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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-91-020

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25 July 1991

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Veterans Committee Appeal

91UM0685B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA headline: "Soviet War Veterans Committee Appeal to Internationalist Servicemen"]

[Text] Respected internationalist servicemen!

In the latter part of 1988, the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA printed the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree establishing the Internationalist Serviceman Certificate and Chest Emblem. The decoration was originally intended only for servicemen credited with carrying out international duty in Afghanistan. The problem of international assistance the Soviet Union was rendering other peoples and countries was kept hidden from the Soviet people, as it had been for many years. As a result, publishing of the Decree gave rise to an enormous number of letters written by internationalist servicemen to party, state and governmental institutions and to organs of the press.

In connection with the above, on 17 May 1989 the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium extended the 28 December 1988 Decree to include all those who saw combat or rendered Soviet fighting men medical assistance beyond our Motherland's borders. On 30 June 1989, the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree authorizing the granting of benefits to internationalist servicemen, while the USSR Minister of Defense published Order No 300 of 19 August 1989 offering a list of countries which at various times had been rendered assistance in repelling aggression on the part of international imperialism. At a later date, 21 December 1989, the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel issued a directive, and on 2 January 1990 the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Rear Services an order, adding to the list of countries named in Ministry of Defense Order No 300 the countries of Spain, China and Mongolia. Subsequently, Ministry of Defense Order No 220 of 5 June 1990 included Cuba into the list.

In response to requests expressed by internationalist servicemen in their letters and in press organ publications of a large number of various associations of internationalist servicemen, and in an attempt to combine their various groups and interests into a purposeful activity, in October of 1989 the Soviet War Veterans Committee (SKVV) passed a resolution to organize within its structure the International Commission on Affairs of Internationalist Servicemen. At a session held on 20 February 1990 it gave final approval to the resolution and designated as head of the commission Retired Lieutenant General of Aviation A. Pushkin.

The commission intends to carry out work in promotion of the following interests and groups: Asian interest (Chinese, Korean, Mongolian, Vietnamese, Cambodian-Laotian, and Bangladesh groups); African interest (Algerian, Angolan, Ethiopian and Mozambique groups); Near East interest (Egyptian, Syrian, Yemeni groups,

including U.N. observers); Latin American interest (Cuban group); Spanish and Afghan interests.

Now that the commission has been organized, the SKVV hereby issues an appeal to all internationalist servicemen to join the groups. All inquiries may be directed to: 119885, Moscow, Gogolevskiy bul'var, 4, International Commission on Affairs of Internationalist Servicemen, SKVV. (Inquiries are to be addressed to the particular group in which the serviceman is interested.)

Presidium, Commission on the Affairs of Servicemen, SKVV

GlavPUR Announces Public Office Hours

91UM0670B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 May 91 First Edition p 6

[Unattributed report: "Information"]

[Text] The Main Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces has set up an office that will deal with correspondence and offer citizens walk-in service.

The office providing information and referral, including questions involving social and legal protection for servicemen and their dependents, is located as follows: 103160, Moscow, K-160, ul. Shaposhnikova, Building 14, Entrance No 2. Visitors can ride the Metro to the Arbatskaya or Kropotkinskaya stations. Hours of operation are 0900 to 1800 daily; closed holidays, holiday eves, and other days as announced. The telephone numbers are 293-40-15 and 293-42-78.

Hearings on Officers' Misuse of Military Aircraft

91UM0670A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 21 May 91 p 4

[Article by Natalya Kozlova in the column "New Privileges": "An Aircraft for the General: How Much We Pay for Comfort of Military Leaders, Their Offspring and Households"]

[Text] Two committees and three commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, all under the commission that is involved with benefits and privileges, examined a problem dealing with "undisputed facts." It was listed in the agenda as follows: "Shortcomings and Abuses in the Use of Fixed-Wing and Rotary-Wing Transport Aircraft Belonging to the USSR Ministry of Defense."

We have many generals. As for aircraft, we have too few of them—to the point of embarrassment. This however is true only at first glance. People who are in the know are aware that every general has at least one aircraft, with a little left over, to boot. Persons of lower rank took in the facts quite readily.

In a separate special-purpose aviation division—the name of the cost-free air taxi pool which supplies our generals with multiple-passenger Tu-154 and Tu-134 aircraft, 30 percent of the flights carry no passengers. Almost 1,000 hours of flight time was required to carry

one to 10 passengers. The maximum possible loading attained by military transport aircraft of the separate aviation transport regiment is about 60 percent of capacity. This is not loading in the civil aviation sense, of course, but rather attempts to keep aircraft from flying completely empty.

For some reason, top authorities of long-range aviation units are in the habit of travelling alone. Last year, for example, General Yu. Kalugin went on a baker's dozen flights all by himself; what's more, this to Russian cities easily accessible by aircraft, trains and even automobiles.

Enjoying even more liberty are partakers of free trips assigned to a separate helicopter regiment of the Moscow Military District. Five persons just had to take a helicopter to Tula. The cost in time was 3 hours 30 minutes, the cost in money, almost 2,500 rubles. It would otherwise have cost the state 20 rubles apiece. But that would have been cheap and lacking in prestige. Much easier to ask for a helicopter and be done with it. In January, Lieutenant General Pavlov decided to fly from Tushino to Torzhok. A helicopter was flown there to pick him up, but flew back without a passenger after the General declined the offer. So it was a case of waste of 800 kilograms of fuel and loss of 1,000 rubles.

In addition to the above, there is the practice of sending reports and summaries exclusively by air, this supposedly having something to do with special security and importance.

The state foots the largest bills in the case of large-capacity Il-76 aircraft. Of 189 flights out of Chkalovskiy airport in a single quarter, 117 carried nothing but air.

It is considered very smart to arrive at the capital in proud solitude to attend a routine meeting, gathering or council session. Thus, in autumn of last year, five commanders of groups, including the chief of the Stavropol School of PVO Troops and three or four subordinates, flew into the city of Klin to attend a military council meeting of troops of the PVO [air defense]. After discharging their passengers, the planes flew home. They returned empty two days later to pick up the generals. The flights of the military leaders to the PVO Troops military council meeting cost the state 24,000 rubles. That in the period between spring and fall when there is an annual problem to find transportation for children of ordinary military personnel planning for their summer vacation, with the added difficulty of the parents laboring in desolate areas of the country. Military families cannot find a flight to take their vacation, while aircraft continue to fly empty. The military authorities of the separate special-purpose aviation division devised a reasonable suggestion: Let servicemen and their dependents purchase flights on transport aircraft so that they can travel from distant points to the center of the country or to resorts. However, the leadership of the Air Force Main Staff and USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation is still thinking it over, trying to decide whether or not to adopt the suggestion.

It is clear that the thousands of rubles spent on the flights are not thought as being of any consequence. The logic here must be that rubles are a weak means of foreign exchange. But the currency has value and is convertible. It is worth something! For example, last year a Tu-154 carrying six passengers flew to Paris. The group was headed by General V. Ochalov. V. Arkhipov was in charge of five subordinates, aboard the same kind of plane, in this case flying to Bagdad. General V. Varennikov had it easier—he led only four persons on their trek to celebrated Paris. It may not be necessary to mention that there were no other passengers aboard the aircraft.

Now about the foreign exchange. Using the foreign skies, the refuelling, and the landing fees on airfields that were "not ours" required payments to be made twice. For the aircraft, after delivering the generals, headed homeward, only to return in two days to bring them back.

It hurts to pay that much money, of course, but it could be paid back in full. Last year, the family of General V. Govorov was flown to a beckoning seashore and back aboard a 70-passenger Tu-134. The trip cost the state 10,000 rubles. Of that amount, the sum of 33 rubles was paid back. This is not a singular occurrence. In addition to flying entire families, it is also possible to change the routes of postal aircraft, such as flying into Adler or Simferopol, even returning from there to Moscow, in the case of the families of Generals S. Sokolov, V. Varennikov, V. Kulikov, M. Gareyev, V. Mikhalkin, N. Shestopalov, M. Soroka (tired yet, reader?), A. Betekhtin, L. Shabunin, V. Shabanov, etc.

The above is only a partial listing of the facts and figures. The picture is decidedly unpleasant. Be the truth known, I must relate something else, also.

First, about the general mood of the discussion. The "combat zone" separating the opposing sides caught fire even before the session could be initiated. The situation was the same as in past times: We called people onto the rug; they owe us an explanation. In my view, it is not enough to lance the boil. It is necessary to get to the bottom of the matter, to ascertain the origin of this outrage, decide what to do about it. This is something that is not unusual; it is the consequence of a system that existed before these generals came along.

Then again, there is the problem of acceptable behavior on the part of deputies. I think that if someone does not happen to like the Air Force Commander in Chief, that is not a reason to be rude to him. Or to whisper, to say nothing about shouting from the hall. After all, the deputies did invite the man and offer him the floor. Maybe that kind of behavior is all right in a bazaar, but not in a parliamentary commission. Incidentally, General Ye. Shaposhnikov did have some sensible things to say. The trouble is, they were not noted. It was an environment where this did not agree with the rules of some preconceived game. Really, now, there was no need to display grimaces and giggle during a discussion of the

activities of military transport aviation in situations of natural calamity and accidents, something that has become almost normal in our life. There is all that, of course. Incidentally, humanitarian activities are carried out only by the military, even though someone else could perform this more handily. Clothes-washing detergent costing mere kopeks or cookies carried by enormous military aircraft are just as expensive for Soviet people as flying the families of generals to a beach vacation. The paid trips of the ministry, wherever allowed, sink into the bottomless pocket under the label of "state budget." Millions of defense rubles are floating around somewhere, while the pilots and their dependents can wait decades for an apartment, perhaps never finding one.

The whole truth be known, it must be stated that many persons other than military use military aircraft. It would be interesting to see how Presidential Council member Ch. Aytmatov would be turned down when he requested that an aircraft be dispatched to pick up his family in Frunze. And what about people's deputies of various ranks? The same Air Force Commander in Chief Ye. Shaposhnikov made no more than a passing reference to this, for some reason choosing not to divulge any names. A group from the USSR National Center for Reduction of Nuclear Danger made 324 trips aboard Tu-154s to foreign countries alone. The aircraft as a rule would fly back to their base the same day, only to make a return trip to bring the delegation back home. Who can argue about the need for struggling with nuclear danger; the question here is why the struggle should cost us so much. Judge for yourself. For the past two years, an Il-62 has been taking off regularly, twice a month, carrying a group of 20 to 25 persons from the Center for Reduction of Nuclear Danger to Washington or San Francisco. The cost is 95,000 rubles per flight. Incidentally, the trip can be made via Aeroflot aircraft. Efforts are made to fly foreign delegations, the number of which is growing at an unusually high rate, using military aircraft to cross the boundless expanses of our country. Free flights aboard military aircraft are the order of the day for a great number of people who have nothing to do with the Ministry of Defense. Flown to the city of Shperenberg five times last year were groups of mere RSFSR people's deputy candidates from Gorkiy, Tula, Ryazan, Kalinin and Voronezh oblasts. The groups consisted of about 10 to about 30 persons each. There were 30 such groups. Also ferried about the country are soccer teams and a Supreme Soviet delegation. They pay nothing. Little information is available as to who takes along baggage, and how much there is of it. There naturally is no baggage fee; some passengers carry as much as several dozen—as called in aviation—"pieces of luggage." To foreign countries, at that.

Does the Commander in Chief really need an aircraft? Of course. However, considering the existing practice, the plane does not have to be the largest in the country. There is no doubt about the necessity of a change. And not only in the Ministry of Defense. Do you know what I am afraid of? I fear that the whole thing can repeat itself

in the worst traditions of an old scenario. The only difference may be that other people will be doing the questioning and other people the answering. It is a fact that a sum total is not affected by changing the positions of addends. We must take up the question not so much of "undisputed facts" as of what gives rise to them. This time, the Supreme Soviet is undertaking the "battle of shortages," which is similar to the well-known battle of the harvest, coal, knowledge, etc. We have yet to win one of these battles.

Generals Investigated On Use Of Military Aircraft

91UM0662A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by I. Travin: "Airplane For General's Mother-In-Law"]

[Text] At a joint session of several USSR committees and commissions, the USSR Supreme Soviet Privileges and Benefits Commission discussed the question of abuses in the use of transport airplanes and helicopters in the country's Ministry of Defense.

A few figures from the information presented at the session: The USSR Ministry of Defense has at its disposal several thousand airplanes and helicopters that are intended solely to meet transport needs and carry people. How effectively are they used? Here are some data from last year. It turns out that the average aircraft load was just 15 percent of total capacity! The result is a 30-million-ruble loss.

But that's not all. Instances were cited in which generals and marshals have used such aircraft to travel to the south and have kindly made military aircraft available to their relatives. Things have reached the point of absurdity. An enormous airliner flew from Moscow to the Urals to haul the personal belongings and furniture of a high-ranking officer. One such flight costs the state a minimum of 10,000 rubles.

Military transport aviation is widely used to serve party forums and conferences. Members of the USSR People's Control Committee reported on such instances. And this at a time when there are not enough aircraft to transport passengers and economic cargo and when fuel is very short supply. Yet this kind of use of "transport" wastes 500,000 tons of fuel each year! Moreover, the Ministry of Defense also leases airplanes from the Ministry of Civil Aviation to the tune of 40 million rubles. In the meantime, passengers have to endure waits for tickets and flight departures that are postponed due to "technical reasons."

"In the Supreme Soviet," said N. Ignatovich, Chairman of the Privileges and Benefits Commission, "we asked for several million additional rubles to aid the victims of the Chernobyl accident. We were told that there is no money."

Needless to say, it's a strange situation. The budget is in shambles, the people's standard of living is rapidly declining, and yet this kind of luxury is allowed.

The army should go about its job of defending the motherland, and not be involved in arranging flights and commercial shipments "on the side." However, representatives of the Ministry of Defense had a very unique response to the Deputies' criticisms, saying that the aircraft and helicopters are their property. But isn't it the taxpayers who provide the millions of rubles for the Defense Ministry's budget?

The session decided to submit this question to the USSR Supreme Soviet for discussion. After all, defense spending for the second six-month period is to be confirmed soon.

All-Army Komsomol 'Program Goals'

91UM0685A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report in the column "In Anticipation of the First All-Army Komsomol Conference"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] As reported in our newspaper, the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations, after a lengthy and heated discussion held at its recent plenum, adopted the draft version of the "Program Goals of the Komsomol Organization, USSR Armed Forces." In view of the forthcoming First All-Army Komsomol Conference, which is to be held in the end of June, it seems to us that it would be useful for all Army and Navy youths to become familiar with this document and express their opinion on its salient features.

The document is written to be responsive to this transient period in development of the USSR Armed Forces Komsomol Organization, a time of changes in political organs and of reorganization of Komsomol structures in the Army and Navy.

The political processes and social changes occurring in society and in the Armed Forces are determining a new role for the Komsomol Organizations of the Army and Navy, a role consisting of:

- transforming the Armed Forces Komsomol into a champion of youth policy that would express the interests and protect the rights of all Army and Navy youths;
- maintaining political leadership in an environment of an extensive multiplicity of movements and organizations;
- actively participating in the country's political life through their representatives, who are elected to serve in the organs of state power, and through other political and social structures.

The Armed Forces Komsomol, in its position as a socio-political independent-action youth organization, considers as its main purpose the creation of conditions conducive to maximum development of the young man, encouraging him to exercise his creative potential in the interests of military service; mobilization of its members to carry out their service requirement in an exemplary manner; taking an active part in social life; and protecting and furthering their rights and interests.

The ideological basis of our organization is the pursuit of a creatively developed theory of Marxism and Leninist instruction in protecting the socialist Fatherland. The organization grants free access to every young serviceman who believes in the socialist option and accepts its program goals.

Continuing our devotion to the history of the VLKSM [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] and honoring its best traditions, we resolutely reject:

- dogmatism in theory and meaningless repetition in practice, negation of continuity in development;
- vilification of our past, disregard of history to satisfy a political situation and gain immediate advantage;
- equating democracy and glasnost with permissiveness and irresponsibility;
- application of administrative command leadership methods; dictating to the primary organization;
- treating persons as disposable commodities; exhibiting indifference to needs, problems and interests of Army and Navy youth.

Having established the Komsomol's position and significance in the life of military collectives, the Armed Forces Komsomol Organization went on to set down its program goals.

State Youth Policy

The Armed Forces Komsomol Organization, as a major mass organization representing the interests of various categories of young servicemen, does hereby accept some functions of implementing tasks levied by state youth policy in the Army and Navy. The Komsomol Organization, making active use of its right of legislative initiative and of representation in the body of deputies, in social organizations and commissions, and working closely with military political organs and with commissions involved with youth affairs in the organs of state power, does hereby intend to participate in the development, coordination and implementation of youth policy in the interests of more extensive encouragement of creative potential and for the protection and effectuation of the rights of young servicemen.

Ideology

Following a path of creative study and development of the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the history of the

Fatherland, the history of the Komsomol, and traditions of the Armed Forces, employing open dialogue and free discussion, with respect for the various viewpoints and opinions, the Komsomol Organization resolves to: encourage in Komsomol members and young servicemen a high sense of civic duty, patriotism and loyalty to socialist ideals; promote a willingness to carry out the constitutional duty to protect the Motherland; actively familiarize the rising generation with the values of world and domestic cultures and attainments won by modern social thought.

Improvement in Quality Indices in Combat Training and Young Soldier Skills Attainment

The Komsomol Organization intends to employ personal example on the part of Komsomol members in combat training activities, service and military discipline; encourage in Army youth lasting interest in military service; and develop concepts of competitiveness, employing a system of moral and material incentives available to Komsomol organizations.

Strengthening of Military Discipline

Komsomol organizations, while working in military collectives to promote a healthy moral and ethical climate, encouraging Komsomol members and young servicemen to develop respect for a person's integrity, honor and dignity, in addition to a responsible attitude toward the law and general military regulations, are to direct their major efforts at cancelling odious phenomena and habits that have taken root among youths and renewing collectivism, comradeship, and brother-in-arms and new traditions that further the increase in authority of honorable Army and Navy service.

Interethnic Relations

International in its makeup, convictions and structure, in addition encompassing within its ranks Army and Navy youths of all ethnic origins, the Armed Forces Komsomol Organization is resolute in promoting a just society and harmony, in rejection of ethnic enmity, and in the free and democratic development of each people. We set as our goal interethnic nurturing of Komsomol members and young servicemen; the generation in them of respect for and tolerance of ethnic traditions and customs; and the rejection of any manifestations of racism, nationalism, chauvinism, or attempts to fuel interethnic conflicts in the Army environment.

Social Protection of Youth

The Komsomol Organization, in representing and protecting the interests of Army and Navy youth, is to actively participate in implementing the Armed Forces general social development program until the year 2000, directing its major efforts toward securing social protection for young servicemen and their dependents, with this to include the social and psychological adaptation of youth to Army life and the rendering of material and humanitarian aid to servicemen without parents and to

those who suffer a disabling injury while on active duty. The organization is to act on its concern for re-employment and education of servicemen discharged into the reserve, and is to become involved with establishing a system designed to provide Army and Navy youth with legal information. We intend to actively support and participate in the activity of charitable functions and organizations that are geared to render assistance in matters of social development and protection of young servicemen.

Work Within the Union

Our Komsomol Organization, as a united and integral organization, is to struggle for the preservation and reinforcement of the ideological and organizational unity of its ranks; for insuring the predominant role of primary organizations by virtue of broadening their rights and independence of action, enlarging their material and financial base, and rendering the Komsomol structures more capable of dealing with specific problems encountered by units and subunits.

Collaboration with State and Social Associations

The Armed Forces Komsomol Organization stands ready to enter into constructive dialogue and cooperation with the various political and social parties, movements and organizations for the purpose of consolidating efforts directed toward the resolution of problems peculiar to youth.

The Komsomol Organization is to function in collaboration with party organizations on the basis of ideological unity, political cooperation, complete organizational independence, mutual respect, comradesly trust and support.

Speeches at All-Army Afghan Vets' Conference

*91UM0688A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 May 91 First Edition p 3*

["A Model of Loyalty to the Oath: Speeches at the First All-Army Conference of Internationalist Servicemen"]

[Excerpts]

**Lieutenant General G. Kondratyev, first deputy
commander, Turkestan Military District**

"All of us here," said the speaker, "in spite of differences in age, military rank and ethnic origin, are united by a commonality of background: The Motherland ordered us to protect her interests by carrying out our international duty in various hot spots' of the planet. Regardless of what may be said about us by people who have never worn the uniform, we know that we have done our duty.

"Two opinions on the 'Afghan' problem and internationalists exist in society. One holds that they are a lost generation, while the other maintains that they comprise the better part of the nation, people who have retained throughout highly difficult trials the ability to take

uncompromising and honorable action, an ability to give a definite 'yes' or 'no.' We know exactly in which segments of society both opinions reside.

"There is here no end to problems. A person can argue about whether the politicians were right or wrong, about errors and omissions on the part of those who were giving the orders, but beyond reproach and sacred in my view are those who fought in this war that is so little known to our people. On behalf of the district's internationalists' conference, I wish to declare our conviction of the need to erect in our Motherland's capital in the near future a monument to all internationalists, to those fallen and those living, who did their duty at various times and in various areas of the earth."

The speaker then took up the subject of tasks which he believes should be resolved by internationalist soldiers' councils. Of salient importance in this regard are the study, dissemination, popularization and utilization in troop training of combat experience gained in Afghanistan, experience purchased with the blood and sweat of a great number of comrades. They can be resolved only by overcoming conservatism and excessive rigidity in planning. Standing in the way of progress here are the large volume of everyday and economic problems, excessive reduction in size of units and large units and inadequate strength levels.

Of equal importance in the speaker's opinion is concern for social protection for internationalist servicemen. The leadership of the country and the Armed Forces is doing much in this regard. Responsive legislation has been passed, benefits and privileges provided, etc. However, "Afghan" officers in exercising their rights and privileges often encounter formalism, indifference and bureaucracy on the part of functionaries. As a result, people who went through fire and water, those who did not hesitate to take on an enemy, are often forced to step back to avoid sinking into bureaucratic mire. This is where councils must be loud and clear in their helping a comrade stand up to petty tyranny and self-conceit.

The speaker concluded by endorsing the concept of convening an all-union internationalist servicemen's unification conference.

**Colonel General B. Gromov, first deputy minister,
USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs**

The former commander of the 40th Army spoke with alarm of the difficult and critical situation in the country's economy, politics, social sphere and interethnic relations. He spoke approvingly of finding a way out of the crisis via the program proposed by Russian presidential candidate N. I. Ryzhkov, discussing its principal features in some detail.

"My entire life has been associated with the Army," said B. Gromov. "It is only natural that I even now have a grasp of the situation peculiar to military collectives and of the tasks they must resolve. The Army stands again today as a guarantor of society's stability. Be it an

accident, an act of nature, a problem in road construction or crop harvesting, the Army is there to help. That is how it has been and will continue to be. It will be a long time before we can build structures that will enable us to fully release servicemen from tasks which are not part of their typical duties.

"The drop in prestige the Army has suffered is more than a misfortune; it is a tragedy of our society, something we have yet to fully comprehend. Most alarming is the fact that age-old national traditions are crumbling, especially in Russia, where serving the Fatherland in the ranks of its armed defenders was always considered to be a sacred matter.

"It is distressing to raise again and again the question of the need to provide aid to 'Afghans' and the families of men killed in action. Progress in resolving these problems is very slow. Simply put, we need a law granting internationalist soldiers social protection, for nature abhors a vacuum,' as the saying goes. If we do nothing about this, someone else will do—and is doing—something about it; someone who sees fit to look upon 'Afghans' as ruffians and mobsters.

"We all share the same degree of interest in our history, the history of our state. I am not advocating fighting with the past. Historic truth must be completely restored and made accessible to everyone; there is no point to fighting our own history. Wasting an enormous amount of forces and financial resources to rename streets and cities at a time when we are overburdened with other unresolved problems is unwise at the very least.

"Speaking of history, I would like to present an idea that has been in existence for some time. I believe it will be supported by everyone here present. I propose that we restore the designation 40th Army, a designation that would unite hundreds of thousands of persons. The whole world knows about it. This is the army which even in our time has shown the younger generation's devotion to the Motherland, the oath and the military obligation.

"In this difficult situation that has come about in the country, I bid my comrades-in-arms not to lose faith in the Motherland, not to forget our people's past, but rather to look boldly to the future. Yes, the future will be problematic, but it will be the kind of future made by ourselves—patriots of the Fatherland."

**General of the Army N. Lyashchenko, military
inspector and adviser, General Inspectors Group, USSR
Ministry of Defense**

Recalling the events that transpired in revolutionary Spain, where he had occasion to participate, General of the Army N. Lyashchenko noted that the present day internationalist servicemen have inherited the best traditions of those who at various times were involved in rendering assistance to the peoples of Korea and Laos, Algeria and Egypt, Vietnam and Syria, China and Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, Cuba and Nicaragua.

"However, a special place in our history," stressed the speaker, "is held by Afghanistan. No one should have any doubts about whether Soviet fighting men carried out their military and international duty with honor and distinction. The main thing today is to preserve the glorious combat traditions, the moral and ethical potential they accumulated there, and pass this on to the rising generation. The job of educating youth will become doubly fruitful if the internationalist soldier movement combines its efforts with organizations and councils of veterans of the Great Patriotic War.

"You saw for yourselves the significance of the friendship between peoples of our multinational Motherland. That was a time when the last mouthful of water was shared by a Russian and a Uzbek, a Ukrainian and a Moldavian, an Armenian and an Azerbaijani. I am convinced that it is you who are obligated to become the force that will help to rally our peoples, overcome interethnic discord and pull the country out of the spiritual crisis. That is the principal task of the patriot and internationalist."

**Yu. Zubko, deputy chairman, Ukrainian Union of
Afghan War Veterans**

In his speech, Yu. Zubko informed the delegates of an expanded session held by the board of the Afghan War Veterans on the eve of the conference; it decided in favor of supporting the idea of consolidating all social associations of "Afghans" in the country. He read the following statement prepared at the session by the leaders of the associations:

"We, the leaders of internationalist servicemen's associations and Afghan War participants, representing 14 Union and nine autonomous republics, more than 50 oblasts and cities and a number of other areas of the country, do hereby recognize that this meeting is a genuine attempt to seek solutions to a large set of problems being faced by internationalist soldiers and Afghan War participants. The meeting affirmed the commonality of goals and interests shared by the various efforts of this movement. It also brought to light the multiple approaches being taken to resolve the problems.

"In this regard, recognizing the need for further dialogue between our organizations, we hereby state the following:

1. We affirm our devotion to our brotherhood and to the traditions of the united USSR Armed Forces, seeing our role as that of a reinforced contribution to consolidation of society, development of the latter's economic potential, the patriotic education of youth, the training of youth to defend the Motherland and the linking of our efforts to organizations of veterans of war, labor, the Army and Navy and reserve servicemen.

2. We have a right to expect that society will fully honor its obligation to Afghan War internationalist soldiers and participants, taking decisive and specific measures

to implement a suitable state program and create conditions favorable to the establishment and development of organizations and associations of Afghan War internationalist servicemen and participants.

3. We consider it necessary to render a greater amount of social and material assistance to needy comrades-in-arms, those suffering disabling injuries and the families of those killed in action, by virtue of establishing our own production activity, with a view toward the participation in this activity of Afghan War participants and internationalist soldiers. In this regard, we expect to receive support in our production commercial activity from the USSR Ministry of Defense and from other interested state organs.

4. We do acknowledge that attainment of these goals is associated with a definite need for coordinating our actions, mutual support and cooperation. We are in general agreement on the subject of consolidating the activities of Afghan War participants and internationalist servicemen with regard to convening for the pursuit of these goals an all-union conference on the basis of a war participant and setting up an organizational committee that will deal with convocation of the conference, working via the leadership and boards of existing associations, organizations and funds of Afghan War participants and other internationalist servicemen.

5. We demand that decisive measures be taken to free our brothers-in-arms who are being held as prisoners of war.

6. We petition the USSR Government and the country's President to grant internationalist soldiers who have seen combat the status of war participant."

**Lieutenant General P. Grachev, commander, Airborne
Troops**

"We are all witnesses to a real-life national drama, one with an unpredictable outcome. Empty store shelves. Inflation. Proliferation of crime. Frequent bloody interethnic conflicts.

"In this regard, a person becomes increasingly convinced that the Army today is one of only a few elements capable of preventing final ruin of our state. One is constantly forced to think this thought by the chaotic attempts to effect sovereign status, with associated bids to create republic armies, something which can have catastrophic results.

"The above conditions being what they are, a person cannot help but think about the role of internationalist servicemen in the life and activity of the Armed Forces at the present stage in time. In my view, without any pretense to exclusivity, we have every right to say that internationalists should become the cementing nucleus for each and every military collective. We may look upon them as being a kind of Army 'genetic fund' that possesses special professional and moral qualities.

"The internationalist today is not only our past: He is to a greater extent our present and future. This of and by itself does not confer authority. A leader is made when, possessing combat experience, he is able to rally people and have them follow him in the most difficult and critical times. That is my point of view.

"I can say without reservation that a commander has support in all matters when there are people possessing combat experience. In the VDV [Airborne Troops] they number slightly more than 2,500, but it is they, holding positions directly connected with education and training of people, who shoulder the major load of maintaining a high degree of troop combat readiness.

"Noteworthy here is the fact that internationalist qualities such as loyalty to duty, self-sacrifice and steadfastness and honesty in actions are peculiar not only to those who travelled the roads of Afghanistan: They are communicated to everyone. That is why encouraging personnel to develop high professional military qualities, Soviet patriotism and devotion to the socialist option constitutes an obligation for you and me and, if you please, a sacred trust.

"What is required to remain a leader, become a nucleus for building the entirety of Army life?

"In my view, the first thing we should struggle for uncompromisingly is an affirmation of the honored label of internationalist in our everyday actions, in our competence. The second thing is personal example in our behavior. Next comes the preservation of our honor and integrity under all conditions and in all situations. To that I would add—probably the most important thing—loyalty to the international brotherhood, the ability to maintain the sacred sense of devotion to ideals guiding our service. We require nothing else.

"Almost 30 months have passed since we saw our last battle. There, in Afghanistan, we were often able to get through a situation by mutual confidence, a constant feeling of fellowship, the right of acting openly, treating each other honestly. This drew us together and made us strong. The struggle continues. At stake in the latter is the fate of the most sacred and valuable thing we could ever have—the fate of the Motherland, the fate of the great Union of Soviet people and their Army. I believe that we, internationalists, have not lost our qualities; at a time of danger for our Fatherland, we will make our worthy contribution to the matter of the country's well-being and strengthening of its Armed Forces."

Colonel General (Res) Yu. Tukharinov, the first commander, 40th Army in Afghanistan

"The joining together of Army internationalists is a matter of importance. The need for organizing an all-Army and all-Union movement has existed for some time. Our conference has brought out into the open the problems of those who carried out their duty beyond the borders of our Motherland."

The speaker then dwelled on the problems of applying the combat experience gained in Afghanistan to the training of today's commanders and men and on the lasting value of this experience.

"Very few combat veterans of the older generation remain in the Army today," stressed Colonel General (Res) Yu. Tukharinov. "One would expect that 'Afghans' would take their place. Some people working in personnel organs unfortunately do not understand this. An officer possessing combat experience should command a subunit that is up to strength, not one that is 'truncated,' reduced in strength. He is supposed to train people, since he has something to say and demonstrate with the authority of personal knowledge. I regret to say that the Armed Forces reductions have removed some Afghans" from the roster of preference, relegating them to a position of secondary importance. Is that any way to approach the problem?"

On the subject of social protection for servicemen, Yu. Tukharinov noted that this is something that should be provided in its entirety by the USSR Ministry of Defense. People who devoted their youth and health to the Armed Forces should be guaranteed that their needs and requests will be satisfied.

Prospects for Army Komsomol Organization Viewed

91UM0759A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jun 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksey Reshetnikov, chairman of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations, by Captain V. Popov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; date and place of interview not given: "Preparing for the First All-Army Komsomol Conference: We've Forgotten How to Attack"]

[Text] There is good reason why the editor's mail is said to be a sensitive barometer of public opinion. And the sizable number of letters from readers concerning the topic of the forthcoming First All-Army Komsomol Conference is evidence that army youth is awaiting this event. And for good reason, it seems. In the words of Aleksey Reshetnikov, chairman of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations, the conference is to become a major event in its affairs. What, then, are its participants to expect?

We now turn the floor over to Aleksey Reshetnikov.

[Reshetnikov] Those who like demagogical battles will be disappointed. Yes, we support pluralism and debate. But I am opposed to verbal attacks at the conference. We've had enough. We need to orient ourselves on concrete, serious work.

I think that we will finally determine the place and role of our organization in the youth environment, in army structures and in the All-Union Komsomol. My hope is

that we will adopt the Charter and the Program Goals—this will make it possible to create a base of standards for subsequent fruitful work.

[Popov] As we know, many critical barbs were shot at the armed forces and the army Komsomol at the eve of the 21st All-Union Komsomol Congress. As I remember, some even proposed abolishing the Komsomol from the army. What now?

[Reshetnikov] Even today, unfortunately, many see the army card as a losing one.

Dislike for us is fully explainable. To the disdain of certain young political oracles and prophets, we are still alive. Young soldiers admit: "In the army, the Komsomol is something entirely different. It's nothing like 'on the outside'." Such admissions carry a lot of weight.

[Popov] During the debates at the conference, the discussion will probably turn to existing youth organizations that stand on positions other than those supported by the All-Union Komsomol. What is your personal attitude toward them? Is creation of structures acting as an alternative to the army Komsomol justified from your point of view? Are there fundamental differences between them?

[Reshetnikov] Speaking in the language of the military, we are forced to make an adjustment for the alternative youth organizations. Some young soldiers were members of these organizations, and they entered the army with political views and ideas they absorbed there. And we must take this into account. We will talk about this at the conference.

But it is my deep conviction that there is no serious alternative to our organization. And here is why. While we are doing something concrete, something useful for army youth, albeit with mistakes and with delays, the leadership of all of these alternative youth organizations usually does nothing more than make pronouncements on social objectives.

[Popov] Nor should we apparently forget that there are many complaints against the army Komsomol. As a prelude to the debates, could you say anything about what is keeping the uniformed Komsomol from becoming a real youth leader?

[Reshetnikov] We have no intention of hiding our shortcomings and deficiencies. My hope is that a principled discussion will be carried on at the conference about this.

We must self-critically recognize that Komsomol work is undergoing restructuring more slowly than we would like, and that the theoretical disputes have dragged on unjustifiably. We have been unable to completely ensure the rights and independence of the grass-roots organizations. Having rejected methods of compulsion, we have not yet found a worthy replacement for the obsolete methods of leading the young.

These are the main causes of our mistakes. There are of course specific problems as well. But this is the main thing.

[Popov] How do you feel, to what extent is complete and unqualified independence of the army Komsomol justified? How much have our relations with party and military political organizations changed?

[Reshetnikov] This is a very painful and important question. Yes, there were cases earlier of suppression of the young's initiative, and overcautiousness of all kinds was a major hindrance to youth work. But there were also examples of very effective cooperation. You can't take that away—it really happened.

I would not like Komsomol organizations and Komsomol workers to be deprived of the support, attention and concern they need from senior comrades in today's complex and acute political situation. We are neither parasites nor whiners, but why artificially place the Komsomol in the army in isolation? Such a thing does happen, because many commanders and many party and political workers are avoiding the Komsomol.

We will also talk about this. Fundamentally.

[Popov] Aleksey, we have discussed the problems facing army and navy youth in detail with you. We know that much attention will be turned to them at the conference. Can you say anything right now about how to solve many of the acute problems? What must we focus our main attention on in the immediate future?

[Reshetnikov] First of all, the councils of the Komsomol organizations must realize their legal, organizational and financial possibilities. It would be important to tighten military and Komsomol discipline, and to strictly observe regulations and statutes. Nor can we forget about material and other stimulation of Komsomol members. But our morale will be a topic of special discussion. Many of us have broken down and lost our way. We've forgotten how to attack.

[Popov] I have heard from several sources that the matter of renaming the organization will be brought up at the conference.

[Reshetnikov] That's no rumor. Demands of a certain faction of army youth and of Komsomol workers are behind all of this. We will not be able to avoid this issue at the conference. But one thing must be understood. We can change our name (there is all too much passion being displayed around this issue). But the viability of any organization, party or political group is determined ultimately not by its name but by the work it does.

[Popov] What, then, is your attitude toward an opinion that is being voiced ever louder today—that it is time for youth organizations, parties and groups to reject all "political alignments"? That we should do nothing more than simply serve the young, their needs and interests?

[Reshetnikov] Anyone who says this is playing the hypocrite. History confirms that there has never been a single organization, group, bloc or party possessing a membership that did not exhibit some sort of political leanings.

[Popov] And one final question, one requiring maximum honesty. Do you, an army Komsomol worker of what we might call the attack echelon, believe in the forthcoming conference? Will this really be an event in the life of army youth?

[Reshetnikov] It would of course be better to answer this question after the conclusion of our forum. But for the moment, let me say that I have very high hopes that the conference will become a turning point in our work.

Lt Gen Tarasov on Otchizna Movement

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11 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with RSFSR People's Deputy Lt Gen B. Tarasov, chairman, Otchizna Coordinating Council, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col. V. Gavrilenko: "Otchizna Stands for the Native Land"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Some time ago, the mass media reported on the appearance of the patriotic movement Otchizna. Since little information on it was available, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA requested RSFSR People's Deputy Lieutenant General B. Tarasov, chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Otchizna deputy group, to provide us with information on the movement. Below is the text of an interview our correspondent had with him.

[Tarasov] It is said that the new is the well-forgotten past. Our country finds itself in a situation similar to that existing in Russia after February of 1917. We are facing a crisis in all areas of life: politics, economics, social sphere, culture. This is the source of the moral confusion in the minds and hearts of people. Does our great Motherland deserve this? Is this bitter fate inevitable for Russia? Just look at what it has come to: Someone is saying that Russia as a state no longer exists, that we should "put to rest" the word "patriotism." However, the fact is that love for the Motherland, a striving to elevate it and make it prosper, are a commodity that is true and eternal, something every civilized society holds dear. To renew the Motherland, to place it up among our national treasures—that is the passion that drives the initiative group Otchizna. We are happy to see that we are not alone.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Boris Vasilyevich, some publications have made sarcastic remarks, saying that this is nothing but another "society of pensioners."

[Tarasov] I have a good idea which publications they are. "Let God be their witness," as the saying goes; they spoke without thinking. Yes, indeed, a good number of war and labor veterans have expressed their interest in

participating in the movement. However, we have also attracted quite a following from young people. Just recently I was happy to hear from a group of young business people. They even offered the movement financial support.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Now is a good time to discuss the goals and plans of Otchizna.

[Tarasov] The All-Russia patriotic movement Otchizna has as its goal the unification of all patriotic forces for the purpose of preserving the statehood of the Russian Federation and of equal rights and freedoms of all resident nationalities. We address our appeal to all patriots who feel the need to preserve and unify Russia and her natural, cultural, and spiritual values, and the heroic traditions of Russian military valor.

In addition, we consider it necessary to come out decisively for protecting the sovereignty and national integrity of the Russian people. This certainly is not chauvinism, nor is it a manifestation of narrow national interests, but rather a natural striving for fairness. We stand in opposition to sentiments circulating in certain segments of society advocating under the banner of human values a denial of identity and self-determination of the Russian people, of the right to be head of one's own household. As it now stands, Russians are forgotten, humiliated, and insulted in their own home. All of them are starting to sense ever more acutely the lack of Russian statehood. At a time of expressions of national self-determination throughout the country, of affirmation of rights and identity, the Russian people find themselves in a nebulous, indefinite state, realizing that many problems national in nature are being resolved at their expense. This can no longer be tolerated.

The movement will come out in opposition to ideological confrontation and disintegration of the Union of the SSR, against subordinating the Russian people's interests to narrow party interests, against blind and mindless policies that have brought harm to the working man. The movement intends to be decisive in coming to the defense of all Russians residing beyond the boundaries of their historic Motherland. We will cooperate actively in the renewal of society and the rebirth of patriotic traditions, bringing the Russian economy out of the crisis, improving the people's well-being, intensifying democracy, restoring a healthy feeling of national awareness and statehood, breathing new life into the nation and its genetic fund, strengthening the family, and protecting the environment.

Of special concern of course are the Armed Forces, for it was said in ancient Rus that someone not a friend of the army was not a friend of the people. There cannot be a Fatherland without the army, and there cannot be an army without the Fatherland. Disintegration of the army would mean disintegration of the country, for the army is the face of the government, an essential concentration of mental discipline, an embodiment of orderliness, of purposefulness, of selfless and unselfish service to the

Native Land. Not all armies in the world possess such a reserve of valorous and heroic traditions. They must be safeguarded. In my view, this is one of the aspects of Russian patriotism.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Boris Vasilyevich, there have already been heard sighs to the effect that well, so a movement has been formed. All it will do is create opposition to the Russian government and the newly elected President of Russia.

[Tarasov] To people like that I can say only one thing: We intend to support the Russian President—presently Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin—in all his actions and strivings to renew and elevate Russia. If his actions will be responsive to the above principles, he will be able to count on our reliable support.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Can you tell us about the organizational structure of the Otchizna movement?

[Tarasov] We are thinking of setting up movement committees in republics, krays, and oblasts. The Moscow and Leningrad organizations are already in place. Next on the agenda is setting up this kind of organization in other centers of Russia. We are appealing to, and have already elicited the interest of, various sections of the public. We are also accessible to our countrymen residing in foreign countries.

Instituting of republic, kray, and oblast committees is carried out in founding conferences and assemblies, in which it is planned to outline the movements's goals and plans and its further activity, select coordinating councils (15 to 20 men) and their bureaus (three to five persons), and set down the rules in writing.

After that will come rayon and city founding assemblies of the Otchizna movement. The concluding phase of founding work should be the setting up of Otchizna sections in primary labor, educational, and military collectives.

We feel that participation in the movement's work will be effected via individual and collective membership and by associate linkage on the part of all patriotic groups and citizens. We are not concerned with who will be in charge or the ranking of status. For that matter, we do not care if any group that exhibits initiative in any city or rayon takes the initiative to form a movement.

If our initiative receives due public support, sometime in the end of August or beginning of September we intend to convene the All-Russia Founding Conference of the movement. To be discussed there will be problems of membership, certification, and sources of finance, with consideration of the rules and program goals with the intent of adoption.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In what kinds of activities does the movement intend to become involved?

[Tarasov] Work of an educational nature; the use of the mass media; participation in charitable activities; the exercise of initiative in protecting and restoring cultural and historical monuments; repair of monuments to those who gave their lives for the Motherland; and much, much more. It is natural that at some stage the issue may arise of organizing our own mass media.

We are issuing our appeal of a united front to all patriots: party members and non-party members; believers and atheists. We stand for rallying of all societal forces but against disorganized public opinion, against national pessimism and defeatist attitudes. Only combined efforts on the part of all patriots who stand for unity of Russia and of her peoples and the army will enable us to renew the Native Land. We are relying on the true feelings and enthusiasm of millions, on a soaring of national awareness, on mass expression of patriotism. Every person who is proud in the knowledge that he is a Rossiyanin, one who considers himself to be the recipient of patriotic traditions, can take his place in our ranks to make whatever contribution he can to the movement.

Possibility Of Azerbaijani Standing Army Discussed

91US0563C Baku EDEBIYAT GEZETI in Azeri
22 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by Colonel (Ret) R. Zeynalov: "My Opinion: We Have The Strength To Keep An Army"]

[Text] From an interview conversation between I. Novoselov, advisor to the State Defense and Security Department of the USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat, and N. Nikolayev, correspondent for the weekly newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (6-12 October 1990, Nr. 40):

—Today one can say that drawing in the army to resolve interethnic conflicts everywhere is being defended. The Union of Soldier Mothers has strongly protested the intervention of Russian youths into events like the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. What can you say about this?

—It is written in our draft that that army is only for the defense of the Union when it is attacked from abroad. Coming to internal conflicts, I would consider that every republic must create voluntary military units which would defend the security of society for the resolution of its own internal conflicts.

Questions of establishing a military structure and creating a national army are raised very often on the pages of newspapers and discussed in television and radio broadcasts. Recently, military administrations and commissions have been established in the Baltic, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia. In the republics of Belorussia and the Ukraine decrees have been passed on the relevance of establishing their own security forces and internal troops. Nevertheless, our republic is in favor of keeping a single army. But B.N. Yeltsin has said a number of times that interethnic conflict centers must be extinguished not by army and internal troops but by well-prepared military units in which representatives of the entire republic take part whenever it is necessary.

I have to point out that Colonel V. Ochirov, Hero of the Soviet Union, deputy chairman of the State Defense and Security Committee, Afghan war veteran and a man of great life experience, said recently that he is a proponent of local military units and internal forces established by the republics. This same question has special importance in our republic. Whether we want it or not, it is a fact that our people have been exposed to attacks by Armenian bandits. It is true that necessary steps are being taken in the republic to end this bloody aggression, but these have been few. Let us take a look. After passing USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's decree forbidding illegal armed forces, not one further step was taken. It is as if this document in which we had put so much hope has gone unseen in higher state circles. One can say that the decree has gone unfulfilled. In our opinion, this shows the level of real authority of the president and the High Military Command. Come, let us be objective.

Declarations calling for the withdrawal of armed forces personnel from Russia, the Ukraine and Belorussia are increasing. From a humanistic point of view, we can imagine the agitation of soldier mothers...But, let us speak openly, if the situation is aggravated to the ultimate extent, then what will we do? I have met and talked with army and internal forces soldiers often. Most of them said they are ready to volunteer to defend Azerbaijan's borders from Armenian aggression if republic Supreme Soviets would pass any kind of decree on it.

I personally think that the decree drafting Azeris into the USSR KGB and MVD forces and army ranks which are concentrated on Azerbaijan's territory should have been passed earlier.

What will it be like later? This is a question that disturbs many people. A. Mutellibov, president of Azerbaijan, has answered this question often. There is not that much difference whether the future military units are called "national security corps", "national division" or anything else. There are many plans.

One thing is clear. After this we cannot waste any more time. In my opinion, we have to study how the national army was created during the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. The rich experience of this army could now be of great use to us.

Today very few people could be found who are unaware of the powerful military force of the Army of Azerbaijan which had been created in 1921-1922. The Republic's Peoples Commissariat for the Military and the Naval Fleet had been engaged in creating the Army of Azerbaijan.

The nucleus of the young Army of Azerbaijan was the Azerbaijan Division which was formed in 1920. Then the republic had its own fleet, air units, and armored vehicles. Military cadres were trained on a regular basis. Military education was begun during adolescence. An army unit formed from Red Military Academy students was active.

After the USSR was established, military forces from the Transcaucasian republics which had been included in the composition of the All-Union army were added to a separate Caucasian army. Despite major difficulties, the Azerbaijan division was quickly turned into a well-prepared military unit. I have to add that other Soviet republics of the Transcaucasus also had their own national military units.

In the relevant official documents the need for preparing special military uniforms for a national army, and placing national military specialized cadres in command and political duties.

The separate Caucasian Army command was also making plans to strengthen national armies. Thus, there was a special meeting of the command of the separate Caucasian Army in Tiflis on 23 August 1923. Representatives from all the military units in the Transcaucasus

took part in this meeting. They discussed important issues in compulsory military service in the TSFSR, the organization of national armies, the military preparedness of the population, and similar items. At this point I have to say that at this time there were various approaches to military structure. For example, L. Trotsky, in the period that he served as military commissar up to 1920, was hostile to national armies. His position impeded the development of national armies. Trotsky and his faction were against compelling non-Russian peoples who had had no military background into military service. They called the organization of a national army an empty game, a game which fulfilled the national egoism of certain peoples. This great-state chauvinistic view was demonstrated not only in Azerbaijan but also in the other republics of the Transcaucasus. Even among the leaders of the national armies there were those who gave no importance to the strengthening of the defense capabilities of the Transcaucasian republics, and considered the national army as something to be used as a tactical principle during the time when the nationality question was being resolved.

As a result of the relationship described above, the funds allocated for the support of national armies was suddenly reduced in 1923. That was because the question of reducing the national division had been before the EGO command. But the appeal to the country's leadership from leading organizations of the TSFSR had yielded a positive result. Despite all the difficulties, the Union government compensated for the basic inadequacies of the Transcaucasian national armies. This also created the possibility for developing a military organization. One can see this in the example of the Azerbaijan division.

In 1923 2,219 soldiers were in the ranks of the Azerbaijan division: three artillery, a special cavalry unit, communications and mechanized units, etc. J. Nakhchivanski was then commander of the artillery. In 1924 G. Vezirov and after him, H. Rehmanov were appointed to the same position. During the war much work was done to establish the present [OADKYJ]. All of this played a major role in preparing Azeri soldiers and in the formation of a national division during the Great Fatherland War.

At the First Congress of USSR Peoples Deputies this issue of further developing armed forces on the same basis and of the same quality was put forth with complete clarity.

Now a reform in military policy was put as a basic goal in the preparation of the draft of the Union treaty. It has been reported in the press that the representatives from Azerbaijan basically applauded this idea. But a corresponding document demanding the dispersal of illegal military units active in Armenia went unsigned.

Unfortunately, the republic mass media reveals that it has no information on discussions of military policy. It is still worthwhile to discuss the establishment of a

national army. One cannot approach this issue in a biased manner. If it was possible to place national military units in 1920-1938 and 1941-1950 on the territory of other republics, does that not mean that placing them in various regions now would pose no difficulty? Then military units of the USSR armed forces could concentrate on areas of national defense and on concrete military-political conditions.

In my opinion, in connection with this we have to take into consideration in the preparation of a plan the point below: the republics have the authority to maintain military units. For example, we must bring back to our republic the 27th motorized artillery division, which historically began as the Azerbaijan division. This division is now a part of the Privolzhsk-Ural Military District. Not only Azeris, but also conscripts of other nationalities can serve in it. Changing the division's location to Azerbaijan is no easy task. That being the case, I propose that we have to give the first battle flag of one of the Transcaucasian divisions to our division. That means, if they would bring the 77th Simferopol artillery division from the Ural Military District which is now the 23rd motorized division to Azerbaijan, the problem would be solved. This division as a whole should be in the Transcaucasian Military District. Its costs would be paid out of the republic's domestic expenditures.

For information: in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 4 November 1990 I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, said that his government was ready to pay the expenses of army units on Russia's territory. I consider that our republic should show the necessary interest in the Caspian Sea Fleet and the Transcaucasian Border Military District. Especially because we owe much to soldiers of other nationalities who are serving in internal forces and defending us against the Armenian bandits. For this a direct relationship should be established with local Soviets.

We have to take urgent measures to protest order on the Azerbaijan-Armenia border. It is clear that we cannot put all our hopes in the help of USSR MVD and KGB organs. It is difficult for the local population to stand their ground in the tensions which occur while repelling Armenian bandits. I am sure that our republic has the strength to maintain such an army.

The last question is the preparation of cadres. In our republic two military schools are active: The Baku All-Army and the Caspian Sea Military Fleet schools. To these we have to add the Merdekan Militia School and the J. Nakhchivanski boarding school. Officers of a number of nationalities are serving in various units of the Soviet army also in our republic. In my opinion, they have been defending our soil with their heart and souls. I am well acquainted with our countryman and Hero of the Soviet Union Chernozhukov and dozens of other officers. What if they did not want to help our republic in these difficult days? And then there are the Afghan veterans. All of them are ready to defend the peace courageously. Why should we drag our feet on this, who

knows what crisis awaits us? I think there should be a "round table" discussion between the leadership of the Azerbaijan Republic, the Azerbaijan Peoples Deputies and Army General N. Popov, Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, Aviation Marshal A. Yefimov and even some war veterans. I think that if this were to take place, a number of issues would be resolved. Along with this, it would not be bad to learn the public's opinion. One cannot create a skilled army by holding meetings. A military structure requires active measures. If such a "round table" were to be held, one could turn to a republic parliamentary session with concrete proposals. This would reduce the time wasted on discussion.

The most important is not to be passive in this matter. One can only strengthen the republic's territorial integrity, its peaceful activity, and the fight against crime with the help of modern internal troops and a national army. That is my opinion.

I am sure that various opinions will be voiced on this issue. The most important is that our proposals be heard and that active and concrete work be done.

I also believe that soldiers of our national army will continue the fighting traditions of our people in a worthy manner.

Military Tribunals Chief on Inadequate Protection of Personnel

*91UM0675A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 May 91 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Lieutenant-General of Justice A. Muranov, Chief of the Directorate of Military Tribunals, by Major I. Ivanyuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Under Protection of the Law: Servicemen and Their Families Are Far from Always Being Protected. Why?"]

[Text] **Judicial reform in our country is proceeding with difficulty and in a contradictory way. Called upon to place a person, with his inalienable needs and interests, at the center of the judicial process, justice itself often slips. The number of crimes committed against individuals is not decreasing but growing, and social guarantees are becoming ever more shaky.**

In such a situation, it seems that the least protected are servicemen and their families. We are not speaking only of everyday unsettled life or material difficulties. Cases of physical violence against those who are fulfilling their military duties have become more frequent.

Why did this situation, which can only be called intolerable, develop? Why are judicial organs silent? The discussion of our correspondent with Lieutenant-General A. Muranov, Chief of the Directorate of Military Tribunals, began with the above questions.

[Muranov] It is true that recently we have been frequently hearing that servicemen are not protected by law, and the organs of justice are doing nothing. There are grounds for these reproaches. The fact of the matter is that there are indeed applicable laws, but in order to make them work we need solid grounds. If a crime is committed, it is clear that the prosecutor is required to initiate a criminal case. But not always. For example, when there are beatings, slander, or insults a case can be initiated only when the serviceman files a complaint with the prosecutor's office or the tribunal. A similar situation would prevail in the area of civil lawsuits. As long as a military unit—considered a legal person—or a specific individual, whose honor and self-respect have been infringed upon, does not present a statement of claim to the court, justice will be silent.

[Ivanyuk] **Does this mean then that the servicemen themselves are at "fault"?**

[Muranov] Not at fault, but rather having the misfortune of people who do not know to whom they should appeal when something happens. For example, we recently had an appointment with a Major Grigoryev. He was interested in finding out if he could turn to a people's court. But when all the circumstances were examined, it turned out that his claims of a material nature could be fully satisfied by a comrades' court of honor.

The reason is not simply that people are illiterate in judicial matters. The historical evolution is such that in

our country it is considered reprehensible to go to court. And for a military man it is something totally unacceptable. This kind of prejudice should be overcome as quickly as possible.

Last year the number of lawsuits throughout the country increased greatly. They concerned defenses of honor and integrity of citizens and organizations, and now number in the thousands. On the other hand, up until recently servicemen hardly ever instituted similar suits. But, as they say, things have changed. As examples, lawsuits have been settled in the cases of General A. Makashov, slanderously accused of being involved in Iraq's aggression, and General V. Gromov, accused of preparing a fictitious military takeover. As already publicized, with regard to cases against the military prosecutor and the commander of the Pacific Fleet, and a youth newspaper which attempted to pour a tubful of dirt over them, the court ordered the slanderers to apologize to the victims of this slander, to print a retraction in the newspaper, and pay 5,000 rubles fine for each case.

[Ivanyuk] **As far as I know, in the last case they tried to accuse the military investigators of "beating" evidence out of persons under investigation and the fleet prosecutor of taking bribes in the form of luxurious dachas. So even the followers of Themis need judicial protection?**

[Muranov] I do not want to create the impression that military lawyers have it more difficult than anyone else, but these days threats against judges are not uncommon, and neither are attempts to disrupt judicial proceedings nor blowing up and setting fire to military tribunals. An idea of the environment in which we have to administer justice, for example, can be obtained from the two following facts: In November 1990, during an examination of a criminal case by a garrison military tribunal in the city of Batumi, a group of aggressive fellows broke into the courtroom and threatened to wreck the building and to use force against us unless we terminated the proceedings. When the same tribunal, soon afterward, was looking into another case in the city of Tbilisi, relatives of the accused began shouting threats against those conducting the proceedings and attempted to disrupt them as well. We had to call out a platoon of the OMON [special purpose militia detachments] to bring order to the court.

As strange as it may seem, judges also have pressure from public elected officials. In all my years of service I do not remember a single instance of direct interference by any command staff or political organ in resolving specific cases with the aid of "telephone" law. But now we are already beginning to feel the "deputies'" law.

For example, the military tribunal of the Moscow Military District began examining the case of a Captain Filimonov, who was accused of being a part of a group committing robberies and assaults. Immediately the tribunal was inundated with telephone calls and written petitions, including those from deputies. Among the "intercessors" were also 13 people's representatives

from Uzbekistan, trying to whitewash the accused, who was convicted of attempted rape.

We have only one thing we can do in cases like this: Act in strict compliance with the law. And this is what we do.

[Ivanyuk] But laws also lag behind the times, don't they? All of us have been waiting for over a year now for better and more effective legislation on legal rights which would be reliable in protecting servicemen....

[Muranov] Unfortunately, legislators indeed do not keep up with the times. Approval of draft laws has been held up for an unacceptably long time, and without it the problems we discussed will not be resolved. Moreover, military reform will not move ahead. These are laws on defense, universal military obligation, and military service. The law on military justice also fits into these categories. The draft law on military justice exists and responds to the needs of the time.

Discussion of this law that is so important to us has been postponed time and again by the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is enough to say that as long ago as August 4, 1989, the USSR Supreme Soviet approved a resolution in which it recognized the necessity of having this law ready prior to October 1, 1989. The draft law was edited and presented to the legislators within the specified time. But up to now it still has not been approved.

[Ivanyuk] On September 5, 1990, the President of the USSR signed a decree "On Certain Measures to Strengthen the Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen." It substantively broadens the basis, in accordance with which a serviceman would have the right to turn to a tribunal for legal protection. In connection with this, many persons are asking if these rights are already valid at present and, if so, in what cases?

[Muranov] The President's decree to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposes an examination of this issue. But inasmuch as the law on military justice has not been adopted, and the proposals are included in that law, military tribunals today do not have a legal basis for looking into these types of complaints. In general, I think that these complaints will include more than just different kinds of infringements on civil rights and freedoms of servicemen. In particular, these guarantees can also be included in the category of military service interrelationships which, of course, are not directly connected with with military- operational issues or military preparedness. I think that the law on military justice will help remove a number of problems raised by the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, because many of them are tied specifically to broadening the basis for being allowed to turn to the tribunal.

Criteria which determine a set of legal relationships and which could be the subject of discussion in a court are now being developed. We believe that the Decree's formulation of illegal actions "that go beyond statutory

relationships and which infringe on rights and personal dignity of servicemen" needs to be defined more precisely.

Also Article 84 of the draft Law is not presented well. This article has to do with the status of servicemen where it specifically states that the protection of life, health, honor, and dignity of servicemen is provided for by legislation of the Union of SSR and the union republics. This legal norm, it seems to me, should not be relegated to a mere reference. Such important issues of principle should be embodied directly in the All-Union law on the status of servicemen.

It is important in the new draft laws to establish the priority of military service ahead of other kinds of state service or work, and the penalty for an attempt on a serviceman's life should be increased. The laws of the USA, for example, directly state that the murder of an officer is an offense committed under aggravating circumstances. As far back as 1988 the criminal codes of our union republics had addenda especially included that established general penalties for insults or resisting militiamen, civilian militia, or servicemen (Articles 191-1 and 192-1 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR). In other words, even at that time, servicemen who had the duty of maintaining public order were actually equated—under the criminal legislation—to representatives of the state. It has now been proposed to officially embody this principle in Article 4 of the Law on the Status of Servicemen.

But it is not understood at all why, in 1988, they "forgot" to include a separate article imposing a greater penalty for an attempt on the life of a serviceman, as is the case with militiamen and the civilian militia. In the RSFSR Criminal Code this is Article 191-2. It is unique, because if an attempt on the life of a militiaman under aggravating circumstances is a proven fact, the court may impose the death penalty. Servicemen, however, who perform analogous duties on protecting public order in "hot" spots, turned out to be less well protected in a legal sense. This is true even though, as is well known, last year alone 81 officers and warrant officers, 16 term enlistment servicemen, and 6 border guards were killed by civilians.

[Ivanyuk] This year we are also waiting for the new Foundations of Criminal Legislation to be approved. Will this also help resolve the problems we discussed?

[Muranov] Of course, this law also has to play its part, so that the judicial, or—as it is also called—the third branch of power will become a full participant and be able to guarantee the stability of the foundations of a legal state.

Disillusionment of Defector Servicemen

91UM0680A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Major S. Popov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Sobering Up: It Happens More and

More Often to Those Who Have Had Time to Feel What It Is Like to Be a Deserter in the West"]

[Text] Not a single one of them can explain clearly how it happened....

One evening First Sergeant V. Aytzhanov, who is on extended active duty, met Warrant Officer Yu. Ososkov, who had become the owner of a used Mercedes, and asked him when Ososkov is finally going to take off to the other side. And his old friend and comrade answered that he is ready any time even now.... They drank for a long time and discussed the merits of the automobile at leisure. Then, in the course of the conversation, the name of a distant relative of Aytzhanov's wife came up. This was an "uncle from Nuremberg," whom the First Sergeant had actually never met. And soon, everything—the uncle in the West, and the powerful Mercedes that had not been properly tested yet, and the drunken boldness—somehow became woven together. "What the hell! Maybe we can take off over there and come right back...." In the dead of night they drove onto the Autobahn.

The further they went, the more important everything became. When they started sobering up, they immediately "supplemented" their intake. Stifling elementary common sense and the fear that was already becoming evident, they strayed around Berlin. The police caught them, but they got out of it somehow, and drank some more.... Even at the moment when, after their automobile had gone off the road and onto the shoulder somewhere around Hannover, members of the criminal police knocked on their car window, they still did not totally understand what kind of situation they had got themselves into. Only in the morning, when representatives of the Bundeswehr talked to them separately, and when they were delivered in a state of complete moral paralysis to the defector camp in Braunschweig did they realize, "it's over, we have arrived." Life in the West officially began for them in a room where there were already eight persons. A bed was found for Aytzhanov, but Ososkov had to make himself comfortable on the floor with a mattress....

They ran away from the camp after thirteen days, and with great difficulty caught a ride to Magdeburg. Once there, they immediately went to the Soviet military command headquarters....

I spoke with both Ososkov and Aytzhanov during those days when the military prosecutor's office was trying to figure out what they deserved for their "joy ride." They claimed that they found themselves in the West only because of their "foolishness." But then, why didn't they leave right away and demand to be returned? They say they were scared: "Who knows, after all, what is on these Germans' minds? They could take us and stick us somewhere and no one would ever find us...." All right, let us assume they are right, but perhaps they wavered all the same and hoped to take advantage of this unexpected chance that some dream about. What is there to hide?

The Western Group of Troops has deserters who consciously left their units, enticed by the dream of a sweet Western life.

The 30 year old Aytzhanov said the following about these dreamers: "Oh, these are people who think that someone is really waiting for them there. Two soldiers, both extended active duty types, who shared our room thought exactly that way.... They were boys and acted like it. They slept, and saw themselves as millionaires. They walked along the streets, stared at everything and consoled each other: 'give us time and all this will be ours.' And they didn't realize that they were in a trap. Boys...."

Aytzhanov himself did not figure out this "slip-knot" right away either. At first everything went properly and was even touching: they were given free civilian clothing, food coupons, and a bed. You want to go to town? Please. But, here the reins tightened. What are you going to do in that town with the 67 Marks given to you to last for two weeks? Choke on your saliva when you look at the store windows? A beer, sausage, and a pack of cigarettes cost 15 Marks. And the further you go the tighter the invisible knot becomes. "Sprechen Sie deutsch? Do you speak English?" And you stand there with wide open eyes. "Auf Wiedersehen," then. In Europe they don't use their fingers to count. Legally, they cannot give a job to someone who does not understand anything and who does not have a passport to boot. One time Ososkov tried to make some money unloading goods for a private tradesman, but when he looked at his "Ausweis," the owner immediately said, "nein." You can wait for years for a passport and citizenship.

How does one live then? Everyone gets along in a different way. Some manage to wash dishes for a couple hours a day or clean toilets. Some get together with suspicious strangers and then usually disappear during the night. It is during the night when used or stolen automobiles are driven from West to East by emigrants who have turned into speculators. But here is another story.... Aytzhanov was told how a Negro was found hanged one time in the camp. Another time they found two guys with gunshot wounds and, according to rumors, they were those "business" types, and apparently they were Russians....

It is the naive hope of every "defector" to receive political asylum. But it is not enough to simply ask for it (everyone asks for it). In Braunschweig, for example, to begin with you had to be "interviewed." What does that mean? A private and very detailed conversation strongly reminiscent of an interrogation. Who are you and what are you? Why did you come over? What do you have to tell or inform about to the representatives of the German government? What they want you to tell is obvious even to a dunce.

Incidentally, Soviet deserters in the West often have to be interviewed without any restrictions. Former Private Stanislav Kaminskiy told how, already in West Berlin,

reporters from STERN recorded the story of his escape from his unit together with I. Shirokolobov, an employee of the Soviet Army. They were clearly told that the recording is one thing, but the price for political asylum is something special. Kaminsky (who then thought that the West is going to be a place forever for him) light-heartedly fabricated a tall story as he went along. For example, he told how he was at his post in Wuisdorf when it was attacked, how he was wounded in the leg, and how he was shooting at someone. But then, supposedly, instead of being thanked, the commander put him in the guardhouse for being discourteous to him.

As for Shirokolobov, even the "tough" interviews were "not enough". They demanded proof that he was persecuted by official authorities. His letter to his parents showed how he tried to find this proof: "...Gather all the summons to the militia, and if you cannot find any, try to obtain just blank forms.... I am asking you to act according to your highest principles and write down on scraps of paper something on the following order: '...that people from the militia came to get me, that today I cannot spend the night at home, that unknown persons have begun telephoning'.... Write a separate letter, saying that after my emigration, people in dark suits came to see you and that they are constantly questioning you about me. And please, be as natural as possible: add a few minor details, the latest news, tell about the prices, and finally play the role of parents of a repressed emigrant."

Aytzhanov and Ososkov are not the first and only ones who, after roaming around the West, returned home. Earlier, the same was done by Privates S. Kaminskiy and A. Shishigin, and Sergeants A. Zakiyev and D. Lendyukov. They came from afar: Nuremberg, Bonn, and even from France. Why?

There is Kolesnikov, a deserter, a turncoat and a traitor. There are criminals who have committed various crimes (stealing weapons, as did Senior Lieutenant V. Trandofilov; or murder, as was the case with Warrant Officer V. Matiyenko). People like them go to the West and do not leave any tracks behind them. There are those who deserted (although it is closer to go to the military prosecutor in any case than to Bonn) because they were afraid of the "old man's" threats. And there are those

who, upon joining the army, already had the definite goal of running off, but not just anywhere. According to the stories of soldiers of Armenian nationality, for example, it is known that since the middle of last year a "place" in the Western Group of Troops costs a recruit around 150 rubles or more. It is understood that they do not pay just for the privilege of later distinguishing themselves in "combat and political" deeds. We understand what it is all about with these kinds of people, but there are also those who want to return home after tasting Western life....

An official representative of the German government recently stated in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI that the first requests of Soviet deserters for political asylum (going back to those who left in August of last year) would be looked at only in mid-summer. But it is a question as to how everything will go after July. Yet, according to certain information, former Soviet servicemen will not be given political asylum on principle.

Actually there is one other reason which presumably will force many of those who tried this very foolish experiment to think twice. No, no one is going to take revenge on deserters, despite this scare tactic constantly used by the Western masters of psychological treatment. It is another matter to ask questions strictly according to the law. Thus, Kaminskiy, who fully repented and recognized his guilt, was sentenced to two years in a disciplinary battalion, and Private E. Filonov, who had committed a crime prior to deserting, was imprisoned for four years. They both understood full well that they would be tried in court. Nevertheless, they preferred to answer to their own people rather than be "fifth or sixth rate" citizens, as Ososkov said upon his return....

Recently I happened to meet the mother of Junior Sergeant Nikolay Loparev. He had deserted from his unit. Svetlana Nikolayevna did the unthinkable. Fighting her way through all the bureaucratic obstacles, she came to Germany and began looking for her son. She went to Bonn in person, and contacted officials. "I do not believe," she said, "that Kolya was a traitor to his country. And you just wait and see: If only he is alive, if only I find him, he will return...."

So, where are you, Kolya Loparev?

Soldiers Not Trained to Fire Vehicle's Main Gun

*91UM0677A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 91 First Edition p 2*

[Letter to the editors by Specialist 1st Class Sergeant S. Ponazhev: "No Hand-Holding in Combat"]

[Text] In a recent session on weapons training I was conducting with young soldiers, I was discussing sight adjustment of a combat vehicle weapon. I explained everything in detail, drew a ranging target on the board, related my personal experience, and then I suddenly realized: I was not getting anywhere. Why not?

Judge for yourself. For example, was there much sense to Private U. Narimov's taking copious notes if he will never perform gun sight adjustment? This is performed by officers and certain NCOs. This is true not only for our subunit. "Why include this in the program?" you may ask. I also would like to know the answer to that. I am told that there are many cases of this lack of

connection between training theory and practice and, this being the situation, I should adopt a philosophical attitude to the matter.

There are indeed many instances of lack of such a connection. We are given scanty information in our instruction in familiarization with the weapons of a probable enemy, only a brief talk on onboard radio equipment. And -once more!- theory is not carried into practice in instruction on the ammunition consumption rate counter located on the control panel of turret-mounted smoke-discharge grenade launchers. The soldier has no idea of how to correct malfunctions in night sights. In a word, a great deal of his instruction amounts to nothing more than getting him to do some firing of the weapon on the gunnery range.

The question I want to ask here is: Is this kind of approach wise? Does the instruction program not need improvement and completion? It may be that an NCO should not be asking these questions, but I do know one thing: There will be no hand-holding for a soldier in combat.

Sergeant S. Ponazhev
Specialist 1st Class

Profile Of Col-Gen Shaposhnikov

91UM0663A Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 1, Jan 91 p 45

[Interview with Colonel-General of Aviation Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov: "Colonel-General Of Aviation Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, Air Force Commander In Chief And USSR Deputy Minister Of Defense"]

[Text]

[*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, why did you become a pilot?

[Shaposhnikov] I owe that choice in many ways to the Great Patriotic War pilots Kozhedub, Pokryshkin, and others: I was raised on their exploits. Ekzyuperi's books helped. The area right beside the house where I lived was a pilot zone for the Rostov flying club, and there were flights every day. I was also influenced by the example of my older brother Viktor, who studied at a aviation school.

[*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*] How has your life changed since being appointed commander in chief?

[Shaposhnikov] My responsibility for the state of the Air Force has significantly increased, especially at the current difficult stage of our society's development.

[*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*] What is the "secret" of your rise through the ranks?

[Shaposhnikov] Responsibility in my work, love for my profession. A communicative nature. A desire to do everything that has been done more and better, especially as regards flight safety, military discipline, and seeing to the social needs of subordinates.

[*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*] Do you get a chance to fly?

[Shaposhnikov] I still have the desire, but no opportunity. I've been in the air force for more than 30 years, but I still have an emotional reaction to every airplane flying within my field of vision.

[*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*] How do you improve your knowledge?

[Shaposhnikov] I do independent work two hours a day. I constantly communicate with not only my chiefs and the leadership of ministries and departments, but also with subordinates of all levels. This enriches my knowledge.

[*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*] What sources of information do you trust?

[Shaposhnikov] I rely on a very wide variety of information, most of it official. I formulate my personal opinion

by analyzing and comparing all sources of information. It's very important to know how to listen to people. Especially professionals.

[*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*] Does the commander in chief have any time left over for his family?

[Shaposhnikov] Very little, unfortunately, and I have three children. I try to set an example for them in all things. There is complete openness and trust in our family. I am grateful to my wife, who through her help compensates for my lack of free time.

[*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*] Do you have a good-luck charm?

[Shaposhnikov] My good-luck charm is my convictions, which in short amount to the view that our work does not forgive shoddiness. Forgive me for using that word, but it very broadly reflects all the shortcomings that are inexcusable everywhere and especially dangerous in the profession of pilot and military leader.

Biography

Ye. I. Shaposhnikov was born on February 3, 1942, into a worker's family in the village of Bolshoy Log, Aksayskiy Rayon, Rostov Oblast. His father was killed at the front.

He graduated from the Kharkov Higher Aviation Air Force Pilots School, the Air Force Academy, and the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. He served as a pilot, a senior pilot, a flight and squadron commander, a navigator, deputy commander for political affairs of a fighter aviation regiment, deputy commander and commander of a fighter aviation division, and deputy air force commander of the Carpathian and Odessa Military Districts. Since 1985 he held the posts of air force commander of the Odessa Military District and of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (now the Western Group of Forces), commander of an air army, and First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Air Force. He is an air force pilot first class.

He has been a member of the CPSU since 1963. He is a member of the CPSU Central Committee. He was been awarded the Orders of the Red Star and "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" Second and Third Classes, and many decorations. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel early and became a Major General of Aviation at the age of 37. He became a Colonel General of Aviation in 1990.

His wife, Zimfira Nikolayevna, is a physician and therapist. His oldest daughter works as a nurse. His youngest daughter is a 10th grader, and his son is a student at the Moscow Medical Institute.

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Helicopter Subunit Unexpectedly Arrives in Tula

91UM0676B Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN
in Russian No 9, Feb 91, p 7

[Article by V. Pishchulin under the rubric "Special Reports": "Helicopters First?"]

[Text] The combat helicopters appeared over Tula unexpectedly. The predator-like silhouettes of the rotary-wing aircraft drifted over the horizon and touched down at an airfield outside the city.

Men in green camouflage coveralls and high leather boots began making themselves at home in the officers' messhall and the enlisted men's barracks. City authorities and the local garrison were taken by surprise, totally disconcerted, and did not know what to do....

Right here I want to put the reader's mind, already shocked by recent events, at ease. The real scene I have just described is not the scenario of another Western hit movie, and certainly not a real military coup of the kind with which they frighten us from the lofty platforms of both parliaments. Even the residents of the ancient hero-city can sleep peacefully. The weapons produced in their "foundry" will apparently not equal the oil consumption here any time soon, because the former are strictly regulated by coupons.

Everything we have described did take place, so to speak. This was last spring. Even the helicopters came in, like a bolt out of the blue. There was also temporary confusion on the part of the Tula city ispolkom. It did not know what to do with the large number of combat pilots who arrived with the helicopters and whiled away the time in the enlisted men's barracks between training flights. They were not expected—rather, they were expected, but not so soon.

Under the agreement on the withdrawal of our forces from the countries of Eastern Europe, Col V. Arбузов's helicopter subunit made planned preparations for the return to the homeland. It was planned to transfer personnel and equipment sometime at the end of the year, and the leadership of the Moscow Military District and the city of Tula were warned to be prepared to receive the combat unit by that time. The schedule was for some reason moved up by 6 months, however. Orders are not questioned, but the pilots, many of whom were schooled in Afghanistan, can still not understand why the hurry. It was most likely a political thing: They were the first to leave Czechoslovakia, after all.

In our attempts to demonstrate to the world the seriousness of our intentions, however, we should not have forgotten about the people. Leaving behind nice apartments and well arranged, comfortable lives, they arrived to find literally nothing. They could not bring their families, but had to foist them upon relatives and acquaintances. The lucky ones were able to rent privately owned apartments for a third of their salaries as officers.

Maj Mashanov, for example, only recently moved from his into a small apartment with his wife and five children!

The city kept its promise and allocated eight apartments out of its limited pool. A fellow officer moved away and vacated one more. But there are 238 families on the waiting list! A total of 115 of them live in privately owned apartments. The others live in hastily erected, prefabricated barracks, where the thermometer drops to 8° during the cold month of February. There is one kitchen and one bathroom/laundry for eight families. The officers' families, including children, live in little 10X12-m rooms.

"But according to instructions," deputy subunit commander for political affairs V. Nazarov tells us, "a pilot is supposed to rest for a certain period of time under certain conditions between flights. Only then do we have the right to demand irreproachable execution of his assigned missions."

Unfortunately, we are unable to discuss this, the daily work of the helicopter pilots, in our sad festive report. One simply cannot lift a brush to paint the beauty of the combat aircraft parading into the sky, stirring the snow into whirlwinds and carrying clusters of destructive missiles beneath their wings. It is all much simpler in everyday life. Fill up. Take off. Fire the weapons at the range. Land. Fill up. Take off. And they do this several times a day. Ordinary man's work. Incidentally, it is not very well paid today. The pilots joke about the fact that, judging from the ads for streetcar operators, the latter earn more than a rated pilot. And many of them face the real prospect of retraining for other jobs. In these troubled times no one can be certain that he will be able to serve out the number of years required to retire. There are disturbing rumors of an impending reduction. The unit was already reduced by a third during the redeployment. Some members got themselves transferred closer to reserved apartments. Some could not take the poor living conditions and requested discharges....

And one can understand them. Beautiful as the earth is from the bird's-eye view, up close it is not nearly as harmonious for many of them. A 75-apartment building which the military construction workers promised to complete for them back in December has only reached the second floor at the present time. Two others included in the housing construction plans for the post are still on the drawing board. This means that many of them will be living in prefabricated barracks for more than a single year yet.

"It is therefore doubly annoying," the courageous Afghan pilots complained to us, "that after all these ordeals and moves, we find ourselves right back where we started. And instead of compassion—not to speak of gratitude—we are attacked by antimilitary forces. Many people regard us as freeloaders living off the working people. Perhaps the complaints are in some ways justified, but just how are we to blame?"

Indeed, how are they to blame?

Lt-Gen Osmolovsky on PVO in Wake of Gulf War

91UM0666A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 23 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Osmolovsky by an unidentified SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA Correspondent under the rubric: "We Serve the Soviet Union": "The General of the most Peaceful Troops Is Convinced: 'Our People Are Golden'"]

[Text] Air defense troops are a branch of the USSR Armed Forces that we need to admit the press rarely mentions and, as a rule, in connection with some unusual event. Today the PVO Troops have once again drawn attention to themselves. The recent war in the Persian Gulf, where as we all know the allied air forces completely dominated in the air which also caused Iraq's defeat, has forced us to once again begin talking about air defense. But really people who are far removed from military problems know that the Iraqi Air Defense Forces were equipped with primarily our, Soviet, equipment. Does it turn out that it did not prove itself? Will it turn out that in the event of war our PVO will also not be able to withstand the aggressor? Today these questions worry many SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA readers. Therefore, the editorial staff addressed them to a man who has unquestioned competence in this regard—Lieutenant-General V. M. Osmolovsky—who devoted more than 35 years to service in the PVO Troops.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, how could you allay the fears that are arising among people with regard to the reliability of our PVO system?

[Osmolovsky] Today I can hardly say anything new—the preliminary analysis of the combat operations in the Persian Gulf has already been covered in the Soviet press. Therefore, I am just repeating the main thing. First of all, Iraq had at its disposal far from the most modern models of our military equipment—unlike the coalition forces which were equipped with the newest weaponry. And second, the main thing is not so much the equipment as whose hands it is in.

And here I would single out two primary factors. The first is the general cultural level of the country's population. You will agree: no matter who says what or how much about the disastrous state of culture and education in the USSR, our army receives an incomparably better educated contingent of personnel. Ultimately, the difference is, does the lad sitting in front of the radar screen have a secondary education and also a technicum behind him or was he a completely illiterate peasant only yesterday.

The second factor is from the category of moral-psychological. I am not vouching for a verbatim reproduction but already two hundred years ago one of the figures from the French Revolution expressed in that

sense that an army, while defending democracy, always stands fast more than an army that is carrying out the function of defending a tyrant. As they say, there is nothing new under the moon—the accuracy of these words has been frequently confirmed by history. Iraq is the most recent example.

Incidentally, here is one more argument for you in the dispute with modern native prophets who actively prophesy an impending military dictatorship. Aside from a multitude of other reasons according to which any coup in our country is unrealistic. But by the way this is so.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Yes but also in our country no matter how intelligent and morally steadfast a man is who enters the soldier's ranks, making a real specialist out of him lies ahead. To do this, I would think requires the investment of a great deal of both time and effort. And all of us have heard quite a lot about how the army in our country is involved in everything but combat training.

[Osmolovsky] I cannot hide the fact that there is a grain of truth here. And we build ourselves, dig, gather the harvest, and we carry out still many other tasks that are not characteristic to the army. But nevertheless we also manage to both train the troops, fire at firing ranges, and perform alert duty. I ask you to believe that we do it quite well at that. Thanks to what? Primarily thanks to the fact that the people we have are truly golden!

Take the most ordinary rank-and-file, so to speak, officer. Just recently the people have learned how far from the ideal his life and social protection are. At the same time, consider that the officer corps in the PVO Troops is mainly skilled specialists in the area of electronics, computers, programming, and automated command and control systems. Yes, in our units it is the most elementary thing for many lieutenants to disassemble and assemble a color television. Intellectuals of the highest order! I assure you: they would tear out of your hands any scientific-intensive production, as they say. And perhaps we would get somewhat more in the army with fewer stressful situations.

But qualities such as loyalty to duty and consciousness of the enormous responsibility that has been assigned to them, and a sense of officer honor, male dignity and, finally, human decency are completely characteristic of these people. That is why today, despite everything, they continue to serve their Homeland with loyalty and truth under really the most difficult conditions. I stress: they serve the Homeland and not some momentary interests of individual personalities or social groups.

And judge for yourself: is the massive presence of such qualities possible among people who have been educated in a society that is at a low level of cultural development?

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] But, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, you are saying all of this about officers. But what about the soldiers? I have frequently had the

opportunity to hear these complaints from your colleagues: not that one, they say, about a soldier walking by right now—he does not want to serve and he is sort of lax and completely politicized.

[Osmolovsky] I already do not agree! Although naturally there is a definite reason in all of this. We do not get people out of thin air and we do not import them. Let us frankly state that if there is no order in the country and if anti-army propaganda is being massively conducted—should this have an impact on the consciousness of those lads coming into the army? That is unavoidable. And only all of this is alien. The husk is very rapidly peeled off when a man ends up in serious conditions and when he is entrusted with a real cause that is worthy of a man, for example, alert duty.

And as for politization, this is generally healthy! Really, what does a “politicized young man” mean? This means a man who is hardly indifferent to what is happening in society. This means a man who is not indifferent, a thinking man, and a man who feels with all of the ardor of his young fiery heart. Yes any commander should dream about such a subordinate!

It is another matter to work with such a person and it is more complicated to win him over to your side, especially if he has been negatively “charged” from the start. Then, first, it is a lot more interesting. Second, it is more useful: insofar as the education and training of such subordinates presents heightened demands to the teacher and trainer and he is compelled to self-improvement in all aspects. And, third, the end result of such work is also much more beneficial both for the army and for all society: in the end we get not a motionless robot to press buttons but a conscious ally and reliable comrade in arms. It is worth fighting for this. And we are fighting and not unsuccessfully.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Frankly speaking, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich, in my opinion, your optimism is not very much in keeping with the information we have received in recent years about what is occurring in soldiers' barracks. Maybe, we should not recall this but you yourself also know that today soldiers' mothers shudder at that one word “dedovshchina” [hazing of conscripts]. Yes and it is no accident that the question about soldiers' deaths has been raised to the level of a Presidential Decree.

[Osmolovsky] And I will also not begin to deny that this problem exists. Although I could also answer you, for example, that mortality in the Armed Forces, including in the PVO Troops, is nearly five times less per thousand persons than among the population of Belorussia. This is with our supersaturation of equipment and weaponry which are a factor of heightened danger in and of themselves. And that is also with the fact that the calculation encompassed absolutely the entire population, everyone from suckling infants to extremely old men and we deal with 18-20 year-old lads—there is no higher “risk group.” So if we are unbiased, it turns out

that it is quite a bit safer in the army than among the civilian population. This is not a paradox but objective evidence of the fact that perhaps we regard this problem more seriously than anywhere else.

But with regard to “dedovshchina” and similar phenomena.... You know there is no family without a black sheep. Besides, on this score, objective information confirms the reduction of crime on all articles. That is, even here we are not sitting idly by.

And later, if “black sheep” find themselves among thousands and thousands of lads—does this really refute my deep conviction? Not a bit! I am ready, without playing the hypocrite, to repeat 100 times over that, in their absolute majority, simply outstanding people serve in our units. And is this really not grounds for optimism?

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Then, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich, let us also end our conversation on this exuberant note.

[Osmolovsky] I would just like to make one small addition. You know that our troops are the most peaceful, if this word is used in general with regard to the army structure. We simply cannot conduct offensive, aggressive operations. Our only function is defense. Our only goal is to make it reliable to the maximum. We are constantly striving toward this goal and we live and work for its sake. And I dare assure you that we earn our bread.

But most of all in the world, I would like to wish both to the people of Belorussia and to the people of the entire country, yes and to myself too, that our knowledge and skill, experience and combat potential will never have to actually be employed!

Military Pilot Seeks Turkish Asylum

91UM0676F Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Apr 91
Second Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: “He Requested Asylum”]

[Text] Ankara, 25 [April] (TASS)—Today the Soviet pilot who hijacked a transport helicopter from Armenia requested political asylum from Turkish authorities. The helicopter was hijacked from an airfield on the outskirts of Yerevan. According to the Anatolian Agency, the helicopter and the pilot who flew it are presently at Erzurum.

Mi-8 Helicopter Hijacked From Yerevan

91UM0676E Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Apr 91 Union Edition p 8

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent S. Bablumyan: “An Uninterrupted Flight”]

[Text] Yerevan—At 15:35 local time on 24 April an Mi-8 military helicopter suddenly rose into the air from Yerevan's Erebuni Airport, took a course toward Turkey and crossed the state border.

I asked Aleksandr Grigoryan, chief of the Public Relations Section of Armenia's KGB, for a detailed account of the incident:

"The helicopter arrived at Yerevan from Telavi, Georgia, on 23 April. Its takeoff for the return flight to its home base was held up by weather. The next day Sr Lt Irek Irshakovich Gimatov, the helicopter's co-pilot, tricked the aircraft mechanic, took the latter's keys and took off in the helicopter. It should be pointed out that the Yerevan airport is so close to the Turkish border the helicopters sent up to intercept him had no chance of accomplishing their mission. According to our information the deserter landed at Erzrum and asked Turkish authorities for political asylum."

The only thing left to add is the fact that Irek Gimatov graduated from the Higher Military Air School in Saratov in 1986. He was divorced.

Hijacked Mi-8 Said to Be Unarmed

91UM0676G Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Report by Col A. Manushkin: "He Flew to Turkey"]

[Text] According to preliminary information, an Mi-8 military helicopter crossed the Soviet-Turkey border on 24 April. The hijacker turned out to be Senior Lieutenant G. Gimatov, a navigator. He was born in 1965 and had served in the Soviet Army since 1982.

Neither the helicopter nor the hijacker carried any weapons.

Engine Failure on Approach Leads to MIG-27 Crash

91UM0676D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 91 First Edition p 4

[Report by Col A. Manushkin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Incidents": "An Aircraft Accident"]

[Text] Night training flights were underway in the Western Group of Forces. Coming in for a landing at 00:24 on 7 May, Captain S. Golovanov, military pilot 2nd class, detected the smell of smoke and something burning at an altitude of 600 meters. The instruments showed a drop in RPMs and speed. There was a fire on board. At an order from ground Captain Golovanov ejected. He was picked up at 01:12 by a search and rescue team.

We were told at the Main Headquarters of the Air Force that the plane had fallen near the community of

Regentin. There were no casualties among the residents, and no damage. The aircraft was carrying no ammunition.

The causes of the accident are being investigated.

Crippled 747 Permitted Passage Over Soviet Territory

91UM0676A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Report under the rubric "The Army and Navy News Service": "They Allowed the Boeing to Pass Through; They Earned a Banner"]

[Text] An engine failed on a Japanese Boeing 747 in the air above the Pacific on 7 February of this year.

To avoid having the emergency turn into a disaster the aircraft was permitted to proceed to Hokaido by the shortest possible route, that is, over Soviet territory. The unusual target was tracked by radiotechnical subunits of the air defense unit commanded by Col. A. Nazarov. A challenge Red Banner was recently presented to the unit for its excellent performance of this noble mission.

Details on Be-42 Air-Sea Rescue Aircraft

91UM0676C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 May 91 Union Edition p 8

[Special report for IZVESTIYA by V. Belikov: "The Naval Rescuer Rushes to Bourges"]

[Text] The Be-42, the largest amphibious plane in the world today, will be the main new air item in the Soviet section of the international hall in Bourges, near Paris, which opens on 13 June.

The 86-ton aircraft was built by the Taganrog Scientific and Technical Complex imeni G. Beriyevev, birthplace of numerous Soviet hydroplanes and flying boats, as well as amphibious aircraft capable of taking off and landing both on the water and on land. Chief Be-42 designer Panatov reports that the main purpose of the team's latest development is to perform search and rescue work at sea and on the ocean. For this purpose the aircraft is equipped with two economical turbojet engines and improved navigational equipment. It is capable of flying 5,500 kilometers at a cruising speed of 700 km/h without landing.

Speed is reduced to 320-400 km/h for patrolling over water. The aircraft can be refueled in the air from a tanker when necessary, which in effect gives the amphibious aircraft unlimited operating range. When the Be-42 spots people in trouble, its five-man crew can land alongside them even in waves up to 2 meters high.

A special rescue team then goes into action. They have on board not only essential flotation equipment, but also a splendidly equipped operating room and first-aid station. The amphibious aircraft can accommodate to up 60

people in its 42-meter, sectioned fuselage. This makes it possible for naval vessels to replace their crews without going into port.

During the first third of June the Be-42 will take off from Taganrog for Kiev and then land at Bourges on its wheeled landing gear, which retract into special fairings on the wings. Incidentally, the aircraft engines are mounted on pylons which "rest" on these fairings. This unique design prevents spray from entering the turbines when taking off and landing on water.

Supreme Soviet Commission On Abuse Of Air Transport

91UM0662B Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 May 91 p 2

[Article by S. Sokolov: "Comrade General, Fly On Aeroflot Planes"]

[Text] People's Deputy Ella Pamfilova, Secretary of the Privileges and Benefits Commission, cited some curious instances at a recent session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

In conjunction with the USSR People's Control Committee, the Deputies commission had learned that procedures governing the use of military aircraft and helicopters are at variance with not only government resolutions and decisions but also the orders of the Defense Minister himself.

In particular, they calculated on the basis of selective checks that the efficiency of military aviation use is extremely low. The average load of such planes as the TU-134 and TU-154 is just 10 percent to 20 percent, and of helicopters—just 15 percent. Some 5,000 hours of absolutely empty flights have cost the state more than 15 million rubles. Transporting commanders for the purpose of "tallying the results of the winter period" alone cost 210,000 rubles. It is interesting that the following generals and admirals flew to a recent conference in Moscow aboard personal TU-154 airplanes from the same region: Comrade Khvatov from Vladivostok, Comrade Novozhilov from Khabarovsk, Comrade Filonov from Chita, and Comrade Kovtunov from Ulan-Ude. But Generals Postnikov and Dubinin set the record: Each flew to Moscow aboard his own airplane from the same city. There have been four mass flights of generals in the past year alone.

And if the latter can nonetheless be explained in some way as serving the interests of defending the socialist motherland, it is difficult to explain instances of frequent "shipments" of wives and relatives of Generals Snetkov, Kalinichenko, Postnikov, and Samoylenko aboard military aircraft.

The Privileges and Benefits Commission is insisting that parliamentary hearings be held on this matter.

Shaposhnikov on Use of Military Transport Aircraft

91UM0655A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Air Force Commander-in-Chief and USSR Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General of Aviation Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Rudenko: "Why They Are 'Judging' VTA [Military Transport Aviation] or Why It Is Impossible To Assess the Work of Military Aviators Through National Economic Cargo and Passenger Traffic Alone"]

[Text] A number of critical articles have appeared in the press recently whose authors think that military transport aviation is being utilized inefficiently.

So KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, in the dispatch "Comrade General, Fly Aeroflot Aircraft" (April 12, 1991), convinces its readers that military aviators are thoughtlessly spending the people's money. On the contrary, IZVESTIYA, in the article "Red Cross—in a Debtors' Prison" (April 19, 1991), accuses military pilots of wanting to extract an economic advantage for themselves even in such a sacred matter as delivering cargoes of humanitarian aid. And here is an excerpt from the article "Whom Do KRYLYA RODINY [Wings of the Homeland] Serve" by USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Issues of Privileges and Benefits Commission Member and People's Deputy Ya. Bezbakh that was published in the May 9, 1991 issue of KURANTY newspaper: "Aircraft and helicopters in the military department that are either nearly empty or totally empty have been racing about and continue to race about to the detriment of state interests while squandering the taxpayers' money right and left."

How well-founded are these accusations—our correspondent's conversation with Air Force Commander-in-Chief and Deputy USSR Minister of Defense Colonel-General of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov began with this question.

[Shaposhnikov] If you look at military transport aviation as at aviation with a national economic mission and assess its work from the positions of commercial payload and cargo turnover achieved as the authors of the articles mentioned above do, then you can actually form an opinion on the VTA's [Military Transport Aviation] low efficiency. But how objective will this assessment be? It is the same as judging an aircraft plant by the quantity and quality of consumer goods produced within the framework of conversion and not by aircraft produced.

National economic cargo and passenger traffic is only a small part of the mission that military aviator-transporters have to carry out. Their primary concern is maintaining high combat readiness, flying training, operational air cargo delivery of military equipment and weaponry to the needed point, support of troops' vital

activities, and execution of exercises for airborne personnel. They have been engaged in doing only this for many years and no one raised any questions about why aviators carry out flights to other airfields to improve their flying skills.

Right now when we have begun to get involved with commercial traffic at our own initiative along with our primary mission, they are constantly accusing us of squandering the people's money. And no one wants to delve into or to understand the simple truth that we are carrying out this traffic as a rule using flights that are going the same way and using the fuel quotas and aircraft resources allotted for combat training.

Naturally it frequently occurs that there is no cargo in an area where a military airfield is located and the aircraft returns home partially loaded or completely empty. But let us see, can we call these flights ineffective if the crew carries out the planned training flight to maintain the required proficiency level? Of course not.

[Rudenko] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, the readers will be interested in learning what the military aviators' passenger and cargo traffic volume is, what flights they carry out, and to which regions?

[Shaposhnikov] Military-transport aircraft routes run to practically every corner of our Homeland and to many foreign countries. Primary traffic volume is on flights to the so-called hot spots—the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, the Baltic Region, Moldova, and the areas of the Extreme North. For example, last year we carried out nearly 30,000 aircraft flights there and transported 190,000 men, including several tens of thousands of Meskhetian Turks, nearly 7,000 pieces of equipment, and approximately 8,000 tons of various types of cargo. This is not considering flights to remote garrisons to deliver fruit, vegetables, and food.

Furthermore, we are actively participating in airlifting humanitarian aid cargo from abroad. As of today, we have already carried out more than 300 flights to the FRG, India, Austria, and to other countries. I will point out that these flights have already cost us more than 18 million rubles. Add to this the ahead of schedule expenditure of 25 aircraft engines and nearly 30 percent of our aircraft fuel which we planned to expend on commercial traffic.

As for international flights, we are carrying out the absolute majority of them on assignment from the government of the USSR under conditions of an extreme situation and a drastic shortage of time. I have in mind primarily the inspection groups which we transport to conduct inspections abroad in accordance with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-range Missiles. Our aircraft are also being used to transport foreign inspection groups within the country. The intergovernmental agreement states that after the arrival of this delegation in our country, we are obliged to airlift

it, within a matter of several hours, to the location indicated in a special envelope which is opened directly at the airport.

Today, as a result of authorized organizational changes within the USSR Armed Forces and the troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, nearly 120 military-transport aviation aircraft are on the flight routes every day. I want to point out that the fulfillment of international flights costs the Air Force a tidy sum and furthermore in hard currency. We need to pay to fly over the territory of other states, for the use of navigational and air traffic control systems, and to land the aircraft. This is not considering expenditures to pay for aircraft parking and servicing, the crew's stay at a hotel, and payment of temporary duty expenses. Therefore, at times we are actually returning the aircraft home for economic considerations and then once again flying to get an inspection group abroad.

I have had to participate in many foreign delegations and I must say that it is customary throughout the world to use military-transport aircraft to transport groups of servicemen.

[Rudenko] USSR Armed Forces commanders' flights to various meetings, congresses, and conferences and various commissions flying on VTA aircraft have already become the talk of the town. I would like to hear your opinion: how legitimate are these flights?

[Shaposhnikov] Guiding documents do not prohibit this air traffic. As commander-in-chief of the Air Force, I personally also do not see anything reprehensible or illegal in them. They are once again carrying out flights along the way because the crews on these flights are learning new routes and airfields and are improving their skills.

Naturally when some military leaders carry their families on board without the appropriate documents or payment, and such cases have occurred, then this is a violation. I completely agree that such cases merit all possible condemnation.

I cannot agree with those people who think that transporting 40-50 people on a VTA aircraft is legal but 10-12 is illegal. Entirely unforeseen missions frequently arise. Say, an accident or natural disaster has occurred and we need to urgently send a small group of officers to that location. Do we really need to sit and wait until a group of 50 people has been assembled?

Recently a decision was made to use VTA aircraft to transport Soviet Army servicemen, workers, employees, and members of their families and also civilians who are traveling in the interests of the Ministry of Defense. Therefore, I can in no way agree with the assertion of USSR People's Deputy Ya. Bezbakh that servicemen and members of their families cannot, as he writes, take advantage of the "Wings of the Homeland." They say the Ministry of Defense is trying too hard to help them.

[Rudenko] Comrade commander-in-chief, in your opinion, what do we need to do to increase military aviators' contribution to national economic cargo traffic today?

[Shaposhnikov] First of all, we need to create a single database on the availability of national economic cargoes in the country so that we can use initiative during flight planning to approach the organizations concerned and resolve the issue of delivering some cargo or other by air. For now, we are forced to sit and wait for someone to present a request to us. I can responsibly say that we have always had an understanding attitude toward such requests and, as a rule, we have met them halfway.

However this does not mean that we can endlessly increase the volume of cargo and passenger traffic. It is impossible for military-transport aviation to totally reorient itself to civilian missions. The war in the Persian Gulf demonstrated that military-transport aviation's role is very high during the preparation and conduct of combat operations. American military-transport aircraft did not completely cope with the mission assigned to them. It is no accident that the Pentagon is now urgently completing steps to develop the newest transport aircraft right now.

Unfortunately, the existing profits distribution system is also not stimulating a further increase of national economic traffic volume when 70 percent is transferred to the state budget and only 30 percent to the USSR Ministry of Defense. These resources are barely enough to just cover the expenses associated with conducting the flights. There is not a plug nickel left for the construction of housing or to resolve other social problems which have become particularly exacerbated of late.

And nevertheless we think that military-transport aviation must be involved with commercial traffic. But it must be carried out without harming combat readiness. We can find a happy medium only with the constructive attitude and mutual understanding of all interested organizations and not through confrontation and mutual rebukes.

Transports Fly Freight into Novaya Zemlya

91UM0655B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by P. Zadirov: "With a Course Toward Bolshevik Island"]

[Text] Today no one is surprised anymore by the fact that military aviators are becoming increasingly involved in airlifting national economic cargoes. Not so long ago, a unique new task became the lot of the crew of an IL-76 aircraft. From an airport near Moscow, it set out on a course to Tiksi. The flight destination for the crew commanded by Lieutenant Colonel B. Oleynikov was Ostrov Bolshhevik [Bolshevik Island] which is in the Severnaya Zemlya [North Land] archipelago. The military aviators were assigned the task of delivering and air

dropping outsized cargo to Kularzoloto Combine specialists who are conducting explorations on the island.

We need to point out that Colonel Oleynikov is already familiar with this course. A month earlier, his crew carried out an airdrop of specialists who prepared an airfield to receive a military transport aircraft that was delivering needed equipment to the island.

Fate of PVO Officers Responsible in 'Rust' Case

91UM0700A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 May 91 Union Edition p 8

[Article by N. Buryga and S. Mostovshchikov, IZVESTIYA special correspondents: "Long 'Stays': What happened Following Mathias Rust's Landing in Red Square"]

[Text] Tallin-Moscow—Four years ago, on 28 May, German pilot Mathias Rust landed his Cessna in Red Square. He then landed—this time without the plane—in Lefortovo Prison. A few months later two officers were arrested, deprived of their ranks and awards, and expelled from the party. Their criminal penalties were apparently supposed to symbolize atonement for the sins of the Armed Forces of the USSR, which had made it possible for the young man from Germany to carry out his adventure. By incarcerating Rust and the two officers, from all indications, our nation intended to get out of the awkward situation it found itself in on 28 May 1987.

When the generals responsible for the safety of the homeland's skies were taken to task, the names of Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Karpets and Major Vyacheslav Chernykh were not revealed to the public, which was discussing the details of the sports plane's landing in Red Square by the 19-year-old youth from the FRG. The army punished its men quietly, without any special publicity.

It punished them severely, however.

Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Karpets was arrested on 16 July 1987. The investigator handling the case of the latter, duty officer for the PVO division and responsible for the air space over Estonia, and that of Vyacheslav Chernykh, his assistant, had gone to Moscow just prior to that. After reporting the latest news and receiving instructions for continuing the investigation into the criminal charges stemming from Rust's flight from the state border of the USSR to Moscow, he returned to Tallin. Upon his return Karpets and Chernykh were asked to report for questioning in civilian clothes, not in their uniforms. After the second interrogation (in civilian clothes) Ivan Karpets did not return home to his wife and daughter. He was sent to an investigative isolation ward.

Vyacheslav Chernykh was arrested on 1 October 1987 in the courtroom after a tribunal had sentenced Ivan Karpets to five years in a strict-regimen colony, and Vyacheslav Chernykh was sentenced to four years. The tribunal agreed with the finding of the investigation,

which contained seven points. The main point, they say, was a statement made by Boris Yeltsin in the military council of the Moscow Military District. It was essentially that Rust's overflight had harmed the nation's prestige and its Armed Forces. Karpets and Chernykh were slapped with their terms for the "damaged prestige."

Ivan Karpets still recalls the year 1987 with anger, even though both he and his "accomplice" were given a pardon and freed in 1988. We met with the former lieutenant colonel in his office in one of Tallin's military commissariats, where he works as a recruiter for the army, despite the fact that it rewarded him with imprisonment, asthma and an ulcer, and, he believes, made a misfit of him.

Only the first 15-16 minutes of the young man's flight over Soviet territory occurred in Karpets' area of responsibility. He and his assistant were the ones sent to prison, though. Their case was handled separately. The search for the others to blame, it was said, would continue. Three days after the sentence was handed down, however, the case was closed, and no one ever got back to him. It was apparently decided that putting two military men behind bars was perfectly adequate for a report on steps taken.

The lives of I. Karpets and his assistant were destroyed at approximately 13:20 on 28 May 1987, when the lieutenant colonel received a report that there was a low-altitude object 20 kilometers from the state border, moving slowly—now 60, now 180 kilometers per hour. I. Karpets did not follow instructions and report this to his superior. He spent 15 or 16 minutes trying to identify the flying object.

Slightly later, when a fighter pilot, at Karpets' orders, flew over the object and made out a dark blue strip on the side, a report went to the superior, but 15-16 minutes had been lost. Karpets had made a mistake.

Perhaps he was justly punished. It would have been a different matter had he reported the situation. As experience has shown, however, a good thing about the little man is that he is always to blame in every case. To blame for everything.

"I still think about what would have happened had I phoned my superiors," Ivan Karpets said. "They would have punished me anyway. After all, I couldn't have said right then what the object was. They don't like to assume responsibility but prefer merely to approve decisions made by subordinates. But I had no decision. I do not deny the fact that I made a mistake. But then I had only 15-16 minutes, after which he continued his flight for more than two hours. Was it really my failure to report the situation promptly that enabled him to land in Moscow?"

Be that as it may, it was Karpets and his assistant who tasted the watery soup of the prison. Two months later an ulcer was detected in the former lieutenant colonel.

Karpets was placed onto a therapeutic diet. They gave him a glass of milk in the evening, extra butter, a meat patty, and sometimes, as he put it, "a bit of fish." Once a month his wife brought him packages. Once a month he was permitted to make purchases at a stand—10 rubles worth. He learned later that wiring had caused a small fire in his home, a military apartment. His wife was asked to move out so that repairs could be made. She was not permitted to move back in. Someone else was given the apartment.

The former lieutenant colonel and major wrote appeals to the Military Board of the USSR Supreme Court. While the paperwork was being done, they remained in the Tallin SIZO [investigative isolation facility?]. Karpets was first held in a ward with some kind of policemen. He was then placed with adolescents, whom he was assigned to indoctrinate. On 28 January 1988, after reviewing the appeals, the Military Board of the Supreme Court dismissed all charges against the demoted officers, except that of failing to report the incident promptly. They were freed on 5 February 1988.

After the former lieutenant colonel was freed, he spent a long time writing letters to various authorities requesting housing and a pension. He was finally given an apartment, and he is being paid a pension. Not a full pension, however, since Ivan Karpets lacked 18 months of serving out the time required.

The Soviet Union dealt somewhat differently with the culprit who landed his aircraft in the center of the state, which had what was considered to be an incredible air defense system. He spent 1 year, 2 months and 5 days in the investigative isolation facility of the Soviet KGB, better known as Lefortovo Prison. He was not sent to a camp in consideration of a request from his family and the FRG embassy and apparently, the opinion of the authorities involved. On 3 August he was pardoned by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and expelled from the USSR without having served out his sentence: four years in prison for illegally crossing the air border, violating international laws of the air and malicious hooliganism.

Lefortovo Prison is a special subject which the USSR State Security Committee would not discuss with IZVESTIYA. The correspondents were not allowed to speak with the SIZO chief. The information we have on Lefortovo Prison and about Mathias Rust's stay there is nonetheless completely reliable.

There are many rumors in circulation in the West about Lefortovo Prison, and most of them are true. The concerns of the Kremlin pilot's mother that her son would be held under intolerable conditions there are therefore perfectly understandable. She shared with Lefortovo officials her concerns that in a Soviet prison one can sleep only on one side and that there is knee-deep water in the wards.

They say that the situation at Lefortovo Prison today constitutes something of an anecdote, since conditions

there are envied not only by prisoners, but even by the nation's prison workers who visit there even once. Lefortovo Prison, clean and never overcrowded today, can in no way be compared to the rest of the present prison system in the Soviet Union.

Most Lefortovo supervisors (called overseers as in the past) have a higher education and are forbidden to address prisoners with the familiar form of the pronoun "you." The runners in the prison halls and the leatherette on the ward doors are also impressive, but not as impressive as the fact that the cooks actually pick through the groats before turning them into porridge for those held behind the leatherette-covered doors.

Packages can be received here more frequently than at ordinary prisons. And there is every indication that Mathias Rust received plenty of them, considering the fact that the wife of the FRG's ambassador to Moscow personally baked pastries for him. The libraries at Lefortovo are also a good model of humane care of prisoners. There were books in German for the guest who flew in unexpectedly, and a job was found for him. He repaired books, which are still on the shelves there.

The specific nature of Lefortovo is such that people with whom the KGB deals end up there. And the KGB does not deal with ordinary racketeers, gangsters or murderers. Rust had only two cell-mates during the entire time. They were both imprisoned for committing large-scale financial crimes and they knew English. Vsevolod Yakovlev, the German pilot's lawyer, told us later that they found a common language and even translated articles from PRAVDA for Rust.

According to a report by Yevgeniy Bovkun, IZVESTIYA correspond in Bonn, the life of the young man from a Hamburg suburb was destroyed in a sense on 28 May 1987. He was not permitted to publish his recollections of Lefortovo, for example, since he had too high an opinion of them.

"If I had told about personal derision, bad food, poor morals, rude neighbors or callous lawyers, my recollections would have been accepted," Rust told Yevgeniy Bovkun.

Instead, Rust told about how well he was treated by everyone, from the prison workers to the lawyer.

Perhaps the former pilot developed some sort of complex after all of his failures, and his courting of an 18-year-old nurse, who refused to serve in the Bundeswehr and worked at the hospital where he was employed, was extremely strange. Displeased by the nurse's rejection of his persistent attempts to date her, Rust stabbed her with a knife. He was sentenced to two and a half years in prison for this. His defense has appealed, and Rust is free at the present time.

His freedom obviously differs somewhat different from that of Ivan Karpets, whom he has never seen. At any rate Mathias Rust is presently occupied with horses and tropical fish.

Ivan Karpets is engaged in restoring his pension and recruiting for the Soviet Army.

Col-Gen Deynekin on Air Forces' Housing as of 15 April

*91UM0700B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 May 91 First Edition p 2*

[Report by Major General Avn P. Deynekin, first deputy commander in chief of the Air Forces, under the rubric "Response": "They Have Lost Hope..."]

[Text] 11 Apr—The editors have received an official response to the article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Usoltsev on the difficult housing situation at the air base commanded by Major General Avn V. Rodionov. We are printing it in full below.

We sincerely appreciate the article expressing concern about the poor living arrangements for the military airmen and their families.

Unfortunately, a critical housing situation has developed at most air bases. As of 15 April 1991 there were 37,800 military families without housing in the Air Forces, and another 17,200 in acute need of better housing. At a number of bases there is a shortage of children's facilities, schools, bathhouses and other social and cultural facilities, and the water-supply and heating situation is bad.

A plan worked out by the Ministry of Defense calls for the construction of three apartment buildings at the base in question. In 1992 it is planned to begin construction of a kindergarten and rebuild the boiler room, as well as to carry out other repair and construction projects, which will certainly improve the lives and personal conditions of the servicemen and their families.

The limited possibilities of the Far East Military District's construction directorate and its departmentalism in their use, however, make it impossible to begin implementing the program in full and according to the schedule set.

Nor is the base command element, headed by Major General Avn V. Rodionov, demonstrating the needed persistence and initiative in the resolution of these matters. While prior to his assumption of this position the construction of five apartment buildings and the reconstruction of the water-intake and heat-distribution systems and other facilities were organized within a short period of time, any and all construction has now been halted.

Maj Gen V. Rodionov's attention has also been directed to his omissions in monitoring the distribution of housing in units under his command.

General Designer Compares S-300 SAM, Patriot

91UM0766A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Academician Boris Vasilyevich Bunkin by Lt Col A. Dokuchayev: "The S-300 is More Effective Than the Patriot"]

[Text] This discussion on the Soviet S-300 surface-to-air missile system with Academician Boris Vasilyevich Bunkin, general designer and director the Almaz Scientific-Production Association, became possible owing to widening glasnost in the armed forces. Publication of this interview was also stimulated by letters to the editor of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA querrying if we have a weapon such as the American Patriot system. According to reports from the Persian Gulf, it successfully destroyed Iraqi SCUD ballistic missiles in the recent war.

[Dokuchayev] It was reported from the Colombian capital a month ago that an infant born there in the Palermo Clinic was named Patriot by its parents—the name of an American surface-to-air missile system. The boy's parents said they were greatly impressed by the events in the Persian Gulf. The wide publicity about the American weapon obviously had an effect here, Boris Vasilyevich.

[Bunkin] The Patriot was developed by the Americans relatively recently, in the mid-1980s. It is quite an up-to-date weapon. Later on, the USA modernized the system, giving it the capability for hitting tactical and operational-tactical ballistic missiles. This is why the Patriot was transferred to the gulf vicinity—the Americans were extremely fearful of strikes by Iraqi SCUD's, against which they had no defense.

The Patriot hit the SCUD's, but not very effectively, at the price of many of the USA's own guided missiles. Moreover the conditions under which the combat operations were conducted were easy: The missiles that had to be intercepted were launched singly (one or two a day), and they did not have any of the special counter-measures typical of modern ballistic missiles. The rave reviews in some foreign publications were hardly justified.

We carefully compared the characteristics of the Patriot and the S-300 (giving the former the benefit of the doubt), and concluded that our weapon is superior to the American one in certain parameters, and not inferior to it in others. There are grounds for asserting that the Soviet surface-to-air missile system of the most recent generation is the most effective in the world. This opinion is also held by many foreign military specialists. For example it was noted in the journal JANES DEFENCE WEEKLY: "The USSR produced the world's most diverse surface-to-air missile systems, the SA-10, SA-11 and SA-12, which are complex and highly effective weapons. (The SA-10 is the foreign designation for the S-300.)

[Dokuchayev] What motivated Soviet designers to develop the S-300? Didn't our country already possess surface-to-air missile systems that proved themselves well in combat activities in Vietnam and in the Near East?

[Bunkin] The decision was associated with the appearance of a new offensive weapon in the 1970's—cruise missiles with a large effective radius, launched from airplanes and ships, and presenting an enormous danger to our country, which is surrounded by American military bases. The unique features of cruise missiles—they fly at very low altitude (on the order of 60 meters), they have a terrain-following capability, and they can be used in large numbers in a single combat operation—made them difficult to fight.

To counter the threat, we had to develop a fundamentally new surface-to-air missile system capable of simultaneously defeating several targets and repelling attacks at all altitudes, especially low, at which the defender is extremely pressed for time.

Aleksandr Andreyevich Raspletin was the brains behind the creation of almost all Soviet surface-to-air missile systems. He was also responsible for a number of the promising technical concepts that went into the present generation of missile systems. But we had to develop the S-300 and surmount many of the scientific and engineering problems without him, following his untimely death. The task was difficult, but we completed it, and we created a highly effective surface-to-air missile system with a great potential for further expansion of combat capabilities owing to introduction of new materials and technologies, wide use of electronic integrated circuits and digital equipment, automation of the principal combat functions, and use of more-sophisticated methods of guiding missile to their targets.

[Dokuchayev] Boris Valilyevich, what are the principal unique features of the S-300, and what are its fundamental differences from systems of previous generations?

[Bunkin] The heart of the system is a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system consisting of a polyfunctional illumination and guidance radar and several launchers with four missiles each.

The S-300 SAM system has a short reaction time, combat operations are highly automated, and the effective rate of fire is high. The system can fire simultaneously on six targets, each targeted by two rockets. This makes the S-300 fundamentally different from the earlier S-75 and S-125 SAM systems, which are capable of multiple control only in regard to missiles: The guidance station could simultaneously control several missiles guided on the same target. These SAM systems were unable to open fire simultaneously on several targets.

Another unique feature of the S-300 is that the surface-to-air missiles are supplied, transported and maintained

on combat alert in transporter-launchers. The missiles are also launched at their targets directly from them.

What else? The polyfunctional illumination and guidance radar consists of an antenna station and an instrument container mounted on a single chassis. The antenna station could be raised on a special tower when the system is to be deployed in forested or highly rough terrain. The radar is capable of searching for and tracking targets and of guiding missiles to them with high precision in the presence of intensive signals reflected from terrain features and intense countermeasures by the enemy. When the S-300 SAM system conducts combat operations on its own, it receives target data from an attached all-altitude three-coordinate surveillance radar station.

[Dokuchayev] But is there anything comparable in the characteristics of the S-300 and the Patriot?

[Bunkin] The S-300 is capable of destroying airplanes and cruise missiles at all combat altitudes beginning with 25 meters, while according to available information the minimum altitude at which targets could be intercepted by the Patriot is 60 meters. But in modern combat, low altitude is the main factor in surmounting anti-aircraft defenses.

Let's consider mobility. Our SAM system can be switched from traveling to combat configuration (deployed) in 5 minutes, and it can be switched back in the same amount of time. The Americans need 30 minutes for each of these operations. If we add to this that the S-300's resources are mounted on self-propelled chassis with cross-country capability, while the Patriot's resources are carried by trailers, it becomes obvious that the S-300 is significantly superior to the Patriot in mobility, and consequently in viability as well.

Because S-300 missiles are launched vertically, they can be fired at targets flying from any direction without having to turn the launchers. In the case of the Patriot, the missile is launched at an angle, meaning that in the course of intensive, fluid combat, the launchers would have to be deployed or prepositioned in such a way that they could cover all threatened directions, and this would reduce fire capabilities.

The missiles of our system have a larger explosive charge. Given identical guidance precision, this ensures a higher probability of target kill, which is especially important when firing at ballistic missiles.

[Dokuchayev] From what I know, the S-300 is inferior to the Patriot when it comes to the number of targets that could be fired on simultaneously. If we believe the Pentagon's advertising, its system is capable of firing simultaneously on nine targets. Can you comment on this fact?

[Bunkin] My information comes from articles in credible American technical journals. It follows from them that although the Patriot can lock onto nine missiles en route,

in the last leg of the target approach phase it can simultaneously defeat only three targets. On the other hand our system is capable of guiding rockets to all locked-on targets from the very beginning. In intensive raids, the effective rate of fire of our SAM systems will be higher than the American system. The Americans themselves, it seems, have concluded that the ratio of the maximum number of targets to the maximum number of missiles guided to them (9:12) designed into the Patriot is not the optimum one. The experience of military conflicts and exercises shows that as a rule, one target should be attacked by two missiles in order to maintain a high kill probability in the event of its anti-aircraft maneuver.

[Dokuchayev] While the facts you have cited speak in favor of our system, the Patriot has already proven itself in real combat, while the S-300 hasn't.

[Bunkin] Yes, our latest system has not undergone the test of war. But the Almaz association is not a greenhorn in designing surface-to-air missile systems. The S-75, S-125 and S-200 systems underwent the baptism of fire, and they proved themselves in all conflicts as a dependable means of anti-aircraft defense.

Vietnam was far from just a training exercise: It was a large-scale war involving the use of aviation and surface-to-air missiles. Even we, the designers of the S-75 system, were amazed by how stable and effective it turned out to be. It was in Vietnam that the Americans first began using the Shrike antiradar missile. Equipped with a passive homing head, it was launched from airplanes, and it homed in on emissions from operating radar. However, competent use of SAM systems by Vietnamese soldiers, who learned to use them with the assistance of Soviet specialists, made it possible to successfully oppose the new antiradar weapon. Having used over 5,000 Shrike missiles against our SAM systems during the war, the Americans were never able to neutralize the combat capability of air defenses. The battle score of the SAM missilemen was impressive: Some battalions destroyed up to 40 enemy airplanes.

The following fact is interesting from the standpoint of an independent assessment of the effectiveness of our surface-to-air missiles. Following Nasser's death in September 1970, Egypt's foreign policy began undergoing significant changes, Soviet military advisors and specialists were forced to leave that Arabian country, but the equipment we supplied was left behind. Soon after, American experts were invited by the new Egyptian leadership to evaluate the condition of the air defenses and to examine the question of reinforcing them. Here is their evaluation, cited in the journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY: "This missile system is believed to be the best in the world," "The system is impenetrable," "Egypt must continue operating with the Soviet-made resources." The experts proposed that our systems should not be replaced by American ones, instead recommending that their own firms should take

over their technical maintenance and keep them on line for another 10 years. A flattering evaluation, is it not?

[Dokuchayev] But the same S-75's and S-125's you are talking about didn't perform well in the Persian Gulf—the Americans bombed Baghdad with impunity.

[Bunkin] What the Gulf War showed was precisely that even our obsolete equipment, developed more than 30 years previously, had not lost many of its combat capabilities. Why is it that almost all of the air raids by the international forces were conducted at night, and only unmanned air strike weapons—low-flying cruise missiles—were used during the day? It became known to the Americans that in addition to possessing radar equipment, Soviet SAM systems are also supplied with optoelectronic equipment. The latter makes it possible to fire on airborne targets while maintaining radio silence (the Americans are aware of this from the unfortunate experience of the Vietnam War), depriving the attackers of their possibility of using antiradar missiles. It was precisely in avoidance of high aviation losses that raids were made at night, when the optoelectronic resources of the vintage SAM systems could not be used.

The question that arises is this: Why didn't the missilemen fire at night on the basis of information from their radar stations? To a significant extent this might have been the consequence of incompetent actions by the Iraqis, who feared radar countermeasures on the part of the enemy. The crews had not learned the means of maintaining the viability of their systems that were employed so successfully in their time by the Vietnamese.

[Dokuchayev] While the S-75 and S-125 systems fought airplanes under combat conditions, in the recent war the Patriot duelled with ballistic missiles, which as we know are targets that are much harder to defeat. This might be an explanation for the low effectiveness of the Patriot against the SCUD's—around 40 percent. Do the characteristics of the S-300 allow it to defeat operational-tactical missiles?

[Bunkin] Yes. All of our systems, especially the S-300, can deliver sufficiently effective fire against such missiles. After we adopted the new system, we put it through the appropriate tests, which produced fully satisfactory results. A number of the practice firings of the S-300 against ballistic missiles similar to the American Lance were conducted after the war in the Persian Gulf. All targets were defeated. Here is an interesting fact: Two out of four of the defeated missiles fell 7-8 kilometers from their aiming point. This is a very good indicator.

[Dokuchayev] Boris Vasilyevich, I'm not sure that all of our readers understand the significance of that.

[Bunkin] To defeat a ballistic missile means to damage it in such a way that it is unable to reach its target—that is, to knock it off course. Why? In the final phase, when it can be fired upon by surface-to-air missile systems, having expended its fuel it flies like an ordinary hunk of

metal. It can be damaged by shrapnel, but it would still reach the point at which it was aimed. If the explosive charge remains intact, it will explode. It is important not just to shower a ballistic missile with a blanket of shrapnel but also to knock it off course in such a way that neither its impact as a heavy body nor explosion of its charge could do damage to the defended objective. We were able to do this: Deflecting a missile 7-8 kilometers insures the security of the defended objective.

[Dokuchayev] Can the S-300 system be used to defeat medium and longer-range ballistic missiles?

[Bunkin] Missiles of these classes require much more powerful radar resources and guided missiles. We can gain an impression of the capabilities of such antimissile defense systems from the numerous publications devoted to ground resources of the American SDI program.

[Dokuchayev] How do military specialists evaluate the S-300? According to my information the Air Defense Forces received the system well.

[Bunkin] The responses are good, and of course we react efficiently to all remarks. The accumulated experience shows that the S-300 is liked by the combat crews. I already mentioned that the deployment time is only 5 minutes. There is no need to use hoisting cranes like before, or to exert considerable physical effort—the work of the missilemen has been eased significantly. The actions of the specialists are simpler, and they have greater confidence that the intricate system of resources does not harbor sources of trouble for them, and that the multiprocessor computer and the built-in function control apparatus will operate trouble-free. Or consider this. The missiles are supplied in transporter-launcher containers, and they do not require any tests or adjustments for 10 years. The personnel are relieved of routine work.

Finally, there is great significance to automation of combat operations.

[Dokuchayev] Boris Vasilyevich, after the war in the Persian Gulf some countries expressed a desire to purchase the American Patriot system. Will the S-300 be sold to foreign states?

[Bunkin] Our country is currently seeking approaches to the sale of military equipment that are adequate to the situation of trust and international cooperation that is now developing. New thinking is spilling over into this sphere as well. Uncontrolled sale of offensive weapons according to cold war criteria will be prohibited by the international community, I hope. But surface-to-air missile systems are a purely defense weapon, and there should be a special attitude toward their sale. Therefore if orders are placed, we will examine them promptly and attentively.

[Dokuchayev] Will foreign military specialists come across any difficulties in operating the S-300?

[Bunkin] I'm sure they won't. On the condition, of course, that they strictly fulfill our operating instructions and carefully train their service personnel. It stands to reason that any equipment, including the S-300, requires quality support: Repair outfits, and kits of spare parts, tools, and accessories must be supplied together with the equipment. When we provide armaments for export, we provide support that is no worse than that of Western companies. Moreover the S-300 can be adapted to different automated air defense control systems and different reconnaissance systems, included foreign-made. This will permit countries that acquire the S-300 to integrate it with their existing air defense systems without added expense.

In a word, the "golden rule" should be observed in relation to defensive armaments: Commercial gain should be reconciled sensibly with the interests of the country's security.

Parts Shortage Retarding PVO Flight Operations

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[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel B. Usoltsev: "Side by Side with the 'Blue Lightning'"]

[Text] Not long ago, Military Pilots First Class Majors A. Demchenko and A. Mamayev, taking off from another airfield, intercepted and destroyed over a range unknown to them a small high-speed target that was executing forceful course and altitude maneuvers while under the protection of combination jamming. They accomplished this using the fighter search method, without prompting from ground. At that time, the performance of many other combat pilots was also exemplary, in that they destroyed all the targets.

Nonetheless, Colonel V. Ostashko and other pilots believe that the results could have been even better, and that the unit could become a regiment of first-class combat pilots—masters at their skills.

"What is keeping you from doing that?" That is the question I asked many aviators. The reply was amazingly unanimous: "Our poverty."

Having worked in several aviation units of the PVO [air defense], I knew that they were right.

On the day I was visiting that regiment, flights were taking place. Having been a pilot, I knew that pilots usually are in a good mood on their flying day. That is not what I saw there.

"What is there to be happy about?" asked a pilot as he moved toward his Su-27, a Blue Lightning. "This is not flying; it is going through the motions."

I asked the regimental commander for an explanation.

"We are suffering due to conversion and a failure to think things through on the part of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry and our superior aviation rear services," sighed Viktor Nikolayevich.

Aircraft maintenance Captain Yu. Shydchenko and Military Pilots First Class Lieutenant-Colonels V. Rusayev and A. Marfitskiy, and others who were at the command post at the time, joined in on the conversation. It seems that quite a number of aircraft cannot be flown due to unavailability of replacement parts.

I was amazed at what I had heard, since this particular PVO fighter regiment is based on an airfield belonging to an aircraft plant. Parts replacement for the regiment is centralized, i.e., they come from Moscow. You can imagine the number of days it takes request forms to "float" through channels. Meanwhile, the parts in use wear out or break down, and the whole process is repeated. It is of course possible to obtain some things from warehouses of the Far East. However, as I was told by aviation maintenance specialists, replacement parts for fighter aircraft are virtually never available in the necessary quantities. The main reason for this is that aircraft plants are reducing their output of military items and converting some of their shops and sections to the manufacture of nonmilitary products, which are often unprofitable for the enterprises and have the added disadvantage of causing loss of the aircraft building qualification.

The situation is the same in the case of other aircraft types in the PVO inventory. This is not restricted to aircraft. Thus, the small number of MiGs planned for the flying day of the regiment commanded by Military Pilot First Class Lieutenant-Colonel V. Yefremov as explained to me was due to unavailability of parts for the aircraft service trucks. In this connection, it should have been known beforehand that the vehicles would break down, since they are in use virtually 24 hours a day for a period of several years running.

In the present practice, trucks which have been kept in storage are sold to the national economy, most often to various cooperatives, under the conversion principle. Commanders of rear services subunits complained to me: "That is the kind of vehicles we need to incorporate into the aircraft service trucks. We are supposed to use this old junk to service the latest aircraft."

This raises a question: Is it possible to transfer motor vehicles from the Ground Troops to the Air Forces or the PVO?

"Why not?" Colonel A. Kezin, deputy chief of district motor vehicle transportation asked in his answer to the question. "However, Moscow must issue an order for this; we here are not authorized to make such a decision. The fact is that there is no advantage for us to sell vehicles to the economy."

Can it be that the PVO Troops Main Staff is unaware of this? If it is aware of it, why is something not done about the obstacles to combat training?

"By the way, the same Su-27 craft are not presently fitted with pylons for attaching air-to-surface missiles. They could at least have been left on two-seater aircraft," complained Lieutenant-Colonel A. Marfitskiy. "Then we ourselves could place parachute-retarded targets over the range. Now we must spend a great deal of time 'hashing out' these problems with our Air Forces neighbors, who have their own headaches. Why was this not foreseen by the Very Important Persons who are responsible for aerial training of PVO pilots?"

I recall that during one of my TDY trips a senior lieutenant on alert duty at the time said to me with a touch of irony, "Getting ready to write some more about our successes? You are much better at that than we are."

He then showed me one of this flight boots with its sole taped to the top.

"I have not had much luck gluing this. There is no glue that can hold up to the concrete," said the discouraged aviator. "There is nothing to which to sew the sole, since the boot is falling apart from age, and new ones are not to be had at the warehouse."

The situation regarding pilot and technician supply of flight gear is indeed sad. Interceptor pilots scramble to the stratosphere wearing flight suits that have been mended several times. Throat microphones, oxygen masks, helmets with built-in headset and microphone, sea rescue suits, and other flight gear, the condition of which is critical to the quality of performance of a training mission as well as the pilot's life, are sometimes no longer serviceable and well beyond the point of replacement. However, it appears that new ones are not now available nor will they be so in the future.

The following figures were given to me in the rear services of a PVO large unit. There was a shortage of 26 oxygen masks, 54 protective helmets, 20 throat microphones, and quite a bit more.

Colonel V. Volokh, large unit deputy commander for rear services, said the following:

"We must 'squeeze out' of Moscow virtually every piece of high-altitude gear; there is nothing available within the district. If the center does fill a request, it does so in the best case in quantity, not quality, with sizes to fit the average' person. We may be given a sea rescue suit that is too small for a particular person but too large for someone else. If one does fit, it must be worn in turns. I am preparing to make a trip to Moscow. Maybe I can 'squeeze out' something there."

Another topic discussed was refusal on the part of many pilots to eat in the mess hall, in violation of preflight rules. It was explained to me that they objected to the low-quality dishes offered there instead of the foods intended for flight personnel.

We—journalists—previously portrayed the defenders of the country's skies in a light whereby flying was all they needed. Now that the personal comfort situation has deteriorated, they do not hesitate to admit that they are dreaming about obtaining a complete rest, not only flying. Almost half the pilots in the regiment commanded by Colonel V. Ostashko alone have no apartments; some of them are in dire need of improved housing. Many ground personnel are renting mere parts of an apartment. The situation in some other PVO units is no better.

A pilot or aircraft maintenance specialist and his family living in a tiny room does not have an opportunity to recover physically and mentally by obtaining a sufficient amount of sleep after a difficult flying day. It must be realized that a pilot's body is subjected to enormous stresses during every flight. But alas! even his trained body is not made of iron; even the metal cannot withstand the loads in some flights.

Most of the PVO units of the Far East have no flight health units where combat pilots could obtain at least some rest after flying training missions.

In conclusion, all the problems encountered daily by interceptor pilots, who are referred to as the "Soviet sky border patrol," are too numerous to list in a single article. All we can do is suffer amazement and regret over the fact that in PVO aviation the highly-developed equipment and personnel poverty exist side by side.

Legal Questions Surrounding Commercial Use of Transport Aircraft

*9JUM0763B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Jul 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Colonel of Justice V. Sergeyev: "'Legal' Flights: Will Military Transport Aviation Passengers and Freight Be Insured?"]

[Text] It has become customary for military transport aviation to carry nonmilitary freight and people, such as Chernobyl area children heading for medical treatment, as well as ordinary passengers.

The first question this raises is: Is such a practice legal? The fact is that the USSR Aviation Code holds that the Ministry of Civil Aviation exercises a monopoly in this activity. This is where reality comes to the rescue: Monopoly as an economic practice is coming to an end, to be replaced by healthy rivalry and competition. Relative to the USSR Aviation Code, this is an area long in need of overhaul, as stressed in a recent session of several committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in which the topic of discussion was effective use of military aviation transports.

The second question is more problematic: Is a person availing himself of the services of the VTA [Military Transport Aviation] entitled to the necessary social and legal guarantees, and are his life, health, and property

insured? This is certainly not an idle question, for, as shown by statistics, Air Forces transport aircraft last year alone flew about 600,000 persons and more than 200,000 tons of commercial freight. The hauling fees totalled 30.5 million rubles.

I had an opportunity to spend some time at a Moscow area airfield where a considerable number of these flights originate. I learned that no insurance coverage for passengers and commercial freight was provided there, although passengers have been insured against accidents for 60 years in our country on a mandatory basis.

Officials with whom I spoke on the subject told me that there is no written guidance on that score, and that there is no provision to finance such coverage. I beg to disagree: There is more than enough of a legal basis to provide insurance coverage for persons flying aboard military transports. In the existing Aviation Code there is a section which establishes that passengers travelling aboard aircraft, regardless of the departmental affiliation of the latter, are entitled to receive insurance coverage in accordance with existing legislation.

Now about the financial aspects. No costs whatsoever are incurred to cover passengers, since insurance fees are included in the cost of the ticket. Insurance for freight is arranged for by the freight owners themselves. The USSR Ministry of Defense is responsible (prior to payment of primary compensation) for insuring the aircraft.

To make up for possible inadequacy of the coverage proposed by the Main Administration of State Insurance

state inspection, it should be known that other possibilities have recently come into play. The ASKO -Joint Stock Insurance Company—for example, is fairly well-known. It offers its clients a number of benefits, going so far as covering any harm caused by violent weather conditions and acts of terrorism; it is willing to honor agreements based on foreign exchange in the case of international flights.

Incidentally, ASKO has a branch at the Moscow area airfield. I spoke with the head, a reserve officer P. Vakula, who is also a pilot. "This is something new for commanders of military units," he said, "and, for that reason, hesitating to do anything in this regard, they are awaiting instructions."

The above is an accurate observation. The fact is that both existing legislation and common sense dictate that passengers and freight in our time of high speeds and increased risks are in need of substantial legal protection and firm financial guarantees of loss compensation. The personal interests of people availing themselves of military transport aviation should not suffer.

FROM THE EDITORS: We have learned that the Ministry of Defense has recently taken measures to arrive at a solution to the abovementioned problems. Thus, in compliance with a 30 April 1991 order issued by the minister of defense, the Central Finance Administration has been tasked with setting the rules for insuring passengers and freight carried by Ministry of Defense aircraft. Therefore, the matter has been placed into the hands of a specific agency for action.

Chernavin on Physical Training, Sport

91UM0689A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 May 91 First Edition pp 1-2

[Report on interview with Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy, by unidentified KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; date and place not given: "The Ocean Is a Strict Examiner"]

[Text]

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vladimir Nikolayevich, you yourself selected the theme for today's discussion, focusing attention not on global questions, if it can be put this way, but on something quite specific—the role of physical training and sport in the system of training and educating sailors. It is very likely that to some this will seem far from the most vital problem among the concerns of the commander in chief of the USSR Navy...

[Chernavin] I do not look at it that way. As a person who has dedicated his life to the Navy, who has seen a lot, and who has almost daily had the opportunity to confirm his opinion, I am convinced that the only person capable of mastering his specialty and intricate equipment and weapons, and employing them successfully and with maximum efficiency, is the one who, in addition to everything else, possesses the entire range of physical and moral qualities that simply cannot be developed without regular physical exercise and without participation in sports training and competitions. It is hardly necessary to convince anyone that service on modern surface ships and submarines and long-range cruises at various latitudes are not as easy as sailing in the waters of the Klyazma River Reservoir. The ocean is a very strict examiner, which places very severe requirements on the sailor. And I will say frankly that work on the physical training of Navy personnel is endless.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Especially now when the USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a decree on conducting an experiment in several large Navy formations [soyedeniye] in manpower acquisition for seamen and petty officer positions on a voluntary, contract basis and the reduction of active service in the Navy to two years?

[Chernavin] Precisely so. And, in former times, it took a lot of effort to bring to the required level those young people who were called into the Navy, among whom, alas, there were a lot who were physically weak and who had had a coddled upbringing. With a reduction in the term of service by a year, commanders and physical training and sports specialists will have to intensify work even more and find new ways of reaching the target. Professionals, and that is exactly what seamen and petty officers who go through service under contract are called on to become, are a special subject. Even if such a specialist is as wise as Solomon, the return from his activity inevitably will be directly dependent on the level of his personal physical fitness. The maintenance of professional sailors costs the Navy and the state too much.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But a lot of experience has been accumulated in the training of professional cadres—I have in mind officers most of all. Since olden times in Russia, a Navy officer was considered a model of physical bearing and physical perfection...

[Chernavin] The training of officers in higher naval schools takes five years, but even so I cannot say that they all come to the Navy with solid training and excellent health. Can a situation be considered normal when one out of every 14 of those officers who arrived from school last year received a "failed" on a physical training check? Unfortunately, there are also enough who are at a mediocre "three-level."

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It would be interesting to know, do the command elements and the teachers of physical training and sports departments know about these facts? This is evidence of an obvious defect on their part.

[Chernavin] As a rule, they know and are making certain efforts to correct the situation. But they do not always succeed, because of the pace of our life and the continuously growing demands on the level of physical fitness of future officers. And the attitude toward this training, and also toward the organization of large-scale sports work, varies. It is even awkward to talk about this, but the chiefs of some higher naval educational institutions have come out with proposals not to conduct the more traditional school sports and athletic meets, which, I know from my personal experience, contribute so much to the physical development of the cadets. The reason? They think that the pursuit of sports distracts future officers from studies. Meanwhile, analysis indicates the opposite—the progress of the cadets who actively engage in a sport is higher than the average progress in school.

The underrating of the role of physical training and sport by the command authorities of some schools results in the fact that every year young officers arrive at ships and shore-based units whose outward appearance and training condition are quite far from ideal. All of this forces us, along with increasing the demands on commanders and teachers to organize the training process in physical fitness and sports work, to resort to radical measures of influencing both the chiefs and the teachers, as well as cadets who systematically shirk exercises and training, and who do not meet training standards. Thus, last year eight cadets were dismissed from the Black Sea Higher Naval School imeni P.S. Nakhimov and five from the Kiev Higher Naval Political School. A severe punishment, but after all young people who decide to devote themselves to the Navy should understand that the excellent physical shape of an officer is not his personal business, but a requirement dictated by the conditions of the service.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But what about those who already serve on ships, in shore-based units, and in headquarters who, because of the low level of their

physical conditioning and poor health, cannot fully utilize their knowledge and abilities?

[Chernavin] A sick man is a problem for us. It is enough to say that during clinical examination of officers and petty officers, it was learned that every third one of them is overweight. And all because these people have an irresponsible attitude toward keeping their bodies in proper shape and, using any pretext, they avoid planned exercises in physical training, and do not even want to think about sports training. In addition, 40 percent of those who were examined smoke. So, is it any surprise that we have an unjustifiably high percentage with colds and cardiovascular diseases? What is especially alarming is the decrease in professional qualities and work capability, and the large number of those absent from duty because of sickness.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And this is given the fact that every admiral, officer, and petty officer is personally responsible for his own physical fitness. Are there measures to influence the negligent? Can a commander take strict measures against such people?

[Chernavin] He not only can, but he is supposed to act that way. Efficiency reports and character references are supposed to contain data on an officer's physical fitness. They certainly must be taken into account in position advancement and promotion to the next military rank. It is a powerful influencing factor, and it is unforgivable for an officer not to use it. Thus, for example, an officer's career in the United States is directly dependent on the condition of his health and the level of his physical development: If he fails pertinent testing twice in a row and a check on a rigid permissible weight—he has to leave the service. Why should we not do the very same thing? As a top priority measure directed at increasing the responsibility of officers, petty officers, and persons, who as an experiment, will serve in the Navy under contract, I think it is necessary, in perfecting a check on their physical condition, to introduce individual charts that would show monthly evaluations and measure the volume of necessary physical commitments. And it is absolutely obvious that transferring officers into physiotherapy exercise groups for reasons of health is not warranted. As a rule, exercises are not conducted in these groups, and also proper medical control is not carried out, which is a consequence of the inadequate special training of military doctors.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vladimir Nikolayevich, the measures you propose, if it can be put this way, are of a coercive and administrative nature. But, after all, it is hardly likely that you will in this way impart to a grown person, an officer, respect for physical training and a realization that it is vitally necessary to devote time to it regularly.

[Chernavin] I agree. Physical training is an important component of human culture. And the fact that we at times are compelled to order other servicemen to engage in physical training and to pass approved standards

attests not to the "brutality" of senior chiefs, but, rather, to the inadequate general cultural level of people who treat the maintenance of their health, professional work capacity, and the prolongation of longevity irresponsibly. This, if you wish, is our common misfortune—not just so much of military people. The love of physical training has to be inculcated from the cradle...

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But you personally did not have such a problem?

[Chernavin] I think not. I have been and remain a great friend of sports. While still a cadet in the naval training school, and later in the Higher Naval School imeni M.V. Frunze I became keen on swimming, water polo, and basketball, I trained regularly, appeared in contests, and had sport ratings. Yes, and subsequently, while commanding a combat unit, a submarine crew, a naval force, and the Northern Fleet, I considered it my duty to find time for daily exercises and participation in contests with my subordinates. And, believe me, during 17 years of service in submarines, my health did not let me down. So, thanks to sports.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Are you deliberately not mentioning the fact that your subordinates also were noted for their excellent physical conditioning, and that they achieved high results in sports work inspections and reviews?

[Chernavin] I simply consider this self-evident. In the Navy, in view of the specific nature of the service, when a commander and subordinates are noted for union and friendship, it cannot be any other way. For example, at the last sports work review of the Navy, a Northern Fleet submarine force, commanded by Captain 1st Rank V. Makeyev, took first place. The success of Vladimir Mikhaylovich's subordinates did not come as a surprise to anyone. After all, back in his cadet days the commander himself became a swimming master and a participant and prize-winner in many contests, including the USSR championship. And, today, Captain 1st Rank Makeyev has not given up the sport, and he is successfully directing work among personnel. A match for him are Captain 1st Rank V. Sviridov, commander of a naval surface force of the Black Sea Fleet, and Major General V. Domnenko, commander of one of the shore-based units of the Pacific Ocean Fleet. The military collectives they head also achieved outstanding results in the review.

But here are examples of another kind. In an inspector's check conducted in the Pacific Ocean Fleet, sailors of formations and units commanded by Rear Admiral V. Dovzhenko, Captain 1st Rank M. Bakayev, and Captain 2d Rank M. Mezentsev clearly were not conspicuous for their physical fitness. As a result, their combat readiness evaluation was lowered. And this happened in great measure because the commanders continue to underrate physical training and treat sports as something secondary.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The examples are completely convincing. But, perhaps, commanders like Captain 1st Rank V. Makeyev, who are well trained in a physical and methodical respect, are exceptions in the Navy?

[Chernavin] By no means. Captain 1st Rank V. Sviridov, whom I have already mentioned, is also a master of sport. This high title, together with titles of champion and prize-winners in championships of the country, the Armed Forces, and the Navy, are held by many officers and admirals, including Captain 1st Rank S. Manuylov, Rear Admiral V. Visoven, Rear Admiral V. Aleksin, and others. I especially would like to emphasize that all of them got into sports in schools, and that they actively participated in combined sports and athletic meets.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] I have heard complaints from sailors more than once that many of them cannot swim. It is difficult to believe this...

[Chernavin] However, to our chagrin, cases like this do exist. Unfortunately, youths are frequently sent to the Navy who are unable to swim. In trying to correct the situation, I will be frank, we run into insurmountable difficulties: The Navy is catastrophically short of indoor swimming pools. Garrisons and VUZ's [higher educational institutions] are short a minimum of 33 such facilities. It is not possible to teach people to swim under such conditions, especially now, when most of the sailors will serve only two years. The Navy cannot cope with this problem; it is necessary to resolve it at a state level.

In general, the Navy obviously has been deprived of sports facilities. We do not have enough gymnasiums, stadiums, and shooting ranges. Our inventory is also in trouble. The Clothing Service of the Ministry of Defense provides sailors only 10-15 percent of the clothing requirement. For several years, the Northern Fleet has not been receiving ski bindings. Sets of skis are being collected from all units and ships for personnel of subunits that are participating in the end-of-training-period performance evaluation under conditions of the all-army military sports competitions for prizes of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA newspaper and the Sports Committee of the Ministry of Defense. Regular competitions are taking place, and at times we hear unflattering words at the regular big conference on sports, and...everything remains as it was. But, after all, the Navy needs help—specific, effective, and urgent help.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It must be hoped that what you said will not leave the managers of the pertinent departments and services indifferent. And here is an idea that comes to mind. Will not the illusion of well-being be created by the successes of Navy sportsmen, for example, of those water polo players of the Central Sports Club of the Navy?

[Chernavin] Well, that could happen. Our water polo players really perform excellently—last year, under the leadership of the chief coach, Lieutenant Colonel A. Kabanov, they became the champions of the country for

the nineteenth time. Sailors have a right to be proud of their kayak and canoe oarsmen (chief coach is Captain 2d Rank A. Sobolev). Again, as the saying goes, masters of boat-racing are on the rise, and lead positions in the country and the world are held by teams in military technical and applied military types of sports. And so, some department manager, who supplies us with appliances and equipment, will hear about the next big success of water polo players and oarsmen and will say: Why are these sailors complaining about a shortage of property and a poor material base, when things are going well for them in sports?

But popular sports and high-achievement sports are not the same thing. They have different aims and tasks. Although I cannot agree with the persistently propagandized thesis that popular sports are no longer a platform for nourishing an environment for major sports. Where then do you derive a reserve for our sports clubs?

We treat a major sport with proper attention, mindful also that the example of the leading athletes is intended to stimulate young sailors to engage actively in physical training. It is precisely about them and about their health and physical development that it is necessary to demonstrate daily concern.

Early Aircraft Carrier Advocate, Galler, Career Profiled

*91UM0637B Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 6, Feb 91 p 8*

[Article by Rear Admiral (Ret) V. Kozlov: "A Dishonorable Trial Over Honor." First paragraph, boxed, is introductory, titled "History in Destinies," and in italics in original. The last paragraph, also boxed, serves as an epitaph, of sorts.]

[Text] *History in Destinies Historical changes are always the products of men's minds, energy, and handiwork. But these changes, in turn, also directly influence people's destinies. History elevates some to great heights—nearly as high as the sun—and throws others into an abyss or into oblivion... How can one foretell these flights and falls, and how can one "put down a bed of straw" in time, before one is thrown down on the cement floor of a prison cell? Apparently, no one will give answers to these questions...*

It is difficult to say what the sick admiral was thinking about in his lonely cell. But apparently, they were thoughts and reminiscences about what he had experienced and lived through, and about his deeds and actions that were in keeping with his conscience and honor, and were a part of his character, inherited through his parents' genes and fostered through his upbringing.

The son of a general, an engineer, and grandson of a Petersburg physician, he received a good education at home and in the gymnasium. In 1904 he finished the prestigious naval college and, as a young officer served aboard ships of the Baltic fleet and made long voyages in the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.

During World War I, artilleryman Galler sent shells into German ships and later became the senior officer on the battleship "Slava." This ship became famous in the autumn of 1917. After a battle which lasted for many hours, the crew scuttled the battleship in the narrow Moonzund Strait, preventing the German squadron—which was trying to break through to Petrograd—from passing through.

To make certain that the "Slava" would sink where it would do the most good, the destroyer "Turkestanskiy Stavroplets" finished it off with its torpedoes. It is noteworthy that several months later, seaman Galler, who had welcomed the revolution and crossed over to the side of the people, was selected by the sailors to be commander of this ship. The demanding, but just, commander with combat experience, got to be well liked by the sailors from the Baltic area. Soon afterward he was entrusted with the command of a cruiser, then a battleship, and later, with the command of large formations. From 1921 on he was the Chief of Staff—as they called it then—of the Baltic Sea naval forces. Incidentally, L.M. Galler was awarded the Order of the Red Banner "for valor and heroism in combat on the sea during the years of the Civil War."

The chief of staff of the fleet needed a great deal of personal valor and energy to restore the destroyed Baltic Fleet. Here is what Admiral Yu. A. Panteleyev wrote in his memoirs, *Half a Century in the Fleet*: "Everyone who worked in Kronstadt knew Galler, those in factories and aboard ships, in training detachments and in forts. He won the respect of the masses, from top to bottom, primarily with his attentive and respectful manner toward each person—worker, sailor, and commander—and, it goes without saying, with his knowledge of the job and his highly cultured manner... Courteous and, in addressing people, often using words not regularly heard, such as 'my dear fellow' and 'please,' and at the same time stroking his little reddish brush-like mustache, he could also, if required, be a stern chief who did not tolerate irresponsibility and disorderliness..."

The flag officer made use of his rich naval experience in the winter of 1929. The Revolutionary Military Council charged him with commanding the transfer of a ship detachment from the Baltic to the Black Sea, with stops in Brest and Naples. This was the first large foreign voyage of Soviet ships. On the way, in the treacherous Bay of Biscay, they had to weather a severe storm that took 60 different ships to the bottom of the sea over the course of several days. Our ships and their crews withstood it all and accomplished their mission.

In the summer of 1932, L.M. Galler became commander of the Baltic Fleet, and in 1935 he was promoted to the naval rank of fleet flag officer 2nd rank. The certificate of promotion said that "...He is an excellent seaman and a reliable flag officer, who knows how to direct the command personnel and the staff..."

Notwithstanding the beginning campaign of repression and the command reshuffling, Fleet Commander Galler remained in his position for a full four years. He devoted all his energy to increase the combat strength of the fleet. New ships delivered by the shipyards were put into operation and combat training was actively conducted. Oh, it was so hard to do all this!

A storm of arrests raged all around. Former officers of the old fleet disappeared. Commanders and political workers—those who had come from the ranks of sailors-bolsheviks—were not spared. And Lev Mikhailovich waited for this storm from day to day. But for now he survived. Moreover, he was appointed Deputy Chief of Naval Forces. Soon afterwards, a People's Commissariat for the Navy was created and Galler became Chief of the Main Naval Staff.

The repressions, however, did not end. In a period of two years (1937- 1939), four members of the Naval Commissariat were arrested! During this period, Galler became better acquainted with N.G. Kuznetsov, who had become the People's Naval Commissar in 1939. In his book, *On the Eve*, the people's commissar wrote the following about Galler: "...Telling in detail about the fleet, he was able to call every formation commander by his last name, and in describing people, he did not speak badly about anyone, but while not hiding their shortcomings, he spoke first about their good points..."

Goodwill and decency were the admiral's outstanding characteristics. Six months before the war he was transferred from operational duty to the position of Deputy Commissar for Shipbuilding and Armament. Admiral Kuznetsov highly regarded the assistance that his comrade, senior in experience and service, gave him, and valued Galler, who had done a great deal to prepare the Main Staff and naval forces for war.

During the war years, he was charged by the people's commissar to fulfill the duties of his first deputy, and was in the naval command post practically around the clock. Devoting himself completely to his service, Lev Mikhailovich never did have time to start his own family. He lived in a small room next to his office, and only rarely went out for walks. And he had to pay attention to many problems, for which he always found time, expertly organizing the work of subordinates, and already giving thought to what kind of fleet should exist after the war.

Immediately after the war, a project for a program of shipbuilding, developed in the people's commissariat, approved by Kuznetsov, and signed by Galler, was sent to the government. It is too bad that neither admiral got to participate in the realization of this program. Independent generals, admirals, and marshals who defended their views were not needed by the leader.

The war had already ended, and at the end of 1946 the people's commissar and his deputy were removed from their positions and assigned to Leningrad: the first one, as chief of the naval training institutions, and the second,

as the chief of the Academy. A similar fate befell Admirals V.A. Alafuzov and G.A. Stepanov (during the war, both had directed the Main Naval Staff, one after the other), who were also transferred to cadre training duties.

But the disgraced admirals did not have long to serve in Leningrad. In November of the next year, the following orders were received: "All four are to report to the capital!" From those whom they met at the train station, they found out that they had been called in for a major court trial. The so-called investigation began. The country was undergoing a postwar wave of repressions under the slogan: "A Fight Against Admiring What is Foreign." Having the goal of enlisting public support for condemning cosmopolites, courts of honor were often held. These trials often denounced biologists, philosophers, and writers, and for many people the trials were the precursors of a Supreme Court trial. The "Case of the Admirals," as was later found out, was put together by Bulganin's evidence and, of course, sanctioned by Stalin.

In Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov's notes, recently published for the first time, he writes that Bulganin "did not know much about military affairs (although he was marshal and Minister of the Armed Forces), he carried out all orders, not having his own official viewpoint, was a bad politician, but a good political intriguer. It was by his order that it was decided to try us in a court of honor..."

Everything had begun with a denunciation by Captain 1st Rank V. Alferov, who worked in one of the military science-research institutes. The ambitious denouncer, dreaming about leaving his mark in the stream of officious over-vigilance, and making his career out of this, wrote a letter directly to Stalin. The letter fell into Beria's and Bulganin's hands. The denouncer reported that by direction of the leadership of the Navy, the Allies—during the war—had been given a secret aviation torpedo and because of this, a great loss to the country's combat capability had occurred. Somewhat later, there was an additional accusation about handing the Allies certain navigational charts and documentation regarding artillery armament. It was convenient for someone to forget that as early as 1942 an agreement had been made among the USSR, Great Britain, and the USA on mutual exchange of information relating to armament hardware, and of course, all exchanges were approved by Stalin.

It is not easy to defend one's honor, if the court itself is without honor. Heading the court was Marshal L.A. Govorov, "a decent man, but not daring to have his own opinion and even exaggerating where he could..." (N.G. Kuznetsov, "Notes"). In the presence of Naval officers gathered in the assembly hall of the Main Staff, witnesses and experts came forward, the majority of whom were persons concerned basically about their own careers. There were those who had principles and who assessed the fictitious secrecy, but their voices were drowned out by the presentations which castigated the admirals "for the loss" of vigilance.

Especially zealous was one accuser, Vice-Admiral N. Kulakov (Deputy People's Commissar for Political Affairs), who—as Kuznetsov remembers—"was already calling us by all kinds of indecent names and demanding that we be punished as severely as possible..." Thus was trampled the honor of combat admirals whom someone did not like; admirals who essentially had to defend themselves.

Admiral Kuznetsov did not attempt to refer to Stalin's permission for giving away the above-referenced "secrets" and took full responsibility onto himself, trying to save his subordinates. Galler, too, deported himself quietly and confidently, and also did not refer to anyone else. When asked, "Who is basically at fault for giving away [these secrets]?", he answered: "I take this opportunity to establish only my personal involvement."

This answer was honorable and completely in keeping with the character and personality of the extremely decent admiral. Unfortunately, military experts acted differently, supporting the accusation. Witnesses for the defense, not able to withstand the pressure, declined to give firsthand evidence. Thus the accusation against Admirals Kuznetsov, Galler, Alafuzov, and Stepanov "that they committed anti-state and anti-patriotic deeds" was upheld. Having received approval for the sentences in the Kremlin, Govorov returned to the hall and began reading the decision of the court of honor. "Acknowledging the guilt of the admirals ... fully proven in this case, and considering that all the accused, through their actions, dealt a great loss to the combat might of the Navy ... the Court of Honor directs that it petition the Council of Ministers of the USSR to hand over the accused ... for trial by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR."

All seamen who witnessed this trial saw the tendentiousness of the investigation and the falsity of the accusation. The admirals' attempt to give a written explanation to Stalin and Bulganin was not successful. The leadership of the Navy also refused to support them during this time.

Soon the interrogations began in Ulrich's office. Everything was done quite quickly here: The law of 12 December 1934, regarding quick conduct of trials of "enemies of the people," was adhered to. Here is how N.G. Kuznetsov describes the events: "We were called and escorted under guard to our places according to rank. I was in the first row with Galler. Admirals Alafuzov and Stepanov stood in the second row... There were 5-6 persons in the hall who, apparently, had to attend the final presentation. Alafuzov's case was read first. Smoothly presented accusations and the sentence—10 years. Stepanov was next; he also received 10 years... Galler's turn was next—a 4-year sentence. Well, two persons got 10 years each, and two—4 years each. A total of 28 years. This is what the opportunist Alferov's note did, plus Bulganin's dirty dealings. But I was mistaken. I was given a suspended sentence, but they proposed that I be reduced in rank to Rear-Admiral." (Admiral of the Soviet Fleet Kuznetsov's rank was restored only after 40

years). The other admirals were dispossessed of all their decorations and military titles (Alafuzov and Stepanov were rehabilitated in 1953 and returned to duty in their previous ranks).

Lev Mikhailovich Galler did not gain his freedom. By a resolution of the Council of Ministers, signed by the very same Bulganin in May 1953, the admiral's honorable name was restored. The life of a remarkable man—a fleet commander, and a Russian intellectual whose name should never be forgotten, especially in the memories of those who really love the sea and their Fatherland—was prematurely cut off amidst the sharp turns of our history.

Unfortunately, right up to the present time, L.M. Galler's name is presented in an edited version in official publications. The "Military Encyclopedia" of the 1970s, in a short biographical sketch, does not give a single word about the admiral's trampled honor or his rehabilitation. The same silence exists in the "Naval Dictionary," published as late as 1990. No place was found for the admiral's name, except for one and a half lines (in the enumeration of a number of names of commanders who had distinguished themselves in 1918) in the large historical collection, "The Baltic Fleet—Twice Awarded the Red Banner" (Voyenizdat, 1978). It is as if he had never commanded this fleet, having served in the Baltic for nearly thirty years! And this is how our slogan "No One is Forgotten..." is carried out.

During the hot July days of 1950, in the Kazan prison hospital, the distinguished admiral, formerly an officer of the Russian imperial fleet, Lev Mikhailovich Galler, bade his farewell to life. The unjustified horrible trial, that he had lived through two years before, and the prison atmosphere had an effect on his already poor health. The admiral died on July 12th. It is not known where the former Chief of the General Naval Staff and Deputy People's Commissar for the Navy is buried. Two years later he was rehabilitated and restored to his admiral's rank—posthumously....

USSR SupSov Approves Contract Service Experiment

91UM0637A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Urban: "Service By Contract: The USSR Supreme Soviet Approved Conducting the Experiment in the Navy"]

[Text] Resuming work after a break, the USSR Supreme Soviet on Sunday examined an issue which had been discussed even before the parliamentary recess. This issue concerns the Ministry of Defense conducting an experiment on personnel staffing by contract, to perform the duties of seamen and petty officers in the Navy.

The Deputies, however, first amended the Law "On Universal Military Obligation." From now on, the enlistment term for active duty in the Navy and in naval units of the border troops will be two years. For soldiers,

sailors, sergeants, and petty officers with a higher education, the enlistment term is one year. The Ministry of Defense also has the right, if the need arises, to extend servicemen's active duty enlistment period for up to two months.

The parliament then approved the resolution on conducting the experiment from 1991 to 1994 in four Naval formations. It is now permitted to staff, on a voluntary basis, by contracting with servicemen called in for active duty this year to perform the duties of seamen and petty officers. The contract with the seamen is for a period of two and a half years, after they have been on active duty for at least six months.

Sailors and petty officers, who sign the contract, continue with their enlistment periods, but they receive higher pay. The amount and method of payment will be determined by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. The government has three months to approve the Provisional Resolution "On Active Duty Service by Seamen and Petty Officers on a Voluntary, Contract Basis."

And thus, what KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has been proposing for over a year now, has acquired a legal framework. It was not by coincidence that A.I. Lukyanov, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, remarked that this is a step toward the establishment of a professional army. I want only to remind readers that the internal troops of the USSR MVD have already established a system similar to this one. And who will attempt the next experiment?

Pacific Fleet Chief of Staff on Contract Service Experiment

91UM0667A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Vice Admiral V. Kalabin, chief of staff, Pacific Fleet, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "What Will Contract Service Be Like?"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] This is a development the Navy has been awaiting and preparing for. As previously reported by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a decree implementing on an experimental basis for the 1991-1994 period the enlistment of seamen and petty officers for volunteer contract service in several Naval units, with the men to be drawn from the pool of servicemen drafted this year.

Following is the text of an interview held by our permanent correspondent with Vice Admiral V. Kalabin, chief of staff of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, who is involved with carrying out this experiment in the Navy.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade Vice Admiral, the 1991 spring season is at its height. When will the Navy commence the contract service experiment?

[Kalabin] I wish to say at the outset that the decision relative to the mandatory introduction into the Navy of the experiment of setting up another kind of compulsory service—by contract—was made only recently at the governmental level. It will be several months before the government can ratify the temporary contract service regulation and other bills, including financial legislation.

Plans call for carrying out the experiment in a large unit of surface ships, which is equipped with complex materiel and manned by a personnel force of size sufficient to obtain constructive results. We intend to initiate the experiment this year and complete it in 1994.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vladimir Ivanovich, what are the highlights of contract service?

[Kalabin] First and foremost, it will be up to the ship commanding officer to select contract servicemen. We assume that the contract will specify the length of service, conditions and obligations which both parties must honor. The contract, to be executed in writing, will become binding upon application of signatures of both parties. Provision is made for the possibility of canceling the contract. The following are particulars of the draft regulation. The contract will be in force for an initial period of 30 months in the case of Navy seamen, after they will have served at least six months of active compulsory duty. Acceptance of the service is purely voluntary. Upon completion of their contract service, seamen and petty officers will become eligible for increased pay and allowances in accordance with the prevailing pay scale. The particular monetary amounts have been published in the press, but have not been officially approved as of this time. Of course, men voluntarily entering into contract service will be entitled to receive the rights, benefits and privileges granted servicemen in compulsory service and their families by existing legislation.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How will the many everyday problems common to servicemen be addressed? The contract arrangement does not appear to do anything to resolve them.

[Kalabin] I will not attempt to say how they will be resolved. Judge for yourself. In the unit commanded by Vice Admiral I. Khmel'nov, many officers and warrant officers still do not have an apartment. There is no dormitory to be found for them at that station. This should not come as a surprise, since this problem is not peculiar to the Navy. With regard to the planned experiment, servicemen possessing a contract will reside aboard ships, eat the same food and take daily liberty at the end of the duty day, of course with no more than 30 percent of the unit on liberty at the same time, the same as that specified by existing regulations.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vladimir Ivanovich, how do you think youths will react to the offer of contract service at a time of a market economy?

[Kalabin] I assume that a certain percentage of seamen and petty officers will agree to the conditions. They most likely will be people who have decided that the sea is in their future. Some of them may have families experiencing financial difficulties, especially with the onset of unemployment problems associated with the change to a market economy. I think that mass information media will be instrumental in successful prosecution of the experiment, particularly with their advertising of this activity. As far as making definite predictions is concerned, I believe that the time is still too early for that. Everything depends upon a reasoned and well-thought-out contract service regulation, one naturally backed up by good material incentive.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It would be interesting to know the degree of success experienced in other countries. The USA and Canada, for example.

[Kalabin] Contract service encountered difficulties there, too. It took about 10 years to put it through. And this in countries possessing a smoother economy. So, this is not a simple matter for anyone.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In your view, what kind of a professional serviceman does the Navy require, and how much will this cost us?

[Kalabin] Your question touches on a host of problems. What kind of background should the professional seaman possess? From which service categories should he be selected? How much to pay him? I believe that he should be a young man, physically fit, of developed mental abilities, who can at the outset successfully employ his skills to handle weapons and equipment, displaying eagerness. In my view, not all job classifications are amenable to filling by contract arrangement. There is the situation of some youths reporting for Naval duty who do not satisfy the above-listed requirements. A mere 12 percent of those reporting for duty engaged in sports on a regular basis or are work-hardened. Sixty-eight percent of the inductees indicated a desire to serve only two years. Of that group, one out of five preferred service in the Marines. Fifteen percent chose service aboard surface vessels; 3.5 percent, aboard submarines; 7.8 percent, in aviation units.

Consider the following statistics. In the spring of 1990 in our Maritime Kray, more than 560 youths were transferred into the reserves as being unfit for duty. More than 150 draft-age youths were rejected due to drug addiction. More than 430 men had a record of especially grievous offenses or had committed a second offense. The Navy is in possession of statistics broken down into additional categories. I must say that they are depressing.

I believe that the professional serviceman should be trained in a narrow specialty, for example within the confines of his particular assignment. Only later, after the passage of some time, should his training be expanded outward to the broader outlines of the division or complement. Subsequently, he must not in any way be

discouraged from learning a related specialty. The contract serviceman's pay should definitely make up for all the trials and deprivations of military service, constitute sufficient compensation for the physical and mental stresses and offset his personal inconveniences. I consider it advantageous to offer material incentive for each successive extension of the contract. The pay should take into account satisfactory proficiency ratings. In addition, provision must be made for the imposition of fines for disciplinary infractions and unsatisfactory performance of duty.

Discussion of monetary amounts is premature. It is generally known that the state has not made funds

available to carry out the experiment, which will be financed out of the USSR Ministry of Defense's budget. In short, the situation will be clarified completely in several months' time.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] My final question. Do you personally believe that contract service is applicable to the Navy?

[Kalabin] For this kind of service to become a reality, mere wishes on our part are not sufficient. What is required is a general improvement in the economy of the country as a whole.

Review of General Staff Mail on Reform

91UM0652A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by General Staff Directorate Chief Major-General V. Chepurnoy under the rubric: "Military Reform: Commentary on the General Staff's Mail": "What Kind of Army Do We Need"]

[Text] A discussion has been occurring for more than a year on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on what our army should be. Hundreds of suggestions associated with military reform have arrived at various echelons. Many letters have been addressed directly to the Ministry of Defense. All of them are being painstakingly analyzed in the appropriate General Staff subunits.

At the request of the editorial staff, General Staff Directorate Chief Major-General V. Chepurnoy comments on some of the letters.

First of all, I must comment on the interest in the Armed Forces by the widest circles of society. And granted we are finding a different attitude toward the army in the letters, for example, something like the attitude of Comrade Verbenko from Poltava who writes: "I have not served, I am not serving, and I will not serve...." But this nevertheless defines the nature of the mail associated with the problems of military structural development. The absolute majority of letters and suggestions are prompted by sincere concern about the future fate of the army and navy.

Naturally, not all suggestions are sufficiently well-grounded. However, there are also those letters that have entered into the General Staff's "idea bank" and are actively being used in the work on the concept of military reform.

For example, the authors of many letters think that we first of all need to clearly determine: will we have an Armed Forces that is small in size but equipped with the latest word in equipment or will we continue to place the emphasis on massiveness under conditions of extremely limited appropriations?

Indeed. We all know that by 1995 military expenditures will decrease by a factor of one and a half to two as a fraction of the country's national product and will total nearly six percent. Under these conditions, it is obvious that the deep reductions of the army and navy that are currently being conducted are only one of the ways to bring them into compliance with the realities of the times. A shift to new manpower acquisition principles and large-scale restructuring of the composition of the troop structure and naval forces are also necessary. Naturally, all of this must be done rationally, taking into account the level of the real military threat and the development of the military-political situation in the future.

The most complex question is the determination of Armed Forces strength. They write us that we need to

reduce the Armed Forces by 1.5-2 million men. Is this acceptable right now? As we all know, the USSR occupies one sixth of the earth's surface and is washed by the waters of two oceans. It is entirely understandable that adequately major forces are needed to insure the security of the borders of this state. According to our calculations, nearly 3.0-3.2 million men are needed to do that. Naturally, those people are correct who direct attention to how expensive the cost of maintaining such Armed Forces will be. But what can you do? The Soviet Union's geostrategic position is such that reliable defense has always been expensive for us.

Questions associated with improving the Armed Forces manpower acquisition system occupy the central place in letters on reform of the Armed Forces. Some authors see the solution to the problem only in a shift to a professional army that is smaller in size and manned on a voluntary basis. Incidentally, this has been laid as the foundation of an alternative draft military reform concept that has been proposed by a group of USSR people's deputies—servicemen. Advocates of this shift cite the experience of the American Army's military structural development that has permitted them to guarantee a higher level of training for it. Here it is obvious that we need to bear in mind that we cannot blindly copy the experience of other armies no matter how good that experience has been. We also need to consider the state's capabilities and our own historical experience which incidentally convinces me that it would be completely irrational to deviate from the principle of universal military obligation under our conditions.

As for expenditures, we all know: any reorganization requires significant initial capital investment. Unfortunately, a return from them is possible only after a definite, maybe, a sufficiently prolonged period of time. Therefore, the assertions that a shift to a professional army in our country will not be accompanied by a substantial increase of expenditures to maintain it appears to be unconvincing. According to expert assessments, this shift, considering the state's capabilities, may be carried out over the course of 10-15 years (nearly 18 years was required to do this in the United States) and the initial expenditures total a significant sum—salary increases, increased expenditures for combat training and pensions, and additional expenditures for everyday life facilities and for capital construction. Otherwise it will simply be impossible to man the Armed Forces since as we all know a professional army is primarily oriented toward material interests and the high prestige of service. Calculations show that expenditures for maintenance of such an army will increase by a factor of 3-4 in contrast to today.

But then again, there may be substantial divergences caused by a difference in calculation methodology in the determination of this indicator among various authors. There are articles which assert that an army manned just by contract is allegedly cheaper than one in which conscripts serve. Analysis, even not the most profound,

convinces me: these assertions are fleeting and untenable. With a shift to a professional army, we will have to triple expenditures for personnel maintenance alone. And we cannot avoid this fact. Extremely substantial assets would also be required to reorganize combat training.

This is how the financial side of the problem looks. As for the military aspect, it also has its "but's". Yes, a professional army is good for conducting local wars and conflicts when combat operations are not associated with the inevitability of large losses. But even in this case as the experience of war in the Persian Gulf zone has shown, you cannot get by without the involvement of a significant contingent of trained reserves of which active duty service is primarily the source. I need to note that the training of reserves under conditions of a professional army requires significantly greater assets. The creation of a new system for their formation and the corresponding facilities is associated with additional expenditures. That is why our draft military reform concept provides for the gradual professionalization of the army. This process is strictly tied to the processes of a balanced reduction of troops and arms. In the future, we plan to shift to a mix Armed Forces manpower acquisition method based on universal military obligation and contracts and the introduction of alternative service. In so doing, it is possible to reduce the active military service term to 12-18 months which many people are asking about.

A number of letters propose the revival of ethnic formations. In so doing, they make references to the fact that the declarations on state sovereignty of certain republics has assigned them the right to create their own armed forces. It is also asserted that this "will only promote an increase of combat capability, moral spirit, and reinforce the ties with the people." What can we say here? We already have a precedent for the creation of modern "ethnic armies." Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—this is a partial list of republics where the appearance of amateur armed detachments is being noted. As we know in a situation of the expansion of separatist sentiments, they have not brought anything to the people besides blood and tears. They are not resolving either defense or interethnic problems but are only exacerbating them. Defense is a nationwide concern and it cannot be structured on a regional level. While proposing the creation of ethnic formations on the territories of the republics, the letters' authors also are not considering the change in the nature of modern war and the fact that the strength of deployed troop formations and naval forces are not correlated with the location and the density of the population throughout the country's regions. As a result, it does not even seem possible to ensure that all citizens perform military service within the borders of ethnic territories. The preservation of the extra-territorial Armed Forces manpower acquisition principle for our state is a basic issue in the resolution of defense tasks.

Our correspondents devote a great deal of attention to the social issues of military people's lives. Here the disarmament and troop reduction processes are exacerbating the situation. I can only say that major steps are being stipulated for the improvement of lifestyle conditions in the army and navy in accordance with the social insurance program for servicemen and members of their families (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote about this). We are proposing a change to the defense budget structure and priorities in the development of the Armed Forces in the social sphere.

The greatest number of proposals have been received on the structural transformation of the army and navy. Military personnel who have the appropriate experience and knowledge behind them primarily raise these questions. So, V. Ivanov suggests that we have five Armed Forces branches in three organizational forms: strategic, administrative, and operational. A very complex, cumbersome, and obviously expensive structure is built as a result. V. Shefer includes practically all social and state structures which have armed formations, including the KGB and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], in the composition of the Armed Forces. This directly contradicts the positions developed by the Ministry of Defense for withdrawal of those elements which do not meet its functional tasks from the composition of the Armed Forces. The author supports his suggestions with a reference to the historical experience of military structural development in Russia. But I will permit myself to point out that organs and structures that carry out functions that are not inherent to it—customs, state border defense, etc., were never included in the Russian army.

V. Yermolayev's suggestion is interesting in this regard. He sees three branches in the composition of our Armed Forces (according to the number of spheres of combat operations): Aerospace forces, the Navy, and the Ground Forces. In his opinion, this will permit us to increase their combat readiness and the efficiency of command and control and to reduce expenditures for maintenance. I think that this structural variation has definite sense and internal logic but for the more remote future. Its painstaking review is required. But in general I need to point out that—and this is recorded in the draft military reform concept—it is recognized as advisable to preserve the existing structure of the Armed Forces under modern conditions. Obviously we can also examine this issue in the future and decide on the Armed Forces composition type after the withdrawal of troops from the countries of Eastern Europe and as strategic offensive and conventional weapons are reduced. In any case, preparations for this are already being conducted today and all of these suggestions are very important for us.

The branches of the Armed Forces have different roles in the system of insuring the USSR's security. The leading role in it is assigned to the strategic nuclear forces. At the same time while considering that our country is primarily a land power and has a greater length of state borders, we need to assume that the Ground Troops will

remain numerically the largest branch of the Armed Forces. They will compose the foundation of the formation of troops and forces on the main axes and create and support an effective system of strategic defense of the state. This approach does not nearly signify the disparagement of the role of the remaining branches of the Armed Forces. The war in the Middle East has demonstrated their increased significance. It also confirmed the preferred directions of their development and the need for technical re-equipment based on the newest weapons

and the review of the priority and directions of the modernization of their internal structures.

So, military reform assumes the resolution of many urgent problems of our defense structural development and bringing it into compliance with the principle of reasonable sufficiency. At the present time, its draft concept has been sent to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Many suggestions that were sent to Ministry of Defense institutions also found reflection in it.

Ministry Agreement with Federation of Trade Unions

91UM0654A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[USSR Ministry of Defense and USSR Armed Forces Workers and Employees Federation of Trade Unions Agreement for 1991: "Agreement Between the USSR Ministry of Defense and USSR Armed Forces Workers and Employees Federation of Trade Unions for 1991"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Defense and USSR Armed Forces Workers and Employees Federation of Trade Unions express their mutual aspiration for constructive and businesslike cooperation for the purpose of effectively defending the social and economic interests and rights of army and navy workers and employees.

Under conditions of a shift to a market economy and the conduct of military reform, the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions will manifest constant concern about workers and employees, the increase of their standard of living, timely resolution of daily-life problems, and creation of the required conditions at work for the maintenance of constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the USSR. They are obliged to take the required steps to improve production relations, increase the productivity of labor, strengthen work discipline, improve working conditions and workers' health, and reduce social tension in workers' collectives.

While proceeding from the assigned task, the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions conclude an Agreement on the following.

1. General Provisions

1. The parties will implement the steps outlined in the Agreement based on partner interrelations, mutual trust, mutual understanding and candor, and coordination of common efforts for the creation of favorable conditions for the activities of enterprises, organizations, and institutions, and the increase of the efficiency of their work.

Differences between the contracting parties will be resolved in accordance with existing legislation through negotiations.

2. Drafts of the normative acts submitted by the USSR Ministry of Defense to the highest organs of state power and government that affect the working and socio-economic rights and interests of workers and employees are developed with the participation of the Federation of Trade Unions Ispolkom.

3. The USSR Ministry of Defense in the cases provided by law with the participation of the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet will efficiently develop the specific features of application of individual laws of the USSR and other normative acts that affect the interests of workers and employees and will disseminate them to military

units, institutions, military training facilities, enterprises and organizations within a month.

4. Work on prior repeal and introduction of changes to USSR Ministry of Defense orders and directives that affect the rights and interests of workers and employees will be implemented by the USSR Ministry of Defense and also according to the proposals of the Federation of Trade Unions Ispolkom.

5. The USSR Ministry of Defense insures that commanders and chiefs execute laws of the USSR and other normative acts that affect the rights and interests of workers and employees.

6. The Federation of Trade Unions Soviet receives information from the main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense on issues that are associated with work and socio-economic development of workers' collectives within the framework of the statistical reporting (tables of urgent reports) prescribed for the USSR Ministry of Defense.

7. The command authorities of USSR Ministry of Defense military units, institutions, military training facilities, enterprises and organizations will resolve all issues associated with pay, work safety regulations during production, provision of housing, health protection, and pension, social, and trade support of workers and employees in accordance with the jointly or with the participation of the appropriate trade union organs (committees) in the cases stipulated by law.

The appropriate trade union Central Committee will carry out the efficient raising of socio-economic issues that affect the interests of workers and employees throughout the branches and combat arms of the Armed Forces.

8. The most important issues that affect the rights and interests of workers and employees are examined at joint sessions of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions Ispolkom.

2. Social and Economic Policy Issues

9. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet will insure absolute observance of the rights and guarantees for workers and employees that are defined by the Fundamental Law of the USSR and the republics and other normative acts on employment of the population.

10. The USSR Ministry of Defense jointly with the Federation Soviet will submit proposals to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers on the dissemination of compensatory payments to workers and employees released from military units as a result of their redeployments that are provided for by the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, and VTsSPS [All-Union Trade Union Council] Resolution No 1,457 dated December 22, 1987.

11. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet are obliged to take steps beforehand to disseminate additional measures (compensatory payments, grants, additional payments, and other social benefits) to workers and employees that are stipulated by union and also republic, regional, and local population social protection programs that exceed nationwide norms.

12. After state organs decide to prescribe the amount of the minimum wage for low-paid categories of workers that is not lower than the subsistence wage level prescribed for the given region, the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet submit proposals on disseminating this procedure to workers and employees of the USSR Armed Forces.

13. Prepare proposals for the improvement of the existing USSR Ministry of Defense non-production sector material incentive system and its impact on the end results of work. In accordance with specific proposals of the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet, the organs of labor and the wages of the branches of the Armed Forces of the USSR, military districts, fleets, main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense, examine the issue on the sources and procedures for bonuses for workers of USSR Ministry of Defense military units, institutions, military training facilities, enterprises and organizations that are contained in estimated budget financing.

14. For the purpose of ensuring a single procedure and amount for wages for work at night for USSR Armed Forces workers and employees in contrast to similar workers of the national economy and the USSR Ministry of Defense's specific work, prepare proposals for government organs on the dissemination of wage standards for work at night to workers of USSR Ministry of Defense military units, institutions, military training facilities, enterprises and organizations to which they do not apply at present.

15. The USSR Ministry of Defense, for the purpose of creating conditions for steady work of workers' collectives and with the distribution of product orders for the state to enterprises and organizations in accordance with the law, takes the required steps to provide them with material-technical resources, timely sale of manufactured goods, and also renders assistance while concluding economic contracts.

16. The USSR Ministry of Defense, while proceeding from the specific features of the activities of cost-accounting enterprises and organizations of the ministry, will make more precise the existing system of planning and utilization of hard currency resources in the interests of enterprises that provide production (services) for export.

3. Housing Provision Issues

17. The USSR Ministry of Defense will stipulate steps for the expansion of housing construction using its own

resources with the forces of contract organizations for share holding in its erection, the development of a housing and housing construction cooperative and individual construction and will render assistance to workers and employees—who are ZhSK [housing construction cooperative] members and individual builders under conditions stipulated by the appropriate USSR governmental resolutions.

18. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet will conduct an analysis of the provision of housing to workers and employees who work at USSR Ministry of Defense military units, institutions, military training facilities, enterprises and organizations and who reside in cities and city-type villages, having singled out at the same time those working under cost-accounting, budget enterprises and organizations, and prepare proposals for providing housing to these categories of workers.

19. Accounting, distribution, and giving living space directed at improving housing conditions of workers and employees is carried out based on housing legislation and orders that correspond to it, and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and his deputies. The distribution of living space among workers and employees is carried out based on the joint decision of the USSR Ministry of Defense military unit commander and the chief of the institution, military training facility, enterprise or organization and the appropriate trade union committee.

20. The USSR Ministry of Defense jointly with the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet submit proposals to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers on the distribution to workers and employees of budget organization provisions that have been stipulated for servicemen at units that grant free of charge financial aid to ZhSk and ZhK [communal housing] members and to individuals conducting individual housing construction.

21. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet ensure strict compliance with glasnost while accounting for the distribution of living space for workers and employees and constant monitoring by the military command authority and trade union committees for compliance with housing legislation.

4. Trade Support Issues.

22. The USSR Ministry of Defense jointly with the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet will prepare proposals on improving trade—everyday life support of workers and employees who work at USSR Ministry of Defense military units, institutions, military training facilities, enterprises and organizations.

23. Local military trade organs jointly with the command authorities and trade union committees of USSR Ministry of Defense military units, institutions, military training facilities, enterprises and organizations will provide the precise number of workers and employees

served, having ensured compliance with the principle of social justice during the distribution of goods.

24. Organize the conduct of consumer conferences in garrisons at which they discuss the state and plan the path to improve trade and everyday life support of workers and employees.

When necessary, examine the composition of the commissions for social control in accordance with USSR Ministry of Defense order No 135, 1990 to create them there where they have not been created and to conduct training assemblies with the members of these commissions.

Labor Protection and Health Issues

25. The USSR Ministry of Defense jointly with the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet will:

ensure timely detection and elimination of noncompliance with labor safety regulations and standards at work locations, buildings and structures, vehicles and equipment;

take the necessary steps to order for 1992 overalls and overshoes for workers and employees in quantities that correspond to prescribed standards;

increase medical supervision of the working conditions of workers and employees who have contact with ionizing radiation and harmful chemical substances and also of the radiation situation in deployment areas of USSR Ministry of Defense military units, institutions, military training facilities, enterprises and organizations; and,

organize the supply of individual dosimetric and radiometric monitoring devices of all those who work under conditions of the use of radioactive substances and sources of ionizing radiation.

26. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet are obliged to efficiently submit proposals to the government of the USSR when they receive well-founded suggestions from the branches and combat arms of the Armed Forces and USSR Ministry of Defense military districts, fleets, main and central directorates;

on changing and supplementing the List of productions, shops, professions, and positions with harmful working conditions, work which provides the right to additional leave and a reduced working day; and,

organize the granting of benefits and compensation to workers and employees who work under conditions of the impact of radioactive substances and sources of ionizing radiation.

27. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet consider it necessary to implement the gradual registration of workers and employees for medical care at military medical institutions.

For this purpose:

develop a program for the gradual registration of workers and employees for medical care at military medical institutions prior to September 1, 1991. Provide for construction and formation of military out-patient clinics, hospitals, and sanatoriums, allocate additional numbers of medical and support personnel to the military medical service; provide material and financial resources; the fractional participation of the Federation of Trade Unions in the financing of the program's measures;

provide grants for workers and employees in 1991: 20 percent of the bed capacity of military hospitals in the Baltic and Transcaucasus republics, 10 percent in other regions of the country, 20 percent in clinics of the Military Medical Academy imeni S.M. Kirov (for the reception of patients with the most complex pathologies). Primarily organize the rendering of medical assistance to workers and employees with serious and harmful working conditions;

study the issue on the procedures and standards for granting trip passes to USSR Ministry of Defense sanatoriums and rest homes to workers and employees and members of their families for the most complete satisfaction of workers' requirements for improving their health; and,

increase the number of preferential trip passes allocated for workers and employees by 2,500-3,000 at the expense of reducing their treatment and rest periods at military sanatoriums and rest homes in 1992.

28. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet will submit proposals to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers on the allocation of resources for the payment of transportation to the sanatorium to workers and employees who reside in areas that have been affected by the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power plant] accident and who receive trip passes to USSR Ministry of Defense health resorts in accordance with USSR Ministry of Defense Order No 205, 1976 and No 80, 1990.

29. The Federation of Trade Unions Soviet, jointly with the USSR Ministry of Defense, will work the issue on the construction of sanatoriums in Miskhora using Federation member organization resources.

30. The USSR Ministry of Defense will provide the required conditions for the productive activities of inventors and efficiency experts and the creation of interim creative collectives for the development and introduction of effective inventions and efficiency expert proposals on a contract basis at scientific research and draft construction organizations under VOIR [All-Union Society of Inventors and Efficiency Experts] organizations and military training institutions and at enterprises.

31. The USSR Ministry of Defense will provide the Federation of Trade Unions the use of an equipment facility required for its activities free of charge and also communications, transportation and other services on a paid basis.

32. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions Soviet are obliged to create the necessary conditions to carry out this Agreement.

33. The Agreement between the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions prescribes the minimum social guarantees for workers and employees which cannot serve as an obstacle for the establishment of more beneficial social and economic conditions at the expense of their own resources in collective agreements and also agreements on the level of central committees of trade unions of the branches and combat arms of the USSR Armed Forces.

34. The force of this Agreement extends to all categories who work at the USSR Ministry of Defense regardless of their affiliation to some trade union or other.

35. Any of the parties who have signed the Agreement have the right to submit proposals about changes and supplements to the Agreement which do not create obstacles for the fulfillment of obligations that have already been accepted by the Parties. These proposals may be adopted only by mutual agreement.

36. The results and course of the fulfillment of the agreement will be covered in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and in other mass media organs.

37. This Agreement enters into force on the day it is signed by the contracting parties and is in effect throughout 1991.

General of the Army K. Kochetov, First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense

Colonel-General N. Shlyaga, Chief of the Main Military Political Directorate of the Armed Forces of the USSR and First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense

S. Arzhavkin, Chairman of the USSR Armed Forces Workers and Employees Federation of Trade Unions

This agreement was signed by the parties on April 26, 1991

Col-Gen Gryaznov on Bidding Process for Housing Construction

91UM0661A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel-General N. Gryaznov, chief, Main Biling Director, USSR Ministry of Defense, by Major I. Ivanyuk: "Who Is to Build the Housing (Do Would-Be Apartment Dwellers Care?)" ; date and place not given; first three paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany is a task without parallel in the history of the world. Its resolution is complicated by the fact that serving in the units and large units are tens of thousands of servicemen who have no housing to which to return. There is more to the problem than the 72,000 apartments: Also to be built are schools, polyclinics, kindergartens and other cultural and communal facilities.

Accomplishment of this program depends at least half on committing 7.8 billion marks made available by the FRG for this specific purpose. The month of May was supposed to mark the start of construction of the first four housing facilities in Krivoy Rog, Vladikavkaz, Shaykovka and Borisov. However, the matter has suddenly come to a standstill. The cause seems to be falling behind in the preliminary international bidding on the part of the German firms relative to the competitors from other countries.

Wishing to learn more about the situation from the standpoint of the client, we requested an interview with Colonel-General N. Gryaznov, chief of the Main Biling Director of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

"Up to now, our joint effort was proceeding in an atmosphere of unusual friendliness and harmony," said Nikolay Viktorovich. "Preparation of the necessary documentation was initiated on 10 January, even before we signed the agreements made with the Kreditanschaft Bank and the German consulting consortium and design office. Both the German consultants and ours, those representing the Soyuzvneshstroyimport, Tekhnoeksport, Zagrantekhsstroy and other organizations, worked endless hours without taking a day off. Everyone was aware that the welfare of many thousands of people depended on this; in fact, the troop withdrawal schedule had already taken effect.

"The first bidding session was announced in the end of January; the second, in March. Intensive effort was underway to prepare for the third session, and—all of a sudden—the disruption."

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Due to the German side's feeling that they were treated unfairly?

[Gryaznov] In this case it is probably better to avoid speaking of emotions. The Germans themselves initiated the idea of international participation in the bidding. We at the very outset suggested that they themselves build the housing, but they insisted that the preliminary agreement call for open international bidding. The resulting preliminary agreement was signed on 13 December 1990 by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, USSR Ministry of Defense and the FRG Federal Ministry of Economics. That particular arrangement was written into the 18 January 1991 agreement.

You will agree that since this was made a matter of world-wide attention, with the rules of the game decided on, there should be no question but to observe the latter. The first phase of the competition elicited the interest of

100 bidding firms. The consortium of consultants analyzed their proposals, taking into account their level of qualification, ability to make payments, technical capabilities, costs and construction schedules. To insure maximum objectivity, all involved worked together to devise a point rating system.

The end result was that 22 firms, including the German ones, enjoyed a successful outcome of the pre-qualifying selection process. Incidentally, the latter were not bad at all, but—alas!—they lost out in the bidding.

Analysis of the proposals submitted by the bidding firms indicated that the Turkish, Austrian and Finnish firms came in at a cost 100 million marks lower in the bidding to build the first four housing facilities at the acceptable quality level. In this connection, keep in mind that there was no negotiating with the interested firms after the latter had submitted their proposals; the above mentioned monetary amount was based on the prices as first announced. Under conditions of implementing the special housing construction program, potential contractors should have been mindful of the existing price situation in the Soviet construction market, which if properly understood would tend to lower even more the proposals submitted by the bid leaders.

The serious intentions on the part of certain bidding firms is evidenced in their interest in writing their proposals with the intent of taking on construction of several housing facilities. As a matter of fact, one of these firms stands out in what it has to offer in the case of two orders. Nonetheless, the agreement reached by the participants is such that this firm may try for working on only one site.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nonetheless, the German side apparently entertained hopes of being accorded a most favored status because of—shall we say—their money? The fact is, the 8 November 1990 memorandum we received from the FRG Ministry of Economics did contain such a wish.

[Gryaznov] Indeed, that is so. And we support the suggestion of favoring the German builders, but, well, with all other conditions equal. I cannot see how anyone can just ignore the results of the competition. The German government is feeling political pressure; it is being accused of being remiss in looking out for the interests of the German firms. However, bidding is something requiring the application of strictly economic methods and business ethics. Also, I believe that the German firms stand a good chance to win out in the second phase. This involves 97 firms and consortiums; preliminary selection of their proposals is under way.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Strange as it may seem, some of our people feel inclined to suggest that the Ministry of Defense will definitely create machinations as it attempts to save on foreign exchange. In this regard, a recent article in IZVESTIYA had it that the military department cut Soviet builders out of the bidding process.

[Gryaznov] What can I say? Several Ukrainian construction organizations did participate in the competition, but they had neither the forces nor the experience to overcome the selection barrier. I must give credit where it is due and say that a lesson was learned there: To participate in the next competition for construction of 10 more housing facilities, Soviet organizations have joined with foreign firms to form a consortium possessing sufficient financial and material resources to pool their efforts with the intent of attaining the desired results.

Generally speaking, we do not have much time: We are supposed to have ready by the end of the year 3,000 apartments for officers, warrant officers and their families returning to their native land and those already here. The Ministry of Defense has a singularity of interest - doing everything possible to make sure people are not left without a roof over their heads. Let me remind you that in addition to the above mentioned hopefuls, there are in the Army and Navy many tens of thousands lacking shelter.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Is there a way out of this situation?

[Gryaznov] I believe that the conflict will be resolved one way or another. The Soviet side is prepared to collaborate with the German side in organizing a joint Soviet-German management committee not later than 20 May 1991, the purpose being to select firms and go on to sign contracts. That is no longer a major concern. The point is, there is a tremendous amount of work to be done. We are faced with erecting 29 additional residential facilities and four housing construction combines. The program in general is associated with a high degree of urgency and cannot take this kind of disruption. Even the present hitch may cause difficulties serious enough to threaten the entire program with failure. Also to be taken into account is the dynamic time in which we are living. Following the signing of the documents bringing the program into being were the changes in the situation in East Germany and our republics. We must work together to do all we can to make a reality of the intergovernmental agreements, which are supported by the parliaments of our countries and broad sections of the public.

Soviet-German Program To Build Five Reservist Training Centers

*91UM0767A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Jul 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Major I. Ivanyuk: "USSR—FRG: Training Centers for Reservists"]

[Text] Somehow, we do not contemplate the fact that soldiers and officers, who are returning home from the Western Group of Forces and transferring to reserves, will encounter a new and unaccustomed social environment. They cannot help but worry, though, about their prospects for settling into civilian life and, above all,

about the threat of unemployment, which is being mentioned increasingly often lately. The redeployment of Soviet military units from Germany will have a direct effect on the labor market in our country: By the experts preliminary estimates, about half a million people will need jobs.

There is hope that they will be helped by the agreement recently signed by the USSR Ministry of Labor and Society Issues and the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This agreement outlines a joint Soviet-German program of professional training for military people transferred to the reserves, and adult members of their families; among other things, it envisions the creation of a number of specialized training centers on the USSR territory.

"We have already decided on the location for the five base centers," says M. Zakharchuk, deputy chief of the USSR State Committee for Labor Main Administration on Employment. "Two of them will be oriented towards agriculture—in Ramenskoye in Moscow Oblast and in Alma-Ata; three others will specialize in construction—respectively, in Leningrad, Minsk, and Kiev. Where the other five centers will be located and what their professional orientation will be is to be decided by sovereign republics on the basis of their estimates of their own needs."

It is envisioned that these will be multiprofile learning institutions on the basis of existing professional-technical schools. The length of education will be six months. During that time, former members of the military will be able not only to master the skills that are in short supply, but also to acquire the necessary commercial skills so that those who want to could open their own business. Because of the fact that the education level in these new schools will be noticeably higher than in professional-technical schools, it is planned to give them a special status.

The FRG Government allocated 200 million Deutsche marks for the implementation of this program. This money will be used to equip the centers with the equipment, training devices, educational aids, and programs. If necessary, additional training of our instructors will be conducted.

As of now, 58 German companies, schools, and enterprises have expressed the desire to participate in the implementation of the program. A specially created commission analyzes and selects their proposals on a preliminary basis. The final results will be determined by competition, the first round of which will take place in the near future.

In the Soviet Union, sponsoring enterprises have also become involved; they will help to restructure the existing educational base, to adapt the proposed educational programs to local conditions, and provide material support. Most importantly, the enterprise must guarantee a job for each graduate for a period of at least five years. In Kiev, for instance, the sponsors list includes the

industrial and scientific-industrial associations Techniform, Mir, and Helios, and the Kievotdelstroy trust.

It is impossible to list all the professions for which training will be performed. Let us mention just a few: auto service mechanic; computer equipment adjuster; electric and gas welder—with the right to receive an international certificate. Many skills are related to construction business, environmental protection, and computer technology.

The education will be conducted by a "modular" method: Three months for a general course, and another three months for specialization. There will be an opportunity to master several related professions. In other words, everything will be done to prepare a person for independent work—as a farmer, in the service sector, or in small business.

A large-scale survey conducted in the Western Group of Forces showed that 76 percent of the respondents would like to master working professions on such terms or to upgrade their skills in this way. They believe—probably, with a good reason—that this will help them to overcome the "market" barrier.

Problems of Military Farms in Kiev MD

91UM0673A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 May 91 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Gennadiy Georgiyevich Kurdakov, Deputy Commander of Kiev MD Troops for Rear Services, by Colonel A. Polyakov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Military Sovkhozes: A Difficult Bread."]

[Text] *This year's spring has stretched out, as if to give the grain sowers the opportunity to prepare themselves better for the sowing. Judging from everything, however, things have not become any easier for the farmers.*

In a conversation with the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Lieutenant-General G. Kurdakov, Deputy Commander of Kiev MD Troops for Rear Services, tells how everything is going in the military sovkhozes of the MD.

[Polyakov] Gennadiy Georgiyevich, these days we are hearing alarmed concern from not only farmers, but in politicians' speeches as well, about how the sowing is progressing. Everyone is talking about the difficulties of obtaining equipment and spare parts, and seed. Here and there, some are thinking about decreasing the sowing areas....

[Kurdakov] All this is understandable. No wonder the popular proverb is: You shall reap what you sow. Bearing this in mind, we tried to have five military sovkhozes finish sowing the early spring grain in time. Corn and sunflower remained. We are not decreasing the sowing area by even one hectare. In fact, we are trying to find every way possible to increase the area. Each of our

sovkhozes has its own repair shop, so all equipment was ready about a month before sowing began. Tractors, combines, and sowing machinery are stored in our covered concrete sheds. Sowing was organized in two shifts, that is, we worked all the daylight hours. All our farms were supplied with wheat, barley, oats, and buckwheat seed, as well as with POL products from their own supplies.

[Polyakov] You seem to indicate that there are no problems. Somehow that is hard to believe.

[Kurdakov] Well, of course there were and there are difficulties. But there is no use talking about them; we have to overcome them. For example, problems came up with regard to obtaining sunflower seed. The agricultural section for rear services of the military district, headed by Major A. Nikitiuk, came up with an answer: He exchanged some things he had in his supplies for seed from the Odessa and Kirovograd oblasts. Work stopped in one sovkhoz because of lack of spare parts for sowing machinery. F. Galenko, director of the "Stepnoy" sovkhoz, saved the day.

[Polyakov] Gennadiy Georgiyevich, decisions have been made about developing farming and leaseholds. They say that this is where the future lies. What do you think of the future of military sovkhozes?

[Kurdakov] I have no doubts about the effectiveness of independent farms. But for the time being, this is really in the future. After all, we have to feed the Army today. We have already seen what has happened in industry when economic ties between the different regions of the country collapsed. If something similar were allowed to happen in agriculture, something irreparable will happen: Bread will disappear.

The Rear Services of the Armed Forces are now directing all their efforts at increasing agricultural production, and the workers of military sovkhozes are not letting us down. Last year we harvested an average of 42 metric centners of grain per hectare. And in a number of areas in the republic, not the worst ones by far, they harvested only 32 centners per hectare.

[Polyakov] They say that a number of kolkhozes are asking to be placed under the military district command.

[Kurdakov] Yes, that is true. The Chairman of a kolkhoz in the Yagotinskiy District of the Kiev Oblast asked us, on instructions by the collective, if we would accept them into the system of military sovkhozes. You might ask, what attracts them. My answer is: good organization of labor, discipline, strict demands, great results, and consequently, good pay.

[Polyakov] Are the kolkhoz workers not bothered by the fact that the word "discipline" means strict demands?

[Kurdakov] Apparently that does not bother them. After all, they know that we are not trying to command them or tell them where, when, and what to sow or how to harvest. All our collectives work on the basis of being

cost centers, but we do not deprive anyone of our attention. For example, only over the last one and a half years we helped the "Blagodatnyy" sovkhoz to renovate one-third of their production capacity facilities. And in the "Borispolskiy" sovkhoz, we helped construct a facility for hard cheeses. A few weeks ago we purchased one and a half centners of super-high quality alfalfa seed. We have already sown 50 hectares with it and hope to receive 15 tons of seed in the fall, which will give us a solid profit. And people, seeing our concern and assistance, work conscientiously. An example is the tractor-field brigade from the "Blagodatnyy" sovkhoz, directed for over 31 years by Mikhail Ivanovich Trostyanko, which last year harvested nearly 50 centners per hectare. And now, over a period of three days, they sowed 400 hectares of spring crops.

[Polyakov] And how are your relations with neighboring kolkhozes and sovkhozes and local authorities?

[Kurdakov] Your question is, as they say, a delicate one. Relations are more or less normal, but.... Last year we began delivering a great quantity of wheat to the state, but we were given a delivery time for the elevators beginning at 2400 hours; it could not be worse. Our sovkhozes have to receive their spare parts through district organizations of agricultural equipment, but we receive crumbs—on the leftover principle. And just recently the city authorities of the Chuguyev Kharkovskiy Oblast demanded that we give up 10 hectares of land that was allocated to us, so that they could use them as garden plots for city dwellers. We explained to them that we have no right to give up this land. Then they disconnected the electric power from an entire section of the sovkhoz. It is true that we finally found a common language, but are these really the methods to use?

[Polyakov] Are you awaiting the harvest with optimism?

[Kurdakov] Absolutely. After all, nature has to take into consideration the difficult situation we have in our country. But seriously, I have just returned from looking over the sovkhoz fields from a helicopter, and I have traveled dozens of kilometers by car. Young growth of the winter crops is good and sowing of spring crops has been finished in the optimal time. I am convinced that our harvest will not be bad at all.

Khrenov On New Uniforms

*91UM0699A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 May 91 First Edition p 2*

[Lieutenant General M. Khrenov interviewed by Correspondent P. Altunin: "Military Uniforms: What They Will Be Like Tomorrow"]

[Text] A time of great change in all areas of our life has come. Military reform is under way in the army and navy. Naturally, the renewal of the country and the Armed Forces cannot help but be reflected by the outward appearance of our men in uniform. This was the subject of our

correspondent's discussion with Lieutenant General M. Khrenov, Chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Clothing Directorate.

[Khrenov] Current military uniforms were adopted in 1969. After so many years without any changes, they have now become obsolete. At the same time, there is the following argument. Democratization processes are gaining momentum in the army and navy, penetrating all aspects of servicemen's relations with one another and bringing people closer together, as it were, regardless of the status, rank, or title. However, existing military uniforms are clearly at variance with this trend—for they have too many distinctions among generals, officers, warrant officers, and compulsory-duty servicemen.

In our view, a uniform that is fundamentally of the same design for all servicemen—from enlisted man to general—is much more in keeping with both the times and the requirements of the profession. A uniform, for example, like the standardized field service dress first used in Afghanistan. It is comfortable, practical, modern, and democratic. In short, it incorporates the principles on which we decided to base the design of new military uniforms.

[Altunin] Mikhail Mikhaylovich, what will the implementation of these principles mean from an economic standpoint? For example, reader R. Lazanenko fears that new uniforms might prove too expensive.

[Khrenov] I will say from the outset that for all practical purposes, uniforms have already become more expensive, and long before the official price increases. This has been a concern of ours for the past several years. Since many light-industry enterprises have shifted to full economic accountability, our military orders have become unprofitable for them. They don't get enough allocations of raw materials—such as fabrics, leather, and other materials. Deliveries have started falling short of our orders, and the enterprises are demanding that we pay them more. But all our expenditures are planned well in advance, down to the last kopek. We are expecting 200 percent to 400 percent price increases on various goods in the future. This applies to current military uniforms, but it will also have an impact on the new ones, of course. Nevertheless, one thing is clear: In any case, the new uniforms should not be more expensive than the old ones.

[Altunin] How do you hope to make sure this is the case?

[Khrenov] Above all through standardization and optimum design elements and by doing away with excessive decoration. For example, officers wear the existing navy-blue full-dress uniform fairly infrequently. And its color is too garish. Now a new, standardized uniform has been proposed—an olive-colored single-breasted jacket. It will serve as both an everyday and dress uniform. The full-dress uniform will differ from the everyday uniform only in terms of the color of the shoulder boards and shirts.

[Altunin] What new features are proposed for officers' and warrant officers' uniforms?

[Khrenov] In keeping with the wishes of numerous officers, the clothing directorate is doing away with box calf leather boots, trousers tucked into the boots, the dress belt, collar tabs, and certain other items. In their place, we will introduce insulated low-top boots and a summer raincoat made of nylon [bolonye] fabric. The summer woolen coat will be replaced by a raincoat made of synthetic material, like the ones that generals now have. I want to speak about uniform overcoats separately. They will be of a free cut, with sewn-in insulation and a fur collar. As for the tradition fur cap, it's not very comfortable, especially in cold weather. And so we plan to replace the colonel's fur cap with a cap with ear flaps made of beaver lamb [tsigeyka], and out of astrakhan for generals.

[Altunin] Many readers have written about officers' service caps (A. Khoroshev, I. Vansovich, V. Polomaniiy).

[Khrenov] The design of service caps has indeed provoked a lot of arguments. But you can't please everyone. Based on the majority view, we have settled on the following design: Not an excessively broad brim, a khaki cap band, and a patent leather peak. The internal materials will not be cardboard and cotton wool (which quickly swell and lose their shape in rain), but plastic. The service cap will thus be lighter and more elegant. The same cap has been proposed for generals, which is to say a cap without a colored cap band and without embroidery. In addition, we plan a forage cap for everyday wear for officers, warrant officers, and extended-duty servicemen.

[Altunin] Judging from letters to the editors, military aviators have a very strong attachment to sky blue.

[Khrenov] Their wishes have been taken into account. Both their full-dress and everyday uniforms will be made of dark blue fabric.

I would also like to talk about efforts to improve the way clothing is distributed. We think it necessary to allow an officer to choose for himself which items he needs most at any given time. Each one will receive a small booklet with vouchers, and various items of clothing will be assigned a cost: for example, 300 rubles for a overcoat, 45 rubles for a pair of low-top boots, and so on. These items will then be allotted on the basis of a total voucher amount set for one year.

[Altunin] Let's turn now to compulsory-duty soldiers and sergeants.

[Khrenov] As in the case of officers, the full dress uniform and single-breasted uniform jacket will give way to the uniform jacket alone. On full-dress occasions, it will be worn with a shirt and tie; the winter everyday version will be buttoned all the way to the top. There will be a cotton uniform for summer. The service cap will be

replaced as well—by a newly designed forage cap. Compulsory-duty servicemen will be supplied with a sweat-suit, something we have never done before. Scarfs, which are currently issued only in areas with especially cold climates, will be issued to everyone.

[Altunin] What about the famous canvas-top boots? In my opinion, they have performed very well, having been in use ever since the war.

[Khrenov] You're probably right: They are inexpensive, comfortable, and water-proof, to a certain extent. But now we have the potential to raise them to a new level of quality. We are introducing lower boots made of Russia leather, with adjustable top width. And again, I emphasize: They are the same for soldiers, officers, and generals. And as a rule, they will be part of the winter everyday uniform. There is an insulated version for cold regions. There will also be high-top field boots, which have already been tested by troops. They will be part of the summer uniform. There are also plans for box calf leather boots with textile tops for regions with hot climates.

[Altunin] Are there any changes in sailors' uniforms?

[Khrenov] There are no significant changes.

[Altunin] And what about cadets' uniforms?

[Khrenov] For the first two years, cadets will dress just like compulsory-duty soldiers. But starting with the third year, they will wear a uniform patterned after the officer's uniform. This will be in keeping with the concept governing the performance of military service set forth in the draft USSR law on universal military duty and military service.

[Altunin] And now the question that concerns the majority of our readers: When will the new uniforms be placed in service?

[Khrenov] Their design is virtually complete. They have been exhibited several times among the troops and at various conferences. But they haven't been approved by the country's top leadership yet. It's not easy to make a decision, since much depends on the state of the country's economy and on how things go in light industry in light of the switch to new prices and market conditions.

Moscow Commissar Bepalov on 1991 Spring Draft

91UM0774A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jul 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Moscow Military Commissar Major-General Vladimir Aleksandrovich Bepalov by Reserve Colonel F. Semyanovskiy, under the rubric: "Timely Interview": "What the Spring Draft Showed: Moscow Military Commissar Major-General V. Bepalov Answers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Questions"]

[Text]

[Semyanovskiy] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, how would you assess the results of the current draft campaign?

[Bepalov] We are totally satisfied with the overall results. Almost everyone who was supposed to appear did appear at draft commission sessions in accordance with the voyenkomat [military commissariat] notice; they underwent medical examinations, and were sent in a timely manner to the locations where they will perform their active duty service. I say "almost" because some people are still attempting to evade the draft. But there are just a few of these people.

[Semyanovskiy] So, there is progress in comparison with last year?

[Semyanovskiy] You are correct. According to the results of last year's autumn draft, Moscow, among oblasts on whose territories Moscow Military District troops are deployed, was only in 12th place. At that time, they justifiably criticized us at the military soviet session.

The fact that we could not make a correct prediction of a demographic nature was the most substantial shortcoming. So, many of those people who, according to our calculations, should have appeared before draft commissions had entered VUZ's [higher educational institutions]. And students, as we all know, are generally released from military service. Our other miscalculation was that we did not completely take into account the state of health of our draftees. Many of them in fact turned out to be unfit for military service although we had counted on them. Incidentally, here I must note that the state of health and level of physical development of the younger generation causes serious alarm. The suitability of youth for military service totals 81-82 percent throughout Moscow but nearly 70 percent of them have various restrictions according to their state of health, that is, they cannot serve in the Navy, VDV [Airborne Troops], or border troops. Indeed, this year we strived to more accurately predict the situation.

[Semyanovskiy] Some other steps were certainly taken that facilitated the conduct of the current draft campaign?

[Bepalov] In our opinion, the conference the Mossoviet [Moscow Soviet] ispolkom [executive committee]

chairman conducted with the rayispolkom [rayon executive committee] chairmen, rayon military commissars, and heads of rayon public health and public education administrations played an extremely positive role. This conference occurred... at Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division. Naturally, its participants became acquainted with the lives of the soldiers and talked with them. This helped to make the subsequent conversation more topic-oriented. We, in turn, attempted to objectively show the state of affairs with the draft and those problems that require a solution.

We can list the Open Houses that we conducted at the city induction center during the draft among the effective organizational measures. For example, this fact is noteworthy in connection with this. Last year, various social groups with a frankly anti-army orientation picketed the city induction center several times. We had to manifest quite a bit of restraint in our contacts with them, conduct a dialogue, and explain things that were at times obvious. This year, no obstructions were organized at the GSP [city induction center].

Finally, I will talk about one more factor which operated during the draft campaign. As we all know, a decision was made to reduce terms of service in the Navy to two years and on contract service. If in previous years, many young Moscow residents did everything they could to avoid being drafted into the Navy, now they are willingly entering the Navy.

[Semyanovskiy] And what can you say about cooperation between the military commissariats and the ispolkoms of local Soviets of people's Deputies?

[Bepalov] Soviets of people's deputies ispolkoms are currently implementing the draft for military service. That is their direct responsibility. And military commissariats as local military administrative organs organize the practical work on the draft. Unfortunately, not all rayispolkom leaders understand this to be their role. For example, things have reached the point in Dzerzhinskiy Rayon that they are refusing to assign specialists to work in the medical commission to conduct the draft.

Naturally, we are not reconciling ourselves to such views and actions and we are conducting work in the ispolkoms. I especially want to stress that we are finding Mossoviet's complete support in this work.

[Semyanovskiy] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, quite a few military-patriotic clubs and associations operate in Moscow. As we all know, the desires of young people who are involved in these clubs and organizations to serve in some or other troops according to specialties they have acquired in the clubs must be taken into account when they are drafted. How do matters stand here?

[Bepalov] The work of these clubs, say, like "Yunyy desantnik" [Young Airborne Troop] and "Yunyy moryak" [Young Seaman], are constantly in the military commissariats' field of vision. During the draft, we are

obligated to consider the training of members of these clubs. And in general this is being done. But problems also arise. The fact is that the clubs often accept everyone desiring to join without any medical examination whatsoever. A young person enthusiastically participates and dreams about service, say, in the airborne troops. But draft time arrives and the military-medical commission ascertains that he cannot serve in the VDV because of the state of his health. Situations occur when we do not receive requests to send young men to that branch of service for which they trained at the club.

[Semyanovskiy] And the last question. What problems concern you in the work of the military commissariats themselves?

[Bespalov] I will begin with the fact that among all categories of Armed Forces officers, military commissariat officers are the lowest paid. Under conditions of price increases and the transition to the market, you yourself understand how vital the problem of survival is becoming for them. Soviet Army workers and employees who make up more than two thirds of all of our personnel are in the same situation.

The physical condition of many of our officers worries me. They frequently send officers and warrant officers to military commissariats who suffer from serious physical deficiencies, who are sick, or who are disabled.

And one more thing. The laws that regulate the work of military commissariats are obviously obsolete.

Gulf War Analysis: No Amphibious Operation?

91UM0634A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant General I. Skuratov in the "Persian Gulf War: Lessons and Conclusions" column: "Why Did the 'Desert Sword' Remain Sheathed?"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] To accomplish their final ends in the military actions taken against Iraq, American military authorities planned the "Desert Storm" operation, which in turn was to include three independent but interrelated and coordinated operations: an air, a ground, and an amphibious operation with the code name of "Desert Sword." The latter did not take place. Why not?

First, a few words about the kind of Marine force the U.S. deployed in the crisis area and how the operation was prepared. The force included the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions, separate brigades and detachments. Total strength was more than 90,000 men, about 240 tanks, and up to 1,500 artillery pieces, mortars, antitank and antiaircraft weapons.

The Marines were supported by a large group of amphibious forces deployed in the Persian Gulf for the purpose of supporting the action (beach landing proper, suppression of enemy weapons countering the assault, fire support of the force securing the beach, supply operations). It consisted of more than 30 assorted assault transport vehicles, including about 10 large ships—classes "Tarawa," "Wasp," "Whidbey Island," "Iwo Jima," "Raleigh," and "Newport," which were capable of carrying from 100 to 1,800 Marines and from 50 to 200 pieces of equipment, including a separate tank battalion (70 tanks). The ships also carried a sufficient amount of air and amphibious landing craft. In addition, there were more than 200 aircraft and a significant number of Marine attack helicopters.

The 1st and 2nd Divisions, deemed to be the most mobile and combat-ready, were designated as the first echelon in the ground component of the Coalition Forces; they were to occupy the right flank, i.e., the beach area. There was a reason for this. Troop beach operation, both in defense and offense, differs in a number of ways, often assuming greater complexity. The Marines were obviously deemed to be the most capable of accomplishing this mission.

A part of the Marine force, consisting of two reinforced brigades of more than 15,000 men located directly aboard the assault vessels, was slated for the amphibious landing. The Marines made their final boarding of the assault ships in the beginning of February, after which landing detachments started to deploy into the northern part of the Persian Gulf, closer to the possible assault area. At that time, surface combatants initiated shelling of Iraqi anti-assault weapons and troop positions in southern Kuwait. Carrier-based and Marine aircraft stepped up their activity against enemy troops and other

targets located in the beach zone. Coalition mine-sweeping forces worked the shoreline of southern Kuwait.

Based on the makeup of the amphibious forces and the Marines aboard, it may be assumed that Coalition Forces authorities were planning to accomplish a landing in one amphibious assault area using up to two reinforced brigades or two operational-tactical landings. The main purpose of the operational amphibious landing was in all probability to take the capital and port of Kuwait City, with the intent of executing a deep enveloping attack along the border to meet up with Coalition Forces striking from the North, ultimately effecting complete encirclement of Iraqi forces. The multiple goal of the operational-tactical landings was to take Kuwait City; perform an assault on the flank and rear of the coastal concentration of Iraqi troops; and support the 1st and 2nd Divisions in their advance inland.

As indicated by subsequent actions taken by the Marines, it had been planned to carry out the landing in the immediate vicinity of Kuwait City. The major reason arguing in favor of this was the latter's being virtually the sole large port that could possibly be used to unload heavy non-amphibious equipment directly onto docks.

A disadvantage associated with the above-indicated area was its relative distance from the front—about 80 kilometers. In addition, the route to Kuwait City was blocked by several islands (Qaruh, Umm al Maradim, Failaka), protected by Iraqi units, that would have to be taken to facilitate the major part of the landing. Most heavily fortified was the island of Failaka, which was held by units of an Iraqi Marine division numbering more than 4,000 men.

Thus, the "Desert Sword" operation was initiated with landing of the Marines and the taking of the first two small islands. However, this was virtually the end of the operation. It is true, as stated by Brigadier General Richard Neal, that a major military action was performed on Failaka, in that U. S. Marines landed to take more than 1,400 Iraqi troops prisoner.

Thus, only part of the "Desert Storm" operation was carried out. An amphibious operation did not take place in the full sense of the term. Several causes may apply.

A likely cause would be the absence of an operational requirement for carrying out a major amphibious assault on the heels of the successfully initiated "Desert Storm" ground operation and successful ground advances by Coalition Forces in all three intended directions, including the coast.

However, there are significant factors arguing against the above.

First, an amphibious assault is ordinarily launched somewhat before or simultaneously with initiation of action by ground troops. For this reason, in the case of Iraq it would have been advantageous to initiate an

amphibious assault simultaneously with the start of ground troop action, all the more since everything had been prepared to this end.

Second, an airborne assault had been accomplished under conditions that were similar with respect to time and distance from the front.

Third, taking into account the personal characteristics of General A. Gray, the Marine Corps commandant, who had done much in a short period of time to modernize, restructure and intensify Marine combat training, one may logically assume that he would have wanted to utilize such an opportunity to test his new concepts in an actual major amphibious assault.

Nonetheless, one must not forget that the American Marine force was facing a relatively strong body of Iraqi troops amounting to five divisions, including enemy Marine divisions that were defending a 200-kilometer coastal strip. The latter of course were decidedly inferior to the U.S. Marines in quality of weapons and level of training. Be that as it may, the Iraqi troops had been prepared to repel an assault with their developed system of engineer anti-assault barriers located in the water and on the shore. This is something the American military authorities could not ignore, especially since pounding of the coast for several days with fire from aircraft and surface ships obviously had not produced the hoped-for damage.

Analysis of past wars indicates that the U.S. Marines look with disfavor on a strongly-fortified coast. Let us recall that the USA in assault operations carried out against the Japanese in World War II in the Pacific did have dozens of battleships and cruisers and hundreds of aircraft pound intended landing areas for one month and longer, hurling hundreds of thousands of tons of explosives at the defenders. The Kuwait coast probably did not permit the Americans to expect a lightning-fast assault at minimum losses, something that had been the case in Grenada and Panama.

We see here the major cause that frustrated the execution of the "Desert Sword" plans.

Gutontov Responds to Filatov on Gulf War Interpretation

*91UM0683A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 May 91 Union Edition p 8*

[Open letter to General Filatov, Chief Editor of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, from Pavel Gutontov: "Instead of Bruderschaft: An Open Letter to General Filatov"]

[Text] I hereby notify General Filatov, Chief Editor of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL and one of the main heroes of the retort, "Did Hussein Sustain a Brilliant Victory?" (IZVESTIYA, No. 82), that I intend to embark on extracting earned income from his general's pay. Let me explain my intention. In the retort

cited above, I allowed myself to express doubt as to your talents as a strategist and analyst, since it seemed rather amusing to me that you, who are filled with the greatest sympathy to the Iraqi dictator, were convincing your readers in all (as they say) seriousness that the Americans were allegedly just about crushed by him in the Arabian desert. In this connection, I ask a sad question. It would be interesting to know how long will General Filatov, who was rashly entrusted with this journal, continue to bring shame to our Ministry of Defense and military science which he more or less tries to represent? I want to emphasize that I was motivated exclusively by my concern about the authoritative nature of the ministry, science, and the army as a whole, but except for this admittedly insulting phrase and your own citations, there was nothing in the blurb about you, general. I read with great consternation in the latest issue of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL what you allegedly saw in my text. I am not speaking at all about your format of sharing what you saw with your readers.

Clearly, the format is not correct.

"Here is a phenomenon—Pasha [nickname for Pavel] Gutontov," as you so nastily put me down in IZVESTIYA (so why shouldn't I, although we haven't drunk to Bruderschaft as of now, start calling you by your nickname, Vitka, even though it is not quite the thing to do since I have never met you). "The Korotich of IZVESTIYA! It is the same kind of zoological attitude toward generals, obviously toward Soviet generals, but this one adores generals—naturally, American, and his idol is General Schwarzkopf.... For Pasha from IZVESTIYA he is a humanist and a civilizer"....

And where did you get all this? Especially, the "zoological attitude toward generals." What does that mean? You know exactly that it is not a geographical, algebraical, or paleontological attitude "toward generals"? And further on I found out something about myself even more unpleasant. It turns out that for me "hundreds of children burned alive in Iraq is nonsense." It turns out that my "goal is to be like Korotich, that is, to be employed at American government expense." It turns out that if I "write denunciations against you, Filatov, it means that I am also keeping dossiers on my own wife and perhaps my friends!"....

Isn't this just a bit too much, Vitya?

I think I shall really haul you into court where you will have to prove everything. But since (and you wrote this yourself) the words "honor and dignity" confirmed by the court, evoke nothing but laughter in you, I shall insist on your paying the moral loss that you have caused me out of your own pay, general, which, incidentally, I contribute to personally by paying for the support of the Armed Forces.

This is how I intend to get rich quickly.

Perhaps I shall even organize a cooperative that will charge you for moral expenses. At the first opportunity I

shall call this same Korotich (about whom you scribbled so much in passing!...) to join the company, as well as the ophthalmologist S. Fedorov (whom you contemptuously call a "bigwig," but who has saved the eyesight of far more people than all those in the whole world who have ever read your journal), film director E. Ryazanov (you not only call him a "lover of the beautiful life," but rashly declared him a deserter who avoided going to the front, the future comedy moviemaker was a minor and not subject to being drafted), my colleague Yu. Shchekochikhin (whom you address, without troubling yourself to explain, by simply saying: "You are dissolute").... I shall think about what to do with S. Kovalev, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, whom you treated more softly and about whom you wrote: "I cannot say anything about Kovalev," but then you still forced yourself: "I know only that he was the fastest errand-boy for Sakharov, the same Sakharov" (as if someone may not know who he is! - P.G.) "who, just like OGONYOK, Shchekochikhin, and Ryazanov, dumped his barrel of mud on the army.... I think that Kovalev," says the general, sharing his assumption with us, "managed to keep his barrel without dumping it..."

One does not have to be a prophet to assume this: our descendents will figure out whether Sakharov or Filatov (who went up the extremely difficult steps of military journalism, and only military journalism, to get to his general's shoulderboards, about which I grieve, for he is throwing a shadow on our common profession) made the greatest contribution to our country's defense capability. With regard to Sergey Adamovich Kovalev, he is a well-known biologist and a major protector of legal rights; and unfortunately, did not really have the time to serve his Motherland to his fullest capacity: he was otherwise occupied—"in his time" he was imprisoned in Brezhnev's labor camps....

Basically, we are going to bring you to ruin, general. And I only took one of your monthly little pages full of the most unpardonable boorishness, most ungrammatical declarations, and the most reckless lies. There is no use pretending that someone is defaming everyone who is dressed in generals' uniforms and the entire army while they are evaluating your activities. I, too, can accuse you of hating the entire civilian population of the Union, even though I am an officer, albeit in the reserves. And why should you love us civilians? It was your journal that at one time expressed it quite clearly: any military man is a hundred heads taller than any civilian....

And one final comment. Judging by your written remarks about legal procedures as such, you will also have to pay for being disrespectful to the courts. Such a law does exist today. So, consider carefully before taking up your reckless pen again: What kind of games will you play and will they be worth the candles?

Pavel GUTIONTOV

P.S. Yes, comrade Filatov! While this material was being readied for publication, smart people gave me some advice (this is in connection with my intentions to

"obtain employment at American government expense"): Perhaps we should even establish a joint venture enterprise "for you," with that General Schwarzkopf who is, according to you, my idol. As a retired officer he will receive a few kopeks and I will get an extra dollar or two....

Anyway, I'll think about it.

French Military Intelligence To Be Upgraded

91UM0669A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 May 91 Union Edition p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "Does A Blind Man Need A Big Stick?—French Military Special Services To Be Reformed"]

[Text] France intends to carry out a fundamental reorganization of its military intelligence and to make it one of the basic components of the country's defense structures, along with its nuclear and conventional armed forces.

This was announced by Defense Minister Pierre Joxe in a recent speech at the Higher National Defense Institute. The recent war in the Persian Gulf, he said, demonstrated that France is extremely dependent on the United States for highly important intelligence information. For example, the pictures obtained from the French Spot [transliteration] satellite cannot be compared with those from American satellites. French special services are poorly organized, often work independently of one another, and do not coordinate their operations. Moreover, they lack sufficient funding and, as a result, are poorly equipped.

"Why does a blind person need a big stick?" asked Pierre Joxe after analyzing the condition of such services as the Main External Security Directorate, which gained notoriety following the bombing of the Greenpeace ecologists' ship Rainbow Warrior, as well as the center for processing military data, the defense security directorate, and others.

To enhance their effectiveness, plans call for setting up in the Defense Ministry a special agency that will direct all activities of special services. In addition, corresponding appropriations will be increased, staffs will be expanded, and special attention will be devoted to professional training.

But the military is pinning its main hopes on the launch, by 1994, of two new spy satellites known as Helios [Gelios], whose technical capabilities are not inferior to those of American satellites. They will provide the Defense Ministry with complete information on what is happening in any part of the globe around the clock. The launch of a third Helios [Gelios] in 1998 is under study.

It must be said that not all top military officers agree with their minister's opinion regarding the need to upgrade intelligence. Since defense appropriations as a

whole will hardly be increased, the additional funding for special services will most likely come at the expense of cutbacks in other programs. And the "old guard," commentators point out, are still inclined to measure their army's power in terms of numbers of guns.

However, specialists believe that a fundamental reform of military intelligence is inevitable. If France wants to remain a formidable military and political power and intends to play an important role in international affairs, writes the newspaper *Liberation*, it has to have the required highly capable special services. Only they will enable Paris to operate independently and not to depend on the United States in military affairs.

And this is especially important today, experts stress, at a time when France and Germany are urging the creation European defenses that could act independently of their trans-Atlantic ally.

Time-Frames, Casualties of Soviet Foreign Deployments Noted

91UM0674A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel General Ye.I Smirnov, deputy chief of General Staff of Armed Forces of USSR, by Col A. Oliynik, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Title Earned in Combat"]

[Text] **The soldier/internationalist.... Following the withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan these words acquired special meaning. They now define the legal status of hundreds of thousands of people. This status has now finally been acquired also by members of our Armed Forces sent on international missions to many other nations of the world, those who, far from the homeland, defended its state interests in situations demanding courage and self-sacrifice. Today we will learn that which was classified until just recently and get to know heroes who have remained unknown for decades.**

A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent interviews Col Gen Smirnov, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, about certain periods of our military cooperation with other nations and about people who performed their international duty in a worthy manner.

[Oliynik] Yevgeniy Kirillovich, our military cooperation with other nations has a long and rich history....

[Smirnov] And deeply rooted traditions. On the eve of the All-Army Conference of Soldier/Internationalists, at which the largest and most representative group will be those who fought on Afghan soil, of course, we could not fail to recall our close military cooperation with our

southern neighbor during those long-ago years following the revolution. V. Primakov, the Soviet military attache in Kabul, was military advisor to Afghan Emir Amanullah Khan. Soviet military specialists and a group of pilots were also sent to that country to train the Afghan army. Even today, after the withdrawal of the 40th Army from Afghanistan, a small group of Soviet military specialists remains there at the request of the government.

Our country has frequently sent the very best of the command, political, technical and engineering personnel from the army and navy to work abroad, and frequently also to take part in combat operations.

Take A. Rodimtsev, for example, who was made a Hero of the Soviet Union for feats performed in Spain. It was not until later that the name of this military hero, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, went down in the history of the Battle of Stalingrad.

Involved in the rendering of international assistance to revolutionary Spain were Ya. Berzin, V. Gorev, P. Batov, N. Voronov, N. Kuznetsov, N. Lyashchenko, R. Malinovskiy, K. Meretskov, M. Nedelin, Ya. Smushkevich, M. Shumilov, G. Shtern.... The names of many of these people are inseparably linked also with our Victory in the Great Patriotic War.

We usually assess the Great Patriotic War from the military talent and personal courage of V. Chuykov, P. Rybalko, P. Zhigarev, P. Batitskiy.... I believe that these are enough, although the list goes on and on. We are far less aware of the performance of future military leaders who rendered international assistance to China at the end of the '30s, however.

At that time the USSR extended credit to China in the amount of 250 million U.S. dollars, armed 24 divisions with modern weapons, turned over around 900 combat aircraft, and sent more than 1,000 Soviet military advisors, specialists and volunteer pilots there. Almost all of them subsequently fought heroically on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and greatly appreciated the training acquired in China.

[Oliynik] We engaged in extensive military cooperation with other nations even after the Great Patriotic War. Many of the Soviet advisors and specialists performed their international missions in situations where combat operations were underway. Can one state specifically today when and where this occurred?

[Smirnov] I can offer the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers a composite list prepared in one of our directorates of when and where our advisors, specialists and translators served in nations in which combat operations were underway. It begins with the year 1950.

Country	
Period of Combat Operations	
North Korea	Jun 50-Jul 53
Laos	1960-1963, Aug 64-Nov 68, Nov 69-Dec 70
Algeria	1962-1964
United Arab Republic (Egypt)	18 Oct 62-1 Apr 63, 1 Oct 69-16 Jun 72, 5 Oct 73-1 Apr 74
Yemen Arab Republic	18 Oct 62-1 Apr 63
Vietnam	1 Jul 65-31 Dec 74
Syria	5-13 Jun 67, 6-24 Oct 78
Cambodia	Apr 70-Dec 70
Bangladesh	1972-1973
Angola	Nov 75-1979
Mozambique	1967-1969, Nov 75-Nov 79
Ethiopia	9 Dec 77-30 Nov 79
Afghanistan	Apr 78 to present
Nicaragua	1980-1990

Naturally, Soviet servicemen who performed international duty in these countries during these periods have the legal status of soldier/internationalist. Figuratively speaking, this is a title derived from combat.

One can say that around 50,000 of our servicemen in all have spent time in these and other countries over the past forty-odd years.

[Oliynik] Exhaustive information has been published on our casualties in Afghanistan. Have we suffered losses also in other nations in which there was combat?

[Smirnov] Of course, we have. But they are not to be compared with the combat losses suffered in Afghanistan. Incidentally, our Afghan casualties include 193 military advisors and specialists. We lost 75 men in Ethiopia, 59 in Angola. Total losses since 1950 exceed 600.

Those who died in the performance of their international duty in various years include Maj Gen Avn N. Vlasov, Cols A. Tihonov and V. Ignashev, Lt Cols V. Dideychuk, V. Kryuchkov, N. Bobrik and A. Serikov, Maj M. Paukan, Capt N. Kustov.... Many have been wounded or crippled. The All-Army Conference of Soldier/Internationalists is yet another reason for recalling these glorious names.

[Oliynik] I assume that the matter of social protection for the soldier/internationalists and aid to the families of those who died will also be discussed among other issues at the conference.

[Smirnov] Without a doubt. There are many problems in this area. Many matters are decided on an individual basis. For example, a special group has been set up to review letters from soldier/internationalists to the General Staff. We try to see that not a single one of the

military advisors and specialists goes without the benefits due him. The job is made easier by the order issued by the USSR minister of defense on 19 August 1989, which precisely specifies who is entitled to what benefits. Naturally, a great deal depends upon the treatment of the soldiers, reserve officers and enlisted men, locally: in the republics, krays and oblasts.

[Oliynik] One last thing, Yevgeniy Kirillovich: Our understanding of international duty has changed considerably today. I would guess that our approaches to international cooperation with other nations has changed just as much.

[Smirnov] Yes, the approaches to and the forms and methods of international cooperation by the USSR with other nations have fundamentally changed. But then our attitude has not changed with respect to the people who have demonstrated professionalism, courage and selflessness in the performance of their duty.

Problems In U.S. A-12 Development

91UM0756A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jun 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel M. Rebrov: "Military-Technical Survey: Stealth Aircraft: Battle of Ideas and Arms Makers"]

[Text] "The clouds that have gathered over the development of the A-12 Avenger stealth aircraft, in all likelihood, are not going to disperse"—this is how the magazine *US News & World Report* characterized passions surrounding cost overruns in the program to develop the new-generation carrier-based fighter. The weekly points out that the initial appropriation of \$4.7 billion for the project has significantly exceeded "permissible figures." But then the magazine promptly qualifies this by saying that all outlays for such development projects are financed by the Pentagon's "black budget," which is to say funds earmarked for top secret programs to develop new weapons systems.

"The long-term future for military subcontractors is cloudy, but don't wait for the giants to admit this," writes a commentator in *Fortune* magazine, using the word "giants" to refer to McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics, among others. His assertion is based not only on the fact that the A-12 was to replace the A-6 carrier-based fighter and that the US Navy had intended to buy 620 such warplanes based on stealth technology at a total cost of \$52 billion. Should the Avenger fail to appear, something else, like the prospective ATF tactical fighter will; in one way or another, the "giants" won't give up anything of their own.

The time that has passed since the contract was signed has been rich in mistakes and new ideas, but even today some are asking: "Is the A-12 really all that bad?"

It is easy to understand this reaction. The stealth aircraft was conceived as a "flying wing" with a wing sweep of 48

degrees along the leading edge and without a vertical tail. Immediately under the tip of the nose are two circular "windows" that probably hold new optical-electronic navigation equipment and instrumentation. Other parts of the airframe surface have dielectrical panels, conventional and satellite communications antennas, and an electronic warfare system.

According to the US Navy, the A-12 was to significantly surpass the A-6 in terms of specifications. Its operating radius was increased by 60 percent, and the maximum combat payload by 40 percent. It was to have the best parameters in terms of maneuverability, reliability, and serviceability.

The aircraft's maiden flights from an aircraft carrier deck were slated for 1992, and efforts to refine its combat use were to begin in 1995. The possibility that the A-12 would have several modifications was not ruled out.

And although Department of Defense officials initially expressed their "dissatisfaction" with the new aircraft's progress and later announced that the A-12 would not appear on the scene in the foreseeable future, commentators believe that the "financial scandal associated with cost overruns" (a figure of \$4 billion is cited) will be overcome. They attribute this to the fact that the Pentagon's "black budget" is constantly growing and reached \$25 billion in the past fiscal year.

The war in the Persian Gulf served as a catalyst. The commander of the multinational forces' air forces in Operation Desert Storm was able to persuade members of the US Congress who are responsible for drawing up the 1992 budget and who will decide the future of the stealth aircraft program of the need to continue this work. His report, the American press reports, revealed "certain previously classified data." Soon afterward it was reported that instead of the A-12 carrier-based fighter, design work had begun on a similar aircraft codenamed the A-X.

The new aircraft has also been supported by Time magazine, which wrote that "in the past 10 years, the number of Soviet installations targeted for nuclear destruction has grown to more than 20,000, including hundreds of permanent fortifications and communications centers." These figures, foreign commentators point out, might be made up, but they are helping the US military justify the need to develop supersophisticated and superexpensive weapons systems. Unfortunately, this is true.

In the struggle between defensive and offensive weapons systems, it's hardly possible to identify a winner with any degree of certainty. Successes in this struggle are only temporary. Confirming this idea, the journal Aviation Week and Space Technology analyzed the state of affairs with respect to the vulnerability of the F-117, the B-2, and the prospective ATF tactical fighter. It claimed that a stealth aircraft can be detected and destroyed, that new

ideas are constantly arising, and that radar and other detection systems are being continually upgraded. This being the case, it is also essentially to try to devise new weapons that stealth aircraft will delivery to their targets. In this connection, the magazine points out, great hopes are being pinned on the "Khev Slik" [transliteration] missile, which is designed for stealth aircraft.

Much is being written about the "Khev Slik" [transliteration]. In the view of foreign commentators, this missile could lead to the development of a new class of supersonic air-to-surface weapons with a low level of location-revealing characteristics. Mounted on a stealth aircraft's external stores, the missile will supplement its combat payload in the comparatively small internal weapons bay. According to its designers, after being launched, the Half "Khev Slik" [transliteration] will be able to cruise at supersonic speeds to a combat zone, "searching for targets and dropping its subordnance with high accuracy."

The missile weighs nearly 900 kilograms, is 4.3 meters long, and its airframe is .6 meter wide. The program's tentative cost is \$13.2 million. Details of the complex configuration of the "Khev Slik" [transliteration], which has a skin made of composite materials, are classified. However, some information has appeared in the press to the effect that the missile has four "steering wheels" in the tail section and a flat lower surface that acts like a wing. It is mounted flush with the aircraft's skin and is equipped with an autopilot.

It is believed that the "Khev Slik" [transliteration] missile will be able to cruise at supersonic speeds with a range of 30 to 40 kilometers to a target area and then slow its speed for more accurate approach to the object under attack. After ejecting its subordnance on one or more targets, the missile falls to the earth and self-destructs.

If analyses of tests show the new ideas to be promising, commentators note, the results will be used to develop the next generation of aviation weapons launched outside the boundaries of an air defense system. This work is scheduled to begin in 1993 and 1994.

In fighting for the market—a fight that is heating up throughout the world, Fortune observes—the most clever contractors with the best-quality wares will have the advantage. As Assistant Defense Secretary John Betti [transliteration] said, "military contractors will try to win their share, after going through all the stages of a competition shock." This is akin to the five stages of death, D. Betti [transliteration] explained, in which the first stage is disbelief.

He failed to make clear just who disbelieves whom and about what. The basic thrust of his remarks can be taken to mean that one team of arms makers will be supplanted by another, but that the game will continue. It is a costly and dangerous game of playing with fire.

Conversion at "Araks" Prior to Start-Up

91UM0628A Yerevan EPOKHA in Russian
7 Feb 91 p 4

[Article by B. Tsagikyan under the "Conversion" rubric: "The 'Araks': What Will It Be?"]

[Text] The new switch plant under construction should not be confused with the "Ani" Production Association "Araks," which produces children's toys, even though both plants bear the same name.

It was necessary to dig out and haul away by truck one million cubic meters of basalt to prepare the site of approximately 16 hectares for the plant. In less than nine years, with our constant shortages of construction materials and interruptions in deliveries, we have seen the erection of enormous plant buildings, each of which consists of up to 10 different shops, depending upon the particular technological configuration required.

A multiple approach was employed from the very start, i.e., erection of important facilities proceeded at the same time that the production buildings were being raised. These facilities included: an engineering laboratory building; a production training combine designed for 780 trainees; a plant eating facility seating 300 (in addition to a small restaurant in each building); 15 substations; a fire-fighting unit; and a meeting room. Of interest is the fact that all the supply lines are not buried in the earth, but instead are located in aboveground conduits provided with ventilation and lighting. This means that there is no need to dig trenches and pull out pipes from the earth in the event of pipe failure. Incidentally, the plant, which is just getting started, has been designated for conversion. The sum of 16 million rubles earmarked to complete construction of the last two buildings next year has been deleted; the two production buildings have been put on hold, even though 8 million rubles' worth of equipment has already been delivered for use in these buildings.

A Rocky Road

The idea of erecting the plant originated in the minds of our leaders as early as the 1980s, when it became clear that it was necessary to reduce construction of chemical plants that poison the environment with their wastes, and cut down on the number of enterprises employing a preponderance of labor-intensive operations requiring a considerable amount of manual labor, instead placing our means into the development of science-intensive manufacturing. That was how the idea of building a radio equipment plant in Armenia came about. So it happened that in 1981 Genrikh Agadzhanian, the then chief engineer of the "Armelektodvigatel" Production Association, was summoned to the offices of his superiors and tasked—in the forced voluntary manner of that time—with construction of the new plant. There is no point to describing all the difficulties that ensued. Suffice it to say that G. Agadzhanian himself had to draw and order printing of the drawings of the future plant. He

also for some time had to work alone, as the manager, construction engineer, and supplier.

"In 1986, when I first came here to work," recalled L. Grigoryan, chief of the Labor and Wages Department and one of the enterprise's veterans, "the plant's personnel complement numbered no more than 15 to 20 persons. Now there are about 1,000. The training course combine has not yet opened; specialists are being trained for two or three months by experienced workers directly in the shops."

In response to my question as to whether people are willing to come work at the plant, Lazar Grigoryevich said with a hint of pride, "Of course! They have their reasons."

Avoiding Mistakes of the Past

We in past years became accustomed in planning industrial giants to placing our emphasis on production, with—alas!—far less thought to the people who would be living and working there. The result was that the "temporary" inconvenience of workers would turn into years of trying experiences in barracks, temporary abodes, and dilapidated dormitories, until they would finally obtain their longed-for apartment after the passage of decades. Plant manager G. Agadzhanian, mindful of the sad experience of the past, decided to build the enterprise proper and housing for its new workers at the same time.

"Four multistory apartment buildings have already been built," said L. Grigoryan, continuing his story. "Right here, in Davidashen. About 180 families have moved in. The foundation of the fifth building was laid this year. Yes, there is a waiting list. But there are only 200 persons on it. As a matter of fact, the last apartments went to some persons who were put on the list only last year."

A Benefactor in Davidashen

It is a fact that favorable conditions, both in everyday living and on the job, have a positive effect on a person. The plant administration took this important psychological factor into account, and, from the very first day, has been according production culture a position of enormous importance. G. Agadzhanian, when designing the plant, went so far as to insist that the plant buildings be made of travertine, which is a white rock that is pleasing to the eye and tends to create a pleasing architectural appearance for the entire enterprise.

The plant under construction in Davidashen has a constant influence on the infrastructure of the entire microregion. Thus, the enterprise administration turned over the plant polyclinic rated at 375 visits per shift to the residents of Davidashen as soon as the polyclinic was completed. The residents previously had no polyclinic of their own, being forced to travel to the republic hospital polyclinic. The same is true in the case of a water pipe, boiler house and fire station that were built at the expense of "Araks" and turned over to the residents of the Davidashen area. In other words, the plant does not

limit itself to narrow departmental interests, but rather promotes development of the entire area by virtue of its powerful material and production bases.

Conversion

Thus, the "Araks" plant has already been subjected to conversion, without having initiated its start-up, i.e., before it undertook the manufacture of its intended products, which have been dropped from the production plan. It is true that the plant while under construction has been manufacturing special-purpose radio equipment for three years.

"In line with conversion, we are in a rush to decide the kinds of products we are to make," said the "Araks" manager, "but at the same time are weighing everything and proceeding on a scientific basis. There is no profit in employing our considerable production base to make consumer goods that could be produced just about by any cooperative that has the slightest technical capability. No, we are looking for items that are actually needed by our republic. With openness permeating all areas of manufacturing activity, our enterprise is being visited by foreign groups. Many of the latter have expressed a desire to set up business contacts and initiate joint enterprises. However, the country's political instability and absence of pertinent legislation that would offer them legal protection and financial guarantees tend to daunt our potential partners and inhibit their making business offers. Nonetheless, businessmen are still willing to take a risk. For example, we signed a preliminary agreement with the Italian firm Edilgrapp to set up a joint enterprise that would make Edilgrapp scissors. In addition, we have signed a preliminary agreement with the Swedes, who have offered to organize for us the manufacture of consumer goods needed by Armenia. We recently hosted representatives of the firm Araratbrokerage, French entrepreneurs, and American bankers. They are all sending out probes in the hopes of establishing business contacts.

Plant specialists are presently studying a number of industrial items with the intent of determining the ones that are suitable for the plant. Plans at the plant abound.

New Products from "Aviakompleks"

91UM0628B Yerevan EPOKHA in Russian
7 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by B. Tsagikyan under the "Conversion" rubric: "Armaviakompleks: What Is It?"]

[Text] One of the enterprises that have taken up conversion is the Armenian Production Association "Aviakompleks."

"Unfortunately," said association Chief Engineer S. Khandanyan, "enterprises are suffering losses due to poor coordination between buyers and consumers as a result of the absence of conversion legislation and a suitably developed all-union program dealing with

reduction in production of military equipment. What are the consequences? For example, the APO [Armenian Production Association] "Aviakompleks" prepares its production and financial plans for the coming year and signs contracts for delivery of raw materials and other materials. The next year arrives, and all of a sudden a buyer refuses to take delivery of the item he ordered, stating as his reason that he was given a change in production task, thus eliminating the need for the particular item. The association lost 50 percent of its gross volume in 1989-1990 alone; this naturally resulted in a drop in planned profit. For this reason, it would be wise to organize a coordinating center in Armenia that would develop a program of continual change to production of national economic goods on the part of certain enterprises, coordinate their activity, and provide industrial enterprises with new technologies geared to ideal utilization of a particular facility. As the situation now stands, the former "letter boxes" essentially serve two masters—the VPK [military-industrial complex] and branches that make consumer goods. Nonetheless, in spite of all the difficulties, this is not the first year that the APO "Aviakompleks" is involved with consumer goods, in fact increasing its output and expanding the variety.

Car owners are very familiar with the Mars-202S stereophonic tape recorder, which won popularity the first day of its production and has been in strong demand for four years.

Specialists of the special design office are presently developing the new "Dvin" radio-tape recorder. Plans call for initiating production of the Mars-203 tape recorder in 1992; it will be technically more advanced and pleasing to the eye. And businesspersons will undoubtedly be interested in an answering device (attached to a telephone), production of which is slated for 1991.

With its powerful manufacturing base, well-trained worker cadres, considerable "brain center" of engineers and designers, the association's collective is developing and preparing the manufacture of modern medical devices in addition to radio equipment. For example, the ALG, a device that stops internal bleeding, was rated highly by doctors.

Worthy of special note is the complex sorption therapy device (AKST-3), which employs sorption to remove toxic products of exogenous and endogenous origin from body fluids (blood, lymph, miscellaneous fluids). The "Aviakompleks" association is the only enterprise in the country producing the device, which is in great demand throughout the Union. The AKST-3 was exhibited in Iran, China, Finland, and Bulgaria, where it was highly rated by specialists. In Moscow, it was awarded a diploma first class at the "Health-90" exhibition. The device has garnered many positive responses made by various clinics in our country that have adopted and used it successfully. Incidentally, Iran expressed its interest and has signed an agreement to purchase the AKST-3.

Another association product—Melt-DI of “Krios”—won high international acclaim—a gold medal—at an international exhibition held in Bulgaria. Applicable to the chemical and textile industries and nuclear power generation, it is designed to measure pressures from minus 280 to plus 350 degrees in cryogenic and high-temperature environments.

All the above items are needed, of course, but they are intended for use by a narrow circle of specialists. There is an item that will undoubtedly be of interest to every family, especially housewives. This is an iron, but not an ordinary one, the kind that unfortunately is not easily found in our stores; rather, this one is of the induction heating type. The fundamentally new design (developed in the Yerevan Polytechnic Institute and protected by an author's certificate) is such that the item can be guaranteed for at least 15 years. The new iron [words missing in text] is to be produced cooperatively with the Iranians.

The “Razdan” plant of APO “Aviakompleks” is the base of new joint enterprise that is to produce rest room equipment: wall tiles, toilet units, and wash basins, all to be made of synthetic materials. Production is to initiated in 1991; the items will be sold both in our country and in foreign countries.

The APO “Aviakompleks” intends to start making satellite antennas not later than the end of next year.

The collective has many realistic plans and ideas. However, departmental confusion and the lack of conversion legislation with associated legal protection for enterprises restrict the collective's capabilities by not permitting the full realization of its creative potential.

Conversion: Severodvinsk Nuclear Submarine Facility

91UM0764A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Jun 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain Third Rank Yu. Gladkevich: “How Nuclear Submarines Originate”]

[Text] We are discussing this for the first time. The flagship of Soviet nuclear submarine building—the Northern Machine Building Construction Enterprise Production Association—is living under the threat of large and small problems these days. They have affected practically everything—production, social, cultural, and domestic life, and also the future of the 250-year-old city of ships, Severodvinsk.

Is there a way out of the crisis that awaits the plant and the people working at it—this is the subject of the remarks of our correspondent who visited the Northern Machine Building Enterprise (SMP).

...On 18 June 1936 two steamships, the Ivan Kalyayev and the Vycherzhanin dropped anchor near the low bank of the Nikolskoye estuary of the Northern Dvina. The

plant's first builders who arrived on these ships found shelter under the arches of the ancient Nikolo-Karelskiy Monastery, which is about 600 years old. These people had to carry out the decision of the Council of Labor and Defense under the USSR Sovnarkom [Soviet of People's Commissars], adopted in May 1936. And in October of 1939 the facilities of the first section were put into operation. After another month, the construction of the first ship, the battleship Sovetskaya Belorussiya, was started at plant 402, as it was called, which was on line.

The history of the plant is the history of the country. Great and tragic. Thousands of boys and girls who considered it their duty to contribute to strengthening the country's defense capability gathered on the marshy banks of the Northern Dvina. Here under the stern gaze of the escort, GULAG victims built roads across the marshes and erected the building that housed the first shops. Here during the years of the Great Patriotic War children manned the machine tools, replacing their fathers who had gone to the front. Here, finally, during the years of confrontation with the West, in the shortest possible time periods we prepared a production base for changing over to the construction of nuclear submarines...

“We managed to do this quickly and without excessive expense only because of the foresight of the plant's designers and builders,” says SMP head engineer Fedor Nikolayevich Shusharin. “They built it so that it would be possible to develop and improve production and to efficiently restructure it for producing new kinds of products without resorting to finding and appropriating new space.”

The government decree on the beginning of the construction of nuclear submarines at the SMP was adopted in 1953. What was happening at that time? In the United States the first nuclear submarine, the Nautilus, was just about to be launched.

At that same time our scientists were actively working on the problem of creating submarines with “nuclear locomotion.” Under the leadership of Academicians I. Kurchatov and A. Aleksandrov, scientific research was conducted and nuclear transportation propulsion units were created. Soon the design bureau (head designer—V. Peregudov) had designed an experimental submarine with a nuclear propulsion unit. But the practical realization of this design required the creation of the corresponding revolutionary technology for shipbuilding production capacities. The Northern Machine Building Enterprise was better prepared for this than others.

A new shop was built at accelerated rates especially for the experimental submarine (it was subsequently included in the Navy and given the name Leninskiy Komsomol). Auxiliary productions and unique machine tools and mechanisms were created. Highly qualified engineering and technical personnel were added to the plant's staff.

The organization of production also changed significantly with the switch to series construction of nuclear-powered vessels. It was at this time that we began to create all-inclusive comprehensive sections, which made it possible to make the labor collectives personally responsible for the entire cycle of work. And then, through the efforts of the enterprise general director Ye. Yegorov, the idea of creating specialized closed sections, shops, and productions for specific items was realized. What Yevgeniy Pavlovich Yegorov did was worth several volumes of scholarly monographs—in terms of its purely scientific, and technical, and practical-organizational significance. For this work Yevgeniy Pavlovich was awarded the degree of doctor of technical sciences without defending a dissertation.

Designs for new and better nuclear-powered vessels originated at the desks and drafting tables of the designers. At the same time the technology at the SMP was being improved, and the plant areas were expanded and filled with new, as a rule, unique technical equipment which had no analogues in the country and sometimes in the entire world. And today the Northern Machine Building Enterprise has a production base that makes it possible to produce submarines with a high degree of sophistication. Moreover, the flexibility and efficiency of retooling production provide for maximum modernization of the design during the process of building a series of ships. In other words, while a series is being constructed, the combat effectiveness of a submarine can more than double as it proceeds from building to building, without changes in its external parameters—silhouette, size, displacement.

If one compares the Northern Machine Building Enterprise with analogous productions abroad, one can conclude that the SMP is comparable to its "competitors" in terms of its capacities and surpasses them in terms of other parameters.

Some people might think that what has been said is an attempt to embellish the state of affairs in military shipbuilding. Not at all: There are still plenty of shortcomings in this branch. But one must give the Northern Machine Building Enterprise its due. And this is extremely important right now when more and more frequently and loudly we hear voices saying that the technical equipment and arms of the Army and Navy are no good, that our military-industrial complex is squandering public funds to no advantage while we should be thinking about disarmament.

It is not certain whether statements like this contain more pure delusion or a cold-blooded desire to weaken our defense potential. Yes, the process of disarmament is gathering force in the world, and monitoring strategic nuclear arms, reducing them, and, in the future, refusing to own weapons that are so dangerous to civilization are increasingly becoming the subject of discussion in negotiations. But does this mean that we may proceed toward disarmament unilaterally?

The answer to this question is the more obvious if we recall that neither the United States nor the NATO leaders even want to hear about any reduction of an important constituent part of their nuclear triad—missile-carrying nuclear submarines. Moreover, scientific research and experimental design work under Navy programs is continuing full speed ahead. In this context, unilateral disarmament and scaling down of the shipbuilding programs would be an act directed against the country's guaranteed security.

We should listen to the voices of the people who know the state of affairs, and not just in shipbuilding but in the Navy as well. One of them is the head builder of the Northern Machine Building Enterprise, V. Chuvakin.

"In terms of the level of provision of technical equipment the Navy bases are significantly below the level of modern nuclear-powered vessels. Strictly speaking, they do not make it possible to fully conduct high-quality training of submarine personnel without starting the ship's energy units or to maintain the required level of technical readiness of the ship itself.

"Take, for example, the quality of the on-shore power supply. The shore power supply networks are in such a poor condition that frequently there are voltage surges and power failures. And yet the electronic complexes of the latest submarines will not tolerate any bursts—fluctuations in voltage in excess of those established by the GOST's [All-Union State Standards]! The naval repair base is lagging behind the times. And we know," says Vladimir Mikhaylovich, "that the Navy is not to blame for that. Even previously it was not pampered with the means that would make it possible for it to develop in a comprehensive and balanced way—here it was necessary to lean in the direction of filling the Navy with combat vessels, ignoring the development of the necessary infrastructure. And today, under the conditions of a sharp tightening of the Navy's budget and the inclination of a considerable number of legislators to further tighten the defense purse strings, we can certainly not count on correcting the long-existing faults..."

But today this circumstance—the progressive reduction of the defense budget—is also linked to the physical aging of the Navy's combat vessels. Ill-considered approaches to the conversion of the defense industry, the reduction of financing of shipbuilding programs, and the breakdown of ties among enterprises of the defense industry cause direct harm to the defense capability of the Navy.

"Today there has been a significant reduction of the number of orders for nuclear submarines," says the deputy chief of the main administration of the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry Yu. Soldatov. "The Navy's budget losses make it impossible for it to finance the program for construction of nuclear-powered submarines in its initial volume. And if these ships were not needed..."

Indeed: If... But even if we did not count (which, of course, is impossible) the rates and degree of improvement of nuclear submarines in the developed capitalist countries, if we were to ignore the need to switch our submarine fleet over to the new generation of ships, we would still be faced with the minimum task—at least to maintain the fleet. After all, ships are not eternal and they, like people, get old, they want to retire, and they need to be replaced. But this also takes a good deal of money. Where will we get it?

In our conversation the general director of the Northern Machine Building Enterprise said that, in his opinion, there is a good chance that in terms of their destructive consequences these past years will comprise an entire epoch for the defense industry. He called it an “epoch of hard times”—when administrative command methods of leadership are no longer in effect and market relations are still like a baby, and a premature one at that. Under these conditions the destruction of production structures of the defense industry, the technological losses, and the outflow of skilled personnel are taking place practically without any hindrance.

“The process of conversion at enterprises of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry,” asserts Yuriy Iosifovich Soldatov, “is proceeding much more actively. But what does it mean to switch the Northern Machine Building Enterprise over to the output of civilian products? This plant is now fully adapted to the output of nuclear submarines, as they say, 24-hour and very large-scale output. To change its profile would cost billions. And this is not permissible because the shipbuilding production base would be almost completely undermined.”

At the plant I saw that the building slips were filled with the hulls of nuclear submarines under construction. Some of them should have been launched long ago but they are standing still... Special sumps are crammed full of assembled sections—prepared for future ships—which have taken up space in the building slips for a long time. The hull processing shop, which is capable of handling many thousands of tons of metal per year, today processes half as much as before—there are no orders. There is less than a year’s work left for the assembly and welding shop. The beds for the installation of steam production plants in the new slip way are empty—there are no deliveries...

On the whole, today the plant is far from fully loaded. In many shops there is simply no work. The people—the main wealth of the enterprise, specialists with the highest qualifications whose training took decades—are leaving. The percentage of workers in lower categories is increasing—for the percentage of recent graduates of vocational and technical schools is increasing. Incidentally, the decline of the prestige of the shipbuilder—and this is linked to many factors, including the unclear future of the enterprise—will lead to a situation where youth will no longer vie for admission even to the plant vocational and technical school, where previously there was even

competitive selection. And this means the future disappearance of an entire segment of the mass of plant workers, a loss and inevitable decline of the quality of the workforce...

“We are taking measures to save this unique enterprise,” says Yuriy Iosifovich Soldatov. “Through redistribution of orders, according to our calculations, we will be able to provide an acceptable load for the Northern Machine Building Enterprise until approximately the year 2000. Together with the SMP collective we are studying the possibility of producing certain civilian ships and other products at the existing facilities. But today we are mainly disturbed about how to provide for rhythmic output of the main product of the SMP.”

The uneasiness of the leaders of the main administration is understandable. Today many enterprises practically refuse defense work. Delivery discipline has declined sharply and the supplier enterprises are discontinuing the delivery of certain kinds of equipment intended for installation on ships. There is an economic explanation: This cooperation is disadvantageous to them. For instance, today many others are prepared to buy the same electric engine from the plant. So why make it for the nuclear submarine builders, who impose strict requirements on the reliability of electric engines, their noise level, and so forth, while other buyers pay no attention to such trivia...

The only thing that inspires hope is that the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, Ministry of Defense, and Navy, with the support of the military-industrial commission under the USSR Cabinet of Ministers have firm intentions of preserving the enterprise and not letting it be destroyed. As long as there is the task of preserving the Armed Forces and the Navy, the nuclear vessels will not leave their combat post.

But this certainly does not mean that the enterprise is completely devoted to exclusively military production. Although the Northern Machine Building Enterprise is not scheduled for conversion, the volumes of consumer goods production here will increase.

And these volumes are considerable even today. While 20 years ago the SMP produced approximately 2 million rubles’ [R] worth of consumer goods, this figure is now 30 million. And in comparable prices. It produces upholstered and kitchen furniture, crystal which was rated highly by foreign specialists who visited the enterprise recently, sets of sports and physical training equipment, garden buildings, gas stoves, and certain kinds of kitchen equipment... On orders from Agroprom they have set up production of vacuum boilers for processing animal husbandry wastes. The Ikhtiandr, an underwater excursion apparatus, recently appeared on the list of products. Its design was developed by the Rubin Central Design Bureau for Maritime Equipment. It is intended for a miniship for conducting underwater excursions at depths down to 40 meters. The design is quite competitive, it has undergone testing, and after “the bugs are

worked out" the Ikhtiandr will probably be in great demand, not only in our country but abroad as well.

Of course, people at the plant understand that this is not enough. The enterprise's capacities that are not loaded with military orders make it possible and even demand that they look for orders whose fulfillment will be possible with SMP equipment. And certain prospects have been earmarked. The equipment and technology of basic production make it possible to successfully fill orders, for example, of the Ministry of the Petrochemical Industry for producing floating super-platforms for drilling derricks, deep-water diving and research equipment, and various modifications of underwater entertainment devices—self-propelled minisubmarines, mounted equipment, securely fastened on the bottom of a catamaran or other surface vessel... In terms of the capabilities of the SMP, it is also possible to manufacture large metal elements for bridge builders—and, incidentally, suggestions concerning this have already been made by several foreign clients...

And this kind of investigation can only be welcomed. With favorable development of the global process of reduction and elimination of strategic nuclear forces and nuclear arms in general, the very logic of this process places on the agenda the question of the further existence of an enterprise that produces nuclear submarines. Even if this will not be in the near future, it must be taken into account. We need the appropriate operating time and we must gradually prepare ourselves for switching over from the production of death-dealing equipment to peacetime products.

But so far these are not problems of the immediate future. Today it is much more important to find a final solution to this problem: How is the Northern Machine Building Enterprise to fulfill its main purpose—building nuclear submarines?

There are two complementary conditions for escaping from the situation that has developed. The first is the restoration in the sphere of the defense industry of the role and significance of centralized leadership. A proponent of this is the head engineer at the Northern Machine Building Enterprise, F. Shusharin:

"We have been in too much of a hurry and have thrown the baby out with the bath water. Defense and the production of equipment and arms for the Army and Navy comprise a state task. And this means that there is nothing surprising in the fact that the state will firmly control branches of the defense complex and coordinate the activity of all the structures working for defense. At the same time, of course, it must provide the enterprises with everything necessary both for the development of production and for the satisfaction of the needs of the people employed at enterprises of the defense complex..."

And still the logic of the times in the country is such that sooner or later our defense industry will have to find its appropriate place in the market structures and relations.

Hence the second condition, without which anything we do will be merely half measures. Its essence is that it is time to give up verbal battles regarding the essence of the definition of the "military-industrial complex" and to recognize the existence of such a complex in our country and give it the form and content that will provide for its effective functioning under the conditions of the market.

What will this take? Well, in the first place, as certain specialists at the Northern Machine Building Enterprise think, it will be necessary to analyze the experience of military shipbuilding in countries where market relations determine not only the lives of individual people but also the life of the whole state and the functioning of its structures, including the military-industrial complex. It will be necessary to optimize the structure of the domestic military-industrial complex and to reorganize to meet the demands of the market the entire system of ties and relations among various firms and productions working for defense. Perhaps it will be necessary to create a special banking system that serves the defense industry under special conditions. As an alternative, we might create a joint-stock bank for the defense branches. It could be founded by the state as a whole and various branches of industry engaged in the production of defense products, and possibly also large production associations that have funds for this at their disposal. Such a bank, being included in the country's overall banking system, would conduct broad banking activity under market conditions in keeping with the parameters adopted within this system. But the activity of the defense branches would be served under privileged conditions. Alternatives, as they say, are also possible. Ultimately the result is important: Our defense branch must enter the market with the forces and means, structures and ties that will provide acceptable conditions for it to fulfill its most important state task—providing the Army and Navy with everything they need to maintain strategic parity and defend the interests of the country.

Time does not stand still. The Northern Machine Building Enterprise must take its place in the new economic relations that are developing. Both the country's defense capability and the fate of hundreds of thousands of people, the fate of an entire city, depend on this.

And even today there are many problems in the relations between the plant and the city...

Incidentally, dividing Severodvinsk into the "plant" and the "city" is extremely conventional. For these two parts are frequently linked to one another. Severodvinsk was created specifically as a zone for satisfying the needs of the enterprise and its workers—for housing, social and domestic amenities, leisure... And essentially its role has not changed much during past decades.

Two-thirds of the residential buildings in Severodvinsk belong to the plant and about 60 day nurseries and kindergartens, the majority of facilities for social and

domestic purposes, the stadium, the pioneer camp, and the Palace of Culture are on its books. Maintaining the city's housing fund costs the plant (in old, pre-April, prices) more than R20 million each year, children's preschool institutions—another R13 million, and the maintenance of repair services and water supply services—another R60 million...

The region in which an enterprise like the Northern Machine Building Enterprise operates, of course, requires ecological protection as well. And this too is on the shoulders of the plant.

Difficulties with financing will obviously also lead to a situation where the enterprise will have to shrug off what I would call its patronage role in the life of Severodvinsk residents. For decades the city dwellers have linked most of their plans to obtaining from the plant not only an occupation but also an education in general—to its polytechnical school and the plant-vocational and technical school and the support the plant has rendered to the secondary schools of the city. Will it be able to continue to do all this in the future? There is no simple answer...

In the country today there is an active process of turning the real power over to the soviets. To be sure, it is not proceeding without problems and not without difficulties. But have we not completely forgotten about cities like Severodvinsk—these unique "military settlements" where official power structures are merely appointed and have no real power?

The chairman of the Severodvinsk City Ispolkom [executive committee] Albert Aleksandrovich Dobryakov thinks that neither the local soviet nor the ispolkom can consider itself a free, full-fledged master of the city. They have practically nothing—neither a normal city budget nor municipal services that are developed to the slightest degree, as it is now fashionable to say. All this is in the hands of the Northern Machine Building Plant.

But then why not place the existing forces and funds for maintaining the city, as well as the technical equipment, in the hands of the city authorities?

It turns out that it is not time to do this either. Members of the plant administration and the ispolkom say that the city authorities are simply not prepared to take over such an extensive economy and maintain the condition of municipal services at the proper level. The city has neither the funds for this nor the experience in running this kind of economy. Finally, when creating the legislative basis for the future life of the country, it is necessary also to provide for transforming plant settlements like these into regular cities where the soviet and the ispolkom have all the proper authority and the enterprise does its own work—producing products.

...We have discussed certain problems of the Northern Machine Building Enterprise. Of course, this discussion cannot be complete. Dozens and possibly hundreds of problems have been left untouched. But the fact that the

veil of secrecy has finally been removed from Severodvinsk makes it possible to draw attention to this region from the government, ministries, and departments and the general public of the country.

Conversion Progress at Machine Building Ministry Plants

914A0919A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Jul 91
Union Edition p 2

[Interview with Vladislav Kharlampiyevich Demtirov, chief, Main Scientific-Technical Directorate of the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building, by V. Litovkin, IZVESTIYA correspondent: "How to Earn Money for Conversion."]

[Text] **Rockets constitute the production of the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building. These are strategic and operational-tactical combat missiles, and rockets for peaceful space research. But the Ministry's plants also make refrigerators, equipment for the APK [agro-industrial complex] processing branches and for light industry, color television sets, tape recorders, tractors, and even streetcars. Forty percent of the total production is for peaceful purposes. In 1995, this ratio should go up to sixty percent.**

How is conversion going? What problems does it pose? How are they resolved? V. Demtirov, Chief, Main Scientific-Technical Directorate of the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building, answers our correspondent's questions:

[Litovkin] Vladislav Kharlampiyevich, I know that your Ministry has been working on the conversion program for over two years now. What has it brought you, good or harm?

[Demtirov] This is not a simple question. Of course, for all of us sensible people, it cannot be anything but good. But in practice, conversion is a most painful process.

[Litovkin] Why?

[Demtirov] The reorientation of defense production enterprises to production of consumer goods has to be a result of a well-developed and well-thought-out plan that takes into account all the consequences. But what do we have today? A jumbled up system of material and technical supply, violations in deliveries of materials and component parts, and low wages.

[Litovkin] But isn't this the general situation in our economy?

[Demtirov] Unfortunately it is, and we have experienced it fully. Well-organized labor and smoothly functioning production have always been our standard. It is difficult to guess what kind of losses the total disbalance of the economy has caused us and is still causing us. It bothers us greatly that the technical equipment for the processing branches of APK, made with such great effort in our plants, is often not needed.

The leadership of a number of republics and oblasts are not at all rational in their use of the machines and assembly units that we make for them. Here are some concrete examples: As of January 1, 1991, our customers had accumulated a total of around three billion rubles' worth of equipment. And as of the beginning of this year, remaining equipment amounted to another 700 million rubles. This is significantly more than our annual output. Included is equipment for the production of sugar, sausage products, prepared meats, butter and oil, and bread and bakery equipment. Our country is extremely short of all these products. Nearly every republic has a solid "reserve": 1.6 billion rubles' worth "lying around" in Russia, half a billion in the Ukraine, 164 million in Belorussia....

Not only does the branch not receive any grants for conversion, it cannot even pay for its own expenses. We are faced with a critical question: How do we get through this?

[Litovkin] And how will you? What is the way out?

[Demtirov] The way out is through specialized state support of conversion. The first priority is legislative support, followed by material and technical support, public support, and of course, financial support. Unfortunately, the government conversion program adopted a year ago is not backed by anything and no implementation procedure was established. There is simply no money to implement it.

[Litovkin] And why couldn't you earn this money yourself?

[Demtirov] There are certain "buts" involved in this. If, for example, the Ministry of the Aviation Industry, instead of producing military aircraft, could make civilian aircraft or else increase the production of military aircraft in order to sell them abroad, and pay for converting production from the profits.... But we ourselves cannot sell the rockets we produce. This means that we have to approach the problem from a different angle.

There are two possible approaches. Let us conditionally call them the quantitative and qualitative approaches. The first one calls for increasing the output of "peaceful" products for space: more communication satellites, relay equipment, and navigation satellites. And what if we use this method to its full capacity? But this method is finite because requirements for this technology are limited.

This means that we have to "develop" the second approach. For starters, we must have a radical change in the attitude toward our equipment for the processing branches of the agro-industrial complex, which is perceived as "second class" production. After all, in foreign countries this equipment is now to a great extent the result of the very latest engineering and technology. We also have this kind of engineering.

Here, for example, is a vacuum cutter, a machine for processing meat and making prepared meat products.

This is complex technology and electronics in the system of programmed control. Our chief designer for rocket engines, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Konopatov, and his deputy, Anatoliy Sidorovich Kashchuk, began working on it. They made a machine that we would not be ashamed to show even to the whole world. Take the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], the pace-setter for the latest products in the output of equipment for meat processing. But their experts walked all around our 125-liter cutter, looking at it this way and that way. It has some unique, original features. And our processing industry refuses to acquire these cutters.

[Litovkin] They are probably too expensive for them, are they not?

[Demtirov] The old equipment, "a piece of iron," is probably cheaper, and it also processes all kinds of raw material. But this is on a completely different level. This new equipment requires some respect. You cannot pack it with a meat substitute. And it costs 80,000 rubles. This is why it is "inconvenient" for our customers.

But if you count that 80% of the processing industry is equipped with imported machinery that was paid for by hard currency, and then convert its cost according to the official exchange rate, you will see that our new machine is less expensive and no worse in quality than the imports.

[Litovkin] If they start buying your machines, the trips abroad will also stop.

[Demtirov] I am speaking about the state approach, not the bureaucratic approach to this matter. Let us count it up. Development of all equipment for the APK, in accordance with the program approved by the government, costs a total of about 500 million rubles annually for the Union. If we spend this amount over a three-four year period, our country will have its own processing plants, technologically-excellent product lines, and individual types of equipment that meet world standards. We could saturate the domestic market with these items and not have to spend several billion hard currency rubles abroad each year for the purchase of products and equipment. Then the time would come when we could also sell our machinery abroad. To do otherwise means that we would be doomed to having to make purchases abroad every year and to being backward forever.

Meanwhile... The financing of our work has been cut off. The government program has been left hanging in the air. The State Commission on Food and Purchases still has not concluded a single agreement for 1991. Soon we shall just not have anything to pay our workers, technicians, and engineers—the elite of our country's scientific and technical potential. Is this any kind of a state approach to the problem?

True, a few days ago it was said that allegedly 80 million rubles had been earmarked for next year. The problem is, however, that we need 162 million rubles for our seven-system machines, for such socially important branches of

the food industry as bread baking, meat processing, butter and oil, bakery, sugar, yeast, and potato processing. This constitutes 25% of the total volume of production. Where, then, are we going to get the rest of the money?

We turned to the republics and encountered understanding on their part, especially in Russia and Kazakhstan. A glimmer of light hit the window, but it is too little for peace of mind.

[Litovkin] You speak of the high cost of your products. Experts in the processing branches complain about this, too. Would not one method of saving money be to decrease the cost?

[Demtirov] Of course. For us to overcome this barrier is the problem of all problems. Former high costs were explained by the nature of our work: piecemeal production and the necessity for exceptional reliability. Our products were "Energy," "Buran," and the "Mir" space station. Thousands of people participated in this work; entire complexes of scientific research institutes, design bureaus, and plants. Needless to say the prices were "astronomical," too. The situation has changed now. We are transitioning to a serial production organization in those same plants. This means that the entire process has to be different. This is one side of the story. The other side is that there is a new problem of having to achieve the necessary and sufficient quality for this serial production. The former scrupulous form of control—from the smallest detail to the finished product—is not good any longer. We just do not have the time for it. This means that we have to abandon it, but at the same time we have to raise the technology of machine building to the level where any possibility of defects is excluded. This is exactly how well-known Western firms work.

[Litovkin] There is another way to earn money for conversion that seems self-evident to me. Prior to our meeting I visited the branch exhibition. Why can't you increase the production of television sets, refrigerators, and washing machines that are exhibited?

[Demtirov] Alas, not everything is as simple as it seems. Last year we increased the production of consumer goods by nearly 1.4 times. This is the limit of our capability. In order to go further, we would need not only new shops to produce component parts, which are now supplied by other branches, but a new production base, including new shops, new equipment, and new floor-space. Where would we get them?

You cannot present the problem by saying that if we used to make 200 rockets, and now we make 20, instead of the 180 rockets we can make television sets or refrigerators. We would need different types of equipment for that.

The production base, test stands, and the entire selection of technological equipment is the same, whether for one rocket or a hundred. They have to be maintained in working order, and this cost quite a bit of money.

How, then, can we increase production of these refrigerators? We have to look for different ways. We have to obtain a bank loan and establish a joint enterprise. We are attempting to do this. For example, in Orenburg, we have decided to establish a joint enterprise for producing absorption refrigerators, using the production base of the "Strela" amalgamation. In addition to us, two foreign firms will join the enterprise. We have determined the degree of participation of each party.

Our capital is simple: buildings, equipment, electrical power, water, and all the rest. But we need a certain amount of hard currency, some 7-10 million rubles, so that our share would be 45%. We asked for this money. They did not give it to us. Foreign banks are ready to give us credits, but the Vneshekonombank [Bank for Foreign Economic Activity] is not providing a state guarantee that this loan would be paid off. And this plant alone could give us an annual profit of 200 million rubles.

[Litovkin] But the Vneshekonombank is not your last resort. There are still the Cabinet of Ministers, the Prime Minister....

[Demtirov] Unfortunately, they all try to avoid our problems. They maintain that there is no money and they do not see any in the future, and they propose that we look for money wherever we can. And they do not provide guarantees either.

[Litovkin] Why couldn't you "borrow" the money from plant workers and give them a chance to become shareholders? Or offer shares to foreign companies? I know that there are people in this country who are ready to spend their money, including hard currency, on a profitable business. Would it be possible to establish small enterprises at your plants and give them the opportunity to make some money for conversion? Or is the ministry afraid that it would no longer be the owner of these enterprises and could not order them around, as before?

[Demtirov] We are not afraid of that. Although our functions are changing—the administrative pressure methods of work we used in our relationships with enterprises are now fading into the past—believe me, we shall have plenty of ways, even in the future, to influence plant policies.

The essence of the matter is something else. Our production funds are very expensive. Our "cheapest" plant costs 40 million rubles. Four thousand people work there. Do you think they have enough money to buy the equipment? I am convinced that they do not. Even if shares cost 1,000 rubles each, and each person would be able to acquire one share, including the cleaning woman, it would come up to only four million rubles—10% of the value of the basic funds. Where would we obtain the rest of the money? And how about reconstruction? And to get the new production going?

In principle though, you are right. We have to be bolder in using new methods and the most diversified methods. We are trying to do this, but quite honestly, it is very

difficult to step over the old psychology. We are stuck in the vicious circle of thinking that the state has to help us as it did before. How can it be otherwise? He who orders the music to be played is the one who also has to pay for it.

The market is a good thing, but it is not a panacea. Judge for yourself: the market demands a quick payoff. You take a loan from a bank and in a year or two you have to pay it back. How can a small enterprise do this? If they purchase even the simplest equipment, for example, to stamp out small plastic basins, the machine will start putting them out. They will sell them. They take another loan and increase their production, this time for another item that is used widely.

This item is also in short supply in our country and undoubtedly it is needed. But it is impossible to satisfy the domestic market with complex, science-intensive, high quality merchandise in this manner, including automobiles, automatic washing machines, video recorders, refrigerators, or SVCh [expansion unknown] stoves. Without state capital investment and without a long-term state scientific-technical policy, this production cannot make it. Otherwise, our backwardness will increase even more.

In order for this not to happen, scientific-technical progress must be directed with economic levers, preferential tariffs, tax regulation, subsidies, credits, and non-budget resources. A mechanism is needed to carry out conversion or it will be doomed to failure.

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