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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

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PROLIFERATION ISSUES

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31 January 1992

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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SOUTH AFRICA

RSA Said To Employ 500 Soviet Arms Experts

*MB1101100392 Johannesburg South African
Broadcasting Corporation Network in English 0900
GMT 11 Jan 92*

[Text] A Danish researcher says South Africa [RSA] is one of several countries providing employment for about 500 experts from the former Soviet Union arms industry.

At the conclusion of an international conference in Copenhagen on the conversion of the arms industry in the former Eastern Bloc countries, (Miss Kronberg) said she had obtained the information from a senior official in Moscow.

Other countries providing work for the experts are Liberia, Syria and Pakistan. Various Western leaders have expressed concern about the proliferation of the former Soviet Union's expertise in the field of nuclear arms.

Scientists Conduct Satellite Experiment for Sweden*OW2812113591 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 2112 GMT 25 Dec 91*

[By Li Chenfeng (2621 2525 7364) and Liu Linzong (0491 2651 1350)]

[Text] Beijing, 26 Dec (XINHUA)—China recently successfully carried out a vibration experiment for a Swedish satellite.

Vibration experiments are important in detecting the intensity environment of a satellite prior to its launching. The experiment is also needed to ensure the safe launching of a satellite. The Beijing Intensity Research Institute under the China Academy of Carrier Rocket Sciences undertook the task of carrying out the experiment for the Swedish satellite. The institute has advanced experiment equipment and technology and has successfully carried out vibration experiments for the "East is Red" satellites. This institute conducted its first foreign satellite vibration experiment in 1990. It also provided kinetics data on the separation of satellite and rocket to a foreign satellite company.

Thanks to the close coordination between China's and Sweden's technicians, the vibration experiment for the Swedish satellite was successfully and safely carried out five days ahead of schedule. The manager of the Swedish Space Company, Swedish Satellite Engineering Company, said "We are very very satisfied with the experiment." His evaluations of the experiment are: "The acceleration precision control has been improved greatly; the handling of response curve has not only been rapid, but also timely; and I am sure experiments with European equipment will not achieve better results than the experiment conducted here."

Column Cites 'Peaceful' Nuclear Assistance*HK3012112291 Hong Kong HSIN WAN PAO
in Chinese 30 Dec 91 p 1*

["New Talk" column: "Numerous International Nuclear Issues Emerge at Year End"]

[Text] News on nuclear proliferation and nuclear arms came hard on the heels of one another shortly before the end of 1991, attracting attention from various circles.

Yesterday alone saw three such relevant news items. One was that the Chinese National People's Congress adopted the resolution approving the State Council's request for joining the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." The second, originated from Pakistan's capital, concerned a story that China will sign in Beijing tomorrow, the last day of this year, an agreement with Pakistan to assist Pakistan in building atomic power plants by offering nuclear technology. The third

item was that U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney accused the former Soviet republics of continuing to manufacture and deploy nuclear weapons after independence, and this was unacceptable to the United States; it revealed that nuclear expert teams will be sent to Russia and three other Soviet republics, all of which possess nuclear weapons, to study the implementation of the "treaty on U.S.-Soviet strategic arms reductions."

With the above events, the South Korea-North Korea talks for making the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone, the yet-to-be resolved problem of international verification, and the German foreign minister's proposal yesterday for holding arms cut talks with the purpose of eliminating the strategic nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union—people realize that despite the momentous changes over the last year or two, nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons are still important issues in the current international situation.

The "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" is an international treaty of universal binding power on arms cuts and arms control, was signed in 1968, became effective in 1970, and now boasts over 140 signatory states.

Twenty-seven years ago—1964—China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb and became the only Third World country to possess nuclear weapons, and has been continually developing peaceful exploitation of nuclear technology for the last few decades. However, as everybody knows, when the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" went into effect, China was isolated from the United Nations, and the Taiwan authorities had signed and approved the treaty under the name of China. Therefore, it is only a normal response that China did not join the treaty. In recent years, Western nuclear powers have repeatedly invited China to join the treaty. It was only with this background, plus the new developments on the international scene, that China has initiated the legal proceedings for signing the treaty. It was reported that when China officially joins the treaty next year, it will declare that Taiwan's previous signing and approval are all illegal and therefore invalid.

Joining the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" does not mean that China will cease to assist Third World countries in peaceful exploitation of nuclear technology. China has yet to publish the news on signing relevant agreements with Pakistan. But if this is true, then obviously China is making a clear distinction between the two uses of nuclear energy, and this will contrast sharply [as published] with its support for making both the South and North sides of the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. If some countries reasoned that China must cease to assist Third World countries in developing nongovernmental nuclear energy technological exchanges because it has joined the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,"

they would be making an "overstretched" demand. Perhaps China preparing to join the treaty on the one hand and signing an agreement with Pakistan on the other was intended to serve as a response to such demands.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the problem that now has all the U.S. attention is the centralized control of nuclear weapons. The Yeltsin-led Russian Republic has failed to secure in its hands all the nuclear weapons that are spread out in four republics. Moreover, Ukraine and Kazakhstan Republics, the two republics that have nuclear arms on their lands, are prepared to hold onto their nuclear weapons and will bring this up again at the Minsk meeting today and tomorrow. It does seem that

Cheney has chosen this time to release his statements for the purpose of exerting an immediate influence on the Minsk meeting, apart from long-term consideration.

There have also been reports from Western media that experts working in the former Soviet aerospace industries may all seek outside employers because of political dissolution and economic difficulties. Whether these former Soviet nuclear experts will act in the manner of "every man for himself" and effect a trend of "personal nuclear proliferation" or seek sanctuaries in the West or in some weak but financially powerful and ambitious countries is also a new issue in the international community.

JAPAN

First Launch Rehearsal of H-2 Rocket Conducted

*OW2412155491 Tokyo NHK General Television
Network in Japanese 1000 GMT 24 Dec 91*

[Text] The first practice launch of the H-2 rocket, Japan's primary next-generation rocket, was conducted today at the Tanegashima Space Center in Kagoshima Prefecture. The launch practice commenced at 1400.

The first and second stages of the rocket were assembled on the launch pad. The doors on the left and right were opened to reveal the gigantic body, which is approximately 40 meters high.

Today's rehearsal was designed to check the launch procedures. The liquid hydrogen and oxygen rocket fuel was injected into the rocket.

At the mission control center, the countdown procedure was repeated many times. The launch practice went smoothly and ended this evening.

The H-2 rocket is a large, two-stage rocket, developed solely by Japan. It will be able to launch a 2-ton stationary satellite.

The National Space Development Agency plans to carry out further ground tests prior to the first launch, scheduled for the winter of 1993.

India Urged To Sign Nonproliferation Treaty

*OW2001083092 Tokyo KYODO in English 0803 GMT
20 Jan 92*

[Excerpt] Tokyo, Jan. 20 KYODO—Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe on Monday called on India to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, officials said.

But Indian External Affairs Minister Madhavsinh Solanki told Watanabe in a 90-minute meeting that India's geopolitical situation complicates its accession to the treaty.

Solanki, who arrived in Japan on Sunday for a six-day official visit, also said the treaty greatly discriminates against countries that did not claim to have nuclear weapons when the treaty was drawn up, assigning them greater duties than those with such weapons.

Officials said Solanki's reply appeared to indicate India is unwilling to join the treaty in light of its rivalry with neighboring Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, China.

India claims it has no nuclear warheads but exploded what it called a "peaceful nuclear device" in 1974. Pakistan, which says it will sign the treaty if India does, is widely believed close to being able to produce nuclear arms.

China, which acknowledges possession of nuclear weapons, has indicated its readiness to sign the international treaty.

Watanabe told Solanki of Japan's new policy of linking aid to how recipient countries deal with such issues as nuclear nonproliferation and arms exports.

He added that Japan intends to carry out the policy and that it is supported by Japanese public opinion. [passage omitted]

NORTH KOREA

Envoy to Russia on Signing N-S Nuclear Accord

*LD2912103591 Moscow TASS in English 1011 GMT 29
Dec 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Georgiy Shmelev and Aleksey Luzin]

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS—The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is prepared to sign an agreement on guarantees to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and would agree to inspection in accordance with the established procedure, Son Song-pil, North Korean ambassador in Moscow, told TASS today.

South Korea's recent statement that "not a single nuclear weapon has remained in the South of the peninsula" was welcomed in the DPRK, the ambassador said.

If U.S. nuclear weapons have been fully removed from South Korea, this, in the ambassador's opinion, is an illustration of "a great triumph of our nation that has persistently striven for the elimination of the menace of a nuclear war".

At the same time he emphasized that when the DPRK undergoes an inspection under a nuclear safeguards accord, "it is essential to carry out a simultaneous inspection in South Korea to verify and confirm the fact that U.S. nuclear weapons are absent from the south of the Korean peninsula".

The North Korean ambassador voiced regret over the fact that the United Nations has not up to now officially confirmed the fact of removal of nuclear weapons from South Korea's territory. He pointed out that Pyongyang hopes that the U.S. side will clarify its position.

The South Korean "declaration on the ensurance of a non-nuclear status" followed the DPRK's proposal to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, the ambassador emphasized.

He believes that North and South Korea should immediately adopt a joint declaration on making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

'Full Text' of N-S Denuclearization Agreement

SK2101110592 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1032 GMT 21 Jan 92

[“Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang January 21 (KCNA)—Following is the full text of “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” finally signed recently by the premiers of the North and the South:

With a view to denuclearizing the Korean peninsula and thus removing the danger of nuclear war, creating conditions and environment favorable for peace and peaceful reunification of our country and contributing to peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world, the North and the South declare as follows:

1. The North and the South shall refrain from the testing, manufacture, production, acceptance, possession, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear weapons.
2. The North and the South shall use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes.
3. The North and the South shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.
4. The North and the South shall make an inspection of objects chosen by the other side and agreed upon between the sides through procedures and methods defined by the North-South joint committee of nuclear control in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
5. The North and the South shall form and operate the North-South Joint Committee of Nuclear Control within one month after the publication of this joint declaration in order to implement it.
6. This joint declaration shall take effect from the day of exchange of its texts between the North and the South through procedures necessary for their effectuation.

[Dated] January 20, 1992

[Signed] Yon Hyong-muk

Premier of the Administration Council of the DPRK and head of the North side's delegation to the inter-Korean high-level talks.

[Signed] Chong Won-sik

Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea and head of the South side's delegation to the inter-Korean high-level talks.

SOUTH KOREA

Nuclear Tactics, Strategy Reexamined

922C0023A *Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean*
2 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by reporter Kim Chang-su: “Timetable for Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Korea Could Change”]

[Text] The measure to withdraw the tactical nuclear arms of the U.S. Forces in Korea [USFK] has, first of all, become a “nucleus” of the changes to occur in the strategic environment of the Korean peninsula.

What is the direction of the ROK-U.S. joint defense system? Are there any changes in the plans to reduce the strength of USFK and in the procedure of transferring its operational authority rights after the reduction? Will the Korean military strategy itself remain unchanged?

These are the questions that spring up since Bush issued a statement on nuclear weapons reduction.

Of course, withdrawal of tactical nuclear arms alone is not likely to lead to a significant change in the “military map” of the Korean peninsula.

It is true that the USFK's tactical nuclear weapons along with the NCND [neither confirm nor deny] policy have served thus far as a war deterrent. This war deterrence was maintained because they were used largely as a psychological weapon.

Thus, most military analysts predict that as long as the United States maintains its nuclear umbrella policy in Korea, the concerns over the decreasing power of the war deterrent in the Korean peninsula, just because of the reduction of tactical nuclear arms, would be insignificant.

Value of Military Use Diminishes

Particularly, analysts say, under the circumstances where the military value of the ground nuclear arms is diminishing as a result of the development of high-tech weapons systems, tactical nuclear arms no longer play a significant role in the military strategy.

Such a prediction and analysis can be seen, at first, in the viewpoints of the defense authorities who read the background of Bush's recent announcement of nuclear policy.

In connection with this, during the parliamentary inspection of government offices on 28 September, National Defense Minister Yi Chong-ku said that “Abolition of the nuclear arms does not mean the weakening or loss of the United States' deterrent power to control nuclear arms.” Regarding the background of the recent measure, he said, “Basically, it was due to a military judgment that the ground and marine nuclear arms have lost their strategic value due to the epoch-making development of high-tech weapons and early-warning systems.”

In other words, the experience in the Gulf war has proven that the military value of tactical nuclear arms can be substituted by a high-tech weapons system in local or limited warfare. In view of this, it can be said that the recent measure is not an indication of an immediate and full-scale change in national defense strategies. Military analysts agree that it will inevitably result in long- and short-term changes, however, that must fill the "power vacuum" resulting from the abolition of the tactical nuclear arms that served as a "military balances" between the South and the North.

Revision of the "5027 Plan"

A military analyst forecasts the first possible change to occur in the ROK-U.S. Joint Defense Plan, known as the "5027 Plan." It is said that the withdrawal of tactical nuclear arms will inevitably require a revision of the "Fire Power Support Plan" contained in the Annex of the 5027 Plan and also a revision of the "Special Weapons Support Plan" contained in the attachment of the Annex, which describes nuclear arms support. It is known that in accordance with the declaration of "nuclear umbrella support," which was adopted at the annual ROK-U.S. Security Council Meeting (SCM) in the 1970's, both Korea and the United States have discussed issues of deployment and use of the USFK's nuclear arms. A reexamination of the overall nuclear arms applications is expected to follow.

It is also predicted that a future SCM or other high-level policy meeting will reexamine the timing of deployment and the size of the U.S. reinforcement, which is included in the defense force against North Korea.

Both the ROK and the United States tentatively agreed on the Wartime Host Nation's Support (WHNS) pact on 25 July, and set up provisions for munitions supplies for U.S. reinforcements to be dispatched in case of warfare. Because of the diminishing power of the war deterrent caused by a withdrawal of the existing tactical nuclear arms, however, it has become more necessary to employ a highly mobile operation in the deployment of troops and the support system of equipment and facilities.

In this regard, a concerned authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "We are presently reviewing the articles concerning a timely deployment of troops, which must be renewed every two years, according to the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Pact, to strengthen the scale and mobility of troops." He said that this issue will be discussed at the annual ROK-U.S. SCM in November.

In addition, military analysts point out that the Combined Defense Improvement Project (CDIP), which is being carried out as a USFK's support task, will also likely be revised in terms of strengthening the war deterrent.

Following the possible changes in the ROK-U.S. joint defense system is the plan for a three-step withdrawal of

the USFK and the issue of transferring the strategic control rights, all of which are based on the Nunn-Warner Amendment.

Role of Nuclear Inspection

A concerned authority of the Defense Ministry said, "Withdrawal of the tactical nuclear arms will unlikely cause any immediate changes in the large framework of the USFK's withdrawal plan, but adjustments are possible—such as delaying the withdrawal—in order to reinforce the diminishing power of the war deterrent."

He added that the issue of transferring the operational authority, too, could be decided based upon the progress in the reinforcement of the ROK's conventional defense force, and therefore, the original timetable could change.

It is also highly probable that the Korean military could independently reinforce or develop plans for a short-term emergency.

Another authority of the Defense Ministry said, "It has become more necessary to reinforce present strategies for a short-term emergency while doubling the ability to reinforce the U.S. troops." He added, "Part of the short-term plans to reinforce the military capacity will change, including converting the conventional weapons into a high-tech system."

The possibility of all these strategic military changes, however, could depend on North Korea's willingness to allow nuclear inspections, which still remains a key issue, and on the resulting circumstances for negotiations between the United States and North Korea and between South Korea and North Korea.

ROK To Recruit Top Soviet Scientists

WA0901030092

[Editorial Report] The 12 December Seoul TONG-A ILB0 in Korean, page 2, reports that the South Korean Government plans to recruit from 300 to 500 leading Soviet scientists from 1992 until the year 2000 to assist in government-sponsored high technology research and development projects.

Due to a growing interest in the "commercialization" of Soviet military industries, the ROK Ministry of Science and Technology [MST] recently held a conference on ROK-Soviet science and technology cooperation and promotion in Seoul. The major emphasis of the conference was to assess the impact of current Soviet "political trends" on Soviet scientific research organizations. Subsequently, the MST proposed that leading Soviet scientists in the fields of aircraft industry, space industry, new materials, new energy sources, and the environment be recruited every year to work on government research projects.

For 1992, the MST plans to recruit about 100 Soviet scientists, 80 of whom will participate in 48 current ROK-Soviet joint projects. The remaining 20 scientists

will join South Korean research organizations and universities to conduct government-sponsored research. The joint projects include support for the transfer and commercialization of Soviet advanced technologies and the formation of an advisory group composed of senior scientists from both governments to work toward the privatization of the Soviet munitions industry. The advisory group will also work to identify areas of cooperation and "managerial support" for the commercialization of military enterprises.

The article also states that the major goals of ROK-Soviet "Joint venture companies" will be to invest in or purchase certain parts of the Soviet munitions industry. In the commercialization of Soviet defense industries, the "priority sectors" are: production of heavy equipment for developing natural resources; processing technologies for communications equipment; factory automation equipment; developing special materials to sell on international markets; the conversion of military aircraft to civilian use; the production of satellites; the manufacture of major electronic auto parts from special materials used in military equipment; and the incorporation of military equipment used for measurement and computation in civilian communications systems.

DPRK Proposes Abandoning Nuclear Reprocessing

SK2612142391 Seoul YONHAP in English 1247 GMT 26 Dec 91

["News analysis" by Yi Tong-min]

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 26 (OANA-YONHAP)—South and North Korea broke through one major barrier Thursday with Pyongyang's proposal to abandon nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants.

The proposal was what South Korea had wanted to hear all along. It is virtually an announcement by North Korea that it will not own these facilities, which in turn means it will not develop nuclear arms.

North Korea went further to say it has already notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its intention to sign the nuclear safeguards accord, even specifying the date.

It did not tell South Korea when the date is, but indicated it plans to sign, ratify and implement the accord as soon as possible, officials here said.

The breakthrough came at Thursday's inter-Korean nuclear negotiations at the truce village of Panmunjom. The talks came just 13 days after Seoul and Pyongyang signed an agreement pledging reconciliation, non-aggression, exchanges and cooperation during the fifth round of South-North Korean prime ministers' meeting.

North Korea tabled a revised version of its draft declaration on the denuclearization of Korean peninsula that closely resembled South Korea's draft.

The new North Korean draft reflects South Korean demands that nuclear energy be used only for peaceful purposes, that both sides abandon nuclear reprocessing and enrichment plants, and that they establish a joint watchdog.

But there still remain stumbling blocks, and they are no minor ones.

North Korea's new proposal does not mention anything about opening its civilian or military facilities for simultaneous pilot inspection as suggested by South Korea.

Instead, it insists that Seoul and Pyongyang jointly verify withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons and removal of nuclear bases in the South.

North Korea also insists in including an article that says Seoul and Pyongyang will not conduct simulated nuclear war game in which nuclear weapons and equipment are mobilized on the Korean peninsula.

This article is aimed at getting South Korea to stop its annual military maneuver "Team Spirit" with the United States.

Yi Tong-pok, spokesman for the South Korean side, said Seoul "cannot and will not" accept these two demands.

Simultaneous pilot inspection must be on one-on-one basis for facilities in both sides, Yi said, and any changes in Team Spirit schedules must be preceded by North Korea's acceptance of outside inspection on its nuclear facilities and abandonment of reprocessing and enrichment plants.

North Korean officials reportedly showed willingness to compromise on the simultaneous inspection issue, according to Yi, saying their position was open to adjustment through further negotiations with South Korea.

Thursday's progress has now thrown the light on the timetable rather than the content of the agreement.

Question now is how and when Seoul can verify whether Pyongyang sincerely means what it proposed.

North Korea said it will sign and implement the nuclear safeguards accord as soon as possible, but it can take months after the signing before IAEA can inspect North Korean facilities.

Time South Korea does not have. Reports say North Korea can complete its reprocessing facilities in Yongbyon between coming May and August.

This is the major reason why Seoul insists that Pyongyang sign the safeguards accord at the latest by Jan. 15.

Yi Tong-pok said Seoul made clear at Thursday's talks that progress in nuclear negotiations is a prerequisite before it can put the inter-Korean agreement into effect.

North Korea may be pressed enough to make more forward steps. North Korean President Kim Il-song who turns 80 next year nearly completed power handover to his son Chong-il Wednesday by naming him the supreme commander of the North Korean Armed Forces.

Pyongyang needs to create a favorable climate for the power transfer, and improvement in inter-Korean relations is certain to blow a favorable wind.

Meaningful progress seems to be close at hand. The two sides meet again Saturday, and officials say prospects are brighter than ever before for a successful solution to the nuclear problem.

North, South Agree on Nuclear Pact Preamble

*SK2812084091 Seoul YONHAP in English 0814 GMT
28 Dec 91*

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 28 (OANA-YONHAP)—South and North Korea inched bit closer to signing an agreement for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula Saturday at the second working-level talks and promised to meet again Dec. 31.

The two sides agreed on the preamble and two of the seven articles proposed—using nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and pledge not to own nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities.

They also agreed to form a joint committee on nuclear issues within one month after they put the agreement into effect, Yi Tong-pok, spokesman for the South Korean side, said after the talks.

"I can cautiously say that chances of reaching an agreement at the next talks is rather high," Yi said in a press conference.

"We presented our new proposal, and we expect North Korea to review it fully before our next meeting for even further progress," he said.

Five officials from the two Koreas met Thursday [26 December] for the first inter-Korean nuclear negotiations where North Korea presented its revised proposal that the two sides promise not to own nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities, removing a major stumbling block to bilateral negotiations.

South Korea reciprocated with its own revised proposal Saturday that deletes an article for elimination of chemical and biological weapons but adds an article demanding North Korea conclude a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and accept full-scope international inspection of all nuclear-related facilities and materials.

The two sides are near consensus on Article 1 where they pledge not to test, manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. North Korea did not object to dropping the word "introduce" from its proposal, according to Yi.

Seoul and Pyongyang, however, remained apart on military exercise and simultaneous pilot inspection.

While South Korea championed mutual pilot inspection on military and civilian installations, North Korea insisted on inspection solely to verify withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the South Korean territory.

North Korea insisted on prohibition of any military exercise that simulates nuclear war, aimed specifically at halting the annual South Korea-U.S. joint military maneuver "Team Spirit."

Seoul could not accept these two demands because embracing them would be a virtual admittance that it has introduced U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea and that Team Spirit is a nuclear war practice, Spokesman Yi said.

"North Korea's motive in including these two points obviously lie in getting such admittance," he said.

South Korea is sticking by its article that demands North Korea's speedy conclusion of the nuclear safeguards accord with the IAEA.

North Korean officials repeated the signing was a matter to be settled strictly between Pyongyang and the IAEA, and the Seoul government "understands" such reaction, Yi said.

"But we stress again that North Korea needs to sign, ratify and implement the accord in order to make clear to us and the rest of the world its sincere commitment to nuclear-free Korean peninsula," the spokesman emphasized.

The northern officials said they would soon sign the safeguards accord and therefore was against having a related article in the agreement, Yi explained.

"But what is important now is the date North Korea actually signs the accord, not the date North Korea promises to sign it by," he said.

The spokesman hinted Seoul's flexibility in simultaneous pilot inspection, saying, "conditions have changed considerably since the time we made the proposal."

The main motive in proposing the simultaneous inspection was in opening North Korea's nuclear reprocessing facilities to outside inspection, Yi pointed out.

"But North Korea now says it will not possess the reprocessing and enrichment installments," he said.

Government To Sign Chemical Weapons Prohibition

*SK3012114891 Seoul YONHAP in English 1129 GMT
30 Dec 91*

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 30 (YONHAP)—The South Korean Government has decided to sign an international convention on prohibiting chemical weapons as soon as it is

concluded in the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD), government sources said Monday.

The government, the sources said, recently convened a meeting of relevant officials from the Foreign, Defense, Trade-Industry and Science-Technology Ministries and the Agency for National Security Planning and decided to make laws and draw up administrative measures necessary for fulfilling the terms of the convention.

The meeting discussed measures to minimize the impact the nation's signing of the convention would have on the domestic industries.

The pact, which is widely expected to be concluded next year, is likely to oblige all signatories to file reports on all chemical weaponry, its manufacturing facilities and related research institutes in their possession within 30 days of signing it and start to dismantle them the following year for a complete abolition in 10 years, or by 2002.

The convention is expected to spell out strict restrictions on the use and trade of chemical substances normally needed for manufacturing chemical weapons, sources said.

The government has decided to provide domestic chemical businesses with lists of chemical substances of which use or trade is feared to be banned by the envisaged accord.

President No Tae-u, when announcing on Nov. 8 a proposal for a non-nuclear Korea, made clear that South Korea would join in international endeavors to eradicate biochemical weapons.

South-North Joint Denuclearization Declaration

*SK0101053992 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
1 Jan 92 p 1*

["Text" of the South-North Joint Declaration for a Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula, initialed at the third round of North-South delegates' contacts in Tongilgak, Panmunjom on 31 Dec]

[Text] Pledging to remove the danger of a nuclear war, to create conditions and circumstances favorable to peaceful unification of our country and to further contribute toward peace and security in Asia and the world by denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, the South and the North declare as follows:

1. The South and the North will not test, manufacture, produce, introduce, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.
2. The South and the North will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.
3. The South and the North will not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

4. The South and the North, in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, will conduct inspections of the facilities as chosen by the other side in accordance with procedures and means to be provided by the Joint South-North Nuclear Control Committee.

5. The South and the North, in order to implement the joint declaration, will form and operate the Joint South-North Nuclear Control Committee within one month after the joint declaration takes effect.

This joint declaration will take effect from the day when the South and the North exchange documents after going through the necessary formalities for their effectuation.

Official Signs Inter-Korean Nuclear Agreement

*SK1301023992 Seoul YONHAP in English 0222 GMT
13 Jan 92*

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 13 (OANA-YONHAP)—Prime Minister Chong Won-sik signed the inter-Korean nuclear-free declaration Monday with a call on North Korea to honor the spirit of the document.

The declaration, initialed Dec. 31, was a first step toward implementing the inter-Korean agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, exchange and cooperation signed here Dec. 13, he said.

Present for the signing were Kim Chong-hwi, presidential secretary for diplomacy and national security, Yim Tong-won, vice national unification minister, and Yi Tong-pok, spokesman for the South Korean delegation to the inter-Korean prime ministers' talks.

The declaration will take effect upon exchanging copies in Pyongyang on Feb. 19, the second day of the sixth inter-Korean prime ministers' talks.

Before the exchange, however, several steps must be taken.

First, the document signed by Chong will be exchanged for one signed by Chong's North Korean counterpart Yon Hyong-muk at the truce village of Panmunjom on Jan. 14. The prime ministers will sign these copies Jan. 20 and exchange them again on Jan. 21.

The six-point declaration states that South and North Korea will not test, manufacture, produce, accept, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. It calls for the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, renouncement of nuclear reprocessing facilities and enrichment plants and pilot inspections of suspect nuclear installations by both sides.

South and North Korea will discuss specific measures to implement the declaration at a meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee, which is to be formed within one month after the declaration takes effect.

French Article Cites Russian Nuclear Emigration*SK1801102692 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean
17 Jan 92 p 4*

[YONHAP from Paris]

[Text] The 16 January edition of the French weekly news magazine L'EXPRESS reveals that a Russian intelligence agency warns in a recent report about the possible emigration of nuclear engineers from the former Soviet Union. The target countries will be Iraq, North Korea, India, and Pakistan.

According to L'EXPRESS, in connection with the West's apprehensions over the outflow of the former Soviet Union's nuclear technology, the Russian leadership instructed the intelligence agency to prepare a report. As result, it was learned that the intelligence agency submitted the report on 6 January.

This report says that a large number of nuclear experts are likely to move overseas. Their top priority countries will be Iraq, India, Pakistan, etc., in which nuclear weapons development is at a final stage. Iran, Syria, and Libya come under the next priority category.

This report notes that in particular, the uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction specialists are the nuclear engineers in the most demand. It was learned that the engineers of the nuclear research institutes in Shevchenko, Kazakstan, Krasnouralsk, and Tobolsk, Siberia, are becoming targets for recruitment.

According to the report, the number of the former Soviet Union's nuclear specialists are estimated to be 10,000-12,000. It continued to say that to prevent the specialists' emigration, it is necessary to watch their moves and at the same time to conclude treaties with the nuclear possessing countries to prevent it.

THAILAND**EGAT Official States Case for Nuclear Power***92WP0111A Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 22 Nov 91
p 18*

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] When one compares the amount of uranium needed to produce 1,000 megawatts of electricity with the amount of coal needed, one finds that it requires 7,000 tons of coal per month but only 2.4 tons of uranium.

In addition nuclear power plants help with the problem of having too much carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. At present there are 20 billion tons of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and the amount is steadily increasing because fuel is constantly being burned to produce electricity.

If a nuclear plant were built, it would help reduce the amount of carbon dioxide produced a great deal. [passage omitted]

The question now is whether Thailand is ready to accept a nuclear plant.

Mr. Suphin Panyamak, the director of public relations for the Electrical Generating Authority of Thailand [EGAT] made a noncommittal statement that the nuclear power plant project for Thailand still did not have a definite schedule. He just said that plans had been made for EGAT to build a new plant in the year 2001 which could generate 1,000 megawatts with an appropriate power source.

Mr. Suphin did not explain clearly what an "appropriate power source" might be or whether it would be a nuclear plant or not and so we must follow developments in the future.

In any case the Office for Peaceful Atomic Energy issued a document stating that according to EGAT's plans for increasing electrical generation, after 1996 Thailand would begin to be short of energy sources including both natural gas and lignite and would have to rely on foreign energy sources more and more. That would mean great expense because the world price of fuel would rise.

In addition according to EGAT's projections by the year 2001 Thailand would need four coal-fired electric plants and by the year 2006 Thailand might need an 8,800 megawatt coal-fired plant. These plants would release 57.2 million tons of carbon dioxide, 79,200 tons of sulfur dioxide and 39,600 tons of nitrogen oxide, which would cause pollution and acid rain dangerous for the people.

And this does not take into consideration the ash from burning 13,200 tons of coal which would also affect the environment.

These considerations might make it unavoidable for Thailand to turn to a nuclear power plant.

The Office for Peaceful Atomic Energy stated that if Thailand must build a nuclear power plant, the first thing it must do is to make preparations so that there are people with the knowledge and experience to build the plant according to safety standards and efficiently.

The Office for Peaceful Atomic Energy is preparing public servants to inspect the safety of the nuclear power plant on a continuing basis. They are relying on the experience gained in 30 years of the use of and research into nuclear reactors.

If there is a decision to build a nuclear power plant, the Office for Peaceful Atomic Energy is prepared to organize a unit to inspect the safety of the plant and to coordinate with the assistance provided by the International Atomic Energy Commission.

With regard to safety the Office for Peaceful Atomic Energy stated that the International Atomic Energy Commission had set strict safety standards for nuclear power plants for countries with such plants to follow covering everything from the choice of the location for the plant to the plans for the plant, the production of

various parts for the machinery, the construction of the plant and the operation of the plant. If Thailand followed these rules, the plant would be very safe.

The various accidents at nuclear plants were generally just routine problems. However the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in Russia severely frightened the people of the world.

The Office for Peaceful Atomic Energy said that this accident was not the result of routine operation of the equipment but of an experiment within the plant which involved deliberately shutting off the entire safety system in violation of existing safety regulations. Meanwhile the Chernobyl plant had design faults which caused the accident. Even so if the regulations had been

strictly followed, the chance of an accident happening would have been extremely small.

Even though the Office for Peaceful Atomic Energy is quite confident about the safety of nuclear plants, nevertheless if Thailand must decide whether to build a nuclear plant or not it should study the matter in detail and get the opinion of the Thai people throughout the country to see whether they agree or not.

In addition all the data involved should be made public in detail, both the advantages and disadvantages, to help in making the decision whether Thailand should have a nuclear plant or not.

If the data is not clear or is ambiguous, it would not be appropriate to put the lives of a great many Thai people at risk with this nuclear plant!

HUNGARY

Arrests of Nuclear Material Traffickers Detailed

*LD0901200692 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 9 Jan 92*

[Text] In Milan, Italian authorities have arrested three Hungarians and one Austrian citizen accused of smuggling materials that can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. Gyula Ortutay-Lovass reports from the Italian capital:

[Ortutay-Lovass] Italian television reported in its early afternoon broadcast that three Hungarians and an Austrian citizen have been arrested in Milan for smuggling mercury iodide [voeroes higany]. The report said that the persons arrived from Bucharest bringing two bottles containing some two kg of material that, according to the authorities, presumably is used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

The arrests took place on Wednesday night in a hotel in Milan. The men of the Italian customs and finance guard immediately handed the material over to the investigating magistrate who, since October, has been investigating the forbidden trade in plutonium and uranium that originates in the Soviet Union. Two months ago in Como, in northern Italy, and in Zurich at the same time, a total of 30 kg fissionable material of low radioactivity was confiscated.

In addition to Italians, people of Swiss, Austrian, and Czechoslovak nationalities are suspected of being involved in the affair. The Italian press also knows about two Russian military agents who are suspected of organizing the sale of uranium and plutonium from the Ukraine and Irkutsk.

Investigating Magistrate Romano Dolce said today that it was possible to assume that those arrested on Wednesday night—the three Hungarians among them—

are linked to that organization. At this stage the experts are investigating whether the confiscated mercury iodide is indeed the type that is used in nuclear technology.

POLAND

Ukraine's Defense Minister on Nuclear Weapons

*LD1401215892 Warsaw PAP in English 2047 GMT
14 Jan 92*

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 14—Ukrainian Defence Minister Konstantin Morozov pledged on Tuesday [14 January] tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from the Ukraine by July 1 while strategic ones would be dismantled by the end of 1994.

Morozov, who paid a one-day official visit to Warsaw on Tuesday, also declared that the Ukraine would never use its nuclear weapons nor initiate an armed conflict.

The Ukraine makes no territorial claims on any country and renounces the use of force in international relations. The republic will obey international agreements on the reduction of conventional arms and is not going to join any military pacts, the minister said.

Morozov stated the Parliament would decide the size of the new Ukrainian army but added it would be similar to those in the neighbouring countries.

Commenting on the talks with General Morozov, Polish Defence Minister Jan Parys said they had "a historic significance."

"We heard statements from Minister Morozov which clear up many of our doubts and I think that from this time on cooperation will be good from every point of view, political as well as military," he said.

As a result of the visit working teams will be set up to deal with military cooperation between Poland and the Ukraine in such spheres as training, contacts between general staffs, security of flights, and arms production.

ARGENTINA

Government Allots Funds for Nuclear Project

PY1001171392 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1343 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Mar del Plata, 10 Jan (NA)—Manuel Mondino, chairman of the National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA), has reported that the government has earmarked \$350 million to expedite the construction of the Atucha II nuclear plant. It is thus expected that 90 percent of the project will be completed by the end of this year.

Mondino is currently resting in this resort city. He said Argentina is not interested in receiving any nuclear waste.

Commenting on the funds earmarked by the government for the Atucha II nuclear plant, Mondino said: "It reflects an awareness by senior government officials that there can be no growth without energy."

Mondino said that 1991 was a better year than 1990 in that the government had the satisfaction of dedicating the Mendoza School of Nuclear Medicine and Atucha I worked beautifully.

The CNEA chairman compared Atucha I to "a prodigal son" because when the reactor broke down in 1988, "Argentine CNEA technicians managed to repair it and get it operational again even though very few people believed this was possible."

BRAZIL

Aeromot Contracted for Leo Missile Project

92SM0172D Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL
in Portuguese 13 Dec 91 p 11

[By Virginia Silveira]

[Text] Sao Jose dos Campos—Aeromot Aircraft and Engines, Inc., a Porto Alegre aerospace firm that manufactures power gliders and avionic components (electronic instruments), was given a contract by the Brazilian Aeronautics Company (Embraer) at the beginning of last month to continue the Leo antitank missile project.

The project is being developed under a contract with the Ministry of Army in cooperation with the Otto Melara firm of Italy. The Brazilian portion will involve construction of a simulator and of the missile's test equipment at an estimated cost of \$11.5 million.

"We made an agreement with the Ministry of Army that our subsidiary Orbit Space Systems would reduce its participation in the supervision of the missile project," announced the superintendent of Embraer, Ozires Silva.

The missile project began in 1987 and was assigned to Orbit, which was then a joint venture between Embraer and Specialized Engineers, Inc. (Engesa). When Engesa went bankrupt in 1989, Embraer assumed full control of Orbit. But financial difficulties and the new policy adopted by Ozires Silva for Embraer have lessened interest in keeping up the state-owned firm's activities in the field of defense materiel. "Embraer is a company concerned with the atmosphere, not the stratosphere, which is Orbit's field," he explained. "Because of that, Orbit will be liquidated as soon as work on the missile is complete," he added.

Embraer's industrial manager, Antonio Garcia, has also announced that Orbit's contracts with the Aerospace Technology Center (CTA) for the development of accelerometers and gyroscopes will also be transferred to Aeromot.

According to Garcia, Aeromot was chosen partly because Avibras Aerospace, Inc., of Sao Jose dos Campos (currently in bankruptcy proceedings) did not respond to the invitation to participate in the project. "Those two firms are the only ones capable of working on the missile."

The purpose of the Leo missile is to hit a moving tank from a distance of from one to three kilometers. It is operated by one person. "Guidance is by laser beam, which is one of the most advanced technologies used in short-range missiles," he said.

Having been placed in charge of the project, Aeromot has awarded a subcontract to Mectron Engineering, Industry, and Commerce, Inc., a firm established in Sao Jose dos Campos by five engineers who were part of the team developing the air-to-air missile for Iraq under the leadership of General Hugo de Oliveira Piva, Reserve. "We decided to participate in this project by using the technology already mastered by those engineers, a solution that reduces our investment," says the director-president of the Aeromot Group, Claudio Barreto Viana.

According to him, the general timetable for the antitank missile calls for completion of the Brazilian portion of the project in the middle of 1992. "The design of the simulator is 10-percent complete, and that of the test equipment is 40-percent complete," he said. Claudio Viana also said that about \$1.5 million will be invested to develop and manufacture the rest of the Brazilian equipment.

The Italian portion, which involves developing the actual missile, is scheduled for completion by the end of this year [1991], according to the timetable. Field testing with ballistic missiles will be carried out before that time is up.

To handle the project, Aeromot is setting up a subsidiary in Sao Jose dos Campos at an initial investment of \$50,000 in equipment. In addition to the missile project, the president of Aeromot said that his group was interested in participating in projects by the INPE [National Institute of Space Research] and the CTA.

The Aeromot Group, which bills \$21 million annually, is divided into three firms: Aeromot Aircraft and Engines, Inc., which sells aircraft and engages in maintenance, major recovery and repair, and modification; the Mechanical Metallurgical Industry, which handles the design and manufacture of mechanical aircraft parts and seats for commercial jets; and Aeroelectronics, which specializes in the design and development of electronic components for civil and military aircraft. The firm participates in the Tucano program—a military turbo-prop trainer—with 11 components of its own design, and the AMX program—a military jet aircraft designed and produced jointly by Italy and Brazil—with 12 components. The firm is the only one in Brazil whose components are used in the Italian AMX.

Return of Piva's Team

Returning to Brazil in October 1990, five of the 23 engineers who had been in Iraq with Gen. Piva to develop missiles for the Iraqi Armed Forces decided to form a company specializing in civilian products for industrial automation. But the contract with Aeromot has brought those engineers back into the field of military defense.

Although once again connected with military projects, the five engineers, who were trained at the Aerospace Technology Institute (ITA), prefer to forget the past in Iraq, which has made them well known in Brazil but has also resulted in various clashes with the armed forces because of the fear that they are transferring missile technology to other countries.

With estimated billings of \$200,000 in the first year of operations by their company (Mectron), the engineers now divide their time between projects such as oscilloscopes and electronic traffic control equipment.

Gen. Piva, who is familiar with the technological know-how of his former employees, says the antitank missile job is a simple one. "The missile we were making for Iraq was more sophisticated," commented the general, who says he no longer has any social contact with the members of his former team who now run Mectron.

PRC Delegation Discusses Joint Space Project

92SM0172C Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL
in Portuguese 13 Dec 91 p 11

[By Luiza Pastor]

[Text] Brasilia—A mission from China's Ministry of Aerospace Industry was in Brasilia yesterday to meet with the secretary of science and technology, Edson Machado, and try to smooth the last of the rough edges hindering the progress of the Chinese-Brazilian program. The agreement, signed in July 1988 by then President of the Republic Jose Sarney, calls for building and launching exploration and remote sensing satellites SSR-1 and SSR-2, but it has been held up by Brazil's delay in releasing the funds and the lack of a more definite statement regarding the protection of industrial property and the transfer of sensitive technology to other countries.

Although the ministry's planning director, Zhang Rumou, made it a point to state that the mission he heads in Brazil is intended solely to "strengthen the ties of friendship and cooperation between the two countries," the true purpose of the mission is to review the real situation with the various disputes existing between China and several Latin American countries—chiefly in the technological area—in preparation for the upcoming visit to those countries by the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party in 1992.

But the Chinese leader was certainly not displeased by Secretary Edson Machado's announcement that this week the government would approve release of the funds enabling Brazil to pay its debt of \$1.4 million by this coming 15 December [1991]. The country paid \$625,000 of that amount this week.

Apart from the debts to be paid, the meeting by the mission's members with the secretary was also aimed at making progress with the negotiations begun during Machado's visit to Beijing in October. The purpose of those negotiations is to enable Brazil to participate more directly in Brazil itself in the building and testing of the SSR-2. But that decision will have to wait for one more meeting—this time with a technical mission that is scheduled to arrive in the second half of January. It is hoped that that meeting will also result in a more specific date for launching the SSR-1, which is scheduled to go into orbit in 1994.

"We also feel that the National Institute of Space Research (INPE) is in a position to take charge of controlling the satellite's flight, and we are also demanding that," said Machado, explaining that if agreement on those measures is reached with the Chinese, the terms of the original agreement will have to be revised. That revision would include the insertion of safeguards guaranteeing the security of the satellite, the launcher, and, chiefly, the technologies involved.

AFGHANISTAN

Missile Attack on Kabul Leaves Six Dead

*LD2612161291 Kabul Radio Afghanistan Network
in Pashto 1430 GMT 26 Dec 91*

[Text] Six Kabul citizens were martyred today as a result of the firing of surface-to-surface missiles by extremists; six others, including two children, were wounded.

The BIA military section reports that the wounded were transferred to hospital and are under treatment.

The extremists today fired eight surface-to-surface missiles from northeast and west of Kabul city hitting residential areas in Kabul city's 4th, 5th and 11th wards. They have inflicted heavy material damage on our compatriots. A missile hit the Kala Kashef mosque, destroying it and burning copies of the Holy Koran and dozens of teaching books.

The missiles were of the Sakr type, which—contrary to the tenets of the sacred religion of Islam, human dignity, and all international norms—were supplied by Pakistani militarists for creating terror and massacres in our country, and for the continuation of the fratricidal war in our homeland.

Kabul citizens condemned these criminal actions by the Pakistani-backed extremists as inhuman and un-Islamic.

ALGERIA

Reports of Nuclear Program 'Categorically' Denied

Foreign Ministry

*LD0601194292 Algiers ENTV Television Network
in Arabic 1900 GMT 6 Jan 92*

[Text] Following reports carried by some British newspapers in the past few days to the effect that Algeria had acquired some material and had resorted to foreign assistance to carry out a military nuclear program, the Algerian Foreign Ministry has categorically denied these erroneous reports.

Prime Minister Ghazali

*LD0601234892 Algiers Radio Algiers Network
in French 2200 GMT 6 Jan 92*

[Text] Speaking this evening during the "Club de la Presse" program on France's Europe 1 radio station, Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghazali categorically denied the reports published recently in the British paper THE SUNDAY TIMES claiming that Iraq has sent uranium and its know-how to Algeria for the production of an atomic bomb. Because this paper claims to have obtained its information from official sources, I would ask these sources either to furnish proof of what they are claiming or to retract it, the prime minister said.

He recalled that Algeria is a country which cooperates most extensively with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which regularly checks the operation of its reactors, and that it has a very clear agreement with this agency.

On the subject of why Algeria has not signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Mr. Ghazali replied that this was a different problem; just because we have not signed this treaty does not mean that we are in the process of producing the atomic bomb, he said. I do not see why pressure is put on Algeria, which has never made a bomb, which is not in the process of producing one, and which has no program for producing bombs, to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty, while a country like Israel, which has 180 nuclear warheads and has not signed this same treaty, is not cross-examined in the same way, he said.

Speaking on a completely different topic during this radio program, Prime Minister Ghazali expressed the view that the results of the first round of Algeria's legislative elections were something of a personal failure in that he was not able to achieve his aim of an undisputed election, but he added that he does not regret his action because one must respect the people.

On the subject of the Islamic state which would be established in Algeria if the Islamic Salvation Front's [FIS] victory is confirmed in the second round, Mr. Ghazali recalled that a majority in the assembly would not be enough to change the Constitution; only the president of the republic can make such an initiative, he said. Furthermore, he described as exaggerated and at times a caricature the picture given in France of the situation in Algeria. Even if what is happening is not an easy path, these are the rules of the democratic game, and we have to respect them; the party which has the majority will enter the government.

Will the FIS be competent to handle the economic and social crisis which Algeria is currently experiencing? To this question, the Algerian prime minister replied that the FIS is quite capable of choosing competent people to run the country. As for the Army, it is not an army of putschists, he said, before specifying that it operates within a very specific institutional framework.

Newspaper AL-WATAN

*LD0601174292 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1634 GMT 6 Jan 92*

[Text] Algiers, Jan 6 (TANJUG)—The Algerian press today describe as a 'science fiction story' the allegations, published in the London weekly THE SUNDAY TIMES yesterday, according to which Algeria is secretly working on the production of the first 'Islamic atomic bomb,' in cooperation with Iraq.

The independent Algerian newspaper AL-WATAN says today that the British accusations are probably aimed at

presenting Algeria as a 'danger to the world's peace' and consequently the object of a 'foreign intervention.'

THE SUNDAY TIMES, carried by a number of Algerian newspaper today [as received], said Iraq had allegedly sent over ten tonnes of natural uranium to Algeria last May before the UN inspection teams arrived.

The shipment was followed by an Iraqi team of experts who were supposed to work on a nuclear reactor, which would every three years produce two atomic bombs as strong as that which was thrown on Nagasaki in World War Two, as the British weekly specified.

AL-WATAN says that it cannot be a pure coincidence that the 'alleged discoveries' of the Anglo-Saxon press were published immediately after the first round of the parliamentary elections in Algeria, whose results indicate the possibility of creating an Islamic republic in the country.

AL-WATAN said that similar accusations were launched last spring in some American newspapers. The U.S. press at that time said Algeria intended to build an atomic bomb in Ain Oussera, where a nuclear reactor was being built in cooperation with China.

Both Algiers and Beijing denied the allegations, which proved completely groundless after the inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, as AL-WATAN sets out.

Sharp accusations in the Anglo-Saxon press about the non-existent 'Islamic nuclear weapons' is all the more strange, bearing in mind that it has remained completely silent over 'Israel's atomic bomb which really does exist,' the Algerian paper concludes.

INDIA

Iran Rejects Stipulations on Nuclear Technology

92WP0095A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
12 Nov 91 pp 1, 7

[News report: "Iran: Stand on Kashmir Will Not Be Altered in Exchange for Atomic Technology; Before the Start of the Islamic Leadership Conference, the Indian Foreign Minister's Visit to Iran Did Not Produce the Desired Results"]

[Text] Tehran, 11 Nov (PPA)—Iran has rejected India's proposal that in exchange for nuclear technology, Iran remain silent on occupied Kashmir, the deplorable plight of Indian Muslims and [the issue] of Babar's mosque and that Iran refrain from supporting Pakistan's stand on these issues. Madhav Singh Solanki, India's foreign minister, is at present visiting Iran and talking with high-level Iranian officials. According to reports received from Iranian foreign ministry sources, Iran has made it clear to India that it will not change its position on the Kashmir issue even if its stand should have an effect on India's offer of atomic technology. India has

recently offered nuclear technology to Iran whereas China continues to supply nuclear technology to Iran. Last week China's foreign ministry issued a statement saying that China was helping Iran in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and this statement was later corroborated by Iran. India's foreign minister is visiting Iran on a special mission that has been described as an effort on India's part to obtain the support of Muslim countries prior to next month's Islamic leadership conference in Senegal; to take Muslim countries in its confidence; to reassure them in regard to the problems of occupied Kashmir, Babar's mosque and the dangers to the lives and property of Indian Muslims so that these issues would not be raised in the Senegal conference. According to Indian Embassy sources in Tehran, Solanki intends to visit other Islamic countries in the next few days and will try to gain support for India's position regarding Kashmir and other problems.

Papers Comment on Nuclear-Free Zone Proposal

Disarmament Support Urged

92WP0084A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
23 Nov 91 p 6

[Editorial: "Nuclear Physiocracy"]

[Text] The Soviet Union's ballot at the United Nations in favour of a South Asian nuclear-free zone should be taken not as a diplomatic catastrophe but as a dash of cold water in the face. It was an embarrassing reminder that India's foreign policy needs refashioning in the post-Cold War world. In the age of superpower confrontation, both Moscow and Washington subsumed their support for nuclear non-proliferation to specific strategic interest. The Soviet Union consistently abstained from supporting a nuclear-free South Asia because it was then more important to retain India as balance against China. A parallel can be drawn with the U.S.A.'s public support for non-proliferation and its simultaneous blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear programme. The strategic compulsions that kept non-proliferation at bay have now disappeared. Both superpowers are obsessed with nuclear fears. Pakistan realized this when the United States, virtually overnight, deprived it of all economic and military aid for refusing to shelve its atomic ambitions.

It was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union took a similar line with India. While the United States may have done some prompting, the interest Moscow has in promoting a nuclear weapons ban in any region of the world within ballistic missile range of the Volga basin is obvious and evident. Mr. Boris Yeltsin's embrace of global nuclear disarmament is closer to the spirit that possesses the modern Russian world-view than any number of Mr. Mikhail Gorbachov's reassurances to old allies. All of this does not, however, mean that India has no case when it argues that a South Asia no-go zone is military gibberish. There can be no nuclear-free area in a continent still bristling with nuclear arms—open and clandestine. Besides, the Indus and the Irrawaddy do not

mark the limits of India's security interests. While India can perhaps be faulted for failing to come to a diplomatic settlement of its boundary dispute with China—a view that Moscow seems to take—it is also true that national security cannot be based on present geniality and ignoring potential future danger. A nuclear-armed Beijing will be in a position to exert unacceptable pressure on an India that has renounced the nuclear option. Pakistan, too, has made no secret of its nuclear ambition.

New Delhi has reason to argue, therefore, that a nuclear-free South Asia must be part and parcel of a larger disarmament programme that would encompass Russia, China, and any nuclear republics in Soviet Central Asia. India's present refusal to convert its nuclear potential to warhead reality is also an implicit recognition of the fact that long-term atomic security is illusory and ruinously expensive. With the Soviet arsenal heading for the scrapyard, the opportunity for an Asia-wide arms limitation agreement is there, however slender. The UN vote is a symbolic act and can be ignored, but nuclear non-proliferation is fast becoming one of the top items on the international agenda. Taking up the banner of nuclear disarmament in right earnest will make clear India's commitment to arms reduction and shift the focus from South Asia to where it deserves to be.

'Imaginative Diplomacy' Needed

92WP0084B Calcutta *THE TELEGRAPH* in English
22 Nov 91 p 8

[Editorial: "Pressures on India"]

[Text] Those Rajya Sabha members who were vocal in their indignation over renewed U.S. pressures on India to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) were unwittingly guilty of being obstacles in the path of a pragmatic reappraisal of the country's foreign policy in the light of changed circumstances. Like the mandarins in the South Block who are fighting a rearguard battle to prevent the existing policy from being jettisoned, there are a large number of politicians cutting across party lines who mask their inability to comprehend the dynamics of a unipolar world by reiterating archaic platitudes. This is, of course, not to suggest that becoming a signatory to the NPT is desirable. The treaty is clearly discriminatory and unworthy of acceptance by a country that entertains notions of being the regional policeman. If the United States is successful in pressuring India into accepting the NPT, it will be tantamount to New Delhi formally accepting a second class status in world affairs. Whatever the present difficulties, the Narasimha Rao government has no moral right to mortgage the future prospects of the country.

Such a visionary zeal may appear woefully out of place in the context of India's present vulnerability. With the Soviet leaders, including Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev and Mr. Boris Yeltsin, bluntly articulating their relative disinterest in India to a crestfallen Mr. Madhavsingh Solanki, the country seems strangely bereft of reliable

and powerful allies. No wonder the Bush administration and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has chosen this moment to pressure India into reviewing its existing opposition to the NPT. The timing could not have been more opportune since China and Pakistan too have shown themselves willing to accommodate U.S. susceptibilities. Mr. Nawaz Sharif in particular has proved himself an adroit politician by suggesting a regional non-proliferation treaty that includes India, China, the Soviet Union and the United States as an alternative to a blanket endorsement of the NPT. With the Soviet Union also seeing merit in such a proposal, India stands totally isolated.

Under the circumstances, it makes little sense for India to stick rigidly to its existing position. The rigidity becomes all the more meaningless because the country's present dependence on international finance will make it impossible to sustain such a position for too long. And there is nothing more demeaning than having to capitulate when the United States really tightens the screws. What is called for is some imaginative diplomacy aimed at securing a respite. For a start, India would do well to reiterate the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and encourage international verification of this fact. Second, there is a need to formulate a credible response to the Nawaz Sharif proposal. While welcoming the idea of a nuclear-free South Asia, India has to alert the international community of the non-viability of such an approach as long as Iraq and Libya retain the likelihood of being undercover arsenals of Pakistan. In short, the scope of a nuclear-free zone has to be extended keeping in mind the turbulence in West Asia and the gathering momentum of Islamic fundamentalism. Finally, the economic liberalisation initiated by the present government has to be speeded up and the country made attractive for international investment. There will be a greater appreciation of India's national interests once economic links are forged and strengthened. As things stand today, an unfortunate overdose of economic nationalism has made it difficult for the West to understand the essential convergence of long-term interests between the free world and India.

Scientists Give More Details on Nuclear Camera

92WP0123A Madras *INDIAN EXPRESS* in English
24 Nov 91 p 9

[Article: "Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Develops Nuclear Camera"]

[Text] PTI, New Delhi, Nov. 23—A nuclear camera developed by scientists of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre [BARC] in Bombay has diverse applications in aerospace, ordnance, metallurgy and biology in addition to nuclear field, BARC scientists have said.

The camera takes pictures of objects in great detail using a beam of nuclear particles called neutrons. Such pictures are more useful, in certain situations, than those taken with X-rays, they said.

Work on the camera, which started as a scientific curiosity, has now culminated in a full-fledged system that can be used in non-destructive testing, BARC scientists said in a report in the Indian journal of pure and applied physics.

They said the nuclear camera has now been functioning at the swimming pool reactor "Apsara" in Trombay.

Neutrons, that stream out of a reactor can be used for the camera. It is also possible to build a compact machine to generate neutrons, they said.

Taking pictures with neutrons has some advantages over X-rays because they interact with atomic nucleus unlike X-rays that interact with electrons outside the nucleus, the scientists explained.

As a probing tool, neutrons are more suited than X-rays particularly when materials to be imaged contain very light or very heavy atoms or contain isotopes of an element which need to be distinguished. X-rays cannot be used for this purpose.

The BARC team said their camera has been extensively used to investigate the integrity of fuel pellets during fabrication of fuel bundles, to detect defects as such as voids and water ingress, and to examine used fuel elements taken out of a reactor. Feedback from such studies had helped BARC to design better fuel.

The scientists said the camera has also been used to inspect aerospace components and products from ordnance factories such as explosives and detonators.

"The penetration power of neutrons through heavy metals is exploited for radiographic examination of these devices".

The scientists said that BARC has established the basic capabilities of the nuclear camera and "a vast scope exists for exploitation of the method in a variety of fields".

West Urges India To Join London Club

92WP0122A Madras *THE HINDU in English* 2 Dec 91 p 6

[Text] New Delhi, Dec. 1. India is now being urged by the Western powers, notably the United States, to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), commonly known as the London Club. Ironically, the Club had been formed shortly after India exploded its nuclear device in 1974.

The nuclear weapons monopolists at the time had taken fright that a country like India, already in possession of the technology, might go ahead and make the bomb. The clear purpose of the Club, therefore, became to manifestly act as the management for nuclear supplies worldwide and to ensure that any export of nuclear technology did not cause nuclear weapons to be produced.

Fairly in consonance with the NPT regime, the present members of the London Club are the Western possessors of nuclear technology. China, for instance, has doggedly kept out of both the NPT and the NSG, though lately, keeping in view the changed international circumstances after the collapse of the Soviet counterweight to the U.S.-led western alliance, it has agreed to join the NPT.

Gentle suggestions to India to join the NSG have been made for some time. The latest instance was during the recent visit here of the U.S. Under-Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Mr. Reginald Bartholomew.

A discussion of London Club affairs, or for that matter the international proliferation of nuclear weapons, did not constitute Mr. Bartholomew's agenda here. Accordingly, there was no formal tabling of an invitation to join the Club. But a hint to that effect was more than discernible, according to knowledgeable sources.

India has a credible record of being a restrained nuclear technology power, with no lapses of any kind whatever of irresponsible export behaviour in the area of nuclear know-how, i.e. passing on critical knowledge to international personalities who would think nothing of putting it to weapons production.

This is a lot more than can be said for any of the sponsors of the NPT or its depository States, the nuclear Big Five, who for political reasons have bred well-known international mavericks on forbidden weapons technology, eliciting worldwide concern. Indeed, India has never been challenged even for diverting imported dual-purpose technology even at the height of the cold war when it was on best friends terms with the East European bloc. In the circumstances, Mr. Bartholomew used the goodwill argument.

The point was why does India not formally join the NSG and earn the good will of the nuclear technology community, i.e. the western powers, when it has been on exemplary behaviour anyway?

This is a good question since joining the Club cannot circumscribe or compromise India's own indigenous and peaceful nuclear programme, though NSG membership is unlikely to give it free access to western nuclear technology any more than not signing does. But on the plus side western goodwill has its uses in today's world.

Indian officials have not said yes or no, but have agreed to consider the idea, it is understood. The cautious response arises from a consideration of the costs entailed.

Two kinds of issues are involved here. The U.S. official's suggestion was mixed up with the context of the preliminary discussions on the sale of a nuclear reactor to Iran. The Americans are not happy about the idea even though Iran is a NPT signatory and, therefore, treaty-bound to observe restrictions imposed by the non-proliferation regime.

The Indian argument is that it would be an open sale under the usual IAEA safeguards, and of the kind that the westerners have themselves executed without inhibition. At any rate, one of the objects of the IAEA is to make nuclear technology available to developing countries for peaceful uses.

India did not reject outright Mr. Bartholomew's views on avoiding the sale of the reactor, but agreed to consider all aspects of the matter. Nevertheless, a section of decision-making here is unhappy about the U.S. wishing to dictate the definition of end-user.

But more to the point, a strong view here is that if India balks at the sale, it would lose all prospective buyers for reactors even under the usual IAEA safeguards. This entails a considerable loss of revenue. In the case of Iran, it might affect political ties with which is tied up talks for oil supplies and other matters of mutual interest.

Another set of issues worrying officialdom here is the larger NPT context. Some argue that joining the London Club might be the first western step into ensnaring or cajoling India into signing the NPT as a non-(nuclear) weapons power which has several negative implications.

Exchange of Nuclear Data With Pakistan Welcomed

BK0401120292 Delhi All India Radio General Overseas Service in English 1010 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Commentary by P. Dev Kumar, UNITED NEWS OF INDIA special correspondent: "Mutual Inspection of Nuclear Installations by Pakistan and India"]

[Text] The exchange of documents between India and Pakistan in connection with the 1988 agreement on nonattack on each other's nuclear facilities should go a long way in removing mutual suspicions about their nuclear designs. This agreement was conceived in December 1985 when General Zia visited India. At that time, Pakistan was seething with rumors that India was planning to attack the Kahuta nuclear plant in collaboration with Israel. The rumors had created a high-pitch, anti-India frenzy in some sections of the Pakistani population. It was amidst this that the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistan's President Gen. Zia ul Haq agreed to sign the agreement. However, the agreement could not materialize during Gen. Zia's lifetime because of disagreement on some details. It was only when Ms. Benazir came to power that this agreement could be signed during Mr. Gandhi's visit to Islamabad in December 1988 during the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] meeting. But this agreement remained ineffective because Pakistan hesitated in disclosing the sites of its nuclear facilities as had been provided in the Rajiv-Benazir agreement.

It is significant that Pakistan finally agreed to provide the required list only after its Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's proposal in June last year for a five-nation consultation on making South Asia nuclear weapon free.

India rejected this proposal outright as a rehash of Pakistan's earlier proposals for making South Asia a nuclear-free zone. Pakistan has since used this proposal as a propaganda against India in the United States and other countries. But its refusal to provide a list of its nuclear facilities in accordance with the 1988 agreement came in the way of the credibility of its nuclear-related propaganda against India. And that is perhaps the reason why Pakistan has finally decided to do the needful.

The agreement entered earlier provides each party shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging, or participating in directly or indirectly any action aimed at causing the destruction or damage to any nuclear installation or facility in the other country, and that the term nuclear installation or facility includes nuclear power and research reactors; fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities; as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form; and establishments storing significant quantities of radioactive materials. Each contracting party shall inform the other on January the 1st of each calendar year of the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installations and facilities whenever there is any change.

Now that this agreement has become effective on the New Year's Day, one should hope for a better level of relationship between the two countries. But again, everything depends on intentions. Secretary General in Pakistan's Foreign Ministry Akram Zaki has told the Voice of America that the agreement would help in easing tension, but Kashmir continues to be the main stumbling block in the normalization of India-Pakistan relations. There is another stumbling block in the process of normalization. Since the days of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan has declared that it must become a nuclear power. As early as 1965, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister of Pakistan, saw in the nuclear energy the source of military supremacy and world recognition. He played an important role in laying the foundation of the weapon-oriented nuclear program.

Dr. A.Q. Khan, who built the clandestine Kahuta plant with nuclear secrets from the Western countries, was the find of Mr. Bhutto. The Kahuta plant was Mr. Bhutto's brainchild, and as the world reports go, it is here that Pakistan has been quietly working on a nuclear bomb. Subsequently, Dr. Khan claimed that they have made enough success to produce a nuclear bomb. India, on the other hand, has declared a policy of not using its nuclear capabilities to produce a bomb. Thus, for effective peace between India and Pakistan, Islamabad will have to assure India that it has no nuclear weapon intentions. Also, it has to desist from activities such as supporting terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir and revert to the spirit of the the Simla agreement.

Soviet Upheaval Halts Thermal Power Project*BK0401080892 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 0730 GMT 4 Jan 92*

[Text] In Kerala, the work of the proposed 1,210-megawatt super thermal power project of the NTPC [National Thermal Power Corporation] at Kayankulam has come to a halt. According to senior officials of the NTPC, environmental reasons and the political upheaval in the former Soviet Union, which had agreed to share the cost of the project, are some of the hurdles. Five crore rupees have already been spent on preliminary work on the project.

High Commission Says Pakistan Nuclear List Complete*BK0901034092 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 0245 GMT 9 Jan 92*

[Text] The Indian High Commission in Islamabad has refuted reports appearing in a section of the Pakistani press that the list supplied by India of its nuclear installations and facilities in pursuance of the Indo-Pakistan agreement on nonattack on each other's nuclear installations is incomplete.

A press release issued by the high commission says the list is complete in every respect.

IRAN**Exiled 'Ayatollah' on Potential Use of Bomb***92WP0014A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 13 Dec 91 pp 37,39*

[Interview by Ran Adelst with an anonymous exiled ayatollah in Geneva: "The Clerics Want a Bomb"; place and date not given; first three paragraphs are YEDI'OT AHARONOT introduction]

[Text] "Pakistan is not serious about using the bomb, and Iran is. If it seems to you that Saddam Husayn is the cruelest and most insane in the world, the Iranian regime is, in its own way, much more determined and brutal than the defeated Saddam of today, with everyone watching every move that he makes." That is what one of the Iranian ayatollahs, who was once Khomeyni's partner and is now an exile in Geneva, says. Naturally, he wishes to remain anonymous.

The shadow of the Islamic bomb is coming closer and closer to us, and the Israeli panic runs in two directions. On the one hand, everything related to our nuclear capability is considered the most terrible state secret. On the other hand, everything related to the capability of the Arabs is the most terrible source of danger. This panic has several justified facets but, like all panic, it also looks like panic, i.e., a mixture of fright and hasty acts of foolishness and basic lack of judgment. This is beyond the justification of the existential and ultimate weapon and the possibility that Qadhdhafi or Khomeyni or

Saddam will drop a bomb on Tel Aviv. The fact that we are approaching the stage in which Ge'ula Cohen, Rabbi Levinger, and Arik Sharon will stand before the Saddam and Qadhdhafi and Khomeyni of the hour, waving the atomic chain at each other, is a real source of worry. Particularly when both we and they have absolute censorship on the subject. It is likely that the first time that the citizens of Israel or Iran will learn about the atomic problem in our region is when their room temperatures suddenly rise from 20 degrees celsius to 20,000. Therefore, there are grounds for opening up the entire issue, including clarification of the danger deriving from the development of a bomb in the neighboring countries.

UN investigators have found that the Iraqis are as close as the range of pressing the button to manufacturing a bomb, and the worrisome part is that the Israeli Government, despite the fact that thousands of people were engaged in the Iraqi atomic project, did not know in an organized manner even approximately what was happening in Iraq. (Not just routine cries of sanctimonious position papers, intended more for waving an alibi in a commission of inquiry rather than for real work.) Now, when the Iraqi bomb appears to be under control, and UN teams assess that it will be possible to neutralize the Iraqi atomic threat if the close supervision continues, the Iranian bomb, which is even more dangerous, is being created. The Iranian bomb, more so than the Iraqi one, is what is called in the jargon of atomic experts "the Islamic bomb." Although Pakistan has an atomic facility which is also called the Islamic bomb, Pakistan is not building it in order to exchange Mohammed's sword for a bomb, but as a reaction to the Indian bomb. Iran, on the other hand, is definitely manufacturing a bomb in order to export the Islamic revolution.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Why is the Iranian bomb more dangerous than the Iraqi or Pakistani bombs?

[Exiled ayatollah] Because Pakistan is not serious about its use of the bomb and Iran is.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What is the problem with arranging similar supervision in Iran, as well?

[Exiled ayatollah] The problem is that there is no organization with the authority to enter Iran in the way that they entered Iraq after the war. After the Americans defeated Saddam and also enabled him to remain in power, they could have received almost anything that they wanted from him. Entering Iran now under the same terms is impossible, and worse: Iran now has the backing of France and Britain, who are willing to ignore everything that is happening in Iran in exchange for fat contracts and Iranian money. Just recently, the British company "Rover" signed a \$1.6 billion contract with the Iranians, and British exports to Iran jumped over 40 percent in the first nine months of 1991 compared to 1990. Just now, a French official visited Tehran, preparing the visit of Foreign Minister Ronald Dumas, and he said that the murder of Bakhtiar was an "accident." This official signed a contract exactly one day before the

release of Terry Waite (for the return of money belonging to the Shah that was given to the French as a loan). The Americans, too, are not waiting for the Iranian market to open up automatically before them, so can they supervise the Iranians? They need jobs for their unemployed, so what do they care about the Iranian bomb? And you will see how the Germans will also cooperate with them. They also want a portion of the market, even though the Hizballah is holding two of their hostages. Those two have not yet been released because of internal logistic problems, but they will be released in January 1992.

On a clear, cold winter day in Geneva, I met him in the lobby of a hotel, located on the bank of the mouth of the Rhone, facing Davidov's cigar temple. In other words, he really is an ayatollah, even when he is garbed in a European suit, and a pearl-gray silk scarf is wrapped around his holy neck. The beard, too, was not exactly spilling over with Khomeyni-like wildness; rather, it was trimmed in Hindu-Pakistani width, if not in complete French, with a wide, silver mustache. Big devil, little devil, my ayatollah happens to be fond of the Jews, and the Americans, too, are no different than anyone else, as far as he is concerned, just stronger and more stupid. He has no problem mentioning the names of one or two of his Israeli acquaintances under the stipulation, of course, that his name not be divulged. In principle, as is said when not referring to anything of principle, he is a kind and gentle type. It is true that when he was associated with the Khomeyni regime he was in charge of some of the more brutal events that took place at the onset of the revolution, but since then a lot of blood has flowed in the sewers of Tehran, and "then it was a matter of mistakes because of initial constraints and for the sake of the salvation of the revolution."

He now resides in Geneva, a hospitable city in accordance with all of the rules of Swiss kindness and hypocrisy: if you have money, you are in, if you do not have money you are out. After contributing his part to the salvation of the revolution, my ayatollah discovered that such a revolution was not exactly the formula that would save Iran from itself. He picked up and left Tehran. Like hundreds of thousands of Iranian exiles, he is now waiting for the end of the power struggle between the hawks over Khomeyni's legacy. In the interim, he is enjoying the plenty of Western decadence and things are happening in Iran. The bomb, for example. And my ayatollah is worried, very worried. "The West must do something in order to stem the progress of atomic development in Iran, because these are the most dangerous people in the region. Saddam is a pussycat in comparison."

The Iranian bomb is now falling on a world that is different in how it relates to atomic problems than the world of several years ago. As in most cases where politicians must make decisions about fundamental problems, they deal with the atomic issue, too, from a perspective of total ignorance on the one hand, and total dependence on current market forces, i.e., the needs and shrieks of the audience surrounding them, on the other.

From this perspective, the present period bears a dimension of loud development in the realm of reference to nuclear weapons. The fall of the Red empire distracts from the atomic issue, which has moved from the balance of terror between two powers and international supervision to a real international chase after maniacs holding the bomb in their hands and saying: if you do not fly me to Acapulco or Tripoli, I will blow up half of the world. Formally, an agreement exists in the world, the nuclear "Non-Proliferation Treaty," which was completed in 1968 and became valid in 1970. Generally, the treaty required that the nuclear powers refrain from distributing the weapon and know-how, and that the nonnuclear powers not purchase or manufacture nuclear weapons; 120 countries are signatories to the treaty. Iraq and Iran, for example, are signatories to the treaty. Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa are not signatories to the treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency, a UN agency based in Vienna, is entrusted with overseeing the implementation of the treaty. It has indeed succeeded in preventing overt "horsetrading," but has not prevented the creation, on the one hand, of "near-nuclear states," such as Iraq and Iran, and, on the other hand, has not managed to force nuclear states, such as Israel and India, into acting within the limits of the treaty and supervision.

It is impossible to speak of the Iranian bomb without attempting to understand what is happening with whoever is managing that country, and the first and most basic thing, according to my ayatollah, is that there is currently nobody managing Iran.

[Exiled ayatollah] As long as Khomeyni was alive, he was the sole decision-maker about everything, small and large, and he was clearheaded almost until his final days. After he died, the war over the inheritance began, which still has not been decided. Actually, the inheritance war had begun before that, and Irangate was one of its aftergrowths. But now, since the occupation of Kuwait, there is a kind of revolutionary council in Iran with approximately 24 people—a kind of national security council—and only there are major decisions made. Khomeyni was the religious, military, and civilian leader. When he died, 'Ali Khamene'i was appointed as president of the republic and religious leader. Today, he is barely functioning, because he is very ill.

The prime minister is Musvi, but he lacks real authority. The president of the Majles, the parliament, is Rafsanjani, who was number two after Khomeyni, but he was unsuccessful in establishing himself as number one after his death. The president of the Islamic Court is Ayatollah Yazdi and, of course, Ayatollah Montazeri and Khomeyni's son, Ahmad, who is the most extreme of all. The struggle currently boils down to three groups, led by Musvi, Rafsanjani, and Montazeri. They differ in their approach to the West or in internal laws in Iran, but this is a power struggle, not ideology. The atomic issue can be brought up only by each of the sides to the shura. This also holds true because those dealing with the issue—technicians, engineers, and those with financial interests

in Iran and abroad—approached some mula to push the matter in the shura. You must understand that things are not conducted there like in a western country.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Why now, in particular?

[Exiled ayatollah] That is really a good question. I think that the push came from outside of Iran. The fact is that Iran had an atomic infrastructure back during the Shah's rule. There was an agency called "Sazemane-Atomi-Iran" which employed hundreds of people in the construction of a reactor for peacetime needs. The Shah signed an atomic treaty for electricity purposes with the United States, Germany, and France. A French company named "Auerodif," for the enrichment of uranium, was supposed to provide material for a 90-megawatt reactor, and the Shah gave the company a \$1 billion loan, thus rendering Iran a partner in a company for the enrichment of uranium. When the revolution prevailed, nobody wanted to deal with the matter. It was a contaminated western issue. In southern Iran there was a place called Bushehr, where the Iranian reactor was being built, and I remember that people came and asked what was being done there, and someone, perhaps Montazari, perhaps Rafsanjani, said that Khomeyni says to stop the whole thing and to send all of the Germans home, and so it was. Now, I hear that they are asking the Germans to return, and I hear that the Germans are hesitating, that they have yet to give a final answer.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Why do they need a bomb at all?

[Exiled ayatollah] The justification is that the bomb will be an important component in the conduct of their foreign politics.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do they understand at all what that means?

[Exiled ayatollah] They understand just like everyone else. The difference between them and others is that they are also willing to use the bomb. I have no doubt that if we had a bomb during the war with Iraq, we would have dropped it on the Iraqis back when they entered Karbela.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do they understand that there is opposition in the world to this matter of the bomb?

[Exiled ayatollah] Yes, they understand this, but they see that Israel has a bomb and India has a bomb and China has a bomb and Pakistan has a bomb, and you should know that right now top secret talks are being conducted among Iran, Pakistan, and China on the signing of a joint defense document, and this will render the Iranian bomb almost legitimate.

In a Parisian suburb half an hour by air from Geneva, Bani Sadr, the first Iranian president after the rise of Khomeyni, waits for something to happen. Sadr was once termed "a child of God," and was Khomeyni's favorite, until he became involved in the wild power struggle around Khomeyni and was ousted [and] exiled. He now resides in Versailles. He looks out of the window

and sees French police cars surrounding his home, recalling that just a few months ago Shapoor Bakhtiar, the first prime minister under Khomeyni, was murdered. He waited too. Not far from here. As opposed to my ayatollah, who makes the publication of part of the conversation contingent upon not making his name public, Bani Sadr does not hide his opposition to the current regime in Iran. He knows that his life is a bargaining issue between the French and Iranian governments, and he is learning to live with the fact that even if the French object, the Iranians are likely to do what they have already done before. The fact that I am an Israeli citizen bothers him, but after brief encouragement he is willing to make adamant statements about the matter of the Iranian bomb: "First of all, and most important in a discussion of the atomic problems in our region, is the fact that Israel has a bomb, and all of the development in the entire region is a product of that."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Insofar as you know those currently holding positions in Iran, are they also likely to use the bomb?

[Sadr] Without a doubt. They will not have any moral or political inhibitions about dropping a bomb over Tel Aviv or even over Saudi Arabia, if they think that this will serve their goals.

Defense Official Confirms Arms Deal With Russia

*PM1401122692 London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 12 Jan 92 pp 1, 6*

[Unattributed report: "Arms Deal With Russia Worth \$5 Billion"]

[Excerpts] Tehran, SAWT AL-KUWAYT—Russian President Yeltsin has assured the Iranian leadership that after the the breakup that hit the Soviet Union, his country will remain committed to the agreements and contracts concluded in the past. This was stated yesterday by a senior official of the Iranian Defense Ministry's military procurement department. [passage omitted]

SAWT AL-KUWAYT has learned that so far, Iran has received 24-28 Mig-29's and Mig-27's, in addition to Sukhoi fighter bombers, and between 200-250 T-72 tanks. The new shipment scheduled to be delivered before the end of the month includes 18 fighters and two modern Ilyushins fitted with air reconnaissance and early warning equipment. The shipment also includes 50 tanks, missile launchers, and long-range guns.

According to military sources in Iran, a group of Russian experts arrived in Iran at the beginning of the year to supervise the training of Air Force officers and technicians and the Iranian Army's missile unit. One must keep in mind that 80 Iranian pilots and technicians have completed their special training at the Russian Air Academy near Moscow. [passage omitted]

Editorial Denies Tehran Seeks Nuclear Weapons

LD1501141292 Tehran IRNA in English 1117 GMT
15 Jan 92

[Text] Tehran, Jan. 15, IRNA—Iran is neither in the race for nuclear arms nor has it any intention to destabilize Africa, as the Western media and its Third World surrogates allege, said the English daily KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL here today.

Such assertions, said KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in its editorial titled "Dispelling Misunderstandings" are "simply intended to mislead the public and spread false information" about the Islamic Republic of Iran.

"As far as Sudan is concerned, it must be said that it is a Muslim state and the Islamic Republic has always said it would do everything, moral and material within its power, to help and cooperate with Islamic states," said the daily.

Turning to the former Soviet republics, it said "six of these republics are Muslim and have common borders with Iran in the north and northeast by land or sea. The six republics with more than a 60 million population can be like another Persian Gulf to Iran as far as the possibility for economic and cultural exchanges is concerned. Some of these states... once formed part of greater Iran and that the cultural and historical ties between Iran and them are great and these ties can act as an instrument for advancing the two nations' goals."

The editorial said that "with Islam acting like a powerful common bond after years of communist rule, the Islamic Republic is now seeking stronger ties" with the former Soviet republics.

"Therefore, the active diplomacy the Islamic Republic has launched... is natural and in response to social needs," and "is not out of desire to buy nuclear bombs but gain foothold in a mutually beneficial future."

ISRAEL

Committee Approves Controls on Missile Exports

TA2512125491 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew
25 Dec 91 p 1

[Report by On Levi]

[Excerpt] The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee yesterday approved measures consistent with Israel's decision to join the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] as of 1 January 1992.

A Defense Ministry spokesman said yesterday that the committee approved amendments to the Control of Commodities and Services Order pertaining to the export of warfare equipment and defense-related expertise. The amendments impose strict control on missile and missile technology exports, in compliance with the MTCR. [passage omitted]

General Shahaq Discusses Nuclear Threat

TA2612125591 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew
1005 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Interview with Major General Amnon Shahaq, deputy chief of staff, by army affairs correspondent Karmela Menashe on 26 December at the end of a news conference with military correspondents at which he presented the army's annual program—recorded]

[Text] [Menashe] How ready is the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] to counter the nuclear threat? Is this reflected in the IDF's annual work program for 1992?

[Shahaq] To the best of my knowledge and luckily for us, there is no nuclear threat in the Middle East today, but this is an evolving issue. The IDF takes a very grave view of it and closely follows the possible involvement of a nuclear threat in the Middle East. We attacked the Iraqi reactor in 1981 because we wanted to prevent a nuclear threat. The Gulf war exposed wide-ranging nuclear activities in Iraq aimed at acquiring a nuclear capability as fast as possible. There is no doubt that given the present circumstances, Iraq and other countries will pursue their efforts to develop nuclear capability.

On the one hand, the IDF will closely monitor these developments. On the other, there are events outside the Middle East that could affect the involvement of such a threat, such as what will happen to the nuclear weapons and unemployed nuclear scientists following the disbandment of the Soviet Union. We will have to monitor the situation in terms of intelligence, which is the job of the Intelligence Corps and the intelligence community. Moreover, we will have to start thinking about how to prepare for the eventuality of a nuclear threat, and this process will definitely start in 1992.

[Menashe] In addition to the nuclear threat, the Arab countries are pursuing their buildup of nonconventional weapons, both in terms of quality and quantity.

[Shahaq] That is correct. In the past few months we have seen Syria acquiring modern tanks and artillery guns and better surface-to-surface missiles than it had before. We are not only closely following these events, but also preparing our response. I believe our preparations will wisely counter the woes you have mentioned.

[Menashe] Will the IDF be amenable to a change in its multiyear program in the face of a possible political process?

[Shahaq] First of all, what we presented today was an annual program. We will be amenable to changing both our annual and multiyear programs, to diverting our efforts, and to anticipating new developments. This definitely applies to the multiyear program.

[Menashe] Israel drew lessons concerning intelligence from the Gulf war. You said that long-term intelligence has been given more prominence and funds in the IDF's programs.

[Shahaq] That is correct. Israel has learned its lessons, and the IDF will do what it knows how to do best to be better prepared and to obtain intelligence from places further away from our borders.

[Reporting on Shahaq's news conference, Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew at 1100 GMT on 26 December notes: "The deputy chief of staff added that the IDF is trying to reduce the number of troops in Judaea and Samaria, but that occasionally, for limited periods of time, the IDF reinforces its troops there to cope with specific situations."

[In a related report, Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew at 1100 GMT on 26 December adds: "General Shahaq said the IDF believes Syria is very unlikely to launch a war in 1992, but noted that this assessment could change from one minute to the next."]

Intelligence Branch Chief on Nuclear Arms, Syria

TA0301121492 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
3 Jan 92 pp 10, 11

[Interview with Brigadier General Oren Shahor, chief of the Intelligence Branch, by Avi Bnayahu; in Tel Aviv on 30 December]

[Excerpts] [Bnayahu] On 1 January, the USSR was officially liquidated. The Western world is worried about the tactical and strategic nuclear weapons stationed in four different republics. How does the Intelligence Branch view the impact of this situation on the Middle East and Israel?

[Shahor] As a superpower, the USSR traditionally supported Arab countries, such as Syria. Syria's longtime ambition to achieve strategic parity was based, among other factors, on that superpower support, which no longer exists. In terms of the possibility of an armed conflict with an Arab country, such as Syria, I would say the impact of the weakening, disintegration, and metamorphosis of the USSR into a sort of commonwealth is a relief.

[Bnayahu] Will the weapon supply lines from the former USSR vanish or will weapons sales grow via the republics?

[Shahor] We must not forget that the Arab armies' main supply of weapons comes from Eastern Europe. The disintegration of the former USSR will be significant in the future regarding spare parts, advisers, and supplies. On the other hand, the market is opening up, and the worse the cash shortage is, the easier it becomes to procure warfare materiel. All of Eastern Europe is naturally short of money, and this influences the arms market. In the current process, it will be increasingly easier to secure weapons, technology, and information. In general, the impact is negative for the Arabs, who have East European weapons. They are aware of it, but there is nothing they can do.

[Bnayahu] And what about the nuclear aspect? Is there room for the apprehension voiced by Western leaders?

[Shahor] The nuclear issue threatens the entire world and not any one particular region. Our attitude to it is one of fear and awe, and justifiably so. The Americans are equally right in being more concerned by the issue of nuclear arms control than the economic and other important issues. Irresponsible control of the briefcase with the codes can play havoc with the world.

My impression is that the message from Yeltsin and the leaders of the other republics is mature and responsible and that they seem to be saying: Relax, people, we are dealing with the issue seriously; President Yeltsin will keep the briefcase and control everything connected with nuclear weapons. This is how it looks, but there is no way to know how things will develop. At the moment, as they have told the Americans, they appear to have a responsible approach. [passage omitted]

[Bnayahu] Has Kazakhstan, with its nuclear weapons, become a superpower and a target for Israeli intelligence? Do such weapons make rulers or countries into superpowers in the eyes of other countries?

[Shahor] Nowadays, there is only one genuine superpower in the world, one that behaves like a superpower: the United States. Although the United States has been the leader for many years now, the traditional balance between the United States and what used to be the USSR has been upset more than ever. Being a superpower takes more than nuclear weapons; there is also economy, industry, and the ability to produce results.

[Bnayahu] In the short and medium run, is the disintegration of the Soviet Union good or bad for the Jews?

[Shahor] Everything is at the embryonic stage just now, but I can discern some possibilities for us in terms of our enemies' loss of a superpower's support and of a steady supply of weapons, the U.S. ability to influence these countries, and so forth. In my view, there are numerous possibilities. [passage omitted]

[Bnayahu] Has the Intelligence Branch invested more effort in Iraq in the wake of the Gulf war and Iraq's desire to rebuild its Army and damaged infrastructure?

[Shahor] As part of the lessons we learned from the war, we are naturally focusing more on peripheral states today. Missiles make distant countries more threatening. It is necessary to deploy intelligence infrastructures. It is not easy, but this is the challenge with which we have been tasked. The peripheral countries, including Iraq and Iran, are serious targets. [passage omitted]

[Bnayahu] When will Israel have a surveillance satellite? The defense minister promised one within two years.

[Shahor] I will not discuss timetable details, but we are speaking about the next few years. It is a long-range process involving advanced technologies. The satellite is a real thing, its development was given priority, and it

will grant us an ability we did not have in the past to view, assess, and, in time, to alert. The surveillance satellite is not a magic wand, but in my opinion, it is very important for every sphere for which the Intelligence Branch is responsible. The more we are faced with nonconventional means, the greater the satellite's significance. I regard it as something that will place Israeli intelligence in a higher class. I am saying this as an Israeli: The satellite is of supreme importance. With us, it has high priority. [passage omitted]

[Bnayahu] Can you assert that today we possess the intelligence capability to know more about Iraq than we did a year ago?

[Shahor] Definitely, undoubtedly. Our capability to cope and to know is better. It is the result of our continued buildup in this sphere. [passage omitted]

[Bnayahu] Is Saddam capable of rebuilding Iraq despite the still-valid embargo?

[Shahor] In my opinion, the answer in the long range is yes. The embargo has not proved itself; it has encumbered Saddam, but contrary to expectations, it has not smothered him.

[Bnayahu] What is the state of the Iraqi nuclear infrastructure?

[Shahor] Part of it has been exposed, but not everything, I think; exposing everything will take many more years. It should be remembered that Iraq possesses know-how which cannot be obliterated, and various capabilities it has achieved; the potential will be there for a long time.

[Bnayahu] Israel's nearest and most immediate remaining enemy is Syria, which is now sitting down to peace negotiations with us. What is the Intelligence Branch's evaluation of the potential situation, if the peace talks fail? Is there still danger of a Syrian military move in the present reality?

[Shahor] The annual intelligence assessment says there is little likelihood of a war with Syria in the foreseeable future. This is based on the existence of a peace process, peace debates, the absence of Soviet support, and so forth. In parallel, we have noted that from year to year, the Syrian Army becomes more quality conscious.

All in all, it should be clear that although the Syrians are involved in the peace process, they have not abandoned their ambition to attain strategic parity. They are interested in the peace dialogue and, as an intelligence body, we have to be ready for changes.

In my opinion, Syria is interested in negotiations, but the possibility that the peace talks or the entire political process will break up is potentially dangerous, because this outcome is liable to take Syria back to its unchanging traditional stand.

I think al-Asad is a very pragmatic leader with an unchanging and quite balanced way of thinking. With

al-Asad, the emotional aspects are low on the scale of importance, while rational considerations are very high. Syria aims to regain the Golan Heights; this is the Syrian motivation in the negotiations.

[Bnayahu] There has recently been increasing concern about the growing Iranian threat and Iran's desire to acquire nuclear weapons. To what extent is Iran an intelligence target?

[Shahor] The Iranians strive to attain nuclear arms with the aid of China. They believe that the Muslim world should have an answer to what they think Israel has, and they want to get it in the coming decade. The Iranian perception of our existence is very radical, as they have openly declared. In addition, the Gulf war has taught them the importance of missiles, and they are trying to acquire a 1,000-km-range missile. We definitely view Iran as a danger, beginning with its support for the Hizballah-perpetrated terrorist attacks from Lebanon down to international terrorist activities in general.

At present, Iran seems potentially dangerous, and we have presented the situation as such. Iran is a central target, to which we have accorded very high priority. [passage omitted]

[Bnayahu] In the wake of the latest operation in Lebanon, the volume of our intelligence data about Lebanon and our ability to obtain information about Hizballah activities have again been questioned. How does the Intelligence Branch cope with this matter?

[Shahor] Quite a few activities, as well as continuing military operations, are carried out in Lebanon. Intelligence is a complex issue, because Lebanon is a complex country. There is a flow of intelligence in various directions, there is a lot of disinformation and compartmentation in Hizballah; in addition, they are well acquainted with the terrain. All this affects our activities, but we are coping. Our objective is to reach worthwhile targets, and we are aware of the problems I have mentioned. The judgment that a target is indeed a target involves a lot of energy, and it does not always work. We try to have accurate information, however, and occasionally we admit we do not know. This, too, is sometimes important.

[Bnayahu] Was the most recent operation, in which three Lebanese were kidnapped, conducted for intelligence purposes?

[Shahor] The answer is: not only for intelligence purposes. As the chief of staff has explained, the objective was both to gather information and to show presence. I can state unequivocally that there was no misidentification, nor was there any failure. The media reports on this event were a canard, and for that reason, the chief of staff backed the intelligence personnel, for which I am most appreciative.

[Bnayahu] Has the Intelligence Corps anything to say about the timing of this kind of operation? The question

comes in connection with the UN secretary general's statement that the operation had damaged his efforts toward the release of hostages.

[Shahor] The Intelligence Branch has a part in almost everything, and occasionally in the timing as well. I think the operations in Lebanon should be viewed as an ongoing activity. When such activity, which can be neither stopped nor decreased, takes place, the intelligence sector is a full partner.

[Bnayahu] Can you say that, without any doubt, the timing of the operation has done no damage?

[Shahor] My impression is that it was okay, including everything connected to the timing and performance.

[Bnayahu] It has been five years since Ron Arad and his plane went down in southern Lebanon. Lebanon is a neighboring country, in which no reconnaissance satellites and so forth are needed. Is not the failure to ascertain Ron Arad's place of captivity and condition for five years an intelligence fiasco?

[Shahor] This issue is incomparably sensitive. For that reason, my answer also requires caution. I can say that there is high awareness of the issue, and there is no limit to the resources and effort which we are prepared to invest in promoting a solution. I would not like to address your question specifically, because it may be harmful.

[Bnayahu] In the last year we have seen significant intelligence activity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. How is this activity expressed?

[Shahor] Intelligence cannot only deal with strategy and not provide assistance on the issue of the intifadah. It begins with field intelligence, processed in the General Staff, which creates field files, target files, and so on. We have a deployment of special observation posts that assist the forces in the field and makes a significant contribution in selecting and locating quality targets—meaning capturing people with blood on their hands—and in providing additional assistance in terms of the forces' sophistication. We are doing this in cooperation with the Shin Bet, to which we send noncommissioned operations officers to simplify the cooperation methods. I would like to take this opportunity to compliment our men in the territories and the Shin Bet. This is a group of people doing a very important job.

[Bnayahu] What means are being used in the territories?

[Shahor] We use various cameras, day and night observations, television cameras and binoculars for various ranges, surveillance balloons, and other means.

[Bnayahu] Speaking of the territories, a remark made by a senior intelligence figure not so long ago comes to mind, that too much is being invested in surveilling PLO men around the world, so that sometimes we miss the

important things. The whole intelligence community is being brought up on this order of priorities. Is it not a mistake?

[Shahor] The intifadah made us change our perceptions of certain issues and make the appropriate modifications.

Surveillance of terror elements does not come at the expense of anything else. Preventing spectacular terror acts is a major target. The terrorists are aware of the fact that we have a sensitive soft belly. We have to monitor this and do it, and it does not come from not doing something else.

When we speak of political activity, leadership and people change, and each period has its own typical characteristics. Speaking of terrorism, this is often more complicated; often it is like searching for a needle in a haystack. For this we need sophistication, initiative, and professionalism.

[Bnayahu] Things have already been said about the challenge the intelligence community now faces in locating attempts to infiltrate agents into it using the massive immigration from the USSR. How does the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] field security, of which you are in charge, deal with this?

[Shahor] As far as our activity is concerned, this issue is highly sensitive. All I can say is that we are working in cooperation with the Shin Bet. The Shin Bet has a great responsibility, and our Field Security Department joins in when it is needed on all that concerns the IDF. We are aware of the issue and deal with it quite extensively. The issues concerned are delicate and sensitive, so we better keep silent. [passage omitted]

[Bnayahu] Is the Intelligence Branch [IB] today an IDF arm, with all that this means?

[Shahor] The IB and the Intelligence Corps [IC] are one and the same. We are in a process of assuming the status of an arm in terms of resources and manpower. Currently, we are reexamining the structure of the IB and the IC, the control span of which is very complex.

[Bnayahu] In your time, battlefield intelligence has undergone a real revolution. What are its main characteristics?

[Shahor] We are doing this with the Ground Corps Command. In terms of target intelligence, we are in a process of making a substantive change which would bring an updated intelligence picture in real time to the battlefield. The issue of introducing the unmanned air platform to the units is making progress. The Americans have also identified this means to be important, as a lesson they have learned from the Gulf war. [passage omitted]

China Delivers Reactor to Syria

TA0701184592 *Jerusalem Israel Television Network*
in Arabic 1730 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Citing informed sources, our correspondent Dani Levi reports that the recent deals concluded by Syria with the PRC and North Korea to provide it with long-range surface-to-surface Scud and other missiles have not yet been implemented due to the pressure being exerted by the United States on these two countries. It is worth noting that Syria has reached agreement for the delivery of a nuclear reactor from China for research purposes only.

Arens on Iraq's Nuclear Potential

TA1001122092 *Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew*
1005 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Interview with Defense Minister Moshe Arens by army affairs correspondent Karmela Menashe on 10 January; place not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Menashe] Defense Minister Moshe Arens, one year after the Gulf war, Iraq is rebuilding its nuclear weapons industry. Reports say that Iraq is toiling day and night, reconstructing its nuclear site.

[Arens] I cannot confirm this report, and I do not know that anyone in the world has precise information about what goes on in Iraq. We know that the Iraqis are not telling everything, that they are trying to conceal their remaining potential and their latest developments. There is no doubt, however, that the Iraqis will make a continuous effort to achieve the goal they had set before the Gulf war: namely, nuclear weapons.

[Menashe] How has Israel prepared for the possible introduction of nuclear weapons to the Middle East—to Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya?

[Arens] Our multiyear plan includes several plans which, when taken together, constitute an appropriate answer to this threat.

[Menashe] Do you think the world has done enough in this respect?

[Arens] I think since the Gulf war, there have definitely been intensive activities, led by the United States, aimed at revealing everything at Iraq's disposal, destroying its potential, and preventing Iraq from rebuilding it. If this activity is pursued with the same determination, there is a good chance that the Iraqis will be unable to attain nuclear arms.

[Menashe] A media report says today that Israel will purchase weapons or MiG-29's from the USSR.

[Arens] I have not seen this report, but no such decision has been made. [passage omitted]

PAKISTAN

Editorial Calls for Better Protection of Nuclear Facilities

92WPO112A *Karachi JANG in Urdu* 23 Nov 91 p 3

[Editorial: "Arrangements Made for Safeguarding Nuclear Installations"]

[Text] Mohammed Siddique Kanjo, federal minister for foreign affairs, speaking in the senate on a motion for adjournment, said that although an agreement had been signed between India and Pakistan in which each country pledged not to attack the other's nuclear installations, nevertheless, in view of the conspiracy between India and Israel concerning Pakistan's nuclear installations and the presence of Israeli experts in occupied Kashmir, Pakistan had made all necessary arrangements for the protection of its nuclear installations and that the government was fully aware of the possibility of an attack. In this connection he announced that an attack on Pakistan's nuclear installations would be tantamount to a declaration of war and that an attack would provoke a similar retaliation. Pakistan's nuclear program is aimed solely at alleviating the energy crisis and Pakistan is continuing the program for peaceful purposes. But because of the conspiracy between Jews and Hindus, Western media are constantly maligning Pakistan on the international level. In this atmosphere of suspicion, the United States has stopped aid to Pakistan. There is no doubt about the enmity that India and Israel feel towards Islam; hence, because of their constant plots against Pakistan's nuclear installations, Pakistan's safety depends on its vigilance and preparedness at every level. India has paid little attention to its past agreements with Pakistan and cannot be trusted to observe the terms of any new agreement. In view of this fact, the necessity of preparedness at all times for the defense of our borders and sensitive installations cannot be neglected even for a moment.

Commentary Criticizes U.S. Nuclear Pressure

92WP0112B *Karachi AMN in Urdu* 26 Nov 91 p 2

[Commentary by Juma Khan: "Pakistan Should Construct the Nuclear Bomb and Curse the United States; We Are Not a Shameless Nation: We Will Live Our Lives in Freedom and Dignity; U.S. Kindness Toward India and Israel; If the Nuclear Bomb Is Dangerous, Then Its Stockpiles Should Be Destroyed"]

[Text] Bilateral negotiations to restore normal relations have started between Pakistan and the United States. An American general has toured Pakistan and a U.S. under secretary of state for international defense affairs has held talks in Islamabad. Pakistan's position during these talks was that Pakistan is not ready to sacrifice its nuclear program for the sake of normalizing relations with the United States and the United States has expressed the desire that relations between the two countries remain as friendly as they were in the early part of the 1980's.

If Pakistan persists in continuing its nuclear program in spite of U.S. protests and if the United States continues to withhold aid to Pakistan because of its objections to Pakistan's nuclear program, then what becomes of this talk of friendship? The two countries would be deceiving each other if they said that, despite the suspension of U.S. aid, friendly relations would continue as before or that if Pakistan kept working on its nuclear program, the United States would consider the suspension of aid a sufficient reaction and would continue its pleasant association with Pakistan.

When a great power suspends aid to a small country, then as long as the aid remains suspended, it is useless even to think of pleasant and friendly relations existing between the two. Similarly, if Pakistan continues its nuclear program despite the severe objections of the United States, it is not conceivable that the United States would respect Pakistan's interests.

Cutting off aid is not an ordinary matter; and the suspension of U.S. aid to Pakistan is tantamount to open hostility.

Such an act is not merely unfriendly; Pakistan and the United States have been friends for more than 40 years and Pakistan has supported the United States under very difficult circumstances. Pakistan even placed its own safety in danger for the sake of U.S. political, military, and economic interests and allowed the United States, acting on its own military interests, to use Pakistan's territory to spy on the USSR and China. If the reward for these sacrifices is that Pakistan's national interests should receive no consideration and U.S. aid to Pakistan be suspended, then one can only say what the people are saying: goodbye to the United States and its friendship. Our people now are openly saying, "build the nuclear bomb and curse the United States."

The Indian nation is the second largest in the world [in territory] and in population, India is the second-largest country; but relations among nations are not measured in terms of territory and population. However big or small a country's territory or population, it enjoys the same status as all other countries. Relations among countries are established on the basis of equality; the world does not accept the rule that one should have good relations with large countries but should ignore small countries. In the brotherhood of nations, Bhutan enjoys the same status as China.

India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, but up to now Pakistan has not done so. India does not allow international inspection of its nuclear centers and is not ready to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Pakistan's position is that it will sign the treaty if India does so as well. But India maintains that it will not sign the agreement irrespective of whether Pakistan does so or not. Nevertheless, the United States has accused Pakistan of trying to construct a nuclear bomb and has halted aid but has not placed any restrictions on aid to India. At one point, aid to India was suspended but it was later restored even

though India neither promised to refrain from constructing an nuclear bomb nor did it sign the nonproliferation treaty.

Pakistan had suggested that South Asia be made a nuclear free zone but India turned down the proposal. Pakistan had also suggested that Russia, the United States and China bring about an agreement between India and Pakistan not to construct nuclear bombs. All other countries liked the suggestion but India's answer was in the negative. Then Pakistan tried to have the organization of South Asian countries, SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation], sign the nonproliferation treaty; but India postponed the SAARC leadership conference in order to prevent any discussion on Pakistan's proposal.

In view of these facts, is the suspension of U.S. aid to Pakistan and the continuation of U.S. aid to India based on justice?

The attitude of the United States shows that it wants Indian hegemony in South Asia; it wants to abandon Pakistan to India's tender mercies and wishes even to see Pakistan become dependent on India.

Pakistan is a small country compared to India; but it is inhabited by a dignified nation that will die for its honor. This nation has a single ideology and is ready to sacrifice everything for its safety; it does not wish to live a life of ignominy. It holds very dear the message of its leaders that it is better to live one day like a lion than a hundred years like a jackal.

We cannot live as anyone's slaves. We will live in dignity and freedom; we do not choose to live in a cage, even a golden one.

By stopping aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear program and by continuing its aid to India, the United States has been unjust. If the United States acknowledges its mistake and begins to treat all countries evenhandedly, then Pakistan will not complain; but it is international injustice if, for the same act, one country is punished while another is granted patronage. As long as the United States follows this two-faced policy, it will not have the friendship, or even the pretence of friendship, of Pakistan and its people.

The U.S. Government, under its new world order, had decided to recall all its troops from South Korea; but it has now changed its mind and made the withdrawal of its troops from South Korea contingent upon North Korea announcing that it would not construct a nuclear bomb. North Korea is also being pressured to allow international inspection of its nuclear centers. The United States will not gain anything by pursuing such policies. If the United States does not withdraw its troops from South Korea, would that decision induce North Korea to abandon its plan of constructing a nuclear bomb? And if North Korea does construct such a bomb, what action can U.S. troops take against it? Dignified nations do not yield to pressure and force. The

U.S. Government should adopt diplomatic methods; but it has taken a big stick in hand and is trying to push all nations with it. Such behavior will give the United States a bad international reputation.

It is surprising that, in order to prevent a Muslim Middle Eastern country, Iraq, from acquiring nuclear technology, the United States had its puppet Israel bomb the Iraqi nuclear plant. Pakistan has been threatened through various sources that if it does not abandon its nuclear program, Israel may bomb its nuclear plant as well. But, though well aware that Israel is building a nuclear bomb, no pressure was put on it. Why is it that the United States has failed to induce Israel to sign the nonproliferation treaty but is giving Israel the largest amount of economic and military aid? Does this not prove that the United States wishes to make Israel the largest unconquerable military force in the Middle East?

Some time ago, Iran tried to establish contacts with China and India in order to obtain nuclear technology. The United States at once sent high-level delegations to both countries and forced them to abandon any nuclear cooperation with Iran because Iran had not signed the nuclear nonproliferation agreement. In principle India had agreed to give nuclear help to Iran; but India was bribed and pressured into abandoning the transfer of nuclear technology. It is not known what answer China gave to the United States; but China follows a policy that acknowledges in principle the right of every country to progress and believes that if progress in any special field is to be abandoned, then it should be done with mutual consent.

The United States was the first to construct a nuclear bomb and China was the last; only five countries, the USSR, the United States, France, Britain, and China possess nuclear bombs. Since the idea of the atomic bomb was conceived, only two such bombs have been used. These were dropped some 46 years ago on the two Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing hundreds of thousands of people. Only the United States has dropped atomic bombs; the other four nuclear powers have never used the bomb against anyone even though they were also engaged in wars and each possessed thousands of bombs, each one thousands of times more powerful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

All five countries consider the nuclear bomb the most lethal weapon, each bomb capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people; but the United Nations has not banned the nuclear bomb. The United States doesn't want any other country, except the five who already possess it, to construct nuclear bombs; but it cannot answer the question as to why such a lethal weapon should remain in the possession of the United States and the other four countries. If it is dangerous for other countries to possess a nuclear bomb, how can the stockpile of nuclear weapons in the United States, the USSR, Britain, France, and China be considered safe?

India also wants the destruction of all nuclear weapons and it wants all countries to sign an agreement not to construct nuclear bombs; in other words, nuclear weapons should be banned. It would indeed be discrimination if five countries continued to build nuclear bombs while other countries were told not to do so.

In the recent failed military coup in the Soviet Union, nuclear bombs were in danger of falling into rebel hands; thus, nuclear bombs are not safe in any country. What is needed is that stockpiles of nuclear weapons in all countries should be destroyed and the weapons banned.

Unilateral Nuclear Controls Rejected

92WP0094A Karachi NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 28 Nov 91 pp 7, 8

[News report: "Siddique Kanjo: Pakistan Will Not Accept Unilateral Controls on the Atomic Issue; National Interests Will Not Be Bargained Away for Foreign Relations and Foreign Aid; Bartholomew Was Informed of the Stand on Principle; Self-Sufficiency Will Take Time; A Speedy Solution of the Afghan Problem Is Expected in Light of the Five-Point Formula"]

[Text] Islamabad (NAWA-I-WAQT correspondent)—Mohammad Siddique Kanjo, minister of state for foreign affairs, reiterated the government's resolve not to accept unilateral controls on the atomic issue. He said that where the interests of the country were concerned, the current government would neither enter into any deals regarding foreign relations and foreign aid, nor would it deviate from its position on matters relating to national safety. The minister said that Bartholomew, the U.S. undersecretary of state for international security affairs was informed of Pakistan's position on these principles. Following a reception the previous day, the state minister said during an informal conversation that the opposition's charge that the present government was bargaining over Kashmir and U.S. aid was baseless propaganda.

[The minister said] "We have made it clear to our U.S. friends that our relations with the United States are not limited to aid alone and Pakistan will not enter into any deals regarding its national interests for the sake of aid. We are following a policy of self-sufficiency, which will take time to achieve. Over the past year, the government has made good progress towards this goal but we must not forget that Pakistan cannot live isolated from the world. We will have to increase relations and cooperation with other countries." In reply to a question, the minister said that Pakistan would not accept one-sided controls on the atomic issue; that Pakistan would sign the atomic weapons nonproliferation treaty if India signed as well, otherwise there would be no compromise

on the problem. He said that the issue of atomic capability was tied to Pakistan's energy needs.

Self-Sufficiency in Nuclear Energy Near

92WPO112C Karachi AMN in Urdu 1 Dec 91 pp 1, 6

[News report: "Pakistan Will Soon Become Self-Sufficient in Nuclear Energy"; Interview With Nuclear Scientist Dr. Qadeer: "We Have the Capability To Enrich Uranium"]

[Text] Quetta, 30 Nov (PPI) "Pakistan is one of the seven countries in the world who are capable of enriching uranium; in order to become self-sufficient and satisfy its energy needs, the country is progressing towards the peaceful goal of its nuclear program." These thoughts were expressed by Pakistan's world renowned scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer, in an interview with the PPI. Dr. Qadeer said, "The basic objective of our nuclear program is to attain self-sufficiency in energy needs for the nation's economic, industrial, and social progress." He expressed the hope that, by the grace of God, these objectives would be achieved in the near future. He said, "We have said repeatedly and say it again that Pakistan's nuclear program is of a peaceful nature; but countries who have their own special interests to satisfy, continue their usual propaganda against Pakistan." Comparing Pakistan's nuclear program with that of India, Dr. Qadeer said, "India prepared its nuclear program because of its 1962 war with China when, in confrontation with Chinese troops, Indian forces proved to be mere paper tigers; hence India exploded an nuclear device in 1974 and became an nuclear power. India has built ballistic missiles and other weapons that prove that the aim of its nuclear program has been to construct atom bombs. Still, India continues to maintain that the objectives of its nuclear program are peaceful." Dr. Qadeer said, "Pakistan, on the other hand, has not done any of those things and is ready to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Pakistan will also allow international inspection of its nuclear installations whereas India does not want to do so." Dr. Qadeer said that Pakistan would not accept discriminatory treatment. He added, "As far as Pakistan's defense is concerned, there is no need for anxiety. Pakistan's defense is in strong hands." Regarding U.S. military aid he said, "We can demonstrate superior performance even without such aid." He added, "U.S. aid annually amounts to 2 dollars per person; with that sum, one can buy a chicken and a half."

Joint Nuclear Program With PRC Finalized

BK2412105391 Lahore THE NATION (Islamabad Supplement) in English 22 Dec 91 p 11

[Text] Islamabad—Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission [PAEC] and Chinese Academy of Sciences have decided to draw up an agreement of cooperation in the field of peaceful application of nuclear sciences.

The details of the programme of collaboration between the two organisations, are being worked out and will be finalised during the stay of Madame Hu Qiheng, Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Science, who is on a week's visit to Pakistan at the invitation of the PAEC.

Madame Hu is an eminent scientist with specialisation in the process control, instrumentation and automation.

The Academy of Sciences plays a pivotal role in the development of science and technology in People's Republic of China administering more than 120 research institutions and a university for teaching sciences. The Academy also operates numerous production units and factories where R&D results are implemented. The Academy was set up immediately after the Chinese revolution showing importance given to science and technology by the political leadership of the country.

During her stay here, Madame Hu will visit Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology and various PAEC establishments, Quaid-i-Azam University, Pakistan Academy of Sciences, University Grants Commission and different organisations of the Ministry of Science and Technology. She will also pay a visit to Karachi Nuclear Power Plant.

Sharif Welcomes PRC Accord for Nuclear Plant

BK3112143091 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 1400 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Text] Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif has welcomed the accord signed between Pakistan and PRC for a 300-megawatt Chinese nuclear power plant for Pakistan. He said this accord reflects the spirit of long-standing friendship and cooperation existing between the two countries. Congratulating the chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commissions of PRC and Pakistan, the prime minister stressed that the nuclear power plant will operate under the safeguards of International Atomic Energy Agency.

PRC Nuclear Pact Said Proof of Friendship

BK0101132892 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in English 1300 GMT 1 Jan 92

[Text] A Foreign Office spokesman has said the signing of the agreement in Beijing for the supply of a 300-megawatt nuclear power plant by China to Pakistan attests the time-tested and ever-growing friendship between the two countries. Briefing newsmen in Islamabad today, he particularly referred to the presence of the Chinese premier, Mr. Li Peng, at the signing which he said reflected the importance China attaches to its friendship with Pakistan.

Sharif on Nuclear Issue, Ties With India

BK0201094592 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 0200 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif has said that his proposal for ending the nuclear arms race in

South Asia will reinforce efforts for nuclear nonproliferation at the global level. In an interview with an INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE correspondent during his recent visit to Singapore, he said India had initially rejected the proposal for a discussion with Pakistan, China, and the United States in this regard, but New Delhi has indicated recently that it will reconsider its stand. Pakistan has stated over and over again that it will agree to any regional, international, or global mechanism for inspection of nuclear installations which is nondiscriminatory and which treats India and Pakistan on an equitable basis.

The prime minister declared that Pakistan is not manufacturing an atom bomb. Pakistan has given categorical and concrete assurances that despite possessing a nuclear capability, it will not manufacture an atom bomb. [passage omitted]

Islamabad Reports Exchange of Nuclear-Site Lists

BK0101113292 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in English 1100 GMT 1 Jan 92

[Text] Pakistan and India today exchanged lists of their nuclear installations and facilities as provided under the Pakistan-India agreement on the prohibition of attack against each other's nuclear installations and facilities in Islamabad today. The exchange of lists fulfilled the legal obligations on the two sides regarding exchange of such lists by today.

Nuclear Technology Transfer to Iran Denied

LD1201122692 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1030 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] Pakistan has denied signing any kind of agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran on the transfer of nuclear energy. Hosayn Haqani, the Pakistani deputy prime minister, in a statement issued last night, declared: The published reports on Tehran-Islamabad cooperation in terms of nuclear technology are totally baseless. Pakistan does not intend to sign any agreements with any country, including Iran, on transfer of technology. He added: Pakistan's nuclear project is an internal one with totally pacific objectives.

Kanjo Explains Nuclear Stand

BK1301023092 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 0100 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Pakistan has once again rejected as baseless the Indian allegation that Islamabad is involved in incidents in Indian-occupied Kashmir and Punjab. Addressing a news conference after his talks with U.S. Senator Larry Pressler in Islamabad yesterday, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mohammed Siddique Khan Kanjo said Pakistan's principled stand against terrorism is known to all and that Islamabad has always condemned terrorism vehemently. He however added that the people of occupied Kashmir are waging a struggle to achieve the right

to express their view through a plebiscite, and to crush that struggle, India is committing atrocities against them; and under these circumstances, New Delhi cannot shift the blame onto others. He observed that the struggle for freedom and terrorism are two different things and the entire world now knows fully well what is happening in Indian-occupied Kashmir.

Kanjo said he explained to the U.S. senator Pakistan's principled stand on the Nonproliferation Treaty and informed him that Pakistan will not accept any discrimination in this regard. Referring to the five-point peace plan forwarded by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the minister of state told the U.S. senator that India has not yet responded to Pakistan's efforts for ensuring stability in the region.

Dispute With France Over Nuclear Deal Settled

BK1301164592 Hong Kong AFP in English 1609 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Islamabad, Jan 13 (AFP)—Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Monday revealed that France and Pakistan have settled a 13-year-old financial dispute over cancellation of a nuclear deal by Paris.

France has agreed to pay 600 million francs (about 118 million dollars) as compensation for not honoring its promise to supply a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan in 1978, Sharif said.

He told AFP that Pakistan wants to buy two squadrons of 44 Mirage-2000 jets from France and that a financial package was being mutually worked out, adding that the compensation money from France would be available for defence deals.

Pakistan wants to expand defence cooperation with France "in all fields, army, navy and air force," he said on the eve of a five-day visit to France.

Describing his visit as "very important," Sharif said agreement on the compensation had been largely settled with France. "There is no ancilliary problem attached to it now."

Sharif said a 900-megawatt nuclear power plant French President Francois Mitterrand offered during his visit to Pakistan two years ago "remains a priority."

Pakistan concluded a deal with China on the supply of a 300-megawatt nuclear power plant, shortly before Sharif's visit to France. But Sharif said the Chinese plant, even with a Canadian-supplied nuclear plant at Karachi, "do not meet our ever-growing energy requirements."

"We need much more than the capacity that is already there or the one which is coming from China," he added.

Asked if Pakistan had lost hope of a resumption of some 600 million dollars in annual U.S. military and economic assistance that Washington froze in October 1990

over Pakistan's nuclear policy, Sharif said "we have not abandoned the idea of resuming the aid."

But he said Pakistan found it difficult to get the U.S aid revived by meeting the Pressler amendment, which bans assistance to countries pursuing a weapon-oriented nuclear programme.

"We have in fact spoken to the United States about what Pakistan's point of view is," he said referring to Islamabad's objections to unilateral application of the legislation and its insistence on including India in South Asia's nuclear non-proliferation pact.

He said France had been one of Pakistan's major suppliers of armament.

"I think we regard France as one of the most reliable sources of defence equipment," said the prime minister, who appeared confident of achieving positive results from his visit.

Wearing the traditional Pakistani dress of shalwar-Kamiz, a long shirt and baggy trousers, and a black jacket, Sharif laughed when asked if Pakistan was using France to apply pressure on Washington.

"That's not true. We are not using France as a pressure tactic, there is no truth in that," he added.

Pakistan, he said, was also "making payments to the United States" for some 60 multi-roll F-16 aircraft Washington had agreed to deliver.

"We do believe that the F-16s would be supplied to Pakistan at the same time we would like to have two squadrons of Mirage 2000," he added.

He said Pakistan and France have to sort out "a lot of technical details" on the Mirage deal. In this context he mentioned the question of price and the financial package issue which observers believe could figure in his talks with French leaders.

Spokesman Criticizes Pressler Nuclear Remarks

BK1301160792 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 1500 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] A Foreign Office spokesman has said that Pakistan time and again has clarified at the highest level that its nuclear program is totally for peaceful purposes and that it is determined to adhere to nuclear nonproliferation and wants to make South Asia a nuclear-free zone. The spokesman said this at a news conference in Islamabad today while commenting on U.S. Senator Larry Pressler's statement on Pakistan's nuclear program.

Senator Pressler has expressed the opinion that the Bush administration is under the impression that Pakistan has a nuclear capability and that it might use it as well. Pressler has further said that he had told the Pakistani authorities that U.S. aid to Pakistan can only be restored when the Pakistani Government is prepared to give up its nuclear program. Senator Pressler said the United States wants to establish friendly ties with both Pakistan and India, but according to agency reports, when Pressler was asked to comment on the Indian atrocities in occupied Kashmir, he left the news conference.

The spokesman told Radio Pakistan's diplomatic representative this evening that Pakistan wants a regional solution to nuclear nonproliferation and that it will never accept any discriminatory stand. The spokesman said Pressler does not recognize India's nuclear capability, which it demonstrated, and he has leveled allegations against Pakistan without any evidence. In fact, it is Pakistan's neighboring country which has been opposing nuclear nonproliferation for the past 17 years after exploding a nuclear device in 1974.

In reply to a question, the spokesman regretted that Senator Pressler does not also recognize the widespread human rights violations in occupied Kashmir. The spokesman said that Pakistan quite often has invited foreign observers and proposed the deployment of neutral observers on the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir, which reflects Pakistan's policy of noninterference in any way. On the other hand, India has refused to grant permission to any institution or human rights organization to visit occupied Kashmir.

Zaki Says Pressler Showed 'Partiality'

BK1401112292 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in English 1100 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Text] The secretary general foreign affairs, Mr. Akram Zaki, has said the visit of American Senator Pressler will certainly not have positive effect on efforts for improving Pakistan-U.S. relations because before coming to Pakistan he showed partiality by expressing his views about Pakistan in New Delhi.

In an interview to the Voice of Germany, Mr. Akram Zaki said Pakistan Government needed no advice about its important national matters like nuclear program. He said national interests would not be sacrificed for the sake of American assistance. He said that international relations are not determined by military and economic aid alone; rather, they depend on promotion of bilateral political ties. Pakistan is desirous of honorable and dignified friendship with the United States, and economic assistance is not essential to attain that aim.

Official Says U.S. Worries 'Baseless'

*BK1401025492 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network
in Urdu 0200 GMT 14 Jan 92*

[Text] Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, minister of state for economic affairs, has described as baseless and imaginary the U.S. apprehensions that Pakistan possesses a nuclear bomb. Addressing a function in Islamabad yesterday, he said the views expressed by U.S. Senator Larry Pressler at his news conference are not based on facts. They are the unfounded viewpoints of a person who took

no pains to make a detailed assessment of the regional situation and whose views are the product of a distracted mind.

As for the possibility of Pakistan's cooperation with the Central Asian republics in forming an Islamic bloc and acquiring a nuclear bomb, the minister of state said that this is a baseless and absurd hypothesis, as the question of forming any bloc whatsoever has not arisen. He said that like Pakistan, the Central Asian republics have also declared that they harbor no designs against anyone.

Armed Forces 'Big Question Mark' Viewed

PM2612210691 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Dec 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by V. Litovkin: "Yeltsin Has the Nuclear Attache Case. On Arbat Square the Defense Ministers Confer, But Without Morozov"]

[Text] On 25 December, immediately following his speech on Central Television, Mikhail Gorbachev signed a decree surrendering his powers as supreme commander in chief of the Soviet Armed Forces and transferring the right to use nuclear weapons to Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

At the same moment, the technical procedure for the handover of the nuclear attache case to the Russian president took place, with the participation of Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, who, as is known, is acting commander in chief until 30 December—until the Minsk meeting of heads of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The world community, including the United States, was forewarned—control of the strategic deterrent forces remains in one pair of hands. The leaders of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan also agreed to this, in Alma-Ata.

But there is still a big question mark over the fate of the joint or allied—but by no means unified—armed forces of the Commonwealth. On 26 December, as was agreed in the capital of Kazakhstan, the defense ministers and chairmen of defense committees of the independent states met for a conference in the Defense Ministry building on Arbat Square in Moscow. The subject of the latest consultative meeting is the future of the Armed Forces.

The meeting is taking place behind closed doors. Journalists are not allowed in. But IZVESTIYA's correspondent has learned that Ukrainian Defense Minister Colonel General Konstantin Morozov is not present. He is planning to leave for Moscow the next day [na sleduyushchiy den], but none of his immediate entourage knows whether he will come or not.

Defense Official Discusses Nuclear Issue

LD2612231491 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Interview with Aleksandr Alekseyevich Kotenkov, deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet's Defense and Security Committee, by correspondent Rasul Mikailov; place and date not given—live or recorded; from the "Russian Parliamentary Herald" program]

[Excerpt] [Mikailov] I have in my hand the text of the agreement on joint measures for nuclear weapons signed by the presidents of four republics—Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine. Yesterday, 25 December, this document was ratified by the

Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. Undoubtedly, there is no need to persuade anyone of the fact that documents of this sort are of enormous significance not just for the Commonwealth of Independent States, but also for the entire world community. Aleksandr Alekseyevich, you will recall no doubt, the immediate repercussions throughout the world to all of the reports concerning the issue of who would now have his finger on the nuclear button and who would control nuclear weapons in general, and the reports that the country was disintegrating and the republics could lose control of nuclear weapons.

[Kotenkov] Yes, this problem has been a matter of concern to all the world's politicians—and, of course, not just politicians, but, undoubtedly, all sober-minded citizens in all countries of the world. We know this from the recent visit to our country by U.S. Secretary of State Baker. This was one of the central issues he raised in all the republics. Incidentally, it is no coincidence that he first visited all of the republics on whose territory nuclear weapons are deployed. This problem was the focus of attention of the latest session of the Western European Union assembly, which was attended by our delegation. The whole world was worried about who would control and command nuclear weapons following the USSR's disintegration.

[Mikailov] There was, in fact, a danger here?

[Kotenkov] Yes, indeed. Yes, indeed. There was such a danger, and all these worries were being expressed for good reason, of course. At last we can say that the agreement signed in Alma-Ata and ratified by the Russian parliament yesterday dots all of the i's. We confirmed a document guaranteeing the preservation of unified control over all nuclear weapons. Moreover, I have to say that this agreement is the primary document. Many other documents are to be drafted and signed to elaborate on it. But the most important thing is that the ideology of the actual process has been enshrined in the agreement.

[Mikailov] And its basic principles?

[Kotenkov] Yes, its basic principles—above all the maintenance of nuclear weapons—all of them, both strategic and tactical—under unified control—and, I wish to stress, under single command. The issue of command is a very controversial one, and during the discussion on this treaty, that is to say agreement, and during its ratification, the question also was raised about who would command nuclear weapons. Command will be carried out from a single center. For now, this center is concentrated in the former Ministry of Defense, but from December 25th, the so-called nuclear button passed into the hands of Russian Federation President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. But this does not mean that he will control this button on his own. What I mean is that he

personally will make the decision on whether or not to use nuclear weapons. He will make that decision in coordination with the heads of all the republics that signed the agreement: Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Belarus.

[Mikhailov] He even has stressed the detail that they are now linked by a special conference line....

[Kotenkov interrupting] They are; that's right!

[Mikhailov] ...(?I have heard), which enables them to contact each other.

[Kotenkov] There exists the concept of a conference line, which will link all four presidents, and if it is necessary to hold consultations or to obtain agreement on the use of nuclear weapons, Boris Nikolayevich can indeed, so to speak, contact the presidents of all four republics virtually instantaneously. Generally, this line will be, in a manner of speaking, in the same black briefcase which contains the nuclear button, meaning that the line is with the president at all times. Therefore, the suggestion that this coordination might take a very long time is wrong. Besides, I want to say that we shall develop this agreement by drawing up a whole series of additional agreements, including some which will provide for the possibility of using nuclear weapons in the event of a response to a nuclear strike on our Commonwealth.

[Mikhailov] But this principle of no first use of nuclear weapons is enshrined.

[Kotenkov] That is what I am saying: We shall never use nuclear weapons first. But, in the event of a missile attack, a nuclear missile attack on the territory of the Commonwealth we can inflict a retaliatory strike, but this retaliatory strike must be inflicted before the nuclear missiles explode on our territory.

[Mikhailov] But, of course.

[Kotenkov] Here we are counting literally in seconds, and it must be regulated by a separate agreement, of course. But, in principle, for now, it is guaranteed that decisions on the use of nuclear weapons will be made by the four presidents with unified command and control [yedinyy kontrol i yedinoye upravleniye].

I also especially would like to talk about tactical nuclear weapons. The point is, in fulfilling the agreement—the initiative of President Bush and President Gorbachev on unilateral... [corrects himself] the mutual initiative on the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons—the parties which signed that agreement reached an understanding that by July 1992 all tactical nuclear weapons would be concentrated on Russian territory, where they would be dismantled, disarmed, and destroyed.

[Mikhailov] Aleksandr Alekseyevich, nevertheless, this problem is bound up with great—I would even say immense—material and technical costs. What will Russia's share be, and what will the other republics' share be?

[Kotenkov] I believe that all of the states participating in the Commonwealth will bear the expenditure jointly, for both the maintenance of the combined armed forces and the destruction of nuclear weapons. Of course, it is a very expensive pleasure. Because of our economic potential, based on gross national product, it is natural that the main share, the lion's share, of the expenditure will fall on Russia, but all of the other states must participate in this process as far as they are able. Moreover, I do not believe that we will manage without help from Western countries, because if we want to destroy these weapons as quickly as possible, we will need not only our own technology, but we will have to attract foreign technology. We have offers from the United States and France to provide their most modern technology for destroying nuclear weapons. This will require hard currency, of course. I believe that we will need material assistance here from Western countries.

[Mikhailov] And nobody has refused yet?

[Kotenkov] Correct. Nobody has refused yet, but I want to warn now—and this is generally known—that this process will be rather protracted, by virtue of both economic and technological indices. It will take more than just one year. When studying the issue of the destruction of nuclear weapons at the Ministry of Defense, we are talking about a period of seven or eight years. It simply will be physically impossible for us to do it any earlier.

I would like to mention one more very important feature of this agreement: the republics, principally Belarus and the Ukraine, have undertaken a commitment to join the 1968 nuclear nonproliferation treaty as nonnuclear states. In other words, they are confirming unconditionally their commitment that there will be no nuclear weapons on their territory, and that when the time limit of the treaty reducing strategic weapons expires, there will be no nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus and the Ukraine.

[Mikhailov] [words indistinct]

[Kotenkov] This matter has not been settled with Kazakhstan yet. In general, it is believed that such weapons will be kept on the territory of Kazakhstan for the time being, but I believe that this issue will be settled later in a separate agreement. [passage omitted]

Official Notes Security of Nuclear Safeguards

LD2612125691 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1200 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Report on nuclear weapons control safeguards, by correspondent V. Martynov, including remarks by M. Andreyev, "chief of the Main Administration for the Security of Communications," from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Martynov] Wherever the president of the country happens to go, there is always a man behind him holding a briefcase in his hand, a briefcase that many people talk about and know about.

From the beginning of the disintegration of the Soviet Union into independent states, the question was raised in the world's media: Who in that country keeps his finger on the nuclear button? We asked one other question: Who will ensure the technical irreproachability and reliability of this button? Who is responsible for missiles not being launched without a command?

[Andreyev] We check literally every possible point from which any unsanctioned launch might be carried out. We guarantee that this cannot happen.

[Martynov] This evening, in accordance with the understandings reached, following the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, the president of the former Soviet Union, this briefcase will be passed over to the hands of Boris Yeltsin, the Russian president. [video shows correspondent and Andreyev, close-up of Martynov's hand on a black briefcase]

Military Observer Discusses Nuclear Safeguards

LD2712163691 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 27 Dec 91

[Commentary by military observer Navy Captain Aleksandr Yakovlev, including remarks by Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, commander of Naval Forces; Yakovlev and Chernavin in Russian fading into English report]

[Text] Control of nuclear weapons in the former USSR remains in focus in the media and among the politicians and military experts of various countries. We will now hear how reliable this control is from our military observer Aleksandr Yakovlev, a Navy captain:

Twenty-seven thousand nuclear warheads have been put under single control by the decision adopted by the Commonwealth of Independent States. In line with the decision, control of the so-called nuclear button has passed from Mikhail Gorbachev to Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Only he can authorize the use of nuclear weapons upon agreement with the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, possessing nuclear arms as Russia does. From now on no leader of the former Soviet republics will be able to give such a command on his own.

That is the political side of the matter. As far as the military aspect is concerned, the following safeguards are provided. To begin with, the components of nuclear arms are stored reliably. Any attempt to get hold of any component, not to mention a missile, is doomed to failure. Besides, a nuclear weapon could be used by one method alone. For one thing, the system of strategic forces deterrence which controls land, ship, and air-based missiles can be put in a ready-for-combat position only after a nuclear attack on the commonwealth has

gone on record as fact and information on the attack could come solely from the nuclear attack warning system.

Through radars deployed in space and on the perimeter of commonwealth territory, the system could monitor the take-off of a missile at any point of the globe, could determine trajectory of its flight, and calculate the point of its warhead fall. However, the missiles installation will retaliate only after a coded signal from the Central Command of General Headquarters has been received. Nor would ammunition to battlefield nuclear arms become operative. Each warhead is supplied with a code-blocking device. Nuclear weapons on submarines assigned for long-term missions are most difficult to control. However, their crews are unable to use the weapons without a signal from the center either, as Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, commander of naval forces explains:

The unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons from naval vessels is ruled out in this country. That's first. Second, as the admiral explains, being a special commission member he had checked the reliability of control of nuclear weapons during the putsch. The commission confirmed that technical and organizational precautions ruled out a misunderstanding with nuclear weapons in this country's armed forces.

Rumors of Nuclear Materials Smuggling Denied

LD2912191691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1658 GMT 29 Dec 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Dec (TASS)— A spokesman for the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces has denied a report in the Italian newspaper L'UNITA that alleges that nuclear weapons and radioactive materials are being smuggled from the republics of the former USSR to the Near East. The article claimed that Oleg Petrovskiy and Vitaliy Dorchuk, two officers of the "military information service", were involved in the contraband.

A TASS correspondent was told that the information directorate of the Defense Ministry has no such officers on its staff. The "military depots" from which fissive materials are allegedly being stolen "simply do not exist and cannot exist" on the territory of the former USSR. "The Ministry of Defense has no need to store substantial quantities of radioactive materials for a long time", the General Staff spokesman said.

"As for the persistent rumors of a trade in nuclear weapons being conducted from the territory of the former USSR, these have been repeatedly denied by the Ministry of Defense, the chief military procuracy, and other authoritative bodies, so this topic can be regarded as having been closed long ago", the General Staff spokesman declared.

Alma-Ata Nuclear Arms Agreements Viewed

*PM3112142191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Dec 91 Union Edition p 6*

[Article by V. Mikheyev: "Nuclear Button... Human Rights... Market Forces; Questions To Which World Expects Answers From Commonwealth"]

[Text] It was hard to expect that the "special positions" of the members of the Commonwealth which has been announced would immediately be reduced to a common denominator and that some middle ground—leveling and conciliating—would be introduced. The experience of the EC, if one recognizes the correctness of a direct analogy, shows that it takes years, if not decades, for that.

Does that justify the fact that the Alma-Ata agreements contain yawning gaps? Most likely, yes, but outside states, which are making every effort to paint a picture of "cautious optimism," are not ceasing to ask direct questions to which Alma-Ata has not given an answer.

Without collusion the German and Japanese foreign ministers set two essential conditions for diplomatic recognition of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]: respect and observance of the international commitments of the former USSR, especially in the field of disarmament, and full clarification of the problem of control over the 27,000 nuclear warheads.

Indeed, a bold compromise was required to determine the fate of the "nuclear button." It is well known that Kiev insisted that all four republics with nuclear systems in their territory (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) should have the right of veto. A procedure was even proposed for making a collective decision, something like a duplicate "dual key." It is well known that Alma-Ata—in contrast to Kiev and Minsk, which stated their intention to become nonnuclear states in the future—wanted to retain its "share" of nuclear strategic arms.

The decision to transfer by July 1992 all tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the control of the central organs, where they will be subject to destruction under unified control, was a triumph of common sense over localistic ambitions. Only Russia will have nuclear deterrent forces. Thus instead of four nuclear buttons there will be just one. [passage omitted]

Unified Command of Nuclear Forces Agreed

*LD0301135492 Moscow TASS in English
1326 GMT 3 Jan 92*

[By BELTA-TASS correspondent Vladimir Glod]

[Text] Minsk January 3 TASS—"Belarus' agreement to place strategic nuclear forces, deployed on its territory, under a unified command has been confirmed during the meeting between commander-in-chief of the Commonwealth Armed Forces Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov and Chairman of the Belarus Supreme Soviet

Stanislav Shushkevich. It was agreed that they may be used, in case of need, only with the consent of the republics' leadership," Belarus Defence Minister Lieutenant-General Petr Chaus told BELTA, commenting on Shaposhnikov's Thursday [2 January] visit to Minsk.

The visit to Belarus is the first of the series Shaposhnikov is to pay to other members of the Commonwealth after the Commonwealth December summit meeting in Minsk. The purpose of these visits is to hold consultations on the spot in order to shape a military policy, finalise the new structures and submit corresponding documents to the next meeting of Commonwealth leaders.

During the Minsk talks Shaposhnikov was unequivocally informed that Belarus intended to have its own army. However, this is not a matter of one day, one month, or even one year. A definite transitional period will be required. The national army will be formed on the basis of the present Belarussian military area and other military contingents and units, deployed on the territory of this sovereign republic. It will ensure the security of Belarus, which is eventually to acquire the status of a nuclear-free neutral state.

Shaposhnikov was also told that a Belarus Defence Ministry would be set up shortly on the basis of the command of the Belarus military area. It will handle all military matters on the territory of this sovereign state with proper account of national interests.

Cost of Destroying Nuclear Weapons Noted

*LD0301144592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Dec 91 Union Edition p 1*

[Untitled report from IZVESTIYA, TASS, RIA, REUTERS, AP, UPI roundup]

[Text] The destruction of stocks of nuclear weapons in our country will take at least 10 years and cost \$2 billion, reports Swedish radio, citing CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and U.S. nuclear scientists.

Shaposhnikov Comments on Nuclear Transfer

*OW0401121092 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1115 GMT 4 Jan 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Now there are only two "nuclear buttons", or "black suitcases", IF's [INTERFAX] correspondent Petr Vasiliyev was told by Marshal Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces. "One is in the possession of Russia's president, and the other in my hands", he said. Earlier there was a third "button", in the hands of the chief of General Staff.

In comments on the recent top-level meeting in Minsk the marshal said that participants in it gained a full consensus on strategic forces. They agreed that strategic forces will be under a joint command. Tactical nuclear forces will also be under joint control.

All presidents in the possession of nuclear weapons are in the same position. Under certain circumstances they will be able to consult with each other, Marshal Shaposhnikov pointed out.

As for tactical nuclear arms deployed in some republics, they will be destroyed on Russia's soil.

Five states: Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia spoke in favor of unified Armed Forces. The rest announced their desire to have armed forces of their own.

Since the Ukraine already adopted many legislative acts in this connection, the process of transferring conventional armed forces to it has already begun.

A coordinating committee led by deputy commander-in-chief Cl.- [Colonel] General Pyankov has been formed. On January 2 it began to work in the Ukraine. The most important documents will be signed by the Ukrainian Government and Marshal Shaposhnikov. In the next two months Marshal Shaposhnikov will hold talks and consultations with the leaders of each member state with a view to working out a joint stand on the ways to monitor conventional armed forces and exercise their right to create armed forces of their own. In the following two months the commander-in-chief and his aides will work in all sovereign states by turns. He hopes to find common approaches as well as reveal the differences. The heads of state are planning to gather for another meeting within two months to gain final understandings.

Russian Company Urges Destroying Stockpiles

*PM0601100192 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Dec 91 p 2*

[Interview with Russian People's Deputy M. Bocharov, president of the company Rusabalvest, by Igor Mosin under the rubric "Operation 'Nuclear Charge'"; place and date not given: "Conveyor Belt of Disarmament"]

[Text] "Rusabalvest," a major Russian company, has actively joined in Operation "Nuclear Charge." The company's president, RSFSR People's Deputy M. Bocharov, talks to our correspondent.

[Bocharov] Frankly, when I learned of the idea of, figuratively speaking, popular destruction of nuclear weapons [zaryady], I decided then and there that we must definitely play the most active part in this. Just think—any person, any firm or company in any corner of the world has the opportunity to purchase the right to destroy a nuclear weapon.

Remember how many treaties, negotiations, and arguments between politicians, academics, and military men

there were—how to make reductions, how many to make, and what to reduce. Does anyone remember anything at all of this? The bombs remain as before. The initiators of the auction propose to take a specific nuclear warhead targeted, say, on Paris or New York, transport it to a factory, and dismantle it in view of the whole world. This process should be broadcast from the first step to the last on all television channels and to all countries of the world. Let the people see with their own eyes what a nuclear weapon is and how it can be dealt with.

But the main thing is that virtually everyone can become a participant in the destruction of nuclear weapons. The point is that the people themselves start destroying nuclear weapons. I would very much like for other nuclear powers to follow our example.

[Mosin] How do you envision the realization of this idea in practice?

[Bocharov] "Rusabalvest" is ready to take on all the organizational work. A few words about our company. Our annual turnover is about 20 billion rubles. We cooperate in a very active way with the military, trying to help them in economic and social questions. We are extremely concerned and alarmed, and hurt by all the treatment meted out—I cannot put it any other way—to people who only yesterday were respectfully called defenders of the fatherland. I hope that we will show by this action that our military is for disarmament in deeds, and not just in words.

[Mosin] But of course, this will be not simply a humanitarian action, but also a commercial one?

[Bocharov] You know, I have a dream. Recently I have had cause to meet very often with military men and their families and to visit closed cities. Your heart bleeds when you hear stories of the humiliations, insults, and injustices to which the men in shoulder boards are being subjected. These are the people who saved the world from fascism, the people who faithfully and truly guarded our tranquility. These are the people who created the strongest army in the world, the people behind whose backs we have lived without war and bloodshed for half a century now. My word, they have not deserved all this outrageous treatment.

I also dream of giving all the funds that we manage to earn from this venture to the closed cities which created the atom bombs. I hope that with their aid we will be able to reverse the atom bomb production line. Let them begin operating now to destroy our nuclear stockpiles. If you like, ultimately this is our common moral duty to mankind. In addition, I hope that people in these cities will be given work and will gain social confidence in the future. After all, today they have been left to cope with their problems virtually alone.

Defense Official Explains Nuclear Safeguards

LD0601161192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1310 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] Many questions arise today as to whether nuclear weapons are reliably safeguarded by the armed forces of the former Soviet Union; whether these weapons can be seized and used by terrorists; and whether trade in these weapons is possible without the consent of the Defense Ministry. Our correspondent took all these questions to a high-ranking Defense Ministry official who is responsible for the protection and prevention of nonsanctioned use of nuclear weapons, Lieutenant General Vladimir Korotko, and here is what he said:

[Begin Korotko recording in Russian fading into English report] There have never been any attempts at a seizure of nuclear weapons. The system of safeguarding nuclear weapons is multifunctional. On the one hand it provides for top secrecy; on the other it ensures safeguard of engineering facilities where nuclear weapons are stored.

The access to nuclear weapons is limited and regulated by related documents. Today, nonsanctioned access to nuclear weapons is completely out of the question. Protection of nuclear weapons acquires special significance during transportation, and this is understandable. So the Defense Ministry has developed a reliable system of escorting and supervising nuclear weapons during their transportation. There have never been any attempts at capturing nuclear weapons during transportation either.

Public in and outside this country is especially concerned about tactical nuclear weapons in the areas of the former Soviet Union where high ethnic and social tensions prevail. Lt. Gen. Vladimir Korotko comments:

We can say today that nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from the areas of high social tension. We started to transport them from the Caucasus, for instance, at the time when seismic forecasts were unfavorable. We feared a repetition of the earthquake there. These measures were taken in keeping with the decisions of the defense minister and the chief of the General Staff. So there are no nuclear weapons in such areas today.

In keeping with the plans, we have also withdrawn nuclear weapons from the former Soviet nuclear republics that have become independent states. True, certain difficulties arise, notably with transportation of weapons from the western part of Ukraine. These matters are under discussion now. An agreement has been reached with the Ukrainian Government that components of nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from its territory by the middle of the year, and the term might be reduced.

Nuclear Launch Procedures Detailed

92UM0280A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No. 52, Dec 91 [signed to press
26 Dec 91] p 2

[Article by Lieutenant General Yu. Kardashevskiy, doctor of military sciences: "In Whose Hands Is the 'War Button'?"]

[Excerpt] First of all, what is a nuclear button? It is a code clearance and release arrangement [kodoblokirovochnoye ustroystvo] of the command and control systems of missile units and formations, and also of the systems for controlling missiles and warheads.

And so, the president does not have any kind of button. He has a written system of ciphers for the employment of various types of nuclear weapons. In the event that it is necessary, he transmits an appropriate cipher (for example, 153) to the minister of defense. He, in turn, adds his cipher (153609) and transmits it to the executors, the commanders in chief of the Navy, Air Force, Ground Forces, and the Strategic Missile Troops. And they add their ciphers (153609731, etc.), and issue these commands to the launch site which is cleared for release, and only after this can it be employed. Given our low level of command and control, 15 to 20 minutes will be spent on this.

All of these ciphers and codes are fed into an automated system, which protects against the unsanctioned employment of nuclear weapons.

But not long ago, the commander of troops of a district could quite independently give the order to employ operational-tactical and tactical weapons, inasmuch as there were no codes and ciphers directly on missiles and projectiles.... But there was only an envelope with stamps in which these ciphers appeared. After receiving an appropriate telephone call, the commander was supposed to then open an envelope with the appropriate number, read the cipher, and transmit it to the executor.

Who Will Get Them?

The West (most of all the United States) is uneasy about the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons in connection with the breakup of the USSR into a number of independent states. If four independent states of the Commonwealth of Independent States have nuclear weapons, this means that the number of nuclear states in the world will increase by three. In the former USSR, all nuclear weapons were under the control of one center—Moscow. The question is this: If Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus do not intend to use nuclear weapons independently, why will they keep them on their own territory?

There is only one way out of the situation that has developed—remove (partially destroy) all nuclear weapons from the territory of these republics.

The reduction of various types of armaments, both conventional and nuclear, is a very critical question.

This has to be destroyed, that does not affect stability. If there is no effect, and peace is preserved on the planet without arms, then in general all types of armaments can be destroyed. But we are not taking the latter path—that is the path of madness.

But the first path is the path of errors. It especially revealed itself in the decisions on the destruction of tactical nuclear weapons.

What is the gist of the question? Tactical nuclear weapons have a limited employment range—up to 70 kilometers. In the main, this is artillery, mortars, and tactical missiles. It is perfectly obvious that these weapons do not represent any kind of a threat to the territory of the United States. And the United States gladly support their destruction. But we find ourselves under absolutely different conditions. Neighbors can operate against us—a multi-million army, and we will not in any way defend ourselves against them with conventional weapons. Under these conditions our tactical nuclear weapons are transformed into a strategic deterrence factor. The conclusion from this is that we are defenseless without tactical nuclear weapons. [passage omitted]

Underground Blasts To Destroy Nuclear Warheads

LD1301193892 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] At the testing ground of the Ministry of Defense in Shykhany, experiments have been completed to discover the effect of high temperatures on chemical weapons, according to a report in the KOMMERSANT newspaper. The experiments were carried out to order for the Chetok joint-stock company, which intends to destroy chemical weapons, nuclear warheads, and highly toxic wastes with the help of underground nuclear explosions.

Number of Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn Reported

PM1401100192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jan 92 p 1

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel D. Anatolyev: "Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons From Ukrainian Territory Has Begun"]

[Text] Under the agreement signed by the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] in Minsk, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory for subsequent destruction has begun. This has been reported by RIA [Russian Information Agency]. The report has been confirmed by the General Staff Directorate. Operations are being carried out by highly trained specialists.

According to the experts' figures, there are 1,408 strategic warheads (on ICBM's and heavy bombers) and 2,605 tactical nuclear warheads on Ukrainian territory. The agreement notes in particular that until complete

destruction is achieved, the nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian territory will be under the control of the joint command of the strategic forces to ensure their nonuse and dismantling by the end of 1994. Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk stated at a press conference 2 January that the nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from the republic's territory for the purpose of their subsequent destruction. All tactical weapons are to be removed before 1993 and all strategic weapons before 1994.

The decision on the destruction of nuclear weapons results from the CIS' confirmation that it will observe the international treaties of the former USSR and pursue a coordinated policy in the sphere of international security, disarmament, and arms control. The Commonwealth states are to implement the provisions of the START Treaty. In addition, in the USSR president's counter initiative of 5 October 1991 approved by the State Council, a decision was adopted on a deeper reduction of strategic offensive arms than envisaged by the START Treaty. By the end of the seven year period of reductions, the number of strategic nuclear warheads in our possession should be 5,000 and not 6,000 as laid down by the treaty. The USSR also pledged to scrap all nuclear artillery munitions and nuclear warheads for tactical missiles.

The nuclear weapon withdrawal raises security questions—both ours and the world public are concerned about the accidental (unauthorized) use of nuclear weapons, especially tactical weapons, as the "most destabilizing" factor. The General Staff Directorate which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent contacted and the missile forces and artillery headquarters of the Ground Forces artillery noted that unauthorized use has been ruled out. The storage of nuclear weapons is rigidly centralized and they are operated by highly trained specialists. In addition, each munition is equipped with a coded device which prevents anyone from using it unless a special coded signal is received from the General Staff; this, in turn, cannot be given without the consent of the political leadership.

Below-Cost Uranium Sales to U.S. Denied

OW1401233192 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2035 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The former Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry has denied accusations by American mining companies supported by the U.S. Department of Trade that Soviet uranium is being sold to the U.S. at lower prices compared to its production cost.

The ministry officials stated at a news conference in Moscow Tuesday [14 January] that selling prices of uranium are being established on the basis of the world ones which cover production costs. The officials expressed readiness to help the International Trade Commission examine these accusations.

It was also stated at the news conference that all uranium supplies from the Commonwealth republics abroad are fully controlled by the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry.

Reports of Unsanctioned Uranium Sales Unconfirmed

LD1401235292 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Jan 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The story of illegal sales of uranium by the former Union and now by the sovereign states hit the headlines a month ago and today at a news conference given by the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry, the department's official position was explained to journalists. Above all, the department does not know of any instances of enriched uranium being leaked abroad in the last 40 years since rigorous controls are in place at the plants which produce it.

Second, regarding Italian police reports alleging the presence of trademarks of the Irkutsk Works on confiscated samples: This report has not been confirmed. No Russian trace has been found. Unfortunately this does not complete the matter of unsanctioned sales. The USSR, and now Russia, is the largest supplier and even now the ministry has a store of 95,000 tons of concentrate. Prices for the product are falling since a great deal of ore has accumulated in all producer countries.

This is related to disarmament and there is no hope of selling it in the near future. However, now independent republics such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan are trying to earn hard currency by putting uranium ore onto the world market at lower prices. This will lead to chaos and complete lack of IAEA control over the process. Finally it was announced that although these republics do have extraction plants, uranium enrichment plants and works producing weapons-grade plutonium are located only on Russian territory and Russia will not permit radioactive material to be sold to Middle East countries.

Uranium Exports 'Hampered' by U.S., EC Interests

LD1401165292 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1535 GMT 14 Jan 92

[By TASS correspondent Lyubov Dunayeva]

[Text] Moscow, 14 Jan (TASS)—The price of uranium supplied to the world market by the former USSR is set on the basis of world prices, and fully covers production costs, Albert Shishkin, general director of the Tekhsnabekspost foreign economic association stated at a news conference in Moscow.

We use the most advanced technology for production of enriched uranium, something that has also been

acknowledged by our American counterparts. However, we stand accused of having production costs for enriched uranium which are higher than the world price. Uranium exports from the former USSR are being hampered by certain interests in the United States and the European Community, Albert Shishkin emphasized.

We are able to compete seriously in sales of uranium on the world market. Reserves in the country amount to about 50 percent of world reserves, and we have 25 percent of the capacities for processing it, while our share of exports amounts to only 5-6 percent. This ought to be considerably higher, Shishkin said.

Yevgeniy Mikerin, deputy minister for atomic power engineering and industry, told journalists that charges of uncontrolled sales of uranium on the world market by former republics of the USSR, and Tajikistan in particular, are not true. There is no technology for production of enriched uranium in Tajikistan. Production of plutonium and of enriched uranium, and the whole cycle of nuclear weapons production, is located solely on Russia's territory. These are under the strictest control.

Academic Ponders CIS Nuclear Future, Treaties

PM1401162192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Article by Academician Vitaliy Goldanskiy, member of the leadership of the International Pugwash Movement: "The World Wants Clarity and Reliability When It Comes to the Former USSR's Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Perhaps no other question perturbs people in all continents more than the fate of the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. The BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, which comes out in the United States, carries on its cover a symbolic clock with its hands approaching midnight. After the Soviet-U.S. treaty on intermediate- and short-range nuclear missiles was concluded, the clock's hands were put back from 2357 to 2353 hours, and since April 1990 they have stood at 2350 hours. It seemed that, after the Soviet-U.S. treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive weapons was signed 31 July 1991, it would have been possible to boldly put the hands even further back. But new, unforeseen, and very serious threats presented themselves to the world at this juncture, coming this time exclusively from our side, which was armed not just to the teeth, but literally from head to toe....

Only Russia Has the Right To Remain a Nuclear Power in the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]

At first, during the three days of the August putsch, it was not clear into whose hands the "nuclear button" had fallen, and whether it had fallen into the plotters' hands. And there was reason to fear—it is sufficient to reread the pre-putsch press statements by scientists and high-ranking officials who have linked their fate with the military-industrial complex, as well as the August junta's very first diplomatic documents.

Now the world is again alarmed, although this is for another reason—to this day there is no sufficient clarity in the distribution of the former Soviet Union's functions among the CIS member countries with nuclear weapons on their territory.

Russia has been recognized as the USSR's legal successor in its capacity as a permanent member of the UN Security Council with the power of veto. I think that it is necessary to determine as soon as possible Russia's similar capacity in the two most important international treaties offering fundamental guarantees against the threat of nuclear war. These are the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Under both these treaties the USSR—together with the United States and Britain—was one of three depository countries (which keep the ratification documents), with the right to veto any amendments.

The number of countries participating in the Non-Proliferation Treaty had reached 141 by the beginning of 1991; France and China joined last year. This treaty clearly formulates the rights and obligations of two categories of country—nuclear and nonnuclear ones—whereby the nuclear ones are defined as those which had manufactured and exploded nuclear devices prior to 1 January 1967. There were five such countries—the United States (1945), the USSR (1949), Britain (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). Now, of all CIS member countries, only Russia has the right to claim the title of a nuclear country. Although all Soviet nuclear tests in the first five years (1949-1954) were carried out only in Kazakhstan, the manufacture of nuclear weapons remains a Russian monopoly.

I consider it a matter of urgency to officially register the transfer to Russia of all the USSR's rights and obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to have all the remaining CIS member countries become parties to this document as nonnuclear countries. Let me remark that, under Article 5 of the relevant Alma-Ata document of 21 December 1991, Ukraine and Belarus, but not Kazakhstan, pledged to join in such a capacity.

The United States and Britain May Review Their Stand on Nuclear Tests

The importance of legally defining the future status of our nuclear weapons is so enormous, that it would probably be worth thinking about the possibility of urgently convening an extraordinary conference of the countries which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (there is a provision that such conferences be regularly convened once every five years, and the treaty's future fate is due to be determined in 1995). Moreover, such an extraordinary conference could resolve or at least raise once again, and this time with particular force, one more question—that of a complete ban on nuclear tests.

The point is that it would be possible to enshrine a complete ban in law as an amendment to the 1963

treaty—and to add a fourth environment in which tests are banned to the three already mentioned in it—underground. There are 118 countries which today are parties to the 1963 treaty, of which 104 have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would be enough to get initiatives from (or the agreement of) 60 countries that are parties to it, to convene a conference to examine amendments to the 1963 treaty—and this is perfectly feasible. True, the United States or (and) Britain may well and truly block the adoption of an amendment ensuring a complete ban on nuclear tests using their veto. But in the current international situation these countries may seriously review their unbending positions with regard to a complete ban on nuclear tests. I think that the political gain for the United States and Britain from an agreement on such a ban would far outweigh the rather arguable technical arguments in favor of continuing tests. If the United States continues to insist on their continuation, I can only repeat the proposal which I have already made in the pages of IZVESTIYA (No. 311, 1990)—let us carry out not only U.S. and British nuclear tests in Nevada, but Russian ones as well.

Incidentally, broad scientific and technical cooperation between U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists, their joint activities to resolve the most important problems of fundamental science where the experience accumulated in both countries and the unique equipment of the leading nuclear centers may play an invaluable role, could offer the most reliable protection from the threat of our highly qualified specialists leaving for countries like Iraq and Libya.

The Way To Eliminate Tactical Nuclear Weapons

To conclude—something on perhaps the most real threat contained in our tactical nuclear weapons, which may even be put in operation without the knowledge of the leaderships of the CIS countries or of the Armed Forces, and which lend themselves far less easily to reliable monitoring, inventorying, and localization and may more easily get into irresponsible or even criminal hands. Even though a criminal may not be actually capable of setting off a nuclear explosion, the chemical explosion in the sheath surrounding each nuclear warhead will release highly toxic radioactive plutonium into the atmosphere in quantities of only three to four times less than Chernobyl.

We discussed the necessity to completely destroy tactical nuclear weapons together with U.S. scientists back in September 1991 in Beijing. The statement of the scientists' Pugwash Movement anticipated G. Bush's and M.S. Gorbachev's October initiatives and contained the following specific proposals:

1. Within one month the United States and the USSR (we would now say the CIS) declare the types, models, quantity, and location of all tactical nuclear warheads as well as the means to identify them (for example their codenames and special numbers).

2. Storage buildings are designated and adapted for the supervised storage of all tactical nuclear warheads. The countries possessing nuclear weapons use all necessary means to ensure the safekeeping of the assembled weapons against any possible attacks on the places where they are stored. Permanent international supervision guarantees the weapons' safekeeping—so that they or their components are not moved clandestinely and the forces guarding them do not themselves become a threat to the weapons' safekeeping.

Within one to two months after the details of the tactical weapons' storehouses are announced, they should be transferred to these storehouses, which have been equipped with massive concrete screens, and each warhead should be encased and sealed up. When this period has expired, not a single tactical nuclear warhead should remain outside these supervised storehouses.

3. The nuclear warheads stored in the storehouses should be dismantled over a period of several years, and subsequently destroyed. It will be necessary to transport the weapons to supervised workshops where scrap metal, chemical explosive substances, and other combustible components, as well as crushed fissile materials, will be extracted.

As I was finishing this article, I heard about the meeting of the leaders of these five powers—permanent members of the UN Security Council—planned for the very near future. The main topic of the forthcoming meeting will be the fate of the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. Fine, let us wait and see.

Tactical Arms Withdrawn From Belarus, Ukraine
OW1401131192 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1215 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Tactical nuclear arms are being pulled out from Belarus as well as Ukraine. The withdrawal should be completed by July 1.

As for strategic weapons, under the Minsk accords they will be dismantled in Ukraine by the end of 1994. The territories of Belarus and Kazakhstan will be cleared of strategic nuclear armaments in line with the Soviet-U.S. START treaty. Initially the strategic nuclear arsenal of the USSR was supposed to be reduced to 6,000 units within 7 years after the ratification of the treaty. However, later the Soviet side unilaterally decided to cut down the number of units to 5,000.

Potential for Nuclear 'Brain Drain' Assessed

50 Reportedly Already in Iran

PM1501133592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Jan 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 8

[Article prepared by Andrey Illesh "with the assistance" of correspondents Aleksey Tarasov, Vladimir Ardayev, and Anatoliy Yershov: "Brain Drain Here Equivalent To Exporting Atomic Bomb"]

[Excerpts] I will start with a sensational report carried by RIA [Russian Information Agency]. "The assembly of three nuclear charges, whose components come from Kazakhstan, has started in Iran," the Tunis-published weekly magazine AL-ANWAR AL-TUNISIYAH reports, citing sources of information in France. According to the version in the magazine, talks started by a group of Soviet experts before last August's events have been successfully completed by the Kazakhstan authorities, which established control over the nuclear weapons production complex in the city of Kurchatov (Semipalatinsk-21) after the failed putsch. The approximate value of the deal is \$150-180 million. According to the magazine's information, 50 atomic industry personnel from the former USSR, who will be carrying out the assembly of the charges, are already in Iran. [passage omitted]

D. Sembayev, deputy head of the Republic of Kazakhstan government, described everything published by AL-ANWAR AL-TUNISIYAH as "a provocation which has nothing in common with reality and is designed to further destabilize relations among the states of the former Union."

Commenting on the report, the Kazakhstan deputy premier said that the atmosphere inside the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] is being artificially charged. Among other things the pan-Islamic card is being played—articles are constantly appearing about the alleged danger that Kazakhstan and the Central Asian states will unite with oriental countries on a religious-political basis. The vice premier is disposed to put the information with which we started this article in that category. "I can officially assure you that the Kazakhstan Government has not concluded and does not intend to conclude any such deals," D. Sembayev stressed.

However, the deputy prime minister did acknowledge that the Kazakhstan leadership is studying the possibilities for the production and sale of weapons abroad. The republic has inherited a powerful network of defense enterprises from the collapsed Union, and not to use this potential for its intended purpose "would be simply irrational, particularly as trade in weapons, provided it is not in breach of international legal norms, is a generally accepted pursuit"—in the opinion of the official.

Regarding the story of the possible recruitment of nuclear specialists for the countries of the Islamic East, this situation was commented on by V. Okolovich, chief scientific secretary of the Kazakhstan Republic Academy of Sciences. The research facility of the Semipalatinsk Test Range, where a special scientific center has been set up, has passed into the hands of the Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences.

"Kazakhstan does indeed possess a certain cadre pool of nuclear scientists," V. Okolovich said. "They are mainly concentrated in the Republic of Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences Nuclear Physics Institute, where I work too. This is not the first time I've heard talk of a 'nuclear

brain drain.' However, I am not aware of a single specific instance of any specialist's being recruited for abroad. Just as I am unaware of even one case of such a recruitment offer coming from any country, East or West. As far as the group of scientists working at the Semipalatinsk Test Range is concerned, they continue to work in our academy's scientific research center. Although it has to be acknowledged that the center's activity on the program originally planned has somewhat slowed down. This is due primarily to lack of resources—around 40 million rubles is needed to finance this work today."

But Kazakhstan is not of course the sole source of this dreadful potential export. Krasnoyarsk Kray is also a long-standing location for huge military-industrial complex facilities. At least two facilities that could interest countries seeking to create nuclear weapons are located in the kray. These are a mining and chemical combine producing weapons-grade plutonium—material for atomic bombs—and the electrochemical plant at Krasnoyarsk-45, which is engaged in enriching uranium—it previously worked for the defense sector, but now works for the nuclear power complex. Both enterprises indeed possess unique collectives which have a wealth of highly skilled specialists. They are now potential candidates for a brain drain. Why? There are virtually no foodstuffs available in these secret Siberian settlements today, and the pay of these former standard-bearers of the military-industrial complex is extraordinarily low....

"There are people who want to go on a tourist trip abroad. But I have not heard of anyone wanting to go there for a 'job,'" said Pavel Morozov, deputy chief engineer of the mining and chemical combine. "We are production workers, and discipline is no mere word to us. I think that institute and design bureau staff are more likely to become suppliers of nuclear technology. At least, no desire to do that has been recorded here to date."

Anatoliy Shubin, director of the secret plant at Krasnoyarsk-45, responded in roughly the same terms. After the war in the Persian Gulf the enterprise was asked to send specialists to the UN commission tasked with studying how close Saddam Husayn had gotten to possessing an atomic bomb. But the Siberian workers declined—which does show indirectly that the search for contacts with foreign colleagues and special services does not interest Krasnoyarsk-45 atomic industry personnel overmuch.

However, it is becoming increasingly tough to live and work in the taiga settlements ringed with barbed wire. For that reason, I think, the possibility of a brain drain and hence a drain of nuclear know-how cannot be ruled out. According to its workers, not a single "foreigner," except for Ukrainians, has yet been able to go underground at the mining and chemical combine. But foreign trips for atomic industry personnel are more accessible now. So certain conditions for the "emigration" of nuclear secrets have been created. However, it should

not be forgotten that workers in this sector were bound to form a special "state-conditioned way of thinking" during the long years of the "cold war". The near future will show how durable the ideological dogmas are.

Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast is not just Andrey Sakharov's place of political exile but also a region of top-secret nuclear production units. Valeriy Takoyev, chairman of the Arzamas-16 City Soviet, took up this post comparatively recently; he was previously a "bomb-maker." Arzamas-16 produces and develops nuclear weapons. The crux of his position is as follows. Last December he sent Boris Yeltsin a memorandum in which he described the alarming state of the sector. There are specialists working in the city, each of whom has at his command (to a greater or larger extent) the technique for making an atomic bomb. Although the city is a "closed" city, there always was, is, and will be a natural migration of its population. The anxiety lies elsewhere—material hardships have recently struck here too, and a half-starved worker with a nuclear device is a dangerous person. The last thing on his mind is work.

The material situation in the city (coupons and other such delights of our time have long been in evidence) has not yet reached the critical point. But the situation is dangerous all the same. The following "chain reaction" is possible: Specialists who have left the city because of the hardships of life could, if they came together, start developing a nuclear device. Who potentially is in a position to invite them to carry out their customary work? Any of our own independent states of the former Union. There are also those abroad in a position to really evaluate (in hard currency) the abilities of our nuclear industry personnel, according to the head of Arzamas-16.

In his memorandum to the Russian president V. Takoyev raises, for example, the question of the status of the "closed" city (its inhabitants must be provided with social protection if they voluntarily live behind barbed wire, where their rights are restricted—previously the inhabitants of Arzamas-16 never went on leave, receiving a sizable sum of money by way of compensation). And the final piece of evidence of Arzamas-16's uniqueness is that not just nuclear physicists but other specialists too work here—engineers, designers.... Taken together, such a brain drain harbors the possibility of a nuclear device being created wherever suitable conditions exist....

To briefly sum up, it can be stated, as in jokes, that two conclusions can be drawn—good and bad. Following tradition, let us start with the bad news. The justification for anxiety about the spread of nuclear technology and, first and foremost, of know how from the CIS is perfectly clear. Moreover, it is realistic. The destruction of socialism in this respect is no less dangerous than the continuation of extreme socialist ideas, in whose realization state trade in bombs or missiles with regimes that pleased us was also perfectly feasible. You only have to remember the war in the Persian Gulf, where most of the weapons used by Iraq were supplied by us. The good

news is that no specific (material) evidence of a brain drain from here to there has been discovered by IZVESTIYA.

For the time being.

West Said 'Worried'

LD1401233192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 2200 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Commentary by Petr Fil—from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Today the West is worried about the fact that the USSR's political collapse can result in a drain of both nuclear arms and scientists capable of developing them. It has become known that Libya has already offered jobs to several employees of the Moscow Kurchatov Institute for Nuclear Energy. Many institute specialists are keenly considering the opportunity of getting a job abroad. After all, the salary promised by the Libyan side amounts to \$2,000 a month. According to TASS, several dozen specialists from the Kurchatov Institute are already working in the United States, Japan, and other countries.

In addition, it seems that a split of the nuclear complex, which was unitary at one time, is starting. In reply to the Ukraine's refusal to supply Krasnoyarsk Kray with food and industrial goods, the Krasnoyarsk Kray Soviet informed the Ukrainian leadership that as of 15 January the kray would cease to receive waste from Ukrainian nuclear stations. South Korea immediately showed interest in the storages for waste nuclear fuel situated in Krasnoyarsk, which form part of the mining chemical combine which produces weapons-grade plutonium for atomic bombs. The country's business circles showed readiness to pay up to \$1 million for a ton of waste fuel from Korean stations accepted in Siberia. Nuclear sites in Japan and India are also being considered as prospective suppliers of nuclear waste and currency.

If, motivated by economic profits, other home storages of nuclear waste start to refuse to accept the waste fuel from Commonwealth nuclear power plants, one can expect wagon-loads of unburied radioactive waste to appear roaming across the land. [Video shows archive footage of various nuclear plants, control rooms.]

Prevention of Nuclear Technology Leaks Supported

PM1601153592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 3

[Report by Major M. Pogorelyy: "Nuclear Weapons Still Important Factor in World Policy"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] We are not the only ones with nuclear weapons, and that must not be forgotten. British Defense Secretary T. King said, for instance, the day before the parliamentary nuclear debate that his country would be acting "imprudently" were it to reduce

its nuclear potential, at least during such an "extremely alarming and threatening period" for the world's largest nuclear power, which is breaking up.

It must be stressed at this point that many people are not averse to speculating on this problem, which is indeed very complex and crucial. Countless statements—as yet, fortunately, without any real foundation—have been heard about nuclear technology being "leaked" to "Third World" countries with unstable regimes or dictatorships.

U.S. experts, unilaterally reacting to these proposals, are suggesting retargeting some of the U.S. strategic nuclear weapons on these countries. Admittedly, I suspect that the list of these countries is decided in an extremely voluntarist manner and states whose leadership is not greatly to Washington's liking may run the risk of ending up on it.

Evidently, the option suggested by German Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher—that nuclear and nonnuclear states submit a joint initiative on preventing the "leak" of dangerous, including nuclear, technologies—is more promising. This step would be of more practical assistance in reassuring the world community and would promote the stabilization of the international situation.

Disarmament Plans, Proliferation Viewed

PM1701103992 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1200 GMT 15 Jan 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Report by A. Sidorov]

[Text] [Sidorov] Mikhail Gorbachev, former CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, announced a program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world. It consisted of three stages: the first in halving nuclear weapons capable of reaching U.S. and USSR territory, abandoning the creation, testing, and deployment of space arms, and scrapping USSR and U.S. intermediate-range missiles in the European zone; the second in scrapping tactical nuclear weapons by all the nuclear powers and ending nuclear weapon tests; and the third in scrapping all remaining nuclear weapons before the year 2000.

In past few years quite a lot has been done: Intermediate- and short-range missiles have been scrapped, our weapons have been withdrawn from Europe, the Treaty on the Limitation and Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms has been signed, our program for the development of new generation weapons has finally been wound up, both our test ranges have been closed down, and production in four out of the 10 nuclear cities has been stopped. Has the world become a safer place? To a certain extent, yes. But work in the sphere of space weapons goes on, on both the U.S. and our side. Some of these systems have been deployed, while prototypes of others have been developed. Strategic weapons are to be reduced, but on a smaller scale. The problem of the former Union's nuclear button has caused all continents to shudder. The

Arab world has already announced a plan to create a nuclear bomb. Syria has plans to produce weapons-grade plutonium at a nuclear station built there by Soviet specialists. The potential of Iraq's nuclear industry, which we also helped to create, remains unknown at present. Using Soviet Scud missiles as a basis, North Korea is secretly developing its own ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead. This work could be completed in one-to-two years. In this situation, instead of the destruction of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 we could have several more nuclear powers.

Pyongyang Preparing To Sign Nuclear Accord

Simultaneous Inspection in ROK

*LD2912103591 Moscow TASS in English
1011 GMT 29 Dec 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Georgiy Shmelev and Aleksey Luzin]

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS—The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is prepared to sign an agreement on guarantees to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and would agree to inspection in accordance with the established procedure, Son Song-pil, North Korean ambassador in Moscow, told TASS today.

South Korea's recent statement that "not a single nuclear weapon has remained in the south of the peninsula" was welcomed in the DPRK, the ambassador said.

If U.S. nuclear weapons have been fully removed from South Korea, this, in the ambassador's opinion, is an illustration of "a great triumph of our nation that has persistently striven for the elimination of the menace of a nuclear war".

At the same time he emphasised that when the DPRK undergoes an inspection under a nuclear safeguards accord, "it is essential to carry out a simultaneous inspection in South Korea to verify and confirm the fact that U.S. nuclear weapons are absent from the south of the Korean peninsula".

The North Korean ambassador voiced regret over the fact that the United Nations has not up to now officially confirmed the fact of removal of nuclear weapons from South Korea's territory. He pointed out that Pyongyang hopes that the U.S. side will clarify its position.

The South Korean "declaration on the ensurance of a non-nuclear status" followed the DPRK's proposal to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, the ambassador emphasised.

He believes that North and South Korea should immediately adopt a joint declaration on making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

Additional Negotiations Necessary

*LD2812031391 Moscow TASS in English 0851 GMT
28 Dec 91*

[By TASS correspondent Aleksander Krolikov]

[Text] Moscow December 27 TASS—Son Song-pil, North Korean ambassador to Moscow said at a press conference on Wednesday [25 December] that his country is ready to meet officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency. North Korea will sign an agreement on nuclear guarantees if the United States officially announces that it does not have any nuclear weapons on South Korean territory.

The South Korean Government said on December 18 no U.S. nuclear weapons remain on its territory, but the United States still keeps silent on the subject, the ambassador said.

Nuclear inspection should be conducted in South Korea. To carry out an inspection in North Korea additional negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea are necessary "to consider certain questions and problems of averting "the nuclear threat," the ambassador said.

DPRK Ability To Make Nuclear Arms Viewed

*SK0901013192 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1330 GMT 8 Jan 92*

[Report by Pyongyang-based Moscow radio reporter, from "Today's World" program]

[Text] On 7 January, the DPRK announced that it is ready to sign and ratify the nuclear safeguards accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. The DPRK also stated that it will accept international inspection of its nuclear facilities in the near future. According to a report from Vienna, where the headquarters of the organization for international issues is located, the DPRK will sign these documents by the end of this week.

The nations which have participated in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have the obligation to sign the nuclear safeguards accord with IAEA within 18 months and to accept international inspection of their nuclear facilities.

The DPRK signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in December 1985. However, the DPRK has never accepted international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

Two years ago, some countries' space satellites discovered facilities for producing plutonium, which is required for nuclear warheads, in North Korea. Since that time, the nuclear issue has been raised as an acute question.

According to what is known, the DPRK has three nuclear reactor facilities. The first reactor facility was built in 1965 with the help of the Soviet Union. This was

a science-oriented facility. The remaining two were built with the DPRK's own resources. No foreigner has ever discovered the functions of these reactor facilities.

The process of these facilities raised the fear that Pyongyang was developing its own nuclear weapons. However, Belayev, reporter for this radio station who has lived in the DPRK for nearly 10 years, wrote that, in view of this nation's technological level, it is hard to believe that nuclear weapons have been developed at these facilities. An international inspection of these facilities will be accepted.

Meanwhile, Seoul announced that it will cancel the U.S.-ROK Team Spirit joint military exercise this year, responding to such a decision by Pyongyang. Washington also promised to vitalize unofficial contact with the DPRK. Diplomats of the two countries are holding such contacts in Beijing.

DPRK To Sign Nonproliferation Agreement

LD0901095392 Moscow TASS in English 0847 GMT
9 Jan 92

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Nikishov and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow January 9 TASS—The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) will sign a safeguards agreement to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the end of January, North Korean Ambassador Son Song-pil told a news conference at the DPRK Embassy in Moscow on Wednesday [8 January].

The ambassador commented on a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement dated January 7 announcing the government's decision to sign a safeguards accord soon, ratify it and receive an inspection group in accordance with the established procedure and arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Son Song-pil spoke positively of South Korea's recent statement that there are no nuclear weapons in the south of the Korean peninsula. An atmosphere necessary for "a fair solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula" has been established, he said, reaffirming his government's striving to seek the conversion of the peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

In response to a question from TASS correspondents, the ambassador specified that a safeguards agreement would be signed not later than the end of this month.

He said this is connected only with procedural aspects and is not dependent on any other circumstances.

Son Song-pil welcomed the decision of the United States and South Korea not to hold joint large-scale exercises Team Spirit this year.

"This decision signifies that our demands for the creation of guarantees of nuclear security have been met," the North Korean ambassador emphasised.

UK Experts 'Concerned' Over Nuclear Secrets

LD0501211692 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 5 Jan 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] A leak from British intelligence has come to light today. British intelligence experts are seriously concerned about the possibility of the creation of an Islamic union of Near East states and the former Central Asian republics of the USSR. The economic situation in the former Union is extremely difficult, and, therefore, British experts think the Central Asian states, and Azerbaijan, too, are now very vulnerable to the advances of the rich Arab countries.

Some members of the British Government think that—given the increasing emigration from our country of nuclear scientists—Iran, Libya, and perhaps even Iraq will be able to create nuclear weapons by 1995. The International Atomic Energy Agency has already obtained data—as yet unconfirmed—that recruiters have appeared in Tajikistan offering major contracts to local scientists. According to information from British sources, Iran is currently offering many goods in exchange for Soviet nuclear technology and equipment.

Iran Said To Have Purchased Nuclear Warheads

PM0601145592 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Jan 92 p 5

[Report by unidentified correspondent: "Atom Bombs on Sale—And at a Reasonable Price"]

[Text] Cairo, 5 Jan—Iran has received three atom bombs from the former Soviet Union. The cover of the weekly AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI carried this stunning sensation.

An extensive article in the publication announced that about a year ago one of the numerous Iranian delegations that recently visited the so-called Soviet Islamic republics included a nuclear specialist. He was set the task of meeting his colleagues and sounding out the possibility of offering them work. It is well-known that Iran has long had dreams of an "Islamic atom bomb" and that the relevant research center has been set up there.

The Iranian scientist performed his task. But one of his Soviet colleagues suggested taking an "easier route"—buying ready-made nuclear weapons. They could be delivered in pieces and assembled on the spot.

Tehran initially decided that this was a KGB provocation. But following the August events, during the Iranian scientist's return visit, the offer was repeated. The Iranians made up their minds. For starters—to acquire three tactical nuclear warheads [zaryad] at a cost of

\$130-150 million. A numbered Luxembourg bank account was opened into which a \$3 million deposit was paid. It was agreed that Iran would employ 50 Soviet nuclear specialists, offering them \$5,000 per month each.

Now, the journal claims, the components of the nuclear warheads have already arrived in the Islamic republic. It is hard to tell whether this story is true. At any rate it seems plausible. The journal points out that the Iranians have acted on two premises: First, everything is now being sold and bought in the former Soviet republics. Second, as a result of the collapse of the Union, up to 20,000 scientists and nuclear specialists may be left without work.

Estonia Foreign Minister on Nuclear Treaty

LD0701204492 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 2000 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] According to Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri, Estonia is ready to propose to Latvia and Lithuania a treaty in which the countries would bind themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons. The precondition for making the proposal is that the tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, which are still on the territory of the Baltic states, are first withdrawn. Meri said in Helsinki today that there are still short-range nuclear weapons on Estonian territory. According to him, the existence of the weapons has been confirmed by many quarters. Meri said that they form a security threat to Estonia as well as to the whole of northern Europe.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons Located in Georgia

LD0501102892 Berlin ADN in German 0924 GMT 5 Jan 92

[Text] Tbilisi (ADN)—Tactical nuclear weapons from the former Soviet army are now on the territory of the Caucasian Republic of Georgia. This was confirmed today by the Georgian agency IPRINDA. The agency, however, was unable to give details about the precise number of warheads. The weapons are part of the former Soviet army units stationed in Georgia and will be under the command of the Commonwealth of Independent States, like all the nuclear arms of the former USSR.

Kazakhstan Denies Nuclear Agreements With Iran

LD1401194592 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1809 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Text] Moscow, January 14 (TASS)—Deputy Prime Minister Daulet Sembayev of Kazakhstan has refuted a report, published by AL-ANWAR weekly, that the "construction of three nuclear warheads has started in Iran from parts delivered from Kazakhstan."

In an article published in the newspaper IZVESTIYA today, he described this report as "an act of provocation,

having nothing in common with reality and intended further to destabilize relations between the states of the former union."

According to the magazine, which is published in Tunisia, the Kazakh authorities, who are now in control of the nuclear weapon producing plant in the town of Kurchatov (Semipalatinsk-21), have completed talks with the Iranian leadership and have sent 50 nuclear scientists and specialists from the former USSR to Iran to supervise the production of nuclear weapons there.

"I can give official assurances that the Kazakhstan Government has signed no agreements of this kind and has no intention to," Sembayev stressed.

Also today, Aleksandr Medvedev, assistant to the minister of nuclear power engineering and industry, told a news conference in Moscow that no Soviet scientists with nuclear knowledge have left for other countries, in particular for Middle Eastern countries, recently.

At the same time, according to the Kazakh deputy prime minister, the Kazakh leadership is studying possibilities for producing weapons for exports. The republic has an extensive network of defense enterprises left over from the collapsed Soviet Union. Not to use their potential "would not be sensible, especially as trading in arms is a generally accepted business, unless it violates international legal norms," he said.

Daulet Sembayev also stressed he is not aware of a single case where a nuclear scientist was recruited to work abroad. "I also do not know of a single case where an offer of such recruitment has come from either an Eastern or a Western country," he said.

Kazakhstan Press Service Denies Nuclear Exports

LD1701113292 Alma-Ata Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 0100 GMT 17 Jan 92

[Text] There have recently been reports in a number of the mass media of certain states, including the United States, alleging that Kazakhstan has started trading nuclear technology, equipment, and raw material. Iran and Turkey have been mentioned as customers.

In this connection the press service of President Nazarbayev of the Republic of Kazakhstan is authorized to state that such assertions do not correspond to reality. The Republic is strictly following the obligations it has taken on both to the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and to the world community concerning the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. In accordance with the agreements adopted in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991 Kazakhstan, like the other CIS members, undertook not to pass on to anyone nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices and technology, and also control of them. Here also the Republic will in no way help other states not in the possession of nuclear weapons to produce or acquire them.

As for sales of uranium, the Republic has stocks of this raw material, and in the future intends to arrange sales of it, including abroad. However, these steps will be undertaken in accordance with international norms in agreement with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], which will be provided with the necessary information and documents.

Kazakhstan Denies Selling Nuclear Technology

92P50083A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 92
Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Vladimir Ardayev, IZVESTIYA correspondent: "Kazakhstan Has No Intention of Proliferating Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] President N. Nazarbayev's press service has distributed a declaration in regard to reports in the mass information media about the sale of nuclear technology, equipment and raw materials by Kazakhstan.

The document says that mass information media in several states, in particular the United States, have recently carried reports that Kazakhstan has supposedly begun to trade in nuclear technology, equipment and raw materials. Iran and Turkey, for instance, have been named as buyers. In connection with this the press service of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan declares that such assertions do not correspond to reality. The republic strictly observes the obligations it has taken upon itself as a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as its obligations to the world community, in regard to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

In accordance with the agreement adopted in Alma-Ata on 12 December 1991 Kazakhstan, as well as the other members of the CIS, obliged itself not to transfer to anyone nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or technology, or to transfer control over them. In this connection the republic will not in any way help other states, which do not possess nuclear weapons, to produce or acquire them.

As for trade in uranium, such steps will, without qualification, be taken in accordance with international norms.

Kazakhstan Said Owner of Nuclear 'Legacy'

92US0183A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 1, Jan 92 p 3

[Article by V. Isayev, department chief at the Oriental Studies Institute, under the rubric "Authoritative Opinion": "Hands Extended to the Nuclear Button"]

[Text] At the end of last December in different corners of the world two events occurred which are externally unrelated to one another in any way: PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat made a brief visit to the capital of Kazakhstan

and Islamic Fundamentalists won a convincing victory in the first round of elections in Algeria.

It is known that Algeria has been working on developing its own nuclear program for a fairly long time and without much success. In its implementation it relies on an agreement concluded with China in 1972. Let us recall, incidentally, that China has not yet signed the Agreement for Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. According to certain information, the Algerians are also exchanging nuclear information with Iraq. The UN experts who inspected the Iraqi nuclear installations after Iraq's failed aggression against Kuwait stated that some of the uranium accumulated by Iraq which was suitable for producing an atomic bomb had disappeared. After a certain amount of time this uranium floated to the surface... in Algeria. In the Western press there was an announcement that a group of Iraqi nuclear physicists had also ended up in Algeria. It is possible that this information should be regarded as normal cooperation between the two countries in the sphere of peaceful nuclear energy engineering. But at least two considerations put us on guard: the character of the Iraqi regime, which is now known throughout the world, and the victory of Muslim Fundamentalists in the elections in Algeria.

The fact that the PLO has extremely "warm" relations with Saddam Husayn's regime is generally known. But one should not forget that it also has these ties with Algeria, whose leaders have been captivated by the moods of the "Arab street," which since the autumn of 1990 has been exulting in an attack of "Saddamomania." And the PLO has never forgotten that Algeria is one of the economically and militarily most powerful Arab countries, which also has two operational nuclear reactors. There is evidence that another reactor is in the stage of construction. Contacts with Algeria became especially important to the PLO leaders after they ended up in deep political isolation after the failure of the Iraqi adventure.

Under these conditions Y. 'Arafat on his flight from China stops off in Kazakhstan. The questions arise quite naturally: Why Kazakhstan in particular and not, say, Uzbekistan? Is it not because Kazakhstan has now become one of the owners of part of the nuclear "legacy" of the former USSR? It would be interesting to know how the "equivocal" figure of 'Arafat appeared in Alma-Ata. Who sent the invitation? Or did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan decide to begin to establish diplomatic relations not with sovereign states but with the PLO? It would be interesting to know Alma-Ata's answers to these questions.

Ministry Confirms Yeltsin Has Nuclear Button

PM2712114991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 27 Dec 91 p 1

[A. Khokhlov report: "On the Button Again"]

[Text] INTERFAX reported yesterday that the "briefcase" containing the nuclear button is still in the possession of the defense minister.

At the Defense Ministry it was reported that the information is not authentic. On the evening of 25 December, immediately after the USSR president's resignation statement, the button itself and all the necessary paraphernalia were transferred first by M. Gorbachev to Ye. Shaposhnikov and then by Shaposhnikov to B. Yeltsin.

In a telephone conversation a high-ranking general of the General Staff said that it could not be any other way.

Russia's Burbulis on Nuclear Weapons Control

LD2912212691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1015 GMT 29 Dec 91

[By TASS correspondent Gennadiy Petrov]

[Text] Lisbon, 29 December (TASS)—Gennadiy Burbulis, first deputy prime minister of Russia, thinks that 1992 should become a year of the survival and revival of Russia. He stated this in an exclusive interview for the Portuguese newspaper PUBLICA.

In his view, it is natural that Russia aspires to take the USSR's place in the UN Security Council. Russia is taking on responsibility for the USSR's obligations to the world community and we give this official recognition, he noted. Among the documents signed at the meeting of heads of 11 republics in Alma-Ata, I would single out in particular the agreement of four states, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, which hold nuclear weapons, G. Burbulis continued. The content of this document is global in nature, as these states have confirmed Russia's legal continuity as the main holder of nuclear weapons and as the guarantor of our nuclear policy. Belarus and Ukraine have once again confirmed their intention to press for the status of non-nuclear states. As for Kazakhstan, it is close to this position, and the elimination of strategic weapons on its territory is a question of time. The nuclear button is in Russia's hands, and that is the most important thing.

On the former Union's Armed Forces, G. Burbulis stated that this issue will be addressed on 30 December at the council of heads of state in Minsk. We advocate the conclusion of a treaty on a defense alliance and the creation of a defense council. It is proposed to create united strategic armed forces which will include the actual strategic forces, and also the air force and the navy. This plan is realistic, especially taking into account the agreement of the four, which makes provision for rules insuring single control of nuclear weapons and a single policy regarding accords on their reduction. We are not only ready to carry out the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic offensive weapons, but also to propose a more far-reaching and somewhat different system of cutting nuclear arms. We discussed this with George Bush and we found support.

Kozyrev Urges Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

LD0301132992 Moscow TASS in English 1207 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Moscow January 3 TASS—"The purpose of Russian diplomacy in the coming years is to secure a radical reduction of nuclear weapons, to stop the arms race and find minimum nuclear sufficiency with an eventual complete liquidation of nuclear arsenals," Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says in an article, published by the newspaper "IZVESTIYA" on Thursday [2 January].

"Equality does not rid Russia of its special, historical responsibility. This refers, primarily, to nuclear weapons. Establishment of unified and reliable control over nuclear weapons will ensure, I am convinced, reliable security both for Russia and for the other Commonwealth nations," Kozyrev believes. [passage omitted]

Tajikistan Takes Control of Uranium Plant

OW2912141291 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1338 GMT 29 Dec 92

[Transmitted by KYODO]

[Text] Under the Declaration of Independence adopted in September 1991, Tajikistan takes under its full control the supersecret plant built in the republic's north in the 1940s to enrich uranium for the first Soviet A-bomb. Until recently all information about the plant was strictly classified.

According to IF's [INTERFAX] reporter, Tajikistani MPs [members of parliament] have lately been heard actively discussing the possible dividends that republican control over nuclear technology may bring, particularly now that new and still more significant uranium deposits have been discovered in Tajikistan.

One kilo of raw materials obtained in the republic costs \$100,000 and more in the world market. There has been talk of the possible establishment of a uranium-developing consortium with Arab countries.

Tajikistani authorities have so far made no official statements on the matter.

Tajikistan 'Toying' With Plans To Sell Uranium

LD0201110592 Hamburg DPA in German 0941 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Text] Dushanbe (DPA)—Tajikistan, the southernmost republic of the former Soviet Union in central Asia, is threatening to become a factor of nuclear instability worldwide. According to reports in Tajik parliamentary circles today, the leadership is toying with the idea of selling abroad enriched uranium and technology for processing uranium. Interested parties from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan have already been

to the republic's capital, Dushanbe. President Rakhman Nabiyeu intends to travel to India for talks soon.

Tajikistan, which is in the northern Himalayas, has rich uranium deposits at its disposal. The first uranium enrichment enterprise was built in 1940 in Leninabad in the north of the republic at the personal instruction of Soviet dictator Stalin. The fissile material for the first Soviet atomic bomb was produced in Tajikistan.

The Tajik leadership's plans apparently go even further. Cooperation in extending uranium mining and uranium enrichment with the rich Arab countries and with Iran have been considered. Recently new uranium deposits were discovered in Tajikistan and these are to be mined.

Tajikistan Begins Nuclear Talks With Pakistan

LD0401140192 Moscow Teleradiokompanii Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1300 GMT 4 Jan 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] According to an Austrian newspaper, Tajikistan has begun talks with Near Eastern states and Pakistan to sell nuclear materials. However, there has not yet been any confirmation of this report from internal news channels.

Tajikistan Denies Enriched Uranium Deals

LD0601174592 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1705 GMT 6 Jan 92

[By TAJIKTA-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe, 6 Jan (TASS)—The Tajikistan Government denied a report that there are enterprises in the republic engaged in processing enriched uranium and on the discovery of new deposits recently. Such a statement was made on behalf of the republican Cabinet of Ministers by Georgiy Koshlakov, chairman of the State Committee for the Economy, at a session of the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet. His speech was prompted by a report by the NANT local news agency, which also was carried by a number of foreign agencies. The report published by the republican NARODNAYA GAZETA mentioned the existence of uranium deposits and special processing plants in Tajikistan. It also voiced "concern in connection with the interest shown by a number of Muslim Arab states in Tajik uranium." The Tajik Cabinet of Ministers representative said that, during talks on trade and economic cooperation with Muslim Arab states, the issue of uranium was not touched upon at all, because "even to raise this issue would have been absurd." In connection with the government's statement, the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet instructed the republican procurator to carry out an investigation on the publication by the Nant agency of "a sensational report."

Tajikistan Plans No Sale of Enriched Uranium

OW0701203992 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1912 GMT 7 Jan 92

[From the 8 January "Soviet Business Report"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Tajikistan, one of the republics of the now defunct Soviet Union, has no intention of selling enriched uranium abroad. This was announced in the Tajik parliament on Tuesday [7 January], where it was also reported that this and similar government plans appeared in certain printed publications. The head of the republic's Economic Committee also said that enterprises belonging to the former Ministry of Defence did not possess the equipment necessary for uranium enriching.

Earlier (in September, 1991) Tajikistan announced that a secret uranium enrichment plant, built during the 1940s for the production of the first Soviet atomic bomb, had been taken over by the republic. Recently new and even larger uranium deposits have been found in Tajikistan. The price of such uranium as is found in Tajikistan could fetch, according to some estimates, more than \$100,000 per kilogram on the world market.

Uranium Sales Not Overseen by IAEA

LD0901140792 Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Jan 92 p 3

[Report by A. Komrakov: "Was There a Bomb?"]

[Text] A report from Dushanbe, flagged "Especially for TRUD," arrived in our editorial office before New Year from a news agency called NANT. Without naming names, the report claimed that the idea of selling enriched uranium to rich Arab countries was maturing in certain echelons of power in the now independent Tajikistan. It claimed that the Islamic world, including Saddam Husayn and Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, would find Tajikistan a supplier capable of satisfying their nuclear ambitions. "Independent observers," the report said, "believe that the mountain republic has enough uranium reserves to supply the population of a hundred Tajikistans."

G. Koshlakov, chairman of the republic of Tajikistan State Committee for the Economy, made the following comments on the aforementioned report when asked to do so by B. Ashurov, our own correspondent in Dushanbe: "This is pure fabrication. There are no major uranium deposits on Tajik territory, and none have recently been discovered. Talks were held between the republic and delegations from Iran and Pakistan, but there was not even a hint of cooperation in the field of developing and selling enriched uranium."

Thus it seemed to us that the matter was of no importance. This is precisely why we refrained from publishing this item at the time. But over the last few days a number of foreign mass media, followed by our own mass media, have again started to elaborate on the theme of the

"Islamic nuclear bomb," and, moreover, Tajikistan has again been mentioned as the main supplier of uranium, technology, and even specialists.

This is what Yu. Vishnevskiy, chairman of the Russian State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry, said about this. "Tajikistan does indeed possess uranium ore reserves, but the percentage of uranium they contain is low. About 3 percent of the total quantity of ore extracted on the territory of the former USSR is extracted there. The republic has the potential to preconcentrate the uranium ore to some degree, but it has neither the technology nor the suitable raw materials to produce the nuclear fuel needed to manufacture weapons. Therefore the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] does not oversee the sale of Tajik uranium. Only the movements of nuclear materials and the highly enriched uranium-235 isotope—the type which Tajikistan does not possess—are overseen in this way."

Yu. Vishnevskiy added that Tajikistan has hitherto sold all its uranium to Russia, where it was enriched. There are absolutely no obstacles to Dushanbe finding new buyers for its uranium, including Islamic countries. As he said, the IAEA does not monitor these deals, and Russia can find other sources of raw material, for example Czechoslovakia, without disadvantage to itself. After all, world uranium prices have fallen quite considerably over the last few years, and trade between the former Soviet republics is increasingly geared to these international prices.

So, judging by the expert opinion of Tajik and Russian Government representatives, rumors of a "Central Asian bomb" are exaggerated.

Tajikistan Denies Uranium Enrichment Plant

*LD0901120792 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1100 GMT 9 Jan 92*

[Text] Passions continue to rage in Tajikistan over the local NANT news agency's report on Tajik uranium for an Islamic bomb, which caused serious alarm throughout the entire civilized world. Several days ago, this canard was officially denied to the republic's parliament by Georgiy Koshlakov, a member of the Cabinet of Ministers in charge of economic issues. The republic's NARODNAYA GAZETA today carries an interview with the leaders of the enterprises which, according to NANT, were engaged in uranium enrichment. I can say with full responsibility that there is no top secret uranium enrichment plant in the republic, said Yuriy Nesterov, director general of the Vostokregmet production association. He therefore called the correspondent's suggestion that nuclear technology might be sold to a number of Arab Muslim countries a fabrication.

[Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English at 1300 GMT on 9 January, in a similar report, adds the following: "According to him [Koshlakov] the authors of these sensational statements carried out a special order from certain republican forces aimed at destabilizing the

situation in Tajikistan. Under a decision adopted by the Tajik parliament the prosecutor's office of the republic will launch an inquiry into the matter."]

Ukraine President on Control of 'Nuclear Button'

*LD2512184291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1645 GMT 25 Dec 91*

[Text] Moscow, 25 Dec (TASS)—Ukraine wishes to completely rid itself of nuclear weapons on its territory. This was confirmed by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk in an interview published in today's IZVESTIYA. He explained this, in particular, by the "psychological shock" resulting from the accident at Chernobyl.

"Ukraine's president," writes IZVESTIYA, "rejected both the short-term and long-term probability that the Russian leader or any other person will be given the individual right to be in charge of strategic weapons situated in the Ukraine." At the same time, the newspaper notes, he put forward the "original concept of collective responsibility, which is essential in the transitional period." "That should be control [kontrol] over the nonuse of nuclear weapons," Kravchuk stated. "I stress: Over not the use but the nonuse. Why is it that almost always the 'nuclear button' is identified with the fact that it is pressed, with a launch? It is technically possible to block the 'button' so that neither Kravchuk in the Ukraine nor Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan can display willfulness."

As for tactical nuclear weapons, in the words of the Ukraine's president, "no problems at all exist" with them, because all troops in the Ukraine must entirely and fully be under the command of the president, who is the commander in chief, writes the newspaper.

In contrast with the Baltic states, Ukraine, in the president's words, does not think the troops must leave its territory, notes IZVESTIYA. He stressed, moreover, that the ethnic composition of the remaining troops is of no significance. The government, the newspaper says citing Kravchuk, will not strive to the slightest degree either to appoint Ukrainians in place of Russians or to recall Ukrainians who are serving in other states of the community.

Kravchuk Confirms Four-Way Nuclear Control

*AU2912134891 Paris AFP in English
0119 GMT 29 Dec 91*

[Text] Moscow, Dec 29 (AFP)—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said the Commonwealth of Independent States' strategic nuclear weapons can only be fired with the agreement of the presidents of Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Kravchuk spoke in an interview with the Rome newspaper CORRIERE DELLA SERA, which supplied AFP with a transcript on Saturday [28 December].

"I can technically block the button and the others can too," he said. The agreement of the four presidents to fire one or more strategic nuclear weapons was to be made by telephone, he said.

He also predicted that the CIS as a unit would have no cohesive foreign policy, leaving such matters to the individual republics.

"We don't have any intention of forming community structures on the international scene," he said.

Kravchuk, Shaposhnikov Cited on Nuclear Issue

*LD3012105691 Moscow TASS in English
1024 GMT 30 Dec 91*

[By TASS-BELTA special correspondent]

[Text] Minsk December 30 TASS—"Ukraine's stance on nuclear forces remains unchanged", Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk told TASS. He arrived in Minsk today. "We have armed forces of our own, but we are for joint strategic forces," he said. The Ukrainian president said that non-strategic part of the Black Sea Fleet will belong to Ukraine. He believes there will be no difficulties during the discussion of the military problems, if respect for national laws is shown in Minsk.

Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov has a different opinion. He believes military questions will be among most complex in Minsk. The commander-in-chief of the joint armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States who arrived in the Belarussian capital said, nevertheless, he still hopes that "the disintegration of the Army can be prevented".

Asked by TASS if there are changes in the mechanism of control of strategic nuclear forces, the commander-in-chief said decisions on this matter had been made in Alma-Ata and no changes were envisaged. He warned the press against whipping up passions regarding this problem. For instance, he flatly denied the assertion of the Russian TV programme "Vesti" (news) that 7,000 units of nuclear ammunition are deployed in Tajikistan and the Transcaucasia. "This is nonsense", Shaposhnikov said.

"We have a right to expect good results from the summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Minsk", Ruslan Khasbulatov, president of the Russian parliament, said on Monday [30 December]. During a conversation with journalists at the Moscow airport after Boris Yeltsin had taken a plane for Minsk, he said the Russian leaders assumed the policy of close cooperation and that the prospects are good.

Commenting on the statement U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney that the manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons continues in the territory of the former Soviet Union, the head of the Russian parliament said that it is very difficult to halt any production overnight. At the same time he emphasised that "our

policy is not aimed at building up the arsenals of nuclear weapons". "The Russian president and parliament firmly believe that there is a need to reduce the production of all kinds of weapons, not only nuclear", Khasbulatov said.

Kiev Reduces Alert Status on Nuclear Weapons

*LD0101234192 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 2200 GMT 1 Jan 92*

[Text] According to Ukrainian news reports, the Ukraine has started taking nuclear missiles off alert status. Previously, Ukrainian President Kravchuk stated that his republic would not object to the president of Russia becoming the supreme commander in chief of strategic forces, provided some technical operations are carried out to prevent missiles from being launched from Ukrainian territory.

The agreement on the united control of the nuclear arsenal was reached at the meetings of leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States. But the question of conventional armed forces is more complex. The Minsk meeting failed to reach a unanimous view on the subject. The Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova want to create their own armies, leaving to the united command only control over nuclear weapons. The other eight republics would like to preserve the united armed forces.

Ukraine To Withdraw Nuclear Weapons by 1 Jul

*LD0301053792 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 0430 GMT 3 Jan 92*

[Text] Inhabitants of the Ukraine, just like the people of Russia, saw new prices in shops yesterday. The process of the creation of its own armed forces also begins in that sovereign republic today.

Leonid Kravchuk told a UKRINFORM correspondent that it is intended to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of the Ukraine before 1 July 1992 and strategic weapons before 1994. Before this deadline, the Ukraine will carry out tough control [kontrol] of the nonuse and nonexploitation of nuclear weapons. The Ukrainian president will have special technical control [kontrol] to ensure that no one uses nuclear weapons from Ukrainian soil.

Ukraine President Kravchuk Views Nuclear Arms

*LD0801203292 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1930 GMT 8 Jan 92*

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Aleksey Petrunya]

[Excerpt] Kiev, 10 January (TASS)—The Ukraine's intention to become a nonnuclear power was confirmed once again by President Leonid Kravchuk in a conversation with a delegation of the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, headed by its chairman, Les Aspin. During the meeting, which took

place last Wednesday [8 January], Kravchuk told the guests that unlike Russia, the Ukraine has no intention of joining NATO or any other military blocs.

The Ukrainian president said that at present we are preparing documents and making calculations in order to implement our plan of removing all tactical nuclear weapons from our state by 1 July 1992 and of destroying all strategic nuclear arms by 1994. We should like this matter to be under not only Ukrainian but also international control. In accordance with the treaty between the USSR and the United States, 130 silos with missiles are to be destroyed in the Ukraine over a period of seven years. We, however, wish to destroy all 176 on our territory, and to do it in three years. There are no political obstacles to this, because all the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] approve of the Ukraine's position. The problem lies in the technologies and the technical side of the matter. The essence of the matter here is that in the former USSR there was only one plant for the destruction of nuclear weapons, located in the Urals. We do not have such a plant. We also need help from Western countries. But even if such help is not given, we still have another option—we will simply remove the missiles from combat readiness.

"We now have reliable telephone communications with Yeltsin, Shushkevich, and Nazarbayev, which will prevent any one of us from using nuclear weapons without coordination with the other three," Leonid Kravchuk stressed. "In a few days, a device will be installed in my office that will be able, when necessary, to block the nuclear button. This means that it will be impossible to launch a missile from any point in the former Union without a joint decision by us." [passage omitted]

Kravchuk Plans System To 'Block Nuclear Button'

*OW0901182092 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1539 GMT 9 Jan 92*

[Transmitted by KYODO]

[Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said Wednesday [8 January] at a meeting with a delegation of the U.S. House of Representatives' Armed Forces Committee that he had a reliable system of communications with the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus that will not allow any of the four leaders to use nuclear weapons without consultation with the three other members of the "nuclear club."

According to Kravchuk, he will have another system installed in his office very soon that will make it possible to block the nuclear button. A joint decision by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan will be necessary to launch a nuclear missile from a silo in any of the republics.

Ukraine Says 'No Nuclear Weapons' by 1 Jul

*LD1601100792 Kiev Radio Kiev International
Service in Ukrainian 0100 GMT 16 Jan 92*

[Text] The Black Sea Fleet also has become involved in the process of dismantling or removing nuclear weapons beyond Ukraine's borders. As we were informed at the Ukraine Defense Ministry, the nuclear warheads are being transported by rail out of Ukraine to the places where they will be destroyed at the nuclear arms producing plants. By 1 July, there will be no nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory at all.

AUSTRIA

Suspected Nuclear Material Smuggler Arrested

AU1201190092 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
11 Jan 92 p 20

[Report by "rie": "Smuggler of Nuclear Material Arrested"]

[Text] Vienna—Scant information was available on 10 January concerning the arrest of an Austrian in Italy who, together with three Hungarians, has allegedly smuggled nuclear material from the former Soviet Union. The material that can be used for the construction of nuclear weapons was apparently destined for Iraq. Italian authorities stressed that the arrest of the four smugglers is linked with investigations concerning an international gang of smugglers of nuclear material.

The public prosecutor in Milan, where the four men were arrested 9 January, announced that the name of the Austrian is Alexander Kuzmin. The Department for State Security at the Interior Ministry knows about a criminal in Vienna "with a similar name." The man was repeatedly involved in economic crime, organized crime, and fraud.

When arresting the gang, the police confiscated 2 kg of "red mercury," allegedly used in the construction of nuclear weapons. As early as October, Italian police arrested a Swiss national who carried four grams of plutonium. Later 30 kg of Soviet uranium were seized in Zurich.

FINLAND

Sweden Grants Permission for Nuclear Reactor

LD1101102292 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network
in Finnish 1300 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] The Swedish Government has granted the ABB Atom Company permission to deliver a nuclear reactor to Finland. The permission will be valid for seven years, and it requires that Finland make a decision on building a new nuclear power station. ABB Atom previously delivered reactors to the Olkiluoto nuclear power station.

In addition to the Swedish company, a Soviet and a German-French power station firm submitted bids for the building of the fifth nuclear power station. It is expected that the government will decide in principle on the new nuclear power station before the summer. The new nuclear power station could be ready at the end of 1998 at the earliest.

FRANCE

Nuclear Power Station Coordinated With Pakistan

PM0201142692 Paris LE MONDE in French
27 Dec 92 p 6

[Gad Sutherland report: "France Will Honor Its Pledges To Islamabad in the Nuclear Sphere"]

[Text] Islamabad—France will honor its pledges to Pakistan. This sums up Paris' position following Quai d'Orsay Secretary General Francois Scheer's recent visit to Islamabad. In other words, the promise made two years ago by Mr. Mitterrand to facilitate the sale of a nuclear power station to Pakistan will be kept if Islamabad agrees to full monitoring of its installations.

Foreign Minister Roland Dumas established the general framework of French policy in this sphere at the United Nations in September. Mr. Scheer reaffirmed this position that has been calmly welcomed by the Pakistanis. They also have very clear arguments on nonproliferation. They accept full monitoring provided the Indians also allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect all of their installations. Pakistan is also ready to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty if New Delhi does likewise.

According to both sides, complete harmony emerged from Mr. Scheer's talks with Akram Zaki, his Pakistani counterpart, on nonproliferation. The two men agreed on the need for a "regional approach" in the nuclear sphere, according to the official Islamabad communique.

Since Mr. Mitterrand's visit in February 1990, the negotiations on the plan to sell a 900-mw power station to Pakistan had made scarcely any progress. It seems that the Islamabad officials themselves were dragging their feet regarding French preconditions.

A Difficult Financial Deal

Their nuclear program is still surrounded with the greatest secrecy but they have the capacity to "produce something" most Western experts agree. That brought them a serious quarrel with the United States which suspended its annual aid in 1990 following a sudden "unacceptable" acceleration in nuclear work.

In addition to the political aspect, the financial deal linked to the sale of a French power station remains difficult. Its cost is estimated at Fr [francs] 12 billion, and Pakistan does not have the necessary money. In its last public position on this subject, Islamabad spoke of a loan at a rate of around 7 percent and of a 20-year repayment period, starting after the power station begins operation. The Pakistanis also mentioned the possibility of financial assistance from some Gulf countries.

The situation will probably be clarified during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's visit to Paris next month. The local media have put forward the dates of 17 and 18 January.

Regarding the financial dispute linked to France's failure to honor a previous contract (Paris abandoned the construction of a nuclear waste reprocessing plant in 1978), the Pakistanis are apparently becoming increasingly conciliatory. The amount of compensation claimed by Islamabad has been reduced over the months and is now well below the figure of Fr1.5 billion cited several times in the past.

Mitterrand on Nuclear Defense Issues

*AU1001154792 Paris AFP in English 1522 GMT
10 Jan 92*

[Excerpt] Paris, Jan 10 (AFP) — President Francois Mitterrand said on Friday [10 January] that the notion of a "European doctrine" on nuclear defence is an issue the European Community (EC) will have to resolve "very soon." Mitterrand said that in the wake of the EC summit meeting held in Maastricht, Netherlands, in December, "the debate on European defence poses some unsettled problems that will have to be resolved"—and particularly in connection with nuclear weapons. He was addressing a gathering here on "national meetings for Europe" held by the French Government Friday and Saturday [10 and 11 January].

He noted that "only two community members (France and Britain) have nuclear weapons," and each has its "national doctrine." "Can one imagine a European doctrine? This issue will very quickly become the main question with respect to a joint (EC) defence policy."

The speech marked the first time the French president has mentioned the issue of the future of French nuclear weapons in connection with the EC.

Earlier in the day, EC Commission President Jacques Delors, a Frenchman and a possible candidate to succeed Mitterrand in 1995, told the meeting that French nuclear arms might serve Europe in the long run—"if the European Community enjoys very strong political union one day."

Former French Foreign Minister Jean Francois Poncet said it was "clear that European solidarity implies nuclear solidarity," though it remains to be seen how that could be implemented. [passage omitted]

Nuclear, Military Cooperation With Pakistan

*AU1501164892 Paris AFP in English 1628 GMT
15 Jan 92*

[Text] Paris, Jan 15 (AFP) — France on Wednesday [15 January] committed itself to continued nuclear and military cooperation with Pakistan, but within the framework of global disarmament that Paris supports.

"France confirms its commitment to work with Pakistan in the domain of peaceful nuclear cooperation," Prime Minister Edith Cresson said at a luncheon for her visiting Pakistani counterpart, Mohammad Nawaz Sharif. "We intend to place this action in the new context created by our global disarmament plan, our adhesion to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and complementary control," she said.

During Nawaz Sharif's visit, France signed an agreement to sell Pakistan three minesweepers that saw action in the Gulf war, valued at 1.3 billion francs (260 million dollars).

"In the area of defense," Cresson told Nawaz Sharif, "your country has needs that we recognize as being legitimate. Our cooperation in armament goes back some time. We are well disposed to continuing it in respect for the principles that guide us."

Nawaz Sharif said Pakistan was "pleased that France recognizes the right of all nations to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and we would be willing to cooperate with France in promoting these ideals for ensuring a safer and better world." "My own proposal for a nuclear non-proliferation regime in South Asia shares some basic elements of the French proposal like the recognition of the need for a regional balance," he said.

Pakistan is hoping to acquire a 900-megawatt nuclear generating plant that French President Francois Mitterrand promised during a February 1990 visit. It is also anxious to buy 40 Mirage-2000 warplanes.

Sources said the nuclear plant was no longer a top priority in talks between the two countries as Pakistan had bought one from China and reached an accord to buy two thermal generating plants from France. The same sources said the Mirage sale was still under discussion, notably over financing problems.

Pakistan, one of France's arms customers in the past, wants the 40 Mirages to replace its U.S. F-16's for which it can no longer get replacement parts as a result of U.S. restrictions.

Pakistan's Sharif Confers on Major Projects

Meets With Mitterrand

*AU1701155792 Paris AFP in English 1424 GMT
17 Jan 92*

[Text] Paris, Jan 17 (AFP)—Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met here Friday [17 January] with French President Francois Mitterrand, but question marks remained over the future of two major projects involving the sale of Mirage-2000 warplanes and the construction of a nuclear power plant, French sources said.

Sharif told reporters that his talks with Mitterrand had been "positive," but the sources said conditions placed by France on the two projects could result in delays, or even their cancellation.

The two agreed that France should pay Pakistan 600 million francs (109.1 million dollars) in compensation for having backed down on a promise to build a nuclear waste treatment center, French sources said.

Mitterrand told Sharif that France was prepared to sell Pakistan Mirage-2000 warplanes, but on condition that total agreement is reached on financing, presidential advisor Pierre Morel said.

The question of the nuclear plan was not brought up, he said.

Mitterrand had promised to sell Pakistan a 900-megawatt nuclear power center when he visited Islamabad in 1990, and the spokesman said France was still willing to do so, but on condition that the nuclear equipment it exports be strictly controlled.

The two countries on Thursday signed an agreement for the construction of two other power plants, one thermal and the other hydroelectric, at a total cost of 367 million francs (66.7 million dollars).

Sources close to the Defense Ministry here said that the two countries would sign an agreement later in the day for the sale to Pakistan of three Eridan-type mine-sweepers.

The first of the three ships will be picked from a first batch delivered to the French Navy, the sources said, the second will be built in France for Pakistan, and the third will be built in Pakistan with French technical assistance.

Sharif and Mitterrand also discussed international matters, spokesmen said, with the Pakistani leader saying he wanted to improve relations with India and work with the domestic opposition to reform and modernize his country.

Mitterrand stressed the importance of the United Nations on the world scene and the need to rely on international forums to solve the problems emerging from global political upheavals, they said.

Views Nuclear Policy

*AU1701174592 Paris AFP in English 1703 GMT
17 Jan 92*

[Marie Joannidis report]

[Text] Paris, Jan 17 (AFP)—Pakistan is capable of building atomic weapons but is concentrating on development instead, Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif said Friday [17 January] after an hour of talks with French President Francois Mitterrand.

"No doubt we have the capability (of building atomic weapons) but we are not doing it because we are concentrating on development", Nawaz Sharif told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE.

"How can we do that when we have to feed a nation of 115 million people?", he said. "Countries like Pakistan

and India which have so many people to feed should sit down seriously and look after the welfare of the people and not waste resources in building up their defense," the Pakistani premier said.

He said that during his talks with the French president he did not ask for a nuclear plant that France promised last year. This was because Paris wants Islamabad "to ensure comprehensive safeguards which for Pakistan today is not possible to accept", unless differences between Pakistan and India on the nuclear issue are first settled.

"If we are able to resolve the nuclear issue then it will be possible for Pakistan to accept these safeguards. Till then it seems impossible," Nawaz Sharif said. "But the nuclear plant remains in discussion," he added.

France said last September that it was applying "overall control" to its exports of nuclear technology.

Nawaz Sharif criticised the attitude of the United States, which has expressed concern over Pakistan's nuclear programme. "I would like the U.S. to carry out an objective appraisal of the whole situation of that region, examine the proposal Pakistan has put forward for nuclear non-proliferation in south Asia," he said, stressing Pakistan's "sincerity" on the issue. "It is about time the U.S. studies what is stopping India from having a meaningful discussion with Pakistan on the subject." He said Pakistan wanted to maintain friendly relations with Washington, but noted that "this nuclear business has created a bit of problem".

In his talks with Mitterrand, Nawaz Sharif said, he reached agreement in principle on a 7 billion franc (1.27 billion dollar) arms deal involving the purchase of "anything up to 40" Mirage aircraft, although "technical and financial details have to be sorted out". The agreed package covers the purchase of three non-nuclear submarines and also Mirage radars.

A further agreement signed Friday provides for the purchase of three mine-sweepers, one from an existing fleet, one to be manufactured in France, and a third to be built in Pakistan.

The arms deal followed an accord signed Friday for the construction of two power-stations, one thermal and one hydro-electric.

On Pakistan's differences with India over Kashmir, Nawaz Sharif said he had asked Mitterrand "to exercise his influence on India to resolve this issue". The situation in Kashmir was "very bad", with violations of human rights and "alarming" atrocities committed by Indian troops, he said.

The Pakistani premier was hopeful that in Afghanistan the situation was "moving in the direction" of a political solution, affirming that Islamabad had "successfully been able to persuade the (Islamic guerrillas) to talk with the Soviets and now the Russians".

However regarding Pakistan's differences with India, he could see "hardly any movement on the ground", such that "much more needs to be done".

Government To Sell Military Hardware to Pakistan

BK1801031092 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 0200 GMT 18 Jan 92

[Text] France has agreed in principle to sell 40 Mirage-2000 aircraft, three submarines, and three radars to Pakistan. Specific details are to be worked out. Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz told a news conference in Paris yesterday, that Pakistan and France have signed an agreement under which France will also sell to Pakistan three naval minesweepers worth 1.2 billion francs. Out of these three ships, one will be supplied from the present French naval fleet, while the second will be delivered after it is built in France. The third will be built in Pakistan after the transfer of technology.

The finance minister said that France will provide 291 million francs for the Kot Addu power project and 167 million francs for the Hub power plant.

About the compensation for the nonsupply of the nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan, Sartaj Aziz said France has agreed to pay \$130 million which can be used by Pakistan in consultation with France.

The finance minister said a French firm, Alcatel, has expressed readiness to install 500,000 telephone lines and set up a telephone manufacturing plant in Pakistan. A French automobile firm has expressed interest in manufacturing small cars in Pakistan.

About trade between the two countries, the finance minister said France is exporting machinery and equipment worth \$500 million, while Pakistan's exports to France have touched a \$300 million mark.

Mohammed Siddique Khan Kanjo, minister of state for foreign affairs, told newsmen that, besides bilateral issues, President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif discussed Afghanistan and Kashmir. He said the French stand on Kashmir is in full harmony with Pakistan. France wants the issue to be resolved according to the UN resolutions and on the basis of self-determination. France also appreciates Pakistan's five-point plan for a nuclear-free zone in South Asia as it is in harmony with France's own plan for denuclearization. He pointed out that France supports the right of countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Akram Zaki, Foreign Ministry secretary general, told newsmen that a French mission will shortly visit Pakistan to hold talks for cooperation in use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Food and Agriculture Minister Abdul Majid Malik told newsmen that understanding has been reached for cooperation in the field of agro-industry, especially in

improving seed quality, plantation and forestry matters. A French delegation will visit Pakistan in April in this connection.

GERMANY

Parties Warn of Uranium Sales by Tajikistan

LD0401105392 Hamburg DPA in German 0001 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Osnabrueck (DPA)—The Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union lower house has asked the federal government, the EC, and United States to bring in the United Nations to examine and, if necessary, stop alleged plans by Tajikistan from exporting enriched uranium. In an interview with NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG (Saturday edition), Foreign Affairs spokesman Karl Lamers demanded on-site checks by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] to stop such "dangerous trade with uranium that can also be used for military purposes." In addition, the West and the United Nations should urge the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to exert pressure to ensure that the restrictive export practice of the former Soviet Union is followed.

Lamers also suggested that the IAEA, under UN auspices, set up an organization to employ former Soviet nuclear scientists. [passage omitted]

Russians Deny Nuclear Expert Brain Drain

LD1401170892 Hamburg DPA in German 1524 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Text] Moscow/Berlin (DPA)—The Russians are attempting to counter the impression that specialists with nuclear know-how are emigrating abroad. A spokesman for the Moscow Ministry for Nuclear Power Engineering and Industry, Aleksandr Medvedev, today rejected Western press reports that claimed that nuclear researchers from the former Soviet Union were emigrating, particularly to countries in the Middle East, reported the Moscow news agency TASS. There were indeed cases of specialists who were working for industry abroad, which belonged to the nuclear branch. However, they were not carriers of nuclear "know-how," said the spokesman.

Albert Shishkin, the director of the Uranium Sales Authority of the former Soviet Union, said in an interview with the BERLINER KURIER AM ABEND that of 150 nuclear experts in Moscow not one had left. He denied that the individual republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were involved in a "nuclear black market." Of course, it was also a great temptation for the CIS states to make "a quick dollar," said Shishkin. "But the black sheep presumably are not members of the government."

The Moscow Uranium Sales Authority will, according to Shishkin, retain control of sales throughout the whole

CIS for two to three years yet. "For 30 years we have had a monopoly in the country. During that time not a gram of nuclear material has fallen into the wrong hands."

'Foundation' To Aid Russian Nuclear Experts

*LD1601203192 Hamburg DPA in German 1614 GMT
16 Jan 92*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—It has been learned in Bonn that a "foundation" is to provide financial help for unemployed Russian nuclear experts and thereby block attempts to sell nuclear weapons secrets. Interested people have already been located by secret services, it is said. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher is to press for these plans with the nuclear powers after Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev expressed great concern about this "intellectual proliferation" in Bonn yesterday, diplomatic circles said. Details of how a foundation of this type is to be financed are still unclear.

Initially, contact is to be established with Western nuclear powers of the UN Security Council in order to examine the possibility of a "safety net" for the nuclear weapons engineers of the former USSR. It is pointed out that work is apparently continuing without interruption in the former Soviet Union's nuclear factories, probably because of a lack of future prospects rather than armament motives.

Individuals Linked to Iraq Exports Charged

*LD1601190192 Hamburg DPA in German 1115 GMT
16 Jan 92*

[Text] Bochum (DPA)—In connection with investigations into the supply of turbo pumps to Iraq, the Bochum State Prosecutor's Office has filed charges against three managers of Thyssen Maschinenbau GmbH, based in Witten. State Prosecutor Johannes Hirsch reported in Bochum today that the two managers and a former marketing director of the firm aged 50 and 43 [as heard] are accused of violating the foreign trade law.

According to the investigations by the State Prosecutor's Office, the accused are alleged to have arranged the export in spring of 1990 of 35 turbo pumps and five nozzle segment cases [Duesensegmentgehaeuse] worth 1.9 million German marks to Iraq. They were aware, it is alleged, that the parts were destined for use in rocket motors.

Genscher Seeks Nuclear Proliferation 'Clampdown'

*LD1701191492 Hamburg DPA in German 1317 GMT
17 Jan 92*

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)— Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher once again called for an immediate international clampdown on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In a personal statement published by the Foreign Office today, Genscher stressed the particular importance of securing tactical nuclear weapons because

the dangers of illegal proliferation have become even greater following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Genscher has been demanding an early solution to this problem again and again since the beginning of the year. Diplomatic circles explain with growing suspicion that attempts are being made to buy weapons illegally.

Next week Genscher will meet UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali in New York to discuss the possibilities of an international convention. [passage omitted]

German Firms Implicated in Iraqi Nuclear Program

*AU1901155292 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 18-19 Jan 92 p 1*

["deu." report: "UN Investigations Prove Serious Involvement of German Companies in Iraqi Rearmament"]

[Text] Bonn—The findings of the UN inspectors in Iraq show an increasingly serious involvement by German companies in Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn's nuclear bomb and poison gas program. According to official information, numerous investigations have already been initiated against German companies that are said to have illegally supplied parts and know-how for Iraq's nuclear, poison gas, and missile production. The list of the accused companies that the inspectors have brought along from Iraq show that German enterprises participated in more than 80 percent of poison gas production. The Federal Government expects that the Germans had a share of about 25 percent in the "Scud" missile technology.

German supplies to the Iraqi nuclear program will occupy the Bundestag Economic Committee on 22 January. So far, Bonn has not made public the extent of the findings and the names of the accused companies because of current investigations by the Department of Public Prosecution. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] reported in Vienna on 17 January that a considerable share of the raw materials and parts for the production of gas centrifuges in Iraq had come from Germany. Baghdad has now admitted to the ninth IAEA inspection team that the construction of thousands of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment with the objective of producing nuclear bombs had been planned. However, in the opinion of the IAEA, the materials were not yet suited to begin building centrifuges. As early as in mid-December, an IAEA inspection team told the Federal Government the names of eight German supplier companies for the Iraqi nuclear program. Apparently, the origin of a coal fiber plant that was discovered by the inspectors in the Iraqi uranium enrichment plant is still controversial. British members of the UN inspectors' commission claim that in the whole world only the German MAN Company has constructed such a plant so far.

On 17 January, the Foreign Ministry referred to the Federal Government's "policy of glass pockets." So far, Bonn has been the only country to pass on its findings on suspected companies to the United Nations and it has been much praised for it by the United Nations and the IAEA. The Federal Government is appealing to the other Western countries to follow that example. If the impression is created in the foreign press that there were only German companies, "it does not correspond to the situation," a spokesman said. With its open information policy toward the United Nations, the Federal Government wants to "demonstrate that we are serious about the relentless prosecution of illegal armament exports." In the opinion of experts, the German companies rarely supplied complete weapons systems, but mostly "dual-use" goods, that is, machines and products that can be used for civilian as well as for military purposes. However, the technicians sent by the supplier firms to Iraq to install the plants should have realized for what purpose they were used, it was stated.

The findings of the UN commission indicate that some German companies specifically told the Iraqi Government what parts it should buy for the nuclear and poison gas program, where it should do it, and which scientists it should recruit. The enterprises acted as a "turntable" and were part of an international network of companies, it was stated. In the field of nuclear weapons, the company "H und H Metallform Maschinenbau und Vertriebs GmbH" in Drensteinfurt in Westphalia and in the chemical sector the Karl Kolb Corporation in Darmstadt are mentioned. The Bielefeld Department of Public Prosecution is conducting investigations in the case of the firm in Drensteinfurt. The Darmstadt Department of Public Prosecution already brought a charge against the Kolb Corporation for violations of the foreign trade law on 1 March 1991. The main proceedings in that case are to start in April.

The UN experts proceed on the assumption that since Iraq now has the know-how, it will be able to rebuild the nuclear plants that were destroyed in the Gulf war in a few years. Moreover, they fear that there might be a second uranium enrichment plant that has not yet been discovered. In their previous investigations, the inspectors found out that Iraq deployed all parts and plants of the nuclear program twice and in different places. Moreover, they found uranium, which was enriched up to 96 percent—and thus suited for nuclear bombs—and the production of which had not yet been technically possible in the examined plant.

Genscher Launches Nonproliferation Initiative

*AU2001195192 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT
in German 20 Jan 92 p 4*

[“SM” report: “Genscher Wants To Win Over United Nations for His Proposals”]

[Text] Bonn—In the runup to his participation in the Washington conference on the coordination of aid for

the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has announced a new initiative against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The goal is to stop “power-hungry rulers,” “technological mercenaries greedy for money,” and “irresponsible businessmen and producers who want to make money quickly by circumventing the export regulations of their own countries.”

Genscher's initiative includes the following four aspects:

- All countries that participate in the initiative and that have nuclear specialists should make punishable the involvement of their nationals in the production of weapons of mass destruction abroad, in accordance with the penal provisions to be introduced in Germany.
- Countries that try to procure knowledge and to create the facilities for the production of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are to be threatened with the “toughest possible measures.” The UN Security Council should assume an important role in that, Genscher urged.
- Scientists and experts who know how to produce nuclear weapons must not become “vagabond partners” of those who want to recruit them. Proposals aimed at making the knowledge of such specialists available to the whole community of states through an international foundation should be examined carefully, the foreign minister suggested.

Karl-Heinz Hornhues, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union Bundestag Group, called on the Federal Government to take up, together with the partners in the EC and NATO, the proposal by Russian Foreign Minister Kosyrev that the findings of advanced nuclear research by the former Soviet Union should be made available for civilian use through a Russian-West European financing fund, thus preventing the recruitment of Russian nuclear scientists as “nuclear technological mercenaries” by other countries.

- In addition, Genscher suggested further steps for the worldwide reduction of nuclear weapons.

The foreign minister announced that he will submit the proposal to UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali next week. It would be advantageous for the United Nations to deal with the nonproliferation issue, Genscher wrote in a newspaper article.

During the coordination conference initiated by the United States and scheduled to take place on 22 and 23 January, immediate humanitarian aid for the CIS republics will be discussed primarily. The conference will be attended by 47 countries, including the industrialized nations and numerous Asian and oil-exporting countries,

as well as seven international organizations like the EC and the IMF, but not the CIS states themselves.

According to diplomatic circles in Bonn, the conference will focus, in particular, on better coordination of immediate humanitarian aid in the CIS countries and among the donor states, but not on a more just distribution of the burdens resulting from the CIS aid. The future employment of Russian nuclear scientists, as well as the safety of the nuclear power plants in Russia, will be discussed by the "Technical Aid" working group. In addition, working groups are planned for foodstuffs, energy supply, medical care, and housing.

Nuclear Weapons in Former USSR 'Deactivated'

*AU2101115492 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 21 Jan 92 p 2*

[“wtr.” report: “Russia Withdraws Nuclear Weapons”]

[Text] Bonn, 20 January—Apparently, the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons from the USSR successor states to Russia has progressed more than the West knew. Meanwhile, the strategic nuclear weapons that are still in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are said to have been “deactivated.” This was reported by Karsten Voigt, foreign policy spokesman of the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] Bundestag Group, after a meeting with representatives of the parliaments and governments of Russia and Ukraine and U.S. Congressmen and government members.

According to Russian information, tactical nuclear weapons (ranging from nuclear mines to short-range missiles) have already been completely withdrawn from the three Baltic states, the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and Moldova. The withdrawal from Ukraine and Belarus is to be completed by 1 July this year. However, according to Voigt, there are still problems between Ukraine and Russia. Kiev insists that part of the fissible material, which is created in the conversion of the weapons, be returned to the Ukraine for peaceful purposes.

During talks held by Voigt, it was not explained in more detail how Russia deactivated the strategic nuclear weapons in the other republics. However, the U.S. side supposed that the warheads were separated from the missiles. According to Russian information, a reactivation of the strategic weapons would take about three months, Voigt said.

In view of information obtained from his Russian and Ukrainian partners in the talks, Voigt thinks that the main problem for the West is not the control over the whereabouts and the destruction of the former USSR's nuclear weapons, but rather the prevention of the export of nuclear arms knowledge and “individual” technical “components.” In order to achieve this, the Social Democrat proposed that the Western nuclear powers should help Russia “technically and financially” in the conversion of its weapons.

GREECE

Turkey Reportedly Seeking Soviet Nuclear Warheads

*NC2912183091 Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek
29 Dec 91 p 1*

[Text] According to well-informed Athens sources, the Turkish Government is attempting to acquire additional nuclear technology and nuclear warheads from the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union. The same sources add that the Greek Government is deeply concerned over this development.

According to reliable reports, Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis asked the National Intelligence Service (EIP) to prepare a report on the situation in the Islamic republics, particularly on the possibilities of channeling nuclear technology and nuclear warheads to third countries, but the EIP report has not yet been submitted.

The major problem occupying the United States and Western countries in general is the control of nuclear weapons in the crumbling Soviet Union. This problem appears particularly acute in our area because the Turkish Government is trying to become a major regional power and increase its influence over Turkish and Muslim populations in the southern provinces of the former USSR and the Balkans.

For a number of years, the Turkish Government has been attempting to acquire nuclear potential by cooperating with Islamic countries, particularly Pakistan. These attempts by Ankara had been spotted by Western intelligence agencies and relevant reports have appeared in the international press.

On the basis of all these developments, diplomatic sources point out that the Greek Government should actively participate in international procedures aimed at controlling the dissemination of nuclear weapons to third countries.

Government Follows Turkish Moves on Nuclear Arms

Said Moves Inconceivable

*NC3012175791 Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio
Network in Greek 1600 GMT 30 Dec 91*

[Text] Foreign Ministry Spokesman Emmanouil Kalamidhas said today that the Greek Government is closely following indications that Turkey is seeking nuclear warheads from the former Soviet Union. He added that it would be inconceivable for Turkey to proceed with actions violating the international nonproliferation treaty at a time when it is trying to prove its respect for the rules of the international community.

Reports Denied

NC3012132991 Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network in Greek 1230 GMT 30 Dec 91

[Text] Government Spokesman Viron Polidhoras denied news reports that Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis asked the National Intelligence Service [EIP] for particular information on the possibility that Turkey will buy nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union.

Polidhoras said that Turkey has signed the agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and noted that NATO, the EC, and other international organizations set out the nonproliferation agreement as a condition for recognizing the former Soviet Union.

ITALY**USSR Nuclear Materiel Trafficking Investigated****Awaiting Buyers In Europe**

AU3012171791 Paris AFP in English 1704 GMT 30 Dec 91

[Text] Como, Italy, Dec 30 (AFP)—Italy may be a key site for trafficking in nuclear materiel from the ex-Soviet Union destined for Middle Eastern nations including Iraq, an Italian magistrate said Monday.

Romano Dolce, the judge heading a probe into the sales, told AFP much of the materiel was in European countries awaiting buyers.

He called for "cooperation by all European countries" to halt deals which, he said, "could have catastrophic consequences."

A secret investigation was begun two months ago after two intermediaries who turned state's evidence and divulged information that led investigators to a sample of plutonium which had been brought to this northern town by a Swiss, Dolce said.

Italian authorities went on to arrest seven people and seize almost 29 kilograms (64 pounds) of uranium in Zurich.

Studies conducted by Western secret services found the materiel was so-called "poor" uranium which Soviet specialists were able to process through special technology and which could only be headed for countries that already had the Soviet technology, he said.

Iraq could be one of these nations, according to Italian newspaper reports.

Dolce said the smuggling could also involve nuclear warheads.

He declined to reveal details of the probe, but the daily *CORRIERE DELLA SERA* said two men were smuggling the materiel out of the Irkutsk military centre in Siberia.

It identified them as Oleg Petrowsky, allegedly an agent of the GRU Soviet military intelligence services, and Vitaly Tarcuk, a Ukrainian officer in the KGB secret police.

A dozen countries were involved and one of the smuggling "routes" went through Austria, Switzerland and Italy, where intermediaries negotiated between "suppliers" and "buyers," the report said.

However according to Dolce, ringleaders could go free because Italian law does not cover smuggling of nuclear materiel.

Further on Investigation

AU3112102091 Rome ANSA in English 0828 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Text] (ANSA) Como, December 30—International trafficking of nuclear warheads and radioactive materials from the former Soviet Union through Switzerland to Iraq, Yugoslavia and some Third World countries may also involve Italy, investigating magistrates here said today.

The alleged traffic is believed to have begun shortly after the failed August coup in the Soviet Union and came to light after Swiss police on November 11 confiscated 30 kilograms of enriched uranium and arrested six people, including the Honduras honorary consul to Zurich.

Seven people have been called in for questioning by Magistrate Romano Dolce in this northern Italian city on the Swiss border in connection with the alleged traffic but only four have been found so far, sources close to the investigations said, adding that one, an Iraqi citizen, has apparently escaped to Yugoslavia.

The Swiss sting operation "was an important breakthrough," Dolce said, "because until then we could only make conjectures, whereas the confiscations showed that the traffic really exists."

The uranium was not meant for use by industrialized countries because it was not highly enriched, he said, but "it was destined for countries with east bloc technologies, such as Libya and Iraq. American scientists and the CIA have been claiming the same thing." Ten kilograms of plutonium are still "at large" and unaccounted for, he said, and may be hidden in Italy.

The organization, trafficking in uranium, plutonium and red mercury, has its headquarters in Switzerland but intermediaries may include Italian businessmen, sources close to the investigations said.

Members of the former Soviet secret services, KGB, and of the military secret services (GRU) in Russia and the Ukraine are thought to be behind the traffic, the Italian daily *L'UNITA* reported Sunday, but the Russian chiefs of staff yesterday denied the allegations in statements to the TASS news agency.

The November arrests were made possible thanks to information provided by a Swiss member of the organization, Karl Friederich Federer, who in October contacted the Italian secret services and testified to Dolce. He also provided a sample of radioactive material later identified as plutonium.

Arrests Made in Soviet Nuclear Material Trade

AU0901151292 Paris AFP in English 1505 GMT
9 Jan 92

[Text] Milan, Italy, Jan 9 (AFP)—Three Hungarians and an Austrian have been arrested here in connection with an investigation into trafficking of nuclear material from the former Soviet Union, officials said Thursday.

Judge Roman Dolce, who ordered the arrests Wednesday, said his inquiry had crossed paths with a separate investigation into arms trafficking for the breakaway Yugoslav republic of Croatia.

Venetian Judge Nelson Salvarani, leading that case, told AFP one of eight Italians implicated in the Croatian case had contacts with two Italian intermediaries implicated in the trafficking in Soviet nuclear material. The identities of the four arrested Wednesday were not disclosed.

The judge said they were arrested at a Milan hotel with two bottles containing red mercury. It has been turned over to Italian atomic energy officials to determine whether it could be used in making nuclear arms. The case started with the seizure of plutonium in the northern city of Como, then led to the seizure of 29 kilograms (63 pounds) of unenriched uranium in Zurich.

Dolce said the material was from former Soviet territory, notably Irkutsk in southern Siberia, and was ultimately headed to Arab countries that already have Soviet technology.

Venetian Judge Salvarani also said the arms bound for Croatia via Cyprus never arrived in the Yugoslav republic, probably because of the Federal Yugoslav Army blockade on Adriatic ports.

Three Israelis were also implicated in the Croatian deal, he said.

NORWAY

Return of Heavy Water From Israel Detailed

92WP0119A Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian
4 Dec 91 p 12

[Article by Axel I. Walo, Norwegian Wire Service: "Nuclear Weapons from Norwegian Heavy Water"—first paragraph is ARBEIDERBLADET introduction]

[Text] For 25 years, the Israelis have gotten needed heavy water from the nonproliferation nation Norway in

order to produce nuclear weapons at the Dimona reactor in the southern part of Israel, according to Western experts.

The whole world knows that Israel has used the Norwegian heavy water to produce nuclear weapons, says Sverre Lodgaard, the head of the Peace Research Institute. "What else are they supposed to have used heavy water for?"

Undoubtedly Weapons

The head of the State Nuclear Inspectorate is of the same opinion: "Israeli authorities have never admitted anything, but I myself am not in doubt: The heavy water has been used in the production of nuclear weapons," says director Knut Gussgard.

On Monday, half of the heavy water was delivered back to Norway and unloaded in Kristiansand. The other half has been lost along the way, according to the Israelis.

Already 12 years ago, when Lodgaard became aware of the secret treaty with Israel, he maintained that the heavy water was being used for military purposes. But, despite the fact that Norway had a right to inspect the use of the heavy water, no inquiry was ever sent from the Foreign Ministry to Israel asking what the water was being used for.

Nonproliferation?

"Norway has stood in the forefront of efforts to hinder the spread of nuclear weapons," writes former Foreign Ministry State Secretary Johan Jorgen Holst in the foreword to a small Foreign Ministry volume on Norwegian nonproliferation policy. "Consequently, we are obligated as well to establish clear and strict export regulations, and to create an apparatus and such routines that the regulations are observed in the way that is intended."

At that time, the Israelis had already produced nuclear weapons with Norwegian heavy water for over 15 years, according to the French journalist Pierre Pean. In the book *Les Deux Bombes [The Two Bombs]*, which came out in 1982, Pean writes that the first Israeli bomb was built at Dimona in 1966.

Horrible Example

When Supreme Court Judge Jens Chr. Hauge undertook the first and only Norwegian inspection of the heavy water in the spring of 1961, he reported to the Foreign Ministry that it was the Israeli Minister of Defense who had responsibility for the Dimona reactor.

Despite the fact that Norway was the only country that, through an inspection agreement with Israel, had the right to check what the water was being used for, no new inspection was ever undertaken.

American professor Gary Milhollin has characterized Norwegian conduct as irresponsible and a horrible example of what he calls selective proliferation policy.

The experts' suspicions about nuclear weapon production at Dimona were confirmed when the Israeli nuclear technician Moredechai Vanunu revealed activities at the reactor in several long interviews in the SUNDAY TIMES last fall. Vanunu was later kidnapped by the Mossad intelligence service and sentenced to 18 years in prison.

Heavy Water in Safekeeping at Kjeller

Fifty steel drums containing 10.5 tonnes of radioactive heavy water were placed in safekeeping Monday night in Kjeller, outside Oslo. From being an important contribution to Israeli nuclear weapons, the heavy water will hereafter be used for research in Norway.

Secret

The 13-day-long trip from Israel to Norway passed without problems. In deep secrecy, the heavy water was unloaded in Kristiansand Monday afternoon and transported further by trailer truck to the Institute for Energy Technology at Kjeller. At 0110 hours the last drum was in place in the storeroom under the Kjeller reactor.

The steel drums contain precisely half of the amount of heavy water that Norway sold to Israel in 1959. The rest, the Israelis maintain, was lost in wastage or evaporation. The heavy water will be gradually used in research activities at the nuclear reactors at Kjeller and in Halden.

Radioactive

The Norwegian general cargo ship Lys-Bris set out from the quay at Ashdod in Israel on Tuesday, 19 November. Beneath 569 tonnes of oranges, lemons, and grapefruit destined for Poland and Sweden, Captain Age Holand had a special cargo: 10.5 tonnes of radioactive heavy water.

On Monday, the ship landed at the quay in Lagmannsholmen harbor in Kristiansand. Fifty pallets of fruit had to be moved before the two containers with 50 drums of heavy water could be hoisted onto land. After three hours the job was done. The containers were opened for a radiation check: The measuring devices showed no radioactive radiation from the drums.

Transport by vehicle to Kjeller went without incident. In Kjeller, the drums now stand in place in the "steel house," where the Jeep II reactor celebrates its 25th anniversary on 18 December. With these extra tonnes of

heavy water in reserve, it will take ages before "Jeep II" needs to refill its stock of heavy water.

13.5 Million for Heavy Water

The Norwegian government had to pay out 13.5 million kroner to get the heavy water back from Israel. The State Nuclear Inspectorate will resell the heavy water to the Institute for Energy Technology, which is an institution with significant public support.

The repurchase of the heavy water from Israel is a burden on the budget of the State Nuclear Inspectorate, which is subordinate to the Oil and Energy Ministry. The heavy water itself cost \$1,873,500—approximately 12 million kroner.

Norway's ambassador to Israel, John Egil Grieg, delivered the money in two checks to a representative of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission a few days before the shipment left Ashdod on 19 November.

PORTUGAL

Slump Reported in Uranium Exports

92WP0110A Lisbon SEMANARIO ECONOMIA
in Portuguese 30 Nov 91 p 12

[Article by Luis Naves: "Portuguese Uranium Business Facing Worst Crisis Ever"]

[Excerpts] In 1989, the National Uranium Company sold 197 tons of ore, with an income totaling 1.27 million contos. In December 1990, the contract with the French ended, and the uranium mines embarked on a crisis. The characters in this story are "the bomb," the fallen walls, Chernobyl, and, perhaps, Saddam Husayn.

For years everything went well. Portugal was selling its uranium with assurance. Suddenly, in December 1990, this discreet business ended. The production from the mines dropped to a third of what it had been. Portugal lost its markets and stopped exploiting the rich lodes of natural uranium ore it possesses (at Urgeirica and Niza). Far away, the Persian Gulf was in flames, and Kuwait was within a few days of witnessing the Iraqi defeat.

The story of Portugal's production and export of this strategic ore is little known. The only entity involved in this sector is a public enterprise, the National Uranium Company, ENU, extracting the ore. In 1982, it exported as much as 431 tons, with an income exceeding 1.7 million contos at the time. An analysis of the exports table shows that, during recent years, sales have always exceeded a million contos.

Uranium Exports (Part I)

	1980		1981		1982		1983		1984		1985	
	Tons	Contos	Tons	Contos	Tons	Contos	Tons	Contos	Tons	Contos	Tons	Contos
Total	138.3	585,335	67.5	203,488	431.3	1,758,059	232.9	1,130,531	114.5	581,736	130.9	626,428
United Kingdom	0.2	73										
Iraq	138.1	585,262			148.3	705,132						
FRG			67.5	203,488								
France					115.9	516,250						
United States					167.1	536,658	232.9	1,130,531	114.1	581,736	130.9	626,428
Others					—	18						

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Tourism

Uranium Exports (Part II)

	1986		1987		1988		1989		1990 ¹	
	Tons	Contos	Tons	Contos	Tons	Contos	Tons	Contos	Tons	Contos
Total	157.1	902,517	156.9	1,128,907	159.2	1,106,464	197.7	1,330,723	158.6	1,275,922
United Kingdom										
Iraq										
FRG										
France	157.1	902,517	156.9	1,128,947	159.2	1,106,464	197.3	1,330,723	158.6	1,275,922
United States										
Others										

¹Version 1

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Tourism

The countries of destination were the United States, France (these being major users of nuclear power plants for electricity), and also Iraq, which was then accused of conducting a program to develop nuclear-type weapons. In 1980, Iraq was our only client. It made a direct purchase of 138.1 tons, out of a total production of 138.3 tons. The ENU is currently having trouble marketing the 60 tons it has produced. Furthermore, it has to diversify, producing ornamental granite, as well. [passage omitted]

There is the fact that major European power companies interested in doing business in our country, such as the German RWE (involved in the Pego power plant) and the EDF, purchased uranium from the ENU at prices this company's administrator, Jose Mascarenhas, described as being offered "as a favor."

The coincidence of the Gulf war, the end of the EDF contract, and the clearing of the international situation occurring simultaneously also gives food for thought. Uranium ore is a sensitive material, a strategic business, and the beginning of a technological circuit, with some politics blended in.

SWEDEN

General Defends Nuclear Arms Contingency

92EN0189C Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 19 Dec 91 p 5

[Article by Christian Palme: "Freedom of Action the Goal"]

[Text] General Carl Erik Almgren, who was chief of the Defense Staff during the 1960's, still feels that it was right for Sweden to prepare to produce nuclear weapons. "It was a matter of retaining freedom of action," he says. "It was at such an early stage, and we did not know how many countries were going to acquire nuclear weapons."

The report on nuclear warheads includes an exhaustive discussion of how Sweden would be able to attack troops while the latter were departing from Baltic ports or during a deployment in Finland aimed at the Swedish border. Almgren says it was a completely justifiable plan that could have been implemented in an emergency or if Sweden had become isolated.

"Our goal was always to retain our freedom of action, not to have Sweden acquire nuclear weapons immediately," says Almgren, who thinks the government was wrong to decide in the late 1960's to halt all nuclear weapon planning in the Swedish Armed Forces.

The Defense Staff did not feel that Sweden should have signed the test ban treaty in 1963, but Almgren also defends that stance on the grounds of freedom of action.

"We did not know at the time, of course, whether the big powers would be able to abide by the treaty, and besides, there are several nuclear powers that have never signed the treaty—France, for example," Almgren said.

Military Weighed Using Nuclear Weapons in Baltic

92EN0189B Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 19 Dec 91 p 6

[Article by Anders Hellberg: "Nuclear Weapons Against Soviet Union"]

[Text] The Swedish military had plans as late as the mid-1960's for using fighter bombers to carry out nuclear attacks on Soviet ports in the Baltic states.

With 10 nuclear warheads somewhat larger than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, the Swedish military would have prevented a Soviet invasion across the Baltic Sea, according to plans approved by the then commander in chief of the Swedish Armed Forces [OB], Torsten Rapp, and the chief of the Defense Staff, Carl Eric Almgren. The Swedish military wanted a total of 100 nuclear warheads.

The above is revealed in a report by a committee whose existence was kept secret until just recently. Known as the Nuclear Warhead Group, it was set up by the OB in 1961 and paid for by the Ministry of Defense.

The Nuclear Warhead Group's report has been a secret since it was submitted in March 1962, as have all the other documents on how the Swedish military planned to use their nuclear weapons.

But as late as September 1964, it was stated by the then chief of the Defense Staff, Carl Eric Almgren, and the future commanding general of the Army, Nils Skold, that "in substance, the Nuclear Warhead Group's report is still in force."

Big File Folders

A few weeks ago, OB Bengt Gustafsson released the last secret information on the Swedish nuclear weapon program and on how the bombers were to be used by the Swedish Air Force against the Baltic states and also against Soviet troops entering Swedish territory.

That information, which fills from 10 to 20 large folders in the Defense Staff's files, is much more sensational than earlier information about the "security research"

through which the Swedish military were only trying to find out more about nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons were seen as a political rather than a military weapon. It is very unusual for detailed military plans for the possible use of nuclear weapons to be made public.

It has long been obvious that the Swedish nuclear establishment (the Defense Research Institute, the Atomic Energy Corporation, the Defense Staff, and portions of heavy industry) continued its research on Swedish nuclear weapons until the early 1970's despite repeated bans by the Riksdag.

Aircraft and Missiles

The government managed to keep providing money for "security research"—meaning research enabling the military to learn more about nuclear weapons so that it could ensure protection against them. The Riksdag had refused to provide money for weapon design.

But until now, information on how the Swedish military really wanted to use the nuclear weapons for which they were propagandizing so intensely has remained a secret.

The Nuclear Warhead Group's proposal included a detailed discussion of how the Swedish nuclear weapons would reach their targets. Possible alternatives were fighter bombers and missiles.

The report stressed the importance of protecting the nuclear weapons as much as possible so as to guarantee that they could really be used:

"Weapon systems involving nuclear warheads will be very valuable systems from the standpoint of battle management, and for that reason, they must be made resistant to attack both during a preparatory stage and during the actual hostilities. We must count on making a considerable effort to ensure that they can go into action," wrote the authors of the report.

Extra Equipment

That was why fighter bombers were recommended and why the Swedish-developed A-32 Lansen came into being. The released documents include detailed descriptions of how the nuclear weapons would be loaded on the Lansen aircraft, how long it would take, and what it would cost. Expressed in the money values of the time, the cost was calculated at 15,000 kronor per aircraft plus 5,000 kronor for the extra equipment that would be needed to fasten down the bombs.

Even the Viggen, which was then only in the planning stage, was to be armed with nuclear weapons.

But it was not just a Soviet invasion force that was to be bombed before it entered the Baltic Sea. An enemy deployment against northern Finland would constitute a threat to the Swedish Kalix line and would also be attacked with nuclear weapons.

"About 50 nuclear warheads against eight or nine leading divisions during preparations for attacking the Kalix position and its northward extension would disrupt the attacker's striking power for a considerable period of time," says the report.

"The conclusion," writes the Nuclear Warhead Group, "is that the need for nuclear warheads for holding off a border invasion across Finland in the direction of Norrbotten totals from 50 to 100 such warheads."

It is generally assumed that the Swedish weapons would be in the 20-kilotonne class. The U.S. bomb that was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima in the final stage of World War II in 1945 was a 13-kilotonne bomb. It killed between 70,000 and 100,000 people instantly.

Naturally, the thoroughgoing Swedish military also investigated the effects on the Swedish civilian population of the deployment of nuclear weapons against Sweden. They naturally expected that the Swedish use of nuclear weapons would be answered with an attack of the same kind on the Swedish population.

The committee chose four targets: Skane, east-central Sweden, the Sundsvall area, and Upper Norrland.

If the population were "completely lacking in protection" against nuclear weapons—and that was the case with large groups of people in the 1960's—the number of people killed by a 20-kilotonne warhead in Skane would total 31,500. In east-central Sweden, 90,000 people would die, and in the Sundsvall area the total would be 15,300. For some reason, the committee reached the conclusion that only 930 people in Upper Norrland would be killed by a 20-kilotonne nuclear warhead.

The committee came to the conclusion that "evacuation is of great importance in responding to an attack by nuclear warheads."

No Majority

But despite enthusiastic military planning for the Swedish production of nuclear weapons during the late 1960's and the 1970's, there was never a political majority in favor of Swedish atomic bombs.

It is true that the commander in chief continued to argue on behalf of a Swedish "H policy"—meaning the freedom of action required for producing nuclear weapons if they were needed—as recently as in the OB's 1965 Program Plan.

But Social Democratic Minister of Defense Sven Andersson stated in March 1968 that "for the present, it is not in our country's interest to build nuclear weapons."

As a result, there was no further development, no production of fuel elements and heavy water, and no production of plutonium. The planned design facility and warhead plant were never built.

TURKEY

Ministry Denies Trying To Get Nuclear Technology

TA0801162092 Ankara ANATOLIA in English
1605 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Text] Ankara (A.A)—Turkey said on Wednesday [8 January] it had done nothing or made no efforts to obtain raw materials or technology used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Filiz Dincmen, who made the statement, stressed that there was nothing underhand [as received] or secretive in NATO-member Turkey's moves to boost its ties with the largely Turkic republics of the former Soviet empire, with which it shares ethnic, religious and linguistic affinities.

"Turkey wants peace and friendship with all countries," she said, adding, "we have neither pan-Turkish nor pan-Islamic designs."

Turkey on Jan. 28, 1969 signed an accord on the prevention of the propagation of nuclear weapons and in 1982 adopted a system of guarantees of the atomic energy agency.

UNITED KINGDOM

Iran, France Said To Sign Secret Nuclear Accord

PM0201150092 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
in Arabic 31 Dec 91 p 1

[By Amir Tahiri: "Secret Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between Iran and France"]

[Text] Paris, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—Reports from Tehran and Paris indicate that Iran and France have signed a secret agreement on nuclear cooperation between the two countries. Informed sources have told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the cooperation program includes supplying Iran with enriched uranium for its nuclear projects. The sources pointed out that talks on the technical aspects of this cooperation will begin early in the new year.

These reports have aroused concern in Western capitals, especially Washington. And it has been reported that the U.S. administration intends to demand a full and comprehensive explanation of this secret agreement.

Tehran recently asked France to supply it with enriched uranium under an agreement concluded between the two sides during the shah's rule, but Paris hesitated to supply Iran with that substance, which can be used to produce nuclear weapons. That French hesitation was the reason for obstructing an agreement between Iran and Paris to settle the 12-year financial dispute between the two

countries—the dispute in which Iran is demanding that France repay a \$1 billion loan. But the day before yesterday the two states agreed to settle the dispute during the visit of Francois Scheer, French Foreign Ministry secretary general, to the Iranian capital.

The secret protocol in question on nuclear cooperation between the two countries was attached to the agreement concerning the settlement of the financial dispute. It is known that in recent months Tehran has rushed to proceed with its nuclear program. To that end it has started to invite hundreds of Iranian scientists to return from exile. Some sources say that Iran has received nuclear technology for military use from North Korea, India, China, Brazil, and Argentina, in addition to the Soviet Union prior to the recent announcement that it had ceased to exist as a political entity. Reports also say that Tehran sent Iranian teams to the republics of the former Soviet Union to recruit scientists who have become unemployed as a result of recent developments.

Nuclear Power Plant Missing Uranium 235

*AU1701134092 Paris AFP in English 1325 GMT
17 Jan 92*

[Text] Strasbourg, Jan 17 (AFP)—Uranium missing from the nuclear power station at Dounreay in Scotland is mainly in the form of enriched uranium 235, EC Commission Vice President Frans Andriessen said on Friday.

Of 13.7 kilogrammes (30.14 pounds) of uranium listed as missing, 10.2 kilograms are in the form of highly dangerous uranium 235, he told the European Parliament.

Several members of parliament said this was far more than was required to arm an atomic bomb.

British authorities had announced on December 5 that they had lost trace of the uranium and did not know whether it had “physically” disappeared or was missing because of an accounting error.

Andriessen said that the answer was not yet clear.

Europe, Japan Plan Fast Breeder Reactor Project

92WS0096X Paris LE MONDE in French
30 Oct 91 p 17

[Article by Jean-Francois Augereau: "International Partnership on Breeder Reactors"; first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction]

[Text] Europe and Japan sign scientific and technical cooperation agreement in this field....

Kyoto—On Monday 28 October in Kyoto, France, Germany and Great Britain signed an agreement with Japan that will provide for broad exchanges of information and eventually the pooling of experimentation resources for work on breeder reactors, development of which is not expected to occur before 2005-2010.

The agreement comes as somewhat of a surprise. For some time now, breeder reactors have been in the doldrums, primarily because of weakness in the uranium market (prices are at a record low) but also because of a slowdown in most nuclear power plant programs following the Chernobyl accident. Under these conditions, the principal virtue of breeder reactors—their ability to effect substantial fuel savings—has lost most of its appeal. This is especially true since few are prepared to underwrite the costs involved in developing the technology.

Evidence of this attitude is not hard to find. In 1988, the United Kingdom announced a drastic reduction in appropriations for development of these reactors, which in earlier years it had championed. More recently, in March 1991, the German Government, yielding to pressure from public opinion and certain politicians, decided simply not to put its Kalkar breeder reactor into service. The result: 7 billion German marks (23.8 billion French francs [Fr]) down the drain.

France along with other countries has felt the effects of budget constraints (the research and development budget for breeder reactors has declined from Fr900 million in 1987 to about Fr500 million today) and is waiting for these reactors—which once made it a world leader in the field [of nuclear technology]—to become operational again. That may happen soon in the case of the Phenix (250 megawatts), which recently experienced an "incident" still under investigation. Pending clarification of the facts, the industrial-scale Superphenix (1,300 megawatts), which in the past has had problems with its fuel discharging system (barrel piston chamber), will have to wait for a nod from the safety authorities. The message in France is clear: There is no room for error in such a sensitive domain.

Officials Optimistic

Given the worldwide slump in nuclear programs, one might speculate that work on breeder reactors should be postponed. That would be a serious mistake, according to experts attending the 28 October-1 November meeting on this subject in Kyoto (Japan). Obviously,

none of them called for massive development of breeder reactors in the next few years. But all insisted this technology will be needed in 25 or 30 years to solve the problems of electricity production and to reduce the volume of radioactive waste generated by the power plants. In other words, it does not seem reasonable to drop the whole idea.

France, the United Kingdom and Germany understood this; in the 1980's they tried to join forces to keep up a decent level of activity in this domain. In February 1989 they signed three accords covering (respectively) cooperation in research and development, joint industrial ownership, and industrial cooperation (LE MONDE of 17 February 1991). Thus all three partners could respond, if necessary, to a request from the working group (EFRUG [expansion not given]) entrusted by several European power companies with the task of studying a joint project to build a future European reactor (EFR [expansion not given]). Advantages of the strategy: merging resources in a period of budgetary austerity, and affirmation of European unity in a domain in which, in the past, the nationalistic sentiments of an earlier age sometimes found expression.

Japanese Push

From this point of view, the signing in Kyoto of the accord between the Europeans and Japanese has the virtue of creating a sort of world breeder reactor partnership. The choice of Japan was certainly significant, since that country is having less difficulty than others with its program. On the west coast, not far from Tokyo, Japan has a modest 100-megawatt installation (Joyo), and on the east coast, at Tsuruga, it has a 280-megawatt reactor (Monju) expected to enter into service in October 1992.

Finally, Japan envisages future construction of a still more powerful breeder reactor, the FBR (670 megawatts), which will prefigure the industrial-scale reactors that officials are determined to build in the next 20 years. The Japanese have also been working with the United States, interested as they are in the ambitious American waste-burning breeder reactor program developed under the leadership of General Electric.

IAEA To Monitor Nuclear Materials Trafficking

AU0301125892 Paris AFP in English 1234 GMT
3 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Vienna, Jan 3 (AFP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is seeking more power to monitor possible trafficking in nuclear materials and know how from the former Soviet Union, officials said.

IAEA officials said they were worried by the legal vacuum concerning nuclear controls in the disintegrated Soviet Union and the opportunities that might consequently arise for "uncontrolled elements."

While IAEA spokesman Hans-Friedrich Meyer played down some of the more alarmist reports about former Soviet republics selling deadly nuclear knowhow to the highest bidder, he acknowledged that such reports were "an additional argument" supporting demands for a strengthening of the IAEA system for checking nuclear installations.

The latest worrying report published on the front pages of Austrian newspapers Friday [2 January] came from Tajikistan, a former Soviet republic in southern Central Asia where the authorities reportedly intend to sell enriched uranium and atomic technology to foreign interests.

Representatives from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan had reportedly visited the capital Dushanbe, and the republican president was reported to have planned meetings soon in India, the reports said.

Meyer said the agency had no knowledge of such activities "and must wait until some institution informs us." At the moment the agency had "no proof that nuclear material has been taken out of the former Soviet Union."

Some sources at the agency hold that Tajikistan does not possess any installations for the enrichment of uranium, but merely plants for treating uranium mineral which is not covered by IAEA controls.

The Director General of the agency Hans Blix has argued for tighter controls in response to discoveries after the Gulf war that Iraq had secretly developed a huge military nuclear programme around small civil facilities.

The former Soviet Union had 27,000 nuclear warheads and about 45 nuclear power stations and 25 research reactors. It subscribed to the non-proliferation treaty concerning nuclear weapons.

But the question of which entities are the legal successors of these commitments is not clear.

Questions also remain about checks on nuclear power plants which the Soviet Union had voluntarily opened to inspection by the agency.

The fears that widespread smuggling of nuclear materials from the former union might develop were raised in December when an Italian magistrate, Romano Dolce, began investigating the suspected smuggling of such material through Switzerland and Italy.

The sensationalist press immediately referred to alleged efforts by some Third World state to build a plutonium bomb, although Meyer said investigations concerned only a small quantity of fissionable materials used to regulate measuring instruments.

"If the Italian police had seized a significant quantity of plutonium, they would have alerted us so that we might

seal the plutonium, because Italy has signed the non-proliferation treaty and applies the control agreement with the agency," he said.

People from the former Soviet Union were also involved in the illegal importation into Bulgaria of several kilogrammes of a radio-active chemical product known as "red mercury."

Three Russians and a Bulgarian security officer have been arrested in possession of the substance which is used in the manufacture of detonators for warheads and in the manufacture of drugs.

But red mercury does not come within the terms of controls by the IAEA.

There are greater fears about the risks posed by an eventual "brain drain" of Soviet nuclear scientists. [passage omitted]

IAEA Director Blix on Iraqi Nuclear Program

*AU1301113592 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
13 Jan 92 p 6*

[Interview with Hans Blix, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, by Lothar Ruehl; place and date not given: "Traces of Uranium in Iraq Pose Riddles for Us—We Are Worried"]

[Text] [Ruehl] What results have so far been yielded by your agency's observations and investigations of the true state and importance of the Iraqi nuclear program, in particular of the nuclear weapons program?

[Blix] First of all, one must say that a comprehensive large-scale program for uranium enrichment has been found that includes outdated methods of using calutrons; that is, an electromagnetic technology for isotope separation. In addition, there is comprehensive use of European-type centrifuges and some use of chemical uranium enrichment. Our impression is that their main efforts were directed toward the centrifuges, but that this had not yet yielded any results for the production of enriched uranium. The enriched uranium that we found came from the calutron program. It is clear that there is no explanation for these activities that would permit the conclusion that they are directed toward the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Our investigations have shown that the Iraqis were far ahead with regard to the technical bases, the design for the production of nuclear weapons. This discovery confirmed the intention to establish a capability for the production of nuclear weapons, even though Iraq denies that a decision—that is a political decision—for starting nuclear armament had been made. Investments for this purpose had been implemented and capability was on the point of being established. We are still placing some question marks, and we must beware of potential surprises. Some questions still have to be answered.

[Ruehl] Which ones, for instance?

[Blix] We have traces of uranium that were enriched up to 93 percent, but we do not know from where these traces come. One also has to ask why a pilot plant for enrichment by means of centrifuges was not put into operation first before the large-scale production of centrifuges was started; that is, whether it would not have been more sensible for the Iraqis to use such a test stage first. Therefore, we are convinced that Iraq had technical help from Western engineers.

[Ruehl] According to your findings, how much time would Iraq still have needed to produce fissionable material that could be used for weapons and for assembling nuclear weapons?

[Blix] The Iraqis had the engineering technology, the design for nuclear weapons, but so far we have not found any traces of hardware, of the existence of nuclear weapons per se. Our inspectors have become aware that the problem of arms production was the production of enriched uranium and not so much the technical development and the production of the actual weapons.

[Ruehl] What kind of weapons were prepared?

[Blix] This is difficult to say now, but they were some kind of implosion weapons following the principle of nuclear fission, not thermonuclear fusion weapons. We found signs of the use of lithium-6, which is used in thermonuclear explosions, also for the intensification of the effect of fission weapons; we also found signs of an attempt to produce lithium-6. Therefore, it is possible that for the future they wanted to establish the option for thermonuclear fusion weapons, but also, of course, that they were looking for means to intensify the effect of normal nuclear fission weapons.

[Ruehl] There have been repeated estimates that Iraq would have needed approximately another two years to produce nuclear weapons.

[Blix] Between 12 and 18 months would probably have been necessary to produce a sufficient quantity of enriched uranium for building some initial nuclear weapons. If one further assumes that the technical development of the weapons itself was not the problem, one comes to an estimate of about two years or a bit less.

[Ruehl] How is it that this comprehensive program was not discovered earlier, on the basis of your agency's international safeguards to verify the observance of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty?

[Blix] If one lives in Europe and does not know Iraq, one cannot imagine what kind of closed society—isolated toward the outside and controlled on the inside—one has to deal with, which hardly permits observation from the outside by visitors. There are only a very few other countries in the world with similar internal conditions. Before the beginning of the air raids during the military operations, the United States did not know where these installations were located in Iraq, either. Until 1990 attention was concentrated on the two research facilities

with the research reactors in Iraq, which had been subjected to the safeguards control regime. These two facilities were not used for the military program. These facilities remained intact after the war.

The United States did not know where the covert uranium enrichment for arms production was taking place. The same goes for the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. In addition, the acquisition of nuclear material and nuclear technology by Iraq abroad was reported by the Western press. However, nobody knew where all this was used. Of course, there was a certain suspicion that Iraq was up to something. However, international inspection presupposes knowledge of the objects that have to be inspected: The inspectors must know where they are supposed to go. Before some defectors from Iraq informed the United States, nobody, apart from those involved, knew where to look for such secret uranium enrichment facilities. Only then could the international inspectors start looking on the basis of the UN resolutions. At first, they just realized that the official Iraqi statements were not conclusive, that is, they were not trustworthy. When the photos of the facilities in al-Tarmiyah were analyzed, it was readily noticeable that this was a calutron facility for uranium enrichment. Later, the Iraqis confirmed this.

[Ruehl] What does this experience mean for the application of the nonproliferation treaty and the reliability of the IAEA safeguards inspections?

[Blix] The lesson is clear: International inspections must be extended to undeclared facilities, but one must know that no inspection organization can comb an area blindly for secret installations. One has already had this experience with the covert large-scale production and transportation of drugs, even though police in the individual states can mostly move about and investigate without hindrance. Of course, nuclear material and nuclear facilities are more difficult to hide than those for the production and storage of heroin. However, the task remains extremely difficult, particularly since we suffer from a lack of personnel: We only have 200 inspectors for the entire world.

[Ruehl] How many nuclear installations do you have to check?

[Blix] There are 438 nuclear reactors, all in all about 1,000 nuclear facilities that have to be inspected. The inspections presuppose information about the objects that have to be inspected, and this information must come from the states themselves and also from those countries that export nuclear material and technical components to other countries. However, there is no information about what is produced in a country with its own facilities if these facilities, materials, and activities are not declared. Without information there can be no effective inspections.

In the case of Iraq, the United States finally received such information, and this permitted purposeful inspections that yielded the corresponding results. That is why

we insist so much on special inspections with the goal of applying the safeguards in such a way that we acquire information and can demand explanations from the respective countries about undeclared facilities or undeclared nuclear material; that is, data and other information that can then be checked and evaluated, as has been the case with Iraq since 1991. In our routine inspections we can find certain anomalies in the operation of a facility that provide indications that material is channeled off and that the installation is not used for the declared purpose.

[Ruehl] But in Iraq such anomalies did not occur, so there were no clues.

[Blix] That is right; no indications. The only technical clues that might have emerged in the inspected facilities would have been clues to the re-use of fuel rods of declared material under safeguards for reprocessing and chemical treatment for the production of plutonium. If we had had more frequent inspections than was possible with our limited resources, we might have found certain clues. After all, one must admit that three grams of enriched uranium are too small a quantity to lead to specific conclusions.

It is our goal to find significant quantities—8 kg of plutonium, for instance, which would require a production period of 80 years in Iraq under the current technical conditions. In fact, the Iraqis used some old fuel rods for reprocessing and chemical treatment—but the quantities for the production of plutonium were negligible.

Thus, this anomaly was not a serious threat. The main effort of the Iraqi program was focused on uranium enrichment in the undeclared facilities.

[Ruehl] Can one expect something similar in the other countries in Asia, Africa, or in Europe and Latin America? In other words, can a country that has signed the nonproliferation treaty and has concluded a safeguards agreement on its fissionable material violate or circumvent the treaty through secret activities without this being noticed in time before nuclear armament is successful?

[Blix] First of all, one should not panic because of Iraq. There are speculations in the press that this might happen in all countries. However, this is not true. Iraq is, or was an extreme case, a particularly closed country. Second, over the past year the world has experienced a number of spectacular successes against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear armaments. South Africa joined the nonproliferation treaty and concluded the safeguards agreement with our agency. Then in December 1991 the presidents of Argentina and Brazil concluded the safeguards agreement with us in Vienna. Thus, three so-called threshold countries have joined the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Negotiations to this effect have been started between South Korea and North Korea. North Korea has now promised that it will sign a safeguards agreement with us at the end

of January, and bilateral talks are to be continued so the Korean peninsula will become and remain free of nuclear weapons.

There remain another two regions: a bigger one—the Middle East, where the Middle East peace conference on arms control is to take place within a year and is to deal also with the elimination of means of mass destruction, in particular nuclear means. The IAEA General Conference gave me a mandate to examine, together with Middle East countries, what kind of verification through consensus would be necessary for this purpose. Thus, even though no one has any illusions that it will be easy to crack the hard nut of the Middle East positive new elements have indeed emerged. The other region that remains is the Indian subcontinent. There, too, new discussions are under way. Against this background one should not see the situation in Iraq as a drama of global importance.

[Ruehl] If one assumes that the policy of international arms control will be consistently pursued by the United States and Europe and that the USSR successor states will participate, so that the existence and effect of the nonproliferation treaty, as well as of SALT and START, will be ensured at least on the former Soviet territory, what contribution can the IAEA make?

[Blix] As I said before, the IAEA is not an arms control organization. Our assignment is to apply the safeguards system of the nonproliferation treaty. Our first conclusion for strengthening the nonproliferation treaty refers to the undeclared facilities. We suggest special inspections. We have presented a proposal for this purpose and stated our intention to use this method in the future and to ask the member states for information, which they are supposed to provide voluntarily.

[Ruehl] This is supposed to serve to clarify gray areas?

[Blix] These special inspections should help clarify the scope and importance of nuclear facilities, which could be important for the purpose of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear armament. In addition, there are a great number of questions and potential improvements or supplements on which we are working and which we will present to the IAEA board to strengthen the safeguards regime, such as the question of early information on technical plans for facilities. Every country that plans to construct nuclear facilities is to provide us with information at an early time, before construction begins. For instance, if a country plans an enrichment plant or a reprocessing plant, such as the Wackersdorf plant in Germany in the past, this is a big event in the sphere of the nonproliferation treaty. This is not something about which one should brief the IAEA routinely only 180 days in advance. It should be done much earlier.

Another example are plans for the export of technical components or of material for such facilities, which should be shown to the IAEA early, by the exporter and by the importer. Iraq acquired certain components in

various countries and spread out its purchases. If information had been provided on that by the exporting countries, it would have been possible to realize earlier what was going on. This also applies to other countries. Then the IAEA would be on firmer ground and would know which questions to ask individual countries to find out whether there are any extraordinary activities under way.

[Ruehl] But this presupposes that the member states do not want to circumvent the treaty but cooperate loyally.

[Blix] That is correct. I do not have any doubt that countries such as Great Britain, Germany, France, and Russia will do this, because they all have a common security interest in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. But the industries are always interested in selling their products and also in exports. Therefore, it is the business of the governments to check on their industries and to restrict or prohibit exports in the spirit of the nonproliferation treaty and to enforce prohibitions. No one can take this burden from their shoulders. Most industries loyally accept such restrictions.

[Ruehl] Do you expect it will become easier to prevent nuclear proliferation in the highly risky region of the Middle East than it was in the past? Do you think this is easier with regard to Iran, for instance?

[Blix] Yes, Iran is not a similarly closed society, a similarly closed country as Iraq was and is. Iran has signed the nonproliferation treaty and has a comprehensive agreement with us. We are inspecting a research reactor in Tehran.

[Ruehl] And do you not yet have any indications or clues that there or in some other place in Iran covert nuclear armament might be under way or might start soon?

[Blix] There are no indications or clues of that within the framework of the activities covered by the safeguards system.

[Ruehl] This was the same in Iraq.

[Blix] That is correct.

[Ruehl] What is your conclusion from that?

[Blix] If somebody were to offer us proof that something else was happening in Iran, we would naturally be willing to ask Iran some questions. If Iran were to be confronted by the media with questions about special facilities, it should give us information and invite us to visit such facilities to see what is happening there. It would be in Iran's interest to do that, because if it has nothing to hide, we can dispel distrust. International verification would then be in their interest.

[Ruehl] Does this also apply to Libya?

[Blix] Of course, Libya has signed the treaty, and we have a safeguards agreement. This agreement is normally applied with the envisaged inspections. So far everything has been normal.

[Ruehl] The probable end of the former Soviet nuclear arms programs raises the question of exports to other countries, also of illegal covert exports of fissionable material or of nuclear weapons themselves, and, finally, of the emigration of former Soviet nuclear arms experts, who might offer their services to other countries. The risk would be difficult to assess.

[Blix] Well, such a risk might exist; it is difficult to assess. I do not want to deny that there are such possibilities, and one must expect the USSR successor states to do everything on their territory to maintain control of the facilities, activities, materials, and personnel, and to continue to observe the nonproliferation treaty as in the past. However, individuals might of course go abroad. In Iraq, however, it was not Soviet experts who helped but Western ones. IAEA verifications apply to nuclear material. Even if a country has foreign experts it still needs imports or its own facilities to produce weapons material. Such facilities cannot be hidden easily, even though it is possible, as Iraq has shown. That is why all information about exports and technical facilities and construction plans is so important.

[Ruehl] Then there is also the possibility of illegal nuclear arms exports and the covert channeling off of fissionable material, as seemed to have happened from the ex-Soviet Union covertly via other countries, most recently for instance via Italy and Switzerland.

[Blix] No one can say that this risk is negligible, but it cannot be generally determined. If a country imports or produces enriched uranium, for instance, without declaring it, it would violate the nonproliferation treaty and the safeguards agreement with us. Therefore, we are worried about the traces of uranium in Iraq, which was enriched to 93 percent, which still poses riddles, and therefore we are asking questions about it. We have not yet drawn any conclusions.

[Ruehl] And Iraq is uncooperative in this respect?

[Blix] Yes and no; in their first statement the Iraqis did not declare anything. Then they declared the things that fall under the safeguards when we pointed that out to them. Then we found traces that indicated uranium enrichment and subsequently they provided a longer statement with information about that, after they had first denied the existence of enrichment. This information helped us. It would have been far more difficult to discover the scope of the activities without it. But one is never sure how much one is told. A certain cooperation is offset by a certain refusal to cooperate. Thus, we have to continue looking.

[Ruehl] This means the result contains a question mark.

[Blix] There remain open questions, but we have discovered a great deal. However, it would be imprudent to say that we have discovered everything.

IAEA Publishes Ninth Iraq Inspection Results

No Nuclear Weapon Capability

AU1701184892 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio
Network in German 1700 GMT 17 Jan 92

[Report by Constanze Riper]

[Text] Today the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] published the results of its ninth inspection tour of Iraq.

Does Saddam Husayn have the bomb or not? Some U.S. experts are afraid that this might be the case, but the IAEA denies this. During its ninth inspection tour of Iraq, the IAEA team finally gained a largely reliable picture of the extent of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, delegation head Mauricio Zifferero said.

[Begin Zefferio recording in English with superimposed German translation] According to our experts, the uranium enrichment program on the basis of gas centrifuges had not reached a stage making it possible for Iraq to produce nuclear weapons, but if Iraq had had a little more time, it would have been able to do so. [end recording]

Iraq admitted for the first time that it was working on a comprehensive program to build atomic bombs. The inspectors had presented the incriminating results of investigations in Germany. Thus, international companies supplied sufficient raw materials and components to produce several centrifuges. The centrifugal process is a modern procedure generally used internationally to enrich uranium. Baghdad also tried two other outdated methods but finally concentrated fully on the centrifuge method, IAEA Director General Hans Blix said. Iraq

claims to have destroyed all the parts it purchased and all the parts produced in Iraq. The IAEA inspectors have come to the conclusion that a large number of them really have been destroyed. Now they want to find out exactly what still exists, but the knowledge of how to build an atomic bomb cannot be taken away from Iraq.

IAEA Director Comments

AU1701221492 Vienna ORF Television Network
in German 2100 GMT 17 Jan 92

[Report by Heinz Leger]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] who submitted a report on their recent inspection tour of Iraq did not want to rule out that hidden plants for the enrichment of uranium still exist in Iraq. They consider it impossible at this point for Iraq to resume its nuclear program without foreign help. Referring to speculation that nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union might be recruited by states that are working on secret nuclear programs, IAEA Director General Hans Blix said:

[Begin Blix recording in English with superimposed German translation] I do not think one can exclude the possibility that, in a situation in which there is a shortage of food in the Soviet Union and in which jobs are uncertain, Soviet scientists might be tempted to accept offers to go abroad. I cannot imagine that anybody would wish the Soviet Union to close its borders again, thus preventing the scientists from leaving the country. For this reason, the Western world should make constructive proposals allowing the scientists to continue their work in the Soviet Union or in Western states in their professions. [end recording]

According to Blix, research in the field of nuclear fusion would be one possibility. Scientists from the Commonwealth of Independent States might cooperate with researchers from Japan, the United States, and Europe.

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