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ABSTRACT

The post cold war world appears to be an era of unprecedented change. Nations are disintegrating in some places while in others they are forming supranational powers such as the European Union. Transnational threats such as narcotrafficking, crime and terrorism along with ecological problems, uncontrolled population growth and large-scale population migration create new challenges for the legitimacy of governments. New computer and telecommunications technologies are changing the nature and relationships of societies, nations, and economies creating new fault lines and flash points. In this turbulent environment the armed forces are called upon increasingly for operations other than war. These operations by their nature require increased coordination and cooperation among the departments and agencies of the government. In light of this increased requirement for coordination and the environment of global change it is time to assess the impact on the planner to determine if new or modified organizations or paradigms are needed to adapt effectively. This monograph uses three categories of change (co-evolution, punctuated equilibrium and tectonic plates) as metaphoric lenses through which the impact of change on the elements of national power can be assessed. By understanding the impact of the forces of change on the elements of national power we can more fully understand the environment within which the planner must operate and therefore how planners and their organizations should adapt.

This monograph concludes that a new organization should be established to coordinate the use of the elements of national power on a regional basis. Additionally, in an operations other than war environment, planning will be increasingly collaborative rather than directive and resemble a network more than a parallel or sequential hierarchical process. This collaborative process requires a shared vision established by a process-centered paradigm as the foundation for unity of effort.

THE FUTURE OF PLANNING IN A CHANGING WORLD

A MONOGRAPH

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INTRODUCTION

Change. It permeates our lives. It affects individuals, organizations, societies, nations and the world community. The forces of change can move slowly, almost imperceptibly (sometimes they can only be seen in retrospect) or they can be sudden and abrupt. The nature of change may be inconsequential or monolithic in its impact, tearing apart nations or even causing their collapse. The past ten years seem to have been a period of unprecedented and continuing change. The changes we are seeing today appear to be affecting the very fabric of societies, their governments and international relations. This paper will examine how these forces are shaping our present and future in order to understand their impact on the U.S. armed forces and the joint military planner. We must anticipate and respond to the impact of these changes. We must shape the environment where we can and adapt where we must.

Trying to determine accurately the effect of the forces of change and where they are leading us is extremely difficult. We cannot predict the future but we can describe the present. We can identify various trends emerging from the changes evident in our time. By doing this we can determine what we must do now to adapt to changing conditions and what forces we can shape. We may also estimate how the forces may shape our future.

This paper will define and analyze key forces of change using concepts borrowed from the physical sciences to help us understand the mechanisms of change. The analysis will include a discussion of the roles of technology and ideology in facilitating change. Next, using the elements of national power as a framework, we will identify how these

key forces are defining our present and shaping our future. Finally we will assess the impact of these forces on the current bureaucratic organizations and planning systems.

In order to define and analyze the forces of change it is useful to look at them in three categories. First, there are forces that can be shaped even as they are shaping us. Second, there are forces that cause change rapidly and have a lasting impact on the systems they affect. Third, there are forces that cause change slowly and over long periods of time. Three concepts borrowed from the physical sciences are useful in helping us to understand the forces of change in this regard. The three concepts are co-evolution¹, punctuated equilibrium and plate tectonics², representing respectively the forces of change we can shape as we are being shaped, the rapid and significant forces of change, and the slow acting forces of change. The boundaries of these categories are not distinct. Yet, looking through these metaphoric lenses at the forces of change we can define ways to anticipate how we might respond to the changing environment and how we must adapt to these new conditions.

CATEGORIES OF CHANGE

Co-evolution

Co-evolution “is reciprocal evolutionary change in interacting species.” It refers to the interrelationship of a species and its environment. Each shapes the other making the evolution of a species inseparable from the evolution of its environment. The evolution of the species and its environment is tightly coupled as a single indivisible process. Put another way, “evolution is adapting to meet one’s needs. Co-evolution, the larger view, is adapting to meet each other’s needs.”³

Co-evolution is a form of interactive learning that occurs over time. Just as ecology is a whole system, co-evolution is a whole system changing in *time*. "The health of it is forward-systemic self-education that feeds on constant imperfection. Ecology maintains. Co-evolution learns."⁴

There are two basic types of co-evolutionary learning. The first, adaptive learning, is "survival learning."⁵ It is learning that facilitates adaptation to environmental conditions. The second is "generative learning."⁶ This is creative learning, the impetus for change on the other part of the co-evolutionary environment. It is the creation of change that allows one to shape their environment. These forms of learning occur simultaneously and are interactive. The relevance of a response (adaptation) or an idea (generation) of change to the current environment further complicates the interactive nature of learning. What worked before may not work now and what doesn't work now may work in the future. An example of this problem is the use of military force by nuclear powers before, during and after the cold war as a means to protect or further national interests. Large scale conventional conflict conducted without the specter of global nuclear war was possible before and after the cold war but not during the cold war. The limitations placed on forces during the wars in Korea and Vietnam decreased the possibility of nuclear power involvement and the escalation to nuclear war. As the environment changes so does the relevance and suitability of solutions.

Co-evolution creates or requires a mutual relationship between two species or a species and its community (environment). "Rather than eat or compete with a competitor, the two form an alliance – a symbiosis."⁷ There is no requirement for parity in the relationship. Even if one side gains at the expense of the other, both sides may

gain over all.⁸ This mutually beneficial relationship highlights the important difference between the zero sum and non-zero sum game. In a zero sum game there is a winner and there are losers. In a non-zero sum game all can win and all can loose.

“You can’t win a chess tournament by never beating anybody. But with co-evolution -- change changing in response to itself -- you can win without beating others. Hard-nosed CEO’s in the business world now recognize that in the era of networks and alliances, companies can make billions without beating others. Win-win, the cliché is called. Win-win is the story of life in co-evolution”⁹

The advances in telecommunications and computer technologies have created new virtual worlds that are networked and “ripe for emergent co-evolution, spontaneous self-organization, and win-win cooperation. In this Era, openness wins, central control is lost, and stability is a state of perpetual almost-falling ensured by constant error.”¹⁰ In the network environment cause and effect do not occur in a linear manner. Change is interactive and simultaneous. It spreads “horizontally, like a creeping tide, influencing in round about, diffuse ways. It is as if the filters of distance and time were subverted by the complex connecting of everything to everything.”¹¹

Finally it is important to understand that whole communities can be co-evolutionary. “Any organism that adapts to organisms around it will act as an indirect co-evolutionary agent to some degree. Since all organisms adapt that means all organisms in an ecosystem partake in a continuum of co-evolution, from direct symbiosis to indirect mutual influence.”¹² The more connectivity there is, the greater the speed and quantity of information that will be transferred. This in turn speeds up and further complicates the co-evolutionary process.

Punctuated Equilibrium

Punctuated Equilibrium is different from co-evolution. It is not interactive change. Punctuated equilibrium occurs when the “environment suddenly changes and what has been the dominant species rapidly dies out to be replaced by some other species. Evolution takes a quantum leap. Natural selection, which normally works on the margins, suddenly alters the core of the system.”¹³ The best known example of punctuated equilibrium is the demise of the dinosaurs. After dominating the earth for 130 million years they suddenly became extinct. A radical change in the environment caused the dinosaurs to die off. Mammals, which could exist in this new environment, became the earth’s new dominant species.¹⁴

Environmental changes often transform earlier adaptive specialization into cruel traps. As a changing environment passes beyond the range of a gene pool narrowed and made less versatile by specialization, it often forces the extinction of whole species.¹⁵

Successful adaptation to one environment may in fact be the cause of extinction when the environment changes rapidly during a period of punctuated equilibrium.

In order to survive in a period of punctuated equilibrium, organizations are changing the way they do business at a fundamental level. In an environment of punctuated equilibrium that can quickly make organizations and their purpose irrelevant, organizations must become learning organizations.¹⁶ They are structuring and organizing themselves to exist in an environment characterized by rapid change. Reengineering and Total Qualitative Management are examples of new processes created to facilitate change and constant improvement. Total Qualitative Management rigorously traces the symptoms of an inadequately performing process back to “root causes,” highlighting an underlying problem so that it can be addressed.¹⁷ In other words TQM is focused on

improving a process. Reengineering does not merely enhance the individual steps of the process but reconsiders entirely how the steps are put together or even the creation of a new, more effective process.¹⁸

Where co-evolution was essentially non-zero sum, punctuated equilibrium is zero sum. Organizations not flexible enough to adapt to the new environment become either dysfunctional or cease to exist. The punctuated equilibrium environment is win/lose. Organizations that can best adapt to the new conditions are the new winners. The punctuated equilibrium environment differs from the slower moving environment of the tectonic plates.

Tectonic Plates

Slow moving forces of change are the hardest to understand and react to. Using tectonic plates as an analogy for the slow but powerful forces of change, we recognize that these plates are in constant motion. Their constant movement is imperceptible and their powerful movement cannot be altered. We get what we get. As World War II ended, conflicting ideologies and nuclear weapons provided two of the key forces which precipitated the cold war. The appearances of these forces caused a brief period of punctuated equilibrium followed by a longer period of several decades when these plates continued to cause change. Governments adapted their organizations, strategies, agendas and budgets to issues defining the cold war. As these plates (the slow moving but powerful forces of change) move volcanic eruptions and earthquakes occur, appearing to be immediate crises. Their causes are actually to be found in the inexorable forces of the plates.

Lester Thurow in his book The Future of Capitalism defines five tectonic plates that shape the economic surface of the earth.¹⁹ These five tectonic plates are the primary forces shaping the economic surface of our changing world.²⁰ However, these “plates” affect more than the economic element of national power. They are today’s key forces of change affecting the economic, political, psychosocial and military elements of national power.

The first tectonic plate is The End of Communism.²¹ The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War unleashed a new and powerful plate as the old plate of the cold war disappeared in the volcanic eruption caused by the destruction of the Berlin wall. The end of communism has and is causing significant change across all economic, political, psychosocial and military aspects of society. Its sudden emergence as a force of change created a global environment of punctuated equilibrium. Although it appeared suddenly, this new plate will continue to cause change for years to come.

The speed at which communism as an ideology and the Soviet Union as a nation collapsed caused rapid, fundamental changes around the globe. The defining aspects of the mostly bipolar cold war world disappeared. This required a fundamental change in our National Security Strategy. In this period of punctuated equilibrium, many countries were cast adrift as the Ideology that defined their government and economic systems disappeared. In the search for new ideologies, some countries look to their cultural and historical roots in democracy. Others turn to religious fundamentalism or cling to other notions of government that they can connect with culturally or historically.

The second plate is An Era of Man-made Brainpower Industries.²² The revolution in information technologies, especially in the area of computers and telecommunications,

has and is causing fundamental changes in the economic, political, psychosocial and military aspects of people, organizations and the world. The changes caused by these technologies have been rapid and co-evolutionary, yet they have not been abrupt. The speed and magnitude of the change is best summed up by Denis Waitley in his book Empires of the Mind when he points out that today's musical birthday card has more computing power than existed on the planet before 1950, the year he graduated from high school.²³ Tom Peters, a respected chronicler of change in the business world, captures the pervasive nature of change in a different way.

“From the Union Pacific railyard to the farm to the factory to Wall Street, information technology is altering everything. It's causing the most significant change in the way we organize, live, make war, and do politics in a thousand years. The world has been turned upside down, and the computer, along with telecommunications networks, is the engine of the revolution.”²⁴

The computer and telecommunications technologies have co-evolved with new ideas creating a shift to a knowledge-based society.²⁵ In the knowledge society the fundamental economic factor of production is not land, labor or capital. It is knowledge²⁶, with the mobility of a human being or a stream of electrons. This new fundamental economic element is not defined by location or borders as means of production used to be. Concepts such as proximity and central location mean less in an environment where communications flow at the speed of light. New possibilities and reasons for people and organizations to network are emerging, creating new grounds for commonality and division.

The third plate is Demography - Growing, Moving, Getting older.²⁷ This plate moves slowly but has significant implications for the present and the future. A volcanic eruption or a period of punctuated equilibrium might occur when populations grow too

fast, when economies are choked by entitlements as populations age, or when a massive population migration destabilizes a government or nation. Changing demographics are having a significant impact on the world. Ethnic tensions, stifling population growth, aging populations that are overburdening states with entitlements, and migrations that destabilize governments are some of the aspects that affect us today. When we add ideology as a factor to demographics the problem becomes even more difficult.

There are other factors that have aspects in plates three and four. These factors become more global with changing demographics in a shrinking global environment. The other factors such as environmental decline, food and water supplies, and disease are affecting the world both regionally and globally. Governments are having difficulty dealing with these global issues as well as regional issues, such as rain forests, that have a global impact. The UN provides only a partial solution to some of these problems. For this and other reasons transnational non-governmental organizations have emerged and are increasing in their influence and involvement in policy formulation and humanitarian assistance. The increasing influence and involvement of non-governmental organizations in the world make them an important asset and a new partner to work with in all forms of conflict.

The fourth plate is A Global Economy.²⁸ The emergence of a global economy where anything can be made anywhere and sold everywhere is causing fundamental changes.²⁹ The emergence of supranational powers like the European Union and a simultaneous increase in regionalism among the economic centers of Europe are examples of the impact of the co-evolutionary development of a truly global economy.

The emergence of a global economy is decreasing the significance of boundaries as information, goods and people move more rapidly and freely. As demonstrated by Japan and China, in this global economy size is not a determining aspect of economic or political power. The decreasing importance of size and proximity is demonstrated by increasing regionalism. This regionalism may be economic, cultural or ideological. Regionalism has no regard for national boundaries and saps the integrating power and sovereignty of the nation state.³⁰ Regionalism, in this sense, is not the grouping of nation states to form regional power centers. It ignores borders and redefines areas based on economic, ethnic, cultural or ideological commonality. In Africa, national boundaries were created by colonial powers taking little or no account of existing social, political, economic or cultural aspects of the African continent.³¹ Regionalism in Europe, for example, manifests itself with portions of France, Germany and Switzerland with common economic interests connecting their common economic regions directly to the global economy.³² The rise of Supranational power centers and regionalism is changing the internal and external characteristics and sovereignty of nation states and may require a redefinition of how elements of national power, particularly the military element, are applied.

The fifth plate is A Multipolar World with No Dominant Power.³³ With the growth of national economies since the Second World War, the size of the U.S. national debt, and the collapse of the communist threat a new multipolar world has emerged. The United States is more the first among equals rather than the leader of a unipolar world.

The new multipolar world also includes non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations with increasing political influence, transnational threats, and

multinational organizations that are gaining more power and distancing themselves from their “home” countries. Still, Madeline Albright, the U.S. Secretary of State, has described the U.S. as the world’s essential nation.³⁴ She stated that the United States is not the world leader or the world’s police force, and that the United States best understands the threats the world faces today and is in the best position to shepherd the world peacefully through this turbulent period.

These five plates representing key forces of change present the world with new challenges in a period of expanding technology and shifting ideology. In this world, there are new and different challenges. How do people make the best use of technology? Is democracy, or at least government responsible to an electorate with processes for the protection of minority rights, a universally applicable ideology? What changes will governments and societies have to make to adapt to the impact of new or changing ideologies? The start point for answering these questions is understanding the role of technology and ideology in change.

Roles of Technology and Ideology in Change

Technology and ideology provide the impetus for the movement of ‘tectonic plates.’³⁵ Understanding the interrelationship of technology and ideology and their role in change is essential for understanding the forces of change. It will help anticipate change, to adapt to change, and potentially help us to understand how to shape our environment to co-evolve with the forces of change. Technology and ideology are the hardware and software of change. Technology is the hardware. Ideology, or paradigms if you will, is the software. It defines how the technology will be used and to what extent technology’s potential is developed and exploited.

Ideology acts as a lens through which we see the world. It is the set of paradigms we use to interpret our present and guide our decisions for the future. The paradigms of our culture, religion, values, and beliefs, define how we interpret our present and make decisions for the future.

Ideology provides a unifying force for societies and cultures. It is the basis for a sense of community that people search for. The collapse of an ideology, like communism, causes some nations to search their cultures and their past for ideologies they believe will provide solutions for the problems they face today and return them to a time when their nation or culture flourished.

Technology and ideology co-evolve. As with a computer, to make the best use of the technological hardware, you must have the right ideological software. The drive to achieve closure with the desired ideological software drives technological innovation. Similarly, improvements in ideological software can facilitate more effective and efficient use of technological hardware, even creating new uses for existing hardware.

However, technology alone is not sufficient to cause change. To cause change technology must be linked with an idea that works. The Aztec Indians, for example, had developed the wheel but used it only for children's toys never for transport of people or equipment.³⁶ Similarly, fifteenth century China had all the technologies for an industrial revolution but did not have the right ideologies to cause it.

China invented all of the technologies necessary to have the industrial revolution hundreds of years before it occurred in Europe. At least eight hundred years before they were to occur in Europe, China had invented blast furnaces and piston bellows for making steel; gunpowder and the cannon for military conquest; the compass and rudder for world exploration; paper, movable type, and the printing press for disseminating knowledge; suspension bridges; porcelain; the wheeled metal plow, the horse collar, a rotary threshing machine and a mechanical seeder for

improving agricultural yields; a drill that enabled them to get energy from natural gas; and the decimal system, negative numbers, and the concept of zero to analyze what they were doing. Even the lowly wheelbarrow and the match were used centuries earlier in China.³⁷

Thus, change can result from an interactive relationship between existing technology and a new ideology. Using existing technology in different ways is the equivalent of using different software for the same hardware. This allows for innovations in use or new capabilities when combined with other ideas or technologies. Napoleon Bonaparte's new ideas for conducting warfare created a period of punctuated equilibrium among the nations of Europe. With the same technology as other European nations, he created an Army whose superior size, organization, agility and fighting ability, gave him a decisive advantage over his adversaries until they adapted to his new form of making war.³⁸

Ideology alone can be the engine of significant change. Religion, acting independently of technology, has had a profound effect on societies and cultures. The rise and spread of Christianity, Islam and the various eastern religions, has shaped societies, governments and international relations in many historical periods. These ideologies have shaped the experience of cultures and nations and in some cases such as the Middle East today define perceptions and actions.

Ideology and culture also co-evolve. This is most easily seen in the case of religion and ideology based essentially on a faith system of interpretation. Christianity and Islam have co-evolved with cultures creating various forms of these religions aligned with varied cultural norms. Different forms of Buddhism in Japan, Tibet and China are also examples where religion and culture have co-evolved.³⁹ There are implications for this concept in the execution of our National Security Strategy. The Enlargement of

Democracy is not as simple as demonstrating that democracy works, or that it is a better form of government. There must first be a connection with cultural norms or national history to facilitate social understanding and acceptance. The implementation of democracy may require a co-evolution of cultural norms and the ideological concept of democracy.

It may be said that the only certainty these days is change. Societies and institutions that cannot cope with change become dysfunctional or fail. To cope with change we must shape the environment. If we are to adapt to change we must first understand the how the key forces of change affect us and, where possible, how we can affect them. Our ideologies and paradigms will define our ability to use technology and to shape and adapt to the forces of change.

Using the paradigm of the elements of National Power (Geographic, Economic, Political, Psychosocial and Military) to assess Thurow's tectonic plates, we expand our view of change and its impact on societies, nations and the world.

The elements of National Power are interrelated, each affects the others. The issues that face governments today are complex and interdependent. The complex and interdependent nature of these issues affects the way nations interact and it affects intragovernment planning, coordination, preparation and execution. The forces of change defined by Thurow's tectonic plates are also complex and interdependent. Examining key aspects of these forces of change and how they affect societies and nations will help us understand their impact on the global and national political, military and psychosocial environment, and the impact on planning organizations and systems to respond to it.

ECONOMIC

The collapse of the Soviet Union appeared to some as a great victory signaling the end of the cold war. To others it was the death knell of a bad ideological and economic system. It was both of these and more. The shock waves created by the end of the cold war and the end of communism created a period of punctuated equilibrium reverberating throughout the world unleashing forces which are causing global reordering and restructuring. These forces are influenced and shaped by the other plates moving us inexorably into a future that we must be able to anticipate so that we can adapt effectively. Nations who fail to adapt to the new environmental, social, economic and technological changes will become extinct, or irrelevant, as have many species, which did not or could not adapt to their environment.

As communism collapsed 1.9 billion people entered the world's capitalist economic system.⁴⁰ Tremendous amounts of cheap and, in some areas, well educated labor became available. New markets and new competition were added to the world economy. China, at least in the coastal "economic zone," appears to be making significant economic progress. The countries of the former Soviet Union on the other hand seem to be having a very difficult time adapting to the global economy. Their massive armed forces, once some of the largest and most powerful in the world are now having trouble feeding themselves. This would not be as significant a problem for the United States and other nations were it not for the large number of nuclear weapons under the control of an army on the verge of disintegration. This situation may create new problems and requirements for armed forces to prevent the proliferation or

uncontrolled use of nuclear weapons. The instability of these emerging countries makes the future uncertain and potentially dangerous. The fault lines and pressure points may become situations requiring the use of military force to provide the stability necessary to permit growth.

In the United States the population continues to age as the baby boomers continue to close on retirement. As middle management and jobs that defined middle class America continue to shrink new domestic problems present new challenges. Entitlements such as welfare, medicare, pensions, social security, and other social programs already in trouble, will become choked by a surge of growing poverty and a growing body of retirees dependent on pensions, medicare and social security, will increase the burden on a budget already strained by deficits. The desire to maintain the social contract with the aging population will make tax increases or the budgets for governmental agencies and departments look very tempting as a source for dollars. It would not be unreasonable to expect the defense budget to continue to shrink.

Economically, the importance of proximity and central location has decreased as long as connectivity is maintained. The computer and telecommunications technologies facilitate network organizations that usually have no hierarchy and depend instead on sharing information of common interest. From an organizational planner's perspective transnational threats such as terrorist, drug and crime organizations, are often best approached using a network model since there is often little or no hierarchy in these organizations.⁴¹ When one part of the network is removed, the network adjusts to fill the gap. The rise of regionalism, that is, regional groups organized around common

economic, cultural or ideological interests, is greatly facilitated by the combination of the new technologies and the shift to a knowledge based society.

The mobility of multinational corporations and capital will continue to increase as economies and capital continue to become more global. The increased mobility of multinational corporations and capital will decrease the traditional sovereignty of nations that are used to having stable industries within their geographic boundaries. Nations will find it increasingly difficult to impose their will on multinational corporations or businesses that can move to more favorable conditions, taking their jobs with them.⁴²

All of this will affect the government/military planner to some extent. Yet, hot spots caused by changing global economic conditions, taking the form of population migrations, failing or failed nations, as well as national and regional conflicts will affect planners and their organizations to an even greater extent.

POLITICAL

The cold war, in time, intensity and duration, was a defining event. Following the world's worst wars, it pushed the political and military elements of national power toward to the forefront of domestic and international relations.⁴³ The world was in many ways bipolar. Communist socialism and democratic capitalism formed two opposing camps with non-aligned nations standing on the sidelines. Nations aligned themselves along the ideological lines defined by the cold war.

The cold war defined the relative importance and relations among the government's departments and agencies. In response to the nuclear threat, and the

hegemonic threat posed by the Soviet Union, the United States government became militarized in its outlook and focus.⁴⁴ The State Department, Defense Department and Intelligence Agencies, played the primary role in policy formulation and the conduct of international relations.⁴⁵ The National Security Council “became the government’s main steering mechanism” for the formulation and coordination of policy.⁴⁶ In “1953 the military accounted for more than 60 percent of government outlays and more than 12 percent of the Gross National Product” and remained a dominant consumer of federal government discretionary funds through the Cold War.⁴⁷ The Department of State played a central role in the formulation and execution of policy as exemplified by its instrumental role in drafting NSC 68. The threat of nuclear war, Soviet hegemony and communist ideological expansion, put the Department of Defense on the frontiers of democracy in an effort to contain the communist threat. The primary collection efforts of our Intelligence agencies were focused on getting vital information for the State and Defense Departments.⁴⁸ Can a government, forged by the environment of the cold war, adapt to and shape the new global environment? The answer to this question will determine our future.

The end of the cold war brought with it a need to change the policy guiding the actions of the United States. The policy of containment is no longer relevant in today’s period of punctuated equilibrium. With the loss of our cold war enemy, the foe against whom the “free world” united, forces that had been pent up for decades were unleashed. Cultural, religious and ethnic regionalism, as forces of change, are having greater impact. Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union disintegrated. Islamic fundamentalism became

a dominant social and cultural force in the Middle East shaping international relations and foreign policy. As Jessica Matthews points out:

The end of the Cold War has brought no mere adjustment among states but a novel redistribution of power among states, markets and Civil Society. National Governments are not simply losing autonomy in a globalizing economy they are sharing powers – including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty – with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups, known as non-governmental organizations (NGO's).⁴⁹

Changes caused by technology, changing economies and the loss of communism as a unifying ideology have created a new and uncertain world. A new strategy was needed to help shepherd the turbulent world through a time of massive transition. This strategy is defined in our National Security Strategy; the Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. We have to look at our world through a new lens, a lens taking full account of the new and changing world.

The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement can be seen from a co-evolutionary perspective. Although it is a strategy based on a win/win philosophy, it does not ignore the win/lose situations inherent in state to state conflict. In light of this the planner must reassess the purpose of forward basing. For example, from a regional perspective our presence in South Korea is most useful today as a stabilizing force limiting conventional and nuclear arms races that could destabilize the region thus creating an unfavorable economic and political situation in North East Asia that would have global ramifications. Our presence in Korea is a result of the cold war policy of containment. In the post cold war era our presence there and in other places must be validated under the strategy of engagement and enlargement. Our presence in a region may no longer be necessary. If our presence is necessary it is probably for a

different reason than during the cold war. In an unstable and changing world our presence is most likely to be beneficial for providing a stable environment that fosters economic prosperity and cooperation.

While our policy of Engagement and Enlargement can help shape the world it cannot determine the future. We cannot control the forces of change but we can shape the environment (to an extent) in which the forces act. A new win/win National Security Strategy has replaced the win/lose strategy of containment. Planning organizations must take full account of this change and the impact it will have on the multipolar environment in which plans will be developed.

Today's multipolar world places the political and economic elements of national power at the center of domestic and international relations. The relationship and relative importance of the departments and agencies of our government are changing in this new environment. International and domestic economic issues are at the center of national attention. In the domestic area, concerns such as entitlements, education, economy, drugs and crime are also at the forefront of our government's and the media's attention. In this multipolar environment, the most prominent and powerful agencies may well be the Departments of Treasury, State, Agriculture, Labor, the Interior, and Commerce.⁵⁰ Other agencies and departments may increase in importance as our government continues its focus on fighting transnational threats. Although the Department of Defense will continue to play an important role it will not be the defining role in government as it was during the Cold War. Without a credible and palpable threat, defense budgets are likely to continue to shrink as international and domestic economic concerns drive policy and budgets.

For the planner this means more missions and fewer resources. Units may well have contingency plans tied to three different continents, for different purposes, making it difficult to maintain a high degree of readiness for any one specific type of mission as was possible during the cold war.

In a multipolar world with no dominant leader, shifts in power are also taking place. Regional unions of nations are increasing their economic and political influence in global trade and politics. Transnational forces are growing and the response to these forces is creating new organizations to deal with in military and humanitarian operations such as non-governmental organizations. An important shift is that non-governmental organizations are becoming increasingly influential in the national and international policy development processes. In addition, multinational organizations, increasing economic, religious and cultural regionalism are eroding the sovereignty of the nation state. Political-Military alliances, which formed the bulwarks against communism, have to adapt to these shifts in power or continue to lose sovereignty. These shifts in power further complicate intragovernmental planning.

At the heart of this shift in power is increasingly affordable and accessible computer and telecommunications technologies. These technologies broke governments' monopolies on the collection and movement of information.⁵¹ Moreover, the requirement for physical presence is reduced as information, ideas and money are moved around the globe at the speed of light. The importance of proximity is reduced drastically as is the time available to plan, prepare and execute operations.⁵² The impact of these technologies is hard to predict. They may divide society along new lines, or separate

ordinary people from elites who possess the wealth and education to command technologies' power.⁵³

The technologies are fundamentally changing the structure, organization and operations causing the disruption of hierarchical organizations as well as increasing the responsibility, authority and power of the individual team and process oriented organization. The network, a relatively new organization with no person at the top and no center, has become a significant player in the international arena. Networks of individuals or groups are linked for joint action without building a physical or formal institutional presence. They have multiple nodes where collections of individuals or groups interact for different purposes making them difficult to find and deal with. Governmental bureaucratic hierarchies in their present form are residue from a previous era and are incompatible with all that the new technologies make possible.⁵⁴

The sovereignty of the nation state is eroding in today's multipolar environment. Since World War II the nation state has steadily been losing its position as the sole organ of power.⁵⁵

Nations are uniting to form supranational economic and political power centers such as the European Union. As these supranational powers are evolving, additional forces are causing changes within nation-states.⁵⁶ These forces are having a tremendous impact on the sovereignty of nation states as well as the nature of international relations. Technological advances in telecommunications have increased global interdependence making transnational threats such as terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation, the environment, narcotrafficking and failing states the key international issues which dominate the attention of all government's and media. The growing influence of

multinational organizations, transnational threats, growing regionalism, and the growing involvement of non-governmental organizations in international relations are fundamentally altering the nature and sovereignty of nation states. The computer and telecommunications revolution are the technological foundation for this fundamental change. These changes alter the nature of the elements of national power and the application of national force.⁵⁷ A closer look at these forces of change affecting the sovereignty of nation states will provide a better understanding of their scope and impact.

Transnational threats

Significant threats to global and national stability in the form of transnational forces are increasing. Secretary of State Madeline Albright has called transnational threats the greatest security threat we face today. Although these threats cut across the political, economic, military and psychosocial elements of national power, due to their impact on the political order both nationally and internationally these threats will be analyzed here. Because these threats involve all elements of national power, planned responses must be reached through closely coordinated actions by the departments and agencies of the government and inside the various international fora. Old bureaucratic processes and solutions must be discarded or changed or they will become irrelevant. New process oriented organizations, such as Joint Interagency Task Force – East, are forming in order to address transnational threats. Narcotrafficking, crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environment, population growth and migration are perceived to be dangerous threats to national sovereignty and security, as well as a government's legitimacy.⁵⁸

Narco trafficking and crime undermine the legitimacy of governments. These threats corrupt and subvert legal and political systems as political and military leaders are corrupted and the social contract is broken. In extreme cases, such as Columbia and Mexico, the national fabric begins to unravel. Narco trafficking and crime are just as dangerous to national sovereignty, legitimacy and survival, as any invading armed force. The method of destruction is different. Instead of destroying from without in a contest of wills the nation rots and disintegrates internally as legitimacy and national will are dissolved from within.

The tremendous increase in the amount of goods and the number of people routinely crossing borders in the new regionally organized economies, places pressures on controlling agencies to ease inspections and reduce paperwork. Drug cartels have become global industries, taking advantage of the “largely unregulated multi-trillion-dollar pool of money in supranational cyberspace, accessible by computer 24 hours a day,” making it easier to transfer large amounts of illegitimate money into investments in legitimate business.⁵⁹

Global crime requires nations to pool their resources and efforts and require unprecedented cooperation with the private sector. The police and the military are the two traditional responses that states have for physical threats. These traditional responses are not adequate by themselves to address these complex transnational threats. The CIA, DIA, FBI, Customs, USIA, and USAID to name a few must work together in a time sensitive, interdependent environment in order to fully address these complex problems.

Terrorism is a destabilizing transnational force. The motivations are typically political, attempting to force or prevent some activity or to destabilize some

government by attacking their legitimacy directly or indirectly. Improvements in telecommunications have increased the speed, breadth and impact of terrorist actions. The threat to citizens and the perceived inability of the government to deal with terrorist attacks erodes the legitimacy of the government. Issues that affect peace in the Middle East may also involve the United States as a key player making the United States an effective, even lucrative target for Middle Eastern terrorists.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and conventional weapons, also has a destabilizing effect. When connected with other transnational threats, such as crime, narco trafficking and terrorism, their effect is magnified. Additionally, proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons has the potential to touch off regional and possibly even global arms races. Arms control, and prevention of transnational forces acquiring conventional or mass destruction weapons, is a critical piece of national, regional and global security.

Since transnational threats typically involve more than one nation and do not 'belong' to any nation, a single nation's resources are not enough to attack the problem.⁶⁰ A further complicating factor involved in addressing transnational threats is the problem that these threats involve multiple elements of national power and therefore multiple government agencies. Thus, transnational threats must be addressed in a multiagency and multinational environment. Our current organizations and planning systems, forged by the cold war, are too slow and cumbersome to combat flexible and agile transnational threats.

Since transnational threats do not belong to any particular nation, interaction between these threats and a nation or region does not fall neatly into normal intrastate or

interstate interaction around which governments are organized. Additionally transnational interactions require coordinated anti-terrorist, anti-drug, anticrime, intelligence, state, commerce, treasury and military involvement to attack or resolve. Separate actions by agencies and departments of the government are ineffective. There is a pressing need for the structure of the government to adapt to post cold war conditions. The National Security Council, or an organization like it, must not only promulgate and coordinate policy formulation and advice it must actually coordinate and supervise the planning and execution of activities among agencies and departments of the government. Requirements for action will arise and require execution inside of budget cycles. The “new National Security Council” must also have a discrete budget to fund the execution of actions that do not fit within budget cycles, thereby creating a new balance within branches of national governments.

When considering the multidimensional nature of these transnational threats it is essential to consider the nature of time. Tracking and seizing narco-traffickers requires timely, shared information, and coordinated action. Tracking a drug shipment or trafficker may require near real-time intelligence. Timely sharing of information among intelligence, law enforcement, customs and military forces, are essential to allow a coordinated response. Stovepipe bureaucratic organizations are ineffective in this environment.⁶¹ They simply cannot act quickly and effectively enough.

Joint Interagency Task Forces, East, South and West, were established to provide timely and effective action against narcotrafficking. These interagency task forces are composed of appropriate Department and Agency representatives empowered to coordinate programs or activities and take action when called for. Without this

empowerment, their organizations would be largely ineffective. Yet these organizations are not enough to address the full problem. Supply sites and the customers must also be addressed in order to ensure an effective and comprehensive response. Addressing the supply and demand of drugs also requires close interagency and interdepartment coordination since the problems and solutions are outside the purview of any single agency or department. Timely and effective action against transnational threats is complex and multidimensional. Solutions cannot be achieved using standard bureaucratic organizations and methods, they are too slow, too cumbersome and unidimensional.

In order to address transnational threats the government must adapt, creating process-specific organizations that address all dimensions of the problem. Transnational forces are a threat to our people and our national security. The armed forces with their broad range of skills and multidimensional capabilities will be an important contributor to solutions for transnational threats. As the military experience of this decade indicates, the armed forces can expect to be involved in more missions of different types than ever before. The armed forces are the only executive expeditionary element of the government. We can be confident that the armed forces will continue their involvement with transnational threats. Still, interagency and interdepartment coordination is an important component for military action against transnational threats. The requirement for timely coordination and interdependent execution implies that we may need to reassess the way we plan, prepare and execute missions.

Regionalism

Regionalism is a phenomenon that is both intrastate and trans-state. Like transnational threats, regionalism affects the sovereignty of the nation state but in different ways and by different means. Regionalism is a phenomenon related to groups identifying themselves primarily by common economic interests, culture, religion, ethnic origin, or ideology rather than with a particular nation state. Again, telecommunications and computer technology have made size and proximity less important. These technologies facilitate rapid sharing of information and the ability to connect everything or everybody to everything else or everybody else with common interests or agendas. Local economies or businesses can link directly to the global economy where money and information have become transnational. Regionalism is a powerful force of change that can be benign or devastating. As Peter Drucker has written,

It has torn asunder Yugoslavia in bloody civil war. It threatens civil war all over the former Soviet Empire. Scots want to secede from the United Kingdom; Slovaks demand autonomy and separation from the Czechs; Belgium is torn by strife between the Flemish and the French-speaking Walloons. Tiny local groups, though never discriminated against, demand "cultural autonomy...."⁶²

There are several other factors contributing to the rise of regionalism. The reasons are not so much political or economic as they are existential.⁶³ People need a sense of community, they need to feel anchored in a changing transnational world.⁶⁴ They need roots that are geographic, linguistic, religious, and cultural. They seem to need to feel that they are a part of a community "which is visible to them and which, to use an old cliché, they can 'get their arms around.'"⁶⁵ With size and proximity of decreasing importance some of the pressures that encouraged assimilation are gone.

Regional groups can maintain cultural and political independence and still be integrated economically.⁶⁶

The changing economic environment is encouraging regionalism. As global trade increases and national borders become more porous the “patterns of commercial and cultural interaction are reappearing in regions where people have more in common, culturally or economically, with their neighbors across the border than with their fellow countrymen.”⁶⁷

Europeans, as a community, are finding it hard to define interests.⁶⁸ The role and purpose of national governments is also beginning to blur. During the Cold War the common interest in collective security provided a foundation for legitimacy. Trying to define national interests in terms of economics is more difficult. Wealthy regions can connect directly to the global economy making national governments less important or in some cases an obstacle in the form of regulations or taxes that sap economic strength.⁶⁹ The co-evolutionary interaction of these wealthy regions in Western Europe is “creating super-regions – large economic zones that transcend national boundaries.”⁷⁰

Regionalism saps the nation-state’s integrating power.⁷¹ A nation’s perceived inability to maintain the social contract will cause a loss of legitimacy for the nation and indirectly strengthen the region.⁷² This is not to suggest that the region is replacing the nation state as a political entity, only that the power of nation state is becoming more diffuse. While regions are increasing the scope of their responsibilities and capabilities they are reducing the load on national governments.⁷³ The shift of power we are witnessing is a local co-evolutionary adaptation to the conditions of the post cold war

world. National governments and their planning systems will have to adapt or their ability to govern will be diminished further.

Non-governmental Organizations

Non-governmental organizations are not new to the international arena but their increasing numbers and their impact on economic, political and military activities certainly is new. In military operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti, Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC) were established to coordinate, among other things, the actions of the non-governmental organizations and military operations in order to harmonize their efforts with the military's and vice versa. A challenge for military operators is that non-governmental organizations do not work for any nation or any higher headquarters. Their presence arises from their own interests. As a result, they must be co-opted in order to provide safe, coordinated actions. This was accomplished in Haiti by providing superior information that gave them the ability to be at the right place at the right time.⁷⁴ The relationship between the military and various non-governmental organizations is a network not a hierarchy. Each element of the network is acting in its own interests based on shared information and capability.

Non-governmental organizations can be very influential. Ibrahima Fall, head of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, in 1993 pointed out that, "We have less money and fewer resources than Amnesty International, and we are the arm of the U.N. for human rights, this is clearly ridiculous."⁷⁵

Today NGOs deliver more official development assistance than the entire U.N. system (excluding the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). In many countries they are delivering the services – in urban and rural community development, education, and health care – that faltering governments can no longer manage.⁷⁶

Although they erode national sovereignty through their influence and participation in national and international affairs, non-governmental organizations have an ability to address many complex global and regional issues. During this period of post cold war transition non-governmental organizations are proving themselves to be capable of responding to new demands and opportunities quicker than governments.⁷⁷

Internationally, non-governmental organizations can out perform many national governments in the delivery of many public services. Because they are perceived as an honest broker non-governmental organizations are in a position to help “strengthen the fabric of the many still-fragile democracies.”⁷⁸

Non-governmental organizations can deal with issues that governments have difficulty addressing especially the slowly developing regional and global threats like environmental degradation. They are also invaluable for addressing issues involving health, environment, drugs, population growth, and food shortages. Additionally, non-governmental organizations can provide an ear to concerns that people feel their government is not addressing and they can even represent governments at international negotiations.⁷⁹ The computer and telecommunications revolution will strengthen the momentum of non-governmental organizations continuing the expansion of their influence and making them more capable of large scale activity across national borders.⁸⁰

Non-governmental organizations have many strengths and they can be very valuable in today’s dynamic global environment. Their strengths aside, non-governmental organizations are special interest groups motivated by common interests on issues, not profit. Each non-governmental organization is focused on its own interest and as a result suffers from tunnel vision. Because they are typically small and have limited

budgets their capacity for large scale efforts is limited.⁸¹ As they grow they will need larger budgets. Their need to maintain large operating budgets may compromise the “independence of mind and approach that is their greatest asset”.⁸² Unlike states non-governmental organizations cannot impose order and cannot tax to raise revenues for operations.⁸³

Supranational Powers

The formation of supranational power centers is relatively new. These power centers are evolving in North and South America, the Pacific Rim and most notably in Europe. They are more than traditional alliances. They require the fusion of nations’ elements of power. These supranational powers are not superstates whose government replaces the national governments. They create regional governing agencies whose decisions and powers are binding on the nation state with respect to particular activities – most often economic.⁸⁴

Supranational powers, like the European Union (EU), have their own elements of power, which replace traditional elements of sovereign governments. The European Union is a political and economic union with a military arm, the Euro-Corps, and a populace that increasingly sees itself as European rather than any specific nationality. The incentive for European unity is economic. European countries, with a history of conflict, have made significant progress toward creating a powerful political, economic and military union. There are many issues to resolve but the economic potential of the European Union, with a potential population close to 500 million, is vast. The success of the EU will provide an example for other Supranational powers to emulate. These regional unions will most likely have the economic base to fund large, modern and well-

equipped armed forces if they choose to do so further complicating the planner's life. Whether movement from economic to military or other forms of integrated activity will succeed remains to be seen.

Multinational Organizations

Multinational businesses have been in existence for many years. The computer and telecommunications revolution is changing their nature and their relationship with their countries of origin. Joint ventures, the ability to transfer large amounts of money almost instantaneously, and offshore banking, all combine to disconnect the multinational corporation from the nation and its interests. If economic conditions are not favorable where such firms are located, they can move operations elsewhere, moving jobs and tax revenues with them. Governments can place limits on the mobility of multinational corporations in today's competitive global economy. However, if businesses are not competitive in their locations they will be minimized or shut down by their competition. In either case, whether they move or are shut down, the effect on the local economy is the same. Multinational corporations and their wealth no longer really "belong" to any nation.⁸⁵

The national and international political environments are changing. New and varied threats to a government's legitimacy and power, as well as an erosion of the nation state's sovereignty, are changing the dynamics of interstate and intrastate relations. Transnational threats in forms that require new approaches and a continuous, coordinated focus over time will place new demands on government organizations to adapt and become more flexible, more agile and more integrated. The environment for addressing

transnational threats is multinational and includes non-state actors as well as an increased requirement for rapid interagency and interdepartment coordination. For planners and planning organizations this means co-evolving with an increasingly complex environment developing new organizations and methods to adapt to change.

PSYCHOSOCIAL

Consider the slide from the peak of the Roman Empire to the bottom of the Dark Ages. With the onset of the Dark Ages (476 to 1453), real per capita incomes fell dramatically from their imperial Roman peak. The technologies that allowed the Roman Empire to have much higher levels of productivity did not disappear. No malevolent god forced man to forget during the following eight centuries of uninterrupted decline. The rate of invention was actually up from the Roman era. Output was down despite those new and old inventions. The devil appeared in the form of social disorganization and disintegration. Ideology, not technology, began the long downward slide.⁸⁶

The fall of communism as an ideological system has sparked a period of punctuated equilibrium. Many countries were cast adrift as the ideology that defined their government and economic systems disappeared. After generations of effort to make the communist ideology work, it has proved to be unworkable. Former communist countries are now searching for another ideology that can unify their people by defining a national vision and purpose. The cold war had a defining effect on non-communist countries as well. The threat posed by the expansion of communism and nuclear war provided a common vision that unified people and nations. The unifying force of an outside enemy is gone. "Societies now need some overarching goal toward which everyone can be working to create a better world."⁸⁷ Societies can unite in resisting an outside threat, in the desire for conquest or in a common effort to realize the promise of a better future.⁸⁸ Without a unifying vision "any society will eventually retreat to ethnicity.

The social system will be held together by focusing anger on some different and despised minority that needs to be 'cleansed' from the land. Eliminate those with a different religion, a different language, or a different ethnic inheritance, and somehow the world will magically be better."⁸⁹

The impact of the fall of communism is magnified today by social changes caused by advances in telecommunication and computer technology. These technologies not only affect the sovereignty of the nation state, they affect the relation of people with their government in ways we are just beginning to understand. The challenge is further magnified by the changing national demographics. The ideologies and paradigms of the cold war should be replaced by new ones more relevant and capable of unifying nations and capable of unifying nations in the age of the 'knowledge society.'

The U.S. National Security Strategy promotes the enlargement of democracy as the ideology that can provide a peaceful and prosperous global future. Successive U.S. administrations have focused on the spread of human rights and a U.S. vision of democracy in an effort to make the world more prosperous and peaceful. This vision of democracy began to expand in southern Europe in the middle 1970's, Latin America in the 1980's and in many parts of Asia, the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Africa in the late 1980's and early 1990's.⁹⁰

These successes were followed in some areas by democratic stagnation and retrenchment. This backsliding has been most pronounced in the former Soviet Union, Africa, and the Middle East. Several former Soviet republics have made genuine democratic progress since the U.S.S.R.'s dissolution in 1991, but in 15 states, pluralism was still born or is losing ground. In some countries, elites have been able to

reconsolidate their rule after initial democratic successes because of the political and economic resources they command and the weakness of fledgling opposition forces. In other cases the initial success were “highly controlled and top-down, reflecting ruling elites’ desire to relieve rising pressure of change or to impress Western governments rather than forge a commitment to cede significant authority.”⁹¹

There are no absolute rules or conditions for societies to embrace democracy. A nation’s government must be appropriate for the people, social organization and culture. Historically, democracy seems to need at least three conditions to flourish. First, a high literacy rate in the population. Second, a developed and well off middle class. Third, the government and the armed forces must have a good relationship.⁹² Other factors are helpful, such as experience with multiparty politics and other democratic practices, location in a region that looks to the Western industrialized countries for social and political models, or a nation that seeks integration with the West.⁹³

There are several implications for the armed forces for the implementation of the current National Security Strategy. Intervention in a failed state must consider the form of government desired as the endstate. Armed forces can provide the stability necessary to get a nation back on its feet but they cannot fix problems with literacy, and the development of an economy in a short period of time. The ability to hold elections doesn’t mean that democracy has been established.⁹⁴ Creating the conditions necessary for democracy to flourish requires close multi-agency and multi-department coordination in planning and execution and most importantly, time. Non-governmental organizations can be tremendous assets in helping to create the conditions for democracy by providing assistance, expertise and a non-state honest broker.

Democracy may not be desirable or even possible for some nations and cultures. Adopting democratic capitalism in a country with no cultural or historical roots in democratic institutions is a major leap. Countries such as Albania are searching their cultural and national histories for connections that provide precedent, legitimacy, and commonly understood values to help make the transition to democratic capitalism.⁹⁵ Religious fundamentalism, nationalism, and cultural retrenchment are glues that nations and ethnic groups have reached out for in order to provide a common purpose and vision for their lives and their nations.

MILITARY

The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the loss of a concrete, visible threat to focus on and organize against. Our National Security Strategy during most of the Cold War was focused on forward basing, accomplished through a military strategy supported by the other instruments of power, with the purpose of containing the communist threat. The end of the cold war necessitated a new National Security Strategy. The President's National Security Strategy provides a framework to shepherd the nation and the world through the difficult and turbulent post cold war period. The strategy of Engagement and Enlargement places a focus on force projection, symbiotic (win/win) rather than adversarial (win/lose) international relations, and the enlargement of Democracy as a national system of government. In executing this new strategy the military essentially supports other instruments of power. Although our armed forces will continue to play a key role in negotiating the uncertain times ahead, it will primarily be in support of rather than supported by other instruments of power. Over the long term we must maintain the capability to fight and win against a strong and determined enemy, unseen now, but likely

to emerge in an unsuspected form in the next ten to twenty years. In the mean time, we must continue to take on new and diverse missions relating to Engagement and Enlargement as well as national and regional stability.

Changes in the National Security Strategy naturally lead to changes in the National Military Strategy. The focus of our armed forces changed from forward based ready forces to force projection of flexible force packages. The end of the cold war meant not only that a new National Military Strategy was needed, it also meant that we lost the monolithic enemy that provided the threat against which we planned, organized and equipped ourselves. Our armed forces changed from threat based forces to capability based forces. At a time when our armed forces are dominant in the capability they are designed to achieve, they may be creating vulnerabilities to asymmetric threats.

At the same time our military strategy was changing, the armed forces began receiving new and a greater variety of missions. Peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions have increased in number and scope. Armed forces' involvement in counter narcotics, counter terrorism and counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is relatively new and increasing in scope. Countering transnational threats and participating in operations other than war require closer coordination among government agencies and departments than was heretofore the case. The downsizing of our forces, the increasing number of multinational operations, and the rise of non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations create new challenges and new environments in which our armed forces must operate. The pace, spectrum, number and locations of missions are greater and more varied at a time when we are downsizing.

Wars are defined by the conditions that create them. They can be blundered into or entered deliberately. The unstable world conditions that exist today lend themselves to operations other than war. Although in most areas of the world the conventional threat seems to be reduced for now, we must maintain our readiness to fight a conventional war of some size. As the global situation stabilizes and nations begin to look beyond their borders more closely they may wish to develop the foundations to support conflict. The friction and hot spots caused by global and regional competition will increase the possibility that conventional wars will happen again.

With the shift from a threat-based force to a capability-based force we must also recognize that we do not know the specific purpose for which we are creating our military capability. The capability we are creating may not be appropriate for the threats we may face in 15 or 20 years. The problem of identifying a palpable and proximate threat will make it more difficult to justify large expenditures of money in a time of constrained resources. Additionally, the missions we will most likely execute in support of the National Security Strategy in the near term (primarily against transnational threats and for regional or national stability) will be in addition to the more conventional missions we must maintain our capability for in the long term. In other words the armed forces will have to prepare for more missions with fewer resources. These missions result from the United States being called upon more frequently to execute missions such as nation assistance, counter-terrorism and insurgency, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, internal security, refugee management on a colossal scale, development assistance in deteriorating situations, environment damage assistance, disease control and disaster relief, famine relief, and drug-control assistance.⁹⁶ The

military element of national power is insufficient to handle these missions alone.⁹⁷ They require solutions that involve all elements of national power. Engaging the elements of national power and focusing them on a situation requires the involvement of the agencies and departments that embody those elements.

During the Cold War, Unified Commands were working with multiple agencies of government, but then the focus was the warfighting strategies to counter the Soviets.⁹⁸ In a peacetime environment where operations other than war are dominant the CINC “represents only one of many government agencies operating throughout his area.”⁹⁹ The CINC must plan on a regional basis to meet the demands of his Area of Responsibility.

Regional planning and operations involve all the elements of national power and, by extension, the many agencies of government that are outside the military chain of command. In the post-Soviet military era, unified commanders routinely operate in a peacetime environment where large-scale combat in the traditional theater of war does not apply. This is a multiagency environment, where cooperation is essential, but it is also defined by competition for recognition and resources.¹⁰⁰

Operations Other Than War require multiagency cooperation. In this environment armed forces are used primarily to provide a secure and stable environment for assistance and nation building. In a situation where multiagency coordination is ineffective the armed forces may find themselves doing civilian tasks such as rebuilding justice systems, establishing police forces and jails, fixing utilities and facilitating the creation of trade. The armed forces have proven that they can accomplish these missions in places such as Haiti and Bosnia but other government agencies and departments are better suited and could be more effective.¹⁰¹

Further complicating this environment requiring multiagency cooperation is the need for multinational operations, coordination and cooperation with non-governmental

organizations and the requirement for a continuous planning, execution and feedback system. Although multinational operations help to spread the burden across several nations, they provide a complex environment for mission execution. The lack of common goals, language, equipment and doctrine present challenges for planning, preparation and execution for everyone involved in multinational operations.

Non-governmental organizations are present in all forms of conflict but are especially prevalent in operations other than war. These organizations provide valuable assistance in many forms. Gaining their cooperation is difficult since they are autonomous and prefer to maintain their objectivity and neutrality. When co-opted the potential of these organizations and other participants can be synchronized. USACOM has conducted exercises that included the participation of non-governmental organizations.¹⁰² These exercises provided a valuable forum for all participants to understand the needs and capabilities of all actors and established a foundation for future cooperation.

The environment of operations other than war is certainly complex. With the involvement of multiple departments and agencies, non-governmental organizations, and possibly all of this within a multinational framework, it becomes necessary to assess how the armed forces should work within this environment. The "military must act in support of, and in concert with, other agencies. Interagency cooperation is therefore essential to smooth policy implementation."¹⁰³ During peacetime different levels of activity from various agencies and departments at different times will be required. For example, Departments of State, CIA, Commerce, USIA, and USAID may be involved initially with limited participation from Defense in the form of SOF. If the state collapses, or is in

danger of collapsing, larger participation by the armed forces and other agencies will be necessary. Additionally, as in the case of Bosnia where Hungary, Italy and Germany were needed for support operations, actions will have to be coordinated on a regional basis. Up to now this paper has focused on how key forces of change affect elements of national power. These forces of change are defining a new, more time sensitive and interdependent environment. The impact of these forces on planning and the related systems and organizations must be assessed. Failure to adapt to this new environment risks failure or loss of relevance.

THE IMPACT OF CHANGE ON PLANNING

Planning and executing operations at the national level in an operations other than war environment has four basic requirements. First, someone must be in charge with the power and authority necessary to direct activity.¹⁰⁴ Second, the organization must have the power to act bilaterally or regionally. Third, the organization must be process centered and include representation of all participants. Finally, clear objectives and a process centered paradigm that provides the framework for collective action must be established.

“The problem of “who is in charge?” still vexes interagency efforts.... The executive and legislative branches have not seen fit to provide interagency leadership routinely with direct control over the resources necessary for interagency operations.”¹⁰⁵ There are three approaches for putting someone in charge of a multiagency organization that exists to tackle operations other than war missions. The first is legislation. The second is identification of a lead agency. The third is empowering an interagency working group under the purview of the National Security Council.

The 1993 Presidential Decision Directive for Counternarcotics, though not strictly legislation, provided the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy the authority over interagency processes that consists “of developing, coordinating and implementing international counternarcotics policies, strategies, and programs.”¹⁰⁶ At the national level this effort could provide a model for other missions such as peacekeeping and nation assistance.¹⁰⁷ At the regional level in South America, however, this effort did not solve many of the interagency and interdepartmental problems. Counternarcotics efforts in the Andean Ridge were undermined by a failure of the Department of Defense, the State Department, the Drug Enforcement agency and agencies responsible for intelligence collection and analysis to coordinate adequately with one another.¹⁰⁸ The primary causes of the coordination problems “can be traced to legitimate differences in their respective institutional missions, attitudes, and operational approaches, which seem to prompt almost inherent conflicts between and among them.”¹⁰⁹ Using legislation is certainly a useful approach. This approach does have potential shortcomings at the regional level since it would require legislation appropriate for a dynamic, changing environment. Establishing a useful foundation of legislation in such a dynamic environment would be extremely difficult. Relying on legislation alone appears to require a cumbersome process at multiple levels to “enforce” coordination, support and commitment.

A second approach is the “lead agency”. The designation of a lead agency with directive authority over other agencies or the appointment of a regional coordinator for strategic functions is a presidential prerogative.¹¹⁰ Civilian agencies don’t have the planning systems or organizations to provide the necessary direction, integration and

execution of major operations.¹¹¹ While the identification of a lead agency does place someone in charge, without the expertise and resources of other agencies, it is difficult to maximize the capabilities of all agencies and departments. Additionally, parochialism and the legitimate differences in the agency's respective institutional missions, attitudes, and operational approaches will prompt inherent conflicts between and among them.¹¹² The parochialism of a lead agency may also lead to the problem that people tend to approach problems and define solutions to problems in terms of the way they have been trained by their organization to solve them.¹¹³ In other words solutions will sub-optimize the capabilities of participating agencies because those defining the solution do not fully understand how to integrate other departments and agencies to effectively synergize the efforts of all participants. Consider the following alignment of departments and lead agencies for counterdrug operations.

Department	Lead Agency for:
Department of State	U.S. assistance funds for counterdrug programs.
U.S. AID	Sustainable assistance in host nations.
Department of Defense	Detection and monitoring and communications infrastructure.
Department of Justice (DEA)	Investigations
Treasury Department (Customs)	Aerial smuggling and detection and monitoring aircraft.
Transportation Department	Maritime interception.
Intelligence Community (National Drug Intelligence Center, El Paso Intelligence Center, CIA, NSA, DIA)	Intelligence.

Figure 1: Lead Departments and agencies in the counterdrug effort.¹¹⁴

How can synergy be achieved among these “lead agencies”? Even if there is an agency or office in charge, how will they operate at a speed that can match the drug lords

when responsibilities and actions are 'stovepiped' and coordination is inhibited by bureaucratic walls? This type of organization may be called "task centered," that is, it is an organization where tasks are compartmentalized into responsible organizations whose charter it is to deal with a specific aspect of a problem.¹¹⁵ The problem with this type of organization is they are "inflexible not because individuals are locked into fixed ways of operating, but because no one has an understanding of how individual tasks combine to create a result, an understanding absolutely necessary for achieving effective results. The problem lies not in the performance of individual tasks and activities by each agency or department, but in the overall processes, how the agencies and departments fit together into a whole."¹¹⁶

Today's complex environment demands that agencies and departments be capable of working both bilaterally and regionally. U.S. Ambassadors are in charge of synchronizing all U.S. capabilities within a single host country. However, some military mission areas, such as those associated with Bosnia, extend beyond single countries and are inherently regional in nature.¹¹⁷ In addition:

...beyond the Department of Defense, few government agencies enjoy a system of strategic planning with which unified commands could correlate their efforts. The Joint Strategic Planning System of DOD knows no counterpart in the civilian agencies, where 1-year planning horizons are typical. Even the global operating areas of the Departments of Defense and State, the Agency for International Development (AID), the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Information Service do not precisely coincide. In the theaters, the CINCs find that the U.S. Ambassadors' country teams are not aligned to operate on a regional basis, making regional coordination difficult.¹¹⁸

A process-centered organization is one that is focused on results achieved through a process that combines the tasks through an overarching framework of activities.¹¹⁹ The focus is on the value of the results achieved not on who is executing what task. The

emphasis is on teamwork since members better implement something that they have helped construct rather than something that has been imposed on them.¹²⁰ When searching for a process-centered organization a seemingly obvious choice is the National Security Council. There are, however, some shortcomings in the current organization and authority of the National Security Council.

The relative power and role of the National Security Council is at the discretion of the President. Traditionally, the vital functions performed by the National Security Council Staff are; administration, crisis management and all aspects of policy: coordination, integration, supervision, adjudication, formulation and advocacy.¹²¹

The supervision function is of great importance, but it must not be confused with an operational role for the NSC Staff. The Staff has neither the expertise nor the size to execute policy decisions made at the presidential level; nevertheless, sometimes problems with policy implementation within the departments create pressures for the Staff to assume an operational role.¹²²

The National Security Staff is small and although they are expert in security, the staff has no authority to implement policy. The National Security Council system of committees and coordinating subgroups seeks policy consensus. Additionally, the NSC process and staff organization are not designed to execute policy decisions in the sense of coordinating interagency operations afield.¹²³

Instilling unity of effort at the national level is a necessary but elusive goal. Beyond the policy formulation role of the NSC, an interagency organizing structure is not available for overseeing integrated operations in the field. Until a national interagency system and process is considered desirable and put in place, the function of multiagency integration to support regional objectives will reside in a good offices of the separate government organizations: the State Department as the lead for foreign policy overall; Drug Enforcement Administration for a specific counterdrug operation; the unified commands for a military contingency; and so on.¹²⁴

A proposal by former CINC USACOM Admiral Paul David Miller recommends that Interagency Action Groups be established to manage the execution of policy.¹²⁵ These Interagency Action Groups “would implement presidential policy decisions in such areas as nation assistance, humanitarian assistance, disaster assistance, and countering illicit drugs.”¹²⁶ These Interagency Action Groups would be most effective if they are process-centered. The size, shape and membership of a process-centered organization is determined by its purpose. Beginning with the purpose (the policy objectives) and the situation (i.e. the environment – regional issues, multinational mission etc.) the organization is defined by working backward. This process is first an adaptation to the environment and policy objectives. The organization then co-evolves with the situation as it changes using the policy objectives as the guiding vision. In other words the organization is a learning organization that both causes change and adapts to change as a continuous process.¹²⁷ Prior to defining a planning model let’s first consider the planning process.

The doctrinal planning process described in Joint Pub 3.0 is designed to be executed in a sequential or parallel manner that is seemingly suitable for a hierarchical organization. This process is still in use for the development and validation of formal plans based on potential future conflict in places such as Korea. This type of planning is based on assumptions that define conditions that are expected to trigger conflict. Anyone would be hard pressed to name two operations in the last decade where ‘on the shelf plans’ were used ‘as is’ to execute operations. Even in the case of Just Cause and Desert Storm, existing plans were significantly modified in order to be relevant to the existing operation. Considering the number of operations conducted in the last decade perhaps a

more relevant process for planning should be considered. This is especially necessary when we consider the changing nature of the world today and the increased requirement for multinational operations and operations other than war that require increased interdependence among departments and agencies.

In today's changing environment the operational planning process being used to produce plans for execution is not sequential or even parallel; it is collaborative and 'networked.'¹²⁸ In the collaborative process hierarchy of headquarters is of less importance. Plans may be developed from the bottom up. Plans for higher headquarters may be done by subordinate headquarters and then slightly modified before approval by a higher headquarters. In essence the subordinate headquarters defines the details of its role and objectives based on a shared understanding of an overarching vision. There is no evidence that the change in the relationship of headquarters in the planning process was deliberate and foreseen. It appears to be the result of an adaptation to the conditions that define today's environment of change.

There are several reasons that planning is not conducted in a sequential or parallel manner. First, in many cases, the timing of political decisions can cause a compression of the time available from mission receipt to execution. Crises, elections, consensus building, multiple nations requiring agreements of purpose, method and end-state (such as the Dayton Accord), and news events that arouse public outcry for action are all examples of why time for planning and execution may be compressed. Second, and this is especially true in operations other than war, the levels of war are compressed. Two recent examples highlight this compression. On the strategic end of the spectrum SHAPE has experienced a cultural change. The SHAPE Crisis Response Center has been

converted into a Current Operations Center that monitors and coordinates day to day operations in Bosnia and partnership for peace operations throughout Europe. On the other end of the spectrum is the emergence of the 'strategic soldier.' The 'strategic soldier' is a term coined to define the strategic impact a single soldier at a check point or election site can have in today's world of mobile media armed with advanced telecommunications and computers.

When strategic considerations have a tactical impact, and tactical considerations have a strategic impact, lines of responsibility and authority blur causing the planning process to become interdependent among the various levels involved. In such an interdependent environment the plan must be derived from the situation as it exists and modified as the environment changes.

The interdependence caused by the compression of the levels of war also occurs among the elements of national power. All elements of national power are engaged in achieving the overall end-state; the strategic vision. To reach the end-state each element of national power must support the other. In the case of Bosnia the armed forces cannot be content to meet the requirements of Annex 1-A of the Dayton Peace Accord and then declare success. The armed forces must provide the needed stability and, to the extent possible, support the achievement of goals in other areas just as other elements of power must support the achievement of military objectives. Success is achieved by reaching the desired political end-state. In operations where Centers of Gravity are more likely to need building rather than attack and destruction, the armed forces will take on new missions and support other elements of national or international power to an even greater extent.

Multinational environments further complicate the planning process. This is due to the fact that nations will continue to maintain final approval on the level of commitment, involvement and activities their forces will undertake. Among the nations involved in Bosnia, planning is almost a negotiation. Time is needed for coordination with home governments and the right balance must be found for each nations level of commitment and willingness to participate. In a multinational environment a chemistry of trust provides the binding power for the multinational operation. Because nations reserve the final say on what their forces will and will not do, unity of effort is probably the best we can achieve towards unity of command.

If planning is interdependent, collaborative and at times bottom up then the role of the higher headquarters is no longer to 'tell' subordinates what to do or how to do their job. Headquarters are already adapting to their new environment. There appears to have been a shift from directing and instructing toward facilitating and enabling. The higher headquarters now functions more as a facilitator, approver/appraiser, forecaster, adviser and enabler. The role of facilitator helps to clarify the strategic vision, goals and objectives. As approver and appraiser the higher headquarters ensures coherence of purpose and unity of effort toward achievement of the strategic vision. The role of forecaster provides a common picture or context pointing out emerging trends and a higher level perspective for political, cultural and international issues. As an adviser the higher headquarters provides feedback from their perspective identifying possible support and obstacles. The higher headquarters sets conditions in its role as enabler. In the enabler role they assist the achievement of goals by coordinating resources and actions to enable mission accomplishment.¹²⁹

With the changing nature of the planning environment in mind let's turn to the process-centered model for planning. The model must include several important elements. First it must provide a strategic vision to focus effort. Second, it must facilitate unity of effort by identifying where we are and where we are going thereby creating a common understanding that allows effective collaborative planning. Third, it must help to define the relative role of the elements of national power to assist unity of effort among agencies and departments. Within the context of shaping, responding and preparing; agencies and departments can take appropriate action coordinated in the appropriate forum. For example forward deployment of forces may help shape the situation and would require economic and political involvement to execute. Responding would include department and agency functions of intelligence, airlift, communications, logistics and infrastructure development. Preparing would include diplomatic, economic, information requirements (in the context of psychosocial power) as well as military activities necessary to be capable of accomplishing the strategic vision. Finally, when considered within the context of the overall situation the model should assist the definition of decisive points and execution mechanisms. Decisive points may be holding elections, establishing a police force, a judicial system, a stable environment for resumption of local economic activities or other actions that will help reach the strategic vision. Execution mechanisms include forcing functions such as Joint Military Commissions, liaisons with factions, Civil Military Operations Centers, information campaign, engineer plans, meetings of principal players (governmental and non-governmental), compliance assessments and normality indicators. Additionally, the model must recognize that categories of peacekeeping and peacemaking are not rigid and

that we may slide easily from one to the other while ensuring that missions and resources are linked.

A paradigm, or framework for collective action, in the process-centered Interagency Action Group responsible for planning and execution would have policy objectives as a guiding vision and key transition points as nodes.

The process-centered model in figure 2 can be used as a framework for interagency coordination. It is a simple, basic model that could be refined to fit




Figure 2: Process centered model¹³⁰

a specific situation. The OPLANs shown in the figures could be base OPLANs, branches or sequels. This 'road map' provides a common picture of where we are and

where we want to go. The intention is to show the paths or process that will get us to our strategic vision. Recognizing that we can only influence and not control situations; the paths, indicated by the arrows, represent where the use of the elements of national power including information operations would be used to achieve a solution.

The nodes, represented by the boxes, indicate key transition points where the type of operation and therefore the techniques for the application of power typically changes. For example the transition from peace enforcement (G) to peacekeeping (H) requires armed forces to execute different missions or the same missions differently. Recognizing that this transition occurs will help other elements of national power become engaged in the nation building process at the earliest possible opportunity and in a coordinated manner. For example, once stability is established, police forces, judicial systems and basic services can begin to be rebuilt by the agencies or departments most suited to the task. Objective criteria can be established that defines conditions to be met before civilian agencies would begin active nation building.

The arrows that indicate paths are double headed. This is important since situations can 'backslide' from peacekeeping (H) to peacemaking (G). The double arrowed paths indicate periods where the elements of national power would be applied to prevent or facilitate movement to the next desired transition point. For example, information operations, agricultural assistance and military training may be used to stabilize a situation (D) preventing a crisis from occurring (E).

Each node or transition point represents a change in the situation great enough that an Interagency OPLAN, OPORDER or FRAGO should resynchronize actions.

For example, when a crisis (E) occurs and intervention (E) becomes necessary the OPLAN for intervention would be executed by the Defense Department, the CIA and the State Department, each coordinated and mutually supporting in their execution.

From the perspective of synchronizing the elements of national power, this framework suggests that in the event we must intervene that there are diplomatic, economic and information actions we can take to set favorable domestic, national (in subject country), and international (regional, U.N., non-state actors) conditions.

Although we may not be able to forecast all aspects of a crisis situation we can better anticipate, in a coordinated manner, what might happen and what actions should be prepared for in advance to facilitate rapid, timely and effective action.




Figure 3: Interagency Action Group's relationship to the National Command Authority, National Security Council and Ambassadors.

For this model to have utility on a national level, a process-centered organization such as an Interagency Action Group should be established with the proper representation, budget and authority to plan, coordinate and execute assigned missions.

The Interagency Action Group would be part of the National Security Council organization. It could be chaired by the Drug Czar in the case of a transnational threat such as narcotrafficking, or perhaps by a regional ambassador in the case of a regional requirement. A regional ambassador would synchronize the regional employment of national resources and coordinate the efforts of involved ambassadors. The nature of the operation would define the level at which the IAG would be formed. It could be formed at the sub-cabinet level, the assistant secretary level or the working group level. The composition of the IAG would be tailored for the situation and would be flexible enough to add or delete members as necessary. For example, an assistant secretary of defense may be a key member if more than one Warfighting CINC's area of responsibility is involved. Two or more areas of responsibilities may be involved in the case of Israel and Arab nations, or in the case India and Pakistan.

For Joint and Unified Command planning organizations this means that interagency planning in a region will most likely be accomplished by their organizations. In addition to the dearth of equivalent planning systems and organizations in civilian agencies and departments there is another obstacle to be overcome for effective interagency planning and execution. A civilian department or agency that, for example, begins planning an intervention as a contingency before the president makes the decision to intervene may cloud or disrupt actions in the

international environment when it is perceived that the president has already made a decision. For these reasons when it comes to operations that require interagency planning and execution the Joint or Unified Command planning organizations become the government's contingency planners.

CONCLUSION

Looking at the forces of change through the lenses of punctuated equilibrium, co-evolution and tectonic plates facilitates an understanding of how these forces are defining our present and shaping our future. In a world of continuous change we must learn how these forces are affecting us and determine what we can shape and where we must adapt. In other words we must co-evolve with our environment.

The co-evolutionary relationship between technology and ideology will continue to fuel change. These changes, particularly those caused by the telecommunications and computer technologies, will continue to be an engine of change in our turbulent world. Governments, whose organizations and structures have been defined by the cold war must adapt to this changing global environment or become dysfunctional and possibly fail. The requirement to adapt to significant change comes at a time when governments are faced with new threats and challenges.

Nations face an erosion of national sovereignty. Transnational threats enabled or made more effective by new technologies require close cooperation among government agencies and departments, as well as among nations, for effective action. Supranational organizations, regionalism and non-governmental organizations are also eroding national sovereignty and changing the environment in which international relations are conducted.

Rapid population growth, ethnic conflict, environmental problems, migration, famine and other challenges further threaten the stability of nations and regions around the globe.

Until the world stabilizes or a near peer competitor (such as a recovered Russia or a stronger, more aggressive China) appears and provides us with a serious conventional threat to organize against, our armed forces must remain capability based. In the interim, our armed forces will continue to be primarily involved in intervention operations as the United States continues to shepherd the world through these turbulent and changing times.

The planner's world will continue to change and co-evolve. The changes that affect us today are impacting on the role, requirement for, and use of military force. As these aspects of military force co-evolve in a changing operational environment the process of planning preparation and execution will adapt to the needs of the environment. Changing time horizons and the increased probability of multinational operations present new problems to planners and organizations. Additionally, operations other than war present an unfamiliar environment for organizations trained to conduct conventional operations. Levels of war are compressed increasing the interdependence among the elements of national power. This requires increased interagency coordination throughout the planning and execution process. It also requires a mechanism or organization to direct and orchestrate their activity.

Until Admiral Miller's proposal "or a similar proposal to supplement the NSC system is adopted, military commanders must recognize that the integration of multiagency capabilities for field operations is unlikely to be done by interagency groups in Washington or elsewhere."¹³¹

In an environment that demands interagency coordination, planners must possess a broader range of knowledge. They must understand the capabilities of each agency and department and be able to synchronize the overall effort. They must be able to work effectively in a collaborative planning environment, anticipating the needs of various headquarters while integrating important aspects of each element of national power into the overall plan.

In an unfamiliar environment, the planner must be able to impose situational structure in the form of a mental model, a paradigm, which provides a common basis for communications and action. Most importantly the planner must be able to plan with little guidance or time. This requires a shared vision that may already be defined or must be established in an interactive manner between departments, agencies and the National Command Authority. Without a shared vision to provide focus and a mental model as a common basis for communication and action, unity of effort will be serendipitous at best.

The Interagency Action Group or an organization like it would be invaluable for coordinating the actions and activities of the government's agencies and departments in the quest for unity of effort. The post cold war environment, in conjunction with advances in telecommunications and computers, have established the need to adapt. In addition to organizational changes, control mechanisms are needed to assist the agencies and departments with 'systems thinking' and building a shared vision.¹³² The policy end-state provides the shared vision and the process-centered model provides a mental model for thinking systemically about the approach and solutions for the problems we are facing. A shared vision and systems thinking through the process-centered model can

provide planners with a valuable set of tools for operating in an interdependent and collaborative environment. In light of this we need to reassess the role, structure and methodology of campaign plans.

The armed forces can be expected to continue to be the government's executive expeditionary force. The unique capability and versatility of the armed forces makes them the right tool in a turbulent and changing world, even if the missions are not the traditional, conventional ones many would prefer. Until an organization or process is established to orchestrate the execution of operations demanding close interagency and interdepartment coordination, the armed forces will continue to be the default contingency planner for the government. This will be inefficient and cumbersome. However, building a shared vision through a common process-centered model will reduce the friction and turbulence caused by inefficient organizational structure. The process-centered model, the Interagency Action Group, mental models as a common basis for communication and action, shared vision for focus, and an organizational structure appropriate for the environment of change we face today are the tools we need to adapt and co-evolve with today's dynamic global environment.

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¹²⁷ Senge 3.

¹²⁸ Personal notes taken during briefings and roundtable discussions at SHAPE, European Command, AFCENT and the ARRC, April, 1997.

¹²⁹ Caela Farren and Beverly L. Kaye, "New Skills for New Leadership Roles" in *The Leader of the Future: New Visions, Strategies, and Practices for the Next Era*, eds. Frances Hesselbein, Marshall Goldsmith, Richard Beckhard (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996): 178-181.

¹³⁰ Conway, Colonel, USMC, J-5 Plans, USACOM, adaptation of briefing slide presented during visit to USACOM. 9 December 1996, Norfolk Virginia. The original version of this framework was used to describe a framework for a campaign plan and how subordinate OPLANS as well as branches and sequels could be derived using this process-oriented model.

¹³¹ Mendel, 16.

¹³² Senge, 10.