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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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21 June 1991

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Col Gen Shlyaga on Depoliticization of Army

91UM0508A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN
in Russian No 21, Nov 90 (Signed to press 22 Nov 90)
pp 20-26

[Interview with Colonel General Nikolay Ivanovich Shlyaga, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, by Viktor Kuzmin: "The Army Outside of Politics?"]

[Text]

Who Stands To Gain from This?

Right now there is much alarm in society with regard to our army. For example, what does the infamous "dedovshchina" [harassment of conscripts] cost in both a moral, political, and practical context. The long-lived unsettled social state of officers has become the talk of the town. Yes, unfortunately all of this is so. We hope that military reform will put right and solve many things.

However, I want to say that many people, while ignoring everything, are attempting to undermine the army in every way. They carry criticism to the absurd, gloat over the actual shortcomings and troubles of army life, and advocate depoliticization of the USSR Armed Forces. This demand has become fashionable and very convenient: One can display one's democratic qualities and use them as a means to satisfy personal ambitions.

In so doing, the other side "is forgotten." And how will it be with the democratic rights of citizens who are performing duty in the army? Depoliticization in practice signifies a ban on a profession for political and ideological reasons. All civilized countries have long ago rejected this shameful practice and our pseudo-democrats want to resurrect it. But, even when a man leaves the Party, it is impossible for him to suddenly stop having his own views and convictions or for him to become sterilely neutral. Obviously, the people who are advancing similar demands are either thoughtlessly or consciously striving to weaken the position of the Party of the communists to please certain forces.

I would advise them to carefully study the processes of creating national military formations, police, and carabinieri in Moldavia, Armenia, and the Baltic republics. They would see that these formations primarily select individuals for political reasons: nationalists and separatists. There are quite a few extremists among them who openly oppose the socialist development of our society.

Objective, true articles about the army help people to sort out the maze of conflicting opinions about it. Yes and army personnel themselves must more frequently speak out in the press.

Ibragim Galimov
Partyan and War Veteran

Kazan

The Army Outside of Politics?

Nikolay Ivanovich Shlyaga was born in 1935 in the village of Peredereyka in Petrikovskiy Rayon, Gomel Oblast. He

spent his youth there. From here he entered the army. He successfully completed automobile school and was designated a platoon commander.

He has been assigned as a commander and political officer in the following army elements: Subunit—regiment—division. He was invited to become a member of the CPSU Central Committee staff from the position of tank division political section chief. Several years later, he once again returned to the Armed Forces and to political work. Currently N.I. Shlyaga is a colonel general and is chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

[Kuzmin] Nikolay Ivanovich, the army is entering the stage of reform. Various opinions are being expressed in this regard in the press, at rallies, and at meetings. There are people who have a negative attitude toward the reforms being conducted. Their primary argument is: Reform is coming from above, from the generals, and therefore it first of all considers the interests of the highest command ranks in the army.

[Shlyaga] We know about these statements and we sense their underlying theme. They say that reform does not have an objective foundation under it—it is a product of the interests and desires of a group of people, in this case generals, and therefore it will not provide anything to society or to the army. The people who can assert that and who do not see and perhaps also do not wish to see what is occurring in the world and in the country are distinguished by extremely strong political shortsightedness.

If previously the main things in politics were balancing on the verge of war, destroying each other, and reliance on strength, the situation began to primarily incline toward the use of political means of solving all international relations issues after the world adopted the new political thinking. Hence it logically follows that the armed forces, structured with consideration of the realities of the Cold War must be reformed. This is the first circumstance that we must consider.

The most radical changes in all postwar history have occurred in the Warsaw Treaty. It has become a military-political treaty and perhaps even more a political treaty from being a military treaty. We must see the aspiration of several states who are currently members of this alliance and who want to leave it. A similar situation is fundamentally changing not only the Warsaw Treaty's place in the world but also the role of our Armed Forces to a significant degree and is causing the need to adopt reasonable "compensatory" measures to support the country's defense potential at the proper level, although, of course, this does not signify a yearning to repeat the ideological dogmas of the Cold War.

Today reform is occurring in many NATO armies and therefore it would be a mistake to lag behind in this matter, however, as would moving along the path of blindly copying the experience of these countries.

I have talked about external factors but internal factors are no less important. When our entire society is being restructured, it is theoretically naive and practically impossible to

preserve the army unchanged. It is no secret—a reduction of the army's prestige is occurring among the people. Military reform is also called upon to raise the prestige of the Armed Forces.

Further. We all know that the share of military expenditures in our country is high enough. The transition to a lower indicator presumes a qualitative transformation of the economic relations between society and the army, all the more so under conditions of the transition to the market. Financial relations are first of all undergoing changes. The inclusion of military production's leading technologies in the process of producing consumer goods is possible—the country acutely needs consumer goods. In general, conversion is one of the elements and one of the reasons for conducting military reform.

Finally, there are the strictly military reasons. We must also consider them. Here are just a few factors. A total of just nearly 40 percent of young people of draft age have actually performed military service by 1989, that is actually until the time the principle of universal military obligation was no longer totally in force. The situation has been worsened by the sabotage of the spring draft in a number of republics. The demographic situation in the country will remain difficult until 1994. The question of strengthening military discipline is not being easily solved. Even with large expenditures modern military technical programs are being carried out with difficulty. The solution of personnel moral-psychological training tasks has become complicated. The development of the troops social and everyday life sphere has lagged behind modern demands. It is enough to say that today nearly 200,000 families are not being provided with housing in the army.

All of these problems require their own solution precisely on the paths of military reform. It is already actually occurring. Sociological research, which of course has more confidence than superficial populist opinions, show: The overwhelming majority of the population supports reform. It has a purely objective basis. Both the private and the general must consider this. The latter, no matter how many stars there are on his shoulder boards, cannot stop its progress and therefore cannot impose his exclusive interests on reform. We are also not inclined to minimize or to overestimate our own role in reform and we are ready to hear any businesslike advice in this regard. We are attentively following press articles and other mass media items. And we are grateful to them for revealing the spectrum of the Soviet people's opinions with regard to military reform. We are just as painstakingly analyzing the numerous appeals, statements, and resolutions that are being adopted during the course of meetings and rallies and collective and individual letters of citizens that we receive. I can assure the readers that the most valuable items in them are immediately summarized and added to the conceptual piggy bank of reform.

But we decisively do not agree with those politicians who are not averse of ambitions to let the matter of the country's reliable defense fall apart. We live in too troubled a time to let some call for infuriating the army and to sow dissension and discord in it.

[Kuzmin] What do you think, if we conduct this reform, will such phenomena as, for example, "dedovshchina" and protectionism subside and disappear from army life?

[Shlyaga] Of course, it will substantially improve the moral atmosphere in military collectives. But perhaps we should not view it as a panacea for each and every difficulty, negative phenomenon, or vice. Many of them have deep social roots, are based on ancient "traditions," and are manifested in unique and frequently harsher form in the army environment. As we all know, the army is manned by the human material that society produces. And judge for yourselves what kind of material it is. In 1989 alone, 957,700 juveniles between the ages of 14 and 17 were handed over to the militia. Many of them are tomorrow's soldiers. What will they bring with them into the army environment?

The situation with the draft for military service in the union republics and in certain regions of the country as a whole is having a negative impact on the moral climate in military collectives. For example, in the Baltic republics the number of cases of youth not appearing at conscription points increased 6.6 times and the number of people criminally charged for evading military service increased by more than a factor of three from 1982 to 1987. And during the current year, 1990, evasion of service in the army received legislative support in the Baltic republics. You can say the same thing about the Republic of Moldova. Hotbeds of nationalistic and anti-army sentiments are also appearing in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Transcaucasus. The situation there will hardly change for the better in the near future. Under these conditions, the idea of creating national territorial formations seems absurd and immoral to us. And here the most weighty argument—it has become obvious that armed nationalistic groups have already caused blood to be shed and grief for hundreds of Soviet citizens.

But I would not want to transfer to society that portion of the responsibility that should justifiably be assigned to the Armed Forces and to its leadership. We could do much better and more thoroughly educate young people. We already have some reassuring results right now. For example, from 1985 through 1989, the total number of accidents and crimes with the death of personnel was reduced by 22 percent and crime based on relations not in accordance with regulations was reduced by 40 percent. There is a reduction but the problem retains all of its intensity. The death of a soldier and the violation of his dignity causes a sharp pain in the heart.

We are striving and will strive henceforth so that "dedovshchina" receives a fundamental assessment. Unfortunately relations not in accordance with regulations have begun to acquire an ethnic tint and are expressed in the rivalry of servicemen of various nationalities for privileges and influence. Various tools are being used in the struggle with "dedovshchina." From administrative and legal to ideological. The main thing that we are emphasizing is instilling a feeling of friendship, military comradeship, internationalism, the culture of ethnic contact, and tact among servicemen. We are striving to make each

officer and warrant officer an example here. In my opinion, the USSR Presidential Decree "On Certain Measures To Increase the Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen" that was adopted on September 5 must perform a good service and other legal acts, that are being developed right now and that will help the army acquire a new moral spirit, will raise the level of honor and duty of officers and respect for soldiers and sailors.

Protectionism is also being persistently overcome. We are laying special hopes on the restored institution of the officers' assembly and the constantly operating efficiency report commissions that along with the command authorities participate in the efficiency reports of officers, assigning them for training, transferring them in the service, and awards. Glasnost and openness [otkrytost] are the best cure for this disease.

[Kuzmin] Obviously, it would be incorrect if you skirt the issue that is frequently being raised about the privileges of generals, on the one hand, and the lack of social protection of servicemen, on the other hand.

[Shlyaga] In my opinion, the question presupposes several aspects of the answer to it. First—on the acceptability of privileges for individuals who occupy generals' positions. If our society has seriously decided to live according to the principle of "from each—according to his capabilities, and to each—according to his labor," then it must recognize the legitimacy of certain privileges for those who voluntarily made service to the people in the ranks of the Armed Forces their whole life's cause. Is that not so?

They are not born generals and admirals, they become generals and admirals. Before they put on generals' shoulder boards, people spend long years under the most difficult conditions of remote garrisons, and they experience all of the "delights" of living under field conditions, training exercises, firing ranges, lengthy ocean cruises, and grueling combat alerts. Many of our current generals have combat operations experience, served in Afghanistan, and some received solid skills of advisory work in the armies of friendly countries. Almost all generals are highly skilled experts and many are people's deputies of Soviets of all levels and members of Party organs. As a rule, all have been decorated. Therefore, I am not afraid to say that these people who have preferred military service to the conditions of civilian life have earned a good attitude toward themselves and they have the right to receive somewhat more from society. This would be just.

The second aspect of the answer concerns the very content of generals' privileges. Generals and admirals have higher salaries: An average of 700-750 rubles with all raises for years of service and military rank. In contrast to a colonel's salary, this is R150-200 more. A number of generals and admirals have official cars, the number of which is being steadily reduced which I will not conceal has resulted in the reduction of the effectiveness of headquarters command and control activities. Some generals and admirals, nearly two percent of their total number, enjoy the use of official dachas which were previously maintained at the expense of the USSR Ministry of Defense and which are

currently maintained at personal expense in accordance with a USSR Council of Ministers resolution. A number of highly-placed military leaders have aides [poruchentsy] or, as they are still called, adjutants, whose main task is reduced to organizing the reception of visitors and monitoring the execution of orders issued by the commander.

I am convinced that if we can call all of this privileges, they are from the service-related and needed category and are not "luxury items." Generals just wear civilian clothes to stores and at the bazaar. And they do not allow generals to travel in peace on city transportation....

The third view on the problems of generals' privileges is dictated by the radical left logic of posing the question: They say, the generals are getting fat and the remaining servicemen are not socially provided for and are unprotected in a legal sense. It is not difficult to reveal the underlying political causes of this reasoning. Whether consciously or by chance, they are directed at splitting the unity of the ranks of the country's defenders and they sow the seeds of dissension in relations between various categories of servicemen and stir up passions. Here I want to frankly state: Soviet soldiers are capable of soberly assessing not only the statements but also the intentions of representatives of some or other of the country's political forces. They are graphically and daily becoming convinced that the primary generals' privilege is hard work for the benefit of the Soviet people and for its peaceful tomorrow. It is this privilege that does not allow peaceful sleep to those people who would not like to see the USSR remain a mighty power. But it is this generals' and admirals' privilege that no one will be able to take away: The country's interests will not permit it.

[Kuzmin] And now I would like to ask a question that is possibly pivotal in our conversation. Does reform provide for the depoliticization of the army? Right now this is the main argument of those who are inciting a wave of anti-army sentiments. They think that no reform of the army will help without depoliticization and they assert that we need a politically neutral army. What are your thoughts on this score?

[Shlyaga] Actually, the question of depoliticization of the army is being raised in some of the mass media, in the speeches of some political leaders, and in citizens' letters. Furthermore, some people are even stating that there can be no military reform whatsoever without it. Some people have even perceived the September 3 USSR Presidential Decree as the first step toward depoliticization of the Armed Forces. Well, as they say, each person sees what he wants to see. We must clearly submit that military reform does not stipulate any depoliticization whatsoever. What is more, reform itself—is a political phenomenon that stipulates further democratization of army service and, naturally, cannot be successfully implemented without support on political structures.

What goals does the slogan of "depoliticization" pursue? This is an aspiration of political figures who are not accountable to parliament to weaken the influence on the Armed Forces and to strengthen the constitutional and

legal foundations of its structural development, functioning, and utilization. We share this aspiration but we think it is inaccurate to equate it with depoliticization. I will name another goal. They are trying to involve the army in political intrigues and, more precisely, to use it in the struggle for power under the banner of depoliticization. The forces that are in opposition to the CPSU and to socialism are most frankly expressing this position.

There are also those who sincerely believe in the possibility of the existence of politically "innocent," neutral armies. I would like to say this to those people: Depoliticized armed forces, both theoretically and historically, are just as untenable as a depoliticized society and non-state forms of its social development. Mankind simply has not reached that stage at this time. The artificial withdrawal of the armed forces beyond the limits of politics is transforming it into a dangerous, armed organization that is being compelled to sell its specific services to all who are ready and able to pay for them. Such armed forces can easily form their own party—to involve the party of the military and others along with them in the struggle for power. We cannot anticipate anything good from this.

The path of depoliticization does not strengthen but weakens the unity of the army and the people since it leads to the assignment of servicemen to a special caste with an indefinite political appearance and unpredictable behavior. Such an army cannot and will not defend the interests of the entire population. The disintegration of the armed forces into several opposition or even conflicting military formations has also not been excluded.

Apart from everything else, the demand for depoliticization is anti-democratic because it alienates a large social group of people—servicemen—from political activity and restricts their constitutional rights. It is also immoral since it deprives military service and military labor of political meaning and orientation points and servicemen themselves—of responsibility to the state and to the people. Besides, this slogan is unpatriotic. Whether we want this or not, it justifies citizens' evasion of service in the Armed Forces for political reasons.

The demand for depoliticization is frequently reduced to the elimination of political organs in the army and navy. No matter how it is justified, it objectively leads to the curtailment of educational work with personnel and the weakening of their moral potential and internal unity. It also contradicts both our native reality, our military history, and world experience of military structural development.

All civilized states have and are constantly improving similar structures in their own armies. They are differentiated according to form and designation but they fulfill one and the same function—they form the political consciousness of soldiers and officers. Sixty thousand political workers function in the U.S. Army at the present time, that is, nearly three percent of the total number of servicemen. Political workers total a little more than two percent of the total number of servicemen in our Armed Forces. Nine thousand trusted individuals conduct political work in the

FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] Army, besides organic personnel and the powerful ideological staff. All of these services operate in accordance with strictly defined programs. Thus, the "Equal Opportunity" Program operates in the United States, the "Political Education" Program operates in Great Britain and in France, and the "Civic Education" Program operates in Belgium and Holland. Classes are conducted annually in accordance with these programs: Seven hours per week in the FRG, 8-10 hours per week in France, and 12-14 hours per week in Great Britain. It is politicization and not depoliticization, as certain "experts" of army life want to instill in us, that is the common trend in the development of the armies of all states.

In short, all conversations about a politically neutral army are not only untenable, they also contradict the very goal of military reform—to form such an appearance of the Armed Forces that would correspond to the character and nature of human, democratic socialism.

[Kuzmin] While speaking about depoliticization of the army, it turns out that proponents of this idea have in mind de-partyization of the Armed Forces.

[Shlyaga] De-partyization is a more narrow concept in contrast with depoliticization and signifies in our reality neither more nor less than excluding the CPSU from the army. No matter what arguments apologists of this "idea" cite: Both the specific nature of the army's activities as an instrument of the state, the impending multiparty system, and many other things. They frequently cite the experience of other armies and, in particular, the experience of the U.S. Army. Actually, party structures like ours do not function within the U.S. Army. But this is purely organizational. And if we look from the political point of view, the ruling party renders the decisive influence on the American Army through a quite efficient operating mechanism: Congressmen and senators, that is, political leaders with clearly expressed party affiliations, provide recommendations for entry into the military academies. Servicemen swear an oath to the president—the representative of a specific party. Finally, as American military personnel themselves say, each person demonstrates his membership in some party or other and his ideological convictions and views at the moment of voting, while dropping the ballot into the ballot box which preserves the secret of his party affiliation.

If we add that the party choice of American military personnel as a rule is in a very narrow range—the Republican and Democratic party programs basically have little to differentiate them—then their political and party predilections are entirely understandable. In short, it is quite erroneous to present the armies of other countries as military organizations that are totally excluded from the political process and inter-party relations.

[Kuzmin] Nikolay Ivanovich, what goals are being pursued by the people who assert that none of the socio-political organizations, including the CPSU, can function within the army under conditions of a multiparty system?

[Shlyaga] No matter how it has been externally covered up, this is being done first of all to generally weaken or to exclude the CPSU's influence. It is none other than the Communist Party because it is the only real political force and the most massive and organized political force that enjoys great prestige within the army. This also does not suit certain destructive forces who are openly conducting a struggle for power and for their own influence in society and in the army. But no one has given anyone the right to decide this problem for the army communists themselves—there are more than one million of them today. The Party strata in the Armed Forces totals more than 25 percent and 75 percent or more among officers. How can you deprive army and navy communists of the opportunity to realize their own political interests and ideological attachments? This would be incorrect both from a legal and also from a moral point of view. It is another matter to define legislatively how socio-political organizations must function under army conditions because there is nevertheless a specific nature.

As for the functioning of CPSU organizations in the army under conditions of a multiparty system, the most varied points of view exist on this score. But we can mainly separate them into three views. Proponents of the first view think that only the ruling party must have the right to create its organizations within the army. The second view is the right to send delegates to all parties. Proponents of the third view defend the thesis of nonpartisanship in the army. Time will tell which of these points of view is closer to the truth. The majority of army and navy communists share the first view.

Therefore we invite an exclusively weighty approach to the problem of the so-called de-partyization of our Armed Forces. But this does not at all signify an attempt to preserve the CPSU's monopoly in the matter of military structural development. As we all know, the Party rejected this at its 28th Party Congress. Let all parties make their contributions to military structural development. In so doing, a struggle of opinions may occur but it is important not to lose the main thing—its high combat and moral-political potential.

While talking about de-partyization, we must ponder: Are there objective circumstances that require the elimination of Party structures from the army? Serious analysis shows that there are none. There are shortcomings in the work of Party organizations and even errors that have resulted in certain negative consequences. There actually was an unfounded Party monopoly in the solution of many issues. But are they enough to raise the question of de-partyization of the army so sharply and aggressively? Of course not.

The process of renewal of socialism is taking place in the country. The political organization that has declared the need for this and that has assumed the primary load of solving this problem—is the CPSU. And if we decided to actually renew socialism and the army that is standing in its defense, then it is certainly logical to have the organization present in the army that has proclaimed and assumed responsibility for the solution of this problem.

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Shlyaga Meets Soldiers' Mothers' Representatives
91UM0707A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jun 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Zhirmov: "From Rallies To Dialogue"]

[Text] On May 28, by mutual agreement, Lieutenant-General N. I. Shlyaga, Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, met with representatives of the All-Union Committee of Soldiers' Mothers (chairman—M. I. Kirbasova). A substantive and constructive discussion of a wide range of issues was held.

These issues have to do first and foremost with problems relating to the social protection of servicemen and efforts to improve the conditions in which they perform their military service. The discussion dealt with issues involved in improving the work of commanders and military-political agencies of all levels with respect to the military and moral education of army and navy personnel, strengthening order and discipline among the troops, and overcoming various negative phenomena in the USSR Armed Forces, above all hazing. The question of showing greater concern for protecting servicemen's lives and health was a subject of especially intensive discussion.

The committee representatives voiced a considerable number of proposals that are of certain interest—in particular the idea of deeper democratization of military service, and the exercise of public oversight of the observance of law and order and the conscription and the medical examination of draftees. There were other proposals as well. Not everything in these proposals is unambiguous, of course. But the important thing is the desire to engage in constructive work and to search for solutions that would eliminate the causes of negative phenomena in army life. And in this regard, the All-Union Committee of Soldiers' Mothers has many good deeds to its credit.

After noting the noble character of the aims pursued by the parents' movement, Lt Gen N. I. Shlyaga briefed the meeting's participants on measures to improve the material situation and social-legal protection of servicemen that are being taken at the initiative of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

For example, mandatory insurance for servicemen and reservists in the event of death, injury, contusion, and illness was introduced on January 1, 1991, in accordance with which provision was made for paying out insurance amounts.

Pay for enlisted men, sergeants, senior sergeants, and cadets at military educational institutions has been significantly increased this year. Plans call for improving their food rations.

Draft laws whose adoption is expected this year provide for the right of compulsory-duty servicemen to weekly leave of at least 12 hours and to a leave during their period

of service that includes a return home (20 days for soldiers, sailors, and military construction workers, and 25 days for sergeants and senior sergeants), the right to appeal to military tribunals actions by officials and military administrative agencies that violate the rights of or infringe on the personal dignity of servicemen, and other measures.

N. I. Shlyaga pointed out that the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Military-Political Directorate are stepping up their efforts to ensure the unconditional implementation of planned programs relating to the social-legal protection of USSR Armed Forces personnel.

The representatives of the All-Union Committee of Soldiers' Mothers expressed their concern at processes taking place in the parents' movement, which is heterogeneous in terms of composition, aims, and methods of work. They condemned various attempts to exploit the grief and suffering of mothers whom certain people are using to further their own aims. Soldiers' mothers are often drawn into noisy rallies at which calls are made to "punish culprits," "identify those who falsify" the actual state of affairs in the army, prosecute commanders, sabotage orders, evade service, and so on. The committee representatives, while taking an understanding view of the feelings of mothers who have lost their sons, believe that a path of indiscriminate slander and confrontation is harmful and that a constructive approach is necessary.

It was deemed expedient to organize a study of the opinions and proposals of servicemen's parents and to have commanders and military-political agencies take them into account in their daily work with compulsory-service personnel.

Draft CPSU Instruction on Political Work in Army
91UM0508B Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian
No 21, Nov 90 (Signed to press 22 Nov 90) pp 55-58

["Official" Draft Instruction: "On the Work of CPSU Organizations in the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text] [editorial introduction] Proposed draft instructions have been prepared in accordance with the 28th CPSU Congress assignment. The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and the TsKK [Central Control Commission] Presidium request that communists and all those who express an interest in these documents send their comments and suggestions directly to the CPSU Central Committee or TsKK or to any Party committee.[end of introduction]

This instruction defines the primary specific features for the fulfillment of the CPSU Charter by USSR Armed Forces Party organizations.

CPSU organizations in the army and navy are independent in practical activities and conduct Party work using political methods taking into account the specific features of military and workers collectives and the tasks resolved by them.

Party organizations function within the framework of Soviet laws and also other legal acts that define the vital functions of the USSR Armed Forces. CPSU organizations and their organs cannot interfere in the work of military command and control officials and organs.

The All-Army Party Conference is the highest governing organ of the USSR Armed Forces Party organization. Party conferences are the governing organs of corps, army groups, military districts, groups of forces and fleets, and combat arms and branches of the USSR Armed Forces Party organizations. They review the most important issues of Party work, hear reports and elect executive organs (bureaus and committees) and control organs (control commissions).

I. Primary Directions of Army and Navy Party Organization Activities

CPSU organizations in the USSR Armed Forces express and defend the interests of Soviet Army and Navy servicemen, workers, employees, and members of their families who are dedicated to the socialist choice. Party organizations are concerned about strengthening their own ranks, increasing the number of supporters of the CPSU in military and workers collectives, and about the consolidation of efforts of army society on a healthy basis.

CPSU army and navy organizations conduct ideological and political work, implement the Party's military policy, organize the execution of Party decisions in military and workers collectives and at military unit deployment locations, bring pressure to bear on the resolution of military reform tasks, combat readiness, and military discipline, consolidate social protection and improve material and everyday conditions of Soviet Army and Navy servicemen, workers, employees, and members of their families.

Party organizations pay particular attention to insure the active participation of communists in propagandizing and explaining the CPSU position on issues of defense of the Socialist Homeland, the need to perform military duty, support an atmosphere of friendship and military comradeship in military collectives, and strengthen interethnic relations. They promote in every way possible consolidation of the authority of the Soviet Armed Forces and increase the prestige of military service.

Party organizations are constantly concerned about the development of communists' interest in participating in Party work, strengthening ties with the broad masses of servicemen, workers, and employees, and periodically inform communists and people with no party affiliation about their work, the execution of Party decisions, and critical comments and suggestions expressed toward CPSU organizations. They persistently conduct a search for ways and techniques of Party influence on personnel policies in the army and navy, actively participate in the development and implementation of state youth policy, and cooperate with social organizations that support the positions of democracy and social justice.

Armed Forces Party organizations actively participate in the struggle for CPSU political leadership in society during

Soviets of people's deputies elections and through other forms of Soviet citizens' expression of will. Jointly with CPSU territorial organizations and organs of Soviet rule, they conduct work on patriotic education of the population, strengthen army ties with society, and train youth for service in the USSR Armed Forces.

II. Leading Party Organizations

Leading Party organizations are created in regiments, on ships, in individual units, at headquarters, in the departments of military educational institutions, at scientific research institutions, at military enterprises, and in organizations where no less than three Party members decide to meet. Communists among servicemen are registered in leading Party organizations at their duty location.

The general Party meeting is the leading Party organization governing organ. Delegates meetings may be conducted in those cases when it does not appear possible to convene a general meeting of Party organizations due to service conditions and the nature of tasks being fulfilled by communists.

The secretary and the leading Party organization bureau:

- organize execution of the decisions of their organization meeting and also those of higher Party organs;
- render assistance in the work of subunit Party organizations and groups;
- conduct individual work with communists and are concerned about their ideological, political, and moral growth; persistently strive for all Party members to actively participate in explaining CPSU policy and manifest personal exemplariness and an avant-garde role in combat and political training, labor, service, and socio-political life, discipline, and observance of ethical standards;
- constantly study the opinions of communists and structure their practical activities while considering their interests, needs, and requirements, and provide political support and protection of the honor and dignity of communists;
- hear communists' reports on their execution of charter obligations and Party missions and effectively react to their critical comments and suggestions;
- conduct work to involve army and navy servicemen, workers, and employees in the CPSU and in the ideological and political education of people who have been newly accepted into the Party;
- render practical assistance to communists elected to Komsomol organs in the education of Komsomol members and youth and insure the leading role of VLKSM [All-Union Lenin Young Communist League] members in training, service, labor, and discipline. Help communists who work in other social organizations; and,
- actively promote the advancement in service of communists and people with no party affiliation who have high professional and moral-political qualities and participate in their efficiency reports and in their assignment to training.

The leading Party organization secretary is tasked to accept Party membership dues from communists and is responsible for timely accountability and transfer of sums received to the Party cashier's office, and to register communists and maintain order in Party management.

Leading Party organizations in battalions, artillery battalions, companies, batteries, squadrons, ship departments, headquarters sections and command and control organs, institutions, training groups, and other subunits can create shop Party organizations and Party groups if they have three or more Party members.

III. Party Committees

Party committees are independent in their activities and have the right to constitute an appropriate Party organization in relations with command authorities and military political organs, and also with local Party and social organizations and institutions.

For the duration of their mission, Party committees create a working staff that is subordinate to them which is maintained at the expense of the Party budget and is formed based on the recommendations of leading Party organizations and carries out primarily informational-analytical, predictive-sociological, and consultative functions. The structure and strength of the Party working staff is determined by the appropriate Party committees. Its material support procedures are coordinated with the command authorities. Party committee plenums are convened when necessary.

1. Party Committees of Corps or Equivalent Size Units

Party committees of corps, military educational institutions, scientific research institutes, and military district, fleet, Armed Forces branch directorates, and also special units, military construction organizations, military district, oblast, kray, and republic military commissariats, and major military garrisons enjoy the rights of a CPSU rayon committee. By a decision of higher Party committees, similar rights may be granted to Party committees of city military commissariats and other USSR Ministry of Defense institutions. They directly combine leading Party organizations of corresponding military units and are a structural support element of the CPSU in the Armed Forces. These Party committees are elected at Party conferences for a five-year term and report to the conferences on their work. The Party conference determines the numerical composition of a Party commission and the procedures for electing the secretary and his deputy.

Party committees of corps and equivalent size units conduct registration of communists, register leading Party organization and coordinate their activities, and together with them organize work to implement Party policy and decisions in military and workers collectives, at the place of residence of servicemen, workers, and employees, and submit specific military-political, social, cultural, and other problems for society's review and facilitate their realization. They render assistance to leading Party organizations in ideological and political work with communists and personnel and directly interact with command

authorities and military political organs when resolving the tasks of increasing combat readiness and strengthening military discipline.

Party committees can express their points of view when transferring communists within the service, submitting them for awards, or promoting them. They inform communists and higher Party organs on the execution of Party decisions, monitor receipt of membership dues from communists, the timely transfer of collected sums to the Party cashier's office, and the purposeful use of Party budget assets.

2. Party Committees of Armies, Flotillas, Military Districts, Groups of Forces and Fleets, Combat Arms and Branches of the USSR Armed Forces

Party committees of armies, flotillas, military districts, groups of forces and fleets, combat arms and branches of the USSR Armed Forces are elected at conferences of the appropriate Party organizations for a five year-term. They elect a bureau from among themselves and create working organs to perform routine work. While enjoying the rights of an oblast or kray committee of the Party, the above named Party committees:

- develop recommendations for Party organizations on the execution of resolutions of CPSU congresses and conferences, Party Central Committee decisions, systematically analyze the state of Party work, and submit proposals for its improvement;
- coordinate the work of Party organizations and Party committees on the most important issues for the realization of military policy, life and activities of military collectives, and organize training of Party activists;
- recommend communists and people with no party affiliation to specific sectors of work and public activity and promote their election or designation within the framework of democratic procedures;
- conduct efficiency reports of released Party committee workers;
- actively promote the resolution of tasks of social and life style infrastructure of officers, warrant officers, workers, employees, and members of their families;
- influence the content of Party work in the headquarters and directorate staff and the work style of communists in the troops; and,
- maintain contacts with Party territorial and other social organizations and render assistance to them in military patriotic education of the population, especially of pre-draft age and draft age youth.

3.. All-Army Party Committee

The All-Army Party Conference, which is convened at least once every five years, elects the All-Army Party Committee. The All-Army Party Committee secretary is elected at the conference or at the Party committee plenum at the discretion of the delegates. A bureau, deputy secretary, and appropriate commissions and groups are elected at the plenum.

The All-Army Party Committee is independent in its activities for implementing Communist Party policy in the

Armed Forces. Based on the CPSU's fundamental program and charter principles, it develops the most important standard systematic documents on issues of Party work in the army and navy, resolves organizational, personnel, financial, and other issues, and has contact with the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense and with the country's political and social organizations.

The All-Army Party Committee reports on its work to the CPSU Central Committee and the All-Army Party Conference and systematically informs communists on execution of Party decisions. In its work, the All-Army Party Committee interacts with the Main Military Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces.

The All-Army Party Committee:

- develops the most important issues of ideological and political work and Party structural development in the USSR Armed Forces;
- studies problems and develops proposals in the sphere of Party work to execute combat readiness tasks and to strengthen military discipline;
- summarizes and disseminates the positive experience of Party work;
- renders practical assistance to Party committees and Party organizations of the Ministry of Defense central staff, headquarters and command and control organs of military districts, groups of forces, and fleets to improve their work style, develops a creative approach of communists to elaboration of the problems of military structural development, and constantly influences the education of command and control organ communists;
- conducts measures to explain and practically implement CPSU personnel policy. Actively interacts with the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Military Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces on these issues;
- while considering the opinions of leading Party organizations, develops the structure and staffs of Party organs and the procedures for providing material support to their workers;
- systematically studies the state of work of Party organizations on issues of membership in the Party, organizes the conduct of Party statistics, and supplies Party committees with Party document forms and accountability for them to the CPSU Central Committee;
- interacts with appropriate trade union and other social organizations in the Armed Forces; and,
- interacts and cooperates with the All-Army Council of Komsomol organizations and with other youth organizations.

The All-Army Party Committee interacts with Party control commissions that are elected at the appropriate Party conferences on issues of membership in the Party and compliance with Party, state, and military discipline and public moral standards by communists.

The appropriate CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission instructions define the issues of

elections to Party organizations, registration of communists, paper work, Party dues and financial and management activities, participation in the conduct of referendums and discussions, the status of the Party organization secretary, and also procedures for the creation and rights of control commissions in the army and navy.

Note. This instruction is being disseminated to CPSU organizations in the USSR KGB troops, USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal troops, and railroad troops.

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Lithuania's Defense Deputy Describes Department's Functions

91UN1413B Vilnius LIETUVOS RYTAS in Lithuanian 22 Feb 91 pp 1,2

[Interview with Jonas Pauzolis, deputy general director of the Lithuanian Defense Department, by Lilija Valatkiene: "The Steps on the Career Ladder Are Unpolished"]

[Text] We agreed that the discussion with the former Soviet Army Lieutenant-Colonel and the former Military Commander of the Vilnius Region and current Deputy General Director of the Defense Department, Jonas Pauzolis, would be in exchange for the find. On February 12, we wrote in "Lithuanian Morning," that Norwegian journalists retrieved their bag from the Central Committee of the USSR communist party organization in Lithuania and found in it the documents of Jonas Pauzolis. At first, he explained how he came to lose his documents:

[Pauzolis] On the morning of January 11, we were warned that attack forces might be coming. We dismissed the women so they could go home. I also intended to leave the Defense Department, however I thought that they would not attack us during the daytime. They are usually nocturnal animals. Not much later, I heard a series of automatic weapons fire. Glass shattered. I could no longer get away. They caught us between the third and fourth floors. They saw my grey hair and probably thought, "Now that's a hefty catch" [at the time Jonas Pauzolis was the Head of the First Section].

They crammed us into a room and aimed their machine guns at us. A General came in (it appeared to me to have been V. Ushopchik) and commanded us "Down on the floor!" The guns were cocked into ready as we fell to the ground spreading our arms and legs. One man tried to defend himself. The soldiers let go a few rounds, plaster fell on our heads. We understood that it was dangerous to argue. They searched us. First of all they demanded weapons, which we never had. Then they took away all of our documents.

They took from me an address book filled with names and addresses of friends, my driver's license, my savings bank book, wallet, a pass to the Supreme Council, and Defense Department employment identification. The General ordered: "If they move, shoot them in place." They kicked

us in the sides and commanded us not to move. Four of the younger men were released. They placed me and a colleague against a wall with our hands raised. Later they locked us in a dark ventilation system room and held us there until 4:30 pm. Later on General Taurinskas arrived in civilian clothes with his retinue. He was "overjoyed" to see me on the other side of the barricade. We had been colleagues once upon a time. He was the Military Commissar in the Lenin region, I in the Vilnius region. Later he became a General while I earned myself a rest as someone not quite suitable for a further career. After a while they let us leave the Department.

[Valatkiene] What does the First Section of the Department do?

Jonas Pauzolis winked his big blue eyes and smiled

[Pauzolis] They decide military and cadre issues and take care of registrations. They work with draft-aged men and with veterans. The rest is a secret.

The longer he looked at me, the larger the secret seemed to grow

[Pauzolis] In short, we are the alternative to the Lithuanian Soviet Republic's Military Commissariat. That is the reason that General Visocky is so unhappy. He is hunting down our young people, frightening their parents. We are not implementing draft laws so long as the Parliament has not adopted laws establishing units. And for those young people who come to us, we advise them to keep on working and living, to stay healthy and wait until Lithuanian units are formed in Lithuania.

[Valatkiene] Through the First Section young people are applying for military service?

[Pauzolis] Yes, they have to be in very good health.

[Valatkiene] And what about provocateurs?

[Pauzolis] No *interrupted Pauzolis*. We have data on these people...It is not hard to find out who their parents are, who he himself is. But... we cannot guarantee that in a large group of people there will not be a provocateur."

[Valatkiene] What can you say about the people defending the Parliament Building. Are they checked out?

[Pauzolis] I do not know about the defense of those buildings. Another service is in charge of that. One would have to think that there are no provocateurs there. The men are sifted out pretty well.

[Valatkiene] How many sections are there in the Defense Department?

[Pauzolis] Not quite ten. *he laughs*

[Valatkiene] Oho! That's quite a few.

[Pauzolis] Right...Our activities are quite extensive. A military organization needs everything in order to execute the tasks of the Government.

[Valatkiene] Your son. Is he in the Defense Department?

[Pauzolis] Yes. On the night of January 13, he was at the Parliament and he is still there.

[Valatkiene] And where were you?

[Pauzolis] I had another assignment which is why I had left. My wife also was at the Supreme Council.

[Grineviciute] Are there many professional military persons in the Defense Department?

[Pauzolis] There are. They have served in the Soviet Army, they have various ranks and specialties (pilots, sailors, infantrymen), i.e., professional soldiers who have left or been discharged as being disloyal. Most of them are Lithuanian. If those of other nationalities wanted to join, we would accept them. What is important is to be a Lithuanian citizen, to know the language, and to be prepared to fight for a free Lithuania.

[Valatkiene] It would be interesting to find out about the secret lists which were drawn up at the Department of Defence. They were published in "Soviet Lithuania" and broadcast over "Soviet Lithuanian" radio. This casts a shadow over the Department.

[Pauzolis] There was even a correspondent from Moscow asking about those lists. He came here, but I was unable to meet with him. It is pure fabrication. Everything started with Svedas along with Naudziunas reading the supposed Order 0009A of the General Director of the Defense Department in which ostensibly there is an order to draw up lists of people to annihilate, etc. There is no such order, nor are there any such lists. We are a depoliticized organization and are not hunting down other parties or people with opposing viewpoints. Our purpose is to defend the country, not to wage an ideological war.

[Valatkiene] "Soviet Lithuania" published handwritten copies..."

[Pauzolis] We never saw them, they don't show them to us. It would not be difficult to conduct an investigation and prove that they are counterfeit. They make these lists up themselves. I do not know whether this is Surupov's or Naudziunas's work, but it certainly is not ours. The Defense Department does not do this kind of dirty work. This is another "wild goose chase" just like all the others: about guns found in the Department, about our parliamentarians, supposedly yesterday's armed narcomaniacs, that we shot at our own people, or that we stuck old boots under tanks. So "finding" my documents in the bag of a foreign journalist is perfectly understandable. They were put there since I had to be compromised in some way.

Jonas Pauzolis described how his cottage in the country was recently burned down off Nemecines Highway at the 10th kilometer.

[Pauzolis] I think that it was a political act. Revenge against my activities. It was preceded by many threats over the telephone. I was pushed up against the wall on the street one evening. While I was driving they tried to push my car into the opposing lane of traffic. They have also threatened my family. They have us all counted up and figured out. The terrorism started when we created an

alternative. At that time they tried to take away our pension and our rank. I used to be a lieutenant-colonel. Now I hear, I no longer am ...

It is very difficult for a Lithuanian to become a general, and if he even has a Lithuanian wife ... The wives of Naudziunas, Visocky, Taurinskas are all Russians. This helped them climb their career ladder. I would have gotten Afghanistan, but I was lucky. I was an inconvenient man—they moved me from a sub-unit to the commissariat. I didn't even get a whipping...

'Monologue' By Presidential Candidate Makashov

91UM0686A SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian

No 21, May 91 pp 8-9

[Monologue by Colonel General Albert Mikhaylovich Makashov, people's deputy of the USSR, member of Russian Communist Party Central Committee, prepared by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT correspondent M. Bobilev: "What the Army Lacks Most is Warmth..."; first five paragraphs are box insert]

[Text]

Lines From His Biography

Albert Mikhaylovich Makashov was born in Voronezh Oblast on 12 June 1938. His parents were natives of these same places. His father was an extended-term serviceman and his mother was a nurse.

Albert Makashov linked his fate with the Army from childhood. He completed the Voronezh Suvorov School and then the Tashkent Higher Combined-Arms Command School. He received an honors diploma along with his first officer rank. He completed the Frunze Military Academy and then the General Staff Academy with gold medals.

Makashov began service as a reconnaissance platoon commander and now commands one of the largest military districts. Between these positions he commanded a division reconnaissance company, was a tank regiment intelligence officer, and commanded a battalion, regiment, division, and army. He served in the Transcaucasus, Kiev and Ural military districts and the Western Group of Forces.

Colonel General Makashov is a people's deputy of the USSR and a member of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee.

Makashov is married and has three children and five grandchildren.

It would appear to be unnecessary to introduce Colonel General Albert Mikhaylovich Makashov to SOVETSKIY PATRIOT readers. His name is widely known in the country today. People's Deputy of the USSR and Red Banner Volga-Ural Military District Commander A. Makashov openly expresses his special viewpoint on political and social processes occurring in the country and the Armed Forces. Far from everyone shares it, but Makashov also has many supporters. A number of public movements and military collectives have nominated him for the post of president of Russia.

We hope the readers will take interest in this piece, which permits an unbiased, firsthand evaluation of Makashov's position on a number of problems troubling the public.

I believe I have the right to say that I know Army life, already having been in the Army for 35 years. I have served in remote garrisons and abroad. I commanded the Ural Military District and now the unified Volga-Ural Military District.

I feel for the Army and can in no way agree with those attacks which have fallen on it from various sides. Military people are openly called parasites and spongers. They are lectured like the evil stepmother lectured Cinderella about "how much they have eaten, how many cups they have broken..."

Do we ourselves really not see that it is impossible to demand of the people what it does not have?! The very same pay as in armies of western countries, for example. I commanded an army on GDR territory stationed near Berlin. I received 1,780 East German marks a month. Not far off in a British brigade a corporal was receiving the very same number of western marks, which is essentially ten times more. So what? We knew these figures and chuckled over them, and that's all. Officers, warrant officers and enlisted men realized that they were not serving for money. I give a general's word that our morale and combat proficiency were higher than for those who stood behind the Berlin Wall.

Our soldiers concede nothing to professionals or, more accurately, mercenaries. I know this from more than hearsay. I have seen how the British, Germans and French shoot, and they are no more physically prepared than our lads in the second year of service. Only the American soldier at that time was receiving \$800 per month and ours was receiving 30 marks. Is this bad? It probably is, but it is good for the state—the Army costs it very little. The Army is unique in this sense.

A great deal is being said now about Armed Forces reform. I too am for cleaning ourselves up and rousing ourselves; I am for competition which would not permit some to grow fat and thoughtlessly wear their pants thin in warm places.

Our state and Army won an unprecedented war. There has never been a war like the Great Patriotic War in the entire history of the military art from Alexander the Great up to today, to the Persian Gulf. To understand this it is enough to take the figures: the number of troops and equipment and the scale of engagements. The entire people fought the enemy. The Urals and Volga area alone supplied the front with 183 divisions, each with 8,000-10,000 persons. Here in Samara there is a building not far from district headquarters which accommodated a reserve flying brigade. Well, the brigade alone provided the front with 26,000 IL-2 crews.

After our victory and until Churchill's speech at Fulton marking the beginning of the "cold war," U.S. military delegations regularly arrived in the USSR to study Soviet

Army combat experience, which they do not scorn to this day. And suddenly we got the desire to reform...

Any reform has to have a purpose. Do we wish to strengthen or weaken the Army, or simply satisfy an administrative itch? In this sense something is happening here all the time. First we connect the floor with the ceiling, then the toilet with the bathroom, then industrial obkoms with rural obkoms. Then it is vice versa: we take everything apart. When you see obvious wrecking and skews in all directions, then excuse me...

In the first year of perestroika I had occasion to be a delegate to the 27th party congress. The party members elected me on an alternate basis. I saw for the first time how big politics is done. I remember well a slogan that was proclaimed at that time: "Perestroika in the Armed Forces is increased combat readiness." But gradually the slogan disappeared somewhere. Why? As a district commander, I do not understand who removed it. Do we really no longer need to increase combat readiness?

I understand that the political situation should be considered and the Armed Forces should be reduced. It is clear that their quality must be raised simultaneously. This was said in particular at the 19th Party Conference. But what is to be done if there is no growth in quality either of people's training or of arms? We received new combat equipment in the notorious stagnation years, but we have not yet seen anything new over the last five years. I am not sure that there is even anything in designers' briefcases. That means quality remains the same as before. Then we are told that it seems to be costly to maintain the Army. But are we really only losing with it?!

Yes, we are losing, but at the same time we are also gaining. Above all those young people who serve in the Army are gaining. A young lad is taken away from wine or even from drugs and a criminal environment at age 18. He begins to live by a routine and regularly engages in physical culture and sport. Suffice it to pick up the medical records of soldiers in any military unit to see that practically every one of them has gained 10-18 kg during service.

Young men mature in the Army not just physically; they live in a collective, come to manhood and become accustomed to military labor. It is no less difficult than any other labor and is connected with constant risk as well, because soldiers have to drive vehicles, fire, and make parachute jumps. I am sure that this produces an enormous gain educationally.

The decision recently was made to relieve students of service. I regard this as a great social error. We conducted what was to a certain extent a sociological study in our district for the purpose of identifying the social makeup of soldiers' parents. Well, there are almost no children of highly paid categories of leaders, scientific workers and so on among them.

It is no secret that our "elite" uses both pull and bribes to relieve their offspring of service. Far from everyone has the money to maintain a young man or woman during university studies. And in the example of the Army now, alas, one clearly observes a stratification of society according to social affiliation. It really has again become a workers' and peasants' Army, as it was at one time. One can hardly take the argument of highly placed parents seriously that enlisted service is dulling. The majority of our academicians (the real ones; not those, of course, in whose scientific works one found Stalin or Brezhnev or Chernenko on every page) served in the Army, and it was fine; they did not become dull.

There is much talk now to the effect that "dedovshchina" or nonregulation relationships allegedly flourish in the troops quite often. But I know that if we completely rid ourselves of these negative phenomena, first in society and then in the Army, then those who are "gnawing" at the Army definitely will find something else; what, I do not know, but they will find it.

Believe me, I am ready to place my head on the line and offer five of my grandsons for immolation that commanders do not teach "dedovshchina." It did not originate in the Army. If one half of those on the dance floor fight the other half, if girls fight until they are bloody over boys, and if laws of "anything goes" quite often flourish in vocational-technical schools, do you think that a draftee will turn over a new leaf immediately on becoming a soldier?

I assure you that there is essentially no "dedovshchina" in combat subunits in the form about which people speak from many rostrums and in the pages of publications, but this cannot be said of construction units, because around 30 percent of the personnel here have had past convictions.

Is it necessary to keep construction units? It is. Last year they fulfilled the housing construction plan in the district by 103.8 percent. At the same time, civilian builders of Samara Oblast, for example, fulfilled the plan by 70 percent, Sverdlovsk Oblast by 67 percent and Chelyabinsk Oblast by 80 percent. This also hits the Army. We were shorted around 3,000 apartments. And at times local soviets do not even give out what is built with our participation. There is an acute housing shortage. There is nowhere to settle officers arriving from groups of forces. If we ourselves did not build, it would be entirely bad.

I am against using the military to plug holes in the national economy. I once visited the Nizhniy Tagil Railcar Building Plant. The foundry has vaults to where slag drops and where there is a stench and inhuman conditions. This is the seventh circle of Dante's hell. And soldiers work there, not from the Ministry of Defense, but from some department, let's say Zapsibyugtyazhmash [not further expanded], you can't even pronounce it. You won't drive

workers there for any money, although it turns out to be possible to drive soldiers there. But what does the Army have to do with it?

Back in October 1989 I told Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov at the country's Main Military Council: "Keeping construction battalions at plants under various departments and ministries is a crime!" I received a lot of bumps and slaps in the face for this: allegedly I was undermining foundations. And now such military construction subunits are being reduced. The president made the decision to eliminate them before 1992. Military commissariats no longer are supplying them with people, so various departments have begun to whimper that there is no one to work! For example, the Saratov Minvodkhozstroy [Ministry of Hydro-Technical Construction] is frankly panicking—it is not fulfilling the plan.

Although disbanding the detachments as is being done also is another stupidity—not of the Ministry of Defense, but of the Cabinet of Ministers. Why? There is a structure, spaces, equipment and funds for materials there and, finally, there are command personnel who could receive the young men for alternative service and accomplish the very same missions. But now we will cut everything, drive away the specialists, and then we will create everything anew.

Construction is the most difficult sector for us, and so it is necessary to send here those who do not wish to serve for whatever motives you like, political or religious, in the form of alternative service. Let a young man give up 2-3 years to his society at the concrete mixer, with a trowel or with a shovel. Pay him as much as he earns and even allow him to live at home, but he will serve without a military uniform and without shoulderboards with the letters "SA" [Soviet Army]. Then 80 percent of the attacks on the Army for this "dedovshchina" will disappear, because it is my firm point of view that not one convicted person can be called into the Army!

A soldier in the Russian Army would receive one and a half pounds of meat a day. This is over 600 grams. Now he receives 175 grams. Of course, more is desirable, but where are we to get it if it is not there? Recently we added 100 grams of milk to each soldier's ration, but for now there is not enough milk even for children. I wrote to Moscow to the Rear Directorate: "Request approval of my decision to replace milk with canned food..." What is to be done if, let us say, only four percent of the population of Sverdlovsk Oblast lives in the rural area and enterprises do not help agriculture. But district troops do this constantly. Last season around 15,000 man-days were worked in the harvest, mainly on Saturdays and Sundays, in Samara Oblast alone. Officers and warrant officers had practically no days off.

Can one really demand that which is not there at this tense moment? Well, we are not demanding, we will overcome it somehow. But what is most lacking in the Army today is sincere warmth on society's part. Without this it is really difficult to serve, especially for the youth...

Let someone—the president or some one of the academicians—stand up and say: “That’s it, the Army is not needed.” But let him bear responsibility for his decisions and words. This is what is absent. First we are reducing the Armed Forces rashly and are destroying weapons without consideration. This not only is economically unprofitable, but also strikes at the destinies of thousands on thousands of people.

Take the withdrawal of our forces from Europe. We did not yet know anything about the conclusion of treaties when wheels already were beginning to rap—an air defense brigade at full strength arrived in the district from Hungary. Where are the people to be accommodated and settled? No one thought about this “higher up.” But it takes R25 million to build for one division, for example. This will not drop from the sky. By the way, “poor” France declared that until it builds housing for its troops it will not withdraw them from Germany until 1996.

Now people are floating to us over the Baltic Sea from Germany on ferries. Poland is not passing them by rail—it imposed such a tax on each car axle! One analyst of the “Vremya” program accused the military of this: allegedly they did not conclude the necessary treaty when troops were introduced to Hungary in 1956. But it is not generals who conclude treaties! They are not even present. This is that very instance where politicians command the generals and when strategy gives way to politics.

By the way, our district received none of those Deutsche-marks which Mr. Kohl is allocating for building for Soviet troops being withdrawn from Germany. Evidently I was unable to break through. As always, houses will be built in the Moscow, Leningrad and Belorussian districts. There probably are grounds for this... But troops are arriving here: personnel, equipment, and families of officers and warrant officers. One has to look a woman in the eyes who has a household goods container in one place and children in another, but life is life; she is also afraid of losing her husband, who is somewhere far from her!

Of course, we ourselves are looking for a solution. We put up 25 modules. This is a “prefabricated-crevice,” i.e., panel barracks. We covered the crevices with brick to keep out drafts. But still, there are 20 rooms in each module. It was warm in them in winter, and kids ran through the corridors in T-shirts. But this module has another deficiency: in the next room a person can hear, excuse me for saying so, who is making a declaration of love and how. One young married woman even came to me with complaints... But what is to be done? Be patient, I say. We recently built five houses in Chebarkula. We are putting up another six in the settlement of Totskoye. We are hurrying like in the good old times, timing the turnover for some kind of holidays, overfulfilling, straining ourselves because of the enthusiasm of officers and warrant officers. But what is to be done? The majority of apartments will be allocated to newcomers.

Local soviets themselves also are aiming to “bite off” something. We wanted to build our compound in Ulyanovsk at the military school tank training area, but the oblast “fathers” demanded R15 million for utilities. For us this is a loss of seven houses. We had to refuse...

Using the Army to resolve internal state conflicts... If one recalls history, Pugachev’s uprising was put down by regular troops headed by General Mikhelson. That was when Suvorov, after serving in Poland, also went against Pugachev and smashed several detachments. But this is another time, other circumstances and another political situation.

The Army is intended for protection against external enemies, for protection of the state’s external functions. It is that way everywhere in all civilized countries, including the United States, which we are now setting as an example for ourselves in the sense of democracy and freedom. So? Remember the uprising of the colored population in Miami several years ago. Who took part in quelling the conflict? The National Guard. These are real regular troops, only veiled.

I am categorically against the Soviet Army being used either for fulfilling functions of suppression or for construction or for taking in the harvest or for sweeping streets.

But what is to be done?

The chief of the railroad administration implores: “Help me—the tracks are under snow. The trains are stopped!” And I do not order, I ask my subordinates: “We have to work another Sunday.” And they clear snow in Sverdlovsk, in Samara, in Penza... We take this role on voluntarily.

I was first deputy commander of the Transcaucasus Military District. The first time I served there as a lieutenant and departed as a captain, and the second time I returned as a lieutenant-general. I know local customs and traditions. But two peoples who call themselves the greatest, the most ancient, the most cultured, the most, the most... struck up a war between themselves on nationalistic soil. This is a real war. I know the number of killed, I simply cannot give the numbers. I will say only that in a week’s time one republic drove out 180,000 persons of another nationality. We took these people off the passes. It was December, with snow, and only combat vehicles on tracked drives got through to them. We placed 15-20 persons in each, two or three times more than authorized.

I well remember one populated point. I sent a battalion of small prime movers there and they brought back about 500 persons. I asked whether there were any remaining, and they answered that there probably were... But it was early in the morning and there was a blizzard on the pass. This was certain death for rescuers as well. We awaited the morning. Local residents went out on bulldozers. We had prime movers and I was in a helicopter. And again we

evacuated people. The helicopter takes up to 18 persons; we loaded 30 children each. I said to the pilot: "Sasha, let's land somehow—women and children are freezing there..."

Could I, a general, and all of us military really remain calm when we saw what was happening? Is this not our function?

I won't mention the address—God forbid that it should flare up again—but how many times I saw people killing and robbing, how villages went one against the other in organized columns! The fact is, everyone had lived together for centuries all intermingled.

There was the following incident. There were pogroms and arson and people were being slaughtered in a populated point, but an MVD battalion was standing and not intervening. It was not subordinate to me. The battalion commander was smoking and cursing loudly, but he did not give a command to stop the disorders. I told him: "Let's impose order." And he said: "There is an order..." "What order!? There are people here!" "Are you so bold? Sign your name..." The lieutenant-colonel was an impudent fellow, but a good lad. I took a map from him, laid it on the armor and wrote: "I order you to stop the slaughter of people and the arson. Remain until the 25th. Makashov." And order was restored. They probably saved someone's life. And the fact that troops now are standing somewhere also saves; otherwise it would be much worse.

Many understand this. There was another incident at the market in Nakhichevan. Not far away stands a bust of Twice-Honored Hero Geydar Aliyev (a place to put it was found after all). The crowd was seething and I sensed that there was about to be an explosion. Remember the death of Griboyedov in Persia—it was the very same tension.

I went up to the mosque. I removed my pistol belt and gave it to the adjutant. I took off my boots and went into the mosque in my stocking feet. The crowd quieted down: look, the general knows our customs... I spoke with the mullah for about an hour. We understood each other. At the end of the conversation I gave him a pass permitting him to go anywhere at any time: "Take it, please, I trust you." The mullah went out into the street with his pass and said: "People! Soviet Army soldiers are sacred people. Do not touch them and do not touch those who have lived here for centuries." And the crowd became quiet and dispersed. The Army cannot be turned into a bugbear for the people.

The chief of Kuybyshev Railroad came to see me last year toward New Year's and presented me with an honorary railroader's badge. I told him: "Your minister took one and a half years to decide whether or not to give me this badge. Why?" He responded: "He was thinking whether or not they would put you in prison."

Again it was in the Transcaucasus, where our border runs along the Araks and the southern railroad likewise. Everything there is divided into an Azerbaijani sector and an Armenian sector. Near one station 25-ton dump trucks

had traveled out to the rails from a molybdenum mine and covered about 10 km of track, halting traffic. A blockade. Then I recalled Lenin's expression that railroads are extra-territorial. I gathered representatives of the republics and said: "I gave the order to shoot anyone who approaches the roadbed." Of course, the troops were warned to shoot only against tires so that no one suffered in any case.

Yes, several tires were shot out, but the sabotage stopped. A month later, when an earthquake demolished the northern railroad, cargoes went over this one. That is how I became an honorary railroader. Again, no one ordered me, I acted out of conscience. Shout what you like at rallies, but don't dare break windows and rape people. The Army will not remain aside here. It has no right to shoot first, but it will stand up like a wall for the people...

Look how many times in a short period America showed its muscles: Grenada, Panama, Kuwait, Iraq... What kind of position is this? A position of strength, and the United States does not plan to reject it. It is easy to be convinced of this by reading Bush's speech during the launching of the last carrier. So he continues to regard the USSR as an enemy number one, he continues to act only from a position of strength, and he calls his troops the flower of the nation. It is common knowledge what we call our Army... For some reason we forget that Bush was director of the CIA, or that there is a 20-year plan for destroying our state, our structures and the Army. Time is passing and it is apparent that in many positions we have not become stronger, but rather the reverse. We are outstripping the Americans' plan ourselves...

The Near East is a sphere of vital interests for Americans. It is thousands of kilometers from them. Why should we take a calm attitude toward what is occurring in the Baltic? Is this really not a sphere of our interests historically, beginning with Narva and with Ivan the Terrible? The Baltic republics legally are part of our state; no one has as yet revoked the USSR Constitution. Nevertheless, the Landsbergis government, for example, passed over 200 measures contradicting the country's existing laws, including measures aimed against the Armed Forces. Is this really permissible in a rule-of-law state?!

We are inferior to Americans in certain things such as in equipment for command and control and electronic warfare and in the number and quality of aircraft, but we surpass them or are on an equal basis in tanks, armored equipment and artillery, and I know precisely that we surpass Americans in our proficiency and in the Army's high morale. High Army morale was taken into account in the times of Alexander the Great, and under Yermolov, and today. This is not ideology. This is a sense of duty, patriotism, and readiness for self-sacrifice for the sake of the Homeland. The Russian and Soviet soldier always was

distinguished by this. That is also how the Great Patriotic War brought him up. The Americans know about this perfectly well.

Just why do we give away for next to nothing today the captured equipment which our fathers won? This is our mistake. By the way, why "our"? I do not wish to be put on the same level as Shevardnadze, who must answer for what he and his ministry did and for the fact that we are cutting off at the root the most valuable of our advantages: our morale and our patriotism.

Is the fact that we won the war really not a credit also to our party? It was not under the machineguns that fighting men wrote: "Regard me as a party member..." No one forced them to do this. During the war years three million party members died at the front line and five million joined the CPSU. It was a fighting party. This was mass heroism. But after the war many bureaucrats got fat off the party.

Here is what I think: if our General Secretary had completely relieved all obkoms after the 19th Party Congress and put not second secretaries and ispolkom chairmen in the place of first secretaries, but people from plants, from the primary party organizations, they really would have renewed our party. Perhaps someone would not have been able to write resolutions or conduct something, but the apparatus would have helped him. By the way, "apparatus" is not such a bad word. It should be everywhere. The party has many time-servers and courtiers; to this day it has not completely been renewed.

I am a party member; I do not change or hide my convictions. And no matter what they say, the CPSU defends the workers' interests. We made a table listing various parties: CPSU, anarchists, social democrats, monarchists... And for each one we gave quotes from programs and bylaws about membership in the party and the attitude toward ownership, land, the Army and the state system. Who's who immediately became clear. Some declare that they are the party of hired workers and entrepreneurs. Is this said for the workers? Officers and soldiers themselves quickly come to understand everything.

So that a multiparty system in the Army is physically impossible today and tomorrow and, I think, for several years more. Our command personnel are 95 percent party members. Officers were brought up in schools, learned to fight, and studied Marxist-Leninist philosophy and political economy. They were not coached or made fools of to be turned into Mamelukes who do not remember their kinship. I too studied. We did not accept everything blindly on faith—we argued and doubted before we arrived at our convictions. It was understandable that it was nonsense that the building of socialism was ending and the class struggle was becoming acute. We understood that there were many dogmas and superfluous things in ideological work. This did not take root. But try to say in the Army: "None of you are party members" or "We will discharge all of you party members." It is easy to predict what will happen then.

I am trying to speak directly in a soldier's manner. I do not respect those who joined the party at a mature age (no one drew them there) and then suddenly left it. These are time-servers. It was advantageous to be in the party; they were appointed as leaders, prospects opened up, and so everyone in succession crawled into it. Now it has become advantageous to attack the party, and so there they are, they fled. In Latin they are called "renegades" but the corresponding word in Russian is "betrayal." This was never honored either by enemies or, moreover, by the Russians...

Varennikov at Internationalists' Meeting

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[TASS "abridged speech" by General of the Army V. I. Varennikov at a conference of soldier-internationalists; place and date not given: "The Army Values You, the People Are Proud of You"]

[Text] More than 700 representatives of a large detachment of Soviet people have assembled in this hall who performed international duty in different years and in various countries, said the speaker. There are those who are in the ranks of the Army and also in retirement and in the reserve.

The all-army conference of soldier-internationalists will have to consider the problems of this social movement and work out directions of practical work. This conference was preceded by meetings and conferences in military districts, groups of forces, and in all services of the Armed Forces. More than 3,000 soviets of soldier-internationalists were established at all levels, starting with the regimental level.

There are many outstanding and convincing examples in the history of the Soviet state of rendering international assistance to more than 50 countries. But for various reasons, our combat international assistance was hushed up. The memory of the people who performed this honorable mission honestly and conscientiously has been consigned to oblivion.

Thus, the power of the soldier-internationalist movement, and its influence and prestige in society, depend on the deep sources of tradition of our people and its army. We were ready at all times to come to the help of victims of aggression and injustice. Soviet soldiers had to render international assistance to various people who were fighting for their social and national liberation. In the years of the revolution, our soldier internationalists fought on the side of the Hungarian soviet republic, and they helped the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army defeat the White Guards troops of Ungern and Semenov.

Subsequently, the USSR rendered great assistance to the Chinese people in their struggle for national independence. The assistance to the Spanish people in their revolutionary struggle is a bright page in the history of international solidarity.

The liberation mission of the Soviet Army in the years of World War II, in which seven million soldiers of the army

and navy participated, became historic for the fate of the world. They brought freedom to the peoples of 20 countries of Europe and Asia, with populations of about 150 million persons. Our people paid a dear price for the freedom of neighboring countries. More than a million soldiers of the Land of the Soviets gave their lives on their soil. Soviet soldier-internationalists fought in the ranks of soldiers of the resistance in Italy, France, Yugoslavia, and Norway. Many of our countrymen became national heroes of these countries. The people's memory is more reliable than the shifting political winds. It will always preserve in the hearts of the people of these countries a feeling of gratitude to those who liberated them from the brown plague.

A new activation of the world liberation process began in the postwar years. However, the efforts of peoples who cast off the chains of colonial bondage encountered the fierce opposition of reactionary forces that also resorted to the use of force. Under these conditions, the USSR rendered international assistance, including military assistance, to more than 20 countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Soviet pilots conducted many battles in providing assistance to the DPRK in repelling American aggression in the years 1950-1953.

Soviet soldier-internationalists provided great help to the Vietnamese People's Army in the creation of an effective air defense. As is well-known, this PVO [Air Defense] was based on the use of our surface-to-air missile complexes.

The best traditions of rendering international assistance were continued by Soviet soldiers in the repulsion by Arab states of Israeli aggression in the years 1960-1970. Here tank crewmen, artillery men, communicators, and representatives of other military specialties distinguished themselves. Air Defense soldiers reliably protected the most important strategic installations of Egypt and Syria from air attack, and they did not permit the destruction of the famous Aswan Dam. In 1974, Soviet sailors on minesweepers sailed more than 17,000 miles in mine fields, clearing the Suez Canal of mines and safeguarding movement along a very important route of world navigation.

Our military advisers and specialists, frequently with risk to their lives, performed governmental tasks in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and many other countries.

I want to emphasize that in the last two years more than 3,000 generals and officers from among the soldier-internationalists are decorated with orders and medals of the USSR, and more than 600 persons with foreign decorations.

Unfortunately, because of the curtain of secrecy that existed for a long time around the military side of rendering international assistance, we now know very little about the heroic deeds of soldier-internationalists.

The most striking and tragic turned out to be the fate of soldiers who rendered international assistance to the Afghan people. There were 546,200 Soviet citizens who

served in the complement of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

Soviet soldiers performed their international duty honorably, nobly, and with dignity. They came out of Afghanistan with pride in their military work, after setting examples of courage and heroism, and loyalty to the Motherland and to socialist ideals, and after having demonstrated examples of respect and humanism toward the Afghan people. More than 200,000 persons were decorated for heroism and courage in the performance of international duty. Seventy-two soldier-internationalists were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

However, the value of these nine fiery years is not measured by the number of decorations. In the performance of international duty, 18,826 Soviet citizens placed their lives on the altar of the Fatherland. More than 50,000 persons were wounded.

Just two or three years ago, many in the mass media were enraptured by the feats of our soldiers, they raised questions about the social rehabilitation of the "Afgantsy" [Afghanistan veterans], and they held up to shame those who did not want to resolve their problems. But the situation changed, and the picture became something else. Now in the forefront is the savoring of negative occurrences during the course of this war and attempts to prove that soldiers fought under duress, and that massive atrocities and outrages allegedly were committed with respect to the local population. Isolated immoral occurrences in military collectives are presented in exaggerated form. Willingly or unwillingly, the thought forces through: But do those who fought in Afghanistan deserve the people's respect, and should we be concerned about their fates?

Thus, who were our Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan?

A principled and just answer on this question was given by the Second Congress of People's Deputies, which noted that political and moral condemnation of the decision to introduce Soviet troops in no way casts a shadow on the soldiers and officers who were sent to Afghanistan. Loyal to their oath, convinced that they were defending the interests of the Motherland and that they are giving friendly assistance to a neighboring people, they were only performing their military duty.

No kinds of changes in the political situation will be able to disparage the greatness of the feats accomplished by them, emphasized General of the Army V.I. Varennikov. They buttressed the prestige of our Motherland with their life and death, asserting loyalty to such sacred concepts as internationalism and allied obligations. It is precisely this understanding that determines the deep respect that soldier-internationalists in general, including the "Afgantsy," enjoy among the people.

Starting in 1983, the Supreme Soviet and the government of the USSR passed a number of decrees and ukases directed at granting servicemen and other Soviet citizens who performed international duty outside the borders of the country privileges and preferences in the resolution of everyday living questions. Six rehabilitation centers were

established through modification of sanitarium and recuperation establishments that belonged to the CPSU Central Committee, the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], and ministries and departments. Just in the Rus sanitarium, with the very interested participation of the Central Committee of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], 500 persons were fitted with prosthetic devices. I will note, incidentally, that this year everyone will get prosthetic support who needs it.

Great material assistance is being given soldier-internationalists by social organizations and movements. Thus, the all-Union association of Soviet soldiers of the reserve, soldier-internationalists, and defense-patriotic societies allocated 700,000 rubles [R] for assistance to those who suffered the most and to the families of those who were killed. More than a half million rubles were collected in a charity marathon that was conducted in Sverdlovsk at the end of last year.

A lot is also being done in the USSR Armed Forces to give soldier-internationalists the necessary opportunity to resolve their service and social problems. Just in the last two years, almost 30 percent of the officers and warrant officers (and this is about 16,000 persons) who have service experience in Afghanistan have been promoted to higher positions. About 3,000 persons were sent for training in military training establishments with the right of preferential registration. Many families, as a rule, during the course of a year from the moment of arrival, are provided housing. In 1990 alone, soldier-internationalists received 4,000 apartments. They are provided medical service, passes, and necessary commodities and services.

It is important to note this fact as well: 180 servicemen who were declared invalids by military medical commissions were permitted to remain in the ranks of the Armed Forces at their request.

At the same time, the measures that are being taken by state organs in the resolution of vitally important problems of the soldier-internationalists and members of their families are clearly inadequate. There has been a delay in the study envisioned by decisions of the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies, which was directed at the resolution of questions associated with the everyday living of soldiers who were part of the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the families of those who were killed.

The ukase of the USSR president "On Measures for the Social Rehabilitation and Improvement of Everyday Living Conditions of Persons Who Performed International Duty in the Republic of Afghanistan and Members of Their Families, and Other Participants in Local Conflicts Outside the Borders of the USSR" was directed specifically at the accelerated resolution of these and other social problems.

In the execution of this ukase, the Ministry of Defense, jointly with other ministries and departments, developed a draft state program aimed at arranging the everyday living conditions of former servicemen and other persons who were part of the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and also the families of those soldiers who were

killed. At the present time, the draft program is under review in the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

The soldier-internationalist movement, being one of the most important phenomena of the social life of the country, is playing an increasingly noticeable role in the activity of the USSR Armed Forces.

Today, 67,641 servicemen who performed international duty are in the military service. Of these, 65,912 are soldiers who served in Afghanistan. Among them are 230 generals, 53,623 officers, 13,581 warrant officers, 207 on extended military service, and 11 cadets. Eight army commanders, 23 division commanders, 143 regimental commanders, and 788 battalion commanders are soldier-internationalists.

Many of them are present in this hall. These are Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General P. Grachev, commander of the Airborne Troops; Lieutenant General V. Kudlay, commander of a tank army of the Belorussian Military District, and holder of the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner; Major General V. Andreyev, commander of a motorized infantry division of the Turkestan Military District, decorated with the Orders of Lenin, Red Banner, and Red Star; Hero of the Soviet Union Major S. Filipchenkov, commander of a helicopter squadron of a regiment of the Baltic Military District, a military pilot 1st class, and a participant in the elimination of the aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station]; Colonel V. Shcherbakov, deputy chief of staff of a large unit [soyedineniye], who fought in Vietnam in 1966 as a missile guidance officer of a surface-to-air missile battalion; Colonel S. Kovalenko, commander of a pipeline large unit [soyedineniye]; Lieutenant V. Klin, senior navigator of an air regiment who flew 763 combat sorties, spending 1,069 hours in the skies of Afghanistan; Major S. Vykulov, a research worker of a scientific research institute of the Engineering Troops, who was assigned at his personal request to Afghanistan as a commander of a sapper platoon and there disarmed hundreds of mines and demolition charges; Colonel S. Kosachev, a military doctor, Doctor of Sciences, and professor, who performed more than 200 complicated operations in Afghanistan; Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Colonel G. Kuchkin, a political officer; and many other soldiers. Today, they are all reliable commanders and chiefs who are teaching and training personnel very well.

Especially noteworthy is the role of soldier-internationalists in the sociopolitical life of the country. They constitute a significant part of the deputy corps at all levels. Twenty-one servicemen whose combat route went through Afghanistan were elected USSR People's Deputies. Practically every soldier-internationalist works on the staff of social formations of military collectives. Communists picked more than 5,000 of them as their party leaders.

But personal fame alone is not enough now for the soldier-internationalists. They must become the nucleus around whom like-thinking persons will come together, those to

whom the fate and the security of the Motherland, friendship, and military comradeship are dear. It is in this that the main idea of the creation of new social structures is contained.

We expect specific assistance from soldier-internationalists in propaganda and the inculcation of combat experience. New generations of soldiers must not be allowed to learn from their own mistakes. Everything must be done so that the examples and lessons of combat actions in Afghanistan are firmly assimilated.

We are particularly counting, comrades, on your participation in the formation of the military-professional qualities of officers and warrant officers, especially the young ones. Many of them, under the influence of factors well known to you, are trying to leave the Armed Forces. Our common task is to support those who are in doubt and are wavering, and to retain personnel of the officer corps and warrant officers.

For these purposes, it is necessary to actively utilize new democratic formations—Officer Assemblies. With their help, to transmit that respectfulness of relations among officers that prevailed in units of the limited contingent.

Of no small concern of the soviets, undoubtedly, will be assistance to soldier-internationalists in their performance of service and promotions and awards. And there is a need for this. According to our data, for example, 138 soldiers were wounded, but were not decorated. Many of them were submitted for decorations; however, they have not received them to date. More than 8,800 officers and warrant officers served the established terms of service for promotion, but the authorized category does not permit them to be promoted to the next rank. A determination has to be made here on each person.

Under conditions of an increase in social and economic problems, aggravation of the political struggle, massed influence, and bourgeois ideology and culture, the role of educational work becomes more important. The force of moral ideals is weakening in society. There is a devaluation of such qualities as patriotism, faith in the advantages of the socialist choice, and the outlook for the development of the country. The readiness of the Soviet individual to perform his civic duty to the Motherland is eroding. All of this affects the attitude of the youth toward military service. In 1990 alone, more than 86,000 youths evaded the draft.

The duty of soldier-internationalists, together with soldiers of the reserve, is to help local organs of military command and control establish a high status of military service in the eyes of those who will have to be part of a soldier's formation. There is one more problem in this connection. Many undertakings and traditions of military friendship and comradeship, which are now taking root in the life of the troops, originated in Afghanistan. They have great influence on the moral situation in military collectives. They have to be developed and strengthened.

There is another aspect of this important problem. Many large units and units went through the combat route as part

of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan. They accumulated remarkable traditions that were born in a combat situation. Unfortunately, this experience is still not exploited adequately in our military collectives.

There are still few works of art that objectively describe the actions of our soldiers in Afghanistan. It is necessary to find and to support, and to promote from among the soldier-internationalists, artists who are capable of revealing the entire depth of what was experienced, and to help the people understand that the "Afgantsy" are worthy representatives of the Soviet people. We appeal to the representatives of the mass media, journalists, artists, and writers to support the soldier-internationalists in this difficult time. By doing this, you will also be supporting our Armed Forces.

One of the important tasks of the soviets will be the education of the soldier-internationalists. I want to note: They themselves give rise to a number of problems. For example, not all of them correctly evaluate their services and their place in the ranks and in society. Many of them are weakening, thinking that since they went through difficulties they do not have to exert themselves now. Others display harshness and crudity, justifying such behavior as the moral right of a person who has gone through the fire of war. There are even examples when young veterans display a cool alienation toward those who went through the Great Patriotic War. Some are offended by the fact that they have not been promoted over the course of several years. However, analysis shows that among the main reasons for such a state of affairs is the low personal responsibility of the aspirants for promotion.

Several words about the social problems of soldier-internationalists. Soviet legislation has established privileges and preferences for servicemen who have performed international duty. But it is also known how difficult it is at times to implement them. There are many reasons. One of them is that our society does not now possess the necessary potential for the good things in life. At the same time, not all leaders have explained that privileges for people who went through war are not a sop, but a duty of the country to sons who defended its interests.

Frequently, the resolution of social questions runs into red tape and bureaucratism. Housing problems have still not been resolved for many families of officers and warrant officers who performed international duty. Not all families have been ensured places in preschool establishments. Problems remain that are associated with the restoration of health and the receipt of authorization for remedial treatment.

It is the sacred duty of the soviets to preserve the memory of those who were killed and to help their families and relatives. We are obligated to help those who became invalids after sustaining wounds and contusions. At the present time, soldiers of the army and navy have under their patronage 45,000 veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and they are helping 6,000 invalids who took part in combat operations in Afghanistan, and 5,500 mothers and

families who were left without a breadwinner. I am confident that soviets of soldier-internationalists will become the organizational centers of this noble work. Therefore, the idea of establishing an all-Union soldier-internationalist memorial day deserves all-round support.

It is very important that the soviets, together with other social forces, support the efforts of the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR in stabilizing the situation in the country and leading it out of the crisis. We must strengthen the unity of the army and the people. We must demonstrate this unity and speak our weighty words during the period of the conduct of the very important political campaigns, which the signing of the Union treaty and election to the RSFSR presidency will be.

Today, the very concepts of "friendship of peoples" and "internationalism" are often subjected to ridicule. In defiance of historical truth, the great sacrifices of the Russian people, who more than once saved Georgians, Armenians, Moldavians, and many other people from genocide, are being consigned to oblivion. Fanning the fire of interethnic conflicts, national separatist forces are playing the "Afghan card," drawing soldiers of the reserve into the ranks of militants and extremists, and racketeers and bodyguards of "godfathers" of the native Mafia. It is the high moral duty of soldier-internationalists who are serving in the Armed Forces, jointly with internationalists of the reserve, to keep comrades from participating in such dirty affairs.

Soviets of soldier-internationalists are established as social organizations, and they function in close contact with military-political organs on equal terms with other social formations in military collectives and in full conformity with the USSR law "On Social Associations." The soviets organize their work under the leadership of commanders and chiefs on a democratic basis, and in a situation of broad glasnost.

The soviets of soldier-internationalists must not be allowed to be transformed into an exclusive caste and alienate themselves from the rest of the officer corps and warrant officers.

Being concerned about the continuity of the best traditions of the people and the Armed Forces, it is necessary for our soviets to establish close ties with soviets of veterans of war and labor, and of the Armed Forces. They need support.

In connection with the 50th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War, we propose that soldier-internationalists take an active part in the conduct of all measures both in the units and among the civilian population.

The question about the cooperation and coordination of efforts of the soviets of the Armed Forces with organizations of soldier-"Afgantsy" who are in the reserve is an urgent one.

The proposal on the creation of an all-Union organization of soldier-internationalists deserves support. Yesterday, at a meeting of the USSR minister of defense with the representatives of social organizations and movements of soldier-internationalists, the first step was taken in this

direction—the question was resolved on the establishment of an organizational committee for the convocation in 1992 of an all-Union united conference of soldier-internationalists. We believe that the question of a clear definition of the legal status of a soldier who performed international duty is urgent and appropriate.

Shchit Report on Vilnius Bloody Sunday

*91UM0490A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 21 Feb 91 p 2, 22 Feb 91 p 2*

[Article in two installments by independent military experts A. Yevstigneyev, I. Bychkov, S. Kudinov, G. Medkov, and N. Moskovchenko: "The Bloody Sunday: How It Was: Conclusion of Independent Military Experts of the Public Organization 'Shchit' on the Events in Vilnius 11-13 January 1991"]

[21 Feb 91, p 2]

[Text] The independent All-Union public organization "Shchit" sent a group of experts down a hot trail to Lithuania to investigate the circumstances of the tragedy in Vilnius. As the newspapers reported a few days ago, an act of intimidation was undertaken against this group, which had finished its work and was already preparing to leave for Moscow—a military patrol detained the experts right on the platform of the railroad station.

The editor's office of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIA has the concluding document of the independent experts on the investigation of the January tragedy in Vilnius and is offering it to the readers. After becoming familiar with this, it will not be difficult to understand the reasons for the detention of the military experts who uncovered the real state of affairs behind the bloody events in Vilnius.

At the invitation of the State Commission of the Lithuanian Republic on the investigation of the events of 11-13 January 1991, a commission of independent military experts comprised of Capt. First Rank A.A. Yevstigneyev, reserve (leader of the commission, people's deputy, and candidate of technical sciences); Lt. Col. I.V. Bychkov, reserve; Col. S.M. Kudin (people's deputy); Capt. Second Rank G.M. Melkov, reserve (doctor of juridical sciences and professor); and Maj. N.I. Moskovchenko, reserve, performed the following work during the period of the 3rd through the 12th of February:

a) studied the documents available to the commission, looked at the video cassettes recording the events of 11-13 January, studied the recordings of intercepted radio conversations of military people, examined the acts and conclusions of the forensic medical experts and the reports and evidence of the medical and sanitary personnel of hospitals and the morgue, and studied the statements in the press of state, military, party, and public figures as well as other materials relating to these events;

b) had detailed conversations with members of the Government of the Lithuanian Republic, department heads, and other official persons;

c) held meetings and similar conversations with representatives of the Communist Party of Lithuania [KPL] (Secretary of the KPL Central Committee Yarmalavichyus, liason of the KPL with the Committee for National Salvation (KNS); Secretary of the KPL Central Committee General Naudzhyunas, member of the KNS, according to an official TASS report in IZVESTIYA; KPL gorkom secretary Khadunkin; KPL Central Committee worker Shurupov; and others), with the public prosecutor of the Lithuanian SSR Petrauskas, with the representative of the USSR KGB Rukshenas, and with managers of the plant for radio measurement instruments;

d) held a meeting with the deputy chairmen of the Democratic Party of Labor V. Gerzhonas and V. Berezov;

e) held meetings and conversations with soldiers and officers of the Vilnius garrison and their family members and with inhabitants of Vilnius of different ages and nationalities;

f) Major General Uskhopchik, commanding officer of the Vilnius garrison, refused to take part in an official meeting, declaring by telephone that he does not recognize the Government of the Lithuanian Republic and that "your mandate has no meaning for me."

The garrison commandant Colonel Belous refused to meet, saying that he had already given all the information to the official investigator.

The chief of the garrison's political section Colonel Smokarev refused to meet. Repeated attempts to establish contact with him failed.

There was a conversation with the chief of the political section of the republic military commissariat Colonel Golubev, who declared that he does recognize the Government of the Lithuanian Republic and its laws.

The members of the commission were received by Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic V. Landsbergis and Prime Minister G. Vagnoryus.

Based on an analysis of the documents, materials, and information relating to the events in Vilnius on 11-13 January, the independent military experts established the following:

1. SITUATION IN VILNIUS PRIOR TO 11 JANUARY AND THE REASONS HELPING TO AGGRAVATE IT

As a result of free democratic elections, a Supreme Council headed by V. Landsbergis came to power in Lithuania, which on 11 March 1990 passed an Act on the Restoration of an Independent Lithuanian State and began the practical realization of the full sovereignty of the state.

The Communist Party of Lithuania split. The overwhelming majority of communists (about 90 percent) formed the Democratic Party of Labor (leader A. Brazauskas) and the remaining part formed the Communist Party of Lithuania on the platform of the CPSU.

As a result of the passage of the first legislative acts, the KPL essentially lost not only economic but—the main thing—also political power. Lithuania became the first republic in which a Communist Party on the platform of the CPSU, having lost the trust not only of the people but also of the overwhelming majority of communists, was put in the same category with other public organizations. At the same time, Lithuania was the first among the republics of the USSR to declare its choice of an independent path of development in full accordance with the 1966 international pacts on human rights, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, and the Paris Charter in 1990.

At the same time, carried away with the desire to affirm its independent state order as quickly as possible under the conditions of the actual economic blockade from the center, the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic passed a number of laws affecting the interests of service members.

Public dissatisfaction was heightened by the decision of the government on 7 January of this year on the multiplying of prices. In January, there was a mass public meeting in front of the parliament building, in which working people putting forward political and economic demands took part regardless of their nationality (Lithuanians, Russians, Belorussians, Poles, and others). Under the pressure of the popular masses, the parliament rescinded the decision of the government on the price increase and the government of K. Prunskene resigned.

Utilizing the natural dissatisfaction of the working people with the economic conditions of life (these conditions are worsening throughout the country) in the complete absence of any interethnic conflict whatsoever, the KPL, wishing to restore its own authority, made an attempt 11-13 January in the name of the working class and peasantry to overthrow the legally elected constitutional authority in the Lithuanian Republic by bringing in the armed forces and the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and USSR KGB for this purpose.

2. CHRONOLOGY OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL ACTIONS OF THE CENTER, KPL, AND MILITARY BEFORE THE EVENTS OF 11-13 JANUARY 1991

The 29 August 1990 Decree of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee ST-4/6, secret, signed by Deputy General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Ivashko "On the Results of Meetings and Conversations with the party aktiv, communists, and working people of the Lithuanian SSR":

"Point 7. The state legal section of the CPSU Central Committee [should] through leading communists of law enforcement agencies of the country organize work to bring the leaders of different nationalistic and anti-Soviet public formations, extremists, and deserters violating Soviet laws to criminal and administrative account. For this purpose, coordinate the work of the USSR Procuracy, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, USSR KGB, and USSR Supreme Court and send an operational-investigatory task

force to Lithuania. Together with the USSR KGB, examine the request of the KPL Central Committee (Comrade Burokyavichyus) on the registration of communists of military units with the republic party organization....

"Point 10. the socioeconomic and agrarian sections of the CPSU Central Committee [should] organize a series of measures in support of the Lithuanian peasantry protesting the agrarian policy of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR" (independent newspaper, 29 January 1991).

In November 1990, at the Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. Poloskov: "...more and more popular locally is the idea of establishing public committees for the salvation and defense of socialism." ..."it would be good if the party committees together with communist deputies would be initiators of this work."

On 1 December 1990—a ukase of the president of the USSR on the dismissal of Minister of Internal Affairs Bakatin and the appointment of Pugo to the position of minister of internal affairs and General Gromov, former commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan, as deputy minister of internal affairs.

There was also a constituent congress of "Soyuz," the All-Union association of deputies of all levels. The demand was for the immediate establishment of direct presidential rule in the "adverse republics."

In December 1990, the adherents of the KPL united in the Congress of Democratic Forces.

On 20 December 1990, E. Shevardnadze announced his resignation on account of his unwillingness to participate in the establishment of a dictatorship in the country.

A joint order 492/791 was signed by USSR Defense Minister Yazov and Chairman Kravchenko of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting "On the Establishment of a Creative-Industrial Television and Radio Company 'Radar'" (announced in the mass media on 7 February 1991).

On 29 December 1990, there was a joint order 493/513 of USSR Defense Minister Yazov and Minister of Internal Affairs Pugo on the organization of joint patrolling in large cities through the efforts of workers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and members of the Soviet Army using armored personnel carriers and armed with small arms (on 25 January 1991, this order "accidentally" fell into the hands of the mass media).

On 30 December 1990, Colonel General Achalov, the commander of the airborne troops who in September 1990 was in charge of the movement of units of airborne troops to Moscow, was appointed deputy minister of defense (supernumerary) and Major General Grachev was named commander of the airborne troops.

On 8 January 1991, Defense Minister Yazov orders the bringing of subunits of the airborne troops to seven union

republics but above all to the Baltic republics, supposedly for the capture of persons avoiding induction into the Soviet Army.

Units of an airborne division from Pskov began to arrive in Lithuania. These units for ensuring the induction into the Soviet army were not called and no orders on this account were received in the military commissariats of Lithuania, because the airborne troops had quite different missions.

The independent military experts came to the conclusion that the decision to use troops in Vilnius for the accomplishment of a coup d'etat was made by the center no later than 8 January.

While in the Baltic republics, Major General Grachev, the commander of the airborne troops, declares that the troops under him must not participate in political actions in the Baltic republics. After making this statement, he is immediately called away to Moscow.

On 9 January 1991, on behalf of the president of the USSR, Nishanov and Oleynik meet in Moscow with a "group of representatives of public and political organizations of the Lithuanian SSR," who informed the leadership of the country of the "unconstitutional and anti-Soviet actions of the Lithuanian authorities."

On 10 January 1991, the president of the USSR accuses the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic of striving to restore the bourgeois order, proposes repealing all previous unconstitutional acts, and gives consideration to the demand of the masses that presidential rule be established in Lithuania.

A post for satellite communications with Moscow is set up in the Northern Military Base in Vilnius.

On 11 January 1991, the member of the KPL Central Committee Bureau Yarmalavichyus announces the establishment of a Committee for National Salvation (KNS) by the Congress of Democratic Forces of Lithuania. The committee "takes full responsibility for the fate of the republic."

On that same day, units of the airborne troops occupied the Press House and the buildings for the DOSAAF, the department for the preservation of the kray, and archives, thereby beginning to use military force and firepower. The first victim at the Press House was V. Lukshis, a tekhnikum student who received a gunshot wound in the head. Colonel Kustryuk was in charge of the operations to seize the buildings.

On 12 January 1991, General Achalov, deputy minister of defense, came to Vilnius to manage the actions of the troops.

In response to the use of military force, the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic formed a Provisional Defense Directorate. This body manages the "military, political, and informational defense with the objective of stopping the attack and war of the USSR against Lithuania."

11-12 January. On behalf of the Supreme Council and its chairman, appeals were made to citizens of Lithuania to defend the government buildings. The population responded to the appeals and thousands of people went out on the streets and surrounded the government institutions. The greatest concentration of people was at the television tower and parliament of the republic.

At 2200 in the gorkom of the KPL, a worker of the KPL Central Committee, Colonel Shurupov of the reserve, instructs about 400 representatives of warriors of worker groups who were brought up by buses detached at the request of the directorate of affairs of the KPL.

About 2400, representatives of the KNS appealed to the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic with a petition in which they demanded its resignation and the establishment of presidential rule. At the same time, the KNS made a decision to take control of the building of the Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the television tower. "To support and defend the warriors of the worker groups against armed militants of the Department for the Preservation of the Kray (about 1,500 of whom had gathered in the building of the television tower armed with knives and firearms as well as a combustible compound), the committee appealed to the commanding officer of the Vilnius garrison for help. Such help was given" (Information Agency of the KPL Central Committee, 14 January 1991, LITVA SOVETSKAYA, 19 January 1991).

We independent military experts declare quite responsibly that the information in the insinuation of the KNS and KPL is a deliberate lie intended for absolutely uninformed people. The activation of the airborne troops and internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and USSR KGB with tanks of the first group requires a decision by the president of the USSR.

0200 on 13 January 1991. The troops seize the buildings of the Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and television tower. From a tank at the television tower and armored personnel carriers roaming about the city, they broadcast a previously prepared recording with a report by Yarmalavichyus to the effect that the KNS had taken full political control in its hands.

On behalf of the KNS, martial law was declared beginning at 0630 on 13 January and Major General Uskhopchik, commanding officer of the Vilnius garrison, was appointed military commandant of Vilnius.

Colonel General Varennikov, deputy minister of defense, arrived in Vilnius on that same day after the conclusion of the operation.

On the basis of an investigation of the chronology of events and the available documents, publications, and materials, including the secret decree of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat ST-4/5 from 29 August 1990 signed by Deputy General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Ivashko "On the Results of Meetings and Conversations with the Party Aktiv, Communists, and Working People of the Lithuanian SSR," we military experts came to the following conclusions:

1. The Committee for National Salvation (KNS) is an unregistered actually existing public organization that was founded long before the events on 11-13 January 1991. The leaders of the KNS are persons who make up the nucleus of the KPL Central Committee and the command of the Vilnius garrison. Precisely this made it possible for the Lt. Col. Astakhov, regiment commander, to declare: "I knew many of them personally and met with them. They are outstanding lads" (MN, No 4, 27 January 1990).

Thus, the leaders of the KNS and the nucleus of the KPL Central Committee are the very same persons, although they now deny this. This is also the conclusion from the analysis of the "Appeal of the KNS of Lithuania to the Peoples of the USSR" on 15 January 1991 in comparison with the "Chronicle of the Political Crisis in Lithuania" prepared by the Information Agency of the KPL Central Committee on 14 January 1991 (LITVA SOVETSKAYA, 19 January 1991).

2. The KNS, arbitrarily usurping the function of the highest authority in the Lithuanian Republic, made an attempt on 13 January with the help of the Armed Forces of the USSR to carry out a coup d'etat for the purpose of overthrowing the legally elected authority.

This attempt, which led to great human losses and material and moral damage, was thwarted. The following can be named as the main reasons for the failure of the coup:

- the self-sacrificing actions of the people of Lithuania regardless of nationality, who rose up in defense of the legally elected authority and who were prepared to sacrifice their lives in defense of the freedom and independence of the Lithuanian Republic;
- the prompt arrival in the Baltic region of the Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet B. Yeltsin and his joint actions with leaders of the Baltic states to stabilize the political situation. After establishing contractual ties with the Government of the Lithuanian Republic, the Government of Russia received a real opportunity to defend the legal rights and interests of the Russian population of Lithuania;
- the negative reaction of the broad popular masses of the country, of world public opinion, and of the governments of foreign states.

3. The KNS, having undertaken an attempt at a coup d'etat that resulted in substantial human losses, thereby committed a grievous state offense, which gives reason to classify it among criminal organizations.

The leaders and members of the KNS are subject to criminal accountability for the commission of a grievous offense against a state. An analysis of the documents, situation, level of information, and actions permits the supposition that the following persons were the leading nucleus of the KNS: First Secretary of the KPL Central Committee Burokyavichyus, Secretary of the KPL Central Committee Yarmalavichyus, Secretary of the KPL Central Committee Major General Naudzhyunas, section head of the KPL Central Committee Colonel Shurupov of the reserve, First Secretary of the Vilnius KPL Gorkom Lazutka, Second Secretary of the Vilnius KPL Gorkom

Khadunkin, secretary of the party committee of the plant for radio measuring equipment Dostal, and the commanding officer of the Vilnius garrison Major General Uskhopchik.

Because the leading nucleus of the KPL Central Committee is made up of leaders of the KNS and on the basis of the Law of the Lithuanian Republic on Political Parties, the activities of the KPL must be stopped until the conclusion of the investigation.

4. One is astonished by the ignorance, distortion of the facts, and gross lies of the members of the KNS and KPL Central Committee in the appeals of the KNS and reports of the Information Agency of the KPL Central Committee.

From an appeal of the KNS: "An officer of the Soviet Army who was escorting emissaries of worker groups sent to the premises of the television tower...was shot in the back with an assault rifle by a militant."

From a report of the Information Agency of the KPL Central Committee: "When the ultimatum was given to the administration of the television center, an officer guarding the parliamentarians was shot in the back." And all of these "wild" reports were essentially composed by the same authors found in one issue of the newspaper LITVA SOVETSKAYA on 19 January 1991.

As a matter of fact, Lieutenant Shatskikh, an officer of the special group of the Seventh Directorate of the USSR KGB who was sent to carry out the coup d'etat, was accidentally wounded by his own comrades during the operation to seize the Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting.

The insulting attacks and threats against the legal authority and leaders of the Lithuanian Republic (V. Landsbergis—"murderer No 1," fascist regime, and the like) published in the newspaper of the Communist Party of Lithuania LITVA SOVETSKAYA are aimed at increasing the political instability and at precluding dialogue, which shows not only a lack of respect for its readers—ordinary communists and service members—but also the indefensibility of the ideas that the KPL is trying to defend.

A poll carried out on 9 February 1991 showed convincingly the amount of respect that the working people have for the authority existing in the Lithuanian Republic.

[22 February 1991, p 2]

[Text]

3. ACTIONS OF TROOPS IN PREPARING TO SEIZE THE TELEVISION AND RADIO COMMITTEE AND THE TELEVISION TOWER

Materials of a radio intercept permit the assertion that as early as 11 January tank subunits of the Vilnius garrison were in a state of full combat readiness to carry out the mission set by the center and were awaiting a special signal. This indicates that the actions of the troops were planned and coordinated in advance.

The preparation for the use of the 107th Motorized Rifle Division was certainly known by the chief of a special

section of the division, Ryzhov (this was part of his official duties), who worked in direct contact with the territorial bodies of the USSR KGB then supervised by Major General Tsaplin. Thus, the information must naturally go to Chairman of the USSR KGB Kryuchkov and from him to the president.

Colonel Smokarev, chief of the political section of the division, who conducted the specific preparation of the personnel for the performance of the operation, certainly informed Lieutenant General Novikov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Military-Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District, who in turn was obligated to report to Colonel General Shlyaga, chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. After that, the information was supposed to go to the minister of defense and the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Feedback was also natural.

Units of the 76th Guard Airborne Division stationed in Vilnius together with the special group of the Seventh Directorate of the USSR KGB seized the buildings of the Television and Radio Committee and television tower under a previously elaborated plan. The overall operation was guided by Colonel General Achalov, deputy defense minister of the USSR, and Major General Uskhopchik was in charge of the actions of tank subunits. (A general diagram of the actions of the troops at the television tower and a deciphering of the radio intercept of the directorate of the mechanized group are attached).

There was no return fire from the civilian population and employees in these buildings. Only the attacking troops used firepower. Thirteen persons died as a result of the use of weapons, including 12 peaceful inhabitants and a lieutenant of the USSR KGB. According to the report of the investigating agencies, the troops did not capture a single militant with a weapon, nor were there any depots with weapons and ammunition discovered.

The assertion of the Information Agency of the KPL Central Committee on 14 January 1991 (the newspaper LITVA SOVETSKAYA, 19 January 1991) that "even on the way to the television tower worker groups and service members were fired upon with different kinds of weapons, including assault rifles, and grenades were thrown at them" does not correspond to the truth and is a gross disinformation. Under Article 35 of the USSR Law on the Press, the authors of this false report are criminally liable.

To cause panic and to disperse the population, the tanks opened fire on them with blank charges in their guns, causing acoustic injuries to the people. The deciphering of the radio intercept shows that the tanks continued to fire even after repeated demands of the leader for them to cease firing.

Gunshot wounds were inflicted by bullets of caliber 5.45. The reports of the forensic medical investigation indicate that bullets of caliber 5.45 have these structural features: their jacket may disintegrate with detachment of the steel core. Thus, a bullet fragment was taken from the right pleural cavity of the body of V. Vaytkus; fragments of a bullet jacket were removed from the thigh of the body of

G. Yuknyavichyus; bullet fragments were taken from the body of Lieutenant Shatskikh; there is an indistinct bullet wound in the body of V. Matsulyavichyus. The entrance hole is in the skin of the left cheek. The wound channel extends across the arc of the lower jaw through the soft tissue of the face, the body of the lower jaw to the right, the diaphragm of the mouth, the left internal carotid artery, the superior lobe of the left lung, and the body of six or seven cervical vertebrae into the cerebrospinal channel. Bullet fragments were found in the wounds.

At the conclusion of the seizure operation, units of the airborne troops were replaced by subunits of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Vilnius garrison, which are still guarding the seized buildings. Material damage was done to buildings, equipment, property, and territory. The physical assets and personal things of employees were plundered.

After the operation, under a ukase of the president of the USSR on 4 February 1991, Internal Affairs Minister Pugo was awarded the military rank of colonel general and by order of the supreme commander of ground forces Varennikov appreciation was expressed to the personnel of the 107th Motorized Rifle Division for "bold and decisive actions." Their actions were made an example for all the personnel of the ground forces.

4. FRAGMENTS OF THE RADIO INTERCEPT 12-13 JANUARY¹ (VERBATIM TEXT)

0350 12 January: "Zenit 22," "Zarevo 11" here, over.

"Zenit 22" asks the officer in charge to come to the phone. Understood.

"Zarevo 11," "Zenit 22" here, I am waiting at the phone. Over.

0155 13 January:

"Uspek 10," "Zenit 22" here, go out to your neighbor, go out to your neighbor.

I understood you. I understood you. Make noise?

Yes, yes. They authorized it, "Zenit 22" here.

"Zenit 22," L...17. "Bronya 3" came to the place, it began actions....

"Uspek 19." "Zenit 22" here, stop firing.

Here "Zenit 22," who just fired? Stop firing.

"Uspek 19," "Zenit 22" here. Do not fire, do not fire with your big boxes.

Here "Zenit 22." I ask you earnestly to stop firing from the tanks.

Here "Zenit 22." That is all. Go ahead. Do not fire from the tanks, stand still. So when you talk over the radio, do not hurry. Give it to me once again calmly.

"Zenit 22," "Barkas 25" here. I am in the park. I am in the park. I await your instructions.

"Fara 16": the people are not dispersing, they have surrounded the armored personnel carriers.

"Zenit 22": I understood. Be in place, close all hatches, observe and so on.

Be ready to receive the command, stay in place.

"Zenit 22": I understood, good report. The situation is calm and the people are quietly dispersing. Good, stay in place.

"Uspek 19," report the situation briefly, "Zenit 22" here, over.

Do you have anyone there under the caterpillar tracks? Over.

Answer unintelligible.

I understood you. Start your engine quietly and go to the base at low speed. Do you understand?

"Uspek," "Zenit" here: turn on your headlights so that you can see a good distance and go forward slowly so that you do not crush anyone.

"Zenit 22" answers "Uspek 19": Good, good. So go into the park, stop in that traveling position, turn off your engines. Let them rest. Just let the vehicles rest and be ready. There could be another mission...

5. VICTIMS OF THE UNSUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION

According to the official information of the Ministry of Health of the Lithuanian Republic, 13 people had died as of 31 January, including:

—nine people from 5.45 caliber bullet wounds (eight civilians and one KGB lieutenant in the uniform of an assault trooper);

—one person run over by the caterpillar tracks of a tank (Loretta Asanavichyute, born in 1967);

—two people run over by the wheels of armored personnel carriers;

—one person from wounds caused by an explosive device.

Forensic medical reports were prepared on all the dead in accordance with prevailing legislation.

Malevolent assertions to the effect that the gunshot wounds were inflicted on people who had already died are refuted by the forensic medical reports and the statements of witnesses.

Only service members fired. KGB Lieutenant Shatskikh was wounded in the back by a bullet of caliber 5.45 fired by his own comrades at the building of the Committee for Television and Radio. According to the medical workers who performed the autopsy of the body (in the presence of public prosecutors), the wound was not mortal. If they had brought Shatskikh to the hospital in time, his life could have been saved.

There were no gunshot wounds from the fire of snipers. Bullets of caliber 5.45 are not used in snipers' rifles because of the unstable ballistics of these bullets.

There were 604 injured persons, including 438 men and 166 women. Of them, 49 received gunshot wounds; 342 persons had acoustic injuries (damaged eardrums from the firing of blank charges in tank guns; 10 persons were burned; 20 persons had a combination of injuries; 99 persons received other injuries; and there were others. As of 30 January, 30 people were still hospitalized.

6. LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EVENTS OF 11-13 JANUARY

1. The unconstitutional and criminal actions of the KNS and in essence of the KPL Central Committee are in direct conflict with articles 137 and 148 of the Constitution of the USSR.² The formation of the KNS violates Part 2 of Article 7 of the Constitution of the USSR. Based on this article, the KNS should have been dissolved immediately by the highest authorities of the Lithuanian Republic or USSR and its members ought to be brought to criminal accountability immediately.

2. The actions of Defense Minister Yazov, Minister of Internal Affairs Pugo, and Chairman of the USSR KGB Kryuchkov, who permitted the use of the Soviet Army and internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and USSR KGB against the unarmed population of the Lithuanian Republic at the request of the unconstitutional and criminal public organization KNS, are criminal acts. They could at any moment have stopped the actions of the KNS and troops, inasmuch as satellite communications had been established for instantaneous reporting to the Government of the USSR.

3. Likewise criminal were the actions of Achalov, Uskhovich, Kustruyuk, and Astakhov, who led subordinate troops in carrying out the criminal plans of the KNS and KPL Central Committee.

The soldiers, sergeants, and officers who were directly involved in firing on the peaceful population must also be made criminally liable.

In addition, Major General Uskhovich, appointed commandant of the Vilnius garrison by the KNS, must bear responsibility for the illegal declaration of martial law and the use of weapons by patrols, which led to the death of the citizen Y. Tautkus on 29 January.

4. The president of the USSR ignored the decision of the Federation Council made unanimously literally on the eve of the tragedy, with prohibited the use of military force in the resolution of political conflicts. Thus, there was a violation of the principles that the president defends so insistently—respect for law and constitutional authorities.

The president of the USSR, contrary to the requirements of the Constitution of the USSR (Article 127, Paragraph 4), did not stop the unconstitutional actions of the defense minister, the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and chairman of the USSR KGB that authorized

the utilization of forces subordinate to them in an attempt to carry out a coup d'etat in the Lithuanian Republic.

After the statement by Pugo and Yazov at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the president of the USSR should have disavowed such statements in the manner provided by law and the constitution and dismissed these officials from their posts. In addition, his ukase awarded to Pugo the military rank of colonel-general.

The president of the USSR did not stop the unconstitutional activities of the KNS at the time of its formation or the execution of the first steps in preparation for a coup d'etat in the Lithuanian Republic.

The president of the USSR did not act as a "guarantor of the observance of the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens and of the Constitution and laws of the USSR."

If one assumes that the Lithuanian Republic is part of the USSR, then the president of the USSR did not perform his direct constitutional obligations at the time of the attempted military coup in Vilnius.

If one assumes that the Lithuanian Republic is not part of the USSR, then the use of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the Lithuanian Republic 11-13 January 1991 is an act of aggression against this state in accordance with the definition of the concept of aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS

On the basis of their investigation, the independent military experts reached the following conclusions:

1. There was an attempted coup d'etat 11-13 January in Vilnius utilizing the armed forces and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB of the USSR for the purpose of restoring the political authority of the CPSU in the person of its integral part, the KPL.

The president of the USSR could not fail to know of the planned joint actions of the Soviet Army and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB of the USSR. Such actions could not have been carried out without his personal authorization.

2. The participation of military formations of the USSR in the coup d'etat was planned, coordinated, and approved in advance by the center.

3. The initiator of the coup d'etat was the KPL Central Committee.

4. For the practical realization of its plans, the KPL Central Committee established a so-called "Committee for National Salvation," the personnel and leadership of which is carefully concealed to avoid responsibility in the event of failure. The only officially known person among those having to do with the KNS is Secretary of the KPL Central Committee Yarmalavichus, authorized liaison of the KNS with the Vilnius garrison.

Independent military experts think that the following persons were the nucleus of the KNS: First Secretary of the KPL Central Committee Burokyavichus, Secretary of the

KPL Central Committee Yarmalavichus, Secretary of the KPL Central Committee Naudzhyunas, section chief of the KPL Central Committee Colonel Shurupov of the reserve, First Secretary of the Vilnius Gorkom of the KPL Lazutka, Second Secretary Khadunkin, secretary of the party committee of the plant for radio measuring equipment Dostal, and commanding officer of the Vilnius garrison Major General Uskhopchik.

5. The KNS and KPL Central Committee were hoping for the broad support of working people dissatisfied with the worsening of their economic position and of the Russian-speaking population and military whose rights had been infringed upon by individual legislative acts of the Lithuanian Republic. This was the purpose of the specific agitation and political work of the members of the KPL. Analogous work was carried out by the political organizers and party organizations of the CPSU in military units and subunits and among the family members of service personnel.

Thus, they artificially created an atmosphere of hostility and enmity between the native population and the army. At the present time, the Government of the Lithuanian Republic is attempting to improve relations with the military units stationed in its territory and is taking constructive steps to normalize the situation. But the military command categorically refuses to establish any contacts whatsoever.

6. Confident of its victory and of the impunity of the KNS and relying on units of the Vilnius garrison and elements of airborne troops and USSR KGB sent by the center, it [the KNS] undertook a coup d'etat, which resulted in many victims among the peaceable population and in significant material losses.

7. There was not a single case of the use of weapons on the part of the peaceable population and defenders of state institutions. Only troops opened fire. As a result of the use of weapons, 13 people were killed and 604 received injuries. The victims were among the peaceful population only. The 13 killed included a lieutenant of the USSR KGB, who was accidentally wounded by his own people and died because the military did not give him qualified medical help in time.

8. The troops used bullets of caliber 5.45 with structural features (the bullets break up into fragments), which greatly increases the suffering of the individual and falls under the prohibitive provisions of international conventions (1989 Declaration on the Nonuse of Bullets That Tend to Turn Over or Flatten Out, Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 on the Laws and Customs of Land War, Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Protection of Victims of War with additional protocols I and II in 1977).

9. The execution of the coup d'etat was thwarted by the working people of the Lithuanian Republic, who defended their legally elected authority. The results of a survey of the population on 9 February 1991 graphically and convincingly demonstrated the choice of the working people of the Lithuanian Republic.

10. The responsibility for the attempted coup d'etat and for the numerous victims and damage is borne by:

1) the president of the USSR, who did not fulfill his constitutional duty;

2) Defense Minister Yazov, Minister of Internal Affairs Pugo, and Chairman of the KGB Kryuchkov, who permitted the use of forces under them for unconstitutional and criminal purposes;

3) Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Achalov, the commanding officer of the Vilnius garrison Major Uskhopchik, regiment commander of airborne troops Colonel Kustryuk, and regiment commander in the 107th Motorized Rifle Division Colonel Astakhov, who were in direct command of subordinate troops for the implementation of the criminal ideas of the KNS and KPL Central Committee.

4) the immediate executors among the soldiers, sergeants, and officers firing at the peaceable population.

11. The responsibility for the material damage done to the Lithuanian Republic, its state institutions, legal entities, and individuals rests with the president of the USSR, USSR defense minister, USSR minister of internal affairs, USSR KGB, and KPL.

12. The KNS is an unconstitutional and criminal organization whose activities must be prohibited and its members must be tried for committing a particularly dangerous crime against the state.

13. Considering the direct link between the members of the KNS and the KPL in carrying out the coup d'etat, the activities of the KPL must be stopped until the end of the investigation.

14. The central press, radio, and television were not objective in covering the events of 11-13 January in Vilnius, adhering to the position of the CPSU and KPL.

15. It would be advisable to amend the legislative acts that infringe on the rights of the Russian-speaking population, service members, and members of their families.

16. On the basis of the objectively existing political situation, when the laws of the USSR are not being carried out in the territory of the Lithuanian Republic and the republic's legislative acts contradict the laws of the USSR, it is essential prior to the signing of the corresponding treaty between the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic to work out a special provisional status in the protection of the rights, honor, property, and dignity of service personnel and their family members.

17. To coordinate the efforts between republics to defend their own sovereignty and political and economic independence against the dictates of the center and collective actions in situations analogous to the events of 11-13 January in the Lithuanian Republic, it is urgently necessary to sign horizontal treaties between republics that make it possible to oppose these dictates.

18. It is necessary to establish a national guard in republic formations for the purpose of ensuring state sovereignty and law and order.

19. The supreme soviets of the republics need to pass a law defining the concept of a "criminal order" and establishing criminal liability for its execution.

20. The events in Vilnius are in the same category as cases of the criminal use of the Soviet Army against its own people: Novochoerkassk in 1962, Tbilisi in 1989, and Baku in 1990.

21. The events of 11-13 January have nothing to do with interethnic conflicts and are purely political in nature.

They showed that:

- the party bureaucracy is striving to turn the Soviet Army into the hostage of its own criminal political intentions and the soldiers into mindless and submissive executors;
- the separation of the armed forces, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and KGB of the USSR from the party is dictated by objective necessity and must be carried out urgently;
- all nationalities are equally threatened by the conspiracy of the party-military elite, which is trying to remain in power by any means, insolently trampling on laws and dooming the peoples to poverty, hunger, and death.

The independent military experts consider it their duty to present these conclusions to the people's deputies of the USSR, RSFSR, other republics, international public opinion, and the governments of foreign states and the United Nations.

Independent military experts:

- A. YEVSITIGNEYEV, captain first rank of the reserve, candidate of technical sciences, and people's deputy.
- I. BYCHKOV, lieutenant-colonel of the reserve.
- S. KUDINOV, colonel and people's deputy.
- G. MEDKOV, captain second rank of the reserve, doctor of juridical sciences, and professor.
- N. MOSKOVCHENKO, major of the reserve.

11 February 1991 Vilnius, Lithuanian Republic.

FROM THE EDITOR'S OFFICE:

We presented to you, dear readers, the point of view of independent military experts on the events in Lithuania. It is based on extensive documentary material and is worthy of confidence. As far as we know, however, there are somewhat different positions that do not entirely coincide with the conclusions of the specialists from "Shchit." MOLODEZH ESTONII, doing a reprint from MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, recently familiarized its readers with one of these positions.

One thing is clear: a thorough and unbiased assessment of the events is necessary to avoid a multitude of new versions and rumors. And it should be at the highest level, using all

the materials of the investigation. It is necessary to give honest and direct answers to many questions that remain open.

Footnotes

1. The complete text of the radio intercept is in the General Procuracy of the Lithuanian Republic.
2. The independent military experts are examining the actions of the KNS as applied to the Constitution of the USSR, for the KNS and KPL recognize only the Constitution of the USSR and do not recognize the laws of the Lithuanian Republic.

'Servicemen for Democracy' Supports Yeltsin Candidacy
LD2905094391 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 28 May 91

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The Servicemen for Democracy's Coordinating Council today adopted an appeal to servicemen nationwide stating that the movement will support Boris Yeltsin during the forthcoming Russian presidential elections and that it regards him as the worthiest candidate:

[Begin recording] [Major General V. Dudnik, reading from the appeal] Soldiers of the fatherland! We appeal to you not to act according to orders and instructions at the elections but to act according to the call of your conscience and to display civic dignity. You will help justice triumph by acting in this way.

[Unidentified correspondent] The Coordinating Council's work continues. It has already decided to bring the appeal to the notice of every serviceman: soldier, sailor, and officer. [end recording]

Baltic Military Council Hits Landsbergis
91UM0687A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 25 Apr 91 p 3

[Text of statement by Baltic Military District Military Council]

[Text] On 18 April 1991, V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, made a provocative appeal to the officers and men of the USSR Armed Forces, Internal Troops and USSR KGB stationed within the borders of the republic.

This particular appeal is a logical extension of the antisoviet and anticommunist activity being waged by the Lithuanian Parliament and its leader. Amounting to mere wishful thinking, it is subversive and antistate in nature, intended to impair the country's defensive capability. By employing deceit and disinformation, the author of the libel is making pitiful attempts to sow in the minds of the officers and men doubts relative to the need to fulfill their constitutional and civic duty and incite them to commit high treason.

Landsbergis' appeals, the same as his adventurous acts, have not found nor will they find welcome and support among district troop personnel. They cause in the servicemen feelings of nothing less than disgust, loathing and contempt.

The Military Council of the Baltic Military District does hereby vehemently protest the latest provocation perpetrated by V. Landsbergis and is authorized to state the following:

1. The acts committed by the Lithuanian leader are incompatible with the status of a statesman of his rank.
2. The Army is not an instrument to be manipulated.
3. District personnel have sworn allegiance to their one and only, indivisible Motherland—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and they intend to remain true to it to the end.

Military Council
Baltic Military District

Soldiers' Mothers Call for Greater Involvement

*91UM0687B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 May 91 First Edition p 1*

[Text of Appeal by Committee of Soldiers' Mothers]

[Text] The All-Union Committee of Soldiers' Mothers does hereby issue an appeal to the parents of servicemen, enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, seamen and petty officers in compulsory service, and their commanders.

Dear Comrades! The country is undergoing a highly difficult period in its history. In addition to the economic difficulties, society is experiencing a deterioration in discipline and law and order.

The negative phenomena have affected the Armed Forces; our sons, brothers and nephews have been placed into a most difficult situation. In honorably carrying out their military duty, many of them have come to know the meaning of personal discomforts, social and legal vulnerability, rudeness, insult to personal dignity, and ethnic hostility on the part of their fellow countrymen.

We appeal to you, respected soldiers' mothers and fathers, and in our motherly concern for our sons we ask you to make the men's service a matter of maximum interest, supporting them in this time of trouble.

We are relying on your active participation in the work of the All-Union Committee of Soldiers' Mothers to protect the rights of servicemen on compulsory duty and create for them a good personal and moral climate.

We ask that you work with people's deputies to set up local organizations of soldiers' mothers, participate in the work of draft boards, more boldly visit military units, and take to the units your motherly warmth. Meet with the parents of draftees, get them to understand the necessity for bringing up their sons in an adequate manner. Only by means of constructive cooperation will we be able to

resolve many problems and render our children's service more useful to the country and less hazardous as far as their life and health are concerned.

No sons are strangers. Today you may help a soldier from a neighboring military unit, tomorrow your son may receive help and support from the mother of another soldier.

Dear sons, enlisted men, seamen, noncommissioned officers and petty officers!

Painful indeed is a change from the warmth of one's home to the harsh conditions of the barracks. You have much to do with the kind of interpersonal relations that develop later. We beseech you to keep in mind that a human life is more precious than anything else. Do not permit malice and interethnic differences to destroy your souls.

Remember that we want to be proud of you and your accomplishments in the service; we want you to come home alive and healthy, strong, more mature.

Respected comrade officers!

We have entrusted you with our future—our sons. The responsibility for them has fallen onto your shoulders.

We place trust in your wisdom and kindness, and we hope that you will be able to maintain and increase the good aspects of our sons' natures.

We fervently appeal to all of you—mothers, sons, and commanders: Surround all boys who have no parents with your warmest concern.

Only by constantly working together in a constructive manner will we be able to sow seeds on the soil of the future.

The All-Union Committee of Soldiers' Mothers does hereby express the hope that our joint efforts will enable us to influence the situation existing in military collectives and make our boys into real-life protectors of the Fatherland.

On behalf of the Coordinating Council, All-Union Committee of Soldiers' Mothers:

M. I. Kirbasova
Committee Chairman
V. A. Melnikova
Committee Secretary

Our address is as follows: 101000, Moscow, tsentr, Rybny pereulok, 8, Entrance 1.

The above was passed during a meeting of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers Coordinating Council, USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Policy, and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Affairs of Women, the Family and Demographic Policy.

System of Officer Privileges Condemned

91UM0672A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 20, 22 May 91 p 6

[Article by Professor N.P. Pankov: "Bravely, We'll Go to the 'Deluxe' Suite...: What Makes Our Military Command So Confident in Their Fight for Their Privileges?"]

[Text]

Clue to the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Investigation

"But the general officers are a special matter, they have become a special target for attack. The things that are being said about our generals! They are being defamed, insulted, scorned; any clown now makes fun of the generals' gray hair, the generals' honor. The only purpose of this is to lower the prestige of the commanders, to break them away from the intermediary link and to break the intermediary link away from the soldiers and sergeants..."

General I. Rodionov

(The DEN newspaper, 9 May 1991)

This Is Our Way

Leningrad—ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, OGONEK, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA are all waging a fierce battle for a just cause in their attempts to expose abuses in dacha construction for the military high command. The result is zero. What is the problem here?

They have noticed the tip of the iceberg near Moscow. The iceberg itself has spread "from Moscow to the farthest outlying borders" and even further, beyond the borders of our country. The military machine has been contaminated from top to bottom with a money-grubbing disease; many commanders have lined their pockets at the expense of so-called government public funds by misappropriating those funds. Those who have their own "kuren" [Cossack word for hut] (that is the name the elite use for their dachas) near Moscow, spend the "Indian summer" months at a spa, in Sochi, in the Crimea; not so long ago they used to go to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, or Poland. In Gurzuf you will come across Malinovskiy's dacha, cross the ravine and you will see Grechko's dacha, go around Ayu-Dag and there is a whole settlement of villas behind the green fence on the territory of the Krym sanatorium, and so on. In Sochi they have occupied the sanatorium imeni Ya. Fabritsius. In Leningrad, visiting party elite and high-ranking Navy and infantry officers have a good time in the mansions standing behind high fences on Kamenny Island.

Let us go the lower links in the chain of command—to the level of military district and fleet commanders in chief and their equals. Each of them brags to others of his own district sanatorium, tourist facility, hunting grounds, and his personal accommodations at all of these. They may have different names in different districts—a "dacha" with a sauna, a sophisticated gym, a hothouse and greenhouse, and other additions. Many military districts (and

fleets) have their sanatoriums on the Black Sea coast and if the commander in chief decides to relax in "his own" sanatorium, they make elaborate preparations for his arrival. Leningraders, for instance, used to throw everyone out of the women's lodge. Every August in Gurzuf, in order to accommodate Moskalenko they would remove everyone living in the second floor of building No.7, fence in a part of the beach, bring a Navy launch with a crew of five from Sevastopol for Moskalenko's son, a lover of water-skiing, and set up tables in the cafeteria or on the porch to cater to the launch crew and other aides.

Within the last two decades competition between commanders has grown around such seemingly prosaic matters as the size and equipment of the work place known as the office.

The office furnishings are the latest, the materials all foreign-made. Later, the quality of the office furnishings is applied also to personal premises, either free of charge or for a nominal fee.

The use of transportation acquired such bizarre forms that everybody learned to put up with it—both its users and its sufferers.

I think there were enough examples cited to imagine the dimensions of the iceberg our people are carrying on their shoulders as they sacrifice huge amounts of money on defense, taking it away from themselves and their children. Had we managed to collect all the money misappropriated in the Armed Forces after the war, not a single officer would have found himself without an apartment today, I think. And what about the damage to morale?

But what allows our generals and marshals to be so bold that, apart from misappropriating the people's money, they refuse to let anyone, including people's deputies, on their territory? What gives them the strength to repel the attacks of the Supreme Soviet commission on privileges and benefits? It seems to me that there are several reasons for that. The first one is their conviction that it is not only the military who behave that way in our country. They just follow in the tracks of the authorities. Have you ever watched how Romanov was delivered to Smolnyy—the headquarters of the revolution? A procession of five cars, with three to five people in each, escorted the bullet-proof car with Romanov sprawled over the seat inside. God forbid that you walk or drive in the direction opposite to that of the cavalcade. The roaring "Halt!" would thunder through the area from the loudspeaker of the front car and you would wonder, in spite of yourself, why you were not Khalturin. But the Romanov ritual was repeating to the minutest detail what was happening in Moscow. This entire performance was taking place not because of any fear of punishment but due to the desire to assert oneself, to demonstrate one's grandeur and one's power to the serfs. That is true of people other than Romanov, too.

The second reason the military are so bold is the weakness of our laws (or their absence on many issues) that would permit regulation of the relationship between private and public property. The elite have mastered an important rule of our life: You do not build your fortune out of private

property. But then they rushed to get the public piece of the pie and on the way hypnotized people with stories of having to wait a little, suffer a little, and then everybody would have whatever he desired—castles in the air and land flowing with milk and honey. That was the way it was for the entire 73 years: Today is for me and tomorrow is for you. The status of deputy has turned into a prestigious and plentiful feeder for many people now. The often not very competent top party officials are being replaced by a different, very often even more incompetent, power of democrats.

The third reason for the decisive actions of the military is their confidence in the reliability of their machine for the selection, training, and placement of personnel, started in the old days by Stalin himself. The routes of the military, with their dachas in every corner of our country and other privileges, lie through the military department of the Central Committee. The Central Committee, as before, is making up nomenclature lists and forming various reserves. Cultivation of the elite is continuing. That means that the Armed Forces continue to remain a powerful

support of the CPSU, on which it can rely at any moment, and the CPSU remains a protector of the Armed Forces.

All I have said above means that privileges are a failing of the system under which many leaders get their benefits not "according to their work" but "according to their position." So, if we take a dacha away from one leader today, we are making it possible for another leader to appear tomorrow who will build a more grandiose one as soon as he can. Nothing can be achieved here with bans and decrees. We have to do what the entire civilized world has been doing for a long time—pay a market price for every creature comfort. Among other things, the market is a great healer of human vices. Many of our legislators know this and are applying inhuman efforts trying to prevent the advent of the market and oppose privatization and the appearance of private property. The public piece of the pie is disappearing, there will be nothing to grab, one will have to work for one's luxuries. The sooner we transfer the life of our people to a monetary foundation, the sooner our society will eliminate all attempts to get rich at somebody else's expense.

Generals Assail National Division of Army

91UM0657A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 91
(Signed to press 01 Mar 91) pp 17-23

[Round table with Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Major-General I. Danilenko, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Major-General V. Malkov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Colonel O. Belkov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Reserve Major-General M. Yasyukov, and *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* Problems of the Theory of Socialism Editor, Candidate of Historical Sciences Colonel Ya. Renkas, under the rubric: "KVS Discussion Club": "Who Benefits from the Dismemberment of the Army"]

[Text] This article is recommended for use in officer political training groups while studying the topic "NATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE ARMY."

The ethnic issue in the Soviet Union has acquired exceptional sharpness. Today it is obvious that the solution of problems that have arisen as a result of this has enormous significance for the fates of perestroika and our country's future, including for the Armed Forces. We are alarmed by attempts to separate the army along national billets and to boycott the conscription of young men for military service. In some republics, anti-army passions are being incited and garrisons in the Baltic Region, the Transcaucasus, and the Western Ukraine have come under "siege." It is no accident that these issues were discussed so hotly and with interest during a meeting of the President of the USSR with people's deputies-servicemen during November 1990 and also at the 4th USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

Today in the KVS Discussion Club, General Staff Academy military-political science department scholars conduct a conversation on various aspects of ethnic policy and the country's security. The participants are: Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Major-General I. Danilenko, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Major-General V. Malkov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Colonel O. Belkov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Reserve Major-General M. Yasyukov, and *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* Problems of the Theory of Socialism Editor, Candidate of Historical Sciences Colonel Ya. Renkas.

[Renkas] Today it is obvious that we are very late with the restructuring of interethnic relations. We are also late with the adoption of specific political decisions to manage such a complex and, I would say, one of the most delicate spheres of multifaceted human relations. In your opinion, what are the causes of this?

[Malkov] The old methodology did not "work" somewhere. The well-known stereotype of thinking also had an impact: ethnic relations totally depend on socio-economic conditions and it is sufficient to establish economic and political life in a country and all remaining problems will be solved, including the ethnic question. Unfortunately, right up until recently, at the highest levels of the political

and state leadership this issue was only talked about in passing and by the way. And only the events in Alma-Ata in December 1986 compelled us to seriously look into the restructuring of interethnic relations and the renewal of the ethnic policy itself. Moreover, these events showed that the national factor is becoming a determining factor both within individual republics and also in relations between them. You do not have to go far for examples. They are both Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, Lithuania, and Moldova.... As a result, all of society is in a state of social tension.

Today, attempts are present to break up the USSR into national parts, that is, to dissolve the indissoluble—united production forces and to cut off the main elements of all-union production: railroad, water, motor vehicle, and air transportation, communications systems, union-wide oil and gas pipelines, the single energy system, etc. This aspiration of individual republics runs counter to the objective world trend toward integration of production. The USSR's economy has developed as a single national economic complex that satisfies union-wide and national interests.

[Renkas] The opinion exists in scientific circles that a paucity of theoretical baggage played a negative role in the development of modern ethnic policy. Do you agree with this?

[Malkov] That is so to a certain degree. In the 1970's and 1980's, studies of ethnic relations noticeably lagged behind life's needs and were conducted in an abstract context and in scholastic and dogmatic forms. Scientific criteria for the resolution of the ethnic issue were not developed. It was theoretically proclaimed that unity of blooming and the drawing together [sblizheniye] of nations are characteristic for developing socialism and primary emphasis in political practice was made on the trend to draw together. And since the desired did not coincide with the actual, cases of open ideological "postscripts" often occurred under conditions of a instilled universal good nature and reticence in the theory and practice of interethnic relations.

For example, take the advertised assertion about the emergence of a new historical community—the Soviet people. It is impossible to refute the fact that this community has developed. This is part of our all-union life style. But have all of the processes been completed here? Of course not.

In short, in studies of the ethnic issue, we have plodded along somewhere in the tail end of events which had not been given a scientific prediction. Problems were raised when life itself had already advanced them. In the sphere of ethnic policy, the people who conducted ethnic policy did not have enough professionalism and analysis, modeling of various forms of ethnic relations, and the resolution of conflict situations were absent. This lagging behind of theoretical thought in the sphere of interethnic relations also was one of the preconditions of the distortion of the living experience. As a result, nationalistic, separatist, and extremist forces that seek political advantages have entered into and are currently actively operating in the

arena of our political life. They oppose signing the new union treaty with incredible stubbornness. This is a pernicious practice because the union treaty directly affects the resolution of many defense tasks. Their spectrum is very broad: the preservation and strengthening of the indivisible Armed Forces, the improvement of cooperation between the USSR Ministry of Defense and local organs of power, the normalization of conscription into the army and many others. Here theoretical formulations must also be presented in a fitting manner. The trial and error method is not suitable for serious political practice, including in the sphere of ethnic policy.

[Renkas] The processes of ethnic revival and the ethnic and nationalistic movements they have engendered and also the growing tension in interethnic relations raise quite a few issues about the fundamentals and principles of military structural development under conditions of a multinational state in a new way. Some republics are increasingly persistently manifesting the aspiration for independence in the adoption of decisions on defense issues and for creation of their own organized military structures; the formation of army subunits has begun in some places; a course has been taken toward structural development of their own armed forces in the future; they are encouraging evasion of military service and desertion from the Soviet Army and Navy; they are making decisions that require redeployment of USSR Armed Forces corps and units without considering the interests of the state's defense and security; and voices are being heard on dividing up nuclear weapons. Laws that are in force on military issues are being unilaterally repealed on the territory of some republics. Moreover, there are statements on the need to create national armies even within autonomous formations. In other words, a review is essentially occurring in society of the institutions that have developed to ensure the security of our multinational state.

You will agree that the question arises: What is legitimate in the steps that have been planned and undertaken and what has been dictated by national ambitions and separatist aspirations?

[Belkov] There is no simple answer to that question. Sharp theoretical discussions on the problems of military structural development are being concentrated around the need and advisability of creating national armies. It is a question of separating the Armed Forces along national billets.

Of course, the sovereign republics will decide what path military structural development will follow. However, it is clear that politically well thought-out, realistic changes of the existing system must proceed based upon the fact that the ethnic factor does not have and cannot have a self-contained nature. It is impossible to examine the problem of a national army outside the context of the military-political processes of the modern world and the place and role of the real and proposed subjects of international life in the maintenance of the military-strategic balance.

So, why and who needs a national army? One can theoretically formulate several goals of its creation. Let us assume that it is needed to protect national sovereignty from

powerful neighbors who retain imperial claims with regard to republics that have become independent. In this case, the speculative nature of the numerous warnings about the impending "armed suppression" by the Soviet Army that has "restored the freedom of the people" is obvious. Whether it wants to maintain the former status quo or not, the center has a multitude of other more effective and not so painful ways. As for the military factor, a simple analysis of the correlation of forces and the real capabilities of the parties will reveal the futility of calculations to solve the problems of asserting and defending sovereignty. Past and current local conflicts are evidence that small countries are not capable of opposing an aggressor who is superior in strength and who has the military equipment resources. Say the Lithuanian Department of Defense plans that nearly 15,000 young men will be serving in the Lithuanian National Army by this Spring. Estonia has decided to form two divisions with a strength of 15-16,000 men. You do not need to have special military training in order to understand: if this army is created, it will be able to provide only limited surveillance and internal defense but it will turn out to be incapable of confronting "imperial" military force. But then why in the case of "power [silovoy] pressure" on Georgia does its Supreme Soviet intend to call upon the population not to resort to armed combat but to civil disobedience?

[Renkas] I would also like to make this issue more precise. Will a national army insure security from third parties that are commensurate with the countries' potential? It is no secret that voices are already being heard in the former states of the socialist community about their intention to enter NATO.

[Belkov] Today the geopolitical position of our union republics is being determined by their affiliation to the powerful Soviet State. Their secession from it will create a fundamentally new situation for the latter-day subjects of international life. And, as we know, this will revive former territorial and other claims against them by other states. This is not nearly a rhetorical question. We can find in the annals of history both documented confirmation of territorial injustices and personal whims of tsars, kings, and shahs who simply gave away entire pieces of lands and territories.

Now let us pose the question in this way. Maybe a national army is needed for maximum consideration of ethnic factors in the joint insurance of the common security of a single territorial and economic expanse which was formed over the course of decades? I think that there is a definite reason here. However, we need to recognize that essentially a denationalized army is found in which there is no proper consideration of national military traditions nor profound attention to national military-historical events and personalities in contradiction to the growth of national self-consciousness which is increasing peoples' interest in the national originality of peoples. Besides, society in many republics has a critical attitude toward the extra-territorial troop manning acquisition principle. In some places, it is suggested that they also have republic (territorial) troops who can be used to carry out private defense

missions, or as Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman V. Grinev says "for additional defense," along with the preservation of a single union army that carries out strategic defense as a possible way out of these contradictions.

However, only in speculative constructions can one create a situation when one member of the union resolves issues of armed support of its security and the remaining members are interested but passive observers. Isolationism here is absolutely reprehensible. Besides, the dismemberment of the army will not improve the country's defense capability. Yes and can one painlessly divide the nuclear potential, the PVO [air defense] and PRO [antiballistic missile defense] structures, the military-strategic command and control system, and the military industrial complex as a whole? Will it become simpler and cheaper to carry out defense tasks if 15-20 ministers of defense and 15-20 chiefs of the general staffs, etc., begin to get involved with this matter? For example, Lithuania intends to not only import weapons from Germany and the Scandinavian countries for its subunits, it will also set up its own production. But does everyone know how much more than the modest republic budget this will cost? For the curious, I can remind them that in Armenia the approximate maintenance cost of just one special regiment is 35 million rubles. Why do these people need these enormous expenditures?

Finally, maybe a national army is needed in order to calm the awakened national consciousness of the people who are striving for true state independence and who consider the army's existence to be an inalienable sign of the state and its symbol? And here there is a topic of conversation. It is true that the categorical nature of the formula according to which "sovereignty is impossible without one's own army" appears to be vulnerable. Earlier, we already stated that it is difficult to view the army as the obligatory and unconditional guarantor of state independence, territorial integrity, and other components of national sovereignty. As for the still retained objective need for its military support, the matter is reduced to making military policy open for the republics' joint participation and mutual responsibility. We can find the appropriate organizational forms of military unity with a common vested interest.

[Renkas] But can it be that the concept that has been taken as the basis for military reform which was prepared by a group of USSR People's Deputies which views the transfer "based on the new union treaty of the resolution of the issues of military structural development and the Armed Forces and the guarantee of state security within the joint jurisdiction of the USSR and the republics that are part of it," and also the laws that consolidate the rights and obligations of the republics through the development and realization of military policy?

[Belkov] I think it cannot be because in this case it is a question not about the army but about military formations that, considering the multinational composition of the population of the republics, cannot be composed of a single nationality. Besides, we also need to see the simply organizational difficulties on that path. Here is a specific

example. Georgia is training conscripts in 11 military specialties and all Transcaucasus Military District training subunits provide another 70. The center trains people in nearly 250 specialties. In all, there are a bit more than 330. And a military district's average requirement is approximately 800-900 different specialties. It is a question of only Ground Forces soldiers and sergeants. Obviously Azerbaijan President A. Mutalibov is completely correct when he says that "Today the objective need does not dictate drafts to create one's own army. Besides, if you consider the enormous expenditures which will be required to support it, it is simply unrealistic to conduct these drafts." But then you need to admit that latter-day leaders of nations need a national army as a sort of unique palace guard from one's own people. As the armed support of ethnocracy, it does not have anything in common with the defense of a nation's sovereignty or a people's independence. At the same time, the transfer of army formations to the jurisdiction of nationalistic and separatist forces could result in combat operations between individual republics or even to armed clashes between various political groups within them.

[Renkas] It seems to me that the USSR Armed Forces have the internal potential to strengthen unity, cohesion, and friendship between servicemen of various nationalities which can in a definite situation weaken the influence of nationalistic elements that exist outside the army. I have in mind the feelings of internationalism which have been cultivated among soldiers throughout the entire history of the USSR Armed Forces. Is it obvious that we should conduct this work more aggressively today?

[Yasyukov] Absolutely. But new objective factors that demand definite modifications in the content and methodology of international education have appeared under contemporary conditions. It is a question first of all of placing the ideas of democratic socialism and universal values at the foundation of this education. However, the formation of this foundation has been impeded by the explosion of national self-consciousness in the process of developing glasnost and democracy.

[Renkas] But how can we understand that?

[Yasyukov] It is very simple. The turbulent growth of national self-consciousness in and of itself also has both an objective and a progressive nature to a definite degree. But this distinction is so mobile and inconspicuous that in practice the growth of national self-consciousness is capable of engendering exceptionally dangerous manifestations of extreme nationalism and chauvinism that are, frankly speaking, devastating for the unity of the peoples of the country. The latter are acting as a rigid barrier on the path of internationalism and as an ideological platform of fratricidal clashes on national grounds. This sort of innocuous quality—pride for one's own nation—already carries within itself the embryo of a view with disdain toward another nation. But can we really be proud of those things that arise regardless of our labor, will, and desires, for example, like our birth? Certainly just like you should never be ashamed of our nationality, so you should not compare it with other nations. And nevertheless under

contemporary conditions, we are observing, first in one republic and then in another, that people are divided into native and non-native people and into those who can be proud that they are, say, Lithuanians and those who are not that nationality. An appeal for proletarian, socialist internationalism in these cases is already not "working" because people are divided not by class but by the national sign. I think that this approach must be excluded first of all in the army although there were attempts "to abide by known proportions" and on this basis to restrict the advancement in service of soldiers of some nationality or other during the period of stagnation.

Right now the time has come to expand the framework of proletarian, socialist internationalism, having assigned primary importance to universal values and primarily those like protection of human and citizens rights and freedoms and democratic law and order thereby creating a powerful spiritual strata of international values that are capable of detecting and forcibly separating any manifestations of nationalism. This internationalism confirms the primacy of the individual citizen of the common great Homeland over his national affiliation. It consists of the best traditions of proletarian internationalism as M. Svetlov so poetically extolled them in the poem "Grenada": "I left my peasant hut and went to fight in order to give the land to the peasants in Grenada." I think that this Ukrainian peasant lad who died for the happiness of another people stands incomparably higher spiritually than those who in recent years have manifested "Hurrah, patriots" and who are ready for the sake of national egoism to doom both themselves and neighboring peoples to bloody clashes.

The proper organization of international and national education is unthinkable without precisely formed ideological reference points among which universal values must have an ample priority. This is also important because people with various world views and diverse party affiliations will come into the army.

[Renkas] Security, including military, has always played an exclusively important role in the formation, development, and activities of our state. Many republics entered into it first of all for reasons of their own military security. However, today nationalistically and separatistically minded people and the movements organized by them are trying to find offense against Russian and Soviet central rule. Can we say that they are correct?

[Danilenko] There certainly were offensive cases and we need to depict them as such. But we also need to understand something else: thanks to this power the peoples have preserved themselves as national communities. Without entering into the Russian and later the Soviet multinational state, some peoples would have found themselves under the rule of other states.

Until now, the Soviet Union as a multinational state has been perceived by the rest of the world from the military-political point of view as a single whole. It is with this whole that other states have structured their relations.

During the period of the Cold War and fierce military-political confrontation, the Western powers had the aspiration to weaken the USSR's military might. For this purpose, they actively and not unsuccessfully exploited the factor of the Soviet State's multinational nature. They actively conducted nationalistic and separatist propaganda addressed to practically all nationalities of the Soviet Union. For example, it is significant that the government of England closed access to the archives (the time period of their opening had arrived in accordance with the laws operating in that country) which contain documents that define the goals, nature, and methods to incite interethnic antagonisms within the USSR. Not only England was involved with this during the entire postwar period. The Western powers conducted this "work" with all their might and in close coordination.

[Renkas] It is indisputable that intense contemporary interethnic conflicts in the USSR—are first of all the result of our internal development. But can we disregard the significant "contribution" that Western propagandistic and other intelligence services made while striving to weaken the USSR's military might?

[Danilenko] I do not think we can. But today the situation is changing. The Western powers already openly no longer support nationalistic and separatist extremists. It has not been excluded that they will be totally disappointed if the extremists undermine military-political stability to dangerous limits. However, the role of the Western powers in the stimulation of nationalistic and separatist movements in our country has been substantial until now. They understand that if interethnic relations break down in a multinational state and take on an alienated and moreover a confrontational nature, this will negatively impact the entire series of its defense problems.

[Renkas] And could you also express your opinion on the problem of creating republic armies?

[Danilenko] It seems to me that this path is hopeless and very unreliable. It does not even untie the knots of interethnic relations within the republics, each of which is practically multinational. Consequently, the entire spectrum of interethnic problems will exist with regard to the army, inside the army, etc. Fifteen republic armies (and there could be even more of them) will create a complicated system of military-political relations that is fraught with dangers. The probability increases for an adventurist military policy and the use of armed forces in relations between union republics or those who have left the Union. Moreover, this is fraught not only with domestic but with external military-political dangers. It is a groundless illusion to hope that each republic will establish ideal military-political relations with all states. The secession of any republic from under the common military-political roof of the Union will also signify a new military-political situation in a specific region. If we proceed from the importance of the problems of war and peace, it is understandable what a high responsibility each subject of our union statehood has in this matter.

Issues of military policy, military structural development, life and the activities of troops must certainly be resolved in a new way in a renewed Union. Each subject of the federation will be a full-fledged participant in their resolution. But it is obliged to bear its share of the responsibility for these decisions.

From the editorial staff: The thoughts expressed during the discussion are certainly not indisputable. But we are not closing this subject with this conversation and we are counting on subjects in political training classes to express their opinions on these issues. We await your letters.

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Nagorno-Karabakh Commandant Sends in Troops
OW1705114091 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1830 GMT 16 May 91

[Text] IF's [INTERFAX] correspondent in Stepanakert, referring to sources in the Interior Department of Nagorno-Karabakh, reports that troops of the Commandant of the state-of-emergency area were sent on Thursday to interfere in the passport control operations conducted by the Azerbaijani OMON (spetsnaz police) with assistance from Soviet Army and USSR Interior Ministry troops. Colonel Zhukov, the commandant, ordered his troops into the village of Karintak after a group of local residents had complained to him about OMON arbitrariness. "They said spetsnaz policemen had been burning civilians' homes and had arrested nearly all men in the village, preparing to send them to prison in the Azerbaijani town of Shusha. The complainers had managed to break through OMON cordons and reach Stepanakert.

Fresh reports say the Commandant's troops have taken the situation in Karintak under control, driving all the other servicemen away and letting residents return to their homes.

In Stepanakert, Major Pikinin, deputy Commandant of the Askeran district, has told a group of journalists, among them IF's reporter, that "I want the media to announce as widely as possible that I condemn the arbitrary actions taking place in Nagorno-Karabakh under the guise of passport control operations. I favor the use of more civilized methods. The militants indeed must be disarmed, but one needn't ravage hospitals, break into private homes or humiliate people while fulfilling that task."

Major Pikinin blamed these malpractices on the country's leadership which, he said, "is either unaware of what's going on or else deliberately trying to remove all Armenians from Karabakh."

Estonian Minister Confirms No Militia on Republic's Border

LD3105090691 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1700 GMT 29 May 91

[Excerpt] With regard to the stationing of militia units on Estonia's border, Arved Jaaska, deputy minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Estonia, has confirmed

to the BALTIC NEWS SERVICE that the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs has received a telegram [from USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo]. At the same time he emphasized that as from 1 March there is no militia in Estonia, according to the law on the police. As the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs is independent, according to the Savisaar-Bakatin agreement [of 1990], the directive does not concern the Estonian police. Jaaska confirmed that the border guards are being reinforced with police as there has already been an attack carried out at Murati and Luhamaa by armed criminals. [passage omitted]

Latvian Named Political Chief in Baltic MD
91P50220A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Apr 91 p 3

[Yuriy Zubkov: "The Baltics"]

[Text] For the first time in the existence of the Baltic Military District, a Latvian, Major-General Viktor Zakars has been named Chief of the Military Political Directorate and Deputy Commander of Troops. Political observers suppose that with this decision a noticeable improvement in relations between the army and the local population is possible.

Non-official information about the possible replacement of the commander of the Baltic Military District which had made the rounds earlier had evoked alarm from Latvian society. This was due to the fact that, in the words of the republic's Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Gorbunov, he has good relations with the Air Defense Forces' Commander Fedor Kuzmin. During the January events Kuzmin assured Gorbunov that the army would maintain neutrality. Indeed: the servicemen did not interfere in the conflict of the civil population with the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments] nor did they conduct patrols in the republic's cities.

In the Baltic Military District Press Center our correspondent was refused any kind of predictions for the future and it was stated that the current situation does not need any commentary.

Latvian Law Will Offer Army Service as Alternative
PM3105141891 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel M. Ziyeminsh: "Alternative Service... in the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text] Riga—It is simply amazing how, in just a short period of time, some laws adopted in the Latvian Parliament can undergo such a transformation. In speaking about this, I am thinking primarily of the controversial law on alternative (labor) service. I happened to be present when the first texts of this law were drafted and constitutionally enshrined. This was one and a half years ago. At that time, arguments centered around one issue—such a law was needed by those and only those whose religious

convictions clashed with army service. Today the parliamentarians have altered their approach to this question so much that, by way of alternative service, young people of draft age are offered the chance to... serve in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces.

Soon the Supreme Soviet Commission for Defense and Internal Affairs intends to submit a draft law on state service in the Latvian Republic to the parliament for examination. According to this draft law, it is proposed that conscripts be sent to serve in the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, the customs and excise department, and also the border guards and rescue services. And again, in the more distant future, this law is seen by some as the first stage in resurrecting the Latvian Army.

As announced by A. Ligoznis, a representative from the Commission for Defense and Internal Affairs, the law will come into force to coincide with this year's fall draft. The republic will assume all military commissariat functions, a mechanism will be set up for registering and drafting persons liable for state service, and those who evade it will be subject to strict disciplinary measures. It is expected that state service will be granted obligatory status, although service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces is, as noted above, an alternative.

Latvian Border Guards To Use Arms If Attacked

*OW0306043491 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1530 GMT 1 Jun 91*

[Text] Latvia's customs posts of Ramata, Ipiki, and Keni have been reinforced with militia servicemen from the Latvian region of Valmiers. Border guards were ordered to strictly observe the regulations and allowed to use arms in case of attacks.

Head of the regional militia Juris Kubulins told the newspaper "DIENA": Our Estonian colleagues say they are working together with customs officers. We are in Latvia also will have the militia helping us."

Latvian Supreme Council's Deputy A. Berzins thinks it is necessary to set up joint customs posts with Estonians. "We will be stronger then," he says.

Latvian Official Reports on Baltic Council Statement

*OW0306044391 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1230 GMT 1 Jun 91*

[Text] Deputy Chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council Juris Dobelis told reporters that at a meeting of the Baltic Council in Vilnius May 30 heads of the three Baltic republics issued a statement.

It says that the USSR having canceled consultations between delegations for talks scheduled for May, "started military actions against the Baltic states". "Actions by military groups run counter to the Soviet Union's promises not to use force and to move to democracy", the statement points out.

"The categorical demand by the military that recruits from the Baltic republics should serve in the armed forces of the

foreign state poses threat of forced call-up and may lead to destabilization of the situation in the Baltics", the statement notes. J. Dobelis also said that the three republics had signed at the meeting an agreement on interaction in case talks with Moscow are resumed.

Alleged Troop Movements Close to Lithuania Denied

*PM3105134491 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 May 91 First Edition p 5*

["Rejoinder" by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Pronin (USSR Defense Ministry Press Center): "New Version of Old Story"]

[Text] I read an article in the 25 May ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA which, quite frankly, cheered me up—even though generally this newspaper, in my view, suffers from a clear excess of official Russian Government material. The article had a very brief headline: "Dangerous Maneuvers." But I laughed because it reminded me of an old, highly amusing story. Ivan meets Petr. "Why've you been so quiet, Vanya? I heard you won a Zhiguli in the lottery." "Yes, Petya," Ivan replies. "Only it wasn't a car, it was 100 rubles. And it wasn't the lottery, it was a card game. And I didn't win, I lost..."

Well, that ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA article was just like this story. Except that it had the blessing of the prestige of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet organ. The writer of the article, having heard about the telegram sent by the Lithuanian premier to USSR President M. Gorbachev and Defense Minister D. Yazov stating that "the Pskov Airborne Assault Division has been transferred to the borders of Lithuania," picked up on this rumor which lacked any real foundation. Moreover, he blames the USSR military department for allegedly "continuing to conceal troop movements on the country's territory." Well, the writer of the article has evidence from another, clearly very prestigious, source: The Lithuanian Territorial Defense Department itself (!) stated that the Pskov Division "is currently in the Belorussian city of Porechye, which is approximately 20 km from Druskininkai."

As for other official sources, it simply ignores them. Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, stated in the 24 May PRAVDA that the rumors about assault troops being moved from Pskov were provocative and irresponsible. Major General V. Markov, chief of the Airborne Assault Forces Staff, made it clear that the division had just finished checking the results of the winter training period and, as of 12 May, not a single subunit had moved beyond the borders of its deployment areas.

But ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA does not favor PRAVDA and, clearly, does not read it on principle... Nor does it trust the explanations provided by Defense Ministry officials responsible for press relations. Explanations which it itself seeks, incidentally. This is a pity. They would make

fools of themselves less often, finding themselves in the position of the Ivan in the story who made a "loss"...

Second Attack on Lithuania's Lavioriskes Border Post

*OW3005061391 Moscow BALTFAX in English
0930 GMT 29 May 91*

[Text] The Lavioriskes border post of the Vilnius region on the Lithuanian-Belorussian frontier was attacked for the second time Tuesday evening. At about 21:30 15 men wearing uniform and civilian clothes came in a "Ural" truck. They severely beat customs officers and burned down the post. Two badly wounded customs officers were taken to a hospital.

The Lavioriskes border post was restored two days ago. On May 24 night it was set on fire among other Lithuanian border posts by the Vilnius OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] special unit.

BF's [BALTFAX] correspondent reports on May 28 the Lavioriskes and six other Lithuanian border posts were transferred under guard of the Lithuanian police (Earlier, they were under the authority of the Lithuanian Home Defense Department). However, during the attack the policemen were making their rounds along the border.

The Lithuanian radio says Lithuanian Minister of Internal Affairs Marijonas Misiukonis failed to comment on the incident because, as he put it, "On that day he was in Belorussia and was not well-informed about it".

The Lithuanian parliament passed a resolution Monday which confirms the right of officials "to defend their state by all legal means".

Lithuanian Defense Department To Build Vilnius Barracks

*PM3105131091 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 May 91 First Edition p 1*

[Unattributed article: "'Pentagon' for Butkevicius"]

[Text] Vilnius—What should Lithuania currently be building as a priority? Apartments? Hospitals? Kindergartens? Schools? Not just that, it seems. The republic's government believes that Lithuania is currently in extreme need of a... barracks. Particularly in central Vilnius.

The newspaper RESPUBLIKA has informed its readers that the Territorial Defense Department headed by A. Butkevicius is planning to build its headquarters in the center of the capital. It is planned to construct the building on the right bank of the Neris River near the Zhirmunskiy Bridge.

"But does Lithuania really need a national Pentagon headquarters more than anything?" the newspaper asked.

"Perhaps it simply has nowhere to put the millions allocated to the Territorial Defense Department out of the republic's leaking budget?"

Stratospheric Commo Equipment Functioning at Vilnius Base

*LD3105150791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English
2130 GMT 30 May 91*

[Excerpts] The violent events of 13 January in Vilnius have become a new starting point in the history of Lithuania. The notorious Soviet paratroopers from Pskov were moved back right after they had done their dirty work here. On 20 May units from the ill-famed paratroopers division in Pskov were once again sent to Lithuania.

The paratroopers landed in the military airport of Kazlu-Ruda, southeast Lithuania, and moved toward Belorussia. At present they are stationed in the Porechye-Gozhe forest near Druskininkai, a Lithuanian resort city near the Belorussian border. Official Soviet military sources say that military teachings are now underway. [passage omitted]

The training sessions started with attacks on customs control posts on the Lithuanian-Latvian border. Reliable sources say that the military trainings are of a strategic character with privates and sergeants of the 1989 call-up taking part. Let me point out here that these men have some military experience already.

Besides, a month ago a group of high-ranking Soviet officers from Leningrad, Moscow, the Baltic, and Belorussian military districts arrived in Lithuania with special secret instructions of some kind. [passage omitted: background on Pskov paratroop division]

The present appearance of paratroopers from Pskov on the Lithuanian and the Latvian stage and the secret documents brought to Lithuania by high-ranking Soviet military officials are too much reminiscent of the tragic events of January here. [passage omitted]

We don't know if the present secret instructions have already been opened. However, we do know that the stratospheric communications equipment installed in the northern military base of Vilnius is already functioning.

The latest developments on the Lithuanian borderline testify to the fact that these instructions are already being carried out and that the provocations machine has been set to motion.

Training, Tasks of Lithuanian Volunteer Army

*LD0106124691 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network
in Swedish 1030 GMT 1 Jun 91*

[Text] Lithuania is currently building its own army, but so far it is voluntary and more or less unarmed.

[Reporter] Here comes a little troop of the volunteer Lithuanian army [sound of soldiers marching]. Only two

weeks after the massacre in Vilnius on 13 January, the training of 250 volunteer soldiers started. This training is not viewed with approval by the Soviet Army. This is the reason why the Lithuanian soldiers are not allowed to wear the green uniforms outside the barrack area, (?Ramunas), one of the volunteer says.

(Ramunas) says: We avoid all contact with the Soviet Army, we never wear uniforms outside this area, they do not know who we are. He earlier did military service in the Soviet Army. The actual barracks, if one can call them that, are directly connected to the parliament and were previously the (?house) of the trade unions in Vilnius.

The volunteer army is directly under the Ministry of Defense and has conscript training of one year and officer training of four months. In addition to this home guard, men in civil disobedience [as heard] are trained by the ministry. This volunteer army will be unarmed and the soldiers do not receive any training in arms. But according to the chief of their training, there are weapons in the barrack area. The parliament has not decided that we should be armed yet, he says, and therefore we do not use the few weapons we have. They see it as their task to make a Soviet invasion of the parliament more difficult. It is not possible to stop it, but will take longer for the Soviet Army make entry there and they will be forced to use violence to succeed. More than that the Lithuanian army cannot do, the way the situation is at the moment.

Roundtable with Rodionov, Chernavin, et al

91UM0706A Moscow DEN in Russian No 9, May 91 p 1

[Roundtable discussion with USSR Defense Council Deputy Chairman Oleg Dmitriyevich Baklanov, USSR Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin, USSR Armed Forces General Staff Academy Commander Colonel-General Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov, and DEN Editor-in-Chief Aleksandr Andreyevich Prokhanov: "A Visit to General Rodionov's Office"]

[Text] USSR Defense Council Deputy Chairman O.D. Baklanov, USSR Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin, USSR Armed Forces General Staff Academy Commander Colonel-General I.N. Rodionov, and DEN Editor-in-Chief A.A. Prokhanov are having a discussion at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Academy.

[Prokhanov] Igor Nikolayevich, we have gathered here today in your magnificent office under crystal chandeliers and this reminds me of how we met.... Afghanistan, Panjir Ravine, tanks were firing direct laying on the rebels' firing positions, your BTR passed through the front line and went beyond our combat formations into the direct fire of the rebel machine guns.

[Rodionov] It is impossible to forget Afghanistan. Believe me, Aleksandr Andreyevich, I often find myself there at night in my dreams. That same green river, the steep granite slope with the machine guns, and the tanks on the unharvested wheat field.

[Baklanov] This is how man's life has been arranged that once severe ordeals fall to his lot, they bend and break him. And he either wins and withstands or breaks and dies. There have been many tests in Igor Nikolayevich's life, including the ruins of Spitak and the stiffest—Tbilisi. And we can now say: he has courageously withstood it.

[Chernavin] Today, our Homeland and the entire state is undergoing a test. The history of Russia is remarkable—first smooth sailing, then explosions and collapses. But each time, while almost destroyed to its foundation, it has been reborn and has become more powerful and wiser. But what is this costing the people? Who needed to place the country on the verge of catastrophe for the third time in this century?

[Prokhanov] We are all actors in this drama. Each one of us has his role, large or small, tragic or tragicomic. But an awesome and fantastic drama is unfolding. There are many riddles and many secret characters and plots in it that have still not come out onto the stage. Some of them will also never appear. But our descendants will unravel this secret. Maybe they will assemble a "peoples' court"—they will judge those who shed the people's tears and blood. Right now let us attempt to answer several questions here.

[Baklanov] Providing assessments is a complex task.... But wise men say that the roots of the present are in the past

and today lays the foundation for tomorrow. Unfortunately, right now we are losing our scientific-technical potential, not to mention other things, and that is dangerous.

[Prokhanov] Let us attempt to explain to ourselves and to others, who and for what reason did they need to destroy our army, to remove it from the social consciousness, to deprive it not only of awesome weapons and strategic bridgeheads but also of the people's love and trust. What and who is behind this?

[Chernavin] I think that our army hinders the external rival, the mighty, rich, and intelligent rival who is striving for supremacy in the world and who is striving to force its "new world order" on mankind. And it is our army and our navy which are the support of the state and the system and which maintain the state patriotic philosophy, impede those forces, groups and, now one can already say—even classes who are striving to change the system and change the country's philosophy. The external, as we say, "super-state" and the internal "fifth column" have united in their attacks on the USSR Armed Forces.

[Rodionov] If we analyze this entire dirty, disgusting torrent which is raining its constant detractors down on the army—the OGONEKs and VZGLYADs, Komsomol members and perestroyka academicians, this entire squall of rebukes, slander and profanity is being arranged in a definite outline with regular consistency. This is not simply profanity but a well-planned counter-propaganda operation to demoralize enemy troops. A war is going on and they are destroying our army just like during a war.

[Prokhanov] What about this outline, Igor Nikolayevich, and what about the consistency?

[Rodionov] Look, how did this anti-army propaganda begin. They say the army, the USSR Armed Forces—is a threat to the new world war and the end of the world. The military, they say, is pushing us toward a world catastrophe. And disarmament began being served up with this dressing and they began destroying missiles, tanks, and groupings of forces, and entire theaters and entire regions of the world have been exposed. Today this retreat has assumed the nature of panic-stricken flight. And the rival immediately arrives at the empty locations and fills the vacuum. America is not disarming, is not dismantling bases, and is not using oxyacetylene torches to cut up its boats and aircraft—this is the first thing. And the second thing. The myth has been put into circulation in the press and in the parliament that, they say, the army is extracting the juices from the national economy and from the non-military economy and there are no consumer goods because we are building submarines and bombers and there is no meat because we are launching space vehicles. That is how the destruction of the country's military industrial potential began and I would say it is irrational: conversion is criminal. Oleg Dmitriyevich knows better than I what conversion has been transformed into.

[Baklanov] Yes, doleful sounds are being heard at defense enterprises. They are breaking the bones of the defense industry. They are creating the myth about the militarized

economy but this does not correspond to reality: in production of weapons, we are third with nearly seven percent of material resources and that is no more than in other countries.

The rates of reduction of defense potential—are 15-20 percent annually which is not optimal; it requires greater expenditures and results in social tension.

Certain forces are conducting coordinated attacks against the Party, the army, state industry—and against the state system as a whole.

[Rodionov] Well, that means I was correct. Conversion for political and demagogic considerations—this is a crime, the murder of the army. The third axis of attack. They assert that the Armed Forces are a throng of all sorts of defects and all moral crimes, that service in the troops destroys the individual, and that “relations not in accordance with regulations”—are terror and violence. I am not idealizing the army but arousing and fanning this hysteria has resulted in the fact that young people have begun to fear army service. Mothers and families have begun to fear the army and they begin to tremble in the 8th and 9th grades while anticipating the draft notice. As a result—desertion and mass failure to appear at conscription facilities. The army is finding itself cut off from the family and from the people. Its most important ties are being slashed. One more axis of attack—is the social position of officers. Who will begin to assert that our officer is well situated?! With an apartment, salaries, and comforts? Of course, no one will.

[Chernavin] What kind of comfort! A submarine officer anywhere in the North or on Kamchatka spends a month in a nuclear submarine on an autonomous cruise in the midst of the iron and special weapons and returns to base and there an ice-cold barracks with icicles hanging from the ceiling awaits him. Officers' wives are crying from these comforts!

[Rodionov] Of course, the social security of our junior and middle level officers is sometimes deplorable. Especially those who are returning from our East European Groups, from well-appointed Europe, to our emptiness, sand, and swamps. But this is being used for political purposes. It is being stressed, it is being hysterically whipped up and it is sowing instability. Right now there is a very difficult situation and high social tension among our middle and junior officers. But the generals are the special item and the special object of attack. No matter what you say about generals, disparage them, insult them, make them a laughingstock, some buffoons will wear general's gray hair and a general's honor. There is one goal—to lower the prestige of the command staff and to isolate it from the middle level, and the middle level from the soldiers and sergeants. To destroy the internal unity of the army and to split the structure, make it full of holes, frail, and unmanageable—that is the task of propaganda!

[Prokhanov] I recently talked with a senior Bundeswehr officer in Germany. He was amazed: how can you, your government, and your army permit people to deride the

uniform and an officer's honor?! This is impossible in any country of the world! But it is permitted in your country?!

[Rodionov] Unfortunately, right now everything is possible in our country. For example, is it possible to insult, disparage, or call Afghan vets who shed their blood in accordance with the state's order or who gave their lives on the state's altar butchers and psychologically abnormal. They instill inferiority in the army's most combat capable contingent that underwent baptism by combat. In any country this would be the army's elite and a precious national military resource. We have treated them shabbily in our country... having called them butchers, we have argued with each other and we have shunted them aside. Callously and unconscionably.

[Chernavin] And now, Igor Nikolayevich, one more axis of attack has been added to all of the others. When they need to save the situation, they send the army into the zones of interethnic conflicts and practically make it a participant of a civil war and later when it carries out its duty, they “thank” it—by submitting it to be tormented by pseudo-democrats. You understand this very well after Tbilisi.

[Rodionov] You are correct, Vladimir Nikolayevich, this is one more and maybe the most destructive weapon that the army's enemies are using. They present the army as a butcher and a punitive expedition! And the army in these bloody conflicts is correcting the political leadership's shortcomings and the shortcomings of the state's highest policy. It would be very important to juridically formalize the army's conduct in extraordinary domestic situations. And until there is a Law on the Army, the political leadership must stand between the army and its detractors. This is our political leaders' direct duty.

[Prokhanov] I think that our highest leadership is finally beginning to see the light. Not that but the following. The government's state thinking requires respect and consideration of the army from it and especially for an army like ours that unselfishly, dedicatedly, and selflessly serves its people, be it saving harvests from under the snow or suppressing Chernobyl Block Number Four. I believe that an Afghan vets parade will nevertheless occur on Red Square. And the president who did not meet the troops who were being withdrawn from Afghanistan and extracting their severely wounded columns near Termez and Kushka, will stand on the Mausoleum at the position of attention and the Qandahar, Herat, and Kabul regiments will march along the paving stones, the knocked out, blown up vehicles will extend past, the veterans' wheel chairs will push up onto the square, and the nation will bow down before them—their own sons!

[Baklanov] If not ideological conviction, the Party, the army, and the people themselves—then who will protect the country from chaos?

[Prokhanov] You sort of predetermined my next question, Oleg Dmitriyevich. What is the army's role in society's current chaotic state? The word “dictatorship” is not on our lips. Shevardnadze left his post with this word, frightened of the responsibility for the collapse of the USSR's foreign policy. The democrats are frightening the people

with dictatorship. Is there any truth to this? I have to admit that I do not have a precise notion of this. Maybe indeed, we need to say the hell with these cunning laws and establish a dictatorship in order to prevent a civil war and the disintegration of the state?

[Baklanov] But what about if you look at this from the other side? Empty shelves—is this really not the dictatorship of poverty? Miners' strikes, irreversibly destroyed entire sectors of the economy—is this really not a dictatorial, unconstitutional method? Today, the ordinary man lives under the oppression of several dictatorships, including information, when only one opinion, only one type of music, and only one point of view of a group of politicians is drummed into him.

[Chernavin] I am sure that the army is not contemplating a dictatorship. I simply agonize over the fact that with increasing disorder, disruption of ties and the paralysis of state, I would say that society itself is burdening the army with functions that are not characteristic to it. That same clearing of the rubble in Spitak, elimination of the consequences of accidents and catastrophes, rescuing refugees during interethnic war, transporting cargoes, harvesting wheat..... One can assume that only the army will remain capable of maintaining social order, will use air bridges to connect regions, will feed the population from its strategic reserves, will combat epidemics and outbreaks of violence in the event of general chaos and at the same time will maintain external security. It is simply society, having lost its ability to govern, that is itself delegating this function to the army. Is this really a military dictatorship? It is a burden, a heavy and horrible burden! But the army cannot leave its own people in trouble and it cannot be indifferent to its suffering.

[Prokhanov] In general, our army is surprisingly different from all others in this sense. It has been deprived of political will. If the political power refuses to defend it, the army is incapable of defending itself. It is funny to say but all of these years a small handful of patriotically-minded Russian writers has defended the army and the army itself has been silent although at the same time it has had its own newspapers, political organs, and propaganda institute. And right now the army and its generals do not have the political will which would result in a dictatorship. Zhukov, the most powerful military man in the world, rejected dictatorship and submitted to Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. But naturally this does not signify that the army and the defense complex do not have their own domestic political role. I think that this role will increase especially after our troubled post-perestrojka time. But we need to discuss that separately. So, what will the army's role be in the post-perestrojka period?

[Baklanov] I will attempt to express several opinions on that score. We need to remember that the army and the defense industry—are part of the whole, they are part of the people, and they are part of the country; all of this is not isolated, all of this is united. But you are correct: the army, if it has to take responsibility for governing the economy, transportation, and society as a whole could only support that government for a certain period of time and at

an extremely low level. The army would be interested in transferring this government to civilians and to promote the restoration of civilian structures as soon as possible. It, the army, would need serious intellectual support in order to formulate the concept for the new period and to introduce into it not only stabilizing elements but also elements of development. In general, enormous organizational experience has been accumulated in the Armed Forces and in the defense industry which civilian society can take advantage of. Imagine: to create and carry out a nuclear project or a project to create an ocean fleet, the space missile industry—to do this, you need to create an entire economy, an entire science, new mines, new cities, new cadres of workers and engineers, to form an infrastructure, and to provide regulation and command and control to millions of components: technological, social, and psychological. And we succeeded in doing all of this and, when the end product appeared—a rocket lifted off, ships left on a cruise, or a new generation of satellites were placed into orbit—besides this tangible product, an intangible product remained in the hands of military engineers and army men: a multitude of invaluable organizational discoveries. It is these discoveries and these spurts—from one super-project to another, from Polaris to Ohio, from Shuttles to SDI—that advances American civilization. Therefore, the defense industry has much greater organizational experience than, say, newly appointed politicians who are incapable of insuring even garbage collection on the streets of Moscow, cannot feed or clothe the population, or plan a city management strategy.

[Chernavin] The main thing right now is to prevent our technologies from being squandered, our scientific collectives from being disbanded, and from losing the flower of our officer corps. They are our future.

[Baklanov] It is the future because, while developing super new technologies—exotic according to the current times, we are sending them not only to the defense programs, not only for weapons development, but also into the civilian world. The "technotron" civilization of the 21st century is being preserved in our aviation and space design bureaus and I believe: when the dilettantes retreat into the background and stop slapping engineers' hands, they will once again renew the frozen industry, will revive the scientific research collectives, and will continue their research and discoveries. Their contribution to the future is unquestioned. And lastly. With the current decline of state ethics, the decline of social morals, and the destruction of collectivist, patriotic ideals, the army remains the custodian of these values. It, the army, as previously, thinks on the scale of the entire state and of all of the people, and as before feels that it is the heir of ancient military traditions, it is selfless, and honors its own heroes and its own military leaders. It carries the national ideal within itself. And this ideal which today has been crowded out by egotism, separatism, and anti-state individualism will be returned from the army to society and will once again become established in it.

[Rodionov] And I still need to say: despite the entire anti-army uproar, the army remains the people's favorite

offspring. The people have developed a certain scepticism toward many structures, but not toward the army.

[Prokhanov] It seems to me that here, within the walls of the General Staff Academy, it would be appropriate for us to touch on the theoretical and strategic tenets because all of the interlocutors, besides myself of course, are directly concerned with the problem of the country's security and its defense philosophy and doctrine. Right now it is time for us to finally and frankly admit: the parity that we achieved with such difficulty, that unique balance of peace from which mankind could have gradually, while reducing the level of confrontation and rivalry, reached a harmonious, "post-parity" world, has been destroyed in NATO's favor and to the detriment of the USSR and now America completely dominates in the world. The world has been knocked off its foundation, has lost its balance, and the latest war in the Middle East—is evidence of the unstable state of the world.

It is obvious that the old approach to the arithmetical balance in the military sphere leads to distortions not only in military-technical policy but also in the country's long-term development plans and therefore the current attempt to formulate a military doctrine raises a number of questions.

First of all, it assumes an appeal to universal values and in so doing does not define the concepts of "national interests and goals" that it must first of all do. Existing and potential threats to these interests and their sources have not been defined.

Secondly, the system of ensuring the country's national security remains not entirely clear. Today, how does the country's military leadership examine the problem of military security?

[Rodionov] In my opinion, a thoroughly developed doctrine does not exist. The doctrine that has been formulated has an extremely abstract, undeveloped nature. Those enormous changes that have occurred in former theaters of military operations are changes that are not in our favor and our internal instability and the split of the state require new components for the doctrine. For example, Europe. Previously, our troops stood in direct contact with NATO troops. In the event of a conflict, fronts and offensive and defensive operations on the ground would have arisen immediately with tactical and operational-tactical effects. But now the troops are separated by thousands of kilometers. They can come into contact only using intermediate range missiles and army aviation. During the first days of a war, the tactical effect will be nearly absent while the strategic component of the war will drastically increase. Right now the General Staff is pondering all of this and it is being discussed among the military.

[several lines missing]

...concept of doctrine, the navy's role as an instrument for conducting our military policy, although it would be incorrect to talk only about the navy's capabilities without considering the might of the ground forces. In principle, the military doctrine has left the task facing the navy

unchanged. Only the conditions under which these tasks may be carried out have become unfavorable for the USSR Armed Forces.

[Prokhanov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, what are these tasks?

[Chernavin] For the Northern Fleet—high readiness of the fleet's strategic forces, support for our ground troops flank during defense and the counteroffensive. Combating the probable enemy's submarine and surface ship strike task force. Creation of a threat to the enemy's maritime transport movements. Providing security to our maritime transport movements along sea routes.

For the Pacific Fleet—support for the ground forces and amphibious landing defense of the coasts of Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and Kamchatka. Insurance of naval strategic nuclear forces' ability to resist the enemy. In other words, maintain the ocean fleet's nuclear potential in readiness: submarine, surface, and air.

For the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets—support for the ground forces flanks in defense and counterattack, destruction of enemy ship task forces, blockade the Baltic and Black Sea straits, and amphibious landing defense of our own coasts.

[Prokhanov] I recall that I sailed with our ships on the Mediterranean Sea to the Adriatic Sea and our antisubmarine warfare officer made acoustic contact with an American submarine equipped with nuclear missiles. I saw how difficult it was for the navy to organize the Mediterranean squadron's life and combat alert duty. Maintenance without bases—only at sea without access to ports, without repair facilities, and often with a shortage of fresh water. And the American 6th Fleet was based in the best ports in Europe—Piraeus, Barcelona, and Naples. For seamen—service, rest, and a repair industry. The squadron commander told me: it is important to withstand the first several minutes of attack, to reduce a possible missile attack on our Black Sea bases, the Donbas, and then we can die! The brutal logic of these remarks astonished me at the time.

[Chernavin] The logic was brutal but we servicemen understood it. There are losses and then there are losses. In order to reduce the level of losses in the first minutes of war, we need to improve the forces command and control system and build protected command posts and communications centers. Disperse and conceal reserves of weapons, ammunition, and food. And this also means expenditures, money, and construction. Increase ship repair facilities. However, budget appropriations for development of the Navy have been significantly reduced for 1990 compared to 1987 which significantly weakens the navy, and reduces its capability to repel an attack from the ocean and sea axes. We decommissioned a large number of ships that were no longer usable, rejected modernization, and we still do not have enough resources for repairs. And this directly impacts the navy's combat readiness.

[Prokhanov] During long cruises, I had time to understand what it meant for a ship to have a base, repairs, a fresh water source, and the opportunity for the crew to leave the

iron deck for Mother Earth for a couple of hours. But, unfortunately, we were forced to leave bases that were created with such difficulties in various regions of the world, like Dahlak in the Red Sea. And, as I understand it, this is leading to the reduction of our naval presence abroad. The Americans are increasing their presence.

[Chernavin] You are correct, our recoil is occurring in the background of the increase of U.S. and NATO naval activity. In 1987, the American command increased the 3rd Fleet's zone of responsibility which previously encompassed the eastern and central portions of the Pacific Ocean to the areas adjacent to Kamchatka Peninsula. American warships armed with strike weapons have begun to appear often in the areas of Kamchatka and the Kuriles and also in the Black Sea off the coast of the Crimea. Exercises are constantly being conducted off our coasts. It has practically become impossible to differentiate the probable enemy's exercise deployments of forces from combat deployments. Deployment of American forces for the invasion of Grenada began in the guise of an exercise. Therefore, the navy requires greater concern, greater attention, and greater investments. Right now, Peter the Great is watching at times as we operate our navy and his mustache is obviously bristling angrily.

[Baklanov] In general if we return to military doctrine, it is impossible to properly formulate it and fill it with specific content without awareness of such a category as national interests. The Americans talk about America's national interests which are sacred to them. They are prepared to send their navy and army to any region of the world where her interests are being infringed upon. England and France act in the same way. All of them base their strategic concept on "national interests." Just what are our national interests? I think the primary national interest of the USSR and of all of the peoples and nations that are part of it is the preservation of the USSR as a united, great power with sovereign development. The unity of the state and its sovereignty and uniqueness of development permit it to realize the entire gamut of various characteristics and interests of our peoples. A great power surrounded by three oceans that has friends and rivals in the world, that senses the inevitability of future conflicts—energy, ecological, information, and ideological, has its own interests on the entire world's surface, on all continents, on the ocean's bottom, and in space. These interests are being attained through economic, political, cultural, and military means. Naturally they must not contradict universal and class values. What is cunning here! In order to scientifically assess the recent history of the USSR, the conflicts and wars in which we have had to participate, including the Afghan war, we need to formulate the USSR's national-state interests in those periods of history and find out if the state acted in its own interests or if it disregarded them. Military theoreticians, historians, and strategists must explain this and not hand over these problems into the hands of dilettante-journalists or demagogue-parliamentarians. I am convinced: we will pass through this troubled period of our history and reach the next period where enormous work, physical and intellectual,

enormous matters and discoveries await us. We are a great people, a great power, and our unique role has been prepared for us.

[Rodionov] Aleksandr Andreyevich, you mentioned that Russian writers came out in defense of the armed forces. Believe me, we value this very much and we need attention from culture and literature. Russian men of letters have always been close to the Russian Army. Lermontov and Tolstoy were officers.

[Chernavin] The remarkable Artist and Painter of battle scenes V. Vereshchatin fought with the troops throughout Turkestan and died like a soldier on the deck of a ship in Port Arthur along with Admiral Makarov.

[Prokhanov] Right now, during this difficult time, thank God, we have overcome our alienation. All of us, patriots, have come closer to each other. Officer, writer, engineer, and priest—everyone who holds dear the state and the future Homeland has united to rebuff the destroyers and lunatics. And I am sure that the Homeland will survive.

[Baklanov] We will not forget that our meeting is occurring on the eve of the Anniversary of the Victory. During those days in 1945, the year Berlin gave off smoke, the Reichstag burned, and the Imperial Chancellery glowed, Hitler lived out his last seconds and the Soviet soldier went on to Victory. So let us congratulate each other on the Victory!

To the Victory, comrades!

Statistics on Crime, Dedovshchina

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VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 91
pp 11-14

[Discussion by Major General S. Syedin, doctor of psychological sciences; Colonel (Reserve) Boris Ivanovich Krasnov, doctor of philosophical sciences; Lieutenant-Colonel Gennadiy Leonidovich Buzuk, candidate of philosophical sciences; Colonel Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Arbuzov, candidate of historical sciences; Lieutenant-Colonel V. Neverov, chief of Construction Directorate Political Department; Major V. Mamontov, student at the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin; and Major V. Mukhin, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL writer-organizer, under rubric "Reader's Forecast": "Nonregulation Relationships: What Happens Tomorrow?"]

[Text] A transition to the market, a radical military reform and renewal of social policy are under way in the country. How does all this affect the moral-psychological state of our Armed Forces personnel and the state of military discipline? This is discussed by Major-General S. Syedin, doctor of psychological sciences; Colonel (Reserve) B. Krasnov, doctor of philosophical sciences; Lieutenant-Colonel G. Buzuk, candidate of philosophical sciences; Colonel A.

Arbuzov, candidate of historical sciences; Lieutenant-Colonel V. Neverov, chief of Construction Directorate Political Department; V. Mamontov, a student at the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin; and Major V. Mukhin, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL writer-organizer.

Alarming Statistics, But...

[Buzuk] A forecast is a ticklish matter, especially in our days, and even more so, for example, when it is a question of a phenomenon such as crime in the Armed Forces. Much data here is classified, but even that which is published generates alarm. Not long ago we victoriously "reported" that the number of infractions in the Army and Navy dropped 25 percent compared with 1985... But not much time passed and the trend toward a reduction of infractions in the Army already had stopped in 1989, as noted by the USSR Minister of Defense at the 28th CPSU Congress. To this must be added instances of massive evasion of military service, for which thousands of refusenik draftees suffered no liability. The fact is, they often are protected by local authorities. It is no secret that the spring call-up to the Armed Forces essentially was disrupted in some union republics in 1990. A similar situation shaped up with the call-up of young men into the Army last fall as well. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA recently wrote: "If the call-up proceeds subsequently in the very same manner, then very soon our Army will become professional even without the efforts of Democrats"—only officers and warrant officers will remain in it."

[Syedin] In my view you are exaggerating, Gennadiy Leonidovich. Of course, the situation with the call-up of young men into the Army is serious, but not so much as to give way to pessimism.

[Krasnov] It would appear that problems with the call-up of young men into the Army will be resolved after signing of the Union treaty.

But what will be the level of discipline in the Armed Forces? Judge for yourselves. The country's crime rate is growing with each passing year. It rose 12.3 percent just during January-September 1990 and the number of unsolved crimes increased by almost one-third. Infractions among juveniles are growing at outstripping rates, increasing by 22 percent in 1989. The fact is, many transgressors evidently will put on a military uniform at some time or other. There is your forecast for the future and what situation to expect.

More than 50,000 young men with previous convictions are called up annually. Many initiate various illegal activities in subunits. Take the data of the Military Tribunals Directorate for example. Of the soldiers sentenced for nonregulation relationships in 1989, 15.6 percent had criminal proceedings instituted against them prior to the Army and 7.7 percent had been subjected to administrative punishments and were registered with juvenile affairs commissions. Every third person sentenced grew up without a father or mother or in an unfavorable family situation, and 18.9 percent did not even finish secondary or vocational-technical school...

Let us ponder the last figures. Servicemen's real educational level is low—unfortunately, this too is a sign of our times. The situation also is aggravated by the fact that we have ceased to call student youth into the Army, for it is no secret that servicemen with a higher intellect not only held more responsible positions, but also had a positive influence on their contemporaries, which facilitated both establishment of a healthy moral atmosphere among personnel as well as successful performance of combat training missions. Now these problems will be more difficult to solve.

Unfortunately, the conclusion from all the information cited is a sad one: until our society, and consequently also the draft contingent of the youth, becomes more civilized, one hardly will expect substantial changes in the Army's criminogenic situation.

[Mukhin] Boris Ivanovich, I can back up your conclusion with other examples that are not without interest. All violators of military discipline in an air defense formation were surveyed anonymously. An analysis of their responses highlighted the following picture.

Fifty percent of those surveyed noted that they had encountered injustice in relations of seniors toward juniors even before service in the Army. Half of the soldiers admitted that they had used alcohol in civilian life; eleven percent noted that they did this daily, 16 percent monthly and 23 percent less than once a month.

The opinion previously was that a person who had come to know need and poverty in childhood was more diligent and industrious at a mature age. By and large, that is how it was: war, hunger, ruin, loss of loved ones. These misfortunes touched almost all people of the postwar generation who, frankly speaking, were attempting to get out of poverty. And they emerged from those ordeals with honor, but that was that generation.

Now the study about which I am talking revealed quite different facts. The poorer that draftees lived, the greater their proportion among violators of military discipline. For example, there were 49 percent of violators of military discipline (of whom over 40 percent lived below the poverty level, i.e., with an income of less than R60 per person) among soldiers whose per capita family income before the Army was from R60 to R90, 28 percent from R91 to R150, 6 percent from R150 to R200, and 4 percent over R200.

In my view, one hardly will solve problems of effective work with draftees successfully without a social program aimed at economic support of the youth and at shaping its highly moral and cultural makeup.


[Arbuzov] We have delved deeply into examining so-called social roots of "dedovshchina," but in my opinion we missed an essential point. Statistics indicate that nonregulation relationships are gaining a clear-cut ethnic coloration today. Studies show that ethnic and countrymen's groups have appeared in some Army and Navy units and subunits which attempt to place themselves in a privileged

position with respect to other servicemen. Conflicts naturally arise. While there were 17-20 percent of such conflicts in a number of military districts in 1986, there were already 28-31 percent in 1990, i.e., every third or fourth infraction of regulation requirements occurs as a result of clashes among servicemen of different nationalities. We see that the tendency toward a growth of ethnic conflicts in subunits is directly proportionate to the number of such conflicts for the country as a whole in recent years.

Is Everything Quiet in the Construction Battalion?

[Neverov] Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, your conclusion clearly confirms the data on infractions in our directorate's military construction detachments. An analysis shows that over the last five years statistics on "dedovshchina" (as it is traditionally understood) have begun to give way at an accelerated pace to the number of nonregulation relationships on ethnic soil (see chart—Ed.). Numerous talks and anonymous surveys of servicemen convincingly show that 98 percent of soldiers are disturbed specifically by this phenomenon.


Dynamics of Change in Level of Nonregulation Relationships (according to data received by Lieutenant Colonel Neverov)



Microgroups of military construction personnel called up from Caucasus and Transcaucasus areas form actively in subunits. Speculating on their alleged "ethnic features of upbringing," they have demonstratively begun to refuse to perform fatigue work and they are forcing colleagues of other nationalities to do this. Such relationships gradually also are being transferred to the production sphere.

Growing social tension and instability of inter-ethnic relationships in the country, and numerous anticonstitutional laws of union republics can be said to largely predetermine the gradual growth in the number of infractions involving military construction personnel going AWOL from their units. For example, their number increased ninefold in our detachment in the last two years and there was a substantial change in the structure of motives for which servicemen are leaving their units. Unfortunately, national-separatist notes also prevail in these motives (see diagram—Ed.).

Proportion of Reasons for Military Construction Personnel Going AWOL From Units (according to data received by Lieutenant Colonel Neverov)



Nevertheless, I would make the optimistic forecast that the trend toward a reduction in infractions will gain the upper hand. In my opinion, this is also explained by active preventive work being performed by commanders and political officers and by the fact that in the very near future collectives of military construction personnel will be more homogeneous in ethnic makeup despite the expected understrength status of units. And finally, the personnel rest great hopes on reform in construction units. It would appear that establishment of economic incentives for highly productive labor will help solve many problems here, including those concerning strengthening of military discipline and law and order.

Just What Did the Survey Show?

[Mamontov] I asked 100 servicemen—privates, junior commanders and officers—the questions touched on here. They represented motorized rifle troops, airborne troops, air defense and naval infantry. It would appear that their responses merit attention. Here are the tables.

Table 1—What Can Significantly Influence Eradication of "Dedovshchina" in the Army?

No	Response Variants	Percentage of Respondents
1	Army's transition to a volunteer basis	58
2	Granting subunits an opportunity to engage exclusively in combat training matters	30
3	Manning subunits according to age	19
4	Rigidifying disciplinary pressure on violators	12
5	Increasing periods of service for soldiers incriminated in "dedovshchina"	11
6	Manning subunits by the ethnic principle	10

Table 1—What Can Significantly Influence Eradication of “Dedovshchina” in the Army? (Continued)

No	Response Variants	Percentage of Respondents
7	Strengthening criminal liability for gross infractions of military discipline	10
8	Faultless fulfillment of the USSR President's Ukase “On Certain Measures for Strengthening Servicemen's Social and Legal Protection”	5
9	Institution of alternative service	4
10	Adoption of the Law “On Status of Servicemen”	3
11	Refusal to call up persons with convictions or who have been arrested by the police	1

Table 2—“Dedovshchina”: Forecast for the Future

No	Response Variants	Percentage of Respondents
1	Undecided	32
2	It will remain unchanged	25
3	It will accelerate if the country's socio-economic situation does not change	20
4	It will subside even if the situation in the country does not change	14
5	It will basically be eradicated by the year 2000	9

[Syedin] Data of the survey cited by Major Mamontov represent a specific spectrum of views on the problem of eradicating nonregulation relationships in the Army. They unquestionably have to be taken into account subsequently. But what places a person on guard is that every third serviceman surveyed has trouble giving a forecast for “dedovshchina.” What does this indicate? In my opinion, in our unstable time people are losing confidence in tomorrow. Social tension is growing, economic difficulties are increasing, and life seems hopeless. Are people up to forecasts here? It seems to me, however, that respondents also have trouble responding because we are unable to predict and we do not attempt to interpret and presume just what will happen tomorrow. But we cannot go into the future blindfolded. There must be forecasts which will help take measures to prevent infractions in the Army. Then it would appear that matters of strengthening combat readiness and increasing military proficiency in military collectives also will be resolved more effectively.

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Numbers of General Officers in Armed Forces Questioned

91P50201A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 21, Jun 91 p 4

[Letter from Col (Res.) A. Kravtsov, followed by editorial response, under the rubric “Question”: “Secret Data”]

[Text] How many generals are there in the USSR Armed Forces, not including the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs?

Marshal S. F. Akhromeyev reports in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA that 1,991 marshals, generals and admirals are serving in the USSR Armed Forces as constituted on 1 October 1990.

According to D. T. Yazov, in the process of cutting the USSR Armed Forces by moving officers into the reserves or retirement, 1,477 generals are being discharged. It turns out that the generals' corps is shrinking by 70%

Further. In the first version of the draft Concept of Military Reform it is suggested “taking account of the shift of the USSR Civil Defense and of the railroad and construction units out of the structure of the USSR Armed Forces, to reduce by 1,300 the number of general-officer-level staff positions.” In the new version of the Concept, instead of an absolute figure, there appears a relative number for the proposed reduction—20% or 30%

Taking account of these data, it turns out that the number of general-officer-level positions amounts to from about 4,333 to 6,500 individuals. However, if one turns one's attention to the fact that many general-officer-level positions are occupied by colonels (about 10% of them), then the number of generals amounts to from about 3,930 to 5,900.

Thus, Comrade Akhromeyev “erred” by, at a minimum, two or three times?

FROM THE EDITORIAL OFFICE

Possibly, our reader's calculations are unreliable. One hopes that his mistakes will be corrected by the Ministry of Defense Cadres Directorate. Or are all these figures so secret?

Kochetov to Visit UAE

91P50218A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report]

[Text] In accordance with an agreement which has been reached, USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense General of the Army K.A. Kochetov will visit the United Arab Emirates on an official visit in the beginning of June of this year.

Algerian Chief of Staff to Meet with Moiseyev

91P50218B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report]

[Text] By invitation of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR General of the Army M. A. Moiseyev, the Chief of Staff of the National People's Army of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic, Major-General A. Guenaizia will visit the Soviet Union on an official visit in the beginning of June of this year.

Journalists Invited to Fly in Soviet AWACS

91UM0665A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 17,
22 Apr 91 pp 14-15

[Article by IZVESTIYA special correspondent Viktor Litovkin: "'Secret' People"]

[Text] These photographs are a year old. They were made in April 1990, when an IZVESTIYA correspondent, the first among journalist colleagues, succeeded in making a flight aboard a Soviet analogue of the American AWACS, an aircraft for long-range radar target acquisition. But I am telling about that event only now. Why so late? About this a bit later... For now I will say that during the war in the Persian Gulf the accuracy and effectiveness of air and cruise missile strikes by the anti-Iraq coalition was to no small extent a credit to the AWACS aircraft.

After a four-hour flight from Lithuania, our aircraft landed toward evening at a Black Sea Fleet airfield in the Crimea. The warrant officer who received it "led" the aircraft to the very edge of the flying field where Tu-22-ye strategic maritime reconnaissance aircraft were standing awaiting their hour.

Crew commander Major Valeriy Khakimov was last to descend to the concrete, where his boys already were thoroughly cussing out a confused warrant officer, the flight line duty man. The voice of radar flight engineer Major Sergey Kholin resounded louder than the rest:

"Where were your eyes, scarecrow?! How do we get out of this trap now? Perhaps tomorrow you will fly to the exercise in our place? Or do we knock down the posts?"

The duty man did not give excuses. No one was listening to his arguments that he was receiving such an aircraft for the first time in his life and did not know what kind of ramp area it needed.

Khakimov went around the aircraft and whistled in surprise. The aircraft's right wing hung about 30 m deep over an earthen breastwork protecting the concrete ramp, and concrete light posts rose up practically equidistant on both sides of it within a radius of approximately 20 m. Even to enter here with a 150-ton aircraft was possible only by a miracle, but to leave it... Special prime movers and special equipment were needed here. Even then there was more than a single hour of bother... And where was it to be gotten?

...One could say that I ended up in Major Khakimov's crew by chance. After questioning me about the time periods and purpose of the TDY, Political Department Chief Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Fedoseyenko talked by telephone with an air controller and with the unit commander and warned:

"[several words missing] only one aircraft. It will take off in a half-hour and will land in the Crimea..."

Getting my things out of the hotel and settling with it was not difficult, but we caught up with the AWACS right on the runway—Khakimov was taxiing out for a take-off. Without shutting down the roaring engines, they opened

the door a bit for a minute and lowered the ladder, and I found myself in the dark maw of an enormous airship glimmering with greenish screens of displays and plan-position indicators and very, very tightly crammed with cabinets of all kinds of gear.

It turned out to be Kholin who greeted me. He held out a helmet with built-in headset and microphone and a small metal bench and indicated a place next to him. The roar in my ears began to become a little quieter. I looked to the sides, and along the sides I saw people bent over the screens of instruments, with figures and symbols running before their eyes, and the winking of various lights. The aircraft shuddered and I was shoved back into a cabinet rack. I sensed how the aircraft, all the while accelerating and accelerating its run along the runway, suddenly separated from the ground almost the same way as an Il-86 passenger liner and moved swiftly and steeply upward, already in a military manner...

Khakimov took his place in the right seat in a proprietary manner, moved the direct-vision windows aside, looked to see how his people were standing on the concrete, made sure that they had a good view both of himself and of each other, and turned his head to the flight engineer:

"Start!"

Vershinin ran his fingers along dozens of toggle switches, buttons and levers. Needles came alive on instruments, indicator lights came on, and immediately all four engines began rumbling quietly, gathering force. The commander waited for them to warm up and shoved one of the levers with an easy movement of his hand.

The body of the AWACS shuddered ever so slightly as if it had begun to oscillate somewhat in place. I got the sensation that this was an enormous elephant in a store crammed solidly with fragile crystal that began to take steps and turn a head with large protruding forehead and a trunk from side to side so as to quietly make its way to liberty and into the open without damaging anything.

"Millimeter men," I recalled. That is what I was told they called air defense pilots flying the long-range radar target acquisition aircraft, performing reconnaissance of air, surface and ground space and vectoring groups of fighters for intercept. Airborne for many hours on end, they frequently literally had to "stand" like a bicycle racer on a track, dancing out a standstill in one place so that the disk-shaped antenna did not lose the indicated search area from its field of view and so that communications between ground command posts and the interceptors were not interrupted.

The art of such a smooth slip without 360-degree banked turns or steep turns is a very delicate and complicated science. It is given only to masters of expert-level advanced aerobatic maneuvers, and then only with years and with experience. I was told that Major Khakimov, a former fighter-interceptor pilot who left the supersonic g-loads because of his state of health, specifically was one of those masters.

But expert-level advanced aerobatic maneuvers and a "standstill" in the air is one thing; it is another on the concrete of the airfield. No one ever teaches this. It is not even covered by AWACS flight operations rules.

In contrast to foreigners, Soviet citizens have not had occasion to read about our long-range radar warning aircraft (AWACS by American terminology), except possibly in the foreign press. For us they were classified, but there even their photos were published many times. The fact is, "we fly the same skies"—our pilots regularly meet American reconnaissance pilots above the Baltic, over the Barents Sea, and over the Pacific Ocean, and they also meet Swedes and Norwegians in Europe.

Meanwhile, such aircraft have existed in our country for a quarter-century now. Their first modifications were accommodated on the basis of the Tu-95 strategic bomber and were called Tu-126's; the present ones are installed on the basis of the Il transport and the military call them A-50's. Many members of Major Khakimov's crew—majors Viktor Vershinin, Aleksandr Terekhov, Sergey Kholin and Andrey Chernyshev—flew the Tu and mastered this relatively new aircraft. In comparing various aircraft, they have a kind word to say in recalling the Tupolev, where designers were concerned for people and made a crew lounge; there is none in the present aircraft, just as there is not even a toilet and one has to suffer an entire flight of many hours or run to the bucket.

Nevertheless, the Il's combat capabilities are higher. I was told about them in rather great detail and was shown a very respectable area of the Black Sea with the strip of the Crimean coastline on screens of displays and plan-position indicators. Dozens of blips flickered on them like a field of islands in the ocean—it turned out that these were ships and vessels hurrying with cargoes to Odessa, Nikolayev, Kherson and Izmail, standing on the roads awaiting free berths or heading on the return path. Right here on the screen it was possible to receive very precise coordinates and other necessary data on each of the echoes, and if there were aircraft in the air, complete information on them.

What such complete information means for modern combat can be judged from recent events in the Persian Gulf.

"Are you satisfied with your aircraft?" I tried to elicit a response from specialists of Khakimov's crew.

They shrugged their shoulders.

"Yes and no."

But Kholin expressed himself directly:

"I would like to rip off the ears of those who made the electronics for us..."

I saw how many times during the flight he ran into the zone of powerful high-frequency irradiation and how many times he switched one set to another, disconnecting automatic equipment, shifting it to a manual tracking mode and vice versa, especially when this was dictated not by narratives, but only by malfunctions in equipment operation, and thought: "How long will the health and life of our

people such as Major Kholin and his colleagues and other officers, warrant officers and privates still be hostages of egotistical interests of defense firms and their supersecrecy? Or is man, as before, merely expendable material for us, an appendage of a militarized economy?"

It was in Moscow that Colonel General I. Maltsev, chief of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff, told me:

"Yes, the problem of supplying our Army with reliable, high-quality equipment is very acute today. Serious measures must be taken so as not to lose military-scientific potential in the course of conversion but, to the contrary, to strengthen it. The war in the Persian Gulf teaches that it is necessary to take things not by numbers, but by quality."

...Captain Gakalo tossed his arms above his head and crossed them next to his service cap. Khakimov suspended the "dance" of the enormous AWACS on the concrete. His lean face was calm and impassive, as if he had not moved a 150-ton machine backward and forward for a good hour on a ten-meter spot of airfield, but had sat for this time with a fishing pole on the bank of a sleepy pond.

"I believe, Viktor, it will not be necessary to knock down the posts," he said, smiling sparingly at the flight engineer. "A little more and everything will be in order..."

The crew members shared with me that the most difficult problems of their life were mutual relations with local authorities. They already had become accustomed to protest rallies with and without cause at the checkpoint of the military post near Shyaulayay, as well as to demands to "Close the airfield!" and "Go back where you came from!" They had reconciled themselves with the fact that they are not given apartments in the city; they already are not even given out for any kind of money, although the pay for a specialist flying in an AWACS is not large: exactly the very same as for a military transport aviation pilot. This is half that of a Moscow trolley bus driver, but it is not a matter of rubles.

The children and wife of GCI controller Captain Yuriy Gladyr are forced to remain in Maykop. Yuriy sees his loved ones only on leave because of the absence of an apartment or even a place in the dormitory.

The pilots also try not to argue with postal employees when they do not accept parcels from them to the Soviet Union, especially when it should have been a question of food products or consumer goods—they did not even accept a little bouquet of dried flowers from Kholin and his wife, who each year send them to Samara for their daughter's grave. "Forget about them," Sergey said, giving it up.

But it is extremely difficult to tolerate when nonacceptance of the military and political speculations on their presence reach absurdities devoid of common sense.

A topic made the rounds of local television for several weeks in a row about how the military were ruining nature. They showed a forest lake. One of the television people got a bucket of water from it, tossed in a match, and the water

flamed up like gasoline. Right there they showed a flying AWACS which allegedly was dumping its fuel on the forest.

The pilots invited city soviet deputies to the airfield and led them to the aircraft. They told them: "Look for drain valves." None were found.

They drove a fuel tanker up to the aircraft. Before everyone's eyes they filled the tanks with kerosene and filled a bucket from the very same hose that was connected to the AWACS and lit a match. They tossed it into the kerosene—it did not burn... It turned out that special fire safety additives are provided in that kerosene, and the subject of the little lake was simply a very cheap trick calculated for unskilled persons.

...Gakalo again tossed his hands over his head joyously and even somehow in celebration and crossed them in the air several times: "Brilliant, commander, shut down the engine!"

Khakimov released the throttles. The aircraft stood in the middle of the runway as if it had been led there immediately. The happy warrant officer, the flight line duty man, was jostling among the pilots, congratulating them on the success.

I went up to Khakimov to shake his hand. He raised darkened eyes to me.

"Let's come to an agreement, correspondent: you saw nothing, heard nothing, and nothing happened here."

"I don't understand," I said, taken aback with surprise.

"There is also nothing to understand here," he added quietly. "If you write, they will remove me from the aircraft..."

"For what? For proficiency?"

He frowned.

"For an emergency incident—for an accident-threatening situation with the aircraft... Better write how we are greeted at others' airfields: it is already the second hour here, there is still no bus, and we don't know where we will spend the night or where we will have supper..."

The bus arrived toward midnight. That same warrant officer who received our AWACS had been trying to dislodge it. Khakimov and I agreed that if I did write about this "standstill" of the AWACS on the airfield concrete, it would only be in a year's time, when no one would be able to find fault with him any longer according to all Army laws, including according to regulation.

I kept my word.

New Air Defense Installations in Latvia's Liepaya
OW3005044891 Moscow BALTFAX in English
0930 GMT 29 May 91

[Text] According to the newspaper "DIENA", the construction of new air defense installations is underway in the Latvian port city of Liepaya. At the same time, some of

the old ones located in the villages of Vainode and Varte of the Liepaya region are being dismantled.

In an interview with "DIENA" spokesman for air defense troops Yury Zamyatin explained the moves with the Gulf War experience. In his words, the war "showed that fragments of missiles shot down above inhabited areas cause great damage. Taking into account the possibility of attacks from the sea, air defense installations should be located on the coast so that missiles fall into the sea".

MiG-31 Export Version to Appear at Paris Air Show
91UM0701A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jun 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by Col A. Manushkin: "The MiG-31 Flies to Paris"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] On 10 June, the Soviet MiG-31 fighter-interceptor, with USSR Merited Test Pilot V. Menitskiy at the controls, will take off from a Moscow area airfield, "violate" the USSR state border and set a course for Paris. This all-weather supersonic aircraft will be placed on view there for the first time, at the world show of modern aviation attainments held at Le Bourget.

We wrote nothing about this aircraft for quite some time. Even photographing it was forbidden, even though NATO circles had a name for it: "Foxhound," after the dog. Indeed, this rather large craft (takeoff weight carrying 46 tonnes, 200 kilograms of fuel in internal and wing tanks) is capable of developing speeds up to 3,000 kilometers per hour at altitudes exceeding 17 kilometers.

The change in the international political situation, with the glasnost and openness appearing in our country, made it possible to demonstrate the MiG-31 interceptor at the international air show.

"The craft has much that is unique," said Chief Executive Designer Rostislav Apollosovich Belyakov of the OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni A. I. Mikoyan. "The original design of high-temperature engine with its high compression ratio has enabled us to attain a high ground speed at fairly good economy. No other country has an engine that operates in this manner."

However, the aircraft has more to offer than the above. It also possesses unique flight characteristics and armament. The MiG-31, a defensive aircraft, is designed to destroy air targets at low and high altitudes flying in the forward and rear hemispheres, and with the earth as background, in both VFR and IFR weather, with an enemy executing maneuvers and employing active countermeasures.

The long range and high speed make it possible to destroy enemy aircraft before they launch their missiles. The interceptor is fitted with a unique radar (which incidentally will also be shown at Le Bourget) that is capable of tracking 10 targets and engaging four. As a comparison, the American F-14 fighter can engage four to six targets, but they must be located in a narrow sector.

The above capabilities of the Soviet interceptor are made possible by its phased array antenna, which offers a large scan angle. Four MiG-31s flying together can scan forward 600 kilometers and further.

The craft is designed for a crew of two. The navigator-radar operator occupies the rear cockpit. He monitors the air situation and manages the armament.

"Has the aircraft set any records?"

"An interesting question," said Rotislav Apollosovich Belyakov. "In this connection, our country's record altitude of 37 kilometers, 600 meters has yet to be broken. It

is possible for the MiG-31 to fly even higher. However, we were not presented with that kind of task."

And so, opening on 13 June in France is the International Air Show. Working with Experimental Design Bureau imeni A. I. Mikoyan Chief Pilot V. Menitskiy demonstrating the aircraft's features will be Navigator-Radar Operator Yu. Yermakov. We wish them and their OKB colleagues success! What will be demonstrated at the show will be the export version. This means that someone may become interested in purchasing it. Foreign exchange is something the country needs very badly.

Obituary: V-Adm (Ret) V.I. Petrov

*91UM0616A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Apr 91 First Edition p 4*

[Obituary signed by: V.N. Chernavin, I.M. Kapitanets, K.V. Makarov, V.I. Panin, V.V.Zaytsev, A.A. Kuzmin, F.I. Novoselov, V.P. Potapov, I.G. Makhonin, and V.V. Sidorov: "Obituary of V. I. Petrov"]

[Text] Vice-Admiral, Retired, Vladimir Ivanovich Petrov died after a prolonged illness. He devoted his entire life to selflessly serving his socialist Fatherland and the cause of the Communist Party, in whose ranks he had served since 1948. V.I. Petrov was born on January 18, 1926 in the city of Yuryevets, Ivanovsk Oblast. Beginning in October 1943, he was a student in the Baku Naval Preparatory School. In the postwar years he served in various command positions aboard ships of the Baltic Fleet. Upon completing the Naval Academy he was assigned to the Pacific Fleet, serving as Deputy Commander for Rear Services, Commander of Rear Services, and member of the Military Council of the Northern Fleet. He later served as First Deputy Commander of Naval Rear Services. V. I. Petrov distinguished himself in all his assignments by his outstanding organizational abilities, responsibility and devotion to duty, great degree of diligence, competence, sensitivity, and attentiveness to people. For his services to his Fatherland, V.I. Petrov was awarded numerous orders and medals. The sacred memory of Vladimir Ivanovich Petrov will forever be in our hearts.

Poor Quality in Submarine Construction Lamented

*91UM0635A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 May 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Captain-Lieutenant K. Puteyev of the Northern fleet: "Readers Ask": "Nonstandard' Nuclear Submarines"]

[Text] The nuclear submarine on which Captain Third Rank I. Sapozhnikov is serving was on a cruise when one of the sonar complex units malfunctioned. At first they suspected the electronics, which in this unit tends to fail, but further examination revealed this time the kinematics were at fault. At the manufacturing plant one of the workers incorrectly installed a bearing on the shaft, which made the shaft vibrate and, as a consequence, the gear teeth of the pinion installed on it quickly wore out.

There was no spare bearing, and one is not actually required, because a submarine, even taking into account the poor quality of equipment, cannot carry a complete submarine on board in the form of spare parts. Fortunately, there was a skilled craftsman among the sonar operators, who was able to make a new pinion. The sonar complex was repaired and the nuclear submarine was able to continue carrying out its assigned mission.

After returning to base the submariners discovered that the same incident had occurred on another ship for the same reason.

We have heard much about the situation with construction, usually concerning residential construction, in our country. Many newspaper articles have described how houses are handed over near New Year's Day, but with a lot of things left undone. Judging from everything it seems that shipbuilders are handing over combat ships to the Navy in a similar manner. The grounds for such a conclusion is provided, in part, by the situation in the nuclear submarine formation [soyedineniye], which has just been mentioned. The chief of the electromechanical service of the unit, Captain First Rank A. Smolyakov says straight forwardly:

"In recent years practically all new ships have arrived on the eve of the New Year's Day holiday or immediately after it. Industry is handing them over quickly, thus there are imperfections. For example, in the past year the new submarine, on which Captain Second Rank V. Shuklin serves, had to be sent back to the shipyard to eliminate serious faults of the main shaft lines. And so-called minor defects are abundant. For example, the nuclear submarine on which commander of the electromechanical unit Captain Second Rank V. Zagrebin serves left the shipyard with unpainted bulkheads in the compartments, with unlabeled equipment, without electrical switches in the cabins and at battle stations, with a malfunctioning high pressure valve at the chemical fire extinguisher station, with leaks in the piping, and so forth.

When it was still at the shipyard, says Captain Second Rank Zagrebin, the builders promised that the lights and switches would be installed in the last days before delivery. But they did not keep their word. How can one hold exercises and training sessions, or work in darkness? The deficiencies were eventually eliminated, but time for instructing personnel and arranging combat preparation was lost.

One and one half months were also lost for instruction on the submarine where Captain Second Rank S. Chernenko serves. It was not able to put to sea because of serious malfunctions in the support system of the main power plant. The manufacturing plant was at fault.

For many years it has been repeated that Soviet equipment is the best in the world. Possibly this was true at one time. But now in the electromechanical service alone of this formation of nuclear submarines more than one hundred complaints are sent annually to the manufacturers (and in recent years the number of claims of seamen to the builders has increased). If one multiplies this number by the number of special services in the navy and then by the number of units and formations?

At least two questions must be raised in regard to what has been stated here: Why has industry lowered its quality of work, and Why does the Navy accept ships, as A. Raykin says, "on time but with major deficiencies?"

We will not reveal a secret to America if we say that the main cause of reduced quality and reliability of ship equipment is in the crisis, which the entire economy of the country is going through. This includes a monopoly of developers and manufacturers of equipment which is

leading to stagnation, obsolete technologies, a shortage of modern industrial materials, and much else. Nevertheless, seamen, who have the occasion to visit shipyards, do not tend to blame the designers, engineers, and workers for everything.

I twice participated in acceptance of new ships, states Captain Third Rank I. Sapozhnikov. On the second trip to the shipyard it struck me how greatly changed was the composition of workers in the shops. It happened that many good specialists had fled to cooperatives, to other enterprises, where they pay more, where transition to the market economy had begun earlier. In many sections of the plants there remained yesterday's vocational school graduates, and others who had only one or two years left until receiving a pension.

In a word the misfortunes of the shipbuilders are well known to seamen. But it is not only out of the goodness of their hearts that the Navy representatives accept ships with deficiencies. First, in such cases the shipyard is obliged to fix any deficiencies when the ship arrives at its deployment base. Second, the Navy itself is interested in quickly receiving ships, because they were previously included in the plans of combat preparation, the personnel policy has been prepared for them, the old ships have been retired, and thus a whole chain of events is involved.

How do we get out of this situation? Captain First Rank A. Smolyakov is convinced, for example, that changes for the better will come only after overcoming the crisis in the overall economy of the USSR. His opinion is probably realistic. In any case do we really have to wait so long?

Kuznetsov Joins Northern Fleet

*91UM0635B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 May 91 First Edition p 1*

[Unattributed article: "Aircraft Carrying Cruiser Began a Cruise to the Northern Fleet"]

[Text] On May 6 the heavy aircraft carrying cruiser Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union, which was constructed at the shipyards of the industrial association Chernomorskiy Shipbuilding Plant headed for the Northern Fleet. Its main combat purpose is the protection of Soviet ships located beyond the reach of land-based aviation.

An extensive program of tests of its seaworthiness and combat qualities in the Black Sea preceded the sortie of the cruiser on its maiden long-distance cruise. In recent months the crew worked closely with the shipbuilders, which helped the seamen to quickly and fully familiarize themselves with the complex equipment and to feel at home on the ship.

Modification of Naval Professional Manning Experiment

*91UM0616B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 May 91 First Edition p 2*

[Unattributed article: "Naval Personnel Will Begin an Experiment," under the rubric, "Around the Country: At a Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] The May 7th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet examined the question of amending the Law "On Universal Military Obligation" and the draft of the resolution "On Conducting an Experiment in the USSR Ministry of Defense on Staffing the Navy With Volunteer Servicemen Presently on Active Duty and Contracting With Them to Perform the Duties of Seamen and Petty Officers." The draft law was presented by Colonel-General G.F. Krivosheyev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

First of all, the Ministry of Defense, taking into consideration the complexity of the economic situation, is not asking for a supplementary appropriation of funds from the state budget for conducting this experiment or for transitioning the fleet to a two-year period of duty. But in connection with this, funds will be needed during the transition period of 1991-1992. Those called up for duty in the spring of the current year will already be on a two-year duty tour, while the rest, called up prior to the approval of this law, will give the Navy two and a half or even a full three years.

The military administration, as already mentioned, is also planning to cover the expenses involved in conducting the Navy-wide experiment to staff ships with petty officers and seamen who volunteer for military duty and are given duty contracts. The choice for draftees is this: If you want to earn from 300 rubles per month or more, you have to serve three years.

L.V. Sharin, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security Affairs, supported the basic provisions of the draft Law and resolution. There were, however, a good number of criticisms made as well.

The deliberations will continue.

IZVESTIYA Runs Correction to Komsomolets Article

*91P50181A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 May 91
Union Edition p 8*

[Unattributed article: "Correction".]

[Text] In issue number 110 [Moscow IZVESTIYA 11 May Union Edition p 3] a report was published titled "And That Which Was Above Our Abilities" in which the heroic performance of the crew of a sinking submarine was discussed. Due to the carelessness of the correspondent a grievous error was committed: the events described were reported to have been about the disaster which occurred on the Komsomolets when in fact they were about the loss of a different submarine.

The editorial staff offers its sincere apologies to the surviving crew members of the Komsomolets, to the relatives of the deceased, and to all naval servicemen.

Critique of Current State of Civil Defense

91UM0535A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Apr 91 First Edition pp 1-2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel I. Sergeyev: "A Nonorganic Structure: Will Our Life Become Safer After the Reorganization of Civil Defense?"]

[Text] As the draft concept of a military reform indicates, the removal of structures which are nonorganic for the Armed Forces in their composition will become one of the components of the reform. As we see it, the notes being published give some food for thought in conjunction with this.

To begin with, there are several facts.

In the summer of 1988, an operations group of the USSR Civil Defense Headquarters arrived in Armenia in order to prepare a command post exercise. It was planned to specifically emphasize training involving measures to be taken in the event of an earthquake during the exercise. However, the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Government secured the cancellation of the exercise, citing a complex interethnic situation. The exercise was canceled. In December, something happened which, according to headquarters documents, corresponded to the predicted training scenario 70 percent of the time. In addition, as was to be expected, the incompetence of the leadership of the republic and of the affected cities with regard to the issues of eliminating the consequences of a natural disaster was also revealed.

Recently, a book was published that discusses the operation of Civil Defense units in the course of eliminating the consequences of earthquakes—the 1988 Spitak earthquake and the 1989 Gissar earthquake. The book was prepared by authoritative organizations: the USSR Civil Defense Headquarters, the Civil Defense Institute, the Higher Central Course of USSR Civil Defense, and the Department of Civil Defense of the Military Engineer Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev. Experience in rescue efforts and other emergency work was summed up, and recommendations were made regarding the improvement of Civil Defense forces and the planning of civil defense measures in peacetime. They published the book as classified, instead of making it a mass and popular edition.

The down-to-earth scientific magazine GRAZHDAN-SKAYA OBORONA SSSR is published every other month. It covers on a regular basis issues associated with protecting the populace against the weapons of mass destruction and natural disasters and catastrophes, and the elimination of their consequences. It is published by the USSR Civil Defense Chief Administration. The magazine is also a classified publication.

Editor in chief of the magazine Colonel V. Raspopov clarified the situation: "There is no paper for large printing runs."

Something else about secrecy.

As is now known, a heat explosion accompanied by the discharge of a large amount of a radioactive substance into the atmosphere occurred at the first Soviet enterprise producing plutonium for military purposes in the vicinity of the city of Kyshtym, in Chelyabinsk Oblast, more than 30 years ago. Its radioactive trace amounted to 300 kilometers, and about 15,000 square kilometers were contaminated. This is where everything happened for the first time: the urgent evacuation of a large number of people, decontamination, and medical help... However, this sad experience was not used during the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station] accident because it was classified.

This is how it was. What awaits us tomorrow?

Last year's floods in the Maritime area, when typhoon Judy inundated 109 localities and destroyed 267 bridges, 1,340 kilometers of roads, and 700 kilometers of electric lines, showed that Far Easterners are careless as far as civil defense measures are concerned. Meanwhile, as recently as 20 years ago, every adult resident of this area had—"just in case"—a dinghy, a tent, a flashlight, a ladder, a rope, and so on. As it came out, this time around all of these were also available on paper, at the civil defense headquarters, but they had somehow failed to take it all to the populace. Not only the headquarters but also the managers of national economic entities and enterprises are to blame for this. As they say, God himself ordained that they should take care of their employees.

Of course, ignorance of their responsibilities within the framework of civil defense measures is not the flaw of the Far Eastern leaders only. Here is what we may call a classical example. I recall that former USSR Minister of Health Ye. Chazov took pride in his physicians and paramedics having done a good job in Armenia, whereas civil defense, supposedly, had failed. It turned out the minister had no idea that in his ministry he was chief of civil defense... There have been many cases whereby some leaders arriving at the sites of accidents could only stamp their feet and demand to "call in" colonels or generals responsible for civil defense.

The reason is as plain as can be: There is no Law on USSR Civil Defense. The Civil Defense Regulations adopted in 1976 are clearly obsolete and do not reflect the current situation in our country and the world. However, as they say, the issue will remain on the agenda for a very long time if you place it well. A document has been developed, refined, and considered for eight years now in which it is planned to clearly set forth the duties and responsibilities of citizens and leaders of all ranks for the execution of defensive measures, and procedures for participation by ministries, departments, and public and other organizations in rescue efforts and other urgent work to eliminate the consequences of natural disasters, accidents, and catastrophes. Meanwhile, civil defense has been left without any rights. The issues of civil defense are sort of nonexistent in everyday life, given the array of an uncounted multitude of problems which surround us. We recall the issues of civil defense only when disaster strikes.

Who is to blame for this? It appears that there is nobody to blame because the law does not set forth responsibility for the status of civil defense and for evading participation in its measures. Specialists believe that it has become necessary to separate it out into an independent state system reporting directly to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. Other variants are possible: For example, reporting to the president through the Defense Council, as is the case in the United States. The variants are under consideration.

Meanwhile, civil defense is being restructured internally. The structure of military units is changing: Mobile mechanized rescue brigades, which include units on permanent standby in their composition, are being created instead of cumbersome regiments, the potential of which is small. New nonmilitarized units are being formed at enterprises and the headquarters of civil defense. For example, the "Republic Multipurpose Rapid Response Center" has been set up in Uzbekistan. Its strength is 68 people (up to 100 are planned). They rotate based on 10- to 12-day duty periods. In the opinion of Major General V. Krasnikov, chief of administration of USSR Civil Defense, the future belongs to such detachments. On the initiative of the management of the production association Tolyatti Azot, an accident rescue team of 25 people has been created. It has been outfitted and equipped with small-size machinery which is on the cutting edge of foreign technology. Commissions for emergencies have been set up at the councils of ministers of the USSR and Union republics, and the executive committees of oblasts and cities... However, we can judge from the condition of our economy what the destruction of old structures brings about in the absence of previously set-up and fine-tuned new structures. In the USSR Civil Defense Headquarters, they believe that the best way out in our situation would be to improve the existing system of civil defense which has established communications on an all-Union scale, experience in predicting and preventing accidents at enterprises, and many other things which the newly created formations still do not have. The main point is that civil defense has trained cadres. We have already seen many times how important this is.

In East Kazakhstan Oblast, 8,874 residential buildings were destroyed and about 37,000 people were left homeless in 1990 by an earthquake no less powerful than the one in Armenia. Seismologists projected the loss of up to 10,000 people. One person died. All of this was due to Chief of the Civil Defense Headquarters of the oblast Colonel V. Alikov quickly turning on the warning system after the first mild tremors and announcing the danger on the radio. Everybody had left the buildings...

This is how professionals work.

Another example. After a railway accident in the vicinity of Yaroslavl in 1988, it took an unjustifiably long time to decide to protect the populace due to the insufficient training of the civil defense leadership. As a result, 18 people were poisoned by SDYaV's (highly toxic agents).

The examples are graphic. Yet, we need to discuss the cadres of civil defense, the officer cadres in particular, in more detail.

...The year was 1982. No sooner had I shaken Far Eastern dust off my boots than I stepped onto the drill field of a Civil Defense regiment in the Kiev Military District. As I was walking past the guardhouse, I heard the heart-rending shout of a just arrested drunken sergeant: "Long live the 'Tikha Zhittya' ['Quiet Life' in Ukrainian] collective farm imeni Anatoliy Maslenko!" Several minutes later, regiment commander... Colonel A. Maslenko shook my hand in his office.

We must say that at the time life was quiet in most Civil Defense regiments. The service in the regiments was soft: There were considerably fewer accidents, and the servicemen relaxed. Officers from all services and arms of the Armed Forces who were for some reason unfit for service in their specialty went to the Civil Defense regiments and headquarters of various elements. It was believed that nothing could be simpler and safer than Civil Defense troops.

Unfortunately, little has changed in the manpower acquisition of the civil defense troops and forces since that time. It is still forbidden to use people who have mobilization assignments in nonmilitarized formations. It is all right to use young men between 16 and 18. Meanwhile, even some experienced soldiers faint when they see fake corpses during exercises. There is a reason why in foreign countries they select experienced people to be on rescue teams who are drivers, crane operators, divers, surgeons, welders, and so on at the same time.

At the USSR Civil Defense Headquarters, they believe that there is an urgent need to set up a special school, and in the future an academy. Wonderful technical facilities are available to this end at the Higher Central Course and the Department of Civil Defense in the Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev. Apparently, this will happen when Civil Defense troops are taken out of the Armed Forces.

Training the newly elected top leaders of cities, oblasts, and republics is another, equally important cadre problem. Our stormy sociopolitical life complicates this problem. At the USSR Civil Defense Headquarters, I was shown letters addressed to the leaders of the three Baltic republics in which reminders and explanations were given concerning their Civil Defense responsibilities. We know what the response is on the part of some local leaders who reject any initiative from the center right away.

So far, we can mention a ray of hope for the passing of the time of wholesale classification and secrecy in Civil Defense: A press service has been created at the USSR Civil Defense Headquarters and has already embarked on work to organize and maintain cooperation with the Soviet and foreign mass media. Lieutenant-Colonel V. Volkov has been appointed its chief.

I will give their phone number for those who are interested: 449-97-12.

There are also other shifts that make it possible to view the future of Civil Defense with a certain dose of optimism. For example, it is known that according to a protocol of the 1949 Geneva convention, civil defense measures are for

the public good, and they are socially significant. However, both the MPVO (local air defense) before 1961 and Civil Defense, thereafter, were not geared to handling peacetime tasks. The system of Civil Defense began to turn, so to say, toward the people only after the Chernobyl disaster.

The need for such a turn is more than obvious. At present, according to the data available to the USSR Civil Defense Headquarters, about 2,300 industrial enterprises in almost 800 cities and localities of our country produce and consume annually more than 1 million tons of various highly toxic agents. More than 64 million people reside in the zones of possible chemical contamination, and about 120 million people reside in zones of possible radioactive contamination by the AES [nuclear electric power stations]. In 1990 alone, our country lost more than 500 people as a result of various accidents at ecologically dangerous facilities (according to the data of the USSR Civil Defense Headquarters, there were 347 of them). If we take into account the fact that the continuing decline of production and technological discipline and our unhealthy slovenliness boost the probability of such incidents continuously and inexorably, we may say unequivocally that in the immediate future the role of Civil Defense is going to increase. Do we understand this?

Technical equipment of the troops cannot stand up to any criticism. To this day, equipment that is no longer in production is in service with civil defense regiments: engineering equipment—25 percent, communications equipment—29 percent, chemical equipment—11 percent, and medical equipment—14 percent. This is not surprising: Equipment was provided to Civil Defense based on the residual principle; Civil Defense was granted the status of procurer as late as this year. Understandably, we had no exhibits at an international exhibition of rescue equipment which was held in Moscow recently.

Incidentally, about international cooperation. Despite our poverty, important contacts have been made recently through the channels of Civil Defense with the official representatives of the United States, France, Sweden, the FRG, Switzerland, and New Zealand. An intergovernment agreement with Italy on civil defense has been signed. It is to be assumed that this will facilitate the development of

the socially significant nature of our Civil Defense. For now, the main asset of our Civil Defense consists of its varied and bitter experience involving accidents and disasters which, apparently, prompts foreign specialists to cooperate.

Therefore, what is our Civil Defense going to be as a result of the reform? Specialists, experts, and legislators are yet to answer this question. Meanwhile, it appears that our unique ability to turn all good things into bad things has not failed us in this instance either. The primeval, embryonic signs of a market and economic independence have produced results: Shelters have not been included in the designs of residential buildings and administrative structures; positions of those in charge of Civil Defense in the ministries, enterprises, and offices have been cut; funds have not been allocated for the construction of protective installations where ecologically dangerous industrial facilities have been built. The enumeration may be continued. However, will this bring the leaders who issue instructions of this nature closer to understanding that outlays for preventing accidents are considerably smaller than those for eliminating their consequences? Let us recall the "high-quality" collapse of nine-story buildings in Armenia and how tightly they folded—no empty space at all between slabs and beams, and no hope for finding anyone alive. Probably, someone also saved cement and metal...

The Civil Defense Institute wrote a useful book about what to do in case of an earthquake. They sent it to highly seismic areas with a request to run it off locally and distribute to the population free of charge. The book has been sitting on the desks for one year now. The reason is still the same: There is no money and paper. However, a campaign of sex education has proceeded full-tilt everywhere.

As we reflect on the issues of civil defense, we think primarily about its peaceful mission. This is somehow closer to us and easier to understand. We may describe its significance in wartime more tersely. This is what the book "Survival Strategy" published in the United States says about it: "If all efforts in the area of diplomacy, disarmament, and containment fail to work, civil defense will offer the only hope for the survival of society."

We would like not to lose this hope, after all.

Problems of Moscow MD Medical Services

91UM0692A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel of Medical Service Yuriy Viktorovich Nemytin, chief of Moscow Military District Medical Service, by Colonel (Reserve) F. Semyanovskiy; date and place not specified: "Concerns of Military Medical Personnel"]

[Text] Like any of his colleagues in any other district, Colonel of Medical Service Yu. Nemytin, chief of the Moscow Military District Medical Service, has an abundance of work. Even during our conversation that was not very long, Yuriy Viktorovich would look at his watch now and then—a new TDY trip was coming up.

[Semyanovskiy] Yuriy Viktorovich, what causes the greatest concern of all the various tasks facing the district medical service?

[Nemytin] Paradoxical as it may sound, construction problems now are in the foreground for me. The fact is that units being withdrawn from Eastern Europe are arriving in our Moscow Military District. I will say frankly that our existing polyclinics, hospitals and troop medical establishments and subunits were not designed for such replacements. This means we have to expand existing ones and build new ones. We now are doing this in earnest.

Construction of a new hospital wing for more than 100 beds is being completed in the district training center. With the active assistance of one of the gorispolkoms, the decision has been made to design and build a polyclinic for 300 visits a day on this post. And renovation of a building for a polyclinic especially for reserve officers is being completed in Belgorod.

[Semyanovskiy] And so the number of medical establishments will increase. But is there someone to work in them?

[Nemytin] Yes, this is no simple question. We have a great shortage of physicians and nurses. This problem is difficult to resolve since there is a shortage of physicians for the

entire country and we understand that the strain in this matter will not be successfully relieved quickly.

We also have another difficulty. The district clearly has insufficient sanitation-epidemiological establishments. The fact is that there has been an increase in the density of soldiers living in the barracks in connection with the arrival of units from abroad. The load on enlisted messes has increased sharply. Meals have been organized in some in two or even three shifts. All this requires rigidifying sanitation-epidemiological monitoring. In this connection we are faced with the need to increase the table of organization of corresponding subunits.

[Semyanovskiy] One primary mission of the medical service is to conduct broad preventive work, especially among first-term servicemen. What is the district doing in this direction?

[Nemytin] You know, the need for such work is especially great now. This is connected with the fact that lately more and more young men have been coming into the Army with serious deviations in physical development and with mental disturbances.

We are seeking new forms for such work. That is how the idea originated of conducting a social-psychological study among the troops and in military schools. We developed tests and prepared special charts. We began this work in the Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division and in the district training center.

The first results are as follows: in the very first examination we were forced to send over 20 young soldiers to the psychoneurological hospital for treatment. We also identified a so-called risk group of 45 persons. The next category of servicemen we identified are those inclined toward infractions of military discipline to one degree or another. A group of young men who suffered from chronic ailments which had not been promptly identified back before call-up into the Army turned out to be a rather significant group.

We unquestionably will continue the social-psychological studies and will try to include the maximum possible number of servicemen in them.

Moscow Area Prosecution of 1990 Draft Evaders

*91UM0645A Moscow SYN OTECHESTVA in Russian
No 13, 29 Mar 91 p 6*

[S. Kovalchuk report: "But the Procurator's Office Does Nothing"]

[Text] In 1990, a total of 995 young men in Moscow evaded the draft. Materials on 726 have been passed to the rayon procurators' offices for institution of criminal proceedings. A total of 11 young men have been prosecuted, but were given conditional or suspended sentences. One reason for the mass violations of the USSR law "On Universal Military Conscription" is the weak interaction between the rayon military commissariats and the law enforcement agencies.

In Moscow's Kirovskiy Rayon only 75 percent of the detail for the autumn draft were called. This indicator is higher than the average for the city (71.2 percent). Notwithstanding, dozens of draft evaders were counted, and workers in the rayon military commissariat do not know what to do with them.

Draftee S. Malinovskiy, who was born in 1966, candidly told the rayon draft commission that he would not serve in the Armed Forces. He did not turn up at the time appointed for his departure to his unit. A second summons was also ignored.

Draftee Ya. Shelumov repeatedly failed to present himself at the draft commission. Finally he was brought in by a section chief from the rayon military commissariat, Major M. Plotkin. He was deemed fit for military service. But he ran away from the draft post and has failed to respond to subsequent summonses.

But why, the artless reader may ask, does not the military commissariat exert its influence on those who have broken the law—it is a matter for the law enforcement agencies. It is. But only theoretically.

The general list of draft evaders was sent to the procurator and rayon administration of internal affairs for Kirovskiy Rayon. The effect was zero. In a best case scenario the answer was that "this draftee is not living at the address shown." Period. But we also make application for the militia to conduct a search since we know that he does not live at the address shown. Is this its work? In the rayon administration of internal affairs they have repeatedly analyzed and debated this question but have found no way to improve the work. The official documents that we send to the militia section are not returned, or the responses are unjustifiably delayed. And those who have evaded the draft just walk about calmly, laughing at the law.

So, what is to be done? A man has evaded the draft, the militia cannot find him, the procurator's office does not institute criminal proceedings against him. Total impunity? Up to now, yes. They told me at the garrison military procurator's office that they had recently been granted the right to institute criminal proceedings against draft evaders (previously this had been the prerogative only of the territorial procurator's office), undertake the preliminary investigative steps, and pass the case to the competent bodies. Moreover, a series of joint meetings of workers in the military commissariats and the procurators' offices has been held, at which recommendations were drawn up for agreed actions to execute the law of the USSR "On Universal Military Conscription." Will all this be capable of changing the situation with respect to the draft? We would like to hope so.

Extra Pay Offered Volunteers for Transcaucasus

*LD0606181191 Kiev Radio Kiev International Service
in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 5 Jun 91*

[Text] The INTELEKT news agency reports that announcements and appeals have appeared in Zhidachev Rayon, Lvov Oblast, to the effect that conscripts enlisting to serve in the transcaucasian region will be paid 230 rubles a month during the first year of draft service and 270 during the second. They also offer a number of privileges. However, so far no volunteers have come forward.

Association of Military Historians Formed

91UM0495A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Mar 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by V. Runov: "There Shall Be an Association!"]

[Text] The intentions of certain military historians to create their own association (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 February 1991) was received with great interest by both professionals and "informal" students of the military past. The numerous letters delivered from all areas of the country to the organizational commission attest to this fact.

Such an enthusiastic reaction is encouraging and makes discussion of the viability of the future association realistic. At the current time a set of draft regulations has been worked out, which, after discussion and reworking, will be presented for ratification at the constituent conference.

The Association of Military Historians (AVI) is seen as a voluntary, independent, professional organization having juridical and financial status. Publishing, scholarly, and business manufacturing activities are proposed for the organization. The profits from these as well as member dues, deductions from authors' honoraria, voluntary contributions and donations from organizations and individuals will be used to conduct the programs of the association.

Those wishing to familiarize themselves with the draft regulations should write to: 119255, Moscow, Devichego Polye Prospect No. 4, The M.V. Frunze Military Academy, The Department of the History of Military Art, The Organizational Commission for the Association of Military Historians. We request that those interested also send to this address their suggestions and comments for the draft regulations.

Role, Capabilities of U.S. Carrier Fleet Viewed

91UM0668A Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH
SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 91 pp 69-72

[Article by Colonel V. Roshchupkin under rubric "International Affairs": "A Flash on the Screen and a Track on the Ocean"]

[Excerpts]

An Anniversary Which Forces Reflection

The U.S. nuclear carrier Chester W. Nimitz (that is her full official name in honor of the well-known U.S. Navy admiral) was commissioned in 1975. The full displacement of this enormous steel object (length 332 m) is 91,500 tons and her speed is over 30 knots. The total output of the main power plant is 260,000 hp. The hull is assembled from steel plate; especially important components, including the flight deck, are assembled from armor steel. There are all conditions aboard for the duty and rest of the crew and flight personnel: simulators, shops, bars, automatic games and saunas. A cable television system provides reliable visual communications for the commander with all staff departments, and for the latter among themselves.

The U.S. Navy has six such carriers built in different years. The latest ship of this class was launched in 1990, about which we will tell. The construction of just one costs enormous amounts of money—three billion dollars. It costs 18 billion together with the deck-based aircraft.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon undertakes such expenditures. Why? For it would seem that a huge thing such as the Nimitz is an ideal target for destruction. When he was in the United States at one time, N. S. Khrushchev visited an American aircraft carrier and arrived at the "profound" conclusion that there would be no particular difficulty in destroying her.

While at a Northern Fleet base thirty years ago, at the beginning of the 1960's, Khrushchev again imperially deigned to give an evaluation of aircraft carriers. He determined their place in the "table of ranks" of naval arms at a stroke or, more precisely, with one phrase: they were expensive and complicated to operate and had excessive dimensions. At that time one young officer wrote a letter to the author of such evaluations, expressing disagreement with him. But it is common knowledge that it was not acceptable for us to instruct prominent leaders, especially at that time.

The Soviet leader's peremptory opinions clearly generated only a skeptical grin in the possessors of the world's largest carrier fleet, but they had a very deplorable effect on the destiny of domestic plans for developing this kind of arms...

Well, let us turn to studies by the Americans themselves concerning vulnerability. They do not confirm opinions about carriers' vulnerability and excessive cost. It depends on what they are compared with! If, for example, a ton of

displacement is taken as the unit of reference, it will cost less for the Nimitz than, for example, for a type of ship such as a frigate.

Of course, what a nuclear carrier costs exceeds that of a carrier with a conventional, non-nuclear power plant, but if we compare expenditures of both over a 30-year period of operation, the difference turns out to be negligible. Yes, the carrier's dimensions are great, but this hardly means that she can be destroyed so simply, for the larger the "floating airfield," the more means of protection—active and passive—with which she can be outfitted. In the estimates of U.S. specialists, it takes 7-12 hits of antiship missiles to put a carrier out of action and 20 hits to send her to the bottom.

A carrier's combat might is determined above all by deck-based aircraft, their armament, and their radius of action. The radius of action for U.S. attack aircraft based aboard carriers averages 1,200 km. The carrier herself has a reliable radar early warning and control system warning of an air attack. Escort ships protect the "floating airfield" from an attack out of the depths. Some specialists believe that only one out of ten submarines can penetrate to the U.S. carrier.

As a result, today the United States presumes that despite the fact that the future of carriers is not that bright because of the wide development of other means of modern warfare, their end nevertheless has not arrived, and that considering the above factors it is more advisable to build large-tonnage (up to 90,000 tons displacement) nuclear carriers of the Nimitz class in the present situation.

"A Carrier Fuss"

These days, when events in the Persian Gulf zone are in the military-political epicenter, names of U.S. carriers often are heard in mass media news summaries. Another very large U.S. Navy carrier, the Midway, entered Gulf waters in November together with seven escort ships and with 75 combat aircraft aboard. By that time four U.S. carriers already were in the Near East: in addition to the Midway, there was the Independence in the northern part of the Arabian Sea, the Saratoga in the Red Sea and the John F. Kennedy in the Mediterranean.

According to U.S. press reports, a total of six U.S. carriers will be concentrated in the Persian Gulf area. The world has not known such a concentration of air-capable ships and deck-based aircraft since the time of the Vietnam War. In addition to American carriers, the region's waters also are patrolled by one British and two French carriers.

It stands to reason that providing everything necessary for an entire network of "floating airfields" in the Near East requires an uninterrupted air bridge. In just one week aircraft deliver tens of thousands of tons of supplies and equipment over its gigantic "spans" for the John F. Kennedy and seven escort ships. The Kennedy and her "suite" "consume" 22,000 tons of food products and 22 million liters of fuel weekly. Several tons of sand-colored paint the color of the desert went to camouflage the combat equipment aboard...

The situation on the eve of and during the war prompted western observers and the press to carefully analyze possible options for the development of events and the entire situation in the region. There also were many statements about insufficient effectiveness of using the carrier component, the most powerful component of the multinational forces. In particular, the authoritative British journal *ECONOMIST* casts doubt on the possibility of employing carriers with a high return in the zone of opposition to Iraq.

Here is what the *ECONOMIST* writes in particular: "The commander of the carrier *Independence*' said that there is an abundance of space in the Gulf for launching and receiving aircraft, but a chart of this region inspires doubts on this score. The carrier's parameters require water areas with a depth of at least 60 feet (around 20 m), but the majority of Gulf locations are shallower."

In fact, only channels with a certain minimum depth are suitable for passage of the large-tonnage combatant ships. Freedom for maneuvering also is necessary, which is not at all simple for such a bulky, cumbersome thing. Moreover, the heat substantially reduces the power of the deck-based aircraft's engines. For their take-off the ship has to be disposed in such a way that the oncoming wind blows toward her bow with constant maximum velocity.

But the fact is that aircraft also have to be received back aboard deck, and for this the carrier has to constantly maneuver and keep her stern downwind. What are the dangers of such maneuvers? In such cases, first of all, the ship risks running aground; secondly, she risks becoming a target of the French-made Exocet antiship missiles acquired by Iraq and of sea mines laid by aircraft. In the journal's opinion, if the Iraqis use these kinds of weapons, then although they do not even sink the carriers they are capable of easily disrupting any act hostile toward them and at the same time undermining the U.S. Navy's reputation.

The situation involving ships of lesser tonnage—auxiliary vessels from the carrier groups—also is not much better. It is difficult for them to deploy in this area because it is saturated with reefs, buoys, oil platforms, auxiliary navigation equipment and innumerable vessels, from coasters to supertankers. The Chinese Silkworm missile systems intended for Iraqi coastal defense also cannot be discounted. They are capable of offering "opposition to a U.S. attempt to execute an amphibious landing in Kuwait."

As a result the *ECONOMIST* concludes: "The Persian Gulf is not the best place for a carrier." Life will show how well-reasoned that conclusion is. Nevertheless, one must assume it is of interest not only to the Americans.

But the question may arise: Why was it worthwhile making all this "carrier fuss" if it is fraught with many costs in the region? The answer suggests itself when we recall what role is set aside for carriers in plans of U.S. politicians and strategists. These huge things are set in motion not only by powerful propulsion plants, but above all by U.S. military-political interests in the region. In my view, the combat operations of the United States and its allies which began

against Iraq in January 1991 largely were determined specifically by Washington's military-political interests in the Middle East, a very rich oil-bearing and strategically important region of the planet.

Fantasy and Reality

The work of a carrier's crew and flight and technical personnel clearly is romanticized in a garishly filmed color war movie, "The Last Count," made by the way with Pentagon assistance and spread around the entire world on millions of video cassettes. These are lads who are totally strapping, strong, noble and ready to come to the assistance of people in distress. They withstand all ordeals prepared for them by the authors' creative imagination. But these are fantasies in the direct meaning of the word. How is it in reality?

It is worth remembering that it was fighters from the Nimitz that shot down two Libyan aircraft in the Mediterranean over the Gulf of Sidra. This incident seriously complicated the situation at that time not just in that region... The "noble" Americans reiterated with one voice that the downed aircraft allegedly were threatening their security. But how could two "Libyans" threaten an aircraft carrier with over 90 combat aircraft concentrated on her flight and hangar decks and outfitted with radar early warning equipment and a very powerful air defense system?

Judging from everything, however, it is doubtful whether anyone aboard the Nimitz asked himself such questions. Procedures aboard a carrier are strict and no idle talk, let alone blunders and errors, is tolerated. One can even end up in the brig for three months for negligence in combat duty. A major monetary fine also can be imposed on a person who is at fault, or he could be removed from the ship. Then it is goodbye to prestigious service and the high earnings of a professional navyman, which are at least \$600 per month for a nonrated seaman. Engaging in "politics" was severely punished. The fine for holding political discussions aboard a carrier is \$5,000. Moreover, under special circumstances a Nimitz crew member could end up in the brig for a period of a year for this.

Today the winds of new political thinking have dispelled the cold war stormclouds. Results of the Paris Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the meetings of USSR President M. S. Gorbachev with U.S. President G. Bush off the shores of Malta and in Helsinki which preceded this event, upcoming meetings with him in the current year, as well as meetings with leaders of other major capitalist states possessing great military might—Germany, England, France, Spain, Italy—inspire hopes in people's hearts for a further advance along the path of decreasing nuclear danger. The matter of arms reduction on land is advancing.

But this cannot be said about naval arms, where the problem unfortunately is on a permanent mooring anchor for now, although lately our side has been persistently suggesting to partners in the talks to take specific steps for decreasing the threat from the sea. This question was raised again during the October 1990 visit to the United

States by General of the Army M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

And what is the attitude toward the problem on that side of the ocean and that side of the negotiating table? For example, what is the position of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Colin Powell, one of the highest American military leaders? In an article published in the journal U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Powell openly announced what he had told a Soviet military leader at the Vienna meeting: "I am ready to discuss the question of our naval forces at any time, but I am not ready to hold talks on arms limitation and control or on reductions of our naval forces."

Is it not because Washington would like to preserve a clear advantage for itself in the sphere of naval arms that no desire for convergence is seen on its part? The fact is, the U.S. Navy exceeds ours by twofold in overall tonnage and by two and a half times in large surface ships and naval aviation aircraft. This factor, the clear U.S. superiority on seas and oceans, would appear to be what allowed the U.S. administration to raise the question of removing three battleships of World War II construction from the inventory (each ship's operation costs the treasury \$58 million annually). Such a reduction also is calculated not in the least for a propaganda success.

And how about the American Navy's "sacred cow," the "floating air bases"? The U.S. administration was unshakable here and insisted on keeping 14 carrier groups in the Navy (there is a total of 15 carriers: 14 in commission and one in repair), almost half of which are on operational patrols in the "hot zone" of the Persian Gulf today. Enormous amounts were planned for their upkeep in 1991: \$4.8 billion are being directed to purchase missile weapons for deck-based aircraft and the ships and \$9.8 billion for carrier equipment for the Navy. Financing for A-12 deck-based attack aircraft is entirely classified.

A new U.S. nuclear carrier, the George Washington, was launched in Newport News, Virginia in July 1990. This is the sixth Nimitz-Class ship. It is noteworthy that President Bush chose the launching ceremony as a military-political rostrum for statements from a "position of strength," which can be considered program statements. The metallic notes in the president's voice echoed the scraping of steel cables during the launching: "American might continues to be the supreme force in the world."

And then, accompanied by the noise of waves and a champagne salute, the president issued the following passage addressed to his military policy: "We have a good service record at home and abroad of which we are proud." And this, in Bush's opinion, is the result of U.S. policy "from a position of strength." And so that there be no doubts against whom this strength is aimed, in those same days the president's press secretary provided answers to the questions of how to take Bush's statements and whether or not the United States continues to regard the USSR as an enemy. "Yes, it remains such," came the answer without a shadow of a doubt.

And so the United States has absolute advantage in carriers, although the Soviet Union also has begun creating ships close to this type. Creation of a heavy air-capable cruiser and perhaps also other similar ships of course will cost us a pretty penny. The country's internal economic situation as a whole is a serious factor which does not favor construction of such vessels.

But if this theme is developed further, then evidently it is necessary to refer to the past, to the initial period when plans for creating domestic air-capable ships were wiped out for many years. I quote a stenogram of a USSR Ministry of Defense conference held immediately after the October 1957 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. (At that time, as we know, G. K. Zhukov was removed from the post of USSR Minister of Defense.) At this conference Khrushchev, who had pretty well "run roughshod" over the removed minister, suddenly also recalled Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov, who had been removed from his job: "Two years ago Kuznetsov introduced a ten-year project for building a fleet. We rejected it and he raised a fuss. . . . The Americans build carriers because it is their job to direct their affairs across the ocean. But Kuznetsov did not know his job, and had very major complaints against him. We looked into it and removed the..." Then followed a scathing, offensive word which the prominent naval leader, who had done much for building the fleet, did not at all deserve.

And so an assessment or, more precisely, a sentence was handed down at this conference on an important direction of development of the domestic fleet, and only with the passage of time did worldwide trends in the development of naval forces show who was right and who was wrong. Today, by the way, historical justice has been restored with respect to Kuznetsov: the aforementioned air-capable cruiser was given his name.

In our days even such countries as Brazil and Spain, which are hardly leading countries in the military-technological sense, have carriers as part of their naval forces. Then what does this say about a power such as France? Construction of the first nuclear carrier, Charles de Gaulle, which tentatively will be commissioned in 1998, is in full swing there. Construction of a second similar ship also is planned. Both will replace the non-nuclear carriers Clemenceau and Foch, which have been operational with the French Navy since the early 1960's.

It is not superfluous to recall that today, in the year of the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, voices are heard demanding that Japan's own carriers be built and introduced to the fleet of the Japanese "Self-Defense Forces."

Washington's clear lack of desire to come to an agreement on naval arms talks, the age-old reliance on superiority at sea, and relapses of imperial "gunboat policy" as confirmed by the aggressive U.S. actions against Grenada and Panama, force us to think about and undertake measures of security on the seas and oceans.

In the finale of the film *Reverse Count*, a fantasy prototype of the real commander of the real carrier Nimitz gives a command to change the attack course to pilots of modern jet aircraft heading toward a Japanese air armada (I will

remind you that the carrier was shifted into 1941). Executing a chandelle brilliantly, the aircraft returned to the Nimitz. History was not turned backward. The carrier also changed course and safely returned to our days. A happy ending, as is customary in Hollywood? Yes, but for now there are no grounds to speak about a change in course of U.S. naval policy by those who stand at its helm today.

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Early Analysis of Naval Role in Gulf War

91UM0696A *Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian*
No 2, Feb 91 (signed to press 21 Feb 91) pp 59-63

[Article by Captain 1st Rank K. Kzheb under rubric "In Foreign Fleets": "Naval Forces in the War Against Iraq: First Results"]

[Text] Hopes for a peaceful settlement of the crisis caused by Iraq's occupation of Kuwait collapsed on 17 January of this year when the multinational armed forces of the anti-Iraq coalition began military operations in the Persian Gulf zone.

As announced, the following are the principal political goals of this war:

Liberating Kuwait and returning power to the lawful government;

Restoring stability in the Persian Gulf region;

Confirming principles of a "new world order."

Other military and political goals of the war are as follows:

Destroying Iraq's offensive military potential, which above all threatens Israel and monarchies of Persian Gulf countries, and destroying its air, tank and missile groupings;

Depriving Iraq of an opportunity to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons;

Changing the makeup of Iraq's leadership and its political course.

In addition, in the course of combat operations experience is being gained by armed forces of the United States, Great Britain and France in conducting a local war; the conformity of tactics, operational art and strategy to new conditions of warfare is being checked; the effectiveness of new military equipment is being tested; the suitability of a new organization of formations and units is being studied; requirements for means of transportation and advance stockpiling of military equipment and supplies in support of a rapid movement of ground, air and naval forces to areas of future conflicts are being updated; and paths of organizational development and further evolution of armed forces are being determined.

Operation Desert Shield, conducted from August 1990 and concluded in January 1991, consisted of the concentration and buildup of forces of anti-Iraq coalition allies in the crisis area. Its result was the stationing on and around the Arabian Peninsula of a grouping of multinational forces of

a number of western countries and certain Arab states numbering 690,000 persons supported by supplies for 45-60 days of warfare.

Operation Desert Storm, which began 17 January 1991, envisaged the combat employment of multinational forces within the scope of an "air-land-sea campaign," including the conduct of an offensive air operation, a land operation and an amphibious assault operation against Iraq. The concept of this campaign outlined three phases:

First—conduct only of an air war (offensive air operation) by massive employment of cruise missiles and aircraft against military targets on the territory of Iraq and Kuwait;

Second—liberation of Kuwait by forces of ground troops and Marines with close air support (land operation and amphibious landing operation);

Third—completion of the defeat of Iraq's Army on its territory if the war did not end after the liberation of Kuwait.

The duration of the "air-land-sea campaign" was set at from several weeks to 3-6 months.

The primary stake in the war was placed on the allies' massive use of their air power to reduce losses on land to an "absolute minimum." The calculation was based on the capability of cruise missiles and aircraft to disarm, blind, deafen and decapitate the enemy in the very first phase of the war. In this period it was planned to win air superiority; destroy the main Iraqi military targets and military industrial enterprises by strategic bombings; and isolate the area of upcoming combat operations with the simultaneous destruction of Iraq's personnel and combat equipment in it.

By the beginning of the war the naval force grouping of anti-Iraq coalition countries in the conflict zone included over 170,000 persons (more than 30 percent of the strength of all multinational forces), around 150 combatant ships and over 40 auxiliary vessels (of which more than 90 were U.S. Navy ships), including six U.S. multipurpose carriers, two battleships, seven large landing ships and over 20 combatant ship platforms for the Tomahawk cruise missile. Taking into account the high probability of Iraq's use of mines during Persian Gulf combat operations, the United States and its allies deployed 16 ocean minesweepers (four U.S., five UK, two Belgian, five FRG) in that area by the beginning of the war.

The makeup of the naval force air grouping of the multinational forces includes six deck-based air wings (around 460 combat aircraft, including 194 attack aircraft), over 220 Marine aircraft, and up to 20 land-based patrol aircraft for a total of around 700 aircraft.

The Marines have over 90,000 persons, around 240 tanks and up to 1,500 guns, mortars, ATGM launchers and antiaircraft weapons in their makeup.

Military operations began at 0235 hours on 17 January by the conduct of surprise night air strikes against Iraqi targets. In the first 14 hours of the war over a thousand bombers, fighter-bombers and deck-based attack aircraft

and 30 F-117 fighters had flown combat sorties and 114 sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles had been launched.

U.S. Navy representatives of the unified Central Command reported that in the first 24 hours of war "blinding" missions had been accomplished to a significant extent (operation of up to 95 percent of radars had been disrupted) and missions of "deafening" (suppressing the operation of communications centers) and "decapitating" Iraq (disrupting command and control of the country and Armed Forces) had been accomplished partially. Air Force and air defense aircraft were essentially bottled up on the ground, surface-to-air missile systems had been neutralized, intermediate-range missile launchers and stores had been partially destroyed, and electrical power had been partially disrupted. In the second 24 hours air superiority had been won, strategic bombings continued and the mission of isolating the area of combat operations had begun. In two weeks of war aircraft of the international forces flew more than 30,000 sorties (including 3,500 sorties by deck-based aircraft) and 260 sea-launched cruise missiles had been employed.

Strategic bombings of military and military-industrial targets were deemed successful on the whole. The effectiveness of EW assets against Iraqi air defense personnel and equipment also was highly evaluated.

In the assessment of the Coalition command, in this period 25 of Iraq's 44 main airfields (57 percent) were completely put out of action and the remaining were damaged; as a result the intensity of combat sorties by Iraqi aircraft dropped steadily (from an average of 40-50 sorties per day in the first week to three at the beginning of the third week).

Up to 100 percent of targets connected with production and storage of weapons of mass destruction were destroyed and all fixed intermediate-range missile launchers and a portion of the mobile missile launchers and stores were destroyed. As a result, the number of Iraqi intermediate-range missiles launched dropped sharply (35 in the first week, 18 in the second and four in the third).

A fuel shortage arose as a result of destruction of petroleum industry installations and petroleum product storage facilities (oil refineries cut production by 50-90 percent and a portion of the Iraqi Armed Forces' POL depots was destroyed). Electric power installations were 25 percent disabled.

It is believed that around 25 percent of Iraqi Armed Forces' command and control entities and their communications equipment was destroyed and 50 percent damaged. But Armed Forces command and control nevertheless was not disrupted despite the disabling of a considerable number of command posts at a high and medium level.

The mission of isolating the area of combat operations (southern Iraq and Kuwait) was accomplished rather effectively. Ninety-three percent of the bridges initially listed were destroyed and transportation routes and equipment

were put out of action; as a result the amount of supplies being transported to Southern Iraq and to Kuwait was reduced by 90 percent. The joint naval forces destroyed or damaged around 50 percent of the makeup of Iraq's naval forces at sea and in bases.

In the assessment of the U.S. Armed Forces leadership, "the Iraqi Navy had been neutralized" at the beginning of the third week of war and by the end of that week preparation began for an amphibious landing operation by allied forces.

According to U.S. statements, overall losses of the multinational forces by the end of January were 42 aircraft and eight helicopters.

The following characterizes combat employment of anti-Iraq coalition naval forces in the first phase of the war.

Carrier striking forces operated as part of two formations (with three carrier striking groups in each). The combat tasking areas of the carrier striking forces were located in the Persian Gulf (multipurpose nuclear carrier "T. Roosevelt" and multipurpose carriers "Ranger" and "Midway") and in the northern Red Sea (multipurpose carriers "Saratoga," "J. F. Kennedy" and "America"). That operational alignment permitted the U.S. Navy to deliver strikes with deck-based aircraft from two directions essentially against the entire southern part of Iraq. During combat operations deck-based aircraft flew an average of 270 missions daily (12 percent of all sorties by the air grouping). These missions were distributed as follows: 53 percent for weapon employment (combat sortie) and 47 percent for support (reconnaissance, fighter cover of attack aircraft, EW, air and ABM defense of ships).

The efforts by naval attack aircraft in the first days of the war were basically concentrated on delivering strikes against military and military-industrial targets as well as against positions of Iraqi Armed Forces' second echelons. Subsequent targets of combat pressure by naval aviation were Iraq's antilanding defense system installations on the Kuwaiti coast, Iraqi 3rd Army Corps positions in Kuwait, Iraqi Navy ships and small combatants in the northern Persian Gulf, as well as mobile SCUD operational-tactical missile launchers in western Iraq (for aircraft operating from carriers in the Red Sea). In the assessment of specialists, deck-based aircraft were employed with optimum intensity ensuring their operations over a lengthy period. Attack aircraft losses were promptly replaced and a certain order was established in the use of carriers for this same purpose: five days of active combat operations and two days of operations at reduced intensity.

Deck-based aircraft used MK-117 bombs and GBU-58 cluster bombs to destroy area targets during combat sorties and 2,000 pound (900 kg) BLU-109B guided laser bombs were used to destroy highly hardened targets. In addition to munitions already in the inventory, the U.S. Navy command had an opportunity to test the combat effectiveness of the latest weapon models which had not even undergone a series of traditional tests. For example, according to western military press reports, deck-based aircraft employed the SLAM air-to-surface guided missile

with a 120 km range capability for the first time in the first air strikes against Iraq. The guided missile was created based on the Harpoon antiship missile and is intended for engaging fixed ground targets and surface targets. A basic distinguishing feature of the guided missile is a combination system for guidance in the terminal phase which includes an infrared homing head and television guidance system (the Harpoon antiship missile has an active radar homing head). The first combat launches of two SLAM guided missiles were on 19 January from an A-6E Intruder deck-based attack aircraft against a hydroelectric station in a Baghdad suburb from a distance of 50-55 nm (90-100 km). After receiving a television image of hydroelectric station structures from the missile, the pilot directed the first missile to a given point on the machinery room building and the second to the hole which formed in the wall from the first missile's hit. The electric power station was put out of action.

From the beginning of combat operations aircraft of the multinational forces actively used the British-made ALARM antiradiation guided missile with a range capability of up to 100 km. In the opinion of the British, it played a deciding role in neutralizing the Iraqi air defense system. The missile became operational with countries of the anti-Iraq coalition even before completion of testing.

British Sea Skua antiship missiles (18 km range capability) which Royal Navy ship-based helicopters used to sink several Iraqi launches also confirmed high combat effectiveness.

Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles were employed for the first time in local wars involving the U.S. Navy. Twenty ships which carried this weapon, almost half of them nuclear-powered submarines, were deployed for these purposes in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. According to some western specialists' estimates, there were over 400 missiles, some with nuclear warheads, aboard the combatant ships. At the same time, targets were designated and flight programs were compiled for 700 cruise missiles. The latter may attest to U.S. intentions to reload the platforms, build up their makeup, or make a scheduled replacement.

On the night of 16/17 January Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles were employed in the first echelon of a surprise massive strike against electric power stations, command centers, command and control facilities, Iraqi Armed Forces headquarters and missile launch positions. Of the 114 of these missiles which fell on Iraq in the first 14 hours of the war, the bulk of them were launched from surface ships, including from the battleships "Missouri" and "Wisconsin," and several were launched from a submarine. In the first strike as in succeeding strikes, the U.S. Navy employed two modifications of the cruise missile, the BGM-109G and BGM-109D. We will remind the reader that these missiles, with a range of 1,200 km, are supplied with a high capacity warhead (453 kg) and cluster warhead (166 1.5 kg bomblets), have a flight speed of 885 km/hr and an accuracy (CEP) of less than 10 m.

The missiles proceeded to designated targets at an altitude of 15-60 m above the sea. An inertial guidance subsystem took them to the first terrain contour matching areas, and the TERCOM (Terrain Contour Matching) subsystem was switched on during the approach to the areas. Then the missiles proceeded from the first terrain contour matching sector to the next ones. The location of Iraqi air defense weapon positions had been taken into account in the cruise missiles' flight programs and routes for bypassing them had been worked out. In the terminal phase the DSMAC (Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator) electro-optical matching subsystem inspected the areas adjoining the target using a video camera and input the images obtained to an on-board computer. The latter compared the imagery with "digital maps" of the given terrain made in advance by reconnaissance satellites. As a result, missile adjustment maneuvers were worked out, permitting it to make a target approach with an accuracy of 3-4 m.

As announced, in the first 24 hours of combat operations Tomahawk missiles engaged 50 of 51 designated targets. According to a report by a U.S. Navy representative, two missiles were shot down by Iraqi air defense weapons (four according to a statement by the Iraqi side).

During the second 24 hours of the war, U.S. combatant ships launched another 28 Tomahawk cruise missiles, as a result of which a number of ships almost completely expended the unit of fire of missiles with conventional warheads.

On 19 January, the third day of the war, SSN's, including "Los Angeles"-Class SSN's with vertical missile launchers ("Louisville"), were used to bombard Iraqi military targets.

We will remind you that those SSN's have 12 launchers each in the bow and a unit of fire of up to 20 cruise missiles, including those in the torpedo compartment. Some missiles (according to western experts' assessments, up to 25 percent) carry 200 KT nuclear warheads.

According to a statement by Rear Admiral R. Mixson, commander of a U.S. operational task force in the Red Sea, the nuclear submarines deployed in the Red and Mediterranean seas had made 40 Tomahawk cruise missile launches against Iraqi targets as of 21 January. Their flight paths were over the territories of Turkey, Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Surface combatants and submarines subsequently continued to bombard Iraq's military and economic installations with missiles. Strikes were delivered against newly identified targets situated basically in the vicinity of the cities of Baghdad and Basra. The daily expenditure of missiles was 3-18. A total of over 290 missiles were launched against Iraq by the U.S. Navy in three weeks of war. According to a statement by Lieutenant General Kelly (director of operations of the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff), the effectiveness of cruise missile strikes was evaluated at 80 percent.

The involvement of U.S. Marines in combat operations reduced to liberating two small Kuwaiti islands, Kura and

Umm-el-Maradim, from the Iraqis as well as participating in combat operations to encircle and eliminate Iraqi troops which had undertaken to seize the city of Ras al-Khafji.

The U.S. Navy concentrated around 30 landing ships in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf to conduct amphibious landing operations. Beginning with the first days of February the U.S. Navy set a plan in motion for preparing and conducting a landing operation codenamed Desert Saber.

In accordance with the plan, on 3 February Marines were loaded aboard landing ships, which began the transit to the landing area as part of the landing detachment on the following day. From that very moment the battleship "Missouri" began a gun bombardment of targets and Iraqi Army positions in southern Kuwait, and the battleship "Wisconsin" joined her on 6 February. Minesweeping of coastal waters along Kuwait's south coast was carried out in parallel with gunfire preparation of the supposed amphibious objective area.

It is apparent from an analysis of the first three weeks of the war that the views of the command authority of leading western countries, and the United States above all, have been confirmed as to the possible nature, scale and methods of operations by armed forces, including naval forces, in a local conflict. In this case, conduct of an "air-land-sea campaign," including a number of offensive air, land, and amphibious landing operations that are successive or interrelated by time, place and objectives will be the basis for combat employment of forces (and apparently in the future until the end of the 1990's).

A very large naval force grouping was deployed in a conflict area for the first time since the Vietnam War. It consisted of up to 200 combatant ships and auxiliary vessels of 14 countries, including six U.S. multipurpose carriers (40 percent of the total complement) and 20 combatant ships, including nuclear submarines, carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles. This fact can indicate that in similar conflicts naval forces will acquire ever greater importance as the most versatile and mobile branch of the armed forces capable of accomplishing a wide range of missions both at sea and on land.

In the initial period of the war multinational force operations were concentrated on conducting the offensive air operation, including the wide use of deck-based aircraft and sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles.

To achieve surprise and reduce losses from Iraqi air defense, the first massive strikes using U.S. Navy deck-based aircraft and precision cruise missiles were made for the first time at night with advance electronic suppression of the Iraqi air defense communications system and electronics, as also was the case during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Attacking aircraft had no appreciable losses in the first hours of the war as a result of such pressure on the Iraqi air defense surveillance and command and control systems.

The contradictory nature of information about losses on the Iraqi side does not permit drawing unequivocal conclusions about results of operations by the multinational

armed forces, including naval forces, during the first phase of the war. The restrained nature of statements by official representatives of the military leadership of the multinational forces, including the United States, especially in the final days of January, provides grounds to assume that the offensive air operation's objectives have not yet been fully achieved. Iraq apparently preserved a significant number of its aircraft, operational-tactical (especially mobile) missiles, and tactical air defense weapons.

During the first phase of military operations Coalition air and naval forces tested the effectiveness of combat employment of essentially all modern kinds and systems of weapons, including U.S. Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles from various platforms, British ALARM antiradiation missiles and so on.

On the whole, according to statements by a number of western military analysts, without active offensive operations by ground forces of the multinational forces, the war in the Near East can assume a protracted nature, which will entail significant losses on both sides.

The war in the Near East clearly demonstrates the role of professionalism in mastery of military equipment; importance of the rear, especially logistic and transportation support; importance of intelligence; effectiveness of EW assets; prospects for precision long-range cruise missiles; influence of air superiority on the course of modern warfare; effectiveness of stratagem, especially covertness, deception and disinformation; and difficulty of warfare against mobile intermediate and lesser range missile launchers.

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Two Views on Gulf War

British: High Tech Requires Additional Expenditures

Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Apr 91 p 3

[Article by TRUD staff correspondent A. Burmistenko: "Blitzkrieg in the Gulf: Two Viewpoints"]

[Text] The war in the Persian Gulf has ended. But the course of the combat operations and their outcome have raised many questions. In the opinion of many of our readers, it was to a large extent Soviet and American arms and their combat equipment that collided in the Gulf zone. And many Iraqi officers were trained in our academies. What does such a rapid rout of the Iraqi forces tell us? There are various viewpoints about this, both in our country and abroad.

British Generals Think:

London—"This was possibly the most complete victory in the history of war," declared Lieutenant General Sir Peter de la Billier, commander of the British forces in the Persian Gulf.

"If some staff officer had predicted that the allies would rout the fourth largest army in the world in six weeks and complete a ground operation in 100 hours, causing

immense damage to the enemy and still losing only 149 lives, people would have thought he was crazy," the general develops his idea in the newspaper THE SUNDAY TIMES.

In counterbalance to the chorus of enthusiastic self-congratulations, however, there are more thoughtful voices which, while giving the allied victory its due, nonetheless note that the power of the Iraqi Army was initially grossly exaggerated merely on the basis of a count of the number of divisions, tanks, and aircraft. They did not take into account, or deliberately ignored in public statements, factors which turned out to be decisive such as the low professional level and the even lower morale and will of the Iraqi troops, the complete lack of coordination, and general lack of any kind of plan for conducting combat operations, and also the absolute dilettantism of the Iraqi leader in the role of commander in chief.

"Frequently appearing in a general's uniform, Saddam Husayn assured people that it gave him the necessary knowledge of the military profession," General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley writes in THE SUNDAY TIMES. "In fact his experience in this area was limited to the Iran-Iraq war, which he lost in spite of all expectations. He came to the conclusion that defense strategy is superior to offense and that a war in the air plays an inferior role to ground combat operations."

Farrar-Hockley continues, General Schwarzkopf followed the classical principle of modern warfare: First you achieve a victory in the air. And although this intention of the allies was obvious to anyone without reconnaissance, simply from reports in the world press on allied air power, the Iraqi air defense system was caught unaware when the bombing attacks began. The Iraqi Air Force did practically nothing, giving up air space without a battle.

One of the main conclusions reached by practically all specialists is that highly technological equipment with extensive application of computers, lasers, automatic tracking systems, and night visibility proved their effectiveness and superiority under real combat conditions. Among this equipment, observers single out above all the Lockheed F-117A Stealth fighter bomber, known as the stealth aircraft, and also the precision bombing systems controlled by a dozen computers on board each aircraft. As a result, from an altitude of up to 1,000 meters, that is, higher than the enemy aimed fire from light anti-aircraft weapons, such a bomb can be delivered right into the air shaft of a reinforced concrete bunker.

Military comments on how Soviet equipment acquitted itself during the war is a different matter. It is widely known that many countries of the West participated to one degree or another in equipping the Iraqi Army, but the largest share of the arms in it came from Soviet production. According to the figures of Tony Mason, who from 1985 through 1989 was British deputy defense minister for air force affairs, during the period of the Iran-Iraq war the Soviet Union delivered \$23.5 billion worth of arms, and \$2-3 billion more after 1988.

"The lessons of the conflict are quite unfavorable for Moscow," writes director of the Royal Armed Services Institute Jonathan Eyl [as transliterated] in THE GUARDIAN. "In the first place, the Iraqi strategic defense system, which consists of a multitude of interconnected trenches and is intended to draw the enemy into a trap of 'strike zones,' could be easily taken from the flanks. In the second place, this war confirmed once again that large tank formations and mass artillery fire are useless unless there is at least equality of forces in the air. In the third place, the Soviet equipment with which the Iraqi troops were armed, was considerably below the level of the Western technology of the allies."

"The conclusion is obvious: In a modern military confrontation it is impossible to win by virtue of the quantity of arms alone. It is necessary to have high technology and superiority in precisely those areas in which the Soviet Union is now unable to compete."

But far from everyone agrees with this analysis. In the opinion of the military observer of the ITV television network, "if all of the allies arms were in Iraq's hands and Iraqi equipment were in the hands of the allies, the allies would still have been able to win easily." Approximately the same viewpoint is held by Christopher Bellamy, observer for the newspaper THE INDEPENDENT. "According to military sources in London, Iraq's inaction was determined not by the weakness of its material base but by the quality of the Iraqi soldiers," he writes. One of these sources said: "We were opposed by a very well armed army, but this army was poorly trained from beginning to end, it was absolutely incapable of conducting combat operations under nighttime conditions, and in general it had no idea of military matters." "The Iraqis had fantastically modern systems, air forces with great potential, the latest models of tanks, and the most modern artillery, but they did not have the slightest idea of how to bring all this together into an effective army. This was simply an uncoordinated, disorganized crowd..."

The analysis of combat operations in the Persian Gulf will undoubtedly continue. The further development of the defense industry depends on it to a great extent. Unfortunately, as the newspaper THE INDEPENDENT notes, the success of highly technological systems "will most likely lead to increased military expenditures in many countries, including Great Britain and the United States, signifying a 180-degree change in the direction of the recent trend toward reduction of budget allocations for defense."

Deputy Chief of Operational-Strategic Research Center Interviewed

91UM0528B Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Apr 91 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General V. Shtepa, deputy chief of the Center for Strategic Operational Research, by TRUD correspondent V. Badurkin under the general heading "Blitzkrieg in the Gulf: Two Viewpoints"; place and date not given]

[Text]

Soviet Military Specialist Comments:

"Let us put emotions aside and return to the facts," said V. Shtepa, deputy chief of the Center for Strategic Operations Research, to our correspondent V. Badurkin. "In the first place," as we know, we were not the only ones who armed Iraq. Paradoxically, 95 percent of Iraq's military potential was created with deliveries from the five countries that are permanent members of the UN Security Council. As for Soviet arms, we developed the majority of them in the sixties and seventies and sent them to Iraq at the beginning of the eighties.

"Taking into account the fact that the life span of the main kinds of arms, if they are to continue to meet modern requirements, is little more than 10 years, it becomes clear that to compare Soviet and American arms from different generations is inappropriate to say the least. And Western specialists understand this quite well. We delivered more modern arms to Iraq only in the last few years (from five to 10 percent of the overall quantity of our weapons in this country) and, judging from available information, they performed fairly well.

Another question. Some of the officers of the Iraqi Armed Forces actually did go through training in our military VUZ's [higher educational institutions]. Without going into detail, I would just like to say that there is a great difference between what they were taught and how this knowledge is used in practice. It is my profound conviction that the professional training of the officers in the Iraqi Armed Forces was not the reason for their defeat in the war, although this did play a role, but it was the fact that the Iraqi leadership ignored the elementary principles for the effective use of their Armed Forces and means.

There are examples in which the actions of the Iraqi forces proved highly effective from a purely military standpoint. Thus, during the night of 30 January two Iraqi brigades wedged their way 25 kilometers into the territory of the allied forces, took the city of Ras al-Khafji, and held it for about two days. Then with a well planned maneuver the brigades were pushed back to their initial positions. Attention should also be given to the engineering equipment of the positions and the large-scale measures for operational camouflage of the troops. But by and large the Iraqi command utilized its troops in far from the best way.

Of course, all this does not mean that we have no problems either with military science or with the quality of our arms. Unfortunately, we have many such problems. But I would not link our difficulties to Iraq's defeat in the war.

As for high-precision equipment—bombs with laser guidance and remote-controlled rockets, the war in the Gulf proved their high degree of combat effectiveness. True, here too one must qualify the statement: It was applied under almost ideal conditions—the locality was flat as a pancake, the weather was good, and, the main thing, there was no resistance.

[Badurkin] Regarding electronic warfare and air defense, what conclusions can be drawn from this?

[Shtepa] The complex of measures conducted by the multinational forces during the period of mass air attacks provided for effective suppression of Iraq's air defense systems. Centralized control of Iraqi anti-aircraft missiles was destroyed by troops and aircraft. This made it possible for the multinational forces to avoid losses of aircraft in comparison to the scale of the air operation.

One can draw the conclusion that in the armed forces of the United States and the countries participating in the anti-Iraq coalition electronic warfare has grown from an operational (combat) form of support into a means of waging armed combat which directly affects the enemy and provides certain advantages in the confrontation between the warring parties.

Our general staff has also paid more attention to the development of the electronic warfare since the end of the seventies. The war in the Persian Gulf zone is undoubtedly forcing us to return to our plans for improving combat equipment, to refine them, and, the main thing, to apply maximum efforts to fulfill them.

[Badurkin] The multinational forces achieved success mainly because of the latest weapons. But in our military budget, as far as I know, expenditures on scientific research and experimental design work (NIOKR) have been significantly cut. What does the Ministry of Defense think about this?

[Shtepa] Expenditures on defense are being approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet in the following structure: purchases; NIOKR; maintenance of the Army and Navy; capital construction and pensions; and other expenditures.

For 1991 12.4 billion rubles [R] have been allotted for expenditures on NIOKR, and R37.6 billion for purchasing arms and equipment. The Ministry of Defense is not authorized to redistribute funds after the budget has been approved by the Supreme Soviet, although, in our opinion, this would be expedient under the present conditions.

This question also arises: In connection with the change-over of the country's national economy to the new conditions for financing beginning in 1991, the prices of military output increased considerably. But the paradox is that even under these conditions it has become disadvantageous for the defense enterprises. Here we are faced with a contradiction between the needs of the Army and the interests of the defense complex. As a result, the acquisition of arms could decrease by approximately 20 percent, which would make it difficult to update them for the troops.

[Badurkin] Many countries armed Iraq. We now know what this led to. Are any changes being suggested in the policy for rendering USSR military aid to developing countries?

[Shtepa] The war in the Persian Gulf did indeed raise many questions before the world community. Apparently, the answers to many of them will be given after careful and deep consideration. But one can say with confidence that the United States and the West are not likely to change the essence of their policy to achieve and assert their own

interests in various regions of the world, where they may arm any countries they want to, through which countries it would be possible for them to exert their influence on other states as well. These countries will want to protect their sovereignty and, apparently, have someone to turn to for both economic and military aid. Probably including us. These issues will obviously have to be resolved by the USSR Supreme Soviet in each concrete case.

[Badurkin] What general conclusions have you been able to draw in connection with the war in the Persian Gulf?

[Shtepa] An in-depth analysis of all aspects of this war still lies in the future. But above all we must keep in mind that the conflict broke out not far from the southern borders of our state. In this connection, can we proceed from the idea that the development of events in the foreseeable future will completely rule out the appearance of similar situations in some other region of the planet, including near our borders again? There are no such guarantees. Therefore we must be concerned about our country's safety. And the basis of our state's security, in my opinion, is mainly the preservation of a unified Union and unified Armed Forces, and the maintenance of their combat strength at the highest modern level.

Major-General Bolyatko on Military Activities Pact with Canada

91UF0808A Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 May 91 p 3

[Interview with Major-General Anatoliy Viktorovich Bolyatko, head of the Soviet portion of the USSR-Canada Joint Bilateral Military Working Group, by TRUD Correspondent E. Alekseyev: "USSR-Canada: Reinforcing Security Together"]

[Text] Several days ago in the capital of Canada, Ottawa, USSR Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev and Canadian Defense Staff Chief General D'Chastelain signed an agreement between the government of the USSR and the government of Canada on preventing dangerous military activity. Our country has a similar agreement only with the United States. What is the agreement's meaning and significance? Our Correspondent E. Alekseyev talks with Major-General A.V. Bolyatko who headed the Soviet portion of the Joint Bilateral Military Working Group and who worked out the terms of the agreement.

[Alekseyev] Anatoliy Viktorovich, what is the basic idea of the agreement whose development I have learned had already begun in October 1990?

[Bolyatko] It is based on the aspiration of both parties to adopt effective measures directed at reducing the possibility of the emergence of incidents between their armed forces or their immediate peaceful resolution if they do emerge. And they can emerge as a threat to the security of personnel of ships, aircraft, or ground-based systems as a result of military activities near the other party's armed forces personnel or equipment.

[Alekseyev] The primary meaning is generally clear. But I would like to know what you specifically have in mind by the concept of "dangerous military activity"?

[Bolyatko] The agreement defines four types of armed forces activities that are recognized as dangerous and whose prevention is both parties' goal in accordance with this agreement.

First. The parties are obligated to take the required steps to prevent incidents when their armed forces personnel (or equipment) enter within the boundaries of the state territory of the other party. This may occur by virtue of, as we say, force majeure circumstances (that is, when these circumstances are of an extraordinary nature associated with the influence of an insurmountable force—natural disasters, catastrophes, etc.) or as a result of the unintentional activities of the personnel themselves. Crossing a state border for these reasons is not hostile in nature. However, its consequences may be extremely dangerous if a precisely established communications system is absent.

Therefore, the agreement stipulates the required levels of communications, radio frequencies, signals, and even phrases in each specific situation. The advisability of utilizing one or other communications channels must be determined by the appropriate commander for the most rapid resolution of the situation that has developed.

Precise fulfillment of the procedures to settle these types of incidents by both parties guarantees that those extreme measures which are stipulated by the appropriate laws for action against border violators will not be employed. And this is very important.

Second. The parties have been obligated to take the required steps to prevent the utilization of lasers when their radiation may harm personnel or damage the equipment of the other party's armed forces. At the present time, a large number of different types of laser instruments have been developed that differ substantially from each other by their parameters. Therefore, it did not appear to be possible to prescribe some sort of definite quantitative criteria to restrict the dangerous use of laser devices. As a result, each party independently determines at what distance the use of laser devices is dangerous. And in accordance with the agreement, each party will operate in such a way so as not to expose the other party to danger.

Third. We agreed on the definition of areas of special attention. The presence of armed forces formations of various states in a similar area under conditions of the extreme tension that has emerged there for whatever reasons could result in a situation when any unforeseen actions of one of the parties is fraught with tragic consequences. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt the agreed measures in order to reduce the dangerously explosive level of tension in those places where armed forces formations are located in contact with one another.

Fourth. Each of the parties is obliged to take the required steps not to create interference for command and control networks which may become the cause of harm to the other

party's armed forces personnel or damage to their equipment. In this case, we have in mind accidental or unintentional interference. If personnel have detected interference in their own command and control nets and have certified their potentially dangerous nature, they can inform the other party's armed forces personnel. Having received this information, the other party's personnel, having verified it and having come to a conclusion based on the complaint, must immediately cease the interfering activity.

[Alekseyev] And now all of these measures to prevent possible dangers have already come into force?

[Bolyatko] No, the agreement will enter into force six months after it has been signed but before that the USSR and Canada armed forces will painstakingly study it. Requirements will be increased for crews of aircraft and ships that operate on the high seas or in the airspace over it and also for the parties' ground forces subunits that are located in direct proximity to each other.

And I also want to add that the parties have agreed on regular meetings of their representatives to make measures more precise and specific that are directed at further increasing the effectiveness of the agreement and that will help to discover new spheres of cooperation to prevent dangerous military activity.

[Alekseyev] Consequently, Canada has become the second country after the United States with which the Soviet Union has concluded such an agreement. Are there plans to conclude similar agreements with other states?

[Bolyatko] I am convinced that the signing of this type of agreement with other contiguous countries could make a weighty contribution to the improvement of the Soviet Union's relations and to the deepening of its cooperation with its neighbors and would serve as an additional guarantee to maintain stability and security in appropriate regions and, naturally, improve the international climate on the whole. It is worthwhile to work on this.

Dubynin: Impasse on Withdrawal From Poland

*91UM0690A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 May 91 First Edition p 1*

[Interview with Colonel General Viktor Petrovich Dubynin, USSR government representative on matters concerning the stay of Soviet troops in the Republic of Poland and commander of the Northern Group of Forces, by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bugay; place and date not given: "Compromises Not Achieved"]

[Text] It is **hardly possible to imagine a more favorable atmosphere for Soviet-Polish negotiations on the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces than that which developed after 9 April when, not waiting for confirmation of the final dates of the withdrawal, our units began to leave Poland. And the sixth round of negotiations which occurred in Warsaw on 11-12 April, it seemed, mapped out ways toward mutual understanding and agreement. But the next, and seventh in succession, meeting of the delegations in Moscow ended, and it turned out that it in fact did not give any positive results. Why not?**

With this question, our correspondent began his interview with Colonel General V. Dubynin, USSR government representative on matters concerning the stay of Soviet troops in the Republic of Poland and commander of the Northern Group of Forces.

[Dubynin] The delegations could not find a common ground in the resolution of property and financial problems. The Polish side stressed the conclusion of an agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops as fast as possible, and, in addition, its completion by the middle of 1992. And only then, they said, will we take up financial and property questions. I will try to explain what this kind of approach will lead to with examples and facts.

Discarding completely the entire previous experience of Polish-Soviet relations, and referring only to international laws and new Polish legislation, the Polish delegation states the question in a way that the Soviet side in general cannot sell built installations inasmuch as, in its time, the right to the land on which the installations were built was not formulated legally. Indeed, the Poles explain, we will buy something from you, but only that which we need, and only after capital repairs and remodeling. But, after all, it is clear, for example, that a barracks is a poor kindergarten, and that its remodeling will cost a pretty sum. Then, the Poles say, dismantle the entire building and take it with you. Considering that the shipment of one rail car of property from Poland will cost our country \$1,500, it is not difficult to calculate that the removal of an installation will cost more than its value.

Based on Polish legislation, we do not have the right on Polish territory to sell surplus movable property that we possess—fuel, scrap metal, and building materials. But inasmuch as we are insisting on this, then the condition is raised: Before we sell anything, we must pay a state duty on property brought into Poland and a trade turnover tax, and we must also pay for the services of a Polish intermediary firm. I will not weary you with all of the details of these recalculations, but I will explain: To sell a ton of gasoline, it will be necessary to pay more than 100 percent of its cost. Who will trade at a loss, and especially that which there is a shortage of in our country?

It gets worse and worse as we go on. It was announced to us at negotiations that for the 45 years that Soviet troops stayed in Poland they caused damage estimated at 32 trillion zlotys and, therefore, it was proposed to arrive at a zero version in the resolution of property-financial questions; that is, depart and leave everything free of charge. This figure was a surprise to me personally. It became necessary to remind them that, according to documents that both sides had, there is not one debt that had to be paid as compensation for damage done to the Polish side. This statement disturbed the Poles, but the very next day the same 32 trillion were presented as the bill for damage to the ecological environment. Who, when, and with what methodology these calculations were made remained unclear.

All of the foregoing facts prove that the Polish position in the sphere of the property-financial question does not

amount to a search for mutually acceptable compromises, but to a delay in their resolution. They say, the Russians have no way out: They will depart and leave everything. Indeed, they will even later pay the bill we present them.

[Bugay] Comrade Commander, articles appeared in the Polish press recently about the possibility of using the territories left by the Soviet troops. Thus, Doctor Jerzy Sienkevicz, the vice director of the department for the development of private business in the Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Poland, proposed creating "private business zones" on the territories now occupied by the Northern Group of Forces. What can you say in this regard?

[Dubynin] There are several dozens of territories that are occupied by Soviet military units. Today they possess a well-developed communications infrastructure and, naturally, they offer a splendid opportunity for the establishment of various enterprises. However, at the official level of negotiations, this is being rejected not so much in favor of possible economic advantages, but as a consequence of ideological dogmas and aims to impede the Soviet side in the resolution of the property-financial problem.

Indeed, joint enterprises can be established in the zones where military units are now deployed, including with the attraction of Western capital, and joint maximum benefit can be obtained from the withdrawal of Soviet troops. And then the difficulties of such zones—cleaning the territories, installation repair, and putting the environment in order—would be resolved with high quality and without mutual offenses owing to the troops being withdrawn.

Unfortunately, the concept of withdrawal proposed by the Polish side for the time being prompts us involuntarily to undermine the infrastructure in places where units are stationed. After all, the Polish side is trying to convince us in negotiations that it does not need a majority of what we built (implying here that we will leave these installations free of charge). In that case, we will dismantle those elements of the infrastructure which in many instances will disrupt it, but not because we are pursuing such an objective, but because we will be forced to take out that which we need. But not to leave materials that have a definite value, and free of charge?

I very much want a turning point to take place finally in the approaches to the resolution of the property-financial problems. So that a mutually acceptable version would emerge on the basis, I emphasize, of mutual benefit.

[Bugay] What do you have in mind specifically?

[Dubynin] While I am not an eminent economist, I can straight off propose to the Polish side obviously beneficial spheres of enterprise with the participation of Soviet firms. This is agriculture, tourism, and health services. I think that the activity on Polish land of a branch of the clinic of the world famous academician S. Fedorov, or rehabilitation centers for children who are victims of the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station accident would bring a lot of profit. In addition, this income would be possible for

Poland virtually without cost—all it would take is goodwill and signatures on appropriate documents.

[Bugay] Viktor Petrovich, in concluding I would like to return to those 32 trillion zlotys, which our side allegedly "owes" Poland for activity associated with disruption of the ecological balance...

[Dubynin] The fact that this figure is "inflated" is indicated by the suddenness of its appearance as an argument in the negotiations. I would like to explain that it is generally typical of the Polish delegation to produce bills without grounds. At one time, they proposed that we pay for the use of training grounds land and, moreover, at prices that take into account profits lost from estimates of the average grain harvest since 1945. It was possible then to convince the Poles that more than 90 percent of the 57,000 hectares of training grounds were forest. Grain could not grow there at all. Combat training could have caused damage to the land if it was not exclusively in the so-called training grounds operational field which is taken up by land that is absolutely unsuitable for agricultural work—swamp and sandstone.

Of course, like any combat training activity, the activity of the Soviet Army caused certain damage to the ecological environment. But to calculate it in tens of trillions of zlotys, while not even having accurate basic data, is simply ridiculous. We will fix what we spoiled. Of course, airfield land is contaminated with kerosene. But this cannot be avoided anywhere—that is the way the aircraft is built. And we will recultivate these lands. Especially since we have the means for neutralizing the fuel. But I get the impression that the Polish side is intent not so much on acquiring vacated land as in acquiring convertible currency, and the more the better. For this reason, the objective being pursued is—as fast as possible—to get the Soviet troops out of Poland without taking existing capabilities into account and without resolving the property-financial problems. But afterwards, to dictate its will in a unilateral way.

Swedish Military Neutrality Questioned

91UM0708A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 1 Jun 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by IAN Correspondent V. Ilyashevich: "Has Sweden Been Neutral?"]

[Text] Sweden intended in the 1950s to acquire tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable aircraft to counter "growing Soviet nuclear power," the Finnish newspaper TURUN SANOMAT reports. The targets for Swedish nuclear strikes were in the Baltic region and Karelia. Sweden's Saab concern designed a nuclear-capable aircraft prior to 1957, and nuclear weapons research reportedly continued in Sweden until the early 1970s.

In a recent issue, the Swedish magazine FLYGREVVY described plans for a 600-to 800-kilogram nuclear bomb dubbed Type-1 and for a heavy attack and fighter-bomber known as the A-36. Only a few years ago, Swedish officials

categorically denied the existence of military nuclear programs in the past. In 1965, then Prime Minister Olof Palme denied claims that the Swedish government had approved nuclear research as late as the 1970s, as the Social Democratic government had banned all research work back in 1960. Nevertheless, Finnish military expert Lieutenant Colonel Erkki Nordberg believes that such work continued until 1968, when the U.S. abandoned the military doctrine of "massive retaliation."

Work on the plans for the A-36 bomber (the A stood for "attack," and 36 was the number of the airplane type) was carried out amid the strictest secrecy. The operating radius of the supersonic 15-ton aircraft was to be 410 kilometers. After the Swedes dropped plans for the A-36 aircraft in the late 1950s, efforts to design the Viggen combat aircraft continued for a good 10 years. As for nuclear weapons per se, Sweden worked on their development all the way up to 1972, in the opinion of Finnish specialists.

However, nuclear planning isn't the only reflection of the aggressive orientation of Sweden's military strategy in the past. An aggressive inclination during the cold war was also manifested in the intelligence activities of the Swedish Air Force, activities that were clearly directed against the USSR. According to Erkki Nordberg, all this is confirmed by information published in the United States recently. In 1952, Soviet fighters shot down a Swedish DC-3 spy plane over the Baltic, and then downed a Katalina aircraft that had gone out to search for it. The purpose of those flights is no longer in doubt. FLYGREVVY asserts that Swedish

Air Force planes made the flights to photograph Soviet military installations on the Kola peninsula and in the Baltics. On the whole, the country's armed forces were adapted to the American doctrine of "massive retaliation."

The aforementioned obviously prompts the following question: Was Sweden neutral? Today the neutrality question is taking on special significance in connection with Sweden's plans to join the Common Market, which inevitably raises the problem of the country's possible future relations with Western Europe's political and military structures, such as the West European Union, for example. One of the widely divergent points of view in Sweden was recently expressed by Sven Svensson, former chief of the political department of the authoritative Swedish newspaper DAGENS NYHETER. Sven Svensson said: "Despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the maintenance of NATO definitely serves Sweden's security interests. This will make it possible to prevent the European Economic Community's transformation in the late 1990s into a military alliance that would have its own armed forces. Sweden cannot join a European military alliance whose sole adversary is seen as the Soviet Union." This viewpoint is by no means indisputable, in view of the need to create an all-European security system. However, something else is noteworthy. It reflects a vision that has regarded and continues to regard the existence of only one of the two military alliances—in this case with its mechanisms for an American presence in Europe—as a guarantee of Swedish neutrality.

Director of Leningrad 'Signal' Association on Reconversion

91UM0530A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Apr 91
Union Edition p 3

[Interview with Valentin Petrovich Zanin, general director of the Signal Production Association by E. Gonzalyez: "On the Other Hand We Make Missiles; Conversation With the General Director of 'Signal' (the Former 'Postbox') on Reconversion (Former Conversion)"]

[Text] Quite recently the military industrial complex did its evil deeds only for others, that is, among the accursed imperialists. What we had was silent, humble postboxes. And later, these disappeared. There arose the Pozitrons, Vympels, Rotors and Nords and everyone decided that the long awaited transformation of the military industrial complex into a peaceful industrial complex had begun.

It turned out that this had not begun. It also turned out that this was to be the end of it. Regardless of the big stir over the problem of conversion, the solemn promises to forge swords into plowshares and the grandiose programs for producing irons, pots and pans and meat grinders.

After this we completely ceased to make any difference where our military industrial complex was and where was theirs, the imperialists. And we began to call our own defense industry an economic behemoth, a monster, and a hundred-eyed dragon which fed on the wealth of the people. And from the autumn of last year, they began to see the military industrial complex as some stumbling block on the path to the market and generally against any economic changes.

[Gonzalyez] "How valid is such an attitude on the part of society toward its defense industry?" I asked Valentin Petrovich Zanin, the general director of the former "post-box," and currently the Leningrad Signal Production Association.

I asked this without particularly counting on objectivity. How could such a question be answered by a general from the defense industry and who was fatally attached to the state budget, whose briefcase was stuffed with military orders and who was fenced off from all our problems by a solid wall with gates supplied with a peephole?

[Zanin] "The defense industry actually does hold too large a place in the economy," replied Valentin Petrovich. "The national economy cannot allow itself such a skewed structure. All of us, the defense workers, actually have our own selfish interests and are ready to fight for them. Incidentally, this is like any interconnected part of society. But understand that our interests are not irreconcilable with the interests of society, as they often endeavor to show."

[Gonzalyez] That is, you mean to say that conversion and of which society is dreaming for the defense industry is not so lethal as, for instance, the loss of power by the ruling party?

[Zanin] Not at all lethal and possibly even beneficial. Only it would be correct to speak not about conversion but

rather reconversion as precisely this is the name given to the converting of the military industry to peaceful purposes.

[Gonzalyez] Again, we have confused something. But since the term "conversion" has already become part of our usage, let us stick to it. In order not to become completely confused.

[Zanin] It seems that we are already confused. And it is no accident. Look what has happened. The USSR Supreme Soviet has reduced expenditures on weapons. But there have been no announcements about reducing the number of regiments and divisions. Is it possible to imagine a division without any weapons?

The minister of defense naturally has cautioned that the reduction in allocations in no way should be reflected on the nation's defense capability. Incidentally, deputies in January approved the 1991 budget but we during the same month were drawing up our order portfolio for...the year 1992. As you can understand we concluded the contracts for the present year a long time ago.

[Gonzalyez] Hence, at the end of the year the customers may not have the money to pay for the orders?

[Zanin] Everything is possible. But by that time we already will be carrying out the work and it will be necessary to either find the funds somewhere or turn out the articles gratis and that of course would also suit the army. This is how events would develop in the area of weaponry. Simultaneously, there has been a noisy campaign to convert the defense industry to a peacetime footing.

The USSR Gosplan has worked out a gigantic, all-encompassing scheme for conversion. This has been created by scores of institutes and hundreds of specialists and has been discussed by three commissions of the Supreme Soviet. The program basically contains the production of equipment for the processing industry. It is assumed that this would draw down the capacity of the defense enterprises by some 10 percent.

Having learned this, we found it quite funny because many defense enterprises are currently 10-20 percent overloaded. A 10-percent reduction in the load factor (even if this were to occur) would merely mean that the collectives would begin to have Sunday as a day off. But there would still be a struggle for Saturday.

[Gonzalyez] This means that you are unenthusiastic about the prospect of producing meat grinders on Sundays?

[Zanin] One-tenth of the products at Signal is toys, medical instruments and musical instruments. But these have no bearing on the Gosplan conversion scheme. I do not think that any defense enterprise would approach this program seriously.

[Gonzalyez] So you, Valentin Petrovich, have involuntarily confirmed the general opinion that conversion is an unrealistic matter and that we must not expect anything good from this.

[Zanin] This depends on what results you achieve. If we must employ an enormous army of bureaucrats, then everything is normal. Then it would be possible to still compile schemes, work out programs, supervise them, coordinate the work and so forth. But if civilian products are actually essential, then we must operate in a completely different manner.

[Gonzalyez] Do you know precisely how?

[Zanin] Yes, I do because I am certain that for a majority of the defense industry enterprises there is no problem of converting from military orders to peacetime products. Incidentally, when one raises the issue of conversion, inevitably one must keep in mind both the defense industry as well as the mass of other related, as they say, open enterprises including metallurgical, instrument building and so forth. As a total, three-quarters could convert to peacetime products without any major effort.

[Gonzalyez] The technology would permit this?

[Zanin] Of course. Except, naturally, those enterprises which currently produce one particular article, for instance, a missile, shells or cartridges. But there are few plants with such narrow specialization.

[Gonzalyez] And what is required to convert the remainder?

[Zanin] Not to give orders for military equipment. Inform me that in three years the demand for such a type of weaponry will be not 100 units but 20 with a breakdown by the years. And that is it.

[Gonzalyez] So simple?

[Zanin] It is even simpler than is the case now. My main client at the beginning of last year requested articles which take up one-half of my production volume. In December, an official contract was sent and there a completely different order was placed because there was a sudden change in the military budget. I had already ordered all the preassembled parts and materials. Incidentally, my production cycle is six months. I begin hollering, I begin visiting superiors and I turn to the press.... But in response from the press I hear that the military industrial complex are fat cats again demanding special conditions.

But I am asking for one thing: tell me in February what you are to order for the following year. I will not ask for anything, neither money, materials nor orders. Incidentally, military equipment for me is less advantageous than civilian. I make it only because that was the reason I was set up. That is the entire problem of conversion in a nutshell.

[Gonzalyez] Honestly speaking, there is a completely different notion of your life behind the solid fence.

[Zanin] We are not responsible for fostering that notion. It is essential for those bureaucrats and organizations which, having lumped all the defense enterprises together, are now drawing up global schemes and programs. And they are demanding billions of rubles for this undertaking. Incidentally, three-quarters of the enterprises quietly and

without interference from the state could convert partially or completely to peacetime lines.

[Gonzalyez] But this would idle a mass of people in the Gosplan, Gossnab, Goskomsen [State Price Committee] and the ministries.

[Zanin] They would have more than enough to do with the remaining enterprises which could not be so easily restructured. But this is real, serious quiet work and for this reason is not as attractive as working out programs.

[Gonzalyez] Are you not oversimplifying your conversion to peacetime production?

[Zanin] Of course, it is easier to move along a well trod path. All the same, we must resolve problems here. While maybe not in the area of technology, then certainly in organizing production together with others, in retraining the personnel and marketing the products. But competition is completely possible. But these are all accessible and rather quickly overcome difficulties without any capital investments and involvement of the state.

[Gonzalyez] And could not the bureaucrats be of help here?

[Zanin] They certainly could. Incidentally, we highly regard their knowledge and experience. I am generally against running down the ministries. For what reason? For the reason that they have conscientiously followed official economic doctrine. But if the management conditions were altered I feel that they could find useful employment for themselves in the new place.

[Gonzalyez] It is interesting that here you are, a leader of a defense enterprise, feeling at least some need to convert to civilian products. Possibly the economy is forcing you into this? Certainly you have said that toys and medical instruments are more profitable than weapons.

[Zanin] That is the case, but the enterprise does not feel any need to convert. And it would not seriously feel this until it got rid of the military orders. Ties have been established, capacity has been scheduled and the balance (and a very tight one) for all the production components has long been established, so that without such a system nothing new can appear.

But if the orders are cut back, then capacity is freed up, and energy and productive force will appear. If you wish, these are also elements of the market about which everyone is presently shouting. The enormous plant, having become a free zone, will be confronted with the problem of employment. This has already existed for us. And we resolved it very quickly. Having free, capable structures, certain materials and small amounts of money, we have entered into market relations with other enterprises and consumers. There was simply nothing else to do.

[Gonzalyez] And you feel that such a path is suitable for a majority of the enterprises?

[Zanin] It is the only possible one. Everything else is variations of the blind-alley administrative system of production management. In this regard the Gosplan conversion program differs in no way from the lamentable story of the Food Program. There must be only a free search and the enterprise should not be overloaded and should be slightly supported.

[Gonzalyez] What do you have in mind?

[Zanin] A very serious case of the missile plant. The military orders were reduced but the enterprise could not immediately make up for this. It is essential to provide a chance to survive. For example, during the first year the plant should be allowed to receive 100 percent of the wages for the released portion of the personnel, not counting the pensioners, of course. In the second year, the figure would drop to 50 percent. Then it would have to be on its own as there had been time for maneuvering.

At first, of course, there would be a shock. They will loaf for two or three months. But people will not agree to receive money for a long time without working. Either the administration will find work or they will abandon it. In any case, the collective after a year will be doing treble the amount provided by the best Gosplan program. The ministry specialists are completely capable of helping in this, naturally for a separate payment.

[Gonzalyez] Thus, in your opinion, it turns out that for converting a majority of enterprises need nothing more than free capacity with which they can enter the market. Approximately a quarter of the defense industry still needs support.

[Zanin] Only temporary support. And there is also a very small portion of the plants which need major attention. There either the director is crazy or they have sat for a hundred years behind the barbed wire and do not know what is going on outside or the entire plant, for instance, is a single tower which does not know how to adapt to peacetime products.

I would point out again that our officialdom is not to blame for the fact that it is constantly involved with all the defense enterprises and not with that small number of "dissidents" which actually require concern. The Supreme Soviet has resolved to establish a program for converting to peaceful production and saturating the consumer market with goods. The bureaucrats are honestly carrying this out. They order that you will produce a milking unit and you a packaging machine. They organize cooperation, they prepare a decree for producing a special motor made from stainless steel and allocate the funds. And they might give us R2 million. Of course, we do not turn down the money nor do we turn down the military orders.

[Gonzalyez] And it can be said ahead of time that there will not be any benefit from such trouble. That may be but they also say that there are also regional conversion programs.

[Zanin] Here things are more complicated. The ministry has some authority or we are accustomed to obeying it. The local soviet does not have any management levers and

for this reason there merely remains the path of petty dirty tricks. If you do not participate in our program then we will send the inspectors, auditors, we will shut off the water, we will not allow a nursery to be built and so forth. Generally, everything as it was in previous times with the sole difference that previously you could take away a party card but now they send a fireman or shut off the water.

[Gonzalyez] I would assume that under certain conditions this could have its effect.

[Zanin] Certainly, but the local soviets have so many concerns that they do everything quickly, that is, they draw up the programs quickly, they are quick to anger with those who do not carry them out and just as quickly forget about this.

[Gonzalyez] Thus, if you will forgive the comparison, it turns out that the only method to force a monkey to walk on the ground is to cut down the tree. And so long live market relations, at least in terms of the freed capacity. But, they say, a market is impossible without privatization and a private missile plant, you will agree, sounds bizaare.

[Zanin] Incidentally, the weapons with which the Allies achieved victory in the Persian Gulf were basically made at private enterprises. Possibly, stock companies.

I see nothing terrible in a situation when, for instance, our collective becomes the stockholder of a portion of its plant. The composition of our employees is established and very stable, regardless of the very average earnings. Incidentally, a majority of the workers does not even know what part they are manufacturing at a given moment, that is, for the military or for civilian products.

I am watching with perplexity and the expectation of disaster how privatization is being carried out at certain other enterprises. This is not the grounds for new arguments and hostility in society! For example, the excellent watch plant with a value of 36 million rubles has been offered to the collective for a purchase price of 7 million, as evidently they could not pay more. But this means that the plant workers will collide head-on with everyone around: the teachers at nurseries, the police, teachers and employees of the rayispolkom. Certainly, everything for us is to be held in common! Why then is the worker of the executive committee to be deprived of his share of the plant? And at the executive committee they begin silently to hate this plant: "So, you are now well off. Are you receiving dividends? So then build the housing yourselves." Then they refuse to provide orchard plots, they forget to deliver bread by dinnertime and so on and so forth. An unlimited field of hostility!

The director of that plant and I were friends. But what sort of friend is he now to me? He is a free entrepreneur and now he is traveling in America and collecting orders. But what about me? For that week, I went to Moscow to conclude a one-sided contract with a firm.

[Gonzalyez] Forgive me, but privatization must begin somewhere.

[Zanin] Only not by seizing pieces of common property. In my view, it is essential to start from the fact that each inhabitant of the nation has a right to a share of national wealth. Any attempt to sell what belongs to a person or to acquire this at the expense of someone else is a criminal deception. If an organization desires to turn itself into a stock company, then the collective can count only on its own part (in terms of the number of members). It can obtain the rest from society on lease or for money at market prices.

[Gonzalyez] Is there a way to determine this part?

[Zanin] Of course. Proceeding from the value of the fixed and working capital of the nation. Incidentally, this is clearly a separate question which is now being given a lively discussion by economists. And many of them even recently were strong opponents of the "last apportionment," while now the idea is seemingly more and more taking over the masses, although I would speak not about apportionment but rather granting the right to a share.

[Gonzalyez] However, there is the opinion that for now in society there is no group interested in market relations. And for this reason any privatization is beneficial.

[Zanin] Nonsense. Everyone who works is interested in the market.

[Gonzalyez] But they say that people are afraid of unemployment, high prices and competition.

[Zanin] Right. And they should be afraid. That is normal. People largely are simply obliged to fear unpleasantness. If this were not the case, then one would have to think about the mental state of society.

But there is the other question of how such fears are used. If this is for speculation and intimidation, this is immoral.

[Gonzalyez] We, as you know, have been so brought up that once we obtain an education and profession in life, we

try not to change jobs and generally it is a matter of pride to work 30 years at one machine tool.

[Zanin] A just observation. But the time has come to debunk this myth. Such a way of life is harmful to both man and the job. We must begin by changing the labor legislation. The administration must be given the right to maneuver the labor force while the worker must be able to protect himself from arbitrariness. This is the first essential condition for adapting to the market.

At present, in five minutes I can hire a lathe operator. But I cannot transfer him, for instance, to the metal workers even if it is learned that the man was deceiving us and had never been a lathe operator. He will drag me through the courts.

[Gonzalyez] We come back again to the degrees of freedom at the enterprise. But one other question arises: What will happen if everyone tries to produce a more advantageous civilian product? The former postboxes will swing over to meat grinders, but what about the tanks and cannons?

[Zanin] Don't worry, they will not be any worse. On the contrary, the new relations will force the manufacturing of more efficient weapons at lower cost. To put it honestly, in maintaining the level of military expenditures for each plant or sector, we in a way are also preserving the level of the product. I have mentioned that there are established contacts, familiar consumers and previously formed orders.... Should all of this be broken up voluntarily for the sake of conversion?

[Gonzalyez] On that same day, Valentin Petrovich Zanin, the general director of the former "postbox" and now the Signal Production Association, asked the local sports society to send him a pair of ski bindings, the latest model. "They say that they are expensive and are selling like hotcakes," he explained. "We will cut them apart and take a look.... And possibly we will make them better."

Can they actually do this? For the ski bindings are not provided in the Gosplan scheme.

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