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23 APRIL 1991



# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

## ***Military Affairs***

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# Soviet Union Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-91-011

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23 April 1991

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### **Lithuanian Banks may be Seized by Army**

*LD1004212191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Russian  
2030 GMT 10 Apr 91*

[Text] At the plenary sitting [of the Supreme Council] today—I am not going to describe it in detail—Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius was speaking about Moscow renewing threats of an economic blockade. It seems this is the consequence of Gorbachev's statement about payments to the union budget. The republic's budget does not provide for such payments [words indistinct] as a foreign state. The matter concerns the prices of raw materials, buying raw materials for hard currency.

Gediminas Vagnorius also said that there exists a real threat that the military might attempt to seize the banks. Thus the coming night may be troublesome, especially as there is a government decision enabling the country's defense department and the police, who guard the state buildings, to take more resolute actions in case of attacks. [Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian at 1600 GMT on 10 April adds in a similar report: "The premier noted that, among various degrees of threats and expressions of anger, there are proposals to discontinue the supply of basic raw materials to Lithuania or to sell them for currency."]

### **Shchit Fails To Make Ties With NATO Group**

*91UM0567A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
10 Apr 91 First Edition p 6*

[Article by N. Sinyavin: "There Was No Fraternalization—Why Shchit Turned Out To Be an Unsuitable Partner for Euromil"]

[Text] The optimistic expectation of the leaders of the informal organization Union for the Social Protection of Servicemen, Those Liable To Callup, and Members of Their Families (Shchit) that the Union would enter the international arena at any cost, but more accurately speaking, the European arena, has apparently been fated not to materialize. The reason for this pessimistic assessment lies in the extremely unsuccessful results Shchit has had at the recent regular congress in Prague of the international organization of the European Union of Servicemen—Euromil.

The Euromil leadership approved a policy for the development of ties with similar associations from the countries of Eastern Europe, and it approved, in particular, full membership for the Union of Professional Servicemen of the CSFR but...unequivocally rejected the request of the Shchit delegation to be accepted into this organization. It was decided that this question would not even be put on the agenda at the forthcoming Euromil meeting in Paris this April.

Unfortunately, the mass media in this country and abroad assessed this event as being of no interest in the arena of "big" politics. Meanwhile, it characterizes all the difficulties in the development of ties between trade

union organizations of servicemen of NATO country members and the East European states.

Owing to the new climate in international relations, opportunities have opened up for direct contacts between the unions of Euromil and Shchit. At first, significant interest was shown in Shchit by the Union of Servicemen of the Bundeswehr (DBVF), which plays a key role in Euromil. Colonel Wenzel, DBVF chairman, held discussions with the leaders of Shchit in Moscow and in Prague. The DBVF also planned to organize a series of seminars for the Shchit leadership to determine specific plans of cooperation. At the Euromil congress in Prague, its Western participants did not conceal the fact that they would like to use the membership of the professional organizations of servicemen of Eastern Europe and the USSR in this union to influence the mood in their armies. Nonetheless, even with such stakes the expected "fraternization" of Shchit and Euromil on the banks of the Vltava in Prague did not take place, and this was because of the latter.

The Shchit fiasco most of all was conditioned by the fact that its objectives and tasks, and also its practical activity differ substantially from those of Euromil. This depoliticized association stands outside politics and is involved exclusively in social problems. Meanwhile, Shchit proclaims its main program objective to be no more nor less than the "formation of an army of a new type." In addition, the Soviet press reported in this connection that V.G. Urazhtsev, an RSFSR people's deputy and a lieutenant colonel in the reserve who was elected chairman of Shchit at the second congress last December, "has set a course for the creation of a military-political party on its basis."

In the event of the regeneration of a "professional union" of servicemen into a political party, as follows from the experience of new political organizations appearing in the USSR, instability, political contradictions in Shchit itself, and a split in the organization could arise. During the second congress, when it became clear where V. Urazhtsev was leading the group, a group of military and also USSR People's Deputy V. Smirnov left Shchit.

Further, while Euromil unites the legally acting professional unions of servicemen of Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, the FRG, Italy and the CSFR, according to V. Urazhtsev, Shchit allegedly has 500 officially unregistered primary detachments and 22,067 persons and, further, a substantial number of his supporters have the rights of "secret members." Of course, other members of Shchit who know the real situation strongly doubt the reliability of these figures. Nevertheless, the differences in the programs and principles of the organizational structure of the unions could not help but cause perplexity not only in our country, but in the West as well.

Incidentally, Shchit's clearly expressed extremist tendencies long ago attracted the attention of Euromil. At the

second Shchit congress, V. Urazhtsev characterized the union as a "left radical democratic organization," and he devoted a lot of time and words to plans for future political and international activity. What is the meaning, for example, of passages about the fact that allegedly "secret members" of the organization were sitting in the hall where the congress was going on, registered under pseudonyms and wearing "mustaches glued on for conspiracy." Such stunning "information" so struck the imagination of guests attending the congress that the utterly intrigued president of Euromil, Ens Rodvol, Vice President Daleman, and Wenzel, executive secretary of the organization, insisted on holding a meeting in the USSR Ministry of Defense to analyze objectively just what Shchit actually represents.

Not very long ago, personnel officers of the Army and the Navy who took part in the work of the Second Shchit Congress, came out with a statement which observed, not without bitterness, that "servicemen and members of their families and the great grief of soldiers' mothers who lost their sons are an enormous and complex problem that enable V. Urazhtsev and his closest circle and other politicized groups with extremist ideologies to go to the peaks of political power." In their opinion, the Shchit union can in no way be considered the kind of organization that will be capable of resolving questions of social protection for the military individual. An assessment close to this was given by USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov. At a press conference on 19 December last year he stressed that Shchit is a shady organization.

Shchit's method of operations came through clearly at the time of the meeting in Moscow on 28 March of this year. USSR Minister of Internal Affairs B.K. Pugo talked about this in an interview with the Soviet press. He said that Deputy V.G. Urazhtsev broke through a cordon on Manezhnaya Square and took several hundred demonstrators with him. The affair could have ended in a tragedy.

After long reflection and weighing all of the "pro's" and "con's," Euromil deemed it necessary to recommend to the leaders of Shchit that they categorically renounce any kind of political activity in the USSR, concentrate attention on the social living conditions of servicemen and members of their families, immediately legalize the existing structures in the Soviet Army, and register officially. As became clear, Shchit can make a claim for joining Euromil only on a legal basis and in adherence to all formalities. In this respect, the unsuccessful journey of the Shchit leaders to Prague convincingly confirmed that this union, at least in its present form, is an unsuitable partner for Euromil, when it comes to the question of defending the social rights of servicemen, and not political ambitions.

### Attempts To 'Discredit' World War II Moscow Victory Hit

91UM0562A Moscow VETERAN in Russian  
No 15, Apr 91 p 2

[Article by N. Vasilyev under the rubric "Permanent Committees": "Education Through Deeds"]

[Text] The committee of the All-Union Council of Veterans on Work Among Youth held an expanded meeting. Participating were activists of veterans organizations of Moscow and Moscow Oblast, councils of veteran-fraternal soldiers, leaders of youth patriotic associations, Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] workers, and also representatives of the military-political directorates of the Moscow Military District and the Moscow PVO [Air Defense] District.

B. Shumilin, the chairman of the committee, spoke. He talked about the fact that there is a need now to coordinate and unite the efforts of various organizations in the preparation of historical data.

V. Davydov, deputy chairman of the Moscow City Council of Veterans, reported that the MGK CPSU [Moscow City Committee of the CPSU] adopted a special resolution on the question being discussed. Besides the general city plan, plans have been worked out in each rayon. Provision has been made for meetings of Muscovites with front-line soldiers, workers of defense enterprises, and former students who built fortifications at the approaches to the city. Trips will be made to battle places in the "Belt of Glory," and there will be film festivals of documentary films and picture displays.

Lieutenant Colonel S. Volgin, chairman of the Military-Political Directorate of the Moscow Military District familiarized the meeting participants with the substance of a directive of the commander of the troops of the district on preparation for the 50th anniversary of the Moscow battle. Monuments and fraternal cemeteries will be put in order, and memorial plaques will be put up. V. Kharchenko, manager of a sector of the Central Committee of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], talked about the traditional "Memorial Watch," which will take place in a number of oblasts, including Smolensk and Kaluga Oblasts, and about plans to create an interregional Komsomol headquarters for the burial of the remains of fallen soldiers. V. Gorelov, executive secretary of the Moscow section of the SKVV [Soviet War Veterans Committee], spoke of the falsifiers who through the mass media are trying to defame the victory of Soviet troops in the Moscow battle and to reduce its notable significance to naught. The speaker called for a decisive rebuff to the spiteful critics and asked that front-line soldier propagandists be provided materials that reveal the true picture of the battle at the walls of the capital. He was supported by M. Malakhov, a former secretary of the party's MGK, who was involved in the formation of combat groups for dispatch to the enemy rear area.

The meeting participants observed that Moscow was defended against the onslaught of the Hitlerite invaders by sons of all of the fraternal Soviet people. The whole country will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Battle for Moscow.

N. Shapalin, chief of the department of sociopolitical work and information of the All-Union Veterans Committee, who gave the concluding remarks, noted that it is now necessary at the local level to organize cooperation efficiently and to avoid duplication of measures and scattering of forces and resources. The truth about the war has to be revealed vividly and convincingly, so that the youth will be proud of the deeds of the older generation and in their example prepare themselves for devoted service to the Motherland.

### Job Security for Soviet Members

91UM0562B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 11 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Reply by Colonel of Justice G. Lutsenko, chief of the Legal Service of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Directorate of Cadres, to query from reader on USSR People's Deputies who have completed their term of military service: "If a Deputy Has Completed His Term of Military Service"]

[Text] *The USSR law "On the Status of USSR People's Deputies" states that a serviceman-deputy cannot be discharged from work on the initiative of the command element. What does "at the initiative of the command element" mean? And can an officer-people's deputy be dismissed if he reaches the maximum term of service?*

[Signed] Colonel V. Snyatkov

### Colonel of Justice G. Lutsenko, chief of the Legal Service of the Main Cadres Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense:

Article 36 of the USSR law "On the Status of USSR People's Deputies" states: A deputy cannot be relieved from work (active military service) at the initiative of an administration (command element) without the prior agreement of the Soviet.

We will recall that, in accordance with the USSR law "On Universal Military Service" and regulations on the completion of military service by officer personnel of the USSR Armed Forces, which do not contain such grounds for discharge as personal desire, the initiator of a discharge is the command element. Moreover, it must notify the officer of the impending discharge, hold pertinent interviews with him, and refer him for medical examination.

However, as the saying goes, life introduces its own corrections, and this also concerns the case under consideration. By virtue of all of this, those officer-people's deputies who have reached the maximum age for active military service, or who even were considered unsuitable

for service by a military medical board, cannot be discharged without the prior concurrence of the Soviet.

### Armenia MVD Protest to Transcaucasus MD Reported

PM0304151791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
29 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2

[Sergey Bablumyan report under "Direct Line" rubric: "Armenian Ministry of Internal Affairs Statement"]

[Text] The Armenian Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] has issued a statement to the Transcaucasus Military District command.

It was issued because of concern at the situation in Azerbaijan's state of emergency 5-km border zone, which is monitored by military units of the Transcaucasus Military District.

"From here," the statement says, among other things, "population centers are still being shelled, MVD posts continue to be attacked, hostages taken, livestock rustled, and other unlawful acts committed. Since the beginning of this year alone 49 such incidents have been recorded, and just recently shelling has been a daily occurrence."

The Armenian MVD statement expresses a resolute protest at the continuing provocations and a demand for the necessary measures to nip them in the bud and prevent them in the future.

### Col-Gen Makashov To Sue Local Deputy for Slander

91UM0383B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 12 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Correspondent V. Babenkov, Samara: "General Makashov Versus Deputy Karlov"]

[Text] "Do you intend to resort to court protection?" Volga-Ural Military District Commander and USSR Peoples Deputy Colonel General A. Makashov responded in the affirmative to that question:

"What can I do if there is no other way to stop the slander....

A joint meeting of Samara Garrison servicemen and the city's Great Patriotic War veterans insistently recommended that the commander-in-chief act precisely in that manner. A rally organized on January 20 by a group of local Soviet deputies against the military district headquarters was the grounds for conducting the meeting.

There was no shortage of accusatory speeches against the army as happens in such cases. And besides all of that, Oblsociety Deputy V. Karlov went to extremes in his criticism. He nearly called the general the organizer of

the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and a criminal who conducts evil against his own people.

Time will tell how further events turn out. We can generally agree with the meeting's appeal: These acts do not become a people's deputy.

### Col. Gen. Makashov's Libel Suit Viewed

91UM0549B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 9 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Yuliya Panyushkina: "The Case of General Makashov's Lawsuit Has Taken an Unexpected Turn"]

[Text] A conflict between Colonel General Albert Makashov and fitter-assembler of the Samara Aviation Plant Valeriy Karlov is well known both in Samara and far away from it. Here is the short history of the case.

Speaking at a democratic rally on 20 January, Karlov voiced a supposition that Albert Makashov was a military adviser to Iraq and took a direct part in developing a plan for attacking Kuwait. A response from the general was swift: The lawsuit he brought contained the demand to sentence Karlov for libelous statements and to demand an apology.

Between 4 and 6 March, three court sessions were held in conjunction with the Makashov lawsuit, and of these the general did not attend a single one. He was represented by a lieutenant colonel whose name, unfortunately, a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent failed to learn.

The court did not meet persistent demands made by Karlov to ensure the presence of the plaintiff himself. The following is a quote from our telephone conversation with Valeriy Karlov: "Things were drawing to a close, and I was already convinced that the court would soon render the final verdict and would rule in favor of Makashov when a representative of the plaintiff 'divulged' interesting information. This came as a surprise to all, and in particular to the judicial panel. It turns out that USSR People's Deputy G. Starovoytova, political commentator of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI S. Volovets, and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent A. Shumilin published in the press as early as the summer of last year the information which I announced at the rally and which was termed libelous. The newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published on 15 August 1990 the article by Major Skrylnik "A Fairy Tale on an Assigned Topic" to which the lieutenant colonel referred. Why did the general not institute a case against the above persons then? Of course, I understand that taking to court a deputy and a journalist is riskier than taking to court a common fitter from the provincial city of Samara..."

We may only guess why the representative of Makashov behaved so strangely; in the words of Karlov, he simply disrupted the entire court scenario with his statement. They say that he still cannot understand what a mistake

he made. They now joke in the city that the lieutenant colonel will never make colonel now. As a result, a regular court session was postponed until 12 March. Within this period of time, the judicial panel is to make a true "Solomon's" decision. Perhaps, General Makashov will show up at the next session after all?

### New All-Army Party Secretary Interviewed

91UM0549A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 6 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Secretary of the All-Army Party Committee, USSR People's Deputy Major General M. Surkov, by A. Orlov; place and date not given: "The Truth Needs To Be Defended"]

[Text] **The First All-Army Party Conference ended in the creation of a unified party organization of the USSR Armed Forces and the election of the All-Army Party Committee.**

[Orlov] Mikhail Semenovich, we may congratulate you on yet another elected position. I have already heard the following said in reference to you among the journalists: "general secretary of the Communist Party of the Armed Forces..." So, has yet another party appeared?

[Surkov] First of all, thank you for congratulating me. As far as "the general secretary" is concerned, I do not by any means lay claim to this position. For us, the servicemen-communists, the party has been, and will be a united organism. We fully recognize the Program and Statute of the party, and we do not seek any alternatives. Therefore, despite the pleasant sound of "general," I will still remain secretary of the All-Army Party Committee. We are not some newly created party. We are still the same, just over a million army communists whose organizational affiliation used to be with political organs, and who have now united in their own structure.

[Orlov] You are also creating your independent apparatus in party organizations...

[Surkov] We are attempting to create a new party structure which is not too cumbersome and does not have a bloated staff. This approach is necessitated primarily by the budget that is available to us. As they say, we draw only on our own resources. We will not create new positions; moreover, we are eliminating positions: We will now have no full-time party functionaries in separate battalions. They will remain at the regiment level and on first-rank vessels. Meanwhile, the strength of the party organization of the Army and the Navy is quite significant at present. Actually, at present we are one of the largest organizations even compared to those of republics: We rank third, next to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the Ukraine...

[Orlov] Mikhail Semenovich, I would like to clarify one issue. No sooner had the first party conference of the Armed Forces come to an end than a rumor crept around



that military delegates had, supposedly, expressed their lack of confidence in the USSR president. Is it so?

[Surkov] I have already had to respond to this question. Someone is indeed circulating such rumors. I state with the full weight of responsibility and, I believe, 1,026 of our delegates will confirm this, that the atmosphere at the conference was benevolent and businesslike from beginning to end. The discussion was serious; various views were voiced; critical remarks were made. They involved a broad circle of individuals. If some remarks and suggestions addressed to the president were made, this was done in a benevolent tone; a quite regular discussion was under way.

[Orlov] How would you define the goals and tasks of the new organ of army communists—the All-Army Party Committee? What force in politics will you represent?

[Surkov] We state with complete determination that the army communists remain committed to the socialist choice and remain in positions of loyalty to the leadership of the country. We are in favor of continued openness in our society, of having an abundance of points of view, but of all of this occurring within a parliamentary framework, the framework of the USSR Constitution. We do not want to act like the forces which advance their "careers" by means of all conceivable and inconceivable accusations against the center and the Communist Party.

[Orlov] What if we detail the political goals that the army communists set for themselves still further? Who are they going to oppose, with whom are they going to stand?

[Surkov] This is how I would put it: Our main political goal is to look for allies who share our point of view and our choice. Who are we going to cooperate with, and who are we going to fight? I would not at all like to make enemies right away. However, this will happen quite soon. For example, how can we avoid conflicts with those who are obviously inclined to cheat at political cards? How can we fail to denounce those who at present call for fighting the communists at all levels?

[Orlov] Incidentally, to what degree do these words of yours correspond to the general sentiment in the Army?

[Surkov] I will state what is strictly my point of view. I have not done sociological surveys of any kind, but I know from personal communications that at present a calm, balanced, and sober view of the situation in the country exists in the army community. Certainly, we are influenced by interethnic aggravations, the lack of economic and spiritual balance in the country, and the persecution of the families of servicemen in some regions. Everything is not normal regarding the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe. The Ministry of Defense does not have the wherewithal for solving the problems associated with this; we would like to count on help from the leadership of the country and the republics, including Russia. However, we understand that at

present the condition of Russia and the republics is most difficult. This is why we correlate this potential with our needs.

[Orlov] You are not a novice in politics. In your capacity as a USSR people's deputy, your position on many issues is known. As you see it, what is the essence of the current troubles in the country?

[Surkov] Briefly, this is how I would put it. Perestroika was necessary; at present, nobody doubts this any longer. However, many things went wrong in the very first days of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies. I would not like to act as too much of an economist; I will hardly be successful at that. However, the collapse of economic ties, which we allowed to occur, has undermined the entire economy. At present, I cannot subscribe to the point of view that we should have delayed the issue of negotiations with miners, despite the fact that I cannot subscribe to the position of the miners who are issuing ultimatums to the leadership and the entire country. However, the republic leadership, and not just that of the center, should have resolved the issues of miners in a timely manner. Ultimately, all of this affects the economy. Also, there is discipline. At present, foreign partners are losing faith in us. They do not have faith in us and in our obligations. The lack of elementary stability in our country is to blame for all of this. This is the essence of the troubles. There will be no stability until there is responsibility. For example, someone gets the nerve to hold an action against the Armed Forces. This means that he should also have to assume certain obligations, and should be responsible for what might happen.

[Orlov] Do you mean the increasingly frequent confrontations in Moscow? Or Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius?..

[Surkov] Let me give you an example from South Ossetia. The Georgian leadership says that the South Ossetian leadership is to blame for everything. South Ossetia states that the Georgian leadership is to blame. There are no culprits, but the people keep dying... Also, look at previous events in other regions. At present, everyone blames the Army for events in the Baltic area. However, someone did, after all, prompt the people to confront the Army. Why would someone not ask this question? Here is another facet of the same problem. It is particularly painful for me to go to Leninakan, to the earthquake zone. Restoration efforts have failed there in all of these years, mainly because of continuous blockades. Either one side imposes a blockade or the other, either railroads shut down or power is turned off. The people suffer and are tormented because of, once again, somebody's irresponsibility...

[Orlov] Where is a way out?

[Surkov] There is only one way out. It is to cultivate this responsibility. Otherwise nothing will work out for us. The question is: Why fight for particular amendments to the adopted laws if all of our new laws do not work anyway?

[Orlov] If I understand you well, unity and a common will are necessary. Is such a common will possible at present? For example, the situation in Russia resembles a "dogfight" of sorts. It is like two aircraft playing "Chicken." Both sides know: He who turns away first is the loser...

[Surkov] Indeed, there is a real danger of both sides perishing. I am afraid of this more than anything else. You see, we have already grown used to just blaming each other over and over again. We have already compromised ourselves at all levels. I always look with involuntary envy at the respect they have in civilized countries for their leadership, their decisions, and their positions. In our country, there is always a pretext for a fight.

[Orlov] So, it turns out that differences in thinking and pluralism alone will not overcome the impasse in our country. In addition, the greatest patriotism and high spiritual values of the people are required. Do you as a party functionary think about this?

[Surkov] This is also the common point which may and should unite us—the feeling of patriotism, the pride we take in our Motherland even when it faces difficulties, the pride we take in our flag, our anthem, our past.

[Orlov] Mikhail Semenovich, it appears that at present everyone who outlines his positions so definitively is immediately targeted for attacks.

[Surkov] It would be too naive of me to think that everybody is going to greet me with open arms in the position of secretary of the All-Army Party Committee. At present, being, first, a serviceman, second, a general, and third, a communist and a party functionary is not in vogue... However, what can I do—the truth needs to be defended.

### Signals Directorate Sponsors TV Network in Estonia

91UM0465B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 7 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by F. Kaazik of the ETA [Estonian News Agency]: "The Army Is Creating an Alternative Television Network"]

[Text] An alternative television network will soon become active in Estonia, which will broadcast transmissions of the first program of Central Television [CT]. It is envisaged that two to two and a half hours of each day will be allotted to programs of the Intermovement of the Estonian SSR.

This is news for the Ministry of Communications of the Estonian Republic, as affirmed by the minister of communications for Estonia, T. Symera.

"A decision by the communications chief of the armed forces of the USSR is the foundation for the planning and construction of the alternative television network,"

said the minister. "Representatives of the planners are already in Estonia. According to some data, planning is expected to conclude this year, and construction will begin in the first months of next year. It cannot be ruled out that construction is already underway. All the planning and all the construction are in the hands of the army. It is known that it is being planned to place the equipment on the premises of garrisons of the Soviet armed forces."

T. Symera added that the transmitters for the alternative TV are planned to be located in Rakvere, Kokhtla-Yarve, Narva, Sillamyae, Tapa, Tartu, Valga and Khaapsalu. A studio will be built in the Tallinn area. It looks like the transmitters and other necessary gear have already been delivered to the site, probably from the Eastern European countries.

The CT first program can now be seen by 96.3 percent of the population of Estonia, almost all of the country. No one intends to curtail the broadcasting of this program. Is such an alternative network needed?

"No, of course not," said T. Symera. "Some other considerations are clearly in effect here for the servicemen. No one has applied to the authorities in the Estonian Republic on the question of building a television network or for the necessary frequencies. The issue is the interference of the army in civilian affairs. Even the planners who are now in Estonia did not feel it necessary to get together with the local authorities."

### Veterans' Aide Scores RSFSR Stance on Republics

91UM0336A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 6,  
Feb 91 pp 2-3

[Report by V.I. Dolgikh, All-Union Veterans' Council deputy chairman, to 23 January 1991 council plenum: "We Will Preserve and Strengthen the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"]

[Text] The sociopolitical situation in the country continues to remain acute, tense, and in crisis. The miscalculations permitted by the leadership of the country and the CPSU and the belated reaction to the actions of Russian authorities, who have assumed the position of open confrontation to the center, have become a destabilizing factor. The power of the President of the USSR and its prestige have begun to sharply degenerate. The causes are the disparity between actions and words and promises, the increasingly worsening economic situation, first of all providing the population with food and manufactured goods, and the wave of interethnic conflicts. It is impossible to not see the indecisiveness and even helplessness of the authorities. The President's Decrees are not being carried out and there is no demand [to deal with] the guilty. The people do not understand why the organizers of interethnic strife and bandit acts and shadow economy businessmen who are illegally accumulating millions [of rubles] are not being brought to justice.

The Soviet people are extremely upset by the confrontation of the leaders of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and the center. The Russian Parliament, which should become the binding element in the Union, is becoming a factor of its collapse and alienation. Their adoption of the well-known Declaration on Sovereignty was a sort of catalyst of similar activities in other republics and we observed the so-called parade of sovereignties. The Russian leadership's clearly destructive role has been manifested in connection with the worsening of the situation in the Baltic countries.

Events in the Baltic republics, and in Lithuania in particular, have developed in such a way that the matter has reached decisions on its secession from the USSR. The hopes of the country's leadership for compromise and its attempts to stabilize the situation through explanation, persuasion, and economic sanctions under conditions of the open and irreconcilable extremism of the Lithuanian leadership has turned out, as we should have anticipated, to be an illusion. The communists of Lithuania, who stand on the positions of the CPSU, the Russian-speaking people who have been deprived of their rights and who have become alarmed by a future that promises nothing good, and also servicemen, their families, and veterans of war and labor are the only force opposing Landsbergis and his entourage. The situation in workers collectives of union-subordinated enterprises in the Baltic Republics has become extremely tense. This part of the working class of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia has begun to express open complaints against the union government—they say they have been left to the whims of fate. They have expressed their resolve to fight for their rights and for the socialist order. A fundamental confrontation of supporters of socialism and capitalism has taken shape—this is the key to the issue. The provocative acts of the Lithuanian authorities have caused an outburst of indignation from some of the people, primarily from the Russian-speaking population. Bloody clashes have occurred in Vilnius, relations between the center and the republics have become difficult, and the general background in which the Union Treaty issue will be discussed has worsened.

A difficult situation has also developed in the long red-hot region—the Transcaucasus. Having taken advantage of the shocked confusion of the CPSU Central Committee and republic party organizations, so-called Popular Fronts—radical democrats and antisocialist forces—have assumed power in Georgia and Armenia. The leaders of these republics have taken a course toward secession from the USSR and toward the formation of independent states of another socialist content. The new Georgian authorities have adopted discriminatory decisions with regard to South Ossetia and have created a new hotbed of interethnic discord that is fraught with serious consequences.

The intensity of the struggle between Azerbaijan and Armenia in connection with Nagornyy Karabakh has not abated and it has even worsened. Interethnic conflicts in

the Republic of Moldova have reached dangerous development. Rukh's pompous propaganda activities in Ukraine are increasingly acquiring organized forms.

The demand of the majority of the republics for recognition of the supremacy of republic law over union law is placing the union leadership in the person of the President, USSR Supreme Soviet, and the government in a position similar to a dead-end, and many political figures, including people's deputies, are continuing to search for decisive steps, including the introduction of presidential rule in individual regions, as a way out of it.

The All-Union Veterans' Council has expressed its attitude toward it in a special statement. We advocate observance of the Constitutions of the USSR and Lithuania, we oppose attacks on human rights, oppose terror with regard to activists of Soviet rule and party members, and we oppose the restoration of capitalism.

Veterans decisively condemn RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman B.N. Yeltsin's statement on the intention to create a Russian army and his appeal to servicemen from Russia who are in the Baltics to not obey their commanders' orders. Veterans assess this statement as a carefully thought out provocative act directed at the collapse of the USSR and that undermines its Armed Forces and dooms the country to chaos, anarchy, and lawlessness. We support the USSR President's January 22 statement on this issue.

The economic situation in the country continues to worsen and the workers' standard of living is declining. Prices are even rising on everyday necessities. The destruction of the so-called command-administrative system of national economic management without replacing it without anything new, the disruption of economic ties between enterprises, and the decline of discipline and responsibility have resulted in the reduction of the level of production. One can practically note the collapse of capital construction.

The vows and promises of many "democratic" deputies during the elections that they would rapidly resolve the housing problem as soon as they came to power have turned out to be empty irresponsible slogans that pursued the goal of only obtaining additional votes from the voters.

The food situation is especially alarming. Despite a record harvest in 1990, goods reserves in trade and industry have been reduced. According to the government, the decline of delivery discipline is the main cause of the food crisis. Nearly all food products have become shortage items and speculation in them is increasing. Fees for utilities are increasing. This painfully hits first of all of the low-paid portion of the population—veterans and the disabled. The trouble also is the fact that the government has not developed an income index mechanism during inflation. The All-Union Veterans' Council has repeatedly raised this issue to the government and to the Supreme Soviet, however, it, as they say, "has hung" unresolved just like many others.

A CPSU Central Committee Plenum which discussed the Union Treaty issue occurred at the end of 1990. The adoption of amendments to the name of our state and amendments that determine the socialist nature of its social system were the most important decisions. However, the plenum did not lead the party out of its state of stupor. Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat decisions are still not having a serious impact on the activities of party committees, on life, or on the situation in the country. Neither the CPSU Central Committee nor the editors of PRAVDA are opposing the activation of antisocialist forces with anything serious. Communists are finding themselves unprotected and left to their own devices. And this is under conditions of a wave of permissiveness and the threat of physical annihilation of communists.

The question arises, with what did Moscow Party Gorkom oppose the January 20th antisocialist sabbath? Nothing. We must support the proposals of a number of veterans in order to express appropriate views to the party leadership.

The dramatic effect of the situation that has developed achieved its apogee at the USSR Supreme Soviet winter session when people's deputies demanded a report from the President on the situation in the country and the steps being taken to establish order and to improve food supplies. The passions that flared were concluded with the well-known presidential program of action and by the latest reorganization of executive power.

While speaking about the results of the RSFSR and USSR Congresses of People's Deputies, let us point out that a more active than previously position and better organization of the communist deputies was the primary distinguishing factor of the Russian Federation forum. The deputies insisted on calling Russia a socialist republic in the new Draft Constitution. The Congress also expressed its opinion with regard to personnel appointments and rejected a number of proposals by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman. So, one can ascertain that one can hardly speak about the unqualified support for any of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet leadership's proposals at the Congress.

The Soviet people expected a lot from the 4th USSR Congress of People's Deputies. It approved the President's program of action to overcome the crisis in the economy and in society, discussed the concept of the Union Treaty, reviewed the structure of presidential power, and amended the Constitution of the USSR. A decision was made to conduct nationwide referendums on the issues of the USSR and on private ownership of land.

We know how broadly the mass media advertised and encouraged its next attack by so-called "democratic forces" against the central authorities. However the "democrats" did not achieve all of their goals and they themselves are even talking about their temporary defeat. But everywhere we can see that destructive forces

are extracting lessons: They have begun frantic activity locally in all directions, including conducting rallies, strikes, and increasing work in workers collectives. Everything is being set into motion: Insinuations, misquoting facts, and even deception. In words, there is pluralism of opinions but in fact there is a taboo for speeches by dissidents at rallies, sessions, and in the press. In words, there is an appeal not to use force but in fact there is organization of combat detachments. In words, there is freedom and the guaranty of safety for the individual, but in fact there is terror against communists. Destructive forces are skillfully changing their methods, as they say, on the run. They move from appeals of "Down with the President!" to his active support when it suits them. The tactics are changing and attention is being concentrated on insuring influence in Soviets and workers collectives. The "democrats" of Moscow and Leningrad, who are generating the appropriate impulses at the periphery, are at the head of these destructive forces.

The impending referendum on the preservation of the USSR must determine the actual opinion of the population of each republic on the most important issue for the country's fate: Is the Soviet Union to be a great power or will it surrender its place to a divided group of states, having returned the people to the times of Ivan Kalita. Really the state, if it disintegrates from within, will die. Imperialism, having understood that it cannot defeat us with a frontal assault, is betting precisely on the internal split of the USSR.

The referendum on the issue of private ownership of land will determine the future social order of the state.

For the older generation, these issues are the cause of their entire lives. Veterans still feel the hot wind of the Great October Revolution that opened a new era of modern civilization and they know in what torment the new socialist state of workers and peasants was born. They remember the fiery years of the civil war and the foreign intervention against the young Republic of Soviets, collectivization, industrialization, and the tragic period of mass repression. Veterans know, and not through hearsay, how fatal the battle with Fascism—the "Plague of the 20th Century"—was. They saved their Homeland and the peoples of Europe from enslavement. Then in an unprecedented short period of time they reconstructed the economy that had been destroyed by the war and transformed the Soviet Union into a mighty power that is capable of defending not only itself but also its friends. We were proud of our victorious army, our science, education, and culture, and the achievements of our Homeland. And right now we say: To improve our socialist system—yes! To create human, democratic socialism directed toward man—yes! To democratize the party—yes! To use all forms of property under the priority of collective [property]—yes! This great socialist power was created by the hands of preceding generations and by our hands and no one should be permitted to tear it apart. Veterans will never reconcile themselves to the wholesale defiling of the entire history of the Soviet State

by those who still yesterday were calling themselves Marxist-Leninists but who today yell louder than everyone and condemn the path we have taken, rename streets and squares, and take down monuments to V.I. Lenin. The leaders of "Democratic Russia" and those like them are for the Union in words today but in fact are doing everything for its destruction and will openly repudiate the Union tomorrow. Behind these leaders stand forces who thirst for power and who understand that the union state, the army, the KGB, and the CPSU are the barriers to their goal. Today fire is also being concentrated against them.

The collapse of the Union (if this were to occur) would be a destructive blow against the forces of socialism, the working class, and the historical cause to which veterans have devoted their lives, blood, health, strength, and knowledge. The collapse of the Union could destabilize the international situation and destroy the system of international treaties.

Hence, there is only one possible way out—to struggle to preserve the Soviet Union as a single state. Only in the Union is the guarantee of the country's independence and the preservation of its prestige in the international arena. Only in the Union of sovereign republics can one discover the colossal potential capabilities of this enormous territory and its wealth. The national economic complex which was created 73 years ago is an indissoluble system of economic ties whose elimination will be fatal for the Union as a whole and for all of its subjects.

That is why veterans must conduct the required explanatory work not only in their own organizations but also among the broad strata of the population and first of all among the youth. No one, besides us, has endured both the calm and storm of our history. Veterans have a moral right to state the truth. Everywhere—in the mass media, at meetings, gatherings, and in conversations, in personal conversations among the population, etc.—they can and must boldly expose any attacks of extremists who structure their "arguments" on insinuations and slander.

If we talk about purely practical tasks, then we need to concentrate on the following:

1. To discuss these issues at plenums and at other forums of republic, kray, oblast, gorod [city], and rayon soviets, and with veterans in their homes and in their workers collectives.

2. The task consists of reaching every veteran in explanatory work, including those living in veterans homes and those who are in hospitals. We need to strive for each one of them to vote for the Union. To convince our own children, grandchildren, and friends and comrades of this.

The duty of veterans is to tell young people about that great work which was conducted in the country under the leadership of the CPSU to strengthen the friendship of peoples. Thousands of enthusiasts are still alive—

doctors, teachers, engineers, and agronomists—who went to the villages and cities of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and to the Transcaucasus from Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia during the first years of Soviet rule to teach children to read, to cure local residents, and to assist them to master equipment. And during the years of the war, ten million Soviet people from the western oblasts were evacuated to areas of the Urals, Siberia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and the local population gave them shelter and treated them like family.

3. We also need to be concerned that all categories of veterans are included in the composition of electoral commissions.

4. In connection with the emergency situation in a number of regions of the country (in the Baltics, Moldavia, and Georgia), the question naturally arises about what role local veterans organizations can play in the conduct of the referendum. It certainly is difficult to provide a general recommendation for everyone. One thing is clear: Veterans must decisively support the planned referendum and expose any substitution of it by local polls as they had resolved to do in Lithuania.

### All-Union Veterans' Council Holds Plenum

#### Kravchenko Delivers Keynote Report

91UM0335A Moscow Veteran in Russian No 6,  
Feb 91 pp 1-2

[All-Union Veterans' Council Deputy Chairman P.I. Kravchenko's keynote report: "Remain Fighters! All-Union Veterans' Council Plenum"]

[Text] As we have already reported, an All-Union Veterans' Council of War, Labor, and the Armed Forces Plenum was conducted on January 23 in Moscow at the TsDSA [Central House of the Soviet Army] imeni M.V. Frunze. All-Union Veterans' Council First Deputy Chairman A.I. Golyakov opened the plenum.

Elections took place for a USSR People's Deputy from the All-Union Veterans' Organization to replace the former deputy. Latvian Republic Council Chairman E.Ya. Ratniek was elected USSR People's Deputy.

All-Union Veterans' Council Deputy Chairman P.I. Kravchenko delivered a report on the next item on the agenda—conduct of a report-back campaign in the veterans organization and convocation of the 2nd All-Union Veterans' Organization Conference.

The speaker pointed out that veterans activists advocated a revolutionary renewal of society, socialist selection, and rallying all progressive forces in the interests of the future at the All-Union Council Plenum that took place in November. National-chauvinistic and separatists activities directed at the dissolution of the USSR were condemned. Republic, kray, and oblast council plenums that occurred have also shown that veterans are ready to fight for and defend their interests.

Their impending report-back campaign, which must be completed by the 2nd All-Union Veterans' Organization Conference in December 1991, is viewed in the context of overall measures directed at increasing the activity of our organizations. We think that we will act properly if we decide that union republic veterans' councils will establish the procedures and time periods to conduct the report-back campaign without constraining initiative at the local level. We propose prescribing just the total number of 2nd Conference delegates and the number of delegates per republic—700 people in proportion to the number of veterans. We do not need to be concerned with how representation of all categories of veterans—war, labor, and the Armed Forces, SKVV [Soviet Committee of War Veterans] sections, and various veterans associations—is insured both among delegates and in our electoral organs.

The All-Union Veterans' Council Expanded Plenum that occurred in November, continued the speaker, thoroughly reviewed the draft of the new wording of our organization's Charter, approved it, and recommended it for review and adoption at the All-Union Conference. Proposals, remarks, and desires that were stated at the Plenum are now being considered. What happens next to the Charter and how do we conduct the report-back campaign? Certain fundamentally new provisions associated with membership, organization building, structure, rules and obligations, legal status, financial issues, etc. have been made to the proposed draft Charter. Organizing a report-back campaign without taking them into account means to delay the introduction and entry into force of the Charter for another two-three years after its adoption. We consulted many republic, oblast, and rayon council representatives on this issue and discussed it yesterday at the presidium. Everyone thinks that we need to conduct the report-back campaign based on the draft Charter's provisions but we are offering the veterans themselves the right to decide this issue at meetings and conferences.

During the last four years, our councils have done much in the center and locally. Such initiatives have arisen as the All-Union unannounced investigation to inspect veterans' living conditions, the "Zabota" and "Podvozye" programs, serving veterans at home, etc. An aktiv has been formed. Today nearly 200,000 people are involved in rayon or higher councils and more than a million are involved in leading elements of councils. Even more activists work in various types of commissions. But today it would be erroneous to be satisfied with what we have achieved. Right now, as never before, we need to raise the work of all veterans organizations to a higher level and to fully utilize the report-back campaign to do this.

It is quite obvious: The unity of action of all veterans in it must be insured if the veterans organization is to really be an influential and authoritative force. And secondly: Councils and SKVV sections must know very well how veterans live and really know all of their problems. And not only know but act, find ways and solutions jointly

with local organs of power, and be persistent and irrevocable in the defense of elderly people's interests. Veterans' organizations will be influential and authoritative when they closely cooperate and assist government organs and trade unions and all progressive social organizations and movements, when they adhere to precise and proper socio-political views, and decisively oppose the reactionary forces which have attempted to turn our society away from the socialist path of development, disparage history, etc. For example, the Armenian Republic Council acted properly when it spoke out against attempts of certain forces to push a decision to repeal the Victory Holiday through the republic parliament. Leningrad Oblast Council condemned Lensoviet attempts to infringe upon veterans social interests.

But many rayon, city, and even oblast rank councils are still working somewhat narrowly, with little initiative, do not know veterans problems very well, and timidly resolve them. We need to state the case in such a way that all councils aggressively struggle with indifference, callousness, and social egoism with regard to the older generation. The opinion must be formed in society that the attitude of any official toward elderly people is an important criterion of his political, moral, and spiritual qualities.

Much in the work of veterans organizations depends on the activists who head the councils and on their initiative, adherence to principle, and skill in uniting people. During the report-back campaign, we must naturally maintain continuity and attempt to retain comrades who have recommended themselves well but naturally there will be changes and, this is very important, businesslike and respected people will work in the councils.

The leading element is our weakest element. At the present time, nearly 105,000 organizations at workers collectives and places of residence have been founded and are operating. As a rule, quite strong councils have been formed and are aggressively operating at major plants and enterprises. They resolve in a complex manner all veterans problems in close contact with party committees, trade unions, and the Komsomol. Right now the practice is being widely employed when people who are retiring remain in their trade union and veterans organizations and they have all of the advantages at their disposal just like enterprise workers. At Moscow ZiL [Plant imeni V.I. Lenin], more than 5,000 veterans, of whom more than half do not work, fully maintain their ties with their native collective. The same picture exists at Moscow's State Ball-Bearing Plant and at the production association imeni Lapse (Kirov) and "Arsenal" (Kiev). We need to develop this practice in every way possible.

Things are worse at small enterprises and in institutions. There are none of our organizations in many collectives where there is a small number of veterans. With the introduction of membership, we need to be concerned first of all that they are created in all workers collectives. This work needs to be conducted during the initial

portion of the report-back campaign. Organizations at residence locations must encompass with their influence all veterans who are outside workers collectives.

Every year there are more than 3,000-4,000 visitors at the All-Union Council reception. In conversations with them, we learn that, as a rule, they do not know about the existence of organizations where they live. The problem is that in many cases only very large organizations under the ZhEk [Housing Operations Office], REU [Rayon Operations Administration], and DEZ [Building Operations Board] have been created without any structural subdivisions whatsoever. Naturally, it is difficult for this type of council to encompass all of its veterans. Experience proves that councils of large homes derive the benefit. Really the primary goal is to approach every individual. We need to substantially improve the resolution of all of these problems during the course of the report-back campaign.

We need to seriously think about how not to weaken the activity of SKVV sections and to assist our brother veterans and soldiers councils in every possible way.

In his report, P.I. Kravchenko reviewed problems of veterans social protection and the ways to most rapidly resolve them.

Already today, he said, many veterans of war and rear area services workers, especially elderly people who live alone and widows, are finding themselves in conditions of unprecedented poverty in both cities and rural areas. We need to help them. What are we proposing? First—is to announce, in the name of the plenum, 1991 as the year of social protection for citizens of moderate means and to attain USSR Supreme Soviet support of this initiative. Second—is to persistently strive for the consistent implementation of urgent measures for veterans social protection. The All-Union Council has sent specific proposals to the country's President.

We also have in mind appealing to all ministries and departments to plan and implement their own measures to assist veterans. Furthermore, we intend to ask social funds and charitable organizations to allocate funds for partial or total payment of natural forms of assistance to needy veterans.

As for republic, kray, and oblast veterans' councils—we recommend that they submit proposals favoring improvement of veterans living conditions (pension supplements, material assistance, establishment of benefits for payment of housing and various services, housing repair, provision of fuel, and the opening of special commission stores) to the appropriate Soviets of people's deputies. Local veterans' councils must coordinate in the closest possible manner with social insurance organs, public health organs, trade unions, charitable organizations, and funds and actively seek out veterans who are in dire need. That is why I have to once again stress the need to structure work so that we reach every person.

Along with local organs of power, we need to think through a system of measures for veterans employment.

The speaker also dwelled on the organizations' financial capabilities and the need to earn money themselves to support their activities and to implement social actions and programs.

P.I. Kravchenko concluded by saying that this year we have a great test of our maturity, strength, and skill at organizing the cause.

Soviet Committee of Veterans of War Chairman Marshal of Aviation A.H. Sidantsev, Estonian Republic Council Chairman N.M. Akhsinin, and the following oblast and kray council chairmen participated in the discussion of the report: Chelyabinsk—N.M. Kuznetsov, Kurgan—D.I. Uvarov, Krasnoyarsk—A.A. Shipov, Donetsk—A.A. Pandiy, Tver—A.Ya. Troitskiy, Teryapol—V.V. Mylnikov, Uzbek Republic Council Deputy Chairman—G.I. Skorobogatov, and deputy council chairmen: Leningrad—I.A. Rosselevich, Sakhalin Oblast—I.Z. Saponon, and SKVV section chairmen: Odessa—N.F. Stafeyev, Khabarovsk—S.S. Travkan, and others.

They talked about the work of their organizations, unresolved problems, exchanged opinions on problems touched upon in the report, and made suggestions.

Marshal of Aviation A.H. Sidantsev said in his speech that the Soviet Committee of Veterans of War Plenum stands for unity of organization but that the SKVV Plenum did not support the draft All-Union Organization Charter provision that provides for the SKVV to become an All-Union Organization structural subdivision without its own [SKVV] charter. Odessa SKVV Section Chairman N.F. Stafeyev pointed out in this regard:

"Today all antisocialist forces are uniting and attacking. And we are acting like we are disbanding. Can we really allow this to happen? We in the Odessa SKVV Section and in the oblast council do not share power, we work in unity, and Armed Forces veterans and warrior-internationalists are working with us. And naturally this is producing positive results. We need to consolidate forces and solidly support the President of the USSR along with our children and grandchildren. Strength is in unity."

Having discussed P.I. Kravchenko's report, the plenum decided to conduct a report-back campaign in all elements of the organization of veterans of war, labor, and the Armed Forces in 1991. Union republic veterans' councils are prescribing its procedures and time periods. Plenums of the appropriate councils will determine delegate election procedures to rayon, city, oblast, kray, and republic conferences. Republic veterans' organization plenums will prescribe delegate election procedures to the 2nd All-Union Organization Conference from republic veterans organizations.

The resolution states that the report-back campaign must promote the future activation and development of the veterans movement, resolution of veterans' economic, social, and work problems, and unite them in the struggle against destructive separatist, antisocialist forces. Special attention must be paid to the review of practical measures to strengthen social protection of elderly people during the transition to a market economy.

The plenum considers it advisable to conduct reports and elections (in accordance with the decisions of meetings and conferences) based on the provisions of the new draft wording of the All-Union Organization Charter.

We have decided to convene the 2nd All-Union Organization Conference in Moscow in December 1991. The following issues will be submitted to the conference:

1. All-Union Veterans' Council and Soviet Committee of Veterans of War Report. All-Union Council Chairman N.V. Ogarkov's report and SKVV Chairman A.P. Sidantsev's co-report.
2. All-Union Veterans' Organization Auditing Commission and Soviet Veterans of War Organization Auditing Commission report.
3. On the new wording of the All-Union Veterans' Organization Charter.
4. The provision on the All-Union Veterans' Organization Auditing Commission.
5. Elections of central organs.

The number of delegates to the 2nd All-Union Organization Conference has been determined—700 people and the number of delegates from republic veterans organizations has been established.

A commission has been formed from All-Union Council members (Chairman—Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov) to organize preparations and to conduct the 2nd All-Union Organization Conference.

The Plenum adopted a resolution: "On Measures To Strengthen Guarantees of Veterans' Social Protection."

USSR Referendum Central Commission Member V.S. Nechayev reported to the plenum on how the referendum on the issue of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be conducted.

Then All-Union Veterans' Council Deputy Chairman V.I. Dolgikh delivered a report: "On the Position of Veterans' Organizations With Regard to the Impending Referendum Under Conditions of the Sociopolitical Situation That Has Developed in the Country." Plenum participants ardently approved V.I. Dolgikh's report and adopted an appeal in connection with the impending referendum on the issue of the USSR.

All-Union Council First Deputy Chairman A.I. Golyakov closed the plenum.

The following people participated in the plenum's work: CPSU Central Committee Sociopolitical Organization Relations Department Sector Head A.S. Marasanon, this same department's Senior Adviser A.V. Voskoboynikov, VLKSM Central Committee Young Servicemen's and Law Enforcement Organ Agents Problems Council Chairman S. N. Yepifantsev, representatives of the USSR Nationwide Confederation of Trade Unions, and other social organizations, ministries, and departments.

### **Ratniek Elected People's Deputy**

*91UM0335B Moscow Veteran in Russian No 6, Feb 91 p 3*

[Communique on Eduard Yanovich Ratniek's election as USSR People's Deputy: "USSR People's Deputies Electoral Commission Communique on the Results of USSR People's Deputy Elections From the All-Union Organization of Veterans of War and Labor"]

[Text] The election of a USSR People's Deputy from the All-Union Organization of Veterans of War and Labor occurred on January 23, 1991.

One hundred seventy eight people participated in the election at the All-Union Organization of Veterans of War and Labor Plenum.

Eduard Yanovich Ratniek, CPSU member, USSR Goskominturist Riga Association assistant general director, and Latvian Republic All-Union Organization of Veterans of War and Labor chairman was elected a USSR People's Deputy. He is from Riga. The number of votes for—176, against—2.

### **Resolution on Protection of Veterans**

*91UM0335C Moscow Veteran in Russian No 6, Feb 91 p 3*

[Resolution on protection of veterans adopted at the All-Union Organization of Veterans on January 23, 1991: "On Measures To Increase Guarantees of Social Protection of Veterans: All-Union Council Resolution"]

[Text]

1. Strengthening the guarantee of social protection for individuals of advanced age is one of the most acute problems under conditions of the transition of the country's economy to market relations and price increases for basic types of food, goods, and services.

As a result, we recognize the need to propose to the President of the USSR the announcement of 1991 as the "Year of Social Protection for Citizens of Moderate Means."

2. Approve the proposal submitted to the President of the USSR on the implementation of urgent social protection measures for citizens of moderate means in accordance with the 4th USSR Congress of People's Deputies decisions which concern:



- approval in 1991 of a list of vital goods and services for which firm state prices will be established and average price levels for food and consumer goods while taking into account regional peculiarities and insuring their production and sale;
- increase the minimum size of pensions since the minimum wage has practically reached 80 rubles per month in all sectors of the national economy although this is not prescribed by law;
- introduction of a guaranteed system to render assistance to veterans of moderate means in natural form (free food, sale of clothing and shoes at reduced prices with compensation to trading institutions for the difference from charitable funds, etc.) which would not only add to monetary compensation but would also create a firm guarantee of minimum material security for old and disabled people of moderate means.

Task USSR People's Deputies from the All-Union Veterans' Organization and the All-Union Council Presidium to seek adoption of these proposals.

3. To have the All-Union Veterans' Council President propose:

- request ministries and departments that carry out transport services of the population to review the benefits and priorities for elderly people while reviewing issues on possible fair increases for transport by rail, air, water, automobile, and especially by city transport;
- to the USSR Ministry of Public Health—about the conditions of the geriatric service and priority issuance of medicine to this category of the population;
- to social funds and charitable organizations—to allocate assets for partial or total compensation of natural forms of assistance to pensioners of moderate means.

4. To recommend to republic, kray, and oblast veterans' councils:

- in close coordination with social insurance and public health organs, trade union organizations, social charitable organizations and funds to actively find those elderly and disabled people in greatest need of society's concern and to participate in rendering them different types of social assistance in a practical manner;
- to develop and introduce to the appropriate Soviets of people's deputies proposals favoring improvement of veterans living conditions, having in mind additions to pensions, material assistance, establishment of benefits for payment of housing and its repair, utility and transportation services, provision (free of charge under benefit conditions) of fuel, passes for rest and treatment, organization of cultural enlightenment activities and shows, opening special commission stores for sale to pensioners of clothing, shoes, and appliances suitable for use at low prices or distribution of these goods free of charge using assets allocated by charitable funds and organizations.

Adopted at the All-Union Veterans' Council Plenum on January 23, 1991.

### Appeal on Referendum To Preserve Union

91UM0335D Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 6,  
Feb 91 p 3

[All-Union Veterans' Council Appeal: "All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor and the Armed Forces of the USSR Appeal"]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

A USSR referendum on the issue of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be conducted in our country on March 17, 1991. Citizens of the Soviet Union must answer if they think it is necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal union republics in which the rights and freedoms of people of any nationality will be totally guaranteed.

The All-Union Veterans' Council Plenum supports the 4th USSR Congress of People's Deputies resolution on conducting the referendum as a needed urgent step on the path of leading the country out of the crisis and saving our Native Land by our road from the shame of disintegration and from the destruction of the many centuries old ties of the peoples that inhabit it.

Quite recently, raising this issue would have been impossible and even sacrilegious. Today it has been raised during the course of social development.

Serious deformations in ethnic policy and state structural development in the past and major errors and miscalculations in the implementation of political reform during the course of perestroika have resulted in a drastic worsening of interethnic relations. In a number of regions of the country, extremist, nationalist forces have come to power who have openly taken a course toward the disintegration of our multiethnic state. These destructive forces that have come into power or that thirst for power are attempting to portray their political ambitions as the interests and moods of the broad people's masses.

For us, veterans, who have endured difficult but worthy lives and who created a mighty multi-ethnic power using our own hands and later our blood too and, having defended its freedom and independence in mortal combat with Fascism, there are no doubts whatsoever that only a united Union of sovereign soviet socialist republics can insure the freedom and independence of the Homeland and a happy future for our people and each person individually.

Dear veterans of war, labor, and the Armed Forces!

We appeal to you to become aggressively involved in preparations for the nationwide referendum together with the CPSU and other truly democratic sociopolitical organizations and movements and to begin mass explanatory work among the population.

The patriotic duty for each of us is to participate in the referendum and to cast our votes to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

We appeal to the youth and to all of the country's workers to say along with us: Yes to a multiethnic Union of Soviet Socialist Republics!

While voting to preserve the USSR—we are voting for socialist selection.

While voting to preserve the USSR—we are voting for the indissoluble friendship among our peoples.

While voting to preserve the USSR—we are voting for happiness and well-being in our home.

While voting to preserve the USSR—we are voting for peace on Earth.

Adopted at the All-Union Veterans' Council Plenum

January 23, 1991.

#### Attitudes of Some New Parties to Army Listed

PM0502150591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 31 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[G. Ananina, consultant for the Russian Communist Party Central Committee Department for Work with Public Associations, answers reader's letter: "Military Views of Parties and Movements"]

[Text] "In its 'Briefing' section your newspaper has told us about the most well known parties and how many members they have. Could you perhaps now tell us about the military views of these parties and movements?"

["Signed] Lieutenant Colonel I. Starikov."

The basic tenor of the CPSU's military policy is well known from the documents of the 28th party congress, which spoke out firmly in favor of military reform, the adoption of a targeted state program of social provision for military servicemen, and the reform of political and party structures in the Army. These and other decisions taken by the CPSU are now being put into practice. As far as other parties and movements are concerned, some of them have yet to define their attitude to the Armed Forces and others have a too one-sided view of the relationship between the army and society. There are also parties and movements which, despite proclaiming a course that conforms with the USSR Constitution, in practice operate in defiance of the law, viewing the Armed Forces in the light of their own narrow party interests, which are certainly not in keeping with the country's security. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers should form their own opinion on this, however. We will just give them food for thought:

The Democratic Russia Movement (cochairmen Yu. Afanasyev, G. Popov, A. Murashev, and others) takes an anticommunist standpoint and consequently demands the departization and depoliticization of the Army. At its

constituent congress it adopted an appeal to military servicemen and members of law enforcement bodies, calling for an end to their being used "as a police service" and for the elimination of political bodies in the Army, KGB, and Internal Affairs Ministry. All this is accompanied by declarations on the need to resolve several social issues, such as the creation of a state insurance system for military servicemen, for example.

The Democratic Party of Russia. Its chairman is N. Travkin. It has the same hobby-horse: The depoliticization and deideologization of the Army. Among the party's collective members is the union of military servicemen, "Shchit [Shield]." KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has written about this semiclandestine, semimilitary organization and its leader V. Urazhsev more than once in the past, so I shall quote just two clauses in its statute: "Keep one's membership of the union secret" and "participate in the union's activity under the guidance of a coordinator."

The Republican Party of the Russian Federation. Its cochairmen are V. Shostakovskiy and V. Lysenko. Its program includes the section "Defense Capability and the Internal Security of the Country." It advocates reasonable defense expenditure, guarantees for armed people's rights, a gradual transition to a hired, professional army, and, moreover, the introduction of alternative, state service for draftees. There is one glaring discrepancy we should point out: A hired army makes absolutely no provision for compulsory conscription into service.

The Russian Christian Democratic Movement. It demands the institution of an army clergy and, at the same time, proclaims "a rejection of the policy of state atheism and all ideological and party structures in the Army." The Christian Democratic Union of Russia has virtually the same objectives.

The Free Labor Party, of which Artem Tarasov is cochairman, devotes a section of its political platform to the Armed Forces: In addition to problems of general significance, such as enhancing the social protection of military servicemen, carrying out military reform, and so forth, it includes a clause on the "federalization" of the army (i.e. allowing the republics to form their own armed forces).

The Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists. Its program contains the section "Replacing the Permanent Army and Militia With a Universal Arming of the People," which states that "socialism cannot be reconciled to the existence of a regular army, because it is an enormous caste of exploiters parasitizing on social labor." The Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists calls for the conscription and mobilization system to be abandoned completely and replaced by universal military instruction coupled with professional formations. The Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists believes that national guard formations set up in territorial communities will be the basic component of the Armed Forces.

### Army Refutes Charges of 'Servicing' Ossetia Extremists

PM0504165591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 3 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel N. Astashkin report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Unsubstantiated Accusations"]

[Text] Tskhinvali—Many villages around the city of Tskhinvali are practically deserted. Subunits of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops have evacuated more than 2,500 people. People have been killed and injured. The blockade around the city is gradually tightening.

The city's residents are living in alarmed anticipation. What will happen tomorrow? Will rampaging thugs burst onto the streets? That is why many people are coming to the gate of the checkpoint where two Soviet Army regiments are housed. People see the military as their last hope.

The day before my trip to Tskhinvali I attended a press conference held by leaders of the Russian and Georgian parliaments in Kazbegi. B. Yeltsin and Z. Gamsakhurdia said, in particular, that these regiments must be removed from Tskhinvali. The same reasons were given in Gamsakhurdia's subsequent statement on Georgian television. Why? These regiments are supposed to help in the loss of weapons, and Soviet troops' helicopters are servicing Ossetian extremists.

This is what the commanders of these regiments said about these arguments.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Kondratyev: "This is an unfounded claim. No weapons or munitions have been stolen recently and they are being kept safe."

Lieutenant Colonel A. Vostrikov: "Why did Z. Gamsakhurdia not cite a single specific example? Because there is none. As for 'servicing' the fighters, judge for yourselves. When the village of Dmanisi was totally under blockade, I personally sent foodstuffs in by helicopter. Yet we are alleged to have delivered weapons..."

"Here is another example. The day before the referendum there was a fierce skirmish between fighters. Movie studio cameramen were working in the unit at that time. They asked for permission to film the skirmish from the roof of the barracks. I gave permission. The next day I was blamed for Ossetian extremists' allegedly firing on Georgians from the roof of the barracks."

### Appeal of New Armenian Government Military Coordinating Committee

91UM0532A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian  
21 Feb 91 p 2

["Appeal" signed by V. Sarkisyan, chairman of the Committee for Coordinating Work of Military Departments]

[Text] In accordance with the Declaration of Independence of Armenia, the republic's Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers are making a great effort to ensure the inviolability of our borders.

The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia has adopted a decree on the active military service of conscripts in military units stationed on the territory of the republic. Military construction subunits in the disaster zone will also be replenished by Armenian conscripts. To resolve these and similar tasks, the Council of Ministers has created a Committee for Coordinating Work of Military Departments.

However, activities to ensure that Armenian conscripts carry out military service on the territory of the republic are complicated by the irresponsible conduct of some of the people subject to military service obligation. Leaving their military units stationed on the territory of Armenia, these violators of order create doubts about the solution of the problem and play with the fate of thousands of conscripts, evoking mistrust in the collective image of the Armenian serviceman. It is only on the basis of the combat readiness and discipline of this serviceman that the creation of a national military is possible.

From now on, we must not permit such an irresponsible attitude toward the republic and its people.

We appeal to all servicemen who have abandoned their military units stationed on the territory of the republic to return to their units. We request that their parents, correctly viewing the situation in the republic, ensure the return of their sons.

We also hope for the assistance of the executive committees of the soviets of people's deputies, public organizations, labor collectives, and leaders of educational institutions.

Those who do not return to their units by 1800 hours on 22 February in accordance with existing legislation will have criminal action brought against them.

[Signed] V. Sarkisyan, chairman of the Committee for Coordinating Work of Military Departments.

### Estonian Request on Local Maneuvers

91UM0532B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 12 Feb 91 p 1

["Statement of the Government of the Republic of Estonia"]

[Text] On 8 February 1991 E. Savisaar, chairman of the Government of the Republic of Estonia, received a letter from Colonel General F. Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military District. The letter reported that staff exercises will be conducted on the territory of the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with the participation of troops of the district during the period of 10-20 February in accordance with the plan for exercises for

the district. The exercises will be led by Lieutenant General P. Chaus, chief of staff of the district.

The Government of the Republic of Estonia appreciates this step of the leadership of the Baltic Military District, which has informed the government of the republic in advance about the conduct of exercises connected with the departure of troops from their compounds.

In order to clarify the information, the Government of the Republic of Estonia requested today that it also be informed of the number of troops taking part in the exercises and the routes of movement of combat equipment. Additional information will be made available upon the receipt of a response.

The Government of the Republic of Estonia also contacted V. Pavlov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, with a proposal that the exercises be canceled or postponed to a later date inasmuch as the departure of troops from their compounds will contribute to an increase in political tension among the population.

The Government of the Republic of Estonia requests that residents maintain calm and avoid possible provocations.

The local organs of self-government should communicate reports on the movement of military units and combat equipment as well as on material loss to the population caused in the course of the exercises.

[Signed] E. Savisaar, chairman of the Government of the Republic of Estonia

### **Radio Rossii 'Canards' Over Northern Fleet Party Forum Hit**

*PM0104093591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 91 First Edition p 1*

[Rejoinder by Captain Third Class (Reserve) A. Penkov, staffer at the Northern Fleet NA STRAZHE ZAPOLY-ARYA newspaper editorial office: "Radio Rossii's 'Canards'"]

[Text] The other day "Radio Rossii" reported a party conference held in the Northern Fleet. Initially I was pleased—at least they had noticed this event. But the longer I listened, the more confused I became. Although the fact that the conference of Communists was called a "conference of party workers" (can you sense the difference?—A.P.) could, if you like, be considered a slip of

the tongue, how are we to assess the report broadcast by the station citing a certain Baranov (or Barannikov—I did not hear the name clearly) that the building where the conference was held was guarded by men wielding submachine guns and that, during the conference, the streets of Severomorsk were patrolled by armored personnel carriers ... [APC's]

Were I not a resident of Severomorsk I might have believed it. But I live in this city, alongside the Officers' Center, where the conference was held. On the day of the conference I was near the Officers' Center and walked through the streets, but I saw no submachine guns or APC's. Like everyone else! As for ordinary military patrols, they patrol our garrison every day.

Just in case, I asked staffers at the garrison military commandant's office and party conference delegates about it. Anyone who had not heard the "Radio Rossii" report looked at me in surprise, to say the least.

The commentator went on to report a quite sensational piece of "news"; it transpires that I. Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee, who took part in the conference, quite simply promised the delegates to "deal with the Democrats in May" and to double officers' pay. But nothing of the sort happened! In the editorial office of the naval newspaper where I work there is a complete tape recording of I. Polozkov's speech. There is not even an allusion to the promises ascribed to him.

I simply feel uncomfortable about my radio journalist colleagues who, judging by everything, put their faith in a casual source of information.

### **Motor Pool Attack Foiled**

*91UM0518A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Mar 91 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel I. Yesyutin, (Ministry of Defense Press Center): "Attack Rebuffed"]

[Text] On the 26th of March at 0430 an attack was carried out by unknown individuals on a park of specialized vehicles of one of the signals subunits in area of the populated point of Artashat, Armenia. Having fired automatic weapons at the guards, the raiders attempted to penetrate the territory of the motor vehicle park. Return fire from the watch threw back the attack. There were no casualties among the servicemen.

### The Art of Command

91UM0396A VOYENNY VESTNIK in Russian No 11,  
Nov 90 pp 34-37

[Article by Col. N. Shishkin, doctor of military sciences and professor: "The Art of Command"]

[Text] Tactics is the most dynamic area of military art. Its role is very great, as the experience of local wars confirms. This is dictated by the fact that combined-arms combat will have great significance for the achievement of victory. This is combat in which superiority in fast operations and maneuvers, anticipation in effective engagement and delivery of strikes, and military strategems and surprise lead to success and their absence to defeat.

Meanwhile, some officers are still attached to the stereotypes of position and linearity in actions and by inertia are still hoping for superiority of force. It is obvious that this is the result of insufficient attention to tactics.

This above all is why the article of Maj. V. Pylayev, "Where You Lost It, There You Will Find It," is timely.<sup>1</sup> The author correctly criticizes the existing practice of emphasizing the engagement of targets with no connection to tactics. And he thinks it is incorrect to carry out exercises in which each step is determined in advance and commanders do not have to use military strategems, skillful maneuvers and original procedures.

One has to agree with the author that to a certain degree the oversimplification and indulgence in exercises and training come from forgetting the invaluable experience of the Great Patriotic War and from the superficial assimilation of the experience of local wars and the battles in Afghanistan. At the same time, one of the reasons for the inadequate tactical preparation of some commanders is the failure to understand fully the current demands on tactics and the trends in its development.

Under present-day conditions, the commanders of all ranks need to have knowledge of the situation in a substantially larger space than is dictated by the scope of the direct contact of their units and subunits with the enemy. It has become necessary to resolve the tasks arising in the command and control of subunits and units in an extremely short time, through various weapon systems and in the "detect and destroy" regime. It is becoming more important to forecast and foresee, to make careful calculations, and sometimes to take justifiable risks to achieve success. In connection with fast operations and the power of highly accurate weapons, it is now especially important to anticipate the enemy in all actions.

Where can the officers obtain the necessary skills? Only in exercises, with the background of the complex situation, in which all the conditions exist for the showing of creativity. Commanders of all ranks are required to seek unordinary decisions actively and to have the ability to find the "key" link in the situation, to make maximum

use of the combat possibilities of subunits, and, at the same time, to neutralize unfavorable factors. In this regard, the words of M.V. Frunze are still applicable: "...it is necessary for every Red commander to grasp firmly that the most dangerous thing for us is to get bogged down in a routine and to be distracted by some particular scheme and some specific method.... The skill of the commander is manifested in his ability to choose from the multitude of means at his disposal those that will yield the best results in a given situation."<sup>2</sup>

The range of questions in the command and control of subunits is extraordinarily broad. But ultimately almost all of them are realized in the battle plan. Precisely its content is the basis for command and control and characterizes the tactical maturity of the commander, the level of his understanding of the principles of military art, and his ability to apply them competently in a specific situation. But battle is a two-sided phenomenon. This is why the plan of one side encounters the corresponding counteraction of the other side—with craftiness, deceit, and disinformation. And the decision taken must not only meet standard positions or conventional views, for example, for the establishment of the tactical order of battle and the organization of effective engagement, interaction, or maneuvers. Above all it must guarantee the effective counteraction of the probable plan of the enemy and make use of factors that would make possible the maximum realization of the opportunities of own forces and weapons.

Here it is important to consider the following. Frequently the capability of a subunit to carry out the established or emerging combat mission is assessed based on the balance of forces and weapons. But experience shows that it is not always possible to gain an advantage in them and that more often success is the result of skillful maneuvers, military strategems, and sudden actions. Suvorov's troops, for example, did not have numerical superiority in a single battle but were victorious because of their high morale ("miraculous heroes"), rapid maneuvers ("quickness, exactitude, impact"), secret training for battle, sudden strikes, and skillful utilization of the results of fire. Let us recall the favorite motto of the generalissimo: be victorious not through numbers but through skill.

Of course these factors must predominate in the even more complex conditions of the present day. As before, for example, one of the key positions of tactics is the application of the optimum expedient combat positions with a differentiated distribution of forces and weapons at the front and in the depth. In this connection, Major Pylayev properly raises the question of the stereotypical approach that once prevailed, in which the emphasis is on the observance of statutory positions regardless of the possibilities of the enemy and the conditions of the situation. But its diversity cannot be forced into any standard framework. This is why in each case one must provide for a practical order of battle in terms of the size of the intervals and distances between its elements as well as in terms of the distribution of forces and

weapons. And it is most expedient to have a nonstandard and original version taking into account the guaranteeing of a decisive superiority or at least its appearance in the basic sector (direction) and the minimum needed in others. It is important that as a result one can deceive the enemy and make maximum use of the combat effectiveness of one's own subunits and all advantages of the situation.

The indicators of the great tactical maturity of the commander are the flexibility and efficiency of the command of subunits when there are abrupt changes in the situation, especially in the transition from one form of activity to another. For the situation often may require the strengthening of subunits in one sector, the closing of a breach in another, the repelling of an attack by an outflanking enemy, and the inflicting of a defeat on a tactical assault force in the rear. It may be that there are no forces and weapons for the simultaneous resolution of the tasks arising in such cases. And the main condition for success will be the ability of the commander to consider the specific features as well as his own possibilities and on this basis to carry out a maneuver, that is, to deceive the enemy and to deliver a surprise blow.

The content of the tactical devices that need to be reactivated will depend upon the type of combat engagement. Contemporary defense is becoming more and more dynamic and active. In its organization, therefore, special attention is paid to a previously conceived maneuver with forces, weapons, and fire, including second echelons (reserves) and part of the forces of the first echelon. It is necessary to provide for the holding of favorable line of fire positions and lines for counterattacks, the establishment of fire ambushes and killing zones, and actions of migratory weapons.

As everyone knows, the attacker will strive to use the entire arsenal of tactical devices. In the regulations of the armies of the probable enemy on the offensive, for example, priorities are considered to be the powerful and deep effect of fire, the establishment of high densities in the decisive sector, the suddenness of attack, the striving for flanking movements, and the landing of air assault forces and air mobile groups. Hence the importance of continuous reconnaissance not only before the front but also on the flanks and in the depth of the tactical order of battle, and the provision of an active and if necessary all-around defense on the forward edge as well as in the rear. It is acknowledged to be essential to have an effective antitank and air defense and to combine positioning and maneuvering. To realize these conditions, naturally, the subdivisions in the first and second echelons, on the firing lines, and in ambushes must interact efficiently. Commanders are obliged to direct fire flexibly and to make skillful use of minefields and fortifications. In all cases, they must decide which methods or procedures need to be selected on the basis of a precise calculation of their real value and effectiveness.

The reactivated tactical devices in defense may include the creation of false targets and the realization of demonstrative actions so as to force the enemy to attack with his main forces where killing zones and ambushes have been prepared for him and where dependable barriers have been set up, whereby the measures carried out for this purpose will be effective only if they are absolutely secret and as realistic as possible. Thus, these questions must be the basis of the preparation of commanders.

Attention should also be paid to the peculiarities of contemporary antitank defense. Besides the deep echelonnement of antitank systems and maneuvering with them, such elements of the tactical order of battle of the battalion (company) as armored groups and fire ambushes are also widely used in it. Small subunits may rapidly change their positions and through sudden fire quickly inflict significant losses to the tanks of the attacking enemy both in advance of the front as well as on the flanks and in the depth of the defense. The main thing is that such innovations do not remain merely in the field manual but become a permanent part of the practice of the commanders of subunits.

In the offensive, the arsenal of tactical devices is even greater. Attacking forces have more freedom in the choice of the place and time of the strike, the kind of maneuvers, and the order of the combat effect. But it is more difficult for them to conceal the maneuver, for practically the entire force disposition of the attacking subunits is in the field of vision of the enemy. It is therefore important to make skillful use of the advantageous conditions of the terrain—the relief, small population centers, groves, hollows, and aerosols (smoke) and to combine real and feigned actions. To achieve success, it is in all cases necessary to concentrate enough forces and weapons in an important sector (direction) in time. These actions do not automatically lead to success, however. They will be effective only if they are carried out in an unordinary way, when the defensive forces are in a difficult situation. And their problems should be predicted so as to take advantage of them immediately before the enemy can take appropriate measures. That is, the originality of the chosen method or actions in the offensive consists in the fact that in a given specific situation precisely this version (in terms of mode, place, time, sequence, etc.) is what the enemy least expected.

Let us give an example. In September 1944, the tank battalion under the command of Major Sedov was given the mission of acting in a forward detachment [PO] and of capturing an important road junction in the region of Yamno. His advance guard (a tank company with an automatic control system battery) knocked out a small infantry group on the southern outskirts of Yamno and captured it. But it was then stopped in the region of individual farmsteads to the north of Yamno and, losing one tank, it took cover. It turned out that about 20 tanks and up to a battalion of motorized infantry defended themselves in the region of individual farmsteads and in the hollow between two forest-covered heights. The

commander of the PO decided to coax the enemy out through feigned actions by some of his tanks and to destroy the enemy in prepared fire ambushes. For this purpose, he ordered two tank companies to take firing positions secretly at the edge of the forest to the northeast and northwest of Yamno and to carry out a demonstrative attack using the advance guard with a subsequent withdrawal.

The enemy, seeing that there were few attackers, decided to envelop them from the flanks, for which purpose he advanced two groups of his own tanks. Then the advance guard, having knocked out two of them, started to pull back slowly to Yamno. The fascists deployed in a battle formation, began to pursue our guard elements, and came under the crossfire of tank companies. Ten enemy vehicles were knocked out by the first volleys. Here the PO attacked and on the shoulders of the Hitlerites penetrated into the region of their defense.

This example showed not only the tactical mastery of the commander but also his skill in utilizing the psychological factor of "provoking" the enemy into actions advantageous to the attackers by imitating a repeat attack.

One of the most important problems in the offensive battle is the overcoming of antitank defense. For even in the case of strong fire against personnel and weapons, part of the antitank systems may survive and subsequently cause perceptible losses to the attackers. In addition, the enemy in the defense plans to create continuous zones for the destruction of tanks (killing zones) and foresees the placement of some of the antitank systems, especially of the antitank missile system "Toy," in positions behind cover out of sight of the attackers. All of this should be foreseen and one ought to try to reveal the probable places for the deployment of such weapons and to prepare accurate fire against them and the use of smoke for the purpose of blinding them. And, in the combat dispositions, to see to it that the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles attack as close as possible to the explosions of the projectiles of support

artillery. Also, as combat experience has shown, mock shifting of fire and diversionary maneuvers are effective in the offensive.

Here, in our view, the art of command consists in timely maneuvering. In any situation, it is necessary to avoid a frontal attack and to use envelopments and outflanking movements more often. Frequently a frontal attack is advantageous for the imitation of actions in a secondary sector or for locating the position of a fire system in the enemy's defense. Then it needs to be carried out through small forces. Important conditions for the successful implementation of the intended maneuver are secrecy and meticulous coordination of the actions of withdrawing subunits, fire support systems, and attackers from the front.

At the same time, it often happens in practice that it is impossible to undertake an extensive maneuver in small training grounds. This, in turn, limits the initiative and search for original courses. Under night conditions, however, fearing that something might happen, they sometimes exclude maneuvers entirely. But let us recall that a successful maneuver and the taking of an advantageous position in relation to an adversary have always led to significant success, including the ensuring of the maximum effective engagement. Combat experience indicates that as a rule complacency and inertia, in which reserves, artillery, air defense systems, command posts, and rear services installations are not brought up in time, no measures are taken to strengthen lines, and the flanks are not secured, lead to the loss of the achieved success. Under contemporary conditions, however, the situation may change even more rapidly: it is literally possible for the enemy to introduce fresh forces suddenly through redeployment by helicopter within a matter of minutes.

Let us note in conclusion that the list of tactical devices and operational methods in defense as well as offense is extensive. But their effectiveness is not the same in different situations. It is a matter for the commander to select the best among them and to command the subunit in combat skillfully.

Copyright: "Voyenny vestnik", 1990.

**Republican Guard Unit Operating in Kutaisi Region**

*PM0504114991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
1 Apr 91 Union Edition p 4*

[V. Kiknadze report, reprinted from VESTNIK GRUZII, in E. Pasyutin's "Focus on the Press" column: "National Guard Created"]

[Text] Tbilisi—"As far back as the first days of January this year, a group of Georgian youths dressed in warrior-like uniforms could be sighted to the south of Kutaisi where the cabins of the 'Rioni' tourist resort are located. It emerged that this was a section of the Kutaisi Republican Guard. Barely two months have passed since then, and the section has already expanded to 100 men. However, the number of guards continues to grow and, more important still, the youths have embarked upon intensive military training...

"Thus, the first few lines of the Imereti [old name for the Georgian region based around Kutaisi] Regional Guard's life story have been written. Upon entering Kutaisi... you are bound to encounter youths in warrior uniform—they are the soldiers of the Georgian National Guard."

**Riga reports new Baltic Soldiers' Union founded**

*LD0904164991 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian  
0900 GMT 9 Apr 91*

[Text] The newspaper ZA RODINU today publishes the draft regulations of a new organization, the Baltic Soldiers' Union [Baltijas Karaviru Savieniba]. The aims of the founders of this organization are to defend the social and political rights of soldiers, officers and staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the State Security Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The draft document on the status of the Army in the Baltics points out that the struggle to defend its interests and rights may involve the use of armed force. The coordinating centre of the Baltic Soldiers' Union calls for the establishment throughout the USSR of special committees to defend the rights of soldiers and Soviet citizens. The announcement states that the Baltic republics have adopted inhuman and antihuman laws which (?deny) the guarantees of the most elementary rights to persons serving in the Armed Forces, deprive the children of soldiers of the opportunity to attend preschool institutions, not allowing them to study at school. The Army must stick closely to the USSR Constitution, and on this basis must stand for the unity and indivisibility of the USSR. All forces and means must be used against efforts to undermine the defense capability of the land of the soviets.

Commenting on the documents of this new organization, we point out that a new element has appeared in these theses, heard once long ago: There is open stimulation to use armed force against real and fabricated opponents of the Army.

**NKAO Commandant Calls For 'Moratorium' on Violence**

*NC0304135091 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian  
1950 GMT 2 Mar 91*

[Report by ARMENPRES correspondent Aleksandr Grigoryan from Stepanakert: "Nagorno-Karabakh, Appeal by the Military Commandant"—date not given]

[Text] Colonel Zhukov, military commandant of the state of emergency region, has addressed an appeal to the citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and adjacent areas of Azerbaijan.

The appeal says that the situation in the area remains complex and tense. Activities carried out by extremists and hooligan elements—who fire upon passenger and freight transportation, settlements and economic installations, and attack shepherds, taking them hostages and driving away their animals—are the main destabilizing factor.

The danger of crop failure for the 1991 harvest is causing serious concern to the population of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The military commandant's office has called on the citizens of the oblast to declare a moratorium on all violent operations during the period of intense agricultural work and not to succumb to provocations.

The appeal stresses that troops from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, who are enforcing the state of emergency, will also resort to every legal means to ensure the performance of the spring field work and will resolutely counter all those who are trying to destabilize the situation in the region.

**Around 30 'Bandits' Killed in Azerbaijan Firefight**

*PM0504104191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 2 Apr 91 First Edition p 3*

[Colonel V. Kaushanskiy report under the rubric "Direct Line": "Met with Fire"]

[Text] Azerbaijan—As was forecast, militants' actions in the Armenian and Azerbaijani border regions has increased sharply with the coming of spring. An Army post located to the east of the Azerbaijani settlement of Yukhary Askipara was the target of an attack by bandits 31 March. As a result of retaliatory action, the bandits sustained significant losses. Of the servicemen, Lieutenant N. Duyshenaliyev was wounded; furthermore one armored personnel carrier and a radio unit was put out of action.

These are the comments which political officer Colonel V. Salimullin passed on this event over the telephone:

"At around 1500 hours, a group of unknown persons dressed in protective uniforms drove up to the post in two Zhiguli automobiles and commenced observation using binoculars. In reply to the sentries' demand to



leave the protected region the unknown persons fired into the air. After this the vehicles drove off, but two hours later returned accompanied by a truck packed with armed people. They hurriedly opened fire on the settlement and the post with automatic weapons. The personnel were called to arms, and a battle began. Our armored car group arrived at the scene of the firefight, but the militants moved up reinforcements. The bandits were scattered by the coordinated fire of an automatic grenade launcher and heavy-caliber machine guns. The number of dead among them is being established, but according to preliminary figures about 30 militants perished...

### Planning for Creation of Ukrainian Army

91UM0566A Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian  
No 6, 4-11 Feb 91 p 12

[Article by Ye. Krasnikov and A. Ostapchuk: "The Ukraine: A National Army Will Be Created in 18 Months to Two Years"]

[Text] Not only the extreme radicals but also the entire democratic opposition and even some members of the leadership of the republic have begun to demand the creation of a national army in the Ukraine recently. A conference on the subject "The Foreign and Domestic Security of the Ukraine" took place in Kiev on 2-3 February. Members of the leadership of the republic and officers of the General Staff and the Military Academy took part in it. The conference worked out a plan in stages for the creation of a Ukrainian army.

Work on the creation of national military formations in the Ukraine has already been underway in the Ukraine for several years. In the beginning youth and radical nationalist organizations were involved in this. Since the beginning of 1990 various youth military sporting organizations have begun to spring up in the western oblasts of the Ukraine and in Kiev: "Sich," "Brotherhood of St. Vladimir," "Union of Nationalist Ukrainian Youth," and the scout association "Plast." Later the Committee for the Revival of the Armed Forces of the Ukraine was created in Lvov. Its chairman was Yuriy Shukhevich—the leader of the Ukrainian Interparty Assembly, which consisted of the most radical political groups of the republic.

After the events in the Baltic region, the demand for the creation of a national armed forces was supported by the "moderate opposition" (particularly Rukh) and by several members of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium.

A conference on the subject "The Foreign and Domestic Security of the Ukraine" was held on 2-3 February in Kiev. In addition to the "national democrats," members of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium and people's deputies (including some from the communist majority in the parliament) took part.

"More than half the delegates to the conference were servicemen," reported Igor Dergach, member of the

organizational committee and people's deputy, to a KOMMERSANT correspondent. "The Main Directorate of the General Staff, the Kiev Air Defense Academy, and military service schools were represented. The delegates were unanimous in the opinion that the Ukrainian SSR needs a national army. The conference worked out a concept for the creation in stages of armed forces of the republic."

It is presumed that the first step (until summer of 1991) will be legislative. At the beginning special state organizations involved with military issues will be created: A Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine and a parliamentary commission to revive the armed forces of the republic. The armed forces of the Ukraine will be given the necessary legislative foundation of a future army: Laws will be adopted on military conscription, state security, and on the transfer of all military industrial enterprises on the territory of republic to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian government. The republic's budget for next year will stipulate a special article of expenditures for the formation on a professional basis of a republic-level army. Simultaneously, allocations to the all-Union military budget are supposed to be drastically cut.

In accordance with the plan worked out at the conference, formation of a Ukrainian army will begin with the creation of a national guard corps. Later work will begin to form an air force, a navy, and organs of state security. Inasmuch as the Ukraine has been declared a nuclear-free zone in accordance with the Declaration of Sovereignty, all nuclear weapons located on its territory will be transferred or sold to Russia. For the present the "national democrats" have not been able to agree on whether to consider all nuclear weapons existing on the territory of the Ukraine its property or not.

The very representative nature of the participants of the Kiev conference gives one reason to suppose that the plan worked out there for the creation of a national army will be genuinely implemented. It seems that in the near future the Ukraine will become another (after the Baltic republics, the Transcaucasian region, and Moldova) Union republic where military formations will be created quite legally.

For the time being the events in the Ukraine alarm the Union leadership far less than the confrontation with the Baltic republics. However, if this Soviet republic, the second in terms of population and economic power (and, incidentally, providing a significant percentage of the recruits and officers to the Soviet Army), declares its insubordination to the center, it will be quite difficult to set matters straight.

### Georgian Legislation on Conscription, Service

#### Promulgating Resolution

91UM0434A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian  
5 Feb 91 p 2

[Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Resolution: "Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Resolution on Approval

of the Interim Provision on Procedures for Performing Military Service in the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard”]

[Text] The Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet **resolves:**

1. To approve an Interim Provision on procedures for performing military service in the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard.

2. To enter the Interim Provision into force from the moment it is adopted.

**Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Chairman**

**Z. Gamsakhurdia**

**Tbilisi**

**January 29, 1991**

**Temporary Statute on Internal Troop—National Guard Service**

*91UM0434B Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian  
5 Feb 91 p 2*

[Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Interim Resolution: “Interim Resolution on Performing Military Service in the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard”]

[Text]

1. In accordance with the Law of the Georgian Republic: “On the Formation of the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard,” this Interim Provision defines the procedures for performing military service in the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard by officers and other servicemen and establishes their rights and duties.

2. Citizens of the Republic who have been confirmed by the Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium or who have been promoted to a military rank prescribed by the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet are considered to be officers.

3. There is active military service and reserve service for officers.

4. The following ranks are established in the Internal Troop—National Guard:

Junior commanders—lieutenant, senior lieutenant, and captain;

Senior commanders—senior captain, major, and colonel; and,

Highest commanders—brigadier general, division general, corps general, commanding general, and commander-in-chief.

The word “guard” is used before the rank in the Internal Troop—National Guard and, the word “mister” is

added when addressing someone; for example: “mister guard lieutenant,” “mister guard brigadier general,” etc.

5. In view of the fact that the Internal Troop—National Guard is being formed during a transition period, manning it with officers will occur according to the following procedures:

a) Junior command reserve officer personnel up to 30 years of age who have not performed military service and who were promoted to an officer military rank upon graduation from a higher (middle special) educational institution after training in a military department and who are drafted into the Internal Troop—National Guard when necessary for a period of two years;

b) Junior command staff reserve officers up to 35 years of age who have performed military service are voluntarily enlisted in the Internal Troop—National Guard on a contract basis for five years; and,

c) Senior and highest command staff officers are voluntarily enlisted in the Internal Troop—National Guard on a contract basis for five years.

6. Establish the following age limit for officers who are performing military service in the Internal Troop—National Guard:

Lieutenant, senior lieutenant, and captain—45 years of age;

Senior captain, major—50 years of age;

Colonel—55 years of age;

Brigadier general, division general, and corps general—60 years of age; and,

Commanding general—65 years of age.

When there is a service requirement, the Georgian Republic Council of Ministers will grant the right to extend military service terms for officers and generals up to five years, based on the commanding general’s recommendation.

7. It is possible to grant officers early release from military service:

for health reasons based on a medical commission’s conclusion;

during a reduction in force;

in the event of professional unsuitability for service; or,

in the event of the commission of a crime or deed that discredits an officer’s honor.

8. Citizens up to 30 years of age who have completed compulsory military service are voluntarily enlisted on a contract basis for a period of two years into extended service in the Internal Troop—National Guard and for a further period of three years—based on a personal application.

An age limit of 50 years of age has been established for extended service personnel. For noncombatant service, an extension of the extended service time period for five years is stipulated based on a brigade commander's or officer of higher rank's order.

Establish the following military ranks for extended service personnel: Senior NCO [noncommissioned officer], sergeant, and senior sergeant.

9. Military Promotions are conferred by:

the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium based on a Council of Ministers recommendation for the ranks of General, Commanding General, and Commander-in-Chief;

the Council of Ministers chairman for the ranks of senior command staff officers based upon the commanding general's recommendation; and,

the commanding general based on General Staff recommendations for the ranks of junior command staff officers.

10. The following rank is conferred on an officer if his organic position stipulates the next military rank and if he has served the time period prescribed for the military rank in accordance with this Provision.

11. Establish a compulsory service period for officers prior to being promoted to a higher rank:

for a lieutenant—two years and for a senior lieutenant—three years;

for a captain—three years; for a senior captain—three years; and,

for a major—four years.

No service period has been established for promotion to a rank higher than colonel.

12. Only the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium has the right to promote someone to a higher military rank early.

13. The Council of Ministers has the right to demote someone in military rank, including the rank of colonel, by one rank, as a punishment based on the commanding general's recommendation; generals—Supreme Soviet Presidium based on a Council of Ministers recommendation. Officers can be restored to a previous rank after the expiration of one year.

14. An officer (general) is released from the army by the Supreme Soviet Presidium based on a Council of Ministers recommendation.

15. The first deputy commanding general (corps commander) promotes extended service personnel. The commanding general has the right to release extended service personnel from the army based on the unit commander's recommendation.

16. Establish positions for Internal Troop—National Guard to which individuals who have the following military ranks will be assigned:

Squad commander—sergeant or senior sergeant;

Platoon commander—lieutenant or senior lieutenant;

Company commander—senior captain;

Battalion commander—major;

Regimental commander—colonel;

Special regimental commander—brigade commander or brigadier general;

Division commander—division general;

Corps commander—corps general;

Commanding general—commanding general; and,

Commander-in-chief—commander-in-chief.

**Remarks:** For deputies and for positions commensurate to them, establish a military rank that is one level lower, for aides and positions commensurate to them—a military rank two levels lower.

17. The following personnel assign people to the positions indicated in Article 16:

Regimental commander—to the position of platoon commander or to positions equivalent to it;

Commanding general, General Staff—to the position of company commander and battalion commander;

Georgian Republic Council of Ministers Chairman—to the position of regimental commander—based on the commanding general's recommendation; and,

Supreme Soviet Presidium—to the position of brigade commander (special regimental commander) or to a higher position—based on a Council of Ministers recommendation.

A transfer to a higher position is conducted based on the immediate commander's recommendation. The immediate commander has the right to demote a position by one level as punishment.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium has the right to relieve someone from a position, to transfer that person to a position at one level lower, or to completely dismiss someone from performing service in the internal troops.

18. Internal Troop—National Guard officers (extended service personnel) enjoy all of the rights of citizens of the republic. The Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium rewards officers and extended service personnel for outstanding service.

Officers and extended service personnel are granted monetary and other material compensation prescribed

by the Council of Ministers. They are provided apartments at their duty locations and, when they retire—at residence locations of their choice that are within the borders of the territory of Georgia.

Military service performance time for officers (extended service personnel) is calculated as both general and also preferential work service.

19. One annual 30 day leave is prescribed for officers (extended service personnel). Officers (extended service personnel) who have served 15 years enjoy an additional five day leave, those who have 20 years of service—10 days, and those who have 25 years or more service—a 15 day additional leave.

Servicemen are granted short leaves of not more than 10 days per year based on family circumstances; leave for health reasons—based on the conclusion of a medical commission that does not exceed (together with illness time) four months. The prescribed time period can be extended for an additional two months by the commanding general. Then the military commission will resolve the issue of his fitness for military service.

20. Officers (extended service personnel) have the right to receive a pension after 15—20—25 calendar years of service in the amount of 30—50—75 percent of their monthly salary, respectively.

21. Officers (extended service personnel) assume responsibility for crimes in accordance with military regulations and republic law.

### **Resolution Promulgating Statute on National Guard Conscription**

*91UM0434C Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian  
5 Feb 91 p 2*

["Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Resolution on Approval of the Interim Provision on Conscription Into the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard"]

[Text] The Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet **resolves:**

1. To approve the Interim Provision on Conscription into the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard.

2. This Provision is in force upon adoption.

**Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Chairman**

**Z. Gamsakhurdia**

**Tbilisi**

**January 29, 1991**

### **Temporary Statute on National Guard Conscription**

*91UM0434D Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian  
5 Feb 91 p 2*

["Interim Provision on Conscription Into the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard"]

[Text] Service in the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard is a Georgian citizen's sacred responsibility and patriotic duty. The Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard is tasked to defend the interests of the Homeland, its territorial integrity, and citizens' constitutional rights and freedoms.

Male citizens of the Georgian Republic who have reached the age of 18 and also conscripts up to 25 years of age who have lost their rights to privileges and deferments under the draft for military service are conscripted for compulsory military service except for individuals who are already performing or have performed alternative service.

Conscripts perform compulsory military service on the territory of the Republic of Georgia.

The term of service is two years. The ages of conscripts, terms of service, and conscription will be precisely defined and legalized when the new Law on Universal Military Obligation has been adopted. After publication of the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Resolution on conscription of youth, draftees will be obligated to appear at the appropriate draft commission based on their residence to determine their state of health, family situation, and other issues based on which the draft commission will resolve the issue of conscripting or releasing them from compulsory military service, in particular, in the ranks of the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard. The draft commission's decision is entered in the commission session protocol.

Existing service registration cards are completed for conscripts enlisted into the conscripted group.

Medical draft commissions are guided in their work by the conscripts' personal affairs based on coordination with military commissariats; based on mutual agreement, draft commissions must work at existing medical facilities if there are no other possibilities in the rayon or city.

Conscription and dispatch of conscripts into compulsory military service from Georgian Republic rayons and cities is carried out based on the Republic Conscription Commission task which must indicate the number and categories of draftees and also when, where, and at what Georgian assembly and distribution points they must appear. Conscription and send-offs are conducted in a solemn manner.

Manning military units is conducted by dispatching new recruits from the Tbilisi and Kutaisi assembly points

based on coordination with Republic Military Commissariats and with their assistance.

Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard conscripts are obligated to appear at assembly points with the appropriate assignment. Groups are manned according to conscripts' place of residence and considering military unit deployment locations. They will be sent mainly in an organized manner using transportation assets allocated by the Georgian Republic Ministry of Transportation according to draft commission and assembly point requests.

Dispatch of conscript groups to Georgian assembly points and also their distribution to military units is conducting according to name lists which are printed in three copies: One copy remains at the location, another is maintained at the Republic Assembly Point, and the third is returned to the local draft commission with an annotation of the number and assignment location of the conscripts subject to dispatch and those conscripts dispatched. Georgian rayon and city draft commissions submit a memorandum and a report to the Georgian Republic Conscription Commission immediately upon completion of the draft.

Conscripts who are studying at higher educational institutions that have military departments and who are undergoing appropriate military training are released from active military service. After graduation from a VUZ [higher educational institution], they are awarded the rank of reserve officer and when necessary they are conscripted for military service into an officer's position. During their studies, students of those educational institutions where they undergo military training receive draft deferments. This category of conscripts is conscripted for compulsory military service for a two year period upon graduation from the VUZ. Conscripts who study at middle special educational institutions are granted this privilege right up until completion of studies, until 20 years of age.

VUZ students who pursue daytime, evening, or correspondence studies are granted the privilege until they reach the age of 25.

Conscripts are released from compulsory military service for family circumstances and for wives and children or disabled parents, sisters, or brothers who are dependent on them. Only sons are not conscripted for compulsory military service.

Previously convicted conscripts who have served their sentences in penal institutions are not conscripted for active military service. Conscription of individuals who are charged in criminal cases is temporarily halted.

Only totally healthy conscripts are conscripted into the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard. In the event of disease, medical commissions grant conscripts one to three year deferments. If the conscript does not recover within this time, he is removed from the military rolls and is released from military service.

Conscripts who have obtained the specialty of teacher at higher special educational institutions and who have been sent to work in Georgian regions with difficult environmental or demographic conditions are also released from compulsory military service. Furthermore, the Georgian Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers can grant privileges to conscripts of certain individual specialties during a period of work in industry.

Unresolved issues that arise among conscripts as a result of conscription for military service are resolved by military unit commanders in coordination with the appropriate rayon or city conscript commissions.

Draft evasion from military service in the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard for an invalid reason is considered to be treason to the Republic of Georgia which is punishable by the utmost severity of the law.

#### **Resolution on 1991 National Guard Conscription**

*91UM0434E Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian  
5 Feb 91 p 2*

["Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Resolution on Drafting Conscripts Into the Ranks of the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard in 1991"]

[Text] In accordance with Article 61 of the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia and the December 20, 1990 Georgian Republic Law: "On the Formation of Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard" for the purpose of organized conduct of drafting conscripts for compulsory military service, the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet **resolves:**

1. To form a Republic Conscription Soviet in the Republic Internal Troop—National Guard.

2. To draft, during the Spring of 1991, male citizens who have reached 18 years of age by the date of the draft and who do not have the right to an active military service draft deferment and also citizens older than draft age who have lost the right to a draft deferment for active military service in the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard.

3. To task the Abkhaz and Adzhar Autonomous Republic Councils of Ministers to form appropriate draft commissions with the participation of representatives of rayon and city internal affairs and public health organs and other state organs and socio-political organizations in republic rayons and cities within a two-month period. To immediately report on the creation and location of the commission to the population through the local media.

4. The Georgian Republic Ministry of Public Health and Social Security to strengthen management of health care work among pre-conscripts and conscripts and to take steps to man medical commissions with highly qualified experts.

5. To task the Georgian Republic Military Commissariat to:

Ensure the use of existing service facilities to skillfully conduct medical commission work; and,

Examine the conscript contingent and send data on drafting conscripts into military service to draft commissions.

6. The Georgian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs to insure the timely appearance of conscripts at assembly and conscription points and to insure law and order there.

7. The Transcaucasus Railroad Division and the Georgian Republic Ministry of Transportation to insure movement of conscripts in accordance with orders and requests.

8. To task the Georgian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Republic Conscription Soviet to create two assembly and distribution points based on existing military commissariat facilities in the cities of Tbilisi and Kutaisi. To simultaneously insure the uninterrupted dispatch of conscripts and observance of law and order.

9. To satisfy the requests of servicemen who have voluntarily left the ranks of the Soviet Army and to enlist them into the ranks of the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard.

10. To task the Georgian Republic Ministries of Finance and Trade for material support of the conscripts.

11. The Georgian Republic State Committee for Television, Radio Broadcasting, and the Mass Media to conduct active propaganda on the question of formation of the Georgian Republic Internal Troop—National Guard.

12. To task the Georgian Republic Council of Ministers to monitor execution of this resolution.

**Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Chairman**

**Z. Gamsakhurdia**

Tbilisi

January 29, 1991

### **Retired General Hits Idea of Republic Army**

*91UM0539A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII  
in Russian 7 Mar 91 p 1*

[Article by Major General (Retired) N. Aksinin, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia: "A Point of View:.. The Draft of a Disaster?"]

[Text] "Having sausage is better than having the Kantemir Division"—maintains the Canadian political scientist Ilya Gerol.

There is such a notion as entropy. This is a measure of uncertainty in a situation, a measure of internal disorder in a process. It appears to me that at present the society of Estonia is in a condition of ever increasing entropy: We have come dangerously close to a point which is marked by a red line on instruments.

In mid-March, a law on defense may be submitted for consideration by a plenary meeting of the Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet session which sets forth the concept of creating national formations of the republic defense force (an army). Such formations have already been created in the past, and have played a favorable role in establishing and reinforcing ethnic awareness and in getting the peoples of our country involved in the cause of defending the motherland. However, even then, in the 1920's and 1930's, as well as during the Great Patriotic War, the representatives of indigenous nationalities in these units did not exceed 30 or 40 percent. This was also the case when the Estonian Rifle Corps was created in Kamyshlovo-Chebarkul in the Urals.

Let us recall how the current defense ideas in the republic originated and how they were born. There was a rally on 15 January, and 1,000 Kodukaitse members were in the yard of the castle. Their means of defense included fire engines, truncheons, chemical means of attack, autonomous power generators and field kitchens; there were communications and a commander... In a word, there was everything for combat, albeit at close quarters, hand-to-hand. Subsequently, a system of fortifications—"lines"—emerged, displaying once again a very well-conceived organization.

Let me remind readers who are not experienced in military affairs that "lines" have been built many times in the history of many states.

The "Maginot Line" (1929-1932) was a system of fortifications along the German border. It was named to honor its author, military minister of France Marshal A. Maginot. According to the French military doctrine, the "Maginot Line" was supposed to become an impenetrable barrier. This predetermined the passive nature of French military strategy. Its authors failed to take into account the fact that powerful armored forces existed at the time... As a result, tremendous funds were spent to build the line, whereas the Hitlerites simply bypassed these fortifications.

The "Mannerheim Line" (1927-1939) was named for Marshal Karl-Gustav Mannerheim (who, incidentally, was a graduate of the Nikolayevskoye Cavalry School in Petersburg). A former president, he was also the commander of the Finnish Army. Large boulders, similar to those of ours on the shore of the Gulf of Finland, were used to build the line. At present, you may see boulders like this only on Toompea. The line was destroyed.

Finally, the "Savisaar Line" (1991) is a name given by the people. Unlike the "Mannerheim Line" which was covered by garrisons positioned in fortified areas, in our republic only the passages are covered.

Has the "Savisaar Line" really been built for an invasion by the "hordes" of Mikhail Lysenko? No, this is not a tactical calculation by the military, but a strategic concept of politicians. We may assume that "the Line" will disappear in the foreseeable future, and nobody will know how much it has cost the residents of Estonia in rubles and, perhaps, foreign exchange. However, this action has already yielded political dividends for certain people... But, this has already happened in the history of the republic. For example, due to a general growth of military threat, they began in the second half of the 1930's to pay more attention to the defense capability of the republic. At the time, they attempted to create the so-call "Laidoner Line" on the border between Narva and the mouth of the Narva River; however, its construction was discontinued because of costs.

What about "the Line" in front of the palace on Toompea? Did even one of the deputies who feel for Estonian culture and morality acknowledge, or at least give some thought to, the fact that a defensive structure which has a temple in its center amounts to blasphemy? Incidentally, in the years of World War II, the Hitlerites used churches as strong points and for forward artillery observation... Esteemed Deputy Pastor Jürjo, chairman of the Ethics Commission, perhaps, you should speak to that?

I am familiar with the draft law on defense which was given to me as a present by Chairman of the Defense Commission Deputy R. Tamme. Despite the fact that R. Tamme has not served in the Army, he stated to me with supreme confidence: "There will be an army." This happened at night, in the palace on Toompea, during an appearance there by B.N. Yeltsin.

As a joke, I assume that we could call a council of war to which we could invite Marshal Maginot, Marshal Mannerheim, General Laidoner, General Aksinin, Senior Lieutenant Savisaar, and Private Tamme, and raise this issue: "Does Estonia need an army?" We would find an answer by consensus. The answer would hardly be in the affirmative. After all, we are clearly not in a position to create an organizational and staff structure, form the ground armed forces and the navy (we are a maritime power), develop a military-technical policy, and manufacture and procure weapons, military materiel, and control systems.

If this is so, then why start it all? It is clear to all that confrontations, including military ones, are in the nature of duels. It is also clear how duels end. In addition, it will be very difficult to make this fit the concept of new political thinking and the idea of the comprehensive security of the peoples... However, a discussion of the law on defense in the environment of the current array of forces inside the republic is fraught with other difficult consequences as well, this time specifically for the people of Estonia.

How much money is necessary for the new "defense" concept? The parliament should make a determination rather than lead the electorate by the nose. So far, the

amount required constitutes "a military secret." It will be difficult for the "Military Council" alone to keep this secret. It will be up to the commander in chief to make a decision... He will get power, but will this not bring about unjustified casualties and colossal financial expenditures?

I am aware of General Laidoner asking for funds to purchase between 50 and 60 planes. The Duma at the time turned him down because its coffers were empty. What is the "Military Council" to do at present if a modern plane costs 30 million rubles [R], one tank costs R1 million, one round costs as much as the boots of a soldier, and an antitank guided missile costs as much as a Moskvich car? Honestly, perhaps it is more useful to drive this Moskvich to where we gather mushrooms.

The level of the development of industry, transportation, agriculture, science and technology, and the number and quality of the population are the main factors laying the foundation for creating defense forces.

In his time, Laidoner understood this: "We should supply our human resources with the most up-to-date weapons in order to use them efficiently." However, financial and human resources were lacking, and the general envied Lithuania: The latter spent 42 percent of its budget for military purposes, whereas Estonia spent only 21 percent.

Where are we to get the money? The sale (privatization) of apartments will hardly help or patch up holes in the budget. Does this mean that taxes will have to be raised? After all, the government does not have another wallet. However, this wallet is in the pockets of voters. Therefore, is it from our pockets that the leaders of the Republic of Estonia intend to confiscate money for defense?

What precisely is to be defended? And with what forces?

If we recognize that the northern and southern shores of the Chudskoye Lake are operational directions (all the more so because, as local historians maintain, "the army of occupation" came precisely from there), it is necessary to form two divisions, with 15,000 or 16,000 men, to begin with. This is a "level" which may be called the defense forces of the Estonian Republic. Where are the cadres to come from? From the Soviet Army? However, Soviet officers and warrant officers are being exiled from Estonia, and residential permits are not being issued even to wives joining their husbands. Meanwhile, there are fewer than 300 or 400 officers of Estonian nationality.

With regard to the cadres, I would like to stress this: The size of the population restricts the numerical strength of the defense force whereas its qualitative composition hinges on the unity of the people of the republic. Unfortunately, we are far from united; it is precisely a deep split that is apparent. This begs the following conclusion: Until the people of Estonia unite, alternative military

formations may spring up here, as they already have in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldavia...

I dare to assert that creating an army of the Republic of Estonia is a utopia, but it is a dangerous utopia, because the slant introduced in the practical sphere by its theoretical provisions will bring about a catastrophe for the republic. This is why I am convinced that it is necessary to discontinue the consideration of the law on defense.

It is high time for the author of the newest Estonian "line" to abandon the traits of an "iron" leader, a brilliant and strong-willed commander... The parliament did not give him these powers.

One can see with the naked eye that the doctrine of creating national defense forces presupposes the dismemberment of the USSR into republics, regions, individual cities, and hamlets... Would it not be better to take the path of reinforcing the USSR Armed Forces (the status of which will be determined in Moscow at consultative meetings)? After all, we are stronger when we are together. It is also safer for us to live together.

#### Survey of Republic, Other Military Formations

91UM0465A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 12 Mar 91 p 1

[Article compiled by K. Bayalinov, B. Vishnevskiy, V. Zarovskiy, A. Mursaliyev, S. Romanyuk and A. Khantsevich: "How Many Armies Are There in Our Country?"]

[Text] *The sovereignty parade is ending. It now looks like the time of military parades is coming. National armies—or prototypes of them—are now appearing on the national map with the sovereign states...*

**Armenia.** The first armed detachments appeared here three years ago. They grew, combined and obtained experience and weapons. The theater of military operations in Armenia, as a result, came to be divided between two major military formations by the summer of 1990—the Armenian National Army (ANA) and the combat detachments of the Armenian Nationwide Movement (AOD), in the face of armed neutrality by the regular Soviet Army and internal troops. The rivalry between the groups was basically expressed, up until the middle of August, by who destroyed ROVD [regional internal-affairs] and GAI [automobile inspectorate] stations (weapons were taken from the majority of the Armenian policemen over 1989-90) and expropriated army stores (the most sensational was the seizure of 165 flamethrowers on 2 Aug 90) the fastest.

**The ANA.** The largest armed force in Armenia up to September of 1990. The commander was a former correspondence student of the Moscow Finance and Economics Institute, Razmik Vasilai, who declared repeatedly that he was subordinate only to the new parliament

of the republic. Relations between the ANA and the AOD had grown worse as early as the summer of last year (on June 2 a detachment of the ANA in Aparan routed an AOD meeting). The victory of the latter in the elections did not foster an improvement in mutual relations. Clashes between the rivals occurred in Yerevan on August 29. Viktor Aybazyan, a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of Armenia who was visiting the headquarters of the ANA in the capacity of a parliamentarian, was killed on the next day. The parliament of the republic instituted a state of emergency on August 29, declaring the ANA and other formations that were not subordinate to the parliament to be unlawful. R. Vasilyai gave himself up along with his staff, and they were arrested. Some of the ANA fighters who had kept their faith in their commander were disarmed, and the rest were integrated into the ranks of the AOD. Certain groups, however, concentrated primarily at the border with Azerbaijan, as well as in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug], retain a certain independence. (One of them has already undertaken the storming of the border towns in Kazakhskiy Rayon of Azerbaijan since the state of emergency, battling with all-union forces.)

The number of armed nationalist fighters in Armenia, according to various estimates, ranges from 140,000 to a few thousand. Their arms are of the most diverse types—firearms, including automatic weapons, artillery, helicopters (civil aviation), missile launchers and the 165 flamethrowers.

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**Azerbaijan.** The two neighbors have been perceived in the country as sparring partners (and not only that) over the last three years. Armed detachments of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan (NFA) had arisen and begun to form up here by January of 1990, and the Committee for National Defense was created in Baku on January 12. It ceased to exist after the entry of union troops on 20 Jan 90, the smashing of the military (and, in some places, non-military) structures of the NFA and the arrest of the committee leaders (its chairman, Etibar Mamedov, was arrested in the building of the permanent representation of Azerbaijan in Moscow. Today he has been released from custody and has been elected a people's deputy of Azerbaijan).

Individual quasi-partisan groups exist in the NKAO and, evidently, remain concealed in Nakhichevan. The latter waged vicious battles with Armenian armed formations in the area of the border towns of Sadarak, Germechatakh and Shada in January through March of 1990. Even though no serious clashes have been recorded at the Nakhichevan-Armenian border since then, the facts of the disbanding or rout of these groups are also not known.

The creation of a national army in Azerbaijan seems more than a little likely in the near future.



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**Georgia.** The Supreme Soviet of the republic adopted the law: "The Formation of Internal Troops—The National Guard of the Republic of Georgia" on December 20 of last year. The planned size of the guard, as announced at a press conference by Z. Gamsakhurdia, is about 13,000 people. What they will wear and what they will be armed with are still unknown.

*By the way*—At the end of January of this year, the prime minister of Georgia, Tengiz Sigua, offered a barter deal to the Tula Weapons Plant NPO [Scientific Production Association]: meat and dairy products for weapons for the national guard. Tula rejected the meat as well as the milk.

Meanwhile, several armed formations already exist in Georgia that arose after the events of 9 Apr 89 in Tbilisi. The best known among them are Tetri Giorgi and Mkhedrioni.

**Tetri Giorgi** (White Georgia) is a military order that supports Z. Gamsakhurdia and is taking part actively in the current conflict in South Ossetia. A clash occurred in the summer of last year between Tetri Giorgi and Mkhedrioni, as the result of which there was firing in the center of Tbilisi.

The **Mkhedrioni** (Knights) are a militarized organization opposed to Z. Gamsakhurdia. It is supported by the National Congress, which is in confrontation with the current republic authorities. It took active part in the quelling of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 1989-90. It is not taking any clear part in the current conflict. The leader is professor Dzhaba Ioseliani, who was imprisoned as a young man. There are, in the words of Ioseliani himself, two thousand fighters in his army and another four thousand that could be raised by alarm. Tanks and APCs of the Soviet Army stormed the Tbilisi suburb of Shavnabada, where a Mkhedrioni base had been located for many months, on February 19 and arrested 20 people. The next day Ioseliani, who had organized a protest meeting and come down on the Supreme Soviet of Georgia with accusations, was also arrested. The adversaries of Mkhedrioni accuse it of ties with the criminal world and the Mafia. Ioseliani really did have prestige in the Georgian underworld. But that is not all. The Ossetian National Front, as it turns out, also had a respectful attitude toward him, since the "hands of the members of Mkhedrioni are not stained with Ossetian blood."

The **Shevardeni** (Falcons) are a militarized organization created in the summer of 1989. They occupied a portion of the building of the Tbilisi Higher Artillery School. They are still keeping neutral in the conflict between the Supreme Soviet and the National Congress.

The spectrum of the national armed forces of this republic is not exhausted by intrinsically Georgian formations. **Abkhazia and South Ossetia** also hold their places in the Georgian column.

The armed detachments of the Abkhazians arose in the course of the conflict of 1989. The majority of the adult male Abkhazian population at the time was structured, divided into military subunits and "assigned" to assembly points. In the event of a new conflict (God forbid), a small (there are only about 80,000 Abkhazians) but sturdy and mobile army can be raised.

There are detachments (self-defense and fighting) armed with firearms, including automatic weapons, in South Ossetia as well. They also have missile launchers, with the aid of which the Ossetians destroyed two Georgian APCs in the course of the conflict. Z. Gamsakhurdia accuses the center of supporting the "Ossetian separatists," and the internal troops of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of supplying them with weaponry. Volunteers from North Ossetia, the residents of which are helping the southerners with weaponry and money as well as people, are fighting as part of the Ossetian detachments.

Attempts to create a national guard were undertaken before Georgia.

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**Moldova**, which began to form one at the beginning of November of last year. The first Tiras-Tigina battalion assembled volunteers who had acquitted themselves most successfully during the October march on Gagauzia, which was seceding from Moldova. It was officially blessed on November 23 in one of the churches of Kishinev. A nationwide collection of funds for the maintenance of the future troops was announced. Parliament adopted the "Republican Guard Law," and the department for military affairs set about the formation of a second battalion. The ukaz of the president of the USSR came out at the end of December, however, and one of its clauses prescribed the disbanding of all armed formations. The supreme soviet of the republic adopted the corresponding decree at the beginning of January, which abrogated the law adopted earlier on the national guard.

But there are two officially unrecognized but proclaimed sovereign formations on the territory of Moldova as well—**Pridnestrovye** and **Gagauzia**. And, accordingly, two militarized formations.

The workers' patrols in Pridnestrovye began to be created immediately following the proclamation of a republic here. Their structure and size have not been advertised, but the following is known: the United Council of Labor Collectives, which can supply several thousand men "under arms" when necessary, guides the actions of these detachments. A column of volunteers numbering about 800 men—principally from Tiraspol and Rybnitsa—was dispatched to assist the Gagauz during the well-known events in the south. The worker patrols from Tiraspol also redeployed by forced march to the Dubossary area immediately following the bloody clashes with the Moldavian police in the environs of that city, where three residents were killed and 14 were injured.

The Gagauz self-defense detachments were created spontaneously on the eve of the institution of a state of emergency here at the end of October of last year. Nothing is known of any well-defined structure or organization. The Gagauz leadership favors a parliamentary resolution of the issue in principle. The sole organization that has openly proclaimed its adherence to armed methods of struggle is the Arkalyk Party of National Resurrection. Its leader Ivan Burgudzhi, who has already been arrested twice for calling for the violent overthrow of the existing order and the illegal carrying of firearms, is now in confinement.

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**Lithuania.** The Department for the Protection of the Lithuanian Region. Created in the spring of 1990 to train specialists for the customs and border services. Its centers and branches were located across the republic, as a rule in former DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] buildings, for which they paid; in January assault troops first evicted them from there "with fighting." The formation of the "department" did not receive the proper support from either the old government or the taxpayers. Little was written and said, and unwillingly, regarding its activity. One of the first documents—a request to allocate hunting lands—caused a scandal in Lithuania. It used to be financed out of the budget of the Supreme Soviet, against the will of the Council of Ministers. The staffers of the "department" also protected public buildings. There were six of them in the Press Hall in January, who out of idleness were trying to check the credentials of journalists entering the building.

Subsequent events affected both the number of these armed guards in the region and the attitude toward them on the part of the Lithuanians. Another Lithuanian formation, Shyaulyu Sayunga, is a militarized formation that existed in bourgeois Lithuania. It was resurrected in 1988. It has its own uniform and charter. It publicly swore allegiance to an independent republic during the events in January.

The Lithuanian formations are opposed by "workers' detachments." Lithuania heard of them for the first time in the fall of 1988, when the *spetsnaz* and some in civilian clothes routed a meeting devoted to the anniversary of the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. The meetings of "Unity," a committee of citizens of the USSR and the communist party, was guarded by patrols with red armbands. "Workers' detachments" began to be created in mass fashion at plants of all-union subordination starting in March of last year. A large influx into the "detachments" began after the tragic events of January.

Calls to create armed detachments were sounded at a recent meeting of the active membership of the KPL [Communist Party of Lithuania]. The former chief of staff of the OMON [Special Purpose Militia] detachment, B. Makutinovich, is recruiting people and trying to find alternative forces to the Lithuanian police.

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**Latvia**, following the example of its neighbors, has also restored the "*apsarg*" militarized organization that had existed under the "old regime." The opposing side—the Interfront of Latvia—also did not remain far behind, and declared the creation of armed workers' patrols at its last congress.

The greatest repute in Latvia, however, belongs to the "Black Berets" from the Riga OMON, six of whom hold the MVD building without ceremony. The number of black berets, well armed, is not known, as is who they are subordinate to.

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**There were two militarized national patrols in Estonia** at once—the Kodukaitse and the Kaitseliit—whose members determinedly took up the defense of the parliament after January's events in Vilnius. Kaitseliit is also renowned for the fact that it was the first in the country to begin signing up volunteers for the war against Saddam Hussein.

The Estonian Intermovement, having decided not to lag behind its Baltic brethren, naturally created its own workers' detachments, which are still conducting training fire at the rifle ranges.

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South of the Baltics, on the other hand, it is peaceful. **Belorussia**, judging from everything, does not yet intend to fight.

*By the way*—Many enterprising people, under the cover of trackers engaged in searching out and re-interring soldiers who fell in the Belorussian forests during the war, are using those forests as a kind of arsenal. They are seeking out stored weapons and redirecting them (or selling them) to various national (or criminal) formations.

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But calls for the creation of a national army have long resounded on the territory of its Slavic neighbor the **Ukraine**. The recreation of detachments of *streltsy* was recently announced. And the head of the Ukrainian interparty assembly—which includes several organizations that consider themselves the successors of the OUN-UPA (the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), Yuriy Shukhevich (the son of UPA commander-in-chief Roman Shukhevich), declared that he intends to begin the formation of a Ukrainian national army in the near future.

As early as the summer of last year (16 Jul 90), the Supreme Soviet of the republic adopted a resolution for Ukrainians to complete basic military training only on the territory of the Ukraine. Not one of the militarized Ukrainian formations, however, has yet undergone baptism under fire.

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**Kazakhstan and Turkmenia**—we have recorded no militarized (or internationalist) formations on their territory whatsoever.

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The existence of such formations on the territory of **Tajikistan** is also unknown. Even though the official authorities were talking about fighters, "vakhkhabitakh," and deliveries of weapons from Afghanistan during the events of February 1990, they were not able to present any concrete proof. But the appearance of Tajik armed formations in the near future cannot be ruled out entirely. Another organized force that arose in the course of the February events was self-defense detachments that united the Russian-speaking population. These detachments could very easily be transformed into militarized formations in the event of a Tajik-Russian conflict. The more so as experience in organization, structure, the possibility of obtaining weapons and ideology and leaders all exist.

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A special group of KGB officials that was recently checking on the existence of armed formations on the territory of **Kirghizstan** detected no such formations. An organized Kirghiz cavalry, however, was in active operation during the Osh events. The leaders, structures and forms of identification and communication are unknown. But the rapidity of the appearance of a solid military structure and its just as rapid disappearance forces one to consider the possibility of its appearance in the event of a new conflict or worsening of the situation.

The Uzbek population of Osh, caught unawares in the summer of 1990, is today, in the words of some Uzbek informal groups, organized and structured the way they are in Abkhazia. Weapons have been transferred to Osh, in the words of these same informal groups, from Andizhan, Fergana and other regions of Uzbekistan.

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National armed formations, the existence of which was much discussed during the events of February, have also not appeared in **Uzbekistan**.

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We have not seen any other armed formations deserving of attention in the **RSFSR**.

The fighters of "Pamyat," about whom so much has been said, are also not noticeable in the arena. The "Beytar" organization, which arose after the rumors of Jewish pogroms, intends to fight, judging from the statements of its leaders, in the promised land rather than our country.

Historical experience suggests to us that recreated Cossack circles could entirely possibly aspire to the role of militarized formations in the near future as well.

National formations could also appear among a number of the Russian autonomous regions. The Tatar "Azatlyk" youth formation that was created at their 1st Koryltay (congress) is thus essentially the youth wing of the influential Tatar Public Center (TOTs), which has adopted a resolution on its attitude toward military service. The koryltay felt it necessary to:

"1. Create the Armed Forces of the Republic of Tatarstan, to be manned on a strictly volunteer basis. 2. To seek a ban on the completion of military service by local conscripts outside the boundaries of the republic until conversion to the professional army of the Republic of Tatarstan, and to institute alternative service. 3. To resurrect the practice of forming national Tatar military formations and units..."

#### In Place of an Afterword

A hungry man with a gun in his hands and ideas in his head that he is ready to give (and take) life for has appeared on the boundless expanses from the taiga to the seas of Britannia for the first time since 1918. The revolution (sovereignty, parliament) should know how to protect itself, they could take exception to us. Undoubtedly so, but the concept of defense includes more than shooting; the defense, say, of the market. Not one of the multitude of sovereign powers, however, has been able to protect its sovereign citizens against the exchange of paper money, against price rises, against the emptiness devouring the shelves.

But, as is well known, a people that does not want to allocate food for its own army is doomed to feed someone else's. That is also true. But on the other hand, when all sovereign forces are rushing about only for the sustenance (arms, uniforms, training) of the national army, "everything for the front, everything for victory," then, as a rule, its own army almost becomes someone else's... We think this is also known to you, and you understand how dangerous that path is as well.

#### Army Seen as 'Main Destabilizing Force' in Armenia

*PM0504115791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 91 First Edition p 1*

[Correspondent Colonel V. Kaushanskiy report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "How 'Ours' Becomes 'Theirs'"]

[Text] Yerevan, 22 Mar—"Our Army and Theirs." This is the title given by the editors of the new Russian-language newspaper NASH KAVKAZ, published in Tbilisi, to a selection of articles on the formation of an armed force in Armenia that will be "solely within the jurisdiction of the republic's Supreme Soviet."

It is clear what is meant by "ours" and "theirs." Not without reason, one of the newspaper's observers complains that "people in Soviet Army uniform are still a serious obstacle to the formation of a national army in

Armenia." There is certainly a measure of truth in this, if you consider, of course, that hundreds of deserters fleeing to the republic from military districts have no desire to continue their army service.

Following the example of the Armenian parliamentary commission for defense and internal affairs, efforts have been made to place deserters in Soviet Army units stationed in the republic's territory. But both the Armenian military command and the Armenian military commissariat have responded with an unequivocal refusal. No one has abolished the USSR Law on Universal Military Service or the articles of the Criminal Code which carry penalties for leaving one's unit without permission.

I must also add that Lieutenant General N. Pishchev, chief of the Yerevan Garrison, has repeatedly stressed at various levels that proposals by official bodies in the republic to form troops consisting exclusively of Armenian conscripts are unrealistic, because these proposals largely exceed demand. So what is going to become of the deserters?

The situation is apparently becoming clearer with regard to those who have abandoned units in the republic's territory. An extraordinary session of the Armenian parliament adopted a resolution which obliges local deserters to return to their units by 26 March. But what about the rest?

"We intend to find a radical solution to the problem," V. Shirkhanyan, deputy chairman of the aforementioned parliamentary commission, said in NASH KAVKAZ. "Obviously, the young people will be given all the documents they need to continue their training or work." Meanwhile, people are still being recruited into a national formation—the only one at present—in the shape of an Armenian Internal Affairs Ministry regiment.

The high costs of the new structure are easy to determine, because new recruits can expect to receive a wage of 300-350 rubles. True, Shirkhanyan did delicately say: We hope that we will not find ourselves in a situation where we will have to form and maintain a large army.

But what about the Soviet Army? In his interview, the parliamentarian described it as the main destabilizing force. He developed this point by adding: "If it were not for the Soviet Army, we would have peacefully sorted out our relationship with our neighbors in Karabakh and along the border long ago. The only force which periodically provokes clashes and adds fuel to the fire is the Soviet Army. Either in the form of Internal Troops or regular units—the center itself no longer makes any distinction between them."

What can one say? In place of a commentary, I will just recommend that V. Shirkhanyan visit the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. But that would be too risky, as you can easily be hit by a stray bullet "en route"

to Karabakh, even if you do have a deputy's mandate. Not fired by Soviet Army soldiers, I should point out. Fired by "their own."

### **Azerbaijanis Die in Attacks on Armenian Villages in NKAO**

*NC2903111991 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian  
1730 GMT 28 Mar 91*

[Text] For the last few days, Azerbaijani brigand groups have continued armed attacks on the Armenian-inhabited settlements in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. With such provocative acts they are further exacerbating the exceedingly tense situation in the region.

The press center of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation reports that on 27 March at 1600 Azerbaijanis opened automatic weapon fire on farmers working in Dimatsidzor valley from three buses that suddenly appeared on the Lachin-Shusha highway. The farmers managed to reach the village unharmed. A few buildings were damaged by the Azerbaijani machine-gun fire. In the evening, two helicopters came to the assistance of the brigands and joined the attack on the village. The military commandant's office stated that Army subunits from Lachinskiy and Shushinskiy rayons were sent to the region of conflict, but that they reached there only at 1830. After the arrival of the soldiers in Yegtsaog village with six armored cars and three cars, the Azerbaijanis intensified the firing and withdrew only after running out of ammunition. According to the accounts given by the participants in the act of self-defense, after their withdrawal the armored cars again opened fire. [sentence as heard].

The same night, Azerbaijanis attacked Hinshen village and burnt down some houses. However, they were forced to retreat in the face of resistance by the residents of Hinshen. There were no casualties or injured among the defenders and the material damage is insignificant.

On 27 March between 0900-1000 members of the Azerbaijani Special Purpose Militia Detachment equipped with two armored cars and [word indistinct] cannon tried to attack Getashen. According to preliminary reports, nine Azerbaijanis died. There were no casualties or injured among the Armenians.

On the evening of 28 March the Azerbaijani brigands demolished and pillaged the war museum in the Tsakhkadzor village in Berdadzor region.

[Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian at 1215 GMT on 28 March reports the following: "Fighting is going on in Shaumyanovskiy between local Armenians and Azerbaijani guerrillas who are armed to the teeth. One hundred and twenty young men in Getashen and Martunashen have picked up their grandfathers' hunting rifles and taken up positions against modern Soviet automatic weapons. The Soviet Army is not intervening."]

**Cossacks Protest at Nuclear Power Station Construction**

*PM0804101991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 91 p 4*

[Report by S. Sineok: "Assault on Moscow. But for the Moment by Petition"]

[Text] Rostov Oblast—Uniformed cossack foot soldiers and cavalry completed a march from the city of Volg-odonsk to the Rostov nuclear electric power station's walls. They did not take the power station by storm—on this occasion they limited themselves to convening a cossack circle right next to the administrative block.

The circle's participants considered the building of a nuclear electric power station on the Tsimlyansk Sea

shore, in the midst of rich agricultural land, as a continuation of the genocidal policy against the cossack people. Fears were voiced that if work on the power station begins, people will fear Don grain like the mutant vegetables from the Chernobyl zone.

The cossacks affectionately called the nuclear electric power station a "monster," and demanded that "the vile monstrosity be closed down." In the appeal, signed by 26 cossack circle atamans from the Don Army region, they declared their determination to "take more effective measures" in the event of the nuclear electric power station's construction being continued.

A cossack delegation (for the moment on foot and without swords) will be sent to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

### Problems of Tank Division Withdrawn From Hungary to Belorussia

91UM0369A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
14 Feb 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondents N. Andreyev and V. Litovkin: "Three Letters From the Army: I. A Division Comes Home"]

[Text] The Guards Nikolayev-Budapest Tank Division was the first large unit of the Southern Group of Forces to leave Hungary after the signing of the intergovernmental agreement on troop withdrawal.

"If one is to say that our Army 'ran out of Europe,' Colonel Nikolay Gutor, divisional political section chief, said to us, 'then we were the first to do so. The agreement was signed on 10 March, and already on 12 March our motorized rifle battalion was being loaded onto railroad flatcars. Then one or two trains a day headed for the border. As of 3 September, the division was located at its new station.'"

What kind of place is that? Vitebsk Oblast, in the north of Belorussia. Sparse forests, bushes, marshes, and lakes; in a word, a remote corner. The tankers however were pleased. After all, preliminary reports had them being transferred to another republic, a place lacking water and housing. It was to be a naked steppe: withering heat in summer, in winter cold winds that would knock you off your feet. In Belorussia on the contrary the people remember well the war and hold the military in special regard. The housing there is not much to speak of, but it is available.

The housing until recently belonged to a unit that underwent reduction and was disbanded. A good half of its officers departed for their new duty stations, while their dependents remained behind; also remaining on the post are personnel who were discharged into the reserves, people who had long since lost all ties to the Army. There were more than 200 such families. The tankers, motorized riflemen, artillerymen, antiaircraft artillerymen, and other specialists of the division arriving at their new station were accompanied by more than 500 families. Others found temporary shelter with relatives in other towns and villages.

Those who had no place to go were settled as follows: 120 families were placed into two recently completed apartment buildings; 87, into old buildings of post-war construction. The owners and previous occupants, still serving on foreign assignments, rented the quarters to the new occupants.

The remaining 311 families settled as best they could. Seventeen of them found apartments—located in nearby villages—owned by elderly women; 121 families took up quarters in prefabricated modular panel type dormitory buildings (a wooden barrack set virtually on unprepared ground, faced with a single layer of brick); 68 moved into soldiers' barracks.

Occupying the first floor in this kind of barracks is unit headquarters. Next to it are weapons rooms, sinks for personal washing, and sleeping facilities for enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers. The second floor is divided in half by a wooden partition, with one half serving as family dormitory, the other as barracks. The third floor is also barracks.

Camping out in the winter are 150 men. The repair and restoration battalion and men of the medical battalion. The tents are lined with boards on the inside; each is provided with a cast-iron stove. When fired there is heat. A special detail attends to each stove.

The division's main problem for the days we were visiting was heating. The frosts in Belorussia this year are unusually severe: down to 30 degrees below zero. The temperature inside the apartments, modules, and barracks in no time at all became a headache for commanders.

"I told the political workers," Colonel Gutor said to us, "that we would check the guard details less often—we must take care of the boiler rooms. As soon as it was reported that the temperature was minus 37 outside, the political workers started to stay next to the stokers all night long. If there is no smoke coming out of the chimney," he said as he pointed toward a window, "130 families will freeze."

On the post there are 25 chimneys. That is how many boiler rooms there are. They are all ancient, they burn coal. You have to bring in the coal, unload it, shovel it into the stove, scrape out and remove the ashes. A stoker is paid 120 rubles. Who can you hire to do that kind of work? Perhaps an alcoholic good for nothing else. That kind of person bears watching. That is why soldiers are doing the fuelling.

"You cannot help but think back about Hungary," said the colonel. "The boiler rooms there were automatic. The cleanliness was comparable to that of a surgery. Attractive plastic, glass, steel. The woman in charge made sure that the thousands of families and all divisional services were provided with steam and hot water. The last such heating room we had was in July. We did not even have a chance to fire it up."

This however is not the time to live on memories. Two boiler rooms for existing and future residential buildings are under construction on the post. They—also ancient—are to burn coal. There are to be no gas- or oil-fired types installed. Belorussia has no additional funds for this purpose.

Funds. This has been the main topic in all meetings of all levels since the very arrival in the homeland. When the post's population more than doubled; when in the lines waiting to purchase meat, milk, sugar, and butter the "Hungarians" were called foul names, as if it were they who were guilty of descending upon Vitebsk residents, people who were still burdened by the shortage.

Is it really a matter of lines alone?! Money to erect housing is available; the post needs another 1,500 apartments. Construction is included in all plans, but for two months there are no cement, concrete, metal, lumber, plumbing, and, finally, pipes, which means that we will not soon see new buildings, a school, kindergarten, stores.

Housing on the post is being erected by military builders.

"We are even glad that Western companies will not be working here," we were told in the political section. "The quality of the apartments will be lower, of course, but we will not have to give up to foreigners existing buildings for use as hotels or provide guard details to safeguard their tools and construction equipment. All they would do would be to erect only the buildings; the simplest part—earthwork and pipe-laying—they would unload on us."

The division was helped out with grocery products by the Vitebsk Oblast Soviet, Vladimir Viktorovich Grigoryev its chairman. It supported headquarters and the district rear service as much as it could. It was possible to double the funds and by the use of coupons and name cards assure for everyone an adequate supply of meat, cigarettes, and eggs. We saw even liver in the post store. The prices are those set by the state. The waiting line is short, peaceful, conflict-free. The situation in the manufactured goods store is not as good; the shelves are half-full, the same as everywhere else. Is that something new for a Muscovite, Leningrader, or Soviet person in general?

So much for that. As important, pressing, and difficult as the problems of supporting the division may be, the main consideration for the latter, the most important reason for an army's existence is skill in defending its land, the capability of accomplishing its assigned combat mission under all circumstances.

"If you want to have a division fall apart," the Division Commander Major General Vyacheslav Sukharev said to us, "make it do work of an economic nature instead of performing combat training."

The division has not undergone combat training for one year, since the day loading onto trains was initiated. It arrived at its new station; it had to settle down and house itself in the residential and barracks quarters that were available and erect new housing. Military builders raised several residential buildings, assembled modules, and laid pipes. They required assistance so as to complete the work before the cold season arrived. And it was also necessary to ready the training grounds: for tactical exercises; tank training and vehicle driver training areas for tank and combat vehicle instruction; equip firing ranges, fighting vehicle gunnery training facilities, tank gunnery ranges, artillery gunnery ranges; set up fields for subunit engineer exercises, for communications men and scouts, and for instruction in mass destruction weapons.

In the fall it was necessary to assist the oblast in harvesting the crops. Three thousand soldiers worked for

a month, in the rain, knee-deep in mud, gathering potatoes, beets, and flax. Two thousand trucks carried off the crops from the fields. The troops were helping not only the neighboring farms; they were also helping themselves by stockpiling stores for the winter. Since the division does not yet have its own food depots, the Army's potatoes, carrots, beets, and cabbage are being stored in sovkhoz and kolkhoz storage facilities.

On top of that, the tankers were required to retrain on the new combat equipment. Their own equipment was loaded onto a train and shipped to the Urals, perhaps to bases or to be melted down. They were issued the materiel that the installation inherited from the disbanded unit. It was necessary to start learning the equipment from the beginning. That was impossible without being able to shoot without missing, without practice in driving tanks, self-propelled guns, trucks, and infantry combat vehicles.

"We have no problems with BMPs [infantry combat vehicles]," said Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Druzhinin, commander of the motorized rifle regiment, "since we have no combat vehicles. In conformity with the Armed Forces and armaments reduction treaty, we sent them to the Urals, receiving instead KamAz's. They also will be taken away from me in the summer; they will be used to gather the harvest. That leaves the infantry without armor. How we are supposed to fight—God forbid that something happen—and how are we to train people to acquire combat skills is something I cannot imagine."

The lieutenant colonel is tall and stately. His face is permanently marked by wind, sun, and cold. He was seated in his office wearing his overcoat. We were able to grab him before he headed for the field.

The main problem on the commander's mind is the unit's understrength situation. It is short 120 drivers. There is only one driver for every 10 KamAz's. Fifteen platoon leader slots are vacant, i.e., every fourth slot. (The division is short a total of 196 officers.) Of the 109 warrant officers called for, there are only 35 (leaving a shortage of 545 in the division). In the regiment there is a total of five first sergeants. And the first sergeant is the key man in the subunit. As was previously said, he is the soldier's virtual father, his main teacher, mentor, and expert.

The warrant officer is the prototype of the professional army that is much discussed as a cherished goal of our Armed Forces, something we seem to have agreed upon. Why are warrant officers not being attracted to the service?

"Low pay," said the lieutenant colonel, counting off on his finger. "A company first sergeant with 15 years seniority is paid somewhat more than 250 rubles, while a young warrant officer receives 190. In Hungary I had warrant officers serving as tank commanders. They were aces; they knew the vehicle down to the nuts and bolts. They could hit a target with the first shot. They all have

left the regiment. A bus driver, who works a set duty day, is paid twice as much. He travels on asphalt, not a training ground."

"Another problem is housing," he said as he counted off on another finger. "In Hungary each one had his own apartment. But here? And what about a school, kindergarten, work for the wife, rest? A television set is not a good substitute. Before we speak of a professional army, let us first build a good foundation. We were promised a raise on the average of 100 rubles, but today money alone is not enough to interest a person, especially if there is nowhere to spend it. As far as that goes, any kind of raise you get is eaten up in no time. If we want to have a reliable army, the country must be remade. Without that military reform will go nowhere."

Officer pay is indeed low. A platoon leader—a lieutenant—receives 300 rubles; a company commander, 320; a battalion commander, somewhat more. If the wife does not work—as in 90 percent of cases in the division—and if there are one or two children, the living standard of officer youth borders on poverty.

It is true that it is slightly higher in the case of a division that has recently returned from foreign duty. That is something we will discuss. In any event, the physical, psychological, and ethical loads an officer must shoulder are such that no amount of money is sufficient to retain him in service. Something else is required.

The motorized rifle regiment is 50 percent under strength in enlisted personnel and NCOs. In the fall 317 were discharged into the reserve, 26 took the oath. In the spring another 200 are to receive their discharge; the number of replacements is unknown. But no one reduced the combat training program. There is no way it can be reduced. That is because there is a scientifically established number of hours in which you can train a man of average ability and average application to handle a tank, fire an artillery piece or assault rifle, and observe safety rules.

Eight days a month—that is the norm. Twice a week it is necessary to carry out small arms practice, drive a tank or combat vehicle. One-third of this time takes place at night. Three sessions a week are devoted to the physical training facility. After each field exercise there is maintenance and cleaning of equipment and weapons to be done. This is accomplished—if it is accomplished at all—with great difficulty. There are also details: duty in the company, the armor park, mess hall. It is necessary to select men to guard the equipment, ammunition stores, clothing and related gear, and for stoker duty. In the regiment 86 men are on details every day. About 15 of them are officers. That is more than in the present battalion.

The following is the battalion's load (taking only one week of the exercise schedule): Monday, drill, political and weapon training, tactics in the field, physical

training; Tuesday, tactics, weapon training, night exercises—firing and driving; Wednesday, equipment servicing; Thursday, political training and drill, protection from mass destruction weapons, military regulations, assumption of detail; Friday, detail; Saturday, equipment inspection and maintenance day; Sunday, day free of duty. However, a subunit can be put on duty on the day free of duty (a train arrives with coal—who is to unload it?), there can be post patrol, mass sports exercises. An officer is always present in the case of enlisted personnel and NCOs. Even in the evening and late at night in the barracks. He is responsible for everything.

It is generally known that there is hazing going on in the barracks. Let us not discuss that now. Because much has already been said about the causes and consequences. Also because the division is much more concerned with another problem, a problem previously unknown in the Army: ethnicity.

The sore spots of our society and contradictions of our country are probably more concentrated in the Army than anywhere else and break out with unusual force in a manner that is sharp, painful, and dramatic.

In the motorized rifle regiment Druzhinin commands there are 100 Russians, 80 Ukrainians, nine Belorussians, 117 Uzbeks, 31 Kazakhs, one Georgian, 19 Lithuanians, five Moldavians, 14 Armenians, and 21 Azerbaijanis.

Someone may fail to share something with someone else, and what you have is two nations on a collision course, with fellow countrymen taking their respective sides. An officer moves in between them and sticks out his chest, standing between two walls, in the path of clenched fists. What nerves, self-control, courage, even down-to-earth wisdom and human experience are required, to keep the argument from becoming a flame of interethnic conflict, something that must be extinguished, before it goes as far as the use of weapons!

Alas! not everyone can do this all the time.

No, there is no record of incidents involving weapons in the regiment. But there are plenty of conflicts on an ethnic basis, insubordination to an officer, disrespect for what he says and his exhortations. Of 500 soldiers, 170 come from an unhappy family; one which drinks, makes trouble, uses foul language, divorces; one in which an 18-year old lad has already seen and tried everything. Just try to get through to him. Also to someone who has been subjected to unofficial rallies, strikes; one who is deeply convinced that the Army is out to maim a person, that it degrades him and insults his dignity. What can be done with him?

"It has gotten to the point," we were told in the regiment, "that there is no one with which to mount a guard. Just watch out that someone may do something untoward with his weapon or perhaps run away with it."



Yes, deserters are also a problem of today's Army and the division. On the run are Moldavians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis... Officers traverse the country looking for fugitives. Until recently at their own expense, by the way; there were no funds available for this purpose. In their search they run into edicts issued by local authorities: Young people are to serve only where they live, for the Union is now a foreign country as far as they are concerned. So that commanders return empty-handed.

There is another problem of problems. A modern army needs more than reform. It needs not only commanders, not only political workers, not only engineers; it also needs psychologists, specialists in the psychology of individuals and society, sociologists, specialists in inter-ethnic and intracollective relations, teachers. Whence are they to come? The wheels of the program-writing machine in military schools are turning slowly, very slowly. It must be realized that military school instructors also require mentors. They cannot be produced all of a sudden.

The political section chief continued to inform us: "I had a talk with an officer who struck a soldier at formation after the latter cursed him out. The irritated lieutenant said to me: 'Comrade Colonel, I am completely powerless as far as they are concerned.' There is no justification for laying a hand on anyone, but when an officer is powerless when confronted by hooliganism, that is also a problem."

"The law is not working here," sighed Colonel Gutor. "The war of laws in the country, absence of respect for the law and of knowledge of the law on the part of the population, especially the youth—this makes for big trouble. However, most terrible is lawlessness in the Army, something that undermines its very foundation."

"Why has a complex of laws on defense not been passed?" was a question frequently asked of us in divisional units. "There are no new regulations, no law on universal military obligation, no law on status of the serviceman. Can it be that someone in the country likes to see an army that has no clear guidelines?"

How are questions like that to be answered? How can one fail to understand officers who make statements and write letters to newspapers and magazines, storm offices of high-ranking military leaders, do anything they can to try to receive a discharge from the Army? If this is needed by one person, or two, dozens, or hundreds, is this something needed by the country?

#### USSR Said Too Open on Military Data

91WC0085A Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian  
15 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Boris Tretyakov, representative of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by unidentified IAN correspondent: "More Open Than NATO..."; place and date not given]

[Text] **The USSR Ministry of Defense is convinced that people abroad know more than they need to about the military activity of our country.**

**The war in the Persian Gulf riveted the attention of the world community. But even against this tragic background, USSR military activity within its own borders has not been forgotten. Voices abroad have been resounding ever more frequently concerning the build-up of military activity in the Soviet Union. But where do matters stand in actuality?**

**This is the topic of discussion between our IAN correspondent and USSR Ministry of Defense representative Colonel Boris Tretyakov.**

[Correspondent] First let us clarify what it is that stands behind these assertions.

[Tretyakov] If we are talking about more intensified combat training activity, let us look at the statistics. In 1987 we conducted 18 exercises on the scale which requires notification (those in which 13,000 or more troops participate). In 1988, we conducted 16, in 1989 nine, and this past year just four. We might also use the following figures for comparison. Whereas four years ago more than 40 operational-tactical exercises were conducted in the Soviet Armed Forces, in 1990 their number was reduced to less than one-fifth of this.

[Correspondent] But this is, as they say, on our own territory. What about outside our borders? Specifically, how does the Soviet Navy "conduct itself" on the world's oceans?

[Tretyakov] Whereas previously, for example, up to 15 submarines and 22 surface ships operated in the Mediterranean Sea depending on the situation, today there are no more than a total of six or seven Soviet warships there. In the Indian Ocean, the region closest to the Persian Gulf, the number of warships decreased from 14 to 17 down to three to five, accomplishing missions of protecting Soviet shipping...

[Correspondent] What, in your opinion, could possibly be behind the assertions of increased military activity in the USSR?

[Tretyakov] Accusations directed to the Soviet side of concealing certain data and exercises. But these are incompetent accusations.

Let us go back to the history of the practical development of confidence measures in Europe. This traces its origins to the Helsinki meeting of heads of CSCE member states in 1975. Agreement was reached at that time to provide information on a voluntary basis regarding the conduct of military exercises, and to invite observers to the most large-scale exercises. Prior to 1986, when the Stockholm Conference document was signed, the Western nations conducted 95 such exercises and the Warsaw Pact 30.

But the Stockholm agreements required mandatory notification of military activity when 13,000 or more individuals or 300 tanks take part, and also when 3,000 or more individuals take part in an amphibious landing or airborne drop. Foreign observers are invited when the level of participation reaches 17,000—or 5,000 in an airborne or maritime assault operation. Beginning in 1987 the Soviet Union provided notification on the conduct of 47 military exercises (NATO—46). Observers were invited to 15 of these (NATO—25). Therefore, all of our military activity—whether we like it or not—has come out into the limelight, as they say. Additionally, the Stockholm document afforded the right to each of the 35 CSCE participants to conduct inspections of military activity on the territory of any other CSCE participating state. Since 1987, inspection groups of the USSR Armed Forces have visited other countries on 15 occasions. Over this same period, 23 inspection teams have visited our forces. Thus, all the conditions have been established to ensure that nothing is hidden. It should be added that at the Paris meeting of heads of CSCE member states, the Vienna document was adopted which combined measures envisaged by the Stockholm agreements with new measures for solidifying confidence and security in Europe.

[Correspondent] Are such concepts as confidence and openness always understood in the same manner?

[Tretyakov] No, unfortunately. At Soviet troop exercises, foreign military observers are informed on a mandatory basis of their intent and the missions of units of all sizes. Then they see our forces in action and obtain answers to all their questions. The observers are always able, therefore, to draw fairly objective conclusions as to the nature of activity we are conducting—whether or not it is threatening.

But allow me to cite another type of example. In September of last year, the Norwegian Government invited observers to an assault landing during the NATO combined armed forces exercise "Teamwork-90." In spite of a request made by those invited, however, and an official protest registered by the representative of Switzerland, no one ever saw the landing conducted by a British-Dutch marine brigade.

This instance is entirely typical of NATO. As a rule, they carefully conceal the intent of the exercise from observers and the true missions of exercise participants. Display of troop operations is limited to showing those of small technical and rear service support units.

In addition, a significant portion of the combat training exercises of NATO armies in recent years has been conducted on the scale from battalion to brigade. This means they can develop and perfect the training of their forces without informing CSCE participants. On the level of division and higher, as a rule, it is command-staff exercises and computer war games which are conducted, which also allow command and control of groupings of forces to be developed outside the notification requirement.

[Correspondent] So it turns out there is greater knowledge abroad about the military activity of our country than that of the NATO countries?

[Tretyakov] No doubt about it. Apparently, our national characteristics also play a role here—our open heart, our hospitality. We sometimes acquaint foreigners with the newest varieties of armament and technology although, according to international agreements presently in effect, we are not required to do so.

In the meantime, military activity on U.S. and Canadian territory to date does not fall under the purview of confidence and control measures. Nor do these encompass the activity of naval or air force activity—precisely the components with respect to which the United States and NATO in general have a significant superiority over the USSR. Thus, you can see that it is we who have greater cause for alarm.

#### Reader Asks About Reactive Armor

91UM0501A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "In the Dossier of a Military Erudite": "The Armor is Called 'Reactive'"]

[Text] "Recently I heard the expression, 'reactive armor.' What does it mean?"

A. Kostylev, Moscow Oblast.

As is well known, a special danger for tanks are shells which pierce the armor by a directed shaped-charge jet of molten material. Elements of dynamic defense [EDE - in Russian], designed to increase protection primarily from these shells, are installed on top of the basic armor (see photo). These are steel containers in which there is a sheet explosive charge of explosive material with metal facings. When the EDE is hit, the firing mechanism of the shell is actuated and the resultant shaped-charge jet of molten material causes a detonation of the shell's explosive material. Due to the metal facings of the EDE, the shock wave deforms the shaped-charge jet to a great extent and greatly reduces its shell-piercing capability.

"Reactiveness," according to Western terminology, may also be applied to the multi-layered combination armor used for constructing the hulls of modern tanks, in which explosive material is used to fill the areas between the layers of steel.

#### Specifications of RPO-3 Flame-Thrower

91UM0501B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 26 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "A Flamethrower for the Infantry"]

[Text] *Dear Editor! I know that just in the recent past our army was supplied with two types of stream flamethrowers, portable and emplaced [high-powered]. They were used by special subunits of the chemical troops. News just*

*came out about new rocket-launched flamethrowers, which any infantryman can use. Would it be possible to write about this weapon in the newspaper?*

*I. Borisiuk, Vinnitskaya Oblast.*

Rocket-launched infantry flamethrowers were introduced into the inventory at the end of the 1970's.

Several models of infantry flamethrowers exist, differing in their configuration. One of them (RPO) has a multi-use launcher (launching tube) and two projectiles, combined in a single packload weighing 22 kg. The sketch shown below [not reproduced] depicts the RPO-A type flamethrower. It is a one-time-use weapon and, therefore, does not need a launcher.

Here are some combat specifications of the RPO-3 flamethrower: Aimed range of fire—850m, maximum—1,000m. Length—940mm; combat-readyweight—11 kg; and weight of the flame-fuel in the jacket—2.1 kg.(The RPO-D flamethrower uses a capsule with a smoke mixture weighing 2.3kg.

Rocket-launched infantry flamethrowers are reliable and are quickly (within 30 sec.) deployed from a portable to a combat-ready state. Any soldier, infantryman or paratrooper, can use this powerful, close-combat weapon after a short instruction period. In its effectiveness, a shell fired from an RPO can be compared to a blast from a 120mm mine or a 122mm artillery shell.

**Tretyak on PVO Changes Since Rust**

91UM0553A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 11 Apr 91 First Edition p 6

[Article by I. Lymar: "The Shadow of Rust: How Are the Country's Air Defense Troops Living Now?"]

[Text] Arkhangelsk—"To the USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense General of the Army Comrade P.G. Lushev:

"I am reporting on the results of actions by duty forces during the period from 1446 hours through 1721 hours on 27 May 1987.

"At 1448 hours I received a report from the operations duty officer at the command post, Colonel B.N. Voronkov, that at 1445 hours target designation No. 8255 had been detected in the region of Sillamae (25 kilometers west of Narva) at an altitude of 500 meters, traveling on a course of 120 degrees at a speed of 150 to 170 kilometers per hour and not sending any recognition signal.

"At 1500 hours a crew was guided into the target area.

"At 1523 hours when the target broke through briefly from the cloud cover, pilot Senior Lieutenant A. Puchkin reported a brief sighting of the target, describing it as a "type of helicopter," and at 1528 hours during a second sighting it was reported that a small aircraft similar to a Yak-12 had been observed at an altitude of 600 to 700 meters...

"At 1532 hours a second MiG-23 fighter was scrambled, and at 1612 hours was guided into the target area at an altitude of 600 to 1,200 meters. The pilot did not sight the target...

"At 1554 hours a third MiG-23 was scrambled and guided into the target area at 1612 hours at an altitude of 1,500 to 2,000 meters. The pilot was guided by a vectoring post but did not sight the target. At 1617 hours after a conversation with the pilot, Senior Lieutenant A. Puchkin reported to the general on duty at the Air Defense Troops Central Command Post that the target was a light aircraft of the Yak-12 type, and that there were haze and cloud in the target area, and that no state national marking had been seen on the target...

"At 1625 hours a fourth duty crew was guided to the target area in a MiG-23, and at 1649 hours entered the target area at an altitude of 3,800 to 4,200 meters, after which it reduced its altitude... At 1654 hours the pilot observed the target on the airborne radar (twice) but had no visual sighting because the target had gone into cloud; this was reported to the duty officer at the PVO Central Command Post...

"At 1714 hours target designation No. 8255 was in the area 15 kilometers southeast of Novgorod at an altitude of 400 meters, and was passed on to the Moscow PVO District...

[Signed] "Major-General Kromin"

Such is the chronology of the memorable episode with Rust—the air defense alarm that has gone down in history as the "slap in the face for the country" and the "shame of the Armed Forces." One and a half hours after the events described, a small aircraft landed in the center of Moscow, almost on Red Square...

Later, in a letter of explanation to the PVO Political Directorate party commission, Major-General G. Kromin noted that "...I believe the main reasons for the failure to intercept the flight of an unidentified target within the borders of the area of responsibility are as follows:

"—the unsatisfactory organization of operations at the command post for the unit, which led to a delay of 17 minutes before the information was passed on;

"—the fact that a small aircraft was flying along the borders of the area of responsibility, which made it impossible for the crews of the fighters that were scrambled to determine the type and nationality and force it to land;

"—I personally failed to show persistence and decisiveness in the matter of duty personnel carrying out their combat mission when information about the target was available. The commander in chief did not report on his own decisions or on the actions of the duty communications officer, believing that the report had been passed along the line to the duty officer at the PVO Central Command Post.

"In line with the 1961 USSR Minister of Defense Order, the command to open fire on the target was not given."

Today, when the reasons for the unauthorized flight are known, this explanation is being accepted with understanding. But four years ago after the shock that the whole country experienced, every word in defense of the PVO troops was regarded as trying to defend the honor of the uniform. And this despite the fact that all those to blame got what they deserved, as the saying goes (Kromin, in particular, paid with his position and his membership in the CPSU).

We talked with the Commander-in-chief of the PVO Troops, General of the Army I.M. Tretyak, about the staff and structural changes that have been made in the troops in recent years.

"In addition," my interlocutor said, "let me tell you candidly that in my more than half century in the Army I have never seen such poverty and ruin as I did in the PVO garrisons and remote 'posts.' I am talking about everyday conditions. I recently returned from the North... At one aviation garrison, for example, the barracks look like four wooden sheds, two of which are being held up on supports—they are about to collapse. And the living conditions for the pilots who fly the supermodern planes are like shanties from the stone age..."

To this day, in the PVO it seems that this duality of sophisticated electronic equipment and squalid living accommodation is considered quite normal. This legacy has been passed on to what is now the ninth Commander-in-chief in the history of the Troops. Incidentally, the very fact that the number of commanders for the PVO is now approaching double figures speaks for itself. Six of them were relieved of their posts. This leapfrogging of personnel, the various kinds of reorganizations, and the endless experiments have turned the PVO troops into a personnel test site, as one military historian has aptly put it.

"And there is no need," General of the Army Tretyak believes, "even to talk about any inadequate concern and attention paid to the troops by the people and government. The PVO is equipped with supersonic, highly maneuverable fighters, missile systems, and modern electronic equipment. It is our business to make good use of this, and also to familiarize ourselves with it and master it. And to do this for ourselves, remembering the difficulties that the country is now experiencing..."

I expressed an interest in learning more about today's PVO Commander-in-chief.

"I started the war as a Junior Lieutenant, and I remember well how dear we held the brotherhood of officers, and how we did not plume ourselves with shoulder boards but dealt with the soldiers in a simple and friendly manner," Ivan Moiseyevich told me. "Today it is a bitter thing when one sees the gap between the commander and his subordinates. We have lost our humanity, and respect in our mutual relations."

He thinks that the cold of alienation was first felt in the Army during the time of Khrushchev's notorious "million two hundred thousand," when even the best were included in the cutbacks, and those who could adapt remained in the ranks. The new wave of cutbacks in the Army may do the same kind of damage. It is a very complicated business. The more so since young people have in recent times become disenchanted with the idea of service.

To the point, none of the lieutenants in the PVO who graduated last year wanted to take his place in the Army. "Why?" I asked the General. He smiled. "Perhaps because we no longer force them to stay. We need people who are devoted not to fear but to their conscience..."

"...Say what you will, the remoteness of the 'posts' from populated points is not a very attractive feature of the PVO troops. Isolated from civilization, this antediluvian existence is a heavy burden to lay on the shoulders of the servicemen and the members of his family. Notwithstanding, we must not forget that for them the main thing is the sky."

It is 1644 hours on 2 September 1990. Radar operator, Private V. Ilin, detects the luminescent mark of a target on his screen. The target is over the Barents Sea. Its altitude is 29,000 meters...

At 1818 hours the target (it is immediately assigned the target designation of No. 7912) violates the state border of the USSR in the area of Kildin Island. Checking the characteristics of the intruder, the experts find that what they are dealing with is automatic drifting aerostat [ADA]. Missiles are readied to destroy the sphere.

The order is given to observe, and to report on the readiness of the fighter aviation. The aerostat flies over the densely populated regions of the Kola peninsula and use of the SAM missile systems cannot insure the total safety of the northerners. It is decided not to risk it.

The aircraft of Captain Igor Zdatchenko is scrambled to intercept. The ADA has descended by that time to an altitude of 14,000 meters and, attracted by the air currents is moving toward the border...

"Starting acceleration. I have the target on the onboard radar... Visual sighting of target..." A missile is fired. The laconic report comes over the air: "Target destroyed."

The sphere breaks up, the pyrotechnic cartridges fire, and the portable ADA container hangs there on its parachutes.

A special group is employed to search for the container.

"When we approached it," Lieutenant-Colonel Yu. Nekoz, the leader of the search group, recalls, "the object was sending out a signal. We opened it and let out exclamations of surprise. A very powerful telescope, worked with silver, capable of conducting accurate reconnaissance of a locality. A high-resolution camera, infrared-capable, the latest microcircuits, an expansion detector [ekspanometr], an astronavigator... And our eyes were dazzled from the labels: 'Made in the United States,' 'Made in Japan,' 'Made in the FRG....'"

And here are the figures that were quoted to me at the unit that "caught" the aerostat. In all, last year they tracked about 47,000 targets. Of these, 22,809 were foreign: about 400 were intelligence-gathering aircraft. Our fighters were scrambled more than 1,000 times to prevent violations of the state border. To this end, antiaircraft missile divisions were brought to combat readiness more than 6,000 times. Impressive, I think, even for those who are suggesting that the country can get by without the PVO, that everyone abroad is united in their sympathy for the Soviet Union...

Meanwhile, I happened to witness one of the provocations timed to coincide with the anniversary of Rust's flight. PVO troops endured it on 29 May 1988. On that day the USSR border was violated by a Cessna-172 light aircraft that had taken off from the Norwegian airfield at Kirkenes. It was flown by Rust's instructor, Andre Asomer. The PVO troops were alert. The intruder was "stopped." After he had landed back in Kirkenes, where journalists awaited him, the German shared his plans: nothing more nor less than penetrating through to Leningrad and landing the aircraft on Dvortsova Square.

Since then, every year late in May at the Kirkenes airfield there is a hustle to make ready a small aircraft to break through the border. Will they fly even now?

### Continued Development of Carrier Fleet Advocated

91UM0393A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
19 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Vice-Admiral Ye. Shitikov: "Lost Priorities"; first paragraph is an introduction]

[Text] Behind the arguments about what our Navy should be like, there are few who recall that a significant number of ideas nurtured by our scientists and sailors may have been forgotten here, but they are being used successfully in ship-building practice abroad. This applies first of all to air-capable ships, the construction of which is termed nothing less than "defrauding of the public" by certain Navy "patrons." Meanwhile abandonment of such a ship-building program, of which our designers were the source, would mean an even greater lag in the arms field. And the fact that our fleet today does not have formations which are balanced in ship and air strength, which the U.S. is not even thinking of reducing, by no means testifies to the poverty of our scientific thought.

The birth and evolution of the "ship-aircraft" complex in national ship-building began in the last quarter of the 19th century. In 1876 the commander of the steamer "Opyt," Capt.-Lt. M. Skalovskiy, was the first to suggest using aerial balloons from the steamer to bombard enemy targets on shore. The year 1884 saw realization of a proposal by O. Kostovich regarding the use of an aerial balloon with an electric signal light to increase the range of communication between ships. In 1894 a tethered aerostat was used in the search for the sunken ironclad "Rusalka" by the transport "Samoyed." The armored warships "Dvenadtsat Apostolov" and "Georgiy-Pobedonosets" were also equipped with aerostats. And back in 29 October 1909, Captain of the Naval Engineer Corps L. Matsiyevich sent a report to the Naval Ministry arguing the merits and the possibility of constructing a ship with airplanes on board. Matsiyevich proposed using the destroyer "Novik," which was under construction, to realize his idea. It had a rated speed of 35 knots, which would allow takeoff of an airplane after a short takeoff roll, and shorten the landing roll. To Matsiyevich belonged the ideas of accelerating devices (catapults) for takeoff of planes from the deck, as well as braking devices (now know as arresting wires), and development of methods of maneuvering a ship for the launch and landing of airplanes.

After the death of L. Matsiyevich in an air crash, ideas regarding the construction of air-capable ships were developed by Col. of the Naval Engineer Corps M. Konokotin, who proposed adding a takeoff and landing deck, projecting beyond the dimensions of the ship's hull, to the old shore-defense battleship "Admiral Lazarev."

There were no fundamental opponents of such ideas in the Russian Navy, but the poverty of the treasury did not

permit them to be implemented. In addition, ship-building thought abroad was taking a somewhat different path at this time. In 1919 the Frenchman A. Fabre developed the first seaplane in the world, significantly simplifying the use of aviation at sea. Seaplanes took off from and landed on the surface of the water, but this entailed technical difficulties in the loading and unloading of aircraft on board the "aircraft mother ships," special plane-carrying transports.

In Russia the First World War did not allow implementation of plans for the development of plane transports adapted for the launch of aircraft from the deck, or the furnishing of large combat ships with aviation weapons. The cruisers "Chervona Ukraina" and "Krasnyy Kavkas," which had been started in 1913, were not commissioned until the Soviet era, the former with equipment to launch planes from the water, the latter from a catapult.

The U.S. began developing the idea of launch and landing of planes with wheeled landing gear on a special deck back in 1910. A year later the pilot Eugene Ely was the first to take off and land on the deck of the cruiser "Pennsylvania," which was specially fitted with a wooden platform with sandbags. In England the refitting of the battleship "Furious" as an aircraft carrier as it is presently understood took many years. However through trial and error the English arrived at the "classical" layout of the aircraft carrier by 1932. The takeoff and landing decks had a single whole, the superstructure and smokestack were moved to the side, and the takeoff and landing strip was not inclined but rising toward the bow of the ship. Recalling that just this solution was proposed by M. Konokotin back in 1910, one might expect its embodiment precisely in our Navy, but this did not occur.

In 1939, when our country began developing the construction program for a large fleet, the development of aircraft carriers was not part of the thematic assignment plans for industry.

After the war, which demonstrated the need for interaction of ship elements with air-capable ships permitting air defense and long-range air reconnaissance, it was still possible to make up for lost time. The German aircraft carrier "Graf Zeppelin" was transferred to the Navy. It was designed for 40 aircraft and had powerful artillery. The Germans did not have carrier aviation, so the air-capable cruiser had not been put in service. It could have become the experimental base for our science, but even then priority was given to other types of ships.

Only in 1962-1968 did the Naval Command manage to receive permission to lay the keel of two helicopter carriers, the "Moscow" and the "Leningrad." In 1970 the keel was laid for the first in a series of four air-capable "Kiev" cruisers capable of receiving not only helicopters, but also VTOL aircraft.

Thirteen years later, at the Black Sea Ship-Building Plant in Nikolayev, the keel was laid for the heavy air-capable "Tbilisi" class cruiser (after renaming, "Fleet Admiral of

the Soviet Union Kuznetsov"), with a takeoff-and-landing deck for the use of MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters. Its "architecture" now shows a marked similarity to the American aircraft carriers, but its air armament and displacement are significantly less. And these are not the only differences. In making comparisons between our air-capable ships and the American unfavorable to our fleet, "independent experts" clearly are dissembling, "forgetting" that the air-capable ships and aircraft carriers have different missions. The striking power of the American surface fleet is concentrated in aircraft carriers, and ships of other classes support their actions. This was again confirmed by events in the Persian Gulf. Guided missile ships are the foundation of the Soviet Navy, but without air-capable ships they have inadequate ability to stand up in combat. Therefore the country requires a Navy which is balanced in its strike and defensive capabilities, if only because the U.S. is not thinking of reducing its assault carrier groups in the immediate future, and the threat of war may also arise from other countries where large stocks of weapons have accumulated. But to abandon construction of air-capable ships merely because it is expensive and we do not have experience like that of the Americans is at the least short-sighted—we may finally lag in that area where once we were first.

#### **'Komsomolets' Investigation Reopened**

*91P50156A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
10 Apr 91 First Edition p 5*

[TASS report: "In the Office of the Main Military Procuracy"]

[Text] Information has appeared in several print media sources explaining the reopening by the Main Military Procuracy of the investigation into the 'Komsomolets' disaster as being due to the fact that the announcement by the government commission which completed the investigation of the circumstances and causes of the loss of the ship did not clarify this tragic story.

TASS correspondent A. Danilin was told in the office of the Main Military Procuracy that the preliminary investigation into the accident on the 'Komsomolets' nuclear

submarine was reopened on 25 March 1991 in connection with the need to complete a large volume of work by the time the operation to raise the submarine, Komsomolets, is concluded. This operation is scheduled for 1992.

Only after the ship has been raised, after a technical investigation has been completed, and after receipt of an expert conclusion on the matter, will a final decision be reached.

In the course of the supplementary investigation a more thorough investigation of the circumstances under which the ship joined the fleet [sdacha v ekspluatatsiyu], and the crew's level of training, as well as questions of the ship's unsinkability, its explosion proofing and fire proofing, and a whole series of other questions.

#### **New Vessel May Help Resurface Sunken Nuclear Submarine**

*LD1304125491 Moscow TASS in English  
1109 GMT 13 Apr 91*

[Text] Riga April 13 TASS—Rostislav Sciavinsky, an engineer from Riga, has worked out drawings and model of a vessel designed to surface sunken ships.

The vessel is an unusual crane capable of surfacing objects weighing up to 10,000 tonnes from a depth of up to two kilometres, LETA news agency correspondent Semion Spungin reports.

The most challenging operation—the fetching away of a sunken ship from the seabed—will be carried out by means of a system of underwater drums. As outside water is pumped out of them, the drums turn into floats possessing a great lifting capacity.

Then powerful hydraulic cylinders begin to rotate the drums, with cables coiling on them. The crane design makes it possible to conduct operations even in stormy weather conditions.

Sciavinsky believes that in this way it would be possible to surface the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets from the bed of the sea of Norway. The submarine sank as a result of an accident in 1989.

**Enlisted Duties in SS-25 Subunit Noted**

91UM0462A Moscow SYN OTECHESTVA in Russian  
No 2, 11 Jan 91 pp 8-9

[Article by Captain M. Kislov]

[Text] The structure's flaps silently moved aside. There it stood in the rays of bright light—the huge, dull-green cigar, with its blunt hemisphere, all in dark camouflage design, lying on the back of the huge trailer. A living, breathing mobile launcher, stiff in anxious expectation.

Given the launch command (if such were to come from the supreme military-political leadership of the country), this huge, cylindrical "pencil case" would rear up in a wild roar of fire and deliver its lethal body to its "designated" spot on the Earth.

After I became familiar with the combat capabilities of the SS-25, it occurred to me, at what an unimaginably high level must be the responsibility and the professionalism of the people on whom depends the second-by-second readiness-to-launch one of these supermissiles.

We met with the commander of the regiment, Lt. Col. A. Shurko, in the unit's training building, which was crammed with electronic equipment. The officers spend no small part of their service here, perfecting their skills. Anatoliy Fedorovich was involved in the total preparation of a shift to go on the duty watch. Tomorrow the shift had to stand watch at the strategic missile console.

The duty watch.... One cannot be distracted from the equipment for even a second: one does not have the right. And one cannot even dream about standing and stretching one's numb body. The electronic command signal might arrive at any instant. The hours of intense contact with the electronic equipment are endless. From time to time queries about the status of the missile

systems and their readiness to launch are sent via this equipment. In the event of malfunctions or some "surprises" about which the instruments "report" on their own, the team is given a fixed number of seconds to report the problem and the solutions taken. A slip-up can turn into a disaster. This is why no matter how often one sits in front of the control console, regardless of how good a superspecialist he is, before going on duty, he must undergo total training and pass an exam.

Our Strategic Missile Troops have high potential capabilities for parrying American programs with a minimum of expenditures. Today our missile troops, small in number, are forced to solve a qualitatively new level of problems which are determined by the defensive nature of our military doctrine.

The main burden of service in the Strategic Missile Troops, of course, rests on the shoulders of commissioned officers and warrant officers. But the combat specialities of the soldiers and non-commissioned officers in Shulko's regiment are in no way of secondary importance. The overwhelming majority of first-term servicemen here are communicators: radiotelegraphists, radio repairmen, ASU [Automated Control System] operators... They transition to operational readiness on an equal footing with the commissioned officers and warrant officers.

Conventional wisdom dictates that it is necessary to do away with nuclear weapons. But then this is the business of politicians, not the military. And while they carry on a dialog, the rivalry at the strategic missile control consoles continues by default.

Such is life. But we will never be the first to push that button. Should the enemy, however, push it on his panel, then our duty teams will do the same. Our missile forces have no other alternative than a retaliatory strike.



**Moscow Civil Defense Chief of Staff Dies  
'Suddenly'**

*PM0504164391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 3 Apr 91 First Edition p 6*

[Obituary of Lieutenant General A.V. Yermakov]

[Excerpts] Lieutenant General Anatoliy Vasilyevich Yermakov, chief of staff and deputy chief of Moscow Civil Defense, has died suddenly.

A.V. Yermakov was born 3 October 1936 in Berdsk, Novosibirsk Oblast. [passage omitted]

He was deputy commander of Moscow Military District Civil Defense Troops from 1984 and chief of staff of Moscow Civil Defense from February 1985. [passage omitted]

[Signed] V.L. Govorov, G.Kh. Popov, Yu.M. Luzhkov, Yu.A. Prokofyev, N.F. Grachev, V.M. Kozhbakhteyev, G.V. Kochkin, N.N. Dolgin, G.V. Filatov, B.S. Perfi-lyev, A.A. Malyy, A.O. Khomenko, A.V. Dronov, V.V. Zakrevskiy, N.I. Gaychenya, and G.M. Kirillov.

**Potential Losses on Property Disposal in FRG**

91UM0546A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
6 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General A. Klimov, chief of staff of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin; place and date not given: "Our Property in the FRG: What Will Happen to It Tomorrow?"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

**[Text] The agreement already reached on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany will undoubtedly have a positive influence on the political climate in Europe and on the strengthening of cooperation between the USSR and the FRG. However, quite a few problems of an economic nature are arising in the process of this withdrawal.**

There is an apt folk saying: relocating twice is equal to surviving one fire. The Western Group of Forces, on its way out of Germany, is leaving behind solid structures and buildings; it is simply not cost-effective to return much of its quite usable equipment home. At the same time, the redeployment and settlement of the troops at new locations require very substantial expenditures. These could be compensated for, to a certain degree, by selling off our property in Germany on the spot.

Is this being planned for in the process of the troop withdrawal? What steps are being taken, and what are the results? These were the opening questions in the conversation between our KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent and Lieutenant General A. Klimov, chief of staff of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services.

[Klimov] We have built quite a lot during the years of our troops' stay in Germany. By preliminary estimates, the value of the real estate of the Western Group of Forces is 10-12 billion Deutsche marks. This includes residential housing, dormitories, hotels, medical buildings of hospitals and sanitariums, cafeterias, barracks, production facilities, air fields, and so on. Among items that could also be profitably sold on the spot are fuel and lubrication materials, ferrous and nonferrous scrap metal, chemical protection items, engineering equipment and supplies, communications equipment, automobiles, and armored vehicles.

In accordance with the agreement between the governments of the USSR and the FRG of 9 October 1990, and the USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 29 October 1990, the real estate built at our expense is to be sold as it becomes available after the troops withdraw, or temporarily leased to Soviet organizations and enterprises and legal and financial entities of Germany or other countries. The proceeds from these transactions are to be used to purchase construction materials, equipment, and other goods to be used in the relocation of the troops withdrawn from Germany at new places of deployment.

There is, however, a danger that in disposing of this property we will sustain substantial economic losses,

since the conditions are not fully agreed upon yet. There are, for instance, arguable points in the interpretation of Article 8 of the agreement between the USSR and the FRG of 12 October 1990 on the conditions of transfer of real estate that is the property of Germany, as well as on evaluation methods in regard to buildings and structures built at our expense.

So far German representatives are saying that they have no intention of providing security for vacated premises, on the grounds that the administrative organs of the five new FRG lands do not have the necessary resources. The German side also rejects our proposal to accept those buildings and structures that are now FRG property as is at the time of transfer. After all, vacated properties deteriorate with time, their value decreases, and new reasons for property claims arise.

[Altunin] It looks as though disposal of real estate and other property is not such a simple problem. It cannot be solved in a rush, in passing—coordinated efforts are needed on the part of not only the Ministry of Defense but also the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, as well as other departments. Perhaps these efforts should somehow be combined?

[Klimov] Yes, of course. Work groups have already been created at the formations and at the Air Force Staff of the Western Group of Forces; they will include representatives of appropriate ministries and departments. They, together with the Soviet part of the Soviet-German commission already formed in accordance with the USSR Council of Ministers resolution, determine and agree upon the inventory and value of the real estate and the conditions for its disposal. We hope that their activities will bear fruit.

[Altunin] You are talking about what will be done. But the troop withdrawal is already going on. What happens to the property left behind today?

[Klimov] Unfortunately, the situation is rather alarming. As of today we have transferred to the German side 22 military bases, and 903 buildings, of which 503 had been built with our money. The transfer of the bases is registered by the transfer-receipt protocols. However, we have not received any money, since the German side is now bringing up the question of compensation for the cost of repairs to the buildings and structures that now belong to Germany. The problem is that there are no mutually agreed-upon methods for determining the value of objects built by us, or for calculating expenses related to opening up the possibility of beginning the disposal of real estate on military bases that have already been transferred.

[Altunin] It is known that direct sale of real estate is a lengthy and not always profitable endeavor. Why not use other ways? Or are there any?

[Klimov] That is the point—there are. In the beginning of the year, for instance, a group of USSR people's

deputies—members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security headed by L. Sharin—made a trip to the garrisons of the Moscow, Kiev, the Baltic, and Belorussian Military Districts where the withdrawn troops are being and will be redeployed. Having studied the problem related to the relocation of our troops to their new places of deployment, the deputies then toured the Republic of Poland, the Hungarian Republic, Czechoslovakia, and the FRG. Their report to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium summarizes the results of their trip and contains a number of proposals on the rational use of Soviet real estate and other property that is being left in these countries. One is the creation of joint enterprises. This is an undertaking that has good prospects, and it is already bringing in income. For instance, there is the Soviet-Swiss joint enterprise, Mosenikoinvest, and some of our property has already been disposed of. The hard currency earned has been handed over to the Ministry of Defense.

A further method of using the real estate is to lease it with the option of buying it out for residual value after a five-year period. Also interesting are the proposals to create, on the basis of shops and production facilities left on the bases, joint enterprises that would, for instance, repair and service the armaments and military equipment of Soviet make. After all, units and subunits of the armed forces of some European countries, former Warsaw Pact members, will continue to use this equipment for quite a while.

In short, there are quite a few reserves and I must say that lately, after the issuance of the USSR Ministry of Defense Order No. 90 of 28 February 1990, things have started moving more energetically. By 20 March 1990, 622,700 Deutsche marks cleared from the sale of various properties had been deposited into a special account opened in the city of Zossen; this consisted of 559,700 Deutsche marks for scrap metal and 63,000 Deutsche marks for coal and pulverized coal. In addition, nine contracts had been signed for the sale of ferrous and nonferrous scrap metal for 7.3 million Deutsche marks; of fuel services reserves for 48,000 Deutsche marks; of batteries for 140,000 Deutsche marks; and other items, for a total of 12 million Deutsche marks. A display of the property for sale is now open on a permanent basis; it is being advertised, and the first auctions have already been conducted.

This is just the beginning, of course. It is necessary to enter into long-term contracts on a professional basis, and we should not be timid in engaging in commerce. After all, the final result is that it is a good and mutually profitable business.

### 1990 Final Results for Military Construction Units

91UM0404A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Military Construction Personnel": "The Year in Review"]

[Text] The military construction personnel's work during 1990 has been summed up at the USSR Ministry of Defense. It was noted that the State plan for capital construction was fulfilled by 102.5 percent in the commissioning of basic funds, by 101.5 percent in the total residential floor space put into use, and by 101.4 percent in the volume of structural assembly work.

More than 3.3 million square meters of residential floor space and 636 social and cultural welfare facilities, including 37 medical institutions, 23 schools of general education, 41 preschool institutions, and 56 bathhouses were built and put into use. Military construction personnel ensured the fulfillment of the year's quotas in profits and improving labor productivity.

Collectives in the construction directorates of the Kiev Military District and the Pacific Fleet, and from organizations led by A. Bitukov, A. Gvozdenko, M. Gromenko, V. Dukhin, T. Ksenzov, O. Solomin, and V. Tukshumskiy achieved the best results.

Military construction personnel from the Leningrad, Baltic, and Odessa military districts and from organizations led by I. Dolgikh, A. Ivanov, A. Kurakov, L. Lapshin, and N. Smirnov fulfilled last year's quotas in the primary indicators of the plan for capital construction.

The construction directorates of the Moscow, Belorussian, and North Caucasus military districts and of the Northern Fleet contributed heavily to the infrastructure of the forces that are being withdrawn from the countries of Eastern Europe.

The construction industry enterprises fulfilled their target figures by 101.3 percent. The variety of consumer goods produced by them was expanded. The collectives led by V. Vakhrushev, V. Kutsenko, V. Kazachkovskiy, V. Kasimtsev, V. Kolychev, V. Nazarenko, N. Lyubarskiy, I. Petrov, V. Chikalov, and Z. Chudnovskiy obtained good results among the industrial enterprises.

The collectives in the quarters and utilities services, which are led by N. Burenkov, V. Vaygant, Yu. Zhegin, I. Kicherga, and N. Sheludchenko managed to raise the quality of the maintenance of the housing resources.

Planning and prospecting organizations reliably provided documentation for special purpose construction projects. The organizations led by S. Voinov, Yu. Ignatov, V. Kolesnikov, N. Kozlov, P. Pospelov, S. Rusenko, and O. Shadrjukhin were noted for their achievements during the year.

Unfortunately, in a number of military construction organizations, deficiencies have been permitted in separate production and economic indicators, among them are the construction directorate of the Ural Military District and the organizations led by V. Gribanov, V. Grigoryev, I. Isanin, A. Makarov, B. Soborov, and A. Chernyshov.

Collectives in the construction directorates of the Siberian Military District and the Black Sea Fleet, and organizations led by I. Golovko, V. Komov, G. Phillipov, and O. Chernyavsin performed unsatisfactorily last year.

In the construction directorates of the Far East, Turkestan, and Transcaucasus military districts, and in organizations led by V. Sapryga, N. Andreyev, and V. Kondratyuk, standard work conditions were not provided for military construction personnel, which resulted in a high level of industrial injuries and even the deaths of people in these organizations.

The basic reasons for the behindhand organizations' failure to reach target figures were the low level of the organization of production, the inefficient use of military construction personnel's labor, and delays in providing designs and materials for construction jobs. There continue to be many shortcomings in the use of small-scale mechanization and the quality of structural assembly work has not improved.

#### Chief of Transcaucasus MD Auto Service on Vehicle Theft

91UM0374A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
15 Feb 91 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Transcaucasus Military District Auto Service Chief Major General Vardiko Mikhaylovich Nadibaidze by Colonel V. Kaushanskiy: "The Hunt for UAZ's"]

[Text] Transcaucasus Military District Auto Service Chief Major General V. Nadibaidze answers our correspondent's questions.

[Kaushanskiy] Vardiko Mikhaylovich, alas, life itself is spurring us on to this topic—about the sad fate of military motor vehicles in the Transcaucasus, both those illegally appropriated by the former DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy (USSR)] organizations of Armenia and Georgia and those seized by armed fighters of every stripe. In short, due to such a seizure this year, your humble servant, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, discovered that his official vehicle had been stolen. While returning to the motor pool, the driver was subjected to an armed attack. The UAZ [Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant Vehicle] was driven off in an unknown direction.

[Nadibaidze] As of today, nearly 700 motor vehicles have been stolen on the territory of Georgia of which only 21 have been returned. Throughout Armenia, the corresponding figures are 416 and 19. Our total, so to speak, losses fluctuate at around 1,095 vehicles. The lion's share of this number were caused by the change in the structure of DOSAAF Armenia and Georgia and by the unconstructive position of the leadership of the already former republic defense societies.

[Kaushanskiy] I think we will return again to the positions of the former DOSAAF leaders but right now I would like to hear in more detail about the bandit raids. All the more so since our UAZ's, although with civilian license plates, have been noted on the streets of South Ossetia. Armed hijackers are behind the wheel....

[Nadibaidze] As of today, 60 vehicles have been stolen from troops in Georgia, 38 in Armenia, and two in Azerbaijan. January of this year provided a drastic flareup throughout Georgia—20 light vehicles. The overwhelming majority of the vehicles have been seized using weapons. Here, undoubtedly, the drastically worsened situation in the republic associated with the events in South Ossetia has had an impact. Georgian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] has also come out with a sharp condemnation of the pirate acts and it sees one of its primary tasks in disarming armed formations.

Recent cases demonstrate the urgency of this task within the context of our conversation. On the evening of January 19, after four shots from a pistol, a UAZ-469 was seized in Tbilisi but fortunately Private M. Mustafayev, who was behind the wheel of this vehicle, was unhurt.

[Kaushanskiy] What is your reaction to thefts of military transport vehicles?

[Nadibaidze] A criminal case has been brought in each hijacking case. But the effectiveness of these measures is extremely low in my opinion. Unfortunately, local law enforcement organs practically do not help us. They have only succeeded in returning several vehicles to us and that was thanks to the toughness and persistence of military vehicle inspection agents. Without exaggeration, they work in an extreme situation today.

[Kaushanskiy] Therefore the only hope is self-protection?

[Nadibaidze] You know only aircraft carriers actually move with escort ships. A military motor vehicle is alone on its travel route if it is not carrying out a mission as part of a column. Alongside the driver—is just the vehicle commander, who in recent times has had to carry a personal weapon on his person. Analysis of hijackings and armed seizures demonstrates: As a rule, the unpleasantness begins from the moment the driver is left alone while driving into the motor pool. The criminals attempt and successfully blockade the "selected" UAZ on the road using other motor vehicles. The main thing is to stop it. That is why I think that activation of the struggle with crime, the immediate dissolution and disarming of illegal militarized formations not in words but in deeds—is the very first condition to stabilize the situation on the roads. For our part, we naturally have developed and introduced a number of protective measures. We will improve them.

[Kaushanskiy] Maybe it makes sense to arm the drivers?

[Nadibaidze] I do not think so. This path in the background of the explosively dangerous situation in the region is hardly productive. The drivers' nerves are almost at their limit even without this. We have gone down a different path. We are striving for maximum publicity of each hijacking case and we are demanding that commanders disseminate them to people. Second, we have categorically demanded from those officers who have become accustomed to not needing to have their vehicles parked alongside them for hours to exclude prolonged parking near bases, headquarters, or hotels. We have even resorted to removing external door handles from light vehicles and reducing movement of vehicles in motor pools, etc. There are also other steps which I will not talk about here because the situation itself gives us the right to our own secrets.

[Kaushanskiy] And now if you can, Vardiko Mikhaylovich, tell us about those persons at the official level who have already decided to "shelter" the military vehicles that used to be part of DOSAAF.

[Nadibaidze] The situation is such that training specialists in the former defense societies of the two republics has been terminated, including military vehicle drivers for the troops. But... Armenia is refusing to return 297 vehicles plus 81 vehicles that belong to the Ministry of Public Education. In Georgia, these figures total 477 and 143 vehicles, respectively. At the same time, Armenia refers to the law, adopted during September of last year, according to which everything that I talked about has been declared national property. Its transfer to the army has been prohibited without the authorization of the republic's Council of Ministers. In Georgia, the leadership of the newly formed society to assist the army announced at its plenum that it will only obey parliament's decisions and will train cadres for the national

army. The truth lies in another place: The vehicles are under the control and in the keeping of informal structures and under the watchful eye of illegal armed formations and all of the listed vehicles need to be seized and returned to support military district troops in the shortest possible time periods in accordance with the Law on Property in the USSR. There cannot be two opinions on this score.

[Kaushanskiy] I would like to end our conversation on this note. You recall that about five years ago our newspaper wrote about the founding in the district of Transcaucasus Military District operational alert VAI [military motor vehicle inspection] under the aegis of the motor vehicle service. The experience turned out to be valuable and successfully recommended itself to other military districts. Can this structure be used as one of the "antihijacking" methods to prevent the thieves from going very far?

[Nadibaidze] Not only can it be but we also must use it. It is precisely with the aid of this system of operational alert personnel that we have returned some of the vehicles.

My deep conviction is: Today it is impossible to work on the level of individual initiative. Considering the situation that has developed, we are in dire need of an organic operational alert VAI institute. Let it be small but they will be professionals with their own sector of responsibility and with strictly defined functions. I am sure this will relieve the load on our small staff of inspectors and will serve the common cause....

**From the Editor: As this article was being prepared for press, we learned that unknown persons had once again hijacked our Transcaucasus Military District correspondent's official vehicle.**

### Odessa MD Critique of Moldovan Government Actions

91UM0547A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
6 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel Yu. Mulyar: "Moldova: Playing Games Around Conscription"]

[Text] Over 1,000 draftees from Moldova deserted the Soviet Army last year. The authorities are searching for 475 people this year. There is a growing tendency to desert the Army. Decree No. 165, recently passed by the Council of Ministers of the republic, contributes to this to a large degree. The decree requires that the state department for military affairs, the republic commissariat, and the executive committees of the city and rayon soviets provide employment for the young people who have left the Soviet Army.

As the reason for this, the preamble of the decree cites the failure of the Odessa Military District to honor the terms of an agreement. The agreement concerning the problem of young people deserting the Soviet Army was signed by Moldova's government.

I asked Colonel L. Grinchenko, deputy chief of staff of the Odessa Military District, to comment on the government decree.

"It is no secret that antimilitary hysteria has been thoroughly stirred up in Moldova lately," said Leonid Dorofeyevich. "The military district command is being constantly blamed for the destabilized situation in the press and in speeches by republic leaders. Among others they blame Colonel General I. Morozov, USSR deputy and the district commander. The statement of the

Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet directly mentions 'the flagrant interference of the Soviet Army into the internal affairs of sovereign Moldova,' as well as orders from the top, etc.

"Anyone with the smallest degree of intellect can see why all this is being done—to distract the public from the complex economic problems that have descended upon the republic and to create their own national army on the sly.

"Prime Minister M. Druk spoke at a meeting of Moldovan women and said the same thing in a much clearer way: If the people consider it necessary to establish their own national army, they should address the parliament, which will consider the issue along with the government. The concept is becoming reality, and the parliament's newspaper SVATUL TSARIY does not disguise the fact. An article by G. Muntyanu, an official at the department for military affairs, says: 'A republic without a national army cannot be a sovereign state.' They are already setting up obstacles to the work of military commissariats in Moldova. Military registration desks are being removed from them, the work of enlistment commissions has been stopped; all paperwork sent to the military commissariats is in the Moldovan language. In other words, they are doing everything to frustrate the Spring enlistment and to follow this by creating a national army, having given the reasons for it."

As for the accusations directed at the Odessa Military District command on its alleged failure to honor some agreement, Colonel L. Grinchenko said the following:

"No agreement of any legal force exists in reality. Therefore, it is absurd to blame the district command for anything in this respect."

### Czech Military Reforms Noted

91UM0545A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
6 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Shaparskin: "Czechoslovakia: How the Army Is Being Reformed"]

[Text] "As is Rome, so are the legions"—this very old saying in a very direct way corresponds to the reality of today's Czechoslovakia. The difficult and ambiguous processes that are occurring in the country, are reflected, as in a mirror, in the Army.

The reduction in its numerical strength and the most significant redeployment of troops begun since 1918 are accompanied by a continuous outflow of cadre personnel. According to information from the Czechoslovak press, about 12,000 officers and warrant officers left the Army for various reasons by the beginning of January of this year. This is precisely why a majority of the companies and platoons are left without commanders at the present time. Also threatened with a breakdown this year is the recruitment of cadets and students for military schools: By the first of December 1990, only 8.9 percent of the required number of applications were submitted.

The restructuring of the Czechoslovak Army was started under rather difficult conditions, not least of all caused by anti-Army propaganda. Its main purpose, in the opinion of the organizers, is the creation of a "small professionally trained and equipped army," which in 1993 will number approximately 140,000 persons.

In the first stage—up to April of this year—the Ministry of Defense is being reformed, and it will be transformed in fact from a military department into a political one, after becoming part of the central organs of state administration. The political part of the ministry is the directorate for social and humanitarian questions, headed by Doctor A. Rashek. The structure has a directorate for social management, a directorate for legal service, a directorate for VUZ's [higher educational institutions], physical culture, and sports, a Military Institute for Sociological Research, a Historical Institute of the ChA [Czechoslovak Army], and the Army Institute of Culture. The strategic and conceptual management subsystem, which, among other things, will have a directorate for scientific and technical development subordinate to it, is headed by General I. Andrejcek. The economic subsystem, which will deal with budgetary questions, ecology, and private enterprise, is headed by General I. Balas. The military part of the emerging macrosystem is distinguished by the General Staff, which, as previously, is headed by Lieutenant General A. Slimak.

In accordance with the new doctrine adopted in the CSFR, defense must be "aimed not only to the West, but also to ensure the security of Moravia and Slovakia." In connection with this, provision is made for the creation of three territorial ground forces commands, while the PVO [Air Defense] and the VVS [Air Force] will remain

centrally subordinated. At the end of last year, the local authorities of Olomouc gave a positive reply to a request of the CSFR Minister of Defense on the formation of a territorial command "Center" in the Moravian capital city.

Plans have also been made in accordance with adopted laws on defense and jurisdictions for the redeployment of large units [soyedineniye] and units [chast] of the ChA to Slovakia. In particular, by November of 1991, a tank and a mechanized division will be deployed on the territory of the republic, and principles will be established for the formation of a PVO division and combat arms units, which it is contemplated will be quartered in garrisons that were previously occupied by units of the Central Group of Forces.

In accordance with Vienna agreements, the combat potential of the Czechoslovak Army is being reduced significantly. Henceforth, it will possess 1,435 tanks, 2,050 infantry fighting vehicles, 620 armored personnel carriers, 1,150 field artillery guns, 345 combat aircraft, and 75 helicopters. Taking technological dependence on the USSR into account, the Czechoslovak Army in the near future will orient itself, as previously, on Soviet military equipment. But to all appearances, the time is not far off when the CSFR will begin to purchase weapons and military equipment in Western countries. At the same time, as was announced by Minister of Defense L. Dobrovsky, "Czechoslovakia is already today capable of producing competitive tanks and BMP's [armored personnel vehicle], equipped with modern electronics."

In the spring of 1990, the Federal Assembly of the CSFR adopted a law on civil (alternative) service. It provides for alternative civil service for those who for religious or moral reasons do not want to serve in the Army. The term of civil service, 27 months, is one and a half times longer than the term of active military service. The draft age for civil service is from 18 to 38 years of age. In the opinion of the CSFR minister of defense, the law in its present wording "could completely destroy the Army," inasmuch as nothing restricts a soldier's transfer from compulsory military service to the alternative service. By 1 January, 16,500 applications were already registered (for comparison, in France about 2,000 persons go through the alternative service annually).

Simultaneously, the term of compulsory service was reduced from 24 to 18 months, and for VUZ graduates, to 9-12 months. All servicemen in compulsory service are guaranteed freedom of speech and religion, including participation in religious rites. For this purpose, a decision was made to grant clergy the right to visit military units once a week. To coordinate this activity, a group on moral and ecclesiastical support was established under the Ministry of Defense.

Against a background of curtailing contacts with the USSR Armed Forces on the whole, the Central Group in

particular, contacts between servicemen of the Czechoslovak Army with their colleagues from the armies of the NATO countries and neutral states are taking on a permanent character. Thus, during the course of his visit to Germany in November of last year, the CSFR minister of defense and his German colleague, G. Stoltenberg, arrived at an understanding that 20 officers of the Czechoslovak Army will be sent for short-term courses organized by the center for internal management in Koblenz to study the experience of educational work in the Bundeswehr. Incidentally, the first group of Czechoslovak citizens is already studying in German military VUZ's. The United States has also offered to train youth from the CSFR in its military schools.

Discussions are continuing on the professionalization of the Czechoslovak Army. It is planned as early as 1993 to raise the percentage of those serving on contract from 35 to 48 percent, and by the year 2000 they will constitute 75 percent. There is no talk now about a completely hired army. The existing principle of manning the armed forces, only slightly changed, apparently, will be continued into the future.

#### **WEU Prospects in Wake of Gulf War Viewed**

*91UF0641A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 12 Apr 91 First Edition p 5*

[Article by IAN correspondent V. Katin for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "The 'Sleeping Beauty' Recalled"]

[Text] Luxembourg—The ancient Zenningen Castle in the suburbs of the Luxembourg capital is a government residence for high-ranking guests, a place for important meetings and ceremonial receptions.... On 26 March the gates of the castle were opened wide, and black limousines with the flags of European states rolled in a line up to the main entrance. The foreign ministers of the 12 European Economic Community (EEC) countries plus its leadership proper had assembled this day in emergency session here. The initiative for the meeting had come from France. The governments of the EEC countries had delegated their ministers to Luxembourg, whose turn it is in this six-month period to preside in the community.

What had brought about the need for a special meeting? The attache cases of the participants contained selections of papers and instructions on a single topic—European defense. It might seem strange that such importance is being attached to this problem. After all, that warm spring evening Europe was living by the laws of peacetime. But beneath the arches of the medieval castle opinions were clashing in keen debate on how Europeans might better and more reliably organize their defenses. As though the continent were on the threshold of war....

The discussion was clearly dragging on—four, five, six hours had elapsed. The lights in the windows of the residence burned brightly into the night, and no sounds

emerged from behind the strong oak doors. We journalists were exhausted from the lack of action, awaiting the promised news conference.

Uncertainty always gives rise to rumors. But in this case only one thing was known: The question of clothing the EEC in military uniform had arisen at the height of the war in the Persian Gulf. In the opinion of the leaders of France, Britain, Belgium, and other countries, the European Community as such was unjustifiably remaining aloof from participation in the military operations against Iraq and was giving absolutely no account of itself in these events. The reason being that the EEC does not have an independent military organization subordinate to it, and it alone.

In the course of the debate and search the "sleeping beauty"—this was what the Western European Union (WEU), a military-political grouping which emerged back in distant 1948 and which was somewhat restructured in 1954, was jokingly called—was recalled. This nickname was bestowed on it because in all this time the WEU has accomplished no practical action and has existed only on paper. True, there is a London headquarters, at which the ambassadors of the nine countries accredited in Great Britain sometimes stop by, as at a club.

The WEU incorporates nine European Community states: France, Italy, Germany (now together with the former GDR), Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Britain, Spain, and Portugal. Three Community countries are not yet members—these are Greece, Denmark, and Ireland. The intention of the founders of the union was to establish European cooperation in the military and, to some extent, political spheres and also to establish control over one another's arms. But nothing meaningful came of this. True, supervision of the FRG's compliance with the established arms ceilings was exercised kind of formally for a time. This was essentially merely camouflage: All the restrictions were gradually lifted by the allies themselves, and in 1984 the West German Government had the final prohibitions on the production of conventional arms of an offensive nature—strategic bombers and long-range missiles—removed. In 1986 the WEU abandoned altogether its function pertaining to control of the quantitative level of conventional arms. At this its entire "activity" ended.

Inasmuch as the union legally still exists, the idea arose of filling its outer casing with actual content and turning it into an effective organization capable, if necessary, of defending Europeans' interests on the basis of self-reliance. But there is no complete unity in the approach to this problem. The majority believes that the defense of Europe should, as before, be catered for by NATO and that if purely European joint armed forces with their own command were to be created, this would be a challenge to the Americans.

It was over this dilemma that the foreign ministers were racking their brains in the Luxembourg castle, seeking a



formula acceptable to all. The news conference began at midnight. The participants appeared tired, but content. "The meeting was useful and cleared up many points," J. Delors, chairman of the European Community Commission, commented.

Four approaches to the single problem emerge. The first: Italy and the EEC Commission propose the insertion in the text of a future political union of Europe (it is planned to form such a union for standardization of the 12 countries' foreign policy in 1992) a paragraph on mutual assistance in the event of aggression. This would be the embryo of a system of joint defense. The second: France, Germany, Spain, Greece, and Luxembourg advocate the independent development of the WEU and its merger with the political union, but not before the year 2000. The third: Britain and the Netherlands take exception to the first and second proposals: The WEU should be merely a bridge between the European Community and NATO and act in conjunction with it. The fourth: Denmark and Ireland have not determined their position—they are thinking about it.

So what is the stumbling block? Why in the camp of West European fellow thinkers has this argument about defense and the methods of bringing back to life the slumbering military union suddenly erupted? The war in the Persian Gulf, it seems to me, was a convenient pretext for, without delay, embarking on the installation of an entirely new military structure in West Europe, which is even now being called the "armed arm" of the EEC. To judge by the plans, it is conceived of as a collective organization with its own army and geographically unlimited range.

If events and sentiments are viewed objectively, it can be seen that NATO is manifestly not to the liking of some of the countries within it, although publicly all unequivocally support its preservation. It is a question not of abolition of the bloc but merely of how to interact more efficiently with it, having in parallel their own independent European military union.

What are the motives prompting some European states, France particularly, to raise the question of the expediency of the construction of their own purely European defensive organization independent of the United States? Is this merely an aspiration to complete independence in military matters? It is felt from various indications that the EEC capitals are concerned at the increase in the influence and buildup of the military presence of the United States in the course of the war in the Middle and Near East region, which has traditionally been under the tutelage of West Europe.

Such are the facts, trends, and alignment of forces in Europe: There is NATO, which is as yet not only stable but has been strengthened even further thanks to the GDR, and there is the serious intention to create yet another powerful military union. And this is happening under the conditions of the widely heralded military detente on the continent! After all, quite recently the

Conference on Security and Cooperation adopted the Paris Charter, which contains a mass of appeals and wishes for peace, trust, and harmony. In addition, all this is happening under conditions where the sole counterweight to NATO—the Warsaw Pact—has ceased to exist.

In my view, the admission of Belgian Foreign Minister M. Eyskens is highly indicative: "At a time when the Warsaw Pact is disappearing, NATO should not be expanding the zone of its operations lest it add to Gorbachev's problems. But it is essential to preserve entire both NATO and its nuclear forces inasmuch as the Soviet Union is showing signs of a reluctance to comply with certain disarmament agreements." Is this not a model of typical Western logic, when all that Moscow does, even if it agrees to disband a military alliance, is not enough, inadequate, insufficient.

One further disturbing signal from an unexpected quarter is emerging: Our Warsaw Pact allies are now flirting with NATO, transparently hinting that they have, you see, been left unprotected and that they could now be hurt, motioning toward the East here. Having recently visited NATO headquarters, V. Havel, president of Czechoslovakia, publicly apologized for his country—for having permitted itself to say unflattering things about this peaceable military organization.

I do not believe that the flirting with the EEC, NATO, and the WEU will benefit the countries and peoples of East Europe. Of course, they could in some way be attached to and associated with these organizations. But the undivided sway of the United States in NATO is so great that the other participants are becoming a burden to it. Many people in the West believe—and it is possible to hear and read about this—that NATO membership means a partial loss of sovereignty. It was for this reason that de Gaulle formerly pulled France out of the NATO barracks. As far as the Western European Union is concerned, if it is structured in accordance with the Paris and Bonn models, the main master of ceremonies in it will most likely be the German command. Such a turn-about, incidentally, is feared by the French themselves, who are seeing how Germany has now moved sharply up in all indicators.

But what could stop the Germans en route to this desired goal if giant military-industrial potential were to mature in the henceforward reunited state and if it, as an industrial power, were to take the lead not on a European but a world scale?

No, the lessons of the past two wars should not be consigned to oblivion—neither by us nor West Europe nor East Europe. Prior to World War II Europe was ringed in all directions by all kinds of pacts, unions, and blocs, and there were "axes" and friendship and fidelity treaties even. And Germany necessarily figured in each of them. As we now know, with one aim in mind—lulling its partners, gaining their trust, and building up its own muscle at the expense of its allies in order subsequently

to swallow them up like rabbits one by one. Including France, which had so plumed itself on its diplomatic dexterity and farsightedness.

### 'Soviet Threat' Prompts New CSFR Military Doctrine

91UM0403A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 91  
First Edition p 5

[Article by A. Krushinskiy, PRAVDA Correspondent, under the rubric "A Voice From a Place of Rapidly Changing Developments": "Who is Threatening Whom?"]

[Text] A surprise awaited journalists, who appeared at the customary briefing with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) President's press secretary: Vaclav Havel himself stood before them.

It is well known that the idea of a "Citizens' Forum" has become predominant: just yesterday the president participated in a meeting concerning the terms of the "divorce" between two groups which had arisen in this movement. But they did not forget about foreign policy either. In particular, this question from the BBC was heard: "Doesn't the development of events in the USSR pose a threat to Czechoslovakia"? V. Havel responded, we who live in this region, must take very seriously that which is happening in the USSR. And not only because of possible mass migration. That vast territory radiates instability, and we are directly exposed to this instability.

The British correspondent's question was predicated on a number of important innovations in the domestic political life of the CSFR, the essence of which could be expressed by the formula: "Strengthen the defenses in the East". Judging from appearances, the Czechoslovakian leaders are no longer worried about the western borders of the republic: in the period since the "velvet revolution", for example, as reported by the press, 750 kilometers of barbed wire entanglements, 38 thousand antitank obstacles, almost 600 guard towers, etc. on the border with the FRG and Austria have been dismantled.

A free exchange, without visas, has been implemented with those nations, while at the same time, with respect to the USSR, the previously existing system of officially registering invitations has become noticeably more complicated. With regard to the border, steps are currently being taken to fortify it. As a prominent spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here reported the other day, the Czechoslovakian-Soviet border used to be guarded by only 38 Czechoslovakian border guards. Now a regiment of border guards, which may be reinforced by units taken from the Czechoslovakian-Polish and Czechoslovakian-Hungarian borders, has been sent there.

A new military doctrine, a draft of which was recently submitted to the Federal Assembly for consideration, is being elaborated in the CSFR simultaneously with efforts to eliminate the military framework of the

Warsaw Treaty. One of its important elements is transferring military units from the West to the East. As regards the motives for the redeployment ("the largest since 1918" in the estimation of LIDOVA NOVINA), L. Dobrovskiy, the CSFR Minister of Defense, stated in one of his recent interviews: "In Chekhiya, especially in its western part, we had a considerable overabundance of soldiers, whereas in Slovakiya there were appreciably less soldiers. In the future out of the overall strength of the army, approximately 39 percent of the military units must be stationed in the eastern part of the republic, only 18 percent of them were there in the past".

Among the foreign journalists accredited in Prague, it is being suggested that the redeployment also has its domestic reasons: the potential threat of social unrest, associated with the anticipated deterioration in the standard of living and the increase in nationalistic sentiments. By the way, the new military doctrine was coincidentally submitted to the members of parliament at the same time as the draft law on threats to the state, which gives the president the power to unilaterally declare a state of emergency without taking the opinion of parliament into account.

All of this, of course, is purely a matter of domestic concern for Czechoslovakia, as are the issues of protecting its borders and the deployment of its armed forces. However, the fact that the propagandistic support for these innovations in a number of cases is apparently being conducted according to the patterns of the "Cold War" has been noticed.

And how do you like the style of some of the headlines in the capital press! "All Quiet on the Eastern Front", "Are We Capable of Defending Ourselves?", and "Fourteen Killed on the Border with the USSR". Incidentally, in the latter case the discussion was about a statement by one of the parliament deputies to the effect that apparently in January, 50 armed people attempted to infiltrate into Czechoslovakia from Soviet territory: 100 percent fiction, as the joint investigation conducted afterwards has shown. However, it has become fashionable here to intimidate people with the "Soviet threat".

For example, the withdrawal of the Soviet Army's Central Group of Forces from the territory of the CSFR is now under way. It is going exemplarily in every respect, precisely according to schedule, a point which Czechoslovakian members of parliament and military men, who are involved in paving the way for this complex operation, constantly stress. However, "warnings" slip out here and there, they say the Soviet generals "dream of returning".

Quite recently, the Czechoslovakian leaders acknowledged that there would not have been a "velvet revolution without the Soviet perestroika. As the saying goes, much water has flowed under the bridge since November 1989 and both states are currently experiencing many similar difficulties (although the scope of them is incomparable, of course). However, the political course of the

USSR has remained immutable: the efficient fulfillment of all accepted commitments and a radical renovation of political and economic relations with its former allies on the principle of complete equality. On the part of the Soviet Union, there was not and is not any threat with respect to Czechoslovakia. This is the essence of the USSR foreign policy in the region of Eastern Europe.

Prague.

### Three Officers Return After Eritrean Capture

91UM0533A Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*  
in Russian 29 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by I. Chernyak: "You Will Be Given a Parcel of Land. All You Need To Do Is To Be Taken Prisoner in Ethiopia"]

[Text] This morning, a plane from the Sudan will land at Sheremetyevo-1. It will have on board three Soviet officers who were held for more than three years by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF).

They were seen for the last time on the morning of 17 March 1988. A group, including Lieutenant Colonels Yevgeniy Churayev and Yuriy Kalistratov and military translator Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Kuvaldin, was ordered by chief military adviser Lieutenant General A. Denisov to go to the command post of a division.

As witnesses testify, the Churayev group left in the cargo box of a Ural together with Ethiopian guards. The command post of the division was located 40 kilometers away from the city of Af-Abet. However, the unexpected happened: EPLF detachments suddenly went on the offensive. Few people among our command believed that the well-fortified Af-Abet was in serious danger. However, the government army panicked; the soldiers fled the city, and many of them tore off their shoulder boards. Most Soviet officers managed to break out together with the retreating troops. The Churayev group was the only one not to be rescued.

Half a year later, foreign journalists who had visited EPLF-controlled territory approached USSR embassies in several countries: Your people in Ethiopia are alive. As the foreigners said, the officers of the Soviet Army were put up in a two-room house with a vegetable garden close to the Sudanese border. They were allowed to take walks, listen to the radio, and receive newspapers. However, they were closely guarded.

MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] representative V. Lipnyakov said: "They could not be considered prisoners of war because they did not take part in combat operations. Their stay in Ethiopia did not transcend the framework of international practice. Previously, advisers from the United States, France, and Cuba worked in this country, and currently those from Israel and Korea do. We tried to act through the official authorities of the United States and Canada and diplomats from other countries which have contacts with the

EPLF. We worked with religious figures and the Red Cross. An MFA representative, then chief of the Administration for African Countries, Yu. Yukalov, met repeatedly with EPLF leader Isaias Afewerke. We sent musical greetings to the captives through Radio Moscow in order to keep up their spirits..."

Similar situations had occurred before, but everything had ended well. For example, two Soviet physicians captured by Tigre insurgents were set free through the Sudan in the early 1980's. Not so long ago, we ransomed the crew of a fishing trawler that was captured in Somalia. However, in these cases civilians were at issue, whereas in this case officers were. Perhaps, this was the reason why the EPLF leadership was in no hurry to hand them over and made political demands. For example, they hinted that the USSR should discontinue military cooperation with Ethiopia.

The issue of the Churayev group was raised at meetings between not only Shevardnadze (and later Bessmertnykh) and Baker, but also between Gorbachev and Bush. The Americans promised to help, and they kept their word. It is no accident that USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Bessmertnykh sent a telegram expressing gratitude to U.S. Secretary of State Baker after the release of the officers.

The family of one of them fell apart in the meantime. Others awaited their release, hoping for a miracle, and a miracle indeed happened.

As I was assured at the USSR MFA, more than 1,100 Soviet citizens are in no danger, despite the fact that the situation in Ethiopia has once again deteriorated.

### TASS Advertises Forthcoming Gulf War Analysis

91UM0533B Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*  
in Russian 26 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[TASS announcement: "TASS: Analytical Review 'Combat Operations in the Persian Gulf'"]

[Text] In the first half of April, the service of urgent scientific-technical information INFO-TASS will publish THE ANALYTICAL REVIEW "COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF."

The review will examine the following issues in detail based on numerous materials from authoritative foreign sources:

- preparing the personnel of the multinational forces for the war;
- tactics of combat operations by the air force and ground forces;
- results of combat use of the newest types of weapons.

The analytical review "Combat Operations in the Persian Gulf," the volume of which is four standard publisher sheets, will only be sent upon the receipt of a letter

of payment guarantee with the enclosed copy of a payment voucher. The review costs 262.5 rubles (including the sales tax). Payment should be transferred to the current TASS account No. 608404 at the Operations Administration of the USSR Zhilsotsbank [Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development] Board, MFO 299093, code 9299093, bank index

103820. We request that you indicate the number of copies of the review when ordering. Orders should be sent to the following address: 103009, Moscow, 10-12 Tver Boulevard, the Department of Commerce, Pricing, and Advertisements.

Telephone number for information: 202-83-66.

### Missile Designer Utkin Interviewed on Career

91UM0496A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by Colonel M. Rebrov: "Profile of a Chief Executive Designer: An Owl Works at Night"; first three paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] "Without the past, there is no present; without the present, there will be no future." That was said a long time ago, but not by me. This thought goes through our minds as we go through life. In this connection, a person often reflects on how little he knows about people who created and are now creating our rocket might. For both defense and space applications.

Today the names of the pioneers are well known: S. P. Korolev, V. P. Glushko, M. K. Yangel, N. A. Pilyugin; V. I. Kuznetsov; V. N. Chelomey, V. P. Maneyev. These and other chief designers and chief executive designers did have and presently have students and disciples. Some of them may be nameless; if their name is mentioned, this is done so without reference to their occupation. Nonetheless, they do live and work. And their occupation is quite important. They exhibit strong feelings and put up a struggle in their jobs. I have had the opportunity on a number of occasions of meeting with one of them and holding open conversations, shedding light on that which for years was hidden behind a security label.

Academician Vladimir Fedorovich Utkin devoted almost 40 years to defense, creating many generations of missiles and space rockets. He was until recently the director general and chief executive designer of the Yuzhnoye NPO [Scientific Production Association], which is located in Dnepropetrovsk. At the present time he is the head of a lead scientific research machinebuilding center in Kaliningrad in the vicinity of Moscow. That is where his experiences of the past, present, and future come into play.

It occurred at Baykonur, in the beginning of October of last year. A launch of a Zenit was in progress. The order "Launch!" was given. The engines with their usual increasing noise were entering the booster phase. The timing operators started the countdown. All of a sudden a brief and bright flash split the sky, producing an enormous dark cloud.

The chief executive designer listened to detailed reports: on the precise time of occurrence; behavior of the "item"; the damage caused to one of the launch pads.

"What about the people?" interrupted Utkin. "What about the people, I ask you?"

The Zenit's launch was fully automated; this kind of procedure is performed without human intervention. Present however in the area were testers, developmental engineers and representatives of science—about 100 persons in all.

"There were no human injuries."

This calmed him down somewhat, but did not do much to relieve the tension. Questions shot through his mind: Why? What went wrong? That certainly was not the first launch.

"A random occurrence, perhaps?" he asked.

I must admit that in my eagerness to get the full story, I tried to look into the eyes of Vladimir Fedorovich. He did not look away. But his face seemed to be pale. It seemed to me that something angered him, but maybe I am wrong. He said nothing for quite some time, then came right out with it:

"The trouble is in the RD-170 first-stage engine; it was developed by another firm. I hesitate to blame them, with the technology so devilishly complex; the thought of developing another engine is awful."

He sighed, stood up, and went over to a window, through which I could see the rainy winter day drawing to an end. He did not long remain silent.

"I remember how the first secretary of the obkom gave me a magnifying glass as a gift on my birthday. It was quite ordinary—the kind you can find in any physics classroom. He explained to me the reason behind the gift: 'Take this, Vladimir Fedorovich. It is something you can use every day to look for dust particles on rockets.' That was not stretching the point too much. Our items consist of thousands of tiny parts, so that dust particles could actually cause something unpredictable. I am telling you this, because when something goes wrong, the blame falls on the chief executive designer. That is the way it should be. However, if the chief executive designer is held responsible for all successes and failures, then he should be listened to, and this is not always the case."

I could not help but ask him: "Have you ever been disappointed with yourself or suffered doubts about achieving a success or about your own abilities?"

"Well, ...," he said with a grin. He then fell into thought, as if the question meant something to him.

"I have suffered in the past and I suffer now. However, I must stress that I never became disappointed in our work. Also, a person can harbor doubts and still be successful. Yes! Yes! None other than Pascal said, 'Question theory, authority; test everything yourself, for even a silly thought can generate an excellent idea.'"

It took me some time to comprehend what he said. Sensing this, he continued:

"A random occurrence? But that is not a failure; it is the most important part of our work. Random occurrences are what dreams are made of. An unexpected occurrence, the way I look at it, is something new, something no one has yet encountered. Unexpected, interesting, important—these are synonyms, as it were. No two random

occurrences are alike. What harms our work is amateurishness. I will not mention any names, since the fault lies more with stereotyped thinking."

Rockets. They determined his life for many years. The word has many shades of meaning the way he uses it. It does not sound militant, nor does it threaten or relegate everything else to a position of lesser importance. He endows the word with warmth, honesty, and humanity. I am convinced that his design work is inseparable from the ethical category, thus serving him in the capacity of a moral foundation. For the world is facing a multitude of new problems, without having resolved old ones, which show up here and there to deprive mankind of a tranquil existence. This is something we all must realize.

He was born in the Ryazan area. Mstera; Pustobor; Kasimov; Zabezhno [word indistinct], all located on the left bank of the Oka. Places of his father, grandparents, and great grandparents. Very beautiful there, deeply Russian, with a heavy aroma of bread baking, an aroma so thick that it could be nearly eaten. Kasimov with its churches and bell towers, factories, artisan shops, which sold their fishing nets to countries as far away as Japan. Their tanned sheepskin coats would be the envy of today's Hungarian craftsmen. There was more than this that brought fame to the "Rayki." Their cast iron, scythes, rafts, and barges were in use throughout Russia. The peasants of that area were self-willed and freedom-loving, endowed with wit and humor. If a merchant would lose an anchor that would later show up in the hands of the pilferer, the latter would spread his hands and say, "I spotted this anchor floating on the water and retrieved it." Vladimir Fedorovich told me about things like that.

Rockets. That is a word he never heard as a child. It started with a boy's games, whereby he and his brothers (there were four of them in the family) would make airplanes out of wood and paper and power them with a rubber "motor" fashioned out of an old bicycle inner tube. That was the time of germination of the creative spirit that would later form a solid foundation for the rest of his life. The models flew, and not badly at that. That was not to last too long. Much time was not required to grow up. Boys his age became adults on the 22nd of June, 1941. Utkin already in August was one of them that arrived in Ulyanovsk to enroll in a military communications school. There were 10 times as many applicants as could be accepted. He found himself assigned to a reserve communications regiment; in May of 1942 he was sent to the Volkhov Front to serve in communications for the duration of the war.

He grew silent once more, thinking of the past.

"Memories of the war are something you retain for the rest of your life. Even half a century later, I still remember how I suffered a boy's fear: What if I never see the day of victory?"

He did see it! He returned to his native area, but there were no permanent jobs, not even small ones. The war

swept away the captivating aroma of hot bread. In his pocket he had a biscuit, and that was moldy. Incompetent managers ran the foundry into the ground. What to do? Where to go? The first thought he had—to study engineering—he rejected. Not because he was not interested. Not at all! It was a time of hunger. "Maybe I should go into commerce. That is how people earn a good living." Before he could make a final decision, his older brother Nikolay intervened. After the father died, he took on the entire burden of caring for the younger children. "You must go to school," he said decidedly. "If you do not obtain an education, you will not get anywhere in life."

He was accepted into the Leningrad Military Mechanical School without the formality of entrance exams, since he had served at the front and had a good academic record. Although he had forgotten much during the war years, he had no problem keeping up with the other students. Study in the daytime; evenings, part-time jobs to earn money on which to live. As fate would have it, in Leningrad he got together with a friend from the front who was working in a phonograph record factory. That is where Vladimir and Aleksey Utkin (Aleksey Fedorovich, presently the chief designer of a defense design office, at that time also a student) acquired a hands-on knowledge of engineering.

The factory, not much in itself with its antiquated equipment, nonetheless was given directives from above: start producing more under the plan. This prompted the brothers to start modernizing the presses. Vladimir designed a 150-atmosphere hydraulic valve. It was put into service and successfully used. As a reward, he was given the first pressing with the inscription: "You have not changed."

Upon graduation from the VUZ, he was sent to NII-4. He had a job but not a place to stay. His entire pay went to pay for the privately-owned apartment, actually part of a room. That is how he wound up in Dnepropetrovsk.

"I was fortunate to be there, as it turned out, even though it was hard at first. After suffering long ordeals, I was assigned a small dormitory room of eight meters for two families. Suddenly, luck! A room all to myself in a communal building! But the important thing was the interesting work. I gave it my full devotion, putting in 15 to 16 hours a day. When it was time to go home, the streetcars were no longer running. So I had to hoof it 10 kilometers. Home at two or three in the morning, back in the enterprise by nine am."

Utkin came into his own in Yuzhnoye, where his grasp of engineering was recognized. His skill in gaining people's interest and his organizational ability served to win his election to party committee secretary. Combining design and party work was not an easy matter. At that time (the year was 1954), the plant was about to produce missiles. M. K. Yangel, a Korolev man from Moscow, was appointed chief designer. Questions went through people's minds as they waited for him to arrive. What kind

of man was he? Why are they sending a stranger? At that time, no one in Dnepropetrovsk knew Mikhail Kuzmich.

"At first we were making the R-1 rocket, which was patterned after the V-2. We called it 'item 8A11.' Then followed other Korolev developments: the R-2, R-5. We also created our own missiles, ones which used entirely different fuel components. They were given the SS designation: SS-4, SS-9, SS-5, SS-7. The SS-4 was employed as the base of the booster rocket that put sputnik DS—Dnepropetrovsk No 1—into orbit. It led the Kosmos series."

After Yangel's death, Utkin took over the design office and plant collective. He did not believe in small tasks. The SS-18, SS-24, Tsiklon, and Zenit were only a part of what he accomplished, of what he achieved with much pain, to be more precise. He paid for it in sleepless nights and spats with persons who did not share his views. A chief designer's function goes beyond knowing how to work: He must also prove that he is right. Distrust of new ideas runs in the blood of people. There is no point to hiding the truth: In those years, some people were riding the crest of the wave, while others were working unnoticed by the "higher circles." But Utkin pursued his goals.

I watched him as he worked. He concentrates, somber and even rude in his ways. He becomes detached from everything. Telephone calls irritate him. He however cannot exist without communication. He agreed to take leave only on the condition that a radio-relay telephone be installed in his sanatorium room.

"A rest can do me good only if I am calm. I cannot stay away from work for any length of time. I simply cannot!"

That is the high drama of people like Utkin: At first they are able to control their energy, but later their energy takes over them.

Time. We often take notice of it when it is slipping away; implacable, relentless time. It goes away never to return. Never! It takes with it that which we have not finished doing, thinking through, or dreaming about. Vladimir Fedorovich reached for the telephone, but his hand stopped in mid-air. Assuming a look of frustration, he continued to speak:

"This has become a chronic illness, this lack of time. The day is not long enough; the night, also. My work requires me to travel quite a bit. I live aboard an airplane, my mobile office."

I listened and imagined how a late night airplane would land, take aboard a lone traveller, and race away into the night, away from the southern city, toward Moscow. A man is sitting and working in the passenger compartment. "Good and useful thoughts, the same as a night owl, appear at night." His words.

"How does your wife take this?" I asked.

He shrugged his shoulders, and a warmth glowed in his eyes.

"Ask her yourself. Incidentally, I have been lucky in this work, the way things have turned out. We are friends; we understand each other without having to resort to explanations."

Vladimir Fedorovich suddenly grew sad. "People count my awards, but no one wants to count my wounds." Having said that, he added:

"I consider myself to be a lucky person and a successful designer. Nonetheless, I cannot say that I was born under a lucky star. All kinds of things can happen. You are probably of the opinion that a chief designer or chief executive designer spends days and nights at the drawing board drawing and computing, and a new missile or space rocket is born. If only that were so! This is a war of ideas, a struggle involving realities of common sense, not only of engineering. It is a sign of the times that we have all become to one degree or another philosophers, economists, politicians, and managers. One cannot halt this progress, throwing a monkey wrench in the works. The competition with the Americans is not for number of missiles. It is a competition involving design ideas. Also, a new missile costs money. Quite a bit, at that."

He started to discuss testing of one of his new ideas, a so-called "mortar launch."

"Baykonur. The steppe was awakening after the night, with daybreak on the way and the air as clear as ice. A missile rushed skyward out of a silo in the earth. At an altitude of about 20 meters there was a delay lasting only a moment, then—full speed!"

Marshal Grechko, continuing to watch through his binoculars, said uncertainly:

"I was told that it falls back dangerously, and ..."

"It takes off," interrupted Utkin, "without delay; the engine fires at that altitude."

The new version provoked guarded comments and heated arguments. On the evening before the test, V. N. Chelomey said, "It will not go." Following him came an opposing "It will go," said by a sour Utkin in response. "If it does go, Vladimir Fedorovich, I will take off my hat to you." That is what he said, but when the time came, he did no such thing.

Of a firm that takes a long time to "come across," it is said that it has not "found its way." That kind of thinking is all right for a period of 5 to 7 years. If it has not "found its way" after 10 years or so, then this means that the firm is not doing well. It would appear that the idea here is fairly clear and understandable, but it is not to the liking of anyone interested largely in acquiring status and augmenting a personnel roster, by a firm that does not produce. That kind does exist.

There definitely is such a thing as love of power. This is strange to have, of course, but I must admit that there are those who do harbor it, this love of power. But what good is it? Merely to show that a person knows more than anyone else, that he can order people around any way he likes, without fear of consequences, without accounting to anyone? That is nothing but nonsense. If a person is a chief designer, that means that he is good at bringing people together. The main thing here is not that he is the chief, period. He is supposed to function as an prime mover.

"Do you ever have to justify your actions?" I asked Vladimir Fedorovich.

"Justify my actions?" he repeated. "I can recall when we were conducting a test launch of a new item. Quite a lot of people came to see what would happen. When the rocket produced a foxtail, they all ran away in no time. Kurushin (in charge of the test facility at the time) and I hurried to the point of impact to see what had occurred. We were suddenly called in on the carpet so that an explanation could be sent 'upstairs.' I will not tell you in detail about the situation, but I will say that I spoke everything that was on my mind, thus causing consternation. What is needed is the truth, not soothing words. People working for me had their backsides burned by the blast; they are not about to sidestep. After the higher authorities departed, one of the 'yes-men' came up to me and whispered into my ear: 'You are a courageous man.' What an affront! At first he remained silent, later he praised me. 'You did not exhibit courage by supporting me out loud,' I interrupted."

Academician Utkin, Twice Hero of Socialist Labor, chief executive designer of space rocket complexes, had erected in his honor by decision of the government a bronze bust. Ryazan area people hold their fellow countryman in high regard. Incidentally, we also owe a debt of gratitude to those who created a reliable shield for our Fatherland, those who brought fame to it in space matters. However, something else is in the air: Times have changed; we must disarm. We must! It is our country that has initiated this. Nonetheless, in spite of the forthcoming Soviet-American agreements on reduction of strategic armaments, the Americans are stubbornly and in some ways secretly continuing their work on creating new missiles as replacements for the aging Minuteman-2. Let us put that onto the scales and try to predict what may come of that. I personally do not care to make any such predictions at the present time.

My early-morning telephone call to Vladimir Fedorovich was not early enough to awaken the academician. He was hurriedly preparing to visit the Supreme Soviet. He apologized for not being able to meet with me in the next few days. "I must explain to someone what conversion is and what kind of conversion the country and people need." "Are there any serious opponents?" I asked him. "No, there are dangerous amateurs," answered Vladimir Fedorovich. The chief executive designer must have spent another night working and thinking.

As he was about to leave, Vladimir Fedorovich requested that I in my narrative do not overdo it—exalting him above those with whom he has become accustomed to share the labor and cares, the aggravations and joys, the defeats and successes. I promised to abide by his request.

### **Alma-Ata Center Promotes Industrial Use of Lasers**

*PM0804110791 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian  
1530 GMT 4 Apr 91*

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by A. Nugmanova, V. Zhiryakov, identified by caption, from Alma-Ata]

[Text]

[Announcer] Kazakhstan's first laser technology engineering center has opened in Alma-Ata.

[Nugmanova] Strictly in accordance with a preset program, lasers are capable of fashioning woodwork, machining metal, and cutting fabrics and plastics faultlessly and with the utmost precision. Altogether, as you can see, their potential is unique. The prospects for utilization of laser technology in the national economy are very promising.

The Alma-Ata Engineering Center, which is a subdivision of the USSR Academy of Sciences Intersectoral Scientific and Technological Complex [MNTK], will not only develop laser equipment on orders from industry but can also organize series production of this equipment, introduce it into industry, and train highly skilled specialists in this sphere. There are four more sections like this one at Alma-Ata enterprises. This equipment, which is not cheap, is also available for hire. According to economists' estimates the cost of laser production equipment can be recouped within 18 months or two years.

[G.A. Abilsiitov, director general of the MNTK, identified by caption] Our aim in establishing this laser center is to identify enterprises' interest. We believe that there will be great interest. Therefore, within the framework of the engineering center, we must also simultaneously attend to the problem of the production of this laser equipment. We are planning to establish joint ventures and a number of small enterprises for the assembly of laser equipment here in Kazakhstan for use at republic enterprises. I believe that this equipment will appear at quite a few enterprises before the end of this year.

[Nugmanova] The MNTK director's confidence is quite understandable. The visit to the center by republic President Nazarbayev, the interest in the scientists' problems which he has shown, and the support given—the republic has allocated additional funds for the development of laser technology—is bound to produce good results.



### Confusion Over Conversion at Buran Plant

*PM2103114991 Moscow Central Television First  
Program Network in Russian 0600 GMT 19 Mar 91*

[From the "Topical Report" program entitled "Conversion and We" by A. Abramov, figures in parentheses indicate time in mins/secs elapsed from beginning of broadcast]

[Excerpts] [0000] [Abramov, over footage of advanced military aircraft and rocket launches alternating with shots of food waiting lines and poor housing] What makes a state strong? Do weapons alone secure might and respect in the world? Even if this were so, how many tanks, rockets, and aircraft are needed for this?

It appears that we have overdone it. But how can the gigantic military industry machine be stopped? We have invested our best brains, best specialists, and vast sums of money in it. It is possible, of course, to hang a padlock on the gates of half the defense industry enterprises, but what will happen to their workers, engineers, and scientists then? After all, they too are our potential. And so the concept of conversion was born—conversion of some of the defense industry to civilian output.

But is it possible for a plant which has produced the Buran spacecraft and mastered almost 300 new technological processes to produce an icebox, for example? Of course it is, but not straightaway and not without credit from the state. And so more money is needed, money which the state does not have. We will try to brief you on the progress of conversion at the "Tushinskiy Mashinostroitelnyy Zavod" production association, until recently one of the country's most secret plants.. [0225] [passage omitted containing interviews with Association Director General S.G. Arutyunov, two workers, and A.F. Breusov, chairman of Aviation Industry Workers Union Central Committee]

[1042] [Abramov] Let's concede that the Buran is no longer needed. But you have 100 fitters and 50 lathe operators with the highest skills. You are aware that in five years' time you may be asked to produce some new product, after all, science does not stand still, perhaps a civilian aircraft, or something of that kind, but what are these fitters, lathe operators, and other specialists to do during the intervening five years?

[I.D. Nakhabtsev, chairman of the plant trade union committee, identified by caption] This is a very difficult question, of course, especially in the conditions which apply at our plant. The point is that Buran is a unique piece of equipment and it could not have been built without special testing facilities, special premises, and special installations. Therefore it is simply impossible to easily switch to some kind of different output. It should be similar output in terms of either content or scale.

[Abramov] But there is no such output?

[Nakhabtsev] No, for the present there is not. But the plant has experience in this field. We used to produce

streetcars, trolleybuses, and aeroleighs in the past. So there is experience of other work.

What are we doing at the moment? Unfortunately, as of now, we have a 100-percent state order. This means that we cannot switch to any other output. However, without waiting for some kind of decision—after all, there is no law on conversion as yet and this means great losses for us—we are nonetheless trying to produce civilian goods.

[Abramov] Incidentally, part of the plant's civilian output—calibrators for use in agriculture—has been produced in this production unit, which was once secret. They have obviously decided here that a bird in the hand is better than Buran in space.

[Excerpts] [V.N. Tatarintsev, fitter and assembly worker, identified by caption] Generally speaking, people are leaving the plant, they are looking for better jobs, so to speak, joining cooperatives... In principle, few of the cadre workers are still here.

This used to be a prestigious job, of course. How can I put it, when Buran, that bird of ours, went up together with the Energiya which launched it, it was an indescribable feeling, you have to have seen it, it cannot be put into words. [video shows An-225 landing with Buran]

[D.G. Arutyunov, director general of "Tushinskiy Mashinostroitelnyy Zavod" Production Association, identified by caption] I am in favor of conversion. But at the same time I must insist that it is impossible to implement it in the way that is being done. This is my firm conviction.

It is necessary for someone who knows what defense sufficiency means to say what the country needs to achieve this sufficient defense, and how much of it. When someone has told us this, we will be able to decide ourselves what needs to be done.

[Abramov] So far this is lacking?

[Arutyunov] So far this is lacking. Conversion has been implemented for several years now, and still no one has any idea what defense sufficiency means, what this principle which has been proclaimed means, what it means in real arms terms, so to speak, what types of weapons are needed, of what quality, and so on and so forth. This is what is causing our difficulties. We are constantly on our guard because we have no certainty that tomorrow someone will not say: "Excuse us, it was all a mistake, we have to go back to..." Meanwhile the facilities will have been taken over. What will we do then?

[Abramov] This has obviously happened before?

[Arutyunov] We have been through this before, and not just once, many times, every plant has been through this at one time or another. Where else would our experience and our misgivings come from? It is not that we are afraid of something. We have not been afraid for a long time. But we cannot help having misgivings.

[Abramov] Meanwhile one of the former space production units is producing disposable syringes. The unit's conditions make it possible to produce them at world standards. It is expected that 20 million will have been produced by the end of the year. This is conversion for you. But nonetheless, you ask yourself whether another aircraft on the lines of the Buran will ever take off again. Or will the Buran become an expensive monument to our bungling and our irrepressible desire to sound a fanfare, and to hell with what happens afterward. [program ends with brief shot of Buran in flight] [1515]

### Debate Over Resubordination of Enterprises to RSFSR

91UM0376A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 91  
Second Edition p 2

[Debate of defense industry enterprise directors: "Putting in a Word for the 'Public' Plant"]

[Text] On 12 February on the pages of its "Discussion Page," PRAVDA published material of the people's deputy of the USSR Yu. Komarov in which the author voiced doubts about the economic advisability and legality of resubordinating the union enterprises to the organs of state administration of the RSFSR. We have asked the leaders of major collectives of the defense complex to speak to this.

#### V. Aleksandrov, Gen. Director of the Leningrad Admiralty Association:

—Shipbuilding is one of the main branches of the domestic economy. A specialist need only look at a particular ship, a cruiser or submarine, in order to give an opinion about the scientific-technical, industrial, and defense might of the state.

The modern ship is a most complex engineered structure. No one plant, however large it may be, could build one by itself. For instance, the share of our own expenditures in our branch is about 30-50 percent. The rest is done through the interbranch cooperatives which operate in our country. And indeed, each defense branch long ago developed its own system of deliveries.

It is no accident that from time immemorial—and national shipbuilding will soon be three hundred years old—this branch has always been within the jurisdiction of the state.

Well, shall we break up the defense ministries? I believe that if we do we will not be able to construct a single ship. It is another matter that we must precisely comprehend the state of the shipbuilding industry and then consider the end of our task—where do we want to go? Only then should we be reorganization of administration. It is a fact that the administrative system of the "defense world" requires modernization. Life demands that we do that. But not breakup! Disruption of long-time partnerships, resubordination, a change of flags will scarcely

promote good service. After all, the modern state enterprise is a kind of model of the state, and if you will, its prop...

#### A. Karpov, General Director of the "Biysk Chemical Combine" Production Association:

—In my view the importance and advisability of retaining the defense ministries as union ones are dictated by several reasons. First I would cite the urgent need to retain the Union as the form of existence of our state.

Second, effective, adequate, and guaranteed support of the Armed Forces with all types of arms and military equipment, and consequently their maintenance in constant combat readiness is possible only in a centralized manner, with the interaction of the union ministries. In this way we can maintain the established economic ties with practically all republics (regions) of the country, and supply the defense industries with all necessary resources without interruption.

The basic task of the defense complex is the development, manufacture, and supply of arms and military equipment with the greatest effectiveness, i.e. cheaply, quickly, with high quality, and reliably. And this will be impossible if we disperse resources. Suppose we transfer the union defense ministries to republic subordination. To what may this lead? To the disruption of a complex, decades-old infrastructure of defense branches, the disruption of stability maintained even under today's difficult conditions. It may do irreversible harm to the national economy...

#### A. Koselev, Director of the Moscow Machine-Building Plant imeni M. Khrunichev:

—One might ask, how many scientific, design, and production collectives must exert their efforts and potential in order to build the "Mir" orbital complex, say. Here's how many: about five hundred enterprises of union and republic subordination.

Indeed, all the "defense types" are part of a great cooperative. If we break these chains, we will break the spine, the backbone, call it what you will, of the defense industry, and only add to the organizational chaos. This is precisely the threat of the noted tendency of withdrawal of such enterprises from union subordination. Let us look the truth in the face: do you really think that present relations between republics are unclouded? In the old days plants like ours were called "public." They determined the technical might of the state, and consequently its military might. In my view under any turnabouts in economic policy, "public" enterprises should retain their aspect.

Collectives of the defense enterprises are now in a difficult situation. A reduction in military orders, conversion processes, the transition to the market, the tax policy of the state toward the "public" plants, the inadequate social protection—these and many other

problems demand close attention. They may be resolved only on the union level. I again repeat what I have already had occasion to say from the pages of PRAVDA: "They propose putting the "defense types" into the market with hands tied, and this threatens a mighty technical potential with collapse."

**B. Galushchak, General Director of the "Novosibirsk Instrument-Building Plant" Production Association:**

—The council of the labor collective and public organizations of the association have discussed the question of its subordination. We believe that it is advisable to retain union subordination.

The association does a large volume of research, development, testing and engineering work to devise new equipment. We long ago established the closest ties with scientific centers, institutes, and enterprises not only in Russia, but also in other republics. Assembly is implemented through centralized and intraministry deliveries from enterprises in all republics, who are generally monopoly manufacturers of their goods.

In our opinion, until the market is created, the development and assimilation of new equipment of a high technical level in short time periods are impossible without state financing, centralized coordination of tasks, and material-technical supply from the allied ministries and the state military-industry commission.

**Commentary of the military department:**

As you have noted, today leaders of the 'public' enterprises on the territory of Russia have shared their thoughts. But plants, scientific-research institutes, and design bureaus of the defense complex also exist in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Belorussia. Such is the line of the next confrontation, to which the defense people are being forcibly drawn by "strategists" with narrow regional thinking.

We support the main thing in the position of the defense people: the state should not abandon its offspring, the military-industrial complex, to the whims of political-economic fate.

It is true that this "child" was always a favorite, and that no resources were spared for the flexing of military muscles. This is probably one of the reasons why we do not live today as befitting citizens of a great power. In addition, the monopoly on placing orders, on the production and delivery of specific models of new military equipment, missiles, planes, ships, combat vehicles, is dangerous if only because the relations of industry and the client, the Army and Navy, have developed for years on the principle of "take what they give."

On the other hand, where do we get the refrigerators in our apartments, the televisions, washing machines, sewing machines, the cameras, and a lot of other goods? All from the same place, from the bowels of the military-industrial complex. Why is it only now, when the motley

republic flags have already begun to flutter on "public" enterprises, when a real danger of the collapse of organized production and ties has appeared, that we have suddenly recollected ourselves and raced to catch the departing train? I believe a great role was played by the extreme secrecy of the military industrial complex, this "state within a state," about whose existence or nonexistence other state figures were mumbling indistinctly just three years ago.

However this is more of an external reason. The root of the question clearly lies in the fact that they are striving to make the Army and defense branches of industry hostages of a political struggle in which there is no place at all for union interests.

Indeed, the designs of that portion of our economic system which directly or indirectly is involved in defense require thoughtful analysis. The military requires regularly renewable quality equipment, but how can it be made under conditions of a sharp reduction in budgetary appropriations for research, development, engineering, and testing? How to prevent, more correctly, to reduce the already-begun "brain drain" from the "public" enterprises. Is the state capable of giving full social guarantees to those who are employed in the production of science-intensive military and civilian goods?

Here, it seems to us, is more fertile soil for the search for effective solutions.

**Supply Problems Dog Perm Plant's Conversion Products**

*PM1204153391 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian  
1530 GMT 9 Apr 91*

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by M. Klepov, V. Oshchepkov, identified by caption, from Perm]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] Conversion is taking place in difficult conditions. Disruption in the supply of raw and other materials and lack of production equipment for civilian goods are among the main obstacles. The Perm "Mashinostroitel" plant has also come up against these difficulties.

[Klepov] We saw this unusual "house on wheels" in the production unit. Its floor space is 18 square meters. It has a sitting room, a bedroom, and a veranda. This is the "Skif" camper trailer—the covered wagon of the 20th century. With it you can set up camp anywhere, and it can be pulled by any make of car. Thanks to conversion additional premises have been vacated for the production of these goods. Unfortunately, suppliers are letting the plant down. There is a shortage of canvass and of "pralon" [as heard]. People here believe that there is only one solution—finding other materials to replace the ones which are in extremely short supply. Locally produced freight trailers are also very popular with vegetable and fruit growers and small-scale farmers. They can

carry loads of up to 700 kg. A new, updated version is now available, a freight trailer with a run-out speed controller [tormoz nakata].

An experimental batch of microwave ovens has been produced at the plant. Housewives will be pleased with its new feature—a rotating spit. Demand for such ovens is growing and output could be increased. However, automatic equipment for the production of plastic components is needed for this purpose. Three units are needed, but only one has been allocated and it will not be supplied until the end of the year.

The machine builders also produce a baby stroller-cum-swing, skis, and sports equipment made from graphite composite material.

[passage omitted—interview with S.A. Agapov, plant deputy director]

### Sverdlovsk Center Aims To Promote Conversion Process

*PM0304131791 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 29 Mar 91*

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by E. Erkomayshvili and V. Zhivkov, identified by caption]

[Text]

[Announcer] The Urals Regional Scientific and Technical Conversion Center has been set up in Sverdlovsk.

[Erkomayshvili] Consumer goods production at the Sverdlovsk Radio Plant started with cheap cuff links and clothespins. What is more, it was housed in a small corner of the shops producing the so-called main products. As of this year a special block has been commissioned which, in terms of its technical standard, is not only not inferior but is in some ways actually superior to defense production. Workers who transfer here do not lose their skills or lose out in their pay. The result is the series production of a three-band stereo radio incorporating a clock and timer.

[N.A. Marov, shop foreman, identified by caption] We could increase radio production by 50 percent this year if it were not for the components which we have to obtain from dozens of cities all over the country.

[N.A. Sidelev, director of the Urals Regional Scientific and Technical Conversion Center, identified by caption] This is a typical situation for an enterprise undergoing conversion. In our complex situation it may not be possible to obtain components from cities in remote parts of the country. And a typical feature common to defense industry enterprises that are undergoing conversion—their publicity-shyness (or, to be blunt, their secrecy) and the lack of information they provide to prospective customers—prevents firms from approaching them directly. But all this can be taken care

of here—within the framework of either the oblast or of an economic region such as our Urals Region.

[Erkomayshvili] And have there been any results?

[Sidelev] The results may be modest as yet—we are just starting out. But, at any rate, targeted programs have been worked out and in a few months' time will make it possible within our economic region to produce the necessary components for complex domestic equipment.

[Erkomayshvili] I was also asked to make a point of saying that the Urals Regional Conversion Center is a state economically accountable enterprise which is prepared to cooperate not only with defense industry structures but with any organizational structures interested in improving the effectiveness of conversion.

### Sukhoy Focuses Conversion on Civilian Aircraft

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[Interview with USSR People's Deputy and Chief Designer Mikhail Petrovich Simonov of the Design Bureau imeni Sukhoy by a SOVETSKIY PATRIOT Special Correspondent: "Mikhail Simonov: Conversion Needs Talent"]

[Text] Retooling a sector and, all the more, one like the aviation industry, is an extremely difficult business, said USSR People's Deputy and Chief Designer Mikhail Petrovich Simonov of the Design Bureau imeni Sukhoy.

I am often asked: Are our talented technical experts, engineers, and designers not suffering from the defense industry conversion? This is not an idle question. If, let us assume, a goldsmith is forced to tin-plate pots, then with time we will be left without any elegant items and even without any pots. But real conversion presupposes something quite different and we need talent to implement it.

We cannot allow conversion to result in some sort of major negative phenomena. At first glance, they are insignificant and even enticing. And we almost became carried away by the illusory idea of creating a super automobile. We have the appropriate composite materials from which we could make good bodies, and we have talented designer A.A. Ryzhov who is producing an excellent diesel engine for a sports plane and we could have adapted it for an automobile. But....

This "but" was a stumbling block. When we had considered everything, we understood: In order to insure that our workers were employed, we would have had to manufacture no less than 300,000 of these automobiles per year. We do not have enough either production capacity or materials to do this.

Therefore, we decided: Aviation is aviation and we will work to improve it. In accordance with conversion, our design bureau is oriented toward designing civilian, and

first of all, sports planes. We are now producing the well-known SU-26 in two versions.

We are making the SU-26M for our sportsmen. This aircraft is quite flexible in a technological sense. We are improving it from year to year. We need to gain access to international competitions with an aircraft that has new qualities. Our competitors are not sitting idly by.

We will probably produce the SU-26T for the future championship of Europe and the world. Lead Designer Boris Vladimirovich Rakitin is now productively working on the design of this aircraft. So, we have not been satisfied with what has been achieved and the attainment of the world and European championships in Switzerland where the SU-26 showed itself to be quite stable has not lulled us to sleep.

Conversion also allows us to expand our international economic ties. For example, we are producing the SU-26 MX export model. On the whole, the Americans thought up the designation. You obviously paid attention to the fact that their missiles are "MX" and that their new tanks are "MX." Well they also decided to throw a little spice into the designation of the SU-26 in order to make it obvious that the military industrial complex is engaged in the manufacture of this aircraft. We laughed and agreed to the proposed designation.

Six of these aircraft have been delivered to the United States of America and one each to England and Spain. And we are happy that Western pilots are beginning to fly in our aircraft. It is true that they do not occupy high positions for now but they are satisfied with the aircraft. Even the accident in Oklahoma has not affected its prestige.

Ex-American Champion and Oklahoma Aviation Exhibition Director Tom Jones died in a SU-26. This was a painful moment for me as the chief designer. They even suggested that I leave inconspicuously. I did not agree. And, on the contrary—I appeared on American Channel 4 and I stated that I had confidence in my aircraft and that I will completely trust the conclusions of the Dallas public prosecutor's office commission and the Federal Aviation Administration commission.

Soon the experts ascertained that the accident did not occur due to aircraft design errors. On the contrary, they noted the high quality of the aircraft. We allowed them to open up an engine. The experts determined that the technology of engine manufacture was at a high level. All of the moving parts turned despite the hard impact with the ground....

The conversion program is intended to develop the SU-26 UT "Sparka" trainer aircraft for the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] Aeroclub. That same hobbyist and designer Boris Vladimirovich Rakitin is working on it right now.

French aircraft builders presented a good idea to us. Their KAP-231 sports aircraft confirmed its reliability at the last expert level advanced aerobatic maneuvers world championship. They have proposed uniting the intellects of the two firms to design the best aircraft in the world. We did not let this opportunity slip by and concluded an agreement to build this aircraft. We will obviously designate it the KAPSU-2.

The pilots' seats will be located side by side in the aircraft. It will have a low-power 150 horsepower engine. We are reviewing gasoline and diesel engine variants. We can consider that work has begun on the trainer aircraft for the [DOSAAF] Society's broad network of aeroclubs. The aircraft will be comparatively inexpensive, durable, simple to fly, and will have a high margin of stability.

The design of a jet trainer aircraft for Soviet sportsmen is also listed in conversion plans. We have already made the SU-28 which has been tested at the USSR DOSAAF expert level advanced aerobatic maneuvers championship. Experience has shown that for now the aircraft is too large, has high fuel and POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants] consumption, and naturally is very expensive. Therefore, we want to design an aircraft with flying characteristics like the L-39.

So, we are making three aircraft: An aircraft for individual training, a performance aircraft for competition, and a jet aircraft for aeroclubs. This will give us the capability to not only preserve the design bureau during the conversion period but to direct its intellect toward the production of competitive aircraft for DOSAAF aviation.

As a result, I must touch upon the problem of the development of gliding. It has recently been in decline. And those lads who piled hundreds of rubles at the doors of glider clubs with the hope of "flying" are currently "flying" in a different way—they are entering the criminal world.

In my opinion, we need to take urgent steps to create mass youth aviation. Our glider club which operates under the design bureau is a drop in the Moscow sea. Therefore, jointly with the Partkom and with Designer Rakitin's active participation, we are seeking an opportunity for our glider club, that operates only in the capital's Frunzenskiy Rayon, to become a citywide glider club.

I consider it one of my deputy duties to resurrect the glory of the country's glider clubs. We certainly need to go down the path of cost accounting. For example, all clubs in the West require payment. And I think that a cadet must pay for flying because free flying is not highly valued.

Of course, a cadet cannot completely cover training expenses. Sponsors must help him. For example, coenterprise and many other major enterprises, rich cooperatives, and various types of production associations

could act in this role. DOSAAF Committees cannot carry out this work by themselves although they are also engaged in commercial activities.

In short, the development of gliding requires our rapt attention. According to my calculations, sponsors need to assume responsibility for 80 percent of the expenditures

and cadets must pay 20 percent for these clubs to become reliable and constantly functioning.

And in general, we must broadly discuss the problems of mass youth air clubs. I call on SOVETSKIY PATRIOT weekly to be the initiator of this much needed cause.

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