


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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Russia Proposes Regional Confidence-Building Measures

HK2407023192 *Quezon City MALAYA in English*
23 Jul 92 p 6

[By Ellen Tordesillas]

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrei A. Kozyrev said yesterday his government will continue to use Cam Ranh Bay as "logistic support center" after their naval forces have left the Vietnamese naval base.

In a consultative meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers, Kozyrev said: "The time has come for a frank and friendly discussion of the future of naval bases—our common heritage of the confrontation era."

Without specifically naming Cam Ranh Bay, Kozyrev said. "But isn't it worth thinking about transforming those facilities into logistic support centers for naval activities?"

In an interview, Kozyrev said: "We are not necessarily in a hurry to leave (Cam Ranh)."

He said what is important is to transform the naval base, built by the Americans during the war against Vietnam, into something that suits the new strategy, stability and cooperation in the region.

Russia, then a part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, started withdrawing from Cam Ranh Bay in 1990 as part of the demilitarization program of then President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Kozyrev said, "Russia's intention is to be constructively present in the Asian and Pacific region and it is ready to conduct a comprehensive dialogue with ASEAN countries."

Kozyrev proposed other confidence-building measures in Asia, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean:

- Impose limitations on the scale of naval exercises and refrain from such exercises in international straits, areas of intensive navigation and fishing.
- Initiate a multilateral dialogue on establishing a crisis management system in the Asian and Pacific region to avert the buildup of military tensions.
- Negotiate formation of an international naval force to provide freedom of navigation.

BURMA

Rebels Claim Government Using Chemical Weapons

BK2407015792 *Bangkok THE NATION in English*
24 Jul 92 p A4

[Text] Anti-Rangoon Kachin guerrillas have accused the Burmese Army of using chemical weapons against them in northwestern Kachin State near the Indian border. It would be the first use of chemical weapons against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the group said. The KIA, based in the rugged mountainous area, is one of a dozen armed ethnic groups which have been fighting in border areas during the past four decades for greater autonomy from the Burmese government. However, there was not any hard evidence [to support] the KIA claims.

The accusations were based on testimony given by porters and Burmese Army troops arrested during clashes, according to Brang Seng, chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization which is the political wing of the KIA.

The Burmese Army began its offensive in Kachin State in April, about the same time it announced a unilateral ceasefire with Karen guerrillas in southern Karen State. However, the Karen said the retreat was a result of heavy casualties.

The Kachin accusations came after Burmese ground and air assaults on the Indian-Burmese border to recapture the villages of Pang Sau and Nam Yung which the KIA had captured from Burmese Army forces on June 5. Brang Seng said Burmese Army, operating out of a base in Danai township, had used air strikes and bombed the two villages. Under interrogation, captured Burmese porters and troops said they had been told to retreat 300 metres from the frontline as Burmese aircraft were going to drop "gas weapons".

"It is the first time they (Burmese Army) have used the gas weapon. However, we don't have any evidence as all those shells missed our positions," he said.

The KIA, in capturing the villages, had taken 27 Burmese prisoners of war, five of whom were released on June 21 and the rest on June 30, he said. The Kachin chairman said the prisoners had said they "were told in radio messages to move back 300 metres from the frontline as the Burmese planes were preparing to use a new kind of gas weapon for the first time."

The relevant Burmese word in the radio communications was Datnwake (gas) said another Kachin representative. Burmese ethnic dissidents have previously accused the Burmese Army of using chemical weapons, especially in the Shan State, but the groups could not provide evidence to prove the allegations.

Brang Seng said the Burmese Army, in another first against the KIA, employed paratroopers in its attack,

dispatching 200 in three helicopters on June 7 to the battlegrounds. The heavy air raids forced the KIA troops to withdraw from Nam Yung and Pang Saw on June 15 and July 2 respectively, he said. The villages are located on strategic Ledo Road, which was built by the Allies during World War II as a main supply route from Assam in India to northern Burma.

He said 20 KIA troops were killed and 24 wounded in the battle. The KIA captured a large amount of weapons and ammunition including 95 assorted M16s, German-made G2, G3 and G4 machine-guns, about 20,000 rounds of ammunition, 42 tons of rice supplies and more than 1.4 million Kyat from the two villages.

The KIA's capture of the villages and seizure of arms and supplies blocked the initial Burmese plan to move on to attack a KIA strategic outpost at Pinawang Zup on the Indian-Burmese frontier, he said.

Brang Seng said 18 Burmese troops under the command of Maj Than Soe fled from Pang Sau village into India and surrendered to the Assam Rifles, handing over their arms and a wireless set. All were later released, he said. More than 100 villagers also fled to India during the clashes, he added.

The Kachin chairman said he believed the Burmese attack on this western Kachin front with India was aimed at cutting off "all our access to the outside world," and disrupting the Indian-Kachin relations.

The KIA had earlier abandoned its 3rd Brigade headquarters on the Sino-Burmese border after heavy Burmese attacks.

NORTH KOREA

Paper Says ROK Lied About U.S. Nuclear Arms

SK2307050892 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0420 GMT 23 Jul 92

["South Side Is To Blame"—KCNA headline]

[Text] *Pyongyang* July 23 (KCNA)—Through the seventh meeting of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee held on July 21 the South side admitted that the "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" it had so far advertised was a lie and that it itself was to blame for the delayed discussion of matters for the implementation of the joint declaration on denuclearization, says a NODONG SINMUN analyst today.

He notes:

The South side avoided answering the question of our side as to which was true, the U.S. announcement on July 2 on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea, or the South Korean chief executive's "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" in December last year. This tells that the South Korean chief executive's "declaration" was a lie and they have kept the U.S.

nuclear weapons in hiding in contravention of the joint declaration on denuclearization.

Now that the "absence of nuclear weapons" advertised by it has turned out to be a lie and it has become clear who is to blame for the impasse over denuclearization, the South side must reflect on its insidious acts of going against the times and approach with sincerity the dialogue with the North for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

What is important is for the South side to discard the anachronistic idea of dependence on outside forces and confrontation intended to get something by tailing behind foreign forces, bereft of the spirit of national independence.

The United States has announced the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea and, if it is true, the South Korean authorities must not turn their back on their total inspection any longer but respond to the North's fair and aboveboard proposal regarding rules of inspection without delay.

Whether the question of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is solved or not entirely depends on the attitude of the South side.

Cheney's Remarks on Nuclear Testing Criticized

SK3107090792 *Pyongyang Korean Central*
Broadcasting Network in Korean 0806 GMT 31 Jul 92

[Text] According to a report, U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney declared in a Congressional hearing on 28 July that the United States will continue underground nuclear tests up to six times a year. He said to maintain the safety and credibility of the U.S. nuclear armory, it is necessary to carry out these tests.

By doing so, the U.S. imperialists once again revealed their aggressive ambition to secure domination over the world through nuclear weapons by maintaining their nuclear superiority.

As everyone knows, from January of last year until now, the United States carried out various nuclear tests on 19 occasions. In just five days from 19 to 23 June, nuclear tests were carried out twice at a nuclear test site in Nevada.

The U.S. imperialists have been noisily blabbing that the cold war era has come to an end and that the era of peace has emerged. They also propagandized as if they were interested in reducing nuclear weapons. However, they themselves are exposing that this is nothing but a mere sophistry to pacify the world's peace-loving people's denunciation over their maneuvers to increase nuclear weapons.

During the Congressional hearing, Cheney said that the United States will continue to carry out nuclear tests and tried to justify the maneuvers to increase nuclear

weapons. This is a challenge to the world's peace-loving people who demand the abolition of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. imperialists must deeply reflect upon the just demand of the world's people who oppose nuclear war. They must stop the development of an aggressive nuclear war commotion which threatens world peace.

SOUTH KOREA

ROK Not Ready for Chemical Arms Pact Impact

SK2707002992 Seoul YONHAP in English 0002 GMT
27 Jul 92

[Text] Seoul, July 27 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korea's 50 billion U.S. dollar chemical market and billion dollars more of related exports are at stake from a global chemical weapons ban accord due at the end of this year.

South Korea told the Conference on Disarmament meeting in Geneva last week, the first in which countries could announce their positions, that it would accept the accord draft as it is with scores of other nations.

The centerpiece of the accord is a pledge by all owner countries of chemical weapons to destroy them within 10 years while non-owners promise not to develop them.

Key parts for countries like South Korea, although less played up at this point, are strict regulations on sales and use of some 20 chemicals used in the weapons-making and also applied commercially in auto and electronics manufacturing process, fabric dyes and pesticides.

The draft on the chemical weapons ban treaty was prepared in June, and its wide acceptance at last week's meeting virtually guarantees its approval by the U.N. General Assembly.

The treaty will be opened for signing from December and it will take affect two years later on condition that at least 65 nations sign it.

South Korea's main concern is with regulations on large-quantity transfer of chemicals, requiring detailed sales and use report from both exporting and importing countries.

According to the draft agreement, nations suspected of unreported transfer activities are subject to inspection.

A Foreign Ministry initial report, compiled after meetings with related ministries and chemical industrial leaders, points out some major negative impacts.

The reporting regime may force open industrial research secrets including facilities and their operation records. This may lead to industrial monopoly by advanced nations.

It will limit and delay availability of the needed chemical products although they are intended solely for commercial use, hurting South Korea's export activities.

The current process is already time-consuming since the United States, Japan and Germany, major sellers to South Korea, require prior permit before export.

A more technical problem is South Korea's low productivity rate when using same amount of materials as other countries.

Advanced nations can turn 90 percent of chemical raw materials into product form while the rate is about 80 percent for South Korea. Having to account for the 10 percent gap every time will be no easy task, according to the report.

Other countries have long been preparing for the treaty, holding regular talks for the past few years between the government and industry leaders and inviting businessmen to attend negotiations meetings on the treaty.

"We have just begun assessing possible impact of the treaty on South Korea, and we are not quite ready to say anything or do anything definite," Cho kyu-hyong, director of Security Policy Department at the Foreign Ministry, says.

First meeting of such kind was held late last year, and the second just last month. They were mostly for exchange of information rather than seeking countermeasures.

A third, more in-depth meeting is scheduled sometime next month before the treaty draft is approved by the U.N. General Assembly.

"There are still debates on pros and cons of joining the treaty. The principle of preventing weapons proliferation is respectable, but from economic perspective, the principle is ambiguous," Cho says.

COOK ISLANDS

Prime Minister on Opposition to Nuclear Testing

BK2407075692 Melbourne Radio Australia in English
0500 GMT 24 Jul 92

[Text] The Cook Islands prime minister, Sir Geoffrey Henry, says France's suspension of nuclear testing in the South Pacific poses a challenge to other nuclear powers. Sir Geoffrey said the French moratorium could become permanent if other nuclear powers also stop testing, but he thought this was not likely to happen.

The prime minister said several member countries of the South Pacific Forum had written to various world leaders seeking support for the French moratorium adding that the Cook Islands would continue to formally oppose nuclear testing.

POLAND**Spokesman on Former Soviet Army Personnel Data**

*LD1707121192 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network
in Polish 1000 GMT 17 Jul 92*

[Text] There are still about 20,000 soldiers of the former Soviet Army and over 20,000 medical, auxiliary staff, and civilians in garrisons of those armed forces on our territory, Colonel Stefan Golebiowski, press spokesman for the government's plenipotentiary for the stationing of the armed forces of the former Soviet Army in Poland, has announced.

These armed forces have been using about 65,000 hectares of land. The Russians claim that there are no combat aircraft in Poland. According to Polish information there are still 21 of them.

The Polish side never had any basic data on the numbers of soldiers of the former Soviet Army in Poland, Col. Golebiowski explained. He also noted that even in recent times there was no Polish control of the airfields used by the Russians, the port of Swinoujscie, as well as the numbers of civilian population residing in the garrisons. That is why the data on these might differ so much, Col. Golebiowski added.

CUBA

Delegate States Position on Chemical Weapons

*FL3107005092 Havana Radio Rebelde Network
in Spanish 2300 GMT 30 Jul 92*

[Text] Cuba clearly stated its position today in Geneva on a future convention on chemical weapons. Cuban Delegate Jorge Morales declared that Cuba could not make commitments or assume responsibilities under that convention because of the possible presence of chemical weapons within the insular territory of the Naval Base in Guantanamo. Morales was explicit when he characterized the situation as extremely delicate to our country.

ISRAEL**Experts Urge Signing Chemical Weapons Treaty**

*TA3007132092 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
30 Jul 92 p A1*

[Report by defense affairs correspondent Aluf Ben]

[Excerpts] Israel will sign the international treaty for the prohibition of chemical weapons at the end of 1992, and will put off resolving the political dispute surrounding the treaty to the final endorsement stage, which will last about two years.

This is the recommendation currently being formulated by experts from various government ministries. Their conclusions will be submitted to the political echelon for approval within the next few weeks.

The professional experts believe that Israel has a clear interest in eliminating all chemical weapons in the

Middle East, both because of its historical sensitivity to the use of gas in killing human beings, and also because it was actually threatened with the use of such weapons, as proven in the Gulf war.

Israel is now waiting for the final approval of the draft of the chemical weapons nonproliferation treaty by the international disarmament committee in Geneva, which comprises some 40 countries. [passage omitted]

Over the past few months, Israel and the Arab countries have demanded that the other side be the first to sign the treaty. Pressure was exerted on Israel to sign first in order to neutralize the Arabs' demands. This was the most prominent issue on the agenda during German Deputy Foreign Minister Josef Holick's visit to Israel two weeks ago. Germany is in charge of all issues related to the treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, within the framework of the International Disarmament Committee. [passage omitted]

GENERAL

Notes on Talks With U.S. On CW, Rocket Sale To India

925P0158A Moscow DEN in Russian No 17, 26 Apr 92
p 3

[Transcript of Deputy Foreign Minister Berdennikov's Discussion With U.S. Embassy Counsellor J. Collins: "Kozyrev and Bush's 'Six'—In Repudiating Profitable Contract With India, Yeltsin Government Dooms Russian Space Industry]

[Text] Transcript of discussion with J. Collins, counsellor of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. April 6, 1992.

I received J. Collins at his request.

1. He reported that the U.S. Embassy had received from Washington, to be conveyed to the Russian side, extensive proposals for further bilateral contacts in the area of banning and destroying chemical weapons (to be sent separately). It is his understanding that these proposals were also forwarded to the Russian Embassy in Washington. They basically amount to the following: The United States proposes to hold a meeting of experts on destroying chemical weapons, to begin on April 27 of this year in Moscow, and another round of official bilateral talks on chemical weapons, to begin on May 12 of this year in Geneva. The American side proceeds from the premise that based on the results of this dialogue, concrete agreements will be reached on the threshold of B.N. Yeltsin's visit to the United States in July of this year.

In setting forth its proposals, the American side has also taken into account the fact that the U.S. Congress has enacted a law appropriating \$400 million from the Pentagon budget for the purpose of assisting the destruction of the former USSR's weapons during the current fiscal year. At the same time, up until now most attention has been devoted to the problem of destroying nuclear weapons. However, recently American legislators have spoken out in favor of having some of these funds spent on chemical disarmament. It is necessary to bear in mind that unless the sides promptly reach agreement on a concrete program for using them, these funds could be earmarked for other purposes.

I expressed gratitude for the American side's initiative on chemical weapons. I said that the American proposals regarding subsequent contacts in this area will be communicated to our relevant agencies, above all to the Russian President's Committee on Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention Problems, headed by Academician A.D. Kuntsevich. I expressed a preliminary view to the effect that the American proposals have elements in common with B.N. Yeltsin's recent message to President G. Bush informing him of the creation of A.D. Kuntsevich's committee and containing a proposal regarding the work of a joint group of experts from the two countries on solving the problems of destroying

chemical weapons. As for the timetable proposed by the American side for holding the expert meeting and the round of bilateral talks, we will communicate our opinion on this matter after reviewing it.

2. Citing our discussion of April 3, 1992, in which the American side again raised the question of holding a meeting of experts to discuss the Glavkosmos Space Agency's contract with India for cryogenic rocket engines, J. Collins informed me of Washington's negative reaction to our proposal. The American side continues to take the view that unless the cooperation with India is halted by April 8, the United States will be forced to impose sanctions against Glavkosmos.

The American official contended that the American administration is taking this decision "against its will" and that the U.S. President would like to lift any and all restrictions on cooperation with Russia in the field of advanced technologies. However, the American government has concluded that everything possible has been done and that U.S. laws do not allow it to compromise in this matter.

I expressed regret at the American authorities' decision. I called attention to the fact that American legislation with respect to compliance with the international regime for missile and missile technology nonproliferation does not put the administration in a rigid time frame with respect to imposing sanctions. I expressed the REQUEST that he reiterate to the American government our proposals for holding a meeting of technical experts from the two countries in the near future, during which Russian specialists could provide in-depth explanations of concrete aspects of our cooperation with India in this field and of how this cooperation corresponds to the missile and missile technology nonproliferation regime.

J. Collins promised to communicate this request to Washington. At the same time, he observed that the decision to take a hard line on the matter of the Glavkosmos Space Agency's cooperation with India was taken at a high political level with the direct participation of Secretary of State J. Baker and that the American side has no more room for maneuver and flexibility.

The discussion was attended by D. Chuvakhin, chief adviser to the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Arms Limitation and Disarmament Administration and by A.V. Vorobyov, second secretary of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Administration.

[Signed] G. Berdennikov, Russian Federation deputy minister of foreign affairs.

Comment on Joint Destruction of Nuclear Weapons

LD1907152192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 17 Jul 92

[Commentary by military observer Valeriy Chebotaryev; Chebotaryev speaks in Russian fading into English translation]

[Text] The forthcoming large-scale reduction of the former Soviet nuclear weapons is in the focus of attention both within the Commonwealth of Independent States and outside its borders. Military observer Valeriy Chebotaryev presents the following commentary:

[Chebotaryev] Cutbacks in nuclear armaments stipulate the stopping of their production and subsequent liquidation, which faces a number of complicated financial, organizing and scientific and technical problems, since it is the question of dismantling nuclear charges, processing radioactive materials and ensuring the safety of their transportation and storage. Under the existing agreement (?in) the framework of the CIS all former Soviet republics having nuclear weapons on their territory must hand them over to Russia to be destroyed. Only Russia has the potential needed to carry out this task. Still, it won't be enough for a speedy liquidation of weapons given the present difficult economic and financial situation in Russia.

This is clearly understood by Western countries offering help to Moscow. The issue of international assistance in the dismantling of the former Soviet nuclear arsenals is moving from discussions to a practical stage. For one, the United States agreed to give Russia \$150 million worth of aid. The means will be used to set up an international scientific and technical center in Russia, to supply protective cover for storage facilities, containers for the transportation of nuclear materials, and special protective clothes.

Britain and France have also voiced their intention to cooperate with Russia in this domain. Even Japan, the first and the only country which came under nuclear bombardment, does not keep aloof. In February it announced readiness to make its own financial contribution to the destruction of nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union.

Quite evidently nuclear disarmament responds to the interests of all nations. That's why the broader international efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat, the faster and more successfully this task will be resolved.

Scientists Review Nuclear Winter Theory

PM2207140992 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jul 92 First Edition p 5

[Letter from I. Safonov, consultant of Russian president's group of experts, and A. Tarko, senior scientific staffer at the Russian Academy of Sciences Computer center: "Nuclear Winter Nonetheless Possible"]

[Text] Having familiarized ourselves with the item "No Need To Fear 'Nuclear Winter'" published in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 16 May 1992, we believe it our professional duty to express disagreement with the AP report it describes on the need to review forecasts of the climatic consequences of a large-scale nuclear war—the so-called nuclear winter.

The report says that scientists from a number of U.S. scientific centers believe that the fact of relatively slight and merely local changes in the temperature of the air near the earth as the result of the fires at the Kuwait oilfields is confirmation that the climatic consequences of a nuclear war could be small and that previous forecasts of a nuclear winter should be reviewed.

That assertion is incorrect. Analysis of the climatic consequences of the fires in Kuwait in no way refutes the correctness of nuclear winter calculations. Nuclear winter occurs as a result of nuclear bomb attacks and subsequent gigantic fires in large cities, when the products of combustion rise to the outer troposphere and stratosphere (up to 10 km) and spread there, first over the Northern Hemisphere then over the Southern. The considerable drop in the temperature of the air near the earth takes place as a result of the blocking out of the sun's rays by a mass of aerosols in the air at this altitude, with the quantity, composition, and size of the aerosol particles which arise as a result of nuclear fires in large cities.

The nature of the fires in cities and at oilfields and also the composition of the relevant combustible substances differ considerably. The consequences of these fires also differ considerably. The products of combustion from fires at oilfields did not rise to a great altitude. It was this fact that determined the relatively slight change in temperature of the near-earth air.

These facts are well known to the specialists who not only studied the fires in Kuwait but also calculated their climatic consequences. Suffice it to say that these calculations were carried out by S. Bakan and others at the Max Planck Institute (Hamburg), C.A. Browning and others at the British Meteorology service (London), and G.L. Stenchikov at the Russian Academy of Sciences Computer Center (Moscow). All these calculations correctly reproduced the climatic consequences of fires. It should be noted that G.L. Stenchikov has done calculations on the same model on which he had previously, in conjunction with V.V. Aleksandrov, obtained nuclear winter forecasts which have become world famous.

There are thus no grounds for reviewing the forecasts of a nuclear winter as a result of the information about the fires in Kuwait.

[Signed] I. Safonov, consultant of the Russian president's group of experts,

A. Tarko, senior scientific staffer at the Russian Academy of Sciences Computer Center.

Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin Interviewed

On New Military Doctrine

OW2407072392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0545 GMT 24 Jul 92

[Interview with First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Andrey Kokoshin by Marina Chernukha and Vyacheslav Terekhov; place and date not given; from the "Nation and Society" feature—transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpts] Andrey Kokoshin, first deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation, shares his views of Russia's new military doctrine and many other problems. [passage omitted]

ANDREY KOKOSHIN OUTLINES NEW CONCEPT OF RUSSIA'S SECURITY

Correspondent: In your opinion, where is the difference between Russia's concept of military security and its USSR analogue?

KOKOSHIN: There are many of them. Essentially, they are predetermined by the fact that we have become a different nation, although, in a great number of ways, we still remain the Soviet Union's successor.

The Soviet Union had regarded the United States and its NATO allies as its potential enemy for dozens of years. This kept us in constant preparedness for a nuclear war, or, as a minimum, a major conventional war. Therefore, the structure and composition of the Soviet Armed Forces had been tailored to accomplish such missions.

The bent to protect all of our foot soldiers by armor was mostly prodded by our perception of a future armed conflict as a warfare with the use of short-range nuclear weapons when the troops would have to operate under the conditions of a CBR [chemical, biological and radiological] contaminated environment, since they were expected to be subject to the attacks by the weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear and chemical.

Knowledgeably, the United States was the first to develop short-range nuclear weapons adding them to then inventory of the USAREUR. On our part, we began channeling into our armed forces great quantities of armored vehicles, making vigorous efforts for deploying our own short-range nuclear capabilities.

At present, the probability of major armed engagements of this category has waned, although we cannot say that it no longer exists. In the meantime, the chances of local conflicts have increased. Such conflicts are already taking place near the Russian borders in Transcaucasus and Moldova. Understandably, we cannot be indifferent to these conflicts, for Russia's security largely hinges on the stability in those regions.

Understandably, we approach the objective of insuring Russia's security, upholding its sovereignty and territorial integrity as our commitment to contain any conflicts involving our national interests at their incipient stage, precluding their ramifications. It's a demanding multi-fold mission with a pronounced political import. Not exaggeratedly, in certain situations the armed forces may become absolutely essential as a stabilizing factor. Under certain conditions, the developments are likely to take a turn so dramatic that only their direct involvement will become instrumental for resolving a critical situation. This is why their doctrine which is currently shaped up by the professional military and Russia's Supreme Council envisage a probability of such local conflicts as much as the employment of the armed forces for averting, containing, and putting them out.

Apparently, this will become the army's greatest challenge, for local warfares and conflicts, per se, are different from the operations the troops of the former Warsaw Pact and present-day NATO had been trained to accomplish for dozens of years, when they had complete awareness of their potential enemy, and when the front line was clearly marked on the commanders' operative maps. [passage omitted]

Q: Russia is known to undergo a disarmament. How does it affect are your relations with defense enterprises in regard to military orders?

A: The budget allocations for the defense purposes have been minimized causing even our predecessors to dramatically reduce their military orders. Sometimes our cuts have reached 60-70% and more against the level of 1991.

I can give you some concrete figures. In 1988, we turned out over 3200 tanks a year. 2800 of them were directed to the troops, the rest were exported. This year we have ordered only 20 tanks.

Q: Probably, there is no demand for them any longer?

A: This would be true for the quantities of tanks we used to turn over by the end of the 1980s. On the other hand, 20 tanks are apparently not enough either for revamping the inventory of our armor, however minimal. The orders for artillery pieces, mechanized infantry fighting vehicles, and many kinds of missiles have been literally brought to naught. Therefore, I have to acknowledge a tremendous drop of purchase of combat materiel. These enormous reductions badly reflect on the profitability at many enterprises which, in the assessments of specialists, is often in the red.

At present, in compliance with the provisions of Russia's new military doctrine, we are working out new priorities for the purchases of military materiel. In the meantime, we are reducing the nomenclature of the military gear trying to adopt the policy of their unification and standardization. The matter is that our inventory, as regards certain kinds of armored vehicles, used to be 2.5 to 3

times larger than in the United States. This hiatus became especially dramatic conceding we were 2.5 times poorer than the Americans.

As a result, the cost of their operation and crew training for different kinds of materiel was extremely high. It may take us 3-4 more years to resolve the problem of unification and reduce the number of types of equipment in the inventory of the armed forces, provided we do it under favorable conditions. Only then our efforts will bear good results and lead to a considerable decrease of our operational expenses for weapons and combat materiel.

Paradoxically, without any orders (i.e., before the supply of new equipment) we have to keep in the troops a great variety of outdated materiel.

Admittedly, a lot of most updated combat materiel has remained on the territory of Ukraine and Byelarus. I would like to specially emphasize that in terms of proportion the ratio of outdated to up-to-date equipment in those countries is much better than in Russia. The same situation is with the tanks, artillery systems, fire support helicopters, etc.

Q: Doesn't this dramatic cut on the military orders reflect negatively on the armed forces' combat capabilities?

A: This is a difficult situation both for the industry and for the army. The army does maintain certain reserves of combat materiel, at it can rely on these resources for some time. As regards the industry, however, it will either crumble under such circumstances or refuse to fulfill even minimal defense orders for years ahead. Restoration of the defense production even to the minimum level may turn into a highly costly enterprise.

Q: Is the defense ministry going to preserve the same "legendary infatuation" with the armor?

A: I have already told you that Russia is going to place special emphasis on mobile forces with relatively light armor.

I don't think we will ever again produce tanks in such enormous quantities. At the same time, we do not want to forfeit our preponderance in tanks.

We are also observing a very difficult situation in the ammunition production industry. As is known, it constitutes the backbone of our defense industry. It seems we have approached the line when we will be forced to make most responsible and momentous decisions which we have been putting off for years. We will combine our efforts with the ministry of industry and ministry of economics recommending to the government the enterprises which would need to be preserved as government sponsored producers contracted by the ministry of defense, as well as those "to be liberated".

In my opinion, both the conversion and the development of our defense industry should be performed on the basis

of Russia's national industrial policy which we need to develop the sooner the better, for our country still lacks such a policy. We should clearly see our long-term perspectives - in what areas, when and how we can achieve the standards of the world's best producers, as well as what will be laid in the foundation of our economy. We should give a clear account to ourselves as to where and in what proportions the presence of foreign capital is applicable, and where it is not. I am convinced that a number of our branches of industry are unquestionably competitive with their highest world analogues. The development of these branches is undeniable for restoring incontestable defensibility for our country.

Q: What are these branches, in your opinion?

A: Aircraft and missile construction, a number of trends in quantum electronics, laser technology, shipbuilding, heavy machine building. I am confident that given adequate incentives, our country can become a producer and exporter of a great variety of commodities, both high-tech and of medium technological input. [passage omitted]

On Future of Weapons Production

*PM2207112692 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 Jul 92 p 1*

[Observer Aleksandr Golts report: "How Many Weapons Do We Need? First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin Shares His Thoughts on This With Journalists"]

[Text] Among the many acute problems which the nascent Russian Defense Ministry will have to solve, the questions of military-technical policy, arms purchases, and the formation of military orders occupy a noteworthy place. This became obvious to me during a "press hour" when First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin answered journalists' questions. Although, apart from the aforesaid aspects, he is also in charge of international cooperation in the military sphere and talks on the problems of safeguarding security, policy in the military-technical sphere was the main topic of the discussion.

When State Orders Are No Salvation

Orders for the purchase of military hardware are being drawn up under exceptionally difficult conditions, A. Kokoshin noted. Arms production is being cut back on a huge scale—by 50-60, and in certain cases even 90, percent. And, contrary to the widely held view, military-industrial complex enterprises by no means always see a way out for themselves from the complex economic position in state orders for arms production. The fact is that in a number of cases they have already reached the profitability borderline and in some cases have already crossed that line. Military orders are becoming unprofitable owing to the explosive growth in component prices, particularly for electronics. Some components

have gone up in price 30-40-fold. Yet the end price of the output is set at a considerably lower level.

Just what are the Defense Ministry's tasks under these conditions? In A. Kokoshin's opinion, they are to supply the Armed Forces' most urgent needs on the basis of the modest funds which will be allocated. And it is necessary to retain as much scientific and technical potential as possible and to lay the groundwork in the sphere of next-generation scientific and technical developments.

At the same time, A. Kokoshin believes, the time has come to determine together with other departments which enterprises will remain purely state enterprises stably producing military hardware and armaments. We also need to determine which enterprises will leave the defense complex and be converted. And, in A. Kokoshin's opinion, the most important role will be played in the future by diversified companies producing both military and civilian equipment.

One other priority task is to introduce the contract [kontraktno-dogovornyy] system in relations between the Defense Ministry and enterprises, whereby both sides would have mutual obligations. After all, state orders—which have demonstrated their inefficiency under market conditions—are still in operation. The defense department is currently concluding a discussion of the principles of contractual relations with top industrial leaders and the league of defense enterprises.

Life Is More Complex Than Even the Most Accurate Blueprints

Many people—and A. Kokoshin admitted to probably being one of them—campaigns for a military doctrine to be drawn up initially, followed by a concept for the Armed Forces' organizational development. And we should only order military hardware on the basis of this concept. But we have yet to arrive at this logical and entirely correct position. A different position currently operates.

The goal of switching from an army-based to a corps-based structure, and from a division-based to a brigade-based structure has already been formulated. This presupposes an entirely different organizational and personnel structure. And a number of very fine weapons are to all intents and purposes losing their original role in the process. After all, they were not only part of the division-army concept, but also of the concept of the war which it was thought would be fought. The concept was of a large-scale battle in the continental theater. Incidentally, A. Kokoshin noted, there is so much remarkable equipment that we simply have to find room for it.

When drawing up next year's orders we must start standardizing military hardware. A. Kokoshin quoted the following figures to the journalists. There are 37 specifications and versions of missile and artillery armaments deployed with the U.S. ground forces. We have 62. Equally—we have 62 specifications of armored equipment, whereas the Americans have 16. We have 26

types of surface-to-air missile complexes; they have four. Needless to say, it will take years and years to get rid of this weapons proliferation. But we simply have to start producing one type of weapon instead of four different types.

But these are by no means easy decisions. And it is not the new ministry leadership that will have priority in this area. These issues emerged over the course of years and decades. But whenever they did emerge, they were never resolved. And now the ending of production of a certain type of military hardware often escalates into a political matter and an issue whose resolution could affect social tension in areas with a large preponderance of defense enterprises in their industrial base. And the decision will have to be made at the top political level.

Full Independence Is Possible But Not Advantageous

Political considerations are also affecting production sharing with the other CIS republics in arms production. A. Kokoshin believes that Russia now has sufficient potential to produce the full range of military equipment. In certain cases we do indeed need to transfer production of certain types of armaments to within the country—in order to ensure complete independence in the most important areas, and to guarantee stricter controls over this equipment.

But in most cases there is no need for this. Moreover, a transfer of production will require expenditure running into hundreds of billions of dollars. Furthermore, meaningful talks have been begun with certain countries on mutually advantageous military-technical cooperation, with a discussion of specific projects, specific enterprises, and financial commitments.

Defense Industry Is Source of Russian Output's Competitiveness

In general, in A. Kokoshin's opinion, it would be wrong to view the defense industry merely as a source of armaments and military hardware. Such scientific and technical might is concentrated there that it could become a most important component of the market economy. And, in the long term, a source of ensuring the competitiveness of Russian goods in the world market. But, for this to happen, the defense sector will have to break out of its familiar, isolated world.

The reason conversion has not succeeded is not because defense enterprises should be assimilating simple output instead of complex output. The fact is that the targets given to defense enterprises were set without reference to the prime cost of output or its competitiveness. Major associations which were designed to resolve highly complex targeted tasks in the military sphere should focus on the same tasks in the civilian sphere. For instance, they should not be producing refrigerators, they should be developing communications systems and unique products in the sphere of transportation and power engineering. And this could give a boost to the development of the entire economy.

Mikhaylov Interviewed on 'Nuclear Danger'

PM2307114392 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jul 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhaylov by O. Volkov and A. Khokhlov; place and date not given: "Nuclear Danger Is No More Than a Myth. That Is What Russian Nuclear Minister Viktor Mikhaylov Believes"]

[Text] [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Viktor Nikitovich, you have been involved in science your whole life and you have created nuclear weapons and systems to monitor them. How do you view the recent disarmament accords?

[Mikhaylov] I always said we did not need so many weapons. After all, we had over 25,000 nuclear munitions: warheads, mines, and shells—that is simply terrible! The quantity of weapons has now become a matter of quality and is threatening to become uncontrollable. So arsenals must be reduced.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How soon will this happen?

[Mikhaylov] Unfortunately, it will take us a while to get rid of them. It will take at least 10 years and considerable expenditure.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Where will the weapons be destroyed?

[Mikhaylov] At our enterprises—in Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, and Yekaterinburg—and in the places where they were assembled: Zlatoust, Penza, Arzamas, and Nizhnyaya Tura.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Are there sufficient capacities?

[Mikhaylov] The Americans visited recently, and I said to them: If you have problems with this, bring yours over here. We will also dismantle your weapons—for a moderate fee.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] U.S. scientists are continuing to develop [razrabotka] third-generation nuclear weapons. What about our scientists?

[Mikhaylov] Scientific programs are under way, but without real-life experiments. The moratorium Russia announced last year is still in force.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Are we already a long way behind?

[Mikhaylov] No.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Will tests be resumed at Novaya Zemlya in October, when the moratorium expires?

[Mikhaylov] In all probability there may be tests in 1993.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Tell us a military secret: Will these explosions be weapons tests or are they for peaceful purposes?

[Mikhaylov] What secret is there—there will be weapons tests.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] We have heard that the "Chetek" company has made a promise to foreigners to start destroying their chemical waste this year by means of nuclear explosions. Is this true?

[Mikhaylov] This firm offered its services in financing some of the Arzamas-16 conversion programs in 1990, when our appropriations were drastically cut. Permission was received from the leadership of the former USSR. "Chetek" invested 10 million rubles [R], including in the technological studies [razrabotki] you mention. For our part, we promised the businessmen a share of the profits if this program is launched and brings in profits. "Chetek" took the risk. I believed and I still do believe that private capital can be involved in conversion programs. So I gave my agreement.

Today "Chetek" is having some difficulties, and we have not renewed the contract with it, but if the technology "works out," the company has the right to some of the profits because of the capital it has invested.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Is it going to work?

[Mikhaylov] Everything still has to be weighed. I think next year we will submit the plan for expert environmental assessment, international assessment, if you like. Although there are quite a lot of alternative proposals that do not involve nuclear explosions. The winner will be the plan that is cleanest from the environmental viewpoint, entails the smallest risk of consequences, and is economically advantageous.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You are about to go to the United States. What is the purpose of the trip?

[Mikhaylov] I will be discussing a whole series of problems with Energy Secretary Watkins. One of them is the possibility of selling highly enriched uranium-235. We have to earn hard currency.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] To whom are you going to sell it?

[Mikhaylov] We are intending to sell uranium in the form of fuel elements to firms and countries to which the U.S. Department of Nuclear [as published] Energy formerly sold it. Our quota is very small—just 5 or 6 percent of world trade or just \$300-400 million in money terms. We want to increase our quota in order to obtain as much again.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Why are the Americans interested in such sales? Are the prices low?

[Mikhaylov] No. There was an instance when we sold a consignment of output at low prices—last year. But now

in the United States there is an entire protest campaign. The U.S. Department of Commerce believes that we have caused losses to U.S. enterprises. However, American experts today admit that Russia did not sell uranium at below prime cost. So far as they were concerned this was dumping, but it is just that our technology is better and wages are low.

The Americans' interest lies elsewhere. They need to modernize their uranium enrichment plants. I am not saying their technology is backward, but ours consumes 20 times less power, so prime cost is low. Meanwhile their Department of Energy does not want to lose its "nuclear" customers, and so it is temporarily ready to sell our uranium to its customers.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] In general, this is as "advantageous" as selling crude oil.

[Mikhaylov] This is not the crude oil trade. Of course, uranium reserves are limited—although we have 45 percent of the world reserves, incidentally. Even without weapons-grade uranium we have more than enough fuel. There are entire deposits! All the storage facilities are full. So what are we supposed to do, just hoard it all? Or try to sell at least some of it? After all, if we were to sell even 10-20 percent of this quantity, it would mean billions of dollars—not credits from the world community, but honestly earned money!

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Will we be able to sell it? What is your view of the situation on the international market for nuclear materials?

[Mikhaylov] Not a cold war, but a real "hot" war is under way there. Russia is trying to fight its way in.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Who actually sells the uranium? The ministry? The government? Businessmen?

[Mikhaylov] Today uranium is sold directly by the producer enterprises under our ministry's control, of course. All decisions to sell go through the government. The rules are similar in the West. So you could say that the state, Russia, sells it.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What about the other republics of the former USSR?

[Mikhaylov] We have managed to reach agreements with the CIS uranium-producing countries. They all now sell uranium only via "Tekhsnabeksport." That is to everyone's advantage.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Won't the uranium that is sold come back later in the form of waste that we will have to bury?

[Mikhaylov] No. We will sell it as raw material and take nothing back. In general waste is one of the most painful problems today. For some reason people did not think about it before.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Indeed, I have often heard it said that nuclear power is regarded as cheap only because the costs of reprocessing and burying radioactive waste are not taken into account.

[Mikhaylov] That is not quite true. Feasibility studies today take the whole cycle into account.

Today we have new techniques for reprocessing waste. We now know how to construct the nuclear power stations of the future: They will accumulate radioactive substances which will go back into the fuel cycle after reprocessing.

All this forms part of the new blueprint for the development of the nuclear power industry that was recently examined by the ministry collegium. A plan for the next 20 years has been drawn up. The program can be said to have passed its first reading.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Will new power stations be constructed?

[Mikhaylov] Certainly. There are applications from the Urals, the Far East, and Kazakhstan. China and India are appealing to us. In general there is much that is interesting in this blueprint. For instance, we are considering the option of underground power stations.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Where are you going to get the money to implement the program?

[Mikhaylov] Do not worry; we are not going to be an albatross around your neck. We are not going to get into debt. Our ministry has tremendous potential. For instance, we have an excellent process for silicon carbide production. We will calculate how long it will take to recoup the outlay, and we will see how much money we need. I am proposing to create joint ventures.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Maybe the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is always offering aid?

[Mikhaylov] It is a question of its money! Yes, they are offering \$700 million on a preferential loan—at 10-12 percent—but from the next year we would have to pay \$70 million. Where are we going to get that money? Would you listen to your wife if she were urging you into debts you could never repay?

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But the money is being offered to improve the safety of our nuclear power stations. Can we really cope with this problem ourselves?

[Mikhaylov] Last year we spent R200 million on ensuring safety, and that was a sizable sum then. We will invest some of all the profits without fail in nuclear power station safety.

We have the opportunity to earn good money. Scientifically speaking, our institutes and science and production associations are more than a match for any foreign competitors. In August I am going to the RSA to reach

agreement on using our unique technologies in extracting gold from long-abandoned tailings. No one else but us can do this. Half of the profits will be ours.

But I will be honest: As yet there are few specific joint projects; there are more proposals. Nevertheless, we will make \$600 million this year.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How will relations develop with the countries of the former CEMA and the present CIS where we constructed power stations? In general is it advantageous for us to maintain some sort of connection with them?

[Mikhaylov] What does advantageous mean? We must all stick together—not only in the nuclear sphere. On our own it will take us too long to “crawl” into the world community, we simply will not be recognized as equal partners, and many people realize this. I value the freedom of any people and the right of every state to be sovereign and independent, but you have to realize that the pragmatic West is not going to help anyone just because it likes their face. So it is now time to restore scientific, technical, production, and technological links. We cannot manage without integration and cooperation.

No one except us is going to modernize the power stations we constructed. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia asked Germany's Siemens and Italy's Ansaldo. The latter refused and referred the “petitioners” to us.

Incidentally, the “Loviisa” nuclear power station we constructed in Finland is regarded as one of Europe's and the world's safest. At our power stations there is usually one automatic actuation of the shield per reactor unit per year, or to be more accurate, a little less—0.9. At “Loviisa” the figure is 0.3-0.4. At U.S. power stations this indicator is almost 2. Today many people are interested in our reactors: South Korea, Japan...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] The world is demanding nuclear safety guarantees from the republics of the former USSR, but what guarantees can we give today if city soviets are making decisions of state importance? The Krasnoyarsk authorities, for instance, do not want to reprocess radioactive waste on their territory. Ukraine is not allowing spent fuel from Czech nuclear power stations through to Russia for reprocessing.

[Mikhaylov] That is all depressing, of course, but what can you do? These are the times we are living in; everyone thinks he is being “pushed out” of something. As for Ukraine, this matter is almost resolved; we are reaching agreement.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But to whom are we going to write off the losses? All this disarray primarily affects people working in the nuclear sector. Can there be any question of safety when one “nuclear” city after another is threatening to go on strike?

[Mikhaylov] Recently there was a plenum of the Nuclear Power and Industry Workers Union Central Committee, and it was both painful and bitter for me, as the minister,

to hear people. Indeed, a prestrike situation has now been declared in Krasnoyarsk, Arzamas, and Krasnokamensk. For several months workers in the sector have not been receiving their pay; there is no cash. The government promised to resolve this question by 1 July. What's the date today? So there you are.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Are you not afraid the scientists will flee abroad?

[Mikhaylov] That is a separate issue. People have long been trying to prove that there is total chaos and mayhem in our country, but none of our specialists has gone abroad. This is all fantasy. The people who are periodically portrayed as Soviet “nuclear specialists” in the West were not closely involved with our military secrets. The CIS has decided at intergovernmental level to control all scientists in any way involved in weapons production.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] So are nuclear specialists doomed to be banned from traveling abroad for their whole lives?

[Mikhaylov] Why? For instance, a conference of mayors of closed cities of the “nuclear cycle” was held recently—abroad, in Norway. I think the cost was justified, because we must learn to communicate with our foreign colleagues. Unless we now open up the closed cities a little to the outside world, it will be simply impossible to live and work there.

Admittedly, in choosing Norway I was also pursuing another aim: We have to respond somehow to the constant reproaches from our Scandinavian neighbors about Novaya Zemlya. There are no “horrors” there. Since they do not believe me personally, I thought, maybe they will believe people living actually at Russia's nuclear facilities?

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Did they believe them?

[Mikhaylov] I do not know. But for the umpteenth time they asked how I can sleep in a country crammed with sources of radioactivity. I sleep soundly, like a log.

Russian, UK Adopt Military Cooperation Plan

*PM2707083992 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Jul 92 p 2*

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Voronkov report: “Military Contacts Expanding”]

[Text] London, 24 Jul—By the end of the year Russia and Britain will complete the elaboration of and adopt a two-year program for the further development of relations in the military sphere. That is one of the results of the official visit here by Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation defense minister.

The joint statement adopted here with British Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind envisages the continuation of cooperation in strengthening and advancing international agreements on cutting arms and armed forces to the level necessary for defense purposes. The sides also agreed to cooperate on questions of taking further measures to prevent the spread of weapons, including nuclear and other means of mass destruction. As the document emphasizes, Russia and Britain intend to cooperate in strengthening monitoring of compliance with the ban on the development [razrabotka], production, and storage of bacteriological and toxin weapons, and verification of their destruction.

The new elements in relations between the two countries in the military sphere are an exchange of opinions on the questions of running the armed forces under the conditions of democracy, cooperation, and the retraining and job placement of discharged servicemen, an exchange of military academy students, and the establishment of military sports links.

This fall, the statement reports, there will be an exchange of opinions between delegations from the Russian Armed Forces General Staff and the British Defense Staff. The heads of the military departments expressed their readiness to pursue contacts and, to this end, M. Rifkind will visit Russia in early 1993.

Concerns, Problems Facing Russian Nuclear Researchers Examined

*924C2029A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 31, 29 Jul 92 p 13*

[Article by Andrey Tarasov: "The Nuclear Weight on Mankind's Neck Has Increased Since August 1945"]

[Text] **A specter wanders behind the fence. The federal nuclear center is on the threshold of destruction**

It makes off with the guilty and the innocent, soldiers and children, "hawks" and "doves" into hellish flame.

Everyone is equal before it. But not everyone is the same to us, the living. Not everyone is the same to those consumed at Hiroshima. Not everyone is the same even to the scientists who gave birth to it.

What were the German nuclear workers saying in August 1945?

What are the Russians saying in the summer of 1992?

Arzamas-16 today and 40 years ago.

There are now two holy saints in this city: Monk Serafim Sarovskiy and Academician Andrey Sakharov. It is said that the poor devil Nikolay II kept an eye on a promise in Serafim Sarovskiy's prophecies of a favorable conclusion to his reign after many bloody storms. And thinking that these bloody storms were in the past, somewhere at the start of the century he pulled strings to give Serafim the title of saint, appearing with his whole family at

Sarovskiy's monastery for the official registration of this matter. The saint, despite a certain shortcoming in the required deeds, still was registered, and we know what the reign ended in.

How the matter of the atom bomb and the "unrestrained academician's" prophecies will end is not clear at the moment.

Yuliy Borisovich Khariton, who is enjoying good health, and, belatedly, Lavrentiy Palich Beriya, who was executed by a firing squad, actually picked out a beautiful spot for the "maternity home" for our atom bomb—the extremely secret Institute of Experimental Physics. I also would like to spend my life in such a clean, tidy, well supplied green community, with interesting work and all the prerequisites for it. As would, certainly, the makers of tractors, hay mowers, canned meats and vegetables, clothing, footwear, and many other things. I think that many of them would even be reconciled with the border strip and with the two barbed-wire fences, and with the careful checking of passes for each person who arrives here, by asphalt or by rail.

And there are not many of them. Actually it is almost a kindred idea—to fence off one-sixth of the dry land with wire and provide it with everything necessary for a full and protected life. Why did we not want it?

The specter of the partitioning and of curtailment and disarmament wanders over a "cozy corner of communism," as the local residents had a complete right to nickname it. An important specter, which has already been personified, is an actual delay in being paid. What are the "bombmakers" saying and thinking about it at this time, which is critical for their branch of the economy?

Of course you do not hear the fervent slogans of "down with the atomic bomb" from them. More likely the contrary. For the physicists and for the designers, it is both a beauty and a clever thing, and it behaves correctly, if you teach it to. That is, it explodes only when necessary, and when it is not necessary it will be silent, like a guerrilla, though you cut it, burn it, or scatter it around.... There is not one, but several tens of shapes. It is easy to guess: rocket, aircraft, torpedo, mine, and there are also silo, wheeled, shipborne, huge strategic, and little tactical ones, you name it. And each charge has its chief designer and its creative staff under theoreticians, for whom at no time has anyone set the tone as did Sakharov. "It is a pity, you have not seen him at all as we did here. After exile he grew old, he was changed—you would not recognize him. He was indeed a real genius, quick with any answers, a polemicist, one who liked to argue—the sparks flew...."

And Academician Khariton himself, skinny and light, with his weak but formerly incontestable voice, surrounded by chief designers and theoreticians, academicians, Heroes of Soviet Labor, and laureates of all the

prizes, explains that he stands for nuclear parity, not because we are almost alone but because we have overtaken America:

“Such an extraordinary intensity of efforts was required of our fellow workers because our technology was worse, especially the computer equipment. And brains played a more essential role here than in the U.S., where the equipment was better.”

It was a tall order, and you involuntarily look at each one with triple respect. But there was still another overload on the scientific manager himself. My eye happened to fall on bureaucratic secrets—no, not the scheme of the newest bomb but an old questionnaire form, where Yu. B. reported in calligraphic ink that his father, Boris Osipovich, a journalist, who published the newspaper RECH in 1922, was sent “abroad” because he was an ideologically hostile element. With such a pedigree, he had to pass so many years under Beriya’s snaky eye! He had to try to make a good, a very good bomb.

It had its day, but conversion, as they say, grabbed it by the throat. At first by strict party decisions. Then simply by a budget cut. In some laboratories there is enough to pay for three or four hours of daily work. There are no more orders. Next, the struggle for survival. In the courtyard of the main institute structures, several high-powered military vans are parked in all their splendor. Repainted from green to a bright civilian color, these recent Ural bomb carriers had been converted into advanced complexes for medical, radiological, and chemical monitoring. They are waiting for a serious buyer.

But again he had to be lured beyond this wire, which was not at all simple. My collocutors were people who for 10 years could not bring their own fathers here, never have their sisters here as guests. I agreed completely, this vigilance at such a disturbed time had to be higher so that no strange person or maniac would carry some part of the bomb, or even a model of it, out the gate. But the business’s success, as is well known, was in instantaneous contacts and operational ties among partners. Meanwhile the partner was searched and eavesdropped on like a violator of the state frontier, a sour activity for him.

How can this be outweighed except by the seductiveness of the laser scalpel, or the portable ultraviolet inhalator, miniature Roentgen equipment, the personal dosimeter....But there was also a real shortage: the Briz installation, well known as an antiburn bed....

One could continue this circus of science-intensive things that were shown to the guests—journalists of the Nekos science studio. But the nuclear workers themselves purse their lips: is this the governing factor? Ingenious flashiness will not rescue their budget. Not this budget, not that strained interpretation. The real line is fundamental nuclear physics, in earnest, without the petty details. The world’s most powerful magnetic fields.

But pay for them only in exchange for an atomic bomb. If the bomb is not needed, then the science goes aground. What is to be done?

But let us take a look at the peaceful outlet of this VIGR—the fast-burst graphite reactor, which, as seen through the periscope eyepiece on the control panel, is an inoffensive samovar three meters high. Americans still have not seen it and did not believe it. The world’s most powerful, it is disposable, but the main thing is that it is self-extinguishing. Like this neutron bomb, capable of giving a most powerful, murderous impulse of several seconds to 10^{-3} second and then settling down. The uranium-graphite fuel is put together so cleverly in 12 ring-shaped bagels. A flash—a dense stream of fast neutrons—it loses criticality and stops. Only the air in the room glows, say the experimenters, who are separated from it by a reinforced concrete wall.

Laboratory chief Mikhail Ivanovich Kuvshinov names the density of the neutron flux, but it is limited by the fact that the metal tvel [fuel rod] (this is the nuclear fuel element) in the “bagel” channel is instantaneously evaporated. And in general, any type of fuel, in ceramic or metal, can be brought to destruction. Is this not an imitation of the gravest accidents at AES’s? This means new stages in the nuclear-power safety program. And if one looks further at what are only beginning to be talked about, then plutonium-based underground nuclear-power stations also are waiting for their designers and for experiment. Only Sakharov has as yet said the first word about them.

It was he who slipped in the idea of controlled nuclear fusion with a laser pump. The TOKOMAK, as is well known, burns and sustains a plasma furnace within strong magnetic fields. More truly, ignition is still being tried. Here, at the Iskra-5 installation, 12 laser beams pierce a crumb target, where, a microhydrogen bomb of deuterium and tritium sits in a quartz-glass drop no larger than half a millimeter. In order to meet all the requirements for igniting the plasma, the power of the laser itself must, on my honor, be raised by two orders: from the existing 30 kilojoules to 2-5 megajoules. By ourselves, this is highly improbable for our century. Iskra chief Valeriy Tikhonovich Punin explains all this, helping us to climb all around the cruciform building, which is of very precise settling and clearances (with halls on five floors), along the 3-kilometer laser paths. These paths converge on the central sphere, where 2,000 parameters are recorded at the time of the shot....Aside from technical and scientific problems, there are also social problems. A leaflet was put up recently on the bulletin board: if you, Punin, will sell our secrets and technology to the Americans—let us settle accounts when they return ours! Such was the general sense. Here you also have contacts at international conferences. Punin did not tear down the leaflet, and he did not sting the author administratively. He understood that there are things which a man must understand himself. In the final analysis we are exchanging ideas, which must be spoken about in simple language, clarifying whether we

are in jail or in the free world. The author took down the leaflet, but....We are still talking about this "but."

And here I also will explode something. It is not an atom bomb, be assured. In the section for "ordinary" VV's [explosives], they press a button and beyond the wall, in an explosion chamber, something resounds sharply, sort of like a grenade. Actually it is an explosive string, a cumulative charge that cuts along a fairly thick steel plate in a fraction of a second, like a scissors. They adjusted the explosive for the experiment right before the very eyes of science staffer Yuriy Petrovich Dendenkov. And here are photographs which colleague Yu. A. Vlasov has just now brought him from Uzbekistan, where the section had filled a civilian order. There, you see, in a half-hundred tank, sulfur had congealed, and this is what no fire could melt. Gas welding takes a long time to melt it, and it is dangerous. So they cut it with an explosion, girding the barrel with a cumulative string charge.

"This means that you do not fear for your future if the atom bomb is killed?" I ask Doctor of Engineering Sciences Lyudmila Valentinovna Fomicheva, who has preserved her femininity surprisingly after decades of this hazardous explosive work.

"Our' trade is grubbing stumps and digging quarries, mine shafts, foundations, canals, and wells. But the bulk of explosives technologies reigns in industry, multiplied by the anarchy and chaos in the country! Half of the explosives there do not explode at all when it is necessary, and then when it is not necessary...."

In addition to her femininity, she still has a polemicist temperament. But do explosions in neighboring Arzamas as well as in not-so-near Vladivostok not confirm her differing way? The section has developed effective perforators for oil and gas wells. Today's detonators are considerably more reliable and safer than the miners' detonators, which can go off from the electrostatic charge of a human's palm....But the torments of conversion truly were unforeseen. "Yes, we cost more. The quality is better, but it is expensive." In general our habituation to cheapness has made a mess of everybody and of everything. At the same time we are still paying for bygone enthusiasm. "Perforators were made for Vietnam free and in a short time, 7,000 of them in three weeks from a clean start. And in order to deliver them—the ship cost \$50,000, and again it came from us!" She has a very suspicious attitude toward commercial entities. "Yes, in a small enterprise the science worker receives more than do I, a doctor of sciences. But I want to work for the state, I want to work in one shift and not share this technology with anyone. And I do not doubt that there is much to regret! But I cannot bear it when a small-enterprise director who hires me makes three mistakes in a simple paper. Everything within me protests!"

The feeling is that the atom bomb has lost its chief boss. The supply that Stalin and Beriya made for the people is like an orphan. And now this proprietary feeling is

slipping over to its makers. There are interesting cases of the transfer of physicists and designers who, during the years of the most blatant stagnation, were proud of their freethinking on the policy of the powerful system of statehood. At each step one could be drawn into discussions under the most varied guises.

Well, I also put up with it when young politicized intellectuals persuade me that using the atom bomb is not, of course, permitted for anything but is to be held as a kind of political means—even if it is very much needed. Once you have it, then it is foolish to throw away what you already have entirely.

But when the most thoughtful and wisest academician asserts seriously that "pseudoattention is paid to Russia only because of the nuclear weapon," bitterness engulfs me. If this is all that we have achieved, I am ready to give back this respect and to conquer a different field of endeavor: in feeding the people, in building roads, machines, warm and comfortable housing, in conserving nature!...This honor is insulting... a troglodyte with a powerful cudgel.

Then from a third side comes a sympathetic, inspiring, even young engineer, who says earnestly: "But you know the Anglo-Saxon nations are building global plans for sucking out our resources and destroying our industry with a view to putting an end to it, once and for always? And to make us a raw-materials adjunct of Western civilization?" Yes, that is not what I know—he has passed from first class, it is just that this has been driven into a small head. Then to answer would be no use, and now, with a healthy thought and a certain expansion of vision, a guess that is not so bad comes, that to be a raw-materials adjunct for our own atomic bomb is still more sickening, lad. And it is as if we have a knife to our throat: either that, or that! As if there is no third way. And suddenly, nevertheless, there still is?

Finally, a completely well-read man, not foolish in appearance, looks me directly in the eye through his thick glasses: "And you know that the American Congress can declare us a danger to the world and two Tomahawks will put an end to us forever? With Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70....What are 200,000 people to it in the name of world domination and order?" I also am lost: who looks into his head, this American Congress must suddenly and actually....How does this worm of suspiciousness take up residence in you—at nights you do not trample it down from your consciousness and it bores in and bores in. I understand this poor devil. But at the same time I ask: perhaps, it is both more useful and more practical to deny the danger (like Saddam Hussein), but is it safe for the surrounding world? And do not make menacing motions "under a blanket"? Then many unsolvable problems, such as political and psychoanalytical ones, are not being solved? So the professionals in one field, imperceptibly for themselves and for all of us, transfer to another one. From military engineering to the political, for example. And since this is where our state

managers, up to now, have been recruited from, then one can understand their logic of rescuing their branch.

This requires many, many discussions. But the sensation is that they have been left alone, like those in an abandoned submarine. With their fear of losing their accustomed work, with the label of "hawks" given them by impatient humanists, and with the cork from the bottle in which the nuclear genie is pent up. So let us not forget that plutonium fissions for 24,000 years.

And, removed from a warhead, it should be kept competently and reliably all the time.

Or, with new intellectual and experimental efforts, transform it into fuel for AES's.

One must not skimp on the safety of disarmament, otherwise we shall fly up into the air or vanish into vapor from our own lack of ability. The nuclear genie has been born—this is forever. And one must not lose skill in dealing with it.

Ukrainian Committee for Disarmament Starts Functioning

AU2907114092 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1000 GMT 29 Jul 92

[Text] Ukraine's National Committee for Questions of Disarmament is starting its activity. As reported by the Press Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regulations and other normative documents that will regulate all aspects of the activity of this department have already been prepared and approved. Services of experienced specialists in questions of disarmament and politics, as well as of lawyers and diplomats, have been enlisted. Its chairman is Borys Tarasyuk, Ukraine's deputy minister of foreign affairs.

Moscow Hosts Conference on Nuclear Deterrence

Kokoshin Addresses Conference

LD3007180792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1238 GMT 30 Jul 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS—A conference "Nuclear Deterrence after Cold War" opened in the building of the Russian Parliament in Moscow on Thursday [30 July].

Addressing the conference, first deputy Russian defence minister, Andrey Kokoshin, said that the problem of ensuring reliable nuclear deterrence and prevention of another world war is one of the main elements of Russia's military doctrine.

Kokoshin said that nuclear deterrence is playing an important role in the policy of the United States of America and other nuclear powers.

"Therefore it is important to thoroughly discuss the problem to determine a new system of coordinates of nuclear deterrence and also to reveal the multi-measured situation which has emerged in the world and which greatly differs in its complexity from the recent past," Kokoshin pointed out.

He noted that although the Cold War is over, the problem of security still remains. It depends on the balance of forces, he said.

The participants in the conference will discuss a wide range of questions connected with the problem of nuclear deterrence, the role it plays in the constantly changing international, military and political situation, and also problems of cooperation with the United States in the field of "global protection" including anti-missile defence. The results of the discussions will be summed up by the Parliamentary Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations and submitted to Parliament.

Does the threat of nuclear aggression from the United States remain? The Russian parliamentarians do not have a unanimous answer to the question, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the Russian Parliamentary Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, said commenting on the problem.

He paid attention to the fact that some of his colleagues, the participants of a recent discussion on the Kuril Islands, expressed the opinion that "the United States in alliance with Japan remains our main adversary. This is where the alleged threat comes from, from those whom we are hastily calling allies," Ambartsumov said quoting these parliamentarians as saying.

When asked whether Russia and the United States could become strategic partners, the participants noted that life itself compels the two nuclear powers to make this step.

Proceeding from this position, parliamentarians, scientists and experts are to analyse the role of nuclear deterrence in the international military and political situation, and, in particular, the agreements reached between the Russian and American presidents on reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

Participants Discuss START

LD3007205692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1903 GMT 30 Jul 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS—The strategic arms limitation treaty START signed by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush is a result of the epoch when a radical transformation of the Russo-American relations began. This was said by parliamentarians and scientists who spoke on Thursday [30 July] in the Russian parliament house at a conference of experts "Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War".

It was noted that, on the one hand, the treaty follows traditional models that formed in the period when the Soviet Union existed. On the other hand, it has formulated for the first time the idea of consolidating strategic stability and means a serious attempt at coordinating the positions of the sides in this direction.

Russia and the United States have achieved a new level of relations, experts believe. This is shown by planned unprecedented measures to verify the treaty's observance. They achieve a level of openness of the strategic potential of the two biggest nuclear powers unthinkable in the past. A transfer from confrontation to constructive interaction is reason enough for the Russo-American treaty to be ratified at once, participants in the conference said.

They were unanimous in the view that the "infrastructure of confidence" laid down by the treaty creates conditions for more decisive actions of the sides in the area of disarmaments. Speakers in the debate rejected as unfounded the thesis that the United States gets unilateral advantages in the military area under the START treaty.

U.S. Nonproliferation Initiative Could Go 'Considerably Further'

*PM0408104992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Jul 92 p 3*

[Report by Gennadiy Kostenko: "America Would Only Stand To Gain by Going Further"]

[Text] As you know, the U.S. Administration recently published a new initiative in the sphere of mass destruction weapons nonproliferation. It has provoked plenty of reactions in various countries. A study of world press reaction and the conclusions drawn by experts and politicians makes it possible to conduct an in-depth assessment of this step by President G. Bush.

While giving credit to the Washington administration's efforts to try to limit global proliferation of the most lethal kinds of weapons, virtually all experts are nevertheless of the opinion that there is nothing fundamentally new in this initiative. THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote that it only articulates something that the United States is already putting into practice.

The statement regarding the suspension of production of plutonium and weapons-grade uranium, the core of the whole initiative, has aroused particular skepticism. The point is that the United States effectively suspended production of weapons-grade uranium more than 20 years ago and plutonium in 1988. According to the experts, there are enough stockpiles of these materials for a five-fold increase in the U.S. nuclear arsenal! So, Bush's decision is of no significance as far as limiting U.S. nuclear potential is concerned. Moreover, it goes hand in hand with a whole range of provisos such as, for instance, retaining the opportunity to produce fissionable materials for space apparatuses' nuclear power units

for research, etc. At the same time there is total silence on the question of suspending production of tritium—a fissionable material without which no contemporary nuclear weapon [zaryad] can exist. After all, only suspending production of this material (because, unlike weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, it does not have a long storage life—its half-life is only 12.5 years) could really take nuclear states to a nuclear-free world.

The U.S. initiative would look much more far-reaching if it at least mentioned the gradual elimination of the stockpiles of fissionable materials, along with a moratorium on nuclear explosions and a reduction in the relevant testing programs. But it does not. Is that not due to transient considerations arising from the worsening White House election campaign?

The press also views that section of the initiative on containing the threat of the missile, chemical, and bacteriological weapons proliferation as designed for effect and primarily designed for domestic consumption. Something that has already been enshrined in international accords or something that is so to speak on the negotiating table is merely dressed up in new packaging here. However some specialists note with satisfaction the U.S. Administration's willingness to support the efforts to set up an international fund to finance the work of destroying weapons and conducting special inspections.

Summing up the assessments of President Bush's initiative, many people are of the opinion that the United States could go considerably further with mass destruction weapons nonproliferation. America would only stand to gain by taking the lead in implementing bolder proposals.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Strategic Missile Forces Manpower Problems

*PM2207142792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Jul 92 p 2*

[Report by Aleksandr Dolinin on interview with Strategic Missile Forces Directorate Chief Major General V. Putilin followed by report by Anatoliy Stasovskiy on interview with General Staff Main Directorate Chief Lieutenant General Gennadiy Bochayev; places and dates not given: "Draft-92: The Number of People Wanting to Join the Strategic Missiles Forces Has Fallen Somewhat"]

[Text] The spring draft in the CIS republics was due to end by mid-July, but forces and fleets have so far only received 70 percent of the recruits they require. Maybe the situation is better in the strategic forces' units, which, as is known, provide security for all the CIS countries and which should get young men from these states?

"So far only the Volga-Urals and Transbaykal Military Districts and Turkmenia have completed the draft selection schedules for the Strategic Missile Forces," Major General V. Putilin, chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Mobilization Organization Directorate, said. "The work is a long way from completion in the Russian Federation and in Kazakhstan. The North Caucasus Military District has provided only 60 percent of its quota of new recruits. In Tajikistan, where the quota is 6,500, they have not started selecting for the Missiles Forces, although the draft has been completed in the republic.

"The existing law on the general liability to military service in the CIS states is virtually defunct. As is known, they all have their own laws that determine length of service and the procedures involved. Often they conflict with the accords on the status of and procedure for manning the Strategic Forces. Everyone wants to keep his own draft contingent close to home. This is not always acceptable as far as the missile forces are concerned. According to the agreement on the Strategic Forces, the republics have Missile Forces draft quotas, but they are more concerned at local level with keeping their own armies up to strength.

"The shortage of conscripts is also due to the fact that in the sovereign states too, many people are being granted a deferment, notwithstanding the well-known demographic problems.

"In all, the Missile Forces have received only a little over 60 percent of the young soldiers they require, although the battle teams should be fully manned by now, but it appears the commanders are not in a position to do this at the moment—they are having to do something they have not been accustomed to doing in the past: go into the CIS countries searching for recruits. The units are simply overstretched. They are having to temporarily cut the number of duty shifts because of the shortage of people and encroach on the interests of special forces and rear services, who also have harvest, vegetable procurement, and winter preparation responsibilities.

"In the very near future it will be necessary to establish the legal basis for the Strategic Forces' implementation of their tasks. They provide security for all the Commonwealth countries, so concern for them must be universal and all-embracing."

[Stasovskiy report] In some sections of the media there have been signs of alarm that the 1992 draft campaign might be ruined.

Here is what Lieutenant General Gennadiy Bochayev, chief of the Russian Federation General Staff Main Directorate, told our correspondent:

"I can confidently say that the draft has not been ruined; it has taken place normally, according to plan. Of course, you may say there have been draft problems in certain regions, North Caucasus, for example, but the political situation is entirely to blame in this case."

Finally, a few figures to corroborate what the general said. In Russia as a whole the draft plan has been fulfilled by 93 percent. In the districts the figures are as follows: Leningrad—95; Volga-Urals—98; Transbaykal—101; North Caucasus—72 (it is expected to reach 85 percent by 1 August).

Russia Urged Not To Ratify Arms Cut Accord

924P0144A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by Air Force Major General (Retired) Boris Surikov, candidate of technical sciences: "Opinion: Disarm, But Intelligently"]

[Text] Boris Surikov is a retired Air Force major general and a candidate of economic sciences. During the Patriotic War he was a night bombing commander. At the beginning of the 1970's he participated in the Soviet-American SALT-1 negotiations as an adviser to the Soviet delegation. From 1976 through 1982 he worked as an expert for the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. He is the author of a number of works on problems of anti-aircraft and antimissile defense.

During the meeting between B.N. Yeltsin and G. Bush on 17 June of this year in Washington, a framework agreement on deep cuts in Russian and U.S. strategic offensive weapons was signed.

For an objective analysis of the agreement's essence it is well to recall what the USSR and the United States had at their disposal at the time of the signing of the START Treaty on 31 July 1991 when Moscow and Washington exchanged official information.

Included in our strategic ground-based potential were 1,398 intercontinental ballistic missiles, of which 321 are mobile. Today there are eight types of ICBM's in the arsenal of the CIS. We have three types of single-warhead missiles—the RS-10, RS-12, and RS-12M—and five types of ICBM's with individually targetable warheads. The most powerful missiles—such as the RS-20 (SS-18) and RS-22 (SS-24) with launching distances of 11,000 and 10,000 kilometers, respectively—carry 10 warheads each. A total of 6,212 warheads have been deployed for ground-based ICBM's.

The Navy has strategic nuclear arms as well. It has deployed 940 ballistic missiles with 2,804 nuclear warheads on 62 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN's). We have 38 SSBN's of seven classes assigned to bases of the Northern Fleet and 24 SSBN's assigned to bases of the Pacific Ocean Fleet.

We have a large number of submarines of the "Muren" class. There are 18 of them and each is equipped with 12 launching devices for missiles with a striking range of 9,100 kilometers. But our most powerful missile-armed crafts are considered to be the SSBN's of the Tayfun and Delfin type. The six Tayfuns in the formation, each with 20 launchers, carry 1,200 charges. Seven Delfins can

deliver 448 warheads to their targets, just as the Tayfun can, at a distance of 8,300 kilometers.

Our long-range aviation is now armed with 162 heavy subsonic bombers and also a small number of modern supersonic ones such as the TU-160, and 99 heavy bombers are equipped with air-to-surface cruise missiles.

In 1991 the USSR had a total of 2,500 strategic delivery vehicles on which there were 10,271 nuclear warheads.

The United States has deployed 1,000 ground-based ICBM's, including 50 MX missiles, each of which is equipped with 10 warheads. Additionally, they have 450 Minuteman-2 missiles with two warheads each and 500 Minuteman-3 missiles with three warheads each. This is a total of 2,450 warheads. It is significant that the Pentagon has the most powerful and invulnerable component of the first-strike weapon—872 sea-based missiles equipped with 5,760 individually targetable warheads (54.5 percent of the strategic potential).

The basis of the U.S. nuclear power are 18 SSBN's of the Trident class, each of which has 24 nuclear missiles with eight individually targetable warheads. U.S. strategic aircraft include 574 heavy bombers, more than 160 of which are adapted for combat use of air-to-surface nuclear cruise missiles. There are 2,353 nuclear charges on them.

Washington has a total of 2,222 delivery vehicles and 10,371 nuclear charges for them.

Such is the alignment of forces today.

There is no doubt that the desire of the parties for a radical reduction of weapons of mass destruction, and above all strategic offensive weapons, deserves all kinds of support.

It is well to recall here that according to the "McNamara criterion" from the former U.S. secretary of defense under the Kennedy administration, it was thought that the USSR and the United States could not use more than 400 strategic charges of a megaton capacity in a nuclear war since there would not be any point in a further exchange of nuclear missile strikes because of the irreplaceable losses of people and the complete destruction of the material base of each participant in the combat actions.

Fortunately for mankind, the "McNamara criterion" was not tested in practice even during the days of the Caribbean crisis of 1962. But today this criterion has been exceeded no less than 10-fold. Models show that even in a limited nuclear war it would be enough for the warring sides to exchange a few dozen nuclear strikes, which would lead to mass death of the population and complete collapse of the warring states.

We would like to believe that all the agreements and treaties signed in Washington in June of this year will contribute to the flourishing of the long-suffering Russia. But there is no cause to rejoice in the signing of the

framework agreement on strategic offensive weapons. The hasty preparation of this document led to a situation in which the agreement for a radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons was, for political, strategic, and economic reasons, extremely advantageous to the United States, and it greatly encroaches on the interests of Russia and the CIS.

The framework agreement for a radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons between Russia and the United States was preceded by the START Treaty signed in Moscow in July 1991 by M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush.

It was signed on behalf of the USSR, whose collapse was legally documented five months later—on 21 December 1991—in Alma-Ata, where the formation of the CIS was proclaimed. The basic decisions regarding nuclear weapons were laid out in a special agreement on joint measures regarding nuclear weapons which was signed by the heads of the republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. In the aforementioned document the leaders of the three republics besides Russia where strategic ground-based ICBM's are located agreed to have them moved to the territory of the Russian Federation for subsequent destruction.

A new situation was created, and now Russia's strategic potential could not be considered equal to that of the former Soviet Union. Only 81 percent of the strategic offensive weapons of the former USSR are deployed on the territory of Russia, and 104 heavy missiles are located in Kazakhstan, and they are still being controlled from Moscow. Mobile ICBM's are stationed in Belarus. And 176 silo-based ICBM's and 43 heavy bombers are located in Ukraine, where the government has taken practical steps to nationalize them.

The framework agreement on strategic offensive weapons signed in Washington envisions by the year 2003 a radical reduction of the number of warheads—from 21,000 to 6,000-7,000. In the first stage of the reductions (1993) the United States should have 4,250 nuclear warheads left, and Russia—3,800. There should be 1,200 warheads on ground-based missiles, of which 650 are to be on heavy delivery vehicles and 2,160 on submarine delivery vehicles.

In the second stage of the reductions of nuclear offensive weapons the limit set for Washington is 3,500 warheads, and Moscow—3,000. All ground-based, independently targetable ICBM's are to be destroyed. For sea-based strategic missiles a limit of 1,750 warheads has been set. Thus the United States has imposed extremely disadvantageous conditions on Russia.

Washington intends to eliminate its 50 MX missiles which have 10 warheads each, for which Reagan coined the term "peace keepers." We agreed to destroy our 308 ICBM's of the RS-20 type.

The strongest components of the Americans' strategic offensive weapons were and still are sea-based. Our partners in the negotiations are retaining their immense superiority here. Formally the framework agreement on nuclear offensive weapons places the two sides in equal conditions, but in life everything looks different from the way it looks on paper. The Americans are keeping their 18 most powerful submarine delivery vehicles of the Trident type, which are equipped with high-precision strategic first-strike missiles.

As stated above, Russia has only six delivery vehicles of the Tayfun class, which are comparable to the Tridents. The majority of ships of our nuclear submarine fleet are obsolete delivery vehicles which were launched in the 1970's. Moreover, many of our nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines are now either at bases or undergoing capital repair. Little more than 20 percent of the nuclear-powered vessels are used for combat alert duty. As we know, our defense plants are experiencing a deep crisis, and it cannot be ruled out that by the end of the century all of the Russian submarine delivery vehicle fleet will be in dry dock and lose its invulnerability.

American strategic aircraft are capable of delivering 2,353 nuclear charges to their target, which is more than 22 percent of all their nuclear potential. Our 162 heavy bombers can hold 855 nuclear warheads, which amounts to 8.3 percent of the overall number.

The Pentagon is continuing to develop its strategic aircraft. The United States is to be armed with 15-20 B-2 "invisible aircraft" built according to the Stealth technology. And our latest heavy bombers, the TU-160, have been left, as we know, in Ukraine and will probably not be returned to Russia at all. Additionally, we have forsworn further production of aircraft of the TU-160 and TU-95 MS type. In other words, Russian long-range aviation will now be left with some aircraft built as early as 1956....

Further. In the framework agreement for some reason they forgot about long-range air- and sea-based cruise missiles equipped with large nuclear warheads with high striking precision. U.S. superiority in these arms systems is generally known.

Taking into account the deviation from the principle of equal security of the parties and the fact that the Russian-American framework agreement on strategic offensive weapons in its present form is not in our interests, this document should not be approved.

One can understand the desire of the president of Russia to rid the world of the gigantic arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, mainly nuclear, as quickly as possible. But Russia does not have the means for large-scale destruction over a period of 10 years of approximately 70 percent of our strategic offensive weapons.

In this connection a way out might be found by solving the problem according to the intermediate version. For this it is well to return to the proposal of the former

Soviet Union to transfer part of the strategic forces of the CIS and the United States to a lower level of combat readiness which is mutually monitored. Diplomats and the military have forgotten about this today. Its essence consists in a coordinated number of strategic missiles of two or more parties being kept without nuclear warheads, stored separately from the delivery vehicles. In my opinion, up to 80 percent of the strategic offensive weapons of the CIS and the United States should be put on a regime of 24-hour combat readiness.

During the course of the implementation of the Soviet-American Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles Treaty, about 90 percent of our 1,846 missiles were destroyed by exploding them and the rest were eliminated by launching them, which led to considerable losses. In our extreme economic crisis, we must not repeat this mistake.

In addition to strategic missiles, we will destroy many SSBN's. Some Canadian specialists are showing an interest in the potential technical possibility of using disarmed and modernized nuclear submarines for transporting oil on the shelf of the Arctic Ocean. These nuclear submarines could have multinational crews—with the participation of seamen from Russia, the United States, and Canada. In the opinion of the Canadian experts, this would produce a great economic and political effect, and it would also serve as an incentive for arms reduction by proving its economic effectiveness. There is another idea pertaining to this problem. This has to do with the possibility of using our disarmed nuclear submarines as powerful energy plants in the Far North of Russia.

A similar approach could be used for heavy bombers and cruise missiles that are not intended for military use. These aircraft with their unused potential should not be primitively destroyed.

The conclusion. The framework agreement on strategic offensive weapons should not be ratified by the Supreme Soviet of Russia in its present form since it does not correspond to the principle of equal security of the parties and is unacceptable to Russia because of economic considerations.

The solution is to have the Supreme Soviet of Russia instruct the government to immediately take the initiative and propose that the United States provide technical consultation at the level of government experts with the goal of coordinating additional protocols pertaining to special measures for increasing the overall security of the parties and obtaining a maximum economic return in savings by the parties through using in the national economy mothballed strategic weapons which are scheduled for destruction.

I ask that the honorarium for this article be transferred to the fund for support of the newspaper PRAVDA.

NASA, CIA Visit Yuzhnoye Missile Plant

*LD2207123692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1225 GMT 22 Jul 92*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Sergey Kravchenko]

[Text] Dnepropetrovsk July 22 TASS—A group of experts from NASA, the CIA, the U.S. National Space Council and the Air Force visited a top secret space and missile centre “Yuzhnoye” in Ukraine.

They acquainted themselves with space craft designed there, watched documentaries on the launches of the missiles, visited design bureaus and productional facilities. They were mostly interested in the SS-18 strategic missile which was nicknamed “Satan” in the U.S. The missiles are to be scrapped according to agreements with the United States.

Director of the enterprise Leonid Kuchma and chief designer Stanislav Konyukhov offered several directions of cooperation to American guests, in particular, the creation of a unified missile system for rendering emergency aid to people in any part of the globe. Equipment to predict earthquakes can be also jointly produced.

Kokoshin, Dubynin on Strategic Forces in Byelarus

*LD2307201492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Jul 92*

[From the “Novosti” newscast]

[Text] [First Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin, in progress] ...the agreement between Russia and Byelarus on coordination of activities in the military sphere forms the basis, and there is a whole package of military documents on the military issues, among which I should certainly single out the agreement on the strategic forces that are temporarily deployed on the territory of the Republic of Byelarus.

[Dubynin, first deputy defense minister and chief of General Staff] This agreement enables the Russian Federation to take under its jurisdiction the strategic forces which are based on the territory of the Republic of Byelarus. We have also agreed that Russia and the General Staff will exercise direct control—naturally, in interaction with the Byelarus Ministry of Defense. The financing and maintenance of all the strategic forces will also be done at the expense of the Russian Federation. This agreement enables us to plan, to draw the timetable for the transportation, withdrawal of the forces and weapons of the nuclear forces into the territory of the Russian Federation with the view of subsequently destroying or perfecting them on the territory of Russia. In other words, we can now plan this for the transitional period and implement the CIS treaty in practice.

[Kokoshin] I believe that in a way this could be taken as an example for solving the problems of the strategic forces with other states of the former USSR on whose territories these strategic forces and weapons are now situated.

‘Military Observer’ on Rocket Forces’ Plight

*PM2407110192 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
23 Jul 92 pp 1, 2*

[Military Observer Colonel Viktor Baranets article: “The Nuclear Cuckoo’s Cry. Missile Shield or a Gravestone?”]

[Text] Do you recall how, until very recently, ICBM’s were being served as a “dessert” at the end of military parades in Red Square? Awe-inspiring and majestic, our nuclear behemoths, lovingly fostered through hard work and tribulations by geniuses in secret conditions, trundled across the sacred pavement.

Ah ha, some reader might say, here we have yet another “hawk” who will preach nostalgically about the good old times when our missiles defiantly threatened the world, but I am not about to do this. Only a manic militarist can fail to realize that the time has come for us and the Americans alike to firmly reduce the size of our nuclear swords. But whereas the process of destroying surplus missiles generally fails to produce any acute headaches in the States, we at times resemble someone who has pulled the pin of a nuclear grenade and is holding it in his hands, not knowing what to do next. In other words: While wanting to reduce the size of the burdensome nuclear shield, we often do this so clumsily that it can easily be transformed from a means of protection into a communal gravestone.

For more than 30 years the Strategic Rocket Forces [SRF] were the object of our special concern. During the fifties the Union was forced to respond to the nuclear challenge of the United States, which was so proud of its nuclear might that it looked down on the Union like an elephant looks down on a tiny insect. And how! More than 200 Soviet cities were in U.S. nuclear sights, but this did not last long. Since the beginning of time, Russia’s muzhiks have disliked having their noses tweaked by conceited foreigners. Shifting their brains in high gear, their military-patriotic complex blew such a missile raspberry in reply that U.S. strategists were unable to rest for decades.

For almost a third of a century, the Americans and we chased one another in the infernal missile marathon.

But mankind will always remember something else as well: We were the first to come to our senses on the edge of the nuclear abyss in which the Earth’s surface could have disintegrated like an overripe watermelon. The planet heaved a sigh of relief when both we and the Americans started cutting back.

No matter what we may think of Gorbachev today, there is no escaping the truth: It was under him that the arms

race was transformed into a disarmament race. But even under him we were the first to trample the holy of holies: We betrayed the principle of equal, fair, and symmetrical reduction of nuclear arsenals. That was a concession closely resembling treason.

As for the Americans, they adopted an unbelievably strict approach toward "missile stripping," each time going for some advantage—maybe only the tiniest, but an advantage nonetheless—for themselves, aiming to somehow dupe us. Under Gorbachev's leadership we got carried away by this striptease to the point where we undertook to recklessly "cut" almost 1,000 nuclear warheads more than the Americans. Flattered by America, the champion of disarmament signed yet another "celebrated" agreement on missile cutbacks and made our country look stupid. The U.S. generals joyfully clapped their hands and toasted Mikhail Sergeevich's health with sweet champagne. Their Soviet counterparts had to swallow bitter pills.

Even our fiercest enemies admitted that this was a monstrous mistake.

Be that as it may, however—the process got under way. The Belovezhskaya earthquake occurred while it was at its height, the Union collapsed, and its debris rained down upon the SRF hitting men, weapons, and equipment—the entire multistory system for ensuring normal operations by the strategic missile complexes, which had already suffered serious damage as a result of the gigantic and utter chaos of perestroika. The war of sovereignties engendered the threat of destroying the SRF's integrity. This was compounded by the onset of shortages of the (already meager) financial resources. The defense industry was in grave turmoil; the old system of exceptionally fine-tuned technological links and maintenance started creaking. The level of manpower acquisition regarding subunits' officers and rank and file personnel started dropping. Social and everyday life problems were acutely aggravated. To put it briefly, the strategic forces were unable to avoid the bitter cup of the consequences of the major political and economic destruction sweeping the country. All this was happening not in some inoffensive soap factory but in the nuclear missile shop which operates around the clock and incessantly monitors, second by second, the "heartbeat" of systems, the weakest of which carries the charge of 10 "Hiroshima's."

Power in our country changed hands almost a year ago, and it is almost six months since the fickle, capricious, and sickly CIS came into being. Four of its members—Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine—are chock-full with nuclear missiles, but it still lacks a single strategic document, a military doctrine, and laws in line with which this entire mighty setup could exist. True enough, there are some agreements, but they are not being fulfilled by all sides. This as well is fraught with the monstrous threat of a nuclear risk. It was certainly no accident that back when the sovereignty of the CIS nuclear countries was conceived, the Americans were quick to figure out how it all might develop. They

immediately promised us more than \$400 million to organize the destruction of missiles being cut back, while some of our nuclear leading lights were offered (in exchange for hard greenbacks) places in joint scientific research projects.

Specifically, there was talk of joint work on individual systems for the SDI in which, so it is said, they had already pumped more than \$20 billion. Somehow it all came to a standstill—it proved more than they could cope with. Enter, just at the right time, the clever Russian guys who initially produced devices capable of penetrating the multilayer U.S. system and now will probably tackle the reverse—seeking methods to combat "the Fatherland's" MIRV's (multiple independently targeted warhead reentry vehicles) and to consolidate the nuclear scientific might of America, whose 51st state beneath the SDI umbrella will be, judging by everything, Mother Russia herself. Some altogether strange things are happening: We are taking care of improving the U.S. antimissile systems, and the Americans are taking care of the earliest possible destruction of our missiles, but not all of them. We promised to destroy our own SS-18's. The Americans already want to acquire them for their SDI. It would be interesting to find out whether the missiles will be handed over together with their combat crews. Generally speaking, things seem to work out according to the famous Russian proverb: "Give up your wife..."

The probability of accidents and disasters seems to have increased nowadays when, for numerous reasons beyond the rocket forces' control, the system for maintaining the complexes in order is in turmoil, even though the probability factor, according to specialists' estimates, is one in 30-300 years. This is only in theory; in practice, the missiles often pose riddles. All well and good if the crew manages to quickly determine which warhead or component should be replaced and does it. It does happen, however, that some instrument or component has to be urgently shipped to Russia from, say, Ukraine. At times people there, as the rocket forces' saying goes, "slam the door": "We do not have to do as you say. We are independent!" Time for entreaties and flatteries, and yet time is running out. It goes far beyond just parts and components. An attempt has already been made to bring an entire defense industry enterprise in Ukraine, producing means for protection against unsanctioned actions for the entire SRF, under that state's jurisdiction. SRF officers have told me that they have repeatedly had to resolve such problems by making offers that cannot be refused—in the shape of half-liter bottles. Can you imagine this: We have been reduced to using bottles of vodka and cognac to pay for the missiles' combat readiness and for our nuclear security. It would be apt to smirk if the issue concerned spares for, say, sewing machines or drinks dispensers, but we are talking about a supersensitive nuclear dragon, responding instantaneously even to a hair brushing against it. We are quickly running out of time to sober up after the sovereignty hangover and to realize: He who is severing the "blood

vessels" which are the SRF's lifeline is also laying nuclear mine charges beneath the CIS.

Yes, Ukraine is an independent state. Yes, nobody has the right to dictate to it how to consolidate its own defense, but is there anyone who cannot realize that ripping out the nuclear umbilical cord of the system for the SRF's unified lifeline which was set up over decades just like that, by a single stroke, means lighting a fuse not only beneath the Ukrainians' beds but also beneath those of the Byelarusians, the Kazakhs, the Russians...

I am writing this on 4 July, and I ask myself: What is the "citizenship" of missiles with SRF units now deployed in Ukraine? Russian or Ukrainian? No answer is forthcoming. There are two captains hanging on to the nuclear ship's helm. One is steering to starboard, the other to port. Icebergs aplenty all around. Will we sail through?

The populist policy, which is recklessly invading the nuclear arms sphere and the SRF's operations system, frequently confuses the professionals. For the second time now, for example, the following statement has resounded sensationally around the world: Our strategic missiles are no longer targeted on the United States! I recall how, as soon as I heard this statement the first time, I telephoned a senior SRF officer and bluntly asked him:

"Was this question discussed with you in advance?"

The general replied:

"I am hearing about all this for the first time!"

Later on, another SRF officer of my acquaintance was to add on the same topic: "We were all agog for several days and nights until we were persuaded that this was 'only a trial balloon, a preliminary political statement.'" I would have understood such an extraordinary joke had I heard it on April Fool's Day, but we are talking about global politics. The world kept on guessing: If the Russian missiles are no longer targeted on the United States, where are they targeted? Nobody got a sensible answer. Washington again repeated the selfsame "sensational news" quite recently, but there is no such news. Some of our eager beaver journalists hastened to inform the world: As a sign of goodwill, we started withdrawing the SS-18's from alert duty even before the treaty was signed, but the reason for withdrawing them is different: scheduled cutbacks. And also because the missiles' lifeline system is malfunctioning.

I was told by many SRF veterans that, in the time of "rigid totalitarianism," all nuclear questions were elaborated very seriously and sensibly: Not a single decision, not even on a trivial matter, was made at political level without the most thorough discussion with SRF specialists. Malfunctions were rare; there were no ill-wishers to gloat over them. Now it looks as if some politicians deem it undignified to listen to military specialists and try to remedy their own mistakes by placing a gigantic physical

and moral overload on the missile forces. There are no guarantees that these weapons will not be fired.

Having loudly proclaimed to the world the latest missile cutbacks, today's politicians are actively earning Brownie points. The only insulting point is that we seem prepared to throw our entire missile shield at the Americans' feet as long as they rescue the situation by money and food handouts. It is insulting that, having firmly attached our screeching cart of reforms to fat America's gleaming carriage, we are abjectly sacrificing not only our missile might but also something that is equally important—our renown Russian dignity. But it seems to have already been transformed into a doormat.

The destruction of the surplus nuclear missile arsenal will demand colossal financial, material, technical, intellectual, and physical costs and a considerable amount of time. The main point at issue here is safety. In view of the defense industry enterprises' switch to financial autonomy and the laughable 6 percent "grant" for the SRF from the military budget, it is virtually impossible to guarantee total safety during the use and cutbacks of missiles. If there is no money, there are no spare parts, no specialists, no instruments, no full-scale maintenance. A missile, even though it has an electronic brain, is not worried about all these market problems. The destruction of economic ties and the collapse of the well organized defense infrastructures providing backup for the SRF have sharply reduced the threshold of our nuclear security. This gigantic burden is now weighing terribly on the strategic forces' shoulders. By some miracle they are just about managing to plug the gaps. In this context, one of the SRF's most experienced specialists on missile use told me bluntly and harshly:

"We are talking in terms of weeks. Months at best."

One can still understand the nuclear problems caused by the defense industry's disintegration. The ones that are impossible to understand are those we are creating for ourselves through thoughtlessness or someone's ill will.

We do have rail mobile combat missile launchers. These smartly camouflaged trains used to quietly move around the areas assigned to them. Maybe the Americans got fed up with tracking them; maybe our own courtiers—at the Americans' request—planted the "idea" with our top leadership, but the "trains" have been halted. And what has happened? We got them supposedly out of harm's way and they are now laid up almost on the banks of three mighty Russian rivers. But what if an aircraft or a helicopter were to crash down on them? How about sabotage? Someone might say: This can happen anywhere. I agree. Nuclear weapons are safe only in one case—when they do not exist. But why multiply the danger tenfold?

Our home-grown pacifists, "greens," and people of other diverse hues have been especially active in their offensive against the SRF in the last few years. At times, however, the struggle for a nuclear-free world waged by some public organizations is so mindless that it actually

brings a nuclear catastrophe nearer instead of moving it further away. It seems to me that very soon we will no longer be amazed on seeing frenzied local peace-lovers, armed with crowbars and cobblestones, attacking a mobile launcher cruising around the region until it all goes bang. What terrifying stupidity—perceiving your own brothers and compatriots as enemies of peace, transforming them into social outcasts. It is so simply done today: Some populist deputy gathers a crowd, delivers an ardent speech about universal peace, ecology, and Russia's excessive militarization, and then leads an angry mob to a missile division's commander and declares: "Get out! Give the land used by the missile forces back to the peasants!" It would be nice, however, to approach this distant point in history without animal-like roars and without broken skulls. Even though some people might already wish to see kolkhoz cows sleeping on top of missile silos and large flocks of sheep grazing around the command centers.

I recall how some 10 years ago it was very fashionable to describe the SRF as "lords," "thunderers," and "missile knights." Nowadays I find it embarrassing to write about them when I see these lords—a gray-haired general or a young SRF lieutenant—sitting underground in some God-forsaken distant corner, hungrily spooning meat stew out of an imported can, when officers tell me that they have to moonlight at the local timber plant at night so that "the kids might enjoy a few apples at least once a month," when a colonel, exhausted by a long journey to nearby foreign parts, degradingly begs an independent Ostap Ivanovich to "send a couple of maintenance experts." They are certainly no lords—spending 15-17 days a month on alert duty, deprived of many basics of civilized life virtually throughout their service, being exposed to radioactive radiation for decades and receiving a paltry supplement of 38 rubles for this, suffering from radiculitis as much as labor camp inmates working in the mines, failing to even reach pensionable age in their hundreds. They are the fatherland's nuclear slaves, its most devoted patriotic elite deserving a monument cast in gold, but they do not want this. All they want is "to reliably protect the country, to somehow feed their families, to settle down somewhere and enjoy retirement before death."

Of course, not all of them are like this. Many, having turned their backs on the service, have fled to cooperative stalls and are selling trinkets, imported beer, and contraceptives. Yet in places the shortage of officers in the force is approaching the threatening 20-percent mark. This is an indirect but serious threat to nuclear safety. Just a few weeks ago, the SRF was short of 3,000 officers. I was told that military commissariat staffers almost get down on their knees before draftees to entice them into the strategic forces. The guys laugh at them: "Do you think we are fools?" How is the problem to be solved? How are we to make up the manpower shortage and prevent our own nuclear shield collapsing on our own heads?

Having avoided the world nuclear abyss, we may at any moment fall into our own "nuclear pit." For several years now, many of our nuclear experts have been loudly sounding the alarm. Here is the warning issued by three of them—Ye. Avrorin, B. Litvinov, and B. Novikov:

"It is impossible to imagine that partial disarmament will solve the safety problem. On the contrary, when the procedure and schedule for disarmament are wrongly determined, the ensuing situation may necessitate the dismantling of nuclear warheads, mass transportation, the defusing of nuclear ammunition, and other processes on a much larger scale than envisaged in the technical normative documentation. In such circumstances it would be easy to succumb to temptation and speed up the work. This would almost certainly create preconditions for the emergence of accident situations."

Other specialists in this sphere are even more categorical: We have not yet reached the requisite standards for ensuring nuclear safety and destroying missiles. Unless they master modern technologies, the CIS' nuclear countries could bring themselves to the brink of self-destruction.

But assurances can already be heard that the "treaty" missiles can be destroyed not in seven but in four years. Adventurism pure and simple! We lack the necessary special storage facilities and equipment. We are not talking about putting potatoes in the cellar for winter storage, but we are reassured: "America will help us!" Yes, by promoting our nuclear dystrophy, and thus making itself stronger.

A nuclear missile is not a car which can either be parked somewhere for a long time if it is out of order or be taken to the scrap yard if it has outlived its usefulness. It demands the most thorough "medical observation" until the very last second of its existence. For a multitude of reasons, we often lack the manpower and facilities to provide it. We are already "detaching" the warheads—no longer in theory but in practice—but the crews continue to perform what seems to be proper alert duties. Work it out for yourselves: If this carries on, we will not need any "sensational" disarmament treaties with the Americans. We will drive ourselves to destroying our own missiles.

We will have to pay a high price unless we realize right now that we need an accurately designed reform of the SRF to be implemented at the level of a state program. Let us bear the following in mind: Despite the dizzying disarmament euphoria and love affair with those who believe that their handouts entitle them to dictate to us the pace and scale of "missile stripping," let us not make any decisions for which our descendants will curse us. For some reason, I firmly recall M. Thatcher's words that an opportunity to preserve peace remains for as long as nuclear arms exist on a reasonable scale.

During one of my last business trips to the SRF, one serviceman admitted: "I get the feeling that we lost the enemy following the fraternization with the States." But

the Americans are smart guys! They have not lost us. And even though they have kind of promised to effect solid cutbacks, they are still vigilantly keeping us in their nuclear sights and are cobbling together new missile systems. Once again, the idea comes to mind: Let us not make fools of ourselves. There can be no doubt that it is necessary to cut back, but let us do it sensibly and without trying to abjectly please the rich uncle. For as long as he retains in his arsenal just one missile capable of reaching Russia, he will still remain our adversary. Whether real or theoretical—only time will tell.

I departed from the missile unit at noon on a sunny day in July. A blindingly white model of a huge and beautiful missile stood outside the headquarters among the tall pine trees. A cuckoo was calling somewhere deep inside the green forest. Superstitiously, I started counting: "One, two, three." The bird stopped. Was its prediction right or wrong?

Plans To Convert Missiles to Civilian Uses

SS-25's as Space Launch Vehicles

LD2507202692 *Moscow Radio Rossii Network*
in Russian 0600 GMT 24 Jul 92

[Excerpts] Engineers of the Heat-Engineering Institute have found a useful application for military intercontinental missiles. Deputy chief constructor Lev Solomonev talks about it.

[Begin recording] [Solomonev] We undertook a trial which ended, we think, successfully, to implement an effective, in our view, conversion project connected with the utilization of SS-25 missiles that were in army operation as launch vehicles for civilian payloads into space. In a word, it is a modern, intercontinental ballistic missile which is mobile based. As a civilian launch vehicle it uses an effective rocket booster that is supplemented by a specially constructed further, fourth rocket booster that allows approximately up to half a tonne of satellite to be taken into space.

[Correspondent Below] What kind of satellites can be taken into orbit with the help of this rocket?

[Solomonev] It seems to us today that there are no limitations on the types of payloads that can be taken into space since this rocket is in no way different from traditional launch vehicles for the available weight for equipment, instruments—for a satellite. If I were to talk about the types of satellite which it could take into space then they are communications satellites; technical satellites for manufacturing various materials and medical preparations in space; and satellites with various scientific equipment, equipment for monitoring the earth's surface, and for a whole number of other kinds of research. There are many others. [passage omitted]

It is true that we successfully destroyed 72 missiles, one after the other, in front of American inspectors, to applause. But that is it; apart from applause this was of

no use to anyone. It damaged the environment and mankind gained nothing from it. We lost a huge amount of money invested in this equipment and that is it. So if it were possible to carry out our project, and not just ours, but also convert other similar rockets with the aim of studying space, then the money earlier invested in them can be returned to the people, not only to our own. The British have missiles, so do the Americans, the French, and the Chinese. They could serve mankind a second time, return to man what he at one time—10, 15 years ago—put into these technical products born of confrontation between each other. [end recording]

Plans for SLBM's

PM0408103792 *Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*
31 Jul 92 Morning Edition p 1

[RIA report: "Ballistic Missiles To Help Disaster Victims"]

[Text] Ballistic missiles from the former USSR's nuclear-powered submarines will be used for commercial launches.

According to V. Apanasenko, chief of the Navy Center for Ensuring the Implementation of Disarmament, satellites or other scientific equipment can be placed in the missiles' warhead section after slight technical alterations and put into near-earth orbit without any considerable outlay. These missiles can also be used effectively to deliver rescue equipment to disaster victims and aircraft.

Grachev: Old Concept of Parity 'Abandoned'

PM3007135592 *Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 28 Jul 92 p 3

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Dmitriy Voskoboynikov: "Pavel Grachev: New Level of Trust Needed"]

[Excerpt] London—Russia does not regard any state as an enemy, but the transition to mutual relations based not on a balance of power, but on a balance of security, presupposes the establishment of a new level of trust when tackling questions of international relations. Russian Federation Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who is on a visit here, said this in a lecture delivered at the Royal Armed Forces Institute. He pointed out that political and other efforts to prevent violence "can be effective only if they are based on sufficient military might." "Therefore," the minister said, "in its military policy Russia is seeking to maintain military might at a level that will deter any potential enemy from using military force and will ensure strategic stability."

Talking about the Russian-American accord on the reduction of the sides' strategic offensive armaments by nearly two-thirds, P. Grachev noted that Russia has "abandoned the old concept of parity with the United States, which amounted to quantitative equality" in

these armaments, and has achieved with the United States "common views on the fundamental problems of security and of ensuring stability in the world."

The minister voiced the conviction that the "negative phenomena that accompany the transitional period are of a temporary nature" and that in the years to come the world will see the "revival of a great Russia which will occupy a fitting place among the most highly developed states of the world." [passage omitted]

Impact of Arms Cut Agreements Weighed

924P0157A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 31 Jul 92 p 4

[Article by Sergey Rogov: "Strategic Demands: Facts and Conjectures: On this Day a Year Ago the USSR and United States Signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)"]

[Text] In our consciousness (and in our politics) two mutually exclusive things are closely interwoven: Belief in general and complete nuclear disarmament (if not tomorrow, then by the year 2,000, or in any case, soon) and the conviction that the legacy of the nuclear superpower should guarantee our survival. In the words of the minister of defense, "strategic offensive weapons are still the main means of ensuring Russia's national security and are a guarantee of deterrence against the unleashing of nuclear and conventional wars."

The duality of our position is manifested most clearly in our attitude toward the ABM Treaty. We demand that it be preserved and at the same time we are in favor of creating a "Global Defense System," which reminds one very much of Reagan's SDI idea—the deployment of large-scale space ABM's in order to make nuclear missiles "useless and obsolete." And we began to support the ABM's with the same enthusiasm with which we recently were discussing the SDI, without any justification for our rejection of our previous axiom which asserted that ABM's have a negative effect on strategic stability and undermine mutual nuclear deterrence.

In order to figure out the essence of the problem one must recall that at the beginning of the eighties the Reagan administration began an unprecedented round of the arms race, starting up a number of new strategic programs for high-precision weapons capable of destroying protected targets. This is what our strategic weapons were to have been like, above all the launch silos for ICBM's (especially 308 "heavy" SS-18 missiles), and the points of combat control and political leadership. In essence, the United States has created a potential for a preemptive, disabling, and debilitating strike.

Reagan's program envisioned, in particular, mass development of 200 MX ICBM's (with 10 MIRV's) and 500 Minuteman single-warhead ICBM's, 40 Trident submarines, which are to be equipped with 24 D-5 SLBM's [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] (with 8 MIRV's), 132 B-2 bombers with Stealth technology and the ability

to carry up to 24 nuclear charges, more than 1,000 ALCM's [air-launched cruise missiles], several hundred SRAM-2's [short-range attack missiles], and about 800 sea-based cruise missiles with nuclear warheads.

Now let us try to sum up the consequences of the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] talks and the Washington Agreement. Practically all of these programs were sharply curtailed and some of them were scrapped altogether. The United States developed only 50 MX ICBM's, and they will have to get rid of them in keeping with the "framework" agreement. The Minuteman ICBM program has been canceled. The number of Trident PLARB [SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine] was reduced first to 24 and now to 18. The number of warheads on the D-5 SLBM will be reduced to four, and they have already halted production on the powerful and high-precision W-88 nuclear warhead intended for this missile, which turned this missile into a counterforce weapon. The construction of B-2 bombers was limited to 20, and they will be equipped with nonnuclear weapons. The production of the ALCM's has been halted. The SRAM-2 program was scrapped. SLCM's [sea-launched cruise missile] have been removed from the ships and stored on land.

To this list one must add that in keeping with ISRM [intermediate and shorter-range missiles] Treaty, the Americans have already eliminated all of their land-based cruise missiles and Pershing-2 missiles, which could reach our territory from Central Europe. Moreover, the United States has not been producing fissionable materials for nuclear weapons for four years now, and recently President Bush announced that plans for resuming their production had been dropped.

Thus if the agreements are kept, the American strategic triad will consist of 500 single-warhead Minuteman-3 ICBM's, which were first adopted as weapons during the sixties, 432 new D-5 SLBM's with approximately 1,750 warheads, 97 B-1 bombers built in the eighties, and 30-60 B-52 bombers produced at the end of the fifties. The United States is left with a total of 3,000-3,500 strategic warheads, of which approximately 900 can be used for preemptive strikes for highly protective targets.

The strategic threat to us will be sharply reduced. Of course, at the same time because of the rejection of ICBM's with MIRV's, our possibilities of dealing a preemptive counterforce strike will be reduced to nothing. But we will still be able to launch a retaliatory strike, which is mainly because we will have mobile single-warhead ICBM's, which the United States does not and will not have.

Yes, we will have to remove our "heavy" SS-18 missiles with 10 MIRV's, but it should be noted that, since they presented a threat to the United States, they were a primary target for a preemptive strike. In order not to lose these missiles in launch silos, we would have to launch them either immediately after the Americans start or before that. That is, these missiles, like the

American MX ICBM's, have not contributed to the strengthening of strategic stability.

We will also have to destroy our new mobile rail ICBM's with MIRV's, which were named SS-24's in the West. But if we recall what is happening with our railroads, we see that these missile trains are more of a threat to us ourselves than to the Americans.

We still have our single-warhead mobile ground SS-25 missiles. Moreover, we may, as was planned, develop them further in order to replace the old single-warhead missiles in silos. While now we have approximately 300 of them, within the framework of the Washington Agreement we will be able to increase their number to at least 500.

Attacking mobile missiles requires firing at areas, and the "framework" agreement does not leave the Americans a sufficient number of warheads for such an option. Moreover, as was noted above, the United States has actually curtailed the program for the construction of B-2 bombers, which was created in order to catch up with our mobile ground complexes.

In the aviation component of the strategic triad the United States will surpass us as usual, which is related not only to technical but also to geostrategic factors. But this advantage will be reduced to a minimum. For in Washington the United States agreed for the first time to a real counting of nuclear arms of heavy bombers instead of the conventional count of the SALT Treaty, according to which a bomber equipped with gravity bombs and short-range ballistic missiles was equal to one warhead. The old rule enabled the Americans to have another 3,500-4,500 "uncounted" warheads over and above the 6,000 counted under the SALT Treaty. For this the Pentagon wanted to build 132 B-2 aircraft.

So the decision to halt the production of our Tu-95M and Tu-160 bombers was not a unilateral concession. It was preceded by the discontinuation of the American B-2 program—this was more than sufficient compensation for our decision.

And now the U.S. quantitative superiority in the aviation component is little more than 500 warheads. Moreover, in principle we can compensate for it with the ground or sea component of our strategic triad, since the parties agreed to an overall equality of all strategic arms.

True, this compensation would require additional expenditures. The construction of new submarines would be extremely costly and not very effective, taking into account the American advantage in means for antisubmarine combat. It would apparently be simpler to develop a certain quantity of single-warhead ICBM's.

But on the whole the "framework" agreement, for the first time in the history of arms control, envisions a real quantitative equality of strategic forces of the two countries. Previous SALT agreements either did not take the air component into account (the 1972 Agreement) or

accounted for it according to rules that were disadvantageous to us (the 1979 and 1991 agreements). To this one should add the fact that the United States either removed the weapons or mothballed all operational-tactical land- and sea-based nuclear missile equipment which could reach our territory.

We, like the Americans, must begin a restructuring of our strategic forces. But the result will be a higher degree of survivability of START, which will make it possible to refrain from relying on a retaliatory counterattack and reliably provide for nuclear deterrence with the help of a guaranteed retaliatory attack under any circumstances.

The earmarked reductions will make it possible to obtain a considerable advantage in means as a result of refraining from a number of new programs and modernizing some of our "heavy" missiles, which were developed during the seventies. There will also be a significant reduction of operating costs. Finally, the structural reorganization and the reduction of the size of the armies and divisions of strategic missile forces will produce a savings.

Another problem involves questions of the social adaptation of discharged officers and warrant officers and also the conversion of the defense industry. And the reduction of strategic forces is only part of the problem. The cuts in conventional weapons are considerably greater, especially the infantry. Moreover, the number of combat aircraft of the Navy and Air Defense will be cut in half. Russia is well aware of the time periods for fulfilling these international commitments—40 months from the time of ratification.

But no plans for reorganization of the Armed Forces have been announced yet. Nor is there a long-term program for buying weapons. As a result, the defense industry last year and the beginning of this year produced a large quantity of arms and military equipment "just because," without having a buyer. At the same time, programs for defense scientific research and development work are being cut in a clearly ill-considered way.

There is also concern about possible attempts to divide up the Soviet military arsenal. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus are in no hurry to part with the nuclear weapons located on their territories. Transformed into truly independent states, they are quickly getting rid of the antinuclear syndrome caused by the ecological consequences of Chernobyl and Semipalatinsk. And if Russia and the United States do not decide to refrain from nuclear weapons, why should anyone else agree to that?

Ukraine is proving to be especially active with regard to this issue. In April it unilaterally announced the establishment of its own administrative control (jurisdiction) over strategic forces on its territory. Some of the long-distance aircraft in Uzen have already been nationalized.

One can assume that in the next few months there will be attempts to get strategic missile forces stationed in Ukraine to take the oath.

Ukraine's renunciation of its commitment to destroy all nuclear weapons by the end of 1994 was also a violation of the Alma-Ata agreements. Now they are talking about a seven-year deadline, and it is conditioned by a number of demands which make one doubt that Ukraine really wants to become a nonnuclear state. The Lisbon Protocol signed in May does not guarantee a solution to this problem. In any case, Ukraine, like other former Soviet republics, is in no hurry to sign the Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty. And how can they sign the treaty if they do not recognize the nuclear warheads on their territory to be the property of Russia?

A ban on ICBM's with MIRV's may solve this problem, since all missiles on the territory of Ukraine and Kazakhstan are in this category. These states will hardly be able to keep ICBM's with MIRV's if the United States and Russia refrain from them. In any case, this factor played no less of a role than traditional strategic considerations did in the achievement of the Washington agreement.

One can only regret that certain of our decisions were made impulsively and that not everything in Russian politics has been thought through, well considered, and explained to the public. It is also unclear why, instead of reinforcing the conditions for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology, we willy-nilly took a course toward undermining the ABM Treaty.

Obviously, one can reproach the Security Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense for the fact that they prefer to act separately, as they did before. The adoption of key decisions in the sphere of national security requires not only competent assessments but also broad and open public discussion. Without this, sooner or later foreign policy will lose its intrapolitical base.

Conditions for Cuts in Strategic Arms Listed

*PM3107140592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Jul 92 p 3*

[Article by Lieutenant General Prof. Yevgeniy Volkov, doctor of technical sciences, under "Military Expert's Opinion" rubric: "So Is 3,000 Enough?"]

[Text] At their recent Washington summit the Russian Federation and U.S. presidents agreed to start preparations to reduce both sides' strategic offensive weapons by more than two-thirds. This agreement produced a lot of, often contradictory, reactions. In certain cases it has been claimed that the proposed cuts could be even deeper without detriment to the country's defense capability, at other times it is claimed that the planned level of cuts is impermissible and would virtually be a betrayal of Russia's interests. Both views are purely subjective. Their adherents do not even attempt to answer the

question of just what level of strategic offensive weapons is actually needed. Without an answer to that question it is, of course, impossible to make a balanced assessment of the proposed cuts.

The most general assessment of the combat potential of strategic offensive weapons is made on the basis of the number of nuclear warheads carried on various platforms (ground-based and sea-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers). In 1991 the number of U.S. strategic offensive weapon warheads was approximately 10,500, the USSR had 10,200, France and Britain around 1,000, and the PRC several hundred.

The USSR and the United States had been holding talks on strategic offensive arms limitation and reduction for more than 20 years. The most notable results were achieved in recent years. In 1991 a treaty was signed in Moscow cutting them to the level of 6,000 warheads on each side. In Washington the Russian Federation and U.S. presidents agreed to reduce this to 3,000-3,500 warheads. How are these agreements to be assessed?

To establish what quantity of arms is required it is necessary to define the missions for which they are intended and the conditions under which they will be used. Strategic offensive weapons cannot be seen as a means of waging war. A war involving the massive use of nuclear weapons is impossible inasmuch as it would lead to the destruction of all life on earth. Their only role is to deter any possible aggressor (or aggressors) from attempting to start a war—including a nuclear war. The deterrent is provided by the ability of strategic offensive weapons to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor in the process of retaliation even under the most unfavorable conditions.

Strategic offensive weapons should most probably be seen first and foremost as designed for use in a retaliatory strike—that is, after action [vozdeystviye] has been taken by an enemy. In general this action could be carried out by nonnuclear forces (if the conflict begins with conventional warfare), nuclear weapons (if conventional warfare escalates into nuclear warfare), or ABM systems. On this basis an extremely important conclusion can be reached—the number of strategic offensive weapon warheads should not be less than the number of warheads needed to carry out a retaliatory strike mission (deterrence mission) and the possible number of warheads lost during all three of the above types of enemy action.

Determining what is a sufficient number of warheads to perform deterrence missions is exceptionally difficult. Most specialists set the figure at several hundred (around 500) modern strategic missile warheads. This means that cutting the number of warheads to 6,000 or 3,000 will not in itself deprive strategic offensive weapons of their ability to perform their deterrence mission. But in order to know whether they will really have the ability to do this we need to know the number of warheads that will be lost before than can be used. This is precisely the

point that is most often overlooked by those who try to evaluate levels of cuts. And yet it is the central question.

Losses of strategic offensive weapons in a conventional war would be determined mainly by the use of precision airborne weaponry. As the Gulf War showed, such weapons are being rapidly developed [razvivat] in the United States and other NATO countries. And they already pose an entirely realistic threat to strategic offensive weapons. That threat will become all the more dangerous if strategic arms are cut while conventional offensive (above all, airborne) weapons are not cut to the same extent—the situation would be complicated still further in the event of any weakening of air defense systems.

Losses of strategic offensive weapons in a nuclear war could be very large (in the opinion of foreign specialists, up to 75 percent or more). Any cuts by one side will not lead to a corresponding reduction in losses, since the other side's strategic offensive weapons will be cut at the same time (the number of targets to be attacked will fall) and, moreover, cuts to nuclear systems will mainly affect the least sophisticated types of system. Incidentally, when discussing possible losses as a result of nuclear action it is necessary to bear in mind that, whereas previously the French and British strategic nuclear forces could be overlooked—since they comprised less than 10 percent of our forces in terms of warhead numbers—now the situation will change. Under the French and British strategic nuclear weapons modernization plans their warhead numbers will increase to 1,200—that is, 40 percent of our figure (3,000). Under these circumstances it is no longer possible to overlook the NATO countries other than the United States.

And, finally, to turn to possible losses of missile warheads subjected to ABM system action. Despite the 1972 treaty, work on these systems in the United States continues to be intensive. Along with space-based systems they have now reached the full-scale testing and deployment stage. Cutting CIS (or Russian Federation) strategic offensive weapons considerably simplifies the United States' task in creating [sozdaniye] an ABM system: The smaller the number of attacking warheads, the easier it is to destroy them. The United States is currently developing [razrabatyvat] so-called limited ABM systems. These are designed to intercept several hundred warheads. This number of warheads could remain combat capable even after the start of a conventional war and a nuclear strike against strategic nuclear weapons—if they are reduced to 3,000.

It is known that the Russian Federation and U.S. presidents agreed at the Washington summit to study opportunities for creating a global protection system. We should not, however, delude ourselves into thinking that we will be taking part in the work on the ABM system along with the United States. From the very outset the U.S. ABM systems have been created as a means of countering our country's missiles, and this will continue to be their main role. It is painful to read irresponsible

and incompetent arguments claiming that the creation of these systems by the United States does not pose any threat to us and that therefore the 1972 treaty could be revised in order to allow the United States to create its own systems, including space-based systems. The appearance of such systems would have a major impact on the combat effectiveness of our strategic nuclear weapons and would essentially deprive them of any opportunity to carry out their deterrence mission.

Thus, the assessment of the state of affairs regarding the development of means of exerting influence would lead to depressing conclusions: These means continue to be improved, and there are no grounds for expecting a reduction in possible losses of strategic offensive weapons in line with the cuts to those weapons unless certain special measures are taken. The main measures of this type could include the following:

together with strategic offensive weapons cuts there should be simultaneous and equally deep cuts to nonnuclear weapons—primarily those posing a threat to strategic offensive weapons. Agreement should be reached (or an unambiguous statement issued) to the effect that, in the event of action being taken against strategic weapons during the nonnuclear phase of a war, the country whose strategic weapons they are is entitled to use them first;

the development of nuclear warfare systems should be aimed at improving their survivability rather than at improving the potential for destroying the other side's systems;

the development and deployment of ABM systems capable of destroying strategic missiles and their warheads should be totally banned; when setting levels for strategic offensive weapons cuts CIS weapons should be compared to the weapons not only of the United States but of all the NATO countries.

We would note that none of these conditions would need considerable amounts of expenditure in order to be implemented. The main requirement for their implementation would be an agreement between the sides on the basis of a common concern to reduce the threat of war.

Now I can answer the question asked in the headline—is it permissible to cut our country's strategic offensive weapons to the level of 3,000 warheads? Yes it is, but only if the aforementioned conditions are met. Then, even after being cut, strategic offensive weapons would be able to retain the ability to perform the missions for which they were created and are being retained. If the above conditions are not met, this chance will be lost and strategic offensive weapons will essentially remain unnecessary and, consequently, pointless. They could be totally eliminated. But that is a different question—the question of whether it is permissible for our country to lose, wholly and finally, the ability to protect itself and defend its interests.

Nazarkin on Prospects for Speeding Up Cuts

*LD3107161692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1435 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—The radical change in relations between Russia and the United States has made it possible to speed up the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department on Disarmament Yuriy Nazarkin told ITAR-TASS today.

A year ago, on July 31, 1991, in Moscow the former Soviet Union and the United States signed the treaty on limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons, that provides for the reduction of about 30 per cent of strategic nuclear carriers.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union created some additional difficulties in the fulfilment of the treaty, said Nazarkin. The main one is the achievement of agreements with former Soviet republics on whose territories the nuclear weapons are stored.

The complicated task was solved during a meeting of representatives of Russia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the United States, when the treaty on strategic offensive weapons was made a five-side document.

Speaking on the Russian president's U.S. visit, Nazarkin noted the importance of the Washington political agreement between George Bush and Boris Yeltsin to be the basis for a new bilateral treaty between Russia and the United States.

The document provides for a two-stage reduction of armaments. The first stage envisages the reduction of the overall level of military loads to a figure not exceeding for each side 3,800-4,250 units, 1,200 units for intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as other measures.

The second stages to be completed by the year of 2003, envisages the reduction of the overall level of military loads to 3,000-3,5000 units for each side, as well as the complete elimination of nuclear charges on ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

"I hope the political agreement between the two presidents will soon become a bilateral treaty, and the disarmament process will actively go on," Nazarkin said in conclusion.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS**Review of Missile Defense Pact Seen Premature**

*LD2007200892 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1810 GMT 20 Jul 92*

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] Russia and the United States keep discussing problems of cooperating in setting up antimissile defenses. A comment from our news analyst, Vladislav Kozyakov.

First, a reminder that the idea of pooling efforts of the two countries in this area was advanced in Moscow. The two presidents discussed it last January and June. Now, under the accord they have reached, Russia and the United States will be allies, must work out a concept of global defense system to deal with ballistic missiles. A joint statement signed in Washington last month noted that such cooperation will be a tangible expression of the new relations existing between Russia and the United States and will draw them into a major undertaking together with other countries of the world community.

At that time Boris Yeltsin and George Bush decided to set up a high-level group to examine practical steps, for example information exchanges on early warning by creating a center of early warning about rocket launches, or cooperation of states in developing means and technologies for antimissile defense and a possible conclusion of new treaties or making amendments in the already available agreements.

According to reports in the U.S. press, the discussions outlined issues in Moscow, a delegation is to arrive here from the United States featuring high-ranking officials of the State Department, the Pentagon, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the National Security Council. [sentence as heard] This gives one hope that the exchanges of view will bring about advancement, despite the fact that the problems discussed are very complex. But one must also mention the fact that some comments over these talks appearing in the U.S. press make one stop and think, for too great an emphasis is laid in them on the fact that the United States is interested above all in a review of the missile defense treaty banning tests and development of antimissile systems in outer space. For example, THE NEW YORK TIMES said last week that was the main goal of the United States.

But the missile defense treaty has been and still is a quite important factor in maintaining stability in the world. It's possible that in the future, when the world community will be able to set up a global system for antimissile defense, or when it will be already deploying this system, some points in this treaty will have to be changed. But it would be hardly justifiable at present to ruin the missile defense treaty. In fact, in the United States too, close importance is given to observing this treaty. For example, during the debates on the work under the SDI program, Congress several times gave its consent for earmarking funds for some particular experiments, provided these would not upset the treaty. That is a display of concern about maintaining stability at a time when Russia and the United States are reducing their nuclear armaments.

As a matter of fact, the accord reached at the Washington summit leaves no doubt that there is understanding on

this score. The joint Russo-American statement on the global defense system speaks of a need to start developing the legal basis for cooperation. It can incorporate new treaties, agreements on other possible amendments to existing treaties and amendments. [sentence as heard] And all these are essential for nothing else but realizing the global antimissile system. So it's too early to speak of a review of the antimissile defense treaty now as the main task. This is something like putting the cart ahead of the horse.

U.S. Space-Based Intelligence Hardware Viewed

PM2807090992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Jul 92 p 3

[Colonel Yu. Makarov "Military-Technical Review":
"U.S. Intelligence Services' 'Ear' in Space"]

[Text] U.S. space intelligence systems get their fair share of attention in foreign publications. Books, reviews, and other materials are devoted to these 20th century creations. Moreover, space-based imaging intelligence and radio and electronic intelligence attract the greatest interest.

If the U.S. imaging intelligence satellites equipped with electro-optical and radar apparatus for observing installations on the earth's surface are figuratively called the U.S. intelligence services' all-seeing "eye" in space, then the electronic intelligence and surveillance satellites (radio and electronic intelligence satellites) should by rights be called these services' all-hearing "ear" in space.

The listening capabilities of this "ear" enable it to track a number of sources of radio emissions. Various information communications systems that use radio-relay, space, and troposphere radio communications networks, radar facilities for guidance systems, radio navigation facilities for moving objects, flight backup complexes for aerial and space devices, and radiotelemetric and other radio systems which are an integral component of many modern technical devices and military and industrial installations are all vigilantly monitored by radio and electronic intelligence satellites. They locate radio signals, "cleanse" them of interference, get a bearing on sources of electromagnetic radiation, determine parameters, compose the necessary intelligence databases, and transmit them to ground computer centers for further processing.

The powerful computers in these centers turn the intelligence raw material recovered via space into an intelligence product—the tactical and technical characteristics of radio facilities, the modes of functioning and structural peculiarities of the systems and complexes to which they belong, their organizational affiliation, and also, of course, the contents of the various commands and reports that are being transmitted via radio control and communications channels.

In the 30 years since they first appeared, radio and electronic intelligence satellites have mastered all near-earth orbits—from low to geostationary. They form more than 80 percent of U.S. modern intelligence fleet in space.

Up to now the United States has operated four types of radio and electronic intelligence systems in space. Modernized first-generation Ferret electronic intelligence satellites, whose intelligence technology was developed back in the 1960's, continue to operate in low circular orbits 700 km up. They only monitor the work of fairly strong radio emission sources, mainly various systems with a military purpose.

SSU [expansion unknown] electronic intelligence satellites, which began to be used in the early 1970's and have undergone several modifications since, are continuing to track the work of the radio facilities of naval installations from 1,000 km up. The special ballistic characteristics of these satellites make it possible to determine the coordinates of the sources of radio signals with considerable precision.

Both these types of low-orbit satellites are fairly simple in terms of their apparatus, and they are lightweight, compact, and relatively inexpensive. Their antenna systems have wide directional patterns so they can scan a 2,000-3,000-km zone on the earth's surface.

The end of the 1970's marked the appearance in the United States of a new generation of radio and electronic intelligence satellites. During these years the United States deployed Rhyolite electronic surveillance satellites in geostationary 36,000-km orbits and Jumpseat radio and electronic intelligence satellites in extended elliptical orbits (about 40,000 km up in the northern hemisphere). The former type was designed primarily to intercept signals from radio relay, troposphere, satellite, and certain ultra shortwave radio stations located south of the 60th parallel; the latter targeted its antennae on northern regions while it "hung" over them for six to eight hours.

Taking the operational experience of all the previous systems into consideration, the new generation of Magnum radio and electronic intelligence satellites was developed and deployed in the mid-1980's. It is designed to gather multifunctional electronic intelligence from quasistationary (synchronous elliptical) orbits with an apogee of about 41,000 km and a perigee of about 35,000 km. This orbit makes it possible to "peep into" more northerly regions and get a fix on radio facilities that are on the air for a long time by using different viewing angles, thereby eventually enabling their coordinates to be determined with greater precision. To ensure interception of low-power and short-duration radio signals, the satellite has been equipped with a receiving device whose sensitivity is close to the theoretical limit and has high-speed frequency retuning and an extended dynamic range. A dual-antenna system consisting of parabolic

antennae with a diameter of about 23 meters enables intelligence to be gathered from two regions simultaneously.

The Magnum satellites are deployed in quasistationary orbits in such a way as to make possible a simultaneous survey of practically the entire surface of the earth. In the opinion of U.S. specialists, they have pioneered a new era in radio and electronic intelligence in space. The technical solutions that form the basis of the Magnum satellites reflect the principal directions of future development. These include: guaranteed interception of transitory emissions and signals with complex types of modulation; greater precision in determining the coordinates of low-strength emission sources; an increase in the number of radio facilities from which intelligence can be gathered simultaneously; and greater reliability of radio and electronic intelligence when communications intelligence denial and deception facilities etc. are in use.

The increasing speed with which space is being conquered by radio and electronic intelligence demonstrates that where radioelectronic systems are used en masse in various spheres of human activity, satellites of a particular class tend to be further improved and are a highly effective means of obtaining varied intelligence information.

Columnist Ponders GPS, GPALS Systems

*PM2407132192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Jul 92 p 3*

[Aleksandr Golts article: "GPS [Global Protection System] Is Not SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative], and Not Even GPALS [Global Protection Against Limited Strikes]. At Least This Is What Moscow Assumes"]

[Text] This Russian habit of going to extremes seems to be ineradicable. No sooner had the talks between Russian and U.S. delegations on the Global Protection System [GPS] Against Ballistic Missiles ended in Moscow, the newspapers carried a report: Work has begun on a Russian-U.S. SDI. Our own scientific circles, which were fiercely opposed to SDI until a couple of years ago, have now become its equally fierce supporters and advocates. Moreover, many among them perceive GPS as just a means of getting Russia involved in the U.S. SDI.

But the idea of GPS, put forward in the joint statement by the two countries' presidents, differs most fundamentally from the SDI concept. Let me remind readers that the latter assumed the deployment of some sort of "space shield" over America's entire territory, thus protecting the whole country against a missile strike. This was a most fundamental breach of strategic stability, which was meant to be ensured by the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty. In this form, SDI was and still remains totally unacceptable to Moscow.

As far as it can be understood, GPS is perceived by our representatives primarily as supranational and multilateral. In this form, GPS would not give rise to any fears because its potential and capabilities would be known in advance. The system itself would be controlled by all parties to any future accords. Such a system would not ensure the protection of just one side's territory and would therefore not be in breach of the ABM Treaty. At present, and this ought to be especially emphasized, the Russian side perceives this treaty as the fundamental and immutable basis of strategic stability.

It is no secret, however, that Washington would like to incorporate the remnants of SDI in the GPS concept, and specifically the implementation of the U.S. global protection against limited strikes [GPALS] system. The Pentagon plans, within this system's framework, to deploy by 1997 some 100 interceptor missiles (which does not contravene the ABM Treaty at this stage, since the interceptors would be deployed at just one site). Incidentally, this highly expensive project, whose implementation is estimated at \$16-18 billion, is already the subject of sharp criticism in Congress. After all, the United States (in contrast to Russia) is virtually beyond the reach of any tactical and operational-tactical missiles which are, or could be, held by so-called "unstable regimes."

In these circumstances, the administration would obviously not be averse to using GPS as a kind of tugboat which would pull through finances for GPALS. It is said that even Moscow realizes the need for such a system, but Russia is in no hurry to incorporate GPALS in the global protection concept. Primarily because the potential of GPALS is as yet unclear. Furthermore, the U.S. plans envisage the deployment of interceptor missiles in several other regions, which would inevitably lead to the scrapping [slom] of the ABM Treaty.

Judging by everything, Russia's position at the recent talks boiled down to boosting the role of supranational elements in the future GPS concept. As far as it can be understood, zones of agreement have been defined along several avenues, like early warning issues for example. Furthermore, according to informed sources, the U.S. side has confirmed that it perceives the strengthening of Russia's security as strengthening the security of the United States itself. If these words are backed by deeds, a reasonable future lies in store for GPS.

In general, I would like to note that Moscow and Washington are still working only on the conceptual bases of GPS. They are at the very start of rather a long path. Therefore, let us hold back both criticism and enthusiasm.

Anti-Missile System Cooperation Viewed

*LD2507153192 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 0730 GMT 25 Jul 92*

[Excerpts] As it is the end of the week, we can, as usual, dwell in greater detail on the most important events that

have taken place recently. Among these events was the arrival in Moscow of a high-ranking delegation from the United States, which discussed the project for creating a joint U.S.-Russian system for defense against ballistic missiles. Only a narrow circle of specialists knows and understands this issue. We have decided to broaden this circle, and we offer for your attention a conversation between Mayak commentator Lidiya Podolnya and Aleksey Arbatov, director of the Strategic Research Center. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Arbatov] The latest stage began at the start of 1991 when President Bush, taking account of the changing relations between the Soviet Union and United States and the significant reduction in allocations for the U.S. Star Wars program, put forward what looked at first glance like a totally new idea. The program would now be aimed not at defending the United States from a massive strike by Soviet missiles but at defending against a limited missile strike, which could result from an unsanctioned missile launch or from some third nuclear power or even from a terrorist group.

A year later, at the start of 1992, President Yeltsin virtually agreed to that and now we have got down to talks on this theme.

[Podolnya] If I understand you correctly, it is a question of deploying a joint anti-missile defense. In your opinion, to what extent is this system in accord with Russia's national interests? And why is the United States so interested in creating this system?

[Arbatov] The paradox is that both sides have now begun talks about cooperation on the creation of a system to carry out tasks that in reality are not the main motives. The United States has already spent over \$2 billion dollars on this program. There is strong pressure in the military industrial complex, and the administration also considers that something must be done with it. Even if it is not a massive, multi-echelon system as was considered before and as Reagan called for, and even if it is not directed against the Soviet Union, it is awkward for the Republican administration to say that a mistake has been made.

Additionally, it is expected that it will produce some gains in the sphere of military technology. Many new space technologies and terrestrial technologies are being developed in connection with this. In brief, in order to defend against those threats the United States now officially considers to be serious ones, they do not need the sort of system they are proposing, because the United States is still beyond the reach of third nuclear powers. Even to defend against such a threat it does not need to have a space system. It could have a somewhat expanded ground-based system. It would be quite adequate to fulfill the task of intercepting individual launches, even if one believes that this is a serious threat.

Now, let us talk about Russia. I think that Russia aligned itself with this idea, not because a serious assessment had been carried out on the threat to Russia from missiles

from any third countries, but because there was a desire to join in this program in order to engage in technology exchanges, to obtain some important U.S. technologies, and to support those sectors of the military-industrial complex that have now been left without orders.

In this sense, it seems to me that the question of what systems would be suitable against what threats was purely a secondary consideration. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Podolnya] Can one speak about parity, about equal participation by the two sides in creating this system?

[Arbatov] I do not think so because in principle the United States does not need Russian participation in this system. Its interests lie in providing orders for its own military-industrial complex. I do not want to blame them—that is a natural attitude—and you know there is the principle: He who pays the piper calls the tune. In this case, it is the United States that is paying, and this principle is still valid. It exists in business. Therefore, the United States is interested in deploying a system that would be to its own advantage. Consideration for the specific security interests of the other side is not very important in the Americans' thoughts.

Apart from anything else, there is something one must bear in mind. In view of the extreme instability in Russia, the United States cannot be certain how the situation will develop here. To agree to an exchange of technology and joint deployment of systems would mean making its system, which costs billions and into which vast resources have been invested, a hostage to the policy of another country. We, ourselves, are not certain how the situation will develop in Russia. Can one imagine that the United States will wager everything on this card? They are cautious and sensible people and, therefore, they are not going to transfer any such major technologies to us.

For another thing, the United States cannot be sure that the technology they transfer to us will not be used for other aims, for it is not possible to monitor this. The technology is such that some of it can be used for both offensive and defensive purposes. The United States cannot be certain that this technology will not get into the hands of other countries via us.

[Podolnya] Taking account of what you have said, in this situation what are the prospects for the 1972 ABM Treaty?

[Arbatov] The Americans have long proposed renouncing this treaty. Previously, we asserted that this treaty was very important for strategic stability and that it should not be renounced. There are now certain internal contradictions in our position. On the one hand, we say that we are prepared to cooperate with the United States, and on the other we continue to adhere to the idea that the treaty is important for strategic stability and security.

In principle, of course, the ABM Treaty is not holy writ. It is a treaty, and if national interests change then the treaty can be changed too, or replaced by another, different treaty. Before changing anything in the treaty it is necessary to look again at all these questions: What are the real threats to Russia's security? What are the prospects for cooperation with the United States in the sphere of deploying such a system? Do we have the resources for such a system? What other means could there be to deal with the same threat? For example, in order to defend oneself against an unsanctioned launching of a missile one could have, instead of an anti-missile defense system, a more reliable system of preventing an unsanctioned launch, that is a system of control and communications that excludes such a possibility.

All of this should be subjected to very serious analysis, not in secret but with the involvement of the broadest circles of specialists from various spheres of knowledge.

[Podolnya] Returning to the delegation that has just been to Moscow. Can one say that anything was achieved?

[Arbatov] The sides made a step forward. They agreed in principle, or, to be more accurate, they are now going along the path of cooperating in creating a warning system that includes space components. This is undoubtedly a correct and rational approach. I think that the political result is that the United States now regards every step in this sphere, including the joint development of space sensors, as a step toward renouncing the ABM Treaty. Thank God, we still adhere to the ABM Treaty, and we say that it is necessary to create some things jointly—space sensors, for example—but without violating the ABM Treaty. We and the United States are pulling in different directions. [end recording]

'Experts' Want Antimissile Treaty Revised
OW2707124592 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1217 GMT 27 Jul 92

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The anti-missile defence treaty should be revised, since it hinders the implementation of the project for building a global defence system coordinated between the Russian and American Presidents. The International Security Council (ISC) said so in its resolution adopted in Washington recently on the results of a meeting between Russian and American experts.

According to the resolution, the anti-missile defence treaty will hinder not only the implementation of the project for building a global defence system, but also the efforts to work it out.

Those who share this view are Russian generals Geliy Batenin and Viktor Samoilov; their American colleague Michael Dugan, former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Aleksandr Savelyev, Deputy Director of the Moscow

Institute for Strategic Studies; Joseph Churba, President of the ISC; Ambassador Henry Cooper, Director of the Strategic Defence Initiative Organization; Stepan Sulakshin, President Yeltsin's personal representative in the Tomsk region and one of the leading scientists in high-power lasers and space technologies; and a number of other Russian and American experts.

What underlies the anti-missile defence treaty is the idea that the two sides will refrain from building global anti-missile systems, including a global defence system, Aleksandr Savelyev, Deputy Director of the Moscow Institute for Strategic Studies, told DP's [Diplomatic Panorama's] correspondent.

According to him, the very idea of global defence system conflicts with the idea of the anti-missile defence treaty. "Because of this the treaty becomes an obstacle".

Besides, there is a "purely technical" reason. The anti-missile defence treaty doesn't make it possible to deploy the most effective systems of protection against ballistic missiles, such as a space-based system. This involves not only "interceptors", that is "strike weapons", but also targeting, spotting and escorting systems. "These systems are indispensable in creating reliable defence".

"I don't quite understand those who speak in favor of preserving the anti-missile defence treaty and at the same time call for launching together with the U.S. work designed to build a global defence system", said A. Savelyev.

According to him, this discrepancy must not be ignored. "Signed during the Cold War in order to halt the arms race, the anti-missile defence treaty was good for its time but it has already played its role". Now it becomes an obstacle to the development of Russian-American relations.

A. Savelyev believes that this issue requires a radical solution. "The new quality of the Russian-American relationship points to the need to work out new agreements that would make it possible to carry out joint work and confirm the present level of bilateral relations".

Official on Future Role of ABM Treaty

OW3107140492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1331 GMT 31 Jul 92

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian foreign ministry believes that the ABM treaty can become an integral part of the global anti-missile defences the idea of which is now under discussion by Russian and US experts, the deputy in charge of the ministry's department for control over military technologies, Sergey Chuvakhin, told DP [Diplomatic Panorama] commenting on the recent meeting in Washington by Russian and American experts within the framework of the International Security Council.

He said some of the assertions made there that the ABM treaty should be reviewed on the grounds of being an obstacle to the implementation of the global anti-missile defences were inconsistent.

The Russian diplomat said the global project was in essence a new collective security system, and its multinational character, and hence its openness to other countries was one of its fundamental principles. The Russian side believes that in the view of the strategic balance of forces worldwide, the ABM treaty must be kept intact while working on the basic concepts of the global anti-missile defences.

The new project's priority element must include a well-defined system of objective assessment of what is a real threat and possible counter-measures in each separate case.

In other words, the extent of threat must be defined and classified first before any coherent steps are taken to remove it. The diplomat said the Russian and American sides shared understanding on that issue recognising the need for the creation of an international missile attack warning centre.

Chuvakhin said the package of diplomatic and political measures for averting possible missile strikes had not exhausted itself yet although recognising that "there may be the need for the creation of certain types of anti-missile defences in future".

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

French Experts To Help Destroy Ammunition in Byelarus

LD2007132492 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1324 GMT 20 Jul 92

[By BELINFORMA correspondent Leonod Tratsevskiy for TASS]

[Text] Minsk July 20 TASS—Byelarusian military units and French experts intend to start a project to destroy ammunition accumulated on the territory of Byelarus, the Byelarusian Defence Ministry reported on Monday [20 July].

A preliminary agreement on this effect was reached last week in Minsk by Byelarusian First Deputy Defence Minister Aleksandr Tushinskiy and French Director for Strategy and Planning Alain Brocard.

Detonators, shell bodies, cartridge cases, gunpowder and explosive substances are to be processed. Part of the processed explosives will be sold to ore-miners and builders, the gunpowder will go into varnish industry, detonators will be used for construction of television appliances, watches and other household appliances. Shell bodies and cartridge cases will find application in non-ferrous metals. There are also plans to produce ammunition for hunting and sports rifles.

In September, the French side is expected to make its proposals and name companies which will participate in the project, Brocard said.

Russian Supreme Soviet Resolution on Baltics Criticized

Latvian Foreign Ministry Statement

OW2207015392 Moscow *BALTFAX in English*
2018 GMT 21 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Latvia's Foreign Ministry considers the resolutions adopted by Russia's Parliament in respect to the Baltic states as "a display of a desire to delay the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces".

Russia's Parliament adopted a series of resolutions blaming the Baltic states for "violating the human rights" on July 17.

Latvia's Foreign Ministry issued a statement today, saying that "the very formulation of the issue, the character of discussion, and the adopted documents were unacceptable for Latvia".

The ministry says that the Russian Parliament showed the developments in the Baltic states in the most unfavorable light.

Latvia regards these resolutions as an attempt by "some Russian politicians to show their unwillingness to carry on their dialogue with the Baltic states as equal and independent partners".

The statement says that Russia's position bewilders Latvia and complicates negotiations on all scopes of activities.

Further on Statement

LD2207042192 Riga *Radio Riga Network in Latvian*
1731 GMT 21 Jul 92

[Text] The Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued an announcement in connection with the question on the situation in the Baltic states as discussed at the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet. It says:

On 15 and 17 July this year, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet discussed the situation in the Baltic republics. The discussion ended with the Supreme Soviet's announcement on human rights in the Baltic states and the adoption of a Supreme Soviet resolution on human rights in the Republic of Estonia.

The formulation of the question, the nature of the discussion, and the adopted documents are unacceptable to the Republic of Latvia as they falsely represent the situation in the Baltic states, accusing them, without reason, of transgressions against human rights.

The Latvian side believes these resolutions will serve to delay the solution of the main problem—the withdrawal from the Baltics of the troops under Russian jurisdiction.

Some Russian politicians have demonstrated their unwillingness on a regular basis to talk with the Baltic states as equal partners and independent sovereign states.

This position is incomprehensible for the Republic of Latvia. It will make our talks with Russia on the entire complex of mutual relations more difficult. So states the announcement from the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Estonian Popular Front

*OW2207022992 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2018 GMT 21 Jul 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Estonian Popular Front board says that the Russian Parliament seeks to delay the withdrawal of its armed forces and step up its political pressure upon the Estonian delegation at the negotiations on military and political issues by taking the resolution “on the rights of individual in Estonia” on July 17.

The resolution by the Russian Parliament says of “brutal violations of the human rights in Estonia”.

An open address by the Estonian Popular Front board to the speaker and presidium of the parliament released today says that the Estonian Foreign Ministry’s statement alone “was not enough politically” and that the issue was worth discussing at an extraordinary session of the parliament.

Russians Begin CFE Inspection of British Bases

*LD2107120692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0851 GMT 21 Jul 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Voronkov]

[Text] London July 21 TASS—Russian military experts numbering nine began the inspection of British bases and other installations on Tuesday [21 July] after the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] came into force late last week.

The aim of the inspection is to get convinced that Britain abides by ceilings set by the agreement limiting the number of tanks, warplanes, helicopter gunships, artillery pieces and infantry combat vehicles for treaty participants.

Under the treaty, the British Army may have 1,015 tanks, 3,176 infantry combat vehicles, 900 warplanes and 384 gunships. Russian military specialists will conduct inspections mostly in the country’s eastern part. The British Defence Ministry announced that it would help the inspectors in every way.

‘New Stand’ on Baltic Troop Withdrawal Noted

*OW2307130792 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1232 GMT 23 Jul 92*

[Report by diplomatic correspondents A. Borodin, A. Pershin, and Igor Porshnev and others from “Diplomatic Panorama”; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia has formulated “a fundamentally new stand” on the issue of Russian troops withdrawal from Latvia and other Baltic countries, said Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin. On Wednesday, July 22, he took part in a meeting between Russia’s Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar and his Latvian counterpart Ivars Godmanis.

“If such issues as the status of troops, the possibility of retaining certain strategic facilities for a longer period of time and every-day problems faced by the servicemen are resolved in one package, military units will be able to withdraw in a much shorter time”, he told newsmen.

In answer to a question from DP’s [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent V. Churkin said: concrete times for the withdrawal of troops have not been mentioned yet, but he hopes that they’ll be fixed in the near future. The Russian diplomat said he is satisfied that Latvia agreed to the principle of resolving problems in a package.

According to him, Y. Gaydar called the attention of I. Godmanis to the Russian parliament’s statement concerning the observance of human rights in Baltic countries. At the present talks, said Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Latvia has taken a very civilized and advanced stand on the problems of human rights.

V. Churkin drew attention to the assurances of I. Godmanis that when working out legislative acts concerning human rights Latvia will adhere to “high European and international standards”.

According to the diplomat, Latvia promised to back Russia’s call for establishing the post of High Commissioner for the affairs of ethnic minorities in the framework of the Council of Baltic States. The decision to establish a similar post on the level of Europe has also been taken in the framework of the CSCE.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry decided to form a group to consider this issue in detail and ensure prompt exchanges of information. Therefore a range of measures has been planned with a view to bringing these problems from the field of emotional declarations to the area of concrete consideration and practical solutions”, said V. Churkin.

5th Round of Estonian-Russian Troop Talks Close

No Agreement Reached

OW2307212992 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1902 GMT 23 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The fifth round of the Russian-Estonian negotiations closed in Lohusalu, near Tallinn.

The heads of the two delegations, Russia's Ambassador at Large Vasilii Svirin and Estonian State Minister Uno Veering, said at the press conference on the results of the round of talks that the parties had failed to initial any agreement.

Vasilii Svirin said that the results of this round might be viewed from different angles. "Although we failed to initial a single agreement, a very vast work on discussing a wide range of issues has been accomplished", said Mr. Svirin. He added Russia welcomed Estonia's decision to resume the negotiations on military issues and proposed a schedule for the Russian armed forces' withdrawal from Estonia for this year. Under the schedule, 44 units totalling 6388 people will be withdrawn from the republic until the end of the year. This figure amounts to a quarter of the Russian land forces in Estonia. However, the schedule fails to provide for the Russian armed forces withdrawal from Tallinn within this year. Vasilii Svirin said Russia's delegation "was working on the possibilities" to accomplish the withdrawal in the first half of the next year.

Estonia's demand is to withdraw Russian forces from the Estonian capital in the first place.

The negotiations failed to touch on the deadline for the final withdrawal, for, as the Russian delegation head said, "the parties did not change their positions".

The Estonian delegation head, Uno Veering, said that the two delegations could not reach an agreement on many issues because of different historical and legal assessments of the Russian-Estonian relations.

Uno Veering also said that the two delegations agreed to immediately work out agreements and set up a bilateral commission for exchanging consumer goods, mutual accounting and other economic issues. [Moscow ITAR-TASS in English at 1506 GMT on 23 July in a similar report adds: "Estonia's negative trade balance with Russia stands at 3.8 billion rubles. Vasilii Svirin, head of the Russian delegation at the talks with Estonia, told journalists today. "We could stop our deliveries, but we have not done this, and in essence we are continuing to offer Estonia trading credit".]

The delegations failed to reach an agreement on the time of their next meeting, but, Uno Veering says, it will be held no earlier than in September.

Estonian Chief Delegate Comments

LD2407082792 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1400 GMT 23 Jul 92

[Interview with Uno Veering, head of the Estonian delegation at the talks with Russia on troop withdrawal, by unidentified presenter on 23 July—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Presenter] Estonian and Russian delegations have been working at Lohusalu for four days. A lot of work has been done, but it was acknowledged at today's news conference that not one agreement was initialed. [passage omitted] In respect to the main issue, the Russian troop withdrawal, the Russian side has become more specific regarding the current year. A schedule for Russian troop withdrawal by the end of 1992 was presented to you. According to Mr. Vasilii Svirin, head of the Russian delegation, a quarter of the 20,000 men will be withdrawn.

[Veering] Yes, this schedule was indeed presented to us, and we have it black and white, with signatures. Unfortunately, I must say immediately that it does not please the Estonian side, because the schedule does not mention any withdrawal starting from the capital. In addition, if we look at the proposed speed of withdrawal, we see nothing in the schedule that is as speedy as we would like. In other words, we presented our side's calculations, a specific schedule of our own, and I think that this one meets the interests of Estonia because the deadlines in this draft schedule are very short.

[Presenter] Specifically?

[Veering] Well, the main and complete withdrawal, I would say, should take place by the end of 1992, with some exceptions. For example, some storage facilities or some very large installation which could not be physically removed by this end of the year could be moved within the first months of next year, and so on. However, I do not wish to comment now in detail on the schedule, because this is part of the process of the talks. The Russian side has taken it away with them to Moscow and has promised to study it with their specialists. [passage omitted]

[Presenter] Vasilii Svirin let it be understood today that during the first half of next year, 1993, the major part of the Russian troops will be withdrawn, and that next year will be the main period for troop withdrawal. However, this matter cannot wait and cannot be dragged out.

[Veering] Yes, that is so. This is why there was nothing left to us but to present our side's principled proposal in writing to the Russian side in an official manner. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian-Russian Talks on Troop Withdrawal**Experts' Group Ends Talks**

*OW2307213092 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1902 GMT 23 Jul 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A meeting between Russian and Lithuanian military experts closed today in Vilnius. Lithuania's expert group was headed by the deputy Foreign Minister Gediminas Sarknis, and that of Russia, by a Foreign Ministry official, Rudolf Alekseyev.

A protocol on the results of the meeting will be published.

The head of Russia's delegation, Rudolf Alekseyev, said that the two delegations "made a considerable progress", and expressed satisfaction over the work done. The parties made a giant step, discussing principles of the Russian armed forces' withdrawal from Lithuania and conditions of their temporary stay on the territory of the republic.

Rudolf Alekseyev said that some difficulties which had not existed before appeared in the process of the negotiations. Now that Russia became a party to the treaty on the arms reduction in Europe, this access must be discussed as well, for the armed forces withdrawn from the Baltic states should not affect the balance of forces in Europe.

Commenting on the Lithuanian-proposed schedule for the Russian forces withdrawal, Rudolf Alekseyev said it took into account only the capabilities of railways, and, therefore, was "very idealist". In his opinion, such a rapid withdrawal may cause much harm to both sides. By now, 3,800 Russian servicemen of 35 thousand have already been withdrawn, and 3,200 more will leave the republic till the end of the year.

The head of Lithuania's delegation, Gediminas Sarknis, expressed regret that Russia had failed to present its schedule and the final deadline for the withdrawal. At the same time he said that experts managed to reconcile their positions on the text of the agreement on conventional arms and several items of the general treaty.

Delegation Heads on Progress

*LD2407085792 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 23 Jul 92*

[Italicized passages recorded]

[Text] Negotiations on the withdrawal of the armed forces from the territory of Lithuania were constructive, however, much uncertainty remains. Here is a report by our correspondent Vytautas Mazutaitis:

[Mazutaitis] The coordination of the protocol of the meeting between the expert groups of the state negotiation delegations of the Republic of Lithuania and the

Russian Federation, which took place on 20 to 23 July, is nearing completion. What is it? What will it bring to Lithuania? During a short break the leaders of both the expert groups of the state delegations agreed to say a few words to the journalists. Here is Rudolf Alekseyev:

[Alekseyev, speaking in Russian] *From the Russian side, I would like to voice our satisfaction that this time we moved forward significantly the discussion of the main documents on the order of the withdrawal and the conditions of the temporary deployment until the complete withdrawal of the troops of Russia. Of course, a number of problems still remain and certain difficulties arose as well, and, as we say, life introduces its own corrections. Let us say, if earlier we did not have such a problem as international inspections, now, according to international obligations on the carrying out of inspections within the framework on the reduction of army forces in Europe, we are compelled to cope with it.*

The withdrawal has started. At present 3,800 have already been withdrawn, another 3,200 servicemen will be withdrawn by the end of the year. Thus, from 35,000 servicemen at present, by the end of the year less than 30,000 will remain. The withdrawal continues and we, of course, are interested in seeing that it takes place in an organized manner, that troops being withdrawn are deployed in tolerable conditions.

Lithuanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gediminas Serksnys is at the microphone:

[Serksnys] *This time, too, the Russian delegation was unable to supply basic data on which the documents under preparation are depending; that is, they were unable to submit the final date of the withdrawal. We earlier submitted, a month ago, the schedule of the withdrawal, but we did not receive a reply from the Russian side. The atmosphere was really constructive, benevolent, and, if we have time and opportunities, we will be able to meet once again and continue our work.*

Withdrawal of Russian Forces From Byelarus**Withdrawal Under Way**

*LD2407215992 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 24 Jul 92*

[Text] The withdrawal of the personnel of the Russian forces from the territory of the former Byelarusian Military District is now under way. This was revealed to a RIKIA correspondent at the Byelarus Defense Ministry. Rumors which have arisen in connection with this that the Russian military are taking with them military property, hardware, fuel, and food reserves do not correspond to reality. The forces by agreement with the Russian Defense Ministry are being withdrawn with regulation and standard-issue property. This means that neither armaments, military hardware, nor even the reserves of uniforms will not be taken beyond the borders of the republic.

Troops To Leave in 'Seven Years'

*LD2807181392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1039 GMT 28 Jul 92*

[By BELINFORM correspondent Valentina Menshikova for TASS]

[Text] Minsk July 28 TASS—Russian troops will withdraw from Byelarus in seven years, according to the republican parliament speaker. During the period the strength of the Byelarusian Army will grow up to 100 thousand people, Stanislav Shushkevich said on Tuesday [28 July] in a "direct line" talk with readers of the Byelarusian "ZVYAZDA" newspaper.

The Byelarusian branch of the Soviet Communist Party will remain banned in the republic as a new "Party of Byelarusian Communists has been registered and no one impedes its activity," Shushkevich said.

The speaker called on the people to boost economic development. "if everything goes on the way it is today, prospects are very dim", he said.

"Independence, consistency and concord are the path to be traversed by the country and each of us", he added.

Tank Regiment From Germany Returns to Samara

*LD2507180092 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0300 GMT 25 Jul 92*

[Text] According to a report from the RIA agency, a tank regiment from Germany has redeployed in Samara Oblast. As reported at the press center of the Volga area military district, the army base and military equipment will be located in the open air, and the tank crates will be re-equipped as barracks for the servicemen.

In the opinion of one of the officers from the district's headquarters, the problem of housing for the families will partly be resolved at the expense of voluntary redundancies among army officers.

Lithuanian Premier on Russian Troop Transit From Germany

*LD2807155292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 28 Jul 92*

[Text] A report disseminated by ELTA concerning the statement by Prime Minister Aleksandras Abisala during his meeting with Wolfgang Groebl, Germany's first deputy minister of transport, about the possible transit of troops of the former Soviet Union from Germany through Lithuanian territory has been wrongly interpreted.

An ELTA correspondent asked Prime Minister Aleksandras Abisala to present the government's position on this issue.

As you know, the prime minister said, the troops of the former Soviet Union—Russian troops now—are being

withdrawn from Germany besides the route via Mukran on the ferry to Klaipeda and across Lithuanian territory.

Indeed, we are not inclined to stop the withdrawal from Germany; we do not want to slow down the rate of the withdrawal because Lithuania is also interested in the withdrawal.

However, this must be arranged in legal terms. Until now, Russia has not yet concluded any agreement with us on the transit through Lithuania by the above troops, and Russia is not showing a great initiative on doing this.

Therefore, if such an agreement with the acceptable conditions to Lithuania is not concluded in the near future, we will not be able to allow this. I told this to the German first deputy minister of transport and asked that his government pressure Russia in order that such an agreement is discussed and reached as soon as possible. We would like both political and economic compensation for allowing this kind of transit through Lithuanian territory, Prime Minister Aleksandras Abisala said.

Polish Press Coverage of Russian Pullout Viewed

Military Official Criticizes Polish Actions

*PM2907123592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Jul 92 p 2*

[Interview with Colonel General Leonid Kovalev, government agent dealing with Russian forces in Poland, by Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Bugay: "Colonel General Leonid Kovalev: Common Sense Must Prevail Over Intrigue"]

[Text] Lately the Polish media have been harping on the issue of the withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of Poland. The tone of the vast majority of newspaper pieces is clearly inimical toward the actions of the Northern Group of Forces command. As a rule, they make unfounded charges against the Russian side of destroying and plundering facilities that are to be handed over and of trading illegally in movable property.

Colonel General L. Kovalev, Russian Federation Government agent handling the affairs of Russian forces in Poland, comments on the propaganda campaign in Poland in a conversation with our correspondent.

[Bugay] Comrade commander, first of all I would like to hear to what extent the schedule for the withdrawal of units and subunits from Poland is being observed.

[Kovalev] The withdrawal is going according to plan. The Russian forces are being moved out of Poland on schedule. We have withdrawn more than 45,000 personnel, 453 tanks, and 953 armored fighting vehicles and brought out all the heavy artillery and antiaircraft missile installations. Practically all the aircraft have left Poland. Four helicopters and 13 transport aircraft

remain in the Northern Group of Forces to preserve the viability of the group's forces.

We provide Polish officials with regular and prompt information on servicemen and equipment that are being withdrawn, which makes it all the more hurtful to read in Polish papers distorted information on the rate of withdrawal of Russian forces.

[Bugay] Leonid Illarionovich, the Polish press has lately been accusing the Northern Group of Forces command of violating accords reached at intergovernmental level on a range of questions connected with the withdrawal of Russian forces; in particular it is charged with carrying out an illegal, dutyfree trade in Russian Army property. What have you to say on this score?

[Kovalev] Let us see. First of all let us compare the way the Russian Army sells real estate in Germany with the way this is done in Poland. You would think there would be no particular difference, but look at how civilized it is on German soil; it is carried out on the basis of mutual understanding, mutual benefit, and goodwill. The Germans never raised the question whether or not the Russian Army is entitled to sell its own property. The only condition was that German legislation should be observed. As far as the Northern Group of Forces is concerned, the spurious problem whether or not we can trade our own property has been discussed at talks at various levels over many years. Until recently we were totally prohibited from selling anything on Polish territory.

On 20 May the Polish Government's agent dealing with the affairs of Russian Federation forces in Poland and the commander of the Northern Group of Forces signed and exchanged letters on the procedure for the sale of movable property on a contract and noncontract basis.

Because there was no decision by General Zdzislaw Ostrowski's department, the sale of our property was delayed. The Polish media started to heat up the atmosphere surrounding what is, I emphasize, our movable property. Moreover, police pickets were stationed around some military units.

I received a letter from Mr. [Gospodin] General Ostrowski, signed 7 July 1992, in which, despite the accord that already existed, he "allows a range of Russia's movable property to be sold on the Polish market" and in so doing reminds us that we are supposed to adhere to jointly defined principles, which he considers it necessary to enumerate once again. The secret is that the "principles" he enumerates are not "jointly defined." At best, they are yet to be defined. So the 7 July letter should be regarded as a unilateral attempt by the Polish side to establish a new procedure for the sale of movable property that nullifies the earlier accords.

We do not agree with that viewpoint. In our opinion, the procedure for the sale of movable property is laid down quite clearly and specifically in the letters that were exchanged. The new property sale procedure that was

offered to us will complicate matters, make the movable property sale process chaotic, and could ultimately disrupt the schedule for the transfer of facilities to the Polish side.

I believe that as problems connected with the sale of property arise, it is necessary, in each specific case, to sit down and hold talks. But we are not getting a dialogue with the Polish side at the moment. Often they simply say: It cannot be sold. Why? No explanation given.

Our opponents must realize that Russia will not throw away its own property. Even if we do not reach an understanding, we will urgently remove all that belongs to us, and all it will mean will be a tight schedule for the withdrawal of Northern Group of Forces units.

The next problem is that hitherto we and the Polish side have had different ideas about what movable property is. The different interpretations of this term have given rise to conflict situations. A year ago, at the Polish side's request, two aviation regiments were moved from Brzeg to Krzywa airfield. Carrying out this pretty major relocation cost us a great deal in material and financial terms. In particular, concrete flags had to be laid on the earth to provide extra flight line parking space. Naturally, when preparations were being made to withdraw the regiments to Russia the flags were lifted and stacked up. I would emphasize that these measures were carried out before the Moscow accords were signed. Moreover, the new flight line parking spaces were not logged in the airfield maintenance record. Now the Polish side is trying to accuse us of destroying the airfield in Krzywa.

[Bugay] Comrade commander, what do you think is the way out of the present situation?

[Kovalev] Let us return to the documents signed in Moscow. Let us look at the protocol on the settlement of property, financial, and other problems. I am referring to Article 7. In its final version the gist is as follows: Poland and Russia will aim to develop cooperation and will conduct a quest for cooperation. To that end there was provision for the creation of a joint Russian-Polish commission.

The withdrawal of our forces is proceeding rapidly, but the commission, which could deal swiftly with any disputes that might arise, in particular in the matter of the sale of property, has still not been set up. Incidentally, our side has done all the preparatory work: A list of names is already being considered by the Russian Federation Government.

[Bugay] Leonid Illarionovich, to my knowledge there is an accord to the effect that this commission will also contribute to the establishment of Russian-Polish joint ventures, some of whose profits are to be used to set up the forces that are being withdrawn to Russia.

[Kovalev] Yes there was such an accord, but during the working meetings Mr. General Ostrowski repeatedly said

that the Polish side would hardly agree to the establishment of joint ventures. The Poles explain their position via the media, saying that the Russian Army is allegedly trying to establish a foothold in Poland through the establishment of joint ventures.

I have met with many Polish business people. The interesting thing is that as soon as we get away from politics and start speaking the language of figures it becomes clear that this kind of economic cooperation would benefit both Russia and Poland.

One would like to believe that despite the delay, our joint work will eventually bear substantial economic fruit. We have facilities that could provide a basis for joint ventures' activities and help replenish the Polish coffers and provide Poland with new jobs. Common sense must prevail over political intrigue.

The Russian and Polish publics must know that we are leaving the country, but we want people to have good memories of us. We favor an honest, open dialogue when tackling any problems that might arise.

Russian Foreign Ministry Statement

*LD3107192992 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1730 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[Report on news conference by Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Information and Press Directorate, by station correspondent Aleksandr Kozhin, at the Foreign Ministry press center on 31 July; Yastrzhembskiy's recorded remarks within quotation marks]

[Excerpt] A briefing on current problems of international politics took place in the Russian Foreign Ministry Press Center. Over to our correspondent Aleksandr Kozhin.

[Kozhin] At the beginning of the briefing, Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Directorate of Information and the Press, expressed the opinion that the general situation in the Near East is improving. During the sixth round of talks planned to begin on 24 August in Washington, he said, Russia intends to act in coordination with the other cochairman, the United States.

At the meeting with journalists, the representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs read out a statement in connection with the campaign around the withdrawal of Russian troops, which has been unleashed in some of the Polish mass media.

"According to the Polish version, the pilfering of property, war materiel, the handing over of military facilities in an unfit state, and illegal operations circumventing the customs regulations in force are being ascribed to Russian troops. Of course, such facts cannot be excluded completely. Apparently at issue, however, are just individual cases. It would be unjust, to say the least, to accuse servicemen of the Northern Group of Forces of all these sins. At the same time, measures taken by the

Polish authorities to ban repair work at a number of military installations of the Northern Group of Forces, the take-off of transport aviation from several airports, and the setting up of posts around Russian military units are illegal.

We believe that the present campaign is being consciously initiated in order to justify somehow the blunders made by the Polish side in fulfilling the commitments regarding lending aid in accommodating the Russian units withdrawn from Polish territory. We think that this is not the time for mutual reproaches and insults. The main thing is to implement the agreements reached with Walesa, president of the Republic of Poland, during his official visit to Moscow. For its part, the Russian leadership intends to continue firmly and steadfastly to observe the set timetable for troop withdrawal." [passage omitted]

NWGF Commander, Latvian Premier Discuss Troop Withdrawal

*LD2907212092 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1300 GMT 29 Jul 92*

[Text] Colonel General Leonid Mayorov, commander of the Northwest Group of Forces [NWGF] under the jurisdiction of Russia, paid his first visit to Ivars Godmanis, chairman of the Council of Ministers, at 1000 today. The talks, aimed at making acquaintanceship lasted 45 minutes; the main topic discussed was problems connected with the withdrawal of the Russian troops from our state.

Ivars Godmanis expounded and substantiated the (?competent) stance of the Latvian government on this question, namely, the Russian troops are to be withdrawn from Latvia in their entirety, first of all, and in the nearest future, from the capital, Riga. A demand was expressed for the army ranges to be vacated at Adazi, Dobele, and Zvarde, and for immediate cessation of bombing exercises at Zvarde.

The premier categorically stated that no kind of illegal formation of commercial structures at the military sites to be vacated is permissible. He reminded Mayorov that all the immovable property of the army, in accordance with the legislation, is the property of the Republic of Latvia.

Fully agreeing with the necessity of withdrawal of the Russian troops, Colonel General Leonid Mayorov recognized as his main task, the implementation of this process. In his view, the most important task at present is housing construction for officers outside Latvia, because a positive solution of this problem would certainly speed up the troop withdrawal. There is construction capacity in Russia, but money is needed. In this connection, General Mayorov advanced a proposal for obtaining these means by selling or leasing the sites constructed by the army.

In turn, the premier recommended the use of assistance from western countries, for example, Germany, which is sharing the responsibility for the consequences of World War II.

The Adazi military range will be vacated within the next two to three months. Early removal from Latvia of the dangerous stocks of artillery ammunition is being considered, for example from the storage places in Ventspils.

The NWGF command wishes to meet very soon with the heads of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other militarized structures of Latvia, in order to discuss the (?regime) of sojourn of the Russian troops.

WGF Denies Ownership of Dresden Ammunition Cache

LD0108182192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1152 GMT 1 Aug 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Konstantin Savvin]

[Text] Berlin, 1 Aug—A large quantity of antitank mines and hand grenades have been found in a deserted building in Dresden. This was reported by the ADN news agency on Thursday, 30 July. According to the agency, the Dresden police suspected that this ammunition belonged to military units of the Western Group of Forces [WGF].

The WGF press center circulated a statement today stressing that the hasty assumption of a connection between this find and the WGF units deployed in the Dresden area has caused bewilderment in the WGF command. "A civilized investigation of any violation of the law must proceed on the basis of hard evidence and not on subjective estimations, the press center points out. We also think it appropriate to recall that it was not only WGF units but also the National People's Army of the former GDR and armies of other East European states which had Soviet ammunition. According to information provided by the WGF command, none of the units in its subordination has registered any theft of arms or ammunition."

Byelarus Begins Assembling Armed Forces

LD0208043792 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0300 GMT 2 Aug 92

[Text] RIKa reports that the Republic of Byelarus is now forming its own armed forces units. A mechanized brigade has been set up in the Grodno area. Byelarus Defense Minister Pavel Kozlovskiy says that 100 military units will be in existence by the end of the year.

Russia, Baltic States Negotiate on Troop Withdrawal

Landsbergis Calls For Immediate Pullout

LD0308083992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2130 GMT 2 Aug 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Kazis Ustisila]

[Text] Vilnius, 3 Aug—"The army must be withdrawn from Lithuania now, as quickly as possible, or at least its withdrawal should begin." This is perhaps the main point to be heard in the interview with Vitautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic, as relayed by Lithuanian TV yesterday evening.

The head of the Lithuanian parliament recalled that Russia has not yet replied to Lithuania's specific proposals, and the proposed draft timetable for the withdrawal of the army of the former Soviet Union, now under the jurisdiction of Russia, was calculated on the basis of the army's complete withdrawal within four months.

Landsbergis noted that in this respect, the meeting of foreign ministers of the Baltic states with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev should be "important". At the same time, he did not hide the fact that he is not pinning high hopes on the forthcoming meeting of heads of diplomatic departments. He said "the invitation from the foreign ministers could turn out to be a trick to avoid a reply to Lithuania's proposals". He suggested that Russia itself might make proposals unacceptable to Lithuania to show that Lithuania is allegedly inflexible and is rejecting the proposals.

Replying to a question from the television journalist concerning the results of last week's talks between the head of the Lithuanian parliament and Colonel General Leonid Mayorov, the new commander of the North-western Group of Forces, Landsbergis insistently emphasized that Lithuania "will not tolerate breaches of the republic's laws by the military, including the law on the state border which is also binding on flights by warplanes to and from Lithuania".

"We shall check and punish," the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic warned.

Landsbergis 'Skeptical' on Talks

LD0508083992 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 3 Aug 92

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, is skeptical about the upcoming meeting between the Russian foreign minister and the foreign ministers of the three Baltic states.

As we have already reported, such a meeting is to take place this Thursday [6 August] in Moscow on the initiative of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Speaking on Lithuanian television on 2 August, Vytautas Landsbergis said that Russia might not respond to the Lithuanian proposals at the forthcoming meeting concerning the dates of the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Lithuania. According to the leader of the Lithuanian parliament, Russia might present its own proposals to Lithuania which could be unacceptable to Lithuania and then Lithuania would find itself in the position of rejecting the proposals.

As is known, Russian representatives at the negotiations have avoided discussing with Lithuania the date of the final withdrawal of the Russian troops from Lithuania and have rejected the proposal advanced by Lithuania on the schedule of the withdrawal of the Russian troops which envisaged the withdrawal of the troops in four months. Meanwhile today, Galina Sidorova, political adviser to the Russian foreign minister, reported that Russia will present a package of proposals at the meeting between Andrey Kozyrev, the head of Russian diplomacy, and the foreign ministers of the three Baltic states, on the withdrawal of the troops from the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Russian General Staff Aide Comments

*LD0508140792 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0850 GMT 5 Aug 92*

[By ITAR-TASS military observer Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Aug— The schedule for the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from the territory of the Baltic countries will be one of the most acute problems on the agenda of the meeting of the heads of the foreign policy departments of Russia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia which opens in Moscow tomorrow. Asked by the ITAR-TASS observer to comment on this issue, Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, first deputy chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, stated today: "In our opinion, the leaders of the Baltic states should take an understanding view of the difficulties confronting our country in withdrawing its troops from Germany, Poland, and Mongolia. To move the entire Baltic military grouping to Russia at a stroke, as some politicians are demanding, would mean creating intolerable conditions for the personnel." Our delegations at the negotiations with the Baltic countries on troop withdrawal, the military commander observed, are proposing the realistic time tables within which the General Staff and the Russian Defense Minister are able to carry out this most complex operation in a civilized manner. "If the leaders and the parliaments of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia really do wish to speed up this process, then they should start thinking about the actual assistance which can be offered to the Russian Federation troops to create the necessary infrastructure in their new locations. This involves, first and foremost, help in building housing for the families of officers and warrant officers," Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov said in conclusion.

Lithuanian Minister Stresses Strict Schedule

*LD0608091792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0901 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Gvritshvili]

[Text] Moscow August 6 TASS—Lithuania is determined to insist on the withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory in 1992, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Saugardas Algirdas told journalists in Moscow on Thursday [6 August].

The statement was made on the eve of the quadripartite meeting of foreign ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Russia, which will focus on drawing the schedule of the troops' withdrawal from Baltic states.

The Lithuanian foreign minister added that the Lithuanian delegation had presented to Russian officials its own schedule of troops' withdrawal beforehand, and he believes the schedule is quite realistic and could be implemented.

He also voiced hope that the Russian minister would give a concrete answer to Lithuanian proposals.

However, Algirdas dismissed a question asked by ITAR-TASS on possible Lithuanian concessions in the matter, saying that he was not authorised by his government to discuss "variants".

Kozyrev, Jurkans on Timetable Issue

*LD0608134392 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1230 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[Report by correspondent Valeriy Panfilov on Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, and Russian foreign ministers meeting in Moscow on 6 August, including recorded remarks by Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans]

[Text] [Panfilov] I think it is superfluous to say that relations between Russia and the Baltic countries are extremely tense. This is connected with the presence of Russian troops on the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The stumbling block here is the timetable for their withdrawal. While Russia has been insisting to this day on a final withdrawal by the end of 1997, the Baltic countries want this to happen by the end of the current year. All previous meetings between the interested countries deadlocked on this issue. Apparently, a turning point was noted today. The Russian side came out with new initiatives in which the final withdrawal of troops will be carried out in 1994. At the same time, Russia is insisting on the observation of human rights in the Baltic countries. Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev spoke about this in detail at a news conference:

[Kozyrev] We consider this the first move and our first package or set of proposals regarding the protection of the human rights of Russians and all the other ethnic

groups. We believe this is a subject for very serious concern as far as certain acts of legislation are concerned—and mainly in the Baltic states, although each state has its own—but this is primarily a common problem. This is a very important area requiring urgent solutions. Of course, a solution for many other, if not all other, questions is connected with this.

[Panfilov] Russia also links the troop withdrawal with a renunciation of territorial claims to it, the payment of money for damage incurred during the period of the troops stay and the construction of housing for the servicemen being withdrawn.

At the end of the conversation, Andrey Kozyrev said that the meeting was fairly productive and the signing of an accord between the heads of state of Russia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia may take place soon. But, in my view, it was Janis Jurkans, the Latvian foreign minister, who summed up the results of the talks:

[Jurkans, in Russian] I think the main thing is that we all agreed to move to where we stand now; that is, to set up a time table for the withdrawal of troops which would suit all sides. I think that this step, when it is taken, will be a turning point in relations between Russia and the Baltic countries.

[Panfilov] At the very end of the news conference the Baltic ministers thanked Andrey Kozyrev for setting the good-neighborly relations between their countries and Russia in motion again.

Kozyrev Gives Conditions for Withdrawal

*OW0608133192 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1226 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" by Diplomatic Correspondents A. Budris, I. Porshnev and others; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia will withdraw its troops from the Baltic region in 1994, if an agreement is reached on a number of issues connected with this, said Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev today, July 6 [date as received], in Moscow at a meeting with his Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian counterparts, Algis Saudargis, Janis Jurkans and Jaan Manitski.

According to A. Kozyrev, a major condition for an "accelerated" solution to this problem is the need to grant the troops for the period of withdrawal a legal status that would ensure their normal functioning. With this aim in view a number of strategic facilities should be preserved in the territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania temporarily. The Baltic countries should give up their demands for being compensated for the losses which, as they maintain, were inflicted on them by the former USSR in 1940 through 1991.

Russia believes that the Balts must take part in the building of housing, with the use of funds from international sources, for members of the military units to be

withdrawn. The quantity of houses and the time for concluding their construction should be linked to the time of troops withdrawal. Besides, Russia must be given guarantees for the transit of military cargoes to Kaliningrad Region.

The problem of replacing the servicemen whose time of service has ended without increasing the stipulated number of troops must also be resolved. Besides, Russia wants to settle the following issues: Compensation for the immovable property to be left by the troops; guarantees for the social security and human rights of servicemen, retired servicemen and members of their families; measures to prevent unilateral actions and discriminatory decisions toward Russian servicemen during the time when general agreements on troops withdrawal are worked out.

With reference to the need to protect the rights of ethnic minorities in the Baltic countries A. Kozyrev pointed out that Russia demands that the legislation infringing on the political and economic rights of Russian-speakers in Baltic countries be amended.

Besides, Russia's foreign minister demanded that the Baltic countries make explicit statements as to their willingness to give up their claims to the border areas and cancel in their internal legislations the clauses that sanction such claims.

Speaking after the conference A. Kozyrev said that "it was frank and useful, and passed in a constructive atmosphere". Participants in it expressed their "mutual desire to ensure a turn for the better in relations between the countries".

The proposals made by Russia reflect the opinion of its government and its president, A. Kozyrev pointed out. According to the minister, the president is prepared to meet with the heads of the Baltic states who will have to take a final decision on the essence of Russian initiatives.

Ukraine Preparing To Destroy Conventional Arms

*OW0408194192 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1826 GMT 4 Aug 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Mentioning the press center of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, the information agency "KHARKOV-NOVOSTI" reports that "Ukraine will undertake measures on liquidation of conventional armaments envisaged by the Treaty on Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe" in the period from August 18 till September 17 this year.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Bush Rejection of Nuclear Test Proposal Noted

Letter to Congress Cited

PM2007110192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Jul 92 First Edition p 7

[ITAR-TASS report under the "Disarmament" general heading: "Nuclear Explosions Give Confidence to Washington"]

[Text] U.S. President George Bush has rejected a proposal to limit significantly the number of U.S. underground nuclear tests and adopted a decision to adhere to current practice regarding such tests.

THE WASHINGTON POST reported this, citing the text of a letter it received from high-ranking representatives of the administration explaining Bush's decision, which was submitted to Congress 10 July.

"The administration continues to believe that the nuclear test program, which is insignificant in terms of scale, is necessary to preserve confidence in our greatly reduced nuclear deterrence forces," the letter states.

The letter describes the U.S. President's decision as a shift in U.S. policy, as nuclear tests will now only be conducted to verify the reliability and safety of existing nuclear weapons, and not for the creation of new ones. The newspaper points out, however, that back in January U.S. officials declared that there are no plans to create new nuclear weapons. "Under the circumstances which can be foreseen at present," the letter says, "we do not anticipate conducting more than six tests a year over the next five years or more than three tests of a capacity greater than 35 kilotonnes."

U.S. 'Failed' To Meet Challenge

LD1807183792 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1710 GMT 17 Jul 92

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] The White House is reported to have dismissed the idea of reducing the number of nuclear testings which will be kept up at a level of six blasts a year. Comment is by Vladislav Kozyakov and this is what he writes:

This follows Mr. Bush's decision now published in a letter to the Senate by the Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, the Energy Secretary James Watkins, and the Presidential aide Brent Scowcroft. To stave off criticism, they have given reassurances that the nuclear explosions will be carried out only to test the safety and reliability of nuclear warheads, but not to develop new weapons. They also held out promises of cutting the number of U.S. nuclear tests in the future.

Arguments of this kind can hardly be a convincing response to widespread demands for an immediate

nuclear test ban. Mr. Bush's decision happens to coincide with a call on the American president by leaders of the antinuclear campaign, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear Wars, to abandon further tests.

The leaders of the movement uniting physicians from 80 countries do not believe that further tests now that the cold war is over makes any sense. They say the safety of the existing nuclear stockpiles can be ensured without recourse to nuclear explosions—a view that is shared by experts in other countries.

The administration's decision to go ahead with tests as before appears to be out of line even with its proclaimed policy of nuclear cutbacks, together with Russia, and effective international measures for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Each new explosion in the Nevada desert can evoke nothing but doubts in Washington's commitment to those goals.

There was a unique opportunity for the suspension of nuclear testings as an initial step before a comprehensive ban now that both Russia and France want to maintain a test moratorium until the end of this year.

Canada and Norway have both said they are supportive of moves by Moscow and Paris. Elsewhere calls can be heard to follow the two countries' suit.

The House of Representatives in a change of heart in June passed a bill calling for a 12-month suspension of nuclear tests, and more than half in the Senate put forward a similar bill to be debated soon. Significantly the Democratic candidate for presidency, Bill Clinton, is in favor of a comprehensive test ban, while former President Jimmy Carter in a speech to the Democrats' national convention regretted to say that his country remained the only stumbling block on the way to such a ban.

The issue of nuclear explosions is becoming a serious trial test for the White House, a challenge which it has so far failed to meet.

Spokesman: Bush Decision on Testing 'Met With Interest'

LD2207134292 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1333 GMT 22 Jul 92

[Text] Moscow July 22 TASS—The decision of U.S. President George Bush on changes in the policy in the field of nuclear tests was met with interest in Russia, according to spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry. It testifies that there appeared "a certain movement in the previously inflexible U.S. position on this important international issue", Aleksandr Rozanov said at a briefing on Wednesday [22 July].

Russia hopes that the joint consideration of the American programme underway in the U.S. administration and the Congress will result in concrete steps aimed at limiting and, finally, stopping nuclear tests, he added.

The Russian position remains the same. "We stand for an early ban on nuclear tests by all countries", the spokesman said, adding Russia has been fully observing its one-year long moratorium on nuclear tests. "We welcome the decision of France which has interrupted its nuclear tests. We believe other nuclear powers should follow suit of Russia and France", Rozanov added.

Russia is ready to immediately begin working out an international agreement on a complete ban of nuclear tests with the participation of all countries. "In practical terms we offer to the U.S. Administration to resume phased negotiations and view them as a process towards a complete ban on nuclear tests", he stressed.

Commentary on Need for Ban on Nuclear Tests

LD2407091292 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 23 Jul 92

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] On Wednesday [22 July] the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman announced in Moscow a readiness to resume phased negotiations with the American Administration and view them as a process toward a complete ban on nuclear tests. Our commentary is by Vladislav Kozyakov.

The offer to resume Russian-American dialogue may be seen as yet another opportunity to ban nuclear tests completely, or at least to make a decisive concerted effort in that direction. And this appears to be timely. The moratorium on tests introduced by Russia and France remains in force. In the circumstances Russian-American talks may be viewed as yet another effort to practically solve a most complicated international problem inherited from the cold war. Moscow applauded Washington's decision to conduct no more than six nuclear tests in Nevada annually, and the declaration that all the explosions would be carried out only to verify safety and reliability of weapons and not to develop new types of weapons. The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman has described the initiative as a certain movement in the previously inflexible U.S. position. Incidentally, the announced restrictions are extended to the developments of the nuclear component in the framework of Strategic Defense Initiative. The NEW YORK TIMES reports that the Energy Department has canceled the test of the nuclear-powered X-ray laser though dozens of millions of dollars have been spent for the purpose under the Star Wars program.

So changes for the better are clearly felt on the international scene, and I believe the time has come to ban tests, not only limit them. To prevent the proliferation of the mass-destruction weapons is the top priority task now. President George Bush has said the nuclear arms proliferation presents a growing threat for the interests of the United States national security. To be more precise, this is a threat for the entire mankind. Banning nuclear tests would prevent this danger. On the other hand, if continued the tests would pose an incentive for those

countries that would like to become members of the nuclear club. Their leaders, obsessed by the nuclear ambitions, don't see the difference whether the tests are conducted to create new types of weapons or to check the potential of the existing arsenals. Each new nuclear blast in Nevada or another nuclear site may only boost the proliferation. It seems U.S. congressmen are well aware of the fact, insisting that the country join the moratorium declared by Russia and France, and introduce a one-year moratorium for nuclear tests. The House of Representatives approved in June a relevant bill while the majority of senators have supported the demand. The Congress and the Administration seem to have to settle their differences on the issue. The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said Wednesday that Moscow hoped the decision would eventually be taken to discontinue tests and that the United States would follow suit.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Chemical Troops Deputy Commander on Baltic Cleanup

PM2407084792 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Jul 92 First Edition p 7

[Interview with Major General Professor Doctor Igor Yevstafyev, deputy chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Chemical Troops and corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, by Mikhail Gusev; place and date not given: "No Need To Rush To Fish for Bombs. Why Politicians Are Interested in the Mysterious Floor of the Baltic"—first four paragraphs are Gusev introduction]

[Text] Not just any sensation is enough to surprise presidents. George Bush the naval officer was hardly likely to know about the chemical weapons barbarically buried in the Baltic Sea. It is unlikely that George Bush the professional diplomat had ever heard about it. It is hard to imagine that George Bush the CIA director would not have known about it. But George Bush the President, on learning this oldish piece of news revealed by a Russian colleague during a transatlantic trip, expressed his surprise to the entire world. Which was quite enough to revive this totally "top secret" story, turning it into a sensation.

A sensation is what it was. Once. Today, it remains a problem. Problems last a long time, sensations just an hour. There is no need to be particularly surprised that this hour has come again. Things can get very strange in big-time politics. What is surprising is something else. In Helsinki our president again reiterated for the entire world to hear that the Baltic Sea will gradually be "blown up" by chemical shells eaten away by time and water. This was another sensation, but the winner will be the person who "capitalizes" on it.

With the presidents' encouragement scientists, businessmen, and statesmen have homed in on the underwater burial site. The Baltic's woes will produce major

capital—monetary for some, political for others. One of the first to react was the head of the Latvian Supreme Council, who frightened the participants in an international forum in Switzerland with the prospect of the Baltic Sea dying from the military chemical content of German bombs dumped on the sea floor in 1947 off the coast of Lithuania, Latvia, and Denmark by, Anatolijs Gorbunovs claims, the Soviet authorities. A lot of what he said in his intriguing statement was lies.

Lithuania and Latvia, in whose coastal waters nobody has ever dumped any chemicals, were cited by the Latvian leader for absolutely transparent reasons. And the clearly exaggerated powers of the Soviet authorities—alleged to have personally decided to dump the foreign poison—were a purely political and economic step: They dumped it, they should clear it up. Our authorities at the time, it should be noted, were shared [obshchiye], even if they were culpable. Various stories, accusations, and forecasts have poured into the newspapers, whipping up interest in the mysterious floor of the Baltic. What is down there? Whose heavy hand caused the damage? Who “ordered” the disaster and who will now have to pay for it? I put these questions to a recognized authority—Major General Professor Doctor Igor Yevstafyev, deputy chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Chemical Troops and corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences.

[Gusev] Igor Borisovich, were we or were we not—and by “we” I mean the Union—to blame for the Baltic “burial site” which was kept secret for many years and which surprised the U.S. President?

[Yevstafyev] I will answer your question with another question—what right did we have to personally dispose of the captured German arsenal? Bush could not fail to have known about the burial of the chemical agents, if only because dumping decisions, as well as others, were made by the United States too. In October 1943 the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, and the USSR unambiguously advocated the demilitarization and disarmament of Germany under the control of, and following a program laid down by, the allied control commission and its special organs.

Then came the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of the leaders of the three victorious powers. The 1 August 1945 protocol to the conference recorded: “All armaments, ammunition, and weapons of war together with all specialized means for their production should be under allied control or destroyed.” In September 1945 a session of the Military Directorate decided to “destroy all stocks of military chemical agents and chemical munitions; and to destroy, burn, or dump at sea all chemical warfare agents.”

The German chemical weapons were dumped in the Baltic immediately after the war, as attested by the materials of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. This is confirmed by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman in their book *A Higher Form of Killing: The*

Secret Chemical and Bacteriological War and by surviving participants in the chemical dumping operation in the Baltic.

[Gusev] The press is currently giving the most varied figures for the amount of weapons dumped...

[Yevstafyev] The Stockholm Institute again believes that “at the very minimum no less than 20,000 tonnes of weapons were dumped in three places.” But these tonnes also include the weight of shell and bomb casings. The dumping sites themselves are also known—the Skagerrak near the Norwegian coast, the outer roadstead off Kiel, and a point 20 miles east of the Danish island of Bornholm. There is nothing new or secret about this information. Incidentally, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA discussed it back in June. More accurate information can be found in the control commission archives.

[Gusev] How fair is it to accuse Russia—as the Union’s legal successor—of having committed an environmental crime?

[Yevstafyev] Current international law prohibits this means of getting rid of chemical weapons. And the international convention on the prevention of pollution from ships specially lists the Baltic as being among the most environmentally vulnerable regions.

But the dumping of chemical munitions was carried out by the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition at a time when these norms of international law did not exist. Moreover, there was a widespread opinion both here and in the West that the sea was the most reliable place to bury waste. Furthermore, it would have been no less dangerous at the time to have left the chemical munitions on the territory of any European state.

[Gusev] But, judging by statements from our president and from completely official sources throughout Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia claiming that the chemical shells could “make their presence felt” at any time, this decision does not seem to have been very farsighted or safe.

[Yevstafyev] In my view, it is in practice unrealistic to create in a body of water a concentration of toxic agents or of the products of their decomposition that would endanger the biosphere. First, these agents hydrolyze, losing their toxic properties, and the speed with which they enter the atmosphere owing to their shell casings becoming less airtight over the course of time will be significantly lower for all types of toxic agents than the speed of their hydrolysis—their interaction with the water. Additionally, they are diffused in the water, and this is “helped” by underwater currents...

[Gusev] But surely nothing stays underwater forever, much less shells...

[Yevstafyev] Cannon artillery munitions will remain airtight for 15 to 25 years at a depth of 50 to 200 meters.

[Gusev] Unfortunately, it seems that they started leaking a long time ago. What, in your opinion, has happened to their deadly contents?

[Yevstafyev] Mustard gas is virtually insoluble in water and the products of its hydrolysis are quite toxic, therefore we can expect the munitions that originally carried it to retain toxic products even after partial rust-through corrosion. But as long as the munitions are under a layer of silt they will pose no danger to the environment even after the casings have been completely destroyed. Lewisite is easily hydrolyzed, but it contains arsenic, all compounds of which are toxic. These are safer when covered by silt. Sarin, which is a particular worry for the Danes and Norwegians, is not present on the seabed—it was not produced back then.

The shells are most probably dispersed over a large area, overgrown with seaweed and barnacles, and covered with sand and silt. Even if they could be "counted" and detected, we would need to determine whether chemical agents were present in them. How would we determine whether they were airtight or whether hydrolysis had taken place? And how would a corroded shell be brought to the surface? How would the chemical agent be destroyed and where would this happen? The modern technology developed in our country has been designed for a different type of munition.

[Gusev] Nonetheless, there is a problem and it cannot be avoided.

[Yevstafyev] And it will be very expensive. If a decision is made to rid the floor of the Baltic of military chemicals, then the combination of cryogenic technology with technology for burning toxins while, naturally, purifying the waste gases, will look very attractive. Most probably, installations would have to be set up on mobile floating platforms, since transporting munitions raised from the seabed will be highly problematic, and the effectiveness and purposefulness of the work is not yet clear.

Captain First Class Yuriy Yefremov, chief of the Baltic Fleet's Chemical Service, is also confident that there has been no sudden massive discharge of toxic agents. Vasiliy Rodionov, a civilian and secretary for technology questions with the international commission for the protection of the Baltic Sea region maritime environment, sees no grounds for panic either.

But, despite all this, the Swedish newspaper SYDS-
VENSKA DAGBLADET SNALLPOSTEN has shaken the world with a report that the German defense minister not only had a concrete plan for neutralizing the dumped munitions, but had also generously proposed it to us and that we had arrogantly refused. If the newspaper's information is to be believed, the minesweepers Marburg, Koblenz, and Goettingen, which have operational experience in the Persian Gulf, were prepared to bring the chemical munitions to the surface. But this is hard to believe. And anyway, bringing them to the surface is not the same thing as destroying them. H. Nilsson, a chemical agents expert at the Swedish Defense Research

Center, believes that the "Stoltenberg plans are more akin to a political gesture than anything realistic," and that the danger of chemical agents being present in the seawater has been patently exaggerated.

The Baltic is a polluted sea. And, unfortunately, poorer and poorer owners—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland—live along its coastline. They cannot afford to shell out the \$22 billion which those in the know reckon would be needed for a complete clean-up. Our former "sisters forever" in the Baltic have a vision of Russia as the rightful heir to all the sins of the former Union, hinting that it would be a good idea for it to spend some of the dollars it has borrowed from the West on "chemically cleaning" the Baltic seabed. And they are not alone in their complaints. The West is not refusing to give technical assistance, but the politicians' new wave of interest in the fate of a foreign sea gives their well-off potential voters a chance for lucrative capital investment. It is undoubtedly a good cause, but it should just be looked at from both sides. We have plenty of things to spend money on—we just do not have the money... During Yeltsin's visit to Helsinki it was decided that an international commission would draw up a program for raising and destroying the German shells. But our unjustified sense of nonexistent guilt could cost our taxpayers very much under this program.

Yet a far wealthier power—Britain—has been unenthusiastic about the Scandinavian idea of stopping the seabed from being turned into a nuclear dumping ground, and, weighing up its abilities, replied that it could do nothing to help before 1998: There is nowhere left to put the waste. Incidentally, Britain is responsible for three-quarters of all the nuclear waste that has officially been dumped in the Atlantic. And the other countries on the list are not paupers either—Switzerland, the United States, Belgium...

...Which in no way means that we should follow their example and give up on the Baltic. Of course it must be saved. But saved jointly. All the more so because it is now far more important to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia than it is to Russia, which controls a far smaller area of the Baltic, whose industrial pollution has come not only and not so much from Russian shores. It is obvious that military chemical pollution is now less dangerous than industrial pollution, which continues to flow into this tragic semi-enclosed sea from sovereign shores. Bombs, shells, and weapons are words which impress politicians more than environmentalists. During election campaigns politicians will be happy to harp on about the dumped bombs to their "green" voters. Is it worth playing to the gallery on this subject? The process of cleaning the Baltic may be accelerated if this international problem becomes the focus of short-term policy, but it will hardly benefit from it.

There is no need to rush when fishing for bombs.

Text of Resolution on CBW Treaty Commitments

*PM2407135092 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Jul 92 First Edition p 4*

["Resolution of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on Ensuring the Fulfillment of the Russian Federation's International Commitments in the Sphere of Chemical, Bacteriological (Biological), and Toxin Weapons," No. 3244-1, signed by Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman R.I. Khasbulatov and dated 8 July 1992]

[Text] Having examined the state of fulfillment of the Russian Federation's international commitments in the sphere of chemical, bacteriological (biological), and toxin weapons [CBW], the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To confirm the Russian Federation's status as legal successor to the USSR's commitments under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972) and under bilateral Soviet-U.S. accords on the control of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles, and also to confirm the commitment to the policy of concluding a global convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

2. The Russian Federation president is recommended to submit to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet draft legislative acts of the Russian Federation on the prohibition, in line with the Russian Federation's international commitments, of the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical, bacteriological (biological), and toxin weapons, and on the liability of officials for violations of the said commitments.

3. It is deemed expedient to allocate as a separate item in the Russian Federation Republic budget, under the heading "Implementation of international treaties on the elimination, reduction, and limitation of arms," appropriations for expenditure, including expenditure in freely convertible currency, associated with the fulfillment of the Russian Federation's international commitments on matters relating to conventions on chemical and biological weapons.

4. The Russian Federation Government, in conjunction with the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on Industry and Power Generation and the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources, is instructed to submit to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet by 15 September 1992 draft comprehensive programs for the phased destruction of chemical weapons and the utilization of the specialized biotechnological potential to organize the development and production of medical preparations.

[Signed] Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman R.I. Khasbulatov. [Dated] Moscow, Russian House of Soviets, 8 July 1992, No. 3244-1.

Provisions of Weapons Ban Convention Described

*PM0308153392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Jul 92 p 3*

[Report by Mikhail Zheglov: "Chemical Weapons Finally Banned"]

[Text] Representatives of the 39 countries party to the Disarmament Conference have once again assembled in Geneva following the summer recess. They will discuss the draft convention on a global chemical weapons ban.

In accordance with the draft convention the acquisition, development, production, sale, and use of chemical weapons is universally prohibited. What is more, not only all stocks of this kind of mass destruction weapon but also any existing enterprises producing them should be destroyed within 10 years after the document comes into force. The convention makes provision for the monitoring [slezheniye] of national chemical industry installations and for regular inspections with a view to preventing chemical weapons production. Provision is also made for measures to ensure the effective monitoring of possible violations, including the inspection of installations on demand. In the latter case countries will be obliged to provide foreign observers with access to installations suspected of producing chemical weapons.

The following element is also interesting. A state party to the convention, if subjected to an attack involving the use of chemical weapons, does not have the right to use these weapons to repulse the aggression even if it still has stocks of such weapons at the time in question. Nor can it retain its reserve stocks of war gas until all countries with chemical weapons subscribe to the convention.

The working group operating within the framework of the conference expects the draft convention to be ratified by 7 August in order to give the UN Secretariat time to decide the size of the text, determine whether it conforms with legal norms, and translate it. Following these purely technical procedures, a vote at the UN General Assembly session to be held this fall in New York awaits the convention. If it is adopted it will be open for signature late this year or early next year in Paris. The document will come into force once it has been ratified by 65 states.

To date, according to Stephen Ledogar, U.S. delegation head at the Geneva conference, two-thirds of the conference participants are willing to subscribe to the convention. They include Russia, the United States, Canada, all West and East European countries, and a number of states in Latin America. As for the rest, they still have time to make up their minds.

U.S.-Russian Agreement on Aid in CW Destruction**CBW Committee Chairman Comments**

*PM0508084992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Jul 92 Morning Edition p 6*

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "Americans Will Pay for Destruction of Chemical Weapons in Russia"]

[Text] Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons [CBW] under the Russian president, and Donald Atwood, U.S. deputy defense secretary, signed an agreement on the secure, reliable, and environmentally clean destruction of chemical weapons in our country.

Russia needs to spend 100 billion rubles to get rid of the 40,000 tonnes of these lethal weapons. The U.S. Government has decided to allocate us during the initial phase \$25 million of the \$400 million that the United States is willing to spend to help our country eliminate all kinds of mass destruction weapons.

But this is no act of charity. Specialists think that in adopting this decision, the U.S. Congress was primarily acting in the interests of its own national security, rightly thinking that if mass destruction weapons are eliminated somewhere, they will never threaten the lives of U.S. citizens.

"Another fundamental idea behind this decision by Congress," Academician Kuntsevich said during a conversation with your IZVESTIYA commentator, "was that Russia is indeed in a difficult economic position and cannot raise this problem without real outside aid."

However, the chairman of the conventional committee said, everyone is perfectly well aware that no matter how great and timely the aid, it will not replace Russian spending and efforts to destroy the stocks of chemical agents, although it will be a major incentive for it to organize the work and transform existing projects into concrete real actions.

Moreover, the money allocated by the U.S. Administration will not enter Russia's economy in the form of long-term loans or deposits and will not be spent on other purposes. The agreement between the two countries envisages that the chemical disarmament process in our country will be funded via a U.S. firm that will win a tender for this work.

According to Anatoliy Kuntsevich, the firm will take part in formulating a concept for the destruction of chemical weapons and preparing and analyzing tenders for our installations, it will recruit experts to assess them and also supply reliable high-tech equipment—reactors, furnaces for incinerating munitions, containment structures [zapornaya armatura], automated systems, measuring equipment, and apparatus enabling effective

checks to be carried out, including on the environment. This apparatus only exists in the United States.

Russian specialists will also be involved in choosing this firm. The agreement also envisages that our scientists and experts will work with the Americans during all phases involved in formulating and implementing the plans for the destruction and salvaging of chemical weapons. The projects themselves will be the incarnation of all our countries' best and most effective achievements in this field.

Provision has been made for a special center to be set up based on the Russian conventional committee to exercise national and international supervision of the chemical weapons destruction process. Our specialists hope to recruit not only U.S. but also European firms to take part in the program for the chemical demilitarization of Russia, in particular to create comfortable population centers and social facilities in line with high international standards in terms of living conditions.

"We think," Academician Kuntsevich told your IZVESTIYA commentator, "that highly developed countries can help Russia in destroying and salvaging chemical weapons in highly varied areas, including meeting the needs of the local population and personnel working at the installations eliminating the toxic chemical agents as far as improving their living and working conditions is concerned."

What will the first \$25 million in U.S. aid be used for? According to the chairman of the conventional committee, it will be used to assess the possibilities of reorienting a chemical plant that was at one time engaged in producing chemical agents to destroying these agents and also to conduct expert analysis of the largest chemical weapons stocks—lewisite and mustard gas. They were formed back in the forties and present the greatest environmental concern today.

Kuntsevich thinks that these toxic chemical agents should be destroyed on site.

The academician thinks that the projects prepared for international tender accord with the highest requirements of absolute reliability, guaranteed security, and environmental cleanliness. Admittedly, they will also be comprehensively evaluated not only by international experts, but also by the population of those areas where it is planned to build the installations to destroy the toxic chemical agents, and will only be accepted for implementation with their consent.

Incidentally, President Boris Yeltsin recently published a special ordinance on priority measures to prepare to implement Russia's international pledges in the sphere of destroying chemical weapons stocks, an ordinance which makes provision for a whole series of specific measures and concessions with regard to developing the social infrastructure, improving material and social provisioning for workers and the population of areas where

the installations destroying the toxic chemical agents are sited, and ensuring priority supplies of food and industrial commodities for them.

When will the Russian-U.S. agreement start producing a real return? After a competition has been held in the United States to find the firm to whom to entrust cooperation with Russia's conventional committee.

According to Anatoliy Kuntsevich, this work will take several months under U.S. legal norms and regulations. Then the plans will be studied, the best one will be established, and experimental design work carried out—that will take roughly a year. It will take another year to organize the full-scale process for destroying one of the most dangerous kinds of mass-destruction weapons. So, 1995 may see the launch of the program.

We are in no hurry," Anatoliy Kuntsevich said before flying off to Washington. "The main thing is to start the process of ridding mankind of lethal weapons. One of the main priorities should be to ensure not only that our people are absolutely secure, but also that the population, the natural environment, and ecology of other countries are too. That is the crux and purpose of Russian-U.S. cooperation."

Commentary on Agreement

LD3107223092 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 31 Jul 92

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] Russia and the United States signed a cooperation agreement in Washington on Thursday [30 July] to destroy the existing stockpile of chemical weapons. Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov:

The deal follows an agreement that Moscow and Washington signed two years ago on halting the production and eliminating the existing chemical stockpiles. Work is due to be finalized later next month on an international chemical ban which may come into force already next year. Under yesterday's deal struck at the Defense Department, the United States will help Russia destroy its chemical stockpile by allocating \$25 million to this end.

The appropriate contract will be awarded to an American firm on a competitive basis. Such a company is expected to come up with projects for the weapons' destruction, including a feasibility plan for reconvertng a Russian chemical plant engaged in the manufacture of toxic agents into a weapons construction [as heard] facility.

One of the overriding priorities is to determine how to dispose best of large stocks of toxic agents such as lewisite and mustard gas, causing most concern by the environmentalists. Much of these was produced back in the 1940's and has to be destroyed locally.

The American company is also expected to supply incinerators, automation, and the equipment for monitoring the process of destruction and the state of the environment.

A Russian official, Anatoliy Kuntsevich, who signed the Washington deal on behalf of this country, says that the United States is the only country possessing such equipment. Russian and U.S. experts will work together at all stages of the weapons destruction, and a team of Russian specialists is due to visit U.S. installations to watch the process there.

The agreement is part of the Russian Government's program for the elimination of chemical weapons, with parliament instructing the cabinet to submit its draft by 15 September. Russian legislators approved a resolution speaking of the need to prepare laws and earmarked funds to meet the country's obligations for the destruction of chemical weapons. Russia faces a daunting job of getting rid of a total 40 million tons [tonnes] of toxic agents at the cost of 100 billion rubles or \$800 million at the current exchange rate. Although the U.S. aid looks too small, it can certainly be of help to the ailing Russian economy. More importantly, the two countries once again join forces in one another's practical venture to the benefit of mankind.

The destruction of the existing stockpile of chemical weapons is the best guarantee that neither the Russians nor the Americans nor the people of other countries will ever face the nightmare of troubles linked with the use or storage of this barbaric type of weapons.

Problems With Destroying Chemical Weapons

LD3107113192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0610 GMT 31 Jul 92

[Text] [Announcer] Near the port of Kambarka in the Udmurt Autonomous Republic in central Russia there are reported to be big stockpiles of the deadly chemical warfare agent Lewisite. Disposing of the stockpile will be quite a problem but our science correspondent Boris Belitskiy has heard of some new ideas on the score. Boris, what did you hear?

[Belitskiy] First of all, let me explain that Lewisite is a vesicant. That is an agent that forms blisters on the skin, just like the notorious mustard gas of World War I fame. But unlike mustard gas, Lewisite has never been used in action. As for its stockpile in the Udmurt Republic, that's doomed to stay put for at least four or five years. The reason is that there is as yet no method for destroying Lewisite. It's therefore expected that a contest will be announced for the development of the safest and least expensive method of its destruction.

In the meantime however a group of scientists in Russia have proposed one such method which seems to be quite promising.

[Announcer] And how general is this problem Boris?

[Belitskiy] Well, in the Commonwealth of Independent States there is a total of nearly 40,000t [tonnes] of poison gases and something like 30,000 in the United States. This is a huge amount and the problem of destroying them is now quite a formidable problem. The method of destroying them that has been proposed, quite unexpectedly, originates with a group of scientists in Arzemas-16.

[Announcer] And what is that?

[Belitskiy] That's a formerly hush-hush town which is the home of Russia's Research Institute of Experimental Physics [as heard] which has been concerned with developing atomic and hydrogen bombs. Its deputy scientific head, Dr. Yuriy (Trubnev), has just proposed that these very bombs be used to destroy chemical warfare agents. Here he is, explaining his idea.

[(Trubnev), in Russian with English translation by Belitskiy] (Trubnev) says they're studying the problem of destroying chemical warfare agents, highly toxic wastes of the chemical industry and even nuclear warheads by nuclear explosions. To be sure the public is today highly allergic to underground nuclear explosions but it's simply uninformed in (Trubnev's) view of the fact that such explosions can be conducted in an ecologically clean manner, provided appropriate geological structures are chosen and the blasts are conducted at an adequate depth.

(Trubnev) says that he and his colleagues could demonstrate that chemical warfare agents can be destroyed in this way without dismantling. Other destruction technologies require that chemical weapons be dismantled and the poisonous chemicals be extracted from them. What's more the destruction of chemical weapons has to be not just 99 percent effective but 99.9999 etc. percent effective. A nuclear blast achieves just that. It turns the chemicals into plasma, after which only simple substances can be formed. Existing technologies on the other hand produce other substances and they too have to be buried.

(Trubnev) sees this dilemma. Either we keep storing the chemical warfare agents, running the risk of a chemical Chernobyl, or else, at a fraction of the cost, destroy them by means of an underground nuclear explosion. Back to (Trubnev):

(Trubnev) considers the technology sufficiently developed for a demonstration under international supervision. It's important he feels to convince the world public of this. Physicists are after all part of society and they cannot live in society and feel entirely independent of it.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Talks With PRC on Border Troop Reductions Recess

LD0408174492 Moscow *ITAR-TASS* in English
1645 GMT 4 Aug 92

[By *ITAR-TASS* diplomatic correspondent Igor Shubin]

[Text] Moscow August 4 TASS—The seventh round of negotiations between delegations from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China has come to an end.

The round was held between July 21 and August 4 in accordance with the agreement of April 24, 1990, "On fundamental principles of mutual reduction of armed forces and consolidation of trust in the military sphere in the border area".

In a friendly and constructive atmosphere, the sides continued to discuss components and categories of armaments and materiel liable for reduction, as well as territorial aspects of the future agreement, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Directorate Sergey Yastrzhembskiy told a briefing here today.

The delegations were received by First Deputy Russian Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin, as well as at the Russian Foreign Ministry.

When visiting the Russian Federation, the Chinese delegation made a trip around the Far Eastern Military District, including the cities of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and Khabarovsk.

The next round of negotiations will be held in Beijing in the fall.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Russia-Byelarus Nuclear Weapons Accord Viewed

Joint Launch Decision Needed

OW2407123792 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English
1203 GMT 24 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The agreement between Byelarus and Russia on defence matters guarantees reliable coordination of all issues on the presence of nuclear weapons in Byelarus. The republican government circles single out as the main achievement just this point in the document, signed in Moscow on Monday [20 July] by the Premier Vyacheslav Kebich and the acting head of the Russian cabinet Yegor Gaydar. It's noted that until recently, secret codes to control nuclear missiles launch were in the Russian President Boris Yeltsin's hands in Moscow. A new system, as sources close to the Byelarusian Parliament's leader believe, makes it technically impossible to launch strategic missiles without a joint decision.

Although concrete terms for the withdrawal of Russia's strategic forces from Byelarus were not agreed in Moscow, the delegations noted at their meeting that they must not be longer than 7 years, as had been determined at the Lisbon conference. The documents signed in

Russia are intended for only 5 years. They take effect after the ratification by both Parliaments.

Byelarusian Defense Minister Cited

*LD2407163992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1211 GMT 24 Jul 92*

[By BELINFORM correspondent Valentina Menshikova for TASS]

[Text] Minsk July 24 TASS—"It is impossible to use nuclear armaments temporarily remaining on the Byelarusian territory without the consent of the republic", according to Byelarusian Defence Minister Pavel Kozlovski.

This provision is included into a treaty signed with Russia on July 20, he said at a meeting with British military attache on Friday [24 July].

The treaty also envisages that strategic nuclear arms, which are to be withdrawn from Byelarus in seven years according to the Lisbon agreement, will be eliminated only in Russia, he added.

The treaty is not a military pact between two states and it is not aimed against third countries, according to Kozlovski. The document confirms the principles and provisions enclosed in the U.N. Charter.

It envisages that in case of aggression against one of the parties the other one promotes legal and political settlement of the conflict. Byelarus and Russia will hold consultations and use internationally-acknowledged mechanisms of settlement in case of an attack or a threat of aggression against each of them, the minister explained.

SRF Deputy Commander Discusses Nuclear Ownership

*LD0308190292 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 0415 GMT 3 Aug 92*

[Interview with Colonel General Igor Dmitriyevich Sergeev, first deputy commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, by correspondent Tatyana Chemodanova; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Chemodanova] Igor Dmitriyevich, the issue of nuclear-free status is a matter of great concern for world public opinion on the whole, and I am not overstating it. However, it is still unclear how this issue is going to be solved. What is the current state of the issue of the unity of missile forces within the strategic forces?

[Sergeev] This question is worrying both the world public, the newcomer states [novoye zarubezhye], and Russia itself, for this will determine future developments to a great degree. On the positive side, the following can be pointed out at the moment. The co-participants, that is co-owners of the nuclear arms—Kazakhstan and Byelarus—have defined, I believe, their position and taken

the appropriate decision, or are about to take one. They have already routinely agreed on all documents. On the whole, the centrifugal trends that used to be prominent until now have given way to some signs of centripetal force.

Both Kazakhstan and Byelarus will agree, I think, that they should implement the Lisbon accords in the near future and ask to take, or take under their jurisdiction those units of Strategic Rocket Forces that will be temporarily located on their territories.

[Chemodanova] Igor Dmitriyevich, you have mentioned centripetal tendencies in the Commonwealth. Does Ukraine have the same tendency?

[Sergeev] One cannot probably say that the same tendency can be observed where Ukraine is concerned, though it is to be desired, naturally. At present, I believe, Ukraine has not yet defined its positions and are remaining the same as before. That is, administrative management has been introduced in Ukraine and is being implemented in the missile units located on its territory. However, in the future our Ukrainian friends may take the same path.

[Chemodanova] In your view, is there a way out of this situation which is somewhat entangled?

[Sergeev] The tendencies that have emerged and the actions undertaken by Byelarus, and those that Kazakhstan is going to take in the near future, lead me to believe that wisdom will take the upper hand; that the same tendencies will come into our relationships with our other partners. Soon, I think, Ukraine may define its stand as well.

Ukraine Claims Ownership of 19 TU-160 Bombers

*LD0408124592 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 4 Aug 92*

[Text] Yesterday, the leaders of Russia and Ukraine reached a mutually acceptable decision on the future of the Black Sea Fleet, as first comments suggest. However, it is difficult to imagine that the implementation of this decision will go smoothly. There are still questions, and not only where the military marine are concerned.

Likewise, some of the military aircraft are in Russia, but the uniforms and helmets for the crew are in the Ukraine. That is something else to be divided. Our correspondent Igor Deryugin reports from Saratov:

[Deryugin] The TU-160, a jet bomber which is now being tested at an airfield in the Saratov area, is deemed to be one of the most important components of the national [otechestvennaya] strategic triad alongside the TU-95. The maximum flight speed of this machine is 2000 km an hour, maximum weight at take-off is 265 tonnes.

These and other performance data allow specialists to consider this machine to be the most powerful aviation complex in the world.

Tests of these planes in the Saratov sky are being carried out by officers of the Poltava-Darvinskiy Guards Aviation Regiment, based in Priluki [Ukraine]. However, at present it is hard to consider the regiment as existing, for the majority of its officers, having refused to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine, are now serving in a unit in the Saratov area.

The decision to leave Ukrainian territory was made at the General Officers' Assembly. Here in the Volga region, they are facing a lot of problems as well, accommodation being the main one. But these are problems of a different magnitude, the officers believe.

In the meantime, 19 TU-160 planes have been left in Priluki, and Ukraine is claiming them. In terms of strategic capability they are unlikely to be of interest to Ukraine. So the probability is that the bombers will be sold, fetching at least 2 billion [currency not specified] each. So, following the Black Sea Fleet, the long-range aviation which used to be part of the single CIS system of strategic forces is now up for grabs.

Tu-160 Bombers Transferred From Ukraine to Russia

*PM0408123792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Aug 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Igor Andreyev report: "CIS Strategic Aviation Following the 'Black Sea' Scenario?"—the report is accompanied by a photograph of an aircraft taken by the author]

[Text] The air base at Engels (Saratov Oblast) has witnessed an event: The Tu-160 long-range supersonic bombers have had their first training flights there. The heavy craft, which, it was specially emphasized, belong to Russian military aviation, were piloted by men who have just transferred to serve in Engels from the Ukrainian village of Priluki.

The flights in Engels should have seemed festive, but they made me feel sad and perplexed, primarily because the crews who took to the skies here have already displayed before journalists the most sophisticated aircraft in our combat aviation. Three years ago, in Priluki itself, where the main base for the dreaded state-of-the-art strategic bombers was set up. Now we have, as it were, a second premier following the dramatic events that have divided one country's army into the armed forces of various states.

While politicians are investigating to whom the strategic weapons belong, some two dozen of the fabulously expensive aircraft nationalized by Ukraine are being put out of commission at the Priluki airfield. At any rate, only a few Tu-160's are still capable of flying. Unlike the aircraft, which are indifferent about the state to which

they belong, the people who command them have had to decide under which flag to serve. They have made the decision—30 pilots and the same number of ground crew officers—not to swear two oaths. They have left their home airfield, their apartments, and their friends and have flown to Engels to start everything from scratch.

This is no figurative speech—"from scratch"—because there is little at the base in the Volga region that is reminiscent of Priluki. Instead of a well-equipped airfield costing billions, there are ground services and structures ill-adapted to the Tu-160's. Instead of a smooth way of life, they face an officers' hostel and life without their families. There are none of the high-altitude flight suits and protective helmets with the special radio socket [radiator] just for the Tu-160's—everything has been left behind in Ukraine, and this apparent trifle is causing pilots a vexing feeling of discomfort.

Mature restrained men with the rarest of flight qualifications—only a few dozen crews worldwide fly this class of aircraft; there are far fewer of them than cosmonauts—are not reproaching the Ukrainian authorities and their former comrades-in-arms. But it is obvious that they are really suffering as a result of the aircraft being divided up and people split up. They are glad to be flying again after a break of almost four months. They discuss heatedly and with some disquiet the ups-and-downs involved in the construction of an apartment block where local airmen have allocated apartments for the newcomers, keeping them separate from themselves.

On the day when some of the men from Priluki were testing the Tu-160, others headed off to Ukraine, to their families. They asked: Don't write bad things about our former colleagues and commanders, we still go there. I won't, but I would like to make this point—I think that these pilots in Engels, in Russia, have a sense of their professional and personal future. They are at home, they are flying, receiving housing, and they know who they are serving, and why—unlike the men serving in strategic aviation in Priluki, aviation which effectively no longer exists.

The photograph shows the first takeoff of the Russian Tu-160 from the Engels Air Base.

Byelarusian Defense Minister on Doctrine, Nuclear Arms

*OW0508170992 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1612 GMT 5 Aug 92*

[Report on interview with Byelarusian Defense Minister Pavel Kozlovskiy; place and date not given; from the 6 August "Presidential Bulletin"—transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Becoming a neutral state is one of the strategic aims of Byelarus but an aim which is difficult to attain, Byelarusian Defense Minister Pavel Kozlovskiy said in an exclusive interview with IF [INTERFAX].

He stressed the special geographical position of the republic, with the principal railways and motor roads between Russia and the West running through its territory. For this reason "a stable and consistent policy on the part of Byelarus is in the interest of the entire European Community." More specifically this means that Byelarus will have its own independent military policy. "What kind of policy this will be," Kozlovskiy said, "will be clear when we have finished work on our military doctrine, which will be an officially adopted set of fundamental propositions on what kind of armed forces we should have, how we should handle foreign aggression, and what steps we should take to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Byelarus. We need a doctrine reflecting the interests of Byelarus as a neutral nuclear-free state and taking into account the political situation in the world." He believes that initially the republic may have a provisional military doctrine for the period until Byelarus has finished forming its own armed forces and Russia has withdrawn its entire 30,000-strong strategic contingent from Byelarusian territory. A draft for this doctrine, the minister said, had recently been considered by the Byelarusian Security Council, which accepted all the basic propositions in it. After some amendments were made to it on the basis of various criticisms and suggestions, it would be considered by the Security Council once again and would then be introduced into the parliament.

In Kozlovskiy's opinion it is too early today to describe Byelarus as a neutral state. It took Austria, Switzerland, and other countries centuries to become neutral, and they had to go through many political vicissitudes to attain that status too.

The Byelarusian armed forces possessed considerable offensive potential, Kozlovskiy pointed out. "Byelarus has inherited it from the USSR, and we have to get rid of this legacy gradually, carefully, and intelligently," he said. He thought Byelarus had normal relations with all its neighbors. According to him, the military agreement it has signed with Russia and those it is planning to sign with other former Soviet republics are not attempts to set up a military alliance but are simply designed to put Byelarus's military relations with those states on a more systematic basis.

Commenting on his republic's agreements with Russia on the nuclear weapons stationed on Byelarusian territory, Kozlovskiy said, "We have agreed to work out mechanisms which would make it technically impossible to use Russian nuclear weapons stationed on our territory without consent on the part of our leadership. We were not making arrangements for joint use of nuclear missiles but were making technical provisions to prevent their use." Asked about the usefulness of the Byelarusian Defense Ministry's contacts with its counterparts abroad, Kozlovskiy answered, "The main thing is experience. I've been to France and Finland, and have met members of the military from other states too. Many of them were quite open about the structure of their defense ministries, about their systems of personnel training, and about the procedures in which their armed forces were being reduced. At present we are inviting British and French military experts to come to Byelarus to discuss a few points." According to Kozlovskiy, shortage of funds is the greatest problem in the forming of the Byelarusian armed forces. "According to very modest estimates, this year we will have about 13 billion rubles less than we need," he complained.

FINLAND

President on Russian Troops in Border Region, Baltics

PM1707134892 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 15 Jul 92 p 5

[Report by Bjarne Nitovuori: "Conflicts Not Only Our Fault"]

[Excerpts] Kultaranta—One of the impressions President Mauno Koivisto formed during President Boris Yeltsin's visit at the end of last week was of the Russian leadership's willingness to look at history from the angle that the Soviet Union also made mistakes in the past. However, Koivisto did not think that the admission that the Soviet Union interfered in Finland's internal affairs was particularly remarkable. [passage omitted]

The information Koivisto was given during Yeltsin's visit about the Russian troops close to our borders was "very satisfying."

"Yeltsin knew about the debate that has taken place here, and we said that we are only interested primarily in knowing what is happening."

Koivisto expressed his understanding that the Russian troops that are being withdrawn from many countries have to be stationed somewhere.

Koivisto also commented on Yeltsin's proposal to make the border between our two countries more "transparent."

"Since there is great unrest in the world and many sorts of desirable and undesirable changes are also taking place on the territory of our eastern neighbor, we naturally want to see that our border is kept under proper surveillance."

But he did not rule out more open borders in the future "if the state of affairs in the world improves" and if Russia puts its economy in order.

He said that he thinks that he has noted certain developments in a positive direction in the East. In Koivisto's view, a sign of this is the fact that within the CIS, agreement has been reached on cooperative solutions to solve the economic problems and on peacekeeping arrangements.

According to Koivisto, a good solution to the question of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states was achieved in the final document from last week's CSCE summit.

"I would think that it largely corresponded to the Baltic countries' aspirations. The most important thing for us, bearing in mind our immediate environs, is that an authoritative international forum approved a statement which in itself provides a framework for the status of the

Russian troops and their withdrawal. Yeltsin has also made statements which have supported the CSCE stance."

Koivisto reminded the press that even before the CSCE summit, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NACC—of which the NATO countries, the former Warsaw Pact countries, and the former Soviet republics are members—reached agreement on a fairly far-reaching statement on the Russian troops. Koivisto mentioned that this is one of the reasons why Finland wants to know what is going on in the NACC.

"Since agreement was reached in the NACC between the Baltic states and Russia on that statement, we were interested to know what else is discussed there," Koivisto said on the subject of Finland's observer status in the NACC.

He admitted that there was some confusion when Finland became an observer, but stressed that everything happened for a good reason. [passage omitted]

SWEDEN

Foreign Minister on Sweden's Disarmament Role

PM2807152092 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 21 Jul 92 p 3

[Focus' article by Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas: "Sweden's Contribution to Disarmament"]

[Text] Swedish disarmament policy has to operate in a dramatically changed world, which is characterized both by opportunities and by threats. Our policy must constantly adjust itself to these developments. Two lines of development have recently been dominating the world stage.

The end of the cold war has meant that the two largest nuclear powers have begun real nuclear disarmament. Iraq's arms buildup and attack on Kuwait has brought the world's attention to the risk of the spread of weapons of mass destruction to major regional powers. More than ever before, the problems of nonproliferation have moved to center stage. They will, it seems, be the central issues in the field of disarmament in the nineties.

After decades of continuous growth in the size of nuclear arsenals, the tide began to turn in 1987 when the United States and what was then the Soviet Union reached the INF agreement on the total abolition of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe. Since then nuclear disarmament has accelerated. Last summer there was the START agreement on reductions in strategic arsenals. During the fall of 1991 and in early 1992, the two superpowers announced further unilateral nuclear arms cuts.

At the summit in Washington in June between President Bush and President Yeltsin, the two states reached agreement on further drastic cuts.

The agreement means that the number of warheads will decrease to one-third of their present level. All the land-based missiles which were the nucleus of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arms capability will be scrapped.

The comprehensive cuts that have been announced are a tangible reflection of the new world situation. The most recent indication of the new situation in which we find ourselves is the fact that the United States has decided to halt the production of plutonium and enriched uranium for military purposes. This is yet another important link in the chain of nuclear disarmament.

The build-down of the enormous nuclear arsenals is not without its problems, however. There must be controls on the fissionable material which becomes available when nuclear arms are dismantled. Maintaining surveillance over this material will be one of the central tasks of the international community.

Almost two years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Through a forceful intervention by the UN Security Council, the army of invasion was defeated and Kuwait regained its independence. The Security Council decided that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and missiles must be destroyed and that in the future the country will not be allowed to acquire such weapons.

A special commission under the leadership of Sweden's CSCE ambassador, Rolf Ekeus, was given the task of destroying Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, and its missiles.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, was instructed to inspect Iraq's nuclear plants in order to prevent the country from acquiring a nuclear capacity of its own. On the strength of the Security Council's resolutions, all nuclear-relevant material and equipment must be handed over to UN personnel and be destroyed.

The special commission and the IAEA have been able to demonstrate that Iraq—in secret and contrary to its international undertakings—is well on the way to developing its own nuclear arms. So far three uranium enrichment plants have been discovered and destroyed.

The commission has also found tens of thousands of chemical weapons and uncovered proof that Iraq has engaged in advanced research into biological weapons.

Swedish experts, some of them from the Defense Research Institute, have been involved in the work of locating, identifying, and destroying Iraq's chemical and biological weapons. The IAEA has also made use of Swedish expertise when blowing up the installations which have been part of Iraq's nuclear arms program.

It is the first time in the history of the United Nations that an attacker is being disarmed in this way. It would not have been possible in the old era of bloc divisions and superpower confrontation.

The conclusion which the world's governments drew from the case of Iraq was that effective international

measures had to be adopted to prevent the further spread of nuclear arms, chemical and biological weapons, and missile technology. In a number of areas, this new awareness has resulted in concrete measures.

The international system of controls on nuclear technology was tightened up this spring by the 26 member nations, including Sweden. Now there also are rules covering so-called dual-use products which are manufactured and intended for civilian use but which can also be used for the production of nuclear arms. Iraq had been fairly successful in acquiring such products for its nuclear arms program. Missile technology can also be used for civilian and military purposes.

The rules which control the export of such products have also been tightened up.

Iraq was the first country to violate the Nonproliferation Treaty on nuclear arms (NPT) which over 140 countries have signed. As a result, discussions are taking place within the IAEA on various ways of reinforcing the organization's ability to make sure that fissionable material in the NPT's nonnuclear states is not used for the production of nuclear arms. Sweden is taking an active role in these discussions, and from this fall will do so as a member of the IAEA's governing body.

Sweden is also working to extend the NPT by the longest possible term when the future of the treaty is to be decided in 1995. We consider that it is important that the states which still remain outside the treaty should sign as soon as possible. This covers not only new states such as the nowadays independent republics of the former Soviet Union, but also a number of countries in the Third World which have been unwilling in the past to commit themselves.

A total ban on chemical weapons has been the subject of negotiations within the framework of the United Nations in Geneva for almost 10 years. The Gulf war had the effect that several countries which had previously blocked the negotiations abandoned their former positions. As a result, the road to real success was opened up.

This spring's negotiations have resulted in a final draft text of a conventional agreement on chemical weapons that is currently being scrutinized. This contains a total ban on chemical weapons, control mechanisms for checking that the convention is being observed, and rules on how existing chemical weapons are to be destroyed.

The text of the agreement has now been submitted to the respective governments for approval. A final round of negotiations will take place in early August.

Sweden has played a leading role in the negotiations. On certain points we had hoped for stricter provisions, but the prospects are good that the draft convention can be adopted by the UN General Assembly this fall.

The so-called Australia group—of which Sweden and around 20 industrialized countries form part—works

together to check on chemical weapons and is now also trying to come to grips with the spread of biological weapons. At a meeting in Paris at the beginning of June, the group reached agreement on the introduction of stricter export rules covering biological organisms which could be used as disease-inducing weapons.

As the result of a German and U.S. initiative, two research centers will shortly be set up in Moscow and Kiev with the aim of giving experts in the field of weapons of mass destruction the opportunity to apply themselves to other tasks in their field of competence. Sweden, which is one of the founders of the Kiev center, has promised to make contributions to both centers totalling over 30 billion kronor on the condition that their work also includes civilian nuclear safety. Our involvement is an expression of our interest in the aim that knowledge of nuclear technology should be used for peaceful purposes.

As an expression of our concern over the poor safety of a large number of formerly Soviet nuclear power stations, I set up in February of this year a group of experts who were given the task of proposing and preparing Swedish action in support of disarmament and nuclear safety in the CIS states and the Baltic region.

The National Nuclear Power Inspection Board and the National Institute of Radiation Protection have developed close cooperation in the field of nuclear safety with the corresponding authorities in Estonia, Latvia, and

Lithuania. The group of experts is also preparing further measures to help with the establishing of border control systems able to prevent the spread from the CIS countries of material and technology for the production of weapons of mass destruction.

The seemingly unchecked growth of arms arsenals in regions of conflict like the Middle East has led as a first countermeasure to the internationally coordinated charting of deliveries of heavy and sophisticated arms. Sweden is one of the cosponsors of a UN resolution to be discussed this fall on the introduction of a special register of the trade in conventional arms. In the initial phase, countries will be called on to provide information about exports and imports of heavy conventional arms from 1 January 1992.

At the same time, as problems linked with the spread of arms have become more important, the United Nations' capacity to take action in this field has increased. The UN Charter gives the Security Council the ultimate responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. In line with this, considerable attention was paid to nonproliferation issues in the declaration which the Security Council's members adopted at their summit in January this year. In it they committed themselves to working to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction. If Sweden gathers support for its candidacy and wins a place on the Security Council for the next term, we will have an opportunity to make a special contribution in this area.

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