POLICE INTEGRITY:
USE OF PERSONALITY MEASURES TO IDENTIFY CORRUPTION-PRONE OFFICERS

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PREFACE

The primary research question addressed in this study of police betrayal is whether pre-employment psychological screening tests can identify individuals prone to engage in acts of trust betrayal. And, by inference, whether a similar method be developed to screen out people who might be prone to committ espionage.

We posed the question as part of our study of espionage, a subject of great concern to PERSEREC. The major problem in studying espionage, however, is that it occurs relatively rarely. Thus, only a few cases become available for analysis. On the other hand, similar acts of betrayal do occur in other contexts: people sometimes embezzle money, and some law enforcement officers commit acts of betrayal (serious crimes). If we could increase the numbers of cases of such espionage-like betrayal in our databases and thus be able to conduct statistically meaningful analyses, our work could lead to an enhanced understanding of why some people, including spies, commit acts of trust betrayal.

In this study, we used police corruption as the surrogate for espionage. Policemen, and those with access to government secrets, are all required to submit to thorough background checks before being employed. However, in the case of the police, many are given personality tests as part of their standard pre-employment screening battery. By examining the test materials filled out during the job application process and comparing them to the records of policemen who later commit crimes, our researchers attempted to answer the question of whether the pre-employment tests could be used to identify, and even perhaps predict, those who might engage in trust betrayal.

We sought and obtained cooperation from over 2,000 police departments nationwide. Sixty-nine of those departments had the type of cases we were interested in and were able to supply all of the personality, background and offense data we required. Complete data sets were obtained on 439 offenders and 439 matched non-offenders.

We would like to thank all the organizations and many individuals who provided valuable assistance during the course of the study. A partial list of their names appears in the acknowledgement section at the end of this report.

James A. Riedel
Director

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background:

The primary purpose of this study was to determine the feasibility of screening for police corruption using currently administered psychological instruments. Scales and items from four psychological tests actually administered to the subjects as part of their standard pre-employment screening process were utilized. Those tests were the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), the California Personality Inventory (CPI), the 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF), and the Inwald Personality Inventory (IPI). The goal was to identify those sets of items and scales that could differentiate officers who engaged in corrupt acts after they were hired *from* an equal number of matched officers presumed not to have engaged in acts of corruption. Violators were a) identified by their department as having engaged in at least one act of corruption, b) had their involvement in that act corroborated/substantiated, <u>and</u> c) were formally punished for committing that violation.

Method:

Over 4,000 departments were contacted and asked whether they were both willing and able to participate in this study. A vast majority of the departments that responded either did not a) administer psychological pre-employment tests, b) retain or have access to the results of those previously administered tests, or c) have a current or former officer that they successfully caught and punished for corruption. Sixty-nine departments met all of the prerequisites and supplied personality test data on 878 officers (439 violators and 439 non-violators). All of the officers included in the study were anonymous.

The pre-employment personality test most frequently administered to those officers when they originally applied to their respective departments was the MMPI (92.7%), followed by CPI (41.0%), 16PF (11.2%) and IPI (11.0%). Many of the subjects completed more than one of those psychological tests during their selection phase.

Two-thirds of the subject data was placed in a developmental sub-sample. This sub-sample was used to try to identify or create scales that predicted corruption. The other third of the cases was used as a "hold-out" sample to cross-validate those findings.

Results:

Overall, the predictive scales did very poorly during the attempted cross-validation. This indicates that at best only modest improvements in combating corruption can be made through better utilization of the personality data that is being collected.

Of the few personality measures that had any success in the cross-validation attempts, they tended to indicate that the

violators had <u>more</u>
        difficulty getting along with others,
        delinquent histories, and
        indications of maladjustment, immaturity, irresponsibility, and/or unreliability.

Non-violators, on-the-other-hand, tended to be <u>more</u>
        tolerant of others,
        willing and able to maintain long-term positive relationships with others,
        willing to accept responsibility and blame, and/or
        controlled by guilt and remorse.

Violators also appeared somewhat <u>less</u> willing to respond in a manner that might reflect negatively upon themselves (which they probably thought would lower their chances of being hired). Suggestions are made for developing a Forthcomingness scale to be able to better control for this effect.

Discussion:

The lower than anticipated relationship between the personality measures and later acts of corruption was probably due to several factors. Environmental factors undoubtedly played a key role in affecting the outcome, such as whether the officer a) was assigned to work with a supervisor, partner or training officer who was corrupt; b) worked in a department or community where offering and accepting bribes is commonplace; c) was assigned to work in high corruption prone duties or areas; and/or d) had suffered personal set-backs that might make that officer more vulnerable to temptation. However, those factors should have also affected the outcome of other corruption and betrayal of trust studies. Some of the effects of personality would have been attenuated by some of the police applicants with certain personality-related problems being screened out as a result of psychological testing or other components of the background investigation. However, it is not anticipated that corrections for range restriction caused by that prior screening will substantially affect the results, especially if corrections for true base-rate[1] are also applied. The primary differences between this study and those that have found much higher correlations in the past appear to be:

    1) this study was based on the actual pre-employment tests completed by subjects at the time they were applying for their position,

    2) the subjects were probably motivated to hide past problems and issues during the psychological testing phase *as opposed to* prisoner-based studies where subjects may be motivated to reveal or exaggerate their past problems,

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[1] A 50-50 split between violators and non-violators was used in this study. Correcting for the fact that the true proportion of violators to non-violators is probably much lower than that ratio is likely to further reduce the size of the correlations.

3) all of the subjects actively sought law enforcement positions and probably knew prior to applying for those positions that one of the selection requirements that would be imposed was passing a thorough background investigation,

4) the findings reflect the extent to which police pre-employment personality test information predicts subsequent acts of corruption *as opposed to* those in prisoner-based studies which reflect the extent to which personality test information differentiates convicted prisoners from a selected group of non-prisoners who have been asked to take part in a study, and

5) the effects of chance were better controlled for than in many other studies through use of larger samples, multiple test versions measuring the same constructs, and use of a hold-out sample.

The single best predictor of corruption found in this study was not a personality measure. It was post-hire misconduct. Officers who got into trouble with their supervisors for volitional acts of misconduct were significantly more likely to be punished for later engaging in acts of corruption. Separate recommendations based upon the findings are made for 1) police managers, 2) police personnel practitioners and psychologists, and 3) researchers. Those recommendations and a more complete summary of the main findings can be found in Section V of this report.

The personality and background data that PERSEREC acquired from the police departments for this study have been placed in a data base which has been made available to interested researchers through the National Institute of Justice. Only two cases were deleted from that data set because the department that supplied them chose not to have their data included. It is hoped that providing access to this information will promote further scientific inquiry and advances relevant to combating corruption and other betrayal of trust offenses.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

The Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) began the *Police Integrity Study* in 1992. The objective of the project was to determine if characteristics indicative of public trust betrayal can be assessed through personality tests already being used by law enforcement agencies. Previous studies of public trust violations have been limited because they focused upon only one agency, did not investigate personality tests, and/or did not use a predictive design. In this study, personality tests (i.e., the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory, California Psychological Inventory, Inwald Personality Inventory, and 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire) completed prior to the acts of trust betrayal as part of a department's normal screening battery were collected from agencies across the United States.

This study was ambitious in its conception and execution. The *Police Integrity Study* has been endorsed by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the Association of Major City Chiefs of Police, the Commission for Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., and the Arizona Law Enforcement Office Advisory Council. Without the support of these organizations, the high level of cooperation from each participating department, and the guidance of professionals from the concerned communities, the project would not have been possible.

A. Phases of the Police Integrity Study

Three phases made up the *Police Integrity Study* -- design, data collection and analysis, and assessment of practical implications.

The first phase was concerned with designing a study capable of addressing the seemingly simple question:

> **1. *Can a scale or set of scales predictive of public trust betrayal be identified or created from pre-employment personality tests commonly used by law enforcement departments?****

Successful completion of this phase required identification and development of a sample appropriate for testing the central question of the study; talking to experts and reviewing the literature on personality, law enforcement, and corruption to identify likely predictors of public trust betrayal; and matching standard scales available from the tests being used by the law enforcement departments with the predictors of trust betrayal identified from the literature and discussion with experts. Scales were identified and a data analysis plan drafted during a conference sponsored by PERSEREC in 1993.

The second phase of the project was concerned with collecting the data and preparing it for analysis, as well as modifying the original data analysis plan to fit the actual data collected. This phase of the study was concerned with two main questions:

> **2a. Given the actual data available from the departments, what analyses should be conducted?**

> **2b. How will cross-validation be executed?**

The final phase of the project was concerned with the practicality of the study. Specifically, the objectives were to determine:

> **3a. How can the data set best be used by all interested parties?**

> **3b. How can PERSEREC facilitate its use?**

To this end, a grant was sought from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to aid in making the data set and an accompanying codebook available to other researchers, as well as to aid PERSEREC in seeking feedback from other researchers and practitioners on the findings. The intended audience for this report includes police administrators, police selection practitioners, and social scientists concerned with issues such as prediction, screening and selection, public trust betrayal and personality. A brief review of some of the main testing issues germane to this study is presented next.

B. Testing Issues

Personality and other psychological tests are valued in part because they are a low-cost means of collecting information about job applicants. Not only do tests allow information to be collected in groups, they also ensure standardization in how the questions are asked, objectivity in how the tests are scored, and consistency in how applicant information is collected and compared. Psychological tests have been used by law enforcement officers for both 'selecting-in' individuals with characteristics that would contribute to success on the job and 'selecting-out' individuals with characteristics that indicate a higher risk for behaviors that make it difficult to rely upon and trust the officer in stressful situations (Hogg & Wilson, 1996).

1. Selecting-In.

Traditionally, selecting-in has been the purview of screening and selection practitioners. Under this approach an employer uses tests to identify job applicants possessing the skills, abilities and knowledge that best match the job requirements. The job requirements are generally broken down into dimensions indicative of functions and behaviors that make up a job. Typically, tests are selected (or developed) according to their ability to measure performance

relevant dimensions. Selection practitioners strive to improve the reliability, validity, and fairness of an employer's screening process by seeking the best mixture of assessment techniques. Other applicant assessment techniques commonly in use by law enforcement agencies include: job applications, ability tests, physical fitness assessments, credit checks, background investigations, polygraph tests, clinical interviews and situational judgment tests.

This study sought to leverage the information available from personality tests already in use by many law enforcement agencies. The goal of the study was to assess the feasibility of developing a reliable, valid and fair measure of public trust betrayal from tests already in use.

The personality tests identified in this study are most often administered as part of screening conducted by police clinical psychologists. In a recent survey, approximately 92% of the 59 police departments reviewed used a psychological assessment to determine the emotional and mental stability of candidates relative to the demands of police work. The tools used in the assessment generally include a clinical interview, a battery of psychological tests, or both (Langworthy, Hughes, and Sanders, 1995). Few psychologists seem to use the tests independent of the clinical interview. Use of psychological tests in selection has most often been criticized due to the lack of clear linkage to job tasks (Butcher, 1985).

Evidence exists from studies in industry that people vary on a testable dimension called conscientiousness (Ones, Viswesvaran & Schmidt, 1992). An important goal of a law enforcement selection system should be to improve the likelihood that individuals with higher levels of conscientiousness become police officers.

2. Selecting-Out.

The use of a selecting-out approach has traditionally been the purview of risk assessment professionals. Risk assessments are conducted by clinicians to identify potential mental health-related concerns such as an applicant's maladjustment and psychopathology that might inhibit performance in a high-stress policing environment. Additionally, background investigators seek information about an applicant's past history of behaviors considered unacceptable for a police officer. The goal of this study is to add value to departmental selection processes by providing a low-cost, prescreening measure capable of reliably and validly identifying applicants not meeting the personal integrity standards required of law enforcement.

3. Criterion Measure.

Irrespective of what items or groups of items work on a test, the performance behaviors the department is concerned with predicting are the best starting point for identifying potential predictors of those behaviors. Towards this end, the

literature on workplace counterproductivity was reviewed, and the input of police administrators and practitioners sought to develop a list of different types of counterproductive job behaviors associated with corruption. Corruption inhibits police performance and decreases the public's trust in law enforcement in general. However, public service jobs may differ from other types of jobs. Thus, the concept of public trust betrayal in law enforcement was narrowed into a definition that focused upon the abuse of police authority for personal gain. Table 1 presents the specific acts or violations identified by the law enforcement community. The commission of one or more of those acts served as the primary criterion used in this study. Violators were a) identified by their department as having engaged in at least one of those acts, b) had their corruption involvement corroborated/substantiated, <u>and</u> c) were formally punished for committing the violation(s). The responses of the violators were compared to responses from a matched comparison group that was presumed not to have engaged in those acts.

Table 1.
Categories of Corruption Identified by Law Enforcement Authorities

Corruption Category	*Definition*
Information Breach (Endangering Officers)	Providing restricted information to outsiders that was likely to result in officers being harmed (e.g., providing the identities of undercover officers who had infiltrated gang, drug, terrorist, or organized crime groups).
Information Breach (Aiding Criminals)	Providing restricted information to outsiders that was likely to result in criminals avoiding arrest (e.g., providing raid, surveillance, or other police operations information to known offenders)
Bribes/Shakedowns	Releasing apprehended traffic violators or criminals without processing them after taking or receiving funds, drugs, property, sexual favors, or other personal considerations (i.e., shakedowns, accepting bribes)
Protection Money	Failing to apprehend known offenders who previously gave money, property, services or other personal considerations to the officers for not interfering with their criminal activities (i.e., protection rackets)
Fix (Dropping Case)	Recommending that a traffic or criminal case be dropped or dismissed due to lack of evidence against the suspect after being given funds, property, services, or other personal considerations to make that recommendation
Fix (Testimony)	Failing to testify against traffic or criminal offenders or testifying in a manner that results in their avoiding punishment in order to receive money, property, services, or other personal considerations
Theft On Duty	Committing an on-duty theft of drugs, money, or property from victims, offenders, burglary sites, evidence lockers, or other areas under police protection.
Off-Duty Violations	Committing an off-duty theft or other criminal act in which the officer has used his/her police position to help commit the crime and clearly betrayed the trust placed in him/her by the department
Embezzlement/Fraud	Embezzling department funds or submitting fraudulent expense/payment claims to the department
Falsification of Time Worked	Claiming unearned over-time or flagrantly and deceptively leaving early from a shift

4. Range of Potential Indicators.

Again, this study focused upon tests already being used by law enforcement departments. Consequently, the study was limited in the range of potential indicators of a person's integrity available for empirical analysis. Examples of the types of items asked on the four tests analyzed in this study are provided in Table 2. Items thought to be related to integrity issues and items not thought to be related to integrity issues are illustrated. A listing of the scales and constructs thought to be related to corruption are presented in Appendices B and C.

Table 2.
Examples of Personality Test Questions and Their Presumed Relation to Integrity

Example Items by Personality Test	Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory (MMPI)	California Psychological Inventory (CPI)	Inwald Personality Inventory (IPI)	16PF
Potentially Related to Integrity	I have been in trouble with the law. I was suspended from school.	I am sure I get a raw deal from life. If people had not had it in for me I would have been much more successful.	I have never cheated on an exam. I have been suspended from school.	If the odds are really against something's being a success, I still believe in taking the risk. I think that plenty of freedom is more important than good manners and respect for the law.
Considered Unrelated to Integrity	I see things or animals or people around me that others do not see. I am almost never bothered by pains over the heart or in my chest.	I think I would like the work of a librarian. I am troubled by attacks of nausea and vomiting.	I have frequently had at least one of the following: heartburn, indigestion, stomach aches. I have been involved in a car accident while driving.	I prefer semiclassical music to popular tunes. I occasionally get puzzled, when looking in a mirror, as to which is my right and left.

5. Forthcomingness.

As can be seen from Table 2, the preferred response to many of the test items potentially related to corruption may be easily identified by law enforcement applicants (e.g., I have been in trouble with the law). There are also items which have a less clear purpose. Both types of questions may provide useful information about an applicant's integrity or tendency to betray the public trust An important concern for employers, however, is how willing applicants are to admit the past acts and/or attitudes most likely to identify them as candidates for trust betrayal. The degree to which a job applicant is forthcoming (consciously or unconsciously) about past behaviors and experiences on a paper-and-pencil test may influence how desirable that job applicant appears to be in relation to other job applicants. One could define honesty as a propensity to tell the truth even when it is not the response that person feels would reflect the most favorably on him/her in that immediate situation. Consequently, a test-savvy, dishonest person who engaged in many earlier acts of inappropriate behavior might appear the same on a test addressing misbehavior as honest applicants who only engaged in minor acts of indiscretion.

PHASE ONE - STUDY DESIGN

A. Study Design

In order to focus upon the variance of greatest interest and maximize the empirical power of the sample of trust-betraying officers, a matched study design was used. The matched design required that when a violating officer was identified, a similar (i.e., matched) non-violating officer also must be identified. Subjects were matched on the basis of department, academy class graduation, gender, ethnicity, and age. Each department was also asked to provide the results of psychological tests completed by the officers at the time of their hire. The officers' names and other personal identifiers were removed from the data by the submitting department. The focus of the empirical analysis was whether the tests could differentiate public trust violators from non-violators.

The results from a study must be replicable if they are to have scientific merit. A common means to provide a replication sample is to split the total data set collected into development and hold-out samples. In this study, two-thirds of the full sample was allocated to the development sample while one-third of the sample was held out to replicate the findings. A stratified random process was used to create the two data sets (stratification took place at the department level with the matched offenders and non-offenders treated as a set so they would be placed in the same sample). T-tests comparing the characteristics used to match the violators and non-violators indicated the developmental and hold-out samples did not differ significantly.

B. Attempt to Identify and Collect a National Sample of Corrupt and Non-Corrupt Officer Test Data

Initially, the 15 largest police departments in the U.S. (based on number of sworn officers) were identified using the 1991 Department of Justice statistics contained in the Uniform Crime Report for the United States. Letters describing the study and asking the department to participate were sent to the Chief of Police and followed-up with a telephone call approximately one week later. Appendix A presents an example of the initial letter sent to the departments asking for their participation in the study. Points of Contact (POC) were identified within the departments that voiced interest in participating, and arrangements were made for acquiring their data.

In exchange for participation, departments were promised a report of the results of the study, as well as a copy of the data set. Additionally, departments were advised they could request specialized interpretation and implementation guidance. Within the first month of the study it became apparent that additional departments needed to be contacted in order to obtain a sample size large enough to conduct meaningful analyses. Letters were sent to all of the State Highway Patrol/Police organizations and to all police and sheriff departments where more than 50 sworn officers were employed. The

sampling plan was modified several more times to attempt to increase the final sample size.

Over the four years of data collection 4,235 departments were eventually invited to participate in the study. The overall response rate was calculated at 52.5 percent. Departments responded a number of different ways. The most common responses were either that the department had not detected any individuals who had engaged in the types of violations being studied or that they had not administered the personality tests. Other reasons given for not participating are included in the list presented below.

1. Reasons for Non-Participation.

Many departments were unable to participate in the study because they:

    a) did not/had not used pre-employment psychological tests to screen police applicants;

    b) did not have one or more incidents where an officer who completed the psychological screening engaged in a corrupt act that was substantiated;

    c) did not have access to the officer's psychological test responses (e.g., discarded the data, the data were retained by a non-departmental psychologist who would not share the information);

    d) were not willing and/or able to find another officer presumed not to have engaged in acts of corruption with the same general characteristics as the violator (e.g., recruit class, age, sex, race) whose pre-employment test responses were also available;

    e) were not willing to provide the data to PERSEREC even after masking the officers' personal identifiers; or

    f) did not have the personnel/staff resources available to collect the information needed.

2. Departmental Variation and Its Potential Impact.

The departments and law enforcement officers included in this study represent a convenience sample. Convenience samples are often the only means by which to assess a phenomenon of interest. Such was the case with public trust betrayal. The problem with convenience samples is that there may be an over representation of some sample characteristics. Consequently, police officials and other readers will need to draw upon their own knowledge and data to reach experientially based conclusions concerning the applicability of the findings of this study to their department or situation. Among the departmental variations that could affect the findings of this study are:

a) Departments differ widely in their effectiveness at detecting and proving acts of corruption. Therefore, it is possible some of the "non-violators" included in this study were in reality undetected violators.

b) Departments vary in how they screen applicants. Some departments use a more thorough screening process than others (e.g., some use only one personality measure, some use multiple measures, some do not use any). Therefore, the indicators of corruption may have been present for some of the applicants' data and not for others'.

c) Departments vary in their selection ratio of applicants to hires, as well as how effectively they utilize the screening information available to them. The more selective departments may have already screened out most of their 'bad apples' who, in turn, would have been more prone to engaging in later acts of corruption.

d) Departments vary in how they categorize certain corruption-related acts (e.g., accepting discounts or free food or services), as well as how they punish the different types of misconduct (e.g., informal versus formal actions). These actions, in turn, could affect whether or not subjects were classified as violators.

e) Departments vary considerably with respect to a wide range of environmental factors believed to affect the likelihood of whether officers will engage in acts of corruption, such as the level of corruption in that department and the surrounding geographical area; the character of the officer's partners, training officers, supervisors, and commanders; and departmental policies and procedures regarding corruption.

To help control for the effects of those potential departmental factors, we sought participation from as many departments as possible. Once again, over 4000 police departments within the United States were contacted and asked to consider participation if they possessed the required information.

C. Review of Literature and Discussions with Experts

Several reviews of the literature were made in order to identify potential predictors of corruption and other forms of trust betrayal. It is important to note that the reviews were made with an eye toward predicting not only the occurrence of a trust violation, but also if there had been previous studies of any of the particular categories of violations (e.g., theft). Several pockets of research exist that were anticipated to be related to the criterion of public trust betrayal. Research has been sponsored by users of nuclear technology interested in predicting personnel reliability (Barge, et. al, 1984) and by companies who want to hire individuals likely to be successful in high risk jobs (Cooper, 1986). A growing body of research exists about integrity and counterproductive behavior in industry (Ones, et. al., 1993; O'Bannon, Goldinger & Appleby, 1989; OTA, 1990; Goldberg, Grenier, Guion, Sechrest & Wing, 1991). Appendix B presents

information concerning the dimensions identified as potential predictors of public trust betrayal based upon the literature review and discussion with experts.

PHASE TWO - DATA ANALYSIS

A. Data Description

The questionnaires the departments were required to complete for each corrupt and non-corrupt officer are presented in Appendix D. These questionnaires provided basic demographic information about the pair of officers, as well as information about the violation, such as type, punishment, motivations, whether the officer acted alone or as part of a group, what division the officer was in when he/she engaged in the violation, etc. Cases were first screened to ensure that they were pre-employment tests rather than fitness-for-duty or other post-hire assessments of the officers. As previously noted, among the reasons tests were eliminated include the test was not a pre-employment test, the department was not using tests included in the study, the data provided was unreadable or unscoreable, and the department did not provide a matched non-violator.

The specific personality measures requested from the departments were the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory (MMPI), the California Psychological Inventory (CPI), the 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF), and the Inwald Personality Inventory (IPI). Table 3 presents a breakdown of the number and types of tests that were received.

Table 3.
All Tests Received (Violator and Nonviolator)

	MMPI 1 raw	MMPI 1 scales	MMPI 2 raw	MMPI 2 scales	MMPI R raw	CPI 1 raw	CPI 1 scales	CPI 2 raw	CPI 2 scales	IPI raw	IPI scales	16PF raw	16PF scales
MMPI 1 raw	198	0	0	0	0	115	0	59	4	41	0	46	0
MMPI 1 scales	0	67	0	0	0	0	17	0	9	5	31	0	2
MMPI 2 raw	0	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	19	0
MMPI 2 scales	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
MMPI R raw	0	0	0	0	58	0	0	102	15	1	0	15	0
CPI 1 raw	115	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
CPI 1 scales	0	17	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
CPI 2 raw	59	0	0	0	102	0	0	23	0	8	0	9	0
CPI 2 scales	4	9	0	4	15	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
IPI raw	41	5	3	0	1	2	0	8	0	2	0	0	2
IPI scales	0	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0
16PF raw	46	0	19	0	15	0	0	9	0	0	0	8	0
16PF scales	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	8
Total	460	129	35	8	182	115	21	191	33	59	38	88	10

Note: Numbers on the shaded diagonal represent the number of tests received with no other test.

Overall, the personality test most frequently used by the participants was the MMPI-1. The CPI 2 was the next most common test provided by the departments followed by Form R of the MMPI-1. Small numbers of additional tests were provided by the departments. These tests included CAQ, OSI, Roger's MMPI/CPI, Taylor-Johnson Temperament Analysis, Otis Self-Administering Tests of Mental Ability, Nelson-Denny Reading Test, Spielberger, Gorsuch, and Lushene Self Evaluation Questionnaire, Edwards Personal Preferences Schedule, Strong-Campbell Interest Inventory, Raven's Matrices, Wechsler Memory Scale, WAIS, Hilson Personnel Profile, Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey, Shipley Test, Set V-3, and Rotter's Sentence Completion Test.

B. Sample Description and Data Analysis

Analysis of the data took several forms. The approach anticipated to offer the most useful information was a series of one-to-one assessments of whether a scale could discriminate corrupt from non-corrupt officers. Analyses using multiple scales were attempted to assess whether an equation could be developed that would reliably and validly discriminate corrupt from non-corrupt officers. Subsequent to the largely negative findings provided by these analyses, several exploratory approaches to the data were also attempted.

These exploratory approaches included development of an additional criterion of corruption, item level analyses of the different measures, an empirical key, factor analyses, and cluster analyses. Only the most meaningful findings from these exploratory analyses are presented.

1. Verification of Hold-Out Sample Appropriateness.

Replication of predictive results is a central concern to an organization seeking to use tests for screening and selection. In other words, if scales from a test are significantly predictive of a performance dimension in one sample, the same scales should be statistically significant predictors of the performance dimension in a second and even third sample drawn from a similar or the same population. Use of the hold-out sample to assess the validity of the results in the second data set led to the observation that very few of the results in this study could be replicated in the smaller sample. Consequently, the results are displayed for the 2/3 and 1/3 sample, as well as the full sample. There are patterns of findings in this study which offer insight into ways that corruption might be combated using pre-employment screens. However, we strongly recommend a comprehensive validation effort of any screening methods your department chooses before full implementation, followed by continued validation after its implementation.

2. Description of the Sample.

a. Geographic and Departmental Percentages. A total of 69 law enforcement departments provided data. They were located in twenty-nine different states. The departments providing data represent a national sample and include participation of departments in the Northeast, the South, the Midwest, the Southwest, and the West. Seventy-four percent (74.1%) of these cases were from municipal agencies, 9.8% sheriff, 13.1% state troopers, .9% county and 2.1% Special Law Enforcement districts such as university, airports, railroads, and school police.

b. Demographic Information about the Officers. The overall sample consisted of 878 individuals (439 violating and 439 non-violating officers). The sample was 92.1% male, 53.5% white, 33.1 % Black, 11.7% Hispanic; the remainder were Asian or Other. Just over 3% of the officers' highest level of educational attainment was a GED (4.2% violators and 2.4% non-violators), 30.5% had a High School diploma (31.9% violators and 28.9% non-violators), 49.5% had some college (48.0% for violators and 51.1% for non-violators); 16.1% had a bachelor's degree or higher (15.4% for violators and 16.9% for non-violators); and .6% had some graduate school (.4% violators and .7% non-violators).

As Figure 1 indicates, most of the officers included in the sample (80.1%) were assigned to the patrol division of their department. Most of the violators (90.6%) and non-violators (93.3%) were patrol officers or deputies. A small percentage were corporals (1.1% for violators; 1.6% for non-violators);

sergeants (4.1% for violators; 1.6 % for non-violators); Lieutenants (.7% for violators; .5% for non-violators); Captains (.7% non-violators); or other (3.4% violators and 2.3% for non-violators).

Figure 1.
Percent of Violators and Non-Violators in
Departmental Divisions

The average age of the violators at the time of the violation was 31 years. Officers varied greatly in how long they were on the job prior to the violation. The time on the job (from graduation) ranged from 0 (less than a year) to 29 years. The average time on the job for the corrupt officers was 4.72 years and 4.77 for non-violating officers.

The majority of the violators punished were punished alone (75.6%). Only 5.5% of the offenders were the probable ringleader of a group of violators; for 7.3% it was not possible to determine if the officer was the ringleader; and 11.6% of the offenders were part of a group of officers punished, but were not the ringleader. This information was missing for only one of the violators. For the cases where a motivation for the violation could be identified, the most common reason given was money (138 offenders). The next most common motivation listed was 'unknown' followed by sex (52 offenders), drugs (46 cases) merchandise (44 cases), and friendship or affection (39 cases).

Table 4 provides descriptive information about the corrupt and non-corrupt officers in this data set, as well as a comparison of the violators and non-violators for the characteristics used to match the two groups. T-tests of the differences between the gender, ethnicity and time since graduating from the academy indicate the violators did not differ significantly from the non-violators on the characteristics used to match the two groups.

14

Table 4.

Means, Standard Deviations, and T-Tests Comparing the Violators and Non-Violators on Matching Characteristics-Developmental and Cross-Validation Samples

Var	*Mean*		*Std Dev*		*T-test*	*Var*	*Mean*		*Std Dev*		*T-test*
	Viol	Non Viol	Viol	Non Viol			Viol	Non Viol	Viol	Non Viol	
Developmental Sample (n=586)						*Cross-Validation Sample* (n=292)					
Gender (1=male)						Gender (1=male)					
Gender	1.09	1.09	.28	.29	-.15 (p=.88)	Gender	1.06	1.06	.24	.24	.00 (p=1.00)
Ethnic Group (1=Yes)						Ethnic Group (1=Yes)					
White	.54	.57	.50	.50	-.83 (p=.41)	White	.49	.50	.50	.50	-.35 (p=.73)
Black	.34	.30	.47	.46	.80 (p=.43)	Black	.36	.35	.48	.48	.16 (p=.88)
Hispanic	.12	.12	.33	.32	.13 (p=.90)	Hispanic	.12	.11	.33	.32	.32 (p=.75)
Asian	.01	.00	.08	.06	.58 (p=.56)	Asian	.01	.01	.12	.12	-.01 (p=.99)
Other	.00	.00	.00	.06	-1.0 (p=.32)	Other	.01	.01	.12	.12	.01 (p=.99)
Time Since Academy (Yrs)						Time Since Academy (Yrs)					
Grad	4.87	4.99	3.92	4.34	-.36 (p=.72)	Grad.	4.44	4.32	3.70	3.70	.26 (p=.79)
Age at Time of Violation (Yrs)						Age at Time of Violation (Yrs)					
Age	31.09	30.86	5.55	5.54	.52 (p=.61)	Age	30.52	30.17	6.10	5.66	.50 (p=.62)

3. Information about Violations.

As illustrated in Figure 2, the most common type of trust violation was Off-Duty Violations. Officers classified in this category may have engaged in such acts as using knowledge about a crime scene gained under police authority to return to the scene and steal valuables. The next most common act of trust betrayal was Theft On Duty. The least common violation was Information Breach (Endangering Officers).

Figure 2.
Percentages of Violators by Type of
Public Trust Violation

False Time Work ▬▬ 10.3
Embezzlement ▬ 7.5
Off-Duty Violation ▬▬▬▬▬▬ 41.5
Theft On Duty ▬▬▬ 20.3
Fix Testimony ▬▬ 10.3
Fix Drop Case ▬ 4.3
Protect Money ▬ 3.9
Bribe/Shakedown ▬▬ 12.8
Info Br Aid Crim ▬ 6.8
Info Br Endg Off ▬ 1.1

0   20   40   60   80

Many of the violators were identified as having engaged in more than one of the acts of trust betrayal. Table 5 provides the percentages and numbers of single and multiple category violations. It is interesting to note that for officers identified as engaging in only one act, the most common act was an off-duty violation (41.6%). For officers identified as engaging in more than one offense, the most common offense was theft on duty (18.7%). Overall, off-duty violations made up the largest proportion of the violations (34.9%). The least common violation for both single and multiple offenders was information breach endangering officers.

Table 5.
Frequency and Percentage of Occurrence of Types of Corrupt Acts for Single Act and Multiple Act Offenders

Corruption Category	Single Act Offenders Frequency (Percent)	Acts Committed by Multiple Act Offenders (Percent)	Total Acts Frequency (Percent)
Information Breach (Endangering Officers)	3 (.8%)	2 (1.5%)	5 (1.0%)
Information Breach (Aiding Criminals)	14 (3.6%)	16 (11.9%)	30 (5.8%)
Bribes / Shakedowns	35 (9.0%)	21 (15.7%)	56 (10.7%)
Protection Money	4 (1.0%)	13 (9.7%)	17 (3.3%)
Fix (Dropping Case)	14 (3.6%)	5 (3.7%)	19 (3.6%)
Fix (Testimony)	30 (7.8%)	15 (11.2%)	45 (8.6%)
Theft On Duty	64 (16.5%)	25 (18.7%)	89 (17.1%)
Off-Duty Violations	161 (41.6%)	21 (15.7%)	182 (34.9%)
Embezzlement / Fraud	24 (6.2%)	9 (6.7%)	33 (6.3%)
Falsification of Time Worked	38 (9.8%)	7 (5.2%)	45 (8.6%)
Totals	387 Violators	134 Acts (52 Violators)	521 Acts (439 Violators)

a.   The Violator/Non-Violator Variable.   The initial study analysis plan called for predictive analyses within the different violation categories. Meaningful analysis of the personality test data was not possible within many of the violation categories because of the low number of cases identified by the departments. The dichotomous violator/non-violator variable (or criterion) thus became the primary dependent variable for the predictive analyses in this study. The violator/non-violator variable was coded '1' for violators and '2' for non-violators.

b.   The Punishment Variable.   There are multiple additional ways the violation categories could be grouped and studied. The most desirable way to gain more information about the violators would be to have a way of ranking the violation categories according to how 'bad' the trust violation was considered. After considerable discussion, it did not appear possible to order the violation categories this way due to what little was known about the circumstances associated with each violation. The next most likely way to assess the degree of 'badness' associated with a particular act was to see how it was punished by the departments. It was thought that the worst acts of trust betrayal would be punished by criminal prosecution and firing. The original punishment categories were suspension with pay, suspension without pay, asked to resign, fired, criminally prosecuted, demoted, and other. Offenders could be assigned to more than one category (e.g., fired and criminally prosecuted).

4. Information about Violations and Punishments.

Table 6 presents the relationships between the different violation categories and the different types of punishments. Subjects may be categorized under more than one punishment category (e.g., fired and criminally prosecuted). There is a wide range of punishments associated with the different violation categories. The least frequent punishments were suspended with pay and demotion while the most frequently occurring punishments were firing the violating officer and criminal prosecution.

Table 6.
Frequency of Occurrence of Punishments by Corruption Category

Punishment Categories	*Violation Categories*										
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Total**
Criminally Prosecuted	1	11	20	10	0	13	34	56	2	1	148
Fired	2	20	38	12	4	17	32	96	12	7	240
Asked to Resign	2	1	3	0	1	0	11	19	6	7	50
Demoted	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	8
Suspended without Pay	1	4	8	3	9	15	10	36	7	23	116
Suspended with Pay	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	5
Other Punishment	1	5	3	2	6	9	21	39	13	12	111
Total	9	44	73	27	20	54	110	251	40	50	678

Note: 1=Information Breach (Endangering Officers);
2=Information Breach (Aiding Criminals);
3=Bribes/Shakedowns;
4=Protection Money;
5=Fix (Dropping Case);
6=Fix (Testimony);
7=Theft On Duty;
8=Off-Duty Violations;
9=Embezzlement/Fraud;
10=Falsification Time Worked

The ability to more precisely describe the large number of 'other punishment' cases and the frequent occurrence of multiple punishments led to the creation of a revised list of punishments. The new categories of punishments were criminally prosecuted and fired, resigned and criminally prosecuted, criminally prosecuted, fired, voluntary resignation, and departmental actions (e.g., suspended without pay, lost leave or days worked, probation, transferred, indefinite suspension, written reprimand).

Table 7 presents the relationships between these derived punishment categories and the violation categories. Under this categorization scheme the most frequently occurring punishment was the single punishment of firing and the least frequent punishment was the combination of punishments of resignation and criminal prosecution. Departmental discipline was used as a punishment for all categories of trust betrayal. Similarly, firing was used for all of the categories of trust betrayal. Falsification of Time Worked, apparently a relatively more common and less serious type of violation (cases=43), was most likely to have been punished by the department using internal procedures.

The variety of the punishment/violation categories combinations suggests that there may be differences in departmental sentencing for these types of violations, as well as that there are other factors beside the act that are considered when an officer is punished for violating the public's trust.

Table 7.
Frequency of Occurrence Using Revised Punishment Categories

Nature of Punishment	Violation Categories										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
Fired and Criminally Prosecuted	1	9	11	8	0	3	12	31	2	1	78
Resigned and Criminally Prosecuted	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	23	0	0	29
Criminally Prosecuted	0	2	6	2	0	9	19	2	0	0	40
Fired	1	11	27	4	4	15	20	63	9	6	160
Resigned	1	2	0	0	1	0	16	28	5	9	62
Departmental Discipline	2	6	8	3	14	18	17	29	14	27	138
Total	5	30	55	17	19	45	87	176	30	43	507

Note: 1=Information Breach (Endangering Officers);
2=Information Breach (Aiding Criminals);
3=Bribes/Shakedowns;
4=Protection Money;
5=Fix (Dropping Case);
6=Fix (Testimony);
7=Theft On Duty;
8=Off-Duty Violations;
9=Embezzlement/Fraud;
10=Falsification Time Worked

C. Relationships between Test Information and Violator Status

The results are grouped according to personality test. General information about each test is presented prior to the results. The general information covered includes the number of questions and scales the test contains, differences between test versions, its reliability, and how it is scored. The analyses conducted for each test are grouped by commonly available scales. Item level analyses, as well as multivariate analyses, are then presented where appropriate. The last section of information presented addresses analyses that were conducted to assess specific hypotheses drawn from the literature that appeared to have some potential value for use in selection.

The results of the analyses are presented for the developmental, hold-out and full data set. Certain correlations are highlighted with an * (p<.05) or ** (p<.01) dependent upon the relationship's level of statistical significance. A correlation coefficient is the means by which the strength of association between the predictor scales (taken from the personality tests) and the violator status variable are assessed. A high negative coefficient (e.g., -.50) would indicate a strong relationship between a high score on the scale and being a violator. The direction of the relationship (i.e., whether it is positive or negative) should hold across different samples and test versions if it is meaningful. Comments are provided in the text for many of the significant correlation coefficients.

After the results of the four personality tests are presented, the degree of association between subsequent acts of corruption certain other independent variables is noted. Those additional independent variables are 1) post-hire misconduct, 2) awards, 3) time on the job, 4) education, and 5) prior occupation.

D. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)

Of the personality test data collected, the MMPI was by far the most frequently obtained. 'Raw' MMPI-1 (i.e., Form 1) data were available for 460 individuals (or 230 pairs). The term *raw* is used to denote that departments provided answers to all of the actual questions asked of the officers, rather than an aggregated (scaled) number that represents the applicant's answer to multiple questions.

The validation sample consisted of 311 officers (154 complete pairs). The cross-validation sample consisted of 149 individuals (or 74 complete pairs). The subsample of individuals with raw MMPI-1 data was 91.3% Male; 50.9% White; 33.3% Black; and 15.0% Hispanic. The remainder were Asian or Other.

1. General Information.

The Minnesota Psychological Inventory (MMPI) was developed in the 1930s and early 1940s as a diagnostic tool for psychiatric and medical screening. The items and scales were developed empirically based upon the abnormal behaviors and symptoms that differentiated types of psychiatric patients from a normal (or nonpsychiatric) group of people. There are three versions of the MMPI (Versions 1 and R have 566 questions and Version 2 has 567 questions). Applicants are asked to respond true or false to the

questions. MMPI-1 and MMPI-R are identical except for the order of the questions. The MMPI-2 contains most of the same items as the two earlier versions; however, certain items were added, dropped or modified to update the test and improve its psychometric properties. The test takes approximately an hour to administer. The MMPI-1 and MMPI-R are written at approximately the 6th grade reading level while the MMPI-2 is at the 8th grade reading level. There are 10 standard scales and 4 validity scales. Over the 50+ years of its use, a large number of additional scales have been created for the MMPI-1 and MMPI-R. Norms for law enforcement applicants are available for the MMPI-2 from the publisher.

a.   Validity Scales. The MMPI validity scales have served as the model for development of similar scales for many other tests. Validity scales are the primary means by which the person interpreting the test can assess how honest and reliable the test-taker is being when answering the questions. The first assessment made concerning the MMPI's validity is the number of questions the respondent left blank (e.g. the Cannot Say or ? Scale). The three other scales are the Lie scale (which assesses the degree a person is trying to avoid answering the test frankly and honestly); the K scale (which assesses the degree a person is answering the items in an atypical or unusual manner); and the F scale (which was developed empirically to identify individuals who display significant psychopathology yet had profiles within the normal range).

b.   Reliability. Reliability refers to the dependability and stability of a test or scale. Usually assessed on a numeric scale from 0 to 1 (where 1 is the most reliable), there are several different statistical and theoretical approaches that can be applied to estimate reliability. The MMPI standard scales have traditionally been supported by assessing the same person on the same scales at different time points to determine how many changes he/she makes in answering the questions (e.g., test-retest reliability). Using this approach, the reliabilities of the MMPI have been described as moderate to high where longer scales have higher reliability coefficients. A second means to assess reliability is by assessing the internal consistency of a scale. A scale that is measuring one concept should have items that a person will answer similarly. Persons who are high in the concept being measured (e.g., dominance) will answer most of the questions in a direction that indicates liking to have influence over others. Questions that do not somehow relate to dominance will not be answered in the same way as the other questions, and consequently their inclusion on the scale lowers the internal reliability of the scale. The MMPI standard scales are heterogeneous and as such have low internal consistency coefficients. Scales with low reliability are inherently limited in their ability to validly predict other behaviors.

c.   Scoring. MMPI answer sheets are generally first assessed as raw answers for concerns such as missing data, carelessness, and internal test-retest consistency. Next, the MMPI is traditionally scored on several psychological dimensions using standard scores (i.e., t-scores), where the mean for all the scales is 50 and the standard deviation is 10. A variety of norms are available for the MMPI. Females and males are frequently scored separately. Studies of the differences between male and female officers on the MMPI scales have been mixed. Due to the low number of females in this sample, it was decided to use a combined sample of males and females for most analyses.

2. Criterion Correlations and Standard Scales.

Table 8 presents the correlation coefficients between the dichotomous dependent variable (i.e., corrupt and non-corrupt officers) with scales from the MMPI-1, MMPI-R and the MMPI-2. If item-level data were available they were used to calculate the scale values. Correlational analyses were conducted using the data provided by the departments in both scale and raw form. Due to the low sample size of the MMPI-2 and the MMPI-R, correlations are only presented for the full sample.

Table 8.
Correlations between the MMPI-1 and MMPI-2 scales and the Violator/Non-Violator Criterion

Scale	MMPI-1			MMPI-R	MMPI-2
	Dev.	H.O.	Full	Full	Full
	(N=395)	(N=194)	(N=589)	(N=182)	(N=43)
Lie	-.10*	.09	-.04	-.06	-.32*
Validity	-.04	-.04	-.04	.01	-.01
K	-.02	.07	.01	-.05	-.17
Hypochrondriasis	-.01	-.09	-.04	.01	.31*
Depression	-.03	-.05	-.04	.09	.03
Hysteria	-.05	.02	-.03	-.08	.24
Psychopathic Deviate	-.07	-.11	-.09*	-.08	.12
Masculinity-Femininity	.02	-.09	-.02	.00	-.02
Paranoia	-.02	-.11	-.05	.07	.00
Psychasthenia	.06	-.06	.02	.12	.15
Schizophrenia	-.02	-.11	-.05	.06	.20
Hypomania	.04	-.09	.01	-.06	-.13
Social Introversion	-.05	-.01	-.03	.02	.11
Welsh's A	.03	-.06	-.01	.17*	.13
Welsh's R	-.03	.02	-.01	-.05	.00

Note: Violator=1; Non-violator=2

The Lie scale is significantly correlated with violator status in the developmental and MMPI-2 samples. The direction and magnitudes of the correlations in the full sample and the MMPI-R suggest that the finding may be replicable. The Lie scale is typically used by law enforcement to assess if the applicant is being frank. Offending officers were more likely to obtain high scores on the Lie scale, indicating a tendency to be less than honest during the job application process.

If the full MMPI-1 sample is considered, it appears that violating officers are significantly more likely to have higher scores on the Psychopathic Deviance (Pd) scale than non-violating officers (r=-.09); although, the magnitude of that relationship is quite low. The MMPI-1 correlations in the developmental (r=-.07) and hold-out (r=-.11) were not significant. However, they were in the expected direction and of a magnitude that approaches significance. Interpretation of the Psychopathic Deviance scale suggests that corrupt officers might be described as alienated, coming from a family high in discord, and having conflicts with authority figures (Dahlstrom & Welsh, 1960). The positive correlation between the Pd scale and violator status in the much smaller MMPI-2 sample (r=.12) was not consistent with the correlations in the other samples.

The significant positive correlation between the Hypochrondriasis scale, developed to assess a preocupation with medical symptoms, and corruption (r=.31) with the MMPI-2 sample suggests that non-violators tend to voice more concerns about their health. This scale correlated in the opposite direction with violator status in the much larger MMPI-1 sample, suggesting this relationship was probably just an artifact of the smaller sample and the large number of analyses conducted.

The significant positive correlation between corruption and Welsh's A factor (r=.17*) in the MMPI-R sample and the positive correlations in the MMPI-2 (r=.13) and the MMPI-1 developmental (r=.03) samples suggest that non-violators are more anxious than violators. This factor has also been defined as an indicator of socially desirable responding. It may be that the high scores for non-violators simply indicates short-term anxiety caused by the job application process. However, this relationship did not replicate in the MMPI-1 hold-out sample (r=-.06).

In order to determine if there were scales other than the standard scales being used by the law enforcement community that were predictive of violator status, correlations were calculated for a number of additional scales. Only those scales that were significantly related to violator status in either the MMPI-1 Full and developmental, MMPI-2 or MMPI-R samples are provided in Table 9.

Table 9.
Significant Correlations between Additional MMPI-1 and MMPI-2 scales and the Violator/Non-Violator Criterion

Scale	MMPI-1			MMPI-R	MMPI-2
	Dev	H. O.	Full	Full	Full
	(N=322)	(N=158)	(N=480)	(N=182)	(N=43)
Physical Malfunctioning	-.09	-.17*	-.11*	-.05	.24
Brooding	.10	.12	.10*	.13	.11
Pure Psychopathic Deviance	-.08	-.21*	-.12**	-.01	.19
Non-Overlapping Purified Psychopathic Deviance	-.07	-.19*	-.11*	-.03	.16
Psychopathic Deviance (O)	-.07	-.18*	-.11*	.03	.25
Authority Problems	-.06	-.16*	-.09*	-.11	-.04
Paranoia, Obvious	-.05	-.11	-.07*	.11	.34*
Situational Stress due to Alcoholism	-.10	-.16	-.12*	-.02	.27
Threatened Assault	.06	.00	.04	-.02	.42*
Depressed Suicidal Ideation	.04	.03	.04	.08	-.34*
Substance Abuse	-.02	-.16	-.04	-.03	.35*
Problematic Anger	.05	-.02	.03	-.07	.39*
Bizarre Sensory Experiences	-.01	-.08	-.03	.08	.33*
Imperturbability	.02	-.01	.01	.04	-.41**
Mental Confusion	-.04	-.22**	-.10*	-.02	-.17
Sexual Concern and Deviation	.01	-.25**	-.07	-.03	.11
Somatic Symptoms	.05	-.17*	-.02	-.04	.26
Depression - Obvious	.03	-.04	01	.17*	n/a
Psychopathic Deviance-Subtle	-.04	-.05	-.04	-.12*	.24
Ego Inflation	.07	-.02	.04	-.19**	.04
Wiggins Depression	.02	-.02	.01	.21**	.31
Poor Morals	.08	-.08	.02	.18*	n/a
Lie Purified	-.11*	.04	-.06	-.05	n/a
Inhibition of Aggression	-.12*	.02	-.07	-.07	.32

Of these additional scales, the direction of the findings remained fairly constant across the sub-samples and tests reviewed for scales reflecting likely relationships between later acts of corruption and either authority problems or psychopathic deviance. Additionally, the non-violators appear to be more likely to admit brooding over their troubles, perhaps

indicating a hesitancy to act that inhibits corrupt behaviors or a greater propensity to be honest about their weaknesses. Finally, officers who were reporting confusion during the job application process, perhaps indicating adjustment difficulties, were more likely to become violators.

3. Differences in Proportion of Officers with Elevated Scales.

In the developmental sample, 306 officers (162 violators and 144 non-violators) exhibited t-scores over 65 on at least one of the MMPI-1 validity or clinical scales (k-corrected). T-scores over 65 or 70 on the MMPI are often used as cut-scores by screening psychologists. Only 6.7% of the original norming population would be expected to have a t-score of 65 or higher on a given scale, and only 2.3% a t-score of 70 or higher. The 306 officers represent 77% of the officers in the developmental sample for whom MMPI data were available. In the hold-out sample 152 officers (74 violators and 78 non-violators) exhibited t-scores over 65 on at least one of the MMPI-1 validity or clinical scales. This represents 78% of the officers for whom MMPI data were available. Forty-one percent of the developmental sample evidenced t-scores of 70 or higher on one or more of the validity or clinical scales. The scale most commonly over 65 was the K scale with 151 of the 306 people (in the developmental sample) with t-scores over 65 (78 violators, 73 non-violators). Table 10 below presents the results of the comparisons between violators and non-violators.

Table 10.
Z-Score Values for Difference in Proportion of Violator vs. Non-Violator with T-Scores over 65 on the MMPI-1

Scale	Developmental		Hold-Out	
	Viol/Non-Viol	z-score	Viol/Non-Viol	z-score
Lie	27/46	2.0**.	18/22	n.s.
K	78/73	n.s.	34/40	n.s.
F	1/1	n.s.	1/0	n.s.
Hs	2/2	n.s.	0/0	n.s.
D	5/8	n.s.	6/5	n.s.
Hy	8/12	n.s.	2/6	n.s.
Pd	42/24	1.80*	19/11	2.0**
Mf	9/11	n.s.	3/3	n.s.
Pa	4/4	n.s.	0/0	n.s.
Pt	24/30	n.s.	10/14	n.s.
Sc	43/40	n.s.	15/15	n.s.
Ma	32/36	n.s.	16/12	n.s.
Si	1/0	n.s.	0/0	n.s.
Mc	42/40	n.s.	23/23	n.s.

A test of the proportion of corrupt versus non-corrupt officers exhibiting t-scores over 65 on the Pd scale indicated that corrupt officers are significantly more likely to have a score over 65 on this scale than non-corrupt officers in both the developmental and hold-out samples (z-score$_{Developmental}$ =1.80, p<.05; z-score$_{Hold-Out}$ =2.00 p<.01). A one-tailed test was used because Pd was anticipated to be higher for violators. Additionally, in the developmental sample officers with t-scores over 65 were more likely to have done so on the Lie scale (z-score=2.0, p<.01). Although the direction of the finding was the same in both samples, the magnitude of the relationship for the Lie scales did not reach statistically significant levels in the hold-out sample.

The Pd scale findings suggest if a person is high in delinquency at the time of job application, he/she is more likely to later become a violator. These findings should be examined at the departmental level given that there may be differences in how departments used testing information to arrive at a determination of mental instability (e.g., cut-off scores, other tests, other background information, applicant's prior experiences). Further, a test of the significance of the differences in the proportion of violators with one or more scales over 65 versus the non-violators was not significant, z-score=1.50, suggesting that there may be factors that the psychologists have found to mitigate the elevated scores. Systematic identification of these factors would aid the law enforcement departments in differentiating when the elevated t-scores should be a firm ground for not hiring someone (e.g., elevated Pd scores) or as a reason to further investigate the person.

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E. California Psychological Inventory

1. General Information.

The California Psychological Inventory was developed by Gough (1967) to assess normal individuals. There are two versions of the CPI (Version 1 has 480 questions and Version 2 has 462 questions). Applicants are asked to respond true or false to the questions. There are 18 standard scales in the first version and 20 standard scales in the second version. The test takes between 45 minutes and an hour to administer and is written at approximately the 7th grade reading level. Norms of law enforcement applicants are available from the publisher.

a.   Validity Scales. Three general scales are used together to assess the validity of an applicant's responses to the CPI. The three scales and their relationship to the assessment of validity are: Well-Being (Wb) which assesses dissimulation; the Good Impression (Gi) scale which assesses the degree to which an individual is trying to present a favorable impression; and, the Communality (Cm) scale which assesses the degree to which an individual might be responding randomly. In addition, Faking Good, Faking Bad and Otherwise Invalid scales have been developed empirically to more directly assess the validity of a person's responses.

b.   Reliability. The CPI scale test-retest reliabilities have been reported as ranging from .53 to .80 with a median coefficient of .70. The internal reliability coefficients have been reported as ranging from .45 to .85 with a median coefficient of .72. The publishers of the CPI did not intend for the scales to define factorially homogeneous dimensions and they point out that the multifactorial nature of the scales is not incompatible with the purposes of the scales ("which are to forecast what people will say and do in defined contexts, and to identify persons who will be described in interpersonally significant ways," Gough, 1987, p. 31).

c.   Scoring. The CPI is traditionally scored using standard scores where the mean for all the scales is 50 and the standard deviation is 10 (same as the MMPI). Separate norms and profile sheets are available for males and females. The CPI can be interpreted based upon how high or low a person scores on the scales (e.g., a high score on the scale will indicate the person is high in that characteristic which is held to be a positive).

2. Criterion Correlations and Standard Scales.

Table 11 presents the correlations between the standard CPI scales (for the CPI-1 and CPI-2) and violator status for the development, hold-out, and full sample.

Table 11.

Table 11.
Correlations between the CPI-1 and CPI-2 scales and the Violator/Non-Violator Criterion

	CPI-1			CPI-2		
	Dev.	*H.O.*	*Full*	*Dev.*	*H.O.*	*Full*
	(N=87)	(N=49)	(N=136)	(N=146)	(N=78)	(N=224)
Dominance	-.11	.08	.03	-.04	-.17	-.09
Capacity for Status	.01	.11	.04	-.20*	-.06	-15*
Sociability	-.08	.04	-.05	-.06	.05	-.02
Social Presence	-.05	-.09	-.07	-.03	-.09	-.06
Self-Acceptance	-.02	.10	.03	-.09	-.11	-.10
Well-Being	.04	.23	.10	-.13	.14	.00
Responsibility	.00	.11	.04	.04	.15	.09
Socialization	.11	.05	.09	-.02	.12	.04
Self-Control	.18	.07	.14	-.11	.13	-.02
Tolerance	.16	.15	.16	.00	.06	.02
Good Impression	.12	.18	.14	-.10	.28*	.04
Communality	.01	.02	.02	.04	.18	.10
Achievement via Conformity	.03	.00	.02	-.06	.14	.02
Achievement via Independence	.14	.13	.14	-.06	.22*	.04
Intellectual Efficiency	.08	-.08	.02	.00	-.08	-.04
Psychological Mindedness	.16	.09	.13	.01	.20	.08
Flexibility	.12	.14	.13	.01	.02	.01
Femininity	.09	-.05	.04	-.02	.19	.06
Independence	-.01	.34*	.12	.06	-.08	.00
Empathy	.02	.03	.02	-.05	-.05	-.05

As shown in Table 11, none of the primary CPI scales consistently differentiated between the offenders and non-offenders at statistically significant levels. The scales where the direction of the correlations were consistent across all of the CPI-1 and CPI-2 samples are described below:

a) *social presence* - violators are unusually self confident and feel able to meet any situation, relatively free of neurotic trends, create good impressions, are clever and imaginative and appear socially at ease;

b) *responsibility* - violators indicate they led borderline delinquent existences in high school, consider themselves to be underachievers, had a great deal of friction with parents, and are self-indulgent;

c) *tolerance* - violators' answers indicate they may be described as distrusting, resentful, temperamental, cold, fault-finding, poised and overtly cooperative yet evasive;

d) *communality* - violators' answers to this scale indicate they may be described as irresponsible, forgetful, reckless, lazy, distractible, unhappy and generally dissatisfied with life, as well as, doubting of own ability;

e) *psychological mindedness* - violators may be described as sensitive yet confused, careless, restless, defensive, immature, unsure of self but kind; and

f) *flexibility* - violator's answers indicate they may be described as inhibited, planful, organized, rigid and precise with fathers who were stern and authoritarian.

To summarize, violators appear to be unsocialized, lacking insight into relationships, and intolerant of differences. However, they are capable of appearing adjusted on the surface.

3. Criterion Correlations for Additional Scales Often Used to Screen Law Enforcement Personnel.

In order to determine if there were scales being used by the law enforcement community in addition to the standard scales that were predictive of violator status, correlations were calculated for a number of additional scales. Only those scales that were significantly related to violator status are provided in Table 12.

Table 12.
Correlations between the Additional CPI-1 and CPI-2 Scales and the Dichotomous Criterion

	CPI-1 (N=136)	*CPI-2* (N=224)
Law Enforcement Orientation	.22*	-.05
Narcissism	-.21*	-.03
Optimism	.23*	-.03
Interpersonal Awareness and Sensitivity	-.19*	.08
Baucom Unipolar Scale for Femininity	.14	.13*

The only law enforcement scales that differentiated between the violators and non-violators at a statistically significant level in either the CPI-1 and CPI-2 sample that did not change direction on the other version of the CPI were

29

narcissism and femininity. Narcissism has consistently been linked in the literature to betrayal of trust. The link to femininity is harder to understand. It could be an artifact of looking for relationships across numerous scales, related to offenders being prone to portray themselves as more sensitive than they really were, related to personnel high on that trait not fitting into a masculine dominated profession, or related to some other explanation.

The scales on the CPI can also be reviewed in terms of a profile (e.g., if the person is high on three scales it may be the combination of the scales that provides an indication of how he/she will behave). When this approach is translated into an attempt to predict a particular behavior, it can take the form of a regression equation. One regression equation that was thought to be potentially predictive of violator status was an equation that has been found to differentiate delinquents from non-delinquents. The equation consists of the weighted combination of the following scales: Socialization (So), Good Impression (Gi), Tolerance (To) and Flexibility (Fx). When this equation was correlated with the violator status criterion in the full sample it was not found to be significantly related ($r=-.09$). While this equation has been replicated in several samples of delinquents versus non-delinquents, it does not appear to be a statistically significant predictor of law enforcement trust betrayal.

Finally, the CPI may be used to categorize people according to both their level of functioning and way of living. Higher scores on the level of functioning scale (e.g., Level Scale) are generally viewed as positive. Table 13 presents the classification percentages for the CPI-1 for the violators and non-violators in terms of their modes and levels of functioning while Table 14 presents the classification percentages for the CPI-2 for the violators and non-violators in terms of their modes and levels of functioning.

As can be seen from Tables 13 and 14, law enforcement officers are overwhelmingly defined by the Alpha lifestyle. Alphas are described by Gough and Bradley (1992) as involved, participant, entrepreneurial and rule-favoring. At their best they can be charismatic leaders and effective in managerial roles, at their worst they can be punitive and authoritarian. Betas are described as humane (at high levels of ego integration), conventional and dysphoric (at low levels of ego integration). Gammas are described as creative (at high levels of ego integration), impulsive, and sociopathic (at low levels of ego integration). Deltas are described as visionary (at high levels of ego integration), conflicted, and disintegrative (at low levels of ego integration).

Table 13.
Percentages of CPI-1 Modes and Levels of Functioning
for Male and Female by Violation Status

Category	Males			Females		
	Violators	Non-Violators	Total	Violators	Non-Violators	Total
	(N=50)	(N=58)	(N=108)	(N=3)	(N=4)	(N=7)
Lifestyles						
Alpha	68.0	70.7	69.4	100	100	100.0
Beta	28.0	24.1	25.9	0	0	0
Gamma	4.0	1.7	2.8	0	0	0
Delta	0	3.4	1.9	0	0	0
v.3 Ego integration Levels						
7 (highest)	40.0	53.4	47.2	66.7	100.0	85.7
6	18.0	20.7	19.4	33.3	0	14.3
5	20.0	12.1	15.7	0	0	0
4	16.0	8.6	12.0	0	0	0
3	4.0	5.2	4.6	0	0	0
2	2.0	0	.9	0	0	0
1 (lowest)	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 14.
Percentages of CPI-2 Modes and Levels of Functioning for Male and Female
by Violation Status

Category	Males			Females		
	Violators	Non-Violators	Total	Violators	Non-Violators	Total
	(N=90)	(N=90)	(N=180)	(N=7)	(N=4)	(N=11)
Lifestyles						
Alpha	67.8	54.4	61.1	71.4	75.0	72.7
Beta	21.1	34.4	27.8	14.3	0	9.1
Gamma	8.9	7.8	8.3	0	25.0	9.1
Delta	2.2	3.3	2.8	14.3	0	9.1
v.3 Ego integration Levels						
7 (highest)	31.1	28.9	30.0	0	25.0	9.1
6	24.4	23.3	23.9	85.7	25.0	63.6
5	15.6	22.2	18.9	0	50.0	18.2
4	17.8	16.7	17.2	14.3	0	9.1
3	10.0	6.7	8.3	0	0	0
2	0	2.2	1.1	0	0	0
1 (lowest)	1.1	0	.6	0	0	0

Most of the officers were in the middle to high levels of ego integration. A person who is high on the ego integration scale is perceived as competent by others in their chosen style of life and they have a self-view that they are comfortable with. The high percentage of Alphas is congruent with previous studies of law enforcement applicants where 62.3% (of 6,446) of the males and 51.0% (of 1,575) females were Alphas (Gough, 1995). Gammas have been found to be delinquents. In this sample, it appears that male Gammas were more likely to be violators, the only female Gamma was a non-violator. However, the sample of Gammas for both sexes is very small and generalizations from those groups may not be appropriate. To summarize this analysis, it was expected that a larger number of violators would be Gammas and that they would exhibit lower levels of ego integration. There was some weak support for that notion among the male officers. However, it appears that predominantly the officers (offending and non-offending) were more similar to each other (e.g., they are chiefly Alphas) and exhibited comparable levels of ego integration.

References.

1. Gough, H. G. (1987). CPI: *California Psychological Inventory Administrator's Guide.* Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc.
2. Gough, H. G. and Bradley, P. (1992). *Delinquent and criminal behavior as assessed by the revised California Psychological Inventory.* Journal of Clinical Psychology, 48, 298-308.

F. Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF)

1. General Information.
The 16PF was developed for assessing normal adults. There are several integrated sections to the 16PF referred to as Forms A, B, C, D, and E. The Forms A and B are written at the 7.5 grade reading level while C and D are written at the 6.5 grade reading level. Form E is designed for individuals with reading difficulties and is written at the 3.5 grade reading level. Norms are available by sex and age. The 16PF Form A takes about 45 minutes to complete. The questions force the respondent to chose between three response options. There are 16 standard scales (factors). The test publisher recommends administering Forms A and B together, but when time pressures do not allow the administration of both, they recommend use of the Form A 16PF. Eighty-two percent of the 16PF data collected in this sample were the raw answers to the Form A. Scale level data for the Form A made up the next largest piece of the 16PF data acquired from the police departments using that instrument.

a. **Validity Scales.** The Form A 16PF has three validity scales: Motivational Distortion (e.g., Faking Good), 'Faking Bad,' and Random responses. Again, while scores on these scales were assessed, none of the cases was eliminated from the data set used to conduct the analyses, due to the fact that all of the applicants in this study were selected for a law enforcement position. Correlations between the validity scales and violator status are presented in Table 15.

b.   Reliability. The *16PF Administrator's Guide* reports averaged short-interval test-retest reliabilities for the 16 scales of .80; the long-interval averaged reliability is .52. Additional information is available from in the 1991 *Administrator's Manual*.

c.   Scoring. The 16PF is scored by adding up a 0, 1, or 2 allotted for the answers to the questions. The scale scores are converted to Sten scores where the mean is fixed at 5.5 with a standard deviation of 2.0. The scores are distributed over 10 equal-interval standard score points. The Stens scores can be computed using norms appropriate for the individual and then a profile and narrative report obtained describing the individual relative to others. In addition to the 16 primary scales, various combinations of the scales may be calculated to predict specific criteria. The raw scores are used for the correlational analyses presented on the next page.

d.   Difference between 16PF and the MMPI/CPI. The 16PF was developed based upon a series of analyses of personality items that were specifically selected for administration because they reflect personality dimensions that might differentiate normal individuals. These factor analyses resulted in scales that have been replicated in many different groups of people. These stable personality scales are then used to predict different criteria. Alternatively, the MMPI and CPI scales were developed by comparing items already on the test to different criteria of interest. Items that differentiate people on the criteria of interest are then added together to create a scale. In the case of the MMPI, comparisons were made for the purpose of assessing pathology. The CPI and 16PF were not intended to assess severe psychopathology.

2. Criterion Correlations and Standard Scales.

Table 15 presents the correlations between the 16PF scales and the criteria. Non-violators had higher scores on Tough Poise than the violators at a statistically significant level for the full sample. People high on that factor are more influenced by facts than by feelings. The direction and the magnitude of the correlations provide information concerning other scales that might be useful to assess by other researchers at the departmental level. It is important to note, however, that these correlation coefficients are based upon much smaller sample sizes than the figures reported for the MMPI and CPI.

33

Table 15.
Correlations between the 16PF Scales and the Violator/Non-Violator Criterion

Scale		*Dev*	*H.O.*	*Full*
		(N=64)	(N=33)	(N=97)
A	Cool to Warm	-.03	-.13	-.06
B	Concrete to Abstract	.08	-.08	.03
C	Affected to Stable	.17	.02	.12
E	Submissive to Domin.	.01	-.11	-.04
F	Sober to Enthus	.03	-.28	-.07
G	Expedient to Consc.	.04	.10	.06
H	Shy to Bold	-.09	-.28	-.15
I	Tough to Tender Mind.	-.08	-.20	-.11
L	Trusting to	-.03	.04	.00
M	Practical to Imagin.	-.10	-.22	-.14
N	Forthright to Shrewd	.01	-.22	-.07
O	Self-Assur. to Appreh.	.04	.15	.08
Q1	Conservat. to Exper	-.03	-.09	-.05
Q2	Group-Or. to Self-Suff	.10	.07	.09
Q3	Lax to Soc. Precise	-.05	.03	-.02
Q4	Relaxed to Tense	-.14	.11	-.03
FG	Fake Good	-.10	.04	-.06
FB	Fake Bad	-.11	.12	-.03
ADJ	Adjustment	.24	-.20	.07
TPOISE	Tough Poise Profile Pattern	.24	.22	.23*

Non-violators appear to score higher on Factor C, indicating they are more emotionally mature, stable, realistic about life, unruffled, possessing ego strength, and better able to maintain a solid group morale. It is interesting to note that the 16PF manual indicates individuals with a good Factor C level may achieve effective adjustment despite an underlying psychotic potential. The pattern of correlations with Factor G suggests that the non-violators are moralistic, rule-bound and depict themselves as dominated by a sense of duty. The pattern of correlations with Factor H suggest that violators are more emotionally sensitive, sometimes demanding of attention and help, impatient, dependent and not very realistic. They dislike rude people and rough occupations. The relationships between Factor M and violator status suggest that violators are individualists that may cause them to be rejected in a group. Non-violators appear to be more apprehensive, self-blaming and guilt-prone with a strong sense of obligation due to higher scores on Factor O than the violators. Once again, it is important to note that while the correlational patterns are more consistent for the 16PF than they have been for the other tests, the sample size is considerably smaller (encompassing only 14 of the 69 departments), with most departments only contributing 1 or 2 cases with 16PF data. The small sample size means that the findings could change if there is an attempt to replicate the analysis.

References.

1. Cattell, H. B. (1989). *The 16PF: Personality in depth*. Champaign, IL: IPAT.
2. IPAT Staff (1991). *Administrator's Manual for the 16PF*. Champaign, IL: Institute for Personality and Ability Testing.

G. Inwald Personality Inventory (IPI)

1. General Information.

The Inwald Personality Inventory was developed specifically to assess applicants for criminal justice positions. There are 310 items to which applicants are asked to answer true or false. The measure takes approximately 30 to 45 minutes to complete. There are 25 original scales; however, Hilson Research (the publisher of the IPI) has an aggressive research and development division that seeks opportunities to develop new scales. The test publishers describe the IPI as "...designed specifically to aid law enforcement agencies in selecting new officers who satisfy psychological fitness requirements (Inwald, Kratz, & Shusman, 1982)." The items have considerable face validity in terms of asking the applicants about historical life events related to failure as a law enforcement officer. The IPI is often administered with the MMPI. The IPI is designed to focus on work-related counterproductive behaviors that a normal person might have engaged in, but would not have been picked-up by the more psychopathological focus of the MMPI.

a.   Validity Scales. The IPI has one validity scale (Guardedness) which assesses the degree to which an applicant is responding defensively to the questions. Low scores indicate a desire to appear unusually virtuous and without fault. If this score is low, the other scale scores may be affected due to socially desirable responses.

b.   Reliability. The *IPI Manual* (Inwald, Kratz, & Shusman, 1982) provides information concerning the reliability of the IPI scales. Generally, they have evidenced sufficient reliability to include a higher degree of face validity for law enforcement job applicants than the MMPI and CPI.

c.   Scoring. The IPI can be scored using both raw scores and the t-scores (used for the MMPI and CPI). As with the three other tests, a narrative report can be obtained that provides a written description of what the scores mean. Critical items are also provided that may be used for follow-up questions in an interview. High scores on the scales indicate the applicant is high on the concept (for example high drug use scores mean higher self reported indicators of drug use propensity).

2. Criterion Correlations and Standard Scales.

Table 16 provides the correlations for the developmental, hold out and full sample.

Table 16.
Correlations between IPI Scales and Violator/Non-Violator Criterion

Scale	*Dev.*	*H. O.*	*Full*
	(N=65)	(N=32)	(N=97)
Alcohol Use (AL)	.06	-.22	-.01
Drug Use (DG)	-.05	.08	-.02
Trouble with the Law (TL)	-.10	-.29	-.13
Job Adjustment Difficulties (JD)	-.22	.07	-.12
Absence Abuse	-.11	.15	-.02
Guardedness (GD)	-.10	.12	-.03
Substance Abuse	.17	-.08	.09
Antisocial Attitudes (AS)	.20	-.24	.07
Hyperactivity (HP)	.20	-.17	.08
Rigid Type (RT)	.06	-.11	-.01
Unusual Experience (UE)	.09	.00	.06
Family Conflicts	-.02	-.32	-.09
Undue Suspiciousness (US)	.08	-.04	.04
Lack of Assertiveness (LA)	-.26*	-.02	-.19
Loner (LO)	-.26*	.00	-.17

While none of the scales was significantly correlated with violator status in both the developmental and hold-out samples, the direction and magnitude of the correlations across the samples offers some suggestions concerning which scales might replicate at the departmental level with an applicant sample. Specifically, violators appear to be more likely to score higher on the Trouble with the Law scale indicating they have had more of a history of interactions with the law and with social norms. The test publisher recommends that particular attention be paid to the background investigation for law enforcement applicants scoring high on this scale. There was a significant correlation between Lack of Assertiveness and status as a violator in the developmental sample ($r = -.26$, $p<.05$), as well as with identifying oneself as being a Loner ($r = -.26$, $p<.05$).

References.

1. Inwald, R. E. (1988*). Five-Year follow-up study of departmental terminations as predicted by 16 preemployment psychological indicators.* Journal of Applied Psychology, 73(4), 703-710
2. Inwald, R., Kratz, H., & Shusman, E. (1982). *The Inwald Personality Inventory Manual.* New York: Hilson.
3. Shusman, E. J., Inwald, R. E., and Knatz, H. F. (1987*). A cross-validation study of police recruit performance as predicted by the IPI and MMPI.* Journal of Police Science and Administration, 15(2), 162-16.

H. Assessment of Predictive Utility of Personal Characteristics

1. Post-Hire Misconduct.

Analyses of the officers' personal characteristics identified post-hire misconduct as the best predictor of subsequent acts of corruption ($r = -.26$, $p<.01_{Developmental}$ and $r = -.34$, $p<.01_{Hold-out}$). Individuals who engaged in acts of misconduct after they were hired were significantly more likely to engage in acts of trust betrayal than those who did not engage in acts of trust betrayal. Post-hire acts of misconduct did not include the act(s) of corruption resulting in the officer being assigned to the violator group. Post-hire acts of misconduct also did not include accidents because they did not constitute efforts by the officer to misuse positional authority.

Figure 3 illustrates how the number of post-hire acts of misconduct varied by violator and non-violator. Non-violators consistently engaged in fewer acts of post-hire misconduct than violators.

Figure 3.
Number of Officers with Post-hire
Acts of Misconduct

Given the statistically significant relationship between post-hire misconduct and later acts of corruption, correlations were also run to assess whether there was a significant association between post-hire misconduct and any of the personality scales on the MMPI. The post-hire misconduct criterion was created by assigning one point for each incidence of prior misconduct. Once again, post-hire acts of misconduct did not include either a) the act(s) of corruption resulting in the officer being assigned to the violator group or b) any disciplinary actions for accidents. The variable ranged from 0 to 5 with a mean of .70, and standard deviation of 1.25 in the full sample.

Correlations between this new criterion and the full MMPI-1, MMPI-R, and MMPI-2 samples are presented in Table 17.

Table 17.
Correlations between the MMPI-1 Scales and MMPI-2 Scales and the Post-Hire Misconduct Criterion

Scale	MMPI-1	MMPI-R	MMPI-2
	(N=585)	(N=181)	(N=42)
	Full	Full	Full
Validity (F)	.20**	.08	.08
Purified Validity	.21**	.06	n/a
Psychopathic Deviate	.08*	.13	-.15
Psychopathic Deviate - O	.15**	.18*	-.04
Mental confusion	.14**	.07	.24
Responsibility	-.13**	-.08	-.11
Paranoia	-.02	-.16*	-.22
Somatic Symptoms	.11*	.16*	.18
Non overlapping purified Hypochondriasis	.11*	.17*	n/a
Admission of Symptoms	.11*	.26**	n/a

Note: **High scores indicate more post-hire acts of misconduct.**

The scales associated with post-hire misconduct are very similar to those identified as predictive of status as a violator. Specifically, the Psychopathic Deviance scales indicate that individuals with more acts of post-hire misconduct violations described themselves as generally deviating from societal standards and conventions and as having a past that may.involve minor criminal acts, family problems, and interpersonal difficulties. Not only does violator status appear to be related to internal conflict and confusion, but this mental confusion also appears to be related to getting into trouble on the job more often.

Relationships between the number of post-hire acts of misconduct and responsibility indicate that violators described themselves as less responsible at the time of hire. Correlations with the Paranoia scale indicate that individuals that get into trouble more often are insensitive and unaware of the motives of others, may be gullible and overly trusting.

38

2. Awards.

The presence of awards in an officer's personnel file appears to be related to whether the officer was a violator or non-violator in the developmental sample (r= -.08). Non-violators were more likely to have awards than violators. While the correlation was not significant in the hold-out sample, it was in the same direction as that found in the developmental sample (r=-.11). Unfortunately, the number of awards an officer received was not requested from the departments.

3. Time on the Job.

An additional observation was that time on the job (since hired) was related to the number of post-hire acts of misconduct (r=.18, p<.01). Not suprisingly, the longer an officer was on the job, the greater the number of post-hire acts of misconduct. Given this finding, it might be possible to identify a period of time on the job when violators are most likely to engage in an act of trust betrayal. It also indicates the possible utility of controlling for length of service in follow-up analyses. The relationship between time on the job and number of priors for violators and non-violators is displayed in Figure 4.

Figure 4.
Post-hire Misconduct by Time Since Hired
(Violators)

Table 18.
Average Number of Priors and Range for Violators and Non-Violators
According To Time On The Job (Since Hired)

Number of Priors				
	Mean		Range	
Time on Job	Viol.	NonViol.	Viol.	NonViol.
<1 yr	1.75	1.20	0-5	0-2
1-2 yrs	1.84	1.38	0-4	0-2
2-3 yrs	2.13	1.89	0-5	0-4
3-4 yrs	2.32	2.23	0-5	0-5
4-5 yrs	2.56	1.50	0-5	0-2
5-6 yrs	1.90	1.50	0-5	0-2
>6 yrs	2.32	1.90	0-5	0-5

Table 18 shows that both violators and non-violators appear to have an increased number of acts of misconduct between the third and fifth year of employment. Violators are very likely to have multiple acts of misconduct between the third and fifth year, suggesting that a department that could identify violators prior to the third year of employment could reduce the overall level of misconduct in the department. It should be noted that some of the participating departments did not retain personality data for more than 5 years. The levels reported in Table 18 after year 5 may have been affected by that reporting limitation.

4. Education.

Non-violators tended to have slightly higher education levels than violators, as shown in Table 19. Violators held the majority in the lower educational levels: GED only (64%) and high school education only (53%). Non-violators held slim majorities at all other levels of education (except for Ph.D.). Since many departments now require their candidates to have at least a 2-year degree, this policy may help to reduce the number of corruption prone officers entering the workforce.

Table 19.
Education Levels of Violators and Non-Violators

Education	Violators	Non-Violators	Total
	(N=429)	(N=415)	(N=844)
GED	18 (64%)	10 (36%)	28 (100%)
High School	137 (53%)	120 (47%)	257 (100%)
Some College	206 (49%)	212 (51%)	418 (100%)
Bachelors	66 (49%)	70 (51%)	136 (100%)
Some Graduate	1	2	3
Masters	0	1	1
Ph.D.	1	0	1

5. Prior Occupation.

Prior occupation, as illustrated in Figure 5, appears to exhibit some influence over a person's willingness to participate in acts of corruption. Occupational categories dominated by non-violators included military (55%), police (55%), clerical (57%) and management (60%). Violators were more prevalent in categories such as security (55%), construction (72%), food service (71%), driver/delivery (60%) and manual laborer (88%). This latter group included occupations where part of the income (e.g., tips, gratuities) is often not reported to tax authorities. Individuals who are socialized to accept under-the-table payment for their services may be more likely to accept other forms of corrupt behavior. Other factors may be 1) the relevance and quality of assessment of the candidates' character by the prior employer during the background investigation and 2) the impact of the position on the personal and professional growth of the employee. There were no significant differences between the number of violators and non-violators in some occupations such as retail and customer service. Other categories were too small to make a determination and the prior occupation was unknown in 32% of the cases.

Figure 5.
Selected Prior Occupations of
Violators and Non-Violators

PHASE THREE - THE PRACTICALITY OF PUBLIC TRUST BETRAYAL SCREENING

The purpose of this study was to answer a relatively straightforward question:

> *Can a scale or set of scales predictive of public trust betrayal be created from pre-employment personality tests commonly used by law enforcement departments?*

The answer to that question was that no single indicator or combination of indicators was able to reliably and accurately discriminate between violating and non-violating officers who provided data for this study. There were, however, several findings that might be useful to police authorities interested in finding ways of decreasing the level of corruption experienced by their department. Those findings are presented below.

A. MAJOR FINDINGS

Substantial improvements in reducing police corruption and other acts of trust betrayal do not appear possible solely through improved utilization of the personality factors currently measured by most police departments. The decision of whether or not to engage in acts of corruption is shaped to a great extent by environmental factors[2] and foreground triggers[3]. Those factors and triggers are often not associated with the employee's personality. The low correlations found between personality and corruption indicate that only very modest improvements can be made through better utilization of the personality data that are already being collected.

Undoubtedly, some of the strength of the relationship between corruption and personality was reduced in this study because those same personality measures, as well as other background screening procedures, were already being used by the departments to help screen candidates. The data from this study will be made available to other researchers, and corrections for range restriction can be applied by those possessing the necessary police applicant normative data on the personality measures. Even with those corrections it is unlikely that the amount of variance accounted for by the personality measures will raise substantially. This means that it is unlikely that improved personality screening has the potential to substantially reduce police corruption. Rather, it appears that significant reductions in corruption will only be possible if the resulting knowledge of the personality factors affecting corruption is combined with systematic efforts to reduce the environmental factors and foreground triggers that also contribute to its occurrence.

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[2] Examples of environmental factors include the level of undesirable behavior tolerated at that agency; the character of the employee's coworkers, training officers, and supervisors; whether police candidates are properly trained on how to respond to observations or solicitations of police corruption; and whether the individual is assigned to areas and assignments where corruption potential is higher.

[3] Examples of foreground triggers include whether the person was passed over for promotion, has a romantic relationship with someone with expensive tastes, and perceives him/herself as unjustly treated.

It has been noted that a challenge to modern policing is not eradicating corruption but rather maintaining vigilance and attention to the issue such that when the precursors of corruption emerge appropriate measures will be taken to control them. This study sought to leverage a selection procedure already in place in many departments (i.e., screening candidates with psychological tests) to create a reliable, valid, ethically responsible and legally defensible means to decrease the level of corruption experienced by departments.

The leveraging approach that was utilized sought to find scales and items on certain psychological tests (the MMPI, CPI, 16PF and IPI) that differentiated individuals who had betrayed the public trust from those that had not. What was discovered is that the best predictor of violator status assessed by this study was an officer's history of on-the-job acts of misconduct, not personality measures.

Although the personality measures were not as strong predictors as anticipated, certain personality characteristics were found that appear to be related to violator status. In this study bivariate correlations were run on the primary personality scales associated with each of the four personality tests examined using violator status as the criterion. Scale correlations on the MMPI (e.g., Pd), CPI (e.g., Re, Cm), 16PF (e.g., Factors C and G), and IPI (e.g., Trouble with the Law) indicate that violators are more likely to have a history of disregarding or expressing disregard for the rules and laws that govern society, as well as for the individuals responsible for enforcing them. Additionally, those scale scores suggest that violators may frequently be described as immature, unreliable, and irresponsible. The 16PF Factor H and CPI Narcissism correlations suggest the violators may be overly concerned about how they appear to others on the surface. Violators scores on the MMPI-Lie and CPI-Social Presence scales indicate that they are also less likely to divulge attitudes and behaviors that they feel might harm their chances of being selected for the law enforcement positions for which they were applying. However, the violators did respond affirmatively more often to delinquency-related items, such as "I have been in trouble with the law" and "I have been suspended from school".

The scale scores indicate that the non-violators are more likely to be described as tolerant of others, thoughtful concerning their relationships with others, achievement oriented, and willing to accept responsibility for their actions. The findings from the MMPI Pt scale, 16PF Factor M scale, and CPI Psychological Mindedness scale also suggest that non-violators are more affected by internal behavioral controls such as guilt and remorse.

Not only can these traits be assessed to some degree by personality tests, they can also be addressed by questions asked during subject interviews and during the employment and reference checks conducted as part of background investigations.

To summarize, police officers who betrayed the public trust were more likely to have engaged in post-hire acts of workplace misconduct than non-violators. Further, while background investigation data on the subjects was not collected, the violator's item responses and scale scores on the personality tests indicate that they were also more likely to have engaged in delinquent acts in other settings (e.g., high school). Non-violators, on-the-other-hand, appear to be more concerned about behaving in a socially

responsible manner, as well as maintaining stable interpersonal relationships with friends, family, coworkers, and supervisors.

B. SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICE MANAGERS

Law enforcement has a responsibility to the communities it serves to take the lead in seeking and maintaining employees of the highest ethical standards. Combating police corruption requires coordination among members of the law enforcement agency, as well as with local or state government, police professional organizations, and the communities served.

Validation of any selection procedures used by the department adds value to the organization by providing evidence that the department created a system of records necessary for tracking, evaluating, and refining the measures used to assess corruption propensity. Further, doing so demonstrates that the department is seeking to make reasonable attempts to identify officers who might later engage in acts of corruption.

As previously noted, the best predictor of violator status found in this study was post-hire acts of misconduct. Attempts to construct MMPI and CPI betrayal of trust scales[4], both empirically and based upon theory, capable of reliably and validly differentiating violators and non-violators were largely unsuccessful for this sample. These efforts, however, do not necessarily negate the possibility that such a scale could be developed and validated within a given department using their own applicant norms. **It is recommended that the results be reviewed by the larger participating departments with attention to potential differences caused by departmental characteristics (i.e., applicant norms, demographic ratios, selection practices in place during the time each violator was hired).**

None of the pre-employment psychological tests currently being used by law enforcement departments appears to offer a new general scale or dimension that can reliably and validly differentiate officers at the beginning of their career likely to violate the public trust later in their career. However, there are indications that the selection systems currently in place may be refined through informed use of certain items and scales on the tests. For example, **individuals with elevated Psychopathic Deviance scales at a t-score of 65 or higher were significantly more likely to violate the public's trust. Departments should examine which factors led to not using this information to question an applicant's suitability for law enforcement.** Further, there were officers with elevated scales who did not betray the public trust. Identification of the factors or characteristics that might have mitigated a propensity for misconduct could be of substantial value to departments seeking to decrease the overall level of corruption they experience. This information would help ensure that cut-scores are not being ignored for inappropriate reasons (e.g., candidates being given preferential treatment because of contacts) and are not treated as disqualifying when stronger or more valid evidence exists that the applicant would make a good officer.

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[4] Most of the personality data collected in this study was either MMPI or CPI, which essentially limited meaningful new scale development and cross validation to the items contained on those two tests.

Given the apparent prevalence of past indiscretions for violators, **law enforcement agencies should work to ensure there are internal mechanisms for exchanging information among personnel responsible for the selecting and training of other officers, as well as the personnel responsible for identifying and punishing corruption.** Improvements in the way a department deals with corruption are possible only if an effort is made to provide honest and direct information about specific incidents of corruption to all parties involved in combating it.

There was considerable variation in how departments responded to those earlier acts of departmental misconduct, as well as how they punished substantiated cases of corruption. Undoubtedly, some of the variation was justified by the circumstances. However, it is also likely that some of this variation was not justified. Therefore, **it is recommended that the law enforcement community seek more common standards for punishing their personnel**, perhaps resulting in a non-binding document similar in nature to the Federal sentencing guidelines used by judges. Those standards would probably be most appropriate if they were set for and by law enforcement organizations with input from organizations representing their officers and deputies. **It is also recommended that a study be conducted to assess whether police officers who have been fired or asked to resign from one jurisdiction have been able to be hired at another police force without disclosing that fact.** If so, steps should be taken to prevent that problem from occurring such as having a central registration file of all current and former sworn officers which departments could check during their background investigation process.

Maintaining the highest ethical standards requires the support of civilian and police review boards, police unions and fraternal organizations, and command personnel. Associations concerned with the law enforcement profession must work with their rank and file officers and with police managers to ensure that the goal of professional integrity helps guide their efforts.

Professional and departmental integrity standards should be clearly established and consistently administered at all levels of an organization. Constraints upon the consistent administration of such standards should be reviewed and questioned if they infringe upon the ability of the individual officer to maintain the public's trust. The fact that similar acts of trust betrayal are punished differently highlights the need for departments to more clearly define how trust, both within the broader community served and within the department, is to be maintained.

C. SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICE PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS

Some aspects of an individual's propensity for corruption might not currently be assessed using the psychological screens. A background investigation can pick up some of these elements. A concerted attempt to assess the utility obtained by marrying the information obtained in a background investigation with information provided by the applicant on the self-report has not yet been made.

Job applicants will normally strive to present themselves in the most advantageous light. The findings from this study, however, suggest that individuals prone to trust betrayal will be particularly concerned with trying to appear honest. This finding could have considerable impact upon selection systems using a top-down selection process based upon scores on psychological tests. **Practitioners should carefully investigate the relationships between applicant self-reported forthcomingness and other indicators of the level of honesty displayed.** For example, comparisons might be made between specific items on the MMPI (e.g., I have been suspended from school) and information uncovered from record checks and the background investigation. Individuals with a history of unwillingness to be honest about past mistakes may place departments at risk in the event he/she later becomes involved in incidents on patrol that require an honest account of events.

It is recommended that further effort be made to develop forthcomingness scales designed specifically for law enforcement applicants who take personality or integrity tests. Applicants high on those scales would be more likely than others to admit to their prior acts of wrong doing and their imperfections. Many of the items on this scale would probably be similar to those contained on the MMPI Lie Scale. However, each item selected should meet the following criteria: a) it relates to a trait most applicants would consider relevant for a law enforcement position (e.g., honesty, courage, control of temper, etc.), b) few applicants, if any, would be able to truthfully claim they met the behavioral standard reflected by that item (e.g., "I have never told a lie"), c) applicants would not perceive the question as an obvious "lie" scale item (i.e., reflecting a standard that probably no applicant could ever meet, such as "I have never done anything wrong in my entire life"), and d) there is clear empirical and rational support that the item would serve to improve the scale and enhance prediction.

In addition to helping to correct for socially desirable responses, a well-constructed forthcomingness scale may help predict corruption potential, as indicated by the positive correlation between the lie scale and offender status in this study. People who admit to transgressions and weakness in situations where those admissions may have immediate negative implications are exhibiting honesty. Therefore, candid responders in employment testing contexts may prove to be somewhat less likely to engage in acts of wrongdoing in the future than their less candid/honest fellow applicants.

As noted in the preceding section, elevated t-scores (65+) on the Psychopathic Deviance (Pd) scale were found to significantly differentiate trust betrayers from non-betrayers. While there has been considerable discussion in the literature concerning the ability of the MMPI Pd scale to predict psychopathology, the evidence in this study suggests that for normal individuals seeking law enforcement positions, entering the department with an elevated Pd score puts him/her at significantly greater risk of later acts of trust betrayal. **Police personnel practitioners should examine those cases where a decision was made to allow individuals with elevated Pd scales to enter the department.** Identification of factors that either contributed to the successful integration of such officers into the department or that resulted in the officer becoming a violator should be the goal of such a review. This information would be extremely valuable to police practitioners when selecting candidates to be hired.

The fact that the best predictor found of an officer's future trust betrayal was on-the-job misconduct suggests that departments may have a warning when someone is likely to become a trust betrayer. What is not known is whether the violators who had post-hire acts of misconduct, also had pre-hire acts of misconduct of a similar nature. A useful step for departments to take would be to review the trust betrayal cases to clarify the types of acts the officers were getting in trouble for prior to the act of trust betrayal. **The data that were collected in this study suggest that the most common act of on-the-job misconduct was supervisory problems. It is recommended that departments review those cases and more clearly articulate the nature of those offenses. After doing so, the psychological tests could be analyzed to identify items and/or scales that are related to the specific types of discipline problems that come before the acts of trust betrayal, and development of predictive scales could be attempted.**

Departments may also find that there is a propensity for conflict between certain types of officers and supervisors. Friction between those pairs could escalate to the point where the patrol officer no longer identifies with departmental interests or concerns and begins seeking rewards in other venues. This statement is made because of the considerable variance in punishment that was found, the frequent history of earlier departmental disciplinary actions, and evidence on the personality measures that the offenders have a greater propensity for problems getting along with authority figures. If poor supervisory behaviors appear to be part of the problem, **departments may want to consider adding supervisor selection measures that better identify leaders who are able to positively integrate the department's "problem" subordinates back into the fold.** In addition, departments may want to establish clearer guidelines concerning the punishments to be allocated for specific violations of departmental rules.

Given the degree of association between trust betrayal and on-the-job misconduct, police personnel practitioners may want to seek a more active role in evaluating individuals who engage in those less severe acts of on-the-job misconduct. The characteristics and past behaviors of officers engaging in acts of misconduct while on probation should be carefully reviewed with increased emphasis being placed upon whether the individual will be able to successfully adapt to the demands of public service.

Some of the relationships reported indicate the importance of identifying and taking into consideration the person's pattern of behavior in job-relevant situations, as well as how long that person has been adhering to that pattern of behavior. Some people change for the better, some people change for the worse. These changes may occur after the person is married, accepts a full-time job, enters college, has children, gets divorced, is caught and punished for a transgression, or experiences some other significant event. Discernible positive patterns of behavior in job-relevant situations are likely to have played a part in creating the positive correlations between non-violator status and 1) certain categories of prior jobs, 2) education, and 3) personality variables related to dependability, reliability, and conscientiousness. It is also possible that some of those life experiences provided positive role-learning situations, served as screening mechanisms that weeded out those who were unable to perform satisfactorily, and/or gave candidates added time to mature.

One of the reasons the personality measures did not perform as well as had been anticipated may be that those questions failed to adequately take into consideration the changes in the person's behavior over time. For example, one of the questions that was predictive of later corruption was "Have you ever been in trouble with the law?". It may have been far more predictive, however, if that question addressed the recency, frequency, or seriousness of the incident. If the law violation was isolated, and the applicant learned from it, it might not be a negative reflection on the applicant's character.

Many of the possible responses to items asked on the personality tests would be of keen interest to background investigators, such as the question "Have you ever been in trouble with the law?". Of the four tests examined, only the Inwald Personality Inventory identifies "critical issue item responses" for possible later follow-up. **It is recommended that background investigators and screening psychologists identify those responses to items on the personality test(s) their department is using which they want to be notified of, then set up a system for receiving that information.**

D. SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICE RESEARCHERS

Prior research concerning the prediction of misconduct appears to have been limited by the use of concurrently collected samples and small sample sizes. While some of the characteristics found to be predictive of corruption in previous studies were of value in this study (e.g., MMPI-Pd), the vast majority of the scales were unable to differentiate violators from non-violators over time. It is noted that the variance in this sample is restricted by the use of a sample of incumbents rather than applicants. However, the criterion variance is enhanced by the use of a sample containing an equal number of matched violators and non-violators, instead of reflecting the true base rate.

Law enforcement applicant norms could be collected on each measure of interest to assess whether the use of such norms improves differentiation of corrupt from non-corrupt officers. The use of applicant norms may increase the magnitude of the correlations to the point of statistical significance, but it may not influence the pattern of correlations (e.g., direction of relationship). Any measure that will be used to identify individuals prone to betray public trust that does not substantially encompass evidence of the individual's past problems with authority and the laws governing society, but instead uses other personality based indicators must be held to the highest possible scientific, ethical, and legal standards. Thus, a consistent pattern of measurement should be established through such means as the collection of multiple samples, the collection of data across departments, and the use of predictive designs.

The analyses conducted in this study were limited to the test questions for which there were data. While it was observed that the officers likely to become violators were also more likely to try to appear more honest than they actually were, improved reliability and validity may be possible if additional questions are integrated into broader psychological measures such as the MMPI or 16PF and/or additional tests are developed specifically targeted at assessing the number, type, and timing of past acts of misconduct. Additionally, the sample size was limited for several of the measures (e.g.,

MMPI-2, IPI, 16PF). This study suggests some patterns of characteristics that may lead to development of reliable and valid screening measures. **It is recommended that departments compare the findings observed in this sample with data taken from their own department for applicants and individuals given a conditional offer of employment (e.g., assessed via MMPI).**

All but one of these personality measures, the 16PF, uses a true/false response continuum. While this is consistent with the medical professions use of behavioral/symptom checklists, it may be that the differences between normal individuals on a criterion such as trust are more subtle. Just as time concerns should be taken into consideration in future studies, the degree to which an individual endorses many of the less objective items should be considered. Five point response options that strive for a normal distribution across the different responses may, or may not, prove a useful means of improving reliability and prediction with job applicants.

The corruption criteria used in this sample were focused upon acts of trust betrayal. **The predictive validity found between an individual's general misconduct and status as a trust violator suggests that there is a need for a taxonomy of law enforcement corruption.** It has frequently been noted in the criminal justice literature that there are many different types of criminals. Such may also be the case with individuals engaging in acts of misconduct. One approach to generating such a taxonomy would be to work with individuals responsible for punishing the acts at different levels of the organization (e.g., supervising officers, commanding officers, internal affairs, union representatives, civilian review boards). The acts found to be most damaging to the mission of law enforcement could also then be identified to be punished most severely and consistently.

There were perceptibly lower correlations between personality measures and betrayal of trust found in this study compared to others reported in the literature. In addition, there were numerous statistically significant, high correlations found within some of the smaller samples that failed to replicate in either the hold out sample or for an alternative version of that same test. **It is believed that these findings reflect the importance that researchers:**

> **1) Use predictive designs similar to the one used in this study as opposed to using concurrent samples for validating predictive tests,**
>
> **2) Have a sufficiently large number of subjects and departments participate in the development and validation of screening scales,**
>
> **3) Cross-validate their findings, even if those findings have been reported previously in the literature, and**
>
> **4) Use subjects and criteria that mirror those found in the applications of interest.**

Psychologists and others involved in the screening process should review the empirical basis for some of the tests and cut-scores that they have been using in light of these recommendations. If those measures fail to meet these standards, consideration should be given to seeking further validation evidence.

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52

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APPENDICES

A. LETTER SEEKING DEPARTMENTAL PARTICIPATION

**DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH
CENTER (PERSEREC)**

99 PACIFIC STREET, BUILDING 455, SUITE E
MONTEREY CALIFORNIA 93940-2481
(408) 656-2448/DSN: 878-2448

11/25/97

Chief John Smith
Skipjack Police Dept.
P.O. Box 329
Watertown, VA 99833

Dear Chief Smith:

I am writing to seek your department's assistance in conducting a research project on people who betray the trust that was placed in them by their organization and the public. Our goal is to identify a set of items contained on background screening instruments that differentiate people who later commit acts of trust betrayal from those who are presumed not to have done so. It is our hope that we will find a set of items that will serve as the basis for developing (a) trust betrayal predisposition scale(s).

It is our intention to develop valid screening procedures based on the data we receive from your and other police departments. The resulting instruments should decrease our integrity problems, assist us in meeting the new Americans with Disabilities Act standards, and be able to withstand any legal challenges that might result from their use. If we are successful, your department would reap the same benefits without having to bear any of the developmental costs.

This study has received endorsements from the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, the National Institute of Justice, the Association of Major City Chief's of Police and the Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Council. More than 150 State, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies across the nation are currently participating.

In the event your department is able to participate we will share our findings with you. Your department will receive a copy of the final report, a complete set of the data for your own analysis, and a point of contact for answering any questions you have regarding the study or its implications. No department names will appear in

the data set and the only mention of your name and your department's name appearing in the report will be to acknowledge that you assisted us with the project.

We would not need, nor could we accept, any information that contains personal identifiers. We would, however, need to know 1) which group the officers fell under (betrayal or nonbetrayal), 2) the officer's gender, 3) the officer's age at the time of testing, 4) the length of time that passed from when the officer was tested to when the officer committed the act in question (betrayal group only), and 5) whether or not it appears that the officer committed the violation alone or was part of a larger group of violators (betrayal group only). We would also need photocopies of the response sheets that the officers completed when they took their pre-employment psychological tests.

The tests we are specifically interested in collecting data on are the MMPI, CPI, 16PF, and IPI. If your department has used one or more of those instruments for pre-employment screening, we would definitely be interested in working with you on this project.

If your department would be unable to devote any resources to this project (e.g., college interns or police cadets), we may be able to hire a retired officer from your department (or a currently employed officer desiring overtime) to pull the response sheets, make the photocopies, and blackout the personal identifiers contained on the response sheets. If you would prefer that we perform those tasks ourselves, we may be able to arrange to do so. However, we have limited funds available to cover those costs and would like to discuss the matter with you before making a firm commitment.

The offenses we are interested in collecting data on tend to be very rare events. Therefore, it is essential that we secure the cooperation of every possible department. Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and over ninety other departments have already agreed to participate, but without a large number of additional departments participating we will not acquire a sufficient number of cases to properly conduct the analyses. Given the rarity of the violations, your department will probably only have a few cases, which also means relatively little work would be involved in supplying the requested information.

To be categorized as a "betrayal" case, the allegations made against the officer by your department must (1) involve a selected integrity issue, (2) be corroborated/substantiated and (3) have resulted in the officer being punished [fired, asked to resign, suspended with or without pay (for any length of time), demoted, or criminally prosecuted]. The integrity violations we are covering are:

    1) information breaches (endangering officers)—providing restricted information to outsiders that was likely to result in officers being harmed

(e.g., providing the identities of undercover officers who had infiltrated gang, drug, terrorist or organized crime groups);

2) information breaches (aiding criminals)—providing restricted information to outsiders that was likely to result in criminals avoiding arrest (e.g., providing raid, surveillance, or other police operations information to known offenders);

3) bribes/shakedowns—releasing apprehended traffic violators or criminals without processing them after taking or receiving funds, drugs, property, sexual favors, or other personal considerations;

4) protection money—failing to apprehend known offenders who previously gave money, property, services or other personal considerations to the officer(s) for not interfering with their criminal activities (i.e., protection rackets);

5) fix (dropping cases)—recommending that a traffic or criminal case be dropped or dismissed due to lack of evidence against the suspect after being given funds, property, services, or other personal considerations;

6) fix (testimony)—failing to testify against traffic or criminal offenders or testifying in a manner that results in their avoiding punishment in order to receive money, property, services or other personal considerations;

7) theft (on-duty)—on-duty theft of drugs, money, or property from victims, offenders, burglary sites, evidence lockers, or other areas under police protection;

8) off-duty violations—committing an off-duty theft or other criminal act in which the officer has used his/her police position to help commit the crime and clearly betrayed the trust placed in him/her by the department;

9) embezzlement/fraud—embezzling department funds or submitting fraudulent expense/payment claims to the department; and

10) falsification of time worked—claiming unearned overtime or flagrantly and deceptively leaving early from a shift.

As previously noted, the comparison group would be comprised of police officers who are presumed not to have engaged in betrayals of public trust. We will provide guidance to your staff on the least burdensome way to select the comparison group.

Due to the time constraints on this study, I would appreciate hearing of your decision as soon as possible. Please fax or mail the enclosed form to let me know of your response. If you or any of the other department administrators have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact either me or the project manager, Howard Timm, Ph.D. Our office phone number is (408) 373-3072. I appreciate your attention to this matter and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Callie Chandler, M.P.A.
Assistant Project Manager

B. CHARACTERISTICS RELATED TO CORRUPTION

(Similar characteristics are placed next to each other)

Acceptance of Criminality	Prior Criminal Activity	Trouble with Law	Delinquency
Achievement			
Approval Seeking	Weakness of will		
Attitude to. Honesty and Integrity	Conscientiousness	Dependability	Trustworthiness
Credibility			
Depression			
Disorders of Caring			
Emotional Stability/ Adjustment	Emotional Control	Moodiness	
Ego Needs	Empowerment		
Fear	Anxiety		
Flexibility	Rigidity (-)	Toughmindedness	
Hostility to authority	Aggressiveness		
Immaturity	Moral/Ethical Development		
Impulsivity	Rule Governed (-)	Hyperactivity	Irresponsibility/ Responsibility (-)
Intelligence	Disorders of Capacity		
Narcissism			
Need to be Powerful	Dominance		
Psychopathology	Maladjustment		
Rationalizations			
Response Style	Honesty	Defensive	
		Incompetence	
Risk taking	Wheeler Dealer Mentality		
Self Esteem	Self Efficacy	Self Respect	
Locus of Control	Self Regulation	Self Discipline	
Guilt			
Sensitivity			
Sociability	Social Skills	Socialization	
Social Adjustment	Social Alienation	Antisocial Disposition	
Resentment			
Somatic Concerns			
Stress Reaction			
Substance Abuse	Alcoholic Disposition		
Vocational Interests			

C. CONSTRUCTS HYPOTHESIZED TO PREDICT CORRUPTION AND MMPI SCALES THAT COULD BE USED TO MEASURE THEM

Construct Assessed using the MMPI	Related Constructs	MMPI Scale Used to Measure the Construct
Acceptance of Criminality/Delinquency	Prior Criminal Activity Trouble with the Law	Empirical/Rational Developed Pd
Attitude toward Honesty and Integrity		Empirical/Rational Developed Pd
Beliefs about Humanity		Empirical/Rational Developed Pd
Depression		D - Clinical DEP (Wiggins, Depression)
Emotional Stability	Emotional Control Moodiness Emotional Adjustment	Ma Sc D
Fear	Anxiety	Pa Empirical/Rational Developed PHO (Wiggins, PHO)
Hostility to Authority	Aggressiveness	Pd Pa AUT (Wiggins, Authority Conflict) HOS (Wiggins, Manifest Hostility)
Immaturity	Moral/Ethical Development	Pa REL (Wiggins, Religious Fundamentalism)
Impulsivity	Rule Governed (-) Hyperactivity	Ma Pt Sc
Narcissism		Empirical/Rational Developed
Need for Power	Dominance	Empirical/Rational Developed DOM
Object Beliefs		Empirical/Rational Developed
Psycho-pathology		Pd
Resentment	Antisocial Disposition	HOS (Wiggins, Manifest Hostility)
Response Style	Honesty Defensive Incompetence	L K F Pa
Risk Taking		HYP (Wiggins, Hypomania)
Self Regulation	Self Discipline Guilt	Empirical/Rational Developed Self Control (Caudra)
Self Respect	Self Efficacy Self Respect Locus of Control	MOR
Sociability	Social Skills Socialization	Pd Si
Social Adjustment	Social Alienation	Pd SOC (Wiggins, Social Maladjustment)

Somatic Concerns		Hy Hs HEA (Wiggins, Poor Health) ORG (Wiggins, Organic Symptoms)
Stress Reaction		Hy
Substance Abuse	Alcoholic Disposition	MacAndrews Alcoholism Scale
Vocational Interests		Empirical/Rational Developed Mf

D. INSTRUCTIONS AND QUESTIONNAIRES COMPLETED BY THE DEPARTMENTS

Table of Contents

I.   INTRODUCTION

Thank you for participating in this study of police officers who violate the trust that was placed in them by their department and the public.   Our intention is to develop valid screening procedures based on the data we receive from your and other departments across the country.   These screening procedures should help your department decrease future integrity problems.   Also, the Americans with Disabilities Act, which is being implemented this year, requires the validation of some pre-employment procedures.   Our research will help your department to meet some of those requirements with very limited cost.   Finally, the procedures developed from this study will be able to be easily implemented with little change in your current pre-employment procedures.

The purpose of this instruction booklet is to provide you with guidelines and information for:

> 1) identifying the officers (violators and non-violators) for whom information will be collected;
>
> 2) coding the officers' data according to their status as a violator or a non-violator of public trust;
>
> 3) completing background information and psychological testing information forms for each subject included in the study; and,
>
> 4) photocopying the answer sheets from the psychological tests taken by the subjects as a part of their pre-employment screening.

Instructions and data collection forms for each of these procedures are described in the following sections.   Should you have questions about this booklet or any part of the data collection process, please call Howard Timm or Callie Chandler at (408) 373-3075.   Again, thank you for your help in this effort.

II. INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOUT THE PERSON COMPLETING THE FORMS (CONTACT PERSON)

A data summary sheet (page 16) is requested for each packet of information sheets forwarded to PERSEREC. This summary sheet should be included with each batch of data you send to us. This form identifies the departmental point of contact. It also provides us with information about each group of officers for whom you are sending us data. This information will help us in case we need to contact you for clarification regarding the cases you are supplying.

III. CATEGORIZING OFFICERS INTO GROUPS

A. DEFINING THE TWO GROUPS (VIOLATORS AND NON-VIOLATORS)

Data is needed on two types of officers:

<u>violators</u>   officers identified as trust violators, and,

<u>matched non-violators</u>   officers who are similar to the violators on specified characteristics, but who did not violate the public's trust.

The number of officers identified as trust violators determines the number of officers included in your non-violator group. An equal number of officers presumed not to have violated the trust should be selected to make up the matched comparison non-violator group.

Example:

If you identified 50 violators in your department, you will then identify 50 non-violators using the matching procedures. The total number of officers you should be sending us information on would be 100.

The following sections describe the steps for setting-up your groups of violators and non-violators, assigning case numbers, completing the enclosed forms, and submitting the photocopied answer sheets.

B.   STEPS FOR SETTING-UP THE VIOLATOR GROUP

1. Familiarize yourself with the following definition of officers considered to be <u>violators</u>.

      Categorization as a violator requires that the allegations made against the officer by your department must:

      a) involve one of the integrity violations listed in Table 1,

      b) be corroborated/substantiated, and

      c) have resulted in the officer being punished (fired, asked to resign, suspended with or without pay, demoted, or criminally prosecuted).

Table 1. Integrity Violations

Information Breach	*Providing restricted information to outsiders that was* (endangering officers) *likely to result in officers being harmed (e.g., providing the identities of undercover officers who had infiltrated gang, drug, terrorist or organized crime groups)*
Information Breach	*Providing restricted information to outsiders that was* (aiding criminals)*likely to result in criminals avoiding arrest (e.g., providing raid, surveillance, or other police operations information to known offenders)*
Bribes/Shakedowns	*Releasing apprehended traffic violators or criminals without processing them after taking or receiving funds, drugs, property, sexual favors, or other personal considerations (i.e., shakedowns, accepting bribes)*
Protection Money	*Failing to apprehend known offenders who previously gave money, property, services or other personal considerations to the officer(s) for not interfering with their criminal activities (i.e., protection rackets)*
Fix (dropping case)	*Recommending that a traffic or criminal case be dropped or dismissed due to lack of evidence against the suspect after being given funds, property, services, or other personal considerations to make that recommendation*
Fix (testimony)	*Failing to testify against traffic or criminal offenders or testifying in a manner that results in their avoiding punishment in order to receive money, property, services or other personal considerations*

Table 1. Integrity Violations Cont'd.

Theft On-Duty	*Committing an on-duty theft of drugs, money, or property from victims, offenders, burglary sites, evidence lockers, or other areas under police protection*
Off-Duty Violations	*Committing an off-duty theft or other criminal act in which the officer has used his/her police position to help commit the crime and <u>clearly betrayed the trust</u> placed in him/her by the department*
Embezzlement/Fraud	*Embezzling department funds or submitting fraudulent expense/payment claims to the department*
Falsification of of Time Worked	*Claiming unearned over-time or flagrantly and deceptively leaving early from a shift*

2. Prepare a list of all officers identified as violators under these guidelines. Your search should cover those dates for which your department has psychological test records or the past 20 years, whichever is less. The further back your search goes, the more accurate and valid will be this project's results.

3. Pull the personnel files for all the violators on your list.

C. ASSIGNING CASE NUMBERS

1. All officers included in the study should be assigned a five digit case number. The numbers your department should use in assigning case numbers are included below in Table 2. Please begin with the lowest case number when assigning them to individuals. Please assign them in ascending order.

Table 2. Departmental Case Number Assignments

DEPARTMENT'S ASSIGNED CASE NUMBERS	

2. A list of coded identifiers should be created and maintained in a secure location. Table 3 presents an example format for recording the personal identifiers. DO NOT send this information to us.

Table 3. Example Form for Maintaining Case Identifiers

CASE #	OFFICER'S NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	BADGE #

3. All case numbers of <u>violators</u> will have an A after them (A is the suffix). The same case number will later also be assigned to a matched <u>non-violator</u>. However, all <u>non-violator</u> case numbers will have a B as the suffix. You should therefore have two officers with the same case number but with different suffix identifiers A and B. Accurate assignment of the suffixes is vital to this study.

Example:

00001A - Violator (Officer #1)
00001B - Matched Non-Violator (Officer #2)

00002A - Violator (Officer #3)
00002B - Matched Non-Violator (Officer #4)

All the forms you will need have been included in this packet of materials. The forms have been precoded with your department's assigned case numbers. Please begin with the lowest case number and assign them in ascending order.

D. RECORDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE VIOLATORS (FORM 1)

1. Using your departmental records, complete Form 1 for each violator. This form asks for personal information, violation information, and for a list of the psychological tests taken by the violator. Instructions associated with Form 1 and an example form are provided on pages 19-23.

2. Again, no names or other personal identifiers (e.g. SSN or badge number) should be written anywhere on the sheets you send to us. Sheets with the five digit case numbers are all we should receive. However, be sure to retain your list (similar to Table 3 on page 8 matching officers to the case numbers you send us.

E. STEPS FOR SETTING-UP AND RECORDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE NON-VIOLATOR GROUP (Form 2)

1. After obtaining your list of violators and filling out the background information and psychological test information on Form 1 - Violator Information, use that information to select the matched sample of non-violating officers according to the following standards:

> o Obtain a list of the other officers who either were in each offender's academy class or a list of officers who were hired the same year as each violator. If possible, have the officer's date of birth, sex, and race indicated on that list.

> o Using that list, select a non-offending officer at random who matches the violating officer's sex and race, and, is approximately the same age (When possible, please try to use officers with the same year of birth. If this is not possible, just get as close as you can).

2. Locate and complete the copy of Form 2 which is precoded with the matching violator's case number and the B suffix. The instructions associated with Form 2 and an example form are provided on pages 25-28.

3. Once again, no names or other personal identifiers (e.g. SSN or badge number) should be written anywhere on the sheets you send to us. The five digit code is the only case identifier we should receive. However, be sure to retain your list (similar to Table 3 on page 8) of case numbers.

F. PREPARING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST PACKETS (VIOLATORS AND NON-VIOLATORS)

1. Test packets should be put together for each person included in the study. These packets should consist of copies of the officers' answer sheets from each of the psychological tests described in Table 4 on Page 11. These answer sheets should:

> -have all personal identifiers blacked out,

> -be coded with the violator's case number and group assignment (A or B), and,

> -have the date of testing for the various psychological tests included on the copies of the answer sheets.

Table 4. Psychological Tests included in Police Integrity Study

MMPI	(Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory) - Please indicate the Version Number if known.
CPI	(California Psychological Inventory) - Please indicate the Version Number if known.
16 PF	(16 Personality Factors) - Please indicate the Version Number if known
IPI	Inwald Personality Inventory - Please indicate the Version Number if known.
Sentence Completion	(Rotter's, etc.) - Please indicate the Inventory's name, authors and Version Number.

Information about any other tests you have consistently administered as pre-employment measures would be appreciated.

Please do not send us any original answer sheets, only photocopies. Be sure to <u>BLACK OUT ALL PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS</u> (such as name, badge number, I.D. number or Social Security Number) on the tests. Be certain you have included the subject's full case number (with suffix) on each response sheet you send us (including all continuation sheets, if more than one answer sheet was needed).

IV. WHAT INFORMATION SHOULD BE INCLUDED?

The completed packet you send to PERSEREC should include:

1. A completed Data Summary form (See Page 17).

2. All completed case groupings

   A completed case group includes:

   1. 1 Form 1 - Violator Information (See Pages 19-23)

   2. 1 Form 2 - Matched Non-Violator Information (See Pages 25-28)

   3. 2 TEST PACKETS (See Page 10)

      a) Labeled copies of answer sheets from each psychological test taken by each individual, WITH ALL PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS BLACKED OUT.

Again, personal identifiers should have been blacked out on all the answer sheets and replaced with the subject's full case number.

V.   SEND TO PERSEREC:

Please place all the material in an envelope and send to:

> Project Manager (CODE HT)
> Defense Personnel Security Research
> Center
> 99 Pacific Street, Bldg. 455, Suite E
> Monterey, CA 93940-2481

Again, if you have any questions, concerns, or would just like to chat about the project, please do not hesitate to call Howard or Callie at (408) 373-3075.

VI.   MAINTAINING YOUR LIST OF OFFICERS:

We are asking that you maintain a list of case number assignments in a secure location. A copy of the format shown on Page 8 is included for your use in maintaining this information. DO NOT send this information to us. The lists should be kept in case of problems with the information. Unfortunately, sometimes photocopies are unreadable, packets get lost in the mail, or handwriting is illegible. If you or members of your department have concerns about maintaining these records, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Again, thank you for participating in this study. Only through the cooperation of your department and other departments across the country is this study possible.

VII. APPENDICES

A. SUMMARY SHEET

B. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1 - VIOLATOR INFORMATION

C. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 2 - MATCHED NON-VIOLATOR INFORMATION

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY SHEET

TODAY'S DATE (MM/DD/YY): __/__/__

DEPARTMENTAL POINT OF CONTACT FOR THE PROJECT

Your Name:_____

Work Phone:_____

Job Title:_____

Police Department: _____

DATA

The following is information needed to ensure that what you sent us is what was received. Please include a SUMMARY SHEET with every packet of data you send to us.

Case Numbers Included: FROM _____ TO _____ TOTAL # = _____

Case Numbers of **Violators**:

FROM _____ A TO _____ A Total # = _____

Case Numbers of **Matched Non-Violators**:

FROM _____ B TO _____ B Total # = _____

APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1 - VIOLATOR INFORMATION

DO NOT MARK ON THIS SHEET
USE FORM 1

DIRECTIONS: Please answer the following questions about each officer identified as a **Violator** Please circle the appropriate response on the answer sheet (**Form 1**).

A1. Case # _ _ _ _ _ A

A2. What is the officer's gender?
- M) MALE
- F) FEMALE

A3. What is the officer's ethnic group?
- A) CAUCASIAN/WHITE
- B) AFRICAN-AMERICAN/BLACK
- C) HISPANIC
- D) ASIAN
- E) MIDDLE EASTERN
- F) OTHER

A4. What is the officer's date of birth?
(MM/DD/YY)

A5. What was the officer's highest level of education?
- A) GED
- B) HIGH SCHOOL
- C) SOME COLLEGE
- D) B.A. OR B.S.
- E) SOME GRADUATE SCHOOL
- F) M.A. OR M.S.
- G) J.D.
- H) PH.D.

A6. What was the officer's occupation just before entering your department?
- A) MILITARY
- B) POLICE (OTHER DEPT.)
- C) FULL-TIME STUDENT
- D) SECURITY
- E) OTHER _____

A7. When did the officer graduate from the academy?
(MM/DD/YY)

A8. When was the officer hired by your department?
(MM/DD/YY)

A9. What was the date on which the violation occurred?
(MM/DD/YY)

A10. Using Table 1 (Pages 6 and 7) for definitions, which of the following offenses did the officer commit? Please include any officer who the department thought was guilty. (Circle all that apply)
- A) INFORMATION BREACH (ENDANGERING OFFICERS)
- B) INFORMATION BREACH (AIDING CRIMINALS)
- C) BRIBES/SHAKEDOWNS
- D) PROTECTION MONEY
- E) FIX (DROPPING CASE)
- F) FIX (TESTIMONY)
- G) THEFT ON-DUTY
- H) OFF-DUTY VIOLATIONS
- I) EMBEZZLEMENT/FRAUD
- J) FALSIFICATION OF TIME WORKED

80

A11. Which of the following did the officer receive or attempt to receive as a result of committing the violation? (circle all that apply on the answer sheet)
- A) MONEY
- B) SEX
- C) MERCHANDISE
- D) DRUGS
- E) SERVICES
- F) JOB OFFER FOR FAMILY OR FRIEND
- G) FUTURE FAVORS (unspecified)
- H) FRIENDSHIP OR CONTINUED FRIENDSHIP/AFFECTION
- I) GLORY ('SUPER COP' OR HERO STATUS)
- J) DO NOT KNOW
- K) OTHER _____

A12. Does it appear that the officer committed the violation alone or was he/she part of a larger group of violators?
- A) ONLY police officer punished
- B) Other police officers punished- based upon the record it appears this violator WAS the "ring leader" of those police officers involved
- C) Other police officers punished- it is UNCLEAR from the record whether this violator was the "ring leader" of the police officer involved
- D) Other police officers punished- based upon the record it appears this violator WAS NOT the "ring leader" of those police officers involved

A13. What was the rank of the officer when the violation occurred?
- A) OFFICER/DEPUTY
- B) CORPORAL
- C) SERGEANT
- D) LIEUTENANT
- E) CAPTAIN
- F) CHIEF
- G) OTHER _____

A14. What division was the officer in at the time of the violation?
- A) PATROL
- B) TRAFFIC
- C) CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION/ DETECTIVE
- D) ADMINISTRATIVE
- E) TECHNICAL SERVICES
- F) INTERNAL AFFAIRS
- G) SPECIAL OPERATIONS
- H) OTHER _____

A15. What was the officer's punishment for the violation?
- A) FIRED
- B) ASKED TO RESIGN
- C) SUSPENDED WITH PAY _____ DAYS
- D) SUSPENDED WITHOUT PAY _____ DAYS
- E) DEMOTED
- F) CRIMINALLY PROSECUTED
- G) OTHER _____

A16. Did this officer have other disciplinary actions on his/her record prior to the violation?
- Y) YES
- N) NO

A17. If the answer is **yes** to A16, how many prior disciplinary actions?
- A) 1
- B) 2
- C) 3
- D) 4
- E) 5 or more

A18. If the answer is **yes** to A16, generally what was the nature of these violations (Mark all that apply)?
- A) ILLEGAL DRUG USE
- B) ALCOHOL ABUSE
- C) DISCRIMINATION/ FAVORITISM
- D) FIRE ARMS MISUSE
- E) EXCESSIVE FORCE
- F) SUPERVISORY PROBLEMS
- G) OTHER _____

A19. Had this officer received commendations or awards for service prior to the incident?
　　　Y) YES
　　　N) NO

A20. What was the date of the officer's psychological testing?

　　　　　　　(MM/DD/YY)

A21. Please complete ALL information requested under item A21 of Form 1. You should indicate which psychological test(s) the violator took, the test's version number, and the date of test administration.

FORM 1 - VIOLATOR INFORMATION

PERSONAL INFORMATION	A1. CASE #: _ _ _ _ _ _ A	TODAY'S DATE (MM/DD/YY): _ _ / _ _ / _ _
	A2. GENDER: M F	A3. ETHNIC: A B C D E F
	A4. DATE OF BIRTH (MM/DD/YY): _ _ / _ _ / _ _	A5. EDUCATION: A B C D E F G H
	A6. PRIOR OCCUPATION: A B C D E: _____	A7. ACADEMY GRADUATION (MM/DD/YY): _ _ / _ _ / _ _
	A8. POLICE DEPARTMENT HIRE DATE (MM/DD/YY): _ _ / _ _ / _ _	
VIOLATION INFORMATION	A9. DATE OF VIOLATION (MM/DD/YY): _ _ / _ _ / _ _	
	A10. VIOLATIONS COMMITTED (Circle all that apply): A B C D E F G H I J	
	A11. REASON FOR VIOLATION: A B C D E F G H I J K: _____	
	A12. OTHER VIOLATORS: A B C D	
	A13. VIOLATOR'S RANK: A B C D E F G: _____	A14. VIOLATOR'S DIVISION: A B C D E F G H: _____

FORM 1 - VIOLATOR INFORMATION

PERSONAL INFORMATION	A1. CASE #: _ _ _ _ _ A	TODAY'S DATE (MM/DD/YY): _ _ / _ _ / _ _
	A15. PUNISHMENT FOR VIOLATION (Circle all that apply): A B C:___DAYS D:___DAYS E F G:_____	
	A16. PRIORS: Y N	A17. NO. OF PRIORS: 1 2 3 4 5(or more)
	A18. NATURE OF PRIORS: A B C D E F G: _____	A19. PRIOR AWARDS: Y N
TEST INFORMATION	A20. DATE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (MM/DD/YY): _ _ / _ _ / _ _	

A21. NAME OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS (CHECK IF GIVEN):	VERSION # (IF KNOWN):	ADMIN. DATE MM/DD/YY
MMPI		
CPI		
16 PF		
IPI		
ROTTER'S		
OTHER:		
CASE #: _ _ _ _ _ A		

APPENDIX C

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 2
MATCHED NON-VIOLATOR INFORMATION

<u>DO NOT MARK ON THIS SHEET</u>
<u>USE FORM 2</u>

DIRECTIONS: Please answer the following questions about each officer identified as a <u>Matched Non-Violator</u>. Please circle the appropriate response on the answer sheet (Form 2).

B1. Case # _ _ _ _ _ B

B2. When did the <u>Violator</u> this officer is matched with commit his/her violation?
(MM/DD/YY)

***
Please answer the remaining questions providing information about the <u>non-violator</u>, but using the date of the matched violator's offense as a reference point.
***

B3. What is the officer's gender?
    M) MALE
    F) FEMALE

B4. What is the officer's ethnic group?
    A) CAUCASIAN/WHITE
    B) AFRICAN-
       AMERICAN/BLACK
    C) HISPANIC
    D) ASIAN
    E) MIDDLE EASTERN
    F) OTHER

B5. What is the officer's date of birth?
    (MM/DD/YY)

B6. What was the officer's highest level of education at the time of the <u>Violator's</u> offense?
    A) GED
    B) HIGH SCHOOL
    C) SOME COLLEGE
    D) B.A. OR B.S.
    E) SOME GRADUATE
       SCHOOL
    F) M.A. OR M.S.
    G) J.D.
    H) PH.D.

B7. What was the officer's occupation just before entering your department?
    A) MILITARY
    B) POLICE (OTHER DEPT.)
    C) FULL-TIME STUDENT
    D) SECURITY
    E) OTHER _____

B8. When did the officer graduate from the academy?   (MM/DD/YY)

B9. When was the officer hired by your department?
    (MM/DD/YY)

B10. What was the rank of this officer when the <u>Violator</u> committed the offense?
    A) OFFICER/DEPUTY
    B) CORPORAL
    C) SERGEANT
    D) LIEUTENANT
    E) CAPTAIN
    F) CHIEF
    G) OTHER _____

B11. What division was the officer in at the time of the <u>Violator's</u> offense?
    A) PATROL
    B) TRAFFIC
    C) CRIMINAL
    INVESTIGATION/
       DETECTIVE
    D) ADMINISTRATIVE
    E) TECHNICAL SERVICES
    F) INTERNAL AFFAIRS
    G) SPECIAL OPERATIONS
    H) OTHER _____

B12. Did this officer have disciplinary actions on his/her record prior to the Violator's offense?

      Y) YES
      N) NO

B13. If the answer is yes to B12, how many prior disciplinary actions?

      A)   1
      B)   2
      C)   3
      D)   4
      E)   5 or more

B14. If the answer is yes to B12, generally what was the nature of these violations (Mark all that apply)?

      A) ILLEGAL DRUG USE
      B) ALCOHOL ABUSE
      C) DISCRIMINATION/
         FAVORITISM
      D) FIRE ARMS MISUSE
      E) EXCESSIVE FORCE
      F) SUPERVISORY
         PROBLEMS
      G) OTHER _____

B15. Had this officer received commendations or awards for service prior to the Violator's offense?

      Y) YES
      N) NO

B16. What was the date of this officer's psychological testing?
      (MM/DD/YY)

B17. Please complete ALL information requested under item B17 of Form 2. You should indicate which psychological test(s) the non-violator took, the test's version number, and the date of test administration.

FORM 2 - MATCHED NON-VIOLATOR
INFORMATION (Page 1 of 2)

PERSONAL INFORMATION	B1. CASE #: _ _ _ _ _ _ B	TODAY'S DATE (MM/DD/YY): _ _ / _ _ / _ _
	B2. DATE OF OFFENSE BY MATCHED VIOLATOR (MM/DD/YY): _ _ / _ _ / _ _	
	B3. GENDER: M F	B4. ETHNIC: A B C D E F
	B5. DATE OF BIRTH (MM/DD/YY): _ _ / _ _ / _ _	B6. EDUCATION: A B C D E F G H
	B7. PRIOR OCCUPATION: A B C D E: _____	B8. ACADEMY GRADUATION (MM/DD/YY): _ _ / _ _ / _ _
	B9. POLICE DEPARTMENT HIRE DATE (MM/DD/YY): _ _ / _ _ / _ _	
	B10. OFFICER'S RANK AT TIME OF VIOLATOR'S OFFENSE: A B C D E F G: _____	B11. OFFICER'S DIVISION AT TIME OF VIOLATOR'S OFFENSE: A B C D E F G H: _____
	B12. PRIORS: Y N	B13 NO. OF PRIORS: 1 2 3 4 5(or more)

	B14 NATURE OF PRIORS: A B C D E F G: _____	B15. PRIOR AWARDS: Y N
TEST INFORMATION	B16. DATE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (MM/DD/YY): __ __/__ __/__ __		
	B17. NAME OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS (CHECK IF GIVEN):	VERSION # (IF KNOWN):	ADMIN. DATE MM/DD/YY
	MMPI		
	CPI		
	16 PF		
	IPI		
	ROTTER'S		
	OTHER:		
	CASE #: __ __ __ __ __ B		

E. Sources of Information Specific to Assessing Police Officers

1. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the Community Oriented Policing (COPS) have received funding through the federal government to aid law enforcement in efforts to maintain and improve policing.

2. Each state has a Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) office.

3. Division 18, the Police and Public Safety Section, of the American Psychological Association (APA) offers a directory of psychologists meeting APA membership and ethical standards.

4. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has a Police Psychological Service Section. Psychological Guidelines for Issues in Law Enforcement are available from this division, as well as, Guidelines for Providers of Pre-employment Psychological Evaluation Services to Law Enforcement Agencies.

5. The International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training (IADLEST) is seeking to create a national clearinghouse of decertified law enforcement officers. It is hoped that such a database could serve as a resource to aid departments in hiring officers who left previous law enforcement positions due to difficulties maintaining public trust.

F. Professional Associations Offering General Information About Psychological Testing and Employment

1. American Psychological Association (APA)
750 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20002
Tel. 1-800-374-2721

2. Association of Test Publishers (ATP)
655 Fifteenth Street, NW
Suite 320
Washington, D.C. 20005
Tel. (202) 857-8444
or
Lauren Scheib, ATP Administrator
Tel. (717) 755-9747
Fax. (717) 755-8962

3. American Society for Training and Development (ASTD)
1640 King Street
Box 1443
Alexandria, VA 22313-2043
Tel. (703) 683-1523

4. International Personnel Management Association (IPMA)
1617 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 549-7100

5. Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM)
606 North Washington Street
Alexandria, VA 22314-1997
Tel. (703) 548-340
Fax. (703) 836-0367

6. Society of Industrial and Organizational Psychologist (SIOP)
745 Haskins Road, Suite A
P.O. Box 87
Bowling Green, OH 43402-0087
Tel. (419) 353-0032
Fax. (419) 352-2645

G. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many thanks to the following departments and individuals, as well as the departments and individuals who chose to remain anonymous. Without their cooperation and assistance, this project could not have been possible.

Akron Police Department
Amherst Police Department
Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Council
Arkansas State Police
Arlington County Police Department
Association of Major City Chiefs of Police
Austin Police Department
Bridgeton Police Department
Buena Park Police Department
Buena Vista Township
Cape Coral Police Department
Charleston County Sheriff's Office
Chicago Police Department
Cleveland Police Department
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies
Connecticut State Police
Dallas Police Department
District of Columbia Metropolitan P.D.
Florida Highway Patrol
Ft. Lauderdale Police Department
Fort Worth Police Department
Gilbert Police Department
Greensboro Police Department
Greenville Police Department
Harris County Sheriff's Department
Houston Police Department
Huntington Beach Police Department
Indian River County Sheriff's Office
Ipswhich Police Department
Jefferson County Sheriff's Department
Kokomo Police Department

Lafayette Police Department
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Los Angeles Police Department
Maryland Heights Police Department
Memphis Police Department
Middlesex County Police Department
Monroe County Sheriff's Office
Moultrie Police Department
National Institute of Justice
New York City Police Department
Norman Police Department
North Little Rock Police Department
North Dakota Highway Patrol
Oklahoma Highway Patrol
Orange County Sheriff's Office
Peoria Police Department
Pulaski Police Department
Rochester Police Department
Salem Police Department
Salt Lake City Police Department
San Antonio Police Department
Sarasota Police Department
Scottsdale Police Department
South Bend Police Department
South Gate Police Department
Spokane Police Department
Stow Police Department
Tallahassee Police Department
Town of Putnam Valley Police Department
White Bear Lake Police Department
Wisconsin Highway Patrol
Wyoming State Patrol

Walt Adkins
Augustine Aloia
Norm Ansley
Eloise Archibald
Robert Baer
Steve Barton
Blinda Beason
Wilke Bermudez
Sherman Block
Bruce Bloxom
Terry Boatwright

Michael Borges
David Boyd
Michael Brasfield
Rick Bradstreet
David Bridges
Donnie Bridges
Joe Brockman
Dianne Brown
Larry L. Bruckelsby
Ronnie Burks
Bruce Butler

Paul Calvaruso
Joseph P. Calzerano
Charles Campisi
Michael Capps
William G. Carlos
Ralph Carney
Albert Cantara
Douglas Cederblom
David B. Chapman
Bonnie Chase
Judy Collins

Cary A. Conaway
David Corey
Cynthia Craven
Richard Crouch
Beth Daugherty
Fred Dees
Dante DeMatteo
Margaret Downing
Robert A. Dreischer
Steve Edwards
Bob Emerson
T. G. Enloe
Lt. Eppler
Lorraine Eyde
Tim Falk
William Fleming
Peter A. Foote
Matthew Forte
Frank Fox
William L. Fulliton
K. S. Galbraith
Dave Geyer
Bob Giannoni
James Gieseke
Kevin Gilmartin
John Goral
Harrison Gough
James L. Greenstone
Darryl Gunn
Charles Hackett
George Hargrave
Willie Harper
John Harris
Victoria Havassy
Larry Hersom
J.S. Herndon
Thomas Hickey
Charles Higginbotham
Mikel Hollaway
Dick Holmes
Audrey Honig
Jack Huelsmann
M. Wayne Huggins

Robin Inwald
Edward Irvine
Gary Kaufmann
Sheldon Kay
Raymond Kelley
J. Kingsbury
David Kleppe
Bryan Klipfel
Richard Klimoski
Steven Koster
Neil Kurlander
Jim Janik
John Lenonard
James Lucas
Jerry Lyons
Michael Maher
Terence J. Mangan
Todd Montefusco
Michael A. Markman
Phyllis McDonald
Mike McMains
Ed McErlain
Joe McKay
Michael J. McMains
Lee McMenamin
Marjorie McMeniman
Michael McNeilly
Kathryn T. Mengel
Kris Mohandie
John Moslow
Michael McDaniel
Michael Mumford
Daniel J. Murray
Donald Neff
Dan Nichols
Rauol K. Niemeyer
Deniz Ones
John Orlove
Eric Ostrov
William O'Sullivan
Thomas P. Panther
Charles Peckat
Scott A. Pellerito

Ralph Peters
Al A. Philippus
Bruce Philpott
Rocco M. Pollutro
Dan Ramey
Phil Redstone
Robert Regulus
Martin Reiser
Lt. James Reno
Don Retzer
Greg Riede
Mel Risch
Jim Roberts
Michael Roberts
Michael Ryder
Howard Safir
Floyd Sanderson
Theodore Sarbin
Jeff Savitsky
Neil Schmitt
Diane Schneider
Ellen Schrivner
Carl Segatti
James Sharf
Jim W. Spearman
Steven Stahl
Richard Stevens
Don Stockton
Paul B. Taylor
Bruce Tekach
Lt. Torres
George Troxcil
Ernest B. Tye
Nicholas L. Vasilopoulos
Janet Wall
John Walters
John L. White
Enoch J. Whitney
Phil Williams
Lauress Wise
Martin Wiskoff
Ray Zimmerman
Dan Zivkovich