


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24 February 1993



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

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24 February 1993

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Col Gen Kopylov on Training Reserves in Siberian MD

93UM0396A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Feb 93 p 2

[Interview with Col Gen Viktor Andreyevich Kopylov, commander of the Siberian Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Aleksandr Veklich under the rubric "The Combat Training: Problems and Solutions": "Will 'Siberian Character' Help?"]

[Text] The Siberian Military District, remote from hot spots, could be considered the most favorable for organizing the combat training of the troops. Correspondent Aleksandr Veklich asked Col Gen Viktor Kopylov, district commander, to tell about the actual situation.

[Kopylov] The Siberian Military District has traditionally been directly linked with the training of reserves. Naturally, one of our basic missions is to develop methods for training and retraining mobilizational reserves. We must not only familiarize them with the new equipment entering the arsenal but also teach them to use it under all climatic conditions, day or night.

[Veklich] And how is this mission being carried out?

[Kopylov] Since we still do not have a decision on mobilizational assemblies for reservists, we are having to make some adjustments in the training process. Based on the actual situation, in order to prevent a gap from developing in the combat training due to the shortage of personnel in the ranks today, we are mainly stressing the improvement of combat training for the officer corps.

Or take the matter of working out matters pertaining to the combat training of the units and subunits, for example. While we previously took only the first week of the training year for this, we have now been spending two. We have abandoned field trips on the battalion scale for units with a reduced T/O, since, given the shortage of personnel, they do not produce the desired results. In addition, they entail the use of increased quantities of fuels and lubricants. With this in mind, the decision was made to train in the field by units. Composite companies are formed just prior to the exercises. Young officers are ordinarily used to make up the shortage of first-term specialists. They man the infantry combat and artillery vehicles during exercises. In this process some subunit commanders have an opportunity to perfect their personal skills while others are learning how competently to direct a subunit in combat. The officers then change places.

The effect of this approach is in evidence. We are able to work out problems of officer training and fire control in the climatic conditions of our harsh Siberian winter. Most important, however, is the fact that we are not permitting the skills of our officers, left without personnel, to deteriorate and are maintaining their professional level.

[Veklich] But the district has now been given the opportunity to replenish the units with professionals on a contractual basis, Viktor Andreyevich.

[Kopylov] I still have hopes that the system of military recruitment by contract will take hold. Recruitment at the Novosibirsk Garrison is going fairly well, for example. Contracts have already been signed with 141 volunteers. We were forced to reject some of them right off, to be sure, because they turned out to be unsuitable for the army for one reason or another. Another problem is the fact that some volunteers want to serve in a specialty they have already acquired in the past. We have need of a strictly delineated range of specialists. We therefore have to send 90 percent of the volunteers for retraining.

[Veklich] And how are things with those officers who arrived in the district as members of units withdrawn from the groups of forces and following the demanning of the districts in the CIS countries.

[Kopylov] There are differences here as well. Some of them were not intimidated by the Siberian cold and are continuing to serve in a worthy manner. Others—and there are many, unfortunately—barely arrive at one of our garrisons, a perfectly good one according to today's standards, and immediately go off in search of a "better life." Some subunits have only one or two officers from the Western Group of Forces. Others take advantage of the disorder and impunity which now exists and do not even make it to Siberia. Their documents lie around in the personnel directorates for four or five months, waiting to be matched with personnel. There are around 300 of them right now. We have a strange situation in which the officers' names are in the card files but there is no one to appoint to the positions.

I am still optimistic, though. There are still difficulties ahead, of course, related to the manning shortage and to the shortage of fuel and lubricants. This certainly does not mean, however, that we are ready to give in to the difficulties. On the contrary, the famous "Siberian character" of our people is manifesting itself. Among other things, many commanders are stressing the establishment of modern simulation facilities both in the training buildings and in the barracks. This too is expensive today, but then it makes it possible to train mechanics/drivers, gunners and other specialists with fewer outlays. In addition, when these specialists go to the field, they make fewer mistakes in operating the vehicles and their armament. Once again we profit from the standpoint of the economics of combat training.

Ivanov on Combat Readiness, Professional Enlistment

93UM0206B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 24 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by Mikhail Semenov: "Service Under Contract in the Russian Army is Becoming a Reality"]

[Text] The decision to create a Russian Army was made half a year ago. Not a long time, naturally, but quite a bit has already been done. The departing year 1992 was defined as the first stage in the formation of the armed forces of Russia. The main things in it were the creation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the legal basis for the building and functioning of the army and navy, along with the development of a conceptual framework for military organizational development.

And that was achieved, feels Major-General Gennadiy Ivanov, the chief of the Directorate of Military Organizational Development and Reform of the RF Ministry of Defense. The ministry has been created, an analysis of the state of the combat readiness of the troops and an inventory of the armaments and military hardware have been performed, the withdrawal of troops from nearby foreign countries is continuing and the creation of new groupings has begun.

The size of the personnel complement had been cut back by 180,000, and the central apparatus by 30 percent—including the abolition of 140 general's positions—as of November 15. The minister of defense today, by the way, has six deputies instead of the former eleven.

The political preconditions have appeared over this time, asserts General Ivanov, for the creation of a military doctrine. The point is that the fundamental documents for military organizational development in the very recent past were the programs of the CPSU and the speeches of its general secretaries. The last word in real life, however, always belonged to the Politburo sessions. And there was no discussion of any legal substantiation for the decisions made by the Politburo on military issues. The absence of purely legal documents freed the hands of the party-state leadership of the USSR. The army suppressed popular disturbances on orders from the Politburo, and they—the leadership—placed the focus on military forces in the solution of problems in foreign security. An end was put to this legal unboundedness in the Russian Federation by the Supreme Soviet's adoption of the "Security" and "Defense" laws. Averting wars and aggression are at the heart of the principle of organizational development of the armed forces. Any nuclear war leads to global consequences. Russia thus repudiates warfare, opposes the use of military force, recognizes the inviolability of borders and does not consider any state or any groups of countries to be its enemies. The armed forces of Russia, in light of the new legislation, are intended exclusively for protecting independence and territorial integrity, as well as fulfilling the international obligations of Russia.

These political principles also define the nature of the armed forces, the conceptual framework for the development of which has been submitted for the approval of the President. The substance of it may be reduced in brief to the following: preserve the necessary combat potential in the Russian Army and withdraw troops from nearby foreign lands back to the territory of Russia, cutting back their size considerably. The discussion

concerns the creation of better-quality armed forces. Their composition will include strategic forces, including nuclear naval and air units. Highly mobile general-purpose troops—composed of several ground and naval groupings—are being created for the efficient neutralization of local military conflicts.

So then, the conceptual framework for military organizational development is based on high mobility of the armed forces, with the rapid augmentation of forces in a threatened sector right up to full mobilization readiness. The second stage of the reforms is figured for 1992-95. It assumes the completion of the formation of the armed forces, which will create the foundation for their profound reformation.

Troops will be completely withdrawn from nearby foreign countries and the standard organizational structure of the troops will be altered, with its foundation to be the brigade—corps. The necessary manpower and weaponry for the corresponding types and branches of the troops will be determined. The formation of a qualitatively new armed forces at the size defined by the Law on Defense will be completed in the third stage of reform right up to the year 2000. The creation of a new army will also require a new system of manpower acquisition. Its main principle is draft conscription into the army and voluntary entry under contract. The experience of the armies of the United States and European countries was studied in work on preparing these proposals.

"Conscription under contract will begin in 1993 as an experiment," relates General Staff Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General Gennadiy Bocharov. "It is being proposed that up to 100,000 people begin to serve under contract. The foundation for this experiment is the decision of the government that was made in November of this year. The contract system will make it possible to create military service that is more attractive and advantageous in a material regard. Enlisted men and NCOs, for example, will get from 4,000 to 12,000 rubles depending on their fields, branch of service, years served etc. The pay will be more than 18,000 rubles under special conditions of service. Roughly half of Russian servicemen will enter service under contract by the year 2000."

Six Billion Rubles for 1993 Three-Year Enlistments
93UM0206A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by I.F. under the rubric "Facts, Events, People":
"They Are Waiting for 100,000 Contracts"]

[Text] "The Ministry of Defense plans to recruit up to 100,000 citizens of Russia (at ages up to 40 years old) as professional soldiers in 1993," it was announced yesterday at a briefing at the RF MO [Russian Federation Ministry of Defense]. Some six billion rubles have been allocated for this purpose (in prices as of the end of 1992). The minimum contract term is three years. The pay depends on the degree of risk and the difficulty of service—from 4,000 rubles in the central strip of Russia

to 13,000 on submarines. Plus the other types of army remunerations, life in a dormitory etc. This program has essentially already started—with the aim of keeping in the service some of today's already-trained soldiers. The signing of contracts starts December 1. The commanders of units have also been charged with trying to convince the best of the conscripts serving today to stay in the service under contract.

Our army is thus gradually becoming a mixed one. Do not forget about the reservists, either. Military registration has been thrown into confusion with the collapse of the USSR, but the refresher training stints for the reserves are planned to be resumed in 1993. The military commissariats will not be left without work. The selection of candidates as professionals under contract from among the ordinary citizens "up to the age of 40" will be entrusted namely to them, since the creation of a special recruiting service is not yet planned.

German Police Incident in Western Troop Grouping

93UM0185B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Sergey Pashayev: "From the Western Group of Forces: Violation of Rights Instead of Legal Assistance"]

[Text] The Press Center of the Western Group of Forces disseminated a report about an incident in the city of Altenburg (Thuringen, Land) with respect to servicemen of the Western Group of Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. On 5 November, the report states, during an action by criminal police and a special subunit with dogs, operations were conducted that were not stipulated by the garrison command. The police forced open the doors of 27 apartments and other facilities, conducted a search in apartments of servicemen, and confiscated personal items without sanction of the procurator of the Western Group of Forces and without presenting the appropriate documents of the German public prosecutor's office. Senior Lieutenant I. Markin was illegally arrested, but soon released.

The Press Center's report notes that this action is contrary to the provisions of the treaty on the stay of the Western Group of Forces in Germany, infringes on the rights of Russian servicemen, and adversely affects legal cooperation.

It must be mentioned in this regard that the extraordinary incident in Altenburg is not a precedent. Two weeks earlier, the German police conducted a similar "operation" in Potsdam, where, speaking the language of protocol, they also conducted "unsanctioned actions similar to a search." The command authorities of the Western Group of Forces protested this case to the police, local city authorities, and federal bodies of the FRG.

Session of CIS Committee of Chiefs of Staff

93UM0185A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by Anatoliy Dokuchayev: "Committee of Chiefs of Staff Is Working"]

[Text] A session of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of the CIS states was opened on 18 November at the Moscow Headquarters of the Main Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

It is assumed that the committee will discuss proposals on the effective strength of forces for preventing local conflicts on the external borders of the CIS, questions of flight safety in the airspace of the Commonwealth, the committee's work schedule for 1993, and also information on the course of preparing proposals on the composition of the Strategic Forces of the Joint Armed Forces and on joint measures for training the armed forces of the Commonwealth next year.

Answering a question from a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent concerning the creation of collective forces to prevent conflicts on the external borders of the Commonwealth, Colonel-General Viktor Samsonov, chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces, noted that for the time being it is not a question of practical measures; a decision of the heads of states is needed for that. Initially, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff must be formed here.

CIS Local Conflict Forces Discussed

93UM0206C Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian No 33, 19 Nov 92 p 9

[Article by Aleksandr Stukalin under the rubric "At the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff": "The Structure of the Forces to Avert Conflicts Has Been Defined"]

[Text] A session of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces of the nations of the Commonwealth was held yesterday in Moscow under the chairmanship of Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Commonwealth Colonel-General Viktor Samsonov.

Military delegations from all of the republics of the CIS—with the exception of Moldova—came to participate in the work of the committee. The principal question on the agenda was discussion of the structure of the combined forces to avert local conflicts. The plan, in the words of General Samsonov, envisages singling out units and formations at varying degrees of combat readiness for this purpose from the composition of the republic armies, with their subsequent operational subordination to the Main Command of the Combined Forces (see diagram for more detail).

All of these formations will retain their former base locations therein, and will enter into action only in the event


conflict situations arise at the external borders of the Commonwealth. General Samsonov named Tajikistan as being the most likely place for the use of the forces being created today.

The representatives of the republic staffs that were present at the session approved the draft that was offered. The final decision on this issue should be made at the session of the Council of Ministers of Defense of the CIS nations that will be held at the end of this year or the start of the next.

The participants at the session moreover discussed the problem of flight safety in the airspace of the CIS and joint measures for the combat training of armed forces of the Commonwealth nations in 1993, as well as hearing information clarifying the agreements on strategic forces and defining the list of military formations and facilities that make them up. They were not, according to competent military sources, able to overcome the differences that exist on the last question—Ukraine is insisting, as before, on its right to dispose of the strategic arms on its territory.

Structure of Administration and Composition of Forces to Avert Local Conflicts

Структура управления и состава сил по предотвращению локальных конфликтов



6.	Армения	Казахстан	Кыргызстан	Россия	Таджикистан	Узбекистан	Сроки развертывания
Мобильные силы	ОМСБ	МСП	ОМСБ	МСД	ОМСБ	МСП	3-5 суток
Силы быстрого развертывания	МСП	МСД, ВДБР	МСП	2 МСД, ВДД, АК	МСП	МСП	10-15 суток
Силы усиления	МСД	2 МСД, АК	МСД, ОМСБР	3 МСД, ВДД, АК	2 МСП	МСД	30 суток

Использованные сокращения:

АК — армейский комплект средств связи, управления и обеспечения действий соединений;
ВДБР — воздушно-десантная бригада;
ВДД — воздушно-десантная дивизия;
МСД — мотострелковая дивизия;
МСП — мотострелковый полк;
ОМСБ — отдельный мотострелковый батальон;
ОМСБР — отдельная мотострелковая бригада.

Key:

1. Council of the Heads of State
2. Collective Security Council
3. Council of the Ministers of Defense

4. Main Command of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS
5. The states that have signed the treaty on collective security
6. [see table for key to rest of diagram]

	Armenia	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Russia	Tajikistan	Uzbekistan	Deployment times
Mobile forces	DMRBt	MRRg	DMRBt	MRDv	DMRBt	MRRg	3—5 days
Rapid-deployment forces	MRRg	MRDv, ABr	MRRg	2 MRDv, ADv, FS	MRRg	MRRg	10—15 days
Reinforcements	MRDv	2 MRDv, FS	MRDv, DMRBr	3 MRDv, ADv, FS	2 MRRg	MRDv	30 days

FS—set of field equipment for communication, command and control and support for the operations of formations;

—ABr—airborne brigade;

—ADv—airborne division;

—MRDv—motorized rifle division;

—MRRg—motorized rifle regiment;

—DMRBt—detached motorized rifle battalion;

—DMRBr—detached motorized rifle brigade.

Fall Call-up Said Insufficient

93UM0393A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by Col Gennadiy Miranovich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The New '92 Recruits Are in the Ranks: The Problem of Manning the Army and Navy Continues"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported that Russia's armed forces began their first training year with a shortage of personnel. The situation has not improved much even since the decision was adopted by the Ministry of Defense to extend the tour of duty by 20 days for those inducted last fall. Through the efforts of the military commissariats and law-enforcement agencies almost all of the new recruits were in the ranks by 20 January. Naturally, they will go primarily into the Strategic Missile Troops, the PVO [Air Defense] Troops, the VDV [Airborne Troops] and the Navy, which have particularly great demands for combat readiness. One assumes that these forces will be fully manned. One does not envy the "ground troops," however. The shortage of military construction workers, railway troops and other specialties with prestige in the business world is especially great.

The alarm expressed about this in letters from our readers is perfectly understandable. This means that some personnel will have to continue to take on a double or even triple load in the service, to perform their own jobs and those of people who have evaded the draft by hook or by crook. It means that officers will continue to stand guard and perform other duties of soldiers and NCOs. This is despite the continuing planned and unplanned withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics to Russian territory. And despite the fact that the organic reforms and the smaller number of formations and units with a reduced T/O should be making it possible better to man the combat formations remaining in the military. Where is the logic?

Regretfully, that is nonetheless precisely the situation, and there is no getting around it. Neither the withdrawal of the troops, most of whom—like the divisions with a reduced T/O, incidentally—are to be disbanded, nor a tightening up of the induction procedure is enough to solve the problem. According to the specialists with whom I spoke on the subject, it will be extremely difficult to avoid various kinds of sacrifices in the organization of the combat training, at least for the immediate future.

Steps will be taken and are already being taken to keep these sacrifices to a minimum, of course. Among other things, the planning of the training process is becoming more realistic and taking into account local circumstances, including the availability of personnel. The number of facilities being guarded—and consequently the number of guards and guard posts—is being reduced. Technical means of guarding facilities and other such things are being adopted. No matter how we try to fill in the "gaps" in the military ranks by all sorts of stratagems, however, the shortage of personnel is still placing a heavy burden on the officers. What are we to do? We have to rely on their rational initiative, creativity and... endurance.

Yes, their endurance. The problem we are discussing will not be solved overnight. And the problem is actually not a "purely army" one, as some might perhaps view it, but a problem of the whole state, a universal, national problem, one might say. We are dealing with the building of an army, after all, a qualitatively new army, in a situation in which the military service is just about at the bottom on the prestige scale. Never before in Rus has it been the case that a mother would deter her child from the very thought of military service, that a grandfather would be ashamed to go outside holding a soldier by the arm. It has never before been that way, and I solemnly swear that in time it will not be that way again. Even if an honor guard is the only thing left of the army. But that will come in time. Right now....

While I was working on this article, Lt Col Aleksey Bogachev, a deputy unit commander for personnel, telephoned me from the Moscow suburb of Monino. He told me a real detective story. On the fourth day of the new year headquarters received a telegram by phone from the Shchelkovskiy City Military Commissariat. "Come to Shchelkovskiy," it said, "and we shall decide on the matter of completing the unit manning." A very unique decision was proposed in the military commissariat: Here is a list of the draft evaders. Find them, vigorously publicize the situation.... A special group set up by the commander spent five days in this degrading search. When the "operation" was concluded, however, and 17 draftees had succumbed to the campaign and agreed to join the ranks of a unit located nearby, the military commissariat suddenly did an about-face and announced that these draftees had another assignment.

"OK, we will somehow get over the deception," Lt Col Bogachev said with bitterness. "But what are people going to think of us the next time? We did, after all, promise the parents to look after their sons in every possible way."

I personally am also ashamed and upset that the army, which has become a hostage to the legal vacuum and intransigence of opposing political forces, has reached the point of rounding up recruits at their homes. It is not just—and not even so much—a matter of difficulties with the draft for the army and navy, however. Yes, the call-up proceeds with greater difficulty each time. This is in part due to the expanded list of deferments. As of today, for example, 70 percent of the draftees have deferments, half of them so-called students. And the percentage will increase as the system of commercial education grows. There are many other factors complicating the induction process, which have already been discussed in the press. They will obviously have to be systematized and thoroughly studied. Right now I would like to discuss something else, however.

The specialists know that even if the induction plan is fulfilled by 100 percent, we shall not be able to man the army and navy with draftees. There are just not enough of them. There is apparently only one solution: while implementing the planned reduction of the armed forces, to step up the work performed with the induction group in every possible way, improve their preparation for the military service and steadfastly apply the principle of manning the army and navy by contract. Incidentally, the specialists believe that the shortage of recruits can be made up to some extent just by adopting that principle this year. This is especially perceptible in the airborne troops, for example, where recruitment by contract is proceeding most successfully, and in the Northern Fleet.

The organization of service by contract is still only developing, however. A thorough legal foundation is needed in order to put this work onto a broad footing, so to speak. For now, those engaged in it have as guidelines only the government's decree of 30 November last year,

On Measures Toward a Phased Transition to the Manning of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation With Volunteer Servicemen by Contract. This document, experience has shown, is clearly not adequate for establishing an effective system for recruiting volunteers or organizing their service. This is something for the lawmakers to think about, as they say. Both the present and the future of the army and navy and of the nation's defense capability will depend in great part upon how long they continue to work up legislation on matters of military organizational development, including the procedure for serving under contract.

CIS: POLICY

Naval Main Staff Appeal on Second Oath

93UM0261B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 3 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank (Res) V. Zaborskiy, on behalf of a group of reserve officers of the Main Staff and central directorates of the Navy: "An Urgent Oath?"]

[Text] To the Standing Presidium of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union and the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation.

An expanded meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation was held on 23 November. Participating in its work were President B. Yeltsin, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet R. Khasbulatov, Vice President A. Rutskoy, and members of the Supreme Soviet and the government.

Speaking at the Collegium, B. Yeltsin noted that up to now there is no approved text of the military oath, and it would seem that "it turns out today we are inducting lads not into the Army of Russia, but into the Army of the USSR." At the same time, according to available information, at one of the previous collegiums of the Ministry of Defense, despite the objection of a number of its members, they still adopted a decision on administering the Russian oath to servicemen of that part of the Soviet Army which remained under the jurisdiction of Russia. It was decided to conduct taking of the new military oath promptly, beginning 1 December.

Why such haste? Why was the start of the taking of the new oath timed to coincide namely with 1 December, the date of the opening of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation? After all, soldiers of numerous nationalities serve in the Army and Navy. Were the initiators of the "retaking of the oath" counting on the coming disorder and, God forbid, nationalist excesses in military units and on ships, which are quite possible during the course of such a process?

So, what is the solution to this situation? There is one! In and of itself, the taking of the new oath to Russia, its people, and its government does not run counter to the

convictions of our officer-statesmen. However, in accordance with the age-old code of honor of the Russian officer (the armies of most other countries also have the same codes), the oath to the fatherland and to the people is taken once. Suggesting or forcing an officer, soldier, sailor, and so forth to take some other oath is possible only if the appropriate state body (or individual) releases them from the oath taken earlier.

We are appealing to the Standing Presidium of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation. It is necessary to urgently adopt the corresponding decree:

- to authorize personnel of the Armed Forces to take a new military oath of allegiance to Russia, its peoples, and its government;
- to confirm that since the Russian Federation is the basis of the future unification and restoration of our state, the taking of a new oath by Russian servicemen will signify the preservation of their loyalty to our homeland.

This act will cut the ground from under the feet of those who are fond of changes in vows and oaths and who hope to use such actions to split and demoralize the officer corps.

Causes of Legal Dispute Between Ministry, Servicemen's Union

93UM0261A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
9 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by Pavel Vasilyev: "Break up and Forget: The Generals Are Trying To Dispose of the Servicemen's Union"]

[Text] An unusual case is already in its third week in the Leninsky People's Court in Moscow: a colonel against the Ministry of Defense. You will agree, even for our democratic-chaotic times, this is quite out of the ordinary. Briefly, here is the essence of the case. Having served 28 years (17 of them flying combat jet aircraft) and having completed two military academies, Colonel Aleksandr Maksimov, a General Staff group chief, suddenly ended up discharged early for an "official discrepancy." The grounds for this was supposedly a violation of an order on the procedure for going abroad, which Aleksandr Petrovich is also disputing in court.

I am not a lawyer and do not intend to ascertain the truth in this dispute. What is more, I am certain: If this wording of an order "fails," something else will come into the world, and then something else again... That is because the real reason the experienced officer was discharged from the service does not at all involve violations or crimes. Maksimov is simply an "uncomfortable" person for the ministry to have around. He is chairman of the Independent Union of Servicemen, the

same union which the minister of defense called "illegal" and ordered it to be "broken up."

Since the fates of the officer and of the public organization he heads are intertwined so closely and dramatically, it is inconceivable to break up the "Maksimov case" and the "union case."

This story began two years ago when several servicemen—people's deputies of Russia—joined an organizational committee for creating the Independent Union of Protectors of the Homeland. Among them were also such well-known people today as the leader of the state and legal administration, Aleksandr Kotenkov, and a committee chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, Sergey Stepashin. The events of August 1991 put forward new, very serious and urgent problems both before our society and before the armed forces. Against their background, the idea of creating a military union was sort of relegated to the background, but did not die completely. New people picked it up, including Colonel Maksimov.

Arguments about the advisability of and need for a servicemen's union have not died down to this day. Opponents of this idea claim that such an organization is not needed in the army. They say, officers and soldiers are the "sovereign's" people, and the state itself will see to their social protection. It is hard not to agree with this. Yes, the state is obligated to provide its protectors everything necessary. But there is huge difference between what is and what should be.

The Russian Army has entered the age of reform. Its numerical strength is being reduced, the structure is being reorganized, the manpower acquisition system is changing, and the troops of the Federation are gradually returning to the homeland. As usually happens in such cases, the specific person with his needs and concerns is lost behind the scale of the problems. At a recent expanded Collegium of the Ministry of Defense, the President of Russia gave an exhaustive picture of the disastrous social situation of people in uniform. Hundreds of thousands of servicemen are living "in the corridors" or maybe in an open field or in tents. Their pay and allowances is hardly enough to make ends meet. Tens of thousands discharged from the army are not ready for civilian life.

After eliminating the political bodies, the situation in the army itself changed. Whereas before a soldier or officer went to the political affairs officer for help, hardly anyone turns to today's assistants for working with personnel. That is because he does not have the slightest possibility of influencing a commander who has gone to extremes. For example, if a battalion commander wants, he will listen to his "assistant"; if he does not want to do so, he orders him out the door together with the applicants. The abhorrent party dictatorship has been taken off his back, and a so necessary balance to dictatorship of one-man command has been removed.

I am not all calling for a return of party committees and political sections to the troops. Their time, fortunately, is

over. But it is perhaps still too early to leave the soldiers one on one with the commander. In just six months, military procurators have protested about 1,500 orders and directives, and the rights of nearly 4,000 people violated by command authorities have restored. And this is just in tested units. I do not think the picture is any better in the rest of them.

You see, more than 15 state and public organizations are involved in social protection of servicemen. Upon registration, they all promised to build houses for officers and create centers for occupational retraining, allocate funds to the needy, and help families of servicemen who have died. Unfortunately, things went no farther than promises in the majority of cases. Perhaps only the Fund of Social Protection of Young Servicemen is actually working.

So, does the military need its own union in these conditions? More than 6,000 officers who sent their delegates to the constituent conference in January of last year answered affirmatively. Now there are seven times as many members in the new union, despite the pressure and opposition by command authorities and threats of disciplinary punishments, right up to early discharge. Basically, the reinforcements are coming namely from those regions where the military personnel are least protected—the Baltic region, Moldova, and the Russian North. Having lost faith in the promises of command authorities and understanding that the government simply does not have the money to solve their problems, these people seriously consider a military union to be almost their last hope.

Is it justified? The executive committee of the military union has many plans and programs. They have already managed to do something. For example, they organized rest and treatment for Chernobyl-area children, reached an agreement with the administration of several Russian oblasts on the allocation of land and construction of housing for officers being discharged into the reserve, and have begun training them for civilian occupations. For the time being there is not enough funds to do more. They have begun to receive their own money—deductions from membership dues—only since January, and there are not all that many sponsors and patrons.

But the main thing that is hampering the work is opposition on the part of the Ministry of Defense. Hindrance became a reality literally from the first days of existence of the Independent Union of Servicemen. First Marshal Shaposhnikov and then General of the Army Grachev rejected all the union leadership's proposals on cooperation. The only one who initially supported the union was General N. Stolyarov, chief of the Committee for Work with Personnel. But soon he also changed his opinion.

This happened after the leaders of the organization published material that had come into their position about the involvement of the top generals in commercial structures. Literally after several months, two members

of the executive committee—Andrey Goptar and Vladimir Popov—were dismissed from the military academy where they were studying “for unwillingness.” Maksimov was first ordered to be reassigned from the General Staff to the academy as an instructor, and then discharged altogether “for personal reasons.” At this time, the “red light” was given to all the union's social programs.

For the sake of fairness, it must be noted that the members of the executive committee themselves to some degree provoked the seizure of their organization by the ministry. Instead of engaging in social protection of servicemen, they “got into” politics, exposure, and a struggle for power. After learning that the Ministry of Defense had rejected a draft labor agreement prepared they had prepared, Maksimov and Goptar, without investigating, accused all the general officers of bureaucratism and waged a struggle with them...

The next phase of the struggle began with the statement by General of the Army Pavel Grachev that the military union was an illegal organization and would be treated as such. For some reason, Pavel Sergeyevich [Grachev] added: The American military gets along without unions, and so will we.

Let the lawyers argue over legality. As far as advisability is concerned, an organization protecting the rights of officers is needed very much in our army today. It will especially be needed in the future, when service under contract becomes the rule rather than the exception. A professional army without a professional union—there is no such thing anywhere, including in America. The Pentagon's soldiers and officers pay from \$20-\$25 a year to become members of a servicemen's association which stands guard over their legal and material interests. The Bundeswehr has had a servicemen's union for 36 years now, and it is headed by a regular military officer—Colonel Rolf Wenzel. The present military attache of the Dutch Embassy in Russia was the first chairman of the military union in his country. So as not to tire the readers with further examples, I will say only that the military members of the Old World have gone farther than their overseas colleagues and 20 years ago joined into the European Organization of Military Unions (Euromil).

The need to unite servicemen by the professional principle is recognized everywhere. I do not doubt that they will also understand this sometime in the Russian Ministry of Defense. It is just too bad that people are wasting time and energy in the struggle over “who is who.” They should join efforts and direct them towards a good cause. There is enough work for everyone.

But for the time being, the next session of the Leninskiy People's Court for the umpteenth time is postponed. The “defendant”—the minister of defense—again did not arrive.

New Laws Define Terms, Conditions for Servicemen
PM0302174393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Feb 93 p 1

[Vladimir Yermolin report in "From Our News Bureau" column: "'Military Package' of Laws Swelled by Two More Documents"]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has signed the Law "On the Status of Servicemen" and the Law "On Additional Benefits for Servicemen Performing Military Service on the Territory of the States of the Transcaucasus and the Baltic and the Republic of Tajikistan and Carrying Out Tasks in Defense of Citizens' Constitutional Rights in the Conditions of a State of Emergency."

The Law "On the Status of Servicemen" establishes servicemen's rights, duties, and responsibilities and defines the bases of state policy regarding the legal and social protection of servicemen, citizens discharged from military service, and the members of their families. The second law lays down the social and legal safeguards for the protection of servicemen performing military service in trouble spots and regions where a state of emergency is in operation.

Dangers of Politicized Army Viewed

MK1002131193 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 7, 14 Feb 93 (Signed to Press 9 Feb) p 11

[Major General Vladimir Dudnik "Analysis": "Military Putting Politicians to the Test"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] On the eve of the constitutional referendum analysts are eagerly studying the distribution of political forces. But the Army is quite wrongly left out of this political game of patience. It cannot be ruled out that this is deliberate.

Today's Army, together with family members, amounts to 5-7 million voters. In garrison cities, military academy campuses, and military training grounds, they carry along in their wake a considerable number of "nonmilitary" votes. We could be talking about approximately 8-10 million. Who will they vote for?

The Army's clout as a purely strong-arm organization is equally important in this process. Which scenario for overcoming the crisis will this force support?

According to data from military sociologists, in November 1992 only 19 percent of servicemen supported the government, 56 percent were against, and 60 percent of officers did not approve of the decisions of the CIS leaders on military questions. In the middle of last year the Expertiza Entrepreneurial Research Center under the Institute for National Economic Modeling established that approximately 20 percent of officers fully support the government's line. The president's popularity in Army circles is comparatively low; 30 percent support him fully, 10 percent are categorically

opposed, and 60 percent have not made up their minds. At least one-third of the officer corps is in favor of reviving the USSR, and the same proportion is against cutting military spending. Around two-thirds are in favor of imposing a firm hand. National-patriotic forces enjoy the support of 70 percent of officers, and 75 percent favor the state sector of the economy.

A comparison of two independent expert reports produces matching results: The majority of officers are in opposition to the CIS and Russian Federation leadership.

And this can hardly be considered pure chance. There is a whole string of circumstances demonstrating that the situation in the Army is preprogrammed to be as it is.

The Army remains involved in internal political processes in various forms. This involvement takes place mainly through senior and top officers and generals: Dozens of them participate in parliamentary battles, and thousands sit on soviets at all levels.

Russian troops outside the national borders, often as a means of strong-arm support for big politics, are still a "high-risk" zone for Russian politics. The remnants of Army groupings are falling apart before our very eyes. There is an increasing likelihood of the Army turning into a conglomeration of semi-guerrilla and downright bandit gangs. According to experts' estimates, there are already more than 500 illegal and "independent" armed formations on CIS territory. They consist largely of men who would otherwise be in the Russian Army today, and are armed with weapons seized or bought from that Army.

Society has recently been resorting voluntarily and with increasing frequency to the Army's services, sending it into front line of domestic problems: a general in the Dniester region, a third successive general in the North Caucasus, a militia detachment of special-purpose troops on the Moscow Railroad, joint militia and Army patrols with a backbone of Afghan war veterans. It could come about imperceptibly that, against the people's will, the Army ends up not only on the front line but spearheading events. In what direction could its energies be directed?

This can only be predicted on the basis of well-authenticated facts. And these include the following.

There are about 20 social organizations of officers. A significant proportion of them take an antidemocratic line. Toward the end of 1992 the Officers Union, "Officers for Russian Rebirth," and 27 antireformist politicized social associations signed a declaration "On the Formation of a United Opposition."

The right-wing radical "Russian National Party" has gone even further: It has declared the creation of a Russian Social Government. The well-known obscurantists General Viktor Filatov and Colonel Vladimir Miloserdov have taken the leading roles in it, declaring an antireformist platform. Generals Albert Makashov

and Aleksandr Sterligov; Colonels Aleksandr Martynov, Vladimir Popov, and Nikolay Proselkov; Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Terekhov; Captain 2d Rank Yuriy Makunin; and Captain 3d Rank Andrey Skrylev have not been shy about lending their names to it. The nature of their specific steps and the statements made by their leaders make it possible to suggest that the Russian National Assembly, the Cossacks Union, the Officers Union, and some other servicemen's organizations are the military-combat organizations of our national-patriots and neocommunists. They are already attempting to seize the initiative from the official authorities and arrogate their functions for themselves. General Sterligov and Lieutenant Colonel Terekhov—not without the support of a section of the now legally disbanded All-Russia Coordinating Council of Officer Assemblies—have announced the convening of an All-Army Officers Assembly on 21-22 February.

There are further options beyond that, as the saying goes. To some extent they are familiar to us—from rallies of men in formation to tanks in city squares.

But it is precisely the further options which must be ruled out. In a democratic society the Army must not cause the people concern but must be a protective police force for them as they move toward self-determination, freedom, and prosperity. This requires a number of immediate steps to complete the depoliticization of the Army.

Step one. Servicemen must be removed from soviets at every level. There is a presidential edict prohibiting political activity in the Army. On its basis the defense minister should propose to military deputies that they make a personal civic choice: If you want to continue political activity as a deputy, that is your right. But for the duration we will discharge you from the Army (with the right of reinstatement after your deputy service is complete, of course, if your age, health, and political feelings allow). But if you want to be in the Army you must devote yourself to this and, complying with the depoliticization edict, submit your resignation as a deputy.

Thereafter the new constitution should include the principle that servicemen can vote in elections but cannot themselves be elected. This logical restriction on individual rights is offset by a package of moral and material benefits and privileges.

Step two. The Defense Ministry should also set an example of depoliticization and become civilian. So you have people in civilian clothes without military-administrative functions serving as a focus for all incoming political signals and transforming them into professional military administrative signals. Here you get a clear delimitation of the currently intertwined functions and powers of the Defense Ministry as an organ of military-political leadership and its General

Staff as an organ of professional operational and strategic leadership of the Army. This cannot be expected, as Army General Pavel Grachev suggests, until 1995.

Under the present election regulations servicemen doing their compulsory military service and also all servicemen in restricted-access garrisons vote at restricted-access polling places with the election results being reported to the immediate superior officer. These are not free "elections," particularly for soldiers and sergeants, and are easily controllable. We could see this at the referendum on the fate of the USSR and the elections for Russian president.

Provision must therefore be made for a third step: All servicemen vote at general territorial polling places and are included on the general roll of voters. The secrecy considerations cited as an objection here are unfounded in present-day conditions.

Of course, until the Army is completely professionalized and radically restructured, politicization will continue to take its toll. But its effect can and must be weakened right now. For this society must use wise legislation and a far-sighted personnel policy to insure the Army against political influences. And insure itself against risk.

Legislative Progress, Hoped-For Benefits of Law on Status of Servicemen

93UM0384A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Feb 93 p 1

[Article: "We Have Waited a Long Time for This Law: So May it Have a Smooth Sailing"]

[Text] Today KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is publishing the Law on the Status of Servicemen. It is the result of a very difficult job performed by law-makers, government experts and specialists with the State Legal Administration under the President of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. We know that Russian President Boris Yeltsin himself gave a lot of attention to the work done with this law. It is just an interim product, however. The package of "military" laws will be further enlarged and refined. The main thing has occurred, however. We servicemen now have a law—the first ever—which thoroughly defines our legal relations with the state. The state demands a great deal from the military man and will now also bear a large range of obligations to him.

The text of the law is now before you, dear readers. We only want to underscore the fact that within a fairly short period of time—slightly more than a year—our parliament has advanced fairly decisively from talk about the need to give our military reform a legal basis to concrete results. The Law on Defense was passed last year; the Law on the Status of Servicemen this year. The Law on Military Duty and the Military Service is coming up. The process is agonizing, but we hope that the bill on pensions for servicemen will become law in the immediate future. It is primarily a result of the efforts of the two

parliamentary committees which exercise legal "trusteeship" over the armed forces: the Defense and Security Committee and the Committee for the Disabled, War and Labor Veterans and for Social Protection for Servicemen and Their Families. Also of the entire Supreme Soviet, of course, which negotiated with extreme patience all of the pitfalls in the difficult legal and sometimes, political debate surrounding the draft "military package."

We frequently curse our life of late, and there are grounds for this. It would not be fair to ignore also the good changes, however. There will be critics of the law, without fail. For some it will be too "narrow"; for others, overly "broad" ("given all our poverty"). It is taking force, however, and beginning to affect the actual lives of millions of people, activating the legal self-awareness of the "man in shoulder boards," stirring him, making him realize that the nation still needs him, that he is not forgotten.... So why not say to this long-awaited law: "Smooth sailing"! And may the state have the fortitude to do its utmost to see that the serviceman's declared status does not remain just words on paper.

We feel that the readers might also like to know the names of those who worked for many months on the bill, then defended it in the parliamentary forums and worked with the amendments. They include N. Rymorov, Ye. Alayev, A. Belashov, Yu. Vetrov, V. Bushuyev and B. Dobedin, members of the Committee for the Disabled, War and Labor Veterans and for the Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Families, and committee chairman A. Korovnikov. The names of specialists on the Committee for Preparing and Implementing the Military Reform, headed by Army Gen K. Kobets, could be added to the list.

Tomorrow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will publish yet another long-awaited law, the Law on Additional Benefits for Military Personnel Serving in the Transcaucasus and the Baltic States and the Republic of Tajikistan and Those Who Protected the Constitutional Rights of Citizens in the Emergency Situation. Its chief provisions were submitted for consideration to the Supreme Soviet by the President of the Russian Federation and have become law through the efforts of the Defense and Security Committee.

The "package of military laws" continues to be enlarged....

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Designer Views History of ABM Developments

934P0066A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 93 p 4

[Interview with retired Lieutenant General Grigoriy Vasilyevich Kisunko, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin Prize Laureate, and corresponding member of the RAN, by Anatoliy Pokrovskiy; place and date not given:

"Three Episodes From the Life of Our ABM Defense: There Is No More 'Berkut.' What Kind of Geese Will Save Moscow Now?"]

[Text] Perhaps it is true that we, and principally our "friends," were unable to get a detailed picture of the scientific-technical foundation of the Soviet Army and to single out its creators by name. But time ages both people and equipment. And history absorbs lessons that are instructive not for delayed regrets, but for mature modeling of the future. This is probably why the material published in PRAVDA on 11 December under the rubric "Interview With a Former Incognito" aroused such keen interest. The article, in particular, gave the heretofore little known name of the general designer of the antiballistic-missile defense systems A, A-35, and A-35M for the first time—retired Lieutenant General Grigoriy Vasilyevich Kisunko, a Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin Prize Laureate, and a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

First Episode

[Pokrovskiy] Grigoriy Vasilyevich, the popular expression "nuclear missile shield of the country" is not entirely accurate. There is the "sword"—an attack weapon, and there is the "shield"—a defense weapon. So, which of them was forged in your KB [design bureau]?

[Kisunko] The "shield," of course. During my service in the army, I was a "defender" in a direct sense of the word, starting as a private in the Leningrad People's Volunteer Corps.

[Pokrovskiy] From private to lieutenant general, from the volunteer corps to the general designer of an antiballistic-missile defense system is a long road. Where did it start?

[Kisunko] My fate, like that of other participants in the creation of these systems, was decided on one summer night in 1950 when the director of SB-1 [Special Bureau], Pavel Nikolayevich Kuksenko, who arrived after being summoned at 0200, and was led into Stalin's apartment by a security guard. Sitting on a sofa in his pajamas and looking over some kind of papers, the owner of the apartment received his guest. Then, shoving the papers aside, he said:

"You know that the last time an enemy aircraft flew over Moscow was on 10 July 1942. This was a single reconnaissance aircraft. But now, imagine that a single aircraft appears over Moscow, but with an atom bomb. It is clear that we need an absolutely new PVO [Air Defense] that is capable, even under a massive raid, of not allowing even one aircraft to reach a defended target. What can you say about this problem?"

"According to our calculations, future PVO systems must be built on the basis of a combination of radars and guided 'surface-to-air' and 'air-to-air' missiles," Kuksenko answered.

After this, in the words of Pavel Nikolayevich, Stalin began to ask him "rudimentary" questions about a matter that was so unfamiliar to Stalin, which is what radio-guided missiles were at that time. Kuksenko emphasized that the scientific-technical complexity and the scale of the problems here were no less than the problems associated with the creation of an atomic weapon. After hearing him out, Stalin said:

"There is the opinion, Comrade Kuksenko, that we must start immediately to create a PVO system for Moscow that is calculated to repel a massive enemy air raid from any direction. For this reason, a special main directorate on the order of the First Main Directorate on Atomic Matters will be established under the USSR Council of Ministers.."

All of this work, Pavel Nikolayevich recalled later, began to move with inconceivable speed. Stalin summoned Kuksenko to him several more times. He elicited detailed information, particularly about the capabilities of future systems to repel a "star" massive raid (simultaneously, from different directions) and a "ramming" massive raid.

A decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers assigned the code name "Berkut" [golden eagle] to the Moscow PVO system. P.N. Kuksenko and S.L. Beriya were appointed its chief designers. The system was kept secret even from the minister of defense. A newly created Third Main Directorate (TGU) was established under the USSR Council of Ministers as the client. For this, the TGU set up its own military delivery and official acceptance system, its own surface-to-air missile test range in the area of Kapustin Yar, and, as the facilities of the system were being established, its own military formations for the military operation of these facilities.

According to the initial concept, the "Berkut" system was supposed to consist of the following subsystems and facilities:

- two rings (inner and outer) of radar detection systems based on an RLS (radar) with a 10-centimeter band—chief designer L.V. Leonov; two rings (inner and outer) of surface-to-air missile guidance radars—chief designers P.N. Kuksenko and S.L. Beriya; the B-200's located at the stations and the surface-to-air guided missile launchers associated with them—general designer S.A. Lavochkin; chief designers: missile engine—A.M. Isayev, warheads—Zhidkikh, Sukhikh, Kozorezov, proximity fuse—Rastorguyev, onboard electric power sources—N.S. Lidorenko, transport-launch equipment—V.P. Barmin.

In 1950, I was transferred by a decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers from my teaching position at the Military Communications Academy, where I was working on the electrodynamics of superhigh frequencies, to a special bureau that was headed by Kuksenko. Now it was reorganized into KB-1 [Design Bureau-1]. In KB-1, for me personally and

for my future associates on ABM problems, participation in the creation of the "Berkut" system was that school without which we would not have been able to "mature" to an understanding of these problems.

Second Episode

"Encrypted Message, Top Secret of Special Importance.

"Moscow, Presidium, CPSU Central Committee, for Comrade N.S. Khrushchev.

"We report that on 4 March 1961, in the area of Test Range A, an R-12 ballistic missile equipped with a mockup in the form of a steel plate weighing 500 kilograms, instead of a standard warhead section, was launched from the State Central Test Range of the Ministry of Defense. The resources of the A-system detected the target at a distance of 1,500 kilometers after it came over the horizon. Based on data of the Dunay-2 radar, the central computer constructed and continually refined the target trajectory, issued radar plots to precision guidance radars, calculated and issued prelaunch turn angles to the launchers, and calculated the time of launch. On a computer command, the B-1000 ABM missile was launched from launcher No. 1. At an altitude of 25 kilometers, on a computer command from Earth, the high explosive fragmentation warhead of the ABM missile was detonated, after which, according to a camera film record, the nose section of the ballistic missile started to break up into pieces... Thus, for the first time in national and world practice, the nose section of a ballistic missile was destroyed in its flight trajectory by an ABM system."

[Pokrovskiy] Can you talk about the features of this system in a little more detail?

[Kisunko] This was an experimental system with fully computerized automation of the operational cycle. By its appearance on the radar screen and in the computer, the target itself seemingly pressed the button for its own destruction. As soon as the missile is pinpointed, the transmission and computer data processing system goes into operation and the flight trajectory is fixed. In a word, the operational algorithm operates automatically right up to the meeting of the missile with the ABM missile and the explosion of the charge. I emphasize—nonnuclear.

[Pokrovskiy] But what does it represent?

[Kisunko] We called it "cherries in syrup." This is 16,000 pellets with a carbide-tungsten nucleus, a TNT filling, and a steel shell. Thus, the combined chemical and kinetic energy smashed the missile into smithereens. The Americans succeeded in demonstrating a similar result only 23 years later.

[Pokrovskiy] But, apparently, they had their own system?

[Kisunko] Yes, they had their experimental Nike Zeus and operational Safeguard systems in which the ABM

missiles were equipped with nuclear combat charges. The Safeguard system was intended for the defense of ICBM launch silos that were engineer-protected from atmospheric nuclear bursts of the intercepting and attacking missiles. Thus, similar systems are absolutely unsuitable for the ABM defense of cities. Imagine, somewhere in the atmosphere over Moscow, the nuclear charges of the ABM missiles defending it and the attacking missiles explode in two's. What will happen to Moscow? For it, this means nuclear hara-kiri.

By the way, the Americans, with the help of false information, tried to push us into scientific-technical dead ends. For example, as far back as 1956, a newspaper "canard" appeared that they were working on a method of destroying missiles with focused radio waves in a superhigh frequency band. They reported this to Marshal Zhukov, and he ordered that this be looked into. Then we succeeded in proving that this was physically not feasible. But in June of 1984, even a U.S. patent "High Energy Microwave System of Defense" was published in the American press. The "deza" [disinformation] worked partially, and forces, means, and what is most important, time, were spent on hopeless studies.

So that the cost of the stakes in this game are more understandable, I will recall: A situation was created in the nuclear missile confrontation in the 1950's which American Senator Taft called a nuclear stalemate. In his opinion, the country that first gained an antiballistic-missile defense will achieve a decisive strategic superiority. However, the problem of creating an ABM system capable of influencing the outcome of a large-scale exchange of nuclear missile strikes proved to be unprecedentedly complex, and it can be said that it is the most complicated among the military-technical problems of the 20th Century, and it has not yet received a strategically significant resolution. But, in addition, approximately since the 1970's, we began to fall behind the Americans in the resolution of this problem. In response to Reagan's SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative], there was only the bragging statement by M.S. Gorbachev that we, he said, have the formula for an "asymmetrical variant" for reacting to the SDI program that in 10 years will be ten times and even a hundred times cheaper. While we are lulling ourselves with discussions and statements, the Americans are confidently moving ahead to a conceptual system for the unification of strategic offensive and defensive arms.

But in the ABM-1 Treaty of 1972, our delegations committed astonishing "bungles." From our side, mostly politicians and bureaucrats took part in composing it, and the technical specialists remained on the sidelines. And we fell into a technical trap. One example. According to the conditions of the treaty, we can build a missile attack warning radar only on the periphery of the territory of the country. Therefore, we were forced, like guilty boys, to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar that was supposed to cover the radar "gap" in the northeastern sector of the SPRN [Missile Attack Warning System].

What is the crux of the problem here? After all, it would seem that the farther the station is from the object being defended, then the sooner the signal will come of a possible attack on it. However, the northwestern outskirts of our country contain the taiga, the tundra, and swamps. It is expensive and difficult to build there. But the borders of the United States are well-populated areas with a reliable infrastructure. In addition, the Americans already built an external network of stations in Greenland, Scotland, in Alaska, and internally on the territory of the United States. Why were we deprived of the capability of having two defensive rings on our own territory—on the periphery and inside the country? And if you consider that with the breakup of the USSR, our ballistic missile attack warning system also broke up, ending up in different states, then it can be said that Russia's ABM defense is vulnerable because of radar "gaps."

Third Episode

[Pokrovskiy] Grigoriy Vasilyevich, I know that you took part in the calculations of the possibility of defeat and a retaliatory strike in the event of a nuclear conflict. This was possible to do—the text of the SALT II treaty with all of the necessary data was made public. But, on 16 January, PRAVDA carried the text of a memorandum to the treaty between Russia and the United States on the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons (START II), which was signed by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush. There on each line, there are only periods instead of specific numbers. How do you assess this?

[Kisunko] It is no coincidence that, until the START II treaty is examined by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, it is being kept a secret from the Russian public, from the mass media, and especially from the specialists who would be able to express professional judgments about this treaty and to reveal its unacceptability to Russia.

By ratifying this treaty, Russia would relinquish its own sovereign right to direct the allocation of the number of nuclear warheads agreed to with the United States according to types of arms: ground-, sea-, and air-based.

They want to force us to dismantle and destroy the very heart of our strategic deterrence system—silo-based ICBM's with multiple warheads—under the inspection of American "helpers." These missiles, with their high readiness for immediate launch, accident-free reliability, and survivability in defense-engineered launch silos guarantee the inevitability of a retaliatory strike even in the worst case for us, when our remaining nuclear means would be destroyed by a preemptive strike by the attacking side, while the United States will have left untouched 18 submarines with multiple charge missiles carrying 1,728 warheads!

Are our strategists not haphazardly scraping up mobile railroad- and ground-based missile complexes, submarines with nuclear missiles, and all the rest of the

"arithmetic" permitted us in the lines with the periods in the START II treaty? In truth, all we have not had yet are nuclear railroad catastrophes, nuclear road accidents on highways, and tragedies similar to the Komsomolets submarine. It should be kept in mind that generally when our nuclear submarines set out to sea they are immediately fixed by a U.S. global monitoring system and come under the invisible surveillance of its antisubmarine systems. Therefore, under the delivery of a disarming strike, they can be destroyed simultaneously with non-nuclear systems. In short, for Russia, START II is its nuclear disarmament under U.S. control. At the same time, I am not touching on the ruinous economic aspects of the START II treaty for Russia.

[Pokrovskiy] Pardon me, but is this, as they say, steep reduction in nuclear weapons not for the blessing of all mankind? After all, this reduces the danger of a "nuclear winter" on the whole planet...

[Kisunko] It depends on what objectives the contracting parties are pursuing with all of the reductions. Reagan, for example, refused to acknowledge that the ultimate objective of all reductions of offensive arms is the total prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, on which the Soviet Union has always insisted. Consequently, is some kind of a maximum limit for reductions implied? Will reductions not stop at a level that is ecologically acceptable for nuclear aggression and simultaneously suitable for an ABM defense of the United States against a limited retaliatory strike. Moreover, this can be a conventional nonnuclear ABM-SDI, without any kind of outer space exotica. This means that with the decrease in the number of offensive missiles a significant strategic advantage will go to the side that has ABM superiority.

Remember what was said about the "gaps" in our ABM defense. Add to this that for us to overtake the United States in the creation of antiballistic missiles is a matter that is more expensive and takes more time than the manufacture of offensive weapons. And then those advantages that START II gives the American side will become more understandable. In short, parity is needed not only in offensive but also in defensive arms. We did not start our talk with a comparison of the "sword" and the "shield" for nothing. Given a technical violation of this balance (and even politically, probably, also), a situation is possible where one of the sides, having superiority in ABM defense, will tell the other:

"Just dismantle your 'toys' in an amicable way." And move into the ranks of nonnuclear states with all of the consequences that derive therefrom.

Is this what we want?

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Marshal Kuleshov Comment on Use of Nuclear Artillery

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[Interview with Marshal of Artillery Pavel Nikolayevich Kuleshov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Nikolay Poroskov, under the rubric: "Interlocutor of the Day": "I Didn't Sit in the Presidiums and I Didn't Appear in the Press..."]

[Text]

Calling Card

Marshal of Artillery Pavel Nikolayevich Kuleshov

There was a period in his life when he didn't even use his own name—Range Chief General Sergeyev. Yes and he avoided fame after that due to the nature of his duties. He directly participated in the development of new rifled, artillery and missile weaponry, tanks, mortars, radars, lasers, night vision devices, and nuclear artillery.

Pavel Nikolayevich was born in 1908 in Krasnoyarsk Kray. He graduated from Tomsk Artillery School, the Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy and the General Staff Academy. He assumed command of a guards mortar regiment ("Katyushas") with the initiation of war and later command of an operational group of guards mortar units (GMCh) on the Northwestern, Kalininskiy, and Volkhov fronts. In 1943, he was appointed GMCh deputy commander.

After the war, he led the Artillery Academy's missile department that was founded by him, he was chief of the newly organized air defense range from 1953, and later PVO [Air Defense] deputy commander-in-chief for weaponry. During the last 18 years—Chief of the Main Missile-Artillery Directorate. He has been a member of a general inspectors' team for some time.

He is a Hero of Socialist Labor, and a Lenin Prize Laureate.

[Poroskov] Pavel Nikolayevich, it is amazing to say that you have 66 years of service under your belt, and you are a participant of events, many of which are milestones in the country's history. People with even somewhat more modest fates have had the honor of biographic essays and even books. How can you explain that?

[Kuleshov] Fate has often been ordered in such a way that I have found myself where I have had to begin something for the first time, to open and to master. I participated in the creation of two ranges, two military NII's [Scientific Research Institutes], one of the Ministry of Defense's Main Directorates, a missile department... And hence—the high degree of secrecy. I wasn't elected a deputy and I didn't sit in presidiums. In a word, I was "restricted".

[Poroskov] Were the new things that you encountered and introduced into the army easy to deal with?

[Kuleshov] Far from always. In 1943, N. Khrushchev, the then former member of the front military council, sent Stalin a letter in which he asserted: the guards mortar units are ineffective forms of combat, they need to be disbanded. The first "Katyushas" actually had a large scattering during firing but work was successfully conducted on the attainment of grouping, so Khrushchev was hasty. Nevertheless the Supreme Commander-in-Chief demanded a reasoned reply. As GMCh deputy commander, I was tasked to sort it out. The author of the letter avoided explanations. But the overwhelming majority of generals and officers idolized the guards mortars, including Front Commander Batutin. "Katyushas" were set up on urgent sectors of the front where concentration of fire and rapid maneuver were required. This weapon, all else aside, had a strong psychological impact. I saw German soldiers who had lost their senses and who hid in bunkers after an RS [rocket projectile] salvo.

But, as we see, there were also opponents of the "Katyushas". Even Marshal of Artillery N. Voronov subsequently admitted that he had initially underestimated them.

I sent GMCh Commander Abarenkov an enciphered message: the facts were not confirmed and Khrushchev's personal opinion could not be decisive during the development of missile equipment. They reported that to Stalin. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief's order on the unification of guards mortar units and artillery was the only consequence of this story. Obviously, an understanding had arrived by that time that rocket projectiles are in general a variety of artillery and they need to operate together.

[Poroskov] It seems to me that the role of a high official's subjective opinion was graphically manifested in the story you told. Based on the big picture, we could also have ended up without "Katyushas"... But that was under Stalin. But after that?

[Kuleshov] Unfortunately, the subjective factor has existed in all times. Khrushchev (already in the rank of the head of government), accompanied by Minister of Defense Malinkovskiy, his Deputy Konev and PVO Commander-in-Chief Biryuzov, flew in during the concluding phase of S-75 antiaircraft missile complex testing at the range. I need to say that the latter were opposed to the S-75. Their motivation—it took a long time—six whole hours—to deploy the system. Moreover, the innovation was very expensive. Its possible that the military leaders were poorly informed by their own entourage.

If Khrushchev had agreed at that time, if he had said a single word—PVO missile design could have followed an entirely different route or could have even been stalled for some time. But Khrushchev decided to learn the opinion of the range chief. I explained: neither antiaircraft artillery nor fighters could reach the reconnaissance

aircraft that were flying over our territory. Only a missile could do that. I immediately summoned a target and demonstrated the complex's capabilities. It was accepted into the inventory. Powers was shot down by precisely this missile.

[Poroskov] And the story with the "Oka" complex that caused a sensation already in our days? Is the role of some sort of personality also visible there?

[Kuleshov] At one time, I spoke with now deceased Marshal Akhromeyev in that regard. "Go, prove to 'him'," the marshal waved his hand, "that 'Oka' does not fall under the treaty". He thought that Gorbachev was the culprit and I agree with him.

[Poroskov] But let's return to the sources. How did our rocket design and the equipping of the troops with these awesome weapons begin? How was the missile department begun? Really, you had to essentially begin the training of cadres from zero.

[Kuleshov] We immediately selected students in the 1st-3rd years with academy and institute educations. The teachers themselves wrote the lectures and later published the first textbook. They worked jointly with S. Korolev and B. Chelomey.

The paradox consisted of the fact that the department was created, still without having its own missiles. They delivered Fau-1 and Fau-2 surface-to-surface missiles from Peenemunde where the Germans' test range was. Then they also supplied antiaircraft missiles: "Wasserfal", "Rhinetohter", and "Shmitterling". We studied them and raised all of Tsiolkovskiy. We could not expect help from the German scientific elite—they had all emigrated to the United States.

We created a missile brigade under the command of Major-General A. Tveretskiy based on the Kapustin Yar range. The officers gained experience at Peenemunde and we launched missiles at the range in our country. The academy's senior cadets were involved with launches. Soon Korolev carried out the first launch of his own R-1 and the need for German rockets passed. Our Designers Raspletin and Pilyugin also proved themselves. Things were moving along.

[Poroskov] The concept of the "Kuleshov School" emerged at the PVO Troops range where you were the chief. In the mid 1970's, testing was extended to other ranges based upon the military-industrial commission's recommendation. What was the point of that decision?

[Kuleshov] We moved away from the classic range design and introduced scientific sections that were capable of making proposals to modify the missile and improve it during testing. Furthermore, we introduced an analysis section where experts manufactured not the missile as a whole but its components and processes. That is, range officers became participants in the development of the missile and not only executors.

This innovation already had an impact on the first S-25 PVO complex, regiments of which were subsequently deployed in two rings around Moscow.

[Poroskov] I have heard from your former fellow servicemen that you are an ardent proponent of precisely these weapon systems. While proceeding from this conviction of yours, you, already being the GRAU [Main Missile and Artillery Directorate] chief, with risk for yourself defended the production of the "Tunguska" mobile antiaircraft missile complex in which the missile launcher is combined with the traditional gun.

[Kuleshov] There is a system in the oldest weaponry—rifled: the pistol, assault rifle, machinegun, and so forth. Each item has its own sufficiently narrow functional purpose. And take the system of calibers in artillery. It must be the same with Ground Forces antiaircraft missile complexes to which the "Tunguska" also belongs. "Krug", "Kub", "Osa", "Tor", "Buk" and others that are a system stand alongside it. One—is for a regimental element, the others are battalion, army, front, etc.

[Poroskov] Certainly the development of some or other models was dictated not only by the desire to maintain a system but also by the need to respond to a potential enemy?

[Kuleshov] I was always convinced: if both confronting sides have some sort of new, non-traditional type of weapon that has colossal destructive force, the idea of its use dies.

[Poroskov] Can you cite an example?

[Kuleshov] The Americans dropped atomic bombs on Japan but they did not do that in Vietnam—there was already our counterbalance.

[Poroskov] Nevertheless, the Americans developed nuclear artillery. What was our response so that the idea of its use died?

[Kuleshov] At the beginning of the 1970's, this report came across the intelligence wire: the Americans are developing nuclear munitions. We convened the scientific world and discussed it with the Ministry of the Defense Industry and with the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. The word of Atomic Scientists Khariton and Aleksandrov turned out to be decisive. After a certain amount of time, 203 mm projectiles were manufactured. And when we learned that the Americans had shifted to a smaller caliber, we also placed 152 mm projectiles into the flow. We conducted tests.

[Poroskov] And what was the yield of the projectiles?

[Kuleshov] Several kilotons.

[Poroskov] Could nuclear artillery have been utilized, say, in regional conflicts?

[Kuleshov] Hardly. This is precisely that case when the idea dies. Today, work in the sphere of nuclear artillery

has practically been reduced to naught as a result of the signing of several international agreements.

[Poroskov] We touched upon one of the "white spots" of our history. I would like to ask you to talk about one more similar event in which you directly participated—about the testing of the S-25 PVO complex, the missile of which was equipped with a nuclear warhead.

[Kuleshov] Testing was conducted in the middle 1950's at the Kapustin Yar range. Bombers, while passing over the range, dropped corner reflectors and then two remote-controlled targets were launched at a distance of two kilometers from each other. Both were disposed of by an explosion at an altitude of 10 kilometers. The radius of impact was determined based on the angles. The commission approved the results of the test.

[Poroskov] Pavel Nikolayevich, you have had to be involved with rifled weapons, tanks, missiles, and even with lasers... Today, doesn't a feeling of sadness arise in you that some of your brain children are being turned into scrap and are being melted down?

[Kuleshov] The state, if it wants to be strong, must have a strong army, intelligence, and counterintelligence. And today it is painful for me to see that the destruction at times exceeds rational limits, while literally destroying the army. A soldier goes to serve where he wants to...

Previously I drove throughout the entire country and was at home everywhere. People of various nationalities worked at the range and shared a common cause. But today... But I believe that everything that has been inflicted will pass and Russia will once again become great and will unite the peoples.

Preparing Motor Vehicles for Summer Operation

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[Article by Maj S. Vedenev]

[Text] Scheduled maintenance is performed in the process of preparing motor vehicles for use during the warm period of the year, and a number of additional measures are also conducted to ensure reliable operation of the vehicles in conditions of relatively high air temperature and dust. In particular, antifreeze is drained from the engine cooling system and replaced with water. The system should be flushed before filling. If scale deposits are minor, water can be used for flushing; the engine and radiator are flushed separately, and the thermostat must be replaced. Water is fed through hoses using a special nozzle in the direction opposite normal circulation of liquid in the system. Its pressure should not exceed 1 kg/cm² (100 kPa). The flushing must continue until clear water flows out of the drain cocks.

Special solutions are used if there are lots of scale deposits. For engines whose cooling system parts are made of aluminum alloys (ZMZ-66, ZIL-131, KamAZ),

they are prepared in the following manner: for every 10 liters of water it takes 0.6 liter of a 31-percent industrial hydrochloric acid (GOST 857-69) or a 27-percent hydrochloric acid (GOST 1382-69), 10 grams of PB-5 inhibitor, 250 grams of industrial hexamethylenetetramine (GOST 1381-60), and 10 milliliters of foam suppressor (fusel oil or amyl alcohol). For engines with a cast iron crankcase and head (YaMZ-236, YaMZ-238), 750-800 grams of caustic soda (sodium hydroxide) and 150 grams of kerosene or 1-1.2 kg of caustic soda and 20-30 g of potassium bichromate should be added to 10 liters of water. Mix the solution well and pour it into the cooling system. Start the engine and let it run at low RPMs until the liquid warms up to 65-70 degrees C. Drain it out after 10 minutes, and flush the system at least twice with clean water.

If it is not possible to prepare the recommended solutions, a saturated solution of trisodium phosphate can be used (100 grams of powder per liter of water). It is poured into the system at a rate of 50-100 cm³ of solution per 10 liters of water, and the motor vehicle is used for two or three days. Then the solution is drained, and the entire system is thoroughly flushed out with water.

It should be remembered that the cooling system must be filled with clean, soft water. If the water is very hard, boil it for 30-40 minutes and add a ternary additive. To prepare this compound, mix potassium bichromate, trisodium phosphate, and sodium nitrite in water heated to 60-80 degrees C at the rate of 0.05 percent of the system volume for each component. The additive can be poured directly into the filler neck (the engine must be running at minimum crankshaft rotational speed); when doing this, it dissolves completely in 10-15 minutes. The temperature of the water in the cooling system at this time should be 40-60 degrees C. If the bichromate and sodium nitrite are not available, the water can be softened by adding trisodium phosphate (15-20 grams for 10 liters of water).

During the course of servicing and maintenance, make sure of the serviceability and normal functioning of the cooling system fan drive and radiator air dampers (gills). Blow out the radiator and engine with compressed air, and then wash it off with a stream of water. It is not permitted to wipe their surfaces with gasoline, since this could start a fire.

Of great importance to the normal operation of the cooling system is the serviceability of the steam and air valves, which, as a rule, are built into the filler plug. Their condition is checked by using a special instrument from the MTO-AT equipment kit. Remember that the air valve spring should ensure that it opens at a vacuum of 0.98-13.0 kPa (0.01-0.13 kg/cm²). At a gauge pressure of 45.0-100.0 kPa (0.45-1.0 kg/cm²), a normally adjusted steam valve opens and the space of the cooling system is linked with the atmosphere.

One should be certain to check the condition of the lubricating system: serviceability, presence, and quality of oil. Deviations in its operation are revealed primarily in an increase in oil pressure, which is measured when the engine is idling and with a nominal load by using a liquid-filled column manometer or KI-4940 diagnostic instrument, which are connected to the oil line.

To check the oil level in the crankcase, the motor vehicle is stopped on a horizontal area, and the level is measured 5 minutes after stopping the engine. Fresh oil is added if necessary. If the lubrication system has winter oil in it, it is drained and replaced with summer oil. In addition, it is mandatory to flush out the coarse and fine oil filters and connect the oil cooler.

The oil quality is checked using a PKZh-904 instrument or, if one is not available, by its color, odor, and viscosity. It is believed that the oil needs to be replaced if the mark on the dipstick is not visible, if the oil is not viscous (sticky) enough, or if it has mechanical impurities or an odor of fuel.

In servicing a diesel engine fuel supply system, the technical condition of its injectors is determined by using a K-290 instrument. To do this, disconnect the high-pressure line of the injector being checked from the high-pressure fuel pump and connect it to the instrument. Start the engine and with a manometer monitor the pressure of the start of the fuel injection. For KamAZ-740 engines it should be $180 + 5 \text{ kg/cm}^2$ ($18 + 0.5 \text{ MPa}$); for YaMZ-238 engines it should be $160 + 5 \text{ kg/cm}^2$ ($16 + 0.5 \text{ MPa}$).

The serviceability of the high-pressure fuel pumps is assessed according to the beginning, evenness, and amount of fuel feed. The fuel injection angle of advance on engines of the KamAZ and YaMZ families is checked and set by using an ignition tester, without removing the high-pressure fuel pump. The amount and evenness of fuel feed by individual sections of the pump are checked on a KI-921 (STDA-2) stand. Unevenness of fuel feed should not be more than 10 percent, otherwise the pump is to be adjusted.

On carburetor engines, the functioning of the carburetor is checked during the servicing. It should ensure reliable operation of the engine at idle at a minimum crankshaft rotational speed (about 400-600 RPMs). One of the important operating parameters of this device is the level of fuel in the float chamber. It should be 18-19 mm below the plane of the joint for K-84, K-88, and K-89 carburetors (checked according to the locating hole) and 19-21 mm below for K-124, K-126, and K-22 carburetors (checked through the window in the wall of the float chamber).

The reliability of the fuel pump is checked without removing it from the engine. An instrument Model 527V is used to do this, which has a manometer with a scale to 1 kgf/cm² (100 kPa). The engine should be idling, and a serviceable pump should create a pressure of 0.2-0.3 kg/cm² (20-30 kPa).

To protect the fuel supply system from dust, flush out its air filter in kerosene and fill it with clean oil. Then flush out the fuel filters and use compressed air to blow out the channels of crankcase ventilation system. All these operations must be performed in specially equipped, closed facilities. It should be remembered that when removing devices for servicing, the places where they attach must be covered with cloth (paper) or plugs. Rags or fiber packing must not be used for this, since they may get into the channels of the system.

It is mandatory to check the fuel feed system for leaks. In carburetor engines, faulty spots are located by the presence of air bubbles or fuel leaks, and in diesel engines by using a Model 383 instrument. After correcting the faulty connections, air should be bled from the system.

In conditions of a humid climate, there may be corrosion as a result of water getting in the fuel and lubricants in tanks and units of the vehicles, and breakdowns in operation of the fuel supply system and excessive foaming in the oil are possible. Therefore, special attention must be given to the condition of the fuel filler gaskets and their tightness. However, even with tightly closed plugs, it is not always possible to avoid getting water in the fuel and oils, since moisture penetrates into the units through valves and drainage openings (breathers). Therefore, during preparations and periodically during the course of summer operation, the sediment that has collected in the fuel tanks and engines should be removed. It is advisable to do this 3-5 hours after returning the vehicles to the park. If water is detected, drain the oil and replace it with fresh oil. Refueling is done with a closed stream through screen filters of the gas tank filler necks.

The portable K-484 instrument is used to determine the condition of electrical equipment. It should be kept in mind that in checking the serviceability of voltage regulators, it is necessary to put the "Winter-Summer" switch into the second position, and run the engine at medium RPMs. Test the starter directly on the vehicle after first warming up the engine. In doing so, the crankshaft should rotate with a starting rotational speed ($40-60 \text{ min}^{-1}$ for carburetor engines; $80-120 \text{ min}^{-1}$ for diesels). In addition, there should be no strange noises or knocks.

In proceeding to prepare storage batteries, they are charged, the ventilation openings of the filler plugs are cleaned out, the level of electrolyte is checked, and its density is brought up to the level specified for the corresponding climate zone. Remember that if the electrolyte level is low, only distilled water is added to the battery. When the air temperature is higher than $+30$ degrees C, the electrolyte level in batteries can drop up to 2 mm in a 24-hour period; therefore, it should be checked 1-2 times a week. In a moderate zone, the battery condition is checked at least once a week in the summer.

When the battery is being charged, the temperature of the electrolyte should not exceed $+45$ degrees C; therefore, it is necessary to protect it from direct sun rays and provide ventilation (forced air cooling) both in the motor vehicle and when charging in battery rooms. In areas with a hot climate, it is advisable to charge the batteries at night, decreasing the current by 40 percent compared to the normal current.

When servicing lights and signals, they are checked for serviceability, security of attachment, and cleanliness of the surface of the reflector and diffuser. If necessary, they are washed with gasoline, and the oxidized contacts are cleaned. Headlights are checked and adjusted by using a Model E-6 portable device.

When preparing transmission mechanisms and units, the winter oil is replaced with summer or all-season oil. The fluid in the clutch hydraulic drive is also replaced. All spaces in the gimbal gear, where stipulated, are filled with new grease. Timely cleaning of ventilation openings of units promote normal operation of a power drive (transmission). It is best to flush out the breathers (valves) in kerosene and blow them out with compressed air.

To ensure reliable operation of a vehicle in conditions of a heavy dust content of the air, protect rubbing parts with special canvas covers, sailcloth, or other dense and strong cloth. Above all, insulate universal joints, steering linkage, surfaces of ball and socket bearings of drive axles, breathers of units, the brake control valve, battery, starter, generator, and distributor from dust. Make the covers easy to remove in order to provide access to lubricating points.

Motor Vehicle Operating Materials

Name of Operating Material	Make of Motor Vehicle						
	GAZ-24	UAZ-469	GAZ-66-11	ZIL-131N	Ural-4320	KamAZ-4310	KrAZ-260
	Summer Gasoline				Diesel Fuel		
Fuel (tank capacity, liters)	AI-93 (55)	A-76 (78)	A-76 (210)	A-76 (340)	grade L (270)	grade L (420)	grade L (380)
Motor oil (lubrication system capacity, liters)	M-12G ₁ (6)	M-63/10V (5.8)	M-10V ₁ (10)	M-8B ₁ U (9.5)	M-10G ₁ (23.7)	M-10G ₂ k (24.5)	M-10V ₂ (29)
Transmission oil for gearbox	TAp-15V (0.95)	TAp-15V (1.0)	TAp-15V (3)	TSp-14 (6.7)	TSp-14.5 (8.5)	TSp-15K (8.5)	TSp-15k (9.0)
Transmission oil for transfer box	-	TAp-15V (0.7)	TAp-15V (1.5)	TSp-14 (3.3)	MT-16p (3.5)	TSp-15K (5.4)	TAp-15V (7.5)
Transmission oil for drive axle	TSp-14gip (1.2)	TAp-15V (1.85)	TSp-14gip (6.4)	TSp-14 (5)	MT-16p (4)	TSp-15K (7)	TAp-15V (11)
Transmission oil for shock-absorber	AU spindle oil (0.21)	AZh-12T (0.32)	AZh-12T (0.41)	AU spindle oil (0.45)	AU spindle oil (0.85)	AZh-12T (0.475)	grade R (0.85)
Transmission oil for steering gear hydraulic booster system	-	-	grade R (1.35)	grade R (3.2)	grade R (4.8)	grade R (3.2)	grade R (5.0)
Transmission oil for steering gear case	TSp-14 (0.3)	TAp-15V (0.25)	TAp-15V (0.6)	grade R	MT-16p (1.48)	grade R	grade R (2.0)
Brake fluid	BSK (0.8)	GTZh-22M (0.52)	GTZh-22M (1.35)	-	Neva (1.5)	-	-
Coolant (cooling system capacity, liters)	water (11.5)	water (13)	water (25.5)	water (31)	tosol A-40 (29)	tosol A-40 (29.4)	tosol A-40 (48)

Covers with a semipermeable seal (of coarse calico, gauze, or felt) are placed on the battery. In doing this, ensure there is good ventilation. The generator is protected by a cylindrical screen filter covered on the outside with a cover of flannel. Covers made of cotton fabric (flannel) with a nap are placed over the starter and distributor. In order to keep dust from getting into the crankcase through the opening for the dipstick, the stick is covered with a tin dust cap with a leather or felt collar.

A Model K-402 general-purpose device, which is installed on the steering wheel rim, is used to check the mechanical condition of the steering gear. The front wheels are jacked up off the ground, and the vehicle's parking brakes are applied. On vehicles with a hydraulic booster, steering wheel play is checked with the engine running. Force on the steering wheel rim is checked with a disconnected longitudinal linkage in three positions: twice turning the wheel to the left, to the right, and in the middle position. The working condition of the hydraulic booster depends on the level and quality of oil and also on the pressure being created by the pump. Therefore, if the oil is of poor quality, it should be replaced with fresh oil, and the air must be bled from the system.

When servicing the brake system, special attention should be given to the airtightness of its linkage connections, the condition of cups (diaphragms) of the brake cylinders (chambers), brake linings and drums (the intensity of their wear in conditions of heavy dust increases two-to threefold). In the pneumatic drive, the amount of drop in air pressure when the engine is not running must not exceed 1 kgf/cm² (100 kPa) per hour, and there must not be any brake fluid leakage in a

hydraulic drive. Air leakage is determined by ear or by using a soap solution, with which the areas of possible leaks are moistened. Any detected problem areas are corrected by either tightening the connections or replacing them.

Preparation of the tire pressure regulating system begins with checking the operation of the check valve of the central control cock. To do this, pressure in the pneumatic drive loop is brought up to 0.6-0.7 MPa (6-7 kg/cm²) and the control cock lever is put into the position to discharge air from the system. If the check valve is correctly adjusted, air stops being released when the pressure drops to the 0.45 MPa (4.5 kg/cm²) mark. In checking the airtightness of the system in the area from the control cock to the shut-off cocks, the latter are closed and, having put the lever in the middle position, the manometer readings are observed for 20-30 seconds after stopping the engine. If the arrow shows a drop in pressure, that means there is a leakage of air in the loop being tested. Experience shows that most often the leakage is due to a failure in the airtight seal between the cup of the air supply head and the half-axle. In order to prevent a leakage of air, it is necessary to thoroughly cover the surface of the cups with lubricant 1-13. After this, check the tire pressure (using a tire pressure gauge) and adjust the wheel hub bearings. The reliability of bearing tightness is determined in succession by suspending the wheels and rocking them crosswise. If there is play, the bearings should be adjusted, and the correct tightness is checked on a test run of the motor vehicle to warm up the wheel hubs.

Storing Self-Propelled Guns

93UM0279A Moscow *TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 5, May 90 pp 28-29

[Article by Capt I. Arkhipov]

[Text] Before placing self-propelled guns in storage, they are inspected for good working order, fullness of standard fluids, and the presence of the necessary equipment and singular or group (for a set number of guns) spare parts, tools, and accessories kit.

Recoil mechanisms must be filled with POZh-70 fluid and charged with nitrogen to the standard level. The anti-aircraft machineguns are removed, lubricated with KRM oil, and stored inside the self-propelled guns in the fighting compartment (in a horizontal position on waxed paper). Sighting instruments are checked and installed at their designated places. Radios are tuned to the frequency specified by the unit senior signals officer. Helmets with built-in headsets and microphones (summer helmets in the southern areas and winter ones in the rest of the area) are put in their places inside the guns. Second helmet sets are kept at unit storage facilities by subunits.

Atomic defense and firefighting equipment systems must have parameters corresponding to the requirements of technical descriptions and operating instructions.

All air bottles, firefighting bottles, and fire extinguishers must be fully charged and certified. An external inspection is made during storage.

Seals are placed on all gun components, assemblies, and mechanisms requiring sealing. Where specified by operating instructions, cooling systems of the chassis engine may be filled with antifreeze during the year, but the rest of the engines' cooling systems must be deactivated and kept without antifreeze. Engine lubrication and fuel supply systems are also filled completely with fuel.

Storage batteries can be stored both dry and in the operating condition. In the first instance, when the storage dates expire, the batteries are brought to the operating condition and stored with or without a trickle charge.

Materials used for putting equipment in prolonged storage (see table) must correspond to the requirements of standards and technical conditions, which is determined during the course of an analysis conducted within established time periods. In addition, these materials are subjected to an analysis when they have arrived in damaged packaging, without a certificate, or if it is discovered during a check analysis that their qualities do not correspond to the requirements of documentation for even one indicator.

The barrels, turrets, and frames of self-propelled artillery are subject to corrosion-proofing. In doing so, the method of static dehumidification of the air is used.

Corrosion Prevention Materials

Brand of Material	Distinguishing Characteristics	Brand of Substitute
KAM-25 oil, TU 38.401.41-83	Dark brown oil with good protective, anti-wear, and water-displacement properties; operating temperature range from -40 to +50 degrees C	GOI-54p lubricant, GOST 3276-74
KRM oil, OST 01391-85	Thin brown oil with good protective, anti-wear, and water-displacement properties; operating temperature range from -50 to +50 degrees C	RZh oil, GOST 9811-61; VO oil, GOST 3045-51
MZ lubricant, TU 38.001263-76	Dark brown, water-resistant, thick oil with good adhesion and antifriction properties in a temperature range from -50 to +50 degrees C	GOI-54p lubricant, GOST 3276-74
OKB-122-7 lubricant, GOST 18170-72	Light yellow, vaseline-like, water-resistant lubricant with a low volatility and good protective properties; operating temperature range from -70 to +80 degrees C	TsIATIM-201 lubricant, GOST 6267-74; TsIATIM-203, GOST 8773-73
KSMG and ShSMG silica gel, GOST 3956-76	Hard, vitreous substance obtained by treating quartz sand with mineral acids	-
Indicating gel, GOST 8984-75	Dry blue-violet grains of ShSM silica gel impregnated with cobalt salt solutions; turns a light rose color when moist	-
Gerlen-D self-adhesive sealing tape, TU 400-1-165-79	Operating temperature range from -50 to +60 degrees C	-
88N adhesive, TU 38-105-10-61-76	Yellowish gray solution intended for gluing together Fabric 500 or gluing it to metal surfaces	KT adhesive, GOST 12172-74
Fabric 500, OST 38-05-1-71	Two-ply, rubberized, silvery, percale-based fabric; withstands temperatures to -50 degrees C	TT fabric, TU 17-355-69
U-20A putty, TU 38.105367-76	Greenish gray mass; working temperature range from -70 to +70 degrees C	ZZK-ZU putty, GOST 19538-74
51-G-7 nondrying mastic, GOST 24025-80	Gray uniform mass having high elasticity and stability in a wide temperature range	Same
BP-3-35 waxed paper, GOST 9369-79	Light brown paper impregnated with a mixture of paraffin and industrial oil	-

Corrosion-proofing of barrels, whose breech is on the outside of the frame (turret), and the sight is done in the same manner as for towed guns, but additional work is called for to corrosion-proof the barrel-venting mechanism. The following sequence is recommended. First, after unscrewing the plug from the receiver, drain the fluid that has accumulated from flushing out the barrel. Dismantle the receiver and remove the propellant fouling from its parts and housing, and also from the outer surface of the barrel. Next, wipe all parts and the barrel with a rag and lubricate with KAM-25 oil. After this, reassemble the receiver.

KAM-25 oil or MZ lubricant combined with UNI inhibitor paper is used when corrosion-proofing the bore. If KAM-25 oil is used, the clean bore should be lubricated using a bore-cleaner with an oil-soaked rag wrapped around it. Excess oil is drained out when the barrel is lowered. A thin, solid layer of MZ lubricant and oil is applied over all surfaces of unpainted parts of the breech mechanism and semiautomatic breech mechanism.

If MZ lubricant is used, after applying it to the inner surface of the bore, inhibitor paper twisted into the shape of a cylinder is inserted into the bore. The edges of the paper are overlapped. The length of the paper cylinder is made to equal the length of the bore (plus 50 cm), and its width is made to equal the circumference of the outer face of the chamber (plus 5-10 cm).

Inhibitor paper is inserted into the barrel from the chase with the breech mechanism open, after first coiling the paper around the bore-cleaner. The sheet of paper should butt up against the surface of the barrel tightly (with the lengthwise edges overlapped).

A test sheet of inhibitor paper 500 sq cm in size is inserted into the barrel from the chase. The ends of the paper protruding from the chase and breech end are folded over inside the barrel.

It is recommended the wrap the chase (muzzle brake) in two layers of waxed paper, tie it up with twine, and cover it with a cover of Fabric 500 (TT) or V film (formerly V-118).

The cover is made in the shape of the chase. It is best to glue its edge to the barrel with KhVK-2 adhesive (it is permitted to secure the cover to the barrel with strips of cloth).

The breech face with a wedge-type breech mechanism is also covered with waxed paper (two layers) and fabric (one layer).

To seal guns, it is recommended to use Gerlen-D tape (Fabric 500 or TT), U-20A putty, or 51-G-7 sealant. All openings in the turret wider than 10 mm and holes more than 20 mm in diameter are sealed with tape or glued shut with fabric. First, the surface to be sealed is cleaned of dirt and dust and degreased if there is an oil or grease residue. The tape (fabric) is glued in overlapping strips (300 cm), first horizontally and then vertically. When

gluing the tape, the protective silicone covering is removed from the edge for 20-30 cm, and the tape is applied and rolled with a rubber roller (can be done by hand). Then the covering is removed from the rest of the tape for 60-80 cm, which is then applied and rolled. It is recommended that joints be sealed with tape when the temperature is not less than -10 degrees C. The tape must butt up tightly against all surfaces and joint surfaces without any wrinkles or air bubbles.

Adhesive 88 or KT is used to glue Fabric 500 or TT, respectively. The sealing fabric is first cut out with an allowance of 40-50 mm on each side. Then a brush is used to apply a thin layer of adhesive to the armor at the places where the fabric is to adhere and on its edge (a strip of 40-50 mm) and air-dried for 5-7 minutes. After this, the process is repeated, but the drying time is increased to 10 minutes. The fabric pattern is placed on the adhesive-covered surface and pressed tightly for several seconds.

At the joint of the fabric and armor, U-20 putty (51-G-7 sealant) is applied. Its layer is 10-15 mm wide, and the average height of its bead is 5-7 mm.

Openings in the frame and turret less than 10 mm wide and holes up to 20 mm in diameter can be sealed with this same putty (51-G-7 sealant).

When corrosion-proofing the sight, all its unpainted metal surfaces are covered with OKB-122-7 lubricant. Cotton batting is placed over protective glass and eyepieces, after which the eyepieces are wrapped up in tissue paper and tied with string or twine. Dehydrator plugs (when necessary) are replaced or dried. General protective covers are dried, cleaned, rolled up, and secured in their proper place. Covers with all the assemblies, mechanisms, and instruments located inside the mount are removed and stowed on the floor under the breech ring of the gun. The rubber gaskets of the hatches are dusted with talcum powder.

After completion of the work to seal the frame and turret and corrosion-proof the equipment inside the self-propelled mount, a dehumidifier is loaded through the remaining unsealed hatch. KSMG or ShSMG silica gel is used for this. The moisture content in the silica gel should not exceed 2 percent of its constant weight. The silica gel is packaged in 300-400 gram clean bags made of calico or other cloth, enabling it to absorb moisture from the surrounding air. In packaged form, silica gel can be store in the open air for not more than 30 minutes (otherwise it must be kept in an airtight metal or glass container).

The bags of silica gel should be placed evenly throughout the airtight space and should not touch the surfaces of assemblies and parts. The entry hatch is sealed no later than 10-15 minutes after placement of the silica gel. The silica gel placed in one mount should weigh 25 kg when stored in conditions of the Far East, Transbaykal, Siberian, or Volga-Ural military districts [MD], 20 kg in the Turkestan MD, and 30 kg in the rest.

During the course of storing self-propelled mounts, the humidity inside the sealed space is checked. Its maximum permissible relative level is 60-65 percent, which corresponds to a 26-percent water content in the silica gel. As experience shows, the water content can be checked by one of three methods: using a PKV-2 instrument, whose capacity sensors are placed inside the mount; indicating gel; and test bag of silica gel.

To monitor the humidity using indicating gel, it is placed inside the turret in a glass container. The relative humidity is determined according to the change in the color of the indicating gel: blue or light blue—20 percent; lilac—35 percent; rose—50 percent or more.

The control bags of silica gel are weighed immediately before being placed inside and then during inspections in the process of storing the self-propelled guns. The water content is calculated according to the following formula:

$O = (S-V)/A \times 100$, where

—O is the water content in percent;

—S is the weight of the bag of silica gel during the inspection, in grams;

—V is the original weight of the bag of silica gel, in grams; and

—A is the weight of the dry silica gel in the control bag, in grams.

To restore the dehumidifying properties of the silica gel, it is dried in special cabinets or ovens at a temperature of 150-180 degrees C for 3-4 hours.

The self-propelled guns are placed on wooden or concrete ground plates 1 meter apart and from the wall off the storage facility. The ground plate should be 1 meter longer than the length of the bearing surface of the track and equal to (or greater than) its width. A marking is place on the turret (left side) with white EP-51 enamel. For example, Cat. II, 7.88, KR-9.86, $\Delta = 1$ percent; KAM-25; ShSMG, where Cat. II is the category of the self-propelled gun; 7.88 is the month and year the corrosion-proofing was done; KR-9.86 is the month and year the major overhaul was done; $\Delta = 1$ percent is the amount of muzzle velocity lost; KAM-25 is the lubricant used for corrosion-proofing the barrel; and ShSMG is the brand of silica gel used for dehumidification.

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Vehicle Maintenance During Storage

93UM0275A Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 10, Oct 91 p 20

[Article by Col A. Grushin]

[Text] Scheduled servicing TO-1x and TO-2x are performed to check the condition of motor vehicles being kept in long-term storage and also to replace operating materials and parts with a limited service life. The time periods for conducting them for specific vehicles are indicated in motor vehicle servicing, maintenance, and

testing schedule, and also in the annual and monthly plans for equipment maintenance and repair.

As a rule, personnel of the storage (servicing, maintenance, and repair) subunit are used to do this work. The deputy unit commander for armament organizes and supervises their actions. Unit-wide training sessions are first held with the maintenance personnel, where they familiarize themselves with motor vehicle service regulations and study the properties of the operating materials and their expenditure rates. The most experienced specialists demonstrate on one of the vehicles techniques for performing complex operations and the sequence of performing the work. The training session leaders remind them about safety regulations and regulations for handling toxic fluids.

During the month before conducting the servicing, subunit commanders inspect their equipment. They check the condition of the external surfaces of the bodies and paintwork, the reliability of airtightness of assemblies and units, and the serviceability of rubber items (drive belts, seals, tires), seats, canopy, and the canvas cover. Detected flaws are recorded in the subunit's vehicle inspection book. Thus, the amount and labor-intensiveness of the planned work is determined, and then a subunit vehicle servicing and maintenance schedule is compiled. It indicates the types and sequence of operations to be performed for each motor vehicle.

In addition, subunit commanders make out requisitions listing the spare parts and materials needed and submit them to the technical unit. Based on the requisitions, the deputy unit commander for armament and the chiefs of the unit's corresponding services arrange to get the necessary property, spare parts, fuel, and lubricants. Painting and corrosion-proofing supplies, as well as fuel and lubricants can be transferred to the subunits immediately and stored there with the vehicles.

As experience shows, to perform the work it is necessary to prepare a vehicle maintenance point, and at motor vehicle parking areas it is advisable to organize specialized posts equipped with the necessary equipment. In addition to the standard equipment, they are equipped with benches with placards and auxiliary devices, which are made in the unit workshop. In particular, it is recommended that each post have two tables (one for tools, devices, and instruments, and the other for disassembled units and assemblies), crawlers, pans for washing assemblies (parts), and containers with lubricants. There should also be containers for collecting used oils and boxes for rags. Besides the fixed servicing equipment, equipment of mobile workshops is also used for performing the work.

Vehicle maintenance and servicing work is usually conducted by the line end method. Therefore, in the parking areas posts are also organized for preparing operating and corrosion-proofing oils; for checking and servicing fuel and air filters; for checking the presence of spare parts, tools, and accessories kits; and for silica gel drying.

They are arranged so the specialists of one brigade do not interfere with those of another and spend as little time as possible going from operation to operation.

A total of three brigades operate. Their composition depends on the operations being performed. For example, calibrating, fastening, and adjusting operations are accomplished by a regulator-mechanic, automotive electrician, and auto mechanic. Lubrication, fueling, corrosion-proofing, and sealing of motor vehicle systems and units are accomplished by a greaser and auto mechanic. Painting is done by a painter and auto mechanic. The duration of a brigade's work at each post should be the same—this is one of the conditions of conducting servicing and maintenance of vehicles being kept in storage. Since it is difficult to synchronize completely the actions of all brigades, specialists completing their operations assist those running behind. Therefore, during the course of preparatory training sessions they should receive the corresponding training.

For convenience of performing maintenance and servicing and monitoring its progress, brigades are given an objective. It must provide for the possibility of making notes in this document about the operations actually performed. In addition, the list of work performed and spare parts used is entered in the repair (servicing, processing) book of the armament, equipment, or property. Based on guidance for storing motor vehicle equipment and property, maintenance procedures checklists are compiled for each post, and it is advisable to have a line schedule for better coordination of the actions of specialists.

Beginning to perform the work, the senior brigades primarily make sure that the motor vehicle is set securely on the supports. Safety trestles are placed under its front bumper and rear cross-member of the frame. Dust is removed from the surface of the cab and body using a soft broom or brush. This is done so as not to damage the paint and not to break the airtight seal. Upon detecting breaks or peeling of the sealing materials, they are glued or replaced. Areas damaged by corrosion are cleaned with emery paper and painted. The painting can be done at an open area when the outside air temperature is not below +15 degrees C and the relative humidity is not above 30 percent.

Before adding more corrosion-proofing oils to the engine and transmission, the serviceability of seals (gaskets, glands), housings, and pans is checked, as is the secureness of their fastening. The oil is prepared at a separate post, first for the engine and then for the transmission. Special-purpose equipment or electrical heaters are used to warm up the oil. This must not be done with an open fire. The antifreeze and brake fluid being replaced are poured into separate containers, sealed, and stored in closed facilities. A person responsible for performing this operation is assigned who monitors the consumption of liquids, not allowing them to be poured into systems above the prescribed level.

Engine fuel supply systems are serviced by a fuel equipment master and a regulator-mechanic. Their task is to

check and adjust, if necessary, the fuel supply control. In addition, in diesel engines they are to run fuel through the fuel supply system using the fuel-priming pump.

When performing calibrating, fastening, and adjustment operations, special attention is given to the reliable operation of the brake system and engine-starting instruments. In the event of difficult shifting of gears in the transmission (transfer box) or seizure of the switching mechanism linkage (rods), the cause of this is identified and the malfunction corrected.

It is permitted to perform maintenance and servicing in open areas during warm, dry weather. All operations begin only after thorough drying out of electrical equipment instruments and rubber parts of the motor vehicle, as well as materials used for corrosion-proofing and painting. If vehicles have been stored for more than four years, the engine is started during servicing and, cranking over the transmission, the serviceability of its units, assemblies, instruments, and mechanisms is checked. Backup batteries or model 536M or E-307 special units are used to start the engines. In the summer, the engines should not run for more than 30 minutes.

After performing the servicing and maintenance, the deputy unit commander for armament and other unit officials check the quality of performance of all operations. They do this both by external inspection and by testing using instruments. A notation about the results of the work performed is made in the vehicle certificate (log book).

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Performance, Specifications of 'Tor' Air Defense Missile System

93UM0314A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Dokuchayev: "'Tor'—The Robot From 'Antey'"]

[Text] In the mid 1970's, it became clear to Russian military experts that air strikes against troops in an engagement would be carried out using precision-guided weapons—by missiles, guided by the thermal and radar emissions of various targets, guided bombs with television guidance, and by remotely piloted vehicles (RPV's). The antiaircraft weapons that existed at that time operated ineffectively against them. And that's why the Russian firm Antey (Chief Designer Veniamin Yefremov) began to develop "Tor"—a new generation antiaircraft missile system. And intense work was crowned with success.

An antiaircraft missile system has been born whose elements have been installed on a single self-propelled chassis—eight missiles in a canister, detection and identification systems, and a fast computer. Field testing has shown: "Tor" is capable of covering division-sized units in mobile forms of battle from manned attack aircraft weapons and precision-guided weapons, including from aircraft missiles,

(guided) "smart" aircraft bombs, RPV's, and antiradiation missiles. No other antiaircraft system in the world has had or has these capabilities today.

An interesting fact. An experimental-research exercise was conducted in Ground Forces PVO [Air Defense]. During the exercise, two elements of fighter-bombers formed from experienced pilots (pilot-expert marksmen and pilots first class) penetrated the air defense system created by a "Tor" battery. The result? The pilots came to the conclusion: a PVO system based on "Tor" was practically impenetrable by the attacking side without the use of additional weapons systems.

Much has been done for the first time in the world in "Tor" (based on systems of a similar class). A vertical missile launch is utilized. A catapult launches a missile that is inclined in the direction of the target and only then is the missile's engine started. This is important for repelling air attacks from all directions. The missile has a radar proximity fuze and a fragmentation-high-explosive warhead with high energy fragments. It is capable of destroying all maneuvering targets—from precision-guided weapons to armored aircraft.

"Tor" is the first field system where a low-element electronically steerable antenna array is utilized. What does that provide? The capability of automatic tracking and destruction with high accuracy of two targets simultaneously in any weather and at any time of day, regardless of interfering reflections on the battle field and enemy electronic countermeasures. An automated television system is used as a relay system for target tracking which makes "Tor" resistant to precision-guided weapon strikes.

Tactical-Technical Specifications of the "Tor" Antiaircraft Missile System

Target detection range, in kilometers	25
Number of targets being detected and identified simultaneously	48
Formation of air routes	10
Tracking range, in km	25
Number of targets being simultaneously tracked	2
Coverage of target speeds, in meters per second	0-700
Maximum destruction range, in km	12
Destruction altitude, in meters	10-6,000
Maximum missile speed, in meters per second	850
Reaction time from moment of target detection, in seconds	5-8
Antiaircraft missile transportation speed under its own power, in kilometers per hour	60

There is a simulator in a separate cabin to train operators.

There is a transport-loading vehicle for transporting an additional combat load of missiles and a loading complex.

Missile guidance and control of all of the antiaircraft missile system's operating modes is carried out by a fast digital computer system. "Tor" is essentially a robot. It can intercept enemy aircraft or destroy precision-guided weapons, it has a reaction time of five seconds from time of target detection to missile launch. The surveillance radar detects targets (up to 48 targets) and of them the 10 most dangerous are transferred to automatic tracking. These targets are separated into a priority list based on threat criteria (that is, it is determined that this target is the most dangerous, that target is the second most dangerous, that target is the third most dangerous,...), and firing is prepared on the most dangerous and most important. The operator's task is to confirm whether or not the selected targets should be tracked and to press the "Launch" button.

And the last feature. "Tor" is the most effective system for repelling mass attacks and permits us to obtain the lowest cost for a target being shot down.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Russia's Historical Role as a World Power

93UM0201A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 10, Oct 92 (signed to press 5 Oct 92)
pp 8-16

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences N.A. Narochnitskaya, under the rubric: "Polemical Notes": "Do Not Overlook Our Russia..."]

[Text] How naive and gullible we are! How did we overlook the improper substitution of concepts that was carried out before our very eyes? The transformation of the political system and the regime was not recognized by some and the destruction of the STATE was quite intentionally substituted by others. But the state and the ruling regime that relies on it—are not identical concepts either from the historical, philosophical or the moral point of view.

We can certainly admit that each generation has the right to attempt to change life in its own way in our countries: the system of rule, the regime, and the order... Certainly even a revolution—the most radical breakup of the entire state structure, if only it does not lead to irreversible consequences can be completed by some and then condemned and rethought through a stage by others...

So, in France the unrestrained and destructive spirit of the revolution destroyed the monarchy and established a republic. Soon the Jacobite dictatorship fell and then a Thermidorian reaction followed, Bonaparte's empire, the restoration of the Bourbons, and a series of republics... But France remained France! It did not occur to any of the most genuine revolutionaries or champions of the monarchy to divide it or to sacrifice their state to political doctrines and ambitions.

We have placed our hand on the most sacred Gift given to us from above and preserved by preceding generations—on our own FATHERLAND. This is the highest property of a nation for which every person bears responsibility to the memory of those who assembled the state and also to our descendants.

Now when sobriety is returning and the people are regaining their lost instinct for self-preservation is the very time to sort out how and why this has occurred.

Utilizing the constitutional provision on the right of nations to self-determination right up to secession, certain forces in the USSR have begun to encourage nationalism and separatism and any attempts to stabilize the state or to support centripetal trends in it are called "relapses of imperial thinking". The ideas of the democrats and the tasks of social and legal reform of society are being cunningly countered by the attempt to resurrect the true understanding of our own fundamental national interests. The feeling of historical superiority of generations and the sensation of belonging to the fatherland's entire thousand year history, and not only to our own time or to a specific regime, has slackened in us for too long. The absence of a national self consciousness has permitted false prophets to convince a bewildered people that it is necessary to destroy the "bad" fatherland for the sake of destroying the "bad" system.

Therefore, the salvation of the Fatherland is in the deep consciousness of the improper substitution that has occurred and in the revival of the true enlightened patriotism that will save not only Russians but also all surrounding peoples. Only when belonging to our State once again becomes the source of values will we be able to not permit the scattering of burned Russia's ashes. Only when we ourselves pluck the foundation of our common home, Russia, from under the site of historical fires like the Phoenix that is resurrected from ashes.

So, what does the "dismemberment" of Russia that has existed for the last 70 years in the form of the USSR augur for the world?

Farsighted politicians in the West and in the East are gazing with a great deal of substantiated fear at the appearance of the conglomerate of hostile and already in some places fighting quasi-states that are capable of transforming the USSR into the world's ulcer of unresolved conflicts. But it is the collapse of the Soviet Union—of the state that in recent decades promoted the development of the idea of a united Europe—that can undermine the very concept of European Federalism which will turn out to be powerless before the consequences of this collapse.

It was often characteristic of Europe to display shortsightedness with regard to Russia and its role. And its role and fate, its primary historical mission consisted of the fact that it, as a great European power, was the custodian of the balance between Europe and Asia, between the European and Eastern civilizations. It is not difficult to note that the Soviet Union, that preserved the

territory of the Russian Empire and, the main thing, its strategic geographic borders (first of all the accesses to the sea) continued to fulfill this external function—the holder of the balance between the European and Asian civilizations. Therefore, statements on the need for Russia to "enter" or "return" to the international community reflect a total misunderstanding of the essence of its historical role.

A realistically thinking political scientist and scholar cannot ignore the fact that 4/5 of humanity lives not under conditions of European civilization, and that in Asia, of which Russia is an enormous part to the east of the Urals, almost every major state—is a civilization of world scale with ancient and powerful ethno-cultural traditions and religious-ethnic systems (India, China, and Japan). No convergence is being observed among purely Asian civilizations, for example, Islamic, Hindu, or Chinese, without mentioning their readiness to "enter", more correctly, "to be absorbed" into a quite aggressive European model in spirit or to impose their own standards. Russia with its unique multiethnicity and tradition of constructive cooperation of the Orthodox and Islamic culture must be, as before, the opening to Europe, without being absorbed into it.

How here can you not recall that it is certainly no coincidence that the two-headed eagle was chosen for the Russian coat of arms whose heads are turned toward Europe and Asia. Can't Russia, that has drawn the Asian peoples into its orbit for 300 years, neglect this vector of policy and violate the balance that has developed? It seems that Russia's "new thinkers" are not even pondering this issue, at a time when the former Central Asian republics, who have literally found themselves abandoned by Russia, are beginning intensive searches for new orientation points for their policy. We must particularly stress that these ideas can turn out to be seductive even for other peoples of Russia who will prefer "to be absorbed" into that portion of the world community that is closer to them in spirit.

Do we need to say how dangerous and irresponsible the lack of a geostrategy is in the policy of the enormous, multiethnic and tolerant power that Russia always has been?

The distinctive quality of the geographic position of Russia at the junction of Europe and Asia and at the border of the European and Asian civilizations has made it one of the major participants of the confrontation of these civilizations, having transformed the "world eastern issue" into the main content of its history. Just the Russo-Turkish wars and Russia's ultimate access to the Black Sea Region (the establishment in the Crimea as a Black Sea power) resulted in a definite historical balance. Russia became the holder of this balance and the balance that was found acquired world significance.

The philosophical poverty and suicidal nature of the new doctrine that makes Russia the instrument of a mondialist policy that is contrary to its own interests did not

immediately become obvious. The proclaimed "new thinking" was perceived with well-known enthusiasm because it signified a rejection of the "class approach" to international relations. Few people complained about the era of foreign policy that was concentrated on the aspiration to expand the "zone of Communism" and that frequently determined the support of dubious regimes and plunged our policy into adventures that were disastrous for national interests and compelled us to oppose the West's policy only because it proceeded from "World Imperialism". But it was as if some ideological dogmas were replaced by others. Now another doctrinal approach has been taken into the inventory—mondialism that is nothing other than the reflection of the Trotskyite idea of a supernational world order. "Planetary" thinking is declaring the very concept of national interests and all the more so its defense of the anachronism as incompatible with the ideas of democracy. However, this latest improper substitution of concepts and the mystification of what the world considers to be universal values.

Democracy—is just a method for the functioning of society, a method for realizing national, that is, collective, interests and individual rights. The primary component concepts of force, the positions of the state, and its national interests in general hardly depend on what kind of regime exists in a given state. This is first of all the components that are associated with the country's geographic position: the availability of ice-free ports and accesses to the sea, navigable rivers and the defensible configuration of borders. They are also the components that are associated with the geopolitical position of the state; with which countries and civilizations surround it and what is their traditional policy, military force, and tendency to enter alliances of some direction or other, are there conflicts among them and what their prospects are. These components are also identically important both for the 18th century monarchy, for the 20th century republic, for the tyrannical authoritarian and even totalitarian regime, and for the most democratic rule-of-law state. What kind of regime it is only colors the policy methods and tools. Today's world is characterized by the complication of the concept of national interest, as a result of which the interrelationship of states that is based upon mutual respect is increasing even more. However, a state's own interests, as a rule, prevail over the rest. And there are a great multitude of examples of that.

Was Great Britain really guided by the "new thinking" when its military armada sailed to the Falkland Islands to which Argentina had expressed claims? Isn't Japan really demonstrating the old thinking by stubbornly defending its own territorial interest which even causes a certain respect? Finally, what thinking guides the U.S. government that announces that the Baltic zone is a zone of U.S. strategic interests? Why is the United States announcing its recognition of Georgia, without even waiting for the legitimization of the new rule there that was established through not nearly constitutional or democratic means? Is

this really rather an attempt to reinforce the dismemberment of an enormous power that is advantageous for the United States and to assert its own influence in a region that was previously inaccessible?

Natural questions also arise in relation to the native "new thinkers" who display a surprisingly double standard on issues of national interests. Proponents of mondialism think that you can destroy the USSR, you can change its borders, you can change the borders of the Russian Federation (of course, not in Russia's favor), but it is impossible to change the borders of the other republics, even if entire peoples demand that whose rights were flouted during the voluntarist division of the country (Ossetia, the Dniester Republic). In their opinion, you need to take 1954 as the point of departure on the issues of the Crimea, 1855 on the Kurile Islands, 1939 on the Baltic states (why not the opposite—1939 for the Crimea, 1855 for the Baltic states, and 1954 for the Kurile Islands?). Why this double standard? But then again, even a single standard is envisioned—that is the familiar since 1917 abhorrent Bolshevik interpretation of all of Russian history, the attitude toward our Homeland as the primordial evil of empire, the entire territory of which is the "jail of the peoples" and to defend it is a manifestation of "imperial thinking".

That is why the real Russia must recognize its own interests as soon as possible and define a strategy for the restoration of self-preservation and self-intensification of its role as a force for stabilizing the world balance. And first of all—the preservation of its territory and maritime borders that have strategic significance.

Russia's role in the world correlation of forces of civilizations and the states that represent them was finally formed only upon the completion and consolidation of its geographic position. There are definite patterns of the formation of the territories of states that are associated with mandatory access to the seas, first of all, of major states, and secondly, of countries that it is customary to call "powers", that is, states, who due to the combination of various internal and external factors play a significant role in world policy. The struggle for access to the sea was the main content of history until the final formation of the world's political-geographic make-up.

It is not difficult to note that only states that have accesses to the sea have begun to play and until now play not only an appreciable but also a fundamental role in the world balance of power and were system forming factors in the development of all currently existing systems of international relations. For Russia, this special "inter-civilized" civilization, the geographic expansion and attachment to seas was a legitimate condition of its survival because the lack of cultural and religious missionary work, the "non-aggressiveness" of Orthodoxy (in contrast to Catholicism) required compensation of this quality.

Aleksandr Nevskiy was the first to understand Rus's Eurasian destiny and the main strategic task—the preservation of the foundation of our civilization—Orthodoxy. He directed his sword against the "Latin" West that threatened "both the body and soul with slavery" (imposed conversion to Catholicism), and the East (that demanded only material dependence) and made it the object of his diplomatic efforts. Obviously, the first step toward the establishment of a Eurasian balance in the Russian state's policy was made at that time. The path to that balance was still quite long. It led through the battle of Kulikovo and the Battle of the Ugra River and through the expulsion of the Poles from the Kremlin which they had desecrated, to their expulsion from the Russia's ancient western principalities and the liberation of the mother of Russian cities—Kiev. It is no coincidence that this path united the Eastern Slavs [pravorossy]—Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. Only 32 years after the Pereyasavl Rada that reunited the state of Ukraine and the Russian State in 1654 and, in 1686, the Rech Pospolita renounced its claims to Kiev and Zaporozhye and recognized Moscow's right to defend Orthodox believers on Polish territory in the "Eternal Peace" Treaty. In exchange, the Russian State was obliged to send a host to the Crimea to protect its own and Polish (that is—Europe) lands that were suffering from the devastating raids of the Crimean Khanate—a vassal of Ottoman Turkey.

Expanding to the East and West, Rus was confirmed as the Orthodox civilization. But Russia could only ultimately win its right to its distinctive existence by gaining access to the Baltic coasts in the Northwest and having returned to its southern stronghold—Tavrida¹.

The talent and will of the young Peter, who recognized perfectly Russia's geopolitical needs and who cleared a "window" to Europe was called for. Peter the Great also undertook the first purposeful effort on the southern axis. This path occupied nearly two centuries and made Potemkin—Tavrida, Suvorov—Rymnik, Rumyantsev—Transdunay, Muravyev—Karsk, Dibicha—Transbalkan. But without that, many Orthodox peoples would hardly have been able to withstand and preserve their civilization under the powerful onslaught of Catholic "Latin" Europe and militant and intolerant Ottoman Turkey... Thus, the fate of the Orthodox civilization at the junction of Europe and Asia was directly linked with the transformation of the Russian State into Russia. And our state became Russia thanks to the accesses to the seas and the ultimate consolidation in the Crimea which was the necessary geographic element that had global significance in the arrangement of state forces that determined the balance of civilizations.

However, our people needed another entire century of efforts for the new balance of power to be finally established in Europe and, it seemed, for Europe to reconcile itself to the new geopolitical status of the Russian Empire. And although Russia, having gained access to the Black Sea region, had saved Europe because the Turks were already at the walls of Vienna, the "Latin"

West attempted to deprive it of its status as a Black Sea power in the Crimean War. But, as A.S. Pushkin, who possessed the most amazing historical instinct, wrote, "Europe was always so ignorant and so ungrateful with regard to Russia".

Having terrified the world with the monstrous massacre of the Armenians, Turkey, the former bearer of the "Asiatic" belligerent spirit for several hundred years, was reduced to a safe condition for states and civilizations. The World Eastern question gradually began to lose its acuteness.

Right now the beyond the ocean United States, that opposes the Asiatic spirit in Iran and in a number of Middle Eastern countries, clearly personifies the world "Latin community" [latinstvo]. And their regimes are attempting to withstand the aggressive (in a modern way) offensive of the "Western spirit".

But Russia, in its last historical form as the USSR, has been staggered. It is already losing the sense of its predestination and its dismemberment has begun. And suddenly a world struggle is beginning for its inheritance. Because the balance of power has been disrupted and the world of civilizations has been set in motion and the one that is stronger attacks. Where has the main strike been directed? On the maritime borders that made Rus—Russia. It has already been returned to its position "before the Livonian War" (a section of the Baltic region). Now the task is to return it to its position "after the Crimean War"—to deprive it of the Black Sea Fleet.

It is no coincidence that during the Crimean War, the LONDON TIMES wrote that the main goal of policy and war cannot be attained while Sevastopol and the Russian Navy exist. But only that center of power on the south of the empire will be destroyed—they will also destroy all of the buildings which Russia built over the course of a century. So can Russia, that has already been undermined by the destruction of the triune Slavic nucleus (I would like to hope—not finally), permit the loss of the Crimea and therefore cease being a Black Sea power?

The mantle of doctrinairism on universal values is hardly capable of masking any longer the destruction of the military-strategic balance in the region that has already begun or the revival of Pan-Turkism in Turkey's policy and it is no coincidence that the United States counted on that in recent years. The Balkans crisis and the fate of the unfortunate Serbs who have been devoted to Russia for the first time in their entire history is also largely a mediated consequence of the weakening of Russia and the loss of its capability to conduct an independent policy based on national interest and moral obligations.

At a time when in Catholic Croatia they are already compelling little Serbs to read the Catholic Catechism, the "gray wolves" in Turkey are publishing maps where all of the Russia Black Sea region, the Crimea, and the Caucasus with Armenia and Georgia are colored by the same color as Turkey and from that region arrows stretch

toward Tatars and Bashkirs... Once again a spiral of the Eastern question, in which the "Latin" West and the Islamic World are squeezing the Orthodox civilization. It is surprising that Ukrainian leaders, who are stupefied by the stage of romantic nationalism, do not see that Orthodox Ukraine will achieve the bitter fate of being in a vise between frenzied Russophobia, the "crusading" anti-Orthodox spirit of Galicia and extremist Crimean-Tatar expansionism. That is why it is important to understand the geopolitical significance of the Crimea belonging precisely to Russia and not to Ukraine which in the historical retro- and future is the guarantee of the normal civilized development of Ukraine in a commonwealth with Russia.

I must point out that it is the delay with the final solution of the issue on the status of the Crimea, the timid initiation for which was laid by recognizing the act on its transfer in 1954 as unconstitutional because it can result in a Yugoslav result. Kiev's current policies that are dependent on extreme nationalists from whom they have borrowed the banner of independence are hastily building up military force. The persistence and rapidity with which Kiev has begun to violate both the spirit and the letter of the Belovezhye agreements demonstrates that there they sense an infringement of their rights to the Crimea and they are rushing to become a military power so that fear of a Slavic war will force Russia to retreat. Therefore, those people are mistaken who think that they can count on constructive cooperation and "reconciliation" with Kiev at the current stage, if we don't stir up the problem of the Crimea. If that were so, Kiev would not have begun to touch upon the problem of the Black Sea Fleet just weeks after the "Brest Peace-2". Unfortunately, due to a combination of objective and subjective factors, the forces who see their career in encouraging any trends in the region to the detriment of Russia, in the game of a deliverance from the complex of "younger brother", in distancing themselves from Moscow, in the demonstrated rejection of a common Orthodox orientation in policy that is impulsive and irresponsible ignorance of the historical interests of the Ukrainian people and a contradiction of the logic of history have won out on Ukraine's political scene today.

That course will certainly demonstrate its bankruptcy and the demonstration by the Russian government of its interests with the assistance of a clearly expressed political will will help this. (The absence of a strong policy in the conditions that have developed in Russia dooms the future to a forceful resolution). On the one hand, the romantic nationalists who are up in the clouds and who ignore the historical realities will understand the real correlation of forces and will reassess their own capabilities for distancing and competition. If the extreme anti-Russian forces are aroused against Russia even more and will begin to prompt Kiev toward drastic and adventurist démarches, that will sober up the enormous majority of the Ukrainian people and will show them what path threatens the region. The inevitable demarcation of Ukrainian society by oblasts, that view differently

the idea of the division of the triune people of the Eastern Slavs that has already begun, will become even more clear.

In the process, Russian policy must proceed from the fact that the precise fixation of the status of the Crimea as a part of the historic Russian State must not be accompanied by political-administrative changes on the peninsula without the will of the population for it. Russia's firm position must signify just one thing—Kiev's démarches with regard to Sevastopol and the Crimea do not have legal force. Russia's next step, it seems to me, could be a proposal to Ukraine to conclude a comprehensive treaty with confirmation of Ukraine's special interests in the Crimea and with the problematical defense from the common threat and military cooperation with the entire complex of problems that emerge. It will be quite difficult for Kiev to avoid this proposal without having revealed its true intentions.

But the internationalization of the conflict could occur at a time when Russian "new thinkers" are closing their eyes to Russia's historically preeminent, vitally important strategic and geopolitical interests. Extremist forces will go so far as to employ foreign "advocates" of universal values here and those advocates are not failing to appear in the Black Sea in order to protect either the Crimean Tatars or "democracy a la Kiev" in the Crimea where the population is clearly pro-Russian and, consequently, "pro-imperial". Unfortunately, there are not yet any examples of the capability of the Russian government to conduct a national policy. At the same time, you can congratulate Russia for not yet having transferred the naval officers and seamen who, having disregarded the general chaos and slyness, have been loyal to the oath and to the historical Fatherland and who are desperately defending Russian churches and the state's interests along with the population of the Crimea.

At a time when a course toward the division of the country has already resulted in fierce conflicts and a threat to Russia's southern maritime borders, another drama of the downfall of Russia's historically preeminent interests and a threat to its Pacific Ocean maritime borders is unfolding in the Far East. Having taken advantage of the simple-minded Russian "new thinkers", the United States has obtained the transfer of enormous sectors of the oil-bearing shelf in the Bering Strait from E. Shevardnadze. That agreement was concluded in secrecy from Russian society because it is a concession to the U.S.'s claims of many years that are based on a very dubious and arbitrary interpretation of the treaties that outline the territorial holdings in the Arctic along the various sides of the Bering Strait. This is a question of the treaties of 1824 and 1825 and also the treaty of 1867 on the sale of Alaska.

During the entire 20th century, the American side has periodically advanced claims to the establishment of its jurisdiction in this area and even claimed Wrangel Island. As a result of the increasing importance of the oil and gas resources located there for the economy, the task

of the expanded interpretation of the treaty of 1867 became vital for them. A chance to resolve it presented itself only when the "new thinking" won out in our country, an outstanding representative of which is Shevardnadze who, unquestionably with Gorbachev's approval, in secrecy from his own parliament (because the agreement on the treaties entered into force prior to ratification!) gave away the richest enormous areas of the sea bottom which the United States immediately put up for sale. Under this state of affairs, it has not been excluded that the sudden news will appear that Vrangeli Island, to which the United States has already repeatedly made its claim, has become American territory!

If the loss of the Baltic states and the threat of the loss of the Crimea are comparable with the geopolitical position "prior to the Livonian War" and "after the Crimean War", the settlement of Japan's territorial claims will transform Russia into a country that lost the Second World War. We must admit that the "return" of the Northern Territories is a revision of the results of the Second World War and the principle of inviolability which is the primary factor of territorial and geopolitical stability.

The adoption of the term "return" that was forced on us by Japan promotes the confirmation of present-day Japan's role as the successor of that Japanese State that unleashed and lost the war. But the specific features of the postwar settlement consists precisely of the fact that neither the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] or the GDR [German Democratic Republic], or Japan, or a unified Germany are in the legal sense the successors of the prewar states. This proceeds from the special interpretation and status of the concept of **total and unconditional surrender** that signifies the total dismantlement of the previous state as a political institution, its sovereignty, constitution, ruling powers, etc. It should not be confused with ordinary surrender—simple defeat in combat operations after which the previous state as a legal party conducts negotiations on peace terms. It is no coincidence that the FRG and Japan were given new constitutions and new organs of state power.²

The Japanese government's concept obviously proceeds from nonrecognition of the basis of the postwar settlement. Japan has stated that it does not consider itself to be tied to the Yalta Agreements because it was not a participant in them! The FRG never attempted, either prior to or after unification, to revise the most important principles of the postwar order in this manner. But in the future we can also expect this turn of events. Therefore it is important to not forget that present-day Japan is a postwar state and the settlement must proceed only from the postwar international-legal basis.

One other layer of the argument of the Japanese side, that certain Russian politicians shamelessly propagandize although they are obliged to defend Russian policies, also does not withstand any criticism whatsoever. This is the reference to the 19th century treaties—The Shimoda Trade Treaty of 1855 based on which a border

was conducted between the Islands of Urup and Iturup, and Sakhalin remained undivided and also the Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1875, based on which for the recognition of Japan, all of Sakhalin became Russian and all of the Kurile Islands were transferred to Japan.

The Shimoda treaty was concluded when the Crimean War was in full swing, when the English and the French squadrons were the masters in the Far East and had landed their troops on Kamchatka. There was substantiated alarm with regard to a possible similar English landing in the Kuriles which **had not been formally delimited in an international treaty**. Security interests compelled Russia to resort to that delimitation, under which part of the islands would be under Japan's jurisdiction and not subject to occupation by Great Britain. Moreover, the agreement with previously totally "isolated" Japan to trade food with Russia was considered to be a great success. Without the treaty, Russia could not have expanded and maintained existing military posts on Sakhalin and the Kuriles due to the undeveloped state of agriculture there and the chronic shortage of food.

The same situation was preserved during the conclusion of a treaty on the exchange of territories at St. Petersburg in 1875. It was more important to consolidate Russia's possession of all of Sakhalin in an international-legal manner and to secure it from the shameless military expansion of the Western powers, to which Germany had already been added. You can refer to these treaties only as historical examples, and unsuccessful ones at that!

The treaties listed above have long since lost their force because international law states that **a state of war between states terminates the force of all and any treaties between them**. It was this that was indicated by the Japanese side to Count S. Witte who was attempting to defend Russian interests at the Portsmouth negotiations in 1905 and to preserve Southern Sakhalin, while referring to the treaty of 1875. According to the Portsmouth Peace, Russia ceded all of the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin to victorious Japan which has always been viewed by Russian diplomacy as a great defeat.

It is interesting to note the role that the already at that time rapidly developed North American States played in encouraging Japanese appetites against Russia. The United States viewed Russia as one of the main obstacles on the path to its broadest trade-economic and political expansion in this region and Japan as the main instrument against Russia.

The American missions and military personnel who visited Japan at that time did not spare any effort to convince its leadership not to agree to the recognition of Southern Sakhalin as Russian and were continuously convincing the Japanese side of Russia's imaginary aggressive plans with regard to the Island of Hokkaido. Russian diplomats had to disavow these démarches all of the time and the Americans even had to offer their apologies for such insinuations.

And this intermediation at the negotiations at Portsmouth on the results of the Russo-Japanese War appears to literally be a detective story. Brilliant Diplomat Count S.Yu. Witte almost defended the preservation of the terms of the St. Petersburg treaty. It became known that a dispatch had already been sent from Japan that ordered the Japanese delegation to agree to Witte's terms: the Kuriles—to Japan, all of Sakhalin—to Russia. The American representative to St. Petersburg, having requested an audience with the Czar, began to hint significantly at Japan's colossal claims. Inexperienced in perfidy, Nicholas understood that Japan was claiming all of Sakhalin and exclaimed that he would never give up Northern Sakhalin. The information on "the agreement to transfer Southern Sakhalin" was immediately transmitted by telephone to Portsmouth and the Japanese delegation, citing that information, forced Witte to concede.

The U.S.'s current role in the discussion of the territorial dispute with Japan is pursuing that same goal about which the NEW YORK HERALD had already written in 1872—"reduction of Russia's holdings in the Eastern part of Asia". Just what "universal values" prompt the United States to this policy? This is nothing other than the constant and unchanged fundamental component of any foreign policy—national interests, the bases of continuity and predictability of foreign policy. But it is this approach that the "new thinkers" reject for Russia today, while accusing every person who raises his voice in its defense of "imperial ambitions".

Present-day Japanese politicians are also attempting to historically substantiate their claims to the Kurile Islands. These arguments in principle cannot be decisive in the settlement of territorial disputes but are rather assigned to the category of legal principles. Only that semi-official historical research and maps are being cited in contemporary Japanese literature where somehow or other the Kuriles as, by the way, many other lands, are designated as Japanese possessions. One can nevertheless find much more evidence in Japanese sources and historical works of the fact that Japan did not consider either Sakhalin, the Kuriles, or even the Island of Hokkaido which was not settled until the second half of the 19th century, as its possessions. A convincing response to all of Japan's groundless attempts to distort history is given in our literature that is based on our and foreign archival materials, historical evidence and cartographic data.

Be that as it may, the decisions of the powers at Yalta, Potsdam, and the Peace Treaty of San Francisco with Japan that was signed in 1951 by 51 states headed by the United States are the main and only international-legal basis of the current territorial solution and the status quo.

In accordance with the decisions of the Yalta conference, all of the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin Island were returned "in perpetuity" to the Soviet Union. The Potsdam Declaration of the United States, Great Britain

and China, to which the USSR became a party, confirmed that. Based on these documents, the U.S. Military Administration in Japan sent Directive No. 677 dated 29 January 1946 with the indication that all of the Kurile Islands, including Shikotan and Habomai are being removed from under Japanese jurisdiction.

We all know that the USSR did not sign the Peace Treaty of San Francisco with Japan in which the United States managed to include many provisions that contradicted the Soviet Union's interests. But in Article 2 of that treaty, Japan "rejects all rights, legal bases, and claims to the Kurile Islands and that part of Sakhalin Island and the islands adjacent to it, sovereignty over which Japan acquired based on the 5 September 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth".³

Since it does not appear possible to avoid the provisions of the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan acquired in the mid 1950's a new argument which right now is being increasingly cited with the approval of the United States that is interested in both preserving the Treaty of San Francisco and in utilizing Japan against Russia. This argument consists of declaring the islands of Shikotan and Habomai as allegedly belonging to the system of the Island of Hokkaido and the concept of the Kurile Islands that allegedly does not encompass the Southern Kurile Islands—Kunashir and Iturup. This geographic "innovation" is a "striking" thesis, although even the Encyclopedia Britannica lists Kunashir, Iturup and Shikotan among the "largest of the Kurile Islands".

The 19 October 1956 Soviet-Japanese Declaration which settled certain problems from the legacy of the war and also announced the USSR's intention to transfer the Islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, but only after the conclusion of a peace treaty, is also being interpreted arbitrarily. A declaration is distinguished from a treaty in that it is only a protocol on intentions and does not compel the parties to unswervingly comply with what had been announced, especially after the passage of more than 30 years. All the more so that during this time Japan concluded a Treaty on Military Cooperation with the United States, which consolidated the permanent presence of American armed forces on Japanese territory. It is clear that the expansion of Japanese territory as a result of the transfer of the islands will also expand the territory on which the forces of a third party—the United States—may appear.

The statements of Japan and its advocates that a peace treaty is totally necessary are also untenable. There are quite a few cases in international law when the postwar settlement got by without a peace treaty. There is no and there probably won't be a peace treaty with Germany, the state of war with which was unilaterally terminated by a USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree.

We must regard the territorial dispute with Japan as a historically successive problem that is guided by Russia's vitally important interests in the general context of the security problems in the region. At the present time, it is

necessary to disseminate to the Japanese side only that simple truth that it also must be interested only in a lasting and long-term solution. Unilateral concessions in violation of the foundation of the postwar settlement will make an agreement vulnerable to the domestic political situation in Russia where forces that stand on guard of national interests and that understand the significance of accesses to the sea and the defended maritime borders will insist on observance of Russia's Declaration of Sovereignty. This Declaration states that any territorial changes associated with the reduction of territory are possible only after conducting a local and Russia-wide referendum.

The irrational satisfaction of Japanese claims will undermine the principle of inviolability of the results of the Second World War. The problem of Kaliningrad Oblast will arise sooner or later in this regard which, after the secession of the Baltic region remains one of the primary accesses to the sea in the Baltic. So, a threat that is unprecedented in history threatens Russia's maritime borders along the entire perimeter. And maritime borders in the terminology of geopolitics are the "light-weight" powers and it is easy to smother them once you've corked them up. Besides this, any retreat from the postwar settlement will explode European international relations and will tempt German politicians to play on the East Prussia problem, and will resurrect the Polish-German-Russian knot of contradictions. Therefore, Russia must be more interested than everyone else in preserving the interrelated principles of the world's postwar infrastructure.

Few people are paying attention to the fact that, with the connivance of the "new Russia", the postwar status quo has already been undermined by the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. The Western world's attitude toward the Yugoslav crisis is actually the total flaunting of the Helsinki Act in which 35 participants mutually guaranteed the territorial integrity of the parties that signed this document—that is, in Yugoslavia. It is not the Serb Nation that is separatist and is violating the integrity of Yugoslavia. But the "civilized Latin Community" has once again manifested a surprising double standard, having called Belgrade the last Communist regime in Europe and, therefore, unworthy of protection (a familiar scheme). The Helsinki Act, a modern document that reaffirms Yalta and Potsdam, has decreased in value. Germany has managed to force its model of the collapse of Yugoslavia on England, France and the United States, and on Russia after them. Croatia, which is analogous to the quasi-state created by Hitler that fought on the side of Fascist Germany and committed massive murders of Serbs, has been recognized. Moreover, Russia rushed to become a party to it, having betrayed its Orthodox brothers the Serbs! Even Anglo-French political scientists dolefully commented on the fact that "it's as if Germany won the Second World War". It has not been excluded that future historians will assess this turn of events with regard to Yugoslavia that was made in Germany's interests, as a new Munich, that

did not assuage the appetite but only provoked new demands. In this regard, only a strong Russia will be viewed by Germany as a partner for cooperation and a weak Russia will become prey to be plundered.

The idea of "Russia's entry into the world civilized community" has made it an instrument in this community's historical and quite "uncivilized" attack against other civilizations, first of all, against the unity of the Orthodox Slavs and against the Arab world. Russia must express its right to an independent foreign policy. And all of the events on the territory of the dismembered USSR and Russia's relations with the former republics and also with Serbia must be announced to the entire world as a zone of Russia's vital interests. And this is not imperial ambitions but the nation's political and moral sovereignty.

Russia is not the West and not the East, this is Russia. Once having understood that, both the country itself, its new and old allies and its new and old competitors will be able to find ways for constructive cooperation.

Footnotes

1. It was at Tavrida that the meeting of the Rus and Byzantium occurred. The first Russian Princes Askold and Dir received Holy Baptism at ancient Khersones. Prince Vladimir was also baptized there and he was married to Anna, the sister of the Byzantine Emperors. Andrey Pervozvashnyy began to preach the Gospel from Tavrida and later—Saints Cyril and Methodius. After the formation of the Tmutarakan Principality, the Evk-siyskiy poit (the Greek name for the Black Sea) began to be called the Russian Sea, and the Sea of Azov—the Surozhskiy Sea.

2. It is no coincidence that neither the FRG nor the GDR had total sovereignty even 40 years later. A formal act on the ending of the quadripartite responsibility was needed for the new state to acquire total sovereignty. Therefore that is precisely why we can criticize Shevardnadze's foreign policy which was more concerned about demonstrating the "new thinking" than about the maximum utilization of the dependence of that process on the approval of the USSR for observance of its own interests and reducing to a minimum the political, economic, and organizational consequences of the troop withdrawals and other inevitable results.

3. Cited from: Tikhanniskiy, S.L. "K istorii vosstanovleniya poslevoyennykh sovetsko-yaponskikh otnosheniy" [On the History of the Restoration of Postwar Soviet-Japanese Relations]/VOPROSY ISTORII, NO 9, 1990.

Excerpts From Supplement to Edict of President of Russian Federation*93UM0202B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 10, Oct 92 p 33*

[Excerpts from supplement to the edict of President of Russian Federation on naval ensigns and pennants of the Russian Federation]

[Text]

1. **Naval ensigns**—a white field with two diagonal stripes blue in color.
2. **Guards naval ensign**—a naval ensign with a Guards ribbon on it, attached by knot with fluttering ends.
3. **Naval decoration ensign**—a naval ensign with a depiction of the decoration placed at the upper lash.
4. **Guards decoration naval ensign**—a Guards naval ensign with a depiction of the decoration placed at the upper lash.
5. **Jack and fortress ensign**—a red field with a white vertical cross, on which is superimposed a blue diagonal cross bordered in white.
6. **Naval vessel pennant**—a narrow, tapered strip of red color with pointed tips, with a reduced-size naval ensign at the bolt rope.
7. **Ensign of vessels (craft) of the Naval Auxiliary Fleet**—a blue field with a depiction of the naval ensign at the upper lash.
8. **Ensign of hydrographic vessels (craft) of the Navy**—a blue field with a depiction of the naval ensign at the upper lash. A depiction of a light beacon in black is placed in the middle of the right half of the flag in a white circle bordered in black.
9. **Ensign of search and rescue vessels (craft) of the Navy**—a blue field with a depiction of the naval ensign at the upper lash. A depiction of a diver's helmet in black is placed in the middle of the right half of the flag in a white circle bordered in black.
10. **Ensign of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy**—a naval ensign at the center of which is placed the coat of arms of the Russian Federation, framed by a laurel wreath of gold color. A gold ribbon with fluttering ends is placed underneath the wreath.
11. **Ensign of the Chief of the General Staff of the Navy**—a naval ensign at the center of which is placed two crossed admiral's anchors of gold color, framed by a laurel wreath of gold color. A gold ribbon with fluttering ends is placed underneath the wreath.
12. **Ensign of a fleet commander**—a red field with a depiction of the naval ensign at the upper lash. Three

white stars are placed on the red field of the flag—two are placed on the red vertical half of the flag, and one under the upper lash.

13. **Ensign of a flotilla or squadron commander**—a red field with a depiction of the naval ensign at the upper lash. Two white stars are placed in the red vertical half of the flag.

14. **Ensign of the commander of a vessel task force**—a red field with a depiction of the naval ensign at the upper lash. One white star is placed in the middle of the right half of the flag.

15. **Command-pennant of the commander of a task force of ships (vessels)**—a naval ensign of reduced size with a tapered field and pointed tips of red color.

16. **Command-pennant of the commander of a division of ships (vessels)**—a naval ensign of reduced size with a tapered field and pointed tips of blue color.

17. **Command-pennant of the senior harbor officer**—a naval ensign of reduced size with a rectangular field and pointed tips of white color.

18. **Naval ensign of ships (craft) and vessels of the Internal Service Troops**—a field of mottled color with a depiction of the naval ensign of the Russian Federation at the upper lash.

19. **Pennant of ships (craft) of the Internal Service Troops**—a narrow, tapered strip of mottled color with pointed tips, with a depiction of the naval ensign of the Russian Federation of reduced size at the bolt rope.

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Agreement Between Russia and Ukraine on Black Sea Fleet*93UM0202A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 10, Oct 92 pp 17-18*

[Text of agreement between Russia and Ukraine on Black Sea Fleet under the rubric "Official Department"]

[Text]

Agreement Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Principles for the Formation of the Navy of the Russian Federation and the Naval Forces of Ukraine on the Basis of the Black Sea Fleet of the Former USSR

The Russian Federation and Ukraine, hereinafter the "Agreeing Parties," striving to reinforce the amicable, equal and partnership ties between them based on the norms and principles of international law and guided by the provisions of Paragraph 14 of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the further development of relations between the nations of 23 Jun 92¹, have agreed to the following:

Article 1

The Black Sea Fleet is subject to division between the Agreeing Parties for the purpose of creating the Navy of the Russian Federation and the Naval Forces of Ukraine on the basis of it.

Article 2

Taking into account the interests of the Russian Federation and Ukraine as friendly nations and striving to ensure security in the Black Sea basin, the Agreeing Parties have resolved to establish a transitional period, up to 1995 inclusive, before the formation of the Navy of the Russian Federation and the Naval Forces of Ukraine. The status of the transitional period is defined by separate Agreement, which should be concluded by the Agreeing Parties before 1 Oct 92.

Article 3

The Black Sea Fleet, for the transitional period from the moment of signing of this Agreement, is withdrawn from the force composition of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS and is subordinate directly to the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

Article 4

The Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine are designated by consensus as commanding the Black Sea Fleet for the transitional period.

Article 5

The Agreeing Parties have agreed that manpower acquisition for the Black Sea Fleet for the transitional period will be performed using conscripts from Russia and Ukraine in equal proportion (50 percent to 50 percent).

Article 6

The servicemen of Russia and Ukraine who are called to complete service in the Black Sea Fleet for the transitional period are sworn to the oath of the state whose citizens they are.

Article 7

The naval symbols of the Black Sea Fleet will be determined and approved by the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine in a month's time.

Article 8

The Agreeing Parties will make joint use of the existing system of basing and logistical support for the course of the transitional period. The later procedure for the basing of the Navy of the Russian Federation and the Naval Forces of Ukraine is defined by separate agreement.

Article 9

The Agreeing Parties ensure the civil, political, economic and social rights of the servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet who enter the composition of the Navy of the Russian

Federation and the Naval Forces of Ukraine by their own desire, as well as individuals who are discharged from military service and the members of their families, in accordance with the legislation of the Agreeing Parties on whose territory they reside, and with a regard for the Agreement among the member nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States on social and legal guarantees for servicemen who have been discharged from military service and the members of their families as of 14 Feb 92.

Article 10

The joint use of the existing system of basing and logistical support by the Agreeing Parties is accomplished with due respect for the legislation of the Agreeing Parties and without interference in the internal affairs of each other.

Any statement or any action of officials aimed at interfering in the internal affairs of the Agreeing Parties will entail the taking of the appropriate measures.

Article 11

The Agreeing Parties will conclude separate agreements to make concrete the principles contained in this Agreement.

The state delegations of the Agreeing Parties will prepare drafts of such agreements before 1 Oct 92.

Article 12

The Agreeing Parties proceed from the expediency of pursuing a policy aimed at turning the Black Sea into a nuclear-free zone and a zone of peace and collaboration.

Article 13

All problems of the Black Sea Fleet before the end of the transitional period should be resolved in accordance with Paragraph 14 of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the further development of relations between the nations of 23 Jun 92.

Article 14

This Agreement enters into force from the moment of its signing and remains in force to the end of the transitional period.

Executed in the city of Yalta on 3 Aug 92 in two copies, each of which is in the Russian and Ukrainian languages, with both texts having equal force.

For the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin

For Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk

Footnote

1. Paragraph 14 of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the further development of relations between the nations of 23 Jun 92: In connection with the creation of their own armed forces, the Parties

have confirmed the importance of a continuation of negotiations to create a Navy of the Russian Federation and Naval Forces of Ukraine in the Black Sea on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet. They have agreed to make use of the existing system of basing and logistical support on a treaty basis. The Parties have agreed to refrain from unilateral actions until the completion of the negotiations.

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Return of the Flag of St. Andrew

93UM0202C Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian
No 10, Oct 92 pp 34-35

[Article by Captain 1st Rank (Retired) V. Milanov, senior naval consultant on the study of flags and symbols]

[Text] The following decision, as is well known, was made on January 16 at a working meeting of the heads of state of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Moscow: "It is deemed expedient, in connection with the end of the existence of the Soviet Union and the necessity of bringing the status of ships and vessels of the Navy into accordance with the requirements of international law and practice, to replace the naval symbols.

"Notice is given that the historically Russian flag of St. Andrew (a white field with two diagonal stripes of blue) is instituted as the main (stern) naval ensign. The President of the Russian Federation will confirm the statute on the naval symbols by his own edict.

"It is confirmed that the Navy of the former USSR will enter the strategic forces of the Commonwealth, with the exception of a portion of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet, which will be a part of the armed forces of Ukraine.

"In the transfer of a portion of the ships and vessels of the Navy of the former USSR to the member nations of the Commonwealth, the naval ensigns of the corresponding nations are raised on them in place of the flag of St. Andrew..."

The replacement of the naval flag of the USSR with the traditional flag of the Russian fleet was also discussed at an All-Army Officers' Assembly. A directive of the Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy was issued and a commission was created to develop draft statutes on the naval ensigns of the Russian Federation and the Edict of the President of the Russian Federation that is headed by First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy Vice-Admiral V.Ye. Lyashenko. It includes ten representatives from the central bodies of the Navy and a scientific consultant of the Navy for flag studies and symbols.

While the documents were being prepared and the naval flags were being developed, the mail brought letters from the fleets, from naval veterans and from the fleet community at large. Many proposed leaving unchanged the

fields of universally known ensigns, command pennants and pennants that had acquitted itself well in naval practice, replacing them only at the upper lash. This approach made it possible to remake a portion of the ensigns that had been in effect in the master sailing fleets, so as to protect against possible disruptions in the supply of new flags and, at the same time, to save money.

The conversion to the flag of St. Andrew entailed the return to the fleet of the historical jack (5) that was developed in 1700 by Peter I himself. And insofar as our Navy has ships flying the Guards, Red Banner and Guards Red Banner naval ensigns, special St. Andrew ensigns have been developed for them that preserve the distinctions that had been established earlier (2, 3, and 4). A flexible approach to the placement of one or a number of figures in the field—both those decorations existing today that have been earned by the crews and those that could appear in the future and be placed at the upper lash—is envisaged for the ships that hold decorations.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the Chief of the General Staff have acquired their own special flag insignia (10, 11). The crest of the Russian Federation is proposed to remain the current one, with the new one going on after approval.

A Naval Ensign and pennant for the ships (craft) of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] have also been developed (18, 19). The latter have unfortunately not been included in the overall range of flags that have been developed, in view of the new instructions on the resubordination of the naval border troops and the required changes in their flags.

The commission, with the aim of economizing funds, also decided in the course of its work to reduce the quantity of standard flag sizes from six to five, eliminating the second.

A new rectangular signal flag—divided diagonally from top to bottom (from left to right) with a white triangle on top and black on the bottom—has been introduced as a 3rd additional one in view of the return of the jack as a bow ensign for ships in the 1st and 2nd ranks, and it has been withdrawn from the table of flags of the USSR Naval Signals.

The commission also performed an accounting of the requirements of the Navy for new flags and their cost.

A special ritual for changing the flags has also been developed (in which maximum use is made of the prevailing Navy Regulations in order to simplify the entire procedure and eliminate possible errors) via the combination of provisions connected with the ceremonial lowering of the flag in the case a ship is decommissioned when being written off, and with the ceremonial raising of the flag when the ship is commissioned. This ritual has for the first time envisaged the performance of

the ceremonial raising of the Naval Ensign of the USSR, the reading aloud of its history, the Edict of the President of the Russian Federation and the history of the new naval (St. Andrew) ensign and, finally, the simultaneous lowering of the naval ensign of the USSR and the raising of the naval ensign of the RF with the hymn of the Russian Federation.

A draft Edict of the President of the RF and a supplement with color drawings of the ensigns, command pennants and pennants of the Navy and the MVD, their description and indications of the measurements and proportions of the elements of the drawings (see color insert and text to it) had all been prepared by the commission before 20 Feb 91. All of the documents were approved by the RF Ministry of Defense, and have been sent to the President of the RF.

The text of the ritual and the historical information prepared by the commission were sent out to the fleet after approval by the Naval Commander-in-Chief.

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The Ensign: Path to the Gaff

93UM0202D Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian
No 10, Oct 92 pp 35-36

[Interview with Vladimir Fabric and Haberdashery Mill Acting Director and Chief Engineer L. Dedova by Captain 1st Rank B. Tyurin]

[Text] *The ships and vessels of the Navy, with the exception of those in the Black Sea Fleet, have raised the Russian naval ensign of St. Andrew on their flagstuffs, gaffs and topmasts in accordance with the Edict of the President of the Russian Federation. Our public and the sailors have an overall positive attitude toward its return to the fleet, clearly understanding therein that the old one—the Soviet naval ensign—also covered itself with the same unfading combat glory in the Great Patriotic War.*

The small collective of the Vladimir Fabric and Haberdashery Mill, the sole one in the country that manufactures naval ensigns, took a most direct part in preparations for the change of flags. The collective is not large—a little over fifty people, the overwhelming majority of them women, great masters of their business. Our correspondent visited Vladimir, met with them and then spoke with the acting director of the mill at the time, Chief Engineer L. Dedova.

[B. Tyurin] Did you begin assimilating the output of the St. Andrew naval ensign very long ago?

[L. Dedova] We shifted to its output at the end of last year, when the requisition came in from the Navy for St. Andrew ensigns with standard dimensions of 180 x 90 and 230 x 115 cm [centimeters].

[B. Tyurin] How did you perceive this transition at the mill?

[L. Dedova] Our almost unanimous opinion was that the Soviet naval ensign is rightfully recognized as one of the most beautiful naval ensigns in the world. We liked it very much, and still do today. We feel that they rushed a little with the change "on high." The dispute between Russia and Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet is not over yet, after all, and its ships remain under the Soviet flag to this day. The war veterans do not approve of this step very much either, especially on the verge of the 50th anniversary of the victory. They gave their lives for that sacred object. We have also heard that many officers in the fleets do not approve of such haste...

[B. Tyurin] You have now mastered a whole "set" of new flags with the St. Andrew symbol—ship, boat, position and special?

[L. Dedova] We have provided for the manufacture of all types of flags. First we mastered the new ship ensigns and jacks. New in relation to the Soviet ones, but old and traditional for the Russian fleet. The temporary (all of the Russian governmental and naval symbols have not yet been worked out) "List" of new naval ensigns that was created by naval specialists and approved by the President of Russia is the basis for developing the color schemes and composing the flag patterns. We have been working on it since February now...

[B. Tyurin] That means that the fleet order has been fully satisfied?

[L. Dedova] We are accustomed to filling them all on time and in full. We have not let the sailors down this time either. They had received the ensigns, jacks, pennants and command-pennants by Navy Day this year. We hope to meet all of the requisitions of the Navy on time in the future as well.

[B. Tyurin] Please tell us what the manufacture of the modern naval ensign is like.

[L. Dedova] Dye production had been based here at our mill (and is it ever an old one!) at the end of the last century. A shop had existed on this location that was engaged not only in dyeing fabrics, but in their manufacture as well. We alone are left with our orders and problems in the CIS today. But we have enough problems. You yourself were able to be persuaded in a small tour of the mill of the fact that our technology for the production of the flags is very labor-intensive. We have to employ old methods for manufacturing the flags, which are moreover harmful to the health of the personnel in the dye shop.

How is the flag manufactured? First, the layout people and the artists at the mill, on a large cut of special sheet, mark out the pattern of the flag according to the approved drawing.

More than 10—15 layouts for dyeing are noted on one such piece all at once. Then this flag fabric (by the way, it is called "bunting" and is manufactured from especially durable material) goes to the dye shop, where our

women color in all of the attributes of the jack or pennant by hand along the outlines that have been applied. The material with the applied pattern, stretched out and treated in accordance with the process, is dried for a time on special tables. The process of fixing the colors onto the flag then takes place in a special enclosure in that shop on the corresponding equipment. The flag is then decorated and dried. It then goes to the finishing section along with its other "colleagues from the cut." There the flags are cut and sent to the stitching shop. And all once again by hand! On old equipment by a small collective. There the flags are finished and sewn. Then they are turned over to the quality-control department and packaged.

[B. Tyurin] Why is bunting used as the base material for the flag? Couldn't some synthetic material, for example, be used?

[L. Dedova] We do not yet have the required technology for the manufacture of the flags from synthetic fabrics. We tried nitron and it "didn't go," although it is more durable than the bunting, true, though considerably more expensive. By the way, we were working with Australian raw material—Crossfet woolen material—up until 1990, but today we are using domestic material that is manufactured from the wool of our merinos.

[B. Tyurin] Which of your colleagues were affiliated to the greatest extent in the birth of the flags?

[L. Dedova] Our whole collective takes part directly in this work. They include the template artist O. Spasova, cut-out workers G. Fomina and L. Khokhlova, coloring workers R. Loginova and A. Gavrichenkova, sewing shop foreman L. Rogucheva, stitchers V. Okhlopkova, T. Fomin, Ye. Sorokoumova and Z. Petrova and warehouse manager V. Borovkova. And many other workers I did not name here.

[B. Tyurin] And what is the cost of the flags?

[L. Dedova] They are not unprofitable to make, but there are inconsistencies in pricing today. The way we work, after all, is that the customer from the Navy for us is the GUER, with whom we work out a protocol of agreement and approve it. That document stipulates the prices for our products. The fleet has always prepaid, but look at how sharply the prices for raw materials, fuel and the like have gone up lately. All of that affects us, the profits of the enterprise, its profitability level and the wages of the personnel. The prices for the flags differ depending on the dimensions of their fields and the funds expended for their manufacture. A flag of 277 x 185 cm, for example, costs 1,248 rubles (for now), and one that is 45 x 30 cm costs 60 rubles 95 kopecks. We make 3—3.5 million rubles worth of products every month.

[B. Tyurin] How independent is your enterprise?

[L. Dedova] We joined the Vladimirlen concern, which is in turn a part of the Department of the Textile Industry, in 1992. The volume of our flag production

under Navy orders is approximately 80—85 percent. The rest of the products are one-time orders from the Navy, fisherman, the Academy of Sciences and river sailors. They are about 15—20 percent.

[B. Tyurin] Thank you for the discussion and, most importantly, your work for the fleet.

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The Fleet and Accidents

93UM0202E Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian
No 10, Oct 92 pp 37-42

[Article by Navy Chief Navigator Rear-Admiral V. Aleksin under the rubric "Cruises and Flights": "The Fleet and Accidents—(A Problem Not Only for the Fleet, But for the Whole Nation)"]

[Text] Statistical data on the accident rate in various sectors of the national economy over the first half of 1992, published in the mass media, attest that it is rising in the country. The attention of the public is directed toward this, in my opinion, not so as to shock or frighten the public yet again, but rather so that the exceptional acuity of the situation and the necessity of the fastest possible adoption of a national program to fight accidents in all types of transport and in industry, including in the armed forces of Russia, will be clear to all. It is about the military aspect of this problem that I would like to speak.

I will be so bold as to declare that Russia has its own, unique domestic experience in this regard with no equal anywhere over the last 15 years. I have in mind the prevailing system of preventing ship accidents in the Navy. This problem is difficult to solve in many countries due to its exceptional complexity. We will analyze data from the U.S. Navy and our own for comparison.

The accident rate for ships was always a great concern for the command of both nations. The fire on our nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets and its subsequent sinking in April of 1989, with the loss of 42 crew members, and the explosion in a main gun turret of the battleship Iowa of the U.S. Navy that was accompanied by the death of 47 people, also in April of 1989, attracted the particular attention of the public, the governments of both countries and some international organizations, especially Greenpeace, to the problem of accidents.

But while the principal source of information on accidents in our navy for non-specialists used to be the foreign press, with the onset of the era of glasnost (especially after the loss of the Komsomolets) materials on this subject began appearing in our own press as well from individual retired naval officers and some domestic journalists who had not, as a rule, had any relationship to the navy and did not possess trustworthy information. Their inflammatory and dilettantish features in a number of newspapers and journals excited the public for a long time.

Something similar, and with an analogous scenario, had occurred earlier in the United States as well. Here is what the well-known American naval writer G.N. (Gorz) wrote in his book, "The Raising of Sunken Ships": "After 21 American submarines had gone down with the loss of 431 people due to various accidents during the period from 1900 through 1970, many people who have no direct relationship to the navy began persistently to demand a radical improvement in the equipment intended for the rescue of submariners who had suffered a disaster. Such demands were largely of a purely emotional nature. These people, after all, receive without the slightest trepidation the news of the crash of a giant airliner and the loss of all of its passengers and crew. They simply dismiss it when they are reminded of the yearly, bloody tribute that is paid by the American people on the highways of their country. The cries of the necessity of reform in no way come from those who are serving on those submarines.

"The Navy could, of course, equip its nuclear submarines with all of the necessary devices to ensure their complete safety, but in that case those submarines would not be fit for anything. No one would deny, meanwhile, that submarines are an instrument of war and that service on them is one of the most hazardous of occupations."

But we return to Russia. Our country is in one of the first places in the mournful statistics of overall accident rate. About 50,000 (50,000!!) people die in automobile accidents each year; there were 8,000 deaths recorded, and 12,000 people became invalids, at enterprises in Russia alone in 1991 (KOMсомOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 1 May 92). There were eight railroad crashes in 1990 with the loss of 64 people; another 71 people had died in such accidents by the middle of March 1992 (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 17 Mar 92). There were an average of 23 air crashes a year with the death of 160 people in the 1986-90 period. Those losses were 27 and 203 respectively in 1990, and 35 and 249 in 1991 (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 10 Apr 92). There were 26 crashes in the Air Forces in 1991. There have already been eight over the first three months of 1992, in which 23 servicemen have died (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 Jun 92).

Despite the fact that great significance has always been assigned to work on preventing accidents in our navy, it was not sufficiently purposeful, coordinated or effective 5—10 years ago by today's assessments. The organization, principles and methods of work to prevent ship accidents were all reviewed by order of Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin in 1986, after the sinking of a Soviet missile submarine in the North Atlantic due to a fire in a missile silo with the loss of four people. Most important was to eliminate the purely formal and occasional nature of this work, impart to it a clearly pronounced preventive thrust and raise the personal responsibility of officials.

Much analytical and organizational work was conducted by the Combat Training Directorate of the Navy, as the result of which a new system for the prevention of ship accidents was born.

Work on namely the prevention of accidents (*i.e.* aimed at the objective and complete determination and elimination of the CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS, rather than just the consequences of them as had been the case by and large before) began to be planned and conducted continuously over the course of the whole year, regardless of training periods and the condition and degree of readiness of the ships. It includes the performance of indoctrinational, organizational, personnel, methodological-training and monitoring functions, technical and rear support and the preparation of theaters. It is supervised by the naval commander-in-chief, his deputy for combat training, the commanders of the fleets and formations, the commanders of task forces, the officers in charge of special directorates and the chief specialists at the center and in the fleets. The "Anthologies of Descriptions of Typical Accidents of Naval Ships and Vessels" have been published every year for more than 60 years, including during the years of the Great Patriotic War, for the purpose of studying and incorporating experience to prevent accidents. They go out to all of the ship formations, and performance evaluations on the knowledge of the reasons for accidents and steps to keep them from happening are given every year according to them for the entire officer corps before the start of the training year and every quarter under the leadership of the immediate superior officers.

The average annual quantity of accidents with ships and support vessels has decreased three times over, as a result of the work carried out under this system, over the last five years (1987-91) as compared to the prior five-year period (1982-86). Cases of running aground have declined by four times (and six times compared to 1977-81), and there have been six times fewer collisions between ships—which, as a rule, used to lead to grave accidents. No other fleet in the world has had such positive results over the last 10—15 years. It is especially important that not a single ruble of the people's money has been spent for the attainment of such palpable and steady results. The accident level for naval vessels in 1992 also does not differ from that of 1990-91. But the emotional "independent experts" who have "surfaced" from who knows where, with a poor knowledge of the matter, are stubbornly offering their own "simple" solutions to overcome this most difficult problem. They are, more precisely, not offering any fundamentally new solutions at all, but are rather continuing to criticize the prevailing situation and the naval command and confuse the public.

And although the quantity of technical incidents with ships (explosions, fires, sinkings) has been reduced by 1.5 times over the last five years against this background, it is namely these that account for more than half of all accidents in the fleet today, leading as a rule to the gravest of consequences. This can also be seen from the

data on naval accidents over 1987-91, published for the first time in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA on 21 and 26 May 92. There were 46 incidents cited there: 17 on submarines, including 10 on nuclear submarines, and 29 on surface ships and support vessels. We moreover offer considerably more information than the U.S. Navy provides in the press on its own accident rate.

Three of our nuclear-powered submarines have been lost for technical reasons over the last 30 years: in the North Atlantic in 1970 and 1986, and the Komsomolets in the Norwegian Sea in 1989. Two American nuclear submarines, the Thresher (1963) and the Scorpion (1968), were lost in the Atlantic with their crews.

A profound analysis of the state of affairs after the loss of the Komsomolets showed that the causes of naval ship accidents (especially submarines) in recent years may be divided into three basic groups:

- insufficiently high quality of the design engineering and construction of new ships;
- the exceptional complexity, lack of standardization and poor reliability of some models of weapons and hardware being installed on the ships, and
- shortcomings in the training of personnel to support the hardware.

A new reason, true, appeared in 1992. Rear-Admiral B. Kozhin, still commander of a naval base, and his staff, distracted by political struggles and having lost naval organization and vigilance, did not carry out the stipulated measures for storm protection as announced by the fleet command post in February, when political battles were underway in the Black Sea Fleet. The PZhK-70 fire boat thus ripped open its side and sank right at its mooring and before the eyes of the base command during a storm that had come up.

The development of new, more effective and reliable systems for ensuring the explosion and fire safety of ships and their ability to withstand damage is currently underway in the navy, in conjunction with industry, and the training of crews in handling damage is being organized in a new fashion. The elimination of a major fire on board the Admiral Zakharov large ASW ship of the Pacific Fleet in February 1992 is a visible result of that work. And although one sailor unfortunately died during the fighting of that fire, they were able to avoid significant losses. The Otvazhnyy large ASW ship of the Black Sea Fleet, by way of comparison, burned up completely and sank during the same kind of fire in 1974, and the crew was missing 24 of its members.

All navies, including those of the countries that are the most advanced in a technical regard, have encountered the problem of accidents. According to data from Greenpeace, 27 submarines have been lost around the world in the postwar period, including five Soviet (three nuclear), four American (two nuclear), three British and four French. There were 56 collisions, 113 fires, 12 cases of

running aground, 85 explosions and 48 floodings of interior enclosures and compartments on U.S. Navy submarines over the five years of 1983-87. There were 71 accidents involving ships in the U.S. Navy in 1989 alone, including 34 with nuclear submarines, of which eight were nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines and 26 were nuclear-powered attack submarines; they including twelve fires, two accidents with the main propulsion unit, three cases of running aground and nine collisions.

The overall accident rate for submarines of the U.S. Navy and a number of other NATO countries over the last five years, in the assessment of its leaders, continues to remain considerable, and has even increased for surface ships and support vessels. The latest confirmation of this was the major fire on 30 Apr 92 on board the Turbulent nuclear-powered attack submarine of the British Navy at a shipyard at Davenport in a compartment adjoining the reactor compartment. Twenty-four of its crew members were hospitalized with injuries and burns as a result, while the submarine sustained considerable damage and was disabled for a long time. They were able to avoid even greater trouble thanks to the fact that they were able to carry out an emergency scram of the operating reactor on the submarine through the efforts of the crew and the shore fire companies.

A fire occurred on 19 Feb 92 at sea in the control room of the new Norwegian submarine Uredd, which was underwater in an area to the west of Kross Fjord. A powerful fire occurred on board the guided-missile destroyer Dahlgren of the U.S. Navy, in which two people, died on February 22 of this year in the Atlantic.

The accident rate in the navies of the United States and a number of other NATO countries has still not declined appreciably, in the evaluation of American specialists, despite the various steps of an organizational, scientific-and-technical and practical nature that have been taken and the creation of additional special bodies intended chiefly to perform the task of preventing and reducing that rate. U.S. Navy specialists have, for just that reason, expressed a readiness to collaborate with the Russian Navy on preventing accidents. A mutual exchange of positive experience in solving this difficult problem would save the fleets of both countries many priceless human lives, and would preserve ships and the millions in expenditures that are required to eliminate the consequences of accidents.

Some journalists are convinced to this day that "every accident is the result of somebody's incompetence or negligence, carelessness among the naval personnel or attempts to blow smoke in the eyes of the higher command." The chief purpose of an investigation, in their opinion, is to seek out and punish those who are to blame (designating the "low man on the totem pole"), remove someone from responsibility and conceal from the public the true causes of accidents. The latter is altogether absurd, since no one here can conceal anything today. Secrets are being bandied about under the slogan of

glasnost today, while generals are dismissed the next day in the United States for divulging secrets of incomparably lesser importance. Not to mention ordinary civil servants.

The most strict and irreversible punishments have been used for accidents in the Russian Navy as early as since the times of Peter I. And that rule is unchanged today as well. One can cite a host of examples. But you cannot halt accidents with strict discipline and material and other liability. No one intentionally wants to get his ship into an accident and perish along with it. The main thing in an investigation is to establish the true causes of an accident, and to devise and implement concrete measures to keep the causes of such accidents from occurring.

A special, authorized commission is created to investigate each accident in the Navy, and which includes competent, experienced and principled specialists from the fleet and, where necessary, representatives of industry and science right up to academicians known around the world. These commissions analyze the ship's documents, the readings of recording devices and the testimony of participants in, and eyewitnesses to, the accident.

The military procuracy is informed of each accident with ships or their armaments and hardware. The guilty are subjected to disciplinary, material and criminal liability under the procedure stipulated by law.

Despite the appreciable and steady positive results that were presented above in the fight against accidents, a feeling of equanimity and well-being should not arise in anyone in the navy. Work to prevent accidents with ships, their weapons and hardware remains one of the main directions of the activity of the command, staffs and special directorates of the navy, the fleets, formations, task forces and the crews of ships. Evaluations of its effectiveness in the navy are made not according to the number of measures taken, but rather according to the ultimate results—the absence of accidents and crashes.

The data presented herein, I am profoundly convinced, shows quite clearly that good results can be attained in solving such a most complex and multi-tiered problem as accidents—moreover, even under our conditions of economic, political and legal instability and ruin—with the appropriate coordination of efforts among competent and responsible specialists and the good organization and purposefulness of their work.

Returning to the beginning of the article, I would like to say that it is essential to assemble responsible and competent specialists and representatives from all spheres of transport, industry and the armed forces of the country and, under the supervision of the State Committee on States of Emergency of Russia, begin the formulation of a national program to fight accidents.

I offer data on accidents in the navy over 1987-91 for detailed familiarization.

Accidents of Submarines (1987-91)

18 Feb 87—a fire broke out in a forward compartment of a Foxtrot class submarine when cruising on the surface in the Gulf of Peter the Great. Six crew members were killed. The submarine returned to base.

1 Mar 87—a Charley class nuclear-powered submarine hit the bottom when cruising on the surface near the shore in the Avachinsk Gulf, and sustained insignificant damage to the outer hull.

28 Oct 87—a Northern Fleet Tango class submarine ran aground when leaving the outer harbor of Liyepaya on the Baltic Sea at night. The submarine did not sustain any damage thanks to the soft, silty bottom.

11 Nov 87—a Delta-3 class nuclear-powered missile submarine bumped into another submarine at the mooring from inertia while backing up when remooring at one of the bases of the Northern Fleet. Both submarines sustained slight damage.

9 May 88—a Delta-1 class nuclear-powered missile submarine in the Arctic hit the submerged portion of an iceberg. The boat sustained slight damage to the bow portion of the hull, continued unassisted sailing according to plan and returned safely to base.

8-9 Oct 88—the main engines failed on a Foxtrot class submarine in the central part of the South China Sea. It ended up in the path of a tropical cyclone and sustained damage to the outer hull. The boat was towed to the base at Kamran.

21 Nov 88—a Delta-1 class nuclear-powered missile submarine sustained slight damage to the sail when bumping into ice, continued to sail unassisted and returned safely to base.

7 Apr 89—the Mayak class nuclear-powered torpedo submarine Komsomolets sank in the Norwegian Sea as the result of an extensive fire in a forward compartment. Forty-two crew members perished.

26 Jun 89—a rupture occurred in the water cooling system in the first loop of the main power reactor installation on an Echo-2 class submarine in the Norwegian Sea. The submarine returned to base on the surface under auxiliary power and escorted by rescue vessels. Some personnel sustained high doses of radiation.

16 Jul 89—an Alpha class nuclear-powered torpedo submarine went up to the surface to eliminate leakage in a steam turbine line and went over to diesel power. The defect was eliminated at sea, and the submarine returned to base with the main power installation operating in standard mode. The radiation situation was not worsened.

5 Dec 89—a mock-up of a ballistic missile landed in the sea as the result of an unsuccessful training launch from a Delta-4 class nuclear-powered missile submarine in the Belaye Sea. The submarine did not sustain any damage, and the on-board power and control systems were functioning without adverse comment.

12 Aug 89—a Foxtrot class diesel submarine in the Norwegian Sea caught the nets of the Norwegian fishing trawler Orion. The boat surfaced and freed itself from the nets.

2 Nov 89—a Foxtrot class diesel submarine tore the nets of the Norwegian fishing trawler T.O. Sinor in the Barents Sea 50 miles from the coast of Norway.

19 Mar 90—the high-pressure air system on a Typhoon class nuclear-powered missile submarine became fouled with oil in the Barents Sea. The submarine returned to base.

26 Jan 91—a decommissioned Foxtrot class submarine sank at its moorings in Vladivostok. The crew members were not hurt. The submarine was raised from the bottom.

19 Mar 91—a Foxtrot class submarine in the Baltic Sea damaged the nets of the Polish seiner NEL-136.

27 Sep 91—an accident occurred with a solid-fuel missile on a Typhoon class nuclear-powered missile submarine during a training-missile firing in the Belaye Sea. The missile silo cover was damaged. The crew was not hurt. There was no ecological contamination of the water.

Accidents on Other Naval Vessels (1987-91)

9 Jan 87—a Polunochnik class medium assault ship in the roadstead of a port on the Baltic Sea was torn from its anchor, tossed onto the shoals and covered with ice of the coastal ice fringe. The ship was removed from the shoals by fleet salvage vessels.

20 Feb 87—an Aist class air-cushion small assault ship of the Baltic Fleet sustained considerable damage as the result of a fire in the main engine room.

15 Apr 87—part of the electrical equipment of the forward machinery room was disabled as the result of a short circuit and subsequent fire on a Krivak class patrol ship. There were no injuries.

22 Apr 87—the Kresta-2 class large ASW ship Admiral Nakhimov sustained a hole above the waterline as the result of running into the pier when mooring at the port of Severomorsk.

15 Jul 87—an Osa class missile craft ran aground in the Gulf of Aniva off Sakhalin due to a large error in the coordinates of the location at night and in the fog at a speed of 20 knots. The hull did not sustain any damage thanks to the silty bottom, and the craft was removed from the shallows by tugboats.

13 Oct 87—a crew member was killed on a Kashin class large ASW ship in the Mediterranean Sea while extinguishing a fire that had broken out when taking on fuel.

17 Oct 87—control systems and instruments of an Alligator class assault ship of the Pacific Fleet were disabled as the result of a fire while berthed at a mooring.

12 Feb 88—two Krivak-1 and Petya class patrol craft collided with the American military vessels Yorktown and Caron while driving intruders beyond the boundaries of Soviet territorial waters nine miles from the coast of the Crimean Peninsula in the Black Sea.

10 Mar 88—a fire broke out during welding operations at anchor at a shipyard in Vladivostok on a Krivak class patrol craft, which required additional repairs.

14 Apr 88—the research vessel Adzhariya ran into a Turkish vessel in the port of Kork when departing the quay. The damage sustained by both ships was slight.

8 Sep 88—a Grisha-5 class ASW ship and a Pauk class border patrol craft collided in the Sea of Japan at night. Both ships sustained hull damage, but returned to port unassisted.

8 Dec 88—a Koni class patrol craft collided with a Soviet fishing vessel, which sank after eight hours, while performing guard duty for training firings in the Baltic Sea. All of the fishermen were taken on board the military vessel. The stem was damaged on the patrol craft.

24 Feb 89—the military vessel Khariton Laptev ran aground onto sandy shoals when departing its mooring at the port of San Fuegos. The ship was removed from the shoals with the aid of tugboats. The hull did not sustain any damage.

28 Mar 89—a Kara class large ASW ship of the Pacific Fleet suffered the disabling of the forward electronics station as the result of fires at anchorage.

19 Aug 89—a Vanya class coastal sweeper sustained severe damage and sank as the result of an explosion of ammunition and subsequent major fire at a mooring in the port of Ochamchira in the Black Sea. Two crew members were killed.

14 Sep 89—the auxiliary tanker Ilim of the Pacific Fleet and the medium ocean-going fishing trawler Tungus sustained hull damage in the traffic separation zone of the port of Nakhodka due to violations of the requirements of MPPSS-72. There were no casualties among the crew members.

1 Feb 90—several compartments in the forward portion of the aircraft-carrying cruiser Minsk were flooded due to a break in the integrity of the firefighting system while anchored at a mooring buoy in the area of the city of Vladivostok, which required the full replacement of some of the equipment.

21 Mar 90—a fire broke out on the aircraft-carrying cruiser Kiev at a shipyard in the city of Murmansk due to violations of safety measures in the performance of welding operations. Significant damage to the matériel and accommodations was prevented through the fire-fighting measures that were taken. There were no casualties among the personnel.

10 Sep 90—a fire broke out on the tanker Dunay, which was quickly extinguished, due to a break in the seal of a fuel line in the Bering Sea. There were no casualties.

14 Oct 90—a Polunochnik class assault ship hit underwater rocks and sustained damage to the underwater portion of the hull when entering the harbor at the island of Rukhnu in the Baltic Sea.

5 Nov 90—a fire broke out on the measuring vessel GKS-23, moored at the quay of the interkolkhoz shipyard at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, from a short circuit in the lighting for one of the wardrooms. The fire was not promptly localized, which led to the burnout of the enclosures on the lower tier of the superstructure and the disabling of the vessel.

10 Nov 90—the auxiliary vessel Agatan of the Northern Fleet was torn from anchor and thrown onto the coastal coral reefs in the area of the Bay of La Mulata in Cuba under stormy conditions. The vessel returned to Severomorsk after the performance of dockwork at the port of Havana.

11 Nov 90—four wardrooms were destroyed by fire, and some of the mechanisms and electrical equipment of the forward portion of the ship were damaged, on the large ASW ship Udaloy as the result of a fire at anchorage at a berth at Severomorsk.

20 Nov 90—the large ASW ship Marshal Voroshilov and the refrigerated transport Goretz collided at the entrance to the port of Vladivostok at night during a storm. The ships sustained slight damage to the hulls above the waterlines.

26 Nov 90—a fire broke out in a machinery room of the auxiliary vessel SFP-340 in the Gulf of Peter the Great due to defects in the gas duct of the main engine. Rescue vessels were brought in to fight the fire. The vessel was disabled for a long time.

9 Jun 91—some of the cable lines running through an auxiliary enclosure were damaged on the aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Gorshkov while anchored at base, due to the ignition of trash. There were no casualties.

15 Jun 91—two wardrooms were destroyed by fire and a part of the service accommodations were damaged as the result of a fire on the aircraft-carrying cruiser Kiev during repairs at a shipyard. The crew members were not injured.

17 Jul 91—an explosion of fuel vapors in tank No. 2 of the tanker Izhora occurred when anchored at a mooring at a shipyard in Vladivostok during welding. Three yard workers were killed.

10 Jun 91—the destroyer Sovremennyy bumped into the mooring at the port of Antwerp through the fault of the pilot. The bow portion of the ship and the berth were damaged.

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Sea Evacuation of Russians From Poti Described

93UM0365B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Pasyakin: "Russia Has All Sorts of Heros. Honor and Praise to Some, the Glory of Heros-tratus to Others"]

[Text] The tragedy of the disintegration of the former Union has affected not only economic, cultural and other ties developed over decades, but also many thousands of concrete citizens who have found themselves, against their will, in the very thick of many conflicts. In peacetime the words "refugees" and "evacuation," behind which lie broken lives, abandoned homes, and the lost peace of their accustomed existence, have become common. Russian men and women have become trees with their roots in the republics which have proclaimed their independence. In their forced return to their historical motherland, they hoped that Russia would take them under its roof. And the first to strengthen this hope in people who had lost faith in decency and fairness was the newly born Russian Army, which has taken them under its protection and has been supporting their evacuation from the "hot spots."

When the war blazed up in Georgia, the Black Sea sailors were the first to come to the aid of the Russians. By order of the then commander of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral Igor Kasatonov, a final deadline was set, by which time it was necessary to conclude the evacuation of our compatriots from Poti, a *kray* which became a foreign land on 31 December 1992. The operation of the Black Sea Fleet to rescue the people in trouble, which lasted for some months, and the evacuation of property and military equipment of the Poti garrison were carried out precisely in the designated period.

"All citizens, veterans, the Russian-speaking populace, and the families of service members desiring to leave Poti were evacuated." I was told in a talk with the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, the Chief of the Fleet Command Post Captain 1st Rank Yuriy Nichik. "In the concluding stage of the operation, from 1 November to the end of December, ships and vessels of the fleet carried off more than five thousand service members and their families, around nine thousand tonnes of household goods, three thousand pieces of equipment and arms, and 220 official and personal vehicles."

These numbers, and also the composition of participants in the operations, two large landing ships Nikolay Filchenkov and Krymskiy komsomolets, a tank landing ship, medium landing ships, the search-and-rescue craft Apsheron and Baskunchak, the patrol craft Krasnyy Kavkaz, Bezukoriznennyy and Sderzhaniy, the command ship Dauriya and others, testifies to size of the task which the sailors had to perform.

The last evacuees were taken aboard when the ships were already in the roadstead, transported there by water craft. Only 25 men from an air-defense missile unit were left ashore to transfer the property to the Georgian side. A caravan of 15 ships and vessels, many of which were overloaded and towed small water craft, left Poti on 25 December. Then after the harassment and obstacles imposed by the Georgian side, the sailors immediately had to duel the elements.

The caravan plowed at eight knots (around 15 kilometers per hour) through snow storms and a level-five winter squall to Novorossiysk. And all this time the Senior Naval Chief of Novorossiysk Captain 2nd Rank Igor Tulchinskiy negotiated with the port authorities so that the ships could put in, practically without result.

"The chief of the port, Valeriy Bykov, did not allow the landing craft to enter the port. These were the ones who needed it the most in the raging storm," recounted Igor Tulchinskiy later. "The mayor of Novorossiysk, Valeriy Prokhorenko also did not help in any way, and the port captain Georgiy Popov even refused pilots to direct the ships into the unfamiliar port."

After long negotiations and holdups, finally the tug Besposhadny left its moorings to provide assistance to the ships, but after feeling the force of the elements, it turned back. Even after the bureaucratic demand of the port authorities to submit an official request for assistance was satisfied, a second tug Tigris would not take the risk, justifying its refusal of aid by saying that the sailors were in trouble outside its zone of responsibility.

The DK-634 and its crew, which were in distress, were rescued by the patrol craft Bezukoriznennyy, Dauriya and a tug of the auxiliary fleet. But even in the port, into which the whole caravan had made its way by the morning of 30 December, the battle with the elements did not cease. The port authorities would not provide sheltered moorage.

"We tried to safeguard our craft and change their moorage sites," Capt. 2nd Rank I. Tulchinskiy told me. "But on 31 December, New Years Eve, we could not find any of the leadership, just as on 1 January. The port captain Georgiy Popov refused to activate the emergency rescue personnel, and found nothing better than to advise the craft to run aground."

In a wind which by 3 January had grown to 30-35 m/s, with icing of the ships and vessels, and their crowding of one another, the DK-634, DK-533, and DK-530 received hull damage and sank. The crew fought to save

the craft and the property on them until the last possible moment, and did not wait for assistance from the port authorities. Help came only from the director of a ship-repair plant, which "sheltered" the water craft, shattered by the elements, at the plant moorings. As for the port officials, however, evidently state interests "attract" immeasurably less than hard cash for their own pockets.

The fleet will raise the sunken craft. True, this will take a lot of time, manpower and funds, which the port officials were so hoping to earn from the misery of the refugees brought to Novorossiysk by the navy men. The bravery and the unselfishness of some in the eyes of hundreds of people, including women, old people and children, were overshadowed by the callousness and indifference of others, for whom their own peace and well-being were dearer than other generally important values. That is why they are named here by name, to the prejudice of those who risked their own lives to save others. Let Russia also know about such of its "heroes."

Defense Ministry Officers Inspect State of Discipline in Northern Fleet

93UM0365A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Gundarov: "The Russian Fleet Maintains Its Reputation"]

[Text] A group of officers from the central and main directorates of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation paid an inspection visit to the Northern Fleet.

It studied the work of various administrative structures to strengthen military discipline and educate personnel in the traditions of patriotism and loyalty to their constitutional duty.

As the leader of the group, the Chief of the Main Directorate for Personnel Work Lt-Gen Konstantin Bogdanov stated to your correspondent, this inspection, like that conducted earlier in the Pacific Fleet, allows one to conclude that the morale of personnel of the units and ships allows quality accomplishment of all missions.

Observations, analysis and generalizations will be used to adjust the concept of educational work in the Armed Forces.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

'Anti-Army' Bias Seen in Reporting of Pensions Increase

PM0402103393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Feb 93 p 3

[Report by Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel (retired), Professor Vladimir Yevdokimov: "Insinuations About Generals' Prosperity"]

[Text] It very much pays some people to misinform the public about servicemen's new pension provision.

I write with an item seen on the Vesti news program fresh in my mind: The item dealt with the sitting of the Russian Supreme Soviet session which examined the draft law on servicemen's pension provision. Following the announcer's comment that discussion of the draft was proceeding with difficulty, the figure of a general appeared on the screen. This was presumably a representative of the Defense Ministry who had endeavored to defend the interests of people in uniform who had given long service to the fatherland. We never learned what the general had said. On the other hand, viewers did get to know in full the opinion of Mikhail Zakharov, representative of the parliamentary Commission on Social Policy. How is it possible, the people's deputy asked, to pass a law whereby a general will receive a pension of 50,000-60,000 [rubles] while even a miner's pension will only equal 12,000... Where is the justice; what will the people say to us?!

At this point the transmission from the Supreme Soviet sitting, which, incidentally, unequivocally showed viewers who are today's parasites growing fat on the people's suffering, was interrupted. The bias and anti-Army thrust of such television items are obvious. As far as the crux of the issue is concerned, Mikhail Zakharov's "arguments" are more blatant demagoguery than real

substance. Where did he get the figures of 50,000-60,000 for the generals' new pensions? According to the information I have, they are patently and deliberately exaggerated. Mikhail Zakharov must know that the draft law does not talk about any kind of special pensions for generals. The salary for the post and length of service are the crucial factors.

Incidentally, there are cases known whereby a colonel's pension is greater than a general's. All other things being equal, a general's pension can be higher by the sum representing the relevant percentage of difference in salaries based on military rank. This actually amounts to a few hundred rubles. A colonel's pension will differ from a lieutenant colonel's by roughly the same amount, and so forth. Mikhail Lvovich was clearly trying to pull a fast one by omitting to mention that the establishment of any kind of pension ceiling for generals would automatically have an adverse effect on all servicemen.

I do not know what maximum pension a miner can count on today. But in any case I regard the attempt to set the representatives of two respected professions at loggerheads as beyond the pale. Army and Navy veterans resent this, particularly when the matter is presented as if they want to grab an extra slice of cake for themselves at the expense of others. This is also unfair because for the overwhelming majority of veterans the pension is the sole source of livelihood for them and their families.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Status of Russian Forces in Latvia Reported

934K0212A Riga PANORAMA LATVII in Russian
No 8, 14 Jan 93 p 1

[Press release of Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Latvia on Russian Forces in Latvia on 1 January 1993]

[Text] Some 681 military units of the Russian Army are deployed in the Latvian Republic, occupying over 70,000 hectares of Latvian territory. At the present time there are 27,000 personnel of the Russian Army in Latvia, including 11,000 officers and warrant officers as well as 16,000 soldiers.

1. The land forces consist of 6,600 military personnel (including 3,600 officers and warrant officers and 3,000 soldiers).
2. Naval forces consist of 11,000 military personnel (including 3,400 officers and ensigns and 7,600 seamen).
3. The Air Force is represented by 7,500 military personnel (including 3,200 officers and warrant officers, and 4,300 airmen).
4. The Air Defense Forces include 1,700 military personnel (including 900 officers and warrant officers and 700 soldiers).

At the present time Russian forces have 29 T-72 tanks, 73 BMP and BTR, 12 "Shilka" anti-aircraft installations, 36 self-propelled howitzers and over 2,500 various-purpose vehicles, 30 "Mig-27" fighter-bombers, 20 tactical bombers, 11 different kinds of transport aircraft, 11 helicopters, and 12 submarines, 29 warships of various types, and around 100 auxiliary vessels. Security, intelligence, and counterintelligence services of the Russian Army continue operating with impunity on the territory of the Latvian Republic which is evidenced by the presence of over 20 intelligence units on the territory of the Latvian Republic, including 11 in Riga and vicinity, three at Ventspils and vicinity, three at Liepaja and vicinity, as well as elsewhere.

In the second half of last year the Russian Army vacated 90 of the military facilities it occupied. In addition to that 50 were deactivated at the local level and the property of 15 military units sold illegally to commercial structures. This indicates that the Russian Army is regularly moving off the territory of Latvia but at the same time it is systematically violating conditions of the communique on withdrawal of forces adopted on 1 February 1992. Recruits are being illegally transferred to Latvia and violation of its air space continues. Civilian employees are recruited for military units from among the citizens of Latvia. Some 54 cases involving illegal transfer of additional contingents for the Russian Army were recorded in 1992 (2,630 military personnel), along with 392 air space violations, 38 violations of maritime navigation rules, as well as 186 violations of railroad

regulations and motor traffic rules. The Ministry of Defense regularly reports these violations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia which delivers notes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Embassy of Russia in Latvia.

The 25th Motorized Infantry Brigade was formed illegally as of 1 January 1993 and includes three tank battalions, three artillery divisions as well as other units the appearance of which cannot be convincingly substantiated by the SZGV [North-Western Group of Troops] command. The formation and deployment of that brigade not far from Riga, as well as the large concentration of troops in Riga and its vicinity, in Liepaja and in Daugavpils constitute a permanent threat to the independence of the Latvian Republic and destabilize the political situation.

The Ministry of Defense is not claiming to be accurate regarding the dates and figures pertaining to the state of the Russian forces in Latvia since this information was prepared on the basis of observations by regional services and also by the residents. Our information, however, basically does not contradict a report of the SZGV commander, Colonel-General Leonid Mayorov, to the effect that prior to 18 December more than 40 percent of the troops deployed in the Baltic region have been withdrawn. A total of 7,000 units of military materiel and 170,000 small arms, all fighter aircraft, 70 percent of the radar equipment, and 80 percent of antiaircraft missile complexes were withdrawn from Latvia alone.

Russia's 25th Brigade Not on Alert

934K0218C Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER in English
29 Jan 93 pp 1, 11

[Article by Nick Cabanov: "A Town of Sleeping Tanks"]

[Text] Last week Latvia's Deputy Defense Minister Valdis Pavlovskis and Chief Controller of the withdrawal of Russian troops Ilgonis Upmalis accused the Russian 25th brigade of hostile activity. They said that this unit, located in Dobeles and Adazi, is ready to attack Riga from two sides. Latvian officials reported that there are about 3,000 soldiers in this brigade, and battle technology from another garrison is being imported.

The command of the 25th brigade invited Upmalis and some Latvian journalists to visit their garrison in Dobeles to formulate less accusatory opinions. When we reached the 25th brigade, we found a snow-covered absence of human beings. We were met by Colonel Alexander Starchenko, sitting behind his desk under the Russian flag and map of Europe and Asia.

"I have no reason and no opportunity to attack Riga," he said. "There was a tank training division with three tank regiments. But now there is only one tank regiment. I don't even have soldiers to serve as guards. There are only 100 soldiers and 400 officers in our brigade, but the Latvian press writes about a mythical three thousand!"

"Our only task is the withdrawal of 29 tanks, three armed vehicles and 142 cars. But we don't know where we shall go! If Latvia will help us build some garrisons in Russia, I will be ready to leave in a half year."

The local residents of Dobeles have been quite hostile to this battalion, the colonel said. There have been several incidents with the guards, and some people have tried to steal ammunition from non-controlled army stores. One of three garrisons in Dobeles was deprived of electricity that had been paid for by the brigade. For each officer's child in the local kindergarten, the municipality asks 50,000 Latvian rubles a year.

It is also not true that the brigade is presently engaged in tank training, Starchenko said, since the area designated for this has been destroyed by local residents.

A few minutes later Russian General Nikolai Tailakov, head of the withdrawal commission of the Northwest Army Group, joined the discussion.

"The aim of this visit is the discreditation of rumors about the aggressiveness of Russian troops," Tailakov said. "My colleague, Mr. Upmalis, sees a 'paper tiger' in his dreams. I declare that the 25th Brigade, just as other Russian troops in Latvia, is only a unit preparing for withdrawal."

As we had our lunch in the officer's club, Latvian officials arrived in Dobeles. Upmalis demanded to see the tanks, so we went to another part of the garrison to see them, but first saw two armored vehicles (BTR-70S) covered by snow and also about 50 cars in very neglected condition. These machines, officers said, will be destroyed in Leipaja in the spring. But the tanks are in good condition. The commander of the tank battalion, Major Ivan Konstantinov led us into the shed where we saw all 29 tanks: T-72s.

Upmalis was impressed and asked a lot of questions. The chief controller was seeing tanks for the first time in his life. His past employment had been as an electrician in a movie theater. Later he had been elected in a local municipality.

So Upmalis counted all the tanks and the "inspection" was over. As a courtesy Tailakov offered him a seat in the tank driver's chair, but Upmalis politely declined. Then the restless "experts" went to another company that turned out to be empty. All the journalists were released and we boarded our bus. On our return journey we saw the first Russian army's sub-unit. Ten troops were accompanied by a sergeant, marching to the mess hall and singing, despite the snow, cold and frost.

Russian Troop Withdrawal Progress Detailed

934K0206A Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 16 Jan 93 p 6

[Report by the National Defense Ministry of the Republic of Lithuania: "How the Russian Army Is Being

Removed from the Territory of the Republic of Lithuania—Data as of January 7, 1993"]

[Text] On the basis of a report by S. Knezys, the commissioner of the Republic of Lithuania for questions of the removal of the Russian army, the National Defense Ministry of the Republic of Lithuania has distributed the following data:

At the beginning of September 1992, the Russian army on Lithuania's territory had 20-22 thousand servicemen. Five divisions were stationed in Lithuania—a total of 288 individual combat units as well as service detachments, units and subunits (a part of them belonged to the above-mentioned divisions).

According to the time-table, the Russian army must be removed from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania by August 31, 1993. Sixty-one units had to be withdrawn by the end of 1992 (first stage): 23 units belonging to the land army, one airborne, four anti-aircraft, 30 military air force, and three military fleet. Forty-seven military units were withdrawn to this day, or 78 percent of the numbers to be withdrawn by December 31, 1992, according to the timetable.

The first stage of the withdrawal of the Russian army from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania ended on December 31, 1992. The results show that the chief tasks of this stage were completed. The 107th motorized rifles division, which used to be stationed in Vilnius, Ukmerge and Pabrade, was withdrawn. So was the 119th paratroopers landing regiment from Marijampole, which belonged to the 7th airborne landing division. Also withdrawn were a large portion of the 18th transport aviation (Panevezys, Kedainiai) and the 53rd fighter bomber regiment from Siauliai with its service subunits. The withdrawal of the border guard units has been completed. All the military units and subunits are adhering to the time-table, except for the 3rd shore defense division (Klaipeda, Telsiai), the 367th individual helicopter regiment in Kaunas, and the 177th individual radioelectronic fighter aviation regiment in Siauliai.

Although the withdrawal of the military air-force has begun, it is proceeding very slowly. The military air-force units were not withdrawn at the time set in the time-table (by the end of 1992).

The withdrawal of the military sea fleet has not yet begun.

Fifty-two military objects were taken over since the signing of the time-table for the withdrawal of the Russian army from the Republic of Lithuania. The largest of such objects are: the Northern town in Vilnius, the military towns in Ukmerge, Pabrade and Marijampole. The takeover of the airports and military towns of Pajuoste (Panevezys) and Zokniai (Siauliai) has begun. The inspection of 19 objects has been completed. The transfer of such objects to the Republic of Lithuania was temporarily halted in October and, particularly, in

November. The justification for this was that the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation had no agreement on the procedure of their transfer and settling up for them; it was also said that the commanders of the military units and subunits had not received a permission to do this. In December, the transfer of military objects was proceeding smoothly.

The withdrawal of Russia's military units from Lithuania is taking place in disregard of the protocol "On the Procedure of the Solution of Technical and Organizational Questions in Connection with the Withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the Republic of Lithuania." Statements and claims dealing with the withdrawal are not presented by a commissioner of the Russian Federation but by the commanders of the military units and subunits.

Defense Ministry Denies Russia 14th Army Transferred Equipment, Arms to Dniester Region

93UM0368B Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 4 Dec 92 p 13

[Article by "A.S.": "Russian Defense Ministry Denies Transfer of Arms to Dniester Region"]

[Text] Yesterday the Russian Defense Ministry denied reports which had appeared a day earlier in the Moldova mass media regarding the transfer of materiel, equipment and ammunition from the arsenals of the 14th Russian Army to the armed formations of the Dniester Republic. The Defense Ministry stated that it had not given Lt-Gen Aleksandr Lebed any approval for such a transfer.

As correspondent "B" was able to learn, information regarding the transfer of weapons of the 14th Army was leaked to the mass media from sources close to military circles of Moldova. It is reported that for this reason a large number of confidential documents between army commander General Aleksandr Lebed and the President of the Dniester Republic Igor Smirnov have been signed in Tiraspol. In the opinion of experts, the goal of these operations may be not so much to arm the army of the Dniester region as to reduce the arsenals of the 14th army in case of its withdrawal from Moldova, and prevention of transfer of some of the property to the Moldovan Ministry of Defense. Some of the weapons of the 14th Army have already been transferred to Russian peacekeeping forces in the Dniester region.

The Russian Defense Ministry hastened to strongly refute this information. In the command of the 14th Army they are presently refraining from any comment.

Vityaz Spetsnaz Detachment Search-and-Disarm Operation In Northern Ossetia

93UM0368A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jan 83 pp 1-2

[Article by Colonel Vladimir Zhitarenko: "The Masked Detachment"]

[Text] In a region in a state of emergency, Northern Ossetia and Ingushetia, the fragile peace is indisputably maintained by the bravery, nerves, sweat and blood of Russian Service members. They guard the roads. In the course of an operation to confiscate arms or look for hostages, they surround populated areas. They are ready to rush in any moment, wherever an exchange of fire between the warring sides may break out.

There are alarms enough for all, motorized riflemen, signalmen, airborne troops. A special role has been assigned to subunits of the internal troops. They are the ones who operate at the epicenter of events, the ones who directly confiscate the weapons and combat equipment, and rescue the hostages.

Today our story is about the special-purpose [Spetsnaz] detachment "Vityaz," with which our correspondent went into combat operations.

Time and People

The first thing I heard from the commander of the maneuver forces of the detachment operating here was:

"Don't give out our names. Photograph us only in masks."

As a separate unit "Vityaz" turned 15 recently. First it was a company, then a battalion. The expansion of strength of the Spetsnaz reflects the law-governed regularity of our "recent history," with its outburst of crime, nationalism, and "sovereignization" of all and sundry. It has had to switch from operations to free hostages in homes, on transport vehicles, and in interrogation cells to halting mass disorders. In Baku it protected the government from pressing illegal militarized formations. In Nagorno-Karabakh it stood as a wall between the Armenian and Azerbaijani fighters. In Fergan it rescued Turkish Meskhetintsy from the recriminations of the nationalist bands there and in Novyy Uzen it prevented rivers of blood. In Sukhimi it freed hostages from a local cell. Then again there were massive disorders in Grozny and Nalchik, and a conflict in Southern Ossetia.

In its whole fifteen years, the company, battalion, and detachment has never been the first to open fire. Only in exceptional cases, when the weapons in the hands of the criminals were already trained either on the Spetsnaz men themselves, or on peaceful civilians. And even then they did not shoot to kill, but only to neutralize the criminals. Most often they were neutralized without fire: in the skills of hand-to-hand combat, the specialists of "Vityaz" have scarcely any equals either in our country or in the world, as is acknowledged in the well-known "Alpha" and in no-less renowned special units of other states. Thus it would not be a contradiction to say that not only the people they have rescued owe their lives to the "Vityaz" personnel, but also those from whom they were rescued.

Here in Northern Ossetia and Ingushetia, that is also how things are. By confiscating weapons from the warring sides, the Spetsnaz detachment prevents possible deaths both of the Ossetians and of the Ingushi. Why then do they have to operate in masks? Because, as the saying goes, they can't work with visors up? One would think that they would deserve only words of gratitude from the people.

"Sometimes they thank us. But usually its something else. After our stay in Nagorno-Karabakh and Grozny, there were lots of phone calls to the apartments of officers and warrant officers, and someone would politely inquire: "How is the health of the master of the house? It's surprising that it would be okay, after all he doesn't mind his own business, and that will definitely affect one's health, if not his own, then that of his wife and kids." And here in Northern Ossetia and Ingushetia we are literally pelted with questions like "Why are you disarming the people." Some sort of collective hypnosis is affecting these people. But then, see for yourself.

Six armored personnel carriers break the morning silence of the mountain and race to where local residents and reconnaissance say that a militarized formation of one of the warring sides is hiding weapons.

We sit on the top of the armored vehicle. Of course we are exposed to possible bullets, but in this way we are protected from ending up in a "fraternal grave" if a shaped-charge grenade should hit the APC. There wouldn't be any rescue from that, while our armored vests and special helmets might protect us from bullets. The soldier sitting next to me asks: "Where are we going?"

Only a few officers from the staff of the operational group of the internal troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], and the "Vityaz" command know about that. And although I had also been allowed at the pre-operation meeting of the Spetsnaz officers, at the same time they made it quite clear to me: everything you hear here, comrade correspondent, is a secret under seven seals until the end of the operation. And for all that, they tried not to name either the populated areas or H-hour. For the officers of Spetsnaz much was understandable even without "chewing." But I learned little. Judging from their replies concerning the estimate of the situation in this region and the proposed actions of the detachment ("If we get blocked in this gap, we'll have to fight our way out," and "Keep not one but two APCs in the reserve group" and "It's not likely the medical vehicle can get into these areas, so evacuate the wounded on combat vehicles,") one thing became clear: matters could take a quite unexpected turn.

The Spetsnaz were ready. The soldier who had asked the question, after receiving a mute shrug of the shoulders in replay, turned away in seeming indifference. But he did manage to smile approvingly, as if to say you did the right thing to pretend you don't know, you'll sleep better.

The attitude toward those who know a lot in the detachment is not all that good: some of the operations, seemingly planned in secrecy, led to a zero result, and it was possible that the cause was an information leak. They blame the "walls" where the staff of the operational group is housed. The telephone communications, which for all their secrecy can still be bugged. Finally, the fact that "basically the Caucasus is a subtle matter!"

Nonetheless, the detachment operates with an impressive return. The overwhelming majority of the weapons and combat equipment confiscated from the Ossetians and Ingushi are credited precisely to the "Vityaz" personnel. A few dozen officers, warrant officers, NCOs and enlisted. Even though thousands of service members have been recruited for operations. But here in the detachment they are professionals, after all.

We reached the search area. Only there did the commander of the maneuver forces of the detachment, Aleksandr Ivanovich, assign the mission to all of his men. To each of the four mobile groups, the Lieutenant-Colonel was brief: search for weapons on the ground and under the ground, for the latter incidentally they also have everything, including mine detectors, and if necessary also bomb detectors. A senior staff officer of the internal troops, Mikhail Ivanovich concludes the talk:

"Use weapons only in extreme necessity."

Our team, which is commanded by Andrey Vyacheslavich, races up to a livestock farm. They pour out of the APCs, quickly block all the entrances and exits, and comb the administrative building, the veterinary clinic and the cattle buildings meter by meter. Some of them are locked, the personnel do not have the keys, and no one knows where they might be. So the locks are knocked off with rifle butts. And after a minute or two it turns out that the key can be found after all. The commander of the group scowls: again they will accuse us of high-handedness. Although the state of emergency forces us to act harshly and decisively. Of course you don't wait for them to give you the "key on a platter."

We searched all the basement and attic areas on the farm, the haystacks and the silage, even the cesspools. On the face of it, this is dirty work, you can't deny it. But if you "look at the heart of the matter" how can you avoid it if your job is to bring peace to this land?

Someone finds a part from a machinegun trigger horn. That's all! Its time to apologize for invading the farm. But its working personnel, by all appearances, do not expect apologies, they are simply openly happy at the failure of the Spetsnaz. The commander of the group curses quietly, and orders that the "top-to-bottom search" be repeated.

The result is the same. Almost everyone is cursing. With that we leap onto our APCs.

En route we encounter another group. They have searched one of the houses at the "direction" of the

inhabitants of a neighboring one. The result once again nil. Worse yet, an old lady threw after the team: "If you had come as guests, I would have welcomed you as my own sons. Why do you act so disgracefully?"

We began to feel bad. On the other hand, if you don't respond to such "direction," you immediately hear the complaints saying that you check the Ingushi or (Ossetians), but you don't bother the Ossetians (or Ingushi).

Other groups of the detachment return with nothing. The only consolation is that a negative result is also a result. But each one understands that if we didn't find anything, that certainly does not mean that there is nothing in this region. Andrey Vyacheslavich shouts reproachfully:

"Now they are hiding better than we are searching. But we have to have our own reconnaissance data, in addition to the 'direction.'"

We concluded the operation, as far as I understood, based precisely on reconnaissance data of the detachment.

At full speed our lead APC leapt toward some repair shops, and ten meters away, right behind a one story entry way I see an infantry fighting vehicle [IFV], its gun pointed right at us. Massive iron gates, and a tough lock on them. Of course in such a situation you don't have to look for anyone to ask for the keys. Our vehicle rammed the gate on the move, and the assault troops were pouring down in the blink of an eye. They found three proprietors. Shop workers or the crew of the IFV? Understandably, they assert that they have nothing to do with the combat equipment, which turned up there "who knows how." The Spetsnaz troops have already checked: the IFV gun is ready for battle. But the slide had stuck, and that was why, apparently, they had not hidden the IFV further away from the eyes of the Spetsnaz.

An attempt to tow it was not successful. The transmission of the IFV was engaged. Combat engineer Captain Sergey Viktorovich decided to blow up the tracks and tow it on its rollers. One charge was like a fly swatter to the track. Our equipment is strong, for all that! Two charges brought the same result. Finally the left rollers were stripped. But this took about ten minutes. And half a hundred local residents had already gathered around the shops. The Spetsnaz troops were blocking entry to them for now. But more and more people were coming, they were no longer asking but threatening, demanding that we "leave the IFV where it was." Another explosion, another. The detachment surrounded the ten vehicles.

Finally the IFV is hitched up. In a single leap the Spetsnaz are on top of their vehicles. The people shout after us: "Do you think you've won, masks? We shall see?" And in a falsetto, as if it were all nonsense: "Marauders in masks!"

The column of the detachment rushes as fast as it can, but over the strained roar of six engines an even more powerful sound suddenly breaks through. A siren! From the center of the populated area, and we were still some

distance to the center. We were approaching it when dozens of people rushed in the same direction, some of them with something under their coats.

"In a different situation we would stop and check to see what they are holding against their sides so movingly," the platoon leader Andrey Richardovich, seated next to me frowned. "But we don't have time for that now, it's more important to get the IFV away."

The officers prepared special equipment in case the column was blocked, teargas grenades and others which do not kill but wound, putting those who are hit out of action long enough to calm down and let the column pass. But if something serious happened, the machine-guns, assault rifles, grenade launchers, and sniper rifles were also ready. Only now did I understand why our column was in such "disarray": the first APC was moving down the right side of the road, the next just to its left. It did not allow those who were pursuing to pass. The men in the masks sat calmly on the armor in their masks, confident. And terrible. That must be why not a single shot came after us.

Later on there was a forced stop: The IFV weaving behind our APC nonetheless had run into an enormous boulder on a sharp turn, and the thick tank cable had broken. Again we had to marvel at our equipment: the APC was indifferent, as was the IFV, which had only a scratched bottom when we dragged it off the boulder. The detachment, which had assumed a defense for the time of the "rehitching," proceeded on. We dragged the "trophy" to the assigned point. Score another one for the staff of the operational group. Although you could also look at it that the detachment had saved the lives of tens if not hundreds of people whom this single IFV might have shot up with its machinegun and main gun.

A few days later in that same staff they showed me black on white a written accusation of high-handedness and marauding against the "Vityaz" troops. With respect to the broken locks on the farm, that is understandable. What happened, happened. But with respect to the six automotive batteries and four wheels of a "Volga" which were "stolen" from the shops. If I had not been there myself, I would believe it, so plausibly was it written. The lie was refuted with the help of the author of these lines.

But the gossip had apparently spread. A little later I learned that the officers of the detachment were again being threatened over their home phones. Well of course, marauders!

Absurd times, when those doing good are forced to do so in masks, and slanderers operate out in the open!

But then again, evil is not eternal. And the "Vityaz" troops are certain that the time will come when they can remove their masks. In any case, they dreamed of that in the conversations I had with them in the course of subsequent operations. But that's another story.

UKRAINE

Morozov on New Military Training System

93UM0168C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
13 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by Lt Col Sergey Nagoryanskiy: "To Train Patriots of Ukraine: Ukraine's Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov Met With Heads of Military Educational Institutions"]

[Text] Reforming the 34 higher educational institutions [VUZes] of the Ministry of Defense and creating a fundamentally new system of military education is a job of enormous complexity. But it is reassuring to know that it is being accomplished by experienced experts, knowledgeable people, and patriots of their country. This is how the minister of defense of Ukraine, Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov, began his address before the heads of higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense and chiefs of military departments of the country's civilian VUZes.

The concept of military education did not take shape in one day. At first, a commission was created, then the Directorate of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense. Representatives from virtually all military VUZes expressed views on how to train personnel for the armed forces. There was extensive discussion in the mass media. Based on a comprehensive analysis and consideration of opinions, a concept was elaborated which, after several reviews in commissions of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, was given the "green light." One of its main peculiarities, the defense minister emphasized, is that it is integrated into the state-wide education system.

The first steps in implementing the concept are convincing us that the correct path has been chosen. At the same time, new difficulties are coming to light. Recruitment stopped at 17 VUZes this training year. Organization of the Military Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has begun. Much work is being done to create a military university at Kharkov, seven military institutes, and in other directions. This is being done based on state-wide interests, taking into account the role that has been given to the armed forces.

Until recently, huge sums of money were allocated for the needs of military education. Two and a half times as many officers were graduated from VUZes each year than are needed for the country's armed forces today. Many tens of thousands of specialists were involved in training personnel. Today we must decisively free ourselves of the burden of the past. At the same time, the experience amassed over the years must be effectively used.

The process of creating a new system of military education is calculated until 1995-1996. But, based on the circumstances that are unfolding, Colonel-General

Morozov noted, it is desirable to reduce this time period. And this must be done in a thoughtful, planned manner, by stages.

Of the 34 former VUZes, 20 remained under the Ministry of Defense. The rest went under the jurisdiction of the Border Troops of Ukraine, have been transformed into civilian VUZes as military departments, reorganized into training centers, and so forth. The decision for each VUZ was made by a certification board of the Ministry of Defense. Not all of them went through the board process, for example, the Kiev Higher Combined-Arms Command School and the Kharkov Guards Higher Tank Command School, which were disbanded.

The previous system, when one VUZ supplied personnel only for one branch of the armed forces, has exhausted itself. Besides everything else, this was not a good idea economically. Today we have followed the principle of breaking up the schools into smaller units, the defense minister said. This is being done taking into account many aspects and, above all, to increase the level of training of personnel. The system of training military specialists at civilian VUZes also requires review. Here we need to take into consideration the experience amassed in other countries. We should, depending on a number of factors, either reduce the number of military departments or change their specialty.

Social protection of servicemen of the military education system is a special concern. There are also a number of serious criticisms here.

The reform being conducted affects the fates of many people, the defense minister continued. We must keep this in mind. We cannot allow someone to be wronged undeservedly. The primary principle is to leave the most qualified specialists who are agonizing over the job and capable of seeing it through to the end. At the same time, I do not understand the positions in the localities, where an atmosphere of waiting is taking shape and where rumors are spreading that everything will be reversed. We must fight such moods decisively and be concerned about creating a normal moral atmosphere in the professor and instructor collectives and among the command personnel of the VUZes.

The concept has been worked out, but it is not something frozen. This is especially so since life today requires a certain amount of interference and adjustment. And this is natural. Therefore, Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov noted, we have to reorganize on the march. Taking into account the proposals received at the Ministry of Defense, it makes sense to make a request to the Cabinet of Ministers to retain the military departments at the Dnepropetrovsk and Chernovtsy state universities. We should react flexibly to the changing situation, the defense minister re-emphasized.

In implementing reform, from now on we will respect the opinions of people, including those who do not agree with us. We need to inform the personnel of military educational institutions and the public about the steps

being taken so that people have a clear idea of what we are doing and are not suspicious. There should be regular meetings and conferences of supervisory personnel of the VUZes and heads of military departments of civilian VUZes with the Directorate of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense and the leadership of the military department itself.

Integration of the military education system into the state-wide system and raising it to the level of world standards will require from all of us a great exertion of efforts, persistence, and consistency in the work. All this is well within our ability. The minister of defense expressed confidence that the adopted concept will be implemented and that this will largely serve the development of the Armed Forces of an independent Ukraine.

Having touched upon the question of the country's military doctrine, Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov said that the Ministry of Defense is not the body that formulates it. This is the prerogative of the state structures, and the Ministry of Defense is an executive body.

Involving all officer, professor, and instructor personnel in implementing the reform of military education creates favorable prerequisites in such a difficult matter. Concluding his speech, Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov expressed confidence that the human potential which military VUZes possess today and the experience amassed by them will help create a highly effective system of training military personnel and patriots of Ukraine, which in the end should have a productive effect on the defense capability of our state.

New Minister of Youth and Sport on Cooperation with Military

93UM0168B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
13 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by Maj Vladimir Knysh: "Combined Efforts: State Departments Restore Ties with the Army"]

[Text] This meeting had to take place. The reason for convening it was the position of Valeriy Borzov, Ukrainian minister of youth and sport, clearly formulated at a meeting with young border guards. At that time the point was that it was time for the state departments to begin restoring ties with the army, help it, assist in the call-up, and conduct a state program regarding lads in military uniform. The recent meeting of representatives of the departments concerned recently held at the Ministry of Youth and Sport confirmed that these were not just words.

Experts from the directorates of the Ministry of Defense, the National Guard, the State Committee for Protection of State Borders, and the Ministry of Health, and journalists gathered in the office of the first deputy minister, V. Barabash. The purpose of the meeting, conducted for the first time in such a composition, was to coordinate the efforts of all departments concerned, work out a single policy on working with induction-age young people, and try to compile a coordination plan. And the

main thing is to help the military with the induction of good, healthy replacements. You cannot have one without the other. As we know, they are not born soldiers. Family, school, society—all these institutions mold the future armed defender of the motherland. It is the military department, having received the molded personality, that must instruct the young man in skillful use of weapons.

Our society has obviously overdone it, in all its institutions having "overeducated" the personality so much that the very idea of serving the fatherland evokes either regret or laughter in a young person.

Having once legalized desertion, we undermined the moral foundation of the army with our own hands. And Anatoliy Tolstoukhov, people's deputy and secretary of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Youth Affairs, present at the meeting, was right a thousand times: "When they announced the return home of citizens of Ukraine, it was necessary to take into account that at that time in Russia they were shouting 'Ay!', but today we can reply." An explanation for his words is simple. The motherland received her sons who deserted from the former Soviet Army. Those units and subunits from which these lads left considered them deserters. Having returned to Ukraine, many conscientiously completed their agreed-upon service. But it turned out that there also were quite a few who decided either not to trouble themselves with service or again tried to desert, since they had experience...

Now about how the good intention "responded" to us. As Lieutenant Colonel V. Voychenko, chief of the induction group of the Directorate of Mobilization and Manpower Acquisition of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces, reported at the meeting, after the first 1992 spring call-up, there were 1,842 habitual evaders. But, you see, now citizens of our state serve only on its territory. What is more, they are sometimes only a 4- to 5-hour drive away from home (often even less). Did our older generation dream about such a thing as being able to visit home, being discharged? That a soldier once during his time of service (which also is reduced considerably) is supposed to take a mandatory extended leave. And besides, provided that he has lots of "moms"—protectors in the person of public organizations... Is there somewhere something similar, identical at least in purity of intentions of the Central Asian call-up? You see, this purity is just what is not seen in our state.

Highly competent people talked about this and much else at the meeting. Purely civilian and military, they are sincerely upset over the future of our young armed forces. They are looking for a way out of the many dead-end situations that have arisen not from the good life.

It is gratifying that the people talked not about who was to blame. Those times, we hope, are gone forever. They sought advice: How to live from now on? How to make it so a healthy generation grows up and strong, ambitious

lads go in the army? How to raise the prestige of service—a job for real men?

The first step has been taken in these directions. I believe that the next steps will follow.

Missile and Artillery Troops Directorate, First Chief Profiled

*93UM0168D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
5 Nov 92 p 1*

[Interview with Colonel Vladimir Ivanovich Tereshchenko, chief of the Missile and Artillery Troops Directorate of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, by Lt Col Oleg Vachayev: "We Are Not Given the Right To Make a Mistake"]

[Text] **Background.** Born in 1946. Graduated from the Suma Higher Artillery Command School imeni M.V. Frunze and the Military Artillery Academy imeni M.I. Kalinin. Served in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Ukraine, and the Turkestan Military District. He served consecutively in all positions from platoon commander to deputy chief of district missile and artillery troops. In September he was appointed chief of the Missile and Artillery Troops Directorate of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

[Vachayev] Vladimir Ivanovich, the Missile and Artillery Troops Directorate in the structure of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was created relatively recently. Prior to this, as far as I know, two separate offices existed in various directorates. Is the return to the previous structure a tribute to the past or a vital necessity?

[Tereshchenko] I admit that I was somewhat surprised when I came to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine that I did not discover a single command and control body for such an important combat arm. Working as chief of one of the offices, I concluded that the volume of tasks urgently dictates the need to create an independent directorate. But, I was not the only one who thought this.

I want to emphasize that here is precisely a case when, on the one hand, initiative from below helped and, on the other, the experience in the work and development of the Main Staff demonstrated to its leadership that the presence of uncoordinated offices does not make up for the lack of a Directorate of Missile and Artillery Troops.

I know from experience that in combat, for effective engagement of the enemy, the volume of fire missions are sort of distributed among combat arms. Thus, for the missile troops and artillery it is 60-70 percent. That is why the Missile and Artillery Troops are an independent combat arm waging combat and not supplementing someone. That means we need the appropriate command and control of this combat arm from bottom to top.

Incidentally, I am grateful to NARODNA ARMIYA for defending this viewpoint on its pages.

At the same time, I want to be understood correctly. I am not at all saying that the fact that it initially was that way and then changed was some fatal mistake, nor am I making a dig at someone. This is a completely normal process when the truth emerges in arguments and clashes of opinions. The new decision was also prompted by the new tasks facing the Missile and Artillery Troops of the Army of an independent state...

[Vachayev] Please, go into a little more detail on this.

[Tereshchenko] Only a directorate can accomplish the tasks of combat employment of the Missile and Artillery Troops on the scale of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And, first of all, it has to deal with issues of development of artillery science and its connection with scientific research institutions; orders and control of the entire process of creating armament and equipment; training personnel; drawing up field manuals, courses, regulations, gunnery regulations and procedures, and so forth. Hence, the demands on officers assigned to headquarters also increase. Many of them, as you know, are well-trained people having command and job-related experience. But this is only half of it. I want to create a good atmosphere in the collectives enabling them to work in an emancipated way, without looking back at someone's authority. Businesslike, principled relations with the appropriate directorates of the districts, armies, and, of course, in the Ministry of Defense itself and the Main Staff are just as important.

[Vachayev] But, I think, these are only some of the tasks. The main ones are still linked to the troops.

[Tereshchenko] You are absolutely correct. Due to certain reasons, combat training in the troops has been conducted, say, on a case by case basis. Therefore, I began my work by checking the combat effectiveness of the Missile and Artillery Troops. The performance evaluation exercises and live artillery firings conducted in a number of formations and units (incidentally, for the first time in the last one and a half to two years) provided a general picture giving plenty of food for thought and practical deeds.

The main indicators of the troops are their combat readiness and combat effectiveness. And it is only from these positions that we should approach combat training, and only these basic tenets can be used as criteria for all deeds and achieved results. Let us be candid: for many years, an improper attitude towards combat readiness and combat training flourished, which manifested itself in deception, window-dressing, irresponsibility, and impunity. We are obligated to move away from this, to get rid of these shameful phenomena. It can be no other way, otherwise there cannot be real Armed Forces of Ukraine and Missile and Artillery Troops as a important component of them. And we must not be mistaken, the role of the directorate in this is dominant.

[Vachayev] The combat training of the troops is depends directly on the state of the training facilities. Moreover, it was noted long ago that the attitude in the unit and formation towards combat training is the same as at the training range and training center...

[Tereshchenko] ...And that is one of the most important elements of this problem. Another is that the content of the material base is reflected in the our young state's shortage of money. Hence the attitude towards the future material base, at the basis of which is a differentiated approach: if something is not suitable here, something will be improved. But under no circumstances will this be extensive. We do not need huge ranges; the state of the training facilities should reach new horizons in accordance with the new missions facing the missile and artillery troops.

[Vachayev] However, the specific nature of this combat arm is that it requires special conditions for combat work. It is known, for example, that all the large training ranges remained on the territory of Russia...

[Tereshchenko] Indeed, there are certain difficulties. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has offered to let us accomplish these missions at their state training range... Today we have not taken them up on that. I want to say that there also are possibilities in Ukraine for live firings virtually without restriction. What is more, the former artillery training center of the Kiev Military District already has its own training range with the necessary structures, which, I would emphasize, makes it possible to accomplish many tasks qualitatively without occupying additional areas. Thus, everything is in order here, and the main thing is to get down to business. And we will not depart from these positions.

[Vachayev] What about the prospects of development of armament, since this is no minor issue for the directorate?

[Tereshchenko] As of today, we have everything necessary for the Missile and Artillery Troops in the sufficient amount. But in the future, the armed forces may end up in a difficult situation, since the entire production complex is concentrated in Russia.

On the other hand, we have a sufficient scientific potential. My viewpoint on this issue is this: maintain the existing armament in battle-ready condition, direct the main efforts at creating Ukraine's military-industrial complex under a closed cycle, and begin creating weapon systems. I hope that with the appointment of a new Cabinet of Ministers we will establish a strong contact with the military-industrial complex and scientists, a program will appear, and orders will be placed. We are ready for this already today.

[Vachayev] Vladimir Ivanovich, artillery is called the god of war, but by no means do gods serve in it. At the same time, the training of a missile or artillery officer has its own specific nature. It is not interrupted even when there is a diploma of higher education in the pocket. Is Ukraine capable of training such personnel?

[Tereshchenko] On the whole, I share the concept of reforming military education. I agree that the level of general educational training, which is supposed to be achieved, will give very much to a future officer. I am concerned that in doing so the qualities of a purely professional context not be left in vain. I do not totally understand the fact that the Suma Artillery School is being eliminated, and we are counting on the Odessa School as part of the institute of ground defense to train artillery officers. I would have chosen the Kharkov Military University as the single center for training missile and artillery officers and for developing military science and research and development.

The training base of the Suma Higher Artillery Command School looks to be much more preferable in its capabilities, and the training center is more powerful than the Odessa School located in a resort area in the immediate proximity of a port-area plant that is not very successful from the ecological standpoint. Certain restrictions on the number and types of arms which are much greater in the Odessa Military District than, say, in other districts. And this cannot help but affect supplying the institute with all types of weapons. In addition, powerful defense enterprises are concentrated in northern and eastern Ukraine, which helps bring the scientific-production and training structures closer together.

I cannot imagine today's artillery or missile officer without a knowledge of the fundamentals of combined-arms combat. You see, without knowing all the missions being carried out by the combined-arms commander, we will not be able to organize effective engagement of the enemy. Therefore, the most important task for officers is to combine a high degree of combined-arms training and professionalism. Believe me, no offense is meant to representatives of other combat arms, but the training of artillery and missile officers and subsequent professional training are a special process which cannot be interrupted for a single day. Much in this depends on the person, his pride in belonging to the Missile and Artillery Troops, and the conscience and honesty of an officer...

For our part, we will do all we can to carry out the tasks given by the people of Ukraine to the armed forces and the large detachment of missile and artillery personnel. The one thing we have not been given is the right to make a mistake. Otherwise, we again have stagnation.

[Vachayev] There is a question I must ask. The Army of the former USSR annually celebrated Missile and Artillery Troops Day. The USSR and its army are no longer, but will there be a similar holiday in the Armed Forces of Ukraine? What do you think about this?

[Tereshchenko] I am deeply convinced that the missile and artillery personnel, including veterans, have earned the right to their own professional holiday. After all, it

was on the territory of Ukraine that the artillery personnel made a decisive contribution to the overall victory in the Great Patriotic War. In short, there are quite a number of dates that could be used as the holiday for the Missile and Artillery Troops. The task for all of us, and not only historians, is to find such a day.

Army's Security Roles, Legal Bases Set Forth

93UM0127B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
17 Oct 92 pp 2-3

[Article by Lt Col (Ret.) Vladimir Lartsev: "For the Sake of Our Ukrainian Homeland's Security"; first paragraph is NARODNA ARMIYA introduction; article is to be continued]

[Text] In the history of every people there are dates that constitute guideposts not only for contemporaries, but for successive generations of the particular country as well. It was this kind of turning point for Ukraine that occurred on 24 August 1992. That was the day, as you know, when the republic's Supreme Soviet passed the Act of Independence. The people of Ukraine were granted one more historic chance to realize their centuries-old dream: building a free and democratic state.

Predictable Nature of the Rise of Ukrainian Statehood

The phenomenon of independence that transpired last year, in spite of the unexpectedness of its occurrence, was quite predictable. World history witnessed the disintegration of all empires existing in the 19th and 20th centuries. This holds true for the English and French colonial systems, Austro-Hungary, the Turkish Empire, and the attempt to create the Third Reich of fascist Germany. The Soviet Union is not an exception.

The main causes of the above do not lie in a coincidence of circumstances, in subjective activity of prominent personalities, or even with large social groups of people, but rather in economic differences existing between individual territories, areas, and countries, in characteristic differences of cultural and spiritual bases of various nations and entire peoples.

The Ukrainian people have lived on their land since ancient times. The roots of their statehood are buried in the depths of centuries. The first documentary proof attesting to the existence of an independent Kievan principality is found in the 9th century A. D. Kievan Rus emerged on the boundaries of forthcoming centuries as one of the most powerful and civilized states in the world. The Ukrainian people at that time built a highly-developed society, created a rich and original culture, and converted to Christianity in the year 988.

Also predictable was the fact that our Supreme Soviet passed along with the Act of Independence the decree on military units located in Ukraine by which it made subordinate to itself all the troops of the Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian Military Districts and the Black Sea Fleet, while tasking the government to undertake the

creation of the national Armed Forces and the Republic Guard. This was not merely a case whereby the UkSSR on 19-21 August found itself defenseless against the threats issued by emissaries from the GKChP [State Committee on Emergencies] headed by Army General V. Varennikov. It was in part simply a case of Ukraine's people possessing since days of yore rich military traditions. The latter were born in years of severe military trials. The geopolitical situation and the great migrations of peoples from Asia to Europe from the south to the north occurring from the end of the 1st millennium compelled the Ukrainian people to take up arms to defend their homes, hard-earned possessions, and their fathers' land from the Polovtsy, then from the Turks in the south and the southeast, the Mongol Tartars in the east, Polish and Lithuanian knights in the northwest, Hungarian and Moldavian princes in the west, and serfdom-advocating Russians in the north and the northeast. Written for eternity on the pages of history of military art are the smashing victories of the Princes Svyatoslav, Vladimir the Great, Yaroslav the Wise and Danil Galitskiy, and the Zaporozhe Cossacks.

In the same vein, the accelerated effort to create our own army without delay was also fueled by the tragic experience suffered in the recent past. It is common knowledge that it was nothing less than underestimation of the army's value as a means of defending sovereignty and independence that led to the defeat of the Ukrainian People's Republic in the year 1918.

Ukraine's decision to build her own Armed Forces is also reasonable from the ideological and theoretical point of view. In the first place, they constitute an essential element of the national security system presently in the process of creation. Secondly, there is the consideration of the fact that mankind has not yet attained the level at which wars are no longer a threat. Striking examples of the latter abound, even in the last decade. Thirdly, the Commonwealth of Independent States does not constitute a state organization. Therefore, all the efforts being exerted by existing circles to retain unified armed forces do more than contradict elementary logic; they have laid the groundwork for the threat that they could, under certain circumstances, emerge from the bonds of control to stifle the processes of national rebirth arising in young countries in the midst of the ruins of the USSR.

Altogether another matter is the necessity of retaining for the transitional period, within the framework of the CIS, a unified command for the strategic forces. Underlying this need are factors relating to the assurance of international security and fulfilling the obligations for observing all international agreements and treaties signed by the USSR and our parliament's stated intent to pursue a nuclear-free policy.

The fourth consideration here is that even if our people were to ignore the rules of common sense to declare a mindless peace-loving goal by divesting themselves of the burden of an army, they still would not be able to accomplish this, since the several hundred thousand

officers and warrant officers Ukraine "received" from the USSR as an "inheritance" would have constituted a death knell for the young state.

Ukraine's leadership, having declared its goal of creating a civilized and democratic society, proceeded further in a legal manner in the military area as well. Serving as a point of departure in this regard was the right of Ukraine's people to possess their own army, as set down in the Declaration of State Sovereignty passed on 16 July 1990 by the Supreme Soviet.

After the August 1991 happenings, the higher bodies of our system faced three routes relative to creating our own Armed Forces. The Supreme Soviet could have followed the example of the Baltics by declaring the Soviet Army to be *persona non grata* and requesting the troops to withdraw from the soil of the independent republic. It could have undertaken the creation of our own army with the existing military force in the background. However, our parliament, having initiated the construction of the national Armed Forces on the basis of the Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian Military Districts and the Black Sea Fleet, acted in the name of the Ukraine's people, thus extending trust and high honor to all personnel of the included troops.

The subsequent step in the legal sense was development of the first package of legislative acts dealing with military topics: the Decree on Concept of Defense and Construction of Ukraine Armed Forces; and the Law on Defense, the Law on Armed Forces, the Law on Social and Legal Protection for Servicemen and Their Dependents, the Law on Universal Military Obligation and Military Service, the Law on Pensions for Servicemen, and the Law on the Military Concept Doctrine.

With the 30 December 1991 special agreement concluded by the state heads of the CIS in Minsk as a basis, on 3 January 1992 we commenced administering the oath to personnel of the Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian Military Districts and the Black Sea Fleet.

The purpose of settling differences was served by signing with the High Command of the Unified Armed Forces in Minsk in February of 1992 agreements dealing with the status of the Strategic Forces; by principles for assuring the armed forces of Commonwealth member countries a supply of weapons, equipment, and materiel; the drafting of a single defense budget and associated financing; and social and legal guarantees for servicemen discharged from military service and their dependents. Detailed legal work of an internal and interstate nature is in progress. It will expand as time goes on.

Phases in Construction of the Ukrainian Army

To conduct a thorough and scientifically valid analysis of the results and lessons learned relative to construction of the Ukraine Armed Forces, of prime importance is the determination of the principal phases of this process.

The preliminary phase encompassed the period starting with 16 July 1990 and ending on 24 August 1991. It was characterized by a significant increase in criticism of the shortcomings in all aspects associated with the Soviet Armed Forces. Becoming especially active with the considerable increase in frequency of violation of interpersonal behavior regulations was the Soldiers' Mothers movement. The Supreme Soviet, acting under pressure exerted by the movement, took action in the fall of 1990 by attempting to forbid the assignment of inductees outside the Ukraine's borders. The democratic press of Kiev, Kharkov, Lvov, Odessa, and Rovno started to print articles written by progressively-thinking servicemen who offered their suggestions for creating a national army. Quite a few of their ideas were included into program documents prepared by Ruch, the Republic Party, the Ukraine Democratic Rebirth Party, the Democratic Party, and by a number of other parties. This was a time when the first officers and warrant officers voluntarily and involuntarily left the CPSU on ideological grounds to join the new parties.

A theoretical conference for discussing ways in which to build the Ukraine Armed Forces was held on 2 and 3 February 1991 in Kiev under the aegis of Ruch. Also called at that time, at the Kiev People's Assembly Institute, was a founders' meeting of the Sozidatel, a union of social protection for servicemen, pensioners, and their dependents.

Harassment and persecution of servicemen who had come out in favor of independence for Ukraine were initiated in the spring and summer of 1991 at the instigation of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Some of the personnel were discharged from the Army under flimsy excuses.

In spite of furious reaction and open threats on the part of the High Command and political agencies, the end of June saw the convening in Kiev of a constituent assembly of the Officers' Union of Ukraine.

The first phase set in on 24 August and ended on 3 September 1991. The Supreme Soviet's passage of the decree on the military force located in Ukraine was followed by a gathering of information on the moods and actions of servicemen. Ye. Marchuk, the state minister for defense, security, and emergencies, and V. Durdinets, the chairman of the Commission on Defense and Security of the Armed Forces, organized members of the Ukraine Officers' Union into a working group for the drafting of Ukraine laws on military topics. On 3 September, our parliament appointed a minister of defense for Ukraine.

The second phase began on 3 September 1991 and ran until 3 January 1992. Several floors of the building—located on the former Ordzhonikidze Street—formerly used by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine were assigned for use by the Ministry of Defense. Various kinds of specialists from a number of

units and military schools were assigned to the Ministry of Defense for temporary duty.

Finding items as common as paper for printing and other office supplies constituted a problem. The leadership of the USSR and the Soviet Armed Forces instigated a fierce propaganda attack on the intentions of Ukraine's pursuit of building her own army. Insults and even threats issued from the Soviet Union's Ministry of Defense and a number of spokesmen of the Kiev Military District's High Command.

The drafting of laws dealing with military topics was actively pursued. Some of them were passed by our Supreme Soviet on the first reading. Measures were taken to prevent the withdrawal of weapons and other materiel from Ukraine and their movement to Russia. In the middle of October, our parliament made its announcement of Ukraine's nuclear-free status.

The results of the 1 December referendum and the presidential elections accelerated all the sovereignization processes. The Supreme Soviet approved the text of the national military oath, accepted the latter from the Ukraine minister of defense, and decided on the procedure and time frame for administering the oath to all servicemen.

At a meeting at Belovezhskaya Pushcha, our state's leadership took the initiative by introducing a fundamentally new kind of relationship between the USSR republics—the Commonwealth of Independent States. Joining the CIS in December were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

President L. Kravchuk issued an edict calling for the withdrawal from Ukrainian soil of all tactical nuclear weapons by July of 1992 and of all strategic nuclear weapons by the end of 1994.

Acknowledged at the 30 December meeting of Commonwealth state heads held in Minsk was Ukraine's right to build her own Armed Forces on the basis of the troop force located on her soil. This initiated talks on dividing among the CIS member states conventional weapons belonging to the Soviet Army and on implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe the USSR had signed in Paris on 19 November 1990.

The third phase started on 3 January and lasted until the end of February of 1992. A number of military leaders took advantage of the poorly-planned procedure for administering the Ukrainian oath to personnel of the Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian Military Districts and the Black Sea Fleet by distorting the meaning of the oath's text and provoking in Kiev and in a number of other garrisons feelings of dissatisfaction and even organized "indignation" among officers and cadets. This was immediately utilized by the High Command of the Unified Armed Forces to arouse a new round of anti-Ukraine sentiments in central and Russian news media.

The high point in this activity was the January All-Army Officers Assembly held in Moscow.

The psychological pressure exerted at that time caused several pilots of the aviation regiment based at Starokonstantinov to remove to Russia without authorization six SU-24 aircraft. There were many reports of other acts of illegal removal of combat materiel and military property from Ukrainian soil.

President L. Kravchuk issued the Edict on the Procedure for Armed Forces Sale on Ukrainian Territory of Materiel, Armaments, and Immovable Property, which set down the procedure to be followed for the sale of materiel and property taken out of service as a result of the reductions and for the use of the resulting monies to be applied to social needs of servicemen.

A decree issued by the Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers created the Committee on Problems of Social Protection of Servicemen at the level of this Cabinet.

Kiev was the location of a conference dealing with questions of military construction in which the country's leadership acquainted general and flag officers with conceptual views on reforming the forces stationed on Ukrainian soil.

The Black Sea Fleet situation deteriorated rapidly. Red Banner Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral I. Kasatonov, speculating on the corporate conscience of the seamen, employed blackmail, threats, and even official retaliatory methods to attempt to use this conscience to gain the upper hand in a game of playing with the relations between Ukraine and Russia.

To "substantiate" their claims to the Black Sea Fleet and retain our people in their sphere of influence, some Moscow politicians have set about heating up separatist sentiments in the Crimea.

Exhibiting self-restraint and calmness of approach, Ukraine's leadership at the meeting of CIS state heads held in February in Minsk exerted efforts leading to the signing of a number of agreements intended to resolve in a civilized and lawful manner existing contradictions of a military nature. The first truly Ukrainian generalcies were awarded.

The fourth phase occupied the time frame from March to May of 1992. Moscow's stubborn refusal to resolve the points of difference on equal terms understandably caused the Ukrainian leadership to suffer feelings of distrust toward the opposing side. This culminated in President L. M. Kravchuk's issuing in the middle of March an edict instructing our Ministry of Defense to call a temporary halt to the removal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia until an effective mechanism of international monitoring of the destruction of these weapons could be worked out.

Numerous cases of lawlessness on the part of units and large units of Commonwealth of Independent States strategic forces stationed on our soil were uncovered by

military counterintelligence agencies and patriotic officers and warrant officers.

A deepening of the Russo-Ukrainian differences and failure on the part of the CIS OVS [Unified Armed Forces] to honor its commitments related to military issues prompted the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people by some personnel of the Uzen Heavy Bomber Division, the Kharkov Higher Engineering School of Strategic Missile Forces, and of personnel in a number of other units that are part of the CIS Strategic Forces. Similar action in opposition to the furious reaction of Admiral I. Kasatonov was taken by servicemen of a brigade of sea frontier ships, a battalion of naval infantry, coastal defense units, and individual ships of the Black Sea Fleet.

The above events compelled President L. M. Kravchuk to issue on 3 April the Edict on Immediate Measures for Construction of the Ukraine Armed Forces. The latter calls on the Ministry of Defense to utilize the Black Sea Fleet force to form the Ukraine Naval Forces and organize an administrative directorate for the CIS Strategic Forces located on Ukrainian soil.

President B. Yeltsin issued decrees which brought into being the Ministry of Defense and the Russian Federation Armed Forces and placed the Black Sea Fleet under his subordination.

To prevent further deterioration in relations between Moscow and Kiev, the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine communicated with each other by telephone to impose a moratorium on their decisions.

The Supreme Soviet passed the Decree on the State of Carrying Out the Ukraine Military Policy and of Implementing the Legislative Acts Dealing with Military Affairs, which calls on the President to review the question of creating an effective system for overseeing the Ukraine's military-industrial complex and of assuring a closed cycle of production of armaments, military materiel, and equipment to fill the needs of the Armed Forces and of other armed units of Ukraine.

The leadership of our Armed Forces, as part of its plan to set up military cooperation with all democratic countries, undertook active participation in the work of the Coordinating Council of the North Atlantic Assembly and of various international conferences and seminars; the Ukraine Minister of Defense paid the USA a visit.

Spokesmen for social organizations of servicemen and the latter's dependents spoke out in the press and in various forums against the vices and shortcomings which the Ukrainian Army "inherited" from the Soviet Armed Forces.

The fifth phase, commencing in May of 1992, continues to the present. Ukraine fulfilled on time her commitment of removing tactical nuclear weapons from her soil. The 15 May meeting of CIS heads of state held in Tashkent produced an agreement on the principles and

procedure to be followed for Commonwealth countries' compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The Supreme Soviet in the middle of June ratified the latter along with the Paris Treaty of 1990 proper. The passage of those internationally legal documents set upper limits of conventional armaments and combat materiel for the Ukrainian Army. Our minister of foreign affairs signed in Lisbon, along with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the Protocol Additional to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

Next to come was passage of Ukraine Presidential Edict on Formation of the Ukraine Ministry of Defense Military Collegium and of Military Councils in Military Districts (Operational Commands) and in Large Units of the Ukraine Armed Forces. Subsequently issued was Directive No 10: Ukrainian Language Instruction in the Ukraine Armed Forces.

The breakout of armed conflict between the Dniester area and official Kishinev compelled our leadership to provide greater military security on the Moldovan border. Action was completed to return to Ukraine from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova families of officers and warrant officers desirous of making this change.

One battalion of our Armed Forces was dispatched to Yugoslavia to join U. N. peacekeeping forces.

Presidents B. Yeltsin and L. Kravchuk, meeting on 24 June in Dagomys, reached an agreement on creating the navies of Russia and Ukraine, with the Black Sea Fleet as a basis.

The large intelligence-gathering ship Slavutich, the first vessel for the Ukraine Naval Forces, slid down the ways at Nikolayev to begin her sea trials.

The continuing fear campaign waged in disregard of the agreements reached by leaders of both states by Admiral I. Kasatonov against officers and warrant officers who had taken the oath of allegiance to our people compelled the crew of Escort Ship SKR-112, 17th Sea Frontier Brigade, to leave their station for reassignment to the port of Odessa.

The above occurrence was an indication that the Black Sea Fleet situation had become heated to the maximum and fraught with "explosive" social potential. This compelled Presidents L. Kravchuk and B. Yeltsin to meet once again, on 4 August in Yalta, this time to work out a resolution relative to withdrawing the Black Sea Fleet from the CIS Unified Armed Forces for transfer to the combined command of Ukraine and Russia for a period of three years.

Thus, the high point in the fifth phase of construction of the Ukrainian Army was the defusing—at the leadership level of both countries—of major differences between Kiev and Moscow in the area of military issues.

Constituting the principal attainments of the first year were the actual acknowledgement by all CIS states and the world community of Ukraine's right of creating her

own Armed Forces; establishing military ties to other countries; setting the processes of national military construction onto a solid legal foundation; forming—on the basis of the three districts—of Ground Troops and Air Forces and in general of a single military entity in the form of our Army; creating a system of command and control of all units and large units located on Ukrainian soil; establishing a rear and technical supply service; developing a program of combat and humanitarian training for troops; and initiating fundamental reform of the military education system.

A look into the near and the distant future reveals the following. To take place in the fall of this year is the important event of the Supreme Soviet's final approval of the military doctrine and that body's completion and passing of the: Law on the Legal Basis of Military Organization; Law on Strategic Intelligence of the Ukraine Armed Forces and Budgetary Appropriation Amounts for the Latters' Maintenance; Law on the Status of Armed Forces Temporarily Located on Ukraine Territory; Law on Mobilization Procedure; and legislation dealing with our own military regulations.

Detailed work planned for accomplishment in 1993 and 1994 includes continuation of reforming the troops and the introduction of performance quality indices. Slated for completion in this period are an integrated strategic plan for employing the Ukraine Armed Forces, the concept and program for developing branches of military service, and regulations governing combat employment of the latter; devising a plan for preparing a defense infrastructure; and creation of state strategic reserves. The system of training youth to enter the service and filling the manpower needs of our Army will be reformed in this time frame. The end of this period should see the destruction of all strategic nuclear missiles located on Ukraine's soil.

It is planned to complete in 1995 the organization of our Armed Forces; create a system of mobilization deployment and training of reserves; and satisfy the terms specified in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Our Army's strength by the end of aforementioned year should drop to 400,000 to 430,000 men.

Plans call for trimming in the period 1996-2000, if the military and political situation in our area so permits, the strength of our troops to 220,000 to 250,000 men. Also to receive attention in this period is the fostering of an environment conducive to converting our Army to a professional basis.

Conceptual Principles and Quality Indices for Military Construction

Lying at the basis of our varied activities associated with the Ukraine Armed Forces is a scientifically-formulated and well-conceived concept. The latter's principle tenets have been incorporated into the military doctrine written by Ministry of Defense specialists, into the Supreme Soviet Decree on the Concept of Defense and Construction of the Ukraine Armed Forces, and into the

laws: Defense of Ukraine; The Ukraine Armed Forces; Universal Military Obligation and Military Service; and Social and Legal Protection for Servicemen and Their Dependents.

Serving as the cornerstone of all conceptual ideas underlying military construction in Ukraine is the defensive nature of our military doctrine. The doctrine's defensive nature is a natural consequence of the principles of our state's foreign activity that have been set down in the Supreme Soviet's Declaration of State Sovereignty. The salient principles in the military area assure that Ukraine:

- will not be the first to undertake military actions against any state if she is not the object of aggression;
- favors the resolution of all interstate differences by the express application of peaceful and political ways and means;
- intends to make no territorial claims on any state and does not perceive any people as an enemy;
- is establishing her interstate relations with full consideration of military security interests held by other states, while steadfastly honoring the integrity of her territory;
- entertains no plans for attaining military superiority over other states;
- respects the independence of all states and acknowledges their right to participate on equal terms in resolving all problems of international relations;
- participates in reducing troops and armaments on the basis of multilateral and bilateral agreements as well as by unilateral decision;
- does not interfere in the internal affairs of other states but does believe in the use of the Armed Forces under the aegis of the United Nations Organization, provided that such action does not violate her state interests.

(To be continued.)

Commission to Study Easing Civilian Reintegration Due to Projected Personnel Cuts

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20 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel Viktor Gapchenko, chief specialist, Committee on Problems of Social Protection for Servicemen at the Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers; Colonel Aleksandr Grinkevich, candidate of philosophical sciences; Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Dubinskiy, executive director, Ukrainian Servicemen's Intellectual Property Fund: "Civilian Reintegration of Discharged Servicemen: A State Concern"; first three paragraphs are NARODNA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] The process of change of generations that is natural for any army is made more difficult by the fact that those leaving the ranks are not necessarily old people capable and willing to labor but no longer able to withstand the rigors of military life. All civilized countries take definite measures to soften and facilitate the transition to civilian life for persons involuntarily leaving a military career. This problem takes on an even greater significance in the case of application of planned reductions in armed forces, a situation in which the usual outflow of servicemen into the reserve is swelled by younger persons whose services are no longer required by the army. This as a rule is a time when a state program of civilian reintegration of returning servicemen is to be applied. This kind of program was developed at one time or another in England, France, the USA, and other countries.

The founding of the Ukraine's Armed Forces is associated with the reforming of the military force the country inherited from the former USSR. One of the most serious problems connected with the transformations is manpower reduction, with its ensuing requirement for discharging from active duty a considerable number of officers, warrant officers, and men serving in extended service.

What can be done to help many servicemen become accustomed to the new demands imposed by civilian life, for them to adapt to the new conditions attendant to the country's incipient market economy? Below is an attempt to answer this question by persons responsible for drafting the State Program for Civilian Reintegration of Servicemen Discharged into the Reserve.

It is the intent of the authors of the draft plan that the civilian reintegration of career servicemen discharged into the reserve be assured by a system of civilian reintegration centers—presently in the formative stage—whose activity would be coordinated and headed by a working group empowered with the necessary state authority. It is thought that the centers will be modelled after garrison-type officers' clubs. The centers, operating on a basis of responding to local conditions and capabilities, with a knowledge of the qualitative and quantitative makeup of persons receiving discharge, will engage in the following: creating a system of classroom retraining of former servicemen; working with local organizations to promote job placement for those discharged; rendering assistance to those former servicemen who wish to organize various kinds of commercial associations (commercial structures); devising of proposals relative to applications for surplus materiel, vehicles, and property formerly belonging to military-industrial complex enterprises.

In our view, great importance attaches to the feature whereby a discharged serviceman will not be left to his own resources, in that he will have immediate access to counselling for retraining, receiving job placement assistance, and advice relative to the most effective ways of claiming his rights and privileges provided by the laws of

Ukraine. In addition, the civilian reintegration centers will maintain a close watch on progress made in providing entry into civilian life for former soldiers; vigorously pursue their claims for legal rights and privileges; take timely action to uncover bottlenecks and shortcomings associated with the state's legislation; exert direct influence on local power and control organs and leaders of the latter that are lax in carrying out their work of proper resettlement of discharged servicemen.

It is clear that the civilian reintegration centers will eventually be in a position to employ contributions—as managed by the centers—made by commercial structures to render definite material assistance to servicemen discharged into the reserve during their period of training and during servicemen's initial venture into commercial activity.

The civilian reintegration center, being an element of state structure, should naturally receive funding from the budget and possess a small staff sufficient to organize its own activity. We are of the opinion that it is not too early to start now—along with the development and approval of the state program at local levels—to set up initiative groups that would serve as a kind of embryo for future centers, the purpose being to facilitate the creation of the latter and initiate their activity. This definitely is a matter for initiative-type, creatively thinking and acting officers and warrant officers who would set as their goal the rendering of practical assistance to their colleagues so that the latter can place themselves in their new situation. A purpose would be served if such initiative-type groups would report their activity to the Committee on Problems of Social Protection for Servicemen at the Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers (252186, Kiev-186, ul. Antonova, 4-b). This report would serve as a kind of request for creating a civilian reintegration center in your area. In addition, the Working Group on State Program Implementation could also step in to assist initiators in organizing their practical activity.

Constituting an essential component of the proposed civilian reintegration measures is the provision of courses for retraining of discharged servicemen. It is thought that this system will be set up at a number of institutions of higher education and industrial associations.

The courses intended to retrain servicemen discharged into the reserve must become accredited by the Ukraine Ministry of Education and qualify for registration by the Working Group on Management and Coordination of State Program Implementation.

The courses are designed to train specialists:

- a) for working in state control, executive, and representative organs located in the center and in field locations;
- b) as organizers of production management and personnel departments in industrial, agricultural, and commercial structures;

c) as organizers and managers of commercial associations and privately-owned activities;

d) as workers for cultural, educational, medical, and justice institutions;

e) as workers for industrial enterprises, agricultural associations, and other structures where they can utilize skills they acquired in the Army.

The civilian reintegration centers are to become directly involved in job placement for men discharged into the reserve, working with rayon and municipal employment centers. They are to expand their capabilities by playing an instrumental role by assisting former servicemen to establish commercial structures. In this connection, the centers are to include in all founding documents a statement specifically setting down the obligation of priority hiring of former servicemen.

What will be the source of funding for reintegrating the discharged military professionals into civilian life? This is one of the most difficult problems attendant to the program being developed. The experience gained by civilized countries indicates that this problem is quite painful. The reason is that reduction in army manpower does not ordinarily result in a reduction in the military budget in the initial stage, but rather leads to some growth, due to problems associated with resettlement of discharged servicemen, payments of compensation, etc.

Constituting the primary source of financing for the state program is the Ukraine's budget. It is clear that the reintegration needs of the returnees should be covered by monies saved this year by virtue of the absence of costs that would be incurred if the men were to remain on active duty in the Ukraine Armed Forces. Also, additional special-purpose funding is required via line-item provision in the country's budget to pay for the reintegration. An estimate of monies required is being prepared. The program assumes that the authority to allot these funds should be granted the Committee on Social Protection for Servicemen at the Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers.

The burden of financing the program to be assumed by the state budget can be somewhat lightened by the following:

- funds allotted by the governments of other countries to be applied to civilian reintegration of discharged servicemen;
- monies received by the Ukraine Ministry of Defense from the sale of military property and materiel;
- various state benefits and privileges granted those who participate in selling military equipment.

It is also possible to effect a reduction in expenditures by designing reintegration courses patterned after certain military VUZ's and by inviting staff personnel of officers' clubs to work in reintegration centers.

Additional sources of funding for the program may be found as the activity of the Working Group and reintegration centers develops in the form of contributions made by the newly-created commercial structures as the latter enjoy a profit, and in the form of partial payment by state and commercial structures for specialist training in the system of courses. It evidently will also be possible to accept donations from voluntary (sponsoring) enterprises, organizations, and private individuals.

Now for a few words about commercial structures established by servicemen discharged into the reserve. These structures are to serve the following purposes: offering of employment to men discharged into the reserve and to their family members; providing partial financing for the construction of housing and other objects of a social nature for these people; furnishing individual insurance coverage and pension plans for servicemen and their dependents; and rendering former soldiers financial assistance.

The founders of commercial structures are to be, firstly, the civilian reintegration centers, and, secondly, servicemen discharged into the reserve who unite to form a commercial association. The Ukraine Ministry of Defense can, with the cooperation and support of the reintegration center, make available as a setup fund for these economic structures a portion of property and materiel slated for sale via the ministry commercial center.

General leadership and coordination of the activity of the structures organized to reintegrate discharged servicemen into civilian life is to be rendered by the Working Group which is being set up on an interdepartmental basis at the Committee on Problems of Social Protection for Servicemen. Some of the members of the Working Group are to be drawn from the group's regular personnel; others are to be specialists from ministries and departments sent as representatives for regular work with the Group; still others are to be specialists detailed for temporary duty to deal with any problems that may arise.

Authorized representatives of public organizations and commercial structures involved with the resolution of problems relating to reintegration of discharged servicemen can participate, with the right of holding a consultative voice, in certain ways in the activity of the Working Group.

In the view of the program writers, the above are the principal provisions and approaches of implementing the program. Efforts were made to include in the draft as far as possible the suggestions and estimates made by departments and public organizations (including the Vinnitsa officers' organization Ukrinvestkonversiya, the Ukrainian Servicemen's Intellectual Property Fund, the Sozidatel servicemen's social protection union, the Novaya Ukraina organization, and others). The document is not free of shortcomings, of course. Thus, it may be argued that setting up a system of retraining courses

in institutions of higher education only would tend to place the retraining at too high a level. It may be more proper to offer several levels of instruction: training unskilled workers to become specialists; training personnel to acquire medium skills; finally, offering specialists a higher education.

Another shortcoming of the program is a certain amount of technocracy, so to speak, in that it ignores problems related to socializing by former servicemen and their dependents, who as a rule are discharged into an environment in which they lack established ties with respect to friends, relatives, etc. This likewise constitutes one of the most pressing problems of a person's reentry into civilian life. The draft program also has nothing to say about ways in which former servicemen can further their spiritual development. This would involve providing assistance for these people to develop their poetic, artistic, and in some cases creative talents, an accommodation that of and by itself would tend to mitigate many problems associated with civilian reintegration. This would not entail outlays of capital and other material expenditures.

Thus, in concluding this discussion of the draft of the State Program for Civilian Reintegration of Discharged Servicemen, the drafters invite constructive deliberation of the basic concept and the mechanics of implementation. We sincerely welcome for our close consideration suggestions on the part of servicemen and their dependents, so that the work on the document being performed by state departments will widely reflect public sentiment and meet with public approval.

Acting Chief of Staff on Impact of Service Evasion, Desertion

93UM0168A Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Russian
31 Oct 92 pp 1, 2

[Article by Lieutenant-General Georgiy Zhivitsa, acting chief of staff of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: "On Evasion of Military Service: Reasons, Circumstances, Consequences"]

[Text] According to data available at the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, several thousand servicemen have deserted their units and subunits in the nine months of this year. As of the first 10 days of October, more than 800 soldiers and sergeants are absent without leave [AWOL]. Expenditures associated with returning deserters were more than 8 million rubles [R].

The largest number of AWOL conscripts are from the Republic of Crimea, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Lvov, and Ivano-Frankovsk oblasts, and Transcarpathia.

What is making the servicemen desert and set out "on the run," violating the oath and disregarding the criminal liability for military crimes?

It is hard to give a single answer, because just a brief glance at a few of the cases of persons who have gone

AWOL gives reason to talk not about one, but about a minimum of several reasons for the splash of evasion of service. It is at least naive to reduce everything, as some try to do, to the instinct of self-preservation of young people from the military disorders.

Yes, "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts by conscripts with more seniority] today is indeed a serious reason pushing soldiers and sergeants to go AWOL. However, (as the results of an analysis of instances of evasion of service indicate) soldiers are deserting not only because of beatings, harassment, and humiliation. Often an unwillingness to serve in the army prompts them to uncommit this crime. The situation, frankly, is paradoxical. Whereas before, prior to the adoption of the corresponding agreement on an interstate level, they did this for reasons associated with impatience to move home more quickly from other republics of the former Union, now, when everything is in place, when our troops are manned exclusively by citizens of Ukraine, we ideally should be able to forget about AWOL's and deserters. But not everything is that simple in life. The AWOL's not only have not stopped, but have become more frequent. True, soldiers are deserting today not to the other end of the world, but to neighboring oblasts, rayons, and villages. In short, to where their parents, friends, and relatives live. And they accept them with open arms.

Today not every girl turns away from such an apology for a defender, but the parents rejoice... Why, it was almost a miracle the hometown boy saved himself from the "dedovshchina"! It would never occur to some parents that their overgrown child simply does not want to serve. He does not want to, and that is all there is to it? No, perhaps the reasons for a soldier's desertion is more terrible than that.

At various times, evasion of service was regarded as one of the gravest crimes and was prosecuted with merciless toughness. In ancient Egypt, for example, deserters had their tongues cut off, and in the Roman Empire no girl could marry a Spartan who was a deserter. Deserters were simply banished. The purpose of this historical digression is not to call upon our legislative bodies to revive these punishments, but merely to show that service to the people, to one's homeland, has always and everywhere been placed above all else. Those who tried to avoid it got what they deserved.

However, let us get back to our times and try to contemplate about who is to blame for the fact that many draftees do not want to fulfill their constitutional duties. Some of the mass media, defending the apologies for defenders, sometimes unequivocally hint that the army today is not what it used to be: it does not do enough military and moral education.

But, is that really true?

Look at who is deserting today: for the most part, they are young soldiers who have served one or two months.

Many have not served long enough for their commanders or even co-workers to have time to become properly acquainted with them. Is it appropriate in that case to blame army educators for not being able to instill in the new guy a desire to serve his homeland conscientiously and honestly? I believe that this unhealthy symptom should, first of all, put the deserters' parents and the teachers of preinduction-age young people on their guard. In short, everyone who in the family, in the school, and in society is obligated to put in the consciousness of young men a deep understanding of the need to defend the homeland and their people, to instill in them high moral, spiritual, and physical qualities and a willingness to steadfastly endure the rigors and deprivations of military service. It is ruinous to protect soldiers who are AWOL or to justify in every way the crimes they have committed, because we will never get rid of the ailment that has affected our army today and will not achieve in its collectives a healthy situation and "by-the-book" mutual relations among soldiers.

We can hardly correct the neglect of patriotic, moral, and spiritual education of preinduction-age young people today if we engage in oversimplification of everything, juggling of facts, and camouflaging of the true reasons soldiers are deserting their units. Today the press, for example, often writes "with understanding" and sympathy about deserters and one-sidedly and unintelligibly discusses cases of evasion of service. Understanding the vulnerability of their position, some authors of articles try in every way to whiten their "heroes" and prove that in some or other situation they could only act that way and not differently.

One can also read that for the most part, the soldiers are leaving less than prestigious places: construction, railroad, and other auxiliary units. Indeed, quite a few people are deserting from them, and we will not deny this. For example, construction workers and railroad men presently account for nearly half of the deserters. However, it should be admitted that cases of evasion of service are also frequent in such prestigious troops as the Air Force and Air Defense. But they are fewer. Therefore, I think that with very good reason we should talk about young people's unwillingness to serve in the army and their lack of preparedness for the customs of army routine.

At any time it was characteristic of an armed defender to take pride in the successes in training and service and the difficulties overcome when ascending to certain pinnacle of combat skills. Why now do even the slightest burdens become unbearable for some of them? Why is the path so short and straight, say, from insufficient everyday conditions or from performance of tasks uncharacteristic of the subunit to committing a crime? Why, in wishing to excuse some or other deserter, some public organizations raise a universal noise and demand that commanders be held accountable? Yes, there are in the troops omissions in the education of soldiers, mutual relations that are at variance with regulations, as well as insufficient everyday conveniences, and much else that should be

decisively stamped out and improved (which we will talk about later), but there are also causes which the armed forces is unable to resolve. They simply go beyond the limits of their jurisdiction and abilities. One is the unwillingness of some young people to serve in the army, but this is not the only cause. Public opinion occupies an important place in the package of conditions determining the degree of willingness of inductees to fulfill their constitutional duty conscientiously. Today, it would simply be frivolous to examine the increase in AWOL's without regard for the attitude towards the army and what directly or indirectly affects its prestige. Before, the role of a man with a rifle in safeguarding the peaceful labor of the people was elevated to the highest levels and was an unquestionable truth. Now, pacifism has replaced (or is replacing) it. They say, some politicians assert that the military threat to our country has passed. Therefore, why do we need large expenditures for defense and maintaining an army? It is sort of a naive question, but it is actually sowing doubt. Of course, I would not want to think that such conclusions are perceived to the same degree by everyone. But when they are repeated over and over again, you instinctively begin to think about those deserters who cite the lack of a need for military service in our time as their excuse.

Those who do not see the laws themselves behind the appeals for a rule-of-law state also directly or indirectly affect playing down the prestige of the army and its virtues in safeguarding the peaceful labor of the people. How many young destinies could such demagogues cripple if everything were allowed to take its course...

The parents' attitudes towards their sons' service are also ambiguous. For example, can you imagine some of them stating publicly at work or in their circle of friends that their son had gone AWOL? They would have died of shame. Now they are not even ashamed. They even announce it in the newspapers. They not only announce it, but they also tell, in the words of their son, about how bad things are in the army. The claims in and of themselves may be reasonable, but each of them cannot be grounds for desertion. Here it would be good for parents to investigate with the deserter and send him back to his duty station. Alas, instead of doing this, they begin calling on nearby units with a request to find a job for their offspring. And they do, without knowing that by doing so they are making it worse for him and themselves. The closeness of a soldier to home (and this has been proven more than once) is not an incentive for him to serve and does not contribute to conscientious performance of his duties. What is more, having deserted once without being given any punishment at all for it, he begins to look for a convenient moment to go AWOL. The majority of deserters, as it is customary to call them, are those who have gone AWOL two or three times without punishment. But the point here is not in the number of times they have done this, but in the fact that a soldier's desire to serve in his city or village is not always justified. I would like for parents not to knuckle under to their sons and not try to carry out their whims

and wishes, but ask them strictly: Why do you need to look for conveniences? In the end, this would benefit both them and our army.

There are other causes that are being introduced into military collectives from the outside. There are quite a few of them in the army itself which, incidentally, no one has or is planning to keep secret. Only recently, the newspaper *NARODNA ARMIYA* published several articles on this topic. Still, it seems, it would not be a bad idea again to give some thought to what is preventing us from achieving substantial changes in the fight against desertion.

It would be incorrect to say that they do not see this problem in the troops and are doing nothing about it. Work is being done to cut short even the slightest attempts to leave the garrison, but not with the same purposefulness and persistence everywhere. And in those place where omissions and miscalculations are made in this important matter, there inevitably are deserters. There are more of them in the construction troops, units, and subunits of the Odessa and Carpathian military districts. In the nine months of this year, about 80 percent of such cases were in these large strategic formations! That is something to think over!

As far as the motives that prompt soldiers and sergeants to evade service are concerned, soldiers not wishing to serve rank first (21 percent), those wishing to be transferred to their hometown or village are second (19 percent), and those who are personally undisciplined are third (18 percent). Only 15 percent deserted due to mutual relations at variance with regulations, rough treatment by commanders, doubts about the need for military service in conditions of the lessening of international tension, complaints about bad food, heavy physical burdens, the lack of free time, a difficult family situation, and so forth. What we have is cause and effect. Take, study, arm yourself with forms and methods of preventive influence on soldiers inclined to go AWOL, and...

It turns out that in order to be successful in conducting preventive measures against desertion, one needs the appropriate pedagogical knowledge and experience. Unfortunately, many commanders (especially young ones) do not have enough of one or the other. Experience comes and knowledge can be acquired, but what do you do with passive, unconscientious officers who permit lack of supervision and commit the most flagrant miscalculations in training personnel to perform tasks associated with standing guard duty? To confirm this, I will cite a few instances.

Recently at the Khmelnytskyi Garrison, having taken up his post, Private Kuznetsov abandoned it an hour and a half later. When they searched for the deserter, it turned out that he was included on the guard detail not two days ahead of time as was supposed to be the case, but on the eve of the posting. Naturally, no one had trained him, and he did not know his duties. Kuznetsov arrived at the

guardroom without his weapon (he had not yet been assigned a weapon at that time). While at his post, not a single time did the soldier communicate with the commander of the guard (as it turned out, he simply did not know where the signaling system was located). Finally, Kuznetsov had not taken the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine, although this was not the first month he had served in the subunit since his transfer from Russia. Should we be surprised why the soldier deserted, and with a weapon? The only thing that is not understandable is the position of the subunit commander and other officials who created the most favorable conditions for committing the crime.

Unfortunately, these examples are not far from isolated. What is more, often striving to pass off what is desirable for actuality, commanders, chiefs of staff, and commandant's staff officers, without any pangs of conscience, embark on the path of concealing breaches of desertions. Thus, in one of the aviation garrisons, a soldier deserted (also taking advantage of miscalculations in organizing duty). They began the search for the deserter late (after two days). The search was unsuccessful. Seeing that they themselves would not be able to return the soldier to the unit, the commanders sounded the alarm and reported what had happened to the senior commander. When the alarm signal was given, the chief of the Directorate of Service of the Troops and Daily Activities of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Major-General V. Vasilyev, went to the garrison. On site Valeriy Pavlovich [Vasilyev] properly organized a search for the soldier, who was soon delivered to the duty station. But while they were searching for the deserter, they discovered three more who were AWOL. As it turned out, they knew about their disappearance, but had not reported it. The commanders figured the deserters themselves would suddenly show up, and everything would be kept in the dark.

Here is another example. Another garrison was counting on the deserter's good sense. Not spreading the word about what had happened, an officer having nothing at all to do with this soldier was assigned to organize the search for him. Naturally, that officer had no burning desire to return the soldier to the unit quickly. As a result, two days were lost. After a belated report, an officer from the Main Staff arrived at the garrison and discovered the deserter after six hours.

Concealing violations is not a new phenomenon. It happened before, too. We fought against it, but without success. It was inherited by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, continues to ruinously affect the strengthening of discipline, good organization, and order, and prompts some officers to bargain with their conscience. Of course, this cannot continue. The Main Staff and its directorates and services will persistently strive to get rid of this wrong and hold strictly accountable those who do not report all violations and crimes to the appropriate echelons in a timely manner.

Military commandant's offices of garrisons, which have an authorized status today, must do much to eliminate evasion of service. Before they did not have any capabilities, for they existed almost on a voluntary basis and at the garrisons were not real defenders of strong military discipline, organization, and order. Now, when commandant's offices have specific tasks, it is within their power to step up work in this direction and achieve significant changes in improving the morale in military collectives.

Today we talk a lot about returning prestige to the army. However, are we doing everything to this end? No! No, we are not! Look how many violations servicemen are committing in public places, on transportation, and when traveling on official duty and to their duty station! Today it is nothing for a soldier of ours to offend a girl, insult an elderly person, or appear on the most central street of the city in an untidy condition or intoxicated. As a result, the beauty of the military romanticism and symbols fades, the sacred concepts of military honor and valor fade and wither. Deserters are doing so much harm to the prestige of our young army! Hiding in the daytime from people's eyes in the attics, basements, and woods, in search of clothing and food (they do want to eat!) they commit robberies (there is no other word for it) of dachas, gardens, and orchards, steal motor vehicles, and when dividing up their loot they often get into fights with criminal elements. All this cannot help but concern the civilian population and cause alarm and indignation. Turning to the Ministry of Defense, people demand that we put an end most decisively to desertion, impunity, and all-forgiveness with respect to soldiers evading service.

Not every AWOL is widely publicized, and criminal charges are not brought against every one of them. What is more, a certain portion of the deserters find protection and support in the non-military structures and public organizations. Taking the cowards and deserters under their protection, they state publicly that in many cases the desertion was justified and basically involved saving life and limb. At first glance, it cannot be denied, this looks pretty terrible, but in fact does not always correspond to the truth. Thus, we not only are not solving the problem, we are making it even worse.

Today, as never before, there is an urgent need for a presidential edict on additional measures for absolute fulfillment of legislative acts of Ukraine on questions of military organizational development and military service and on development and implementation of an integral system of national-patriotic education of preinduction-age young people. It is mandatory that this edict review the responsibility of civilians for evasion of military service and obligate law enforcement bodies to strive more effectively for observance of the law in the troops. There is also an urgent need for the Cabinet of Ministers to develop additional incentives and benefits aimed at increasing the prestige of military service and implementing a mechanism of practical implementation

of legislative acts already passed on questions of social and legal protection of servicemen and their family members.

We have named above causes for desertion. There are quite a few of them. But which of them is "to blame" to a greater or lesser degree for the existence of this phenomenon is interpreted differently at different levels. It seems it is time to conduct a comprehensive sociological study in this area, and involve in it not only representatives of the Ministry of Defense but also of other ministries and departments, medical personnel, psychologists... The Socio-Psychological Directorate of the Ministry of Defense could initiate such a study. Otherwise, in the future we will continue to proceed from an approximate knowledge of the motives for evasion of service and record the miscalculations of commanders after the next crimes are committed.

The young state of Ukraine needs honest, conscientious, and trained defenders. Let us not do a lot of talking about this, let us make it so our people, who have had their share of ordeals and difficulties, are proud of their defenders of the motherland!

Edict on Return of Officers to Ukraine

93UM0260B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
2 Dec 92 p 2

["Edict of the President of Ukraine on the Return to Ukraine for Service of Servicemen-Citizens of Ukraine From Military Units Deployed in the Territories of Georgia and Tajikistan"]

[Text] Pursuant to the Ukrainian "On the Armed Forces of Ukraine," I DECREE:

1. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall:

a) ensure the return of servicemen-citizens of Ukraine from Georgia and Tajikistan to Ukraine, taking into account their desire to serve in the territory of their state:

—servicemen in compulsory service—by 1 February 1993;

—officers, warrant officers, and servicemen in extended military service—during 1992 and 1993, on a case-by-case basis and in coordination between the chief personnel directorate of the United Armed Forces of Commonwealth States and the personnel directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;

b) dispatch delegations to Georgia and Tajikistan, with the participation of representatives from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the Committee for the Issues of Social Protection of Servicemen of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers (with their consent), to conduct negotiations with the heads of governments and the command of the armed forces of these states on the issue of the return of servicemen to Ukraine.

2. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine should ensure transportation for the servicemen from the locations of deployment of their units in Georgia and Tajikistan to Ukraine, including through the use of military transport aviation.

[Signed] President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk

City of Kiev, 1 December 1992

Psychiatric Screening of Draftees Outlined

93UM0382A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
26 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Oleksandr Mizyakivskyy, senior officer, VPS [Vinnitsa Psychiatric Center] Press Service: "Fit for Service in the Ranks"]

[Text] What is a normal person? Who is considered normal, and who is considered abnormal? More than one generation of writers, philosophers, and psychologists have searched for the answers to these questions. The individual personality does not reveal itself within the restricted framework of accepted behavior, morality, and stereotypical thinking. And so people are in a hurry to avoid a person, to inform themselves about his psyche, for he has broken away from the "herd." How many victims of our Soviet, ideology-based psychiatry were tormented within the walls of gray sanitariums and injected with psychotropic drugs...?

Fortunately, psychiatry has ceased carrying out punitive functions. The doors of the various units of the Vinnitsa Psychiatric Hospital imeni Yushenko—until quite recently kept closed and locked—have been thrown open; the butcher-type paramedics and orderlies have been retrained in other rackets, and the cast-iron gratings already look like decorations. But the problem of "normality" still remains to be solved. This is of top-priority interest to the military because the mental condition of persons who—in the very near future—will be holding deadly weapons in their hands, beginning to engage in complicated, responsible work, and employing expensive equipment is extremely important. Mistakes could lead to catastrophic results.

The specially trained Unit No. 17 is engaged in the task of detaining and investigating those draftees who have been initially diagnosed as having some kind of deviation or perversion in their mental condition. This unit has been in existence only since 1986. Prior to that time, military expert opinions on this matter were rendered in the human psychiatry wards. What such "detainment" was like can be surmised from this statements made by a former patient, Oleh Semko from Vapnyarka:

"I had experienced no accidents, fainting spells, or injuries to my brain. I had no complaints about my health, but—for some reason—the rayon-level military command decided to have me re-examined. For almost a month I remained in one of the units of the Psychiatric Hospital imeni Yushenko. During that time nobody

even took my temperature, nor did they tell me anything honest or reliable as to the reason for my detention. Every day and all day persons such as myself were employed in heavy physical labor. As a lad with a powerful build, I was assigned the task of carrying out corpses from the unit and from the morgue and bringing them to other places. They were piled on sledges. There was no rest for us even at night, and the same was expected from my 'roommates.' And so, after this, I fell really ill with dysentery."

Then 1986 arrived; the winds of change began to blow and play around the psychiatric units.

...A modest-sized, single-story building with bare plastering and rusty gratings; there were already handles on both sides of the doors.

"Come right in; don't be afraid." I was met by an elegant young woman dressed in a white coat. This was Lyudmyla Antonivna Potapchuk, chief of the psychiatric units.

"Our units," she said, "are designed to accommodate 60 beds. During the autumn and spring periods, when the youths are called up before the medical commission at the various military command posts, the psychiatrists discover various deviations in the mental conditions of some of these youths. If such diseases are serious ones, the lads in question are sent to us for confinement and treatment."

"Tell me, Lyudmyla Antonivna, what kinds of illnesses are encountered most frequently, and what diagnoses exclude draftees from the army?"

"You understand that times are changing. There used to be batons for beating the patients, and some persons would pretend not to see them being used. Patients used to be restrained for mild degrees of schizophrenia or various nervous disorders. Everyone agreed that such persons should not be allowed to hold weapons in their hands. But everyone knows full well to what stage this finally led. Nowadays all this has been fundamentally revised. Let me cite just one example for you: If a person suffered from incontinence the army still used to accept him. But now if such a thing manifests itself, it is enough to review the situation before the commission for a possible medical discharge."

Indeed, times are changing, as are also the modes of placing youths in the army, although still very, very slowly. Call-ups are still feared. They evoke fear among fathers, who will use and take advantage of any provision or possibility if only to prevent their sons from being taken into the army.

One of my acquaintances, who is also a physician, asked me the following question:

"Do you know what the most widespread illness is nowadays, what terrible virus is stalking among our young people?"

"Probably AIDS," I replied at that time.

"Pardon me," he rejoined, "but the illness I am referring to is what the medical textbooks call 'Munchausen's Disease'; it is simply feigned. I have worked as a therapist for almost 20 years, and I have never encountered such a flood of fakers as I have during the last few years. Some of them pretend to have worked in fishing, thinking thereby that they will be sent to an institute [word illegible] in order to study commercial fishing abroad, and so somehow get out of serving in the army...."

Feigning an illness.... What is to be gained by that? In my opinion, our society still has a negative feeling—exacerbated by inertia—from persons who were drafted into the former Soviet Army—an organization which, to be sure, was far from corresponding to the interests of the Ukrainian people. Therefore, in the psychology of many draftees and their fathers there is a certain lingering stereotype concerning army service, and an illness would make it possible for them to return or remain in civilian life. Although in recent times there are fewer youths who are biased against the draft, they ought to exercise a certain amount of control over the state of their health, including psychiatric control.

...The narrow corridor of Unit No. 17 leads me to a rather small vestibule. Dozens of lads who look like they have just arrived are modestly and bashfully sitting along the wall. Stretching out in the center of the room are some fellows with "abundant experience in life."

"Sergiy, you know what I told the doctor? That I had suffered an injury to my skull and that my memory has gotten quite a bit worse. I also told him that I see some kind of spots in front of my eyes.... Do you think he'll believe me and maybe give me a discharge?..."

L.A. Potapchuk comments on such situations simply as follows:

"Really now! In order to feign a mental disorder or illness, someone would have to be personally familiar with the medical fine points involved. But these 'clever fellows' will hardly succeed in fooling the physicians. All their fictitious symptoms can be easily seen through...."

And so, even though there are more than enough problems still remaining, psychiatry is gradually making progress. Both draftees and military commanders can be assured of the following point without any doubts whatsoever: If the physicians render the diagnosis "Fit for service in the ranks," this will always correspond to the reality involved.

BALTIC STATES

Defense Forces Activities Related

Defense Forces Chief Laaneots Interviewed

934K0058A Tallinn PUHAPAEVALEHT in Estonian
31 Oct 92 p 5

[Interview with Col Ants Laaneots, Chief of Estonia's Defense Forces by Sulev Halli: "Our People Are Not Ready For Guerilla Warfare"]

[Text]

[HALLI] On October 31, 1991, the government issued Decree Number 404-k regarding the formation of Staff Headquarters for the Defense Forces. What were some of the things that lead up to it, Colonel?

[LAANEOTS] Before that, in October, Raivo Vare, who was state minister at the time, offered me a position as government consultant dealing with defense forces. I accepted and started work as a defense consultant for the state in November. At that time, there was no conceptual position on state defense, nor on the structure of defense forces. Every man was out there, forming his own army, and doing it intuitively, without any background or training. The underlying idea was that Estonia did not even need a defense or military force, and that everything could be brought together under one organization, the State and Border Guard Office.

[HALLI] This idea found wide support, even in the Supreme Council.

[LAANEOTS] How state defense could be handled in such a manner, no one could tell. There is no country in the world that combines border guard with defense forces. Border guard has more of a police-like structure, whose mission it is to guarantee a border regimen, not state defense.

The preparation of border guards is also totally different from that of the regular army soldiers. The whole idea made no sense.

These were the things that lead up to the creation of staff headquarters. Basically, we started out with nothing. By October 31, we took over the offices of the former Estonian SSR War Commissariat. The staff headquarters are still in the formative stages.

[HALLI] Was this when you started looking for people to work there?

[LAANEOTS] The first employees at the staff headquarters of Defense Forces started work in November. These were primarily volunteers, since the concept of state defense was still hanging in mid-air. We also had to think of the future. Many were hesitant, didn't want to join, wages were low. First, a group of enthusiasts developed.

[HALLI] Who were they?

[LAANEOTS] Mostly officers retired from the Russian army, some younger ones started joining by the end of November.

[HALLI] Did forming of the defense ministry take a very long time?

[LAANEOTS] We started building state defense from the roof, not from its foundations. First, the staff headquarters were set up, as an organ for directing operations, after that the formation of the defense ministry began. I haven't heard of anything like it in the whole world. There was a lot of opposition to forming a ministry of defense during Savisaar's administration. Setting up a system of state defense was tied to major political intrigues and power struggles. The absence of a defense ministry slowed down the development of state defense considerably. Dealing with foreign states, military men are not listened to, it's the politicians who do all the dealing. We couldn't accomplish anything for state defense in the foreign countries, because we had no system for dealing with it.

[HALLI] Would that explain the emergence of several weapons systems, the competition between them, and some other things?

[LAANEOTS] The helplessness of state and power organs in setting up state defense could well have been responsible for the emergence of self-proclaimed organizations, whose formation or actions were brought about by power struggle and political ambitions.

[HALLI] Would you deign to say that some political forces consciously created their own armed units?

[LAANEOTS] I wouldn't go as far as to say that. As a military man, I am reluctant to speak about politics, but was it not clear that there were political forces behind the armed groupings that were formed.

[HALLI] What is the function of staff headquarters?

[LAANEOTS] In its international sense, headquarters or general staff headquarters represent the highest organ for directing state defense operations that deals with the purely military matters like the formation of defense forces, combat readiness, etc.

[HALLI] Whom is the headquarters chief of the defense forces reporting to currently?

[LAANEOTS] The headquarters chief reports to the president, as was confirmed by our head of state L. Meri at our meeting. Since no commander-in-chief has been appointed, I am also acting in this capacity, according to the staff headquarters statute of defense forces. I report directly to the president.

[HALLI] Have you ever been insulted personally, or had mistrust shown against you.

[LAANEOTS] Very much so. Somebody apparently thinks that it is necessary to have this kind of backbiting

and mistrust that gets blown up artificially. I wouldn't even rule out that it comes from certain services of our neighboring states, who would like to see our united national front crumble, and us taking a stand against each other. This weakens us considerably.

[HALLI] What kind of a relationship do you foresee with Hain Rebas, the defense minister of the new government?

[LAANEOTS] We have known each other for a long time, met on a number of occasions, and talked at seminars put on by the Tõnisson Institute. I must say that our views are quite similar in matters of state defense. Mr. Rebas is a reserve officer of the Swedish army, he has been in the military service and knows what it's all about. We are not dealing with an amateur here. In my opinion, his appointment as minister of defense should be a great boon to the development of our state defense.

[HALLI] Mr. Jüri Toomepuu has said that officers of the former Soviet army are not suitable for Estonia's defense forces, particularly because of their mentality.

[LAANEOTS] This smacks of political populism, again. Mr. Toomepuu has not even studied the matter properly. First, he backs up his indictment with the statement that our military units march the same way the Russian troops do. Our military does not march the same way the Russian military does, but the way it was prescribed in the military statutes of the pre-war Estonian army. The Prussian step may indeed be outdated for today's democratic society, but this is not the most important issue. Another concern is the development of a leadership cadre. We are currently using officers of the former Soviet army, because there simply are no others. This has been acknowledged also by many senior Estonian officers from abroad, who know how things stand. Mr. Toomepuu has been criticizing but, so far, has not come up with anything helpful on his part. If he wants to—through the Defense Initiative Center, for example—turn over leadership to these self-appointed officers, then he should also keep in mind that rank alone does not do it—knowledge is also needed. The man may well have the epouettes of a field marshal, but if there's nothing between the ears, then ...

My position is that we should make use of all Estonian officers, who are loyal to Estonian independence, who have the appropriate education and preparation, and who want to serve the state of Estonia, regardless of their previous service in the armed forces of either Sweden, Germany, United States, the Soviet Union or some other state. As long as the person is a good specialist and loyal to the state of Estonia.

[HALLI] You said, Colonel, that the selection of headquarters staff is still going on.

[LAANEOTS] We have less than half of the headquarters staff, as specified by the staffing chart—we lack specialists for certain areas. The selection process has been

laborious, we have been forced to dismiss many who do not meet the requirements, or who cannot stand up to the workload. Quality is a complicated, and a very painful issue.

[HALLI] Are our defense forces capable of deterring even the most minimal attack against Estonia?

[LAANEOTS] I think we could cope with an internal threat, when needed, but in case of organized aggression from the outside, we could localize the conflict, at best, but we are not ready to stand up to a military force. We could, however, maintain guerilla warfare.

[HALLI] Are the people also ready for that?

[LAANEOTS] The people of Estonia? Speaking of the people as a whole, I don't think they are ready ideologically. I am sorry I have to say that. The reluctance of the draftees to serve their country shows where the attitude of the people is at. However, we have to understand that service in the Soviet army, the system from which we are still emerging, has always been distasteful to Estonians. This attitude has endured. It will take a long time to overcome that.

[HALLI] What do you think of the removal of Russian troops? Is it being held back, or will it be going more smoothly in the future?

[LAANEOTS] It is with great unease that I am waiting for the Russian Congress of Deputies to convene in December. Empire-minded, pro-Communist forces are mounting an attack against Yeltsin and the democratic government. The troops leaving here, and all forces opposed to Estonia's independence, are following the events in Moscow. Yeltsin has said that the removal of troops from the Baltic states depends on resolving the citizenship issue. This, however, amounts to interference with the internal affairs of another state. Such bellicose statements make one wary.

[HALLI] Can we count on any help from the West, should it become necessary?

[LAANEOTS] Not militarily, but politically, for sure. Estonia's leaders and the president have turned to several foreign states to make sure that such help would get here on time. Military support could not be counted on right now.

Meri Officiates At Kuperjanov Ceremony

934K0058B Tartu POSTIMEES in Estonian 24 Dec 92 p 1

[Article by Väino Koorberg: "Kuperjanov Battalion Gets Flag"]

[Text] The first nail into the flagpole was driven by Lennart Meri, president of the Republic of Estonia At yesterday's ceremonial lineup at Võru Lennart Meri,

president of the Republic of Estonia, presented the Kuperjanov Single Infantry Battalion with the historical flag of the unit, that had been restored by the joint stock company of Ars.

President Meri, accompanied by Col Ants Laaneots, chief of staff of Estonia's defense forces, Hannes Walter, deputy defense minister, and Capt. Johannes Kert, chief of the Kuperjanov battalion, saluted the Kuperjanov battalion and Kaitseliit [Defense League] units lined up at the Võru stadium. After that, the president drove the first nail into the flag pole. The honor to participate in the rebirth of the combat flag was also shared by Hannes Walter, Rein Helme, chairman of the State Assembly's defense commission, Col. Ants Laaneots, and Fred Bush, senior military attaché of the U.S. Diplomatic Corps. Taking turns driving their nails into the flagpole were also representatives of officers, soldiers and veterans of the Kuperjanov Battalion, representatives of Kaitseliit and the mayor of Võru.

"A few moments ago we had a pole and a piece of cloth on the table. Now, we have witnessed a miracle, the rebirth of the flag that, at one time, lead our fathers and our forefathers into the battle that ended with self-determination for the small Estonian nation, and the creation of the Republic of Estonia," Lennart Meri said at yesterday's lineup. "I wish you plenty of all that was characteristic of our forefathers: Loyalty, objectivity, sober judgment and, above all, discipline. If you follow your orders to the letter, you will be stronger than the biggest army."

As he took the flag from the President of the Republic of Estonia Capt. Kert promised, in the name of the battalion, to hold it high as the symbol of defending our home, and to defend the Republic of Estonia under this flag, even to the last man.

When the speeches were over, the fighters of the Kuperjanov battalion marched, with their brand-new flag at the head of the column, past the president and the assembled guests. After that, the warriors returned, in parade formation, through the city to their barracks.

President Meri, with his entourage, looked over the restoration work at Taara barracks, and got to know the living and working conditions of the Kuperjanov battalion.

The Kuperjanov Single Infantry Battalion celebrated its anniversary yesterday. In the afternoon, the Kuperjanovites dedicated a memorial plaque at Puurman, from where the Kuperjanov partisans started their battles in the War of Independence, and visited the grave of the legendary Julius Kuperjanov.

Soviet Forces Withdraw From Pärnu

934K0058C Tartu POSTIMEES in Estonian 22 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by Tõnu Kann: "All They Left Behind Was an Armored Car and a Bullet-Scarred Lenin"]

[Text]

Russian army departure left 430 vacant apartments in Pärnu

Pärnu is the first of Estonia's bigger cities to be rid of the foreign forces. The military airfield of Sauga, the communications unit at the edge of the city, the storage facilities at Papinlidu, and the barracks of the chemical defense brigade in the city have been turned over to the Republic of Estonia.

The military buildings in Pärnu are historical in the sense that they were used by military units of the Republic of Estonia even before World War II. After the war, these buildings were simply lucky, because it is quite miraculous that they and their territories have escaped any major restructuring and pillaging which, based on the experiences had so far, seem to have been typical of the Russian armed forces. Pillaging had, however, occurred at the Sauga military airfield, and anything left behind by the communications unit was carried away, including buildings, stone by stone, to be used for building summer cottages. The Pärnu military barracks at the intersection of Tammsaare and Riia Streets, however, are in a good shape inasmuch as they don't need much beyond what broom and water, some paint and a brush can do. Even the window panes have not been bashed in. Renovation will be needed for the depreciated heating plant, the shower room in the steam bath and the fixtures in the washroom.

In the spacious compound of the barracks, two noteworthy objects were left behind. These are a weathered-looking Lenin's bust that had once been white, and an armored car perched on a concrete base. The latter is supposedly in working order, even though there is a piece of metal fastened to the base that says "Chernobyl, mesti bodviya. April 1986." The commander of the Russian sixth chemical defense brigade had asked Hannes Toomsalu, head of the Kuperjanov training company, to leave the armored car where it is—as a memento of Chernobyl!

The stone Lenin, staring at the armored car at the other end of the compound, has two bullets shot into him... Hannes Toomsalu said that not a single shot had been fired at the compound of the Estonian army barracks at Tammsaare and Riia Streets. It is assumed that Lenin's stone bust was used for target practice by some Russian officers taking farewell of their troops. However, the speech made by the chief of the chemical defense brigade in defense of the Chernobyl tankette fell on deaf ears, because Hannes Toomsoo thinks it would be too much of a luxury, on the part of the Kuperjanov training company, to leave a perfectly good war machine mounted in the compound. And that's exactly what this tankette, turned into a monument, is. In addition to the barracks of the training company, communal housing will also be fixed up soon.

Even though 430 apartments were vacated following the departure of Russian troops, the city is not overly generous in turning them over to Kuperjanovites. The

training company would need 30 to 40 apartments to accommodate the company's key personnel. After all, the company's training personnel should be made up of people from all across Estonia.

Training Exercises Considered Successful

934K0058D Tartu POSTIMEES in Estonian 28 Dec 92 p 1

[ETA Release: "Training of Defense Forces Went Well"]

[Text] The recent training exercises of defense forces showed that the units of our regular army are ready to perform complicated combat assignments. That was the way Rein Helme, chairman of State Assembly's state defense commission, summed up the training exercises of defense forces held from December 18 to 23.

He said that great strides have been made in our defense forces and recognized the good preparation of the Kuperjanov and Kalevi battalions.

Helme added that the equipment held out well. There were no incidents or failures of any significance. The chairman of the state defense commission also said that the performance of border guard units participating in the training left something to be desired, as did the preparation of some officers. What stood out, in particular, was the carelessness of border guards in their handling of training ammunition.

Somewhat alarming, to Helme, was also the fact that only 40 percent of those called in by the training draft actually showed up. This reflected deficiencies in our legislation, Helme remarked.

Kalev Battalion Head Named

934K0058E Tartu POSTIMEES in Estonian 6 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Peeter Tali: "Kalev Battalion Head Appointed"]

[Text] Capt. Alar Laaneman (30) was appointed Chief of the Kalev Single Infantry Battalion by the Commander of Defense Forces.

Capt. Laaneman started taking over the Kalev battalion yesterday and, by next Monday, he should be giving orders to Kalevites as chief of their battalion. Yesterday, Laaneman was introduced to the personnel of the Kalev battalion by Col. Ants Laaneots, Commander of Defense Forces.

"The most important thing in defense forces is discipline and adherence to the regulations," Capt. Laaneman told POSTIMEES.

Alar Laaneman has no regrets about having graduated from a Soviet military school, and having been conferred his first rank by the Soviet head of state. "I had decided

in favor of a military career. The only way to become an officer here was to attend a Soviet military school," Alar Laaneman said.

Alar Laaneman graduated from the Second Middle School of Pärnu and, in 1985, from the military school of the USSR. In the Soviet army, he has been acting company commander, has worked at the War Commissariat at Võru, and also as chief of the Republic's local assembly point at Lasnamäe.

In the Fall of 1991, Capt. Alar Laaneman and Col. Ants Laaneots of what was then the Soviet army, together took over the War Commissariat building on Narva Maantee in Tallinn, and started forming defense forces.

Alar Laaneman was the first commander of current staff headquarters for defense forces, and later chief of the headquarters staff company. The rank of captain was conferred on Alar Laanemann by the Supreme Council chairman of the Republic of Estonia. Before his appointment as chief of the Kalev battalion, he was a headquarters officer dealing with garrison and communications services.

Alar Laaneman is a first-level champion in free wrestling. Due to a leg injury during his middle-school years, he had to give up professional sports. Married, has a 4-year old daughter.

Acting as chief of the Kalev battalion, up until now, has been Capt. Albert Helme, chief of staff of the battalion.

Laaneots on Results of First Training Exercises

934K0058F Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian
7 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Tiit Tambi: "December Battle"]

[Text]

A Black Scenario

*Toward the end of last year, the world public learned that in the state neighboring the Republic of Estonia a coup d'etat had taken place and power was seized by empire-minded forces, who demanded that the Baltic states be rejoined to the territory of the Commonwealth. This was followed by several days of provocations at the Narva, Narva-Jõesuu and Võru-Petseri border sectors, and by clashes between Estonian border guards and the enemy's reconnaissance and diversionary groups. Estonia's leadership was informed that the neighboring state's motorized rifle divisions were being concentrated near our northeastern and southern borders.

By the evening of December 18, the government and the State Assembly reached a conclusion that political means for resolving the conflict have been exhausted and, the very same evening, the Kuperjanov battalion located in the southern defense district was put on a high level combat alert. During the night before the 19th, the danger became imminent and the president issued a

draft order and a full combat alert. The Kuperjanov and the Kalev battalions were summoned to the assembly points, along with 760 reservists.

Early that morning, aggressive enemy action had dislodged 70 percent of Estonia's border guards. Right away, the Kaitseliit combat units of the city and the district of Tartu received an order to reinforce the border guard and to defend the border from the north, while the Võru and Põlva units would handle the defense from the south. The Kuperjanov battalion, as the cover unit, took its defensive position in the darkness of that evening, and prepared for deterrent action. The Kalev battalion put in 250 kilometers of combat travel from their base in Jägala to Põlva, in the Kanepi region. Everything was ready for combat.*

Fortunately, Only Exercises

The foregoing black scenario was made up for the first after-war exercises of Estonia's defense forces, and represents a journalistic rendition of that document, so I want to apologize in advance if some of the military terminology is made to be more palatable. The forces were further deployed in such a manner that the northern sector was covered by the Kalev battalion and the Kaitseliit sub-units from the City and the District of Tartu, while the southern sector was defended by the Kuperjanov battalion, along with the Võru and Põlva sub-units of Kaitseliit. The Põlva-Kanepi highway served as the state border for the exercise.

The Kalevites received an order to mount a pre-emptive attack on the Kuperjanovites who had taken in favorable attack positions on the other side of the border, to prevent their further concentration and preparation for aggression. Reconnaissance came in with additional information: In the Narva-Jõesuu sector of the border the enemy is trying to secure the river so as to create a bridge-head for an offensive aimed at Sinimäed [Blue Hills] and Kohtla-Järve. For all practical purposes, military action "had begun."

In the evening of December 19, the combat companies of Kaitseliit were given permission to cross the state border and start reconnaissance and diversionary acts. The objects had been determined before, as had been the conditions of their destruction. The action between the Kaitseliit units lasted all night. On the morning of December 20 the Kalev battalion, along with the Kaitseliit units assigned to it, mounted an attack. A fierce battle ensued, as a result of which the Kuperjanovites had to retreat to the reserve position on the Ora river, where the attackers were contained and forced to resort to defense.

During the night, the main forces of the southern side arrived and the Kuperjanovites, as a unit, received an order to regroup and start a counter-offensive in the morning—the previous condition on the border had to be restored. And so it was. The Kalevites still managed to break loose from the attackers in an organized manner and to retreat to a favorable position, where they still

tried to put up resistance but, by the evening, everything was back to normal on the border.

That concluded the so-called dynamic part of the exercises. The Kalev battalion, and its training staff, also participated in overnight camping under field conditions, and then faced a return trip to Jägala.

Evaluation from Col Laaneots

I asked Col Ants Laaneots, chief of headquarters staff of Estonia's Defense Forces, to comment on the foregoing.

[TAMBI] Why were the exercises held in the winter?

[LAANEOTS] This way, all participants could be exposed to the real experience under field conditions. As for winter, much less damage was caused to the land than would have been the case during the soft season. We had hoped to get done without causing any damage at all, but the weather betrayed us—it didn't get cold enough. Afterwards, the engineering unit of the Kuperjanov battalion had to smooth out quite a few fields and stretches of local roads. We also got complaints when some car parked where it shouldn't have.

[TAMBI] What else stood out?

[LAANEOTS] The lack of communications equipment made command more difficult, especially in the case of Kaitseliit. Lack of experience on the part of some officers also became evident. We found out what studies should be expanded, and what should be emphasized. The draft attempt showed that this is an area of concern, we are short on appropriate laws but, perhaps more importantly, on the sense of duty among Estonian men—many simply ignored the call.

Those who participated, felt the tension of a combat situation, even if it was only practice. I noticed some men from the Tartu Kaitseliit in a vigorous argument, while crawling in the ditch, about how best to destroy the armored vehicles of Kuperjanovites (if only they had what it took). Kalevites, who had previously attacked the positions of Kuperjanovites, got so carried away that defenders had to put an armored vehicle on the bridge of the Ora river to stop them from crossing. Even if that meant that the vehicle was destroyed.

[TAMBI] How did the equipment hold out, on the whole?

[LAANEOTS] Quite well. We had 30 armored vehicles and 70 cars participating. There were no problems with the armored vehicles, everything went smoothly. Two bread trucks broke down during the exercises. The men got their bread on time, just the same.

[TAMBI] Your personal impression, in general?

[LAANEOTS] On the whole, it went much better than I had first expected. In comparison, I can say that the Kuperjanov battalion is not inferior to any of the units I have seen at exercises during my Soviet Army days,

except for the armament, of course. The Kaitseliit men were well prepared and followed all orders meticulously. The Tartu unit even rolled its artillery gun into position to fire.

Jundzis on Problems of New Defense Forces

93UN0637A Riga RIGAS BALSS in Latvian 7 Dec 92 p 4

[Interview with Talavs Jundzis, Minister of Defense of the Republic of Latvia by Ivars Libietis: "Variegated Army is Born in Difficulties"]

[Text] When politicians become bored, they readily like to debate the question: does Latvia need an army?

The very old folks, who still remember the Latvian army of the first independence years, critically eye the young men in their variegated uniforms and sigh nostalgically.

Let's take a look at our defense forces close up, overall, and from the inside. Such an opportunity is being presented in an interview with the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Latvia, Talavs Jundzis.

[Libietis] Mr. Minister, the people are calling the divisions under your control the Latvian army, while the administration and lawmakers are using a different name. Which do you prefer?

[Jundzis] Yes, that is a vital question. We, myself included, would like to use the name - the Latvian army. And I think that this will happen, eventually; but right now, the law refers to them as the defense forces. Discussing this matter from a theoretical point of view, it must be said that we are creating a rather unique defense structure, and for the time being, it would not be quite correct to call it an army. The main reason is that the basic function of our soldiers in the defense forces is to protect Latvia's land, sea and air borders. Thus, we could say that each of our soldiers is also a borderguard, and conversely, we can call the borderguards—soldiers. This is an original concept, and yet is has been favorably received by the European nations, and viewed positively by NATO. Why did we select this variant? The answer is prosaic—to save the people's money.

[Libietis] You said—protect the border. What about the interior?

[Jundzis] Also the interior, and this, at the same time, involves the borderguards, as well as other types of soldiers. The total length of our land and sea border is about 2,000 kilometers. If we were to make that into a straight line, then the distance would be greater than from Riga to Paris. The borderguards also control the interior, in addition to which we are simultaneously forming mobil units to cover the internal areas, if help is needed in one section or another. Mobile units are being formed in Suzos, on the approaches to Riga; and in the future, another such site will be Aluksne.

[Libietis] What you have just said seems quite understandable, from a visual point of view. Perhaps we could now allow ourselves a little theoretical digression: what is Latvia's defense proposal?

[Jundzis] To give you a definition in a few words, the basic focus of the proposal is the protection of the nation's borders and territory. That is the same as it is in most European countries. Of course, this also means that we will not allow our national territory to be used by some other nation, and thus we will not allow military bases of some other nation—neither Russian nor European—into Latvia. With respect to foreign policy, our defense proposal anticipates active cooperation with all well-intentioned nations, and participation in the formation of the European community security system. Thus, this is not a policy of neutrality, as we simply cannot allow that; we are a small and, in terms of material means, frugal nation, and only large and wealthy nations can afford to remain solitary and still guarantee their own safety.

With respect to the proposal, I should also mention the makeup of the internal defense forces. Armed units, consisting of various structures, have been anticipated. One structure is the defense forces, another—the national guard, for which a very important role has been anticipated, and also the security forces and, in an emergency situation—the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[Libietis] We hope for the best, but in real life, anything can happen. If a real threat does materialize, then we probably can't only think about defense ...

[Jundzis] Naturally, at the present time, we cannot call any specific nation our enemy, but our defense proposal contains the term "sources of threat". One such source is represented by the internal forces within our own territory, which do not approve of Latvia's independence. Another source of threat is represented by the unstable situation in the territory of the former USSR, especially in Russia. Right now we have several programs on how to act in a threatening situation, in combination with the security services, national guard, and divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We have now started to develop a national defense plan, which will be confirmed by the newly elected National Defense Council.

[Libietis] I gather that in every one of your fields of activity, information plays an extremely important role. What is the present status of information collection? Haven't the specialized structures been overly fragmented? Is the collected information being transferred quickly enough to one location and analyzed?

[Jundzis] I think that the problems you mentioned are not the major ones. Naturally, I could hope for a greater compactness of information. These matters are being handled by the security services, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the respective divisions of the national guard, and the Ministry of Defense. The greatest problem is the lack of trained people. The people are learning on the job, and that

is very difficult. In all other fields, we could find workers—doctors, lawyers, and other specialists, but in this field, we cannot use the former KGB, nor members of other special services, although they are recognized as professionals through the whole world. For instance, the KGB was one of the most powerful intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations in the first world threesome, together with the respective services from Israel and the United States. With great difficulty, we are forming our information gathering and analysis system. We hope that the collected information will become increasingly more complete, objective and qualitative.

[Libietis] I know approximately how much of the plan falls into your budget. I invite you to temporarily forget your money problems. Imagine that I have just arrived with a car load of money. How much do you need?

[Jundzis] We would need 240 million until the end of the year.

[Libietis] I don't deal with such insignificant amounts. Tell me how much for the entire next year. Only, I would want to know how you are going to spend it.

[Jundzis] We would need about 6 billion rubles for the next year. If you were to give us this, then, hoping that there is a reasonable rise in inflation, we could establish the foundations for an air force and a naval force, and also develop the mobil units and inland borderguard. In addition, I would like to clarify that we have been able to arm the inland borderguard somewhat, at present, using infantry arms and supplying them with ammunition, but the situation with the air force is critical. Frankly speaking, there is no sense in protecting the inland area, if, for instance, we are unable to monitor the relocation of Russian army helicopters. As of October 1, when we started monitoring, using the technical means we have available, more than 130 violations of Latvian air territory by the Russian army were confirmed. There is talk of flights taking place without verbal contact nor permission being requested. That is creating a threat to air traffic. We cannot monitor helicopters at all, because our radar systems do not operate at such low altitudes, and on the eastern border, the radar system capabilities, in and of themselves, are a major problem. I would like to work together with civil aviation services, creating a radar system that could control our air borders and air space in a normal manner. If we had the money, then the next step would be—to create some sort of air defense system; either aircraft interceptors, or other arms systems. It is essential to train people for air defense. We are apparently going to receive two aircraft, but in order to prepare two fliers in the month long course requires 23,000 US dollars.

We can continue the conversation by turning to naval forces. Right now, we have three patrol boats, and hope to expect help from the western countries in the near future—with six more. That will again require money for

operating expenses and radar installations. Nevertheless, we have to think about this, and allocate the money.

[Libietis] What do you think about the commanding staff in terms of their stance, knowledge and intelligence? What is the quality of training for the rank and file? What grade would a military inspector give?

[Jundzis] Frankly speaking, the grade would not be high. Why? First of all, there is the appearance of the defense forces. We are as mottled as a woodpecker's breast. Even now, the national guard uniforms can be confused with our uniforms, and this applies to the security service, as well. Recently, we placed an order with a factory, which would further increase this variegation: in order to help, we supplied the fabric. The manufacturers are ready to make everyone a handsome and regulation uniform, but again, we need the money. I hope that within the next year, we will be able to bring some order in this respect.

The other thing is the stance of our young men. We are neglecting sports to a great extent, and the youth coming out of our schools are in poor physical condition, and even the higher level schools have done away with their military training departments. As a result, their stance is poor, and the level of their conduct is also not very high.

With respect to officers. The Ministry has been in operation for one year and a few weeks. A corps of officers was also being formed during this period. I have great hopes for these officers, and we will most certainly turn them into true intellectuals and spiritually superior beings. It is anticipated that the competition for positions of officer will be fierce, because the salaries will be very good, and the service conditions will also be very good, while the number of officers anticipated is small—only about one thousand people.

[Libietis] We have bitter historical experience with what happens when three small nations start flaunting and acting capriciously. What are the relationships with our neighbors?

[Jundzis] That is a vital question. I could go as far as to say that it is not worth our while to think about defending ourselves alone. We must be convinced that our neighbors are trustworthy and our borders safe. In 1940, Latvia did not concern itself with securing its border with the USSR, and that is why the military agreement concluded with Estonia fell apart. We should not be allowed to repeat past mistakes. There is good cooperation right now. If not every month, then at least every few months, there are various meetings. In the beginning of July of this year, in Parnu, we, the three ministers, concluded agreements on cooperation in the exchange of information, on the conformity of principles in the formation of defense forces, and coordination in the area of training. I would even venture to say that our cooperation could be used as a model by the politicians.

[Libietis] Do you think that it is essential for us to join some military association, such as NATO, for instance?

[Jundzis] I already mentioned that it is impossible for a small nation to remain neutral, and that is why we must work together with NATO, and with the Western European Alliance (which is a security structure). But NATO has already stated quite clearly that it will not be able to accept any more new members in the near future. At present, NATO has 16 member nations, while the number of those who want to join is much larger. I think that if Latvia was offered the opportunity to join NATO, we would be very glad to accept, but there is no such offer, and there will not be one in the very near future. However, NATO has formed the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which includes all of the nations that would like to join NATO, also including the three Baltic nations and Russia. Contacts are being made. I would just like to remind everyone that we cannot allow ourselves to make the mistake of waiting for someone else to think about our defense. Decide for yourself: does NATO need Latvia, which right now has a few thousand semi-uniformed and semi-armed soldiers? And why should the mothers of France or Germany send their sons to Latvia in the case of a military conflict, if we don't know how to take care of our own defense? Naturally, we have to think about strengthening our own forces, so that later, we, too, could become members of the international peace forces. A few weeks ago, I met with a certain general from Luxembourg. The small nation, which has about 40,000 residents, has an army of 1,000 men. He talked about his army so proudly, that I enjoyed listening to him. At this time, we have five times more soldiers, and yet it is the Luxembourg divisions, not ours, that are participating in the peace keeping mission in former Yugoslavia. That means that in the event of an emergency, UN forces would also provide help to Luxembourg. That is why I once again stress that every nation must first think about itself. Continuing on this topic, I will remind you that the Polish Minister of Defense, during a visit to Riga in September, said: "Seeing what you have accomplished in one year, makes Poland, as well as other countries, want to help Latvia. You are concerned about yourselves, and that's why you are worth helping."

[Libietis] In accepting the position as Minister of Defense, you have taken upon yourself an incredibly heavy burden. After spending one year on the job, do you regret leaving your original profession—the legal profession? How, in general, do you envision your future?

[Jundzis] You have proposed a very basic question. No, I have no regrets, and I even feel satisfaction that something, which is permanent, tangible, and maybe even lovable, has been accomplished. Yes, the major job has been done—the foundation is laid. In this respect, Mr. Godmanis helped a great deal, although I did criticize him in the beginning for stalling. Already in the Defense Commission, in the Supreme Council, we said that an army could be created, even if they were to be armed with canes. When the money is available, we could purchase the arms within a few days, but the structure would already be prepared, the people found.

Time was wasted, and that's why we are quite a bit behind Lithuania, although we have already caught up with Estonia. The administration supports us now, as much as possible.

Speaking about the future, I must say that it is uncertain, in the same way as it is for any politician. What will happen in the future? I don't know. If another, better minister is found, then I won't be able to remain and

serve in the officers' corps. I will have to think about returning to my original profession, although that will be very hard to do. But, nevertheless, whatever may happen in the future, I will remain satisfied about this period, throughout my life.

Ivars Libietis interviewed the Minister. Photo by Girts Ilmajis.

SECURITY SERVICES

Border Guards Stage Protest in Pskov Area

934Q0015A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
4 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by V. Karpov under the "Bayonets Into the Ground?" heading: "Officers On.....Strike"]

[Text] Strikes come as no surprise to anybody any more. Still, this act of protest has caused an unusual reaction. If only for the fact that it was conducted by people wearing military uniforms, whose regulations do not allow them to go on strike.

Officers and warrant officers of the Pytalovo border guard detachment, deployed in the Pskov area, barricaded highways and stopped for a considerable period of time all transportation from Russia to the Baltics. They also put picketers on the railroad. They were forced to take this step by their feelings of desperation and hopelessness. It got their dander up, as the saying goes.... The picketers in green caps wanted to make sure that "Yeltsin himself" got real information about their life and service conditions on the new Russian border. It seems that all of the reports he gets are optimistic and cheerful.

These kinds of reports must have been going to those at the top last summer also when the detachment was taken out of Latvia. They were leaving in a hurry, as if retreating before an enemy onslaught. They abandoned an outstanding military base and their apartments. But nobody was expecting them in the Pskov area, on the new Russian border. Soldiers were not assigned any premises, officers were not given residences. Those who found some hovels to live in could be considered incredibly lucky. The conditions have been inadequate either for service or for a more or less decent life. But the

service itself is sort of "outlawed." Even though the administrative and territorial borders of Russia were given state border status, the guards here are doing more observing than actual guarding. When the troops were redeployed from the Baltics, no laws on state borders existed in Russia then; the law still does not exist. How can we talk about a fully legitimate border service, with a secure "lock" against smugglers and with its own secrets, if one of the Pytalovo checkpoints has just one telephone, which it shares with a local resident!

On top of their "illegal" service burden, their unsettled life, and delayed wage payments, they also worry about 76 of their families who have remained in Latvia. They are staying there without any means of existence and without any protection against blackmail or provocations. This was the spark that made the officers' patience explode.

The oblast governor, V. Tumanov, and its top brass hastily met with the strikers in green caps. But, unfortunately, they failed to find anything definite with which to calm the desperate servicemen. Where is the sum of 6.8 billion rubles promised by the government for equipping the Pskov sector of the border? It has not come yet. That is why it has been impossible to contract builders or to buy completed or partially completed housing for the military.


It is quite obvious today that our troops were withdrawn from the Baltics in a hurry, while no preparations were made for them in Russia. The border guard units were practically thrown out into the open. Who will answer for this direct abuse of the people and of their reputation as "sentinels of our motherland" is the question asked by those very sentinels, who are now driven to despair. The picketers told the authorities that their protest action might be repeated if no real work was started to build up the new state borders. In short, dark clouds are hanging low at the Pskov sector of the Russian border.

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