

110142

JPRS 82803

4 February 1983

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 2103

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT B
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

19971230 075

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

QUALITY INSPECTED 8

12
137
A07

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

JPRS 82803

4 February 1983

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 2103



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 6

JPRS REPORTS

Japan Report
Korean Affairs Report
Southeast Asia Report
Mongolia Report

Near East/South Asia Report
Sub-Saharan Africa Report
West Europe Report
West Europe Report: Science and Technology
Latin America Report

USSR

Political and Sociological Affairs
Problems of the Far East
Science and Technology Policy
Sociological Studies
Translations from KOMMUNIST
USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology
World Economy and International Relations
Agriculture
Construction and Related Industries
Consumer Goods and Domestic Trade
Economic Affairs
Energy
Human Resources
International Economic Relations
Transportation

Physics and Mathematics
Space
Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine
Military Affairs
Chemistry
Cybernetics, Computers and Automation Technology
Earth Sciences
Electronics and Electrical Engineering
Engineering and Equipment
Machine Tools and Metal-Working Equipment
Life Sciences: Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences
Life Sciences: Effects of Nonionizing Electromagnetic
Radiation
Materials Science and Technology

EASTERN EUROPE

Political, Sociological and Military Affairs
Scientific Affairs

Economic and Industrial Affairs

CHINA

Political, Sociological and Military Affairs
Economic Affairs
Science and Technology

RED FLAG
Agriculture
Plant and Installation Data

WORLDWIDE

Telecommunications Policy, Research and
Development
Nuclear Development and Proliferation

Environmental Quality
Law of the Sea
Epidemiology

FBIS DAILY REPORT

China
Soviet Union
South Asia
Asia and Pacific

Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Latin America
Middle East and Africa

To order, see inside front cover

EAST EUROPE REPORT
 POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 2103

CONTENTS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Political Attitude of Students Criticized
 (Frantisek Fejar; TVORBA, 17 Nov 82)..... 1

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

SED's 1982 Foreign Policy Postures Reviewed
 (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 30 Dec 82, NEUES
 DEUTSCHLAND, 29 Dec 82)..... 5

West German Commentary
 SED Journalist's Assessment, by Werner Micke

POLAND

Olsztyn Province Party Activities Noted
 (GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA, various dates)..... 14

Plenum Party Tasks, by Adam Bartnikowski, Wieslaw
 Bialkowski
 Plenum Resolution
 Plenum Preparing for Province Conference

Emigre Daily Cites Bujak Statements in Underground Press
 (DZIENNIK POLSKI I DZIENNIK ZOLNIERZA,
 8, 9 Dec 82)..... 31

Continued Solidarity Activity Urged
 Offer To Dissolve TKK

Research Center Head Discusses 1982 Public Opinion Poll
 (Albin Kania Interview; ZYCIE WARSZAWY, 30 Dec 82)..... 36

Future of Polish Intelligentsia Discussed (Janusz Kuczynski; RZECZPOSPOLITA, 25 Oct 82).....	40
Mokrzyszczak Views Tasks of Party Lecturers (TRYBUNA LUDU, 13 Jan 83).....	47
PZPR Internal Affairs Ministry Secretary Interviewed (Zbigniew Pocheć Interview; TRYBUNA LUDU, 27 Dec 82).....	50
Party Organ Refutes Grabski Letter Charges (ZYCIE PARTII, 22 Dec 82).....	53
Problems of Party Control Activity Discussed (Jerzy Urbanski; NOWE DROGI, Nov 82).....	61
Public Opinion Research Center Director Interviewed (Habilitation Stanislaw Kwiatkowski Interview; TRYBUNA LUDU, 15 Dec 82).....	74
Polish Professor Indicts Martial Law Record (EL PAIS, 3 Jan 83).....	78

ROMANIA

Jewish Envoy Meets With Ceausescu on Emigration (DAVAR, 26 Dec 82).....	82
Increase in Romanian Immigrants to Israel (ITIM, 30 Dec 82).....	83

YUGOSLAVIA

Sociologist Outlines Results of Study on 'Yugoslavs' (DANAS, 4 Jan 83).....	84
Role of Slovenia in Yugoslavia Discussed (Jak Koprivc Interview; DANAS, 4 Jan 83).....	94
Yugoslav Discussion of Albanian Armed Forces (Miroslav Lazanski; DANAS, 23 Nov 82).....	105
Yugoslav Weekly Notes Albanian Support of Portuguese Party (Aleksandar Antonic; DANAS, 30 Nov 82).....	110
Slovenia's Marinc on System Changes, Responsibility (DELO, 30 Dec 82).....	112
Branko Horvat Discusses Ideological Deviations in Society (Branko Horvat; SOCIOLOGIJA, Apr-Sep 82).....	114

Data on Youth in Republic of Croatia (Aleksa Crnjakovic; VJESNIK, 10 Dec 82).....	122
Benefits, Drawbacks of Workers Abroad Evaluated (Mladen Vedris; VJESNIK, 25 Dec 82).....	125
Briefs Albanian Sentenced	131

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

POLITICAL ATTITUDE OF STUDENTS CRITICIZED

Prague TVORBA in Czech No 46, 17 Nov 82 p 8

[Article by Frantisek Fejar, secretary of the SSM Central Committee and chairman of the Czechoslovak SSM Center: "University Students Give an Accounting"]

[Text] On 18-19 November, the nationwide upper school conference of the Union of Socialist Youth [SSM] will meet for the fifth time. Its delegates here will represent all members of the SSM who study at universities in Czechoslovakia and in other socialist countries. The assemblage will end shortly after we celebrate the 65th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and a few weeks before the 60th anniversary of the inception of the Soviet Union. It is already traditional that our conference take place in connection with the holiday of progressive students of the whole world--on the occasion of International Student Day. The events of the 17 November 1939 are a symbol for Czechoslovak students of the heroic resistance of our predecessors to the tyranny of German fascism, which unleashed the most destructive war in the history of mankind to that point. It is, therefore, wholly natural that we again use the agenda of the Fifth Nationwide University Conference in the given circumstances for the expression of our full support for the peaceful effort of the Soviet Union, for emphasizing our resolve to deepen our friendship and cooperation with the youth organization of the first country of victorious socialism--with the Soviet Komsomol.

The upper school conference has critical demands for the improvement of work thus far, and will take up the tasks of the SSM in the universities at the 16th Plenum of the CPCZ Committee Central. In so doing, it will proceed from the agenda of the Third Plenum of the SSM, the conclusions of which further solidified the terms of activity of SSM organizations in the upper schools.

In conformity with the conclusions of the Third Plenum of the SSM, we will deal primarily with the expansion of the role of university students in scientific-technical development, its part in improving the quality of the instructional aspect of the educational process, with increasing the activity of the instructional work in ideology by the organs and organizations of the SSM. In a consistent working out of the above-mentioned

tasks and in their implementation we see the expression of an active attitude by every upper school student and by our SSM organizations to the implementation of the conclusions of the 16th Plenum, where Comrade Gustav Husak, in an address delivered to the Central Committee of the CPCZ, declared, among other things: "It is extremely important that graduates who leave our universities be well trained and politically prepared for practical life, that they be capable of introducing the results of science into production, that they be the bearers of everything progressive and which determines the further development of our country. In education are the great riches of our society, which we must make even better use of."

The SSM has an important place in the realization of these thoughts. We are aware that at the present level of construction of a developed socialist society, scientific-technical development is the decisive factor in the intensification of the national economy, the most significant source of growth for the social productivity of labor. We therefore want to share in it much more actively.

We look forward to the evaluation of the significance and practical contribution of student scientific and professional activity, which was called for at the Third Plenum of the SSM. We have also achieved many good results since the Fourth Nationwide University Conference of the SSM in creating a responsible attitude by students toward their future occupation. However, we are not becoming self-satisfied. We know that the tasks which our society is solving, under the most complex internal and external economic conditions and complicated by the international situation, represent in their totality factors which call, first of all, for facing up to responsibility and then meeting it. The moving of the national economy along the path of intensive development, the task of achieving substantial growth in the effectiveness and quality of every job and perfecting the system at all levels--all of that requires the best preparation of upper school-educated experts. It is a matter of equipping upper school students --for their active participation--with such knowledge and capabilities that they will be able to creatively apply the results of scientific-technical progress and use them; that they will become their real bearers and in that sense that they will further develop them.

If we want to make clear-cut the participation of university students in the acceleration of scientific-technical development, we must, in the university organizations of the SSM, cultivate far more intensively a responsible attitude toward studying and to the practical mastery of the latest scientific methods and forms of work. Through student scientific and professional activity as will react much more to the current work requirements; it is precisely in this that we see one of the significant possibilities for supporting the creative activity of university students, who thus even before their entry into their particular career field make use of the results of science and technology.

In the union of effort of the universities with work, we likewise further intend to use the students' summer work activities, the friendly contacts of the universities with production enterprises and additional significant institutions, and with universities abroad. Such excursions and professional work provide us many opportunities to verify theoretical knowledge in practice, to form a creative attitude by university students toward work, to strengthen the relations between students and working youth. The consistent application of this capability will also result in the increased contribution of the youth account for the effectiveness and quality of the 7-year plan, by which our organization called for the implementation of the economic and social program of the 16th of the CPCZ.

The exemplary fulfillment of student responsibilities, a creative approach to work, together with a desire for knowledge--this is now precisely the path for university students to contribute the energies of league members to the implementation of the categorical requirement of aiming for a conspicuous increase in the level of professional and political preparedness by graduates of universities. As early as the Fourth Nationwide Upper School Conference, therefore, we concentrated on the introduction of conspicuous progress in the share of the SSM in the instructional aspect of the educational process. One of our main tasks was to lead university students to a creative, active approach toward the elective study area. However, such a goal cannot be achieved without a responsible attitude by each student toward the fulfillment of his student responsibilities, without the consistent utilization of the method of concrete tasking directed at the area of studies, without regular review of educational problems at meetings of SSM groups and membership meetings of the basic organizations of the SSM. Although we have in past years in this way achieved a variety of positive results, at the same time a number of facts demonstrate that our activity here must be increased.

We require the fulfillment of student responsibilities as the decisive criterion for the improvement of the level of activity of the individual members, and of the SSM group collectives and basic organizations of the SSM. Study groups are precisely the place where student posture is created, where it is possible to encourage an enlightened attitude toward study and to combat indifference, selfishness and mediocrity.

As the Third Plenum of the SSM affirmed, the younger generation is a natural part of socialist society. We share with it economic, social and cultural prosperity, we live with the successes and concerns that accompany the development of our country. The socialist community, together with the Communist Party, is creating everywhere the best conditions for our education and overall assertion. At the same time, however, it is properly demanded of us that we study well, that we display a responsible attitude toward work and toward our entire life. That applies at the same time to all university students.

In the past term we strove in our SSM organizations for students to master the capability of always correctly orienting themselves to circumstances at

home and in the world. We tried to inculcate in them a conscious conviction of the need for the inseparable union of professional and political life, which are, besides anything, else, a necessary condition for the study of the subject of Marxism-Leninism. There were very successful discussions and meetings of university students with direct participants in the class struggle, and we have likewise had positive experiences with the expansion of student scientific and professional activities, to which was added a theme relating to the history of socialist construction and the building of a developed socialist society in our country.

The results achieved in the SSM collectives in the universities affirm that an absolute majority of students, candidates for graduation, pedagogues and other worker-members of the SSM have actively shared in the realization of the goals which arise from the policy of the CPCZ. However, this fact must not be allowed to lead us into complacency. It would be an extremely big mistake to overlook the fact that some students still display a definite abstract attitude in connection with political and social problems. That fact certainly depends not only on the level of education in certain families but also on our unsatisfactory ideological-educational activity and on the fact that students are very critical of inadequacies and problems, sensitive to the lack of conformity of words and deeds.

In the coming term, it is now necessary that in the universities, in cooperation with other educational activists, that we work much more intensively to produce good results, and, at the same time, that we take the offensive against any negative phenomena. We must see to it that each of our operations is convincing, that it not leave unanswered any problems that the students raise, that it be concerned with concrete tasks and problems of the relevant faculty. This is an entirely essential presupposition for the further increase in activity in ideological-educational work by the SSM in the universities in the coming term, in which we will implement the conclusions of the Third Plenum of the SSM and the Fifth Nationwide University Conference of the SSM.

CSO: 2400/72

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

SED'S 1982 FOREIGN POLICY POSTURES REVIEWED

West German Commentary

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 30 Dec 82 pp 1-2

[Article signed 'Ws,' datelined Berlin, 29 December: "The GDR Makes Positive Assessment of Its Foreign Policy During Past Year: Inner-German Relations--For a European Disarmament Conference--The Socialist 'Fraternal League.'" A translation of the East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article cited below follows this commentary]

[Text] In the struggle for peace and international security, for effective disarmament measures and the continuation of the process of detente brought about by the Helsinki Conference, the GDR has, during 1982, exerted every available effort, was the statement of a year-end review of foreign policy published last Wednesday in the SED party newspaper NEUES DEUTSCHLAND. Even certain of the "chief manipulators of the economic war in the Western hemisphere" have been brought to the point of making a more realistic assessment of the weight carried by the GDR in international life. The relationship between the domestic strength and the foreign influence exercised by "our socialist state" has come to light more clearly than ever before in the course of the past 12 months.

Concerning the relationship with the Federal Republic, the full-page article stated that, in harmony with its socialist character and mindful of its founding oath, the GDR was directing its active peace policies at assuring that "a war would never again originate on German soil." It was in this sense that the GDR was pursuing its relationships with the Federal Republic in accordance with the Basic Treaty. This was the point made by Honecker in his meeting with the Federal President in Moscow. The assertion made by Federal Chancellor Kohl that he agreed fully with Honecker that both German states bore a special responsibility for peace, was viewed as a good basis for the further evolution of relationships. What was important in this connection was that the Federal Republic would also adhere to the treaties already concluded and would make a corresponding contribution to preventing the worsening of the international situation and toward keeping the relationship with the GDR free of all ballast that might hinder progress. Especially in light of the "confrontation and rearmament policies of the aggressive imperialistic circles," the United States' resolve to deploy MX missiles contrary to the SALT II agreement and NATO's plans for deployment of new U.S. intermediate range nuclear missiles, the GDR has always placed the safeguarding of peace at the center of its foreign policy.

Concerning the Madrid meeting of the signatory states of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (KSZE), the foreign policy review stated that the GDR, through close cooperation with other "fraternal states," had undertaken everything possible to achieve a substantive and well-balanced final document. The proposal put forward by the neutral and non-aligned states was a good basis for such an undertaking. The GDR also advocated convening a conference concerning confidence- and security-creating measures and European disarmament.

Characterized once again in 1982 as the "most significant constant of our foreign policy" by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND was the intensification of the fraternal bond of friendship with the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist community.

Andropov and Honecker were said to have reiterated the basic policy lines for the continued cooperation of both parties at their meeting in the Kremlin on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union. "They emphasized the major significance of the translation into reality of the agreements concluded in August 1982 in the Crimea," the paper went on, referring to the meeting of Honecker and Brezhnev. Honecker was quoted as having declared in his salutation speech at the ceremonial session in the Kremlin, "The fraternal bond with the CPSU and the USSR was, is and continues to be for our people the unshakeable foundation for its unrelenting progress along the path of socialism and peace."

The review pointed out that the SED, at the winter session of its Central Committee, had expressed once again the interest of the GDR in good relationships with the People's Republic of China and in a positive outcome of Soviet-Chinese discussions. The GDR was taking constructive steps aimed at normalization of its relationships with China in accordance with the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as non-intervention. Elsewhere in the review, praise was expressed for the People's Republic of China--like the Soviet Union--for its resolution renouncing any first use of nuclear weapons.

Honecker's visit to the Near East last October was characterized as "an extraordinarily important contribution by the GDR to the securing of peace, toward containing the dangerous sources of conflict of our time." Following the exacerbation of the situation "by the barbarous aggression of Israel, with U.S. support, against the PLO and the progressive forces of Lebanon," it was a matter of great international importance that the head of state of the GDR had given voice in that very place to the "constructive viewpoint" of the socialist countries, calling for a just and peaceful resolution of the Middle East problem and reiterating the GDR's solidarity with the peoples of the Arab world in their struggle. In his conferences with Syria's President Assad, the Emir of Kuwait and PLO leader Arafat, Honecker made it plain that such a resolution would assume respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and that the Arab plan for a Near East resolution was in agreement with those principles for which the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, including the GDR, have been struggling for years to attain.

SED Journalist's Assessment

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 29 Dec 82 p 5

[Article by Werner Micke, deputy chief editor, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND: "Balance Sheet for 1982: GDR Foreign Policy for the Benefit of the People--In Fraternal League with the Soviet Union Working Constructively to Secure Peace--10th SED Congress's Line Being Implemented With Determination--Cooperation in Socialist Community Strengthened--Determined Against Imperialist Confrontational Course and Against Arms Buildup--Significant Trip by Erich Honecker to Near East--Solidarity With Liberation Struggle of the Peoples--Respected Partner of World-wide Peace Movement"]

[Text] At the core of the efforts of our party, our country and our people at this year's end was the great goal of our continued strengthening of the German Democratic Republic as a stable workers and peasants state, as a cornerstone of socialism and peace in Europe. In doing so we have also made a contribution during 1982 to the resolution of the most important task before us today: that of preventing a nuclear world war, of securing a permanent peace. The relentless and reckless policies of confrontation and arms buildup, with which the aggressive circles in the United States and other NATO countries have exacerbated the international situation, have been withstood by us, acting in fraternal alliance with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, through our well-balanced, constructive peace policy.

The GDR's Weight in International Affairs

The foreign policy guidelines laid down at the 10th SED Congress have been able to gain increasing effectiveness to the degree that our republic has made substantial advances, thanks to the diligence, the creativity, the achievements of the working class, the farmers of the agricultural collectives, members of the intelligentsia and all of our working population involved in the translation into reality of the resolutions of the party congress. Even certain of the manipulators of the economic war in the Western hemisphere have been obliged to take a more realistic look at the weight of the GDR in world affairs. The connection between our domestic strength and the influence exercised abroad by our socialist state has come to light more clearly than ever before in the course of the past 12 months. Our policies, aimed at securing peace and at the benefit of the people, based upon the militance of our party, its alliance with associated parties and mass organizations and upon the initiative of the masses of our people, have proven, in both the international arena as well as at home, to be correct and successful.

The GDR, throughout 1982, has committed all of its energies to the struggle for peace and international security, for effective arms control measures and the continuation of the process of detente brought about by the Helsinki Conference. It has given firm support to the broad-ranging peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and has urged that all other states in possession of nuclear weapons follow the example of the Soviet Union in renouncing the first use of nuclear arms. As we know, the People's Republic of China has also passed a similar resolution. At the United Nations, our republic has introduced numerous resolutions within the framework of the joint policies of the socialist community, aimed at disarmament and arms control, particularly in the area of nuclear

weapons. The GDR has been working with great determination for the strengthening of its alliances with other socialist countries, with newly liberated countries and all other forces active for peace in the world against the threat of a nuclear world war, against the arms race being pressed by the aggressive imperialistic circles.

Basis of Our Strides Forward

The most important constant in our foreign policy in 1982 as well, has been the deepening of our fraternal bond, our friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. Yuriy Andropov and Erich Honecker, during their cordial meeting at the Kremlin on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, reiterated the basic policy lines for the continued and broad ranging cooperation of their two parties. They stressed the major significance of the translation into reality of the agreements concluded in August 1982 in the Crimea. In the course of their discussion of current problems in the international situation, both men expressed the firm resolve to do everything within their power to bring an end to the arms race and to secure peace for the peoples of the earth. The secretaries general of both fraternal parties emphasized during their exchange of views that the programs dedicated to the memory of Karl Marx and scheduled to be carried out during 1983, stressing the importance of this activity for the study and dissemination of his undying scientific and revolutionary legacy. "The fraternal bond with the CPSU and the USSR was, is and will continue to be for our people the unshakeable foundation for its unrelenting progress along the path of socialism and peace," was the point stressed by Erich Honecker during his salutation address at the ceremonial session in the Congress Palace at the Kremlin.

Within the GDR, the new, wide-ranging disarmament proposals put forward by Yuriy Andropov in his formal address at the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Union and affirmed in the appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU, have been received with great joy and lively support. The people of the GDR have given their explicit support to the willingness of the Soviet Union not only to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons but also to negotiate conventional armaments; proposing to reduce their strategic arms by more than 25 percent while maintaining their parity, if the United States will make a corresponding reduction; keeping only as many missiles in Europe as those deployed by Great Britain and France.

Along with our Soviet friends and comrades we celebrated the 65th anniversary of the Red October and the 60th jubilee of the multinational Soviet Union. Together with them we mourned the death of Leonid Brezhnev, to whom the last respects were paid in Moscow in the name of the communists and all the citizens of the GDR by the party and state delegation headed by Erich Honecker.

The firm friendship between the Soviet Union and the GDR is a reliable guaranty for further successes in the resolution of the tasks of socialist and communist development. It is, as was manifested at the Crimea meeting, an influential factor of political stability on the European continent.

Cooperation with other fraternal socialist countries also received strong new impulses in the course of the year. In late March, the party and state dele-

gation from the People's Republic of Poland, headed by Wojciech Jaruzelski paid an official friendship visit to our republic. Erich Honecker stressed to the Polish comrades the full support of the GDR for their efforts to secure the people's power, for overcoming the political and economic crisis and the assurance of the country's continued socialist development. Poland, he stated, would always find in the GDR a reliable friend and a loyal ally.

The broad-ranging cooperation with our other socialist neighbor, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, was the focus of the amicable meeting between Erich Honecker and Gustav Husak at Berlin in late October. Especially in light of the present international situation, it is of great significance that the alliance between the GDR and Czechoslovakia has proven effective as a stable factor for peace along the dividing line between socialism and imperialism.

A high point in the relationships between the peoples of our republic and Hungary was the official friendship visit of the party and government delegation from the GDR under the direction of Erich Honecker to the Hungarian People's Republic in June. The conversations with Janos Kadar served to expand the cooperation of the parties and governments in all sectors and, beyond that, the continued strengthening of the unity and cohesion of the socialist community.

New Impulses for Cooperation

One expression of the continued development of friendship and cooperation between the GDR and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the official friendship visit of Petar Stambolic to our republic in November. Erich Honecker, during the comprehensive exchange of views with the Yugoslav head of state concerning the international situation, agreed that it was the primary task of the socialist countries, the non-aligned states and the progressive forces throughout the world, to do everything in their power to avert the danger of a new world war.

The further development of bilateral relationships with the socialist fraternal countries was also the focus of the meeting of Willi Stoph with the heads of government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Grischa [sic] Filipov at Sofia in October and of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Constantin Dascalescu, at Bucharest in November.

Relations between the GDR and the Lao People's Democratic Republic achieved a new stage with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation by Erich Honecker and Kayson Phomvihan during the visit which the Laotian party and government leader paid to our republic in September. On this occasion, the loyal support of our republic was reiterated for the policy which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the People's Democratic Republic of Laos and the People's Republic of Cambodia have been pursuing as outposts of socialism in Southeast Asia.

Community of Nations Further Strengthened

Among the more significant international events of the past year in the GDR can be counted the friendship visit of Babrak Karmal in May. With the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a further step was taken in the development and strengthening of our relations. At the same time, the GDR affirmed its soli-

parity with the Afghan revolution, its defense against imperialist aggression and counterrevolutionary attacks and its support for the constructive proposals made by the Afghan Government for the normalization of the situation in Southwest Asia.

The GDR made its active contribution to the strengthening and collective defense efforts of the socialist community in the Warsaw Pact Organization, whose military council met at Berlin in May and in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, at whose 36th meeting in Budapest a delegation headed by Willi Stoph participated. The exchange of views and delegations with the countries of socialism continued at party, state and social levels. Delegations from the SED's Central Committee were guests at the party congresses of fraternal parties in Yugoslavia, Vietnam and Laos.

At the Fifth Congress of the Central Committee of the SED, the GDR's interest in good relations with the People's Republic of China and the positive outcome of the Soviet-Chinese discussions was expressed. Our republic is undertaking constructive measures toward normalization of its relationships with China in accordance with the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and of territorial integrity as well as non-intervention. This will serve the struggle for peace and to counter the imperialist confrontation course.

For a Just Solution to the Near East Problem

An extraordinarily important contribution on the part of the GDR to the securing of peace and to confining the dangerous sources of conflict of our time was Erich Honecker's visit to the Near East in October. Following the sudden exacerbation of the situation by the barbarous aggression by Israel, with U.S. support, against the PLO and the progressive forces of Lebanon, it was of great international significance that the GDR head of state should outline the constructive viewpoint of the socialist countries for a just and peaceful resolution of the Near East problem and reaffirm the GDR's firm support for the struggle of the Arab peoples.

In his conversations with Hafiz al-Assad, the Emir of Kuwait and Yassir Arafat, Erich Honecker underscored that such a resolution would have to assume the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and that the Arab plan for a Near East solution was in accord with the principles for which the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, including the GDR, have been struggling for years. To Spyros Kyprianou, Erich Honecker similarly expressed the GDR's support for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict along the lines of the UN's resolutions.

In all three countries, the conferences with the heads of state produced agreement on their determination to do everything possible to avert the threat of a nuclear war and to secure peace. Thus the trip, together with the strong impulses for the development of bilateral relationships, contributed to the continued strengthening of ties between the socialist and non-aligned nations in the struggle for the resolution of the most important task of our time.

At the Side of the Struggling Peoples

An expression of the solid cooperation of our republic with the forces of democracy, peace and social progress in Latin America which are most directly exposed to the imperialist policies of threats and boycotts, was the visit of

Maurice Bishop to the GDR in June. It was testimony to our firm alliance with the people of Grenada and all of the peoples of the Caribbean area in their struggle for the strengthening of their national independence.

Vigorous support was extended by the GDR during the past year to the peoples of Southern Africa in the struggle against the dangerous activities of imperialism aided by the racist regime in Pretoria, aimed at expanding their confrontation policies and of depriving Angola, Mozambique and other progressive states of the fruits of their independence struggle and to turn back the wheel of history. One manifestation of the GDR's solidarity with the freedom struggle of the people of Namibia was the meeting of Erich Honecker with the chairman of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma. In July the visit of ANC president Oliver Tambo to our republic was a demonstration of the fraternal support for the patriots of South Africa in their struggle against the Apartheid regime. A significant step toward development of relations with Lesotho was the visit of Prime Minister Chief Dr. Joseph Leabua Jonathan to our republic.

Over the course of the year the GDR expanded its broad-ranging cooperation with Angola, Ethiopia, Burundi, India, Iraq, Iran, the Yemenite Arab Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Cameroon, Columbia, the Congo, Libya, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tunisia and other countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Heartening Effect of Socialism

The common struggle to secure peace was the focus of the friendship exchanges with the general secretaries or chairmen of the fraternal parties in Syria, Cyprus, Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, Equador, Portugal, Finland, Turkey, West Berlin and Bolivia. Erich Honecker met with Khaled Bagdache in Damascus and with Ezekias Papaioannou in Nicosia. Harilaos Florakis, Herbert Mies, Rene Mauge, Alvaro Cunhal, Jouko Kajanoja, I. Bilen, Horst Schmitt and Jorge Kollé were guests of the GDR. Discussion served to intensify the traditionally close militant community in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and the strengthening of the unity of action of the international communist and labor movement.

Comrades from capitalist countries reported of the hard struggle against arms increases and cutbacks in social services and the shifting of the burden of the economic crisis to the shoulders of the working people. The achievements of socialism in the GDR, its economic capability and stable development, the unrelenting continuation of the policy of its paramount mission and the active engagement of the socialist German state in the cause of peace were cited by them as a great encouragement in their own struggle.

Delegations from the Central Committee of the SED took part in the party congresses of their fraternal parties in Canada, India, Ireland, Norway, Cyprus, Equador and Greece. A wide-ranging exchange of delegations, experiences and views served to strengthen cooperation with other communist and workers parties, national liberation movements, socialist and social democratic parties. Significant for the development of relations between the SED and social democratic parties were the visits to the GDR by party chairman Helmut Hubacher of Switzerland and secretary general Erkki Liikanen from Finland.

The Main Question at Center Stage

Relationships with capitalist countries have taken a large place in our foreign policy and have continued to develop with the visits of leading political figures, government and parliamentary delegations. Especially in light of the policies of confrontation and rearmament of the most aggressive imperialist circles, of the deployment of the MX missiles planned by the U.S. administration in contravention of the SALT II agreements and NATO's planned deployment of new U.S. medium range nuclear missiles in Europe for 1983, the GDR has always put the issue of securing peace at the center of its attention. "Our continent can only have a future in peace, and then only if the coexistence of countries with differing social orders is assured in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence," was the point emphasized by Erich Honecker at the Fifth Congress of the SED's Central Committee. In accordance with its socialist character and mindful of its founding oath, the GDR has directed its active peace policy at assuring that a war will never again begin on German soil.

It is in this sense that our republic has oriented its relationships with the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with the Basic Treaty between the two German states. This was also expressed by Erich Honecker at his meeting with Federal President Karl Carstens in November. The assertion by Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl that he was in agreement with Erich Honecker that the two German states bear a special responsibility for peace, is seen as a good foundation for the further development of our relations. What is important in this connection is that the Federal Republic of Germany adheres to the treaties which have been concluded and that it makes a corresponding contribution to opposing the exacerbation of the international situation and keeps its relationship with the GDR free of all ballast which might hinder progress.

In the course of 1982 additional steps were taken to strengthen existing good relations with Japan, Mexico and Austria, those states which received official visits from Erich Honecker in recent years. High level cooperative efforts with France, Great Britain, Greece, Spain and other countries have been carried forward. In the course of the year a number of additional treaties and agreements with non-socialist countries have been concluded in the areas of political, consular and economic affairs.

At the Madrid conference of the signatory states to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the GDR, working closely with other fraternal states, undertook everything in its power to achieve a substantive and well-balanced final document. The proposal made by the neutral and non-aligned states is a good foundation for this. We advocate a resolution calling for the convening of a conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

In all of these negotiations and other international contacts and in our overall foreign policy, it has been the most important concern of our republic to counteract the recklessness of the aggressive circles within the United States and other NATO countries and to avert the danger of a nuclear war and to secure a permanent peace.

National Policy and the Cause of the People

Not least, this is why it is of such importance that the policies of our socialist

state not only coincide fully with the interests of its citizens, but also that they be supported actively by the entire population. This found vigorous expression at the plenary session of the GDR's Peace Council in July, at which representatives of all classes and strata, all parties and mass organizations, citizens of varying philosophical and religious views emphasized their common conviction that there was no more important issue for our people than the securing of peace. This was also evidenced by the impressive May demonstrations everywhere in our country, at which millions of working people marched in the streets in favor of the constructive peace initiatives of the socialist community of nations, against the imperialist policies of confrontation and arms buildup. Another high point of this committed peace movement was the Whitsun convention of young people, at which millions once again demonstrated for a peaceful future without NATO nuclear missiles from the United States.

The GDR, through its international efforts and the conscious commitment of its citizens, has proven itself to be a trusted and respected partner of the worldwide peace movement which, over the past year, has continued to grow in breadth and strength in its struggle against the threat of war emanating from the rearmament policies of imperialism. This was also vigorously underscored at the Ninth Congress of the International Federation of Resistance Fighters which took place in September at Berlin.

Thwarting Imperialist Plans

Looking back at the year now concluding, we can say: our socialist country, its leaders and its citizens have done everything within their power to strengthen the GDR as a bastion of socialism and peace in the international class struggle for the future of mankind. It is in this sense that we will continue our efforts during the coming year. In our foreign policy as in all other sectors, our tasks and our exertions will not become less, but greater. In the struggle to secure peace, what is of utmost importance is the thwarting of the dangerous plans of those who seek to shift the existing and approximately equal military-strategic balance in favor of imperialism and, toward this end, seek to deploy the new U.S. medium range nuclear missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany and other West European countries.

Not preparation for war, which would condemn mankind to the senseless wastage of its material and spiritual treasures and even threaten its very existence, but the securing of peace--this is what Erich Honecker has characterized as the only rational, the only constructive guide to tomorrow's world. We enter the New Year with the consciousness that we have available to us all of the conditions necessary to achieve our goals for the continued development of socialism, of increasing the defensive capability of the GDR and thereby to make a contribution toward assuring that the peoples of the world will be safe from a nuclear holocaust.

9878
CSO: 2300/107

OLSZTYN PROVINCE PARTY ACTIVITIES NOTED

Plenum Party Tasks

Olsztyn GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA in Polish 18 Nov 82 pp 1, 2, 4

[Article by Adam Bartnikowski and Wieslaw Bialkowski: "Difficult Tasks Harden and Strengthen Party Members' Attitudes"]

[Text] The basic subjects dealt with at yesterday's (17 November) plenary meeting of the PZPR KW [Voivodship Committee] in Olsztyn were an assessment of the functioning of the voivodship party organization during the current term and the tasks of the echelons and organizations in implementing the resolutions of the Central Committees (KC) Tenth Plenum. Organizational matters were also examined. Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak, PZPR Central Committee secretary and candidate member of the Politburo, participated in the deliberations.

Those in attendance at the plenary meeting had earlier received the KW Secretariat's written report on the functioning of the voivodship party organization during the current term, whereas the paper read by the KW secretary, Adam Weselak, at the beginning of the deliberations, dealt with actions taken as a result of the recent inspections: party, conducted by the PZPR Central Audit Commission (CKR), and comprehensive, conducted by the Armed Forces Inspectorate.

Adam Weselak, KW secretary said:

From 20 September to 2 October of this year, the PZPR Central Audit Commission, in cooperation with members of the voivodship echelons, conducted an inspection of the functioning of the Voivodship Committee, selected committees and organizations in the entire voivodship. The inspection pertained to intraparty and socioeconomic problems. The Central Audit Commission team was also interested in problems of cadre policy, the information system, ideological training, and the Voivodship Committee's financial management. The members of the inspection team conducted many individual talks, and examined documents and methods by which party elements operate. The direct contact with the party leadership and apparatus and the party rank-and-file provided an opportunity for discussion of many problems relating to

party work and also to give assistance, instruction and advice, especially where inexperience was the reason for shortcomings found in the implementation of party program assumptions.

At the same time, the Armed Forces Inspectorate conducted an inspection of the voivodship management and administration.

The findings of the Central Audit Commission and the resultant tasks for the party organizations and echelons were the subject of a KW executive board meeting, attended by the Audit Commission chairman, comrade Kazimierz Morawski, the chief of the inspection team, comrade Zdzislaw Stepien, the Armed Forces Inspector General, comrade General Wladyslaw Mroz, members of the central party leadership in our voivodship, directors of KW departments, and regional directors of the party work centers. On 4 October 1982, in the voivodship office, the Armed Forces Inspectorate presented the results of its inspection and recommendations pertaining to implementation of these results to the voivodship party and administrative authorities and to representatives of the local authorities. Irrespective of this, the people in our voivodship were informed about the inspection and its results on a current basis.

On 19 October, the KW executive board, after thoroughly familiarizing itself with the CKR report, prepared and approved a schedule for the implementation of tasks ensuing from the inspection, specifying the method, the dates, and those responsible for implementation of the recommendations and conclusions.

One of the very important tasks which the voivodship party organization has to deal with is the dissemination, implementation and control of the resolutions and decisions of the voivodship and central authorities by all party elements. The KW executive board in its daily activity called particular attention to the need to further popularize and implement the Ninth Party Congress' program. This program and the current Central Committee and Voivodship Committee resolutions should form the basis for planning and for party activity.

The executive board has increased the tasks of the KW departments in this regard. Once every quarter they will submit to the KW secretariat their proposals for popularizing the Central Committee and KW resolutions and for checking up on the implementation of the tasks assigned. These inspections, depending on the subject matter, will be conducted by KW problem commissions, made up of commission members and workers and teams of KW employees. We intend to conduct the inspection activity in close cooperation with the Voivodship Audit Commission, whose conclusions and determinations will be given special attention.

In the party's control activity we intend to make wider use of, through the executive boards of the KW, the City Committees (KM), the City and Gmina Committees (KMG), the Gmina Committees (KG), and the Plant Committees (KZ), the results of the inspections conducted by the teams and institutions of State, subsector, and plant control. We intend also in our control work we make constant use of analyses and reports prepared by the scientific and technical societies, the Polish Economic Society (PTE), the Chief Technical Organizations (NOT), the Scientific Society of Organization and Administration (TNOiK) and the Society of Accountants.

It is extremely urgent that the work of the regional party work centers as concerns assistance to the echelons and the primary party organizations (POP) be improved.

The KW executive board will turn its attention to the organizational and cadre consolidation of the Regional Centers for Party Work (ROPP), and, first of all, to appointing, by 1 February 1983, ROPP assistant directors for propaganda and ideological affairs, to organizing, or consolidating already existing, lecture teams divided into specialist sections for work in POP, to organizing regular meetings of directors of regional ideological-upbringing work centers in order to exchange experience and coordinate tasks, to organizing in the ROPP permanent propaganda teams for assistance and training for the POP.

Another important task assigned by the KW executive board to the primary party organizations, plant committees and basal echelons, is that of systematic work on the development and distribution of party strength in specific socio-occupational circles, so as to equalize the very large disproportions in party memberships in communities and groups. The problem of development and distribution of party strength will be the subject of systematic examination and evaluation by the KW executive board and the executive boards of the basal echelons. This problem is already reflected in the reporting campaign now underway.

Correct functioning of all party elements requires regular contacts by representatives of the voivodship party authorities not only with echelons on the basal level, but also with the primary party organization in the towns and the countryside. The KW executive board, recognizing the role and importance of these contacts, decided to specify concrete tasks and duties for members of the voivodship party authorities. It allocated tasks and imposed an obligation of close cooperation with the regions and party echelons upon the groups of aktiv deriving from the party apparatus. The KW secretaries or department directors head up these groups. Furthermore, the KW executive board recommended also that an aktiv be appointed in all regions and echelons to do political-ideological work and take charge of the particular POP.

The PZPR KW executive board is introducing into its work plans the rule that regions and basal-level echelons will be evaluated at field-trip meetings. This evaluation will be preceded by a detailed study of the various forms of management and party activities. These studies will be conducted by members of the problems commission in cooperation with the audit commission of that echelon and members of the party leadership.

Irrespective of this, the regional party work centers and the basal-level echelons in planning their work must include a once-a-year comprehensive inspection of POP activities and evaluate the work of their own aktiv. Measures of this kind should serve to improve party discipline, mobilize members for implementation of party resolutions and tasks, and make for better settlement of local management matters.

In the activities of the echelons and organizations we attach great weight to the observance of the principles of overt party operation, to informing party members of the resolutions and decisions of all party authorities, about their own work, about the political and socioeconomic situation in their own area, about the social moods and problems of the working people. The KW Party Information Team, appointed 29 September 1981, is fulfilling this task better and better. Despite progress achieved in the flow of information "upwards" and "downwards", i.e., from the party members, POP, and local echelons through the Voivodship Committee to the Central Committee and from the Central Committee and Voivodship Committee to the local echelons and POP, shortcomings are still apparent. If the functioning of information

is to be made more efficient, the organizational structure, program assumptions, and scope of duties of the information sector in the propaganda department must be made uniform. The KW secretariat will investigate this problem in the immediate future.

We also see a need to improve the effectiveness of the influence of the POP on the members, particularly in the low-membership organizations. We intend to increase the participation of members of the voivodship and central authorities, the party apparatus, the Central Committee, Voivodship Committee and ROPP lecturers and the local party echelons in work with the POP. We anticipate that more community meetings will be organized in the ROPP and local echelons than heretofore for workers, teachers, youth and other social groups, on subjects related to the party's current policies.

The Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress assigned great importance to the motions proposed by members, organizations and party echelons, and made their proper implementation a statutory obligation. The KW executive board, implementing the PZPR Ninth Congress resolution and the Central Committee Ninth Plenum resolution, will still this year investigate the information in the motions submitted during the current term. Also, the echelons and larger party organizations will be charged with the duty of seeing to it that the motions submitted not only by the PZPR members but also by members of other parties and nonparty members are dealt with correctly. For this to be accomplished, commissions and groups for matters of suggestions, complaints and grievances, must be formed, who will watch over the settlement of these matters by the workers who are responsible for this, to prepare analyses and assessments of the implementation of the suggestions, complaints and grievances, submit them at the meetings of the executive board, and constantly improve the methods for solving the problems to which these suggestions pertain. Party echelons and organizations must make use of the experiences of the different organs of State and social control, and inspire party members working in people's councils' commissions to include in their activities the function of inspection as regards settlement of complaints and suggestions in offices and institutions.

Recognizing the role and importance of suggestions, complaints and grievances, and also implementing the Central Committee Ninth Plenum resolution, in the present reporting campaign in all party organizations and echelons a register of suggestions has been instituted, which will facilitate proper supervision over their implementation.

Today all party organizations and echelons have the large task of making the matter of the attitudes of their members the everyday subject of their work. A subject not for theoretical consideration, but for concrete assessments, for concrete action. These assessments are to take place at the party meetings. The function of a meeting in shaping party attitudes is still neither properly understood or recognized by many organizations.

Yet the concern about the comrades' attitudes, and particularly that of the management cadre, about their activeness, assumes particularly importance today. That is why echelons and organizations must seek new methods and improve the forms of cooperation used thus far with these cadre, assist them in solving complex problems, and

in a friendly way, point out the mistakes and the sources of their origin. In evaluating the cadre we must see not only the achievements and the mistakes made, but also the conditions under which both occurred.

In implementing the recommendations and suggestions of the CKR, the executive boards of the KW, KM, KMG and KG, in their current work with the management cadre, have developed and apply constant forms of work. The rule has been made that the confirmation and removal of persons who are in the echelon's "nomenklatura" [a list of positions that can only be filled with the consent of the Party organization], takes place in their presence and with the participation of the POP secretary. The rule is also applied that once a year individual talks are conducted, evaluating the management cadre, including the opinion of the POP or basal-level echelons. Where transgressions or neglect is ascertained, talks will take place with the participation of the person involved and the POP secretary, and conclusions will be drawn as to service to the party in relation to the guilty.

In work with the broadly understood management cadre, i.e., not only the directors but also the managers and foremen, the KW executive board and secretariat intend to organize and apply all kinds of forms of work. This is also the duty of all of the echelons.

In the practical activity in behalf of the effective performance of the party's inspirational and control role in relation to organs of authority and the state and economic administration, the KW executive board will apply and develop tested forms and methods of work, which were discussed in the information submitted to the comrades for today's deliberations. Furthermore, in this activity we intend to coordinate the work plans of the Committee, the executive board, the secretariat and the KW problem commissions with the programs and plans of the Voivodship People's Council (WRN) and its organs. These intentions will be implemented to a greater degree than heretofore by the basal echelons also.

The executive board and the secretariat of the PZPR Voivodship Committee regularly examine and evaluate the course of the revival of the union movement. Party organizations and echelons give maximum assistance to the initiative groups, the founding committees of the reviving trade unions, paying particular attention to the establishment of partnership relations between the party and the trade unions. Therefore:

--The action programs passed at the reporting conferences should include the principle of partnership-cooperation with the plant union organizations in solving vital community problems,

--In evaluating PZPR members who are also trade union members, the opinion of the plant union organization should be requested as to their activeness in union activity,

--Party echelons, in inspiring organizations to develop in practice methods of cooperation with plant union organizations, must pay particular attention to the establishment of this cooperation on partnership conditions.

Relations between the party and the trade unions are of decisive importance in the rebirth of a strong union movement, in the prevention in the future of mistakes and distortions in the activities of the party, the trade unions, and the State.

The Voivodship Committee with the help of the local echelons will examine and assess the political-organizational actions of the party organizations on behalf of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON) very shortly. A structural examination of the movement will be made, and an examination and assessment of the activeness of party members. The activities of the administrative organs in assisting in solving problems brought up by PRON will also be examined. Particular attention in the political-inspirational work will be paid to the youth circles.

In the sphere of propaganda-upbringing influence, work popularizing the concept of reconciliation and the achievement and aims of PRON will continue to be conducted by the mass media.

The teaching community will be included in the popularization-upbringing activities to a greater degree than heretofore.

I have discussed the more important intents of the voivodship party organization in the implementation of recommendations of the PZPR Central Audit Commission. These recommendations, together with the suggestions of the Armed Forces Inspectorate, will, for the near term, be the basis of the work of party organizations and echelons in many fields of party, political, and socioeconomic activity. The correct implementation of the tasks and proposals outlined in the KW executive board schedule will depend on the entire party organization, on its executory and control organs. Based on the party statute, we must develop party work in all party organizations and echelons. We must critically deal with the negative aspects of socioeconomic life and boldly combat symptoms of bureaucracy and unfeelingness in solving many of the difficulties of everyday life, in the interests of all working people.

/Next, the KW secretary, Jan Malinowski, took the floor, discussing the tasks of the party organizations and echelons in implementing the PZPR Central Committee Tenth Plenum Resolutions. Here are some the main ideas contained in this speech/ [in boldface]:

At the Tenth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, the most important social goals were again underscored: feeding the nation, supplying the people with the consumer-goods indispensable to everyday life and restoring market balance, bringing a halt to the further deterioration in the housing situation and creating the conditions necessary for gradual improvement, bringing about improvement in health care, observing the socialist principle of remuneration and providing welfare protection to those groups who are financially the worst off. Concern for the best possible implementation of the above aims is part of the daily activity of the voivodship party organization. These problems were the subject of the plenary deliberations of the Voivodship Committee on 28 August 1982, whereas a number of detailed problems were investigated at executive board meetings. In accordance with the instructions of the Central Audit Commission, plan schedules were drawn up by the executive board for implementation of the post-inspection recommendations and political safeguarding of the performance of tasks resulting from the findings of the Armed Forces Inspectorate. Steps were taken to put into effect the tasks covered by the above schedules, the implementation of which conforms with the directions of party activity approved at the PZPR Central Committee Tenth Plenum.

Attainment of social goals requires successful implementation of socioeconomic tasks, i.e., on a level higher than that achieved under crisis conditions. The following tasks were given priority:

--increasing the size of production and improving its quality,

--improving management efficiency and making structural changes in production in order to better meet the requirements of agriculture and the food economy, housing, the domestic market, export, and measures which would strengthen the weak elements of the national economy, such as transportation and the power industry,

--stimulating export and improving the effectiveness of import,

--making better use of regional scientific-research and engineering potential and the efficiency-improvement and inventiveness movements,

--perfecting economic mechanisms, organizational solutions, and legal regulations of the reformed system of economic management. The factory incentive systems and implementation of the principle of joint responsibility of the enterprises' workforces in public life and joint management, will have an important role to fulfill here,

--ensuring good results in regional planning, including on the enterprise level. Results of planning should be measured in terms of the execution of tasks that were assigned at the beginning, both this year's, as well as for the years 1983-1985. We believe that all voivodship units should prepare socioeconomic plans for 1983-1985.

The tasks listed should be effectively accomplished by the enterprises, the primary and factory party organizations, committees and their executory organs, in accordance with the resolution of the last PZPR KW plenum.

Thus far we have given most attention to overcoming the economic crisis. What, then, are the results of the past efforts of the workforces and regional authorities? According to data obtained in July 1982 from 27 of the most important industrial enterprises of the region, in the second half of the year an increase of approximately 11 percent in sold production in industry was expected over that of the first half-year. In the July-October period, average monthly sold production in industry amounted to 7 billion zlotys, whereas during the first half-year it was 6.1 billion zlotys. Therefore, the increase achieved is really 15 percent. Results obtained in September and October are even better--an average of 7.7 billion zlotys. This means that in comparison with original assumptions, progress is greater. However, in relation to the same period last year, results continue to be lower. For example, in October, sold production in industry was about 0.4 billion zlotys lower than last year in October. That is why one of the main tasks of the party organizations and echelons continues to be the undertaking of comprehensive inspirational-control means which would assist in the full execution of the ambitious factory programs for overcoming the crisis.

One reason for the successful implementation of industry and construction's tasks in the first six months, in relation to amounts envisaged in forecasts, was improvement in economic reform solutions, and in particular, facilitating an increase in wages by exempting the workplaces from paying taxes into the Vocational Activation Fund where production increases occurred. Proposals for further improvements relating to economic instruments of reform are being considered. It should be emphasized that these proposals are generally in agreement with the assessments and suggestions submitted earlier by our party aktiv.

Tomorrow there will be a meeting of the Voivodship People's Council during which the final WRN resolution on the voivodship's socioeconomic plans will be worked out. In mid-December of this year, the KW executive board will examine the assumptions of the socioeconomic plans dealing with goods and services. The determinations will be used by the WRN party councilor team in approving plans at the January session of the Voivodship People's Council (WRN).

Discussions thus far on assumptions of next year's and 3-year socioeconomic plans generally confirm the correctness of the goals which we presented earlier. At the same time, it appeared that there was a great lack of funds with which to implement them. Thus the problem of seeking optimal solutions is being regarded as being moot.

Two basic goals require concentration and effective utilization of the major portion of outlays: first, agriculture and the food economy; second, housing construction and municipal-residential management. We propose that all of these problems be examined at separate plenary meetings of the PZPR Voivodship Committee. We also believe that the suggestions and assessments on the plans submitted today and during the course of future work must be investigated by an organ of the party Voivodship Committee.

The Socioeconomic Department has the assumptions of next year's plans and those for 1983-1985 from several dozen enterprises. Their main feature is a widely varying economic growth rate, and a diversity of economic ratios. In many cases, it is worth mentioning, managements and more frequently enterprise self-governments are undertaking relatively large tasks. This means that the striving to overcome the crisis is becoming more widespread.

Workers' self-governments are beginning to fulfill a constructive role in this process. There are several-fold more of them than there were during our August deliberations. By 15 November, applications to activate workers' councils were submitted from 114 enterprises, while favorable decisions were already made in relation to 81 economic units. Party organizations and echelons should therefore increase their activities so basically by the end of the year workers' councils should be activated in all enterprises.

This year's efforts by the PZPR voivodship organization have done a good job in solving enormous and difficult problems. But we can do much more. Society expects this of us and supports us in our constructive endeavors in behalf of political stabilization and overcoming the socioeconomic crisis.

The first person to take the floor in the discussion was Janusz Wawszkiewicz. He brought up the problems of the workers' health service center, which he represents in the PZPR voivodship echelon. These matters, in his opinion, are given too little attention by the voivodship party and administrative authorities, despite the fact that they have been pointed out many times at different assemblies, including at the PZPR KW plenary meetings in Olsztyn. Yet the situation in this center is simply tragic. The physicians and staff in the health service centers work in disastrous conditions. As a result, as many as eight directors of health service teams in our voivodship have resigned. There is, and will continue to be, a shortage of physicians until incentives are created in the form of housing and adequate working conditions. The speaker moved that the executive board concern itself with health service problems as soon as possible.

Wawszkiewicz also brought up the problems of intraparty work. He said that the discussions at the party meeting are still not as critical or constructive as they should be. In this context, he criticized the significance of the party discussions in the voivodship's socioeconomic practices. Referring to the question of free Saturdays, he said that it should be clearly approved and stated that work on free Saturdays is, in some professions, a duty and not a question of volunteering.

The chairman of the Municipal Administration of the League of Polish Women in Olsztyn, Maria Tomulowicz, reported on the status and the activity of this organization, and also on its program, which was approved at the Extraordinary Congress. She said that the women's organization will, insofar as it is able to, assist in the achievement of national conciliation and improvement of living conditions.

Wladyslaw Pypkowski, from Szczytno, criticized the present system of wages. It is paradoxical, when, for example, a driver for the State Motor Transport earns as much as 30,000 zlotys, and the manager of an enterprise, several thousand zlotys. These abnormal proportions must be reversed, and only then can there be any talk about responsibility and creative activity in management positions.

On the question of free Saturdays, Pypkowski said that there is general confusion in the country in relation to this. How, for example, can a vehicle be sent from our voivodship to other parts of the country when we do not know whether they are working there on that Saturday.

--As a young POP secretary, he said in conclusion, I feel that I have not had the proper training from the echelons, or from the older comrades, on the question, e.g., of documentation. Of course activity is more important than accountability, but the paperwork should be in order also. We, the young secretaries, simply are not able to deal with this.

Stanislaw Groblewski, a farmer from Janowiec Koscielny, called attention to the constantly punishing distributions for socialized agriculture and private farming. Only the faults in peasant farming are seen, and it is criticized right and left. In the variants of the 3-year plan, there is talk, for example, about reclaiming and developing 300 hectares of meadows and fields. At the same time, however, the highest production growth rate index has been assigned to the peasant farms. And so: take the outlays away from the farmers, but demand an increase in production.

The countryside is also rebelling, the speaker said, against the taxation system and also the system of insurances. Insurances should be voluntary for the farmers. He also said that the countryside is being discriminated against in the allocation of market goods. Why is it impossible to buy rubber footwear in the villages when we see larger allocations to the cities?

The governor, Sergiusz Rubczewski, acquainted the KW members with the work being done on the construction of a draft socioeconomic plan for the next 3 years. A new and very vital element of this work is the socialization of the planning process. The discussion materials have been presented to the party echelons and the other political parties; the people's councils on the basal level; the industrial, construction, agricultural, and transportation enterprises; the Scientific-Economic Council in the Olsztyn voivodship; the Polish Economic Society; the Chief Technical Organization; the Agricultural Technical Academy; and the youth organizations. In a general discussion the most correct solutions may be worked out, and as a result, the assumptions of the plan may be correctly implemented. In this discussion a departure from stipulations to a consideration of the voivodships capabilities was observed. This does not mean, of course, that a consensus was achieved. For example, on agriculture: There were opinions that farm production should be set as high as possible, but there were also a goodly number of opinions that other fields should be given more support. It was the same in other sectors of the economy. Here the governor stated, referring to Stanislaw Groblewski's (from Janowiec) remarks, that at the moment nothing has been taken away from anyone and nothing has been given. And as far as the situation in agriculture is concerned, disturbing reports have been coming in from consultations with the village administrators about the continuing drop in livestock production.

The second subject which was also intensely discussed, was housing construction. The prevailing opinion was that the middle variant of development for this field of the economy should be accepted. A great deal was said also about the new pattern of single-family construction. Conditions should be created for building small (read - cheap) houses, also out of wood.

As governor Rubczewski said, priority in budgetary funds will be given to the municipal economy, reclamation, and health protection. We must also tell ourselves very clearly that the investment program will, for all practical purposes, be restricted to the continuation of investments that have already been begun. The hospital in Bartoszyce is an exception. Here the governor addressed himself to the accusations made by J. Wawzkiewicz. --The needs of the health service are known to us, but building a new facility is not always the answer. We know of examples where health centers, with housing, in villages, stood vacant for many months, and even years. On the other hand, difficult working conditions in hospitals cannot be used as an excuse for disorder, dirt, etc. And this also happens. The governor also referred to the matter of goods for the villages, brought up by S. Groblewski. He said that 80 percent of rubber and rubber-felt boots are allocated to the countryside. The fact that there is a shortage of them everywhere is another matter. Where goods are scarce, any form of sales is bad, because for sure someone will not get them.

Finally he returned once more to the principles of constructing a draft 3-year plan. He said that the basic premises for the creation of this plan are known. We are familiar with the voivodship's needs, and also with the capabilities of our country

and our region. We should also remember that we are still operating under conditions of a deep crisis which, fortunately, is no longer intensifying but is still far from being overcome.

After the governor's speech, Janusz Wawszkiewicz again took the floor. He said that the problem of employing physicians in the rural areas does not depend merely on providing them housing. A physician, in order to develop professionally, must have steady contact with a hospital. Thus if a health center is to function without interruption, it must have a double staff. He also brought up the problem of a nurses' center. The belief has become common, especially among the authorities, that nurses will be happy with simply a nursing dormitory. How are these young women supposed to establish a family life?

Włodzimierz Mokrzyśczak, candidate member of the Politburo, also took part in the discussion. First he answered questions from the floor. Questions were asked about the effects of the elimination of certain offices and institutions (how many people went into production work?), about the new wage rules, about possible changes in the administrative division of the country. Comrade Mokrzyśczak said that employment in the central administration decreased 8 percent, and in the branch ministries, by 35 percent. In the associations that were formed, one-third of the amount of the personnel employed in the former associations is employed. It appears that the administration will be decreased further as the social climate permits and the implementation of economic reform. This is only a matter of time.

As to wage rules, the speaker made a very brief reply: There is a brochure in general circulation, material for discussion: "How Much, To Whom, For What". The result of this discussion will probably be a second version of the draft of the new system of wages.

As to possible changes in the administrative division of the country: A special Polish Academy of Sciences commission is to prepare a scientifically-based opinion on this subject. -- My personal feeling is that until we come out of the economic crisis, we should not increase the administrative confusion. Of course we should return to this subject after that.

Next Mokrzyśczak presented to those present a preliminary assessment of the state of the party organizations in the country. Over 80 percent of the reporting meetings have already been held. They proceeded with the highest efficiency in the workplaces, and with the greatest difficulty in the village organizations. In this discussion there was a great deal of concern about the party's strength and on increasing its influence on all of society. There was a positive sign: the workers' aktiv spoke out more frequently, often criticizing the management cadre.

--It is true, comrade Mokrzyśczak said--that after 13 December 1981 the party ranks shrank greatly. Let us observe, however, that 80 percent of the decisions to cancel party membership were made by the primary party organizations, and not the echelons or party control commissions.

In evaluating the attitudes of party members, the Central Committee secretary said that this attitude must be unequivocal everywhere: in the workplace, in the family, among a group of friends. In other words, one must be a party member everywhere and consistently express his convictions. Such an attitude, experience shows, gains

the respect also of those to whom the party ideology is foreign. In closing this subject, comrade Mokrzyzszak said that the PZPR is a stronger party than it was even recently. Each difficult task, and certainly there is no shortage of them, toughens and strengthens the attitudes of the party members. Thus this is a party that is more cohesive and controllable, and thus able to perform successive concrete tasks.

Passing to economic matters, the speaker emphasized that it is not the business of the Central Committee or the government to issue resolutions on the elimination of free Saturdays. However, where it is possible to increase production as a result, the party and the government can and will appeal to the work forces' judgment and sense of civic duty. There are already positive examples: footwear factories are working on all free Saturdays, and some textile industry plants also.

A tremendous obstacle to a more rapid emergence from the crisis is still the great mistrust of the people in the authorities. If it were possible to convince the great majority of the people that the actions of the authorities are directed at improving their living conditions, then these percentage figures in the economy could go up much faster. But there are positive changes here too. The people are becoming convinced that their comments and suggestions are being closely noted and put into effect. This is not proof that the authorities are weak--this is exactly the way it should be. No authority has a monopoly on wisdom and rightness.

--The large group in society are those people who observe both our actions as well as those of the political opposition--secretary Mokrzyzszak said.

--What happened on 10 November 1982 is proof that social attitudes have stabilized. I do not hesitate to describe this as a victory of the judgment of the Poles. All of us have a share in this victory: the party, the allied parties, and the state and economic administration.

--But party members--said the speaker in conclusion--must approach certain matters more quickly and watch over them with absolute pertinacity. This pertinacity is a positive characteristic, because the interests of the working people are at stake. There can be no indifferent people in the party.

The PZPR Central Committee secretary added his own thanks to those which the people preceding him in the discussions directed to the people in uniform: the Citizens Militia members and the soldiers of the Polish People's Army. In this difficult period they are fulfilling their responsible functions with dignity and for the good of society.

Next the first secretary of the PZPR KW, Jan Laskowski, took the floor, referring to the opinions expressed from the rostrum.

--Opinions have been expressed here which may give rise to the question, whether we as a voivodship party echelon, we, as its leadership, are effective in our operations. Because we talk and talk, and act and act, and there are no result from this. Are there actually none? Let us attempt to apply a measure and an assessment appropriate to the present time. The truth is this: If we, the party members, had not buckled down, then many matters which really are now being taken care of, would not have been touched. But it is also true that in many matters we have taken just one step, and maybe only half a step. But we are doing something. Perhaps all of this is still

not too apparent, particularly since in a wave of criticism, in our overall criticizing, we sometimes lose our sense of direction, and we do not see that in many matters we have moved forward. There are matters which already deserve praise. There are such matters, only one has to know how and want to notice them. And this should be, and is, a sign that we are coming out of the crisis, although still very slowly. It cannot be said, therefore, that our party activity is nonexistent. It exists and it brings results. If just the 10th of November. This was the day of special test for the party. We withstood this test. Good judgment won out. Many party organizations, many echelons, a large number of party members employed in the economy, in administration, and in other positions on this particular day, and even earlier, acquitted themselves, like good party members. The party aktiv deserves thanks for this.

In the final portion of the deliberations, after passing a resolution pertaining to improvement in the functioning of the voivodship party organization, the members of the Voivodship Committee looked into organizational matters. Three comrades, for various reasons, asked to be released from their duties. The resignation of Jan Rudnicki (from the Iława gmina) from membership in the KW was accepted. Marek Sapinski, from Ketrzyn, resigned from membership in the KW and the KW executive board, and Zygmunt Kruka, resigned from his position as KW secretary. The vacancies in the KW executive board and secretariat will be filled at the next KW plenum.

Plenum Resolution

Olsztyn GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA in Polish 22 Nov 82 p 3

[Resolution of the PZPR Voivodship Committee, dated 17 November 1982, on Tasks Ensuing from an Evaluation of the Voivodship's Party Organization Work and Tasks in the Implementation of the PZPR Central Committee Tenth Plenum Resolution]

[Text] The PZPR Voivodship Committee in Olsztyn, after familiarizing itself with materials, listening to papers and discussions, resolves:

1. To approve the courses of action taken by the KW executive board aimed at improving the work of the voivodship party organization.
2. To bind all its members to work resolutely to stimulate the primary party organizations in implementing the party's program and in giving these organizations assistance in conducting political-organizational work, and in autonomously solving local problems.
3. To bind the Voivodship Committee problem commissions to coordinate their control plans with the plans and intentions of the Voivodship People's Council in order to undertake joint measures in the area of control and analysis of party work. The problem commissions at the basal-level echelon should begin and regularly conduct similar activities.
4. For the purpose of seeking new ways to effectively perform the inspirational-control role of the voivodship party echelon in relation to the organs of authority and the state administration, take measures to coordinate the plans and programs of activity of the Voivodship Committee and its organs with the plans and intentions of the Voivodship People's Council and its organs.

5. To bind the KW Commission for Complaints and Suggestions to energetically attack the problems ensuing from the complaints and letters sent to the party echelons and organizations, and the method for receiving and dealing with the persons involved.

The Voivodship Committee recommends to the party echelons at the basal level that they appoint a commission for complaints and suggestions and that greater supervision over disposition of complaints, letters and suggestions be exercised by offices and institutions.

6. To bind the KW problem commissions to take control actions as regards the implementation of tasks contained in the KW executive board's plan schedule.

7. The Voivodship Committee authorizes its permanent political apparatus to conduct an ongoing inspection, combined with instruction, as regards implementation of tasks ensuing from the resolutions and decisions of the Central Committee and the Voivodship Committee.

8. Fully acknowledges and accepts for consistent implementation the main goals of social policy, as follows:

a) to feed the nation and make it possible to permanently solve the food problem in the voivodship;

b) to supply the populace with the industrial goods indispensable to everyday life and restore market balance;

c) to bring a halt to the deterioration in the housing situation and form the premises for its gradual improvement;

d) to improve health protection, meet the requirements for medicines, and consistently implement the program for construction of hospitals, walk-in clinics, and health centers;

e) observe socialist principles of remuneration in wage and income policy and provide public welfare to those groups of people who are financially the worst-off.

9. The Voivodship Committee acknowledges the implementation by the party echelons and organization of the post-inspection suggestions of the PZPR Central Audit Commission, and by the local and economic administrative units of the recommendations of Poland's Armed Forces Inspectorate, to be an integral part of the socioeconomic tasks in the voivodship. The KW organs and party echelons are advised to conduct regular assessments of the implementation of post-inspection tasks.

10. The PZPR KW Plenum ascertains a slow but systematic progress in the voivodship's socioeconomic development. The observed tendencies prove that there is discipline and that society and the workforces understand the need to surmount the economic difficulties in the country and the voivodship. Further progress in this area will form the premise of more rapid emergence from the crisis situation.

11. The Voivodship Committee stresses the importance of the socioeconomic plan for 1983 and for 1983-1985 in the further development of the voivodship and the country.

Having in mind the fact that the economic activity of enterprises will develop during the process of economic reform in the country and improvement in the instruments of reform, the plenum recommends that the primary party organizations inspire all social forces, and mainly the newly formed workers' self-governments and trade unions, to actively participate in the enterprises' planning process and in the economic education of the workforces as regards economic reform.

12. The PZPR Voivodship Committee, having in the mind the urgency and complexity of the implementation of social goals, and taking into account the voivodship's capabilities, resolves:

- a) to accelerate the holding of the KW plenary meeting dealing with the housing construction program for 1983-1985; this problem should be the subject of the PZPR KW plenary meeting in the first six months of 1983;
- b) to bind the KW executive board to include in its work plan for the first quarter of 1983 problems pertaining to health protection in the Olsztyn voivodship, to be preceded by consultation with the interested parties;
- c) to recommend to the governor that variant programs for development of agriculture and the food economy be prepared for the period up to 1985 and also to the year 1990. The plenum invites the United Peasant Party and the Social Democratic Party Voivodship Committees to participate jointly in this work.

13. The KW plenum recommends that the party organizations and echelons familiarize the party members and society as a whole with the provisions of the PZPR Central Committee Tenth Plenum resolutions and those of today's PZPR KW plenum. It is recommended also that the party organizations and echelons consistently implement the plan schedules approved thus far for political-organizational actions relating to socioeconomic problems.

14. The Voivodship Committee calls on the members of the PZPR and other political parties and social organizations, and also on the people in the voivodship, to forward their comments, suggestions, postulates and assessments pertaining to socioeconomic problems and economic reform. The Voivodship Committee will treat this as a valuable form of social consultation.

The PZPR Voivodship Committee expresses the conviction that the attitude of the people in the voivodship, as shown on 10 November 1982, forms a premise for positive transformations in the voivodship's economy.

Olsztyn, 17 November 1982

PZPR Voivodship Committee in Olsztyn

Plenum Preparing for Province Conference

Olsztyn GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA in Polish 30 Dec 82 pp 1, 2

[Article by (jer)]

[Text] Yesterday's [29 December 1982] PZPR Voivodship Committee (KW) Plenum was devoted to an assessment of the reporting campaign

and preparations for the voivodship reporting conference. The meeting, which was chaired by the PZPR KW first secretary, Jan Laskowski, was attended also by Politburo candidate member and PZPR Central Committee secretary, Wlodzimierz Mokrzyaszczak.

Adam Weselak, PZPR KW secretary, reported on how the reporting campaign was proceeding in the sectional, basal, city, city-gmina and gmina party organizations. He characterized the course of the meetings and conferences, which summed up the work at midterm and outlined tasks for the future. In general, the atmosphere at them was good, indicating an increase in political activeness, ideological cohesiveness and organizational efficiency on the part of PZPR members. A very scrupulous accounting of the execution of motions and resolutions passed at its own meetings and of the resolutions of the higher level echelons was noted in the reports and discussions. But not all of the decisions previous made were implemented, either because it was not possible to do so or because they were made in haste, not thoroughly considered or not realistic, and could do harm to the party. The critical speeches were mainly concentrated on internal matters, i.e., those that it was possible to solve within the organization. At District Party Organization (OOP) and Primary Party Organization (POP) meetings, over 2,000 motions were made. In 87 cases changes were made in the first secretary position, 15 in the second secretary position, and 43 members of the executive board. Frequently the subject of deliberations was the attitude of party members, matters of discipline, evidences of uneconomical management, disorder and irresponsibility, the role of the POP in economic reform and the changing political situation, and the trade unions. Not everywhere was attendance good. Other weaknesses lay in the preparation of resolutions and the formulation of concrete tasks.

The next subject at the KW Plenum was an assessment of the previously prepared draft report by the Voivodship Committee for the PZPR voivodship reporting conference in Olsztyn, which is drawing near. The following comrades addressed themselves in the name of the KW problem commissions to particular parts of the material, making comments and corrections: Jozef Doliwa (Economic Commission), Stanislaw Wiatrowski (Youth Commission), Andrzej Wojcicki (Order and Safety Commission), Tadeusz Pogorzelski (Intraparty Commission), Zygmunt Kruk (Farm Commission), Krystyna Lobacka (Womens Commission), Sylwester Krakowski (Health and Social Welfare Commission), Jan Zielinski (Complaints and Suggestions Commission), Marian Ceynowa (Ideological Commission), and Boleslaw Konieczko and Janusz Wawszkiewicz.

Wlodzimierz Mokrzyaszczak, candidate member of the Politburo and PZPR Central Committee secretary, also spoke. He called attention to the fact that the reporting campaign is an occasion for comparison of how things were towards the end of 1981 and how they are now, and also an occasion to show what we have obtained in the voivodship and the country as a result of the consistent implementation of the Ninth PZPR Congress resolutions--the progress that is being made. We should also be aware of the strength that the voivodship party organization has in internal activities for the good of all the people in the region. We should realize that the political opponent, although now weaker, will attempt to win his case, with the support of foreign centers inimical to us.

The concrete results in overcoming the crisis--he emphasized--mean that as a party we have greater confidence among the people and we must always take care to ensure that the people, particularly in places of work, need us. It is very important that

complaints and suggestions sent to the party be investigated carefully and in conformity with the principles of justice and law and order. Most of the attention should also be given to the POP in the workplaces, where it was and is most difficult for the comrades. Wlodimierz Mokrzyzszak also strongly emphasized the matter of maintaining party organizational and ideological unity, and the struggle with everything that violates or shatters this unity. In speaking about economic problems, the first achievements in particular fields--obtained under conditions of drastic import restrictions caused by the West--he stressed the need to honor and respect the people who give all of themselves that they have in developing the concepts for bringing substitute materials and technology into our industry. The Central Committee secretary also devoted a great deal of space in his speech to cadre policy, saying that it will be the subject of deliberations at the PZPR Central Committee Twelfth Plenum.

In addressing himself to the draft report, KW first secretary Jan Laskowski called attention to the fact that necessity forces us to also give consideration to party functioning under conditions of suspended martial law, when a very great deal will depend on the results of political activity, particularly in the workplaces.

The result of discussion on the draft report was a resolution. It authorizes the KW secretariat to do the final editing on the draft, calls a PZPR voivodship reporting conference for 29 January (9 o'clock), defines the principles and procedures for inviting guests to take part in the deliberations, and requires that prior regional meetings be held with the delegates to the conference in order to discuss organizational matters.

An election was also held during the plenum to fill the position of KW secretary, which, as we know, was vacant after the resignation of Zygmunt Kruk. Wladyslaw Dragun (Morag State Farm director, KW member, delegate to the Ninth Congress, has a degree in agriculture) was elected in a secret vote. The Voivodship Committee was also expanded by one person, by secret election KW member Adolf Teresiak (deputy KW member, party member since 1946, retired, worked in the Voivodship Meat Industry Enterprise).

9295

CSO: 2600/243

EMIGRE DAILY CITES BUJAK STATEMENTS IN UNDERGROUND PRESS

Continued Solidarity Activity Urged

London DZIENNIK POLSKI I DZIENNIK ZOLNIERZA in Polish 8 Dec 82 pp 1, 4

[Text] Chairman of the Temporary Coordinating Commission (TKK) of the underground "Solidarity," Zbigniew Bujak, announced a program of action for the near future in the secret weekly newspaper MAZOWSZE and confirmed that rumors of misunderstandings of the TKK with Lech Walesa are untrue. The regime press is carrying on a shrill anti-American campaign, which was accompanied the day before yesterday by the beating of a Polish worker of the U.S. embassy in Warsaw and anonymous threats addressed to two American women employed at that embassy. The Vatican protested against the sentencing to prison of two priests and one civilian church worker in Gdansk. In Czestochowa and Krakow a new way of releasing interned persons is being employed by militia commanding officers at the suggestion of local regime organizations.

In the announced declaration in the weekly newspaper MAZOWSZE Zbigniew Bujak expressed doubts in his own mind and in that of the "Solidarity" TKK that in calling off martial law the Military Council for National Salvation [WRON] will free all interned persons, and announced that underground activity will be carried on as long as not only those held forcefully are released, but until all people sentenced as a result of the breaking of martial law regulations are released.

At the same time, Bujak expressed the view, that after the lifting of martial law, "Solidarity" activists will have to carry on more open work and they will present at the beginning of next year a project aimed at amendment of the new law about labor unions, directed toward the expansion of workers' rights--among others, the right to strike. That program will also contain a plan of economic reforms and a tangible battle with the crisis in the Polish People's Republic.

Walesa

As far as Walesa is concerned, Bujak wrote, that the authorities could have hoped that he would break from the TKK, but that did not happen. He emphasized that the TKK is made up of former coworkers and helpers of Walesa, after which he confirmed, verbatim:

"We perfectly understand Lech's situation and the limitations given him, as well as those possibilities of the TKK, which he doesn't possess at this time. We can and should expect from him, that he will remain faithful to the ideals of August 1980 in spite of all obstacles."

Program

Bujak outlined the future program of "Solidarity" not as an armed plot for the purpose of overthrowing the regime, but as a positive plan of evolution of "Solidarity's" system. He added, that it will be a program of national understanding but not on the basis of principles shoved on them by the communist authorities. It will aim toward economic reform and "setting the whole economy of the Polish People's Republic back on its own feet."

Further on in his statement, Bujak acknowledged that a call to strikes and demonstrations in opposition to martial law regulations fell short of expectations and didn't manage to prevent the dissolution of "Solidarity." But the call to boycott the new labor unions, which are to come into being only in individual plants and which are threatened by dependence on the Communist Party, was seen to be a success.

The official news agency PAP has informed, that to this time there have been only 809 labor unions confirmed, and with small numbers of members.

Anti-American Campaign

An American Embassy worker in Warsaw, not identified by name, was severely beaten up by "unknown persons," that is, by thugs sent by the Security Service. Three men attacked him last Saturday after he left the embassy office. While they beat him, they warned him, that, that what they were doing was only a warning.

At the same time two women workers from the American Embassy, the same ones whose cars were damaged in October by "hooligans," found notes on their cars with threats and orders of the nature: "Americans--get out of Poland and go to hell," and with longer figments of the imagination, as well as assurances that Poles are not red-skinned Indians from Wild West films, that they don't retreat when shot at by B-B guns and that to the contrary, they can shoot--quite accurately at that. The conclusion of these statements goes like this: "Get away from real Poles with your dirty mitts. If you don't change your attitude, you'll hear from us again."

Those elaborations were signed: "Patriotic Movement of Progressive Youth." They were edited maybe by Mr Jerzy Urban--in Polish. This is accompanied by

a hysterical campaign, not only in opposition to American sanctions, but also--and maybe this is more significant--in opposition to United States Defense Secretary Weinberger, who called Jaruzelski "a Russian general in Polish uniform."

Imprisoned Priests

DAILY TELEGRAPH correspondent Robin Gedye confirms that the Vatican has expressed concern about the fate of two Gdansk priests who were summarily sentenced to prison by a Gdansk court because it was rumored that they frequently took part in antigovernment demonstrations.

Fr. Tadeusz Kurach received 3 years in prison and Fr. Jan Borkowski, 2 years. At the same time a nonclerical church worker, Henryk Kardas, was sentenced to 3 1/2 years in prison. They weren't allowed to appeal. In the Vatican the opinion prevails that all three were sentenced without a shred of evidence of their guilt. Everyone confirmed that they are not guilty.

Arrests and Releases

The press agency PAP informed that in Warsaw two groups of young people have been arrested, who pasted up "antigovernment posters" on streets. Among those held, it is rumored that there were two former workers of the Warsaw "Solidarity" office.

In Czestochowa the local council of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth asked the local militia commandant for the release of interned persons there, after which the commandant quickly released 10 "Solidarity" activists. In the PAP news bulletin on that subject, it was given that after that decision in the Czestochowa province there remain only 8 interned persons--among these, three "for notorious money changing in front of PEWEX [foreign currency stores]."

In another PAP news bulletin it was given that "in Krakow the last three interned persons remaining from the Lenin Metal Works Combine were released. Request to the provincial commandant of the MO [militia] for their release was made by the foundry workers founders committee, representing the newly formed labor unions in the combine.

Offer to Dissolve TKK

London DZIENNIK POLSKI I DZIENNIK ZOLNIERZA in Polish 9 Dec 82 pp 1, 4

[Excerpt] Lech Walesa requested the regime authorities for permission to speak at a public gathering 16 December in Gdansk on the 12th anniversary of the bloody incidents of 1970. According to information from Krzysztof Bobinski, leader of the underground "Solidarity," Zbigniew Bujak would like Walesa to lead further legal opposition and is ready to end secret activities in exchange for release of interned and imprisoned activists. The commandant of the Warsaw militia ordered the release of 32 interned Warsaw residents and area residents, but among them there were not any of the head

"Solidarity" activists. The conclusion can be reached from a news release of the military prosecutor, that in November an investigation was begun into 108 civilians for crimes committed against the martial law decree.

As Krzystof Bobinski reported, Bujak published an interview in the weekly newspaper MAZOWSZE, in which he laid out the political line, which in his opinion Lech Walesa should undertake at the present time. He said that Walesa should fight by legal means for the return of labor unions in the original form of "Solidarity," for a tamer censorship, and for social control of security forces in the Polish People's Republic [PRL].

Bujak firmly underlined the already previously declared offer of "Solidarity" to end its underground activity under the condition that not only all interned persons are released, but also of an announcement of amnesty for all those sentenced as a result of the martial law decree.

Asked about the possibility of the creation of an officially recognized Christian-Democratic Party, Bujak spoke out against it. He is a proponent of other legal forms of opposition and of putting pressure on the regime by other means. According to him, that all can happen possibly after repeal of the present state of affairs.

According to Bobinski the interview with Bujak appears to forecast the end of underground activities of "Solidarity" in its present form and the dissolution of the TKK.

Walesa's Intentions

It's not known if Lech Walesa will follow the line recommended by Bujak. That may be seen on 16 December in Gdansk, if the regime positively processes his request for permission to have a public gathering on the anniversary of the 1970 incidents. At this gathering Walesa would like to deliver his basic address, the first after his release from Armalow.

His wife, Danuta, informed the Western press about his intentions by telephone. She added, that other than workers, local government authorities and local Catholic clergy also were to take part.

According to martial law regulations no public gatherings are allowed to take place without permission of the authorities. On the other hand, the regime promised the repeal of martial law on 13 December, but later began to talk first about the possibilities of shifting the date to 23 December, and lately outrightly about a new thought of suspending [in boldface] martial law while leaving far-reaching police ordinances for the time being before its final repeal.

Release of Warsaw Residents

The day before yesterday the spokesman for the Military Council for National Salvation [WRON], Jerzy Urban, informed the foreign press of the release of

32 interned Warsaw and Warsaw area residents by the Warsaw militia commandant--at the suggestion of the National Social Council. To reporters' questions about whether among them are leading "Solidarity" activists, he could not or did not want to answer, but it is known from families of such people as Janusz Onyszkiewicz and Seweryn Jaworski, imprisoned in Bialoleka, that they did not gain freedom yet, in spite of the fact that they are Warsaw activists.

Also, persons not released from Bialoleka were: a resident of Gdansk, Andrzej Gwiazda; a resident of Bydgoszcz, Jan Rulewski; and a resident of Wroclaw, Karol Modzelewski.

In addition, Urban did not say one word about how many still remain interned in camps, or how many were released in individual cities, and emphasized that transitional regulations can be issued that permit further internment of certain persons, even after the first orders concerning the repeal of martial law. He made it understood, that the Sejm will begin discussion about the present state of affairs on 13 December, but later will take it up again on 23 December. He also said that transitional regulations have not yet been worked out.

12281
CSO: 2600/154

RESEARCH CENTER HEAD DISCUSSES 1982 PUBLIC OPINION POLL

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 30 Dec 82 pp 1,2

[Interview with Albin Kania, Public Opinion Research Center director, by Barbara Drozd; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] The Center, for several years now under your direction, conducts a survey in December on the topic: evaluating the year coming to a close. How did the evaluation of this year turn out?

[Answer] In evaluating 1982, 17 percent of those questioned stated that this year was a good year for the country, 44 percent said that it was a bad year, 29 percent found that it was neither good nor bad, but 10 percent of those queried did not express any opinion. In the very breakdown of these opinions one can see this as unfavorable, but if we compare it to the evaluations of previous years, it changes its significance somewhat. Thus, in 1979, 21 percent of those queried evaluated the previous year as bad for Poland, in 1980--78 percent, in 1981--86 percent; however, this year it was 44 percent. It was not, therefore, a good year for the country according to public opinion but, still, it was not as bad as it was 2 years ago.

[Question] What do the results of your surveys say about the reasons for this year being evaluated as better than the previous year?

[Answer] The results of the survey showed that in 1982 people's anxieties, concerns and misgivings about personal security and the situation of the country have decreased; that there has been a rather small but generally felt decline in the difficulties of acquiring food supplies; and that the prospect of calm, a normalization of life and the country's emergence from the crisis has appeared in the public consciousness.

[Question] In that case, why did so many people nonetheless evaluate this year as bad?

[Answer] Because in 1982 supplies of food articles, although slightly better, were nevertheless still bad, and it was even worse than before for certain manufactured goods. That is why a large increase in prices and a considerable decrease in real wages occurred, why the crisis persisted, why this year was not free of controversially judged decisions, heated conflicts and social unrest.

The results of this year's opinion surveys repeatedly revealed these particular reasons for the critical evaluations of the situation in our country.

[Question] We are speaking this whole time about 1982 in its entirety, though it is a well known fact that at that time we lived through various cycles and that our feelings and opinions changed. What do the results of the OBOP [Public Opinion Research Center] surveys say on this point?

[Answer] Based on the results of the surveys, we can distinguish 3 periods in the past year: the first until mid-spring, the second until November, and the third from 10 November until today.

[Question] What did your surveys note as characteristic in the first period?

[Answer] Above all, the severity of martial law restrictions. At the same time, restrictions connected with daily life, relating to freedom of mobility, telephone communications, and the curfew, were more universally felt than the restrictions connected with union activities and political freedom. After the initial shock, there nonetheless arose a recognition of the need to enforce martial law, based on such premises as: a rise in the feeling of security, a reduction of tensions and fears, (very intense in the final months of 1981), satisfaction with the restoration of calm and law, with better work uninterrupted by constant strikes, with a more intensive war against speculation, and with greater order.

At this time, (I am speaking about the period up to mid-spring), results of the surveys revealed a dual attitude toward the price rise in food articles that was introduced on 1 July 1982. This increase was evaluated by substantial sections of the population as being too drastic and it elicited fears of hardships. Simultaneously, however, it was not evaluated, as it had been in 1976, as an unwarranted increase--and this is due as much to the market tests preceding it, as to its partially positive effects on the market.

Converging with this evaluation was a considerable improvement in the people's opinion of the food market and a sense of the efficiency of the workings of the system of regulation; and, against this background, was the widespread all but acceptance of this system as the form of proper distribution during a crisis period.

During this period, the survey which moved on to the topic of the policy of restrictions by the U.S. in relation to Poland revealed a rise in criticism of the United States.

[Question] What do the results of the survey say about the second period, that lasted from mid-spring until November?

[Answer] Demonstrations and street encounters exerted considerable influence on the public mood during this time. The public mood worsened, and unrest and a sense of uncertainty mounted. On the one hand, the underground was losing according to public opinion--criticism of "Solidarity" was mounting--on the other hand, the authorities did not gain approval either. Still, surveys at

the end of this period showed that the call for a general strike is not getting broader support and that the decision to disband the hitherto existing union structures and to form new trade unions perhaps may be accepted with understanding by a large segment of the public.

[Question] And, finally, the third period, the one from November until today...

[Answer] Conventionally, 10 November can be accepted as the date of its beginning, although the changes and revaluations, of which such and no other course of this day was the result, took place earlier. The defeat of the underground, its isolation and detachment from society, on the one hand, and the political offensive of the authorities, the decisions of the authorities, clearly communicating to the public their intention to form national agreements, on the other hand, brought about results in the form of improvements in mood, a decrease of tensions and a growth of confidence in the government.

Surveys from the end of November revealed that the authority of the military remains very high and that the government is gaining the confidence of the majority of the public. Surveys from the end of November also revealed that a considerable portion, by more than 40 percent surveyed, was afraid of an early repeal of martial law, the possibility of which was then already put before the public in the appeal by PRON [Polish Council for National Defense].

Considerably less fear was elicited by the decision to suspend martial law. According to the initial results of the survey conducted on 21 December, namely, already after the decision to suspend martial law on 31 December, the distribution of opinions on this issue was as follows: 54 percent of those surveyed met the decision with approval, 11 percent found that it was still too early for suspension of martial law, 27 percent maintained that martial law should be completely repealed and not [merely] suspended, and 8 percent did not express an opinion.

This survey also showed a considerable improvement in the public's mood, a lessening of unrest and fears, as well as a rise--in the public's general feeling--in the prospects for stabilization and calm in the country.

[Question] I understand, sir, that in our conversation you have handled the general effects, relative to the entire Polish experiment. Do your surveys show a differentiation of attitudes depending on the affiliation of the respondents to various social classes and groups?

[Answer] A differentiation of attitudes and opinions conditioned by age, sex and especially the position occupied in the social structure occurs in many issues and the results of the surveys show these differences. It is difficult to present these differences in their entirety in a brief interview. So, I will restrict myself to only one of the occurring types of divisions of opinion that stood out most distinctly in the last period, namely in 1982. I mean the differences in opinions, views and attitudes between the intellectuals and the rest of society.

These differences always occurred but they were usually not greater than the differences between other social classes, divisions or groups. A radical change occurred in 1982. There were factions of intellectuals, considerably greater than other social classes and divisions, assuming critical attitudes regarding fundamental social and political problems, regarding the government, martial law and decisions in the area of the union movement. I could mention many such examples from several score of our surveys of this year. They show that the difference in opinion between the intellectuals and other social divisions and classes are now far greater than the differences conditioned by age, party affiliation or also by former union affiliation.

[Question] To end our conversation...how are we entering the new year, with optimism or pessimism?

[Answer] At the end of 1981, the hope that the coming year would be better was expressed by 20 percent of those surveyed; at the end of this year, it was 41 percent. That is, optimism in the current year is slightly greater than it was in the past year.

9891

CSO: 2600/203

FUTURE OF POLISH INTELLIGENTSIA DISCUSSED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25 Oct 82 pp 3, 4

[Article by Prof Janusz Kuczynski: "The Cultural Avant Garde, the Indispensability of Social Rationalism, the Principle of Silence and the Principles of Intelligence: The Future of the Polish Intelligentsia"]

[Text] Much good is being said about the fact that the genealogy of the Polish intelligentsia is well spoken of. But I would like to discuss the 'futureology' of Poland's intelligentsia rather than its genealogy, the objective conditioning of the growth of its role and the pre-requisites--as I believe--for its very extensive development so that we can have hope for the near future and certainly for the far future.

I envision the following conditioning: the internal, far-reaching logic of the present and anticipated situation must also generate with increasing force an ever increasing need for social action by intellectuals. The socioeconomic structure in which we live is governed by a law of internal development that is not always obvious because it is hidden in its essence; the main principle of this law is that the relations of production and productive forces must be necessarily in conformity. This law operates not only during a revolutionary period, during the passage to a new structure, but on a continuous basis, especially in an evolutionary manner during the passage from a lower to a higher stage of socialist development.

In the history of the Polish People's Republic, it can be shown easily that a certain degree of nonconformity was transcended when production relations and the political-cultural superstructure hindered greatly the further development of productive forces even while the 1956, 1970 and 1980 crises occurred inescapably. Please remember that after 1956 and 1970 we had a new 'adjustment' of production relations and the superstructure to the new level of productive forces, whose most important component is man, including his capability, intelligence (in a psychological sense) and knowledge.

In both historic cases, however, it turned out that the stabilizations were too insignificant and too narrow, and lacked a proper programmatic perspective, and thus the stabilizations were of short durations. They

lacked a suitably broad social base, were insufficiently far-reaching and lacked a well-founded theoretical vision; they did not strive realistically toward the sufficiently extensive, deeply-rooted national traditions. On the other hand, they could be characterized as defensive; they were a rejoinder to a valid protest and not the creation of a new situation based on a far-reaching initiative of our own. In other words, they were primarily political solutions and not ideological solutions--in the positive meaning of the word. What is more, they were not theoretical solutions worthy of a socialist structure. Of course, this does not mean that they did not contain certain permanent values, often developed by the entire nation, which today represent a basis for continuation.

But the new stage that we are entering must be characterized from the viewpoint of the Marxist philosophy of the sense of history and include the following traits:

1. Regardless of present and anticipated tensions, we will witness the formation of a new stabilization. It can be of a permanent nature this time if it is sufficiently deep-rooted and broad. Every stabilization is the building of a well-defined whole, the foundation of which should encompass the widest possible domain. Only if the currently created stage of the whole agrees in scope with the fundamental whole (that is, the socioeconomic structure of socialism) will it be permanent and accepted by history.

2. It will be a stage having stronger central state and political authorities, and at the same time these authorities will provide increasingly pronounced support of the independent, self-governing and autonomous worker base (trade unions and self-governments as co-creators) as well as the economic (reform), scientific and then cultural bases.

In the widest meaning of the relationship between both social phenomena: a stronger central authority and the widest possible base, there is no inconsistency in spite of the current law court and presently vast scope of phenomena. On the contrary, good historical experience as well as theoretical analysis show that both phenomena condition one another. Lenin's famous words that "The state is the potent consciousness of the masses" are a classical expression of this interdependence which today can be defined symbolically as the complimentary of state and self-government (which also is the title I gave to my article published in SZTANDAR MŁODYCH, April 1981). The reality and durability of the base is possible, especially in our circumstances, only as the power of the authorities flows from the base of society and only if the government is stronger.

3. This stage must be a stage for creating extensive, flexible production relations (including management systems, factual ownership or joint decision-making), and the intelligent building of structures so extensive and flexible so as to create a large field and great motivation for the full utilization of current productive forces and their accelerated development, and to gradually involve more and more social groups. More precisely, the concern here is to define socialist relations of production so that the stimulation of productive forces--above all, let us repeat, of man, people--would be maximized.

This development is not only a conclusion of the theory of structure, it also is an absolute dictate of the present stage of conflict between socialism and capitalism. To win this conflict, which in the widest stratum is taking place on the economic plane, to win it once and for all, it is necessary to achieve a labor productivity that is higher than that of capitalism. This already was postulated by the greater authority of the worker movement in words that are just as famous as those cited above. It is known how it is now. However, one also must look at those areas, though there are not many, in which the labor productivity of our factories have better indexes than those in the West.

4. This stage can and must begin with a period for taking advantage of the opportunities embodied in the possibilities for properly planning social development and rationally building production structure. The harmonious combination of the science of a strategic plan, the energy of the base of self-government and a sensible flexibility in the marketplace can quickly overcome the physical crisis and in time the economic crisis. The concern here is about rationally complementing the three factors and not their confrontation in the form of absolutism of the state or self-government or the marketplace which can be disintegrating.

The unrestrained regulation of social organizers, although presently very effective in capitalism, is a tremendous waste of energy in the free competition system; to a great extent the competitors neutralize one another, it is a colossal waste of energy (read the objective report of the Club of Rome). It drains intellectual energy from other countries and the like. This obstacle of growth and advantage are diminishing rapidly and are counter to social morality. The 'limits of growth' will inhibit expansive, exploitative development more and more, the symptoms of which are intensifying.

5. Thus, in Poland's present situation, the new stage must be one of intensive and not extensive development. We do not wish and cannot go sideways. For all reasons--moral, political and economic--we must go 'deeper.' In other words, the concern here is not about space but of time, not of production potential but of productive intellect, not of effectiveness but of efficiency.

6. The advanced centers of the world are entering a phase that is still more important and striking than the scientific-technological revolution. It is an information revolution, and thus a revolution of the economy of intelligence, the proficiency of intelligence. The thesis of 'Das Kapital' regarding science as a direct productive force will now probably be applied decisively and ascertained.

The above objective truths generate the obvious premises concerning the expansion of the basis role of the intelligentsia. As a social stratum, it becomes one of the two fundamental conditions of our social existence--the existence of Poland in an increasingly complicated world. To an increasing extent, two factors will decide Poland's development:

a) the working class and its party, as a fundamental force guaranteeing the most extensive cohesion, the essential whole and a socialist structure.

b) the intelligentsia and its intellectual, that is scientific, cultural, ideological man. These are social creators, demarcating new realms and mechanisms of substance, rationality, inspiration and capability with its discoveries and activities.

The first factor--the working class and its party--represent the political avantgarde. The second factor represents the cultural avant garde. In reality they are interdependent and not antagonistic as now is the case in some circles.

They are interdependent, and the more they unite and work with one another the more the one and the other of these two avant gardes will develop. In other words, the durability and real efficiency of actions of the political force depend on the intellectual base, and the freedom of the intelligentsia 'toward' and not 'from' the highest type of conditioned freedom and the historical significance of intellectual effort depend on the fundamental force.

None of the above forces can realize its substance and goals without the simultaneous development of the other: the political force will assure the basic social order, guide the overall scheme and the ideological direction or, in other words, guarantee the whole of the structure. On the other hand, the intelligentsia can guarantee the proper realization of this stage of the structure, regardless of any temporary distortions and strains, or also participate in realizing the whole. Both forces are the collectives, subjects of socialist evolution and of the scientific, technical and information revolution. The latter must also be a revolution of the intellect.

The revolution of the intellect: in as much as the words of Einstein and Russell in their famous appeal on the future of our species, in the words of the rhetorical question: "Will we learn to think in a new way?" are true, then it is all the more important that we learn to think in a new way to renew and develop our country. The concern here is also about a rationalism that will operate widely and effectively in society.

The magnificent tradition of rationalism in Poland can be reason for optimism. Saying nothing of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment and the positivism of the post-insurrection epoch, I will mention only the latest trends of this Polish rationalism: the Lwow-Warsaw school with Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbinski and Tatarkiewicz; phenomenology with Ingarden; and Marxist rationalism.

In addition, elements of rationalism and even areas of rationality also exist in other philosophical trends and in ordinary world-views. However, their subjects usually are only the intellectuals and front ranks of the intelligentsia, and ideologues of social action. But the possibilities of increasing the influence of these rationalists are great, of which Marxist rationalism, of course, is the most important one for us because of its inexhaustable resources for scientific and social inspiration and not in the more frequently encountered banal ideological declarations which often compromise even the best intentions.

But the reader may ask: How can one reconcile the many absurdities and antirationalisms which existed and still exist in many areas of social life? If an answer is wanted then that sad paradox can be explained broadly. For the time being, let it be sufficient to say that the symbolically assumed gist of the matter is--even by the most unrelenting foes of Karl Marx, a genius and the founder of social science and thus a 'physicist' of society--that Karl Marx cannot bear the responsibility for the actions of the social 'architects,' 'engineers,' and 'technicians' (theoreticians, ideologues and politicians), especially since these people often do not understand the truly very difficult science of Marxism. Perhaps it is even the most difficult because it concerns the most complicated object of research in the whole known universe: human society.

The laws of physics, however, do not cease to operate objectively and do not cease to provide opportunities for their rational study, even though structures erected by undereducated architects, limited engineers and none too diligent technicians frequently are unsteady.

The potentially and often factually avant garde character of the intelligentsia in culture and its social role in the broadest sense of the word also result from the increased importance of the subjective factor in the process of building socialism. This subjective factor is jointly pursued with diversity, above all by intellectual workers. And unquestionably one of the decisive parts of that subjective factor is the rationalisms as intellectual prerequisites for individual and joint actions. The mentioned rationalisms, despite their diverse justifications, can represent a plane for verifiable and rational discussions, and in time provide more emphatic linkages for practical efforts.

In addition to being a common plane of discussion, rationalism can also be a common prerequisite for revolutionizing work, its intellectualization. From this perspective, one of the Catholic philosophers was right when he wrote lately that "Today labor took a big step in the direction of dialogue. An integral part of work--the work which I do--is understanding the world and its people. Its key value is not force but truth--force which is only derived on the basis of truth: truth for truth, in a just manner. On this level the sense of responsibility for the course of a dialogue--work matures" (Father Jozef Tischer: The Horizon of Laboring for the Fatherland" TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, 19 Sep 82).

In this way, it is possible to expand meeting grounds of the rationalistic elements of various philosophies. Understanding people is linked with understanding the world and work dialogue simply becomes a condition for fundamental and social sense. Regardless of the other intentions of the cited philosopher and the problem of priority, for example, the right to the designation of philosophy of work, the option for coresponsibility and thus social understanding and even a dialogue on work is an opening of the path toward realizing undeniably common values. It is the condition for all other conditions. This is so because to communicate we must first understand one another (not necessarily agree), and even prior to this one must exist biologically (work) and socially (responsibility).

The extent, durability and at the same time development of the present stage of the structure also depend on the extent of historical fundamentals to which both avant gardes adduce to in principle (the political and cultural avant gardes). The force of ideology depends, among other things, on the depth and extent of its historical roots; and the extent of the influences and strength of the authorities also depend on the extent of approved traditions. It is an indisputable standard proven many times in practice. Of course, along with this is also banal in that in evaluating an inheritance the principles of historicism are obligatory, and the rightness of seeing the substances and not chance or secondary effects which make it difficult for some people to see the whole.

Thus it is worthwhile to mention a part of the evaluation of the role of the intelligentsia during a particularly significant period:

"The rank and file socialist movement, for which PO PROSTU was representative and symbolic prior to October, appealed to Marxist axiology, especially to the value of democracy, and made use of revolutionary bits and pieces. This movement expanded, beginning with criticism of the manifestations of bureaucracy and autocracy by exploring the applications of Marxism, explaining reality and ending with the most literal explanation of a people's government. The Clubs of Young Intellectuals, a revolutionary organization of youth and worker self-government, obtained their initiatives here" (article by Z. Rykowski and W. Wladyka: "The Polish October," No "Here and Now" of 29 Sep 82).

Those experiences, later distorted and denounced, should be evaluated realistically, not for empty satisfaction but above all to determine if the time is not now approaching to reinitiate the formation of similar type activities, for example, by expanding the Club for Social Rationalism. There are reasons justifying such an initiative of the intelligentsia and workers desiring to expand everyday life by infusing it with science, culture, intellect and values.

The future of Poland's intelligentsia depends above all on the good fortunes of the Polish working class. As a class, the intelligentsia should adopt the slogan: *Frustra vivit qui nemini prodest*" (Verily, for life to have meaning one must be useful to others).

The substance of calling the intelligentsia is service to social culture, proficient organization and the co-creation of social values. That is why (especially after the political battle that is now generally crucial in shaping the new stabilization) the acceptance of something that can be called the 'principle of silence' not only encourages operation of the Copernican law of supplanting good coin with bad, but it also is a process of self-destruction of the essence of the intelligentsia, the essence contained in the mission of the intellect, of faith in the power of argument and not any kind of argument of demonstrated power and of the force of silence. Regardless of the often very noble intentions and actions performed in a climate of desperation, in the final analysis it will be the historical-social bilateral results that will count.

It would be worthy of the traditions and name of the intelligentsia if the 'principle of silence' was replaced by the 'principle of revitalization,' Staszycism or the 'principle of helpfulness' or the 'principle of creativity' (the ultimate principles of positivism--if anyone only recognizes this as being possible), which also can be defined actually as the 'principles of intellect.' If someone does not wish to voice his opinions in the political sphere which may be fully justified because of a lack of interest, other vast spheres of the social base remain--the social mission spheres of culture, economics and science. The intellectualization and humanization of our social life is also worthy in itself.

As a common object of co-creating ideas, values and rational actions, the intelligentsia should also protect the scope and openness of the ideological horizon of the new whole and new stage. The battle concerned and still concerns ideas and values. We are witness in this area and, regardless of our own wishes, participants in the absorbing and very dangerous phenomena which can be termed as an indirect and insidious challenge to the socialist complex of values.

It is known that values are often defined by the whole in which they function; the word 'fatherland' means one thing in the world-view of a patriot and another thing on the lips of an anti-nationalist or nihilist. The battle concerns the right to values, the richness of our own axiological hierarchy.

Today, also on an international scale, a battle rages about self-government. In this regard, there are forces calling themselves Marxist who designate self-government as an 'imperialist slogan' (!). Obviously, this word was interpreted in many ways, but in its essence is part of the classical tradition of the left. In this case it seems as though it became separated from it, contrary to it!

The intelligentsia is also being called to service so that socialism would be ideologically enriched as much as possible and, of course, factually. Sounding utopian from the viewpoint of Lenin's famous words that "one cannot be a communist who does not master the total sum of human knowledge" in reality actually means that we should strive to enrich as much as possible the new structure with all authentic values however and by whoever they are created.

Thus, one must possess the consciousness for a formidable differentiation of goals in the sphere of intelligence. The sociological concept of intelligence--from the philosophical, including the axiological and psychological--should also be differentiated more precisely. As a rule, the word 'intelligentsia' is considered a positive designation. But now, often enough it seems that someone who belongs to this class is not in the least intelligent.

Remembering this, in conclusion I will formulate an apparent paradox: even though socialism from the viewpoint of today's sociology will certainly be a society of intelligentsia, only intelligent people, who often are not intellectuals, are truly building this system.

MOKRZYSZCZAK VIEWS TASKS OF PARTY LECTURERS

AU191028 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 13 Jan 83 pp 1, 2

[Report signed 'A.P.': "The Party on the Threshold of a New and Difficult Year"]

[Text] On 12 January, the first meeting this year of the Central Committee lecturers took place under the chairmanship of Wladyslaw Loranc, head of the Central Committee Ideology Department.

Wlodzimierz Mokrzyaszczak, PZPR Politburo candidate member and Central Committee secretary, presented information on the current political situation and party tasks during the first stage following the suspension of martial law.

While making it clear from the beginning that times are not conducive to hasty appraisals or easy predictions, he stated that we have entered a period of the party's increasing responsibility, a period which can and should also be used to regain the full comprehensive activeness of all party cells, for there can be no question of suspending the struggle against evil in our lives, against bureaucracy, speculation, incompetence and stupidity, nor can there be any truce with the political opponent. However, it is necessary to remember that there cannot be any return to even a hint of arrogance or commandeering in party activities, either.

In appraising the current state of the party in relation to the progress of the report-back campaign, W. Mokrzyaszczak focused the lecturers' attention on the need for opposing false and biased opinions claiming that there is a lack of progress and negating of the great work which the party carried out last year. Among the phenomena which are currently characteristic of party life, W. Mokrzyaszczak mentioned the attainment of skills of conducting the political struggle, increased discipline and activity, the production of more aktiws, progress in the implementation of resolutions and, above all, a change in the atmosphere of party organizations themselves, which are now paying more attention to the problems of the community and are thus overcoming their isolation. The work forces also value the bond between the party leadership and the plants. It can be said that the process of streamlining party ranks and purging them of people who are ideologically alien, and who are passive and casual individuals, is drawing to its conclusion. It is worth

noting in this connection that 80 percent of the decisions in these matters were made by the basic party organizations themselves. New people are also applying for party membership and 6,500 were admitted during 11 months of 1982. Each new admission is already having a political significance that counts. It can be noted that the party, which currently numbers 2,370,000 members, is by no means weaker than the pre-August party, W. Mokrzyszczak said.

Speaking of the tasks which await the party in the near future, W. Mokrzyszczak concentrated on three subjects. The duties of the party in relation to trade unions, the representative unions of the power apparatus, and workers' self-management bodies.

Trade unions are evolving slowly, they are experiencing a difficult start. It is necessary to break down the atmosphere of expectation among the work forces by proving that unions will really be such as the work forces themselves will shape them to be. Since the party statute and the logic of party activity determine the relationship between the party and trade unions, there can be no doubt that the party will support every reasonable union initiative made at plant level. Unions are on the whole formed by completely new people who are not conversant with the affairs of the plant, and it should be the party and not the administration who should help them find a footing and take up their due position. Surely no union activist will take offense if he receives party assistance in, for instance, the struggle for the reconstruction of social labor inspectorates and against even a slight reduction of the funds for this purpose.

The most important factor in the work of people's councils is to inspire councilors to extra sessional activity during their contacts with voters. Before we acquire the right to criticize others in this field, we must recall the duties of party councilors. It is they who should unrelentingly demand that the regional authorities implement proposals made by the armed forces, inspectors and the voivodship defense committees and, to no lesser a degree, the proposals of voters which are accepted for implementation and are still topical. Each basic party organization with a councilor in its ranks should scrupulously appraise his work once a year. Party teams of councilors should also be reinstated.

In the party program workers' self-management bodies are no less an important element of economic restoration than self-financing and the independence of enterprises. Anyone in the administrative-economic cadres who still has not grasped this and carries a party membership card should be called to order by the party under the threat of withdrawing his recommendation. Each plant-based party organization should adopt its own clear and concrete stand--the work force should be familiar with it--on the enterprise's plan for the current year on the valid system of pay, on the planned division of profits and so on. Such a stand can sometimes raise conflicts between the party organization, the management and the less aware part of the work force, but we should not avoid such conflicts.

One of the questions directed to W. Mokrzyaszczak, following the presentation of the above information, was in what way should the leading role of the party manifest itself. The reply was that it should manifest itself, inter alia, through exactly the above kind of conduct of party organizations. There are many questions besides, some concerning the subject of the meeting, as well as some departing from it. Replying to them, W. Mokrzyaszczak informed the lecturers that the new version of the declaration entitled "What we are fighting for, where we are going," will be presented at the 12th PZPR Central Committee Plenum after two rounds of consultations.

Wladyslaw Loranc thanked the lecturers for their contribution to party activity during the past year and presented the immediate plans of the Central Lecturing Unit.

CSO: 2600/271

PZPR INTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTRY SECRETARY INTERVIEWED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 27 Dec 82 p 3

[Interview with Zbigniew Pochec, first secretary of the PZPR City District Committee in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, by TRYBUNA LUDU correspondent Teresa Grabczynska: "On the Front Line of Battle"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] To put it laconically, this is service on the front line of battle...the battle for socialism against adversarial attacks. But it is also a battle for order and harmony, and for public safety. For functionaries of the militia and the Security Service, the past months have been a difficult political and organizational test. I spoke about this with comrade Zbigniew Pochec, first secretary of the PZPR City District Committee in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[Question] Yours is the first city district organization in Warsaw which has already completed its reporting campaign. As the beginning of our conversation, comrade secretary, I would like to ask you what the specific character of your party organizational work is based on.

[Answer] The PZPR City District Committee in the Ministry of Internal Affairs includes within its sphere of activity the organizational units of the headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as the Citizens' Militia Main Headquarters and is subordinate to the Warsaw Committee, as are all city district committees in the capital. The essence of our activity and the role of our organization ensue from the functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is responsible for order and social calm in the country and for the security of the socialist state. Particularly in the last 2 years we have been waging a trying and difficult battle with the enemies of socialism in Poland. Our political adversary set himself the goal of turning against us a portion of society and public opinion, which is susceptible to the action of antisocialist propaganda. He attempted to set us at odds with the Ministry of National Defense, and he tried to drive a wedge between the militia and the Security Service.

We had to consider this in our party work. Substitute member of the Political Bureau, minister, and division general Czeslaw Kiszczak spoke about the close ties between the requirements of the service and its political character at the city district reporting conference, emphasizing that the campaign being waged at the present time obliges all party members to stand up against the political adversary in a tough battle that is filled with personal sacrifice.

We are setting the city district party organization a clear task: to influence the best possible accomplishment of service obligations, the rank and responsibility of which are expressed by the statement: defense of the system and effective actions restoring social order, calm, and the security of the people. We are concentrating our attention on protecting and aiding our functionaries, who are exposed in their daily work to the direct action of antisocialist forces and to enemy propaganda.

Our professional work compels us to make independent evaluations and to have independent political attitudes. It is the obligation of the functionary to quickly and accurately distinguish people who have been and still are disoriented, lost politically, and susceptible to the propagandistic influence of an external and internal adversary, from avowed enemies of socialism coming from the KPN [Confederation of Independent Poland], the KSS-KOR [Social Self-Defense Committee], the extreme party activists of the former "Solidarity" union and other opponents of the system. And that is why we place great importance on the agitprop and political work in our organization, which we carry out using various forms of activity.

The cooperation of the party organizations with representatives of the political propaganda service deserves emphasis. This service is our ally in political activity. The integral collaboration of the City District Committee and executives at all levels with the political propaganda section in shaping the committed, ideological, and political attitudes of functionaries and in improving internal discipline also is one of the particulars of our party work.

[Question] The link between the status of state security and the ideological and professional attitude of the services in the Ministry of Internal Affairs is apparent. During the period of internal emergency and general anarchy in Poland, you were deluged with an avalanche of gossip, insinuations, and accusations. What do you think about that?

[Answer] The essence of our party work lies in molding such attitudes among functionaries of the militia and the Security Service that they will exact respect for the law from all citizens in a law-abiding way and will gain the approval and the full understanding as well as support of the working class and society as a whole with their actions.

Primarily, we expect understanding and respect for our service. We are subject to the law just as other citizens are, and the powers stemming from

the nature of our work are contained in public, legal acts. I think that martial law influenced a change in the social evaluation of order and state security. In accordance with social postulates, the scope of information about our work was widened, and we are speaking frankly about the problems of this work and about some of the methods involved in our activity. The forms of these methods are wrapped in mystery, but not their aims. During the reporting campaign, our comrades emphasized, moreover, the importance of getting through to the community with information about the Security Service and the militia.

But when it comes to our social and everyday, housing, or health care issues, there have been serious deficiencies in fulfilling these needs. Certainly, the present martial law is not compensating either functionaries or their families for hardships, self-denials, or self-sacrifices.

[Question] The reporting campaign covers a period which was very difficult for the entire party. Reestablishing the party's authority and power requires much more effort and time. You speak of the doubly great demands made on party members in your environment...

[Answer] I wish to emphasize that in this period which was special for the party, our organization did not lose its authority and its possibilities for action not only in our environment but also beyond it. For example, we organized meetings in work establishments and hosted workers in our own homes. We held more than 200 lecture meetings in various environments in the Warsaw area. Eighteen comrades are Central Committee lecturers, and more than 40 are involved in lecture work in Warsaw institutions.

We have achieved our basic goal, which we have recognized as the preparation of functionaries necessary to prepare them at any moment to fulfill the tasks set for us. Through mass party training, differentiated in its forms and content, and political and ideological work, we are arming them with a weapon that is indispensable in daily work--factual information, comprehensive knowledge, and the capacity to make political evaluations. Jointly with the youth organization ZSMP [Union of Socialist Polish Youth] we are attaching great importance to the adaptation and upbringing of young functionaries, and to the development in them of a committed ideological attitude, discipline, and self-sacrifice in service for the community.

A full evaluation of our work was provided by the reporting campaign in the basic, plant, and educational organizations, a campaign which was waged in a committee and businesslike atmosphere. The overall accomplishment of results from the reporting and election campaign gained a positive evaluation. There was no problem which would not be examined, and we are utilizing most of the conclusions systematically in our work. The implementation of other conclusions which require time has already been initiated.

To respond to the question of how we defended the socialist motherland during its period of emergency, I shall remind you that army general Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, praised our service highly and spoke about it appreciatively.

PARTY ORGAN REFUTES GRABSKI LETTER CHARGES

Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish No 22, 22 Dec 82 pp 14,15

[Text] Included in the various publications and letters circulated recently throughout the country in the form of fliers is the text signed by comrade Tadeusz Grabski. This letter has aroused the interest of various public circles, spurred on by diversionary reports that the author was a well-known party activist for many years. He served as KW [Voivodship Committee] first secretary in Konin and was a member of the central party authorities; he was a member of the KC [Central Committee] and the CKR [Central Audit Commission]; after August 1980 he became KC secretary and sat on the Politburo. During the Tenth KC Plenum in 1981, he was appointed chairman of a special commission formed to speed up work on determining the personal responsibility of party members who had performed leadership functions in the past and who, by their actions, helped bring about the socioeconomic and political crisis and the violation of statutory norms. At the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress, comrade Tadeusz Grabski was an unsuccessful candidate for party leadership organs.

Clearly, when an activist with such notable past achievements allows a letter that he has signed to be circulated unofficially, it is no accident. Thus, it is no wonder that this matter is questioned at meetings of the party aktiv and is discussed by political enthusiasts in the coffee houses. As often happens, foreign correspondents have also become interested in the topic, and the matter has become known internationally.

Hence, we are dealing with a political fact that is not only stirring up national public opinion, but is also being used against our party by enemy propaganda centers. For this reason alone, the issue must be clarified. This is not the only consideration, however.

The text in question was written in letter form, dated 12 October 1982. It is addressed to the MERA-MONT ZSA [Equipment Plant ?] party organization in Poznan, of which the author of the letter was a member until recently.

It is not customary for POP [Basic Party Organization] members to write open letters to their organizations. Thus, Tadeusz Grabski, aware of the unusual nature of the situation, explains his intent at the beginning of his letter to thank his comrades in this way for their many years of cooperation before his trip abroad. He writes that this letter is his only alternative, since he has been trying in vain for 5 months to have a meeting of the POP called. It is here that comrade Grabski first departs from the truth. His POP has met six times in 1982; their most recent meeting was held 19 October. It is hard to believe that a plant organization activist of such long standing, formerly director of MERA-MONT, could not make it to any of his POP meetings. But why does he make such a serious accusation that the POP neglected its statutory duty?

The author of the letter, referring to his legal rights, feels it his duty to share his doubts and fears. He performs this duty by hurling serious charges at the POP, saying that it has neglected some statutory activity, claiming that its internal life has disappeared and that the symptoms of its atrophy are becoming more and more pronounced. Nor does he spare words of bitterness in upbraiding his comrades for their failure to act during the pre-December period.

We do not know the situation within the MERA-MONT ZSA POP. Even if the life of that party organization were as the author of the letter says, it is indeed difficult not to wonder that he not only does not feel responsible for this situation, but he reprimands his comrades severely, charging them with having "lost their sense of belonging to the Marxist-Leninist party" and with becoming "merely inert party card-carrying members". That is a strange way to thank them for their many years of cooperation.

Every party member has the legal right to express his critical judgments within his own party organization. No one may take away the author's right to do this. The hitch, however, is that the author generalizes his criticism of the MERA-MONT ZSA party organization to the entire party. Consequently, his letter is not really addressed to his own POP, but to the PZPR per se. The author maintains that as a result of the weakness of its basic elements and the vacillating attitudes of its members, the entire party and not merely the POP of which he was a member is wasting away and is losing its leading role in society and its leadership role in the state.

Grabski's catastrophic view of party life may be treated with some forbearance if we believe that more consideration must be given to the state of the party ranks and that every concern voiced about the party should be taken seriously. However, the "bitter truths" told by comrade Grabski on the subject of the "tragic situation within the party" do not have this purpose. In his estimation, the task of rehabilitating the party has no chance of succeeding unless there is a radical "break in the course of events." The letter reads: "What we are now undergoing in the PZPR far exceeds the malady of opportunism that plagued us in the past. It is an intentional, carefully programmed process of incapacitating the party leading to its self-liquidation, that we ourselves often implement unawares."

These sentences contain the quintessential view of comrade Grabski. On this basis he builds his assessments and draws his conclusions. To paraphrase his words, in the past the party was a victim of the flu of opportunism and now it suffers from the cancer of self-liquidation. One is tempted to ask: What is the past of which he speaks? Is it the 1970's, or the more distant past? Perhaps he means the immediate past, between August 1980 and the opening day of the Ninth Congress? If we know the author's reasons for his benign assessment of the "opportunistic" past, perhaps we could answer this question more easily.

There is no need to investigate why comrade Grabski is so categorical and uncompromising in attacking the present. It is simply that aspirin cures the flu, but it takes a surgeon to fight against cancer. For this reason, everything that has been done by the leadership of the party since the end of the Ninth Congress to strengthen its unity, to direct the process of stabilizing public life and to enable our emergence from the crisis is treated by comrade Grabski as an ineffective stopgap measure. Even when he understands the principle underlying a move, for example, the imposition of martial law, he is quick to observe that it has not fulfilled the hope that was placed in it. As a result, the dangers from which Poland was saved by the imposition of martial law, in the opinion of comrade Grabski, have returned after the 10 months of martial law "with a new, incomparably greater force."

In the author's opinion, the counterrevolution has not been crushed; it has merely gone underground and continues to enjoy good health. The party, on the other hand, has not succeeded in rebuilding and wallows "in a state of stagnation and decay." The lack of progress in the economy continues, since the party has not prepared a concrete economic program, but has busied itself with introducing economic reform, which has led to the worsening of the living standard of the broad masses of people. The poor get poorer, the rich get richer, the mushroom of speculation is mushrooming, neophilistinism is growing apace, the aggressiveness of the "haves," a class that has arisen on the basis of the return to private ownership (of what, Grabski does not say), evokes the just anger of the people and a new social conflict, which has an explosive force far greater than underground eruptions, is in the air. Moreover, these rightist forces are led by reactionary clergy from within the highest Church ranks.

How does this apocalyptic vision depicted so powerfully by Tadeusz Grabski compare with the real Poland of the end of 1982?

To put it simply: they have nothing in common. The threat of counterrevolution today is incomparably less than it was before 13 December 1981 and it continues to lessen. Calm has returned to the factories and to the city streets. There is every indication that this state will continue, since the Solidarity antisocialist underground has lost a significant amount of public support. As is proved by what happened on 10 November, the working class has rejected the slogans and calls for strikes spread by the political opposition. Did the fall 1981 reversal in the tendencies characterizing the domestic sociopolitical situation,

obvious to every Polish citizen, occur automatically? Were not this reversal and the systematic progress toward the normalization of life and toward overcoming counterrevolutionary forces carried out by the party itself under conditions of severe, sometimes dramatic political struggle? Do we need further proof of the validity of the general party line, the line of understanding and struggle adopted at the Ninth Congress and implemented consistently by the political leadership?

Let us turn now to intraparty problems. Is the party really on the verge of clinical death? To those who see themselves as its reanimators, we propose that they compare the present state of the party with its state in the fall of 1981. Were the frustration of political views, passivity and ideological confusion greater then than they are now? Maybe something has changed for the better. Perhaps it is true that the rate of consolidation of party ranks is still too slow, that the activism of the member masses has not reached the desired level. If this is the case, are there not also those members of this lacking organization who ennoble their affiliation with the PZPR by using the epithet "real"? We have known for years that it does nothing for the party in its struggle that there has always been a small minority of its members who, instead of struggling, has tried to teach about it by kibitzing, saying that they are the only "real communists." It is high time that we realize that sectarian hornblowing is as harmful to party cohesiveness as defeatism. Why, the renegade Bratkowski also wrote letters to his POP fellow comrades.

Let us now turn to the economy for a moment. Comrade Grabski's charge of a lack of an economic program is laughable. Let us call to mind that until the Ninth Congress he was responsible for economic affairs as KC secretary, that he took part in Ninth Congress deliberations and in creating the party program, and that he is still a member of the Committee for Economic Reform Affairs. Is he playing the role of kibitzer in this field as well? Or perhaps he thinks that the actions of the Sejm taken thus far to standardize changes in the country's economic life and government decisions resulting in a three-year stabilizing plan and a plan of economic development through 1990 indicate the lack of a program and are a sort of improvisation?

It is likewise absurd to say that the implementation of economic reform has caused a sudden decline in the standard of living of working people. The breakdown of the economy occurred in 1979 as a consequence of an unsound socioeconomic policy during the previous decade. The general slackening and strike-related chaos that swept over the country during the post-August period over the Solidarity affair added the rest. All of this happened before the reform was put into practice. Thus the statement that the economic reform has caused a reduction in the standard of living is unwarranted, for it is a lie. The real truth is and can only be that the effects of the crisis peaked just as the reform began. Under these circumstances, the only chance for reform to succeed was under the shield of martial law to discipline the production process. If one recognizes the soundness of introducing martial law, this must also be taken into consideration.

It is true that working people still have it hard and that the implementation of reform alongside the restoration of market stability collided with the price increase. But could it have been any other way? Is the government in a position to suspend the operation of the law of value during a period of reform? And if it did so, would there really be any reform?

In no state on earth where an economic crisis is occurring have working people been spared from bearing its brunt. We only can (and must) try to prevent the crisis from wounding the weakest economic groups most painfully and try to mitigate its effects as rapidly as possible. When this happens, everyone will begin to be relieved.

Comrade Grabski maintains that the crisis is hitting the weakest hard, and that the socialist state is conducting an anti-egalitarian policy instead of protecting them. He departs from the truth here as well. It is worth noting that for the first time in People's Poland, and during a period of extreme crisis, the minimum wage reached half the value of the average wage. We could enumerate dozens of state decisions and actions calculated to create a safety net for the poorest groups, for large families, pensioners and annuitants. It should likewise be noted that the author wrote his letter in October, and as is well-known, in August, for the first time in 25 months, the declining trend in the economy was halted, in many branches of industry production started up again and the process of our hard upward climb out of the depths of our collapse began. Did all of this happen with a wave of a magic wand, by itself, with no help from the party?

It is no accident that since May 1982 we observe in Poland an increasing society's labor productivity. Had this increase been accompanied by a reduction in the material costs of production, there would be a glimmer of hope that our economy is capable of overcoming the so-called efficiency barrier and we could finally begin to produce significantly more cheaply. This in conjunction with a quantitative increase in production and an improvement in its quality would open up the prospect of a better life for Polish working people based not on credit as in the 1970's but on paying one's own way. The entire sense of the economic reform virtually rests in this. Thus, fussing and fuming about the reform will not assume the burdens that fall upon the working man during the course of the crisis-- absolute consistency in its implementation and patience in perfecting economic mechanisms can do this. Did Tadeusz Grabski, with his doctorate in economic sciences, not know this?

Nor do we dare accuse him of lacking knowledge in the area of the phenomena that he attacks so passionately, namely: speculation, the getting rich of "a few groups of neophilistines" and--let us add--parasitism. There are the side effects of the crisis and not the consequences of economic policy. We must battle them with all of the available legal, social and monetary means. This is being done; the effort in the past year has been more energetic and more consistent than ever. Until market stability is regained, however, this action cannot be fully effective. Price-setting measures will not restore stability, as this year's [1982] experiences have

demonstrated. We need goods and services in sufficient supply to match consumer purchasing power. The changes that were made and are being made in the national economy and the changes in people's attitudes during the martial law period, while they are certainly not a milestone, are clearly a step in this direction.

Comrade Grabski is of a different opinion. He holds that our efforts thus far have not yielded the expected results. The longtime impatient maximalist and radical sees everything pessimistically and cries loudly "that we must save the country from self-annihilation."

The editors of diversionary radio stations are quick to seize such assessments for their daily broadcasts, during which they repeat ad infinitum that the party is on its last leg, the crisis is deepening and the underground is growing rapidly and is thumbing its nose at the authorities.

As is evident, making a diagnosis is not Tadeusz Grabski's strong point. Perhaps he is better at prescribing therapy? What does he propose, for example, to halt what he views as the disastrous turn of events?

He states that most importantly, we must rebuild the party and make it the guiding force in bringing the country out of the crisis. This is not an original proposal, since the entire activity of the party leadership following the Ninth Congress has tended in this direction. However comrade Grabski does not seem to be aware of this, since he supports his thesis by alluding to the historical experiences that confirm the elsewhere acknowledged fact that socialism has never been built in any country without the Marxist-Leninist party. Forestalling any eventual opposition he adds that expecting that things will be different in Poland is a dangerous illusion.

If we compare this warning with his view expressed earlier that at present the PZPR is being subjected to a carefully programmed process of incapacitation and self-liquidation this leaves no room for doubt that there are in Poland influential forces that are opposed to the party's strengthening, or, in comrade Grabski's terms, its rebuilding. Thus, these forces must be exposed and repelled and the road to the renewal of our life will then be opened. But where are we to look for these forces? Comrade Grabski does not say. We may surmise, however, that he does not look for them at the lowest levels of the party hierarchy.

In a Politburo report at the Seventh KC Plenum, comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski stated: "A steadfast principle of the socialist structure is the leading role of the party--no nation has ever built or defended socialism without the Marxist-Leninist party. It is not only we who are aware of this; it is a truth that is likewise known to the opponents of socialism." One finds it hard to believe that comrade Grabski did not read the Seventh Plenum materials. Perhaps he studied them so well that he ceased differentiating between his own theoretical knowledge and borrowed ideas that should be set off in quotation marks when quoted.

In this way we can also expose some of comrade Grabski's other "original" ideas. However, this is a fruitless task. Essentially he proposes nothing for the party or for society to help them surmount the crisis; on the contrary, he demands that repressive measures be increased. He believes that the only cure for the (in his view) worsening situation in Poland are: coercion, rigors and "brute force." His demand made in the 11th month of martial law, that counterrevolution must be shattered, it must be isolated from society and the perpetrators must be imprisoned and the like, can only mean this. Was counterrevolution indulged in Poland in the past? It is hard to believe that at a time when the process of a return to normal life in Poland is showing positive signs, the threats made by the enemies of socialism are decreasing and the vast majority of society awaits the lifting of martial law, comrade Grabski would like to extend it and make it more severe.

Comrade Grabski plays the role of Cato for his own party as well. He demands the "revolutionary ideological purging" of its ranks, even at the cost of diminishing its numbers radically, in order to make it a small entity composed of the cadre. In his view, this is the only way to give it a Marxist-Leninist character and to breathe life into it. What does this really mean? It means a "purge" conducted without any allowances. The question arises: What will be the criteria of the purge and who will make it? We may surmise that it is to be conducted by the still existing aktiv of "genuine" communists in which he includes himself. It is not the first time that sectarianism wishes to avenge good sense.

The process of the party's self-purgation, which has lasted for over 2 years and which has cut party ranks by one-fourth, or 750,000 members and candidate-members, is for "genuine" communists still only a prelude to proper restorative treatment to be undergone by the PZPR in order to for it to regain its strength and authority in society. Or perhaps he is speaking of something else entirely--its complete dissolution? Our political opponents--both internally and externally--call the loudest for the party's purgation, or even better, its dissolution. Perhaps the results of the elections for party leadership organs held at the Ninth Congress should be revised to facilitate this operation.

The third element of comrade Grabski's formula for getting out of the crisis is to revise economic policy, or more precisely, to revise economic reform principles to prevent a return to the bureaucratic-technocratic model of management and to prevent the rebirth of "neocapitalism." At the same time it is important that social justice become the ironclad law of socialism--in the distribution sphere of course. For the author says not one word about an increase in production and the need to set in motion the economic mechanisms for stimulating this increase. As we recall, this was the approach of the extremist leaders of Solidarity to the economy and reform programs. In their struggle with the system, Solidarity's leaders undercut the foundations of the nation's economic life. What does comrade Grabski have in mind when he comes out against tolerating those reform assumptions that he finds to have been imposed by Solidarity extremists?

Have we found only one just man in Sodom? He is in such a state over the fate of Poland that he has undertaken to defend it from splinter-group positions. I find it difficult to characterize the political plane and the action of comrade Grabski in any other way. Everything that he writes and does as president of the acting authorities of the Reality clubs has one purpose: to revise the line of the Ninth Congress that for him is too conciliatory and too little imbued with genuine revolution and real radicalism. He proclaims that we must "immediately, while we still have the opportunity, revise our previous line of action, both on the sociopolitical and economic plane."

Such pseudoleftism is as imperious in tone as it is devoid of reflective content. Evidently comrade Grabski has lost the skill to distinguish what is possible under the given conditions from what is desirable or desired. It is a case of wishful thinking. The failure to deal with reality and adopting wishes as reality are two elements of an attitude that is based on daydreaming. The third is ill will. If this attitude is not checked in time, daydreaming ends inevitably in a catastrophic coming down to earth. Perhaps comrade Grabski has learned how to make a soft landing? We do not predict success.

Lenin wrote: "The splinter-group struggle has an objective logic, which leads even the best people inevitably to a position that is essentially no different from the principles of demagoguery, if they persist in their errant position."

Comrade Grabski's letter is essentially a manifestation of activity that weakens the party. The assessments it contains are a slap in the face to more than 2 million party members, including a million workers who have never complained about it and have never doubted in it. The contents of this letter is an attack on the party, for it tries to divide and differentiate it into the better and the worse, and into "genuine" communists, Marxists, Social Democrats and the like. Today he who divides the party weakens it, acts toward its detriment and delays the regaining of its full ability to wage its struggle. After reading the thoughts of the author as expressed in his letter to the MERA-MONT ZSA POP in Poznan, we can only draw these conclusions.

8536

CSO: 2600/201

PROBLEMS OF PARTY CONTROL ACTIVITY DISCUSSED

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 11, Nov 82 pp 26-37

[Article by Jerzy Urbanski, chairman of the PZPR Central Party Control Commission: "Gaining Public Trust"]

[Text] One of the important questions today is the proper organization and control of the execution of party resolutions, because we have been noticing the phenomenon of the undertaking of a substantial number of resolutions, proposals, decisions, and timetables, which takes up a great deal of time and energy, but the weakness is that often there is no consequence in terms of their practical inculcation and implementation.

Therefore it is a question of properly understanding the meaning of the control of the implementation of resolutions. We know that in order to put the party resolutions into practice in our life, consistent, steadfast, multilateral, systematic organizational work is necessary. Without such activity, good resolutions and decisions usually wither and come to nothing, and the effects anticipated are negligible or nonexistent.

Thus, the control of the implementation of resolutions is more than mere monitoring, checking to see if the formal implementation schedule has been drawn up, and what sort of measurable results have been achieved. Control is supposed not only to monitor the actual state of affairs but also to assist and advise how to proceed on one matter or another.

Our experience from party and state control shows that it is precisely this inseparable element that is sometimes not fully appreciated. In previous practice the emphasis has most often been placed on two matters: whether the tasks were accomplished and execution of sanctions against those parties found guilty of shortcomings, but not enough work has always been put into investigating the causes of the difficulties found or the improprieties or into helping to get rid of their sources. Owing to the particularly complicated social, economic, and political conditions, today this is extremely important in the improvement of the production processes, proper organization of work, and objective assessment of managerial staff.

For this reason, during the execution of control functions, let us recall Lenin's statement, which is timely right today, that the task of control consists not so much of pursuing and uncovering as knowing how to fix things in time, of giving assistance in overcoming problems and preventing any improprieties' growing up.

This of course does not mean tolerating inability, inconsistency, laziness, or -- let us not be afraid of the word -- the sabotage of the decisions and resolutions of the party or government officials, which is the expression of conscious social, economic, and political harm. After all, there are people who inspire this sort of activity and find obedient people to carry it out.

In such instances which control finds any, the reaction of the appropriate bodies must be swift and decisive.

Where there is neglect resulting from party members' carelessness, there should be more rapid intervention by the echelons, party organizations, and party control commissions, with the application of appropriate sanctions against the guilty persons.

After all, we already have examples of this. Based on the provisions of the Armed Forces Inspectorate, the WKKP [Voivodship Party Control Commissions] in the voivodships of Ciechanow, Gorzow, Nowy Sad, Opole, Pile, and Torun are conducting party proceedings against 194 party members, against whom specific concrete accusations have been brought. There have already been 93 decisions made, and of these five people were expelled from the party, other party penalties were imposed against 20, and warning talks were held with 68 comrades.

Because of the necessity of increasing the effectiveness of control, without which the contemporary system of administration will not work, it is necessary to accelerate the work being conducted to modify the system of control in our country. As a result more favorable conditions should be assured for substantially bolstering the effectiveness of the activity of many of the control bodies existing in Poland whose past results are sometimes the subject of justified social criticism.

Taking into account the fact that today the major social problem is to restore the health of our economy, we have to make absolutely every party member aware of the fact that the supreme measure of party membership now is the model discharging of one's social and professional obligations and an uncompromising struggle against all manifestations of evil, various sorts of bad practices and habits that hamper the proper structuring of human relations, because where people understand and respect one another and are friendly to one another and wish each other well, initiative is released and the desire to do honest work reigns.

The people responsible for this sort of practice should be publically censured as well as being severely penalized, and not just in the party, because these practices, unless they are stopped, are what make for empty shelves in the shops, a decline in the buying value of the zlotys, and worsening inflation.

Therefore, anyone who thinks that the reform allows him to work less and produce less while earning more and living better is greatly mistaken.

The reform must be treated not statically but dynamically. This is why as practical experience is acquired there are plans not only to improve the methods of inculcating it but also to make systematic, careful corrections in certain assumptions based on straightforward scientific analysis.

On the other hand, whining based on a superficial knowledge of individual instances of failure without constructive proposals about what to change and how does not lead anywhere!

In the history of People's Poland we have more than once paid a high price for lack of consistency in carrying out a number of correct concepts concerning socialist economic transformations.

In the past we have paid no less high a price for the fact that we did not know how to correct in time the solutions we had adopted earlier once certain parts of it did not work out in practice. We must not repeat these errors for any reason!

After all, we cannot exclude the possibility either that those people who today are sceptical in their interpretation and implementation of the real goals of the reform desire more or less by the back door to squeeze into the reality of the socialist state the wolfish laws governing a capitalist free-market economy, because after all setting prices many times higher than production costs or than the expression of high profit margins in trade are signals of just such a phenomenon.

Therefore, we must say clearly that the economic reform is to create the conditions for people of good work to get the full benefit of the distribution of goods according to the socialist principle of "to each according to his work."

The issue is brought up in the resolution of the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the Party, also in the context of not letting excessive imbalances build up in the standard of living of the various strata of the population in a way unjustified by their personal work.

This is the very reason why on the matter of the proper relationship of certain economic activists to the implementation of the reform there should be closer cooperation between the party control commissions and the party echelons and organizations and state control bodies, and especially the Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK], which has the greatest possibilities of transmitting objective technical information in this realm.

As everyone knows, the essence of the socialist system is respect for the principle of social justice, but what this justice really looks like in each area of social life depends on the extent to which party members and all working people react to any sort of departure from the stated slogans and principles.

Party organizations should lead such action. This is the key to the party's gaining public respect. For this reason, with justified suggestions of party organizations, where violations of the principles of social justice have been found, the state and economic administration must absolutely be counted on. Its managerial staff should remember, especially party members, that they bear dual responsibility, to their jobs and to the party, to react effectively to any impropriety in the area entrusted to them.

The next condition to gaining public trust is to react courageously to irresponsible social and political action by people subject to propaganda demagoguery of enemies of socialism who disturb the social peace.

It is true that party members are a minority in relation to the total number of people employed in plants and institutions, but they undoubtedly are in the majority in terms of open political adversaries. The latter are merely noisy and dishonorable in their deeds, and do not have any real support.

It is therefore a question of calling those individuals to order in an organized, reasonable, forthright way, of conducting a brave polemic with their views, uncovering falsehoods and lies, and bringing to light the political game-playing and social demagoguery.

In emphasizing that the overcoming of the crisis of our economy is the basic social task, we must not overlook the importance of the economic reform.

As party control commissions we should actively oppose any flagrant premature excessive criticism of the new, which is beginning to develop only in various sorts of difficulties. This is all our political adversaries are waiting for along with various plots to put things off, moves by people accustomed to a peaceful lifestyle who are anxious to nip in the bud any real economic, social, or political sense of the reform.

As everyone knows, one of the basic goals of the economic reform is to gain a rise in production in both the quantitative and qualitative sense, to reduce direct costs through better work discipline and organization, to rationalize employment and increase labor productivity. The way to achieve this goal passes through the mobilization of a more effective system of incentives, one which favors more productive work, so that it will not pay people to work just any way they please.

As a guarantee of the proper implementation of the reform, the development of the worker self-government should go much further than in the past in binding the employee to his home plant, in liberating the initiative of the workers, and in bolstering their sense of sharing in running things and in being jointly responsible for the fate of the enterprise.

Therefore, we need to speed up the implementation of the resolution of the Eighth Party Plenum on the creation of self-governments in the places of employment.

A matter of great social importance is the renewal of the activity of trade unions that are independent of the administration, on the one hand guarding employee rights and reacting promptly to any bureaucratic nonsense, and on the other, inspiring better work organization, improving work discipline, protecting public property, and controlling the proper distribution of the goods produced. It is mainly in the interest of working people for the trade unions to operate this way.

Therefore the development of the self-governments and the renewal of the activity of the reborn union movement will be factors that help properly implement the economic reform, to which Polish society is attaching so much hope for the gradual improvement of their living conditions.

We know that there are no ideal solutions in life, and that means in the economy. At most there can be solutions which at a given moment will seem to be optimal in a specific situation. This means that alongside decisively positive elements, there will also be a number of potential dangers, and this also applies to the economic reform being implemented.

In short, the problem lies in seeing that the principle of the so-called three S's proclaimed in it not be subject to distortions in the process of the implementation of the economic reform.

Therefore we must not let the enterprise self-government be exploited to bring anarchy to economic activity, as the painful experience following August 1980 shows.

Next, the enterprise's independence cannot feed private particularistic actions which take into account only the interest of individual plants or groups of employees and interfere in the needs of society as a whole. It must not rise up in opposition to the principle of rational economic planning, one of the building-blocks of a socialist economy. Otherwise, our economy would face further chaos.

On the other hand, the self-financing of the enterprises should not be utilized to manipulate prices to the detriment of the interest of all honestly employed citizens. We are noting the dangerous phenomena here and there that enterprises gain a profit easily and quickly, but without better work productivity or organization leading to increased production, only by dishonest financial maneuvering.

Someone may ask why the party control commissions should take an interest in the way the reform is being implemented.

First, because this is today and tomorrow's key problem related to putting our economy in order, and along with that the gradual improvement of the society's living conditions.

Second, as party activists, we should view the reform in not only economic categories but also social and political ones.

In addition, certain people's view of the implementation of the reform, turning it into reality, also has an ethical-moral dimension. If someone easily obtains profitability, through profit gained not through increased labor productivity leading to an increase in production but through the use of jacked-up prices, then this is not just a question of economics but also one of ethics and morality, and this is the domain of the party's interest and also that of the party control commissions.

Now for some reflections on the subject of personnel policy, the principles of which are to be ratified by the plenum of the Central Committee and put into effect as of January 1983.

We have made comments on the draft of this document, in the direction of closer coordination between the party control commissions and the party echelons to this extent. We are particularly interested in the better coordination of party jurisdiction and personnel decisions, thereby to create the possibility for more effective influence to see that the principles of staff policy are respected. Especially not permitting in the future the practice which has been severely criticized in the past but still occurs today of revitalizing what we call "the job carousel."

This is not a new task, but it calls for more consistent execution. It should eliminate the "shoving" still occurring between the party organizations and echelons, on the one hand, and the party control commissions on the other, particularly in connection with the latter's suggestions about the need to remove a specific party member from the leadership position he holds, particularly when he has been penalized by the party.

We think that after the adoption of the above-mentioned Central Committee document the matters will be subject to improvement, but in making staff decisions we must get around the emotional colorations and personal prejudices, the quarrels over prestige, and overcome the bonds of favoritism, giving priority to the established criteria concerning objective assessment of the activity and attitudes of a given party member, based on the effects actually achieved in the realm of work assigned to him.

Concern for the moral purity of rank-and-file party members is still a current task for the party control commission. This is the duty of the whole party, obviously, but the party control commission at all echelons should be particularly principled and careful in this regard. Therefore, where such phenomena occur, they must be quickly reviewed and definitively settled.

We should like to emphasize once more that for us party control commission members there is a great responsibility to see that any violation of ethical and moral norms is responded to in time. Only such action can produce positive results and prevent various deformities which have appeared in the past.

Therefore in this area we treat our work not as a special drive but as continual party control commission activity at all levels. We are carrying out our statutory duties as honestly as possible, to prevent having to conduct one sort of "accounting operation" or another in the drastic way or on such a scale as in August 1980.

Only systematic, profound ideological-upbringing work, the personal example of members of the party, the party activists in particular, and the rapid movement of party echelons, organizations, and the party control commission wherever evil arises or old evils try to return, can provide us with effective protection against it.

Party and social criticism is an irreplaceable method in combatting all sorts of deformities. Unfortunately even today it is often not taken seriously by some of those criticized. Consistent conclusions are not always pursued to improve specific areas of social life or, what is worse, the people being criticized sometimes become the object of various sorts of action.

This is just what is old and dangerous, something to which we must take an absolute position simply. Therefore, we must impose severe party sanctions on those people guilty of an improper attitude towards criticism. We also have the examples of proper reaction by party control commissions to the people who suppress criticism, but unfortunately the cases are still single instances for the time being.

One of the further manifestations of this old situation is the fact that the reaction to the population's complaints and letters is not always the right one. One of the important ways for the party and the state officials to gain the public's trust is to listen carefully to what working people are saying and, more important, to review carefully the matters which they raise.

Nonetheless, we are still running across manifestations of formalism with respect to the review of complaints, sometimes even those sent directly to the party control commission. For example, we have found a case where a complaint sent to the WKKP was forwarded to the MKKP [City Party Control Commission] and then to the KZ [Plant Committee], which was the very object of the criticism made by the person who made the original complaint. As a result, the person making the complaint responded to this way of handling his letter by turning in his party membership card. Therefore, regardless of the merit of the complaint or the legitimacy of such a drastic response on the part of the person involved, such a method of proceeding is absolutely unacceptable, especially for the party control commissions.

Our reaction should be decisive, quick, and loud to these and other manifestations of an improper attitude toward working people's affairs: corruption, bureaucratism, shabby dealings, cliquishness, dishonesty in carrying out professional duties, drunkenness, and the like, if party members permit them.

It is a question of having potential candidates inclined to such action hear us along with working people and of having them realize that we will not tolerate this type of behavior, of convincing society by deeds as well as words that today the party is not casting words to the wind.

One of the main tasks of the party control commission is to protect, as the eyelid protects the eye, the Marxist-Leninist unity of PZPR members' views concerning basic issues, because only on this basis can there be active, consistent inculcation of party resolutions. Life has proved that the lack of uniformity of opinion in basic party matters works contrary to unity of action.

A free exchange and confrontation of views in developing strategic and tactical tasks of the party are something which is by all means desirable and actually essential, because they are the source of all manner of progress, but this has nothing in common with generalizations and oversimplification dressed up as clever slogans which hid specific concepts harmful to the party ideological principles and organizational precepts as set down in the statutes.

Let us remember this, because anyone thinking that there are no longer many grave misunderstandings on these issues is wrong.

The essence of the weaknesses of a number of our party units rests with the effects of ideological confusion which to a great extent stems from shallow understanding of Marxism-Leninism among some of our party members. Gaps in knowledge in this area in relation to ideological and world-view problems as well as to organizational principles this very day are hampering the activation of the party in the struggle against class enemies.

It will be necessary to devote still more time and effort, especially that of our colleagues on the ideological front, to see that these shortcomings are eliminated and to restore quickly the proper content to the words "socialism" and "Marxism-Leninism," not only in party training but also in the practice of party activity.

At the same time it would be difficult not to notice that some people with a good knowledge of the theory of Marxism-Leninism, at least formally speaking, have gotten off into a false interpretation of it during the past 2 years. In this way they have made the ideological confusion in the party greater and have sown the seeds of distrust in socialism. The party's organizational principles have also been undermined with an artificial distinction's having been made between democratic centralism and intraparty democracy, with the idea of what are called the horizontal structures in the party being supported in this context.

It is to be judged that some of these people did not withstand the severity of the crisis and got lost; but others operated here in a completely selfish way. Among them were people about whom I think we might say that they probably never really had any basic Marxist-Leninist convictions but only exaggerated political ambitions. Luckily for some of them, at least insofar as the party control commission affair goes, they are no longer part of the membership. I talked to some of them by way of explanations and warnings, expecting them to change their behavior. Otherwise, their attitudes and actions would be the subject of repeated assessment by the party control commission.

Let us have no delusions. The threat to party unity and to the political-ideological purity of its ranks posed by the advocates of an opportunistic-reformist orientation has still not been overcome yet. The conveyors of these views -- not just in the party, after all -- are more careful today and conduct their activity in a more veiled form, but from time to time we still have the opportunity to be convinced of their existence.

One of the proofs consists, for example, of the various forms of ideological and political publications which propose, for example, allegedly in the name of national harmony, to restore the possibilities for those to operate who themselves do not wish this harmony. On the other hand, the party does not intend to avail itself of their journalistic services, among others. And this is not because of their "personal proofs" but the proof of their political and ideological renegation, which they demonstrated both before and after the imposition of martial law.

Much harm too has been done by the statements of views trying to deny the most valuable thing in the history of our party, the contribution of its truly genuine revolutionary current, including the KPP [Polish Workers' Party] and PPR [Communist Party of Poland], preferring to glorify instead the supposed merits of reform groups or those which are openly nationalistic or anti-Soviet.

There has also been a sort of rehabilitation of certain views rejected long ago by the Polish and international workers movement.

At all cost efforts were made to disrupt the proper ratios between what is universal in socialist construction and what is really specific and national, and in that way to question the utility of the positive experience of the socialist countries and its benefit to Polish conditions.

In initiating discussion on the subject of the reformability or the non-reformability of socialism, efforts were made to create the impression that the main factor underlying the current crisis in Poland is merely an overly principled interpretation of the principles of the construction of socialism, which obviously is untrue. On the contrary, there have been rather too few consequences in adhering to the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the course of building socialism in Poland, and this pertains after all to more than just the 1970's.

This sort of attempt to distort the Marxist-Leninist identity of our party and to lie about its history can be demonstrated in many more examples.

This is the objective truth, regardless of whether the people who continue to lend their ear to the revisionist-opportunist murmurings realize it or not.

The party control commissions have their role in bolstering party unity. It is enough to mention the ouster from the party of individuals presenting right-wing opportunist orientations.

The position we adopted at the Seventh Central Committee Plenum on the solutions for various nonstatutory structures (horizontal structures, forums, seminars, and clubs) operating alongside the party echelons rather than within them was correct. We think that the plenums decisions on this issue were good for the party.

Nonetheless there are comrades even today who are not in clubs associated with the party echelons, it is true, because there are not any such clubs anymore, but they are in separate organizations and associations, where they are carrying on their political activity. Among them are a lot of our comrades who are devoted to our ideas.

It is high time for these very comrades to join in the current of party work in their own party echelons and organizations.

It is true that today it is not the time to hold a contest who is the more leftist and patriotic, but we should join all the forces of the Polish patriotic left to fight opponents of socialism, be they open about it or hidden.

For the national understanding, their actions are harmful, and they exhaust the Polish society's spiritual and physical strength.

For this reason then, in the party echelons and organizations, in the party activist groups, in the problems commissions associated with the party echelons, in the patriotic national renewal movement, in the columns of party periodicals and newspapers, on radio and television, and at meetings with working people it is proper to show our principled stance and our fidelity to the ideals of socialism.

On the other hand, as Lenin said, the "Hurrah, revolution!" slogans stated in small group, sometimes those with a touch of leftism, do not help unify the party politically and ideologically to produce the solidarity needed to fight the political adversary. On the contrary, they can sometimes isolate even some progressive layers of the society, to say nothing of the people on the fence who need to be gained for the ideals of the patriotic national renaissance movement.

Therefore, as a party control commission, we cannot fail to notice all the dangers threatening the party and the political line established at the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress.

The key to resolving social tensions and to getting the country out of the present crisis is in the hands of the party, which is working with the patriotic forces of the Polish nation: with the working class, the peasants, and the intelligentsia, with all people of good will, regardless of whether or not they belong to the party or what their world view is, people concerned about the fate of our country.

Here the goal is to achieve genuine, not just apparent, national understanding among all forces on the basis of the principle of the Constitution of our socialist state.

As for the former extremist leaders of Solidarity, as the result of the crisis of faith with the working class, and party, and state leaders, they have excluded themselves from any national understanding and agreement, because instead of really entering into the job of overcoming the crisis, they took on a political struggle. They listened to the advice of KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], KOR [Social Self-Defense Committee], and inimical elements of Western imperialist sabotage and set as their goal the overturning of the legal authority of People's Poland.

As their method of battle they adopted conscious ruination of the Polish economy, not worrying about making inflation worse thereby worsening the living conditions of working people and the whole society, whose interests and prosperity were supposed to be so much on their minds. The cynical thing about it is that they themselves even admitted it, playing that sort of game from the very beginning!

The fact that some of the Solidarity activists went underground in their activity shows that they chose the method of political trouble-making. It also means that in reality they have no positive sort of social program and never had one.

This is their program: street demonstrations, holding up the government with a general strike, and finally political, moral, and the threat of physical terror. With such people we cannot come to an agreement as one Pole to another, because their political and class goals are different from ours.

This alleged "program" of political opposition after all is leading to chaos, anarchy, and fratricidal warfare.

Are the working people in Poland looking for this sort of program? Of course not!

Our party has such a positive program of gradually but realistically getting the country out of the crisis onto the track of economic and social development. The Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress described it, and successive resolutions of the Central Committee translated it into concrete expression.

There have already been some explanations of the reasons behind the introduction of martial law. As everyone knows, in the Sejm on 21 July of this year the conditions necessary for the suspension of martial law were laid down. They are extremely clear: when there is real dialogue along with social peace, there will be no need for martial law.

After all, martial law was introduced to prevent the destruction of what was fought for with blood and built up with the tedious work of our nation. And after all, despite the mistakes, a great deal was built.

It is obvious that not all Poles still realize that it was a question of the Polish socialist state's being or not being, of a cross-fire of plans to exploit Poland as an experimental ground for evoking an international-scale conflict of incalculable effects.

The difficulties of martial law are undoubtedly a relatively low price to pay to avoid such sad prospects. After all, to put the matter openly, these burdensome aspects interfere mainly with the political trouble-makers in Poland and abroad, the adversaries of the socialist system. Those most upset are the various social dregs, the criminals, do-nothings, and speculators, and this was just the ideal and still is: for these groups in Poland to feel bad and even worse and worse.

Martial law will last no longer than the period necessary for both the antisocialist opposition at home and its backers abroad to finally understand that it is an unrealistic illusion to think they can overturn the socialist system in Poland.

The firmer the state authorities' actions are along with those of our party, other political parties, and youth organizations, in the broadly conceived political struggle against innate antisocialist opposition and absolutely antirevolutionary elements, the more quickly they will come to realize this. Also contributing to this will be a situation where any violation of public law and order will encounter condemnation and effective rejection by all progressive social forces as well as by the law-and-order and peace-keeping organizations created for this purpose.

At the same time, as I mentioned above, we must decisively limit, combat, and eliminate anything which might help in continuing the political adversary's influence in certain circles of society, including among some young people.

We must still be concerned about the existing state of affairs in the so-called sphere of the superstructure. There is still an atmosphere in certain intelligentsia groups far removed from political clarity, to say nothing of ideological clarity.

Some people are still stubbornly using all sorts of means to undermine confidence in the people's officials, and despite the obvious facts they deny the whole 38 years' contribution of people's power. To this very day they

are sulking, allegedly over martial law, assuming evocative poses which highlight their aversion to the existing "regime," which -- this cannot be understood by certain obstinate intellectuals who stubbornly hold on to their ahistorical political thinking -- introduced martial law in Poland, so that Poland would not set off a world conflict, in the course of which their fate and that of those close to them and the whole Polish nation would be exceptionally tragic.

After all, without that, world peace is a greatly endangered effort, owing to the spread of the imperialist policy of the United States and the accompanying arms spiral. Are we Poles to add our contribution to this, to the great joy of the FRG revisionists in particular?

The situation in some schools and institutions of higher education cannot be considered normal either. Such a state of affairs is having a bad effect on the attitudes of young people in some circles.

What is particularly disturbing is the fact that the most irresponsible, inimical individuals are pushing some young people to various sorts of complaining which leads to excesses. Does it not lie in the interest of all young people to prevent the possible dramas which have already occurred with the participation of some of their peers? Is it not high time for adults, with real life experience, and parents and pedagogic staff to turn them from this wrong and dangerous path?

In considering problems of this sort, those related to the situation within the country in the concern for safeguarding social peace, we must therefore each time determine whether tolerance and understanding of virtue can objectively be transformed into a desire to skip the traces. Such attempts can hamper or interfere with the consolidation of the society in favor of getting the country out of the crisis and, in certain circumstances, can even be a factor favoring the appearance of successive social tensions, conflicts, and the accompanying human dramas.

All party members, the members of the Central Committee and those at its lowest levels, will remember the experience of the most recent period. They should therefore be on guard, be active, and be motivated by principle in party actions to get the country out of the sociopolitical crisis. It is a question of taking a positive offensive stand in the severe ideological and political struggle going on, of not stopping at anything that might weaken the activity of the adversaries of socialism and favor party consolidation and the consolidation of all progressive social forces, regardless of their professed world view or whether or not they belong to the party.

10790
CSO: 2600/234

PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH CENTER DIRECTOR INTERVIEWED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 15 Dec 82 p 5

[Interview with colonel, docent, Dr Habilitatus Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, director of Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), by Irena Scholl, National Workers' Agency (KAR)]

[Text] [Question] For what reason has the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) been established? What place does the CBOS occupy among other agencies of this type?

[Answer] The CBOS is a governmental center with a nationwide scope of action. So far we had not yet had such an agency, even though for years there was talk of a need for its existence. The decision to establish the CBOS should be seen as a result of changes that were carried out and which continue to be carried out. How many times after August 80 the government was accused of voluntarism, of ignoring opinions and public feeling, and taking advantage of the luxury of ignorance. In the conviction of working people, it was the source of all our misfortunes, as well as the cause of our political and economic crises. We want to help the government in making right decisions, in improving the style and methods of exercising its authority. On the strength of the constitution the power in a socialist state is exercised in behalf of workers and peasants, that is, in accordance with their interests. The CBOS affords an additional means to articulate these interests, to learn what the working people actually think, what their needs are, how they judge various social facts, etc. With this very thought we will carry out our own research, instigate other agencies, and coordinate heretofore scattered efforts.

[Question] During the last two years we have witnessed considerable socialization of the process of exercising power. Numerous councils and committees are being formed at the central and provincial organs of the government. They are composed of professionals and members of various social circles. Consultations are being conducted in great industrial plants. Recently the founders of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON] were talking face to face with the Government Presidium. This means the participation of citizens' masses in shaping decisions of the government, and a direct information of public feeling is guaranteed.

[Answer] It can be clearly seen how much the style of exercising power has changed. One can hear and see with interest various accounts of meetings between citizens and the state leadership, but we cannot stop at that. How much are they typical of the people at large, of specific circles, social strata, and classes, of which Polish society is still being made up? We are coming to the conviction quite often recently that in many questions we differ very much. There are reasons resulting from assumptions based on our form of government and ideology, but there are also others that are being argued. Is it always being known what those arguments and opinions are? We want to supply the government with straightforward information, and to "measure" needs, appraisals, opinions, without strained-out deformations.

[Question] We are forgetting the trade unions which will soon begin to function. Their function, among other things, is to represent public opinion.

[Answer] We do not forget. Anyway, the trade unions are not the only organization expressing the interests of working people. Specialists from the CBOS will go in person to everyplace where public opinion is being formed, not only throughout the trade unions, but also in social organizations, self-governments, as well as through pollsters. And moreover, as a sad experience of the past showed that the pronouncements "in the name of the society as a whole" were not reliable, even when they were issued by trade-union leaders, our ambition is to be a honest medium of democracy.

[Question] Until now, comrade Director, you worked in the military. Did this not prejudice your appointment as a Director of the CBOS?

[Answer] All appointments of career soldiers to government posts are made not because it is "stylish," and not from a natural need of confidence, but in the first place because of the necessity to cope with difficult situations in which after all we function. Already from these few sentences of our talk it follows that the management of the CBOS requires special professional and political qualifications. It is not as easy to cope with these requirements; for example, I am still looking for a deputy for scientific matters. I would gladly take him from the army, but they will not let me do it. Our armed forces do have highly qualified cadres, for after all constant training is the main military "production." Since the talk is of myself - for the last 10 years I had no mean opportunity to be a link between science and practice, for I had been, as an independent scientific worker, an officer of the Minister of National Defense, and specialized in broadly-conceived socio-political problems. I had acquired a not inconsiderable knowledge of practical sociology and a considerable amount of scientific and journalistic experience (I had been a member of the SDB [Association of Polish Journalists], and at present I belong to the SD PRP [Association of Journalists of the Polish People's Republic]).

What is here still more important: Our society knows too little about what was going on in the forces in the past decade - and these years were significant. During this period of time were settled many problems of social

nature, measurable in organizational, cultural and educational facts, in the coexistence of soldiers and performance of command power. After discussions comprising all aspects of military life, several important programmatic documents were introduced imparting a new quality to army life. All the more important decisions and in particular standard documents, almost every item of deliberation of the collegiate organs of the Minister, for example of the Council for Social and Living Matters and Council for Higher Military Education - were preceded by environmental consultation and corresponding public opinion soundings carried out by the Institute of Social Research of the Military Political Academy. Thanks to this it was possible to oppose those improper tendencies which manifested themselves outside the army.

[Question] Do you not think that it will be difficult to the authorities to reduce to a common denominator, that is, to use for making specific decisions, the results of the public opinion research? Polish opinions were always very differentiated. It is simply impossible to satisfy everyone or even a majority?

[Answer] That's not the point of reducing quite different interests to a common denominator. Opinions are the result of the living conditions of man. Differences between men - real ones and not those caused by momentary emotions--arise from differences of needs and social roles. If extreme opinions are found in our society, evidently it is because we are still much divided stratawise and classwise, whereas the interests of occupational groups are still very different.

To be sure, for the authorities of a socialist state the most important is that what has to say the working class, and in particular the working class of large-scale industry. Thus, our soundings will be based on samples taken using the "telephone directory" method, but will also have a concrete addressee. The opinions are concrete, and arithmetic means are admissible, for example, while counting potatoes.

Certainly - as I mentioned - we will also avail ourselves of the research of other scientific units. We are already receiving such offers and we are grateful for them. I likewise thank all those citizens who - at the CBOS address, Warsaw, ul. Zorawia 4a - are sending letters with opinions and proposals, and even with complaints. I treat complaints as a valuable source for studying social problems and attitudes. To be sure, we cannot handle, the matters contained in the letters, but we cooperate in this with the Bureau of Complaints and Letters of the Council of Ministers' Office.

I wish yet to add that we are under obligation to convey the results of the public opinion research to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Government Presidium, as well as - at the request of the Chairman of the Sociopolitical Committee of the Council of Ministers - to other organs and institutions.

[Question] And if the authorities - one can encounter such doubts - will wish again to take refuge in a luxury of ignorance and won't wish to use your services?

[Answer] We have already many "safety devices." The CBOS is only one of many institutions guaranteeing constancy of solutions. Already the very fact of our existence creates so to say a compulsory situation. After all, from the "top" to the "bottom" there is a general conviction that knowledge of public opinion is a chance for those leaders who wish to fulfill honestly their great public roles. It is also a chance for society - a possibility to achieve a self-recognition and self-appraisal. History of the past years teaches us that the most vocal opinions, pressed forcibly - the ones propagated and shouted out - are not the ones that are being generally recognized. But it is better to have them documented unmistakably.

1015

CSO: 2600/163

POLISH PROFESSOR INDICTS MARTIAL LAW RECORD

PM131631 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 3 Jan 83 p 6

[Article by Polish university professor under pseudonym "D. Morawski": "A Year's Martial Law in Poland"]

[Text] Poland has experienced a restless year, during which the authorities have tried to regain their political monopoly and to destroy the dreams of democracy, freedom and a better defined independence. Has the Jaruzelski government achieved these aims? Which social groups have benefited most from the normalization?

What the authorities mean by normalization is the neutralization of the population's energy, which in the 16 months of freedom following August 1980 manifested itself in open criticism of the system and in the demand for reforms. The explosive emergence of new forces and, above all, of forces composed of young workers and intellectuals was a historic challenge presented to the bureaucracy. The reforms demanded by the majority were so radical that the Polish process was rightly described as a democratic revolution against single-party totalitarian government.

The peaceful advance of the revolution was halted by the armed reaction of the privileged bunker, which had become encircled. As of 13 December 1981, physical force crushed moral strength and the repression annihilated the organizations aspiring to autonomy and freedom. Censorship, which again placed itself above the law, destroyed the newly-reborn expression of freedom and the central bureaucracy extirpated the roots of worker self-management and of the independent organizations of artists and creators of culture. The primitive language of government propaganda replaced the rich range of symbols, ideas and initiatives latent within the Polish factories and universities.

New National Drama

There was one single language instead of several different ones, a single correct program instead of several programs. The actors, with their backs to the audience, deliver their monologues instead of conducting a dialogue with that audience and allowing it to speak on the political stage, not just in the foyer of the theater during the intermission of the play being performed.

A new national drama is being presented on the Polish stage. its directors are the Eastern champions of despotism. The subject of the play is the slow annihilation of the hopes of freedom and faith in a better future. The hopes and faith generated by the Solidarity trade union movement are destroyed in cold blood through the elimination of politics from social life. Instead of politics, the government has the police, bureaucracy and propaganda. For these very reasons there can be no politics in the opposition area and there is only social resistance, a clandestine trade union movement and top-level efforts by the Catholic Church to reach a compromise with the ruling elite.

After a year of repression, the ruling elite has regained administrative control over the public conduct of the majority of citizens. It has succeeded in arousing sufficient fear and disappointment among the workers to ensure passivism. Within the official organizations, which once again must act solely as transmission belts for the ruling party apparatus, they are entitled only to publicly acknowledge that the introduction of martial law was a necessity and a lesser evil.

Meanwhile, the organizations that could not and would not allow themselves to submit and be controlled have been dissolved. This is the fate that has met the Solidarity trade unions of the workers, peasants and craftsmen and some organizations of artists and creators of culture, such as the Association of Polish Journalists [SDP] and the Union of Polish Actors [ZASP].

Among friends, relations and colleagues, people still express very freely the hatred and contempt that they feel for the government apparatus.

Opinions are still very critical and still influenced by the freedom brought by August 1980, despite the fact that the authorities have returned to the debased language invented by the official ideology and bureaucracy of "intensification," "enhancement," "amplification" and "omnidirectional development."

Triumph of Bureaucracy and Political Police

The dictatorship of bureaucracy can tie people's hands and paralyze their actions, but hitherto it has not succeeded in enslaving their minds, destroying their values and imposing its own language of lies and fiction.

Within the ruling elite there are two groups that have benefited from martial law: The civilian economic bureaucracy and the Security Service. Meanwhile, there has been a loss of influence on the part of the professional party apparatus, which in all communist systems is the sector that enjoys the benefits of the nomenklatura, that is, the right to fill all the existing state leadership posts, from the post of foreman to that of minister or deputy prime minister. The party apparatus can no longer arbitrarily impose its will on other groups of the ruling elite, as it did before.

The political police and the bureaucracy of the economic organizations and bodies enjoy proportionately more autonomy, inasmuch as the social institutions that can monitor them have disappeared. The self-management of the workers and trade unions cannot perform this task because it does not exist. Nor can

it be performed by the people's councils, because they are no more than a facade stemming from rigged elections held prior to August 1980.

It was precisely the fear of the elections due to take place (early in 1982) for the people's councils of the cities and rural municipalities that prompted the authorities to introduce martial law. The communist elite was afraid a year ago that its handpicked councilors would be replaced by people elected by free and peaceful suffrage. The guarantors that the elections would be free and absolutely peaceful were Solidarity and other democratic movements. In December 1982 the ruling elite was afraid not of civil war, but of peaceful local elections and a referendum that would reveal that the communists lacked any right to govern.

After a year of martial law the Army--more precisely the body of officers--is still the same as in December 1981. It was, and still is, the shield that defends the bureaucracy's three most important groups: the party apparatus, the executives of the government and the police. It is true that there are some generals and colonels who are party secretaries or ministers; it is true that there are military commissars in the cities, councils and factories; but this does not mean--far from it--that it is the Army that governs the state. The officers are still the fourth most important group within the ruling elite. Their influences have increased temporarily--but only in exchange for a substantial and lasting loss of prestige for the military profession; they have lost more than they have gained.

The principal winners in this strange war have been the government bureaucrats and the professional police officers, who have succeeded in extending or consolidating their power, and whose prestige within society has never been so high and therefore almost impossible to lose.

Economic Benefits

Martial law has brought the ruling elite more than political benefits. It has also given it economic benefits. The authorities are still very anxious about the state of the economy, but they have now managed to appropriate a whole range of benefits. Martial law increased and extended the privileges of the central administration and of the apparatus in charge of the economy, as well as those of the Security Service, which is rewarded by Poles resident abroad, who have guaranteed--independently of the government--substantial gains, since, in exchange for permission authorizing small foreign capitalists of Polish origin to carry out economic activities in Poland, the ruling elite secures good working positions within these companies for their relatives and friends [sentence as published]. In 1982 unquestionable gains were also made by private traders and craftsmen, as well as by some food producers, who earn a great deal on the free market in a situation of total crisis in state industry and trade. There is a small group of workers who are being corrupted with very high salaries. First and foremost, there are the miners, who earn monthly salaries of up to 40,000 zlotys, against a national average of about 11,000.

Who has suffered political and economic losses over the 12 months of martial law, and as a result of it? The living standards, opportunities for improve-

ment and the likelihood of obtaining an apartment have deteriorated for the rest of society. Inflation and the shortage of the most basic commodities affect all sections of workers. Economic losses have been suffered by the workers, those intellectuals not dependent on the government and the majority of peasants.

Young people are particularly lacking in hope and prospects, are embittered and disillusioned, and if they could, they would seek a better life by emigrating for financial reasons, though they know that unemployment has reached almost 10 percent in the West.

There is a great feeling of economic insecurity about the future among young people, and their political mistrust of the system is very deep-rooted. Young people realize that the system has destroyed their hopes, their faith and their dreams, which emerged from the August revolution.

That revolution belongs to the young generation, whereas members of the government, usually between 45 and 60 years old, state that it was a counterrevolution. The old have deprived the young of their hopes, but they have not succeeded, hitherto, in destroying the "new middle class," in other words, the coalition formed by young workers and intellectuals who entered political life in the 1970's and were never indoctrinated by the Stalinism of the 1950's and do not experience the fear that others carry in their hearts and minds. They know that their future depends on science, technology and good organization.

Although martial law has caused extraordinary losses in the ranks of clandestine Solidarity and although its structures and leadership centers are very debilitated, the coalition of social forces capable of waging a broad political battle, thanks to their youth, has not disintegrated.

It is possible that in the months, or perhaps years, ahead, with a new organization--but one as vigorous as before--it will continue to combat the dictatorial government, economic weakness and cultural isolation.

CSO: 3548/105

JEWISH ENVOY MEETS WITH CEAUSESCU ON EMIGRATION

TA261241 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 26 Dec 82 p 4

[Text] A U.S. Jewish emissary is conducting negotiations with Romanian President Ceausescu on the possible departure of Jews from Romania after the adoption of the regulations about paying an exit ransom.

The emissary, Rabbi (Sheiner) from New York, spent the past weekend in Jerusalem and briefed Prime Minister Begin on his talks which he said were conducted with the knowledge of the White House. In his estimation, his mission was crowned with success and the solution for the Jews' exit was found in a "package deal" whereby the amount to be paid per person was determined through understanding reached with a considerable number of the Jewish community members.

In the course of the negotiations the Romanian president made it clear that the pay exacted from those leaving Romania was not intended against Jews in particular. Romania has many difficulties with ethnic minorities members who want to leave the country, thus causing numerous internal problems, and the exit fee, according to Ceausescu, is the way to overcome the difficulties. According to the secret report given by the emissary to Begin, Ceausescu expressed his desire for improved relations between Romania and Israel and certain also between Romania and the United States.

Authoritative Israeli elements who did not manage to meet the emissary are not enthusiastic about the details of the "agreement" if indeed it exists. These elements emphasized that the purpose of their efforts in recent months was to restore the situation prevailing toward the Romanian Jews until 5 November 1982 when the decrees were passed against them. These elements are doubtful whether any benefits can be achieved beyond this.

CSO: 2020/14

INCREASE IN ROMANIAN IMMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL

TA301656 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1650 GMT 30 Dec 82

[Text] Bucharest, 30 Dec (ITIM)--The number of Jews immigrating from Romania has increased over the number during previous years, Romania's chief rabbi, (Dr David Moshe Rosen) reported today.

In a telephone conversation from Bucharest, the rabbi told this correspondent that in 1982 some 1,606 Jews left Romania for Israel, compared to 1,067 in 1981 and 1,119 in 1980. This shows that the number of immigrants in 1982 was 51 percent greater than in 1981, and 44 percent greater than in 1980.

In addition, 737 Jews have had their requests to emigrate approved, but have not yet managed to leave, while 750 Jews are still waiting for their requests to be approved.

CSO: 2020/14

SOCIOLOGIST OUTLINES RESULTS OF STUDY ON 'YUGOSLAVS'

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jan 83 pp 13-16

[Unsigned article summarizing an article entitled "Who Are the 'Yugoslavs'" by Boris Vuskovic published in the most recent issue of the journal NASE TEME: "Who Are the 'Yugoslavs': What Does the Study by the Sociologist Boris Vuskovic Show"]

[Text] Last year's lively, often contradictory and not altogether consistent discussions of the "Yugoslavs" have probably still not faded altogether from readers' memories. By way of a reminder, let us say that the first results of the last population census, though not fully processed, have "raised the temperature" in many heads solely because of the datum that the number of "Yugoslavs" increased 4.5-fold over the last 10 years (1971-1981). A whole army of social and political figures, scientists and theoreticians in various fields have attempted to penetrate and to explain to the public what has happened in the heads of many of our countrymen (1,219,024) when out of the lengthy list offered by the census sheet they decided to declare themselves to be "uncommitted as to nationality--Yugoslav." Many of these interpretations have aroused fierce polemics which have filled newspaper columns for weeks, and there have been "casualties" on both sides--both among those involved in the polemics and among the newsmen. But in spite of the line of argument presented, the debate seems to have quickly run down; it somehow died down abruptly, yet many questions were left without real answers.

The most recent issue of the journal NASE TEME, which is published by the Center for Ideological and Theoretical Work of the Croatian LC Central Committee, has in a way revived this "hot" topic by publishing an article entitled "Who Are the 'Yugoslavs'" written by the Split sociologist Boris Vuskovic. In this ministudy Vuskovic attempts within the limits of the available data (and they mainly date, as he himself says, from the 1971 Census) to penetrate and offer a sound sociological profile of that group of the population which has opted in the census to be "Yugoslavs." In the introductory part of his article Vuskovic offers his commentary on the discussions which have been started up, warning that he must "disturb the noticeable intellectual and ethical colorblindness that had been expressed (of obviously political origin)." The adverse evaluation of the growth of the uncommitted--of "Yugoslavism," which, Vuskovic says, has veiled over the possibility of a more comprehensive and indeed more objective analysis, has probably drawn strength from the following two very closely related sources:

"The first reason is that some of the spokesmen of an adverse attitude toward the 'uncommitted Yugoslavs' still equate Yugoslav (un)commitment with the unitaristic social concept, but no one dares to say this openly. In this game of hide and seek there is a deep-seated grotesqueness between the loud appeals for the right of every citizen to make a free choice, including noncommitment, and the simultaneous 'concern' because of the increase in the number of uncommitted Yugoslavs, and indeed the unfair treatment of this commitment. It is remarkable that the advocates of these views do not see that equating the uncommitted 'Yugoslavs' with unitarianism is just as improper and dangerous as it would be for someone to burden our own ethnic commitments with some sort of Quisling nonsense of another time (there was that kind of nonsense here and there).... In spite of that tacit identification of the uncommitted 'Yugoslavs' with the spokesmen of unitarianism, which on the basis of a certain limited historical experience is a homegrown product, the second reason for this adverse attitude toward the uncommitted 'Yugoslavs' in general, and therefore toward their growth in particular, surely lies in the fact that the nationality aspect has been approached from positions that are somewhat narrow and predominantly academic, positions which relate the nationality aspect decisively to its regional source, that is, to its statehood, which in any historical and current social context, including the Yugoslav context, makes uncommitment as to nationality in a way debatable."

Following the general introductory remarks Vuskovic offers a survey of the main demographic and social features of the uncommitted "Yugoslavs." That part of the study we are publishing in its entirety (the headings have been supplied by the editors).

The age-specific composition of the uncommitted Yugoslavs shows that according to the 1971 Census they are slightly younger than the average of the entire Yugoslav population; that is, noticeably younger than the Croats, Hungarians, Slovenes and Serbs, but at the same time older than the Albanians, the Montenegrins, the Macedonians and the Moslems (we are taking into account only the eight most numerous groups in the ethnic composition of the Yugoslav population). That is, the youngest age group, i.e., those under age 18, comprise 33.12 percent of the uncommitted Yugoslavs, while in the total Yugoslav population this age group is just slightly less sizable (32.60 percent). By comparison with the Croats, one of the oldest age groups in the Yugoslav population, the share of those under 18 in the uncommitted Yugoslavs is more pronounced, since among the Croats that group comprises only 30.05 percent.

Age and Sex

However, whereas there are negligible differences between the uncommitted Yugoslavs and the total Yugoslav population with respect to the share of the youngest age group (index number 101.6) and also relative to Croats (index number 110.2), those differences are considerably larger for the most significant age group, i.e., the group from age 18 to age 40. That is, whereas this group constitutes 33.93 percent in the total Yugoslav population and approximately the same among Croats (33.44 percent), among uncommitted Yugoslavs it has a share of all of 38.46 percent, i.e., an index number of 113.4 relative

to Yugoslavia (115.0 relative to Croats). At the same time, of course, this means that the group over age 40 is considerably less represented among the uncommitted Yugoslavs (28.42 percent) than is the case in the Yugoslav population (33.47 percent), and especially among Croats (36.51 percent); or, shown in index numbers, 84.91 relative to Yugoslavia and 77.84 relative to Croats.

On the basis of the age-specific composition of the uncommitted Yugoslavs, then, we might frame at least three important conclusions, briefly stated:

First, that the group of uncommitted Yugoslavs is somewhat younger than the average age of the Yugoslav population, since 71.58 percent of the uncommitted Yugoslavs are under age 40, while that same age group has a share of 66.53 percent (index number 107.6) in the total Yugoslav population. But that age difference to the advantage of the uncommitted Yugoslavs is essentially stated (as we established by analysis) as a markedly higher share of the age group from age 18 to age 40, since the share of the group under age 18 is almost the same, and the share of the older age groups is considerably smaller.

Second. It is by no means possible to conclude on the basis of that age-specific composition of the uncommitted Yugoslavs that uncommitted Yugoslavism is an option of age groups which are not sufficiently mature.

Third. It can also be concluded on the basis of the same fact that uncommitted Yugoslavism cannot to any high degree be an option of the wartime generation.

It would, of course, be extremely interesting to find out what happened with the age-specific composition of the uncommitted Yugoslavs in 1981. However, the figures on the age-specific composition of nationality groups have not yet been published. To be sure, we might attempt to conclude something indirectly from the ethnic composition of university students, since these are the only data we have available, but certainly this is not enough for a valid judgment concerning the entire population. We will nevertheless give this figure, since it is interesting in and of itself.

Thus in the 1970/71 academic year, in the year of the census, then, 27,804 university students declared themselves to be uncommitted Yugoslavs, which at that time was 10.79 percent of all university students in Yugoslavia and at the same time 10.18 percent of the total population of uncommitted Yugoslavs.

In the 1979/80 academic year, that is, on the eve of the most recent census, the number of uncommitted Yugoslavs who were university students experienced a considerable absolute increase (43,335), but their share among those attending Yugoslav universities had decreased (9.76 percent), and it seems there was also a considerable drop in their share in the population of uncommitted Yugoslavs (3.55 percent of their number in 1981). On the basis of that datum, which should neither be underestimated nor overestimated, we ought to conclude--assuming the necessary processing of the data--that the growth of uncommitted Yugoslavs among young people was probably not at the growth level of the entire population.

As for features with respect to sex, the population of uncommitted Yugoslavs coincides almost absolutely with the features of the entire Yugoslav population; that is, men and women are almost equally present among the uncommitted Yugoslavs. That is, in 1971 men comprised 49.10 percent of the total Yugoslav population and were just a bit more evident--50.61 percent--among uncommitted Yugoslavs.

Geographic Distribution

If we analyze the urban-rural distribution of the uncommitted Yugoslavs according to the last census and the results of the most recent population census within SR [Socialist Republic] Croatia, since we have figures for 1981 pertaining only to our own republic, we come to the unambiguous conclusion that noncommitment is in general a specific Yugoslav phenomenon and especially an urban phenomenon. That is, taken overall, within urban settlements of SR Croatia the uncommitted Yugoslavs make up 11.95 percent of the total population, while in other settlements they represent only 4.40 percent (the average in SR Croatia is 8.24 percent of the total population), that is, nearly threefold more in urban than in other settlements. Indeed, if we take into account the ethnic distribution of the population in addition to the split between urban and rural settlements in 20 agglomerations exceeding a population of 50,000 (one of which is the Zagreb urban community of opstinas), then we will see the growth of uncommitted Yugoslavs in all three aspects:

- i. in the context of both types of settlements of those agglomerations uncommitted Yugoslavs have a higher share than the average in the population of SR Croatia (9.80 percent as against 8.24 percent);
- ii. in the context of urban settlements of these agglomerations they are also better represented (12.33 percent) than in the total aggregate of urban settlements of SR Croatia (11.95 percent);
- iii. in the context of "other settlements" of those same agglomerations uncommitted Yugoslavs have a share of 5.11 percent, as against 4.40 percent in all the "other settlements" in SR Croatia.

Certainly the range of differences between the urban and other settlements of the individual agglomerations is exceptionally high; for instance, in the urban settlements of Vukovar all of one out of every four citizens is an uncommitted Yugoslav, while in Cakovec it is only one out of 20, and then in the "other settlements" of Varazdin it is only one out of every 160, and that figure goes up to one out of every seven or eight in the "other settlements" of Beli Manastir. This is clearly shown by the ranking of the 10 agglomerations which have the highest share of uncommitted Yugoslavs, when compared with the 1971 situation, and those 5 agglomerations in which they have the lowest share.

<u>Agglomerations</u>	Average		1981	
	1981	1971	Urban Settlements	Other Settlements
	1) Vukovar	21.18%	6.13%	26.61%
2) Osijek	17.91%	2.84%	22.10%	7.75%
3) Pula	16.99%	4.35%	20.55%	5.18%
4) Rijeka	15.78%	4.08%	16.93%	9.25%
5) B. Manastir	15.72%	1.86%	21.87%	13.18%
6) Sisak	15.11%	2.84%	22.10%	7.75%
7) Bjelovar	13.45%	2.62%	20.55%	9.12%
8) Karlovac	11.96%	2.48%	15.37%	3.92%
9) Sl. Brod	9.70%	2.06%	15.84%	4.32%
10) N. Gradiska	9.23%	1.63%	17.98%	5.57%

Within these agglomerations the ranking of those with the lowest share of un-committed Yugoslavs was as follows:

<u>Agglomerations</u>	Average		1981	
	1981	1971	Urban Settlements	Other Settlements
	1) Cakovec	1.86%	0.30%	5.33%
2) Varazdin	2.99%	0.89%	6.07%	0.61%
3) Djakovo	3.41%	0.58%	5.07%	2.53%
4) Koprivnica	4.31%	1.15%	7.23%	2.80%
5) Zagreb urban community of opstinas	7.35%	2.46%	7.97%	2.37%

The following conclusions can by and large be framed on the basis of what we have stated:

First, that uncommitted Yugoslavs have increased at approximately the same high relative rates both within those agglomerations in which they have the highest share and also in those in which they have the lowest share. In that sense the increase in the number of uncommitted Yugoslavs is in a way a uni-versal phenomenon.

Second, in principle uncommitted Yugoslavs have a higher share in communities which are not ethnically homogeneous, and vice versa. This conclusion necessarily imposes itself if we analyze the ethnic composition of the population of the first five agglomerations both with the highest share and with the lowest share of uncommitted Yugoslavs.

That is, within the five agglomerations in which the uncommitted Yugoslavs have the highest share, the share of Croats, which is the most numerous group in the given ethnic composition of the population, ranges from one-third to a maximum of two-thirds of the total population. On the other hand in agglomerations where uncommitted Yugoslavs have relatively a smaller share, the ethnic homogeneity of the population is markedly high and ranges from 86.1 percent to 94.7 percent (Croats).

It is difficult to draw a valid conclusion as to which ethnic groups the uncommitted Yugoslavs were predominantly recruited from, since we do not have figures on migration in these agglomerations. Nevertheless, if we neglect this factor, which is extremely important, that is, if we look at the population in an essentially static way, then we can conclude that the uncommitted Yugoslavs were recruited approximately equally from all the more numerous ethnic groups, which as a factual matter usually means Croats and Serbs.

Thus between 1971 and 1981 in Vukovar the share of the two most numerous ethnic groups dropped by the identical proportion: Croats (index number 82.1) and Serbs (83.3). The same thing is true of Rijeka and Beli Manastir, and only in Pula and Osijek was there a somewhat higher relative drop of Serbs as compared to Croats, and of Hungarians in Beli Manastir as compared to both groups.

As for the agglomerations with the lowest share of uncommitted Yugoslavs, the situation is approximately the same as the one already described, note being taken that the Serbs nevertheless did decrease to a greater relative extent, but since we are talking about groups which are small in absolute terms, the statistical relations do not have essential relevance.

Social Composition

In the socioeconomic sphere there are several interesting features of the ethnically uncommitted Yugoslavs.

First of all, as to the distribution of the labor force and dependents there turns out to be a certain difference between the population of uncommitted Yugoslavs and the total population of Yugoslavia, since those who are working make up 38.44 percent of the uncommitted Yugoslavs and 43.32 percent in the total population. However, that difference, which is not negligible, is actually smaller in a way. That is, persons under age 18 represent 6.14 percent of the age-specific composition of the Yugoslav labor force (and we are mostly talking about members of the farm population), while among uncommitted Yugoslavs they represent only 3.13 percent; which means that there are no very significant differences in the share of those who are working between the two adult populations.

Approximately the same thing is true of dependents. They have a somewhat higher share among uncommitted Yugoslavs (51.51 percent) than in the total Yugoslav population (50.63 percent). But in the population of uncommitted Yugoslavs persons under age 18 represent 60.69 percent of the dependents, while they represent 59.07 percent of the total Yugoslav population, so that this slight difference in the number of dependents between the two populations mainly comes down to the higher share of the age group under age 18 in the breakdown of uncommitted Yugoslavs. Incidentally, there are not even any significant differences in the sex-specific composition either for people who are working or people who are dependents.

Yet when it comes to other breakdowns of the people who are employed and dependents, then the population of uncommitted Yugoslavs shows more considerable

departures from the respective distributions of the total Yugoslav population, and most of those discrepancies have very great sociological significance.

The first of these major differences turns up in the breakdown of the labor force into those employed in the socialized sector and those who are employed in the private sector. Among the uncommitted Yugoslavs who are working all of four-fifths (80.7 percent) are employed in the socialized sector, while that percentage in the Yugoslav labor force is only 46.5 percent. Within the context of the overall higher share of uncommitted Yugoslavs among employed persons, it is significant to emphasize that among those uncommitted Yugoslav women who are working those employed in the socialized sector represent all of 84.2 percent, by contrast with the women working in the total Yugoslav population, where this percentage is 59.2 percent (for men the figures are 78.6 and 50.3 percent, respectively).

Education

The second of those major differences in socioeconomic characteristics consist of the spread of the skill-specific composition of both the employed segments and the total population of uncommitted Yugoslavs as compared to the respective groups of the total Yugoslav population (including other ethnic groups as well).

Indeed the very differences in elementary literacy and schooling between the uncommitted Yugoslavs and the total Yugoslav population turn out to be extremely significant. According to the 1971 Population Census, the share of illiterates was lowest among Slovenes (1.04 percent), then among uncommitted Yugoslavs (3.46 percent), then Hungarians (5.09 percent), and then Croats (9.82 percent), and so on, while in the total Yugoslav population the percentage of illiterates was all of 14.91 percent. Within the total Yugoslav population there were another 9.30 percent who had no schooling (but were literate), while among uncommitted Yugoslavs this share was lowest (4.80 percent), and it was then followed by Slovenes (5.50 percent), Macedonians (6.38 percent), Montenegrins (8.03 percent), and so on.

In the Yugoslav population 8.97 percent have finished a school for skilled and highly skilled workers, while that percentage was almost twice as high among uncommitted Yugoslavs (14.73 percent), and that level of skills was higher only among Slovenes (16.07). All of 18.87 percent of the uncommitted Yugoslavs had completed secondary school, which is threefold higher than for the Yugoslav population (6.27 percent), followed at a considerable distance by Montenegrins (10.32 percent) and Macedonians (8.24 percent), and so on. But the greatest differences between uncommitted Yugoslavs and the total population crops up in the area of the highest levels of education; 9 percent of the uncommitted Yugoslavs have graduated from a junior or senior postsecondary school, while this proportion is only 2.81 percent in the total Yugoslav population.

These major differences in schooling between the uncommitted Yugoslavs and the total Yugoslav population and indeed all the other ethnic groups surely will not soon level out for the simple reason that about three-fourths of the

uncommitted Yugoslavs between the ages of 18 and 29 (dependents) are attending the university, while only about 17 percent of the same group in the Yugoslav population was attending the university in 1971 (moreover uncommitted Yugoslav women have an almost sixfold higher share at the university, while among men it is less than fivefold).

It is, of course, easy to conclude from this survey of the education of the total population of uncommitted Yugoslavs that those uncommitted Yugoslavs who are employed are also at a considerably higher average level of skills than the total employed labor force of Yugoslavia, and also that there must exist a sociologically significant difference in social and occupational distribution between the uncommitted Yugoslavs and the general Yugoslav population. The two most numerous social and occupational groups among the uncommitted Yugoslavs are industrial workers (28.73 percent) and specialists (22.13 percent), and in both cases they exceed the average share of the respective groups in the social and occupational composition of the employed Yugoslav population, especially the specialists (about threefold). Like the specialists, the participation of supervisory personnel is almost threefold higher among the uncommitted Yugoslavs than the average share of that social and occupational group in the total Yugoslav population, but that higher share of supervisory personnel comes down to a higher share of uncommitted Yugoslavs who are organizers of work and production rather than officeholders and managers of the administrative type.

Membership in the League of Communists

On the basis of the skill characteristics and social and occupational characteristics of the rank and file of the League of Communists, it would be logical to expect that uncommitted Yugoslavs would have a considerably higher share in its membership than in the total population. However, that is not the case. To be sure, uncommitted Yugoslavs do have a somewhat higher share in the membership of the LCY in 1981 (6.51 percent) than they do in the total Yugoslav population (5.44 percent), giving an index number of 119.7. But since employed persons with junior and senior postsecondary education and specialists and supervisory personnel have a share in members of the LCY which is between two- and fivefold greater than in the respective groups of the general population, we can rightly conclude that the uncommitted Yugoslavs, in view of the features we have mentioned, have a lower share than one would naturally expect.

At the same time, when we analyze the leadership structure of the organization of the LCY, beginning with secretaries and secretariats of the basic organization of the League of Communists and going up to the membership in the central committees, it is easy to see that in those bodies uncommitted Yugoslavs do not have anything like the share they have in the general membership of the LCY. Indeed, it is almost a rule that the higher the body in the LC, the smaller the share of uncommitted Yugoslavs!

Thus in 1980 only 4.06 percent of the total 300,000 secretaries and members of secretariats of basic organizations of the League of Communists were uncommitted Yugoslavs. However, among members of opstina committees of the League of

Communists they even had a considerably smaller share--only 2.06 percent, and then in the makeup of the higher party bodies of the republics and provinces they had a share of only 1.04 percent (in four of the top party bodies of the republics and provinces there was not a single uncommitted Yugoslav, and in two of those bodies there was only one uncommitted Yugoslav!). Even in the makeup of the LCY Central Committee after the 12th congress the uncommitted Yugoslavs had a considerably smaller share than their share in the distribution of the LCY membership: i.e., 2.45 percent.

Which makes it easy to conclude that the LCY has never favored ethnic noncommitment as some possible choice "belonging to it," just as it has not been identified with any sort of ethnic commitment. That is why certain petit bourgeois "fears" that the uncommitted Yugoslavs are dominant in our political life and are accumulating enormous social power by controlling the vital points of our political system really have no basis whatsoever. Along with all the other things, it is almost superfluous to mention that even if uncommitted Yugoslavs (and why should they be singled out?!) had a considerably higher share in the membership of the LC and in its leadership bodies, this would not constitute any sort of decisive political issue, since this simply is not the only prerequisite for exerting influence on production and reproduction of social life as a whole nor indeed on the reproduction of political life in particular.

In conclusion we would like to call attention to one of the essential features of the population of the uncommitted in general and of the uncommitted Yugoslavs in particular. That is, both phenomena are highly related to migration.

Migration

According to the 1971 Census, 40.13 percent of the Yugoslav population migrated, while that percentage is markedly higher among the uncommitted Yugoslavs (57.60 percent), and especially among those who are regionally committed--75.42 percent (even the Montenegrins lie considerably behind this with 49.88 percent, although they are one of the most mobile ethnic groups). However, we will see the true dimension of the migration more easily if we eliminate migration within the same opstina and also migration from one area to another within the same region at the first level and examine exclusively migration from one area to another at the second level, which mostly means migration across the borders of the republics and provinces. Only 19.06 percent of the Yugoslav population migrated in this sense, while nearly two-thirds of the regionally committed (61.43 percent) and almost half of all the ethnically uncommitted Yugoslavs (42.52 percent) did this. After these two groups comes a third group of uncommitted (under Article 170 of the SFRY Constitution) with 41.79 percent, and only then at half that level come the Montenegrins (23.85 percent).

In view of these features of the uncommitted Yugoslavs it is possible to frame a whole series of hypotheses concerning skills, social and occupational, migrational and other features of a population with its ethnic noncommitment. Nevertheless, there is no question that we are dealing with the resultant of a very complicated and mutual relationship among a number of factors, each of which has its own specific weight (it seems to us that precisely the high share

of the migrational factor could for several reasons be the catalyst of ethnic noncommitment). But sound evaluation of the role of any one factor or of their totality is obviously the task for a comprehensive and systematic scientific research project. We certainly have not assigned ourselves that role in this discussion (especially since we do not know certain key features of the present-day population of uncommitted Yugoslavs, since we do not have most of the figures from the 1981 Census).

7045

CSO: 2800/108

ROLE OF SLOVENIA IN YUGOSLAVIA DISCUSSED

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jan 83 pp 8-12

[Interview with Jak Koprivc, member of the Presidium of the Slovenian LC Central Committee, former editor of DELO, and newly appointed president of the Assembly of DELO, by Jelena Lovric, in Zagreb: "Is There a Slovenian Line"; date not specified]

[Text] Jak Koprivc Discusses Crossroads for Yugoslavia, Unitarianism and Separatism, Slovenian Nationalism, Tito and Kardelj, the Sensitivity of Slovenes, the Liberalism of the Leaders ...

[Question] People see the Slovenes as industrious and thrifty, disciplined and civilized, on a working day they have no concerns with their job and house, and on Sundays and holidays they gather mushrooms and drink brandy. But joking aside! For years now, we might almost say forever, we have looked upon Slovenia and the Slovenes as "something different." Whether it is a question of production, of culture, of self-management, of the press, of ordinary people, but also of those others, one is apt to hear that sentence which has now become a convention: "It is easy for them." To some extent this special image of Slovenia and the Slovenes also comes from their political figures, who in their statements and positions as a rule arouse a particular interest, as can be easily proven by the number of quotations used. Nor is it any accident that out of all the republic and provincial congresses and conferences of the LC [League of Communists] which have been held, it was the one in Slovenia that attracted the most newsmen and the greatest attention. Not only because it was the first, but much more because everything taking place in our most highly developed republic has always had far-reaching consequences for Yugoslavia. Recently, especially because of positions concerning the foreign exchange system, the role of SIV [Federal Executive Council], the position of the republics and provinces, the further development of self-management, and certain other "current issues," a set phrase "the Slovenian line" has even emerged. What is that, if it exists at all? That is, does something exist in Yugoslav practice which might be referred to in that way? That was the basic topic of the conversation between DANAS editors and newsmen and Jak Koprivc, member of the Presidium of the Slovenian LC Central Committee, until recently an editor of DELO, and recently elected president of the Assembly of DELO, when he visited our editorial offices a few days ago.

[Answer] Isn't it quite clear what the Slovenian line is? At this point, put most succinctly, it is stabilization in the context of self-management and self-management in the context of stabilization. This means a battle for all those political and economic values which will authentically create of self-management a comprehensive system of social relations and will confirm it not only as a political system, but also as an economically efficient system. Slovenia sees Yugoslavia's prospects for the future only in its self-managing, nonaligned and federal socialist position. Although at times this is taken even as rhetoric, we deliberately insist on all these definitions, since we think that relaxation of any one of them would mean a serious threat to Yugoslavia. Indeed at our republic party congress we openly said that Yugoslavia cannot exist the way it is without self-management. Without self-management we inevitably enter upon large-scale crises, not only economic, but also political. This is our clear and resolute position, one which does not date from yesterday; it has been a constant of Slovenian policy and in our opinion is a synonym of Yugoslav policy, one of the basic principles of AVNOJ [Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] Yugoslavia.

[Question] That can hardly be extracted as a specific characteristic of Slovenian policy. Judgments of that kind are uttered in other places as well....

[Answer] That is why I was taken aback by the question about the Slovenian line.

[Question] Well, in Belgrade, Sarajevo, Pristina, Titograd and elsewhere they also make pledges to stabilization and say that there is neither community nor Yugoslavia without self-management. But what is the content of those terms? It seems that we do after all differ quite a bit on that. How does one recognize the Slovenian line--to be sure, this is a bit forced both as a title and as a thesis--but what makes the Slovenian line in a sense more recognizable?

[Answer] Our global commitment under the specific conditions also signifies a quite specific Slovenian position with respect to certain trends in Yugoslav economic policy and in political relations. We feel that efforts to concentrate capital once again through statist centralization cannot be any synonym for self-management, and we vigorously reject this. Just as it cannot be a synonym for self-management to resort too easily to statist measures, and recently there has been too much of that. Although certainly I do not say that certain measures are not necessary or that all the interventions by the government are a priori antiself-management. But still it seems that we do not always make a sufficiently persistent or organized effort to find self-management alternatives to dealing with social situations in a statist way. Self-management is no kind of special interest or privilege of Slovenia. Accordingly, if day-to-day politics takes steps which make us wonder whether our views on the self-management resolution of certain problems are different, say, in Macedonia and in Slovenia--then for me that is a political question, a fundamental question of Yugoslavia's present and future which we should talk about. Certainly interests may differ at a particular moment, but is there justification for our abandoning the general line and general commitment because of certain momentary interests and certain problems of the moment? There have been misunderstandings over this, to put it mildly. That accounts

for the indispensable role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which, as a unified organization, must spot such tendencies, analyze them, and promptly identify and describe them. And it is that which up to now--this the party itself acknowledges--has not been forthcoming, so that right up to the congress, and for months thereafter, we were faced with disunity within the League of Communists, with differing assessments of the causes and possible directions for resolving the economic and social troubles that exist. All of this does not constitute an opposition between self-management and opposition to self-management, nor is all this a question of one republic against another republic. In the entire space of Yugoslavia there is still a multitude of drastic manifestations of nonself-management consciousness and behavior: both liberalistic and the conventional unitaristic, which for us is a synonym for centralistic. We stated quite clearly at the republic conference that Yugoslavia stands at a crossroad and that at this moment a specific type of class struggle is being waged between the forces of self-management and the forces of centralism and group-ownership interests.

[Question] It is obvious that Yugoslavia, if it wishes to get in step with the world, must consolidate income, must aggregate capital which has been generated to carry out large investments. The key question is who will carry out that centralization, will it be the workers themselves, some technostructure or a bureaucratic structure, that is, the state?

[Answer] I completely agree. That was Yugoslavia's key issue yesterday, it is today, and it will be tomorrow. It is indeed the key issue of social relations in the world. Our answer and our view of the future are very clear on this: to put the worker, associated labor, in the position of governing social reproduction, and that means that the concentration of capital must also conform to self-management. What profit does in the capitalist countries or state coercion in the countries of real socialism must be concentration that conforms to the logic of income sharing in our system. If you attentively follow our so-called Slovenian line, running like a red thread through all our political statements is this: income-sharing relations and self-management pooling of labor and capital, which again sounds like a slogan to some people. And in our economic policy we have indeed looked upon this as a slogan, which is why our results are so feeble. Nor could they be better when the entire set of government instruments is suited to an autarkic economy, an economy which does not respect economic criteria, which counts more on the suspicious aid of the conventional state, and still does not pay enough attention to sound economic criteria of associated labor bound together by self-management. You know the kind of battle which Slovenia fought 2 years ago to bring the federal fund for the underdeveloped into line with the principles of self-management. We realized, and the results have borne this out, that it is impossible to develop the underdeveloped through the conventional statist forms, even though the Law on Associated Labor made provision for the possibility that the economy of the advanced regions might establish direct ties with the economy of the underdeveloped regions. When we brought this idea forth--this was practically tantamount to a disintegration of Yugoslavia, it was conceived as a direct attack on the integrity of the underdeveloped republics and Province of Kosovo. Quite a few years before that an entire philosophy was thought up to the effect that no one had the right to ask how those funds were spent. It

was proclaimed an interference in the sovereignty of those republics and provinces if, say, the Slovenian economy were to ask from time to time about the results of the resources which it was consciously giving in conformity with the system of solidarity of socialist self-management. At that time this was viewed as just short of obstruction. Today some 50 very significant projects are being carried out in the underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia in collaboration with the Slovenian economy, and another 50 or so are being prepared. Revolutionary changes of direction have been achieved in this way; perhaps they do not signify much in financial terms, but from the social standpoint they represent an exceedingly important change of direction.

[Question] The figures recently presented in a series of interviews by politicians from the various communities show that every republic in Yugoslavia has done badly.

[Answer] Too often, unfortunately, that is still the style of operation, way of life and behavior of this time. The other side of the coin is this: At the federal level we note that in general things are bad, and then we make an analysis in the republics, we find that they are nothing but good in practically every republics. I am oversimplifying a bit, but that is actually the case. That is why in Slovenia we have on several occasions opposed very vigorously those general assessments which sometimes do not actually say much and which sometimes do not actually make distinctions between those whose performance is somewhat better and those whose performance is poorer. A few months ago we heard from the federal level a very drastic assessment of the fact that federal laws are not being respected in the republics. I did not notice either in Slovenia or any other republic that this observation was applied self-critically to their own respective situation with a view to a political showdown with such trends should they exist, or, if they do not exist, to protect their own respective good name. Too often we take potshots at one another, we pronounce judgments which are not always accurate: such as, say, the one to the effect that certain republics are exploited or again to the effect that Slovenia always occupies some privileged position.

[Question] This is often talked about. There are those who think that Slovenia itself has in some way committed itself to a position that stands apart a bit and in some way affords privileges.

[Answer] Those are more impressions than arguments. Just as in Slovenia, for example, it is very often thought--we regularly and resolutely combat this--that everything is ideal in our republic, that Slovenia is in every respect a republic which can serve as a model, that it is Yugoslavia's salvation, its driving force. Such assessments seem to us very dangerous, and sometimes they are directly or indirectly at the service of nationalism. Both the thesis which is given currently in Slovenia as to our self-sufficiency, as to some kind of perfection, and the thesis in other places about Slovenia's privileged position fail to take a few significant and specific features into account, the first of which is the level of economic development. I think that the LCY and the LC in every republic and province, in every community, must oppose such one-sided, oversimplified and inaccurate assessments. Especially when it comes to interethnic questions. Sometimes certain Slovenian demands for

incentives and a better status for the exporting segment of the economy, for expansion of the room for self-managing maneuvering by associated labor are carelessly put practically on a par with Slovenian nationalism or some kind of Slovenian partial and dubious interest, and the Slovenian insistence on better work within Slovenia, but also within Yugoslavia, is taken as sermonizing, as a confirmation of Slovenia seeing itself as exceptional.

[Question] Objectively, though, one can speak about a position of Slovenia within Yugoslavia that is not, we would say, privileged, but is different. For example, Slovenia first of all has a manufacturing industry which has always had a higher rate of accumulation. To be sure, those traditional relations in which Slovenia represents manufacturing and Bosnia raw materials have changed quite a bit. But they still exist, precisely because of that contradictory relationship among segments of the class, which at the same time breaks out in terms of nationalities, indeed one can even speak of such sources of conflicts. I think that that fact should not be neglected if we look objectively at the picture of Slovenia.

[Answer] One should first of all clarify the perpetual remark which mostly comes from the underdeveloped republics to the effect that the manufacturing industry and finishers, which means the Republic of Slovenia, are still in a privileged position. This is less and less true or is no longer true at all, especially since Slovenian industry has taken such large steps in turning toward the world market. If at this point we were to refer to the figures, we might even devise a new line of argument to the effect that Slovenian industry carries the greatest burden and suffers the greatest loss since objectively, both objectively and subjectively, it is in a position to export most to the convertible market. But even that would still not altogether correspond to the facts, since it also receives federal funds for those exports. Until quite recently that contribution, to be sure, acted as a disincentive. There have been many half-truths juggled about in public which have been a burden on our relations with one another. Even from the podium of the Federal Assembly we have this year been shooting at one another with figures that were wrong. Where does that lead? The specific features of the Slovenian economy are a higher level of development, higher productivity, an industrial culture, natural ties to the advanced parts of Europe, but at the same time a much poorer composition of productive capital. A few days ago, for example, one of our well-known politicians, a guest from Belgrade, was taken to a textile factory in Maribor. After the tour he told us that the director should be discharged because the machines were such old junk. Yet that factory, with machines dating from 1945, achieves the European level of productivity. The figures show that we have older and poorer productive capital than, say, Bosnia or Kosovo; all those where investments have been made in new things and which now represent one of our large areas of unused potential, unused capital which we speak about very timidly. But you cannot use it for organizational reasons or reasons that have to do with personnel.

We are giving technical aid to African countries, in a certain sense even to countries of advanced Europe, but within Yugoslavia we cannot draw up an agreement for technical aid and aid in the form of personnel. After the war we had Slovenes occupying key management positions in Kosovo, in Serbia, but then

came exclusiveness as to personnel, since some people felt that it confirmed their autonomy to rely on their own resources even where this yielded poor results. I suppose that is a school we had to go through. Just as Kardelj often would say, we deliberately undertook to shatter the centralized capital of the government not because we believed this was a lasting process, but in order to open up the channels for concentration of capital through self-management. There was no other way to break up state capital than to divide it up altogether into little pieces.

[Question] Is it the prevailing opinion that Slovenia must export for Yugoslavia's sake?

[Answer] That does exist, but less and less. In our political action we assert that Slovenia must export, it must above all export to the convertible market, for its own sake. This is the fateful question of our future development and survival. To be sure, it must also export for Yugoslavia's sake, but not in order to figure as a savior; it is above all saving itself.

[Question] What is it that feeds this view of the rest of Yugoslavia which is a bit suspicious? What is it in political and economic life that encourages that?

[Answer] Generally speaking, that is not any permanent position of Slovenes and Slovenia, but emerges in aggravated situations when our people feel--and they are very sensitive--that some things which have a nationality aspect, not a nationalistic aspect, but a nationality aspect, are wrongly interpreted in Yugoslavia. Then there is resistance, which is the result of certain challenges which, like it or not, are tendentious or at least irresponsible. We have been confronted with this since last February: with that trumped-up story about punk, and then about the language court, then the foreign exchange system. All of this was given out in doses, to use the word that won't be too strong, but in such a way that a certain suspicion was cast on the Slovenes. And that is felt. Second: similar reactions are evoked by the confrontation with certain facts which once again have at times been torn from the context of their respective place of origin, without due respect for their specific features. In Slovenia we have this year waged a terrible battle for exports, exports at all costs. This was an economic and political imperative imposed by extreme necessity; you cannot even imagine it; the party, the government, associated labor, the press, radio and TV were involved, each in its own way; we furnished supplemental incentives for those exporting to the convertible area; we tightened up the conditions for those not exporting, and this had a direct impact on personal income policy (those who were exporting were allowed to pay out more [in wages and salaries]). At the same time Slovenia proposed to the Federation a number of measures which it did not respond to promptly. And in a situation serious for all of us this was then perceived as an attitude toward Slovenia that did not conform to accepted principles. Or again, this year we have cut back investments in the economy to 13.5 percent. Has anyone else in Yugoslavia done this? At present this is already an extreme which is beginning to threaten normal simple reproduction of the Slovenian economy. When people see that this has not been done elsewhere, they begin to wonder whether the same principles of optimum behavior are valid everywhere.

And they know that they are giving quite a bit for the underdeveloped and for the joint federal treasury. It is certain that we are not encouraging in a political way this (in)disposition, but perhaps we are even going too far in suppressing it, and people blame us for being inconsistent. But we are doing this cautiously, since it leads nowhere to create the impression of someone's superior power or some specific role. I think that that ought to be a sign for all the conscious forces to react to such situations, and that above all with a still more consistent fight for those same Yugoslav principles in all communities.

[Question] You have referred several times to the conscious forces; at the outset you emphasized the need for a spirit of unity in the LCY....

[Answer] Intentionally....

[Question] ... Hasn't it been demonstrated by the whole series of mutual misunderstandings, disagreements and conflicts that the League of Communists is often leaning toward political compromise, that in so doing it is losing its revolutionary punch?

[Answer] It is one of the basic assessments of past congresses of the League of Communists that a sizable or major portion of our difficulties do not come solely from the real material conditions, but from an insufficient subjective willingness to change things. In that respect the League of Communists has not always been altogether up to its role. I said as much at the 12th congress, which was above all a congress for its reassessment and self-criticism. At this point that spirit has to be carried over into real life and adopted as a constant of our activity. Some people at the congress were extremely radical, they even called for an extraordinary congress, but now they do not dare to seek the calling of an extraordinary meeting of the opstina committee or central committee of the republic even when they judge that things are not going as we agreed.

[Question] One foreign newsman says that it seemed to him that because of the very fierce discussion at the 12th congress that he was attending a gathering of the opposition rather than a congress of the party in power. However, in spite of these harsh words, it seems as though the rank and file is powerless, as though the leadership had detached itself from the rank and file. Some people are already speaking about a certain oligarchy within the party. According to them the lowest level of the opstina leadership bodies is also the most powerful, since it has both material and political power, the republic leadership bodies are also strong and they have reduced decisionmaking to the activity of political aktivs, while the federal top party leadership operates on the principle of consensus, concessions and agreements. The rank and file has a minor role in all this. Isn't this because the party has grown so much numerically that its old methods of operation no longer suit it, but it is not changing them?

[Answer] I think that even the leadership has realized, at least I hope so, that we can no longer go on the way we have up to now. And everything that happened immediately after the congress was an additional blow in favor of the

awareness that we can no longer go on that way. The question that arises in that context is whether the League of Communists, its leadership, but also its rank and file, are ready for the role which the party has defined for itself long ago, that is, to work on its own elimination. Regardless of all the proclamations, our party has still figured too often in its conventional form and role, it has been less a political-ideological force and has acted more as a governing power. This has been our great problem for a long time now. The more the space for self-management is narrowed, the stronger the party becomes in that function which has been proclaimed superseded. That is why a few days ago in a debate whether the League of Communists in Slovenia was on the offensive or not, I asked that an answer also be given to the question of whether that offensive is yielding results, that is, do the results come from the operation of the party in the old commanding way, or is the party operating within the institutions of the system of self-management. And this then commences the story about responsibility, but not only about the responsibility of the leadership structures in the Federation and in the republic--although we must also insist on that--but we should speak about responsibility at all levels of society. It does seem that things have been changing a bit in this respect recently. The secretary of the committee in Jesenice recently told us that in their opstina they had begun to identify specific responsibility (previously they had sought first of all the responsibility of the higher-ups) and the more specific they are in seeking those responsible for individual occurrences within the opstina, the more vigorously and unstoppably they will also seek the accountability of all others.

Large changes in personnel have been made recently in Slovenia: hundreds of enterprise directors have been replaced during their term of office, and during their tenure we have also changed the prime minister and half of the members of the government, since in our judgment they were not up to the new tasks. And now, without making any campaign of it, we will be replacing many people who are not up to the tasks of this time. Precisely at a time when everyone insisted on the 1-year term of office and when they all attacked us because of our position, we have been working on very radical and very significant changes in personnel. I do not state that there is not still quite a bit of behavior in the fashion of "One crow is not going to peck another crow's eyes out," just as there is still too much appealing for general responsibility. Thus some of our people who are specifically responsible for the present situation are evading their own accountability in long harangues about the general responsibility. It is a very dangerous thing that even when you specifically call the roll in a lawful way, through the institutions of the system (and the media are also an institution of our system), individuals do not feel it at all necessary to defend themselves and to react. The Slovenian Republic Conference of the Socialist Alliance has put the finger on certain federal institutions, secretariats, since it feels that they are responsible for the present situation, but they have been silent. This is yet another new form of irresponsibility.

[Question] How are they able to simply turn a deaf ear to a direct public appeal?

[Answer] It is not just a question of silence, but even of a deliberate or unwitting discrediting of the system. Since one can then say: see there, in this self-management you can talk and demand whatever you like and as long as you like, but nothing happens to anyone. We have really gone to absurd lengths when our insistence on responsibility or on the monitoring of performance seems like something abnormal, something which goes against the grain of self-management. That is why there is so much disunity and opportunism in the League of Communists, that is why some people allow themselves not even to respond to a question from a republic forum, much less a question from the newspapers, questions from a worker, an individual citizen. Nor is it any accident that the newspapers, where they have opened up to the self-management structure, have been coming out with a multitude of questions.

[Question] It is often said that Kardelj and his vision and conception is that common denominator on which the Slovenes are insisting and for which Slovenia is recognizable. How accurate is that? At the time of the congress--in connection with certain pictures and texts--there were objections that in Slovenia they were putting Tito and Kardelj and their role for Yugoslavia on the same level or were even beginning to give preference to Kardelj.

[Answer] Slovenia does insist on Kardelj's line, though it is not true that we claim him as our own. There have after all been critical remarks to that effect. As though Kardelj were not a man of Yugoslavia. And when we "do adopt" Kardelj there is no need to particularly emphasize that we are thereby adopting the entire continuity of Tito's Yugoslavia as well. I truly do not know in whose interest it is to forcibly separate Tito and Kardelj. Anyone who is surprised at the Slovenes for their attitude toward Kardelj is not familiar with even the most basic elements of Slovenian history.

[Question] It is rumored that the Slovenian leaders are inclined to liberalism?

[Answer] I think that it is precisely Slovenia that has settled accounts most consistently with liberalism, and that back in the early seventies. But not only with individuals, but with the ideas, with the vision of liberalism that existed and which counted in public affairs on the decisive role of technocracy in tandem with the political bureaucracy. Slovenia was very consistent in clearing that up, it was not a bit easy for us for quite a long time, not only in the party leadership, but also in the economy, in the banks, and at the university. Nor is it any accident at all that one sometimes hears that it would be a good thing if they had "highway affairs" in the other republics as well. It is therefore, to say the least, to have the liberalism label pasted on self-management at this point. This could be a way of discrediting it. In whose name?

[Question] The highway affair was close in time to the mass movement in Croatia. Didn't Croatia also draw lessons from that period? To be sure, attempts are now being made to devalue them because of the rabid outbreaks of certain small groups of university students. But the question is this: How do you see the situation as to the nationalities in Yugoslavia, does that Slovenian nationalism exist which from time to time has been struck with virtual avalanches of speechmaking?

[Answer] Artificial constructions are dangerous in all areas of public life, but especially in the nationality area. Instead of tying the fight against nationalism directly to the permanent fight for confirmation and affirmation of the nationality aspect, we make the serious error of engaging in all-out campaigns concerning certain situations involving excesses. It so happened that the party in Slovenia paid the greatest respect to that dialectics, proved that the class aspect and the nationality aspect do not exclude one another, and this had an impact on its prestige with the working class and with the people, although the nationalists, the clericalists and other reactionaries before the war, during the war and afterward constantly charged that it could not be the hegemon of the Slovenian people, since, anational as it is, it was accordingly anti-Slovene. The Slovenian CP, and later the Slovenian LC, has secured large political, economic, cultural and other freedoms for the Slovene and other nationalities. The Slovenian party, above all within the framework of the Socialist Alliance, has also in recent years made several inroads, initiated concern for the Slovenian language, and initiated a number of actions in the nationality area which previously were mostly in the hands of oppositionist forces or the emigre community. This has essentially eliminated the various forms of nationalism. If the party is unable to open up and broaden ethnic freedoms, others will take advantage of that and put it to bad use. It is not enough for the LC to say from time to time that it will fight nationalism, although we do not at all underestimate the real fight against it, but the party must equip itself to analyze what in its own practice is causing or allowing the growth of nationalism, in what forms it is appearing in Slovenia and in what forms in Kosovo. I am afraid that sometimes this is confused to some extent.

[Box, p 11]

The party has not utilized all the opportunities offered it in connection with adoption of the new measures of the SIV [Federal Executive Council]. It should have created a new offensive atmosphere for self-management against those measures which we are now adopting, but which we have proclaimed to be after all temporary, though, to be sure, the same inclination was not evident everywhere in that proclamation. The party ought to pledge its prestige to seeking self-management alternatives to those measures. In so doing it must take advantage of all its opportunities, just as the self-governing state ought to use those measures for direct mobilization of the masses, and not to make them passive. Changes might have been made conditional upon attainment of certain results, rather than saying: the measures are temporary, but nothing is said as to how long they will be temporary, or why. Future prospects are not known at present, especially since some people are spinning myths and making up new theories of socialism out of this, and some are even saying that this is the ultimate range of Yugoslav socialism. Both in propaganda and in policy we must clearly distance ourselves from such assessments; I would even say that their spokesmen should be punished if they are party members. We have entered a situation where we are placing many of the values and advantages we achieved with Tito under a question mark. By proclaiming those temporary measures to be some new achievement of our socialism we are creating profound changes in people's behavior and thinking. We are going back to the times of inequality, to the times of small and large privileges;

various games are beginning over whether you want to make an official trip abroad, are you in with the butcher? We are going back to something which had already been overcome, and there is a change in what we proclaimed to be a new attribute of Yugoslav socialist self-management. I do not say that we did not exaggerate when we spoke about the new Yugoslav man, but there was something that set us apart qualitatively, something in the style of life, in the freedoms--economic and those others, from both the people in the West and from those in the East.

7045

CSO: 2800/108

YUGOSLAV DISCUSSION OF ALBANIAN ARMED FORCES

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 23 Nov 82 pp 32-34

[Article by Miroslav Lazanski: "The Vocal Guardians of Otranto"]

[Text] Who was Tirana afraid of when it erupted again a few days ago with a torrent of accusations and attacks? Possibly this question would not merit much attention if there had not been a few somewhat amazing overtones in the latest wave of Albanian propaganda. In addition to everything that they have been ascribing to their neighbors for years now, and in addition to the innumerable characterizations to which the entire world has already become deaf, a threat of force has now appeared. "We also know how to speak the language of force, we are prepared," Enver Hoxha said a few days ago in Tirana. He said this, even though no one had provoked him to do this, and no one had used this "language of force." Since he did, however, let us see what kind of force our southwestern neighbors possess.

First of all, there is a surprise. Although Tirana is continually issuing calls to unite in the struggle against the external and internal enemy, the size of the Albanian population has decreased by 20 thousand in comparison with last year and it now numbers 2,750,000, while at the same time the armed forces of that country have grown by 100 soldiers and now number 43,100, of which 23,000 are recruits. The length of service in the surface army is two years, compared to three years in the air force, navy, and special units. The total gross national product last year was \$1.9 billion, of which \$188 million, or 940 million leks, was allocated for defense.

Tripartite System

In comparison with last year, the Albanians have reduced the number of their infantry brigades from eight to five, but they have instead increased the size of the formation, so that a brigade now numbers 2,500 soldiers and officers. It is composed of three infantry battalions, each with 500 members (24 officers) and one battery of 82 and 120 mm mortars, along with a machinegun company. In principle, the organization of the brigade and the battalion is a tripartite one, as in the Soviet army, but with much less equipment. The sole Albanian tank brigade is also based on a tripartite composition, but its exactly one hundred tanks (70 T-34's,

15 T-54's, and 15 T-59's) are enough to equip only an armored regiment. As for artillery, the Albanians have one independent artillery regiment (500 people) with Chinese 122 and 153 mm cannon and howitzers, drawn by type 59 caterpillar tractors produced by the Chinese. The regiment also contains a company of 37 mm antiaircraft cannon.

The Albanian surface army contains a total of 30,000 people (including 20,000 recruits). As far as large military equipment is concerned, it also possesses about 20 BA-64 and BRDM-1 armored trucks, and a smaller number of BTR-40, BTR-50, BRT-152, and K-63 [personnel] carriers. It also has 160 mm mortars, 45, 57, and 85 mm anti-armor cannon, and 37, 57, 85, and 100 mm antiaircraft cannon. The army reserves have 100,000 people.

The views and positions of the Albanian command personnel (the supreme commandant of the armed forces is the chairman of the Defense Council, Enver Hoxha, and the army is directly supervised by the Ministry for National Defense) regarding the nature of a future war, the use of the types of armed forces, and of the combined and tactical units of the surface army, are for the most part based on the characteristics of Albania's physical geography. In accordance with this, certain areas of the country have already been covered with a network of bunkers and anti-tank barriers. This particularly applies to the areas of Van Spasit (the Drin valley)--Shengjergj Bicaj--the valley of the Pal River--the valley of the Kir River, the valley of the Shkumbi River--the Yugoslav border, Puke--Gemshiqi, and Qafa Morina--Firzi--Kukes, as well as Han Hotit--Matit. In defending the surface approaches to their territory, the Albanians are actually relying on two wing supports--in the area of Skadar (Shkoder) and the route toward Debru, and along the course of the Drin River (the Black and Great Drin), which is also a barrier from time to time, since it usually floods in the spring. The wing from the Yugoslav border to Qafa Sanu is an auxiliary support in Albanian strategic plans.

Five Bases

The fortifications along these routes, as well as everywhere in all of Albania, consist of a group of fortified sites, in most cases linked to each other by highways. There are no underground connections. The thickness of the front part of a ring-shaped bunker and its "kalota" (roof) averages 0.50 meters of reinforced concrete, while the rear part is somewhat weaker. Each bunker usually has three embrasures, which can be closed with steel shutters. In case of war, the armament of the sites is composed of three machine-guns or light cannon. The internal arrangement of the bunkers is very modest, without special electrical, water supply, and ventilation equipment. In front of the bunkers, there are usually barriers of barbed wire and from three to five rows of iron rails mounted in concrete blocks to prevent tanks from passing through. There are also anti-tank trenches, the steep walls of which are lined with concrete, 8 meters wide and up to 3 meters deep.

Great importance is ascribed to all of these fortifications in the training and tactics of the Albanian Army. The troops are trained for resistance and defense, and for carrying out a counter-attack, in which the infantry plays the main role, and they compensate for the lack of armament by using earthworks and bunkers. It is still an interesting question, however, how vulnerable this army is to heavy artillery fire, as well as air and tank attacks.

The turning point in the new concept behind the Albanian defense plans was undoubtedly 1968, and the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. The fear of a possible landing on the Albanian coast stimulated even more rapid bunker construction, and at that time the Chinese helped the Albanians to install five missile bases with CSA-1 missiles; this was actually a redesigned Soviet SA-2 Guideline missile, which can hit targets in the air and at sea. Of these five bases, one is next to Tirana, one each is protecting the ports of Drac (Durrresi) and Valona (Vlona), and the other two are in the wouth in order to control the entrance to the Adriatic. All of these bases with anti-aircraft missiles are part of the air force, which is in turn under the direct operational command of the army, and is organized after the Soviet model. The Albanian air force has 10,000 members (including 2000 recruits) and has 100 combat aircraft. They are deployed at five large airfields and several smaller auxiliary ones. At the Shijak airfield near Tirana there is a squadron of Chinese-produced F-8 fighters (a copy of the Soviet MiG-21) and a squadron of F-6 fighter-bombers (the MiG-19). At the Stalin (Kucova) air base there is an F-6 squadron, and F-2 (MiG-15) and F-4 (MiG-17) aircraft are stationed at Valona and Drac. Tirana is also the home airfield for a transport squadron with ten AN-2 aircraft and four IL-14 aircraft.

The Albanian air force has a total of 20 F-2 planes, 30 F-4 aircraft, 30 F-6 aircraft, and 20 F-8 fighters. As for training aircraft, there is a squadron of ten long obsolete MiG-15 aircraft; and there are about 30 helicopters of the Mi-4 type. There are 5000 people in the air force reserves.

All of the equipment of the Albanian air force is of Chinese origin, and all of it came from a factory in Shenyang. It would not be any great surprise if the Chinese had also supplied their former allies with the AA-2 Atoll air-to-air missiles, although this type of weapon has not yet been observed in the army of our southwestern neighbor. As for the equipment at the military airfields, it is fairly modest, just like the airfields themselves, of which only the Shijak air base has a landing strip longer than 2000 meters. The Stalin (Kucova) base has a landing strip 1500 meters long and a field type of fortifications, while the width of the landing strip at both airfields is about 40 meters.

The Cooks and the Flag

In his pre-election speech, Enver Hoxha stressed that "Albania securely controls the Otranto" and that "the Soviet fleet cannot pass the Albanian bases, which are covered with steel and concrete." He was probably

thinking of the increase in the power of the Albanian Navy, since these hundred soldiers more than last year went into the navy, so that it now numbers 3,100 (1,000 recruits and 300 members of the naval infantry), with a total of 98 ships. The fleet's inventory includes three Soviet submarines of the Whiskey class, three patrol vessels of the Kronshtadt type, 44 torpedo boats (including 32 hydrofoils of the Chinese Huchwan type and 12 Soviet P-4's), six Chinese gunboats of the Shanghai class, ten PO-2 patrol boats, and eight former Soviet minesweepers, as well as several other smaller vessels. The main naval bases are Drac, Valona, the Sazan Island, and Pasha Liman. Half of the fleet is already more than 20 years old, and so Hoxha's words should be taken with a grain of salt. Albanian naval vessels rarely leave port, not just because of their age, but also because of the mine fields that exist even now in peacetime, since they do not want to open corridors through them. Instead of a constant presence at sea, the Albanians have developed a system of coastal artillery, mine barriers, and an observation service. The maritime component of defense is based exclusively on protecting the coast; and sailing near it is sometimes exciting...

Last summer, the Liburnija ferry between Split and Igumenica sailed at dawn on 23 July between the Albanian coast and the coast of Corfu when suddenly, on the open sea, an Albanian P-4 torpedo boat appeared, making sharp circles around the Yugoslav ship. The torpedo boat was black, and the crew, two of whom were sitting solemnly behind the black barrels of anti-aircraft machineguns, were also dressed in black. It was just like a movie, and the cameras on the Liburnija kept rolling. The foreign tourists, mostly Germans, used this truly rare opportunity to take exclusive photographs. First of all a green rocket was fired from the Albanian vessel, followed by a red one, while the sailors ran along the ship and showed the captain of the Liburnija some sort of sign that resembled a basketball "time-out." The circles around the Yugoslav ferry became smaller and smaller, and the Albanian torpedo boat's intention of stopping the Liburnija was quite clear. The Liburnija, however, continued to cross the waves peacefully, not turning from its route. After some time, the P-4 nevertheless went away. The entire spectacle was also observed with stoic calm by a group of cooks from the Yugoslav vessel, and in response to a question as to whether this had ever happened before in those waters, one of them answered, "Yes, once a few years ago. We forgot to fly an Albanian flag, and we were in Albanian territorial waters. We cooks quickly drew one on a piece of paper and their ship went away again."

It is not known how Enver Hoxha plans to hold back a stronger fleet if it wants to enter the Otranto, which is 70 to 140 kilometers wide, and 700 to 1,100 meters deep. Admittedly, this is an ideal submarine zone and targets are easily visible, but the Albanian submarines are old, and the question is how far they can dive, and whether they can dive at all.

"We Albanians have the crossroads of the Otranto, Sazan and Karaburun," Hoxha said recently in Tirana. These are two naval bases in the Valona gulf (which goes 12 miles inland, and is 5 miles wide, with a sea depth of

40 meters). Its coast is low, sandy, and swampy because of the delta of the Vijosa River. The Sazan Island is at the entrance to the gulf, and immediately next to it is the Karaburun Peninsula, in which submarine tunnels have been hollowed out in a hill. There are 16 of them. Around them are deployed batteries of coastal cannon (eight divisions), 88 millimeters (old German ones) and 122 millimeters. The bunkers on Karaburun can afford protection against a direct hit from medium caliber artillery and 100 kg aircraft bombs.

The Future

At this moment Albania does not have any large ally, and the uncertainties concerning the direction of its orientation in the future also apply to the development of its army. The Albanians can rely on their own forces only in the production of uniforms, infantry weapons, and some types of ammunition, and for light vehicle repairs. This, of course, is not enough, and the Albanians are aware of this. That is why they are also trying to develop separate territorial forces, which include the 8,000 border guards and the 5,000 members of the security service. For someone who claims that he is the guardian of the Otranto, this is still not very much. For someone who invokes the language of force, it is more than comical. Fortunately, these are probably the last war cries of the present regime in Tirana.

9909

CSO: 2800/93

YUGOSLAV WEEKLY NOTES ALBANIAN SUPPORT OF PORTUGUESE PARTY

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 30 Nov 82 p 53

[Article by Aleksandar Antonic: "'Albanians' in Lisbon"]

[Text] Portugal is one of the West European countries in which a pro-Albanian front is registered as a "political party" and is acting with full financial support from Tirana. It is called the Communist Party (Reconstructed) and has its own "mass base"--the Democratic People's Union (UDP), which was represented by one deputy in the Portuguese parliament, as long ago as 1975.

Its main job is to publish in Portuguese the collected works of Enver Hoxha and other propaganda material, aimed at Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, and other countries where Portuguese is spoken, and to promote Tirana's policies, especially its anti-Yugoslav policy. Recently the emphasis has been on the irredentist demands concerning Kosovo.

In return, in addition to the money from Tirana, this front receives the support of propaganda from Tirana in connection with the internal Portuguese situation. The Albanian news agency ATA recently gave a great deal of publicity to the views of the Communist Party (Reconstructed) on the need to "strengthen political activity in order to stimulate the revolutionary struggle of the Portuguese proletariat and the working masses."

In order to serve such goals, the sole "Albanian" deputy in the Portuguese parliament "boycotted" what was otherwise a very successful visit by then President of the SFRY Presidency Sergej Kraigher to Portugal. In the atmosphere of extremely cordial friendship in which that visit took place, this Albanian provocation had an extremely grotesque effect, and no one in Portugal saw it in any other way.

But why are the "Albanians" in Portugal at all?

During the conflicts and disagreements that have occurred in the international workers' movement during the last few decades, those who have desired to take control of the movement have created their own "communist parties." Enver Hoxha's Albanian Labor Party was no exception to this, and so pro-Albanian parties, abundantly financed by Tirana, appeared among the "communist parties" with different orientations, in Western Europe and elsewhere.

The Communist Party (Reconstructed) appeared as early as during Salazar's dictatorship, but it was launched publicly only after the victory of the Armed Forces Movement on 25 April 1974. It appeared then as the proponent of a "firm alliance with the countries of the socialist camp, the PRC, and Albania." With de-Maoization, the pro-Chinese factions began to disappear from the international workers' movement, but the pro-Albanian factions continued to exist wherever abundant financial and propaganda assistance from Tirana was being distributed.

It appears that a key role in the activities of the pro-Albanian faction in Portugal was played by a certain Diogenes Arruda, an obscure Brazilian who was sent to Lisbon, where he glorified Stalin and "Albanian orthodoxy" to such an extent that he attacked Mao Tse-Tung unmercifully as soon as Tirana quarreled with Beijing in 1978. When the open split between the Chinese and the Albanians occurred, the dual-named Albanian-Chinese faction in Portugal also fell apart.

Its delegation was then summoned immediately and urgently to Tirana, in order to arrange to have the "right-wingers" thrown out of the party on the spot. Arruda unhesitatingly attacked the "heretics" and helped throw them out in accordance with orders from Tirana. The faction was thus unambiguously determined to be a pro-Albanian one, but the internal disputes and dissent are continuing.

The group, which is still receiving financial injections from Tirana, is continuing to be active in political life in Portugal, however, with a voice that is still managing to be heard.

9909

CSO: 2800/93

SLOVENIA'S MARINC ON SYSTEM CHANGES, RESPONSIBILITY

AU120942 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 30 Dec 82 p 5

[Vlado Slamberger report on interview with Andrej Marinc, president of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia, broadcast by Ljubljana Radio on 28 December in its "Studio at 1700" program]

[Excerpts] "The year 1983 will be the first year of the realization of the stabilization program. It is not only a matter of its being one of the most difficult years, but we must also be aware that we are facing a lengthy period in which we will have to act very prudently. We will have to change our way of life and some habits which were permitted in the past period. This is a factual assessment of 1983 and a few years to come, Andrej Marinc, president of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia said on Tuesday in the Studio at 1700 program of Ljubljana Radio. [passage omitted]

Speaking about some attacks on the political system and the voices advocating changes in some of its elements, Andrej Marinc resolutely rejected them and stressed that it is irresponsible and imprudent to blame socialist self-management for the present difficulties. It is true that the system of socialist self-management has not been consistently implemented. Among the fundamental reasons for the present difficulties, Andrej Marinc mentioned primarily the economic policy which for a long time ignored economic laws, and there was too much living above one's means, too many desires, wishes, and demands--more than we could realistically support. He also drew attention to the differing levels of development of the several regions in Yugoslavia, for there are still many where the national income is relatively low and where the problems of employment are a burning issue. He stressed, however, that we must not blame socialist self-management for this.

In the machinery of this system there are undoubtedly shortcomings which do not foster sufficiently efficient business operations and general social development. This must be corrected, but the foundations of the political system of socialist self-management cannot be changed. [passage omitted]

"Dr Najdan Pasic's idea about a more systematic monitoring, examination and, if necessary, supplementation of the political system introduces some vagueness in the public discussion of these problems. At meetings of the SFRY

"Presidency and the LCY Central Committee Presidium, we accepted this initiative as sensible and we set up a social commission under Dr. Tihomir Vlaskalic attached to the federal social councils. [passage omitted]

"However, we are not so naive that we would not pay attention to some forces and proposals which, by changing our system, seek to introduce another system which is unacceptable to the working man and to our development. This is an extremely serious question and therefore we must resolutely refute those who talk about changes in the political system as if we could do this with one hand." [passage omitted]

Many listeners' questions concerned responsibility, particularly responsibility for the present complex situation. Andrej Marinc said "that the League of Communists has never evaded responsibility for the present situation, but on the other hand we, like all the working people, are proud of the development achieved since the war." [passage omitted]

Andrej Marinc also advocated intensified political responsibility and the implementation of the principles of democratic centralism, particularly when it is a matter of public speeches and explanations by leading communists which differ from the basic premises of the constitution. He thought that this was one of the reasons that we are insufficiently united in the implementation of the policy, and in this way, daily interests are pushing ahead of the interests for the common development.

"But in the League of Communists, we do not want homogeneity at any price, nor mere discipline and subordination which do not arise from awareness. Therefore, we must cultivate public speech, a democratic dialogue, a clash of opinions and arguments in the search for alternatives. This is desirable and useful, and it is a part of the process of democratization and of socialist self-management, too." [passage omitted]

He rejected the view that differences are appearing in the LCY leadership:

"The LCY leadership, as well as the state leadership, displayed a high degree of unity following Comrade Tito's death, when we found ourselves in completely new conditions in which great persons of our revolution, such as Tito, Kardelj and others, left the historical scene; these persons with their influence left an imprint on our decisions and our development. There is unity in the League of Communists on strategic questions. However, the search for specific ways is a kind of responsible creative work where opinions must clash. Here we must take care so that even while opinions and positions even of individuals in the most responsible places, clash. We will be ideologically and politically united and will work in conformity with the LCY statute, the congress documents that have been adopted, the constitution and the laws.

Andrej Marinc also disagreed with the idea that the federal executive council is responsible for the present situation, whether it is the old federal executive council of the present one (regarding the federal budget). Matters are much more complex, for essentially new roads are being sought. However, he agreed with those who think that amid an aggravated economic situation there must be public responsibility, and those people who at any given moment are not up to their responsible tasks must be replaced. [passage omitted]

BRANKO HORVAT DISCUSSES IDEOLOGICAL DEVIATIONS IN SOCIETY

Belgrade SOCIOLOGIJA in Serbo-Croatian No 2-3, Apr-Sep 82 pp 314-322

[Article by Branko Horvat, School of Economics of Zagreb University: "Two Large-Scale Ideological Deviations in Present-Day Yugoslav Society"]

[Excerpt] The Caricaturing of Self-Management

Self-management essentially means elimination [original "uklapanje" apparently typo for "uklanjanje"] of hierarchical relations among people and creation of a society of equal and free men. Since people differ greatly in their abilities and inclinations and are not necessarily altruistic by nature--anthropological studies show that individuals may be extremely aggressive and ruthless depending on the social institutions--the equality and freedom of individuals must be guaranteed by social institutions. At least two conceptions and two patterns of historical practice can be distinguished in this regard.

In its struggle against feudal privileges and the feudal hierarchy, the young bourgeois class formulated parity (equality) and freedom as its social goals. Equality meant that everyone had the same civil and political rights, and freedom that everyone was free to arrange his life for himself as he wished and himself to bear all the consequences of that. The corresponding ideology crystallized out as individualism and utilitarianism. But the new society became stratified in its property dimension because a strict hierarchy in the production sphere was set in opposition to the formal-legal equality in the civil and political sphere. What we got was a new class society with new privileges and new forms of exploitation.

Socialist self-management also takes the ideal of equality and freedom as its points of departure, but now they have been defined in positive terms: society guarantees the individual equality and freedom. It is obvious that in such a situation utilitarianism and individualism are unsuitable as an ideology. The individual cannot, of course, be free unless he himself decides on his destiny. But in so doing he is not an isolated individual, but has the aid of society. Individualism accordingly does not fit in here. But society is not some independent external force--as God once was--but consists of socially oriented individuals. In other words, the aid of society implies aid to society; social concern implies concern for society. Accordingly, utilitarianism does not fit in here as an ideology.

Let us now see how self-management has been conceived in Yugoslav practice. It means that every individual can and should participate in making decisions and in that way pursue his own interest. Since he himself must be concerned about his own interest, he must be a member of the workers' council to protect that interest. He thus becomes a member of the workers' council (SIZ [self-managing community of interest], the community for scientific research, the local community, the editorial board, and so on) in order to solve certain problems of his own and the problems of his friends; the interests of the collective do not greatly concern him, and there is hardly any question at all of commitment to any social goals or principles of socialist ethics. When that individual is not a member of the body which is making the decision, then his colleagues make the decision to his detriment (unless he is a member of a clique which has its representatives on that body).

Recently a working group in the Yugoslav Assembly completed an analysis of a survey of constitutional rights, freedoms, duties and responsibilities of individuals and established that in 1981 workers' councils in the greatest number of cases, and their committees and commissions in only a slightly fewer number of cases, violated the rights of workers and did damage to social property. Professional management bodies and officers (the so-called technocracy) were only in third place, with one-third the cases, approximately the same number of violations as worker caucuses.*

The situation we have described has several extremely adverse consequences. One, which is already notorious even now, is the obsession with decisionmaking. All attention and energy are devoted to the taking of the decision, so that the preparation and execution of decisions have been left to manipulation of the clique which happens to be in power at the moment, which, of course, has a feedback effect and only deteriorates the situation.

The second is the obsession with decisionmaking by large groups such as worker caucuses or citizen caucuses.

No sort of essential discussion, analysis of problems or effective followup are possible in caucuses [zborovi]. All that can be done is to vote. That is why the caucuses represent on the one hand a promising target for manipulation and on the other threaten disappointment and demoralization. Both intensify the belief that you can rely only on yourself and your friends, which again has a feedback effect.

The individualism and privatization we have described generate an altogether specific collectivism which is equally destructive. If the individual must see to everything himself, and if, should he by chance not be present, his colleagues will most probably inflict some injury on him, then whenever some individual comes forth with some initiative, it is certain that he does so in his own interest and at your expense. Every individual initiative must therefore be thwarted a priori; initiatives are indeed blocked, and we encounter stalemates at all levels. Which accounts for the obsession with collective decisionmaking. Everything must be sanctioned by some "self-managing" forum.

* "A Ranking Which Stands as a Warning," POLITIKA, 8 April 1982, p 6.

The consequence is a specific quid pro quo: decisions are not in themselves good or bad (the criterion in that case would be the social interest or an ethical principle); decisions made collectively are good, while individual decisions are bad. That being the case, the main thing is to obtain the sanction of some collective body; the question of whether the action is useful or harmful is rather irrelevant.

In postcapitalist society a misplaced individualism engenders a deformed collectivism (which in addition also brings with it atavisms from patriarchal peasant society), and the constant tension between these two deformations makes a caricature of socialist self-management.

It is self-evident that deformations of this kind indicate the absence of internalized ethical norms, which we will have more to say about.

An individualism which leads to privatization and a collectivism which is manifested as naked power are not characteristic of work collectives alone. They penetrate all social structures and all levels. In that context we will examine the question of the state.

In early capitalism the state was the custodian of order. The individual himself saw to all his own interests, and the market was an institution for automatic regulation without social control. However, dating from that time the state, aside from being an organ of government, took over more and more regulatory functions and began to perform social services. Under socialism the state withers away as an instrument of repression, but develops as an organization for the performance of social services.

In our situation today the processes, it seems, have been reversed. The state is continuing to divest itself of the obligations of social services, and it is stressing its government role. The state issues orders or prohibitions, from the opstina to the Federation; it does not serve. If the state is not looking after you, then you need not look after the state. If the state indeed mistreats you, then, of course, you avoid it. If you have to take care of your own interests on your own, often indeed even against the heavy hand of the state, then the state figures as an alienated and hostile force which should be avoided and tricked. There are few countries where the laws of the state are evaded as ingeniously as in our country. Our emigres carry away that great body of experience with them to foreign countries, where occasionally people are appalled by their resourcefulness.

The state as unaccountable government is, of course, the legacy of the Balkan state. *Historia non facit saltum*, and we must reconcile ourselves to the fact that it will take time for us to rid ourselves of that legacy. But that is one problem, and it is quite a different problem when that Balkan state is presented as a socialist achievement. In that latter case we are dealing with a dangerous ideological deviation.

Finally, if the workers' council is not concerning itself with your interests, if the state is not looking out for you, if you have to look out for your rights on your own, if they are in jeopardy even when they have been guaranteed

by law or by bylaws, then, left to yourself, you will begin to look out for yourself without heeding others or the social interest. The "social interest" is put in quotation marks as something abstract, as something that does not fit in with everyday experience, and cannot accordingly be internalized. Since the social interest does not become an ethical norm, by the same token a violation of the social interest is not perceived as an immoral act. Theft of social property, embezzlement, financial offenses, etc., are seen as resourcefulness and savoir faire rather than as criminal acts. The workers' council punishes thieves with token penalties, and reinstates embezzlers in their previous jobs after they have served their time.

"Income-Oriented" Ideology

I have already noted that individualism and utilitarianism are characteristic of the ideology of early bourgeois society. In the first section of this article I pointed to certain factors which are giving rise to a specific individualistic deviation in our country. Since utilitarianism is complementary to individualism, we might also anticipate the occurrence of a utilitarian deviation. In ordinary speech it is referred to as selfishness, greed, the desire to make a killing, the consumer mentality, etc.

The income-oriented mentality of deviant self-management corresponds to the profiteering mentality of early capitalism. To avoid a possible misunderstanding, I must stress at once that as an economist I would not dream of negating the market or underestimating material incentives as instruments for nonadministrative coordination of economic processes. The market is an extremely effective and indispensable instrument for the allocation of resources, and distribution of income according to work represents the basis of a socialist economy and therefore of society. The market and income, then, have their clearly defined place in a socialist society.

However, the existence of the market does not imply that everything is subject to buying and selling--from shoes and automobiles to museum admission, education and erotic services--just as distribution according to work does not imply that all work is to be measured and income determined in that way. Once again we are dealing with a complementary ideological deviation: if everything can be measured, then everything can be purchased. What is more, if everything is to be measured, then everything is to be purchased. And we have thus arrived at an ethical postulate which, of course, has nothing whatsoever to do with socialism.

So, while the trade unions in the West European countries fight against piecework--and in favor of a wage based on time--since work based on a quota shatters the unity of the working class, intensifies exploitation, dehumanizes work and deteriorates human relations, the Yugoslav trade unions proclaim piecework to be the pinnacle of socialist organization. And while professional organizations once nurtured professional ethics, which required that physicians treat people, that judges administer justice, that teachers teach and bring up the young generations, and that scientists find scientific truth, today our trade unions and political propagandists seek to measure medical treatment, judgment, rearing and scientific research and to distribute bonuses.

As a result in meetings of work collectives there is much more discussion of distribution of bonuses and of how the money for bonuses is earned than of treatment of the patient or bringing up the young. As a further result professional ethics are being replaced by the income-oriented mentality. It is not far from there to blue envelopes [(?) bribes].

Once again to avoid misunderstandings, as an economist I am perfectly aware that standards or quotas have to be set for certain work operations. This improves work discipline, stimulates productivity and avoids conflicts, since accounts are straightforward. Likewise in most cases standards should be set on costs--that is the purpose of various budgets, from the individual office on up--in order to avoid wastefulness and carelessness and to establish definite standards of behavior. Finally, the obligations of every job should be clearly defined. But none of that has anything to do with the ideology of measuring every fragment of work. It is the function of norm setting and defining work duties to stimulate individuals to be good physicians, judges, civil servants, scientists, and so on. The former is the means, the latter is the end. What happens is again a quid pro quo. The standards or quotas become the end, and professional consciousness and conscientiousness are lost, since they are something immeasurable and therefore irrelevant. The teacher performs his social function by educating students, not by presenting lectures, producing lecture notes, giving examinations, attending meetings and writing memos. Yet if points are to be given--as is actually done at our universities--for every fragment of a teacher's physical activity, then the teacher will begin to pile up tests, to turn out lecture notes in the largest possible printings and to event the holding of commission meetings, and he will cease to be a teacher. Especially will he no longer be a scientist.* In addition, there is an unremitting tug-of-war with one's colleagues over establishment of every point and distribution of every dinar. In such a situation matters of scientific truth or pedagogical integrity--for which no points or standards exist--become not only irrelevant, but indeed grotesquely out of place.

If everything is to be measured and everything is to bring income, then the work collective of the enterprise should also be broken down into smaller units, each of which will have its own giro account in the bank and will sell its services to other units of the enterprise at market prices. And since everyone is to look out for himself, since there is no society to look out for you, those units should look primarily to their own interests. That is how the OUR's [organization of associated labor; but OOUR's, basic organizations of associated labor, seem to be what was meant] came into being, shattering the collective, deteriorating human relations and lowering business efficiency. The technical aspect of the mistake made is clear: the market, which is based on competition and which is valid as an organizational principle among enterprises was introduced within the enterprise, where cooperation based on solidarity ought to prevail as the organizational principle. The ideological aspect of the error should also be clear: if everything is for sale, then the OUR's [again OOUR's seem to be meant] ought to sell to one another.

* A high percentage of university professors, more than half in some places, are not doing scientific research at all and are not publishing scientific papers.

Authentic self-management does require small groups. The enterprise is too large a unit for the individual to make himself felt. That is why it should be structured as an association of self-managing work units.* So far the analysis is correct and scientifically sound. The ideological element is introduced with the postulate that relations among the OUR's [OOUR's] should be built on the basis of buying and selling, since everyone should "dispose of his own income."

A further illustration of the same phenomenon is the now already notorious principle of past labor. Past labor is the capital that has come into being through investments made with financial savings. The worker does not spend his entire income, but saves a portion and invests it, thereby acquiring the right to derive rent (profit) from those investments. Of course, income from capital has nothing in common with Marx's motto of distribution according to work, but it has direct relations to rentierism. Certainly income from capital is incompatible with social ownership, but it is a natural consequence of private and collective ownership. The belief that the worker-entrepreneur will manage the resources of society successfully only if the capitalist-rentier in him is awakened is not even based on any scientific analysis--on that point I can be altogether categorical as an economist--but on an ideological bias. My past labor is my saving, my saving is my property, and I have the right to collect profit on my property--why otherwise would I save?--is the ideology and practice of capitalist society. I must add, however, that it has not been possible to apply the rentier principle of past labor in Yugoslav practice even a decade after it had been imposed on our society from above because of the spontaneous resistance of the working class. It has not been possible in practice to go further than paying a supplement for length of service, which represents the principle of seniority, which is often applied elsewhere and which is quite a different principle.

It will now be clear what is hidden behind the ever present slogan of the principle of income. It conceals the early-bourgeois ideology of utilitarianism. All human activities are motivated solely and exclusively by personal gain, and this is measured and expressed in material goods. If, then, you want to be good "socialists," get rich the best way you know and the best way you can.

The Moral Basis of the Ideological Deviations

Every ideology has its moral basis, and that also applies to our "self-managerial" utilitarian individualism.

We began our postrevolutionary development with 75 percent of the labor force in rural areas, and that percentage has now dropped below 30 percent. An entire prewar Yugoslavia has moved from rural areas to the city, from agriculture to urban occupations. That resettlement has been accompanied by a rapid rise in the level of education and material prosperity. In addition, there

* I attempted to develop a full-fledged theory of the organization of the self-managing enterprise in my book "The Political Economy of Socialism," Robertson, Oxford, 1982.

has also been considerable vertical social mobility. The level of aspirations has risen by leaps and bounds. Under such conditions there has been a pronounced anomie, a phenomenon whose discovery goes back to Durkheim: the old norms have become dysfunctional and disappear, while the new ones have not yet been built. Anomie is accentuated by frequent changes of regulations, contradictory laws and general disorder in the economy and administration. Since ethical norms represent an automatic regulator of activity, this automatism has now been lost, and ethical relativism and a kind of ethical chaos have emerged. Everything seems possible. Everything seems allowed under certain circumstances--if no one frustrates and no one catches you. The basic virtue of bourgeois life is accordingly "social savoir faire," political adaptability and facility at manipulation.

When large groups of people from families which lived on the margin of material existence enter a situation in which the material standard of living is rising rapidly, and when social mobility is in addition made possible for them, then it is natural for an irresistible and uncontrolled desire to arise to be reimbursed as soon as possible for everything which the earlier generations missed. The psychological need and the pressure of the world around for maximum accumulation of material goods are exceedingly great. When the door of social privileges is opened a crack, the impetus for social advancement in those who were near the bottom of the social ladder grows explosively. One needs to arrive and to achieve regardless of obstacles. One needs to succeed. Success is the criterion of morality.

There exist no general ethical norms. This is an illusion of idealists and Utopians. Morality is relative. Everything depends on the situation. One should be realistic. You can't go through a wall head first. You cannot change society on your own. You have to adapt in order to avoid trouble. You can't spend your entire life being a rebel. What is more, no one gains from that. One should be smart and achieve something in life.

Thus conformism and careerism pass for an expression of intelligence. He knows what he is doing, he will not bring unnecessary criticism down on himself. Insistence on certain principles is a sign of dull-witted ignorance.

If that insistence is a bit stronger in intensity, then it is referred to as an inability to get along or "bourgeois individualism." If you want society to accept you, then you have to renounce some of your views, there is no cooperation without compromise. Excessively great obstinacy may be proclaimed as even hostile activity, since it is harmful to certain established interests. When Seselj, docent at Sarajevo University, ascertained that the master's thesis of the secretary of the city committee in that city was a plagiarism, no one at the time took pains to prove otherwise, nor did that secretary resign, but Seselj was expelled from the LCY, proclaimed morally and politically unfit to be a teacher and discharged from the university. To be sure, this is an extreme case, but it is not the only one and in addition it illustrates quite well the morality of an anomic milieu. We should immediately add, however, that the very fact that this was spoken and written about in public indicates that our society has the strength to combat that kind of morality.

We recognize in what has been cited that we are dealing with the morality of an unscrupulous petit bourgeois desirous of material wealth and social privileges. The petit bourgeois is not stopped by any principles whatsoever. He wants to succeed. His natural philosophy of life is utilitarian individualism. He always finds justification for his unscrupulousness in his own "constructiveness," his "realistic" adaptation, his "intelligence" opportunism. The good is what is useful, what contributes to success.

The psychological pressure of the petit bourgeois outlook, which has filled the moral and ideological vacuum between the prewar peasant society, with additions from the primitive accumulation of capital, and the self-managing socialist society which does not yet exist--that pressure is exceedingly great. The morality which is engendered by that kind of social situation has a horribly corrosive effect which only the strongest and altogether independent individuals can resist. Aggressive nationalism is a product of that kind of morality. Old revolutionaries who were not afraid of any torture and war heroes who unhesitatingly risked their lives in skirmishes begin to tremble with fear that they might miss some medal or might be overlooked for some promotion. If success is the criterion of morality, then failure is, of course, an indicator of some moral defect. And without moral support the personality breaks down.

By Way of Conclusion

The ideological deviations which this article calls attention to are not isolated phenomena. They are on the contrary components of an entire social situation which is fraught with crisis. And moral crisis is the most serious crisis which can befall any society. The present economic crisis which our economy is going through, however serious it might be, is relatively easy to solve in objective terms: Its technical solutions are well known. Yet what is lacking is the political will that can set those technical solutions in motion. And it seems to me the cause of political powerlessness should be sought in society's moral crisis. The economic situation was objectively much more serious in 1950-1952; Yugoslavia was on the verge of hunger. And a solution was quickly found and resulted in explosive economic growth. Just 7 years after the revolution the ethical values of the revolution were still pretty much intact--although to some extent already corroded by the Cominform episode. Revolutionary morality also made it possible to carry out revolutionary political action: to build self-management. And the economic crisis was overcome in record time.

What is happening today with our ideology and morality are not simply "remnants of the old in people's consciousness"--as the smooth-tongued opportunists present this to us every day--although there is that as well. Our situation after the revolution was essentially different, and if something changed later, then that was the result of the new and not of the old. And since these were not changes for the better, but for the worse, and since they have been occurring uncontrollably and spontaneously, the danger of the phenomena which have been noted cannot be overestimated.

7045
CSO: 2800/112

DATA ON YOUTH IN REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 10 Dec 82 p 5

[Article by Aleksa Crnjakovic: "Young People an Ever Stronger Force in Society"]

[Text] According to last year's population census, there are almost 1 million young people living in SR [Socialist Republic] Croatia, or more precisely 994,606 young people between the ages of 14 and 27. Most of them live in four communities of opstinas: Split, Osijek, Zagreb and Rijeka. The concentration of young people in these cities is altogether understandable because of the size of those regions, but also because it is precisely those areas which have the largest number of educational institutions and the bulk of industry, which are stimulating the constant migration of young people toward those regions.

Steady Growth of the Number of Young People

The number of members of the Socialist Youth League is rising steadily. This year the Croatian Socialist Youth League has 813,434 activists, which is a 34-percent increase in the number of members over 1974. They are active in 14,954 basic organizations. The average basic organization numbers 54 young people. The basic organizations which have a large number of members have a more difficult time performing their role, and in the period following the congress one of the tasks will be for them to reorganize themselves. The largest number of members are in the Zagreb, Split and Osijek communities of opstinas.

Over the last 4 years significant changes have occurred in the SSOH [Croatian Socialist Youth League] in the number of basic organizations based on where they are established. There has been a considerable increase in the number of organizations in secondary schools and university schools, and a slight drop in the number in OOUR's [basic organization of associated labor], while their number in local communities did not change.

Presidiums of opstina conferences number 1,347 members. The SSOH carries out a large part of its activities and programs through the operation of public organizations which bring together children and young people, and recently they have all recorded an increase in their membership. This shows that young people want to be organized on the basis of their interests.

Party Members

Young people are also a large force in the League of Communists [LC]. The year before last the Croatian LC had 88,628 young people under the age of 27, which constitutes 26 percent of the total membership. Today 10.8 percent of members of the SSOH are in the Croatian LC, and that amounts to 8 percent of the republic's young people. The number of members of the SSOH who are in the Croatian LC is highest in the Karlovac, Sisak, Gospic and Rijeka opstina communities and lowest in the Varazdin Opstina Community.

Young People in the Political System

Young people are not satisfied with their participation in the country's political system. With good reason. On the basis of this year's election figures (still incomplete, to be sure) the number of young people directly involved as members of various bodies and organs has been gradually dropping or staying at the same level, which runs counter to the positions adopted both by the SSOH and the other sociopolitical organizations concerning the need for and importance of greater involvement of young people in all civic activities. Participation of young people in basic delegations has dropped from 18.8 percent in 1978 to 15.9 percent this year. This year's elections repeated once again the old practice whereby the number of young people nominated in pre-nomination caucuses was far greater than the number of young people confirmed as candidates and elected (by all of between 25 and 35 percent). The participation of young people in workers' councils is also dropping, while young people's participation is increasing only in the bodies of local communities.

Education

Most young people are involved in the process of education and training to enter the workplace, and the SSOH is also paying much attention to that. Before the reform of secondary targeted education there was a pronounced dualism between education for work and that education pursued by attending the university. About 95 percent of graduates of the academic high school went to the university, while few students who graduated from secondary vocational schools went to higher educational institutions.

The reform has put an end to this selection. Unfortunately, the plan for enrollment in nonproduction occupations is being exceeded every year, while the plan for enrollment for production occupations is not being fulfilled. Indeed more than 40 percent of the secondary students enrolled in the last phase of secondary targeted education this year chose vocations which are very crowded, and this is most pronounced in Rijeka. The needs of associated labor for personnel, then, are not being respected.

In Croatia at the moment there are 54,611 university students. The number is dropping year after year, which is a good thing, since until recently their number was out of proportion to the needs of associated labor.

Creation of New Jobs

Over the past 10 years total employment rose at a rate of 3.9 percent. There was a change in the composition of the labor force with respect to skills: the number of unskilled workers dropped and the number of those with higher education increased. But the economy still has a shortage of skilled workers. There is a particularly pronounced shortage of workers in production occupations: carpenters, mechanics, masons, metal lathe operators, machinists. The largest shortage of personnel was recorded in Rijeka, Split and Osijek. The number of unemployed is rising. In Croatia at the moment there are 95,800 workers looking for jobs. Young people and women are predominant among them (70 percent). More than one-fourth of the unemployed have no income whatsoever, and about 15 percent have an income of 1,000 dinars per member of the household, which is minimal. For the first time the number of workers with specialized training is larger among those seeking employment than the share of those who have not had specialized training.

Last year 493 million dinars were spent for material support and other rights of the unemployed!

Voluntary Work by Young People

More young people are participating in work projects. This year about 14,000 young men and women from Croatia participated in federal and republic work projects. In 1980 more than 135,000 young people worked 83,434 workdays on local work projects.

7045

CSO: 2800/102

BENEFITS, DRAWBACKS OF WORKERS ABROAD EVALUATED

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 25 Dec 82 SEDAM DANA Supplement p 18

[Article by Mladen Vedris, M.A., Zagreb Center for Study of Migration: "Migrations Out of Yugoslavia"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the sixties our country has been involved more and more in Europe's migrational flows. In the process of the continuous increase in the number of Yugoslavs in the countries of western and central Europe, at the end of 1973 a maximum of 1.11 million was reached (860,000 workers and 250,000 dependent members of their families).*

Table 1. Workers Migrating From the SFRY

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number Who Left During Year</u>	<u>Total Number at End of Year</u>	<u>Chain Index (previous year = 100)</u>
1968	80,000	260,000	--
1969	130,000	330,000	127.0
1970	240,000	600,000	181.8
1971	145,000	680,000	113.3
1972	145,000	770,000	113.2
1973	115,000	860,000	111.7
1974	30,000	810,000	94.2
1975	25,000	770,000	95.1
1976	20,000	725,000	94.2
1977	20,000	705,000	97.2
1978	32,000	695,000	98.6
1979	35,000	690,000	99.3
1980	30,000	693,000	100.4
1981	<u>30,000</u>	695,000	100.3
1968-1981	1,077,000		

* The figures on the number of Yugoslav workers and citizens were taken from documentation of the Zagreb Center for Study of Migration, and are based (mainly) on statistics of the host countries, which are more complete in their coverage than those in self-managing communities of interest for employment security in Yugoslavia.

After 1973 (beginning of the economic recession) the number of Yugoslavs working abroad drops off, but there is an increase in the number of dependent members of their families; it is estimated that at the end of 1981 there were 1,105,000 Yugoslav citizens abroad (695,000 workers and 410,000 dependent family members). The total number in 1981 was slightly lower than in 1973, but there was a significant change in the composition. In 1973 dependent family members made up only 21.5 percent of the total group of migrants, while 7 years later this share had climbed to 37 percent. Obviously the trend toward stabilization of foreign residents, which has been noted in the entire population of "foreigners" in the European host countries, also applies to Yugoslav citizens. There are fewer of them working, but on the other hand there are more and more living as dependent family members. They are also staying longer and longer. Thus at the end of 1979 all of 40 percent of Yugoslavs in West Germany had resided there (already) between 10 and 15 years; that percentage for the entire foreign population was (only) 23.7 percent. Four-fifths of Yugoslav citizens in West Germany at that time had been there 6 years or more (the figure is two-thirds for the total foreign population). In mid-1981 all of 55.1 percent of Yugoslav citizens had resided 10 years or more in West Germany; and for the Yugoslav population in West Germany as a whole the average period of (permanent?!) residence was 10.2 years. Since the bulk of Yugoslav workers and family members are in West Germany, these figures are typical of the population of Yugoslav migrants as a whole.

Table 2. Workers From Yugoslavia by Country of Employment

<u>Host Country</u>	<u>1977</u>		<u>1980</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
Austria	140,000	19.9	130,000	18.7
France	55,000	7.8	58,000	8.4
Netherlands	10,000	1.4	10,000	1.4
West Germany	405,000	57.5	403,000	58.2
Sweden	26,000	3.7	25,000	3.6
Switzerland	34,000	4.8	31,000	4.5
Other European countries	<u>35,000</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>36,000</u>	<u>5.2</u>
Total	705,000	100.0	693,000	100.0

It is evident that in spite of the number of migrant workers in Yugoslavia in the West European countries since 1977, there has been no change whatsoever in their distribution by country. More than three-fourths of the migrant workers have been concentrated over that entire period in the countries of the German-language region (Austria and West Germany--76.9 percent of the total).

The Benefits and Drawbacks of Employment Abroad

A number of studies, assessments and also controversies have been written about the effect of external migration, both the individual and the social effects. There is a great variety of approaches, depending on the points of departure of the authors of the analyses, and also depending on whether the research is done by the host country or the migrant's country of origin, and studies of migration within those two basic groups also contain differentiated views.

Starting with the economic aspect, which is the principal motive of external migrations, the host countries emphasize the amounts which the migrants send home, and they stress their relative and absolute importance to righting the balance of payments of the countries from which the migrants originate, to expanding effective domestic demand and to the imputed multiplier effects on the growth of industrial production and acceleration of the rate of overall economic activity.

The countries the migrant workers come from call attention to the fact that the major share of the earnings of the migrants stay in the host country; a portion in the form of taxes and contributions squeezed from the gross personal incomes of the migrants, which then goes into the social funds of those countries, the effects of which the migrants have a disproportionate share of. A second portion is spent for their own support; a higher degree of adaptation and accommodation in the host country also presupposes more intensive current consumption; a third portion remains in the form of savings in accounts of domicile banks, while only the remainder goes to the countries of origin.

What are the good and bad effects of external migrations in the case of Yugoslavia? Between 1968 and 1972, during the years of the highest rate of employment of people from our country abroad, 740,000 workers sought jobs outside the homeland, or an annual average of about 150,000. For the sake of illustration, at that same time an average of 130,000 jobs opened up each year within the country. In that context and bearing in mind the large number of persons registered with employment security bureaus, departure to work abroad performed the function of a "safety valve" on the domestic labor market, reducing the pressure for creation of jobs in the socialized sector of the economy.

In an analysis of the economic benefits realized by the process of external migrations it is certain that a special place is occupied by the remittances of foreign exchange by the migrant workers, whose accurate amount is very difficult to determine, while the estimated values vary considerably, depending on whether the gross or net amounts are given. Thus in gross terms the amounts for Yugoslavia in 1980 were about \$4 billion, but on a net basis it was \$1.44 billion. Since the National Bank of Yugoslavia uses the gross in indicating foreign exchange remittances of workers employed abroad temporarily, we shall give below the share of remittances in Yugoslavia's balance of payments for 1980 and 1981 in order to illustrate their importance.

Table 3. Remittances of Workers Abroad and Their Share in Yugoslavia's International Balance of Payments in 1980 and 1981, in millions of dollars

Outflow and Inflow by Purposes	1980*		1981**		Index 1981/1980
	Outflow	%	Outflow	%	
1	2	3	4	5	6
Total outflow	19,472	100.0	20,536	100.0	105.5
To import goods	14,309	73.5	14,110	68.7	98.6
For miscellaneous purposes	5,163	26.5	6,426	31.3	124.5

Table 3 (continued)

1	2	3	4	5	6
Total inflow	17,952	100.0	19,988	100.0	111.3
From commodity exports	9,269	51.6	10,185	50.9	109.9
From tourism	1,115	6.2	1,073	5.4	96.2
From workers and emigres	4,791	26.7	4,928	24.7	102.9
From miscellaneous	2,777	15.5	3,802	19.0	136.9
Balance	-1,520		-548		-36.1

* Data of the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

** Preliminary data.

Even among the other European countries which have a considerable number of workers employed abroad, such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey, remittances of foreign exchange are an item of very great importance to equilibrium or reduction of the deficit in the balance of payments. It is a particular problem to keep the remittances of foreign exchange from serving (exclusively) the purpose of consumption. How they should be put at the service of economic development, to achieve the conditions for return and reintegration of those working abroad, is a question to which the right answers have been sought in all the countries of origin with greater or lesser success.

Further benefits which migrants from the origin country realize in the process of external migrations are manifested in the learning of foreign languages and the acquisition of new knowledge, work experience and skills in the industrially advanced countries.

The negative effects caused by external migrations become increasingly obvious as residence and work abroad lengthens, and they are definitive should the migrants stay permanently in those countries. The massive and predominantly unorganized taking of employment abroad up to 1973 also showed a rather unfavorable distribution from our country's standpoint. Nearly one out of every two workers going to work abroad temporarily left a job in Yugoslavia. Not uncommonly these were skilled and university-trained people, those who were responsible for the production process in their own communities, at the optimum age and with the optimum work potential. The jobs they left were filled with new people who often did not have the right background, and that had an adverse effect on the rise of productivity in the country and more broadly on the rate of economic growth and pace of development.

The direct losses (drawbacks) are also expressed in the expenditures invested in the process of educating and bringing up workers employed abroad temporarily. Nor should one forget the other expenditures that arise for the community which the migrant left when he went abroad to work. The construction and maintenance of the infrastructure, which serves the purposes of government and the social services, is financed first of all by appropriations within the country, and the costs of educating the children of the migrants who remain in the country and the costs of all the rest of the social infrastructure are

again paid for out of the income of persons employed in our country's economy, and so on.

Along with these aspects, which are above all economic, the positive and negative effects of employment abroad also include social effects, which are more difficult to measure, but they are no less important. The lengthy or lasting separation of members of the family results in a higher number of divorces in migrant families. Then the process of creating households consisting only of elderly members (especially rural households) speeds up, as does the general aging of the population of the country of origin. As a consequence of the length of residence and work abroad in recent years there has been a particular aggravation of the problem of the second generation, the children, of the migrants, torn between the host country, where they are insufficiently adapted or not adapted at all, and the country of origin of the parents, which often they are not even familiar with.

Return Flows

So far the return of migrant workers has taken three basic forms: a) forced, resulting from loss of work permit and/or residence permit in the particular foreign country; b) spontaneous--the worker's own decision to return, since he has fulfilled the goals for which he went abroad to work, because children are starting school, parents are old, he is taking over the family farm, etc.; and c) stimulated by measures and activities adopted in the country as an incentive for their return. It seems that the first form was more evident in the 1973-1975 period. Today the spontaneous form is predominant, and the latter is less evident; it is especially aimed at those with skills and at occupations for which there is a shortage in the Yugoslav economy (but they are also in demand on the labor markets of foreign countries). What do the quantitative figures on return flows indicate?

Between 1968 and 1981 approximately the same number of workers returned to the country as those residing in the countries of western Europe. Since 1974 the number of annual returns has consistently been higher than the number of departures, and then that trend was (again) reversed in 1980 and 1981, when more Yugoslav citizens took employment abroad than returned to the country. We also note a considerable unevenness of the return flows, with a somewhat more pronounced intensity between 1974 and 1976. The taking of employment abroad enjoyed the "boom" we have already mentioned between 1969 and 1973.

Aside from that minor portion of migrants who cease to be active when they return to the country (retirement, living off rent, savings, and the like), the bulk continue to work in their homeland. It is a realistic assessment that the key element for the possibility of return is above all reintegration of the migrant workers into the workplace, which also creates the basic prerequisite for existence of the entire family. The capital built up by working abroad ought to be extremely important to the employment of the returnee, but sufficient advantage is not being taken of that possibility. The migrants postpone the return, and the Yugoslav economy and citizens continue to feel a shortage of goods and services, especially in the sector of small business.

It is obvious that over the last several years significant changes have taken place in the migrational flows of Yugoslavs; more and more Yugoslav citizens are living in the host countries, but a smaller proportion is working. The children of the migrants are a factor which favor most the decision to return, but it is increasingly a factor encouraging a longer or permanent stay. In the great majority Yugoslav citizens remain devoted to their country, and they maintain numerous contacts with it; in the host country they do this through various forms of social gatherings, by following the Yugoslav press, and in the course of the year they make several visits to the opstinas they come from. But it is equally clear that the emotional ties to the country often knuckle under to the logic of everyday life: Ubi bene, ibi patria. So the decision to return to the country is made by weighing what there is in the foreign country against what would be desired in the homeland.

Fuller and more effective use of the resources achieved by means of the external migrations is becoming an ever greater necessity; it is evident that our community is not so rich or self-sufficient that it should not acknowledge the fact that the returning migrant does not represent an additional burden on development, but by virtue of his work, innovations and foreign exchange is an important productive force whose productive use is a necessary precondition to realizing the social and economic benefits from the process of external migrations.

Table 4. Return Flows of Migrant Yugoslav Workers

<u>Year</u>	<u>Took Employment</u>	<u>Returned</u>	<u>Ratio of Returnees to Those Departing, %</u>
1968	80,000	20,000	25.0
1969	130,000	60,000	46.2
1970	240,000	70,000	29.2
1971	145,000	65,000	44.8
1972	145,000	55,000	37.9
1973	115,000	25,000	21.7
1974	40,000	80,000	266.7
1975	25,000	65,000	260.0
1976	20,000	65,000	325.0
1977	20,000	40,000	200.0
1978	32,000	42,000	131.2
1979	35,000	40,000	114.3
1980	30,000	27,000	90.0
1981	<u>30,000</u>	<u>28,000</u>	93.3
1968-1981	1,077,000	705,000	

7045

CSO: 2800/102

YUGOSLAVIA

BRIEFS

ALBANIAN SENTENCED--For the crime of hostile activity, the Skopje circuit court has sentenced Destan Aliu, 28, from the village of Zajas near Kicevo, to 7 years imprisonment. The court, on the basis of the indictment, examination of the accused and the testimony of witnesses, proved that Aliu, during several years abroad, acted from a position of Great Albanian irredentism and chauvinism. As an emigrant, he resided in the United States from 1974 to 1981, through the assistance of a church organization in Vienna that paid his way there, and entered the ranks of the hostile Albanian organization "Bali Kombetar." In Chicago, Washington and New York, he frequently participated in demonstrations against our country. [Text] [Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 22 Jan 83 p 10]

CSO: 2800/118

END