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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Union of Baltic Military Personnel Defended

91UM0768A Riga CINA in Latvian 23 Apr 91 p 3

[Interview with Valentin Filatov by Davids Gefters: "General Filatov: 'Union of Baltic Military Personnel' Is Public Organization"]

[Text] Major General Valentin Filatov, deputy commander of the Main Command Staff of the Baltic Military District, rejected the contention expressed in an announcement by the Latvian Supreme Soviet's defense and internal affairs committee that the "Union of Baltic Military Personnel" supports the restoration of a totalitarian regime.

"The 'Union of Baltic Military Personnel' is a public organization," General Filatov told LETA [Latvian press agency] correspondent Davids Gefters. "It unites not only those internal troops of the USSR KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs, veterans of the Armed Forces, and family members, who are deployed in the Baltic Military District, but also those deployed in the Baltic Border Defense District, the Baltic Fleet, Baltic republics, and the Kaliningrad Region of the RSFSR."

The goal of this union is to protect the legal social and political interests, and rights and freedoms, of soldiers, members of their families, and veterans of the armed forces. It categorically denounces the campaign of lies and attacks against military personnel. The union organizes its work in firm accordance with the constitutions of the USSR and the Baltic republics, and with the USSR law on citizens public associations. Not a single document published by the union calls for 'changing the legally elected structures of state power in the Baltic by armed coup.'"

Army Trade Union Chief Interviewed

91UM0783A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with L. Lobacheva, chairman of the Soviet Army Worker and Employee Union Central Committee, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA freelance correspondent F. Semyanovskiy, colonel of the reserve; place and date not given: "Unions in the Army"]

[Text]

[Semyanovskiy] Lidiya Borisovna, whom do the trade union organizations which your Central Committee heads unite?

[Lobacheva] They unite workers and employees who work on the USSR Defense Ministry central staff, in military training institutions, establishments, and Army units, and at enterprises under central jurisdiction.

These are in the majority of cases highly skilled specialists with a length of service of 20 years and more.

[Semyanovskiy] But the union organizations of the main and central directorates were formerly headed by a joint committee. What is this, a change of signboard?

[Lobacheva] It is not just a question of a change of name, of course. We have acquired broader opportunities for participating in the law-making process. Now we not only analyze all legislative instruments connected with the social protection of the working people and the activity of the trade union organizations, but also, if need be, bring them into line with the interests of the members of the union.

And, finally, which is very important, the status of Central Committee has enhanced our responsibility for the decisions we adopt and for the proposals which we take to the appropriate command staff, which was not the case previously.

[Semyanovskiy] As far as I know, certain trade union organizations in the districts of commissaries, and military medical institutions particularly, have preferred to remain in the former sectoral civilian unions. How did things stand with you?

[Lobacheva] Prior to the formation of the Federation of Armed Forces Unions, we were a part of the Moscow State Establishments Worker and Employee Union. And none of our primary organizations expressed a desire to remain in the former structures. On the contrary, new "primaries," which wanted to be part of the single Soviet Army Worker and Employee Union, were added.

[Semyanovskiy] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA recently published the agreement that was concluded between the Defense Ministry and the Federation of Armed Forces Unions. How do you evaluate it?

[Lobacheva] We consider it a very significant event. After all, it is the first time such an agreement has been concluded. It is now recorded in black and white that no legislative instrument determining the activity, rights, and obligations of members of a trade union may be adopted without the federation having been consulted. This affords us an opportunity to influence the formation and preparation of the corresponding instruments, orders, and decrees to ensure that the rights of the workers and employees are not infringed, and that they are not deprived of social safeguards.

A place has been found in the agreement for undertakings of the ministry concerning the implementation of additional measures pertaining to the social protection of the workers and employees. It is planned, specifically, to increase the number of passes to sanatoriums and rest homes of the Defense Ministry, allocating clinics for workers and employees and affording them an opportunity for hospital treatment.

But there are very many unsolved problems also. I will cite just one example. The subsistence minimum in Moscow, according to figures of the Moscow City Soviet Statistics Administration, is at the present time 360

rubles [R]. At the same time, however, the wages of many categories of workers and employees are still the equivalent of R150-180. In our view, it is now necessary without delay to adopt urgent measures to retain the skilled personnel. After all, many good specialists are now leaving the Army.

I would say at the same time that a shortcoming of this document is the fact that it has failed to reflect the wage-rate problem. It is essential as soon as possible to conclude a new wage-rate agreement with the Defense Ministry.

Further, if we read the substance of the agreement somewhat more closely, we see that it contains no specific commitments in respect to a solution of the workers' and employees' housing problems.

One further question. In many establishments, organizations, and enterprises work conditions do not conform to modern requirements. Not that long ago we encountered also a phenomenon which was new to us. There has been an increase in the incidence of occupational illness connected with the operation of electronic equipment. This has already swallowed up a large percentage of the social insurance resources. And since the corresponding commanding officers cannot yet resolve the questions connected with an improvement in work conditions, let them allocate resources and money for a rectification of the health of their subordinates and their treatment in sanatoriums and clinics. This is how it should be, I believe.

[Semyanovskiy] Lidiya Borisovna, as is known, in accordance with the agreement that was reached, the defense minister issued an order. It says, inter alia, that the commanders of arms of the service should conclude agreements with the corresponding central committees. But with whom will your Central Committee conclude an agreement?

[Lobacheva] Ours is a somewhat special situation. I have already said where our union members work. And, naturally, a leader of a sufficiently high rank should conclude the agreement on the part of the Defense Ministry. The first deputy defense minister of the USSR could be such, in our opinion.

A plenum of the Soviet Army Worker and Employee Union Central Committee was held recently. L. Lobacheva's report and the speeches of the participants in the plenum concentrated particular attention on questions of the social protection of the workers and employees under the conditions of transition to market relations.

The work on realization of the agreement between the Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Worker and Employee Unions was subjected to critical analysis. Some things had been done, but this was manifestly insufficient. The most urgent issues of the day are the establishment of wages no lower than the subsistence

minimum, the introduction of income indexing proportionate to the growth of inflation, and an increase in the amount of compensation in connection with retail price rises. It was observed that the decision on the reduction in the cost of meals in commissary mess halls and refreshment areas as of 1 June of this year was not being implemented in the majority of cases. Questions of the provision of workers and employees with housing, and of their children with passes to pioneer camps, remain just as acute.

The plenum addressed to the leadership of the Defense Ministry and the Federation of Worker and Employee Unions a proposal concerning an acceleration of the development and adoption of a wage-rate agreement for 1992 and the legislative confirmation of the status of the workers and employees. Impartial criticism of the federation leadership was heard in this connection.

It should be noted that the leaders of the federation responded very promptly to the criticism. Five days after the plenum, a meeting with the heads of economic departments on the preparation of a wage-rate agreement was held. True, the question arises: Could this not have been done earlier?

Students Threaten Strike Over Deferment

91UM0825A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Aug 91
Union edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "Students Threaten Strike"]

[Text] A student strike committee has been set up in Moscow with the goal of drawing public attention to the new draft law "On general military service," many conditions of which, in the students' opinion, are anti-reform and strengthen the prevailing order in our Armed Forces. In the event the law is passed, students will also lose deferment from military service.

End of Student Deferment Urged

91UM0827A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Aug 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by Army General N. Lyashchenko, Army General A. Shcheglov, and Navy Admiral N. Sergeyev: "There Is Much Ado, but Is There Any Sense?"]

[Text] The sixth, regular session of the USSR Supreme Soviet will discuss the draft law on compulsory military enlistment and military service. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, KURANTY, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, and some other publications printed certain materials in this connection which support the student enlistment deferment. Moreover, all arguments in the defense of the deferment cancellation are labeled by them as demagoguery, a meaningless and immoral talk.

One cannot but feel concerned with this kind of categorical statement. We would expect that a dialog concerning this problem be conducted in a respectful manner and

only facts be used as the basis for the exchange of opinions. But the authors of these articles do not think so, even in those cases where they present really serious claims. Among other things, they are consistently talking about the perilous effect of the military service on the budding talents of our future scientists, engineers, teachers, and workers of culture. But at the same time they do not give any proof of it.

The military service always helped students to develop also. They became more mature and more responsible for their actions. Their military experience helped them to overcome the obstacles in their everyday life at a later stage, to find a common language with their workmates. There are examples of a different nature, of course, as there are shortcomings in the military units themselves. But we should not arrive at such broad general conclusions based on separate incidents.

Let us talk about another important issue, that of social protection. The enlistment of students together with other young people fully complies with this requirement. All people in our country have equal opportunities and obligations. The opportunities may be used in accordance with one's abilities, wishes, financial status, and other circumstances but the obligations are the same for everyone.

Is it fair to extend privileges to some categories of people in this case? It definitely is not, but everything looks different in practice. This may be seen, for instance, from the analysis of our present-day army personnel. Every young man has both the right and the opportunity to enter any higher education establishment, with no preferential treatment for anyone. But for some reason however, those young people who have parents in high positions or have connections or have a lot of money also get more of those opportunities. Can this be the main reason for the uproar in our press about the student enlistment?

All this allows us to say: There should be no exceptions for any category of young people when they are drafted into the Armed Forces. Every person should honor his constitutional duty in due time.

It is a different matter that the term of the military service can be made dependent on the serviceman's progress. If he is expeditious in acquiring military skills and is also conscientious and well-disciplined, the term of his military service can be reduced. Incidentally, that was our practice once, in the early 1930's. We had special qualifications platoons organized of well-versed and diligent soldiers and sergeants. The term of service in them was only one year.

Other solutions are possible. The most important thing is to let common sense dominate when these solutions are considered and put into practice.

Army Employee's Union Set Up in Belorussia

91UM0827B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Aug 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "The Union Will Protect You"]

[Text] Minsk—The following information appeared recently on the pages of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet organ, the NARODNAYA GAZETA and it drew the interest of Soviet Army civilian employees primarily. The Belorussian Federation of trade unions helped to establish an organizing committee which should prepare and conduct the constituent congress of the republic Soviet Army civilian employees' union.

The first steps have already been made in designing the agreement between the commanders of the Belorussian military district and the organizing committee of the future union. They expect to discuss regulations on protection of the socioeconomic and labor rights for the civilian employees of military units.

The constituent congress of the new union is scheduled for the end of September.

Kiev Officers Criticize Rukh

91UM0827C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Aug 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "We Do Not Change Our Colors"]

[Text] Kiev—The officers of the Ground Forces Air Defense Academy, based in Kiev, issued a statement concerning the recent Rukh [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroika] action, the so-called congress of officers—Ukrainian citizens. Among other things, it states that certain political circles and other pseudopatriotic organizations continue their attempts to undermine the Union and to push the Ukraine on the road towards self-isolation, while ignoring the will of the people as it was displayed during the referendum of 17 March of this year. Nobody elected the congress participants or gave them any powers but the impostors assumed the right to speak in the name of the officers of military units and formations and military schools located in the Ukraine. Not being servicemen, these Rukh officials showed the full value of their true political ambitions at the congress.

Understanding that the Soviet Armed Forces present an unsurmountable obstacle in implementing those ambitions, says the statement, the nationalistic elements are making frenzied attempts to discredit them and break them up; they are making attempts to separate the military by ethnic houses and use them in future as tools for the realization of their far-reaching designs.

The officers of the academy have stated that they did and will serve their people alone, contrary to various declarations; they vowed to remain faithful to their oath, their constitution, and their motherland and to not change their colors.

The statement was signed by 579 officers.

Armenian Presidium Statement On Armed Forces Activity

91UM0800B Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
14 May 91 p 1

["Statement of the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] Along with the bloody deportation of the residents of Getashen and Martunashen, the Soviet Army continues its aggression against the Republic of Armenia. The list of villages being subjected to violence and destruction has been joined by Voskepar, Kirants, Tekh, Kornidzor, Shurnukh, Khoznavar, Artsvashen, and other Armenian communities. Soviet authorities describe the bombing and shelling of peaceful villages from the air and ground as a "passport regime check," not a war. In the process, the Soviet Army does not consider itself obliged to observe either international obligations with regard to a state of war—such as, for example, the UN convention on the treatment of prisoners—or legal norms whose observance is mandatory even under the official Soviet interpretation of events. Flouting the law and legality, the Soviet Army and internal troops are engaging in actions that are inadmissible even under extraordinary circumstances. The use of modern combat hardware and firearms against the civilian population in occupied territories, violence against women, children, the elderly, and the disabled and the brutal killing of these people, and the illegal arrest of officials and rank and file employees of local government agencies, economic managers, and police officers without any official sanction whatsoever have become daily occurrences in Armenian border communities. There is considerable evidence that Armenian prisoners, termed "hostages," are being subjected to inhuman tortures in an effort to compel them to give false testimony confirming the official version, supported by the country's president, regarding so-called "Armenian militants."

Based on the aforesaid, the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet Presidium believes:

1. that the Soviet Armed Forces and central authorities must:

- a) immediately cease aggression against the Armenian people;
- b) strictly observe legality on the part of the Armed Forces and prevent them from exceeding their authority;
- c) release all hostages, prisoners, and persons arrested illegally;
- d) provide precise information as to the fate of those who are missing and unaccounted-for.

2. that competent union and international agencies must investigate the events and issue appropriate conclusions:

- a) on flagrant violations of the UN convention, ratified by the USSR, of December 10, 1984, "Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Types of Treatment and Punishment";

—b) on the flouting of the UN declaration of December 14, 1974, "On Protecting Women and Children in Extraordinary Circumstances and Periods of Armed Conflict."

3. that the question of the responsibility of those who have inspired, organized, and executed, at the state level, acts of barbarism in Armenia must inevitably come under the scrutiny of the world community.

May 8, 1991. Yerevan.

Creation Of Estonian Army

91UM0800C Tallinn VECHERNIY TALLINN
in Russian 28 Jun 91 p 1

[Article by Ivan Makarov: "Estonian Army Being Created in Yärvamaa"]

[Text] An Estonian army is being created in Järvamaa, says Enn Jalak, deputy chief of the Vodyaskiy camp, on the pages of PAEVALEHT for June 27.

A training camp for youths performing alternative service was held on May 20 through June 6 at the Vodyaskiy athletic facility. Some time ago, efforts were made to set up a similar training camp by the Tapa area Kaitseliit. However, the undertaking collapsed on the third day, since "the required discipline could not be maintained from the very outset."

The regrettable experience of the Kaitseliit was taken into account at the alternative service training camps. Of a total of 242 conscripted "laborers," 208 youths successfully completed the training. Two young men were expelled from the camp for gross violations of discipline and "advised to join the Soviet Army." The others who failed the tests will have to attend the training camp sessions again.

At the training sessions, the youths performing alternative labor service received instruction in the use of assault rifles and flak jackets and were given elementary instruction in self-defense and first aid. The evenings were devoted to physical and athletic tests, a 1,000-meter race, and exercises on the horizontal bar and parallel bars. The requirements were rather tough: Those who failed to meet them had to try again; if they failed on the second attempt, they have to await a notice requiring them to attend a subsequent training camp session. On the final day of the training sessions, they also had to pass tests in marksmanship, drill instruction, and regulations.

The camp's organizers also wanted to test the alternative service youths' commitment. An alarm was sounded, the session participants got into formation, and they were told that, according to information from Tallinn, the Riga special police unit was heading from its base toward the Latvian-Estonian border. Volunteers were needed to resist the special police. It was stressed that those who declined risked absolutely nothing, that no one would

say even a bad word about them. The youths were given 30 seconds to think it over, and then the order was given: "Volunteers, two steps forward!" Four people came forward. Then another one came forward, followed by yet another. Of the 65 youths in formation, 27 youths stepped forward to confront the "terrible danger."

"We know we can count on those fellows," said Enn Jalak, who wrote the article.

Georgian National Guard Appointments

91UM0800A Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA
in Russian 4 Jun 91 p 3

[Order of the Chairman of the Republic of Georgia Government Defense Commission]

[Text] With a view to maintaining organization, discipline, and order in the troop garrisons of the internal forces of the Republic of Georgia National Guard, I order:

1. That a commandant patrol service be set up in all cities of the Republic of Georgia in which National Guard troop units are stationed; to this end, Colonel Avtandil Tskitishvili is appointed chief of the Tbilisi military garrison; Mr. Gela Lanchav is appointed commandant of the Tbilisi military garrison; commanders of military units in cities in which troop units are stationed are appointed chiefs of those cities' military garrisons.

2. That nonstaff commandants of military garrisons be appointed military garrison chiefs for the purpose of organizing garrison and commandant service, and that systematic oversight of strict execution by them of their functional duties be organized.

3. That National Guard personnel be informed of this order.

Commander Tengiz Kitovani, chairman of the Republic of Georgia government defense commission.

Rodionov Open Letter On Tbilisi Events

91SV0027A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Open Letter by Colonel General I. Rodionov: "The Full Truth Has Yet To Be Told: Open Letter to USSR People's Deputies General of the Army B.L. Govorov, Lieutenant General A.I. Golyakov, and Major General V.M. Miroshnik"]

[Text] Public attention is being focused on the events of April 1989 in the city of Tbilisi more and more. The words "Tbilisi syndrome" have now become a part of our political lexicon. But are those words always invested with a clear and unambiguous meaning? Is everything beyond doubt in the coverage of those events? There is reason to doubt this.

By virtue of a number of circumstances, I want to talk about those events with you in particular. As members of the commission set up by the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies to investigate the Tbilisi tragedy, you know better than many people what actually happened, why, and how. As seasoned military officers, you know first-hand about the character and life of the Soviet Army and the specific features of military service, which are based on the legally enshrined principle of unquestioning obedience to one's superiors.

This is why your understanding and your attitude toward what happened, and in particular your assessment of the actions of the military units and the army, carry special weight and are of great interest. Yet not once have you yourselves spoken publicly about the contradictory conclusions that have been publicized and are being discussed in society. Is this position justified in political, moral, and ethical terms? Can it possibly be that your signing of the findings of the commission on the Tbilisi events relieves you of the need to promote efforts to provide the country's parliament and public with comprehensive and objectively accurate information?

At issue are by no means personal problems, but problems that are of profound political significance and have a bearing on the principles governing the way our society is organized. In addressing you in an open letter, I ask you to view this as a proposal that you take a direct part in ascertaining the truth, the whole truth, and only the truth surrounding the causes and nature of the April confrontation and those to blame for its tragic consequences.

A frank discussion of this is all the more essential in view of the fact that there are now two official documents that offer diametrically opposing assessments of those events. The commission report delivered at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies by commission chairman A.A. Sobchak states: "Serious violations were committed in the course of preparations for and the conduct of the operation to clear the square..., violations that led to tragic consequences." The report by the USSR Prosecutor General states that "the servicemen did not exceed their authority and acted properly; they bear no blame for the grave consequences that ensued."

The diametrically opposing character of the conclusions is obvious. To some extent, it can be attributed to the fact that the parliamentary commission and the investigation team used different methods to ascertain the actual circumstances, and to the fact that the investigation team, having had considerably more time, was able to gather and scrupulously analyze a great deal of testimony that the commission was unable to consider.

You have inside knowledge, so to speak, of the general orientation of the Tbilisi commission and of the sympathies and antipathies of its individual members. Was the commission sufficiently impartial? Dispel my doubts, which stem from at least two incidents. As is common knowledge, when the commission's members were being

named, the nomination of V. Karpov was rejected solely because he is known to like the army. At the same time, the post of commission chairman was assigned to A.A. Sobchak, who, if we are to believe him, on April 10, i.e., before the fact, and not yet in possession of any information, was convinced that "fools wearing general shoulderboards had again resorted to force, with no thought as to the consequences." You will agree that such circumstances hardly strengthen my belief in a desire and ability to subordinate emotions to reason.

Now, however, in light of new information, it seems expedient to return to this matter and to take a critical look at the course of your commission's work and its findings. In this regard, I would like to know your personal opinion on several issues that appear to be of fundamental importance.

First and foremost, to what extent were all 24 commission members—people, as A.A. Sobchak concedes, of varying experience and varying political convictions—unanimous? For example, you, Vladimir Leonidovich, intended at the time to put a special opinion on the record. What provisions and findings of the report did you disagree with? Then, for some reason, you considered it unnecessary to carry through with your intention. Perhaps the new social and political situation in the country and in Georgia, the altered working atmosphere in the supreme legislative bodies, or additional information that had become known about the confrontation in front of the Government House were able to influence your position. You cannot remain silent today, at a time when people are trying to portray the "Tbilisi syndrome" as a sickness of the army and as evidence of police functions on the part of the Armed Forces, which are always ready to move against their own people.

Another question concerns the fullness, objectivity, and validity of the findings. As they formulated common approaches, A.A. Sobchak would write later, the commission members "put aside all that was unproven or that could not be proved." But legal specialists know full well that if one fails to take into account what has not been proved or cannot be proved, (at a given stage, using a given set of methods?), this destroys the rigor of all the evidence, and an investigation could take a wrong path and lead—how can one put it mildly?—to erroneous conclusions. It's no accident that A.A. Sobchak's report contains clever omissions and discrepancies. For example, in speaking about the causes of the deaths, he reports the existence of varying conclusions, but states only one of them—the simultaneous effect of a mechanical crushing of bodies in a dense crowd and the inhalation of toxic substances used by the internal troops. In the process, he doesn't even mention the expert conclusion categorically rejecting the possibility that the irritants had any effect on those who died in front of the Government House, where no such substances had been used. Here's another quote from A.A. Sobchak's report: "The large number of people who had crowded on a small area were simply unable, when columns of soldiers began moving toward them, to quickly clear the square,

where a confrontation arose and subsequently developed into an outright battle." In this context, the confrontation arose as a result of the approaching columns of soldiers. And not a word is said about the many people who, at the urging of those who had organized the rally, had sat on the ground in front of those columns, nor about the organized groups of young people who put up armed resistance to the soldiers. The report goes on to say that "the commission found no evidence of the existence any real threat of a seizure of vital republic installations prior to April 9." Yet such evidence is cited in the documents of the USSR Procuracy.

There are other contradictions in your commission's report as well. And so I have another question for you: Do you agree that the findings of the congress committee were never discussed by the congress itself, and that a statement on those events made to the congress by the Main Military Procuracy was even concealed from the public? Nor was that statement published in the verbatim record of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. It seems to me that this kind of abbreviated and one-sided information fails to meet the requirements of glasnost. Wittingly or unwittingly, it gives rise to pretensions to exclusive possession of the truth, to a monopoly on an openly tendentious interpretation—to be more precise, on an altered version of the actual events.

And here another question arises: Should one view the findings of the commission of which you were members as a final verdict? I ask about this because the Tbilisi commission's findings, which, in the opinion of A.A. Sobchak, were ratified by decision of the Congress of People's Deputies, identifies all those to blame for the April 9 tragedy; but, he laments, none of them has been held accountable.

I do not even bring up the fact that jurists' sacred rule of the presumption of innocence is being ignored here. I am not speaking about the flagrant disregard for the constitutional provision declaring that no one can be found guilty of a crime except by ruling of a court. I only want to point out that we should not forget that with its resolution, the congress did not endorse or confirm the commission's conclusions, but took them under advisement. It censured not specific agencies or specific individuals, but the fact per se that violence was used in Tbilisi. The commission's proposals are subject to review and action (not immediate implementation) by the agencies concerned. Any other procedure could have serious consequences. For we have already known in our history a time when so-called justice served as the obedient enforcer of the will of political authorities and was called upon only to confirm their decisions, which took the form of "put on trial and sentence to death by firing squad."

And so there are quite a few contradictions in the Tbilisi events of April 1989, in the materials of the congress commission regarding those events, and in the public interpretation of those materials. Their resolution is an

important political and moral task. It must be carried out by the government's judicial, executive and legislative bodies, which do not supplant but supplement one another. The Supreme Soviet and the Congress of USSR People's Deputies can and must express their own authoritative views. I urge them to take up anew the question of a political assessment of the Tbilisi events and of the role played in them by various state structures and public organizations, officials, and citizens—an assessment that takes into full account the materials of the USSR Procuracy.

I want to hope that I will have your understanding and support in this.

Drunken Soldiers Go on Rampage in Sukhumi

*91US0717A Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA
in Russian 23 Jul 91 pp 1, 3*

[Unattributed article: "Own Information": "The Fury of Paratroopers...: The Incident at the Sukhumi Tourist Camp"]

[Text] Sukhumi—At about 2130 on 20 July a clash began on the grounds of the tourist camp imeni Chelyuskinty in Sukhumi, which served as temporary quarters for the officers of the airborne assault force battalion. A conflict that started between the servicemen and local young people soon grew into a fight which spilled from the tourist camp onto a nearby street. The people of Sukhumi have differing views of the incident, their opinions vary and sometimes directly oppose each other.

Today we are publishing the text of the telephone message signed by Major General G.N. Lominadze, Abkhaz ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] minister of internal affairs. On 21 July 1991 it was sent to Tbilisi, to the Republic of Georgia Ministry of Internal Affairs, and to Moscow, to the duty officer of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs:

"At approximately 2200 on 20 July 1991 the UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] duty officer received information that officers and ensigns of the Soviet Army Airborne Troops stationed at the tourist camp imeni Chelyuskinty in the center of the city of Sukhumi, in a state of intoxication, had attacked local citizens and were beating them up. The operations group and alerted UVD personnel, together with an Internal Troops battalion, military unit 5482, took certain measures and by 0300 on 21 July had prevented further incidents of public disorder.

"According to preliminary information many of the witnesses, who were interrogated "on the spot" and who live near the tourist camp, testified that the servicemen were drunk and spoke in obscenities on the subject of Georgians, calling on each other to kill them. They chased teenagers and women who tried to escape. After breaking into the house of citizen Zariya, they beat the owner of the house, Mziya Akakiyevna Zariya, born 1949. They also beat and caused bodily injuries to Levon

Nugzarovich Kalandiya, born 1977, Eliso Vakhtangovna Darsaliya, born 1964, Dmitriy Otarovich Gobechiya, born 1975, and Revaz Otarovich Papava, born 1977.

"In their turn, the servicemen described the lawless actions of the local young people as the reason for the conflict, referring to their behavior towards service-woman Alla Aleksandrovna Drapalyuk, born 1962, of military unit 11664. During a conversation with her she said that at approximately 2130 some young men started accosting her on the grounds of the tourist camp. One of them grabbed her hands and pushed her into the bushes. Her screams were heard by some servicemen who were around, and they came to her rescue.

"A narcotics test conducted at 0400 on 21 July established that A.A. Drapalyuk was under the slight influence of alcohol. In order to verify the complaints of the civilian population about mass drinking among the military, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel V.N. Krasovskiy, was requested by the garrison commander, Colonel T.N. Chkadua, to test all the military stationed at the tourist camp. However, only 21 officers out of the 70 could be tested. According to Krasovskiy, the rest of them were either on leave, on duty, or absent for reasons unknown. One of the 21 tested, Senior Lieutenant Oleg Viktorovich Popov, born 1963, was diagnosed with a slight degree of intoxication.

"In order to localize the conflict and prevent public disorders the following people arrived on the scene: Militia Major General G.N. Lominadze, Abkhaz ASSR minister of internal affairs, Colonel A.Sh. Ioseliani, chairman of the Abkhaz ASSR KGB, Colonel T.N. Chkadua, Abkhaz ASSR military commissar, Abkhaz ASSR Procurator A.K. Kvitsiniya, Sukhumi Procurator Z.S. Bartsits, Abkhaz ASSR Deputy Minister of Justice M.A. Gamzardiya, UVD commanders, and the operations and investigations group of the city procuracy and UVD.

"A criminal suit was initiated in the case, and it is now being decided whose jurisdiction it comes under. In order to prevent wide public disorders and further conflicts between the military and the civilian population, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is providing explanations and advice to the people of Sukhumi."

Changing Political Role of OMON Units in Latvia

*91UM0815A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 26 Jul 91 p 2*

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent K. Markaryan: "Party Berets: Two Special Missions Detachments Operate in Latvia at Present"]

[Text] Riga—Sergey Krotov, born 1961, was killed with a pistol in a forest at kilometer 2 of the Riga-Malpils highway. This happened during the day on 2 July. An examination revealed that there was also a slash wound on his head. Sergey worked as chief guard in one of the

cooperatives of Riga after leaving the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment], to which he belonged from the very beginning of its formation, following the January attack on the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Latvia. As early as last summer the former OMON instructor of unarmed combat spoke up against using the detachment for the purpose of political struggle.

The Black Berets

USSR Minister of Internal Affairs B. Pugo is almost categorical with regard to the black berets. Boris Karlovich stated that the detachment has the support of a considerable segment of the population of Latvia, and for this reason pulling it out of the republic is out of the question.

Vecmilgravis is one of the microrayons of Riga, at one end of which the OMON base is located; a red banner flies over it. According to approximate data, the detachment consists of up to 150 men at present. They are commanded by Militia Major Cheslav Mlynnik.

From the files of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Ch. Mlynnik is from Riga; he is 30. In nine months he has accomplished a meteoric rise from senior lieutenant to major. In May he was wounded by unknown persons on a landing in his building. He is a former "Afgantsy" [Afghan veteran]. He graduated recently from the Minsk Higher School of the MVD.

Here are certain thoughts of Ch. Mlynnik "about the times and himself" from an interview printed in a supplement to the republic newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH:

—The internal affairs organs, the KGB, and the Army should be depoliticized.

On perestroika:

—This is another campaign which, it is already obvious, is leading the country to an impasse.

On sovereignty:

—If the republic secedes from the Soviet Union, foreign capital will enter, which is already happening to a small degree—there are farmsteads, and land is being sold for hard currency. This is it. Nothing national will be left here.

—In general, I am in favor of a large and strong—call it empire, call it what you want. There is something else I do not like. Incidentally, the Russians were respected before, just respected, not because they were feared... After betraying and selling Europe, we have lost very many friends.

—You should stay on one shore or another. In our case, there are two of them. That is all. I do not count the middle. There are their people, and there are our people. There is nothing else.

White Berets

The "white berets," as men from the 1st Separate Battalion of the Patrol and Post Service of the Latvia MVD are called, have their base not far from downtown Riga. However, unlike OMON personnel they do not wear berets at all, whether black or white. They have regular militia uniforms. To be sure, they are outfitted better than their colleagues from the Latvian MVD—they have short-barrel assault rifles, personal weapons, and bullet-proof vests... "White beret" is merely a symbol, a password, like the one Mlynnik and Nevzorov, who divide all people only into "ours" and "not ours," have. There is white and there is black; other colors which used to exist are no more, to say nothing about shades.

From the files of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Juris Vectirans, commander of the 1st Separate Battalion of the Patrol and Post Service, Latvian, a cadre MVD employee, 36. He was in compulsory military service with special units of the Internal Troops in the Baltics.

The tasks of the battalion are similar to those for which the Riga OMON was created to begin with—maintaining public order, patrolling, fighting crime, and guarding government establishments. At present, the battalion has 200 people—former marines, border guards, militiamen, and workers.

J. Arbidans, commander of the 2d Company, said: "The people are agitated. On the one hand, there is the OMON, the black berets. They call us the white berets. When there are two armed organizations, politics begins. But who benefits from this? We are not a counterbalance to the OMON, not a political grouping. After all, when we detained OMON members we were not interested where they were from—the OMON, the KGB, or some other organization. If someone has violated the law, he must be held accountable.

Senior Sergeant Gunar Rusins told us: "In January I was at the barricades, and this is why I came to the detachment. There are many people here whom the January events prompted to join the battalion. Our guys are not only from Riga but from all over the republic. Some live with friends, some rent apartments. It so happened that I was in Afghanistan. It seems to me, looking at Mlynnik's picture, that we met over there; at any rate, we went there the same year and we came back the same year. This is why I do not want to be once again put in a situation as when the same communists first sent us to Afghanistan and later renounced us, saying that everything was a mistake. It is a pity that many OMON personnel, especially former 'Afgantsy,' are putting it on the line yet again."

The Extreme

The former Minister of Internal Affairs of Latvia, Bruno Shteynbrik, recently assumed a new position—chief of the USSR KGB Special Department for the Red Banner Baltic Border District. In an interview to the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA he said that actions by the

OMON against customs checkpoints are illegal: "One cannot combat lawlessness with lawless methods. However, the OMON personnel are not at fault: After all, they did not conceive the action themselves."

This is a characteristic admission by "a professional Chekist," as B. Shteynbrik calls himself. Here is one more interesting utterance about the recent actions of the Vilnius OMON:

"Not everything is clear in this matter either. Executing the ukase of the USSR president dated 25 July of last year, they discovered and confiscated ammunition and explosives hidden at a telephone exchange. However, they made a fuss in the West. OMON leaders were summoned to Moscow, to the USSR MVD. It appears that this was about some political game which ended in a search for 'scapegoats.'"

Please note that this is always the case. Let us recall, say, the January events or attacks on customs checkpoints. All those who should have known about them, astonishingly enough, pleaded a strange kind of ignorance. The minister of defense, the minister of internal affairs, and the USSR general prosecutor had no inkling. As is the custom, OMON personnel were at fault again.

It appears to me that everything began when the newly appointed A. Vaznis issued an order on depoliticizing the militia organs, rather than when the new minister came in. The command of the detachment at the time, headed by Lieutenant Colonel E. Lymar, made its first big political play by resolving not to comply with the order and to keep the party organization. They made a beginning. At this point, the minister also banned the operation of the OMON cooperative Viking, through which the detachments generated money (they guarded restaurants and various companies in Jurmala).

I am sure that the latter decision boosted "patriotic" feelings in the OMON. The detachment ceased altogether to obey the new minister, stating that it did not recognize the declaration on restoring the independence of Latvia, and thus did not recognize any decisions of the government of the republic. "The black berets" planted a red banner atop the republic House of the Press, the Latvian CPSU publishing house which was taken under their protection as early as September of last year. The banner is exactly the same as the one flying over the building of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee and over their own base.

The OMON was gradually turning into "our people." Protection was also extended to the building of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Procuracy, which failed to disband, despite the creation of the Republic of Latvia Procuracy. The "Vikings," who were commanded at the time by S. Krotov, whose murder was mentioned at the beginning [of this article], received remuneration for these services, incidentally, as well as for everything else.

As V. Upmace, investigator of the Republic of Latvia Procuracy for particularly important cases, testified, Major A. Chetskiy, inspector of the analysis group, played a major role in developing OMON ideology. When the activities of Chetskiy, who worked in the counterintelligence service, began, a wave of disinformation swept through the OMON, and an image of the enemy personified by the leadership of the republic, which, it was impressed on them, would definitely settle scores with the detachment, was developed.

Later, the January events occurred. Prior to the storming of the MVD building on 20 January the Riga militia school was captured, those on duty at the school were beaten up, and weapons were confiscated. During these same days, equipment barricading strategic points in Riga was set on fire. Also the first victim fell in these days in a firefight on the road—driver R. Murnieks, who was driving the official GAZ-24 car. There were five more fatalities following 20 January. Later, there were actions against customs checkpoints.

Some people could not stand this. By now, about two dozen people remain from the original personnel of the OMON. Many have transferred to similar detachments in cities throughout Russia, where the OMON fights crime rather than carries out party assignments.

A. Shabanov said: "I left the Riga OMON on 2 April. More precisely, they 'let me go,' saying that I was not psychologically fit. I believe that they still failed to understand why I came to the detachment, because at almost the same time eight people came there from Moskovskiy Rayon in Riga. It was crystal clear in their case—they were people who did not have apartments, and if 'soviet' power wins, they will..."

Who Will Come Out on Top?

A commission consisting of USSR People's Deputies S. Belozertsev and Kh. Fargiyev, and aides to USSR people's deputies V. Nasonov and I. Ozdoyev worked in Latvia for five days in late May. They investigated the events that occurred in Latvia in May: the ransacking of customs, the picketing of the Council of Ministers building, and military exercises in Riga. I will quote just a few excerpts from their findings:

"The USSR Ministry of Defense attached a marine unit to the Riga OMON for six months in order to conduct operations more successfully... After the customs operation, the subunit was returned to the Navy brigade..."

"The OMON actions coincided with the posting of unannounced pickets in front of the Council of Ministers building by individuals unhappy with the government's policy... In addition, with a view to further intimidating the population of Riga, without notice to the civilian authorities, on 25 May drills were conducted during which operational command and control of the troops in a densely populated city were exercised, as well as the study of the possible location of combat operations by the personnel.

"Convoys went past government buildings. At 1000 the troops were withdrawn from the city (in the opinion of experts, up to three companies of a motorized rifle regiment were deployed in the downtown area). The command of the Baltic Military District attempted to deny that a drill was being held."

In reference to this, I recall the words of an officer of the 1st Separate Battalion of the Patrol and Post Service, which I recorded on my cassette recorder:

"From time to time they provoke us. They fire flares around the base, supposedly on holidays. Or, for example, on 9 May there were bursts of automatic weapon fire next to the Council of Ministers, where we have a post nearby. However, I think that the OMON men would not like to mess with our submachine gunners either."

Which new order, and at what point, will the combat detachment of the party carry out—a party which, as demonstrated in Latvia, still considers itself a ruling party, and whose local leader is still the chairman of the salvation committee? However, would it not be more logical to give the people themselves a chance to come to terms with the authorities they elected?

Defense, Conversion Minister Interviewed

91UN2274A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
13 Jul 91 p 3

[Interview with V.I. Antonov, Ukrainian minister for the defense complex and conversion, by PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent Aleksandr Sokol under the rubric "About the Cabinet and the Ministers"; place and date not given: "Along an Unusual Road"]

[Text] In a previous issue under this rubric V. Yu. Pekhota, state secretary of the Ukrainian SSR Cabinet described the structural changes in the republic government. Today our correspondent talks with V.I. Antonov, Ukrainian SSR state minister for the defense complex and conversion.

[Sokol] Viktor Ivanovich, the title of your post gives an idea of the subject your state organ—the defense complex and conversion—is concerned with. Previously the Union handled these problems. Why has the republic assumed them?

[Antonov] First of all I would like to make a clarification. The sector of work entrusted to me covers enterprises of Union subordination not only in the defense complex but also in machine building and metalworking. Their proportion of total social production is solid—about 20 percent. We are talking about one-fifth of everything produced in the Ukraine. But how has the republic been handling this? Only on the level of consumer goods production. Moreover, the work was hard but there were few goods; production was maintained through the enthusiasm of the directors.

The declaration on the state sovereignty of the Ukraine, and the law on its economic independence assume a different situation, namely, that the activity of the Union enterprises should be in the interests of the republic. The recent Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution on transferring them to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR was the first step on this road. More significant changes lie ahead, such as, in particular, how to transfer enterprises to republic ownership.

I foresee the reproach: "self-willed independence," they will say. But this is not so. We will be in the Union and we will be producing defense equipment. The point is, how to do this. Today it is half free. But what we need is prices that correspond to the terms of the Ministry of Defense. These links, incidentally, will be useful not only for the producer but also the customer.

One aspect of this problem is the following. It is generally recognized that we badly need appropriate world-standard technologies and machines and equipment. We feel a special need in the sectors operating for the individual: enterprises that produce agricultural output, infant formulas, medical equipment, machinery for municipal work and highway construction. The list is long. But who is capable of producing all this? The defense sector, of course. It produces the most technically advanced, hi-tech products. Hence the conclusion that if we want to restructure production on a modern basis we must rely on the defense complex. And in order to do that, we must have it.

That, briefly is how I answer your question.

[Sokol] How will the government organ that you head influence such powerful enterprises? What kinds of management levers exist for this, and what, in particular, can you say about the apparatus?

[Antonov] Let us start with the apparatus. The state ministry has a department for the defense industry and machine building, and a state committee is also being set up. But it is not administrative might that will do the influencing. This will be replaced by administrative levers. We see the situation about like this.

Enterprises will independently plan their own output volumes and products list. But they will also receive a state order: from the Union, for defense output, and from the republic for civilian output. If the order for some reason is not guaranteed, an enterprise may reject it (the law provides for that right) and operate independently. But in that case it has to do everything itself—determine its product list, find material resources, market its output. As you see, it is a matter of management with the aid of economic levers and economic interest.

With these kinds of approaches it seems to me that there is a unique pyramid of priorities and indicators. At its apex is today's most important, most essential equipment and machinery. Apart from providing the resources for their production, the republic government

will suggest a set of economic advantages—lower taxes, interest-free loans, funding for science, and so forth. As far as taxes are concerned, in the first year, for example, an enterprise may be totally exempt, in the second year 70 percent or 50 percent exempt, and so forth. At the base of the pyramid the advantages will be less significant. The “pyramid” can be made public in advance and the order placed on a competitive basis.

[Sokol] Do you think this work can be done without the involvement of Union organs?

[Antonov] During the first stage the Union ministries will be retained. The republic does not yet possess the infrastructure for material-technical supply. These functions can be carried out only by Union organs. It is also they that will place the order for defense-related output, but through the republic. Everything should be done on the basis of partnership, not diktat.

[Sokol] What tasks do you face as state minister?

[Antonov] To pursue a policy that would make it possible to saturate the market with goods quickly, in the broad sense of the word. What I have in mind are both video recorders and microwave ovens and up-to-date equipment—food, medical, and so forth. The problem of military equipment goes further: Like the enterprises, the republic must make profit from its production, and earnings for the budget.

The most important problems are connected with conversion. They are, I hope, well known.

[Sokol] What is good here, and what bad?

[Antonov] The good thing is that the volumes of military output are being reduced. The bad thing is that for two-and-a-half years the Union Government has been unable to pass a law on conversion. As a result, a collective producing missile equipment, for example, may be assigned the task of producing clothes pegs. This kind of reorientation sets us back even further.

[Sokol] Do you have any favorite ideas?

[Antonov] What we need is not only Union but also republic conversion programs, and corresponding laws. For it is a matter of a very important state problem. For example, they say that whoever is producing tank engines will be able to produce car engines also. In theory this is so, but they are also different kinds of products: Very serious restructuring of production is inevitable.

Conversion assumes considerable capital investments. According to rough calculations, in the Ukraine the sum needed is somewhere in the region of seven billion rubles. A very large sum. Otherwise, we will achieve nothing worthwhile.

[Sokol] An international conference on conversion took place recently in Kiev. Who organized it and what did it produce?

[Antonov] It was a forum of eminent scholars from the United States, England, and Canada, convened at the initiative of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Economic Reform and Management of the National Economy. It was interesting on a cognitive-information level. But I would regard this action only as a beginning. We need similar new meetings, above all with business people, that will produce some specific result.

The work ahead is difficult and crucial, but it is extremely necessary for the republic.

Results of Ukrainian Officers Conference

91UM0815B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 2 Aug 91 p 4

[Article by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent Georgiy Dolzhenko: “There Is No Mace for Mulyava...”]

[Text] Kiev—The call to form a national army sounded strange, not to use the word “provocative,” at a congress of democratically minded officers serving in the Ukraine.

The congress, which drew 320 delegates, began in the same manner as all similar functions of informals. A folklore group sang an anthem, and clergy of the autocephalic church said a prayer. Subsequently, there were reports, rejoinders, and discussions. We will omit the abuse heaped on the “imperial” center and the CPSU and the substantiation of the need to have a republic army—these revelations are well known. On the other hand, innovations in the sphere of military development merit our attention.

For example, quite detailed statistics borrowed from American sources were brought up in a report by V. Mulyava, chairman of the organizational committee of the congress. It turns out that it is known in the United States how many tanks, planes, and missiles particular divisions have, how many ships there are in the Navy, and how much the Army costs the Union, the Ukraine, and so on. It is impossible to find such data in our sources. I also learned that the United States has a plan to send rapid deployment forces to our country in order to guard nuclear power plants against a chance explosion or subversion in the course of a civil war unleashed by, who else, “the Bolsheviks.”

Many speeches were made during the two days of the congress, but all of them boiled down to one point: The Ukraine should have its own army, proceeding from the Declaration of State Sovereignty adopted a year ago. The committee of the officers of the Ukraine formed right there should become the first step toward creating the Ukrainian army. As was stated, the committee is a public organization, and does not set for itself the task of forming military units. Coordinating and advocacy activities only will become the main spheres for its operations. Certain things have already been accomplished. For example, a draft Law on the Legal Status of Servicemen Serving in the Ukraine has been developed. This is an interesting document. Thus, instead of the

oath it introduces an obligation to defend the democratic system and the freedom of the Ukraine. Charges cannot be brought against servicemen for disobeying an order which violates international law, undermines the sovereignty of the Ukraine, or is aimed at the commission of a crime. Participation in preparations for a war of aggression is punishable by law. However, who is going to take regular military training now? They could accuse you of aggressive intentions, could they not?

The concept of the Ukrainian army is another document which merits perusal. In particular, it provides for transferring to the Ukraine all troop structures of the Union Army located on the territory of the republic, and many other things. However, it appears that nobody will be there to study this inheritance. Representatives of the officer assemblies of the Kiev Garrison announced ahead of time that the congress and decisions made at it aimed at undermining the defense capability of the state were not legitimate. The command of the district approached the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet with a demand to prevent the holding of the congress altogether. The response was similar in other districts. However, the leaders of Rukh, the People's Council in the parliament, and other sponsors of the congress are convinced that such statements do not reflect the actual attitudes of the officer corps, and that the number of democrats in this corps continues to increase, and this is why the congress accomplished its task.

Indeed, many problems have piled up in the Army. These include the continuous lack of accommodations for officers' families, favoritism, and deteriorating discipline. The Army is a perfect reflection of the ills of our society. However, the effect of the congress may contradict the good assurances it gave. Dividing the Army and discussing the creation of republic troops in the absence of even the prerequisites for real sovereignty, a new Union treaty, or a Constitution of the Ukraine is at the very least premature; this may entail grave consequences. This is why the call to form the first battalion of the future Ukrainian army, which a delegate from the Rovno area advocated to the sound of applause, sounded all the more strange.

Knyazkov Visits With Local "Volunteer Companies"

*91SV0017A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Jul 91 First Edition p 6*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major S. Knyazkov under the rubric "Who's Who": "Volunteers or Warriors?"]

[Text] Passers-by were asking under their breath, noticing people in black "Afghans" in the market square in Lvov at the end of June, if they were members of OMON. The answer was a shrug of the shoulders, since national Ukrainian symbols were clearly visible on the sleeves of their jackets and the cockades of their berets.

It soon became clear, by the way, that the Lvov residents were getting acquainted for the first time with the "volunteer companies" of the Administration to Protect the Public Order of the Lvov City Ispolkom, more specifically Chervonoarmeyskiy Rayon.

Their ritual oath-taking took place a little later at the city soviet building. Laying their hand on the Bible, having knelt and kissed the yellow and blue banner, the volunteers swore to be honest and disciplined and to fulfill the laws unswervingly. The priests of the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox churches blessed the new guardians of order.

The media in Lvov, run by Rukh, greeted the establishment of the Administration to Protect the Public Order with enthusiasm. They emphasized in their reports from the ceremony that the volunteers are called upon to help the police in keeping order in the city and, as Lvov mayor Vasilii Shpitser announced, they would in time be operating in all of the city's rayons.

It would seem that the local leadership of the UVD [internal-affairs administration] would be delighted with the appearance of these new helpers in the fight against crime. The situation in the oblast and the city today, after all, is quite complicated. Since the beginning of the year, according to data from the deputy chief of the oblast internal-affairs administration, A. Opalkov, some seven thousand crimes have been committed. Criminal groups have united, and recidivism and the crime rate among adolescents are rising. Despite these circumstances, however, none of the leaders of the UVD were at the oath-taking ceremony. Why?

"I saw these 'volunteers' in Lvov for the first time not at the oath-taking, but rather at the 'National-Liberation Struggle of the 1920s-1950s in the Ukraine' international conference that was held at the building of the Lvov oblast organization of the popular Rukh of the Ukraine. They appeared in the foyer during the break between sessions and were immediately at the center of attention of the delegates and elderly people who had been, not a minute earlier, greeting speeches by like thinkers with enthusiasm, speakers who had been relating with pride their struggle against Soviet power, their activity as part of the not-unknown OUN [Association of Ukrainian Nationalists] and UPA nationalist organizations and their years spent in confinement.

"They clustered around the 'volunteers,' shook their hands and clapped them on the shoulders. There were many who wanted to be photographed with them. Ordinary policemen, had they appeared here, would hardly have been worthy of such an honor. But it was another matter here: the aging warriors were greeting their replacements, assembled under the banner of Rukh."

What does it take to enter the volunteer companies? The candidate, in the words of the commander of an analogous organization under the Stryi City Ispolkom, Vasilii Bychko, should have a recommendation from a primary organization of Rukh and the council of the labor

collective, and complete an interview at a session of the oblast Rukh committee. Only after that does he issue an application to the detachment. The new recruit swears an oath—the Ten Commandments of Yevgeniy Konovalets (one of the founders of the OUN—*my note.*)—to the Holy Gospels in the presence of a large number of people, in a stadium, for instance. Bychko notes, by the way, that there are several times more young people who want to try out their strength than are needed. They are basically interested not in the pay, in his opinion, but rather the opportunity to serve the Ukraine during a time of its peaceful winning of independence.

Waiting for a pause when the conference delegates, satisfied with their meeting, left the “volunteers” in peace, I went up to one of them and, introducing myself, suggested that we talk. Taras Kiriliv had no objection.

“The volunteer company was organized in Lvov a month ago,” he related. “It is proposed to bring its size in the city to 800 people with time.”

“The criteria for selection are such,” continued Taras, “that the candidate should be no shorter than 178 cm, have some rank in some kind of sport and be fit, as confirmed by a careful medical examination. One mandatory condition is service in the army. We are not armed, we have only rubber sticks.”

We interrupt the speech of the young “volunteer” here, because the facts at hand testify that the new guardians have more at their disposal than truncheons. Here is what I was told by the chief of the subdivision for public communications of the KGB administration for Lvov Oblast, V. Malchenko:

“Criminal proceedings were instituted against Vasilii Orestovich Shvayko, born 1978, student in the second level at the Brody Pedagogical Institute and leader of an organization division of volunteers to support public order, on 4 Apr 91 in Brody, a rayon center in Lvov Oblast, for a case of breaking into a chest and stealing ROVD [rayon internal-affairs department] items from it. Also against Viktor Iosifovich Tynchishin, born 1974, student at the Chervonoarmeyskiy SPTU [Agricultural Vocational-Technical School] in Rovno Oblast, a resident of Brody and an active member of that same subdivision of Rukh. Eight grenades, explosive devices and cartridges were found during the course of investigative activities at the headquarters of Rukh.

“An old ‘chem kit’ and the start of work on a secret bunker were also found in the woods.”

Igor Iosifovich Kostur, born 1958, was brought into Novorazdol Hospital on May 29 with a gunshot wound. The wounded man was carried in by Novorazdol residents Mikhail Struzhak and Bogdan Melnik. All three were wearing dappled “Afghans” and had the pins of Rukh on their berets. It turned out that Kostur’s wound was sustained during target practice in the woods. A sawed-off small-caliber rifle with bullets, a Mosin rifle, 14 knives and bullets for PM and TT pistols were found

in the apartment of the victim and at the site of the events. There was food, firewood, a face mask, cape etc. in a specially equipped storage area.

Let us return once more to the words of Taras Kiriliv:

“Today each of us gets 350 rubles a month, but as far as I know, the question is being raised of increasing the monetary sustenance by 200 rubles. There was a competition in the detachment. Various people came in. Someone was not suited due to health, another due to frame of mind, even though we have no relation to politics in general. Even if some of us were in the party before this, we left it upon entering the volunteer companies. That is a mandatory condition.”

I do not know if Taras Kiriliv really and genuinely did not understand that the lack of party membership among the “volunteers” is a fiction, or whether he was being cunning, but facts are facts: Rukh has created a militarized organization, veiling it with a noble-sounding name. And reliable and trusted people have been made commanders of the detachments. The head of the first 55 Lvov “volunteers” is Yaroslav Stelmakh. He has technical and legal education. He worked as the deputy chief of an ATP [trucking enterprise] and was highly paid, although he admitted it is true that he had dreamed of working in law-and-order bodies since he was a child. But, as a reporter for the newspaper of the Lvov Oblast Ispolkom, ZA VILNU UKRAINU, wrote, they told the graduate firmly that boy, you won’t get far. Don’t forget, they said, that your parents were sent to Siberia...

Perhaps that is not an argument for some. Thousands of innocent Soviet citizens were sent to Siberia as the result of the illegality of the Stalinist regime. But here, perhaps, is a different case. This line in the record of Ya. Stelmakh only increased the trust of the local leaders in him.

The volunteers are also chosen to be well matched with the commanders. In that same Stry detachment, for example, N. Britan and Ya. Kovalets completed a certain training in Vilnius on January 16-21 of this year, where together with colleagues from the Lithuanian department for the protection of the kray they “defended” the independence of Lithuania with weapons in hand.

A session of the Lvov Oblast Soviet intends to consider the question of the status of the Administration to Protect Public Order as a parallel structure with the police in September. It is difficult to say what it will be engaged in in the future. The appearance of a new militarized organization seems exceedingly dangerous, however, in the western Ukraine, inflamed by political passions. Some see in it the germ of a Ukrainian Army. It is no accident, after all, that the chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet, Vyacheslav Chernovil, stated openly in the LOS ANGELES TIMES in a recent interview on July 7 that “Every republic that is proclaiming independence will have its own army... So why should the Ukraine and the other republics not also have their own armies?”

Where could this lead? The example of Yugoslavia is before our eyes...

Maj Gen Ivanov on Military Restructuring*91WC0142A Moscow KOMMUNIST**VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 15, Aug 90
(Signed to press 27 Jul 90) pp 15-20*

[Article by Major General V. Ivanov, candidate of military sciences, docent, senior instructor of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, under the rubric "Theory and Practice": "Radical Renewal and Not 'Cosmetic Repair'"]

[Text] The program declaration of the 28th CPSU Congress "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism" states that the party considers it necessary to conduct military reform based on the new defensive doctrine and principle of reasonable sufficiency and the priority of qualitative parameters in military organizational development.

This article attempts, on the basis of the situation that has evolved, to set forth certain proposals for a system of reform in structuring our Armed Forces.

Structure

The structure of our Armed Forces has been developing for decades. There have been repeated attempts in their history to perfect the structure, standardize weapons, regulate service obligations, and train command personnel. This was especially noticeable after the events on Lake Khasan and Khalkhin-Gol, the war in Spain, and the Finnish-Soviet War of 1939-1940. Many changes have occurred in connection with the appearance of nuclear weapons. Some innovations disappeared unnoticed, not taking root, others exist to the present day, and some have still not acquired a final status, for example, the Glavkomats [administrative organization under a commander in chief] in a theater of military operations [TVD]. In the proposed concept, the Armed Forces consist of three contingents that differ from each other in degree of combat readiness and task designation.

The **first contingent** of personnel, weapons, equipment, and military property is maintained at **permanent combat readiness** and is always ready for combat employment. It must combine nuclear and space weapons, the main part of the Air Defense Forces [PVO], part of the Air Force, and a specific quantity of Navy and highly mobile Ground Forces. Its composition and numerical strength can change depending on the military-political international situation and the economic position of the country. In all cases, it must be adequate for a defensive resolution of a conflict in an individual region and for ensuring the deployment of the second contingent in the event of war.

The **second contingent** is the most massive. It includes personnel, weapons, equipment, and material-technical stockpiles held in reserve and intended for the formation of units [chast], large units [soyedineniye], and large strategic formations [obyedineniye] in the event of war. Besides the units in reserve, the composition of the contingent includes the cadre basis of formations

[formirovaniye]. It is approximately one-third of the first contingent. As for the total numerical strength and composition of the contingent, this is determined by the strategic plans for the combat employment of armed forces.

The **third contingent** is a training and alternative service contingent. Its main role is the performance of compulsory military service by all citizens of the country on the basis of the Law on Universal Military Service. The total numerical strength is about 600,000-700,000 persons. The term of service is not more than six months in training units, after this a full term in units of the first or second contingent and an extended term in alternative service in Republic Formations. This contingent is one of the main sources for manning the first and second contingents on voluntary principles (on contract), but in the transitional stage, it is the main one. It is possible to include Civil Defense formations in this contingent.

In connection with the above, a fundamental change in the system of command and control of armed forces is being proposed. Analysis shows that no armed forces of any country have such unwieldy and duplicative command and control of the branches of service as we do. Actually, up to the present there are no statutes for this command and control, and there is no clear-cut definition of functional duties and limits of responsibility. During the well-known Afghan events, for example, the 40th Army was directed: immediately by the Army command, an operational group in the Turkestan Military District, and an operational group of the Ministry of Defense, with the involvement of representatives of almost all branches of the armed forces, combat arms, and services. This brought about a lot of unfavorable criticism on the part of unit commanders for the confusion it created.

The proposed concept envisages three forms of command and control in the Armed Forces: administrative, strategic, and operational.

Administrative Form of Command and Control

Instead of administrative staffs [apparat] of the commanders in chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, it is proposed to organize committees. The committee is a collegial command and control organ. Its basis is a council, which issues final decisions on one or another question. The council includes representatives of the Ministry of Defense, military industry, and scientists who work in the military sphere. The numerical size of a committee is no more than 100-150 persons. The committees work out the military-technical and organizational-staff policy of the branches of the Armed Forces for a specific period (five-year plan) and for the long term; they introduce proposals on coordination and approval; they place orders for the production of military products in industry and exercise control over its output and quality, and they organize the manning of units and control over the maintenance of military equipment and property in line units. In doing this, they

work under the direct management of the minister of defense in close coordination with the General Staff and the commands of forces of strategic forms of command and control.

Strategic Form of Command and Control

The strategic form of command and control of the Armed Forces is intended for **planning** the combat employment of the Armed Forces and the practical management of them or of their individual components both in limited military conflicts and in war, if they are imposed on us. It is proposed to have the strategic form of command and control in the form of commands that are organically in the General Staff: Strategic Forces Command, Permanent Readiness Forces Command, General Purpose Forces Command, Training Forces Command, Republic Units Command, Civil Defense, and the commands of organs of local military command and control. The numerical strength of the staff of the command and control of commands is from 50 to 200 persons.

Strategic Forces Command. Included here are the presently existing Strategic Missile Forces, and units and large units of the Air Force, the Navy, and Air Defense Forces and Space Defense Forces that are armed with nuclear munitions and systems for their delivery to target that are consolidated into Nuclear Forces, and also Space Forces—units and large units that are equipped with systems for the destruction of enemy installations from space. The composition of forces also includes support and service subunits [podrazdeleniye] and units [chast].

The General Staff develops the force employment plan and confirms it with the president. The numerical strength of the Strategic Forces in the first stage of reorganizations can be about 400,000 persons, depending on the military-political situation in the world, and will be reduced to the extent that agreement is achieved with the other side and in conjunction with the principle of reasonable sufficiency. The form of their employment is independent operations in coordination with other forces. Combat employment is directed by the Supreme High Command. Strategic Forces are supported by the general state budget and are employed only in wartime. The main force elements of Strategic Forces can be armies, flotillas, divisions, and regiments.

Permanent Readiness Forces Command. In peacetime, these forces are brought up to full strength with personnel, weapons, and equipment according to tables of organization and equipment, and with stocks of military-technical means according to established norms. The Permanent Readiness Forces are employed in peacetime and in wartime (in peacetime—by decision of the president) to repel enemy aggression or to resolve limited military conflicts in individual regions. In this case, they can conduct independent operations under the direction of the High Command of armed forces in a TVD. In all

necessary cases, they must ensure the mobilization and deployment of General Purpose Forces.

In wartime, units of Permanent Readiness Forces are part of fronts that direct their employment. Naturally, they also plan their employment in wartime. The disposition of Permanent Readiness Forces is a decision of the president, and they are maintained by the all-Union budget. Numerical strength also depends on the military-political situation, and it can amount to 1.2-1.3 million persons, including: Ground Forces—700,000, Air Force—170,000, Air Defense Forces and Space Defense Forces—250,000, and Navy—150,000.

General Purpose Forces. This is the main and most numerous component of the country's Armed Forces. They consist of reserve units, large units, and large strategic force elements of the Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense Forces and Space Defense Forces, and the Navy. Personnel are assigned to force elements through military commissariats; equipment, weapons, and material-technical stockpiles are stored at bases, in arsenals, and in depots. The technology of forming units of General Purpose Forces is similar to that in existence.

At the same time, it should be noted that the current strength of units being formed is low, tables of organization are not complete, and equipment in reserve is frequently inoperable and not combat ready. That which is stored at units is actually not maintained. What can now be done by two-tenths of the driver-mechanics when they receive an order to bring about 100 tanks to readiness? It also must be taken into account that equipment assigned to military units from the national economy is not maintained in the best way and is operated relentlessly. Apparently, equipment and weapons intended for units being formed are expediently being maintained at bases and in arsenals (after creating an integral system from them) by maintenance personnel—employees of the Armed Forces and specialists from among the servicemen on contract. In any case, the system of mobilization of military formations and the servicing and maintenance of equipment and weapons in reserve requires thorough study.

The numerical strength of General Purpose Forces in peacetime can amount to about 630,000 servicemen, with a mixed principle of manning—on contract and through performance of compulsory service. Of this number, approximately 400,000 persons are in the Ground Forces, 80,000 in the Air Force and the Navy, and 70,000 in the Air Defense Forces and Space Defense Forces. The disposition of units and the areas of their formation are determined by the General Staff and approved by the Supreme High Command.

Training Forces. Together with Republic Units, they accomplish the practical implementation of the Law on Universal Military Service; i.e., the entire conscript cohort must go through them, and after this either sign a contract for service in the Strategic Forces, Permanent Readiness Forces, or General Purpose Forces, or remain

in alternative service in Republic Units. The numerical strength of the Training Forces is 300,000-350,000 persons, and the period of training five to six months. Of this number, approximately 25,000 persons are being trained for service in the Strategic Purpose Forces, 200,000 for the Ground Forces, 30,000 for the Air Force, 15,000 for Air Defense Forces and Space Defense Forces, and 40,000 for the Navy. The Training Forces are maintained by the state budget, their disposition is determined by the minister of defense, and they are subordinate in peacetime to the command of the military district on whose territory they are stationed. In peacetime, Training Forces form reserve units and train replenishments for the active forces. The formation of line units on the basis of Training Forces is also not excluded. A call-up is conducted twice a year.

Republic Units and Civil Defense. This statement of the question, apparently, can result in many different opinions. On the one hand, the establishment of Republic Units would seem to decentralize the command and control of the Armed Forces of the country as a whole, and, on the other hand, voices can be heard for the withdrawal of Civil Defense from the country's Armed Forces system. I will try to substantiate my own proposal.

Dozens of battalions are formed annually in our Armed Forces to assist in the harvesting of crops. Equipment, mainly motor vehicles, is allocated from line units (i.e., combat units designated for combat operations), and personnel (except for officers and warrant officers) are called up from the reserve, i.e., from the national economy. At the same time, battalions that are formed in one of the oblasts and even in a republic are assigned, as a rule, to another oblast or republic (for example, from the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. In recent years, several road brigades were formed for the construction of roads in the central oblasts. In Moscow and in other large cities in the second half of each year, personnel and motor transport from military units are allocated for the procurement of vegetables for the winter, and now they are also being detailed for the transport of products to trade establishments. Military formations exist for the construction of fruit and vegetable bases, for restoration work, etc. There are military formations that continuously work in production in various ministries.

It is not difficult to imagine what occurs as a result of this: the erosion of military procedures, a drop in the prestige of military service, and actual disruption of the combat readiness of line units, because of the diversion of personnel and equipment. Therefore, it is proposed to permit the republics to have their own formations (companies and battalions) that make up not more than a half percent of the total number of residents of the republic. What kind of formations are these? These are those battalions used for the harvesting of crops, rendering assistance to agriculture and industry, performing security measures, supporting order, and participating in the

elimination of the aftereffects of accidents and natural disasters. The argument in favor of this proposal could be the increasingly strong trend toward the performance of alternative service.

The decision to use Republic Units and Civil Defense units for the resolution of national economic tasks in peacetime is made by the government of a republic, and in wartime, by the command of a military district (front), with their employment in the boundary limits of a given republic.

Local Military Command and Control Organs. It is proposed to have them in the form of military sections of the soviets and military commissariats.

Military sections in the local organs of command and control are not a new institution in our country. The only difference is that previously, in the years 1939-1948, they were in the establishment of party organs, but under the present concept it is proposed to have them in the structure of the local soviets of peoples deputies. Incidentally, this question was already raised at a number of sessions of local soviets. Military sections of local soviets could be involved in questions of pre-conscription training, the call-up of conscripts to service in the Training Forces of the Armed Forces, in Republic Formations and Civil Defense units, the conduct of military-patriotic and mass defense work, and, when necessary, to render military organs assistance in the conduct of mobilization work. In fact, in local command and control organs, they would be the executors of the Universal Law on Military Service.

Military commissariats are a basic link in the overall structure of the Armed Forces. There is no need in this article to enumerate their duties and their positive role in our military history. At the same time, it must be noted that so many duties have been assigned to military commissariats at present that they simply have started to "slip," which makes mobilization work suffer. Apparently, it is necessary to have military commissariats in the force structure of local military command and control organs, with their subordination to the military department, while retaining for them the principle of selection of volunteers on contract for service in the Armed Forces—first of all, in the Strategic Forces and Permanent Readiness Forces—pension work, registration of servicemen of the reserve, and mobilization work.

Operational Form of Command and Control

The operational form of command and control is not an intermediate link between other forms of command and control. It is an independent echelon, and it functions under the direction of the Supreme High Command, first and foremost of the minister of defense and the General Staff. The main task of organs of operational forms of command and control in peacetime are the planning and preparation of the operations of groups of armed forces in a TVD, in fronts, and in army operations, and also the

independent operations of fleets, flotillas, and squadrons. The echelons of command and control in peacetime will remain: high commands of armed forces in a TVD and military districts in peacetime (as an exception—the Moscow Air Defense and Space Defense district), and armies; in wartime, the high commands of armed forces in a TVD, fronts, armies, and peacetime military districts. Thus, big changes in the existing situation are not being proposed here now, with the exception of a reduction in the number of military districts and fleets and the organization of a high command of armed forces in the Northwest TVD.

In peacetime, the structure of a military district contains units and large strategic formations [obyedineniye] of General Purpose Forces and Training Forces and military commissariats that are stationed within the borders of a district, but units of the Permanent Readiness Forces are operationally subordinate. The commands of military districts work in close coordination with the military sections of the local soviets and the command of Republic units and subunits. High commands of armed forces in a TVD in peacetime direct the training of military districts. All units are subordinate to them that are stationed within the boundary limits of the command, including the Permanent Readiness Forces, Republic Units, and Civil Defense units. The elaboration of operations in the event of war is conducted taking into account coordination with the Strategic Forces.

The concept proposes to subordinate all peacetime military districts and fleets (except for the Northern Fleet and the Moscow, North Caucasus, Volga-Ural, and Siberian Military Districts, which remain directly subordinate to the General Staff) to the High Command of the Armed Forces in a TVD.

I would like to discuss certain proposals as a consideration. First of all, about the reduction in the numerical strength of the Armed Forces and, accordingly, the financial expenditures on their support, with a simultaneous improvement in the routine material support of servicemen. In this concept it is proposed to reduce numerical strength mainly at the expense of the administrative apparatus—of the five headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces, peacetime military districts and the fleets, and also support of the High Commands of the Armed Forces in a TVD and military districts and fleets in a quantity necessary only for the training of combat employment of subordinate troops (forces). The remaining functions (support, combat training, control, etc.) will be implemented by the force commands.

Finally, it is proposed to reduce the number of servicemen through replacing their positions with civilian employees and the elimination of those administrative and construction formations whose work could be performed by civilian organizations. In principle, the military formations of the Strategic Forces, Permanent Readiness Forces, General Purpose Forces, and Training

Forces should not engage in administrative work or perform tasks that are not characteristic of their status.

In the interests of raising the prestige of military service it would be useful to regulate the awarding of military ranks. Is it necessary to confer officer ranks on workers in military trade and on finance and medical workers (besides medical administrators), foreign language translators, sportsmen, and workers in the quarters and billeting service? After all, it does not sound military: a major—chief of the sanitary engineering service. But there are such.

There is also an overdue need to put the system of training military personnel in order, starting with the training of sergeants and ending with the academies. There is already a lot of talk that training divisions and now training centers have not justified themselves, and that a person, an individual who will be a future sergeant, was lost in them. One recalls the old regimental schools.

Why does an officer study a foreign language in a school for four years, in an academy, and, afterward, also in the Military Academy of the General Staff, and then never serve in the country of this language? Perhaps it is better to study a foreign language as an elective course and before replacement of the officer for service abroad have him go through a course and pass a test on knowledge of the foreign language?

The Law on Universal Military Service must be the same for all citizens of the country. The exemption of some category from service in the Armed Forces has an effect on the social mood of the population, especially on the youth, and it gives rise to negative manifestations not only in the organization of military service but also in the life of society. Is it really possible, should there be a war, that some will fight and others will not? In its very essence there is social injustice in the exemption of some persons from military service.

Naturally, it is not possible in an article to lay out all the issues of the proposed concept in sufficient detail. Moreover, the author does not claim that some of the proposals are singular and, especially, that they cannot be debated.

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Rayon Soviet, Military Fight over Land

*91UN2200B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Jul 91 p 4*

[Report by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent Gennadiy Gypylov: "Generals in the Trenches: Do Not Yield an Inch of Land"]

[Text] Buryat SSR—Without diminishing the merits of true soldiers, heirs to the bravery of Suvorov and Zhukov, I will say that staff officers fight much more

ferociously. Especially where there is not even a whiff of gunpowder. As has happened in Buryatia. But what are they fighting for?

...More than a year ago people's deputies conducted an inventory. They discovered more than 23,000 hectares of practically ownerless land in their Zaigraevskiy Rayon. In the recent past, when the party-administrative command was still strong, this land was assigned to military unit No. 14344. As a tank training ground. The military, however, soon forgot about this territory—a fact attested to by the audit of the soviet executive committee's special commission: "The allocated lot is not used for the designated purpose..." Therefore, the session of the rayon soviet of people's deputies decided to return the land to its legitimate owners, that is, to public property, and asked the republic government to support this decision. Another factor to keep in mind: There is not much good grazing or crop land left beyond the Baykal, all of it has been used to meet the needs of "civilization"; much has already been plowed. Some of the land has also been depleted through barbaric use.

Some time later the Buryat SSR Supreme Soviet brought up this issue at its regular session and resolved: "To withdraw the land unused by the USSR Ministry of Defense to be used for developing collective gardens, individual residential construction, and auxiliary services of industrial enterprises." It has been almost a year since the moment when the republic parliament unequivocally and in principle issued its verdict. During all this time, the Zaigraevskiy Rayon Soviet has been delicately, calmly, but persistently conducting long negotiations with the unit command, the Transbaykal Military District, and with Colonel General A. Kovtun, commander in chief of the Far East Forces.

But, with no results. The military listened every time, seemed to agree, but evaded a direct answer.

The deputies would have lost the battle, had it not been for the USSR president's decree and the RSFSR law, issued at the beginning of the year, on the priority tasks in implementing land reform. The "trench soldiers," however, were in no hurry to return the property of others, although the owners had been petitioning like tiresome supplicants. A. Vershinin, rayon soviet chairman, recalls: "We met with the general probably five times; made a trip there—no use, some local battles were being conducted." In my opinion, the military did not take the decision of the rayon soviet seriously and regarded it as a charming eccentricity by provincial deputies.

When the "battles" moved higher up, to the level of the republic parliament, they again took an all-round defense. The commander in chief declared: "Your decision is not my order; I answer only to Yazov and Gorbachev."

Then the general shifted decisively to the offensive. He wrote a letter to B.N. Yeltsin: "The decision of the Buryat SSR Supreme Soviet is illegal and should be

revoked on the following grounds: These lands have been occupied by the Ministry of Defense on the basis of the RSFSR Council of Ministers resolution of 14 March 1966; ...request the decision be repealed." With that, he also referred to the General Staff directive to form an Army sovkhos there.

By the way, this entity is indeed being hurriedly created—an all hands operation. Right now People's Deputy A. Kovtun is seeking Yeltsin's support. Just a couple of months ago, though, during his meeting with voters in the Zaigraevskiy Raykom [rayon committee] of the RSFSR Communist Party, he was expressing himself more frankly, more or less this way: "We see how all kinds of democrats like Yeltsin are losing their authority; how Rutsikoy, Kobets, and Volkogonov, who have lost authority among their comrades as well as part of their conscience, have been 'bought up'..." As for Silayev, he told an anecdote about him. Does the right hand not know that the left one is gesturing with its finger? The hand is, naturally, in his pants pocket... I do not know...

Just do not reproach me: Why did you zero in on the military? Maybe they urgently need those hectares? Especially considering that V. Semenov, commander of the Transbaykal Military District, assures us that "they are being used in the defense of our country." No, they are not being used in almost any way. Nearby peasants, making use of the protracted battle, are illegally chopping wood there, teenagers start fires, and so on. Right now they, these hectares, are ownerless. I went there, drove back and forth. Wind was rustling in the grass, which was turning green after a generous rainfall; it whistled in the tops of the pine trees; then it would subside for a moment, and it would become quiet. The sort of quiet that happens before the last battle. But do we need this "last battle"? The battle not between generals and deputies, bosses and subordinates, but between citizens? When we all should be thinking about how to better outfit Mother Russia?

By the way, nobody wants to deprive the military. The local authorities offered a different lot for a tank training ground. One safer for nearby villages, by the way. They refused. Land was allocated for their sovkhos in sufficient quantities, and also for families, for gardening plots... The deputies tried to treat the matter kindly, justly. But when to their plea came the answer: "As you were!"—they did not say, "Yes, sir!" and salute. Besides, the RSFSR Law on Land Reform supports the local authorities. Article 36 of the law says that the lessor loses the right to the land if he does not use it appropriately. The Land Code stipulates a fine for "breaking the terms of returning temporarily occupied land, and not fulfilling the duty to bring it into condition appropriate for its use for designated purposes."

Such a fine was found necessary by the republic Committee on Land Reform and, by its decision, had been levied on the military. In addition, it had to ask the republic Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, and the

State Arbitrage to take appropriate steps. As you understand, people do not decide on such extreme steps on the spur of the moment...

When I was familiarizing myself with this story and following its development, it seemed that the deputies, the rayon soviet, and the parliament would win at any time. After all, they are right in everything, and primarily from a legal point of view. But it turns out that in paper

"battles" the military knows how to not give an inch. Who needs tanks and automatic weapons? One can win with papers and telephone messages, and at the same time show no respect for Russian laws. But laws are written for everybody, including generals who are used to people saluting them at first sight.

In this case, it is their turn to salute. And to say to the law: "Yes, sir!"

Discussion of A-50 AWACS Aircraft

91SV0020A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel N. Poroskov from Moscow, Pechora, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, Vladivostok and Moscow under rubric "Our Defense Arsenal": "A-50: A Radar Lifted Into the Sky"]

[Text] Events in the Persian Gulf area graphically demonstrated once again, that the system of command and control of modern battle plays an important, if not decisive role in achieving success. The AWACS airborne long-range radar acquisition and control system has become one of the central elements of command and control for the Americans. Created on the basis of the Boeing 707-320, it was designated the E-3 Sentry and has been in the U.S. Armed Forces inventory since March 1977.

Do we have something similar?

Our Response to Boeing and Westinghouse

The concept of lifting a radar to an altitude of several kilometers and thereby incomparably increasing its capabilities (the electromagnetic beam's clearance angles are eliminated and target acquisition distance increases) and building up a single radar field arose for us and the Americans simultaneously in the mid-1950's, but our development was postponed for a time as lacking promise. The United States, however, continued work and the E-3 is the result of this today.

The AWACS standard operating scheme is as follows: it loiters 300 km from the front line (or line of possible combat contact), scanning a zone 80 km deep. Of the 600 targets which the AWACS can acquire simultaneously with the onboard Westinghouse radar, it tracks around 250 and performs guidance on 15 with automated intercept equipment. A computer processes data at a speed of 750,000 operations per second. Maps of the entire globe are stored in the onboard computer's memory. Combat patrol routes have the purpose of creating a solid radar monitoring zone along borders to a depth of from 400 to 600 km. It is possible to have automatic, jam-resistant digital communications with 2,000 subscribers within a radius of 500 km from the aircraft. Modifications are the E-3B, E-3C, E-3D and E-3F.

The AWACS also has drawbacks: certain ground ECM equipment can paralyze its normal operation and the aircraft's slow speed and impressive size make it a convenient target for fighters and guided projectiles. True, some modifications can have onboard EW equipment and the E-3F can have air-to-air guided missiles.

According to foreign press reports, seven U.S. E-3D's will be supplied to the Royal Air Force during 1991-1992. They will operate in close contact with similar NATO systems, all 18 aircraft of which are registered in Luxembourg, which does not have its own air force. France is purchasing four E-3F's and leasing some of

them to Spain and Italy. Saudi Arabia also has E-3A's (also purchased). Israel, Japan, Singapore and Egypt have the E-2C Hawkeye operational.

NATO AWACS bases are in Germany, Norway, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Strictly U.S. AWACS aircraft are consolidated in the 552nd Wing at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma—three combat squadrons and one training squadron. Together with air defense and EW squadrons, they are organizationally part of the U.S. Tactical Air Command 28th Division.

Once, having had second thoughts, we tried for an accelerated catch-up, but the United States had moved 2-3 years ahead. Nevertheless, the Tu-126 long-range radar acquisition aircraft, created on the basis of the Tu-95 strategic missile-armed aircraft, came into our Air Force and air defense inventory. A separate air squadron was formed on the Kola Peninsula, then transferred to the Baltic, and in 1984 it received new equipment based on the Il-76. The aircraft was designated the A-50. It is outwardly distinguished from a conventional transport aircraft by the onboard radar antenna fairing nine meters in diameter attached to the fuselage by aerodynamic struts. On the ground the fairing seems flat, but this is an optical illusion—a person can stand up straight in the interior of the "saucer."

The A-50 can serve as an airborne vectoring post, radar post and even command post, if people invested with appropriate powers are in it.

In contrast to traditional radars where only the specks of targets as well as range marks light up, our long-range radar acquisition system screens are mottled with signs, symbols, and in some modes also tables. A computer outputs results to the screens both in alphanumeric and panoramic form. It "stitches" interceptor data on the display's fluorescent disk: number, heading, altitude, speed, and fuel remainder. This vast, precise information is necessary for reliable vectoring to the target.

The number of fixed automated vectoring channels largely determines the A-50's capabilities, which can be expanded significantly by also using voice vectoring, i.e., by giving commands over the air. Everything depends on the intercept controller's expertise.

Information is transmitted (or "dumped"—a term used by the crew more often) to the ground over telecode channels and displayed in color on system screens according to the mock battle principle of "Blue"—"Red." The A-50 also sees itself in dynamics of movement relative to Earth reference points—datum points.

The experience of using long-range radar acquisition in large-scale exercises involving different branches of the Armed Forces permits stating confidently that such an aircraft is necessary. During events in the Persian Gulf the crews of majors Aleksey Serebrov and Vasilii Kubasov, relieving each other, flew regularly over Black Sea waters, viewing the air space near our borders.

Fighters taking off from Turkish airfields and ships at sea could be seen very clearly on the screen. Had a cruise missile appeared, it too would have been detected. At that moment the A-50 was our outpost, and information for making necessary, possibly radical, decisions was expected of it.

At this same time, far to the south over the sands of Arabian lands, the U.S. analogue of our long-range radar acquisition aircraft was on station, helping shape the structure of upcoming battle. Only an analogue? If so, then to what extent? I asked this question of V. Ivanov, USSR State Prize Laureate and chief designer of the radiotechnical system.

"Our aircraft and the American aircraft can be considered analogues in purpose, composition and even the number of crew members," said Vladimir Petrovich, "but there are differences in the design and implementation of what was conceived, and the difference in the level of electronics tells above all. The Americans took ready-made, off-the-shelf computers for their long-range radar acquisition system, but we were forced to order them anew, start from scratch, as we say, and use hybrid microcircuits in place of monolithic ones. Indicators were also fabricated anew for this development."

The A-50's fabricators created a unique system despite objective obstacles. It turns out that only two countries were capable of accomplishing the task. Great Britain, for example, rejected its own developments and is purchasing ready-made long-range radar acquisition aircraft from the United States.

While inferior to the AWACS in target acquisition range and number of automated intercept control frequencies, the A-50 surpasses it in the level of target discrimination against the background of the signal's reflections from Earth. Data on satellites via which it is possible to relay information to Earth are stored in the memory of our long-range radar acquisition system's onboard computer. (The AWACS does not have this according to latest data.) It is also necessary to make corrections in the publicity data of the "American."

Now let us look at our A-50 in action, as they say.

Battle Over the Ocean

Even at present, when many secrets in our Armed Forces have been declassified, I did not succeed in getting on the A-50 right away. I will note that not one journalist had flown in this system before on a combat mission.

The crew of Major A. Serebrov, in which I was included, crossed the country from west to east and landed near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. A kind of military council was held in the five-person room of the billeting and maintenance unit hotel. Intercept controllers Major Vasilii Shatokhin, Captain Aleksandr Zhitnikov and Captain Sergey Selivanov and tracking operators Captain Andrey Nalimov and Lieutenant Aleksandr Zhulay bent over a map speckled with notes and figures. There

was vapor over the cups of mint tea and cigarette smoke. The crew was pondering the combat mission. Tomorrow there would be combat work.

There was to be work in two zones according to the mission received from the Pacific Fleet Air Force command (to which the crew was attached this time). We would find out which one would be first after taking off, but for now we were sitting in readiness. It was rest and acclimatization at the same time.

We received the command for take-off toward evening local time. Air intake covers were removed and stowed in the aircraft's tail section and several special vehicles which had filled the 150-ton cumbersome thing with everything necessary for the flight left its side. The turbines howled.

I sat down in my allotted seat and turned it away from the screen in the direction of flight. Grippled to the seat tightly by parachute harness system straps, I put on the helmet with built-in headset and microphone and drew the rubber band of throat microphones around my neck.

We took off. Small roundtop mountains remained to our left. The south side of Avachinskaya was black from a recent lava and ash discharge. Koryakskaya was covered by a frilly white rectilinear mushroom.

The mountains broke off; below was a narrow sector of level terrain and finally His Majesty the Ocean. The Great Ocean, it is at the same time the Pacific. Eurasia was behind us.

The Anchorage-Seoul international airway was denoted by a chain of flickering dots on the screen. It was the same one from which the South Korean Boeing "accidentally" strayed in 1983...

The screen generally was a repetition of a map, only a changing one. More and more islands and islets showed up on it and the continent shifted to the edge of the screen. Individual pieces of this map can be enlarged by changing the scale or displacing the center of the sweep, and the picture of the unfolding "battle" was apparent in the dynamics.

Having taken off from the continent, seven Tu-22's ("Backfires", as the Americans call them) were crossing Sakhalin and the Kurile chain and attempting to deliver a strike against a ship formation in the ocean. Fighters took off from Kamchatka airfields, scrambled at the command of the shipboard station for control and guidance of fighter aviation. Our mission was to call in and vector a group of interceptors to them to protect the long-range missile-armed aircraft. Selivanov and Zhitnikov used markers to "nibble up" targets appearing on the screens and "inject" the computer with information on them. Some fighters were vectored by voice. The impression was that the air had become thick with aircraft. Tension in the crew also was growing.

Submarines were moving menacingly in another part of the sea nearer the coast, also ready to deliver a strike

against the ship formation. They were attacked by Be-12's. The air defense mission was to destroy the ASW aircraft, and our crew vectored fighters to the new targets.

But then the picture of the large-scale engagement abruptly changed. One more group of Tu-22's appeared. Passing approximately along the very same route, it maneuvered sharply over the ocean and rushed toward the continent, toward naval bases and air defense units. The group was denoting "hostiles." Having detected it in time and guessed the maneuver, the A-50 gave target designations to interceptors.

There were moments when our crew was working both for the "Blues" and for the "Reds." Then Captain R. Badalov and Major V. Shatokhin, who sat next to each other, became "enemies" for a time.

In these days our A-50 was issuing information directly over the air situation warning net to submarines which came up to the surface at a designated time. In this same exercise Colonel V. Rozit's subordinates in MiG-31's delivered a strike against sea-launched cruise missiles proceeding 40-60 m above the water's surface. One can only admire the pilots' results, especially as the missiles' radar cross-section is comparable with that of a Stealth aircraft. This experiment, too, did not get by without the A-50.

We proceeded toward the Komandorskiye Islands, and operated over the open ocean and over the Sea of Japan, 80 km from the Land of the Rising Sun. For some time Japanese fighters hovered behind the A-50's tail and an "Orion" passed twice on intersecting headings. The device which registers irradiation classifies its source: fighter, ground station, ship and so on.

That side literally follows every step of our long-range radar acquisition aircraft: it photographs them with a video camera, it works on them psychologically by going head-on on collision headings, NATO fighters fly by them and RS-135's escort them. Major Yu. Klyuchnikov's crew almost collided with one over the Barents Sea. That one slipped past ahead of the very cockpit of the A-50 in a climb—all details on the belly could be discerned.

Such fixed attention to the A-50 also can be explained by the fact that it outstripped some ground air defense equipment.

Protection of the A-50 itself also remains open to question. For now it is equipped only with decoys fired when the enemy launches a missile, but there is so much trouble with them due to strict instructions on storage and use that crews try not to take them if possible. It remains to call in fighters for protection. By the way, the Americans also have approximately the very same problem.

The previous aircraft, the Tu-126, tried to fly lower in order to "illuminate" the target from below with the

beam of the onboard radar. The new one also "takes" them against the background of the Earth. Therefore we twisted gigantic "figure-8's" at an altitude of almost 10,000 m. If the centers of the "figure-8" paths are joined, you get a straight line 100 km long. The nearby Moon floated from left to right in the glass of the pilot's cockpit. The ocean opened up below. It was 10 km to the surface of the waves, and how much more beneath them. Thoughts involuntarily shifted to the sea rescue suit which Selivanov taught me to put on.

The crew's service is dangerous, and not just because they fly a great deal. If something serious should happen, they of course will become an object of heightened enemy "attention." Is it necessary to clarify what this means?

Who Did Not Tighten the Screw?

The A-50's cabin is literally crammed with gear: indicators, walls of units, the metal covers of a powerful transmitter, and instrument panels. It is made impressively and with good quality, and the designers also did not shun design, although the dimensions of units could be reduced severalfold with a more modern element base. But today the crew does not completely fill the tanks with fuel because of the weight of equipment, fearing overloads on the landing gear.

True, an aerial refueling device is provided, but its probe, which crowns the aircraft nose, essentially is inactive—aerodynamic characteristics, changed in connection with the antenna fairing installation, do not allow forming up behind a tanker as the aircraft is heavily jolted and shaken in the dense airstream.

The crew is not suited by the loud noise and SHF emission, but people do not even have information about the level of biological protection. The reliability of the system equipment leaves much to be desired. When he is in flight, engineer Captain Igor Galutvo sometimes has to dash from rack to rack and transpose units from one niche to another, and each time loosen mounting screws and undo cable connectors.

Neither enclosures for rest and mental relief, nor a toilet are provided for the 15 crew members, who spend many hours in the air during combat work.

"At the time when the A-50 was being prepared for series production," says V. Ivanov, chief designer of the radio-technical system, "we had no choice and so we took the Il-76. The previous system was installed in the Tu-95, which is approximately the very same as the Tu-114, with a passenger design and naturally with a toilet and a corner for rest. But in the case of the Il-76 the client (the Air Force) also could have insisted on crew conveniences from the aircraft firm—there were military people on the mockup commission which examined technical proposals. With respect to the noise, it is not simple to avoid, which is why headphones with glycerin fillings are provided. But in one instance the crew prefers a lighter and more convenient set, and in another the supply

people are slow. I can reassure specialists flying in the system that SHF emission does not exceed permissible limits. That is the conclusion of the Institute of Aviation and Space Medicine. The tail section where the radar transmitter is located is separated by a shielding mesh and there is metallized glass in the windows. Our gear really is heavier than American gear by approximately one and a half times—for now, that is the development level of the country's electronics as a whole. But if we set ourselves the goal of substantially lightening it, we will lose in radar capabilities and we will add additional fuel only for a half-hour of flight."

V. Karpeyev, first deputy general director of the Vega Scientific-Production Association and one of the system developers, added:

"It is not only a matter of the level of engineering, but also of the separation of branches of the Armed Forces. The difference in automated control systems, in encoded messages of communications traffic, and in active response systems forces us to install interface gear on board, increasing overall weight. But the Americans interface on the ground. And jam-protected communications again means new gear and again increased weight."

As Vladimir Ivanovich said, weak points identified in the process of operation will be taken into account in the upgraded version of the A-50. But if a trend is maintained toward suspending advanced developments and toward eroding investments for RDT&E, the quality gap will increase and become a hole which later cannot be patched.

A generally surprising, strange pattern is observed today: the stronger we reinforce doors in our own apartments, sometimes replacing them with steel doors, the broader the dilapidated state gates are ready to be flung open. Enterprises that are being forcibly converted and are in search of funds evidently do not consider military equipment to be a priority. The Air Defense Forces command has to apply more and more effort to see that system finishing and upgrading is carried on constantly.

The United States disregards expenditures for AWACS: the cost of one E-3A is around \$180 million, more than a B-1. But the game is worth the candle: in the assessment of western specialists, introducing the AWACS system was equivalent to doubling (!) the number of fighter-interceptors; it significantly expanded air defense capabilities.

Vladimir Ivanovich Karpeyev is convinced that fully sufficient reliability was put into the A-50's equipment during system design.

Earthly Affairs

Two years ago a regiment of long-range radar acquisition aircraft (not yet at full strength) was rebased closer to the Polar Circle in the northern part of the European USSR.

A nine-story house rose like a candle amidst taiga scrubs near a precipitous ravine, where a turbulent stream ran along the bottom, devoid of fish because of oil. Ironically named the "Hilton" in the very first days to spite the world-famous hotel, it is called that even today.

A residential building is being built nearby, although listlessly, with few personnel, but people are arriving. Some of the officers live in a small neighboring city, wasting two hours one way by rail. But garrison personnel are cramped, experiencing all the hardships of crowded living and compaction both in residential as well as office spaces.

I painfully observed two or three vehicles leaving the "Hilton" daily at 7:30 taking children to a school and kindergarten in a village 14 km away, where children of the military are unexpected guests.

Lieutenant General **Ye. Timokhin**, first deputy chief of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff, explained that the regiment's transfer to the North was caused by the necessity of placing A-50's on the most threatened axis. Only was it worthwhile redeploying in such haste and throwing people into an uninhabited forest? The nature of the crews' work is such that in case of major activities they fly asunder throughout the country closer to air defense groupings and exercise locations. For now they also could have flown from the previous location until completion of construction.

For comparison I will say that both the strictly American AWACS as well as NATO AWACS each have one main base and several forward bases in various countries for receiving aircraft after alert duty, for refueling, for crew change and for repair.

The airfield that was left already is being called home by a unit withdrawn from Eastern Europe, while to this day our regiment is being shaken by organizational reshuffling. Just take supply: combined-arms clothing is drawn in Samara, flight clothing in Arkhangelsk, pay at a third point, and food from whoever will give it.

Pay and allowances unexpectedly were cut back during refitting with the A-50. Experienced pilots with seniority made a rush for pensions under the old rates. A second elimination of experienced cadres occurred during the transfer to the North. Young people remained. Regimental navigator Captain Sergey Tsymbalyuk is 26. Young people have to be taught, but there is no facility or simulators. Training at the manufacturing enterprise clearly was insufficient, and not everyone took it. Under the direction of Colonel N. Antamonov, they themselves compiled combat training programs and instructions. It is a paradox: most of those flying in the unique system are self-taught.

There is a lack of people—tables of organization clearly do not correspond to needs. It has happened where engineers worked as mechanics. People have to be shifted from crew to crew and cohesiveness is lost. The aircraft flight preparation period increases and work

quality decreases under conditions of a sharply continental climate (from plus 40 to minus 50°). Everything enumerated above shows up in equipment malfunctions.

Everyday domestic difficulties are supplemented by ordeals at "other" airfields. I myself was convinced of this at a staging airfield east of Chita.

I am writing about the burdens more than they were talked about in the crew. The people in it are not those who become limp when there are difficulties. I left the A-50 with bright feelings. The crew is a reliable Army cell. Average age is around 30. Higher education. They originate from all social layers. In some ways they all are similar to each other, not only in the standardized flight

uniform, of course, but also in dedication to the cause which they serve, and in discipline. Perhaps it is a trivial thing, but I did not once see anyone leave the aircraft before the commander. Perhaps the greatness of duty is reflected in such trivial things.

...Listening to the airwaves during combat work, I sensed that we were the center of a large-scale play and radio traffic frequencies link all of us—submarines, ASW aircraft, swift interceptors, and long-range missile-armed aircraft—into a single body, a single chain of defense. Despite everything, it is firm.

R-Adm Kuznetsov Discusses Recruitment Experiment

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[Interview with Rear Admiral Vladimir Nikolayevich Kuznetsov, chief of a Northern Fleet staff directorate, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko in Northern Fleet, date not specified, under rubric "Military Reform": "Are Pros' Arriving in the Fleet?"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet decision on transferring Navy seamen and petty officers to a two-year term of service and conducting an experiment in organizing contract service was not unexpected either by the Northern Fleet command or by the staff directorate immediately dealing with first-term manpower acquisition for fleet ships and units. This is where Directorate Chief Rear Admiral V. Kuznetsov began the conversation with our correspondent.

[Kuznetsov] Moreover, we began preparing in advance for work under the new conditions: we made preliminary forecasts, drew up plans, produced recommendations for expanding the Fleet training facility, and held numerous consultations for commanders of various levels. The fact is, for example, the expected reduction in term of service for seamen and petty officers by an entire third was not fully understandable for many.

[Ishchenko] Vladimir Nikolayevich, is everything here clear to you yourself? The fact is, it was not long ago that directors of various ranks seemingly proved in a rather well-reasoned manner that it was impossible to reduce the time of Navy first-term service without serious damage to ship combat readiness.

[Kuznetsov] First of all, I was not among those, who perceived the proposals to replace three-year service with two-year service as almost an attempt on naval combat readiness. Secondly, the job really can suffer if one regards it without proper responsibility. On the whole, however, my viewpoint is as follows: although no small additional load will rest on our directorate now from an increased number of call-ups and discharges to the reserve, nevertheless the advantage gained is beyond comparison. Well, I will not speak a great deal about social-psychological pluses. They are obvious and consist above all of the fact that draftees, heading for the Fleet, and their parents are rid of a "third year" complex, a year which many of them regarded almost as effaced from their lives.

Now it will be considerably easier to man combatant ships, the primary strength of the Navy. An opportunity for selection appears for which there was essentially no place up until today. Things came down to where healthy, competent lads suddenly would begin to request a construction battalion when they went before the draft boards, or those who already had begun to serve aboard ships suddenly discovered that they dreamt and saw

themselves as naval infantrymen. The explanation was quite simple: people in construction units and naval infantry regiments serve two years. While until recently we would get dozens of letters with requests for transfer to the naval infantry, after equalization of terms of service it was as if they were cut off. To the contrary, during spring call-up draftees made numerous appeals to be sent to ships, and not shore units.

What I would call a standardization of the term of service that was performed, considerably facilitated personnel transfers and permitted freely disposing of the draft contingent.

[Ishchenko] Contract service... Much has been said and written of late about this experiment being conducted in the Navy. How does it appear from here, from the North, where it also will be carried out?

[Kuznetsov] I will not begin to repeat what is already known. I will remind you only that after training in a training detachment, persons called up to the Fleet will be able to conclude a contract for a period of 2.5 years and receive rather high pay for this. Inasmuch as this is strictly voluntary, we decided to clarify how popular the idea of contract service will be among seamen. A survey of first-term personnel conducted in one ship formation showed that three out of ten seamen and petty officers would conclude such a contract for R300-400 per month, and these three will not serve an extra year in the North. Seamen called up from the rural area without any kind of civilian specialty basically expressed consent. Based on survey results, one can forecast with great reliability the social makeup, general educational level and material needs of our first professionals.

And one other conclusion seems to me quite obvious: the most thorough specialized training of this category of first-term seamen is necessary. I will express the following consideration in this connection.

Yes, we now are expanding the existing training detachment in the Fleet and are creating a new one in Severomorsk, which is dictated by the accelerated "turnover" of first-term personnel. In my view, however, it is inadvisable to provide specialized training in the training detachment for those who will serve under contract. They should receive only basic naval training for a short time, and specialized training immediately aboard ship. The reason is not just that a seaman often has to begin to be taught anew after the training detachment—alas, the quality of training there is not yet always up to snuff. Something else is important: according to the existing provision, a seaman can sign a contract immediately after completing the training detachment, i.e., even before arriving aboard ship or in a unit. But the fact is, a contract essentially presumes the parties' mutual interest and it is not precluded that this will be unreciprocated love, so to speak. This is why I believe the word of the commanding officer of the ship or unit where such a seaman arrives also should carry weight here. A commander will be able to utter it confidently

only when he is personally sure that a novice is rather well trained and that it is possible to conclude a contract with him. But for this, seamen's training must be organized directly aboard ship or in the unit.

[Ishchenko] Transferring seamen and petty officers to a two-year term of service and the contract service experiment are, without any doubt, the first steps to real professionalization of the Fleet, including its nonrated personnel. But as we know, professional armed forces are a costly pleasure. How much will just these two steps cost the Northern Fleet?

[Kuznetsov] It must be assumed you perceive a reduced term of service as one precondition for a possible transfer to a professional or mixed principle of fleet manpower acquisition on the basis that this measure forces a more active search for ways to raise the quality of training of nonrated personnel. I agree, but if we look at the essence of the matter, I do not know the precise figure. I can only assume it is very impressive. Suffice it to say, that dozens of new officer positions are being introduced in the training detachment being expanded and in the one being created. And how about capital construction and additional training equipment?

The experiment's cost also can be estimated only approximately. If the Navy is being allocated R540 million to conduct it, as already was reported, there are grounds to believe that the portion due the Northern Fleet will be one of the most ponderable, if only because we have a large strategic formation of nuclear submarines taking part in the experiment. According to my calculations, organization of the experiment and expenditures in its first phase alone can be on the order of R50 million for our Fleet, and they will increase even more in the future. There also will be a requirement for apartments for seamen on contract service and a different level of social-cultural-everyday support, but there is no money for such construction. Are we again to build with our own resources, taking people away from studies and combat training?

[Ishchenko] As a matter of fact, could it not turn out that the money needed for conducting the experiment simply will be removed from other Fleet programs such as ship repairs, as already has happened?

[Kuznetsov] I admit I do have those fears, for the country's government has not made a special allocation of money for the experiment, as if the Fleet is paying its own way. This means "internal resources" will be sought for the umpteenth time. It is not precluded that the interests of ship repair also can suffer. Only won't the price of the experiment be too high then?

[Ishchenko] Finally, Vladimir Nikolayevich: Is there total clarity in the Fleet about organization of this experiment?

[Kuznetsov] Much already is known. For example, the fact that seamen and petty officers, who have concluded a contract, will not be distributed evenly or in some other

way to ships and units of the "experimental" strategic formation. Crews and subunits will be formed entirely from them. The purity of the experiment thereby not only is ensured, but preconditions for the appearance of friction between two-year and three-year personnel also are precluded. Unfortunately, one also has to think about this.

The pay of servicemen accepted for contract service apparently will be from R300 to R700. These amounts already take into account compensations designated in connection with an increase in prices.

A security and support subunit has been introduced to the large strategic formation of nuclear submarines in order to create conditions necessary for conducting the experiment, which must preclude any separation of personnel from combat and specialized training. And of course it would be well to accelerate the establishment of such subunits in other large strategic formations and formations.

But with respect to other aspects of the experiment's organization, we are guided here by the Provisional Statute on Contract Service, a draft of which now is being considered by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

V-Adm Khrovin: Dealing With Maritime Accidents

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[Article by Vice Admiral V. Kokovin, candidate of technical sciences, docent and Captain 1st Rank D. Martynov, candidate of technical sciences, docent under rubric "The Problem Requires Resolution": "Ship Survivability Means the Crew's Life"]

[Text] Passionless, joyless statistics ascertain that the number of catastrophes, accidents and incidents in world fleets unfortunately is not dropping. The loss also is growing. There are many reasons, which are common to some fleets, but there also are specific ones. In our view, insufficient effectiveness of the existing arrangement for ensuring ship survivability is typical of the Navy. It is dogmatic inasmuch as it is based chiefly on operating factors, and does not consider the experience of local military conflicts at sea in the last decade.

It is apropos to recall in this connection that warheads of the principal kinds of weapons on ships of NATO navies are filled with an explosive 1.5-1.7 times more powerful than that used in World War II. Explosive mixtures have appeared that are 5-7 times more powerful than TNT. Precision cruise missiles, guided aerial bombs, and mobile mines with a 0.9-0.98 target kill probability have become operational. Even a single hit by a modern weapon is capable of fully depriving a ship of combat effectiveness and even leading to her loss. One does not have to go far for examples. The U.S. frigate "Stark" was fully deprived of combat effectiveness in 1987 after the explosion of an "Exocet" cruise missile. The very same

lot befell the destroyer "Worden" in 1972 with the proximity detonation of a "Shrike" missile, the destroyer "Warrington" as a result of blowing up on her own depth charge, as well as the British destroyer "Sheffield" when an "Exocet" missile hit her in 1982. The British frigate "Antelope" was lost in 1982 from the explosion of a 400-kg aerial bomb and the British frigate "Lowestoft" was lost in 1987 when hit by a "Tigerfish" torpedo.

As a rule, combat damages have a combination nature and are connected with the simultaneous appearance of very heavy fires, the ship's reduced ability to stay afloat, weapons and equipment out of action, and personnel injuries.

Experience has shown, that with major damages and accidents the ship commander is faced with the choice of continuing to exercise command and control of the ship and battle or directing damage control; it is practically impossible to accomplish these tasks simultaneously. After their ships were damaged by aerial bombs in 1982, the commanders of the British destroyer "Coventry" and the British frigate "Ardent" were unable to organize effective damage control while accomplishing missions of repelling the air adversary's attacks, and both ships were lost. The conclusion suggests itself: decentralization is necessary in the direction of damage control, which will permit reacting more promptly and flexibly to situation changes aboard the damaged ship. The very same also concerns the immediate director of damage control, the engineering department head.

The experience of the Anglo-Argentine conflict showed with all obviousness that preserving the working capacity of equipment and facilities is a necessary and in many cases sufficient condition for successful damage control, and that the engineering department head will be forced to accomplish specifically this task, i.e., provide ship receivers with electrical power; maintain ship speed and maneuverability; supply coolant, compressed air, outside water and so on.

It must be borne in mind that the main power plant of modern combatant ships represents a complicated technical complex with an enormous number of functional elements. In an online mode the cumulative flow of data on main power plant status coming to the engineering department head reaches 89 bits per second and it increases by 2-2.5 times with damages and accidents. If we take into account that a person in an ordinary state is capable of effectively processing no more than 25-29 bits per second, and in a state of psychological tension only 2-5 bits per second, then the conclusion is obvious: the engineering department head hardly will be able to control the power plant competently and confidently, not to mention simultaneously organize damage control. A person's physical and mental capacities are not infinite, and it is unreasonable to demand the impossible of him. But all this did not occasion any kind of substantial change in ship table of organization structure from the standpoint of damage control.

Modern conditions for the appearance and development of ship damages and accidents demand crews' constant readiness, proper damage control training, and high mental preparation for actions under difficult, dangerous conditions. The reality is such that the time, personnel and means for training personnel in damage control are steadily decreasing. A rigidification of demands on ship officers no longer leads to an appreciable improvement of the situation.

It must be said that until recently the problem of ensuring ship survivability also was acute in the U.S. Navy, but specialists' efforts permitted partially solving it, including organizationally, with consideration of the experience of military conflicts.

Damage control departments (divisions, groups) were established aboard U.S. Navy ships beginning in October 1987. They are headed by an officer invested with great rights with respect to all ship personnel. The damage control department is obligated to ensure ship safety under ordinary conditions of operation and exercise damage control when there are combat or accidental damages. It includes organic personnel (36 persons on carriers, 4 on cruisers and destroyers, and 8 on frigates) and assigned personnel. The department includes forward and aft damage control parties, power plant repair party, combat systems repair party, and helicopter damage control party.

Damage control parties consist of three teams: assault team for immediate conduct of damage control; containment team for localizing damages and accidents; and support team for delivering and putting in place damage control equipment. Damage control parties aboard U.S. carriers include up to 650 persons, of whom up to 120 are hull specialists. The damage control department includes a special patrol team which monitors observance of fire safety measures. It is planned to have up to 5,400 ship specialists in the damage control area in the U.S. Navy.

It would appear that this experience also is acceptable for our Navy. The position of deputy (assistant) ship commander for damage control should be introduced aboard first and second rank ships; he would immediately direct the personnel's actions from the control center when there are combat or accidental damages.

It is possible to combine the position of deputy ship commander for damage control with that of engineering department head aboard ships of lesser ranks.

The position of deputy ship commander for damage control can be introduced aboard first rank ships in place of that of damage control division officer or habitability division officer, and on second rank ships in place of the position of below-deck party officer. An officer of any specialty from among those most trained in this matter can be appointed deputy ship commander for damage control. It will not be difficult to specify his rights and duties based on the acute requirement for this specialist.

Back in 1987 the authors of these lines proposed making appropriate adjustments to the existing shipboard organization. With consideration of the experience of foreign fleets and based on a positive assessment of this idea by many commanders of formations and major surface combatants, it was proposed to introduce the aforementioned positions and specifically denote the officers' functional duties. Unfortunately, no decisive movement occurred in this matter if we do not count introduction of the position of assistant ship commander for damage control aboard the heavy air-capable cruiser "Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov" and that of deputy commander for damage control aboard strategic submarines.

We deem it advisable to introduce a specialized damage control subunit to first and second rank ships by reducing the number of specialists of the ship engineering department team. The basis of ship damage control parties must be made up of damage control department personnel and the heads of such parties must be appointed commanders of the main lines of defense in fighting fires and flooding. Damage control parties will function on the main or most threatened avenues of development of consequences of damages where the greatest damage control effect is needed.

Not dissipating, but concentrating forces for reliable assurance of damage control is a problem that in our view is very pertinent, for it is no secret that the situation which was pointed out by Admiral S. O. Makarov back at the beginning of the century has formed in fleets: "Requirements of the day are so great that they absorb all labor and all attention of the principal participants of the work. These requirements of the day attain dominant importance in solving problems and so little by little those customs begin to form . . . which remove . . . life itself aboard ship from wartime conditions and thereby disrupt that primary mission for which the military fleet exists." It is also gradually forgotten in particular that survivability is one of the most important combat features of a ship, and that her primary purpose is to fight, not carry crews.

It is understandable that organizational measures alone will not lead to a significant improvement in assurance of ship survivability. This is possible if conditions for increasing structural and organizational-technical support and upgrading naval ship damage control tactics are created simultaneously. It is of course not a simple problem, but it must be resolved if we clearly understand that ship survivability is the crew's life, which means also its ability to fight.

Discussion of Sale of Ships for Scrap

91UM0797A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jul 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Colonel (Res) L. Berezkin, Pacific Fleet, under the rubric "The Fleet and the Market": "How Ships Are Being Sold"]

[Text] Let me say at the outset that we will be discussing the sale of old, written-off ships for scrap. We do not have

much experience, but this is not a new subject. It has been covered in the press more than once. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has also written about it. Nonetheless, people continue to ask the questions: "Just why are there old ships rusting and simply rotting away in many bays, ships which could be profitably sold not just for rubles, but even for currency"?

Indeed, why is it that those capitalists in the developed world have no problems making use of the scrap metal?

Just when is it going to be that way here...?

A fervent desire to change something even in this limited area comes up against incredible obstacles. With respect to the dismantling of ships, for example, we sometimes lack even the technical capability for processing the hulls of worn-out ships and maritime vessels. And the fleets have no recourse but to set up ships' graveyards far from the public eye in some inconspicuous bay.

Recently, however, the Navy set up an agency for the sale of written-off ships and armaments. It is headed by Capt 1st Rank Yu. Yakovlev. It is charged with developing a plan for selling ships and vessels of the Navy, monitoring their dismantling, recording and analyzing export-import operations, acquiring imported technical and other equipment, instruments and consumer goods, seeing to it that the Navy receives them.... Our Pacific Fleet also has men under Yakovlev's command who handle this on the local level but under strict control from the center.

The Pacific Fleet and its command element are not allowed to engage in commercial operations in this area. How do Pacific Fleet personnel view this? I spoke with Col G. Kunovskiy, chief of the fleet finance service.

"Our service has nothing do with selling written-off ships and vessels," G. Kunovskiy said. "Particularly since the currency and various other items of value received from their sale are not under our jurisdiction...."

Rear Admiral V. Topilin, deputy fleet commander for maintenance and repair, had more to say on the subject:

"Documents on the preparation of ships and vessels for transfer to foreign companies are coordinated with me. In other words, we are in charge of the docking and conversion of the vessels sold, and this takes a considerable amount of money. Readyng a cruiser for sale, for example, costs more than half a million rubles. We are reimbursed in that amount, of course, but that is all. The fleet's maintenance and repair agencies end up with nothing for their technical needs...."

"In general I am inclined to believe that operations of this kind do not enrich the country. Given our metallurgical famine, how can we send high-alloy metal abroad while making up our own shortages, to put it crudely, with tin cans? This could only be done in backward nations. And then, if we are to engage in business, why

do we need this centralization? The fleet has practically no authority to select an advantageous purchaser. And consequently, receive a good profit. It has little interest in the end result of its commercial activities. Who benefits from this?"

Here is another, no less competent, opinion. I spoke with Rear Admiral A. Loyko, the Pacific Fleet's deputy commander for rear services and the fleet's rear service chief:

"Let me say something about the total amount going into the state budget from these sales, in which many people have an interest. Fifty percent of the foreign currency goes into the state budget; the rest goes to the Ministry of Defense. In the case of sunken vessels, 75% of the money goes to our ministry. As far as the fleet is concerned, there is no precisely defined percentage. Let us say that a written-off cruiser from the fleet is sold for 100 million dollars. Does the Pacific fleet receive at least half? Of course not. After all, the owner of the cruiser is not the fleet or even the Ministry of Defense. The owner is the state, and, naturally, it decides what is done with the money. The Navy receives an extremely modest share and feels that it should be used in a centralized manner.

"I would say, however, that a decision of the commander in chief of the Navy regarding the transfer to the fleet of a significant portion of the medical equipment and medicine purchased with the currency is presently in effect. On Kamchatka, however, the currency is used to pay foreign companies for reinforcing buildings to resist earthquakes.

"What are the prospects? The fleet has more than 100 hulls afloat and 9-10 million dollars worth sunken or flooded. Can you imagine how much work is involved? Unfortunately, our search and rescue service does not have the necessary funds. According to preliminary estimates, it will take around 15 million rubles (at 1989 prices) to raise the vessels. Where are we to get this money?

"One last thing. I would be in no hurry to conclude that decentralizing the sale of vessels and vesting all the center's authority in the fleet is the best option. After all, the center has a better knowledge of world market conditions. The nation's agencies for foreign economic relations are also located nearer to it. And finally, the government of the USSR operates in accordance with the situation, therefore frequently changing its decisions. This sometimes places the military departments, which find themselves in the role of petitioner, in a difficult position. Think about it. Where is it easier to discuss things with the government, from Moscow or from Vladivostok?"

The last person I spoke with was Lieutenant Colonel V. Starub:

"In the Pacific Fleet I head the group from the Navy's rear service which helps to prepare written-off ships and vessels for sale abroad. When the "goods" are ready, the Navy's rear service seeks a buyer and arranges the sale

through an intermediary agency—Sovkomflot, for example. After the sale is completed, the broker—in this case Igor Ivanovich Dzhokhadze is head of the agency—receives 2% of the amount of the transaction for his firm."

These are the opinions.... Indeed, everything having to do with foreign business today is receiving close attention and requires careful monitoring. This should not hamper things, however.

I would add to this only the fact that the interest of foreign businessmen in our written-off, rusting ships is growing. The Americans, the Japanese and our closest friends and neighbors, the Chinese, are interested in scrap metal. They are willing to pay us with currency, equipment or goods. One feels bad about the metal and the labor-intensive process, of course, but is it better for our common property to go to waste?

'Brain Drain' From Submarine Fleet

91UM0804A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank I. Kostev, chief of staff of a formation of nuclear-powered submarines: "The 'Brain Drain' From Submarines: Is the Navy in a Position at Least to Check it?"]

[Text] The term "brain drain" has been around a long time. It is actually used to refer to the migration of scientists, skilled specialists and cultural figures from one nation to another, to be sure. Today, however, it seems to me that we can speak of a "brain drain" on another level. What else would one call the processes presently occurring in the nuclear-powered submarine fleet? Everyone knows that our nuclear-powered, missile submarine fleet has constituted and still constitutes the backbone of the Navy's combat capability and an important leg of the strategic triad of the Soviet Armed Forces. The role which it has played and continues to play has objectively made it the receptacle, so to speak, of the Navy's intellect. Today, however, the intellectual strength of the nuclear-powered, missile submarine fleet has begun to diminish....

The best officers—lieutenants, captain-lieutenants and senior officers—are leaving the submarines. Going ashore, to headquarters or into the reserve, by fair means or foul.... Young officers use every excuse to avoid moving up to the captain's bridge. If this process continues at the present rate, in three or four years the submarine fleet will find itself with a shortage of commanders and the submarine crews can be classified as "reduced-strength."

This is occurring for many reasons well known to an extensive group of people: a decline in prestige for the officers' service in general and for shipboard duty specifically; an inconsistency between the submariner's pay and the job he performs; outstripping rates of increase in earnings for civilians compared to those in the Armed

Forces. When we add to this the oppressive situation of attacks on and abusive criticism of the army and navy, it becomes clear why the ranks of the officers/submariners are thinning.

It is obvious that the fleet is not capable of eliminating these causes and checking the "brain drain" on its own. However, I will be so bold as to say that the fleet is in a position to reduce and localize it.

It is not just financial factors which make the officer/submariner glance with interest toward shore or beyond the unit. There are other causes, organizational and moral. They sometimes serve as that final straw which motivates officers to leave the fleet.

It was always a tradition in the submarine fleet that the commanders personally worked with those officers who were having trouble developing. How many such "problem" ones have the fleet's chief instructors developed into men of whom the fleet is proud? But today...? I will not say that this tradition was brought almost to naught all at once, but it did occur very rapidly. It is almost the rule today that if an officer arrives on board a submarine who will require special attention, some time later the formation commander will find on his desk a request from the submarine commander that the "unworthy one be transferred..."

We need the old tradition now as never before. The young officers, who will unquestionably be attracted to civilian life, where they feel there are more opportunities for a decent life, particularly need the support of the command element today. Especially its moral support. To help the officer recognize that he is needed in the fleet, that he is irreplaceable, to make a real fleet officer of him—is this not the commander's duty?

Is it not in the interest of the fleet as a whole to have stable, smoothly functioning crews? Here is a specific example. Is the combat readiness actually served by that shuffling of personnel which occurs when the submarine is being readied to depart for combat duty. During that period some officers leave the ship for TDY assignments, weakening the crews, while others....

Naturally, the service needs to be organizationally restructured in general. According to my observations, and the same is said also in other formations, the young officers are bothered most by being taken away from their regular job. This happens all the time. For example, a young lieutenant has to master his area of responsibility, work out relations with subordinates, learn his position thoroughly.... But then there is all that work in the barracks, in the housing areas, at other formation facilities.... These are not activities for a specialist, of course, for a combat officer/submariner. The proper

subunits at the base on shore must fully provide for the life and the combat training of the submarine crews.

This is particularly important today, when the seamen and petty officers are being switched to a two-year service term. A seaman spends half a year in a training detachment, half a year getting comfortable on the ship, and has only one year to work at his full capacity, so to speak. And if we retain the present situation whereby seamen and petty officers are taken off the submarine two or three times a week to perform external detail or guard duty or to perform various housekeeping tasks, there is no time left for actual shipboard duty.

In short, it is in within the fleet's scope to arrange things so as to relieve the crews of jobs not related to their field and make it possible for the commanders to train their subordinates.

I certainly do not think that my suggestions are exhaustive, of course. Nor do I think that their implementation will halt the "brain drain" from the submarines. I am confident, however, that they can check the process. We can at least preserve our navy's intellectual potential and the officer corps of the submarine fleet until better times.

RSFSR, Center Discuss Opening Vladivostok

*91UN2332B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 30 Jul 91 p 1*

[Article by P. Ushanov: "City, at Ease!"]

[Text] A very impressive commission has been meeting for several days in Vladivostok. The commission is trying to find ways to resolve a very old problem—how to open this closed port. Delegations of the Union and of Russia are headed by the defense and security committees chairmen of the Union and of Russia.

People used to think that the main obstacle lay in contradictions between the republic and the center: Russia wanted to open Vladivostok but the Union was against it. But now, after a few sessions, it became clear that this was not a dead-end situation. According to the information from some knowledgeable sources, the sides are close to a compromise.

The unbending stance of the military was considered to be the stumbling block, Vladivostok being the largest Navy base in the Far East. But the Pacific fleet commander-in-chief, Admiral G. Khvatov, said on numerous occasions that missiles had nothing to do with it. It goes without saying that some zones will remain closed in the city, some things will have to be moved to other locations but they did not object to opening Vladivostok in principle.

We are faced with an interesting situation, therefore: Everybody supports the opening of the city but it... remains closed as before.

Mobile ICBM Survivability

91SV0033A Moscow *TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 1, Jan 91 pp 4-5, C4

[Article based on foreign press materials by Major S. Mikhaylov, candidate of technical sciences, under rubric "Status, Problems, Prospects": "ICBM Survivability"]

[Text] Land-based ICBM's are the basis of U.S. strategic offensive forces. Initially they had only a so-called fixed mode in which the missile was accommodated in a fixed launcher. The first launchers were situated on the surface of the ground in relative proximity to each other; then missiles began to be housed in silos covered by a special protection device. According to foreign press reports, all U.S. ICBM's presently have a silo mode, with launchers rather well protected against the effect of a nuclear burst's damage-producing elements and situated at such a distance from each other which is believed to preclude the possibility of two missiles being damaged by one nuclear warhead.

Announcements appeared in the foreign press in the early 1970's that U.S. specialists had begun work under the MX Program to study new missile basing modes. This was caused by the need to give ICBM's higher survivability under conditions of enemy action, since missile warhead yield and hit accuracy had increased so much that previous engineering measures to protect missiles in silo launchers were becoming ineffective.

It is customary to consider the pressure at the shock wave front which a launcher withstands while preserving the missile against damage to be a generalized indicator of launch silo protection. According to foreign press data, it is several tens of atmospheres for modern ICBM's. It was believed that this indicator could be increased further by strengthening silo construction and improving the protection device and shock absorbing system for the launch container with missile in the launch silo. But American experts believe that these measures are rather costly to implement and do not ensure guaranteed protection (permissible pressure on the order of a thousand atmospheres).

Survivability of an ICBM grouping can be characterized by the number of warheads the enemy requires for its destruction. From this standpoint the basing mode must provide high protection, or mobility and concealment of ICBM's, or a combination of all these features. In addition, it must satisfy requirements of launch readiness, launch reliability, operational serviceability and safety and must correspond to missile weight-size characteristics.

The basis for choosing a basing mode acceptable for further development is its technical-economic analysis with consideration of the survivability-cost ratio. U.S. specialists are considering several modes, which can be divided into two basic groups: fixed and mobile.

A dense pack and deep positioning of the ICBM and container are considered the most promising fixed

modes. The former presumes a close disposition of several launch silos of traditional construction having high protection, such as up to 300-400 atmospheres. In this case the enemy will have to deliver an echeloned nuclear missile strike separated in time and concentrated in area in order to destroy a target. In this instance time separation is dictated by the need to preclude the so-called "fratricidal" effect for warheads from adjacent echelons. ICBM's which survive the first action can be launched in the "gap" that forms between strikes. Foreign specialists believe their proportion will be rather large.

It is believed that the mode employing deeply positioned launch silos should ensure reliable protection against a direct hit, underground explosions, and the multiple effect of warheads. It differs from traditional silo basing in that while ordinary launch silos have the upper face of the launch container essentially at ground level, for a buried launcher it can be at a distance of several tens and even hundreds of meters from ground level and be covered not by a mobile protection device but, for example, by a thickness of soil. In this case positioning depth basically depends on soil density. Thus, this depth can be quite insignificant when buried in rock. On the other hand, light soil chosen in positioning launchers beneath the ground can be replaced by heavier material such as slag and pebbles.

Simplicity, operating safety, and the possibility of employing ICBM's of essentially any size and weight are included abroad among merits of modes being considered. Their use reduces combat readiness somewhat, however, especially in the second instance, where soil over the launcher must be removed quickly and the ICBM raised to the surface before launch. The possibility is noted of using special explosive devices, water supplied under high pressure, or automatic tunnel shields to remove the protective layer of soil.

The principal deficiency of these fixed modes is considered to be their high cost and lengthy period for being placed in operation, which is especially important in case of the deployment of a large number of ICBM's. Therefore the possibility is being considered of partially implementing a particular mode and including ICBM's of several different basing modes in an already existing ground grouping. Then the choice of a specific solution is dictated chiefly by economic considerations.

The mobile ICBM basing modes being developed are more diverse. They include those in which an ICBM changes its position in the course of operation, thus introducing an element of uncertainty in the enemy's knowledge. Therefore he is forced to deliver not a pinpoint strike against an ICBM, but an area strike against the possible area of its location. It is obvious that ICBM survivability will increase with an increased area in which launchers may be located, since the number of warheads assigned for their destruction is limited.

It is possible to increase mobile missile survivability additionally if their concealment and protection are ensured. Therefore mobile modes are more attractive from the standpoint of diversity of technical solutions. They allow use of systems and machine units well known in economic activity as means of mobility. In particular, modes using motor vehicle, aircraft, rail and river transportation are considered for supporting ICBM movements. Use of air cushion vehicles, wing-in-ground-effect vehicles, dirigibles and balloons also is considered possible.

It is believed that vehicular and rail modes are the most acceptable, dictated by the fact that the United States has a well developed network of high-quality highways and railroads. The industry producing transportation equipment for them is at a high level. In this case the launcher movement rate can reach a hundred kilometers an hour and possible patrol areas can become enormous. It is presumed that both means of transportation will perform launcher functions. Both modes permit high concealment of ICBM movement.

But it is noted that the vehicular version is restricted in load-carrying capacity and should be considered only for lightweight ICBM's. Roadbed vulnerability and the impossibility of launching from any point on the movement route are considered obvious shortcomings of the rail mode.

Limitations in load-carrying capacity and weather conditions are pointed out in considering modes using air transportation. In addition, it is difficult to launch an ICBM from an aircraft or helicopter, and so it is deemed advisable to use aviation basically for rapid movement of launchers and necessary attendant personnel. According to one concept existing abroad, STOL aircraft with an ICBM aboard are to perform alert duty at the beginning of an air base runway. On receiving a report of an enemy nuclear missile attack, they take off and leave the possible area of damage at maximum speed. After landing at a preselected airfield, crews ready launchers for use (unload, survey, calculate the mission), perform prelaunch preparation and launch the ICBM. It is noted that a short landing roll gives aircraft a wide choice of landing places. It is considered possible to make a launcher in the form of a self-contained module and move it by helicopter essentially to any area independent of the presence of takeoff and landing sites. Some air transportation deficiencies are compensated in a certain sense by its high rate of movement and independence of the status of the road transportation network during movement.

Specialists consider the river basing mode essentially inadvisable. Its deficiency lies in a concentration of large river basins in certain regions, differences in navigation conditions, and the presence of hydroelectric stations and large cities on the banks.

A distinguishing feature of air cushion vehicles and wing-in-ground-effect vehicles is that they can move


over any terrain independent of the presence and quality of roads, as well as over water. This is what drew the attention of specialists to their use as part of missile systems. On the other hand, these means of transportation also have a number of deficiencies. For now, their load-carrying capacity does not conform to what is required and their construction is not that well developed to use these means of transportation for moving mobile ICBM's.

Modern dirigibles and balloons are free of a number of deficiencies inherent to air cushion vehicles and wing-in-ground-effect vehicles. They are capable of moving over considerable distances and lifting even the heaviest missiles, and they have sufficiently high speed. In the opinion of specialists, making a launch from them is less problematical than from aircraft and helicopters, but they are easily vulnerable to any kind of weapon and do not allow providing requisite concealment.

A mobile-hardened basing mode is included among modes combining mobility and a fixed nature. Here several shelters whose protection may not be very high, such as on the order of 10 atmospheres, are built for one ICBM and located at a distance from each other. The hardened nature of the shelters and distance between them depend on the number and yield of warheads and can vary. A missile is moved from shelter to shelter over underground tracks to ensure concealment. A simpler version of this form of basing is a trench mode in which a containerized ICBM is moved between shelters along trenches.

In this case the enemy is forced to deliver an area strike at a moment when the ICBM is in one of the hardened shelters. An ICBM also can be moved between shelters using vehicular transportation, from which a launch also is possible. This permits increasing the distance between shelters because of high movement speed and carrying

Accommodation of mobile ICBM launchers at a fixed missile system position. The following are located at the combined position:



Key:

1. Shelters for mobile launchers
2. Building for mobile system team personnel
3. Fencing
4. Fixed system launch silo

out patrols in an area located at a distance from the shelter location. The necessary effective coverage area increases substantially as a result, since the fact of a transfer of ICBM's is a parameter that can be concealed and the degree of uncertainty in information available to the enemy increases considerably.

The above mobile basing modes are considered the most acceptable from the standpoint of practicability. Such factors as survivability, cost, a set of indicators characterizing effectiveness of ICBM combat employment, and operating characteristics were contrasted in comparing them. According to an open press statement by American specialists, with other conditions being equal the vehicular and rail modes turned out to be least expensive and the air and air-mobile modes most expensive. An increase in patrol areas entails increased operating expenses in view of private and municipal ownership of the road network and land. It is proposed to increase engineer protection of self-propelled launchers in order to decrease the size of patrol areas for vehicular transportation. The natural protection of a mobile launcher consists of tenths of an atmosphere.


It is believed that expenditures for creating mobile ICBM's based on vehicular and rail transportation can be comparable with or even less than expenses for realization of the dense pack and buried modes; however, mobile systems are more complicated and dangerous to operate and their launch readiness is somewhat lower. But compressed time periods for being placed in operation and relative simplicity of engineering are considered to be their positive aspects.

The foreign press has reported that rail and vehicular modes presently are envisaged for new MX and Midgetman ICBM's, which is dictated by their economy, relative simplicity and short time periods for development and placement in operation. But this does not mean that the United States has rejected other modes, including fixed ones. They can be used in the longer term for a limited number of ICBM's in a grouping.

The foreign press reports that 50 MX ICBM's may be deployed in the United States on 25 trains as early as 1991-1993. It is assumed that each will consist of two locomotives, security cars, launch control system cars, launcher cars and support and maintenance cars. The trains will be accommodated in shelters at special Air Force bases and by order of the command element will disperse if necessary over the U.S. railroad network, which extends some 290,000 km. While moving over the national railroad network, trains must adhere to rules for conventional transportation and not be outwardly distinguishable from it in any way. An ICBM can be launched after stopping the train, opening launcher car protection devices and raising the missile to a vertical position.

According to data published in the foreign press, tests of the launch of an MX ICBM mock-up were conducted from a railroad launcher. A reinforced concrete and steel mock-up weighing 90 tons was ejected from a launch

Mobile launcher of a land mobile missile system in travelling and deployed condition



container by compressed gases. The effect of such a launch on the condition of the launcher and railroad bed was evaluated.

Results of studies being conducted under the MX Program are used by specialists in work on the Midgetman program. It is believed that successive deployment of these missile systems realizes so-called "low risk" technology and will keep from going beyond the scope of appropriations allocated by the U.S. Defense Department for both programs.

The Midgetman system is considered more costly, but it is expected to have greater survivability, above all through significant dispersal of the ICBM single warheads.


The small solid-propellant Midgetman ICBM is planned to be 14 m long and have a launch weight of 17 tons, which will allow moving the missiles by motor vehicle. It is presumed that this will be a prime mover capable of transporting a mobile launcher-trailer weighing some 50 tons at a speed on the order of 80 km/hr. The prime mover must unhook from it and take shelter immediately before the ICBM is launched.

It is believed that a launcher on the ground will withstand an overpressure up to 2 atmospheres. To this end its cross section is streamlined, which gives it rational aerodynamic characteristics during flow-around by a shock wave. In a deployed state the side edges of the transporter-launcher are buried and anchored in the ground to reduce the possibility of overturning.

The organization of performance of the alert duty process by the mobile Midgetman ICBM can be quite varied. It allows permanent dispersal over highways and partial dispersal with fixed deployment in the vicinity of any kind of military bases and movement to a patrol area on receiving an order of the command element.

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Railroad Missile System



Key:

I. Combat trains with ICBM's disperse over the country's rail network on receiving a special command in a threat period. In case the decision for their combat employment is made, they are launched from any suitable sector of the movement route after prelaunch preparation operations. During movement in a travelling condition they must adhere to rules established for conventional rail transportation and must not outwardly differ from it in any way.

II. In the usual situation combat trains consisting of a launch control car (1), several maintenance and escort cars (2), two locomotives (3) and two launch cars (4) perform alert duty in hardened shelters in readiness to begin immediate dispersal. Several such shelters are accommodated at one base.

Suggestions For Economizing Among Missile Forces

91SV0028A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jul 91 p 4

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Yefim Lyuboshits:
"Spare Missiles: How to Economize on Military Spending"]

[Text] At the Third Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, Chairman Zakharov of the USSR Supreme Soviet Social Problems Committee called for a sizable reduction in military spending, pointing out that every third ruble in the national budget is spent on defense.

Having worked in the Strategic Missile Forces' head institute for more than 30 years, I can state with absolute certainty that expenditures on missile systems could be reduced by several times without any harm to the country's defenses if the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium were to show the slightest desire to spend funds appropriated for the defense complex in an economical fashion.

The following factors have led to several billion rubles in unnecessary outlays for strategic missile systems each year:

1. Creation of Unnecessary Stockpiles of Unmounted Weapons.

In addition to the weapons maintained on alert duty, the Strategic Missile Forces has a comparatively large quantity of missiles and ground equipment in storage. As studies conducted in 1979 showed, these stockpiles exceed the number required for alert duty by tens of times, and given modern reconnaissance equipment and offensive weapons, the possibility of ever using them is utterly ruled out.

These surplus stocks have come about for two reasons. The first is that the amount of stocks has been determined in an arbitrary fashion, without benefit of scientific studies. The second is that additional missiles were delivered without the USSR Ministry of Defense having placed orders for them, but on the initiative of industry.

Deliveries of excess weapons have often been made under pressure from the Military-Industrial Commission, in order to "help out" enterprises that, for one reason or another, are unable to produce the weapons that orders specify. And this despite the fact that in such instances, it would make more sense to pay workers for forced downtime than to spend tens and hundreds of times more money on the production and storage of these weapons.

2. The Wide Range of Missile System Types.

The number of strategic missile systems in the Strategic Missile Forces is many times greater than the number of such systems in the US armed forces; this vastly increases the cost of the production, maintenance, and

logistical and technical support of missile systems and of training operating personnel.

This situation was allowed to come about because the USSR Ministry of Defense failed to devote sufficient attention to weapons standardization; it also results from a failure to follow generally accepted world practice with respect to developing and ordering weapons models. The essential feature of this practice is that development orders are placed with several enterprises, on a competitive basis, and the best model is put into service. In our country, however, this practice has been repeatedly violated: The placement of missile systems in service has meant very high awards and bonuses for the developers. This has led to a situation in which they seek to obtain approval of their development work using both admissible and inadmissible methods, drawing top national leaders into these efforts.

3. Development of Missile Systems Without Regard for Missile Development Prospects.

In the US, Minuteman-2 and Minuteman-3 missiles were deployed in Minuteman-1 launch silos, without any substantial rebuilding of the silos. Due to design work that failed to take prospective developments into account, our launch silos had to be rebuilt or to undergo major modifications, at a cost of several billion rubles.

4. Insufficient Use of Research Findings in Designing Missile Systems and Missile Maintenance Systems.

The reliability of missile systems and the cost of their production and maintenance depend to a significant extent on the missile system operational specifications presented to the developers. These specifications include the extent and frequency of maintenance inspections, conditions and procedures governing the replacement of defective elements, and many other parameters.

Validation of these requirements is a complicated technical task that has been the subject of at least three doctoral and many candidate dissertations. However, these works have never been put to practical use, and operational specifications continue to be formulated on the basis of theoretical assessments.

5. Flaws in the Logistical and Technical Support System.

Almost 30 years ago, the US began paying considerable attention to the rational use of defense appropriations. R. MacNamara was US Secretary of Defense at the time. He proclaimed and put into practice the slogan, "more bang for the buck."

The greatest savings was achieved by improving the logistical and technical support system. For example, the budget of the US Air Force rear-services command was reduced by \$1.3 billion in the 1963-1964 fiscal year. The most substantial savings was a reduction in outlays for purchasing spare parts, from \$3 billion to \$2 billion. This was achieved by modifying the echeloning of stocks, requiring that replenishment orders be filled more quickly, formulating a rational strategy for managing

stocks (regulations and procedures governing replenishment), and making extensive use of computers.

Part of the US Air Force's experience in the 1960s was used to improve the supply of spare parts for the Strategic Missile Forces. The number of types of spare equipment and supply sets was reduced, provision was made for rush deliveries when necessary, and a method for determining the composition of equipment and supplies was devised and introduced as a state standard. These measures made it possible to save 400 million rubles on spare parts over a 10-year period without impairing the Strategic Missile Forces' combat readiness.

These measures by no means exhaust the potential for improving the Strategic Missile Forces' logistical and technical support system, but further optimization of the system should be carried out with respect to specific missile system types at the design stage. This could be done by varying the echelonment of stocks, the strategy for managing stocks, the means of delivery, the frequency and extent of technical maintenance inspections, conditions governing the replacement of defective components (when they malfunction or are found to have insufficient redundancy), and organization of the rebuilding of replaced spare parts. It is essential to have a method for optimizing requirements made of the spare parts supply system at the missile system design stage.

The basic features of such a method were drawn up in 1988. However, as a result of cuts in the institute's staff, work on the method was halted and has yet to be restarted.

6. Lagging Computer Use in the Strategic Missile Forces.

For all practical purposes, computers at the disposal of the Strategic Missile Forces are not used in the day-to-day management of stocks, nor for the gathering and processing of information on the actual consumption of various items. Nor are they used to optimize missile maintenance and logistical and technical support systems. On account of organizational flaws, nor is information fed into the computers systems to evaluate missile system reliability used to accomplish the aforementioned tasks.

As a rule, the lack of information results in increased stocks and, consequently, to substantial increases in missile system costs.

Similar shortcomings are to be found in other branches of the USSR Armed Forces. Yet the elimination of these

shortcomings alone would make it possible to reduce weapons spending by several tens of billions of rubles a year.

I have tried repeatedly to stop irrational spending on missiles. In July 1988, I wrote a letter to CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev, and in January 1990 I appealed to the newly created USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee, proposing that it set up a group of experts independent of the Ministry of Defense to supervise efforts to make sensible reductions in the military budget. I pointed out that the effectiveness of such a group's work would exceed 1,000 rubles for every one ruble invested.

However, my appeals were never answered.

And so a strange situation has taken shape. The country is in the midst of an extremely grave crisis, 40 percent of the population is living below the poverty line, and yet the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee and the USSR President refuse to consider valid proposals aimed at significant reductions in the military budget.

The likely reason for this is that the aforementioned committee consists largely of representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Military-Industrial Commission, and it will never allow effective oversight of the substantiation of military spending by independent experts. Characteristic in this regard is a statement by Marshal of the Soviet Union and Commander in Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces N.I. Krylov, who declared at a scientific conference: "Why do I need a research institute that can't validate my decisions?"

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Commentary.

The production and amassing of enormous stocks of unnecessary weapons is a direct consequence of the economic system under which the Soviet defense complex has operated and continues to operate. The client requests some new type of modern weapon from the "producer." It is difficult and bothersome for the producer to put the weapon in production. He proposes: Buy such-and-such a quantity of the old model, and for that you'll get the needed quantity of the new model. Like all other economic parameters with regard to the operation of the Military-Industrial Commission, profits are paper transfers, and the money used by both "seller" and "client" belong to others and is never counted. As a result, a new and promising area of conversion is arising today—the conversion of enterprises for the industrial destruction of unneeded stocks of weapons and ammunition.

OGONEK Questions Defense Budget

91SV0029A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 24,
Jun 91 pp 6-9

[Article by Vadim Pervyshin: "Ruination"]

[Text] Nothing but Lilliputians, worshippers of commerce and foreign currency. Are there many of them? Everywhere you look! They are the ones who betrayed us on Malta. Who sold out everything. Those who raised the soldier's bayonet and Stalin's hand at Yalta.

(S. Kunayev, chief editor, NASH SOVREMENNİK)

The external "adversary"—as we call it, and the internal "fifth column," have united to launch a common assault on the USSR Armed Forces.

...A dictatorship of the military? That is a burden, a heavy and terrible burden! But the Army cannot turn its back on the people at a time of need, and it cannot fail to heed their suffering.

(V. Chernavin, Admiral of the Fleet)

If one is to analyze all the dirty, detestable things that are inflicted onto the Army by its permanent detractors—the "Ogonki" and "views," the Komsomol leaflets and perestroika-inclined academicians, then the entire mass of reproaches, slander, and abuse takes on a definite shape and predictable regularity. It is not simple abuse; it is a well-planned anti-propaganda operation designed to demoralize the enemy troops.

A myth has been created in the press and in parliaments to the effect that the Army is squeezing the national economy and nonmilitary economy dry; that the unavailability of goods is due to our building submarines and bombers; that the unavailability of meat is due to our launching of space ships.

(Colonel-General I. Rodionov)

There is the myth of a militarized economy, something that conflicts with the truth, for weapons production is costing us about seven percent of material resources, which is no more than in other cases.

...The defense people possess much more organizational experience than, say, half-baked politicians.

(O. Baklanov, deputy chairman,
USSR Defense Council)

I recently spoke with a senior officer of the Bundeswehr. He asked me in amazement, "How can you, your government, your Army, permit anyone to make a mockery of the uniform, of the honor of an officer?"

It is ironic that the Army has been protected all these years by a handful of patriotic Russian writers.

(A. Prokhanov, chief editor, DEN)

All the above quotes were taken from a single issue of a newspaper (DEN, No 9). There is a large number of this kind of quote and this kind of newspaper. The authors of collective letters and parliamentary declarations (with one of them—making an appeal for the military—signed by

no less than an Orthodox metropolitan), who do not care about the complexities of the situation as they grow increasingly bold, reaping confidence and money out of the deep pockets of generals, are fighting for the so-called defense consciousness. One reads again and again of corruption and lawlessness at many levels of the military-industrial complex, but the responses consist not of reasoned explanations, but merely threats and charges of treason. The uniformed leaders are so confident of their immunity in the country that they ascribe any attempt at exposure to intrigue perpetrated by foreign intelligence services.

In continuing to present the research of the Soviet scientist, who has discussed conversion problems and is considered to be an authoritative specialist in his field, we wish to emphasize that Vadim Grigoryevich Pervyshin continues to head a section in a very large all-union institute. Orthodox in religion, he is a military reservist.

On 22 March of this year, a Friday, Prime Minister Pavlov looked out over the party economic aktiv sitting before him in Moscow plant GPZ-1 and laughed aloud: "Three-quarters in imports!" Then, in a confidential tone, he said, "It costs the Americans 300 billion dollars a year in military expenditures. Do you think that, to maintain a balance, we are spending less?" This was said by a joking and laughing man who had for five years been minister of finances, one who asserted and swore that the USSR's defense expenditures always amounted to "exactly 20.2 billion rubles" and did not exceed five percent of the state budget.

A Major Lie, Major Distrust

It makes sense now to remind ourselves how our leaders informed us—and the whole world—in a steady and strict chronological order, of our military expenditures.

In his speech at the 30 May 1989 Congress of USSR People's Deputies, newly-elected USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman M. S. Gorbachev, in his report, "On the Major Guidelines of Internal and External Policies of the USSR," decided to let a terrible secret be known: "The 1989 military expenditures amount to 77.3 billion rubles. I am hereby informing the Congress of this true figure."

This is where a question comes to mind: Where did the previously-cited amount come from—the clear blue sky?

One week later, on 7 June 1989, the USSR Council of Ministers chairman, speaking at the same Congress, declared "openly": "The Congress should possess complete knowledge of actual defense expenditures. Only then will the people's deputies be able to have some understanding of them so that they can participate

actively in examining and putting together military outlays. Thus, of the 1989 total expenditures of 77.3 billion rubles, the breakdown in billions of rubles is as follows:

Weapons and equipment purchases:	32.6
Research and experimental design:	15.3
Army and Navy maintenance:	20.2
Military Construction:	4.6
Military pensions:	2.3
Miscellaneous expenditures:	2.3

"There obviously is no need to comment on this data," said a modest and solemn Ryzhkov as he completed his speech, after having "divulged" super-secret state secrets.

I beg to disagree—lack of commentary is not the thing to do here. If what Ryzhkov says is the truth, can anyone please tell me what I should think about his successor—Pavlov? Which of the two prime ministers lied? There is a difference greater than a factor of four in these figures!

No less surprising is another statement made by Ryzhkov in the same report at the same Congress: "I consider it necessary to dwell especially on the topic of the creation and application of space technology in the interests of defense and the national economy. It is obvious that here, the same as in the case of defense-related expenses, the Congress should be supplied information on expenditures associated with implementing our space programs."

And so, what kind of monies are spent for this? I shall present the figures in terms of billions of rubles. They are as follows:

National economic and scientific space work—1.7; military-related space work—3.9; reusable system "Buran"—1.3. The total is 6.9 billion rubles.

This gives rise to a question: Are these expenditures justifiable? Ministry of Defense specialists assert that implementation of the military-related programs alone will improve the effectiveness of our Armed Forces by a factor of 1.5 to 2.

Now for the opinion of another specialist: the former chief designer of space rockets, Academician V. N. Mishin, who is continuing the work of the celebrated S. P. Korolev: "There never was, nor is there now, a program for conquering space. All we had were plans of operations of Glavkosmos [Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research]... There are plans to carry out a manned flight to Mars, but is that justifiable? I think not. The need for this kind of flight at this time is not clear. The costs will be enormous. What will we receive in exchange?

Enterprises and ministries that are involved in the space effort are still directly funded by the USSR Minfin

[Ministry of Finance]. The 1987 space effort cost the USSR 30 billion dollars, which is more than that spent by all other countries in the world combined. The sum is enormous, but where is the return? What an amazing coincidence in concealing amounts for space and defense! They are once again decreased by a factor of four!

After seeing these examples of official lying perpetrated on the people's deputies, the Soviet people as a whole have come to a full realization that the government cannot be believed. That is why we in our computations of military expenditures will rely on our experience, knowledge, and common sense.

One feels compelled to make this kind of computation not only because of the country's extremely difficult economic situation, but also due to this unending deceit. In February of 1991, Prime Minister Pavlov stated officially that the Soviet Union in 1990 sold on the external market 234 tons of gold for 1,684 million exchange rubles, i.e., the gold was sold very cheaply, for next to nothing: seven rubles for one gram of gold! Businessmen in the West upon hearing of this unbelievable story explained that the drop in gold prices was due to the fact that "the Soviet Union, in a terrible need of hard currency, effected a substantial increase in sale of gold. Put on the world market in 1990 was 450 tons of Soviet gold"—twice as much as Pavlov's figure. Where was the 1.5 billion dollars hidden or spent that was received in payment for 216 tons of gold that is unaccounted for and forgotten by the authorities? Is this something that merely slipped their mind?

Profit or Loss?

When we feel at the personal level that the country is suffering shortages of food items, housing, and clothing, it is reasonable to look first at the structure of our national economy to see what is useful and what is wasteful.

Let me remind the reader that useful production is defined as everything that is useful to people, that which exists for their benefit: agriculture, animal husbandry, consumer goods, and essential items.

Conversely, absolutely wasteful for example is the production of tanks, aircraft, submarines, nuclear weapons, and other armaments. The same as maintaining the Army, KGB, MVD, enterprises of the military-industrial complex, and military science organizations.

The proportions of these outputs and of unproductive losses determine the usefulness or wastefulness of the entire national economy.

Let us also not forget that the structure of industrial production for the 73 years of the Soviet system was constantly being misshapen in the direction of militarization of the Soviet economy. The weight of the famous group "A"—production of means of production—underwent constant increase. In 1913, it amounted to 33.3 percent of all industrial production; in 1928, 39.5 percent; in 1940, 61.0 percent (which is understandable, since preparations were being made for the war); in

1950, 68.8 percent (the "cold war" started); in 1970, 73.4 percent; in 1980, 73.8 percent; in 1990, 75.0 percent! For what battles were preparations being made in the two decades?" you may ask. What adversary was to be crushed?

Naturally, during the seven decades of bolshevik domination, there was constant diminution in the weight of group "B" (production of consumer goods): Production in 1913 was 66.7 percent; in 1940, 39 percent; in 1990, 25 percent.

The weight of light industry outputs plummeted from the 22.7 percent of 1960 to 13.9 percent in 1990. The food industry volume fell from 23.9 percent to 16.9 percent.

While the enterprises of the light and food industry with their primitive low-output equipment were allowed to fall behind, military-industrial complex enterprises were given priority treatment in acquiring the latest machine tools and equipment, the best high-grade metals, and unlimited supplies of fuel and electric power. The strength and power of the military-industrial complex grew as fast as weeds, while the civilian sectors of the national economy were permitted to founder and fall apart, thus leading to total collapse of the economy and absolute impoverishment of all workers.

It is most unbelievable: We can produce all kinds of armaments and military equipment without assistance, but there is no way whatsoever we can feed and clothe our own people without help from the West, without importing foodstuffs and raw materials for the light industry!

The cost of importing foodstuffs in 1964 amounted to 1.4 billion rubles; in the middle of the 1970s it rose to 6 billion rubles; in 1985, to 15 billion; in 1989 it reached the 20-billion mark. Is it not disgraceful for a large country to haul potatoes from Cuba? Is it not shameful to sell them at 10 kopeks per kilogram in 1985, but in the spring of 1991 to charge 79 kopeks?

Commerce in 1965 received imported industrial goods valued at 4.2 billion rubles; in 1970, at 8.2; in 1980, at 21.6; in 1985, at 33.0 billion rubles. We even got to the point of bringing in underwear from Peru!

Thus, we on the one hand have more submarines than the rest of the world combined. On the other hand, we are paying the owners of ship companies a billion dollars every year for shipment of 30 million tons of grain alone. Hauling of freight by foreign ships is costing us a total of two billion dollars. Because the docks of the Baltic and Zhdanov plants in Leningrad and the shipbuilding plants at Nikolayev and Severodvinsk are producing only cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers, and submarines but absolutely no dry cargo ships, something we must purchase from Finland, Sweden, and Poland.

No matter what branch of the national economy you look at, you cannot fail to be amazed at the planning

involved. For example, the 1991-1995 work plan calls for reducing new cargo ship commissionings by a factor of four! Instead of building ships for our own use, we are selling tankers and trawlers to the West on the basis of a decision made by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. A new concern—the Sudpromimpeks—has been organized to carry out these mindless transactions. Plans call for this concern to sell in the five-year period more than 180 large ships and more than 200 smaller craft and other materiel that is so needed by our domestic fleet. Why are we doing this? Is there a reason? This is nothing but dissension.

A simple computation shows that useful production in the Soviet Union never exceeded 25 percent of total production for all the postwar years. For that reason, the entire national economy of the USSR is economically ineffective, wasteful, and we are sustained only by sales of our national resources: diamonds, gold, petroleum, gas, timber, and furs.

Unknown People

The Ministry of Defense, the KGB, MVD, the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, and military science, with the latter concentrated in the "postal boxes," are all organizations under little supervision. To be more exact, they are subject to no oversight. Their exclusion from control went on for decades; this practice became a tradition, a custom. The number of people there are, and what they do in those organizations, is something no one knows, since everything is protected by an extreme degree of super-secrecy.

In the Soviet Union—indeed in the whole world—there are a few people who have heard something about the magnitude of the USSR's military expenditures, but no one has any idea of how large they really are. International experts maintain that the USSR's military outlays make up 18 to 20 percent of the gross national product, while for the USA the figure is six to seven percent; for Germany, not more than two percent. However, our leaders, when asked to answer this kind of immodest question put by the curious, would merely put on an enigmatic smile and say at party congresses, to wildly applauding delegates, that "we spend as much as is necessary."

That is what we would like to know: How much is that?

The 12 January 1989 population census indicated that the country's labor resources amounted to 164.1 million persons, with 139.3 million employed in the national economy and 24.8 million not employed in the economy. Who are they, these "unemployed"?

They are the persons in military service, KGB workers, the MVD, teen-age students in schools providing general education and in technical and vocational schools, students in tekhnikums and VUZ's, graduate students, housewives, clergymen of the various faiths, and convicts.

It is known that the figures, in millions, for the USSR of 1989 are as follows:

Pupils and college students:	11.7
Convicts:	0.88
Housewives:	2.5
Clergy:	0.06
Total	15.14

Thus, the number of servicemen and those employed by the KGB and MVD comes to exactly 9,660,000 persons.

It is known that in the Army there were 4.5 million persons; in military construction units, 329,000; in railroad troops, 200,000; in border troops, 220,000; in internal troops, 200,000.

Therefore, the number of persons working for the KGB and MVD is as follows: 9,660,000 - 5,449,000 = 4,211,000 persons. A simple calculation, is it not? Another question is: Is this much or little for the military power and defense sufficiency so much discussed? Let us be reminded of the size of the Workers and Peasants Red Army in the Civil War years, the peacetime 1920s, the turbulent 1930s, the wartime 1940s, and the peacetime 1960s, and compare it to the strength of the Soviet Army of our time. For 1920, it was 3,538,000 men; 1921, 4,110,000; 1924, 5,620,000; 1928, 5,620,000; at the start of the 1941 war, 5,300,000; at the end of the war—in 1945—12,000,000; in 1960, 1,360,000; in 1989, 4,500,000, as we already know.

Coming to the VPK—the celebrated military-industrial complex—how many of our fellow countrymen are employed by it? Fourteen million four hundred thousand men. Is that a lot? Not a lot? Judge for yourself: In the machine building complex, which is an amalgamation of enterprises previously belonging to 11 ministries, there are 5,100,000 persons working.

Now for the VPK. Of whom and of what does it consist? Here we count the famous "group of nine": the ministries of the aviation industry, shipbuilding industry, general machine building, defense industry, machine building, radio industry, electronics industry, communications equipment industry, and medium machine building.

Curiously, the progenitor of the celebrated Minsredmash was the super-secret Special Committee (for atomic affairs), which was organized on 20 August 1945 under the chairmanship of Beriya. The committee was charged with supervision of all efforts related to the use of the nuclear energy of uranium.

The Special Committee in 1953 was renamed the "USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building," an innocent-sounding name, is it not? However, what it was involved with was quite serious: creating the atomic and hydrogen bombs. But that was secret, to be sure. The chairman, starting with Beriya, from the instant the Spetskomitet

was organized, never made any accounting in any way, shape, or form to anyone. That also is true for the Sredmash ministers. Only Zverev, Stalin's people's finance commissar who ruled from 1938 to 1960, had knowledge of expenditures attributable to the powerful special departments. He carried all the Minsredmash's secrets to his grave.

Not Counting Billions

Few people know that in our country there is no industrial ministry or department that is not connected directly or indirectly to the military-industrial complex, military science, the Army, KGB, or the MVD.

Ferrous metallurgy provides 60 percent of its state order output to VPK enterprises, five percent to military science, and 10 percent to the Army, KGB, and MVD. Nonferrous metallurgy is fully occupied with the VPK. The fuel and power complex supplies 60 percent of its fuel to the Army, KGB and MVD, and 15 percent to the VPK.

Not far behind are the enterprises of Minstankoprom [Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry]: It sends 60 to 70 percent of its output—metal-cutting lathes, forging and pressing machines, casting machines, tools—to its largest consumer, VPK machine building enterprises.

Minelektrotekhprom [Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry] ships to that voracious complex more than half its electric motors, electric equipment, transformers, generators for gas-fired and steam turbines, storage batteries, and cables. Hauled to the same addresses are products of Minavtoprom (motor vehicles), Minergomash (Diesel engines, mobile electric power units, turbines), and Minneftekhimprom (gasoline, kerosene, heavy fuel oil).

The construction materials industry provides the VPK with at least 30 percent of its output of manufacturing equipment that is used to produce reinforced-concrete constructions and components for the building of missile silos, airfields, space ports, piers, and fortified areas.

The monetary figure for deliveries of products made by all the industrial complexes to VPK enterprises, military science, the Army, KGB, and MVD is mind-boggling: a total of 485 billion rubles. True, VPK plants have produced 30 billion rubles' worth of consumer goods for us. We thank them for that, of course, but just look at the 455 billion rubles belonging to you and me that were squandered on nothing but "defense"! But that is not all. We have failed to mention the centrally budgeted amounts earmarked for military construction: no less than 10 billion rubles, with 15 billion rubles for military science. This makes a total of 480 billion in the USSR's military outlays! This means that they have eaten up 51.9 percent of the gross national product, or 73.1 percent of the national income. What economy can continue to carry such an impossible burden?

Wasted Money

USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman I. S. Belousov recently stated that "the Soviet Union had in the last five-year period made foreign deliveries of weapons and military equipment worth almost 56.7 billion rubles. That included about 9.7 billion rubles for 1990. Uncompensated military assistance delivered in the last five years amounted to 8.5 billion rubles."

"So what?" I can hear my opponents say. "Many countries deal in weapons, and sometimes they give them away to serve their interests. The USA, for example. Did it go broke because of that?" The difference between the USSR and the USA as far as weapons commerce is concerned consists of the fact that 75 percent of the USA's weapons are sent to industrially advanced countries, while the Soviet Union shipped its armaments to emerging countries and those formerly socialist. Guess what we received in exchange for our products? That is correct: nothing.

On top of that, as of 1 November 1989, foreign countries were indebted to their benefactor—the Soviet Union—to the tune of 85.8 billion rubles. Is there anyone who believes that we will be paid even one ruble of this debt? We will never see the money!

The Sovmin [Council of Ministers] deputy chairman is proud of the fact that we have exported thousands of tanks and artillery weapons and hundreds of thousands of assault rifles, but "simply" does not know whether or not we received any money for that. This clearly is the most characteristic trait of the leader of the military-industrial complex. He never did count the money: Whatever he requested, he received; what he wanted, he got.

We wish to remind him—and at the same time inform our poor fellow countrymen—that the largest debtors are counted among the recent "brotherly" countries: Cuba, 15.5 billion rubles; Mongolia, 9.5 billion rubles; Vietnam, 9.1 billion; Poland, 4 billion; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 2.2 billion rubles. Total indebtedness of the former and present socialist countries is 43.8 billion rubles.

Emerging countries are not far behind. India owes 8.9 billion rubles; Syria, 6.7; Iraq, 3.8; Afghanistan, 3.0; Ethiopia, 2.9; Algiers, 2.5; Angola, 2.0; People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 1.8; Libya, 1.7; Egypt, 1.7; Nicaragua, 0.9 billion rubles. All told this is 42.0 billion rubles. In a word, this kind of commerce caused the country losses. To put it more accurately, it caused us—taxpayers—the losses. This is billions of rubles, out of my pockets and yours, squandered by the government at the people's expense.

Another problem related to our military assistance cropped up on 2 October 1990, when the former National People's Army of the former German Democratic Republic ceased to exist. The FRG government

was presented with another concern: What to do with its Soviet-produced weapons and military equipment that had been supplied?

What to do with 3,032 T-72 and T-62 tanks, 5,744 armored personnel carriers, 2,140 artillery weapons, 400 military aircraft, 1.2 million pieces of small arms, more than 300,000 tons of ammunition? Where to dump 250,000 rounds of ammunition for Kalashnikov assault rifles, and how to dispose of the assault rifles proper, of which there were 400,000 pieces? To whom could they offer 24 supersonic all-weather MiG-29 fighter-interceptors? Would anyone have a need for 65 MiG-23 aircraft, 251 MiG-21s, 54 Su-22 bombers, 165 surface-to-air missiles and the associated one million liters of toxic jet fuel?

What about thousands of army trucks, armored personnel carriers, all-terrain vehicles, field kitchens, pontoon bridges, and other military equipment—what to do with that? Give it to someone? Destroy it? But that costs quite a lot of money: To cut up a single T-72 tank, it takes 300 hours of work time, with the cost amounting to 32,000 marks.

Let us note in passing that a T-72 tank on the external market sells for 1.5 million dollars; a MiG-29 aircraft goes for 30 million dollars. A Kalashnikov assault rifle commands a black market price of 1,000 dollars; its sale in Africa, Asia, and the Near East would be no problem.

The sale has started of all types and calibers of weapons—both used and the very latest of Soviet military style—at prices of junk, very cheaply, to anyone, anywhere. A beautiful Makarov pistol was going for 10 marks apiece! Soldier's winter cap with ear flaps sold for 20 marks apiece; the officer's cap, 30 marks; army watches, 50 marks; field binoculars, 120 marks.

All the property and gear of the former GDR army—in the beginning of 1990 evaluated at 90 billion marks—that had been supplied to the GDR by the Soviet Union over a 45-year period was sold in six months. Netting quite an amount of money, the German government made the generous gesture of obligating itself to paying the USSR by the end of 1994 the amount of 12 billion German marks (out of our 90 billion!), of which 7.8 is earmarked for financing of construction of four million square meters of housing for 380,000 Soviet servicemen being pulled out of Germany. The Germans plan to build 35,000 apartments for officers and warrant officers leaving Germany. Thirty-five thousand apartments for 380,000 servicemen! Not much! The waiting line for housing for Soviet officers will be shortened a little bit—a very little—thanks to German assistance. Well, even that is a help, for in 1991 our own Ministry of Defense will provide homeless officers and warrant officers with only 64,000 apartments.

It would be difficult to imagine a situation more paradoxical or nonsensical. It is enough that the military-industrial complex has brought the people to ruin and continues to do so. It is going a step further by making

virtual beggars out of simple military folk. Money is found for everything: new bombers and cruisers, tanks and missiles, ammunition and uniforms, but not for adequate pay for officers, not for housing for them, not to provide their families with a decent standard of living.

Think about it: Can the kind of down-and-out army that we possess become a protector? How many persons are willing to join its ranks of their own free will? And, in general, how long will the Moloch—the VPK—continue to pick away at our economy, at the welfare of citizens, at whose expense is it getting so fat?

This is not the first time such questions are being asked. Answers were not provided previously, nor are they forthcoming now.

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DSSC's Strukov on Pending Military Legislation

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24 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with N. A. Strukov, member, Defense and Security Affairs Committee; chairman, Armed Forces Affairs Subcommittee, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 2nd Rank V. Urban: "The Unopened Military Parcel"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA files: N. A. Strukov was born in 1944. He is a USSR people's deputy from Kursk Territorial Electoral District No 216. Until 1990 he worked as a senior investigator in the Kursk Oblast Office of the Procurator. He later was engaged full-time in Parliament, holding the position of chairman of the Committee on Law and Order and Struggle Against Crime. He was co-chairman of the commission of deputies dealing with the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair.

Since April of this year, he has been a member of the Defense and Security Affairs Committee and chairman of the Armed Forces Subcommittee.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nikolay Alekseyevich, what bills are now before the subcommittee?

[Strukov] The status of men in military service. Universal military obligation and military service. That is all. Two commissions have been organized. One of them—dealing with the draft legislation on universal military obligation and military service—is headed by me. The other one—involved with the servicemen's status bill—has Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Sychev in charge.

I hope that the drafts will be submitted to the Supreme Soviet for the first reading at the next session, the sixth.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] So, the Parliament is slow in setting military reform onto a legal foundation. Incidentally, in the fifth session's plan there was a question of

legislative acts associated with military reform. That is, the plan was not carried out. Why not?

[Strukov] This is something that bears a closer look. The Army and law enforcement agencies have been placed into what you might say is a position in which they cannot function.

Let me explain by way of example, one close to me by virtue of my previous work. The social basis of a market economy is now being created. We have in force the Criminal Code, in which a provision forbids engaging in activity of a privately-owned business nature. If we act in compliance with the Constitution and Criminal Code, we will destroy the social basis of the market economy, the entrepreneurs themselves, even though in our country they are not producers, but entrepreneurs. People who skim off the profits, as I said at the fourth session.

That is what accounts for the present attitude toward the law enforcement system and the Army. The main problem as we all know is for these agencies to function in a positive manner. For the people, as they say. The Army has its mission; the KGB, MVD, and prokuratura, theirs. However, there is as yet no concept for their development. And so, many of our laws are being squeezed into the edifice of a law-governed state, an edifice that is architecturally incomplete.

The same thing applies to the laws pertaining to the military. We were given two laws, but so far there is no general concept of military reform.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In your opinion, why is this so?

[Strukov] This is all artificial, it seems to me. So that there would be no general strategy. That is my view. It is essentially a struggle between two approaches. The old one, the administrative command one, and the new one, the market kind, as I call it.

When privatization does come about, there will of course be a need for a system that will defend the new approach. It will be required. To crush those who strike out against it, those who rise up to disagree, for example.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Do you believe that such a thing is possible?

[Strukov] It is possible. Remember what I said at the second Congress: "Let us define the terms 'Mafia,' 'shadow economy,' and 'corruption.'" That is, we, jurists, did not know whom to fight against. We have no compass, no target, to put it crudely, to shoot at.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What about the Army?

[Strukov] The Army has its own functions: protecting the country from external aggression. We have already knocked down the old economic structures; next on the list—the way it seems to me—are the military structures.

Yes, the Army does possess many shortcomings. But that does not mean that we should tear down everything to the foundation.

How did the criticism of the administrative command system start? With criticism of the "projects of the century": moving the northern rivers to the south, the anti-alcohol campaign, etc. Those are the kinds of projects we are working on now. Pulling the Army out of Eastern Europe, for example. This kind of thing is done at the people's expense. Politics is politics. But any consequences, including the social, must be thought of beforehand. That is axiomatic.

The result is that this "time interval" is reflected in the Army, which is now at a crossroads. The military structures are in limbo. The Army is made to perform tasks that are foreign to it.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Consequently, it is necessary to set up a legal basis for military reform. What has your subcommittee been able to do?

[Strukov] Well, there is the Law on Universal Military Obligation and Military Service. Our commission is of the opinion that it is necessary to remove from it any mention of special musters of the militarily obligated. I am talking about harvest work, of course. That is not the concern of the Army. It should not be asked to fill in economic gaps. This must not be made a part of the law.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How far has the military reform bill gotten? The fact is that the Defense and Security Affairs Committee (which carried a slightly different title at that time) did toward the end of last year complete its work on this bill, afterward submitting it to the government for further work.

[Strukov] I have yet to see it, even though this is my third month in the committee. It is still in the Cabinet of Ministers. The draft law on defense is also there.

As I have said, there are only the two bills. And they were not submitted via the regular channel, bypassing the Cabinet of Ministers. The President sent them directly to the Supreme Soviet. We—the committee—undertook their review, with the Army's needs in mind. We appended our suggestions and comments; now let the Cabinet of Ministers put them in final form.

Concerning noncompletion of the plan by the fifth session, all I can say is that this speaks of the Army's significance at present as far as the government is concerned.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nonetheless, let us discuss the Law on Universal Military Obligation and Military Service. Did you write many comments in this regard?

[Strukov] Quite a few. But that is part of the usual legislative process. For example, the commission feels that servicemen's social guarantees should be expanded. However, in any event, adoption of this law by Parliament will not mean a reduction in number of difficulties.

The problem is that if we include the rights to which a serviceman is entitled, then these rights must be written into other laws.

For example, the right to housing. Our draft includes that. But say that a serviceman comes to the Soviet. He would be turned away, after being told that the law pertains to military personnel only. Therefore, all rights granted servicemen should be made a part of parallel laws.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Does the draft take into account the movement toward an all-volunteer army?

[Strukov] An experiment dealing with establishing contract service for seamen and petty officers is in progress in the Navy. A Supreme Soviet decree covers that. Our draft includes the creation of the same kind of system in the other services and arms. Plans call for having military school cadets enter into a contract arrangement as early as after completion of their first year of study. But,...

BUT, this is the point: Conditions in our country are such that the army must be built using a mixed approach. That is the optimum method. You will recall that the Americans had to call up reservists to serve in the Persian Gulf War. This is another example of the importance of trained reserves. We are using that as a basis.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The press has been printing a wave of protests over your draft's providing for conscription of college students. Is that so?

[Strukov] It is so. But that is only a draft bill. It does grant deferments to many youths. But it deals with the issue of granting this right to many categories of citizens.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But what about the students? Their callup would conflict with the Supreme Soviet's 1989 decree, whereby students—even those who had not completed their term of service—were discharged into the reserve.

[Strukov] Of course. But it also cannot be said that this decree was not in violation of the Constitution, which proclaims the universal military obligation. It must be realized that seven percent of those discharged did not go back to the institutes. That is, good intentions were not backed up by reality. Meanwhile, the Army suffers.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] All right, but imagine that Parliament does pass the Law on Universal Military Obligation and Military Service. Do you really think that it will be possible to organize a regular callup, say in the Baltic? Or say that the Law on Servicemen's Status is enacted. Will there be an immediate change in servicemen's situation in the Baltic?

[Strukov] Of course not. I was in the Baltic in May, along with V. Ochirov, our committee's deputy chairman. Everyone demands that the center make a decision.

People are tired of lawlessness. Everybody knows that. Information is flowing into the Cabinet of Ministers, to the President.

The Army finds itself in a difficult position there. Extremists are committing fewer acts against the military, but they do occur. The direct standoff is continuing. There are armed people on both sides. I spoke with representatives of the Baltic Military District, who told me openly that they cannot speak for officers, who would not hesitate to take action if their families are threatened with violence. Therefore, political means must be employed. A solution must be sought here, in Moscow. This is the place to start.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The state has yet to make a decision that would respect the views of all concerned. But what about Parliament's supervisory function? Or is it merely a discussion club?

[Strukov] This is where the critics may be right. Yes, things often do not get beyond us. It happens that the prediction I made at the first congress applies: "We were called to cast votes for the system and its decisions." So we visited the Baltic and made suggestions for the President to restore all the constitutional rights of servicemen and other citizens. We submitted other suggestions. What happened to them?

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Who is supposed to make the decisions?

[Strukov] It may be that I am a renegade in my thinking, but we are supposed to be endowed with executive rights, rights of the President. However, we seem to have been placed into a tunnel carrying one-way traffic, with someone in front and everyone else forced to follow. And we are accused of failing to take action.

There is much over which we have no control, unfortunately. We cannot even decide our own fate. You should know that there has been a proposal to let the Supreme Soviet go ahead of time. That apparently is the mold into which we were poured. And those deputies who were duly elected have been able to do nothing about the situation.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] On what sort of terms are you with the Ministry of Defense?

[Strukov] The usual kind, businesslike. I personally bear it no negative feelings.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What did the Defense and Security Affairs Committee have on its agenda in the last session? It was held on 4 July, I believe.

[Strukov] This year's military budget.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Were any requests made of you?

[Strukov] Increasing the budget. Due to inflation. The cost of materials and everything else that goes to fill the

Army's needs has risen sharply. In a word, it is not possible to make ends meet with the budget as it exists.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What conclusions have you arrived at?

[Strukov] Speaking of the committee? We suggested that the request be justified on an economic basis, so that we could monitor the cost of each item on the military budget.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Do you think that the Supreme Soviet will support an increase in military expenditures in connection with inflation?

[Strukov] Hardly. Money is presently nowhere to be found, even if the Defense and Security Affairs Committee does support the request. There is no union budget as such. The deputies are well aware of that.

Sychev Interview on Prospects for Law on Servicemen's Status

91UM0818A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Aug 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Lieutenant-Colonel Yu. Sychev by Captain Second Rank V. Urban; date and place not given: "Status of Servicemen: When To Expect the Law"]

[Text] From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA files. Sychev, Yu.P. Born in 1953. Graduated from the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin and completed postgraduate work at the academy. A USSR people's deputy from Leningrad's Primorskiy Territorial District No. 57.

He was a senior instructor of the Leningrad PVO [Air Defense] Higher Military-Political School. Since 1991 he has been working on a permanent basis in the parliamentary committee on defense and security affairs. He is the chairman of the commission on a revision of the draft law on the status of USSR servicemen.

[Urban] It is certainly necessary to answer the main question straight away: When will the law be adopted? The editorial mail is literally screaming about this. So, Yuriy Petrovich, when?

[Sychev] Our committee has just as many such letters. But allow me to mention certain points. Indeed, the question on the concept of military reform and legislation relating to it were on the agenda of the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet. Logically the concept itself should have been reviewed first, afterwards the draft law on defense, and then other documents.

[Urban] But why was this point not implemented? I have asked the opinion of deputies more than once. Now I am ready to listen to yours.

[Sychev] Every person, and not only a parliamentarian, understands that it is impossible to adopt a concept of military reform without a Union treaty. I will explain,

using the draft law on defense as an example. It is still not completely clear how military questions will be treated in the Union treaty. But the law is supposed to define the rights and duties of the chief of state, the parliaments of the republics, and of the local organs of authority in the implementation of defense policy. It is not possible to do this now without a Union treaty.

But how does one get out of this situation? A sensible idea surfaced. Two drafts—about the status of servicemen and about the universal military service obligation—could be considered separately from the “military package.”

[Urban] But the fifth session did not examine these drafts either?

[Sychev] I have the documents here. On 27 April the minister of defense submitted a draft law on the status of servicemen to the USSR president. Further. On 15 May—O. Baklanov's note. On 17 May M. Gorbachev wrote a resolution on it to A. Lukyanov and V. Pavlov. Only then did the draft law come to the Supreme Soviet, and then after omitting the Cabinet of Ministers. This is a violation of regulations. The government appeared to be isolated. Our committee received the draft law without its finding.

[Urban] That is why a working commission was established?

[Sychev] Yes. After all, in principle the committee could have returned the document and demanded compliance with the regulation. But considering that time was passing, and people are waiting for the law, our commission came into being. With a single purpose—to speed up the law-creating process. The commission can be called parliamentary-governmental.

[Urban] Is the draft approved conceptually?

[Sychev] Yes.

[Urban] And what were the main comments?

[Sychev] There are several articles that caused stormy debates. I think that a sharp discussion will take place on them in parliament as well. The main comments naturally were on those articles that require additional financing.

Let us “go through” several articles, then everything will become clear. We will begin with Article 10. “The Right to Monetary and Material Support.” You yourself know that the main income of servicemen is what they receive from the state. And the present time is characterized by the fact that in principle each Soviet individual can earn as much as he can. If not in his main work, then in another place... All of this is forbidden for servicemen. Thus, “discrepancies” appear.

I think it is properly written in the draft that position rates of pay for junior officers and warrant officers assigned to a position for the first time cannot be lower than the average pay of workers and employees.

[Urban] What is the average pay in the country?

[Sychev] At present, the average pay for the past year has not been determined. Indeed, it is practically impossible to make accurate calculations now. The transition to a market has brought about cooperatives, private enterprises, and the like. This also should be taken into account when determining average pay.

So, I will say right off: The arguments about Article 10 have not yet led to anything. What is most surprising is a proposal of the Ministry of Labor and Social Questions that was received: The initial monetary allowance cannot be lower than minimal (?) pay. And today this is 70 rubles.

Is such an approach really acceptable? Our commission rejected the proposal.

[Urban] Nevertheless, will the problem of “average pay” (we will call it this) be resolved?

[Sychev] I fear it is hardly likely that this level will be determined in our country. The Ministry of Defense has its own commission on the development of this law. It has been instructed to define Article 10 more specifically. But perhaps it is not worth getting locked into the term “average pay.” But to consider international experience, to look ahead, since our law is for the long term, and to search for other norms. The main thing is that the material support of the military is worthy of the position of people who are truly of the state.

[Urban] I read the draft carefully. There will be a good number of additional rights for servicemen if parliament passes the law..

[Sychev] But quite a few restrictions also; take this into account. At times, even constitutional restrictions—that is our fate. But the law is being established to compensate for these restrictions. I cannot but note that frequently representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers and of the Ministry of Labor and Social Questions itself, for example, do not completely understand this. Moreover, they are far from the reality that has developed in the country and the world.

[Urban] Can you give an example?

[Sychev] Article 11, “The Right to Rest.” There are words there, if you will recall, that officers and warrant officers who are called on to perform service duty at night are given a rest of the same duration. And then the Ministry of Labor and Social Questions proposes to exclude the words “at nighttime.” The justification: Allegedly rest days for work at nighttime are not granted to any categories of workers. But the specific nature of the service has to be considered, and the commission did not accept this comment.

[Urban] We have broached the right to rest. This is precisely the subject of numerous questions in the editorial mail. Let us dwell in more detail on Article 11...

[Sychev] The commission agreed with the proposals contained in the draft of the Ministry of Defense. That is, the length of leave for servicemen having service of less than 10 years will be 30 days; from 10 to 20 years—35 days; from 20 to 25 years—40 days; and 25 and more years—45 days.

[Urban] Thus, everything here is clear. But the situation is also envisaged that a serviceman in connection with the performance of duties under harmful conditions or of a special service nature is granted additional leave...

[Sychev] Yes, it is envisaged. And we discussed this point for a very long time. I personally think it should be rendered concrete. Let us take the submariners or the aviators. Many of them serve, for example, in areas of the Far North. But they also have special service conditions. It is one thing to be a flier in the Moscow Military District, and another to be in the Northern Fleet or on Kamchatka. Everything has to be taken into account.

[Urban] What did the commission conclude?

[Sychev] The commission concluded that in adding on leave, all of the rights of servicemen have to be considered. Let us take a lieutenant flier in some northern garrison. His leave will be added up this way. Thirty days, plus 15 for service in the North, plus 15 because he flies. The commission is insisting on precisely this version.

[Urban] And once again I come back to the editorial mail. The draft that was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA states: After 20 calendar years of service, servicemen are granted one leave of three month's duration for taking care of questions related to discharge... Will this happen?

[Sychev] I will just define it more precisely. This leave is granted in one of the last three years before discharge. But on the whole, the commission is for such a right. Everyone understands: It is possible that an officer will have to move to another place for a residence, he has to look for work, but it is more difficult to do this each year... The country is heading for unemployment—there is no need to hide this.

It is true that the minister is now suggesting not to grant such leave. For he thinks (I quote): Questions associated with discharge could be resolved during a period of regular leave, and, on individual questions, even after discharge. It states further that "for a resolution of such tasks," provision is made for the payment of five basic payments on discharge.

It would seem that one is not tied to the other. But there is also that argument. We did not agree with him, and we kept the former wording. Incidentally, I am not citing the objections casually; they can also arise in the revision of the draft in the Cabinet of Ministers, and even during consideration in parliament.

[Urban] Something certainly should also be said about compulsory service servicemen. They will have a guaranteed right to leave. But the draft also establishes a norm of reduced leave periods for the number of days spent in the guardhouse under arrest. If, of course, the punishment is not removed. What does the commission propose here?

[Sychev] There are also many proposals here. The MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], for example, is of the opinion that it is necessary to remove all restrictions. It seems to me that their demands are entirely justifiable, because leave is not an incentive measure, but a constitutional guarantee. I supported this, by the way, back in my preelection program. As for incentive, based on this draft, a commander has the right to increase a soldier's or sailor's leave by five days.

[Urban] But, then, how does one deal with a negligent soldier?

[Sychev] I allow that a commander has the right to reduce leave by several days for the one who has sat in the guardhouse, but a soldier has a right to have a minimum of 10 days leave. There can be restrictions, but it is not permissible to eliminate leave. This is also the opinion of the commission.

[Urban] But now, if you please, we will move to still another article that requires additional financial expenditures.

[Sychev] Very likely to the article about housing?

[Urban] Yes, to Article 12 about the right to the provision of living quarters. This is an eternal problem.

[Sychev] I will say right off that a lot of guarantees are established here. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers probably are familiar with the draft; therefore, I will dwell only on the main aspects. For whom? On what resources? These are the two main questions concerning the provision of housing. The time now is such that everywhere governmental decrees are not being implemented.

The draft has a norm that those released into the reserve are the first to be provided with apartments by the local soviets, but not later than a three-month period from the day of arrival at a newly selected place of residence. This rule is in effect now, but it is not being implemented. Therefore, the commission is disposed to the idea that the main responsibility should rest with the Ministry of Defense.

[Urban] But this, you will agree, is very difficult.

[Sychev] Very difficult. But, of course, local organs of authority, republican governments, and the Union Cabinet of Ministers cannot stand on the sidelines. A person

has paid his debt to the government, and he has a right to demand normal living conditions.

But what is to be done? Many officers remain where they were serving. But many leave. There is a proposal that the Ministry of Defense invest resources especially for the construction of housing for officers and warrant officers of the reserve. The army is ready in principle—just give it the necessary resources. This version also is entirely possible—transfer money from the Union budget to the local organs of authority for the construction of such apartments. Especially as our draft makes it possible for officers to find a position in a future place of residence three years before discharge into the reserve, and consequently to get on the apartment list ahead of time.

[Urban] But how will this work in practice?

[Sychev] I will admit frankly that this has not been clarified entirely. A well-grounded decision of the Cabinet of Ministers is necessary. But it is possible to calculate how much housing will be needed for those discharged, for example, in Ryazan in 1995. And how much resources will be expended on these apartments. The question, I repeat, concerns who will provide the financing.

[Urban] Privatization of housing is on the point of starting. Will there be a free transfer to the personal

property of "reservists" and "retirees" of apartments they are receiving or have received, as written in the draft? This also relates to members of families of deceased servicemen.

[Sychev] The Ministry of Labor and Social Questions thinks that this should be excluded inasmuch as the question should be resolved in the law on privatization. Also, this ministry cites the conditions and procedures for the transfer of property envisaged in the law on property.

[Urban] Your opinion?

[Sychev] Serious disputes are in the offing. But, as previously, we insist on the wording of our draft.

[Urban] In a word, changes will have to be made to already existing laws.

[Sychev] Apparently this will be the case, if parliament supports us.

[Urban] And the last question. What is the main recommendation of the Cabinet of Ministers on the revision of the draft?

[Sychev] It is obligatory to calculate each article from the standpoint of financing. The revised draft and all of the necessary additional materials have to be submitted to the Supreme Soviet by September.

Arkhipov on Rear Services' Transition to Market
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[Interview with Army General V. Arkhipov, USSR deputy defense minister, chief Rear Services of USSR Armed Forces, by P. Altunin; place and date not given: "Rear Services—On the Threshold of the Market"]

[Text] Market relations are powerfully invading our economy. And the Armed Forces are not remaining on the sidelines; their material and technical supply is interwoven in the tightest way with the corresponding branches of the country's industry and agriculture. A direct sense of market elements in the Army entities is experienced above all by the Rear Services of the Armed Forces. In this connection we asked Army General V. Arkhipov, USSR deputy minister of defense and chief of the Rear Services of the USSR Armed Forces, to answer a few questions.

[Altunin] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, the Armed Forces and market relations—how does one combine these two seemingly incompatible concepts?

[Arkhipov] The problem of the market, frankly, is especially difficult for us. They are now working on solving it in the main staffs of the various branches of the Armed Forces, in our Rear Services staff, in all the main and central administrations of the Ministry of Defense, in scientific research organizations, and in the military training institutions. I would note that the problem here is not only and not so much the Armed Forces as the state. This is why now, in the final stage of the work on the draft concept for the entry of the USSR Armed Forces into the market economy, civilian ministries were included in it: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economics and Forecasting, and so forth.

The fact is that market relations presuppose above all an essential increase in prices of products delivered to the Armed Forces. And, consequently, there must be a corresponding increase in budget allocations for defense. But in reality the Ministry of Defense is not receiving additional monetary funds adequate to the higher prices. In comparable 1990 prices the country's defense budget dropped by 30 percent. The main and central administrations of the Ministry of Defense are in an extremely difficult position. They do not have enough money to place orders with industry on a contractual basis for substantial property, food, fuel, medications, the necessary technical equipment for the rear services, and so forth.

Things have reached a point where this year it was with a great deal of difficulty that we managed to provide uniforms for the young lieutenants graduating from the military schools. If the situation does not stabilize and improve in the near future the Armed Forces will be faced with the necessity of using our emergency reserve. But then it will not last very long either.

[Altunin] But what about combat readiness?

[Arkhipov] We must maintain combat readiness and defense adequacy under all conditions. This is our sacred duty. But in the current situation we must take radical measures to find additional nonbudget funds.

[Altunin] May we know which ones specifically?

[Arkhipov] There are a fair number of them. In the first place, we must conduct an inventory in the Armed Forces in order to determine possible volumes of sales of worn-out and obsolete military equipment and property on the domestic and foreign markets. But in the near future we must also legalize the right of the Ministry of Defense to sell this property and use the income from it for its own needs. Strange as it may seem, this right of the Ministry of Defense is being disputed by certain other state structures which are trying to appropriate it for themselves.

We have now received consent in principle from the Ministry of Defense to conduct an experiment in selling some of the property through commodity exchanges at market prices, which promises a significant increase in incomes from this kind of activity. The additional funds that are received will be used mainly for the construction of housing for military servicemen.

In the second place, we intend to sharply increase the volume of agricultural output obtained from military sovkhozes [state farms] and kolkhozes [collective farms] and subsidiary farms of military units in order to provide the Armed Forces with their own food products for several months out of the year. But this must be done not by using personnel from combat subdivisions for agricultural work but by creating subdivisions staffed on a professional basis for support and service which would do all the farm work. These subdivisions could also be staffed with hired workers and individuals who are performing alternative service.

Good prospects are also promised from the creation in military units of Western-style farms that would provide these units with agricultural products on a contractual, mutually advantageous basis throughout the year.

Third, many industrial enterprises impose unacceptable conditions when concluding agreements for the production and delivery of products for the Armed Forces: monopolistically high prices for products, partial payment for products in hard currency, the assignment of personnel for work at the enterprises, means of transportation, construction materials, and so forth. Therefore we intend to create a number of our own small enterprises for processing agricultural products and producing hosiery items, footwear, military gear, medical instruments and equipment, and consumer goods. The money saved here will be used in the interests of improving the social and living conditions for military servicemen.

Fourth, there is the foreign economic activity of the Armed Forces. There are considerable reserves here. I have in mind above all the training of military specialists

from foreign countries in our military training institutions. It is paradoxical but a fact that practically all the hard currency earned this way is not turned over to the Ministry of Defense but to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. Incidentally, this is also reflected in the level of domestic and medical service of foreign students.

A similar situation is developing with respect to granting foreign countries transportation services with military air transport and auxiliary Navy ships, the sale of scrap metal, and so forth. We are now taking obvious losses. Consequently, the interest in carrying out this activity is not great but there are reserves for expanding it and increasing its effectiveness.

But the decision to distribute income from foreign economic activity between the Ministry of Defense and other state structures is fair and concrete, and it should be adopted immediately at the government level.

And, finally, the partial decentralization of rear service support that is now taking place requires expansion of the rights of the chiefs and commanders to allow military units, organizations, and institutions to render paid services to civilian organizations and the population on a mutually advantageous basis.

[Altunin] What do you have in mind?

[Arkhipov] The provision of means of transportation, engineering equipment, and assistance from specialists. The repair of sets of equipment, instruments, and machinery in the shops of military units. Barter transactions in order to obtain additional materials, needed technical equipment, and surplus agricultural products for military servicemen, workers, and employees. Of course, this kind of activity must, on the one hand, be stimulated and encouraged, and, on the other, it must be kept strictly within the framework of the law.

I think the Armed Forces should be reimbursed for expenses involved in carrying out government assignments for harvesting crops. These too are kinds of services, which until recently were rendered free of charge. There was wear and tear on automotive equipment and military and technical property, and fuel, food, substantial property, and medications were used, but all of this was not fully replaced or paid for. And market

relations presume that it is necessary to pay for everything. But this should not be understood as payment to the Armed Forces. It would be more correct to call it compensation for the share of the state budget spent on defense.

[Altunin] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, it just so happens that our conversation is taking place during the days when the staff of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces is turning 50 years old. From the perspective of the present day, how would you characterize the development of the rear services?

[Arkhipov] As we know, in the years before the war there was no unified entity for rear services in the Red Army. There were only individual administrations and services under various supervisors which were independent of one another. Even the first days of the war that began in 1941 showed that there was a persistent need to change the principles of leadership and the structure of the rear services.

On 1 August 1941, by an order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the Main Administration of Rear Services of the Red Army was instituted. Its chief was General A.V. Khrulev. The rear services staff was created by this same order. Its generals and officers participated most directly in preparing for and providing rear service support for the largest operations.

As for the postwar years, the main tasks facing the rear were its technical retooling, improvement of organizational structures, and the development of new methods of fighting on battlefields.

[Altunin] Do you have all the same tasks today?

[Arkhipov] Yes, of course. But they have become more complicated. The rear services staff is now truly the "brain center" which determines and develops the basic and general directions for the further development of the rear services and the problematic questions of its functioning under the new economic conditions. The volume of work of the rear services staff officers has increased immeasurably in connection with the reform that is being implemented, the country's transition to a market economy, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the countries of Eastern Europe.

Novosibirsk Draft 'Easier' in Spring 91 than Fall 90
91UM0819A Novosibirsk SOVETSKIY VOIN
in Russian 17 Jul 91 p 1

[Interview with Major General N. I. Sokulskiy, Novosibirsk Oblast Military Commissar, by SOVETSKIY VOIN correspondent Captain S. Nazarov: "Spring Call-Up Results"; date and place not given; newspaper is affiliated with the Siberian Military District; first paragraph is SOVETSKIY VOIN introduction]

[Text] Following is the text of an interview with Major General N. I. Sokulskiy, military commissar of Novosibirsk Oblast, by SOVETSKIY VOIN correspondent Captain S. Nazarov.

[Nazarov] Nikolay Ivanovich, how would you sum up the results of the present call-up?

[Sokulskiy] I am quite pleased. The plan for supplying units with young recruits was met in full. And I must say that the call-up was much easier than the previous one—of the fall. In my view, there are several reasons for that. First, the commissariats' work was greatly facilitated by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers' decision clarifying the granting of draft deferments.

Second, we established common grounds with rectors of Novosibirsk higher educational institutions. We met with them to iron out the granting of deferments to students graduating from preparatory departments of VUZ's and possessing documentary proof of acceptance by an institute. Had military commissariats continued to apply what I believe to be obsolete requirements set by the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation, we would have again experienced considerable difficulties looking for evaders among those wishing to obtain a higher education.

Also, the mass media were extremely helpful. Television, radio, and all the newspapers, without exception, regardless of their political leanings, lent us a hand by actually publishing information on the problems encountered in the course of the spring call-up.

Even MOLODOST SIBIRI, which has a penchant for "processed facts" and service-avoiding criminals, did provide its readers with information issued by the oblast military commissariat. In addition, the newspapers printed nothing whatsoever that would have besmirched the Army or the call-up. We take that as rather warm support of our work.

[Nazarov] So it seems that everything came out all right.

[Sokulskiy] A call-up is a difficult thing to perform in general, even when conditions are ideal. There can be unexpected occurrences in the lives of young people, anxiety on the part of parents—those are things that cannot be prevented. Also, at this time there was not as much vociferous activity on the part of tender-hearted mothers coming to the oblast military commissariat visitors office. I think that the Draftee Days event that

was held in all city localities had much to do with that. The future soldiers were told in meetings about what they could expect in the service and the benefits available to servicemen. And the mothers' mood improved markedly when an authoritative source told them that inductees are sent to the Transcaucasus only as volunteers. Incidentally, there were twice as many choosing this option as were required. A total of 35 men were assigned to service in the Transcaucasus.

[Nazarov] Concerning details of the spring call-up. Could you tell us about that?

[Sokulskiy] This manpower supply activity was accorded major importance. No relaxation or diminution of requirements were permitted. The point is, each service branch does have its own medical requirements that must be met.

[Nazarov] What kind of health picture do the present draft-age youths present?

[Sokulskiy] We unfortunately must delete a large number of them from the list due to health problems. The state of health of our youth is a cause for alarm. One out of 10 young men reporting to oblast military commissariats is declared unfit for service. Approximately 70 percent of all inductees assigned to units are classified for limited duty on the basis of health, i.e., they cannot serve in the Navy, Airborne Troops, or Border Troops. This is the reason for assigning a large percentage of inductees to military construction units.

The situation can sometimes be nonsensical! Such as the case of a young man graduating from a communications tekhnikum, which renders him a trained specialist suitable for duty in a line unit. If his health is fragile, why can't he serve as a telephone man in a communications subunit? But I am not authorized to assign him to a line unit. It happens that a representative of a unit must be talked into accepting that kind of lad; too bad the boy cannot be made useful.

We believe that the cause of poor health of the rising generation lies in there being no one to look after a child starting with the day it is born, for there is a shortage or even absence of children's doctors in localities. A sick young man comes under medical care only when he registers in a military commissariat. It is virtually impossible to cure a sickly youth a mere year before he is inducted into the Army, especially if his illness has been grossly neglected. No matter how you look at it, one problem stands out: The rayon military commissariats have a need for their own physician, and the oblast military commissariat requires at least a medical unit on the premises.

[Nazarov] Now about contract service. Is the volunteer approach to manpower resupply of subunits taking root in line units?

[Sokulskiy] In my view, any talk of contract service is premature. There is no list of specialties that these people could fill, and no one can guarantee observance of certain conditions of contract even if such were developed. Yes, we do offer youths the option of service in the Transcaucasus on a volunteer basis. However, the contractual arrangement is limited to their stated intention to serve in that particular area. There is no mention whatsoever of other contractual terms or obligations.

As reported in the press, the experimental "professional" subunit organized in the MVD Division imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy is not held in high regard by the men serving in the subunit. Virtually the entire contract has been cancelled.

[Nazarov] What can you tell us about cooperation between the military commissariats and ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies?

[Sokulskiy] Unfortunately, there has been no change on this "front." The military commissariats are shouldering the heavy burden alone ever since they were saddled with it. Local organs of authority have turned their backs on this work, even though it comes directly under their responsibility. It seems to me that there never will be any kind of resolution of the problem of cooperation between military commissariats and ispolkoms as long as the present system of subordination and cooperation continues to exist. There is a plan afoot to elevate oblast military commissars to authorized representatives of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers to deal with defense matters at the local level. If this comes about, it would then be possible to speak of a call-up being a concern of local organs of authority, since the military would then be granted the authority to monitor observance of laws in the oblast. As it stands now, with the military commissariat's authority limited to that of a section of the oblast ispolkom, all it can do is ask. You yourself are aware of what attitude we hold toward anyone who must ask for something. Even a call for the entire draft board to assemble is no longer an easy matter.

[Nazarov] Now for the last question. It may be premature to speak of this, but what are your predictions relative to the next call-up?

[Sokulskiy] In the fall it will be more difficult. Far more. Due chiefly to the developing situation involving number of draft-age youths fit for service. The fact is that data on the mobilization possibilities of young men for both call-ups are sent "upstairs" in January and February. In the spring—as I have already said—there was a high rejection rate of registered youths on health grounds. The rejection figure for fall is not expected to be any smaller. The number of draft-age men entering institutes has increased, something we also failed to take into account in compiling the data. If district headquarters does not make a change in the fall call-up plan, the military commissariats will have a difficult time of it.

[Nazarov] Thank you for the interview.

Impact of Reduction in Naval Service on Manpower Acquisition

91SV0018A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jul 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Captain 1st Rank Ivan Vasilyevich Panasenko by Senior Lieutenant V. Balitskiy of the Black Sea Fleet: "How Much Should a Sailor Serve?"]

[Text] *The inductee's first acquaintance with the fleet begins with the naval shore units, where teams come from every corner of our country. This is where the navy also gets to size up its young replacements for the first time. How has the conversion to a two-year term of service affected the work of this structure for manning the fleet? A conversation by our special correspondent with the commander of the naval shore units, Captain 1st Rank I. Panasenko, started with that question.*

[Panasenko] If we are speaking in general, we have appreciably fewer problems today. Many inductees used to come to the navy without particular enthusiasm—three years of service dispelled romantic "notions" of the navy. Today most of them prefer service aboard ship.

[Balitskiy] So then, there are no more instances of refusing to serve in the fleet?

[Panasenko] They are isolated. Today, for example, we are sending one conscript who had run away from his training detachment, motivated by the fact that he did not want to serve on a submarine, to a construction unit. It is terrible, he says, dangerous. There are clearly costs in indoctrination and the psyche. There are unfortunately still infantile conscripts without character.

[Balitskiy] The mass refusal of military service by inductees in some regions of the country was a serious problem just a year ago. How do matters stand today?

[Panasenko] It could be said that a distinct picture has taken shape in that regard. Whereas individual inductees and teams used to come from the Baltic republics, there is not a single person coming today. No teams come from Armenia. Only two teams have come from Georgia, and they had only two Georgians each. Those fellows had soberly assessed the situation and decided it was better to serve honorably than take part in ethnic conflicts. The call-up is proceeding normally, by and large, in the republics of Central Asia. Only solitary instances of failure to appear at the draft offices have been recorded. The rest of the regions are giving us much less trouble than before. I think that common sense is getting the upper hand over emotions.

[Balitskiy] The cutback in the term of service is obviously affecting the level of professional training. Are there any changes in the work of the shore units in this regard?

[Panasenko] This problem, as far as I know, is troubling the commanders of units, ships and staffs very much. And that is no accident. The existing training programs

for sailors are figured to be mastered over three years. How can it be inscribed in a shorter time without losing quality? Proposals are currently being developed in the navy on this issue. We in the shore units are striving, in turn, to send a larger portion of the young replacements directly into the units and to the ships, bypassing the training subunits. This has its minuses, but the emergence of the sailor as a professional occurs more quickly in that case nonetheless.

We have a more attentive attitude toward those young sailors who trained at DOSAAF schools. No inductee who has a naval specialty should be sent other than into his field. The technical admission board moreover has a very attentive attitude toward the civilian specialties of the inductees. Here is an example we just saw: a fellow, after completing an SPTU [agricultural vocational-technical school], was working at an ATS [automatic telephone station]. He will naturally be engaged in telephone communications in the navy as well.

[Balitskiy] Ivan Vasilyevich, what is the social portrait, so to speak, of today's inductees?

[Panasenka] My chief impression from the call-up is that the navy is becoming comprised more and more of workers and peasants as never before. This, of course, is connected with the decision not to draft students. This does not, as they say, reek of social justice. This stratifies the youth, and it is not the best way to serve the students either—it is more difficult for those who have not completed army or navy service, after all, to grow in life. Sixty percent of the inductees who are coming into the navy today are workers, 26 percent are from kolkhozes and 14 percent are from among white-collar workers. The number of Komsomol members has dropped appreciably—they are about 38 percent today. Many young people, on the other hand, count themselves among the informal associations, although that, upon checking, most often proves to be just posturing, behind which there are no intelligent convictions or views. The number of those who count themselves religious believers has increased many times over, and is at 11 percent.

The fact that half a percent of the inductees do not speak the Russian language, and about five percent speak it very badly, gives one pause. Some 12.5 percent of the inductees grew up without a father. Another alarming figure—a "woman's" upbringing is not the best bulwark for a youth to serve in the navy.

One and a half percent of the inductees are married, and that means that the problems of young families that have been without their unfledged "breadwinners" for two years must be taken into account. Six percent of the young soldiers have no secondary education—this, unfortunately, has an unavoidable effect on their professional growth.

[Balitskiy] The USSR Supreme Soviet recently adopted a resolution to conduct an experiment on contract service in the navy. Are the shore units doing any preparatory work for that undertaking?

[Panasenka] Many of the inductees are interested in whether they will conclude a contract. We explain that first you have to study in a training subunit or serve on a ship for half a year. We are doing some work on this, even though we do not have specific documents on this issue yet. We conducted a poll among the graduates of training subunits, for instance, with the aim of ascertaining those who wanted to serve under contract. It turned out to be more than 50 percent. We will offer contract service to those people first at the start of the experiment.

Reform of Reservist Training

91UM0795A Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Jul 91 p 2

[Interview with Major General G. Bogayev, acting chief of the General Staff directorate, by correspondent V. Badurkin, under the rubric "Returning to What Has Been Printed": "The Reservists Can Sleep Peacefully"]

[Text] In a recent article on problems of training reservists ("Training Alert," 5 Jun 91) we expressed the hope that the USSR Ministry of Defense would finally declassify plans for reforming this form of service. Then came the long-awaited phone call from the "White House" on Arbat: "Come on over. We'll tell you everything." And our correspondent interviewed Major General G. Bogayev, acting chief of the General Staff directorate.

[Badurkin] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, every year thousands of our men attend military assemblies. The editors' mail indicates that this training is very often only a formality and is useless. Furthermore, the reservists are used as fill-ins for gaps in the housekeeping systems of the military units and are enlisted to perform jobs far removed from combat training.

[Bogayev] Yes, the system of training reservists whereby enlisted men and officers attended assemblies in those units to which they were assigned was ineffective. There were several reasons, but the main one was the fact that the commanders needed the reservists like a hole in the head, as they say. Special training facilities had to be prepared for them, officers had to be taken away from their subunits to conduct the classes, and programs had to be compiled. The result of all this was a meager one. A year later everything had to be repeated. Many commanders therefore took the line of least resistance, utilizing the personnel assigned there as a free work force.

We are now fundamentally altering that system. Henceforth the reservists will attend assemblies at special training centers, properly equipped and under the supervision of experienced instructors. We tested the system last year in the Far East Military District and concluded that it is far more effective than the present system. Several centers are already operating in the Far East

Military District this year. They are small; they accept only 20-30 men at a time and train specialists for specific positions. Similar centers have been set up in the North Caucasus District and in all the fleets. Next year they will be set up also in the western part of the nation.

[Badurkin] One of the main complaints about past assemblies involved deficiencies in the training programs: too many political classes, drills, classes on regulations....

[Bogayev] This has also been changed. The number of hours spent on general military subjects has been reduced considerably, and the number spent on specialized subjects has been increased. This has made it possible to shorten the assemblies from 90 to 60 days. In addition, only those with complex military specialties will train for two months; the others will train from 10 to 25 days as a rule. It has also been decided to cut in half the overall period of retraining. Reservists in the first category (below the age of 35) will now be called up for assemblies no more than five times, that is, once every three years. In reality it will be even less frequently. The system of training while still performing one's job is being eliminated altogether.

[Badurkin] Nonetheless, male citizens are taken off their civilian jobs fairly frequently. One frequently hears complaints from the managers of enterprises and organizations.

[Bogayev] We also have such complaints. Several volumes of them. In view of the difficulties with the work force in the economy the minister of defense has adopted a decision to call up no more than 100 men at a time from an area (ordinarily from an oblast or even two). While in the past we conducted combat exercises involving up to 6,500 registrants for the draft, beginning this year no more than 700 will be called up. Furthermore, all matters pertaining to assemblies for reservists will be coordinated with local authorities and managers of enterprises. This is specified in a decree of the Cabinet of Ministers.?

The coin has a second side, however. Lately we have been forced more and more frequently to conduct "training assemblies" (if they can be called that) at the request of city and oblast authorities. This occurred during the grain shortage in Moscow, for example. The ispolkom of the Moscow Soviet asked us to mobilize the young men. And there are so many call-ups even today for various undertakings: from mopping-up operations following natural disasters to harvesting the crops. Every year we voice our objections to the formation of "virgin land"

battalions, but to no avail. The government always maintains that this is the last time, and then... draws up the next resolution. And this has nothing to do with the military service.

[Badurkin] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, the question of paying for the assemblies comes up more and more frequently today. Previously the enterprises were expected to take care of everything. Today who is going to pay the farmers, private entrepreneurs and cooperatives today?

[Bogayev] Unfortunately, the payment procedure is not specified in a single current law. For the third year now we have been "pushing" upon the Ministry of Finance a proposal that taxes be reduced for enterprises and private entrepreneurs by the amount of their losses from the assemblies. It appears that we recently "got it done." Now we just have to wait for an official document.

Incidentally, we used the experience of Western countries. Practically all of them have laws on military duty, after all, and the men there are regularly called up for assemblies the same as here. European farmers hire workers for this period, for example, and leave to perform their service. Now our countrymen will have the same possibility. For our part we try to call up those employed in agriculture (including those who work at agricultural equipment plants) only during the winter, and then as rarely as possible.

[Badurkin] Fathers of large families frequently ask the editors whether they are subject to the draft. This situation was not clear in the past.

[Bogayev] Men with three or more children are totally exempt from the draft. We resolve other problems pertaining to family situations each on an individual basis—ordinarily in favor of the reservist. We hold accountable those guilty of violating the procedure. This is substantiated by the fact that Major General I. Litovchenko, military commissar of Minsk Oblast, and Colonel A. Demidovich, his deputy, were recently punished for such transgressions.

[Badurkin] Everything we have discussed has to do with changes for the present and the near future. What about the long term?

[Bogayev] As the Armed Forces are reduced, the importance of a reliable reserve will grow. Incidentally, the Americans are only in the planning stage for reducing their military, but they have already doubled the size of their reserve training system. Our goal is to make the training system more efficient as the basis for reducing the number and the duration of the assemblies.

KGB Border Guards' Chief Details New Tasks

91UM0826A Moscow AGITATOR ARMII FLOTA
in Russian No 8, Apr 91 (signed to press 18 Apr 91)
pp 26-27

[Interview with Colonel General I.Ya. Kalinichenko, chief of the USSR KGB Border Guards, by Major G. Belkin; place and date not given: "In the Interests of the Union"]

[Text]

[Belkin] Ilya Yakovlevich, the press has already reported that work is under way in the Border Guards Main Directorate on a document that is intended to fundamentally change the present view of protection of the border. Toward what is it oriented?

[Kalinichenko] This document is a concept of protection of the state border and economic zone of the USSR. Inasmuch as our state is in a difficult political and economic situation, each newly adopted enforceable enactment of Union significance should be geared primarily to surmounting, if only of part of this extraneous feature or the other, in the life of our society that which is holding back an escape from the crisis. This applies directly also to problems of the assurance of border security, on whose solution we have of late embarked with all due thoroughness. We cannot fail to take account here of the fact that under the new conditions taking shape on the state border there should be an appreciable change in the system of its protection. The trends of the development of the situation in the Border Guards' zones of responsibility are such that we need to be prepared for rapid mobile operations.

In the course of elaboration of the draft concept a number of Border Guards Main Directorate districts, military VUZ's [higher education institutions] and sub-units has advocated the Border Guards' gradual transition to a professional basis of manpower acquisition, the active introduction in the service of an operational focus and also the restoration of the classification of the detachments and the granting of the districts, formations, units and military VUZ's greater rights in respect to organizational-personnel and financial-economic questions. The Baltic Border District, for example, proposed that in the sea areas the border detachment, the naval brigade and the aviation unit be brought together in a common structure, with common control authorities and command posts, of course. The Alma-Ata school proposed that provision be made within the framework of the development of the Soviet federation for the creation in each Union republic of a separate, independent border district....

[Belkin] We should probably explain to the readers why the most fundamental propositions of the concept have been set out in this key or the other.

[Kalinichenko] It should be borne in mind primarily that the USSR law "Delineation of Authority Between the

Union of SSR and the Subjects of the Federation," which attributed questions of leadership of the border forces and organization of protection of the border to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union of SSR in the shape of its highest organs of power and administration, was enacted and took effect in April 1990. But declarations on sovereignty have been adopted in the Union republics since this, which has in a number of cases had ambiguous repercussions in the form of the creation of their own armed formations for protection of their borders, as, for example, in Moldova, Lithuania, and Latvia. Attempts to decentralize protection of the border are being observed in Estonia also.

For this reason we have tried in the concept to adopt a flexible approach to these questions, specifying that they should be regulated by the new Union treaty. In addition, it should be noted that hence forward the Border Guards will be operating both in the interests of the entire Union as a whole and in the interests of each Union republic in particular. However, there can be no question of any decentralization of control of the forces as yet. That in time, as authority between the Union and the republics is delineated, the spheres of responsibility of the border districts will change, affording thereby an opportunity for the creation of regional and administrative-territorial organs of control of the forces, including the possible exercise by the sovereign republics of some of the functions pertaining to protection of the USSR state border, is another matter.

Protection of the economic interests of the Union on the border and also political aspects of the forces' activity in respect to assurance of the inviolability of the border and the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of the USSR and the Union and autonomous republics are taking pride of place today. It was these considerations that led to the formulation of new criteria of an evaluation of the results of the activity of the border forces. We will make of paramount importance now the level of compliance with the conditions of the border and economic zone of the USSR in the guarded sector and the efficiency of the struggle against manifestations of terrorism and extremism and the subversive activity of foreign hostile organizations against the USSR and the Union and autonomous republics and also the reliability of the curtailment in conjunction with the customs house of attempts at the illicit importation into the country and exportation therefrom of contraband, means of sabotage, weapons, narcotics, explosives and toxic substances.

[Belkin] Have points that are fundamentally new for the forces been incorporated in the concept?

[Kalinichenko] There is a question that I would like to mention separately. These are the operations of forces under emergency conditions. The border forces may be enlisted in the curtailment of disturbances of public order in the border area only and exclusively in the event of the said disturbances being of a general nature, representing a threat to citizens' life and health and disrupting the operation of enterprises, establishments

and organizations or of their being aimed at the demolition or destruction of state, public and personal property and connected with disruption of the Soviet constitutional system. Border Guards may be used to perform the said duties, proceeding from the USSR law "Legal Treatment of a State of Emergency," only in exceptional cases following a decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet or the president of the USSR.

[Belkin] So the concept is on the point of being adopted. But are the forces ready for restructuring the entire system of protection of the state border in a very short space of time?

[Kalinichenko] We are putting people in the frame of mind for important work. We now need more than ever the highest professionalism, personalities capable of leading forces in a modern style and military science providing the correct forecasts in the development of operational and service activity and participating in the provision of border and economic zone protection with equipment.

We must today most earnestly and honestly revise our store of knowledge, legal knowledge particularly, and evaluate whether it is sufficient for being ready at any moment on behalf of the state to adopt on its border the sole correct decision.

FROM THE EDITORS: We cordially congratulate the Border Guards on their holiday! We wish them continued success in protection of the USSR's state border!

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Border Guard Official on Baltic Situation
91UM0814A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 13 Jul 91 p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant General B. Shteynbrik, chief of the USSR KGB Special Department for the Red Banner Baltic Border District, by SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA correspondent B. Bryukhanov; place and date not given: "Democracy Is a Dictatorship of the Law"]

[Text] "Building a democratic rule-of-law state has been proclaimed in the country. The Supreme Soviets of the Union and the republics have already adopted a multitude of laws. It would appear that a major step has been taken towards reinforcing the rule of law and legal order. However, the following is paradoxical: The more legislative acts are adopted, the further away we are from the rule-of-law state. The weakness of executive power and the opposition between the so-called center and the republics have brought about 'a war of laws' to which, it seems, there is no end in sight. Meanwhile, genuine democracy means a dictatorship of the law. All adopted laws should be strictly complied with, and should apply in the name of legal order."

This is how Lieutenant-General B. Shteynbrik, former Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] minister of

internal affairs and currently chief of the USSR KGB Special Department for the Red Banner Baltic Border District, began his conversation with a SO VETSKAYA LATVIYA correspondent.

[Bryukhanov] Bruno Yakovlevich, they know you well in the republic, and have very fond memories of you in the internal affairs organs. We would like to hear first of all: How do you feel in your new position? Have you managed to settle in? We will yet revisit "the war of laws."

[Shteynbrik] What do you mean by "we will revisit?" Everything that I intend to tell the readers of your newspaper is associated with "the war of laws" one way or another. It is the main obstacle to the necessary transformations and the root cause of many negative phenomena.

Well, I believe that I have settled in in my new position in the past two months. After all, I am a Chekist as far as tenure and work experience are concerned. I was assigned to the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] from the state security organs.

[Bryukhanov] What are the main tasks accomplished by the department you head? What new problems have emerged recently?

[Shteynbrik] The units and subunits of the Baltic Border District are stationed in the territory of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Kaliningrad Oblast of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. The tasks of the department are determined to a considerable degree by the local situation. Our main task in the Baltic republics is to protect the border guards against the hostile designs of national-separatists and their illegally created formations.

Attempts have been made to disseminate various publications with antistate contents in border guard barracks. Border guards are frequently exposed to insults in the cities and settlements. So far, no dangerous clashes have occurred; however, there have been cases of attacks on the border guard barracks by hooligan thugs. Literally days ago a searchlight at one of the border guard barracks in Estonia was smashed. The cost of the searchlight is about 10,000 rubles [R]. Two local residents were apprehended.

In Lithuania the Department for the Defense of the Land is collecting information on our detachments and barracks virtually out in the open. A special questionnaire has been prepared which includes information on commanders—their last names, home addresses, and phone numbers, information about personnel strength, armament, and the section of the border guarded. Who needs such information and why?

The legitimate rights of the members of officer and warrant officer families are shamelessly infringed upon: Quite a few complications develop with regard to school instruction for children and the placement of wives in

jobs. The issues of providing power, water, and food-stuffs for military settlements are hard to resolve, because local authorities are guided by the resolutions of republic governments which run counter to Union laws and international legal norms alike.

The stepped-up nationalist conditioning of the draftees of indigenous nationalities is underway. They are attempting to convince the draftees to refuse to serve in the Border Guard Troops, as well as in the Soviet Army "of occupation."

The recently adopted USSR Law on the State Border provides for eliminating border zones in a number of locations. However, as soon as soldiers in green service caps left, illegal republic formations, though so far unarmed, entered the zones.

In general, the current rulers of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would very much like to take over guarding the border entirely, and to replace our border guard detachments with their own people. However, a unified countrywide system of guarding the border does not in any way infringe upon the sovereignty of the republics. Meanwhile, it costs a lot, and sober-minded politicians understand this. However, those who now set the political course of the republics do not heed the voice of reason due to a euphoria of ethnic ambitions.

The separatists are looking at discharged border guards and thinking about turning them into consultants and instructors of the future republic border services. They are trying to compromise those who would not yield in various ways.

[Bryukhanov] It turns out that at present the border guards do not enjoy reliable support from the local population, which has always aided them in accomplishing the crucial tasks of guarding the border.

[Shteynbrik] Well, I would not raise the issue quite so straightforwardly. Relations with the local population vary. At many locations, they are quite normal. After all, not everyone has been affected by nationalist ambitions. The border guards assist agricultural workers in the course of fodder preparation and harvesting, and take part in putting out fires.

[Bryukhanov] The "iron curtain" has been removed, the "cold war" is over, and relations between countries have become more open. Do we have to spend a lot of money in order "to keep the border under lock and key," as we used to do?

[Shteynbrik] Indeed, substantial changes have occurred throughout the world. However, we must guard the border securely. All kinds of surprises may yet occur. The Warsaw Treaty Organization has been disbanded, and NATO exists. Soon, not a single Soviet soldier will be left in the former socialist countries, and these countries themselves may no longer be considered indisputable allies of the USSR. Meanwhile, foreign special services have not at all discontinued their subversive

operations against the Soviet Union, and do not intend to give it up. Only their methods have changed.

In particular, they are betting on recruiting agents of influence from among Soviet citizens who, having taken leadership positions, may pursue a policy in the interests of their secret masters. Of course, such agents are not sent across the border, but the border guards cannot fail to be highly vigilant.

[Bryukhanov] What about smugglers?

[Shteynbrik] The district has sufficient potential in order to prevent the transportation of any freight across the border bypassing customs. For example, an attempt to illegally transport 70 cases of vodka, a dozen refrigerators, and other goods to Poland was foiled in Lithuania last week. However, losses due to illegal exports cannot be compared to the damage caused by the open plunder of the country. With the permission of republic authorities, suspect operators and cooperative members push abroad lumber passed off as waste, valuable scrap metal, and construction materials.

Since we are proceeding toward a market economy, we should set up mutually advantageous trade and prevent the plunder of the country. However, the republic authorities are otherwise preoccupied: In violation of Union laws they set up their own customs services and establish customs posts along interrepublic borders. Self-appointed customs officers are the scourge of motorized tourists. Speculators and cooperative members buy them off.

[Bryukhanov] What is your attitude toward an OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments] action against such posts?

[Shteynbrik] Unfavorable. One cannot fight lawlessness by lawless methods. However, the OMON personnel are not at fault: After all, they themselves were not the ones to conceive the action. Incidentally, there are also data on the ransacking of the posts by hooligan elements as well who are instigated by cooperative members unhappy with requisitions by the customs personnel. Since the republic customs posts are illegal, the Union executive authorities must ensure their elimination everywhere and the restoration of a unified economic space.

[Bryukhanov] What can you say about the recent action of the OMON in Vilnius?

[Shteynbrik] Not everything is clear in this matter. In execution of the ukase of the USSR president dated 25 July of last year, the OMON personnel discovered and confiscated ammunition and explosives hidden at a telephone exchange. However, they kicked up a fuss in the West. OMON leaders were called to Moscow, to the USSR MVD. I am not aware of the details, but it appears that this was some kind of a political game which ended in a search for a "scapegoat."

[Bryukhanov] Since we are on the topic of militia affairs, let us pursue it. Of course, you are not indifferent about this, despite the fact that you are not directly involved in these issues at present.

[Shteynbrik] As I see it, the current leaders of the Latvia MVD, and primarily Minister A. Vaznis, got carried away with reorganizing and renaming services. A subjective reshuffling of personnel is underway. The people are nervous, losing sight of the horizon, and distracted from their official duties. As a result, the percentage of crimes solved has declined sharply.

It all began, to put it mildly, with a strange policy of former USSR Minister of Internal Affairs V. Bakatin, who turned republic ministries into something akin to independent principalities, much to the delight of criminals. For example, A. Vaznis is engaged in a protracted fight against the OMON, instead of using the potential of the detachment wisely.

[Bryukhanov] "The war of laws" is a factor in this instance as well, is it not?

[Shteynbrik] Precisely! We will not advance a single step closer to the rule-of-law state as long as this war lasts. I am not convinced that even the signing of the Union treaty will stabilize the political situation in the country. Will the laws already adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet apply, or will they have to be revised? Why is the Supreme Soviet of the country continuing to pass legislative acts which the republics do not comply with, which are suspended or ignored?

It is not enough to proclaim laws. We should enforce unconditional compliance with them. There is no other way toward a democratic rule-of-law state and a firm legal order.

[Bryukhanov] Thank you for the interview!

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