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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ARMED FORCES

REPORTS ON SOVIET MILITARY LIFE IN AFGHANISTAN

Importance of DRA's Salang Highway

PM041037 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Feb 83 morning edition p 5

[Own correspondent G. Ustinov "Afghan Reportage": "The Pass Is Open"]

[Text] Kabul [no date given]--We flew from Kabul to Balkh in the north of the country. The small aircraft of the Afghan Air Force was carrying newspapers, parcels and other mail. About two dozen passengers were occupying the vacant seats. It was a sunny day and through the portholes we could all see clearly the endless chain of snow-capped mountain peaks slashed by deep gorges.

Suddenly the mountains parted and the highway shone through below. "Salang," my neighbor, a young Afghan soldier, who throughout had been resting his bandaged leg on a sack of newspapers, said softly. "I was there just 3 days ago." And he thoughtfully touched his plaster-covered leg.

The roar of the engines prevented conversation and we again looked down toward the highway. Sometimes it ran straight as an arrow, sometimes it began to twist like a snake, rose and wound itself like a narrow ribbon around the steep slopes of the mountains....

I had heard a lot about this highway linking Kabul with the Soviet border. The question of its construction arose as far back as 1928 during the visit to our country by the Afghan King Amanullah Khan. In his record of the conversation with the King, G.V. Chicherin, USSR people's commissar for foreign affairs, noted: "He particularly highlighted two very topical questions: The building of a highway and a trade treaty: Afghanistan undoubtedly needs a highway link with the USSR. This is necessary both economically and politically."

At that time, however, the implementation of a complex project requiring great material expenditure was difficult. The idea was dropped until the late fifties. The construction of a modern asphalted highway was begun by Soviet and Afghan workers and experts in 1958 and completed in 1964. The highway includes the 3 km Salang tunnel driven through the Hindu Kush at a height of over 3,300 meters above sea level. It also gave its name to the high mountain section of the highway. This section, which makes it possible to considerably shorten the old caravan routes, is 108 km long.

The new highway linked the main Afghan industrial centers in a single economic complex: The Jabal Os Saraj and Pol-e Khomri cement plants, the Karkar coal mines, the Golbahar textile factory and the Qonduz cotton gin. It provided the shortest link between the northern provinces--Afghanistan's granary--and the center of the country and made it considerably easier and cheaper to transport freight both within the country and between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Whereas trucks used to take 2-3 days to reach the border port of Shir Khan from Kabul, it now takes them only 6-8 hours. But the main point is that traffic used to be interrupted for 9 months a year because of snow and avalanches. With the building of the modern highway with its tunnels, snow protection galleries and dozens of reinforced concrete metal bridges, traffic has become uninterrupted.

Afghanistan has no railroads, and thus you can imagine what a good highway means to the country, especially in such a crucial direction. The economic and military roles of the highway and the Salang Pass grew particularly after the April revolution, when revolutionary Afghanistan's trade and economic cooperation with its northern neighbor increased considerably. However, gangs of counterrevolutionaries sent in from abroad to try to disrupt this link have repeatedly attacked the convoys of trucks along this highway in an attempt to break this transport connection.

"...Down there, on the highway, is where I received my baptism of fire," my neighbor in the aircraft said.

We landed. An ambulance arrived for my neighbor with two of his comrades inside. Following the widely accepted custom they embraced their fellow countryman three times each in turn. I asked them to stay for a while and tell me what had been happening at the Salang Pass recently. This is what I heard in reply.

"Our battalion, commanded by S Capt (Nazir Gol)," they said, "was accompanying a large group of trucks bound for Kabul. This is a necessary measure: In the unpopulated mountain regions the Dushmans often attack transport convoys, hijack the trucks and kill the drivers."

By means of the "wireless telegraph," the local inhabitants reported that one of the gangs hiding in the mountains was preparing an attack and was planning not only to seize the convoy but also to decommission the highway and destroy Kabul's food, fuel and medical supply lines.

For assistance (Nazir Gol)'s battalion was given two groups of [Khad] (state security organ) staffers and Sarandoy (militia).

Soon after the convoy had left the Salang Tunnel and was approaching the villages of (Farza) and (Kuchi), the crew of the leading armored personnel carrier noticed suspicious activity on the road about 800 meters ahead of the column. "The highway is being mined," (Nazir Gol) surmised and halted the column. At that moment automatic fire rained down on the convoy from concealed positions in the mountains on both sides of the highway.

The battalion commander gave the order: "Fire!" and all the members of the escort detachment opened fire in reply. The fighting lasted over 1 hour.... The Dushmans' attack was beaten off and the gang fled in disarray, leaving behind several dozen dead and wounded. Interrogation of the prisoners revealed that the gang had numbered about 400.

As I found out later from the military newspaper HAQIQAT-E SARBAZ, mine clearance began on the highway immediately after the battle. Soviet servicemen came to the aid of their Afghan friends in that. While that work was underway, several Afghan soldiers wounded by the Dushmans were taken to the Soviet garrison's medical unit. (Nadzhibulla Sherzay), whom I had come to know in the aircraft, was among those men.

"It was my first meeting with Soviet soldiers," he said, "and I was very pleased by their cordiality and their sincere desire to provide assistance. The peasants of (Kuchi) village, where we made a brief stop, said that Soviet soldiers maintain a firm friendship with local inhabitants, help with their work in the fields, in the procurement of fuel and other matters. When I thanked the Soviet commander for the concern shown to me and my comrades, he simply smiled and said: How else could it be, we have a common cause--to defend the Afghan revolution...."

Atheist Education in Services

PM231049 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Feb 83 first edition p 1

[Editorial: "Servicemens' Atheistic Education"]

[Text] The tasks which the party has laid down for further improving ideological and political-educational work are being tackled persistently in the Soviet armed forces. The servicemens' ideological tempering and the formation in them of a scientific philosophy, selfless devotion to the cause of the party and the ideals of communism and constant readiness to defend the motherland and the gains of socialism were and remain at its core.

To form in servicemen a scientific world outlook and enhance their ideological tempering means equipping people with a profound understanding of the laws and prospects of social development and of scientific and technical progress. The solution of this task is inseparable from the army and navy personnel's atheistic education.

During the years of Soviet power, as a result of the triumph of materialist ideology and the development of science, culture and public education, a new Soviet man has been formed who is infinitely devoted to his socialist motherland and the ideals of communism, a man with a materialist understanding and perception of the surrounding world. But at the same time a certain proportion of people, and this includes young people, find themselves the captives of various religious prejudices that are energetically propagated by the church and diverse sects.

Such people are encountered, albeit rarely, even among draftees. They arrive in our military collectives with views on military service that are often

erroneous. Therefore, attention to such people and skillful work with them is one of the most important tasks for commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations.

Atheistic educational work must also be carried out constantly with the whole personnel. This is also called for by the fact that the modernization of contemporary religious ideology, which conceals the falsity and harmfulness of a religious world outlook, can give rise in certain people to a mistaken conception of religion's social role. It has also to be remembered that there are a considerable number of figures abroad who are attempting to export religious ideas and religious wares to our country and that in the international arena religion is constantly being used by imperialist propaganda against communist ideology and the socialist community countries for political ends. Therefore atheistic work must be carried out in a considered and militant fashion and must educate young people in a spirit of communist ideology and morality and help them to develop within themselves a vigorous life stance.

Atheistic education is a matter of great importance. Intransigence toward religion--religion, which is incompatible with the world outlook and morality of an energetic fighter for the new communist society--must be combined with a sensitive, considerate attitude toward believers. One should not cut oneself off from believers but reeducate them by means of persuasion and by involving them in an active social life.

The complete extirpation of survivals of the past from people's consciousness and the overcoming of the factors which give rise to religiosity require a further boost in the people's spiritual culture and education and much patient work. Rudeness, gibes and lack of respect for believers' feelings are inadmissible here. "One has to be exceptionally careful when combating religious prejudices," V.I. Lenin pointed out, "those who introduce the abuse of religious feeling into this struggle do a great deal of harm."

Many party and Komsomol organizations in the army and navy are employing various forms of scientific atheistic propaganda with increasing fruitfulness. A great deal of work in this direction is being carried out, for example, by the members of the agitational and propaganda collective, soldiers' club and library of a guards motorized infantry unit in which guards Maj A. Korovin is a propagandist. On the basis of a long-term plan here lectures, discussions and the viewing of films on the theme of atheistic education are conducted regularly. Essential reading matter for the servicemen is selected and recommended. Particular attention is accorded to individual work with the young intake.

At the same time the scale and standard of scientific atheistic propaganda is still far from everywhere meeting the demands placed upon it. There are facts which indicate that insufficient attention is being accorded to this important area of educational work in certain units and subunits. At times speeches suffer from cliches and crudeness, which can be attributed to the incompetence of certain propagandists and the scant concern of political organs for their training. Such defects are intolerable and should be resolutely eliminated. It has to be constantly remembered that the chief

thing in servicemens' education is not the quantity of measures but their effectiveness and high efficiency. Little benefit, for example, is derived from lectures if they are general and abstract in nature and take account neither of the essential changes which are taking place in people's consciousness under the influence of scientific and social progress nor the sophisticated operations carried out by modern religious organizations.

It is very important today to expose the correlation of religion and nationalistic survivals. One still encounters attempts to present religiosity as a feature of national distinctiveness and nonobservance of religious festivals as all but apostasy from the "behests of the fathers." Such attempts are supported and fanned in every possible way from without by bourgeois propaganda which is aimed at reviving religious and nationalist prejudices.

Party and Komsomol organizations in the army and navy must present the matter in such a way that atheistic propaganda is not only systemic and reaches the masses but militant and forceful too. This greatly depends on drawing the broad army and navy community--all servicemen without exception--into the ranks of vigorous fighters against the survivals of the past. Every communist and Komsomol member must be a militant atheist. The CPSU Central Committee resolution "On the further improvement of ideological and political-educational work" demands the intensification of atheistic work. It is the duty of commanders, political workers and army and navy party and Komsomol organizations to fulfill the party's instructions, inculcate persistently a scientific-materialist world outlook and foster in every serviceman a vigorous life stance.

PDPA's Influence on Military

PM140907 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Feb 83 first edition p 3

[TASS correspondent A. Greshnov report: "The Ranks of Army PDPA Organizations Are Swelling"]

[Text] Kabul, 10 Feb--Meetings are taking place in party organizations in the DRA armed forces to discuss the state of work in fulfilling the decisions of the 10th PDPA Central Committee plenum. The party members' attention is focused on questions connected with increasing the combat readiness of units and subunits and the militancy and activeness of primary party organizations and educating military cadres.

"The fifth anniversary of the April revolution, which opened up for the Afghan people the opportunity to work for the sake of their motherland, is approaching," Col (Abdul Gaffar), chief of the DRA armed forces general staff political section, said in an interview for TASS' correspondent. "But the Afghans' peace and quiet is being disrupted by the forces of counter-revolution, supported and encouraged by imperialist reaction. It is the task and duty of the DRA armed forces to defend the working people against the crimes being perpetrated by bandit groups which are sent into the country from Pakistani territory.

"PDPA members in units and subunits of the DRA armed forces are currently declaring their unanimous support for the decisions of the party's Central Committee and the revolutionary government. Many officers and men link their destiny with the PDPA. In the last 2 months alone primary party organizations examined more than 500 applications for admission to the party. In 'X' independent infantry battalion, for instance, more than half the officers and men have applied to join the party. This battalion is fighting heroically against Dushmans who have penetrated Lowgar Province.

"The servicemen of the 1st battalion of a certain infantry regiment are also giving an excellent account of themselves. They recently rebuffed an attack by a gang on a truck column not far from the settlement of Mohammad Aghah. Lt (Makhmud Nasim), Sergeant (Mansur), Privates (Samar) and (Asad) and others set examples of combat heroism and mutual assistance in this battle. After the battle many servicemen applied to join the PDPA.

"There are many examples of heroism displayed by Afghan soldiers, sergeants and officers in defending the gains of the April revolution. The servicemen's combat skills and political consciousness have increased. Their courage and selflessness are the convincing guarantee that the perfidious plans of the imperialists, who are gambling on the Afghan counterrevolution, will fail. Our people will not yield to anyone the freedom gained at such a price. We firmly declare: Victory will be ours."

Soviet Service Life

PM251157 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Mar 83 first edition p 2

[Report by Correspondent Lt Col V. Skrizhalin: "The Soldiers Spoke of the Exploit...."]

[Text] Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan [no date given]-- The cold, gusty wind beat against the canvas wall of the tent like a large bird. And from time to time those addressing the Komsomol meeting raised their voices, betraying their emotion still more. And the soldiers were speaking of an exploit. They were speaking with pride of Aleksandr Matrosov and Nikolay Gastello, of their virtual contemporary Lt Aleksandr Stoiba and former Comrade in Arms Ruslan Aushev....

The meeting was taking place in a subunit of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Tactical exercises demanding endurance and courage from the servicemen had just ended. Many of them bore orders and medals on their chests. All this lent special meaning to their words. And the magnetic power of the exploit could be felt particularly keenly.

I looked at the inspired faces of the soldiers, sergeants and young officers and listened to their heartfelt words and I involuntarily recalled meetings in the steep mountain passes, on marches, during the minutes of furious tension during combat training....

The mountains. However far you look jagged peaks cluster to the remote horizon. Gray ribbons of roads wind between them, plunge into ravines and hurtle headlong into the expanses of the valleys.

These roads are the living threads linking remote mountain settlements and making it possible to deliver there everything necessary for life. Perfectly well aware of this, the Dushmans mine and blow up bridges and fire on vehicles carrying the most peaceful cargoes--grain and medical supplies. The local organs of power frequently appeal for help to the command of units belonging to the limited contingent of Soviet troops. Our servicemen come to the aid of their Afghan friends.

...When Lt Sergey Andrianov's eyes begin to smart from looking at the mountains, he shifts his gaze to the road. A narrow road looping between steep cliffs, it leads to a remote Afghan hamlet where sick children have been waiting for healing medical supplies for several days. This is the most vulnerable place--the road. Lieutenant Andrianov sees the combat engineers advancing slowly, groping their way--the path is mined. You feel a perfidious hand has been at work here. And the mines? What foreign stickers do they not bear! Lt Sergey Andrianov does not look away from the eye-pieces of his binoculars for a long time. He does not like the dim specks of light on the mountain slopes--they are either windows catching the rays of the sun and brightly reflecting them or the lenses of binoculars flashing in incautious enemy hands....

The company commander is not here today. He, Lieutenant Andrianov, a young platoon commander, has to command the subunit. This keeps him in a state of constant tension and readiness for action.

The first shots set off a dull, multiple echo in the ravine. A hot wave of combat excitement swept over Lieutenant Andrianov. He seemed to be able to sense the mood of each soldier and gave clear orders. He behaved as though he had had to do this frequently in a similar situation. Andrianov saw his subordinates with different eyes, as it were. They acted boldly and selflessly. Yet it was not an exercise where a platoon from the next company stands in for the enemy. You only had to listen to make out the whine of the bullets....

Young officers do not often have to prove themselves in their new capacity as commanders in such conditions. And now whoever looks at Sergey Andrianov will observe without fail: "So young, but he has a combat award!"

The order of the Red Star shines scarlet on the lieutenant's breast.

When does a driver feel light-hearted? When the engine is singing evenly and the road is flying by beneath the wheels and he is sure he will reach his destination on time. This was not the first time driver Private Mikhail Gutsu has been on such a journey. Over several months of service he has many kilometers of winding mountain roads behind him. Mikhail grips the steering wheel confidently and carefully keeps his distance in the convoy of advancing trucks. The freight in the truck is urgent--food for the inhabitants of an Afghan hamlet. That is why there should be no delays en route.

But what's this? The leading truck slows down, begins to swerve to the side of the road, and comes to a standstill. The driver jumps from the cabin and raises the steaming hood. Mikhail can see his young comrade's dismayed face: Just try to determine where the fault is straight off! Private Gutsu rushes to his aid. There is no time to lose. A suspicious silence looms over the deserted mountain road. Mikhail knows that at any second it may be broken by the bandits' perfidious shots.

Private Gutsu's face is blazing from the heat of the hot engine. Where is the failure? Mikhail Gutsu runs through the possible causes of faults. This is hard even on an ordinary, mundane journey, but here he is surrounded by mountains concealing danger.

"Look!" His comrade touches his shoulder. Mikhail raises his head--human figures can be glimpsed on the steep slope between the rocks. Of course, it is hardly likely that someone will have climbed there by accident. Gutsu nods toward the submachinegun:

"Keep an eye on them..."

And he himself bends over the engine again. Careful turns of the spanner follow. And how pleasant it is after all that to half-whisper, half-sigh: "Start up!"

And the road flies to meet them again....

A combat engineer's work is like a jeweler's. That's the only way to describe it. He has work to do here, on the territory of friendly Afghanistan. The Dushmans lard the mountain roads and paths with mines. How many of these roads and paths guards Sgt Abbas Israfilov has opened up to traffic!

Slowly, Abbas gropes his way along the mountain road with his comrades. Some other time you might walk along it listening to the mysterious sound of the river running into the ravine, feasting your eyes on the snow of the inaccessible peaks glittering in the sun. But you have no time for the beauties of nature now. Every centimeter of ground must be "sounded out." There's no other way. The blast will resound with a sinister echo among the mountains if the mechanism of any "surprise" placed by a Dushman's hand should work.

There is no time to wipe the sweat from his brow, no time to straighten his back. "We are like archeologists," Abbas sometimes jokes. And there is a certain aptness in these words: Archeologists return to life objects which man lost long ago while combat engineers guard life itself. They guard it at a risk to their own lives. Abbas has been awarded the order of the Red Star and the "For Valor" medal. He has to his credit, in a comparatively brief space of time, 118 defused mines and incendiary devices. That is 118 duels with death.

His comrades in arms know Abbas as a fearless, selfless man. The commander once said of him: "Israfilov has the character of a frontline soldier." There is a lot behind those meaningful, accurate words.

The cold wind beat at the tent walls. But inside there was warmth from the emotional words and the high pitch of feeling.

The soldiers were speaking of an exploit....

Soviet Army Kindness, Bravery

LD190740 Moscow TASS in English 0623 GMT 19 Mar 83

["Over and Above the Call of Duty"--TASS headline]

[Text] Kabul, 18 Mar, TASS--The TASS correspondent reports:

The presence in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan of the limited contingent of Soviet troops has been marked by many good deeds. I should like to narrate some of them.

1. "Khashar" in a Kishlak

What does it cost to build a home? For some of the peasants of the Alpine Kishlak Kala-i-dala, new homes cost nothing at all. They were built by Soviet soldiers free.

...A gang of Dushmans has been dispersed. An Afghan army unit is gone on another combat assignment. A Soviet field-engineer company enters the Kishlak. Its orders are to clear the area of mines. The sappers fulfilled their mission before schedule. And then one of them--Sergeant Sabit Nugmanov--told his comrades about an old fine custom existing in Uzbekistan where he comes from. "When in a Kishlak back home someone decides to build a house, all the inhabitants come over to help him. The custom is called 'khashar', and people really put their heart into it."

All the company supported the sergeant's proposal to organise such a "khashar" in the Afghan village ravaged by the assault of the bandits. And the work was in full swing. New homes grew like mushrooms. Even smoke appeared in a new home's chimney stack--the grateful hosts began cooking a dinner for all the builders. And they celebrated the house-warming together: Soviet soldiers and Afghan peasants. In addition to the new homes, the soldiers left the villagers another "present"--the wonderful tradition of "khashar." Thus, a difficult job one cannot handle alone will yield to concerted efforts of friends.

2. With no right to make an error

A badge "for mine clearing" and a medal "for courage," blazed on the uniform of the Private Umar Khidoyatov. He received them for his gallantry and skill.

The school which the children of a kishlak were preparing to attend was found to have been mined. Some of the local people saw the Dushmans carrying ammunition there, and the rapid action of the Afghan army unit prevented the bandits from blasting the school.

The company commander, Senior Lieutenant B. Ulyukin asked for volunteers. All the company stepped forward. The commander selected the most experienced ones. Private Khidoyatov was the first to enter the school to reconnoiter.

The minutes of waiting, with time seeming to have paused: An explosion may follow at any moment. A sapper has no right to make an error--it will be his first and last. Was Umar calm? No, he was not. Was he nervous? Very. But this was no hindrance in his work. Rapidly and confidently, he examined every square metre of the premises. "Surprises" cropped up, now here, now there. Losing no time to defuse them--his comrades would take charge--he only marked the mines' locations by little flags.

...On the morrow, the company was leaving the kishlak. Little boys and girls spilling out of the school long waved them goodbye. And the Soviet soldiers set out to face further challenges.

Attack on Rice Convoy

PM240943 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 March 1983 publishes on page 3 a 2,200-word undated Afghanistan dispatch by special correspondent Col Yu. Teplov under the heading "That Bitter-Sweet Rice," describing a Soviet army convoy's journey from Qonduz to Kabul with a consignment of rice. Teplov describes a halt while combat engineers cleared mines from the road and mentions a driver whose cab has "two holes going all the way through--a reminder of an encounter with bandits." Having described the convoy's progress through "the most unsettled section of the route--the three Baghlans," Teplov continues:

"But we only had to leave northern Baghlan for the absence of human life to affect our nerves and for the tension to begin to mount. Again dark hovels and dry irrigation ditches passed by on both sides. It seemed that the silence which consumed even the roar of the motors was about to be broken by a shot or burst of fire.

"That is what happened. Ahead a submachinegun emitted along, chattering burst, and then a rapid burst of fire came from closer by.

"'It's started,' my neighbor, guards Ensign Koka, said without any expression in his voice.

"The next burst struck right by us. Twice it clattered against the armoring. The convoy continued to advance, but the speed had increased noticeably. Then the shooting abated as abruptly as it had begun.

"'Surely that's not all?' Koka said in surprise.

"This time it was indeed 'all.' Not as it had been 3 days before, when a convoy was traveling to Qonduz. Then the Dushmans even fired on the trucks with a grenade launcher. The convoy had been obliged to stop.

"Drivers Vitaliy Fadeyev, Aleksandr Demin, Gennadiy Ivanov and Sergey Sychev jumped from the cabs, dropping behind the wheels of their trucks. Ours was

approaching them along the open side of the road. From the front and rear of the convoy two armored transports came in and covered the Ural trucks with their flank plating, for the convoy had to be diverted as rapidly as possible. Fadeyev rapidly crawled to the leading vehicle and jumped through the open cab door, but a Dushman's bullet prevented him from moving off, stinging him somewhere near the knee. But guards Capt Viktor Maslennikov took the wheel of the Ural and the truck moved off. The second Ural was driven out of range of fire by guards Lt Mikhail Alkhimov, the rations and forage officer....

"That was what had happened 3 days before. But today we passed through this sector almost peacefully. Indeed, it had previously been considered quiet. Freight had traveled in both directions along this road and reached its destination with no special adventures.

"I wonder now why it was precisely this convoy which generated such fierce hatred among the Dushmans? And I can find only one explanation: rice. It is inconvenient to the counterrevolution for the food situation in the republic to be stabilized, for the people to see that the people's power wants to make their lives easier and that soldiers with Red Stars on their caps are ready to aid them at any moment.

"It is now known that a combined gang had come down from the mountains and was waiting for the rice convoy in particular. Perhaps the gang ringleaders reckoned that the Soviet soldiers would take fright and refuse to carry so peaceful and so dangerous a load....

"Time marches on. It not only heals wounds but also changes people's mentality. The hamlet inhabitants who heard the shooting at the time looked fearfully at the advancing convoy. How would the soldiers behave now? Would they have reprisals? There were no jokes or smiles. But our servicemen were perfectly well aware that the people and the bandits are not one and the same...."

The final part of the report briefly describes Teplov's parting with the convoy and his thoughts on the Soviet servicemen's work.

CSO: 1801/234

ARMED FORCES

POLITICAL WORKERS CANNOT AVOID 'POINTED QUESTIONS'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jan 83 p 2

[Interview with Col Igor' Fadeyevich Ovcharov, chief of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation and deputy chief of the SGF Political Directorate, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col M. Malygin; date and place not specified]

[Text] The breath of battle could be felt everywhere in the training center. The echo of explosions rolled across the firing range while here and there could be heard the bark of automatic-weapon and machine-gun fire. With a low note that sounded almost continuously, the mighty roar of the combat vehicles was woven into this "symphony."

Together with Col I. Ovcharov, chief of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation and deputy chief of the SGF Political Directorate, I visited many training stations. Little by little, I sized up the way this experienced political worker handled himself in this or that situation, how he made contact with people, what he spoke about with them and the tone of voice he used. This came to him very naturally.

At one of the control points we lingered a bit in order to find out the results of an exercise performed by a company with whose soldiers Igor' Fadeyevich had spoken the day before, frankly and sincerely. As we waited, a spontaneous conversation arose regarding the style used by commanders and political workers in working with people and the necessity of being closer to them.

[Answer] Col I. Ovcharov (speaking slowly, as if turning things over in his mind): Closeness to the people, of course, is not an abstract concept for a communist supervisor of any rank. It is, if you wish, a unique formula of conduct and, at the same time, the crowning touch on all his efforts. It was with good reason that the most serious attention at the 26th Party Congress and the November Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was devoted to the problem of bringing ideological and educational work closer to the people.

In what is our closeness to the people manifested primarily? It is manifested in specific forms of contact. Breaks for classes, lectures, conversations in the party committee, question-and-answer sessions, reactions to requests, service meetings

and party and Komsomol conferences--such is our life in all its diversity. There is, nevertheless, a method of communicating, without which, I am deeply convinced, a teacher is simply defenseless. By this I mean the skill to make the transition from strict official relations to unofficial, confidential relations and to be a good "friend" in an unofficial setting.

[Question] These days, we have seen many times what kind of unexpected discoveries this skill can bring about and what new facets people illuminate in the process.

[Answer] Do you have in mind the 10-minute question-and-answer sessions in the company, arranged by the regimental commander, or the conversation Maj A. Korovin had with the soldiers regarding the cult of personality? Just recall how Maj N. Yatsenko, the party organization secretary, ended the discussion of his service in the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. We listened to him attentively and asked him many questions. There was something of a genuine mutual interest and total mutual understanding. Yet, Yatsenko was not satisfied. He saw that not everyone was taking part in the conversation, just the same people over and over again. When he asked the others why they were silent--were they not interested?--they answered him: "We are young soldiers. Let those who have served speak, we are somewhat embarrassed." After two or three leading questions, it became clear that this was not an incidental behavioral characteristic of the new recruits, but a reflection of rather peculiar and not always correct mutual relationships among the soldiers of various periods of service in the unit. Here was the way to solving the problem of uniting the collective.

It is very important to note that this is not some minor occurrence or chance incident in the work of Maj Yatsenko. Contact with people and conversations with them in an unofficial setting are not simply a duty for him but a professional and human requirement. Thus, he gets to know life better and influence people better.

[Question] However, it is not a simple matter to create such a setting, particularly, let us say, in one's office, where everything is disposed toward an official tone. Is it possible that it is precisely the devotion to official contact on the part of certain senior comrades that leads to the exact opposite effect--it puts distance between them and the people? One commander told me: "Several times I have called an officer to my office for a discussion. Either he is silent, or else he mumbles some incoherent response. We achieve nothing, although I did so wish to speak heart-to-heart. If the officer does not wish to be frank, we don't have to be. I just question him more intensely."

[Answer] You have to ask questions, of course--strictly, and in the party manner, when it is necessary to do so. Let us reflect on this for a moment, however, in greater detail. At the present time we cannot get by without various kinds of inquiries, reports, phone calls (which, incidentally, make it possible for supervisors to know life and people better). We cannot get by without personal contact with people in our offices. Let us say, for example, that it is a matter concerning appointment to a position, a recommendation or the investigation of circumstances surrounding a misdemeanor. There are all sorts of reasons why a commander or political worker would hold an official discussion. On the other hand, even a strictly official discussion in one's office does not have to be ostentatiously dry and formal. It is all a matter of the approach and the tone used to conduct the discussion. It depends upon whether the discussion is conducive to frankness and straightforwardness.

Unfortunately, not every commander succeeds in selecting the correct tone and in conducting the conversation from the standpoint of mutual interest. You will remember the report delivered by the deputy chief of POL services, Col-Engr A. Vasil'yev, at one of the sessions of the military Soviet of the group of forces. Speaking of political and educational work in one of the units, he listed the number of times he had been there, who he had invited to discussions and how much time was spent on them. Everything had been accounted for and recorded, only there was no one, however, who had anything good to say about the discussions. They were the kind of discussions, you know, in which one of the parties sits bolt upright on the edge of his chair,

[Question] There is one more curious item. Many times people have come to this unit from the POL service of the group of forces as well as from other services. They were interested in how the fuel and lubricants were stored, how the storage tanks were fitted out, how accounting was done, etc. One person would check one thing, another person would check something else, and (from their point of view, naturally) they would meet only with those people with whom it was necessary to meet in order to study the purely practical aspect of the matter. Is there a problem in the fact that, in every case, the representatives from the higher departments should seek extensive contact with the personnel? On the one hand, they receive additional information with regard to their particular question. On the other hand, they get to know what is wrong in the collective and what will later be made known to their superiors and their party organ. The most important thing is that they learn that, as communists, they are obliged to work among the masses, no matter where they may be.

[Answer] In such instances, unfortunately, these people forget that the improvement in combat readiness and discipline, the refinement of the training process, the campaign for economy and thrift and the execution of duties in competition--everything is solved through the people. You have to go to the people and talk with them. You have to learn the real causes of this or that phenomenon that you encounter here and influence it through the party word.

Once again I would like to emphasize the importance of confidentiality and sincerity. When you go out to meet a person or a group of people, and they feel like they are sitting on the edge of their seats, then little good is accomplished.

Moreover, they have to sense your interest. In one tank regiment I had to talk with the people in the presence of the unit's party committee secretary. The questions, as always, touched upon the most diverse issues, and the secretary carefully recorded everything in his notebook. One officer complained about unimportant living conditions. Another took offense at the way that certain communists from the administrative party organization treated their juniors. A third, who had just begun to speak, suddenly fell silent. When I asked him to continue, he noted, addressing the party committee secretary: "Comrade Major, several months ago, when you were here the last time, you wrote down these very questions in the same book and promised to help. But, as you can see, you are doing the same thing again." As soon as someone who is worried about something tells you what is wrong, be it a personal problem or one of general concern (in such a case, everything is important), support him with your advice and your actions. If you cannot answer immediately, tell him frankly. Then you will have to resolve the matter conclusively, answer convincingly and assist the individual.

I am firmly convinced that the supervisor is obliged to go to the people--into the barracks, the officers' dormitory and the training installations. During the course of direct and lively contact, it is easier to find out how the people live, what worries them and what kind of help they need. Then the interest you show in them will give them additional energy.

[Question] You gave the name of the unit propaganda officer, Major Korovin, in connection with his discussion of the cult of personality. Was this a planned discussion or was it impromptu?

[Answer] Korovin was checking up on the political classes in one of the units. During one of the breaks he talked with the soldiers, as they say, "about life." A question arose, and he answered it. There came more and more questions. As you can see, the conversation seemed to have no particular purpose, but it was serious political work indeed. In cases such as this, it is important that you do not avoid pointed questions and do not gloss over things. This is what Korovin did as he conducted an impromptu discussion that had arisen during the course of a conversation with the people. It was a discussion that dealt with the spiritual world and the culture of the Soviet peoples and the soldiers and sailors of the army and navy, as well as with the correct understanding of this issue.

[Question] However, Igor' Fadeyevich, the skill to win a person's trust is like the skill to talk about complex issues in a simple and understandable way--it does not come by itself.

[Answer] True, there is still very much for us to learn. We must think about the form and the content of the training offered by our instructors and propaganda workers.

On the other hand, people have to demand that this be done. We have to be very strict with those who feebly and unwillingly delve into the needs, moods and questions of the people and who avoid having constant contact with them. There is no doubt that these demands will grow.

[Text] An officer with a worried look on his face strolled by not far from us. Judging by everything, he was waiting for the colonel to be free. Igor' Fadeyevich called to him and asked him something. Excusing himself, the colonel moved with him off to the side. He listened to the senior lieutenant attentively, made notes in his notebook, asked this and said that. While they were talking, I noticed that "our" company received a rating of excellent for firing practice.

We again went with Col Ovcharov from one training station to the next. I did not ask him about the subject of the conversation he had with the senior lieutenant. It was enough to see the young officer's face and the way he walked. He walked with a firm step and he smiled.

ARMED FORCES

GENERAL SOBOLEV ON USSR FORCES, 'AGGRESSIVE' WEST

AU210930 Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 3, 1983 (signed to press 8 Feb 83)
pp 18-24

[Article by Col Gen M. Sobolev, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Reliable Guard of the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People"]

[Excerpts] The fighting men of our country mark the day of the Soviet army and navy, which has become a traditional all-people holiday, in the atmosphere of great political and labor enthusiasm. The personnel of the armed forces as well as all Soviet people work under the beneficial influence of the decisions of the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee plenum, the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, and the positions, conclusions and direction contained in the speeches of Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The fighting men of the army and navy unanimously support the policy of their own Communist Party which completely corresponds to the interests of the Soviet people.

The armed forces of the USSR have always stood and continue to stand guard over the people's peaceful labor. The words of the oath of the fighting men, spoken from the high rostrum of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses where the festive session dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR took place, resounded throughout the world: The party of Lenin and the Soviet people can firmly rely on their sons to carry out the honorable duty of defending the gains of socialism and peace. They are always on guard, always ready to defend reliably their beloved fatherland and its allies. [Passage omitted on the history of the Soviet armed forces]

In the years that passed since the war the Soviet Union has built a developed socialist society. It has become a powerful state where socialist democracy is being constantly developed and perfected, and the material and cultural level of the life of the Soviet people is constantly rising.

The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress opened for our people even more majestic prospects of communist construction. The economic and social strategy elaborated by the congress is manifested in the improved well-being of the people and the strengthened economic and defense might of our fatherland. The documents of the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee plenum,

the materials of the festive session marking the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and the speech at this session by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, determine the further paths of development of the country of the Soviets.

Our success and the successes of the working people of the fraternal countries in building socialism have not been easy. During the decades that passed since the great patriotic war the world has repeatedly witnessed the exacerbation of the situation. The aggressive imperialist forces have not benefited from the lessons taught by the crushing defeat of fascism in World War II. Relying on the economic and military might of the United States, the imperialist circles are trying to turn back the wheel of history, put a break on the progressive movement of the peoples and "reshape" the map of the world. They have girded the globe of the earth with military bases, created a system of aggressive military blocs and waged "cold war." In these circumstances, the Communist Party and the Soviet government were forced to undertake all possible measures aimed at strengthening the defense capability of our country and the combat might of the armed forces so that no possible intrigues of our enemies could catch us unawares.

Imperialism's nature was and continues to be the same; it is aggressive. As the experience of recent years shows, adventurism and the readiness to put the vital interests of mankind at stake for the sake of its narrow egoist aims have manifested themselves in the policy of imperialism in an increasingly undisguised fashion. The most militant groups whose class hatred of socialism prevails over the sense of reality and, at times, even over common sense, have become more active.

The aggressive circles of imperialism and, first and foremost, the U.S. militarists are now bluntly preaching the cult of military force and openly declaring their aspirations to play "leading role in the world" and achieve world domination. The present U.S. administration, having declared a "crusade" against communism, social revolutions and social progress, is pursuing the course of gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union.

Alongside the unrestrained arms race and intensive military preparations, the imperialists in the United States and other NATO countries have developed an unbridled anti-Soviet campaign. The ruling circles of the United States and the NATO ringleaders are inflating with all possible means the myth of the Soviet military threat and the "superiority of Soviet military might." It is obvious that this foreign political disinformation is unfounded and false. It is calculated to deceive the public and it serves to justify the unprecedented military expenditures and the U.S. aggressive doctrines. The real aim of these ill-intentioned declarations is to upset the parity between the USA and the USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as regards military-strategic forces, wind up to the full extent the mechanism of the arms race and push the world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe.

However, neither economic blockades nor "cold war" nor military aggression have been able in the past or are able now to stop the victorious march of socialism and the struggle of the peoples for their social and national liberation.

The Soviet people, having themselves borne the burdens and horrors of the past war and being devoted to the cause of peace, completely and entirely support the peace program for the eighties adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress and the peace-loving initiatives put forward by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. At the same time our people realize quite well that it is impossible to get peace out of the imperialists by begging and that real force is required to preserve peace and defend socialism's revolutionary gains against aggression.

Keeping a vigilant watch over the intrigues of the opponents of peace and of the relaxation of international tension, the Leninist Party is taking effective measures to maintain the defense capability of our country which guarantees peaceful conditions for communist construction. The party does not conceal from the people that the fulfillment of this task is not only a matter of great responsibility but also demands substantial expenditures. Our people and the state are forced to make these expenditures in order to guarantee the security of our socialist fatherland. Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, noted: "The aggressive intrigues of imperialism force us together with the fraternal socialist states to be concerned, seriously concerned, about maintaining the defense capability at the necessary level."

At present the Soviet armed forces are a powerful means of keeping in check the military strivings of the reactionary circles. They are a socialist military organization which has reached a new, higher form of development. The purpose of the armed forces of the all-people's state is to defend the socialist gains and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state and to maintain the state of constant combat readiness which guarantees an immediate rebuff to any aggressor. This demand results from the Leninist tenet that the defense of the socialist fatherland is one of the main functions of the state and an all-people's cause.

The international ties of the countries of the socialist community are constantly expanding. The CPSU and the Marxist-Leninist parties of the Warsaw Pact member states are elaborating joint measures to coordinate their economic, political and military efforts aimed at strengthening the collective defense of socialism. The determination to strengthen further the cohesion of the socialist countries, to develop and deepen their political, economic and cultural cooperation and join their efforts in the struggle for the cause of peace and progress was confirmed in the political declaration of the Warsaw Pact member states adopted in Prague in January this year.

The achievements of the developed socialist society exert a determining influence on the content of the activity of the Soviet armed forces. The social sources of their might have strengthened and increased. The features characteristic of the army and navy have been developed further and enriched with a new content.

At present the Soviet armed forces are the forces of all the people as regards their social-political character. They express the will and interests of all classes and social strata of the society and of the entire multinational

Soviet people. The social bases for recruiting into the army and navy has expanded and qualitatively improved and the inner unity and moral-political cohesion of the personnel have increased. The mutual relationship between the army and the people has grown richer and assumed a more diverse nature.

The great achievements in our country's development and the constant strengthening of Leninist friendship between the peoples, vividly demonstrated in the days of celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, are a solid foundation of the combat might of the armed forces and their indestructible moral spirit. With their entire way of life our armed forces contribute to instilling in the fighting men deep respect for the working people of all nations, for their customs and national feelings. The Russian language contributes to the yet closer drawing together of the fighting men of different nations and to their successful training and education. The army and the navy continue to be a good school of socialist internationalism.

The powerful economic base of a mature socialist society and the high level of development of the production forces and of the scientific-technical progress in the USSR make it possible to create sufficient quantities of the most up-to-date types of combat equipment and weapons. The party has imparted a systematic and purposeful nature to the process of qualitative changes in equipping the armed forces and has determined the main tasks in the military-technical sphere whose solution guarantees that the defense needs will be satisfied in the most complete fashion.

Under the party leadership enormous work has been carried out to perfect the material-technical basis and organizational structure of the armed forces which fully correspond to contemporary demands. All arms of the armed forces --strategic missile troops and land forces, air force and air defense forces as well as our navy--have achieved a new, higher level of development. Never in the past did they possess such equipment, weapons and combat might as nowadays. All of this made it possible to attain parity in strategic weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In this connection all sorts of cock-and-bull stories are made up in the West and the "Soviet military threat" is profusely talked about. Our country has never threatened anybody and does not threaten anybody now. It has always said and continues to say that only balanced parity guarantees peace whereas an attempt to upset it to the advantage of the imperialist powers would represent a threat of unleashing nuclear war. The Soviet state is not demanding unilateral disarmament from the West. Yu.V. Andropov's replies to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent demonstrate this very convincingly.

In solving the basic questions of technically equipping the army and navy the Communist Party proceeds from the fact that man was and continues to be the main force in a war. New types of weapons and broad automatization of the process of commanding troops and weapons do not reduce the role of a fighting man, nor the significance of his professional, moral-psychological or physical qualities. The main determining indicator of the might of our armed forces is their constant combat-readiness which guarantees an immediate rebuff to any aggressor. The enormous efforts and material expenditures of

the people for equipping the army and navy, as well as the awareness, training and discipline of all servicemen, the skill of commanders in directing the troops and many other things are focused in combat-readiness. This is both the result of the labor and the permanent task of our military cadres, communists and the entire personnel of the army and navies.

The personnel of the armed forces marked the day of the Soviet army and navy with outstanding results in enhancing combat-readiness. In the course of the broadly developed socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR the combat-readiness of units and ships was enhanced, the training and combat skill of the personnel, the skill of our cadres in commanding military collectives and effectively using combat and technical means were further perfected. The ranks of fighting men with excellent results [otlichnik] and high-class specialist as well as excellent [otlichniy] units and ships grew in all arms of the armed forces. At the summing up of exercises, while carrying out training-combat assignments in difficult conditions and on military duty the fighting men demonstrated great skill and coordination. [passage omitted on training of personnel]

One of the main priorities is given to the task of faultless mastering of weapons and military equipment on the part of the personnel. Aware of their patriotic and international duty, the fighting men are determinedly learning to operate skillfully the missile systems and electronic systems, to pilot supersonic planes, to navigate nuclear powered vessels, to utilize various types of modern technical means, and to vigilantly guard the state borders as well as the air and sea boundaries of their fatherland.

The decisive role in organizing the training of the fighting men and in the process of perfecting their combat skill belongs to our officers. At present the military councils, commanders and political organs are working with great energy and determination at implementing the party's directions aimed at placing politically mature and competent people full of initiative and having organizational talents and a feeling for that which is new, in the decisive positions.

Our officers are the pride of the Soviet armed forces. The share of officers with higher, special military and engineering-technical education has significantly increased, both in the army and navy. A wide network of higher military-educational institutions provides their graduates not only with professional knowledge and instills in them high ideopolitical and moral qualities but also educates among them the knowledge and skills of personnel instructors. Further perfection of the political and business qualities of young officers is continued in the course of their practical work in the army units and on ships.

The history of the Soviet armed forces convincingly demonstrates that high moral spirit has always been and continues to be our army's most powerful weapon. The experience in times of peace also attests to this. Genuinely high-quality and a stable solution of the--ever more complex--tasks of training the troops and maintaining the combat-readiness of units and ships can only be guaranteed on the basis of steadily enhanced ideological staunchness and political awareness of the fighting men which can be achieved through

well-organized party-political work. As regards its content and forms, it continues, as everything that is alive, to be constantly perfected while taking into account the diverse experience of all-party building and the demands of the army and navy development. The units and sub-units are profoundly studying the materials of the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee plenum as well as the festive session marking the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. Lectures are being delivered and political studies and theoretical conferences are being held.

[Paragraph omitted on Marxist-Leninist training of officers]

An active role in the struggle to enhance further the effectiveness and quality of party-political work is played by the army and navy party organizations. Communists-fighting men are a combat detachment of the glorious Leninist Party and the cementing and inspiring force of the army and navy. Communists have added the most vivid pages to the heroic chronicle of the Soviet people and the armed forces. Nowadays in peace time the party members are also setting the tone in combat and political training and in observing the military oath and the fighting men's statutes. They see their purpose and vocation as well as their sacred duty to the party and fatherland in the constant growth of the combat-readiness of the troops. [Passage omitted on the share of communists among the officers and fighting men]

The party organization is the political nucleus of the military collective and the center of its ideological-educational activity. We can see quite clearly that in those collectives where the ideological-political efforts of the party organizations are organically intertwined with the living tissue of military life, where the commander's duty to organize the training and the service is fulfilled by concrete party means, where the appeal to enhance combat-readiness and strengthen military discipline is supported by painstaking work with every fighting man, in those collectives. The military system is more monolithic and the professional skill of the personnel and its political awareness are higher.

Party organizations devote their greatest attention to strengthening military discipline. This is quite natural. The big and responsible tasks which are solved by army units and ships oblige us to approach with stricter criteria the evaluation of military discipline, to examine more profoundly the methods and means of party-political work aimed at educating the people in a spirit of a high state of discipline and industriousness, to devote unwavering attention to uniting military collectives and creating in them an atmosphere of genuine friendship and comradeship and strict execution of orders and demands imposed by the military oath and statutes. By strengthening in all possible ways the one-man-command system, the political organs and party organizations together with commanders guarantee the strong moral-political state of the army and the naval forces as well as the high state of organization and discipline. [passage omitted about the duties of army and navy communists]

The process of the further ideological and organizational strengthening of army and navy party organizations unswervingly continues. Their busy day-to-day life is filled with profound ideological content and is characterized by

efficiency and exactingness. The diverse experience of party work was summarized at the Sixth All-Army Conference of the Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. The conference played an important part in increasing further the initiativeness, activeness and principled nature of the party organizations while mobilizing the communists of the army and navy as well as their entire personnel for the successful solution of the tasks facing the Soviet armed forces under contemporary conditions. [Passage omitted on the role of the Komsomol]

Born of October and raised by the Communist Party the armed forces of the country of Soviets, shoulder to shoulder with the armies of the fraternal socialist countries, are honorably fulfilling their great historic mission of defending the gains of socialism and are a powerful bulwark of security and peace in the world world. Closely rallied around the Communist Party and its Central Committee, boundlessly devoted to the high ideals of communism, the Soviet fighting men are doing everything possible in order to justify the confidence placed in them by the party and the people and be a reliable defender of the great gains of socialism and a reliable guard of peaceful labor.

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NAVAL FORCES

NAVAL TRAINING SIMULATOR NOT FULLY UTILIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 83 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Chupakhin: "A Training Facility on a Cone-Shaped Hill"]

[Text] There is nothing remarkable about the appearance of this two-story building that rises up on a cone-shaped hill, not far from the docks. But if one goes inside, a cascade of typical sounds--the crash of metal, the splashing of water, the booming of voices--will rain down on you....In the training facility building here, in a special basin, is a so-called floating compartment--a simulator in the campaign for damage control of a ship.

The instructor who tends the trainer, Seagoing WO N. Salivonenko, after taking his place at the control panel, presses a few buttons and a small "storm" breaks out in the basin. The cumbersome steel floating compartment, which is essentially a full-size replica of a department of a ship, begins to heel, first to one side, then to the other....

The trainer's readiness for operation has been checked. The training session can be held. Today, cadets of one of the training subunits--future petty officers--will be at work here. Seagoing WO V. Zubov will supervise the training session.

The future petty officers, garbed in orange diving suits, take their places in the compartment. WO Salivonenko presses one of the buttons on the control panel, and a tight water jet from a hole literally broaches the compartment. Cadets A. Kudinov, M. Karel'skiy, S. Katayev and others rush there. Furious work starts. A patch, which two sailors try to press against the hole, will not stay on, the water is resistant and pours over the arms and faces of the servicemen.

In the end, the sailors finally block up the hole. And then, without a breather, they have to take still another cold "shower." "Bullet holes in the bulkhead!" They had just taken care of this situation when water started to break into the compartment from a "damaged" hatch.

Altogether, the test in the floating compartment lasted just a few minutes. But afterwards you would not recognize the sailors--their eyes are more feverish, their faces are lit up with the excitement of battle. A discussion of the misfortunes of the training session went on animatedly, and it was evident to all that each one had a feeling of pride that he had managed to master himself and to carry out the assigned mission.

To help the young sailors to harden their psychological attitudes--this is precisely one of the main tasks of the training facility. In addition to the floating compartment, two compartments for training sessions in firefighting and in frogman diving serve the same purposes here.

There is no need to prove the special significance of the instruction at the training facility for shipboard specialists. For it is clear that at sea it would be very complicated to conduct training sessions such as those conducted here, and sometimes it is simply impossible. Most of the fleet's crews understand its role well. In the office of Capt 2d Rank V. Kolmanovskiy, who has jurisdiction over the training facility, I became acquainted with the schedule for its workload. The picture as a whole that was painted was optimistic. Many charts showed high coefficients, which testified to the effective use that the sailors of various crews had made of the time spent in sessions on the simulators. But, alas, among them there were also insignificant values, and, in some cases, the charts for the sailors of landing craft, for example, showed zeros.

It is these zeroes that prompt comment about the training facility's problems. Among the chief ones is that of planning its work. Not everything is smooth here yet. Sea life, as is known, is extremely dynamic. A training session in the floating compartment is planned, let's say, for an emergency party of some kind of ship. But circumstances change and the people go to sea, the training session is called off, and the simulator is idle. What is the conclusion here? There is one, proposed by Kolmanovskiy and his subordinates. The units must systematically supply them with weekly schedules. Then it will be possible to introduce timely revisions into the plans, and there will be greater potential for flexibility. Unfortunately, not by far do all staff officers respond to this recommendation in a businesslike manner.

"Some of them," Capt 2d Rank Kolmanovskiy testifies, "instead of organizing and monitoring their subordinates' visits to the training facility, farm it out to the officers in charge of the subunits. They sometimes talk about it like this: 'Why should we send people someplace, people who are peaceful, when they are busy on the ship and are at hand? We are at a loss: why let some training group "waste" them?' They begin making telephone calls and inquiries...."

And they are preoccupied here with this question. Any training base, even the best, should be improved and developed. Training-facility instructors Seagoing WO's V. Kulachok, V. Gordybakin and others are doing much in this regard. Gordybakin, for example, recently created an original simulator for the operation of one of the ship's installations. Other similar innovations were introduced here before. But here is what is odd. These new simulators are not in any way finding popularity among the sailors. On some ships they don't even know about them. Yet each of these innovations was created in response to problems posed by actual experience.

The fact that questions about providing the facility with training items and spare parts are not always being solved properly lowers the facility's efficiency. Capt-Lt N. Trepysenko showed me correspondence that he was forced to carry on because of a lack of wood beams, props and wedges that are needed for the sessions. The officers appealed to various authorities for help, but things are still at a standstill.

...The sessions have ended. The sailors, after falling into formation, set out for their ships. And new groups of sailors going up the hill from the docks meet them. The training facility works actively and strenuously. But its efficiency could be raised still more if the problems that prevent it from achieving a maximum workload and maximum yield from each training section held here can be solved.

NAVAL FORCES

BOOK ABOUT NAVAL SHIP CAPTAIN'S DUTIES REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Feb 83 p 2

[Review by G. Kostev, Vice-Adm and professor, of book "Komandir Korablya" [The Ship's Captain] by Yu. Ryss, Voenizdat, 1982, 270 pages]

[Text] In the centuries-old history of navies, not many books have been written that reveal the work of the ship's captain. And, of course, each such book is taken by readers, especially by young navymen, as a significant event.

How does one become a ship's captain? A simple and prosaic answer can be given to this question. One must complete secondary school, enter a naval school, serve as an officer aboard ships for several years, and, finally, after gaining a definite amount of service experience, as well as special knowledge and skills, be promoted to the post of ship captain.

But do all naval officers become a ship captain, does each have the fortune to turn out to reach the ship captain's position? How does one learn to be a ship captain?

Each young naval officer, I dare to believe, asks himself these questions. That is why, it would seem, Yu. Ryss's recently published book, "Komandir korablya," is so urgent and important.

In the modern era, when the Soviet Navy has moved out into the expanses of the World Ocean, where it performs important combat-training missions, the role of the ship's captain--the manager of the crew--grows especially. It is natural that Yu. Ryss's book proposes that its purposes are to enrich young naval officers with a commander's experience, to caution them at the first steps against the standard mistakes that are made, and to arm them with the required knowledge. This is what the author talks about. He himself has passed through all the stages of becoming a commander. He sailed the fleet's ships for 22 years. He was a mate, an executive officer, and commander of a destroyer. Relying upon his own experience and also the experience of other ship captains, the author gives advice about how to conduct oneself as a commander, from the first steps. Instructive examples that are drawn from the memoirs of admirals and naval officers are used successfully in the book.

The book reviewed many aspects of a ship captain's activity. But the chapter, "The Core of Any Organization," is of special interest, it would seem. It examines ways for strengthening military discipline and indoctrination in the state of discipline

and preciseness and responsibility for the job. The serviceman's understanding of the necessity and usefulness of discipline, the author stresses, and his internal assent to the fact that aboard ship the subordination of all to the will of one should evolve into the firm conviction that discipline is an indispensable prerequisite to the accomplishment of the mission that faces the collective. However, such a conviction does not arise all by itself. And it is the task of the commander-indoctrinator to convince his subordinates of this by word and example. The book cites much useful advice, such as relying upon the party organization, rallying the collective, raising the consciousness of each sailor, and strengthening discipline and order.

The commander's personal example is very important for the overall environment on the ship, for welding the collective and for indoctrinating subordinates in the spirit of conscientious fulfillment of military duty. For it is well known that a good commander and his experience remain in his subordinates' memories throughout their whole life. These and his habits, his skill in influencing the crew, his vast knowledge and his skills in handling the ship. All this is unforgettable. This is especially emphasized in the book. It is a pity, however, that the author tells us little about the captains who make up the history of our navy, their peculiarities and workstyles, and, finally, the individuals themselves, as outstanding personalities. This would greatly enliven the book and enrich it with cases and instructive examples. It would seem that in a book about the ship's captain, an appeal to history, aside from the absorbing cases and events, would help to reveal one of the main principles of service activity of the modern ship captain: to show an example, to everyone and at all times, of fulfillment of service duty. Unfortunately, Yu. Ryss has not devoted a separate chapter to this topic but has put it into the chapter, "The Captain Is an Indoctrinator," and told about it briefly and, to an annoying extent, in a general fashion.

Naval service is difficult, but it is especially so for the commander, both in degree of responsibility and in psychological and physical workloads. Naval matters require special work on oneself. The well-known pedagog K. S. Ushinskiy wrote about this: "Some occupations require physical skill, others a special turn of mental characteristics: but the sailor's occupation demands the whole person unreservedly. Yu. Ryss faithfully notes that full devotion of oneself to the job is an excellent feature of our best ship captains.

In order to get nearer to the duty of the ship captain in terms of knowledge, not to mention experience, it must be recognized that the main thing in the commander's job is skill in attacking the enemy. The attack is the consummation of the captain's art. The chapter, "Handling of the Ship in a Combat Situation," is dedicated to this topic. It is constructed on historic cases and examples that enliven the book. The chapter is read with interest, although, in my view, the art of attack, of vanquishing the enemy, as the final purpose in the commander's work, is not revealed completely in it.

Perhaps nowhere but at sea are friendship, cohesion, a feeling of duty to the collective and comradeship so required. Indoctrination of the crew is a central element in daily life, which the ship's captain should take completely to heart, sparing neither personal time nor effort. Yu. Ryss's book has collected and generalized the material on this matter most voluminously. The reader will find here no little businesslike and useful advice and will read it to advantage.

The main school for the commander is daily service, the sailor's life itself. Publications that describe the captain's work, especially his service activity, will, of course, help to shorten the time spent at this school. In this regard, Yu. Ryss's book is desirable and necessary. It is practically the first in the postwar period, and it indisputably must be hailed as a rather good start. Its topic, which is important and urgent, deserves further development.

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NAVAL FORCES

CHIEF OF WARRANT OFFICERS' SCHOOL RELIEVED OF DUTY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 83 p 2

[Article: "Measures Were Taken"]

[Text] On 3 February, letters of Lieutenant-Captain V. Mitroshkin, "Practical Experience for a 'Free Subject'", and Captain 3d Rank N. Zholob, "A Professional Selection is Needed", were published in our newspaper. The authors revealed a number of shortcomings in the preparation of naval specialists in several training subunits.

As the deputy commander-in-chief of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet Rear Admiral A. Apollonov reported to the editorial staff, Captain 2d Rank V. Nosachev, chief of the school for midmen and warrant officers, was transferred to the reserves for dereliction in the organization of training for students and weak exactingness of his subordinates. The student company commander Major V. Ryzhov, who did not exercise the necessary control over the students' class attendance, was punished in a disciplinary manner. The student subunit headed by Lt Col E. Aminov was pointed out for having shortcomings in the work of instilling firm professional knowledge and skills in student radio-telegraph operators.

The facts stated in the letters, were discussed in detail with all the directors responsible for the preparation of warrant officers [midmen and junior specialists] and junior specialists. Measures were taken to improve the quality of professional selection in the student subunits and to perfect the organization of students' practical experience on ships.

Unfortunately, the author of the letter "Practical Experience for a 'Free Subject'" allowed inaccuracy, having indicated that the specialty of the student Voronin was that of a finance disbursing officer. This does not correspond to reality, since the warrant officer school does not prepare such.

12198

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

DOSAAF TOUTS SOCIETY'S ACHIEVEMENTS SINCE 1977

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Feb 83 p 2

[Article: "From One Congress to the Next"]

[Text] DOSAAF has 355,000 primary organizations and a membership of 103 million. In 1977 the defense Society had more than 80 million members in 324,000 primary organizations.

Blue- and white-collar workers make up 60.3% of the defense Society's membership, 11.9% are kolkhoz workers and 27.8% are students.

A total of 47,000 people took part in the All-Union Review/Competition of Primary Kom-somol and DOSAAF Organizations and the testing of pre-draft and draft-age youth in military-technical training, which were conducted in 1980-1981. Participants in the review/competition themselves built and equipped 9,000 military-technical rooms, 7,000 technical sports installations and around 7,000 obstacle courses. A total of 870,000 competitive events were held in the technical and applied military types of sports.

The defense Society has around 3 million activists, more than 1,250,000 of which work in DOSAAF technical sports clubs. Each year the clubs turn out up to 25,000 public trainers and instructors, 280,000 public referees for the technical and applied military types of sports.

The training of specialists for the national economy is one of the important areas of DOSAAF work. More than 12 million specialists in the mass technical occupations were trained in DOSAAF training organizations and clubs and DOSAAF courses during the period 1977-1982. This was 4 million more than were trained during the preceding report period.

DOSAAF promotes 18 technical and applied military types of sports. A total of 57 different types of competitions are held in these sports.

A total of 22.5 million rated sportsmen, 357,000 candidate sports masters and 1st-rank sportsmen, 7,714 sports masters of the USSR and 326,000 international sports masters have been produced in the defense Society since the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress.

Our aviation sports, which have been in existence more than 60 years now, have an interesting history and traditions of victory. Gliding is rightly referred to as the cradle of Soviet aviation. The names of Soviet glider pilots are frequently to be

found on the list of world records of the International Aviation Federation. Today they soar through the air at speeds exceeding 140 kilometers per hour, reach altitudes of up to 14 kilometers and travel distances of 1,000 or more kilometers.

11499

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

ACTIVITIES OF NINTH ALL-UNION DOSAAF CONGRESS

Activities of Congress Summarized

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 18 Feb 83 p 1

[Article: "A School of Courage, a School of Patriotism"]

[Text] Discussion on the accountability reports continued during the evening meeting of 16 February. The following spoke in the discussions: V.N. Makeyev, AUCCTU secretary; A.M. Khodzhibayev, chairman of the Central Committee of the Uzbek SSR DOSAAF; Major General (Zoan Tue), chairman of the Standing Committee of the Vietnam People's Organization of Defense Indoctrination; Vice Admiral Gunter Kutchebauch, chairman of the Central Directorate of the German Democratic Republic's "Sports and Technology" society; V.T. Desyatov, director of the Volga Bearing Plant in Volgograd Oblast; Hero of Socialist Labor D. Rafikov, committee chairman of the DOSAAF primary organization on the Kolkhoz imeni Zhdanov in the Kirghiz SSR; I.R. Dubyaga, chairman of the DOSAAF committee of Leningrad and the oblast; D.A. Okhoromiy, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee; Kim Duk Chung, deputy chairman of the Committee for Physical and Sports of the Korean People's Democratic Republic; M.L. Yemel'yanova, student at the SGPTU[expansion unknown] in the city of Verkhnyaya Pyshma, Sverdlovsk Oblast; and E.Ya. Evin, chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee of the Latvian SSR.

The delegates and guests at the conference were greeted by fightingmen of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Guards Colonel V.K. Kryukov, commander of an excellent unit in the famous Guards Motorized Rifle Taman Division imeni M.I. Kalinin, spoke for them.

He expressed gratitude to the twice order-bearing defense Society for its active participation in the preparation of Soviet youth to fulfill their military duty. The speaker underscored the fact that "we rightly consider DOSAAF as the combat reserve of the army and navy, as a preparatory classroom of the great school of life which service in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces provides."

V. Kryukov stressed the fact that DOSAAF organizations are performing an important and noble job. The more effective the work of the defense Society, the more rapidly the youth entering the ranks of the Armed Forces master their combat specialties and become fightingmen.

From the platform of the 26th CPSU Congress Soviet fightingmen took an oath to their own Communist Party to always be prepared, along with armies of the Warsaw Pact states, to honorably protect socialism's great conquests. This promise is being successfully fulfilled.

The training year is now in full swing in the army and navy. And every day is a step toward new levels of combat maturity. All of the fightingmen entered into socialist competition with the slogan "Increase vigilance and reliably assure the homeland's security!". Together with all the Soviet people, they are preparing to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces in a worthy manner, V. Kryukov said.

For the fightingmen the speaker wished the congress delegates and guests large new successes in the indoctrination of patriots and the preparation of the youth to protect the socialist homeland.

The following spoke at the morning session on 17 February: P.K. Maksimov, chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee of the Belorussian SSR; V.V. Smolin, absolute world champion in aerobatics; Colonel Arnaldo Tamajo Mendez, chairman of the National Council of the Republic of Cuba's Society for Military-Patriotic Indoctrination; Jambym Jamyan, chairman of the Central Council of the Society for Assistance to Defense of the Mongolian People's Republic; Hero of the Soviet Union S.Ye. Savitskaya, pilot/cosmonaut of the USSR; F.Ye. Shtykalo, deputy USSR minister of education; Zygmunt Huszcza, chairman of the Main Directorate of the National Defense League of the Polish People's Republic; A.A. Bodyu, committee chairman of the primary DOSAAF organization of the "KrasnoyarskGESstroy" administration; I.G. Nazimok, chairman of the All-Union Federation of Applied Military All-Round Athletics; Georgiy Vladyka, member of the Executive Committee of the Socialist Republic of Romania's National Council on Physical Education and Sports; Lieutenant General Vatslav Goryachek, chairman of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's Union for Assistance to the Army; M.D. Stepanenko, chief of the Dmitrov DOSAAF Model Driver Training School in Moscow Oblast; Sahit Klokoci, conference chairman of the "Popular Technology" society of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and Division General Muhammed Ibrahim al-Ali, commander of the People's Army of the Syrian Arab Republic.

After a break, the following spoke at the morning session on the second day of the congress: G.T. Oshchepkov, chairman of the Altay Kray DOSAAF Audit Committee; Hero of Socialist Labor Z.Zh. Tamshibayeva, director of the "Yembenshi" sovkhos in the Kazakh SSR; G.K. Kustov, chairman of the Omsk Oblast DOSAAF Committee; and E.P. Vaytekunene, chairman of the Akmyane Rayon DOSAAF Committee in the Lithuanian SSR.

The delegate discussions and speeches by the congress guests have ended. A final speech was made by Fleet Admiral G.M. Yegorov, chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. "Our congress," he stated, "is being held under the inspirational ideological influence of the CPSU Central Committee's greeting. Permit me to express once more our sincere gratitude to the Lenin party's combat staff for its daily supervision of the defense Society's work. We shall do everything possible to increase the contribution made by DOSAAF organizations to the fulfillment of decisions coming out of the 26th party congress and the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee."

It is important for us to note that delegates from DOSAAF organizations of the Union republics and the nation's largest industrial and agricultural regions took part in the discussion on the reports. Their talks added significantly to the accountability reports. We can be confident that the new membership of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee will carefully study the critical comments and ideas expressed here and will do everything necessary to take these into account in its work.

The speeches by the foreign guests at the congress, G.M. Yegorov stressed, have convincingly demonstrated the oneness of our goals and tasks and are clear confirmation of the inviolable friendship of our peoples and of their unity in the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism.

The discussion of the reports was lively and demonstrated a high level of earnestness and principle. This is convincing evidence of the unity of the defense Society's ranks, the maturity of its directing organs and our readiness to continue adding to our successes and move ahead.

The Communist Party teaches us to concentrate on unresolved matters, while giving due credit for what has been achieved. We need to strictly follow this party rule, to perfect our work practices, develop creative initiative and disseminate progressive experience.

G.M. Yegorov expressed confidence that the congress decisions will help to mobilize the DOSAAF members to implement the program outlined for further improving the effectiveness of military-patriotic and mass defense work in the spirit of demands set by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government.

The congress then unanimously adopted a decision to approve the practical performance of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee for the report period.

A resolution on the accountability report of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, a decree on specific changes in the USSR DOSAAF Charter and a congress resolution approving the report from the Central Audit Commission of the USSR DOSAAF were unanimously adopted.

The congress moved on to the election of central DOSAAF organs.

Following a break the congress heard a report from A.I. Averin, chairman of the Accounting Commission and deputy chairman of the DOSAAF committee of Leningrad and the oblast, on the results of elections to the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the USSR DOSAAF Central Audit Commission.

During the break between the congress sessions there was an organizational plenum of the defense Society's Central Committee elected at the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress.

The concluding session of the congress took place after the break. Fleet Admiral G.M. Yegorov, chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, reported that at the plenum held during the break the Central Committee had elected its directing organs. He also reported that the Central Audit Commission of the USSR DOSAAF had elected a commission chairman and his deputies at its session.

G.M. Yegorov reported that the congress had received numerous congratulatory telegrams and letters from DOSAAF organizations, military units and subunits, workers' collectives, schools, Society activists and sportsmen. He spoke for the delegates to express sincere gratitude to all those who had sent greetings and good wishes.

The congress delegates approved with enormous enthusiasm a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers.

With this the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress concluded its work.

Standing Commissions of DOSAAF Central Committee

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 18 Feb 83 p 1

[Article: "Standing Commissions of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee"]

[Text] For purposes of further studying current problems in the defense Society's work, developing proposals and recommendations on matters of improving mass defense, military-patriotic, training and sports work in light of demands set by the CPSU and decisions adopted at the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress, the 1st Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee resolved to form the following standing commissions under the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee from the members of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee:

--a commission on mass organizational work (with V.I. Zhmurko, chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast DOSAAF Committee, as commission chairman);

--a commission on military-patriotic propaganda (with V.A. Glebskiy, chairman of the Kuybyshev Oblast DOSAAF Committee, as commission chairman);

--a commission on the training of youth for service in the Armed Forces of the USSR (with F.I. Kolesnikov, chairman of the Krasnodar Kray DOSAAF Committee, as commission chairman);

--a commission on the propaganda of technical military knowledge and the training of cadres in DOSAAF organizations for the mass technical occupations for the national economy (with V.F. Tarasov, chairman of the Ivanovo Oblast DOSAAF Committee, as commission chairman);

--a commission for the development of technical and applied military types of sports (with Ye.F. Shkurov, chairman of the Penza Oblast DOSAAF Committee, as commission chairman);

--a commission to work with all levels of the student youth and teenagers (with M.A. Shmelev, deputy chairman of the Uzbek SSR DOSAAF Central Committee, as commission chairman);

--a commission for the development of the materials and equipment base in DOSAAF organizations (with B.I. Suslov, chairman of the Gorkiy Oblast DOSAAF Committee, as commission chairman);

--a commission for organizing the production work of DOSAAF enterprises (with I.G. Kondratov, chairman of the Rostov Oblast DOSAAF Committee, as commission chairman).

Meetings of the standing commissions were held, at which plans for the work in 1983 were approved.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

NINTH ALL-UNION DOSAAF CONGRESS

Resolutions Reported

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 20 Feb 83 pp 1-2

[Text of resolution: "Resolution of the Ninth All-Union DOSAAF Congress on the Report 'Accountability Report of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and Tasks Pertaining to Further Improving the Work Performance of the Defense Society Organizations in Light of Present-Day CPSU Demands'"]

[Text] The Ninth All-Union Congress of the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy is taking place in an atmosphere of aggressive political and labor activeness on the part of the Soviet people to implement the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the tasks advanced at the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and in the report by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at an official meeting dedicated to the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR. In the international arena our homeland is a bastion of peace, friendship and cooperation among all peoples and is waging a persistent and consistent campaign against nuclear war and the arms race, and for lessening international tension. In contrast to this, the imperialists are aggravating the situation and intensifying the threat of war. In these conditions the Soviet Union has been forced to take additional measures further to strengthen its defense capability.

The members of the multi-million-member Defense Society unanimously approve and totally support the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and Soviet Government and their purposeful and fruitful activities aimed at raising the people's living standards, strengthening world peace and the security of peoples, and strengthening the economic and defense might of the Soviet State.

The congress notes that all work done by DOSAAF in the period under review was closely linked with the affairs and thoughts of the Soviet people and was directed toward implementation of the historic decisions of the 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses and the decrees of CPSU Central Committee plenums. Today the Defense Society is a mass defense-patriotic organization of citizens of the USSR, the ranks of which contain 103 million members joined in 355,000 primary organizations. Under the tested and proven leadership of the Communist Party, DOSAAF organizations have achieved new performance levels in the principal areas of their patriotic activities.

The level of performance by many organizations of the Defense Society, however, is not yet fully in conformity with today's demands. Existing capabilities and reserve potential for more extensive enlistment of working people and young people to direct participation in mass defense activities are not being fully utilized.

Having listened to and discussed the accountability report of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the Ninth All-Union Congress of the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy orders the following:

Approval of the practical activities of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee during the period under review.

Principal efforts of DOSAAF organizations shall be concentrated on implementing the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the demands of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree of 7 May 1966, and on tireless efforts to improve the quality and effectiveness of mass-defense work among the general public. Active assistance in strengthening this country's defense capability and preparing working people to defend the socialist homeland will continue in the future to be the main task of the Defense Society.

I.

1. The Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF and the committees of the Defense Society, carrying out the instructions of the Communist Party on ideological matters, have carried out specific measures to raise the ideological-political level and increase the effectiveness of military-patriotic indoctrination of DOSAAF members. Certain positive experience has been amassed in this work, its link has been strengthened with the practical activities of defense organizations, and its forms have expanded. There has been an increase in the indoctrinational and organizational role of the periodical press and an improvement in the quality of literature put out by the DOSAAF Publishing House.

Not all committees, however, are working persistently to reorganize their activities in the spirit of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." An inseparable unity of patriotic and internationalist indoctrination of DOSAAF members with training them in the fundamentals of military affairs and enlisting them in active participation in the technical and applied military sports is not being secured everywhere. Indoctrination work continues to be poorly handled in some primary, training and sports organizations, and the specific features of the various population groups are not always taken into consideration. Military-patriotic measures are still frequently carried out on a low level and do not exert the requisite influence on the consciousness and conduct of DOSAAF members.

2. The congress believes that further improvement of military-patriotic work in light of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum shall remain one of the principal tasks of DOSAAF committees and organizations. They are urged to make their contribution toward forming in members of the Defense Society ideological conviction, political activeness, readiness and willingness to defend their homeland.

Toward this end it is essential constantly to improve the work being done by DOSAAF organizations in the area of patriotic and internationalist indoctrination of members of the Defense Society and to concern oneself with improving its quality and effectiveness. It is necessary thoroughly to explain to them the behests of V. I. Lenin, the demands of the CPSU, and the provisions of the USSR Constitution pertaining to defense of the socialist homeland, the heroic traditions of the party, the people, and their Armed Forces, the world-historic significance of the victories of the Soviet people, the great advantages and achievements of the society of developed socialism, and to instill pride in the socialist homeland and an understanding of one's patriotic duty to strengthen the economic and defense might of the USSR.

Measures conducted in honor of memorable dates and events in the life of the party and state must be more extensively utilized in military-patriotic indoctrination. It is necessary to take active part in preparation for and celebration of the 40th anniversary of the outstanding victories of Soviet forces in the Great Patriotic War and the 40th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory over fascist Germany.

DOSAAF committees and organizations shall take measures, jointly with Komsomol and other public organizations, to achieve further improvement of the content of the All-Union Komsomol and Youth Tour to sites of revolutionary, combat and labor glory of the Communist Party and Soviet people, mass-defense work months and weeks, and other military-patriotic measures which help prepare young people for service in the Soviet Armed Forces.

Antiimperialist propaganda shall be deepened and broadened, and determined action shall be taken to expose the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism and its NATO allies. A high degree of revolutionary vigilance and a feeling of personal responsibility for the destiny of the homeland shall be instilled in Soviet citizens.

Tireless activities by the party and government to achieve further strengthening of this country's defense capability and the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces shall be vividly and persuasively explained in agitation and propaganda work; today's army and navy life shall be propagandized. The quality and effectiveness of publicizing the activities of DOSAAF as a reliable assistant and reserve for the USSR Armed Forces shall be improved.

3. There shall be continued improvement of lecture propaganda on military-patriotic subject matter, with more extensive adoption of permanently operating forms of propaganda: Leninist readings, military-patriotic clubs, lecture series, faculties of people's universities, and film festivals. The makeup of lecturer groups attached to DOSAAF central committees of union republics, kray and oblast DOSAAF committees, and teams of speakers under the auspices of rayon (city) DOSAAF committees shall be strengthened, work with propagandists shall be improved, and they shall be provided with informational and methodological materials in a prompt and timely manner.

Requisite measures shall be taken to improve military-patriotic work directly in DOSAAF primary organizations, and a persistent effort shall be made to ensure that it is conducted in an orderly and purposeful manner, ensuring close

unity of indoctrination of DOSAAF members in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism with their military-technical training.

The mass media shall be extensively used in military-patriotic propaganda, and facilities shall be improved for the conduct of indoctrination work; the network of DOSAAF houses shall be expanded, and their role as mass defense activity methods centers shall be enhanced.

4. The ideological-political level and effectiveness of materials appearing in DOSAAF periodicals shall be improved. Newspapers and magazines shall extensively and comprehensively discuss advanced know-how and innovative undertakings to implement the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the tasks advanced at the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Topical issues pertaining to DOSAAF affairs and activities shall be raised for public discussion. The types of published materials shall be diversified, the working style of periodicals shall be improved, and efforts shall be made to ensure the effectiveness, persuasiveness and clarity of published materials. The DOSAAF Publishing House shall continue working on improving the quality of books and art produced, and shall work persistently in order fully to satisfy the requirements of DOSAAF organizations in military-patriotic, training-methods and sports literature.

II.

1. In conditions of increased danger of war, a continuous increase in the technical equipment of combat troops, and the specific features of modern combat, increased demands are being imposed on political conditioning, military-technical and physical training of young men for service in the Soviet Armed Forces.

In the period under review the majority of committees and training organizations implemented measures persistently and in an orderly manner to improve the quality of training specialists for the army and navy. Essentially all conditions have been created at DOSAAF schools and flying clubs in order successfully to accomplish their assigned tasks and to train worthy replacement personnel for the USSR Armed Forces.

At the same time high effectiveness of the training and indoctrination process is not being achieved in all training organizations. Some enrolled personnel are not acquiring solid knowledge and practical skills in working with equipment, or the requisite moral-political, psychological and physical qualities essential for service in military units and on naval ships. The faulty practice of unnecessary simplification and relaxation of demands in training, as well as giving undeservedly high grades to enrolled personnel has not yet been eliminated. Some schools and flying clubs are housed in poor facilities. Technical training devices are still not sufficiently extensively utilized. Efforts to raise the level of qualifications of teachers and shop instructors are not at an adequately high level.

2. The congress instructs the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF, the union republic DOSAAF central committees, kray and oblast DOSAAF committees to

continue in the future pursuing a consistent and more persistent policy of improving quality of training of specialists for the Armed Forces, especially practical skills.

To achieve this goal it is necessary to raise the level of administrative guidance of DOSAAF training organizations. It is necessary to analyze the results of their activities thoroughly and in a demanding manner, promptly to reach substantiated conclusions and to determine ways to improve teaching and indoctrination work, to improve the quality of specialist training, and precisely to determine tasks and ensure rigorous monitoring of their execution. A determined campaign must be waged against giving excessively high grades and against unnecessary situation simplification in training.

Measures shall be taken to achieve further improvement in selection, placement, and indoctrination of training organization cadres, constant concern shall be focused on improvement of their professional qualifications and teaching expertise, ensuring continuous improvement of their refresher and advanced training in DOSAAF courses and at DOSAAF schools, in military units and educational institutions. They shall be provided classes on a more frequent basis at leading training organizations.

3. Further improvement of political indoctrination work in DOSAAF training organizations is of paramount importance in preparing young men for active military service. The main thing is to ensure in a practical manner an inseparable link between training and indoctrination of personnel, skillfully utilizing for this purpose instruction classes, political training and political information sessions, mass forms of indoctrination and work with individuals, and patron ties with military units. The missions of the Armed Forces, the social significance and meaning of military service, as well as obligations pertaining to preparing for military service shall be thoroughly explained to preinduction youth; future conscripts shall be prepared in advance for the rigors of life in the army and navy, and an interest in learning a military occupational specialty and an aspiration to prepare better for performing their military duty shall be developed in them.

In order to strengthen the aesthetic and moral indoctrination of induction-age youth, the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF shall coordinate with the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Cultural Workers activities pertaining to improving the patron relationship between establishments in culture and the arts and DOSAAF training organizations.

4. The congress considers that in order successfully to accomplish these tasks it is important to continue in the future strengthening the physical facilities of training organizations and to ensure that these facilities reliably ensure accomplishment of training curricula. Work shall continue on improving the placing of DOSAAF schools, and technical teaching devices shall be more fully and effectively adopted in training activities. Effective measures shall be taken to increase the manufacture and perfect the designs of training simulators and to increase their operational reliability.

The Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF shall do the necessary work directed toward improving training curricula for preparing specialists for the Armed Forces, with the objective of increasing the percentage share and improving the quality of practical training of enrolled personnel, securing a higher degree of the young men's preparedness for service in the army and navy.

5. DOSAAF committees, working jointly with military commissariats and economic officials, shall step up efforts to ensure high quality of basic military training of induction-age young men at training stations and shall improve the level of training-methods guidance of their activities. They shall more aggressively assist general curriculum schools and other educational institutions in further improving student basic military training and in preparing young men for military service.

6. Prompt and high-quality execution of measures to prevent flight mishaps, highway and other accidents should be the focus of continuous attention on the part of officials of DOSAAF committees, training and sports organizations, and production enterprises. Officials and executing personnel shall bear increased responsibility for strict observance of safety rules and regulations and the requirements of manuals of procedures pertaining to equipment operation and servicing.

Effective measures shall be taken to achieve radical improvement of work at enterprises and in DOSAAF organizations pertaining to adopting a system of work safety standards and a labor safety management system.

III.

1. In performing the tasks assigned by the Communist Party, DOSAAF organizations actively participate in disseminating technical knowledge and in training for the nation's economy cadres of mass technical occupations which are of applied military significance. An appropriate system of training has been established in DOSAAF for this purpose, requisite physical facilities have been established, and instructor cadres are available. Training of specialists is improving year by year. Their level of proficiency, however, does not at the present time always meet today's requirements.

2. It is the task of DOSAAF committees and organizations to increase the effectiveness of training for the civilian economy cadres of mass technical occupations which are of applied military significance, on the basis of further improving the training process, training facilities, the teaching and professional skills of structure personnel.

In view of the fact that in 1983-1985 figures on training in DOSAAF organizations for the civilian economy cadres of mass technical occupations of applied military significance will be included in the state plans of the union republics, DOSAAF committees shall improve supervision of this area of activities and shall more fully utilize organizational and material capabilities in the interests of improving the quality of training specialists.

It is essential more fully to utilize the capabilities of training organizations and technical sports clubs and to develop the network of technical

training courses under the auspices of primary organizations for training cadres of mass technical occupations. It is necessary to strengthen cost accountability and increase profitability of training specialists for the civilian economy. Special attention shall be devoted to training cadres of mass technical occupations for agriculture and five-year plan construction projects, in areas of establishment of new territorial-production complexes and agro-industrial associations, as a genuine contribution by DOSAAF toward implementation of the USSR Food Program.

3. Work on dissemination of military-technical knowledge shall be improved. Lectures and reports, the mass media and visual propaganda, as well as visits to military units and naval ships shall be employed to reveal to DOSAAF members the essence of the scientific and technological revolution in military affairs and activities by the CPSU and Soviet Government pertaining to technical equipment of the army and navy; young men of preinduction and induction ages shall be acquainted with the life of Soviet servicemen and with the equipment and weapons of military subunits. Working in close coordination with the Znaniye Society, scientists, military experts, vanguard production workers, and outstanding performers in combat and political training shall be enlisted to disseminate technical knowledge. There shall be more extensive development of amateur radio and model building activities, with organization of public design offices and laboratories, every possible support for inventors and efficiency innovators; the desire of young people to learn how to drive a car and operate a motorcycle, to study radio engineering and electronics shall be more fully satisfied. Military commissariats shall be assisted in their work with reserve personnel with a military service obligation.

4. There shall be strengthened interaction between DOSAAF committees, civil defense headquarters, and organizations of the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Every effort shall be made to assist in accomplishing the tasks assigned to them, with skilled coordination of efforts in military-patriotic work, with assistance in preparing the general public to perform civil defense obligations and in offering medical first aid. The interests of civil defense in training cadres in the mass technical occupations shall be considered.

IV.

1. The congress notes that in the period under review further development of the technical and applied military sports continued, there was some improvement in mass participation in these sports, with improved qualitative indicators and increased effectiveness of defense sports activities. The leadership position of Soviet athletes in the international arena in the major technical sports was further strengthened.

At the same time certain Defense Society committees and sports organizations are slow about implementing CPSU decisions on increasing mass participation in physical culture and sports and enhancing their role in forming active builders of communism, skilled and courageous defenders of the homeland. Defense sports activities continue to be poorly conducted in many primary and some rayon DOSAAF organizations, a significant percentage of technical sports

clubs are still failing fully to accomplish their assigned tasks, and adequate attention to accelerated development of the motor and radio technical sports is not being devoted in all instances.

2. The congress considers it to be a principal task of DOSAAF committees and organizations in the area of defense sports activities to ensure persistent and consistent implementation of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers on further improving mass participation in physical culture and sports.

In coming years it is essential to achieve more mass participation in and improve results achieved by technical and applied military sports as well as their role in preparing young people to defend the socialist homeland, development in Soviet citizens of an active attitude toward life, improved labor productivity and organization of rest and recreation for working people. Special attention should be focused on combined accomplishment of these tasks, organizational and facilities support of their accomplishment.

3. Effective measures shall be taken to achieve radical improvement of defense sports activities and on development of the technical and applied military sports directly in primary DOSAAF organizations and in the neighborhoods. There shall be more extensive promotion of the shooting sports, applied military multiple competition, model building and other sports which do not require complex facilities and expensive equipment. There shall be fuller use of the capabilities of enterprises, construction projects, kolkhozes and sovkhoses, establishments and educational institutions in the interests of development of the technical and applied military sports, and an effort shall be made to involve in competition DOSAAF members operating their own personal automobiles and motorcycles. Jointly with trade unions, Komsomol, and sports organizations, an all-out effort shall be made to develop at general-curriculum schools, vocational schools and other educational institutions those technical and applied military sports which meet the needs and desires of young people enrolled in school and which are most available from an organizational and material-technical respect. DOSAAF organizations shall intensify efforts to involve the general public in meeting the performance standards of the GTO [Prepared for Labor and Defense] complex.

4. DOSAAF committees shall ensure further development of automotive, motorcycle, parachute, shooting and other sports at training organizations which are compatible with the training program for induction age youth. Efforts shall be made to ensure that all future servicemen achieve the performance standards of the GTO complex, with the majority meeting qualifying standards for category-rated athletes. There shall be an improvement in work pertaining to training at schools and DOSAAF clubs volunteer coaches, instructors, officials in the technical and applied military sports, as well as methodological work with volunteer sports activists. There shall be improvement in the training and refresher training of sports cadres, with an improvement in the organizational-methodological level of organized training sessions. There shall be an improvement in ideological-political indoctrination of athletes, with more extensive enlistment of athletes to participation in the sociopolitical affairs of workforces, schools and educational institutions. The network of technical

sports clubs shall be expanded, as this is a foundation for dissemination of technical knowledge and development of technical and applied military sports in the cities, towns and rayons; their activities shall be tailored more to the needs of primary organizations. Greater efforts shall be made in the area of training athletic reserves, particularly at children and youth technical sports schools. There shall be intensification of the activities of the all-union sports federations and federation offices in the technical and applied military sports, as well as club councils.

5. The Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF, the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics, kray and oblast DOSAAF committees shall ensure holding at a high level the appropriate final competitions of the Eighth Summer Sports Festival of the Peoples of the USSR. They should become a serious test of the effectiveness of the defense sports work being done by DOSAAF organizations.

Increasing the skill level of Soviet athletes and their winning of world championships in the technical sports remains an important task.

6. DOSAAF committees shall concern themselves on a constant basis to achieve efficient utilization of available stadiums, swimming pools and other athletic facilities, ensuring their operational reliability and fire safety. Special attention shall be focused on thorough preparation for the organized conduct of each and every mass sports activity.

V.

1. Work on development and consolidation of DOSAAF organization facilities continued in the period under review. Hundreds of training and production buildings, sports facilities, dormitories, service and other facilities were built, and substantial quantities of new equipment, training simulators and textbooks were acquired. The activities of the Society's production enterprises improved somewhat, and there was an increase in the percentage share of product manufactured in support of defense organizations. The Society's financial situation remained strong.

There are a good many shortcomings, however, in work to strengthen DOSAAF organization facilities. DOSAAF committees do not always efficiently utilize capital funds, frequently accept delay in construction and completion of facilities, do not utilize facilities and equipment with a full work loading, and fail to ensure strict observance of economy in spending funds and other assets. Instances of theft of socialist property have not been eradicated.

2. The congress instructs the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF, DOSAAF central committees of the union republics, kray and oblast committees to improve their work on consolidation and expansion of DOSAAF facilities. Supply shall be improved, in order more fully to meet the requirements of DOSAAF training, sports, primary organizations and enterprises. Fixed assets, equipment and property shall be efficiently utilized.

The Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF should work more persistently to resolve problems connected with designing, building and perfecting new types of sport

aircraft, sailplanes, cars, motorcycles, go-carts, sport watercraft, outboard motors, ultrasmall motors, scuba gear, radio and other equipment, as well as special gear for the technical and applied military sports.

3. Capital construction targets shall be met, and new facilities shall be brought on-stream on schedule. In coming years the volume of uncompleted construction shall be brought down to specified standards. Designing and combined construction of schools and sports facilities shall be accomplished, and there shall be expanded construction of dormitories for enrolled personnel, automotive racing facilities and training grounds, classrooms and laboratories for practical training classes. There shall be aggressive promotion of construction of simple facilities with local available manpower and assets, employing methods of volunteer construction work.

4. Requisite organizational and economic management measures shall be taken to achieve further concentration of production and to improve production efficiency and profitability. Enterprises and workshops shall regularly meet production plan targets in all technical and economic indicators. Work shall be done in an orderly manner to increase labor productivity and improve product quality, and to strengthen plan, manufacturing process and labor discipline. Necessary measures shall be taken to ensure that DOSAAF enterprises turn out primarily those products which are in conformity with the nature of DOSAAF activities. Design organizations shall be further developed and strengthened, with more aggressive adoption of new manufacturing processes.

5. DOSAAF committees, officials of DOSAAF production enterprises, training and sports organizations shall work persistently to strengthen the financial position of all DOSAAF components, improve financial planning, settle matters of finance and management activities in a skilled manner, and seek to ensure increased economic effectiveness of the work done by cost-accountable enterprises and organizations.

Every effort shall be made to improve the results of measures pertaining to the DOSAAF lottery, viewing it as a most important means of publicizing DOSAAF activities and one of the sources of financing mass-defense activities.

There shall be consistent implementation of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum on strict observance of economy, thrifty expenditure of funds, fuel-energy and material resources, strengthening financial discipline and waging a resolute campaign against mismanagement and wastefulness. There shall be greater efficiency and effectiveness in oversight and auditing activities. Economy and a concerned attitude toward socialist property shall be viewed as a most important condition for successful accomplishment of assigned tasks.

VI.

1. The congress notes that in the period under review further organizational strengthening of DOSAAF was achieved, and the process of improving the quality and effectiveness of mass-defense work, improving the style, forms and methods of activity on the part of DOSAAF executive agencies continued.

The Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF, the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics, and the majority of kray, oblast, district, city, and rayon committees for the most part resolved practical problems in a prompt, timely and correct manner, improved their organizational work, and devoted more attention to selection, indoctrination, and training of cadres and volunteer activists.

At the same time there are city, rayon and primary organizations in every republic, kray and oblast which are insufficiently persistently and purposefully carrying out their assigned tasks and which are failing extensively to enlist DOSAAF members in active mass-defense work and development of voluntary principles in the activities of executive agencies. A number of committees and organizations have violated the USSR DOSAAF Rules and the principles of collective leadership and democratic centralism.

Shortcomings in the work of many DOSAAF organizations are a consequence of serious errors of omission in the organizational activities of certain committees, a low level of plan and execution discipline, and a lack of proper demandingness and regular monitoring and verification of execution.

2. The congress calls upon DOSAAF committees continuously to improve guidance of primary organizations and to ensure that each one truly becomes a genuine center of mass-defense work among the public. They should be given daily and effective assistance in organizing and conducting mass-defense work. They should work persistently to ensure that each and every DOSAAF member conscientiously carries out his duties, takes part in his organization's practical activities, and displays personal interest in improving its performance.

There should be every possible support and adoption of positive experience, synthesis of the practical work experience of primary organizations, promptly responding to the processes taking place in the affairs of primary organizations and helping concentrate efforts on work with people. More attention should be devoted to lagging organizations.

It is the obligation of committees to show particular concern for the activities of rural primary organizations, their organizational strengthening, and improvement of mass-defense work among the rural population. An effort should be made to develop and strengthen in every way patron ties between DOSAAF technical sports clubs and schools, primary organizations at industrial enterprises, establishments and higher educational institutions on the one hand and kolkhoz and sovkhoz DOSAAF organizations on the other.

Effective measures shall be taken to improve the performance of primary DOSAAF organizations at higher and secondary specialized schools, vocational schools, and general-curriculum schools. They shall display greater activeness in military-patriotic indoctrination of students and pupils, and young people enrolled in school should be more extensively enlisted to participation in military-patriotic activities, developing in these young people interest in studying the revolutionary, fighting and labor traditions of the Communist Party and Soviet people and the heroic history of the Soviet Armed Forces.

War veterans and reserve officers shall be enlisted to work in every higher educational institution, vocational school and other school for this purpose.

Fuller use shall be made of the capabilities of educational institutions and public occupational category faculties for further improvement of mass-defense work, so that students who are not receiving special military training learn a military technical specialty.

3. The Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF, the DOSAAF central committees of union republics, kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon committees, guided by the instructions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the demands of the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, shall continue working persistently to master a Leninist work style, rigorously and unswervingly carrying out the demands of the USSR DOSAAF Rules, observing the principles of democratic centralism and collective leadership, and extensively adopting voluntary principles in daily practical activities. In the work of committees there should be an organic combination of follow-through with initiative and efficiency, a critical attitude toward shortcomings with purposeful work to correct their causes, and firm demandingness. There should be an effort to achieve further improvement in practical planning activities, determining priority and importance of tasks, effective ways and means of achieving excellent end results in mass-defense work.

The congress draws particular attention on the part of DOSAAF committees to the necessity of sharp improvement of monitoring and verification of execution. All measures shall be taken to ensure that they indeed become a genuine standard for each and every DOSAAF executive agency and an effective instrument for strengthening plan, execution, and labor discipline.

There shall be improved guidance of the work done by auditing commissions and auditors. They shall play an enhanced role in combating bureaucracy, violations of USSR DOSAAF Rules, plan, financial, and staff size discipline.

Smooth precision, a high degree of creative initiative, and personal responsibility on the part of each and every individual for prompt, timely and high-quality execution of specified tasks, adopted plans and decisions shall be secured in the work of the administrative staff of the committees. A resolute effort shall be made to eradicate the paper-shuffling style of leadership, elements of attention to form with consequent detriment to content and bureaucratic rule in civic activities. The quality, reliability and efficiency of record keeping and accounting shall be improved in all DOSAAF committees and organizations.

Successful accomplishment of the tasks facing DOSAAF demands continuous strengthening of the linkages and cooperation of its organizations with trade unions, Komsomol, military units and military commissariats, civil defense staffs, organizations of the All-Union Znaniye Society, sections of the Soviet War Veterans Committee, other public and governmental organizations in the interests of improving mass-defense work.

4. The congress considers that a paramount obligation of the committees is to make every effort to develop volunteer principles at all echelons of the Defense Society as a mass, nonprofessional patriotic-defense organization of citizens of the USSR.

Volunteer activists shall be extensively enlisted for organizational and indoctrination work, volunteer committee departments, commissions and sections shall be strengthened, their creative initiative shall be supported in every possible way, they shall be helped to carry out their duties, and they shall bear greater responsibility for the assigned job.

The Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF, DOSAAF central committees of union republics, kray and oblast committees shall work persistently to implement this demand. In working with cadres, they shall be rigorously guided by Leninist principles and the demands of the CPSU. They shall consistently pursue a policy of combining a respectful attitude and trust toward cadres with concern for their growth and indoctrination, with high demandingness and implacability toward deficiencies.

Efforts shall be made to ensure that leadership positions in DOSAAF organizations shall be filled with persons of great political and cultural breadth, with excellent qualifications and professional training, persons capable of looking to the future and of working with initiative and innovatively. Every effort shall be made to develop the professional and civic activeness of leader cadres, and they shall be helped to master a political approach to their job as well as modern leadership methods. Special concern shall be shown for the selection, indoctrination and training of chairmen of primary organizations, who are the principal organizers of mass-defense work among DOSAAF members.

Persistent efforts shall be made to resolve problems of reducing the rate of personnel turnover, strengthening labor discipline, forming stable workforces, and creating a reliable cadre reserve.

Effective measures shall be taken to improve the training and retraining of administrative and executive personnel, with further improvement of their practical teaching and instruction. Central and zonal training courses shall improve the level of theoretical and practical training classes and shall use advanced know-how to teach enrolled personnel the forms and methods of accomplishing the tasks assigned to DOSAAF committees and organizations.

Efforts shall be made to achieve a high level of efficiency and results at scientific and practical conferences, seminars, and training methods conferences with various categories of DOSAAF staff personnel and activists.

5. DOSAAF committees, executives of training and sports organizations and production enterprises, working in close coordination with trade union and Komsomol committees, shall improve organization of socialist competition and the movement for a Communist attitude toward labor, and shall enhance their mobilizing and indoctrinational role. Efforts shall be made to reinforce the experience acquired in the course of competition to honor in a worthy manner and implement the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, in marking the occasion of the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR. This experience and know-how shall be utilized everywhere in working on fulfillment and over-fulfillment of plan tasks and pledges for the current year and the 11th Five-Year Plan as a whole.

Socialist pledges shall be formulated and adopted from the grass roots upward, taking into account the growth prospects and realistic capabilities of DOSAAF organizations and production workforces. Efforts shall be made to achieve a high degree of publicity, promptness, efficiency and objectivity in totaling up competition results, leading performers shall be shown esteem and respect, every useful undertaking shall be supported, and measures for its dissemination shall be taken.

Further development of the initiative and productive, spontaneous activity on the part of DOSAAF members, every possible utilization of available reserve potential, and improvement of organizational and ideological indoctrination work in each DOSAAF collective should become a reliable foundation for ensuring high end results in socialist competition.

VII.

The congress feels that further development of DOSAAF international ties, on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism and the course of foreign policy of the Soviet State formulated at the 24th, 25th, and 26th CPSU congresses, constitutes an important task of the Defense Society and its executive bodies.

There shall be continued development and deepening of ties of friendship and meaningful interaction with the defense and sports organizations of the brother socialist countries, and greater attention shall be devoted to ideological cooperation with them and to exchange of experience and know-how and patriotic and internationalist indoctrination of young people. There shall be increased effectiveness of mutual visits by delegations, and fuller utilization of international sports competitions for publicizing the achievements of the socialist nations, the Soviet way of life, and the athletic achievements of the USSR.

The activities of all-union federations in international sports associations shall be stepped up, seeking to achieve further democratization of the international sports movement and strengthening of the position of Soviet sports in the world arena.

* * *

The Ninth All-Union DOSAAF Congress, on behalf of the multimillion-member detachment of the Defense Society, assures the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its Central Committee that DOSAAF organizations will rally even more solidly behind the Leninist Party and will work persistently for implementation of the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the tasks advanced by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in his speech at the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and in his report at the official meeting dedicated to the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR; they will promote in every possible way further strengthening of the defense might of the socialist homeland.

DOSAAF Officials Listed

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 20 Feb 83 p 1

[Text] Membership of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee

A. A. Ageyev, I. I. Adabashev, V. N. Alekseyev, N. T. Anan'yev, I. S. Akhmedov, A. A. Babokhin, I. A. Bagramyan, Yu. I. Bakin, N. G. Baygazina, B. B. Baytasov, V. A. Baltiyskiy, Ye. N. Bal', L. K. Balyasnaya, Ye. N. Bandurenko, V. G. Baranov, N. S. Baranov, V. V. Barybin, V. F. Bashkirov, Yu. A. Bedrzhitskiy, N. G. Belous, V. I. Belyakov, G. T. Beregovoy, I. S. Bogovik, Yu. G. Boyko, V. E. G. Boldyrev, V. M. Bondarenko, V. S. Brusov, V. M. Burmistrov, Yu. I. Buvalko, V. S. Butvina, M. A. Vanyukov, N. V. Vasil'yeva, A. A. Vasil'yev, N. A. Vereshchagin, Zh. N. Veshnyakov, A. G. Vinnik, I. I. Vinogradov, A. I. Voytseshchuk, Kh. M. Vologirov, V. M. Gavrilin, M. G. Gareyev, A. L. Getman, I. N. Gladen'kiy, V. A. Glebskiy, N. G. Golodnikov, A. V. Gorokhovskiy, V. A. Gorshkov, V. M. Grishanov, P. A. Grishchuk, O. O. Gunyayev, I. I. Gusakovskiy, N. N. Gus'kov, , L. N. Dargayev, A. N. Daragan, V. T. Dement'yev, V. N. Dmitruk, G. U. Dol'nikov, I. R. Dubyaga, V. N. Yevstiferov, G. M. Yegorov, Ye. N. Yelizarov, K. A. Zhabykbayev, R. M. Zhal'nerauskas, V. M. Zharkov, V. I. Zhukov, V. P. Zakhavin, V. K. Zemlyannikov, Yu. B. Zubarev, D. L. Zyuzin, P. S. Ibrashov, A. P. Ivanov, A. S. Il'yushchnko, S. M. Isachenko, L. F. Kadatskiy, V. V. Karakchiyev, N. I. Karev, I. G. Karelin, V. V. Karpov, V. A. Katayev, K. A. Kirillov, A. I. Kisov, A. B. Klevtsov, I. A. Kovalev, M. P. Kovalenko, A. P. Kogdanin, I. N. Kozhedub, T. T. Kozhekov, A. M. Kozik, F. I. Kolesnikov, Yu. A. Komitsin, P. A. Konstantinov, Yu. M. Konev, G. T. Konobeyev, I. G. Kondratov, V. I. Konovalov, A. P. Korzhov, A. D. Korotchenko, D. N. Korneyev, A. F. Koss, V. P. Krivosheyenko, B. N. Kriventsov, G. A. Krutilin, G. P. Krokhin, V. Ye. Krutskikh, D. N. Kuznetsov, I. A. Kuznetsov, I. M. Kuklin, A. Ye. Kunilov, V. P. Kul'chenko, R. A. D. Kuliyeu, G. K. Kustov, N. S. Kutsyro, V. I. Lapshin, P. I. Lomakin, V. V. Luk'yanov, V. V. Lun'kov, I. I. Lysak, V. N. Makeyev, I. T. Maklakov, P. K. Maksimov, A. I. Malakhova, V. I. Mal'tsev, A. A. Malyashkin, A. L. Mamayev, V. M. Mamadov, V. I. Marchenko, A. A. Maslennikov, I. D. Matyukhin, N. A. Matsak, V. V. Merkushov, N. A. Merkul'yev, Sh. Kh. Minigulov, A. I. Mikheyev, S. Ye. Mikayelyan, T. Moldakhanov, D. Kh. Mongush, B. P. Morozov, S. S. Mostovoy, S. I. Moskalev, V. V. Mosyaykin, N. I. Mokhov, D. G. Mukhametdinov, G. V. Myl'nikov, D. N. Nagimov, V. P. Nadezhin, A. Sh. Nazarov, I. G. Nazimok, G. V. Naneyshvili, Yu. A. Naumenko, N. A. Nachinkin, I. A. Nedashkovskiy, Yu. I. Nemudryy, V. K. Nikishin, A. D. Novgorodskiy, A. V. Nozdrachev, N. D. Nosenko, Ye. V. Nosov, K. A. Oblachev, N. V. Ogurtsov, A. I. Odintsov, V. S. Ozolin, V. K. Orlov, Yu. V. Orlov, A. N. Osipov, , D. A. Okhromiy, I. G. Pavlovskiy, E. E. Pallase, T. K. Pal'm, K. Ye. Pantsyr, I. M. Pasechnik, M. V. Pashkov, V. I. Petrovich, V. I. Petrov, S. A. Petrov, A. S. Petrosyan, V. Ye. Peven', V. M. Pinchuk, K. N. Plakunov, V. I. Pogorelov, V. I. Pozdnyakov, A. I. Pokryshkin, L. L. Polivtsev, I. I. Ponomarev, V. A. Pomortsev, V. A. Popov, Yu. L. Pyatnitsyn, Yu. K. Reyter, M. A. Rogozhin, A. Rozyyev, S. I. Rudenko, T. M. Rudova, V. I. Rusakov, N. N. Ryashentsev, S. Ye. Savitskaya, G. S. Saidov, P. Ya. Samokhodskiy, G. G. Samofalov, R. T. Salikhov, V. K. Sapozhnikov, I. D. Sattybayev, I. I. Svinukhov, V. D. Sergeyeu, F. P. Sergeyeu, V. Ye. Semichastnyy, F. G. Sidorov, N. Ye. Skosyrskiy, A. G. Smertin, A. I. Smetanin, V. V. Smolin, M. G. Sobolev, Yu. V. Smirnov, K. N. Solopov, V. Ts. Sokhiyev, V. V. Suvorov, B. I. Suslov, K. P. Sukachev, V. T. Suonio,

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Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee

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Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF

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Membership of the Central Audit Commission of USSR DOSAAF

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G. V. Tomilin was elected chairman of the Central Audit Commission of USSR DOSAAF; V. I. Yershov and A. V. Khan'kov were elected deputy chairmen of the Central Audit Commission of the USSR DOSAAF.

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CSO: 1801/165

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

BOOK ANNOTATION: U.S. ARMED FORCES USE OF 'SURPRISE' STUDIES

Moscow VOYENNNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 3, Mar 83 (signed to press 2 Mar 83) rear cover carries a 300-word annotation of a book entitled VNEZAPNOST' V OPERATSIYAKH VOORUZHENNYKH SIL SShA [Surprise in the Operations of the U.S. Armed Forces] Edited by M. M. Kir'yan published by the Military Publishing House in 1982.

[Text] In the book the use of the element of surprise by U.S. forces in World War II and in the local wars in Korea and Indochina is researched. The collective of authors, relying on Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, examine American views on the place and role of surprise in armed conflict as well as the means for achieving it in the most important operations by the U.S. Armed Forces. Light is cast upon the actions of the U.S. Army and Navy in time when they themselves experienced surprise attacks by their enemies.

In writing the book materials from the state archives of the U.S. and Great Britain were used as well as other materials.

The book is intended for scientific workers, teachers, propagandists and the entire officer staff.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

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[Full-text translated articles published in this report are indicated with an asterisk (*)]

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COLOR INSERTS

French AMX-32 Tank; E-3A Airplane; NATO Air Force Recognition Marks;
Guided Missile Destroyer D90 "Southampton"

Articles by Soviet authors and the chronicle were prepared on the basis of foreign publications. This issue used illustrations from the Jane's handbook, the newspaper LLOYD'S LIST and the following journals: AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, ARMED FORCES WEEK, ARMADA INTERNATIONAL, WEHRTECHNIK, DEFENSE, DEFENSE MAGAZINE, SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, INTERAVIA, INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, MARITIME DEFENSE, NATIONAL DEFENSE, SPIRIT OF DEFENDERS, FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL and AIR INTERNATIONAL.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

ADVANCE STOCKPILING SEEN AS WAY TO INCREASE U.S. STRATEGIC MOBILITY

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 17 Feb 83) pp 7-12

[Article by Col Yu. Viktorov: "Providing for Strategic Mobility of the U.S. Armed Forces (Advance Stockpiling of American Arms)"]

[Text] The Reagan administration's foreign policy course is based on the most brazen anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, on the aspiration to use all means to destabilize the situation in countries of the socialist fraternity and to undermine socialism as a system as a whole. Interference in the internal affairs of other states and unconcealed action against the movement of national liberation have been elevated to the rank of state policy. Voices speaking of "American leadership" of the world based on force can be heard more and more frequently from the White House. The USA has declared entire regions to be its sphere of "vitally important interests," and it is sending numerous contingents of armed forces to these regions with the excuse of "protecting" these interests.

Transoceanic strategists believe that if global and regional supremacy is to be achieved and if "American interests are to be protected" in the most remote points of the earth (which can actually be translated as carrying out aggressive plans), the armed forces must have, among other qualities, high strategic mobility. This is defined mainly as the ability to quickly transfer armed forces to any region with the purpose of strengthening armed forces groupings already there or deploying new groupings, and organizing their logistical support.

Pentagon representatives have often made references to the significance of strategic mobility and declared their intention to increase it further in the foreign military press and in public statements. As an example, Secretary of State C. Weinberger asserted that military policy must be examined within a global context, that the USA cannot allow itself to ignore any single region for the sake of strengthening another, and that it must be strong enough to defend its interests. Arguing for a further increase in American military power, he makes a plea for armed forces which could deploy quickly in any region of the world.

According to foreign press reports the Pentagon believes the main directions of supporting strategic mobility to be airlifts and sea transfers as well as

a high level of combat and mobilizational readiness of a strategic reserve maintained in the continental USA.

Preparations for implementing such measures can be clearly discerned in the concrete acts of the American military-political leadership, particularly in its adoption of a strategy of "direct confrontation," which in turn elicited arisal of new conceptions and a change of the main premises of a number of previously adopted conceptions having to do, for example, with using and developing general purpose forces. Thus the new conception of "geographic or horizontal escalation" was declared. It essentially means that when armed conflict arises in some region of the world, the United States must be capable of initiating and conducting combat activities "to a point of total victory" in several other regions that are "most vulnerable to the enemy."

Thus it is no accident that the plans for developing the general purpose forces foresee further reinforcement of their combat capabilities and growth of their strategic and tactical mobility. By the 1990s, the number of divisions in the ground troops is to be increased to 26, while by fiscal year 1986 tactical aviation is to possess 40 air wings at full strength (to include National Guard formations). By the end of the present decade the ship strength of the navy is to be increased significantly as well--to 600 units.

The number of military transport airplanes is to be increased in order to support deployment of formations and units and support the combat activities of formations and units already in the field. Airplanes belonging to commercial airlines will be used in wartime to airlift American troops and cargo. Yielding to pressure from the Pentagon, certain NATO countries have pledged to allocate transport airplanes with a large effective radius for the purposes of airlifting American troops to Europe. Some other governments are also being coerced into accepting similar obligations.

A broad complex of measures is being implemented in the USA with the purpose of raising the effectiveness with which military transport airplanes are used to airlift troops and cargo over great distances. In particular the fuselage of the C-141 has been lengthened, and it has been equipped for air-to-air refueling, as a result of which the volume of the cargo compartment should have been increased and the distance of nonstop flight should have increased. Spare parts are being purchased for transport airplanes, the number of maintenance personnel and the quantity of freight handling equipment are to be increased, and there are plans for delivering such personnel and equipment to regions of proposed deployment of ground troops.

Foreign specialists believe that in times of crisis the volume of sea transfers by vessels of the sea transfer command will have to be significantly expanded. This will require the recruitment of the forces and resources of the merchant marine. The NATO countries have pledged to allocate over 400 vessels to transport American troops to Europe by sea. In the opinion of Western experts formations and units of the U.S. Armed Forces can even be landed at destroyed ports and on an unprepared coast. This is why various auxiliary vessel unloading resources are being stockpiled now.

Numerous special training exercises involving strategic transfers of troops and cargo are being conducted in order to insure high mobility for the U.S. Armed Forces. In an emergency situation the Pentagon intends to transfer an additional six divisions and up to 1,000 warplanes to West Germany from the USA within the first 10 days. But the appetites of the American war machine are constantly growing. The command of the U.S. Air Force has been given the task of creating, by 1986, the necessary conditions for transferring up to 80 tactical fighter squadrons (1,900 airplanes) to Europe.

Besides supporting air and sea transfers* and maintaining general-purpose forces in a high state of combat and mobilizational readiness, the command of the the U.S. Armed Forces is spending tremendous assets for the purposes of creating the necessary infrastructure both on the country's own territory and in the most probable theaters of military operations, as well as creating a system of depots in the most important transoceanic theaters of military operations.

This article provides a deeper examination of advance stockpiling of American arms, equipment and supplies on foreign territories, which is one of the important directions of supporting the strategic mobility of the U.S. Armed Forces.

In the estimate of American specialists the prepositioning of weapons, combat equipment and other materials and technical resources in other countries can significantly reduce the time it takes to transfer formations and units from the USA to remote theaters of military operations and increase the rate of transfer, since in this case only the personnel and light weapons would have to be delivered. As was noted in the foreign press, military transport aviation (to include the wide-body airplanes of commercial airline companies) has great possibilities for carrying personnel.

Advance stockpiling first came into practical use in 1961 when following the "Berlin crisis" the U.S. command stockpiled heavy weapons and military equipment on West German territory in the so-called "2+10" program--that is, enough arms for two divisions and 10 separate combat and rear support units. In the late 1960s the Pentagon withdrew a mechanized division and a separate armored cavalry regiment from West Germany to the USA leaving their armament behind in Europe and adding the weapons and military equipment of 74 separate subunits (not subordinated to the division). These reserves were stockpiled in accordance with the "Reforger" program (translated, this means "Return of Forces to Germany"). Annual U.S. Armed Forces exercises with the same code name began to be held with the purpose of working out the problems of transferring troops from the North American continent in order to reinforce European groupings of the NATO bloc, supplying weapons to them from the depots and conducting combat activities against Warsaw Pact countries.

* For greater detail on this question, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 9, 1981, pp 7-12--*Editor*.

In the late 1970s, simultaneously with its deviation from the course of detente and its transition to a policy of confrontation, Washington decided to increase its reserves of heavy weapons to proportions necessary to outfit six ground troop divisions. In compliance with this decision weapons for a fourth division were imported by 1981, and weapons for another two formations are to be stockpiled by the end of 1983. Having created such reserves, the Pentagon leadership believes--so states the foreign press--that when the situation worsens it could transfer the personnel of six armored and mechanized divisions to the European theater of war within 10 days in order to reinforce groupings that had already deployed there.

These reserves are generally referred to in the Western military press as POMCUS (Prepositioned Material Configured to Unit Sets). These reserves are stored at depots in the form of outfits intended for concrete units and subunits.

The missions of keeping the POMCUS reserves in high combat readiness were assigned to a combat equipment maintenance and support group (Manheim, FRG) contained within the composition of the 21st Rear Services Command of the U.S. ground troops in the European zone. They include, in particular, storing armament in specially allocated depots and issuing it to units and subunits in the event of war, for exercises such as "Reforger" and for other operational measures involving the transfer of ground troop units and subunits from the continental USA to Europe.

Organizationally the group consists of a staff, four battalions (eastern, western, northern and northwestern), a detachment to support emergency shipments of combat equipment, a maintenance battalion and a security group.

The eastern battalion possesses three companies that provide services to four POMCUS depots located in the vicinities of Manheim, Karlsruhe and Germesgeym [transliteration]. They maintain certain conditions necessary for the storage of arms, they perform repairs, they are responsible for prompt issue of weapons and military equipment to units and subunits arriving from the continental USA, and they accept these weapons back for storage. The western battalion, which contains four companies, carries the responsibility for five depot complexes in the vicinities of Pirmasens, Mizau [transliteration], Kaiserlautern and Idar-Oberstein, while the northern battalion (composed of two companies) provides services to complexes in Monchengladbach and Kherongen [transliteration]. Depots located on West German territory already containing reserves of arms for four divisions were assigned to all of these subunits. The northwestern battalion, which is now in its formative stage, will be responsible for depots created on the territories of Belgium (Grob-bendonk [transliteration], Syutendal [transliteration]) and the Netherlands (Emmen, Kerkrade) for a fifth and a sixth division of American ground troops. All POMCUS depots (Figure 1) deployed in the rear area of a zone of combat activities are united into major troop depot complexes.

The total personnel strength of the group is about 5,000, to include over 700 servicemen and up to 50 civilian workers bearing American citizenship; the rest are local hired specialists.

In contrast to the conventional method of storing materiel (in relation to forms of equipment and supply items), POMCUS reserves are stored in outfits for each concrete subunit, for example a battalion or a company. Such outfits have now been stockpiled for about 450 subunits. They consist mostly of motor vehicles and armored equipment. Infantry weapons, radio sets, laser sights, night vision instruments, fire control instruments and other elements have been removed from the fighting vehicles and stored in outfits in special buildings (under tighter security).

The general status of all stockpiled armament is inspected every 6 months, and once every 4 years a careful inspection is made, coupled with the necessary repairs and preventive maintenance.

It was reported in the Western press that the issue of weapons and combat equipment to troops arriving from the USA is usually organized in the following way. The first to arrive at a depot are the arms receivers representing the units and subunits assigned to the depot. These individuals begin the motions of receiving military equipment and supporting elements. When the fighting squads and crews arrive within the depot zone the weapons are depreserved and put into operating condition, removable equipment, ammunition, gear and individual units of fire are loaded into the combat equipment, and the vehicles are partially fueled. As the combat equipment is made ready, the subunits leave for their concentration area, which is predesignated in the vicinity of each depot. In this area installation of the instruments is completed, all supporting equipment is stowed and secured, the vehicles are completely fueled, and their performance is tested. Fully armed subunits are advanced to the column formation areas, from where they travel with their own units to their operational destinations. Having analyzed a number of exercises, American specialists established that, as an example, it takes up to 10 hours to issue armored and motor vehicle equipment to a fighting battalion, to prepare this equipment and to reach the concentration area.

It has been noted in the foreign military press that the total cost of creating POMCUS reserves is over \$1.5 billion, and that if we consider that the stockpiles have yet to be completed and that weapons and combat equipment for another two divisions have yet to be stockpiled, this cost will attain \$3.5 billion.

In order to raise the strategic mobility and reduce the time of transfer of marines to the European theater of war, in late 1981 the United States signed an agreement with the Norwegian government on advance stockpiling of heavy armament in the vicinity of the city of Trondheim (northern Norway) for an expeditionary marine brigade to be transferred from the USA in accordance with NATO strategic deployment plans with the purpose of conducting combat activities on the bloc's northern flank. Twenty-four 155 mm caliber howitzers and prime movers for them, about 250 motor vehicles and 100 trailers, supplies for two marine air squadrons, ammunition, fuel, and rations are to be stockpiled by 1984. According to this agreement Norway has pledged to furnish about 150 all-terrain vehicles (snow cats), two motor transport companies (with 90 motor vehicles each), a medical company (35 ambulances) a POL detachment (six fuel trucks) and the necessary engineering and auxiliary equipment in support of the deployment of American troops.

Fulfillment of all of these measures, the Western military press notes, will make it possible to airlift the personnel of an expeditionary marine brigade together with light armament from the continental USA to northern Norway in the very first days following initiation of strategic deployment of the bloc's combined armed forces. At the moment it takes 15-20 days to transport such a brigade by sea.

In order to reduce the time it takes to transfer tactical aviation and to prepare it for combat activities at its operational destination, the command of the U.S. Air Force plans to stockpile auxiliary and navigation equipment as well as supplies for air units and subunits to be transferred to trans-oceanic theaters of military operations. Foreign specialists feel that this would make it possible to release some military transport aviation for the transfer of ground troops.

The problem of advance stockpiling of heavy weapons, military equipment and supplies acquired new significance in connection with creation of the "Rapid Deployment Forces" (RDF) in 1980.* They are intended for use primarily in remote theaters of military operations with a poorly developed infrastructure and complex geographic and climatic conditions. In the estimate of the Pentagon leadership the problem of creating favorable conditions for rapid transfer of the necessary contingents of RDF troops, their deployment in probable operational areas and organization of their material-technical supply has become more acute than ever before.

One of the main directions for solving this problem chosen by the American command is advance stockpiling of weapons, military equipment and supplies near regions of proposed use of "Rapid Deployment Forces." Considering the complex military-political situation in the most probable areas of use of the RDF (Southwest Asia), the instability of the internal political situation of countries in this region and the negative position taken by a number of their governments in relation to this question, the United States has not yet taken steps to deploy a system of prepositioned combat equipment and material-technical supplies on the territories of other states. Instead, it is creating a system of stockpiles aboard ships.

In July 1980 seven depot ships carrying armament, equipment, material-technical supplies and fresh water for expeditionary marine brigades with a strength of up to 12,000 men and for tactical air squadrons of the U.S. Air Force were deployed in the vicinity of the islands of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. In the estimate of foreign specialists this will make it possible to conduct combat activities for 15 days. Three "Ro-Ro" class transporters ("Meteor," "Mercury" and "Jupiter") were used as such depot ships. They provide for horizontal loading and unloading, and they are intended to stockpile armored equipment (Figure 2), artillery, and other large-caliber armament and equipment. Two commercial transporters ("American Champion"

* On 1 January 1983 the RDF were transformed into a combined central command of the U.S. Armed Forces -- *Editor*.

and "American Courier") and two tankers--one for POL and another for fresh water--also serve as depot ships.

All depot ships are manned by civilian crews. Western military specialists believe that they have a significant shortcoming--the inability to unload armament on an unprepared coast, which introduces great difficulties into getting combat equipment to marine subunits transferred to an operational area by air.

According to data in the Western press the number of depot ships in the vicinity of Diego Garcia was increased to 13 in the 1981. This made it possible to create additional reserves of supplies to support combat activities for 30 days.

However, the depot ships presently deployed in the Indian Ocean no longer satisfy the demands of the American war machine. Striving to increase American military presence in this region, to raise in every possible way the possibilities for quickly reinforcing American armed forces groupings and to improve their capabilities for conducting lengthy combat operations in a poorly equipped theater of war, the Pentagon developed a long-range program. According to it, outfits of heavy armament and military-technical supplies to support three expeditionary marine brigades are to be loaded aboard depot ships that can unload weapons and combat equipment on an unprepared coast by 1978-1988. In particular, as was reported in the foreign press, there are plans for stockpiling up 160 tanks, more than 300 armored transporters, 18 self-propelled howitzers, 72 towed howitzers and over 1,000 motor vehicles.

Viewing advance stockpiling as one of the effective ways to raise the strategic mobility of American armed forces, the military-political leadership of the USA is continuing to expand its stockpiling program in the Indian Ocean, it is completing its creation of reserves of weapons and combat equipment for six divisions of ground troops and one brigade of marine infantry in Europe, it is seeking ways to improve the existing stockpiling system, it is searching for possibilities to deploy new depots, primarily in European theaters of military operations, and it is increasing the assortment of stored armament, to include aviation equipment. In particular, efforts to create stockpiles of American helicopters were initiated in January 1982.

The plans and practical measures of the Pentagon aimed at raising the strategic mobility of the armed forces persuasively show that American militants are actively pursuing a strategy of "direct confrontation" and aspiring toward brazen interference into the internal affairs of sovereign states in all regions.

FIGURE CAPTIONS

Figure 1. Field Artillery Guns at One of the POMCUS Depots in the FRG

Figure 2. Loading Tanks Aboard a Class "Ro-Ro" Ship Destined for the Indian Ocean

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

U.S. TRANSFORMING HORN OF AFRICA INTO MILITARY STAGING AREA

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 17 Feb 83) pp 17-22

[Article by Engr-Col A. Andreyev: "Military Bases in the Vicinity of the Horn of Africa in the USA's Plans"]

[Text] Africa has always attracted the attention of the imperialists. Quite recently--just 3 decades ago--it was almost completely a colonial continent. Development of capitalist states transformed it into an appendage providing agricultural products and raw materials. Now it is one of the largest regions of the world in which young independent countries are consolidating their national statehood in the interests of their peoples.

Liberated African states are undergoing development and consolidation in a complex situation, a product of the harsh legacy of colonialism. Despite the fundamental changes that have occurred on the continent, imperialists continue to view Africa as a sphere of application of capital with the purpose of obtaining superprofits. They are using all means to keep the newly independent countries under their influence and to insure monopolies free access to their raw materials. They are pursuing a policy of dividing the African countries and pitting one against the other with the hope of making it impossible for them to rise as a united front in defense of national interests. It is with this purpose that neocolonialists are supporting and imposing reactionary regimes, and interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

Today the African continent is one of the most strategic regions of the world, one having great political, economic and military significance. The continent is bathed by two oceans (Atlantic and Indian) and by the Mediterranean Sea; its eastern and northeastern areas are directly contiguous with the rich petroleum-bearing region of the Near East. Africa is girded by the main cargo routes from countries of the Near and Middle East to Europe and the United States. These are also the routes of important naval lines of communication connecting the USA, Europe and Asia. In view of this, the question of using military bases on the African coast, and particularly on the eastern part of the continent, in the interests of imperialist armed forces occupies a prominent place in the aggressive plans of the imperialists. Control over these bases and a military presence, primarily that of the Americans, are viewed by Western political reviewers as a guarantee of the "security" of the main sea routes in this region and in all the world.

The United States of America is the spokesman for imperialist plans in relation to Africa, and it is the inspiration of practical measures implemented by the imperialists in relation to this continent. "The monopolies need foreign oil, uranium and nonferrous metals, and so the USA declares the Near East, Africa and the Indian Ocean to be a sphere of its 'vital interests'," noted the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress. "The American war machine is actively penetrating into that area, and it intends to stay around for a long time. It has the islands of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Oman, Kenya, Somali, Egypt: What next?" Washington's interference into the affairs of other states under the excuse of "protecting the vital interests" of the USA is a permanent component of its foreign policy. It is no accident that for practical purposes the White House has already included northern, southern and eastern Africa as well as some other regions of the continent into this sphere.

In the mid-1970s the Washington administration proclaimed the Indian Ocean to be the "zone of responsibility and operations of the Seventh Fleet." In early 1980 the American president officially declared the Persian Gulf to be a region of the USA's "vitally important interests," which the country intends to protect with the use of force. This is the basis for the practical steps being undertaken by the White House to consolidate its influence in some African regions.

Three main directions can be distinguished in the plans for pursuing the basic premises of American foreign policy doctrine in this region: creating "Rapid Deployment Forces," expanding the network of naval and air force bases to permit transfer of these forces to regions of possible combat operations, and creating allies in the interests of the USA.

In order to implement their plans, the USA and the NATO countries are constantly expanding military-economic and other relations with some states of this region which have not abandoned their aggressive aspirations and which continue to increase their military potential in response to prodding by the imperialists, particularly with the purpose of fighting peoples who have assumed the road of independence. Such mutual relationships are at the basis of bilateral treaties on "cooperation and assistance" (economic, technical, military) and various sorts of written and oral agreements. As compensation for the right to use facilities on the territories of these countries, imperialists are supplying them with major consignments of weapons and equipment, and they are offering loans. Such states include primarily Egypt, the Sudan, Oman, Somali and Kenya. The United States is being granted access to bases in these countries in exchange for military and economic assistance on an ever-increasing scale.

The USA is attempting to deploy a system of military bases on the territories of these and other countries in the region. Not all of them have the former traditional form, with American flags conspicuously raised over them. Many of them are created in the form of "depots" in which armament is accumulated to supply American troops, should they be transferred to the appropriate regions with the purpose of suppressing movements of national liberation or anti-imperialist regimes.

Considering the negative reaction of neighboring countries to the stationing of American troops on a permanent basis in this area, the United States is resorting to all sorts of maneuvers, to include gaining the right to use bases, offering various services of a military nature, selling weapons and combat equipment, sending military advisors, specialists and "civilians" and so on.

Capitalizing on the events in Iran and Afghanistan as an excuse, recently the United States and other imperialist states began unconcealed growth of their military presence in the northwestern Indian Ocean. The quantity of American and French naval ships patrolling the Persian and Oman gulfs has risen dramatically. The frequency of their visits to ports of countries of this regions and passages through the Red Sea has increased. This is why, foreign reviewers note, the U.S. government has undertaken a number of steps to expand its network of strongpoints and military bases to service its ships and airplanes in this region. The military base on Diego Garcia--the main spring-board for transferring American troops intended for operations in Africa and in the Near and Middle East--no longer satisfies the Pentagon's present demands. Considering the missions facing the "Rapid Deployment Forces," the White House administration has activated its efforts to expand the network of bases that could be used in the interests of its navy and aviation on the African coast, and primarily in the northwestern Indian Ocean where, according to data in the Western press, more than 20 American ships are now permanently stationed, to include two aircraft carriers.

The United States is already using the territories of a number of nearby countries to support the actions of troops in this region. Thus American reconnaissance aviation is flying from bases located in Egypt in behalf of the interests of American troops. An air force base located at Ras Banas [transliteration], which is on the shore of the Red Sea, is intended for the airlifting of "Rapid Deployment Forces" to the vicinity of the Persian Gulf.

Two years ago an agreement was signed on providing the U.S. Armed Forces access to bases in Oman, Kenya and Somali. They will be used jointly with the base at Diego Garcia and other military facilities in this region.

American strategists are especially interested in the Horn of Africa (see figure). The main characteristics of air fields, naval bases, naval supply points and ports are given in tables 1 and 2.

Kenya is of the greatest interest to the USA. It is no accident that the dimensions of annual assistance provided to it by the White House within the framework of economic, food and military programs exceed \$100 million. This is being done in exchange for allowing the "Rapid Deployment Forces" access to the country's ports and airfields in crisis situations. Even in earlier times, American ships did enjoy the right to visit the port of Mombasa, while airplanes had the right to land at the Kenyan airfields at Nairobi (Embakasi) and Nanyuki. Following the events of 1979 connected with the Washington administration's attempt to liberate the hostages in the Teheran embassy, a rapid escalation of American presence in the northwestern Indian Ocean occurred. Warships of the USA and other NATO countries permanently

stationed in this region began visiting the port of Mombasa much more often. Thus at the beginning of 1982 a British naval detachment consisting of four ships, including the ill-fated destroyer "Sheffield" and the frigate "Active," a detachment of the French Navy consisting of five trawlers and many American ships, including the aircraft carrier "Constellation," replenished their supplies here.

According to reports in the Western press a bilateral treaty gave the Pentagon the right to use the port of Mombasa for its navy. The USA intends to modernize the port (clean out and deepen the basin) to permit mooring of large ships, including nuclear aircraft carriers. About \$50 million were allocated for these purposes. According to the plans of the U.S. Defense Department ammunition and supply depots costing \$2.4 million will be built here. The airfield at Mombasa is also being rebuilt. It will be able to handle American warplanes and heavy transporters. A total of \$10 million have already been allocated from the Pentagon's budget to build a taxiway and to lay an additional concrete pad before the hangar.

According to the foreign press the efforts to modernize the base are proceeding under strict secrecy. All servicemen who leave the construction zone must wear civilian clothing.

The USA, which aspires to achieve total control over the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden, evaluates Somali as a key country having one of the longest coastlines (200 nautical miles) among the states of East Africa and permitting control of the Gulf of Aden and the northwestern Indian Ocean from its territory. Its strategic significance to the USA lies also in the fact that it is in direct proximity to socialist Ethiopia and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, which are pursuing an anti-imperialist policy. Being one of the poorest countries of the world, Somali is being drawn more and more into the orbit of aggressive American policy in this region. A few years ago the White House managed to incite it to armed aggression against Ethiopia, and then to gain access to its ports and airfields for minimum payment. Now Somali spends 40 percent of its modest state budget on militarization with the purpose of achieving its expansionist plans--annexing the northeastern provinces of Kenya, the entire Republic of Djibouti and the Ogaden regions, in hopes of creating a "Great Somali."

In August 1980 an agreement was signed between the USA and Somali on the use of the naval base, port and airfield of Berbera by U.S. Armed Forces. American ships and airplanes were simultaneously granted access to the port and airfield of Mogadishu. In exchange for this, Washington promised to deliver military hardware worth \$42 million on advantageous terms (radar stations, antiaircraft systems, trucks) and to allocate an additional \$5 million in the form of economic aid.

The USA needs the naval base at Berbera to support naval reconnaissance, to refuel ships, to create stockpiles of materials and equipment in the event of possible military transfers, and to conduct combat operations in the vicinities of the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. This base occupies an advantageous strategic

position, since it is in direct proximity to the Near Eastern petroleum shipment routes. The Western press emphasizes another important fact: It is located closer to the Persian Gulf than the American base at Diego Garcia, and just 320 km from the strait of Bab el Mandeb--the entrance to the Red Sea, through which lies the shortest marine route from Europe to South and East Asia and Australia.

According to the agreement the initial contingent of American military specialists at the base of Berbera, which will primarily be responsible for establishing communication between the permanent location of the "Rapid Deployment Forces" in the USA and the zone of probable combat operations, must consist of about 100 persons.

It is presently impossible to base warships at the naval base and port of Berbera. The depth at the moorings is 1-9.5 meters, there are not enough cranes, and the concrete mooring, which is about 1,000 meters long, can simultaneously service only two vessels with a displacement of up to 10,000 tons (the naval supply point and port of Mogadishu is similarly equipped).

In order that the naval base and port of Berbera could handle large warships, an extensive modernization effort must be made. According to data in the Western press the estimated cost of such modernization and the expenses of delivering maintenance resources to the air base at Berbera and of measures to locate the contingent of American specialists here totals \$12 million. All manpower required for the work, including skilled labor, must be imported. The U.S. Congress has already allocated \$10 million for the port's reconstruction. In February 1981 the first group of American engineers and technicians (40 persons) arrived there, and preparations were started. There are plans for increasing the length of the mooring by 200 meters, to equip the berths and mooring points and to erect new warehouse buildings.

The airfield at Berbera has one of the longest landing strips in Africa (4,100 meters), meaning that it can handle military transport aircraft carrying weapons, gear and troops. The USA plans to implement a number of measures to rebuild the airfield, to include construction of a command post, creation of airplane parking pads, expansion of the fuel depots and erection of prefabricated housing.

According to reports in the foreign press the command of the U.S. Armed Forces intends to spend \$200 million in the next 5 years to modernize the bases of Mombasa, Berbera and others located in these countries.

The Reagan administration openly demonstrated its intention to expand American-Somali cooperation, primarily in the military area. In the 1982 fiscal year the volume of economic aid provided by the USA was \$90 million and military aid totaled \$20 million, while for 1983 the administration has already requested about \$80 million and \$30 million respectively.

In summer 1982, when combat operations were initiated by government troops against rebels representing the Democratic Front for the Rescue of Somali,

Washington established a so-called "air bridge" to provide military first aid. This is evidence of the USA's aspiration to preserve a pro-American regime here at all costs.

Djibouti, a former French colony, has great significance to the Horn of Africa. According to a treaty signed in 1977, Djibouti is a *de facto* protectorate of France, and France is its privileged ally. Djibouti's principal economic facilities include a marine port capable of handling large ships and vessels up to 300 meters long, and an international airport that can support the flying of heavy transport aircraft. The strength of French troops on its territory is about 4,000 persons--that country's largest military contingent outside of Europe. France provides financial assistance to its former colony in exchange for the right to use naval and air bases. The port of Djibouti remains the main naval base of the French Navy in the Indian Ocean zone, while the airfield at that city is the home of a "Mirage" tactical jet fighter squadron.

In recent years this region has been transforming quickly into to a hot spot in which imperialist states are weaving their intrigues. The deep-water port at Djibouti is becoming an increasingly more important point for refueling, for taking fresh water, food and so on aboard not only for French but also American ships.

As the foreign press reports, Washington has started implementing its plans for gradual transformation of the county into a unique "Hong Kong in Africa," having received permission for American ships and merchant vessels to enter and anchor at the port of Djibouti, and to organize short-term leaves for their crews. The United States immediately capitalized on this possibility to secure its position here and to accustom the residents of Djibouti to the idea that it had arrived, if not forever then for a long time. Two to four American naval ships now enter the port each week. In 1980 the number of American ships visiting the port exceeded the number of French ships for the first time.

In 1981 the USA conducted an exercise code-named "Bright Star"* for its interventionist "Rapid Deployment Forces" on the territories of Egypt, Somali, the Sudan and Oman. According to reports in the Western press over 7,000 American enlisted men and officers as well as units and subunits of the armed forces of the above-indicated countries with reactionary pro-American regimes took a direct part in this exercise. In particular 300 American servicemen and 600 Somali servicemen took part in a joint American-Somali exercise at the naval base of Berbera.

The goal of all of these measures was not only "a most impressive demonstration of American military power" in the region, as was officially announced by Washington, but also the USA's aspiration to lay the groundwork for the permanent presence of its armed forces here. It was quite evident, the Western press noted, that these measures had the purely applied objective

* For greater detail on this exercise, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 8, 1982 pp 16-18.--*Editor*.

of practical development of a poorly equipped theater of military operations and its preparation for combat operations. During the course of exercise "Bright Star" the Pentagon concretely worked out one of the American military operations possible in the future in the Near East, in close interaction with the armed forces of the above-indicated countries of this region.

CAPTIONS

Figure. Airfields, Naval Bases, Naval Supply Points and Ports of Countries on the Horn of Africa

Table 1. Principal Airfields of Countries on the Horn of Africa

Table 2. Principal Naval Bases, Naval Supply Points and Marine Ports of Countries on the Horn of Africa

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

U.S. INTRODUCES AUTOMATED PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION ASSESSMENT SYSTEM

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 17 Feb 83) pp 25-26

[Article by I. Dzhuri: "Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Psychological Operations Conducted by U.S. Armed Forces"]

[Text] Western imperialist circles, and primarily the USA, are attempting to place a barrier in the way of progressive changes in the world, and they are activating the subversive activities of their propaganda organs, making increasingly broader use of the diversionary tactics of "psychological warfare." Such trends are also reflected in the Pentagon's measures aimed at improving the organization and planning of psychological operations, which the U.S. Armed Forces broadly employ in their military adventures.* Recently American specialists have been devoting special attention to developing new methods by which to evaluate the effectiveness of such operations.

During the Korean War (1950-1953) and in the initial phase of combat activities in Vietnam, according to reports in the Western press the effectiveness of psychological influences upon the enemy were evaluated by means of statistical methods, though their possibilities were limited. During American aggression against Vietnam an automated system for processing reports came into being. In it, data on the results of psychological operations were accumulated and attempts were made to evaluate the effectiveness of these operations.

In the mid-1970s an automated information and control system for psychological operations, the PAMIS, was created on the basis of the methods of systems analysis. This system is a part of a global armed forces operational control system. Its introduction, the foreign press notes, was elicited by the need for meticulously studying the historic, economic and national features of particular regions and entire countries against which these operations are planned. The results account for the social and ethnic structure of society, the linguistic groups within the population, the elements of their culture, the characteristics of government members and party leaders, and the policy courses they implement. This information system foresees the possibility for assessing the effectiveness of psychological operations. Information

* For greater detail on the planning and conduct of psychological operations by the U.S. Armed Forces, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 2, 1982, pp 16-19.--*Editor*.

periodicals are published on the basis of these data, and materials can be gathered together in response to specific individual requests. There is a subsystem for analyzing the effectiveness of psychological operations (the PEAS) in the PAMIS for the purposes of accumulating and processing data with which to make effectiveness assessments. This subsystem generalizes information on the conduct of psychological operations, on the results of their influence on the enemy and on psychological operations conducted by the enemy.

According to the ground troops field manual FM 33-1 the effectiveness indicators of psychological operations include the enemy's responses, the testimony of persons subjected to brainwashing in the course of an operation, reports by witnesses and a number of indirect indicators.

American specialists define responses as changes in the behavior of groups of people subjected to psychological influence. The range of the results may be extremely broad: from individual signs indicating formation of tendencies for change in the enemy's behavior in the direction required by the American command, to total surrender of military formations. The latter is said to be the end goal of psychological influence.

Testimony by persons subjected to brainwashing reflects the results of influence upon them. American specialists feel that despite the low dependability of such indicators in view of the emotional features of each individual, they can be useful in assessing the effectiveness of psychological operations. This pertains primarily to those cases where a large amount of similar data can be analyzed.

Reports by witnesses, American psychologists indicate, reflect the opinion of those persons who were not direct objects of psychological influence but who had the possibility of observing its results. These data depend on the suggestibility of witnesses, owing to which their opinion may not be sufficiently objective. When analyzing information from such sources, specialists consider the possible superficiality of their assessment.

The most typical indirect indicators introduced into the PAMIS include:

measures by the enemy to protect the population and his armed forces from the influence of the propaganda resources of units and subunits participating in psychological operations of the USA;

political and military measures to strengthen the moral-political status of the population and armed forces of the USA;

the enemy's anticipatory counterpropaganda.

The effectiveness of psychological influence upon a selected target is evaluated continually in the course of an operation, and a final assessment is made upon its conclusion. Reports on such influence consist of answers to a series of questions indicated on worksheets drawn up for each target of influence as well as in other documents of the plan of operations. Special

attention is devoted in the reports on psychological operations to factors that reduce their effectiveness, among which American specialists include: countermeasures by the enemy, insufficient coordination of the actions of units and subunits during the planning and conduct of operations, a lack of qualified personnel in these units and subunits, absence of complete and timely intelligence, and others. Effectiveness is assessed as a rule by comparing the goals of an operation with the results.

In the opinion of foreign military specialists the problem of evaluating the effectiveness of psychological operations continues to be one of the most important. The American command believes that this problem can be solved through prudent selection of personnel for units and subunits participating in such operations and for organs that analyze and assess their effectiveness, and through further development of the appropriate indicators and constant improvement of the PAMIS automated information and control system.

Considering that the American war machine is activating its efforts to prepare for psychological operations conducted with the purpose of achieving its aggressive goals, Soviet soldiers must exhibit high ideological and psychological maturity, political alertness and a constant readiness to decisively repel the ideological diversions of imperialists.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

MARCH AND MEETING ENGAGEMENT OF A U.S. DIVISION OUTLINED

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 17 Feb 83) pp 27-31

[Article by Col K. Samigulin, candidate of military sciences, docent: "The March and Meeting Engagement of U.S. Mechanized Divisions"]

[Text] Recently reactionary militant circles of the USA have noticeably activated measures aimed against detente and at resurrecting the cold war and intensifying the arms race with the purpose of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union.

American military specialists believe that in a future war, combat activities will become highly dynamic, and success will depend in many ways on the swiftness with which maneuvers are conducted on the battlefield. This is why the command of the ground troops is devoting a great deal of attention to improving the organizational structure of the formations, units and subunits, to providing modern weapons and combat equipment to them, to raising the mobility of the troops and to preparing them for marches followed by commitment to battle.

Marches by ground troop formations and units are interpreted in U.S. Army field manuals as an inherent component of all forms of combat activities, and they are divided into two forms--tactical and administrative.

Tactical marches are undertaken usually in anticipation of a meeting engagement. The main requirement imposed on the troops in this case is their constant readiness to enter into combat in organized fashion. This is why it is recommended that march formations be organized in such a way that the troops could be deployed and dispersed quickly. Today the overwhelming majority of tactical marches are performed aboard transportation resources, while marches on foot are undertaken only over difficult terrain or over terrain that is impassable for transport vehicles.

Administrative marches are distinguished from tactical marches mainly by the conditions under which they are conducted as well as by the effectiveness with which transportation resources are used. As a rule they are organized whenever the danger of a collision with enemy troops in the course of a march or soon after arrival at the destination is minimum or totally excluded.

Today, military experts of the USA believe, the way a march is prepared for and conducted depends to a great degree on the aggressiveness of enemy aviation. Troops are subjected to the threat of air strikes to a greater extent in this form of maneuver than in any other form of combat activities. This is why it is recommended that marches be conducted in dispersed formations, predominantly at night or in poor visibility.

It has been recorded in the foreign military press that a mechanized division can perform a march as part of an army corps, or independently on two to four routes within a zone 20-30 km wide. The march formation of the division depends on its location within the troops of the army corps (if it is not operating independently), on the situation, on the mission, on the presence and state of the road network, on the time of year and weather conditions and on the preparedness of the units and subunits. As a rule a division moves in columns of route, each of which consists of units and subunits traveling the same route. It may include one or several march echelons, while in turn the latter may consist of one or several groups. Usually such a group consists of a company, if a battalion marches as an independent column of route, or a battalion (a battalion tactical group), if it is part of a brigade column of route. The march group consists of a platoon or a company (battery).

Depending on the situation and the conditions, units and subunits of a mechanized division may organize in two forms of a column of route--closed and open. These two forms differ in relation to the distance between vehicles. Thus in a closed column it usually does not exceed 50 meters, while in an open column it is 100 meters or more. The open column is usually employed when moving through large population centers, when marching over terrain having a well developed road network and when moving at night, while the closed column is used when the danger of enemy attack from the air is greater and in daylight. Depending on the passability of the routes, these forms of columns of route may also be used in combination with one another.

The march formation of a mechanized division includes a covering force, security troops and the main forces (see Figure). The composition of the covering force depends on the evolved situation and the concrete missions of the division. American military specialists feel that this force must be balanced in terms of the number of subunits making it up, such that they could operate with considerable independence of the main forces and possess sufficient firepower and mobility. Usually such a force consists of a battalion tactical group (tank or motorized infantry) or a reconnaissance battalion, the actions of which are supported by fire support helicopters, field artillery and engineer subunits. The main missions of the covering force include reconnoitering the enemy and the terrain, seizing and holding important objectives or sectors and containing advancing enemy troops. The force operates as a rule up to 50 km from the main forces of the division, and it may be supported by tactical and army aviation.

March security performs the following missions: forewarns the main forces of appearance of the enemy, determines the nature of his actions, insures continuous movement of the division's units by annihilating small enemy groups,

and supports deployment of the main forces for combat. It includes frontal security (a vanguard), a flank guard and a rear guard.

Foreign military specialists suggest that frontal security--a vanguard--would best be sent ahead of each brigade marching on its own route and consequently making up a single column of route. It usually consists of a company or a battalion tactical group containing artillery, engineer and other subunits having the mission of protecting the main forces from a surprise attack by the enemy and creating advantageous conditions for deployment of the division's main forces and their commitment to battle. It is believed that the vanguard can travel 10-15 km ahead of the main forces. In turn, a point of vanguard (a reinforced platoon) is sent 3-5 km forward of the vanguard, while the point of vanguard sends out a forward patrol with a strength of up to a detachment. Depending on the situation, the latter can travel 1-3 km ahead of the point of the vanguard with the mission of warning the latter's commander of the presence of the enemy and of obstacles along the route of travel.

Subunits of the division called detachments--flank and rear--are sent out as flank and rear guards. Depending on the conditions under which the march proceeds, their strength may vary from a reinforced platoon to a reinforced company. Flank guards usually move on the flanks of the main forces on parallel routes, while the rear guard follows the main forces with the mission of warning the appropriate commanders of a possible surprise attack by the enemy.

In the opinion of American specialists the division's main forces must be constantly ready to strike and capture objectives and lines indicated in the division's mission. The march formation of combat units contained within the main forces must support any decision for a meeting engagement, and it must insure the most convenient and fastest possible deployment of troops upon encountering the enemy and during combat.

The main forces are usually formed into several columns of route that must be constantly prepared to make strong attacks against the enemy's main forces or to capture an objective (a region, a line) designated by the higher command.

It is emphasized in the foreign press that the distribution of the men and equipment of a mechanized division and the order of travel of troops on the march in anticipation of a meeting engagement have important significance right from the start, since it is very difficult and sometimes simply impossible to change combat or precombat formations the moment enemy troops are engaged or in the course of an engagement. For example it would be best to distribute tank battalions and 155-mm self-propelled howitzer artillery battalions (a total of three) in columns of route in such a way that the tank subunits could be deployed and committed to battle quickly, and so that artillery would be able to occupy its fire positions and open fire. Advancing them too close to the head of the column is not recommended, since they may be drawn into combat on terrain not in keeping with the division commander's plan and timing.

Artillery battalions equipped with 203.2-mm howitzers (organic and attached) usually remain subordinated to the formation commander, and they travel as part of the main forces, behind the division's forward units.

The antitank (antitank rocket launcher) subunits of tank and motorized infantry battalions march within the composition of their march formations, closer to the head of the columns in such a way that they would be capable of deploying quickly to repel a surprise attack by enemy tanks and armored transporters.

Locating signal subunits in the column of route in such a way that they could quickly deploy and begin operating in the first actions of a meeting engagement is recommended. As a rule radio communication resources are prohibited from transmitting during a march. Communication is maintained by mobile resources and by permanent wire communication networks belonging to territorial organs.

Air defense is provided to the division by organic and attached resources (for example by a battalion of "Improved Hawk" surface-to-air missiles), which are used at battery strength, moving within the composition of the marching groups (echelons) or independently. The main mission of the surface-to-air subunits is to provide cover to the division's units and subunits at the beginning of the march, in congested areas, at water crossings and mountain passes, and at the end of a march or during deployment of the units and subunits for a meeting engagement.

Engineer subunits are spread among the columns to conduct engineering reconnaissance, remove obstacles along the routes of travel and create bypasses and crossings over water obstacles. It is believed that the nature of the missions predetermines their place: Except for pontoon bridge subunits, they are located closer to the head of the column. The goal of engineer reconnaissance is to promptly establish the places where engineering operations must be performed and to reveal the condition of the routes of travel. Engineer patrols are sent out for this purpose. They can use various resources, including helicopters.

All rear units and subunits of the division travel as an independent column on one of the routes behind the main forces.

During preparations for and conduct of a march, much attention is devoted to organizing and conducting reconnaissance of both the division's routes of travel and its flanks. It is with this purpose that reconnaissance patrols are sent out from a reconnaissance battalion on tanks or armored transporters. The strength of a patrol may attain 12 men in some cases. A patrol may be advanced 5-8 km from the forward subunits of the covering force. Helicopters of an aeromobile reconnaissance company are intended to be used for scouting in front and on the flanks, as well as for airlifting patrols to their scouting regions.

The command of the ground troops feels that given a sufficiently well developed road network within the zone of movement, a mechanized division may travel

24 km per hour during the day and about 16 km per hour at night. Its rate of travel is practically halved when going cross country.

In order to efficiently organize travel in accordance with a preplanned timetable and in order to keep the proper distance between elements of the columns of route, a start point is designated for the division's subunits and units. It must be far enough away that they could pass through it on time without hindering one another.

Making a 15 minute halt 1 hour after travel begins and then 10-minute halts every 2 hours (for technical inspection) is recommended. As a rule long halts lasting about 2 hours are scheduled after 6-8 hours of travel to permit refueling of the vehicles and to allow the personnel to rest.

A mechanized division usually completes its march when its units and subunits reach an appointed area or initiate a meeting engagement.

American military specialists believe that in a modern war, and especially in its initial period, meeting engagements may arise rather often, since in most cases they would be a continuation of troop movements having the goal of approaching the enemy. It is believed that they may arise during a march in the direction of enemy territory and when troops are moved forward to occupy regions subjected to nuclear strikes, to make counterattacks on the enemy, to repel his counterattacks and so on. Success is achieved by forestalling the enemy in preparing for combat. And this, the same specialists believe, can be achieved by competent and suitable organization of the march formations, by prompt deployment of units into precombat and combat formations and their commitment to battle on the move, by anticipation of the enemy and by other actions.

The manuals of the U.S. Army note that the first to come in direct contact with the enemy are reconnaissance subunits, which must transmit data on the enemy troop grouping, the nature of its actions and so on. As the enemy is approached closer, the covering force engages the enemy's forward units. With the support of artillery, antitank and other fire, it inflicts the largest possible losses upon the enemy in order to hinder his deployment on tactically advantageous lines. To exploit the success of the covering force and to seize important terrain that would assist in the approach and deployment of the main forces, the vanguards commit themselves to battle. They are deployed for attack directly out of columns of route. The fighting vanguards are supported by strikes by aviation and fire support helicopters as well as by artillery and mortar fire. If the situation evolves unfavorably for the covering force and the vanguards, they may temporarily go over to defense or to delaying actions, so as to win time, conserve strength and create the most advantageous conditions for deployment and commitment of the main forces of the division to combat.

Basing himself on the evolved situation the division commander determines the order of committing the main forces to combat, the combat formation, the line of deployment and the breadth of the zone of advance. He also determines the

nature of the subsequent actions. It is noted in the foreign press that the main forces of a mechanized division may be committed to battle directly from the march. In this case the assault echelon of the division may contain as many battalion tactical groups as there are columns of route. For example if a division is marching on three routes, three battalion tactical groups would initially enter into combat. The rest of the forces would be committed to combat as they arrive at the region of combat activities. This method is recommended when the enemy has suffered large losses as a result of nuclear strikes, strikes by tactical aviation, and rocket strikes, and when a numerical superiority of men and equipment has been achieved.

If an engagement with superior enemy forces is expected, the division's main forces go over to the offensive simultaneously after a short halt. The latter is necessary so that the approaching troops would have the possibility to concentrate in a given area. In this case the combat formation of the mechanized division is to consist of two echelons, with a grouping intended to perform the main and subsidiary strikes (consisting of two brigades as a rule) present in the assault echelon. There may be two tank and two or three motorized infantry battalion tactical groups in the brigade operating in the main direction, and there may be one tank and one or two motorized infantry tactical groups in the subsidiary group. Usually a brigade consisting of one tank and one or two motorized infantry battalions is placed into the back-up echelon.

The command of the U.S. ground troops believes that the division's main forces must be committed to battle with maximum swiftness if they are to be successful. Taking account of the probable line at which the enemy is to be encountered, brigades traveling on the same route deploy into battalion columns 10-15 km from this line, battalions deploy into company columns 5-8 km from this line, and companies deploy into platoon columns 2-3 km away. It is recommended that the main strike be made on the flank and in the rear of the enemy's columns of route, and that the subsidiary strike be made from the front.

The manuals of the U.S. Army clearly define the indicators for depth of mission and rate of advance of a mechanized division in a meeting engagement. It is believed that these indicators depend on the concrete conditions, and that they may vary. As far as the breadth of the zone of advance is concerned, it depends on the mission of the formation, on the composition and situation of enemy troops, on the nature of the terrain, and on the presence of the supporting forces and resources. It may be 20-30 km and more for a division, 6-12 km for a brigade and up to 3 km for a battalion tactical group.

Reconnaissance and security subunits operate in the intervals between strike groupings and on their flanks when a meeting engagement begins. Supporting tactical aviation and fire support helicopters have the missions of isolating the battlefield and destroying bridges, crossings and other important objectives along the approach routes that could be taken by the main enemy forces to the region of combat operations.

Much significance is attached in a meeting engagement to the use of tactical airborne forces and aeromobile subunits. They can land 15-20 km in from the line of contact of the sides at reinforced company or battalion strength. Usually their mission is to prevent the approach of enemy reserves to render assistance to troops advancing on the front or to encircled troops.

In the opinion of foreign reviewers, success in the meeting engagement depends mainly on fire support provided by both nuclear and conventional weapons (missiles, artillery, mortars). Artillery control is usually centralized. Serious attention is turned to the use of antitank resources, which are moved forward in bounds, from one line to the next, in the combat formations of their units and subunits. Concentration of their efforts on the main direction and on the flanks is recommended.

Further development of combat activities, the American press reports, will depend on the concrete conditions of the situation. The latter may require offense, or defense, delaying actions or withdrawal.

Figure Caption: Combat Formation of a U.S. Mechanized Division Marching on Three Routes (a Variant).

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

NATO SPONSORS COMPETITIVE PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPING CROSSING EQUIPMENT

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 17 Feb 83) pp 39-43

[Article by Col (Res) A. Volzhaninov: "Development of Crossing Resources in NATO Countries"]

[Text] NATO military specialists believe that the crossing resources presently in the troops no longer satisfy requirements associated with supporting the mobility of the troops in modern combat and operations. In their opinion this is why the bloc's ground troops must be completely reequipped in the next 10-15 years and provided with new engineering equipment, to include crossing resources with tactical-technical characteristics significantly superior to those of existing models.

Judging from reports in the foreign press, the principal requirements on NATO crossing resources are:

a high mechanization level for the process of setting up crossings, coupled with reduction of the time to set them up and decrease of the number of service personnel;

their maximum standardization and unification irrespective of the country in which they are developed;

use of new light and strong materials in their structure coupled with lower development cost and purchase price;

further simplification of their operation and of the training of personnel and crews;

creation of a possibility for repairing and restoring bridge-building equipment in troop conditions.

To achieve these goals, a joint conference of military specialists representing the USA, the FRG and Great Britain adopted a decision in the early 1970s to develop unified requirements on a new generation of crossing resources for the 1980s. According to the tentative plans they are to include:

armored bridgelayers, mechanized bridges (mounted on wheeled bridgelayers), floating bridges and ferries. This list did not include prefabricated bridges and self-propelled bridge trains. The main idea behind the proposed system of crossing resources is to provide a possibility for using the same kind of basic structural elements to erect bridges of different types.

Each member country assumed specific obligations for developing the new resources and followed its own program up to the stage of manufacturing the experimental models. In the future the latter will be subjected to competitive testing conducted by a mixed commission consisting of representatives from the member countries. Models that are deemed to be the best on the basis of the tests will be recommended for further development.

In compliance with the responsibilities it adopted, the USA developed a wheeled bridgelay (Figure 1) intended to set up mechanized bridges and to assemble floating bridges and ferries. It was mounted on a special motor vehicle chassis (with a wheel formula of 10x10), and it has the following characteristics: weight with bridge--about 38 tons, length in transport configuration--16 meters, lane width of bridge--4 meters, engine power--450 horsepower, maximum highway speed--88 km/hr, crew--two persons. The bridge-layer may also be used to lay assault bridges, though American specialists feel that absence of armored protection for the crew make its use for this purpose unsuitable.

The bridge girder is made from an aluminum alloy, and the connecting elements are made of steel. It is a track bridge assembled out of three types of blocks--ramp, middle and connecting. A block has a trapezoidal form, and it consists of sections having a triangular cross section to provide rigidity and made of aluminum panels with a reinforced lower section that absorbs the main stretching loads. The length of the middle block is 7 meters, the ramp block is 7.5 meters long, and the connecting block is 1 meter long.

A bridge 31 meters long (for load class 60) is assembled out of two middle, two ramp and two connecting blocks. It is designed in such a way that a single-span bridge 17 or 24 meters long can also be assembled. The bridge is launched over an obstacle in the horizontal plane using a launching nose. To reduce the overall weight of the structure the beams of the launching nose are made from compounds reinforced with graphite fibers. This made it possible to reduce its weight from 500 to 160 kg. Efforts are now being made to use synthetic materials such as kevlar [transliteration] to partially replace the aluminum panels in the bridge sections, owing to which the weight of the bridge will decrease and its stiffness will increase.

The crew performs all the operations of laying the bridge and removing it from the obstacle without leaving the vehicle.

In the opinion of American military specialists the total length of the bridge-layer is rather sizable. The bridgelay has difficulties negotiating roads, and its maneuverability is sharply limited, which is why the length will be reduced in the final design of the bridgelay.

The USA is working on a variant of a mechanized bridge with a cable reinforcing system which would permit assembly of bridges 38, 45 and 52 meters long. The mechanized bridge is conveyed by two vehicles. It will be launched in the following order. A wheeled bridgelayers approaches the obstacle and extends its bridge in the direction of the opposite bank. Then the second vehicle, which carries an additional girder, drives up to the first vehicle. A locking mechanism on the bridgelayers joins this girder to the main bridge, after which the whole assembled structure is extended over the obstacle. The reinforcing system consists of two cables (one for each track) secured to connecting blocks. The blocks are drawn taut--that is, the tie rod is set in working position--after the bridge is laid over the obstacle.

American specialists are also considering the use of a 14-meter bridge, conveyed by a transporter, as the superstructure of floating bridges and ferries. In the 1980s these structures are to replace the tactical bridge trains now in the troops. The possibility of creating a special outfit of identical basic elements from which to make armored and wheeled bridgelayers, ferries and floating bridges is being studied for the purposes of further unifying the crossing resources. New floating piers are being developed to replace the "ribbon bridge" pontoon bridge sections. Installing a water-jet propulsion unit in their middle unit has been proposed. In the opinion of foreign specialists this will raise the maneuverability of the pontoons during creation of crossings, and it will permit them to come close to shore. Moreover a water-jet propulsion unit would make it possible to assemble pontoon bridges over shallow water.

A floating bridge can be assembled in two ways. The first method entails assembly of pontoon bridge sections with a traffic lane 14 meters long, after which they are lined up and joined together. In the second case the bridge is launched by a wheeled bridgelayers that successively extends out blocks on floating piers. It has been noted that this system permits assembly of a bridge of sizable length.

The foreign press reports that besides the crossing resources examined above, the USA has developed a unified span structure 24 meters long mounted on the tracked chassis of an M1 "Abrams" tank. Thus a new armored bridgelayers was created. In the future the length of its bridge structure is to be increased to 32 meters. This country is simultaneously making an effort modernize the "ribbon bridge" tactical bridge train presently available to engineering units and intended to support assault echelon troops surmounting wide water obstacles. One bridge train outfit is enough to launch a bridge 212 meters long or to assemble six ferries. The goal of its modernization is primarily to raise the loading class of bridges assembled from it to 70.

Bridge trains make up the basis of the crossing resources of the FRG. The M2 self-propelled bridge train is believed to be the most effective. In the late 1970s the Dorn'ye [transliteration] and MAH companies created an experimental model of a wheeled bridgelayers to transport and set up a one-span bridge 28 and 42 meters long capable of handling class 60 cargoes in response to an order from the minister of defense (Figure 2). Designed on the basis

of a special motor vehicle chassis (with a wheel formula of 8x8), it is outfitted with a mounting pier, a telescopic launching nose and mechanisms for removing additional bridge sections from the transporter, for launching the bridge over the obstacle and for subsequently removing it. The crewmembers perform all operations without leaving the vehicle. The sequence of laying a 42 meter bridge over an obstacle is shown in Figure 3. The bridge spans have a track structure, and the tracks are assembled out of sections with a triangular profile, each 7 meters long. A bridge 42 meters long is carried by two vehicles--a bridgelayer (28 meters) and a transporter (14 meters).

In compliance with unification requirements, the developed span structure may be used to erect one-span bridges, to assemble mobile ferries and to launch floating bridges. During tests, self-propelled catamaran pontoons that are transported in the same way as bridge ferries were used as floating supports.

Use of new materials based on ceramic compounds reinforced with carbon fiber in the design of the sections made it possible to achieve optimum weight characteristics, lying within 455-470 kg per linear meter, for class 60 bridges having a structural height of 1,150 mm and a span length of 42 meters. However, NATO specialists working on new structural materials believe that by the late 1980s bridge structures weighing not less than 300 kg per linear meter will be developed on the basis of alloys of aluminum and graphite fiber saturated with boron. Thus the total weight of a bridge may be reduced by about another 30 percent.

Creation of armored bridgelayers in the FRG is presently in the developmental stage. Thus systems analysis has been used to determine the optimum variants of bridge structures for tracked bridgelayers depending on the method used to lay a loading class 60 bridge over an obstacle. Two variants were tentatively selected: free horizontal launching and launching over an obstacle using a telescopic nose. In the first case the maximum length of the aluminum alloy bridge was 27 meters, and when the aluminum was reinforced with carbon fiber it was increased to 31 meters. In the case of using a telescopic launching nose, it can be increased to 52 meters, though some shortcomings can be noted: longer laying time, much lower maneuverability due to the cumbersomeness of the structure, high loads on the axles of the bridgelayer, and others which, in the opinion of West German specialists, make such a bridge ill-suited to providing support to tanks on the battlefield for the time being.

Until crossing resources of the 1980 designs become available to engineer troops of the Bundeswehr the multiple-span SAS bridge, which was designed on the basis of the West German "Biber" armored bridgelayer and which is intended to support heavy combat vehicles crossing an obstacle up to 100 meters wide, is to serve as a temporary model. The bridge outfit consists of two bridgelayers, three wheeled transporters and the bridge structures they carry (each consists of two sections 11 and 8 meters long). An intermediate support 4.5 meters high equipped with a hydraulic drive is secured to the end of the shorter section.

Great Britain also manufactured a wheeled bridgelayer with an aluminum alloy track bridge 32 meters long in accordance with the work plan mentioned above.

The cable reinforcing system permits an increase in span length to 49 meters while maintaining a loading class of 60. The cross section of a bridge section is rectangular, and it is assembled out of blocks 8 meters long. The bridge-layer is presently undergoing testing. If the results are positive, it will be submitted for competitive demonstration.

The English specialists are considering, as a long-term idea, modernizing the MGB medium girder bridge. Representatives of Ferry Engineering believe that the design possibilities it embodies and its strength reserves would make it possible to create an entire family of crossing resources quickly and with relatively low outlays:

one-span class 60 or 70 girder bridges up to 49 meters long (sometimes longer);

multiple-span girder bridges on intermediate supports 7.7-12 meters high and higher, capable of handling the same loads as those above;

floating bridges and ferries using rigid girder bridges as the superstructure.

A one-span bridge 49 meters long with a truss reinforcing system was created by Ferry Engineering out of MGB elements. A mechanized bridge 63 meters long is in the development stage. The span superstructure of the MGB is now being used to make floating bridges and ferries (Figure 4).

Although France did not participate in the conference of the principal NATO countries, the Western press indicates that its specialists are working on the design of crossing resources that will become available to the engineer troops in the mid-1980s. They are cooperating with West German experts. It has also been noted that French specialists are trying to maximally mechanize the bridge launching process. It is with this purpose that they are developing the MAF self-propelled bridge train, which is to replace all organic "Zhillua" [transliteration] self-propelled crossing resources presently available to the divisions and corps. Experimental models of ferry-bridge vehicles riding on a special wheeled chassis are being created for it. Two folding ramps are mounted on the bow and stern of the hull, which plays the role of a pontoon, and inflatable floats are secured to the sides. Two screw propellers mounted in the bow and stern sections move the system over water.

There are practically no preliminary preparations to be made of the vehicle for its entry into water. The ramps are unfolded and the floats are inflated (to increase the bouyancy reserve) when the system is afloat. The ramps are shifted from traveling to working configuration and back by means of a hydraulic system. The wheels are tucked into recesses in the hull to reduce water resistance.

The ferry-bridge vehicles can be used as ferries, as floating bridges or as bridges on rigid piers. In the opinion of French military specialists the MAF bridge train can significantly raise the possibilities of the engineering troops for launching crossings over water obstacles. Thus one bridge train outfit consisting of four vehicles can be used to launch a floating bridge

(with a loading capacity of 54 tons) 108 meters long in 10 minutes. Formerly it took 12 amphibious vehicles of the "Zhillua" self-propelled bridge train about 1 hour to do the same.

Delivery of PAA mechanized bridges to French ground troops was completed by 1980. These bridges are intended to surmount various obstacles up to 20 meters wide. The bridge structure includes a girder 22 meters long consisting of two hinged sections, and an aft ramp. In addition the hull of the wheeled (4x4) supporting vehicle is used as one of the bridge elements. The wheels are tucked into the hull in this case. The bridge is launched and removed by a hydraulic drive. The loading class is 30. When two bridges are installed in parallel, the loading class doubles, making it possible for medium tanks to cross. The weight of a wheeled vehicle carrying a bridge structure is 34 tons, the maximum highway speed is 60 km/hr, and the range is 800 km.

Thus the leading countries of the aggressive NATO bloc are conducting an intensive effort to create a new generation of crossing resources, to be supplied to the engineer troops before the end of the 1980s. Special attention is being turned to unifying the bridge structure. On the whole, foreign military specialists believe, fulfillment of the adopted program for developing crossing resources in the 1980s will promote an increase in the maneuverability of NATO ground troops.

FIGURE CAPTIONS

Figure 1. American Wheeled Bridgelaying

Figure 2. West German Wheeled Bridgelaying

Figure 3. Launching a Bridge 42 Meters Long

Figure 4. Ferry With Superstructure From the MGB Outfit

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

ADVANTAGES, LIMITATIONS OF AUTOMATED AIR RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES ANALYZED

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 17 Feb 83) pp 45-50

[Article by Col A. Krasnov, doctor of military sciences, professor: "Automation of Air Reconnaissance Processes"]

[Text] The military leadership of the aggressive imperialist NATO bloc believes air reconnaissance to be one of the most important forms of supporting the combat activities of aviation, the navy, the ground troops and the armed forces in general. This is why it is devoting great attention to developing the resources of air reconnaissance and improving its methods in its preparations for war against the USSR and other countries of the socialist fraternity. In recent years, judging from reports in the Western press, various automated resources have been enjoying increasingly broader use in its conduct. There are two basic reasons behind this, according to foreign specialists: the timeliness with which information is received, and the dramatic increase in the volume of acquired intelligence.

It is emphasized in the foreign press that the time factor has always had important significance to air reconnaissance, and the term "timeliness" has long been one of the factors used to assess the quality of the intelligence obtained. It is believed that even the most complete and accurate intelligence would lose its value if it is delivered late.

As was noted in the American journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, by the late 1960s aerial photographs of reconnaissance objectives were processed and transmitted to interested organs in just 2.5 hours after these objectives were photographed. While this was said to be adequate before, today it is no longer consistent with the dynamics of a combat situation. Discussing the latter, the West German journal WEHRTECHNIK came to the following conclusion: Any delay in transmission of data would reduce the value of the latter, it would permit the enemy to make its strike, and friendly troops would be unable to make full use of their possibilities of fire and maneuver.

In order to reduce the time it takes to deliver information to commanders and staff, the NATO countries are improving reconnaissance airplanes and their equipment and they are creating special systems in which reconnaissance processes are merging with target indication and with strikes on discovered

targets. And even despite this, wrote the journal AIR FORCE, the decision making time is continually decreasing, even though the opposite should be true. What is the reason for this?

Answering this question, the Western military press indicates that commanders are swamped by the wealth of information, the processing of which requires superhuman effort. Consequently the second factor--the sharp increase in volume of obtained intelligence--also requires automation of air reconnaissance data processing.

Foreign military specialists have long believed that because of a lack of information on the enemy, commanders are compelled to make hasty decisions and thus they mistakes. Today, moreover, they note that excess information is also a hindrance to making correct decisions.

The volume of information increased gradually and unnoticeably, and, as the foreign press notes, it was a while before it was realized that two shortcomings were typical of information processing--large time losses and the significant volume of the work.

Thus as the quantity of air reconnaissance resources increased and as their quality grew, the information that these resources acquired increased dramatically. As an example the journal AIR FORCE writes that in one hour of flight the American SR-71A strategic reconnaissance aircraft (Figure 1) can map an area of 155,000 km² with its reconnaissance apparatus, while the new TR-1 tactical high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (Figure 2) can map 13,000 km². The journal goes on to note that even these figures do not provide a full impression of how great the volume of information is in the critical periods of combat activities, when the bulk of available forces and resources are committed to reconnaissance missions and the troops need to receive the information as quickly as possible.

Most foreign specialists believe that given the wealth of information, a large part of it becomes obsolete before it is processed, and the probability of losing important information grows. In their opinion a surplus of data overburdens the communication channels, distracts the staff to unnecessary work, deprives it of the possibility for monitoring current events on the battlefield as they happen and leads to mistakes in decision making.

Analyzing this problem, foreign experts came to the conclusion that a line must be drawn between needed and "surplus" information depending on the nature of the missions and the command level (the higher it is, the more general the information must be). They believe that the troops would not be able to effectively utilize reconnaissance data until such time that the data selection criteria are correctly determined--that is, until such time that a list of information required by the appropriate organs is drawn up and its content is spelled out.

According to the Western press, reconnaissance systems had formerly employed manual data processing, but difficulties in dealing with the growing flows of information began to be felt as early as in the early 1970s. This is why even

reconnaissance officers characterized by a high level of professional training were unable to furnish the command with the information it needed, on time and in the required volume.

Foreign specialists believe automation of reconnaissance processes to be a way to resolve the arising contradictions between the demand of the troops for intelligence and the time it takes to deliver it, and between the timeliness and completeness of the information. First of all they came to the conclusion that transmission of data from an airplane or some other airborne vehicle to ground data collection and processing points must be automated.

The foreign press notes that new automatic devices were created for this purpose and are still under development today. They are enjoying increasingly broader application. In particular, modern reconnaissance airplanes are equipped with apparatus that can process photographic film, video signals from side-looking radar and signals from infrared and television sensors while the airplane is still in the air. This apparatus can also transmit images to the ground within just a few minutes. In the opinion of Western experts the use of such devices makes it possible to reproduce, with a minimum delay, a picture of the terrain (an image corresponding to the sensor employed) as it is seen from the airplane for command posts and interested staffs, and thus to achieve prompt acquisition of reconnaissance information. However, it is noted in the foreign press that automation of the transmission of data from aboard the reconnaissance airplane is not the sole means of surmounting the time barrier. In particular it is said that the contradiction between the timeliness of information acquisition and information completeness can be resolved by insuring fast selection of necessary information and the weeding out of surplus data in the flow of information transmitted by numerous radio communication channels. This is why automation of data processing and analysis is acquiring great significance. To solve this problem, many countries are developing and introducing technical resources for information acquisition, primary processing and classification, various devices for storing, accumulating and generalizing information, and high-speed communication systems.

From the viewpoint of foreign specialists information provided in the form of aerial photographs or transmitted via television channels yields poorly to automated processing, and even greater difficulties arise with automation of the recognition of military objectives. The reason for the latter is the enormous diversity of combinations of different objectives and their mutual arrangement.

According to data in the American press, automatic recognition of objects on photographic or television images--so-called "image analysis"--can be achieved using three computer identification methods: selection of objectives containing straight lines; comparison of their shapes, sizes and outlines with known models of combat equipment; statistical analysis of the densities and contrasts of the images. The first method is based on the fact that a straight line is characterized by certain abstract properties: The succession of points at which a straight line crosses the bars of a rectangular grid may be expressed by an arithmetic progression. Owing to this, a straight line could be recognized by scanning the image and using conventional logical linear servo systems to predict the positions of subsequent intersection points.

The second method requires a computer having the ability to "memorize" complex outlines and forms of objects and their dimensions, and to compare, with sufficient dependability, images obtained by air reconnaissance with the characteristics of known models of combat equipment, stored in the computer.

The third method is based on the use of statistical analysis of the densities and contrasts of images in relation to different types of surfaces on earth: water, forests, urban areas (residential and industrial regions) and others. In this case the image is defined as a function of a statistical distribution of densities and contrasts. A section of this image may be related to a particular type of earth surface if statistically adequate samples of its densities and contrasts provide distribution parameters corresponding to the given type of earth surface.

It has been noted in the Western press that such computers already exist, and that programs providing for graphical input and output of information to decode and analyze photographic and television images, to detect military objectives and to reveal their properties on the basis of assemblages of particular characteristics have been written for them.

However, significant difficulties arise in creating automated devices for correlating information coming in simultaneously from several sensors which function on the basis of different principles of data acquisition.

In the opinion of many foreign military specialists automation of data acquisition and processing is only part of the solution to the overall problem of full automation of all reconnaissance processes. Considering the question as to whether reconnaissance processes could or should be fully automated, they offer different answers. Some believe that this would be possible considering the achievements of science and technology, because air reconnaissance resources that do not require the presence of an individual (a pilot)--reconnaissance drones--already exist. They believe that introduction of automatic systems is gradually reducing man's role both in information processing and in the conduct of air reconnaissance itself.

The problems associated with combat use of drones and their place in the air reconnaissance system are attracting considerable attention among military experts abroad in this connection. They note that the idea of creating such vehicles had been stated long ago, but it was only in the 1960s that the level of technological development permitted partial implementation of this idea. At first, modified guided aerial targets were used as reconnaissance aircraft (Figure 3). Later on, special drones outfitted with the appropriate apparatus were designed.

What are the advantages of unmanned resources? Their proponents present many arguments, the principal ones of which are as follows. Such vehicles are distinguished from manned aircraft by their relatively low cost and lower operational outlays owing to simpler structures and equipment, and they consume less fuel. All of this permits their use in significant quantities. An important merit of unmanned resources is the possibility for performing reconnaissance

missions without the risk of losing expensive airplanes and killing their crews. Moreover owing to their small dimensions and consequently their low optical, infrared and radar contrast, they are less vulnerable to enemy anti-aircraft resources.

The foreign press reports that because of these properties, reconnaissance drones have enjoyed rather widespread acceptance in the USA and some other countries. They were actively used by the American war machine in Southeast Asia and by Israeli extremists in the Near East. In the estimate of Western specialists these resources successfully photographed military industrial facilities, airfields, troop concentrations, surface-to-air missile complexes and other targets. As an example during the USA's aggressive war in Vietnam, the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL stated, American reconnaissance drones obtained more than 80 percent of the photographs of objectives located in regions enjoying the greatest anti-aircraft cover.

Some NATO military experts believe that in a future war, drones will replace manned airplanes for observation of the battlefield and for radio reconnaissance, and in the future in the performance of other tactical air reconnaissance missions.

The opponents of such views point to the serious difficulties in controlling reconnaissance drones, to the need for increasing the number of personnel in ground services, to the poor protection afforded to communication lines and to imperfections in the landing methods, which often result in damage to these airborne vehicles. They believe that even if all of these difficulties are surmounted in the future, this would still not insure that unmanned resources would play the leading role in air reconnaissance. Of course manned airplanes could be abandoned completely, specialists note, if certain features of unmanned resources are ignored--their lack of initiative and their inability to react intelligently to arrival of new unexpected targets and to changes in the situation. But in their opinion these circumstances are precisely what prevent a monopoly of unmanned craft, since air reconnaissance requires an active search for objectives, flexible maneuver and use of particular forms of apparatus consistent with the evolving situation.

It is noted in the foreign press that unmanned resources can significantly fill the gaps in the overall air reconnaissance system and perform many missions, but not all. It is emphasized that everything depends on the situation: The more complex and uncertain it is, the greater is the need for manned airborne vehicles. In this case Western military specialists suggest the opinion that airplane (helicopter) crews should be given the mission of searching predominantly for small, camouflaged and mobile targets on the basis of indirect characteristics which do not yield to formalization and which consequently hinder or completely exclude automation of reconnaissance data acquisition. Their main mission should be to conduct additional reconnaissance on targets after they are revealed by space observation resources and other forms of reconnaissance, as well as in cases where incomplete or contradictory information is acquired on the enemy.

Foreign experts believe it would be easier for the enemy to mislead a reconnaissance effort if the detection and identification of targets and subsequent information processing are performed by automatic devices working on the basis of predetermined formalized indicators. In this case the enemy could conceal his important targets by camouflaging these characteristics, or on the other hand he may use these characteristics to simulate a large quantity of false targets. In such situations the crews of reconnaissance airplanes would have to consider the sum total of reconnaissance characteristics with the purpose of not only identifying the objectives more dependably but also determining, in accordance with the evolving situation, the relative importance and significance of even the same kinds of objectives, depending on their location, on the actions of enemy troops, on the intentions of the enemy and on the actions of friendly forces in behalf of which air reconnaissance is performed.

As for whether or not an unmanned scout that would completely replace manned reconnaissance aircraft would ever be designed, many foreign specialists offer a negative answer for the following reasons. They believe that unmanned resources will doubtlessly approach a desired ideal, but there will remain a certain gap between the possibilities of unmanned and manned scouts, since nonstandard situations requiring nonstereotypic actions will always arise. In this connection the American journal AIR FORCE wrote that the approaching era of automatic systems in air reconnaissance will die out if there is no room for anyone to display tactical resourcefulness, initiative and boldness.

The long-standing debate on the role played by operators collecting, generalizing and analyzing reconnaissance data in automated systems is also continuing strong in the Western military press's examination of the problems of automating air reconnaissance. It would seem that everything is clear and simple: Give the hardest part of the work to the computer, and then it would be quite simple to press buttons. But in the opinion of many foreign experts the truth is far afield of this. They believe that although modern automatic devices can perform operations with dizzying speed and exceptionally high precision, and although they can process large volumes of information faster and more accurately than man, they can do so only on the basis of pre-formulated dependencies stored in their memories. On this basis they came to the conclusion that many operations associated with analyzing reconnaissance data which are now performed by hand continue to be practically impossible for automatic machines. For example assume that the preparedness of enemy airplanes for take-off must be determined from an aerial photograph of an airfield. How could one create a robot that could carry out this simple (from man's point of view) task? The experience of developing automated reconnaissance systems abroad cannot provide an answer to such questions.

Most Western experts assert that only an individual (of course, one who is well trained in all respects) who can process and analyze information and who can summarize a large quantity of factors, albeit approximately, would be capable of thoroughly assessing and predicting the actions of the enemy in complex, contradictory situations. Thus they believe that even if we account for the prospects for development of automatic systems, formalized computer analysis

of reconnaissance data will never replace man's possibilities for creatively conceptualizing and formulating the results of reconnaissance.

On the basis of all of the above, NATO military specialists believe that systems created in the future for air reconnaissance must include the following basic components: resources for acquiring the data (manned and unmanned airborne vehicles outfitted with the appropriate apparatus); points for the processing and analysis of acquired information; the apparatus and devices for displaying and documenting the data. All of these elements must be interconnected by dependable communication lines which can include special airborne retransmitters if necessary, and the work processes must be automated to the extent possible. It is emphasized in this case that although the degree of automation of air reconnaissance processes will grow significantly in the future, the creativity of personnel in obtaining data that cannot be expressed in the form of logical progressions or in quantitative form could never be replaced.

It is noted in the foreign press that reconnaissance information that is processed, analyzed and continually updated and transmitted to displays and troop command and control computers would make it possible to automate the selection of targets, the weapons and the combat formations of friendly forces, and to calculate the anticipated results and the losses associated with different variants of actions, but the right to make a given decision will continue to belong to commanders.

FIGURE CAPTIONS

Figure 1. American SR-71A Strategic Reconnaissance Airplane

Figure 2. American TR-1 Tactical High-Altitude Reconnaissance Airplane

Figure 3. French R.20 Reconnaissance Drone Created From a CT.20 Guided Aerial Target

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

U.S. FIGHTER PILOTS USE COMPUTERIZED COMPLEX IN COMBAT TRAINING

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 17 Feb 83) pp 55-58

[Article by Col V. Berdov: "Training Ground Complex for Teaching Aerial Combat to Pilots"]

[Text] Judging from reports in the foreign press, tactical aviation pilots are being trained in countries of the aggressive imperialist NATO bloc with the assistance of various technical resources, among which air trainers are the most widespread. In the opinion of Western military experts use of such trainers significantly promotes more-dependable memorization of theoretical knowledge, hastens acquisition of practical piloting habits and permits the student to individually develop the most complex elements of combat application of airplanes and their systems. However, many foreign specialists believe that the training situation created in trainers and at conventional aircraft training ranges is far from real. As a consequence pilots make mistakes in selecting a maneuver and using weapons in combat situations. This reduces the effectiveness of their actions, and losses grow.

Considering this, the NATO countries and primarily the USA have come to the conclusion that special training ground complexes making it possible to train personnel in conditions as close to real as possible must be developed.

Thus, having studied the use of their aviation in Southeast Asia, American experts decided that one of the reasons for loss of airplanes and crews was the latter's lack of the habits of fluid aerial combat. Moreover they believe that aircraft weapons, particularly air-to-air missiles, were not always used from the most advantageous position.

Attempting to eliminate these shortcomings specialists of the U.S. Air Force and naval aviation began work in 1971 on a fundamentally new system (a training ground complex) to teach pilots fluid aerial combat in real flight coupled with simulated use of weapons. The first such system, which came to be called the "Fluid Aerial Combat Training Ground Complex" (abbreviated the ACMR) was adopted by naval aviation in 1973. Its improved variant ("Measurement of the Parameters of a Maneuvering Airplane," ACMI) was adopted by the U.S. Air Force in 1976. By the late 1970s the possibilities of the ACMR were

significantly broadened, and it began to be called the "System for Training Tactical Fighter Crews for Fluid Aerial Combat" (TACTS). Development of such complexes continued. Now they are referred to by the same code name in the air force and in naval aviation--TACTS/ACMI.

Each training ground complex consists of four basic subsystems: aircraft instruments (AIS), tracking instruments (TIS), control and parameter calculation (CCS) and data recording and display (DDS).

The AIS is a container 3.6 meters long and 12.7 cm in diameter. It houses the apparatus that measures the airplane's flight parameters, an electronic system simulating an air-to-air guided missile, a sensor indicating the airplane's position in space, and an interrogator-responder. This container can be suspended from any type of tactical fighter capable of carrying "Sidewinder" guided missiles. It takes not more than 5 minutes for a crew of three to mount it. Built-in instruments having similar purposes will be used in new airplanes, the F-18 in particular, instead of the suspended container.

Data are transmitted from the AIS to the tracking subsystem, the TIS, which consists of one central and seven (or more) remote-controlled peripheral transceiving stations. The latter are intended to determine the exact location of airplanes, and they are positioned on the training ground on the circumference of a circle with a diameter of about 80 km (within the limits of direct radar visibility from the central station). The complex can process data from 20 airplanes within the vicinity of the training ground, but communication is maintained only with eight of them. The foreign press has reported that there are plans for raising these indicators to 36 and 16 respectively later on.

The airplane coordinates are transmitted from the tracking subsystem to the control and parameter calculation station (the CCS), which is the principal element of the complex. It contains several computers that process acquired information to determine the locations of airplanes in space (the sequence of transmitting interrogation signals and receiving responding signals is shown in Figure 1). Moreover the computers calculate data in support of simulation of the launching of air-to-air guided missiles, and they determine the most advantageous flight parameters of an attacking airplane with the purpose of creating optimum conditions for the use of weapons. One of the important functions of the CCS is to generate and accumulate information to be used subsequently to reproduce the aerial combat on screens for postflight analysis.

The DDS is intended for the display of the aerial situation in real time and in graphical and digital forms. The situation in the air and on the ground within the limits of the training ground, the locations of airplanes in space, the view from the instructor pilot's seat (the instructor pilot remains on the ground during the flight) and critical parameters influencing flight safety are displayed on two 1.2x1.2 meter color screens. Critical parameters are, according to American specialists, a dangerously close distance between airplanes engaged in combat and impermissible speed, altitude, angle of attack and acceleration values.

When such conditions are approached, traces (symbols) representing the corresponding airplanes begin to blink on the instructor pilot's screen. At this moment the instructor pilot commands the crews to correct their mistakes. The names of the pilots, the types of airplanes, the results of weapon use and an evaluation of the assignment in general are displayed on the screen as well. The main flight parameters of the airplanes, the work of their onboard systems, the readings of their instruments and the state of onboard weapons are displayed on other screens in digital form.

During combat the instructor pilot indicates reasons for failure in weapon use, and he helps the student establish the correct flying conditions and select the optimum position of the airplane for use of its weapons. The DDS provides a possibility for recording all combat training on magnetic tape for subsequent playback during the flight critique.

The foreign military press reports that the memory volume and speed of the complex's computers make it possible to simulate any flying conditions of the airplanes, to select the best conditions, to simulate pilot errors and to display all of these parameters on screens of both types in real time.

On the whole, owing to use of the TACTS/ACMI complex pilot training proceeds in conditions reproducing those of combat to the maximum. It is noted in this case that the greatest attention is devoted to imparting the habits of using weapons effectively, predicting the actions of the enemy and taking steps to avoid being hit.

Improving the TACTS/ACMI complex, American specialists developed two types of indications for the power potentials of an airplane. These indicators are of great assistance in selecting optimum flying conditions during maneuver. One of them is used in the complex's ground equipment system, while the other is mounted in the pilot's helmet (Figure 2). Both types are intended to teach tactical aviation pilots the most effective ways to utilize the power potentials of an airplane while maneuvering. The system provides for this by reproducing the key parameters characterizing maneuverability. Abroad, the latter are defined as: maximum stable angular velocity in a turn, maximum instantaneous velocity of a turn, and the ranges within which airplane power is gained and lost.

The experience of operating TACTS/ACMI training ground complexes together with indicators providing information on the power potentials of a maneuvering airplane revealed the following advantages of such a training method, in the opinion of Western military experts: training proceeds aboard unmodified warplanes of any type, and there is no need for special combat training aircraft; the instructor pilot remains on the ground, and he can guide the actions of several students; the combat display system permits the instructor to report the reasons of mistakes made by students in the air from the ground in real time, and to help the students correctly select the required flight conditions, maneuver, method of weapon use and so on.

Moreover the equipment of the complex affords a possibility for reproducing all stages of a flight as well as computer-calculated optimum solutions to

problems on concrete conditions, which is very important in a flight critique.

On the whole, in the estimation of American specialists, owing to such training ground complexes the required number of sorties is decreasing significantly and the effectiveness of training in each sortie is rising. Moreover expensive airborne targets are not required, and there is no need to launch guided missiles or fire guns.

The Western press reports that in addition to teaching pilots aerial combat, such complexes permit assessment of the actions of crews performing simulated bomb runs and maneuvers and using electronic warfare resources, and to test new air-to-air guided missiles, drones and various aircraft equipment.

According to materials in the foreign press the USA has now deployed five such complexes. One of them is located near Nellis Air Force Base (Nevada), and it is being used extensively to train pilots for the F-16, which can be found in the air forces of the USA, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Israel. There is only one such complex in West Europe at the moment. It is installed at a training ground on Sardinia (Italy), and it is being used to train tactical fighter crews for air forces of the NATO countries. By the end of 1982 a complex of this sort is to be deployed at Cold Lake Air Base (Canada) to train Canadian CF-18 pilots.

In the future the area of application of the TACTS/ACMI is to be widened. In particular, it is to be used to train the crews of tanker airplanes, military transport craft and AWACS and radioelectronic warfare aircraft. There are also plans for using such complexes in joint exercise for all branches of aviation and ground troop units.

FIGURE CAPTIONS

Figure 1. Sequence of Interrogation and Responding Signals of the TACTS/ACMI Complex: 1--Control and parameter calculation station; 2--central station of tracking subsystem; 3--peripheral station of tracking subsystem transmitting interrogation signal to an airplane; 4--airplane with AIS equipment aboard; 5--peripheral stations of the tracking subsystem; 6--trailer housing information recording and display apparatus

Figure 2. Diagram of Helmet-Mounted Indicator of Airplane's Power Potentials: 1--helmet; 2--electronic block; 3--set of light-emitting diodes; 4--safety glass; 5--prism; 6--reflector

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

CARRIER GROUP ANTISUBMARINE DEFENSE SYSTEM ANALYZED

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 17 Feb 83) pp 75-81

[Article by candidate of naval sciences, Rear Adm A. Pushkin, and N. Naskanov: "Carrier Group Antisubmarine Defense"]

[Text] Aircraft carriers--the main naval strike force in conventional wars, a highly prepared reserve of strategic forces in a total nuclear war and a most important tool of achieving political goals in peacetime through the demonstration of military power--play an important role in the expansionist plans of the ruling circles of the USA and other NATO countries.

The significance of such ships was persuasively demonstrated in World War II, which confirmed their extensive possibilities for armed conflict and for expansion of the area of naval operations in maritime sectors. At the same time it demonstrated that submarines are a serious threat to carriers: Their combat activities caused the loss of 19 out of 42 ships of this class in 1939-1945.*

Carriers were able to perform their missions successfully, it was noted in the foreign press, only if they were provided dependable cover by other ships and branches of the navy. Special attention was turned to antiaircraft and anti-submarine defense of carrier formations.

Considering the experience of World War II, and because of the increase in combat potentials of submarines, in the opinion of American military specialists protection of carriers against the underwater enemy has acquired even greater significance today. The following circumstances are considered when organizing carrier antisubmarine defense: the high speed, the practically unlimited cruising range and the independence of modern submarines; the possibilities of detecting carriers both by resources carried by submarines themselves and those mounted on other platforms, to include artificial earth satellites; the great range of weapons used by submarines (10 nautical miles for modern torpedoes equipped with homing systems, and several times more for antiship rockets).

* Aviation is credited with sinking 47 percent and damaging 92 percent of the carriers, while the figures for submarines were 45.2 and 3.5 percent respectively.

Antisubmarine defense is provided by surface ships, shore-based patrol airplanes, deck-landing antisubmarine airplanes and atomic submarines. In addition there are plans for making active use of permanent and static long-range submarine detection systems, both ones presently existing and those under development, in behalf of antisubmarine defense. Thus the USA has created a long-range sonar observation system, the SOSUS, which can detect a submarine by the noise it emits on the background of ocean noises and the noises of other ships present in the area at the given time. Western specialists believe that when two or three receivers are used to detect a submarine, the area of its probable location could be reduced to 100 square nautical miles.

As a supplement to the SOSUS the USA has developed a maneuvering system for long-range sonar submarine detection (the SURTASS project). This system has been tested, and it is to be placed into operation in 1983. It will consist of 12 special T-AGOS vessels outfitted with sonar complexes connected to towed antenna arrays (presently under construction). These vessels are to be used in those regions of the World Ocean in which permanent detection resources have not been installed, or in which their effectiveness is insufficient.

It has been noted in the foreign press that the possibilities of sonar equipment used in conjunction with receivers mounted aboard surface ships and submarines have reached their limit, which is why towed antenna arrays were developed in conjunction with the TASS program. These arrays are immune to interference generated by the noise and vibration of ship machinery and the hull, and they can significantly increase the range of sonar complexes. It has also been reported that the USA has completed research aimed at creating an interim positional sonar observation system, the RDSS, which will be used in the following fashion. Hydroacoustic buoys will be dropped by Orion and Viking airplanes along the proposed routes of submarine traffic (45 nautical miles apart at a depth of up to 5,000 meters). A barrier consisting of these buoys will make it possible to transmit information on the underwater situation to centers on shore for a period of 6 months. Airplanes or artificial earth satellites are to be used as retransmitters. When necessary the buoys could be picked up by surface ships and seaplanes, or they could be caused to sink automatically.

Judging from materials in the Western press the antisubmarine defense provided to a carrier group is zonal-objective--that is, it combines defense of both an area and an objective (a carrier and other ships). In this case some NATO specialists define area defense not only as antisubmarine defense in the area within which the carrier group performs combat maneuvers or travels, but also blockade of the appropriate straits and narrows with the purpose of preventing enemy submarines from reaching the open ocean.

The combat formation and the nature of use of security forces depend primarily on their composition and their missions, on the anticipated enemy countermeasures and on the particular features of the route of travel and the region of combat operations. Both hydroacoustic submarine detection resources (shipborne, airborne and land) and nonacoustic resources (magnetic detectors,

radar, infrared viewing systems etc.) that register the different physical fields created by a submarine or its wake, are to be used in antisubmarine defense of carrier groups.

Antisubmarine area defense is provided to a carrier group along its route of travel by shore-based patrol airplanes that fly forward of the group and on its flanks, as well as by combined aircraft-ship hunter-killer groups (deck-landing antisubmarine airplanes and helicopters, atomic submarines and surface ships) that interact closely with permanent and positional sonar systems.

Antisubmarine area defense is provided to maneuvering carriers both by the forces and resources of the carriers themselves and by shore-based patrol aviation. The principle of organizing defense requiring concentration of forces and resources in the directions of the greatest threat is observed in this case. In the opinion of NATO specialists the disposition of security forces must insure maximally effective use of their weapons and dependable protection of the carrier against strikes by enemy submarines.

The most difficult task in the overall antisubmarine system is that of detecting and classifying the targets and providing target information to antisubmarine weapons. On detecting a target, an airplane attacks it, while simultaneously reporting the contact to the carrier and its escort ships. Other antisubmarine airplanes, helicopters and surface ships are immediately dispatched to the area of the last sighting. It is believed that an attack based on the initial detection data will not always be successful, which is why sonar buoys and magnetic detectors are used to pinpoint the submarine's location. Helicopters station themselves around the perimeter of the area in which the submarine is believed to be, and then, maneuvering in converging spiral patterns, they examine the area with submersible sonar equipment, for which purpose they periodically descend to 4.5-6 meters above the surface of the sea.

The advantages of aircraft hunter systems include their large effective radius, high mobility and covertness. Aircraft submersible and towed hydro-acoustic stations work in the presence of significantly less interference, and they are distinguished by greater effectiveness than ship-borne stations.

Use of helicopters significantly widens the possibilities of ship hunter-killer groups for detecting submarines and tracking them over a long period of time, and it significantly increases the probability of hitting submarines with antisubmarine weapons.

Antisubmarine carrier (objective) defense is organized into near and far zones. Defense is provided primarily by ships (cruisers, destroyers, frigates, submarines), deck-landing antisubmarine aircraft, and shore-based patrol aviation (Figure 1).

The main mission of security forces in the near zone is to prevent enemy submarines from using their weapons (rockets and torpedoes). These missions

are executed primarily by surface ships and deck-landing helicopters. Ships use sonar equipment in active mode in this case. In order to create a complete ring of hydroacoustic observation they station themselves at intervals equal to 1.75 times the effective range of the sonar equipment. During a transfer by sea, when the ships travel at a sufficiently high speed (over 20 knots), security is reinforced in the forward sectors of the cruising order, since submarine attacks are believed to be most probable from this direction. The range at which submarines are detected by ships in the near zone and by deck-landing helicopters can be as much as 40 nautical miles from the center of the order.

As a rule helicopters travel ahead of the escorts of the near zone, periodically hovering over the water surface and checking out the underwater situation. Figure 2 shows the way an area is surveyed by helicopters and, in the future, by hydrofoil and air-cushion ships.

In the far antisubmarine security zone enemy submarines are hunted by passive hydroacoustic resources of permanently installed systems and resources carried by aviation, submarines and surface ships. Passive resources are used because the range at which pulses emitted by hydroacoustic systems can be detected beneath the water is significantly greater than the range at which such systems can detect a submarine. Were a submarine to determine in time that it was being hunted, it could evade the security forces and close in to the defended objective for an attack. Therefore the forces in the far security zone use sonar stations and complexes in their active mode only after a submarine is detected by passive resources with the purpose of determining its classification and pinpointing its location, usually in conjunction with an attack.

Because modern submarines can approach carrier groups at speeds exceeding the capabilities of surface ships, depending on the situation the appropriate forces are allocated to provide antisubmarine security to the group from the rear.

It has been noted in the foreign press that nuclear submarines are to be extensively employed in antisubmarine defense of carrier groups. They are characterized by high speed and covertness of action, they are outfitted with modern sonar equipment, and they can maintain rather stable communication with surface ships. Traveling submerged certain distances from the escort ships and maintaining underwater acoustic communication with one of them, they can effectively hunt and kill enemy submarines. Various systems for measuring the speed of sound and sonographic, beam-recording and thermobathygraphic equipment are used to determine the optimum conditions for the operation of hydroacoustic resources, which is associated with the unique features of sound propagation in sea water. SUBROC missile-torpedoes and homing torpedoes are used to strike enemy submarines.

American military specialists believe that atomic submarines stationed 40-90 nautical miles (75-165 km) forward of the center of the cruising order can detect enemy submarines traveling at a speed of 33 knots up to 55 nautical miles away.

Within 100 nautical miles (185 km) of the carrier, deck-landing antisubmarine aviation (representing one-third of all antisubmarine airplanes aboard aircraft carriers) hunt submarines forward of the carrier group. Efficient planning of the timing and routes, which must not be known to the enemy, has great significance to organizing patrols flown by such airplanes. Their routes are designated in such a way that deck-landing antisubmarine airplanes would fly close to the group's escort ships several times in a patrol, and so that the interval between such approaches does not exceed 2 hours, and better still, 1 hour. The route of a lone airplane must not contain too many tacks (Figure 3).

As a rule Viking deck-landing antisubmarine airplanes, which are capable of flying up to 6 hours, remain in the air for 3.5 hours during peacetime training in antisubmarine warfare. One or two shore-based patrol aircraft patrol (to the extent possible) forward of the carrier group and on its flanks outside the hunting range of Vikings.

It was emphasized in the Western press that security forces of a modern carrier group can monitor an area with a radius of 350 nautical miles and provide a carrier with dependable defense against strikes by heterogeneous enemy forces. In the opinion of NATO military specialists the future inclusion of VTOL and STOL carriers into the composition of carrier groups will significantly raise the combat stability and potentials of aircraft carriers. Vertical and short take-off and landing aircraft would be used to hunt and kill submarines. With such ships positioned a certain distance forward and on the flanks of the defended aircraft carrier to provide more-dependable antisubmarine and other forms of defense, the carrier group would be able to perform its mission even in the event that the aircraft carrier is destroyed or knocked out of action. Some of the helicopters and airplanes capable of vertical or short take-off and landing could be transferred from the inoperable carrier to others for subsequent operations.

Judging from information in the American press, we can expect that the ruling circles of the USA will lobby for allocation of assets to build such ships, and that they will encourage their allies to do the same, so that they could provide dependable cover to their own carrier groups while spending the least possible amount of their own money.

As we know, by 1975 all American antisubmarine carriers were dropped from the navy's order of battle and placed into the reserves. The naval command explained this by saying that these ships, which were refitted Essex class aircraft carriers that had been placed into operation in 1942-1946, suffered considerable hull and propulsion equipment wear by the beginning of the previous decade, and their modernization would have required unjustifiably high outlays. Inasmuch as the role of other antisubmarine resources within the overall system of antisubmarine warfare had risen in the meantime, further use of such ships was deemed unprofitable on the basis of the cost/effectiveness criterion.

However, according to evidence in the foreign press the viewpoints of the U.S. naval command on the use of deck-landing aviation in antisubmarine

warfare had not changed. Moreover, as American specialists assert, if some coastal bases are lost and large antisubmarine aviation forces must be concentrated for a short period of time or if patrols must be flown over a long period of time in areas outside the effective range of shore-based patrol aviation, deck-landing antisubmarine airplanes may become the most effective means of antisubmarine warfare. They can patrol the ocean around a carrier group, hunting within their allocated sectors. The way a submarine hunt is organized depending on the quantity of deck-landing airplanes available is shown in Figure 4.

It is believed that in addition to torpedoes, modern submarines will make extensive use of antiship missiles against enemy surface ships, meaning that carrier groups will suffer a constant threat from the air. This is why Western countries are actively working on combined antisubmarine warfare resources that could simultaneously strike both underwater and airborne targets.

During World War II and in the first postwar years the antisubmarine defenses of carrier groups were organized in a circular order, such that when necessary (to evade an enemy attack, to provide for the take-off and landing of airplanes), the direction of travel could be changed without having to change the positions of ships in the combat formation. In this case destroyers, which were used primarily as antisubmarine ships, operated a distance away from the carrier approximately equal to the range of a volley of torpedoes, and when the threat of an airborne attack was present, they concentrated around the carriers in order to meet the enemy airplanes with dense anti-aircraft artillery fire.

Today, taking account of the greater speeds and detection ranges, and considering the use of modern weapons and the need for concentrating forces in the direction of the greatest threat, to simultaneously solve the entire complex of problems associated with defending carrier groups the command of the U.S. Navy abandoned geometrically regular cruising orders in favor of a system of dispersed combat formations in which ships would maintain their mutual spacing only in a general way.

Inasmuch as the possibilities of weapons and equipment are constantly growing, their effective use in combat conditions would require dependable and efficient interaction of all elements participating in the use of such weapons and equipment. According to the foreign press an analysis of numerous concrete tactical situations that occurred during World War II, and of exercises conducted in the postwar era, showed that given all of the objective circumstances and various "human factors" (physiological, psychological and so on), the possibilities embodied within modern naval weapons by planners and designers are realized to only 20 percent. As a consequence effective organization and dependable interaction of forces and resources providing antisubmarine defense to carrier groups must be insured. It is emphasized that functions such as collecting, generalizing and analyzing observation data, monitoring the position of friendly forces and maintaining dependable communication with them must be centralized.

Information coming from coastal antisubmarine defense centers, from centers of the oceanic observation system and from naval intelligence processing centers is integrated at the command posts of the fleet commanders, which subsequently transmit this information and decisions to subordinated formations and other interested units.

Direct control over the heterogeneous forces of a carrier group is maintained by an admiral's command center deployed aboard an aircraft carrier. Control over ships of different classes, submarines and aviation is exercised with the assistance of combat information and control systems, both ship-borne (NTDS) and airborne (ATDS). The command center consists of command posts (for antisubmarine defense, antiaircraft defense and electronic warfare), an automated intelligence center and other subdivisions.

The antisubmarine defense command post provides centralized control over anti-submarine forces and resources, it provides for exchange of information during the planning and execution of antisubmarine missions, it collects, processes and displays information on the underwater situation in the given area, it evaluates these data and transmits them to the crews of antisubmarine airplanes and to the commanders of escort ships, it prepares decisions on the annihilation of submarines, and it allocates the necessary forces.

In the opinion of American specialists the greatest difficulty lies in controlling the actions of a submerged atomic submarine, since as a rule in such a case it can establish communication with surface ships only by means of acoustic underwater resources. To transmit needed information to such a submarine, the antisubmarine defense command post aboard the aircraft carrier must use the escort ships as retransmitters.

Thus the naval commands of the USA and other countries in the aggressive NATO bloc are devoting the most serious attention to antisubmarine defense of aircraft carriers. They believe that effective antisubmarine defense, when combined with all other forms of defense, would make it possible to preserve the combat stability of carrier groups in the conditions of modern warfare at sea.

FIGURE CAPTIONS

- Figure 1. Organization of Aircraft Carrier (Objective) Antisubmarine Defense: 1--Aircraft carrier; 2--escort ships; 3--deck-landing helicopter; 4--atomic submarine; 5--deck-landing antisubmarine airplane; 6--shore-based patrol airplane; 7--enemy submarine
- Figure 2. Deck-Landing Helicopters Hunting an Enemy Submarine in the Near Security Zone: A--Region of possible use of submarine weapons; B--zone of possible pursuit of a submarine prior to its reaching the effective range of its weapons; C--explored region; D--unexplored region over which helicopters will subsequently hover
- Figure 3. Patrol Routes of Deck-Landing Antisubmarine Airplanes: A--One craft; B--two craft

Figure 4. Flight Routes of Deck-Landing Antisubmarine Airplanes Beyond the Effective Range of Shore-Based Patrol Aviation: *A*--Eight craft; *B*--ten; *C*--twelve

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