




JPRS Report

Soviet Union

International Affairs

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Soviet Union

International Affairs

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23 September 1991

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Kvitsinskiy Cited on Foreign Ministry Role During Coup

PM1009113591 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 24 Aug 91 p 4

[Interview with USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinskiy by Sergey Volovets; date and place of interview not stated: "An Order Is an Order? Interview with USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinskiy on the Foreign Ministry's Work During the Failed Rebellion"]

[Text] [Volovets] Such events face state employees and whole departments with a question: Where is the border between loyalty to an order from higher-ranking bosses and one's own conscience? How do you decide such a question for yourself? Or more sharply: Where does collaborationism begin?

[Kvitsinskiy] A very complex question. Legally and in the sense of its official duty the Foreign Ministry exists to implement union foreign policy, which is formed by the president, the cabinet of ministers, and the parliament. And indeed it will be a poor apparatus—diplomatic, military, or what you will—which is not a reliable executor of these structures' decisions. That is the main duty of the apparatus worker and every official. Of course, he cannot check them at every specific moment for constitutionality or unconstitutionality.

[Volovets] Even in the situation which formed as of Monday morning?

[Kvitsinskiy] Within a day or even less the situation inevitably began to give rise to questions: What was happening and was it all legal?

On that ill-starred Monday I was telephoned from work and told that the minister had returned from vacation and I was expected. He gathered us all together, we consulted over what was happening. It was said that there were a number of documents, that there were instructions from the vice president, who was acting as president in connection with the president's illness, and that the documents had to be brought to the notice of our embassies. The instruction was fulfilled as though it had been any instruction from Gorbachev, Yanayev, or Pavlov. It could not but be fulfilled. It went through automatically. That was official obedience.

But the next day we began to have doubts and we switched to the tactic of having no contact with the State Committee for the State of Emergency. We had instructions from our minister not to accept any orders from them and not to take part in the committee's activity.

[Volovets] The rebels' documents were passed on with your instructions for compulsory dissemination abroad...

[Kvitsinskiy] Yes, that was the instruction of the vice president acting as president. But you know if they had

contained any secrets or news... But there were no secrets, it was all published.

[Volovets] You instructed the ambassadors to present the rebels' documents to the governments of foreign countries. Does it not seem to you that the very fact of this instruction signifies the Foreign Ministry's call to recognize the structures whose documents were presented by an official representative of our country?

[Kvitsinskiy] There was no request there. And whether to recognize them or not was up to the relevant state. But I repeat again that at the time everything looked like the action of a government compelled to this action because of the president's illness: perhaps a heart attack, perhaps a stroke, perhaps something else.

[Volovets] On 19 August a telegram with your signature reached the embassies issuing the instruction: "In explaining internal political processes, be guided by official materials," that is by the plotters' documents. What did you have in mind in demanding ambassadors be guided by them?

[Kvitsinskiy] That they would explain the situation in the country and use the arguments set out in these documents.

[Volovets] And does it not seem to you that here there is also an element of cooperation with the illegal authorities?

[Kvitsinskiy] I repeat to you that at the moment when those who had seized power published these documents it was not clear to most of us that they had seized power. But it was clear that there was a vice president, a prime minister, a KGB chairman, and a defense minister. They were the core of power, so to speak. If they said it was so then would you say it was not?

Foreign Minister Pankin Interviewed by Bulgarian Paper

AU1109130691 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 5 Sep 91 p 3

[Interview with Boris Pankin, USSR foreign minister, by Novosti Information Agency political observer Vladimir Markov for OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK; place and date not given: "The West Must Not Sit and Wait"]

[Text] [Markov] The coup was defeated. The democratic process is developing very dynamically, albeit not without contradictions. How may this be reflected in Soviet foreign policy?

[Pankin] The coup was a tragedy for our country, but every cloud has a silver lining. As a result of the defeat of the coup, important changes are setting in that also affect our foreign policy activities. We are now in a position to remove the people who formally blocked our path. The coup organizers included the leaders of the very departments that were holding things up. They hampered our

policy by constantly demanding consultations, endorsement of decisions, and discussions.

[Markov] Could you illustrate your train of thought, perhaps in relation to the forthcoming human rights conference in Moscow?

[Pankin] This conference begins on 10 September. In times past, those forces represented by the organizers of the coup did not allow us any opportunity to arrange such a forum in our country. When we received such an opportunity, then they tried to turn it into a formal event. We won at the barricades; we stood up for freedom, justice, and the rights of the individual; and now, in international legal relations, we must place all this on a sound, juridical, organizational footing.

[Markov] Will you manage to retain a common foreign policy, bearing in mind the changes now underway in the Soviet Union?

[Pankin] Despite all their differences, the republics are uniting because of common interests in the spheres of defense, foreign, and economic policy. However flexible we make these links between the center and the republics, fundamental strategic questions in our mutual relations with the rest of the world will still have to be coordinated. At the same time, a large proportion of our bilateral links with other countries will be with the individual republics.

[Markov] What economic aid do you expect to receive from the Western countries?

[Pankin] On the one hand, there is the question of emergency measures, such as supplies of food and medicines, and consumer goods, and humanitarian aid, including on the basis of short-term credits. Our country will implement without any hold-ups everything that was discussed at the meeting between the USSR president and the leaders of the seven most developed countries in London. For this reason I believe that the West should not now hold back their help, nor should it assume a wait-and-see attitude on this question.

Pankin Interviewed on USSR Future, Czech-Soviet Relations

*AU0609144491 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
3 Sep 91 p 7*

[Interview with USSR Foreign Minister Boris Pankin by Vladimir Divis in Moscow on 2 September: "I Believe in the Preservation of the Union"]

[Text] The new USSR Foreign Minister, Boris Pankin, former USSR Ambassador to the CSFR, granted an interview to our special correspondent in the Kremlin before the opening of the Extraordinary Session of the Congress of People's Deputies on the morning of 2 September.

[Divis] What is your opinion about the future of the USSR? Will it fall apart or will the republics conclude an agreement on its preservation?

[Pankin] There is no doubt that changes will be made. However, I am convinced that the USSR—as a state formation—will not fall apart. Of course, completely new relations will be established among its individual and independent entities.

[Divis] Are you preparing large-scale personnel changes in the administration of your ministry and at individual USSR Embassies?

[Pankin] We will see. By the way, compared with other central organs and ministries, one of the features of the Foreign Ministry has been that personnel changes at the top level have been more frequent. During the times of Shevardnadze and Bessmertnykh, quite a few personnel changes were made. Now, new factors have appeared on the scene. In no event will a witch hunt take place. There have been rumors abroad that so far, 30 of our ambassadors have been recalled. Even Soviet television reported this. I want to take this opportunity to deny conjectures of this sort. Immediately after the (1 September) news I picked up the phone and told Yegor Yakovlev, who is the director of Soviet television, that this was plain nonsense. The only thing we want to do is to assess the behavior of each official in the foreign service individually in a businesslike and fair manner.

[Divis] Relations between V. Havel and M. Gorbachev—and between other representatives of our countries, too—have not been the best lately. Will there be a major rapprochement between the USSR and the CSFR now?

[Pankin] Today there are no serious obstacles preventing an improvement in our relations and we can expect more frequent contacts between Havel and Gorbachev. I believe that it is only a question of time before our heads of state will meet.

[Divis] Why do you think that relations between your country and the former East European states deteriorated?

[Pankin] When I was leaving for Czechoslovakia in the spring of last year shortly after the velvet revolution, I and my colleagues were given the task of intensively developing relations on a completely new basis. Here in Moscow, a breaking mechanism was introduced shortly thereafter, not only in the sphere of foreign policy but also in other spheres of our life. Basically, all processes were curbed with the aim of stopping perestroika.

Presidential Press Secretary on Pankin Appointment

*PM0909164591 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE
in English (Undated)*

[Unattributed interview with Presidential Press Secretary Vitali Ignatenko; date, place not given: "Integrity

And Efficiency. Boris Pankin Appointed USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs. Presidential Press Secretary Vitaliy Ignatenko's NOVOSTI Interview"]

[Text] [Correspondent] What, do you think, made Gorbachev choose Pankin, until recently Soviet ambassador to Czecho-Slovakia?

[Ignatenko] The integrity and efficiency Mr. Pankin displayed at every job. I know him well—we worked for the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA youth daily together in the 60s and the 70s. He climbed from reporter on probation to editor-in-chief. I became his deputy then, and learned him as a man of firm principles, too good for the time he lived in. Now, during the August coup, he did what I expected of him. He was a true Soviet citizen of democratic convictions and an excellent ambassador. All honest people in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union admired him. Now, the public must know about his conduct.

[Correspondent] Do you think the Soviet foreign policy will change with his appointment?

[Ignatenko] Boris Pankin's a man of profound originality, and I think he'll give this originality to his new office. He has something to rely on—the vast intellectual potential of the Soviet ministry of foreign affairs. Now, I think, it will lose its official atmosphere and obedience.

[Correspondent] Do you think he learned the lessons of those three grim days?

[Ignatenko] I'm sure he did—as diplomat and minister. He's sure to pay attention to attitudes to the putsch as displayed by Soviet diplomats abroad, who had pledged loyalty to the USSR president. As to the cardinal lines of Soviet foreign policy, as determined by the president, they will remain the same.

Kondrashov Views USSR's Changed World Status

PM0809131391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Sep 91 Union Edition p 3

[Stanislav Kondrashov article under the "Political Observers' Opinion" rubric: "New Place in the World"]

[Text] The new realities of our policy, both domestic and foreign, were apparent once again on Friday morning on the television: Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin in St. George's Hall in the Kremlin like the incarnation of the old Russian saying—"Let's sit down and have a friendly chat." They spoke of their harmony and cooperation for all America. Which in turn indicated at least two things: ABC-TV's receptiveness and ability to think big, along with the fact that relations with the transatlantic power are as significant for us as before, albeit in a different way—significant not because of confrontation but because of our desire for economic and political backing on our new path.

A question that frightens the West arose during the television hookup with the two presidential early birds:

What is happening to Soviet nuclear weapons during the collapse of the unified state? There is still very strict control, we heard, and the Russian president indicated that henceforth his finger is quite near or even on the nuclear button alongside the Union president's finger. On the question of the new organization of the military-strategic space, Yeltsin said that nuclear weapons are to be moved to Russia from Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, confirming Russia's natural key role in the changing circumstances. Foreign economic activity will henceforth, he told us, be two-tier, as it were—with common principles prescribed by the center and specific "substance" provided by the republics.

So, the main deciding voice is where the main real power is. Power is switching to the republics and Gorbachev is no longer denying the fact that Yeltsin has at least equal rights. The outside world is aware of this as it adapts its relations with us to suit our internal alignment of forces. Do the two presidents form a duumvirate? Other parties to the "Statement by the 11" are hardly willing to agree to that. For them the remnants of the center counterbalance the Russian tendency to dominate, and I think that this is helping Gorbachev find himself a new, coordinating role.

So, the former USSR has effectively died, although it still exists pro forma under its former name pending the transition to the Union of Sovereign States—if this fairly awkward name catches on and if, of course, the goal is reached. The Union is dead, long live the Union!

However, from the viewpoint of the world alignment of forces it will no longer be the superpower that was guided within its own boundaries and on the global stage by the CPSU's totalitarian, messianic ideology. In effecting the August coup d'etat the superpower's central structures, already weakened by perestroika, committed suicide. The idea of a state system under which a person or citizen only constituted a building block for a happy future that was forever slipping away, has been lost. The system of priorities has been overturned and we are now proclaiming as the top priority human rights, followed by the rights of the people and their self-determination, and only then the rights of the state in general. There is no way back, and ahead lie the birth pangs of an unprecedented interstate formation sprawling over Europe and, still wider, into Asia.

Every sovereign republic has to produce its own blend of national tradition and the principles of democracy and a market economy and every republic has to embody the concept of a state within a state. However, no one has effectively had historical experience of their own statehood, barring the three Baltic republics. They prefer not to take part in the new experiment, seceding from the Union and winning an avalanche of recognition from other states in the favorable circumstances created following the abortive coup.

The new historical experiment that has taken the place of the former tragic experiment not only cancels our superpower status but also changes our whole image, the whole nature of our world presence. No active foreign policy is expected during the transitional period. In conditions of profound crisis economic rather than political and military-strategic interests will be vital. Each republic, seeking sovereign rights, will begin to master the attractive but difficult field of economic cooperation with neighboring and far-off countries. Each republic will find itself in the position of a pupil deciding for himself whether to avail himself of the services provided by the teacher from the center who has been deposed and demoted but retains his qualifications. Foreign economic and foreign political interests will be balanced within the community of sovereign states by trial and error. A great deal depends on the leaders' personalities; they influence the pace and nature of the transformations. Since the process is a long one, the personalities, like the circumstances, will change.

Now, at the beginning of fall 1991, West and East see us as a power that has gone to pieces, where joy at democracy's victory over the putschists goes hand in hand with fears of a cold and hungry winter. Civilization is ready to accept us into its family if we pass the entrance examinations of human rights and market reform. However, there is alarm lest the fragments of the collapsed empire (let us recall Oldzhas Suleymenov's metaphor) fall on its head. Won't the raging energy of disintegration spread, despite assurances to the contrary, to the 30,000 nuclear warheads stockpiled by previous Soviet regimes, roughly 10,000 of which are strategic warheads? President Bush is still not stinting with his compliments, but firmly refuses to heed the calls of those of his compatriots who would like to see an accelerated and more radical cut in U.S. military spending. While pro forma sparing other people's pride, America is effectively acting as guarantor of the kind of world order it finds desirable and also as a prestigious arbiter and adviser in Soviet domestic affairs.

As for a drastic cut in Soviet military spending, British Premier John Major talked about this to both Gorbachev and Yeltsin during his recent intensive visit to Moscow—and received the appropriate assurances from both men. Military-strategic parity against a backdrop of rapid impoverishment of the working people must be forgotten.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker will arrive in Moscow in a few days to study the state of affairs on the spot. Bush has had difficulty in giving up his relations primarily with the central authorities in Moscow where he has put down political roots, but life is imperiously telling him of the need for change. Baker's recommendations are expected to include returning the South Kuriles to Japan, stopping Soviet aid to Cuba, and reducing aid to Afghanistan. This "unfinished business" may make it hard for us to obtain both general Western aid for our reforms, along with the food aid that is increasingly necessary ahead of a severe winter. We are

told almost word for word: First, live according to your means and, second, those embarking on the path of democracy do not help antidemocratic regimes.

The new ideals and the logic of the new path will do their work.

'World This Week' Program 8 Sep

LD0809205391 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1230 GMT 8 Sep 91

["The World This Week: International Review" program with Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, PRAVDA political observer, and Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, observer for All-Union Radio]

[Levin] Hello, esteemed comrades. Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, political observer for PRAVDA, and Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, observer for All-Union Radio, are taking part in today's edition of The World This Week "International Review". We would like to talk about recent international events. But all these events revolve to varying degrees around what is happening in our country - mostly to a very great degree.

[Shishlin] Well, you know, Viktor Nikolayevich, in the light of the joint telebridge between American cities and President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union and President Yeltsin of Russia, new shades of meaning are weaving themselves into the debate about the dramatic events that took place in our country between 19 and 22 August. At all events, it seems to me that there is now greater confidence in the West that Gorbachev and Yeltsin can work together, can cooperate and can forge ahead in unison with the policy of radicalising reform, a policy linked with the hopes of Soviet people and the hopes of the world for transformation in the Soviet Union.

But, of course, there are now more questions than answers. Let's begin with the fact that the world is asking whether the Soviet Union actually exists now.

[Levin] Yes, that's certainly not an idle question.

[Shishlin] Especially as, of course, the former Soviet Union is no more. This has to be admitted. It has ceased to exist. When you talk about a transitional period, when the Congress of People's Deputies talks about a transitional period, when our leaders talk about a transitional period, anybody is entitled to ask what this is a transition from and what it is a transition to. What it is a transition from is obvious. But it is not at all clear what it is a transition to. In this respect, there will of course be a colossal amount of work to restructure our Union along, most probably, confederative lines, though in a number of cases there may be some kind of association with certain independent states. So, one way another, I repeat: there remain more questions than answers.

The second question now being asked in the West is: what will Soviet foreign policy look like? Will there be a Ukrainian foreign policy? A Russian foreign policy? An

Uzbek foreign policy? And so on. Will there in fact be any Soviet foreign policy at all? Will the Soviet representative in the Security Council merely be a front for a throng of Republican representatives? Will everything have to be based on the principle of unanimity among the Republics? These are also complicated questions, ones which you can go on asking. But, without lapsing into the simplistic view that life will provide the answers to them, let's acknowledge that, while the putsch did of course fail, the problems remain. The extent of the grave consequences of this putsch has not, in my view, been fully appreciated yet. We still have to appreciate and ponder the extent of these consequences and then find the necessary solutions to the glaring problems which we are confronted with, not just in internal affairs but also in foreign affairs.

Viktor Nikolayevich, I don't know whether you will agree with me or not, but I think that although we have managed to avoid the worst possible consequences of the putsch for foreign policy, very serious damage has still been done by this putsch to our foreign policy. [Levin] Well, I don't think I can agree so unequivocally with that. I do agree that if this putsch had succeeded, our foreign policy would have been set back very many years to the days of the Cold War. After all, it has already emerged that a TASS statement had been prepared in which U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. administration were subjected to very harsh attacks. The former Soviet Foreign Minister, Bessmertnykh, did not endorse this statement. He did not give it the green light. He realised immediately that this statement would have set back Soviet-U.S. relations by many years.

As far as the current situation is concerned, it seems to me that this victory over the putschists, the people's victory, which has helped to radicalize all the reforms in our country, has greatly increased confidence in the Soviet Union. I can quote an opinion poll that was carried out in the United States. THE WASHINGTON POST Headlined its analysis of the results of this poll with the words *Dramatic Events in Soviet Union End Fear of Communism Which Has Dominated U.S. Politics for Almost 75 Years*. The results of the poll were as follows. Ten years ago 72 percent of Americans regarded the USSR as the country posing the greatest threat in the world. In the latest poll 25 percent declared that they still hold to this view. In other words, the percentage has fallen from 72 to 25. Furthermore, most Americans feel that the democratic reforms now taking place in the Soviet Union are irreversible.

[Levin continues] But I said that I did not wholly agree with you. One should not overlook the alarm that there is in the world over the question of who in our country will control nuclear weapons. The situation is now developing in the following way. The Ukraine has declared itself to be a nuclear free zone. In other words, nuclear weapons have to be withdrawn from the Ukraine obviously to Russia, where over 80 percent—82 percent if I'm not mistaken—of the Soviet Union's nuclear armaments are now concentrated. Kazakhstan, where

nuclear weapons are also located, is, basically, taking the same line as the Ukraine. Everything is going to be concentrated in Russia. One would expect this to make control easier. But it also throws up a number of other problems. How are the weapons going to be transported, for instance? Won't these weapons fall into the wrong hands while they are being transported? On the other hand, the prospect of exclusive control over nuclear weapons by Russia may not, I think, be entirely welcome to other Republics.

[Shishlin] No. Let me remind you that, in their recent interview for American listeners, Mikhail Sergeyevich and Boris Nikolayevich made their position on this quite clear. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin said that control over nuclear weapons is as rigorous as it can be.

[Levin] That's now.

[Shishlin] Now, yes. But they also made it quite clear that there are firm guarantees that control will continue to be rigorous. I think that is how it is.

[Levin] That is how it must be. Otherwise, there really could be a catastrophe. [passage omitted on new union playing important role in international affairs; coup attempt undermined confidence in USSR stability; western aid is more likely to be forthcoming]

[Levin] A conference on the human dimension, sponsored by the CSCE, is scheduled to open on Tuesday in Moscow. It has been under preparation for a long time. Our delegation will now of course have a much more convincing case, especially with the declaration on rights of peoples, adopted by the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies, in its hands. After all, we know how hard it was to push—in the full sense of the word—the law on immigration and emigration through the Supreme Soviet. Human rights questions are now being placed on a different basis in our country. But, in an article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Kozyrev, the RSFSR Foreign Minister, asked why the delegation only represents the Union's Foreign Ministry. The Republics should also participate in the conference in some way, he said. This is a reasonable point.

As far as the Conference on the Human Dimension is concerned, participation by the Republics would, I think, lead to confusion. They would not agree on some things, including approaches to regional problems. Let us take the most acute problem—the foremost problem on the agenda at present if you ignore for the moment problems connected with our country. I am referring to the problem of a Middle East settlement. I do not think—in fact, I would put it more strongly than that—I am convinced that certain Republics will not agree with the approach that would previously have been thought of as the Soviet Union's approach.

[Shishlin] Which Republics do you mean?

[Levin] I have Azerbaijan in mind, first and foremost. I get the impression that it has more sympathy for undemocratic regimes than it has for the achievement of a settlement. I cannot rule out the possibility that Azerbaijan may wish to establish closer relations with Saddam Husayn.

[Shishlin] Well, I don't think that is the case. That would be folly. Saddam Husayn has established his reputation so well—in inverted commas—that his character needs no deciphering even for Azerbaijani politicians. However, I agree that there may be some nuances in the way our predominantly Muslim Republics approach the problem of a Middle East settlement. But it also has to be pointed out that in Azerbaijan, for instance, most believers are Shi'ites. And the Shi'ites have suffered as a result of Saddam's domestic policies in Iraq. Yes, we are talking about a Muslim region. But if we're talking about the Muslim world, then I think the Muslim world—and the Soviet section of it too—ought to be interested in helping achieve a just Middle East settlement. This remains a priority objective for the whole of this region.

[Levin] But, Nikolay Vladimirovich, what do we mean by a "just settlement"? After all, there are people in the Middle East who still think a just settlement means that Israel must be pushed into the sea, that the State of Israel should cease to exist.

[Shishlin] Well, I know that such politicians exist. In this respect, I feel that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev did not tell the whole story when he returned from his incarceration in the Crimea. He said that the only people who expressed support for the putschists were Saddam Husayn, Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi and Rubiks. But there was one other person—Yasir 'Arafat—who supported the putschists and expressed support for the coup.

[Levin] He said that the putsch opened the way to a just solution of the Middle East problem.

[Shishlin] I think, incidentally, that this is also a lesson for our leaders and for the entire Middle East. In the new situation which the country finds itself in now, which our foreign policy also finds itself in, one of the most urgent and pressing tasks may well be, not just the verification of those ties that have already emerged between us and the West, the beneficial ties that we have established in the context of the policy of new political thinking, but also the elimination of all those shortcomings which there have been in the policy of new political thinking, especially as far as Israel is concerned. Diplomatic relations with Israel must be restored without any delay, without glancing over our shoulder at 'Arafat, Qadhdhafi or Saddam Husayn.

[Levin] Nikolay Vladimirovich, you said that the shortcomings in the policy of new thinking should be eliminated. Surely the absence of diplomatic relations means that this aspect of the policy of new thinking has not been taken to its logical conclusion, doesn't it?

[Shishlin] Of course.

[Levin] This is not a shortcoming, but a deviation from the policy.

[Shishlin] It is, I would say, an incomplete form of it.

[Levin] Yes. This question is, of course, outstanding. I will be very glad if my apprehensions turn out to be unnecessary and unjustified. There are, of course, state interests, things of interest to all the Republics that have to be borne in mind. I think it would be a mistake to ignore some examples that manifested themselves this week. I am referring specifically to an article in the LOS ANGELES TIMES which suggested that, since the Soviet Union is now in such need of our economic support—as the article put it—let it make more substantial reductions in its nuclear forces than are required by the START treaty. The article suggested that pressure could be applied on the Soviet Union in this respect. Certain people in Japan are also saying that conditions are conducive to acting more vigorously and aggressively. Nobody uses the word blackmail. But, basically, they are talking about using blackmail to win back the Northern Territories. I don't want to address this specific problem now. But this sort of attempt to take advantage of the Soviet Union's difficulties, the complexities of our domestic reform, to profit from them, should not be overlooked.

It seems to me that there can only be one conclusion for us. In my view, we must pass through this stage of uncertainty as quickly as possible. In this respect I think that the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies did precisely what it was expected to do. It did not emulate the USSR Supreme Soviet session, which turned into an empty talking-shop, where much of the debate was completely irrelevant. Some of the Congress debate was also irrelevant. But the main job was done. We had to get our bearings.

So, we have to bear in mind that, despite the generally very benevolent attitude that there is towards our reforms, despite the unprecedented opportunities that truly are opening up for universal human values to be taken as a basis for cooperation between various world states, one cannot overlook the fact that there are forces in the West—and the East too, if you count Japan—whose thinking has not changed. Therefore, we also have to be prepared for this.

[Shishlin] That is so. But I still think that this temptation is almost beyond the pale now. This temptation—to pressure the Soviet Union, to exploit its difficulties—has, of course, always been a factor in the policy of the most conservative circles. But, all the same, I don't think this is any longer the determinant factor in the West's foreign policy, the foreign policy of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany or Japan—although, maybe, the argument does not apply to Japan.

[Levin] Well, it applies slightly less. The government itself is behaving in a perfectly reasonable way, on the whole.

[Shishlin] The government, yes, but the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is now putting forward a fresh package of demands, insisting that the problem of the northern territories be resolved this year—end of story. [passage omitted on Soviet diplomacy being on the mend; Soviet foreign policy needs to take the republics into account; foreign policy could give a big boost to the new Union]

[Levin] Here I would like to return once again to the problem of our relations with the states which until recently were our friends, allies, and so on—we referred to them by those rather splendid names. Our relations with them are now going through a very, very critical period. When we now say that the single economic area may, in one way or another, embrace all 15 Republics, the formula 15 plus 6 is also mentioned very often. This is a reference to the Eastern European states. I am profoundly convinced that this is a formula that requires very serious attention, on both sides. I realize that there are certain prejudices, that there is suspicion. But economic requirements dictate a search for solutions.

The other day I discovered from statistics published in the Prague newspaper RUDE PRAVO that, according to the Czechoslovak State Bank, the Soviet Union's debt to Czechoslovakia amounts to \$4.7 million. This is a staggering figure. Where did this debt come from? How can it be repaid? How can it be eliminated? This week we had a visit from Balcerowicz, the Polish Deputy Prime Minister. We also owe huge sums to the Poles. A huge amount of goods which we ordered is lying in Polish stores. The Poles cannot deliver the goods to us because we still haven't paid for previous orders. Both sides are suffering as a result. So, if tact, common sense, unorthodox thinking, even imagination are shown, these problems can be resolved in a new way and then we will all benefit. The problem is, of course, a very serious one. [passage omitted: shishlin concludes with opportunities to improve international situation leading to soviet reforms; levin concludes that steadfast action is now needed]

Bessmertnykh on Actions During Coup

91UF1146A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 6 Sep 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with A. Bessmertnykh, former USSR foreign minister, by I. Titov; place and date not given: "A. Bessmertnykh Was Fed Under the Control of the KGB: But How Was the Entire Logic of His Conduct Controlled?"]

[Text] Just one month ago this interview never seemed possible to me: It is very difficult to get hold of the highest leaders, and they are not very willing to converse with journalists. That is understandable: The newspapers do not want banalities, and revelations may have very negative repercussions.

For these very reasons I supposed that a conversation with A. Bessmertnykh after his dismissal would be very candid, inasmuch as that is possible for a career diplomat. I was not mistaken.

[Titov] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, I have several questions for you. Naturally everyone is interested in the details of those three days that "turned the world upside down." As we already know, you made an urgent trip from Belorussia to the Kremlin on 18 August at Kryuchkov's request. He proposed that you join the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. You refused. Describe that situation in detail.

[Bessmertnykh] After my refusal in the private conversation with V. Kryuchkov, we entered the room where the conspirators were. Kryuchkov immediately made a telephone call and said, "Bessmertnykh has refused." They were all sitting at a table upon which lay papers. It seemed to me that those present were already tired out from discussions.

[Titov] What did you feel at that moment? After all, the "illness" of the president, the state of emergency—these attributes of the plot should have prompted you to thoughts about the criminal nature of that assembly...

[Bessmertnykh] I did not have such thoughts. The only thing I could not understand was why a state of emergency was necessary. Why had Yanayev taken such a step in conjunction with an illness of the president?

These days when I analyze the events of that night I think I know why I had no feeling of alarm. The presence of Boldin and Plekhanov created the illusion that everything was normal. These people were responsible for the protection of Gorbachev and the operations of his staff. Whenever they took part in important meetings, everyone always knew that they were functioning in the name of the president.

[Titov] What instructions did you receive from the GKChP on 19 August?

[Bessmertnykh] None.

[Titov] In the morning, before the meeting with Yanayev, did you give your employees any instructions?

[Bessmertnykh] Just one: To study and follow everything. And to report to me.

[Titov] And so, at about 1400 you met with Yanayev in the Kremlin and found out that there were no reports about Gorbachev's health. Why did you not ask the leaders of the coup about Gorbachev's health on the night of 19 August?

[Bessmertnykh] I simply did not have any doubts. But on Monday there was a stream of information from the GKChP and not a word about facts confirming the illness of the president. Everything became clear at that point. I immediately called a meeting of the leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was a small circle of

people—we feared that information about our conversation would reach the GKChP.

[Titov] Was that possible?

[Bessmertnykh] Quite possible. There are “informers” everywhere. Anyway, we agreed not to carry out the orders of the GKChP. And the leaders were to follow this line within their administrations. Then I sent our ambassadors a circular:

(From circular letter No. 7487 dated 19 August: “In your operations you are to be guided by the fact that the foreign policy course of the USSR remains as it has been defined by the constitutional organs... In this difficult situation the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to function in accordance with the policies which are determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet, the presidential power, and the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.”)

There is not even any mention in it of the GKChP. Any genuine diplomat would have immediately understood what we wished to say by this.

[Titov] Did you send this telegram before Yeltsin's declaration or after?

[Bessmertnykh] I do not know when the declaration was made. They brought me a Xerox copy and put into a folder marked “work to be done at home.” By that time the telegram had already been sent out.

[Titov] As I learned from newspaper articles, the GKChP sent out “documents” to the embassies of the USSR with binding instructions from Kvitsinskiy to deliver them to the governments of the foreign countries as well as a telegram signed by Kvitsinskiy demanding that any questions which arise be answered on the basis of these “documents.” How do you explain this?

[Bessmertnykh] On the night of the 19th I fell ill. It was not a cold, as some of the newspapers have written. It was a severe attack of gallstones. But I continued to work at my dacha. On 20 August I sent the ambassadors a telegram containing the following: “The foreign political course of the USSR is that which has been defined by the president of the USSR and the USSR Supreme Soviet. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to operate within the framework of this political course. As before, we continue the practice of receiving instructions from the center which then move through the channels of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The execution of any other instructions must always be coordinated with the leadership of the ministry.”

[Titov] You were not at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Bessmertnykh] I dictated the telegram by telephone. They sent it off. And after that they brought me the original at the dacha and I signed it.

[Titov] When was that?

[Bessmertnykh] During the day. They also brought to my dacha a message by the GKChP prepared at the KGB condemning the statement of G. Bush. I wrote my resolution on it: I opposed it. And so it was not published.

[Titov] Let us return to the telegrams of Kvitsinskiy. Did he get in touch with you and ask your advice?

[Bessmertnykh] No. He did not call me concerning these questions and did not speak of it. How could I give my consent to these telegrams when on that same day (20 August) I was taking the two steps—which I already told you about—blocking the actions of the GKChP?

[Titov] Does that mean that Kvitsinskiy “circumvented” you?

[Bessmertnykh] He was, as they say, “in charge.” He is the first deputy and during an illness of the minister he officially leads the ministry. I do not think that he sent out anything. He is a very clever man. I warned my assistant Ivanov that there were to be no commentaries to the TASS reports and especially no representations to the governments. In my telegrams everything was clear: Only the constitutional organs of power and the president of the USSR. Of course it could have been stated more clearly. But who knows, perhaps under conditions of martial law someone was reading our telegrams and someone would inform. Do you understand?

[Titov] Yes. And I recall your second telegram. As you yourself said, it should have cut off the influence of the KGB over the ambassadors. What kind of influence was there on the employees of Soviet foreign missions?

[Bessmertnykh] There has been information that the KGB, through its intelligence people operating abroad, made attempts to exert influence on the ambassadors. There were dispatches in which the ambassadors were told: Go out there, visit them, tell them... This was an extraordinary situation; under normal conditions such a thing does not happen. The intelligence personnel there cannot compel an ambassador to go anywhere. The ambassador—formally and officially—is the leading official of the embassy. The role of the representatives of the KGB is an impressive one not because of any written communiques they generate but because they engage not only in intelligence but also counterintelligence. And for the small collectives which make up the embassies this is a considerable factor. They constantly feel the unsleeping eye of counterintelligence and it often happens that much depends on the human qualities of those people who must defend the state interests.

But in any case the influence of the KGB was felt most of all in the enormous stream of their own information to the leadership of the country. Sometimes the president telephoned me and said: Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, this is alarming information. See what kind of mood they are in, for example, in country “X.” I often responded that this information only reflects the mood of individual circles or of the government or the administration or

society. And I can give you as much information as you wish. Indeed it is possible to take one side of the information, cut out everything which balances it, put it on the table of the president, and thus receive a terrifying picture of how the officials of country "X" wish to destroy and break up our country, etc. This is the main danger of influence over the president. Now that there are wise people in the leadership of the KGB many questions which constantly disturbed us, ambassadors and ministers, may finally be discussed openly and reasonable solutions may be sought.

[Titov] Did you personally sense any pressure during the putsch?

[Bessmertnykh] No. But after the conversation I understood that they would be dismissing me soon. My wife and I were frightened for our little son Arseniy and decided not to take him out of the house. We decided to refuse to eat...

[Titov] Did you declare a hunger strike?

[Bessmertnykh] The problem was that, like Gorbachev and like the members of the Security Council, I received food that was specially checked by the services of the KGB. It was a funny similarity, but we, like those who were in Foros, did not put a single gram of that food into our mouths. Anything was possible...

[Titov] That means that you too were under a state of siege.

[Bessmertnykh] There were unpleasant events. For example, on 19 August a certain employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came into my office and recommended that I take down the portrait of Gorbachev. I did not do it. But then on the day when Moscow was burying the three boys who died, that same man telephoned and advised me not to go out onto the street—he said that crowd would tear me apart. He said that as though he had not asked me to take down the portrait of Gorbachev but I had instead asked him. Somewhat earlier there were telephone calls, but now they do not call—they are afraid. That is not simply unpleasant—it is terrifying.

[Titov] Let us talk about something else. What position, in your opinion, will the world community, and the United States in particular, take in relation to our country and its future?

[Bessmertnykh] I believe that it is in its interests not for the USSR to break up decisively but instead for us to preserve our statehood. It does not need a dissolved Union. An enormous zone of instability will appear which may pull down Europe and destroy the balance in Asia.

[Titov] Should one expect that in such an event the West will not wish to recognize those states that declare their withdrawal from the Soviet Union?

[Bessmertnykh] No, it will recognize them and is already recognizing them, but a declaration of sovereignty

should not designate—in their opinion, I believe—the end of relations within the framework of the Union. The West has an interest in our preserving a united security zone and a united economic zone.

[Titov] But what will happen now to economic aid to the Union? It seems to me that while one restraining factor has disappeared—the possibility of the restoration of totalitarianism—another has appeared—the danger of sliding into chaos. The "Group of Seven" will not undertake large-scale investment in such a case.

[Bessmertnykh] Quite true. For now we will most likely see emergency forms of aid functioning. In other words short-term types as a result of the emergency situation. Perhaps they will more actively develop support for the creation of a stabilization fund for convertibility of the ruble.

But the flow of investment capital into the country will not get started until we set the situation right.

[Titov] I wish to ask you a last question—concerning Soviet-Japanese relations. What kinds of adjustments will recent events introduce to the problem of territory?

[Bessmertnykh] These events will apparently have an influence. My point of view is that we should not hurry but that we should not draw things out endlessly either. There are formulas by which Soviet-Japanese relations should progress. But it is an issue that must be decided. If we wish peaceful relations with Japan, this cannot be avoided. It is important not to create the impression that we are selling the islands or simply giving them away under the influence of the extraordinary circumstances.

[Titov] And what about recognition of our obligations in accordance with the Joint Statement of 1956?

[Bessmertnykh] They can be examined as a variant.

[Titov] Thank you for the interesting conversation. I wish you an interesting new assignment.

Bessmertnykh Explains Actions During Coup

914B0370A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 30 Aug 91 p 3

[Article by Igor Titov: "The Night Visit of the Former USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Bessmertnykh to the Putsch Headquarters Cost Him More Than His Job"]

[Text] Although we have no wish whatsoever to defend the character of the former USSR foreign affairs minister, still let us give him a chance to speak. We want the details of the murderous plot: When we have enough of them, they will enable us to draw a comparison—the midwife of truth.

Our meeting took place quite by chance: On Tuesday I was driving past the building where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center is housed and I caught sight of A. Bessmertnykh, surrounded—as it later turned

out—by a group of Japanese journalists. I went up and engaged him in conversation.

Here is what we heard.

On 18 August when he was resting on the "estate" of his Belorussian colleagues 140 kilometers from Minsk, the minister received a telephone call from V. Kryuchkov and was told to come to Moscow immediately "to discuss important issues." Thinking that the phone call was related to the appearance of an explosive situation in some corner of the world, A. Bessmertnykh was sure that he would return to resume his vacation in a day or two. And he told his wife this.

When he flew into Moscow late in the evening of that same day, he set out for the Kremlin, where he arrived after midnight. There he met with Soviet leaders and ministers, "excluding, naturally, M. Gorbachev." V. Kryuchkov took A. Bessmertnykh into a separate room where he informed him of the "grave illness" of M. Gorbachev. He briefly related the essence of what had taken place and suggested that he join the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. The minister, according to his own words, refused—quite diplomatically, one must assume. The KGB chief insisted, but to no avail. Then A. Bessmertnykh entered the room where the ministers had already been discussing the situation for from five to seven hours. As he asserts, his speech to them amounted basically to a prediction of the reaction of the world community: the termination of aid, economic sanctions, possibly a blockade. After presenting his position, A. Bessmertnykh went home.

Until noon on 19 August (Monday) A. Bessmertnykh, as he asserts, still had doubts: Perhaps the president was really ill. When he met with G. Yanayev in the Kremlin, he asked him if there were any documents confirming M.

Gorbachev's illness. When he heard in response "something unintelligible," the leader of the diplomatic department, in his words, "smelled a rat."

I venture to assume that if G. Yanayev had mumbled the same thing about the president's health as he did at the evening press conference, the seasoned diplomat would certainly have guessed: The GKChP would not last long and Gorbachev would return to Moscow soon. I know the instructions the minister gave in the morning, but he himself said that after his conversation with G. Yanayev, he called in his deputies and gave them orders not to follow the instructions of the GKChP.

When he guessed the situation, A. Bessmertnykh sent a telegram to the Soviet ambassadors in which he called for them to abide by the foreign political policy of the constitutional organs of power. Incidentally, my colleague on the editorial staff Aleksandr Nadzharov, who was on assignment in Syria during the putsch, says that he himself saw in the hands of Soviet emissary Igor Melikhov a telegram with those instructions signed by the minister.

After a certain amount of time, when he found that the KGB was sending the ambassadors its own guidelines, A. Bessmertnykh said that he sent our foreign representatives circular letters in which he demanded that they obey only the instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Apparently many ambassadors were faced with a difficult dilemma: to follow the course of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the KGB. "Those who were in their right minds were able to figure things out and made the proper choice," the former leader of the foreign political department told me.

Information about how our ambassadors acted and what information they sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will clarify how many "normal" minds there were in the Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Shevardnadze Supports Tengiz-Chevron Deal

91UF1133A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 32, 11-18 Aug 91 p 6

[Article by Eduard Shevardnadze: "Tenghis: A Big Oil Project With Big Political Impact"]

[Text] The latest discussion in the press focuses on advantages and disadvantages of the proposed Soviet-U.S. Tenghischevroil project. MOSCOW NEWS was the first to raise the problem.

A public discussion of the matter is gratifying. It signals the end of past practices, when multibillion deals that later proved a big loss for the country were signed behind closed doors.

I don't feel at all like going into its technical or economic advantages which I think are more than convincing.

I would rather discuss some other aspects.

The Tenghis oil fields and the attempts to develop them relying on our own technology and funds have long been in the news. Since 1979 two billion roubles have been thus spent with no payoff at all.

Thus the decision to look for foreign partners seemed quite reasonable. To my knowledge talks with Chevron have been going on for nearly four years now. They have covered technical and economic terms of a joint project, and there have been various expert studies confirming the project's feasibility.

Attracting direct industrial investments to our economy is a relatively new thing here, and activities of foreign firms in the Soviet Union continue to be regarded with suspicion. This is not surprising as it has been dinned into our heads since childhood that capitalists do nothing but rob other states by buying up their wealth for peanuts.

We can, of course, sell or not sell our raw materials. If we lived well using other resources, we could perhaps be sparing with our oil, gas, ores, forests, etc. It would also be good if we put our resources to better use without harming either humans or nature. But this is not the case. What's to be done? Should we continue to "develop" our natural resources in the same barbaric way or should we turn for help to knowledgeable and skillful people equipped with advanced technology and experience in running business and making profit?

We have reconsidered many things of late, taking a more realistic look of ourselves and others. It's time to take a new look at foreign investments too.

Foreign investments introduce new technology, and open up alternative economic possibilities and greater competition.

While there are still snags and delays in trying to attract foreign investments through joint ventures, the first

benefits are already in evidence. These investments today total as little as 3-4 billion dollars. In Hungary the sum is three times higher.

The Tenghischevroil joint venture is in effect the first attempt to attract foreign capital on a large scale. Let me stress that the money is to be invested in a joint venture.

I talked to many political figures and members of major corporate businesses on my latest trip to the United States. Nearly everyone asked about progress on this joint venture. It is no secret that the United States will judge our readiness to cooperate by the success or failure of this project.

The much expected law on foreign investments in the USSR has now been signed. Well? The law may be good on the whole but how can we persuade foreign corporations to invest directly, to set up their own production in the USSR while even the creation of joint ventures is a major effort and time-consuming? Add to this the risk of the unstable political and economic environment...

When we try to figure out the consequences of this or that approach we should keep in mind the fact that the work to set up Tenghischevroil is proceeding as part of an agreement between U.S. and Soviet consortia. The agreement provides for a number of factories to turn out consumer goods and pharmaceuticals, to process farm produce, and to undertake special socio-economic development projects.

The first stage in 1991 provided for the establishment of eight joint ventures to produce goods worth more than 700 million roubles each year.

The joint ventures will produce goods which the USSR now imports. The broad public hardly knows that hundreds of millions of dollars literally go up in smoke to import tobacco and cigarettes that this country is short of. A joint venture to produce cigarettes and to grow tobacco on modern lines would substantially cut down on hard currency expenditures.

Tenghischevroil also plans to assist in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals. The Tenghischevroil project calls for a network of joint ventures in Russia and the Ukraine and a programme for the rapid economic development of Kazakhstan. This will make it possible to produce goods worth 20 billion roubles each year.

I view this project as a catalyst for expansion and renovation of a number of sectors and as a potent economic stimulus for the development and strengthening of a system of market-based relations in this country. If you wish, as something to test the seriousness of our intentions about restructuring the economy.

From the Editors:

The Tenghis oil fields is this country's only untapped oil and gas field of world significance. A big oil field, history shows, has big political impact. Hence the interest in this

project from such an international political figure as Eduard Shevardnadze, whose letter we publish here.

The project was analysed by MN in two issues (Nos. 22 and 25 this June) and the conclusion was that this project is extremely disadvantageous for this country. Without reiterating the arguments, let's say that Chevron, which is to gain the rights to the oil fields, will reap a hundred billion dollars in profits, while the Soviet side will get almost no profits.

While fully subscribing to Eduard Shevardnadze's general opinion that the Soviet economy needs to be integrated into the world economy as soon as possible, and a favourable climate be created for foreign investments, we cannot agree with him on the economic terms of the agreement with Chevron. MN has already written that the country would win economically and politically only if there is an open international competitive bidding for the right to develop the Tenghis oil fields. Only an agreement based on such a competition, rather than an agreement hammered out the old way, by apparatchiks behind closed doors, will show our readiness to relate to the rest of the world on a civilized basis.

Europe, Asia Buy Construction Cranes

91UN2556A Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
13 Aug 91 p 2

[Ukrinform report: "'Krayan' Has Begun and Is Functioning"]

[Excerpt] **Odessa. Thanks to the foreign-trade firm entitled "Krayan" which was founded here, the Heavy-Crane Construction Production Association imeni January Uprising has significantly improved its own production potential and strengthened its financial foundation.**

It has undertaken to perform those functions which previously were performed by the specialists of Mashinnoeksport—selling construction cranes abroad, as well as buying imported equipment for the city's needs and for modernizing production.

All this is done for hard currency derived from selling its own products—diesel-electric construction cranes with a hoisting capacity ranging from 25 to 250 tons.

Together with its trade in cranes, the Krayan firm, having established direct ties with its foreign partners, provides equipment for the shops of its own enterprise. In the Federal Republic of Germany it has acquired metalworking machine tools, whereas in Sweden it has acquired welding units and other equipment. This has made it possible to set up a procedure for improving the quality of certain units of various types of construction cranes and to begin producing ecologically "clean" machines which—with respect to all parameters—do not "take a back seat" to their foreign counterparts as to toxicity, safety, speed, mobility, metal consumption, and design.

Having set up and fine-tuned businesslike economic ties with enterprises in European and Asian states, the Krayan firm—in accordance with its program of conversion—began to sell 40-80-ton and even 250-ton (on order) construction hydraulic machines mounted on special-service chassis or undercarriages from SS-20 missiles. They are gaining and winning more and more of the international market. Deliveries are being expanded to Egypt, Pakistan, the United States, Italy, South America, India, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, and Kuwait. The international economic firm entitled "Yevrokrayan" [Eurokrayan] was registered in Italy a few days ago.

The hard currency earned by the plant has allowed them to establish a favorable balance of assets. In the Netherlands a line has been acquired to produce sausages for the city, whereas in Japan the most up-to-date medical equipment is being acquired for the city's medical-aid unit, hospital, and health-and-hygiene complex.

[passage omitted]

New Import-Export, Travel Regulations

PM1009124991 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
21 Aug 91 Union Edition p2

[Unattributed report: "In the USSR Cabinet of Ministers"]

[Text] In connection with the abolition of USSR Gosnab [USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], Union enterprises and organizations under its direct jurisdiction as at 1 April 1991, together with all buildings, equipment, and other property belonging to it, are to be transferred to the USSR Ministry of Material Resources.

In connection with the Union-Republic Foreign Currency Committee's decision to introduce as of 1 July 1991 a new Union-republic procedure governing export and import quotas and licences—a procedure adopted in implementation of the agreed principles for demarcating powers between the USSR and the republics in the regulation of foreign economic relations and of the 2 November 1990 USSR Presidential Decree "On the Special Procedure for Utilizing Foreign Currency Resources in 1991"—the USSR Cabinet of Ministers has stipulated that, as of 1 July 1991, the export and import of output (work, services) by Soviet enterprises and organizations taking part in foreign economic relations will be implemented in accordance with the procedure for export and import quotas and licences laid down by the Union-Republic Foreign Currency Committee.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the USSR Ministry of Justice have been instructed to submit within one month proposals on amending or declaring spent any relevant USSR government resolutions and ordinances as a result of the introduction of the new Union-republic procedure for export and import quotas and licences.

USSR government decisions and other USSR legislative acts will remain valid until they have been brought into line with the above procedure, insofar as they do not actually conflict with this procedure.

USSR ministries and departments have been instructed to review and abolish any normative acts they have issued which conflict with the Union-republic procedure for export and import quotas and licences.

It has been stipulated that:

licences to export and import output (work, services) issued before 15 August 1991 will remain valid until the end of 1991;

licences to export goods of all-union importance will be issued by authorized republic bodies in accordance with the Union-Republic Foreign Currency Committee's allocation of all-union quotas for 1991 and on the basis of actual volumes of export for the rest of this year, until the new procedure for quotas and licences is in place.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations has been given one month to:

notify the authorized republic bodies of the volume of goods of all-union importance exported in the past;

submit for consideration by the Union-Republic Foreign Currency Committee proposals on introducing export and import licences in USSR trade with individual countries in order to balance reciprocal payments, and also export licences within the framework of USSR agreements with the United States and the EEC on regulating trade in textiles.

In implementation of the 24 June 1991 USSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On Bringing Into Force the USSR Law 'On the Procedure for Expelling and Deporting Soviet and Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons from the USSR and for Obtaining Personal Documents on Demand,'" the USSR Foreign Ministry has been instructed, jointly with the USSR Ministry of Justice, the USSR KGB, the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and other ministries, departments, and organizations concerned to prepare and submit to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers the following in August 1991:

proposals on bringing USSR legislative acts and USSR government resolutions and ordinances in line with the USSR Law "On the Procedure for Expelling and Deporting Soviet and Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons from the USSR and for Obtaining Personal Documents on Demand";

if necessary, a draft decision by the USSR government ensuring implementation of this law.

USSR ministries and departments are to review and abolish normative acts and instructions they have issued which conflict with the USSR Law "On the Procedure for Expelling and Deporting Soviet and Foreign Citizens

and Stateless Persons from the USSR and for Obtaining Personal Documents on Demand."

The USSR Foreign Ministry and the USSR Ministry of Justice are to coordinate and monitor the performance of this work.

The USSR Foreign Ministry and the USSR Ministry of Justice, in coordination with the ministries and departments concerned, are to elaborate and bring into force from 1 October 1991 a procedure for demanding the legalization of the personal documents of Soviet and foreign citizens and stateless persons. Citizens and organizations are to be notified of the aforementioned procedure through the mass media.

Response to Asia-Africa Committee Appeal for Chernobyl Aid

*91UN2487A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Aug 91
First Edition p 5*

[Interview with Vladimir Tolstikov, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, by L. Kokhanova, PRAVDA correspondent: "The Orbits of Assistance"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Our pain—Chernobyl—does not subside. More and more countries and peoples are sharing it. This understanding is now coming not only from the West, but also from the East. What do our long-standing partners and friends from this region propose? With what do they believe it possible to help, and above all the children of the regions that suffered? These questions of our correspondent are answered by the first deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, Vladimir Tolstikov:

Planet of Children

[Tolstikov] First of all, our pioneer organizations from this region are true to their tradition of inviting children from regions that have suffered for rest and treatment. Thus, the Committee of Afro-Asian Solidarity of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea during the summer of the past year accepted 100 children for treatment and rest, the Cypriot Committee—15 children from the regions that suffered from the Chernobyl accident.

This tradition was continued this year as well. The Korean Committee of Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, in answer to an appeal by the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, the Soviet Peace Fund, and the Russian Peace Fund invited 50 pupils from regions of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia that were affected by the disaster. Soviet girls and boys, like children of the same age during the past year, will go through a month long course of treatment with the use of methods of Oriental medicine. Responding to an analogous appeal, the Syrian Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity invited 30

children from the regions that suffered for rest and treatment, above all from Bryansk Oblast. The children will remain in the country for almost one month. Getting acquainted with its astonishing history will be promoted by excursions to Damascus and Halab. Rest in Latakia in a young people's camp on the shore of the Mediterranean. The inviting parties will assume all expenses for the stay of the children in their countries.

[Kokhanova] But, obviously, rest and treatment of children from the zone of the catastrophe, is not the only form of assistance? And the initiative for it at times comes also from your committee?

[Tolstikov] Of course, it is not the only form. And we have the right to say that the activity of the Committee for Solidarity during the past few years has not by-passed our acute national problems of the past few years. Overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe and the extension of assistance to the victims is one of them. Our appeals to our partners have been heard by them, and we express enormous gratitude to them for this.

Thus, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries on the eve of the fifth anniversary turned to the committees for Afro-Asian solidarity of a number of countries with the proposal to examine the possibility of making a gift of citrus and fruit juices for the children of the Chernobyl zone.

The Vietnamese Committee for Solidarity decided to send to the Chernobyl Fund a large batch of medicinal green tea, as well as a strong toning-up medical preparation (based on ginseng) "Sam Ni Tin".

In April of this year, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries discussed with a delegation of scientists and specialists questions connected with the creation, in the near future in Ho Chi Minh City, of a joint production facility for an absorbent made from the shell of coconuts using Soviet technology. Recently Soviet specialists were in Vietnam for the purpose of reaching a final agreement on the creation of this production facility.

In response to the initiative of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries and the Cypriot Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, the Cypriot Ministry of Trade allotted for the children of Chernobyl 17.5 tons of raisins, 6.5 tons of biscuits, as well as a large quantity of children's clothing and footwear. Steamers with this cargo are now on the way. . . .

[Kokhanova] Apparently, the beginning of this action program can be attributed to the April 1990, when our Committee for Solidarity took part in the telethon "Chernobyl"? Has it been possible to do a lot during this time?

[Tolstikov] Yes, we believe that precisely at this time people began to take up this problem systematically. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity

took the most active part in the telethon "Chernobyl" remembered by all. To sixty partner organizations of the countries of Asia and Africa an appeal was then sent, calling on them to take an active part and to extend financial and material assistance within their ability. As you see, this appeal did not remain without a response. Moved by a feeling of solidarity, the national organizations of the solidarity movement and numerous representatives of political and public circles of the Afro-Asian world responded to this appeal.

The leadership of the Organization for Solidarity with Asian and African Peoples allotted 5,000 Egyptian pounds. "This even if moderate sum," it is stated in the message, symbolizes the deep respect and sympathy which our organization and its permanent secretariat have toward the thousands of Soviet people, who have suffered and are suffering as the result of the consequences of the disaster." Simultaneously, the Egyptian Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Peoples sent several tens of thousands of disposable syringes to Moscow.

Other partners of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries also responded to the appeal. The Chinese National Society for Friendship with Foreign Countries sent free of charge a significant batch of unique medicinal preparation for the treatment of radiation sickness.

The activists of the Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity of Pakistan turned over to the Soviet medicinal preparations for 50,000 rupees, as well as a check for \$50,000. The joint Soviet-Thai Aspak Firm transferred \$1,500 to the account of the Chernobyl Assistance Fund. From Jordan medicines for children who suffered from the catastrophe have been received. The representative of the journal SAUS, popular in the Third World, who was in Moscow at the time, presented a check for 1,000 English pounds Sterling and announced that the journal is sending batches of medical equipment for the diagnosis of radiation sickness.

The echo of the Chernobyl disaster has rolled even to the most remote island state in the Indian Ocean—Mauritius. The National Committee for Solidarity transferred \$500 to the Chernobyl Fund. Financial means came from Namibia, the Seychelles, from the African National Congress of South Africa, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and others.

All of these facts speak in favor of the movement of the solidarity of the peoples of two continents. They also convince us of the benefit of the activity of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, which continues the policy of preserving and improving the historically-developed many-sided and equal cooperation between the Soviet and Afro-Asian public—a policy which has fully proved itself. We are looking for new directions and forms of cooperation, and we are giving it a more fruitful and mutually advantageous character.

**Tyumen Broker Sells 100,000 Tons of Oil Per
Diem**

*OW0609022891 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2102 GMT 5 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Hermes and Co., a brokerage company located in the city of Tyumen, sells more oil via Soviet oil exchanges than any of its Soviet competitors, claim independent experts. Every day it sells more than 100,000 tons of oil on average, half of this amount for freely convertible currency.

Hermes sells oil to customers in Czechoslovakia, Britain, the U.S., and Germany and does the bulk of its business on the Tyumen Commodities and Stock Exchange and the Moscow exchanges for the export of oil. Hermes can also sell to Western customers who have an oil export license and a seat on the exchange.

Western customers buy oil from Hermes at an average price of some \$120 per ton, which is \$4 to \$6 lower than prices prevailing on Western markets. The company's biggest transaction was when it sold 100,000 tons of oil for \$12 million in June of 1991.

**Expert Interviewed on Sakhalin Oilfield
Development**

*OW0609014591 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2102 GMT 5 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Even at this early stage, it is apparent that some of the companies tendering for the right to develop oil and gas fields on the island of Sakhalin, in the Soviet Far East, have "already lost the race," said a member of the panel of experts in an interview with IF [INTERFAX].

The winner will not be known until early October, but the sale of background data to a number of major Western oil companies, including Mobil, Amoco, Mitsui, Idemitsu, and Shell, has already brought several millions of dollars to the organizers of the tender. Prices for the data ranged from \$400,000 to \$600,000.

The winner will get the right to set up a joint venture with the Sakhalinmorneftegaz, a Soviet oil company. The joint venture will develop oil and gas fields on Sakhalin's shelf and build refineries. By preliminary estimates, Sakhalin can produce up to 20 billion cubic metres of natural gas and up to 7 million tons of oil annually.

Chukotka-Alaska Phone Link Hampered by Steep Prices

OW1109133891 Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 0900 GMT 29 Aug 91

[Yu. Kurmyshev video report; from the "TV Inform" newscast]

[Text] Many joint enterprises have been established recently in Chukotka. This is understandable since it is a neighbor of the United States, a place with a wealth of entrepreneurial experience from whom there is much to learn. [Video cuts to technicians working on a telephone equipment console]

[Begin recording] [Kurmyshev] The establishment of the first telephone channel between Provideniya settlement in Chukotka and Gambell settlement in Alaska is already history. The joint Soviet- U.S. Magadan-Alaska communications enterprise, Magalascom, has turned into a fairly well-known company on both sides of the Bering Strait in the years since it was established. [video shows microwave communications antennas] A reliable 80-miles long radio relay bridge has been set up between its shores which links subscribers in any part of the United States and the Soviet Union.

At the time the entire project cost \$200,000 and today it is yielding good profits. In the joint enterprise they are naturally divided in half and go primarily toward expanding facsimile and computer services and international telephone communications. The business is profitable in every way. [video shows Kurmyshev interviewing engineer G.D. Nazarov]

German Dmitriyevich, do you consider yourself to be primarily a communications engineer or a businessman?

[Nazarov] Presently probably a communications engineer. We are not business people yet. Of course, we are trying to become businessmen with the help of contacts with our communications colleagues from Alaska. But not everything is working out yet. Here is a negative example showing why it is not working out. The price formation system in our country is completely incomprehensible to us and even more so to the Americans. Previously, a call from Provideniya to Alaska meant a communications channel spanning the whole globe. And of course this was expensive. One minute of conversation cost six rubles. Now, when we have shortened this distance to 120 kilometers to Gambell, for some reason the cost has remained the same at six rubles. [Video shows notice reading: Gambell, Alaska, USA; Transmit 459.65 mHz, Receive 454.65 mHz]

[Kurmyshev] Obviously this in no way promotes the development of relations. I think that the entire arithmetic of costs would make a good homework assignment for the corresponding central departments, particularly the Ministry of Communications. [end recording]

Khasbulatov Meets Delegation From Iowa

LD0609054391 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 5 Sep 91

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Today a meeting took place between Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, and a delegation from the state of Iowa in the United States. At the meeting, the issue of cooperation in the area of developing agriculture in Russia was discussed. In particular, young Russian farmers are now spending a period of time studying in Iowa. among plans for joint actions is the establishment of an experimental farm not far from Moscow where American experience will be passed to our farmers as they are starting out. [Video shows Khasbulatov meeting Iowa delegation, switches to hall full of deputies with Russian flag hanging over podium]

Today there was also a meeting between Ruslan Khasbulatov and USSR and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputies.

[Begin Khasbulatov recording] We discussed the results of the congress that has just ended. We approved the law that has been adopted and the decree adopted. Our session will be on 19 September. [end recording] [Video shows Khasbulatov in Hallway]

In Khasbulatov's view, the main onus now lies with the republican parliaments.

Military Officers Arrive at Harvard University

LD1109021991 Moscow TASS in English 0926 GMT 10 Sep 91

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Kochetkov]

[Text] New York September 10 TASS—A group of 28 Soviet colonels, generals and admirals on Monday arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to be lectured by their former "potential enemy" at the Harvard University.

Among lecturers are Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, and John Galvin, supreme allied commander Europe.

"The Soviet Armed Forces like the whole country (Soviet Union—TASS) are undergoing changes. We expect much from this two-week programme," Ananiy Politsin, Soviet Defence Ministry strategic research chief, said.

"We want to create a Defence Ministry similar to the U.S. one, where the majority of the staff, including the defence minister, are civilians. We hope to exchange views with American colleagues and use their experience in restructuring the armed forces," Vladimir Danilov, Soviet Defence Ministry information department deputy head, said.

A two-week programme includes the U.S. Governmental system, the lessons of conflicts in Afghanistan, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, and arms purchases in a market economy. No military secrets, however, will be disclosed.

Further on New Revelations on Wallenberg Case

Reasons for Arrest Pondered

91UF1145A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Sep 91
Union Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent M. Zubko: "Raoul Wallenberg, Possibly, Was a Victim of a False Denunciation"]

[Text] Stockholm—Will the circumstances of the tragic fate of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who was arrested by the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] in January 1945 in Budapest and then "disappeared" somewhere in our country, finally be completely cleared up after decades of evasion, false information, and sometimes out-and-out deceit?

Stockholm newspapers are saying that hopes of this increased sharply after the new KGB leader V. Bakatin promised to make public documents that had not yet been affected by glasnost.

...We must never forget that the tragedy of Raoul, who was sent to Budapest to save Jews from extermination by Hitler's men, is not only an everlasting sorrow to the diplomat's relatives in the Wallenberg family of bankers, but also the concern of the official authorities of Sweden and all defenders of human rights. This is a misfortune for the whole Swedish nation. And until our country brings this affair to a close, until it tells the whole truth about why the diplomat was arrested, where he was detained, what torments he suffered, and when he died (if he died), we can hardly count on the full confidence of the Swedish people.

USSR authorities bear the burden of mountains of lies regarding this question. In August 1947, former USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Vyshinskiy declared in a note to the Swedes that there was no Raoul Wallenberg in our country, that we did not know anything about him, and that if such a citizen did exist he had most likely died in Budapest.

Ten years later the USSR Government admitted after all that a Swedish diplomat had been arrested in 1947 and that he had died of a heart attack in prison in the Lubyanka. But for many years the Soviets did not release any other information about Wallenberg.

In the past year or two certain steps have been taken aimed at assisting the international commission, which is headed by Canadian Professor Irwin Kotler, and Raoul's relatives have actually received information about the circumstances of his destiny. They have been given access to the archives of the Vladimir prison and they were given the diplomat's passport which had been kept.

In April of this year in Moscow there was a meeting of the leaders of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the USSR KGB, and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs

with Swedish Ambassador E. Berner and Raoul's relative—Professor Gifon Dardel, who was told that the fact of Wallenberg's death in 1947 was irrefutable and that further investigation of his fate was pointless.

Neither the Swedes nor the members of the international commission agreed that there was no point in looking further: There was not enough evidence of Wallenberg's death (there was only the doctor's conclusion that the Swede died of a heart attack and there is doubt about its authenticity) and there are too many witnesses from among prisoners in Soviet prisons who say that they saw the prisoner alive after 1947-1950 and even in the sixties. Probably not all the evidence is reliable. But one cannot simply dismiss the testimonies of several hundred people.

As for the Swedes themselves, the most optimistic of them think that the diplomat might be alive to this day. Of course, the probability of Wallenberg's survival is small. But theoretically it cannot be ruled out since there is little evidence of his death. It would be interesting to know what documents kept in the Swedish diplomat's file V. Bakatin was talking about.

But for now I wish to draw attention to the following circumstance. Since there are still documents that have not been made public, even in April 1991 at the meeting in Moscow the Swedes were not told the whole truth. In a conversation with me, the secretary of the Swedish Raoul Wallenberg Society, Sonia Sonnenfeldt, noted:

"While we were in Moscow we also met with KGB representatives and felt that there were people in this organization who do not want to tell all they know about Wallenberg. That is our conviction. All of them referred to evidence of Raoul's death in 1947 but still we have so many testimonies from people who saw him alive in years after that..."

Now that the USSR president has disbanded the collegium of the USSR KGB and appointed a new committee leader, there is a real possibility that both the Swedes and we Soviet people will finally be told about everything that happened to Raoul Wallenberg—a person with diplomatic immunity who was a worker in the Swedish Embassy, which, incidentally, represented the interests of both the USSR and Hungary during World War II!

In the extensive literature on Wallenberg there are many versions of the reasons for his arrest. According to one of them which seems reliable, the Swedish diplomat was a victim of the denunciation of Soviet residents in Hungary. Perhaps the impetus for this was the episode with the trucks.

Wallenberg arrived in Budapest on 9 July 1944 but the "Vaadakh" committee for assisting individuals of Jewish nationality began to operate long before that. After German troops entered Hungary in 1944 and a special Supreme Soviet team headed by Eichmann began

to eliminate Jews (there were 800,000 of them in the country), "Vaadakh" began to look for ways of saving people.

In particular, the committee made contact with Eichmann and offered Hitler's men ransom for the release of Jews (they received the money from international organizations). The Germans demanded that for the million people who were condemned the authorities in the United States and Great Britain give them 10,000 military trucks. The transaction subsequently fell through, although "Vaadakh" managed to convince Hitler's men to release two train loads of prisoners to Switzerland as evidence of the seriousness of their intentions.

Soviet intelligence learned of these negotiations. And... In the book "With Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest" by a former attache of the Swedish Embassy in Hungary, Per Anger, who now heads the Raoul Wallenberg Society, it says: "In June 1944, the Deputy People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs sent the U.S. Embassy in Moscow a note stating that it would be undesirable to conduct negotiations with the Germans regarding the business of the trucks."

The question arises: Did somebody not subsequently link Wallenberg to these negotiations? It seems to me that one could try to find an answer to the question of why Wallenberg was arrested in the dispatches from NKVD and GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] residents in Hungary during the second half of 1944 and the beginning of 1945, that is, during the time Raoul was working in Budapest. But to do this, of course, it is necessary to gain access to the archives of these organizations.

...In the near future in Moscow there will be a meeting of the Soviet-Swedish commission which will engage in a study of the Wallenberg affair, and on 10 September an international conference within the framework of the CSCE. A number of delegates to the conference, according to information of the Swedes, intend to raise quite seriously the question of the need for an objective investigation of everything that happened to the diplomat.

On Thursday at 1500 hours in the press center of the USSR KGB there will be a news conference during which they will make public new materials regarding the R. Wallenberg affair. The discussion of this will be printed in the next issue of IZVESTIYA.

KGB Release Documents

91UF1145B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Sep 91
Union Edition p 6

[Article by S. Mostovshchikov: "The Fate of Raoul Wallenberg Still Remains a Mystery"]

[Text] The new KGB chief Vadim Bakatin on 4 September 1991 made a goodwill gesture intended to show that since the coup the Soviet special services are changing for the better. The Swedish ambassador to the

USSR, Mr. Berner, in the presence of a group of journalists which was strictly limited by Vadim Bakatin, was given documents from the KGB archive in which the name of Raoul Wallenberg was mentioned. The night before the journalistic world was given to understand that the papers that were found were extremely interesting. The KGB decided to tell the mass media something concrete on 5 September, 19 hours after the documents were turned over to the Swedish officials.

Interested journalists who gathered in the KGB were given a chance to look at a list of the papers discovered in the archives and their content. But, as became clear fairly quickly, the archive discoveries do not answer the main questions: Where, when, and under what conditions did the life of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who was arrested by the Soviet military in Budapest in January 1945, come to an end.

Strictly speaking, eight documents were found. First of all there was the copy of the dispatch from the chief of the political department of the 151st Infantry Division to the chief of the political department of the Seventh Guard Army dated 14 January 1945. The political worker reports to the other political worker that in Budapest at 16 Bentsur Street, they were detaining the secretary of the Swedish Embassy, Raoul Wallenberg, and "his automobile driver." The secretary and his chauffeur were "located and detained." The dispatch contained the resolution: "Do not send him anywhere for the time being."

Also among the papers that were discovered was a fragment of the journal for registration of detainees in which Wallenberg's name was entered and there is the storeman's list of the things received from him on 6 February 1945. In addition to this there is the petition submitted by German Lance Corporal Jan Loyd submitted in 1953 to the head of the Vladimir jail in which Loyd mentions that he once spent time with Wallenberg in jail in the Lubyanka. There are also three records of interrogations of the employee of the Swedish Embassy in Budapest G. Thomson who, among other things, tells the investigators both about Wallenberg and about the fact that he was involved in saving the Jews by helping them to get out of Hungary, which was occupied by the Germans, which in general the world had known for a long time without the testimony from G. Thomson.

And, finally, there is the letter from the KGB deputy chairman under the USSR Council of Ministers, Lunev, to a member of the collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zamchevskiy, of 12 June 1957, which agrees with the text of the official response to the inquiry of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the fate of the citizen Langfeld who was linked to Wallenberg at one time. Lunev asserts that all the documents on Langfeld, like those on Wallenberg, were destroyed on instructions from the former leaders of the USSR Ministry of State Security.

Judging from everything, the version that all the documents were destroyed was the one the USSR worked with up to the last moment. Everything changed when Vadim Bakatin entered State Security. As was reported to journalists, the new KGB chief intends to make his department fairly open in the near future—within limits, of course. He managed to find the Wallenberg papers which were hidden in the archives with the help of an intercom. Vadim Bakatin contacted the archives and gave the order to find everything the KGB had about the Swedish diplomat. And the documents were found.

A question was asked about whether something significant might be discovered about Raoul Wallenberg if we wait a while.

"Nothing is impossible," Nikolay STOLYAROV, responded former chairman of the Central Control Commission of the RSFSR Communist Party, who after the coup was given the title Major-General of Aviation and the position of deputy chairman of the USSR KGB for personnel problems.

Spain Postpones Ratification of Soviet Friendship Treaty

PM0609134891 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Sep 91 Union Edition p 3

[Report by unidentified TASS correspondent: "Ratification Postponed"]

[Text] Madrid, 5 Sep—Spain has decided to postpone ratification of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR until the situation in the Soviet Union becomes clearer. This was announced by Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, speaking on Wednesday at the senate foreign affairs commission. He described the decision to postpone ratification of the treaty as an "elementary precaution" after the attempted coup d'etat in the USSR.

F. Fernandez Ordonez also announced that guaranteed credits of 150 billion pesetas granted to the USSR by Spain for purchases of Spanish goods and food products are not yet available "for technical reasons." The minister stressed at the same time that Spain intends to give the USSR every possible help.

Soviet Defense Industries Set Sights on France

OW0609160691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1420 GMT 6 Sep 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The USSR Scientific-Industrial Union (SIU) and the Union of Industrialists of France will form a special group to coordinate cooperation in the field of conversion between French firms and Soviet plants of the military-industrial complex. A decision to that effect was made at Friday's meeting of the French Minister of

Finance, Economics and the Budget Pierre Beregovoi with the leaders of two dozen leading Soviet defence industries.

The meeting was attended by the deputy leader of the committee for the day-to-day economic management of the economy, SIU President Arkadiy Volskiy. He said that he had received President Gorbachev's consent to plugging Soviet defense industries into cooperation with foreign partners within the framework of the "Eureka" project. Volskiy said that he had already handed over to the French side a list of 31 industrial plants to undergo conversion that could be used by French companies to open their daughter companies or joint ventures.

In general, Soviet defense industries (87 of them are situated in Russia), suggest cooperation in developing a "Burlak" satellite system on the basis of the Tupolev-160 strategic bomber, an advanced computer still unparalleled in Europe, and the manufacture of disposable syringes, washing machines, vacuum cleaners and a wide range of high technology durable commodities. Besides, the Soviet side is interested in processing the stock-piles of chemical weapons being eliminated into mineral fertilizers and raw materials for the electronic industry.

Pierre Beregovoi said he was concerned about the absence of a system of guarantees to protect foreign investors or a clear division of powers between Union and republican authorities.

As for the outlook for bilateral cooperation, he believes it would be expedient to develop direct ties between French firms and Soviet industries.

Prospects for Economic Aid Viewed

91UF1128B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 4 Sep 91 p 4

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent N. Dolgoplov under the rubric "Who Will Help Us?": "Is It Possible To Obtain Money From Europe If It Wants Only To Feed Us..."]

[Text] Paris—The conclusions of French experts published yesterday on the business pages of LE FIGARO cannot even be called pessimistic. They are tragic: from April 1990 through April of the present year prices in the USSR increased 250 percent. Imports declined by half, and by December production, even according to the most polite estimates, will have fallen 20, "at best," 15 percent. Are there any promising signs at all? They are not altogether absent, thank God: 300,000 private, albeit mainly small, businesses have been created, for all that.

Consequently, is it still possible to pull us from the engulfing mire and save this vast "Upper Volta armed with nuclear weapons"? Perhaps it is, only who will be rushing to help? Somehow not all that many kindly Western volunteers are to be seen as yet. Joining the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank would undoubtedly be a deliverance for us for some

length of time. But by the wishes of the powerful seven most important industrial powers we have been accepted there not as a full, but merely as an associate member. France is not, apparently, opposed to admitting us to the credit trough. But the United States has dug in its heels—it itself currently has an immense budget deficit, and Japan is laying claim to the return of several islands. Were we all of a sudden to acquire a really large sum, experts assure us the world financial balance would really be upset.

And to whom in the Soviets to give the money? In the colorful expression of an IMF specialist, this would be the same as throwing money out the window. Even the fear evoked by the attempted coup has not yet compelled either the World Bank or the IMF to open their pocket-books. The sole achievement is the fact that, following the three days of the putsch, the appropriations for Soviet technical development were unfrozen. But the amount is purely symbolic—180 million francs or \$30 million.

Only there should be no undue panic either. All Western experts, together with political scientists, are absolutely agreed on one thing: The strongest industrial powers are obliged to provide the Soviet Union or what remains of it with dependable humanitarian assistance. And quickly!

The Europeans are in a special position. Whereas the Americans are far away from us, the chaos enveloping the USSR could somehow cross into East Europe and thence to the EEC countries. It is for this reason that at a meeting in mid-September the states of the European Community will determine the scale of this forced contribution to the disintegrating Soviet economy. Even now, alas, the sensitive hearing of West European leaders is clearly picking up the heart-rending voices of protest of the specialists. "Now is not the time to be granting Western credit," Anders Aslund, director of the Stockholm Institute for the Study of the Soviet and East European Economy, warns. "We are observing today, after all, the most complete collapse of the Soviet economy." And in confirmation he adds a detail which could shake the confidence of the European leaders who have gambled on the president of the USSR once for all: "He will have no political role in the future."

But what about the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, created a year ago on President Mitterrand's initiative? After all, its tasks are precisely to rescue the drowning East Europeans. Bank President Jacques Attali recently visited Moscow and Leningrad. A team of specialists is shortly to leave for the Baltic. The purpose of the trips: evaluation of the economic situation of specific areas and determination of the spheres into which Western assistance should be channeled as promptly as possible and where it is likely to produce the speediest results. In Leningrad, as *LE MONDE* reports, Attali met with Mayor Sobchak, mapping out a program for the privatization of state resources. *LIBERATION* maintains that there has already been movement. A most

complete stock-taking, bureaucratically speaking, of state-owned property is taking place: houses, stores, concert halls, hotels, plants.... And in each specific instance experts are suggesting the type of privatization to which it is best to resort. A similar agreement has been concluded with Moscow's city hall. Negotiations are also under way with Russia in connection with the more efficient use of oil deposits. But, *LIBERATION* makes clear, representatives of the bank do not yet intend to put forward any plans for private Western financing. They have not brought any with them as yet. Might such a more efficient program, which we need like the air we breathe, be discussed, possibly, in council in September? We can only hope so. I, however, am very disturbed, I must confess, by Swedish Foreign Minister Andersson's recent prophesy regarding us: "When you switch to the market economy, you will be switching to world market prices also. And this means that a steep decline in revenue awaits you."

Genscher Meets 'Reform Politicians'

*LD0909160591 Hamburg DPA in German 1355 GMT
9 Sep 91*

[Text] Moscow (DPA)—In a series of talks with leading reform politicians in the Soviet Union on Monday, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher noted "an unmistakable development toward federative structures." Speaking to journalists, Genscher stressed the further increase in Russian interest in close cooperation with Germany. The German-Soviet treaties have not been affected by the upheavals following the attempted coup, and their implementation is apparently being given high priority.

In his talks with President Mikhail Gorbachev, the question also arose of the extradition of the former GDR head of state, Erich Honecker. Genscher would not say anything about the Soviet reply. The foreign minister had meetings on Monday, in addition to Gorbachev, with his friend the former foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, the reform politician Aleksandr Yakovlev, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, and the Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin, Genscher is also due to have talks with Leningrad Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak and the KGB reformer Vadim Bakatin.

Summing up the important points, the German foreign minister pointed to the agreement that urgent Western aid is indispensable in order to avoid starvation during the winter months, that special trust is placed in Germany to encourage its Western partners to give aid, and that the modernization of the food sector of the economy must be given top priority. Genscher explained that he has promised to convince the west that a "historic opportunity" has arisen as a result of the failed coup.

The federal foreign minister is expecting to have a personal conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the sidelines of the CSCE human rights

conference on Tuesday. A meeting with Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov to discuss, among other things, the fulfillment of the defense agreement is also planned.

**Genscher Meets With Soviet German
Representatives**

*LD1009090691 Berlin ADN in German 0719 GMT
10 Sep 91*

[Excerpt] Moscow (ADN)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans- Dietrich Genscher this morning at the German

embassy in Moscow met with representatives of Soviet Germans. The meeting was attended by Heinrich Grouth, chairman of the All-Union "Wiedergeburt" Society, Heinrich Martens, chairman of the League for the promotion of German Culture, and Boris Rauschenbach and Hugo Wormsbecher, the heads of the State Organizing Committee for the Congress of Germans in the USSR.

During the talks Genscher was briefed on the problems in reestablishing the autonomy of the Germany minority in the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Soviets Willing To Deliver More Energy to Hungary

AU0909142391 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 4 Sep 91 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Yevgeniy Petryayev, deputy minister responsible for energy, by Laszlo M. Lengyel; place and date not given: "Soviet Energy Problems—They Still Have Enough for the Hungarian Export"]

[Text] The Soviet Union would deliver even more electric energy to Hungary but there is no demand, Yevgeniy Petryayev told our correspondent. In an interview for TASS, he spoke about the problems of energy production in the USSR.

According to the Hungarian viewpoint, Hungary's demand has indeed decreased and sometimes, barter agreements that were previously suggested as a solution to all problems cannot simply be made either, due to the price dispute. However, this is a natural part of relations and we are not talking about the weakening of our long-term cooperation.

[Lengyel] The Soviet difficulties are known precisely from your statements. Could these difficulties affect your export, especially to Hungary?

[Petryayev] In my interview for TASS, I did not say at all that we had difficulties in meeting our export obligations. I warned of our domestic situation and conditions and I described the actual situation.

[Lengyel] It is logical to assume that one does not willingly give to others something that one does not have enough of.

[Petryayev] On the basis of our signed agreements, we have to deliver considerably less electric energy to Hungary in 1991 than before. While in past years, we delivered around 11 billion kilowatt-hours a year, the Hungarian side required 6.2 billion kilowatt-hours electric energy in 1991. This is barely more than 60 percent of previous deliveries. Our partners can hardly quote any examples of interruptions in previous years; therefore, we can hardly expect such interruptions to occur in the case of this considerably smaller amount.

[Lengyel] How would you explain the Hungarian side's modesty in 1991?

[Petryayev] I imagine that production declined somewhat in Hungary the same way as in the USSR; in addition, saving energy has gained ground and technologies needing less energy are being used. The quantity of energy secured in contracts or to be directly exchanged for Hungarian goods within various barter agreements amounts to 6 billion 841.8 million kilowatt-hours in 1991.

We delivered the amount due in the first six months of 1991 on time. There were no interruptions in August, either. The provision of 530-540 million kilowatt-hours

energy a month cannot present any problems for us; in fact, we have been urging to increase the amount so far.

[Lengyel] You do not have enough but you would willingly give some?

[Petryayev] The point is that our industry would need certain Hungarian products, especially because Hungary was our main source of supply of these products in the framework of the traditional CEMA ties. Already in April, our government gave permission to pay with electric energy for the Hungarian products we need, that is to make special barter agreements. Especially in the summer months, we pressed for these agreements very much but with few results, unfortunately.

[Lengyel] What do you need—unless it is a secret?

[Petryayev] We have always purchased the ion-exchange resins from Hungary, which are necessary to process the water to be let into steam turbines. Our power stations cannot function without that. We will have to buy these resins from somewhere else because we were unable to agree on the price. The resin was not too expensive but our energy was too cheap. The Hungarian side offered us a price that is less than our production costs and one and a half times lower than the European energy prices. Relations of many decades became endangered this way. Negotiations are still going on but the Hungarian side is not too active.

Rising Hostility to Former CP in Romania

91UF1129A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Sep 91 p 3

[TASS correspondent A. Timofeyev report for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA: "Anticommunism: A Second Wind, Which Could Be the Last"]

[Text] Bucharest—The Soviet putsch has colored the word "communism" in Romania in even blacker tints. But while rejecting communism and everything connected with it, there is no acting by forcible methods and staging a hunt for communists. The burden of a recent Romanian Government statement may be formulated thus.

Communist structures need to be eliminated by constitutional methods, the Romanian Government believes. But many politicians and the media disagree. Considering such an attitude toward communism "very tolerant," they demand the adoption of stricter measures.

The reference is primarily to the Socialist Labor Party. While not recognizing itself as the successor to the Romanian Communist Party, it unites, in the opinion of some, thousands, in the opinion of others, more than 1 million, former communists. Its chairman is I. Verdec, former chairman of the Romanian Communist Party Central Auditing Commission. Executive positions also are occupied by many former communists.

The attacks on the SLP [Socialist Labor Party] began immediately following its formation in the fall of 1990—it was seen as a “continuation” of the Romanian Communist Party not only laying claim to part of its property but also, in the opinion of some, straining after power. Despite the fact that at a recent congress the SLP declared itself devoted to social democracy, renounced the principles of dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism, recognized all forms of ownership, private included, and allowed its members to be believers, the attacks on it have been incessant. Following the events in the Soviet Union, they have increased even more.

The media are putting forward various demands—from its dissolution through its proscription and outlawing. The country's prime minister and president are being reproached for “being in no hurry” to put an end to communism. Some newspapers categorically support an immediate ban on the parties which are if only tenuously connected with communism. Others, playing on the feelings of ordinary citizens, are “recalling the communist past”—the lack of food, heating, hot water, Ceausescu's draconian edicts, and the ubiquitousness of the Securitate—warning that such may be repeated if the left comes to power. And the newspaper DREPTATEA (organ of the National Peasant, Christian, and Democratic parties) bluntly warned: A repetition of the Soviet version is possible in Romania. It has called on the country's leadership to ban the Socialist Labor Party and demand that legal proceedings be instituted against the party's leaders for the collapse of the national economy in the communists' years of rule.

Proceedings have been instituted against the leaders of the SLP. But not legal proceedings. An action has been brought against them in respect of the amount of 300,000 lei, which the Democratic Labor Party obtained from the national budget for conducting the election campaign in May 1990 (the SLP was formed as a result of the merger of the Democratic Labor Party and the Socialist Party of Romania).

The Bucharest monument to Soviet soldiers who died in the country's liberation from the Hitler aggressors has become a target of the anticommunist attack in Romania. First it was daubed with paint, a fascist Swastika was painted on it, and an inscription insulting the fallen was written. Then two attempts were made to remove it from its pedestal by a crane. “It was they,” semi-intoxicated thugs shouted in front of the monument, who brought communism to Romania on their bayonets. It was this soldier's boot which 40 years ago trampled the earth of our Bessarabia. “But none of these ‘fighters against communism’ could tell me approximately how many Soviet soldiers and officers will lie forever in the soil of Romania.

“Stop, Romanians, stop before it is too late. You have, after all, always had respect for the dead,” the newspaper ADEVARUL appealed recently. Nonetheless, the

municipal authorities gave permission for the monument to be dismantled. Work has begun....

Bulgaria To Query Links With KGB, CPSU

*91UF1147A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Sep 91
Union Edition p 4*

[Report by correspondent A. Kapralov: “Serious Charges Against the BSP”]

[Text] Sofia—President Zhelyu Zhelev intends to officially request of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin that they make available information on relations of the KGB and CPSU with Bulgaria. Such a step, the president declared, is dictated by the serious misgivings in connection with possible anti-constitutional interaction between these Soviet organizations and their Bulgarian partners. The misgivings, Zhelev emphasized, have increased particularly since the attempted coup in Moscow.

The president observed that there are no legal grounds for proscribing the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] since it did not take part in the anti-constitutional rebellion. At the same time, however, the head of state was categorically in favor of the BSP returning as soon as possible, and unfailingly prior to the elections scheduled for 13 October, all the property plundered, as he put it, from the people. Zhelev declared also that it was essential to put on trial all those guilty of the national catastrophe in which Bulgaria has found itself following 45 years of communist rule. Finance Minister Ivan Kostov has already brought suit against the BSP, seeking a total of approximately 2 billion lev.

At the insistence of the deputies and of the Socialist Party, incidentally, a parliamentary commission which will seek to clarify whether there was a connection between certain politicians and statesmen of the country and the Moscow conspirators has been formed.

As is known, right up until the failure of the putsch in Moscow the BSP leadership had not adopted a firm position and had confined itself to vague statements, citing a lack of information. After this, Andrey Lukanov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, stood down. In the opinion of a number of members of the opposition, this step by Bulgaria's former prime minister was dictated not so much by his disagreement with the position of the party leadership as by his embarrassment in connection with the declassification of KGB and CPSU archives.

Professor Nikolay Vasilev, leader of the Alternative Socialist Association, observes that, prior to resigning last year, the Lukanov government failed to render account to parliament. The question of what Bulgaria's currency reserves, the equivalent of \$1 billion, were spent on, remained unclear.

Was it fortuitous, the leader of the Alternative Socialist Association asks, that trial No. 1 was suspended on the

pretext of Todor Zhivkov's physical and mental condition? This occurred immediately after Zhivkov had hinted that he might reveal the actions of Andrey Lukanov.

Meanwhile A. Lukanov and his wife urgently flew to London. Before his departure, A. Lukanov gave an interview to the newspaper OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK, in which he declared that he would return in two or three days and say why he had flown to the West. Very well, we will hold on until Monday.

Search for Correspondents in SFRY Unsuccessful

*LD1109210891 Moscow TASS in English 1702 GMT
11 Sep 91*

[By TASS correspondent Tamara Ivanova]

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS—"Attempts to find our colleagues missing in Yugoslavia have so far been

unsuccessful," Boris Nepomnyashchiy, the director of the information studio of the Soviet television and radio company, told TASS.

Nepomnyashchiy noted that a constant contact is being kept with Yugoslavia.

Chief editor of the Television international service Aleksandr Antsiferov left for Yugoslavia on Monday to help the search.

There are several versions accounting for Soviet correspondents' disappearance, but they have not been confirmed. A psychic has been involved in the search. However, he failed to say anything definite.

Yugoslavian correspondents, including Serbians and Croats, help in the search.

U.S. Congressmen Urge Halt to Castro Aid

*91UF1154A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 10 Sep 91 p 3*

[Aleksandr Oskin report: "Gold Chains of 'Friendship'"]

[Text] A delegation of U.S. congressmen, among whom were prominent figures of the United States' anti-Castro coalition, has been in Moscow. They held a number of meetings in the Russian parliament and with aides of M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin and were received by USSR Foreign Minister B. Pankin. The U.S. legislators' overriding mission was to persuade Soviet leaders to immediately end financial assistance to the Fidel Castro regime, which, according to Western estimates, amounts to \$4-5 billion a year.

At a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists L. Smith, member of the U.S. House Appropriations Committee, bluntly declared that he and many of his colleagues were emphatically intent on voting against the USSR being granted any assistance if the Soviet side continues to pump American taxpayers' money into Cuba. "We are pleased that a firm intention to reduce material assistance to F. Castro and withdraw forces from the island was determined in the positions of M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin," the congressman observed. "We were gratified particularly by Boris Pankin, who recognized as amoral the use of assistance channeled into the USSR from overseas for other countries."

Jorge Mas Canos, chairman of the Cuban-American National Foundation, declared that it is not only Americans who hold such a view. He had brought with him an appeal to the USSR from a large number of Cuban organizations which had formed a democratic coalition on Cuba—concerning the immediate termination of assistance to F. Castro. The Republic of Cuba has the third largest army in the Western hemisphere and a costly totalitarian system, and for this reason the Cuban people are experiencing deprivation and cannot acquire freedom, the leader of the foundation observed, and 20 percent of the Cuban population has been forced to live in exile.

J. Valenta, professor at the University of Miami, compared the present situation in Cuba with the situation in the USSR in the 1930's. F. Castro, like formerly I. Stalin also, is endeavoring to remove all possible opponents and rivals, employing trumped-up "proceedings" and physical reprisals.

Responding to a question from your correspondent as to the circumstances in which the United States would be prepared to assist Cuba, Mr. L. Smith replied that this would only be in the event of the elimination of the F. Castro regime and the holding of free democratic elections on the island. The USSR has for 32 years supported the Castro regime, the congressman added, and it seems to us that it would have been more justified in channeling these billions into the needs of the Soviet people. In this case the U.S. Congress would lift all restrictions on aid to your country.

ROK Wins \$50 Million Building Contract in Nakhodka*OW0809224991 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2040 GMT 8 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The authorities of the port of Pusan, South Korea, have signed a \$50 million contract for the construction of a container terminal at the town of Vostochniy, located near the city of Nakhodka on the USSR Pacific coast. Nakhodka is the center of a free economic zone being created in the region.

Soviet Groups Send Message to DPRK Amity Association*SK0909123491 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1100 GMT 7 Sep 91*

[From "Asian News" in the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] On the occasion of the 43d anniversary of the DPRK founding, which is 9 September, the Standing Committee of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, and the Central Council of the Soviet-Korea Friendship Society sent a congratulatory message to Yi Chong-yul, chairman of the Korea-Soviet Friendship Association.

In part, the congratulatory message says the following:

In the past, the Korean people changed Korea from a backward colonized nation into a developed agricultural and industrial nation. Also, Korea is embodying the program of reforming society that the nation's leadership proclaimed.

We firmly believe that the friendship and cooperation between the people of the two countries will be further consolidated and developed in the future.

On this national holiday, we hope that the fraternal Korean people achieve results in the socialist construction and in the cause of achieving democratic and peaceful reunification.

Changes in DPRK Observed on Anniversary*SK1109124891 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1100 GMT 9 Sep 91*

[Station commentator Oleg Alekseyev; from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] Today marks the 43d anniversary of the founding of the DPRK.

Station commentator Oleg Alekseyev writes:

The Soviet Army annihilated the Kanto Army occupying the Korean peninsula in August 1945, resulting in the liberation of Korea. This is how the foundation was laid in the North for the founding of the DPRK.

The People's Korea was to go through a difficult period. Two years after the founding of the DPRK, peace on the Korean peninsula was jeopardized.

We are not going to discuss now what caused the Korean war or other relevant things. The war brought enormous sufferings and sacrifice to the Korean people.

I would also like to point out the fact that the truth the Soviet Union has cherished for decades does not correspond to historical events.

The Soviet and the Korean people were not the only the victims of the Korean war. It has resulted in inviting the United States to station its forces in the Far East and in the southern part of the peninsula.

The tragic outcome of this war, the 38th parallel that divides the peninsula into two states, has come to serve as a demarcation line of sharp military and political confrontation between them. Consequently, the Korean peninsula has become one of the most unstable places in the world.

Fortunately, the situation has recently begun to change. Until quite recently the (?intelligence community) in the South had been engaged in a noisy debate over the alleged invasion of the North, but today we do not hear about such fears.

Even so, Pyongyang still talks about the threat of the South's invasion of the DPRK. However, this can be said to be a propaganda instrument.

No one will believe that Seoul is, in fact, waiting for an opportune moment to launch an invasion. Moreover, Seoul has recently stated that it will go so far as to cut its armed forces by 130,000 men.

What counts most today is to resume the premier-level talks between the two states of Korea. Regrettably, the talks that began last year have been put on hold this year, a decision by Pyongyang. The two sides, however, have declared that they plan to resume the talks.

The premier-level talks between the two states of Korea are slated for the end of October. This will keep them probing for ways to promote mutual understanding necessary to stabilize the situation on the peninsula.

The 43d anniversary of the founding of the DPRK this year coincides with another event of historical proportions: The DPRK is to become a UN member, along with the ROK.

I hope that this will promise the South and North of the peninsula a new constructive possibility in the contacts between them. I also hope that the contacts are effective.

Moscow Views U.S. Humanitarian Aid to Cambodia

*BK1209091691 Moscow Radio Moscow in Cambodian
1230 GMT 11 Sep 91*

[Text] The United States will provide 5 million dollar to Cambodia as humanitarian aid for war victims. This was announced by the U.S. State Department. We want to promote the peace process in this country, the spokesman of the U.S. State Department told UPI. Here are comments by our commentator Aleksey Nikolayev on this issue.

On our part, we would like to hope that this process will be crowned with success. The progress of the past few months made by Cambodian parties themselves and the international community has generated optimism. However, peace and calm are still to be attained by Cambodia. War, massacre, and an atmosphere of fear which have prevailed for over 20 years represent a tragedy affecting not merely the people of a small country in Southeast Asia. In 1969, when U.S. B-52 bombers started dropping bombs on various provinces in eastern Cambodia, this not-so-big kingdom of peasants and fishermen—led by Samdech [Sihanouk]'s neutralism—dreamed only of one thing: to live in peace surrounded by rice fields and monasteries. However, this dream was destroyed by the United States.

Squadrons of U.S. warplanes dropped on Cambodia 550,000 bombs whose combined force was 120 times more than the atomic bomb which reduced Japan's town of Hiroshima to ashes. In March 1970, Samdech Sihanouk was toppled by General Lon Nol. Who was behind the coup organizers? This is already known. That coup d'etat ended Cambodia's sovereignty and the country itself was plunged onto a war path and onto the side of those who dropped the bombs on the country. In April 1975, the fully corrupt Lon Nol regime crumbled under the offensive of those in black clothing. The Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh. The genocide machine started working. The West, in particular the United States, followed this without expressing any feelings. Pol Pot's activities were in perfect harmony with the strategy and tactic of a cold war because there is nothing better than this to ruin the ideal of building a future for communism. How would this have ended without the timely military intervention of Vietnam into Cambodia's affairs? Genocide was halted but the war went on. It is better to have the Khmer Rouge than the Vietnamese, assistant to U.S. President Zbigniew Brezinski said then.

Relying on U.S. dollar and Chinese weapons, and with the assistance of Thai authorities, a so-called tripartite coalition government was established with the Khmer Rouge as the military core. Washington is never stingy in its support for the so-called anticommunist movement. Only many years later did Washington realize that the

aid did not get to the Sihanouk and Son Sann groups but to the Khmer Rouge instead.

It is not accidental that I have recalled some chapters full of suffering during the past few decades of Cambodia's history. Old U.S. political ideas toward Cambodia are still playing a role. By granting 5 million dollar as humanitarian aid to this country, Washington hastily attached a condition saying as before that we do not recognize the Phnom Penh government and have no intention of lifting economic sanctions against Cambodia as long as the Cambodian problem is not solved comprehensively, said the representative of the U.S. State Department.

Moscow on End of Chinese Aid to Khmer Rouge

*BK0709100591 Moscow Radio Moscow in Cambodian
1230 GMT 6 Sep 91*

[Text] Commentary by Aleksey Nikolayev

[passage indistinct] this is new evidence showing that the conflict in Cambodia is being definitively solved. The constructive stance adopted lately by various outside forces [words indistinct] has greatly helped the process of national reconciliation among warring Cambodian parties.

As is known, it is the cooperation among the permanent members of the UN Security Council that has helped find a formula for a solution, which, generally speaking, has been accepted by all Cambodian parties. Talks were also held among Cambodians. The fact is that there is now agreement on all the points of the UN peace plan except for one important point on election procedure in Cambodia. However, this is an issue which can be solved with mutual concessions.

According to reports, it ought to be said that Samdech Sihanouk has already hinted at mutual concessions. Thus, the chance is growing that the Paris international conference, planned for the end of November, will be concluded with the signing of agreements on a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian problem. It is certain that thought should be given to the concrete implementation of these agreements. There are quite a few difficulties along this path. However, the prospect of the recurrence of the Pol Pot regime—enemy of mankind—in Cambodia is gradually disappearing, and will eventually disappear completely. It should be on this basis that China's decision to stop providing military aid to the Khmer Rouge be assessed.

There is another circumstance worth mentioning. It certainly is no coincidence that China announced its decision at the time of the Vietnamese foreign minister's visit to China.

Taking everything into account, authorities in Beijing are paying attention to creating favorable conditions for future Sino-Vietnamese talks, concludes our commentator Aleksey Nikolayev.

Soviet-Indian Arms Production Ties Discussed

*PM1109091391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Sep 91 Union Edition p 7*

[Correspondent N. Paklin report: "India Proposes to the Soviet Union That They Set Up Joint Enterprises to Manufacture... Weapons"]

[Text] Delhi—According to the Indian press, this proposal will be made during a visit by Indian Defense Minister Sharad Pavar to the Soviet Union scheduled for the near future.

A preliminary discussion of various aspects of cooperation between the two countries in the joint production of weapons was held recently in Moscow, during a visit by a delegation of high-ranking Indian weapons manufacturers led by Deputy Defense Minister Krishna Kumar. Delhi described the results of the talks as "positive."

Various circumstances have prompted India to make this proposal to our country. India is a traditional buyer of Soviet weapons. According to the HINDUSTAN TIMES, in the last five years alone India has acquired various types of weapons in the Soviet Union worth a total of \$10 billion. These purchases account for 70 percent of all of India's weapons imports. Recently, however, the leadership of the Indian military department has shown concern regarding the future of Indian-Soviet relations in this sphere. Its leaders are asking whether the Soviet Union will be able to guarantee the supply of the modern weapons that India needs with the Soviet economy's growing difficulties and declining industrial output.

This concern is understandable. Even now, the newspapers complain, the Indian Army is having difficulty in getting our country to supply spare parts for Soviet arms bought in the past. They are mainly referring to their MiG-21 aircraft, a considerable number of which India bought from us as long ago as the sixties. They have now come to the end of their service life. However, for financial reasons India cannot allow itself the luxury of sending them to the scrap heap. It intends to extend the service life of these antiquated MiG's, a considerable proportion of which are used for training flights by students at the Indian Air Force Academy. MiG-27 aircraft are being built in India under Soviet license, and the MIG-29 came into service in the Indian Air Force a short time ago. Naturally, there is great demand for components and spare parts for this combat equipment.

With the new government announcing a policy of modernizing the country's armed forces, India now needs a large quantity of modern weapons. It intends to replace 400 of its combat aircraft in the next 10 years. In view of the country's long coastline, the defense minister feels it necessary to substantially increase the number of its warships. India's land army—one of the biggest in the world—is also being rearmed.

Although India is interested in acquiring Soviet weapons in the future, it does not agree with changes in the supply system on which Soviet producers are insisting. Until now, the Soviet Union has supplied India with credit on preferential terms for a 17-year period and at an annual interest rate of 2.5 percent. India has paid for Soviet weapons in rupees. A year ago, M.S. Gorbachev and then Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh agreed to continue to base Soviet-Indian trade on rupees at least until 1995. However, Delhi now doubts that this agreement will remain in force. Soviet weapons manufacturers have already demanded that India pay for their products in hard currency and have raised their prices considerably at the same time. India does not have a ready supply of hard currency: The country is undergoing a very acute financial crisis and its currency reserves are stretched to the limit.

In these conditions, India has decided to review its arms strategy. So far, it has mainly bought weapons abroad. But now it intends to become an exporter itself, despite having refused to do so in the past for various reasons, moral and ethical included. The purpose of exporting weapons is to earn money and at least partially offset the military department's expenditure. India intends to make a substantial leap forward this year in this specific area of foreign trade and bring its sale of weapons, ammunition, and various types of military equipment up to 5 billion rupees (there are approximately 26 Indian rupees to the dollar). It plans to increase this figure tenfold in the future. Spare capacity at India's defense enterprises is the main reserve for increasing weapons output. In addition to this, the Indian government plans to involve the private sector, which has so far always been denied access to military production.

Delhi is counting on cooperation with our country. While in Moscow, the Indian delegation discussed the question of manufacturing weapons in India under Soviet license and selling them to third countries. The MiG-21 has been named as one of the first Indian weapons to be manufactured for export. Defense Minister Sharad Pavar also sees great prospects in another area of cooperation: setting up joint enterprises based on the Soviet defense complex. These joint enterprises will share production expenditure and, consequently, income generated from exporting their weapons to third countries.

In addition to developing countries, Indian experts can see potential customers in the East European states, whose armaments include a considerable number of weapons similar to those used by India. The fact that India possesses Western weapons and technology as well as Soviet military equipment is seen by the defense ministry as its trump card. Indian specialists believe this symbiosis will make it possible to develop and produce new, more up-to-date military equipment.

From the editorial office: Until now, the export of Soviet weapons has virtually been a taboo subject as far as our press is concerned. There are no such taboos for Indian

newspapers. Even now they are ahead of us Soviet journalists and carrying reports on the talks between representatives of our two countries' military-industrial complexes. Naturally, these reports give rise to many questions. In particular: Just how profitable will it be for the Soviet side to set up joint Soviet-Indian defense enterprises? And how does the idea of jointly producing weapons to sell to third countries tally with the establishment of a new world order based on the principle of rejecting the use of military force? After all, both Moscow and Delhi have declared this as an objective more than once in the past.

It is quite clear that if we reach the stage of implementing the Indian proposals, they must first be carefully checked out by our legislators and conveyed to the public.

Afghan Mojahedin Plan To Attack Gardeyz Questioned

*BK1009102891 Moscow Radio Moscow in Urdu
1200 GMT 9 Sep 91*

[Vasant Georgiyev commentary]

[Text] Afghan mojahedin field commanders have discussed plans to attack Gardeyz, the capital of Paktia, the biggest Afghan province.

First of all, I would like to draw your attention to the place and timing of the discussion. About 150 representatives of various groups of the Afghan opposition held a conclave in the eastern Afghan city of Khowst.

By way of reminder, Khowst is the only major city the mojahedin have succeeded in capturing. I think the main reason for that success was that Khowst is located near the Pakistani border. The Afghan leaders have said that Pakistani military contingents were directly involved in the capture of Khowst. Now, plans to attack a second Afghan city, Gardeyz, have been discussed.

We will not comment on the possibility of implementing this plan. But the question arises as to why this plan was hatched now when the process for a peaceful solution to the Afghan problem is gaining momentum and Pakistan and the Afghan mojahedin are, following the guidelines of the UN peace plan, taking part in the process. Why this need to use force?

The answer to the question is provided by Pakistani newspapers and mojahedin leaders' statements. Speculation is rife that the Soviet assistance to Afghanistan could be stopped in view of rethinking of the Soviet attitude toward the Afghan problem. According to REUTERS, Kabul Radio has rejected these claims. The radio reports that a Soviet parliamentary delegation that visited Kabul after the failed attempt to overthrow the state authority through extraconstitutional means in the Soviet Union assured the Kabul side that the Soviet Union, as envisaged in agreements reached earlier, is not going to stop its assistance.

Whatever happens, the Soviet stand on the Afghan problem is clearly understood. Our country's position is that all Afghan sides, including the Kabul Government, should participate in settling the dispute on the basis of the UN proposals. The Soviet Union is willing to provide all possible assistance in this context.

Moscow University Denies Expulsion of Africans
*LD1009091191 Moscow TASS in English 1213 GMT
9 Sep 91*

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[Text] Moscow September 9 TASS—Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University has been training specialists for the national economies of Asian, African and Latin American countries for thirty years.

This year, more than 1,000 students from Africa have begun studies in Moscow together with their peers from Asia and Latin America, the university's deputy head Yevgeniy Yushin told TASS. It is just as many as last year and the year before last.

However, THE STAR, a newspaper published in Johannesburg, said in its issue of September 7, that the number will dwindle this year, alleging that about 100 members

of the African National Congress (ANC) are among students to be expelled from the USSR by local authorities.

They were reportedly told to leave the country before November 9. No reasons behind the move were reported. However, the newspaper says these students were in the USSR under the auspices of the Soviet Communist Party and will have to leave following the disintegration of that party.

Asked for the reasons for expelling a group of students, ANC members, Yushin said the report has nothing to do with facts.

"No documents have been signed and no instructions have been issued on this score," the university official stressed. "I must add," he said, "that when admitting students, our university does not take into account their membership in political organisations or their political sympathies. A student can be expelled only if he fails to cope or does not want to continue studies."