

JPRS-EER-92-074  
11 JUNE 1992



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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## **Bulgarian Attitudes, Policy Toward Macedonia**

*92BA0948A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA  
in Macedonian 14 May 92 p 2*

[Article by NOVA MAKEDONIJA permanent correspondent Vladimir Tulevski: "The Opening of a Diplomatic Mission as a Method for Bulgaria To Lecture Macedonia: Greater Bulgaria Motive Behind Solicitude"—first paragraph is NOVA MAKEDONIJA introduction]

[Text] "Anonymous" diplomatic sources, quoted in the newspaper DEMOKRATSIYA, are openly interfering in Macedonian domestic policy, not abandoning the worn-out Greater Bulgaria ideas. The Sofia press is accusing the Macedonian authorities in the Crnomarov affair.

Sofia, 13 May—A delegation of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs left for Skopje, where it will discuss with the Macedonian authorities the purchase of a lot on which to build its diplomatic mission and the temporary rental of space in the Macedonian principal city to house the first diplomatic representatives. This information was published by the newspaper DEMOKRATSIYA, which is the organ of the ruling party, followed by the question of whether this clashes with the fact that Bulgaria and Macedonia have not yet restored diplomatic relations.

Citing an anonymous Bulgarian diplomatic source, the newspaper explained that the opening of a diplomatic mission in Skopje will not conflict with the fact that full diplomatic relations have not been established between the two countries because this will be a consular service. If, meanwhile, diplomatic relations are established (things seem to be moving in that direction), the mission will then be elevated to embassy status. This project, which is essentially a routine operation, has been raised by the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] party organ to a much higher level, thus making it possible to lecture the Macedonian authorities. The newspaper began by warning the readers that the discussions will be difficult, allegedly because the current authorities in Skopje "oppose" the demand for an active official Bulgarian presence in Macedonia.

Continuing to lecture the Macedonian politicians, this "anonymous" source claims that, "of late," Bulgaria has noticed a "clear increase of Macedonianism in the Republic and of anti-Bulgarian feelings." These are strange but well-known stories dating from T. Zhivkov's time, this time expanded with some comments on the situation in Macedonian party life. Thus, DEMOKRATSIYA considers itself justified in blaming the Macedonian authorities for a purely internal political affair, such as replacing Dimitar Crnomarov in the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity]. According to Sofia, he was replaced because of his initiative in accepting medical drugs from Bulgaria!! To complete the picture, versions are once again being fabricated of alleged cases of mistreating

Macedonian individuals who "claimed to be Bulgarian." The newspaper fails to mention whether they include the now replaced Crnomarov. However, totally unrelated to the truth, he is accusing the Macedonian authorities and even the newspaper NOVA MAKEDONIJA. On top of all this, according to DEMOKRATSIYA, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has closely studied cases of "violations of Bulgarian human rights in Macedonia."

Thanks to this "anonymous" diplomatic source, one can very well surmise the program the Bulgarian delegation carries in its briefcases as it leaves for Macedonia to find a site on which to build a diplomatic mission, hoping to God it will be refused so that it can say to those who lately have been sharply criticizing it that it is conducting an independent foreign policy and is not blindly following the diktat originating in Brussels. No other way of thinking is possible if we study the statement made by this "diplomatic source" in DEMOKRATSIYA. This appears naive in the context of what has happened so far. Bulgaria was the first to recognize de jure Macedonian independence and the existence of the Macedonian people as a constituent part of the new state. Now it is discovering some kind of "Macedonianism," thus directly negating the existence of the Macedonian nation and preaching some kind of alleged "violations of human rights."

Clearly, Bulgarian diplomacy has been knocked out and now does not know how to get out of this situation, on the one hand, and prove its declared principled-mindedness, which is very important to it in its international affairs and, on the other, not reject the long familiar Greater Bulgaria ideas and the worn-out options of treating the Macedonians as "blood brothers of mother Bulgaria." Judging by its actions, the new Bulgarian diplomacy, which loudly claims it is working in European style, is finding it difficult to get rid of nationalism and chauvinism. In addition to the official press, the opposition is clearly activating its own commentators on the situation in Macedonia and, of late, has assumed the role of main interpreter and creator of possible solutions that would involve official Sofia.

In an effort to explain some of the "tasks" of Balkan political geometry, today's DUMA noted that the most logical step by Bulgaria would be to resume diplomatic relations with Macedonia, based on the fact that it officially recognized it.

Actually, the commentator cautioned that Bulgaria has no alternative: In no case could it agree with the suggestion that Macedonia change its name or become part of the new Serbian Yugoslavia. According to DUMA, either would mean no more and no less "for Bulgaria to commit national treason!" This is not astonishing in the least because the text steadily refers to Macedonia as the "suffering sister of mother Bulgaria!"

DUMA concludes, on the basis of its analyses and observations on the question of the (non)recognition of Macedonia, that Bulgaria's entry into Europe without

Macedonia would be easier. However, it claims that it would be much more dignified if this included the threat of failure and if diplomatic relations with Macedonia were resumed. According to DUMA, there is no alternative, and the entry of Bulgaria into Europe makes sense only if it is achieved together with Macedonia!!

The recommendation of the commentator in the socialist party organ is clear: Bulgaria must struggle for

Macedonia even if it is "burned out" in this battle with the European Community! Why? For the simple reason that, according to the Greater Bulgaria prescriptions that are being submitted and promoted in some circles here, one would not dare abandon participation in splitting the "Balkan pie" by "close brothers and sisters" and under the patronage of the European powers, who are quite skilled in such matters.

**Ruml on Views of Former Reform Communists**

92CH0592A Prague REFLEX in Czech No 16, 1992  
p 13

[Interview with Deputy Federal Minister of Interior Jan Ruml by Bohumil Pecinka; place and date not given: "A Closely Watched Man"—first paragraph is REFLEX introduction]

[Text] He is Deputy Federal Minister of Interior Jan Ruml. A man of sharp formulations and uncompromising judgments, thanks to which he has become for the leftist press a persona demonized into unreal dimensions.

[Pecinka] Deputy Minister, your recent dispute with Minister Sabata may be understood as a dispute between two concepts, two views of the nature of post-November changes. On your side it is an anticommunist accent, emphasis on discontinuity. Sabata on the contrary emphasized that this revolution must be antibureaucratic, based on a gradual reform of the Communist system. How do you see this dispute?

[Ruml] This is a dispute not just between two different political concepts but also a dispute over the way of conducting politics. A dispute between open politics, which is immediately accountable to both parliament and public and is transparent, and politics behind closed doors, which is essentially uncontrollable.

Sabata is not alone in his views because he is representative of the entire group of reform Communists who believed that after November 1989 they would take power. For this they were also equipped with contacts to Moscow, Gorbachev, and the whole perestroika crowd. Their principal ideologue is Mlynar, who perhaps harbored hopes that he would ascend to the vacated CPCZ [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] throne. They imagine that socialism can be restored in its "correct" version, given a different face. But the majority of our society has rejected it with an equivocal "no" and decided to part ways with the former system in its entirety.

Zdenek Jicinsky, one of the prominent Eurocommunists, maintained still in November 1989 that one cannot abide legal discontinuity presumably because it would disrupt the entire legal order. Of course this is not true because it was enough to separate private from public law and precisely within it carry out this discontinuity. Naturally the former Communists were unwilling to do this and tried only to take over the former system and refashion it somehow.

[Pecinka] Decisions on the nature of the post-November changes probably began to be made only in the summer and fall of 1990 when developments took a clear trend toward destruction of the former system.

[Ruml] And they acquired an increasingly anticommunist character because people began to fear a possible restoration of the former system. Concurrently a moral

indignation began to spread, stemming from the fact that if we want to build a law-governed state we must first condemn perpetrators of the evil—the Communist system and the party. And again as if in reaction to this trend Mlynar and Jicinsky began to promote a model emanating from the legal system built over the past 40 years. This dispute continues to this day and will be resolved only in this year's elections.

[Pecinka] What arises here is an altogether paradoxical situation when the Left criticizes the screening [lus-tracni] law and everything connected with it, even though the responsibility for it is actually its own. The screening law must be understood by everyone as a reaction to a certain unsatisfactory social condition, and not a necessity.

[Ruml] I agree. Here we did not need any screening law at all if only the top politicians had decided after the overthrow to carry out truly radical changes. Then for instance a coopted parliament would have to very quickly pass simple laws, or one could have a provisional government by presidential decrees. The Communist Party would be dissolved immediately and there would be no need for a law directing the CPCZ to return its properties to the people and the whole unseemly haggling around it. Of course the OF [Civic Forum] had wings that would support such measures but they were outvoted by the reform-Communist wing which had its concept dating back at least to 1968.

[Pecinka] When I recently read Mlynar's article in RUDE PRAVO titled "Police in Politics" I realized that the tragedy of his generational group lies in their tendency to apply their experience—gained inside Communist power—to the completely different situation at present and in their inability to offer anything positive except criticism.

[Ruml] In the article Z. Mlynar himself uses the formulation that the current power elite is creating some sort of a conspiracy theory to divert the citizen's attention from problems which trouble them.

But he seems totally unaware that he himself is spinning a conspiracy theory, that supposedly some power elite here wants to misuse the police; that is a typical conspiracy theory, but only in his head. Moreover, what is the power elite? On the one hand he talks about a power elite and on the other about the right. But of course we all know that in the governments the right lacks preponderance and in the federal cabinet it is on the contrary in a pronounced minority.

At the same time Mlynar does not want to hear about the legacy of the past because he would have to admit that the root of all difficulties lies there. He himself held high political office at a time when the police not just intervened in politics but in fact directly determined it. He remembers that time very well, wants to forget it and is trying to foist the consequences on us.

[Pecinka] It is a peculiar psychological process. Mlynar moves around in Czechoslovakia like Marx: Covered by life in a decent capitalist society, he is importing socialism to us. But society is not interested in it. The great lion of ideological salons suddenly finds that his train has left the station and that he is left only with RUDE PRAVO and an ideology no one listens to. It is a rather ridiculous affair.

[Ruml] The top "sixty-eighters" are really masters of ideology, but when they were confronted for instance by the Klaus group in the field of economics it turned out that, although excelling in intrigue and rhetorics, they lack a positive economic program and precisely due to the way they approach politics, cannot even have one.

Indeed, these people disdain not only economics but also social reality in general. They know very well that presently a large number of people feel insecure. In the final analysis insecurity is the individual's basic existential feeling. We are born into insecurity and spend our entire lives in it. If today the "sixty-eighters" talk about social insecurity, they only paraphrase this basic human feeling and misuse it ideologically.

I believe it shows beautifully in Sabata's regular commentaries in ROVNOST where he conducts himself as an opposition publicist rather than a responsible government minister. In the last few weeks he has visibly assumed the stance of Meciár's ideologue in the Czech lands.

This is because he realizes full well that the Meciár trend will gain great strength in Slovakia in the future, and correctly anticipates that the CSFR will not break apart and there will have to be a compromise between the differing victorious political forces in both republics. He believes that through Slovakia he will be able to exert influence on Czech politics where he has already been written off. Therefore he maintains contact with Meciár even though it is unpopular in the Czech lands. Unlike many other politicians he sees farther and senses the direction of future developments.

[Pecinka] Although Minister Langos made repeated sharp references to corruption in the police force, RUDE PRAVO remained silent on these charges. But when you said something similar in a far gentler way, the paper unleashed a campaign. Why did they choose precisely you?

[Ruml] Langos does not disturb them politically and although we are close in many of our views they evidently take him for his pronounced Christian orientation as a more or less neutral politician. To them I am far too uncompromising and they sense that I am a sensitive link in the emerging right. They chose me because of the office I hold.

It is very tempting to attack a deputy federal minister of interior for misusing information for political purposes. They know about me that I am an impulsive person

always speaking my mind fully and when some statement is torn out of context and garnished with a suitable commentary it may lead to allegations about some kind of a new totality. They are simply trying to insinuate to the public that I am not trustworthy.

[Pecinka] The funny thing is that RUDE PRAVO should fear politicization of the police but is totally remiss in pointing to the main instrument of politicization, which is the currently emerging NOSP police trade union. Do you think it could become a fifth column inside the interior ministry?

[Ruml] Far be it from me to create conspiracy theories, but the NOSP union has not come into being to defend police officers' interests. It is a structure which basically copies the CPCZ base organizations. Incidentally, NOSP does not include any of the people who came here after November, but on the contrary consists of people who have worked here for eight up to 12 years. You must realize that NOSP is something of a strange organization inside an armed corps. For my taste such a small state has far too many armed formations and unlike the federal police they are not very transparent. So if someone is really concerned about politicization and the danger of misusing repressive agencies, he ought not to concern himself with irrelevant problems.

[Pecinka] Let us take this last sentence as a message to certain people.

### Origin, Destination of Foreign Capital in CSFR

92CH0589C Prague EKONOM in Czech No 19,  
May 92 pp 18-20

[Article by Judita Stouracova: "Origin and Destination of Foreign Capital"]

[Text] In conceiving the basic elements of economic reform, particularly the internal convertibility of the Czechoslovak koruna and liberalization of foreign trade, as well as during the formulation of expected changes in the development of the Czechoslovak economy, participation of foreign capital and external financial resources was considered to be a requisite for the realization of key reform measures.

From the viewpoint of its external economic position, the Czechoslovak economy was characterized in the prereform period by a gross debt of about \$8 billion (\$7.9 billion in 1989, and \$8.1 billion in 1990), with the expectations that by the end of 1991 it will increase to the level of \$11-12 billion. The amount of foreign currency reserves at the end of 1990 was relatively low (\$1.3 billion); it was assumed that its volume will have to be increased in 1991 to at least \$2.5 billion, which would resolve the impact of the changed external conditions on the one hand, and also would be a guarantee for meeting the expected increased demand for foreign currencies (particularly in connection with the assumed increase of import activities by enterprises and business companies, as well as for tourist activity by Czechoslovak citizens).

Estimates for the necessary financial resources, on which the restructuring and modernization of the Czechoslovak industrial base are contingent, are generally higher—they fluctuate at the level of tens of billions of U.S. dollars, and they quite naturally assume the influx of financial means from abroad, particularly in the form of foreign investments, joint ventures, and last but not least, in the form of loans for restructuring.

A very rough estimate of the overall amount of foreign financial resources that flowed into CSFR during 1991 is about \$3.2 billion; the main contributors were:

- International financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank);
- Groups of countries (group of G-24 countries, European Community);
- Governments, or government institutions (bilateral intergovernmental assistance);
- Foreign entrepreneurs (direct foreign investments).

#### Loans From International Financial Institutions

##### International Monetary Fund

Extremely important for the "startup" of the economic reform was the position of the International Monetary Fund, which granted Czechoslovakia at the very beginning of 1991 a relatively large credit framework and a loan in the amount of 1,250 million SDR<sup>1</sup> (i.e., about \$1,780 million), divided into three parts:

Stand-by arrangement in the amount of 619.5 million SDR (about \$886 million), which represents 105 percent of the CSFR membership quota;

Credit within the framework of the so-called Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) in the amount of 483.8 million SDR (about \$687 million) for financing the expected higher costs of oil imports; this type of credit was granted CSFR in the equivalent of 82 percent of the membership quota, which is the maximum possible amount;

Contingency Financing Facility-Element (risk credit), linked to the Stand-by arrangement; it guarantees 147.5 million SDR (about \$211) for a possible further increase in the price of oil.

Within the framework of the agreed-upon credit, IMF determined the amounts of the individual five portions, gradually released within the period of five months for which the credit framework was set, as well as the conditions and performance criteria, on the fulfillment of which the release of the money was contingent.<sup>2</sup>

Individual IMF missions carried out routine evaluation of the extent to which the agreed upon criteria were met and the economic program of the CSFR Government (formulated in connection with the CSFR negotiations for the loan) fulfilled, which was the basis upon which individual portions were released to Czechoslovakia

practically without problems. Because of the developments in the price of oil on the world market, it was not even necessary to use the risk credit in its entirety. Altogether, during last year CSFR received \$1,312 million from the IMF, which had a positive influence on the balance of payments and contributed to relatively better results in the indicators of the external payment position than was expected; at the end of 1991, foreign currency reserves amounted to \$3.4 billion, gross debt was equal to \$9.3 billion, and in contrast to the minus values at the end of 1990, during 1991 we achieved a surplus in the current balance of payments.

During the second half of 1991, other funds from the World Bank, the G-24 group and the EC were added to the thus far only resources from the IMF, and last but not least, the influx of capital from private entrepreneurs also increased.

##### World Bank

Credits by the World Bank were granted, or rather made ready, in several blocs and were intended for the support of the balance of payments, or to cover its deficit, also to support the development of the financial sector, and for financing the development and modernization of other selected sectors of the Czechoslovak economy (power industry, telecommunications, environment).

In comparison with the IMF, whose interest is focused primarily on the macroeconomic side of the economic reform, the focus of interest of the executive directors of the World Bank and its individual missions during negotiations of the conditions for the loans was, on the contrary, the area of microeconomic problems of the reform processes.

The Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) was granted to Czechoslovakia in the total amount of \$450 million, of which the first portion of \$200 million was drawn during the past year. This is credit earmarked for covering the trade deficit, support of structural changes of the Czechoslovak economy and the process of its transformation. The second and third portions (both in the amount of \$125 million) are expected to be drawn during the course of this year. Same as the IMF loan, the release of the individual portions of the World Bank funds is contingent on the acceptance and implementation of elements of market economy (realization of the privatization processes, restructuring of enterprises, abolishment of subsidies, liberalization of prices, and so forth).

Loan "ENERGY" is earmarked for the resolution of the energy problems of the Czechoslovak economy. Its amount is equal to \$200 million, while the conditions for using it are still the subject of negotiations and are contingent on the presentation of specific projects by CSFR.

### Loans and Financial Assistance by Groups of Countries

#### The G-24 Group

The group of the 24 most advanced countries (G-24) pledged at their summit in Rome at the end of 1990 to give financial assistance to countries in Central and East Europe. Czechoslovakia was promised a total amount of \$1 billion as support for the introduction of internal convertibility of the koruna and the realization of other steps of the economic reform. It was agreed that the activities of the G-24 group will be coordinated by the EC Commission and realized in roughly these dimensions:

EC countries (bilaterally)	\$500 million
G-24 countries (bilaterally)	\$500 million
Of that (preliminary):	
Japan	\$200 million
Canada	\$25 million
Austria	\$50 million
Switzerland	\$40 million
Kuwait	\$50 million
Sweden	\$25 million
Norway	\$16 million
Finland	\$15 million
United States	\$15 million
Turkey	\$1 million

At the end of last year Czechoslovakia signed an agreement with the EC Commission for a loan in the amount of ECU [European Currency Unit] 375 million,<sup>3</sup> i.e., about \$450 million, to be drawn in two portions, of which the first, i.e., \$248, was already granted and drawn last year. In 1991 Czechoslovakia was for the time being given only about \$90 million of the promised funds from the other G-24 countries.

#### Program PHARE

Program PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] came into being in 1989 on the initiative of the G-24 group, as a program to assist the restructuring of economies first in Poland and Hungary and since 1990 also of Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and CSFR (in 1992 this program was expanded to include Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Albania, but, on the other hand, the assistance to Yugoslavia has been halted since 1991). The program is financially guaranteed by EC, and all its activities are coordinated by the EC Commission. Funds from the program are apportioned to individual countries on the basis of the general criteria of the EC Commission (number of inhabitants, level of the GNP per inhabitant, external debt of the country, absorption capacity of the economy from the standpoint of financial means).

The procedure for gaining effective financial assistance from PHARE program is not simple. It devolves from the basic document, which is the Indicative Program, signed by the representatives of the partner countries and expressing the agreed-upon basic priorities of the development of relevant sectors of the national economy, suggested for financing by the PHARE program in a given year with the expectation that they will be maintained as priorities in the following years. After that follows the presentation of proposals for financial agreements (memoranda), and on the basis of their approval the preparation of a six-month detailing of the sector program begins. Only after it is accepted and agreed upon by the EC Commission for PHARE is it possible to begin realization of the projects, while the funds for this realization are allocated gradually, always for a maximum of six months.

In view of the fact that Czechoslovakia joined the PHARE program only in the second half of 1990 and did not yet have a fully prepared overview of its priorities and financial requirements for their implementation, all activities (with the exception of the TEMPUS program—education) connected with the PHARE program were shifted to 1991. Its framework was created by the allocated funds in the amount of ECU99 million (i.e., about \$125 million), which were allocated to these basic areas:

	Allocated Funds (ECU million)
Restructuring and privatization	19
Development of small and medium businesses	20
Restructuring of the labor market	15
Environment	5
Power Industry	5
Telecommunications	6
TEMPUS	9
General technological assistance	20

This allocated amount of ECU99 million was used last year only in part, distributed and used was altogether ECU14 million, for the time being only in three areas: restructuring and privatization, TEMPUS, and general technical assistance. In the other areas all necessary preparatory work, preliminary to the realization of individual projects and drawing of the allocated funds, is underway.

#### Technical Assistance

Foreign financial assistance, given in the form of the so-called "noninvestment, or technical, assistance" is realized largely within the framework of bilateral cooperation with advanced countries, to a certain extent in cooperation with international organizations (particularly with organizations of the United Nations, OECD, and NATO) and nongovernmental organizations, in the form of financial contributions from resources of



regional institutions of some countries, civic movements, initiatives, and grants even from the private sector.

It is characteristic for this type of foreign financial assistance that only a very small portion of the given funds is directly usable materially and effectively by Czechoslovak entities, because they are mostly managed by the governments of the donor country or a nongovernmental institution. The funds are as a rule used to defray costs of activities of foreign educational, training, counseling, and consulting institutions carried out in behalf of CSFR, work of foreign experts, professors, and advisors in Czechoslovakia, financing of temporary residences of Czechoslovak students, pedagogues, and specialists abroad, installation and operation of information centers in CSFR, etc.

Judged by the size of the population, the largest donors thus far of the non-investment-technical assistance to Czechoslovakia are Switzerland and the Netherlands, in the first place by absolute volume of means provided through this assistance is the United States, ahead of Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and France.

The United States is active especially in financing projects aimed at supporting the privatization processes and development of the private sector (among them are especially the Czechoslovak-American Entrepreneurial Fund for granting favorable loans to private entrepreneurs in the amount of \$60 million for 1990-92); apart from that, together with Canada and Great Britain the United States gives financial assistance to teachers of English in Czechoslovakia. Great Britain established on behalf of CSFR the so-called "Know-How Fund" in the amount of 25 million pounds sterling, from which are financed costs of educating managers, experts, and language teachers and their study residences in Great Britain.

Expressed in numbers, the total amount of this non-investment-technical assistance given, or being given, to Czechoslovakia on a bilateral or multilateral basis can be very roughly approximated at about \$300 million for 1990-91, and at about \$870 million as an estimate for the period of 1990-93.

#### Direct Foreign Investments

Direct foreign investments, as the most important and presently the most frequent form of foreign capital participation, are realized in the Czechoslovak conditions mostly through joint ventures (JV's). An exact determination of their status and influx is complicated by the current system of recordkeeping, which cannot express in every detail the immediate situation not only from the standpoint of the number of foreign participants, but especially from the standpoint of the amount of working capital in comparison with issued capital, and understandably neither from the standpoint of the number of and capital investment by foreign participants in the second round of the small privatization.

Relatively detailed information about recorded, registered, and functioning enterprises with foreign ownership participation, their listing according to the amount of invested capital, their direction-line of business, as well as their structure according to the country of domicile of the participants in individual joint ventures is concerned, were contained in the article by Engineer Jaroslava Durdisova, CSc., "Is Czechoslovakia Sufficiently Attractive to Foreign Capital?" (EKONOM No. 12/1992).

To supplement it, let us add, in the context of information contained in the foregoing part of this article, that in 1991—according to preliminary data of the capital account of the balance of payments—the influx of direct foreign investments into CSFR amounted to roughly \$600 million, while at the same time toward the end of the period in question there was a tendency toward reorientation of the main capital streams from the service sector into the industrial production sphere. In the Czech Republic, this concerns mainly the automobile industry, production of technical and pure gases, manufacture of machinery and equipment for the power industry, and the chemical and rubber processing industries. The influx of foreign capital into organizations of individual branches is very unequal in the two republics.

From the standpoint of the amount of the invested capital it still holds true that predominant are joint ventures with a low foreign capital investment. In the Czech Republic—according to the CR ministry of industry—the structure of established and registered joint ventures in 1991, classified according to the criterion of the above mentioned amount of invested foreign capital, was as follows:

Amount of Foreign Capital	Number of Joint Ventures
More than Kcs10 billion	1
Kcs1-10 billion	2
Kcs300 million-1 billion	5
Kcs100 million-300 million	3
Kcs10 million-100 million	9
Kcs1 million-10 million	29
Less than Kcs1 million	35

An analogous situation exists in industrial enterprises of the Slovak Republic, whose participation with foreign capital will be discussed in an article planned for publication in one of the future issues of EKONOM.

In comparison with the estimate or speculation about how capital-intensive the restructuring processes of the transforming Czechoslovak economy will be, the present influx of foreign capital appears somewhat insignificant. The still predominant hesitant attitude and unconvincing activity of foreign investors, as a certain indicator of a comprehensive evaluation of the attractiveness of our economic environment from the viewpoint of the microsphere, contrasts with the unequivocally positive

evaluation of the indicators of the CSFR macroeconomic development not only by international financial and economic institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, European Bank for Renovation and Development, European Investment Bank, EC Commission, etc., but also by representatives of private banks.

For the next stages of the development of Czechoslovak economy, therefore, the heart of the problem is the essential development of activities that create an entrepreneurial terrain comparable with the global, or rather the European, standard from the standpoint of parameters of its attractiveness to foreign investors. By that is understood especially the existence and cultivation of a stable macroeconomic, political, social, but also a legislative framework for entrepreneurs and investors who come with capital at their disposal.

#### Footnotes

1. SDR-Special Drawing Rights, a unit used by the IMF; the actual rate of exchange is 1 SDR to \$1.38 (April 1992). On the date the loan was granted (January 1990) the exchange rate was 1 SDR to \$1.42.

2. In question was the fulfillment of these criteria of monetary policy during 1991:

a. Increase the bank gross foreign currency reserves, i.e., foreign currency assets (by \$1.6 billion);

b. Improve the state of the bank net foreign currency reserves, or decrease the negative balance between assets and debits (by \$1.7);

c. Decrease the debt of the public sector to banks (by Kcs24.8 million);

d. Increase bank assets vis-a-vis the nonbank sector, i.e., particularly credits granted to enterprises and the public (at the most by 23 percent);

e. Draw foreign government and bank credit, payable in 12 years, to the maximum amount of \$1 billion.

3. The ECU exchange rate is currently (April 1992) 1 ECU equals \$1.26.

#### Program To Improve Prague's Ecological Condition

93CH0593A Prague EKONOM in Czech No 18, 1992  
pp 48-49

[Article on interview with M. Doubrava, head of the Department of Environmental Conservation, Prague, by Alena Adamkova; place and date not given: "Will Prague Restore Its Health? On a Program for Improving the Capital's Environment"]

[Text] One of last year's issues of our magazine carried rather alarming data on the environmental situation in our capital city comparable perhaps only to northern Bohemia. But a mere recitation of the facts, however alarming they are, does not do much to improve the situation. Hence the Czech government has directed the Prague city administration to prepare as speedily as

possible a program for improving the capital's environment, similar to the program already prepared for ecological restoration of northern Bohemia and one presently in the works for the Ostrava region. This material should offer the basic guideline for tackling Prague's ecological problems in the nearest future. We discussed the main points of the report now being readied with Eng. M. Doubrava, head of the department of environmental conservation in the Prague city administration, who prepared the material.

One of the key requirements for improving Prague's ecological situation is undoubtedly the assurance of adequate funding. The necessary investment was put at 25 billion korunas [Kcs], an amount not likely to be available within the near future. This year alone we are Kcs2.826 billion short in covering the most urgent costs (Kcs3.209 billion will come from the government budget and Kcs2.351 billion will then accrue from city resources, such as revenues of municipal enterprises, sale of public facilities, renting nonresidential premises and other fees). Therefore it was necessary to set an order of priorities, that is, problems the solution of which cannot be put off without endangering the very life of the city. So the first priority goes to the issue of waste management, specifically the construction of a new landfill and incinerator. Second in the order of priority is the construction of a new sewage filtration plant, and in third place is the problem of assuring adequate supply of drinking water. Moved only to the fourth order of priority was improvement in the city's air quality which is also highly unsatisfactory yet does not present an immediate threat to Prague's functioning as a city.

So what improvements may Prague citizens expect in the next few years? In the area of waste management it will be at last a new landfill at Dablice and an incinerator at Malesice, both probably in 1993. The incinerator's construction is 100 percent funded from the government budget (this year Kcs700 million) and the landfill from city funds (an estimated Kcs205 million); moreover, a foreign investor is being sought. There should be gradual introduction of separated waste collections, prospectively then the construction of sorting facilities and recycling plants.

In the sector of sewage purification the situation is no less critical. Of the 7 cubic meters per second flowing into the existing central sewage treatment plant, .8 cubic meters is not treated at all, 1.6 cubic meters only mechanically and only the rest by the biological-mechanical method because the treatment plant has insufficient capacity. A problem is also caused by the disposal of treatment sludge which contains a large quantity of heavy metals and consequently is unsuitable for farm use. In order to bring the method of treating waste water into compliance with the water law it is necessary to build a new treatment plant as soon as possible. But that will cost some Kcs8 billion and moreover the decision on where to site it is still outstanding (the Cisarsky island and Hostin near Melnik are under consideration). Thus a temporary solution will be to

intensify the original treatment plant so that the quality of the discharged waters will at least approximate the desired standards. But a decision on the site of the new treatment plant ought to be made as soon as possible, after which the process begins to select the investor for the entire project. This year too we expect completion of a sewer conduit [shybka] underneath the Vltava River and there ought to be progress in reconstructing the unsatisfactory sewer system. But this year's funding for upgrading the existing treatment plant alone falls short by Kcs100 million, and another 100 million korunas is lacking for reconstruction of the sewer system.

We have a very tense situation also in regard to Prague's supply of drinking water. Underground aquifers are for the most part unsuitable for this purpose and the current capacity of drinking water sources covers the city's needs so to speak "only just." Meanwhile the quality of water drawn from the Vltava is very poor, especially in the summer months, and moreover the waterworks at Podoli is in a decrepit condition and requires immediate reconstruction. Water from another source at Karane is at threat from petroleum residues in the former military area of Milovice and water from the Zelivka creek which supplies 54 percent of Prague's needs contains excessive quantities of nitrates as well as phosphates which enter the water from the surrounding fields and farm enterprises. Here it leads to an excessive growth of algae which causes considerable difficulties in pumping. Moreover the water level in the Zelivka reservoir has been below normal already for a number of years (even though there is now hope that it will finally fill up again after the spring thaw).

The water pipe system also is in a decrepit condition and loses 26 percent of the water produced. Water consumption in our capital moreover is excessively high—600 liters per person per day, whereas in the FRG it is only 250-300 liters per person per day, and the price charged for drinking water still remains below the total costs connected with its supply.

Reconstruction of the Podoli waterworks alone requires Kcs210 million this year, but only Kcs140 million is assured. Reconstruction of water distribution networks is another Kcs80 million short. So the construction of a new source of drinking water supply for Prague is for now only the stuff of future dreams. Under consideration is the Jizera river, or drawing water off the Vltava above its confluence with the Sazava, both of course assuming also the construction of a new waterworks.

Prague's air quality too presents an acute problem, with its pollution levels highly exceeding the national average (only northern Bohemia is worse off, but only in one measurement—in sulphur dioxide emissions). In the city center the primary sources of air pollution include local heating and transport, on the city margins it is large factories and heating and power plants. The solution lies in a transition to burning natural gas, centralized heat

supply in existing heating and furnace facilities, conversion to gas and heating by electricity locally in the city center. Some help could come also in the form of heat supplies from the Melnik power plant, but because of lack of funding and interminable disputes about the suitability of such a solution the construction of a heating conduit from Melnik was halted. An improvement may come also thanks to the new ordinance on catalytic converters to take effect on 1 April of this year within the capital city (as of 1 October of this year all automobiles owned by organizations or used in entrepreneurial activity and capable of running on unleaded gas must be equipped with catalytic converters; effective 1 October 1993 this will apply to all cars capable of running on unleaded gas, with others required to meet emission limits). Of importance for improving air quality in Prague will be also completion of the communication system now under construction and subject to continuing debate. The measures will include also an ordinance on smog situations which was debated in the council of the city board of representatives in early April but unfortunately has not been approved as yet.

Most of these measures however again fall through because of lack of finances. Conversion to gas and reconstruction of furnace facilities alone this year falls Kcs143 million short of the required 150 million; completion of the transport system falls Kcs856 million short of the proposed Kcs1,610 million (only 450 million will be made available from the government budget); there is lack of money also for repairing communications and expansion of the subway, one of Prague's ecological construction projects.

There is also insufficient care of public green spaces and maintenance of residential and public buildings. Farm production should gradually adjust to meet ecological requirements, within the near future a system ought to be created for protecting and creating public green spaces.

But what is not listed in the program under discussion but according to Eng. Doubrava is no less important prerequisite for improving Prague's environmental situation is ecological education. Without it, in his opinion, there cannot be any pronounced turn for the better. If people fail to realize that they themselves too must take part in improving the environment, if they do not begin to sort their waste, stop littering the streets, destroying greenery, driving cars without catalytic converters, if they do not begin to conserve drinking water and so on, it will be difficult to improve anything. In this regard they should get some help from a massive public information campaign (here we could learn from the advertising by some foreign companies, for instance Procter and Gamble, and so on), as well as suitable economic tools and legislation (a law on ecological education is being readied). Of importance according to Eng. Doubrava is also improvement in government administration in the environmental field and its strict separation from self-government, as well as equipping the government administration with appropriate powers. Environmental issues should be decided primarily by experts, self-government ought to have an advisory voice only.

### Czech-Polish Border Town Dispute Examined

92EP0424A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA (supplement)  
in Polish 30 Apr-3 May 92 p III

[Article by Roman Przeciszewski: "A Disastrous Legacy"]

[Text] Macura's eyes have just opened and that is why he is taking a trip to the other side of the Olza. He is going to see Gierek, he guarantees. He will not mince words, but will forget his embarrassment and ask directly: "Mr. Gierek, is it true that you told Novotny how he could resolve the Polish minority problem in Czechoslovakia?"

Macura says: "The actions of the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia were awkward for Gierek, since they made demands which had to be dealt with in Warsaw as well and which showed a lack of interest on the part of Polish authorities in the minority situation abroad. That is why he made a tacit understanding with Novotny." What Macura is talking about is being heard more and more in Tesinsky Slezk, i.e., in Zaolzie.

Edwin Macura, director of the Board of the Main Polish Cultural-Educational Union in Cesky Tesyn, would prefer cutting himself off from the disastrous legacy of the past, but he is aware that this is impossible. The past still lives in the memory of people: It asks questions, tries to settle accounts and leads to the making of analogies. For history likes to repeat itself, and fears are welling up in the Polish community. Jan Rusnok, editor in chief of the sociocultural monthly ZWROT, who has many quarrels with Macura, is in agreement with him on the issue of the divisions still being caused by the past.

The local Poles are skeptical, even bitter, and we must try to understand this. Rusnok recalls: "Immediately after the war, things were very difficult for us Poles in Zaolzie. During the war we were treated as an enemy element by Hitler's people and we were doomed to a life of servitude and extermination. After the war we were again treated as enemies. We were called invaders and were threatened with being deported to Poland. The participants in the resistance movement, who were threatened with death at every turn, were arrested and were suspected of wanting to continue the struggle in order to annex Zaolzie to Poland. People returning from the concentration camps, from prison, from Polish army units, and from forced labor were also persecuted. Such people as these, who were the most courageous among us, were also the most dangerous for the new authorities... for this occurred at a time when Poland was trying to recover Zaolzie, which had been transferred to Czechoslovakia by the Red Army, and Stalin left certain opportunities to Poland as well. For this we were treated as enemies of the Republic, although we were as innocent as lambs, since great policy took place over our heads. We had the part of the proverbial whipping boys in this policy...."

Later, history was molded according to the communist scenario. The renewal of prewar forms of the national life of the Poles was forbidden and, as dictated by totalitarianism, the organization of the Polish Cultural-Education Union [PZKO] was commissioned. This was to be the only organization in the Republic banding together the Poles who were living here. Officially, everything was fine, and Czechoslovak-Polish friendship and mutual cooperation "blossomed" in accordance with an agreement signed 10 March 1947. Unofficially, however, it became increasingly clear that the policy of assimilation carried out consistently by the communist authorities of the Republic was yielding better and better "results."

The subject of Zaolzie became an uncomfortable one for the Polish authorities. They tried not to notice it, and, when they did notice it, they limited it to matters which had nothing to do with policy and the past. Thus, history was artificially closed. Kazimierz Kaszper, who edited GLOS ZIEMI CIESZYNSKIEJ for the Polish side, remembers that under communism a sort of embargo was imposed against the past, and no articles treating of Polish-Czech clashes or exposing the life not of emigrants but of autochthons—Poles from the other side of the Olza—could appear on the pages of any newspaper. The censor effectively ferreted out such materials, whether under Gomulka, Gierek, or Jaruzelski. "For this reason, under martial law I was questioned severely several times," says Kaszper.

In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, "the Poles came here from Galicia at the end of the 19th century," schooled in the lessons of history. Did they fear the truth? Why? Did they avoid any sort of accounting with the past? Whose purposes did this serve? The effects of such action, however, were clear. Even more, perhaps, they continued and are still in effect.

"According to the 1991 population census, 43,500 Poles live in Zaolzie. This is more than 8,000 fewer than in 1990!" says Stanislaw Zahradnik, a local historian of Polish background.

In the opinion of Zahradnik, changes in the nationalities structure in Zaolzie are not the result of natural assimilation processes alone, but likewise, and perhaps primarily, they constitute the effect of the policy of denationalization. Let us look at how this was in the past. Until 1910, when the Poles in Zaolzie constituted a significant social group, census results were questioned by the Czechs, who claimed that they reflected the "Polonization" of local Moravians and that the Austrian authorities favored Poles in the population counts. By the interwar period, the Poles were alone in their protest. In 1931, the leaders of all Polish political groups protested census abuses. Since 1920, a conscious denationalization policy was in effect, especially locally.

Stanislaw Zahradnik reports: "After World War II, Czechization accelerated. Industrialization, urbanization, the resettlement of people in conjunction with the

cleanup of mine disasters, changes in the administrative boundaries of administrative districts and individual localities and the limited possibilities for upholding national traditions all served this purpose."

Will this change now? It is hard not to ask this question. The Poles in Zaolzie are divided, but at the same time, they are joined by the conviction that the national minority should have guaranteed rights in the Czechoslovak Constitution, and this is still only a slogan. In 1968, Jan Rusnok was on a commission to elaborate a law on the position of national minorities. Later, for this activity and other reasons, he was arrested, and now, he says "only the preamble of that law is in effect."

Danuta Branna, a Polish deputy to the Federal Assembly, and for several weeks also chairwoman of the Council of Poles in Czechoslovakia, is trying to be optimistic in spite of everything. Together with deputies of Hungarian nationality, she has succeeded in forcing through a statement that the solution to general nationalities problems lies in the hands of the Federal Government, while the solution of concrete matters, associated with education or culture, lies in the hands of the governments of the republics. A statement on the right to speak one's native language, to be educated and informed in this language, to expand cultural traditions and to cooperate on concrete minorities legislation is likewise present in the Charter on the Rights and Freedoms of Man and the Citizen, adopted by the Federal Assembly. "Thus, positive changes in legislation have been made, but a great deal must still be done to implement them in full," argues deputy Branna.

The fact is, however, that this is not the case. History is not viewed in the same way and different conclusions are drawn from it. One proof of this is the matter of the Piast Hotel in Cesky Tesyn. It was built by the Savings and Loan Association as a representative Polish house. Next, as the "Germany," it was in the hands of the Germans and, as the "Slavia," in the hands of the Czechs. In 1947—as a German property—it was sold to the PZKO and... was once again taken away. Now, for the third time, it is in Polish hands and is to serve all Polish organizations in Zaolzie. Has justice then been done?

Wladyslaw Mlynec, president of the PZKO, does not hide the fact that "We also want to take over other buildings that once belonged to the Poles."

However, the matter is not a simple one. Poles in Zaolzie are seeking the return to them of Sikora Park and of the Teachers House, among other things (the latter was once the property of the Mother Country School). They are also seeking the return of the school on Kamienisty and the Polish High School in Orlowa, but... the law is not on their side. The law on restitution, for the present, applies only to private persons, sports organizations, the Red Cross, and religious orders and congregations.

Moreover, there is also another problem—the Czechs are suspicious!

This is no exaggeration. The disastrous legacy is becoming evident with regard to them as well. Despite state guarantees that the borders are fixed and final, despite the fact that seeking out "dangers" is unwarranted, here and there one hears of the nationalistic tendencies occurring among the Poles who live here.

Not so long ago, the question was often asked whether Polish capital is coming into Zaolzie. For some, primarily the local Poles, it would bring in new hope for the revitalization of social, political, and economic life, but for others, primarily the Czechs, it would constitute an increased threat. What sort of threat? The threat that property would be purchased, that Poles from Cieszyn would dictate their terms in Cesky Tesyn, and that, as a result, the fight over Zaolzie would become a real one. It is an open secret that the representatives of the authorities of Cesky Tesyn sent a letter to this effect to President Vaclav Havel and Prime Minister Petr Pithart.

"We must eliminate mutual suspicion and insinuation," agrees Stanislaw Gawlik, deputy chairman of the Council of Poles.

The June parliamentary election was undoubtedly an opportunity for this. As is already known, 42 parties and political groups are competing in it (this number represents 15 more political parties than the number competing in 1990). In the Northern Moravian district, which includes Zaolzie, 23 parties will compete. Eight Poles, candidates to the National Assembly, are on the list of Wspolnota, of which Mr Gawlik is a leader. Polish candidates from other party lists will also run. On 13 May, the preelection campaign will begin and the issue of Poles in Zaolzie will certainly be one of the topics of social discussion.

#### **Rokita on Absence of Strong Executive Power**

92EP0431A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
11 May 92 p 3

[Interview with Jan Maria Rokita, Sejm deputy from the Democratic Union, by Malgorzata Subotic; place and date not given: "There Is No Government Outside of Parliament"]

[Text] [Subotic] In your opinion, who is governing Poland now?

[Rokita] There is no unambiguous answer to this question if this is not to be a comment of the kind of statements by the man on the street. From the standpoint of the constitution, power is distributed, albeit in an imprecise manner, between the parliament, the president, and the government. However, from a political standpoint, we are dealing with a drastic frustration of all power centers—with a very weak, poorly discharged presidency, an internally splintered parliament, incapable of making effective decisions, and a government which from the time of the fiasco of negotiations on the grand coalition has obviously stopped governing, if it has ever governed at all. Therefore, not a single power center

in Poland meets requirements for a strong power. This is precisely what the core of the Polish crisis is, rather than the economy.

[Subotic] You have been predicting for many weeks now that the Jan Olszewski government will fall soon. So, your prediction is not coming true, is it?

[Rokita] "I am not as foolish as to conjecture anything about the future." This saying by Konstanty Ildefons Galczyński fits the current Polish situation precisely. I try not to voice opinions to the effect that the government will fall or not. However, I have said repeatedly that the present government is not discharging its basic responsibilities. Its idea of governing the state is to pursue a personnel policy; this is ridiculous. I have also expressed the view that the government may fall at any moment in view of the lack of support by the president and instability in the parliament. The lack of an alternative is the only strength of the Olszewski government. So far, no one has given this government a vote of no confidence, because nobody feels that he is in a position to form his own government. Had this been possible, Olszewski's cabinet would have been gone long ago.

[Subotic] You meant parliamentary groups when you said that nobody feels that he is in a position to propose an alternative solution. What about the president?

[Rokita] To be sure, Poland does not have a good constitution; a dramatic debate over the systemic format of the state is underway. However, the articles of the amended constitution do provide a systemic outline. This outline suggests that the government may be nominated, and formed solely by the parliament. There is no government outside of the parliament. We would have to amend the constitution or stage a coup d'état first.

[Subotic] Therefore, what should the active involvement of the president in forming a new government consist of?

[Rokita] The law does not allow the president to dismiss the government. Such powers do not exist even under the French system to which Lech Walesa refers so frequently. However, the president has the right of initiative if the Sejm dismisses the government. This initiative means that the president designates a candidate for the chairman of the Council of Ministers.

[Subotic] Will the president take advantage of extraconstitutional opportunities?

[Rokita] No, because an extraconstitutional solution would necessitate a coup d'état first. This hypothesis appears to be quite absurd if we take into account the overall weakness of the repressive organs which are affected by the same internal crisis that afflicts the entire state. On the other hand, there is no political base of support in Poland for any dictatorship. All forms of authoritarian government are only possible when a meaningful social group stands behind them. There is no such group in Poland. Lech Walesa himself is not a

politician in whose favor a lobby would speak. Therefore, there are neither political nor technical conditions for effecting a coup d'état. Continuously repeated statements by some essayists and politicians that a coup d'état is a threat to us are not based on any rational premises. However, another solution is possible; perhaps, this solution will become unavoidable given the government crisis which I anticipate.

[Subotic] What solution?

[Rokita] A situation may develop in which a government formed on the initiative of the president will not be all that tragic a solution. This would be the case if parliamentary groups themselves were not in a position to nominate a prime minister on their own. This would be a government attempting to secure in the parliament the acceptance of changes to the system toward greater presidential powers.

[Subotic] Would this be a democratic solution?

[Rokita] Yes. Within the parliament, there are two possibilities. The first one is that parliamentary parties come to an agreement among themselves concerning the candidate for prime minister. In this scenario, the president plays a passive role. The Olszewski government was nominated in this manner. The other possibility is for the president to select the candidate for prime minister. The president and the prime minister coordinate the composition and program of the government, and subsequently secure the support of the Sejm for the cabinet put together in this manner.

[Subotic] What conditions should be met for the second solution, the nomination of a presidential government?

[Rokita] It would call for extensive political consultations by the president. Lech Walesa would have to win parliamentary factions over for this initiative, for the view that it provides the only opportunity to create a center which would be able to really exercise power in Poland.

[Subotic] Would the [Democratic] Union support such an initiative?

[Rokita] I do not rule out a situation in which the Union and, certainly, the entire coalition of the three could accept such a possibility.

[Subotic] In your opinion, who is the president's candidate for prime minister?

[Rokita] I do not think that the president has only one candidate. In addition to Olechowski and Mazowiecki, I can think of other individuals.

[Subotic] However, the desire to form its own government is markedly apparent in the Union, or at least in a section of it.

[Rokita] After the fiasco of negotiations on the grand coalition, we unequivocally ended up in opposition. We

believe that we would be in a position to govern Poland incomparably better than this government. For this to happen, we must secure a parliamentary majority for the candidate we propose. In November of last year, Bronislaw Geremek failed to accomplish this. As the coalition of the three, we will try to win over other groups in order to have a parliamentary majority.

[Subotic] Will this endeavor work?

[Rokita] I doubt it very much. It appears unlikely to me that a parliamentary majority would agree on a joint candidate for prime minister. After all, it would be necessary for him to be nominated not only by the three but also by a majority of the parties of the current government coalition. This is why I am not attached to a scenario under which initiative comes from the accord of the three. If we are not the ones, then it is likely to be the president.

[Subotic] Has the president approached the coalition of the three seeking support for a presidential government?

[Rokita] No. So far, Lech Walesa has not approached us with such proposals. I conclude from this that the president does not intend to bring about the fall of the Olszewski government soon. He says publicly that now is the prime minister's move. Let us keep in mind that the president does not have a constitutional opportunity to dismiss the government. He may suggest this, but the motion must be submitted by deputies.

[Subotic] What was the proposal about which was made a dozen or so weeks ago—to set up at the Belweder a committee of former prime ministers, Mazowiecki and Bielecki?

[Rokita] We did not interpret this proposal as an attempt to put together a political camp in opposition to the government. To my mind, this was a proposal to fill a political vacuum around the president. Contacts between Lech Walesa and individual groups and politicians are cold; Lech Walesa personally is deprived of professional advice, especially on political matters. Walesa is a politician who operates much better when he has professional advisers than in a situation of political loneliness. I regret that the concept of an advisory committee did not work out.

[Subotic] Were the candidates for advisers themselves, Mazowiecki and Bielecki, not the ones to reject this offer?

[Rokita] Accepting this proposal would have been inconceivable had we interpreted it as organizing an opposition reform camp in the initial days of the operation of the Olszewski government, before it showed what it was capable of. However, the entire concept died a natural death. As is usually the case, it turned out that initiatives originating in Belweder are incomplete and unrefined. One meeting was held, but there was no other. In principle, Belweder did not make any proposal to institutionalize this committee. The president floats certain

ideas, and later forgets about them, or does very little to implement them. At times, I get the impression that Lech Walesa is trying to govern by words. This is a great weakness of this presidency, and especially the Presidential Chancellery, which should translate presidential initiatives into the language of political specifics.

[Subotic] However, it appears that the coalition of the three is the political force which is the closest to the president. Do you agree with this view?

[Rokita] Our coalition will not be either an instrument of Lech Walesa or his political client. It will not be the presidential party, nor will it use Walesa to ensure its political success. Nonetheless, we are aware that if the parliament is incapable of nominating a government better than the Olszewski cabinet, it will be necessary to accept a presidential government, provided, however, that it is a proreform government, that is, a government which will again embark on introducing capitalism in Poland; in recent months, this has been resolutely abandoned.

[Subotic] Which political force is currently the closest to the president?

[Rokita] I cannot answer this question. I do know who definitely does not like the president: the Center Accord. Cooperation between Walesa and all other political groups is possible. I would very much like cooperation with the Center Accord to be possible as well, because, its shortcomings notwithstanding, this is undoubtedly a proreform party.

[Subotic] What separates you from the Center Accord?

[Rokita] At present, the political obsession, especially of Jaroslaw Kaczynski's faction, with one issue, or more precisely with one individual, Minister Mieczyslaw Wachowski, separates us the most. The Center Accord is inclined to look at all state matters from the point of view of the role which Minister Wachowski may play in them. Undoubtedly, this is a vision which distorts the picture of Polish reality.

[Subotic] As of now, three groups, the Union, the Liberals, and the Polish Economic Program, belong to what you define as the proreform coalition. You have come to serve in the 16-member council of this coalition. What is the future of this bloc going to be, in your opinion?

[Rokita] I would like these three groups to create a single entity in the future. I believe that this is possible. If this happens (it will take time), the association would entail the development of a new formula which would ensure equal rights. The incorporation of one party into another is certainly not an option.

[Subotic] However, the Union would have the dominant voice within this entity, would it not?

[Rokita] I do not think so. Technically, Tadeusz Mazowiecki is the leader of the three; however, this is not to say



that political initiative belongs to the Union. The people of the Congress are very energetic.

[Subotic] However, for now these three groups are separate entities. The Union itself is perceived as an elitist party which is based on social connections. They also accuse you of the inability to make decisions quickly.

[Rokita] I think that this elitist syndrome is being overcome due to my efforts and those of my colleagues. However, it is true that, in view of social contacts among several individuals in the narrow circle of the leadership, the Union has difficulty making decisions quickly. In politics, such capability to respond instantly is necessary, especially at present. We will certainly overcome this deficiency as well. The common opinion about the Union is perpetuated by the TV depiction of Mazowiecki as a turtle.

[Subotic] Are you trying to convince me that a regular turtle has been transformed into a belligerent Ninja turtle?

[Rokita] I will answer with an anecdote. After a meeting with Jan Olszewski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki lifted his gaze the way he does, and said: "My God, does he speak slowly." I believe that the leader of the Union showed political class in the course of the negotiations about the grand coalition, and especially when the negotiations ended. At that time, I was particularly proud to belong to this party rather than another one.

[Subotic] You are one of the youngest politicians in the leadership of the Union. I have heard the following view of you: You think like Bronislaw Geremek but talk like Aleksander Hall. How would you respond to this?

[Rokita] Such comparisons surprise me. I have learned a lot from Bronislaw Geremek. However, I do not think that we have identical views. For his part, Aleksander Hall practices a more private, closed circle style of politics. I feel best during a fight.

#### Party Popularity, Sejm Representation Statistics

92EP0409A Poznan WPROST in Polish No 17,  
26 Apr 92 pp 24-25

[Article by Boguslaw Mazur: "Lounge Chairs on the Quarterdeck"]

[Text] So far just a few political groups have managed to extricate themselves from the ghetto of 10- to 20-person mutual-adoration societies.

Of course one cannot equate the number of people who pay dues with the strength of a party. In Krakow alone, the Democratic Party numbers 1,300 persons, but it has just one representative in the Sejm. The "quality" of the party ranks—in other words the energy and ingenuity of their leaders and the effective organization of work—is more important than their number. This truth is confirmed by the division of seats among the largest parliamentary groups, which, after crossing the border

dividing them from the "lounge chair set," managed to take advantage of their trump card (their large memberships) to widely varying degrees. So whom do party leaders represent, and in whose name do they speak?

If the size of their representation in parliament was supposed to depend in a simple way on the number of people in the party, then undoubtedly the majority of seats would go to the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. With roots mainly in the countryside, the 180,000 members of Waldemar Pawlak's party are assured of a numerical advantage in all regions of the country. In Bialystok voivodship more than 4,000 people hold green identification cards. It is similar in Poznan voivodship where the 4,000-member PSL has rallied about itself 32,000 followers in recent elections. In Wroclaw voivodship, where there are no more than 2,000 peasant party members, the PSL also gained the lead position with respect to numbers due to the ricketiness of the other parties. Even in the industrialized region of Upper Silesia, the PSL, with 3,000 members, occupied first place.

In the elections, PSL members in Katowice received 40,000 votes. On the Gdansk seacoast, the 2,400 members of the PSL also constituted the largest party in the region, enjoying the support of nine times as many voters. However, that support ensured the PSL just eighth place in the elections.

The Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] has just a third as many members as the PSL. But it too is dominant (behind the PSL) in many centers. In Gdansk, the 700-person group of activists fought for and won the support of 36,000 compatriots. In Wroclaw voivodship, the SdRP numbers over 1,300 persons, including 800 residents of Wroclaw. However, young people constitute just a tenth of Social Democracy's membership in Lower Silesia, and usually they are unemployed. In Warsaw, about 2,000 people have declared their allegiance to the SdRP. In working-class Lodz, 900 members, primarily white-collar workers, craftsmen, small merchants, and retired people, organized the victorious campaign of Leszek Miller. Thanks to them, the SdRP is the largest party in Lodz. But it is characteristic that workers are not in the least adhering to this leftist grouping. The 2,500 members of the SdRP in Katowice voivodship won primarily the support of people from the impoverished intelligentsia. Just as in other cities, many workers in Katowice voted for the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland]. Paradoxically, the antagonism between these two parties is strengthening both of them. SdRP leaders in Poznan (2,000 members, 45,000 votes) noted a large growth of interest after the "decipherment" of the abbreviation PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] by Leszek Moczulski.

The 40,000-strong Center Accord [PC] did not attain electoral success in proportion to its numbers. In Warsaw 1,600 people belong to the PC, but just 800 come to the meetings. The Center Accord achieved a



great success in Katowice, where, with just a thousand members, it won three seats in the Sejm. The current senator, Leszek Piotrowski, got a record number of votes there—more than 260,000. One of the weakest sections of the PC is in Wielkopolska. It has 263 members and won the acceptance of just under 20,000 voters. Intra-party discords reflect negatively on the condition of the Center Accord. They came to light most spectacularly in Krakow not long ago where Jaroslaw Kaczynski's opponents gained the advantage. During one of the meetings of the Krakow leadership of the PC, there was even a shoving match between factions. The PC in Lodz, which started in April 1991, drew close to 600 persons. Today 450 members are paying party dues.

The Center Accord's broad social composition is characteristic. Representatives of nearly all social milieus and professions—from unskilled workers to scientists—have gathered beneath the banner of "acceleration." Along with the ultimate loss of illusions as to the possibility of making a "breakthrough" and the intensification of the factional battles, organizational "cracks" seem inevitable.

The 20,000-member Confederation for an Independent Poland met with success in the elections. Its strength appeared well-defined, especially in Upper Silesia and in Lublin. In Katowice voivodship, the "confederates" got 123,000 votes in the elections. In Lublin they gathered 15.3 percent of the vote, most of their support coming from workers. The KPN in the Lodz district has attracted more than 500 persons—workers, youth, and retired persons—and it is, along with the ZChN [Christian-National Union], one of the parties jointly governing the city.

With its leftist economic program and its similar rhetoric, the KPN is wresting the worker vote from the SdRP and the trade unions. "The working class has given us the greatest support," says Jozef Raszewski, head of the KPN in the Gdansk district (520 members, 32,000 votes). But the activist from Krakow complains that the "Krakow intelligentsia loathes the KPN."

The Democratic Union [UD] is the first of the parties to confirm the principle that a lesser number of members does not have to signify lesser political force. In comparison with the PSL or the SdRP, the 15,000-member Democratic Union does not seem a large party. Right now it forms the largest club in parliament.

One of the UD's strongholds is Krakow, where the party's one senator and five deputies come from. However, of the 1,500 people who formally belong to the UD, only 600 pay dues. This is offset with difficulty by the businessmen who support the Democratic Union. They are associated with the Krakow Industrial Society, the president of which is Tadeusz Syryjczyk. Some of them constitute the "Club of 100," each member of which pays a minimum of 100,000 zlotys toward the party's activities. As in several other cities, the Democratic

Union in Krakow also has its own affiliate, the Forum of the Young, created by 80 students.

Attrition in the Democratic Union among three groups, two factions and Tadeusz Mazowiecki's group, seems more and more to be weakening the unity of the party.

The UD passes for the party of the intelligentsia—and rightly so. Polling in Poznan voivodship indicated that 85 percent of Democratic Union members there have a higher education. The Democratic Union also has the character of a big city party. Of the approximately 1,000 people belonging to the UD in Wroclaw voivodship, only 100 to 150 live outside of Wroclaw. Warsaw, in which there are 1,900 activists (again, primarily people with higher education and students) is the strongest center outside of Krakow. The Democratic Union, along with the KLD and the KPN, also leads in regard to the activities of young activists. Furthermore, the UD has a greater number of well-known "television faces" in its ranks. This undoubtedly enhances the party's popularity.

For the Christian-Democratic Union as well, the proportion between the size of the party and the size of the parliamentary club is highly favorable. The 6,000-member party possesses a 61-person representation in both houses. In addition, the Christian-Democratic Union's electoral campaign was the cheapest. However, it should be emphasized that this party, like no other, had the significant support of the Church in the elections. The founding of the WAK [Catholic Election Campaign] electoral committees in the parishes and the active support of many priests allowed the Union to seriously increase the influence of its campaign publicity.

A very strong ZChN center is located in Lodz. There are nearly 500 activists there whose leaders include the town president, Grzegorz Palka, and the chairman of the ZChN's parliamentary club, Stefan Niesiolowski. The Christian-National Union is also strong in Wielkopolska, in which are gathered 440 members, including some in academic circles and in its youth affiliate, the Movement of the Young.

In Gdansk voivodship, there are 120 ZChN members. They have their roots in the intelligentsia. Local activists admit with sorrow that the ages of the members are "unfortunately, mostly advanced." In Gdansk voivodship, however, the party won as many as 47,000 votes and placed two deputies in the Sejm.

Good election results—relative to the number of activists—were achieved by the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD]. As recently as a year and a half ago, this was a typical "lounge chair" party. The liberals' good platform preparation, as well as the support given them by Lech Walesa, was decisive in their success in passing the "critical point." As a party of "modern pragmatists," it attracted many young people. In Wroclaw half a year ago you could count the liberals on your fingers. Today there are 90 of them, and their average age is less than 30.

The Gdansk Congress, with only 350 members, won the support of 83,000 voters.

This allowed the liberals to win the elections in this district and place Donald Tusk, Tadeusz Bien, and Jaroslaw Ulatowski, who owns "Kablex" and was listed by WPROST among the ten richest Poles, in the Sejm.

Many activists in the Gdansk Congress are counted among the wealthy. This allows this party, though relatively small in number and primarily from the intelligentsia, to assure itself of relatively good material conditions for its activities. In Krakow the KLD numbers about 100 persons, but several of the town's leading businessmen are in the section's leadership.

The liberals have not escaped internal disputes either. The conservative current, lead by Lech Mazewski, won recognition in such strong KLD centers as Poznan and Katowice. (In the Upper Silesian district, the 212-person Congress won 14.7 percent of the vote and put five deputies into the Sejm.) However, the Congress is still a long way from an internal crisis of the sort that is growing in the PC or the ZChN.

The size and composition of the most influential groups vary widely—from an awkward colossus like the PSL to the small but dynamic Congress of Liberals. So far none of the groups has reached such a level of organization as to be able to effectively support its leaders with an efficient party apparatus. On the contrary: Many deputies dedicate their allowances to the maintenance of party structures.

In Krakow, elections to the national councils will soon be held. In regard to the number of candidates running, all the parties were beaten by the Society of the Friends of Prokocim [section of Krakow]....

Party	Membership (in thousands)	Number of Deputies and Senators	Main Centers
PSL	180	59	Countrywide
SdRP	60	63 (SLD [Alliance of the Demo- cratic Left])	Warsaw, Katowice, Bydgoszcz, Lodz
PC	40	51	Katowice, Warsaw, Wroclaw
KPN	20	55	Katowice, Lublin, Lodz
UD	15	84	Krakow, Warsaw, Wroclaw, Poznan, Szczecin
ZChN	6	61	Lodz, Poznan, Radom
KLD	3	43	Gdansk, Katowice, Wroclaw, Poznan, Lodz

### Criticism During Sejm Foreign-Policy Debate

92EP0430A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
9-10 May 92 p 3

[Article by Teresa Stylinska: "Foreign-Policy Debate: Approval for Western Policy, Criticism of Eastern Policy"]

[Text] Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski said the following in a foreign-policy expose at the Sejm: "We are not threatened by armed aggression or conversion to an old-style satellite. Our policy has effectively created prerequisites which protect us against this. These are favorable facts." He outlined the strategic objectives of our foreign policy in a detailed, 45 minute long presentation. He focused on the issues of relations with West European organizations, especially the EEC, and our Eastern neighbors. He also devoted much time to the issues of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and regional ties.

In Minister Skubiszewski's opinion, a European policy is the most important. The treaty of association with the EEC is an historic agreement. At present, the ratification of the treaty and the creation of prerequisites for the admission of Poland to the EEC as a member are priority tasks. As far as contacts with NATO, which we consider a pillar of security in Europe are concerned, Poland "will pursue a policy of moving ahead rather than a policy of words." In the opinion of the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the end of the East-West confrontation improved the security of Poland. However, "it is necessary to perpetuate the view that one Europe exists, and that the space between the EEC and the eastern wall is by no means gray or a buffer zone."

Krzysztof Skubiszewski discussed specifically the development of relations with all neighbors of Poland to the East. He said that the withdrawal of troops is the most important matter in relations with Russia. The resolution of this issue through signing a treaty will make it possible to open a new phase. Relations with Ukraine, which "are free of historical burdens, should be considered a crucial success." The minister recalled that a declaration signed with Lithuania contains a provision on the protection of minorities, which "Lithuania has not honored so far." The Polish Government expects that Lithuania will meet its international obligations.

However, the foreign-policy debate resulted in more critical remarks than words of praise overall. In general, representatives of deputy clubs approved of the West European policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, though not without reservations. At the same time, they did not conceal their doubts with regard to the Eastern policy. They considered the latter to be a policy of lost opportunities. Almost all of them touched on the issue of the drawn-out presence of Soviet troops in Poland. There was a consensus as to the fact that ensuring the security of Poland is the most important issue; however, some did not share the view of the minister that there is no threat to Poland from any direction.

**Excerpts From a Few Presentations:**

**Bronislaw Geremek (Democratic Union):** "Foreign policy should be a domain of accord. The president, the prime minister, and the minister of foreign affairs should speak with the same voice in this area. Establishing friendly relations with neighbors to the East should be the focal point."

**Longin Pastusiak (Alliance of the Democratic Left):** "We have lagged behind in establishing relations with post-Soviet states. As far as the West is concerned, complaints about them giving little to us do not make a good impression there."

**Krzysztof Krol (Confederation for an Independent Poland):** "Central Europe as the 'area between the seas' may be a partner for a united Europe and for Russia in the future. Our policy with regard to Yugoslavia was not proper: Poland, which has been treated with sympathy by all sides, could have played a considerably greater role."

**Marek Jurek (Christian-National Association):** "Aspects which are associated with enhancing the standing of Poland—the Visegrad triangle, consultations with France and Germany—in the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are valuable. However, the Central European dimension of this policy should be dominant. The triangle cannot be an EEC supplement."

**Jaroslaw Kaczynski (Center Accord):** "A foreign policy is not effective if it fails to ensure security. Meanwhile, Poland is indeed under no threat at the moment, but we do not have worst case scenarios prepared."

**Trade Unions: Government Critics or Supporters**

**Solidarity for Intervention**

92EP0414A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 19,  
9 May 92 pp 6-7

[Interview with Marian Krzaklewski, chairman of NSZZ Solidarity, by Mariusz Janicki and Marcin Meller; place and date not given: "A Terrible Test of Friendship"]

[Text] In the transition to a free market system, the trade unions have found themselves in a very difficult situation. They are being accused of impeding reform, making claims, demands, and really wanting to preserve the old order, despite the fact that they have declared themselves to be different in ideology and origin. The three leaders of the largest unions talk about their relationship to the government, to economic transformations, and to privatization. They also talk about the bad social moods and the pressures from the radicalized "grass roots" union members. Are the unions, therefore, allies of reform, or are they a drag on it?

[POLITYKA] Maciej Jankowski, head of the "Mazowsze" region, said: "The situation reminds me of 1980. We do not have a partner, we have an enemy—bureaucracy and economic swindlers, supposedly our

leaders, parliament, the president, the government, the old and new shady dealers—all of them are on the opposite side." Do you agree with this statement?

[Krzaklewski] Those are strong words. I think that Maciej said them under strain. This leads to a kind of yielding to anarchy and radical expressions which help to release tensions. But we must maintain a sense of proportion. I think that in this case Maciej had genuine swindlers in mind....

[POLITYKA] Nevertheless, he names the highest state offices.

[Krzaklewski] It is hard for me to argue with Maciej, since presumably he may run against me in the next elections for chairman of the union. I do not believe in lumping all kinds of things together and looking at them the same way.

[POLITYKA] But isn't this how the union members feel?

[Krzaklewski] I would not generalize. Sure, radicalism is growing as a response to the economic situation and the government's weakness in making decisions and coming up with ideas, as a reaction to the belief that the results of the Solidarity victory are being squandered. Faced with a larger number of extreme situations, extreme statutory decisions are appearing, and even hunger strikes.

[POLITYKA] The Solidarity Club in the Sejm supported Prime Minister Olszewski's government when it was being formed, and shortly after that serious strains appeared. There was open talk about a general strike. So how is it? Is this "our" government, "yours," or whose? Isn't there some kind of schizophrenia in this?

[Krzaklewski] No, there isn't. It is the facts that were contrary and inconsistent. Prime Minister Olszewski's first speeches gave hopes for an antirecessionary and society oriented program. In his expose, Prime Minister Olszewski cited many elements of our stabilization program. Then came the dramatic price increases. This first democratically elected Sejm broke the law at the very beginning by not consulting with the unions and, without preparation, implementing a decision that was fraught with economic and social consequences.

[POLITYKA] That was presumably the legacy of the previous cabinet.

[Krzaklewski] That is unimportant. After all, it could have been a pretext for public riots. Olszewski put us to a terrible test of friendship. We passed that test. We also showed who the representative union in Poland is and focused the public dissatisfaction. Then the prime minister gave the matter some thought. He sent a letter to the meeting of the National Commission in which he officially expressed willingness to negotiate on the subject of putting energy carrier prices in order. We prepared ourselves for talks, but contrary to declarations, we hit a brick wall. What do you call this, other than deception?

Although the politicians call it a maneuver.... How, then, can other letters of this type from the prime minister be regarded seriously?

[POLITYKA] How did you respond to this?

[Krzaklewski] We came to the conclusion that we will treat other lawful conflicts with the state employer more severely and permitted a nationwide strike of railroad employees. That was the needle—let us truthfully admit. In the same way, we permitted strikes in the aviation industry.

[POLITYKA] How are relations between the government and Solidarity now?

[Krzaklewski] Despite the ostensibly good negotiating atmosphere, they are strained. Possibly a general strike will be necessary to avoid an uncontrolled social explosion. The government may also be threatened, particularly when certain of its actions, or lack of action, are taken by the people as a sign that they are being ignored.

[POLITYKA] Prime Minister Olszewski, at the Mazowsze congress of Solidarity, said that "he returned to good fiends." He clearly wanted to create a family atmosphere. Shouldn't this be regarded as an attempt to regain the confidence of the union members?

[Krzaklewski] I'm sorry to have to say this: The prime minister, in direct contacts, is very nice and polite. We appreciate this, but now other things count also. Especially since these nice gestures were accompanied by announcements of new, incremental price increases. The culture of dialogue is important, but this does not mean that we should allow ourselves to be culturally cheated. In short, such price leaps must be accompanied by direct and indirect protection measures, and the government cannot evade this. Do you gentlemen know that if we were to consistently apply a system of wage indexation which would compensate for only 75 percent of the cost-of-living growth, the average earnings in Poland today would amount to 4-4.5 million zlotys [Z].

[POLITYKA] That is an argument similar to the Z7 million retirement pension that L. Moczulski is guaranteeing.

[Krzaklewski] Not entirely. After all, all it would take is for those plants who sell their production to ease up a little on the "above-the-norm remuneration" and the situation would immediately be alleviated. At the same time, the budget would benefit by receiving higher amounts out of the sales tax.

[POLITYKA] But didn't you delude yourselves in allowing yourselves to be charmed by the prime minister? After all, we know who prepares the budget in the Ministry of Finance, that this is done by the people who think like Balcerowicz.

[Krzaklewski] Unfortunately, that is how some of our activists reason: good prime minister, bad government. And yet we know that Prime Minister Olszewski has to

approve every important decision. I heard at one of the meetings that I got a slap in the face from the government and was asked if I will turn the other cheek. No, I won't. Because this is a struggle for the future of Poland.

[POLITYKA] Does this mean that Solidarity will accept the budget?

[Krzaklewski] I think that the union club in the Sejm will have to choose between voting against it or abstaining from voting. We have to take a look at this. We will see.

[POLITYKA] Do you still notice a certain duality—a crack—in the union, consisting of the growing number of demands on the one hand and something on the order of loyalty to successive Solidarity governments? That is perhaps how the fact that officially Solidarity did not take part in the recent teachers' strikes, while at the same time many members of your union took part unofficially, can be interpreted.

[Krzaklewski] I don't agree with you that many Solidarity members took part in the Polish Teachers' Union strike, i.e., the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement]. That is an obvious untruth. Returning to the gist of the question. I personally do not sense this duality. In our disputes with the government and employers, we are fighting with both the relics of the previous system as well as with the mistakes of the current structures of authority. I must, of course, consider the fact that we are talking with a government which was formed fully democratically. And that is precisely what we must reflect upon. Therefore, this duality, once very meaningful, is now slowly disappearing. Our members say more and more frequently: How can we protect a government that does not make the elementary decisions required of the manager of the national assets. Thus the first democratic government, even among the members of Solidarity, is beginning to be perceived in terms of an adversary, and not a partner. Is this what we wanted?

[POLITYKA] The government has already announced quite precisely what the increases to the end of the year will be. Furthermore, the budget is very strained and actually untouchable, if this cabinet is to rule for a little longer. Will you negotiate these increases in spite of everything?

[Krzaklewski] Much can be done even with limited outlays if the flow of money is directed skillfully to those who really need it the most. A special protection zone must be defined, with a limit, let us say, of Z800-Z900 thousand per person in a family. On no account should this protection be denied. Furthermore, we must consider whether there are mistakes in the budget, in logic—so to speak. For example, Z600 billion is lacking for orders for aviation plants. Therefore, they must bankrupt, even though the equipment is necessary. Yet in liquidating these plants, Z350 billion must be spent for severance pay and unemployment benefits. From what I know, the liquidation of the Transportation Equipment Plant in Mielec, for example, may cost about a trillion. Can't money for production in these plants simply be

allocated from the funds for benefits and severance pay? And gradually restructure the plants?

[POLITYKA] You gave the idea for a stabilization fund, i.e., essentially a highly progressive surtax to the income tax. This would be the Robin Hood concept, taking from the rich to give to the poor. Do you believe that this is how we will build a market economy?

[Krzaklewski] At the very least you gentlemen are simplifying, and definitely you are distorting my statement and my intentions. You certainly made use of Mr. A.K. Wroblewski's article on this subject, which, to put it mildly, is untrue. Precisely. It is strange that those people who once cozied up to Lenin are now using his name as an invective. Wouldn't it be better, before putting pen to paper, to pick up the phone and call, arrange an interview, and determine what the facts are directly? Returning to the question. Gentlemen. We know that the majority of the people have reached the limits of their financial endurance. An explosion is imminent. That is why it is in the interest of those who have amassed considerable fortunes, even if they did so completely honestly, to prevent this explosion, during which they could lose a great deal in some kind of uncontrolled, anarchic process or disturbances. The danger is similar to that which existed when we created the National Defense Fund, before the war. On a different scale, of course.

[POLITYKA] Would this tax be voluntary?

[Krzaklewski] That would be determined in the course of discussion.

[POLITYKA] Between whom?

[Krzaklewski] On one side would be the financial "achievers," and on the other, the social and political voices. I received telephone calls from people who after my speech wanted to pay into the stabilization fund because they want "the police to guard them better, so that their children would have a better school to attend, so that there would be tranquility in Poland."

[POLITYKA] But Mr. Chairman, aren't these artificial devices which will distance us from market normalcy?

[Krzaklewski] And do you gentlemen know about the American New Deal of the Roosevelt days? That was an example of positive interventionism. That was necessary then, in the United States and it is now necessary here. After all, Prime Minister Bielecki agreed as early as July of last year that interventionism should be used.

[POLITYKA] Some people say that that is why we now have problems with a budget deficit.

[Krzaklewski] Precisely because this positive interventionism was not used. The lack of decisions which would shape an antirecessionary industrial policy continues. People would like to know which plants must bankrupt and which are being given a chance to survive. They will

agree to even the painful decisions, but they want something to be happening, and meanwhile almost nothing is happening. In over a thousand enterprises in Poland, the labor code is being unceasingly violated—full salaries are not being paid. There is no money either for wages or for liquidation. The situation is stalemated. It is good that under the pressure of the union there is talk about debt-reductions, about another tax policy in relation to plants. But at the moment there is only talk.

[POLITYKA] How do you rate the chances of establishing any kind of official cooperation with OPZZ?

[Krzaklewski] For a long time that organization was the mainstay of the past system, a center of opposition to reform. Let's not forget how it arose, when the directors, secretaries and patrons from the Security Service had to show that they belonged to the union as a reaction to the NSZZ "S" fight for the legal right to function. Unfortunately, I don't see any reflection about the past in this organization. That makes understanding impossible. The behavior of OPZZ and its former federations in relation to the question of the return of the material seized from Solidarity during martial law, distances us even further. In this context I will not be mistaken when I say that an ideological and political chasm divides us from OPZZ, although ostensibly some immediate social goals appear to be similar. Let me remind you that the OPZZ leadership belongs to the parliamentary bloc of former communists.

[POLITYKA] Thank you for the interview.

### OPZZ Profiled

92EP0414B Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 19,  
9 May 92 p 6

[Interview with Ewa Spychalska, chairman of All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement, by Mariusz Janicki and Marcin Meller; place and date not given: "The Seventh Prime Minister"]

[Text] [POLITYKA] How would you rate the first four months of Jan Olszewski's government?

[Spychalska] First, the declaration and actions of this government do not coincide. But most of all we see clearly that we are not dealing with anything new, but with a continuation of the economic policy of the liberals. I would even say that the talks conducted by OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement] with this government are a worse edition of those which were conducted with the Bielecki government. Despite everything, that cabinet was more open to our position, and furthermore it respected the other side and gave the impression of being a worthy partner. However, in our present talks we are dealing, to put it mildly, with the seventh prime minister. Even when our positions appear to be closer, these negotiators do not have the authority to expand the data which interest us or do not have the jurisdiction to change a provision which has been entered by one of the ministries.

[POLITYKA] But the prime minister's Sejm expose was accepted by OPZZ if not warmly, then at least with great interest.

[Spychalska] Yes, particularly those parts pertaining to the economy which promised equal treatment to all sectors, a social safety net, social justice, reduction of unemployment—or at least a halt to its growth, and measures to revitalize the economy. None of these promises was implemented, even on paper in the form of a document presented by the government.

[POLITYKA] What will be OPZZ's position in regard to the budget proposed by Olszewski's government?

[Spychalska] If the government does not change the principles formulated in the budget, then we will be categorically opposed to it, because this budget continues to pull society into a hole.

[POLITYKA] But according to the government, this budget cannot be changed. Given that, do you want this government to fall?

[Spychalska] This is our sixth government and seventh prime minister. And each has been worse than the one before. I will say no more. Furthermore, this is a budget without a program. There is no plan of action to stimulate the Polish economy, and it comes down to an increase in taxes and a reduction in expenditures, burdening society with the costs.

[POLITYKA] And what will OPZZ's response be if the budget passes?

[Spychalska] From our viewpoint, this budget cannot be passed.

[POLITYKA] But if it is passed....

[Spychalska] I believe we will not be alone if we are forced, gradually or in stages, to revise this budget "without anesthesia." Furthermore, there is talk, although I believe that such speculations are premature, about the possibility of an explosion of uncontrolled social unrest. It is true that people are paralyzed with fright, and also, it would be bad if such an explosion were to occur, if only in view of Poland's geopolitical location. This would boomerang against the Poles.

[POLITYKA] In view of that, are you planning any kind of prior action?

[Spychalska] I am not yet talking about a general strike, although we are not saying that it could not happen. But we will talk about forms of protest when we are closer to passing the budget. We can imagine a situation of public disobedience, for example, factories and physical persons withholding payments to the state treasury.

[POLITYKA] Isn't this "revising the budget without anesthesia" a sign of avoidance of responsibility on your

part? This budget has its own logic—with which you do not agree, but it is there, and your "revising" will disturb it.

[Spychalska] In speaking about a revision I am referring to both receipts as well as expenditures. In this budget and in the government's operations there are no basic instruments which would get the economy moving. There is no regulation of the banking system. It has not been defined which field of the economy deserves additional financing from the government. There is no plan to solve the problem of plant indebtedness and the payment holdups among them.

[POLITYKA] The fact is that some plants will have to be liquidated because their operation is not profitable. Will you defend every plant without regard to economic realities or will you permit the liquidation of some of them?

[Spychalska] We do not have blinders on. We know that there are plants that have no chance of surviving, nevertheless their liquidation must be based on a factual and objective analysis, and not like sometimes happens, that a decision is made to liquidate a factory and then it turns out that it was not in such a disastrous situation after all. If a plant is to be closed, we demand that action be taken in advance, i.e., to start up other economic activity in the area where a workplace is being liquidated, particularly in those places where there is only one plant and it is the one that is to be closed. Our main goal is to ensure that people have jobs.

[POLITYKA] You said that a decision to liquidate a plant must be based on a factual analysis. But after all, there will always be an expert who will say that the given firm is in bad condition. Will this not create a situation in which such plants will not be liquidated, although they should?

[Spychalska] Attempts to breathe life into an enterprise are pointless, but liquidation should be conducted in stages, just as something should be built in its place also in stages. We must admit the truth, even if the truth is bitter, but that is exactly what we expect from the government—the truth about what awaits us. We even prepared a list of questions for the government in order to learn this truth—what will happen in three months, in six months. We have not received replies to any of these questions.

[POLITYKA] OPZZ is being accused of taking an unfavorable position towards one Solidarity government after another, primarily in regard to politics, which would indicate that all of your deputies are being assigned a specific political place in the Sejm, i.e., in SLD [Alliance of the Democratic Left].

[Spychalska] Our union's viewpoints are leftist, because we represent the interests of the working people. However, we do not negate any government which will conduct policy in a rational manner. And it personally

does not disturb us that the government is now composed mostly of ZChN (Christian-National Union) representatives, if only because Christian ideology, in some matters, coincides with leftist views. What the government's activities lead to is important, and not its ideology. I would turn the problem around. It is the prime minister and Minister Kropiwnicki who said that Solidarity is much closer to them, because that is the union that they both created. And that is why they did not conceal their unfavorable attitudes towards OPZZ. This does not disturb us. All we want is that the law be respected and we want open talks with the government. It is Olszewski's government that is regarding us in political terms, and much more so than Bielecki's government. Minister Gugulski said outright that for political reasons the government should above all, and first of all, talk with Solidarity. Let it be so. We can be second, but the government cannot weasel out of talking with us, because we are the largest union.

[POLITYKA] You once said that important private entrepreneurs are not afraid of having unions in their firms. To the contrary, they often rely on them because it makes it easier for them to talk with the employees. But isn't it also true that these private entrepreneurs want unions so as to be able to control their activists?

[Spychalska] There is that danger. Formerly, the PZPR [Polish United Worker's Party] applied pressure to elect one person and not another as head of the union in an enterprise. Now a Solidarity director directs a plant along with Solidarity, the workers council, and the plant council, because they all have the same roots. And we are the undesirable ones.

There is still the future danger which you mentioned. The more we strengthen the private employer, the more important his "own" unionist will be to him. But everything depends on the people who create the unions.

[POLITYKA] The matter of Solidarity's assets: OPZZ's position seems to have eased. You said formerly that you will give back nothing, and recently you said that there is something to give back.

[Spychalska] Along with the change in the chairman of OPZZ, the position on this matter changed, as did the way it is presented to the outside. Miodowicz often said publicly that we will not give back an iota, and the reality was that a great deal was being given back. When "S" was again registered, many OPZZ organizations, unfortunately not all of them, gave Solidarity back its assets. Those organizations now have nothing to worry about. However, those who did not do this, and the law on compensation came in, are now in a very troublesome situation. A determination should have been made: What is not ours, we are returning. The chance has already passed. The compensation law, whose political goal was to destroy OPZZ, was passed. This is what President Walesa said at a meeting with us: The law was necessary and it was passed. The president promised us that he would give us his expert, so that normalcy can be

restored, i.e., we would give back the sum taken together with the accumulated bank interest, and not some sum arrived at by the legislature.

[POLITYKA] Does the change in rhetoric and OPZZ's image after you replaced Miodowicz stem from your personality or does this have a deeper dimension?

[Spychalska] In general, the change is the result of pressure from below, a pressure which applies also to personnel matters. It is not only I who sees the need for reform in OPZZ. The trend is more and more apparent. We are getting further away from politics. We want to be a strong, modern union representing strong branches.

[POLITYKA] Thank you for the interview.

### Program of 'Solidarity '80'

92EP0414C Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 19,  
9 May 92 pp 6-7

[Interview with Marian Jurczak, chairman of "Solidarity '80" Trade Union, by Jagienka Wilczak; place and date not given: "The Angels Did Not Come"]

[Text] [Wilczak] Can your good frame of mind be attributed to the fact that "Solidarity '80," which has not participated in the government thus far, is in a better position today?

[Jurczyk] I am convinced that "Solidarity '80" already this year will be one of the strongest trade unions in Poland. This is not a tea leaves prediction. It is a conviction based on facts. We are the only union that people are joining, not leaving. We are seen in the workplaces as a credible union. Our deep moral and mental comfort is due to the fact that we are clean. Our union did not discredit itself with a round table, it did not abandon the August values but is continuing them. Truth may take a long time to make itself apparent, but eventually it comes out. And in our case it is already out.

[Wilczak] What kind of truth are you talking about?

[Jurczyk] Already in February 1990 we made, strictly by ourselves, a revision to Balcerowicz's plan. Today we say with bitter satisfaction that "S-'80," an unwanted, illegitimate child, predicted correctly: that mechanisms based on monetaristic assumptions must bring about a recession.

[Wilczak] You have no problems in defining who you are?

[Jurczyk] We were, are, and will remain, a compensation-oriented union. But I want to explain: A compensation-oriented union is also a very cautious union. We must be fully aware of how much we can demand in today's times.

[Wilczak] You are combining two matters: a growth in the union's membership and its compensation character?



[Jurczyk] I think that today a union's strength depends not just on the size of its membership. There are 160,000 of us. Strength depends on the wisdom of its activists, on good organization and professional knowledge. I often emphasize that a union must have independent experts, so that it can be an equal partner in talks with the government. We have in our union several persons of the intellectual elite—professors, such as Legatowicz, Wojcik, Balcererek, and local professionals. There are more and more such people, which is optimistic. A trade union which takes upon itself a cogoverning function, becomes a political force interested in maintaining a specific configuration. Union functions hamper this. An example of this is the Solidarity union—the president's union, as we say here. The people do not like that.

[Wilczak] And you want to defend the people, not politicize.

[Jurczyk] I will say more. "Solidarity '80" is the union which is supposed to defend the country against a loss of economic sovereignty. And loss of economic sovereignty leads to loss of national sovereignty. And we have to defend the sovereignty of our nation.

[Wilczak] It is seriously threatened, you believe?

[Jurczyk] Yes. There is no party in Poland which will say: Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. President, enough of the selling out of our national assets, enough of the avalanche of scandals, enough of the destruction of the Polish economy. But "Solidarity '80" will soon say: Enough! We will not permit the destruction of the Polish economy—it is the nation's achievement.

[Wilczak] "Solidarity '80" does not approve of economic changes?

[Jurczyk] Definitely not. I already mentioned that in 1990 we had reservations as to this, and nothing has changed. I had a rather good opinion about Prime Minister Olszewski after our talk, but over the past four months my opinion changed. The prime minister promised an end to the good times for the wealthy, and nothing was done. He promised that the economic program of the two previous governing teams would be discontinued, and nothing changed. Simply the opposite. Recently, RZECZPOSPOLITA published a photograph of the prime minister, who, with hand extended, is approaching T. Mazowiecki, even though the latter should be brought to account for the ruination to which he brought the economy.

[Wilczak] But let us talk about reform.

[Jurczyk] I emphatically say that reform has gone in the wrong direction. I will give you an example: High taxes have destroyed Polish industry and agriculture. Putting the monopoly on sale of alcohol into private hands has meant that trillions of zlotys have disappeared instead of going into the state treasury. Someone had to sign this, the angels did not come down from heaven to do it. It is said of me that I am spoiling for a fight. That is not so.

There are rules and they should be observed. Those responsible for corruption and bad management should be hauled before the court.

[Wilczak] Does this mean that you are against privatization, the principles of an open market, competition? That you would prefer a gentle socialism?

[Jurczyk] I am not in favor of continuing what went on for 45 years. But a union activist judges the government by its results. And the results today are tragic. Never in Poland have there been so many suicides due to difficult living conditions. A union activist must look at how people are living. I am not an opponent of reform, but reforms must be conducted wisely. It appears from the economic assumptions submitted by the government that we are dealing more with a continuation of Balcerowicz's plan, than a departure from it. We do not agree to this.

[Wilczak] And do you have some kind of idea?

[Jurczyk] A trade union is not obliged to formulate an economic program, because it would have to have effective mechanisms with which to implement it. On the other hand, we, from a purely union position, are not able to accept reform solutions which envisage a growth in the recession and unemployment. For reform to have a chance at success, it must be based on economic mechanisms. Yet we see that it is more the political considerations than the economic ones which shape the behavior of the governing elite. For example, at one time there was an aversion to private enterprises, and today it is planned that there will be no state enterprises, even though they bring money into the treasury.

[Wilczak] And you would prefer it as it was formerly, either state-owned or no one's. That the state fulfill the role of employer, and the division between employers and employees remain unclear?

[Jurczyk] I am not an economist but I think that it is not important in whose hands the workplace is: private, state, or cooperative. What is important is efficiency. And I know that enterprises must be able to achieve this efficiency. High taxes do not make it possible to revitalize the economy. I do not know whether the government is doing this deliberately or out of stupidity. Taxation is intended to destroy these plants.

[Wilczak] Except that this production still has to be sold. This smacks to me of populism.

[Jurczyk] Those are facts. It does not bother us when someone says "populism" or "demagoguery." We say: People, apply—finally—those mechanisms which have something to do with economy. But everyone turns their head in the direction of the IMF and the World Bank, and not many people look in the direction of society. I am afraid of one thing. If the government does not give the proper direction to the economy, a public revolt is unavoidable within the next two to three months.

[Wilczak] And this smacks to me of communism.



[Jurczyk] The problem is that the state has the duty to create a social welfare policy which will protect the weakest groups. And to date, we do not even have the outlines of such a policy.

[Wilczak] How do you assess your contacts with the government?

[Jurczyk] Negatively. Why? Well, after the second congress we sent the prime minister a resolution together with a letter demanding a quick talk. To date, nothing has been agreed upon. The chairman of the radio committee ignored us completely, although after the second congress I requested 15 minutes of air time. And the president? I think this: A union activist should not be guided by ambition. Every activist has the right and the duty to judge persons holding high office. I must sadly say that I have an unfavorable opinion of the president, because I judge him by his results. That is why we decided to stop pleading, writing resolutions, and sending petitions to the government. We must apply forms of pressure. The National Commission is meeting in mid-May and will decide on the forms of protest.

[Wilczak] And who do you like best?

[Jurczyk] We judge unions by their results. What they are called is unimportant. But there is a general campaign against members of the former PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] and I am against lumping everyone together. I do not believe that 2.5 million people belonging to the Communist Party were dishonest. Left, right, center—that does not interest us. We do not take part in big policy matters. By definition, we are supposed to defend the working man. But I do not conceal the fact that we look at parties and programs. We do not yet have a clear position, but we are observing the independence parties with interest. Although I say it is still too early for declarations.

[Wilczak] Thank you for the interview.

#### **Narcotics: Statistics, Prevention, Legal Issues**

92EP0404A Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY  
in Polish No 17, 26 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Michal Okonski: "Whiter Shade of Pale"]

[Text] "I know some of the drug addicts from Krakowskie Przedmieście [a street in Warsaw] personally. In the evenings I sit in the ministry and I hear how our janitor screams, 'You drug addicts, go to hell with your damn ministry woman.' Because they come to me to get warm, drink tea, and often ask for money needed for drugs, which they get."—Krystyna Sienkiewicz

#### **The State of Possession**

About 4,000 to 5,000 persons dependent on narcotics are being treated in infirmaries run by the health service and social organizations in Poland. According to the health ministry, about 200,000 to 250,000 persons take drugs. There is no place on the map of Poland where this

problem does not show up. "Druggies" come primarily from the working classes and the intelligentsia.

Men predominate among the infirmaries' patients. More than 80 percent of them are less than 30 years of age. Nearly half are under 24.

The most commonly used addictive substances are homemade poppy products, psychotropic medicines, sleeping pills, tranquilizers, cannabis products, and so-called substitute substances—volatile chemicals, solvents, and glues. Some mushrooms and plants are being taken experimentally. In the last two years, amphetamines have begun to show up. The police and those who care for drug addicts fear that "hard" drugs from the West will quickly enter the Polish market. So far, the most commonly taken drug is "compote," which was invented by the "genius from Gdansk" and is produced from poppy straw. It acts quickly and strongly and is powerfully addictive, both physically and psychologically. Compote, which is very impure, quickly ravages the organism.

#### **History of the Illness**

Through nearly all the years of the PRL [Polish People's Republic], there were officially no drug addicts. For years, drug addicts seeking help had to rely on themselves alone. The first center for addicted youth was established as recently as 1970 in Garwolin.

In the "decadent Gierek" epoch it all broke loose. The problem became a topic of conversation for psychologists and psychiatrists. The police became interested. Krystyna Sienkiewicz, undersecretary of state in the ministry of health, who works daily with drug addiction, remembers that she found out about it at the end of the 1970's in nurse's training. In 1978, "Radiokurier" invited Marek Kotanski on its program. At the time Kotanski was still a therapist at the center in Garwolin, which was run by Dr. Andrzejewska, who today is the head of the Society for the Prevention of Drug Addiction [TZN]. "The great, positive social interest suited me," recalls Kotanski.

The changes in 1980 and 1981 made possible the creation of social organizations and societies concerned with drug addiction. MONAR [Young People's Movement to Combat Drug Addiction] was the first. It was created following the campaign in Warsaw's high schools to collect signatures for a letter on drug addiction to the marshal of the Sejm. Kotanski, who was unable to fit in with group work in Garwolin, decided to go independent. A few months later, the TZN was registered. Martial law soon interrupted its activities for two years. After 13 December [1981], MONAR was one of the few associations that were not suspended. This was perhaps the beginning of the controversy that surrounded MONAR, its treatment methods, and Marek Kotanski's public activities throughout the 1980's.

### Representative of the Weak

The list of accusations is long. It has been said that Kotanski displays his own person to excess, that drug addiction quickly ceased to be his main area of interest. His public actions, all conducted with the permission of the authorities, were subjected to criticism: organizing the Chain of Pure Hearts and anti-alcohol meetings, cleaning restrooms, planting trees, organizing the Movement of Pure Hearts. "Let's tear ourselves away from the existing organizations. Let's create a movement that at a certain moment will define itself," Kotanski then wrote. The inquisitive ask: Define itself around what? What is really hidden behind the talk of a state of sincerity, the human heart, brotherhood, honesty, and goodness? One wonders all the more because this was proposed by a man who decided to join the Consultative Council to the Chairman of the State Council. Sorcery played a part in the elections of 1989 when the head of MONAR ran for the Senate "against Solidarity," as the saying then went.

"I felt that power was validated by my actions," he now says, "but I also felt that I had no choice. After all, the reason that my association was not shut down was not that I was an informer for the SB [Security Service] or a confidant of the general. I was doing a difficult, tragic thing that was necessary.

"The goal of the Chain of Pure Hearts was to demonstrate forcefully that the problem of drug addiction existed and that to solve it interpersonal solidarity was needed. Besides, I was being blackmailed at the time. The police commandant threatened me with personal responsibility for every incident on the route.

"And the patients persuaded me to take part in the parliamentary elections. They gave money and only they supported me. I never belonged to any party or to Solidarity. I feel that I am a representative of the weak: drug addicts, people stricken with AIDS, alcoholics. At this moment, I want to found the Polish Party of Marginal People and Their Friends. I am not changing. In a new situation I am the same Marek Kotanski who goes forward and accomplishes something."

And the accomplishments are: 19 rehabilitation centers, not counting the consultation centers operating in the cities; hundreds of cured people; articulation of the problem. In a situation in which (as all those working with drug addiction and AIDS in Poland emphasize) the educational activities of the state are either practically nonexistent or plainly harmful, thanks to the activities of MONAR, elementary information on these subjects is available, at least to the youth.

### Controversy Over Method

However, questions arise as to the price. It is said that a drug addict coming to a center is subjected to "brainwashing," that he is helped to rebuild his personality by first plunging into mud. "Humiliation never yields good results, no matter who the person," says Dr. Andrzejewska. "I got acquainted with several MONAR centers and

I met people who were coming from there," adds Minister Sienkiewicz. "They are subjected to terrible pressures. A bell rings. There is a Community session and they order you to tell your deepest secrets. That hurts even more than walking about all the time in one set of coveralls, shaving one's head, or wearing a sign around one's neck with humiliating captions. I also do not like the fact that after finishing the treatment, the cured are completely unprepared for life. They know how to live only in one community."

Minister Skubiszewski is cocreator of the author's treatment center plan. There are already two centers under the direction of Father Arkadiusz Nowak. He is basing his program on "a positive conception of individual development, finding good traits in the individual, strengthening all who buried their faces in the gutter, and adjusting to life after leaving." The experience of the ministry's centers is not as long as that of MONAR, although, as Krystyna Sienkiewicz says, in the first center's two years of operations the majority of those under its care have been guided to independence. During treatment, they found work, and some even found apartments.

Kotanski answers the accusations by saying, "When you want to apply a filling, you first have to drill and clean the cavity. That is not so much brainwashing as it is washing the psyche of the person."

Treatment at MONAR is voluntary. Those who come to the center agree to established conditions and also to the strictness that has given rise to so much controversy. However, motivations for treatment differ. Often people who have been thrown out of their homes and who are physically exhausted come to the center. In winter, when the poppy season is over, they show up at the centers to make a little progress towards a cure and to put on some weight. When spring comes, they again "hit the streets."

### Self-Management

A stay in a center should last two years. ("If drugs were taken for years, one should dedicate years to rebuilding the personality," says Kotanski.) The patients, most of whom have already been physically cleansed at a detoxification center, become novices. "The novitiate begins with admission to the center. Some take it as a humiliation and sometimes it may look that way. But the person who comes is very weak. The stories of drug addicts are fundamentally very similar to one another, which permits us to look for causes. Why does one start to take drugs? If this is not grasped, the person will return to addiction," says a girl who went through the center. "The novitiate is a mass of responsibilities with practically no rights. Where I was, novices worked until five, and afterwards they also cleaned the center. All the time they work, they are observed. They wear MONAR coveralls. They cannot go out on their own or talk among themselves. Often they are required to cut their hair short. 'Show that you are committed to your cure, that you can give something up.' It is also a matter of

changing behavior. If someone wears a card that says 'I am an aggressive, filthy pig,' everyone pays attention to whether he washes and how he relates to others. The fact that there is a level with greater rights also offers encouragement."

Next in the center's hierarchy is the "housekeeper" who works until two in the afternoon. More responsibilities related to the organization of domestic life rest on this person. There are also cooks, people who organize entertainment, and a director of work. At this level, one may go out on pass and work outside the center. This stage generally lasts about 10 months. After that comes preparation for leaving. "MONAR-ists," people in the last stage of treatment, slowly disconnect themselves from domestic life. Their main goal is to take care of themselves.

Life in the center is regulated by the community, a body made up of all the residents—patients and staff. One of the women I interviewed had been in a center that had five staff persons for 30 patients. About half the staff is made up of people who are professionally prepared to work with drug addicts; the rest are neophytes—cured drug addicts with a long period of abstinence. Any of them may convene the community. There is talk of everything, and the most important issues, such as admissions and decisions to leave, are decided. The residents share information that is supposed to help them in their treatment—Your room was dirty today. Yesterday you were aggressive toward me. "This often looks like airing someone's dirty linen," says Gosia, a therapist.

MONAR's Protection Service operates in the centers. Appointed persons enforce abstinence at various times of day and night. But the majority of the people I talked to from MONAR say that their organization has become a great deal more liberal.

"I ask myself whether the centers are good. And I think they are. It is just that we inculcate in people principles that do not exist outside. They learn sincerity, but everywhere around they see lies. I think that Kotanski also realizes this, and that is where the idea comes from for Victoria-Kotan, a 'little town' in which cured drug addicts live," continues Gosia. However, there are those who see in this further evidence of the weakness of the method: Instead of genuine resocialization and a return to society, another ghetto is created, this time for the cured.

### Sickness of the Soul

"I was not the one who came up with the idea that a person just becomes a drug addict," says Krystyna Sienkiewicz. "This is a sickness of the soul. There are causes deeper than curiosity. The most important is an escape from the conditions of one's life—even when they are very good. After all, children of the establishment also do drugs."

Kotanski says, "This is the result of the lack of educational institutions and schools. This is the way young people fill the emptiness in their lives."

Narcotics may also serve as a prosthesis. It is supposed to help one manage with something that is too difficult for the psyche. Or to replace what is missing. "It is just like a girl I dealt with. Raped at age nine, she was unable to make contact with men throughout her later life. Narcotics helped her overcome her injury," says Gosia.

After a certain time, craving appears. The organism begins to need narcotics to function normally. Drug addicts "with the craving" lose weight abruptly. Spasmodic reactions begin in the stomach. After this comes the inability to take nourishment, then perspiration and salivation. The psyche is pushed aside: The organism demands that the lack be filled. The costs of acquiring narcotics cease to be important. This results in criminality, prostitution, and the growing number of drug addicts infected with HIV. "They know that this is how it will end. They know that they should not borrow needles. But that is not important. Only their craving counts," says Gosia. "In my center, a girl with the face of an angel became addicted and infected a great number of people with the virus. She now realizes this. But when she has the urge for drugs, she is just a damned egoist. What is important is that she is on drugs and that she must have some."

### In the New Order With a New Law

The situation today is different than it was a few years ago. According to Kotanski, the image of a drug addict as a gentle, innocuous hippie belongs to the past. "They are becoming pathological: They are drowning in their swamp."

On the ministry's list are 10 to 20 associations and organizations acting to counteract drug addiction. Aside from the 19 MONAR centers and the two run by the ministry, there are two centers for "glue sniffers" (people who intoxicate themselves with volatile substances) run by the TZN. A Catholic Anti-Drug Addiction Movement has been created. They also have an association of parents of drug addicts called Return from U. [expansion unknown]

Each organization is positioning itself in line for funds from the ministry. "In the first quarter," says Minister Sienkiewicz, "I had 20 billion zlotys. That is about 50 percent of the need. But how can I complain—the needs of the entire health service are funded at the same level."

It seems that society's relationship to drug addiction is evolving for the worse. Most of those I spoke with believe that this is the fault of AIDS. "It began with Gloskow," says Kotanski, "where in the presence of Bishop Orszulik and a government representative, an agreement was signed which said that no HIV carriers would be permitted in the center." Later a center was kicked out of Kaweczyn, and there were protests in Konstancin and Piastow. "The crisis is not in our favor

either. During the work on the social aid bill, it took tremendous efforts to get drug addiction included as one of the reasons for giving aid. The druggie is becoming a competitor," says Krystyna Sienkiewicz.

Every so often, big, spectacular actions are organized to draw attention to the problem. The representatives of antinarcotics organizations agree that this is not enough. There is no education in the schools, the church is not undertaking enough activities, and there is virtually no police activity. "Police officers do not intervene even when they see a drug addict who has been beaten. Without any safety devices (such as gloves) they fear the virus and panic," says Minister Sienkiewicz.

The fact that so far they have had no legal way to take action partially justifies police officers. "Even when we knew the dealer, if we did not catch him during a sale, we could not do anything to him," police officers complained.

And dealers are very well off. It has not been many years since drug addicts themselves were selling surpluses of

what they produced for their own use. Now traffic is organized. A distribution network with foreign connections exists.

The amended law on the prevention of drug addiction is supposed to hit the dealers. The fundamental change is the introduction of punishment for possession of narcotics. During the debates in the Sejm committee, nearly everyone working daily with drug addicts expressed support for this version. However, some are saying that the bill is unprecedented in its repressiveness and will lead to prisons filled with rank-and-file drug addicts. However, the authors of the statute seem to not allow for such a possibility. There is talk of trading sentences for compulsory treatment. But the centers already in existence are becoming more and more full, and they are wrestling with financial difficulties. What will happen if, after the statute goes into effect, it is necessary to accept a wave of drug addicts ordered into treatment by the courts? To that question—at least so far—there is no answer.

### Commentary Views Confederation as Unfeasible

AU0806073592 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST  
in Serbo-Croatian 20 May 92 p 2

[Commentary by Milan Jajcinovic: "Necessity or Historic Agreement"]

[Text] Once again it is demonstrated that Bosnia-Herzegovina is "the most complicated country in the world," not easily understood, particularly by the rest of the world. It is also a country in which time has been condensed—in several months more things have happened there than during the previous centuries. The latest news arriving from Bosnia-Herzegovina on the intention of entering a confederation with Croatia only confirms claims of "the most complicated" and "time-condensed," but, at the same time, gives rise to many questions.

The news that the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina have agreed to enter a "confederal relation as an international linkage of the sovereign states of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia" has had a rather shocking effect. It called for confirmation, and it was confirmed. The initial disbelief that greeted the aforementioned news was probably also the consequence of the recent curious meeting between Boban and Karadzic. However, after that meeting in Graz between the representative of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the "spiritual father" of the brutality of the Serbian Democratic Party's knaves—who have committed so many crimes against the Muslims and Croats—hardly anyone could have expected that the SDA and HDZ would come to such rapid political proximity.

By speaking of a confederation, the Muslim and Croatian national parties have actually returned to pre-election times, when there were hints to that effect. However, that possibility was abandoned for the sake of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Still, even such good intentions (particularly on the part of the SDA) did not manage to keep the ghosts of war away from Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the news on the intention of forming a confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, Karadzic and company will probably start spreading stories about how right they were when they suggested that their supporters boycott the referendum on the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Muslims and Croats apparently want to drag them away from other

Serbs and impose undesirable alliances on them. Karadzic will, without any doubt, now try to present the announced intention of a confederation as a justification for all the brutality and crimes that have been committed—an alibi for war.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is an officially recognized country. As such, it should have the right to do what it wants, including having the right to make contracts and alliances with whomever it wants. However, reality is something else. First, Bosnia-Herzegovina does not control almost half of its own territory. There is no doubt that the Serbian Democratic Party, which has been so richly rewarded by the former Yugoslav People's Army, will do all it can to keep the regions they conquered by force. What then, in that context, is the meaning of the wish of the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina to form a confederation with Croatia? Are they counting on the whole territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or only on the Muslim and Croatian cantons? If they are counting only on their cantons, then, in analogy, they have to agree that the Serbs can do what they like with their territory, even if that means confederation with the newly-formed Yugoslavia. If, on the other hand, they are counting on the whole territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, then they must defeat Karadzic's and Mladic's knaves. If they decide on the latter (as the only guarantee of the territorial integrity of the republic), then the fomenting of war is inevitable.

The results of the referendum, and the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina has been internationally recognized, indicate that the idea of cantonization has been abandoned. However, the question is whether international factors will allow the republic they recognized to enter a confederation with Croatia, against the will of the third nation, even though they had, in the first place, recognized it as independent on the grounds of the will of two nations, and against the will of the third. The principle is the same, but not those who follow it, or should follow it. As the ancient Romans said: What is permitted to Jupiter is not permitted to an ox.

Apart from these principles and their various interpretations and the confusion doubtless created in the world by this latest Bosnia-Herzegovina (and Croatian) move, it remains to be seen what is to be gained through this potential confederation by Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what Croatia stands to gain. Of course, it has to be democratically assessed to what degree their citizens agree with it.

### Solutions Sought: Reactions to Split Agreement

AU0806074692 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian  
20 May 92 p 2

[Article by Vranic, Modric, and Gojak: "Explosion From Split"]

[Text] Zagreb—At the moment, while negative reactions to the meeting and agreement between Boban and Karadzic in Graz are reaching their height in Croatia, while condemnations are heard from all sides, retouched and then duly reported by the regime media, while the leadership is giving the air of relativity to the dishonorable trade, trying to distance itself from accusations of working with its worst enemy on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the opposition, in the range of red to black party color, is accusing Tudjman and his "Herzegovinian puppets" of conducting a dangerous and hypocritical policy toward the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Muslims, all of a sudden came the explosive news from Split on the agreement between the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The news was announced on Monday evening, during the second news bulletin on Croatian Television, and it was accompanied by the reading of excerpts from the "statement" issued after the talks between "the representatives of the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

It is significant that yesterday's daily newspapers in Croatia stressed that they had the information from Croatian Television, which leads to the conclusion that there is either something suspicious about the text, or the way it became public.

Be that as it may, both sides have confirmed that there was a meeting, and they claim that it is only one in a series of talks aimed at ending the war and finding a peaceful solution to the crisis. That is the way Perica Juric, president of the Executive Committee of the HDZ, sees the Split meeting between Dr. Miljenko Brkic, acting president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ, and Irfan Ajanovic, a member of the SDA leadership. Avoiding a concrete reply, Juric claims that it was an attempt to bring closer the views of the Bosnia-Herzegovina parties to those of the EC on the solution to the crisis.

The Party of Democratic Action issued a statement yesterday, and its president, Dr. Semso Tankovic, told BORBA that the intention of the talks was to clarify some misunderstandings, discuss ways to strengthen the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Serbian and Montenegrin aggression, and coordinate all defense forces under one command. Tankovic did not fail to comment on one ambiguous sentence in the text, which many had understood to mean the forming of a confederation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. He said that there was nothing ambiguous about the sentence that both sides agreed that a confederal relation as a form of international association of sovereign states of

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia was acceptable to both the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, he said, various inferences did not enter the equation, and it was not a matter of "Croatia to Drina," nor uniting into a unitary state, nor Bosnia-Herzegovina's blending into greater Croatia. The two parties had only assessed the grounds for possible future cooperation and association of two independent and sovereign states, in accordance with their national interests and the interests of all their citizens. Confederal or similar ties based on realistic interests were possible in other countries, too. It was the European tendency, and he was sure, Tanakovic said, that the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina would follow the example, because it was in the economic, and all other interests, of that country and its people.

There have been no reactions from Croatian opposition parties. We only managed to find out the views of the Croatian Party of Rights, whose vice president, Ante Djapic, confirmed for BORBA that his party's leadership did discuss the Split agreement. Djapic said that the meeting and the agreement were a delayed reaction, forced by the situation within the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which he described as "division and head-butting." Djapic said that one part of the leadership of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ were Tudjman's puppets and are to blame for the confusion in the HDZ ranks, and particularly for the distrust felt by the Muslims after Boban's meeting with Karadzic.

Asked to comment on the statement issued after the secret talks, which had, apparently, been recently held in Split between the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ and SDA, Dr. Zdravko Tomac, Croatia's deputy prime minister, said that a confederal relation as a form of international association between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was an idea rather than reality. It could only be discussed after the war is over, and that only with the participation of the third constituent nation—the Serbs. In principle, it was constructive that the talks were held after the negative impression left, both on the Muslims, and the international public opinion, by the previous meeting between Karadzic (Serbian Democratic Party) and Boban (HDZ) last month in Graz, Austria. All those talks and agreements, Tomac said, did not exclude the continuation of talks under the auspices of the EC. However, the Split talks would have to be taken into account in future meetings between Dr. Tudjman and Izetbegovic, and eventually be added to other elements in a possible interstate defense agreement if the war continues, Tomac added. Besides, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have geopolitical links, and cannot survive without stronger ties. But, at the moment, the priority is to preserve the sovereignty of Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and only then talks can be held on customs unity, or some other form of association, including confederation.

By the way, the Split meeting seemed to have been greeted with approval by the Croatian parliament, "as a step in the right direction—uniting the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the war against a

common enemy." It is only one of the bilateral talks aimed at bringing closer the views of the three leading Bosnia-Herzegovina parties, they say. A meeting has been announced between Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic, aimed at resolving misunderstandings between the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a step by step solution to the crisis in that republic.

#### Minimum Living Standard in Macedonia Set

92BA0951A *Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA*  
in *Macedonian* 14 May 92 p 8

[Article by S. Vukchevic: "Minimum Living Standard—3,000 Denars"—first paragraph is NOVA MAKEDONIJA introduction]

[Text] Families consisting of up to five members who earn less than the guaranteed minimum of 3,000 denars per member have the right to compensation up to that amount. For single people, the minimum is 5,000 denars.

Recently, the social centers in the Republic have begun to accept petitions for compensation for up to the social-protection level for households with low individual earnings. This means the practical implementation of this year's program for the protection of the socially threatened population, adopted by the government two months ago.

Such requests will be filed with employment offices and the pension and disability security fund. Otherwise, the level of the social-protection standard applicable to no more than five members per family for this and next month has been established at 3,000 denars per family member or 5,000 denars for single people. This sum, which is considered minimal, is guaranteed for every citizen of the Republic and is based on 15 percent of the average monthly net income per worker in the economy for the past three months. The payment will be retroactive to 1 May, and the amount will be recalculated quarterly.

According to the government's decision on the procedure for establishing the right to such compensation, published yesterday in *SLUZHBN VESNIK NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA*, the income on the basis of which this right will be granted will be the one earned by all of the members of a single household, consisting of wages, pension or disability payments, monetary compensation and aid for temporary disability, children's supplements, social and other aid, income based on property and property rights, income from agriculture, income from additional economic activities, temporary work abroad, pensions, scholarships, dividends, and so on. To establish whether within a family every member has an income of 3,000 denars each, a variety of benefits are also taken into consideration, such as subsidized housing, a free garden plot, and so forth. With the submission of the request, proof must be submitted for all such income and benefits. The only thing not included as household income is bodily damage occurred

in working the land and taking care of others. If any member of a family has revenue of under the guaranteed 3,000 denars, in accordance with those rules and benefits, the difference up to that amount will be paid in accordance with the program, and those who have no income whatsoever will receive the full amount. Such payments, based on the amount of family income, may be claimed by people who are employed, by farmers, by the unemployed, and by those who are retired.

This right is denied to a household that, in addition to the house in which it lives, has another house or residence, a weekend cottage, a motor vehicle, a combine, a tractor, or detached cultivated land, or to an individual who has refused employment. According to this rule, members of households whose income is summed up in establishing the right to a subsidy includes a married or unmarried companion; children, either in or out of wedlock; a father, mother, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother, or sister; or a spouse employed elsewhere or abroad. Excluded are individuals who are performing their military service or are in jail, people who live with other families, people who attend boarding school, and so forth.

The Republic's budget will appropriate 3 billion dinars [as published] for the implementation of the program for the protection of the socially endangered population. It is estimated that this year the right to a subsidy of up to the guaranteed minimum, such as to reach the socially protected level, will benefit 48,000 households.

[Box, p 14]

#### Requests May Be Filed in Three Locations

Requests for the exercise of the right to compensation for up to the socially protected level must be filed by the unemployed through the employment offices. People who are employed and all others except pensioners must file with the Social Work Centers. Pensioners must file with the regional units of the Pensions and Disability Insurance Fund. The social work centers are already accepting requests, while the Pensions and Disability Insurance Fund will begin to accept petitions today. The employment offices will accept them beginning tomorrow. The regional units of the employment offices and the Pensions and Disability Insurance Fund must regularly submit to the proper social work center the names of those individuals who have filed for compensation in order to remove the possibility of their receiving double payment.

#### 'Difficult' Situation of Serbian Opposition

92BA0958A *Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG*  
in *German* 19 May 92 p 3

[Article by Jens Schneider: "Words for Peace—Denounced as Treason: The Serbian Opposition Finds It Difficult To Fend Off the Milosevic Regime's Nationalist War Propaganda"]

[Text] Belgrade, May—A small mistake made Vesna Pesic think a lot. "This morning my mother bought the wrong newspaper by mistake," she says. Her regular newspaper, the opposition BORBA, sometimes carries a red headline just as one of the many newspapers toeing the government line in Belgrade. By mistake the mother picked up a mass-circulation newspaper at the newsstand. "And I read there: 4,000 Serbs killed in a massacre and, of course, I am outraged," reports Vesna Pesic. "Not until a few minutes later did I notice which newspaper I was holding in my hand and some things became clear to me. If you read reports like that every day, something will always stick in your mind."

Vesna Pesic tries to understand why only so few Belgrade citizens openly oppose the war of their president, Slobodan Milosevic. "The reason is the war propaganda," she says, "the reports on atrocities against Serbs are omnipresent." Moreover many Serbs are afraid of repression. All over the country about 150,000 young men have refused military service, and many are in hiding, she says. But only a few refused openly. For they were afraid of being discriminated against as being anti-Serbian. The sociologist can tell a great deal about how fast that can happen. She herself is well known as being "anti-Serbian." Vesna Pesic heads the Serbian Peace Movement.

What she reports refutes quickly the picture of a unified Serbia, often held in the West, in which the people as a whole are not amenable to rational arguments. But her descriptions also explain why the president, who is responsible for the war and the catastrophic situation of the economy, can continue to stay in power. The socialist Milosevic does not stop the opposition and thus lets them dissipate themselves. Thus Vesna Pesic is easily able to count on 1,000 peace activists if leaflets have to be handed out or a rock concert against the war is to be organized. The biggest rock spectacle thus far, on 23 April, was attended by 50,000 mainly young people in Belgrade's inner city at the Square of the Republic. The only problems arose with a group of nationalists who lobbed a tear gas grenade into the audience during the concert. "But the singer on the stage simply continued to sing, with tears," Vesna Pesic says. "Thus she prevented a panic."

Opposition parties, too, raise their voice in Belgrade against Milosevic. Vesna Pesic herself is president of a weak reform party. The Serbian Renewal Party of the poet Vuk Draskovic and the Democratic Party have the widest following. The government does not suppress the opposition parties, at least not openly. "I don't even know whether my telephone is being tapped or whether the secret police are active against me," says Vesna Pesic. "They use us even as a fig leaf: See how democratic we are, we tolerate anti-Serbs." The real problem is the fact that the electronic media have been brought into line: State television continuously disseminates government propaganda, in which the Muslims in the Bosnian Government are denounced as drug dealers or

German politicians as fascists. "This war is also being conducted as a television war," says Vesna Pesic. "And thus we are not seen."

### Bloody Trail

Television—the outstanding Belgrade opposition politician, Vuk Draskovic, in his office outside the inner city, loudly curses the box in the corner and makes disparaging gestures even though the television set is not switched on. "This war leaves a bloody trail through Yugoslavia, many Muslims and Croats die. But the damned television shows only dead Serbs," Draskovic complains. "And you will see that, as soon as our talk is published in Germany, I will be slandered here on television." He said he will be called a traitor who got involved with fascists from Germany.

In the latest elections, Draskovic, as rival candidate to Milosevic, received the second highest number of votes. The protest against the Serb government in March 1991, when hundreds of thousands demonstrated against the regime and the socialists had the revolt suppressed, was organized around his person. At that time, Draskovic's speeches still sounded very nationalistic, but he never wanted the war. The poet with the dark beard and long, flowing hair meanwhile has moved toward the center. He charges the socialists with continuing to hold the country in their power and of having destroyed Yugoslavia with their policies. For him the solution of the Yugoslav drama still lies in the establishment of a confederation. "Slobodan Milosevic, but also the Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman, have turned down this possibility," Draskovic says. His criticism is not solely directed against Milosevic, he also attacks the foreign policy of the EC: "It is, after all, a free ticket for the Muslims and Croats if always only the Serbs are blamed for all the trouble in Bosnia-Herzegovina." But the opposition politician emphasizes that, as he sees it, the biggest mistakes are being made in his own country: "Never in its history has Serbia been so isolated; I can only hope that not all Serbs are lumped together abroad."

When Draskovic still preferred a nationalistic vocabulary, many Serbs were fascinated by his speeches which were interspersed with many mystical undertones. Meanwhile he has lost popularity; for many he has become too critical. It is not only the all-pervading power of state television which has caused trouble for the opposition forces but rather the appeal of nationalistic slogans. Whoever refuses to embrace nationalism loses influence.

As long as the war goes on, the opposition parties will hardly be able to succeed; therefore Draskovic also wants to boycott the elections, which have been set for 31 May, in the recently founded new Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. The second big opposition party, the Democrats, has also announced its boycott, but could possibly still be made to change its mind if a change to a later date were to be made and it were to be granted access to state television. At present its representatives are negotiating with the government party SPS



(Socialist Party of Serbia) in round-table talks. But the president of its executive committee, Zoran Djindjic, knows that Milosevic will hardly lose the elections as long as the war lasts. "We must not try to oust the government at any price," says the philosopher who received his doctorate in Germany. "It is like being around a person of unsound mind: All others have to act in an overly responsible manner so that the situation does not get out of control."

Coup or war of the Serbs among themselves—in Belgrade various visions of the future circulate, which

have in common only that all of them start out from the worst-case scenario. "The people here are all very nervous," says Vesna Pesic of the Belgrade peace movement. But why then don't more Serbs take a stand against this war? "Why? Why? Just remember Germany in World War II. How many Germans revolted then? And how big was the resistance in the United States to the Vietnam war?" she asks. "It is so difficult to rebel against one's own nation; it feels like treason against oneself." And she adds: "Right now it also has to be important to work for later on, so that there will really have been a protest."

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