




JPRS Report

Soviet Union

International Affairs



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International Affairs

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Implications of Soviet Adherence to UN Human Rights Practices

91UF1084A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 30, Jul 91 p 33

[Article by Lev Yelin: "To the United Nations, in Fine Script..."]

[Text] From now on the Soviet people can complain about their state. The Supreme Soviet has authorized the airing of dirty linen in public....

The fall conference on human rights does not even have to be held anymore: Its main goal has been attained. Our old official practice of putting on a false front has now been replaced by the enactment of long-overdue laws and the signing of international agreements that once seemed terrifying....

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has drawn up a list of priorities, and the president has published a directive "On Measures To Bring Soviet Legislation in Line with the USSR's Commitments to the All-European Process." Besides this, there were secret meetings, instructions, and recommendations.... The first clear sign of change was the law on entry and exit visas, and now, in July, the USSR Supreme Soviet has voted for the Soviet Union's inclusion in international mechanisms monitoring the observance of human rights. To put it plainly, we will allow the world community defending these rights to look into all of the corners of our hut and then sweep them clean—with the utmost courtesy and tact, but also with vigor....

The plans for "broader participation" in these mechanisms were first announced by M. Gorbachev at a session of the UN General Assembly in December 1988. It took two and a half years before anyone acted on these intentions. Throughout that period, our official agencies tried to avert the danger that they might be held accountable for their actions by the outside world. The last of them to withdraw its objections was the KGB.... After that, the Supreme Soviet approved everything with incredible ease (333 votes in favor, 0 against, and 5 abstentions).

The voting, which began at five minutes to six, was governed by the knowledge that "if it has to be, then it has to be"....

The USSR ratified the international pact on civil and political rights back in 1973, but it was not until after the recent triumphant vote in parliament that we began observing the provisions in Article 41 of the pact: A state may complain about another state (more precisely, about its violation of human rights) to the Committee on Human Rights. It is true that although this sounds threatening, the danger for violators is purely hypothetical: To date, no one has complained about anyone else, obviously in the hope of avoiding diplomatic difficulties....

The USSR also withdrew its objections to Article 14 of the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. From now on, we will acknowledge the right of the Committee on Human Rights to investigate the complaints of Soviet citizens about racial discrimination. The recent surge of inter-ethnic strife could make Article 14 particularly relevant in our case, although other states rarely invoke it. Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remembered two incidents: A Turkish woman living in the Netherlands had complained that she had lost her job because of racism, and a Moroccan lawyer with a French wife who was living in France was indignant that he had not been admitted to the French Bar Association.... The investigation of these complaints has taken an extremely long time, and it is unlikely that the states will be "punished." It is more likely that the experts on the Committee on Human Rights will issue recommendations and advice on changes in legislation....

All three verification procedures listed in the convention against torture and other cruel, inhumane, or humiliating forms of treatment and punishment were acknowledged. The main one authorizes the Committee on Human Rights to investigate the complaints of citizens of the USSR who feel that they have been tortured or treated cruelly. This brings up two important points: First of all, this does not refer only to the obvious cases of, for instance, the brutal treatment of suspects or prisoners. It also includes the brutality of the personnel of orphanages, pre-school establishments, mental institutions, and hospitals in general.... Second, our inclusion in this mechanism should encourage us to introduce the very term "torture" into our criminal legislation. We once thought of the word "torture" as a strictly Western term, with no connection to our own social and political order—the "most humane"....

There is no question, however, that the main accomplishment was the signing of the optional protocol (to the pact on civil and political rights). It acknowledges the right of the Committee on Human Rights to investigate the complaints of private individuals and their representatives against a state. The states party to the protocol must submit **written explanations** to the committee, and if the complaints are ruled valid, they must take measures to restore the rights of these citizens.

The protocol sets a strict time limit of 6 months for the reply. If a state has signed a protocol, all of its agencies, including those on the lowest levels, must be prepared to justify all of their decisions. For this reason, the signing of the protocol is expected to get these national agencies "under control" and reduce the amount of time required to investigate complaints within the country. Complaints can only be submitted to the Committee on Human Rights after all national means of defense have been exhausted—i.e., after the matter has been taken to the highest possible court. Therefore, it will be senseless to address the first cry to help to Geneva. A complaint will be investigated, however, if there are unwarranted delays in national judicial proceedings.

Therefore, as soon as the UN secretary-general takes the Soviet parliament's decision into consideration, our insulted and offended citizens will acquire a new defender. They can address their complaints to the United Nations office at the Geneva Center for Human Rights, Palais des Nations CH-1211, Geneva 10.

Former French Official Compares CIA, KGB

91UF1096A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 17 Aug 91 p 4

[Interview with Pierre Marion, former general director of the French Secret Service, by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent N. Dolgoplov in France; date not given: "Both Dangerous and Difficult"]

[Text] Paris—"In technology the CIA is stronger, but in industrial espionage the KGB has no equals"—thinks the former chief of French intelligence, who discussed himself and his foreign colleagues.

The post held by Monsieur Pierre Marion can be compared to Comrade Kravchuk's position. Only he was in charge of French intelligence activity conducted exclusively in other countries. The former general director of the General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) readily agreed to a meeting with our KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Paris correspondent.

[Dolgoplov] Monsieur Marion, at all times and in all ages there have always been many discussions of secret services. Cocktail party stories, conjectures, rumors—from an aura of mysterious glory to complete debunking.

[Marion] That is because the people talking or writing about intelligence usually know almost nothing about it.

[Dolgoplov] But do you not think that soon there will be nothing to find out? It seems to me that secret services of the world, if they are not in a crisis yet, are in a state of confusion.

[Marion] You are deceived: There is no question of disbanding the KGB, DGSE, or CIA. I would say that the opposite is happening. Secret services are always important, and today they are more important than usual. During the years of confrontation and confused relations, the main role in the international arena was assigned to the military and diplomats. But during periods of thaw, it is as though intelligence services are transformed into the principle actors. Because during times of detente they are assigned the task of exerting a certain influence on the foreign countries in which they are operating. This does not pertain to the KGB; even before, this organization had an influence in Europe, in France...

[Dolgoplov] What meaning do you invest in the word "influence?"

[Marion] The term designates political, economic, and other kinds of influence. There are always conflicts of interests among various countries. And there is always a

need to exert an influence to solve the problem in one's own favor. Every power has various kinds of opposition.

Under their seemingly natural pressure, the country undertakes certain actions in the international arena. It is understandable that other secret services participate most actively in this.

[Dolgoplov] Give us just one example as an illustration.

[Marion] It is shocking but eloquent. Now all kinds of lobbies, including military, of course, are influencing politics. And, of course, secret services are associated with military lobbies. Because of this kind of influence Saddam Husayn from the seventies to the middle of the eighties got the Western countries to adopt several decisions that were favorable to him.

At first certain actions taken against him were condemned by the community. And his actions, conversely, if they were not encouraged, at least were not discussed. He received a certain quantity of arms from the West. The explanation is simple: Working in a number of countries, including France, were pro-Iraqi lobbies who were manipulated by Saddam's secret services. Everything was done cautiously and all the ends were tied up and hidden. And as general director of the DGSE at that time, I was extremely disturbed: Public opinion and even the highest leaders had a poor idea of the depth of this influence. Although the network, spread out to the necessary places, sometimes makes it possible to achieve results whose significance is comparable to winning the war. But the intelligence war is quiet, without noisy conflicts.

If you like, you may reject this first hypothesis of mine, but please accept my three other arguments about the stronger role of intelligence in an age of disarmament. Even if there is political detente, this will not cause competition in industry and technology to die out. Here intelligence has a chance of being of inestimable assistance to its country. It has at its disposal special means which no branches of industry have.

The third factor is terrorism, which never dies out. It is stupid to hope that with the warming of the international climate its threat will decrease. The rebuff to terrorist acts must come not from the police, who are helpless in combat, but from intelligence. After all, the terrorists are not committing criminal acts but political crimes.

And, finally, the fourth factor. During a period of detente all rivals and allies involved in the process must have information about the main participants. What do the prime ministers and presidents intend to do? Does the course of history really depend on them, will the situation, their health, and their surroundings allow them to stay on top or is a different team already applying pressure? It is useful for the West to obtain information about the future program for Soviet foreign policy. And the USSR has nothing against finding out about Bush's intentions and at the same time finding out how the President is really feeling.

[Dolgoplov] Monsieur Marion, do you seriously think the situation in the USSR lends itself to analysis? Without any of your agency networks we are so confused that we do not even know what we want or what we are striving for. And you are trying to anticipate and predict.

[Marion] I dare say that it is easier to make predictions today than it was before. An analysis of your situation—do not be offended—is simple. The situation in the economy is as grave as can be and it deeply affects almost all citizens. The second problem is the lack of uniformity among the people. About 70 million of them, according to my personal analysis, would not like to continue their existence within the framework of the Soviet state. I firmly believe that it is possible for them to withdraw from the Union. It is another matter that certain peoples who have been living with Russia for seven decades or perhaps even a century will not be able to lead an independent existence on the level they are hoping for without Russia.

The Soviet Union has now encountered a fundamental historical problem: Everyone is dissatisfied with the center, including both Russians and other peoples living on the territory from the Baltic to Asia. It is not in the interests of the West for this extremely deep dissatisfaction to find its outlet first in an explosion and, second, in a complete rupture. This is why the Western powers must make their contribution to the solution to these problems.

[Dolgoplov] We have inadvertently moved to purely Soviet topics. How about continuing with a question about our secret service called the KGB. There are now many people in the USSR who are convinced of its total uselessness. They say it has outlived its day and has been besmirched. The KGB justifies itself by leading us to believe that it is because of its intelligence or simply industrial espionage that Soviet industry has not fallen apart and has even attained leadership in some areas. What do you have to say about all that?

[Marion] Let me make a remark. As far as I know, the KGB, in addition to intelligence operations, also performed various functions as a political police force, pressuring and investigating dissidents. I understand the negative assessment of KGB activity by Soviet public opinion as a condemnation of this internal function: The people are saying "no" to the political police. But abroad the KGB operated in exactly the same way as our secret services did. It acted in the interests of its country in an all-embracing way.

Now about obtaining intelligence of industrial and technological significance. I formulate it as follows: The KGB was effective here. Information in the area of the latest technology, electronics, and information science has undoubtedly aided the development of the USSR. When I was in charge of the DGSE I spoke about this in the United States with CIA Director William Casey. The American was sure that because of espionage many industrial innovations made their way to the Soviet

Union from the United States without the usual delay of several years. They pertained mainly to American achievements in the area of arms. Let me add that, in my opinion, the KGB has a fairly good counterintelligence service.

[Dolgoplov] The CIA, DGSE, and KGB are constantly coming up in our conversation. Which of them, in your opinion, is the most effective?

[Marion] The Israeli Mossad, without any doubt. It is the best in terms of reaction speed and precision of actions. But do not forget that the field of its activity is clearly defined. The Mossad is exceptionally active in the Near East. It is fairly energetic in certain regions of Africa. It is relatively enterprising in the countries that used to be called "states behind the iron curtain," although its activity there is much like its activity in the Near East. It is also present in Western Europe. Conversely, it is not very interested in America, either North or Central, or China, and it does not conduct significant operations in these regions.

The two largest secret service agencies in the world follow it—the KGB and the CIA. In terms of numbers these intelligence services have no equals in the world. I think there is a minimum of 100,000 people working in them. According to my data, there are more workers in the KGB than in the CIA, even without counting your internal secret police. It seems to me that both the KGB and the CIA are the strongest independent forces in their countries.

Which of these two is more effective? The Americans have more modern technical equipment. The CIA has many subdivisions and therefore its activity is extremely ramified and multifaceted. The CIA has the advantage in the area of political operations. There is no doubt that the KGB is stronger in industrial espionage.

[Dolgoplov] The French intelligence service obviously trails behind Mossad and the two giant octopuses.

[Marion] That is a difficult question. In terms of effectiveness, I would conditionally place the DGSE in seventh place. Probably in front of it are our neighbors in Western Europe where from 2,000 to 5,000 people work in the secret services. I think there are about 5,000 workers in England. In the other countries there are from 2,000 to 4,000.

[Dolgoplov] Are you not being too modest? When reading your book "Mission Impossible," which came out a couple of days ago from the publishing house Kalman-Levi, I was amazed by the depth of your penetration into the inner workings of large-scale Soviet policy during the period of stagnation. At the beginning of the 1980's you predicted both our change in orientation and also, alas, our economic collapse.

[Marion] I am proud of the job I did at that time. In October 1982, we did indeed anticipate almost everything that happened in your country subsequently. I

wrote: "The Soviet Union is in the most difficult economic position. It will deteriorate both in agriculture and in industry. The situation will be aggravated beginning in 1985 and it will be resolved by a new team of leaders who have different thinking."

[Dolgoplov] And you were able to anticipate this because of your intelligence service?

[Marion] Because of our processing and careful analysis of the information we received. The figure of Andropov suggested a great deal to me personally—he was not one of Brezhnev's men.

[Dolgoplov] And the scandal in the Brezhnev family? Were your people close to them or at least somewhere nearby?

[Marion] No. We received this information here in Paris, from a Soviet source located there.

[Dolgoplov] Did he live in France? Was he a diplomat?

[Marion] ...

[Dolgoplov] Well, all right, we do not have to talk about that if you do not want to.

[Marion] The confirmation of the scandal which could break out came from several different zones. The most reliable came from Czechoslovakia. In this case as in others, the problem was obvious.

[Dolgoplov] Perhaps it will seem to you that I am jumping from topic to topic. I would like to return to our discussion of the KGB and then move on to events that are shaking it up and us at the same time. Traitors have appeared within the KGB. A certain part of the Soviet reading public explain their switch to the other side by ideological considerations. The sympathies of female journalists were aroused by KGB Colonel Gordiyevskiy, who fled to London and explained his work for the Intelligence Service by his disagreement with communist postulates and his refusal to accept the regime in the USSR. How do you regard such acts? It is not without reason that you are the one I am asking: DGSE General Director Marion and French President Mitterrand did not get along. As a result, you were the one to retire, naturally, and not the president.

[Marion] You have touched on a painful problem. I thought about it even before the occasion with Gordiyevskiy, which I read about. Let us start with your colonel. Intelligence is an international profession and it is almost exclusively male. Even as he enters on this dangerous path, the man must make a final decision once and for all. It must not be influenced by any boss who wishes him well or despises him and not by the president and the prime minister, who will leave sooner or later anyway. This is your own personal decision. Who am I in this country? What is more important to me—the interests of an individual group, party, or political idea? Or am I true to my country in spite of blunders committed by its elite?

Yes, I for one am pained by the mistakes of leaders and sometimes adventurism. I can imagine that a government could be weak and the ideology—insignificant. But for me devotion to my own country is higher than my personal political affiliation or the transition to new ideas that have appeared under the influence of the changing situation. Therefore, an act of betrayal, even if it is committed because of changes in conscience, must be condemned in the country that is affected by this treachery.

[Dolgoplov] You know, previously in the USSR the subject of the KGB and its vices was forbidden. Thus one got the impression that the policy in this office was exemplary, as one does, incidentally, about any foreign secret service. Now in our country, as in yours, we are hanging out our dirty laundry, that is, we are bringing things out for public discussion. It is just sad that there is so much of it.

[Marion] As there is in any normal state service. Including the secret service. In intelligence there are the same temptations, the same kinds of rivalries. Everything is exactly as it is in any other organization, whether it be in industry, the army, or the church.

[Dolgoplov] You have a reason for bringing up the church.

[Marion] I recently spent a weekend in Biarritz—the cathedral dates back almost to the 15th century. There was a service going on. The atmosphere was solemn. And the holy father was a homosexual surrounded by 15 of his advisers who were also pederasts. That is the way it is in the secret service: There are violations and deviations everywhere and anywhere. The only thing one manages to avoid in a well run secret service is corruption. But there are no angels in intelligence and there can be none.

[Dolgoplov] But is the real problem not in the philosophy of intelligence? If one proceeds from the assumption that any methods will do to achieve your country's goal, there are no impediments left on the path of intelligence.

[Marion] You have gotten carried away and are exaggerating. When I headed the secret service we did not operate like that. The only time I suppressed pangs of conscience was during an outbreak of terrorism: Frenchmen were being killed right on the streets of Paris. Innocent people were dying and the killers were not being punished. We found the terrorists' hide-out. And three times I asked the president for permission to crush the criminals.

[Dolgoplov] How?

[Marion] Physically. I considered this necessary for purposes of self-defense. We did not break the law. But the president refused three times. It is essential that the activity of the secret services does not exceed allowable limits. But it never occurred to me to give the order for their elimination myself. That would have to come not

from someone appointed like myself but from someone who was elected in the normal manner. There must be strict control over intelligence.

But terrorism is always an extraordinary phenomenon. And if we turn to ethical problems, they are what raise unresolved issues for us. Is it all right, say, to steal documents from the briefcase of a foreign political figure which he has left in a hotel, xerox them, and then return them to where we got them? I see that you think this is bad. But what if the copy that was made benefited your country?

[Dolgopolov] It would still be a gross violation of the norms of behavior.

[Marion] No. And yes. Secret services commit violations when this is the only way of getting information.

[Dolgopolov] Do secret services really—how should I put it—steal not only from potential enemies but also from partners in their bloc?

[Marion] Absolutely: France spies in the United States in order to get hold of industrial secrets. The United States does the same thing here, and Japan spies everywhere, extracting technical secrets, and the same thing is done to it. Everyone does whatever he is capable of and can get away with. Military and political cooperation has nothing to do with industrial and technological competition.

[Dolgopolov] Let us say that the DGSE gathered a harvest of secrets like this in Japan. Which sector of industry would it give them to—private or state? For money or free of charge? And who specifically would make the decision to turn it over?

[Marion] The DGSE is a state organ. And what is gleaned by the secret service is turned over to another state organ which is responsible for industrial development—say, the ministry of industry. No special instructions are needed; this is what all special services do. Only the Americans assure us that they do not cooperate with their industry. Hypocrisy! They say they have gleaned information about the Japanese and are keeping it in their safes without giving it to their firms? Ridiculous!

[Dolgopolov] Monsieur Marion, excuse me, but still as I speak with you I am inadvertently being convinced that anyone who enters the secret service is transformed into a cynic.

[Marion] A cynic might be putting it too strongly. I would soften that—a skeptic. Discussions, declarations, handshakes, hugs and kisses are one thing. But business is sometimes altogether different.

[Dolgopolov] Will you admit that there were times when leaders of higher ranks than yours asked for information not about the Soviets and not about the Germans but about the French?

[Marion] They did go astray on occasion. Certain domestic political figures did ask. That is absurd—it is illegal.

[Dolgopolov] Did they want to know more details about people in their own circle?

[Marion] Their own circle but at a somewhat lower level. And they were indignant about my unchanging answer: That is not our profession. The DGSE works outside of France and not inside.

[Dolgopolov] How do they feel about their intelligence service in France itself?

[Marion] In France they have negative assessments of their own intelligence workers. Spy is a dirty word. This pertains not only to the present but also to the past. How different we are from the English, who created their own image of an agent of the Intelligence Service. To my surprise, in my country one senses a certain penitential attitude about maintaining the special service.

[Dolgopolov] And how—I am trying to make up my mind about this question—is the activity of the French intelligence arranged, in rough outlines?

[Marion] The French secret service is constructed in approximately the same way as the others. It has residents in foreign countries. They are appointed by the leader of the service, but they are not appointed as residents but as heads of posts. Their immediate duties include recruiting sources into the network.

[Dolgopolov] And who is in the network?

[Marion] Either Frenchmen who have left their homeland or residents of the country. The sources are financed in the most diverse ways; there are no permanent rules just as there is no permanent salary. The payment depends on the level of the work that is done and the degree of return... Unfortunately, French secret services are frequently attached to foreign special services, for example, in the United States under the CIA.

[Dolgopolov] And where is a good place to work?

[Marion] In Africa, especially where they speak French. The strongest positions have been occupied there since the time of General de Gaulle. The center receives a wealth of information for analysis. And, in turn, it has a chance to give out signals from the French Government to the heads of the African states.

[Dolgopolov] Does the DGSE have a subdivision which, like the Mossad, is ordered to conduct operations using purely military skills?

[Marion] Of course, and not only in the Mossad but also in other such services. I myself created under the General Directorate an organ that coordinates these operations. They are like commandos who perform particular intelligence functions. They participated in missions where it was necessary to respond with force to the

application of force, which occurred extremely rarely. It did not happen frequently, but we sent them down with parachutes. Usually we used operations divisions to obtain intelligence which we could not obtain by normal means. At the height of the war in Cambodia I sent them into the very thick of things: I had to find out what was really happening there. They did the job. A somewhat similar operation was carried out in Poland at the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1981: We used false documents to infiltrate into the country, where a state of emergency had been declared. We gave an analysis of the situation in several cities.

[Dolgoplov] Are you not afraid that with the arrival of the new era in 1993—the opening of the borders between the 12 countries of Europe and complete economic integration—the secret services, including the French, will lose their independence?

[Marion] No, they will cooperate much more closely while retaining their independence. And the cooperation will be more productive. There will possibly also be a certain amount of conversion of special services. They, and not the police, will be made the main instrument for fighting terrorism.

[Dolgoplov] It follows from your responses that you consider terrorism to be the number one threat to France.

[Marion] It is an important threat. And not only to France but also to the USSR. There is so much disbelief in your eyes! Well, if not today, then tomorrow. In certain Soviet republics it cannot be ruled out that you will see an outbreak of the most active fighting for independence. Terrorism is also possible.

[Dolgoplov] Do you think so?

[Marion] It cannot be ruled out. This is not even a prediction but a hypothesis. If there is suddenly a sharp deterioration of relations between the center and certain republics, there will automatically be hotbeds which could possibly find support from outside.

[Dolgoplov] Monsieur Marion, do you still maintain contacts with the DGSE?

[Marion] I have many other concerns. I am studying for my doctorate at the Sorbonne. My subject is the history of international relations in modern Japan. See, we have been speaking for several hours and I have convinced you that it is possible to speak about intelligence openly without giving away any secrets.

[Dolgoplov] I was going to ask you that next. Is there anything to give away? Are there any secrets left in the world?

[Marion] Very few of them. The intelligence means today are so strong, developed, and ramified and the methods of processing information have been so refined... Take computers. They make it possible to process pieces of information that seem to be totally unrelated and to derive benefit from comparing them. Intelligence—as I hope I have proved to you—will remain in any age. But a new phase will come. There will be such an exchange of information, grasp of it, momentary delivery, and faultless processing and use of the information that is received, that I believe that soon there will be no secrets on earth. I personally give them about 10 years. No more.

Support for Free Economic Zones Expressed

Leningrad Zone Described

91UF1079A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 23, Jun 91
pp 22

[Last week Prime Minister V. Pavlov introduced the draft Fundamentals of USSR Legislation on Foreign Investment for discussion in the USSR Supreme Soviet. This document is intended to establish the necessary conditions in our country to attract the foreign capital and new technology without which we cannot retool our outdated economy. The main means of attaining this goal are joint ventures and free economic zones (FEZ's). We already have zones of this kind in different parts of our country. Today we will be discussing the plans for the creation of an FEZ in Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast (the appropriate resolution was signed on 12 May this year by B.N. Yeltsin) and the world experience in this area.]

[Text] Discussion by A.B. Chubays, first deputy chairman of executive committee of Leningrad Council on Economic Reform, recorded by Vladimir Khovratovich: "The Free Economic Zone in Leningrad Will Not Be Surrounded by Barbed Wire"

The Leningrad zone has no exact counterpart in our country or abroad. It is the result of the inherent features of the Leningrad region. What do we mean when we refer to a free zone in Leningrad? There are two salient points. The main one is that it will open up the region's economy to the outside world—open in the sense of opportunities for our own businessmen to engage in outside operations, and in the sense of favorable conditions for foreign investment in our region. The second is that it will promote stepped-up reform, or what we sometimes call advanced reform.

We believe that no matter what kind of plans there are for reform in the country or in Russia as a whole, it would be ridiculous to expect their absolute synchronicity and the simultaneous institution of reforms all the way from the Far East to Leningrad. Each region has its own distinctive features, and unless we take them into consideration we will be likely to take standard but ineffective actions. Leningrad also has distinctive features. We could say a great deal about this zone. It is truly a region of industrial, cultural, scientific, and technical potential. It is a region with special political features, and these also have to be taken into account. These are the premises on which the free zone policy is based.

In general, we are not inventing anything new here. In fact, the situation is closer to the opposite: We are trying to restore everything that led to the creation of St. Petersburg as a "window" to Europe. It functioned in this capacity for a long time, but for reasons well known to us, the "window" was slammed shut after October 1917. We are firmly convinced that this hurt not only Leningrad, but also the whole northwest and even all of Russia. If we take an objective look at our political

prospects, whether we like it or not, we must realize that Leningrad could be the westernmost territory in our country in the near future. This means that we will have to establish conditions here for normal economic ties with the West and the rest of the world. All of the economic and geographic conditions for this already exist.

Today, now that Russia has essentially made the move to interregional barter trade, Leningrad cannot take part in these exchanges because of its lopsided economy. It produces heavy machine-building products and military products, which cannot be used in barter trade. In other words, no one wants to exchange food for "military gear." This is why we have reached the point at which we cannot feed this military-industrial complex. Although Leningrad officials do not have any legal or economic control over the military-industrial complex, they are expected to find the funds to maintain its structures.

The creation of a "free zone" will lead to productions cuts in the military-industrial complex. What are the implications of, for instance, the reduction of the output of tractors, or—if we call a spade a spade—the output of tanks? This means that tens of thousands of workers at the very least, and more probably hundreds of thousands, will be out on the street! We can imagine how high the number will be if we include the workers from other branches.

In our opinion, there is more than one way of avoiding mass unemployment. One would entail breathing new life into old enterprises by means of their partial respecialization with the aid of foreign capital. In other words, this would be the export conversion of the defense complex. Another way is to create a service complex, employing all of the dismissed workers.

Of course, we will not have a fence and barbed wire. Just imagine what would happen if 50 percent of Leningrad's territory were to be cut off from the rest of the hungry and indigent Leningraders. We are simply saying that foreign partners or associates would not have to pay customs duties on imported and exported materials and crude resources and would be granted other privileges, but they would pay more money for the rental of land, buildings, equipment, utility lines, etc. The profits they earn could also be transferred to foreign banks on preferential terms. The transfer of all of this money out of the country, however, would be discouraged by deducting all reinvested profits from taxable income.

Some of our opponents have expressed the fear that goods from Russia will "go over the hill" through Leningrad. This will not happen, because export privileges will extend only to the goods produced at enterprises in the city.

The documents on our idea were submitted to international experts and prominent specialists in the creation of free zones in the world. I will not list their names, but I can say that their advice was instrumental in the creation of FEZ's in Mexico, Canada, Ireland, and other

countries. They did not offer any conclusions on the Nakhodka free zone. Everything these experts said confirmed that our program is the basis on which the creation of the Leningrad FEZ can begin today.

Expert Lists Advantages

91UF1079B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 23, Jun 91 pp 22

[Article by Sergey Tsyplov, candidate of economic sciences and head of sector of Committee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations: "Expert Opinion"]

[Text] The directive of Chairman B.N. Yeltsin of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the economic and legal status of the Leningrad free economic zone envisages tax and customs privileges for the Leningrad FEZ and a simplified procedure for foreign trade operations. The RSFSR Council of Ministers was also requested to define and approve the status of the FEZ. Therefore, the goal the city's leadership has been pursuing for a year, is within reach. Nevertheless, some doubts remain. I will try to explain them.

First of all, there is some confusion about the size of the FEZ. Without any fear of exaggeration, we could say that the Leningrad FEZ will be the biggest in the world. Zone status will be granted to the country's second-largest city, one of its main industrial and scientific centers. There is no question that Leningrad's tremendous potential will establish favorable conditions for the development of various types of economic contacts with the outside world. But there is another side to this attractive coin.

The city's industry is mainly geared to the defense branches. There is no question that the FEZ developers are correct in their emphasis on conversion, but conversion is an expensive proposition and will take a relatively long time.

It seems to me that we should not put too much hope in investments from abroad. Zone status is not enough in itself to guarantee incoming foreign capital. The general political and economic instability in our country will be the primary factor of concern for foreign investors. Besides this, foreign capital will gravitate first toward branches with a high return on investments. The experience of China, which has been successful in developing free economic zones, testifies that the first 4 or 5 years are the hardest in FEZ operations. During this period particularly large investments are needed to build up the zone, but potential investors are only interested in commercial success. We must not forget that the FEZ's in China were created at a time of general economic growth as a result of the economic reform, whereas our own situation is the direct opposite.

We might wonder whether we even need a zone in Leningrad. I think we do. When we talk about these free zones, however, we do not always know exactly what this means. We tend to think only of multifunctional zones

resembling enclaves. There are many types of open territories in the world, however, such as open cities, open districts, etc. In my opinion, Leningrad should probably take a closer look at the experience of Shanghai (which is, incidentally, Leningrad's sister-city), where the huge Pudong zone of technical and economic development is being established.

I know that many specialists in our country also advocated the creation of a technical and economic zone in Leningrad with the simultaneous expansion of the city's economic autonomy. The area of this zone could be expanded later as experience is accumulated. With this kind of gradual approach, Leningrad's tremendous technical and scientific potential would be the decisive prerequisite for success.

Chinese Experience Assessed

91UF1079C Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 23, Jun 91 pp 22-23

[Article by Vladimir Ganshin: "What Do the Experienced Chinese Have To Say?"]

[Text] The first Soviet-Chinese scientific symposium was held in Moscow from 22 to 24 May to analyze and enrich the operational experience of free enterprise zones. It was organized by the Asian Studies Center of the Institute of International Economic and Political Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Academy of Social Sciences of Guangdong Province (PRC).

Why Guangdong? It is here, in southern China, that the special economic zones (SEZ's) are most highly developed. Half of the six operating SEZ's are located in this region—Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou. These could be termed the "old" zones, a category they share with Xiamen in the neighboring province of Fujian. They were established by a decision of the PRC State Council in 1980 and are the embodiment of Beijing's announced policy of economic openness to the outside world. Two more—in Hainan Province (1988) and the Pudong zone in Shanghai (1989)—were added to their number later. In addition, 14 zones of economic and technical development were also created in the PRC.

What are the results of the SEZ's 10 years of operation? Here are just a few figures: The gross product of the four "old" zones increased 18-fold during that time. They account for approximately one-fourth of all the enterprises established in China with foreign capital participation. Around 6,500 contracts have been signed with foreign firms for a sum exceeding 10 billion dollars. The exports of the SEZ's in 1989 amounted to approximately 4 billion dollars, or around 10 percent of all the country's exports. These territories, which were once backwaters, have turned into modern cities where almost 5,000 development projects are being carried out today with foreign capital participation. Electronic, chemical, textile, and food enterprises, working with foreign equipment, have been built and are operating here.

As speakers noted at the symposium, at a time when the PRC economic mechanism was not ready for complete inclusion in world economic ties, the creation of these "oases" with a special status helped to accelerate this process. The special economic zones have become something like a testing ground for new elements of economic reform and market relations.

It would be wrong, however, to assume (in spite of all of the positive aspects of this experience) that the existence of the SEZ's has not given rise to a whole group of problems and that all plans have been carried out successfully. According to Chinese speakers at the symposium, for example, the hopes that the SEZ's would quickly become a source of sizable amounts of foreign currency, were not completely justified. The scales of the work of creating the necessary infrastructure were clearly underestimated. The zones did not receive modern technology immediately, and only a comparatively small percentage of the joint ventures can be called "technologically advanced" even today.

We could run into comparable difficulties, speakers noted, in the creation of free enterprise zones in our own country. There could be problems, for example, in connection with foreign investments. When they began to establish the SEZ's in China, conditions were conducive to a flow of capital investments from abroad. Today the situation is different: After the events in Tiananmen Square and in the Baltic republics, Beijing and we appear to be realizing a somewhat obvious fact: Financing in any form usually depends on a whole set of conditions—political stability, the predictability of the general situation, and the development of the situation in directions convenient for the countries making the investments.

Sony's Plans To Enter Ukrainian Market

91UF1061A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
9 Jul 91 p 6

[Article by Vadim Frunze: "Sony in Lvov"]

[Text] Having barely come into the world, the Lvov State Joint-Stock Trading House is entering the international arena. Not very long ago it was visited by representatives of a firm whose name requires no explanations or enthusiastic epithets—Sony. What has brought the Japanese to Lvov is not a love for architectural monuments, naturally, but business interests. They make no secret of the fact that they intend to conquer the Ukrainian market as one of those with the brightest prospects in the Soviet Union. Sony intends to conquer the Ukraine not with weapons, but with high-quality products known throughout the world. And it plans to begin with Kiev and Lvov.

Arriving in Lvov are Kanaga-san, representative of the Sony parent company, and Suzuki-san, representative of the Moscow branch of the distributor firm CoopTrade Japan Limited (a distributor firm is an organization engaged in selling the products of a producing firm—in this case Sony—in one territory or another).

Going out into an unknown, "dark"—for the civilized world—market, is always risky. But insofar as the Japanese, as has already been noted, intend to assimilate the Ukrainian market, they have brought along a contract disadvantageous for themselves but advantageous for the Lvov Trading House. The contract envisages a consignment method according to which Sony transfers to the Trading House without preliminary payment a consignment of goods at advantageous wholesale prices. The Trading House sells the goods—at higher retail prices—and Sony settles with the customs authorities. The Lvov partners put all the "cut" from the contract—and it will not be a great deal—into purchasing a new consignment of goods from abroad. Operations of this kind are risky for the Japanese, insofar as the goods are sold cheaply and it is not known whether they will be sold at all. However, the game is worth the stakes, insofar as commerce is always associated with risk, and the tremendous dividends which may safely be counted on will cover the expenses sooner or later.

The fact that the Japanese are taking this endeavor seriously can be seen in their intention to very quickly set up the firm's service and maintenance facility, including warranty and post-warranty repairs of the firm's products. In this regard, post-warranty repair of goods purchased at the Trading House—and only at the Trading House—will be accomplished in exchange for rubles (evidently the Lvov Trading House will be delegated certain distributor functions by Sony, although a formal contract has not yet been signed).

As you have clearly already understood, products of the Sony firm will be sold in Lvov for freely convertible currency through a network of stores specially set up by the Trading House. Retail prices for these sales have not yet been determined. However, according to information obtained from Eduard Krasnogolov, deputy director of the Trading House, we may infer that these prices will not exceed average European levels. It has already been divulged that according to the contract (signed, incidentally, for about 300,000 German marks), the following items will appear: television sets, video cameras, video recorders, stereo systems, single- and double-cassette tape decks, combination radio/tape recorders, video and audio cassettes, batteries and power packs. And all of these are Sony products, therefore of high quality.

Lvov has not purchased a great quantity of goods, since it is not known whether they will all find buyers. Shipments of the "hotter" items will be expanded with time. In addition, the Japanese intend to employ the following principle in their trade dealings with the Ukraine: Along with the already well known, popular models, they will exhibit prospective "models of the future" here, as yet expensive items, so that we can get accustomed to the idea that such things are possible in the world (and strain ourselves a bit more to be able to buy them).

We were unable to ascertain more complete information regarding the agreements reached, indeed the Japanese have not even revealed everything to their partners, the

Trading House. This is simply explained: The Moscow market is already feeling the effects of a war for customers between Sony and Panasonic. To let an "unseasoned" partner into one's plans, in this instance the Lvov partners, means fearing leaks of information day and night. Sony representatives have therefore been silent when conversation during negotiations turns to the details—true, they have been smiling very sweetly at these times.

Will Sony products find a demand here for [hard] currency? It would seem so, since it is far better to buy such items in Lvov without customs duty than to bring them in from abroad. And as far as quality of product is concerned, here there is simply no question about it. It seems Japanese televisions can do anything but windows.

But...soon we will see for ourselves.

Lvov Trading House telephone numbers: 74-33-44, 74-42-93.

Gorbachev Adviser Assesses Results of G-7 Meeting

*91UF1060A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
25 Jul 91 p 6*

[Interview with presidential adviser Vadim Zagladin, who accompanied M.S. Gorbachev to London, conducted by Vladimir Markov, political observer of the "Novosti" Press Agency, specially for DELOVOY MIR: "Transformations in the USSR Are Primarily Our Affair"]

[Text] [Markov] Following the president of the USSR's meetings with the leaders of the Seven, there have been many opinions in the world as to its fruitfulness and whether it produced much or little. How do you evaluate the main results of this event?

[Zagladin] I believe that they may be seen from three angles.

First, the directly practical results. There are two here. The first is the fact that the Seven, that is, the leaders of the industrially most developed and most important states, voiced unconditional political support for the policy of transformations which our country is pursuing. The second practical result of the meeting is the fact that the Seven have undertaken to promote the realization of our reforms in the most diverse areas.

I should add something here. Prior to the meeting, during it and even now there has continued to be discussion of the question of the fact that President Gorbachev wanted, allegedly, to obtain credit, but did not. It is odd, but even prior to London Mikhail Sergeyevich had said publicly that he was not about to ask for any money, and he really did not ask for any credit. Credit and investments may come later, but this will be a consequence of the process begun in the British

capital. Gorbachev's task was in conjunction with the Seven to formulate a concerted position, obtain political support and gain the assistance of the leaders of the Seven in implementation of the reforms and the incorporation of our country in the world economy. This he obtained.

The second aspect of the London meeting may be described as prospective. It amounts to the fact that a mechanism of the interaction of the USSR and the Seven, which will enable our country to join in world-economic relations and thereby sharply accelerate our own development, was laid there. It is, after all, no secret that it was estrangement from the world market and world technology and science which to a considerable extent held back the Soviet economy's progress prior to perestroika, nor has there been much of a change in the situation even now. In fact, although we maintain relations with foreign states, we live according to the autarky principle. And now the system of autarky is breaking up, and a new mechanism of the Soviet Union's interaction with the world economy is being established.

Of course, in order that this process progress successfully we need to implement the reforms consistently ourselves. The transformations in our country are altogether primarily our affair. Our task is to bring them to a conclusion. Then the mechanism of interaction with the world economy will operate in optimum fashion also.

And, finally, the third result, which I would call a political theory result, is this: Gorbachev's meeting with the Seven, the proposals he expressed and the West's response to them signified recognition, in fact, of what we have been saying since 1986—recognition of the actual wholeness of contemporary mankind and the growing interdependence of the modern world and its economy. In London all this was embodied in actual agreements.

[Markov] The press has expressed suggestions to the effect that the Soviet leader's participation in the London meeting will entail a kind of consignment to oblivion of the interests of East Europe and the third world.

[Zagladin] Nothing of the sort. On the contrary, and this was said at the meeting of the Seven, incidentally, its cooperation with the Soviet Union will contribute to the development of relations between the East European countries and the USSR, and our participation in the world economy will facilitate the solution of global problems, those confronting states of the third world included.

The USSR's incorporation in the world economy naturally bears out the soundness of the proposition that differences in approach and even contradictions should not prevent cooperation. The differences and contradictions will continue to exist. And we will have to adapt to what will be a new situation for us. True, initially world competition around our market will obviously intensify, and we will have to adapt to its conditions. This is a

profoundly positive process because it will force us to "look sharp," play by the rules of the world market and thus accelerate our own development.

[Markov] Do you share the opinion that whereas the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was a political breakthrough in the USSR's relations with the West, there has now been a breakthrough in the sphere of economic relations?

[Zagladin] Such a comparison is entirely sound, in my view. The Helsinki meeting initiated a political process which helped surmount confrontation and the cold war and its vestiges and lead us all to the threshold of cooperation. To the threshold, because we are as yet in a transitional period: confrontation is a thing of the past, but developed cooperation has yet to be established. The meeting in London, in my opinion, has the same revolutionary significance in the economy as the Helsinki meeting in policy. An important breakthrough was achieved also, and time for realization of the accords which were reached will be required also. This will lay firm foundations for political cooperation and will put a material foundation, so to speak, beneath the new period of world development.

[Markov] It is known that Mikhail Gorbachev's meeting with the Seven, like the session thereof itself, took place behind closed doors. Could you not, nonetheless, tell us how our president's dialogue with Seven went?

[Zagladin] Only to a limited extent. Inasmuch as the Seven always hold their meetings behind closed doors—and this is the correct procedure, I believe—almost nothing of what is said there is published. Confidentiality and the opportunity for open discussion without an eye to publicity would be lost. So it was on this occasion also. The participants in the meeting did not even leave the premises in which it was being held for breaks. Communications with the outside world were maintained via "sherpas," special representatives of the leaders of the states, who communicated with their delegations, and then only by telephone and fax machine. The "sherpas" did not have the right to communicate with the delegations directly.

Mikhail Gorbachev's meeting with the Seven began with a speech by British Prime Minister John Major, who formulated the agenda. Then the president of the USSR, who over approximately 40 minutes set forth his propositions concerning evaluations of the world situation, the significance of the Soviet reforms and the state thereof and future prospects and also specific proposals concerning the cooperation of the Soviet Union and Western states, spoke. This cooperation is seen as being mutually profitable and could contribute to an acceleration of the development of both the Soviet Union and the world economy as a whole.

The heads of the other states then spoke. They set forth their opinion of our reforms, which was highly positive. Gorbachev was asked questions, which he answered. After this, the six points, which John Major made public,

were formulated. Giulio Andreotti, chairman of Italy's Council of Ministers, said that Gorbachev's speech and the answers to the questions had enabled the participants in the meeting to come to more far-reaching conclusions than they had proposed doing prior to the start thereof. This in itself is a good indicator.

[Markov] Nonetheless, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, who participated in the preparation of the material for the meeting with the Seven, did not go to London and, by all accounts, evaluated the message sent the leaders of the Seven by the president of the USSR as insufficiently far-reaching.

[Zagladin] Everyone has a right to his own opinion, and as far as Grigoriy Yavlinskiy is concerned, he is undoubtedly a gifted economist, whose contributions are well known. But in this case he is wrong. He proceeds from the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev did not reproduce elements of his program prepared together with Graham Allinson. But granted that this program is interesting and coincides 90 percent with the anti-crisis program of the government and the republics, it provided for considerable amounts of credit, of the order of \$100-150 billion approximately, which the West should grant the USSR up to 1997. But Gorbachev did not intend asking for credit, and the West did not intend giving it. Had Gorbachev gone to London with Yavlinskiy's program, he would have been turned down. Our president understood this full well, and it was for this reason that he did not do so. I believe that Yavlinskiy's evaluations are somewhat of a subjective nature, although he did make a big contribution to the preparation of the London meeting. In fact the Seven were presented on the one hand with a realistic program of the development of the USSR based on our own calculations and, on the other, with a realistic program of interaction between the USSR and the Seven. Elements of this latter program became a part, for example, of the documents of the Seven, specifically, the economic declaration which it adopted. It speaks of interaction with the Soviet Union in such areas as conversion, power engineering, the agro-industrial complex.... These documents reflect the ideas which were expressed by the president of the USSR and which had been discussed in our country.

[Markov] May it be expected that the accords reached in London will be realized in the very near future and that they will bear specific fruit?

[Zagladin] I have to say two things. The first is that the Seven have assumed commitments in respect of cooperation with us, and I am convinced that they will fulfill them. British Chancellor Lamont, who will be the coordinator of finance ministers of the Seven during the discussion of specific versions of implementation of the points pertaining to the development of interaction which were adopted, will come to Moscow at the end of July. A visitor to our country then will be British Prime Minister John Major, who is coordinator of the Seven, and an entirely specific discussion on this theme will be continued during his visit. In other words, the Seven are

in a serious frame of mind for channeling their efforts into ensuring that the promises not remain a hollow sound.

The second point I would like to emphasize is that no programs of the Seven will bear fruit unless we in our country can move things forward. We need to fulfill our own programs. Only then will cooperation with the Seven be efficient and bear the fruit about which you speak.

Soviet-German Joint Venture to Print USSR Foreign Passports

91UF1075A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Aug 91 Union edition p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA Special Correspondent Ye. Bovkun, Bonn: "Native Businessmen in Europe: Joint Venture with the Participation of Soviet Capital Is Successfully Operating in Germany"]

[Text] Filprint Firm is one of the youngest of the USSR's and FRG's [Federal Republic of Germany] joint ventures on German territory. It began to operate in the south of Rhineland-Pfalz in the small city of Pirmasens. While traveling there, I must admit that I did not expect that the young enterprise's business would be so successful. The firm distributes Soviet postage stamps abroad and already represents Soviet philately at international exhibitions. Filprint's second role is numismatics. It sells USSR anniversary money jointly with the German firm Numiversal and the money enjoys stable demand on the FRG market. Mr. Mako, Filprint's partner and the owner of Numiversal, is ecstatic about the quality of the polishing.

"The best mint shop in the world is located at the Mint in Leningrad," noted this successful manager and millionaire. "We order commemorative money and medals for other countries in Leningrad."

The third important sphere of Filprint's activities is the purchase of printing equipment. But not only. The idea was born to print new foreign passports for Soviet citizens at Pirmasens. MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] agreed. The anticipated product output is five million per year.

It is possible that Filprint's operations would be restricted by these three directions if a man other than Vladimir Kaufman had ended up in the position of technical director. An experienced Moscow printer, he arrived in Germany filled with bold ideas. When I became acquainted with him less than a year ago, the firm was just getting off the ground. I saw how he operates. At that time, he was getting ready to buy the printing equipment. Telegrams from Moscow suggested the well-beaten and not most advantageous path. He began practically from scratch: he thoroughly and rapidly learned the local market, learned the ins and outs about each potential supplier and, having found the

cheapest variation, also gained in quality. He saved a million in hard currency on just one contract.

Filprint has acquired fame and the FRG's leading firms have become its partners. World-famous BASF Chemical Concern is among those who have trusted it to represent their interests at Bumpoligrafmash-91.

By April 1991, Filprint had concluded 52 contracts with foreign firms. Another 18 contracts that are ready to be signed are lying in its portfolio.

Nearly 40,000 small and medium firms fail each year in the West but then nearly 60,000 are created anew. We probably already knew the former fact through the stagnant press and we were silent about the latter for understandable reasons. Medium business is a difficult profession. And these are not nearly hothouse conditions for our entrepreneurs who are striving to emerge on the European market. Frequently powerful and rich founders stand behind a joint venture (Filprint has—*Mezhdunarodnaya kniga* [International Book] and the USSR Ministry of Communications). This helps to make a start but does not guarantee survival. All the more so since successes raise the hopes of our businessmen in Germany.

Use of Counterfeit Dollars Increasing

91UF1086A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Aug 91 p 6

[Article by Ye. Kuzin: "The Out-of-Town Mint"]

[Text] The other day a foreigner came to the currency exchange counter of the Kosmos hotel where he tried to exchange a counterfeit 20-dollar bill into rubles. Shortly before that somebody exchanged a somewhat bigger sum, \$500 in the same place.

What are the origins of the counterfeit dollars that appear more and more often in different parts of our country now?

Most of them "arrive" from abroad. It is very hard for an inexperienced person to distinguish them from real money. The banknotes are printed by professionals who select proper paper and ink and have made good printing blocks.

In the West the counterfeit money is registered by Interpol. The Bank for Foreign Economic Activity receives a special catalog published by Interpol which lists batch numbers, serial numbers, and all the inaccuracies of the fake notes.

More counterfeit notes are made by the Soviet craftsmen. These notes are not listed in the catalog but they are a lot easier to identify as they are usually either made on a regular copying machine or drawn (extra zeros are added on small denomination notes).

The Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee UBKhSS [Main Administration for Combating the Embezzlement

of Socialist Property and Speculation] does not see anything especially criminal in all of this. "The counterfeit money is not used in our country on such a large scale as it is the case in the West. The influx of foreigners has grown lately and it brings more hard currency which sometimes includes fake money," V. Rogov, department chairman of the UBKhSS, explained the situation.

To confirm this he told us that the last investigation of mass production of counterfeit money took place on USSR territory in 1982.

USSR to Sell Natural Gas to Turkey for Consumer Goods

91UF1088A Moscow TRUD in Russian 14 Aug 91 p 1

[Article by V. Svirin: "We Are Selecting Goods in Turkey"]

[Text] It has been decided to use 70 percent of the resources received for deliveries of Soviet natural gas to Turkey to acquire goods for the USSR.

Mr. Erturk Deger, president of the Istanbul firm Degere, reported this news at a press conference in Moscow yesterday. He added that each month the Turkish government pays \$35 million to the Soviet Union for this gas. The company headed by E. Deger has been the leader in consolidating business ties between our countries in recent years and leading Turkish banks support its activities. Specifically, while exporting window glass from the USSR, the firm will deliver the latest Italian line to Saratov Glass Plant which will significantly increase its output and later will create a joint venture to transport the fragile goods in special trucks.

Special emphasis is being made on the development of economic and cultural relations with Tatarstan where by agreement Degere receives raw petroleum and petroleum products. The firm is modernizing port terminals in the Rumanian city of Galati on the bank of the Danube to activate bilateral trade. According to an agreement with Rumania, a wide, Soviet-standard rail spur will be extended to Galati from the USSR border.

What kind of goods will we receive from Turkey? First of all for the home and family. Food deliveries are also planned.

Customs Official on International Cooperation, Smuggling in USSR

*91UF1093A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 91
Second edition p 5*

[Interview with Boris Mikhaylovich Tutin, chief of the USSR Customs Committee Administration to Combat Smuggling and Violations of Customs Regulations, by PRAVDA Correspondent V. Peresada, Brussels, August: "Smuggling: What Does this Word Mean"]

[Text]

The USSR Is Joining the Customs Cooperation Council

Mafia Activity on the "Soviet Axis"

Who Is Buying Up the "Wooden Rubles"?

Every country in the world is familiar with this concept that signifies the illegal transport of various goods and items across a border. At its annual session in Brussels, the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC) discussed with alarm today's situation when these borders are being more widely thrown open, when international economic exchange is growing, and when smuggling is acquiring an increasingly larger scale. The CCC, which unites over 100 states, accepted the Soviet Union into its ranks at the session.

How urgent is the problem of smuggling for us today? A PRAVDA correspondent proposed this topic of discussion to Boris Mikhaylovich Tutin, chief of the USSR Customs Committee Administration to Combat Smuggling and Violations of Customs Regulations.

[Peresada] Boris Mikhaylovich, tell me frankly: Does the alarm which was heard at the session affect us or not?

[Tutin] Of course it does. We have recently encountered a drastic increase of the number of customs violations, including with those types of contraband which have not previously been characteristic. For example, during the last four years, in cooperation with state security organs, we seized 50 times more narcotics alone than during the several decades that the USSR customs service has existed.

The primary specific feature of the current situation is that under conditions of the establishment of market relations, smuggling activity is increasingly acquiring an organized nature and is being conducted by solid groups and through stable channels. Right now we are concentrating our efforts on fighting this type of smuggling which causes the most serious damage to the Soviet economy.

[Peresada] What specifically is the most troubling thing here from the point of view of our service?

[Tutin] First of all the fact that valuable raw materials are flowing out of the country at increasing rates. Last year, already over 60 percent of the cases transferred to investigative organs concerned attempts to export raw materials. Fifty seven thousand tons of nonferrous metals alone were seized. But we discovered so much nickel during the course of just one inspection that it, according to calculations, would have been sufficient for two months of operations at the Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Combine.

[Peresada] But how is this possible? This is not a gold knickknack in the lining or in the false bottom of a suitcase....

[Tutin] They are becoming clever. For example, if it is a question of a smuggling operation under the "roof" of a

joint venture, it is most often conducted as the export of its own products which do not require a license. Say, they are loading railway cars with aluminum bars and they place a layer of bars with holes drilled in them over it as camouflage and they ship this type of "item" abroad. They try to export oil under the guise of waste and others use the export of paper, cellulose, and other goods as a pretext.

Incidentally, we are not the only ones concerned about these "exports." They are already talking aloud about their disastrous consequences abroad.

[Peresada] Why?

[Tutin] The fact is that the dealers who are involved in this "business," while trying to sell these goods in every way possible, as a rule, sell them at prices that are substantially lower than world prices thereby undermining the established mechanism of market relations in the West. Having encountered the open robbery of latter-day Soviet "merchants," a number of Western states are introducing partial protective measures and the European Economic Community is considering forming a reliable barrier and common anti-dumping decisions with regard to exports from the USSR, as they told us here. As a result, we want to ensure that honest participants in foreign economic activity do not suffer, including state organizations.

[Peresada] And today what is "imported contraband"? What dominates in it?

[Tutin] There is no simple answer since it, just like "export contraband," needs to be examined not only by types of goods but also by direction of movement and by categories of individuals. If you take the last aspect, we are increasingly concerned that some diplomats, primarily from Third World countries, while enjoying customs privileges within the framework of the Vienna Convention, are essentially movers of major shipments of goods to the USSR.

In their turn, some directions of contraband also cause its priorities. So, in recent years especially large amounts of pearls are arriving through what we call the "China channel." The prices for pearls are very high in some regions of the USSR. A pearl necklace purchased somewhere in Southeast Asia for 50 cents is transformed into 100 rubles in Uzbekistan. We have stopped attempts to import shipments weighing up to 100 kilograms.

[Peresada] It seems to me that someone will not agree with you here. Our stores are empty, but this is how the market is nevertheless replenished, and you can buy something even if it is for a great deal of money....

[Tutin] But we are not against replenishing the market, we are for that. But this should be done through legal foreign trade operations and not through underground deals which no state will tolerate.

Furthermore, it is impossible to not see the reverse effect of "imported contraband." They are also exporting

something from the country while carrying into the USSR a large quantity of items that enjoy demand (and in our country right now we literally have a demand for everything) while selling them and receiving a profit. Do you think that goods are going in exchange? But they are simply not. They are carrying out paintings, unique collections, rare books, musical instruments, icons, and various church plates. And the matter is not that all of this will float away at cheaper prices under the conditions of the avalanche decline in the ruble's rate of exchange but the fact that we cannot reproduce what makes up our cultural property.

The instability of the situation in the country makes both the sphere of contraband like the import of weapons increasingly attractive. I am not talking about the gas pistols and small cylinders which are now being widely sold as a means of protection but they are frequently, there are enough cases, being used as an attack weapon. The increasing illegal import of "toys" is more serious—military pistols, assault rifles, and grenades.

[Peresada] Much has been said about the presence of large sums of Soviet money abroad. What do you think the customs service can say about this?

[Tutin] Only that Soviet currency has been continuously exported during the last three years. And it is being consistently bought up in many countries and is even being used for payment in a number of stores, including here in Belgium. Just during the first five months of this year, we prevented the export of over R25 million. And who knows how much has gone?

[Peresada] It is understandable why Soviet citizens are exporting rubles. Although at the actually low rate of exchange, they nevertheless will acquire Western currency or goods. But what interest do those people have who buy up our, as it is now fashionable to say, "wooden rubles" abroad?

[Tutin] There are various versions and time will certainly tell the reality of this or that one. One thing is obvious: since the export of Soviet currency is occurring and since Western banks are accepting them, it makes sense.

[Peresada] You said that contraband with regard to the USSR is becoming an organized and group matter. At what stage is this unfortunate process—in the embryo or is it already such that it is acquiring "Mafiosa" traits?

[Tutin] Everything is so serious that we are already labeling, if it is possible to express it this way, groups according to national-territorial indications. For example, take the "Polish channel." We know that entire clans of smugglers operate in Poland who specialize on one and the same routes into the USSR and on one and the same "type of shortage good." They operate within the framework of a precise structure, with payrolls, labels, hideaways, and contactless communications. And although they operate using enormous shipments of goods, it is very difficult to stop their "work."

We are extremely concerned about the growing contraband activity on the "Soviet axis" in the Common Market countries. Especially the activities of former Soviet citizens who have settled on the territory of these countries. Representatives of Belgian law enforcement organs specifically told us that the "Russian contraband Mafia" is better organized, more brutal, and therefore stronger than all other groups that have ever operated here. That is why the Western European customs services and the CCC in general is interested, as we are, in the coordination of efforts, the mutual exchange of information, and operational contacts.

[Peresada] From the speeches at the session, I understand that our participation in international customs services cooperation was not born today. When did it begin?

[Tutin] The first international operation with our participation was carried out in 1988. Since that time, nearly 20 have been conducted. The principle of operation—is controlled delivery. It has been legislatively reinforced both in international law and in the new USSR Customs Code. These joint actions have inflicted a perceptible blow on the drug Mafia. For example, as a result of Operation Diplomat that was conducted in cooperation with the British customs service, property and money worth 3.2 million Pounds Sterling were seized. The latest example—is the operation jointly with the Belgian Gendarmerie. The result—the arrest in Belgium and Holland of a group of 16 people and the seizure of a large quantity of narcotics and over 50 weapons.

[Peresada] As far as I understand it, all of this is operations from transit. But are drugs flowing directly into our country and out of it?

[Tutin] For now, the topic of the fight against imported drugs is not as urgent. Since the ruble is not convertible, the international drug Mafia is barely interested in our market and there is an adequate base for "domestic consumption"—large areas sown with drug producing plants in a number of republics. But as for export, the dealers from the domestic drug business have obviously already totally sensed that their "commodity" is currency. Recently, four attempts to ship Soviet-made drugs abroad were stopped during just one month.

[Peresada] Let us return to the theme of cooperation with the other countries' customs services. Today, is this already certainly not just a specific way to fight the drug business?

[Tutin] As, by the way, not just the fight against contraband in general. The main purpose of this cooperation is to promote economic exchange. If we are moving toward the market and we are subscribing to world economic relations, we must talk with our partners in the common customs language. The new USSR Customs Code, that was developed in total accord with international regulations and in the conventions of the CCC which we have

joined, serves as this language. And in a practical context, this is specific cooperation in the primary sphere for all customs services—economic regulation of shipments across a border.

Of course, cooperation with our foreign colleagues in this direction will increase as long as contraband exists and its amounts increase. The appropriate agreements with the customs services of 15 states have been concluded or are at the signing stage and our participation in the CCC will permit us to use generalized world experience and to develop multilateral ties and contacts.

[Peresada] If you compare the Soviet customs service with Western customs services, do we have an identical capability to fight against contraband or not?

[Tutin] They are nearly comparable. For example, thanks to the fact that the USSR Customs Service Main Computer Center has recently begun to function, we, like our colleagues in the West, now have all customs statistics at our disposal. We know precisely what, where, and what quantities are being transported across the border and by whom and where and for what commodity there is demand. This information is primarily a powerful instrument of economic regulation but it is also a powerful instrument of customs monitoring.

However, on the whole, we noticeably lag behind in the level of equipment. And to increase its level requires not so much the need to equal the West as much as the fact that the very nature of our work has become more complicated. Much has already been done but we still have a lot to do. Say, recently in accordance with worldwide practice, Soviet law granted the customs service the right to conduct investigations. This will inevitably entail the need to provide the appropriate subunits with advanced criminal systems, video tape equipment, personal computers, and transportation.

[Peresada] But how does the personnel situation look in your service?

[Tutin] As we all know, the customs service of any country has two primary functions—fiscal and law enforcement. So, for example, in the United States, there are 3,500 people—"special agents" who are involved only in law enforcement activities and there are nearly 1,000 in England. For the entire enormous country, we have only 300 such people, employees of departments to fight against contraband in local areas. This is totally inadequate today. One of the most urgent issues is increasing the number of personnel.

[Peresada] The numbers describe the effectiveness of the fight against contraband best of all. You cited some of them but the overall picture is certainly a bit brighter?

[Tutin] I can add several "strokes." During the first five months of this year, customs monitoring organs jointly with USSR KGB have seized nearly 200 kilograms of gold (export), nearly 300 kilograms of silver (export and

import), nearly eight tons of drugs (export and transit), and nearly 10,000 icons (export).

Are these figures really not impressive?

Defined Strategy for Foreign Economic Relations Needed

91UF1092A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Aug 91
Second Edition p 5

[Article in the "Thoughts of a Specialist" column by Candidate of Economic Sciences K. Ovchinnikov: "On Integration Once More"]

[Text] Unless the USSR has its own official strategy of foreign economic relations and unless a mechanism for the integration of the USSR in the world economy is created at the international community level, integration, however much is spoken about it, will not occur. There will be neither a Union market nor a strong economy.

In order to see this for oneself it is sufficient to take a realistic look at the world situation. After all, difficulties always arise even for the countries which, having already scored certain successes in the economy, attempt to export their product to the developed countries. And this is explicable: A definite structure of production and employment has already taken shape there, and the influx of imports of similar, but cheaper, products requires the closure of or a reduction in domestic industries and layoffs of workers and employees. All this is a painful process. For this reason the developed states take steps to protect their traditional sectors against imports, and the problem of protectionism intensifies periodically in international economic relations.

I recall that prior to the top-level meetings in London and Moscow there was an emphasis on naive arguments as to whether the president of the USSR would seek credit and how much we would be given. Yet it is well known that for all countries, the USSR included, it is primarily foreign economic relations and participation in the international division of labor that are the most important lever of socioeconomic development. I would make clear at the same time that I have no intention of denigrating the role that is performed by the IMF and the World Bank in the world economy.

I would add one further point: All my arguments are built on the assumption and hope that realization of the measures pertaining to transition to the market model will be secured in the Soviet economy and that the republics will not sever but, rather, will restore the already fractured common Union economic space. Otherwise there is nothing to be discussed.

Why, precisely, is the reciprocal assistance of an international mechanism required for the USSR's integration in the world economy? Because the USSR is not Togo, Benin, or many other countries taken individually or put

together even. If even these countries suffer from protectionism in the way of their exports, the USSR is a piece which could simply choke the world economy. Just compare the potential of the USSR and some groups of countries in terms of size of population, economic and production potential, and natural resources. Of course, today's economic potential of the USSR has still to be reliably assessed. But in terms of size of population as a criterion of the extent of the market (300 million persons) the USSR and the developing countries which are the principal exporters of products of the manufacturing branches of industry (318 million persons in 1987) can be compared.

Certain important documents that have been adopted in the United Nations on questions of international economic cooperation record the proposition concerning equal opportunities existing for all countries. But the age-old practice of competition shows incontrovertibly that this is a myth.

Today the developing countries are voicing concern in connection with the "danger" of a switch of Western financial resources from "third world" countries to the USSR and East Europe. But the entire history of recent decades testifies that credit and assistance alone have not contributed to a solution of the problems of a single country. But trade, as the engine of development, and the questions of competition connected with this merit the most serious attention.

In discussing problems of the USSR's incorporation in the world economy we can talk about what should and what should not be done. Thus it is essential to have a strategy of foreign economic relations. Everyone has such. But what should not be done is the compilation of the kind of program that was drawn up and approved in October 1988 under the title "Strategy of the USSR's Foreign Economic Relations up to the Years 2000-2005." It has today, of course, been ashamedly "forgotten."

If any strategy is drawn up today, it is vitally important to embed in it an economic mechanism of integration in the world economy, including, among a multitude of questions, the development of the export specialization (but not an "export base," as many documents of program significance say) of import-substituting industries. These are most complex economic problems, particularly in the period of transition to the market. The point being that for our weakened economy an economic protection mechanism, within reasonable limits, of course, is essential. It is necessary to determine also which branches should be given more protection. The so-called traditional (textile, light, iron and steel, construction and so forth) or the new, emergent, high-technology branches? A difficult question. When, however, the government draws up a list of industries for the purpose of their expansion as import-substituting industries, one wonders what the guiding criteria here have been. Not to mention the fact that all the factors determining the country's competitiveness in a given branch

are still in rapid and unpredictable motion, particularly at the republic level—prices, wages, taxes, interest rates.

The practice of international economic relations cautions against another extreme also—the restriction of imports beyond a reasonable sufficiency holds back the development of exports with all the ensuing disastrous consequences for the economy. Necessary integration is of great benefit, spontaneous integration would produce several “economic Chernobyls” in terms of summary economic effect. After all, the opening of the national economy to the world market will introduce in addition to domestic policy market factors strong foreign economic competitive pressure. And this will signify a need for a restructuring of industry, the closure of certain industries or the reduced production of others, and the release of manpower, that is, the addition of new armies of unemployed to the millions who will lose their jobs as a consequence of market relations in the country. Are we ready today for these changes?

Practically all our republic leaders today advocate a transition to market relations. But it is well known that competition is the heart of the market. In adopting their own sovereign laws and economic decisions and, consequently, different rules of the game for Soviet and foreign managing subjects, the authors of such enactments and actions are breaking this very heart. What is the purpose of breaking one's own heart and that of one's compatriots, not to mention that of foreigners?

A special question concerns the participation in the integration process of the republics that do not sign the Union treaty. Some “soft-hearted” politicians, shedding a tear, are counseling against the Union republics switching in trade with the “dissidents” to world prices and payments in hard currency. But this, if the truth be told, is the equivalent of a switch in foreign trade to intra-Union prices and payments in rubles. Why should the Union preserve the former procedure of economic exchange with republics that wish to pursue a totally independent domestic and foreign economic policy and create their own customs territory and national unit of currency, that is, all the tokens of a foreign state? This would be ruinous, unnatural, and economically absurd, to put it no stronger.

There is legitimate interest in knowing how much our economy needs in the way of foreign capital and credit in order first to pull itself out of the pit of crisis and then give it initial acceleration. I deliberately do not ask: Is anyone more interested in this than we ourselves?

There is theoretical research on this subject determining the minimum amount of investments. But depending on states' particular features, this amount and its norm may vary within a very broad range. Much depends on the branches into which the foreign capital goes. In addition, study of world experience on the basis of the example of developing countries is little use to us since, aside from

the direct foreign investments, quite a large volume of resources enters these countries along official multilateral and bilateral aid channels.

And what factors influence these flows and their efficiency in the light of our reality?

First, whatever the influx of resources in the form of direct private investments or credit and loans, the granting of local resources in the most varied forms (financial, labor, and raw material, intermediate products, equipment and so forth) in a certain proportion is required per dollar (yen, franc, mark) of such proceeds. Very often the foreign assistance which is offered is used inefficiently or is not used at all if the country is not in a position to provide for the interfacing of its own resources with the assistance received. Such a threat is perfectly real for the USSR also.

Second, the creation of an infrastructure (transport, roads, communications and so forth) is a particularly acute problem for the USSR's conditions. In fact, the absence of an infrastructure is a principal factor that will hold back the influx of foreign investments. Private foreign investors are usually in no hurry to invest capital in development of an infrastructure and branches which are capital-intensive and do not yield profit quickly. Consequently, the interfacing of national investment policy and the influx of foreign investments is required in this area of integration in the world economy.

Under the conditions of the lack of national investment resources (given their increased orientation toward the social sphere) the problem could to a certain extent be solved by an influx of financial and material resources from international financial institutions since they are not so keenly attuned to the speediest acquisition of profit inasmuch as the resources, which are received from multilateral channels, have been shorn of private interest. But the republic sovereignties, distorted by hypertrophy, could be a serious obstacle on this path.

Mention has to be made of the fact that all the good expectations concerning the USSR's integration in the world economy set forth above will remain up in the air if both in this difficult transitional period and subsequently the Union, despite the weak economy, lacks a strong foreign policy. The specifics of the moment are that the danger of a weakening of foreign policy as a most important factor of a strengthening of the economy is once again directly dependent on domestic stability. President Bush spoke about this during his visit to the USSR, not directly but merely indirectly. A pity. The meeting in London approved in various spheres cooperation with the USSR and advisory and technical assistance, including personnel training. But should we rely merely on this? After all, our most acute need today is not so much for the training of specialists at machine-tool or computer or even enterprise level. We ourselves must roll up our sleeves. We need to train personnel in the sphere of politics and economics capable of defending national interests at state level.

Question of U.S. POW's, MIA's Held in USSR Aired**Issue Dated to WW II**

91UF1071A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Aug 91 p 4

[Article by Vadim Birshteyn, Washington—New York: "Where Did 20,000 Americans Disappear to? The Red Army Freed them from Nazi Imprisonment. Since Then They Have Been Listed Among the Missing in Action"]

[Text] Top Secret

Scenes from American history are depicted on the walls of the Capitol Rotunda and statues of U.S. statesmen are frozen between them. The figure of George Washington is on the arch of the cupola. Just one detail disrupts the ostentatiousness of the scene: the black flag alongside the statue of Abraham Lincoln. The white silhouette of a bowed male head is in the center of the flag and the contour of a prison camp tower is behind it. Surrounding it are the letters: POW/MIA. POW means Prisoners of War, MIA means Missing in Action. American families are missing up to 30,000 fathers and sons who did not return home after the Second World War and the wars in Indochina. Members of POW/MIA associations spend all of their free time and enormous sums of money attempting to compel the U.S. Government to provide information about the fate of their loved ones. One of the groups—the National Union of Families—is located in Seattle. Dolores Alfond heads it and her brother was a military pilot who disappeared without a trace in Indochina 24 years ago.

The problem arose at the end of 1944 when Soviet troops liberated many Nazi camps for internees which were located on the territories of Poland and Germany. Hundreds of thousands of citizens of Western European countries, the United States, and Canada found themselves in the zone that was occupied by the Soviet Army. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement signed by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill on February 4, 1945, the Western allies were obliged to deport from Europe tens of thousands of Russian emigrants and relocated persons, including those liberated from Nazi camps. In exchange, Stalin promised to send home citizens of the allied countries who wound up under Soviet control.

However, the Soviet authorities did not hurry to carry out their promises. Six days after the victory, it was reported from France: nearly half of the 200,000 British and 76,000 American prisoners of war who were still present in Germany are obviously in the Russian zone of occupation. From reports: "American prisoners of war who were liberated by the Red Army were often treated poorly and they began to hate the Russians. Many were robbed, their watches, rings, and other items, which they still had even after prolonged confinement in Germany, were taken from them...."

"American prisoners of war in Odessa (a filtering camp—V.B.) were guarded by Russian soldiers who had loaded rifles and fixed bayonets and the Russian camp secret security service was stricter than the German."

On May 19, 1945, General Eisenhower telegraphed the allied main headquarters: "The number of American prisoners of war under Soviet control is exactly 25,000." At the end of May, information about 20,000 American prisoners of war arrived at Eisenhower's headquarters. Contrary to the facts, on July 1, 1945, Eisenhower made an official statement that "only a small number of American prisoners of war still remain in Russian hands." As a result, thousands of American families are still waiting for their relatives who did not return after the Second World War. On the whole, Americans are missing 20,000 of these servicemen.

Twenty thousand is a large number. Where were they kept? This is what a former prisoner reported about one of the camps for internees that was located near Tambov:

"At the end of 1945, there were Germans, French, Americans, British, Dutch, and Belgiques—more than 20,000—military and civilian personnel. They forced all of the prisoners to work, the food was very bad and monotonous. They did not house them in barracks but in dugouts."

A strange disease, during which the arms and legs collapse, was the consequence of the monotonous food. After some time, those who came down with this disease died. More than 23,000 Italian, more than 2,500 French, and nearly 10,000 Rumanian and Hungarian prisoners died. Several Poles and representatives of other nationalities also died from this disease.

This camp's contingent consisted of people of very high culture and knowledge and splendid experts in various fields of science. German engineers were used for special work—they drew designs of an aircraft that could accommodate nearly 500 passengers and attain speeds of nearly 1,000 kilometers per hour. The Russians were especially interested in these projects and the people who worked on this invention enjoyed various relaxations of discipline in the camp's working and living conditions.

Now it is widely known about French prisoners of the Tambov camp. A book was even published about them in France. But what about the Americans?....

Separate information about Americans in various camps glimmers in the recollections of people who survived the GULAG [Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps] during the postwar years: In Vorkuta, Inta, Dzhzhkzagan, Magadan, and others. Cases are known when not only prisoners of war but also workers from the American Embassy in Moscow ended up in the camps. However, no one has encountered the thousands of American prisoners. Lists of missing Americans in the United States are still secret. So, where are they?

For the Americans, the problem of servicemen who did not return after the wars in Korea and Vietnam is no less acute. According to official statistics, 1,000 servicemen were not repatriated from Korea and 8,000 are listed as missing. According to available information, a portion of these people were transferred to camps located in China, Manchuria, and the USSR. This is how it occurred during the winter of 1951—spring of 1952:

"The railroad station was divided into two sections with paths along both sides. Chinese soldiers escorted American prisoners of war from the Chinese side. The prisoners of war passed through the gates that divided the platform to the train which the Russian team serviced. The Russians wore railroad worker uniforms but they were military men dressed as railroad workers...."

On May 5, 1954, the U.S. Embassy sent a note to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a query about the fate of American prisoners of war. In response, on May 12, 1954 the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted: "...there are no such people and there never have been such people in the Soviet Union."

The families of the POW/MIA's think that up to 2,000 Americans were sent from Korea to the USSR.

On January 27, 1973, a peace treaty was signed in Paris by representatives of the governments of the United States, North and South Vietnam and the Interim Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam that specifically provided for the bilateral exchange of prisoners of war. Contrary to this agreement, the United States has still not received a complete list of American prisoners of war who were held in camps in North Vietnam and in neighboring Laos. On March 26, 1973, Vietnam solemnly announced that the last American soldier would be repatriated on March 27. The U.S. secretary of defense seconded it: "There are no more prisoners of war in Southeast Asia, they have all died."

According to the information of POW/MIA families, 591 prisoners of war were repatriated from Vietnam which is just 12 percent of the total number of 5,000 American prisoners of war who were alive in 1973.

"While it is an acceptable situation for American citizens to be prisoners abroad, the freedom of all Americans is in danger." This sentence is from a leaflet published by relatives of the pilots of an RB-89 that was conducting an ordinary reconnaissance flight over neutral waters and was shot down by the Soviet PVO [Air Defense] service over the Sea of Japan on June 13, 1952. It goes on to say: "The crew of 12 men was obviously picked up by a Soviet Naval vessel that was located there at the time of the incident. It is possible that the crewmembers are still alive and are imprisoned in the Soviet Union. Their names are listed: Major S.R. Bush; First Lieutenants J.A. Scally, S.D. Service, and R.J. MacDonnell; Master Sergeants W.B. Hommer and D.L. Moore; Staff Sergeants W.A. Blizzard, M.V. Monserat, E.R. Berg, L.E. Bonnira, and V.J. Becker; and, Private D.N. Pillburn.

There are quite a few of these cases in the history of the Cold War. Normally the American government made one or two queries about the fates of the crews. However, only the relatives, who believe that their dear ones are still alive, are concerned about further explanations.

Naturally, the American administration's reluctance to admit that it did little or did not make any effort to save its citizens—is a matter of the interrelationships of the American voters and the government elected by them. Right now a stormy debate is occurring in the U.S. Senate: Do they create or not create a special commission on the POW/MIA issue? It seems that it will be formed.

But there is another aspect of the problem. Information about all foreign prisoners of war who ended up on the territory of the USSR during the war and until the end of the 1950's is in the USSR Central State Archives in the fund of materials of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Main Administration on Prisoner of War and Internee Issues—in that very one which contains the lists of those Polish officers shot in the Katyn Forest and information about Japanese and German prisoners of war which is now being sent to those countries. So, the names of the 20,000 Americans and their fates may be easily explained in Moscow. However, it is difficult to gain access to these archives: the special authorization of two departments—USSR MVD and KGB—is required and they, as we all know, find it difficult to part with their secrets.

We can much more rapidly establish a mutual understanding among those who share a similar fate: among the relatives of those U.S. citizens who are missing in the USSR and the relatives of Soviet prisoners of war who ended up prisoners in Afghanistan. The American POW/MIA families want to and can assist Soviet relatives of those who ended up Afghan veterans.

The American National Alliance of Families is awaiting any news about their relatives. Contact between people can and must be established.

Washington—New York

Spy Planes Shot Down 1950, 1952

*91UF1071B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Aug 91 p 4*

[Unattributed article: "P.S."]

[Text] As U.S. State Department representative David Denny reported at the beginning of May, on April 9 the State Department sent an official query to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs that requested assistance to establish the fate of 22 members of the crews of two American reconnaissance aircraft that were apparently shot down in Soviet airspace in 1950 and 1952. According to the information that the U.S. government has in its possession, they were seen alive and well in Soviet jails. The Navy Privateer aircraft (with a crew of

10 men) was shot down over the Baltic Sea on April 9, 1950. The Air Force B-29 aircraft (with a crew of 12 men) either went down over the Sea of Japan or over Kamchatka on June 13, 1952.

Queries in 1956 and 1973 did not produce any results.

Since the not-too prestigious WASHINGTON TIMES is the source of the information (recently by the way it was as a result of its contribution that serious complications arose in Soviet-American relations with regard to Soviet SS-23 missiles that were at one time deployed in Bulgaria, the GDR [German Democratic Republic], and Czechoslovakia), the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Editorial staff asked USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Administration Chief V. Churkin if there was any substantiation to American suspicions. We are publishing the answer we received.

Foreign Ministry Denial

91UF1071C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Aug 91 p 4

[Letter to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Editor-in-Chief Vitaliy Tovtsevich Tretyakov by USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Information Administration Chief V. Churkin, July 25 1991: "To NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Editor-in-Chief Comrade V.T. Tretyakov"]

[Text] Dear Vitaliy Tovtsevich,

Our reply to your query is as follows:

The American side periodically poses to USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] the question about American citizens who were missing in action during the course of the Second World War, and also in Korea and Vietnam. The State Department raises this issue because the relatives of these American citizens have not lost hope about learning something about their fate. While proceeding based on the humanitarian and emotional content of the queries, each time we pay proper attention to them and we conduct the required verifications through the appropriate organizations and archives. The essence of the answers which we provide to the American side is reduced to the following: There are neither American prisoners nor their remains in the Soviet Union.

I want to stress that we are discussing this entire issue with the Americans calmly and honestly. We are not keeping any secrets from anyone. This subject is not a problem in Soviet-American relations.

Respectfully,

USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Administration Chief

V. Churkin

July 25, 1991

Reaction to Bush Kiev Speech Gauged

91UN2405A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 3 Aug 91 pp 1, 2

[Article by S. Tikhin, under the rubric "End of the Week": "Bravo, Bravissimo, Mr Bush!"]

[Text] A president of the United States, George Bush, visited Kiev for the first time on 1 August 1991...and left the same day.

First, information for wide-eyed enthusiasts, asking: "Did you really see him? Just like that.... In person?!" I reply: Yes, I saw him. And I can report that G. Bush in person is as alike as two pins to the "television" G. Bush. The same relaxed manner and "unconstrained" attitude, the same style during his speech—at times putting his hand in his trouser pocket, at times grasping the podium with both hands. The deputies and representatives of parties and political movements of the Ukraine invited to attend the U.S. President's speech most likely had the same impression: Having persuaded themselves that they had not been fooled and that it was a wholly genuine president, they accorded Bush a veritable ovation of the kind Italian opera "tiffози" [addicts], for instance, accord the celebrated L. Pavarotti for his matchless high C's.

But Bush did not sing in the Ukrainian Parliament...and said things here, if we look into them, which many of those assembled in the Hall of Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of a sovereign (according to the well-known Declaration) Ukraine would hardly have wanted to hear. Generally the speeches of politicians at such a level are also designed so that the audience can scrutinize the celebrated speaker somewhat better. After all, the content is quite familiar to them, in the main, from other speeches delivered by this same politician over the past several months. There are seasons in big diplomacy, just as in nature—and an international "summer" may not replace "spring" just a day after the latter has arrived. This is all the more the case if the question is one of such a mighty power as the United States. So it is the lot of the lucky ones to pay close heed to what is known to them and to divine **what** and **from whom** the speaker is quoting to create "local color." But such speeches also serve to "change" course—slowly but surely. The journalists are, in fact, waiting like anglers for the silvery tinkling of the little bell of such a speech which might enable them, albeit conjecturing, to draw the conclusion: There is movement!

But on this occasion President Bush did not "bite." He dutifully lavished compliments on the Ukraine, its capital, and its people and quoted Taras Shevchenko and Aleksandr Dovzhenko, but one had the impression, nonetheless, that he himself would have signed the Novo-Ogarevo draft. Not on behalf of the United States, naturally.... True, he hereupon emphasized that the United States was not about to interfere in the Soviet republics' relations with the center and had no intention

of taking sides. And these words also were, in all probability, to have preserved the status quo: Supporters of a federation and devotees of a confederation and furious champions of total independence bear in mind: America will not help you, but you can take self-reliance as a basis for it will not interfere either. The American President's whole speech could be included in a primer for fledgling politicians as an example of skillful balancing. G. Bush welcomed peoples feeling their way, in his words, toward the limits of freedom—political, economic, and individual. That is, he recalled time and again in a single context both freedom and limits. And subsequently insistently recalled American society's rejection of militant nationalism and, remembering his impending visit to the memorial at Babi Yar, warned against the dangers of tyranny.

All this, of course, is well known from the statements of many sober politicians and from countless journalistic articles which have pontificated on this in respected publications. This, therefore, is what, it seems to me, was most important and instructive in the meeting the day before yesterday. The hall greeted the U.S. President and saw him off with a unanimous ovation (just like at a CPSU congress in the old days). And this was, furthermore, the friendly applause of as yet implacable political opponents. There was, of course, an element of provincialism in this enthusiasm, a kind of "open-mouthed wonder" at the sight of a world celebrity. But not only this. After all, all those present on the Ukrainian side had in principle reason to be "sore" at Bush. For the communist majority this had to have been a set of representatives of a beaten ideology listening to the admonitions of the winner. For the opposition the grievance is even more serious—the "consistent fighter for anticommunism throughout the world"—the American President—did not even wish to meet with it—the foundation (it

believes) of anti-totalitarianism. Nonetheless, everyone will remember the truly sincere (finally!) "stormy and prolonged applause, growing into an ovation." They were applauding freedom and the resolve to defend it and the power of democracy and a state built precisely on democratic principles; they were applauding an unstained political reputation and political professionalism—so rare in our country.

Yes, this was an open lesson of established political culture. And, in my opinion, President Bush gazed with emotion at our radical deputies who had raised in the hall posters written in English with appeals for him to contribute to Ukrainian freedom. After all, if the fact that we have such hopes was a discovery for him, he should be dismissing many of his advisers. Of course, our deputies understood this, they simply wanted to demonstrate their resolve, but it transpired that in accompanying the first speech in history by a U.S. President in a parliament of the Ukraine with a commonplace mass-meeting gambit they were emphatically demonstrating their rose-colored political infancy.

And against the background of all this the main hidden meaning of what was heard from the rostrum that day came through distinctly: Freedom comes in various ways and is for this reason varied. It may fall into one's hands of its own accord like ripe fruit, sweet and invigorating. Real freedom, generally. But it may, by contrivance, be plucked from the branch ahead of time—green. And then it is sour and has a sharply bitter, tear-inducing taste.

...Ah, if we could live to see the times, hard to imagine, when a president of the Ukraine is greeted in a friendly state in the same way the Ukraine greeted the President of the United States of America on 1 August 1991.

Electricite de France to Expand Operations

OW0309004291 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2155 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Electricite de France, which opened its office in the USSR last year, is going to cooperate with Soviet organizations in the field of nuclear power and the nonindustrial use of electricity. For instance, the French firm will take part in building a public relations centre at a nuclear power station in Kostroma (the North of the European part of Russia) and in improving uranium wastes processing.

The French firm has suggested that the Moscow City Council should introduce a new system of tariffs for the use of electricity depending on the season, time of day or night and power consumed and to open power supply services similar to those in the West.

Similar projects are being negotiated with the authorities of Leningrad, Khabarovsk, and Tver (a regional centre Northwest of Moscow).

Warsaw Pact's Invasion Plan Revealed

91UF1135A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Aug 91 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Bangerskiy: "Western Europe Shocked by Plans of Warsaw Pact Armies to Attack It; According to AFP Statement, These Plans Were Found in Germany"]

[Text] Paris—Scandal?

Sensational documents were found among the papers of the former army of the former GDR: a plan for a blitzkrieg seizure of Western Europe by Warsaw Pact forces.

Everything in the plan, which is now being studied carefully by NATO experts, is laid out in minutes and kilometers. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and thousands of tanks cross the border between the two Germany's at "H" hour. A powerful tank offensive of the "fraternal armies" is deployed onto FRG territory. The speed of the advance—50 kilometers in a day. The combat task—to reach the shores of the North Sea.

On the second day, an order is given to deliver a nuclear strike against major groups of NATO troops. Polish tanks attack to the north and capture Denmark. The Soviet Navy moves out into the Atlantic: The way is clear. Dozens of USSR and GDR divisions at this time advance in the direction of Paris, Spain, and Portugal.

As an AFP correspondent reports from Berlin, there is talk of tons of top secret documents. It becomes clear from them that offense was the real military doctrine of

the Warsaw Pact and that the Soviet Union was prepared to employ nuclear weapons at the very start of military operations.

It was not old staff elaborations that were found, but documents that no one had rescinded. Maneuvers, in which the technique of the offensive for these plans was developed, continued in the GDR until June of 1990—eight months after the Berlin Wall came down.

"Now we know that they viewed the nuclear weapon as something that was completely normal and acceptable as a conventional weapon in a theater of military operations," a highly placed government official in Bonn told AFP correspondent Richard Ingam. "The threat was real and serious," asserts Walter Reichenmiller, a representative of the FRG ministry of defense.

Each of the Warsaw Pact member countries was supposed to occupy a specific territory. The GDR, for example, was charged after victory to administer the former FRG. "Occupation marks" were already printed, and, right up to the most recent time, special military groups were being prepared to seize specific airports and railroad stations of the FRG. And the Fifth Corps of the GDR People's Army, together with Soviet Army formations, conducted exercises on working out the seizure of Northern Germany, with the employment of chemical weapons and 87 nuclear missiles.

Henry Dodds, editor in chief of the English military journal JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, asserts that, from the documents he was able to familiarize himself with, it follows that the offensive of the allied forces "was supposed to reach Gibraltar in the south and Scotland in the north." However, the discovered documents do not give a complete picture of the Soviet "blitzkrieg," inasmuch as each of the allies received from Moscow only those formulations that concerned that sector of a front that was entrusted to it.

P.S. Viktor Chikin, an employee of the press center of the USSR Ministry of Defense was skeptical of the AFP report. In his personal opinion (except for our telephone call, the press center has no information at the present time), it could be a question not of an offensive, but of a retaliatory strike. As for the mention of "tons of top secret documents," then this is natural: "Since they are military, then they are secret."

Aleksandr Rozanov, acting chief of the information office of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported the official reply by telephone to the question of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: "The ministry does not have any information on this matter." One of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees expressed the opinion in a private conversation that the report is probably a "canard," inasmuch as it is difficult to suppose that any significant amount of secret documents could be found.

Significance of British Petroleum Contract

91UF1074A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 91
Union Edition p 1

[Interview with B. Nikitin, first deputy of the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry, by IZVESTIYA correspondent G. Topuridze; place and date not given: "The Baku Partner of the British Petroleum Company"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry and the well-known English company British Petroleum signed a contract in Moscow which would allow the Baku plant for deep-water platforms to supply metal structures for the off-shore oil rigs constructed in the North Sea.

You must admit that the news of such a contract sounds rather surprising nowadays. IZVESTIYA correspondent G. Topuridze asked B. Nikitin, first deputy of the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry, for an explanation.

[Topuridze] In recent years we were forced to sell primarily raw materials to other countries and we were buying food, minimum numbers of consumer goods, and the most essential equipment needed for the support of our economy. We know, for example, that your industry is importing pipes, various units of equipment, pipeline valves, etc. But all of a sudden there is this contract, to the sum of about \$7 million.

[Nikitin] I would not want to create a sensation out of this. We just have to forget that a recently popular notion that ours is a developing country now. That is not true. Certain concepts developed in our industry are being used in many countries of the world. We also have plants (not very many yet, unfortunately) whose products are on the level of world standards. The Baku plant is one example of such a plant.

[Topuridze] Did the British ever have any doubts concerning the quality of our structures, or the regularity of supplies, or the reliability of their partner?

[Nikitin] First of all, we participated in two biddings for the right to build platforms in the North Sea. In one, we finished second, but the other we won, in which some world famous firms participated. Some English experts came to visit us and they included people from the famous Lloyd's insurance company. They thoroughly examined our finished products and technology and conducted various tests.

[Topuridze] It is prestigious and promising to participate in such contests. Why do they not use such a practice for the establishment of joint ventures with foreign firms in our country?

[Nikitin] Things are just starting. This year we called for bids to set up a joint venture to develop the Sakhalin shelf. American, West European, South Korean, and Japanese companies expressed their desire to participate

in the contest. All this is still ahead of us, but we have already conducted one tender.

[Topuridze] Please tell us about it in more detail.

[Nikitin] A rich oil deposit, Azeri, was discovered on the Caspian sea shelf at depths of up to 300 meters. The current production and technical potential of the Kasorneftegaz Association does not allow them to develop such deposits successfully. For that reason the Azerbaijan Government and the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry decided to call for bids in order to attract foreign companies to the development of the new deposit.

Initially, 15 foreign companies showed interest, such well-known companies as British Petroleum (England), Chevron, Amoco, Conoco, and UNOCAL (the United States), etc. among them. Four companies bought our prospectus describing the deposit and the joint venture organization terms, including social programs, levels of raw material output, environmental requirements, etc. After detailed study of the documents, the number of bidders was reduced to three: British Petroleum, Amoco, and UNOCAL. They presented their feasibility reports on the deposit development and offered their scenarios for a joint venture.

Company representatives defended their projects in Baku for three days. Apart from a specially organized commission, representatives of the public from Azerbaijan also took part in the discussion. As a result, the bid evaluation panel declared Amoco the winner. It has been recommended to use UNOCAL as one of the subcontractors. At present, a group of Amoco experts and their potential subcontractors are in Baku where they are discussing the volume and the schedule of design and establishment work. All of this should be completed before 1 December.

[Topuridze] On which terms is the new joint venture established, or can they be disguised by the already customary phrase "mutually advantageous?"

[Nikitin] The meaning of accepting tender offers is specifically to have an opportunity to select the most perfect technologies in combination with economic advantages. In this particular case the initial capital is formed on the basis of parity in terms of value. That includes the work that has been done before, buildings, equipment, and money. The joint venture sells oil for hard currency, recoups the outlay of each partner and, after paying the taxes in effect in the country, distributes the profits in accordance with the invested capital. As a result, the profits of the foreign partner will not exceed a level corresponding to the world practice of comparable agreements.

Woerner on 'Security Partnership,' Friendship With USSR

PM3008132991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Aug 91 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "'Security Partnership' Needed"]

[Text] Bonn, 29 August—M. Woerner, secretary general of the North Atlantic alliance, has advocated a "security partnership" in relations between NATO and the Soviet Union. We want the Soviet Union to participate as an equal partner in the construction of a new European security system, he said in an interview with the German newspaper DUISBURGER ALLGEMEINE. After constitutional order is restored in the USSR, NATO will continue its policy of cooperation and partnership—and, in the longer term—friendship with it. "I have not the slightest doubt that we must now activate our contacts with the reformist forces in the USSR," he noted.

These forces have emerged strengthened from the recent crisis, which increases chances of the formation of a genuinely reliable and trustworthy "security partnership," Woerner noted. "By such a partnership," he indicated, "I understand four things: first of all, mutual

information, openness, exchanges, and by the same token—mutual trust; second, understanding and consideration of the other side's legitimate security interests; third, collaboration in resolving common problems, such as, for example, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; and finally, fourth, the continuation of the disarmament process down to the minimum level that is unquestionably necessary to ensure security, but not sufficient to threaten anyone whatsoever."

During the days of the crisis the countries of the bloc carried out "constant intensive and practical consultations on an assessment of the situation, its consequences, and a possible retaliatory reaction [otvetnaya reaktsiya]," the NATO secretary general reported. Moreover, he stressed "political methods, such as my telephone conversation with Boris Yeltsin, and not military ones," were used.

In advocating the development of multilateral contacts between NATO and East European countries which are former members of the Warsaw Pact, Woerner nevertheless stated again that he considers their full membership in the North Atlantic alliance "an impracticable matter in the foreseeable future."

Mexican Envoy Assesses Present, Future Ties to USSR

91UF1089A Moscow *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA*
in Russian No 4, Apr 91 [signed to press 25 Mar 91]
pp 3-6

[Interview with Carlos Tello, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the United Mexican States in the USSR: "Carlos Tello: Mexico and the USSR—Countries With Great Resources and Tremendous Potential"]

[Text] [LATINSKAYA AMERIKA] Diplomatic relations were established between Mexico and Russia more than 100 years ago. What, in general outline, are the main sources and principles of the dynamic and open foreign policy of the United Mexican States?

[Tello] Mexico's international activity is based on the principles which have been reflected in our constitution with regard for the lessons of Mexican history. The main ones are self-determination for the peoples, noninterference, the peaceful solution of conflicts, states' legal equality, international cooperation, renunciation of the threat and use of force and struggle for peace and security in the world. Such, in brief, are the principles by which our state is guided in the pursuit of its foreign policy.

[LATINSKAYA AMERIKA] In this case, a supplementary question. Benito Juarez's celebrated words: "Between individuals, as, equally, between peoples, respect for the right of one's neighbor means peace," are well known in the world. How, in your opinion, has Juarez's behest been realized in the history of Mexican foreign policy? Specifically, how has Mexico contributed to the implementation of the principle of noninterference?

[Tello] Truly, these words of President Juarez have in practice determined the country's entire foreign policy course. On account of historical factors, Mexico has always treated this principle very solicitously and respectfully. Noninterference in other countries' internal affairs is the cornerstone of Mexico's activity on the international scene. Just as we do not want others to interfere in our affairs, we ourselves do not interfere in the affairs of other states.

There are in Mexico's history many examples which confirm this. Mexico currently has diplomatic relations with countries with a different ideology and various levels of development and social conditions. It is this principle which enables us to maintain relations with the most diverse states. It is just as pertinent and effective as other principles contained in Mexico's constitution affording it an opportunity to operate confidently in the international arena.

[LATINSKAYA AMERIKA] That is, you mean that Mexico's foreign policy is based on the country's constitution?

[Tello] It may be characterized as state policy. It is not the policy of some government or other, which could change with a change of cabinet. It is a permanent, invariable part of state policy, which is pursued by this government or the other.

[LATINSKAYA AMERIKA] How would you assess the present level of Mexican-Soviet diplomatic, cultural and economic ties and what prospects for their further development do you see?

[Tello] I would say that our bilateral relations have entered a mature phase. It may be acknowledged with satisfaction that political contacts are excellent and that points of contact have been found, and this is permitting the development of close cooperation between our countries. We are each going our own way, and mutual respect has always determined Mexican-Soviet political relations for many years now. Mutual sympathy and cordiality have contributed to constructive dialogue and extensive exchange in the sphere of culture, art, science and education. On the other hand, our economic and financial relations are extremely negligible and do not correspond to available opportunities. Among the natural obstacles limiting cooperation in the said spheres are ignorance of the specific features of each party and an absence of mechanisms of trade exchange. It is very slight and, in addition, unequal. Mexico exports to the Soviet Union commodities worth approximately \$90 million annually (an average figure, which changes from year to year, has been taken), while the USSR supplies Mexico with only \$5 million of products. This is very little, and the exchange is not equivalent and encompasses only a few commodity types. Thus whereas in the sphere of politics, science and education our relations are developing constantly, in the sphere of the economy and trade they are extremely inadequate and unequal.

[LATINSKAYA AMERIKA] What, in your opinion, is impeding the development of economic relations?

[Tello] Various factors. Primarily, and I have already said this, we have inadequate knowledge of one another's requirements. In addition, there are no corresponding mechanisms making it possible to implement trade exchange on a large scale. Mechanisms of financial support, without which Mexican and Soviet entrepreneurs cannot develop commercial activity, have not been determined, for example. And, finally, the nonconvertibility of the ruble. All this is limiting Mexican-Soviet trade. But I am sure that we have opportunities to stimulate it. Both the Soviet Union and Mexico have tremendous potential and resources for this. But for this we must first and foremost determine in what sphere to exercise commercial activity and then get down to business.

[LATINSKAYA AMERIKA] Historically Mexico has been closest to the United States. How do you evaluate Mexican-American relations at the current stage?

[Tello] Truly, Mexico maintains diverse and most close relations with the United States. We engage in commodity trade mainly with the latter. But this does not mean that Mexico has no intention of developing trade with countries of Latin America, the Pacific and Europe, the Soviet Union included. I do not believe that the development of trade, between our countries specifically, will depend directly on an improvement in relations between the USSR and the United States. Even the friendliest contacts between the two superpowers cannot influence the growth of Mexican-Soviet commodity exchange. Economic reforms, if they are conducted successfully both in the Soviet Union and in Mexico, will, rather, stimulate its development.

A process of transformations, in which commercial openness is assigned an important place, is under way very intensively in Mexico. The purpose is the country's active incorporation in the world economy. We are attempting for this to rid ourselves of protectionist barriers and impart a more dynamic nature to the movement of commodities. The Soviet Union also is implementing economic reform and a transition to a market economy and free trade, which will ultimately permit more efficient and intensive Mexican-Soviet commodity exchange.

[LATINSKAYA AMERIKA] I believe that our countries have many problems in common. You arrived in Moscow recently. You have a fresh view of much of what is happening here. How, in your opinion, is the situation in the USSR developing from the political and economic standpoints?

[Tello] The Soviet Union and Mexico are encompassed by a tumultuous process of reforms, and, although there are differences, it is possible to also see a similarity in what is happening in our countries. I will cite a few examples. A reform incorporating, inter alia, the privatization of enterprises which are the property of the state is being undertaken in Mexico. In the Soviet Union this is a principal goal of the economic changes. Relations between the ruling party and the government are being revised in Mexico. The same is happening in the Soviet Union. A whole number of other common features could be cited. Mexico could derive from the experience and practice of the USSR much that is useful and interesting, with regard for its own particular features, of course.

As far as the transformations in the Soviet Union are concerned, I, while not a Sovietologist or economist, believe that the process of glasnost and democratization which has begun here is very important. It will enable the country, despite the pluralism of opinions and forms of their expression, to move forward on a firm foundation toward further improvement. Together with political reform, glasnost and democratization, economic reform is being implemented also. I believe that the measures which the Soviet Parliament is adopting today will contribute to the creation of a firmer and more efficient economy. These two components of reform (political—glasnost and democratization—and economic—

transition to a market economy) are being accompanied by profound changes in the world. The role of the Soviet Union therein is enormous. Fortunately, the cold war has ended, and peaceful cooperation between the two blocs has become a sign of the times. A most important event not only of recent years but decades even occurred recently: the signing of the Paris agreement, thanks to which both the European continent and all countries of the world community will proceed by the path of cooperation and detente. The three reforms which I have mentioned (foreign policy, domestic policy and economic) will undoubtedly strengthen Soviet society even more.

[LATINSKAYA AMERIKA] Practice shows that under current conditions contending blocs can no longer exist and that to develop politically, economically and culturally it is best for peoples to integrate. What do you think about Latin American integration?

[Tello] Two processes are under way in the world: globalization in the economic and trade and financial spheres and a regionalization of markets. They mutually complement and support one another. In recent months, it is still too soon to say years, economic integration has acquired new impetus in Latin America. We are convinced that only by way of integration and other additional measures will our countries be able to become better involved in the process of globalization of economic and financial relations which has encompassed the entire world community. In reality, what is most important is not the division of the universal world economy into regions or the formation of blocs or economic zones, although this is important also, what is most material is the tremendous gulf separating the rich countries and the developed world of the minority and the vast heavily populated world of poor countries. This, in my view, is the main problem. In the past 10 years this gulf between the rich minority and poor majority has only increased. Mankind is faced with the problem of how to close this gap. This is the key question, not the confrontation of economic blocs and regions. We must in the future solve this problem.

[LATINSKAYA AMERIKA] It may be said that the relations of Mexico and Cuba are excellent. The basis thereof are the traditional principles of Mexican foreign policy. Cuba has now come to be in quite a difficult situation. The former socialist countries are not granting it the same assistance as before. Cuba has almost no oil. What do you think, will Mexico sell Cuba oil or supply it on other terms?

[Tello] As of 1991 pragmatic, commercial considerations and convertible currency will be the basis of relations between countries. This will harm the Cuban economy since it traded with the socialist countries on entirely different terms. But I have no doubt that the Cubans will be able to adapt to the new realities. As far as business relations between Mexico and Cuba are concerned, they were previously also built on commercial principles. In the future trade and other contacts based on convertible

currency will continue. Now, as far as oil is concerned. Mexico is a major exporter of this type of raw material. It supplies approximately 1.3 million barrels daily on long-term and medium-term contracts. We cannot increase oil exports as yet but I believe that Cuba's requirements will be met. We hope that Havana will subscribe to the San Jose (Costa Rica) Treaty, in accordance with which Venezuela and Mexico will sell oil to the Central American and Caribbean countries. I do not know what Cuba's oil requirements as of the present are but I see no reason for it not to sign the San Jose agreement, complying, of course, with a number of the requirements established for all states of the region.

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Anti-Cuba Trend in USSR Examined, Friendship With Cuba Defended

91UF1090A Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA
in Russian No 4, Apr 91 [signed to press 25 Mar 91]
pp 44-50

[Article by D. Mutagirov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor at Leningrad University: "The Anti-Cuba Phenomenon in the USSR"]

[Text] All is in confusion in our home, which proudly called itself socialist. Watching what is happening in it, one involuntarily begins to wonder: is not the Lord punishing its inhabitants by first making them mad? How otherwise to explain the astonishing airiness with which they are abandoning the inheritance of their grandfathers and fathers and mothers and the history of their fatherland? Yesterday's enemies have been declared friends and associates, and the true friends and associates are being consigned to oblivion or, which is worse, turned, in deference to the new idols, into objects of attack and calumny. We are talking about countries and revolutionary parties and organizations which at the most difficult times for the USSR have without doubts and hesitation, giving no thought to their own advantage and prestige, remained at one with the USSR and the Soviet people and have always wished them the best success. Yes, the ways of the Lord are inscrutable indeed!

But there is an explanation for all that is happening. And it is entirely terrestrial, somewhat trivial even.

The perestroika and renewal of social processes which began in the USSR in the mid-1980's and which were originally supported by the whole population of the country have as a result of the conscious and purposive activity of certain circles undergone a metamorphosis and are increasingly assuming an antipopular and anti-socialist nature. The economy, politics and the spiritual life of the country have moved from a state of stagnation and crisis to one of catastrophic collapse. The ruling circles and their immediate associates are deceiving the people, expatiating for the sixth year running on the temporary and transitional nature of the difficulties which the country is experiencing. Instead of honestly

and truthfully telling them about the mistaken nature of the course they mapped out and their incapacity for guiding the country into a higher orbit of development and progress, they are thinking up increasingly new experiments and justifications. At the same time attempts are being made to distract the attention of the people's masses from their own mistakes and miscalculations, transferring it to the distant past or artificially designed relations with other countries. The targets of the attacks are, naturally, those of the latter which have had long-standing close relations with the USSR. South Africa, with which the USSR does not even have diplomatic relations, cannot, perhaps, be declared the author of our difficulties. Cuba, with which we have for three decades now been accustomed to sharing both joys and sorrows, is quite another matter. Many people have not cared for this, and it is now the time of triumph of the opponents of Cuban-Soviet friendship and cooperation. The precise coordination of their actions is observed, and the speeches of opponents of Cuba in the USSR are immediately picked up by their sympathizers in the United States and other countries.

Thus speaking at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR about the causes of the economic difficulties being experienced by the country and the budget deficit, the economist N. Shmelev, elected in lobby fashion a people's deputy of the USSR, cited as a paramount factor the Soviet Union's purchase of sugar in Cuba at prices in excess of world prices and some commitments or other of the USSR in Latin America. Since then the overpayment for sugar purchased by the USSR has become a popular proposition. These claims evoke nothing but bewilderment. Except, perhaps, for pity for N. Shmelev as an economist.

The price of sugar is one of the least stable on the world market and may fluctuate in the 7-10 to 50-70 cents a pound range. The USSR's trade agreements with Cuba are of a long-term nature and are based on stable prices for the whole period that they are in effect. The latter could be both far higher and lower than world prices.

The author of these lines was in Cuba when, at the end of 1975-start of 1976, the price of sugar suddenly shot up on the world market and proved to be considerably higher than that which the USSR was paying Cuba. "Well-wishers" of Cuba who from various radio voices began to whisper to the Cubans about the exploiter nature of their relations with the USSR and to calculate how much Cuba was losing in trade with the Soviets immediately appeared. What was the response of the Cubans and their leaders to the situation which had arisen? The unbidden "well-wishers and defenders" of Cuba did not succeed in sowing an anti-Soviet mood in Cuba.

Now the price pendulum has swung in the other direction—downward. And the same "well-wishers" have rushed to open Soviet people's eyes. The words and arguments are the same, it is just the address which is different: "what its relations with Cuba are costing the

USSR". To our profound regret, the doctor of economic sciences who permitted himself to use the microphones of the hall of the Congress to relay anti-Cuban insinuations lacked the wisdom and nobility formerly displayed by the Cubans. In addition, the economist and his audience should know that the USSR's purchase of several million tons of sugar on the world market would inevitably lead to a sharp increase in the price of this product and that far more would have to be paid, in convertible currency, what is more. This is now effected by way of mutually profitable commodity exchange. Even Cuban sugar purchased at a greater cost than on the world market here costs us less and is more profitable than its production here at home. This does not have to be proved now: Cuban citrus fruit is cheaper in the USSR than home-grown apples, and tropical fruit preserves cost less than preserves made here at home from... pumpkins!

I simply cannot agree with the calls for the abandonment of the "USSR's commitments in the Latin America region." Their authors do not, it is true, say which commitments they have in mind. The UN recommendation, which was adopted with the active participation of the USSR, that advanced countries set aside 0.7 percent of their GNP to assist the developing countries is well known. To whom is this assistance allocated primarily? One's friends and sympathizers, of course.

When the Soviet people have encountered difficulties, they have always counted on the assistance and support of the progressive part of mankind. Do we have a right to forget this and abandon solidarity with peoples defending their freedom and independence? Yes, we reject the export of revolution. But we should just as emphatically oppose the export of counterrevolution also. Moral support and material assistance to young revolutions is a true manifestation of the working people's international solidarity. Genuine revolutionaries will never abandon them.

I set forth these thoughts, inspired by N. Shmelev's speech at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, in a short article entitled "Correct Prescriptions?" and sent it to the journal *NOVOYE VREMYA* on 3 July 1989. But the Pharisees of pluralism, who understand diversity as a chorus of voices consonantly taking up their song, hid it. And did not even reply to the author. And anti-Cuba-ism has intensified meanwhile. The USSR has begun to cut off supplies of food and other essential commodities to Cuba, and some newspapers have relished the difficulties which have arisen in this connection.

This is all the more regrettable in that the USSR had assumed almost all the commitments in respect of Cuba voluntarily, on its own initiative. As distinct from the East European countries, which had been liberated from fascist occupation by the Soviet Army and in whose subsequent development the USSR played a determining part, the revolution on Cuba was the result of this country's domestic development and the work of its own

people. The USSR exerted no direct or indirect influence thereon. The very existence of the socialist world and the change in the international situation which this brought about were undoubtedly conducive to the Cuban people's liberation struggle, about which its leaders have always spoken with gratitude. But the revolutionary processes on Cuba occurred independently of the USSR. In addition, prior to the start of 1960 the USSR did not even have diplomatic relations with Cuba. And the Cuban revolution was into its second year.

What an enormity, perfidy and treachery in respect not only of the Cuban people but of all the friends of socialism in the world the sudden unilateral destruction of these ties without regard for the interests, long-term included, of Cuba could prove. And what meanness would gloating in these countries apropos the difficulties which have arisen on Cuba for this reason appear?

This would be an act comparable, perhaps, only with the change in the Soviet leadership's attitude toward fascism following the signing of the nonaggression pact with Germany in 1939. And how, in fact, do the CEMA countries' actions in respect of Cuba differ from the analogous actions of American imperialism, which has refused to purchase Cuban sugar and supply Cuba with oil, industrial goods and foodstuffs? In what way does the anti-Cuba-ism in certain Soviet newspapers differ from the anti-Cuba-ism of the American press? Only in its hypocrisy, crudity and unscrupulousness, perhaps. It is said that apostates are capable of the meanest actions in respect of the faith which they have disavowed and that unreliable friends are worse than sworn enemies. The attitude toward socialism of its former adherents and toward Cuba of its former "friends" more than graphically confirms the soundness of these judgments.

When correspondents of *MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI* (A. Makhov) and *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA* (A. Novikov) were in Havana, they swore eternal friendship. A negligible change in official policy was sufficient for these people to make a 180-degree turn and begin to pour tubs of dirt on yesterday's friends and spread shameless lies and insinuations about Cuba, its people and its leaders.

...In 1974-1976 the author of these lines was a consultant professor at Havana University and the national center for training social science lecturers. When I was taken to the university library, I, accustomed in the USSR to closed collections, was stunned by the wealth and diversity of the literature on display on open shelves. There were here books which were popular in the world at that time, but by authors who were sharply criticized in the socialist countries: Djilas, Marcuse, Garaudy. I was, I confess, dumbfounded when I saw here a multi-volume work of Trotsky with documents published in Russian and English—minutes of meetings of the All-Russia Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee Politburo. Reference literature, both pre- and post-revolution, was on extensive display in the library. I saw a similar picture in the Jose Marti National Library also.

I learned from conversations with my Cuban colleagues that they did not know what a special literature store meant. Everyone could obtain the material of interest to him. And Makhov had no need to go to Miami for this. It would have been sufficient to have crossed the grounds of the university campus and gone to the library.

When I shared my discovery with my Soviet colleagues, the reaction was ambivalent. The scholars rushed to the libraries to study literature hitherto inaccessible to them, but the officials preferred to cautiously advise their Cuban colleagues to move the dubious literature a little further away from the students' eyes. I was categorically opposed to this and as long as I was on Cuba I opposed the Soviet experience of the organization of the special store being passed on to them.

Of course, I cannot rule out the fact that some of our "omniscient Soviet specialists," in K.A. Khachaturov's felicitous expression, still "taught" the Cubans the experience of the organization of special stores. But I can firmly say that prior to 1976 there was no secret literature on Cuba. And what was known prior to 1976 could not be a secret afterward either.

Cuba is now a country with an excellent system of education, medical services and social security. Such indicators as life expectancy and infant mortality testify to this. The Cubans may today say with legitimate pride that they have the lowest infant mortality in Latin America and one of the lowest in the world—11.9 per 1,000 births. We would note for comparison that in the United States it constitutes 10.7, and in the USSR, 26 (in Central Asia, 60). General mortality on Cuba is lower than in the United States. Average life expectancy here has in the years of the revolution increased by approximately 15 years (compared with 4.6 years in the United States and somewhat of a reduction in the USSR). Yes, considerable sums were, indeed, allocated for education prior to the revolution also, but they were looted by officials of the educational system, about which I heard on Cuba many anecdotes.

...Every head of state and government has a personal guard. There are leaders who always "go among the people" surrounded by a large retinue, half of which is composed of bodyguards. This is frequently noticeable during M.S. Gorbachev's meetings with the masses also. He is always surrounded by well-trained young people, who scrutinize everyone who approaches him. They even surrounded Gorbachev during his conversations with milkers at a kolkhoz livestock unit, although these women could hardly have been suspected of constituting any danger to the life of the country's leader.

I have seen F. Castro many times and not once have I observed around him such a number of guardians as in the USSR. This could be confirmed also by the students of Havana University, to which F. Castro is a frequent visitor. These are amazing meetings. Accompanied by one or two aides, the Cuban leader arrives at his alma mater, meets on the grounds of the university campus its

present wards and spends hours chatting with them about the country's problems. He may also be seen in a column of demonstrators on national and international holidays. I can offer as visible evidence photographs also. When I first saw this, the first thought that entered my head was that it would be a good thing were Soviet leaders of various levels also, instead of decorously standing on platforms, to walk if only from their place of work to the center of the festivities in a common column with the people.

I recall the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War. A speech at the ceremonies was delivered by F. Castro. I have heard many speeches and reports on this occasion: of N. Khrushchev in the dress uniform of a colonel general, of Marshal L. Brezhnev and of "man of the world" M. Gorbachev. But I have not encountered such human words of involvement in the general rejoicing as were spoken here by F. Castro. You do not believe me? Get hold of F. Castro's "Selected Works" (Moscow, 1986, p 269). You will see for yourself. But I would like here to call attention to something else.

We were admitted to the hall ID checks. At meetings of such a level in the USSR this is simply inconceivable—they are checked many times over. My wife and I had good seats in the parterre. The two rows in front of us were left empty, and at the end of the formalities, they were occupied by the Cuban leaders. Fidel Castro was in front of us. We Soviet specialists were subsequently amazed by this simplicity and trustfulness of the Cuban leaders and the persons responsible for their security since we noticed no surveillance of our actions. After all, a concert means animation and applause, laughter and turnings in various directions. We considered at that time also that the Cubans' trust in Soviet people was immense. And, of course, they were not expecting any meanness on our part. It is very regrettable that people capable of meanness have come to be among us also.

How many times we foreign specialists encountered F. Castro and other leaders of the Cuba on the crowded streets of Havana. Soviet women told me how on Malecon (Havana's embankment) they saw Olof Palme, prime minister of Sweden, who had come to Cuba. He was standing alongside F. Castro by a jeep and chatting with him. They noticed no guard around them. F. Castro himself, incidentally, drives the automobile and takes Cuba's guests around the city and the island. A remarkable trait, is it not?

On the basis of the modest experience of my time in Cuba I can testify that Cuban society, granted all the modesty of its present income, is to a greater extent a society of working people than Soviet or any other society. Yet Cubans, as distinct from others, are not even 30 years after the start of their revolution talking about the victory of socialism there. They are moving toward it, overcoming tremendous obstacles.

For 30 years the Cuban revolution proceeded from the fact that it had friends who were far away from it in terms of distance, but very close in spirit. Signals of a different nature are coming from this "distance" now. But I would like to tell my Cuban friends that these are phony signals. All truly Soviet people have since the first days of the Cuban revolution been in sympathy with it and have been ready at any moment to come to its assistance. Here is a characteristic feature: when Fidel Castro came to Leningrad, its inhabitants, who had endured the blockade and the 900 days of the defense of the city against a most brutal enemy, took up their places on the Cuban leader's proposed route the night before in order to see and welcome him. Cuba is known to our people as the "island of freedom" or "hero island". Such is the true attitude of the Soviet people toward Cuba and its people—an attitude not dictated by any mercenary considerations. No one and nothing can change these relations. We are true to friendship and solidarity.

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Castro Appearance at Ibero-American Summit Assessed

91UF1140A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Aug 91 p 4

[Article by L. Velekhov under the rubric "Latin America": "Pilgrimage to Canosa? Fidel Castro in Guadalajara"]

[Text] Lost in the shadow of two important political events of July—the London meeting of the "Group of Seven" and the Moscow summit meeting—was a third one, almost as important in terms of world significance. Leaders of 19 states of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin as well as Spain and Portugal gathered in Guadalajara, Mexico at the first Ibero-American summit. However, in the course of the meeting itself nothing extraordinary happened. It's nature was, first and foremost, one of establishment of facts: It outlined the present stage of the integration of Ibero-American states and formalized that process within the framework of a long-term and stable economic union.

But there was one sensation here. And, by an irony of political fate, it was similar to that which distinguished the meeting of the "Group of Seven" in London. Mikhail Gorbachev made his "pilgrimage to Canosa" with a request for aid. Fidel Castro appeared in Guadalajara with a similar goal.

His appearance was awaited here as the main event despite the fact that all the stars of first magnitude of the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking heavens were gathered there, including King Juan Carlos. It was even feared that the summit, whose goal was to discuss a number of issues, would turn into a discussion of one—the Cuban issue. Castro himself clearly feared that as well. And he managed to avoid it in a masterful fashion. He refused to attend the news conference, understanding

that it would turn into a discussion with representatives of the opposition from Miami—the Cuban Democratic Platform (PDS)—which had already announced its right to represent the interests of Cuba at several meetings of the leaders of Latin American states. Instead of the news conference he conducted an "improvised" meeting at the doors of his hotel room with four Mexican correspondents allowed there who asked him distinctly favorable questions in the presence of the 50 bodyguards of the Cuban leader.

But the main thing, of course, was his speech at the summit, delivered with the rhetorical art that is characteristic of Castro. A request for aid sounded in practically every one of his sentences. At the same time, nowhere was it expressed directly. It was wrapped up, as though in a cocoon, in the appeals which ran through the entire speech for unity of Latin American and Spanish states in a bloc able to "oppose the United States, Japan, or Europe." We will note how Castro changes the very subject of integration. It is at the center of discussion, everyone talks about it in its economic aspect, but he suddenly and abruptly leads it into the political sphere, discussing in essence the opposition of the Ibero-American states to the rest of the world. "Which of us can cope with this opposition by himself?" rhetorically asks Castro, already legitimizing opposition as some kind of existing and inevitable necessity which no one had thought of mentioning prior to his appearance at the microphone. Continuing to politicize the idea of integration, Castro declares that "we need to unite our efforts in the name of the unity of Latin America, and not only economic unity but also political unity." This is indeed a fundamental novelty—the "political unity" of Socialist Cuba with yesterday's ideological opponents. Yes, that was the idea: "Cuba is prepared to belong to that integrated, united Latin America," because, at the end of the speech, "we are all one family, independent of ideology."

This is that sharp turn, as a result of which Castro is reintegrating—for the time being on the rhetorical and theoretical level, of course—Cuba into the Latin American community which it left 30 years ago.

But one should not think that Castro himself, urgently in need of economic aid and requesting it under the guise of reintegration, is going back on his word as a politician to any degree. (I have already had the opportunity to hear such commentary from Western radio stations.) Nothing of the sort. All this verbal politicization of the idea of Ibero-American integration has been undertaken in order to achieve a desired economic goal without political losses. Thanks to the fact that the entire speech is so ridden with arguments on politics that are essentially unprecedented (for example, nowhere does he himself purposely define in any fashion the basis of the future "political unity" for which he is appealing), Castro succeeds in avoiding the concrete acknowledgement of his own political capitulation which many expect from him.

He sweeps aside this subject as though it has no relation to the matter at hand or is untimely. Not a word about a rejection of "socialist choice." Not a word about promises of future changes: "We are the country which has changed more than any other over the last 30 years." Not a hope for political freedom: Why, when "our constitution was adopted 11 years ago by 97 percent of the votes?" A dialogue with the opposition from Miami? Maybe, but one must ask on what basis. Never mind politics—not a word was said even of the need for economic reforms. In addition, an intimate conversation at the door of a room with the participation of four journalists and 50 "security men" betrays the weakness of the great man. It is said that he arrived in Guadalajara "prepared to sit in the seat of the accused and defend himself." However, on the other hand, he "never felt that he was guilty." And then, the main thing, that here in Guadalajara "respect prevailed and we felt wonderful." And, in general, what is to be done: "We, revolutionaries, must always sit in the seat of the accused." This, of course, was what they call a Freudian slip. It is clear what Fidel, with his propensity for figurative speech, wanted to say. But in the context of the fate of many "revolutionaries" of recent years, this sounded overly straightforward and fatalistic.

Many, judging by the reaction of the press, saw in this speech practically a declaration of a change of political and economic course. But in fact Castro **did not say a word** about that. He **actually** asked for economic aid, without, however, ever asking for it in words, and he **seemed** to promise political changes in exchange, without so much as even hinting at them.

Brazilian Intent To Attract Skilled Soviet Immigrants Viewed

91UF1083A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 91 Union Edition p 5

[Article by M. Kozhukhov, personal correspondent (Rio de Janeiro): "The Beckoning Shores of Brazil..."]

[Text] **We were understandably annoyed when we read the recent reports of the haste with which neighboring countries were changing their immigration laws in a prudent attempt to protect themselves from an invasion by our citizens, who were expected to rush across the border as soon as the free exit law went into force. But here is some good news: It turns out that we are wanted somewhere! But not all of us....**

The news spread quickly to almost all of Brazil's press organs: The government here hopes to attract "thousands of scientists from the USSR, Jews and members of any other nationality," to Brazil and plans to allocate 100 million dollars for this purpose and issue the necessary visas to import the brilliant Soviet minds whose owners wish to make use of this opportunity.

It is interesting that the news was first leaked to the press on the other side of the world—in Israel. Tel Aviv's influential newspaper, HA'ARETZ, devoted part of the

front page to an article about the Brazilian plan—not, incidentally, because it was happy for the Brazilians, but because it was worried about the negative effects this kind of "re-export" of specialists from the USSR might have on science in Israel.

Intrigued by this turn of events, the Brazilians took their questions to the highest authority named in the Israeli reports—to Jose Goldenberg, the head of the republic president's National Secretariat on Science and Technology. What happened then? The secretariat, according to O GLOBO, confirmed that Brazil did intend to invite all Soviet citizens wearing university pins on their lapels, all who were ready to leave the USSR, to Brazil. The secretariat is investigating the possibility of establishing a "Soviet scientific community" here and assisting in its painless adaptation to the latitudes of the Tropic of Capricorn. It is true that this is still only in the planning stage, as one of Goldenberg's aides explained, and that the prospect of getting the requested 100 million dollars for these "imports" from the government is still uncertain. Now that the American Congress has established an additional quota for Soviet immigrants, he added, Brazil should not miss this opportunity either....

I have to say that immigrants in this country do not have to deal with the prejudice that is so typical in ours. There is at least a drop of African or European blood in the veins of any Brazilian, and it was the immigrants who made Brazil what it is today. J. Kubitschek, one of the most famous presidents of Brazil, the one who built the country's equally famous capital in the middle of a desolate plain, was, as we know, a Czech. Open any Brazilian encyclopedia to the section on the history of the national ballet, and all the names will be Russian: M. Oleneva, I. Shvetsov, N. Vershinina, T. Leskova....

Thousands of Brazilians leave the country each year and go to America, Western Europe, or Japan in search of happiness and high salaries. No one here, or anywhere else in the civilized world, is amazed by this: People go where things are better.

They are not always welcome there, however. According to officials in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, recently it has been increasingly difficult for a Brazilian to obtain even a tourist visa to, for instance, the United States. Almost one-third of the people who line up in front of the American consulate with stacks of official papers in their hands have to change their vacation plans. Why? A tourist visa is frequently just the easiest way of getting across the border, and this is why applicants have to offer extremely convincing evidence that they are tourists and have no intention of staying in the United States forever (obviously, no one will even talk to them until they can prove that they have at least 70 dollars for each day of their American vacation).

Incidentally, the United States is not an exception to the rule: Applicants for tourist visas in the consulates of Canada, France, and Japan have to meet approximately the same requirements. As for Brazil itself, although the

government does not restrict the number of tourists entering the country, it nevertheless views arriving foreigners primarily as a threat to the local labor market. The identification papers the federal police issued to your correspondent, for example, are stamped in bold black letters: "Not authorized to perform any work for pay from a Brazilian source." Although I must admit that registering with the local labor exchange did not enter into my plans, my curiosity forced me to ask for an explanation. The policeman who gave me the papers replied politely that I certainly could write an article for a Brazilian newspaper or perform some other valuable service for this country, but only for free. "You could be deported, Senor, for any attempt to earn money, even if only by shining someone's shoes for a fee...."

Let us return, however, to the subject of our scientists.

The belief that Brazil might be one of the places to which the Soviet scientific and technical emigration might gravitate in the near future is not that far-fetched. This is corroborated by a letter the Rio de Janeiro post office recently received from Vladivostok, from a man named Gena Shebergin, who, just as the Englishman R. Kipling in the famous song, also wants to go "to Brazil, to the distant shores of Brazil." What can he offer the exotic land? Gena—I am paraphrasing his letter, which was printed in JORNAL DO BRASIL—is 32, is in excellent health, and has no vices. Furthermore, he "loves to work." He is a ship radio operator by profession, but does not insist on this and is willing to work in any field "connected with fishing or farming, but could also work in forestry or even in the coal mines."

There is no question that the polite Brazilians will send Gena a reply. As the director of the post office said in an interview, "We usually answer even the letters addressed to Santa Claus," implying that Gena was even more entitled to a reply.

I certainly do not plan to usurp the functions of the postal employees, but while their letter was making its way from Rio de Janeiro to Vladivostok, I went to the alien registration department of the federal police and asked exactly what kind of reply Gena Shebergin, with his dreams about the distant Amazon, might receive.

I was told that everything was possible in principle: Gena could buy a ticket to Rio de Janeiro and begin building a new life—provided, of course, that he was Portuguese, or that he was disabled, or that he was under 21 and could prove that his beloved grandmother was living on the distant Amazon and had no one else to bring her a glass of water, or if Gena's son or daughter had been born in Brazil, or if he planned to spend the rest of his life with a charming Brazilian woman, or if he had enough capital to establish a small metallurgical company or any other enterprise in this country. Then the post office would be certain to urge Gena to come to Brazil right away and work to his heart's content and for the glory of Brazil.

It is true that in any of these cases our Gena would receive only a temporary residence permit and the right

to work only in the private sector: Civil service is prestigious and lucrative here. There was no need to be discouraged, however, the police officer went on to say: Gena could start a family here and apply for Brazilian citizenship after giving up his own, because dual citizenship is not recognized in this country (it is true that even after becoming a citizen of Brazil, Gena Shebergin could never be a deputy, a senator, or—if the worst came to the worst—a general, but he probably is not planning to do this).

In essence, our countryman has only one chance of getting into the country of his dreams, and it is precisely this legal technicality that Goldenberg's secretariat apparently intends to employ. The federal police gave me a list of professions virtually guaranteeing the quick issuance of an entry visa and a temporary residence permit. The list includes engineers in almost all fields, physicists—electronic and nuclear—and specialists in industrial design, as well as technicians in almost all fields, including, for example, welders, and even veterinarians and chefs.

There is a catch, however: In this case the applicant for a visa would have to have signed a contract with a Brazilian firm, guaranteeing him a job, and this contract would have to have been approved by the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Justice. According to my estimates, by the time Gena finished doing this, more than one generation of the armor-clad tortoises made famous by the poet would have come and gone on the distant Amazon.

If this is not enough to discourage him, there is something else he will have to consider, even though it might seem secondary. Not everyone feels "at home" in the completely alien "environment" here.

"I am personally horrified by Brazil," 38-year-old Sergey D., who recently came here from Lvov, told me candidly. Although he agreed to speak with an IZVESTIYA correspondent, he asked that the paper not print his name. His story is a common one, and it has been told more than once. In these situations, only the names and the locations change. In this case, the circumstances are probably not that common. I met Sergey on the embankment of the fascinating Copacabana, where we sat in a cafe, watching the bronze-legged young ladies returning from the beach, which was separated from us only by a stream of traffic. This is the same Copacabana Sergey cannot wait to forget.

He was in an almost privileged position, however, in Brazil: His wife is Brazilian, and he came here ostensibly for a family reunion and was later granted a work permit. Unfortunately, however, a work permit is not the same as a job offer. Neither he nor his wife could find a job, although there is every indication that they are hard-working people. Furthermore, they have mastered several occupations. They sent out resumes to everywhere possible, registered with the labor exchange, and even tried to start a small business of their own. The good

thing was that they did not get attached to their new family, and it was also good that they could not get used to the climate, the songs, the conversations, the books, the different views on the upbringing of their daughter—"alien" to everything that makes up our way of life, from which they had just recently fled, not for any special reason, but simply because they were tired of the endless lines, ration coupons, and other annoyances.

"This is a different world," Sergey told me. "It is a different culture. In spite of the creature comforts, you never get used to it...."

I will not bore the reader with the details, and besides, they might sound too much like the patriotic propaganda of the past. Especially since I know of other cases in which our former countrymen had trouble at first but then settled down quite happily here. In this case, after suffering for just over a year in Brazil, Sergey returned to

the USSR. Before he went to Brazil, he had been working, believe it or not, as a furniture production foreman in one of those places that are usually described as not too remote. He had barely begun to survey his new surroundings and had not even had a chance to show off his abilities when he and his Brazilian wife, faced with the need to choose between the Copacabana and the corrective labor colony, unhesitatingly decided to return to the zone....

As O GLOBO reported a few days ago, highly trained Soviet specialists are already requesting information from the Brazilian Embassy in Israel. The employees have not received any instructions on the matter yet and can only file their requests. Israel's minister of science and technology has asked the government for additional funds to keep the former Soviet citizens with college degrees from setting off for the distant and beckoning shores of Brazil.

North Korean Nuclear Program Viewed

91WP0137A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 24 Aug 91 p 5

[Article by A. Platkovskiy: "Kim Il-song's Favorite 'Mushroom?' New Information About the DPRK Nuclear Program"]

[Text] There are suspicions that North Korea, which defends "the most beautiful socialism" in the Far East, is vigorously working on developing its own nuclear weapons. According to some estimates, North Korea will possess nuclear weapons in two, maybe three years.

So far, no incontrovertible evidence to this effect has been found, with the exception of pictures taken by American spy satellites. However, President of South Korea Roh Tae Woo has no doubts about the fact that Pyongyang has such a program. South Korean intelligence received the latest confirmation from a defector from the DPRK, the highly placed functionary of the security service Choe San Gyu. He reported that "work on the decisive weapon"—which is what they call the nuclear program in the North—is in full swing. He referred to information received by him in the course of carrying out a secret mission associated with providing materials for a nuclear installation in the locality of Yongbyon, 90 kilometers to the north of Pyongyang.

American intelligence has long been following what is being built in Yongbyon. Pictures obtained from satellites are available, the analysis of which makes it possible to state that the construction of a quite large graphite gas-cooled nuclear reactor with a capacity of between 100 and 200 megawatts is being completed on this site. No signs have been found of plans to use it for peaceful purposes. In the vicinity, a well-protected structure is easily discernible. By all signs, this is a plant designed to enrich nuclear fuel...

American specialists believe that the technical parameters are sufficient to generate between 15 and 50 kilograms of plutonium a year. This means that by 1994, Pyongyang will have between two and eight bombs similar to the one which destroyed Nagasaki.

Pyongyang continues to categorically deny charges that it intends to become a nuclear power. Moreover, recently the North Korean authorities suddenly agreed to allow

International Atomic Energy Agency inspections at their installations. However, this does not at all mean that they are prepared to unreservedly "divulge their secrets." They set a condition: An inspection should be held simultaneously in South Korea where, as Pyongyang maintains, American nuclear weapons numbering 1,700 warheads are located.

Meanwhile, nervousness and suspicion of the two sides, the South and the North, are growing. The Southerners are convinced that the Northerners will lead inspectors by the nose even more successfully than Saddam Husayn has managed to. It is possible that ultimately Pyongyang will show something, but this will be a far cry from what actually exists. The view also exists that the facility in Yongbyon is nothing but "a dummy," and when inspectors arrive there they will see something like a large hog farm.

A Soviet military specialist who worked in Korea for a long time and did not want to reveal his name said: "The North Koreans are not simpletons who would put their secrets in full view." In his opinion, all of the most significant facilities serving the military programs are built inside the mass of the mountains. They are camouflaged in such a manner that no specialist will be able to guess where they are located. This servicemen also believes that, perhaps, Pyongyang did have plans to build its own bomb at one time, but that at present Pyongyang is simply bluffing. "Having encountered great difficulties, the North Koreans resolved to primarily emphasize their missile program. In the south of Korea, there are more than 10 nuclear power stations which make marvelous targets for missile strikes from the North. This is considerably cheaper and more effective than the production of nuclear weapons, which calls for colossal outlays."

By all signs, the South is also seriously concerned about the success of the North in creating its own missile potential. According to information which the South Korean Ministry of Defense has, recently a new secret unit was formed in the DPRK which is armed with Nodon-1 missiles with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers. The Southern military intelligence believes that these missiles carry chemical warheads. North Korea has more than 1,000 units of chemical weapons. Moreover, in the South they are convinced that Pyongyang would have never succeeded in developing its missile muscle without Soviet assistance.

Soviet Correspondent Surveys Effects of Iraqi Invasion on Kuwait

*91UF1049A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3,
5 Aug 91*

[Article by Boris Ivanov, personal correspondent (al-Kuwait—Moscow): "Kuwait: Life After the War"]

[Union Edition 3 Aug 91 p 6]

[Text] I got out of the elevator on the third floor, turned to the right, and stopped in front of a door with the number "6" etched on a white plate. The IZVESTIYA news bureau in Kuwait was located in this apartment before the Iraqi aggression. The doorman who had accompanied me, jangling his ring of keys, bent over the lock and, after a minute or so, opened the door.

"Everything here is just as it was during the occupation," he told me. "We just started cleaning up the building, and we did not get to this apartment yet. Of course, we had to install new locks on all of the doors in the building, because the old ones were stolen by the Iraqis."

I looked around. The place was empty—not simply empty, but ransacked and completely cleaned out, down to the last nail, as the saying goes. Literally everything had been stolen: the furniture, the light fixtures, the curtains along with the cornices, the wall-to-wall carpeting, the kitchen cupboards, the gas stove, the washing machine, and the refrigerator. The people who had stayed here had not left anything behind, not even the electrical sockets or faucets.

Actually, they did leave a few things. In one of the rooms, which was once the office, I could see the vivid red and green cover of "Ninny in Sun City" in the trash littering the floor. Nearby, under bits of fallen plaster, I found "The Adventures of Captain Vrungel," "Pippi Longstocking," and a few other children's books. I had brought them here from Moscow last July, when I began working as the newspaper's personal correspondent in Kuwait. They were meant for my little boy, who was supposed to arrive in September. He never did come, however, because the Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait on 2 August. This was followed by 3 long weeks, during which we—a few hundred Soviet citizens who had been in the country at that time—had to live under the occupation, then experienced all of the dramatic events of our evacuation to Baghdad, and finally returned to Moscow on a special Aeroflot flight.

I came back to Kuwait half a year later. I came here with units of Saudi troops 3 days after the Iraqis had been driven out. Now, by the will of fate—or, more precisely, the goodwill of the local Ministry of Information and the vigorous efforts of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the USSR, Abd al-Muhsin al-Duayj, who had invited a group of Soviet journalists to Kuwait—I was here for the third time.

What had happened to the IZVESTIYA bureau was fairly typical: During the 7 months of occupation, every

single ministry, bank, establishment, state and private company, and hospital had been plundered, not to mention the stores and commercial warehouses. The university campus looked like a desolate ghost town. While the Iraqi soldiers were cleaning out the lecture halls, laboratories, and student dormitories, they ripped the air conditioners out of the walls, "with all of the guts," leaving gaping holes behind. The raiding of the university library, where several million priceless works had been kept, on the other hand, was conducted on a "scientific basis." Several deans from Baghdad University were rushed to Kuwait to supervise the selection and loading of the books. The Museum of Islamic Culture in the capital was sacked in the same manner. The removal of its unique exhibits was overseen by Director Mu'ayyid Sa'id of Iraq's Department of Museums and Antiquities, and it was on his orders that the museum building was later set on fire. Today the building is a burned-out shell, with its walls charred and blackened and its roof caved in in several places. It will stay this way: Instead of rebuilding it, the Kuwaitis will build a new museum next to it. "We want to preserve the old building as a monument to barbarism and vandalism, as a reminder of the terrible days of the tragedy Saddam Husayn inflicted on Kuwait," Shaykh Hasah al-Sabah, the museum's founder and permanent director, told me. "There are many other ruins in the city, but we will restore everything. The new Kuwait will be better than the old one."

Coming Back to Life

"We will restore it!" These words are on the lips of literally each Kuwaiti today. And they are not just words. The Kuwaiti International Hotel, where we were staying, probably suffered less than other hotels: The Iraqis burned only the central lobby and stole only some of the furniture and electrical appliances, but they certainly did not forget to take all of the television sets out of the rooms and remove the locks from all of the doors. At first it was difficult not to smile at the sight of the big and bulky padlocks the hotel administrators had had to put on all of the doors. As time went on, however, there were fewer reminders each day of the plundering: Neat locks and shiny door knobs took the place of the padlocks. Each day a notice in the hotel lobby—something like a progress report on the restoration of the hotel—told which of the hotel's services had been restored: The dry cleaning service was back in operation, the gym was ready for guests, and another restaurant had begun serving meals. These signs of a return to a normal life can be seen everywhere today.

The capital's international airport, which suffered serious damage during the military actions, is back in operation, although it is not offering the full range of services yet. Regular flights to and from the world's capitals are being resumed. The streets are being cleared of ruins and debris, and garbage is being collected regularly. The almost sterile cleanliness that was typical of Kuwait before the occupation is returning to the city. The water and electricity have been turned back on,

communications with the outside world have been completely restored, and the stores are literally full of food. On the famous Kuwaiti embankment, which stretches through the city for more than 20 kilometers, traffic is heavy in the evenings, just as it was before the war. In the malls along Salmin Street, the Kuwaiti capital's famous shopping district, the signs and ads of all types of stores and shops are lighting up, blinking, and glowing in multicolored neon patterns. The tables in cafes and bistros are filling up, and the sounds of gaiety and laughter can be heard again. Kuwait is coming back to life. Like a recovering patient, the city is beginning to breathe more easily and confidently. This recovery, however, is still far from complete.

The first stage of reconstruction has already been completed, and it has been a success. Within 90 days and with the help of a few American, English, Saudi, and Kuwaiti firms, the servicemen of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, not only brought the electrical and drinking water supplies back to life, but also cleared the highways of rubble and removed the land mines from the main roads and bridges. After this they concentrated on the restoration of municipal services, so that life in the city could be normal again.

Then the specialists from the American Army Corps of Engineers began restoring several airport buildings and widening the runways and started repairing the 150 schools which had to be ready by the beginning of the school year.

Now it is time for the next stage in the revival of the country's economic potential. Much of this will have to be done from scratch. They will have to almost rebuild desalinizing plants and oil refineries, restore and remodel oil terminals, repair oil and gas pipelines, and—the main thing—put out the fires the Iraqis set in the oil wells. Without this, the oil industry, the foundation of Kuwait's economy, cannot be restored completely. The damages the emirate suffered during the occupation and the military actions and the cost of the necessary reconstruction have been estimated at around 100 billion dollars. Kuwait had put away approximately this amount "for a rainy day" in the form of capital investments in giant Western concerns, such as Midland Bank, Daimler-Benz, and Paribas. Kuwait's bank deposits abroad now amount to around 124 billion dollars, and they produced an income of over 9 billion dollars just last year.

In spite of this, however, the Kuwaitis have to deal with an unexpected problem: They do not have enough liquid assets, but their emirate needs a great deal of money to finish paying their contribution to the maintenance of the multinational forces in the anti-Iraqi coalition and to finance all of the reconstruction. They incurred immediate losses when they tried to sell their Western investments. Therefore, the only solution was to borrow money. According to Western experts, the Kuwaitis will have no problem getting loans: Their international reputation and credit rating are still impeccable. In the

words of Finance Minister Nasir al-Rodan, the ministry has been literally inundated with offers of loans. "In view of this, I think that the country's economy will be as strong as ever quite soon," he said.

Kuwait's financial stability and security are also attested to by the Central Bank's decision to cancel the restrictions it imposed several months ago on withdrawals of funds. Immediately after liberation there was the fear that the Kuwaitis would rush en masse to transfer their savings to overseas banks. This, however, did not happen. The government not only managed to pay each Kuwaiti who had remained in the country "under the Iraqis" a special allowance of 1,600 dollars, but also cancelled all of the debts the citizens of the country had owed before the war on loans and credits totaling 4 billion dollars. And this is not all. Each Kuwaiti will soon be paid a monthly salary for the entire period of the occupation. Those who fled the country to escape the Iraqi aggression, on the other hand, are being reimbursed by the government for all of the costs of the return trip. Besides this, the government is trying to minimize the difficulties of the postwar period by keeping the prices of some goods and services, including gasoline, extremely low. It costs approximately only a third as much to fill a gas tank here as in the United States or the West European countries.

The Palestinian Question

Whenever I met and spoke with Kuwaitis, they made constant references to the need to unite the efforts of the whole society. Only this, they said, would guarantee the quick restoration of the country. The social atmosphere in the country today, however, cannot be described as tranquil. One of the main causes of friction is the native Kuwaitis' treatment of inhabitants from other countries, especially the Palestinians.

The attitude toward them changed dramatically after many Palestinians openly applauded the Iraqi invasion and even went so far as to serve in the so-called "people's army" Baghdad formed in the emirate to subdue the population and fight against the Kuwaiti Resistance. The unconditional support the PLO leadership, headed by Y. Arafat, publicly declared for Saddam Husayn's plans for the complete annexation of Kuwait poured more oil on the flames. Palestinian militarized units, numbering a few thousand men, were even sent to the emirate from Iraq to carry out "punitive operations" against the Kuwaitis.

The Kuwaitis cannot forgive the Palestinians for collaborating with the occupation forces and taking part in the pillaging of the country. Now that the Palestinians have to contend with intolerance and seething emotions, it is not surprising that they are leaving the emirate. Now only around 120,000 of the 320,000 who lived in Kuwait prior to the aggression are still in the country. In the next few months the figure will probably drop even more: The Palestinians are having more difficulty finding jobs, and this is objectively urging them to seek a better life

elsewhere. They still have vivid memories of the trials of the collaborators, many of whom were Palestinian, in June and July. The sentences which were passed at that time (some of which were exceptionally severe) are compounding the psychological insecurity of the non-Kuwaiti segment of the population. The government is not keeping them from leaving the country. A recent resolution states that any Palestinian who had a job prior to the occupation and now wishes to leave the country will receive a fairly decent exit allowance. Nevertheless, some have decided to stay. 'Adil al-Husayni, an employee of a local bank, recently turned 48. He has lived in Kuwait for 15 years, and this is where his two daughters were born. Although he has relatives in Jordan, he does not want to leave the emirate. "Of course, there were many Palestinians who collaborated with the Iraqis," he said, "but there were also the others, the ones who helped the Resistance. So why lump all of them together now?... As for me, I can face Allah and the Kuwaitis with a clear conscience. This is my home, and I do not want to run away from it. It will not be easy to get used to the present situation, but quite honestly, I have to admit that it is our own fault. I am certain that things will be better in the future and that we will all remember the present situation only as a terrible nightmare."

The Most Popular Word

Many foreign businessmen, representatives of the construction firms and industrial companies taking part in the restoration of the emirate, can be seen in Kuwait today. Most of them are American. There is no question that the United States is extremely popular in the country now. The affection for it is sincere, and its prestige is colossal. Today the red carpet is always rolled out for Americans anywhere in the country. "America, Thank You for Everything!" "Long Live the United States!" "United States, We Love You!" Graffiti of this kind literally cover the walls of buildings, fences, and even the bodies of cars. The most popular word in Kuwait since the liberation is the one-syllable word "Bush." Many portraits of the American President have been put up all around the city. The old-timers in the local press corps recall how crowds of Kuwaitis literally laid siege to the U.S. Embassy in the first weeks after liberation in the hope of obtaining some object marked with American symbols. According to witnesses, 6,000 flags of the stars and stripes and over 10,000 portraits of Bush were distributed to the population of the emirate at that time. It is not surprising that American companies were immediately assigned the main role in the reconstruction of Kuwait: They were awarded more than 70 percent of all the contracts for this work.

It is precisely in Washington that the Kuwaitis are seeking guarantees of their own future security. Now that officials in Baghdad are publicly repeating their earlier assertions that Kuwait, in spite of everything that has happened, is still the 19th province of Iraq, security is an exceptionally crucial issue. Many inhabitants of the

emirate believe that the danger of a new military adventure by Baghdad is quite strong. In this context, it is not surprising that when the last U.S. subunits from the multinational force left Kuwait, the 11th American Armored Brigade, numbering 6,000 men, was transferred to the emirate from the FRG at the request of the Kuwaiti Government. It is stationed near al-Kuwait and, according to announcements, will stay in the country until September. In fact, American spokesmen do not rule out the possible of its extended presence.

Although Kuwait and the other gulf states are designing a regional security system, in which they would be joined by Egypt and Syria, the emirate's leadership still relies heavily on U.S. assistance. In spite of this, the government categorically denies the possibility of the establishment of permanent American military bases in Kuwait, although it does not exclude the possibility that the U.S. Armed Forces might be granted certain privileges. In more specific terms, these might include the temporary basing of American planes on Kuwaiti airfields, the entry of Kuwaiti ports by American naval ships for rest and refueling, the organization of joint American-Kuwaiti combat maneuvers, the location of U.S. weapon depots on Kuwaiti territory, and the use of the emirate's infrastructure.

In addition to dealing with the potential danger of another Iraqi invasion, the government must consider the need to reform and re-equip the Kuwaiti Army, which numbered 17,000 men before the war and which was a largely symbolic force. According to local experts, there is also a need to revise the military doctrine, which states that the Kuwaiti Armed Forces will resist any aggression until outside help arrives. The recent events proved that the army was completely incapable of deterring the attacking Iraqi units.

"I Will Not Run Away Next Time..."

Feelings of apprehension and fear about the possibility of a new Iraqi military invasion are one of the main reasons why the population is still carrying thousands of firearms. This is why the government's demand for the surrender of all guns was effectively ignored, except for a few dozen old hunting rifles and sports pistols that were turned in at police stations by the country's foreign inhabitants, mainly Jordanians, Palestinians, and Egyptians. The Kuwaitis have preferred to keep their weapons. "I have two automatic rifles and a pistol at home. They give me a sense of security," I was told by a 30-year-old Kuwaiti who identified himself only as Muhammad. "I certainly can understand why the government would feel that the possession of so many guns by the population creates a potentially explosive situation, but my friends and I feel otherwise. Anything can happen in this life, and if an Iraqi soldier should suddenly knock on my door again, I would not hide and run away as I did before."

Just a month ago, as he told me, it was quite easy to get a gun. All that a person had to do was to drive about 20

kilometers out of the city into the desert and find one of the hundreds of abandoned Iraqi bunkers packed with crates of assault rifles, machine guns, bazookas, grenades, and land mines. Many Kuwaitis took several such trips and never returned empty-handed. Muhammad also added the information that he had taken a bunch of grenades to the police, but only for the purpose of getting a receipt for the weapons. "If anyone wants to search my home, I will show him this receipt. Everyone is doing this. Everyone with two assault rifles is turning one in and keeping the other. Anything could happen: As long as Saddam is in Baghdad, Kuwait can never be free...."

[Union Edition 5 Aug 91 p 5]

[Text] Al-Burqan Is Burning

The oil fields and wells are located around 20 kilometers south of al-Kuwait. Just a year ago, anyone driving along the highway connecting the Kuwaiti capital with Saudi Arabia could have seen the steel thickets of oil wells. Today there are only pillars of fire, enormous clouds of smoke, and the sickening smell of burning oil.

When our car turned onto the road leading to al-Burqan, the biggest and richest deposit in Kuwait, we saw a dismal and almost unbelievable sight: Right in front of us and on both sides, thick clouds of absolutely black smoke rose from the earth to the sky. The sky was completely obscured by a seemingly impermeable sheet of black. Sometimes a strong gust of wind revealed sinister tongues of flame, leaping dozens of meters into the air. After a few minutes the car drove up to two water pumps installed on a wooden deck. The yellow lettering on several water carriers, trucks, and jeeps nearby said: "Fighting Fire Is Our Job," and on the next line: "Wild Well Company, Texas, USA." This is where a group of American firefighters getting ready to put out the fire in another well.

I walked with one of them, tall and ruddy Texan Jim Leabo, around 30 meters in the direction of the burning well. When the heat became unbearable and we had trouble breathing, we stopped. "You can't get any closer without wearing a special suit," Jim said, "because the temperature near the well can get as high as 1,200 degrees." Several strange-looking mounds smoldered nearby, sending thick clouds of absolutely black soot into the sky. "That's the congealed oil burning," Jim said when he saw me look over there. "In this kind of intense heat, the oil coagulates, solidifies, and turns into a thick substance like clay. The whole desert here is dotted with these little black islands. As soon as the fire reaches them, they flare up instantaneously."

According to the latest data, the Iraqis turned around 740 of Kuwait's 950 oil wells into flaming bonfires when they were retreating. This is only an approximate figure: Because of the impermeable smoke covering the sky over most of the territory where the oil wells are located, even aerial reconnaissance cannot reveal the exact number of fires. Specialists from the Kuwaiti Oil Ministry believe that the Iraqis mined 810 wells, but the explosions in

around 70 did not start fires for various reasons. Now they are just gushing crude oil into the desert. As it spreads, it forms oil lakes a meter or more deep. Stopping them up, or, as the firemen call it, "getting the wells under control," is not easy either: The road to them lies through burning oil fields, and this area has not been cleared of land mines yet either.

The fires began to be put out in March, mainly by American specialists under the supervision of three giant companies in this field—Red Adair, Inc., Boots and Coots, and Wild Well. On 31 March the first of the burning wells was extinguished. By the middle of April 30 wells were "under control." After that the work slowed down.

According to the Americans, this was due to delays in the delivery of the necessary machinery, instruments, and materials. Western correspondents, however, felt that there was another reason—the method the firefighters from the United States were using to put out the fires. The technology is quite simple. Powerful guns shoot water at the well from several sides to cool down the air, soil, and equipment so that people can get closer to the burning well. Then a charge of dynamite is lowered onto the ground near the opening of the well, usually by an enormous crane, and then the dynamite is set off and the explosion "blows out" the flames.

According to Germany's DER SPIEGEL, this method might be justified when a single isolated well is on fire and when the time factor is not of major importance. The situation in Kuwait is different, and time is of the essence: Each day the emirate's losses of oil are equivalent to 10 percent of the world's daily consumption. This is why the Kuwaitis had to breach the monopoly of the U.S. firefighting firms. Now specialists from Great Britain, France, Romania, Hungary, and Pakistan are working with the Americans. They are using other, alternative methods of fighting the fires. A few days ago Chinese representatives signed an agreement to take part in the firefighting efforts. Judging by all indications, our firefighters will also be assigned a separate area soon. The Soviet-Kuwaiti negotiations have entered their final stage. The Soviet interests in this agreement are represented by a group of departments and associations, headed by the Konversiya concern. Our specialists are certainly not the only ones wishing to fight the fires in the Kuwaiti oil fields. Doctor Hamud al-Ruqba, the emirate's oil minister, said he now has more than 1,200 bids on file from different foreign companies wishing to take part in this project. In his opinion, however, it would be impossible to increase the number of firefighters substantially at this time. "We will form a few more groups of firefighters, bringing the total number up to 16," the oil minister said. "Each group will work in its own section. The work is picking up speed already: Each day two or three, and sometimes four, wells are extinguished. The work is certain to go even quicker when the present plans for the increase in the number of firefighters are carried out."

The Continuing Ecological Tragedy

The fires in the wells closest to al-Kuwait were the first to be extinguished and are still being put out. This is essential for the improvement of environmental conditions in the city. In July the sun shone again in the Kuwaiti capital for the first time since the fires were set in the oil fields: The thick black smog of soot and smoke that had blocked the sun's rays, and had made noon look like dusk, disappeared. Since that time the skies over al-Kuwait have been clear and blue. Only at night does the gleam of the fires light up the southern sky with a pinkish-orange glow and remind everyone of the continuing ecological tragedy. Its scales are colossal, and it extends beyond the emirate's territory. While people in al-Ahmadi, a town near al-Burqan, have noticed an abrupt rise in the rate of pneumonia, asthma, and bronchitis, there have been reports from Kashmir that black snow fell on the Himalayas at an altitude of 5,000 meters, and the World Health Organization has already warned the inhabitants of southern Iran not to use rain water. Analyses indicated that this water can be hazardous to their health because it contains lead, benzopyrene, and soot. Experts from the World Meteorological Organization believe that although the fires in Kuwait are emitting around 70 million cubic meters of gas and 80,000 tons of soot into the atmosphere each day—the same quantity of solid microparticles as all of the motor vehicles in the world—they are unlikely to have a significant effect on temperatures and precipitation on the global scale. The only thing they can do and have already done is to lower average monthly temperatures by 3 or 4 degrees because the thick smoke screen does not allow the sun's rays to reach an area measuring several hundred square kilometers.

The efforts to put out the fires have been accompanied by measures for the restoration of oil production equipment as quickly as possible (wherever conditions permit) and its immediate operation. The few remaining undamaged wells were producing around 25,000-30,000 barrels of oil a day in late March and April. Now, according to the data of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC), the daily output of oil has already reached 120,000 barrels. By the end of this year the figure could rise to 170,000-200,000 barrels. For the sake of comparison, we should recall that Kuwait could produce 1.8-2 million barrels a day before the war. Specialists from the Ministry of Oil are certain that Kuwait will be able to completely satisfy its own need for oil by fall and begin regular exports by the end of the year. From talks with the oil minister, the KPC experts, and representatives of other government agencies, I gathered that the emirate's leadership is certain that it will only take a year at the most, after the last fire has been put out, to match the pre-war output.

In spite of the devastating effects of the Iraqi aggression, Kuwait is still one of the richest countries in the world. Its known oil reserves alone exceed 90 billion barrels—enough to last 250 years at the pre-war rate of production. With the colossal amounts of petrodollars that will

begin flowing into the country again as soon as the oil pumps start up, the emirate will be able to quickly turn back into the fabulous oasis it was before the Iraqi aggression.

All of this will happen in the future, because today the fires are devouring up to 7 million barrels each day. Every day more than 120 million dollars goes up in smoke....

The White Tent in the Desert

The lively activity from morning to night in an unprepossessing gray building in Doha, a small town near the Kuwaiti capital, is in sharp contrast to the moderate and even tempo of life in the emirate. There are the hum and clicking of typewriters, teletypes, and fax machines and the hissing and whistling of radio transmitters. Officers dressed in the uniforms of different foreign states walk through the halls. Some of them are ours, wearing the camouflage field uniform that became a common sight after Afghanistan. The emblem of the United Nations on a field of blue hangs on the flagpole in front of the building. This is the headquarters of the UN mission observing the ceasefire between Iraq and Kuwait (UNIKOM).

It was established by a special resolution of the UN Security Council and is supposed to record any violations of the ceasefire between the two countries. The members of the mission are servicemen from more than 10 states belonging to the international community. Most of the officers are under 40 and have experience working in other UN military missions. The overwhelming majority are on patrol duty at special UN posts in various parts of the demilitarized zone along the entire Iraq-Kuwait border. It is a strip of land 15 kilometers wide, taking in 5 kilometers of Kuwaiti territory and 10 of Iraqi territory. The presence of military hardware and troops, with the exception of UN personnel, is prohibited there.

Our group of Soviet journalists was lucky. The head of UNIKOM, Austrian Maj Gen Greindl, "okayed" our trip. After a 2-hour ride through the desert, we finally reached our destination: a small enclosed area by the highway. A big white tent in the center was covered with a camouflage net. A primitive washroom, made of boards nailed together, and a make-shift shower—a bucket of water standing on four posts above a little structure that looked like the dressing rooms on our public beaches—were next to the tent. Another wooden structure in the far corner was an outdoor toilet, having many features in common with the "conveniences" that are so familiar to all of us from our stays in vacation cabins. There were also two white Toyota all-terrain vehicles with "UN" written on the doors in big Roman letters. This is probably a complete list of the rudimentary property of UN post "Charlie-6," located in the central sector of the demilitarized zone. In addition to the central one, there are also southern and northern sectors.

An essential condition the UN mission command set for the post was that it had to be manned by an international team. The presence of two servicemen from the same country in one group or team of observers is categorically prohibited. Each post is manned by a team of five. The men at "Charlie-6" were a Frenchman, an Austrian, a Dane, and a citizen of Ghana, and the senior official was one of our countrymen—Timur Gussey-nov from Moscow. He is a 31-year-old Afghanistan veteran with the rank of major.

"We are here just to record any violations of the ceasefire, violations of the Iraq-Kuwait border, and the presence of unauthorized individuals and equipment in our section of the demilitarized zone," he explained. "Our duties do not include detaining the violators. We are only observers and will report violations immediately to UNIKOM headquarters, and the relevant information will then be sent from there to UN headquarters in New York."

Binoculars Instead of Weapons

The observers are unarmed: They are expressly forbidden to carry weapons or even to simply have them in their possession. Instead of weapons, they have binoculars and the transmitters set up in the tent. These run on solar batteries in the daytime and a generator at night. Incidentally, it is an ordinary canvas tent without an air conditioner. It is not easy to live in this tent in summer in the desert. On the day we visited "Charlie-6," the mercury in the thermometer was above 66 degrees Celsius, and I must say that when we stepped inside to get out of the blazing sun, we did not feel any relief.

The furnishings inside were extremely simple, if not ascetic. Five collapsible roll-away beds, a few folding chairs, two carelessly built wooden tables, and a few boxes of groceries in the corner near the entrance. A huge side-by-side Westinghouse refrigerator was a symbol of civilization. In these primitive surroundings, it looked as if it had arrived here by accident.

Fresh fruit and drinking water are delivered to the post from al-Kuwait each day. Most of the food consists of standard army rations supplied by the Americans and the corresponding NATO services. These deserve a more detailed description. The single army ration (the American soldier receives three of these each day) is a small package, hermetically sealed in brown polyethylene. It never goes bad: It can stay in a desert or a swamp for 5, 10, or 15 years without losing any of its caloric value or taste. There are several series of rations, numbered according to the main dish inside. Here is a list of the contents of one of the packages: roast beef with carrots, sardines in oil, processed cheese, crackers, instant tea and coffee, powdered milk, sugar, salt, pepper, a tiny bottle of "Tabasco," a Mexican hot sauce, candy, chewing gum, moist towelettes, matches, and plastic forks, knives, and spoons. All of this is packed in separately sealed packages in such a way that it can be

eaten even with dirty hands. All of the food in the packages can be eaten cold, but heating it up does not present any major problems either. When a little bit of water is poured into a separate transparent package attached to the ration, a chemical reaction caused by a substance inside this package boils the water almost instantaneously. After one of the food packets—the one containing the beef and carrots, for example—is immersed in the boiling water for a few minutes, it tastes as if it had just come out of the oven.

When I looked at these brown polyethylene boxes heaped in a big basket next to the refrigerator, I could not avoid comparing them with our army rations, the traditional pea soup, pork fat, and macaroni. What do the career soldiers think about this? I asked Major Gussey-nov.

"Quite frankly, I get depressed when I compare our daily life in the military with conditions in the American or NATO forces. I have seen things here that we might never have," he replied. "Of course, as an officer, I am disappointed and annoyed by these differences, but when I remember the state of our economy, I wonder if things could be any other way. After all, we have to work with what we have."

A Will Is Compulsory

Twenty Soviet officers work in UNIKOM: two in the liaison group in Baghdad and the rest in observation subunits in Kuwait. The highest-ranking one is Lt Col Vyacheslav Vlasenko, who has had a great deal of experience in comparable UN operations in the Middle East. Prior to this, he was a member of the same kind of mission in Syria and Egypt.

The United Nations signs a contract with each of the officers on virtually all aspects of service in UNIKOM. In particular, each has to write out a will and sign a document consenting to the payment of insurance to his family in the event of...his death. According to the going UN rate, the life of an observer is not worth much—only 20,000 dollars.

The observers work in shifts. Each shift lasts 7 days. Then they have 2 or 3 days off, which they spend in al-Kuwait or Baghdad. Our officers, for example, usually go to Baghdad. Why? No one tries to keep the reason a secret: The cost of living is lower there. The observer is paid 2,800 dollars a month. It sounds wonderful, but it is not really that much, especially when he has to pay for a hotel, food, and transportation. Because of the shortages in our own domestic market, they do not want to go back home empty-handed. Some are planning to buy a television set or video equipment, and some even hope to buy a car. This is what attracts our young men to Baghdad.

Is it difficult to become a member of the team of observers? Judge for yourselves. Here are the requirements: They have to be under 40 and have attained the rank of captain-major, knowledge of a foreign language

(especially English) is essential, they must be in excellent physical shape, and they must have past experience in this kind of service. The General Staff once had another requirement: The officer had to be a family man. Unmarried men were not sent. Now things seem to have changed. It is true that none of Vlasenko's colleagues is a bachelor, but there is one divorced officer. Just a few years ago, this kind of "criminal" could not have even dreamed of going abroad.

When we were leaving "Charlie-6," I asked Gusseyenov if anything there reminded him of life in the Soviet Union. He thought awhile, smiled, and said: "You know, in May we were promised that we could move from this tent into German trailers with air conditioners and all of the other amenities within a month. Later they moved the date up to July. Now they are already saying it will be September or October. My foreign colleagues are grumbling, but I got used to this kind of thing at home long ago...."

Africa's New Political Environment, Impact on USSR Policy Viewed

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pp 5-10

[Article by Vladimir Gennadiyevich Titov, acting deputy chief, USSR MID Administration of International Organizations: "Africa in the Newly Forming Postconfrontational World"]

[Text] In addressing the African topic as a participant in a recently undertaken diplomatic action—the visits of the USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs to a number of countries in Africa, playing a leading role in regional cooperation and in international organizations—I would immediately like to "guard" myself from criticism for a possible "tourist's romanticism" of opinions about the African continent. It is a question more of an attempt to summarize a kaleidoscope of impressions, than of expounding any kind of ready-made concept about the place and prospects of Africa in the new world that is being born.

For the foreign policy of any state, the more so an "ailing" great power, it is exceptionally important to define the accents and priorities in the development of relations with the surrounding world from the positions of national interests, to forecast, preferably for the more distant future, the dynamic of influences of individual countries, regional formations or entire continents on world politics and the course of civilization-wide processes. Taking precisely this premise into account, we evidently should seek the answer to the question, often heard in many echelons of our society and in state structures, of how the African factor should be interpreted when drafting foreign political decisions.

The scattering of moods in our agitated society is great: from the appeals of "neo-isolationists" to "reject Africa" and the retrospective exaggeration of the mistakes and shortcomings of our "expensive" African policy, to calls for reviving the former concept of the continent as a strategic ally of the USSR in the struggle against imperialism. It seems, this dilemma can and should be resolved on the way to bringing the entire complex of our relations with the African countries into conformity with world realities, with the radical transformations in our country, and with processes reflecting the developmental trends and uniqueness of the countries on this enormous continent.

An internal political consensus on our African policy can only be formulated if cooperation with Africa switches onto the track of mutual interest and of creating conditions which to the greatest extent meet the requirements of solving the problems both of the Soviet Union, and of states on the African continent.

The new political thinking, rejection of confrontational approaches, and the end of the "Cold War" have evoked profound processes of transformation on the African

continent. Africa has joined the movement: It is adapting to new geopolitical realities and is now undergoing a stage, commensurate with the scale of the changes that unfolded in the period of decolonization in the early 1960s. The continent is strenuously seeking its own "political niche" in today's world. It is trying to involve itself in the process of forming new international relations and of their transformation on the principles of equality, justice and democracy.

The Africans do not conceal that the renovating processes in the Soviet Union have predetermined the re-thinking by Africans of traditional approaches to world problems and to their own continental politics, and have been an stimulus for the development of internal processes.

Despite the diversity and complexity of the trends manifesting in today's Africa, their basic content is a turn toward reformation as the only possible state policy, capable of providing for internal stability, for the solution of the pressing problems of the continent's countries, and for their national interests in the international arena. Rejection of forcible methods, the priority of political and legal tools in inter-African relations, and the emancipation of the foreign and domestic policies of these states from rigid ideological schemes, along with a shift of the accent to pragmatism in solving a broad spectrum of the continent's problems, objectively contribute to the consolidation of Africa, to its transformation into a united and, at the same time, inalienable and integral part of today's interdependent world.

Under the influence of changes in the world, the information revolution, and the realization of the destructive nature of totalitarianism and the corruption related to it, a wave of democratic demonstrations has rolled across Africa. They have basically criticized authoritarian regimes and called for a conversion to multi-party systems, taking into account, naturally, African specific features (until recently, single-party governments or the army held power in 38 states on the continent). In most cases, young people and students, Africa's most numerous population group, act as the instigators of these changes. The growth of moods in support of democratization of domestic life is accompanied here by the extensive spread of the ideas of the new political thinking.

The aggravation of economic difficulties in African countries is prompting local politicians to seek ways to demilitarize their foreign and domestic policy. Virtually everywhere in Africa, they are beginning to understand the need not only to implement disarmament measures, but also to change traditional thinking in this area, to overcome the military component of protecting national interests.

African leaders are receptive to the idea of the global process of disarmament and of involvement in its orbit not only of all types and categories of arms, but also of all states without exception, without which there will be no

possibility of freeing the resources, so necessary for getting Africa out of its economic crisis and for solving ecological and other problems.

The most important manifestation of the new thinking in Africa is the intensifying tendency to rely on one's own strengths and actively to pursue opportunities for inter-African cooperation and for interaction along the South-South line in order to solve imminent problems. Integrating trends are beginning to dominate here; the structures of subregional cooperation (in Western, Central, and Eastern Africa) are growing stronger; and the idea of launching an Africa-wide process in four directions (security, stability, development, and cooperation), along the lines of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, is being widely discussed on a sociopolitical level.

Many African states are starting to put into practice the ideas published in last year's "Challenge to the South" report, the result of 3-years activity by the Independent Commission of the South under the leadership of J. Nyerere, which reflected the developing countries' vision of world processes and their attempt to raise the significance of joint actions in the interests of the "third world."

Today's world is a world of economic blocs, against the background of which Africa essentially resembles a solitary "oasis," not yet involved in integration processes. That is precisely why the Africans are striving to set the economic "unity" of the continent at the center of their politics, on the basis of reducing subregional structures of cooperation into an Africa-wide market. The Organization for African Unity [OAE], they believe, has fulfilled its basic mission—completing the process of decolonization and establishing the independence of African countries—and now the task of struggling for the continent's economic development is moving into the foreground.

The political landscape of Africa is changing before our eyes. Individual states, declaring themselves leaders not only on a regional, but even on a continental scale, are stepping ever more confidently onto the front stage. Among them we can single out Nigeria, an African giant from the viewpoint of economic and human resources, which has become chairman of the OAE; Senegal—the political and cultural center of French-speaking Africa, instigator of the creation of the African branch of "Sotsintern," and future chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); Zimbabwe—one of the leaders of the Movement for Non-Annexation (DN) and the Community of Nations; the Ivory Coast, which claims the role of the continent's trade and economic crossroads; Ghana—one of the main reformers of the OAE and DN; and Kenya—the fourth center for international organizations after the U.S., Switzerland, and Austria.

The South African region seems very promising in all respects. A new sociopolitical situation is gradually

taking shape and a foundation is being laid for future post-apartheid relations as a result of Namibia's proclamation of independence, the end of the civil war in Angola, and positive shifts in the policy of the government of the Republic of South Africa, occurring under the pressure of the anti-apartheid movement in the country and abroad. The potential of this subregion is basically determined by the Republic of South Africa, with its powerful economy and modern and sometimes unique technology.

After the elimination of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa, a "superpower" will emerge on the continent's political stage, capable of involving the states of Southern Africa in the orbit of its economic and political influence, of creating a unified economic space in the region with rich mineral and power resources and a human potential of 120 million people, and of influencing the course of African and, in the foreseeable future, world processes.

At the same time, the problems related to restructuring the African post-colonial structures and approaches, formed in the course of 3 decades, are painful in themselves and are burdened in Africa by the weight and remnants of past years, by the specific nature of local conditions. These include economic backwardness (about 20 million Africans are starving), poverty, ethnic conflicts, tribalism, and diseases, particularly AIDS, which is annihilating the most able-bodied segment of the population. Against this background, the continent as before remains an arena of contradictions and direct military conflicts, many of which are the legacy of the bloc opposition of "Cold War" days (Angola, Mozambique). The face of Africa is still covered with the new pock-marks of internal ethnic conflicts (Somalia, Liberia, Ruanda, the Sudan).

Africans perceive the contemporary world far from simply. The events in the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe and the passing of the bipolar world have taken many African leaders unawares, especially those which are traditionally oriented toward us, and have led to their loss of customary indicators. The breaking of stereotypes is causing discomfort and a painful comprehension of reality for the leadership of a number of African states. Today, the world for Africa in many ways seems single-poled, in which the continent opposes the North. Against this background, moods in support of isolationism and tendencies to look at the continent as a besieged fortress, to isolate oneself from the surrounding world are often displayed.

However, along with this the majority of Africans understand that the locomotive of international relations is moving forward rapidly, and Africa must succeed in holding its own seat on it, in involving itself in dynamically developing world processes. It is obvious to Africa that, without integrating into the world community, it, in turn, cannot count on the understanding of its problems by the surrounding world. The changes occurring in the

world, Africans believe, are opening up additional possibilities for the advancement of their views and ideas for purposes of ensuring greater fairness in international economic exchanges and in the interests of reviving the economies of developing countries.

In positively assessing the end of confrontations between East and West and the development of Soviet-American cooperation, the Africans see these positive processes as an important prerequisite for solving topical international problems, for regulating regional conflicts, and for stabilizing the situation in the world on the whole. Improvement of the international atmosphere is creating a "unique factor of movement" for the elimination of contradictions, many of which have accumulated in Africa. At the same time, they believe that reducing the role of the military and ideological factor in contemporary international relations advances the economic component to a central place in inter-state relations, which in the future will, in their words, determine the nature of world transformations.

They worry that the problem of economic opposition of a "unified North" in regard to a "disconnected South" might become a basic component of the future world, and might turn into a factor, permeating the vertical and horizontal cross-sections of other world problems. In their opinion, it is exceptionally important to focus attention on the economic measurement of global challenges, to not allow the emergence of a "new type of confrontation" in the world. The end of the "Cold War" still does not insure against repeated relapses of rivalry and does not eliminate the original causes of conflicts that come from differences, still preserved, in the level of socioeconomic development and from the instability of the internal political situation.

Here, they still have fears that the convergence between East and West will lead to a reduction in economic aid to developing countries, will strengthen the confrontational nature of interactions between North and South, and may occur not only to the detriment, but also at the expense of the "third world." To some extent, the Africans' aspiration to direct international cooperation toward actually unilateral aid for the developing world is dissonant with the prevailing trend toward the emergence of a global economic consensus.

They are inclined in Africa to look at the destiny of the Movement for Non-Annexation from positions of consolidation of the developing countries against a background of new world realities. Under current conditions, in the opinion of Africans, it should concentrate its attention on economic priorities. The Movement for Non-Annexation, they emphasize, is also unique from the viewpoint of shaping the unified approaches of the developing world toward civilization-wide problems.

Despite the contradictory nature of Africa's current political picture, a stable international order and its effective management through global mechanisms of cooperation cannot be created without the participation

of this continent, which enjoys a majority in the Movement for Non-annexation and has a third of the votes in the UN. In the contemporary arrangement of world politics, Africa, a continent more than others oversaturated with destabilizing problems, is in many ways a connecting link, without which positive changes cannot be sufficiently strong and stable.

For us, Africa is not just an enormous mass of countries, containing more than half the world reserves of many strategically important mineral resources, a potential market, and a prospective trade partner. The African countries are an important reserve for our authority in the "third world," a factor for ensuring the long-term positions of the USSR in the East-West connection through influence in the developing countries, for our realization of our global destiny and responsibility as a superpower in international affairs.

In this regard, it is fundamentally important that the dependent attitude in regard to the Soviet Union, which previously existed in most African countries, and the expectation of unilateral aid from us fade into the past, being replaced by a recognition of strategic interest in the development of political cooperation with our country without any immediate material or other gains whatsoever.

Most African countries emphasize that they would like, as before, to see the USSR as a superpower which continues to play an important stabilizing role in international relations, constantly present on the continent and on a par with other factors determining its fate. The future entry of the USSR into the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in the opinion of Africans, significantly expands the platform for our interaction as partners, traditionally aimed at the export of raw materials, and predetermines a commonality of interests in the process of restructuring international economic relations.

The changes in the political geography of the continent persistently demand the introduction of amendments in the USSR's African policy. The practical implementation of our policy in Africa is related above all to preserving political dialogue and making it more active. Experience shows that only direct contacts are capable of removing the doubts and misunderstanding of African leaders in regard to individual elements of our evaluations of the development of the world situation, to convince them that the Soviet Union, regardless of the difficulties of perestroika, by no means intends to be passive in the African aspect of its foreign policy, and the more so does not intend to withdraw from Africa.

The problem of political regulation of conflict situations in Africa, above all in the south of Africa (Angola, Mozambique), as well as on the African Cape, remains of primary importance. The achievement of national conciliation in various sore spots of Africa and the creation of regional zones of security, peace and stability on the

continent would give the African countries an opportunity to concentrate on solving problems of development and strengthening the bases of national sovereignty, and would contribute to the more active involvement of the continent in worldwide processes.

The participation of the USSR in the development of models for the regulation of conflicts in Africa and the rejection of confrontational approaches in solving regional problems once again raise the question of our military cooperation with African countries, especially with those where our military presence is still sufficiently large. Today already, the principle of defense sufficiency should take priority in the development of our military ties with them. It is important to switch military cooperation onto mutually advantageous tracks, including by introducing new forms of payment (the delivery of goods and raw materials for the national economy of the USSR) for our deliveries of armaments and for the cancellation of debts in military credits.

The restructuring of our trade and economic cooperation with Africa on principles of mutual profitability is urgently necessary. Above all, it is important to focus efforts on strengthening the principles of profitability of business contacts with African partners. We should lead work toward a fundamentally qualitative renovation of the entire mechanism for economic cooperation with Africa on the basis of the real interests and possibilities of the parties. Obviously, the time has come to think about expanding the circle of our own, still monopolistic participants in foreign-trade and economic transactions with African states. For the time being, new companies, joint enterprises, and cooperatives are not appearing strongly in Africa.

Great potential lies in the possibility of establishing direct economic ties between Union republics or individual regions or oblasts and African partners. In this area, work to create joint mixed enterprises, including with third countries, or projects on a compensatory basis, and to develop forms such as leasing and contracts seems promising. Problems such as the switching economic cooperation onto a multilateral basis along the line of regional and international organizations, the purchase and reinvestment of long-term credit debts, the

training of technical specialists in local areas, and others require detailed development work.

The question of preserving the level of relations with African countries in the humanitarian area is becoming topical. It seems that, in moving our cooperation into the sphere of education, health care, culture, sports, and science and technology on a commercial basis, it is necessary to display a well-considered and differentiated approach with our sights on the future and to consider the economic possibilities of individual African countries, many of which are among the world's poorest states. At the same time, it would also be possible fully to utilize the possibilities of the Union republics and of philanthropic funds and associations, to develop cooperation in the area of mass information media, and to make ties among public organizations more active.

On the whole, analysis of the state of affairs in Soviet-African relations confirms the urgent need to maintain our cooperation with Africa on a level conforming to the political role and place of the USSR in today's world. The potential of interaction with the continent, developed in the past, and our positions there should serve the interests of the active involvement of the African factor in shaping a system of peace, security, and cooperation, relying on the democratic and just goals of the UN Statutes.

South Africa Provides Aid to Russians

91P50282A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Sep 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Humanitarian Gesture"]

[Text] A humanitarian aid party arrived yesterday by a special Aeroflot flight from Cape Town to the capital. More than 11 tons of free food, medicine, and clothing was brought from South Africa for Russians.

"This action first and foremost attests to the recognition of the special role of the leaders of Russia in opposing the anticonstitutional conspiracy," observed G. Olivier, head of the South African interest section in Moscow, during the ceremony for handing over the cargo. As the representative of the secretariat of the president of Russia reported, the aid will be directed to state boarding schools and distributed among invalids and elderly Muscovites in accordance with the instruction of B. Yeltsin.

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