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Soviet Union Military Affairs

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Media Discusses Fate of Nuclear Weapons

OW0812120891 Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 2330 GMT 16 Nov 91

[Boris Smirnov video report; from the "Serving the Fatherland" program]

[Text] There is nothing unusual in the story you have just seen. [Reference to the preceding item on weapon thefts] The young soldiers decided to earn some money. In the heated atmosphere in which our society is enveloped, such concepts as duty, conscience, and honor have long melted away. A market is a market, though true, it is our own market. And so, the soldiers decided to treat a submachine gun like a computer. The most surprising thing in this whole story is that not one of them thought about the possibility that the barrel of the stolen submachine gun, sooner or later, could be pointed at them, that their mothers could be in the gun sights. Perhaps the most frightening thing is that such recklessness and irresponsibility exists in our society on every level, including the parliamentary level.

Currently, the Republics are dividing up nuclear weapons. They are dividing them simply, like children at a party dividing an apple pie. The Republics are forgetting, however, that each piece of this pie is dangerous to the whole world. [Video shows Smirnov holding a book entitled, "Where Does the Threat to Peace Come From"]

In my hand I hold a book, published in 1987, entitled "Where Does the Threat to Peace Come From." Well, where it comes from becomes clear from the initial phrases of this book: The threat to peace comes from the U.S. military machine, from the militaristic course of the U.S. Administration and its efforts to conclude international deals from a position of strength. Nineteen eighty seven, two years before the withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan. Not quite five years have passed, and now we realize that such books should be written about ourselves. [Video shows night missile launch]

[Begin Dimitriy Olshanskiy, political scientist, video recording] The epicenter of today's problems is the problem of security. The Soviet Union is disintegrating, and naturally, that concept of security that we had, is also disintegrating. Today, there is probably not one person who feels secure. Note the facts in the latest polls. Fifty three percent of citizens of the Soviet Union want to have personal weapons, and 14 percent already have them. That is, the concept that we are protected by something has collapsed. Each one of us is defenseless. And at this point, the very large issue of State security emerges. Unfortunately, this concept of national security is not developed in our consciousness. We taxpayers shell out money which goes to who knows where, and have become accustomed to trusting our autocratic politicians and our generals, who pacify us by saying that all is in order. But, in fact, the problem is extremely serious. There is no USSR, and that means there is no security. And a whole new ball game emerges. The question of security is comprised of two issues—the security of who, and from whom. Today, in the

conditions of the disintegration of our country, we must, we are bound, to put the question that, we must ensure our own security ourselves. [end video recording] [Video shows soldiers moving through a tunnel complex and control doors; a crawl announces that filming was done in an underground command post of a Strategic Missile Forces unit]

We have become used to living under the bias that someone is threatening us, and that is why we have always strived for nuclear balance, seriously thinking that this is precisely what will guarantee our security. We deployed the latest rockets, hid them deeper in the ground, and on super modern underwater and air platforms, and raised the level of their combat application. However, the result of this race turned out to be regrettable. Having become a Super Power almost solely by virtue of the availability of a super powerful nuclear potential, we became hostages of this deadly wealth. And although a ray of hope appears to have begun to gleam on the political horizon, the reduction of nuclear danger and the realistic elimination of this danger is, nonetheless, still far off. The number of nuclear warheads would allow the leading nuclear Powers today, to destroy each other at least ten times over. Let us multiply this by the unpredictability of events in our former Union household and it will be clear beyond which brink humanity could find itself.

[Begin Olshanskiy video recording] As has already been publicized, on 18 August, Gorbachev's nuclear control briefcase disappeared from Faros [in the Crimea]. The very same case that has the nuclear codes, which are the key to the nuclear lock. Turn the key, and that would activate the buttons, and the warheads. The nuclear case disappeared along with Gorbachev's nuclear officer, the man who is occasionally called Gorbachev's nuclear subscriber [abonent], and to this day there has not been even one official announcement as to the whereabouts of the officer and the case. [Video shows a missile launch]

[Olshanskiy continues] We were defenseless for two or three days, yet no one attacked us. That means no one wants to attack us. That means this is a pseudo problem which is specially created by certain circles—the Military Industrial complex, the generals, by certain politicians—to support their power base, to support their supremacy. You know, sometimes I think that there is a very large game going on. For that matter, not only among our politicians of the old CPSU order, I think that this game is peculiar to certain U.S. circles, certain politicians, and certain generals as well. Generals everywhere are generals, whether they are American or Soviet. To receive new stars on their epaulets, it is necessary for them to conduct some kind of testing, represent some kind of activity, speak of how they are ensuring security. For the politicians it is necessary to speak about something a little bit different. It is necessary for them to talk about how we are disarming, what negotiations we are conducting, and so on, and so forth. But notice, that no real reduction is taking place despite many decades of talks, and many signed agreements. [end video recording] [Video shows an officer looking into an

empty missile silo, a semitrailer driving off with a tube-like container on its tray, officers throwing what appear to be tennis balls into the silo]

Let us note, however, that reduction is, nonetheless, going on. In the unit where these shots were taken the last rocket was being dismantled. The last one here, in this unit. Altogether, 503 intercontinental ballistic missiles will be stood down from combat duty in the armed forces, and the number of nuclear weapons will be reduced to 5000. But, however few nuclear weapons remain, there will be still too many nonetheless, and it will constantly pose a danger for humanity.

Moreover, under the terms of reduction, the second generation nuclear weapons, are today, being replaced by the highly-accurate third generation, capable of delivering selected strikes, on separate targets. The temptation to use it could become more probable than before. [Video shows various activities surrounding dismantling of missiles]

[Begin video recording] [unidentified officer] I consider it necessary to reduce the nuclear potential of our country, and to retain only necessary quantities to ensure the security of our State.

[Unidentified correspondent] As a professional specialist, do you think that parity is now being ensured?

[Officer] Yes, parity is being ensured in principle, and that is why we are involved with this work of standing them down from combat duty to ensure parity with the United States. [end video recording]

[Begin Olshanskiy recording] Even if the latest Start Treaty is realised now, which promised a 50 percent reduction, but in fact, it enunciates a figure of 30 to 35 percent, no greater, even if it is fully realized—which will take a year—then we will return to the level of armament that we had in 1982. In fact, that is before the beginning of perestroika. That means that in the past eight years we have accumulated as much as in all the past decades. There you have the result of the so-called new political thinking. That means this is a game in which [words indistinct], a play on the level of words, and if you will pardon me, on the level of deceiving their own people. [end video recording] [Video shows what appears to be a Scud missile being readied for launch, a tunnel entrance, a person taking radiation readings]

The world community is not so much worried by a rocket confrontation, as by the internal instability of nuclear powers. As one of the options of ensuring the safety of Soviet nuclear installations handing them over to international control was being considered at one time. An inconceivable move it would appear, but a necessary one in case of civil disturbances. Today, we have to pay an extremely high price, in fact the highest price—the lives of people, their health, and a ruined environment even for the careless use of the peaceful atom. On our own land, we have become like nuclear plunderers prepared to turn it into a lifeless desert.

[Begin video recording] [Victor Minin, USSR People's Deputy and member of the State Council Security Committee] I see it is already difficult for Russia, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine to reach agreement on the control of the button on nuclear problems. They all want to control, but that is impossible. In order to be able to dictate their will to each other, and to be able to speak to Europe in a different tone, they all want to leave themselves two or three rockets, just in case, even though declaring themselves nuclear free zones. Ukraine, having declared itself nuclear free, in fact, is not rushing to become a nuclear free zone. I would say the same about Kazakhstan. Ukraine aside, but Kazakhstan? Who can say that Kazakhstan is a politically stable territory? Of course it is not! I cannot see any structures in the Center which really could clearly ...[changes thought] which have a clear idea of the processes that are going on.

[Minin continues] The Ministry of Defense, and all the structures connected with it, are all yesterday's structures. They still exist by inertia, and by inertia continue to defend their interests, offering the Republics a reform of the Armed Forces. But it is not a reform, it is a fundamentally new system of security.

[Aleksandr Rar, Senior Scientific Worker of Radio Liberty Research Institute] And the dissipation of nuclear weapons, not only to the Republics but to other countries, somehow must be slowed. The Republics, pursuing foreign exchange will, if profitable, sell these very same nuclear arsenals to Third World countries. And who will control this process? The control center no longer exists. We know that even the Germans and the French, that is, specific companies in those countries, participated in various business deals with Saddam Husayn. Why could not some establishment in Azerbaijan, not necessarily a government one, the Ukraine also, or someone in Russia, who has left the control of the center, why could they not sell arms to, for example, Iraq, thereby skirting Europe? [end video recording] [Video shows soldiers entering an elevator in the underground command post]

Too many things have been said in recent years about our fervent wish to draw the United States into the nuclear disarmament process. The leaders of the sovereign Republics continually declared their wish to see their States nuclear free. However, the President of Russia was the only one to react positively to the recent American initiatives also directed toward our Republics. The latter only gave diplomatic excuses. It appears that the wish to divide the country's nuclear pie is nonetheless stronger, but for what purpose? This question is being posed by the very people who it is intended to divide—the rocket troops. Today, on the eve of their holiday, they would also like to know about their future. [Video shows a control room, launch control consoles and operators]

[Begin video recording] [correspondent] Now Nazarbayev, Kravchuk, and so on are demanding the right of veto, demanding their buttons, which as you say, if procedures are followed, then the weapons would be unemployable. That is, in principle, it turns out that all these missiles should be destroyed. Because, in practice, they will really

not be used if there are buttons in almost every apartment. Soon sovereignty will be declared in Kazan and it will need a button, then Chukotka, and so on.

[Unidentified soldier] I consider that the weapons should only be in the hands of one. As to its employment, that is a different matter. That decision should rest with some kind of Council or something similar. But the issue of employment must be decided [words indistinct] at the required moment one man...[changes thought] not simply because we have nuclear weapons, because they exist overseas, and other regions have them. And if these weapons used there, then the government cannot take three or five days to think whether to retaliate or not, because it will be too late. There must be some operative capability. [end video recording] [Video shows an SS-20 missile, a missile launch, missile dismantling work]

Life itself dictates the need for a single strategic nuclear force management. And attempts to split up the decades-old mechanism of collective security of the Republics in one fell swoop, is to take the concept of democratization to absurdity. Establishing a nuclear button in each of the Supreme Soviets, could lead to a catastrophe.

[Begin Olshanskiy video recording] And not the final thing I want to say is, here is a purely political opportunity which cannot be missed. We must return to Reykjavik, to that Reykjavik at which Gorbachev and Reagan nearly reached agreement for total reduction, on a complete destruction of the nuclear stockpiles. I think that what we need now is not the Helsinki Two, about which diplomats are getting into a lather, but Reykjavik Two. In a situation of disintegration, we must safeguard ourselves, and be thankful to the world if it comes to aid us in this. [end video recording] [Video shows a missile being crushed, and various other equipment]

The outgoing rockets are being replaced by other, more highly-accurate ones. And who are we trying to fool in this situation? Ourselves, as well as the rest of humanity?

[Begin video recording] [Smirnov] Nuclear weapons should be controlled by everyone in Europe, is that right? Should there be general control?

[Rar] It seems to me, that nuclear weapons will be controlled by those powers that have them, however, disarmament, and some kind of control mechanism will be created.

[Smirnov] A type of council?

[Rar] Yes, some kind of a council, and a process of integration into a new, common European home should take place. But again, I am speaking about Europeanization of the western Republics, like the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the three Baltic Republics. Let them have their own armies, but they will no longer be subordinate to Moscow, but voluntarily subordinate themselves to some kind of a new European command, which will spring up much quicker than we anticipate today.

[Smirnov] So, this will be a new military political union?

[Rar] A new military, political, and even economic union.

[Minin] It already exists in practice. It is just up to us now. As soon as we are able to create our collective system of security and merge into a single system of security with Europe, then we can say that this block has been formed. [end video recording]

[Begin video recording] [Olga Pobortseva, an expert from the Committee on Security of the Soviet of the Union] About 16 or 17 years ago, the United States changed, or rather, returned to a system of voluntary armed forces. This occurred in the process of military reforms which were being carried out in the United States at that time. This reform was highly successful. We are now seeing successes which the United States army is having around the world. The most recent justification and reaffirmation of the latter, was the war in the Persian Gulf, which is well known to all of us. Also well known is the huge effect and political capital this war brought the U.S. [Video shows footage from Desert Storm tank operations]

This issue is still vital to us. The thing is that presently the Soviet Union, or what remains of it, the sovereign Republics, if you will, are faced with the very same problem. The problem of reform of the Armed Forces. And everything that the Republics are doing now, or trying to do—and not only the military organs of the sovereign Republics, but also of the central organs—I must say, reminds me of reinventing the wheel.

The Americans are very pragmatic people. In developing their reforms, they proceeded from a great number of considerations, but the essence was man, people, the individual. These are the greatest qualities of a legal, democratic, and a free society, and the building of an effective, combat effective, relatively inexpensive armed forces should be approached from this premise. This is what, I consider, is very valuable to us.

[Smirnov] We have never valued man, but material happiness was holy, but man was nothing. [Video shows Soviet soldiers drilling and U.S. forces on maneuvers]

[Pobortseva] Regretfully, yes. It is not only harmful, it is harmful to the individual. It has a great social and economic effect. The Americans were the first to (?to understand this). And they turned out to be correct. According to the latest data for the 1991 financial year, the quality of personnel, not officers, we are not speaking here of officers, but rank and file, those who enlisted like here, for instance, those serving (?for one year) [sentence as heard]. So, in all branches of the armed services this figure remains close to 100 percent, and in several instances, they put it at 100 percent plus.

[Smirnov] That is practically ideal.

[Pobortseva] That is practically ideal, 100 percent quality. The key to combat effectiveness are the people. It is not weapons that fight wars. And as one of their former Defense Secretaries, one of the creators of the concept of a volunteer army, Melvin Laird said, it is not computers, it is not weapons, but people who achieve victory, people achieve success. [end video recording]

Academy Officers Want Self Defense Right

92UM0210C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Dec 91 p 2

[Article based on RIA reports, under the rubric "Chronicle, Events, Opinion": "Will They Protect Themselves?"]

[Text] In an appeal to the USSR minister of defense, the chief of staff of the Armed Forces, and all military servicemen of the USSR Armed Forces, 3,000 students and teachers of the Military Academy imeni Frunze demanded, particularly from the Ministry of Defense: "To inform the president of the USSR, the presidents of all republics, and the leaders of the Baltic states that the officers retain the right to create an organization for decisive protection of the lives of military servicemen and members of their families from nationalistically motivated and other kinds of banditry." They insist on immediate permission for officers and warrant officers to bear arms throughout the territory of the state with the right to use them in cases where attempts are made on the lives and property of officers and their families. The authors of the appeal suggest introducing a 24-hour guard of the residential zones and facilities of the social sphere of military compounds and garrisons throughout the entire territory of the state.

New Deputy Commander on Central Asian Problems

92UM0222C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Dec 91 p 2

[Interview with Major General R. Khadyrbayev, deputy commander of the Turkestan Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major S. Knyazkov: "To Khadyrbayev, District Headquarters"]

[Text] By a 5 August 1991 resolution of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers a new position of military district deputy commander has been introduced in a number of military districts. This event probably would not have attracted our attention had it not been for the fact that this particular official's duty is to organize coordination between military districts and the organs of state power of the republic on whose territory they are located.

In Turkestan Military District, this new assignment fell to Major General R. Khadyrbayev.

[Knyazkov] Rumil Ergashovich, you took over your new duties a relatively short time ago; yet, judging by the mail on your desk, your work is well known not only in the district, but throughout Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

[Khadyrbayev] This is a correct observation: Quite often letters that end up on my desk have a very short address: "To Khadyrbayev, District Headquarters." This is the way letters usually come from ordinary people whose sons serve in our district. There are all sorts of requests, especially considering that since a relatively short time ago many local draftees are sent to serve here.

[Knyazkov] As far as I can see the letters are mostly in the native national language.

[Khadyrbayev] Yes, and not only those on personal matters, but also those from the republic state structures.

Starting 1 January all correspondence between the republics and the district will be only in the national state languages; this may be another reason for introducing the position of a deputy commander.

[Knyazkov] How large is your staff?

[Khadyrbayev] It is envisaged that I will have five line officers, according to the number of states covered by the district. All of them will be working on location, probably in the capitals, as my representatives. In addition, there will be support staff of lawyers, typists, and handlers of secret documentation.

[Knyazkov] It looks as if conducting correspondence and the resolution of various personal problems for citizens is only a small part of your functions.

[Khadyrbayev] Undoubtedly. I have to say right away that the new position under the Turkestan Military District commander came into being, among other things, at the personal initiative of Uzbekistan President I. Karimov and other leaders of the sovereign states of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, who presented this request to the USSR Ministry of Defense. Having gained independence, each republic declared its right to independently decide some matters related to defense development and national security. For instance, now such matters as the military draft and the operation of military draft offices, training of national cadres and the national guard, the introduction of alternative service, and many others, are in the hands of the republic Ministry of Defense. The district actively helps the republic deal with these and many other issues.

[Knyazkov] You mentioned the issue of training national cadres. What are the plans in this area?

[Khadyrbayev] Yes, this is one of the most important problems. Think about these figures, for instance. There are only eight generals among Uzbeks, while people of this nationality comprise 10 percent of conscripted personnel in the national Armed Forces.

In order to train the officer corps, the Government of Uzbekistan resolved to consistently conduct work in selecting young men of native nationality and sending them to study in military schools in the country and the district. I am referring first and foremost to the four military schools located on the territory of Central Asia, and the Beshkhen Suvorov Military School.

I want to take this opportunity to mention that there is a proposal to establish several more Suvorov schools, but with a seven-year course of study.

[Knyazkov] I know from the experience of my own service that there is a great shortage of officers who are natives of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, or commanders who know the native languages. So many problems and conflicts could be avoided.

[Khadyrbayev] I completely agree with you. It appears that my staff will even have to present certain recommendations in respect to working with personnel of native nationalities. As it stands now, quite often the officers who do not have sufficient knowledge of the language, customs, and local

laws, communicate with subordinates with the help of strong language and shouts, believing that this is the only way to get an order carried out. This is a mistake; I would highly recommend the introduction of a position similar to mine in the field, perhaps under the unit commander.

Cossack Troops In Siberia, Far East Form Union

92P50066A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Dec 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "The Cossacks are Uniting"]

[Text] At the same time as centrifugal sentiments are being observed around the country, the Cossacks of Eastern Siberia and the Far East decided to join together in a single union. Plenipotentiary representatives of the Yenissey, Irkutsk, Transbaykal, Ussuriy, Amur Cossack troops, and also the Agin-Buryat and Verkhneudinsk sections of the Transbaykal troops and the Yakutsk regiment signed an agreement on the creation of a union and selected an authorized ataman.

Mistreatment of Military in Transcaucasus MD

92UM0238A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Dec 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel V. Kaushanskiy: "Well, It Is Simply Chaos..."]

[Text] "And what kind of service is this. Complete chaos. Some kind of 'Afghan'"—comrades of deceased Major V. Berilov said to me.

And once again the bell tolls for someone whose fate came to an abrupt end. And once again the rifle salute rings out at the fresh grave of an officer... And the devastated eyes of the wife look inquiringly through tears at the sad and grim faces of her husband's comrades. And the vodka taken at the funeral repast becomes a lump in the throat in the orphaned apartment with the unmade child's bed on the day of the funeral.

...Oh, how often I observed these perpetually similar subjects in our military life in the Transcaucasus, to which, nonetheless, it is impossible to get accustomed. I counted more than 100 assault rifle bullet holes in the jeep that was fired point blank by criminals at the beginning of January not far from Lachin. A small crew, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Larionov, commander of a reconnaissance battalion, perished in the vehicle. In March Lieutenant Dushonaliyev was seriously wounded in a battle with armed bandits... And it is only the beginning of the year!

The entire ZakVO [Transcaucasian Military District] was rocked by the recent bestial murder in Tbilisi of Major V. Berilov right before the eyes of his wife and child.

And the other day criminals inflicted 12 knife wounds on V. Naryzhnyy, an officer in the Border Troops. This occurred right at the Transcaucasus border district. On 10 December in the center of Tbilisi, five armed persons stopped a "Volga" carrying Major General of Aviation V. Glebov, the first deputy commander of the PVO [Air Defense] army, and they seized the vehicle. In the process, the attackers insulted the general and tore his uniform. In a conversation the general had with the president of

Georgia, the latter placed the blame on guardsmen of Kitovani, and he advised of the impossibility of protecting servicemen against the illegal actions of armed formations.

But to what God should the military procurator of the district pray when in this very sad November in Tbilisi bandits once again fired their assault rifles into his service "Volga?" Or to what happy event can we attribute the fact that the six bullets on 30 November that penetrated the service vehicle of the commander of the guards tank regiment, which is located an hour's drive from Tbilisi, whistled past the officer, leaving their mark in the tarpaulin?

Thus, is Major V. Berliov the last victim?. "Indeed, what kind of a service is this?" one of his comrades said to me. "Complete chaos. It is some kind of an 'Afghan.'"

I do not know how others feel, but I will not accept this comparison. The life of a soldier was taken there by war, albeit not declared, but by a war with its brutal laws. But who does one die as at home in your own country. It is frightening when the death of a defender in peacetime becomes a daily fact, like a bitter condiment added to the cruelty of our social existence.

Any fellow countryman can bring to mind the television sequences of funerals of servicemen whose coffins were brought to America after the war in the Persian Gulf zone. The nation grieved. But we grieve with circumspection, and we grieve quietly for those who are killed in our domestic local wars. And we question, and we do not know to whom to turn: to a judge or someone else?

But there are none, judges in the form of respected legislators, because some of them in the republics of the Transcaucasus are more concerned today about transactions of the army depots—from nails and soldiers' underwear to missiles and combat infantry vehicles. They say that an inventory is being taken, and do not interfere. But behind the legislators, frequently there are those, in transports, who have their own idea of "privatization" who are dying to get weapons and means for moving armies, so that they can declare their rights to power at an opportune time. I think that it is they who are firing at us, although frequently with the hands of inveterate criminals.

And do you know what alarms and steals peace? A question that can be heard more and more frequently in our official circles: Because the state is not protecting us, is it not time for us to protect ourselves?

An acquaintance commander who was in the final procession in honor of the memory of Oleg Larionov told me without beating around the bush: "If they kill one more of my officers, I will not hold my people back. Not waiting for a command, they themselves will use the armor and ammunition in order to put an end to the violence." I asked: "And in the meantime, where will you be?" The division commander answered. "On the side of the barricades with the officers."

Drastic? In words, yes—but, in fact, God forbid that things should get even more drastic. How do we get away from our tired old psychology?

Apparently it is easier to kill us, declaring us occupiers, and little by little suggesting from parliamentary tribunes to the broad public and reinforcing it legislatively—to put it as tactfully as possible—that the presence of the Soviet Army on the territory of one or another republic is illegal. But, excuse me, how will a spontaneous rebellion of officers against violence be “softer?” After all, you cannot explain to a lieutenant or to a major who at one time swore loyalty to the Fatherland on what basis armed bandits broke into their apartment and why his military unit should be inventoried together with weapons and equipment, for which he is responsible with his head, according to oath and duty. And, at the same time, no one has the courage to admit: Both the first and the second are against the law. For it must not be allowed that a “conflict” occurs in the soul of an officer between a law that protects his life and human dignity and the amateurish parliamentary improvisation on the theme: As long as the former all-Union pie is being cut up into pieces, why not take one’s own piece on the sly, but bigger, at the expense of the army.

But, nonetheless, let us think about this not on an emotional level, while the nerves of the officers, which are drawn into a tight spring, have not taken on the destructive energy of self-defense.

People in uniform need guarantees. Of course, legislative. Of paramount importance is life. And provision for the family, as long as a bandit’s bullet does not get you.

What else? It is necessary clearly and unambiguously to consolidate in the law situations when an officer can use an authorized weapon to save his own life. And he has to have it not just in authorization papers and in his ID, but in his hands. At least in those regions where provocations against the military have become the norm, and not an exception.

Here is the opinion of officers which I heard at a recent general meeting in the headquarters of the Transcaucasus Military District: A juridical status of the district is necessary, and if it, the district, is to be transferred to someone’s jurisdiction, then it should be to the jurisdiction of Russia. Otherwise, what is the use of a slipping military reform to the officers of the Transcaucasus Military District that does not take the interests of its main subject into account—the person in uniform.

Azerbaijan DOSAAF to Reorganize

*92UM0209A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 48, Nov 91 p 6*

[Article by A. Andreyev under the rubric “The 7th Special Congress of the Azerbaijan Republic DOSAAF”: “The Future Lies in Vigorous and Practical Action”]

[Text] **The 7th Special Congress of the Azerbaijan Republic DOSAAF was held in Baku. It discussed the reorganization and the transformation of the republic DOSAAF into the Volunteer Military-Patriotic and Technical Sports Society (DVPSTO) of the sovereign and independent Azerbaijan Republic. The congress approved the society’s charter, which stresses the fact that the DVPSTO is the legal successor to the Azerbaijan DOSAAF. Col Gen Ye.I. Krylov, chairman of**

the Central Council of the USSR OSTO [Society of Technical Sports Organizations], took part in the congress.

The Azerbaijan DOSAAF members always occupied a worthy place in the nation’s common system of defense organizations. Each year thousands of draftees acquired military specialties in 20 training organizations with modern training facilities. More than 130,000 specialists were trained in the republic during the past 5 years alone.

These figures were left out of the picture, so to speak, at the congress, however. For the first time the report, presented by Maj Gen S. Israfilov, chairman of the Azerbaijan Republic DOSAAF Central Committee, was not filled with figures and, unlike previous congresses, did not list those out front and those who lag behind. It discussed primarily the problems.

The republic is in a difficult political and economic situation. Actual combat operations continue on its border with Armenia. Steps taken to normalize the situation in the area of conflict have yet to produce the desired results.

The turbulent events in the republic’s sociopolitical life have not reduced the importance of the missions assigned the republic defense organization, however. It has lost neither its legal status nor its links with the defense societies of other republics. S. Israfilov said that unity has always been the determining factor behind success in any endeavor.

The charter approved at the congress stresses the fact that the republic’s Volunteer Military-Patriotic and Technical Sports Society is by agreement a part of the country’s Union of Defense Technical Sports Organizations (Societies). It stresses international indoctrination.

The problems facing the Azerbaijan defense society are in many ways similar to the realities of life being experienced by the other defense societies of the former USSR. And one can agree entirely with the concluding words of the speaker: “Today we do not need arrogance, high-sounding words and assurances. Everyone is tired of this. We need vigorous and practical action....”

Many of those who addressed the congress were troubled by the situation of sports, in which negative processes are growing. R. Kuliyeu, member of the Central Committee of the USSR OSTO and chairman of the Baku City DOSAAF Committee, among others, spoke of this with alarm. The funds freed by reducing the tables of organization and equipment, he believes, should be directed primarily into the development of the technical and applied military sports.

The Baku Air Club is one of the oldest in the country. Its graduates include 14 Heroes of the Soviet Union. Many of the club’s trainees have won prizes in world and Union championships in recent years. It has groups of youth undergoing basic flight training for entering higher military air schools for flyers.

It is in an extremely difficult situation today. The level of training of sportsmen is dropping. The equipment is

obsolete. There is not a single modern sports aircraft. The sources for financing the club for the year ahead have not been identified.

V. Agamirova, senior trainer for parachute sports, devoted her talk to these difficult problems. She expressed the desire that the Central Council of the USSR OSTO Union would devote more attention to the development of the air sports. These are not mass sports, of course, she noted, but their significance should not be understated. After all, air sports attract courageous people devoted to their choice. They cannot be tossed aside.

Congress delegates and guests greeted with approving applause the appearance on the speaker's platform of Sh. Salimova, head of the School of Social Sciences at the Azerbaijan Conservatory and honored economist of the republic. She is a DOSAAF veteran. In her distant youth the 15-year-old Shevkat was drawn to air sports and set records in competitions more than once.

In her brilliant and emotional address she sharply condemned those who are in a hurry to bury the society as a mass organization. Our state has acquired sovereignty, Sh. Salimova stated, but we should not lose our ties with the center. We should continue to operate jointly in the best traditions of DOSAAF. I hope very much that the current Central Council of the country's OSTO Union will not deprive us of its help in our common cause of improving the indoctrination of the youth and preparing them for military service. I hope that our republic patriotic society will not let down the country's Union of Defense Technical Sports Organizations.

The following thoughts dominated in the delegates' presentations. The Azerbaijan Republic's defense organization should be independent but continue to be a part of the USSR OSTO Union. Relations with the center should be by agreement. The republic society cannot get by without its help for now, particularly with respect to the provision of training and sports equipment and of material and financial means.

Col Gen Ye.I. Krylov, chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR OSTO Union, addressed the congress.

"The complex sociopolitical and economic processes occurring in the country," he said, "are also affecting the defense society, calling for its accelerated reorganization and renewal. The defense organizations and societies of the sovereign republics are now acquiring complete legal and factual independence. This is confirmed also by our congress, which is being conducted in a businesslike manner and rationally considering the tasks facing us. We feel that you should devote special attention to the preparation of reserves for all branches of the armed forces and personnel for the national guard. We believe that much needs to be done also for the development of air sports. We shall try to help you in this matter.

"I am thoroughly convinced that the defense society should not fade into history, should not die without a trace, but should continue to develop. After all, it performs multifaceted tasks in the interest of strengthening the

economic and defense capability of our entire country. It is another matter that we need to give extremely serious thought to the delineation of functions between the center and the republic defense organizations. This is a natural and normal process. Their precise delineation will permit all of us to build a durable foundation for working out inter-republic agreements and mutual obligations for the directing bodies of the sovereign republics and the Central Committee of the country's OSTO Union. I must stress the fact that there will be no dictation from the center."

That same day Col Gen Ye.I. Krylov, chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR OSTO Union, met with T.K. Ismaylov, secretary of state of the Azerbaijan Republic. In their conversation, which took place in a friendly atmosphere, they discussed the matter of interaction between the republic's volunteer military-patriotic and technical sports society and its council and the Central Council of the USSR OSTO Union and its organizations. They stressed the fact that in the future it is essential to strengthen worthy ties between the republic defense society and the center, but on the basis of agreement and with the observance of complete sovereignty for Azerbaijan's DVPSTO.

From the editors: While this issue of SOVETSKIY PATRIOT was being made up, the report came in that T.K. Ismaylov had died in an air accident.

Azerbaijan Army, Troop Condition Viewed
92UM0237A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA special correspondent Pavel Anokhin: "Nobody's People' Waiting for the Big War"]

[Text] (From a press conference given by the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan on 27 November in Moscow, in the office of the plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan.)

Mr. President, Azerbaijan has resolved to create a national army. What is its strength, and who is its probable adversary?

[Mutalibov] So far, there is no army; there is only a minister of defense. The National Guard, which is at issue, should ensure presidential power. It is created strictly for the purpose of defense, and it does not have a probable adversary, unless there is an aggression.

Mr. President, can the 4th Army stationed in the territory of the republic be called pro-Azeri?

[Mutalibov] To date, the army has been united; it is under the control of the USSR president. I would not call it pro-Azeri...

The words of the Azeri leader could be gratifying had it not been for rumors which have shrouded the 4th Army like a fog, and doubts and questions which come up in conjunction with the rumors. This is why I would very much like to share my impressions from a visit to the 23d Division of the 4th Army, from meeting and talking to its officers and soldiers.

I will not undertake to corroborate the most widespread rumors—that the military in this area has engaged in business and sold weapons to both Armenians and Azeris, depending on their sympathies and the amount offered, and therefore that the military is a party which is interested in the continuation of the conflict.

Unfortunately, I do not have incriminating documents in my possession. Undoubtedly, we may refer to instructions from Baku which forbade the Stepanakert Regiment of the 23d Division to hold fire exercises, including target practice, during which a leakage of ammunition to the Armenians occurred, or to a report of the Lur information center dated 11 November: "The accelerated militarization of Azerbaijan is causing justified alarm among the Armenian population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), also because Azerbaijan succeeded in obtaining some weapons from the Soviet Army during the joint punitive operations of the Soviet Army and the Azerbaijan OMON [Special Missions Militia Detachments] in Armenian localities in the spring and summer of 1991..."

All of these indirect charges await proof or refutation in the future.

As far as the combat dispositions of the 4th Army are concerned, they are no longer a secret. Thus, the 23d Division, which is commanded by Colonel Aleksandr Budeykin, was redeployed in March 1990 to the Armenian-Azeri border from the side of Azerbaijan "to avert bloodshed and interethnic conflicts." By now, it has deployed more than 40 outposts along the line. As officers say, each outpost is capable of conducting perimeter defense, has tanks and armored personnel carriers, and has an opportunity to down helicopters...

I queried one of the commanders: "Whose helicopters?" The answer came without deliberation: "Armenian." "Why Armenian?" The arguments turned out to be categorical: Allegedly, the Armenians supply arms to their paramilitary detachments by helicopter.

I do not know whether this is true, but you would agree that this answer, as if a screen, reveals the position of the 23d Division which has actually become a participant in the interethnic conflict, having forgotten both about its neutrality and human rights.

At any rate, this is what the complicity of the personnel of the army in actions by Azeris against the Armenian population indicates. The range of such actions is broad—from raids to the rear areas of the "enemy" in order to take Armenian hostages, to participation in the operation "Ring" when, under the guise of enforcing passport regulations, the forcible deportation of Armenians from their native localities occurred.

I succeeded in talking to some participants in operation "Ring." That all of them told me everything without a shade of embarrassment was the first thing which surprised me. Major Nikolay Sidorov communicated: "After we conducted 'Ring' in Noyemberyan, all commandos ran away, and it is quiet in the settlement to this day. During operations, we usually blockaded villages, ordered that

weapons be turned in, and drove paramilitary detachments away. In Shaumyanovskiy Rayon, the army acted as an observer, and we fired at the forest only (I thought: as if he did not know that the forest usually was where the fleeing inhabitants of villages hid). Besides, the order of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to the effect that we may fire when a military unit is attacked, blocked, or sabotaged still remains in force."

I would not venture a judgment on the motives for which the major and his fellow servicemen from the 23d Division blockaded Armenian villages or fired at the forest just like that. However, I do not think that it was only extreme zeal in carrying out the ukase by Mikhail Gorbachev or the "utterly Soviet" attachment to the inviolable Union. Lev Tolstoy stated: "A man may contribute to the betterment of public life only to the degree to which he complies with the dictates of his conscience in his life." All officers facilitating the criminal war in Karabakh have themselves set standards for their consciousnesses, ethics, and professionalism alike. Sooner or later, each will get his due.

I am truly sorry for the boys, soldiers of the Internal Troops, dragged into the Armenian-Azeri conflict. Major Nikolay Safonov, one of the executive officers of the division, stressed in our conversation that Slavic soldiers came to the "hot spot" voluntarily, and having signed contracts, made a deliberate choice. Of course, I did not engage in sociological research, but after my conversations with soldiers I will offer an objection: The soldiers flew here as moths into the flame. When they make the choice, they know what to expect, but do they know what they fight for here?

Private Zakir Oginyayev, Tajik by nationality, arrived, as he put it, to "guard my dear Azerbaijan" from Georgia. I do not know what prompted him to make this choice, although I find Islamic solidarity quite probable. However, he still could not explain either the goals or the reasons for the conflict. The 20-year-old fellow answered my questions benevolently: "I have been here for a year, and have taken part in battles and fire fights. Why is the war on? I really do not know. I am in favor of the Azeris, because the Armenians shoot."

Sergeants Gennadiy Ivanin and Sergey Sidorak have been at an outpost for six months now, having served a year in their previous units. Both maintain that they came here of their own will—one to make money, the other looking for adventure. However, like Zakir, neither one really understands what is happening around them.

As I listened to them, I thought: What is more terrifying—is it how duped they were when they agreed to come here, tempted by R350 monthly which they receive under their contracts, or the flippancy with which freedom to kill a man and public lawlessness in general are mistaken for adventure, or the cynicism with which the leadership of the country sacrifices young people on the altar of its imperial frame of mind? Having in its time dragged many military units into the struggle against national and democratic movements in order to preserve the USSR, the Kremlin has

now become unable to practically solve the problems of Soviet troops in national republics. The 23d Division is a case in point.

We still do not fully understand how immoral the situation is in which Russian soldiers implement in the region the policy of a state whose capital, Baku, the Russian population has fled or continues to abandon. We do not fully appreciate the tragic situation of Slavic soldiers who, while serving in units where Azeris account for 60 to 70 percent of the personnel, will simply be forced to fire at Armenians without fail. Also, under certain circumstances, they will fire on their red-star fellow citizens serving with the 7th Army, which is deployed in the territory of Armenia.

Still, despite this dramatic situation, hopelessness is the main woe of the 23d Division, as well as the entire 4th Army. Since they are supplied by Azerbaijan and receive from it everything they need to exist, both the division and the army have, in essence, ended up completely dependent on the leadership and local population of the republic, ended up in the cauldron of Azeri nationality policy. He who pays the piper calls the tune.

It would appear that the withdrawal of the 4th Army from the territory of Azerbaijan could cut the Gordian knot of problems. However, the local population got concerned as soon as such information was aired there. In the words of officers, the Azeris are categorically against the pullout of the army from the border and from the republic as a whole. They say that, be that as it may, the outposts are a shield. The people in the villages are no longer afraid for their lives; if the army leaves there will be a civil war. Therefore, they warned the military that they would lie on the ground before convoys, but will not let the army go.

Frankly, the desire to keep the personnel is surprising, especially in light of the introduction of troops into Baku in January which entailed the deaths of hundreds of Azeris. How and at what price could we have been absolved of our grave blame in order to turn, within a mere year and a half, from enemies to allies? However, other explanations may be found which the officers of the 23d Division in question frequently mention: "In general, the Azeri guys do not know how to fight and do not like to... If the army is withdrawn, the Azeris will keep up the fight for two days... It is hard to be in the service with them; they are not particularly disposed to serve..." (Why should they if a Russian adventurer may always be found for R350?)

As far as the materiel is concerned, the issue is, of course, both controversial and clear-cut! Division commander A. Budeykin himself, in sympathy with the point of view of the locals, thinks as follows: "Really, we cannot remove everything. After all, the army was forged and created from a community pot. We should understand this, and do the just thing."

Undoubtedly, there is some truth in his words. Under the laws of fairness, each republic which wishes to be sovereign and build a national army should definitely be entitled to a segment of the assets of the Armed Forces depending on its contribution to the "community pot." Frictions which

emerge with regard to this issue in Baltia, Ukraine, or the Caucasus republics indicate that this issue cannot be simply swept under the rug.

However, approaches have most likely been found already, in each republic separately. For example, nobody doubts that the materiel of the 4th Army will remain in Azerbaijan in any event, and least of all the officers who serve here themselves. Their attitude is very graphically summed up in the words of an executive staff major: "We will not remove anything from here without bloodshed, because they will not let us. There are many Azeri officers and warrant officers in our division. They will immediately inform the locals about any such attempts, and the latter will place women and old people in the path of materiel. We will not go through crushing them..."

Azeri soldiers will not obey the orders of officers in the course of pulling out the troops either; as has already been said, they account for between 60 and 70 percent of the personnel of the division. They would rather sabotage the materiel than have it pulled out of the republic.

Strange as it may be, many officers are favorably disposed toward this solution to the problem, to be sure, everyone for his own reasons. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Vorobchuk, chief of staff of a unit, insists on this for ideological reasons: "If we pull the army out there will be a civil war... It may be difficult for us, we may have to grate our teeth, but we will defend the people." In his zeal to "defend the people" while at the same time "saving the Soviet Union from disintegration," the officer enthusiastically switched from words to deeds: He is one of the participants in "ring" operations in Chaykend.

Senior Lieutenant Oleg Lukashov spoke more frankly, apparently because he is young: "Where are we to pull out to? They will disband us, or assign us to live together with our families under field conditions. Meanwhile, those who have been serving here for a long time have everything. Therefore, if there are no prospects in Russia, and the Azeris suggest that we serve in their army, many will agree."

Such offers have already been made: They promise very high wages and comfortable living conditions. I am not at all writing this with a view to denouncing mercenaries as a new phenomenon emerging in the Soviet Army. Everybody sells his professional skills as he chooses, all the more so under the circumstances when they, mindful of universal dislocations, are afraid to lose their service, apartment, and everything they spent years working for. Others, having lost faith in all Moscow leadership, understand that they have been abandoned here to their own devices. Yet others, who wish to accomplish the rebirth of their Soviet Motherland, believe that not all is lost yet, and see the preserved 4th Army as needed for their day in the sun.

Their expectation of a big war puts me on my guard. No one in the above three categories, and not even those who unambiguously want to leave Azerbaijan together with the army, believe in a civilized outcome of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. They do not see a specific path toward peace, though they do make widely divergent proposals. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Korotchenko,

deputy commander for educational work at one of the outposts and a former political officer, advocates reinforcing the border between the two republics "in which everybody is afraid for his own life, and the situation is being aggravated." To the contrary, the intelligence chief of one of the regiments thinks that "we need to get out of here as soon as possible. The longer we stand on the border the longer the war will last."

Against the background of our twaddling about peace for four years, his words appear blasphemous. However, could he be right? Retired Rear Admiral Timur Gaydar visited the combat locations of operation "Ring" on the hot trail. Overwhelmed by the events, he sent an urgent message to President Mikhail Gorbachev as early as 24 August.

"I am appealing to you from the village of Verishen—the largest Armenian village in Shaumyanovskiy Rayon, which has now been abolished by a willful decision of the Azeri authorities. The permanent population of the village amounts to approximately 5,000. At present, there are 8,000. The population increased after the Azeri OMON forced the population of three nearby Armenian villages in the rayon to come here, with active combat support provided by the units of our, Soviet 4th Army... The village of Verishen is entirely blockaded by the Azeris and the Soviet army. There is no power, and medicine and food are in desperately short supply. Cargo can be transported, and the wounded and the sick may only be carried by helicopter from Yerevan. However, airborne helicopters en route draw fire from the ground all the time. Verishen is under continuous aimed fire. For the most part, Alazan rockets are fired, but artillery and the howitzers of the tank regiment of the 23d Division, commanded by Colonel Budeykin, frequently join in. The fire is well-aimed and closely patterned. Under other circumstances, I would have praised the commander of the tank regiment Kuliyeu for the good training given to his gunners. However, in this case I believe that Lieutenant Colonel Kuliyeu should be court-martialed for relaying and carrying out inhumane orders..."

"I appreciate how many priority matters of state there are in these wonderful days which inaugurate a new era in the history of Russia (after the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] putsch was put down—note by Pavel Anokhin)! And yet, today there is an extremely urgent concern!... I beg of you that you order the commander of the 4th Army, General Sokolov, to immediately cease all combat operations... The order should be given immediately. I will take the liberty to outline my view of necessary measures and their sequence: 1. The withdrawal of all units of the 4th Army committed to the conflict, to places of permanent billeting. 2. The redeployment of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR in such a manner as to securely separate Armenian and Azeri villages, thus resolutely counteracting mutually inflicted bloodshed..."

It would appear that Mikhail Gorbachev should have heeded this cry from the heart, being shaken by the putsch and having looked down an abyss into which all of our democratic accomplishments could have been pushed, as he stressed when he introduced his new book "The August

Putsch—Causes and Consequences." This was all the more so because the 23d Division showed itself to be, in essence, an accomplice of the junta, carrying out criminal orders by putschists D. Yazov and V. Polyanichko, including in those days in August.

However, the facts indicate that little has changed to date. At present, the 4th Army, not yet Azeri but already not Soviet, is deployed in the same positions.

Where are they to go? I cannot forget a phrase which Colonel A. Budeykin uttered responding to my question about possible unpredictable instructions of one of the three presidents regarding the 23d Division. He said: "We report an order by any president to Minister of Defense Shaposhnikov first." I was naively surprised: "But the USSR president is commander in chief of the Armed Forces. He signs ukases and instructions." The division commander was sarcastic: "Let the president sign, but orders are given by the minister of defense."

What is it—a diplomatic screen which makes it possible for the USSR president to "wash his hands" of the Armenian-Azeri war? Or is the president really powerless to change anything in this region without the approval of military commanders or some other forces which our society does not see? After all, it was for a reason that Ayaz Mutalibov stated at the same press conference: "Nagorno-Karabakh is a model which was fine-tuned well there, and promptly applied in other places."

Draft Begins in Estonia

92UN0463L Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian,
9 Nov 91 p 1

[BNS Release: "Young Men To Be Drafted Beginning Monday"]

[Text] Estonia's draft of young men into defense service will start on November 11. Draft commissions for that purpose have been formed at the state defense departments of district and city governments, notices have been mailed to the homes of draftees.

Called up in the draft are male citizens born in 1972 or earlier, who have not served in the military. According to Ants Laaneots, deputy chief of staff of the Republic of Estonia Defense Force, the draftees will undergo medical screening by several specialists, and only then will the commission decide if the draftee is qualified to serve in the defense force. For the time being, the draftees will be sent to the training base at Remnik, they will be wearing the current uniforms of Kodukaitse [Home Defense].

A. Laaneots did not wish to name the number of men to be drafted. Since units of the Soviet Interior Ministry are not vacating the barracks as scheduled, some problems may be encountered with housing the draftees.

There is no legislative basis in Estonia at this time for punishing draft evaders. "This has created a situation, where many of the young men may not show up at the draft commission. Why should they enlist in these confusing times, when they can just as well stay home," Mr. Laaneots mused. In Lithuania, for example, where calling up for the

draft started on November 6, those not showing up without a valid excuse, are fined 500 rubles.

Ants Laaneots, deputy chief-of-staff of the Republic of Estonia Defense Force, instructed the draft commissions to call up the men according to requirements specified in the 1938 constitution. "It would be too early to tell what will come of it all," Ants Laaneots told the BNS correspondent.

Ministers Meet to Discuss Troop Withdrawal

92UN0471C Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian
14 Nov 91 p 1

[ETA Release: "State Minister Raivo Vare Met With Chief of SU Baltic Military District Forces"]

[Text] On Wednesday, RE [Republic of Estonia] State Minister Raivo Vare received Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, chief of SU [Union] Baltic Military District forces, at Toompea.

Under discussion, according to the RE government press service, were arrangements for accommodating Soviet military units in Estonia, and their removal. Minister R. Vare expressed his dissatisfaction with the slow pullout of the airborne units. The barracks used by the airborne units at Võru have not been turned over to the Estonian authorities yet, because no decision has been made by the SU Minister of Defense. The pullout of units at the Viljandi location has not even begun.

R. Vare and V. Mironov also spoke about organizing military training exercises. Raivo Vare requested that the media be informed of all military exercises taking place at Aegviidu up until November 15, and of all other maneuvers, by commanders of units involved in those exercises, and also that such notification be done much earlier than before.

Army Commander on Combat Readiness

92UM0222A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Dec 91 p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant General A. Ryabtsev, commander of the Army stationed on the territory of Kazakhstan, by freelance correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Savelyev, in the Turkestan Military District, date not given: "Combat Readiness—A Topical Concern: Army Commander's Optimistic Prognosis"]

[Text] December is the time for summarizing the results of combat training and analyzing the achievements of a year that has not been easy for the Army. It is also the time... for putting in place the preconditions for organizing intensive combat training in the coming year. This is the topic of our freelance correspondent's conversation with Lieutenant General A. Ryabtsev, commander of the Army stationed on the territory of Kazakhstan.

[Savelyev] Anatoliy Semenovich, many officers and petty officers are in a state of uncertainty: Will they be engaged in winter, let alone summer, training? I happened to hear some rather pessimistic prognoses: There is no way, they say, to conduct combat training in the old sense during the

next few months. Unless we want to train people by simply pointing at this or that. There is no money for anything more than that...

What is your prognosis in this respect?

[Ryabtsev] I can name only some preconditions that are promising in the sense of providing certain conditions for organizing planned combat training in our formation. I think that, thanks to a constructive and balanced policy in respect of the military on the part of President Nursultan Nazarbayev and the republic government, the troops in Kazakhstan are in much more favorable conditions that are more conducive to constant combat readiness than those in some other regions of the country.

A favorable moral climate exists for the collectives of almost all garrisons in the formation. As a rule, the military fulfills defense tasks side by side with the working people of the republic. People see that today a military serviceman experiences no fewer difficulties than a city or rural dweller. Quite often, families of officers and petty officers find themselves actually in a more difficult situation, without apartments and experiencing severe shortages of food products. Therefore, labor and military collectives provide noticeable mutual assistance to each other on a regular basis. Whatever we have that we can share, we are happy to give to our friends and partners. In turn, thanks to the city and rural residents of Kazakhstan the military here have the minimum of consumer goods and food products that allows them to provide subsistence for their families.

The fall draft, carried out in accordance with the president of Kazakhstan's decree and the agreement reached between the republic and the USSR Ministry of Defense, is the second important precondition for setting up planned combat training in the coming year. Troops stationed on the territory of the republic are the priority destination to which the Kazakhstan military draft office sends the draftees. We are certain that the formation will not be as hugely understaffed in each unit as it had been just recently, which made it literally impossible to conduct tactical training and maneuvers.

The shortage of some types of equipment has been alleviated by using equipment being withdrawn from the group of forces.

And, finally, I should mention that lately officers collectives have regained stability. Those who wanted to be transferred to the reserves have done so. I do not have any discharge requests on my desk, although only recently there were quite a few. The way I see it, those who stayed are the people who joined the Army as a vocation; those who, under the current harsh conditions, are able to show stamina, determination, and loyalty to duty.

[Savelyev] But are there replacements for those officers who left the ranks of the Armed Forces of their own volition?

[Ryabtsev] Of course there are. We have received rather good reinforcement from the units withdrawn from the group of forces to the territory of the Union. Also, graduates of military schools.

Continuing the conversation about the preconditions for a better upcoming year, I would like to say that for the first time in many years we have received five learning-and-training systems that allow comprehensive training of tank drivers. Three of them have already been assembled; the others are waiting for the rooms to be prepared. We received 15 new simulators for tank drivers, with instructional attachments. They are operational by now. In the Alma-Ata garrison a video simulator for training BMP [armored personnel carrier] drivers has been put into operation.

In short, strange as it may sound, the defense industry has been able to enhance the technical resources for our training. We are grateful to it for this. We understand what effort it must have cost the labor collectives—for instance, in Nizhniy Tagil.

[Savelyev] One gets an impression that problems are being alleviated.

[Ryabtsev] Things are currently this way: some work indefatigably, as before, and through their efforts truly “unclog” the bottlenecks. Others only talk about difficulties while doing nothing to deal with them, and by their inactivity and panicky statements sow chaos and confusion. Our Army is grateful to those who made these simulators for us, those who have been delivering fuel for our equipment, those who have been supplying the troops with food, clothing, electric power, heat, and many other things...

We are also grateful to the railway workers of the country, and especially those of Kazakhstan, and the drivers of various automotive organizations in the republic.

What can we say in response? Only that in the difficult situation of economic upheaval that has overcome the country we will do everything to provide a reliable defense of its southeastern borders. We have many people who work creatively and show initiative. I will name three—Colonel Viktor Antoshkin and Lieutenant Colonels Yevgeniy Derbin and Aleksandr Kondratenkov. Under their command, combat training is organized better and military discipline is firmer.

At the same time, I could present a long list of things we currently do not have and which can negatively affect the progress of training in the coming year. For instance, financing. Estimates-requests have been put together, but what amounts will be allocated and when, nobody knows. It will be very difficult to put together the planned field training and maneuvers. Searching for materials for targets, cables, cement, and brick is often futile... But how can one sustain the training material base in working condition without it? There are many difficulties with spare parts for equipment, lubricants, insulation materials.

There are many difficulties, but most of all we are concerned with the political uncertainty. What kind of a state will we have? What will be the status of the Armed Forces? Can all military servicemen count in the near and distant future on social protection provided by the state? These are questions I get from my subordinates every morning, and it is difficult to answer them precisely.

Bitterness Noted in Tyumen OMON Units

92UM0207A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 22 Nov 91 p 2

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA special correspondent Sergey Sevtsov: “How the Riga OMON is Living in Tyumen: Special Detachment”]

[Text] Tyumen is a city that generates crime. The first point—the city market, to which our Rafik drove up with an OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] duty group—was a hot spot. A drunken brawl in the middle of the day. Wall to wall. The solitary militiaman surrounded by a crowd of gawkers timidly and unsuccessfully tried to persuade the fighters.

Four OMON members who jumped out of the Rafik blocked off the source of the fight in a couple of minutes. The senior member of the group—Garik (we will call him what his friends call him)—pushed into the crowd and after a second his powerful paralyzing shout rang out: “Everybody freeze! Do not move!”

The crowd stood still in surprise. The fighters turned in the direction of the shout. Before them stood a stocky young man in a black beret and a mottled army jump suit.

“And who are you, commander?”

“Silence!”

One of the drunks tried to raise his hand but Garik grabbed it:

“Hands at your sides! Everyone freeze!”

“I understand, boss, I am standing still...”

The entire scene of the “breaking up of the fist fight” lasted about 10 seconds. All the militiaman had to do then was take statements and make out his report. And the “black berets” got back into their microbus.

The OMON fighting men work hard. They check any suspicious car—first the documents, then they carefully inspect the inside, the trunk, and the driver himself. Any attempts to disobey OMON men are doomed to failure.

Intended mainly for fighting organized crime, the OMON has had to handle everything. In the airport and in the railroad and bus stations at night I have seen this picture: Two lines standing still waiting—passengers and taxicabs.

“They are reduced to starvation,” explained Garik, meaning the taxi drivers. “They have set their prices and are waiting until the people will pay them. But the taxi drivers are introducing the free market and we are regulating it...”

Here the “black berets” have one scenario: They open the doors of the taxis and invite the passengers: “Have a seat, please.” Not believing what is happening, the people get into the vehicles. Some taxi drivers try to resist the representatives of power, but the OMON members respond briefly and simply: “Make sure you go by the meter!...”

As we found out, the inspection of the motor vehicles is an extremely touchy thing, and far from everyone likes it.

"Checking vehicles and passport requirements is envisioned by the new RSFSR law on the militia," Major General V. Basharin, Tyumen Internal Affairs Administration chief, explained the actions of his subordinates. "Of course, it is unpleasant when you have done nothing wrong and they inspect you anyway. But how is the militiaman supposed to determine just by a superficial look what precisely is in, say, the trunk of your car? And frequently there are more than just empty gas cans back there..."

During the two nights I spent with the OMON crews they harvested a good "crop"—about two dozen knives and switch blades, hatchets, nunchakus, aerosol cans of paralytic nerve gas, homemade pistols with small cartridges, and also two Japanese-produced field radios. The last were prepared to be sent to a hard labor camp.

Two weeks ago the Tyumen special purpose militia detachment (formerly Riga) finally received an official status. A local OMON group was merged with the detachment. They were moved from a suburban pioneer camp to a base in the city, if the crowded, ramshackle dump they are housed in can be called a base.

Since the beginning of September, when the detachment was relocated from Riga to Tyumen, its workers have uncovered about 100 criminal acts and confiscated about 30 kilograms of drugs and a large quantity of edged weapons and firearms, including some produced in foreign countries.

"We need efficient, intelligent, planned work," says chief of the OMON operations division, Senior Lieutenant Artur Timachev. "The criminal world has gotten intolerably bold and the militia is frequently demoralized and powerless. The OMON, of course, is not a panacea for all our problems. But to make it so that the people can breathe more easily and go out on the streets without being afraid, to rein in the unruly hooligans and mafiosi—this the detachments can and should do. The more so since we are not alone—the young Tyumen detachment of special-purpose internal forces is gathering strength."

The Riga (Tyumen) OMON lives. Acting commander of the former Riga detachment, Major Valeriy Brovkin considers the collapse of the Vilnius OMON a tragedy. And everyone in the detachment experiences personal pain at the loss of Sergey Parfenov.

"We would not have turned Serezha over," says Vladimir, one of those who were with Parfenov on that ill-fated trip to Surgut. "But they deceived us..."

"Betrayal." I heard this word many times from the chaps in the black berets. At first they were reluctant to speak about politics, but after that it was like the dam broke: They were drawn into armed conflict, "exposed," and then "cast aside" like a used missile stage. "But where was this missile rushing?..."

Oleg is a sturdy young man with red hair, he wears glasses, and he looks like a student-intellectual.

"We followed Gorbachev's order to unblock the highways and provide for unimpeded passage of national economic cargo," he says. "You know what came of this. The president declared us to be criminals because we followed his orders."

"When we eliminated the customs," Andrey enters the conversation, "we found six of the latest imported leather jackets, two boxes of tanned wild boar hides, and other hidden shortage goods that were not indicated in the documents. As soon as these boys from the police got on the road they started to take advantage of a good thing..."

After the workers of the Latvian militia (and they comprised a large part of the Riga garrison) headed by deputy chief of the city internal affairs administration, Colonel N. Goncharenko, declared their resolve to follow only the instructions of the Union leadership and the laws of the USSR, all of them became objects of mass provocations and persecution.

As they say, the process of sovereignization took place... And those who were standing in the way had to be removed.

Let us recall that first there was the attempt at armed arrest of OMON commander Cheslav Mlynnik—and there was gunfire. One person was killed. Nationalist propaganda immediately christened this unfortunate person the "first victim for the freedom of Latvia," although he himself was hardly dreaming of "glory" and just happened to end up in the crossfire.

Remember that from the Ministry of Internal Affairs building and Bastion Hill in the center of Riga they fired on the OMON guard who were coming to the Latvian SSR procuracy to work their shift. At that time the "black berets" were accused of a deliberate attack on the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs. But so far nobody can give a clear answer to this question: Why was it that these people who were driving up to the Ministry of Internal Affairs building (the guard route goes by it) all at once began to be filmed by at least 10 foreign cameramen who "happened" to be in this place on that evening?

There was a loathsome incident—the seizure by military men of Svetlana S., the wife of an OMON platoon commander. Four months pregnant, first she was interrogated in the car—about the details of the location of the OMON base near Riga—and then she was taken to an apartment. They took turns raping her and recording the woman's screaming and weeping on a tape recorder. Then they telephoned the base and had them call Svetlana's husband to the phone. After he had heard the recording they warned him: Basically the same fate awaits all the wives of OMON members...

One of the scum who raped Svetlana ended up among the "black berets." Svetlana recognized him. What were they to do with him? Turn him over to Latvian "justice"? There they would only encourage him as a hero. Kill him? These ideas were also expressed—the offense was too great, the crime too loathsome and low. The OMON members adhered to their own principles and decided to let him go, not to dirty their hands.

That is what they are like, these "black berets," these "beasts"...

*"We set out in a long column,
In the day—not night, for we are not thieves.
It is a pity that the people have been deprived of our full,
selfless and faithful support."*

The song "We set out" was by the guitar lyricist Andrey Chernyavskiy—one of the detachment's fighting men.

They left with their heads held high. They were accompanied by tears in the eyes of the "second class" citizens, the so-called Russian-speaking ones, whose only protection until recently was the Riga OMON.

Not all of them left. After all, they still had apartments and relatives in Riga... How can one throw all that away?

"Some of the people who betrayed us decided to serve the new masters," says Andrey, whom we already know. "They entered the special-purpose police detachment. And together (two of them) they turned over their diaries to the "security service." They describe day after day and give names. These diaries are helping the Riga investigators to trump up cases against us.

And today nobody from the detachment can be sure that he will not be arrested tomorrow and taken back to the Baltics.

It is only at first glance that the situation surrounding our Riga OMON may seem confused and "incomprehensible." In reality everything is considerably simpler. According to a deal made among "certain circles" of the leadership of Russia and Latvia, through criminal cases concocted in the neighboring states, former workers of the Riga militia are being turned over.

How were the Riga OMON members greeted in Tyumen? At first, in the words of Valeriy Brovkin, relatively calmly, and kindly.

But then, as time passed, the detachment, with its raids and searches, seriously alarmed the local criminal element and mafia structures. There began to appear in the press articles like this small note in the TYUMEN VEDOMOSTI: A certain Sasha Oskolkov "named a kitten he had found Omon. A couple of days ago Sasha visited the editorial offices and he had gotten rid of Omon; the kitten had turned out to be thieving, flea-bitten, and disgusting, and so it was kicked out." Signed—"Friends."

"At first we were disturbed," says Valeriy Brovkin. "But then we just shrugged it off. Because they need their petty intrigues and idle talk. We have no time for that."

Service in Riga was a deep scar on the destiny of each OMON fighting man. Sergey is a tall, dark fellow from Riga (incidentally, all the OMON members were stately, strong, and handsome—the very picture of health), a former para-trooper, who sadly shared his personal experience:

"When my mother found out that I had entered the detachment she said: 'You are no longer my son.' My little boy is one and a half and my mother has never seen her grandson. But my father is all in favor of my being in the OMON."

The fate of the Riga OMON is the fate of the country in the perestroika and post-perestroika period. It is no accident that millions of people are divided: Either they love the OMON or they hate it. But the former Riga special detachment, in spite of everything, has held its own, and it lives as our faith lives. Convictions (they all wear on their chests a red badge with the inscription "USSR") and danger, betrayal at all levels and at the same time support from millions of honest people throughout the country, militant brotherhood and faithfulness to duty force the chaps in the black berets to stay together. They serve as an example to others who are confused and downtrodden and have lost their faith. The fighting men of the present Tyumen OMON will find within themselves the strength to respond to every call from the walkie-talkie like: "Looting at the TsUM [Central Department Store]..." And at the same time they look around and do not get far away from one another so that they will not be seized by people from the special services of the neighboring state.

Honest and blameless, they have been forced to hide their faces in their own country and not tell a journalist their real names. It seems that Mother Russia has never before known this kind of disgrace...

"We find it shameful to hide and disgusting to conceal our faces," I was told in another city by two former officers of the Riga militia, V. Antyufeyev and G. Oksman, who are now living "underground." "We expect support from our Russian deputies. We understand that the people's elected officials have many other, no less important problems, that the country is on the edge of the abyss... But have the people's deputies thought about the fact that it is quite possible that all these problems have befallen the country precisely because for some time now we have all been methodically and indifferently betraying ourselves?"

Latvia Could Help Build Military Housing

92UM0210B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Dec 91 p 2

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Chronicle, Events, Opinions": Housing for the Army for Pay"]

[Text] The Latvian authorities, speaking in favor of accelerated withdrawal of Soviet military servicemen from the territory of the republic, are prepared to contribute in practical ways to solving this problem, announced Talavs Yundeis, who has taken over the duties of the republic's minister of defense. Speaking on republic television, he said in particular that Latvian construction workers, many of whom have ended up without work because of the sharp curtailment of housing construction in the republic, could participate in the construction of housing in the USSR for the needs of the Soviet Army. But, the minister explained, it is possible to do this only according to the principles of a market economy and for the appropriate pay, since, unlike Germany, Latvia cannot finance this construction and provide materials and technical equipment.

In Yundeis' words, Latvia counts some of the Soviet arms located on its territory as compensation for the payments the republic has made to the Union budget over the years,

the harm caused to nature in Latvia by the USSR Armed Forces, and also for the property the Latvian Army had in 1940.

Military Moves Against Moldova Denied

*92UM0210D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Dec 91 p 2*

[Article from USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center, under the rubric "Chronicle, Events, Opinion": "Groundless Accusations"]

[Text] As was reported to a TASS correspondent in the Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the appeal from the leaders of the Republic of Moldova to the parliaments and governments of the countries of the world and to the UN Security Council, in which it accuses the 14th Army of the Odessa Military District of having begun open aggression against the republic and occupied the population points of Grigoriopol, Dubossary, Slabodzeya, Tiraspol, and Rybnitsa on the eve of the presidential elections, does not correspond to reality.

Troops of the Odessa Military District are at the points where they are permanently stationed: They are performing their duties and working according to their military training plans. The military subdivisions have not turned over a single unit of arms to anybody.

The USSR Ministry of Defense is prepared to consider all questions that arise on the basis of mutual respect, mutual understanding, and responsibility. This is the only way to find constructive solutions that correspond to the interests of the military servicemen of the USSR Armed Forces as well as to those of the people of sovereign Moldova.

St. Petersburg DOSAAF Chief Interviewed

*92UM0181A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 42, Oct 91 p 6*

[Interview with St. Petersburg City and Oblast DOSAAF Committee Chairman Georgiy Vladimirovich Kuznetsov by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT Correspondent Valentin Saranchev, under the rubric: "Under Market Conditions": "Saint Petersburg City and Oblast DOSAAF Committee Chairman Georgiy Kuznetsov: The Main Thing is Real Deeds"]

[Text]

[Saranchev] Georgiy Vladimirovich, nearly five months have passed since you were elected chairman. It is a short time but it is still adequate to review and assess what kind of organization you have inherited and what state it is in. I think that this did not take a great deal of work from you, you are not a man "who was not directly involved"....

[Kuznetsov] Yes, that is true. I was Leningrad City and Oblast DOSAAF Committee deputy chairman and I was responsible for mass organizational work and military-patriotic propaganda. So I know our problems firsthand. And this, on the one hand, facilitates my task somewhat. On the other hand, I have to constantly remember that the people

have trusted me and are waiting for specific actions from me and therefore they are justified in making high demands of me.

The sense of heightened responsibility also plays the role of a unique stimulus, does not permit me to slacken, and forces me to work diligently. And this is good.

Great changes are occurring in DOSAAF organizations. A certification of staff workers has been conducted. The composition of the committee has been renewed somewhat. We have new chiefs in three sections. Naturally, some sort of adjustment period is required even with all of their zeal and conscientiousness. Although there is no time to lose. We have to change our approaches toward improving defense-educational work.

As of today, the leaders of rayon and city committees and also of DOSAAF training and sports organizations have, through their collective efforts, developed a concept for the effective solution of socio-economic problems. This is all the more important right now when the country's Defense Society is undergoing far from the best of times. It is understandable that we are concerned about DOSAAF's fate, the cause to which we have dedicated our lives. We can only emerge from the crisis that has developed through the unity of our actions and through prevention of the errors of the past.

[Saranchev] Where do you see these errors?

[Kuznetsov] Well, first of all, we did not have proper coordination of efforts and there was no coordination in the activities of the departments. Therefore we expended a lot of effort to carry out tasks, we lost time, and we far from completely realized our opportunities. So-called parallelism in work existed. We also observed a turn toward administrative methods which also had negative results, especially in work among the population. Yes and it also had a poor impact on the quality of training of specialists in a number of our training organizations. Hence, also the censures directed at us.

The inadequate supply of various material-technical and financial resources and low rates of development of facilities also made themselves known. All of this is the result of omissions in the work of the DOSAAF Committee Presidium and Bureau and the lack of local support for initiatives. Moreover: the leadership's administrative style simply interfered with the deepening of independent foundations in the rank and file. And as a result, as of today we have many unfinished facilities for construction and obsolete training facilities.

[Saranchev] The situation is really not the best. All the more so right now when the following problem has reached its full height for many DOSAAF organizations: How do they survive under market conditions? We all know that until now the Leningrad City and Oblast defense organization has received significant subsidies from the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. Now conditions are different. What do you intend to undertake for the self-sufficiency of the committees, schools, and STK [sports-technical complexes]?

[Kuznetsov] We perceive the transition to the market as an objective need. And this process makes the radical reorganization of the Defense Society inevitable. I will point out that these problems were examined in April at our committee plenum. However, to name the problems and to define the methods and procedures of our activities is far from everything. The main thing is real deeds. And here everything is far from simple. Much depends on personal skill and the professionalism of the executors, their initiative, and the availability of a material and financial base. In a word, we are talking about entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is the chance to survive under market conditions. But here we still have a lot to learn. There will also certainly be bosses.

However, there is no other way.

Today our rayon and city organizations have mainly shifted to new conditions of management they are establishing sports-technical clubs. Incidentally, it is the STK and the interest clubs that the various sections are making their top priority. They are attracting young people to them and I think behind them is the future Defense Society.

One of the ways to survive under market conditions is to create leading organizations based on STK's, thereby expanding the capabilities of clubs and they attain rayon status. Parts of buildings, structures, and other floor space are being leased on terms that are favorable for us. The establishment of small enterprises based on DOSAAF organizations also merits attention.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee is also not standing by. An expanded Central Committee Presidium Bureau session took place after N.N. Kotlovsev's visit to the Leningrad Defense Organization, where they told me about the state of affairs. Substantial financial support was rendered along with useful advice. Specifically, resources were allocated for completion of construction of the water sports facility at Ozerki—a picturesque resort area for city residents on the Neva.

[Saranchev] You anticipated my question. I wanted to ask precisely about the fate of the facility that has been under construction for a long time in Ozerki and also about other similar facilities.

[Kuznetsov] That is a painful topic. At one time, we did not know how to realize existing capabilities for the radical renewal of defense-sports work, the development and consolidation of facilities, and the improvement of financial and economic activities. And now what we could previously accomplish with minimal expenditures of men and equipment requires considerably increased expenditures.

As I already stated, there is a USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium Bureau special decision which provides for definite assistance to complete construction of some of our facilities. But the Central Committee is also not omnipotent. Therefore, certain expensive facilities will be placed in caretaker status, as they say, until better times. They are the oblast aeroclub facility in Vyborg, the dormitory for driving school No 2 in Leningrad, more accurately, already Saint Petersburg, the technical school in Tikhvin,

and the small arms range in Lodeynoe Pole.... Of course, it is too bad. But we need to look at things realistically: there is no money today.

[Saranchev] Georgiy Vladimirovich, Saint Petersburg is a city on the water, a city-seaport. I think that I am not mistaken if I say that there are the most unique opportunities here to develop water sports. But how will they be taken advantage of?

[Kuznetsov] Last year, the last stage of the world water-motor sports championship took place in Leningrad. This was an interesting and graphic event and also the first time it was conducted in our city. Many DOSAAF sportsmen also participated in the great and colorful holiday on the water which was a good propaganda opportunity for the Defense Society and its activities. Hundreds of new water sports enthusiasts were introduced to water-motor sports. I think that water sports will occupy a priority direction in our country.

[Saranchev] One of the main directions of the activity of the Defense Society is the patriotic education of young people. How will this task be carried out now, while considering the political situation that has developed in our country today?

[Kuznetsov] Analysis shows that recently our work on patriotic education of pre-conscription age young men has dramatically slackened. The anti-army campaign that was conducted along with the mass media has had an impact. As a result, a negative attitude toward military service has increased among young people. Moreover, we have continued work according to the obsolete pattern.

In order to emerge at a new level, we have established close interrelations with "Znaniye" [Knowledge] Society, The Council of Veterans of War and Labor and we have joined efforts with a trade union, youth organizations, and public education organs. We have defined joint measures dedicated to the 50th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War. We are also utilizing the capabilities of the DOSAAF Home and our information bulletin "Naslednik" [Heir].

Incidentally, the DOSAAF Home collective, headed by Reserve Officer Nikolay Ivanovich Prokofyev, is doing quite a bit for the patriotic education of young people. Months devoted to a specific cause are regularly conducted, branch of forces weeks and meetings of young lads with veterans of war and labor and soldier-internationalists are being organized. A dramatic theater has been created based on DOSAAF Home which SOVETSKIY PATRIOT has already described. In a word, we are not standing in place although there are a multitude of problems.

[Saranchev] Thank you for the interview. Georgiy Vladimirovich, I have a suggestion: let us return to our conversation in a year. We will analyze what you have managed to do from what was planned and what you did not. And why.

[Kuznetsov] I accept your suggestion.

Navy Transports Potatoes to St. Petersburg

92UM0222B *Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in *Russian* 11 Dec 91 p 1

[Report by Captain 1st Rank A. Zlydnev: "Humanitarian Potatoes: An Afterword to an Emergency Foreign Cruise"]

[Text] The mass media has reported that the Navy has delivered 10,000 tons of German potatoes to St. Petersburg. At our correspondent's request, Rear Admiral A. SLAVGORODSKIY, deputy commander for rear services of the Leningrad Navy Base, told us how this assignment, which is unusual for the Navy, has been carried out.

During the first days of November, the St. Petersburg mayoralty received word from its sister city, Hamburg, that the promised humanitarian aid was ready for shipment. This was in regard to 10,000 tons of potatoes being sent as a gift. The German side also took upon itself the expenses related to loading and berthing in the port of Vismar for Soviet transport ships.

On 7 November, A. Sobchak called on Vice Admiral V. Selivanov, commander of the Leningrad Navy Base; on 10 November, oceanographic research vessels (ORV) Ivan Kruzenstern, Academician Krylov, and Leonid Demin, and training vessels Smolnyy and Khasan left Kronstadt.

The work started practically the moment they arrived at the port of destination. The loading went, as they say, from truck to deck without pause. German longshoremen and Soviet seamen worked from dawn to late evening, demonstrating coordination and complete mutual understanding. It should be noted that neither oceanographic research vessels nor, to an even larger degree, training vessels are suited for transporting such cargo, and the cruise headquarters and the "convoy" commanders had to rack their brains quite a bit to find a way to accommodate the huge number of 50-kilogram sacks, to ensure work safety, and to prevent spoilage of the potatoes.

The original plan called for several shuttle trips. Accordingly, the supply of food on the vessels had been calculated on that basis. Also, this was an emergency cruise, so it had been impossible to make provisions for everything that might be needed. The situation changed, however. Baltic Maritime Steamship Line vessel, the Kommunar, arrived at Vismar to take on 7,000 tons of potatoes. Hands were needed urgently, and the Navy found itself in the center of events again. Cruise headquarters staff agreed that loading of the Kommunar should be done on a volunteer basis. The crew of the Smolnyy and cadets of the Imeni Dzerzhinskogo Higher Navy Engineering School who were on board, were offered a choice: to continue work or to transfer to the Khasan, which was leaving for St. Petersburg in two hours. Everybody stayed, knowing that the city was waiting for food deliveries. They worked for another week, loading 800 or more tons a day. Hard labor required extra nutrition; in addition, the seamen ran out of cigarettes. Help came from the artillery and motorized rifle units of the Western Group of Forces stationed in Vismar—they provided food and cigarettes.

In short, the potato cruise came to a successful conclusion.

Still, this humanitarian aid for a city with more than 5 million residents is like a drop of water in the Neva. So if we count only on this and on help from the military, we will hardly survive in the market economy.

Russian Soldiers 'Hot Spot' Duty Scored

92UM0208A *Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*
in *Russian* 6 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA staff correspondent Zh. Kasyanenko: "Between Duty and Dishonor. Russian Soldiers Continue To Perish in Faraway Lands"]

[Text] Rostov-on-Don—It was very difficult to get them to talk, and next to impossible to make them be frank. Either they had been given such an order—to be silent, or they sincerely wanted to forget as soon as possible what they had seen with their eyes and what their 20-year-old souls had experienced over there, at war. What had they seen?

...A battle between two hostile groups was underway in the mountains. These guys wearing the uniforms of Internal Troops were in the middle, as is always the case. I do not know what the name for their mission is in military parlance, but in civilian terms, they were just pulling apart those who were fighting. When the fire died down, marauders crawled from one camp to the site of the engagement in order to cut off the ears of the dead and subsequently to preserve these eerie trophies in alcohol, in regular mayonnaise jars.

I am deliberately failing to mention the nationality of ear hunters. It is characteristic of people to have a nationality and to belong to a particular people. As far as these are concerned, they were not human. Our boys drove them away, risking stopping a bullet.

The boys have the same response to everything: We were carrying out orders. At present, it is both strange and painful to hear these words which are so common among soldiers. It is strange because we have been weaned away from strength, reliability, and discipline, and because we are somehow learning to live in a situation of unstable equilibrium. It seems to me that there is no need to explain why it is painful.

On 15 November, one more name, that of Vladimir Kirichenko, was added to the list of servicemen who died in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. His tour of duty was drawing to a close, and back home, in Saratov Oblast, they were getting ready for their son's return... On that day, a convoy of four Ural trucks with division materiel left Stepanakert for Novocherkassk, where a unit of the Internal Troops is based. At 2200 hours, the convoy was blocked in the settlement of Kuba by the local militia. They asked what was being transported, checked the cargo, and said that they would not be allowed to go further—the order was to await a member of the government of Azerbaijan.

After midnight, a member of the government escorted by people armed to the teeth arrived. He introduced himself as Rakhim Gaziyeu, people's deputy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. With insults and threats, they made the unarmed soldiers and officers go to Baku under the barrels

of automatic weapons. Nationalization of military materiel located in the territory of Azerbaijan was the pretext. The young sovereign state needs to arm itself.

Armed paramilitary troops were put in the cabs of the Urals next to our guys. Colonel Alekseyev, the officer in charge of the convoy, was pushed into a passenger car; just to be sure, they put a paramilitary member holding a hand grenade on one side, and one with an automatic weapon on the other. This is how they drove, until a crazy KamAZ loaded with persimmons dashed into the oncoming traffic lane. It hit the first Ural which was driven by Volodya Kirichenko. The second car, which did not manage to brake, plowed into the overall mess. Fortunately, in this case there were wounded only.

Having taken advantage of the confusion, our guys sped away in the two surviving Urals. They zoomed toward the border, paying no attention to shots, and crushing lowered gates at State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate checkpoints. Only before dawn, already in Dagestan, did they feel that the ghost of death which was chasing them had finally flown away.

For how long? After all, all of them will have to return to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast again, carrying out orders. Some of them will return only until their tour of duty ends, and others will return for good. Once again, there will be blood, alien guttural words of curses for them from both sides, and barrels of automatic weapons sticking from behind every stone—also from both sides.

We are terribly sorry for all: Armenians and Azeris, and innocent women, children, and old people. It is impossible to go on without believing that fate itself, if not the people, will sooner or later punish those whose hands are covered to their elbows with this innocent blood, even if it is carefully hidden for now under the snow-white cuffs of politicians.

However, who, on either side of the Caucasus Range, is sorry for Sergeant Mikhail Napadiy who has been between life and death for several weeks now with a penetrating wound of the spinal cord? Apart from his loved ones and friends, who is sorry for Warrant Officer A. Putnik who lost a leg due to a wound? What is the war of which they should be considered disabled veterans? In the name of what have 30 servicemen died and 73 been wounded in less than 10 months of this year alone?

These terrifying statistics go up every day. Their deaths and injuries would have made some sense had our military presence in the Caucasus contained extremists. This is not the case at all! Judging by the number of victims on both sides, the trend toward increasing tensions has not only continued, but mounted. It appears that the troops play the role of an irritant and kind of bait for the two hostile sides. Cases of attacks on checkpoints and individual units have become everyday occurrences in the Caucasus war. The goals of such acts are to seize weapons and ammunition. All republic governments and the Union Government are aware of this. However, the result is nothing.

What is it—a stable syndrome of imperial thinking? One hand is used to hand out “walking papers” to everybody wishing to secede from the Union, or the RSFSR, whereas

the other is used to implement the same old policy: Keep them and do not let them go? In this case, let them tell the soldiers: “Fellows, you are risking your lives in order to keep the republics of the Transcaucasus in the Union orbit.”

Of course, nobody will say this today. Therefore, the motive of coercion is ruled out as running counter to the official policy of Russia and the current strange entity which used to be called the Union. What remains?

Gloomy conjectures remain, for example, to the following effect: It is advantageous for someone to keep the Internal Troops, which have been transferred to republic jurisdiction by a ukase of the RSFSR president, in Transcaucasia as long as possible, with all their materiel, weapons, and material and technical facilities. It is utterly unimportant what is going to happen to the people. Is this to say that what happens to the souls of the 20-year-olds who succeed in returning from the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast safe and sound makes no difference to the rulers?

The Internal Troops are not a construction battalion. Strong, literate, and healthy individuals serve in the Internal Troops. Here they are, the future of the country, returning to “civilian life” with scorched souls. This has already happened to their elder brothers who served in Afghanistan. The Motherland betrayed them, having sent them to that war, and subsequently acknowledged that their deaths, blood, and exploits were all nonsensical and in vain.

However, ministers and marshals who gave orders to those guys got the sack, and their actions were denounced. At any rate, the Afghan veterans are certain that they will not be taken from the expanse of Russia, from their native homes, and turned over to the “dushman”—for now, that is.

However, at present, as well as before, he risks the most who carries out orders rather than he who gives them. Those giving orders are always securely protected from places where bullets fly, both by thousands of miles, and by interests and political considerations of which common soldiers have no idea. At present, the men and officers are not even certain that, having come home, they will not be extradited to an adjacent state as criminals, despite their being to blame only for carrying out orders.

What are you to your children, Russia—are you a mother, or a stepmother? What are you to your fathers—their natural daughter or an ungrateful stepdaughter? What kind of support can “green” boys count on when caught in the web of new borders and sovereignties, given the fact that even Russian combat General Ivan Chernyakhovskiy was betrayed and extradited by the motherland 46 years after he died for it, after he committed his indisputable deeds of valor?

The powers that be, with traditional candles in hand, were somehow not in attendance at the sorrowful reburial ceremony for Ivan Danilovich. Perhaps they could not make time. Or were they afraid to injure themselves in the eyes of an adjacent sovereign state?

...The newspapers report that an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan resolved to change the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. It is easy to

surmise how the Armenians still there will take it. It is equally easy to predict what the response of the Azeris is going to be to this. Therefore, the troops remain the only force capable of shielding both from fire. God willing, both Armenian and Azeri women whose children were fed from a soldier's kitchen, and whose homes were saved from commandos by our boys, will not forget that. However, what are we to tell Russian mothers?

Crime, Corruption Prosecutions Increasing

*92UM0221A Kiev VECHERNIY KIEV in Russian
15 Nov 91 p 2*

[Interview with Judicial Service Colonel Vladimir Stepanov, deputy military prosecutor of the Kiev Garrison, by Leonid Frosevich; place and date not given: "Dragon's Teeth"]

[Text] At present, some of the powers that be sow dragon's teeth with impunity just as they used to. Mistrust and fear grow in the "field" of reforming the army, and the evil puts down roots.

He understands full well that, by engaging in this frank conversation, he is asking for trouble. However, we also know well that, because of his active social position on issues of social justice, Judicial Service Colonel Vladimir Stepanov has gotten out of bounds, as they put it, for a long time rather than just yesterday or today. In Kiev and other garrisons where he served, they tried to dislodge him from his position but it did not work, perhaps because Stepanov was always prepared to stand up for his honor and that of the collective. Being humiliated and acting against his conscience sickens him. Talking to me about quite a difficult topic, namely the present and future of the organs of military justice and the shadowy aspects of army life, he did not smooth the rough edges this time either.

Themis, I Know You!

Certain points from a memorandum. In the nine months of this year, the military prosecutors's office of the Kiev Garrison has investigated 117 criminal cases (in 1990, 76 cases over the corresponding period of time). Of the above, 63 cases were referred to the courts (in 1990, 33 cases). The crime rate in the units served has increased considerably. This year, 110 crimes and 14 accidents have already been registered, all of which involved fatalities.

[Frosevich] Vladimir Viktorovich, nobody is in a better position than you, deputy military prosecutor of the Kiev Garrison, to tell the readers of VECHERNIY KIEV what the office in which you work is about.

[Stepanov] The collective of the garrison prosecutor's office is relatively small—11 prosecutors and investigators who shoulder a sizable burden of responsibilities, particularly those associated with reinforcing the rule of law and legal order. Incidentally, we are the ones "burdened" with monitoring compliance with laws and military manuals (there is no way to enumerate everything).

In addition, there is crime control and the preliminary investigation of criminal cases, the heavy burdens which, in a way, comprise our main work. (Nonetheless, oversight,

which I have already mentioned, should be a priority). Strange as it may be, this main area is handled only by deputy military prosecutors, and in large prosecutor's offices there is one more aide. The entire staff of prosecutors and investigators is committed to investigating criminal cases, whose numbers are increasing rather than declining.

I would like to note the circumstances and problems which merit screaming rather than talking about. Since the crime rate has gone up by a factor of two, the volume of work of investigators has increased accordingly. Meanwhile, what do the investigators have at their disposal? Previously, they used to say that they had pens and paper, but now there are difficulties with those too. Our technical equipment is quite scanty. Before we visit accident sites, we as a rule seek the assistance of criminal investigation experts from internal affairs organs. However, they are not particularly eager to help us; they have enough of their own problems.

Transportation is a problem too: If one investigator takes a car another one waits around. The only thing that is satisfactory is our premises.

Here is the problem above all problems: Seven officers do not have apartments; they live wherever they can. We cannot but be amazed by their patience and the courage of their wives, and be equally astounded by the inaction of Judicial Service Colonel A.I. Lisovets, the military prosecutor of the garrison, and the leadership of the military prosecutor's office of the Kiev District, who only know how to demand and monitor. However, the living conditions of officers are of no concern to them.

[Frosevich] Does the district prosecutor's office fail to help with anything at all?

[Stepanov] There is very little actual assistance. District prosecutor's offices are administrative bureaucratic structures which merely issue directives and give assignments. Of course, they generalize and analyze our work, as well as their own, the condition of crime and compliance with the law in the army, and they make proposals to the command. On occasion, they administer prosecutorial review, for example, after articles published in VECHERNIY KIEV on abuses during the construction of dachas in Pukhovka.

However, strange as it may be, on occasion they even hamper our work.

On one occasion, on 30 September, there was one car at the disposal of the garrison prosecutor's office. From the morning on, we were showered with requests for business trips. Suddenly, a call came in... from the district prosecutor's office, from Lieutenant Colonel V.I. Zarubich who relayed the instructions of the district prosecutor to give him (!) this only car.

It turned out that the car was needed to... pick up and deliver a great deal of luggage belonging to the wife of Justice Lieutenant Colonel Rozovik who had arrived from Germany. As far as the investigators were concerned, they took a streetcar.

[Frosevich] However, to tell you the truth, these reviews were of little use. More about them below.

[Stepanov] You are right. However, since you asked about assistance, I will conclude by saying that the "top brass" provides assistance by way of entire groups going on site. Garrison prosecutors jokingly thank them when they see such commissions off: "Thank you for your help. Thank you for not having me removed." As far as assistance is concerned, there is none.

[Frosevich] Allow me to be frank. Does the Kiev Garrison Prosecutor's Office claim to set a certain standard in operations?

[Stepanov] Well, we must view our own operations critically as well. There are some things in the area of general supervision which we are not happy with. This year, we have not worked enough on the issues of preventing mismanagement and the squandering of military assets and construction materials. The standard of preventing non-regulation relations, the evasion of military service, and crimes and accidents involving fatalities is poor.

There are shortcomings in the operation of the investigative staff as well. One criminal case has been returned by the court for additional investigation. As of now, four crimes remain unsolved; all of them are cases of theft, including that of three expensive computers.

The Civilian Life of a Military Prosecutor

What is this life, which is perhaps far from sweet? Let us look at it from the standpoint of observing the law rather than through a keyhole (because the latter is unethical). Let us recall in this instance Judicial Service Lieutenant General A.F. Katusev, former chief military prosecutor. As TRUD wrote, "he did everything possible to shelter the powers that be from prosecutorial supervision... He removed the entire top leadership of the Ministry of Defense from the zone of control and criticism." In Kiev, Judicial Service Colonel A.I. Lisovets, military prosecutor of the garrison, was beyond control and criticism. [Frosevich] Vladimir Viktorovich, it is hardly surprising that the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office transmitted an order by A.D. Vasilyev to support the State Committee for the State of Emergency and sent appropriate instructions to military prosecutors. This stressed yet again the erstwhile dependence of the servants of Themis on Communist dogmas. It was a pity...

[Stepanov] I recall how avidly the military prosecutor of the garrison implemented CPSU policies to the last. He rebuked me personally for failing to take the floor at party meetings for a long time and for failing to support him as a leader; he argued in favor of the view that the privileges of the party political apparatus were fair. This is no accident. After all, in this manner Anatoliy Ivanovich justified some of his illegal actions as well.

[Frosevich] What do you mean?

[Stepanov] For example, he used (and still uses) the official Volga car with state tags 56-80 DG as his personal car. In the morning, he drives his wife to work, and his children to college. The passenger car goes out only on Lisovets' orders, for official or private trips. On weekends, Anatoliy Ivanovich quite frequently drives the official black Volga

to his home town in Prilukskiy Rayon, Chernigov Oblast. It appears that he can do anything at all.

Using his official position as prosecutor, A.I. Lisovets purchased illegally, out of turn, first a Tavria car, and a Zhiguli VAZ-2105, both of them still at old prices. Some time later, he sold the Tavria.

Incidentally, the prosecutor deprived his subordinates of their legitimate right to at least be placed on a waiting list to acquire a passenger car.

[Frosevich] So why, in this case, is everybody failing to respond to lawlessness in the holy of holies, the prosecutor's office?

[Stepanov] It is not that the leadership of the district military prosecutor's office, in particular, military prosecutor Judicial Service Major General A.I. Frolov, fails to notice all this; it even justifies some of the actions of the prosecutor reporting to it. Supposedly to save time, the general allowed Lisovets to go to his home town, more than 150 kilometers away, for recreation. This is a strange saving of time, is it not? To this end, the prosecutor could use private transportation rather than leave the prosecutor's office reporting to him "without horsepower." Besides, who gave the major general the right to permit this? If the distance traveled by the car were to be paid for, it would be possible to consider. But not this..

Judicial Service Colonel A.N. Aleksandrov told me about this position of A.I. Frolov. He sorted out abuses by A.I. Lisovets on instructions from the well-known Katusev.

[Frosevich] The inspector came in response to your statement, I suppose.

[Stepanov] I do not make a secret of it. At the time, Lieutenant General Katusev communicated to me: "Some data on abuses by the Military Prosecutor of the Kiev Garrison Judicial Service Colonel A.I. Lisovets have been confirmed. Judicial Service Colonel A.I. Lisovets has been disciplined for the abuses in question and the immodesty shown in the process of acquiring private cars and sanatorium vouchers..."

[Frosevich] One gets the impression that someone, as if some mythical hero, deliberately spread the seeds of outrage wherever servicemen tread.

Anatoliy Ivanovich remains "the eye of the sovereign" to this day.

[Stepanov] Still, let us not generalize. However, we cannot do without this either; corruption has afflicted many military structures, as if stung by a dragon breathing fire.

The Shadowy Operators of Pukhovka

The Greek legend of the hero Cadmus says that, having slain a dragon, Cadmus tossed its teeth on the ground and plowed them under. Armed warriors grew out of the teeth and set upon Cadmus. It is not by chance that I recall this. There have been a great many publications in the press so far about so-called general's dachas, but there is no end in sight to abuses by high-ranking (and low-ranking) army officials. Dachas keep rising up by the sweat of the soldiers'

brows, as young people get callouses. Warriors with large stars on their shoulder boards, shadowy operators of sorts, grab the best construction materials delivered under quotas. Try taking a dig at them, and there will be no end of trouble.

[Frosevich] Vladimir Viktorovich, of course you remember our critical articles "Privates at General's Dachas" and "The Dacha Garrison..." The command of the troops of the Kiev Military District still has not put an end to outrages with the construction of detached cottages.

[Stepanov] I believe that at the time they just hushed up the matter. It could not have happened otherwise. High-ranking army figures were involved in the abuses and you cannot get to them just like that. This was not just the situation in Kiev alone. After all, Katusev himself forbade his subordinates to institute cases involving the construction of general's dachas.

[Frosevich] Indeed, but who is stopping the district military prosecutor's office, and the commander of the district troops, from devoting close attention to Pukhovka now?

[Stepanov] Try guessing yourself. After all, you and I went there recently, and we saw at whose dachas privates apply themselves. You would agree that this was not a pleasant sight. We came on them precisely at dinner time. Do you recall exhausted soldiers sitting next to an unfinished dacha, and some semi-faded, "brick-like" cereal and gray dried crust being before them... They cannot even give the guys a decent meal.

The fellows called up to guard the Motherland worked their tails off on that fall day at the dacha of Colonel Zhulin, chief of the logistics staff of the Kiev Military District. This was also where the official UAZ, 55-16 NM, stood idle. The soldiers were driven to the dacha by Senior Warrant Officer B.F. Babich, chief of the secret section of the logistics headquarters.

A.A. Korobkov, who works in the Darnitsa Housing Management Unit of the district, delivered the personnel of a cooking school to a dacha, saying, "What difference does it make where one gets soldiers?" It turns out that for him, they are slaves rather than soldiers.

I trust that the use of soldiers from the rear services military units of the Kiev Military Districts should be of concern to deputy commander Lieutenant General G.G. Kurdakov, chief of rear services of the district.

Colonel Ye.T. Ryazantsev, chief of the district topographic service, who arrived at his dacha in an official UAZ car, was not averse to using soldiers' labor free of charge either. At his villa, work was in full swing. Senior Warrant Officer N.K. Kovalchuk himself commanded the "builders." Here is another fact. Major I.V. Soroka dropped by the banks of the Desna "to take a walk" in an official Volga assigned to General S.S. Bolbas. In a word, outrages in Pukhovka have not been ultimately rooted out.

When Will the Star of Corruption Be Extinguished?

At present, it is not enough to slay the dragon, nor is it necessary. The days of this predator, which personifies a

mighty empire, are numbered. It is much more important to prevent the evil and lawlessness he fosters from sprouting, to root out the system of nomenklatura privileges, and to acknowledge that corruption exists not only in "civilian life" but also in the army. As a well-known political scientist wrote, "let us not interpret the word 'corruption' too narrowly." "When an individual is promoted to a prominent position who is not ready for this either in terms of his intellect, or his education, or work experience, or, finally, his moral traits, then what is it?"

[Frosevich] I heard in passing from you, Vladimir Viktorovich, that you refused to institute criminal proceedings against Rear Admiral A.M. Korovin and other officials. Did their dachas surface as well?

[Stepanov] Not quite. Let me explain. Between 1988 and June of this year, Rear Admiral A.M. Korovin, who was chief of the Kiev Higher Naval Political School, allowed violations of law to occur in his activities. Having exceeded his authority, the rear admiral issued orders by which he actually reassigned Captain Second Rank I.A. Kasatkin to a lower position for long periods of time twice, on 15 January 1990 and on 12 April 1991. Both orders were canceled on the suggestion of the garrison military prosecutor's office in the course of a review.

[Frosevich] Indeed, those who were at the apex of power felt inviolable. After all, a mechanism of suppression and threats could have been set in motion at any time with regard to undesirables.

[Stepanov] However, let us go back to our case. In August 1988, Rear Admiral A.M. Korovin used Petty Officer P.V. Oskirko, a candidate for admission, and seaman driver V.Yu. Bakanas with a ZIL vehicle assigned to him, and tractor operator V.N. Blagodyr, for work on his dacha compound in Khotyanovka. They lived there for no less than three days in a car, without ever leaving, which provided conditions for violations of law on their part. We do see violations of the legislation in effect associated with the official powers of Rear Admiral A.M. Korovin in the enumerated actions. However, no grounds for a criminal prosecution were found, taking into account the fact that these actions were not systematic, and were not committed for pecuniary considerations (with the exception of the use of servicemen for work at the dacha compound), as well as by virtue of the insignificance of the crime.

Let us look at another aspect. In 1989, the inspector groups of the financial service of the naval forces of the center audited the financial and economic operations of the Kiev Higher Naval Political School. It was established that servicemen, workers, and clerical workers purchased construction materials at the school at wholesale prices. In these cases, retail prices should have been used in making sales, and in the absence of such—wholesale prices, with coefficients taken into account. Despite the fact that in the course of auditing an adjustment was quickly made with all "purchasers," and the money was paid to the cashier, some food for thought remained. After all, for the most part those who were then at the helm of the school were buyers.

[Frosevich] Abuses are the dragon's teeth which have been plowed deep into the ground by corruption. Perhaps, the organs of military justice need to be reformed in order to extract the teeth. What do you think?

[Stepanov] Changes have been long overdue. This is clear. Nonetheless, lower-level military prosecutor's offices at garrisons are vitally needed. Here is why. In order to ensure the required standard of the rule of law and legal order in military units and establishments it is necessary to know military legal relations and other things well, the things they teach at the legal department of the Military Institute rather than in civilian colleges.

Second. Service in the troops is peculiar; it is different from civilian reality. This presupposes mobility, dispatch, and the ability to respond to violations of law and to put an end to them at any time on the part of the establishments supporting the functioning of the troops, including the military prosecutor's offices.

I believe that it is necessary to subordinate garrison prosecutor's offices to the Procuracy of the republic in order to eliminate the influence of the command on them. Independent material and technical facilities should be provided. Only in this case will prosecutors become independent, and obey only the law.

This begs the question, "What about district prosecutor's offices?" I will be brief: They are unnecessary.

When this article was already prepared for printing, it became known that the collegium of the Chief Military Procuracy had been dissolved. The staff of the prosecutor's office now reports to one of the deputy USSR general prosecutors. This change stresses once again the correctness of statements by Judicial Service Colonel V.V. Stepanov.

Ukraine Deputy on Conversion

92UM0200A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
21 Nov 91 p 3

[Interview with A.A. Bulyanda, general director of Azovstal Metallurgical Combine, by People's Deputy of the Ukraine Aleksandr Goncharov: "Holy of Holies of Any Enterprise"]

[Text]

[Goncharov] Aleksandr Alekseyevich, it has become known that the metallurgical combine that you head has received the "Lloyd" certificate for its produced output, namely for sheet steel. This is certainly world recognition of its high quality. And no other Soviet enterprise has yet received such a document. A rapid expansion of foreign economic ties is probably now expected. But will there not then be a reduction of your deliveries to the domestic market, in particular for the needs of "defense"?

[Bulyanda] First of all I want to explain my position in the current social and economic situation. Yes, we are going to the market. At the same time, I think that it is necessary to maintain the state order in the Ukraine. It would seem to be

a contradiction: on the one hand, there are market relations and, on the other, the state order. So it is. But taking into account the existing economic situation in the Ukraine, it is first necessary to stabilize conditions and stop the decline in production and only then go over to a true market and give complete freedom to enterprise. We must consider the interests of the republic. That is, renounce our own interests for the common good for a short period (a maximum of 1 year). For this reason, the people at Azovstal are not using earned foreign exchange to acquire video equipment and motor vehicles of foreign makes but are purposefully engaged in the technical reequipment of the combine to generate competitive output. Such a decision was made at a conference of the labor collective and we are firmly adhering to it. So there is no reason for fears. The defense complex will not suffer on account of our labor collective. We think that the fulfillment of defense orders is the holy of holies of any enterprise. I am certain that we will not have any interruptions of deliveries.

[Goncharov] The Ukraine currently has about 700 enterprises producing defense output. What do you see their further fate to be in the course of the coming privatization and destatization?

[Bulyanda] The privatization of the enterprises of the defense complex is by no means a simple matter. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine must approach its solution extremely attentively and cautiously, first thoroughly substantiating and analyzing possible courses and approaches. World practice shows that frequently it is not advantageous for privatized enterprises of the defense complex to fulfill particular orders. But the state gives investments so that they will all be fulfilled on time. Do we now have such possibilities? I cannot answer in the affirmative. Nor, it seems, will this be possible in the near future. In short, one must await specific times. Life itself will suggest when it will be possible to begin this process.

[Goncharov] And how would you, Aleksandr Alekseyevich, comment on one of the points of the appeal of the second congress of officers of the Ukraine to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine that the "military-industrial complex in the Ukraine must be adapted to the economic possibilities of the Ukraine and to the necessity of providing the Armed Forces of the Ukraine with equipment and arms" and also on the suggestion of Col. V. Martirosyan about the establishment of a concern with a network of small enterprises whose founders will be the Ministry of Defense and the Union of Officers of the Ukraine?

[Bulyanda] There are extremely strong cooperative ties between enterprises of the former Union in the defense complex and for this reason there simply are no real grounds for the practical realization of the words of such an appeal. True, this is still somehow feasible if it is a matter of the production of rifles and assault rifles. But it is presently impossible to produce up-to-date and complete military equipment through a network of our enterprises. Again, this requires large investments (money and physical resources). This problem can be resolved, of course, but not in a year or two. And even then, it will inevitably be necessary to stop development of some branches. And as for the concern, the question naturally arises: At whose expense should one begin

to finance it? What and whom should one renounce? Or should the allocation of money to improve the ecology be suspended?

And finally, I would like to state my opinion on the process of the establishment of the Ukraine's own armed forces. We have begun this but, alas, without yet knowing our probable adversaries and without knowing against whom we need to defend ourselves. In general, I am in favor of

having our sovereign state, just as several other European states, declare its neutrality. It is necessary to retain a national guard, national security forces, and a Ministry of Internal Affairs. But the entire remaining potential should be used for the most rapid improvement of the life of the people of the Ukraine and the raising of the well-being of each family living in the territory of our sovereign republic.

Description of Underwater Sabotage Team

92UM0230A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 22 Nov 91 p 2

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Special Correspondent A. Khokhlov, Red Banner Black Sea Fleet: "Bubbles in the Water—Expect Saboteurs"]

[Text] No matter how closely you look at the surface of the water, there is not even a ripple.

We are waiting for the foamy stream of bubbles to appear: that is a sure sign of an attack by underwater saboteurs.

Everything happens very quickly. In a second, the saboteurs are on the shore. In another, they have already taken up defensive positions 20 meters from the shore. After a few more moments, the majority of them have been killed by automatic weapons fire or stabbed to death with knives. Someone who received a series of blows in fast-paced hand-to-hand fighting is wheezing, bound, with his face in the dirt. The survivors have rushed back into the water. A grenade launcher is fired and there is a muffled underwater explosion. Wide circles are dissipating in the water.

"Cease fire", says the commander.

The "saboteurs" and "ours" are breathing heavily and are lighting crumpled cigarettes from one match. It is quiet...

The first mention of frogmen [underwater swimmers] dates back to the time of Alexander the Great. But they made their appearance in the USSR not too long ago, in 1967. By that time, underwater sabotage teams existed in practically all of the NATO countries. And news of the appearance of such forces in Turkey, close by the Sevastopol Navy Base, prompted the Ministry of Defense leadership to create its own defense structures. The first detachment for combating underwater sabotage men and equipment (PDSS) was formed in the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet. Next year the detachment will mark its 25th anniversary.

Nearly 100 men serve here today. There are nine officers, 13 warrant officers, and the rest are compulsory service seamen. They end up in this unit in different ways. No military educational institution specially trains frogmen. The majority of the seamen have received diving training in DOSAAF, but there are also those who went under water for the first time during naval training. Surprisingly, there are no master sport swimmers here. They say one ended up here several years ago, but they soon transferred him to a much lighter duty position—to the naval infantry. He was "broken", he was worn out. The frogman's workload is such that only an ideally healthy and determined person can endure it. There are increasingly fewer of them among current draftees.

What we saw, firing and hand-to-hand combat, are the detachment's secondary missions. Think, to "block" the enemy by land, you have to take him on in the water! The detachment for combating PDSS was intended, first and foremost, to detect and destroy underwater sabotage teams. They did not tell us how this is done; it is a secret.

Frogmen are armed with underwater-firing automatic weapons (APS) and special underwater pistols (SPP). The strange looking 10 centimeter bullet (a "nail", in their jargon) can hit an enemy at a range of tens of meters. An underwater breathing mixture regeneration apparatus allows someone to remain under the water for several hours. There are special underwater locomotion systems and there are small surface combatants and vehicles. They even give them aircrafts when necessary. The alert teams are ready to drive or fly to any point (in the country? on earth?) within 20 minutes.

Something happens; they drive off and they fly away. There are false alarms at times. A young seaman on watch thinks he hears gangs of cut-throats with Finnish knives in their teeth swimming near the ship and they call the frogmen. And it happens that they end up doing boring work: clearing away nets wrapped around a ship's screws or searching for naval equipment that has been lost from the deck. But the two officers, five warrant officers and six seamen of the detachment to combat PDSS have not received combat awards and medals nearly for that.

Black Sea Fleet frogmen served as guards for the Soviet naval base at Dahlak, Ethiopia for six years. Anything was possible there. Detachment Commander Captain 2nd Rank Leonid Gubko and Petty Officers 1st Class Ruslan Yevtushenko and Sasha Parkhomenko departed from the port, which was surrounded by the opposition, on our last ship...

But the detachment was not just involved with combat operations. In December 1989, the seamen took part in "strengthening peace throughout the world." With weapons in their hands, the Black Sea seamen provided security for M. Gorbachev and G. Bush during their meeting off the coast of Malta. Incidentally, they were the only armed people surrounding the presidents. For three days, 16 frogmen, while relieving each other, were on underwater combat duty and had orders to shoot without warning at any moving target within a radius of 200 meters of the Soviet and American ships.

If we nevertheless decide to create a professional army, we need to start with professional elite units and subunits, like this detachment. During three years service here, a seaman spends up to 500 hours under water and masters skills and knowledge that are invaluable to the navy... and for which there are no applications in the civilian world. Many would re-enlist. Today, Senior Seaman Igor Cherkasov is wracking his brain: return to his native land of Orsha or put on the shoulder boards of a warrant officer? He will probably go home; you see, he has seen what the lives of the commanders are like, unsettled and poor. Half of them have no apartments, and practically all who have apartments are lined up in single file in the hopeless line for improving their living conditions. And there is no hope of improvement. Warrant Officer Vasilii Fedchenko, for example, has waited eleven years for an apartment.

Frogmen's salaries are modest. An officer receives up to 800 rubles (R250-300 until quite recently), a warrant

officer up to R600, and a seaman—R50. They pay officers R1.20 and seamen 80 kopeks for each hour spent under water.

And all the same, they do not run away from here.

Training Year Results, Impact on Combat Readiness
92UM0193A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Dec 91 First edition p 2

[Interview with Moscow Military District Commander Colonel-General Vladimir Mikhaylovich Toporov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel A. Oliynik, under the rubric: "Combat Training: The Year's Results": "The Plans Have Not Been Fulfilled, The Troops Are Not Fully Trained"]

[Text] The training year has ended in the army and the navy. As we all know, its distinguishing characteristics were: the massive diversion of personnel from combat training to plug up all possible holes in the country's collapsing economy and to maintain order at its "hot" spots. And for the Moscow Military District, the current training year—it is also diversion from the solution of ordinary tasks at the whim of the initiators of the August Putsch.

With what did we arrive at the finish line? Moscow Military District Commander Colonel-General V. Toporov reflects on this in an interview with our correspondent.

[Toporov] The events of those three August days and the situation that developed in the country after them had quite specific consequences for the army: they accelerated the adoption of decisions on problems that had come to a head long ago, first of all, those problems associated with radical military reform. The active reduction of troops, changes in staff structures, departyization, and elimination of military-political organs naturally made their impression on all aspects of life of military district units, including on combat training. In a word, due to objective and subjective reasons, the military district did not have the capability to completely fulfill combat training plans and programs. But, despite this, the end-of-training-period performance evaluation proceeded in an organized manner and the military district directorate commission inspected more than 80 division-sized and smaller units.

[Oliynik] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, what problems did the end-of-training-period exercises reveal?

[Toporov] The first results—their painstaking study still lies ahead—have shown that the quality of training was reduced along with a certain increase of skill of training subunit personnel in individual combat units. Among them I would include units that Lieutenant Colonels A. Gurilov, V. Goryayev, N. Kochenko, V. Kravtsov command.... What concerns me first of all? Classes on commanders training with officers and sergeants are organized and conducted at a low methodological level and as a result, the tactical level of training of their subordinates is poor and subunit teamwork and coordination is low. As before, weapons training remains a vulnerable spot where

officers' weak knowledge of combat vehicle firing systems is the main deficiency. As a result, combat vehicle crews have weak skills in weapons training and fire control systems and they have a low percentage of effective engagement of moving targets. In some units, the weapons skills of RPG [rifle grenade launcher] men, AGS-17 gunners, and expert marksmen remain inadequate....

The discrepancies listed above do not at all signify that there are no leading subunits in the military district. On that same weapons training, personnel of units where the commanders are Colonel A. Denisov and Lieutenant Colonels A. Naletov, A. Kozlov, and A. Grekhov have shown good results....

[Oliynik] Not all of our readers know that socio-humanitarian training instead of political training was evaluated for the first time in end-of-training-period performance evaluations. What can you say about that?

[Toporov] That what we previously called political training today is inadequate for the nature of the processes of renewal that are occurring in the country and in the army. Life itself compels us to develop and efficiently introduce into the practice of training the new humanitarian subject at the foundation of which lies the system of human values and historical facts. As the results have shown, this is a difficult matter and we can only resolve it in the future through the formation of deep knowledge among the people of the country's history, the combat traditions of the army and the navy, and also the military district through the increase of servicemen's legal education.

[Oliynik] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, a special topic is the mood of the people, especially of former officers-political workers, many of whom now face release into the reserve due to reductions or new assignments....

[Toporov] Actually this topic is timely today as certainly never before. But first of all, I want to quite frankly say that under the current complicated socio-political conditions, military district officers and warrant officers are fulfilling their military duty in a worthy manner and they feel for our Fatherland and its future and they are deeply devoted to the Homeland and to the people.

As for officers-political workers, they are socially protected to some degree just like all of the rest of the officers and warrant officers. There were a total of 2,868 political officers in the military district and of them nearly 800 have already received assignments to positions as aides to commanders for work with personnel. More than 300 who have served the appropriate periods have been released or will be released into the reserve in the near future. For now the remaining political officers are at the disposal of their commanders. As a result, we are faced with the problem of their retraining.

[Oliynik] In your first interview in the position of Moscow Military District commander that you gave to our newspaper, you stressed the thought that in units people yearned for well-organized combat training and we need to

pay attention to them. It is obvious from the results of the inspection that this is not so easy to do.

[Toporov] Yes, right now it is difficult to solve the army's most important problem. There are quite a few reasons of both an objective and of a subjective nature for this and I have already talked about them. Nevertheless, the military council and the military district headquarters are applying all efforts to establish a smooth rhythm of combat training and the professional training of officers and warrant officers and of all personnel at the current crucial stage of army life. We are not losing hope that next year we will finally manage to cease or to at least reduce to a minimum the diversion of personnel for various types of measures not associated with military training. And one more vital factor. Cadre servicemen will become personally involved with combat training when the commanders, senior officers, and staffs will evaluate them and when they will advance in service in strict dependence on their professional skill.

In conclusion, I must say one more thing. The transformation of the army within the framework of radical military reform and the increase of its combat readiness is impossible without the adoption of a package of legislative acts that define the place and role of the Armed Forces in society, its functions, that regulate performance of service, organization of combat training, the transition to manning of troops on a contract basis, etc. It is entirely logical that these important issues of military policy must be reinforced in the new Union Treaty. We also need to complete the reorganization of administrative structures as soon as possible, up to military district headquarters inclusively, and to develop and adopt new general military regulations to increase combat readiness. In short, we need facilities—both technical and social and legal—to raise combat readiness to a new level. Unfortunately, for the time being there are none.

Official Criticizes Inventory Procedures for Precious Metals
92UM0197A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Dec 91 First edition p 4

[Interview with Vitaliy Andreyevich Kovalev by Senior Lieutenant S. Zhukov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Not All That Glitters Is Gold, but Gold Always Glitters"]

[Text] Despite this, it is not always noticed when written-off military equipment is salvaged.

Silver, of course, still occupies first place among the precious metals used in the manufacture of equipment for the army and navy. Gold and a number of other precious metals, as well as precious stones are below it. Only hundredths or even thousandths of a gram of the precious metals are used in the parts, of course. The ease with which it can be separated from other elements makes the operation extremely profitable, however. For example, it costs one tenth as much to recover the silver from secondary sources as to obtain it from ore.

Control over the recycling of precious metals went into effect following the reign of Paul I. Today this function is

performed by the State Assay Committee of the USSR Ministry of Finance. A group of workers from that agency recently worked in the Black Sea Fleet. The group was headed by V. Kovalev.

[Zhukov] Vitaliy Andreyevich, this is the second outside inspection of Black Sea Fleet units. Does that mean that they do not trust the military?

[Kovalev] I would never try to compete with the sailors in the art of running a combat ship, because I know nothing about it. I feel that I have a fairly good understanding of the use of precious metals, though, and I am sincerely willing to teach it to others. If you would like to know we have singled out the military, I can cite the following figures. Everyone knows that the military of all nations receive precious metals contained in combat equipment. And the Pentagon is able to return up to 60% of the precious metals it receives to the state every year, while the USSR Ministry of Defense returns barely 10%. You will agree this gave one cause to think.

[Zhukov] Excuse me, but has it occurred to you that the equipment being written off by the Americans today is simply that which contains the most gold?

[Kovalev] Of course it has, but from all indications our equipment is just as rich in precious metals. We merely have to know how to find it. For example, we inspected (to the extent that hatches welded shut and ladders cut off permitted, of course) two written-off submarines and three surface ships, and we found items containing around 60 kilograms of silver. In a selective inspection of the records of precious metals in several dozen of the naval units, we found around 30 kilograms of gold and around 3 tons of silver not on the inventory. And a final fact, which, I believe, will conclusively dispel your doubts about the matter: We revealed entire subunits with precious metals which were not listed in the navy's records at all.

[Zhukov] Could you comment on these figures? How was this possible? Who is to blame?

[Kovalev] There are several causes, but I believe that only one conclusion can be drawn. It was possible because the matter is handled by people who are not professionals at all. What can one expect from an officer, a warrant officer and several seamen responsible for preparing a ship to be written off and removing everything which contains precious metals? The picture becomes perfectly clear when one considers the fact that the documentation on equipment 20 or 30 years old contains no mention of precious metals at all.

In the USA, unlike our country, several dozen special offices are engaged in finding and removing precious metals from written-off military equipment, which take a considerable cut from the Pentagon for their services. There is a double benefit. In the first place, the professional is trained to miss nothing. In the second place, the ship crews stick to their own job, that is, the military. It would not be a bad thing for us to adopt their experience.

Postscript: While this article was being readied for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, it was learned from reliable sources that instructions had been issued to the Black Sea Fleet from the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine that precious metals recovered in the salvaging of military equipment are not to be sent outside the republic. Has the gold found a new owner?

Defense Ministry Invites FRG Firms to Bid on Housing Construction

92UM0205A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Dec 91 First edition p 3

[Announcement: "Construction of Housing for Servicemen in the USSR"]

[Text] The Government of the USSR invites interested German firms to participate in bidding on contracts for the production, delivery, assembly and start-up of production lines ready for operation. Financing is provided by the Federal Republic of Germany, represented by the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Frankfurt am Main.

Type of Production Line		
Product	Volume	City
Vibropressed concrete blocks	200,000 m ³ /year	Slavyanskiy/Krasnodar
"	"	Mansurovo/Moscow
Aggregate-concrete gravel	320,000 m ³ /year	Aleksin
Windows and balcony doors	300,000 m ² /year	Sokol
Doors	500,000 m ² /year	Maykop
Equipment for monolithic housing construction	5 sets	Moscow
Linoleum and furniture overlay	10 million m ² /year	Dzerzhinsk
Floorboard milling lines	10,000 m ³ /year	Bratsk
Woodworking equipment	1 set	Bratsk

Requirements:

- annual output of bidder (firm or consortium) must have been at least 20 million West German marks over past three years for output of similar production lines; for consortiums, leader's annual output must have been at least 10 million marks;
- proof of financial solvency and, upon receipt of contract, presentation of bank guarantee from first-class banking establishment (at least 20% of total amount of contract);
- experience abroad in corresponding field;
- experience in USSR;
- knowledge of Soviet standards and regulations.

Consideration is given to both individual German firms and consortiums, and foreign firms may supply materials totaling up to 30% of the total amount of the order.

Tendering documents may be obtained from 22 Zagrantekhstroy (ZTS) or the Consulting Consortium Stroitelstvo zhilya v SSSR (CWU) at the following address:

Bulvar generala Karbysheva, dom 3, 123154, Moscow;
Telephone: 946-30-26;
Fax: 943-00-37;
Telex, 911 353 CWU SU;

after 3 December 1991 upon presentation of receipt for transfer of 3,000 West German marks for each production line to account No. 220-2307650, bank code 70070010, Deutsche Bank AO, München, or CWU, Moscow, with the notation: "Tendering documents for production lines for the USSR."

Maintenance of Stored Tanks Viewed

92UM0226A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 12 Dec 91 p 6

[Article by N. Belan: "Tank Tribulations"]

[Text] How many of them were there here, these tanks wrapped in canvas, standing in neat rows in the snowy field in the region of Novosibirsk? The same combat vehicles on whose caterpillar tracks there is probably still some dust left from Western Europe.

"This is the storage base," said Colonel Nikolay Parkhomenko, unit commander, showing off his "wares."

It was a bright, frosty day—somewhere around 30 below zero—there was a deep silence all around, and if it were not for the figure of a guard walking next to the barbed wire fence, one might think he had ended up in some frozen snow kingdom.

I had already had occasion to write about these tanks on 5 January of this year. At that time, let me remind the reader, a scandal was started in the press regarding the 20,886 tanks of the Soviet Army that were "missing in action" which had "brilliantly conducted operations for transferring a large military grouping to the East beyond the Urals": Our generals allegedly decided to deceive the Soviet diplomats responsible for submitting information about arms to our partners in the Vienna negotiations on conventional arms reduction in Europe. It turns out that there was no basis for the scandal.

"In 1987 we adopted a new defense doctrine and in spite of the skeptics, started to materialize it," explained the chief of the Information Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant General V. Manilov. "This was done not at the bidding of our partners from the West but through our own good will. And the first and major element in the practical implementation of the new doctrine was the transformation of offensive structures of our troops into defensive ones. As a result, the overall fleet of tanks in Europe was reduced by approximately 10,000 units. In addition, more than 10,000 tanks were taken away from our troops in Europe when we made the

decision to reduce our Armed Forces by a half million men—also on our own initiative, unilaterally.

The fate of the tanks that were withdrawn is known. Some 8,000 of them were transferred to troops in the eastern part of the country to fill in incomplete sets and replace outdated models. And 8,392 vehicles were placed in storage bases in Western Siberia and Central Asia. The rest were written off—they were broken down into scrap metal or re-equipped for civilian purposes. It would seem that no more can be said about that issue. But the interest in the combat vehicles standing in the storage bases has by no means died out.

...I must admit that I was surprised when I saw the tanks, as it were, out in an empty field. I had imagined the storage base to include hangars and heated compartments.

"And there was no such area," said Colonel Parkhomenko. "Who would give up good land for something so uneconomical. Here there are marshes, a lake, and a hilly terrain. Five marshes were dug out to a depth of 3.5 meters and part of the lake was drained, and then they cut off the tops of the hills and filled all this in. A half million cubic meters of earth had to be moved.

"You probably had good engineering equipment," I said naively.

"No way," laughed the officer. "We had one tractor and several old tanks were used for digging."

"How did you manage to do all this?"

"You see, the soldiers and the officers had a good understanding of the importance of the task," a deep crease went across the bridge of Nikolay Petrovich's nose. "After all, these tanks which must be placed in storage are national property. Not only were an immense amount of labor and material means invested in them, but also all the latest and most advanced—design thought, knowledge, scientific and technical achievements. When we were told: It is necessary to prepare a base—and time was of the essence—we took this as a state assignment. These were state interests—I was not the only one who thought this way. All the soldiers did."

Nikolay Petrovich reflected for a moment and his face brightened.

"Nowadays," he continued, "they sometimes argue about patriotism: Does it still exist or has it all dried up? But I witness this condition of the human soul every day. And I know the thoughts of my subordinates: For them the homeland is whole, and sacred, and indivisible. People can say to me: Those are pretty words. But for us something stands behind them."

Communicating with the tank drivers is like getting a breath of fresh air. I liked their passion, their youthful strength, and their spirit. Although it would seem that they have many good reasons to complain about the conditions of their life and service. And again I recalled our leisurely conversations about tanks: To some of them storing them seems like an evil omen and some of them would like to

start up a business of selling them. Incidentally, I understand that there are a great many interests here except one—the safety of the homeland. And when you mention it they laugh condescendingly: Who intends to attack us?

There is no way I can understand this phrasing of the question. Just as I cannot understand the abuse I have been hearing about military servicemen for a long time. These same tanks, of which we must have a reserve, including for combat training—what are they, the concern of the army alone? I have seen the "mountains of gold" the tank drivers who serve on the storage base have. The housing problem has not been solved; 85 percent of the wives of officers and warrant officers do not have jobs; and of the 46 children of preschool age only six have been placed in the kindergarten so far. There is no school either, and the children are transported six kilometers to the village, where the class rooms are overcrowded. Like everywhere, there is a shortage of groceries and those that are to be found in the markets are priced out of reach.

I asked Parkhomenko how many officers had applied for discharge because they were tired of eating watery cabbage soup.

"That question does not apply to us," I heard in response.

The army is still hanging on, abused and harried. The first news I learned in Novosibirsk was that an officer had been beaten up on the streets for no reason. And my first meeting with a military person was in the staff headquarters—a lieutenant colonel who had been transferred in the service from the Transcaucasus. He had spent the night in his office because there was no other corner for him to sleep in. "Well, what is this, are we the only ones who need this?"—these questions were raised when I spoke with the officers. They said this having their own service in mind regarding the jokes that "somewhere in Siberia a general tank battle is in the making," and so forth. But then they would calm down and speak enthusiastically about their work, about their subordinates, and it would turn out: Yes, they need it more than others. They are people of duty and they live with their own understanding of honor.

At the same time they felt pain when they said that for too long the army had been treated like small change in the political games. Since decisions had been made for de-party-ization and depoliticization of the Armed Forces, now the people should be allowed to work in peace. For the conditions and the moral atmosphere in which they find themselves today, to put it mildly, do not contribute to the performance of combat training tasks. On the contrary, they demoralize the people. Now is no time to defame them; instead they should say: Comrade fighting men, we understand how hard your job is, but hang in there. And the people will understand. But when they do their work and people still kick them—it becomes unbearable, their purpose in working is lost, and their difficulties are made a thousand times more difficult.

Yes, I was surprised to learn that tanks were stored out in the open. But to blame this on the military personnel, to

loudly reproach them for inefficiency, saying such things as the people's millions are going down the drain—that I would not do.

“The vehicles have been prepared, they can be stored even under these conditions, although, to be sure, it is much more difficult,” explained Major General Yu. Dutov, the military district's deputy troop commander for arms. “So they are not losing their combat capabilities; that is the first thing. In the second place, we planned to construct heated storage facilities, and it is not our fault that the equipment was withdrawn from Europe before the appropriate storage base was prepared. I repeat: If anyone encountered more difficulties and bigger headaches because of this, it was we military men. So why are we being made the scapegoat?”

“Yes, it takes considerable capital investments. In this regard one might ask: Where are we to get them, with our present poverty? But it is all a matter of which is cheaper: to preserve the tanks and modernize them or to start from scratch, melt them down, and so forth. Have we really not learned anything from the sad experience in disarmament from Khrushchev's times? At least that such things are not done in an off-handed way.

“But it would be unfair to reduce the problem of the country's ‘tank reserve’ to reproaches against the military. It is not by accident that this subject is coming up more and more frequently. A couple of days ago on the information television program ‘Vesti’ they had a report from Germany. It was about the fate of our tanks that were used in the former army of the GDR: They said there was more than enough of this kind of equipment for the states wishing to buy it. And the journalist alluded to the fact that in our country the tanks are rusting on the other side of the Urals.

“I do not know who is responsible for the stories about the ‘rusting’ of the combat vehicles delivered for storage (they talk as though all the tanks were rusting) but it is a nice fabrication. For the sake of what? Perhaps someone has laid eyes on them—and they want to sell out the country,

right down to the last thing. And now they are beginning to prepare public opinion... I wish I were mistaken.”

I talked with Yuriy Yakovlevich Dutov for about two hours. Our discussion went far beyond the framework of the problems of storing tanks. The deputy commander thinks that the state approach is to create an industry for using obsolete armored tank equipment in the national economy. After all, we have experience in this: This equipment is used as a basis for fire engines, prime movers and so forth. And it is most rational and economically advantageous to reconstruct them at the plants that produce armored equipment. And the problem of employing workers and engineering and technical personnel is solved at the same time. And also officers—technicians and engineers who have been and will be released into the reserve: For instance, that same timber industry enterprise that bought the “fire” tanks would probably like to have them operated by highly skilled specialists from among the retired military men. But in order for all this to be more than just dreams it is necessary to have a unified state program, say, within the framework of conversion.

I flew out of Novosibirsk on a frosty morning. In the city there were long lines in front of the baked goods shops: As the taxi driver explained to me, there is grain but there is no way to transport it—there is not enough gasoline. Because of this as well as the difficulties in the city transportation, those same taxi drivers are asking incredible prices. I automatically thought: Perhaps I chose the wrong subject to write about on my trip; perhaps tanks are not really timely? But when I was at home again in Moscow, again I heard: The difficulties come from the army and military expenditures. And I recalled the bare field in Siberia, the square surrounded by “barbed wire,” the railroad car with the stove from which the people wearing rifle slings were warming themselves.

“God forbid that we have such a fate,” said my colleague who had to hide his camera under his jacket every five minutes, “we would freeze to death.”

And yet they chose this fate for themselves.

Troops at Nursi Partially Evacuated

92UN0463B Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian,
7 Nov 91 p 1

[Release from Baltic News Service: "Võru Paratroopers Partially Gone"]

[Text] The airborne batallion located at Nursi, near Võru, has been disbanded, announced Rubert Sinimägi, consultant to Estonian government's department of State and Border Defense.

The combat equipment of the unit was sent out on railroad platforms on November 5. According to the State and Border Defense department, only a 30-member maintenance team is left at Nursi.

The other airborne unit in Estonia, located at Viljandi, "has yet to show signs of moving" according to the department staff, even though the October 3 agreement reached between Edgar Savisaar and Soviet Defense Minister Yevgenyi Shaposhnikov stipulated that both units will be out by November 3.

Use of 'Alazan' Rockets in NKAO Explained

92UM0195A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Dec 91 First edition p 4

[Letter to the editor by P. Gorovoy, Chita, and response, under the rubric: "Briefing for Our Readers, Telephone Number 941-21-94": "'Alazan'. But Maybe Not?"]

[Text] I recently learned from the press that 21 'Alazan' rockets were fired at Stepanakert. Houses and the commandant's building were damaged. Projectiles also fell on the military garrison.

The question arises, where did the guerrillas obtain these rockets? Are they in the Soviet Army inventory? And what are their technical specifications?

P. Gorovoy Chita

The USSR Ministry of Defense Main Missile-Artillery Directorate told us that these rockets have never been in the Soviet Army inventory. They are anti-hail systems designed for use in the interests of agriculture.

The USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology Main Administration explained that the 'Alazan' rocket is an 82.5 mm projectile that is used against hail. To do that, its warhead is equipped with the appropriate reagent. 'Alazan' has a two-stage engine, a destruct mechanism, and two remote control mechanisms (to support operation of the pyrotechnic charge and the destruct mechanism).

The rocket is manufactured practically entirely from plastic materials. Despite its comparatively large length, the rocket's plastic body breaks up into safe fragments and the rocket self-destructs (to ensure safety) at an altitude above 1,000 meters. The rocket's maximum operating range is 8,000 meters. As a result, the information that is frequently arriving (about an 'Alazan' firing from one populated area to another that is beyond 'Alazan's' operating range) cannot correspond to reality.

Moreover, 'Alazan' cannot create fragments with stopping power. We doubt that it can be effectively utilized by the guerrillas to fire at ground targets. The press should most likely be discussing not 'Alazan' but other rockets. Incidentally, these rockets have not been delivered to the territory of the Transcaucasus since 1990, although there are supplies of this rocket in the region.

One more thing. The Main Military Procurator's Office told us that military procurators are not involved in any way in the investigation of the rocket attack against Stepanakert on the night of November 25 because the "firing was conducted by guerrillas and not from weapons of the USSR Armed Forces." Colonel of Justice A. Korotkov stated this.

In a word, the situation is unclear for now and we hope that the interested organs will somehow clear it up.

Foreign Developments in Torpedo Guidance

92UM0233A Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 7, Jul 91 (Signed to press 28 Aug 91)
pp 6-7

[Article by Captain 1st Rank (Retired) V. Dorodnykh:
"Torpedo Guidance Systems"]

[Text] Torpedos continue to be one of the main weapons for use at sea alongside modern shipboard systems. Based on the method of control they are classified as self-contained, homing, and remote-controlled torpedos. Homing torpedos react either to the acoustic field of a target or to its wake and have passive or active acoustical guidance systems or a combination thereof.

In the search for targets, passive systems respond to their primary acoustical field. In this case the torpedo has a magnetostrictive antenna, and the homing device operates on a frequency of 25 kilohertz. It is said to have a range of 600 meters. The foreign experts feel that its main shortcomings are its dependence upon the speed of the target and, consequently, its poor response to targets with a low noise level, as well as its inadequate protection against sonar counteraction.

Active systems use a ship's secondary acoustic field as the guide. To enhance guidance accuracy the frequency of the acoustic pulse signal is amplified as the torpedo approaches the target. The torpedo is exploded by a proximity fuse activated at a distance of up to 20 meters with a certain time delay.

The self-contained motion control equipment includes a gyroscopic angle sensor, an automatic depth control device, and a stabilizer. For example, it is reported that the depth control device of one torpedo gives it vertical travel precision of plus or minus 0.3 meter, and the stabilizer reduces the torpedo's dynamic list to 1-3 degrees. It is believed that in the future all the automatic control devices will be combined into a single unit.

Modern torpedos are equipped with special digital computers, whose programs can be adjusted as the features of targets change and as new active and passive means of sonar counteraction come into being. An onboard computer classifies the sonar echos, determines the operating mode of the sonar set, and issues maneuvering commands during the target search and pursuit.

According to reports in the foreign press, the naval forces of the capitalist states now have a small-caliber torpedo which can develop a speed of 38 knots in the search mode, depending upon the conditions, and 53 knots at the point of attack. Furthermore, the engine can operate at high speed for 6 minutes: 12 minutes for both phases together. The onboard control system of this torpedo has four microprocessors. The first determines the parameters of the target's movement, the second works out the control commands, the third works out the control algorithm, and the fourth combines the function of automatic tracking and that of supporting the movement program. The torpedo's homing equipment includes information receivers,

a processing system, and a computer with a capability of 50 million operations per second and a memory bank of 700,000 words (16 bytes).

Foreign experts have produced new components for homing heads making it possible to increase range and effectiveness in the detection of modern, silent submarines even when they employ passive and active sonar counteraction. In addition, work is underway to reduce the noise of the torpedos themselves, to enhance their travel stability in the presence of man-made interference and increase their capabilities for use in shallow water.

Combined active/passive homing heads have a response range of 600-1,800 meters or more within an operating range of 30-60 kilohertz. There has recently been a tendency to lower the operating frequency. It is 20 kilohertz for American torpedos, for example. It is planned to continue reducing the frequency—down to less than half the present frequency. It is believed that this will make it possible to increase the range of the homing devices.

Antiship torpedos include those which home on a wake. According to the foreign literature they can detect a wake 2,000 meters from the target. Additional maneuvering is provided for by a programmed device into which data on the direction of an enemy ship is fed even before the torpedo is fired. In this case the torpedo is guided at the optimal angle (30°) of intersection, constantly turning toward the wake.

In the opinion of foreign experts the probability that a torpedo traveling at an angle which intersects the beam will impact a target 100 meters long from the wake is 0.8 on . The torpedo's speed in this case is 40 knots, that of the target 15-20 knots, and the distance to impact is 5-7.5 kilometers. Torpedos remote-controlled by wire have recently come into extensive use. This system makes it possible to guide the torpedo to the target manually from the carrier or by computer, and to transmit adjustments to and from the torpedo.

The control commands are sent in discreet form as low-frequency pulses, one pulse corresponding to a change of 2-5° in the torpedo's course or of 3-5 meters in its depth. Guidance accuracy depends upon the distance to the target and the degree of error in the determination of its coordinates by the hydroacoustic system. When launched from a distance of 20 kilometers, for example, a torpedo can deviate from the target by several hundred meters. Homing systems are therefore employed in remote-controlled torpedos to enhance the probability of impact.

In the beginning the remote-controlled systems had one-way communication with the submarine, which received information through a coaxial cable after the torpedo was launched, and only on the lock-on of the target by the homing device and the state of the wire. Modern systems have two-way communication. The carrier receives information on the torpedo's trajectory, the state of the on-board systems and, after lock-on of the target, on its maneuvering. In this case 14 parameters are transmitted through the wire in 1 second. All of the information is reproduced in real time on a screen linked to a videoterminal computer. The foreign press notes that the torpedo designers are hard at work on

replacing the metal wire with a lightguide, which, they believe, will substantially increase the amount of information which can be transmitted.

In case of a break in the communication line or loss of the target by the homing equipment, a programmed device on the remote-controlled torpedo automatically switches it to the search mode. It is noted that the torpedo has several speeds to make it more effective: ordinarily 18, 23, and 35 knots.

A towed coil is fired from the submarine along with the remote-controlled torpedo, which then moved along a special cable around 30 meters long. It is initially attached to the outside of the hull on the stern section. After launching, the wire is transferred from the torpedo tube to the coil on the stern along a special guide rail. The tension generated by the ship's movement is compensated for by the reeling of the wire on the coil. This gives the ship freedom of movement.

In the designing of surface ships, difficulties arose with respect to working out the arrangement of the wire communication elements. This was because the torpedo tubes in wartime and post-war ships were located in the center section. There was therefore a great probability of the wire's being damaged as it moved in the torpedo tube or became snagged on superstructures of the deck or on the side of the ship, or it could be put out of action by the propellers. An increase in speed also complicated the towing of the coil at the prescribed depth, and it was therefore limited to a maximum of 10-12 knots.

Foreign navies have recently begun housing the equipment for remote-controlled torpedos in the stern section of surface ships, either beneath the deck with the caps opening onto a transom or on the deck with the torpedos fired into the ship's own wake. This arrangement is most expedient for establishing a simple and reliable wire communication circuit which does not restrict the ship's speed or range in the process of guiding torpedos to the target. In this case the coil is located on the cap of or next to the torpedo tube.

Foreign designers are presently devoting a great deal of attention to the development of mine-torpedos. Among other things, there are reports on the development of a remote-controlled torpedo which can remain at a depth of 150 meters on the ocean floor for 2 years, then jettison its ballast and ascend to a shallow depth at an acoustic underwater command from 40 kilometers away. An antenna mounted on the cover of the instrument container can receive guidance signals from ships, submarines or aircrafts. The operator can guide five torpedos simultaneously.

The torpedo has a maximum speed of 18.9 knots and a range of up to 100 kilometers. It surfaces 500 meters from the target, and the instrument container emerges from the water. The latter contains a television camera capable of operating in very dim light. The television images are transmitted to the operator, who sends guidance signals back. In the final phase of the attack, trajectory torpedo sensors lock onto the target's radar or sonar and hone in on it.

It is reported that an operator aboard an aircraft flying at an altitude of 10,000 meters can guide the remote-controlled torpedo from a distance of 500 kilometers.

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Carrier Aircraft Pilot Training

92UM0227A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Oct 91 First Edition pp 1-2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin: "'Salamander' Authorizes a Landing: Naval Pilots Have Landed on the Deck of the TAKR [Aircraft Carrier] Kuznetsov for the First Time"]

[Text] At the land-based airfield, they were worried and keeping an eye on their watches. The scheduled time had expired and the SU-27K piloted by Military Pilot-Expert Marksman Timur Apakidze had still not returned. Those who were waiting knew too well what a difficult test had fallen to the lot of the pilot. Besides, each of them remembered very well how just two months ago Apakidze had had to eject due to the total failure of the aircraft control systems. At that time, everything had turned out favorably for the pilot, but how was he doing right now?

But at that time Timur was dead tired and extremely happy, conscious of what he had accomplished, and on the deck of Salamander, the daily operational callsign of the aircraft carrier Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov that was heard on the air...

"At the beginning of last year," says Colonel G. Bakulin, deputy commander for Flight Training of the Carrier Aircraft Pilot Training Center, "in accordance with a decision by the Naval Aviation Command, we selected the first group of fighter pilots who had to complete the carrier aircraft training program. They had to master the carrier-based MIG-29, SU-25 and SU-27. Hands-on training for the four pilots, Officers Apakidze, Yakovlev, Yedush and Artemyev, began at the end of May 1991. They went through general training on the ground and worked on taking off from a ski-jump ramp and landing on an arresting gear with a hook. All of this was done on a special device, a shore-based copy of an aircraft carrier flight deck and under the leadership of Design Bureau imeni Sukhoy Test-Pilots Hero of the Soviet Union Viktor Pugachev and Vyacheslav Averfunov..."

Lieutenant Colonel T. Apakidze became the first military aviator to perform a landing on the deck of the new carrier. I met with him at the airbase after his return from the ship.

"This might sound banal," Timur told me, "but since childhood I have dreamed of the sea and sky in equal measure. That is why I went to Yeysk Flight School after Leningrad Nakhimov Naval School. I served in the Baltic and graduated from the Naval Academy. I am currently chief of a flight and weapons training center and I am a military pilot-expert marksman. I have mastered 11 types of aircraft. I have 2,500 hours of flying time..."

It was a routine training flight that day. But, while taking off into the sky, Apakidze did not know that he would be

landing on the deck of a moving ship. At first, he made an approach over the ship's deck without touching it, then made contact.

"Vyshnya [Cherry Tree], this is 972, I have completed my work," Apakidze reported and he prepared to go back to the shore-based airfield. But then the command to land on the carrier's deck followed. It was a surprise for Apakidze but, at the same time it was not unexpected: as a pilot he was already prepared to carry out a landing on the TAKR.

"I have been moving toward this for 23 years," Apakidze later told me.

The next day, September 27, Colonel Andrey Yakovlev, head of the center's flight-methods department, performed a similar landing, also without prior warning.

Yakovlev landed after Apakidze, but that in no way diminishes his accomplishment. You see everyone conquers this, the apex of flight skills, for himself and on his own. In some ways, it was even more difficult for him. He had to land after making contact with the deck four times, his fuel had run out and the ship was sailing on such a course that the landing had to be made into the sun. They

turned on the flight-deck lights so the pilot could more easily orient himself. In a word, it was nearly an emergency situation.

Colonels N. Yedush and O. Artemyev will follow Apakidze and Yakovlev. With time it will become a routine affair. But the first ones will always be remembered. Because being a pioneer is the most difficult of all. Incidentally, they handled their mission brilliantly. Both pilots' landings were, as they say, a ten. Timur hooked the third line (and there are four in all). Andrey the second. An outstanding evaluation according to the standards. And this is despite all the nervousness and alarm, and the physical and psychological ordeals. At the moment the pilot touches the deck, he experiences at a minimum, three G's. And, during braking, it is close to the limits of human endurance.

Residents of the airfield have already seen a documentary film, shown last Saturday evening via cable television, on how the pilots arrived at this event. There will certainly also be articles in newspapers and examples in textbooks for future pilots. For this landing without warning has opened a new page in the chronicles of our country's carrier-based aviation.

Volkogonov on Retiring Commissars

92UM0153B Moscow GOLOS in Russian No 40,
Oct 14-20 91 p 11

[Interview with Colonel General D. Volkogonov by GOLOS correspondent Fedor Maksimov; place and date not given: "Dmitriy Volkogonov: Retire the Commissars!"]

[Text] **The Army will become professional. Instead of Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] and party leaders it will have sociologists, psychologists, lawyers, and officers organizing leisure time (former political officers may be retrained for these positions if they so desire).**

Perestroika, announced in the Soviet Army last year, is finally acquiring momentum. The list of transformations started just recently with the presidential decree liquidating the system of military political organs. Our correspondent interviews Colonel General D. Volkogonov, head of one of the commissions on military reform.

[Maksimov] Dmitriy Antonovich, could you tell us in more detail about your commission's aims and tasks?

[Volkogonov] The August events have given a push to many reforms long overdue. Particularly a reform that we did not seem to be able to give a final push, that is, the reform liquidating the institution of political commissars in the Armed Forces. As to our commission, among its numerous tasks was the creation of a theoretical and practical base for new organs of combat and sociopsychological work with personnel. The commission also deals with tasks related to the reorganization of the Military-Political Academy Imeni Lenin and other military-political schools... Together with local officer assemblies, the commission must conduct the certification of former political officers in respect of their fitness to be retained in the army. At the same time, we cannot allow a decline in the combat readiness of the army, even less allow 80,000 lower-rank political officers to be left without jobs.

[Maksimov] So what, in your estimation, will all these commissars do?

[Volkogonov] First, during the period of transition toward a professional army we have no intention of dropping the existing structures for working with personnel. They also exist in the armies of other countries. In our army, instead of Komsomol and party leaders we will have sociologists, psychologists, lawyers, and officers in charge of leisure and sports, who are so needed by the soldiers. Approximately 50 percent of the former political officers have already expressed a desire to be part of these new structures, to undergo certification and retraining. Second, new programs are being introduced in the curriculum of the Military Academy, which, by the way, now has a new nonpolitical status of an institute of humanities for military professionals engaged in rendering sociopsychological assistance to soldiers and officers.

[Maksimov] What fate is awaiting the military press?

[Volkogonov] The military press should become independent. That is why, for instance, there is a plan to re-register all mass media of the Armed Forces by local soviets of

people's deputies. This, in turn, will guarantee it protection from some commanders who use unprintable language to blast journalists if the material is not to their taste—as it had been until recently in the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA collective.

[Maksimov] What is the timeframe for your commission to complete its work?

[Volkogonov] We have to deliver our first proposals to the minister of defense in October; the entire package of reforms will be presented for the authorities' consideration by the beginning of December.

Summary of Tsagolov's Reform Program

92UM0153A Moscow GOLOS in Russian No 40,
14-20 Oct 91 p 11

[Article by Aleksey Kuzmin: The New Defense Doctrine of Russia and of the Future Union]

[Text] **The armed forces of the Union are indivisible, but sovereign states may also acquire their own "territorial armed forces." Nevertheless, the USSR president will still remain the commander in chief of the all-Union armed forces.**

In the office of Major General (Reserve) Kim Tsagolov, doctor of philosophy, professor, almost an entire wall is taken up by his creation—a large schema of the concept of the defense and security of Russia and of the future Union. Work on the textual part is almost complete. Very soon the program will be presented for consideration to the Russian and all-Union presidents.

What does the combat general and Afghan war veteran propose? Below is a summary of his draft program.

A single defense space is defined by the territory of sovereign states signatories to the agreement on collective defense. The Armed Forces of the Union are indivisible. They represent an immense nuclear and nonnuclear arsenal; the absence of a unified command over it may lead to unforetold consequences.

The desire of sovereign states—members of the Union—to have their own armed forces is considered absolutely legitimate. They may be called "Territorial Armed Forces" and be under the command of heads of sovereign states. In the event of collective danger (threat of war and such), Territorial Armed Forces are to act as a strategic reserve to the all-Union Armed Forces.

The highest organ empowered to make most important decisions should be the Defense Council, headed by the Union president. The Defense Council includes the presidents of all Union states. Of course, executive and consultative organs are created under the council.

The Supreme Commander of the Union Armed Forces is the Union president. Next in line as the highest ranking official is the chief of the General Staff. The all-Union minister of defense is not a military man. He is a politician in charge of providing support for military programs, the military budget, coordinating military relations between members of collective defense agreements, and also military organizational development and training of reserves.

The chief of the General Staff is the commander of all armed forces.

In Kim Tsagolov's draft program, ground forces are taken off the list of armed forces. They are partially replaced by Territorial Armed Forces. The forces that remain on the list are Air Defense, the Air Force, and the Navy. To this are added Emergency Federal Forces—something akin to the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force—and the Strategic Nuclear Forces, which must be concentrated under a single command. Following from this provision, nuclear components are taken out of the Air Force and the Navy.

The system of military districts is abolished as obsolete. All-Union Armed Forces will be concentrated in strategic directions, whose designations are geographic: Eastern, Western, Southwestern, and so on.

One of the most important thrusts of the military reform should be in the direction of substantial reductions in the armed forces. Unquestionably, the strategic parity that currently exists in the world should not be upset. In the past, this was achieved through numerical strength in personnel; it should now be maintained through quality combat training—which will require that the all-Union Armed Forces be placed on a professional and contract basis. As to territorial troops, they should be formed on the basis of a general military draft; thus, military servicemen will be able to serve not far from their place of residence, which by itself will resolve a number of acute problems. The possibility of alternative service is not precluded.

Lastly. Common all-Union units have a single deployment plan. Therefore, sovereign states must accept the fact that they will host and station on their territory some or other military unit. This has to be provided for in the collective defense agreement. The agreement itself may be signed not only by members of the Union but also by sovereign states interested in collective defense and security.

Rereading the Old

While the Soviet top brass contemplate what kind of military reform there should be, let us leaf through the work of a professional Russian officer, Lieutenant General Dmitriy Parskiy, an 1893 graduate of the General Staff Academy, chief of the operational department of the Army General Staff, and author of the draft of the first service regulations for the Worker-Peasant Red Army:

...AMONG MILITARY REFORMS, THE FOLLOWING ARE MOST IMPORTANT:

- “Moral revival of the army; striving for potential justice, and the elimination of arbitrariness.
- “Raising the educational level.
- “Imparting to the army discipline and a sense of duty and patriotism in the best meaning of these words.
- “Elevation of the individual and protection of the rights of all military servicemen in general, while giving each of them the necessary independence regulated by law and higher ranking personnel.
- “Introducing fairer and more reliable means of evaluating service and appointing to positions in general.
- “Reorganization of the central and local military administrations; decentralization of the army higher command, and the establishment of communication in the work of all departments and organs...”

And, finally:

- “Improving material conditions for officers and soldiers during service and after its completion.

All that needs to be added is that these lines were written in 1908!

Impact of Market Relations on Rear Services Assessed

92UM0184A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Dec 91 First edition p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant-General G. Kurdakov, deputy commander for rear services of the Kiev Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin under the rubric "A Topical Interview": "From the State Order to Commerce"]

[Text] **The process of converting to market conditions in the nation is a difficult and painful one. In the military it involves primarily the rear services providing material, medical and technical support for the troops.**

At the request of our KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Gen G. Kurdakov, deputy commander of the Kiev Military District, tells about problems which now have to be resolved.

[Altunin] Gennadiy Georgiyevich, although the military is not a market structure, it too is moving toward a market situation. Or has it perhaps already "entered" the market?

[Kurdakov] I believe that things would be better if it had. Certainty and stability are very important to us. The marking of time by the politicians, however, the indecisiveness of the economists and the worsening international situation are making themselves felt. And while we have advanced along the path toward the new economics, we are constantly experiencing acute impediments.

I understand that the roots of this phenomenon go deeper. It all began three or four years ago, when the enterprises became independent and self-financing. We thought that this would not have a practical effect upon us. It very rapidly became clear, however, that our orders had become unprofitable for those operating with economic accountability (khozraschet). We continued to count on state orders, however, for reforming the rear services and giving them a market orientation. And what came of this? We began receiving short deliveries and even disruptions in the supply. The soldier's rations began to suffer last year due to the increased cost of potatoes, other vegetables and fruit. They have now been increased. Even today, though, we rear-service workers do not sleep well. Where are we to get the four eggs per week, the milk and other products for the soldier? We are told there is not enough even for kindergartens and hospitals.

[Altunin] What are you doing about it?

Just then a relatively young man entered the general's office. He apologized, explaining that he had a flight leaving in 2 hours. He introduced himself. He was from a food supply firm.

"How can you help"

"We have potatoes.

"We already have a supply.

"We have fresh fish. Carp.

"We can use it.

"We're smoking fresh-frozen fish.

"We'll take it.

"And we could use a vehicle.

"We'll sell you one.

You can see what we are doing, Lt Gen Kurdakov went on to say. Nor are the people at the sites idle. The division in which Col Yu. Bogachev is chief of rear services is also "propped up" on all sides by the sovkhoses and kolkhoses. Previously the products were hauled from district depots, and they would start to spoil before they arrived. The milk would go sour. They now have agreements with their neighbors, however. The division helps them with the harvest, and they allocate plots where division personnel can grow potatoes and cabbage, and they sell it fresh meat and milk fairly cheaply.

They have also come up with some new things. Previously each regiment peeled its own potatoes, taking personnel away from their jobs, but now a single, specialized facility has been set up for the entire division, and the process has been mechanized. It is the same with meat. They have set up their own slaughtering facility, where the meat is dressed and delivered to the units ready for use.

[Altunin] Directive D-57 on improving financial and management affairs in the armed forces was recently issued. Did it remove constraints from the rear-service workers?

[Kurdakov] You know, there are so many stipulations it has turned out to be "self-defeating." It includes what might appear to be a revolutionary point. The units are authorized to conclude agreements on their own for performing jobs and rendering services. But then there is the stipulation that this is permitted only when it is not detrimental to the combat training and after the payment of taxes, other withholdings.... For all practical purposes, all the benefits are nullified. What does "without detriment to the combat training" mean? We need legally designated subunits for these things, and they have not yet been established. And pressure should not be applied for the withholdings, at least for the beginning.

This year we sold equipment and property for 45 million rubles, and it mainly went upward. We cannot properly reward even those directly engaged in this work. We are told, to be sure: Sell at auctions and you can build up your coffers. It is difficult, however, practically impossible, for us to get into the auctions.

Once again, prices are a problem. This is what happens. We can sell property and equipment only at fixed prices. And this is a market situation. A GAZ-66 cost 12,600 rubles, let us say. Discounted for wear and tear, we sell it for 6,000. The cooperative operator—more accurately, the speculator—who bought it sells it for 60,000 rubles. What kind of business is that? We could sell it ourselves for that amount.

[Altunin] As you know, however, the Ministry of Defense is presently setting up its own commercial center with authority to engage even in foreign economic activities....

[Kurdakov] We rear-service workers learned of this with satisfaction. Now it needs to be set up in keeping with the modern situation. For now, the imperial barter dominates, however.

When Gennadiy Georgiyevich and I traveled to one of the garrisons, we had a chance encounter with one of the leaders of the republic's Ministry of Agriculture, which turned into a business meeting. I was standing off to the side, and I could only make out the words "abundant," "sheepskin coat," "Poland," and "but we can help you...." When we had settled down in the vehicle again, the general told me what the conversation had been about: the employment of new agricultural equipment on the Blagodatnyy [Abundant] Sovkhoz, about selling more profitably the children's sheepskin coats and felt boots produced at a military combine and about entering the Polish market.

[Kurdakov] We had begun developing business undertakings in the district even before the directive came out. Based on common sense. There is an oil-extraction plant on a military sovkhov, for example. And we have started up a hulling mill on the Blagodatnyy, where we produce buckwheat, oat, wheat and other groats. Outsiders also come to the mill. They pay with money for these and other services, and we frequently accept payment in kind (construction materials). Other sovkhoves have sausage-making shops, apiaries, shops producing hard cheeses and mineral water. The garrisons have small shops for the production of hard-to-get accessories, as well as shops for the production of various kinds of small items.

In order to establish more substantial market relations we are thinking about establishing an association of military sovkhoves. It will include six of our own farms, and three kolkhoves want to join. Besides that. To tell the truth, I hesitate to say this. I don't want to get into trouble later on.... Our agricultural enterprises have even bought a broker's seat and gone into the exchange. We have sold some of the equipment, several tons of wheat and various items for which we no longer have a use. At market prices.

In short, we are trying on our own to work out the problems produced by the breakup of inter-republic economic relations. We are also aided by good, practical relations with the republic leadership.

Military Commerce, Housing Problem Viewed

92UM0240A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by Sergey Kornilov: "Commodity Exchanges—for Generals, Dormitories—for Captains"]

[Text] The housing problem in the army. Needing housing are 400,000 families. It would be superfluous to enumerate objective circumstances that dramatize the already difficult problem. But how is it being solved? Poorly is the wrong word. Same as before.

In November, a meeting of the high-ranking personnel of the Air Force Academy imeni Yuriy Gagarin was held; the subject—how to provide normal living and functioning conditions for the 25,000 residents of the garrison. Among

items reported at the meeting was the fact that the current year plan for capital construction—housing and the necessary infrastructure—has been no more than 30 percent fulfilled.

The said meeting discussed another circumstance that I would hardly call something of an objective nature. The point is that Shchelkovskiy gorispolkom [city executive committee] has allocated for the academy 75 sites (?) for cottage construction—apparently with the purpose of helping the garrison find a solution to the housing problem. The cost of each cottage is 140,000-170,000 rubles [R], of which one-third is covered by the Ministry of Defense.

The apartmentless and those needing an improvement in housing conditions, of whom there are 1,000 families in the Monino garrison, sadly acknowledged that they do not have this kind of money. They do not even have the R90,000-R100,000 that are required after the Ministry of Defense subsidy is subtracted. The same people on the waiting list also took the time to make some calculations, and came to the conclusion that the R3.8 million allocated by the Ministry of Defense for this construction could have been used in a more democratic way than building expensive cottages for the unknown needy who, one can easily assume, probably already have everything they need for normal living and functioning. This money could be used to build 133 three-room apartments, or 200 two-room, or 260 one-room apartments with the average cost of R440 per square meter of housing.

At the same meeting, as everywhere else in the army, voices sounded actively in favor of active participation of the military in entrepreneurial activities. A Commercial Center is being created at the Ministry of Defense. With its help, the USSR Ministry of Defense hopes to independently earn the money for solving social problems. The main argument—the advent of a market demands this. The Commercial Center is charged with a wide spectrum of activities, where the main thrust is given to the realization of no longer used military equipment and property. As of 1 January 1991, this figure was R125 billion. In the experts opinion, by the year 2000 at a minimum it will quadruple. To realize such immense resources, there is even a plan to create its own commodity exchange.

Interestingly, "spontaneous" commerce, with the knowledge and consent of the Ministry of Defense, has been going on for years, although formally the USSR Ministry of Defense is not the owner of the property in its possession. The property belongs to the All-Union State Fund and republic state funds.

Currently, commanders of large military formations, districts, and bases have a right to conduct the sales. Equipment, gear, and machinery are sold at residual book value to cooperatives, which resell it to consumers at 10-20 times the price. Part of the profit lines the pockets of those who control the feeding bin...

One can understand the desperation of lower army personnel, who have lost any hope that billions of rubles from the USSR Ministry of Defense budget that are annually literally thrown away (see reports of the USSR Supreme

Soviet Commission on Privileges) will be at any time directed at solving chronic social problems.

I asked Yuriy Zotov, vice president of the Moscow Commodity Exchange, to comment on this situation.

"This is total nonsense, a complete lack of understanding of the substance of market relations. The army is a budget organization and must remain that way. It is another question how it should spend its money. There is

no objective need for the Ministry of Defense to create its own commodity exchange. There are more than enough exchanges already. All that is needed are goods to trade and a legal right to trade. Any one of existing exchanges today can handle any consignment of uniform goods and sell it at maximum demand price. Let the army and the USSR Ministry of Defense handle properly their main business—the defense capability of the country..."

Veterans Council Official on Planned Transformation

92UM0188A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Dec 91 First edition p 6

[Interview with All-Union Council of Veterans of War and Labor First Deputy Chairman Retired Lieutenant-General Nikolay Vasilyevich Shapalin by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Rubtsov: "At the Union of Veterans Organizations"]

[Text] The Union of Veterans Organizations is proposing to transform the All-Union Organization of Veterans of War and Labor at its forthcoming conference in December 1991. Let us hear from All-Union Council of Veterans of War and Labor First Deputy Chairman Retired Lieutenant-General N. Shapalin.

[Rubtsov] To begin, Nikolay Vasilyevich, request you characterize the situation that has developed in the veterans movement. It is no secret that the process of sovietization of the republics and the August events have increased the threat of a split and the delimitation of veterans "according to ethnic apartments."

[Shapalin] Without question, our organizations cannot remain aloof from the processes that are occurring in the country. Veterans are persistently searching for their place in a changing society. Incidentally, all of society is interested in the success of this search, one of four of us is an adult—a veteran, and therefore a bearer of irreplaceable life experience and of the people's deep traditions of patriotism.

The conferences that have been completed in the oblasts, krays, and republics provide a unique opportunity to obtain a cross-section of veterans public opinion. Of course, even elderly people have various points of view. But practically all of them without exception cannot agree with this because, like it was with their wholesale reckoning to the conservators, who now only dream of how to return everyone to their circles.

Yes, we are elderly people, not so flexible to change. We have more stable views on life and its values. It is not to our liking to defame our history.

But veterans know very well that society is changing and is proceeding along the path of reform. However, this does not prevent them from soberly looking at life. For example, I recall how the delegate from Zaporozhe spoke with such bitterness at the Ukrainian Republic conference when he presented the progressively worsening life and decline of production to the workers. And he is not alone in his concern.

So, the veterans society as a whole is looking at life while considering contemporary realities and, despite the well-known centrifugal forces in "grand" policy, is striving for consolidation.

[Rubtsov] The opinion has been expressed in the press that veterans organizations should stop being involved in politics. They say, you need to think about the realization of rights to benefits and pensions....

[Shapalin] We do not intend to refuse to participate in public life. It is another matter that we are restressing social protection of pensioners and all people of the older generation and guaranteeing them their civil rights—an urgent requirement of the times. All the more so since some people are undertaking an offensive against veterans' rights under market conditions and under conditions of the conflict-ridden acquisition of sovereignty by individual republics and regions. There have been cases when the activities of veterans organizations have been banned, they have been deprived of their buildings, and attempts at psychological pressure have been undertaken through the mass media.

In all fairness, I must say that the majority of their local conferences occurred under the symbol of growing mutual understanding and the aspiration for coordinated activities of veterans organizations, on the one hand, with the power structures and various social forces—on the other hand.

[Rubtsov] What tasks is the impending All-Union Veterans Organizations Conference called upon to resolve?

[Shapalin] Perhaps, I should begin with the time periods. It will occur on December 17-18 in Moscow. Although we have the right to view it as a reporting conference, nevertheless we handing down the main issue in this way—on the unity of the veterans movement and the protection of the social interests and civil rights of veterans.

We will discuss the draft of the New Charter at the conference. Essentially, we are talking about creating an inter-republic Union of Veterans Organizations. We propose structuring relations between members of this union on federative principles but we will resort to the principles of a confederation according to the desire of some republic or other.

This is ultimately not the essence. The main thing is to maintain the unity of the veterans movement in the union as a whole under total independence in the internal life in each of the organizations of the sovereign republics. I am certain that all of us need not only a common economic space but also a common space for applying the efforts of veterans organizations.

I think that this moral position of the majority of veterans and is both noble and humanitarian. There will certainly be a variety of approaches and tasks in the independent veterans organizations. But there is no variation in the main thing—in the right of veterans to live like humans. Therefore, we need to act as a united front.

I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to express my unfailing respect to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers and to all soldiers of the united Soviet Armed Forces.

U.S. Fighter Aircraft Development Examined, Part 1

92UM0191A Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 3, Mar 91 p 27

[Unattributed article: "Fighters of the 21st Century"]

[Text] One of the highest-priority programs in the realm of air armaments being implemented in the United States today is the development of the advanced "fifth-generation" ATF fighter. It will replace the F-15 Eagle air-supremacy fighter.

The seven leading aircraft-building firms in the United States received contracts worth millions of dollars apiece for work on formulating the look of the new fighter in 1983-84. Extremely tough requirements were posed on the part of the Air Force. The fighter should possess, first and foremost, supersonic cruising speed (without the use of afterburners). The level of detectability in radar illumination was to be two orders of magnitude lower than existing fighters (the F-117A and B-2 Stealth programs were well underway in the United States by the start of development of the ATF). The fighter should take off and land on damaged or field runways whose length does not exceed 600 meters. An increase in flight range was proposed, along with improved operating qualities. It was felt that the ATF fighters would be able to wage battle successfully against any existing or prospective enemy fighters while in the numerical minority and flying over hostile territory.

In order to achieve such high combat capabilities, it was proposed to equip the aircraft with a new generation of engines having increased unit thrust (9-10) and economy. The maximum thrust with afterburners was to be 13,600-15,900 kgf.

The Lockheed and Northrop concerns became the principal developers of the ATF. The aircraft that won out in the competition (the Lockheed YF-22 or the Northrop YF-23) would be adopted as the basis of a series-production fighter that would enter service with the U.S. Air Force in the middle of the 1990s. The creation of a carrier-based ATF on the basis of the new fighter is also being proposed to replace the F-14.

The engines for the ATF aircraft were also selected on a competitive basis. The firm of Pratt-Whitney created the YF119 TRDDF [turbojet bypass engine with afterburner], while General Electric was developing the variable-cycle YF120 engine. The YF-22 and YF-23 experimental fighters were proposed to be built in two copies, fitted with the YF119 and YF120 TRDDFs.

The takeoff mass of the ATF armed with air-to-air missiles and a full fuel load in internal tanks was to be 22,700 kg [kilograms] according to the initial requirements, with a maximum speed of Mach 2.5, combat radius of 1,200-1,300 km [kilometers] (10-15 percent more than the F-15) and EPR [radar cross section] of 0.05 meters from the front. The acceleration characteristics should be triple those of the F-15 at supersonic speeds. The subsonic maneuvering characteristics are comparable to the F-15,

but they are significantly better at supersonic speeds. The assurance of a maximum sustained G-force load of six at Mach 1.8 was also required.

The requirements, however, were gradually eased in the course of the work. The nominal operational G-force load in maneuvering at subsonic speeds was reduced by 0.5, and the flight range by 20 percent, in order to economize on the mass of the airframe. The nominal vertical velocity in landing was reduced from 3.9 m/sec to 3 m/sec, which reduced the mass of the landing gear. An increase in the takeoff distance was made it possible to refrain from engine reverse thrust and reduce the mass of the airframe by more than 450 kg. By reducing the top speed, they were able to get by without using expensive structural materials able to withstand high kinetic heating. The requirements for acceleration characteristics were increased at the same time.

The Northrop concern won the "speed chase." The YF-23 aircraft fitted with the Pratt-Whitney YF19 [as published] TRDDF went up on 27 Aug 90. The flight lasted 50 minutes (the afterburners were not turned on). The sensors recorded a speed of 536 km/hr and an altitude of 7,000 meters.

Aerial refueling was performed on the fourth test flight. The aircraft performed joint maneuvering and contacts with a KC-135 tanker aircraft. The craft demonstrated good stability. "The aerial refueling of the YF-23A is easier to do than the F-15 fighter," in the words of Northrop test pilot P. (Mettsa).

The first test flight of the Lockheed YF-22A experimental fighter fitted with the General Electric YF120 variable-cycle engine took place on 29 Sep 90. The aircraft flew from the plant airfield in the city of Palmdale (California) to Edwards Air Force base. A speed of 463 km/hr and altitude of 3,800 meters were recorded (the landing gear was not retracted in flight).

Just what are the new-generation American fighters? The wingspan is the same as the F-15, which makes it possible to accommodate the aircraft in standard hangars, but the wing area is 35-55 percent larger. The shape of the wing was chosen in accordance with the requirements of Stealth technology.

The engines of the experimental aircraft develop an afterburner thrust of 15,900 kgf with a mass equal to the power plant of the F-15 (afterburner thrust of 10,640-11,340 kgf). They are more economical, simpler to maintain and repair and have higher temperatures at the turbine intakes. The cruising speed of the fighters with the new-generation engines should reach Mach 1.4-1.5 without the use of afterburners.

The mass of the YF-22 and YF-23 airframes is higher than the F-15, but the "excess" is compensated for by the greater engine thrust and the pure aerodynamic shapes. The aircraft has a larger volume, which makes it possible to accommodate a full load of fuel and armaments inside the aircraft. There are no external stores racks. A small signature and aerodynamic perfection are achieved thereby.

The firms of Lockheed and Northrop approach the concept of the fighter in different ways. The YF-22 aircraft

was executed according to a normal aerodynamic configuration. Its shapes are more traditional, but the design contains elements reducing its detectability. The surface of the aircraft has more than eight reflection peaks, since the leading and trailing edges of the wing are not parallel. The vertical empennage is inclined by 27 degrees. The engine nozzles are flat, with controllable vector thrust. This design raises the maneuverability, but does not protect parts of the engine from direct illumination from behind.

The YF-23 aircraft has a quite exotic shape. It has inherited the smooth joinings of surfaces and their shape from the B-2 Stealth aircraft.

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U.S. Fighter Aircraft Development Examined, Part 2

92UM0102A Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 4, Apr 91 pp 20-21

[Article by Vladimir Ilin: "The Fighters of the 21st Century"; conclusion of article from No. 3]

[Text] The upper parts of the engine nozzles also coincide. The shape of the YF-23A fighter on a plane is made up of lines that are pointed in four different directions. The strongest blips on the screen of an illuminating radar are observed in four very narrow sectors that do not coincide to the longitudinal axis of the fighter in that case. The time for target observation in those directions is extremely small, and from other perspectives of illumination the aircraft's signature is considerably less as well.

The separately applicable stabilizers are cut at an angle of 47 degrees to avoid the direct reflection of radar emissions. The nozzle, which has a bulge, screens the engine from direct radar illumination, as well as providing for a lower temperature for the exhaust gases. This design, however, limits control of the thrust vector and has considerable weight.

The large sweep angle of the wings, equal to 40 degrees, reduces the effectiveness of the flaps and decreases the lift factor.

The wing area of the YF-22A is 77.1 m², and the YF-23A 88.3 m² (the F-15C has 56.5 m²). The ATF fighters have greater mass than the F-15C, but their relative increase in wing area is quite considerable. The unit load on the wing is consequently 25-30 percent less. This facilitates an increase in the speed of a non-sustained turn, especially in combination with the leading-edge flaps (the F-15, as opposed to other fourth-generation fighters, has no high-lift devices on the leading edge of the wing). The use of a leading-edge flap meanwhile facilitates an increase in the radar signature (the Northrop B-2 and Lockheed F-117A Stealth aircraft have no leading-edge flaps).

One may conclude, when comparing the YF-22A and YF-23A aircraft with the best fighters of the previous generation (see table), that the ATF has proved to be an excellent "marathoner." The aircraft possess a unique ability for prolonged supersonic flight (the sole series-production fighters capable of such flights are the MiG-25 and MiG-31). The maneuvering characteristics of the

YF-22A and YF-23A at subsonic speeds are, at the same time, most likely inferior to the corresponding parameters of the F-15, F-16, Rafale, Su-27 and MiG-29. The YF-22A and YF-23A are obviously the first maneuverable supersonic aircraft possessing the characteristics of low radar detectability (radar signature of greater than one square meter). The United States, at the same time, has not solved the problem of reducing the infrared signature of the aircraft in flights at supersonic speeds. This could bring to naught the advantages of a small radar signature or force the fighter to fly at subsonic speeds, where the kinetic warming of the structure is not great.

The change in the international climate in Europe and the cutbacks in the U.S. military budget could lead to the curtailment of the ATF and NATF fighter programs. The possibility of creating a cheaper fifth-generation fighter is thus being considered abroad. The firm of McDonnell-Douglas has proposed the modified F-15F. The design uses the airframe of the F-15E fighter-bomber with the installation of improved electronics equipment, including cockpit indicators using electron-beam tubes. The aircraft should be able to strike ground targets effectively. The firm is proposing Saudi Arabia and Israel as potential buyers of the aircraft.

The ATF will most likely be replaced by the F-15XX fighter. The aircraft is fitted with advanced electronics and EW equipment. The use of elements of Stealth technology is being proposed in its design. The use of the radar and engine from the ATF is possible. A new wing with a larger wingspan (14.76 meters) is being developed, with its area increased by 10 percent. Composite materials are widely employed in its design. The wing has large elongation and reduced aerodynamic resistance in flight at supersonic speeds, which will provide the F-15XX aircraft with the opportunity of cruising at supersonic speeds without using afterburners. The fuel reserve in the wing is proposed to be increased by 1,360 kg [kilograms]. The cost of procuring 750 F-15XX aircraft is estimated at 33 billion dollars, that is, slightly more than half that of the ATF program.

An upgraded version of the F-16 fighter, which has received the name of the Falcon 21, is also being considered as a potential replacement for the ATF aircraft. It is being created on the basis of the experimental F-16XL, which was executed according to the "tailless" design with a swept wing. The installation of a trapezoidal wing, close to triangular, with an area of 58.5 m² on the new aircraft is being proposed. Four AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles are accommodated under the fuselage—which is 14.8 meters long—on semi-recessed external-hanger assemblies. It is planned to hang two AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles under the wing.

The work on new fighters in the United States, as we see, is being pursued on a broad front, and is aimed both toward the creation of fundamentally new designs and the substantial modernization of old ones. American combat aircraft, despite the favorable changes in the international climate, remain as before the main rivals of Soviet aircraft, and the efforts of our KBs [design bureaus] aimed at

improving military aircraft technology should be comparable to the corresponding steps by the Americans. What can Soviet aviation use to counter the prospective American aircraft?

Work in our country on new combat aircraft was until recently wrapped in an impenetrable cloak of secrecy. People not taking part directly in the creation of specific prototypes could find out about innovations in domestic aviation technology only from fragmentary features in foreign journals. The nature of the information being issued often depended not on the actual state of affairs in the Soviet aviation industry, but rather on the attempts of the military agencies of the NATO countries to provide a motive for financing these or those programs.

The work of the leading Soviet aviation design bureaus has come to be covered more and more widely in recent years. True, this pertains principally to the Western aviation and technology publications, on whose pages interviews or descriptions of discussions with our aviation designers, test pilots or highly placed military personnel have begun to appear more and more often. A domestic journal unfortunately still cannot report news in this realm to readers. It sometimes seems possible to fill in the information gap only by using quotes on what they are saying there, "over the hill," about work in the realm of a new generation of fighters.

So, in the fall of 1987 R. Belyakov, general designer of the OKB [Special Design Bureau] imeni A.I. Mikoyan, answering questions from a correspondent of the French magazine AIR COSMOS, reported that the collective he heads is working on two new fighters. One of them, in general outline, corresponds to the American ATF aircraft, and the other to the French Rafale fighter.

A report appeared in FLIGHT magazine in October of 1990, with a reference to representatives of the OKB imeni A.I. Mikoyan, on the start of flight testing of a new fighter intended to replace the MiG-29 (it may be assumed that this aircraft is the equivalent to the Rafale fighter). The aircraft possesses high speed and better takeoff and landing characteristics than the MiG-29. An upgraded MiG-29 airframe is the basis of the design, and the new aircraft differs little from it in dimensions and configuration. The new fighter, according to the words of the OKB representatives that were presented, is the first of several advanced successor aircraft to the MiG-29 being developed.

The tasks of increasing the flight duration through reducing fuel consumption and raising the combat capabilities with new electronics, as well as reducing operating expenses, were posed in the creation of the aircraft. New materials are widely employed in the design of the fighter.

The new aircraft has short takeoff and landing runs without substantial innovations in the realm of aerodynamics (the

use of PGO—forward horizontal empennage—for example). Swivel nozzles could possibly appear on advanced versions of the aircraft, but they have not, as reported, been installed on the experimental model of the aircraft. The OKB imeni A.I. Mikoyan is not confident that it is namely this experimental prototype that will be the design basis of the advanced fighters, and the aircraft has thus just been given a project number corresponding to the start of development, which, it is assumed, began in 1988.

The OKB imeni P.O. Sukhoy, along with work on fundamentally new types of fighters, is also actively engaged in the improvement of the Su-27. This is, in the opinion of the majority of Western aviation specialists, the most successful fighter of the 1980s. Testing is underway on a new version of the Su-27 fighter, with enhanced maneuverability and equipped with a TRDDF [turbojet bypass engine with afterburner] with swivel nozzles, that will soon be delivered to the armed forces, according to a report by OKB imeni P.O. Sukhoy Deputy General Designer A. Blinov that was published in FLIGHT magazine in October of 1990. The "aircraft with the new nozzles will enter service as soon as we are satisfied with its reliability," in the words of A. Blinov.

The experimental McDonnell-Douglas F-15 STOL aircraft has forward horizontal empennage to counteract the increased moment of pitching (due to the swivel nozzles). The PGO on the carrier-based SU-27K, as Blinov confirms, increases the lifting force, which is essential for aircraft based on aircraft-carrying cruisers. The aim of increasing maneuverability was pursued at the same time as the program of equipping the Su-27 aircraft with swivel nozzles. These programs, Blinov said, are not connected with each other.

The AL-31F engines from the OKB imeni Lyulka that are installed on the Su-27 are also being improved. Work is currently underway, according to statements from OKB representatives, to increase the thrust and service life of the AL-31 TRDDF with a simultaneous reduction in spending on its maintenance. The increased thrust is planned to be achieved chiefly through an increase in the operating temperatures in the combustion zone of the engine. The improved TRDDF develops a thrust of 13,600 kgf. The thrust of the AL-31F can be increased by another 40 percent in the future as well.

Serious financial difficulties are obviously being experienced in our country of late, and preference has been given to the radical upgrading of existing aircraft rather than the creation of fundamentally new designs. Economy is undoubtedly an essential thing, but it should be remembered that the opportunities for upgrading older designs are not limitless, and the curtailment of scientific research and experimental design could lead to a technological lag in one of several of the realms where we still hold world-class positions. Such a lag could have irreparable consequences under contemporary conditions, when the miser will simply not be able to pay twice.

Comparative Characteristics of Fighters

	YF-22A	YF-23A	F-15C ¹	F-15C	F-15XX	Su-27
Type of engines	YF119/YF120		F100-PW-220		YF119/YF120	AL-31F
Thrust of engines, kgf	15,900 ¹		10,600 ²		15,900	13,600 ³
Maximum takeoff mass, kg	—	—	30,840	30,840	—	30,000
Combat mass, kg	28,123	29,030	27,000	20,240	24,860	22,000
Mass of load, kg	15,420	16,780	14,640	12,970	16,650	12,600
Mass of fuel in internal tanks, kg	11,340	10,890	6,100	6,100	7,390	9,500
Mass of fuel in internal and faired tanks, kg	—	—	10,420	—	—	—
Thrust-to-weight ratio	1.13 ⁴	1.09 ⁴	0.79	1.04	1.28	1.24
Wingspan, meters	13.11	13.29	13.05	13.05	14.76	14.71
Length of aircraft, meters	19.57	20.54	19.42	19.42	19.42	21.94
Height of aircraft, meters	5.39	4.42	5.64	5.64	5.64	5.93
Wing area, m ²	77.10	88.30	56.48	56.48	62.20	62.00
Angle of leading-edge wing sweep, degrees	48	40	45	45	45	42
Angle of trailing-edge wing sweep, degrees	-17	-40	0/10.3	0/10.3	0/10.3	—
Root chord of wing, meters	10.52	12.22	7.65	7.65	7.65	8
Unit load on wing, kgf/m ²	365	329	478	358	399	355
Span load, kgf/meter	2145	2184	2068	1551	1684	1496
Maximum Mach number	over 2	over 2	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.35
Cruising Mach	1.4	1.4	less than 1	less than 1	more than 1	—
Maximum operating G-forces	8.5	8.5	7.33	9.0	9.0	more than 9.0
Radar signature, m ²	0.05	0.05	5	5	less than 1	2-3 ⁵

1—Expected thrust of series-produced engines. A TRDDF of lesser thrust has been installed on the experimental prototypes.

2—The installation of the Pratt-Whitney F100-PW-229 or the General Electric F110-GE-129 with a thrust of 13,200 kgf on the F-15C is being planned in the future. The thrust-to-weight ratio of the F-15C aircraft in that case (with and without faired tanks) will be 0.98 and 1.3 respectively.

3—The thrust of the improved version of the AL-31F TRDDF is indicated. The engine installed on the first models of the aircraft had a thrust of 12,500 kgf.

4—American sources indicate the thrust-to-weight ratio of the YF-22A as equal to 1.03 and the YF-23A as 1.0, which obviously corresponds to the thrust-to-weight ratio with the experimental versions of the TRDDF having less thrust.

5—The radar signature of Soviet fourth-generation aircraft according to the estimates of Western specialists. The size of the signature could be reduced substantially in the long run through the incorporation of elements of Stealth technology.

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Industries' Role in Supplying Weapons to Third World

92UM0085A Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian No 7, Jul 91 (signed to press 11 Jul 91) pp 143-148

[Article by Aleksey Borisovich Kuvshinnikov, commentator for the journal *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA*, and Candidate of Military Sciences Major General (Ret) Vadim Ivanovich Makarevskiy, senior academic staffer at the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO [Institute of the World Economy and International Relations], under the rubric "Our Commentaries": "The Role of the Soviet Military-Industrial Complex in Supplying Weapons to the Countries of the Third World"]

[Text] The threat of war in the traditional East-West direction has effectively been resolved as a result of the changes in the political situation in Eastern Europe, the disbanding of the military structures of the Warsaw Pact and the self-dissolution of the world socialist system. According to the stance of the Soviet military leaders, however, the danger of war is preserved even though there is no immediate threat of it. The reason is the enormous "excess" of accumulated weaponry, affecting the mentality of both Western and Soviet politicians to a certain extent.

The East-West military balance, however, has been stabilized by a whole series of bilateral and multilateral agreements. The results that have been achieved are substantial. But the "zone of stability" encompasses far from all of the territory to which the interaction of East and West had spread—which had the nature of acute military confrontation until very recent times.

The countries of the Third World were able to accumulate an exceedingly serious military potential over the 40 years of Cold War, over the span of which the center of gravity of world politics remained the military and political confrontation of the nuclear superpowers projected onto global international relations by the imposition of opposing bloc structures "in the backwaters of the empires." The social and political instability and presence of territorial disputes, with an absence of even scattered agreements to neutralize the military danger that was typical of the majority of them—there is no need to talk about a system of collective security here—led repeatedly to regional armed clashes. The novelty of today's situation, requiring that the most steadfast attention be paid to this problem, is—as the war in the Persian Gulf demonstrated—that there cannot be any purely regional military conflicts anymore; their inevitable globalization has become an acknowledged factor of world politics.

The region that interests us includes 13 nations—from the two Koreas in the East to Libya in the West. China is beyond the scope of this research; its role in the world military and political equilibrium is separate and unique, and dictated by the distinctiveness and scope of its military potential. The normalization of Sino-Soviet relations that is occurring today can only be welcomed, but it has not yet become irreversible.

The certain restraint that China is manifesting in arms exports should also be noted. Its share is insignificant compared to the flow of arms from the other countries that are permanent members of the UN Security Council. The fact that China unilaterally reduced the size of its armed forces by 25 percent—from 4.2 to 3 million people—at the

end of the 1980s and is re-organizing them, without any conditions or international linkage, is also deserving of attention.

So then, the two Koreas. Each has a military might that is roughly equal to what Iraq had before the start of the war. And if the might of Iraq before the war in the Persian Gulf is hypothetically taken as the unit value (1), then it is equal to the same amount (1) for the KNDR [Korean People's Democratic Republic] and 0.7 for South Korea.¹

Vietnam. Its military might (a factor of 1.2) is disproportionately large for the size of the nation. It is equivalent to the potential of India, with a population 13 times the size of Vietnam's.

Pakistan has a comparatively low factor (0.5), but it is exceedingly likely that it possesses nuclear weapons.

Iran has a factor of 0.6; Syria and Egypt 0.5; and, Saudi Arabia and the other countries that are part of the Gulf Cooperation Council are at 0.4.

Israel constantly has about 150,000 people under arms, but it is close to Iraq in the quantity of its tanks, aircraft, other military hardware and mobilization capabilities. Libya possesses roughly the same might.

In order to obtain a more concrete depiction of the aggregate military might of the 13 nations of the Third World, it is interesting to compare it, for instance, with the potential of the NATO countries. But we must shift from hypothetical factors to quantitative measures for that purpose. The source was the "Military Balance" handbook from the London International Institute for Strategic Studies for 1979-90 and 1989-90 (see Table 1).

Table 1—Growth in Military Potential of 13 Third World Countries

	Year	Popula- tion (mil- lions)	GNP (billions of dol- lars)	Military budget (billions of dol- lars)	Size of armed forces (000 people)	Tanks	Armored vehicles	Artillery and mor- tars (pieces)	Helicop- ters	Aircraft
KNDR	1990	22	45	4.1	1,040	3,500	1,940	7,200	115	650
	1980	17	9.8	1.03	512	2,100	800	2,000	60	655
South Korea	1990	43	159	8.5	650	1,560	1,750	9,000	100	447
	1980	36	31.5	2.6	640	880	520	2,000	49	276
Vietnam ¹	1990	64	20	4	1,250	1,600	1,700	4	50	400
	1980	48	7.1	4	615	1,450	1,200	1,300	39	300
India	1990	807	270	9.0	1,260	3,250	1,100	4,860	140	836
	1980	635	101	3.57	1,096	1,850	700	2,800	269	661
Pakistan	1990	107	39	2.6	520	1,750	800	4	53	450
	1980	77	17.6	1.0	430	1,150	550	1,000	39	275
Iran ²	1990	54	362	6	604	650	600	3,800	50	121
	1980	36	72	10	413	1,870	825	1,200	164	460
Iraq	1990	17.8	45	13	1,000	5,500	8,100	3,500	160	550
	1980	12.4	16.3	1.6	212	1,900	1,620	930	230	339
Syria	1990	11.7	18	2.5	400	4,000	4,200	2,100	110	500
	1980	8.1	6.5	1.2	227	2,600	2,400	875	100	392

Table 1—Growth in Military Potential of 13 Third World Countries (Continued)

	Year	Popula- tion (mil- lions)	GNP (billions of dol- lars)	Military budget (billions of dol- lars)	Size of armed forces (000 people)	Tanks	Armored vehicles	Artillery and mor- tars (pieces)	Helicop- ters	Aircraft
Israel ³	1990	4.5	40	6	141	3,800	5,900	1,350	236	574
	1980	3.7	14.2	3.3	164	3,065	4,000	950	160	543
Egypt	1990	54	76	6.8	448	2,400	3,700	1,120	72	577
	1980	39.7	13.3	2.81	395	1,680	3,000	1,500	200	612
Saudi Arabia	1990	13.7	73	14	66	800	1,600	2,000	110	173
	1980	7.7	55.4	9.6	58.5	525	350	4	40	171
Other Persian Gulf countries	1990	6.1	57	4.7	100	635	1,740	4	68	186
	1980	3.4	26.3	2.38	62.3	172	290	4	4	131
Libya	1990	4.4	21	1.4	85	2,000	1,400	1,200	78	515
	1980	2.7	18.5	0.45	37	2,000	1,000	4	38	178
Total for thirteen countries	1990	1,209.2	1,225	78.6	7,564	31,445	34,530	36,130	1,342	5,999
	1980	926.7	389.5	39.5	4,861.8	21,242	17,255	14,555	1,388	4,993

1—Without counting captured American weapons.

2—The negative dynamic of the military potential of Iran is explained by the unreplenished losses after the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.

3—Counting captured Soviet weapons.

4—Incomplete data.

Sources: "The Military Balance 1979-80," London, 1980; "The Military Balance 1989-90," London, 1990.

The military potential of the 13 countries of the Third World looks as follows compared to the "ceilings" established by the Treaty of Paris (November 1990) for the armed forces of the 14 NATO countries (including the United States and Canada) in Europe.

Table 2

Types of arms	Third World nations more than 7 million	NATO nations less than 5 million
Total size of armed forces		
Tanks	31,000	20,000
Armored combat vehicles	34,000 ¹	30,000
Helicopters	1,170 ¹	2,000
Aircraft	5,800	6,800

1—Incomplete data.

Sources: Same as Table 1.

One could, of course, object that this comparison is not quite correct and is thus not very instructive; the Third World has lots of arms, one could say, but they are by and large obsolete—even by more than a generation. But that is a widespread delusion.

The war in the Persian Gulf demonstrated the striking military and technical lead of the American armed forces. But the Americans have meanwhile pulled away from their own allies in the multinational forces as well, and not only

from Iraqi or, say, Soviet arms. Only the British force was able to handle even limited interaction with the American forces. It is a matter of "smart" weapons and the smart tactics for waging combat operations born of them, in which principally professional personnel were trained in the shortest of times.

The military potential of most countries of the Third World fully corresponds to the contemporary level. It undoubtedly lags behind the level of the leading models, but the new generation of weapons is still insignificantly represented and is not decisive in the armies of the developed countries (excepting possibly the American). One and the same model of tank, for example, is at the foundation of both the Iraqi and Soviet tank inventories, although the Soviet Army is also armed with more modern tanks as well.

The next question that must be elaborated is, with whose weapons is this region saturated? The official stances of the USSR and the Western countries on this issue are close—both the one and the other party, while acknowledging its own "certain responsibility," shifts the principal burden onto its "counterpart."

Research of the problem is unfortunately complicated by the fact that Soviet military statistics on this topic are classified, while open-source data is intentionally distorted for the purpose of disinformation. The sources are not always precise either. Certain data for analysis are accessible nonetheless.

We will begin with **Iraq**. Its potential at the moment of the start of aggression against Kuwait was: 5,500 tanks (all Soviet or Chinese); 1,000 infantry fighting vehicles (all Soviet); 7,100 other armored vehicles (of Soviet and Czech manufacture, with a small quantity of Brazilian and American ones); artillery and mortars (Soviet); firearms, as well as tactical missiles (primarily Soviet, as well as French and West German); anti-aircraft missiles (West German); and, aircraft (only about 100 of the more than 500 aircraft were French, with the rest Soviet).

Up to 80 percent of Iraq's military hardware was of Soviet manufacture or Soviet prototypes. Iraq procured weaponry worth 25 billion dollars abroad over 1980-89, according to SIPRI sources, with 53 percent of that amount going to the USSR. The share of Soviet deliveries in physical terms, however, was significantly larger due to the extremely reduced prices at which it was offered to our "loyal ally in the anti-imperialist struggle."

The overall cost of the imports moreover does not reveal the allocation of funds among the types of weapons procured, which is exceedingly important. It is thus more expedient to compare physical volumes rather than cost by types of arms.

There is another nuance as well—the valuations in dollar amounts used in most of the sources are extremely approximate. The Soviet and American VPKs [military-industrial complexes] operate under economic conditions that are not comparable, and it is just as impossible to obtain comparable figures for the sale of weapons as it is for any other line item in the military budget, which is not subject to reduction to a common denominator in general.

It is, of course, incorrect to build conclusions on the degree of dissemination of Soviet and Western arms based on data for the Iraqi Army alone. We will thus turn to the data of the London source for another seven nations with the largest military potentials in the region being considered.

The KNDR: 3,500 tanks (more than 90 percent Soviet, the rest Chinese); 1,940 BBM [armored combat vehicles] (80 percent Soviet); 54 missile systems (39 Frog and 15 Scud—100 percent Soviet); 650 aircraft (33 percent Soviet, the rest Chinese); and, 115 combat helicopters (50 percent Soviet).

Total—no less than 75 percent of the military potential of Soviet manufacture.

Republic of Korea: 1,560 tanks (more than 90 percent American); 1,750 BBM (23 percent Italian, the rest American); 15 missile systems (100 percent American); and 447 aircraft (100 American).

Total—no less than 90 percent of military potential of American manufacture.

Vietnam: 1,600 tanks (78 percent Soviet, the rest Chinese); 1,799 BBM (75 percent Soviet, the rest Chinese); 400 aircraft (95 percent Soviet); and, 250 combat helicopters (100 percent Soviet).

Total—no less than 80 percent of military potential of Soviet manufacture. There is, true, a very sizable arsenal of captured American arms seized in 1975 in the southern

part of the country (more than 1,000 armored vehicles and about 1,000 aircraft valued at six billion dollars), but it is primarily stored in warehouses in mothballed condition, and in any case can hardly be counted in calculating weapons deliveries.

India: 3,250 tanks (46 percent Soviet, the rest Indian); 1,100 BBM (about 50 percent Soviet, the rest Czech and Indian); 836 aircraft (64 percent Soviet, 25 percent Western, 11 percent Indian); and 68 naval vessels (no less than 53 percent Soviet).

Total—no less than 50 percent of military potential of Soviet manufacture.

Pakistan: 1,750 tanks (28 percent American, 68 percent Chinese, 3 percent Soviet); 800 BBM (American and Chinese, ratio not stipulated by the authors); 450 aircraft (68 percent Chinese, 17 percent French, 9 percent American); and, 53 combat helicopters (American and Soviet).

Total—no less than 60 percent of military potential of Chinese manufacture, and about 10 percent Soviet, including all battlefield jet systems.

Israel: 3,800 tanks (28 percent British, 49 percent American, 15 percent Israeli); 5,900 BBM (American and Israeli); 574 aircraft (70 percent American and 30 percent Israeli); and, 77 combat helicopters (100 percent American).

Total—no less than 55 percent of military potential of American manufacture. A considerable quantity of Soviet armor (6 percent of tanks, up to 8 percent of BBM) also in service, but it remains in the category of captured and is not subject to counting within the framework of arms deliveries.

Libya: 2,000 tanks (100 Soviet); 1,400 BBM (80 percent Soviet, the rest Czech and Brazilian); 105 missile systems (100 percent Soviet); and, 515 aircraft (89 percent Soviet, the rest French).

Total—no less than 90 percent of military potential of Soviet manufacture.

These calculations and the summary percentage indicators should, of course, be taken as quite hypothetical, with a possible error of +10 percent. They nonetheless show unconditionally that the principal burden for saturating this region with weapons was taken on namely by the USSR. The deliveries of Soviet arms in absolute terms significantly exceed not only American exports taken separately, but aggregate Western exports as well.

And last: whereas the overall growth factor in arms in the 13 Third World countries being compared was an average of 1.5 over the last 10 years, it is 3-5 for Iraq, 1.5-2 for Syria and Vietnam and up to 3 for Libya and the KNDR. It turns out—and this is highly instructive—that it was namely our closest allies, already possessing more than adequate military potential, who were arming themselves at the fastest rate. Arming themselves further at our expense, they facilitated the ballooning of the Soviet VPK.

The ground-based Scud operational-tactical missiles must be singled out among all the types of arms possessed by the

aforementioned Third World countries. Not one country aside from the USSR supplies that type of weapon there.

It is archaic by world standards, of course. The 8K-14 missile was adopted into service with the Soviet ground forces at the beginning of the 1960s. And it was off around the world just 10 years later—first the members of the Warsaw Pact, and then a wider circle of countries.

According to data from foreign sources, Libya had 75 launchers, Iran 50, the KNDR 15, Egypt 9 and Iraq and Syria 26 apiece by 1990 (according to more recent data, confirmed *de facto* by the scale of Iraqi missile strikes, the missile potential of Iraq had tripled by the start of the aggression against Kuwait. It is interesting that this sharp augmentation of missile potential did not impel anyone—neither the Soviet military nor the supreme Soviet leadership—to ask the obvious question: just what for? Or was the answer known? And one can only guess how that augmentation of potential was achieved—through their own production, or additional Soviet deliveries?). It is difficult to determine the exact number of missiles, but there are at least 10 missiles for each launcher.

The war in the Persian Gulf showed that the obsolete Scuds, despite the progress in the realm of missile technology, are still a quite fearsome weapon. The Patriot ultra-modern anti-missile systems were unable to ensure 100-percent intercept of the Iraqi Scuds even when they were launched one by one. Their use with conventional charges had no military impact. In a salvo launch, however, and especially using chemical or bacteriological charges, not to mention nuclear, even the destruction of the missile in an intercept poses a threat, and not only the missile hitting the target area.

The most modern systems of observation, including space systems, proved to be insufficiently effective when talking about the detection of the deployment locations of the mobile Scud launchers in real time. The American electronic-surveillance systems were unable to neutralize the whole set of measures for the strategic camouflaging of the missiles either.

The adjusted data testify unequivocally to the obvious over-saturation of Third World countries with weapons. And the chief "credit" for this belongs—with all the possible caveats—to the USSR nonetheless. This has, however, not only not yet impelled the leaders of the Soviet VPK to take steps to wind down their deliveries, but has on the contrary served as an argument for the utmost augmentation of them. An attempt has been undertaken of late to buttress this position with another argument as well—the weapons exports bring considerable income to the country, they say, and moreover in freely convertible currency.

The myth of the profitability of the weapons trade is just as tenacious as it is unfounded. Deliveries of weapons, including Soviet ones, are made only at the expense of credit offered. Often (by way of example, Iraq, Libya or Vietnam) the actual creditworthiness of the recipient is not taken into account either. That same Iraq owes us more than six billion dollars for arms deliveries, but there is no

real possibility of putting that credit into circulation with goods—not now, not in the near future.

In those rare cases where weapons deliveries are paid for directly with hard currency, it bypasses the civil sectors of the economy and the social needs of the population all the same, returning, if not directly to the armed forces, to the sectors of the VPK in any case. The well-being of ordinary taxpayers is in no way changed for the better thereby.

So just what follows from this?

The first and obvious thing is to stop and look around. Count up what we have been selling off and to whom, and who really—really!—gains from this and how much. Assess to what dangerous military and political consequences the deliveries of Soviet weapons have led. Voices are sounding more and more insistently from the VPK demanding limitations on the scope of conversion, converting military industry to the production of ever greater amounts of export arms, so as not to permit a radical break in that structure, the heavy burden hanging around the neck of the Soviet economy. When the discussion touches on the production of weapons, parochial departmental interests are especially dangerous and, obviously, come into contradiction with the national interests of the country—both political and economic. A state policy aimed at restricting weapons exports will force the VPK to take account of public interests to a greater extent.

Further, it is doubtless necessary to halt deliveries of salvo launchers and operational-tactical and anti-aircraft missiles. The escalation of the arms race and its shift into the realm of missile weaponry could cause the situation in the Third World to get out of any control whatsoever. This danger can still be averted. The USSR should not have such interests and such allies in the future that would require a spread of missile weaponry.

And, finally, steps must be taken to restrict the international trade in weapons overall. The simplest and most radical variation is to take unilateral steps to break off or slow down existing agreements on the delivery of munitions, spare parts, maintenance and training, at least in relation to the most odious and militarized regimes. There is no need to fear that the market niche formed thereby would be filled by Western competitors immediately and to the detriment of the security of the USSR. Who, aside from us, would arm Iraq at such a pace? Or Libya? Or North Korea? Or Vietnam? The arms race in the Third World countries was born and was conditioned first and foremost by the confrontation of the two superpower blocs. It is time to recognize that this all-justifying argument no longer exists.

It would be more far-sighted from all points of view, of course, to combine a policy of good example with persistent attempts to revive the Soviet-American negotiations on limiting the arms trade, with the subsequent inclusion of other major exporting countries—and first of all the permanent members of the UN Security Council—in them. The first contacts on this score have already taken

place, by the way, at last year's Paris meeting of the foreign ministers of the permanent member nations of the UN Security Council.

Such negotiations were held in the 1970s, but more "for show," in the confrontational channel of mutual distrust from time immemorial. It is entirely possible that today's atmosphere in Soviet-American, as well as overall European, dialogue on military problems could revive them and make them efficacious. It is essential to display initiative and pose such a question, in any case.

Footnote

1. The correlation of the total size of the armed forces of the nations being considered, the quantity of tanks and armored vehicles (BBM) and the number of aircraft is taken into account when estimating the military might of the Third World nations. The quantity of artillery, mortars and helicopters is also taken into account. The estimates are not absolute and are of a tentative and comparative nature, but are sufficiently correct for the purposes of this analysis.

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Change in NATO Flexible Response Questioned

92UM0185A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Dec 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant General V. Starodubov (retired) of the Russian-American University: "Accurate But the Wrong Way Round: Has the Concept of Flexible Response Been Abandoned in NATO?"]

[Text] Literally on the eve of the November Rome session of the NATO Council a report appeared in the media to the effect that NATO had decided "to put into the archives" its fundamental strategic concept of flexible response. This decision, in the opinion of the observer, would stem logically from the entire course of the change in the military-strategic situation in Europe and in the world in general.

Naturally, experts in the military-political field awaited with great interest the publication of material from the Rome session that would enable them to be convinced of a significant and undoubtedly timely turnabout in NATO's military policy. For at one time, when it adopted the concept of flexible response the NATO leadership argued for its decision by saying that the Warsaw Pact supposedly possessed "overwhelming superiority" in conventional weapons. It had therefore been forced to make provision for the possibility of using nuclear weapons if an attack on the allied Western states was made only with conventional weapons. Thus, the main pivot of the concept of flexible response was the threat from the NATO bloc to use nuclear weapons first.

The situation in Europe has now changed radically. The Warsaw Pact Organization has disbanded itself. The USSR has taken a number of unilateral steps in the direction of reducing its own military potential, which in and of itself objectively testifies that its plans do not include an attack on West Europe or anyone else (which incidentally, it never

did). And in 1990 the USSR signed the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, since when the numbers of its Armed Forces on the European continent have been reduced even more. And if we disregard the political realities and look at the pure arithmetic in the relations between NATO forces and the forces of the Soviet Union (or the state that will become its successor), then since the signing of that treaty it has looked approximately like this:

—in terms of tanks and combat armored vehicles the ratio is 1.5:1;

—in terms of artillery systems the ratio is 1.3-1.5:1;

—in terms of combat aircraft and strike helicopters the ratio is 1.3:1. That is, in rough terms, 3:2 in favor of NATO.

Taking into account the superiority of the United States and NATO over the USSR at sea, the overall advantage of military forces for NATO becomes even greater.

Consequently, the main prerequisite for NATO still to be guided by the concept of flexible response—the superiority of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR in terms of conventional weapons—has not only disappeared but has even pushed the balance in the other direction. Now superiority is on the side of NATO. Formally, using the same logic, the concept of flexible response should today be adopted by our country.

All this would appear obvious. Yet after learning about the new strategic concept adopted at the Rome session of the NATO Council, which, incidentally, was a summit meeting, and after the comments made in connection with the session's adoption of a special document on the subject, it has become clear that NATO has not abandoned the concept of flexible response. Paragraph 40 of the NATO document states that the Western allies have agreed only "to modify the principle of flexible response, taking into account a lesser dependence on nuclear weapons."

In answer to the question of what this means in practice, NATO spokesmen explain that the proviso "taking into account a lesser dependence on nuclear weapons" was made in connection with the declared intent to reduce "present stocks of nonstrategic NATO weapons in Europe... by 80 percent." This percentage includes short-range ground-launched nuclear weapons (up to 500 kilometers); they are promising to eliminate them; also nuclear weapons on surface ships and submarines that "under usual conditions will not be deployed" (it is suggested that in "unusual conditions," that is, when they are "needed," they will be returned to the ships). At the same time, the NATO allies "intend to maintain adequate nonstrategic nuclear forces based in Europe to ensure the exceptionally important connection between strategic nuclear forces by strengthening Transatlantic bonds. They will consist entirely of dual-capability air forces that if necessary can be reinforced by sea-based systems."

What does all this indicate?

First, that modification of the principle of flexible response is connected with the proposed elimination of ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons—short-range missiles and nuclear artillery. In other words, those variants of flexible response that previously provided for the

use of these tactical nuclear weapons are being abandoned. It is not difficult to understand this decision: The NATO countries and the USSR have started to share a distance that greatly exceeds the range of these weapons. Consequently, they have become useless.

Second, in connection with the abandonment of ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons the role of the "dual-capability air forces"—tactical air forces armed with nuclear weapons—is to be even further enhanced.

Third, the emphasis on stressing the "exceptional importance of the links with strategic nuclear forces" and the "strengthening of Transatlantic bonds" is a reminder that NATO also includes flexible response among the scenarios in which American strategic nuclear weapons would be used. The remark that "the presence... of American nuclear forces in Europe as before is of vital importance for the security of Europe" should be understood in the same context.

Fourth, despite the declared intention of not deploying tactical nuclear weapons on ships "under usual conditions," they may "if necessary" be used to reinforce the nuclear weapons of the tactical air forces. Hence, the cutback in naval nuclear weapons is to a certain extent conditional in nature.

If after everything that has been said anyone still has doubts about how to interpret the NATO intention "to modify the principle of flexible response," then in order to dispel them let us say this: The predictions from some observers made on the eve of the NATO Council session in Rome have apparently come true. But, as they say, they were completely accurate, but the wrong way round.

US Progress in Plutonium Disposal Examined

*92UM0196A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Dec 91 First edition p 3*

[Article by G. Kostenko: "There Is a Problem. Is There a Solution?"]

[Text] An article by T. Lippman titled "The Danger of Disarmament" was published in a November issue of THE WASHINGTON POST and was dedicated to the problems of disposing of weapons-grade plutonium during the elimination of nuclear weapons through its storage, destruction, or use for some sort of commercial purposes.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already recently written about the complications associated with the use of released weapons-grade uranium. Although plutonium in nuclear weapons is an order of magnitude smaller than that of uranium, it gives rise to problems that are a great deal more complicated during their disarmament. As T. Lippman points out, the Americans need to decide where to hide up to 50 tons of this substance in a very short time. This problem is no less acute in our country because several kilograms of plutonium are used in all modern nuclear warheads. It is worsened by the fact that plutonium, an artificial radioactive element, is very dangerous in and of itself. It is lethal when it is inhaled or swallowed even in microscopic quantities. The half-life of plutonium is 24,000 years and therefore the danger, primarily radioactive contamination, does not disappear with

time. In the metallic form which is used in nuclear weapons, it is spontaneously combustible—it can burst into flame upon contact with the air. It is hardly worth stressing that plutonium must be stored in such a way that it does not create a critical mass or the possibility of the emergence of a spontaneous chain reaction and that it is not accessible to unauthorized persons.

As we can judge from the articles that have appeared in the United States, American experts are studying several possible proposals with regard to the released plutonium. One of them is its use in new nuclear weapons. Realization of this proposal is possible but it is impossible to view it as the leading solution since the total number of nuclear weapons will obviously steadily decline. Another proposal is the destruction of weapons-grade plutonium either during the process of underground nuclear explosions or by launching it into space on a missile. Both of these variations cause society's criticism both for ecological considerations and also based on the economic factor: there simply is no way to justify the destruction of such a saturated energy carrier as plutonium in which billions of dollars have been invested (according to assessments of American experts, the cost of one kilogram of plutonium is nearly equal to the cost of five kilograms of weapons-grade uranium).

The possibility of using weapons-grade plutonium in the energy reactors of nuclear electrical power plants is also being examined. But as of today, there are practically no such industrially-developed reactors. And it is hardly worthwhile to count on their broad introduction by the end of the current millennium.

Thus, if we need to proceed based on what is "most economically feasible in the near future," then it will nevertheless be storage of the plutonium released from weapons during their elimination, because—in this case we can already say this—its half-life is so long. In so doing, they have in mind to use plutonium as a source of energy when this becomes technically possible.

Unification of efforts of scientists from both of our countries and the rest of the world would promote the acceleration of a solution to this problem. But here, of course, not everything is simple.

Take, by way of illustration, the decision on "aid using the Pentagon's resources" for a total sum of \$500 million, which they plan to give to the Soviet Union. The American Congress just approved this decision.

As we follow from materials of the hearings in Congress on this issue, they plan to send \$400 million of this sum directly for the elimination of Soviet nuclear weapons, first of all tactical, which, in the opinion of the American legislators, are becoming especially dangerous under conditions of the instability in the Soviet Union.

However, they do not propose to place the allocated funds at our disposal to resolve long-term scientific-technical problems on the destruction or utilization of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium which we discussed above. The \$400 million is credit which we will need to return, yes and with interest. We can only use these funds while being

monitored by the Americans. Senator S. Nunn called the allocation of the credits not "aid to a foreign state, but self-defense" since, for the United States, the issue of the elimination of Soviet weapons will be resolved using the extended credit. It is this goal that Washington is first of all pursuing.

Article Looks At Indian Navy

92UM0204A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Dec 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major Z. Fedoseyev: "At Readers' Request: The Indian Navy"]

[Text] "In recent years, your newspaper has published many interesting articles about the armed forces of foreign states, above all those belonging to NATO. But little is said about other countries. For example, I have long been waiting for an article about the Indian Navy, with which, as I understand it, we have strong ties."—K. Ryabov.

This week the Indian Navy is marking its 20th anniversary. Its date of birth is taken to be December 4, 1971, when Indian seamen won a significant victory in the war with Pakistan.

At the time, the Indian naval staff had devised an unusual operation. Its objective was to use Soviet-made Osa-class guided missile boats in service in the Indian fleet to mount a strike against Pakistan's sole port of Karachi, where its navy was located. The plan was unusual in that in the USSR, these boats were viewed as coastal-defense ships that were not used in long-range naval operations. However, the Indian command decided to secretly tow the guided-missile boats to the port of Karachi and to launch a surprise, lightning-swift strike. The plan was executed.

The result of the attack surpassed all expectations. Following the first salvo, three Pakistani Navy warships were knocked out of commission simultaneously. Bursting into the bay, the boats destroyed most of the port installations and set an oil-storage facility afire. The fire raged for several days. The panic in Karachi was so great that on the next day, Pakistani warplane pilots, fearing a fresh attack, strafed their own patrol ship.

Over the past two decades, the Indian Navy has become the most serious regional force in the Indian Ocean. "The versatile might of the Indian Navy is growing in proportion to its constantly expanding duties," is how Indian President R. Venkataraman described this process during his last presidential inspection of naval forces in February 1989. The Navy has many such duties, considering that the nearly 3,535-mile-long maritime border constitutes an exclusive economic zone of more than 2 million square km, and that remote island territories, a large merchant marine, and important sea lanes require protection.

In order to carry out such wide-ranging missions, the Indian fleet presently has two aircraft carriers, 13 submarines, destroyers, frigates, minesweepers, and amphibious-assault and other combat and auxiliary vessels. Its naval

aviation includes TU-142M long-range aircraft, Dornier-228 [Dornier] patrol planes, and Sea King helicopters for engaging in antisubmarine warfare.

The overwhelming majority of this combat hardware was bought overseas. But this is now longer the sole source of military supplies. Today India has a rather high-capacity industrial base for producing its own warships. This gives the country enormous advantages vis-a-vis other states of the Indian Ocean basin with less developed economies and limited raw materials and manpower. India's shipyards, with technical assistance from other countries, are building submarines, frigates, and patrol ships. Using Soviet and Western technology, Indian engineers have designed the Godavari-class frigate, which has good tactical-technical specifications. Three such frigates are already in service in the Indian Navy. India is also modifying obsolete vessels on its own. In the future, India plans to independently build a 30,000-ton aircraft carrier and its first nuclear-powered submarine.

It is also successfully testing the Pritkhvi guided missile, a modified version of which will be capable of being launched from both ground and sea.

This effort to develop its own modern armaments and control systems is increasingly lessening India's dependence on more developed countries. However, its lag behind the level of Western science and technology is so great that narrowing this gap in the near future will hardly be possible. Nevertheless, on the basis of a realistic assessment of its capabilities, India has extensive plans to develop new weapons by the early 21st century. By that time, plans call for forming two aircraft-carrier task forces, several guided-missile strike forces, three groups of reserve ships, and a sufficient number of submarines for carrying out offensive and defensive operations. Special attention will be devoted to strengthening coastal defenses with new patrol ships armed with conventional weapons and missiles. Reconnaissance and observation of the enemy will be conducted by means of a satellite system.

The modern Indian Navy was formed and built with the active participation of the Soviet Union, which has not only supplied military equipment but also trained Indian naval specialists. The history of the Indian submarine fleet can serve as the most instructive example.

The question of creating it confronted India in 1965, during the war with Pakistan. Having realized the importance of strong naval forces to protect its interests, the Indian government adopted a new plan to build and modernize them.

India originally decided to buy submarines from its traditional partners at the time—Britain and the US. But they refused to sell them.

Then the Indian government turned to the Soviet Union, and an agreement was soon reached under which India bought Foxtrot-class submarines, as they are known in the West. The year 1967 was a turning point in the history of India's naval forces. In December of that year, the Indian fleet took possession of its first Soviet-made submarine. At the same time, Indian seamen were trained in the Soviet

Union. Over the next seven years, India was provided with seven more submarines, which make up the backbone of the Indian submarine fleet to this day.

In the mid-1980s, the need to modernize the fleet and to acquire more advanced weapons systems forced India to turn to the Soviet Union for help once again. This time Indian specialists chose six Kilo-class submarines, three of which were placed in service in the Indian Navy beginning in 1986.

However, not even the most advanced diesel-powered submarines could meet the Navy's exacting requirements. In 1982, after long and careful studies and discussions, the Indian government made a firm decision to initiate a program to build its own nuclear-powered submarine. Efforts to build a reactor and hull got under way immediately.

In order to accelerate its nuclear program, India asked the USSR to help train Indian seamen in the maintenance and operational use of nuclear-powered submarines, as well as to lease a Soviet nuclear-powered submarine to it. That request was granted. Indian specialists believe that the program to build the submarine itself will not be completed until 1995.

Soviet Method of Assessing US Military Budget Questioned

*92UM0245A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Dec 91 First edition p 3*

[Article by Captain 1st Rank V. Pankov and Col B. Polikarpov, candidates of technical sciences: "Priority for the Latest Technologies"]

[Text] **It is time to revise our approaches to the assessment of the US military budget.**

At the end of November the American Congress finally approved military outlays of 291 billion dollars for fiscal year 1992. They include primarily allocations for running the Defense Department, as well as for programs of the Energy Department, NASA, and other departments. For example, the Energy Department will receive 11.9 billion dollars for the production of nuclear ammunition.

The first commentary on the matter has already appeared in the press. It appears, however, to be based on our previous praxis for assessing American military outlays. But then, back at the end of the '70s the US Defense Department began switching to a qualitatively new, intensive path of development of its armed forces, one which differs fundamentally from the old, extensive way. The method previously used was ultimately defined by a quantitative approach to the buildup of traditional weaponry and to the missions assigned the armed forces. The intensive path brings to the fore nontraditional methods of resolving military problems and adequate technologies for implementing them, and optimal approaches to the development of science which make it possible to employ new weapons of conducting warfare and weapons systems conforming to those methods.

For this reason alone we can say that overall budgetary allocations for the development of the armed forces have

now ceased to define the level of military strength of the United States. They have begun to shrink in absolute numbers, and they will apparently continue to do so in the future. The capabilities of the US armed forces are steadily growing, however, a fact graphically demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War.

In the contemporary situation three clearly defined, sequential stages can be identified in the development of the American armed forces and their weapons. The first involves the outstripping development of a scientific and technological base oriented toward the accomplishment of long-range projects in the military field. The second involves the development of models of weapons systems on that basis and coming out of medium-range (up to 7-10 years) military projects. The third is the procurement of new weapons systems selected for expanded production, carried out under shorter-term (less than 5 years) military plans.

A relatively small percentage (3-4%) of the annual military budget is spent on the creation of the scientific and technological base within the framework of the first stage. But this is where the foundation of future leadership in the most important areas of military affairs is laid. We must forcefully stress fact something which the Americans have long understood: that the comparison of levels of military technology and not outlays for or quantities of weapons is becoming the criterion for assessing the strength of armies and the outcome of military conflicts.

As a result of the new military-political situation in the world the USA began switching to a new national security policy in 1988. It worked out a strategy for developing the armed forces over the long range (the selective deterrence strategy), and set the objective of developing 10 technologies for achieving the necessary level of the armed forces by the mid-'90s. In addition, special demands were set for a stable annual rate of growth of allocations for the development of the scientific and technological base. It is the growth of budgetary allocations during the first stage which determines the actual possibilities for seizing and retaining leadership in the most important areas of military affairs.

In the second stage around 10% of the military budget is spent on the development and construction of models of weapons systems. This is based on so-called "US Defense Department initiatives." The objective of each initiative is to achieve absolute superiority in one of the most important military areas.

The number of initiatives being developed has reached several dozen today. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is well known here. It has already lost its priority, however. A certain increase in allocations for SDI in the budget for fiscal year 1992 does not mean anything. It is due, among other things, to a drastic increase in work on programs for combatting ballistic missiles in the theaters of war. While more than 4 billion dollars is being allocated for SDI for next year, it is planned to spend only around 1 billion on these programs in 1993. The Patriot system will be further improved, for example.

We should mention something which the Pentagon considers even more important than SDI, the Strategic Atmospheric Initiative (hypersonic means of interception, delivery of troops and cargo from continent to continent in 12-15 minutes, global interception in the atmosphere, delivery of cargo into orbit, and so forth). Allocations for this program will soon exceed allocations for SDI. Urgency is also being attached to the Strategic Computer Initiative. In the near future it is supposed to prepare models of artificial intelligence equipment for troop command and control, delivery vehicles and weapons (smart weapons), which should significantly enhance the effectiveness of operations and the survivability of the troops.

In the third stage around 60% of the military budget will go for deploying the weapons systems selected. Outlays in this stage, previously considered to be indicative, now appear otherwise, because it involves primarily replacing the old

arsenal with a new, more effective and less expensive one. It is not all that simple, however. A reduction in allocations for procurement of the extremely expensive B-2 bomber, for example, in no way indicates a rejection of the Stealth technology used in its construction. This technology is also one of the priorities. It makes it possible effectively to reduce the capability of expensive Soviet radar systems.

It should be said that the Pentagon's attention to the development of its own base for developing the optimal technologies for accomplishing military missions and for preserving national security at the proper level at a small cost is based on a lengthy study of the most effective methods of command and control, improvement of the armed forces and the use of military cybernetics as the scientific basis for this trend.

Defense Plant Converts to Personal Computer Production

924A0270A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
2 Nov 91 p 8

[Article by Aleksandr Drozdov under "Conversion" rubric: "A Plant Changes Its Name"]

[Text] The Cheboksary Instrument Plant is a creation of the military-industrial complex. The time came when the defense industry began to live quite uncomfortably.

A dramatic decline in the volume of basic production began in 1989. The assimilation of new technologies and the reorganization of production helped plant personnel to cope with the difficulties.

Even before, the Cheboksary Instrument Plant put out plastic graters for vegetables, school rulers, and office products. And in recent years here, they mastered the production of "Khevel" thermal fans and "Azamat" radio-tape recorders. But such minor things as those were not sufficient to make up for the losses from the removal from production of instruments that cost several million each. So the offer of the "SespeI" youth center to cooperate in the manufacture of "Delta" personal computers could not have come at a more opportune time.

At the present time, despite the general decline in the economy, the plant has rather good indicators: the rate of growth in the volume of gross output was 120.3 percent and for the first 7 months of the current year 1 ruble and 12 kopecks of consumer goods were produced per ruble of wages. Those same figures were only half as large last year. It has mastered the production of new modifications of goods already issued and is planning to produce toy guns, timers for washing machines, and woodworking lathes. Nor is the plant forgetting about its basic output—navigation instruments for aircraft, which account for 50 percent of the total volume of production. True, profitability is still negative here.

The plant people are hoping that the law on conversion will finally be passed and that complex aviation equipment will be needed for civilian aircraft. It is also necessary to obtain the permission of the Government of Russia.

The plant intends to be solidly integrated into the world economic system. Installing instruments in finished products, the enterprise is already trading with other countries. Now comes the establishment of direct contacts.

Soon the Cheboksary Instrument Plant will change its name. The beautiful word "Elar" won in competition. That is the name of a satellite of the planet Jupiter. Trademarks of the firm "Elar" have been developed and registered and negotiations are under way on the certification of the output produced at the enterprise so that it can go to the world market without price discrimination.

Donetsk Institute Converts to Consumer Plastics

924A0270B Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
2 Nov 91 p 8

[Article by Vladimir Volovnenko: "An Institute Turns Into a Firm"]

[Text] The Donetsk Plastics Institute, a large research center of union importance, until recently has, as it were, been in the shadows in the city of one million. That is understandable: here they worked primarily for the defense industry. But times have changed and conversion has arrived. Having "taken off its shoulder straps," will the research institute not be left without a piece of bread? After all, there are such examples.

Doctor of Sciences Mikhail Klebanov, the institute's deputy director for scientific work, shows his own glasses as his first argument. Light as fluff, they are extraordinarily strong, because the lenses in them are made of a polymer compound developed by Donetsk chemists. Disposable syringes are another example among those that are talked about. A drop of sealing glue is applied where the steel needle is linked with the plastic housing. Considering the fantastic rapid action of plastic pouring machines, the selection of the appropriate formula becomes quite a technical problem. Actually this is not really a problem for the citizens of Donetsk, for both of the named developments were purchased by the medical industry and are yielding income.

"It is fortunate that we are going into a period of conversion along with our old partners, former 'mail boxes,'" explains the interlocutor. Whereas "before that" the enterprises produced special equipment for space, aviation, the nuclear branch, and communications, for example, today they are asking us for practically those same materials to give the consumer market boats, yachts, personal computers, musical centers, and collapsible pools.

The spectrum of innovations ready for use with the mark of the Plastics Institute is exceedingly broad. Whereas on the one pole are the epoxy materials for the hermetic sealing of microcircuits (the required purity is no more than 1 gram of impurities per ton of the substance), on the other are everlasting water pipes and "fantasy" plastic suitable for home tubs. And the polymers with a memory are simply astounding.

—At such a level, the institute must very soon feel an interest in receiving "greenbacks," in earning foreign exchange, I risk to presume.

—Negotiations are proceeding all the time but basically they are, alas, contracts for one-time deliveries, complains Mikhail Klebanov.

—They do not know us in the world market and hence they do not have much confidence in us. We ourselves have to pay authoritative firms just so that they will take our samples for testing. But the West has long been accustomed to advertising, packaging, and hourly charts of deliveries of small batches.

—So is it still too early to go to the market, where there are such "whales" as Mitsubishi, Shell, and Union Carbide?

—Well no.... The giants generally do not like to deal with small change. There will always be a place for a seller of a highly specialized commodity and for the needs of household electronics. We could move from one-time

contracts to the category of permanent supplier and possibly that of a small and growing firm.

Italian Firms Invest in Urals Military Conversion Plans

*OW1511120991 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0750 GMT 15 Nov 91*

[From "Soviet Business Report"; following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Italian Metalle SPA and Financial Project (both of them Italian firms) and Tekhnopark (a Soviet-Italian JV [Joint Venture]) will participate in setting up a technology center in Zarechny, located in Sverdlovsk Oblast. The declaration of intent indicates that their Soviet partners will be the joint-stock company Uralkonversia and the Ural Regional Economic Committee. The technology center will encourage the development and assimilation of new materials and modern technology, especially in the spheres of metallurgy, electronics, food industry, and agriculture. The Italian partners will be responsible for offering financial consultation, selecting Western firms to participate in specific projects, and handling marketing.

Production Association's Conversion Progress Detailed

*924A0269A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
2 Dec 91 p 8*

[Article by Aleksandra Kovinskaya: "Ovens Instead of Guns"]

[Text] That is what Igor Artyukh, general director of the "Toriy" Scientific Production Association, asserts. He is president of the Union of Industrial Enterprises of Moscow that was established last year and brings together 105 commodity producers. They have not set quotas for membership in this organization and are accepting all those who wish to join, including representatives of private business. The annual dues set by the by-laws are 1 ruble [R] from each worker of the registered enterprise. Accordingly, the collective of the "Toriy" Scientific Production Association allocated about R7,000.

Recently the government of Moscow in the person of Vice Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov signed an agreement with the Union of Industrial Enterprises on cooperation "in providing the city with consumer goods, the joint realization of urban projects, and other measures to improve the standard of living of Muscovites."

According to this document, the Union obligates itself to produce consumer goods for R500-750 million even in the next 2 years. It seems to me that the most impressive thing in the stated list is the idea of providing the capital city's construction industry with 25 lines for the production of bricks. The productivity of each is 3.5 million bricks a year. Since the drying is done with a fundamentally new technology using ecologically pure microwave energy, the rejects are practically reduced to zero.

As tests showed, the brick dried in the magnetron facility of "Toriy" Scientific Production Association has the mark

"300" and hence is four times stronger than its Mozhay-skiy, Cheremushkinskiy, or Butovskiy "colleagues." In addition, the installation does not require significant capital investments, as in the case of the use of traditional gas ovens, or huge areas as in drying under "natural" conditions.

What do these 87.5 million bricks a year mean for the housing of Moscow with its perpetual shortages, if, as specialists estimate, an average four-room cottage requires 25,000 and a small production structure 300,000? It will not be necessary in this case to spend foreign exchange for the purchase of imported technologies or entire brick plants. Also, it will subsequently be possible to deliver their own lines abroad.

Will the Union of Industrial Enterprises be able to keep its word and "saturate" the capital and the area around Moscow with high-quality building material? By the way, the first 17-meter installation has already been set up and checked out and is functioning.

It is impossible to enumerate point by point the specific contribution of all 105 enterprises to the realization of the agreement. But the defenders of the "Toriy" Scientific Production Association, for example, have already overcome their complex of fearing conversion.

This, by the way, is also helped by the support of the government of Moscow. The municipal council decreed the allocation of R500 million next year, primarily for enterprises subject to conversion, to help them shift to the development and series production of goods needed by Muscovites. They also stipulated other points of mutually advantageous cooperation. All of this must yield its fruit in the near future.

But practical results of conversion are already apparent today in the association headed by I. Artyukh. An acoustic system "Elektronika75AC-065" of the highest quality group is produced. Its technical characteristics exceed those of analogous output of the most renowned and prestigious firms.

A number of unique medical instruments have been created. They have organized the annual production of more than 70,000 through-the-skin electroneural stimulators, "painkillers" that are very effective and simple to use. The "Elektronika Terma," a small microwave apparatus for physical therapy in the form of a portable unit, meets world standards. And the surgical device "Hemostat" using an ultra-high frequency scalpel makes it possible to perform extremely complex operations on organs with a large number of blood vessels in an extraordinarily non-invasive manner.

Electronic accelerators of different modifications are called upon to resolve the problem of the ecologically clean and faultless sterilization of medical instruments (including disposable syringes), all kinds of secondary wastes offered for sale, and food products stored for a long time.

This is not the first year that the "Toriy" Scientific-Production Association has dealt with the intensive development and improvement of integrated sources of energy

that make it possible to switch to the latest technologies for the needs of the national economy. Thus, a device for the thermal processing of cocoons of the mulberry silkworm makes it possible to avoid unfailing losses of silk thread that previously amounted to as much as 15 percent. The use of microwave energy makes it possible to obtain high-quality raw material. The equipment literally pays for itself within 3 weeks.

Or the "crystal" dream of the contemporary housewife—an ultra-high frequency oven. The enterprise plans to issue a batch of 2,500 by the end of the year, whereas it is anticipated that the annual mark of 150,000 will be reached by 1995. To compare: last year the entire domestic industry supplied fewer than 70,000 ultra-high frequency ovens. But 5-7 million of them will be needed just to saturate the consumer market in Russia. By the way, whereas the design of these ovens is still not up to that of foreign countries, they have no equal from the point of view of practical use.

Something else is worrisome: will not the wonder-ovens and other technical-scientific progress turn out to be "golden," beyond the pocketbook of the ordinary consumer? If completing products are acquired in the markets that now exist, then this will be the case. The members of the Union of Industrial Enterprises see the solution to be in the establishment of their own market, in close mutual assistance with the necessary supplies, raw materials, and nondisposable items, and in the establishment of a data bank.

Here they also consider the rigid limitation of average wages to be a curb on successful work. Average wages do not reach R400 for collectives employed in the defense industry. It is understandable that not a single legislator will raise the question of increasing the military budget under the conditions of the reduction of "guns." But since the period of the transition to the market has been somewhat drawn out here, it is necessary that the workers in this part of the public sector not find themselves in the position of "second-class" people and thus that one allow part of the output that they issue to be sold to small enterprises and cooperatives at contractual prices.

"The market will not tolerate artificial restrictions. Private, cooperative, and state kinds of ownership must fairly be put under equal conditions," said I. Artyukh in specifying the position of the association. "We invite to our Union all those who need dependable partners."

Address of the "Toriy" Scientific Production Association: 117393 Moscow, ul. Obrucheveva, 52.

Contact telephone: 332-29-41. For all questions having to do with the Union of Industrial Enterprises of Moscow, contact its executive director, Anatoliy Grigorevich Drogalev, telephone: 299-58-63.

Military Transport Planes To Be Chartered for Cash

PM0912163791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 4 Dec 91

[From the "TV Inform" newscast: Report by L. Kushnarenko and N. Glebov, identified by caption]

[Text]

[Announcer] USSR Defense Minister Shaposhnikov has granted pilots the right to earn hard currency abroad using military transport aircraft.

[Kushnarenko] The AN-124 "Ruslan" can carry loads of up to 100 tonnes on board, and for this aircraft distance is practically no object. A year ago a "Ruslan" completed a round-the-world trip making just three refueling stops. The trip was devised and financed by Australian businessmen Alexander and Victor Jamirze. When the huge cargo aircraft returned to Moscow, the businessmen suggested to the Air Force leadership that it set up in conjunction with the firm "Jamirze Family Enterprises" the aviation company "Antonov Airlines," based on AN-124's, which in our country are used virtually exclusively for Army needs.

[Victor Jamirze, businessman, identified by caption] If you were to release, say, just four aircraft, within a year we could earn approximately \$1 billion for this country.

[Kushnarenko] At last a contract has been signed for 1992, and during that time military transport aircraft should earn our country tens of millions of dollars. Further increases in profits will depend on how many military transports are deployed to work on international runs.

Military Personnel Committee Chair Named

92UM0211A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Dec 91 p 2

[Interview with Military Personnel Committee Chairman, Assistant USSR Minister of Defense, Air Force Major-General Nikolay Sergeyevich Stolyarov by Colonel V. Semenov: "The Breakup of the Nomenklatura Circle"]

[Text] As has already been reported in the press, Air Force Major-General N. Stolyarov has been named Assistant USSR Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Military Personnel Committee. Today our correspondent interviews him.

[Semenov] Nikolay Sergeyevich, this interview will most likely have the nature of familiarization. And therefore, it will be quite natural if you, figuratively speaking, leaf through the pages of your own biography and fill out a calling card.

[Stolyarov] It is always embarrassing to talk about myself. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers have already received certain information about me when they familiarized themselves with the article on my assignment. Life is structured in such a way that time personifies each of our biography's laconic lines. It is difficult, dramatic and complicated. But, nevertheless, very noteworthy. For that which is possible today was absolutely ruled out only two-three years ago.

Naturally, if you judge by the canons established long ago, I admit that my appointment to such an important post might seem surprising to many people. If you try to think of it in the context of general political processes, then nothing extraordinary occurred. The logic of present events presumes the breakup of the nomenklatura circle. And as soon as the selection fell to me, I had a very responsible attitude toward the decision which had been made. I remember well that society has an adequately high level of natural expectations and claims for those entrusted to lead, including those in the Armed Forces.

I want to single out a very important moment. Numerous appeals from the military, from Officers Assemblies and from individual servicemen arrive that are addressed to the USSR and RSFSR presidents and the USSR Minister of Defense. They contain alarm about the future of the Armed Forces, the fates of officers-political workers, and the state of affairs in military collectives.

The creation of the Military Personnel Committee and the appointment of a chairman allows us to hope that the period of uncertainty is ending. The time has come for constructive, creative action.

We have been tasked with a mission of critical importance: to reorganize, in the most fundamental manner, the system for educating and working with people. Not to raze it to its "foundation," but to reorganize it! In view of today's needs. With these feelings and mood, I stepped over the threshold of a famous department, the former GlavPUR [Main Military-Political Directorate], whose prestige, let us be realists, is extremely low. The new structure will have

to win it and raise it to the proper height. How will this be done, you ask? Through a genuine, not an imaginary, concern for people.

[Semenov] You were USSR KGB deputy chairman until quite recently. But fate, using the lexicon of aviators, has made a steep turn.

[Stolyarov] The offer to me to head the Military Personnel Committee was unexpected. I admit that I did not leave my former post without sorrow. As a human being, this is easy to explain: I had taken a fancy to my new position and, it seems to me, to obtain the peoples' trust. Not all KGB agents, as is sometimes imagined, are people who shun the ideals of humanitarianism and democracy. Incidentally, I will note that I had to become totally involved with problems there that are similar to those that I will resolve here. Namely, a reorganization of cadre and educational work. Definite experience has been acquired which will be useful in a new way.

If you look at life with "far-sighted eyes," you must see that the state structures, regardless of whether it is the KGB, the army, or other organs, are experiencing a very serious period. Radical changes are needed that are in keeping with today's realities. And I stress once more, this is a work of creation, not destruction. We have gone too far more than once in our history. The results are well known and sad. We have had enough of extreme foolishness. Depolitization is just depolitization, who can argue, but the prestige of the officer-educator must be at the height.

Incidentally, this was what was discussed at the first working session of the Commission for the Elimination of GlavPUR. A constructive exchange of opinions occurred. We created a good foundation for cooperation in the future.

[Semenov] Outside it is December, but our memory often returns to the tragic days of August 1991. We know that you, during the grim hour of the ordeal, then chairman of the RSFSR Communist Party TsKK [Central Control Commission], arrived at the "White House" in military uniform to defend democracy and the constitution.

[Stolyarov] After August, the people who experienced resisting the forces of evil and hindrance have changed. It seems to me that today even the "ultra-talented organizers of the coup d'etat" were unable to achieve what the State Committee for that State of Emergency was contemplating. That is why we have felt the fresh winds of freedom.

Time has the characteristic of placing events into the proper perspective and of compelling us to once again take a good look at already well-known facts. On the morning of 19 August, having heard on the radio about what was essentially a coup d'etat, like many citizens of the country, I was in shock. A quick and accurate assessment of the situation was required.

I was constantly at the "White House" from 20 August. Aleksandr Vladimirovich Ruts koy and other of my military comrades were also there. The night of the 20-21st was

one of danger. We observed the redeployment of military vehicles. We discussed a possible assault.

I totally participated in these events within my power. Naturally, I was not running around with an assault rifle, as they wrote in one newspaper. It may have been an emotional and impressive fact, but it was fictitious. My main weapon was words: I prepared draft documents with which the Russian government appealed to the people and servicemen, and conducted negotiations with the putsch organizers through governmental communications channels. Imagine the situation: the Party is practically still in power, and there is the chairman of the TsKK warning about grim responsibilities. It is noteworthy that, a short while after our conversation, Yanayev began to look for me himself. And he even tried to get advice from me on his statement "to clear things up with the people." It became clear: the coup organizers were looking for a path of retreat...

But on the morning of 21 August, as we all know, the crisis had passed. There were thousands and thousands of rallies. A Russian Supreme Soviet session. The flight to Foros.

The episode there is etched in my memory. The former minister of defense with trembling hands. Once fearsome and unapproachable. But there, the pitiful and humiliated gravity of an old man at the end of his rope. He asked what Gorbachev had said about the army. I answered: "We have a remarkable army, Dmitriy Timofeyevich..."

We really do have a remarkable army. I think that the impact of the army's educational work showed in the army's selection of its path and in its selection of our fate in August. And here it is not so much the contribution of the officers- political workers, but rather our seething lives. We can see perceptible progress in the frame of mind of people who wear shoulder boards.

They often ask me about the subsequent ban on Communist Party activities. I am far from thinking of advocating the rebirth of party structures in the army and in society. But I am an advocate of civilized forms of resolving such serious problems as the activities of political organizations and movements. Stern prohibitions do not solve one serious problem. Our own bitter experience demonstrates that.

[Semenov] I would like to once again return to a discussion of the new committee and its conception.

[Stolyarov] In this situation, I am not encouraging intuitive breakthroughs. Serious questions should be seriously comprehended. But you will agree that hasty declarations have long ago bored everyone to death. I hope that it will become a topic of thorough discussion on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in the foreseeable future. I would single out only the main one. Right now specific, energetic measures are needed to create a new system for working with people. Work with people must truly become "the measure of all things," of all of our plans, forecasts, intentions. They, excuse my frankness, began to prattle openly about the theme of "man" in our country in the past. But did it actually become the main criterion of our

intentions, of the state's deeds? Alas, this area remains the most blatant on the scale of society and the Armed Forces. That is why these organs are needed along all vertical lines that could provide socio-legal protection of the people. Take the problems of conversion, infrastructure development for servicemen, and job placement after impending releases. Assistance to former servicemen- pensioners... This is the priority list of our committee's concerns and worries.

We are counting on the widest democratization: creation under the Committee of the Social and Organizational Soviet. Close ties between political parties and movements and social organizations are also called upon to promote the solution of combat training and personnel education problems.

Total glasnost. Glasnost in the selection of people. Glasnost in the committee's work.

Reliance on the humanely and democratically-inclined forces in military collectives. I am convinced that there are such people in the main mass of the people. We need to rally and unite them, and rely on these forces. The task is to attain a natural combination of one-man command and the broadest democratization of military life.

Yes, the weight of an intelligent and kind word is known in all times. But I see the main thing in rendering the maximum practical assistance to people. We will only successfully resolve problems under these conditions. That is the meaning of our committee's activities in the most general terms.

[Semenov] Today there are quite a few conversations about impending famine. Headlines are beginning to continually appear in newspapers about ferment and discontent in the army. Some people predict a military coup...

[Stolyarov] You certainly do not need to be a profound analyst to say: the situation in the country and the armed forces is very tense. The situation is aggravated by the separatist aspirations of a number of republic leaders with regard to the army and navy. The ambiguity of the financial situation for the current year and the unsettled nature of many social and everyday issues are heating up passions. But will we take the problem to the citizens in a number of republics? Our committee should not be aloof from that. However, in my conversation with you, I do not want to sketch a gloomy future and make frightening predictions, as it has become fashionable right now. First of all, we need to understand that the country is in a critical state because there is no way for it to pull through this severe illness, the aftereffects of totalitarianism. Every illness has a critical point and I firmly believe that recovery will come. And as strange as it may sound, the army must become the guarantee and support of democracy. But I do not share the thoughts about a military coup. The army will never turn its bayonets against its own people.

Today daring and consistent action is required. I am impressed by the Russian leadership's program for improving the economy. Yes, it is possible that it is far from perfect. But right now not even thousands of wise

men could create an ideal program. We need to have the courage to implement the program that has been adopted.

If we once again talk about the army at this difficult hour, commanders and officers-educators must think hard about how to rely on their own strength. Remember how at the dawn of perestroika the former defense minister issued a threatening order prohibiting servicemen from individual work activities. And I judge it as follows: everyone who permits an officer or warrant officer, within the limits of the code of honor, to better his own material-day to day position, should be supportive and offer encouragement, of course, within rational limits so that it does not run counter to the interests of combat readiness. Well, as an example of frank barbarity recall the episode of the woeful Belorussian Military District commander who drove a tractor through a kitchen garden, plowing up that which had been fostered by the hands of the servicemen.

Naturally, this is the ideal alternative: servicemen train to defend the Fatherland. That and that alone! But, the realities of today require a definite blending of accents.

[Semenov] You are forming your command...

[Stolyarov] Preliminary conversations are occurring right now. It is early to name specific names. I dream of creating a command of genuine professionals. Intelligent people who have not been affected by the stamp of dogmatism. And it would be a sin to restrict the search to the notorious nomenklatura circle. My principle is, if you please, to value a person for his merit and not for his lack of shortcomings.

And, in conclusion, I would like to voice the hope that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will actively reflect the problems which our committee will be resolving. If they say that social and political journalism is an angry intellect, then the newspaper, in the century of the information boom and "maddening fact," is called upon first and foremost to help the people in shoulder boards to select life's reference points.

Defense 'Commerce Center' Chief Interviewed

92UM0212A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Dec 91 p 1

[Interview with Colonel-General V. Litvinov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Commercial Center, by Colonel (Retired) R. Bykov of the USSR Ministry of Defense press service under the rubric "First Interview in the New Position"; place and date not given: "A Commercial Center. A Commodity Exchange. A Bank..."]

[Text] By order of the USSR Minister of Defense, Colonel-General V. Litvinov has been appointed chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Commercial Center.

He was born on 25 July 1937 in the city of Voroshilovsk, Voroshilovgrad Oblast. In 1957 he graduated from a military automotive school; in 1970 from the Military Academy for Rear Services and Transportation; and in 1979 from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. He went through the ranks—from squad commander to deputy army commander.

Since 1982—chief of rear services, deputy commander of the Siberian Military District and since 1984 of the Kiev Military District; since 1987—first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services.

Married, two children.

We asked Colonel-General V. Litvinov to give us a short interview for the readers of our newspaper.

[Bykov] Vladislav Ivanovich, first question: What has the Commercial Center been created for; what are its main tasks?

[Litvinov] One of the main goals in creating the center was to find new sources to finance socioeconomic programs that would benefit the military.

The functions of our Commercial Center will include the sale of vacated real estate and other unused property of the USSR Ministry of Defense. It will also be coordinating and controlling the activity of the ministry's commercial structures and the enterprises created with ministry participation when it comes to transactions and income from the sale of the assets transferred to them.

Among the tasks the center is charged with is organization of military-economic activities abroad, sales of equipment and obsolete armaments there, organization of commercial transportation, and creation of joint enterprises.

The center has been given the right to privatize ministry enterprises on a joint-stock, share-holding, or lease-holding basis, and to form joint-stock societies on their basis.

As for the tasks at hand, one of them is to create a database of information for commercial activities. For this purpose it is necessary to conduct an inventory of all military property, including the real estate fund abroad. Once we have the results we will determine the plans for 1992, including the organization of fairs, exhibitions, and auctions of military equipment and military property.

[Bykov] What will the structure of the Commercial Center be?

[Litvinov] I cannot answer this question in detail yet. The center's structure is still being developed. Naturally, we will make use of already existing structures of the Ministry of Defense. The center will include a commercial administration for the realization of rear services property, armaments, and military equipment; an administration for capital construction and realization of basic assets and real estate; and planning, realization, licensing, financial-economic, contract-legal, and marketing departments (groups). Commercial administrations (department, groups) will also exist in each armed service, types of troops, main and central administrations of the USSR Ministry of Defense, districts, and in the fleets, armies, and flotillas.

[Bykov] To what extent is the activity of the Commercial Center aimed at the social protection of military personnel?

[Litvinov] I have already mentioned that the main goal, the main meaning of the center activities is to create

additional sources of financing for socioeconomic programs—first of all, the construction of housing for officers. For instance, we will buy shares in housing construction in localities and assist in the creation of production cooperatives on military bases of units and formations due for elimination because of cutbacks.

[Bykov] What can you say about the personnel of the new center; are you going to attract reserve officers to work here?

[Litvinov] The overwhelming majority of employees will be civilian, including reserve officers. Chiefs of administrations and of some departments will be military officers.

To work at the center, one needs, of course, good professional skills and a high intellectual level. Plus the ability to

work hard. As they say, the hound lives by his feet. Preference will be given to people with initiative, enterprise, capable of proposing and implementing effective programs. We will also need specialists with a knowledge of foreign languages. Thus, we are ready to consider candidates who possess these qualities, foremost among them a commercial streak.

In conclusion, I would like to mention that the center operation is unthinkable without proper advertising. Therefore, considerable attention will be paid to publishing and copy-production activities, and to television broadcast production. We are counting, of course, on active help from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and other military publications.

KGB Third Directorate Chief Interviewed

PM1012152791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 91 Union Edition p 5

[Interview with Major-General Yu. Bulygin, chief of the USSR KGB Third Main Directorate, by N. Burbyga; no place or date given: "Who is Military Counterintelligence Trying To Catch?"]

[Text]

[Burbyga] After the August events, KGB organs were also affected by changes. They are now being reformed, and the idea of placing military counterintelligence under the charge of the Defense Ministry has emerged during the reform process. How is this question being tackled at the moment?

[Bulygin] It is a difficult question and there is a story behind it. There was a time when counterintelligence was part of the military department. This applies above all to the Patriotic War period. It was then that efforts were concentrated on providing counterintelligence support for combat operations and on combatting subversion and terrorism. However, everything came full circle after the war. Stalin's pathological fear of Zhukov's prestige and of the military made him put military counterintelligence back in the Ministry of State Security structure, and monitoring functions began to take precedence over actual counterintelligence. But, for objectivity's sake, it should be noted that protection of the Armed Forces and servicemen against subversive intelligence activities has become the main part of military counterintelligence's activities in recent years.

The events of August 1991 necessitated a return to the question of the transfer of military counterintelligence organs to the Ministry of Defense. However, the question was ill-prepared legally, organizationally, and psychologically. Letters and telegrams we received at the time expressed worries that this step would make military counterintelligence a pint-size operation, as you put it.

I discussed this specific question with the defense minister and the chief of General Staff and came to firmly believe that, in the event of the transfer of military counterintelligence to the Armed Forces structures, the vertical hierarchy would remain intact and no one would interfere in its official operations. Apart from those who are empowered by the Law on State Security Organs, of course. Certain fundamental documents were even elaborated.

[Burbyga] So what will happen to the "special departments"?

[Bulygin] The idea was that our main directorate should become part of the Interrepublic Security Service [ISS] as the Military Counterintelligence Department, but the latest signs are that it is more likely to be called the ISS Main Military Counterintelligence Directorate.

[Burbyga] There are still Soviet Army and Navy subunits on territories that have declared their own republic sovereignty. How are the military counterintelligence organs going to function there?

[Bulygin] No common approach is apparent at the moment. In Ukraine, for example, there is talk about military counterintelligence becoming part of the republic's national security service. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and so on have their own ideas on this. As you can see, much remains unclear. All because, in my view, the Armed Forces do not have a legal status and there is no statute on military counterintelligence. The 28 November 1991 USSR presidential decree approved a provisional statute on the ISS, but, at the same time, it was decided to set up a new state commission to reform the state security organs. So the uncertainty remains and this is not the best way to make military counterintelligence work effective. However, irrespective of where we are, we will do all we can to safeguard the Armed Forces' security.

[Burbyga] Reorganization of the military counterintelligence structure and signing of agreements—all this is important. But the main thing, really, is to change the very content of its activity...

[Bulygin] You are absolutely right.

[Burbyga] What, then, is the nature of military counterintelligence activity? Military chekists I know have repeatedly complained that most of their working time is spent on routine work of a "police" nature...

[Bulygin] Briefly, as I see it, military counterintelligence activity comprises mainly using specific forces and means to safeguard the Armed Forces' external and internal security primarily against intelligence and other subversive activity (clandestine, secret, and, therefore, particularly insidious). It seems to me that external security means counterintelligence in the traditional sense: Combatting espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and other forms of subversive activity by foreign special services and organizations. Internal security means protecting the Armed Forces against organized crime, combatting corruption, drugs, and other particularly dangerous crimes within the state security organs' legal powers. "Police" functions, that is, combatting general crimes, should be performed in the Army by the Prosecutor's Office and the military police, which, it has been said repeatedly, needs to be set up in view of the exacerbation of the crime situation in the Army and Navy.

[Burbyga] Is there actually organized crime in the Army?

[Bulygin] Organized crime is just bound to creep into the Armed Forces, especially since they have been forced to become increasingly involved in commercial activity. Some military people who like a fast buck have tried to establish contacts with the criminal world both in our country and abroad. Naturally, all this is bound to pose a threat to Armed Forces security.

[Burbyga] Let us return to espionage. In view of the changes that have occurred in the world, who is your main enemy today?

[Bulygin] Above all, we believe that it is time we did away altogether with the traditional concept of the enemy and switched to understanding what are the real threats to Armed Forces security. We used to regard the special

services of the United States and some other states opposing the USSR in the "bipolar world" system—with which cooperation is being actively developed in the military sphere—as the main enemy. It is not impossible that we, the special services, will become partners on a whole range of problems. But the external threat to Armed Forces security, in particular penetration of our secrets, remains. However, the greatest danger in present conditions is the internal threat, connected with efforts to undermine the moral and psychological strength of the Armed Forces and the appearance of dangerous centers of social tension that could set uncontrollable processes in motion... Don't deficiencies in the storage of ammunition and weapons, particularly mass destruction weapons, pose a threat to the security not only of the Armed Forces, but of the population?

[Burbyga] During the putsch the USSR president's so-called nuclear briefcase was taken away from him. Did military counterintelligence have anything to do with this?

[Bulygin] No.

[Burbyga] Did military counterintelligence know of the planned coup d'etat? What were your subordinates doing at the time? What was your and their reaction to the events?

[Bulygin] We have already been checked out by four commissions (two intradepartmental, one state, and one parliamentary), which drew certain conclusions. The main one is that the vast majority of military counterintelligence officers did nothing to besmirch their reputations. My reaction, like that of most officers, was unequivocal: The putsch was adventurist and did not take the real processes in society into account. The investigation is continuing at the moment, the parliamentary commission is completing its work, so we will wait for the results.

[Burbyga] One final question, Yuriy Yemelyanovich. In connection with the newspaper investigation of the causes of the destruction of the South Korean aircraft in 1983 in the air above Sakhalin, IZVESTIYA has repeatedly mentioned "black boxes." According to some sources, they are kept in your department, but one cannot get anywhere near them. Is that so? And why such ultrasecrecy? If, in fact, you have the "black box," then, as I see it, its content should support the official Soviet version...

[Bulygin] I can say quite definitely that neither the "black box," nor any movie or photographic documents related to the investigation of the causes of the South Korean aircraft tragedy is in military counterintelligence archives and never has been. At the time our officers were engaged mainly in counterintelligence support for naval forces carrying out search work. So this is yet another myth along the lines of "The Cheka knows everything."

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