


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27 January 1993



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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

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PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-003

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27 January 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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ANGOLA

Savimbi Accuses Government of Using CWs

MB1401151893 Johannesburg Radio South Africa Network in English 1100 GMT 14 Jan 93

[Text] The Angolan Government says a large UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] column has left the town of Mavinga in the eastern Cuando Cubango Province to attack the city of Menongve, which has been under heavy artillery fire for the last 24 hours. The report said fighting had resumed in the city of Huambo, the capital of the Huambo Province, where hundreds of people were reported to have been killed earlier this week.

Earlier, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi claimed that the government had used chemical weapons against civilians during the fighting in Huambo. He called on the international community to condemn the government's actions, saying that many women and children had been killed by poisonous gas bombs dropped by Angolan aircraft.

In Washington, senior Angolan officials have held talks with World Bank representatives on the rebuilding of Angola's infrastructure destroyed during the civil war. Several new development projects were also discussed.

SOUTH AFRICA

ANC Opposes Alleged Missile Deal With Russia

MB2101150793 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1235 GMT 21 Jan 93

[SAPA PR wire service issued by: African National Congress]

[Text] The ANC is deeply concerned at increasing reports about various forms of military collaboration between the South African regime and Russia.

It is well known that as part of South Africa's aggressive regional power role it has over many years developed, (with the co-operation of Israel), a missile capability in breach of the international arms embargo.

Attempts are now being made, with the South Africa Foundation acting as an intermediary to arrange formal talks between Denel and the Russian space agency to reach agreement for the delivery of Russian SS-20 intermediate range missile systems—ostensibly for launching South African satellites.

The delivery of Russian SS-20 or any other missile systems to South Africa will be in direct breach of the mandatory arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council.

The ANC expects the Russian authorities to take appropriate action to prevent all attempts to breach the international arms embargo against South Africa.

The ANC notes that this case has been reported to the UN Security Council's Arms Embargo Committee by the World

Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa and supports all international efforts to uphold the arms embargo.

The ANC will not be bound by obligations arising from such deals. All attempts to breach the arms embargo should cease, and instead international law should apply.

Offer to Launch Satellites Eyed

MB2712104492 Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 27 Dec 92 p 1

[Text] Russia has offered to put South African satellites into space using its redundant nuclear missiles—at a fraction of the cost of developing locally made missiles.

The extraordinary offer from Moscow's Scientific and Technological Centre will come as a shock to South Africa's high-tech industries, which are investigating a multi-billion investment in a home-grown space industry.

The Russians are offering to put as many as nine low-orbit satellites in space with the use of one missile at a cost R[and]25-million—negotiable. Meanwhile, Denel, the commercialised arm of Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa], is studying the feasibility of ploughing at least R5-billion into its own space development programme in the next few years.

Russia's bargain-basement offer is a major threat to the armaments industry, which is battling to find a new niche after the winding down of the border war. Details of the Russian offer have been made public by Dr Rudolf Gruber, the SA Foundation's Bonn representative, who discussed the possibilities with Professor Y Solomonov, chief designer of the SS-20 intercontinental missile, in July.

According to the proposal, the satellites could be launched from near the Russian city of Murmansk or could even sent into space by use of SS-20's brought to South Africa.

The launching ramps could be erected on an area the size of a rugby field and then shipped back to Russia once the launch was completed.

The Russians are also offering to provide a complete multi-purpose space system which would provide satellites for communications and meteorological surveys—again at a fraction of the estimated cost of developing satellites in South Africa.

Dr Gruber said this week his sole interest in approaching the SA Government with the Russian proposal was to be of service to South Africa.

Mr Paul Holzhausen, executive corporate communications spokesman for Denel, said this week that no formal offer had yet been received.

He said that feasibility studies for a South African space industry was pushing ahead, but he could not confirm that the cost would be R5-billion.

"We are busy looking into Denel's capabilities. We have also approached foreign and local businesses who may be interested in becoming involved, and are offering our satellites as a service to other African countries."

Somchem, a division of Denel, is developing locally made rocket motors and has already tested three motors this year. Houtech, also a division of Denel, has a well-advanced satellite programme. The Russian offer comes at a delicate moment in negotiations between the SA and US governments.

The US wants to limit the number of countries who acquire the technology to launch inter-continental missiles and has threatened South Africa with punitive steps if it proceeds.

Foreign Affairs spokesman Dieter Petzch said the government was eager to develop a commercially viable space programme without alienating the Americans.

An American source close to the negotiations said the cost of developing the missile and satellite system could be as much as R20-billion.

Reports on 13 Jan Signing of CW Convention

Qian Qichen Urges Prohibition

OW1401063393 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 0244 GMT 13 Jan 93

[By reporter Liang Guihe (2733 6311 0735)]

[Text] Paris, 13 Jan (XINHUA)—At a signing ceremony for the "Convention on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons" on 13 January, Qian Qichen, Chinese state councillor and concurrently foreign minister, reiterated China's consistent stand on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons at an early date. He also appealed to signatory states to strictly abide by the "convention" and work together to safeguard peace and promote development.

Qian Qichen made the above statement at the ceremony after signing the "Convention on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons" on behalf of the Chinese Government. He pointed out: The signing of the document "is a historic event, which signifies the beginning of the end of mankind's nearly century-old scourge of chemical weapons and the dawning of a world free of chemical weapons."

At the signing ceremony, which was attended by representatives from more than 120 nations, the Chinese foreign minister said in retrospective: "For nearly a century, chemical weapons have posed a constant threat to the mainland. China and many other countries and their peoples have been victims of chemical weapons. The 24 years of negotiations on the 'convention' have traversed a difficult and tortuous path. China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all chemical weapons at an early date, and it has worked tirelessly along with other countries in making positive contributions to the signing of the 'convention.'"

He continued: "The advent, development, and eventual destruction of chemical weapons drive home the fact that the arms race was detrimental not only to the world peace, but also to the racers themselves. The trend for world peace will ultimately prevail."

After stressing the great significance of "convention" to the maintenance of world peace and security, Qian Qichen said: "An entire category of chemical weapons of mass destruction will be destroyed and their production facilities will be dismantled. The Chinese Government also has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of another category of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear weapons. We hope this goal can also be achieved at an early date."

Discussing the provisions of the "convention," he pointed out: "The 'convention' is not perfect. It has drawbacks, especially concerning verification, which, we hope, can be remedied, overcome, and avoided during the course of practice."

He emphasized: "Achieving the objectives of the 'convention' rests on its implementation. We hope that the document will become effective at an early date and will be strictly observed by all signatory states. Countries possessing chemical weapons and their production facilities should destroy them as soon as possible. Countries leaving

chemical weapons in other countries should earnestly resolve the problem of chemical weapons left behind according to the provisions of the 'convention'. Meanwhile, we believe that the 'convention' should not affect trade and scientific and technological exchanges in the field of chemistry conducted for peaceful purposes."

In conclusion, Qian Qichen expressed hope that through the joint efforts of all countries, the "convention" can safeguard peace and promote development in a true sense, thereby gaining sustained vitality and universal support.

Qian Describes 'Historic Event'

OW1401033493 Beijing XINHUA in English
0323 GMT 14 Jan 93

[Text] Paris, January 13 (XINHUA)—China today reiterated its consistent stand on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons and appealed to signatory states to abide by the Convention on Chemical Weapons Prohibition and Destruction.

The reaffirmation and call was made by Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen after he signed the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction on behalf of the Chinese Government.

Describing the signing of the document as a historic event, he said it signifies the beginning of the end of the scourge of chemical weapons and the dawning of a chemical-weapons-free world.

At the signing ceremony attended by representatives from over 120 states, he said that the 24 years of negotiations on the convention have traversed a difficult and tortuous path. The advent development and eventual destruction of chemical weapons have driven home the fact that the arms race was detrimental not only to world peace, but also to the racers themselves.

Stressing the great significance of the convention to the maintenance of world peace and security, Qian said that an entire category of chemical weapons of mass destruction, will be dismantled together with their production facilities, the prohibition and thorough destruction of another category of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear weapons—should also be achieved at an early date.

He also pointed out the drawbacks of the document particularly in its verification provisions, and expressed the hope that they would be remedied, rectified or avoided in practices.

He stressed that the achievement of the objectives of the convention rests on its implementation, but it should in no way prejudice trade and scientific and technological exchanges in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes.

Government Statement Issued

OW1401060993 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 0249 GMT 14 Jan 93

[Text] Paris, 13 Jan (XINHUA)—Chinese Foreign Minister and State Councillor Qian Qichen signed the convention on prohibition of chemical weapons on behalf of the Chinese

Government on 13 January, and handed a Chinese Government statement to U.N. Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, whose duty is to safeguard the convention. The statement reads:

1. China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all chemical weapons and their production facilities. The convention has laid down the international legal basis for achieving this goal. Therefore, China supports the object, purpose, and principles of the convention.

2. The object, purpose, principles of the convention should be strictly upheld. Provisions regarding calls that question or demand verification must not be abused, and the security and interests of the signatory countries and other countries which have nothing to do with chemical weapons must not be harmed. Otherwise, general support for the convention will certainly be affected.

3. Countries that have left chemical weapons in foreign countries must abide by the relevant provisions of the convention and undertake its obligations to destroy these weapons.

4. The convention should play a role in promoting trade, scientific and technical exchanges, and cooperation in the field of chemical engineering for peaceful purposes. Any relevant export controls that do not conform with the convention should be abolished.

French Arms Sale to Taiwan Said To Affect Ties

OW2101084093 Beijing XINHUA in English
0827 GMT 21 Jan 93

[Text] Beijing, January 21 (XINHUA)—Sino-French relations, including economic ties and trade, have been adversely affected by France's sale of mirage fighter planes to Taiwan.

Sources said here today that China and France resumed the meetings of the Mixed Commission on Economy and Trade in 1991 and discussed how to further expand bilateral economic co-operation and trade, and improve trade balance between the two countries in the course of development.

During the meeting the two sides also discussed specifically China's intention to purchase French wheat and their intention to co-operate in the construction of Guangzhou's subway, the second nuclear power station in Guangdong Province and many other projects.

There once existed good prospects for bilateral co-operation in energy, telecommunications, transportation, agriculture and other fields, the sources said. But, because of France's insistence on selling warplanes to Taiwan, the foundation of Sino-French relations has been seriously undermined and the previously good prospects for bilateral economic co-operation and trade have been overshadowed.

Commentary on Mirage Sales

OW2812130390 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in English 1215 GMT 28 Dec 92

["Excerpts" of Commentary by XINHUA correspondent Wang Yue: "A Clumsey Defense"]

[Text] Beijing, December 28 (XINHUA)—The French Government's recent decision to sell Taiwan 60 Mirage fighter aircraft has evoked strong protests from the Chinese Government and outrage among the Chinese people, says a commentary by a XINHUA correspondent, Wang Yue.

The following are excerpts from the commentary:

China has made its position clear: The French Government's decision has interfered in China's internal affairs and disturbed its peaceful reunification.

Recognition of the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate one representing the Chinese people and with Taiwan as an inalienable part of China is the basic principle on which diplomatic ties between China and France are based.

The French Government's decision to sell Taiwan advanced aircraft, which has wantonly trampled on the established norms of international relations, and its going back on its promise, has severely violated China's sovereignty and security. The Chinese people cannot tolerate such behavior.

The French side has claimed that its decision is merely of an economic nature and has nothing to do with French-Chinese political ties. This is specious reasoning. The French decision is an open betrayal of the basic principles guiding Sino-French diplomatic relations and a severe violation of the foundation of bilateral ties.

As the French have insisted on selling the aircraft to China's Taiwan province, the deal will threaten the balance of power across the Taiwan Straits. So how can such behavior be merely of an economic nature?

The French side has claimed a deterioration in bilateral trade and an unfavorable balance for the French side. But it is groundless to use the so-called unfavorable trade balance as an excuse to sell Taiwan aircraft. During the last 10 years, the trade growth rate between China and France has surpassed the average rate between China and other European Community nations. France's exports to China also exceeded the growth rate of bilateral trade.

The French side also said that its decision to sell Mirage jet-fighters to Taiwan was to save its domestic arms industry and relieve its unemployment. Such a statement is preposterous. How can one country go back on its promises and worsen its relations with another country just for the sake of saving an enterprise? How can other countries trust the French Government for doing so?

The French side also defended its decision by saying the Mirage fighters are only defensive and will not threaten Chinese mainland's security.

As we all know, the Mirage 2000-5 aircraft is an advanced plane equipped with a radar and missile system. Even its manufacturing company has called it an offensive fighter aircraft; so how is it that it would not threaten China's security?

As China has shown enormous market potential in its economic reform and opening to the outside world, the French Government's determination to serve its parochial interests will force it to eat the bitter fruit.

JAPAN

MITI To Control Exports of BW Products

*OW2812082392 Tokyo KYODO in English
0751 GMT 28 Dec 92*

[Text] Tokyo, Dec. 28 KYODO—Japan will regulate exports of germs and biotechnology-related equipment which can be used for production of biological weapons possibly effective from next month, government officials said Monday.

Exports of 72 items, including cholera germs and centrifuges, will be subject to the approval of the trade minister, said the officials of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

Japan has already controlled exports of materials and equipment which can be used for production of atomic and chemical weapons in accordance with agreements by the London Club to regulate exports of materials for atomic weapons and by the Australia Group to control products to be converted into chemical weapons, both consisting of more than 20 nations, the officials said.

With the export regulation on biological materials and equipment, Japan is to control all related products to be used for production of so-called "ABC" mass-destruction weapons, they said.

The move is in line with new guidelines agreed in mid-December by the Australia Group, they said.

Among bacteria involved are cholera germs, Japanese encephalitis viruses, plague bacilli, and yellow fever viruses.

Among related equipment involved are cultivation devices for ferments, freezers, driers, and microbe filters.

Exporters of these items will be required to specify ultimate users in destinations and gain the approval of original suppliers if they transfer the exports to other destinations, they said.

The nations of the Australia Group have decided to inform each other of any illegal sales of the products to areas of conflict so that the informed country can notify its exporters of the illegal sales.

Biological weapons can be produced more cheaply and easily than atomic arms so that even developing nations can possess them, the officials said.

Under such circumstances, measures have been urged to prevent the spread of biological weapons, they said.

Foreign Aid Linked to Halt of N-Arms Programs

*OW1401115193 Tokyo KYODO in English
1117 GMT 14 Jan 93*

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 14 KYODO—Japan may use its foreign aid program as diplomatic leverage to urge a halt to the alleged nuclear weapons development programs of Pakistan and India, government officials said Thursday.

The government will send Mitsuro Donowaki, Japan's ambassador for arms control and disarmament, to India and Pakistan in early February to urge the two to ink the 1968

nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), a treaty obligating its signatories to conduct nuclear disarmament, the officials said.

The Japanese emissary will tell the two countries that Tokyo may cut off its Official Development Assistance (ODA) unless they comply with requests to put a brake on their alleged nuclear weapons development programs, they said.

Both countries officially deny they have a nuclear weapons program.

The effort to persuade the two countries to scrap the programs stems from Japan's four policy guidelines of linking ODA to recipient nations' readiness to stop development and production of nuclear arms, along with other conditions qualifying them as recipients.

The government of Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa adopted the four guidelines last June, the three others being recipients' willingness to reduce high levels of military expenditure, to stop arms exports and imports, and to stop political repression.

Miyazawa urged both Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif to sign the NPT when they visited Tokyo last June and December, respectively.

Rao rejected the request, saying the NPT is unfair as it fails to obligate countries with nuclear weapons to scrap their existing arsenals.

Sharif also turned down Miyazawa's request, saying that should Pakistan join the NPT, it would be put at a strategic disadvantage as its rival India is not a signatory to the treaty.

However, both nations agreed to continue talks with Japan on the NPT matter, they said.

Japan gave New Delhi a total of 891 million dollars worth of ODA in 1991 alone. Tokyo expressed readiness to lend an additional 111.9 billion yen during Rao's visit.

Japan provided Islamabad with a total of 127 million dollars in ODA disbursement in 1991. During Sharif's visit, Miyazawa offered an additional 100 million dollars.

NORTH KOREA

Foreign Ministry Denies Possession of CWs

*SK1401233293 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting
Network in Korean 2210 GMT 14 Jan 93*

["Press Statement" by DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman issued in Pyongyang on 14 January—read by announcer]

[Text] The United States and the South Korean authorities—its followers, are attempting to fabricate various malicious smears and slanderous maneuvers in a bid to work out an excuse for resuming the Team Spirit joint military exercise.

The United States and the South Korean authorities, who were talking about our nuclear suspicions up to now, are raving about our nonexistent chemical weapons, thus provoking us.

On 9 January, the United States, bringing South Korea's foreign minister to the front, noted that we have the capability of producing so-called chemical weapons, that we have accumulated a certain quantity of materials for chemical weapons, and so forth. Thus, they groundlessly slandered us.

Such moves illustrate that the United States and the South Korean authorities are attempting to resume at last the Team Spirit joint military exercise in which various nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and other mass lethal weapons are to be mobilized, defying the unanimous opposition of the Korean people and the world.

The decision of the United States and the South Korean authorities to resume the Team Spirit joint military exercise, in which chemical weapons will be mobilized together with nuclear weapons, is an act of undisguised nuclear and chemical threat and menace [haekmitt hwahak wihyop konggal] against the Korean people. It is a criminal act of flagrantly infringing upon international laws.

The Korean peninsula was the place where biochemical weapons were used for the first time by the imperialists since World War II, and the Korean people directly suffered the calamity of biochemical weapons.

During the past Korean war, the United States and its stooges indiscriminately used biochemical weapons against our Republic and people, thus committing a barbarous act.

Because the United States and the South Korean authorities committed a criminal act of using chemical and biological weapons during the war, tens of thousands of innocent residents were mercilessly killed and injured and suffered severe pains caused by various infectious diseases including pests, cholera, and typhoid fever. We still remember this vividly.

This fact has also been proven by the report on the United States' crime on Korea prepared by the investigation team of the International Democratic Lawyers Association which directly confirmed the true aspect of the situation on the spots by visiting our country and announced this to the world.

Our people, who suffered the calamity of biochemical weapons, are making every effort to make the Korean peninsula a zone free from chemical and nuclear weapons.

The United States and the South Korean authorities are adhering to various maneuvers to again incur chemical calamity on the Korean people, however.

An enormous quantity of various chemical weapons are being produced and accumulated in poisonous gas plants which have been brought into South Korea from the United States. In addition, various types of chemical ammunitions have been deployed for a real war along the Military Demarcation Line.

In particular, the United States and the South Korean authorities are going to resume the Team Spirit joint military exercise, which is a combined cooperative exercise of nuclear-chemical weapons aimed at our country. This is a grave threat to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and is causing great worries of our people and the peace-loving people of the world.

Our nation has no chemical weapons from the outset. There is no change in the position of our Republic to oppose the development, production, storage and use of chemical weapons.

The United States and the South Korean authorities should abandon the Team Spirit joint military exercise, which is an attempt to drive the Korean people into the calamities of nuclear war and chemical war. They should join our sincere efforts to make the Korean peninsula a peace zone, free from nuclear and chemical weapons.

Commentary Supports Denial

SK1601031293 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0025 GMT 16 Jan 93

[NODONG SINMUN 16 January commentary: "New Anti-Republic Stratagem"]

[Text] The United States and the South Korean authorities who conduct anti-Republic commotions by babbling about our nuclear threat, are now criticizing us by raving about chemical weapons, which we do not have.

A few days ago, the United States made the South Korean foreign minister criticize us groundlessly on our supposedly being capable of producing chemical weapons and our supposed stockpile of a certain amount of materials for the production of chemical weapons. These moves show that the United States and the South Korean authorities are more persistently engaged in all sorts of vilification to open a new stage of anti-Republic commotions.

The innocence of our peaceful nuclear policy has been proven and acknowledged by the world's broad public circles and the so-called nuclear threat has been exposed thoroughly as a deceitful invention of the U.S. and South Korean authorities.

Under these circumstances, the U.S. and South Korean authorities are shamelessly inviting new suspicions of chemical weapons to make it an excuse for stepping up anti-Republic maneuvers. Needless to say, their attempt to fabricate the suspicion of chemical weapons in addition to the nuclear suspicion is motivated by their need to justify the resumption of the Team Spirit joint military exercise. These stratagem maneuvers of the U.S. and South Korean authorities only reveal their own crassness, however.

The United States is a criminal that committed chemical warfare in Korea. During the Korean war of aggression, the United States dropped infectious insects carrying such germs as pest, cholera, and typhus in the northern half of the Republic and used various germs and chemical weapons, cruelly killing many people. Everyone knows this as it was made public by the historical documents produced by the international investigation team. This barbaric act of chemical warfare by the United States cannot be erased from history. The world is well aware that the U.S. and South Korean authorities are pushing forward preparations to wage a new chemical war in Korea. The United States and the South Korean authorities do not deserve to criticize others with the issue of chemical weapons.

It is the consistent position of the government of our Republic to oppose the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. This position of the

government of our Republic reflects our people's aspiration for peace. Our people, who suffered the calamity of chemical warfare by the United States, are aware more than anyone else of the danger and disaster of chemical weapons. This is why our people invariably and resolutely oppose and reject all sorts of chemical weapons.

We keenly feel the need to ban chemical weapons, which are the weapons of cruel mass destruction, and consistently call for turning the Korean peninsula into a zone free from chemical weapons as well as nuclear weapons, and are making every effort to realize it. The United States and the South Korean authorities are engaged in all sorts of maneuvers to bring chemical calamity to the Korean people again, however.

In South Korea today, various types of chemical weapons are produced and stockpiled in enormous quantities in the poison gas plants brought from the United States. Chemical bombs [hwahak tan] of various types are deployed for actual combat purposes in the Military Demarcation Line area.

The stern reality is that it is not us but the U.S. and South Korean authorities who create the threat of chemical weapons in Korea. No matter how skillful the U.S. and South Korean authorities may be in reversing the right and the wrong, they can never falsify the truth of this reality.

The United States and the South Korean authorities should not clumsily attempt to blame others with the issue of chemical weapons but join our efforts to turn the Korean peninsula into a peace zone free from nuclear weapons and chemical weapons.

U.S., Russia Urged To Put Plutonium Under IAEA Watch

*SK2001051593 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0453 GMT 20 Jan 93*

["NODONG SINMUN on Unreasonable Act of U.S. and Russia in Disposal of Surplus Plutonium"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, January 20 (KCNA)—The United States and Russia are refusing international management of plutonium extracted from the nuclear warheads that are scrapped in accordance with the start and avoiding international control of its disposal. This is branded by NODONG SINMUN today as an unreasonable act causing deep apprehensions and uneasiness.

In a commentary headlined "Situation Causing Deep Concern," the analyst says:

If proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be checked, the United States and Russia must place the surplus plutonium under the management and control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

It is hardly understandable why the United States and Russia, the states with which the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is deposited and which should take the lead in checking the proliferation of nuclear arms, are refusing to cooperate with the IAEA in the control of surplus plutonium. We cannot but doubt their ulterior intention.

If the United States and Russia obstruct the work of the IAEA, abusing their privileged status of nuclear-weapon

states granted by the NPT, they will have to bear full responsibility for a possible collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation system.

Dual standards must never be allowed in the international organizations today when the democratization of international society is on the order of the day. The IAEA is no exception.

The IAEA should pay deep attention to the disposal of surplus plutonium and discharge its duty in dispelling deep apprehensions and uneasiness in the international community.

ROK Denial of Plutonium Production Rejected

*SK1401101093 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0441 GMT 14 Jan 93*

[Text] Pyongyang, January 14 (KCNA)—The South Korean authorities are planning to jointly produce with Britain plutonium which is used as a nuclear bomb-grade material, according to a foreign press report quoting THE NEW YORK TIMES. This is shown by the move of the South Korean authorities to make a contract with Britain for a co-production of plutonium, the paper said.

When THE NEW YORK TIMES report was published, the South Korean authorities denied it through a "Foreign Ministry spokesman", the report says.

The reaction of the South Korean authorities to the report of THE NEW YORK TIMES was a fit of those with a guilty conscience.

It is already an open secret that the South Korean authorities are engaged in the development of nuclear weapons.

The fact that their development of nuclear weapons was thus brought to light even by a U.S. paper tells that the criminal acts of the South Korean anti-national elements to violate and obliterate the joint declaration on denuclearisation and turn the Korean peninsula further into a hotbed of nuclear war have reached a very grave phase.

The 70 million fellow countrymen are watching with a high vigilance the treacherous moves of the South Korean authorities.

SOUTH KOREA

Neighbors' Aid Sought To Solve DPRK Nuclear Issue

*SK2001061493 Seoul YONHAP in English
0555 GMT 20 Jan 93*

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 20 (YONHAP)—South Korea will seek to solve the problem of North Korea's nuclear arms development with help from the four neighboring powers, the Foreign Ministry reported to President No Tae-u Wednesday.

The ministry said it would step up the Seoul-Washington alliance, consolidate Korea's friendship with Japan, substantiate good-neighborly relations with China and Russia, and try to solve the nuclear question with their help.

The government will also deal with the issue of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia within the current system propped up by the Korea-U.S. and U.S.-Japan defense pacts.

North's Nuclear Program, Japan's Policy Discussed

*SK1901034193 Seoul YONHAP in English
0241 GMT 19 Jan 93*

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 19 (YONHAP)—South Korea and Japan discussed nuclear conditions and policies at the Foreign Ministry Tuesday on the opening day of the joint nuclear consultative committee's third meeting.

They also will discuss joint reaction to North Korea's nuclear development program, expanded transfer of nuclear safety technologies, stronger nuclear diplomacy and Japan's acquisition of plutonium in the two-day meeting.

On Monday, at a working-level meeting, the two countries exchanged views on technological cooperation and the agenda.

Korea is represented by Cho Won-il, director-general of the ministry's International Economic Affairs Bureau, and Takaya Suto, ambassador in charge of science and technology, heads the Japanese side.

Concern About Japanese Plutonium Shipment Noted

*SK1901110993 Seoul YONHAP in English
1036 GMT 19 Jan 93*

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 19 (YONHAP)—South Korea and Japan on Tuesday discussed Japan's introduction of plutonium and the reported nuclear arms development by North Korea.

At the third Korea-Japan Atomic Energy Consultative Meeting held at the Foreign Ministry in Seoul, senior Korean delegate Cho Won-il, who is Foreign Ministry director-general for international economy, expressed concern about the introduction by Japan of a large amount of plutonium.

"Our government knows your country has been faithfully pursuing the peaceful use of atomic energy. But, as a neighboring country, we are concerned about safety during plutonium transportation," Cho said.

He expressed the hope that in the future, too, Japan will use atomic energy only for peaceful purposes in strict adherence to the three non-nuclear principles.

In response, chief Japanese delegate Takaya Suto, Foreign Ministry Science and Technology officer, said Japan is introducing 30 tons of plutonium from France and the United Kingdom.

Suto said, however, that since all of the 30 tons would be used only for purely economic and technical purposes, "concern about any long-term stockpiling of plutonium is totally unfounded."

He also said Japan undergoes strict nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). "We have 42 atomic power reactors in all or 10 percent of the world's total but 25 percent of IAEA inspections is directed toward Japan," suto said.

On North Korea's nuclear arms development issue, the Japanese official said his country would not make the on-going Japan-North Korea normalization talks progress at least until the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved.

TAIWAN

Nuclear Experts To Meet Chinese Counterparts

*OW1901100793 Taipei CNA in English 0807 GMT
19 Jan 93*

[Text] Taipei, Jan. 19 (CNA)—Republic of China [ROC] officials and nuclear specialists will meet their counterparts across the Taiwan Strait for a discussion on the feasibility of storing nuclear waste from Taiwan's nuclear power plants on the mainland.

The discussion is expected to be a centerpiece of the 1993 Chinese nuclear academic seminar, scheduled to be held March 4-5 in Beijing.

The Taiwan side will be represented by a delegation comprised of scholars from National Tsing Hua University, officials from the Taiwan Power Company, the Nuclear Energy Council of the Executive Yuan and representatives from the private Pacific Engineers & Construction Ltd. and the Ebasco-CTCI Corp.

Participants from Taiwan will also discuss the possible impact on Taiwan from the two nuclear power plants in the coastal areas of the Chinese Mainland—the Qinshan nuclear power plant in Zhejiang province and the Daya Bay nuclear power plant in Guangdong Province.

After the seminar, they will visit the Qinshan plant, 100-percent locally-developed plant, and Daya Bay plant, currently being built by French companies.

HUNGARY

Foreign Minister Notes Commitment to CW Ban

*LD1401161293 Budapest MTI in English
1212 GMT 14 Jan 93*

[Text] Paris, January 14 (MTI)—“Hungary is committed to the fastest possible implementation of this agreement, which bans the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and which provides for the destruction of existing arsenals,” said Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, after signing an international treaty banning chemical weapons, in Paris on Thursday.

Jeszenszky said that 1993 had begun particularly well for disarmament.

The Hungarian Government warmly welcomed the START-2 agreement signed recently and believed that both accords had been made possible by the deep on-going changes that were taking place in the world, mainly in Europe.

SLOVAKIA

Foreign Affairs Minister on Chemical Weapons

*AU2101185693 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
16 Jan 93 p 2*

[“j”]-signed report: “Slovakia Will Help With the Control”]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—Slovakia does not have any chemical weapons but is open to any inspection of its chemical factories, and its experts and resources are available for any monitoring of the compliance with the treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling, and the use of chemical arms, and demand for their destruction. Milan Knazko,

Slovak minister of foreign affairs and deputy prime minister, emphasized this at the news conference that took place approximately one hour after his return from Paris. [passage omitted]

During his meeting with Swedish CSCE Chairman Ugglas, the oft proposed direct military intervention in Bosnia and Hercegovina—which, according to Knazko, is a very risky business—was not discussed.

To the PRAVDA question of why the Slovak ambassador to Hungary, for instance, was not mentioned in the press release issued by the Slovak Government spokesman Bohus Geci last week, Knazko replied that this publication of the government approved proposals of ambassadorial appointments is not good because their actual appointment is not guaranteed: “Until the agreement from the appropriate state is obtained, it is not proper to say that a person will be an ambassador.” The candidacy of Rudolf Chmel (current CSFR ambassador) for the post of the Slovak ambassador to Budapest has not been approved by the government. Knazko emphasized that he, himself, considers Chmel a highly qualified diplomatic representative and values his recent work very highly.

YUGOSLAVIA

Protest on Serb Use of Poison Gas Reported

*LD2001212293 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 20 Jan 93*

[Text] According to a statement by the press centre of the army of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the aggressor has used poison gas on three occasions in the vicinity of Doboje and in Dobrinja. This has prompted Bosnia-Hercegovina Army Chief of Staff Sefer Halilovic to lodge a strong protest with the UN Protection Force as well as with Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen.

ALGERIA**Foreign Minister Voices 'Doubts' on CW Ban**

*LD1501112793 Algiers APS in English
1021 GMT 16 Jan 93*

[Text] Algiers, Jan 16 (APS)—More than 100 countries including Algeria signed the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons on the occasion of the second day of the conference held in the UNESCO headquarters in Paris and which ended Friday.

About 50 delegates representing countries that signed the treaty, took the floor and expressed satisfaction about "the historical importance", "the best landmark" which defines this agreement in the field of chemical disarmament, negotiated in a multilateral frame and providing for a system of control and verification qualified as "revolutionary".

Speaking on this occasion, the Algerian foreign minister, Lakhdar Brahimi, who chaired the Algerian delegation, after observing that Algeria "has brought its modest contribution in the elaboration of the convention" and that its "shares the opinion of delegations on the historical importance" of this treaty, expressed the hope to see the latter "give a major qualitative impulse" on the way of a global disarmament realizing thus "an authentic universal work assuming the same rights and imposing the same obligations and guaranteeing an equal security for all".

"Algeria also hopes that commitments of the convention in the field of cooperation and aid to developing countries will not remain vain promises", the minister underlined before dealing, in relation with this treaty, [with] the "fears" and "doubts" expressed by the Arab countries at the Paris conference in 1989 and the 47th session of the UN General Assembly.

"No one can ignore or neglect that in the Middle-East, he said, one country alone has an arsenal of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and that this country has adhered to no international treaty and persists in its refusal to submit its installations to any international control. This is a situation which the Arab countries can neither tolerate nor accept".

Noting that Arab countries be them present in the Paris conference or not, "are unanimously demand that at the level of their area the question of mass destruction weapons be the subject of a global approach", Lakhdar Brahimi expressed in conclusion the "firm and unequivocal support of Algeria to the constant position of the Arab countries and to the resolution of the Arab League (of September 1992) advocating a general disarmament in the Middle-East. [no closing quotation marks as received]

IRAN**Military Purchasing Agency Set Up in London**

*LD2001171693 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1635 GMT 20 Jan 93*

[By Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION defence correspondent]

[Text] Iran has set up an agency in London to buy military equipment as part of a multi-billion pound mission to

rebuild its war machine, it was reported today. FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL magazine said the agency was set up without the approval of the UK authorities. It was said to be operating from the same National Iranian Oil Company offices from which the Iranian military was evicted more than four years ago after Britain broke off diplomatic relations following an attack on a British tanker in the Gulf. According to FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, the agency—Aviation Technology Affairs [ATA]—had been established to buy aircraft spares and components for assembly in factories in Iran. The magazine said it had seen documents to the ATA from British companies bidding to supply military-related equipment.

Concern has been steadily mounting in the West about Iran's huge rearmament programme, which includes three submarines, fighter aircraft and tanks from Russia, and missiles from China. But the Foreign Office said it had no evidence that British export control regulations had been broken. "Any evidence of wrong-doing would be urgently investigated and, if appropriate, would be a matter for the courts," said a spokesman.

Commentary Welcomes Convention on Chemical Weapons

LD1401223793 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran in English 1930 GMT 14 Jan 93

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Paying attention to the horrible dimension of deployment of these weapons whose manufacture does not really need a very complicated technology the Islamic Republic of Iran has so far made many attempts to sign international agreements to prevent deployment and production of such weapons.

Unfortunately the Western states which in their vast propaganda announced their serious opposition to the production of these weapons in practice place main raw materials for the production of these weapons at the disposal of the buyers under agreements related to production of fertilizers, detergents, and insecticide.

Certainly signing of the agreement related to the control of sale and purchase as well as production of chemical weapons is a positive step.

More important than that is inspection and control by a special international council which can supervise destruction of the existing weapons and prevent probable production of such weapons in the future.

Until before the Iran-Iraq war the world public opinion knew little about the consequences of these weapons. But after the Iraqi regime used these Western-gifted chemical weapons against the Iranian soldiers in a vast level, the world people became somehow acquainted with the dangers and the horrible consequences of deployment of such weapons, through films and reports filed on the martyrs and injured of these criminal acts.

At any rate signing of the Paris convention related to the destruction of chemical weapons by the majority of the world countries indicates the firm will and the international tendency for preventing mass killing by deadly chemical weapons.

Biological weapons are no exception. With the destruction of chemical weapons within the next 10 years it is expected that with the termination of the cold war period the world of humanity will get rid of this serious threat.

It is in fact the aspirational will of the civilized man of today that the mass destruction weapons of any kind and title should be destroyed so that humanity can live in a community full of respect for others rights, peace and security for all.

IRAQ

Reports on U.S.-Targeted Facility Questioned

IAEA Denies Nuclear Plant Claim

*LD1801141793 Tehran IRNA in English
1350 GMT 18 Jan 93*

[Text] Vienna, Jan. 18, IRNA—The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said that the Zafaraniyah facility, 20 kilometres from Baghdad, which was targeted Sunday by United States cruise missiles was "not a nuclear reprocessing plant".

A spokesman for the IAEA Hans Meyer told IRNA Monday that the plant at Zafraniyah was a "precision machine fabricating factory".

After the Persian Gulf war Iraq had declared to the agency that it had been used for producing components for uranium enrichment.

IAEA teams visited the site several times and had access to the facility in the course of the agency's programme of 16 inspections of Iraq's nuclear capabilities.

Several components were removed by Agency inspectors from the plant, Meyer said. The facility was not destroyed by IAEA, however, and it was used to turn out machine components, the Agency spokesman added.

Further on Denial

*NC1701214893 Paris AFP in English
2140 GMT 17 Jan 93*

[Excerpt] Baghdad, Jan 17 (AFP) - Iraq said Sunday's U.S. cruise missile attack hit a mechanical engineering plant and not a nuclear facility as Washington claimed.

"It had been visited several times by U.N. inspectors and they know what it is," an Information Ministry spokesman said.

"It is not a nuclear site as Fitzwater claims. It is a mechanical engineering plant that manufactures moulds," said the spokesman. The spokesman invited foreign correspondents in Baghdad to visit the plant at midnight (2100 GMT). [passage omitted]

Said 'Industrial Center'

*NC1701212993 Paris AFP in English
2106 GMT 17 Jan 93*

[Excerpt] Vienna, Jan 17 (AFP)—The site targeted by Tomahawk cruise missiles in the U.S. raid on Baghdad on

Sunday was an industrial centre producing electrical components for the enrichment of uranium, David Kyd of the International Atomic Energy Agency said here.

The site is located in the southern suburbs of Baghdad about 20 kilometres (12 miles) from the city centre, Kyd said.

It is close to Tuwaytah, site of a uranium enrichment centre comprising two research reactors destroyed during the 1991 Gulf War. [passage omitted]

Information Ministry Rejects Reports

*NC1701212893 Paris AFP in English
2113 GMT 17 Jan 93*

[Text] Baghdad, Jan 17 (AFP)—Baghdad denied Sunday that the target of a U.S. cruise missile attack Sunday was a nuclear facility.

An Information Ministry spokesman said the factory was a mechanical engineering plant. He said it had been visited several times by U.N. inspectors "and they know what it is."

In Washington earlier, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said the raid had targeted a "nuclear fabricating plant."

Commentary on Allied Air Raids

*AU1901112993 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
19 Jan 93 p 4*

[Commentary by Lothar Ruehl: "Saddam Husayn Is Consistently Working on His Nuclear Bomb"]

[Text] Iraqi nuclear technology for nuclear armament is naturally a priority target of Western air raids but it is not easy to hit because the plants are widely ramified and often hidden in normal production facilities. While in 1982 the Israeli Air Force only had to destroy the French nuclear reactor of Osirak to smash the preliminary technical stage for the production of weapons-grade material and to delay the program by several years, it seems that since 1991 a more thorough destruction of the technical plants in Iraq has been necessary on a much broader basis.

The results of the international inspections since the end of the war, which continue to be only achieved at certain points, have clearly proven the secret nuclear armament, particularly the extensive production of centrifuges for the production of fissionable material by uranium enrichment.

Iraq violated the nonproliferation agreement in a large-scale covert action. Before the beginning of the Gulf war, it had gained some grams of plutonium in its IRT-5000 research reactor from the reprocessing of nuclear fuel rods. This did not suffice for the construction of a nuclear weapon, but permitted the conclusion that in about three years some simple nuclear explosives might be produced. According to the inspectors' observations, the development of the technology for the production of operational explosives for bombers had also been initiated.

Since that time, both technical developments have advanced in Iraq. The establishment of a centrifugal plant was planned for 1992 and a second, five times larger one for 1996. A reprocessing plant for the production of material for uranium enrichment has been established in Mosul.

According to the findings of the IAEA, the technology of centrifugal enrichment has been developed into the central pillar of Iraqi nuclear armament since the 80's, although the necessary mass production of high-quality centrifuges has been delayed. Nevertheless, the inspectors ascertained that about 25,000 ring magnets had been procured for this technology in Iraq.

The necessary experiments for arms production had been initiated parallel to the preparations for the production of nuclear explosives. These technical sectors belong to the fields of electronics, metallurgy, and chemistry for the construction of chemical fuses. At the same time, physical experiments had been initiated in the field of hydrodynamics. The Iraqi armament program hid all these processes in various industrial plants if the secret facilities were not separately established.

In the summer of 1991 the World Security Council and the IAEA general conference formally condemned Iraq for the violation of the nonproliferation treaty. On that basis the United Nations has continued to pressurize Baghdad since that time to strictly fulfill the conditions of the armistice of April 1991 and to eliminate all components of nuclear armament.

The endless discussions on the matter illustrate the difficulties of the international verification and implementation of the compliance with the treaty in a country where civilian and military, nuclear and conventional technology is distributed over a large area in the industrial and research facilities, fanned out in industrial branches, and, at the same time, connected in a hidden network.

The allied air raids on "machine factories," as they are called in Baghdad, have not necessarily missed their targets because in some cases they were "normal" machine production plants. There are probably altogether several dozen production facilities that are actually part of a nuclear armament complex and an even larger number that indirectly do the preliminary work for it. Air raids on an even larger scale, including on Iraqi industry, remain as the only technical means if Iraq prevents controls.

All other political or military reasons aside, it is still necessary to definitively deprive a state like Iraq of the capability for nuclear armament and the production of chemical weapons.

ISRAEL

Technology Transfers Pose Obstacle to U.S. Ties

TA1901121093 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
19 Jan 93 p B1

[Commentary by Aluf Ben: "Humiliating Terms"]

[Text] The issue of the transfer of sophisticated technology and its supervision continues to pose an obstacle to defense ties with the United States. Before the U.S. presidential elections, senior U.S. officials made an abundance of promises to Israel, quite unlike anything before. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney announced that he would give Israel the status of a NATO member for receiving U.S. military technology, and Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger promised to make it easier for Israel to get access to sensitive technology kept from it in the past.

The defense establishment expressed great satisfaction with the promises, but the joy was short lived. In the second half of November, two weeks after the U.S. presidential elections, the regular strategic meeting with the Americans was held in Israel, and this time the Americans spoke differently. Administration officials made it clear that the technology would be transferred to Israel only if it agrees to tighter American supervision of defense exports. It was decided to set up a joint working group to consolidate new rules for the transfer of technology.

The Americans did not drop their suspicions that Israel had transferred sensitive technology it had received from the United States to banned countries, such as South Africa and China (as claimed in foreign reports). The crisis that erupted last March over the report by State Department Inspector General Sherman Funk, who accused Israel of stealing American technology, and over the suspicions that Israel sold Patriot missile secrets to China has still not abated. The outgoing CIA chief recently recalled that the Israelis are still not off the hook on the Patriot affair, although the American delegation sent to investigate the matter did not turn up anything.

Washington drew conclusions from the Funk report, which led to the dismissal of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Clarke, claiming that he had ignored Israeli deviations and was generous in approving requests for advanced technologies. His heirs preferred not to take risks and have gone by the book.

This is how export permits for a vital component of the Arrow missile Israel Aircraft Industries [IAI] had procured from the United States were held up for about six months. The foot-dragging caused a delay of several weeks in the missile's launch. We should recall that the vital component was meant for a project being developed with American funding and for the Pentagon, not for export. Israeli sources believe that the Americans were concerned about the use Israel would make of the vital component's technology. They said the State Department is also holding up Israeli export requests for other, less sensitive parts.

There are those who view the pressure for supervision of Israeli exports as an expression of the desire by U.S. military industries to eliminate competitors for Third World markets. "If we put all our exports under American supervision, we will have to get rid of two-thirds of those employed in the military industries, because there will be no exports," senior defense sources said. But the problem is not only commercial. American supervision might force Israel to divulge development plans it wants to keep secret to permit it to enjoy exclusive technology and components.

One of the strong cards the United States holds in the technology game is Israel's membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Israel joined the MTCR in October 1991 in a bilateral agreement with the United States, after the Americans threatened to impose sanctions on the IAI. They claimed (according to Western reports) that they have evidence that the IAI provided missile technology to South Africa. The defense establishment is convinced that there was no choice but to sign the accord and save Israel's biggest defense industry from annihilation.

Israel could have presented its participation in the MTCR as a contribution to an international mechanism to limit the dissemination of ballistic weapons, especially in the wake of the Gulf war. Instead, it acted like a thief caught in the act. The defense establishment tried to put a clamp on reports of Israel's joining the MTCR, and no official Israeli spokesman said anything on the subject, although there was no basis to the charges at the time that the agreement was signed. De Klerk's new South Africa is busy with the transfer of power to the blacks and not with the development of ballistic missiles. Israeli arms exports to Pretoria have dropped to almost nil.

The Americans dictated humiliating terms: Israel received the status of "an adherent state," one which obeys all the restrictions imposed by the supervision but is inferior in status to full MTCR members, which are permitted to exchange information and technology. In this way, the Israeli missile and remote-piloted vehicles industry, which depends on the goodwill of officials in Washington, was doomed to technological strangulation. Tightening the MTCR's supervisory regulations in early January increased the pressure on Israeli industry.

In talks with administration officials, Israelis raised the issue of membership in the MTCR. They were informed that the United States would not support it, and Israel refrained from presenting an official request. American officials say that "in the final analysis," Israel will be accepted as a full member, but first it must be on good behavior.

The defense dialogue with the United States will be resumed in the coming weeks, with the change of administration. The defense establishment knows that Israel will be called on to make concessions in order to receive the advanced technology and maintain the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] qualitative edge; however, it must demand a fair deal from the Americans. An expression of that can be American support of Israeli membership in the club of missile technology owners, which is vital for the continued existence of a crucial aspect of the defense industries, which has become even more important since the Gulf war.

Peres To Allow Inspection of Nuclear, Other Facilities

TA1301203893 Jerusalem Israel Television Network in Hebrew 1900 GMT 13 Jan 93

[Excerpts] A few minutes ago, we received the following report from Paris: Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres said in Paris today that Israel will be willing to open its nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities for inspection by Arab countries once a Middle East peace agreement is signed.

Peres is in Paris to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention, which forbids using, stationing, exporting, and stockpiling chemical weapons, and which will be signed by 115 countries. During his stay in Paris, the foreign minister will meet UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, the U.S. secretary of state, and the foreign ministers of France and Germany. Our correspondent Yo'av Tocker reports from Paris:

[Begin recording] [Passage omitted] Mr. Peres met UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali for a discussion that was at least scheduled to deal with the issue of the deportees. [passage omitted]

The UN secretary general refused to comment on the events in Iraq, and the festive ceremony in Paris in which the Chemical Weapons Convention was signed just two hours ago, seems a little removed from today's events.

[Peres, in English from the podium of the Paris conference] Mr. President. In the spirit of the global pursuit of general and complete disarmament, and the establishment of a regional and global arms-control regime, Israel suggests to all the countries of the region to construct a mutually verifiable zone, free of surface-to-surface missiles, and of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. [end recording]

Rabin Warns Iran Could Obtain N-Arms in 10 Years

TA2001152993 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew 1500 GMT 20 Jan 93

[Text] Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin disclosed in the Knesset today that Iran and several other countries in the Middle East have been engaged in an effort to develop a long-range missile which would enable Iran to hit Israel and even more distant countries. The prime minister estimated that the development process would take five to 10 years, and noted that North Korea has put missile technology at Iran's disposal. Mr. Rabin called for international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction.

Our correspondent Yo'el Nir reports that the prime minister was replying to a motion to the agenda raised by Efrayim Sne dealing with Iran's nuclear arms development. The prime minister assessed that the Iranians have the qualified manpower and resources to enable it to attain nuclear weapons within 10 years or less.

PAKISTAN

Regime Not To Scrap Karachi Nuclear Plant

BK1501152993 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 15 Jan 93 p 12

[Article by Aroosa Alam: "'KANUPP Safe Operation' Project Okayed"]

[Text] Islamabad, Jan 14—After prolonged and intense argument between two schools of thought within the bureaucracy, the government has finally rejected the idea of "mothballing" KANUPP [Karachi Nuclear Power Plant], the only nuclear power reactor in the Muslim World and has decided instead to enhance the life of the reactor. THE MUSLIM has learnt that the government has finally okayed the project "Safe Operation of KANUPP" prepared by the PAEC [Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission] some two years back. The project was held back as some quarters were reported to be advocating that this "obsolete" plant should be closed.

According to details, the main argument advanced by the critics of the project was that the government had no resources to arrange Rs. 853.5 million required for modernisation of the reactor.

However, keeping in view the pivotal role of the KANUPP in development of nuclear technology in the country, the project has now been cleared by the Cabinet Committee on Energy. The Finance Ministry, it is learnt, has been directed

to release Rs. 154 million required for 1992-93 for the project, which is to spread over six years. Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz has already issued instructions for early release of the money so the modernisation work is taken in hand without any further delay. For subsequent years, the PAEC would submit its annual requirements of funds to Finance Division which would be taken care of in the ADPs [Annual Development Program].

The issue of tariff rate for the electricity produced by the KANUPP has also been resolved. It has been decided that KANUPP would be paid by KESC [Karachi Electric Supply Corporation] on the basis of the average unsubsidized power generating cost of all the KESC units w.e.f., July 1, 1992. The cost works out to be 108.75 paisah [words indistinct] for the year 1992.

The revenues arising from the difference between the revised rates and the current rates would be kept in a separate fund after meeting essential requirement of rehabilitation to maintain target availability.

The reserves of this fund would be used for implementation of "Safe Operation of KANUPP [SOK]." Additional amounts required to meet the SOK commitments would be met through allocation in ADP.

It is further learnt that Canadians, who had withdrawn their cooperation for KANUPP (supplied by them in 1973), have indicated their willingness to help Pakistan modernise the plant.

Experts said the enhanced life of KANUPP will have multiple impact on the country's nuclear power programme. They say it is in the national interest to keep KANUPP operating to maintain a continuity to the next generation of power plants. The mode of KANUPP, they say, is not limited to energy generation but it is playing a pivotal role in the development of nuclear power programme of the country. KANUPP is also serving as a ground for imparting training to nuclear experts.

According to the reliable information, the TECHNICAL COMMITTEE earlier had strongly recommended to the government that the plant which is based on old technology should be shut down and decommissioned, unmindful of the fact that the decommissioning of a nuclear power station is an experimentation which has not so far been applied anywhere in the world. Even India has not decommissioned any of its plants although performance-wise some of its reactors are inferior to KANUPP. These include RAPP-I [India's Rajasthan Atomic Power Project].

Pakistan is buying a 300-mw nuclear power reactor from China which is expected to go into operation in 1999. Mothballing KANUPP would have jeopardized the future of this plant as well as the country's ability to run a nuclear power programme would have been put into serious doubt [sentence as received].

Finally the cost of decommissioning was started to be double the cost of its modernisation project. The decommissioning was estimated to cost Rs. 1700 million against Rs. 853 to save KANUPP operation.

Observers say that indigenisation is the keystone of one nuclear power programme and KANUPP is one major window for acquiring from the West the technology

required to build nuclear power plants in the country. KANUPP is also serving as a ground for imparting training to nuclear experts who are an asset for the country.

Editorial Criticizes Signing of CW Convention

BK1701134093 Islamabad THE PAKISTAN OBSERVER
in English 17 Jan 93 p 6

[Editorial: "Pakistan Trapped"]

[Text] Representatives of 120 countries gathered in Paris to approve the Chemical Weapons convention and sign documents banning the use, production and stockpiling of chemical arms. Most of the Arab countries refused to sign the document on the plea that they were not really against it but saw no point in endorsing a ban on chemical weapons as long as Israel refuses to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. Representatives of Jordan, Kuwait and Yemen were not present on the second day of the eight-day ceremony and Libya which had earlier taken up the stand that it would approve the accord finally decided to abstain. Iraq which also had chemical weapons did not respond to the invitation to sign the treaty. Pakistan thought it fit to sign the convention, however. The result of signing this convention was disclosed by this newspaper long ago and it was asserted that what the non-signing of the NPT could not achieve would be obtained by this convention to which, unfortunately, Pakistan has now become a signatory. It is a matter of deep regret that Pakistan should succumb to such pressures and agree to open its facilities to inspection since the convention makes it mandatory that the member states would agree to the inspection and scrutiny of their installations. This becomes more horrendous when considered that the technology pressed into service to check chemical weapons installations were the same which were used to locate nuclear facilities.

We had said it earlier and would reiterate that we are unable to support such a proposition. Under the convention any country can complain that another country possessed chemical weapons facilities and the country complained against would have to open up its facilities not within days, but within hours. India's case is entirely different since it is acknowledged that it is a nuclear state having exploded the weapon in 1974. So far Pakistan has resisted any attempt to allow inspection of its facilities. The signing of the convention by Pakistan would nullify the consistent policy of Pakistan which was related to its own sensibilities regarding its independence and sovereignty. It is a matter of deep regret that in spite of consistent press reports on this grave issue the matter was not discussed in parliament.

The Foreign Office owes an explanation to the public why it decided to tread such a dangerous path which impinges on the sovereignty and security of the country.

'Sabotage' of PRC-Aided Atomic Plant Denied

BK2101135193 Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 20 Jan 93 p 4

[Text] Islamabad—A spokesman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) has termed as incorrect, says a press release. [sentence as published]

In a statement here, the spokesman said that there was no truth whatsoever in the claim allegedly made in the report about moves in certain circles to sabotage the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant.

The work on construction of the plant has already commenced in right earnest by the Chinese scientists, engineers, and technicians who are being actively assisted by the PAEC counterparts, the spokesman emphasized.

He said that the contract for acquisition of the plant was signed by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the China National Nuclear Corporation on December 31, 1991 after obtaining the necessary approval.

He said the signing of the contract was effected after prolonged negotiations between the two sides which fully took onto account all aspects of the project including technical and financial.

Referring to the cost of the project, the spokesman emphatically said that it was absolutely competitive and economical.

He said the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was receiving unstinted support from the prime minister's secretariat, ministries of finance, planning and development and other concerned agencies for the implementation of this vital project. He said that all-out efforts were being made to ensure completion of the project within the laid down schedule.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

Reports on Minsk Summit on Strategic Forces

Expected To Settle Problems

LD2001185293 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1620 GMT 20 Jan 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Minsk January 20 TASS—The CIS summit in Minsk is expected to strictly determine the composition of strategic forces of the Commonwealth so that to avoid any misunderstanding between the interested parties, according to Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the Council of Defence Ministers of the Commonwealth.

He explained that earlier the composition of strategic forces was rather vaguely defined and included units of practically all arms of the armed forces, excluding ground troops.

This caused difficulties for CIS states in determining the concrete and acceptable list of units to be transferred to the strategic force, he told TASS on Wednesday.

The CIS Main Command now agreed with most national Defence Ministries that the strategic forces will include units and objects possessing and storing strategic nuclear weapons and units servicing them, he explained.

This concerns strategic nuclear missile, naval and air forces, certain anti-aircraft units, reconnaissance and technical services, according to Ivashov.

Each CIS state will independently determine the list of strategic units deployed on its territory and sign it with the CIS commander-in-chief, he added.

Ivashov does not believe that the new procedure will eliminate all differences among members of the CIS "Nuclear Club", but said it would open better possibilities for their solution at bilateral talks.

"Apart from Russia, no other nuclear CIS state can provide proper safety and technical maintenance for nuclear warheads", he stressed, adding that this forced Ukraine to accept Russian nuclear safety guarantees.

The joint decision of the Russian and Ukrainian president on strategic forces may serve as an example of eliminating contradictions among other CIS nuclear states, Ivashov believes.

The CIS summit in Minsk is also expected to consider provisions for the Council of CIS Defence Ministers, discuss measures to stabilise the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev suggested to include the issue of the CIS unified armed forces into the agenda and commander-in-chief Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov has already prepared his address to the summit, Ivashov disclosed.

"We hope that heads of state will at least adopt a protocol decision which would oblige heads of government and the Council of Defence Ministers to pay more attention to the defence of the Commonwealth. We have lost a lot in the sphere and we have found little new", he stressed.

The Council of Defence Ministers will meet in Minsk on Thursday to discuss the duties of deputies of the CIS commander-in-chief, social and legal guarantees of military observers and peace-keepers, as well as the plan of the council's work in 1993. "No sensations are expected", according to Ivashov.

Shaposhnikov Interviewed

OW2101130993 Moscow *INTERFAX in English* 1254 GMT 21 Jan 93

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The main purpose of the meeting of CIS Defence Ministers on Minsk on Thursday [21 January] is to finally decide the future of the Strategic Nuclear Force stationed on the territories of four former Soviet Republics. The statement was made by the commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, in an interview with *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*.

Though Ukraine has declared its intention to become a nuclear-free state, he said, it has decided to set up its own nuclear arms control center, and claimed to be the owner of the nuclear weapons on its territory.

Russia believes that the international agreements accepted by the CIS are an indication of the Russian ownership of the nuclear weapons. The viewpoint is shared by Belarus, and Kazakhstan is also about the accept it.

The marshal stressed that Ukraine does not have the appropriate mechanisms of nuclear arms control. Russia and Ukraine have approached a constructive solution to the problem. The two governments have received instructions to begin talks on the terms of dismantlement and transportation of nuclear ammunition and air defence complexes stationed in Ukraine.

Among the other subjects that might be discussed in Minsk, the Marshal singled out the ratification and implementation of the collective security treaty signed by six CIS countries, as well as the use of Russian troops as peace-keepers in the hot spots of the former USSR.

Further on Interview

MK2101163793 Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian* 21 Jan 93 p 2

[Interview with Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, by Vadim Solovyev on 20 January under "Carte Blanche" rubric; place not given: "CIS Joint Armed Forces Commander in Chief Gathers Together 'Nuclear Club.' Differences Between Russia and Ukraine Remain"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] A session of the Commonwealth "nuclear club" will be held 21 January in Minsk within the framework of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers. *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*'s military observer, Vadim Solovyev, met with Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, the day before.

[Shaposhnikov] When speaking about the "nuclear club" of nuclear states and the CIS one must clarify that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine cannot be described as nuclear

states, but states on whose territory nuclear weapons are sited. Russia is a nuclear state and has inherited that status from the USSR and will retain it in accordance with agreements adopted by the CIS.

The main purpose of the CIS defense ministers' meeting this time is to finally determine their position on the Strategic Nuclear Forces. The point is that the documents, which were signed at summit level within the CIS before all the Commonwealth states decided to set up their own armies, stipulate that the Strategic Forces comprise the Strategic Rocket forces, the Navy, the Air Forces, Military Transport Aviation, the Airborne Troops, and other components. Once the former USSR's Armed Forces had been divided up the CIS states formed their own ground forces, naval forces, air defense, air force, and so on. Naturally, the composition of the Strategic Forces must be brought into line with the actual state of affairs. I intend to raise the question that it is primarily the Strategic Nuclear Forces and the units providing direct support for them that should be ranked among the Strategic Nuclear Forces. The Commonwealth defense ministers, above all those who have nuclear weapons on their territory, agree with this idea.

The question of the composition of the Strategic Forces is still not entirely clear given the new, present-day realities within the Commonwealth. But there is a policy to which it is, in my view, necessary to adhere. We must above all proceed from the premise that the leaders of the independent states stated on forming the Commonwealth that they favor a single military-strategic area, joint command, and centralized control over nuclear weapons. This was subsequently enshrined in the Alma-Ata (21 December 1991) and Minsk (30 December 1991) agreements. These stipulate that nuclear arms ensure the security of all parties to the Commonwealth and that the CIS states will coordinate their nuclear policy. A mechanism was worked out for decisions to be adopted regarding the use or nonuse of nuclear weapons with the participation of the four states' leaders and the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. Corresponding structures were set up in accordance with these agreements, in particular, to command the strategic forces and coordinate nuclear policy.

But the future of the nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was not clear enough owing to the lack of certainty regarding the state to which these weapons belong. None of the documents hitherto adopted by the CIS has determined this point.

An important step toward resolving this problem was the signing of the Lisbon Protocol to the START Treaty by the four states and the United States, whereby Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan became parties to the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and at the same time pledged to subscribe to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear-free states. I must stress that under the Lisbon Protocol the words in the START Treaty "national territory" mean the sum total of the territories of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Of course, this presupposes the existence of joint command of the Strategic Forces. What is more the Lisbon Protocol envisages that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine will conclude bilateral treaties with Russia on all issues pertaining to strategic

offensive arms and to the procedure for the practical implementation of the Lisbon Protocol. Talks on these matters have already begun. They are proceeding with a fair amount of difficulty.

The key differences in the sides' positions can be briefly set out as follows.

Ukraine has officially stated its commitment to nuclear-free status, but has, at the same time, decided to set up its own Nuclear Weapons Administrative Command Center on its territory and has adopted a decision regarding ownership rights in respect of these weapons. Russia emphasizes Russian state ownership of the nuclear weapons stemming from the international treaties and agreements adopted by the CIS. Belarus is in agreement and assigns the High Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces operational command of the Strategic Nuclear Forces stationed on its territory until they are completely removed. Kazakhstan's stance is also close to that.

Thus, none of the CIS states is restricting the rights and duties of the High Command insofar as operational control of the Strategic Nuclear Forces is concerned. But this is the main issue today because Belarus has effectively renounced its nuclear status and Kazakhstan has already ratified the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol, yet on Ukrainian territory it looks as though there are no adequate mechanisms to enable me as commander of the Strategic Nuclear Forces to exercise that command and organize and supervise inspection and maintenance work, measures to ensure nuclear safety, technical supervision, and so on.

In view of the fact that, according to the spirit and letter of the Lisbon Protocol, all nuclear weapons in what was the USSR are Russian, naturally Russian structures should perform the entire material and technical side of these functions.

We are today close to reaching a constructive solution to this issue. The Russian president has stated Russia's readiness, prior to Ukraine's ratification of the START I Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to provide Ukraine with guarantees of its security which will come into force once Ukraine has ratified these documents. For safety purposes Ukraine and Russia have agreed that Russia will carry out material and technical support functions and will effect guaranteed and inventor's supervision of the operation of the missile complexes [garantiyniy i avtorskiy nadzor za ekspluatatsiyei raketnykh kompleksov so storony Rossii]. This is precisely what is needed, because neither Ukraine, Belarus, nor Kazakhstan has the resources to perform this work. The Russian and Ukrainian Governments have been tasked with drafting agreements within a month to ensure the implementation of these accords.

Of equal importance is the fact that the Russian and Ukrainian presidents have instructed their governments to immediately begin talks on settling all matters pertaining to the implementation of the START treaties, including those pertaining to the conditions for the dismantling, transportation, and destruction of the nuclear munitions and missile complex elements stationed in Ukraine (including the processing of the nuclear components and their subsequent use as fuel for nuclear electric power stations).

Another tough problem to be examined at the meeting in Minsk concerns measures aimed at ensuring that the Collective Security Treaty signed in Tashkent 15 May comes into effect. Under this treaty the six CIS states pledged to develop collective defense. In effect, this presupposes a qualitatively new level of cooperation, one that ensures the maximum return with minimum expenditure and guarantees legal and social protection for servicemen coordinated within the treaty framework. Regrettably, the treaty has not so far been ratified by all the states. I want to raise this question with the heads of state.

Problems associated with the use of peacekeeping forces in various regions will also be discussed. At present only Russian troops are acting as peacekeepers. Some people have tried to use that to insinuate that Russia is taking "imperial" steps. That is totally incorrect and unjust. It is very important to ensure joint participation in peacekeeping actions in practice, however. The "hot spots" represent a problem for us all. And we must overcome them together.

Report on Talks

*OW2101195493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1917 GMT 21 Jan 93*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The CIS nuclear policy committee, (including representatives from Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus) on Thursday [21 Jan] held a meeting in Minsk. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev reportedly did not attend it "on account of illness," being replaced by one of the ministry's senior officials.

Belarusian Defense Minister Pavel Kozlovskiy told INTERFAX after the meeting that "there are no disagreements between Minsk and Moscow on strategic armaments." "Our positions are identical," he added.

He said military experts will be working on amendments to the agreement on strategic forces until the morning of January 22. The amendments will then be considered the same day by the CIS summit. Some of the republics demand that the list of units classified as belonging to strategic forces be reduced.

Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, told INTERFAX the meeting participants agreed on most points but "complete agreement was not yet reached." The marshal hopes, however, that this will happen eventually. "In any case, the definitive decision will be made by the heads of state," however, he said.

RUSSIA

Report Notes Disarmament Talks With Spain

*LD1901092693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0810 GMT
19 Jan 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Shekhovtsov]

[Text] Madrid January 19 TASS—The first Russo-Spanish consultations on disarmament matters at deputy foreign ministers' level have ended here.

"We informed the Spanish side about the START-2 Treaty and discussed a number of topical international problems

such as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a ban on chemical weapons, and possible areas for cooperation between Spain and Russia, and other matters," Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov told ITAR-TASS.

"In particular, the Spanish side raises the question of its participation as a full member in the Geneva conference on disarmament. We support Spain's intention and consider that its joining the Geneva forum would be quite useful from the viewpoint of the country's growing role and prestige in the international arena.

"The exchange of views has shown that Russia's and Spain's positions on disarmament problems and on a ban on nuclear weapon tests are very close," Berdennikov said.

"Spain favours a ratification of the START-1 Treaty by Belarus and Ukraine without delay and the accession of these two countries and Kazakhstan as non-nuclear states to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons," the Russian deputy foreign minister pointed out.

Taking part in the consultations from the Spanish side was Deputy Foreign Minister Maximo Cajal.

Yeltsin Issues Order on Missile Technology Exports

*OW1501093793 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1700 GMT 14 Jan 93*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian president issued an order (N 20-RP of 11.01.93) confirming the list of equipment, materials and technology used in building missiles, whose export shall be regulated and licensed. The list includes rocket systems, and ballistic missiles, able to carry warheads weighing over 500 kg for a distance of more than 300 kilometers, parts of these systems, ability to produce the missiles, technology, and materials.

Measures Urged Against Illegal Biotxin Exports

*934P0056A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 50, 13-20 Dec 92 p 9*

[Article by Rustam Narzikulov: "Implications: Biological Bomb Under Dirty Fingernails"]

[Text] Russia is preparing for the legal export of microorganisms which could be used in the development of bacteriological weapons. Such is the meaning of a resolution, signed by Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar, with a long title which may possibly not be clear to a non-specialist: "On the Approval and Submission for Endorsement by the President of the Russian Federation of the List of the Pathogens of Diseases, Genetically Modified Forms and Fragments of Genetic Material Which May Be Used in the Development of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and the Export of Which Is Carried Out Under Licenses."

The list presented by Gaydar contains 50 microorganisms which, in the view of the Interdepartmental Commission for Export Control, are likely to be licensed for export. On the first reading of the resolution, one feels terror-stricken—how is it possible to speak about the commercial export of yellow fever, anthrax or gas gangrene pathogens

and, with bureaucratic cynicism, to award a commodity nomenclature code to each of them?

Yuri Buikin, deputy head of the Department of Non-Tariff Regulation Over Foreign Economic Activities at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, was anxious to dispel my doubts. Judging by what he said, the government's resolution was in keeping with the demands of the world community and international agreements on the non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons. The monitoring of compliance with these agreements has been entrusted to the so-called Club of Australia, with a membership of 32 countries. The Club has drawn up special lists and procedures for control over the export of dual-purpose microorganisms. These are pathogens which, on the one hand, are used for the cultivation of anti-infection serums and, on the other, may be used in the production of biological weapons.

It is impossible to ban the export of microorganisms altogether, since they are indispensable for normal scientific contacts and the fight against diseases. According to Yuri Buikin, it was the ban on the exchange of scientific achievements with foreign colleagues that was one of the main hindrances to the development of biology in the former USSR. Therefore, legalizing the export of microorganisms opens up the possibility both to spread scientific information and to join the Club of Australia. The only requirement of the exporter is to present to the official agencies an application, a signed contract and guarantees from the government of the importing state that it will not permit the use of bacteria and viruses for military purposes or their reexport to third countries. Thus, it would seem, a reliable barrier to the spread of biological weapons has been erected in Russia.

This view has been disputed by another authoritative expert—Kakha Bendukidze, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bio-process joint-stock company. As he sees it, the Russian government's resolution was adopted chiefly to soothe world opinion, but does not solve the main problem—control over the illegal export of microorganisms. In a talk with me, Kakha Bendukidze said that it is always possible to take out, as he put it, "a bit of genetic material" in a capsule one-hundredth of a millimeter in diameter. This quantity would be enough to launch the production of biological or toxic weapons.

To prove his case, he cited two glaring examples of the theft of microorganisms. Penicillin was once taken out of an American plant by a member of a Soviet delegation which was on tour there. The resourceful Soviet citizen simply scratched the equipment at the plant with his fingernails and did not cut them until he arrived back in the USSR. Penicillin was thus taken out under the engineer's fingernails. Another example, which is widely known in the scientific world, is the theft of a virus by the editor of a biological magazine. Some young scientists sent an article to this publication with a description of a virus they had discovered, but were reluctant to enclose a sample. The editor was aware that the scientists, being poor, were typing their articles right in the laboratory and thus there was the probability of the virus getting on paper. He put the article into a salt solution and became the owner of someone else's discovery. According to Bendukidze, the list of such instances could go on.

Thus, Russia, having accepted the rules of civilized control over the export of microorganisms, is still not in a position to rule out the leakage of the pathogens. As a matter of fact, the Russian authorities are not to blame for this, inasmuch as it is already a technical, not a political, problem.

Investigators Target Sale of Radioactive Materials

93WN0221B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Dec 92
Morning Edition p 7

[Article by Lidiya Ivchenko: "Radioactive Through Their Own Negligence"]

[Text] "In the cities of Izhevsk and Glazov, security agencies and units of the State Sanitation and Epidemiological Inspectorate confiscated from private individuals nearly 95 kilograms of uranium-238 that had been stolen from the Chepetskiy Mechanical Plant. Measures are being taken to establish the identity of persons who came into contact with the uranium and to set up medical observation." "While conducting a gamma-radiation survey of Barnaul, employees of the Berezovskgeologiya enterprise discovered a source of radioactivity in the form of reflecting markers, emitting a dose of 35,500 of microroentgens per hour, on a Moskvich automobile, No. 1773 AB."

The Russian Federation Sanitation and Epidemiological Committee receives reports like this by the dozen. In one place, a school was contaminated by gifts presented by a sponsoring enterprise—instruments that contained sources of radioactivity. In another place, reflecting identification markers on trucks bought from a military unit "glow" in such a way that measuring instruments go off the scale. Through ignorance and negligence, people are adding new contamination sites to the radioactive anomalies present in all major cities and vacation areas, and it sometimes takes a considerable amount of time and a lot of money to clean them up.

"First of all, there exists natural radiation, which scientists are studying," said G. Perminova, chief of the State Sanitation and Epidemiological Committee's radiation safety department. "It has been noted, for example, that background gamma radiation is higher in areas of oil extraction and near oil storage facilities, where radon emerges from the earth's depths along with the oil. The mechanism of radon emission and its accumulation in residential buildings has not yet been studied. Natural radioactivity is present in certain construction materials, and we therefore require that enterprises that mine such materials check them for radioactivity. But unpredictable, spontaneous sources often appear. The system for burying radioactive wastes came about long after people started working with such substances. No longer usable instruments that contain sources of radioactivity have been discarded in basements or right on the grounds of enterprises or research institutes. In some instances, they have been pilfered on account of the presence of some sort of valuable components."

In Moscow, trash dumps containing sources of radioactivity were found on Baltiiskaya Street, where an institute was once located, on Festivalnaya Street, near the 1905 Street subway station, and on the grounds of several enterprises—more than 100 contamination sites! Urgent measures were taken immediately. The areas were decontaminated by a special unit of the Radon Combine. Now there are only a

few such local sites of radioactive contamination—the most “innocuous ones”—and they are being cleaned up as well.

With systematic, well-organized monitoring of local background gamma radiation (this work is performed by agencies of the Russian Federation Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources), it is not difficult to find anomalies. It is much harder to prevent the “spread” of radioactive contamination to a large number of unforeseen locations. A strong source of radioactivity was found accidentally by a resident in an apartment building on Vasilyevskiy Island in St. Petersburg. The people were quickly moved out. An inspection revealed radium under the floor. How did it get there? No one knows. One possible way is scrap metal, slag from the remelting of which is used in making structural elements. Radioisotopic instruments have been known to make their way into scrap metal. This is why it is so important to check initial raw materials for radioactivity. There is a special government decree to this effect.

The sanitation inspectorate is very concerned by the growing use of military equipment and hardware in the civilian economy. Today, as a result of conversion, military equipment can be purchased directly by any cooperative. And here are the initial results: The Novyy Cooperative in Moscow bought a ZIL truck from the military with reflecting identification markers that were radioactive. Specialists at the ZIL Plant said that trucks are not equipped with such parts at the plant, and that the sources of radioactivity could have come from missile and artillery units. Moscow's Radon Scientific and Production Association discovered 1,400 of these reflecting markers used by the army in Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast!

“This is why we are urging all potential buyers of military equipment to demand a certificate of radiation safety,” officials of the Sanitation and Epidemiological Committee told me. “And if someone happens to receive a gift of instruments from a sponsoring enterprise, look that gift horse in the mouth.”

National Salvation Front To Vote Against START II

OW1401161293 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1446 GMT 14 Jan 93

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Representatives of the National Salvation Front in the Russian parliament will vote against the ratification of the START-2 Treaty, chairman of the NSF's Political Council Ilya Konstantinov told INTERFAX. He noted that given the current agony of Russia's land forces, aviation and navy, the land-based strategic forces remain the only viable component of the Russian armed forces.

Konstantinov believes that the START-2 Treaty envisages the elimination of 80

of the land-based strategic missiles. In addition to that, according to this treaty, the multiple warheads are to be removed from most of the remaining strategic missiles, saving only mono-units. This means, he said, that Russia will lose its independence for good, while the United States'

military potential will be rather large, following the completion of the SDI program. Russia will become absolutely helpless and entirely dependent on the U.S.

Konstantinov said that “this is absolutely clear not only to the opposition, but also to the majority of the deputies.” In view of this, the ratification of the START-2 Treaty will not be easy, he stated.

Envoy Cited on Chemical Weapons Convention

PM1901095193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Jan 93 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by Yuriy Kovalenko: “Checking on Presence of Chemical Weapons ‘Everywhere, at Any Time, Without Right of Refusal’”]

[Text] Paris—At the moment when U.S., British, and French aircraft, attacking several targets, were “disarming” Iraq against its will, the three-day ceremony of the signing of the document on voluntary disarmament—the convention on banning the development, production, storage, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction—which began Wednesday was continuing in Paris.

“People fight with weapons, not poisons”—that statement of the ancient Romans was cited when he addressed the signing by UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, urging the international community to take one more step after that—to destroy nuclear weapons too.

It is the “war with poisons” that should be ended by this convention drafted under UN auspices, which provides for the first time in history for the elimination of one category of weapons of mass destruction. An unprecedented verification regime has been approved for this, whose principle is formulated as follows: “Everywhere, at any time, without the right of refusal.”

But can it be considered that the convention, as some politicians assert, is truly of a universal nature? Over these days the document will be signed by about 130 countries, whereas invitation were sent out to 187 states. Accession to the convention is a gradual process. The convention remains open for signing in New York since the UN secretary general is its depositary.

Chemical weapons in any case must be destroyed, Ambassador Sergey Batsanov, the Russian representative at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, noted in a talk with me. The view that such weapons “lie there and require no attention” is absolutely wrong. They do require attention—funds are needed for their maintenance or at least their safe storage. The longer they are there the more they require.

They must be destroyed while observing all rules of ecological, health, and other safety, S. Batsanov stressed, to the most modern technological standard, with double or triple control so that this process does not entail adverse consequences. For that we will need international cooperation and help at individual stages of this technological chain of destruction. To this day the agreement of the places of destruction with the local population is not advancing as smoothly as one would like. Here the government must act far more vigorously.

According to our own assessments, the Russian representative at the disarmament conference continued, our stocks of

chemical weapons total 40,000 tonnes. Considering what is now happening to the ruble in our country, he says, I would be afraid to name the sum necessary to eliminate them. Although if everything is translated into dollars, including the cost of the workforce and resources, I think we would manage it more cheaply than the Americans (the United States believes that the destruction of its arsenals will cost \$8 billion—Yu.K.). We are not counting on U.S. dollars and aid. Of course, that aid could be very useful. But no one will resolve our problems for us in full."

Ambassador S. Batsanov sees no serious difficulties in connection with the Russian Supreme Soviet's ratification of the convention. In his opinion it is "defensible" from the expert viewpoint, considering that the balance of interests has been observed. Of course, this document is not ideal for us. But all those who sign it are in the same situation.

Problems Noted

LD1501210493 *Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 15 Jan 93*

[Excerpts] Russia was among the first to sign in Paris the international convention banning chemical weapons. Here's what Radio Moscow military observer, Mikhail Ulmanov writes about the convention itself and the difficulties involved in implementing it:

[Announcer read] [Passage omitted] As for Russia it is to destroy the chemical weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union, and that is about 40,000 tonnes of war gas and other poisonous chemicals.

This however, involves a number of problems. The main one is where the weapons are to be eliminated. Four such sites on the territory of Russia have already been named, but before work starts there, it is necessary to create a favorable social, ecological and medical infrastructure for the local population. But doing all that in the present economic situation in Russia can be compared only with the task of Hercules.

Financially that will require about a third of the 100 billion rubles which are so far expected to be spent. The rest, including hard currency, will go directly to organize the destruction process itself. Certain equipment and technology are to be acquired in the West to have everything done as ecologically clean as possible. [passage omitted]

The program of chemical disarmament has been given a high status in this country. There is a special committee under the president, which means that it has been put under his direct control. There have been special hearings on the problem in the Supreme Soviet of Russia. This gives ground for viewing favorably the prospect of the convention being ratified in parliament.

Weapons Plutonium Plant Chief Discusses Conversion

934P0041A *Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 48, Nov 92 p 13*

[Interview with Valeriy Lebedev, director of the Krasnoyarsk Mining and Chemical Combine, by V. Khrebtov, in Krasnoyarsk-26; date not given: "'Samsung' from Krasnoyarsk"]

[Text] *Reporters from EZh first visited the super-secret Krasnoyarsk Mining and Chemical Combine, which produces weapons-grade plutonium, in April of last year. We spoke about plans for the enterprise, connected with a conversion in production, and about the possibilities of a financial and economic development for the combine ("EZh" No. 14, 1991).*

One and a half years have gone by since then. Was the enterprise collective able to implement its plans? How are reforms coming at this huge and super complex production plant?

Valeriy Lebedev, director of the combine, answers these and other questions at the request of the head of the regional information center of "EZh."

There have not been many changes. Two nuclear reactors, with the aid of which weapons-grade plutonium was made, have been shut down. Thus, basic production, which in many ways ensured stable financial and economic well-being for the combine, was partially curtailed.

Shutting down the reactors was not a tragedy for us because the combine had earlier planned a new strategy for developing its production and had prepared to implement it operationally, however.

The basic direction for this work that is new to us consists of producing exceptionally pure substances for microelectronics. Thus, for example, the combine already has the capability of producing especially pure aluminum, which is used for electronic evaporation on integral circuits. Our volume of output is 4 tonnes per year. If one considers that no more than 50 tonnes of this material is used in the entire world, it becomes evident that our capacity is rather solid. In the coming year we are counting on increasing production of this material up to 10 tonnes per year and fully satisfy the needs of all the CIS countries.

In addition, we have begun production of especially pure tellurite, bismuth, gallium, and other super components for microelectronics. We are preparing for a capability to produce a poly-crystalline silicon and arsenide of gallium.

Recently we created special thermo-electric elements, with which we can produce portable refrigerators and heaters. Next year we hope to begin experimental production of these items.

In only half a year, one of the combine shops installed an assembly line and mastered production of television sets of the well-known South Korean firm "Samsung." Before the end of this year, 13,000 units will be produced, and next year—over 20,000. We are prepared to increase output of these items if enterprises can be found to purchase complete units for cash. If we succeed, the combine would be able to deliver television sets to them on most favorable terms.

As a result of conversion, the combine was able to increase its ratio of civilian production from 2 percent to 20 percent. But no less important is the fact that implementation of the conversion program helped us create 1,200 new jobs.

[Interviewer] *Valeriy Aleksandrovich, Many enterprises in Russia and the CIS are having a fit because economic ties have broken down and, as a consequence, supply of materials and equipment is sporadic. Has the combine been able to avoid this fate?*

[Lebedev] We were able to avoid it for most of our production. We understood right from the beginning that the breakdown of economic ties cannot be reestablished easily, and for this reason, during our conversion planning, we tried to take into consideration the political and economic instability of our society and to aim at using local raw materials for our new production.

In sum, the combine receives all raw materials, other materials, components, and equipment either from "distant foreign lands" or from our nearest neighbors—the enterprises of Krasnoyarsk Kray. For example, we use raw materials from the local aluminum plant for producing especially pure aluminum; but for producing especially pure bismuth telluride we use waste from the output of the Krasnoyarsk non-ferrous metal plant. We understand of course that we are forced to take these drastic measures, but so far we do not see another solution.

[Interviewer] *The introduction of new output is always connected to many problems, not only technical, but financial and economic, as well....*

[Lebedev] You are correct, and among these problems the main ones are the decrease in productive labor, decreases in the volume of production, and decrease in income in the face of rising prices. These are the circumstances that by and large are holding back our enterprise from taking major steps to reequip our production plant.

Reality is such that added to these natural and objective factors are subjective ones—excessively high taxes, percentage interest rates on loans, a total lack of preferential terms for investments, unjustifiably high prices for equipment, a lack of turnover funds, and a negative balance of payments for most enterprises. After all this, should anyone wonder why Russian enterprises are only reluctantly going for modernizing their production? They simply do not have the resources, nor are the necessary conditions present to take this step.

Paradoxically, conversion has thus far not brought the expected dividends to our enterprise either. In many cases this can be explained by most of our customers' inability to pay. For example, the milk containers that we produce were selling like hotcakes before. Today, though, at the relatively low price of 35-40 thousand rubles, farmers have stopped buying them because they have no money.

As a result, even though we are ending the year with a positive financial balance, the combine owes its suppliers 1.8 billion rubles, while our customers owe us 3.2 billion. Also, the deficit in the turnover funds is around 20 percent at the combine. We had no choice but to stop construction of housing, and social and cultural facilities, since we now have funds enough only for wages and for purchase of raw materials and other materials for basic production.

[Interviewer] *Valeriy Aleksandrovich, many of your customers are complaining about the unjustified increase of various goods and services. As a practical person, you undoubtedly are familiar with the components of expenses.*

[Lebedev] Yes, we analyzed them carefully and came to the conclusion that prices are "inflated" not so much by the middlemen as by our current tax system.

For example, what does a single value added tax cost us? Before the goods reach the consumer, they go through five or six or more (depending on their complexity) steps in production, each of which "slaps on" 28 percent to its selling price. Finally, the merchandize ends up in a store and is overpriced because it has a number of unjustified price hikes built in. Essentially, the Value Added Tax (VAT) has turned into a turnover tax.

Add a group of taxes for the wage fund, comprising a total of 38 percent, and (again, at every step of production) numerous local taxes, and you will understand that it is these taxes that put our merchandize out of the reach of many Russians.

I think the time has come when it is necessary to reexamine not the tax percentage rates, but the entire tax structure. Revenues going to the state treasury should be flexible enough to be used for stimulating production and use. Today we see not only a decrease in demand, but also a fall in the supply of goods and services, however.

[Interviewer] *The last question, which brings up arguments not only among directors as a whole, but also among members of the government: Should enterprises of the military-industrial complex be subject to privatization? Or, as before, is it their fate to stay under state "protection"?*

[Lebedev] Definitely. There are facilities throughout the whole world that are exclusively under state jurisdiction, an example being dangerous radiation enterprises. But even they have been auctioned off, with the difference being that the controlling number of shares belongs to the governments of these countries, and those governments determine the strategy and safety measures for the existence of their enterprises.

A similar form of privatization would be fully acceptable here also. Moreover, shares of facilities of the military-industrial complex that are not dangerous, I think could and should be sold to all who want to purchase them. The defense interests of the state would not be so difficult to take care of in that circumstance, since the state would have the right to grant contracts for military production based on specific conditions. Also, the safeguarding of military secrets is a purely organizational problem that is fully capable of being resolved.

It is important to understand one thing: The entire world is going this way. Is it worthwhile for us to "reinvent the wheel"?

[Interviewer] *Well then, your point of view is clear, and we hope it will be heard by all interested parties.*

[Lebedev] Thank you.

Our interviewee's "business card":

Valeriy Aleksandrovich Lebedev was born in 1941. After completing his studies at the Krasnoyarsk Polytechnical Institute, he did graduate work at the Moscow Energy Institute, specializing in "Nuclear Facilities." He worked as shift chief and chief inspector of a nuclear heat and power plant. As of 1989 he has been Director of the Krasnoyarsk Mining and Chemical Combine. He is a Candidate of Technical Sciences and a Senior Lecturer.

Parliament Discusses CW Destruction Program

LD1901135593 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1257 GMT
19 Jan 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* parliamentary correspondent *Aleksey Tabachnikov*]

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—Problems of destroying chemical weapons in Russia were discussed today by the Russian Parliament. As earlier reported, the Russian Federation has signed in Paris on January 13, 1993, the convention to ban the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and to destroy them. Under the assumed obligation, the Russian side is to destroy 45 percent of its stockpiles of toxic agents already at the first stage, by the year 2004.

Chairman of the presidential committee on problems of chemical and biological weapons *Anatoliy Kuntsevich* dwelt at length on the submitted draft of a "comprehensive programme for the stage-by-stage destruction of chemical weapons" and on the problems linked with its implementation. According to *Kuntsevich*, the programme is based on principles ensuring the "absolute safety of the population, economy of resources, and utilisation of the accumulated scientific and production potential". *Kuntsevich* noted that the bulk of the hard currency spendings needed by the programme were connected with payments for international inspections. About 500 million U.S. dollars will have to be spent for this purpose over the next 10 years, while the Americans even bring this figure up to two billions.

In light of this, *Kuntsevich* moved to instruct the Russian Foreign Ministry to strive for a decision to share the cost of international inspections among all the signatories of the convention. "At the same time," he said, "it is necessary to adopt a law allowing non-governmental structures to take part in the destruction programme. This would help reduce the budgetary spendings substantially."

Further on Parliamentary Discussion

OW1901181393 Moscow *INTERFAX in English*
1719 GMT 19 Jan 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents *Andrey Borodin*, *Dmitriy Voskoboynikov*, and *Igor Porshnev*; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—transmitted via *KYODO*]

[Text] Russia's expenditure connected with international inspections envisaged in the convention on banning chemical weapons signed in Paris recently will amount to about 500 million dollars. This was revealed in Moscow on Tuesday [19 Jan], during parliamentary hearings on the draft of the first phase of the Composite Program for Scrapping Chemical Arms in the Russian Federation, by *Dr. Anatoliy Kuntsevich*, leader of the presidential committee for conventional problems involving chemical and biological arms.

According to him, payment for the activity of international inspectors (between 400 and 2000 dollars a day) is made by the country on whose territory they work. Considering the volumes of chemical weapons stockpiles, the biggest expenditure will be borne by Russia and the USA. *Kuntsevich* suggested to the Russian Foreign Ministry that solution to

this problem should be found before the Parliament convenes to ratify the convention.

According to him, one of the possible solutions can be to set up a special structure: an international pool that would include countries willing to contribute equal amounts of money to the process of scrapping chemical weapons. To resolve financial problems is also possible through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Besides, hard currency will be needed to set up international centers certified to analyse all components of the environment (poisonous chemicals and all types of toxic substances). According to *Kuntsevich*, the worth of such analysis system will make up 12-15 million dollars.

Dr. Kuntsevich listed the principles underlying the composite program: the ensurance of absolute security for the population and the environment; the need to save resources; the maximal use of the structures built to develop and manufacture chemical weaponry and its potentials. There are plans to reorient the relevant research centers to the development of technologies for scrapping chemical arms and the test sites to testing designed to envisage the possible accidents.

Kuntsevich's arguments failed to convince parliamentarians, who actually rejected the concept of the composite program for scrapping chemical weapons on Russian soil. The idea of transporting chemical arms from storage places to two or three scrapping centers came under fire. The Parliament of *Chuvashia*, on whose territory, in *Novocheboksarsk*, one of such centers was to be built, has already decided to ban the bringing of poisonous substances to its territory. As *MP Venera Pechnikova* said at the parliamentary hearings, *Chuvashia* "has no intention of reverting to this issue, since there are no ecologically clean technologies for destroying poisonous substances, and not a single kilo of such substances is stored in *Novocheboksarsk*".

Tatar Supreme Council Environmental Committee Chairman Aleksey Kolesnik pointed out at the hearings that *Tatarstan* would not give permission for chemical weapons to be transported across the territory of the republic. Analogous resolutions, he said, were being prepared in other *Volga* republics.

Russian Supreme Council Committee for Environmental Matters Deputy Chairman Valeriy Menshikov demanded that a state environmental survey of the composite program be carried out before its presentation to the Russian Supreme Council.

In this case, said *Kuntsevich*, it would be necessary to change the plan and scrap weapons where they are stored. It would further be necessary to build seven chemical weapon liquidation complexes instead of two or three, as planned earlier.

Lev Fedorov, doctor of Chemical Sciences and chairman of the *Anti-Dioxin Committee*, said in an interview with *Diplomatic Panorama* what it was essential to completely change the plan for the Composite Program for Scrapping Chemical Arms in the Russian Federation, which was prepared by the Russian Federation President's Committee for the Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons and by the Russian government.

In Fedorov's opinion, the program should not be restricted to the job of destroying the 40,000 tons of chemical weapons now being stored in Russia. "In the history of the Soviet Union, from 500,000 to 1 million tons of chemical weapons were manufactured, which, at the end of their useful life, were buried or burned," he said.

Dr. Fedorov considers it essential to collect and destroy these materials. According to his data, territories in Moscow and the Moskovski, Ivanoski, Kolski, Permski, Samarski, and Volgogradski oblasts and Chuvashia. Toxic waste has also been dumped into the world's oceans: in three locations in the Baltic Sea, in the North Arctic Ocean, and the seas of the Pacific Ocean.

The condition of Russia's railways, says Fedorov, does not allow for the current chemical weapon scrapping plan, which envisages toxic materials to be transported from their storehouses to two or three liquidation centers, to be carried out. In his opinion, the weapons must be destroyed where they are stored. Russia currently has seven major chemical weapons stockpiles in the Kurganski, Penzenski, Kirovski, Saratovski, and Bryanski oblasts, and two in Udmurdiya. "Payments must be made to these territories for the restoration of the environment and the health of the people," he said.

Chemist Discusses Destruction of Chemical Weapons

*OW1901223793 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1957 GMT 19 Jan 93*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Lev Fedorov, Dr. Sc. (Chem.), chairman of the Antidioxin Committee, told INTERFAX on Tuesday [19 Jan] that 40,000 tons of chemical weapons are stored in Russia. During the years that the Soviet Union existed a total of 500,000 to 1,000,000 tons of chemical weapons were manufactured and, once their service life ended, "buried or sunk". He insisted that these weapons must be collected and destroyed.

According to him, cleaning operations must be undertaken in Moscow and Moscow Region, Ivanovo, Kola, Perm, Samara, and Volgograd Regions and in Chuvashia. Poisonous agents have been sunk in 12 World Ocean sites (three in the Baltic Sea and the others in the Polar Seas and in Pacific Seas).

Method of Vitrifying Nuclear Waste Reported

*PM2001163193 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino
Television First Program Network in Russian 0600 GMT
19 Jan 93*

[Video report by Sergey Sergeev and Semen Sosunov, from Chelyabinsk; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [060845] [Sergeev] For more than 40 years weapons-grade plutonium—the "stuffing" for nuclear bombs and missiles—was manufactured at this enterprise. During this time around 1 billion curies of waste of varying degrees of radioactivity has accumulated in metal containers and open reservoirs. Only now has the problem of the safe storage of

radionuclides been finally resolved. It is one of the most complex and urgent problems in nuclear power engineering.

The technology and equipment has been developed jointly by specialists from the "Mayak" chemical combine and Yekaterinburg scientists.

The radioactive concentrate is boiled with glass in a special furnace at temperatures in excess of 1,000 degrees. Then this viscous mass is poured into reliable steel containers and placed in a storage facility made of solid concrete. Henceforth nothing, neither water nor natural disasters, can set the nuclear jinni free. According to experts from a number of countries who have visited the enterprise, the vitrification of nuclear waste is the most reliable and cheapest method to date compared with other known methods. [060942]

Four Nuclear Subs Scrapped at Far East Shipyard

*LD1901093593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0830 GMT
19 Jan 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Leonid Vinogradov]

[Text] Vladivostok January 19 TASS—The Zvezda shipyard in the city of Bolshoy Kamen, Maritime territory, which had been building submarines for over 30 years, including nuclear ones, has turned into their biggest "grave digger" in the Russian far east.

Yard deputy manager Yuriy Shkolov told ITAR-TASS on Monday that four subs have been already scrapped.

Although the yard has no foreign observers to watchdog the cutting of submarines, Shkolov continued, Americans know all the particulars.

American satellites photograph all the stages of cutting and supply snapshots to appropriate U.S. agencies, wherefrom the information goes to Moscow and then to Bolshoy Kamen.

It is very expensive to cut submarines. It costs 700 million roubles to reduce a sub to scrap. The U.S. side also now participates in this work: A joint Russian-American venture was set up at the yard. It will shoulder the job of cutting nuclear submarines.

UKRAINE

Kravchuk on Ratifying START I Treaty

*LD1801195593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1300 GMT 18 Jan 93*

[News conference by Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk in Kiev following return from talks in Moscow; individual correspondents identified where possible—live]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kravchuk] Well, as far as ratification of the START I Treaty is concerned, I have spoken about there being a corresponding need for several serious arguments for our parliament in favor of ratification. I understand the concern of parliament and the deputies. It is their right to dig for the truth, because they are voting for a relevant document which has great significance for the consequences of our state, our security, our strength, and our power. We should give the deputies such arguments.

The first argument is security guarantees. Such drafts have been prepared, as I already know, both by the Russian side,

and the U.S. President has also agreed with the Ukrainian position, so that the United States is to give an appropriate security guarantee. This is the first thing. I think that when we read these documents to the deputies, then the deputies will understand that these are not simply words but real steps toward guarantees.

Second is the financial-legal side of the matter, what costs are fixed, what part of the costs should be repaid to us, and what assistance, for example with regard to destroying nuclear weapons, should be given. I believe that Ukraine, as a state that is third in nuclear strength, that is voluntarily laying down these nuclear weapons in accordance with the treaty, should also claim help regarding their destruction, especially as we have, you know, an economic crisis, and it is very difficult to expect us to manage this task on our own. That is, everyone is interested in nuclear strength decreasing. Help is needed in order to carry out this destruction. We do not want to be viewed as doing some sort of trading or to gain some sort of dividend from this. Absolutely not. It is for destruction, and destruction is a complex, very complex, technological process. This is the second thing.

The third thing is the very method of this destruction—who, when, and over what period. I have previously stated the figure for you; the 130 complexes with fuel, located here in Ukraine. Equipping them with their components took place, and this with the help of Russian technology; accordingly another class of missiles located in Ukraine and beyond Ukraine's boundaries, on Russian soil, were also equipped with components with the help of Ukrainian specialists, in particular those from our Southern Kharkov plant association [nashe obyednannya Pivdennyi Kharkivskyy Zavod]. In this way, we should agree on how all this is going to happen.

So, after this I expect that when we give these arguments to parliament, then it will not reject our former position expressed in the declaration [of Sovereignty], in the relevant resolutions of the Supreme Council, where it has been said that Ukraine is striving to become a non-nuclear state in the future, and that this should take place in accordance with laws and agreements which will be adopted by the Supreme Council, and which will be based on international documents on this matter. [passage omitted]

Reports Note Emphasis on Nuclear Security

Russia To Guarantee Security

AU1501154093 Paris AFP in English 1501 GMT 15 Jan 93

[Text] Moscow, Jan 15 (AFP)—President Boris Yeltsin on Friday removed the main stumbling block for Ukraine's ratification of the START-I nuclear disarmament treaty by announcing that Russia would grant Ukraine security guarantees against a nuclear attack.

"Russia will grant guarantees on respecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine and will protect it against any nuclear attack," Yeltsin said following talks with his Ukrainian counterpart Leonik Kravchuk here.

He added that the security guarantees would apply once Ukraine ratified the START-I agreement.

French, Chinese Offer Guarantees

OW1901184393 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1751 GMT 19 Jan 93

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukraine is conducting negotiations with the French and Chinese governments on guaranteeing Ukraine's nuclear security, Konstantin Grishchenko, director of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's Department on Arms Limitation and Disarmament, told journalists on Tuesday. He said Ukraine had already received similar guarantees from Russia and the U.S., and they are currently under consultation. According to Grishchenko, the texts of the documents have not yet been revealed.

Grishchenko said that Ukraine has joined the Paris Convention on banning chemical weapons. Although the Ukrainian state has neither chemical weapons nor factories for their production, it is ready to put its territory under control for the possible existence of chemical weapons.

Grishchenko expressed his hope that Ukraine will be able to find a mutually acceptable solution during negotiations with Russia on the issue of destroying nuclear warheads. They will be destroyed in Russia, if "Russia's position is rational and Ukraine does not require payment for the destruction of warheads."

Grishchenko confirmed Ukraine's position regarding the desired exchange of nuclear warheads for fuel for atomic energy plants.

Foreign Minister on Commitment to CW Convention

LD1501113593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in English 0100 GMT 16 Jan 93

[Excerpts] On behalf of Ukraine the first deputy foreign minister of the republic, Mykola Makarevych, signed in Paris on 13 January a convention on banning the designing, manufacture, and stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and their destruction. [passage omitted]

During the signing of the convention Mykola Makarevych said that there are no chemical weapons nor objects for their manufacture on the territory of Ukraine, but Ukraine has a developed chemical industry and the fulfillment of the convention would require significant efforts on the part of the Government of Ukraine. It is important to ensure that all the provisions of the convention, first and foremost those which concern the elimination of chemical weapons and banning the designing of new models, should be strictly adhered to by all signatories. In order to reach this goal Ukraine is prepared to do everything possible.

Report on Nuclear Weapons Dump Denied

*AU1901152093 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
15 Jan 93 p 2*

[Report by Ukraine's Independent Information Agency RESPUBLIKA from Simferopol: "Yet Another Lie From 'Ostankino'"]

[Text] Recently, the Ostankino Television and Radio Broadcasting Company spread a report to the effect that a dump containing nuclear weapons of the Black Sea Fleet is located 15 kilometers from the town of Saky. The Press Center of the Black Sea Fleet stated that the facility referred to by the Ostankino Television and Radio Broadcasting Company has nothing to do with the fleet and that no nuclear weapons are stored on the territory of Saky Rayon.

FINLAND

Expertise in Chemical Disarmament Verification Noted

LD1401233193 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 1530 GMT 14 Jan 93

[Excerpt] [Unidentified correspondent] In Paris Foreign Minister Paavo Vaeyrynen has signed for Finland the convention banning chemical weapons. The convention initiated by the UN has been confirmed by 115 countries. The signing ceremony took place at the UNESCO meeting hall and each country was given five minutes to deliver an address.

[Vaeyrynen, in English] During 20 years of research Finland has acquired a high level of expertise in analytical verification methods for chemical disarmament.

[Correspondent] Finland is working fully in the preparatory work preceding the time when the convention comes into force in 1995, Foreign Minister Paavo Vaeyrynen promised to the international convention audience in Paris today. The effect of the convention banning the manufacture, possession, and use of chemical weapons is largely dependent on this preparatory work. Control and training are Finland's specialities. Finland has in 20 years become a specialist in chemical disarmament verification. Finland intends in the future, like the present, to share the results of this research work with other countries of the convention. Foreign Minister Vaeyrynen also reported on Finland's training program which until now has allowed chemists of 16 developing countries to get acquainted with the analytical verification methods developed by Finns. It will depend on control whether the convention signed after 20 years of work will work better than its historic predecessors. [passage omitted]

FRANCE

Customs Seize Four Kilos of Cesium Isotope

Suspects Held

AU2001090593 Paris AFP in English 0127 GMT 20 Jan 93

[Text] Besancon, France, Jan 20 (AFP)—Three men are being held by police after a customs officer discovered a quantity of an isotope used in the nuclear industry worth 2 million francs (363,600 dollars) in a car, customs sources said.

Four kilogrammes (8.8 pounds) of cesium-133, which is used in research in the nuclear industry, was discovered when customs officials stopped a car at La Ferriere-sous-Jougne, in eastern France, near the Swiss border.

The material, thought to be from Lithuania, was hidden in a box in the German registered car in which two Poles and a German, known to German police, were travelling.

The three men were held in custody for 24 hours although two were later released. The third, thought to be the ring-leader, was detained while police made further inquiries.

Police were examining a large cheque in dollars and an address book found on the man when he was arrested.

The group told police that they were working for a Lithuanian supplier who had ordered them to look for possible clients for the substance in Western Europe.

At best the three face charges of failing to declare the cesium to customs officers, although more serious charges could be brought.

Three Released

AU2101084893 Paris AFP in English 2202 GMT 20 Jan 93

[Text] Besancon, France, Jan 20 (AFP)—Police released two Poles and a German from custody Wednesday after seizing four kilos (8.8 pounds) of cesium 133 at the border with Switzerland, customs officials said.

A check made out for about 500,000 dollars was also confiscated from one of the men, the officials said.

The material, used in nuclear research, was contained in three glass bulbs and a lead cylinder, the officials said, adding that it was thought to be from Lithuania but was accompanied by an analysis document from a laboratory in Lausanne, western Switzerland.

They did not give the name of the laboratory pending an investigation.

At best the two Poles and the German national face charges of failing to declare the caesium to customs officers—punishable by a heavy fine—although more serious charges could be brought.

The check, which should also have been declared, will not be returned to its bearer until payment of another fine, and is being confiscated until authorities are satisfied that some other form of trafficking—drugs or contraband—is not involved.

While in custody the three said they worked for a Lithuanian supplier who had asked them to look for possible buyers in western Europe.

Swiss authorities, who stepped up border controls three weeks ago, Wednesday contacted their French counterparts, concerned over a possible upsurge in trafficking in dangerous substances.

Numerous operations have been reported recently in trafficking in rare and dangerous materials including cesium, strontium and uranium, coming from Eastern Europe.

Cesium 133 is rare but not radioactive. Another cesium isotope, caesium 137, was responsible for the contamination at Chernobyl.

Firms Said Involved in Syria-DPRK Arms Production

LD1601194893 Berlin ADN in German 1736 GMT 16 Jan 93

[Text] Hamburg (ADN)—According to government information, German firms are said to be involved in the production of the joint Syrian-North Korean Scud-C missile. The WELT AM SONNTAG [Sunday newspaper] reports that this was the result of investigations in Sicily where the freighter MS Waalhaven was stopped on its way from Hamburg to Syria. On board were German machine parts which were to be sold to a North-Korean firm which,

for its part, is involved in the export of the former Russian Scud-C missile which is being re-developed by North Korea.

Last spring, German secret services were tipped off that North Korea was not only exporting weapons to Syria but that the two countries were also planning to establish a production route in Israel's neighboring country [Syria]. The range of these weapons would cover almost the whole of Israel.

German experts, who searched the ship in the Sicilian port Augusta at the end of 1992, seized 27 crates. They contained construction parts, which could indeed have been used for civilian purposes, but were also necessary for the production of Scud missiles, the newspaper reports.

According to government information, the firms Protoplan, Leis-Engineering, Berlin, and Mueller-Weingarten are suspected of being involved in this business. Products of these companies have already been uncovered by UN inspectors during their checks in Iraqi weapons production plants. The Federal Economics Ministry was asked by the chancellery to look into the Germans firms. Paragraph 5 of the foreign trade law allows investigations when a firm is suspected of having "subjective knowledge" that the goods sold are not going to be used for civilian but for military purposes. Until the matter has been cleared up the firms Protoplan and Leis had been requested "to distance themselves from further

deliveries." A thorough foreign trade investigation has been ordered into the affairs of Mueller-Weingarten.

Four Arrested as Nuclear Waste Smugglers

*LD2101171493 Berlin ADN in German
1308 GMT 21 Jan 93*

[Text] Potsdam (ADN)—Four foreigners were arrested by Brandenburg police on Wednesday when they tried to pass on radioactive material in a protective container to unknown persons. Brandenburg's Interior Minister Alwin Ziel stated today that the arrest took place at a service station on the A-13 highway near Freienhufen, according to the Federal Criminal Investigation Department [CID]. The arrest is an important contribution to the fight against international crime, said Ziel.

The Cottbus-based police officers were supported in the operation by experts from the federal CID and the Brandenburg Environment Office. They stated that there are no health risks.

The Brandenburg Environment Ministry had previously reported that about 6.5 grams of "alpha emitter" were seized in the swoop on the illegal nuclear waste transaction. The radioactive material is provisionally being kept at a branch of the Federal Office for Radiation Protection in the Karlshorst district of Berlin.


Cottbus police will report further details this afternoon.

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