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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Progress of Independent Servicemen's Union Described

93UM0371A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Correspondent Indira Dunayeva: "The Independent Servicemen's Union Is One Year Old: The Russian Minister Of Defense Is not Joining the Union"]

[Text] In May 1992, Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev approved the creation of a trade union, in June, he rejected a dialogue with it, and in August he called it an illegal organization. Grachev was taken to court after releasing Servicemen's Trade Union Central Committee Chairman Aleksandr Maksimov, however, the minister insists that the court be military and not civilian and reacted to the subpoena only after he was fined 100 rubles for failure to appear.

A number of leading organizations of the Independent Servicemen's Trade Union [NPVS] have ceased their existence under pressure from the Russian Ministry of Defense.

As NPVS Central Committee Deputy Chairman Andrey Gontar reported, "we have no topic of dispute with the ministry, they are just ignoring us. Our organization, while carrying out horizontal ties with civilian trade unions, thereby promotes civilian control over the army and is breaking up its corporateness."

Despite the ministry's opposition, NPVS has begun the construction of three villages for servicemen, has participated in the creation of the law on the status of servicemen, and has established contacts with similar international organizations. The trade union's departments have retrained several hundred servicemen and have concluded a contract with the Peasant Parties of Poland and Russia for on-the-job training of 20,000 reserve servicemen.

NPVS is not the only but it is the largest servicemen's trade union. Its activists hope that it will become the strongest in Russia—a similar organization in Germany that was created in 1956 also underwent a stage of non-acceptance but right now the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] defense minister himself is a member.

Peacekeeping Mission Seen Reinvigorating CIS Forces

934F0304A Moscow NEW TIMES INTERNATIONAL
in English No 5, Feb 93 pp 14-17

[Article by Dmitriy Trenin: "Cover Story: 'Blue Helms' for the CIS?"]

[Text] In December 1991, when the future of the Union and its army was decided, the armed forces submitted to

force majeure circumstances. The military leadership offered politicians from newly independent states a two-year plan for dividing up the armed forces between the successors to the Soviet Union. However, it became clear right away that a "soft" variant for the division was hardly feasible. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia immediately demanded their share. Several months later the divorce was for the most part completed. The consequences of this painful operation will be felt for a long time. But it had a very important result. The military leadership was able to find a passageway between the Scylla of an uncontrolled breakup of the armed forces and the Charybdis of an army coup with the aim of "saving the Union" (the Yugoslav variant of 1991).

A deceptive formula

When the Commonwealth of Independent States was proclaimed it was decided that it would have united armed forces. It was a far-fetched formula at the time because the army still remained a single body. The huge military machine proved in abeyance for some time. The Commonwealth did not set up political bodies to supervise the armed forces while interstate coordination was ineffective. Ironically, this "deceptive" formula helped gain time for everyone. Some gave up their "Union" illusions, others could lay at least the foundations of national statehood.

Today, a year later, the CIS armed forces seem to have melted away. The military wing of an interstate organization usually cannot be stronger and more effective than its leading political structure. Marshal Shaposhnikov's calls for "the priority of collective interests over national ones" could not influence the situation, of course. Despite the numerous CIS documents on military issues the common military-strategic organization could not be preserved. There was simply no political basis for it.

The united armed forces outlived the Union state by two months. The CIS summit held in Minsk on February 14, 1992, formalized the division of the single army into strategic forces, general-purpose forces, and armed forces of the member states. Since then Shaposhnikov's terms of references have been rapidly diminishing. The decision to form the armed forces of Russia, adopted in early March of last year, became a turning point in this process. At the end of May, the CIS Chief Command moved from the premises of the Union Defence Ministry and the General Staff on Arbat Square to the empty Headquarters of the Warsaw Pact on Leningrad Avenue, 41. But the removal concerned only top-ranking officials (Marshal Shaposhnikov and General Samsonov) and their immediate aids. The Defence Ministry and the General Staff remained under Russian control.

Tashkent treaty no "Eastern NATO"

The treaty on collective security, planned since the autumn of 1991, could be signed in a truncated form only on May 15, 1992, at the CIS summit in Tashkent. In

the final count, only six countries—Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Armenia—became parties to it. Even high-ranking officers of the united armed forces admit that it is a long way from this treaty to a military-political alliance. Nothing so far has come out of the idea of an “Eastern NATO.” In Tashkent, the CIS leaders signed a less known but practically more important agreement on the share of the united armed forces due to each CIS country. Under this agreement not only the CIS members but also Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldavia have already received their shares.

Thus, a difficult page has been turned. What could hardly be imagined only a year ago has happened. The division of the world's largest armed forces has been completed. Speaking today about the problems of the army its reform and role in politics, its men and officers, we have in mind the Russian army. What happened to the “united” forces after the divorce, which, incidentally, can hardly be described as civilized, had become a fact? Do the united armed forces continue to exist and are they any prospect for them?

Who controls the nuclear potential?

“The ensuring of reliable centralized control and supervision of the strategic forces stationed on the territory of four independent states, the upgrading of their structure, and the observance of the treaty on strategic weapons” was how the Commander-in-Chief of the united armed forces described their task from the very outset. According to their deployment in the former USSR, the strategic nuclear forces are now distributed as follows: Russia has 80 percent, Ukraine 10, Kazakhstan 6 and Belarus 4 percent of the total.

The task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, maintaining reliable control over them, and ensuring nuclear security is the most forceful of all arguments in favour of the united armed forces. On this matter the situation remains in need of regulations. The question of who takes part in the control over strategic nuclear forces and in what capacity has yet to be specified. Shaposhnikov, who is formally in charge of the strategic nuclear forces, talks about the need of placing nuclear weapons under Russian control. His subordinate, Lt. Gen. Ivashov, Secretary of the CIS Council of Defence Ministers, publicly backs up this view with a menacing argument: “It will be impossible to find the guilty party even if a minor nuclear incident occurs today.” President Yeltsin confidently told the collegium of the Russian Defence Ministry on November 23 of last year that “neither Ukraine nor Kazakhstan but Russia has the nuclear button.”

The Nuclear Planning Committee, envisaged by the agreement on Command of the CIS armed forces, has not been formed. General of the Army Yuri Maximov, commander of the strategic forces, retired and his duties have been entrusted to Marshal Shaposhnikov. Russia officially included strategic missile troops into its armed

forces, and their commander-in-chief was appointed by the presidential decree of August 19, 1992. General of the Army Grachev declared that the Russian Defence Ministry had worked out the concept of using strategic nuclear forces without considering the similar forces in three other states of the Commonwealth.

Russia's attempt to get the entire Navy included in the CIS strategic forces failed, mainly because of Ukraine's stand. True, after stating for several months that the Black Sea Fleet belonged to the CIS united armed forces Moscow finally decided to settle this question with Kiev on a bilateral basis, simply ignoring the Commonwealth to which, as it officially claimed, the Black Sea Fleet belonged. Simultaneously, the President appointed a commander-in-chief to the Russian Navy, and the pre-revolutionary St. Andrew flag was raised on the ships of the three other fleets. Friction over the Black Sea Fleet lessened after Yeltsin accepted Kiev's candidature for the post of its commander-in-chief.

Half-empty shells

For the general-purpose forces, the “united” (or more exactly uncertain) status proved rather a punishment than a blessing. The troops were stationed in conflict zones (the 4th and 7th Armies of the Transcaucasian military district, the 14th Army in Moldova, and the 201st Division in Tajikistan). After the division of the Soviet armed forces not a single state allotted troops for the united forces of the Commonwealth.

In July 1992, the members of the Commonwealth signed an agreement on establishing the Chief Command of its united armed forces, including the headquarters and a number of committees. Half a year later these structures can be likened to half-empty shells. Not even all states which signed the Tashkent treaty sent their representatives to Moscow for the honourable post of Deputy Chief of Staff of the United Armed Forces.

A lateral branch of the army

As usual, the human factor is extremely significant. In December 1991, Marshal Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the CIS United Armed Forces, was the highest-ranking official for all men and officers wherever they served, while Gen. Samsonov headed the General Staff, being the “brain” of the armed forces. Though in the Russian military hierarchy their ranks fall after the Defence Minister and Chief of General Staff, in fact the Shaposhnikov team is not even the “back-up” but a lateral branch of the Russian military establishment. Marshal Shaposhnikov's real influence on the government of Russia is today regarded, by well-informed persons, as very modest. The lack of visible conflicts between the Russian Defence Ministry and the Chief Command of the United Armed Forces indicates that the latter clearly understands its place in the table of ranks.

Thus, it seems that another conclusion can be drawn. The united armed forces played their part as a transitional structure. The size of the united armed forces has dwindled from nearly 100 percent of the former Soviet military might to almost zero. Has the Marshal done his duty and be allowed to go? Not exactly.

It should be established first what the CIS can accomplish. By all indications, the problem of nuclear weapons can hardly be solved satisfactorily within the CIS framework. With regards to Ukraine, Moscow must look for other, more effective ways of settling the problem such as bilateral exchanges of concern, appeals to broader international forums and support from other nuclear powers. Ukrainian and Russian high-ranking officers and experts are expected to meet soon for the discussion of this issue. The nuclear forces and means deployed on the territory of Belarus and Kazakhstan must also be placed under Russian control as early as possible in accordance with agreements taking into account the concern of these countries. It can be concluded from the Defence Minister's speech at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies that Moscow is now inclined to solve the nuclear weapons problem on a bilateral basis. The leaders of the above-mentioned three countries can also arrive at the conclusion that the keeping of nuclear weapons just for an emergency is not a reliable guarantee of their security. Moreover, it can provoke a conflict. Such sentiments are particularly spread in Ukraine.

As the only nuclear state on the territory of the former USSR, Russia could offer its future allies nuclear guarantees of their security. Thus, strategic nuclear forces would be finally excluded from the united armed forces while deterrence would become more reliable.

In the role of a "fire company"?

It has been known since the time of the "massive retaliation" doctrine that nuclear forces can prove incapable of checking aggression unleashed by conventional armed forces. Non-nuclear forces are necessary for dealing with such a threat.

What are the commonwealth's possibilities in this respect? In the northwest, west and southwest, and also in the east, Russia will evidently have to depend for defence mainly on its own armed forces or, where it is possible, to seek the assistance of international Institutions. Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus will not agree to a military alliance with Moscow. Such a position is certainly rational given the present situation in Europe. Things are different in the south. In the past, the countries bordering on the USSR in the south were incomparable with it in military potential. The superpower does not exist any longer, and the southern neighbours—Turkey, Iran and Pakistan—look like giants in comparison with Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and even Uzbekistan.

The Tashkent treaty unites Russia with Kazakhstan, the Central Asian republics and Armenia. Russia is interested in regional stability in the Caucasus and Central

Asia, and in deterring states which lay claim to regional hegemony. A power vacuum is an invitation to aggression. The interests of Russia, the Central Asian republics and Armenia would inevitably be infringed upon if such were to occur.

The Chief Command has plans for forming a Commonwealth mobile force for such an emergency. It would include a sort of "fire company" capable of arriving in the area of a small-scale conflict within three to five days and extinguishing it; rapid deployment forces that would be able, in 10 to 15 days, to deal with medium-scale conflicts; and larger forces for engaging in a major conflict.

The southern "belt of instability"?

However, an immediate danger does not come from the area south of the former Soviet border. It lies in the area north of the border. In the next few years and, possibly, even decades the southern and south-eastern belt of Russia's neighbours will represent a zone of instability with numerous seats of "internal" conflicts. By virtue of many factors Russia will be unable to fence itself off from armed conflicts, even if it makes serious efforts to do so.

The experience of Karabakh demonstrates that the localization of conflicts "until they burn themselves out" does not promise a quick success. What is more dangerous, such seats of tension can generate new ones. That is why, though the internationalization of conflicts involves some risk, operations of this kind will have to be undertaken nevertheless.

But how? Russia could act alone, for instance. This method is usually vulnerable to criticism because in such a case Russia appears to be acting as a hegemonic force. This is a useful trump card for influential nationalists who exploit anti-Moscow and anti-Russian sentiments. Such sentiments are fomented and will apparently be fomented in all former Soviet republics in the near future. Needless to say that Russian unilateral armed operations would endanger the Russian minorities abroad. Therefore, Moscow can and must act on a bilateral basis. In many cases it will probably be the most acceptable way.

Lastly, collective actions can be taken. Thanks to them the task of preventing conflicts and restoring or maintaining peace can be achieved without reviving the image of hegemonic Russia and making thousands of compatriots the hostages of one or another operation. Collective steps should naturally be determined by a number of conditions already tested in world practice. This opens a wide scope for future united armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Thus, the united armed forces, whose name originally expressed wishful thinking rather than reality, have fulfilled the negative but necessary part of their mission, namely, the task of division. The creative mission will be more complex. But things are not so bleak as they might

seem. There are already initial successes. The united armed forces have built a foundation for themselves by drawing up a large number of documents which embrace major questions of military development. Among them are the concept of military security and concrete provisions about Chief Command. These documents can provide a legal basis for the activity of the united armed forces.

Therefore, it would be premature to leave all results of the work done by the Shaposhnikov team out of consideration. In the opinion of military experts, the most promising direction of its work is connected with peace-making. This activity has been undertaken not only in the Commonwealth but also in other countries (Yugoslavia and Iraq, for instance). Last year alone the UN peace-keeping force increased from 10,000 to 60,000 "blue helmets." Since the former USSR is a zone of great instability, and reliance on unilateral actions would involve substantial costs for Russia, it can be supposed that the activity of the united armed forces will be intensified in the near future. Moreover, their services might be needed in other countries as well. In any case, it is too early to conduct the requiem mass for the united armed forces.

CIS: POLICY

Yeltsin Directive On Privatization Aid To Servicemen's Families

93UM0438B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 93 p 1

[Russian Federation Presidential Directive "On Additional Measures to Protect the Interests of Servicemen and Members of Their Families in the Process of Privatizing State and Municipal Property Via Privatization Checks" issued March 6, 1993]

[Text]

1. To adopt the proposal of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs on participation by the public-state Servicemen Social Guarantee Fund (the Guarantee Fund), established by edict of the RSFSR President of November 10, 1991, No. 179, in creating specialized investment check funds for providing social protection to servicemen and members of their families.

2. To direct the Russian Federation State Committee for State Property Management to register and license the specialized investment check funds for providing social protection for servicemen and members of their families that are created with the participation of the Guarantee Fund.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation March 6, 1993

Yeltsin Edict on Reform of Russian Military in North Caucasus

93UM0461A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 93 p 1

[Edict of the Russian Federation President on Reform of Military Structures, Border Troops, and Internal Troops in North Caucasus Area of the Russian Federation and on State Support of Cossacks, 15 March 1993]

[Text]

Edict of the President, Russian Federation

Reform of Military Structures, Border Troops, and Internal Troops in North Caucasus Area of the Russian Federation and State Support of Cossacks

Acting in the interests of the military reform in progress in the Russian Federation, with consideration of the importance associated with the Cossack movement and its furthering of stronger statehood and law and order and raising the prestige of military service, I decree:

1. To carry out reform of military structures, Border Troops, and Internal Troops in the North Caucasus area of the Russian Federation. The foregoing includes:

a) Abolishing the Transcaucasus Border District, with the latter's units and large units to be used to form the North Caucasus Border District as a part of Border Troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, with district headquarters to be located in the city of Stavropol. The plan of the structure and manpower organization is to be submitted to the Russian Federation minister of security for his approval.

The Council of Ministers and the Russian Federation Government are to provide the North Caucasus Border District with the necessary amount of manpower, and supply the latter with weapons, military equipment, and other material means and resources.

b) accelerating the formation of Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops for the North Caucasus District;

c) initiating the creation of general-purpose mobile troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, while keeping in mind in the primary phase the use of North Caucasus Military District troops as rapid deployment forces, which are to include large units and units to be maintained in a state of constant combat readiness.

2. To ordain that citizens of the Russian Federation who are direct descendants of Cossacks and express their intent to act together to restore and develop the traditional Cossack forms of economy, culture, and lifestyle, and citizens who enlist voluntarily in Cossack communities (henceforth referred to as "Cossacks") are as a rule to perform their military service in Cossack large units and units of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and in Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Border Troops, special Cossack motorized military units and in

tactical units of Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops, in accordance with the Russian Federation Law on Military Obligation and Military Service and with the general military regulations governing the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Questions regarding registration for service, training of Cossacks for military service, call-up for duty, and call to training sessions are to be decided by federal executive authority organs, local self-government agencies, and military agencies, with the participation of Cossack representatives, in accordance with Russian Federation legislation.

3. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation Ministry of Security, and Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs are to:

- approve, by 1 April 1993, a list of Cossack large units and units, within the limits of existing structures and strengths of Russian Federation Armed Forces, Russian Federation Ministry of Security Border Troops, and Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops;
- submit via normal channels by 1 May 1993 suggestions for endowing Cossack large units and units with traditional Cossack designations to supplement existing legislation with norms providing for the institution of Cossack military ranks, a dress uniform, and insignia;
- create in the apparatus of the aforementioned ministries the respective structures that will be involved with Cossack affairs.

4. To submit to heads of administrations located within the confines of Cossack reservations suggestions for forming at Cossack territorial self-government agencies voluntary non-military structures offering patriotic and international education for Cossacks, and training of Cossacks for defense of the Fatherland, development of technical and applied types of sports, participation in measures related to civil and territorial defense, clean-up in the aftermath of natural disasters and emergency situations, and rendering of assistance to victims.

The assurance of law and order; protection of private property; protection of lives and health of citizens; and other security services can be performed by Cossacks in accordance with the Russian Federation Law on Private Detective and Security Activity in the Russian Federation.

5. That the Council of Ministers and the Russian Federation Government are to:

a) Act in concert with the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Kalmykia, Khalmg Tangch, and the heads of administrations of krais and oblasts in which Cossacks reside, to develop by 1 May 1993 a statute on land issues involving Cossacks performing military service and on the special conditions pertaining to land use by Cossack communities, with coverage of the following:

—the transfer of lands located in territories in which members of Cossack communities reside to private, collective, and communal use;

—the incorporation of stanitsa (khutor) type areas, consisting of Cossack community member plots, communal use lands, and military reserve lands, into Cossack community lands;

—the provision of terms conducive to agricultural use by Cossack communities for their fulfillment of obligations related to the sale of agricultural products to the state;

b) work in concert with representatives of Cossacks and heads of administrations to develop by 1 June 1993 a draft Russian Federation law on problems of Cossack self-government, with provision for the following:

—prohibition of discrimination relative to membership in a Cossack community;

—Cossack participation in local self-government agencies;

—ataman management of problems relating to economic, financial, and cultural activities of Cossack communities in accordance with existing legislation;

—electivity of atamans of Cossack communities of all levels and their endowment with Cossack ranks in accordance with the regulations governing the particular community;

—responsibility of atamans and members of Cossack communities for non-fulfillment of obligations to the state;

c) to take into consideration, in the preparation of Russian Federation Armed Forces draft general military regulations and a draft law on forming and training a Russian Federation Armed Forces reserve, federal state security agencies, and border troops, suggestions submitted by Cossacks relating to peculiarities of performing military service in Cossack large units and units and to the condition of Cossacks in the reserve;

d) to confer upon Cossack large units and units their traditional designations, as based on suggestions issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation Ministry of Security, and Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs;

e) to render Cossack communities material, technical, and other assistance in tasks related to training of Cossack youth for military service, acting in concert with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation Ministry of Security, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs.

6. That the Council of Ministers, Government of the Russian Federation, and republic executive authority organs within the framework of the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, autonomous oblast, autonomous districts,

and the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, are to promote the rebirth of the Russian Cossacks, including the latter's economic and cultural traditions.

7. That the Russian Federation Presidential State Legal Administration is to act with the participation of interested central federal executive authority organs and Cossack representatives to prepare by 1 June 1993 for subsequent submission for approval a draft of Russian Cossack Regulations.

8. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to organize work related to governing of relations between the Russian Federation on the one hand, and member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States and other states on the other, dealing with problems of Cossacks.

9. To set up an Interdepartmental Commission on Cossack affairs at the Council of Ministers and the Russian Federation Government.

10. That this Edict is to assume the force of law as of the time of its signing.

[Signed] President, Russian Federation
B. Yeltsin
Moscow, The Kremlin
15 March 1993

North Caucasus Border Guard District Created

934F0291A Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian No 30,
18 Mar 93 p 1

[Unattributed report from Moscow]

[Text] Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin has signed an edict reorganizing Russian military structures in the North Caucasus region of Russia and expressing state support for the Cossacks.

The edict dissolves the Transcaucasus Border Guard District and designates it as the basis for creation of a new North Caucasus Border Guard District, to be headquartered in Stavropol. The Russian Federation Council of Ministers has been instructed to begin creating special-purpose mobile forces within the Russian Federation Armed Forces, at the initial stage developing rapid-response forces using troops from North Caucasus Military District.

The edict establishes a procedure for service in Cossack units of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been instructed to draw up a list of large and small Cossack units, make suggestions in regard to their traditional names, and create structures within those ministries to deal with Cossack affairs.

The edict instructs the Russian Government to draw up a "Statute on Land Relations With Cossacks in Military Service and a Special Regime for Land Use in Cossack Societies."

Reforms Directorate Chief On Upcoming Defense-Related Laws

93UM0438A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Mar 93 p 2

[Major-General Vasilii Lata, first deputy chief of the Russian Defense Ministry Military Development and Reforms Directorate, interviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Anatolii Dokuchayev: "First 'Package' of Defense Laws Adopted, Second One Being Prepared With Active Involvement of Russian Defense Ministry"]

[Text] Lately the editors have received more and more telephone calls regarding defense-related laws. Readers' interest is understandable: For too long, people wearing shoulderboards were in a legal vacuum, so to speak. Now their situation has become clearer. But as practice shows, new laws in and of themselves cannot ensure the Armed Forces' development. Military administrative agencies, which are often forced to operate on the basis of increasingly obsolete normative acts of the former Union, are encountering considerable difficulties. What we can expect in this area was the subject of our correspondent's conversation with Major-General Vasilii Lata, first deputy chief of the Russian Defense Ministry's Military Development and Reform Directorate.

[Lata] The law "On Defense," like, incidentally, the laws "On Compulsory Military Duty and Military Service" and "On the Status of Servicemen," is only a foundation, and one that, moreover, often has insufficiently effective levers for implementing the requirements it sets forth. In addition, we are unable to solve other problems that arise even by means of defense minister orders and presidential edicts. For example, the establishment of a military police force, a matter that has been raised repeatedly at various levels, is impossible even as an experiment. The provisions of the laws "On the Police Force" and "On Operational-Investigative Activities," which were adopted last year, do not allow it.

Such situations could continue to arise in the future. The question of using the Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime, for example, must be grounded in legislation. Consequently, the federal authorities and our department have some labor-intensive legislative and norm-setting work ahead of them.

[Dokuchayev] And is that work under way?

[Lata] An order issued by the defense minister on January 14 of this year sets forth basic measures to implement the Russian Federation law "On Defense" in the Armed Forces. It also outlines a plan for the prompt drafting of legislative acts (at the direction of the Supreme Soviet and with the concurrence of the president's State Legal Administration. It also provides for

drafting Supreme Soviet decrees, presidential edicts, and government decrees and for participating in the drafting of legislative and normative acts that other ministries and departments are working on.

[Dokuchayev] Could you be more specific, Vasilii Filipovich?

[Lata] The General Staff has been instructed to draft in the first quarter the laws "On Martial Law," "On Mobilizational Readiness and Mobilization in the Russian Federation," "On the Military Police Force," and "On State Secrets." Also in the first quarter, the Armaments Directorate is to draft a law "On the Defense Order and the Status of Defense Enterprises." The Main Military Budget and Financing Directorate will finish drafting the law "On the Defense Budget" in May.

[Dokuchayev] So the drafts of some laws already exist, obviously.

[Lata] The draft law "On Martial Law" is essentially complete and being readied for submission to the Russian president. Such an act was drafted and introduced only during the Great Patriotic War. After the war, the law was repealed and hasn't been taken up since then. It defines martial law as a special legal regime that is established with the declaration of a state of war or given a threat of armed attack on the Russian Federation.

In addition, the draft law sets forth the powers of the military command in areas of potential military operations and in localities under martial law. It also sets forth special features of legal regulation during martial law and of the activities of courts martial and the military procuracy in carrying out procurator oversight.

The draft law "On the Defense Budget" is also being drawn up for the first time and will set forth procedures governing the compilation of the Defense Ministry budget and the expenditure of confirmed financial resources.

The draft law "On the Defense Order and the Status of Defense Enterprises" is to be submitted to parliamentary committees in March. The law is vital at this time of economic recession and disruption of economic ties and cooperative production. The law will define the procedure for forming the defense order and for enlisting enterprises in filling the state defense order. The draft law provides a definition of the defense enterprise and the defense organization and outlines the procedure for concluding agreements and contracts and providing resources for filling the defense order. It cannot be ruled out that not one but two laws will be adopted—one on the defense order and one on the status of the defense enterprise.

[Dokuchayev] But military development and the functioning of the Armed Forces require not just laws, but also sublegal acts. For example, the law "On Compulsory Military Duty and Military Service" cannot operate with full effectiveness without the Statute on the Procedure

for Performing Military Service and statutes on military registration, military conscription, military medical examinations, and others. The adoption of many legal acts is also required by the law "On Pension Security for Persons Who Have Performed Military Service or Served in Internal Affairs Agencies and Their Families." What is the situation in this regard?

[Lata] For the law "On Defense" alone, plans call for drafting not only six drafts laws, but also four Supreme Soviet and 11 government decrees and six presidential edicts. No fewer numbers of sublegal and other legal acts are being drafted for the other documents you cited. This work is being planned and coordinated.

I want to put special emphasis on the following point. As is well known, the primary foundation of the Armed Forces' development is military policy, the formulation of which in Russia has entered the final stage. It encompasses the theoretical and organizational-practical activities of government structures in strengthening the state's defense capability, building and leading the Armed Forces, developing them in a comprehensive fashion, and improving them with a view to preventing war and maintaining national security. Military policy is embodied in concentrated form in our defense doctrine, whose formulation is being completed. The adoption of this normative act will also clarify the concept for Armed Forces development that has already been approved by the president.

* * *

As we can see, the Defense Ministry has a specific norm-setting program that is being carried out strictly according to plan. The Military Development and Reforms Directorate is in charge of coordinating this work and establishing cooperation with Supreme Soviet committees and commissions and the president's State Legal Directorate.

Preparations are under way to draft the Supreme Soviet decrees "On Military Policy and the Basic Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine," "On Confirming the Military Regulations of the Russian Federation Armed Forces," "On Using the Russian Federation Armed Forces Outside Russia and Stationing Russian Federation Troops and Naval Forces Outside Russian Federation Borders," "On Confirming the Banners and Flags of the Russian Federation Armed Forces," and a number of others.

Presidential edicts are being drafted. The following documents are to be completed in the first quarter: "On the Concept of Russian Federation Armed Forces Development," and "On Confirming the Statute on Territorial Defense."

The military is also preparing government decrees.

In short, the Russian Armed Forces will have a full legal foundation within 12 to 18 months.

**Russian Federation Law on Military Obligation,
Service****Text of Law**

93UM0435A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Feb 93 pp 3-5

[Russian Federation Law signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin, 11 February 1993, Russian House of Soviets, Moscow: "Law of the Russian Federation 'On Military Obligation and Military Service'"]

[Text]

Section 1**General Provisions****Article 1. Military Obligation**

1. In accordance with the law, a Russian Federation citizen is obliged to defend the Fatherland—the Russian Federation.

2. The military obligation of Russian Federation citizens stipulates:

—military registration; training for military service; entry into military service; performance of military service; being in the reserve; and military training in wartime.

A Russian Federation citizen (hereafter referred to as a citizen) has the right to perform alternative service instead of performing military service in accordance with the law.

3. The following citizens are freed from military obligation:

—males under 16 years of age and over 60 years of age; females under 18 years of age and over 50 years of age; and those who are unfit for military service for health reasons.

4. Citizens' fulfillment of their military obligation is ensured by state organs of rule and administration, by local Soviets of People's Deputies, by the local administration and by officials of enterprises, institutions and organizations within the limits of their authority as prescribed by Russian Federation law.

Article 2. Russian Federation Legislation on Military Obligation and Military Service

1. Russian Federation legislation on military obligation and military service is based on the Russian Federation Constitution (Fundamental Law) and includes the Law of the Russian Federation "On Defense", this Law, and also other Russian Federation laws and other legal acts of organs of state power and administration, local Soviets of People's Deputies and the local administration that have been adopted within their authority.

2. The Russian Federation organ of state administration to which individual powers have been delegated in accordance with this Law does not have the right to delegate these powers or a portion of them to another organ.

Article 3. Obligations of the Local Administration and Its Organs, Courts, Officials of Enterprises, Institutions and Organizations Associated With the Fulfillment of Military Obligation by Citizens

1. The local administration and officials of enterprises, institutions and organizations are obliged to:

—notify citizens of military commissariat summonses;

—provide citizens with the opportunity to appear in a timely manner based upon military commissariat summonses; and,

—send information on citizens who sign up for military registration or who are on the military register that is required to fill out military registration documents at the request of the military commissar's request.

Managers of enterprises, institutions and organizations who are responsible for the maintenance of apartment buildings and also homeowners are obliged to report information within one month on changes of citizens who permanently reside there who are on or who are obliged to be on the military register to organs that carry out military registration.

2. Internal affairs organs within their jurisdiction are obliged to:

—send information, within a seven-day period, on citizens who are on the military register that is needed to complete military registration documents at the request of the rayon or city (without a rayon division) military commissar;

—conduct investigations and, when there are legal grounds, detain citizens who are evading military registration, a call up for military service or military assemblies, performance of military service, military assemblies, or alternative service; and,

—report, within a seven-day period, cases of the discovery of citizens who are obliged to be but are not on the military register to the appropriate military commissariats.

3. Civil Registrar's Office organs are obliged, within a seven-day period, to report to the appropriate military commissariats on changes made to civil registry documents of citizens who are or are obliged to be on the military register.

4. Inquiry and preliminary investigations organs are obliged, within a seven-day period, to report to the appropriate military commissariats on the filing of criminal cases with regard to citizens who are on or who are obliged to be on the military register.

5. Courts are obliged, within a seven-day period, to report to the appropriate military commissariats:

- on criminal cases they have brought against citizens who are on or who are obliged to be on the military register; and,
- on sentences that have taken legal force with regard to citizens who are on or who are obliged to be on the military register.

6. Medical-labor examination boards are obliged, within a seven-day period, to report to the appropriate military commissariats on the declaration as disabled of citizens who are on or who are obliged to be on the military register.

Article 4. Guaranteeing Measures Associated With the Fulfillment of Military Obligation by Citizens Who Are not Servicemen

1. Organs of state power and administration, local Soviets of People's Deputies and the local administration are obliged to ensure that the required territories and buildings are provided and equipped, to ensure the provision of required medicines, medical equipment, instruments, housekeeping equipment, and transportation, and to enlist the required doctors-specialists, middle medical personnel and technical workers to conduct medical examinations and checkups of citizens who are being placed on the military register, who are entering military service, who have been called up for military assemblies, and also for the call up of citizens for military service and for military assemblies.

2. An individual who participates in measures to ensure the fulfillment of citizens' military obligation is paid his average salary and is compensated for temporary duty expenses if participation in the indicated measures was associated with a departure from his permanent place of residence during the time of the participation in the indicated measures as prescribed by the Russian Federation Government at the expense of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense resources.

3. Compensation for financial losses borne by enterprises, institutions and organizations and by a citizen as a result of the fulfillment of this Law is carried out as prescribed by the Russian Federation Government.

Article 5. Material Support Associated With The Fulfillment of Military Obligation For a Citizen Who is Not a Serviceman

1. A citizen during the time of a medical examination or treatment associated with military registration, mandatory training for military service and entry into military service, and also during the time spent fulfilling other obligations associated with military registration, mandatory training for military service and entry into military service, is released from work (studies) with the retention for him of a job (student position) and payment of the average wage (stipend) based upon the job (studies), but no more than the 10 minimum wage amounts prescribed

by Russian Federation legislation and temporary duty expenses during time spent in transit at the expense of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense resources.

A citizen is released from work (studies) with the retention of a job (student position) for him during the time he is performing military assemblies, and he is paid a salary based upon his military position and military rank and temporary duty expenses during the time he is en route at the expense of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense resources.

2. A citizen who has been called up for military service or for military assemblies is provided with food during his round trip travel to his duty location based upon the standards prescribed for servicemen who are performing military service based upon conscription or the appropriate monetary compensation at the expense of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense resources.

3. Additional benefits may be prescribed for a citizen who is not a serviceman while he fulfills his military obligation.

Article 6. The Liability of a Citizen Who Is not a Serviceman or of an Official for Violation of Russian Federation Legislation on Military Obligation

1. A citizen who has not appeared after receiving a military commissariat's summons within the prescribed period of time without a valid reason is considered to be evading the fulfillment of his military obligation, and is subject to administrative liability in accordance with Russian Federation legislation.

2. A citizen who has not appeared after receiving a military commissariat notification for a call up for military service or military assemblies within the prescribed time period without a valid reason, or who has received an illegal release or deferment from conscription for military service through deception, is subject to criminal liability for evasion of conscription for military service in accordance with Russian Federation legislation.

3. Valid reasons for failing to appear after receiving a military commissariat summons or military commissar's notification, when supported by documentary evidence confirming the reason for the failure, include:

- an illness or serious injury of a citizen associated with the loss of the ability to work;
- a serious health condition or the death of a citizen's close relative (father, mother, wife, husband, son, daughter, natural brother or sister) or of an individual by whom the citizen was raised;
- a natural obstacle or other circumstance that does not depend on the citizen's will that deprived him of the opportunity of appearing at the place and time indicated in the military commissariat's summons or the military commissar's notification; or,

—another circumstance recognized as a valid reason by a court.

4. A doctor-specialist who participates in the medical examination of a citizen in connection with military registration, training, or entry into military service, or a draft board member or official of an enterprise, institution or organization who assists a citizen in evading the fulfillment of his military obligation, or who prevents a citizen from fulfilling his military obligation, or who does not carry out the obligations prescribed by this Law, is held liable as prescribed by Russian Federation legislation.

Section 2

Military Registration

Article 7. Organization of Military Registration

1. Citizens are obliged to be on the military register with the exception of:

- those citizens who have been released from military obligation by this Law;
- female citizens who do not have a military-registration specialty;
- those citizens who are performing military service;
- those citizens who are performing service in the internal affairs organs;
- those citizens who are serving a criminal sentence in the form of incarceration;
- those citizens who have reached the maximum age for service in the reserve; and,
- those citizens who have departed for permanent residence abroad.

2. Military registration of citizens is carried out by military commissariats at their place of residence.

In populated areas where there are no military commissariats, the local administration carries out initial military registration.

The military registration of citizens who have military ranks of officers and who are in the reserve of the federal state security organs or the border troops is carried out by the federal state security organs in a procedure similar to the one prescribed by this Law.

3. Military registration documents must contain the following information about a citizen:

- permanent place of residence;
- family situation;
- fitness for military service based upon state of health;
- primary anthropometric data;

- performance of military or alternative service;
- performance of military assemblies;
- education;
- mastery of military registration or civilian specialties;
- if the citizen has a first sports category or a sports rank;
- if a criminal case has been filed (dropped) with regard to the citizen;
- the presence (absence) of a previous conviction; and,
- his reservation for an enterprise, institution or organization for the period of mobilization and wartime.

Military registration documents must not contain information on nationality, religion, political views or membership in political parties, other public associations or movements, or other information that may become the cause of discrimination against a citizen, with the exception of cases when the citizen himself insists on the inclusion of such information in military registration documents.

4. The procedures for military registration of citizens are defined by this Law and by the Statute on Military Registration that has been approved by the Russian Federation Government.

5. The local administration and officials of enterprises, institutions and organizations organize and conduct the military registration of citizens in accordance with the Statute on Military Registration.

Article 8. Initial Placement of Citizens on the Military Register

1. Initial placement of male citizens on the military register is carried out by the rayon or city (in a city without a rayon division) commission for the military registration of citizens in the period from 1 January through 31 March in the year when a citizen reaches 17 years of age.

Initial placement of female citizens on the military register is carried out by the rayon or city (in a city without a rayon division) military commissariat after they acquire a military-registration specialty.

2. The commission for the military registration of citizens is approved by a decision of the head of the local administration, and consists of:

- the rayon or city (without a rayon division) military commissar or his deputy, who is the commission's chairman;
- the commission secretary; and,
- the doctors who conduct the medical examinations of citizens and determine their fitness for military service on the basis of their state of health.

3. The commission for the military registration of citizens is obliged:

- to organize the medical examination of a citizen and to determine his fitness for military service;
- to make a decision on the military registration of a citizen or on releasing him from military obligation as the result of unfitness for military service on the basis of his state of health; and,
- to conduct a professional-psychological examination of a citizen to determine his possible utilization in the military service.

4. The chairman or secretary of the commission for the military registration of citizens is obliged to announce the commission's decision to the citizen and to explain his obligation for military registration.

5. The initial military registration of individuals who have acquired Russian Federation citizenship is carried out in the following manner:

- males who are from 17 to 27 years of age, inclusively—as prescribed in the first paragraph of the first part of this Article; and,
- others—by the military commissar of the rayon or city (without a rayon division).

Article 9. A Citizen's Obligations for Military Registration

1. A citizen is obliged to appear after receiving a summons from the rayon or city (without a rayon division) military commissariat on the territory where he permanently or temporarily (for a period of more than three months) resides, based upon the military registration issue.

A citizen who has been released into the reserve from military service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, or in the internal affairs organs, and enlisted in the Russian Federation Armed Forces reserve is obliged to appear within a two-week period from the date of receiving documents on his enlistment in the reserve at the rayon or city (without a rayon division) military commissariat at his place of residence in connection with his military registration.

If a citizen who falls under the provisions of the second paragraph of this Article moves to a new place of residence, he is obliged to appear at the rayon or city (without a rayon division) military commissariat at his new place of residence within a two-week period from the date of his arrival at the new location in connection with his military registration.

2. A citizen who is on the military register is obliged to report any changes in his family situation, place of residence within the rayon or city (without a rayon

division), education, work place or position to the appropriate organ that conducts military registration within a two-week period.

3. A citizen who is on the military register, upon moving to a new permanent place of residence in another rayon (city) (or upon departure abroad for a period of over six months) is obliged to be removed from the military register and, upon arrival at his new place of residence (or return from abroad), to be placed on the military register within a two-week period.

Section 3

Training of a Citizen for Military Service

Article 10. Training of a Citizen for Military Service

1. Compulsory training of a citizen for military service stipulates:

- acquiring necessary knowledge in the sphere of defense; and,
- medical examinations and, when necessary and with the citizen's concurrence, measures for health treatment and improvement.

The compulsory training of a citizen for military service can be carried out during the course of military assemblies.

2. Voluntary training of a citizen for military service stipulates:

- applied military types of sports exercises;
- mastery of military-registration specialties;
- military training at institutions for middle (complete) general education and at institutions for initial and middle professional education;
- study at institutions for middle (complete) general education with additional educational programs for the military training of adolescent citizens; and,
- training students (cadets) through the reserve officer training program at military departments at state institutions for higher professional education.

3. The training of citizens for military service is carried out in accordance with the law as prescribed by the Russian Federation Government.

Article 11. Essential Defense Training

State standards for general and professional education provide for students (pupils) to receive essential training on state defense, on the military obligation of citizens, and also training in civil defense skills.

Article 12. Medical Examinations and Measures for Health Treatment and Improvement

1. A citizen is subject to a medical examination by the following doctors-specialists during initial military

registration: by a surgeon, intern, neurologist, oculist, otolaryngologist, dentist and, if necessary, by a psychiatrist and by doctors of other specialties.

In the event that it is impossible to obtain a medical conclusion locally on a citizen's fitness for military service, the committee for the military registration of citizens can send him for an outpatient or inpatient medical examination at a medical institution located in the republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg, on the territory of which this citizen resides.

2. Financing the medical examinations of citizens that are associated with their fulfillment of their military obligation is carried out as prescribed by the Russian Federation Government.

Article 13. Applied Military Types of Sports Exercises

A citizen, to whom the first sports category or a sports rank for an applied military type of sport has been awarded, enjoys the right of noncompetitive entry into a military school or the right to select a combat arm in accordance with his sports fitness when conscripted for military service.

Article 14. Mastery of Military-Registration Specialties

1. A citizen who has mastered a medical or complex technical military-registration specialty has the right to select a combat arm (service) in accordance with that specialty when drafted for military service.

2. The list of military-registration specialties, including complex technical specialties, is approved by the Russian Federation Government and includes specialties, the mastery of which permits citizens to fill military positions in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops¹, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs.

Article 15. Military Training at Institutions for Middle (Complete) General Education and Institutions for Initial and Middle Professional Education

Military training at institutions for middle (complete) general education and institutions for initial and middle professional education is conducted in accordance with the Russian Federation Law "On Education".

Article 16. Training at Institutions for Middle (Complete) General Education With Additional Programs for the Military Training of Adolescent Citizens

1. For the purpose of the comprehensive education and training for military service of adolescent male citizens, the Russian Federation Government is creating institutions for middle (complete) general education with additional programs for the military training of adolescent male citizens—cadet (Suvorov), naval cadet (Nakhimov) and musical cadet corps (henceforth—cadet corps) in the

Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs systems.

An adolescent male citizen who is an orphan or who has been left without the care of parents and who enters one of these educational institutions is enrolled in it without examinations, on the basis of an interview and a medical examination.

2. The Statute on Cadet Corps is approved by the Russian Federation Government.

3. A citizen who has successfully completed training in the cadet corps enjoys the right to enter a military school without examinations.

Article 17. The training of Citizens Through Reserve Officer Training Programs at Military Departments of State Institutions for Higher Professional Education

1. A citizen who studies at the day division of a state institution for higher professional education, who is fit for military service based upon his state of health and who meets the established requirements, has the right to conclude a contract for military training through the reserve officer training program at the military department of that educational institution with the condition that the citizen has not reached his 27th birthday at the time of graduation from the educational institution in question. This contract stipulates the citizen's obligation to perform military service in the circumstances set forth in the third part of Article 19 of this Law.

A student (cadet) who is undergoing training through the reserve officer training program is paid an additional stipend at the expense of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense resources in the amount prescribed by the Russian Federation Government.

2. The training of citizens through reserve officer training programs at military departments of state institutions of higher professional education is organized as prescribed by the Russian Federation Government.

Reserve officer training programs can provide military training for female citizens.

3. A state institution of higher professional education provides the military department with the accommodations it requires, and also, in coordination with and at the expense of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, creates the necessary material-technical basis. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense recruits the military department teaching staff with the concurrence of the state institution of higher professional education.

4. Training assemblies (tours of duty at line units) that are stipulated by the reserve officer training program are considered to be military assemblies.

Article 18. Participation of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in the Training of Citizens for Military Service

The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense:

- develops the lists of military-registration specialties and applied military types of sports;
- develops, jointly with the Russian Federation Ministry of Public Health, the requirements for the state of health of citizens who enter military service or who are in the military service;
- participates in the development of state educational standards, programs, and the methodology of training citizens for military service;
- participates in the creation, financing and material-technical equipping of educational institutions of medium (complete) general education with the additional educational programs that have the goal of the military training of adolescent citizens in the Russian Federation Ministry of Education system, at military departments of state educational institutions of higher professional education, and also institutions and organizations that train citizens for military service on a contract basis.

Section 4

The Conscription of Citizens for Military Service

Article 19. Citizens Subject to Conscription for Military Service

1. A male citizen from 18 to 27 years of age who is on or who is obliged to be on the military register and who does not have the right to release or deferment from conscription for military service is subject to conscription for military service.

A decision on the conscription of a citizen for military service can be made only after he has reached his 18th birthday.

2. In accordance with this Law, a citizen has the right to enter military service on contract instead of performing military service based upon conscription.

3. The conscription for military service of citizens who have not performed military service, but who have graduated from state educational institutions of higher professional education and who have been enrolled in the Russian Federation Armed Forces reserve with officer rank, is carried out in accordance with the Russian Federation President's ukase.

A citizen who has been conscripted for military service in accordance with the first paragraph of this section performs military service as prescribed for servicemen who are performing military service on contract.

Article 20. Release From Conscription for Military Service

1. Release from conscription for military service is granted to a citizen:

- a) who has been declared unfit or fit with restrictions for military service for health reasons;
- b) who is performing or who has performed military or alternative service; or,
- c) who has performed military service in the armed forces of another state.

A citizen who has a previous conviction for committing a serious crime that has not been served or has not been dismissed cannot be conscripted for military service.

2. A citizen whose brother died or was killed while performing military service based upon conscription has the right to release from conscription for military service.

Article 21. Citizens' Deferments From Conscription for Military Service

1. A deferment from conscription for military service is granted to a citizen:

- a) who has been conscripted and who is temporarily unfit for military service for health reasons—for a period of one year;
- b) who is caring for a family member who needs constant assistance and who is not on full state maintenance, when there are no other individuals obliged by law to provide maintenance and care for the indicated family member;
- c) who has a child being raised without a mother;
- d) who has two or more children;
- e) who has a child under three years of age;
- f) whose mother has two or more children under eight years of age, besides him, and who is raising them without a husband;
- g) against whom a criminal case has been filed; or,
- h) to whom this right has been given by the special ukase of the Russian Federation President to be published in the mass media.

Family members who have reached pension age or who are first or second group disabled persons, and also family members who have not reached their 18th birthday, are considered to be in need of constant assistance and care.

2. Besides the citizens indicated in part one of this Article, a citizen has the right to obtain a deferment from conscription for military service:

- a) who has been elected a people's deputy—for the period of his deputies powers;
- b) who is studying for the first time in the day department at an institution for professional education at a given level—for the period of his studies;

c) who has been raised and maintained for no less than seven years by a relative (or an individual replacing a relative) if the latter is more than 50 years old and who was not married during the indicated period and who doesn't have other children;

d) who has a higher pedagogical education and who is permanently working in a pedagogical position at a rural general education institution—for the period of that work; or,

e) who is a doctor permanently working in a rural location.

Article 22. Terms of Conscription of Citizens for Military Service

1. Conscription of citizens for military service is carried out two times per year—from 1 April through 30 June and from 1 October through 31 December, based on Russian Federation Presidential ukases.

2. A citizen who permanently resides in a rural area and who is directly involved with sowing and harvesting work is conscripted for military service from 15 October through 31 December.

3. A citizen who is a pedagogical worker at an educational institution is conscripted for military service from 1 May through 30 June.

Article 23. The organization of Conscription of Citizens for Military Service

1. The rayon or city (without a rayon division) head of administration, jointly with the rayon or city (without a rayon division) military commissar, organizes the conscription of citizens for military service.

2. The rayon or city (without a rayon division) head of administration is responsible for the organization of the conscription of citizens for military service.

3. The procedures for the conscription of citizens for military service are defined by this Law and by the Statute on Conscription for Military Service that has been approved by the Russian Federation Government.

Article 24. The Draft Board

The draft board is created by a decision of the Soviet of People's Deputies to organize and conduct the conscription of citizens for military service in each rayon or city (without a rayon division), and consists of the following members:

—the rayon or city (without a rayon division) deputy head of administration, who is the chairman of the board;

—the rayon or city (without a rayon division) military commissar, who is the deputy chairman of the board;

—a rayon or city (without a rayon division) Soviet of People's Deputies representative;

—the draft board secretary;

—the doctor who directs the medical examination of citizens who are subject to conscription for military service;

—a rayon or city (without a rayon division) internal affairs organ representative; and,

—a rayon or city (without a rayon division) education administration organ representative.

Representatives of other enterprises, institutions or organizations may be members of the draft board.

Article 25. The Obligations and Method of Operation of the Draft Board

1. The draft board is tasked with the duties of organizing the medical examination of a citizen who is subject to conscription for military service, and of making one of the following decisions with regard to him:

—conscription for military service;

—assigning him to alternative service;

—granting a deferment from conscription for military service;

—release from conscription for military service; or,

—release from military obligation.

The draft board sends the appropriate materials to the investigative organs in the event of a citizen's evasion of conscription for military service.

When a decision has been made to send a citizen for military service, the draft board determines the service or combat arm of the Russian Federation Armed Forces or other troops in which this citizen will perform military service.

2. The draft board makes its own decisions on the basis of the law alone. Its decision must not contradict the conclusion of the doctor-specialist who conducted the medical examination of the citizen on the issue of his fitness for military service based upon his state of health.

3. The draft board chairman or his assistant announces the draft board's decision to the citizen with regard to whom it was made.

At the citizen's request the draft board chairman gives him a copy of the draft board's decision that was made with regard to that citizen.

4. A citizen can appeal a draft board's decision within a ten-day period to the draft board of a republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg or to a court.

In this case, fulfillment of the draft board's decision is suspended until announcement of the decision of the

draft board of a republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg, or of a court.

Article 26. The Draft Board of a Republic, Autonomous Oblast, Autonomous Okrug, Kray or Oblast Within the Russian Federation, and the Cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg

1. The corresponding draft board is created by a decision of the Supreme Soviet of a republic within the Russian Federation, or of the Soviet of People's Deputies of an autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg, and has the following membership:

- a deputy head of the government of a republic within the Russian Federation, or a deputy head of administration of an autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg, who is the chairman of the board;
- the military commissar of a republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg, who is the deputy chairman of the board;
- a representative of the Supreme Soviet of a republic within the Russian Federation, or of the Soviet of People's Deputies of an autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg;
- the draft board secretary of a republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg;
- the doctor who manages the medical examinations of citizens who are subject to conscription for military service;
- a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of a republic within the Russian Federation, or of the internal affairs organ of an autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg; and,
- a representative of an education administration organ of a republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg.

Other individuals may be members of the draft board of a republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg.

2. The draft board of a republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg:

- organizes the medical examinations of citizens who have been conscripted for military service before

sending them to their duty location and control medical examinations of citizens who have received a deferment or who have been released from conscription for military service for health reasons, and also of citizens who have expressed their nonconurrence with draft board decisions on fitness for military service for health reasons;

- certifies the correctness of deferments and releases from conscription for military service that have been granted to citizens;
- monitors the grounds for sending citizens to perform military service in the services and combat arms of the Russian Federation Armed Forces or other troops; and,
- examines the complaints of citizens who have been conscripted for military service against the actions of draft boards.

3. The draft board of a republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg has the right to examine and rescind draft board decisions.

4. The decision of a draft board of a republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg can be appealed to a court.

Article 27. Medical Examination of Citizens Who Are Subject to Conscription for Military Service

1. A citizen who is subject to conscription for military service undergoes a medical examination by doctors-specialists: by an intern, surgeon, neurologist, oculist, otolaryngologist, dentist and, if necessary, by a psychiatrist and by doctors of other specialties.

In the event that it is impossible to obtain a medical conclusion locally on a citizen's fitness for military service, the draft board can send him for an outpatient or inpatient medical examination to a medical institution located in a republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg, on the territory of which this citizen resides.

2. Based upon the results of the medical examination of a citizen who is subject to conscription for military service, the doctor-specialist provides a conclusion on his fitness for military service according to the following categories:

A—Fit for military service; B—Fit for military service with insignificant restrictions; C—Fit for military service with restrictions; D—Temporarily unfit for military service; or, E—Unfit for military service.

3. The procedures for organizing and conducting medical examinations are defined by the Statute on Military Fitness Examinations that was approved by the Russian Federation Government.

4. The draft board, with the approval of the military unit (military medical institution) commander can enlist military doctors-specialists for the medical examination of citizens who are subject to conscription for military service.

5. The financing of medical examinations of citizens who are subject to conscription for military service is carried out as prescribed by the Russian Federation Government.

Article 28. Obligations of Citizens and Officials That Are Associated With the Conscription of Citizens for Military Service

1. A citizen who is subject to conscription for military service is obliged to appear for a medical examination upon receiving a military commissariat summons at a draft board session, or upon receiving a military commissar's notification of conscription for military service.

2. An official of an enterprise, institution or organization is obliged to provide a citizen who is subject to conscription for military service the opportunity to appear in a timely manner upon receiving a military commissariat summons or a military commissar's notification.

Article 29. Conscription of Citizens for Military Service Based Upon Mobilization and in Wartime

The procedures for conscription of citizens for military service based upon mobilization or in wartime is prescribed by the Russian Federation laws on mobilization and on martial law.

Section 5

Entry of Citizens Into Military Service on Contract

Article 30. Conclusion of a Military Service Contract

1. Male citizens from 18 to 40 years of age and female citizens from 20 to 40 years of age have the right to conclude the first military service contract.

2. A military service contract is concluded in written form between a citizen and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (a ministry, state committee or department in which military service is prescribed by this Law) as defined by the Statute on the Performance of Military Service.

The selection of candidates for entry into military service on contract can be carried out by the military commissariat of a republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, or the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg, as prescribed by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense (by the head of a ministry, state committee or department in which military service has been prescribed by this Law).

3. The following are grounds for refusal to conclude a military service contract:

—the absence of vacant positions at a military unit (on a ship), institution or organization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs (hereafter—military unit, if not otherwise stipulated by this Law), in the event of the conclusion of a contract provided for by paragraph "b" or paragraph "c" of the first part of Article 33 of this Law;

—a certification board decision that has been approved by the military unit commander to conclude a military service contract with another citizen based upon the results of competitive selection;

—the citizen's incomplete compliance with the requirements that have been made in accordance with this Law for citizens who are entering military service on contract; or,

—if the citizen has an undischarged or unserved sentence.

4. The fact that a female citizen or a male citizen has a child under eight years of age outside of marriage may serve as grounds for refusal to conclude a military service contract.

5. The refusal of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (a ministry, state committee or department in which military service has been prescribed by this Law) to conclude a military service contract may be appealed in court.

Article 31. Conclusion of Military Service Contracts by Citizens Who Are Studying at Military Educational Institutions for Professional Education

1. A citizen who has not performed military service has the right to enter military schools or institutes, certain military academies, and certain military departments in state institutions of higher professional education from the year in which he reaches his 17th birthday until the year in which he reaches his 21st birthday, inclusively.

A citizen who is performing or who has performed military service has the right to enter these educational institutions until the year when he reaches his 23rd birthday, inclusively.

2. A cadet at a military institution of professional education who has not previously concluded a military service contract concludes a military service contract that has been stipulated by paragraph "a" of the first part of Article 33 of this Law after completing the first year of study, if he has reached his 18th birthday.

A serviceman who does not have an officer military rank, who is performing military service on contract, and who has entered a military institution of professional education that was listed in the first paragraph of part one of this Article, concludes a military service contract that has been stipulated by paragraph "a" of the first part of Article 33 of this Law for the period of study at the indicated educational institution and for five years of military service after its completion.

3. A cadet has the legal status of a serviceman who is performing military service based upon conscription until conclusion of a military service contract.

4. A cadet who has been dismissed from a military institution of professional education for failure to make progress or for lack of discipline prior to conclusion of a military service contract, or a cadet who has refused to conclude a contract, is sent, as prescribed by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense (by the head of a ministry, state committee or department in which military service has been prescribed by this Law), to perform military service based upon conscription for a period of time upon completion of which the duration of military service of this serviceman will be equal to the period of military service for conscription that has been stipulated by this Law if, at the time of dismissal, he has not served the prescribed period of military service based upon conscription, and does not have the right to release or deferment from conscription for military service.

5. Sanctions established by the Statute on Servicemen's Material Liability, that was approved by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, are applied against a cadet who has been dismissed from a military institution of professional education in cases prescribed by the fourth part of this Article.

6. The educational programs of military institutions of professional education must provide for the education of cadets for civilian specialties, the list of which is approved by the Russian Federation Government.

Article 32. Requirements Made of Citizens Who Are Entering Military Service on Contract

1. A citizen who enters military service on contract is subject to a medical examination in accordance with the Statute on Military Medical Fitness Examinations. A decision on the citizen's fitness for military service is made on the basis of the results of the medical examination in accordance with the second part of Article 27 of this Law. A citizen who has been declared fit for military service during a medical examination, or fit for military service with insignificant restrictions, may be accepted for military service on contract.

2. A citizen who enters military service on contract must meet the established requirements for:

- general educational;
- level of professional training;
- moral-psychological qualities; and,
- fulfillment of physical fitness standards.

The indicated requirements and standards are established by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense (by the head of a ministry, state committee or department in which military service has been prescribed by this Law).

3. Military unit certification boards are tasked with the determination of compliance with established requirements for citizens who are entering military service and who are performing military service on contract.

Article 33. Types of Military Service Contracts

1. Upon entry into military service on contract, a citizen concludes one of the following types of contracts:

- a) a military service contract in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense cadres, other troops, foreign intelligence organs or the federal state security organs;
- b) a military service contract in the cadres of a specific military unit; or,
- c) a military service contract in a specific position at a specific military unit.

2. A serviceman who is performing military service on a contract that is prescribed by paragraph "a" of the first part of this Article can be assigned to a military position with a transfer to a new duty location without the serviceman's concurrence.

3. A military service contract can be abrogated early with the concurrence of the parties who signed it in the event of the serviceman concluding another type of military service contract.

Article 34. Military Service Contract Periods

1. A military service contract is concluded for a three, five or ten year period, and also for a shorter period of time, until the serviceman who concludes the military service contract reaches the maximum military service age.

2. A military service contract is concluded with a citizen who is entering military service for the first time:

- who is entering a military position that is filled by soldiers (sailors) and also by sergeants (petty officers)—for three years;
- who is entering a military position that is filled by army (navy) warrant officers—for five years;
- who is entering a military position that is filled by officers—for five years; or,
- with a serviceman—cadet of a military institution of professional education—for the period of study at the indicated educational institution, and for five years of military service after its completion.

A serviceman who is performing military service based upon conscription can conclude a first military service contract for a shorter period of time under the condition that the total duration of his military service based upon conscription and upon the first contract totals three years or five years, in accordance with the first-fifth paragraphs of this section.

3. A military service contract that is stipulated by paragraph "a" of the first part of Article 33 of this Law is concluded with a serviceman who has an officer military rank and who has entered a military institution of higher professional education for the period of study at the indicated educational institution, and for five years of military service after its completion.

4. A military service contract that is stipulated by paragraph "a" of the first part of Article 33 of this Law is concluded with a serviceman who has an officer military rank and who has entered a post-graduate studies or military Ph.D. program for the period of study in the post-graduate studies or military Ph.D. program, and for five years of military service after their completion, or for a shorter period until this serviceman reaches the maximum military service age.

5. A military service contract that is stipulated by paragraph "c" of the first part of Article 33 of this Law can be concluded for a period of no more than five years.

6. The military unit commander makes the decision on the conclusion or refusal to conclude a new contract with a serviceman who is performing military service on contract no later than three months prior to the expiration of the term of the contract.

Section 6

Military Service

Article 35. Military Service

1. Military service is a special type of state service of citizens in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs.

An individual who is not a Russian Federation citizen cannot perform military service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, foreign intelligence organs or federal state security organs.

2. A citizen who is performing military service is a serviceman and has the legal status defined by law.

3. The content and procedures for performance of military service in peacetime is defined by this Law, by the Statute on the Performance of Military Service and by military regulations.

The specific details of the performance of military service in other troops, the foreign intelligence organs and the federal state security organs are defined by the laws that regulate their activities.

The specific features of the performance of military service based upon mobilization and in wartime are defined by Russian Federation laws.

Article 36. Performance of Military Service Obligations

1. To regulate the legal relations associated with the fulfillment of military obligation and performance of

military service by citizens, the fulfillment of military service obligation is understood to be:

- a) participation in combat operations;
- b) fulfillment of the official duties prescribed in accordance with military regulations;
- c) performance of combat alert duty (combat service);
- d) participation in exercises and ship cruises;
- e) carrying out an order, directive, or mission issued or assigned by the commander (a superior);
- f) being on the territory of a military unit during the prescribed daily duty time agenda if this is caused by official necessity;
- g) round trip travel to the duty or treatment location;
- h) while performing military assemblies;
- i) while a prisoner (except cases of voluntary surrender into captivity), in the status of a hostage or internee;
- j) state of being a missing person—until a serviceman has been declared to be missing or declared to be dead as prescribed by law;
- k) protection of life, health, honor or personal dignity;
- l) rendering assistance to law enforcement organs in maintaining legality and law and order; and,
- m) other actions of a serviceman that have been declared by a court to have been completed in the interest of society and the state.

2. The following are recognized as not being the fulfillment of military service obligation by a serviceman:

- being outside the territory of the military unit for relaxation, while on pass or on leave, with the exception of cases prescribed by paragraphs "i-m" of the first part of this Article;
- absence without leave outside the territory of the military unit or a duty location established outside the military unit, with the exception of cases prescribed by paragraphs "i-m" of the first part of this Article;
- having voluntarily brought oneself to a state of narcotic or toxic intoxication;
- committing a deed that has been stipulated by criminal law to be socially dangerous; or,
- committing suicide or attempted suicide if the indicated actions were not caused by illness or by being driven to suicide.

3. Orders and instructions cannot be issued and missions cannot be tasked to a serviceman that have no relation to military service or that are directed toward a violation of the law.

Article 37. Military Service Terms

1. The following military service terms are established for servicemen:

—for performance of military service based upon conscription—18 months;

—for performance of military service based upon conscription on ships, boats and coastal combat support units—24 months;

—for those who have a higher education and who are performing military service based upon conscription—12 months;

—for those performing military service based upon conscription in accordance with the terms of a military training contract through a reserve officer training program—24 months; and,

—for those performing military service on contract—for the term of the contract.

2. The date a citizen is entered onto the rolls of a military unit is considered to be the initiation of military service.

3. The date of the expiration of the term of military service is considered to be the termination of military service.

4. No one has the right to extend the expired term of military service for a citizen.

5. The time of performance of military assemblies is calculated in the total duration of a citizen's military service.

Article 38. The Military Uniform

1. Required types of uniforms are established for Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs servicemen.

The Russian Federation President approves military uniforms and insignia, and the regulations for their wear are established by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense (by the head of a ministry, state committee or department in which military service has been prescribed by this Law).

Depending on the designation, different types of military uniforms can have insignia for military rank, personal information, and also for affiliation:

—to the Russian Federation Armed Forces (other troops);

—to a service of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (other troops);

—to a territorial command of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (other troops);

—to a functional command of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (other troops);

—to a combat arm (service); or,

—to a specific military formation.

2. A serviceman is not obliged to wear the military uniform outside the military unit area during relaxation, on pass or on leave.

3. The military uniform and insignia of servicemen are protected by the Russian Federation Patent Law.

The uniform and insignia of the workers of ministries, state committees or departments, enterprises, institutions, organizations or public associations cannot be similar to the uniform and insignia of servicemen.

A ministry, state committee or department submits the corresponding proposals to the Russian Federation Government after their coordination with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense when it changes existing or introduces new uniforms and insignia for its workers.

Wear of the military uniform with insignia by citizens who do not have that right is prohibited and prosecuted by law.

Article 39. The Military Oath

1. A citizen who is entering military service for the first time, or who has not performed military service and who has been called up for military assemblies for the first time, takes the Military Oath in front of the Russian Federation State Flag and the military unit Colors.

2. The following text of the military oath is approved:

"I, (last name, first name, and patronymic), solemnly swear allegiance to my Homeland—the Russian Federation.

"I solemnly swear to observe its Constitution and laws and to strictly carry out the requirements of military regulations and the orders of my commanders and superiors.

"I swear to perform my military duty in a fitting manner, to courageously defend Russia's freedom, independence and constitutional order, the people and the Fatherland."

Article 40. Administering the Military Oath

1. A citizen takes the Military Oath upon arrival at the location where he will perform his military duty or at the location of military assemblies after undergoing initial military training, the period of which should not exceed two months.

Prior to taking the military oath:

- a serviceman cannot be assigned to military positions, be involved in carrying out combat missions (participate in combat operations, perform combat alert duty, combat service, or sentry duty);
- weapons and military equipment cannot be set aside for a serviceman; and,
- a disciplinary punishment in the form of arrest cannot be imposed on a serviceman.

2. The taking of the military oath is carried out in accordance with the Statute on the Performance of Military Service.

Article 41. Military Positions

1. Servicemen perform military service in military positions that are prescribed by military unit tables of organization and equipment [TOE].

A serviceman cannot be tasked with the permanent performance of the duties of a position that he does not occupy.

2. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (the ministry, state committee or department in which military service is prescribed by this Law) develop lists of military positions. One military rank must correspond to each military position.

Positions are defined in the lists of military positions of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs:

- that can be filled by female servicemen;
- that can be filled by civilian personnel; and,
- that can be filled only on a competitive basis.

3. The unified list of military positions that are filled by flag rank officers in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs are approved by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet based upon the Russian Federation President's submission.

The lists of military positions that are filled by colonels (captains 1st rank) in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs are approved by the Russian Federation President.

The lists of other military positions are approved by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense (by the head of a ministry, state committee or department in which military service has been prescribed by this Law).

4. Skill requirements to which the serviceman who occupies a given position must conform are established for each military position by the Russian Federation

Ministry of Defense (by the ministry, state committee or department in which military service has been prescribed by this Law).

5. Servicemen may perform military service in positions that are not military in the following cases:

- while undergoing initial military training prior to taking the military oath;
- while being at the disposal of the commander (superior), for no more than three months; or,
- while being at the disposal of the commander (superior) as a result of authorized organizational measures, for no more than six months.

Article 42. Assignment to Military Positions

1. Servicemen are assigned to military positions for which the military ranks are prescribed by the TOE:

- flag officers—by the Russian Federation President after receipt of the conclusions of the appropriate permanent commissions of the chambers and committees of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet;
- to colonel (captain 1st rank), inclusively—by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense;
- to lieutenant colonel (captain 2nd rank), inclusively—by the Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense, by the commanders of the territorial or functional commands and services of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- to major (captain 3rd rank), inclusively—by army-level commanders;
- to captain (captain-lieutenant)—by division-level commanders;
- to senior lieutenant—by the commanders of military units (regiments, ship first rank and their equivalents); and,
- to senior NCO (to master chief petty officer)—by military unit commanders.

2. A serviceman who is performing military duty on contract has the right to submit his candidacy for review to the appropriate certification board for a military position that is being vacated or that is vacant.

A serviceman who is performing or who has performed military duty on contract that has been stipulated by paragraph "b" or "c" of the first part of Article 33 of this Law cannot be assigned to a military position that is filled by colonels (captains 1st rank) or by flag officers.

3. A serviceman who has been assigned to the position of commander of a subunit, military unit, or division-sized unit cannot perform military service in that position for more than five years, and also cannot be assigned to a higher military position for two years from the time of his assignment.

4. The assignment of a serviceman to the position of military commissar of a republic within the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, kray, oblast, the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg, or a rayon or city (without a rayon division) is conducted with the approval of the appropriate organ of state rule or local Soviet of People's Deputies.

5. Servicemen of other troops, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs are assigned to military positions in a procedure that is similar to the one stipulated by the first part of this Article.

Article 43. Temporary Assignments of Servicemen

1. A serviceman can be temporarily assigned by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense (by the head of a ministry, state committee or department in which military service has been prescribed by this Law) to a Russian Federation high organ of state rule or administration or to a Russian Federation ministry, state committee or department only as an advisor, expert, or consultant for a term of no more than five years.

The temporary assignment of foreign intelligence service and federal state security organ servicemen is carried out in accordance with special normative acts.

The temporary assignment of servicemen is carried out within the limits prescribed by the Russian Federation President, based upon the submission of the Russian Federation highest organs of state rule and administration or Russian Federation ministries, state committees and departments.

2. The procedures for assigning servicemen of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs to the Russian Federation highest organs of state rule and administration or Russian Federation ministries, state committees and departments is determined in accordance with the Statute on the Performance of Military Service.

Article 44. Termination of Military Service

1. Military Service is temporarily suspended:

- in the event of the election of a serviceman as a people's deputy and his transfer to permanent work in a representative organ of power—for the period of his deputies powers; or,
- in the event of the transfer of a serviceman as prescribed by law to permanent work in an organ of executive power—for the period the position is occupied.

2. A citizen, upon completion of the period of suspension of his military service in cases prescribed by the first part of this Article, has the right to continue military service or to early release from military service.

Article 45. The Composition of Servicemen and Military Ranks

1. The composition of servicemen and military ranks that are indicated in this Article are established in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs.

Composition of Servicemen	Military Ranks	
	Military Ranks	Navy Ranks
Soldiers and Seamen	private (cadet)	seaman (cadet)
	private first class	senior seaman
Sergeants and Petty Officers	junior sergeant	petty officer second class
	sergeant	petty officer first class
	senior sergeant	chief petty officer
	senior NCO	master chief petty officer
Army and Navy Warrant Officers	army warrant officer	navy warrant officer
	army senior warrant officer	navy senior warrant officer
Officers:		
Junior Officers	junior lieutenant	junior lieutenant
	lieutenant	lieutenant
	senior lieutenant	senior lieutenant
	captain	captain-lieutenant
Senior Officers	major	captain 3rd rank
	lieutenant colonel	captain 2nd rank
	colonel	captain 1st rank
Flag Officers	major-general	rear admiral
	lieutenant-general	vice admiral
	colonel-general	admiral
	general of the army	admiral of the fleet
	Marshal of the Russian Federation	

2. The word "Guards" is added before the military rank of a serviceman who is serving in a guards military unit or guards division-sized unit or on a guards ship.

The word "Justice", "Medical Service", or "Veterinary Service", respectively, is added to the military rank of a citizen who has a legal, medical, or veterinary military-registration speciality.

The word "Reserve" or "Retired", respectively, is added to the military rank of a citizen who is in the reserve or who is retired.

3. Official, special ranks or class ranks that are similar to military ranks are prohibited to be introduced for officials, associates and employees of ministries, state committees and departments, enterprises, institutions, organizations and public associations.

Article 46. The Award of Military Ranks

1. A definite period of time is established for performance of military service in each military rank.

A military rank is awarded to a serviceman on the date of the expiration of the term of his service in the preceding military rank if he occupies a military position for which the military rank that is prescribed by the TOE is equal to or higher than the rank being awarded to the serviceman.

A military rank may be awarded to a serviceman early for particularly distinguished personal service, but no higher than the military rank prescribed by the TOE for the military position occupied by him.

A serviceman whose term of military service in the awarded military rank has expired can be awarded a military rank for particularly distinguished personal service that is one level higher than the military rank prescribed by the TOE for the position occupied by this serviceman, but no higher than the military rank of major (captain 3rd rank).

2. Military ranks are awarded to servicemen by the following personnel:

- Marshal of the Russian Federation—the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, for particularly distinguished service to the state;
- flag officers—the Russian Federation President, based upon the conclusions of the appropriate permanent commissions of the chambers and committees of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet;
- to colonel (captain 1st rank), inclusively and the first officer rank—the Russian Federation Minister of Defense;
- to lieutenant colonel (captain 2nd rank), inclusively—the Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense and the commanders of the services of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- to major (captain 3rd rank), inclusively—the commanders of territorial or functional commands of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- to senior army (navy) warrant officer—army-level commanders;
- to senior NCO (to master chief petty officer)—division-level commanders;
- to senior sergeant (chief petty officer)—military unit commanders (regiment, ship first rank and their equivalents); and,
- to private first class (senior seaman) or cadet—military unit commanders.

3. Military ranks are awarded to servicemen of other troops, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs in a manner that is similar to what is prescribed by the second half of this Article but no higher than the military rank of colonel-general.

4. The procedures for awarding military ranks are defined by the Statute on the Performance of Military Service.

Article 47. Deprivation of Military Ranks, Reduction and Restoration of Military Ranks

1. A serviceman, and also a citizen who is in the reserve or retired, can be deprived of a military rank only on the basis of a court's sentence for a crime that has been deliberately committed.

A citizen who has been deprived of a military rank can be awarded the military rank of which he was deprived by an official who has the right to award this military rank only after the sentence has been dismissed (served).

2. A serviceman who is performing military service based upon conscription can be reduced in military rank, and also restored to a former military rank, as prescribed by the Russian Federation Armed Forces general military regulations.

Article 48. Release From Military Service

1. A serviceman is released from military service upon expiration of the term of his military service that is prescribed by Article 37 of this Law.

2. Servicemen are released from military service:

- flag officers—by the Russian Federation President;
- to colonel (captain 1st rank), inclusively—by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense;
- to lieutenant colonel (captain 2nd rank), inclusively—by the Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense and by the commanders of the territorial or functional commands and services of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- to major (captain 3rd rank), inclusively—by army-level commanders;
- to senior army (navy) warrant officer—by division-level commanders; and,
- to senior NCO (to master chief petty officer)—by military unit commanders.

Servicemen of other troops, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs are released from military service in a procedure that is similar to what is prescribed by the first-seventh paragraphs of this section.

3. A maximum military service age is established for servicemen:

- those having the rank of Marshal of the Russian Federation, general of the army, colonel-general or their equivalents—60 years of age;
- those having the military rank of lieutenant-general, major-general or their equivalents—55 years of age;
- those having the military rank of colonel or its equivalent—50 years of age; and,
- those having other military ranks—45 years of age.

The maximum age of a female serviceman in the military service is established in accordance with the first-fifth paragraphs of this Article, but no more than 50 years of age.

4. Up to five annual military service contracts can be concluded with a serviceman who has reached the maximum military service age and who has a military-registration specialty, the list of which is indicated in the Statute on the Performance of Military Service.

5. A serviceman is released from military service with enrollment in the reserve.

A serviceman who has reached the maximum reserve age or who has been declared to be unfit for military service by a military medical board at the time of release from military service is released from military service into retirement.

Article 49. Early Release of Citizens From Military Service

1. A serviceman is subject to early release from military service:

- a) who has been declared unfit for military service by a military medical board;
- b) who is performing military service on contract in a military position for which a military rank to senior NCO (chief petty officer) inclusively is prescribed by the TOE, or who is performing military service based upon conscription—and who has been declared to be fit for military service with restrictions by a military medical board;
- c) who has been sentenced to criminal punishment in the form of incarceration; or,
- d) who has been deprived of a military rank.

2. A serviceman who is performing military service on contract can be released from military service early:

- a) as a result of organizational-staff measures;
- b) for nonfulfillment of contract terms by him;
- c) for committing a deed that besmirches the honor of a serviceman; or,

d) if the serviceman has ceased to meet the requirements that have been made of him in accordance with this Law.

A serviceman who is performing military service on the first contract that was concluded by him at up to 27 years of age, who has not performed military service based upon conscription, and who has been released from military service upon expiration of the term of the contract in the cases stipulated by paragraphs "b"- "d" of this Article, is sent, as prescribed by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense (by the head of a ministry, state committee or department in which military service has been prescribed by this Law), to continue military service based upon conscription for the term upon completion of which the duration of military service of this serviceman will be equal to the term of military service based upon conscription that is prescribed by this Law, if he has not served the prescribed term of military service based upon conscription and does not have the right to release or deferment from conscription for military service at the time of the early release from military service on contract.

The commander's decision on early release of a serviceman can be appealed to a court.

3. When there is an early release of a serviceman who is performing military service on contract from the military service in the cases stipulated by paragraphs "b" and "d" of the first part and by paragraphs "b"- "d" of the second part of this Article, the sanctions that have been established by the Statute on Servicemen's Material Liability are applied against him.

4. A serviceman who is performing military service on contract has the right to early release from the military service in the event of:

- being declared fit for military service with restrictions based upon the conclusion of a military medical board;
- the impossibility of a member of his family residing in the location in which this serviceman is performing military service for medical reasons; or,
- that he has grounds that are stipulated by paragraphs "b", "c" and "f" of the first part of Article 21 of this Law.

5. A serviceman who is performing military service based upon conscription has the right to early release from military service if he finds himself in circumstances stipulated by the second part of Article 20 and by paragraphs "b"- "f" of the first part of Article 21 of this Law.

6. A serviceman who has been declared to be missing or who has died (been killed) is excluded from military unit personnel rolls.

Section 7

Russian Federation Armed Forces, Federal State Security Organs and Border Troops Reserve**Article 50. Enrollment in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Federal State Security Organs or Border Troops Reserve**

1. A reserve is being created to bring Russian Federation Armed Forces manning to full strength based upon mobilization and in wartime consisting of citizens who:

- were released from military service with enrollment in the reserve;
- underwent training through a reserve officer training program at military departments under state educational institutions of higher professional education;
- have not performed military service as a result of being granted deferments; or,

—have performed alternative service on grounds not associated with their convictions.

The creation of the Federal State Security Organs and Border Troops Reserve is carried out in a procedure that is similar to the one prescribed by this Law.

2. A citizen who has successfully completed training through a reserve officer training program at a military department at a state institution of higher professional education is awarded an officer military rank upon graduation from the educational institution, and is simultaneously enrolled in the reserve by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense.

3. A citizen who has not performed military service as a result of being granted a deferment or who has performed alternative service, and also a citizen who has been deprived of a military rank by a court, is awarded the military rank of private (seaman) by the rayon or city (without a rayon division) military commissar at the same time that he enrolls in the reserve.

4. A citizen who is in the reserve undergoes a medical examination to determine his fitness for military service in accordance with the Statute on Military Medical Fitness Examinations.

Article 51. The Composition of the Reserve

1. The composition of the reserve—citizens who are in the reserve—is subdivided into three categories.

Composition of the Reserve (Military Ranks)	Age of Personnel in the Reserve		
	First Category	Second Category	Third Category
Soldiers and Seamen, Sergeants and Petty Officers, Army and Navy Warrant Officers	to 35 years of age	to 45 years of age	to 50 years of age
Junior Officers	to 45 years of age	to 50 years of age	to 55 years of age
Senior Officers Majors and Lieutenant Colonels	to 50 years of age	to 55 years of age	to 60 years of age
Colonels	to 55 years of age	to 60 years of age	—
Flag Officers	to 60 years of age	—	—

2. Female citizens who are in the reserve belong to the third category until they reach 50 years of age if they have officer military ranks, and until they reach 45 years of age if they do not.

3. A citizen who is in the reserve and who has reached the maximum reserve age, or who has been declared to be unfit for military service for health reasons, is transferred by the rayon or city (without a rayon division) military commissar into retirement and is removed from the military register.

Article 52. Military Assemblies

1. Citizens who are in the reserve can be called up for military assemblies for training or retraining for military service.

The conduct of military assemblies for other purposes is prohibited.

2. The time, location, and time periods for conducting military assemblies are determined by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

3. The duration of each military assembly cannot exceed two months.

The total duration of military assemblies to which a citizen is assigned during his time in the reserve cannot exceed 12 months.

The interval between military assemblies to which a citizen who is in the reserve is assigned must be no less than three years.

4. The duration of military assemblies is calculated in the total duration of citizens' military service.

Article 53. Release From Military Assemblies

1. Female citizens are released from military assemblies.
2. Male citizens are released from military assemblies:
 - a) who have been reserved by enterprises, institutions and organizations for the period of mobilization and wartime;
 - b) Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, foreign intelligence organs, federal state security organs and internal affairs organ civilian personnel;
 - c) flight and ground personnel and also air and rail transportation workers and employees who are directly carrying out and supporting transportation or who are involved with maintenance and repair of aircraft (helicopters), airfield equipment, rolling stock and rail transportation equipment;
 - d) merchant fleet and also river fleet and fishing industry fleet vessels—during the period of navigation;
 - e) who are directly involved in sowing and harvesting work—during the period of the conduct of such work;
 - f) pedagogical workers of educational institutions;
 - g) students (cadets) and pupils in day and evening departments of educational institutions;
 - h) students (cadets) and pupils in correspondence departments of educational institutions, for the period of examination and testing sessions, and to complete written work for their degrees;
 - i) those who have been released from military service, for two years from the date of release into the reserve;
 - j) those who have three or more adolescent children;
 - k) those who have reasons that are stipulated by Article 21 of this Law with the exception of paragraphs "d" and "e" of the first part and paragraphs "a" and "e" of the second part; and,
 - l) those who are abroad.

3. The military commissar can decide to release a citizen from a call up for military assemblies if there are valid reasons that have been confirmed by the appropriate documents.

Article 54. Procedures for the Performance of Military Assemblies

1. The procedures for the performance of military assemblies by citizens who are in the reserve are determined by this Law, and by the Statute on the Procedures for Conducting Military Assemblies that has been approved by the Russian Federation Government based upon the Russian Federation Minister of Defense's submission.

2. Material support of citizens who are at military assemblies is carried out in the procedure and amounts defined by the Statute on the Procedures for the Conduct of Military Assemblies.

3. A citizen who has successfully passed the examinations prescribed by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense during military assemblies, upon submission by the official who conducted the military assemblies, can be awarded the next military rank, but no more than twice during the period in which the citizen is in the reserve:

—a soldier or sailor, sergeant or petty officer—to senior sergeant or chief petty officer, inclusively—by the rayon or city (without a rayon division) military commissar; and,

—an officer or army (navy) warrant officer—to lieutenant colonel or captain 2nd rank, inclusively—by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense.

Article 55. The Reserve of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Federal State Security Organs and Border Troops

The procedures for the formation and training of the Reserve of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Federal State Security Organs and Border Troops are prescribed by a special law.

Section 8

Transition Provisions

Article 56. The Transition Period

A transition period is established for the purpose of realizing this Law, the period of which is determined by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet when this Law is enacted.

Article 57. The Force of Previously Adopted Normative Acts

1. The corresponding normative acts that were in force in the USSR, RSFSR, and the Russian Federation, and also the normative acts that were adopted by the Commonwealth of Independent States Unified Armed Forces Main Command until the formation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and by the Commonwealth of Independent States Border Troops Main Command until the formation of the Russian Federation Border Troops, retain their force—in the portion that does not contradict this Law and the normative acts adopted based on this Law—until their total repeal by the organs that are authorized to do that in the transitional period before the adoption of normative acts by the Russian Federation on the issues that are regulated by this Law.

2. The force of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation" ceases in the Russian Federation from the moment that this Law is enacted.

The benefits that have been established on the basis of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation" are in force until the adoption of corresponding normative acts for the Russian Federation.

3. The force of the Russian Federation Law "On the Release of Officers From Active Military Service At Their Own Request" ceases the moment that this law is enacted.

A serviceman who has an officer military rank and who has not concluded a military service contract has the right to be released from military service at his own request if the total duration of his military service in a military position (positions) for which an officer military rank is prescribed by the TOE is no less than five years after completion of an institution of professional education.

Article 58. Conclusion of Contracts With Citizens Who Are Being Trained Through Reserve Officer Training Programs At Military Departments At State Institutions of Higher Professional Education

A citizen who is being trained through the reserve officer training program at military departments at state institutions of higher professional education concludes a military training contract at a military department at a state institution of higher professional education in accordance with Article 17 of this Law during the three month period following the enactment of this Law.

A citizen who has not concluded a military training contract at a military department at a state institution of higher professional education cannot undergo training at a military department.

Article 59. The Force of Deferments and Releases From Conscription for Active Compulsory Military Service

1. A citizen who was released from conscription for active compulsory military service in accordance with the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation" is released from conscription for military service in peacetime.

A citizen to whom a deferment from conscription for active compulsory military service was granted in accordance with the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation" has the right to that deferment until the expiration of its term, or until disappearance of the grounds through which this deferment was granted.

2. A citizen who should have been conscripted for active compulsory military service in accordance with the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation" but who was not drafted prior to the enactment of this Law is subject to conscription for military service in accordance with this Law.

Article 60. Conclusion of a Military Service Contract by a Serviceman

1. A serviceman who is studying at a military school, military institute, military academy, post-graduate studies, a Ph.D. program, or at a military department of a civilian institution of higher professional education concludes a military service contract in accordance with this Law during the three month period following the enactment of this Law.

A serviceman who has the military rank of colonel (captain 1st rank) or a flag officer or serviceman, who is occupying a military position for which the military rank

of colonel (captain 1st rank) or flag officer is prescribed by the TOE, concludes a military service contract during the six month period following the enactment of this Law.

2. A serviceman to whom the force of paragraph 1 of this Article extends has the right to conclude a military service contract in accordance with this Law prior to the termination of the transitional period.

3. The term of active military service for an army (navy) warrant officer, extended service serviceman or female serviceman, and also for an officer who has been called up for military service from the reserve, cannot be extended in accordance with legislation that was previously in force. If this serviceman has the desire to continue military service, he can conclude a military service contract in accordance with this Law.

4. During the transitional period, a serviceman over 40 years of age has the right to conclude a first military service contract for a period of up to 10 years in accordance with this Law.

5. A serviceman, with the exception of one who comes under the force of the second paragraph of the third part of Article 57 of this Law, who has not concluded a military service contract within the time periods stipulated by the first-third parts of this Article, is released from military service during the three month period after the expiration of the term for conclusion of a contract that has been prescribed by this Article.

6. The term of service can be extended, but for no more than three months, for a serviceman who reaches the maximum military service age during the six month period following the enactment of this Law.

Article 61. Military Service in Formations in Which Military Service Has Not Been Prescribed by This Law

Military service in formations in which military service has not been prescribed by this Law is permitted until the conclusion of the transitional period.

A serviceman who is performing military service in formations in which military service has not been prescribed by this Law cannot conclude a military service contract in the indicated formations.

Article 62. Military Service of Russian Federation Citizens in Military Formations of Other States (Former Republics of the USSR)

A Russian Federation citizen who is performing military service in military formations of other states (former republics of the USSR) retains the legal status of serviceman that has been stipulated by the Law of the Russian Federation only until the conclusion of the transitional period.

Article 63. Calculation of the Total Duration of a Serviceman's Military Service

The duration of a Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, foreign intelligence organs or federal state security organs serviceman's active military service prior to the enactment of this Law is included in the serviceman's total duration of military service.

Article 64. The Force of Article 44 of This Law

1. The force of Article 44 of this Law does not extend to a serviceman who has been elected a people's deputy until the expiration of the powers of the session of the organs of representative rule active at the moment this Law is enacted.

2. The force of Article 44 of this Law does not extend to a serviceman who has transferred to permanent work in an organ of executive rule prior to the enactment of this Law.

Article 65. Military Ranks That Are Not Stipulated by This Law

A military rank that has not been stipulated by this Law is retained for a serviceman (for a citizen who is in the reserve or who has retired) to whom the military rank was awarded prior to the enactment of this Law.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin
Russian Federation President
Moscow, Russian House of Soviets
11 February 1993

Footnotes

1. In this Law, we understand other troops to be the troops listed in the Russian Federation Law "On Defense": border troops, internal troops, Russian Federation Ministry of Security troops, the government communications troops that provide communications with military command and control organs, Russian Federation Railroad Troops, and civil defense troops.

Supreme Soviet Decree on Second Review of Law

93UM0435B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Feb 93 p 3

[Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree, signed by Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman R. Khasbulatov, 11 February 1993, Russian House of Soviets, Moscow: "Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree on the Second Review of the Law of the Russian Federation 'On Military Obligation and Military Service'"]

[Text] Having once again reviewed the Law of the Russian Federation "On Military Obligation and Military Service" that was returned by the Russian Federation President, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decrees:

To adopt the Law of the Russian Federation "On Military Obligation and Military Service" while taking into account the remarks of the Russian Federation President and editorial corrections.

[Signed] R. Khasbulatov
Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman
Russian House of Soviets, Moscow
11 February 1993

Supreme Soviet Decree on Implementation

93UM0435C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Feb 93 p 3

[Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree, signed by Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman R. Khasbulatov, 11 February 1993, Russian House of Soviets, Moscow: "Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree on the Procedures for Enactment of the Russian Federation Law 'On Military Obligation and Military Service'"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To enact the Law of the Russian Federation "On Military Obligation and Military Service" from 1 March 1993 with the exception of paragraph "e" of the first part and paragraph "c" of the second part of Article 21, which will be enacted on 1 January 1995.

2. To establish the time period until 31 December 1994 as the transitional period prescribed by this Law.

3. To establish that servicemen, who were drafted for active compulsory military service prior to enactment of this Law, are released from active compulsory military service upon expiration of the military service terms that were prescribed when they were drafted.

4. To establish that USSR Council of Ministers resolutions with regard to the granting of deferments from conscription for military service to citizens as a result of work in a number of sectors of the national economy are not applied on Russian Federation territory.

5. The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Issues submits to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet for review:

—a draft Statute on the Performance of Military Service prior to 1 April 1993; and,

—a draft Statute on Servicemen's Material Liability prior to 1 June 1993.

6. To propose to the Russian Federation President and to the Russian Federation Government, to the Supreme Soviet and to the heads of executive power (the presidents) of the republics within the Russian Federation, the Soviets of People's Deputies and the heads of administrations of autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs, krais or oblasts, the cities of Moscow or St. Petersburg, to local Soviets of People's Deputies, and to heads of local administration, leaders of ministries, state committees and departments of the Russian Federation, managers of enterprises, institutions and organizations prior to 1 January 1994 to bring the appropriate normative

and other acts that affect the fulfillment of military obligation by citizens into compliance with the indicated Law.

7. To propose to the Russian Federation President prior to 15 March 1993 to submit for review of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet the Unified List of Military Positions that are filled by flag officers in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, foreign intelligence organs and federal state security organs.

8. The Russian Federation Government will:

—approve the Statute on Military Registration, the Statute on Conscription for Military Service, the Statute on Military Medical Fitness Examinations, and The List of Military-Registration Specialties prior to 1 April 1993;

—approve the Statute on the Procedures for Conducting Military Assemblies and the Statute on Cadet Corps prior to 1 June 1993;

—submit to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet:

—the draft Statute on the Procedures for the Performance of Military Service prior to 15 March 1993;

—drafts of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Military Regulations prior to 1 April 1993;

—the draft Statute on Servicemen's Material Liability prior to 1 May 1993;

—proposals for bringing Russian Federation laws into compliance with this Law prior to 1 June 1993; and,

—examine the necessity of bringing a number of military departments at state institutions of higher professional education into compliance with the need for training Russian Federation Armed Forces, federal state security organs and border troops reserve officers in the appropriate military-registration specialties while considering the possibility of a substantial reduction in their number, and to approve the list of military departments at state institutions of higher professional education prior to 1 May 1993.

9. To task the Russian Federation Government with the functions for the assignment of citizens who have been drafted for military service in accordance with the requests of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, other ministries, and state committees and departments in which military service has been prescribed by law.

10. To propose to the Supreme Soviets and to the heads of executive power (to the Presidents) of the republics within the Russian Federation, to the Soviets of People's Deputies and to the heads of administrations of the autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs, krays, oblasts, the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, local Soviets of

People's Deputies and to the heads of local administrations the taking of measures to ensure fulfillment of the prescribed tasks for conscripting citizens for military service.

11. The Russian Federation Government and the Russian Federation Procurator General will prepare and submit, prior to 1 April 1993, for the review of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and the Russian Federation President proposals on the adoption of urgent measures directed at preventing citizens from evading conscription for military service and also preventing desertion by servicemen.

12. To propose to the Russian Federation President and to the Russian Federation Government prior to 1 April 1993:

—to submit proposals to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet:

—on the review of the volume of missions being carried out by the Russian Federation Armed Forces and by other troops;

—on the procedures for servicing the halls where judicial sessions take place and for conveying defendants to them by internal affairs organs subunits;

—on the normalization of granting deferments from conscription for military service to citizens; and,

—to resolve the issue on the need to bring the strength of the railroad troops, the troops of the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information under the Russian Federation President, the civil defense troops, and also the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense engineer-technical units into compliance with real needs, while considering the possibility of a substantial reduction of their strength.

13. To propose to the Russian Federation President to complete, within the previously established periods of time, the disbandment of military-construction detachments (units) of civilian ministries, state committees and departments, enterprises, institutions and organizations.

14. To establish that, with the realization of the benefits prescribed by Article 5 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Additional Guarantees and Compensations for Servicemen Who Are Performing Military Service on the Territory of the States of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, and the Republic of Tajikistan, and Also Those Who Are Carrying out Missions for the Protection of the Constitutional Rights of Citizens Under Conditions of Martial Law and During Armed Conflicts", and the second part of Article 20 of the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen" with regard to the family members of servicemen who are performing military service on the territories of the states of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, and the Republic of Tajikistan, the second part of Article 20 of the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen" is applied.

15. The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Issues, on the basis of an analysis of the practice of the adoption of laws, will submit in a timely manner proposals to change or supplement individual provisions of this Law for the review of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

16. It is resolved to examine the course of the fulfillment of this Law in September 1993.

[Signed] R. Khasbulatov
Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman
Russian House of Soviets, Moscow
11 February 1993

Status-Of-Servicemen Law Provisions On Female Personnel

93UM0438C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Mar 93 p 2

[Irina Mineyeva, legal consultant for Russian Defense Ministry Main Military-Medical Directorate, interviewed by Petr Altunin: "Women In Military Service"]

[Text] Quite a few women are serving in the Russian Armed Forces, as they do in many of the world's armies. In accordance with regulations and the Law on the Status of Servicemen, they enjoy the rights provided to all servicemen as well as special benefits stipulated by legislation on protecting families, mothers, and children.

We selected the most typical and general questions from readers' letters and asked Irina Mineyeva, a legal consultant with the Russian Ministry of Defense Main Military-Medical Directorate, to respond to them.

[Altunin] How can women join the service? (Ye. Volkova, Ryazan)

[Mineyeva] Unmarried women who do not have children, are between the ages of 19 and 30 inclusive, are physically fit, have at least an eighth-grade education, and have proven their abilities in their work or studies may volunteer for active military service. An exception to this rule has been made for wives of servicemen in remote garrisons. They can be accepted up to the age of 40, provided they have no minor children. Women can serve for two, four, or six years, and, if they so desire, can extend their service for any of the aforementioned terms.

Military commissariats process documents, conduct medical examinations, and send women to the places where they will serve. They issue military tickets, travel documents, and food and travel allowances. When a woman arrives at her military unit, she is appointed to her post by order of the commanding officer.

Women can also be transferred to other posts or to other military units. This question is decided on a case-by-case basis with due regard for all the reasons for such a transfer and the possibility of granting it. If a unit is changing its place of deployment, this cannot serve as grounds for discharge.

[Altunin] Are there any differences in the material situation of servicewomen or in the way in which they serve? (A. Sudakova, Kaliningrad)

[Mineyeva] Servicewomen have material and pension benefits, a monetary allowance, and the rights, benefits, and privileges established by current legislation for extended-service military personnel.

Their worktime is regulated by the daily work schedule in effect in their unit and is based on the amount of time needed to complete the work required by the position they hold. In military-medical units and institutions, servicewomen work the same amount of time as civilian employees who work under the same conditions and hold the same jobs. Women are required to attend service and training sessions. Except for dormitory details, women do not perform garrison, guard, or internal-service duty. They are not assigned sidearms.

Women wear the military uniform of the prescribed type, and in their free time outside the unit they are permitted to wear civilian clothes.

Servicewomen are provided with living space at their place of service or are assigned to a separate dormitory. With the commanding officer's permission, they may enroll in evening education schools and secondary and higher correspondence educational institutions (departments).

[Altunin] I serve as a private. I am currently expecting a child. How do I obtain leave to care for my child? What are the regulations governing leave for women in the army? (K. Istomina, Khabarovsk)

[Mineyeva] Leave is granted to servicewomen in each calendar year of service (including the first) in the procedure prescribed for extended-service military personnel. Additional leave can also be granted, such as for work in instances in which working conditions are hazardous to one's health.

In peacetime, sick leave based on a finding issued by a military-medical commission cannot exceed four months. Short-term leave for a period of up to 10 days can be granted for valid reasons, and this time is not counted against one's regular leave.

Servicewomen are also granted maternity and birth leave (with monetary and in-kind allowances), as well as leave to care for a child until he or she reaches the age of three. The time of these leaves is counted toward one's total period of uninterrupted service for purposes of setting salaries, toward one's seniority for purposes of establishing raises and bonuses, and toward one's total years of service for purposes of setting pensions. Upon discharge from military service (regardless of the reason), monetary compensation is paid for unused leave in proportion to the time served in the year of discharge.

[Altunin] How are women discharged from military service? (Z. Sumbatova, Samara)

[Mineyeva] Women are discharged after serving their set term, on reaching the maximum age for active service, in connection with organizational measures and the impossibility of using them (usually as a result of manpower cutbacks), for health limitations and sickness, for unsuitability for service or for actions that discredit the title of servicewoman, and for criminal conviction by a court.

Women can be discharged in connection with the birth of a child only after they have used the leave time granted to them to care for a child until he or she reaches the age of three.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

MORSKOY SBORNIK Editorial Response to Naval Critics

93UM0360A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 11, Nov 92 pp 13-15

[Article by Reserve Captain 1st Rank V. Zaborskiy, under the rubric: Point of View: "By Hook or By Crook"]

[Text] Today the situation in our navy remains complicated and is characterized by the aggravation of a number of problems, and the navy's vital activities and combat capabilities depends on the resolution of these problems. The patriots of our state, both military seamen and also representatives of the defense industry, scholars, public figures, writers, and journalists, understand all of that. The numerous articles in support of the Navy in a majority of printed publications attest to that. And yet at times it is quite unpleasant to encounter cases of unjust attacks against the Navy, incompetent criticism, unreliable information, and frequently simply falsehoods directed at the Naval command authorities, personnel, and defense industry workers.

We all know that a polarization of forces, views, and ideas occurs in a period of crisis phenomena in society and, as a result, previously hidden hypocrites and simply morally unscrupulous people are brought to light who are ready to instantaneously change their own convictions and views depending on the situation that is developing. In recent years, they have also unfortunately appeared among Naval officers. A small group has been formed among their number that considers itself the "saviors" of the Navy. But to the honor of the Naval officer corps, there have turned out to be few such officers and you can count them on your fingers in the "water areas" of Moscow and St. Petersburg. However, alas they are causing quite a bit of damage. Their influence is having an especially ruinous impact on the formation of the views of junior officers and also of people who have very poor knowledge of the navy's real life.

They normally speak in those same publications and television programs where, as a rule, the fanning of unverified "cooked up" facts from the life of the Armed Forces in general and from the Navy in particular is

encouraged. In their statements, these "ardent supporters" of the navy cover themselves with the noble goal of combating the inadequacies that exist in the Navy, about which allegedly only they know and it's as if the command authorities either don't know about them and, if they do know, they are deliberately not taking steps. They pounce upon everyone and everything, even frequently lowering themselves to direct insults and slander. Reserve Captains 1st Rank I. Kolton, A. Gorbachev, and Reserve Vice Admiral Ye. Chernov are the most celebrated in this field of endeavor and well known in certain naval circles.

Having received the proper rebuff, these "saviors" of the navy have noticeably reduced their activities in the last six months. Obviously, the mass media workers who welcome them have also become bored with them due to their repetitions of one and the same information and with the superficial arguments of their positions. We also must not forget about them. No, they have not quieted down, but they have begun to conduct themselves somewhat differently and especially one of the leaders of this "movement", Reserve Captain 1st Rank Ilya Borisovich Kolton, the indefatigable fighter with the country's military-industrial complex (VPK).

Just who is this I. Kolton? Based on his service profile—he is a ship mechanic who has a great deal of work experience sailing on Northern Fleet submarines, a nuclear power plant specialist. He was also chief of a submarine task force electromechanical service and was a representative of the permanent commission for state acceptance of Naval ships from industry during the last nine years in the regular Naval. He is most famous as the author of the proposal for the introduction into wide practice of a special mode of the use of nuclear power plants that caused such a sensation last year. We need to clarify that a definite special operating mode in the event of outages or the threat of the emergence of accidents was provided for through the operating instructions for certain types of submarine nuclear power plants. At one time, I. Kolton defended a candidate's dissertation on this topic. Then he decided to deepen it and to expand it to the size of a doctor's dissertation. However, the direction proposed by him to increase the properties of nuclear submarines was not approved after repeated studies and evaluations in the fleets and also in various, right up to government, levels of authority. This certainly was also one of the causes of I. Kolton's dissatisfaction with both the Navy and its leadership and also with the military-industrial complex's scientific production organizations.

Then I. Kolton, taking advantage of the situation of glasnost, began to deceive our society, while distorting the true state of affairs in our Navy in published articles and on television programs. I. Kolton's official appeals were examined with the involvement of specialists and experts. Various commissions and also the Russian Federation KGB (MB) [Ministry of Security] and procuracy worked. In the process, I. Kolton continuously insisted on the need for his participation in their work as an

"independent" expert. However, each time, the distortions and unsubstantiated accusations became obvious as the truth once again became clear. And then it was confirmed that the Navy's shortcomings, narrow places and problems about which I. Kolton was writing (incidentally, he ignored their secrecy) and that were being resolved with difficulty were a "revelation" and "news" only for he himself because they were deeply and more comprehensively known to the Navy's command authorities and to the leadership of industry. And the main thing was that the required steps for their resolution had also been taken previously and are being taken at the present time at the appropriate levels.

As for I. Kolton's "epochal" proposal, one more detailed conclusion was made on it (September 1991) by nine leading design and scientific research organizations, including a legislator in the sphere of resolving the problems of nuclear power IAE [Institute of Atomic Energy] imeni I.V. Kurchatov. I am citing one of this document's conclusions: "Operation of a submarine's main power plant in the mode... is potentially dangerous..., which does not correspond to modern nuclear safety requirements."

In March 1992, I. Kolton sent his latest statement to the Russian Federation Ministry of Security in which he "dumped" the Navy's actual shortcomings and problems and accusations that were unfounded in their content and insulting in their form into one heap that were directed at former and current state officials, Armed Forces command authorities, and leaders of the defense industry. At that time, the materials of that statement were once again painstakingly examined and studied by specialists of the General Staff, the Navy and industry. The conclusion on them with the rejection of all claims against the Navy because of their unsubstantiated nature and the inadvisability of further development of these issues in view of their significant degree of far-fetchedness, falsehood, and repetitiveness was reported to Vice Premier Ye. Gaydar.

It seems that the "fighter" should stop at this. However, that did not occur. I. Kolton once again went on the "warpath" with the military-industrial complex. In May 1992, he prepared a report—now already for the Russian Federation President. Indeed, one other man signed the document—Reserve Captain 2nd Rank G. Melkov but, based on its content and style of presentation, it is clear that the authorship undoubtedly remains totally with I. Kolton. And this appeal with all the material attached to it, including with the Navy's report on the issues posed, was examined by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense, naturally, with the previous result.

And maybe it is not worthwhile to talk about all of this if several fundamentally new factors had not appeared in I. Kolton's last document that, as they say, dot all of the i's and expose the true meaning of the prolonged campaign that was launched by him.

First of all, it turns out that all of our state, industrial and military leadership have long ago agreed among themselves and have merged into a "...highly organized military industrial Mafia, that has spread its tentacles into the former and current power structures" (!). And all of that with the purpose of undermining the country's defense capability by delivering poor quality military equipment and also to obtain bonuses, decorations and so forth. In the process, I. Kolton has included in the assembly of the members of this "Mafia" both the former leaders of the country, industry, science, the military department (Lukyanov, Yazov, Zaytsev, Baklanov, Maslyukov, Belousov, Koksanov, Shabanov, Marchuk, Spasskiy and others), and also the Naval command authorities, and even Russian Federation Procurator General V. Stepanikov who, in I. Kolton's opinion, did not react aggressively enough to his statement.

Second, (attention!), what is, in my opinion, the primary goal of I. Kolton's appeal and all of his many years "struggle": he is finally openly proposing specific candidacies, including himself, to the leading posts in the Navy and in the Russian Ministry of Defense. Not just anyone will decide to do that.

As they say, that has explained everything. It turns out that the meaning of all of the "18 years combating the military-industrial complex" and the "pain for Peter's Navy" consists of his aspiration to appoint himself—whom would you think?—Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense for Weaponry. I. Kolton thinks that he will be most useful in that post because it is "...the military-industrial complex's Achilles' heel is here and here we need to cut the Gordian Knot". Yes, this man will not die from modesty! Well, will he be able to handle it? A narrow profile specialist, who has never in his service encountered any other ship weaponry or the complex problems of Naval development, already not mentioning the weapons and the problems of the other branches of the Armed Forces, who meanwhile does not have an adequate operational-tactical range of vision due to the specific framework of his former service, all the more so a 60-year-old reservist (generals and admirals are supposed to serve only until 55 years of age) wishes to immediately occupy the post of deputy minister of defense. In my opinion, this is the entire essence of I. Kolton's "uncompromising" struggle for "Peter's Navy".

I am not talking about the remaining candidates "mentioned" by I. Kolton for the roles of leaders of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the Navy because of the obvious absurdity of these proposals. And the main thing is that I am not certain that they know where I. Kolton has promoted them.

In conclusion—a small commentary. While accusing the military and industrial leadership in a "plot" for the sake of deliveries of poor quality weapons to the Navy, I. Kolton has not been deterred by remembering something about which for some reason he is silent. During the last decades of his service, while participating in the

acceptance of submarines from industry and while directly being a worker of this same military-industrial complex, he did not make a single remark or claim against enterprises and organizations of the defense sectors for the low quality of submarine power plants or their equipment on a single state test report. And he was not embarrassed to receive bonuses from the Ministry of Shipbuilding and he did not accuse Ministers I. Belousov or I. Koksanov of that.

And the last thing. In the Russian Navy, and in our Soviet Navy too, it was not customary to submit the disagreements that arise, be they with the command authorities or among officers, for general review. Everything was resolved in one's own circle—the Officer's Assembly, the wardroom, and finally, the court of honor. In the process, an officer who permitted a dishonest deed from the point of view of an officer's ethics, was subjected to a boycott. He was excluded from officers' society. I think that it would be worthwhile for certain officers to recall these examples.

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Official Department: Appointments, Promotions

93UM0360B Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK*
in Russian No 11, Nov 92 pp 16-18

[Appointment and Russian Federation Presidential Edicts signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin, Moscow, the Kremlin: "Official Department: Appointments of the Chief of the Main Staff-First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Valentin Yegorovich Selivanov"]

[Text]

Appointments of the Chief of the Main Staff-First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Valentin Yegorovich Selivanov

Valentin Yegorovich Selivanov was born on 17 March 1936 in the village of Stanovaya in Stanovlyanskiy Rayon, Lipetsk Oblast. He graduated from the Naval Higher School imeni M.V. Frunze in 1958.

He began his service in the Navy in the post of destroyer antiaircraft battery commander. Later he was commander of a command department, assistant to the commander, and commander of a small antisubmarine warfare ship. After completing the Navy's VSOK [not found] in 1965, he was commander of an escort ship and destroyer. In 1971, after graduating from the Naval Academy, he was assigned as chief of staff of a brigade of antisubmarine warfare ships and then commander of a brigade of destroyers, commander of a division of missile ships, and chief of staff and commander of a Naval ship squadron. In 1985, he was assigned as chief of staff-first deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet and, in 1989, commander of Leningrad Naval Base.

He is married and has a son.

From the Russian Federation President's Edicts

On the Award of Ranks to Officers, Generals and Admirals of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

Award the military ranks to:

Admiral

Oleg Aleksandrovich Yerofeyev

Vice Admiral

Vladimir Gerasimovich Beskorovaynyy

Leonid Ivanovich Golovko

Aleksandr Vasilyevich Gorbunov

Viktor Alekseyevich Gorev

Vasily Petrovich Yeremin

Innokentiy Innokentiyevich Naletov

Viktor Konstantinovich Reshetov

Rear Admiral

Petr Mikhaylovich Avdeychik

Mikhail Konstantinovich Barskov

Aleksandr Ivanovich Brazhnik

Gennadiy Spiridonovich Verich

Vladimir Grigoryevich Dobroskochenko

Vladimir Petrovich Komoyedov

Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Lagir

Yevgeniy Yakovlevich Litvinenko

Vladimir Mikhaylovich Makeyev

Vladislav Timofeyevich Martynenko

Aleksandr Nikolayevich Melnikov

Aleksey Mikhaylovich Ovcharenko

Mikhail Ivanovich Sviridov

Anatoliy Andreyevich Smolyakov

Yuriy Nikolayevich Sysuyev

Vladimir Ivanovich Tolstykh

Valentin Prokopyevich Fateyev

Aleksandr Sergeevich Tsubin

Valeriy Ivanovich Shorin

Dmitriy Borisovich Shtefanov

Major-General

Ivan Grigoryevich Chernykh

Gennadiy Grigoryevich Shinakov

Major-General of Aviation

Yuriy Sergeevich Andreychuk

Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Artamonov

**On the Award of Russian Federation State Decorations
to Russian Federation Armed Forces Servicemen**

For courage and valor displayed while performing military duty, award:

**THE DECORATION "FOR PERSONAL
BRAVERY" to:**

Captain 1st Rank Igor Vladimirovich Nevelskiy

Seaman Vladimir Vasilyevich Smolnikov (Posthumously)

Captain 3rd Rank Vladimir Mikhaylovich Uchitel

For courage and valor displayed while clearing mines from terrain and while disarming explosives, award:

THE MEDAL "OF VALOR" to

Captain-Lieutenant Igor Yuryevich Zmiyevskiy

ON AWARDING HONORARY TITLES:

For special merit in the mastery of aircraft, high indicators in educating and training flying cadres and for many years of accident-free flying operations in military aviation, award the honorary titles of:

**"RUSSIAN FEDERATION HONORED MILITARY
PILOT" to**

Major-General of Aviation Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Artamonov

Major-General of Aviation Valeriy Iosifovich Bumagin

Major-General of Aviation Nikolay Dmitriyevich Burachik

Major-General of Aviation Vladimir Mikhaylovich Zhdanov

Colonel Nikolay Andreyevich Minochkin

Colonel Pavel Aleksandrovich Nikulin

Colonel Boris Aleksandrovich Ruchkin

Colonel Anatoliy Radionovich Simanov

Colonel Ivan Dmitriyevich Fedin

**"RUSSIAN FEDERATION HONORED MILITARY
NAVIGATOR" to**

Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Yegorovich Beryukov

Colonel Vyacheslav Savelyevich Radostev

Colonel Aleksey Alekseyevich Simanovich

Colonel Yuriy Nikolayevich Khlusov

For many years of productive, inventive activity, award the honorary title of

**"RUSSIAN FEDERATION HONORED
INVENTOR" to**

Reserve Captain 1st Rank Yuriy Yefimovich Ilyash

For Merit and Scientific Activity, award the honorary title of

**"RUSSIAN FEDERATION HONORED FIGURE OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY" to**

Captain 1st Rank Valentin Vasilyevich Kobzev

[Signed] B. Yeltsin
Russian Federation President
Moscow, the Kremlin

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Information Note: Debate Over Accident Rate

*93UM0360C Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 11, Nov 92 p 18*

[Unattributed article: "Information"]

[Text] In October 1992, a session of the Collegium of the Committee for the Affairs of Servicemen and Their Family Members under the Russian Federation Government took place under the chairmanship of A. Alekseyev where they examined the problem of reducing deaths and serious injuries of servicemen in accidents and catastrophes of weapons systems and military equipment in all the combat arms. Retired Captain 1st Rank I. Kolton and Retired Vice Admiral Ye. Chernov delivered a report and a co-report on this issue. However, these officers, who consider themselves to be experts, have already lost a real link with the navy and have not recently requested the required information from the Navy Main Staff and they cannot have at their disposal objective and reliable information on the issue being discussed. This caused the orientation of their reports which touched upon problems of not all of the Armed Forces but only of the Navy. At the same time, representatives of the various branches of the Russian Federation Armed Forces participated in the discussion of the reports. Specifically, alarm was heard in the speeches of

Russian Federation Academician of Pedagogical Sciences Major-General of Aviation V. Ponomarev, Reserve Colonel P. Belov, Lieutenant Colonel N. Kirillov and others that the issue of deaths and serious injuries in certain aviation and ground forces units will not be less but may be more serious than in the navy as a result of the deliveries of some models of inadequately reliable equipment by industry. However, examination of such an important issue in the Committee, unfortunately, occurred without the participation of representatives of the Navy who could not come to the session because they received the invitation late. These and a number of other circumstances formed a distorted impression about the issue being discussed among the people who had been invited to the session and among the Committee members. These causes also affected the appearance of biased articles in some of the mass media.

As a result of what has been said above, the Naval Press Service notifies the public that it is prepared to present all required information to any interested organizations and to conduct a discussion of the issue of the deaths and serious injuries of servicemen, accidents and catastrophes of weapons systems and military equipment in the Navy.

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Reply to Ukrainian View on Division of Black Sea Fleet

93UM0360D Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 11, Nov 92 p 19

[Unattributed article: "Rejoinder"]

[Text] The publication of the Ukrainian Navy newspaper FLOT UKRAINI began in June 1992 in Sevastopol. In its first issue, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Lecturer, Captain 1st Rank Yu. Badakh's article "Problemy Chernomorskogo flota" [The Problems of the Black Sea Fleet] that was published under the rubric "Mneniye spetsialista" [An Expert's Opinion] draws attention to itself. The author considered it necessary at the very beginning to cite, as he expressed it, historical references. Yu. Badakh writes: "The *druzhina* [military retinue] of the Kievan Princes Igor, Svyatoslav and Vladimir were the first to visit the Black Sea... Later, despite the fortresses constructed by the Turks and by the Tatars at the mouth of the Dnepr, the Zaporozhye Cossacks went out into the Black Sea in their *chaykas*... The Russian ship "Krepost" [Fortress] under the command of Dutchman Pamburg visited the Black Sea for the first time only in 1699. So, from the historical point of view, Ukrainians were the first to have visited the Black Sea..."

We think that the reader himself can make the conclusion about the methodology and the principles of the scientific approach to the interpretation of this scholar's historical facts... Under this approach, we must consider not only the Tmutarakan Principality that is located on the Taman Peninsula but also the Great Vladimir Principality itself as remote areas of Ukraine. Does Yu.

Badakh really not know that both Galicia, Volyn, Kievshchina, Chernigovshchina, Vladimirshchina, and Novgorodchina, and another series of lands that were adjacent to them were united by Rus and that the Black Sea itself was called the Russian Sea practically until the 18th Century. Even the subordination of the divided Russian principalities by the Tatar-Mongols did not disrupt this unity. Only the seizure of a number of our western principalities by Poland and Lithuania for several centuries divided their population from the rest of Rus. But these are both branches of a single people, although also apart, but, during the dark centuries of slavery, they managed to preserve their common Slavic language, their culture and, the main thing, the consciousness of their commonality that also resulted in the well known result—their unification in 1654. So, whose was the first ship that entered the Black Sea 45 years after that truly epochal event for the fates of a single people? No, Pan Badakh is pursuing a goal that is far from science—to substantiate by any means the aspiration of forces that are hostile to us to a new division of an essentially single people.

But let's leave the reference. Having further enumerated certain landmarks of the history of the Black Sea Fleet, the author approaches today's problems and first of all, extols the need to divide the Black Sea Fleet. Here, substantiations begin with the enumeration of the Black Sea bases of which—Sevastopol, Donuzlov, Balaklava, Feodesiya, Odessa, Kerch, and Izmail are Ukrainian and only Novorossiysk and Tuapse are Russian which transparently alludes to the extent of Ukraine's and Russia's maritime borders here. And the substantiations end with citing that fact that approximately 37% of the former USSR's military shipbuilding occurred on Ukrainian wharves. Therefore, Yu. Badakh thinks we need to divide the fleet "based on justice". The author does not clarify what is placed at the foundation for determining this percentage. It's as if he took the number of hulls that have been launched into the water and maybe even some sort of other criterion that lies on the surface of the notorious wholesale approach as the basis. The impression is formed that he does not know or that he simply discards those facts such as that today Ukraine does not produce strike and anti-aircraft missile weapons, torpedoes, mines, depth charges, navigation equipment, ship diesels, batteries, and much technical equipment without which a combat ship is simply unthinkable. Having added here the founding of ferrous metals and special heat-resistant alloys for power plants that are provided by Russia and other CIS countries, we would certainly obtain a quite different percentage. So we will not juggle figures, all the more so biased ones.

But it turns out that the author needs precisely that number. He substantiates that number of surface combatants with it that need to be transferred to Ukraine and which exceed everything that there is right now in the Black Sea Fleet. Why? In order to sell them! And here he appeals to those CIS states that do not have seas to support him. Let them obtain their percentages of the

Navy's ships and sell them to "augment their meager budgets" and only Russia is involved with that. Hence, the "scholarly" conclusion: "We need to more rapidly resolve the issue on the division of the fleet because soon there won't be anything to divide".

What does Yu. Badakh propose the Ukrainian Navy consist of? This: "diesel submarines with cruise missiles and torpedoes, task forces of surface escort, antisubmarine warfare, and mine sweeping ships, missile and torpedo boats, land and sea-based missile-carrying aircraft, BRAV [coastal missile and artillery troop] units and a brigade of naval infantry." He thinks that this is adequate: "Having these forces off our shores, we will not permit any enemy to approach our shores and we will sink all of his ships."

The article ends in the spirit of today's philological tightrope-walking: "Russia... will also have its fleet in the Black Sea with bases located on Russian territory, and it will be a friendly fleet for Ukraine".

We will conclude our rejoinder with an apology because we have attracted our readers' attention to this remaining unpleasant aftertaste of the article in our so unhappy time. But we need to know about the broad propaganda in Ukraine of such views (and this is not the most malicious article that distorts the truth).

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Change in Balance of Power Due To Black Sea Fleet Division

92UM0379A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian No 57, 23 Dec 92 p 11

[Article by KOMMERSANT-DAILY Correspondents Vladimir Alekseyev and Aleksandr Stukalin, under the rubric: "The Black Sea Fleet Problem": "The Division of the Fleet Will Entail a Serious Alteration of the Balance of Power"]

[Text] The meeting of the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine, Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk, that was planned for tomorrow has been postponed until the second half of January 1993. Thus, the anticipated agreement on the future of the Black Sea Fleet and the appointment of the new commander will be prepared no earlier than a month from now. Meanwhile the process of its division has already begun and is gaining momentum.

In accordance with the agreements on the fleet that were achieved in 1992 by Russia and Ukraine at Dagomys and Yalta, the transition period in the Black Sea Fleet's fate must extend for two years. However, the division of the fleet is gaining momentum in violation of the agreements: Kiev is actively forming the structure of its own naval forces.

The process of forming the Ukrainian Navy is occurring. The combat ship SKR-112, that was redeployed from the Crimea to Odessa, has already found itself under the

command of Ukraine. Furthermore, the command and control ship Slavutich is undergoing trials and the large intelligence-gathering ship Pridneprovye is nearing completion. According to Ukrainian Navy Commander-in-Chief Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin's statement, the new escort vessel Getman Sagaydachnyy is being prepared for launch; construction of a Zubr Class hydrofoil is also nearing completion. At one time these ships were planned for the USSR's single Navy but right now they have been unilaterally resubordinated to Ukraine—since the primary shipbuilding plants are on its territory.

An artillery regiment, two combat application centers, a special center for anti-saboteur forces, and the only carrier-based aircraft pilot training center in the former Union and the range at Saki have also been transferred to the Ukrainian Navy.

According to observers, the Ukrainian program to create its own navy envisions a comprehensive approach which consists of the formation not only of combat potential but also of the appropriate rear services and auxiliary structures. Issues of rear services support can entirely be considered to be resolved—due to the resubordination of Black Sea Fleet aircraft repair and shipbuilding plants, the construction directorate and the reserve forces base. They have created their own materiel, financial and medical support systems. Ukraine proposes training national cadres for the Navy at the two higher naval schools in Sevastopol which are being reorganized into one naval institute and also at Sevastopol Naval Warrant Officer School and at the junior aircraft specialist school.

Independent experts suggest that the transfer of the coastal infrastructure into Ukraine's hands can doom the task forces and naval units that have remained with Russia to actual inaction which as a result of that will find themselves without rear services support. According to the experts, this fact, along with the appearance of the independent fleets of Ukraine and Georgia on the Black Sea, will result in a noticeable regrouping of naval forces in the region. In the process, it is obvious that the parties will hardly approach parity.

Under new conditions, the naval forces of Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and moreover, Georgia, will hardly be able to dominate in the Black Sea region. Naval experts think that Turkey will obtain a certain operational-strategic advantage. Although the Turkish Navy is not distinguished by any special novelty (with the exception of several frigates built in 1985-1988 and rocket cutters), we must not forget that it holds the keys to the Black Sea: it is sufficient to blockade the Bosphorous Straits and ships of any state will find themselves locked in the water area of the internal sea. At the same time, that "shut-off" valve will be able to continue to operate as an entrance from without and to promote the buildup of the naval potential of Turkey's allies.

Besides the military aspect, the Black Sea countries will also have to take into account the economic aspect. It is here that the most suitable trade routes to the countries

of Western Europe and the Middle and Near East, Africa and America lie (especially for Ukraine and Russia). Consciousness of that compelled Russia to conduct wars for control of the Black Sea straits for decades but right now the distribution of power has turned out to be not in her favor. Although experts think that, in a strategic context, the security of the maritime borders and freedom of navigation are determined not by the number of bases or even by the number of ships and Russia will certainly have to undertake significant steps in reply in that direction.

Meanwhile, observers assert that the Black Sea region is already being viewed as a NATO sphere of naval activity. The actual penetration of leading echelons of the North Atlantic bloc into the Black Sea is occurring under the aegis of the official thesis that the West must know who controls the ships in the Black Sea that are capable of carrying nuclear weapons and concern with the conflict in Abkhaziya. Military experts think that sending ships to the shores of Georgia under peace-keeping flags is entirely possible and, with the expansion of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict—even a naval blockade under the aegis of the UN, as it is being observed in the former Yugoslavia. Involving significant naval forces of countries of other regions in Black Sea conflicts could result in the creation of a real threat to the southern flanks of Russia and Ukraine.

Under these conditions, only the rapid and civilized resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian contradictions can prevent that development of events—quite undesirable for both states.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Current Status of Military Education in Former Republics

93UM0375A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Jan 93
p 2

[Interview with Russian Federation Minister of Defense Cadre Training and VUZ Directorate Deputy Chief Viktor Nikolayevich Pushkarev by PRAVDA Correspondent Aleksandr Nevskiy: "We Have Divided the Army—We Will Now Divide the Cadets"]

[Text] As we all know, there was a single military education system on the territory of the former Union. Now, having separated the Soviet Army according to ethnic apartments, we have begun to divide the military educational institutions in the CIS countries. How much will this affect Russia's defense capability and the training of officer cadres as a whole? What is the situation in the former republics right now in the matter of military education? A PRAVDA correspondent discusses that with Russian Federation Minister of Defense Cadre Training and VUZ Directorate Deputy Chief V.N. Pushkarev.

[Pushkarev] Previously, there were 162 Union Ministry of Defense military educational institutions located on the territory of 10 republics in the USSR officer cadre training system. They were: 115 in Russia, 33 in Ukraine, five in the Baltic States, two each in Belarus and Azerbaijan, and one each in Georgia and Kazakhstan.

[Nevskiy] Viktor Nikolayevich, how did we divide the military VUZ's [higher educational institutions] and their facilities? Were there conflicts with the newly emerged military departments of nearby foreign countries?

[Pushkarev] There were no serious conflicts, although we didn't get by without disputes. So, so far not everything is clear about the fates of Riga and Daugavpils military aviation schools. In general, most of the problems were with the resolution of training cadres for the Air Defense Troops. We transferred Kharkov Academy to the jurisdiction of Ukraine and we had to urgently create our own Russian Academy based on Smolensk School. As you know, we also had to transfer the naval schools in Sevastopol to Ukraine. But we found a solution—we will train additional Naval officers in St. Petersburg and Vladivostok.

[Nevskiy] And on what basis will training of cadets from so-called nearby foreign countries now be carried out at Russian VUZs?

[Pushkarev] Those cadets who were accepted prior to 1989 will be trained free of charge and the rest will be trained for hard currency or based on a joint agreement, as it has already been done with regard to the cadets of foreign states, including the former socialist countries—Warsaw Treaty participants. Incidentally, the GDR [German Democratic Republic] recalled all of its students immediately after the unification of Germany. We lost cadets from a number of African and Asian countries after the introduction of paid training.

[Nevskiy] And with what kind of training facilities have been left for the Russian Armed Forces?

[Pushkarev] We will entirely supply them with professional cadres—we have a very high potential. The Russian Armed Forces have been left with 17 military academies, 81 higher and seven middle military schools, three military institutes and seven military departments under medical VUZs. The training of officers in 450 specialties is being carried out at them. Nearly 148,000 students and cadets are studying in all of the courses. The annual output totals more than 33,000 officers and nearly 5,000 are from the military academies. Over 34,000 teachers and scientists are conducting pedagogical and scientific work. Among them are 600 doctors and 8,000 candidates of sciences.

What do we see as the main task of reform of the military education system? We must bring the Russian military school to a qualitatively higher level that ensures the radical increase of professionalism and general culture of officer cadres. We must train specialists who will easily find employment for themselves in civilian life—in science, in production, and in other spheres of activity. To do this, the policy on disbanding small VUZs and creating powerful educational-methodological and scientific centers will be continued that combines the training of officers of various combat arms and educational levels. During the course of reform, we propose transferring 32 higher military schools from four-year to five-year study programs. And cadets in the most complex specialties at a number of academies and schools will be trained already for six years.

[Nevskiy] Therefore, these people will not be left without work with the further reduction and proposed professionalization of the army and navy?

[Pushkarev] Not at all. The training of our graduates will be brought into accord with state educational standards and military specialties will be made as close as possible to civilian specialties that are similar to them.

Well, these are noble goals. But the professional lack of protection of officers during their release into the reserve continues to cause alarm. Based on unofficial data, more than 135,000 cannot find work for themselves in their specialties, they live with their families on the verge of poverty, and nearly 10,000 high class specialists have gone to "serve" as bodyguards and watchmen in commercial structures.

Russian Commission on Social Questions Meets

*93UM0371B Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 14 Jan 93 p 12*

[Article by KOMMERSANT-DAILY Correspondent Vladimir Makartsev, under the rubric: "The Commission for the Protection of Servicemen Has Begun Work": "Twenty Four Departments Will Guarantee the Rights of Military Personnel"]

[Text] The first session of the Russian Government's Interdepartmental Commission on Social Issues of Servicemen and Their Family Members occurred yesterday. The system of social protection of servicemen and the organization of steps for their retraining were discussed at the session.

The Russian Presidential Edict on the Creation of the Commission had already been signed on 30 September 1992 and the corresponding governmental decree at the end of November. In accordance with them, the commission consists of representatives of 24 leading state organs which are involved with the solution of Russian military personnel's problems. They are primarily first deputy ministers. Government Vice Premier, Minister of Science, Higher School and Technical Policy Boris Saltykov headed the commission. Observers suggest that this appointment is called upon to impart a certain status to the commission. Obviously the primary workload will lie on the chairman's deputies—People's Deputy Anatoliy Alekseyev and Retired Major-General Aleksandr Tsalko.

The creation of the interdepartmental commission is already not the Russian leadership's first attempt to ease the fate of servicemen who find themselves subject to armed forces reductions. It is thought that the Committee for Servicemen's Affairs under the government and the Committee for Social Security under the Ministry of Defense that existed prior to it could not deal with the many obligations due to their narrow-departmental affiliation.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Ukrainian Reaction to Minsk Summit Outlined

93UM0381A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
26 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by Lt Col Sergey Nagoryanskiy, special correspondent for NARODNA ARMIYA: "January Rain, or Something About Anomalies in Nature and Politics"]

[Text] When they broadcast the weather forecast for Ukraine, residents of neighboring Gomel Oblast say, ours will be the same. In turn, the residents of Chernygov Oblast orient themselves on the reports for Belarus. It seems that the politicians are estimating the situation for tomorrow just as primitively. As a result, everything gets worse with each day. We have had our fill of promises and, at the same time, are starving in the direct sense of the word.

Incidentally, about the weather: it rained in Moscow on the days the leaders of the CIS countries were meeting. In mid-January. These anomalies of nature underscored the anomalies in everything that surrounds us.

There is a saying in Ukraine: "A simpleton is rich in ideas." Has the Minsk summit, for which we waited so long, enriched us?

About 25 agreements have been signed. The most important of them are on the CIS charter and on an interstate bank. A document has also been adopted on celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. At their press conference, the heads of state tried to convince us that the negotiations were successful. Stanislav Shushkevich and Nursultan Nazarbayev were particularly satisfied. But the faces of the first individuals said something else which gave away, say, their less than best mood. This mood, it seemed to me, was "slightly spoiled" by the same Ukraine. One of the three initiators of the CIS, it did not sign the Commonwealth charter in Minsk and was "obstinate" the entire year of its existence. Oh, this Ukraine. It should be flogged.

Such an opinion was common among journalists back on the first day of the negotiations, when the Council of Defense Ministers were meeting. Some were outraged already by the fact that our military department was represented not by the minister but by his deputy, Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan.

"Ukraine is not part of the CIS Joint Armed Forces," explained Ivan Vasilyevich [Bizhan]. "Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov is not a member of the Council of Defense Ministers. Moreover, most of the issues being examined here do not concern our country."

"But why are you trying to seize the nuclear forces located on your territory?" the fraternity of writers and photographers continued to press.

"Where do you get such information?" a surprised Colonel-General Bizhan asked. "Ukraine at one time signed the Alma-Ata and Minsk Accords on Strategic Forces and is not deviating a single step from them. I have said more than once and will re-emphasize: Ukraine does not control the nuclear weapons located on its territory and is not reaching for the nuclear button. Moscow exercises command and control."

The deputy minister of defense explained why our state advocates administrative subordination of the nuclear forces to it. Above all, it is because they are stationed on its territory. Moreover, it is Ukraine that guarantees and provides the financing, housing construction, and social rights.

In the smoke-filled journalist corridors, once in a while another tale crept in concerning Ukraine's uncooperativeness. Here is an example: It wants to pump out more money from Russia and the West for everything associated with eliminating the nuclear weapons it has. A Russian lieutenant-general swarmed by journalists reproached us for this. It is good that after it Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan explained to our brother the essence of what is taking place:

"It is a question of financial assistance that could speed up the process of dismantling the missiles. On the whole, the amounts for this work are tremendous. Given our acute economic problems, this issue is not a priority one."

The deputy minister of defense also explained the reason for Ukraine's "slowness" in signing the START-1 Treaty. The point is that it was drawn up over the course of many years by the Soviet Union and the United States. Ukraine did not participate in this as a state, but as an independent state it has to implement it. How? In what kind of time periods? What will the costs be? In short, we must properly look into many other questions? The president has already done this and has passed the START-1 Treaty to the parliament for ratification.

If someone would like to create the largest party in the world, I can make a recommendation: create within the framework of the former Soviet Union the Party of the Deceived. Deceived in the large and small things. Deceived for decades (and one should not ease one's mind with the thought that things were better in the past).

And are they deceiving us once again now in Minsk? Will the signed documents merely become archival papers? You try to find the answer by analyzing the CIS's year of existence. During that year, 250 various documents have been signed. Quite a few meetings were held at various levels. But life has not improved. It has worsened noticeably. To what do we credit this? To the "infancy" of the Commonwealth or some inherent defect with which it came into the world? I doubt whether anyone would dare to answer unequivocally. But optimism still remains (will it last long?). The leaders of the seven countries of the Commonwealth are experiencing it, having signed

the CIS charter. Ukraine and also Moldova and Turkmenistan have refrained from doing so for the time being. Why? Due to the lack of optimism or on grounds of principle? Leonid Kravchuk, back a week before Minsk, expressed the thought in Moscow that economic issues are the top priority for us now. The charter, in the president's opinion, assumes the creation of supranational structures that are at variance with our legislation. Moreover, the document has not been sufficiently prepared. And the doors to the CIS remain open to everyone. Nevertheless, our state, in the person of the president, signed a general statement on the charter. Summarizing the results for the past year, Leonid Makarovich [Kravchuk] said that it would have been worse without the CIS.

Ukraine's special position on a number of issues discussed (particularly on the Commonwealth charter) is not liked by many. Boris Yeltsin ironically nicknamed it "a different point of view." Nursultan Nazarbayev, calling the seven countries that signed the charter integrators of the CIS, tactfully emphasized that Ukraine was not considered to be such. Although a year ago we were one of the three former republics of the Soviet Union that became the initiators of the Commonwealth.

I will venture to say that such an attitude towards us is also caused by the unfinished work of a subjective nature. Obviously, there are flaws in our policy, both foreign and domestic. Strictly speaking, we also see this today. The standard of living in Ukraine is noticeably lower compared to that same Belarus. I do not want to tease my fellow countrymen with what I saw on the counters of one of the Minsk grocery stores, much less say what the prices were. They are outraged there that they now pay 60 rubles for a liter of A-92 gasoline. And we in Kiev seldom can find it anywhere for 500 rubles a liter...

References to the fact that they are punishing (?) Ukraine for "capricious behavior" by suspending deliveries of equipment and raw materials are not always convincing. What do they mean they are not sending? Maybe we sometimes are unable to reach an understanding? As was the case, for example, with the Turkmen gas. Then-Prime Minister Vitold Fokin returned from Ashgabat essentially with nothing, having been reproached for unwillingness to compromise. As a result, the issue became more acute, and we would have been left without gas. But when Leonid Kravchuk visited Saparmurad Niyazov, the problem of deliveries ceased to exist.

Besides Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan, the delegation from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine also included Colonel Viktor Batov and Colonel Valeriy Blidar. They are experienced experts in their areas, which, strictly speaking, they also demonstrated in Minsk. In particular, they managed to legislatively secure the navigation system existing within the framework of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union. It makes it possible to determine with a high

degree of accuracy the location of aircraft. Today, this system is being used effectively, for example, in the Black Sea Fleet.

"We also proposed making a decision on satellite communications systems," says Colonel Batov. "However, the Russian delegation rejected consideration of this issue. To date, certain other issues also have not been resolved. We will work on them at the next meetings."

The times have already been determined. The heads of governments are to meet in Moscow on 12 March, and the presidents are to meet in Yerevan on 30 April. We will again have to wait, torment ourselves with guesswork, and...make mistakes with weather forecasts for the future. Maybe we will still learn to determine it more accurately, and along with us the politicians too?

Russian Marine Training Assault on Ukraine PVO Unit Criticised

*93UM0381B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
26 Jan 93 p 1*

[Article from the Press Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: "Another Provocation"]

[Text] Lately, naval infantry units of the Black Sea Fleet increasingly often are finding themselves drawn into provocative actions, as happened during the memorable events with the capture of the Sevastopol commandant's office and the show of force at Sevastopol higher naval schools.

On the night of 21 January 1993, naval infantrymen of the brigade commanded by Colonel A. Kochenkov executed another provocative act.

A group of servicemen led by Senior Lieutenant V. Klimenko, under the guise of an exercise, made an armed attack on one of Ukraine's PVO [air defense] battalions. They infiltrated the units, captured the assistant duty officer of the regimental command post, fired blank rounds from their small arms, and used battle noise simulators.

Only the cool actions of the battalion duty officer, Lieutenant A. Orlov, made it possible to avoid the use of arms for effect.

Such actions by the group of naval infantrymen can be regarded as a provocation aimed at destabilizing the situation. Moreover, these actions were carried out against a subunit of Ukraine's PVO Troops standing alert duty.

Incidentally, in the Saturday issue of IZVESTIYA, one of the "Crimean" articles again revealed secrets of the horrors on the Ukrainian peninsula. The article was packed with assertions: "naval infantrymen of Russia." It seems that you just cannot get through to some people in Moscow that the naval infantrymen in the Crimea are the same Russian and Ukrainian as, incidentally, the entire

Black Sea Fleet. If, of course, you assume that the Yalta and Dagomys accords are recognized in Moscow.

UKRAINE

Morozov on Problems, Criticism, Russian Relations

*93UM0432A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian
6 Feb 93 pp 4-5*

[Interview of Ukraine's Minister of Defense, Col-Gen Konstantin Morozov by G. Korzh: "I Honestly Believed in the Idea of Ukrainian Independence"]

[Text]

[Korzh] Konstantin Petrovich, tell the truth, is it hard being a minister?

[Morozov] It isn't easy. The duties which I have carried in various command positions, with enormous responsibility, can't begin to compare. For a year and a half now I have felt it every day, every hour. I won't deny that it is very hard being the Minister of Defense of Ukraine.

[Korzh] It happens that I have observed many people who held this post before (when the Kiev Military District still existed). I have also known other military leaders. But you are not like them at all. In our civilian understanding, you are more like a general than those people: even your manner of behavior is different. But tell me, doesn't this difference interfere with your leadership of the system, which essentially has remained as before?

[Morozov] I would not say it has remained as before. It is changing constantly: with every new decision, with every new idea about forming structures and the relations between them. Of course you might think that, if you consider at that we have advanced an enormous number of people to leadership positions who previously served in the directorates of the military districts. However from the very start we have taken the position that only gradual transformation of the structures will make it possible to avoid the aggravations which might arise in the new structures of the Defense Ministry. It is true, that is exactly what some people want. But we disappointed them, giving the officers the chance to decide themselves where they would continue their service. Our approach is this: first of all satisfy the desires of the enormous number of officers. Experience has shown that many questions, including personnel ones, have been resolved. And this didn't come about on its own, but thanks to the course we have chosen, toward gradual resolution of urgent problems.

I understand what you mean. Often people associate actions bordering on rudeness with the image of the true, self-confident military leader (most often this touches on the fates of people). I do not think so. Every officer should remain a person first of all. This is the main thing. I rank this quality with professionalism and devotion to

the idea of the state. But human decency makes it possible to lead people informally. Sometimes this is hard, but I do not see any other way for myself.

[Korzh] I must admit, I believed you when the parliament was discussing your candidacy. Perhaps the reason was that which you have just been talking about. But what about the rest? Your innovations, even if mild, still must affect some peoples' interest. And the arguments of your opponents are quite critical. This one, for example, about whether an army commander should be made a minister. And there are others too. What you do say to this?

[Morozov] I don't intend to defend myself personally, I'll say that. As I see it, the Supreme Soviet had several ways of resolving the problem of the candidacy of defense minister. The first, and quite weighty, was to appoint a civilian to the post, to form the apparatus of the ministry in the manner of NATO. But it decided to retain the military system of leadership, which has proven itself. For Ukraine this was also explained by the urgent need for the officer personnel to accept the new structure. Thus a military person was supposed to become (and became) the leader of the military department. In defending this position, I in no way deny that we should gradually create conditions for appointment of civilian administration of the military department. Experience of the member countries of NATO shows that this makes it possible to control the armed forces, makes them accountable to parliament and government, and other important considerations.

But how did they seek the person who was supposed to head the newly created Defense Ministry? You know that all the military district commanders at that time were categorically against the idea of independence for Ukraine, and the formation of its own armed forces. For about a half year they considered this question absurd. The selection was therefore from the young generals. At that time I had been the chief of staff of air armies for four-and-a-half years, and had commanded an air army for a year. This period gave me some experience in working with subordinates. Just today you and I were talking about the relations of the commander with his people. I believe that it was the people who helped the people's deputies stop at my candidacy and take a better look.

[Korzh] What were your thoughts and dreams when you were appointed to the post of minister?

[Morozov] I remember it precisely: I didn't dream of anything. I thought that this was the most important turning point in my life. I received new appointments on lots of occasions. In the majority of cases these were posts which I did not expect, and each time they required a lot of effort and energy, and I had to study a new sphere of activity. That was the case after the Academy when I was appointed to research work at the tactical performance center. Or when I became the commander of an

air base which was involved in studying tactical performance and development of documents. After the Academy of the General Staff I was appointed to the post of chief of staff of a strategic air army (by no means the same as tactical aviation). Then I became the chief of staff of a large air army which included eight higher military aviation schools.

When I was appointed minister, I felt only a great responsibility and a great trust. In the first days of formation of the new state, to receive such a responsible, important area of work! There was no such precedent in Ukraine. I well knew that I could not count on the assistance of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. There was almost open opposition, prohibitions, calls for disobedience, demands that the instructions of the Ukraine Defense Ministry not be followed. Even not to get in touch with Morozov. I had the feeling there was colossal work ahead. I was certain I would do everything to justify that trust.

[Korz] And how are relations with the military of the CIS and Russia developing now?

[Morozov] In all matters not affecting the fundamental interests of the state, we have complete mutual understanding. Over the entire period of quite difficult negotiations and defense of our own positions, even opposition, I had no personal conflicts with Marshal Shaposhnikov, only [conflicts] on the grounds of service matters. I can say the same about Grachev. In personal relations with them, we have always understood one another. Of course I cannot apply personal relations to resolution of state questions affecting the main point of formation of an independent state. These are only my personal views, although they do play an important role. There are also my rights and obligations, defined by the Supreme Soviet, the President, and the government.

Of course there are disagreements in the search for mutually acceptable solutions.

[Korz] What are your political convictions? How do you interpret the expression "depolitization of the Armed forces"?

[Morozov] I do not accept the assessments which some have tried to convince me of. I myself would put it like this: I truly believed in the idea of independence of the state of Ukraine. And I was ready to completely devote myself to that cause. Without loud words, I consider myself a patriot of Ukraine. And not only because I was born here, that all my roots are here. I believe in the justice of these decisions, in their historical necessity.

In terms of political views, I am a proponent of the democratic tendency. I won't hide the fact that I tended toward these ideas even earlier. For me, democratic ideas mean a sense of justice, respect for people, honesty, openness, and conscientiousness. Nowadays a commander espousing such views does not ask one thing of his people, and allow himself something quite different. If he is exacting toward his subordinates, he should be a

hundred times more so toward himself. These are not loud words, but simply life experience.

[Korz] You have been criticized quite frequently lately. For example for bringing "Petlyura-Bandery traditions" into the Armed Forces. But as I see it, this is not entirely true. We lived for a long time under conditions in which history was retouched, and it is not so simple to make over one's consciousness.

[Morozov] I would agree that I am criticized one-sidedly. Some peoples' deputies have accused me of not being able to, as they put it, hold to centrist positions. I say this frankly, I get criticism from both sides. In any case, in two main areas. Some accuse me of pro-Russian sentiments. These accusations come from the fact that military questions were not resolved at the talks with the Russian side as strictly and as quickly as some would like. I don't deny that I too wanted them to be resolved firmly and surely, in a short time, in accordance with our plans, so that our independence, our independent military policy would be more consolidated every day. But the solutions depend on both sides, and often one has to look for compromises.

At the same time, I hear accusations of sympathy with nationalism, of hasty personnel reformat of the army, the introduction of the Ukrainian language, symbolism, a new military lexicon. The main rebukes have to do with personnel matters.

Here my point is not to defend myself in the post of minister. I said long ago to the peoples' deputies: if the state requires that there be a different defense minister, I am ready to appreciate that situation clearly, and not to complicate it in any way. However I see a connection between the personal political convictions and the political inclination to execute decisions of that same parliament. Now the parliament does not like the decisions which it made six months ago. Not to mention those which go back to August or September 1991. It does not like the October 1991 pronouncements of the Supreme Soviet. But the Defense Ministry is not a structure which can through its activity express an attitude toward the laws of the state. We must implement the laws. But if individual people's deputies enter into opposition to the Supreme Soviet, this should not be reflected in the activity of the Defense Ministry. It is not worth dragging us into the political battles. We must do our own work.

But in general this is normal political life. When you assume centrist positions, you are criticized on both sides. But now, when there are reports of publication of a letter by a group of peoples' deputies, it is clear that the criticism on this side is strengthening, and is acquiring a great political tendency. Why is this? It seems to me that the main thing here nonetheless is nationalism. We are very cautious about nationalism in the army. An enormous number of officers of non-Ukrainian origin, so it happens, are in service in our Armed Forces. There are mostly people devoted to the military profession, and

they assume that an independent state counts on their strengths. And in fact this is so.

Those officers who did not want to take the oath of loyalty to Ukraine, and there were around 10 thousand of them, were transferred outside the borders of Ukraine without hindrance. But those who took the oath should put higher demands on themselves. If you give this pledge to the people of Ukraine, then it is your sacred duty to uphold it. There is simply no other way. There are some unofficial investigations, and although I do not believe them very much, they still form public opinion. So here it is, according to the results of these investigations, a significant portion of the officer personnel took the oath for mercantile reasons, hoping to resolve personal problems, in particular housing problems. Well fine, so it was. That is what we started with. Now, when the quantitative parameters of formation of the Ukrainian army have been reached, we are beginning to work on the qualitative side. And loyalty to the oath was always one of the most important parameters of qualitative transformations. There are also "convenient" accusations here: they say that we are discharging Russians. But none of the critics wants to study the reasons for which a particular commander or superior officer is relieved of his duties. And if the reason is abuse of service position, rudeness, exceeding of authority, inflicting of material damage to the state, involvement of subordinates in all of these abuses? Other officers, seeing this, conclude that nothing is changed: both in that army and in this, the commanders did whatever they wanted. Hence the outrage, letters, even demands. That is the reason for the order on whose basis such officers are being discharged from their position. And one more thing: just look at the breakdown of the officer corp by nationalities. That statistic will in no way favor those who hold to the thesis of "persecution of Russians" in the army.

I think that it is not nationalism at all which is the cause of the attacks which are now made on the Defense Ministry. On the contrary, it is the desire to preserve old principles of manning and appointment to leading positions, to erase the principles of state affiliation of the Armed Forces. All this is done so that, by using the beachheads which exist on the territory of Ukraine (unresolved questions with regard to the Strategic Missile Forces and the Black Sea Fleet), they can clear the way to the joint Armed Forces of the CIS and eliminate those fundamental positions of ours which defend the independence of the state. That is the purpose for which this card is played. If now, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine is being manned with leading personnel, they can get rid of the question of loyalty to the state, this will be the direct path toward blurring of the concept of state affiliation of the Armed Forces, toward the loss of capability to form an independent military policy, and thus toward the loss of independence of the state. Can this really be allowed?

Of course the decisions here should be weighed, should be cautious if you will, with respect to the person.

[Korzh] You are undoubtedly right when you say that the absolute majority of officers at one time took the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine without hesitation. But now we see a different process instead of euphoria, disappointment. Many are perhaps put off by the Ukrainization of the commands. For example, the circular printed in the newspaper MOLODA GALICHINA, associated with the ethnic purge of officers in the Carpathian Military District. Or how about this. An acquaintance of mine, the deputy commander of a division, told me that when he was being considered for the post they asked him if he was prepared to fight Russia. All these are painful questions.

[Morozov] As for the article in MOLODA GALICHINA, I agree that it was the journalists who offered the word "purge" to us. As I see it, the people who wrote the directive were thinking of anything but a purge. This was mentioned in the article. But I must admit that some errors were made in the work of the social psychological service. And this was what gave grounds to "blow up" the situation. The directive said: provide information about those officers who speak the Ukrainian language, and those who do not. It should have been formulated differently, in order not to affect the interests of those who do not speak the language, and simultaneously to still obtain information about how the Ukrainian language is being assimilated according to the Law. You see, there are laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet, and we have to base our work on them. Those who created the directive should have examined the Law and drawn the necessary formulation from it. But as it turned out, they provided the opportunity to speculate about this directive.

In the press they often raise the question of "will you fight Russia?" I categorically reject this sort of posing of the question. And not only because almost half of our officers are Russian. It stated clearly in the Law that the main principle of manning of the Armed Forces is citizenship, and not nationality. Why have such rumors arisen? I think that it is associated with the fact that the certification commissions (for appointment to new posts) quite delicately studied what it was precisely that bound a particular officer to Ukraine (and how strongly). Perhaps not all could answer this question. I believe this was why such rumors arose.

Incidentally, some of the officers have told me quite frankly that when they took the oath they were thinking that the Armed Forces would be joint forces. And they had the right to think that. Perhaps they even truly wanted that. Especially those who have close ties with other republics of the former USSR. It is understandable that they did not want to wind up in an army which did not have any organizational ties with their motherland. But their hopes did not coincide with the actual course of events. Such officers should leave the service in our army. You see, it is impossible to serve in the army of a sovereign state and simultaneously nurture the idea of violation of sovereignty. Perhaps it was just such officers who wrote the formulations about "war with Russian."

I want to stress that I have studied this problem in detail. The question was never raised in this way. Can I now address myself to your colleagues?

[Korz] Go right ahead.

[Morozov] Dear journalists! Please do not print such fables. They absolutely do not reflect the principles and sentiments on which our personnel policy is structured. Errors were made, and upon learning of them from service members, deputies and the press, we reacted immediately. We have learned not only to correct the errors which affect national feelings, but also to prevent them.

[Korz] What will be your policy with respect to these problems?

[Morozov] I think that we must still conduct the policy of formation of the Armed Forces very cautiously, with respect for the personality, based on national affiliation. We have a Ukrainian state, and should have a Ukrainian Armed Forces. And those who assume that under the pressure of ultimatums and threats we will drastically change our course, and will no longer address the question of the loyalty of the Armed Forces to the state, they are mistaken. We will do everything so that the people of Ukraine may work in peace.

[Korz] You did not answer the question of Ukrainization of commands.

[Morozov] You know that the regulations have still to be adopted. No regulations, no commands. But perhaps the rumors have appeared because there is a draft of these commands, compiled by a group of historians of Lvov University, who have studied the history of the Ukrainian army. They have proposed introducing this terminology at once, without a transition period.

We have considered two or three variants. And we decided that it is impossible to introduce any of them all at once. Time will tell when we can.

[Korz] What are you especially proud of when you talk of what you have done in the post of Defense Minister?

[Morozov] Pilots are superstitious people. But I'll give a hint. The main thing was maintaining a calm situation.

[Korz] How is the housing problem being resolved?

[Morozov] This is one of the most painful questions. It has gone beyond the limits of capabilities of the Defense Ministry. And it is gradually acquiring a political coloration. This question will largely determine the further success of reforms in the Armed Forces. The former Soviet Union had an enormous army, which apparently it urgently needed, but still it did not find the opportunity to socially safeguard the officers who served. There is the paradox!

Many have forgotten or do not know that Ukraine was the first to adopt a Law on social protection of service

members and their families. Now other states of the former Union are also adopting such laws. The housing problem is a legacy remaining from the Soviet Army. It is hard to give the exact figure, but we are figuring about 60 thousand service members who today are not supplied with housing. These people are terribly impoverished. In some cases they pay from 40 to 80 percent of their wages for housing, which they are forced to rent. Some of them can't even do that, for it's hard to rent an apartment when you have small children. These people are forced to live in military buildings, often without conveniences. They are prepared to loyally serve the state, but what can you do, they tie their further stay in the army only to the possibility of obtaining housing.

We are obliged to provide these people with housing. The corresponding program has been developed and was passed on to the former Cabinet of Ministers, and to this point has still not been approved. There are proposals for its financing. One great difficulty is obtaining non-government credit for the Ministry of Defense. For example we have different plans for the sale or rent of a large amount of military equipment. But the terms for receiving foreign currency through state structures are onerous when there are excessive taxes. We are counting on three ways of resolving the housing question: an increase in the rates of our own construction (despite all the difficulties, the 1992 plan was exceeded), receipt of housing with partial participation of the state administration, and a search for additional resources for acquisition of housing and construction of cottages. As I see it, it is the program of cottage construction which is the most promising for the state and the army.

[Korz] Konstantin Petrovich, although your assistants are already indicating that my time is up, I still have a few questions. Do you mind?

[Morozov] Go ahead.

[Korz] How do matters stand with the draft? Will students be drafted?

[Morozov] The plan for the autumn draft came off better than the summer one. While in the spring there were great differences in the draft numbers in the different oblasts, now we don't have that. A problem will arise in the future, when two draft contingents will be discharged from the Armed Forces simultaneously, and the numbers of conscript personnel will drop sharply. We are now preparing for that situation, and looking for ways to resolve the problem. There are several proposals. One of them is to abolish certain privileges. Not only students have them. For example, many young men are released from the draft for three years only because they have graduated from an SPTU [middle professional and technical school] and they allegedly have to master a profession. At the time, when it was necessary to raise the prestige of the professional technical schools, this privilege perhaps made sense. But today many of the boys ask that they be drafted earlier.

There is one other privilege which dishonest persons use effectively. I am talking about release of citizens from the draft if they have employment-disabled parents. Such people change their address, their residence permit, as long as they can avoid the draft. This is done fraudulently, while still no one cares for their elderly parents. Many openly dodge service: that is now a criminal matter. We reject four thousand draftees every spring and autumn for precisely this reason.

But let us return to the students. Every year we fail to call up 20 thousand students. Our law on military service has so many privileges that this significantly affects the quality of manning of the Armed Forces. Therefore in the near future the Defense Ministry will prepare proposals regarding the restriction of privileges and will take them to the Supreme Soviet and government. Students will study.

[Korz] Do you fly now?

[Morozov] The defense minister does not fly as part of his position. Of course, I do not deprive myself of this pleasure. Especially when I am on an official visit to another state and I am asked to check out a new modern type of aircraft of tactical aviation.

[Korz] Really, without an instructor?

[Morozov] No, not without an instructor or operator. The difference is, does the "sightseer" have something to do with aviation? If not, then it is a normal flight. But if he is a professional pilot, then he participates in a group flight, in tactical performance, with the use of all the combat capabilities of the aircraft, in a great range of altitudes, with demonstration of the maneuver capabilities of the aircraft. I have experienced all of that in an F-16, Mirage-2000, and Tornado. Before I only studied the tactical performance characteristics of these aircraft. I am very glad that I have had a chance to get to know them in the air. Of course, I also am getting to know other types of equipment too, in addition to aviation equipment.

[Korz] One last question. The pilots are not flying. There is no fuel. This is really too bad. Many of my friends are pilots.

[Morozov] It is too bad. I have even more pilot friends. This is a very serious problem. You know yourself what the results of combat training were last year. Of course we have already found several different plants for resolving this problem. Fuel is starting to come in. I will take all necessary measures so that in 1993 the air units will be supplied with the necessary quantity of fuel. The men must restore their proficiency and completely implement the combat training plan.

[Korz] On behalf of our readers, thank you very much.

Melnikov: Air Defense as Key to Defensive Military Doctrine

*93UM0374A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
15 Jan 93 p 7*

[Article by Lt Gen Pavel Melnikov, deputy commander of Air Defense Forces of Ukraine, under the rubric "The Society": "Victory Is Won in the Air: Point of View of a Specialist"]

[Text] Lt Gen Pavel Melnikov served three years as a military advisor in Syria. His experience in that country has enabled him to analyze in detail the lessons derived from the military conflicts in the Near East and to conclude that priority must be given to the development of air defense forces in the organizational development of the armed forces of a state with a defensive doctrine.

The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine refused to adopt the military doctrine worked out by the Center for Strategic Research of the Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, sending it back for refinement. And this was to be expected. While the political part of the doctrine is in keeping with the spirit of the times, the technical military portion could have been written in the past. It lacks a vision of the nature of contemporary warfare, which ultimately defines the objectives and missions to be assigned to the armed forces. And consequently, also the type of army we need and the branch of the armed forces to which to give priority in view of Ukraine's geopolitical situation and its human and economic resources. I am absolutely convinced that at the contemporary stage in the development of the armed forces we need to develop primarily defense forces for combatting air and space attack—that is, air defense forces, with reconnaissance and warning and antiaircraft missile units, a fighter aviation and radioelectronic warfare units. A buildup of these defensive forces to a level providing reliable protection of Ukraine's air borders against strikes from the air and from space is perfectly legitimate and consistent with the defensive nature of our military doctrine. In a war it would be the PVO [air defense] forces which would be expected to receive and repel a first strike from the air. No other type of forces or weapons could perform this mission.

In the past the territory of Ukraine was regarded as one of the most important sectors in the theater of military operations of the former Union's PVO system. This is why the most powerful groupings of air defense installations, troops and air forces were set up precisely here. Would it be economically practical to ignore the unique possibility of preserving and building up our state's powerful mobile air defense system?

Today, before adopting a serious political decision on priorities in the development of the armed forces, we must make an economic feasibility study and calculations and weigh the state's possibilities. This is why the fact that defensive weapons are far less expensive than offensive weapons is highly important to Ukraine. The latest modifications of antiaircraft missile systems can

destroy any kind of modern aircraft or unmanned weapons costing hundreds of millions of dollars.

I would conclude from a study of wars in the Near East that the air assault groupings of the defending states have not distinguished themselves in local military conflicts. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, for example, Egypt's air forces, which were larger than Israel's, could not stand up against the latter. Egypt's aircraft were destroyed at the airfields, which had no air defenses. Another example. During U.S. air strikes in the night raid on Libya in 1986 not a single one of Libya's aircraft took off. It was the same situation in the recent war in Iraq. Its air force had 500 aircraft, including MiG-29s, Tu-22s and Backfires. They too were unable to perform their combat mission. One can thus conclude that aviation loses all of its advantages when forestalling strikes are impossible, particularly if the state does not have a reliable air defense system. Today one can say with certainty that every war will be started with an advance invasion by electronic weapons throughout the territory of the state being attacked. This was true in Vietnam and Syria, in Egypt and Iraq. Furthermore, all military science and praxis have shown that it is not enough merely to prepare for a singly attack by an aggressor. A reliable air defense system must not only repel an enemy's air/space attack but also force him to reject military operations by his ground forces.

The dialectic of military affairs is such that when new offensive weapons appear, adequate systems come into being for combatting them. Tanks replaced the cavalry, for example (this became extremely clear in World War II, when Budenny's archaic tactics were put to shame after a great deal of bloodshed). Today aviation and space weapons are conquering "armor." Having adopted a defensive doctrine, we should therefore give priority to the development of air/space defense. We must proceed from this basis as we build our armed forces.

A high level of readiness is provided for the PVO troops today with advance deployment—that is, the presence of a permanently operating, mostly fixed PVO system. This conflicts with the need for operational camouflage, however. When a PVO system is stationary and operating constantly, an enemy with a developed reconnaissance system can identify with great accuracy the type of weapons and their state of readiness. The new generation of intelligence equipment, both optical and electronic, based in space, in the air and on the sea, as well as permanent facilities deployed near Ukraine's borders, has a good discriminating capacity and can transmit information almost instantaneously. Studies have shown that enemy intelligence can reveal all changes in a grouping of PVO troops practically within a day or even hours, which makes the entire system vulnerable. The new concept should therefore be based on the principles of a mobile PVO system. It clearly makes no sense to prepare positions for PVO anti-aircraft missile and radio-electronic troops in peace time or dummy positions, since they can be easily detected by enemy intelligence.

At all stages of their development and improvement PVO troops must be able to carry out operational-strategic missions commensurate with the offensive missions assigned to the air enemy. If the air defenses are mobile and not tied to specific objects they can conduct anti-aircraft operations by the classic rules for combined-arms combat—that is, focus the main effort on the axes of main strikes by an air enemy.

Does Ukraine currently have the capability to set up a highly mobile air defense system? I say with complete responsibility that it does. This could be achieved by including some units of ground troops in the PVO forces and by rapidly replacing our obsolete, fixed anti-aircraft missile and radio-electronic complexes with mobile facilities.

Particular note should be made of the importance of radio-electronic warfare (REV), since recent wars have increasingly demonstrated the expediency of making it a separate form of combat operations, one which can determine the course and outcome of campaigns to a significant degree. In setting up this kind of powerful, mobile shield for Ukraine, including fighter aircraft, we must unite all PVO facilities and personnel under a single command element with a single radar field and a single reconnaissance, warning and control system. All the more, since Ukraine already has experimental-design projects which have gone through the adjustment phases and are ready for production.

There can be only one criterion for expediency of change: the conformity of our PVO system to the level of development, the degree of readiness and the scale of the missions of any enemy's means of air attack. A fundamental review of views on the nature of warfare in the contemporary situation shows that it is essential to work out a military doctrine which would orient the state toward a war of the future and not of the past. The creation of a mobile PVO system will require a change in the thinking of commanders and in the organization of their training. The change can essentially be defined this way: teach them to conduct anti-aircraft combat and not to repel enemy attacks. Highly professional commanders with a mastery of operational air and of troop command and control would have to be trained at a special educational institution. Just where are we to prepare such commanders? Our present structure includes two military institutes for ground defense forces, two air force institutes, a naval institute, a military institute of command and communications and a military humanities institute. Ukraine has no military institute for air defense, however. This is especially difficult to understand because the foundation for one exists. I have in mind the PVO Academy of Ground Troops, the Kiev Higher Anti-aircraft Missile Engineering School, training centers for anti-aircraft missile troops and the facilities of another five military training institutions for air defense which were shut down. A decision must be made immediately on the establishment of a military institute for PVO troops, before we have completely destroyed the training base.

Today most professionals are concluding that victory on the ground is gained in the air. Priority in the building of the armed forces of Ukraine must therefore be given to the development air/space defense forces measuring up to the latest demands and oriented toward the future. Only then can we speak of real security for Ukraine.

Possible Russian Reactions One Year After Ukraine Army Formed

93UM0374C Moscow *DELOVOY MIR* in Russian
28 Oct 92 p 15

[Article by Candidate of History Arkadiy Moshes under the rubric "Expertise": "We Shall Re-Forge Ships Into Moorings: The Results of Ukraine's Military Policy"]

[Text] On 22 October it will have been a year since Ukraine's parliament adopted the decision to assume republic jurisdiction over units and formations of the Soviet military stationed in Ukraine. The real history of the Ukrainian National Army (UNA) began on that day, since the decision adopted on 24 August 1991 to subordinate troops of the Soviet Army to Ukraine's Supreme Soviet remained mainly on paper.

This anniversary, which will apparently go unobserved, gives cause for contemplation. First of all, we need to understand precisely the results of Ukraine's military policy for the year. The separatism into which the republic entered on its path of building an independent national army will then become apparent. In the second place, we need to study possible steps regarding Ukraine in Russian policy in the military-political area.

A Year of the Ukrainian Army

Ukraine was the first CIS republic to take a course of establishing its own armed forces. The republic's leadership succeeded de facto in achieving an extremely advantageous status, that of a "free rider." While not breaking completely with the CIS military structures—this was impossible if only because of the presence of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory—Ukraine nonetheless participated only in those meetings of defense ministers of the CIS nations which could adopt decisions advantageous to Ukraine or were stipulated in international commitments of the former USSR.¹

The policy of fence-straddling, which combined adherence to certain multilateral agreements with unilateral moves, promises and failure to fulfill them, the testing of the soil for the acquisition of nuclear status and certain, not always gentlemanly moves with respect to the Black Sea Fleet made it possible to achieve some fairly perceptible results.

In the first place, only two months before was the concept for military reform worked out calling for rejecting the system of military districts, replacing them with operational command elements and combining the air and air defense forces into a new branch of armed forces, the air defense forces, for a phased reduction of

the numerical strength of the armed forces from the existing 650,000 to 200,000-220,000 (230,000-250,000) by the year 2000 and a transition to a professional army over the long run. Adoption of the military doctrine is expected within the immediate future.

In the second place, the implementation of these decisions was efficiently begun. The administering of the oath to the personnel, including the missile troops, was carried out almost without problems. The air force was reorganized. Ukraine won the authority to have its own navy and to participate in command and control of the present Black Sea Fleet.

In the third place, the legal basis was created for the military reform. The passage of a number of laws by the country's parliament from December 1991 to April 1992 significantly enhanced the status of military personnel. As a result there has been a "boom" in the number of officers desiring to serve in Ukraine.

In the fourth place, national frictions have generally been avoided in the army's formation, which has made it easier for the officer corps to adapt. This is particularly significant in view of the fact that more than half of the personnel in the UNA are not Ukrainian.

In the fifth place, the foundation has been laid for cooperation with the nations of Eastern Europe, especially Poland and Hungary, which can ease Ukraine's integration into the region.

In general Ukraine's military policy over the past year has been distinguished by dynamic action and a social orientation. Although the state's economic, budgetary and conversion problems could complicate the military reform in the future, the rapid pace set forces one to take seriously the results achieved.

Russia's Possible Military Policy Toward Ukraine

For a long time (until July 1992) Russia was extremely unwilling to recognize Ukraine's right to form its own army. It sometimes hampered the process and mobilized public opinion in both countries against the taking of the Ukrainian oath and the division of the Black Sea Fleet.

The reasons for this are perfectly understandable. It is to Russia's advantage to preserve the unified strategic territory of the former USSR because of the superior equipment and readiness of forces in the western districts and the historically developed strategic echeloning.

It is apparent, however, that this is impossible right now. Nonetheless, attempts continue to be made to establish an all-encompassing military alliance between Russia and Ukraine. The published Russian plan entitled "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership" between Russia and Ukraine establishes a provision for the coordination of military doctrines based on the fact that "the territories of the two states constitute a single regional military-political area." The logical development of this thesis as contained in the document evoked

serious resentment in the opposition, which has put off the conclusion of an agreement indefinitely.²

Does Russia need such an alliance with Ukraine? It would not seem to. Furthermore, it would be desirable to reject alliance-forming relations. The military priorities of Russia and Ukraine differ greatly and make an alliance practically impossible.

Ukraine cannot in the foreseeable future become a power equal to Russia in strength. It is not even striving for this, but it will not agree to play second fiddle in an alliance. On the other hand, even an officially neutral Ukraine—which is not at all a certainty—could become the largest military center of Eastern Europe, and this factor will promote a further distancing of Ukraine from Russia and the CIS.

The inevitable competition of Russia and Ukraine in the export of weapons is a factor operating in that same direction.

From the standpoint of Russia's interests, however, there is no reason to fear this development of events. Because of its geopolitical situation Ukraine will in almost every case (except for the practically incredible event that Ukraine, alone or in alliance with other states, should threaten Russia with aggression using conventional weapons) will actually serve as a unique, albeit not very reliable, shield for Russia from the southwest.

In these circumstances it would seem desirable to reject reliance on an alliance with Ukraine, given the possibility of cooperating in those areas of common interest (conversion, joint scientific research and development)—that is, the establishment of good-neighborly, nonconfrontational relations calling for cooperation between customs and possibly between the border services, but nothing beyond that. (Military relations between the USA and Mexico are a good example of this.)

The quarrel over the division of the Black Sea Fleet must not exacerbate. Right now Russia has no need to preserve the Black Sea Fleet as it is. The operational scope for the fleet outside the Mediterranean Sea has constricted considerably. Because of the considerable degree of obsolescence and the physical wear and tear on the ships (the "youngest" is 15 years old), the cost of repairing and maintaining the fleet as a whole will increase sharply within the immediate future. (The increased cost of fuel is already keeping large ships in port.) The fleet will gradually be reduced to "forces to cover coastal fisheries" and a coast guard.

In view of this, it would be advantageous for Russia to adopt the following decision: to relinquish a considerable part of the fleet to Ukraine in 1995 or earlier, if possible obtaining the right to use (lease) bases in the Crimea. In the intervening time it should begin a program of construction of 4-8 destroyers and a certain

number of small surface ships most appropriate for patrolling in the Black Sea and guarding Russia's coastline.

The delay with the implementation of its own military reform, accompanied by the stress on an alliance with Ukraine, has already cost Russia politically. The course pursued up to now must be adjusted in order to avoid unnecessary complications in Russo-Ukrainian relations.

Footnotes

1. Example: Minsk, December 1991, Ukraine acquires authority to administer the oath to troops; Tashkent, May 1992, Ukraine's quotas are defined under Vienna Agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe.

2. The opposition has its own plans for military reform. The Ukrainian Republican Party sees the main danger to Ukraine coming from the northern and northeastern borders and is demanding that the main forces be transferred to there and that operational plans be worked out for these sectors. The Ukrainian National Assembly goes even farther, rejecting the principle of neutrality and calling for the establishment of an anti-Russian alliance with the states of the Baltic, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Civilian, Military Education Problems Aired at Conference

93UM0373A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
29 Dec 92 p 1

[Article by Cadet Sergey Parshikov, NARODNA ARMIYA apprentice journalist, under the rubric "We Report the Details": "Learning Is Enlightenment: There Is a Multitude of Scholars, But There Is No Money"]

[Text] The first congress of teachers of Ukraine was begun in a somber and distressful atmosphere. The delegates heard all sorts of epithets and opinions leveled at it: from the demeaning—"a childish game"; to the lofty—"a celebration."

At times hitches in the vote counting created the impression that the organizing committee had not foreseen a vote or had assumed that all of the delegates would be unanimous in the presentation of mandates. Because there were not enough microphones one could hear from time to time in the auditorium shouts of "Balcony"! and the like.

Be that as it may, the congress was still an event. Not without disagreements but still a significant event in the pedagogical life of Ukraine. A total of 2,497 delegates from all parts of our country participated. The delegation from Donetsk Oblast was the largest. Perhaps because of this, and because of the specific circumstances of this powerful region, the delegation from the Donbass set the tone in the forum.

President L.M. Kravchuk opened the congress with a greeting. A report was then presented by Minister of

Education P.M. Talanchuk. Boldly criticizing the Soviet education system, he described tasks and prospects in the field of education. He noted that approximately 15 million people are studying here today—that is, almost every third resident of the nation. The level of the education provided, however, and the material and technical support leave something to be desired. The minister cited some discouraging figures. There are 107 applicants for every 100 slots in the rural area; 113 in the cities. Instead of the 10 percent of the national budget requested for education in 1992, only 8.1 percent was allocated. Furthermore, the bulk of this went to pay teachers' salaries. The process of integration with various ministries for resolving the overall problems is proceeding with difficulty. P.M. Talanchuk pointed to relations between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Defense as a good example of this.

The congress awaited with hope the planned meeting with Prime Minister L.D. Kuchma. Unfortunately, the prime minister was busy. First Deputy Prime Minister I.R. Yuhnovskiy therefore addressed the forum.

He graphically compared contemporary Ukraine with Japan following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Americans. The mafia's presence in all sectors of the economy and the large-scale removal of goods beyond the state borders constitute one of the main causes of the lamentable situation. Some basic changes are necessary in the energy-supply system for the national economy—the most complete possible transition from Russian oil and gas to our own energy sources. The task of reequipping metallurgy and taking it to the cutting edge is an important one. We must eliminate fluctuations in the currency exchange rate. The first deputy prime minister pointed out that we could hire 220 workers in Ukraine for the money allocated for one worker in the developed capitalist countries! Tax discipline must be made more rigid. I.R. Yuhnovskiy named Austria as a sort of "observation-testing ground" in economics for Ukraine.

In his discussion of problems in education, the first deputy prime minister said that technical education is at the lowest level. He then stated that every graduate from a secondary school, regardless of his native language, should have a thorough knowledge of Ukrainian and English (or of German or French). He did not say how this was to be accomplished, to be sure—particularly in the Russian-speaking areas. The impression was: You are on your own. We warned you....

The congress determined that this address was inadequate, and at the initiative of the Donetsk delegation a majority voted to submit a number of troubling issues—implementation of the Law on Education, among others—to Prime Minister L.D. Kuchma.

Following a break the report was discussed. Yu. M. Mushketik, secretary of the Ukrainian Writers' Union,

pronounced some fine words about the congress' noble business: "If the youth are educated, Ukraine will be educated."

Maj Gen Yu.M. Prokofyev, chief of the Military Education Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, was one of the speakers who made a good impression on the delegates. He told them how the reform of the military education system is going and about the problems facing the Ministry of Defense. Only nine of the 34 military VUZs located in Ukraine are left, but it is believed that they will enable us to turn out good specialists and real experts. Where will the other personnel be trained for the army? Ukraine will take the route of the USA, where 70 percent of the officers are trained at civilian VUZs.

So what? This might be a step ahead. I feel, however, that blind orientation toward the West would not be entirely appropriate. The economic conditions and traditions in which military personnel have been shaped in Ukraine differ completely from those in the USA, after all. In general, no one has yet made a thorough, scientific comparison to determine which education system is more effective. And so, only time will demonstrate whether this radical decision is correct or erroneous.

Maj Gen Yu.M. Prokofyev's announcement of the amount being spent to train military specialists evoked a gasp among the delegates. While it has been costing 10,000-15,000 rubles annually to educate one student at a polytechnical institute, from 400,000 to 1 million was required to train one cadet; 60 million rubles for a pilot. The armed forces have a great scientific potential: around 2,000 military scientists. Recently, however, there has been a destructive drain of scientific personnel from the army. Surprising as it is, the salary of a military professor at a military VUZ is less than that of his counterpart at a civilian VUZ. And, as Maj Gen Yu.M. Prokofyev rightly pointed out, no aid program can save the army if it loses its scientific capability. Scientific centers have been set up at all military VUZs to halt the destructive "brain drain."

Talking with the military delegates in the lobby at the congress, I heard them express concern about the issues of predraft training of the youth, military education and the enhancement of prestige for the military service among the youth. Apparently, these problems do not seem so important to the delegates. But it is ultimately the schools, PTUs [vocational and technical schools] and institutes which provide the cadres for the armed forces. It is they which shape the army's substance. And who, if not the teachers, should give this matter some thought?

Reforming Military, Civilian Education to Upgrade Cadres

*93UM0374B Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
15 Jan 93 p 7*

[Article by Maj Gen Yuriy Prokofyev, chief of the Military Education Directorate of the Ministry of

Defense of Ukraine, under the rubric "Military Reform": "Cadres Will Once Again Determine Everything"]

[Text] The establishment of the armed forces of Ukraine based on a reformation of the former Union army will be successful only if there is a dynamic reform of military education. This reform will enable us to implement the state policy in the area of education and science and to eliminate our significant lag behind the world level and prepare functionally competent military specialists.

The concept for reforming the military education system, worked out by a special commission under the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and coordinated to the maximum possible degree with the general state system of education, was considered and approved by the Council of Defense of Ukraine on 4 June 1992.

Today pre-VUZ and predraft training of the youth is performed only by one Suvorov school and two special boarding schools with an emphasis on military training and physical culture. In addition, induction training for specialists to serve in the armed forces is performed by 24 training organizations of the Society for Assistance to Ukraine's Defense (OSOU).

Basic officer training is provided at two academies, 30 higher and two secondary military schools, as well as 73 military departments at civilian higher educational institutions. They provide training in all of the main, organic military training fields, with the exception of helicopter pilots, rear-service specialists, medics and chemical experts.

The capacity of all these military schools and academies significantly exceeds the needs of Ukraine's armed forces for military specialists, however, and it costs a lot to maintain them. Such a large number results in a scattering of funds, as a result of which every higher military educational institution (VVUZ) is short of financial, materiel and logistical support. In the meantime we have everything necessary to put military education onto the level of modern requirements and effectively train specialists for the armed forces of Ukraine. This requires converting the training of military specialists to a multiphase basis.

The present VVUZs and training centers are already being converted into eight military VUZs. It is planned to use part of the remaining facilities for the establishment of military lyceums and military training departments under the Ministry of Education of Ukraine.

Provisions are being made to train regular and reserve officers in certain specialties in military departments (schools) of civilian VUZs. The training of junior military specialists and the completion of training for graduates of VVUZs and military departments (schools) of civilian VUZs will be performed at training centers.

Most scientific research (up to 80 percent) today is performed at training VVUZs, where the main scientific

capability is concentrated. Training centers are therefore being set up at the VVUZs, which will enable us to optimize the military education system and rotate scientific personnel among the departments and scientific structures.

The number of personnel in the system will be cut approximately in half as a result of the reform of military education. This will provide for the quality preparation of military specialists for the armed forces of Ukraine, civil defense, the Security Service and other ministries and departments of Ukraine. Do not forget that cadres are now once again determining everything.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Nurmagambetov on Future Prospects of Kazakh Armed Forces

93UM0429 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Nov p 3, 25 Nov p 3 92

[Article in two installments by Minister of Defense Colonel-General Sagadat Nurmagambetov and Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel Kim Serikbayev, from KazTAG: "The Armed Forces of Kazakhstan: Problems and Prospects"]

[24 Nov p 3]

[Text] *About eight months have passed since the issue of the Edict of the President for the republic to create its own armed forces. Not a lot of time, but there is already an opportunity to sum up some of the results. The necessity for that is caused, on the one hand, by the principle of democratization of the command and control in the military realm and, on the other, the necessity of answering a number of features in the pages of newspapers in which military issues are raised. The aim of the article is to acquaint a broad circle of readers with the work that has been done, set forth in concise fashion the conceptual framework of military doctrine and military organizational development and relate the basic problems and prospects connected with the republic's creation of its own armed forces.*

1.

The external security of Kazakhstan was ensured in the past through the collective efforts and unified military-economic potential of the former Union. That potential was perhaps inordinately large, but it corresponded to the foreign-policy course of the country and protected it to a sufficient extent from any encroachments on the territorial integrity and other state interests of both the Union as a whole and of the individual republics making it up.

The advantages of the collective method of ensuring security, as history has shown, were so obvious to all that it would be superfluous to cite the host of reasoned arguments in its defense.

Suffice it to recall the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 against German fascism and its satellites. It was, is and will remain a brilliant and inextinguishable example in history of the invincibility of the combat brotherhood of different peoples united by a common aim and common intent.

It was not Kazakhstan that was the initiator of the collapse of the military unity of the former Union. The republic, on the contrary, defended the idea of unified—and, subsequently, the Combined—Armed Forces of the Commonwealth right to the last moment, and deliberately favored the partial self-limitation of its own state sovereignty on that issue. The leadership of Kazakhstan remains firmly convinced today that the security of every sovereign state will be more reliably ensured through the collective defense of the Commonwealth countries.

Kazakhstan occupies a special geopolitical place on the Euro-Asiatic continent that is determined by a host of important circumstances, including the ethno-demographic composition of the republic. Extraordinary weighing of political steps and decisions in the realm of military policy that would not disrupt the stability that has been preserved in our region is thus essential under those conditions. It was namely for that reason that Kazakhstan was one of the last to declare its sovereignty and set about the creation of its own armed forces, moreover under conditions when delay would have been impossible. The Presidential Edict "The Creation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan" of 7 May 92 thus laid the foundation for the independent development of the republic's defense.

It is completely obvious that the basis of that development is a clear understanding of the possible sources and scale of the military danger that is currently, and could in the foreseeable future be, the cause of the launching of military conflicts.

It would be entirely appropriate here to point out the somewhat erroneous stance of S. Ryzhakov, who is trying to foist the idea of an existing "threat" to security, including a military one (the newspaper EKSPRESS K of 24 Oct 92).

The enormous efforts of all peoples over recent years have been able to push back the threat of war. The people of our planet, having surmounted prevailing social contradictions, have united in the one great cause of fighting to preserve peace. A military danger remains nonetheless. But a danger is not a threat!

Also obvious is the fact that the grave events that have been transpiring beyond the borders of Kazakhstan elicit not only a feeling of compassion toward our countrymen of yesterday, but also a certain alarm for the security of our own people. The taking of steps aimed at preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our state is thus a task of paramount importance.

One thing is clear—while implementing the organizational development of defense independently, it is essential to be guided by the interests of our own security and the defense interests of the fraternal states who have signed the Treaty on Collective Security. While creating a quantitatively new army and comprehending the unity of the military-strategic space, it is essential at the same time to preserve and develop those positive elements that were inherent in the armed forces of the former Union. The intrinsic security of Kazakhstan, in short, should be founded on the collective security of its friends and on the experience of the past.

President Nursultan Nazarbayev emphasized at a recent session of the Security Council in this regard that "We are a sovereign and independent state, and questions of ensuring security should be a cornerstone in the overall structure of the formation of domestic and foreign policy. We therefore require an army that is modern, equipped with the most contemporary weapons, possesses high mobility, is well-trained and is prepared for action under any conditions in the interests of protecting our sovereignty. And such an army can be created by having a fundamental scientific base founded on historical experience and the contemporary views of military organizational development."

2.

The military doctrine of our republic is a constituent element of the conceptual framework of the state for its national security, and is a system of views on averting war, military organizational development and the preparation of the republic and its armed forces to repel possible aggression, as well as methods of waging armed struggle to protect the Fatherland. It proceeds from the necessity of new approaches to questions of war and peace and the assurance of the defensive capability of the state, with a regard for the mutual security interests of all nations.

Kazakhstan is located at the conjunction of three major theaters of combat operations, the European, Near Eastern and Far Eastern, and the launching of a military conflict in any of them could thus have the gravest of consequences for the republic.

Geopolitical problems, as well as the instability of the internal political climate in some regions of the Commonwealth of Independent States, pose a certain danger of the outbreak of a military conflict. The military doctrine, proceeding from that, envisages measures to ensure the security of the state on the one hand, and methods of protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kazakhstan, on the other.

I would especially like to stress herein that the military doctrine has a defensive thrust. It takes into account the military doctrines of the member nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and assumes collaboration with them in the resolution of joint defensive tasks on the basis of multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements.

The Republic of Kazakhstan—a sovereign state and a full-fledged member of the world community—has solemnly proclaimed that it does not consider any country in the world to be its enemy, and that it has neither territorial nor other claims toward any of them. It adheres to the principles of the inviolability of borders and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. Kazakhstan unreservedly repudiates the use of military force as a means of resolving disputes and contradictions among nations. These ideas, as set forth by the President of the Republic at the 47th General Assembly of the United Nations and in other of his speeches, lie at the heart of the development of military doctrine.

Progressive politicians and common-sense members of the military proceed from the fact that war as a means of attaining political aims has entirely outlived its time under contemporary conditions, and has become unacceptable and impermissible. The fact that only political dialogue with a regard for the balance of interests is the sole means of resolving international problems and settling conflicts thus elicits no doubts.

An analysis of the speeches of the leaders of the republic and the documents adopted by the Supreme Soviet, the President and the government makes it possible to conclude that the republic deems the preservation of peace to be a priority aim and the highest of universal human values, and favors the adoption of the obligation not to be the first to employ military force by all nations in the world community.

The military doctrine of our republic reflects a number of fundamental provisions in this regard. One in particular is that Kazakhstan will never, under any circumstances, be the first to begin military operations against any nation if it or its allies are not the target of military aggression, and will never be the first to employ nuclear weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction. Our republic threatens no one, is ready to build relations with all nations on the basis of a mutual regard for the interests of security, does not strive for military superiority and considers reductions in nuclear and conventional armed forces as a task of historical significance. Kazakhstan acknowledges the equal right of every state and nation to participate in the resolution of all international issues, and is against policies of force and the arms race.

Taking into account the fact that the republic is making the chief aim of its international activity the furthering of any peacekeeping efforts by the world community, the military doctrine defines the topical tasks in the realm of preventing war. The principal ones are halting the arms race on Earth and not permitting it to extend into space; a universal ban on nuclear weapons; the elimination of

chemical and other weapons of mass destruction; participation in negotiating processes to reduce and decrease groups of opposing armed forces to a minimal level in areas of confrontation; to develop contacts along military lines and implement confidence-building measures in Europe on a mutual basis, as well as other regions of the world; and, finally, the transformation of military-political alliances into new structures of a collective and all-encompassing system of international security.

The legitimate question arises of whether any real basis exists for the outbreak of military conflicts at this stage. One must unfortunately state that territorial, economic, religious, ethnic and other contradictions still exist, and the danger of the outbreak of armed conflicts that could turn into large-scale wars through escalation is preserved. The sources of potential danger can be considered to include the presence of powerful groupings of armed forces whose base areas are close to the borders of our republic, the instability of the military-political situation in neighboring regions and the build-up of military potential by some nations, including with weapons of mass destruction.

Our republic, thoroughly evaluating its own defensive capabilities and forecasting the scope and nature of the military danger, plans to carry out military organizational development in conjunction with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and with other nations that wish to enter into a defensive union before the creation of an all-encompassing system of international security. Proceeding from that, the vital necessity arises of coordinating with them our efforts in the areas of steps to prevent war and military conflicts, devise unified approaches to the formulation of military policy and military doctrine, create a system for the joint utilization of strategic forces, ensure the functioning of a system of comprehensive logistical and rear support, undertake common efforts to train and retrain officer cadres, plan joint research and development in the sphere of armaments, develop and perfect military science and the military arts and, finally, provide for the effective utilization of enterprises in defense fields.

The hope exists that the diverse measures being undertaken for the cause of preventing war within the Commonwealth, at the regional level by the member countries of the CSCE and with the North Atlantic alliance, as well as on a global scale with all the member nations of the United Nations, will have positive results in reinforcing world security.

One also cannot fail to take into account, however, that diplomatic and other peaceful efforts unfortunately do not always provide a full guarantee of the prevention of war. The maintenance of the defensive capability of the republic should consequently be considered one of the most important state functions and a matter for the whole people. These ideas are reflected in the draft Law "Defense and the Armed Forces."

[25 Nov p 3]

[Text]

3.

The Republic of Kazakhstan reserves the right to make maximum use of all political, economic and diplomatic, as well as military, opportunities to curtail aggression that could have the aim of seizing a portion of our territory or coercion to meet other demands of a political, economic or other nature.

The leadership of the republic, bearing in mind the extent of the military danger, entrusts the defense of state sovereignty to its armed forces—the army, the border and internal-service troops and the Republican Guard.

The principal tasks of the armed forces of the republic have also been defined proceeding from their main function, and they are to avert war via the maintenance of high combat readiness as the basic guarantee restraining aggression from without, preserve the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of the state, protect and defend military facilities and state institutions, repel aggression and rout enemy incursion forces, eliminate the consequences of aggression and restore the situation at the border.

The armed forces of the republic are structured using a combination of principles: universal military obligation and a contract system; democratic command and control and centralization, along with sole responsibility; and, being subject to monitoring by, and reporting to, state authorities.

The army of the republic includes ground forces, air forces, air-defense forces and units of naval forces, as well as combat, special and rear support and the military formations of civil defense.

Certain authors, in discussions in the press of the basic principles and directions for the organizational development of our own armed forces, have been making proposals that cannot be implemented by virtue of various objective and subjective reasons.

Professor K. Amanzholov came out with a proposal in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 30 Sep 92 to convert immediately to volunteer manpower acquisition for the army, abolishing the principle of universal military obligation. The respected veteran also recommended disbanding the system of military commissariats.

Calculations and practice have shown that an army manned through hiring is no cheaper for any nation than an army manned on the basis of universal military obligation.

One also cannot erroneously equate the concepts of "professionalism" and a "professional army" with the concepts of "manpower acquisition through hiring" and

a "hired army." Professionalism is essential under any system of manpower acquisition for the troops, since the successful performance of military tasks is impossible without a high level of professional training, especially today when an army is equipped with complex military hardware and armaments. The proposal to disband the military commissariats also seems quite hasty, since their functions are quite clearly defined under contemporary forms of manpower acquisition for the army.

We should dwell in somewhat more detail on the contract system of manpower acquisition. This principle represents a certain novelty for us, on the one hand, while on the other we constantly encountered that principle in practice, only avoiding the words "contract system." If one really thinks about it, extended-service servicemen, warrant officers and, finally, women servicemen in the former army were all completing service under that principle.

The intention exists today of incorporating this principle of manpower acquisition for the troops more actively. The subunits of the Republican Guard, for example, could even now be manned on the basis of contracts, with the same for the border troops in the near future. The institution of a contract system for certain types of specialties will probably become possible in the long run.

The formation of the troops according to national traits seems to be of no small importance. The discussion concerns the proposals to restore the national battalions and brigades that existed during the years of the Great Patriotic War. But is it advisable to transfer the experience of the past to the present day, when there are plenty of ethnic problems already? That would seem impossible to do. We, the inhabitants of a multinational republic, must cherish the atmosphere and the tranquillity that exist today.

We must in all likelihood be guided by the experience of other nations, including Western nations, in the process of creating our own armed forces and determining their size. If we proceed from that, then the number of troops could fluctuate from 0.5 to 0.9 percent of the overall population of the state, depending on the economic conditions and the extent of military danger. The main thing herein is that a small army should divert as little of the expense portion of the budget to itself as possible. That is on the one hand. On the other, such an army should be equipped and trained so as to ensure the reliable protection of the state borders and defense of territorial integrity. It should be noted that the interests of military security could require an increase in both the number of troops and spending on their maintenance under certain conditions and in certain situations.

It would be advisable to form a small armed forces, equipped with modern hardware and armaments, proceeding from the prevailing international situation and economic conditions.

Several interconnected practical tasks will have to be accomplished simultaneously in the course of the organizational development of our own armed forces and the formation of their units and subunits: the disbanding of some larger units and formations of the former union army and, through that, reductions in the overall size of

the armed forces; determination of the composition and status of the strategic forces of the Commonwealth; the organization of interaction with the Main Command of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS; the execution of some reforms in all branches of the armed forces and, finally, a significant reduction in both the number of military test ranges and the areas that are allocated for them.

It is completely clear that the interests of ensuring the military security of the republic require the performance of those tasks in as short a time as possible, but certain difficulties in the economy and on personnel issues are forcing the resolution of these problems to be planned in stages. It is assumed that there will be three such stages, and each of them could take 1.5—2 years.

In the first stage (before the end of 1992), it is necessary to formulate the structure of the Ministry of Defense and the command bodies for the other branches of the armed forces, sign agreements with the Russian Federation and the other nations of the Commonwealth on the aforementioned problems, determine the ultimate structure and size of all branches of the armed forces and develop the principal legal documents for the organizational development and functioning of the armed forces (military doctrine, a set of legislative bills).

We will dwell in somewhat more detail on the problems and prospects for the military test ranges. What should be done with them? First, reduce the number of major test ranges considerably; second, decrease the areas of land that are allocated for ranges that cannot be closed now; and, third, operate those ranges for military purposes only in coordination with the heads of the administrations, not hindering the performance of tasks for the national economy.

Four major test ranges are closed and have ceased operations on the territory of Kazakhstan today, and the question of closing a fifth has been raised. The area of the remaining ranges has been reduced by an average of 50 percent, and a tax is being exacted for the use of the land from the military agency in accordance with the Land Use Law.

It seems at first glance that the time has come, and the necessity exists, to close all the military test ranges. It must be taken into account, however, that the interests of ensuring military security force the republic to preserve a certain portion of the military test ranges and to support their operation on mutually advantageous contract terms. Highly skilled specialists are working at some of them, they have advanced technologies and equipment, the families of servicemen live there and many representatives of the local population also have jobs there. They have created a good infrastructure, and are also helping to raise the social and cultural level of the population. The further joint utilization of some of the test ranges is therefore envisaged to accomplish national-economic tasks in the interests of the development of science and new technology and growth in

scientific cadres for the republic. The fate of the former Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Range is a shining example of that. The National Nuclear Center has been created on the basis of it. A study of questions of the utilization of scientific potential for the accomplishment of exclusively peaceful tasks and the revival of the economy in the region is now underway.

The improvement of the structure of the armed forces will be continued, more decisive steps will be taken toward the principle of manpower acquisition under a contract system and the equipping of units and formations with new, highly maneuverable equipment, including airborne combat hardware, will be taken in the second and third stages. The latter has particular significance if one takes our geographical conditions into account.

4.

It is completely obvious that no few difficulties will have to be surmounted in order to realize these difficult tasks. The problems of training cadres, repairing existing—and acquiring new—hardware and preserving and developing the mobilization capacity and resources on which the defensive potential of our state will depend have to be resolved first and foremost.

Kazakhstan is today experiencing a “cadre hunger” in military fields. An insignificant quantity of Kazakh officers had completed service by the day of creation of our own armed forces in the republic, and there were even fewer of them abroad. The shortage of officers is having an effect at all levels of the military structures and specialties. Matters are especially bad with officers at the higher levels. An attentive study of this problem has shown that over the last 74 years, just three representatives of the Kazakh people have been able to complete the Military Academy of the General Staff, and only two have been able to defend their dissertations for the academic degree of candidate of military sciences.

The current personnel shortages are the result of the twisting, as well as the profound distortion, of personnel policies on the part of the former center, along with the excessive modesty and lack of boldness of our party and state leaders in the local areas, who have in essence lost concern for the growth of military specialists in our republic.

What are the ways of solving this problem?

The political and military leadership of the Russian Federation has displayed a readiness to render assistance to us in the training of officer cadres. Representatives of our republic will be studying at the military higher educational institutions of the Russian Federation for five years under an agreement signed in August of this year between the ministers of defense of Kazakhstan and Russia. The significance of this aid becomes especially comprehensible if one takes into account that there are only two military educational institutions in Kazakhstan—the Alma-Ata Higher All-Arms Command

School and the Higher Border School. Instructors from Russia, by the way, will be teaching at the latter.

The study of our youth at military higher educational institutions abroad could be another solution to this problem. We will probably have to take advantage of the proposals of representatives of France and NATO General Secretary M. Werner, who recently visited Alma-Ata, on this score. That would serve, aside from everything else, as one way of entering the world community and strengthening confidence-building measures.

It is necessary at the same time to seek out our own intrinsic opportunities for training military specialists. It is important to transform the Alma-Ata Higher All-Arms Command School into a multiple-field educational establishment and review the curriculum of the Higher Border School for this purpose, as well as to provide for the possibility of creating military departments on the basis of the military departments at some universities and institutes.

The set-up of the educational and indoctrination process at the republic military boarding schools of Alma-Ata, Karaganda and Shymkent requires steadfast attention. The professional orientation and serious training of specialists for our own armed forces should probably begin namely at those schools.

No few problems have arisen that are connected with the technical equipping and provision of the troops with foodstuffs and personal and other gear. Their solution requires, on the one hand, the preservation of the existing structure of military-economic ties with the other republics and, on the other, the taking of decisive steps to provide for our own army ourselves.

Another problem that is being reflected particularly acutely in the vital activity of the armed forces is the problem of supplying the army with personnel. Many young people are avoiding service in the army for a number of reasons—some of them do not come to the draft stations, and some are deserting the military units. The one and the other are not only committing an immoral deed, but a criminal offense as well.

The main cause of these negative phenomena is the loss of prestige of army service. The army, at one time a school for tempering, a school for education, has been turned into an environment where the dignity of the person is diminished. All of the mass media have been covering this problem in quite a bit of detail over the last five years, and there is thus no need to talk about the reasons for these negative phenomena again.

Kazakhstan will soon be marking the anniversary of its sovereignty. It needs its own army to protect it. Since the republic is not starting the creation of its army from square one, many of the negative phenomena could also take root under the new conditions as well. The reputation of the army and the prestige of military service will be raised in the event that all officials and citizens of our state, parents and sons, military and civilian, schools and

labor collectives, are profoundly aware of a simple axiom—the armed forces of the republic have been created to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The solution of the problem of reinvigorating the climate in the army will doubtless require a great deal of time and effort. It is therefore essential to devise a comprehensive program aimed at improving patriotic indoctrination in the whole system of formation of the personality.

Having disbanded the political organizations and banned the party and Komsomol, the former leadership of the center unfortunately did not create structures that would be occupied with the moral upbringing of the soldiers. Practice has shown that indoctrination work is not being conducted in many subunits today. The personnel are experiencing "information hunger." Sponsorship ties has weakened, artists do not come to the soldiers and our veterans find it difficult to speak to today's soldiers for certain reasons. Some commanders have proved not to be on top of matters in this difficult situation. They themselves, instead of strengthening and adopting new methods of indoctrination work and increasing their exactingness, have taken the path of violations not only of discipline, but also of moral norms. The Security Council of the republic that was held recently called for a serious accounting in this regard toward those who are guilty of the death of people in peacetime or have tried to turn the army into a commercial structure.

The question of creating the institution of deputy commanders for indoctrination work at all levels of the armed forces of the republic, starting from the minister of defense to the company commanders and their equals, in place of the assistant commanders for personnel work is currently being studied.

An extraordinary necessity of renewing army cultural centers is arising.

The weekly newspaper of the internal-service troops, interesting both in formulation and in content, is a good example. The issue of the newspaper of the Ministry of Defense, KAZAKHSTAN SARBAZY (Soldier of Kazakhstan), is meanwhile being delayed for a number of reasons.

But it is most important of all to undertake steps to raise the responsibility of the youth themselves to the concepts of "duty," "honor," "dignity" and, finally, to the law.

A set of laws on military issues has been prepared for the consideration of the fall session of the Supreme Soviet—"Defense and Armed Forces," "The Status and Social Protection of Servicemen," "Pension Support for Servicemen and the Members of Their Family," "Universal Military Obligation and Military Service," "The State Border" and "The Border Troops."

The fact that these laws are badly necessary is unequivocal. It was namely the lack of legal documents regulating the functions of the army in clear-cut fashion that led to some of the sad pages of the past. These include the incursion of the so-called limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979, the December events at the central square of Alma-Ata in 1986...

There are no few other problems in the organizational development of the armed forces of a young sovereign state. It is important that all on whom the defensive capability and security of Kazakhstan depend not only see, but also solve those problems. That is the essence of our civil and patriotic duty to the republic.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Pro, Con: Use of Foreign Peace-Keeping Forces

Vasilyev—Against

93UM0423A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 24 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by A. Vasilyev, under the rubric: "Two Points of View": "If You Want Peace—Introduce Troops?"]

[Text] A fierce political and, what is more—an issue of national health and self-consciousness: can we permit force to be used in order to settle conflicts on anyone's (our?) sovereign territory, even the "blue helmets" of the international community? It's understandable why the problem affects us so: as we know, our country is large and there is no order as before but foreign princes with armed retinues—will you permit that?

It's impossible to be silent about the possibility for some power or other to become a patented peace-maker (and to jointly train their own assault troops and to defend global interests), we ourselves fought in Afghanistan for 10 years. But to brandish this threat—means to utilize it for propaganda purposes in the background of the burning situation in Russia.

While publishing two points of view, we do not want to frighten anyone but we propose resolving enigmas of the type "can we approve civilization by force" without cunning circumlocutions and pursuit of a propaganda advantage.

A crowd was beating up a woman at the bazaar in the Somali capital of Mogadishu. They had ripped off her bright flower-patterned dress, threw her to the ground and began to stomp her. The hands of the sellers reached for knives. A minute earlier, this woman was in the company of a French soldier and the Muslims who surrounded her thought that she was engaged in prostitution.

The American and French soldiers who observed the reprisal did not come to her defense. They have come to Somalia in order to save the entire people from death by starvation, in order to "restore hope," but not to come to the defense of just anyone. Later, the commander of the French contingent stated that his subordinates do not take advantage of the paid services of prostitutes. And as for the bazaar woman, she will appear before an Islamic court. According to the laws of the Shariat, she can expect to be stoned for prostitution.

On the whole, Operation Restore Hope is progressing successfully. In Western correspondents' reports, Somali children appear to be very well-fed.

U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempston thinks that once America became involved in this matter, she will hardly manage to extract herself from it. It makes sense

to heed the ambassador: he has spent a large portion of his life in Africa, having begun his career as an African area specialist as a correspondent for one of the Chicago newspapers. With regard to S. Hempston's statement, Former U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said: "We thoroughly pondered what he said and I attempted to disseminate his views to everyone who makes responsible decisions. Nevertheless, we decided that his fears were highly exaggerated and we must continue the work".

L. Eagleburger is among the optimists who think that UN peace-keeping forces—"blue helmets"—will soon replace the American soldiers. Skeptics assert that elementary state and economic structures need to be restored in the country. This is long-term and very painstaking work that must be conducted in continuous contact with the leaders of the armed formations and very ancient tribes and representatives of clans. Soldiers, no matter what uniform they are attired in and no matter under what flag they serve, cannot handle this mission. All the more so since the Americans will leave sooner or later and there will obviously not be enough "blue helmets". And the country will return to the era that preceded Restore Hope.

So many questions and doubts arise because the events that are occurring in Somalia are unique from a political and legal point of view. For the UN, this is the first operation for the establishment and not for the maintenance of peace. The difference is quite substantial here: maintenance of the peace is carried out with the concurrence of all opposing forces when none of them objects to the introduction of the "blue helmets." In this situation, the UN forces will not stand on the side of any formation, but will maintain their neutrality.

In Somalia, it is a question of establishing the peace. No one asked for the Somalis' concurrence to conduct Operation Restore Hope. There was no one to ask: there is no government, it is useless to talk with the bandit clans, and the opinion of the simple people who are dying from hunger was known beforehand. But if the UN will still attend to the task of restoring Somalia as a state, it will somehow or other have to decide on which group to rely.

Already several months ago UN Secretary General Butros-Ghali expressed fears that the organization that had been entrusted to him would have to select on whose side it would be in conflict situations, repeating the Americans' mistake in Vietnam. Having in mind the situation in the former Yugoslavia, B. Butros-Ghali said in an interview with the British newspaper INDEPENDENT: "At the present moment, our operation is limited to peace-keeping tasks... But in the event that we shift to the establishment of peace, we will have to take a position against one of the sides: to state that it is the aggressor and to resort to coercive measures against it".

Today it is already clear that Somalia is a rehearsal of possible UN operations in Yugoslavia. They began with

Somalia because it is simpler to break in various operational models there and the risk of suffering a defeat is somewhat less. But, without a doubt, ahead is Yugoslavia. This is what Lawrence Eagleburger said in an American ABC Television Network interview: "It's possible that Somalia will create a precedent in the sense that at some time they will say to us: 'You did that in Somalia, so now you are obligated to do that there or there.' Strictly speaking, that is already being done in Yugoslavia—but that does not suggest the creation of a precedent. We have simply selected that variation of conduct in this specific situation. Maybe we will be able to do something similar sometime with regard to another country."

We will talk later about what country that could be but right now I would like to stress one other trend that has recently been graphically manifested in UN operations. This is a question of Butros-Ghali's report that was titled "Agenda for the World" which suggests a new principle for carrying out peace-keeping operations—a preventive deployment. According to that principle, the "blue helmets" will be sent to a certain area to deter military operations still prior to their initiation. For this purpose, Butros-Ghali is asking various states to create special subunits within their armed forces that could be put into operation within 24 hours at the request of the UN Secretary General, naturally with the Security Council's approval.

But the following circumstance causes apprehension: the principle of preventive deployment applies a trend by virtue of which the UN renders assistance to one of the hostile parties in a conflict situation while establishing peace. And the question arises: while proceeding from which criteria and while taking into account which information will the Security Council determine whom to support and whom to suppress?

By the way, the legal basis of UN armed forces operations is quite vague. Articles 43, 45, 46, and 47 of the United Nations Charter is its basis. However, these articles, like the Charter itself, were formulated nearly a half century ago when the international situation was quite different. Furthermore, the very text of these articles is distinguished by its vagueness.

In the absence of a precise legal basis for the UN's activities, the Western powers, taking advantage of their own political, economic and military influence, are increasingly running matters in it. Let's recall how a year ago Germany forced the world, including its NATO allies, to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. And the Germans are not even permanent members of the UN Security Council although they are attempting to end up in its ranks. They, just like Japan which is not delaying with new forces to seek a solution of the "Northern Territories" problem, certainly will soon become a permanent member.

So, let's sum up. We see, first of all, the lack of a precise legal basis for the UN's peace-keeping efforts and also

Russia's independent position that permits the Western powers to take advantage of the blue UN flag at their own discretion.

Second, there is the UN's readiness to reject the principle of neutrality and to support any of the opposing sides based upon the selection of the states that have decisive influence in the Security Council. Third, the UN is striving to conduct preventive actions to prevent crises. The states that are already well known to us decide where, when and what kind of crisis will arise.

And one more very important factor that directly affects us: there are political figures (and cultural figures) in Russia who adhere to extreme views and who are actually prepared to summon UN peace-keeping forces to our territory in their own interests.

Several months ago, Vladimir Voynovich's article "Sila protiv nasiliya" [Force Against Violence] and Galina Starovoytova's interview appeared in our press. They proposed the "creation of something like the 'Civilized Countries Club'—countries where human rights are observed, where they have a democratically elected government, a free press and an independent judiciary". Why is this necessary? And this is why: "These states would have the moral right to assume the obligation to establish a new order on earth".

Galina Starovoytova suggests that we need to reject the principle of noninterference in internal affairs when it is a question of defending human rights or the rights of ethnic minorities. "The 'Civilized Countries Club' and its peace-makers in 'blue helmets' also must provide the peace mechanism for realizing these rights," thinks G. Starovoytova, "be they UN troops or NATO troops acting under a mandate of the CSCE [Council for Security and cooperation in Europe] or of another recognized international civilian organization".

As we know, international law contains two mutually exclusive provisions: the right of a people to self-determination and the provision on the inviolability of borders. The states, parties and individual figures select the principle that suits them, depending on the situation and the political orientation. Starovoytova and persons holding similar views focus attention on the rights of ethnic minorities. The epithet "reds-browns" has been prepared for those people who advocate the preservation of Russia's territorial integrity within her current borders. Just like those who support the Serbs, who oppose the policy of radical reforms and uncompromising cooperation with the International Monetary Fund.

The politicians of that plan most probably calculate that it will be sufficient to provoke an ethnic conflict on Russia's territory and to summon the assistance of peace-keeping forces "be they UN troops or NATO troops acting under a CSCE mandate". In principle, that is not so important. It is important whom the "blue helmets" will rely on within the country and to whom they will transfer power when they give up power. The answer to that question is quite clear.

If the scenario seems fantastic to you, remember: Today Russia—is a too fertile ground for provocations. Just one recent congress provides evidence of that: the president's appeal and the trip to the automobile plant, the fight in the presidium that was organized by radical deputies. And Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev's speech in Stockholm that forced many analysts to doubt the emotional even temper of the country's first diplomat?

Russia has real chances to cure itself of the disease of pseudo-democracy and to create a common-sensical, pragmatic center that is capable of leading our state onto the correct path. But there are forces in the country that are not stopping attempts to "restore hope" and to remain in power. Is Somalia not only a rehearsal for Yugoslavia?

Semenov—For

93UM0423B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 24 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by A. Semenov, under the rubric: "Two Points of View": "Yes, If That Stops the Carnage"]

[Text] Concern about the security of its own citizens—is a priority task in the policy of any sovereign state. The various ways to resolve that task are well known to world history. Strong states have attempted to do this individually, others—through various types of alliances, including through the creation of regional security systems. Far from all attempts of this type were crowned with success. The League of Nations is a graphic example of that. Not universal in nature and torn apart by internal contradictions, it did not have either a full-fledged mandate or the capability to withstand aggression and it turned out to be powerless to prevent the Second World War.

While considering this negative experience, the architects of the postwar world founded the Union Nations Organization, having announced not only "the resolve to spare future generations from the disasters of war" but to also place at the UN's disposal the required tools for the "maintenance of international peace and security".

However, during the Cold War years, this mechanism practically did not operate, thus reducing to a minimum the UN's effectiveness as a real peace-maker. The bloc confrontation made joint cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council impossible. As a result, the UN's role was reduced to settling regional conflicts in the Third World using measures that were not stipulated by the Charter that received the designation "peace-keeping operations". The latter were utilized for observance of cease-fires and to disengage the sides with the involvement of military observers or lightly-armed sub-units of UN member-countries. Agreement of all of the conflicting states was the criteria for their deployment and the main trump card was neutrality and impartiality. The "blue berets" or "blue helmets" could open fire only in self-defense.

Despite that limitation of the mandate, these forces, with the political support of the UN and first of all thanks to the coordinated actions of the Security Council members, to some degree helped to stabilize the situation in some of the Earth's "hot spots". The worst was avoided in Cyprus and conflicts were settled in Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Kuwait was liberated from Iraqi occupation, and operations have begun in Cambodia, the Western Sahara and other regions.

In our time, a new vision of the UN's peace-keeping role is being formed in the period after interbloc confrontation. Its distinguishing feature is a comprehensive approach toward maintenance of international peace and security that includes preventive diplomacy, post-conflict reconstruction of the economy and society, implementation of such previously unthinkable functions as organizing and monitoring the conduct of elections, massive humanitarian assistance to the needy and even participation in ruling the country during a transition period.

At the same time, we must see that the former UN mechanism needs renovation. The urgent issue on the legitimacy and conditions for the use of force to ensure peace is on the agenda. The operation to liberate Kuwait, when the Security Council delegated its authority to the coalition member-states with the leading role of the United States, provided the impetus for this discussion. Disputes as a result of the events in the former Yugoslavia have been especially intense.

As we all know, the UN, after the failure of similar attempts by the EC [European Community], has become involved in the settlement in the Balkans. It initially was primarily a question of the Serb-Croatian conflict. UN Secretary General Special Representative C. Vance managed to achieve a delicate armistice which permitted the introduction of traditional peace-keeping measures.

It's important that the UN introduced a general and full embargo on all arms and military equipment deliveries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia which is in force today. Then, a mission of military observers was sent to facilitate a cease-fire. And, finally, in February 1992, the Security Council, in accordance with Resolution 743, decreed the formation of UN forces to protect Yugoslavia (SOONO). They were deployed at hot spots in Croatia (adjacent to Serbia) and for a time were able to achieve a cessation of military operations in the zone of their responsibility.

A Russian infantry battalion was part of a peace-keeping contingent for the first time in the history of such UN operations.

As the conflict grew, the sphere of SOONO's activities was extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance. After this, the leading mission of the observers became operating in Macedonia. This is the first preventive operation in the history of the UN.

Today's crisis in the Balkans is essentially the first serious attempt for the postbloc international relations system. Its future largely depends on how successful world society will be able to overcome it.

Voices are ringing out that demand the use of military force to ensure fulfillment of Security Council resolutions. History provides us with quite a few examples that a purely military solution of the Balkans issue is impossible. A forceful act is fraught with the next upsurge of violence and, in the opinion of many diplomats and politicians, its contribution to the settlement of the conflict is problematical.

A stress on "muscles" would be counterproductive in the background of the negotiations in Geneva and New York, where a timid hope has appeared for achievement of an agreement based on proposals that have been developed by the Geneva Conference co-chairmen. The main thing is to create a constructive atmosphere at the negotiations and to induce all "Southern Slavs" to reject extremist positions.

The UN's new approach to the settlement of crisis hotbeds was clearly manifested during the course of the operation in Somalia which is being unambiguously assessed in Russian circles.

The introduction of foreign troops into Somalia served as the grounds for accusations against the United States of "expansionism" and "undisguised interference in the internal affairs of other states". Education in the spirit of confrontational thinking taught us this black and white perception of the world: they say, Somalia is the test range to rehearse plans for armed interference in other "hot spots" of the planet. I think that these assertions are dubious. By way of illustration, would it be worthwhile for the Americans to resort to tricks, while inviting subunits of nearly 20 states under the banner of international armed forces? Along with the United States and the European countries, Australia, Egypt, India, Morocco and Nigeria have agreed to send their troops to Somalia. Djibouti, Yemen, Kenya, Cyprus and Ethiopia are prepared to provide rear services support and to provide territory or airspace for airlifting or basing to the MVS [international armed forces] contingents. Japan, Saudi Arabia, Finland and the Philippines have expressed their readiness to participate in financing this operation. Wouldn't it have been simpler to wager on one of the feuding groups, having rendered it military and other support in exchange for, say, providing bases for American troops or granting American companies rights to look for and exploit natural resources? These scenarios were well known during the Cold War.

Bloc delimitation convincingly demonstrated that not only interstate disputes and conflicts but also internal crises, that are generated by fierce ethnic, religious, social, cultural and language strife, pose a threat to international security. Alas, in the world today, poverty, hunger, oppression and despair have assumed large proportions, the combined impact of which has resulted

in a massive migration of people both within the borders of national territories but also across national borders.

While considering the factors that have been stated above, the UN, if there is an appropriate request of a government or with the approval of all sides can promote the restriction or cessation of violence through several methods. Among them—is promoting the insurance of security using UN military, police or civilian personnel to save the lives of people and to create conditions for conducting negotiations and reconciliation.

In December 1991, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which contains a system of fundamental principles in the event of the emergence of internal state crises. The responsibility of states to render assistance to victims of extraordinary situations that have developed on their territories and also the need for access to the people who need humanitarian actions is especially stressed. In this case, UN "interference", based on the prevailing opinion today, is not a violation of the sovereignty of states and does not contradict its Charter.

You can advance arguments for a long time for or against the utilization of international armed forces under the aegis of the UN in Somalia. In the end, this dispute is reduced to the following: did the UN action facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of the country, the cessation of intertribal clashes, and also the initiation of a dialog between the conflicting clans? History will certainly provide answers to these questions. But certain positive aspects are already visible right now. This question quite legitimately poses itself: why is a unified command headed by an American general carrying out the operation in Somalia? First of all because the UN in December 1992 was unable to rapidly formulate the mechanism that is capable of conducting that type of operation. However, today that operation—already UN—is being developed and will begin in the next few months.

UN measures with regard to Yugoslavia and Somalia, from the point of view of the situation in these countries, are substantially different. In Somalia, the UN is dealing with the collapse of statehood, banditry on a nationwide scale and with the threat of death by starvation for the entire population. The Somalis were incapable of dealing with the lawlessness that had emerged through their own efforts. For this reason, this UN action is not only humanitarian but also interventionist.

In Yugoslavia, we are encountering an interethnic conflict that has deep historical roots. Alarm is being caused because it is acquiring an interreligious nature. Moreover, the opposing sides are clearly aware of their end goals. This certainty, it would seem, creates quite real preconditions for peace-keeping efforts using traditional diplomatic methods. At the same time, the extreme unwillingness to compromise and irreconcilability of the protagonists involved in the crisis reduces the results of mediation efforts to naught. But here in contrast to

Somalia, the political settlement mechanism has been set into motion—the Geneva Conference on the Former Yugoslavia is operating.

Commentator Terms U.S. Maneuvers 'Legacy of Cold War'

934E0326A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 20 Mar 93 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Oskin: "Iron Birds on the Korean Border"]

[Text] For many years, military exercises have been conducted in South Korea under the code name, "Team Spirit." Translated from English this means "team spirit." Yesterday the 17th joint American-South Korean military maneuvers designated by the term of such ambiguous meaning were concluded.

For 17 years, North Korea has protested and continues to protest against holding the exercises with the participation of the Americans, believing that they threaten the security of the state. It is true, last year there was a hiatus, and the "team spirit" of the two armies temporarily faded into oblivion. This year, however, it returned with even more menacing might. Participating in the maneuvers were "Stealth" aircraft, the latest bombers, along with 70,000 South Korean and 50,000 American military servicemen.

For a period of 10 days, this entire armada demonstrated its force near the border of the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]. No one tried to conceal the purpose of these maneuvers. "Team Spirit-93" was organized for the purpose of exerting pressure on P'yongyang to force the DPRK leadership to permit the inspection of two controversial military facilities which IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] experts want to visit.


No matter now specific the positions of the DPRK may seem regarding the problems of mutual relations with their neighbors and the international organization, it is difficult to understand, and moreover impossible to justify, the many days of brandishing weapons at the borders of the sovereign states. The very "team spirit" in regard to the DPRK, which serves as the guideline for the USA and the Republic of Korea, is entirely unjustified. I am convinced that this is the spirit of yesterday, a legacy of the "cold war." International relations today are being formulated already according entirely different rules and standards. Undoubtedly, it is easy to put an armada of bombers in the air, and it is even easier to inflict a preemptive bomb strike. It is more difficult to come to an agreement, to understand each other, and to opt for compromise.

We would like to hope that these exercises will be the last. "Team Spirit-93" must remain in the history of the Korean peninsula only as a remembrance of the difficult times of the past.

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