the Avar and their related peoples are mentioned in ancient sources dating from the beginning of the Christian era. Among the writers of antiquity, Pliny the Elder mentions in the first century A.D. the **Didur**, whom we easily recognize as our contemporary **Dido**. Ptolemy, who lived after him, mentions the **Savar**, from the name of which the majority of researchers derive the ethnonym **Avar**. Arab ninth-10th century sources mention data on the kingdom of Serir which was subsequently replaced by the Avar Khannate. The Avar Khannate is depicted by historians as an alliance of free societies united under the central power of the khan for military purposes only. Groups of "free people" on Azerbaijani territory were in constant contact with the Avar Khannate. Avariya remained such a

khanate until it united with Russia. In accordance with the reform of the 1960s, the Avar lands were divided into four okrugs in Dagestan Oblast, while the Avars living in Azerbaijan were united within Zakatil Okrug.

Since ancient times the Avar have been livestock breeders and farmers. Usually, their herds consisted of two-thirds sheep and one-third cattle, horses, and donkeys. In the valleys, they engaged in farming and truck gardening. Shortage of land and limited possibilities for both livestock breeding and farming forced the mountain peasants to concentrate heavily on crafts. Avariya was famous throughout the Caucasus with its Andi felt cloaks, Karatin and Kuleb fabrics, felt strips, rugs, and stoles. The population of Golotl, Kakhib, and Urad were famous for their knives and the Chokh settlement for silver jewelry in which the Avar masters combined metal and wood inlays, burnishing, and engraving. The Gotesatl settlement had specialized in copperware.

The Avar settlements were real fortresses where all houses hung to the slopes of the mountains, one above the other. The end houses had multiple-story defense towers which, to this day, are a mandatory part of an Avar rural landscape. In the past the rural community was the main social cell of Avar society, consisting of tribal groups; the rally—the janad—was accepted as the supreme power authority. The Avar practiced Islam.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Azerbaijanis

91UN0541A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 6, Feb 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] The Azerbaijanis are among the most numerous native populations of the Caucasus. According to the 1979 census they numbered 5,477,000. A considerable share of Azerbaijanis, more than six million of them, live in Southern Azerbaijan, on Iranian territory.

Distinct Azerbaijani groups include the **Airum**, who live in the western part of Azerbaijan; the **Padar**, who are the native population of its eastern areas; and **Shahseven**, who are settled in areas adjacent to Araksu and Iranian Khorosan.

The Azeri language belongs to the Oguz (southwest) group of the Turkic languages, and is subdivided into the following groups: eastern (Kuba, Baku, and Shemakha dialects; Mugan and Lenkoran dialects); western (Kazak, Gandzha, Karabag, and Airum dialects); northern (Nukha and Zakatalo-Kakh dialects); and southern (Nakhichevan, Orubad, Tebriz, and Yerevan dialects).

The Azerbaijanis are the descendants of the local and the resettled population on a territory which has been a permanent arena of tragic events. The earliest tribes—**Lulubi** and **Kuti**—known since the end of the third millennium B.C., were replaced in the first millennium

B.C. by the **Mannei, Midyan, and Kaspi** and ancient Albanian tribes. Large numbers of Scythians settled in the steppe part of Azerbaijan in the seventh century B.C. In the ninth century B.C. the state of Manu, which fought Urart and Assyria, was founded here. At the beginning of the sixth century B.C. Manu conquered Mydia, and in the middle of the same century Azerbaijan was conquered by the Persian Ahehmenite Dynasty, which was defeated by Alexander the Great, and Azerbaijan gained its autonomy. Its oldest known name is Atropathena. It was known as Ader-bagan by the Persians, Atrpatakan by the Armenians, and Aderbaijan or Azerbaijan by the Arabs, meaning "Country of Fire," which confirms the widespread worship of fire in the country. The native tribes of this state spoke a language belonging to the Iranian family and included the descendants of said peoples. In the northern areas of Azerbaijan which, together with part of southern Azerbaijan were called Albania, there were peoples who spoke the Dagestan languages: Alban, Uti, Gargar, Leg, and others. In the first century B.C., Albania was conquered initially by the Romans and, later, by the Parthians. During that period Turkic-speaking Huns and Khazars settled in Albania where they mixed with the local population. Iran conquered Albania in the third century. The Sasanids resettled here some of the Persian-language population, known as the Tati. For several centuries the Iran of the Sasanids suppressed the popular movements of the Azerbaijanis. In the seventh century Azerbaijan was conquered by the Arabs. In the ninth, it was invaded by the Seljuk Turks. In the 11th-13th centuries the native languages of Azerbaijan became Turkic. In the 13th century Azerbaijan was devastated by the Mongols and by the end of the 14th, by Tamerlane. In the 16th century Azerbaijan fell under the rule of the Sefavid Dynasty and in the 16th-17th centuries it was ruled by the Turkey of the sultans. At the time of the Persian campaign of Peter the Great, the Azerbaijanis appealed for protection to the Russian tsar. In 1723 Baku and several Caspian oblasts were united with Russia. After the devastating wars between Iran and Turkey for ruling Azerbaijan, at the turn of the 19th century northern Azerbaijan became part of Russia.

Northern Azerbaijan became definitively part of the Russian state with the Turkmenchay Treaty of 1828. It was since that time that the contemporary economic aspect of Azerbaijan began to take shape. The number of people going into the industrial centers increased rapidly. At the time of the October Revolution, Azerbaijan already had a significant proletarian stratum which ensured the victory of the new system.

The Azerbaijanis are the heirs of a great ancient culture most strongly influenced by Islam.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Balkar

91UN0542A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 13,
Mar 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Taulu**, or highlanders. The Georgians call them **Basiani**, and the Ossetians, **Asi**; the Kabardin call them **Kushkhe**. Prerevolutionary sources and specialized 19th century publications referred to them as Mountain Tatars.

The 1989 Population Census recorded about 89,000 Balkar living in the Soviet Union. They are scattered along the northern slopes of the central part of the Great Caucasian Ridge. Their settlements are located along the Baksan, Chegem, Cherek (or Balkar) and Khulam-Bezengi Gorges and in the foothill and the plains of the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR. The Balkar reside in compact settlements in Elbrusskiy, Chegemskiy, Sovetskiy and Zolskiy rayons and in rural soviets territorially under the jurisdiction of the Nalchik City Executive Committee.

Anthropologically, the Balkar are members of the Balkan-Caucasian branch of the big Caucasoid race; religious Balkar are Sunni Muslims. Islam penetrated into Balkaria in the middle of the 18th century.

The Balkar (Karachai-Balkar) language belongs to the Kypchak (i.e. Western subgroup) Turkic group of the Altay language family. The written Balkar language was first written in 1924, initially on the basis of the Latin and later the Russian script. The Baksan-Chegem dialect was adopted as the base of the modern Balkar literary language.

Not all links in the chain of events which led to the origin and ethnic history of the Balkar have been determined. To this day scientists have no common views on this matter. It has been established, however, that the symbiosis of three different ethnic elements played an important role in the ethnogenesis of the Balkar as in their genetically-related Karachai: the local mountain population and two newcomers speaking a Turkic and Iranian languages. It is not excluded that in this case a significant role was played by the nomad and semi-settled Polovtsy (Kuman, according to West European and Kypchak, according to Arab sources, well-familiar from Russian chronicles), who assimilated the local and the Alan population which came from elsewhere. This viewpoint is supported by the existence of similarities in the language and customs of the Balkar and the culture of the medieval Turkic-speaking Polovtsy, as well as the culture, language and folklore of contemporary Iranian-language Ossetians. Furthermore, some proof exists of the connection between the Balkar and earlier Turkic-speaking peoples, such as the steppe Huns and the Volga Bulgars.

The long period of time during which the ancestors of the Balkar lived in the mountain gorges of the Central Caucasus, driven by the Mongol invasion, resulted in the preservation of several territorial-ethnic groups: Baksan, Chechen, Khulam, Bezengi and Balkar proper. Each of these groups had certain specific features in their culture and way of life. The Balkar national group (the Balkar people) were established definitely during the feudal age.

In the past, Balkar settlements were located in basins difficult to attack and in narrow and deep gorges and sometimes along mountain slopes, in cluster and terrace formations, with narrow, twisted small dead-end streets.

Today the population is being consolidated and its living conditions are being improved. The stone mountain hut with a flat earthen roof or gables was the traditional Balkar house. Medieval watchtowers made of stone, still seen on Balkar territory, were aimed at providing protection from outside attack.

The Kabardino-Balkar ASSR is part of the RSFSR. The Kabardin Autonomous Oblast was established on 1 September 1921 (until that time the Kabardin Okrug was part of the Mountain Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic which was established in January 1921). It was reorganized as an autonomous socialist republic on 5 December 1936.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Bashkirs

91UN0542B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 14, Apr 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Bashkort**.

Based on the 1989 Census, there are about 1,450,000 Bashkirs in the Soviet Union.

Most Soviet Bashkirs (59.6 percent) inhabit the mountains of the Southern Urals, east of the Trans-Ural Steppes and the hilly forest-steppe along the Urals. Outside the republic, they live in the valley of the Belaya River and its tributaries, the Ufa, and Bystriy Tanyp on the north; Deme, Ashkadar, Chermasan and Karmasan on the south and southwest; Sim, Inzer, Zilim and Nugush, on the east and southeast. Substantial groups of Bashkirs are settled in Chelyabin and Kurgan oblasts, where they constitute a separate ethnoterritorial group known as "Trans-Ural Bashkirs." A few tens of thousands of Bashkirs, however, live in several other RSFSR oblasts.

Anthropologically, the Bashkirs are of heterogeneous origin, for they were formed in an area of active members of the Caucasoid and Mongoloid races. Anthropologically, the Bashkirs are classified, first of all, as individuals belonging to the sub-Uralic type of the intermediary Uralic race; second, the Eastern European type of the Central European race and, third, the South Siberian race.

Religious Bashkirs are Sunni Muslims. Islam began to take hold among the Bashkirs between the 10th and beginning of the 13th centuries, a time when the Western part of the Bashkirs were ethnopolitically dependent on Volga Bulgars.

Together with the Tatar Language, the Bashkir language belongs to the Turkic group of the Altay Linguistic Family, constituting a separate Bulgar-Kypchak subgroup of the Kypchak linguistic group. Their alphabet, based on the Arabic script, became widespread after the Bashkirs accepted Islam. After the October Revolution, their literary language developed on the basis of the Southern and Eastern dialects. An alphabet was created for them in 1929 on the basis of the Latin script; a conversion to the Cyrillic Alphabet took place in 1939.

To this day the question of the ethnic affiliation of the ancient tribes which led to the development of the ethnic Bashkir people remains unclear. It is more or less obvious that this ethnic "bouquet" consisted of different "flowers." On the eve of the migration to the Urals of the Central Asiatic nomad tribes, a local Finno-Ugric and Sarmat-Alan population had long been established in the area. It is believed that the Bashkir ethnic group was formed by two waves of Turkic-speaking nomad cattle breeders.

Waves of Turkic-speaking population, familiar with the cultures of the predecessors of the contemporary Eastern-Turkic (Altay, Khakas, Yakut and Tuva), Mongol and Tungus-Manchurian ethnic groups reached this area coming from the north of Central Asia and the south of Siberia.

On the eve of the Mongol Conquest, by the end of the 10th and, particularly, during the 11th centuries, Kuman elements actively merged with the Bashkir ethnic group, leaving noticeable traces in the language and the material culture of contemporary Bashkirs. The Kumanization, which continued during the period of the Golden Horde, did not vanish without a trace. It led to the development of the particular features in the way of life of the medieval Bashkirs. It was at that time that the boundaries of the ethnic territory of the Bashkir settlements were established.

After the breakdown of the Golden Horde in the 15th-16th centuries, several groups of nomad Nogay began to merge with the Bashkir ethnic group; in the 17th and 18th centuries, a large group of Kalmyk and Central Asian Sart merged with the Bashkirs.

After the Bashkirs were established as a separate ethnic group within the Russian State, individual groups of Tatars, Mari, Udmurt and Mordvy settled in the 18th century in Northwestern Bashkiriya.

The Bashkir ASSR (Bashkiriya) is part of the RSFSR. It was established on 23 March 1919. It was the first autonomous republic within the RSFSR.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Belorussians

91UN0542C *Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 15, Apr 90*
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Belorussians**. This ethnonym comes from the lands (Western areas of Rus) which, starting with the second half of the 14th century, were identified in written sources as White Rus. The term "Belorussians" grew in popularity following the unification of Belorussia with Russia by the end of the 18th century.

According to the 1989 Census, more than 10 million Belorussians live in the Soviet Union.

Anthropologically, a significant number of Belorussians (Northern, Central and Western areas of the Belorussian SSR) belong to the Eastern European type of the Middle European race, within the Big Caucasoid race.

Religious Belorussians are Eastern Orthodox and, partially, Roman Catholic. By the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, the former accounted for three-quarters and the latter for one-quarter of the Belorussian population.

The Belorussian language is relatively homogeneous. It belongs to the Eastern subgroup of the Slavic branch of the Indo-European family of languages. The southwestern, northeastern and intermediary central and middle Belorussian dialects show insignificant differences among them and are three of the basic dialects of the single national language of the Belorussians.

The written Belorussian language is based on the Cyrillic Alphabet.

Belorussian settlements in which Belorussian-Lithuanian bilingualism or Belorussian-Russian-Lithuanian trilingualism is widespread are found in some rayons in Grodno Oblast, along the border with the Lithuanian SSR.

The ethnic origin of the Belorussians is traced to the East Slavic tribes of the Dregovich, the Southwestern Krivichi and the Radimichi.

Since the 6th century, in the course of 400 years, these Slavic tribes settled a wide territory, including the entire contemporary territory of Belorussian settlements. By the turn of the 10th century the East Slavic tribes, unified in tribal unions, became part of the early Russian feudal state—Kiev Rus.

In the early stages of its establishment, the nucleus of the Belorussian people included part of neighboring Drevlyani, Severyani and Volnyani and Lithuanian ethnic elements (Yatvyagi) assimilated by the predecessors of the Belorussians. The particular feature of the ethnogenesis of the Belorussians, as that of the remaining East Slavic ethnic groups, is that the nucleus of the Belorussian ethnons developed not through the direct consolidation among tribes and tribal formations but on the basis of the established ancient Russian nationality.

Ethnic groups, such as Poleshchuki (Pinchuki and Breshchuki) and Litviny, have been preserved among the Belorussians. Their names are similar to those of the two

ethnic groups of Ukrainians, distinguished by their specific ways of life and culture. However, we should emphasize that the Belorussians lack any clearly demarcated ethnolocal groups, distinguished in terms of local features and formed as a result of the history of the individual settlements or other circumstances governed by historical developments. Today the Poleshchuki and individual mixed groups within the Belorussian SSR have united within the Belorussian people, losing the local features of their way of life.

The Belorussian SSR was founded on 1 January 1919.

The Lithuanian-Belorussian SSR existed between February and August 1919. The Western areas of Belorussia (40 percent of its territory and 38 percent of the population of the Belorussian SSR in its present borders) went to Poland in accordance with the 1921 Riga Treaty. With the establishment of the USSR, on 30 December 1922, Belorussia became part of it as a Union republic. In 1939 Western Belorussia was reunited with the Belorussian SSR.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Beluchi

91UN0542D Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 16, Apr 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Baluch, Baloch or Beluchi.**

According to the 1989 Census, there were more than 29,000 Beluchi in the USSR.

The first Beluchi settlements appeared in Central Asia by the turn of the 20th century.

In the Soviet Union, the Beluchi are settled primarily in Iolotanskiy, Turkmen-Kalinskiy and Bayram-Aliyskiy rayons, Mari Oblast, which is the area of compact Beluchi settlements. The Beluchi in Turkmenia mainly come from Afghanistan, mostly from Chehansur, the Afghan Seistan and some parts of the Iranian Seistan. Most Beluchis resettled into the Turkmen SSR from Azerbaijan, via Iran in 1923-1928. A small number of Beluchi live in the southern part of Tajikistan, in Parkharskiy, Kolkhozabadskiy and some other rayons.

Anthropologically, the Beluchi are members of the Kurd-Mediterranean race of the Big Caucasoid race. Religious Beluchi, like most Arabs, Turks, Afghans, most Kurds, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens are Sunni Muslims. They have preserved various pre-Islamic beliefs. Worship of sacred rocks and ancestral graves and the wearing of amulets are widespread.

The Beluchi speak the Baluchi Language, which belongs to the Northwestern subgroup of the Iranian branch of Indo-European languages.

Along with the two groups of dialects (Eastern and Western group) in some cases the Beluchi in the Soviet Union speak their own dialect.

The written language of foreign Beluchi is based on the Arabic characters.

According to the 1959 Census, the majority of Beluchi (94.9 percent) listed as their native language that of their nationality. In the past few years they have made steady efforts to preserve the use of their language. Few of them are fluent in Russian. More than one-half of the Beluchi are bilingual. Their second language is Turkmen and possibilities exist of expanding Baluchi-Turkmen bilingualism.

The ethnic origins of the Beluchi is difficult to trace because of their heterogeneousness and the dispersed nature of their settlements in different countries. The ancestors of the Beluchi began to settle on what is today Beluchistan between the 11th and the 13th centuries, establishing contacts with Indo-Aryan and Iranian populations, including the local Dravidian population which they partially assimilated. As a result of this, Negro-Australoid features (dark skin, wide nose and thick lips) appeared in some Beluchi groups.

In the 16th-17th centuries, several feudal principalities appeared within Beluchistan, dependent on the empire of the Great Moguls and Iranian and Afghan rulers.

In the mid-19th century, West Beluchistan was part of Iran and East Beluchistan was under British rule; since 1947 it has been part of Pakistan.

The processes of ethnic consolidation and the growth of national self-awareness began intensively to develop after the former individual principalities merged within the single Beluchistan Province in Pakistan in 1970.

The Beluchi, who emigrated to Oman from the opposite bank of Oman Bay at the end of the 19th century, today hold important positions in that country's economy and are also the backbone of the Oman Armed Forces.

Tribal divisions have been preserved among the Beluchi. They include the Mari, Bugti, Rakhshani, Rindy, Khet-rani, Magasi, Dombkhi, Rais, Sangur, Kilkaur and Birandzhan tribes.

A national intelligentsia is developing among Soviet Beluchi and we can note a growing interest in broadening their professional standards. The need has been noted for having their own books and printing press and radio and television broadcasting.

The Beluchi have no national autonomy within the USSR.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Bulgarians

91UN0542E Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 17, Apr 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Bulgarians**.

According to the 1989 Census, more than 378,000 Bulgarians live in the Soviet Union.

Anthropologically, the Bulgarians are members of the Indo-Mediterranean race of the Big Caucasoid race. Balkan-Caucasian features may be noted in some Bulgarians and features of the Central European race, in other.

Religious Bulgarians are mainly Eastern Orthodox, although there are small groups of Roman Catholics and a significant number of individuals professing Islam. The Bulgarians adopted Christianity in the year 865, i.e., somewhat earlier than did Kiev Rus.

The Bulgarian language belongs to the southern subgroup of the Slavic branch of Indo-European languages. In Bulgaria, the Bulgarians have two groups of dialects—Eastern and Western.

The written Bulgarian literary language, based on the Cyrillic script, spread by the end of the 9th century.

The ethnogenesis of the Bulgarians has been determined more or less clearly through the efforts of a number of generations of scientists. Three totally different ethnic components were the foundations for the development of the Bulgarian nation: the **Thracian**, consisting of local tribes which inhabited the Eastern part of the Balkan Peninsula during the Bronze Age; the **Slavic**, based on the Slavic tribes which moved to the Balkans in the 6th and 7th centuries, and **Turkic**, consisting of Turkic-language Pre-Bulgarians, who moved east in the 670s, from the Black Sea Steppes, consisting of a unit of horsemen headed by Prince Asparukh (Asparukh Bulgarians).

The ethnonym "Bulgarian" was definitely established by the turn of the 10th century.

By the end of the 14th century, the Turkish Invasion of the Balkans put an end to the independent existence of the Second Bulgarian Kingdom (12th-14th centuries).

In the course of the 500 years of Turkish rule, which followed, a significant percentage of Bulgarians nonetheless retained their self-awareness and identity, while individual groups were either subjected to Islamization or Turkish assimilation.

Another part of the Bulgarians, together with the Gagauz, opposing the assimilation policy, resettled in the Black Sea areas in the 17th-18th centuries.

The first official data on Bulgarian settlements in the Southern part of Russia may be traced to the second half of the 18th century. At that time, the emigres settled in the Budzhak Steppes (the southern part of Bessarabia), the Odessa area and the Crimea. During the same period of time the southern areas of Bessarabia remained the main area of concentration of resettlers from the northern parts of Bulgaria (especially after the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1812, when Bessarabia became part of Russia).

According to the 1856 Paris Treaty, the southern part of Bessarabia was attached to the Moldavian Principality, which was a Turkish vassal. In 1859 the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities united as Romania. The Bessarabian Orthodox population was allowed to resettle in Russia. At that time a grave shortage of land was felt among the colonists, for which reason some of them permanently resettled in Russia, in the new underdeveloped areas of Southern Ukraine, between 1860 and 1862.

The Russian government was interested in settling and economically developing the steppe in the Northern areas bordering the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov (Novorossiia). It was precisely there that the settlers coming from Southern Bessarabia settled.

Bulgarian settlements appeared in the course of their colonization of the Budzhak Steppes in Southern Bessarabia by the end of the 18th century and, particularly, the first quarter of the 19th century. Many Bulgarian villages were established on the sites of the former settlements of Nogay Horde Tatars, who had left the area after the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812, for which reason the Bulgarians adopted the old toponymics (as seen in the names of villages such as Shikirli-Kitay, Kubey, Tash-Bunar, etc.).

Bulgarians have no national autonomy within the USSR.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Buryats

91UN0542F Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 18,
May 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation (ethnonym): **Buryat, Baryaat**.

The Buryats, which live West of the Baykal, are described as Western or pre-Baykal; those who live East of it are known as the Eastern or Trans-Baykal Buryats. They are also known as Selengi, Ungini, Alari, Barguzi, etc. Buryats.

Based on the 1989 census, more than 421,000 Buryats live in the Soviet Union, including some 250,000 (59.2 percent) in the Buryat ASSR and nearly 50,000 (11.6 percent) in the Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast; more than 42,000 (10 percent) live in the

Aga-Buryat Autonomous Okrug and Chita Oblast and in some other rayons of said two oblasts. Finally, small separate groups may be found in other RSFSR oblasts.

Outside the USSR, Buryats are settled in the northern part of the Mongolian People's Republic (over 45,000) with sprinklings among other ethnic groups in the North-eastern parts of the PRC.

Anthropologically, the Buryats are Mongoloid. They are members of the North Asian race of the Big Mongoloid race.

Most of the Western Buryat are Orthodox but have retained certain elements of shamanism. According to shamanism, which is the ancient Buryat religion, all nature is animate and deified.

In the middle of the 18th century Buddhism replaced shamanism among the Eastern Buryats. The dominant religion (starting with the 17th century) of the Eastern Buryats in the Transbaykal area and among the Kondogor, in the Cisbaykal area, was Lamaism, which is a variety of Buddhism.

The Buryat language is part of the Northern subgroup of the Mongolian group of the Altay linguistic family. The literary Buryat language, spoken by a considerable segment of Transbaykal (Eastern) Buryats was established and developed on the basis of the Mongol-Uygur vertical script which was developed as early as the age of Genghis Khan. Currently an interest in this written language is being revived among some members of the Buryat intelligentsia. In 1931 the old Mongolian alphabet was changed to the Latin and, in 1939, to the Cyrillic alphabet.

The spoken language is divided into a number of dialects: Khora, Selengi, Tsopgol, Khaban-Barguz, Tunkhi, Okhi, Nizhneudin, Ungi, Alar, Bokhan, Ekhirit, Bulagat, etc.

The study of the early stages of the ethnic origin of the Buryats remains incomplete.

On the eve of the unification of the lands inhabited by the Buryats with Russia, consolidation processes occurred in the mid-17th century, in the course of which the development of the Buryat peoples, consisting of individual tribal groups, was completed. The best known among them were the Bulagat, Ekhirit, Khori and Khondogor.

Gradually, some tribes of assimilated Evenk and groups of other non-Mongol speaking peoples were assimilated with the Buryat people.

At the same time, the Mongolian component within the Buryats was strengthened by the inclusion of tribal groups of Mongolian origin which subsequently became the foundation of the Selengi Buryats.

The end of the 18th century is considered the chronological date of the completion of the processes of ethnic consolidation among Buryat tribal groups.

The Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Oblast and the Mongol-Buryat Autonomous Oblast were formed, respectively, on 27 April 1921 and 9 January 1922. On 30 May 1923 they merged within the Buryat-Mongol ASSR, which was renamed the Buryat ASSR in 1958.

The Aga-Buryat Autonomous (until 1927 National) Okrug was established on 26 September 1927 as part of Chita Oblast, RSFSR.

The Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous (National until 1977) Okrug was established on 26 September 1937 within Irkutsk Oblast, RSFSR.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Dargin

91UN0548A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 25, Jun 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Historically, the Dargin are subdivided into three separate groups: the **Dargin**, **Kaytag** and **Kubachi**.

The Dargin self-designation is **Dargin**; the Kaytag call themselves **Khaydak**; the Kubachi self-designation is **Urbagan**. Arab sources refer to the Kubachi as "Zirekheran," or hauberk-makers, in reference to the ancient practice of weaponry making in that area.

According to the 1989 Census, there are 365,797 Dargin. The Dargin are settled in the area between the coastal part and the basin of the Kazimukhskoye Koysu River. They inhabit Sergokalinskiy and Dakhadayevskiy rayons which are specific Dargin territories; the Kubachi live in the Kubachi Settlement, Dakhadayevskiy Rayon; the Kaytag inhabit the Itsari Settlement in the same rayon, in the Dagestan ASSR. Together with Avars and Laktsy, they also are found in Levashinskiy and Akushinskiy rayons and, together with the Dargin and Kumyk, Kaytagskiy Rayon. Individual Dargin settlements may be found also in Buynakskiy, Gunibskiy and Agulskiy rayons (the Kadar, Karamakh, Chankurbi, Mingeb, Amukh and Chirakh settlements). The Dargin Language belongs to the Dagestan branch of the Caucasian languages. It is subdivided into dialects: Dargin, Kaytag and Kubachi. The Dargin language, in turn, has a number of dialects: Akusha, Urakhi and Tsudakhar. The Akusha dialect is the base of the Dargin literary language which is taught in the schools, also attended by the Kaytag and Kubachi.

The Dargin belong to the aboriginal population of the Caucasus. In this area feudal relations combined with communal-tribal relations, which developed at a rather early age. By the turn of the 19th century there were several "free societies in the area," ruled jointly by the

Kaytag prince [utsmiy], to whom the local beks paid obedience. As early as the 18th century, the rulers sent their sons to distant settlements for their education. However, the jamaats—the “free societies”—did not allow the utsmiy and his administration to interfere in their internal affairs. With the Kubachi, for instance, the ruler could visit a reliable friend only as a private individual. Most of the society consisted of free members of the community, the uzden, followed by the rayat or serfs, and a small number of rightless slaves—the kuli.

The Dargin were essentially cattle breeders. Farming, which they had practiced since the Bronze Age, could not meet the full needs of the gorge population for grain and other cereals. They purchased grain from their neighbors, mainly from the Kumyk. The Dargin grew corn, wheat and barley. Most of their animals were sheep of a local breed, accounting for more than two-thirds of their entire herd, followed by cattle, which accounted for about 10 percent, as well as horses, mules and donkeys. Substantial property differences had long existed among the Dargin cattle breeders. A minority of big landowners owned most pastures and livestock herds.

The Dargin were also craftsmen. They made wooden, clay and metal household objects. The art of metal work reached a particularly high level in the Kubachi settlements. The Kubachi not only made weapons from steel but also engaged in goldsmithing and work in precious metals, such as gold and silver. The Kubachi masters had acquired the art of engraving, burnishing, making metal inlays in bones, horns and iron, filigrees, both flat and embossed, enameling, and silver casting and forging. The Kubachi also made large amounts of copper utensils, such as cast pots and hammered objects.

The Dargin settlements were located on mountain slopes, primarily along river terraces, shaped amphitheatrically. The houses were built close together and the roofs of the lower houses were made into small yards of the houses above them.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Dolgans

91UN0548B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 26, Jun 90 p 19

[“Ethnographic Dictionary” series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation **Sakha**. The Dolgans’ neighbors call them **Dolgan**.

According to the 1989 census, there were 6,500 Dolgans in the USSR.

By the turn of the 20th century the Dolgans were no longer a unified nation. In the 17th century, a chain of small Russian settlements appeared on Taymyr territory, stretching from Dudinka to Khatanga. These were small villages. Usually, a village consisted of a single family of hunters. The Russian hunters in the peninsula essentially

engaged in fishing, hunting and trapping wild reindeer. The Russians brought horses to the Taymyr and carried out various assignments, connecting the Russian administration to the localities. Approximately at that time groups of Evenk appeared in the Taymyr—the Tungus of the Dolgan, Dongot and Edyan clans. The Evenk also were hunters of wild reindeer and fishermen. Somewhat later, Yakuts settled in the area between the Pyasina and Khatanga rivers, coming primarily from the area of Yessey Lake. Ethnically, these small groups were surrounded by the Nganasan, settled in the central tundras of the Taymyr, and the Entsy, settled on the right bank of the Yenisey. The Samoyed-speaking aborigines, which had their own way of life and culture, rarely established close ties with the new settlers. It is true, however, that data from the start of the 19th century indicate that the predecessors of the Dolgans, consisting of various ethnic groups, took wives among the Samoyed-speaking aborigines. Members of the Oko, an independent Dolgan tribe, themselves joined the “Avam Samoyeds” and completely merged with the Ongan. After a couple of generations, they began to consider themselves full Nganasan.

Because of these divisions, all three groups were forced constantly to merge, intermarry, and render communal mutual help at all times. The Dolgans were forced to observe the rules governing the Nganasan communal-tribal land use. That was why throughout the 19th century Dolgan farms kept appearing in areas where wild reindeer were trapped at river crossings. This required the permission of the Nganasan reindeer breeders to use reindeer pastures, etc. By the middle of the century the Dolgans were actively trading with the aborigines. Frequently the Dolgans acted as fur and reindeer goods brokers and brought to the tundra goods supplied by Russian merchants.

By the 1920s a stratum of people had developed in the Taymyr, who spoke a Yakut dialect, considered themselves members of the Evenk Clan, were officially Christian and had adopted a number of elements of Russian northern culture.

By the time that the Soviet system was established in the Taymyr, the Dolgans had a considerable number of big reindeer breeders. Among the Dolgans reindeer breeding was of the “Nenets type,” which implied large herds, use of Eskimo dogs and sleds. What distinguished the Dolgan customs from those of the Samoyeds was that the driver sat on the right side of the sled and the trained lead reindeer was also harnessed on the right side. To this day this feature identifies the type of person driving the team.

Presently the main occupation of the Dolgans is hunting wild reindeer, hunting game for furs in the winter and fishing. Traditionally, polar foxes are trapped by the “Russian method,” with wooden traps made of rectangular bars and logs. The traps remain in place for several years on end and the foxes are trapped “conveyer-belt style.” In the summer the young are lured close to the traps and in winter are drawn out.

In Soviet times the Dolgan farms were collectivized. The small Dolgan settlements grew into quite large villages. Some small settlements were abandoned and their population moved to the new villages. This step caused tangible harm to the local economy.

The Dolgan literary language was developed under the Soviet system.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Dungans

91UN0548C Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 27, Jul 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] These people call themselves **Lao Khuei Khuei** or **Chzhun Yuan Zhyn**. The Chinese know them as **Xiao Jia** or junior family.

The name "Dungans" appeared in Sinkiang Province in the second half of the 18th century. It was a name given to all migrants from China's inner provinces. The Dungans who live in the PRC call themselves **Khuei Tzu**, as in fact all Chinese Muslims call themselves, regardless of where they live.

According to the 1989 Census, some 70,000 Dungans live in the USSR.

The Dungans speak in the Chinese dialects of Kansu and Shensi provinces. The dialects spoken by the Central Asian Dungans are distinguished from these idioms by words borrowed from the Arabic, the Russian and the local Turkic languages.

The Dungans are settled in Kazakhstan, in Alma-Ata and its surroundings, Dzhabul and the Dzhalpak-Tyube Settlement, the city of Panfilov and the Chilik Settlement, and the Karakunuz and Shor-Tyube settlements, Kurdayskiy Rayon, Dzhabul Oblast; in Kirghiziya, they live in Frunze and its environs, Tokmak and Przhevalsk, the Yrdyk, Khunchi, Milyanfan, Milyantan, Kyzyl-Shark and Aleksandrovk settlements of Kantsky, Karasuyskiy and Moskovskiy rayons; in Uzbekistan they live around Tashkent and in the cities of the Fergana Valley.

In all likelihood, the Dungans emerged as a group in China's northern provinces—Shansi, Shensi and Kansu. From there the Dungans settled in the Iliyskaya Valley, at a fluctuating rate and over a long period of time. The last substantial move of the Dungans had to do with the so-called Dungan Uprising of the end of the 19th century. This was the final wave of the Great Tappi Peasant War. After their defeat, the Dungan groups moved to Kirghiziya and Uzbekistan. The Karakol group, numbering 1,118 people, was headed by Da Sy-fu and Yelozhentszya. The Osh group, consisting of 1,500 people, was headed by Ma Da-zhyn. From there some Dungans moved near Auliye-Ata (Dzhabul) where they settled.

A third group of 3,314 people, headed by By Yan-khu, remained on the right bank of the Chu River, opposite Tokmak, and set up its own settlement which was known to the Kirghiz as Karakunuz, meaning "black beetles," because initially the Dungans lived in earthen huts, coming out of them dressed in black. In the Chu Valley, the Dungans settled by groups of their land of origin, preserving the dialect of the province from which they had come.

At the beginning of their Central Asian history, the Dungans established closed communities, which were religious associations.

The Dungans developed a most efficient land exploitation system, according to which two-thirds of the land was irrigated and one-third was farmed without irrigation. Areas which could not at any given moment be irrigated were left to lie fallow. The Dungans sowed wheat, rice, barley, millet, mustard, sesame, hemp, flax, sunflower, poppy, corn and various root crops, green bristlegrass, Japanese sorgo and Middle Asian sorgo. Later they developed the cultivation of sugar beets on a broad scale. The Dungans are distinguished by their exceptionally thorough cultivation of the fields and care for the crops, and a planned crop rotation.

A substantial part of the Dungans quickly engaged in industries unrelated to farming: city craftsmen made vinegar and soya semi-finished goods, noodles and other flour-based goods. The Dungans manufactured horse harnesses and engaged in trade and hauling.

The Dungans' housing was traditional: homes made of packed clay with windows giving on the inner yard, surrounded by a high wall and a number of outbuildings. The homes were heated with stove-benches. Next to the houses were small truck gardens.

The clothing of Dungan men and women was similar to the traditional clothing of the northern parts of China—jackets, long robes, cloth slippers, fur caps and hats made of fine felt.

Their food was similar to that of China—flour and vegetable dishes.

The official religion of the Dungans is Sunni Islam.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Gagauz

91UN0548D Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 22, May 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Gagauz**.

Currently there are no accurate data on the actual number of Gagauz throughout the world.

Most frequently prerevolutionary sources refer to them as Turkic or Turkish-speaking Bulgars.

According to the 1989 Census, some 200,000 Gagauz live in the Soviet Union; 77.5 percent of them live in the Moldavian SSR; 16.2 percent in the Ukraine and 5.1 percent in the RSFSR. A few Gagauz live in the other Union republics, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, Belorussia, Latvia, Estonia and Georgia, not exceeding a total of 1,000 people.

Anthropologically, the Gagauz belong to the Mediterranean race of the Big Caucasoid race; some of them show slight Mongoloid features.

Believing Gagauz are Eastern Orthodox. They adopted Christianity in the 13th century, after their ancestors—nomad Turkic-speaking tribes—had come from the Southern Russian steppes and settled in the coastal areas of Northeastern Bulgaria.

The Gagauz language belongs to the Southwestern (Oguz) division of the Turkic group of the Altaic language family.

The spoken language consists of two dialects: the central (spoken by the population of Chadyr-Lungskiy and Komratskiy rayons) and southern (spoken by the population in Vulkaneshtskiy Rayon).

Before the revolution, Gagauz folklore was written in the Cyrillic script. During the Romanian occupation, some literary works, including religious and historical, were published in the Latin alphabet.

Since 1957 the written language of the Gagauz has been based on the Cyrillic alphabet.

The ethnic origin of the Gagauz proved to be a hard nut to crack for science, and one of its difficult puzzles to solve. So far, neither domestic nor foreign specialists have been able to establish this origin entirely, although some 20 hypotheses have been formulated. Many theories are based on an alternate formulation of the question: Who are the Gagauz: are they Turkified Christians or Christianized Turks, are they Bulgarians who adopted a Turkic language or Turks who converted from Islam to Orthodoxy; are they the descendants of nomads or of a settled population assimilated by nomads?

What makes the Gagauz secret difficult to unravel is two main circumstances: first, the lack of information in written Middle-Age sources; second, the heterogeneous composition of the Gagauz in the Balkan Peninsula on the eve of their resettling under the protection of Russia.

On the eve of their move to Bessarabia, the Gagauz in the Balkans consisted of two ethnic components: "Khasyl Gagauz" (true Gagauz) and "Bulgarian" Gagauz.

Most researchers tend to believe that the initial nucleus of the Gagauz people consisted of Turkic-speaking nomads: Oguz, Pecheneg and Polovtsy. One of the latest

migrations of the Polovtsy in the Balkans took place in 1241. However, there also is proof that the Gagauz included some Bulgarians who had mastered the Turkic language and some of the population which was under the protection of the Turkish Sultan Izzedin Keykavuz. European scientists have repeatedly formulated the theory that the likely ancestors of the Gagauz were Turkic-speaking Pra-Bulgarians who arrived in the Balkans in the 670s, coming from the banks of the Volga, under the banner of the Bulgarian Prince Asparukh.

By the turn of the 19th century, in the course of the repeated Russo-Turkish wars, the Gagauz, who took the side of the Russian forces, migrated to the depopulated steppes of Southern Bessarabia, essentially to Benderskiy and Izmailskiy Uyezds. In 1861-1862 some Gagauz moved to Tauride Guberniya.

During the time of the Stolypin agrarian policy, some Gagauz moved to Kazakhstan between 1912 and 1914 and, subsequently, during the very hard years of the beginning of the collectivization, yet another group settled in Uzbekistan and, in order not to lose their civil rights, called itself Bulgarians, as of the end of the 1930s.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Georgians

91UN0548E Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 24, Jun 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Kartveli**.

According to the 1989 Census, some 4 million Georgians live in the Soviet Union, 72.2 percent of whom live in the Georgian SSR.

Anthropologically, the Georgians are members of the Southern branch of the Big Caucasoid race.

The Georgians are Orthodox Christians. Christianity became the Georgian state religion in the year 337.

Some Georgians—Adzhars, Laz, Meskh and Ingiloi—are Muslim. The forced Islamization (Sunni) began in the 17th-18th centuries among Georgians settled in Lazistan, Meskhetiya, Shavshetiya and Tao-Klardzhetiya, i.e., areas which were occupied by Turkey. Georgians, who were deported at the turn of the 17th century to Iran by Abbas I, were forced to become Shiite Muslims, while the Ingiloi, who inhabit today the Azerbaijan SSR, became Sunni.

Georgian is part of the Kartvelian language family.

Initially, as the core of the Georgian people developed, three closely related tribal formations played an important role: the Kartli, Megrelo-Chan and Svan, settled in ancient times on the vast territory between the Big

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Caucasus on the north, the Small Caucasus in the south-east and the basin of the Chorokh River on the south-west.

By the turn of the first millennium B.C. large tribal unions—the Diaokhi and Kolkhi—settled within the borders of today's Southwestern Georgia. Following the defeat of the Kolkhi in the upper reaches of the Chorokh River, several new alliances of Georgian tribes were formed, including a large union known from Greek sources as the Sasper, who actively participated in defeating the once powerful Urart State. Approximately at the same time (6th century B.C.) the Kolkhid Kingdom became the heir of the ancient Kolkhi in western Georgia and the eastern and southeastern Black Sea areas; later, in the 4th century B.C., the Kartli Kingdom appeared in Eastern Georgia.

Following several mass uprisings of slaves and peasants against the Roman conquerors and the local slave-owning nobility, in the 2nd century A.D. the Kartli Kingdom once again strengthened significantly. Its territory was expanded, glass-making and the production of metals and trade were developed; the Aramaic Alphabet was adopted, including its Armaz variety.

In the first centuries A.D. a new slave owning Laz state appeared.

In the 8th and 9th centuries, several early feudal kingdoms and principalities were established within Georgia: the Abkhaz Kingdom (western Georgia), centered on the Kutaisi River, Tao-Klardzhetiya, Kakhetiya, and Kartli.

By the end of the 15th century, the by then weakened Georgia broke down into three kingdoms (Kartli, Kakheti and Imeretin, and the Samtskhi and Svanet principalities), entering a period of lengthy decentralization. The situation worsened by the turn of the 16th century.

A process of coercive Turkicization and Islamization of the Georgian population was initiated in the southwestern Georgian lands captured by Turkey in the 16th-17th centuries: Lazik, Adzhariya, and Meskhet-Dzhavakhetiya. The leaders of the Georgian people saw the salvation from the assimilation from the south in the friendship and rapprochement with Russia, which was spreading north and growing in power.

In 1783 a "friendly treaty" (the Georgian Treaty) was concluded between Russia and East Georgia (the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom), according to which Georgia accepted the supreme rule and protection of Russia, thus becoming free from the lethal threat from Turkey and Iran.

The east Georgian kingdom became part of Russia in 1801; Megreliya became part of Russia in 1803 and the Imereti Kingdom and Guriya, in 1804. By the end of the 1870s yet another segment of its historical lands—Meskhet-Dzhavakhetiya and Adzhariya, became reunited with Georgia.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Greeks

91UN0548F Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 23, Jun 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Greek-speaking Greeks called themselves **Romeos** (rarely Grekos or Elinos); those who spoke a separate Turkish dialect, called themselves **Urum**.

According to the 1989 Census, there are almost 358,000 Greeks in the Soviet Union.

The migrations of Soviet Greeks varied in terms of origin, time of their appearance on the territory which is now the Soviet Union, reasons and circumstances.

The descendants of one of the oldest Greek groups live today south of Donetsk Oblast, in Velikonovoselovskiy, Volnovakhskiy, Starobeshevskiy, Volodarskiy, Peshotravneviy and Primorskiy rayons, and Mariupol City. Initially they had settled in the Crimea, where they lived from the 7th-5th centuries B.C. to the end of the 18th century. On the eve of the unification of the Crimean Khanate with the Russian Empire, by the end of the 18th century, with the support of the Russian government, by special order issued by Catherine II, the Orthodox Greeks were taken out of the Crimea and resettled by the Sea of Azov. Here they founded 25 villages and the city of Mariupol, which became the administrative and cultural center of the self-governing Greek district, which gave them the name of Mariupol Greeks.

The Greek population of the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Northern Caucasus, including Stavropol and Krasnodar krays and the Adygey Autonomous Oblast) established its new homeland here in the course of migrations from Turkey in the 18th-19th centuries. Unable to endure national, religious and linguistic persecution within the Ottoman Empire, within which the ancestors of the Greeks had lived ever since the ancient Greek colonization of Asia Minor, the Turkish-speaking Greeks migrated to the Tsintskaro Tetrtskarovskiy Rayon by the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, and in the Trialeti area by the turn of the 20th century. Greeks migrated to the Caucasus not only from Turkey but also from Iranian Azerbaijan.

During the war, some of the Pontian Georgian Greeks, and some of the Crimean Greeks who lived in the Sukhumi and Bakumi areas, were forcibly deported under various pretexts to the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, as were the Kalmyks, Ingush, Balkars and some other ethnic groups.

The ethnic group of the Greeks of the northern Black Sea area was established by the turn of the 19th century, as a result of migrations from the Balkan Peninsula within

the Ottoman Empire, a process which particularly intensified between 1775 and 1812. Greeks founded a number of settlements from the estuary of the Danube to the shores of the Sea of Azov. A particularly large colony of Greek settlers was established in Izmail and somewhat lesser groups in Akkerman, Khotin and Kishinev.

Anthropologically, the Greeks are members of the Indo-Mediterranean branch of the Big Caucasoid race.

Their religion is Orthodox.

The various ethnic groups of Soviet Greeks have no common language. Noted among Greek-speaking people is the Pontian Dialect of the Caucasian Greeks, the dialects spoken by the Mariupol Greeks and the Neo-Greek speech of the Crimean Greeks, as well as the dialects of Odessa and Black Sea Greeks. Among the Turkish-speaking Greeks we can single out Greeks speaking the Anatolian Turkish Dialect, and the Donetsk Greeks who use the Crimean-Tatar Language.

The Ukrainian Greeks, who lived previously in the southern part of Donetsk Oblast (the "Mariupol Greeks") may be classified according to their idiomatic languages into Rumeic-speaking, who have retained their ancient language, which is quite distinct from Greek as spoken in modern Greece, and those who speak in the Crimean-Tatar Dialect.

Linguistically, the Georgian Greeks may be divided into two groups: Turkish-speaking (Urum), who use the Anatolian Turkish Dialect, and Greek speakers (Rom) who use the Pontian Greek spoken language.

The Greeks inhabiting the northern areas of the Black Sea speak the modern Greek dialects.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Hungarians

91UN0548G *Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 19, May 90 p 19*

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation **Magyars**.

According to the 1989 Census, some 172,000 Hungarians live in the Soviet Union, mainly in the Ukraine, in the Transcarpathian Oblast, where their relatively compact settlements are located essentially in the flat southern and western areas.

Anthropologically, the Hungarians belong to the Central European branch of the Big Caucasoid race. Minor Mongoloid features may be noted in some Hungarian population groups.

The Hungarians are Roman Catholic Christians. As a result of the Reformation (16th century), which led to the conversion of part of the population to Protestantism, and the counterreformation (17th century),

which marked a return to Roman Catholicism, approximately two-thirds of the contemporary religious Hungarian population became Roman Catholic and less than one-third are Protestant. In the past, Unitarianism was popular among a small part of Transylvanian Hungarians. A small group of Transcarpathian Hungarian Unitates consists of Magyarized Ukrainians who, until the beginning of World War I, lived within the borders of Hungary.

The Hungarian language is part of the Ugric branch of the Finno-Ugric group of the Ural language family.

The Hungarian speech is similar to the languages of the Ob Ugric—the Khanty (Ostyaki) and the Mansi (Voguly); morphologically, it is close to the Turkic languages.

The agglutinative nature of the Hungarian language and the existence within it of a significant stratum of words of Turkic origin led, until the mid-19th century, to its classification as being part of the Turkic language family.

To this day, problems of the original homeland and of the origin of Hungarians are still being debated. It is presumed that in the last century B.C. their ancestors, who turned from hunting and fishing to semi-nomad cattle breeding, lived in Western Siberia. The Protohungarian tribes began their migration to the West in the middle of the first millennium A.D., moving from the plains east of the Southern Urals to the west and to what is present-day Bashkiriya. There is a legend according to which, allegedly in the 30s of the 13th century, Brother Julian, a Hungarian monk, could understand Hungarian speech in the territory which medieval Hungarian chronicles describe as "Greater Hungary." Before reaching their present territory (Hungary), in the seventh and 8th centuries the ancestors of the Hungarians moved across the steppes of the northern parts of the Black Sea area, establishing on the way fruitful interethnic contacts with the native population of Turkic-speaking Khazars, Bulgarians, and Onogurs, which had reached a higher level of socioeconomic development, compared to the semi-nomad Hungarians.

Hungarians have long inhabited the present Transcarpathian Oblast of the Ukrainian SSR. Historical legends have been preserved, according to which as early as the 9th century, when the Magyar tribes were migrating to the West across the Carpathians, part of them abandoned the mainstream of migrants and chose as their home the fertile lands in the valleys of the Tisa and Latoritsa rivers, where, to this day, a significant part of Soviet Hungarians remains concentrated.

Starting with the 11th century, after the Transcarpathian area became part of the Hungarian Kingdom, Hungarian migration to this area increased. A number of Hungarian villages in today's Transcarpathia appeared in the 13th century, after the Tatar invasion, and in the 16th and 17th centuries, when Hungary fell under Ottoman rule. It was to these parts, distant from the center, that Hungarian peasants fled from the arbitrary rule of the aggressors. There were more migrations subsequently as

well, for which reason the Hungarians of the Transcarpathian area can be classified both as indigenous and as migrants.

Within the USSR the Hungarians have no national autonomy.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Ingush

91UN0548H Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 33,
Aug 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Galgay**.

According to the 1989 Census, 237,000 Ingush live in the USSR.

The Ingush Language belongs to the Nakh or Veynakh branch of the Caucasian languages, which is particularly close to the Chechen. The Chechen and the Ingush understand each other's speech well.

The Ingush inhabit the plain, foothill and mountain parts of the western areas of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.

The Ingush are the descendants of the native population of the Northern Caucasus. The age-old territories occupied by the Ingush cover the upper part of Ingushetiya, inhabited by various Dzherakh, Feppin, Galgay, Tsorin, Metskal and other tribal groups. Starting with the 16th century, some members of these communities moved to the flat areas and established settlements along the Sunzhe and Terek rivers. One of the first settlements established on the plain was Angush or Ingush, hence the name of the ethnic group first used by the Kabardin. From the Kabardin this name was adopted by the Russians and became the present official name of this ethnic group.

In the second decade of the 19th century, in the course of the building of the Sunzhe fortified line and the establishment here of a chain of Cossack villages, the Ingush were resettled to Nazran, a small site where a military fortification had been built. They were joined by some of the mountain Ingush. In the course of time, this settlement became one of the largest Ingush centers. There was a particularly intensive migration of the Ingush from the mountains in the 1830s and 1860s. Today the main Ingush rayons are Nazranovskiy, Pervomayskiy and Malgobkskiy in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. A small part of the Ingush live in Ossetiya and in Vladikavkaz.

In the past the Ingush were engaged mainly in cattle breeding and farming. As elsewhere in the Northern Caucasus, cattle breeding played a leading role in the mountain areas while farming predominated in the plains.

The Ingush practiced communal land use, in which each family was given an equal amount of land. The land was

redivided each three or six years. The Ingush land demanded a great deal of work. Every year it had to be cleared of rocks and weeds and fertilized. The Ingush borrowed many of their farming methods from the Cossacks. They also engaged in truck gardening. They planted wheat, barley, corn, oats and potatoes.

The cattle breeders raised a local variety of cows and the Red German breed, oxen, buffaloes, goats, horses and donkeys. Tushi and Karachay sheep accounted for most of their herds. In the summer the sheep grazed in the Alpine meadows, while in the winter they moved to the plains where the mountain people leased pasture land. Some of the animals were kept in pens in the mountains.

The old Ingush settlements consisted of six to nine farmsteads owned by members of a single clan. The homes were made of rocks and were two-storied. The settlements had watchtowers which were also used as housing. These towers were built by noted masters and Ingush stone masons were highly valued outside Ingushetiya. On the plain the Ingush settlements resembled the Cossack cottages. The disposition of the rooms inside was different, however, including guest rooms, etc.

The Ingush food consisted of bread made of barley, corn or wheat, cheese, cream, sour milk products and meat dishes.

The Ingush clothing was similar to that of the other groups inhabiting the Northern Caucasus: quilted and Circassian coats, felt cloaks, and fur caps which were taller than those worn by other ethnic groups, shoes made of rawhides and sheepskin coats worn in the pasture lands. The women wore clothes made of expensive fabrics with rich decorations.

There was no nobility among the Ingush. The entire Ingush society consisted of free community members.

Sunni Islam was the official Ingush religion.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Itelmen

91UN0548I Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 34, Aug 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Itelmen**.

According to the 1989 Census, there were 2,428 Itelmen. The Itelmen language occupies a particular position in linguistic classification, as it is not part of any known language group. Some researchers link the Itelmen language to the Koryak and Chukot.

The Itelmen are compactly settled in Tigiliskiy Rayon, Kamchatka Oblast, in Kavran-Tigil, Palana and Khayryuzovo villages.

The Itelmen stand out sharply among their neighbors both in terms of their physical appearance and their culture. According to the anthropologists, they may be classified as a separate type which is apparent even if the Itelmen have intermarried with members of other ethnic groups.

The culture of the Itelmen was clearly that of river fishermen. All other activities were merely to supplement their main occupation, which was fishing for varieties of salmon, as they travel in schools. From the second half of June to the end of September and beginning of October, the Itelmen caught Siberian, Hunchback, Coho, Chinook and Char salmon. The fish were preserved by several methods, the most popular of which was drying the fish which was then used as for food by people and dogs. The fish were caught by damming, with nets and with seines. The second most popular occupation was sea hunting. In the past the Itelmen hunted whales, using poisonous darts. Various methods were used to hunt other Pinnipeds—seals and phoca nautica. The most widespread was catching them in their breeding grounds, where the animals were killed with wooden sticks and caught with nets and woven traps. Hunting on land was a secondary occupation. The Itelmen hunted for bear, mountain sheep and fur game: sable, fox, blue fox, otter, etc. Picking edible items was considered an important part of Itelmen work.

Picking edibles was considered a strictly female occupation. Better than anyone else in the North, the Itelmen were familiar with the botany of their land and made use of a large number of plants. Women picked edible plants and their roots, medicinal grasses and plants with which they made various household items.

In the past the Itelmen lived in small settlements, in so-called stockades, which consisted of two to four earthen huts. These half-huts were of an entirely original shape, accessed through the ceiling, with a notched beam used as a ladder. These huts were their winter housing. In the summer, in the fishing grounds and within the stockades themselves, they lived in lightweight cone-shaped houses with turf roofs. They stored their dried fish and equipment in sheds on piles next to which they installed drying facilities, racks and others, on which the fish and meat were dried. The Itelmen were noted for their highly skilled dog breeding. To the Itelmen dogs were less helpers in hunting than pack animals. The Itelmen dogsleds were distinguished by their extreme efficiency and elegance. Fine wooden lathes were linked together with straps, which made the entire structure flexible and quite strong. The wood canoes and other light individual vessels also demanded high skills.

In the past, the clothing of the Itelmen consisted not only of reindeer hides and hides from sea animals but also bird skins and even grass-woven fabrics.

The Itelmen's main food was fish. The fish was broiled, pickled, dry-cured, salted and dried, frozen and smoked. The meat of marine animals was essentially pickled in

pits and the fat was collected in special vessels and used along with the fish. Fish was used to make fish meal from which were made fritters, soups and kasha. The roots of Siberian red lilies were used as spice.

Although officially baptized, for a long time the Itelmen preserved their ancient shamanist beliefs.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Izhora

91UN0548J Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 32, Aug 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Izhortsy** or **Izurit**. The Yamburg and Luzh Finns call the Izhora **Karyalayset**.

According to the 1989 Census there were 829 Izhora.

The Izhora language belongs to the Finno-Ugric group of the Ural family of languages. Linguists distinguish among the Soyki, Khevay, Oredezh, Verkhneluzh and Nizhneluzh dialects within the Izhora Language.

The Izhora are the descendants of a most ancient population inhabiting the territory around present-day Leningrad. It was these people who gave the name to the Izhora land, familiar in the 13th-15th centuries, and subsequently known as Ingermanlandiya. The Izhora land occupies the southeastern part of the southern bank of the Gulf of Finland, between the estuaries of the Neva and Strelka rivers. In the west it bordered Vodskaya Zemlya.

The Izhora or, as the Russian settlers called them, the **Ingr**, had long linked their fate to that of the Russian people, having adopted Eastern Orthodoxy and borrowed many elements of Russian culture. However, there are many common features which the Izhora share with the Karelians, who are their neighbors. The Izhora land stopped at the estuary of the Luga River, beyond which they lived mixed with Russians and Fins as far as Oraniyenbaum. The Izhora language was spoken for a long time on the Soyki Peninsula, in Kovashi Village and the lower reaches of the Luga, in the villages of Orly, Keygino and Krakoly and the Kurgolov Peninsula, in Liaovo Village. The northern part of Luzhskiy Uyezd was also settled with Izhora until the end of the 19th century. These Izhora used the Oredezh dialect, which is most closely related to Karelian. This area was the Russian-Swedish border during the 17th century. The Izhora settled here after the Treaty of Stolbov.

The Izhora were both apanage and state-owned peasants, which prevented their mixing with the Russians until the 1861 reform, when the emancipated Russian peasants and the Izhora began intensively to mix. By the end of the 19th century there were more than 2,000 Izhora here; in the mid-20th century some old men could remember the Izhora language. In the 19th century, there were

Izhora in the southern part of the Karelian Isthmus. It was here that the noted storyteller Larin Paraske, who was perfectly familiar with the Kalevala, the epic tale of the Finnish-speaking peoples, in memory of which a monument was erected in Helsinki in 1911, was born in 1934. Izhora lived in the Koltushskaya and Ryabovskaya Volosts, Shlisselburgskiy Uyezd. In Finland, the Izhora lived in the Keksholm District—about 700 of them.

The 1897 Census established that there were 13,721 Izhora in Petersburg Guberniya. In Kingiseppskiy Rayon there were 10,595 Izhora in 1920, 1,100 in 1959 and 700 in 1979.

The Izhora engaged mainly in farming, fishing and occasional hunting, as well as other forest-related occupations. They also raised dairy cattle of local breeds, for home use and partially for sale.

The old Izhora always inhabited fishing areas. Fishing had long been their main occupation.

Cottage industries included spinning and weaving linen and woolen fabrics and making a variety of wooden objects, such as spinning wheels, sleds, utensils, etc., and making birch-bark cups, baskets, salt shakers, etc.

The Izhora's official religion is Orthodox Christianity.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Jews

91UN0549A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 28, Jul 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-description: **Yehudim (in Hebrew) and Yid (in Yiddish)**. In Russian they are known as **Yevrei**, which is the general ethnic name given to a number of ethnic communities and subethnic groups whose ethnic origins may be traced to the ancient Jews.

According to the 1989 census, there are 1,376,910 Jews in the USSR or 60.7 percent of their total number in 1959. The significant drop in the overall size of the Jewish population (by 39.3 percent) over a period of three decades has been the result of an array of factors which include a low natural growth, partial assimilation and the emigration of some of them to foreign countries.

Jews may be found throughout the Soviet Union, as follows: 536,000 in the RSFSR, 486,000 in the Ukraine, 112,000 in Belorussia, 65,000 each in Uzbekistan and Moldavia, 25,000 in Azerbaijan, 23,000 in Latvia, 10,000 in Georgia, and less than 10,000 in the other Union republics.

Within the USSR, there is a Jewish Autonomous Oblast in Khabarovsk Krai, established on 7 May 1934.

Virtually all Jews in the Soviet Union live in the cities. The majority (over 90 percent) are Ashkenazic.

Anthropologically, most Jews are members of the Indo-Mediterranean branch of the Big Caucasoid race.

Most Jews practice Judaism. This is a monotheistic religion (belief in a single God) which appeared in the first millennium B.C. and became the catalyst for the greatest world religions—Christianity and Islam. It was also at that time that the main ancient Hebrew literary-historical and religious monument, the Tanakh (i.e., the Old Testament of the Bible) was created. Biblical themes have been the source of many works in world literature, painting, music and sculpture. The interconnection between the ethnic and confessional factors is of essential significance to the Jews: a change of religion is equivalent to converting to another ethnic community; conversely, adherents of other creeds who convert to Judaism are allowed to call themselves Jews.

Hebrew (the ancient Hebraic Ivrit), which developed by the end of the second millennium B.C., is part of the northwestern group of the Semitic branch of the Afro-Asian linguistic family.

A literary language appeared at the end of the second millennium B.C. From the middle of the first millennium B.C. to the Christian era, the literary language developed on the basis of the Jewish Quadratic Alphabet.

Yiddish is the language of the majority of Soviet Jews, as it is of many Jews in the United States, Argentina, Romania and several other countries. It is part of the Germanic group of the Indo-European language family. It appeared in the 12th and 13th centuries, on the basis of middle- and upper-German dialects.

The ethnic origins of the Jews may be traced to deep antiquity. They are based on the symbiosis of Semitic nomad cattle breeders and the settled farming population of Canaan, which took place during the second millennium B.C. in Palestine. According to the Bible, the impetus which led to the development of the Jewish ethnic group was initially the migration of the ancient Jewish tribes from ancient Egypt, their conquest of Palestine in the middle of the second century B.C. and, subsequently, the creation in the first millennium B.C. of several Jewish states. One of them, the state of Israel, was conquered by Assyria in the year 722 B.C., while the kingdom of Judea was conquered by Babylon in 586 B.C.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Central Asian Jews

91UN0549B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 31, Aug 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-description: **Ivri, Yahudi** and, sometimes, **Isroel** or **Bane Isroel** (sons, descendants of Israel). Referred to in literary sources as **Dzhugut**, "Bukharan"

or "native" or else "local" Jews. In the first years after the October Revolution, the name Yahudihti Mahalli (local Jews) became widespread.

The 1989 Census, which was the first in the entire postwar period to provide differentiated information about the different groups of the Jewish population (Mountain, Georgian, Crimean, Central Asian Jews), recorded in the USSR the existence of 36,152 Central Asian Jews, 28,369 of whom (78.5 percent) were living in Uzbekistan and 4,879 (13.5 percent) in Tajikistan.

Central Asian Judaism, which is the religion practiced by religious Central Asian Jews, is of a complex interweaving of a number of beliefs and customs related to their origin and the various stages of their difficult past. A rabbi who reached Bukhara from Jerusalem by the end of the 18th century noted the weakened foundations of the religious life of the local Jews.

As a result of the efforts made to keep the religious faith (supply of Jewish books from Europe, frequent visits by clergy from Palestine, etc.), as well as religious and ethnic factors, by the end of the 19th century the Bukhara Jews set up a colony in Jerusalem, initially numbering 179 families, with two synagogues and two schools. The tradition of exclusivity and isolation, symbolized by barriers (erubas), which separated the Jewish quarter from that of the Muslims. In accordance with religious dogma, on Saturday Jews were not allowed to go beyond their district and were forbidden to leave the erubas.

Some Central Asian Jews, unable to withstand religious persecution, converted to Islam. The newly converted Jews-Muslims (known as Chala) performed Muslim rituals in public but secretly (with the knowledge of the rabbi) continued to observe the tenets of the Jewish religion.

The language of the Central Asian Jews is part of the Samarkand-Bukhara group of dialects of the Tajik language, which belongs to the Iranian group of Indo-European languages.

The literary language of the Central Asian Jews developed on the basis of a variety of written languages: initially it was literature dealing with religious and biblical topics, created in one of the varieties of ancient Hebrew. One of the early works, for example, was a poem dated the beginning of the 9th century, the "Baili Hudoidod," the main character in which was a Bukhara Jew.

Unlike the European Jews, among whom only 11.1 percent indicated in 1989 as their native language that of their nationality, the native language of 64.6 percent of the Central Asian Jews was that of their national affiliation. As a rule, this was Tajik. Many Central Asian Jews are bi- and trilingual. In addition to the Russian language, they are fluent in Uzbek or any other language of the population among which they live.

The ancestors of the Jews migrated to the territory of Central Asia, long ago, as early as the 6th century B.C. According to some legends, they came from Babylon and initially settled in Iran and, subsequently, crossed Afghanistan, moving northward.

The unification of Central Asia with Russia somewhat alleviated the ethnopolitical condition of the Jews. In particular, their legal inequality under the Bukhara emir was reduced. According to an 1886 regulation, Jews were classified into "native," who had lived in the Turkestan area since "times immemorial," and "foreign," who included Jews coming from Central Asian states adjacent to Turkestan.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Georgian Jews

91UN0549C Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 30, Jul 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-description: **Ebraeli.**

Within the group of so-called "native" Jews, unlike the European Jews (the Ashkenazim), the Georgian Jews were exposed to assimilation to the greatest possible extent.

According to the 1989 census data, for the first time after a long "silence," the census provided differentiated information about the various Jewish population (European, Central Asian, Mountain, etc.) group; according to the data, the number of Georgian Jews increased within a single decade, from 1979 to 1989, from 8,455 to 16,054 people, i.e., it nearly doubled (90.7 percent). (In previous publications, the size of ethnic groups for 1989 was indicated on the basis of preliminary data).

The Georgian Jews profess Judaism.

The spoken language of the Georgian Jews is little different from that of the Georgians.

Georgian-speaking Jews did not acquire a separate written language. They began to struggle for their own literary language in the mid-19th century, with the generation of young Georgians involved in the inchoate Georgian national liberation movement.

The origins and precise time of the settling of Georgian Jews in the Caucasus have not been entirely determined.

It is claimed that they are the descendants of most ancient settlers. Travelers at the end of the 18th and beginning of 19th centuries mentioned legends according to which the Caucasian Jews themselves (both Georgian and Mountain) believed to be the descendants of the 10th Tribe of Israel, settled in Mydia by the Assyrian kings.

The earliest written information includes references in the "History of Armenia" by Moses of Khorem (around the 5th century A.D.) and by Benjamin of Tudela, a Spanish Jew who lived in Tudela in the 12th century.

The difficult situation of the Caucasian Jews in medieval times improved somewhat after the unification of the Caucasus with Russia.

The long-standing nature of the Jewish presence (of both Georgian and Mountain Jews) in the Caucasus is confirmed by traces of former Jewish settlements, remembered by the non-Jewish local population by their Jewish names, such as "Chufut-tebe" (Jewish Mountain) "Chufut-kabur" (Jewish Graves), and others.

By the turn of the 19th century, when the Russian penetration into the Caucasus began, the situation of the Jews, surrounded by Muslims, worsened. The revived patriotism of the local population and the fanaticism of the Muslims increased the fierceness of the persecution of the Jews; pogroms and devastating raids on their settlements became more frequent.

According to official data, in 1835 there were 23 kahala (Jewish communities) with a total of 12,234 Jews, 14 synagogues, 18 houses of prayer, 19 schools for children and 73 urban and rural rabbis operating in the Caucasian oblasts of Georgia in 1835.

The kahala played a major role in organizing self-government. Elections for kahala administrations were held on the third day of Passover.

In 1896, 835 Georgian and 1,007 European (Ashkenazim) Jews lived in Tiflis. According to the 1897 Census, 4,089 Georgian Jews lived in Tifliskiy Uyezd. The efforts of the tsarist administration to unite the local with the newcomer Jews by the end of the 19th century failed. In 1892 the local Jews agreed to accept a German Jew as their rabbi, but later rejected him.

The material standards of the Georgian Jews (housing, clothing, ornaments) were very similar to those of the Georgians. Different features were rather found in spiritual life, in ceremonies, rituals and holidays.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Mountain Jews
91UN0549D Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 29, Jul 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-description: **Dag-Chufut**. Together with the Georgian and Bukhara Jews, in prerevolutionary Russia they were classified as "native," unlike the European Jews who, according to official documents, meant Jews living outside the pale.

The 1989 Census recorded the existence of 19,516 Mountain Jews, including 11,342 (58.1 percent) in the

RSFSR and 5,484 (28.1 percent) in Azerbaijan (Krasnaya Sloboda Village, Kubinskiy Rayon; Vartashen Village, Vartashenskiy Rayon, and Baku). A significant number of Mountain Jews live in Dagestan, in the Madzhalis Settlement (Kaytagskiy Rayon), the Mamrach and Zhanzhil-kala settlements (Magaramkentskiy Rayon) and in the cities of Derbent, Makhachkala and Buynaksk—3,649 (18.7 percent), and in the Northern Caucasus: respectively 3,161 people (16.2 percent) in the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR (particularly in Nalchik) and 917 (4.5 percent) in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, including Groznyy. In the past, Mountain Jews lived in the mountains, hence their name. Starting with the 18th-19th centuries, they gradually began to move to the flat areas and the cities.

The believers among them profess Judaism, which was closely interwoven with the pagan beliefs of mountain peoples among whom the Jews lived.

The clergy played an important role in strengthening their religious convictions, disseminating literacy and preserving and reproducing their original features (their ethnicity, in the broad meaning of the term). In the synagogue schools and with individual rabbis Jewish children learn how to read religious books and to understand the place of Jewish culture in the surrounding world and within the context of human civilization.

Judaism was a major ideological factor in supporting and developing the ethnicity of Mountain Jews. In particular, it forbid marrying nonbelievers.

The Mountain Jews spoke Tati, which is a dialect of the Neo-Persian language and is part of the West Iranian subgroup of the Iranian group of Indo-European languages.

Tati has two main dialects: Tati, which is spoken by the Tati Muslims who live primarily in Azerbaijan, and the Jewish Tati dialect of the Mountain Jews.

The following dialects may be distinguished in the conversational variants of the Tati Language: Lakhidzh, Kubino-Jewish, Derbent, Balakhan, Khizim, Muslim-Kubin and Matrasin.

The first printed works of a primarily religious nature in the Jewish-Tati language appeared in 1909.

Tati also has its written language. In 1928 the newspaper ZAKHMETKESH ("Working People") started publication. It has played a significant role in enhancing national self-awareness, upgrading literacy and restructuring the way of life of the Mountain Jews; fiction was also published and the language was taught in the junior grades.

In terms of ethnic origin, the Mountain Jews as, in fact, the Georgian and the Central Asian Jews, have little in common with European and Russian Jews.

It is possible that very long ago, in the pre-Christian era, the ancestors of the present Mountain Jews settled in

southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan, known as Mydia-Anthropatena. In the course of their ethnic consolidation, they adopted the Tati Language although they preserved the Judaic religion. Starting with the 5th-6th centuries A.D. they began to settle in the Caspian Depression.

According to some legends, the first Jewish settlements in the Caucasus may be traced to the period of the destruction of the Samaran Kingdom; according to other legends, the time of the destruction of the First Temple.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Veps

91UN0551A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 20,
May 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: Bepsya, Veps and Vepsya. Former self-description: "Ludinikad." In Russian pre-revolutionary literature they were most commonly referred to as **Chukhari Chud**. In Russian chronicles they are known as **Ves**.

On the eve of the October Revolution 35,000 Veps had settled in Tikhvinskiy and Beloozerskiy Uyezds, Novgorod Guberniya, and in Lodeyno-Polskiy and Petrozavodskiy Uyezds, Olonets Guberniya.

According to the 1989 Census, more than 13,000 Veps live in the Soviet Union. Most of them are settled in the southern areas of the Karelian ASSR. Small groups live in the eastern part of Leningrad Oblast and in the rayons next to Leningrad and Vologoda Oblasts and in Kemerovo Oblast.

Anthropologically, the Veps belong to the White Sea-Baltic branch of the Big Caucasoid Race. Most of them are blue-eyed and blond and light-haired. A small percentage among them are dark haired.

The Veps are Orthodox. After their conversion to Christianity (in the 11th-12th centuries), for a long period of time the Veps retained elements of pre-Christian beliefs. For example, they believed in house spirits (Pert-Izhand) and in the miraculous powers of witch doctors.

The Veps language belongs to the Baltic-Finnic subgroup of the Finnic-Ugric group of the Ural Linguistic Family. In the 1930s the Vep language was taught in schools in the Latin alphabet.

The Veps ordinary speech is comprised of three dialects: northern or Onega (Sheltozer, southwestern bank of Lake Onega); central (spoken by the Veps of the north-eastern part of Leningrad Oblast and Babayevskiy Rayon, Vologoda Oblast) and, finally, southern (spoken by the Veps of Yefimovskiy, and Boksitogorskiy rayons, Leningrad Oblast).

The ancestors of today's Veps, who had long been settled in lands located in the triangle between the Onega, Ladoga and Beloye lakes, were the medieval Finnic-language Ves tribes. Their influence may be seen in the ethnic origins of the contemporary Karelians, some groups of Western Komi and the development of Russian population groups in the north of the European part of the USSR.

In the first-half of the 18th century, the Veps were attached to the Olonets (Petrovskiy) Arms Plant of the Lodeynokolskiy Shipyard.

In prerevolutionary times Veps supplemented their income from farming with meat and dairy animal husbandry, hunting, fishing and collecting edibles. The lean farm crops, due to the cold climate which was unfavorable to farming, and the low fertility of the Northern soils motivated, as early as the second half of the 19th century, some of the Veps to engage in logging.

The difficult economic situation and the ecology, the diminution of the Vep forests and the critical social infrastructure are not contributing to the natural and normal reproduction of this group as an autonomous ethnic community. In turn, in accordance with the feedback rule, this worsens the ecological situation even further. As the Veps disappear, in future decades their land could become a lifeless desert.

As recently ethnosociological studies have indicated, no more than three percent of the Veps know the history of their nation more or less adequately. The Veps themselves realize the ruinous nature of assimilation processes and the fact that both they and their land need strong support. Extreme measures must be taken in the guise of national programs.

As early as the end of the 19th century, as researchers have pointed out, the traditional culture of the Veps began to be diluted and its transmission mechanisms began to weaken. Ancient legends were being forgotten and were disappearing.

The Veps do not have national autonomy within the USSR.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Vod

91UN0551B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 21,
May 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Vadyalayn** or **Vatyalayzet**; in Russian prerevolutionary publications they are referred to as **Vot** or **Vozhan**; in 18th century sources they are referred to as **Chud**.

No precise data on their present number are available. It is believed that no more than several hundred of them remain. By the mid-19th century, there were 5,148 in

Petersburg Guberniya; by the turn of the 20th century, there were slightly over 3,000. Until recently, these people inhabited the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland, between Narva and Neva and the Karelian Isthmus, among groups which spoke related Baltic-Finnic languages, including the Izhora, Finns, Estonians and Karelians.

Anthropologically, the Vod are members of the White Sea-Baltic branch of the Big Caucasoid race.

By religion the Vod are Orthodox. The first efforts at introducing Christianity, with the participation of the popes, were made in the mid-12th century. In 1255 Pope Alexander IV appointed a bishop for Watland (the territory inhabited by the Vod). Orthodoxy was definitely established among the Vod after they became part of the Novgorod Principality.

The Vod language is part of the Baltic-Finnic subgroup of the Finno-Ugric group of the Uralic Language Family and consists of two dialects: western and eastern. According to the 1897 Census, in Petersburg 29 people named the Vod language as their native tongue. In the 1980s, the Vod language was being spoken by no more than 20 members of the senior generation.

The Vod adopted the Russian language as early as the 19th century.

Some researchers believe that the Vod are the oldest population of Ingrya (Ingermanlandiya, Land of the Izhora). The process of separation of the Vod tribes from the North Estonian tribes, related to them, was completed relatively late, while the establishment of a separate Vod language occurred at the start of the first millennium. Novgorod chronicles for the year 1069 inform us that many Vozhane were killed in the victorious battle waged by the people of Novgorod against the Polotsk Prince Vseslav, whose allies they were.

In the middle ages the number of Vod was reduced both because of the numerous wars which took place on the territory of Ingrya as well as as a result of processes of natural assimilation.

The description "Vod Pyatina," found in the chronicles, describing one of the five parts of Novgorod area, comes from the Vod who inhabited this territory and is first encountered in written sources dating back to 1499-1500.

Volkhov was the eastern border of the "Vod Pyatina," while the western was the Lug River. Following the unification of the Novgorod possessions with the Moscow Principality, the "Vod Pyatina," which, according to written data of 1581-1583, included 25 country churchyards, lost its self-government and was assigned governors-general from Moscow.

Starting with the second half of the 12th century, foreign sources include reports on the Vod, described as Vatlandy, and their territory as Vatlandiya. Starting with the year 1240, Vatlandiya began to be subject to devastating invasions by Livonian knights, despite the resistance of the Novgorod princes who were unwilling to surrender their power over the Vod and their territory.

In the 15th century, a certain number of Vod were resettled by the Livonian Order to Latvian lands and became known as the Kreving.

In accordance with the Stolbov Peace Treaty (1617), a substantial part of the "Vod Pyatina" (Ingermanlandiya) was given to the Swedes; 100 years later, it was returned to Russia in accordance with the Nystad Peace Treaty (1721).

Russian influence affected the occupation of the Vod and their way of life and submerged Vod culture and self-awareness. Eventually the Vod were assimilated by the Russian people.

First MVD Komsomol Congress Held

91US0206B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Semenyaka]

[Text] On 25 December, the first congress of Komsomol organizations of the internal forces of the USSR MVD, a voluntary and independent sociopolitical organization of young people, which belongs to Komsomol as a member of the federation, began its proceedings on 25 December in the "Olimpiyets" Center for International Cooperation. Delegates came to attend it from various regions of the country, including the "hot spots."

For three days, the delegates to the congress will be discussing the state of affairs and prospects for development of Komsomol organizations of MVD forces, they will decide on a name for the youth organization, they will draw up their programmatic goals, they will approve their bylaws, and they will elect central bodies.

Veterans of Komsomol, people's deputies, and members of the political command of these forces were invited to the founding congress. Those taking part in its proceedings include representatives of the CPSU Central Committee, the All-Army and Border Councils of Komsomol organizations, and other public organizations, and General Major A.I. Griyenko, member of the military council and chief of the political administration of internal forces of USSR MVD, and V.M. Zyukin, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee.

Future of Kirghiz Komsomol, Informal Youth Groups Discussed

91US0206A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 2 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by R. Khelims kaya: "23d Congress of the Kirghiz Komsomol"]

[Text] On Saturday, in a break between sessions of the congress which ended yesterday, representatives of the informal organization "Akykat" (its members are Kirghiz university students and graduate students studying in Moscow) were selling their own independent newspaper MUROK to the delegates. There were customers: It is something new and unusual for unofficial samoizdat press to be in the corridors of a Komsomol congress.

Today, there are almost 30 informal youth associations in the republic: "Ashar," "Asaba," "Aykyn," "Atuulduk araket," "Zamandash," "Kok-Zhar," and others. What place do questions of social welfare occupy in the programs of these groups, and what place is occupied by political issues? This topic is still awaiting study, but a fact remains a fact: in addition to the Communist youth movement, there are also other associations alongside it. Recently, the sociopolitical organization "Kyrgyzstan' Democratic Movement" acquired the right of a juridical person.

Komsomol long ago lost its political monopoly over all young people—the millions of young men and women between the ages of 14 and 28.

And now several facts from the report delivered by T. Tabyldiyev, first secretary of the Kirghiz Komsomol Central Committee.

The average wage of young workers and employees is 120-160 rubles [R]. One out of every two young families needs a loan to build housing or set up housekeeping. One out of every five young persons is on the waiting list for housing, one out of every eight on the waiting list for a place in a preschool institution. One out of every eight Komsomol members in the republic's capital needs an apartment, and one out of every seven needs a dormitory.

But these unhappy figures could not darken the altogether optimistic tone in which the republic's Komsomol leader delivered his report. In the best traditions, it would seem, of the featureless sham reports that fall on deaf ears.

We joined Komsomol many years ago as 15-year-old boys and girls. It was a stone's throw from our school, No. 8, to the headquarters of the Leninskiy Rayon committee. But how long that distance seemed, how much excitement there was! And everyone was "asked" one and the same thing: How many orders does Komsomol have, and what is the international situation? The question about the medals was asked particularly frequently, we later figured out: not what each one was for, but how many there were in all. We know how enrollment in Komsomol was conducted later, and how it is done now—from a film that made quite a stir a few years ago.

For a long time, we were indoctrinated by the school, the VUZ [higher educational institution], Komsomol, the press, the theater, and the filmmaker. The official propaganda. But reality was reality. Difficulties and problems and conflicts began to exist in and of themselves, in the course of the decades becoming overgrown with a thick layer of irresponsibility, silence, and even deliberate lies.

During the last three years, the number of Komsomol members in the republic has decreased by 108,000. During the first 10 months of this year, 22 primary organizations ceased to exist just in the Pervomayskiy Rayon of the capital. The previous congress of the republic's Komsomol was held in February 1987. But how everything around has changed in that time, how we ourselves have changed! And probably above all there has been a change in the psychology of young people—the least-well-established, least socially protected, and therefore the most susceptible portion of society.

We have finally come to understand: It is not possible to forbid young people anything.

And persuasion is possible only if one knows their problems and understands their difficulties. In real terms, from within, by studying them consistently and in a planned manner. In the opinion of staff members of the scientific research center for youth of the Kirghiz Komsomol Central Committee, the figures of a sociological survey of young people of Frunze, Osh Oblast, and certain rayons under republic jurisdiction conducted on the eve of the congress reflect rather objectively the opinions of young people concerning the processes taking place in Komsomol and in society.

Let us think a bit about those figures.

Some 36 percent of the respondents had not read the draft program of the Kirghiz Komsomol, and almost the same number had not read the draft constitution. Some 32 percent doubted that the decisions of the Komsomol congress would be embodied in actual deeds. The prospects for filling the ranks of Komsomol remain problematical. Some 31 percent of the respondents in the survey were ready to resort to various forms of protest—to take part in strikes and picketing if the transition to the market results in a considerable deterioration of their material position or if they lose their job. Only some 10 percent turn to the news media if their social and political rights are infringed. Some 23.5 percent are convinced that it is pointless to fight under local conditions, you still will not achieve anything.

The lack of protection concerning social welfare, the host of everyday problems, the shortages of produce, commodities, and ideas. How is it going to be for those who are entering life today? Those who do not have very much experience with life and do not have high qualifications feel unemployment and competition earlier and more painfully than anyone else.

Will we be able to make the transition to market relations in agriculture without transferring the land to private ownership? I asked Dilmurat Abduraufov, secretary of the Komsomol organization on the "Druzhba" Kolkhoz in Sokulukskiy Rayon, who was a delegate to the congress.

"No," Dilmurat said. "Nothing will come of it. And there will be still more unemployed young people in rural localities. And the problems of social welfare are bound up into such a knot! Where do we go from here?... We have people belonging to 21 nationalities living and working on our kolkhoz. There are no interethnic conflicts. When people work, when they are preoccupied with their job, when they feel that they are needed—it never occurs to them to spend their time clarifying relations."

The time has come to answer the questions which reality itself has put. What kind of youth organization will make the interests and needs of every specific person the main and basic thing for itself?

What kind of sociopolitical organization is able to rally the thousands of young people belonging to dozens of

nationalities and occupations? To strengthen belief in themselves, in their abilities, to let everyone be himself?

What kind of youth organization does not get bogged down in paperwork, does not become overgrown with an unsinkable caste of officials, a numerous staff? And they in turn have benefits and perks, which, in the absence of culture, inevitably result in a degeneration of the goals of the most humane movement into its opposite?

Who in deeds, not words, will help people starting out in life, without demanding in exchange that they be like everyone else, that they not stick out, that they not dare to have their own judgment?

The time has now come for all of us to understand: the more attention and concern are paid to everyone—the more numerous and stronger the movement will be (the alliance, the association, the party). And then we might be concerned about the truthfulness of the life values to which young people aspire, not about the purity of the ideals for which they will stand.

Ukrainian Komsomol Chairman Addresses CP Congress

*9JUN0619A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
16 Dec 90 p 1*

["Address of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the LKSM of the Ukraine (MDS) Serhiy Vovchenko at the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine"]

[Text] Dear comrades, the people used say that a horse is purchased not in order to stay tied up in his stall, but in order to pull a heavy wagon along a difficult road without wearing out his hooves. . .

And I think our party became the initiator of restructuring not in order to arouse and then abandon the chronic ills of society, but on the contrary—to lead society to the level of world civilization and true democracy.

That is why society followed with tireless attention every phrase that sounded from the party platform when the party was the intellectual and spiritual center of our life, regarded as, perhaps, the highest real authority in society.

In any case, just at that time, in the Komsomol we saw stirring the first thoughts, the first attempts, to find fundamentally new methods of activity, a new level of our youth association. Today, congress delegates are concerned with the question: what is the Komsomol in the Ukraine today? What path will it follow tomorrow? Stanislav Ivanovych fearfully asked about this in his speech. I must answer this question, if for no other reason, then because in searching out untrodden paths, we made many errors.

When we prepared and held the 26th Komsomol congress, we wanted very much to avoid splintering the

Association, to maintain its membership base. To achieve this, we searched for various conceptions and passed a Statute, which, forgive me, is so democratic that we often did not even need to apply it. Half a year after the congress, we see that our expected membership basis is disintegrating anyway, like an old blanket, and within the Association formations are appearing which find it difficult or impossible to agree among themselves. I can cite as examples the events within the Komsomol organizations of the Lvov area, where a fundamentally new organization was been created, and of the Ivano-Frankovsk, Transcarpathia and Vinnytsia regions, where organizations have been renamed and structurally rebuilt.

We in the Komsomol Central Committee have come to the conclusion that the structure allowing for independent organization of a variety of types, including legal entities, to enter into the Leninist Communist Youth Association [LKSM] (Democratic Youth Union - MDS), while perhaps normal at the transitional stage, will no longer be justifiable.

In other words, through our errors we have realized the essential need for an organizational and political strengthening of the Komsomol. The Komsomol as a community-political organization. For this purpose, we are planning to more clearly define our political face, regulate the vertical relations from the local organization to the Central Committee after thoroughly examining our Statute, and bring in amendments to the Program.

Thus, we see the need and the possibility of moving from this chaos to a consolidation of membership and a strengthening of the Communist Youth Association.

At the same time, we forecast objectively that in the present conditions, the membership of the Association will decrease. But without such a self-selection of organization members, without the formation of other youth organizations which will leave us, we will be unable to complete the process of "division into smaller units and vacillation." Furthermore, we believe that it would even be correct to materially support those organizations which are created from our basis but do not oppose us. After all, most of those who wanted to leave us remain today because of the material base.

We are prepared to go along with this to a certain extent. Such an approach will make it possible for progressive youth organizations to create a kind of bloc (or forum) of left-center youth forces. But the center, and a strong one at that, can and should be the Komsomol.

The question of political partnership is current. Today, both you and we are concerned about it. Lively discussions about it took place at our Komsomol congress. But both in our Program and in the appeal to the delegates of the 28th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party there is talk about relations with the Communist Party, about the desire, and I quote literally from the appeal, "To favor the strengthening of communist forces and socialism in Ukraine." At the same time, the thesis about

the organizational independence of Komsomol, which, incidentally, was passed back at the 19th party congress, was viewed by some republican party committees as a signal to wrap up the common activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Ukrainian LKSM in the realm of youth problems, to cease political cooperation. Let us recall the elections to the councils of people's deputies at all levels.

In essence, and Stanislav Ivanovych spoke of this too, the resolution passed by the first stage of our party congress about the youth policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party is not being implemented. But today (we became convinced of this as a result of recent events in the republic) it is becoming clear to most people that if it does not rest on youth, the party will have no prospects. And that the process of renewal, and, in essence, the rebirth, of the Communist Youth Association as an organization with a clear political face, a definite social base, is impossible without serious moral, political and financial support from the Ukrainian Communist Party.

In this regard, it is important to overcome the "Philister-Obломov-like fear of youth" which Lenin talked about in his time.

And to the Ukrainian CP Statute and the resolution about the present moment, a supplement should be added with a clarification of the interrelation between the Communist Party and the Komsomol of the Ukraine as organizations that are linked historically and philosophically. I will make some concrete proposals later and I will also speak in those documents about supporting the humanistic children's movement, the Ukrainian Association of Pioneer Organizations.

As to our practical activity, in particular, in the present situation, perhaps we should cite Marx: "Practical matters are more important than a dozen programs." I will risk not being understood in saying that the Komsomol is the only youth organization in the republic which does not cease to deal with concrete matters—from the local organization up to the Central Committee. But unfortunately, there are not enough of these matters, and furthermore, we do not really show what we are doing: for example, the fact that in Cuba we have cured more than 1500 children at our cost, that we have spent \$129,000, which we ourselves earned, on prostheses for invalids of Afghanistan, that we pay out pensions to families in which the husbands were killed in Afghanistan, and much more. All of this is done by Komsomol, and not the Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth [SNUM], not the Ukrainian Students' Association or other new formations which want to make themselves known.

That is why, given the existing conditions, local Komsomol organizations are actively ready and are setting about creating social assistance services for youth by making use of the possibilities provided by state and community structures, are developing their entrepreneurial activity and preparing, like the rest of society, for

the market system. And all of this for the sake of the young person who needs real help from his organization.

People are becoming conscious of the fact that, even in our difficult conditions, man does not live by bread alone. That is why many Komsomol committees are returning to the question of reviving lost moral human values. I will say that the criticism made of our Komsomol newspapers is absolutely fair, because in the chase after readers, after print runs, they often strayed from Komsomol committees, from our philosophical or political line and, naturally, did not build, but often destroyed. But at the same time, they are quite a strong weapon in the hands of Komsomol committees and party committees, too. So to now place our Komsomol newspapers outside of the limits of party publishers would probably be incorrect.

I am returning, I think, for the third time to this question, but it still remains current today.

I think that with regard to the rebirth of spirituality, moral values, we need to join efforts with the party as quickly as possible, in order to not lose the young generation. Much has been said and understood today about the fact that we will not be able to grow anything on ideas of "leveling to the ground"; people have become aware of this reality. And we do not have the right to fail to use the opportunity provided for us by the development of events.

Now a few words about the problems of the party. It is difficult to add to all the motions which were made during the two stages of the congress. Still, in my view, the Ukrainian Communist Party as a political force requires thorough scientific theoretical work, analysis, assessment and prognosis of events. In particular this is needed by us, the youth, for we are losing very much on this. And secondly, the Komsomol, as you know, in its time, back at the 20th convention of the All-Union LKSM, asked for the right to make mistakes. And many were made, that is why the party should not repeat them in its activity.

For example, from the statute regulation about dues, for we in the Komsomol already tried leaving everything in the local organization, to the search for a new political partner (or ally), when we already have a partner.

In relation with this, we make the following motions with regard to the Statute and resolutions about the present moment: we think that Paragraph 29, second sentence, should be written as follows: "In their work with youth, party committees and party organizations rest on the LKSM of the Ukraine (MDS)—their closest philosophical ally." And then, "working in cooperation with other youth formations" and so on according to the text. And to the resolution in the first chapter on page 8, it would be apropos to add that children's organizations are also important to us, and also to add that the congress supports the efforts of the LKSM of the Ukraine (MDS) in gathering its ranks organizationally and politically and

in its desire for the consolidation of youth formations of the socialist choice. Thank you for your attention.

Georgian Church Head Issues Edict Against Murder

91US0003J Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI
in Georgian 1 Nov 90 p 1

[Special Edict by Georgian Church Catholicus Ilia II, plus commentary: "Special Edict"]

[Text] The ancient Romans used to say that the times change and we change with them. Only a few years ago what is happening today would be inconceivable.

October 28, 1990 is a historic date, as on that day multi-party elections were held in Georgia for the first time. Many innovations lie in store—and, at the same time, many dangers. Men are becoming cruel, untrustworthy, unforgiving. Grave crimes are on the increase, including murder. Georgian threatens Georgian with death, and often carries out that threat.

On that historic day, therefore, His Holiness and Most Gracious Ilia II, the Catholicus-Patriarch of All Georgia, took a special decision, which was read on October 28 in the Sioni Patriarchal Cathedral following mass.

Special Edict, October 28, 1990

In the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost I hereby decree:

From this day hence, anyone who kills a Georgian person, whether the victim (the person killed) be guilty or innocent, shall be declared an enemy of the Georgian nation.

The name and surname of the killer shall be entered in the Patriarchate's Special Book and handed down from generation to generation as an object of shame and condemnation.

This Special Edict is hereby taken, in order to prevent forevermore the gravest sin before God and the nation—fratricide.

Ilia II, Catholicus-Patriarch of All Georgia

The Georgian Patriarchate has asked educators in higher and secondary institutions of learning as well as officials of production enterprises and establishments to inform the population, in particular young people, of this special decision.

Status of All-Union Islamic Rebirth Party Discussed

91US0208A Dushanbe KOMSOMOLETS
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 21 Nov 90 p 2

[Interview with Davlat Usmon by Andrey Lukin: "A Party Which We Officially Do Not Have"; date and place not given]

[Text] I will make the proviso right away, that only the authorities here, in Tajikistan, have not recognized the party of which we speak. But the organization committee of the All-Union Islamic Rebirth Party has been registered at the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Ispolkom in the city of Moscow. Why has only the organization committee registered and not the entire party? Because, according to the law adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, registration of sociopolitical organizations (parties) begins in the country on 1 January, next year.

On 9 June 1990, the constituent congress of representatives of the Muslim community in the Soviet Union was held in Astrakhan; about 200 delegates from the majority of the republics took part. The congress founded the Islamic Rebirth Party (IPV [Islamskaya Partiya Vozrozhdeniya]) and adopted the IPV's program and rules.

In spite of the fact that the leadership of our republic once again took the well-travelled administrative-command path, and the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution forbidding the establishment of an Islamic party in Tajikistan, not long ago a regional constituent conference of the Islamic Rebirth Party was held in the village of Chortut, in Leninskiy Rayon.

Whose interests does the Islamic Rebirth Party represent? What goals and tasks does it pursue? These far-from-idle questions will certainly be of concern not only to the republic's Muslims but to the overwhelming majority of its citizens as well. These were the topics of our conversation with Davlat Usmon, a member of the Coordination Committee and the Ulama [Muslim scholars and jurists] Council of the Islamic Rebirth Party, and chairman of the organization committee for holding the Tajik regional conference.

BISMILLOKhIR - RAKhMONIR - RAKhIM.

[Lukin] The first question, Domullah, is a rather unusual one. It was, frankly speaking, not easy to find you. Our newspaper was not invited to the press conference which your party held after the constituent conference. Why did you nevertheless consent to this meeting?

[Uzmon] Because I want to tell the truth about the Islamic Rebirth Party, and about our activities, goals and tasks. Unfortunately, the ten-year war in Afghanistan, various kinds of conflicts in the Near East and in the Persian Gulf zone, and especially the illumination of all these events in the mass information media, contribute to the fact that in many people's minds, Islam is associated with aggression, and the image of the Muslim with the image of ruthless war and murders. The fact of the matter is that all this is not so. I hope that, after reading our conversation, many people will change their views toward Islam, and will be able to escape the captivity of stereotypes.

[Lukin] In a few words, what are the goals and tasks of the Islamic Rebirth Party?

[Uzmon] To put it very succinctly, it is to defend the political rights of the Muslims, which have been trampled for more than 70 years. Another of our more important goals is establishing and strengthening ties with Muslims throughout world. Of course, we shall carry out these activities within the framework of the law.

[Lukin] But do your plans not include establishing a Muslim state, if only in the distant future?

[Uzmon] We have no such goal. And reaching such a goal is impossible in principle, for objective reasons. We are operating within the framework of international law and Union legislation which establishes the rights of every nation for self-determination. What can one say about the Muslims of various nations, when the true believers of a single nation cannot unite. And the Arab-Arab war in the Persian Gulf zone refutes such an assertion.

[Lukin] My question is not an idle one, because I am acquainted with the program of the so-called Islamic Democratic Party of Turkestan, where the main goal is stated directly—to establish an Islamic State of Turkestan within the framework of the Soviet Union, which the Central-Asian republics and possibly Azerbaijan will join.

[Uzmon] I am acquainted with the program of this party. The basis of its activities is the idea of nationalism born in the 1920's, when by the strong-willed decision of the center, the unstable borders of the pre-revolutionary states in Central Asia, which were still largely feudal societies, were transformed into clear-cut borders with national-territorial demarcation. The Bolsheviks played a significant role in bringing this about.

Islam condemns nationalism in any form. And not only Turkic-speaking people live on the territory of which they speak in the aforementioned program.

[Lukin] But after all, Muslim rites and prayers are carried out in the Arabic language. What is the difference, and which language is used in everyday life?

[Uzmon] There are dozens of countries in the world in which Islam is the state religion, from Indonesia to Morocco. Each of them has its own language, its own culture and its own customs. We are united by faith alone, and in other things we are different.

[Lukin] But could not Islam unite all these countries in a single empire?

[Uzmon] That is a futile idea. History teaches that all empires are destroyed sooner or later.

[Lukin] We, incidentally, are right now witnesses to the collapse of the latest "empire"...

[Uzmon] Yes. The only acceptable form of cooperation is an alliance of Islamic states.

[Lukin] Let us return the beginning of our conversation. There is nevertheless the stereotype that Islam is a warlike religion, and that Muslims are basically religious fanatics...

[Uzmon] Islam spread very rapidly. During the time of the activity of the Prophet Mohammed (Peace and blessings to him!), Islam was accepted on the entire territory of the Arabian Peninsula. Yes, there are examples in history when Islam was spread in a period of conquests, but most nations accepted it voluntarily, including the island nation of Indonesia, which is far away from the continent.

There is in Islam the term "jihad." It does not signify war. It is only that every Muslim must strive for Islam. Jihad can be translated as, "endeavor." One may endeavor with the aid of words and by means of good deeds, but one may also endeavor by means of force. Jihad signifies war only when it is necessary to repel a conqueror. This does not contradict the general human concept. The Koran condemns aggression; in it there is an ayat [possibly, Scripture], which states: "There is no compulsion in religion..." The position of the Islamic Rebirth Party is the same—to build its relationships with other monotheistic religions on the basis of patience and dialogue. We want to live in peace with everyone.

[Lukin] All right, with a unified Islamic state that is clear; but what, in your view, is the probability of establishing an Islamic republic within the framework of present-day Tajikistan?

[Uzmon] I would not want to make any predictions on this plane, because the political situation in the republic is complex and unclear. In essence, public consciousness has only just begun to awaken. New parties and movements are appearing. At the present stage, I think the main thing is to eliminate the monopoly to power of one party, and to create all the conditions for the normal operation of new parties and movements. It is necessary that a normal political process begin to develop in the republic, and that all conditions are created for all the political forces in the republic to campaign for parliament on the basis of equality.

If one tries to genuinely analyze the arrangement of political forces in Tajikistan, one cannot yet see the objective possibility for the creation of an Islamic republic on its territory.

[Lukin] As much as I know of the political situation in the republic, it seems to me that no sufficiently powerful opposition to the communists yet exists. Quite often, moreover, the capability of both "Rastokhez" and the democratic party is exaggerated, for purposes of provocation. They are trying to make them into a kind of nationalistic bogeyman for the inhabitants. These political forces have support in certain strata of the populace, among the intelligentsia and student body for example, but they are not as much a threat as the communists try to depict them, while distorting their goals and tasks.

Therefore, while trying to find the real opposition to the ruling party, I have been pondering this question for a long time: What sort of result would be achieved, if one were to conduct an anonymous sociological survey of the citizens of the republic on the topic: "What sort of Tajikistan would you like to see in the near future?". Perhaps I am mistaken and am assuming the thankless role of a poor prophet; but I would not be surprised if the majority would speak for an Islamic republic. Why? Because the people have lived under socialism; capitalism is something new and unfamiliar; it would be better for us to live as our forefathers lived—according to the Laws of Islam.

[Uzmon] Your analysis of the political situation largely coincides with ours. It is true that today we are observing the growth, or more aptly, the rebirth of the people's religious consciousness. But world experience suggests that the only way to choose one kind of state system or another is by means of creating a rule-of-law state that guarantees the free exercise of the people's will. The people themselves must decide in what kind of state they wish to live. At one time Central Asia was annexed to the Russian Empire as a result of a rapacious policy; next unification with other nations in the Union took place on the basis of, as it is now clear, a futile idea; whereas the true interests of the Tajiks, on the cultural, historical, language and religious planes, lay in a completely different direction. This does not mean that we want to separate ourselves and break the existing ties. No. Even if we arrive at an Islamic republic by means of a rule-of-law state, we shall live in peace, friendship, and cooperation with all the nations, both with our neighbors and within the republic.

[Lukin] There are very few examples in history when someone has handed over his power voluntarily. I think it is unlikely that will be the case with us either. Where is the way out? Use of force?

[Uzmon] Under no circumstances! There are quite a few people with common sense among the communists; people who understand that the political situation in the republic has changed. These are not the 1920's and 1930's, when the nation was politically illiterate. Of course, our social consciousness lags behind that of the other republics in the Baltic, the Transcaucasus, the Ukraine and Russia; but the people's political self-realization is awakening.

When we were summoned to the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet Presidium to resolve our question, I said to those present: "The presence of new political forces in the republic has become a reality which none of you can deny. Therefore, let us work together in cooperation, and together strive to lead the republic out of the crisis. One must not meet a hand extended in friendly cooperation with a stick. The moreso, since our state has rejected the monopoly of a single party in power." Unfortunately, my appeal remains unanswered. The well-known resolution

was adopted, which contradicts not only the norms of international law, but also the Constitution of the country and the republic.

Nevertheless, I hope that all the changes in the life of the republic will take place by peaceful means. I also hope for sound thinking among the communists in the republic, and for the center to caution them against impulsive steps. There is no other way: we must preserve peace and concord in our home.

[Lukin] You spoke the word "crisis." I think it relates not only to the political but to the economic situation as well. Do you have your own economic program?

[Uzmon] Yes. The Islamic Rebirth Party has its own economic program. Its main difference from the economic strategy of the country's leaders, is its lack of half-heartedness and indecisiveness. The attempt to combine the capitalist and socialist paths for developing the economy appears impracticable, inasmuch as it provides no confidence in the future for either one.

Islam has its own view on the economy. It is based upon three principles: 1) various forms of property; 2) free enterprise, within certain limits; and 3) social justice.

The fundamental difference between an Islamic economy and a capitalist one, where the principal form of property is private ownership, and the socialist where social (state) property prevails—is the harmonious combination of social, collective and private forms of property. Thus, for example, Islam forbids private ownership of national wealth—such things as water, minerals and so on. There are other limitations on private property as well, connected with religion. At one time, in Central Asia and on the territory of the present Tajikistan, there was a form of collective property called WAQF. What is that? That is when a rich man, expressing his piety, would give away part of his property (land, gardens, caravans and so on) or would bequeath it to Allah. Waqf is Allah's property. The income from waqf would go for aid to the poorest members of the makhala, to build a medres [Muslim secondary school], hospitals, bridges, roads and so on. After the revolution this form of collective property was destroyed.

[Lukin] How is the limitation on free enterprise expressed?

[Uzmon] For example, in the fact that Islam does not permit, as has been and is being done in a number of capitalist countries, destroying the products of one's labor in order to support high prices for them.

[Lukin] How many members of the Islamic Rebirth Party are there in Tajikistan at this time?

[Uzmon] I cannot say exactly.

[Lukin] Well, approximately?

[Uzmon] About 9,000.

[Lukin] On what principles are you building relationships with other parties?

[Uzmon] On a nationwide or republic scale?

[Lukin] Both.

[Uzmon] In Moscow we signed an agreement on cooperation with the parties and social-political movements of Russia and the entire Soviet Union. In the republic, as I have said, we are prepared to cooperate with all political forces which operate within the law.

[Lukin] What sort of relations do you have with official and unofficial religious figures?

[Uzmon] The Islamic Rebirth Party?

[Lukin] Yes.

[Uzmon] This is a complicated question, for you know about the decision of the official clergy not to participate in the work of political parties, including the Islamic party.

Although Khaydar Sharifzoda from Kulyab, speaking on republic television, asserted that there is no word for "party" in the Koran, there is such a concept in the sacred book, and I can prove it. It is another matter that for 70 years the word "party" has been firmly associated with the word "communist;" thus today, simple, uneducated people are frightened by the word.

[Lukin] And nevertheless, in your view, what positions do the clergy hold on an Islamic party?

[Uzmon] I believe that the majority of the unofficial and official religious figures support us.

[Lukin] Any party expresses and defends the interests of certain strata of the populace. Whose interests do you represent?

[Uzmon] We stand for the interests of the believing Muslims. And they, in our view, represent about 80 percent of the total number of citizens in the republic. These interests lie not only in the sphere of religion, but also in the political, economic and social spheres. But, I would stress once again, our activity is being conducted and will continue to be conducted only within the framework of existing legislation.

[Lukin] There are rumors (and it is not hard to guess where they come from), that the Islamic party has detachments of armed warriors...

[Uzmon] We are an open sociopolitical organization; we have no secrets at all from anyone. I stated this when they summoned me to the republic MVD. The processes of democratization and the creation of a rule-of-law state in our country are, in my opinion, irreversible. The laws of the Union provide the possibility of waging a normal political campaign (by constitutional methods). There

are no reasons whatsoever for employing force, the moreso for us, whose activity is based on the peaceful principles of religion.

[Lukin] The changes of which you speak are taking place very slowly in our republic (if they are taking place at all)...

[Uzmon] I hope that this is a temporary phenomenon. Tajikistan cannot be an island of stagnation in our country forever. In addition, we need something like an observation commission from the center, which would keep track of the actual state of the political situation in the republic, and which would deter its leadership from thoughtless steps.

[Lukin] Let's imagine that an Islamic party comes to power in Tajikistan: would the laws of the Shariat [highly articulated code of Muslim behavior that is binding on all believers] go into effect?

[Uzmon] The laws of the Shariat are not fully in effect in the original form in one single Islamic state, including Iran. Only the people can determine the necessity for introducing one law or another, by means of national referendum. Forcing anyone to live in one way or another by coercion is impossible: we already have more than 70 years of experience in this regard. But I would like to note that there are no unjust laws and customs in Islam. All of them have a firm basis even from other points of view—economic, historical, philosophical, medical, scientific, and so on.

[Lukin] It is well known that power corrupts people, especially in a totalitarian society. World democracy has developed an instrument for controlling power. Is there something similar in Islam?

[Uzmon] I understand your question. One-hundred-twenty years ago, the rulers of the Central Asian states kept the people aloof from politics, taking refuge in Islam. But the Koran contains an ayat on the fact that rule must be collective. The first caliph after the Prophet, Abu-Bakr, said: "I shall rule you, but that does not mean that I am better than you. If I am not right, you must correct me." There are democratic features in Islam, but they have not yet been used. Islam does not recognize totalitarianism and autocratic rule.

[Lukin] Are there representatives of historically non-Muslim people among the members of the Islamic Rebirth Party?

[Uzmon] Yes. In Moscow, for example; seven Russians are active followers of our party. I also know quite a few women from Lithuania, Latvia and Russia who have accepted Islam, go to the mosque, and in short have become true Muslims.

[Lukin] What else would you like to say to the readers?

[Uzmon] I would like to stress once again, that the Islamic Rebirth Party is not trying to exacerbate the

political situation in the republic. We stand for friendship and cooperation among the parties and peoples, and for a joint quest for a way out of the crisis situation.

[Lukin] Thank you for an interesting conversation. I hope that this will not be our last meeting.

The All-Union Islamic Rebirth Party

The party program indicates that the Islamic Rebirth Party [IPV] is a sociopolitical organization (party), which is based upon the values and ideals of Islam. It unites orthodox Muslims who are devoted to the cause of the rebirth of fundamental Islam, and in the struggle for its rebirth are prepared to carry the Koran and the Sunna [sayings and actions of Mohammed relating to correct Muslim belief or behavior] to their people, and to transform true Islam into a way of life for their people.

- The IPV operates by constitutional methods, condemns the methods and practice of terrorism and extremism, and all forms of discrimination. The activity of the IPV is based on faith in a Single Creator, humanism, respect for the rights of all people, and defense of the rights of man.
- The IPV stands for equality between believers and nonbelievers on the basis of patience and mutual understanding, and on stopping the propagation of atheism by the state.
- The IPV recognizes all international legal documents which do not contradict Islam, and shall strive to put them into affect.
- The IPV shall defend the rights of all believers to receive a religious education, organizing Islamic schools (medrese), circles, lectures, seminars and speeches, while guaranteeing access to literature and information.
- The IPV shall defend Islam from attack by its enemies; shall defend its ideals and explain nature and society from the positions of true Islam, and shall bring all this to the attention of the public at large.
- The IPV recognizes the necessity for training scholars possessing a profound knowledge of the essence of Islam, who are capable of providing an answer to the everyday problems of the contemporary world.
- The IPV stands for increasing the role of women in the family, believing that she is above all the mother of her children, and only then is she a production worker, public figure and the like. Society must guarantee her the opportunity to receive an education and all-round development; but most important—to offer the real opportunity to be the preserver of the home and hearth.
- The IPV defends the right of a child to life and health, and also the right to have parents; and the right of future generations to a dignified life.
- The IPV shall strive for development of an ecologically pure economy, and for introducing the economic principles of Islam.

Basic Directions of the Activity of the Islamic Rebirth Party

Excerpts From the Rules

The goal of the Islamic Rebirth Party is the triumph of the ideals of Islam throughout the world; on the way to achieving this goal—a legal struggle of ideas and propaganda.

Any Muslim man or woman committed to living and working according to the Koran and the Sunna can be a member of the IPV.

Reception of new members shall be accomplished in the localities by primary organizations on the basis of personal application and acknowledgement of the program documents of the organizations, upon recommendation of two members, with the subsequent approval of the higher-ranking organ.

Withdrawal from IPV membership shall be discussed at a general meeting of the IPV primary organization.

Expulsion from IPV membership shall be carried out for violation of the instructions of the Koran and the Sunna, as well as the IPV rules, with the subsequent approval of the higher-ranking organ.

A newly-chosen member of the IPV shall have the right to occupy elective office only after three years membership in the IPV.

Three or more persons shall be required to establish a primary IPV organization.

The highest organ of the IPV is the congress, which is authorized to adopt resolutions with a quorum of two-thirds of the delegates, by majority vote. A congress shall

convene by decision of the Ulama Council, and upon the demand of one-third of the members of the IPV, not less than once in two years.

The congress shall elect the Ulama Council from Islamic scholars, who are capable of providing answers to urgent contemporary questions on the basis of the Koran and Sunna. Scholars who do not meet these requirements shall be removed from membership on the Ulama Council by the Council itself, by a two-thirds majority vote, with subsequent confirmation by the Amir [Muslim ruler].

The Ulama Council shall elect a chairman from among its members; he shall be the Amir of the IPV. The Amir shall appoint a first deputy and members upon the recommendation of the Ulama Council. The Coordination Committee shall establish new departments and working groups.

The structure of regional IPV organizations shall duplicate the structure of the higher IPV organs.

A regional conference shall elect delegates to the IPV Congress, in accordance with the established norm of representation.

The Ulama Council shall discuss and decide the question of an Amir's unsuitability to his position. The Council's decision shall go into effect after approval by a congress of the majority of delegates by a two-thirds vote.

The financial fund of the IPV shall be comprised of the zakat [fixed share of income or property for charity], voluntary contributions, proceeds from financial-economic activities, one-time collections by decision of the coordinating committee, and income from paid measures.

The Congress shall elect an auditing committee comprised of three people.

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