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Military Affairs

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Paper Exposes Corruption in Baltic MD

PM0902152593 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 93 p 2

[I. Chernyak article: "Troop Withdrawal from Baltic Region: Generals to Black Sea, Officers to Open Field?"]

[Text] From an ITAR-TASS report: "The leaders of the Coordinating Council of Officers' Assemblies of the Baltic Region spoke of growing corruption in the Russian Army at a news conference in Riga. According to Colonel Vladimir Kandalovskiy and Lieutenant Colonel Yevgeniy Milashchenko, documents confirming instances of the squandering of military property have already been forwarded to the Russian parliamentary commission headed by Deputy Yuriy Yudin. Its representatives are expected to come to Riga—which, in the officers' view, will help to stop embezzlement.

"The officers spoke indignantly of the active campaign to privatize army installations mounted by Viktor Grishin, former commander of the Baltic Military District, who has now been discharged from the Army but has kept his former ties. Incidentally, both leaders of the Coordinating Council of Officers' Assemblies were also recently transferred to the reserve. Kandalovskiy and Milashchenko believe that this was done for political reasons. In their opinion, the activity of this public organization, which engages in the social and legal protection of servicemen, was not to the liking of the top command.

"Reporting on the domestic conditions under which the servicemen withdrawn from the Baltic region live, the two leaders of the Coordinating Council named, for purposes of comparison, the number of apartments which several leaders of the Northwestern Group of Forces have in various cities and also the addresses of the cottages being built for them."

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Commentary

Despite all the orders by Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, and by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev prohibiting servicemen from engaging in commerce, the Russian Army is not ceasing trading. Among the recent sensational affairs I will name the arrest on a charge of trading in military hardware of a group of top officers and generals of the Far Eastern Military District and of the commander of an air division in Vozdvizhenka, also in the Far East, who used military aircraft to transport Japanese machines to the military airfields of Chkalovskiy and Kubinka in Moscow Oblast in return for bribes from businessmen. Proceedings have been instituted against two fleet commanders and the former chief of rear services in the Russian Armed Forces, and many generals and officers have been removed from their posts and are under investigation. But those who

are at liberty do not tire of hitting out: Now the command of the Pacific Border District will sell an alternate command post to a small enterprise, now officers of the General Staff will suddenly dash off to the Arbat to sell industrial silver in ingots. From time to time echoes of scandals issue now from Tajikistan and the Transcaucasus, where Russian servicemen trade in tanks, armored personnel carriers, and small arms, now from the Ministry of Defense itself, whose leader was until recently, so it turns out, co-owner of the "Avia Kap-Info" Joint-Stock Enterprise, as DEN Chief Editor Aleksandr Prokhanov forced him to admit.

Another scandal now seems to be brewing in the Russian Army. Passions had not had time to die down in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense after the publication of the conclusions of the commission under the leadership of Yuriy Boldyrev, Russian chief state inspector and chief of the Control Administration under the Russian Federation president, on the embezzlement and squandering of military property in the Western Group of Forces, before a new "bombshell" appeared.

You cannot call the statement by Vladimir Kandalovskiy and Yevgeniy Milashchenko unexpected. Information about the lawlessness being perpetrated in units stationed in the Baltic region has appeared before. Kandalovskiy has also spoken of this: He declared as long ago as last fall that embezzlement of military property there had reached inordinate dimensions. The Defense Ministry pretended not to notice the disgraced colonel's statement, but another planning commission soon traveled out to the Baltic Fleet. (I will point out that many people have traveled to the Baltic region to combat theft, even including Admiral Chernavin, former commander in chief of the Navy, although this was not much use). The results of that check horrified even the worldly-wise investigators. According to the information of the Military Prosecutor's Office, a transport regiment of the fleet's aviation under the commanding officer's leadership was actively engaged in commercial shipments, and acting as go-between was a firm whose boss was former chief of the special section with, under his command, the former chief navigator of the fleet's aviation and the chief of the Air Force command post. At the rear services artillery arms base of Tallinn Naval Base the supplying of fuels and lubricants to Estonian commercial structures was in full swing under the supervision of the commanding officer. The command of a division of missile boats, the commanding officer of a shore base, and the chief of a fuels and lubricants depot were getting rid of 10-15 tonnes of diesel fuel every month on the side. In the space of a year Baltic Fleet sailors pooled their efforts and sold off 10,000 tonnes of fuel, making millions of rubles. They sell articles made of copper, one tonne of which costs more than \$1,000, ship's screws and anchors, brass shell cases by the tonne, and God knows what else.

Why not steal? The situation at Baltic Fleet depots can be described in one word—chaos. Judge for yourselves, however: Whereas from 1950 through 1990 only 30

pistols and one assault rifle were lost here, in 1991-1992 40 units of small arms, 52 portable anti-aircraft missile systems, 433 grenades, and 99,000 cartridges were lost. (These are just the official statistics). The majority of the thefts result not from armed attacks by perfidious "chukhontsy" [pejorative word for Estonians and Finns] but because of deplorable storage. Only old women pensioners agree to guard depots for the wretched wages, and a single post of the paramilitary security forces is responsible for 1.5 km of installation to be guarded. In some units the signaling went out of commission several years ago, and there is a shortage of barbed wire, guarding and firefighting equipment, and guard dogs. According to Colonel Yu. Voyevoda, chief of the Baltic Fleet Prosecutor's Office, "the situation with regard to storing weapons and ammunition is unsatisfactory." Ownerless mortars, machine guns, and anti-aircraft guns lie scattered around on open sites. Ammunition rusts in the open, and the danger of explosions increases many times over. A few years ago an ammunition dump blew up in a suburb of Severomorsk, and last year one in the Pacific Fleet. Observers forecast that the Baltic Fleet will be the next in line.

But let us return to embezzlement. There is worse to come. At a higher level and on a different scale. According to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's data, in recent years the Baltic Fleet Command has sold abroad through various joint ventures more than 30 obsolete ships and submarines. The sum total of the deals is estimated by competent organs at millions of dollars. But just crumbs have gone into the fleet's coffers—to construct housing for officers, and so on. For example, an obsolete submarine weighing 670 tonnes, including 28 tonnes of nonferrous metals, was sold to Italy through the "Siklin" Joint Venture. The businessmen received \$95,220 for it. Just \$2,200 was "released" to the fleet. It subsequently turned out that for unknown reasons the sale price had been lowered by \$50,000, but these are details. A patrol escort ship which had been raised from the bottom was sold to Spain through the "Purbalt" Joint Venture for \$68,000, and the fleet received just \$11,000. At the same time the amounts of the bribes remained a mystery.

Staffers of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office soon ascertained that Col Gen Grishin, commander of the Baltic Military District and an ordinary Russian general, was the owner of a number of firms and also dachas and apartments in Riga, Smolensk, and on the Black Sea, near Odessa. General Lepilkin, deputy commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces for construction and billeting, while having an apartment in Riga, acquired real estate in St. Petersburg and Vitebsk.... The thieving generals were removed, but nothing changed after this in the Northwestern Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet. Officers openly said that only the little guys had been surrendered in Moscow. This version received indirect confirmation after a large amphibious warfare ship of the Baltic Fleet was detained in Swinoujscie with a cargo of contraband metal being removed from the fleet's

depots. It came to light during a check that representatives of the "Baltgarant" Joint-Stock Company, which had been set up on the orders of the Russian Naval Command, were engaging in smuggling.

Col. Vladimir Kandalovskiy bluntly declared that the results of commercial activity in the Northwestern Group of Forces are officially estimated at 222 million rubles, but incomparably larger sums have settled in the pockets of corrupt officials of the Russian Defense Ministry and the command of the group of forces. He claims to have proof of this.

Kandalovskiy assumes that the matter will not go to trial in respect of his statements: "They fear glasnost for, if they speak, so much will come out—God forbid." You can assume that there will be no official reaction from the military department to the statement by the leaders of the Coordinating Council of Officers' Assemblies of the Baltic Region. Just as there was no reaction to the documents accusing the Western Group of Forces Command of corruption. (Except that the chief unmasker—Yuriy Boldyrev, chief of the Control Administration under the Russian Federation president—felt his seat starting to shake under him). According to observers' forecasts, the affair of the Northwestern Group of Forces can get moving only after the arrival in Latvia of members of the Russian Supreme Soviet deputies' group "Reform in the Army" under the leadership of Yuriy Yudin, who intend to tackle a thorough investigation of the facts cited by Kandalovskiy. I propose to follow the fate of Yudin.

Women Assuming Greater Service Responsibilities

Women Medical Officers Drawn by Job Benefits, Lauded for Prowess

93UM0437A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Mar 93 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Strugovets: "Natasha, Anya and Other Lieutenants"]

[Text] The uniform? It doesn't bother you a bit. On the contrary, sometimes you walk around the city and you're surprised, why doesn't anyone pay attention to you. It turns out you're not in uniform.

Junior Lieutenant Natasha Dragoy, glancing at the star on her shoulder boards, repeated:

I like my uniform.

I don't know how much Natasha and her girlfriends really like their uniforms, but I saw for myself how they were greeted with friendly smiles on the streets of Tomsk.

What is it that draws young girls to the military medicine department at the Siberian Medical University?

The romance? Perhaps, but basically, let's be objective, nowadays it is the material factor. Judge for yourselves:

the students in the first year here are paid three or four times as much as their fellow students who remained at civilian medical institutes. And in the higher grades, when the students are awarded the rank of junior lieutenants, their pay will be four to six times the pay of a physician, plus housing allowance, free travel to a vacation spot and back, and other benefits.

And finally, guaranteed assignment. That is of no little importance today. For example, at that same Siberian Medical University, a component part of which is the military medicine department, this year only 50 work places are promised for several hundreds of graduates.

Of course the girls in shoulder boards will go not only to big cities. Some of them will find themselves in the "hot spots." But service is service. And I should note that the girls get used to this while still in school. Twenty-four-hour details, duties, drill inspections, grounds cleanup. No indulgences.

And indeed, in their training, the most important thing for them, experience shows that they don't need privileges. They can give a head start to anyone they please. Even in such very military disciplines as tactics and combined-arms regulations. And this is not simply a tribute to form. They "fight" on the maps and on the terrain models, and they go to the field. You see, the primary posts for graduates of the department are chief of the medical aid station of a regiment, and chief of the medical supply department of a tactical formation. Here they "fight" at a quite respectable level: the tactical instructors, officers who have served for some time in line units, are at times surprised by the accuracy of the decisions made by the "lieutenants in braids," and by the orders that they issue.

I hesitate to say it, but I believe that it was not the girls, but the teachers and the command of the department who had to readjust. They who have worked for all their lives in very manly collectives, how hard it was for them at first to accept the presence of "young persons of the opposite sex." Now they recall, there were some commands that they had a hard time giving. How would the girls react? It was also necessary accept some disruptions of the schedule: was 20 minutes really enough for a young girl's morning toilet?

And the girls? Surprisingly, they proved more disciplined and conscientious than the boys. It is no accident that now six months after the start of the experiment in training female students as military doctors and inspectors, the command of the department was asked to expand the intake. And today almost half of the students in the department are girls.

I add that every semester they celebrate a number of weddings. Most often the students marry one another. It

is a joyous event. Only the personnel people grumble good-naturedly to themselves: now they have to look for a garrison with two vacant posts for officers of the medical service.

In general the girls are doing well in their service, training and personal lives. May it remain that way always.

New Survey of Commanders: Women Work Well, Lift Morale

*93UM0437B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Mar 93 p 1*

[Article by Olga Ryseva: "The Army Woman Awaits a Knightly Attitude"]

[Text] It looks like very soon the fair half of mankind will also be competing with men in the non-traditional field of military service. In any case, a survey conducted just before the holiday by the Center for Military-Sociological, Psychological and Legal Studies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation showed that the majority of commanders taking part in it, including those of the highest level, rate the qualities of their female service members very highly. It was noted in particular that their presence in army outfits had a beneficial effect on morale and "had a calming effect" on the activity of the stronger sex.

The seriousness of intentions of the women who chose the army way was also confirmed by the fact that not a single one of those polled named as the reason for their decision a desire to improve their personal life (the question was even received with irritation). Half of them (and there were basically wives of service members, who do not often have an opportunity to get work in their basic specialty) don their shoulder boards for family reasons, so to speak. Some 22.8% out of "interest in service and many benefits," while 20.5% were drawn by the higher pay for their specialty in comparison with civilian jobs.

Nonetheless, a woman in the army remains a woman. Every fourth participant in the survey noted with regret that an incorrect attitude toward them (coarse behavior, double entendres and so forth), and also the absence of elementary conditions, especially on trips to the field, had changed their ideas of army service for the worse. They were especially annoyed (what woman does not want to look attractive!) by the problem of issuance of military uniforms, especially in remote garrisons. In such they are not always issued, and at times the clothing shop refuses to make them. And of course from the esthetic standpoint the uniform does not satisfy many.

On the eve of the holiday there is undoubtedly food for thought here for military men.

CIS: POLICY**Patterns For Recruiting Contract Personnel,
Women Emerging****Contract Interior, Border Troops**

93UM0413A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Feb 93 p 11

[Article by Aleksandr Borisov: "Internal and Border Troops Await Volunteers"]

[Text] Moscow—The Council of Ministers, the Russian Federation government, issued a special decree on February 12 extending the decree on voluntary service by contract to servicemen of the Internal and Border Troops.

The Russian Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economics were given appropriate instructions with respect to ceilings on allocations of state capital investments for 1993.

**Siberian Troops Make Skiing Run To Attract
Contract Recruits**

93UM0413B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Feb 93 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Beklich: "Siberian Soldiers Promote Contract Service"]

[Text] Novosibirsk—A ski run marking Fatherland Defenders Day has begun in the Siberian Military District. According to Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Chernov, who organized the run, the skiers will pass through dozens of Siberian communities.

They will meet with draft-age youth, labor collectives, and schoolchildren and talk about the Russian Army's history and traditions and life for soldiers today and explain the terms of contract service in the Russian Armed Forces. The promotional ski runs will become a traditional event.

**Number Of Contract Recruits By Region Given;
WGF Leads Pack**

93UM0413C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Feb 93 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Opting for Contract Service"]

[Text] The selection of candidates for contract service continues in the army and navy. The Ground Forces are led by the Western Group of Forces, where more than 6,800 men had been recruited as of early February. This amounts to nearly 70 percent of the total to be recruited for the Western Group of Forces this year. Second place is held by the Airborne Assault Forces, which has accepted 1,515 volunteers for this year, filling roughly half of its vacant contract slots.

The corresponding figures for the military districts are as follows: Urals, 36.5 percent; Leningrad, 27 percent; Volga,

15 percent; Siberian, 7.8 percent; Far Eastern, 3.2 percent; Moscow, 1.5 percent; and the North Caucasian, 0.8 percent. The fleets are led by the Northern Fleet, with 3.3 percent.

**Numbers Of Women In Each Service; MOD
Directive Seeks To Attract More**

93UM0413D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Dec 92 p 6

[Article by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service: "Women in the Russian Federation Armed Forces"]

[Text] Nearly 100,000 women currently serve in the Russian Army. More than 1,100 of them are officers, and more than 20,000 wear warrant officer shoulderboards. The Ground Forces have the most women, nearly 30,000, while the Navy and Air Force have half that many. The Airborne Assault Forces have more than 1,000 women. In addition 5,000 women are serving in staffs, 6,000 in rear-service units, and 178 warrant officers are engaged in educational and cultural work in the army. One hundred sixty-nine command-related specializations alone are open to women.

Women are recruited for military service by rayon (city) military commissariats on the basis of requests from military unit commanders or military district staffs, which submit the appropriate documents. A directive from the defense minister on stepping up recruitment of women for the army is now in effect. Unmarried women without children who are between the ages of 19 and 40, fit for military service, and have at least an eighth-grade education can serve as soldiers, sailors, senior sergeants, and sergeants for a term of two to four years or six years. When this term ends, service can be extended at their request. The post of warrant officer or naval warrant officer is open to women who are 35 years of age and younger and have a higher or secondary specialized education that is related to an appropriate military specialization. Officer positions may be filled by women who serve as reserve officers, are under 30 years of age, and have graduated from higher educational institutions in civilian specializations with military applications. Women can serve in the military until the age of 50.

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES**Missilemen's Arduous Service Conditions Eyed**

PM0503155193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Mar 93 p 1

[Article by Colonel Anatoliy Belousov and Major Aleksandr Dolinin: "Missilemen's Alert Duty: at Desks for up to 18 24-Hour Periods a Month"]

[Text] Today everyone is hearing about disarmament and elimination. Uninitiated people might get the impression that our Armed Forces are only engaged in "cleaning out" their arsenals. But the labor-intensive and very serious and crucial work of disarmament in

connection with international accords constitutes only part of the concerns of people in uniform.

Take the Strategic Missile Forces. The burden of disarmament that they shouldered, first after the signing of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Reduction [as published] of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and now with the upcoming final accords on START I and II, is exceptionally heavy. But, at the same time, alert duty was and still is the chief thing for strategic missilemen.

Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, who himself performed duty for more than one decade, explained it like this in conversation with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA journalists:

"The threat of a world nuclear missile war and a large-scale military conflict has today been virtually minimized. The danger of war diminishes with the attainment of new accords. But it is premature to speak of its complete elimination. The role of the Strategic Missile Forces, which possess means of ensuring global stability, at present remains as before."

Consequently, it is too soon to do away with the post at the strategic launch consoles. Today there are more than 1,000 launchers—silo and surface, mobile launchers—in the combat makeup of the Rocket Forces. Even if far fewer of them remain, missilemen will perform duty. Alert duty in peacetime.

Officers and ensigns have to be on duty for up to 18 24-hour periods a month. Only their wives and children and they themselves know how they cope, for their entire service consists of preparation for duty, its performance, and a brief rest afterward. The loads, both emotional and physical, are considerable. It is no coincidence that up to 40 percent of those performing duty are young people, who are the only ones capable of fully coping with them.

Despite the difficulties, the missilemen hold duty in particularly high esteem. This is why, on arriving at a new place of service, the first thing an officer does is seek to gain access to alert duty. Without this you cannot earn respect and authority in the collective.

Commanding officers try their hardest to encourage those on duty. During the past two years alone hundreds of officers and ensigns in the Strategic Missile Forces have been awarded orders and medals for distinguished services on duty. Promotions are awarded and ranks conferred according to this criterion. On Young Officer's Day, for example, 37 lieutenants and senior lieutenants pinned one more little star to their shoulder boards, having received ranks ahead of schedule.

It is possible to say that all perform duty in the Missile Forces: commanding officers and subordinates, servicemen and employees. At the very moment these lines are being read, thousands of them are at their duty stations. Some are serving in "waiting mode" by the "Launch" button, others are keeping an eye on battle management and communications signals, and yet

others are servicing systems to ensure the vital activities of command posts. Soldiers and sergeants of guard subunits are in guardrooms. Staff workers, rear service workers, drivers, and airmen have their own concerns.... The work of all of them contributes to the duty watch. When missilemen say that no one among the troops is exempt from alert duty, this is no exaggeration. Precisely such collective labor makes it possible to achieve an irreducible level of alert duty in the Missile Forces.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Tactical, Technical Specifications of TM-83 Anti-Tank Weapon

93UM0415A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Vitaliy Moroz, under the rubric: "Arsenal": "TM-83: The Mine that Destroys From Afar"]

[Text] The rubric "Arsenal" has not yet discussed our army's mine equipment. Meanwhile, it has absorbed quite a few achievements of science and technology, original ideas and discoveries.

The TM-83 antitank, horizontal effect antitank mine, which we are discussing today, is not in the forefront of technology. There are more complicated developments in the engineer troops. But the TM-83's design gives us an idea of how much contemporary mines differ from mines, say, of the World War II era that were most frequently based on "pure mechanics".

The TM-83 is a remote-controlled mine. It destroys a tank or other armored target from a distance of up to 50 meters. Its effect is based on the principle of a so-called penetrator [from a sabot antitank round]. What does that term mean?

Ordinary explosives for mines are placed in a steel case. The side of it that is turned toward the target during installation is covered with a copper fragmentation face which is a hemisphere that is concave into the case. When the charge detonates, a high-velocity compact destructive element is formed (the penetrator) from this fragmentation face that is capable of piercing a 100 mm thick armor plate with a hole from 80 to 120 mm in diameter at a range of 50 meters. Detonation of the mine reminds us of an instantaneous prick by a fiery sword.

The TM-83 mine's case is similar to the headlight of a floodlight that has been secured to a bracket and, when the mine is laid, it is aimed at the required point (a marker installed on the far shoulder of a road) using the sight leaf and the front sight.

What sets the mine off? An optical target sensor that perceives infrared radiation and reacts to changes in its stream that are caused by the appearance of a target are part of its fuze system. A super-sensitive instrument even responds to the flight of a bird. That is why one other

sensor was needed—a seismic sensor. The latter emits an electronic pulse to the safety device-actuating mechanism and ultimately to the firing mechanism only in the event that it senses fluctuations of the soil that are characteristic for the movement of a heavy tracked vehicle. The TM-83 mine can be installed in the controlled (there are special attachments to do that) or uncontrolled (autonomous) variations. They install it on the cover of the packing crate or on a special clamp. For camouflage they use a hood, one side of which is khaki color (for summer)—the other side is white, and natural camouflage.

The best location to use the antitank, horizontal effect antitank mines, of course, is in combination with others—mountain gorges, defiles, cleared strips in the forest, and any chokepoints where the enemy is compelled to advance in columns.

Primary Tactical-Technical Specifications of the TM-83 Mine:

Weight in final armed configuration, in kilograms	20.4
Weight of the Explosive Charge (TG40/60), in kilograms	9.6
Target Destruction Range, in meters	50
Temperature Range for Employment, in degrees	from -30 to +50
Combat Operating Time, in days	30

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

MIG-23 Features Profiled

93UM0386B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Andryushkov: "The MIG-23: The Three Faces of a Fighter Aircraft"]

[Text] In 1967 during the airshow at Domodedovo, thousands of spectators caught sight of an aircraft in the air for the first time which changed its configuration three times in a single flight. The OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni A.I. Mikoyan gave the MIG-23 fighter aircraft its ticket to life with a sweptwing that varies its sweep in flight (range of the angle change is from 16° to 72°).

The MIG-23's aerodynamic design provided the aircraft with high lift qualities, and flight at very low altitudes and in the stratosphere. An almost straight wing with a sweep angle of 16° ensures comparatively low take-off and landing speeds and the capability to operate at airfields with shortened take-off and landing strips (concrete or dirt). A wing with a sweep of 45° makes the fighter aircraft highly maneuverable in a dog fight. The aircraft can perform the entire series of aerobatic maneuvers. At a sweep angle of 72°, the MIG-23 becomes similar to an arrow that has been shot from a bow and successfully

intercepts air targets at high altitudes and, when necessary, near the ground at supersonic speeds.

The MIG-23 family has many modifications. Today the MIG-23 Frontal Aviation fighter aircraft can conduct a dog fight with any enemy, thanks to improvements that have been made to the airframe design, equipment and weapons systems. The MIG-23's onboard systems and its missile armament provide the fighter aircraft with all angle intercept of air targets at a broad range of altitudes and speeds.

Primary Specifications of the MIG-23MLD

Wing span	7.8/14.0
Aircraft length	16.7
Wing area, in m ²	34.2/35
Take-off weight, in kilograms	
—Normal	14,840
—Maximum	17,800
Engine	1 X R-25F-300
Maximum afterburner thrust, in tonnes	13.0
Maximum thrust-to-weight ratio	0.88
Maximum speed, in kilometers per hour	2,500
Maximum speed, low-level, in kilometers per hour	1,400
Service ceiling, in meters	18,600
Maximum rate of climb, in meters per second	230
Practical range with a normal combat load (without PTB [external fuel tanks]), in kilometers	1,500
with 3 external fuel tanks	2,500
Operational G-load	up to 8.5
Armament:	
—Cannon (number of barrels X caliber, mm X combat load):	2 X 23 X 200
—Medium-range guided missiles (number X type):	2 X R-3, 2 X R-24
—Short-range guided missiles:	4 X R-60, 2 X R-73
Ordnance load, in kilograms	2,000
Length of take-off and landing run	500/750
Crew, in men	1

The onboard radar is capable of operating in the background of the earth and the all-angle of attack medium range missiles with the semiactive radar homing and heat seeking guidance heads permit the MIG-23 fighter to conduct successful dog fights at medium range. Six short-range missiles, a built-in high-speed 23 mm cannon and the onboard radar's rapid automatic target lock-on, and the capability for the pilot to select the optimal sweep wing angle makes the MIG-23 highly

effective in dog fights. During enemy use of electronic countermeasures, the pilot can utilize the TP-23 onboard IR radar that expands the aircraft's combat capabilities for detection and tracking of air targets and ensures undetectability of attack.

The flight-control and navigation equipment that has been installed on the MIG-23 makes the fighter an all-weather aircraft that actively operates during the day and at night, and under conditions of limited ground radar support. The pilot can perform aircraft preparation for the next sortie when he is away from the aircraft's home base.

The MIG-23 is in the Air Force and PVO [Air Defense] Aviation Troops inventory. The MIG-23UB—the combat training version of the aircraft that was developed at the OKB—facilitates successful mastery of the fighter at military schools and at line units.

The MIG-23 Frontal Aviation aircraft, due to its low cost, high reliability and combat effectiveness, has enjoyed deserved popularity in the 1970's-1980's and was acquired by many of the world's countries. By 1992, it was in the inventory of the Air Forces of Algeria, Angola, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Iraq, Libya, the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea], Poland, South Yemen, Syria, and Vietnam. The FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] received 110 MIG-23MF aircraft after the unification of Germany. There are several MIG-23's in the United States which participate in the rehearsal of combat training dog fights with U.S. fighter aircraft.

Today the MIG-23MLD is the most widespread model in the Russian Armed Forces. It has heightened maneuverability and handling at high angles of attack. The MIG-23MLD has a second "klyk" [dogtooth] that has been made near the wing root and a vortex generator in the shape of a small plate with sharp edges has been installed on the PVD [pitot tube]. The onboard computer inclines the wing leading edge sub-assembly, placing it in the optimal position depending on the flight mode.

The MIG-23MLD is equipped with an improved radar with an increased operating radius and a dog fight mode, and an automated device prevents an engine surge during missile launch or when firing from the cannon. A jam-resistant transmission line is used in the fighter aircraft automated ground control system.

The MIG-23 is not simply a fighter for intercept and destruction of air targets. It can carry up to two tonnes of bombs, unguided air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles with radar guidance against groundbased targets along a jam-resistant radio line.

In 1969, the OKB developed a design for a light strike aircraft based on the MIG-23S fighter aircraft. It received the designation MIG-23B. It has a fuselage nose section with an improved view of the space "ahead and below". It is tasked to conduct strikes against fixed

targets in the enemy rear during the day and for ground attack operations using cannons, unguided air-to-surface rockets and bombs.

The MIG-23B is equipped with the Sokol-23S sighting-navigation system and with the Fon laser rangefinder and is capable of "remembering" the coordinates of three route turning points and four airfields for landing.

The MIG-23B aircraft was the progenitor for the creation of the MIG-27 fighter-bomber family.

The MIG-23 fighter aircraft is suitable for modernization which will permit us to maintain its combat capabilities close to the level of 4th generation foreign fighter aircraft for a long time yet.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Naval Force Limitations and Defensive Sufficiency
93UM0408B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 1, January 93 pp 27-31

[Article by Retired Captain 1st Rank, Candidate of Naval Sciences B. Makeyev, under the rubric: "Questions of Theory: "Naval Arms Limitations and Defensive Sufficiency"]

[Text] Disarmament is the reduction of capabilities for military confrontation of the political blocs of states through mutual reduction of weapons for conducting war with the goal of reducing the threat of the outbreak of war. At the present time, arms reductions are being carried out based on negotiations of the interested parties on the reduction of their level, banning production and eliminating individual types and categories of weapons, and the limiting military budgets and military equipment development programs.


Definite achievements in the sphere of the reduction of strategic nuclear forces and conventional arms in Europe are well known. As for control over naval weapons, this sphere has not been encompassed by a serious negotiating process. Moreover, a number of NATO member-countries, and first of all the United States, refuse to conduct negotiations on the problems of reducing naval forces, while continuing to substantially increase their combat capabilities.

One can understand the position of the West that considers the United States the "island" state for which sea lines of communications are vitally important and naval forces are the most important component of the armed forces and an effective instrument for accomplishing missions in the sphere of its own state interests. But it is impossible to understand the military experts, scholars and politicians who suggest that one can conduct negotiations on balanced arms reductions, while excluding the naval component from that process. On the contrary, it's quite obvious that if any of the negotiating parties attempts to preserve or not broach a substantial limitation of the naval component of their own armed forces for some reason or other, it must limit to a greater degree other components of its own military potential so that the overall balance of forces remains at the agreed level.

How do we insure balanced arms reductions? First of all, we need a comprehensive approach and systematic analysis of the disarmament process. The armed forces of each state must be viewed as a single military organism consisting of various services and combat arms that are capable of accomplishing combat missions in close coordination. We must not compare the arms of states through the simple comparison of their individuals models and systems due to the various geostrategic conditions of employment, stationing, and deployment capabilities, and also inadequate assessments of the role and significance of individual services and combat arms in various countries. We must conduct arms comparisons based on mission performance effectiveness criteria that are faced by all of the armed forces. That approach requires modeling of possible combat operations between the opposing sides and determination of the composition of the men and equipment that are required and sufficient for accomplishing probable missions with the assigned effectiveness.

The essence of this methodological approach to arms reductions is demonstrated in Figures 1 and 2. Due to the specifics of the arms and military equipment of the various services of the armed forces, the methodology must provide for two levels of research. The first level suggests the development of common problems and interrelationships that are characteristic for the armed forces as a whole (Fig. 1). At the second level, blocks that permit analysis and development of proposals already on the composition of arms of the separate services and combat arms (Fig. 2) will branch out from the common research algorithm. That approach will ensure to a greater degree the clarification of their interdependence and will permit the development of the most substantiated criteria of defensive sufficiency and proposals for the reduction of each service and combat arm within the framework of the approved total military balance of forces.

Figure 1.



Key:

1. Assessment and prediction of the military-political situation. Development of its supporting variation for research.
2. Development of an operational-strategic model of possible military operations.
- 2A. Determination of the composition and condition of the armed forces of the probable enemy. Their deployment by TVD [Theater of Military Operations].
3. Primary missions of the armed forces in the event of war.
4. Allocation of missions among the services of the armed forces in war. The Navy's missions.
5. Modeling of the processes of armed combat for the resolution of assigned missions by services of the armed forces. Modeling of armed combat at sea.
6. Determination of the composition of forces for accomplishing assigned missions by services of the armed forces. Determination of the composition of the Navy.
- 6A. Appropriations for defense.
7. Proposal for balanced arms reductions. Level of the Navy's reductions.
8. Approval of missions and resources.
9. To Figure 2, Block 1.

Specific research in accordance with this general methodological approach to the determination of the level of sufficiency of the armed forces and to the process of their reduction begins from the assessment of the military-political situation and the development of its generalized (supporting) variation. The military-political situation is understood to be the complex of conditions that determine the missions and possibilities for the utilization of the armed forces depending on the system of political and military blocs that may become enemies in the event of the outbreak of war. Its assessment is conducted based upon analysis of the international relations that have developed and also on the prediction of their future development. In the process, about predictions of the military-political situation as a result of the inevitable uncertainty and the many variations for its development, we can say only with a relative degree of reliability, as a result of which in the event of the emergence of an armed conflict, the actual military-political situation cannot coincide with what has been predicted which can have undesirable consequences for planning the process of arms reductions and for determining the level of defensive sufficiency. Therefore, to exclude miscalculations, balance must lie at the foundation of the concept of arms reductions and the recommendations that are developed—must ensure the most painless adaptation of the steps undertaken to the changing situation and the possibility for their timely adjustment.

To do this, they must take into account the most dangerous situations for the country from the point of view of an armed clash from among the most probable, be the most comprehensive, that is, that permit the utilization of the armed forces in a sufficiently large range of conditions and also realistic from the point of view of economic capabilities to support the armed forces at the level of defensive sufficiency.

We can call this generalized variation that was developed based on the prediction of various possible variations of the military-political situation supporting. It was also previously widely utilized by all countries during the development of their own arms programs. And since substantiation of the reduction programs are related to the substantiation of arms development through their methodology, the development of a supporting variation of the military-political situation is not only required and successively justified but also tested. However, it must be utilized only as a basic variation for subsequent research. The operational-strategic model of possible combat operations (this model is often called a "scenario" in the American literature) is being developed based upon it. Here, the general conditions of the utilization of the armed forces in proposed conflicts, the allocation of missions among the services of the armed forces, and the primary methods to accomplish those missions while taking into account coordination and support are depicted in verbal and graphic form. Analysis of the composition and state of the armed forces of probable enemies and also the military potential of the sides and the assessment of the objectivity and validity

of the military missions declared by them at the negotiations or in official statements is conducted within the framework of this section of the research. The allocation of missions among the services of the armed forces in the main strategic operations is the most important stage of operational-strategic modeling.

The instability and changeability of both the international and the domestic political situation in various countries requires an objective examination of all of the primary goals of modern war which are vitally important for any state. In the process, we must not restrict them to today's state of affairs. They must be examined, while proceeding from the current situation and prospects of the development of the men and equipment for conducting the combat operations of states as potential participants of a military confrontation.

In our view, three main strategic missions objectively exist that each opposing side must strive to accomplish in modern war, regardless of its scale. The first—is suppression of the enemy's military-economic potential. Its priority is determined by the decisive impact of the military economy and the effective functioning of the most important military facilities on the course and outcome of war... Second—repelling enemy aerospace attack. It is the antipode of the first and is important because the effectiveness of air attack weapons and the number of nuclear powers and, as a result of that, the threat of surprise missile-space weapons strikes will increase. Therefore, despite the well-known reduction of these offensive weapons, the development and deployment of antimissile defense systems is continuing. And, finally, third—defeat of enemy armed forces formations, without the resolution of which the goals of war, as a rule, cannot be attained. History and the present attest to that.

The fact that naval forces, being an organic component of the armed forces, participate in accomplishing practically all of the main missions of war by conducting combat operations in the sea and ocean theaters certainly does not require a separate examination. Their size and level of resolution may be determined during the course of research while examining the operational-strategic model of war where the coordination of all of the services of the armed forces is considered. Optimization of the allocation of missions among them is a central problem of research at this stage of the work.

Balancing of forces within the framework of defensive sufficiency is conducted to define the required qualitative and quantitative composition of arms on this basis. And scientifically-substantiated proposals on arms and armed forces reductions should be developed only on the basis of this research.

Work on blocks 1-4 is the content of the first, macro level of research, and work on blocks 5-6-7 is the second level of research that is conducted according to the services of the armed forces.

Let's reveal the specific content of this research using the Navy as an example (Fig. 2.). The navy carries out general missions that were indicated above by accomplishing a number of specific partial missions in certain areas and against a specific enemy. Therefore, to determine the required composition of naval arms, we need to imagine those conditions in which the navy's forces will operate and describe them within the framework of these operational-tactical models. In the process, they must not contain all of the details, like let's say, during planning of an operation by a staff. Only the analog of the probable situation that reproduces only those characteristics of the process of combat at sea from which the required composition of men and equipment substantially depends is required.

Thus, partial combat missions and the techniques for accomplishing them that are described in the operational-tactical models serve as the primary and initial precondition for defining the needs for the weapons of armed combat. Mathematical relationships between the missions and required resources are worked out within the framework of these models or other, for example, empirical, expert, etc., methods of determining the required composition of the navy are employed. Various factors of the combat situation from which the qualitative and quantitative composition of naval arms substantially depend are the parameters for calculations.

The selection of effectiveness indicators is the most important element of modeling that determines the objectivity and practical acceptability of the quantitative assessments. In the event of their complexity, expert assessments or other methods are utilized that permit us to skillfully determine the dependence of the composition of men and equipment on the volume and level of the assigned missions that are being accomplished. It is important that this work be conducted within the framework of the systems approach and a single algorithm that is a hierarchical system of models of various levels that are interrelated by inputs and outputs that permit us to conduct the gradual optimization and balance of the composition of naval arms within the framework of defensive sufficiency and existing treaty relations.

It is advisable to conduct optimization in two stages: first of all, the qualitative character of the arms is determined, that is, what it is customary to label the qualitative composition and then the required quantity of arms (the quantitative composition). In the process, both the trends toward their development, the scientific-technical capabilities of achieving the desired parameters, and also treaty restrictions in this sphere are taken into account for their greater conformity. Mathematical models and expert assessments in this case permit us to imagine the overall character of future naval systems. The quantitative composition of arms is predetermined by the requirements of combat at sea and by the country's economic capabilities. Depending on the latter, the qualitative character of arms is ultimately described at the stage of substantiating the quantitative composition of naval arms.

Optimization of arms for the sake of their limitation within the framework of sufficiency is an iterative process (a method of continuous approximations) during the course of which a balance of the composition of the navy is carried out while taking into account that it is a part of the armed forces, accomplishes missions under different variations of the military-political situation, and in a diverse combat situation that requires a rational combination of strike and support systems, and the volume of missions and the levels of their resolution must be coordinated with economic capabilities and treaty obligations. Coordination of the navy's missions and the appropriations that are allocated for its development plays a decisive role in this process.

The required composition of the naval forces that have been balanced in this manner is essentially the combination of those forces that are on hand (while taking into account scrapping and modernization) and new naval weapons with which the navy will be augmented. The total balance of the increase or reduction of the navy will depend on the decisions made in treaties along with the indicated military requirements and economic capabilities. A repeat optimization of the composition of naval weapons to the general algorithm of arms reductions, that is a consequence of the reallocation of missions between types of arms in the goal of attaining an overall coordinated military balance, may be required at the proposal formation stage. The methodology proposed above permits us to analyze the existing composition of the Navy (the existing navy) with the goal of assessing the level of its sufficiency, substantiation of the level of development of its combat arms and the plans for their future improvement, and also the thresholds of permissible reduction. This analysis consists of comparing the existing and required compositions of the Navy (the existing navy and the required navy) to accomplish the mission of repelling aggression from the sea.

If the existing navy is greater than the required navy, that is, the existing composition of the navy exceeds defensive requirements, proposals are developed for the reduction of the composition of the navy.


If the existing navy is less than the required navy, that is, the capabilities of our navy do not support defensive requirements, proposals are developed for the reduction of the other side's Navy in the areas of the World Ocean that are under review with the submission of required substantiations within the framework of the proposed methodology. If they do not think it is possible there to accept these proposals, or they are prepared to partially consider them, a reallocation of missions among the services of their armed forces occurs with the goal of compensating for the inadequate composition of the navy or its corresponding reinforcement.

That is the general concept of the scientific substantiation of the processes for determining the level of defensive sufficiency of the armed forces as a whole and their services in particular, on which arms reduction decisions

must be based. Furthermore, approaches for the acceleration and scientific substantiation of the advisability of negotiations for naval force limitations, first of all of the United States and Russia, exist within the framework of this concept. However, agreements on the limitation of

naval activity in certain areas of the World Ocean must precede that. We understand that attempts to balance the Russian and U.S. navies based only on their composition are fruitless at the present time. On the one hand, this has been caused by the United States' unwillingness

Figure 2.



Key:

1. The Missions of the Navy (From Figure 1 Block 4).
2. Development of operational-tactical models for accomplishing the primary missions at sea.
- 2A. Assessment of the composition of potential enemies' navies.
3. Development of methods to determine the required composition of the Navy (required) for accomplishing the missions assigned to it.
4. Determination of the qualitative composition of the Navy.
- 4A. Assessment of scientific-technical capabilities for the development of new types of naval weapons
5. Determination of the quantitative composition of the Navy (required strength) and its cost (required cost).
Proposed cost is less than the required cost. The proposed cost is equal to the required cost.
- 5A. Assessment of the economic capabilities for the creation and financing of Naval forces.
- 5B. Assessment of the economic capabilities for the creation and financing of Naval forces.
6. Comparison of the required composition (the required navy) with the Navy's existing composition. Composition of the existing Navy is less than the composition of the required Navy. Composition of the existing Navy is greater than the composition of the required Navy.
- 7A. Development of proposals for restricting a potential enemy Navy's composition. Proposals taken into account.
Proposals not accepted.
- 7B. Development of proposals for the reduction of the composition of the Navy (to Figure 1, Block 7).
8. Adjustment of the allocation of missions among the services of the armed forces to compensate for shortcomings the existing navy (to Figure 1, Block 4) or proposals to increase it.
9. Adjustment to the existing Navy.
10. Adjustment to proposed cost.
11. To Figure 1, Block 4.

to utilize the systems approach to the examination of the Navy's missions within the total system of its own armed forces as this concept requires and, on the other hand—by the U.S.'s well-known position on a different mission and role for the navies of our states.

While not denying the fairness of certain views on this issue, however, we cannot agree with attempts to exclude their naval component from the overall system of arms reduction negotiations. We think that after the successful START negotiations, after the well-known initiatives on eliminating tactical nuclear weapons, including on sea-based platforms, conditions are ripe for the initiation of negotiations on naval arms reductions with the prior limitation of the zones of activity of our navies. In this case, the reduction of our navy could be carried out while proceeding from the balance of naval forces in approved areas without involving the entire remaining composition of the navies in this process.

In the process, we are not examining the possibility of building up forces in these areas because it is important to agree on, through the negotiations process, the composition of forces that will be able to participate in the first operations in the event of the outbreak of a military conflict.

The proposed methodology can be utilized both for bilateral and also for multilateral talks. Furthermore, the development of proposals for the limitation of naval arms within the framework of this methodology is closely linked with naval development programs.

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Special Submarine Project Plans, Raising of Komsomolets Outlined

93UM0386A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Vladimir Maryukha: "EPRON's [Special Purpose Underwater Operations Expedition] Heirs: They Are Preparing for Work on the Bottom of the Seas and Oceans"]

[Text] The idea of creating a Special Purpose Underwater Operations Expedition was born in the aura of revolutionary zeal that reigned in the young Soviet republic. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat needed gold and diamonds to purchase bread and equipment. And according to a legend that existed at the time, they could get them on the sea bottom. Some of the most stubborn treasure hunters are still looking for traces of the Black Prince near the shores of the Crimea. It is that ship that was carrying wages in gold coins to the Anglo-French troops who were conducting the siege of Sevastopol during the Crimean War but was caught by a storm and sunk. Goal number one of the Expedition or, as they began to call it in its abbreviated version, EPRON, was the Black Prince's gold.

From 1923 through 1941, EPRON raised from the sea bottom 450 civilian and military ships—a significant portion of which the Russian merchant fleet and navy lost as a result of the First World War and Civil War. Only the Black Prince with its holds crammed with gold was not among the ships that were returned to life. But the work that was done by EPRON members was no less weighty than the legendary gold. It is largely thanks to EPRON that the Soviet Navy was restored and later, when the Expedition was transferred from the OGPU [United State Political Administration] to the subordination of the navy, the underwater operations specialists composed the nucleus initially of the Navy's Accident-Recovery and later of the Search and Rescue services.

But there were also disastrous consequences of the EPRON's elimination. The rescue services and detachments for the conduct of underwater operations turned out to be scattered among the various departments and isolated in their efforts. And therefore not only naval seamen have long dreamed about the revival of the organization that is capable of withstanding emergency situations at sea. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has also written about that. But an impulse was needed, a certain great cause that was capable of uniting the efforts of all interested departments to do it.

Alas, that cause has been found. I am saying "alas" because the Komsomolets, the nuclear submarine that became the symbol of the tragedy of the Russian Navy, had to be lost for us to understand the need to revive the eliminated EPRON. When it became clear that the Komsomolets could not be salvaged, even with the help of foreigners, in the shortened periods of time caused by the submarine's destruction, a Russian Federation Presidential edict created the Committee for Conducting Special Purpose Underwater Operations (KOPRON). Captain 1st Rank Tengiz Borisov, corresponding member of the Academy of Technological Sciences was assigned committee chairman.

Constant readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will certainly recall that name. At one time the newspaper talked about the officer who had come into the navy with difficulty through the barriers of a medical commission. And not just anywhere but into nuclear submarines! There, already a 25-year-old lieutenant, Tengiz Borisov defended his candidate's dissertation in the post of group commander. Service, later study at the Naval Academy where, just like during his studies at the School imeni Dzerzhniskiy, in Tengiz Nikolayevich's words, he was lucky with people, teachers, a doctor's dissertation, work at an NII [Scientific Research Institute], a Lenin Komsomol Prize for the development of new equipment, early promotion to "captain 1st rank" before he was 40... Later all of that suddenly came tumbling down: the navy's budget was incapable of financing scientific development and the promising young scientist found himself at a military acceptance unit at a defense complex enterprise, in a post several levels lower than he had previously held.

You need to know Tengiz Borisov in order to understand why he was incapable of remaining on the sidelines when things are at stake which for him contain the meaning of life. At the ship building department of the School imeni Dzerzhinskiy, Cadet Borisov's teachers were submarine rescue operations experts. Tengiz Nikolayevich currently maintains good relations with Nikolay Petrovich Muru, who, while still a captain 3rd rank, actually directed the salvage operation of the destroyer Novorossiysk that had been sunk. Hence, his understanding of the importance and need for large-scale operations to salvage sunken military and merchant ships and other sunken cargoes, munitions, and harmful wastes that are a threat to the ecology and man. Ultimately, all of this brought Captain 1st Rank Borisov to KOPRON. More correctly, he himself became one of its founders.

I will not hide that KOPRON's creation was unambiguously met in circles close to the rescue of those who are experiencing a disaster at sea. The Department of Maritime Transport has a special opinion and the Navy submitted negative comments.

"The latest structure is being created in the hope for budget injections,"—said Navy PSS [Search and Rescue Service] Deputy Chief Captain 1st Rank Nikolay Koloskov, straight to the point. "And we will do everything with our hands—you can't salvage a sunken submarine with ideas, even with good ideas. We have divers moving at top speed even without that. The Search and Rescue barely has enough men for an emergency ship salvaging operation. KOPRON will "break" us—we will ultimately ruin the Navy.

The concerns of one of the few naval rescue-experts are understandable. From the moment that EPRON was eliminated, the functions of long-term ship-salvaging operations were not part of the Naval Search and Rescue Service's missions. To introduce this "innovation" under current conditions means to cast to the whims of fate the navy's combat units. And then, who knows, how many more times the tragedy of the Komsomolets will be repeated and KOPRON is actually being created to eliminate the aftereffects of that.

But we also cannot leave the Komsomolets in its current state without the intervention of experts. Predictions that the boat would lie without leaks of radioactivity for a long time yet have proven to be incorrect. Underwater currents, the composition of the sea water, and the nuclear submarine's unique titanium hull have made their adjustments to the time periods. It is already impossible today to raise the Komsomolets due to the destruction of its exterior hull but, according to the most pessimistic assessments, the threat of radioactive contamination of an enormous water area may become a reality by the summer of 1994. And Russia will bear the responsibility—both moral and legal—for that. It will also be among the victims.

"We already need to conduct work on the Komsomolets this year," said Tengiz Nikolayevich Borisov. "The

committee, which will become the coordinator for all of the work, still doesn't have its own men and equipment to carry out this task. Therefore, we will have to hire on a contract basis representatives of many departments and foreign specialists and order special equipment at enterprises that are being converted".

At the foundation of the work on the Komsomolets, KOPRON has placed the idea of pumping substances, that have received the designation "khitni-khitozan", under pressure into the submarine's hull. When it comes into contact with water, this jellylike substance that has been developed by the native firm Sitek is transformed into a mass similar to a sponge. Water will continue to penetrate into the submarine through the porous layer of the substance—preservative but, in the process, all of the radioactive substances will be "tied up" by the spongy "khitozan".

Although the project is cheaper than others, it will require considerable expenditures. But this is better than what can be undertaken to prevent the threat of radioactive contamination until technologies appear that will permit the extraction of Komsomolets' reactor and combat load for their subsequent reliable reburial. All of the work must be conducted not by some separate department (which, by the way, none of the existing rescue services is capable of doing) but under the flag of the state—only it (in this case Russia) can bear legal responsibility for the consequences of the entire operation.

"We are faced with difficult, dangerous work. It is difficult to predict to what extent everything will proceed as envisioned in the project. Therefore, Russia is assuming responsibility to other countries for unpredictable deviations," said Tengiz Nikolayevich. "Only in this case, we can, both in both this and in other projects, count on assistance from abroad."

Mutual confidence and guarantees of quality performance of work, which the operation to seal radioactivity in Komsomolets must demonstrate, can entirely serve the cause of founding an international fund for conducting special purpose underwater operations. Preparations for its creation are already being conducted in our country. And not only Russia is experiencing the need to create this fund. American nuclear submarines are also at the bottom of the seas and oceans. The Baltic Region Countries Society is sounding the alarm with regard to chemical munitions that were sunk in their waters after the Second World War. A multitude of production wastes, some of which are already sitting on the sea bottom, that are harmful for mankind have been accumulated in the developed countries. There are whole cemeteries of sunken ships in areas of military conflicts, off the coasts of Third World countries.

"IZVESTIYA rushed to report that KOPRON is allegedly undertaking to disarm those same chemical munitions on the bottom of the Baltic that but that will require the joint efforts of all of the region's countries.

But then again," Tengiz Nikolayevich specially emphasized that, "we need to settle a mass of legal issues, who and how much they must invest in the project and we need to look for an acceptable variation to disarm them. Therefore, collective efforts are ended and the West already understands that."

KOPRON, just like its predecessor EPRON should have, is beginning to accumulate monetary resources and ideas, and to unite hitherto uncoordinated proposals and efforts. Technical systems to conduct special work have been ordered and will be accumulated. In the process, actually, the initiation of the committee's activities to some extent will entail infringing upon the interests of separate departments. KOPRON is beginning from nothing and the budget, no matter how you divide it, is not enough for everyone. There isn't enough for KOPRON to exist "on its own". Therefore, in T. Borisov's words, one of the committee's subunits will "seek" money through commerce. Here, in my view, is the most dangerous pitfall in the activities of the inheritor of EPRON's glory—too many organizations that have begun with good ideas, have been "broken", it is in commerce that they have been distracted from their planned goals. God forbid that this should occur with KOPRON.

The cause which the committee that has been created is initiating should not leave room for departmental problems and ambitions. Because for commerce not to prevail, KOPRON needs priority budget financing and the assistance of everyone who can help with equipment, specialists, and resources. Only this way can we save ourselves from the misfortune that the lost Komsomolets conceals within itself.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Chief of Engineer Troops Interviewed

93UM0442A Moscow VOYENNNYY VESTNIK
in Russian No 12, Dec 92 (Signed to Press
20 Mar 92) p 26

[Interview with Major General Yu. V. Krasnikov, chief of staff, Engineer Troops, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense; date and place not given; first paragraph is VOYENNNYY VESTNIK introduction]

[Text] Yuriy Vasilyevich began his military career as a platoon leader, serving in an Odessa Military District special-purpose battalion after graduating from the Poltava Antiaircraft Artillery School. He had a deep interest in electronics. The Engineer Troops soon developed a need for specialists possessing this kind of training. His attending the Academy imeni V. V. Kuybyshev and his subsequent service as a company commander, battalion commander, and regimental chief of staff were to link forever the former special-purpose officer with the profession of military engineer, something which was to his liking. The capable officer was not unnoticed. It was not

long before he was assigned the post of section chief, then chief of Engineer Troops of a DVO [Far East Military District] corps. Yuriy Vasilyevich then attended the General Staff Academy, and, after graduating, was placed in charge of Engineer Troops of the western sector and the Moscow Military District.

Our Mini-Interview

[VOYENNNYY VESTNIK] You undoubtedly possessed previous knowledge of the general problems facing the Engineer Troops. Speaking from the vantage point of your new position, which of them would you single out as now being of a priority nature?

[Krasnikov] First comes cadre training. This is a problem which has assumed central importance. This, due to the fact that, instead of three military engineering schools, we will soon have only one. And this is not a matter of numbers alone. Each of our schools previously was distinctive, in that its mission was to graduate specialists of a definite area of specialization. Inherent in that microsystem was a kind of contest—currently referred to as "competition"—which tended to improve the effort. The present conditions are such that we must develop some mechanism so that we can effect self-improvement.

The same may be said about the system employed to train junior specialists. It should be realized that we essentially are left with only two centers. The creation of new ones will be associated with substantial organizational and material expenditures and the attendant search for the means.

[VOYENNNYY VESTNIK] There has been much talk of length of training cycles in the schools. What is your point of view in this regard?

[Krasnikov] I believe that, under the present conditions, there is no advantage to endowing a platoon leader with a higher education. Put more simply, it is expensive. It is another matter that we should guarantee any officer an in-service opportunity of pursuing the kind of education that suits him and assure his growth in the service. In this area, it seems to me, the time has come to change the entire process of promoting cadre into higher posts. There is a need for well-defined retraining of future officers. Developments in this regard are even now under way. Put briefly, this will proceed along the lines of the scheme "courses—academy—officer development courses." That is, advancement to a subsequent position will be preceded by study.

[VOYENNNYY VESTNIK] The Russian Army is undergoing the formation process. Can structural changes in the Engineer Troops be expected as well?

[Krasnikov] Yes. That is the second problem. In essence, changes have already started. This or that is being eliminated or reformed and created anew. The goal is to keep the incipient process from becoming precipitous,

maintaining it within the bounds of a scientifically-formulated program. For example, the Ground Troops are undergoing a structural change. The stress is on rapid deployment forces. Therefore, we also must become an integral part of this system. Credit is due our military authorities—and scientists as well—who as early as several years ago foresaw this kind of change and accomplished the corresponding work.

Completely new tasks have arisen. We have been made officially responsible for participating in cleaning up in the aftermath of industrial accidents and natural disasters. Each engineer subunit or unit must act in accordance with the developed plans keep to a particular potentially hazardous industrial facility in the focus of its attention. This means that it is necessary to develop a scientific concept with these tasks in mind, educate the attendant specialists, and initiate training of troops.

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**Northwestern Group of Forces Commander:
Withdrawal Keyed to Housing**

93UM0395B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Jan 93 p 2

[Interview with Col Gen Leonid Sergeyevich Mayorov, commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, by Col Modris Ziemins, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "You Cannot Put Families Into an Open Field"]

[Text] Col Gen Leonid Mayorov, commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, answers questions posed by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[Ziemins] Five months ago KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an interview with you, which, you will recall, was titled "We Shall Leave, But With Honor." A lot of new events have occurred, however, with a legal effect upon the Northwestern Group of Forces. Let us not forget, as an example, the directive issued by Russia's President Boris Yeltsin on 29 October 1992, "On Coordinating and Regulating the Negotiating Process With the Latvian Republic, the Lithuanian Republic and the Estonian Republic," commonly referred to as the directive on halting the withdrawal of troops.... So there is a basis for another meeting, Leonid Sergeyevich.

[Mayorov] Right now, one can conclude only one thing: that the problem of withdrawing our troops is being discussed at all levels through the prism of guaranteed social protection for our troops. These considerations were also dictated in the 29 October 1992 edict of the President of Russia. It called not for halting the withdrawal of the troops in general but for a suspension of their removal to unprepared sites, without reliable social and legal protection for the servicemen and their families. The troop withdrawal is now proceeding with that extremely significant adjustment: that people and military equipment not be dumped onto open fields.

[Ziemins] Have there been any results yet?

[Mayorov] We have signed contracts for the construction of apartments in various regions of the Russian Federation for all officers and warrant officers being released into the reserve, and specifically, those to be released in 1993. Housing is presently being built for servicemen in Leningrad, Pskov, Moscow, Smolensk, Ulyanovsk, Volgograd and other oblasts.

Suffice it to say that contracts have been signed for the construction of 1,382 apartments at a total cost of 2.7 billion rubles, and 834 apartments totalling 1.185 billion have already been paid for. Only 209 apartments have actually been received. The rest are to be received this year.

I ask you thoroughly to read and contemplate these figures. For one thing, although significant, they do not fill all of our needs by far. The group also needs funds for procuring housing for officers and warrant officers to be released in 1994. In addition, one should bear in mind that the cost of housing construction is rising literally by the day. While one apartment cost us 800,000 rubles a year or so ago, the average cost of an apartment is now 1.5 million. In the second place, we have a big favor to ask of oblast leaders of the Russian Federation. It is to devote more attention to the construction of our housing. This has to be said, because our partners in the different regions are not always and not everywhere people who understand the problems of the military.

Officials of Kaliningrad Oblast, as an example, chronically fail to fulfill their commitments for building military housing. The apartment construction agreement is not being kept by the Smolenskstroy Territorial Construction Association and UKS-7 [Directorate of Capital Construction] for the city of Kolomna, and one limited association in the city of St. Petersburg has even contrived to sell apartments ordered and partially paid for by us to another organization, Urengoygasprom, at a higher price. Some upstart entrepreneurs are openly profiteering from the needs and troubles of the army. The most vexing thing is that it is very difficult to bring some of them to justice. This evokes pain and indignation in people who encounter it. It has sometimes even led to profiteering around the troop withdrawal process itself....

[Ziemins] Are there any overall figures on how this process is going?

[Mayorov] As of today more than 40 percent of the troops previously stationed in the Baltic nations have been withdrawn. The Northwestern Group of Forces alone has withdrawn around 30 formations, units and establishments, and disbanded more than 70. More than 13,000 pieces of combat equipment and more than 280,000 firearms have been dispatched to the Russian Federation. The withdrawal of a motorized rifle division stationed at Vilnius has been completed. A full 100 percent of the PVO [Air Defense] fighters have been removed.

More than 40 military posts along with equipment, classrooms, storage facilities and warehouses have been turned over to local authorities.

[Ziemins] There are some differences in the treatment of our army by the leaders of the Baltic states, however, are there not? How is that affecting the troop withdrawal?

[Mayorov] Yes, there are some distinctions, and they are affecting the troop withdrawal most directly. Take Lithuania, for example. In Lithuania it is legal to privatize the housing of servicemen. And this is something on the order of 5,600 apartments. That is, every serviceman can do what he wants with his housing. If he wants to trade it, he trades it; if he wants to sell it, he sells it. He can then acquire an apartment in another place. We do not need to worry about where and how to accommodate these people.

We had an unfinished building with 100 apartments in Vilnius. We asked the republic's leadership for permission to sell it and buy housing in Russian for officers with the proceeds. The "green light" was given. In short, we have mutual understanding on many issues. Lithuania has also committed itself to provide a certain amount of housing for our servicemen in Kaliningrad Oblast.

Unfortunately, we do not yet have the same kind of understanding of our problems from Estonia and Latvia. In Latvia, for example, not only is there no decision yet on the apartment problem of the servicemen, but there are constant problems with providing the military with local currency. One sometimes has the impression that the matter is being deliberated complicated, and some people are attempting to pressure us. That is, they want us to speed up the troop withdrawal.

It all has the opposite effect, however. Additional difficulties arise with respect to the organized and civilized withdrawal of the troops and the provision of more normal support for their vital functioning.

[Ziemins] From time to time one reads announcements and statements by activists from the former coordinating council of officers' assemblies of the group of forces. Statements to the effect that the leadership of the SZGV [Northwestern Group of Forces] is being irresponsible with respect to solving the troop withdrawal problem, that they exhibit callousness and indifference toward the people. And this is particularly painful and deeply felt in the present, difficult social and economic situation.

[Mayorov] Irresponsibility, callousness and indifference are failings which have been battled in all times. I certainly do not believe that everything is going smoothly. I recently read in a newspaper and was surprised at the way the troop withdrawal was described by Col (Reserve) Kandalovskis, a Latvian journalist and in the recent past a worker with the Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District. He asserts that the withdrawal of the military is presently unmotivated and chaotic. He tries to frighten the Baltic governments by

saying things like "after the troops have been withdrawn, they will be pulling their hair, not knowing what to do with the officers unlawfully released into the reserve or the chaos left in the military units."

[Ziemins] What is your opinion, Leonid Sergeyevich?

[Mayorov] It needs to be said that such statements lack any kind of common sense. Not a single officer or warrant officer presently serving in the Baltic states will be released into the reserve without receiving housing in the Russian Federation. We are dealing here with deliberate exacerbation of the situation surrounding the withdrawal of our troops to the benefit of certain political groups. Yes, that is precisely the way we need to assess this and other, similar assertions.

Incidentally, I have spoken with Col Kandalovskis more than once. I asked him, (a "defender of the interests of servicemen," as he calls himself): Why not select someone to accompany you, go to Leningrad Oblast and get to the bottom of where the 70 apartments designated for officers of the SZGV in Lomonosovskiy Rayon went, and who got them? And what do you think? The officer came up with every possible, contrived excuse not to go. Claiming that his father was sick, however, he did set out without authorization on another public undertaking.

According to those in charge, being AWOL from the garrison, failure to show up on the job and deception have constituted a system in Kandalovskis' conduct. The "announcement" that the army is abandoning weapons and ammunition as it departs can be called nothing short of provocation. And in order to give credibility to these "facts"—and at the same time, to his own importance—Kandalovskis maintains that the military leadership suspects him of "collaborating with Latvia's intelligence service." What underhandedness!

[Ziemins] And how would you assess the situation in the group?

[Mayorov] We are in such a fix today that during the past training year we were unable to conduct a single battalion exercise with live firing. Officers are forced to stand watch as sentries because of a lack of first-term servicemen. In general, though, the people are dealing with the specific elements of the present situation with understanding. It is important in this situation to sense concern on the part of Russia's political and military leadership. Financial assistance for unemployed wives of officers was increased on 1 December of last year, for example. Workers with budgeted organizations are receiving an additional 1,500 rubles to cover the increased cost of heating apartments. Fifty percent of the cost of municipal services is paid for the families of servicemen.

[Ziemins] There is one other group of people with inadequate social protection. These are the veterans. There are almost 21,000 retirees of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense in Latvia, more than 12,000 in Lithuania and almost 8,000 in Estonia. Furthermore I

have data from the Russian Embassy in Riga that something on the order of 5,000 people have applied there for Russian citizenship. This means that not many want to leave the place where they feel at home. Apparently, the matter of the veterans' future will also have to be solved separately.

[Mayorov] I have made it a rule always to meet with the veterans when I visit the garrisons. Our war veterans here today do not have the benefits they would have in Russia. I would say that the first practical step toward the rectification of this injustice would be to establish compensation for these benefits, to pay monetary assistance—a certain amount twice a year or quarterly, for example. In view of the significantly increased cost of housing in the Baltic nations we have also raised the issue of paying 50 percent of the cost of municipal services for retirees of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense out of Russia's state budget. It is my view that the matter of providing medical services for veterans could be decided in a positive way.

There is a large number of facilities in Latvia, for example, where medical services could be set up for veterans. They include the group military hospital, the Ryzhskoye Vzmorye and Mayori sanitaria, two health clinics and the sports complex of the SKA [Army Sports Club]. All of these facilities could be consolidated into a single preventive medicine center with 1,000 beds. This is one concept we are submitting for interstate negotiations with Latvia. Similar versions are being proposed to the Lithuanian and Estonian leadership.

If the matter is decided in a positive manner, Russia could assume certain obligations by way of shared participation, providing medical equipment for these health care institutions, treating servicemen of the national armies and covering some of the costs out of the federal budget.

Status of Housing Construction for Servicemen, Poor Western Help Reported

*93UM0395A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Jan 93 p 1*

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Yuri Gladkevich: "The Problem of Apartments for Military Personnel Is One for Russia to Solve"]

[Text] We appear to be reaching the limit in our desperation at the lack of housing for the military, which has become an irritant to all. It has reached the point at which we accept any proposal from abroad with even a slight orientation toward housing construction as an expedient for salvation practically not subject to critical review, almost as a humanitarian act. We need to realize, however, that the West's participation in the implementation of the program for providing housing for Russia's military personnel is not a purely humanitarian gesture. It is rather a business approach.

Last year the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense received dozens of offers from abroad, from both governments and private individuals. To one extent or another most of them involved attempts to break into the Russian construction market, sell their technologies (usually not the latest and not the most environmentally safe) and the products of their construction industries and provide employment for their surplus work force. And in almost all cases the potential partners demanded either loan guarantees from the Russian government or exchanges not to our advantage....

This is normal for business, of course. It is also normal for the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense to reject unfavorable offers, however. Today we essentially have one large Western program which is producing "real" housing, so to speak. It is a program using funds allocated by the FRG for building posts for our troops withdrawn from Germany. It is based on an interstate agreement and was worked out in detail, which is apparently the determining factor behind its good results.

But just what share of total housing construction was financed with these funds, 7.8 billion marks, in 1992? According to data compiled by the office of Col Gen Nikolay Chekov, chief of construction and billeting for the Russian Federation's armed forces, there were almost 105,000 servicemen without apartments in the Russian Federation's armed forces at the beginning of 1992. Since then 59,800 apartments have been built out of all sources of financing. The "7.8 billion mark" program produced only 2,200 apartments: posts at Shaykovke in Kaluga Oblast and at Vladikavkaz....

There is one other program, the Modul, which entered the "producing" stage at the end of last year. It is being implemented in cooperation with German firms by the Konversiya-Zhilye concern established by the Ministry of Defense. One cannot say that it is nearing completion at this point, however.

And so, let us total up the results. Of the 59,800 apartments built only 4 percent was built with foreign assistance. It is therefore obvious that this only provides some help in the difficult and slow process of eliminating the housing shortage in the military.

An awareness of this fact makes it possible to take a more deliberate look both at assistance from outside and at what Russia itself will have to do. In accordance with the 1993-1995 State Program for Providing Housing for Servicemen and Those Released Into the Reserve it is planned to build more than 250,000 apartments for servicemen on active duty by 1995. The plan for constructing housing for regular military personnel has a goal of 82,000 apartments. Most of this is to be built from centralized sources of financing (61,700 apartments) and funds obtained by selling freed military property and equipment (2000 apartments). Military construction workers are to build 45,000 apartments; the

"7.8" is to provide 9,600; the Modul, 900. Local authorities are to liquidate housing indebtedness to the army amounting to 8,200 apartments....

Once again, although the portion of "foreign" housing has grown to 13 percent, the main burden is still to be shouldered by Russia itself. Are we ready for this?

To some extent we are, Lt Col Aleksandr Rylskiy, chief of the section for planning housing construction in Col Gen Chekov's organization, believes. Overall, though.... There are more than enough problems at this point.

Last year, for example, both military and civilian contract organizations were forced to build mainly with credit acquired at great interest. And although they were reimbursed for the costs at the end of the year, the housing was still more expensive. Furthermore, we received less than we anticipated. The 5 billion rubles allocated by edict of the President of Russia to finance the acquisition of additional housing, for example, was received only in December (the edict was issued in the summer). As a result the military were unable to pay off 500 apartments....

And so, financing is the main problem. If funds come in from the budget in a timely manner, the acute need for credit will disappear and all of the planned construction can be accomplished. If, however, receipts from the budget continue to be late....

Obviously, in that case the above-mentioned state program will not be fulfilled on schedule. Remember that despite the fact that almost 60,000 apartments were acquired last year, the number of families of officers and warrant officers lacking apartments has grown from 105,000 to 120,000 at the beginning of this....

Inflation is another danger. The construction costs calculated according to 1991 prices will be revised by the time a building is completed, of course. The Ministry of Finance has set the coefficient at 42.5. According to the Scientific Research Institute of Economics and Management of Russia's State Committee for Architecture and Construction, however, the index will have to be set at over 100.... Because of this the chief of housing and billeting for the Russian Federation's armed forces was forced to ask the parliament to add to the budget for this year at least the provision that allocations for capital construction are to be revised on the basis of monthly indexing. But will that request be considered?

Even in the past the housing problem in the armed forces was one of those which contributed most forcefully to social tensions in the army and the society. Today, however, when Russia is actually being pounded in the grips of various social problems, when it is constantly necessary to support the standard of living now for this, now for that group of the population, the problem of providing housing for servicemen might not appear so acute, might appear to be one which can be put off, albeit with difficulty. Indeed, the Ministry of Defense will not

allow people to be completely homeless. It will "requisition" the hotels and dormitories of billeting units, pack the soldiers together in the barracks and partition off areas for officers' families, even pitch tents in open fields.... But will people accept such action as proper concern? Will such desperate actions make it possible to retain the regular military corps for the Russian army and motivate the officers and warrant officers to perform their duties conscientiously? In other words, will it save the army?

I believe the answer is obvious. But this will certainly not give the nation a respite nor ease the burden of its social problems. On the contrary, it will intensify them to the extreme. This means that there is only one solution: to exert all our efforts, to place the problem of housing for the army and navy under the rigid control of the government and the parliament, to place it onto an economic and organizational level which will make it possible to provide housing for most of the servicemen presently suffering a lack of housing at least within 3-4 years. It all depends upon Russia. No one else—neither rich America nor favorably-disposed Germany—will do it.

Need to Maintain Social Protection of Servicemen Emphasized

Need for Legal, Social, Material Protection of Servicemen Detailed

93UM0394A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jan 93 pp 1,3

[Interview with Lt Gen Vasilii Vasilyevich Vorobyev, chief of the Main Directorate of Military Budget and Finance, by Maj Ivan Ivanyuk, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Social Status of the Russian Serviceman Must Not Decline"]

[Text] We cannot build a modern army and navy without preserving and strengthening the main factor in the armed forces, the human potential, without providing everyone in the military ranks with conditions conducive to the performance of their military duty. In other words, military personnel need appropriate guarantees from the state: legal, social, material.

This thought has been voiced more than once of late at the very highest level: at the Congress of People's Deputies, in statements by President B.N. Yeltsin, at sessions of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet. It has also been pointed out that despite the vigorous steps being taken, the social "health" of the military collectives is far from optimal. The complex spasms of the market's development have perhaps the greatest impact on those outside of it, those like the military, who cannot and should not be actively involved in economic life and commerce.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the problem of bolstering the social protection of servicemen has recently been at the center of attention of the nation's highest administrative agencies and the Ministry of Defense. A number of important decisions have already been adopted.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has reported on one of these, Decree No. 65 of the Government of the Russian Federation "On Regulating Pay and Allowances for Military Personnel and Rank-and-File and Executive Personnel of Internal Affairs Agencies, and Strengthening Their Social Protection." A corresponding directive has been signed by the minister of defense.

The editors asked Lt Gen Vasilii Vorobyev, chief of the Main Directorate of Military Budget and Finance of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense, to comment on these important documents, which should improve material support for the people in shoulder boards substantially.

[Ivanyuk] Vasilii Vasilyevich, pay and allowances for servicemen have been increased five times in the past year. This was done to keep up with the economic inflation. Can one say that the decree passed by the government clears the way for new approaches in securing their social protection?

[Vorobyev] This is how I would answer that question. Despite the difficult economic situation, the nation's leadership has found a way to raise substantially the level of pay and allowances for those who have linked their lives to the homeland's protection, to value more fittingly their work, difficult but needed by the society. In this respect we can say today that the social status of military personnel has improved. That is one thing. In the second place, the government decree has to do with regulating certain types of their pay and allowances. On 1 January of this year, as you know, all budgeted organizations switched to a new wage system, one based on a unified pay scale with 13 levels (categories). This was essentially a reform in the area of wages, which had to affect also the armed forces. The Main Directorate of Military Budget and Finance has carefully followed these developments and, together with other military administrative agencies, has prepared proposals for strengthening the social protection of servicemen. I believe that the increase in pay and allowances should compensate to a large degree for the continuing rise in prices.

[Ivanyuk] Could you please cite some specific figures. How much will a soldier and a cadet be receiving now?

[Vorobyev] The following salaries were established for first-term servicemen as of 1 January 1993: 1,000 rubles for a private; 1,400 for the driver/mechanic of a tank or infantry combat vehicle; 1,600 for a squad commander; 1,800 for a deputy platoon commander; 2,000 for a company sergeant-major; 5,000 for those assigned to officer positions. The following rates have been established for cadets from among the seagoing and shore-based warrant officers at higher military educational institutions: 2,000 rubles per month for those in the first and second years; 4,000 for those in the third and subsequent years; 1,300 and 3,000 rubles respectively for those at secondary military educational institutions. It should be born in mind that these rates can be increased by 50 or 25 percent, depending upon the scores achieved

in testing sessions. Salaries have also been increased at technical schools (1,400 rubles) and military training units and subunits (1,000 rubles). Students at Suvorov and Nakhimov schools and students at the Military Music School and in military units will begin receiving the same amount, 1,000 rubles per month, beginning in January. And so, the increase in pay and allowances is most significant for servicemen in these categories: 4- to 5-fold; 8-to 10-fold for cadets in their third and subsequent years at military educational institutions.

[Ivanyuk] And what will be the pay scales for soldiers serving in the Transcaucas, Moldova and Tajikistan?

[Vorobyev] They approach those for soldiers serving in officer positions: 4,000 rubles per month for the first and second categories; 4,500 for the third and fourth; 5,000 for the fifth; 5,500 for the sixth.

[Ivanyuk] Now, what about the officers and warrant officers? How will their salaries change?

[Vorobyev] The salaries the officers actually receive were increased an average of 2.7-fold on 1 January of this year; those of seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, 2.4- to 2.7-fold.

[Ivanyuk] And that is in addition to other payments?

[Vorobyev] Yes, and I want particularly to mention the fact that the scales for personal military ranks have almost doubled. An extended-duty NCO, for example, will receive 2,000 rubles for his military rank; a warrant officer, 3,500; a lieutenant, 5,500; a captain, 6,500; a major, 7,000. The procedure for calculating the percentage of increment for length of service and the monetary sustenance rates has also been changed.

[Ivanyuk] Vasilii Vasilyevich, does the government's decree contain any fundamentally new elements?

[Vorobyev] It does. The matter of material support for youth (I really want to call them kids) who have joined the military ranks without parents or receiving no support from parents has been considered at our initiative, and an affirmative decision has been adopted. This involves first-term servicemen, cadets at military educational institutions (with the exception of shore-based and seagoing warrant officers and extended-duty personnel), students at Suvorov and Nakhimov schools, students at the Military Music School and in military units, as well as students at higher military educational institutions who are not officers. Annual assistance in the amount of 1,000 rubles has now been established for them.

Another new thing. Monthly increments of 20 and 30 percent of the official salaries respectively have been instituted for students at Suvorov and Nakhimov schools serving as squad commanders and deputy platoon commanders.

As you know, the situation today is such that even lieutenants frequently leave the army. At our initiative, to give them a material incentive and keep them from

making a hasty and ill-conceived move, new amounts and a new procedure have been established for continuous service as officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and extended-duty personnel. This will now be paid in the amount of 5 percent after a year of service instead of two, as in the past. The amount will be 10 percent for 2 to 5 years; 20 percent for 5 to 10 years; 25 percent for 10 to 15 years; 30 percent for 15 to 20 years; 35 percent for 20 to 25 years; 40 percent for more than 25 years. This alone will amount to an increase of 2,400 rubles for a captain commanding a company, for example.

[Ivanyuk] Servicemen with the least social protection have many other problems in their lives. For example, it is very difficult for a soldier, particularly one without parents, to support himself at first following his release from the military.

[Vorobyev] The government and the Ministry of Defense have taken this into account. First-term servicemen will be paid upon separation a lump-sum amount not of 500 rubles, as in the past, but an amount equal to the minimum salary (2,250 rubles as of February). Those who do not have parents or receive no support from parents will receive five times the minimum salary. As of 1 February of this year that amount is 11,500 rubles.

Many officers, primarily those lacking housing, can also be classified as socially unprotected. After all, most of their pay and allowances goes to sublease an apartment. The 150-350 rubles paid them as compensation is now simply insignificant compared with the cost of renting housing in the market. This problem came up a long time ago, but its solution was delayed for a long time due to the nation's economic difficulties. And we are grateful to the government and the Ministry of Finance for supporting our proposal and including this matter in the government's recent decree.

It is impossible to compensate for these outlays "in fact" in the situation of unrestrained price increases. I still want to stress the fact, however, that the amount of monetary compensation has been increased significantly for officers, warrant officers, extended-duty personnel and female military personnel who do not have housing where they are stationed. In addition, increased compensation has been established for servicemen with three or more family members residing with them.

[Ivanyuk] And what is new by way of incentives for the work of the military scientists, those engaged in a different, creative kind of work? There have been inconsistencies also in this area.

[Vorobyev] The government's decree significantly increases the monetary increment for military medical workers with the academic degree of candidate or doctor of sciences and for military personnel employed by testing organizations. They will now be paid increments of 10 to 35 percent of their salaries instead of 35-100 rubles, as was the case until recently.

[Ivanyuk] Please explain the situation with respect to lump-sum monetary awards. Right now, when the results of the year are being summed up, they are being paid in the military units. Some people have already received them; others have not.

[Vorobyev] Under the established procedure lump-sum awards are paid to everyone who has earned them, based on the new rates. In those cases in which pay and allowances have already been paid, new calculations will be made. All of the necessary information has been provided.

[Ivanyuk] Vasily Vasilyevich, you mentioned the unified pay scale being introduced in the national economy. Are there any specific provisions here for civilian personnel of the armed forces? Are they not going to find themselves in a worse situation than the others?

[Vorobyev] The unified pay scale established for workers in budgeted fields by Government Decree No 785 on 14 October 1992 is called that because it applies to all "budgeted workers."

It should be mentioned that its introduction at a rate of 1,800 rubles as of 1 December 1992 and 2,250 rubles as of 1 February of this year for the top grade category, without taking into account the wage terms previously in effect for individual categories of workers, resulted either in a lowering of the wage level or an insignificant increase in many cases. The government of the Russian Federation therefore passed a special decree (No. 2 of 3 January 1993), which expanded the authority of a number of ministries and departments, including the Ministry of Defense, to regulate wages.

For example, it is permitted to increase the salary scales (rates) by up to 50 percent within the limits of the funds allocated for civilian personnel of military units, establishments, organizations and military educational institutions. The specific amount will be coordinated with Russia's Ministry of Labor. To whom could this apply? Primarily to those specialists upon whom the combat readiness of the armed forces depends to a great extent: workers engaged in the repair of military equipment and armaments, machine operators, specialists with the auxiliary fleet, military reception centers and military medical establishments.

On 30 December the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Russia's government also passed a decree regulating wages for workers with representative and executive agencies. Accordingly, wages of the central, district, fleet and army systems will be increased in the armed forces. If we take all categories of civilian personnel, their overall wage level will increase 2- to 3-fold or more as a result of the measures passed. A doctor will receive more than 30,000 rubles, for example; a nurse, up to 17,000; an instructor at a higher educational institution, more than 35,000; a worker in municipal services, 15,000 rubles and up.

[Ivanyuk] Will this not result in an averaging, a leveling?

[Vorobyev] No, the unified rate scale will enable us to avoid that. In addition, the aforementioned government decree grants the Ministry of Defense authority to determine on its own the procedure, the terms and the amounts of incentives, using an amount equalling a 6-month wage fund for this purposes. This can also be used to pay material aid. Finally, we have been granted authority to determine the amounts of rates and scales for civilian personnel, as well as compensation and additional payments related to the specific operations of the military units, coordinating this with the Ministry of Labor.

There is one other significant factor. The system of regional coefficients has been adjusted. They are now the same for enterprises and organizations of all branches in this or that territory. The Ministry of Defense can now set the coefficients within certain limits on its own for its blue- and white-collar workers, who were in a worse situation than others in a number of regions.

[Ivanyuk] The revision of pay and allowances and of wages also involves a lot of work and time, of course. In the meantime inflation will "eat up" all of the increases little by little.

[Vorobyev] There is that problem, of course. In order to prepare the draft order of the minister of defense on the procedure for paying civilian personnel on the basis of a unified salary scale, for example, it is necessary to revise more than 100 orders and directives presently regulating these matters. The minister of defense therefore approved a decision temporarily raising the amounts of official salaries on 30 January 1992: by 50 percent in December of last year and by a factor of 2 in January and February of this year. Wages will be revised from the 1 December 1992 level in accordance with it when the unified pay scale takes effect.

[Ivanyuk] Many of our readers are concerned about whether these measures will affect the pensions of military retirees.

[Vorobyev] Yes, at our initiative—and there were opponents, at least during the development phase—there will be a revision of pensions for retirees of the Ministry of Defense for length of service, disability or loss of breadwinner. It will be based on the increased pay and allowances for servicemen which took effect on 1 February of this year. We believe that this is perfectly correct, because taking care of veterans of the armed forces, who have devoted most of their lives to serving the homeland, and of families which have lost their breadwinner is one of the priorities in our work.

In a word, some important and solid decisions have been adopted with respect to improving the material situation of both military personnel and civilian personnel of the armed forces and of retirees of the Ministry of Defense. It is now up to the commanders and chiefs at all levels and to workers with the military commissariats to see that they are scrupulously fulfilled, that every soldier,

officer, blue- and white-collar worker and retiree feels the effect of these measures aimed at improving their social well-being.

I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to ask the commanders of military units and chiefs in the finance service to demonstrate efficiency and skill in getting the necessary information to the personnel and organizing explanatory work in order to see that each specific individual receives his pay and allowances, wages or pension in the full amount and on time.

Correction to 30 Jan 93 Text on Social Protection of Servicemen

93UM0394B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Feb 93 p 3

[Announcement: "A Clarification"]

[Text] The article, "The Social Status of the Russian Serviceman Must Not Decline," published in the 30 January issue of the magazine should read: "...planned to revise pensions of retirees of the Ministry of Defense for length of service, disability and loss of breadwinner, based on the increased pay and allowances for servicemen taking effect on 1 January of this year.

Eight-Volume Military Encyclopedia Planned

93UM0436B KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Feb 93 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Russian 'Military Encyclopedia' to be Published"]

[Text] On 16 February 1993, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov conducted a session of the Main Editorial Commission of the "Military Encyclopedia." At it they discussed the concept and order of publication of this eight-volume scientific-reference work. The specific deadlines for publication of each volume were determined. Plans are to complete the work on the Russian "Military Encyclopedia" in 1999.

New Air Mobile Rescue Service Formed

93UM0436A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Feb 93 pp 1,2

[Article by I. Sergeyev: "Soldiers of a New Era"]

[Text] The first State Central Air Mobile Rescue Detachment has been formed and is operating in Russia.

It is still young in all respects: in March it will be a year old, and the average age of the rescuers is 27 years. The official birthday of the new formation is associated with the issuance of a Russian government decree dated 13 March 1992. But before that there was a state rescue detachment, consisting of lone enthusiasts, created after the 1988 earthquake in Armenia.

According to the approved table strength level, the first Russian rescue detachment should consist of 190 men, 68 of them actual rescuers. But today the subunit consists of just 85 men, with 28 actual operational rescuers. The rest are support personnel: transport, engineer service, and rear support, so to speak.

This manpower shortage is explained by the fact that the leadership of the new service is trying not to fill the organic positions with whomever they get just to come up to strength more quickly. But it must also be frankly acknowledged that there are no long lines of those desiring to join the detachment either. After all, this is a special subunit, and quite high and varied demands are put on its candidates.

In addition to excellent health and a high level of physical training, a person wishing to join the detachment must have more than a nodding acquaintance with the types of sport which are frequently utilized in rescue tasks: climbing, spelunking, sky-diving. In addition, it is desirable to know how to drive a vehicle, to use radio equipment, and to provide first aid. Today each of those signed on as rescuers have five or more specialties: fire-fighting, air-borne (mandatory for all), radio telegraphist, medical corpsman, military chemical specialist, mountain climber etc.

Regular readers of our newspaper will surely recall an article which told how in September 1991 a group of military engineers performed a unique high controlled demolition at the Ufa petroleum processing plant. At that time the 30-meter top of a 150 meter smokestack weighing 750 tonnes had broken off and was about to crash down. All the calculations of the strength and direction of the explosion were made by military specialists, but the reconnaissance, ascent and placement of the 400 kilograms of explosive were done by the boys from this detachment. And without helicopters, everything by hand.

The leadership of the detachment attaches great importance to the motives for selecting the profession on the part of those who come to join them in their work. They ask those who dream of scraping together a tidy sum in the "risky business" not to bother. An international-class rescuer, i.e. one who has the highest professional qualifications, with all the raises and bonuses receives 15-16 thousand rubles, with a base pay of 8,400. And the others, the probationary rescuer, the rescuer 3rd, 2nd and 1st class receive even less. Consequently the motivation for joining the detachment should at least now lie in a different, non-material plane. True, I learned from a recent talk with the chairman of the State Committee for Emergencies [GKChS] that in the near future the wages for rescuers will be revised.

In the intervals between emergency situations, which occur even in our turbulent lives, the rescuers will work at their training program, which includes fire-fighting and airborne training, landing from helicopters, underwater training, demolition work, horsemanship, English

language and many other disciplines. The English language training is no accident. The detachment is involved in broad international cooperation. Incidentally, for many rescuers the education they received earlier, as a rule higher education, is a good stimulus.

Vladimir Melnik, for example, in his day graduated from the Moscow Institute of International Relations. He has taken part in rescue actions in Iran, Turkey, Tajikistan and Abkhazia. He accompanied the humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and Yugoslavia. Arsen Faradzhev is an art historian by profession. His scientific papers on history and art have been published abroad and are internationally recognized. Today he is an international-class rescuer, of which there are just seven in the detachment.

Patrick Stanton, the director of the association of quick-response rescuers of Great Britain and a former "Red Beret," the British special-purpose troop, calls his men, who are prepared to fly at any time to any corner of the globe where their help is needed, soldiers of the new era. It looks like Russia has now acquired such soldiers too.

Despite the short period of its existence, the detachment has participated in many emergency rescue actions. In 1992 it helped to eliminate the consequences of an earthquake in Turkey. That same year a focus of epizootic plague was discovered among the yaks on the border of Tuva and Mongolia. At an altitude of three thousand meters and a temperature of 45 degrees below zero the rescuers combed the hills and canyons, and collected and burned the carcasses of the sick animals. And this detachment was even involved in provision of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, Albania, and Yugoslavia. In the very first hours after the report on the tragedy at the Rok pass, a team of men from the detachment flew to the site of the catastrophe.

In order for the detachment to justify its name of "air mobile," in the near future the GKChS plans to purchase two Il-76 aircraft and four Mi-8 helicopters for it. In fact, that is why the base address of the subunit was selected next to the airfield in the city of Zhukovskiy in the Moscow oblast.

The chief of the rescue detachment Mikhail Faleyev recently returned from Geneva, where he participated in a conference of a consultative group for search-and-rescue work of the department of humanitarian questions of the U.N. At the meeting they considered the prospects for development of provision of humanitarian aid, and the conduct of search-and-rescue operations within the framework of the U.N. in Europe and Africa. In Faleyev's opinion, by the end of the first six months of this year, our detachment will have every opportunity to enter into broad world cooperation in the field of search-and-rescue tasks. While before we lagged seriously behind in technical and resource support, now these problems are being resolved more and more successfully. Now it is up to the deep and comprehensive training of the cadres, at which the detachment is working. And in

addition, in September 1993 they will conduct all-European exercises of rescue teams in a suburb of Vienna, in which our rescuers will also participate.

In response to my question of whether this detachment would be the only one in Russia, the Chairman of the GKChS Sergey Shoygu said that there are plans to have nine such detachments, in each regional center.

And in conclusion, for those who are interested in the profession of rescuer, I am giving the address of the detachment base: 140160, city of Zhukovskiy, Moscow Oblast, Narkomvod. 8, telephone 556-78-17.

Incidentally, yesterday the leadership of the GKChS held a press conference at Staraya Square for Russian and foreign journalists. Information about the operations of the detachment in the city of Tivarcheli aroused much interest. A group of rescuers had just returned from there after delivering 139 tonnes of humanitarian aid and evacuating more than two thousand residents.

Army Officers' Role in Tax Police Service

*93UM0421A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Feb 93 p 1*

[Article by Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Press Center Officer Ivan Sas, under the rubric: "Reduction of the Armed Forces: Problems and Solutions": "More Than 1,000 Servicemen Have Been Selected for Tax Investigation Subdivisions"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported to its readers that, in accordance with a Russian Government directive and with Russian Federation Minister of Defense General of the Army Pavel Grachev's order, approximately 3,500 Armed Forces officers will be assigned to the Main Tax Investigation Administration under the Russian Federation State Tax Service in 1993. As of today, more than 1,000 servicemen have already been selected and have begun their retraining.

With what will they be involved? What are the selection criteria and the socio-legal guarantees? Judging by the letters and telephone calls, officers who have found themselves on the threshold of being released as a result of Armed Forces reductions are especially interested in these questions.

This is the clarification provided in this regard by Main Tax Investigation Administration (GUNR) Deputy Chief Yuriy Chichelov. The new Main Administration was formed as one of the most important mechanisms to implement the tax laws. According to official data, today the state receives nearly 30% less taxes than it should but there are grounds to assert that this number is significantly higher. For example, in Moscow alone, Main Tax Investigation Administration specialists have discovered over 1,000 entrepreneurial structures that are not registered anywhere at all as a result of several operational measures. The criminal environment has obtained replenishment in the market element. As a result, the

profession of tax inspector is becoming simply dangerous. Moreover, more than 80% of tax service agents are women. At times, they require the support of physically strong, armed people who are capable of guaranteeing their safety. And it's no coincidence that the Main Tax Investigation Administration has granted the officers the right to store, bear, and use fire arms.

An operational-investigations unit, a subdivision physical protection unit, a special structure to combat corruption within the tax service itself, and an operational-technical subdivision will become part of the administration's structure. The corresponding administrations are being formed under the tax inspectorates of Russia's krays, oblasts, and autonomous formations (incidentally, those servicemen who desire to continue service in the tax police need to apply there). There is a small city or rayon staff locally.

In Yuriy Chichelov's words, you don't necessarily need to be a superman in order to end up in a tax investigation subdivision—you need to be able to extinguish the flame of a candle with a round, shatter bricks with the edge of the palm of your hand, etc. And there are strict physical fitness requirements. Aptitudes for operational investigations work are being tested. The moral qualities of each candidate are being especially intently studied. "We need people who cannot be bought," stressed Yuriy Vasilyevich.

As for socio-legal guarantees, then... "Unfortunately, we have been compelled to defer and even not review the folders of those who don't have housing," said our interlocutor. Alas, we don't yet have our own available housing". And there are still many ambiguities with the rest. They are proposing to grant Main Tax Investigation Administration agents a whole series of substantial benefits (say, years of service, one year for 1.5 years), but it is still early to talk about that because the Russian parliament has only examined the draft Russian Federation Law "On the Tax Police" and with it the Statute "On Performing Service in the Tax Police" in the first reading and serious battles have already developed around individual articles. For now we can warm ourselves with the thought that service in similar structures in all civilized countries always was among the most prestigious and highly paid.

It makes sense to scrutinize with special attention how the process of assigning army and naval officers to another department is taking place. If only because this is essentially the first experience of "pouring" the excess of officer cadres into other structures. And next in line is the same kind of assignment but already to MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] subunits.

I spent several hours in a group of "lucky people" who had been selected for retraining according to the Main Tax Investigation Administration's order at the Russian MVD Republic Skills Enhancement Institute. This is

what they think in this regard (they asked me not to advertise the names of the officers for entirely understandable reasons).

Lieutenant Colonel S.B. is an engineer. He was still serving in Turkmenistan in August. His unit has been disbanded.

"Life has driven me into such a corner, that during the conversation I had to lie and say: I have an apartment. But where will I get one in Russia? This is how all social protection is being structured in our country: Whoever is already the very least protected, they help a bit more but, whoever is as poor as a church mouse—he is rejected everywhere. If you have housing—you will also have a job and a salary. If you don't have an apartment, there aren't any chances whatsoever, there's a 'red light' everywhere."

It turned out that nearly half of the group (and there were 25 people in the group) had resorted to such "guile". But what can you do, they told me, it's better not to have an apartment but to have a job than not to have either the one or the other.

It's difficult to presume how this will end for them. I hope that the officers' frankness will not become grounds for "repressive" measures by the Main Tax Investigation Administration leadership. One thing is clear: a person should not "hang" in the dead space of interdepartmental partitions. It's obvious that all such vitally important problems for people must be analyzed beforehand and secured by interdepartmental contractual obligations. And in this specific case, the government must simply mandatorily assist the new administration with either housing or with finances to purchase it.

Senior Lieutenant V.S. is a missileer, he served in Ukraine, he refused to take the oath and he was assigned to Russia. He was not assigned to an authorized position from July through November 1992.

"In recent months, I have only received the salary for rank. If my parents hadn't helped me, I don't even know how I would have made ends meet. The long-drawn out affair with papers lasts for months. Although Saratov is not that far from Moscow. I can imagine how long they last from the Far East and back."

Today the entire assignment process is being carried out through the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Training and Assignment Directorate. "We need to somehow simplify it," this is once again the opinion of Main Tax Investigation Administration Deputy Chief Yuriy Chichelov. "Say, grant the military district commander the right to make a decision on some officer or other. This 'taffy' is bringing all of our work to a standstill. People are incurring moral and material costs".

There are also other, less wide-scale problems but which require ordinary human participation by local commanders.

And one more factor. Today the Main Tax Investigation Administration is experiencing serious difficulties with the retraining of the selected officers—they don't have their own facilities to do that. We think that other departments should help it in this matter. The problem of social adaptation of servicemen who have been released from the Armed Forces due to reductions is becoming statewide in nature.

General on Military Transport Directorate's Role, Problems

*93UM0436D Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Mar 93 p 2*

[Article by Pyetr Altunin: "The Binding Threads of Roads"]

[Text] Chief of the Central Transport Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Lt-Gen Vadim Grebennikov, on the work, plans and problems of the military transport service.

From the KRSNAYA ZVEZDA dossier: V.P. Grebennikov was born in the city of Suchak in the Primorsk kray. In 1960 he graduated from the Leningrad School of Railroad Troops and Military Transport, after which he served in the Missile Troops. He graduated from the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transport. For five years he was chief of the military transport service of the Turkestan Military District. Starting in 1986 he was chief of directorate and deputy chief of the Central Directorate of Military Transport and since 1991, the chief of the Central Directorate of Military Transport of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

[Altunin] Vadim Petrovich, the military transport service is turning 75.

[Grebennikov] The date is counted since the day, 5 March 1918, when the Supreme Military Council of the Republic, which included the directorate of military communications, was formed to replace the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Czarist Army.

Of course in general the military transport service also existed when there were no railroads. With the appearance of the regular army, when land and water routes were used for the transport movement of troops, the need arose for specialists who knew military affairs and transportation. Toward the end of the 60s of the last century, the military transport service was formed on the Russian railroads, with all its basic links at the center and in the provinces.

Naturally it was improved subsequently, with the development of the Armed Forces and modernization of transportation types.

[Altunin] We know that recently the military transport service was subordinated to the General Staff. What brought that about?

[Grebennikov] That decision was dictated first of all by the nature, content and volume of tasks to be resolved by military transport. The Military Transport Service is planning and organizing transport movements in the interests of all the armed services and should be subordinate to an authority which has the right to issue orders and directives on the scale of all the Armed Forces. This has been confirmed both by historical experience and by the subordination of such services in the armies of other countries.

[Altunin] How has the nature of the work of the Military Transport Service changed in recent years?

[Grebennikov] On the one hand, the volume of shipments of materiel has diminished somewhat, and on the other there has been an increase in shipments for the redeployment of troops, including in the withdrawal from the countries of Eastern Europe, and in the arms reduction. Here it is apropos to note that significant difficulties have arisen, associated with the absence of treaty relations between the states formed in place of the former USSR, and also with regard to the need to license and impose fees in international shipments.

Secondly, there have been changes in transport operations. The network of railroads has been divided up among the states of the Commonwealth, and there has been a division of financial and administrative functions. In the near future a division of the rolling stock will be concluded. There is an analogous situation in the other types of transport. This has made it necessary to create a legal basis for implementation of military international transport movements. Now this task is resolved: the Council of Ministers of Defense of the CIS has approved the necessary documents.

[Altunin] The market is affecting all of our budgets. How painful were the higher prices of transport service for us, for example?

[Grebennikov] Well, we have to work anyway. But in this situation, and at times it is characterized by the absence of regulating legal documents for the levying of various fees, the use of payment coefficients and so forth, the primary task of the Military Transport Service is to assure the legality and the efficiency of use of the monetary resources in accordance with the estimate of the Ministry of Defense, and the elimination of any unjustified expenses, especially fines.

Today one of the basic causes of fines is excessive down time of railroad cars for loading operations. Thus in 1992 these amounted to about 95 million rubles. They were especially high in military construction organizations, which cost the Defense Ministry up to 40 percent of all fines, and in units of the Strategic Missile Troops and Air Defense troops, in the Far Eastern, Transbaykal, and Leningrad Military Districts, and in the Northern and Pacific Fleets.

The economic slump in Russia is also affecting our work. Here is just one example: In 1992 the volume of shipments on Russian railroads declined. As a result the Ministry of Transport did not receive the expected profit and to compensate was forced to take steps of an economic nature: it closed inactive stations and sectors, and reduced the number of operating personnel. But many of those stations were directly involved in supporting the work of military installations.

[Altunin] But under these conditions, how is it possible to ensure uninterrupted transport for the troop withdrawal?

[Grebennikov] This is now essentially our main work. It began back in 1990. The railroads of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belarus, Ukraine and Latvia are being used for the troop withdrawal. Shipments are being made by marine transport from the port of Rostok to the Russian ports of St. Petersburg and Vyborg, and also with vessels of the "river-sea" type, to the river ports of Yaroslavl and Rybinsk. Railroad ferries are being used on the Mukran (FRG) - Klaipeda (Latvia) line. Planes of military transport aviation are also being used to accomplish our tasks.

Thanks to the integrated use of all types of transport, it was possible to perform a sizeable volume of tasks. Thus in 1991-1992, 211 thousand service members were withdrawn from Germany, about 73 thousand units of combat equipment, and almost 1.5 million tonnes of material were sent to Russia, including 511 thousand tonnes of munitions.

After adoption of the corresponding inter-government agreements, the basic problems of using the railroads of Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia for the withdrawal of Russian troops were resolved.

It is more difficult to resolve the problems of transport support of the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic countries. Due to the absence of an adequate number of serviceable empty rolling stock, most of it must be sent from Russian railroads to support the troop shipments. In January 1993 the Agreement on Transit Shipments through Latvia of troops and military cargoes of the Russian Armed Forces withdrawn from Germany was adopted, and this vitally reduced the strain on the Belarusian railroad.

[Altunin] Expenditures for transport are also becoming one of the significant expense items in the family budget of service members.

[Grebennikov] Much has been done to reduce this burden. For instance, graduates of military schools are now allowed free travel of family members (spouses and children) and shipment of personnel property from their place of residence. Service-member orphans who are graduates of Suworov and Nakhimov schools and their equivalents, and also students and cadets of military training institutions who do not have officer rank or the

rank of warrant officer have been given the right to free travel twice a calendar year to their selected vacation spot. Officers, army and navy warrant officers, and extended service members, and female service members have the right to free travel during a service move and to their vacation spot by air transport.

Officers discharged from military service upon reaching maximum age for performance of military service, or discharged for reasons of health or in connection with organizational and personnel measures, who have a total time of military service of 20 or more years (as regular personnel) have been granted the right of free travel when going for inpatient treatment ordered by a military medical commission or to a health resort or convalescent institution and back (once a year). Members of their family enjoy the same right.

For service members who have selected a new place of residence at their discharge, the right to payment for travel and transport of personal property has now been extended to five years from the day of discharge, and a standard [allowance] has been established for the transport of personal property on all types of transport (except air) of up to 20 tonnes. The same transport standard for personal property has also been established for service members who have served by contract. However it

should be kept in mind that benefits provided by the Statute "On the status of service members" will be realized only after the government of the Russian Federation has adopted the corresponding decisions.

[Altunin] Vadim Petrovich, there continue to be problems with provision of [travel] vouchers to service members.

[Grebennikov] This problem remains a difficult one for us. At the stations and airports where we have offices representing the commandant of military transport, in response to our requests the transport organs have issued a certain number of seats on trains and aircraft for the transport of service members. However where before this was free, now it is necessary to pay, and quite well, to reserve each seat. And the reservation is intended primarily for supporting urgent business trips for missions of the higher staffs. We are obliged to meet this requirement despite our desire to assist all service members, members of their families and veterans of the Armed Forces. We as well as KRASNAYA ZVEZDA get complaints about the inattention and at times the rude treatment by Military Transport Service officers. We do not ignore any such cases, and we will continue to strive to do everything we can to ease the cares of military passengers.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Defense Minister Involved in Arms Controversy

934K0273E Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian,
2 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by Margus Välja: "Defense Minister Ashamed of Relations With the Russian Military"]

[Text] RH [RAHVA HAAL] reported last Thursday that recently members of Russia's military forces, ignoring Estonia's laws, attempted to take some 100 (actually 101) PM-type combat pistols out of Estonia. We further reported that these Russian military men turned to Estonia's defense minister Hain Rebas with a request to get these weapons back, and that the request was not denied by our defense ministry.

In Saturday's RH, the minister confirms that the pistols were brought into Estonia but, for some unexplainable reason, denies that the Russian military people had written him (i.e. minister H. Rebas—M.V.) anything about it.

The RH editorial desk has a copy of a letter from Col A. Vetrogonov and Col J. Gushin of the Guard Units, deputy commander and chief of staff respectively, of Military Unit 12129 of the Russian Federation, addressed to Mr. H. Rebas, minister of defense of the Republic of Estonia. The document sent out on January 20, 1993 is headed REQUEST. The minister is requested to authorize the return of 101 Makarov-pistols. These Russian military men themselves admit in their letter that they have violated "...customs regulations for taking weapons across the state border." They add: "Persons found guilty of violating the procedure and regulations for crossing the state border have been subjected to severe disciplinary action."

The undersigned Russian officers also assured Estonia's minister that "such transgressions would not be tolerated in the future."

From the same letter we can read in Estonian: "Minister of Defense Mr. H. Rebas does not object to the return of the pistols should the Ministry of the Interior make such a decision. A verbal statement to that effect has been made to a representative of the RF [Russian Federation]. [Signed] E. Priks, Counsel, January 21, 1993.

After these reminders to the revered minister, we will also have to refer to some other documents. H. Rebas writes in the statement published in RH on Saturday: "It is well known that the border guard reports to the Ministry of the Interior. Hence, solving this problem is not within the competence of the defense ministry."

Actually, it is. It is not up to a journalist to explain the boundaries of his competence to an official personage, but Mr. Rebas has obviously not had the time to acquaint himself with the duties of his office.

Border Guard, that does indeed report to the Ministry of the Interior, controls the borders. If something illegal is discovered, the situation is examined. If it deals with some merchandise, it will be seized. The border guard does not get involved with seizures as Mr. Rebas mistakenly thinks. That is the job of the Customs Office.

As far as border crossings by Russia's military go, *these are specifically assigned to the competence of the defense ministry.* According to the government decree of the Republic of Estonia issued on September 3, 1992, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Estonia is charged with: *resolving the issues arising from taking over weapons, combat equipment, supplies and other mobile property from the leaving units of the Russian Federation, or from taking such property out of the Republic of Estonia.* "This decree was amended, in part, on January 8, but not for the portion viewed here.

Thus, as long as defense minister Rebas "does not object to the return of the pistols," he has, in effect, given his final approval, being completely within the limits of his *competence.* The Ministry of the Interior has no need to make such a decision.

The minister's reproaches to RH are not justified in any way. It is especially astounding to read that he takes the factual truth based on documentation and calls it sloppiness and malevolence.

Actually, this is not the worst part of the damage caused by the story. We are also left with the question: How come this person with a background along the Swedish-German lines, who now has become the chief architect of defense capabilities for a third state, has such cordial relations with Russia's military? Could we be dealing with some local *Molotovs* or *Ribbentrops* here?

The Tondi division, the request of whose representatives had been so favorably received by our ministry of defense, constitutes the major portion of Russia's military force in Estonia today. It consists of the Keila tank regiment, units at Klooga and Tondi, and also the polygon at Aegviidu. With its 34,000 hectares, the latter is the biggest of Russia's proving grounds in the Baltic area used for training purposes.

Those in the know say that the first results of Russia's troop removal can only be discussed in earnest after this 144th Division mentioned here has left the country. In the meantime, information to the contrary has been received: New servicemen have been brought in from Russia. And that, again, with accommodating acquiescence from the Estonian side. There is every reason to fear that some *malevolent* person could *inaccurately*, if not *maliciously*, regard such events as undermining to the defense capabilities of the state of Estonia?!

If that should happen, neither RH nor the undersigned would want to claim any credit for it.

Defense Minister Calls For Swedish Aid

934K0404C Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
16 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by Defense Minister Hain Rebas: "The Baltic States Need Military Aid From Sweden" (as published in SVENSKA DAGBLADET, February 3, 1993)]

[Text] We are prepared to buy surplus military equipment from Sweden, and not to use the help of international arms dealers, says Hain Rebas.

"The main task of Sweden's foreign policy is to help involve Russia in the integrating process of Europe," wrote Sverker Aström on this page some time ago. If such a task is considered central for the relatively out-of-the-way Sweden, then for Estonia who has risen out of the ashes, and who has border disputes with Russia, this is vital. Because, if the Western world (including the Baltic states), along with the Russian democrats, does not succeed in making Russia more European, then Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will obviously not be able to survive the coming shocks.

According to a recently published interview in the magazine BUNTE, European politician Otto von Habsburg fears that president Yeltsin is going to lose and that there will be an explosive anti-democratic coup in Russia within the next two years. He adds that that could mean a Russian-Islam war in the South, and a military attack on the Baltic states.

Last summer, Estonia's defense ministry was created anew. Its task is to formulate a defense concept and a military doctrine, and to come up with legislation, organization, education and equipment for the headquarters staff and for the defense forces. The purpose being that well motivated soldiers, trained for defense, could deter an attack mounted by some random reactionary Russian nationalist and/or Communist leaders, who could strike out at the head of their terrorist units. Parallels with the events of 1918 to 1920, and what is currently happening in former Yugoslavia, are obvious.

To face that kind of a future, Estonia and the other Baltic states need the support of the world, economic and even military. In his article, Sverker Aström proposes that Sweden relax its total ban on taking weapons into the Baltic states. "It is obvious," he writes, "that they need light weapons for the police and the border guard." He mentions, among other things, that [their] having light defense weapons is also "of direct interest to Sweden."

Up until now, Sweden's help to Estonia in defense matters has consisted of some promises for education, of an unarmed coast guard vessel, instruments for a musical group and surplus clothing—2,000 sets of blue uniforms, numbers 39 to 58 and winter hats, number 60, the so-called "blue saucepan" (—complete with fond memories).

But the next step—shipping over used Swedish vehicles and radio sets, which are rusting away or gathering dust

in barrack compounds or even in warehouses—has not been reached. And the third step—exporting to Estonia some slightly out-dated defense weapons—is one that the Swedish government has not even been willing to discuss up until now. And that despite the fact that Sweden's current state, foreign and defense ministers have so far been understanding and well-meaning friends of the Baltic states.

Before they can be utilized, these large numbers of cars, radio equipment and weapons, have to be maintained and guarded. This will be a burden on the taxpayers. As we well know, Sweden's defense is being totally reorganized. A lot of materials will be left in storage, with no purpose at all, from the Lapp hunter units north of Kiruna down to the Ystad armored units in the South.

Economic Hardship

Even if Estonia's defense plans were limited to three strong sharp-shooter battalions along with the border guard, national civil defense and local service units, it would still result in colossal expenses for an economically deprived country to cover housing, salaries, military equipment, and the acquisition of communications equipment, transportation and weapons.

Compared to Estonians, the Swedes are living in the lap of luxury, despite of all of their crises. In matters of defense, Estonians will have to start from below ground zero—that's how badly destroyed and beshitten (literally) were the buildings and equipment left behind by the Russian (Soviet) military.

The government of Estonia is planning to spend several million dollars on the acquisition of weapons over the upcoming fiscal year. For us, this constitutes a conservative 3.38 percent out of the total state budget, and it is by no means certain that the parliament will approve this amount. It is quite obvious that, before anything else, funds should be allocated to schools, hospitals and pensioners. If we would only dare!

But, as long as the world looks anything like it does east of Lake Peipus i.e. in the Leningrad military district (still bearing that name!) and around Pskov, and as long as governments of the Nordic countries do not think like Sverker Aström, all we can do is pour part of our gross national product into expensive means of defense. Up until now, we have been forced to fatten the ranks of international arms dealers.

Desire To Cooperate

Estonia's obvious preference is, and that includes matters of defense and armaments, to cooperate with our neighbors we feel related to—namely the Nordic countries, with Finland and Sweden above all. But up until now, we have been forced to buy from regimes that are rather distant to us. Last summer, for example, we only had about 250 automatic weapons and we wound up buying another 2,000—to secure our first national elections in September—from Iliescu's Romania.

Out of its surplus supplies the Swedish army could, without much of a problem, donate to us materials to fully equip staff headquarters for three or four units and one infantry brigade. Sweden should certainly be able to put that much together.

For example, Estonia is interested in M-96 rifles as excellent weapons for basic shooting practice, even though they have been around for roughly a hundred years. Before World War II Estonians held several world championships in shooting. Today these skills are non-existent. In Sweden, at the same time, thousands of M-96 rifles are waiting to be disassembled. Estonia would also be more than willing to relieve Sweden of some of their excess and costly materials. This way, cooperation between Estonia and Sweden could lead, step by step, to the desired level of mutual benefit, increased democracy and peace across our common Baltic region.

Estonia's defense has to be strong enough to deter any possible reactionary military attack from Moscow. Finally, coming back to economic and military aid from Sweden: The thought that Sweden's surplus equipment is defending democracy, and also the interests of Sweden, in an amicably attuned and peace-minded neighboring country, could not be totally foreign to Sweden?

And, maybe the position of the Swedish government will change. After all, it was only recently that defense minister **Anders Björk** said in SVENSKA DAGBLADET that government restrictions on exporting weapons to the Baltic countries should be revised.

Minister On Russian Troop Activities

Russian Troop Violations

934K0146A Riga LATVIJAS JAUNATNE in Latvian
13 Jan 93 p 2

[Report by Latvian Deputy Minister of Defense V. Pavlovskis: "On Violations By Russian Forces"]

[Text] The Latvian Ministry of Defense has ascertained many facts attesting to illegal activities on the part of Russian forces in Latvia in 1992: the illegal transport into Latvia of replacement troops; unsanctioned movement of forces; violation of regulations on the use of airspace; and noncompliance with sea and harbor shipping regulations.

From 1 Feb to 31 Dec 1992, the following violations were confirmed:

- 54 incidents of illegal transport into Latvia of replacement troops, during which time 2,630 military persons entered the country.
- 392 violations of regulations on the use of airspace and nine air strikes with bombing over the Zvarde bombing range.
- 38 violations of sea [and] harbor shipping regulations (unsanctioned entry into and exit from Latvian ports).

—169 instances of unsanctioned transport-column movement (1,940 vehicles) on Latvian territory.

—The unsanctioned movement of 17 trains (350 boxcars and flatcars with military vehicles and equipment) over Latvian railroads.

These violations reflect only part of what has been reported. Many reports are not precise enough to document. Nevertheless, the large number of reports from various locations indicates that Russian forces stationed in Latvia violate the laws and governmental decisions of the Republic.

The Ministry of Defense routinely informs the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of these violations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in turn submits [diplomatic] notes to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Russian Embassy in Latvia.

Data on Russian Troops

934K0146B Riga LATVIJAS JAUNATNE in Latvian
13 Jan 93 p 2

[Report by Latvian Deputy Minister of Defense V. Pavlovskis: "The Russian Army in Latvia"]

[Text] There are 681 Russian military units stationed in Latvia, and they occupy over 70,000 hectares of our national territory. At this time there are about 27,000 members of the Russian military in Latvia, including 11,000 officers and warrant officers, and 16,000 soldiers.

1. In the Ground Forces—6,600 military personnel (including 3,600 officers and warrant officers, and 3,000 soldiers).
2. In the Navy—11,000 personnel (3,400 and 7,600, resp).
3. In the Air Force—7,500 personnel (3,200 and 4,300, resp).
4. In the Air Defence Forces—1,700 personnel (900 and 700, resp).

The Russian forces currently have at their disposal 29 T-72 tanks, 73 AFV's and APC's, 12 "Shilka" air-defense weapons systems, 36 various calibre 24 152mm and 12 122mm self-propelled howitzers [lack of punctuation reflects original], over 2,500 vehicles of various types and missions, 30 MiG-27 fighter-bombers, 20 Su-24 and Su-17 tactical bombers, 11 transport aircraft of various types, 11 helicopters, 12 submarines, 29 warships of various types and about 100 auxiliary ships.

The Russian security service and military intelligence and counterintelligence services continue their activities unimpeded, as attested by the over 20 intelligence units on Latvian territory. These include 11 in Riga city and

rayon, three in Ventspils city and rayon, and three in Liepaja city and rayon, plus elsewhere.

In the second half of last year, the Russian army withdrew from 90 military installations, and 33 units left Latvian territory. Fifty military units have been disbanded in place, and 15 units have illegally been sold off to commercial entities. Thus, the Russian army is gradually leaving the territory of Latvia, but the 1 Feb 1992 communique's procedures for withdrawal are violated routinely. New troops are illegally brought in, and our air space continues to be violated. Mercenaries are being recruited for Russian military units in Latvia from among residents of Latvia.

On 1 Jan 1993, a 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade was illegally established. The Northwestern Group of Forces [NWGF] command has been unable to convincingly argue the need for the three tank battalions, two motorized rifle battalions, three artillery battalions, and other subunits making up the brigade.

The formation of such a brigade and its stationing in the immediate environs of Riga (in Adazi and Dobeles), coupled with the concentration of the armed forces in Riga city, Riga rayon, Liepaja, and Daugavpils, creates a constant threat to Latvia's independence and destabilizes the political situation.

The Ministry of Defense does not claim complete accuracy of the data on the status of Russian forces in Latvia, for the information has been compiled from the observations of employees of rayon civil service administrations and local residents. Nevertheless, our information does not contradict Commander of the NWGF General-Colonel Mayorov's announcement published in the 22 Dec 1992 issue of DIENA. The announcement stated that by 18 Dec, over 40 percent of the troops stationed in the Baltics had been withdrawn. Seven thousand military vehicles, 170,000 small arms, all fighter aircraft, 70 percent of the radars, and 80 percent of the anti-air weapons systems had been withdrawn from Latvia itself.

UKRAINE

Defense Ministry Briefing to Foreign Attaches on Military Doctrine

93UM0372A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
29 Dec 92 p 1

[Article by Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service Senior Officer Captain I. Melnichuk: "Toward Openness and Mutual Understanding"]

[Text] A briefing for military attaches assigned to the embassies of foreign states that are accredited in Ukraine occurred at the Ministry of Defense at which problems associated with our state's military doctrine, condition and the prospects for development of its military structures were examined.

Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Center for Operational-Strategic Studies Deputy Chief, Candidate of Military Sciences, Colonel Georgiy Kostenko delivered a report at the briefing. The speaker familiarized those present with the main provisions of Ukraine's draft military doctrine and reminded them that we are building our own Armed Forces and we are creating an army with modern principles of personnel manning, training and education, while relying on a solid legal and legislative base. Ukraine's draft military doctrine has the nature of ensuring national security and contains a provision on intentional defense and does not enter into contradictions with the principles of European and international security. Never, either in a single document that has been officially adopted on the territory of the former USSR, has the task of preventing war as a priority been set forth so unambiguously as it has been done in Ukraine's draft military doctrine.

Colonel Kostenko reminded them that this draft military doctrine was adopted as a basis by the parliamentarians on 28 October but was rejected so that finishing touches could be made to it. Now, based on the additions that have been set forth by the people's deputies and citizens of Ukraine, the draft has been reworked at the Center for Operational-Strategic Studies and will soon be submitted for approval.

After the report, the chiefs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Main Staff leading directorates responded to the military attaches' questions.

And the latter were interested in practically everything that is associated with the structural development of the army of independent Ukraine. For example, will Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk be able to prevent the unsanctioned launch of missiles with nuclear warheads from the territory of Ukraine? Ukrainian Armed Forces Main Staff Operational Directorate Deputy Chief Major-General Ivan Gnidenko responded to that question as follows:

"Ukraine has rejected the operational employment of the strategic weapons that are deployed on its territory. So, their use is within the competence of the Russian Federation President but with the concurrence of the heads of state in which the weapons are located. But Ukraine is not indifferent to whether or not these lethal weapons will be employed from its territory and therefore the Ukrainian President has the capability to block their unsanctioned employment.

This is not a technical capability. A special signal has been developed that will be sent either via computer networks, via automated command and control or radio network systems, but only with the receipt of precisely that signal will the launch of missiles be possible.

Furthermore, Major-General Gnidenko reminded the representatives of the states' military departments that all of the missiles that are in Ukraine have been removed from combat alert status. They are in the system that provides security until they have been destroyed but they do not have any launch missions, that is, they are not targeted against any targets whatsoever on any territories.

While responding to a question on the future authorized organizational structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a Main Staff representative noted that right now the process of creating two operational commands—the Western and the Southern—is occurring based on the three military districts that were operating in Ukraine. It was mentioned that although parliament has not approved either the strength or the structure of the Armed Forces, they will tentatively consist of Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, which will combine the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces, and also the Navy. Furthermore, there will be combat arms, services, and centrally subordinated division-sized and smaller units, military educational institutions, and junior specialist training centers. All army directorates will be reorganized into corps and new authorized organizational structures will appear—mechanized brigades.

Ukrainian Armed Forces Main Staff Naval Directorate Chief Rear Admiral Ivan Pivnenko told the military attaches about the future Ukrainian Navy. He pointed out that the development of the Naval structural development concept is being completed right now, in accordance with which Ukraine plans to have a small but modern navy which will be capable of ensuring the security of the state from the sea. We don't plan to have large ships. And right now we are making a decision on even those large ships that are at the wharves and that have been laid down in accordance with the former Union's construction plans. Will they be cut up for scrap like the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Ulyanovsk or will they attain another fate. A great deal of resources has already been invested in the large aircraft-carrying cruiser Varyag but it is not needed by the Ukrainian Navy. Russia is proposing to complete it for her navy. If there is an appropriate agreement and resources—we will complete it. Only those ships that are needed will be built for our Navy.

Ukrainian Armed Forces Main Staff Air Force Directorate Chief Major-General Boris Timoshenko and Acting External Relations Directorate Chief Colonel Viktor Tsapenkov answered the military attaches' remaining questions.

Upon completion of the briefing, a decision was made that these meetings will become regular events.

BALTIC STATES

French Review Estonia's Defense Concept

934K0273B Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian,
30 Jan 93 p 1,3

[Article by Tiit Tambi: "Toward Estonia's Defense Concept—With the Help of France"]

[Text] The security forum between the Baltic countries and France, held at the level of defense ministries, that had started early this week in Riga, was continued at Tallinn's Orlov Castle yesterday. The Latvian and Lithuanian delegations had stayed home, this time, which made

it possible for the visitors to take a closer look at the defense concept of Estonia, and its armed forces.

The basic premises of our defense concept were introduced by Defense Minister Hain Rebas, who emphasized the state's specific orientation to *defense*. A review of the structure of defense forces was given by Col Raul Luks, deputy chief of their Headquarters' Staff.

Estonia has four defense regions, out of which Narva is considered to be the most endangered one. Based there are the Viru single infantry battalion at Jõhvi, and the radio-technical battalion at Tapa. Võru is home to the Kuperjanov single infantry battalion, and in the Sakala region (Pärnu and Viljandi districts) there is only one company, so far. The Tallinn region has the Kalev single infantry battalion at Järgala, and a guard battalion having a staff company and a company at Rumm. In addition to these, there is the automotive company in Tallinn, along with a communications company (part of the radio-technical battalion). Once the defense forces are fully staffed, we will have a total of five battalions, three of them infantry. So far, we have no navy or air defense units. We do have, however, a defense college at the Internal Defense Academy, officers' training courses, and twenty-some people who have obtained, or are in the process of obtaining officers' or non-commissioned officers' training in several foreign countries.

The development plan calls for scattering the defense forces, because contemporary war will not be fought at a front, but will rather rely on the use of paratroopers and other mobile units. This is why it is also necessary to have a wider involvement of residents in the state's defense effort. This is handled by Kaitseliit, whose chief Johannes Kert also introduced his organization. (Since a review of his press conference appeared in yesterday's RH, it will not be repeated here).

Who is it that we are defending ourselves against, may well be the question coming from taxpayers, at whose expense this is being done.

Andrus Oövel, executive director of the Border Guard Service, sees one possible danger coming from the sea. Only recently, a paratrooper landing exercise was carried out on our island of Ruhnu. The smugglers have become more active, and they are relying more on small and fast sea vessels. The fishing fleets of our eastern neighbor have lost some of their traditional catch areas and, when getting caught in foreign waters, call in their own navy or border guard vessels. Considerable danger is also posed by criminal elements, who are trying to cross the border by land. This is where both the weapons and the narcotics trades are being conducted. But that certainly is not the problem of one state alone. We are not threatened by direct aggression, but there are "some forces

who want to keep internal terrorism going in Estonia." And many explosive elements there are indeed: A foreign army and part of the non-Estonian-speaking population (the latter, by the way, *considerably* smaller in number than they themselves would have us believe).

First the visitors, headed by Brig Gen Wiroth, did not understand what is the function of our 20 departments of state defense (the former war commissariats). They have a different system. Naturally, there are also many differences in the structure and the command of defense forces, but the function of border guard was said to be similar to that of the police over there, just as it is here. The visitors recognized excellent opportunities for cooperation in several other areas as well.

A drop of tar in the honey jar! Our men could not resist revealing to the visitors some of the differences between our different ministries. What kind of an impression that made, we have no way of knowing. Especially since we are the ones hoping to get a radar system from them, not the other way around. The word has it that, in Riga, we left a good impression just because we tried to rely on the law and the constitution in all of our dealings, while the Latvian and the Lithuanian delegations put their emphasis on the matter of getting material assistance i.e. weapons.

Estonian Defense Policy Evaluated

934K0404ATallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonia
17 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by Aare Raid: "Who Has the Ultimate Responsibility for Estonia's Defense Forces?"]

[Text] The buildup of defense forces for the state of Estonia continues to be a hot subject. But, unfortunately, it has also been plagued by a series of scandals. Anyone who have been following the formation and buildup of defense forces for the newly independent Estonia, has undoubtedly noticed an ongoing scuffle around the whole process.

Lack of Clarity and Authority

It seems that the whole thing goes back to the time when the development of defense forces proceeded before the nature of statehood was determined. Are we dealing with a state that is neutral, not united, integrated into the security system of Western Europe, geared to the new security system of Europe, or a state of some other configuration?

Those who happened to see the television interview with U.S. Army Col Aleksander Einseln of Estonian extraction, will recall his answer to the question of what our defense forces should be like. The answer was unequivocal: First, you have to determine what kind of a state you want to build. The defense forces can then be developed accordingly. He hastened to add, however, that in case of any serious aggression by Russia, all we

will need is a dozen men on our eastern border to fire three shots to symbolize our resistance.

Col Einseln can hardly be accused of not knowing whereof he speaks.

The formation of our defense forces started out as a cooperative effort between the border and state defense department of the state office and the headquarters staff of the defense forces. It was the rank-and-file who decided what Estonia does or does not need in the way of defense forces. If now, our state budget is criticized for being made up by rank-and-file employees of the finance ministry, then the structure of our defense forces did indeed proceed from the vision of its officials and employees. The defense minister states in the February 5 issue of HOMMIKULEHT: "Estonia's overall concept of state defense—to determine what kind of military units Estonia needs—is being discussed in the defense council of the government and in the government commission for streamlining the structure of our defense forces. So far, we have been dealing strictly with opinions."

In the initial stages of forming our own defense forces, the first objective stemming from the situation in Estonia was to guarantee control over our borders and our territory. The extent to which this could be accomplished depended largely on our relations with the Soviet/Russian army which, in turn, depended on relations between the two states.

The second objective stems from the need for internal defense, because the state has to be prepared to cope with erupting events. Both border and interior defense can be linked organically to the state's existence. The size and the structure of both these defense formations will be determined by the balance struck between the scope of the tasks to be tackled and the coffers of the state.

A regular or a defense force, however, is a lot more problematic. If, on the political level, debates have centered on whether our defense forces should be based on compulsory service or would it be better to have a career army, the size and the structure of such defense forces have, up until now, been in the hands of government officials, the defense ministry and the staff headquarters of defense forces. The results of that are here now. Without doubting the skills and capabilities of Col Laaneots as a specialist, for him to find the correct size and structure for our defense forces, we also have to provide him with the scope of dangers these defense forces will have to deal with. Or, in other words, the state of Estonia will have to define itself within the political landscape of Europe.

Right now, however, officials of the defense ministry have been given a large and unrestricted field to play. As is, nobody knows for sure how big the defense forces should be, what should be their structure and their weaponry, how many and what kind of barracks they need and where, and who should be reporting to whom. Demands for creating parallel structures are already

being heard. A separate navy is being requested for the border guard, defense forces and Kaitseliit [The Defense League]. Among those speaking of their own air force are the defense forces, the border guard, interior defense, but not yet Kaitseliit.

Col Einseln mentioned that, in Tallinn, he had been told of eager hopes of getting some older-type airplanes and tanks. He pointed out that such hopes, if they are being entertained, should also include awareness of what it takes, in terms of cost, to keep such equipment in running order.

The problem of authority has been shadowing the creation of Estonia's defense forces from the very beginning. First, Kaitseliit did not recognize the headquarters staff of the defense forces; a little later, one part of Kaitseliit no longer recognized its own leaders and; later yet, the defense initiative center separated itself from Kaitseliit. In the beginning, Kaitseliit only recognized the exile president. Officers' ranks have been conferred by both Heinrich Mark in Stockholm and Arnold Rüütel at Kadrioru.

If the Finns, after their "Spring 83" training, complained that their armored company, in a real combat situation, would have had as many casualties among their own as they would among the enemy, then Estonia's armed forces have only killed their own, so far, and even that outside of training. All of this has created a situation within the state's defense structures, where people take orders from someone else at one's own whim and discretion. We now hear that the pecking order is in place, but that knowledge is not very assuring.

All this considered, it is hardly surprising if Jüri Tohver, head of the defense ministry's property department, hands out visas for bringing Russian military personnel into Estonia, and defense minister Hain Rebas complains that he has bad underlings, who either give him bad advice or don't tell him anything about their activities. But, suppose that Tohver had deliberately, or by mistake, put down 170 or 1,700 men on his authorization instead of 17? Then these men would have been here and quite legally at that, from the point of view of Russia or anybody else.

God, Protect Estonia

There is an anecdote circulating about the Russian-Japanese war, according to which the Japanese were bothered most by one Russian general fighting against them. The problem was that this general was just enough out of line. While the others were fighting according to the rules of warfare, the behavior of this particular general could never be predicted and, very often, the Japanese had to take a beating. Has our defense minister decided to use the same tactics, and is that the new spirit that he promised to bring to the ministry with him? For the time being, both the Estonian people and the Russian army are left in the role of these Japanese.

In the morning, the people are told that nobody has issued any entry permits; at noon they are sworn that if anybody entered it was done illegally; in the afternoon it is admitted that a permit was issued, but nobody had seen anybody enter; in the evening an admission is made that, perhaps they were brought in, but the permit was cancelled afterward. The next thing we know is that the Russian military will decide there is no need to leave because, some day, they may even be given permission to stay.

It would be interesting to find out who will ultimately be responsible for Estonia's state defense? Would it be the government and the minister of defense, jointly or separately, the engineer of the locomotive, or nobody at all? On January 13, 17 members of the Russian military are being brought into Estonia on the authority of a department head at the defense ministry. On January 21, the defense minister himself gives his permission to bring in 250 men, a number that is retroactively made to include the 17 men already here. The fact that such a permission can only be granted by the government is not known to anyone at the ministry and, as it turns out later, no need is seen to bother the government with it. On the evening of February 12, the prime minister, by his own admission, knows nothing about bringing in the military men, seems not to have heard of the permission granted by the defense minister, does not believe the Russian officers, and demands information from the opposition regarding the entry of this military group.

Thus, from January 13 till at least February 12, neither the government of Estonia nor its defense ministry know anything about the Russian military brought into Estonia. And, obviously, never would have found out, had the opposition not looked into it.

Without the "alarum bell" rung by the opposition, the defense minister would also not have cancelled his permit after it was issued, and would probably have issued new ones in the future. Without all that, the defense minister would also not have discovered that he has been given bad advice. But the truly frightening prospect is that, in practice, any number of Russian military personnel could have been brought into Estonia, on the basis of a visa issued by some official of the defense ministry.

The other sad fact is that this incident reveals an utter chaos within the structures of Estonia's state defense. The government has absolutely no defense-related information about the situation on the border and within its territory, and is not capable of obtaining it fast, in case of need. The defense minister does not know his rights and responsibilities, and does not know what is going on in the state.

It is also sad to admit that the defense minister loses his self-control even in a minor conflict situation, judging by his conflicting statements released to the press. What is one to expect in a situation of real conflict? The Border Guard Service is complaining, in turn, that when border

guards did not follow orders for reporting the arrival of the Russian military, it was due to a misunderstanding in the control and reporting system. Who is accountable for this? Certainly not the Russian military. The government did not believe them either.

Mägra Märt says in the February 13 issue of RAHVA HAAL: "If our fatherland has given a job to someone, then it will also give him the brainpower. Within the limits of our meager resources."

Given the situation in Estonia today, we cannot rely on that alone.

Damage At Vacated Tapa Base Described

934K0404B Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian
17 Feb 93 p 4

[Article by Rein Sikk: "With a Box of Matches Against the Military Legacy"]

[Text] The environs of Tapa are a sight for the curious. Burning well and creek water. Burnt-out ruins, barrack dwellings, traces of fires. Shabby citizens staring at you mistrustfully. Growling stray dogs—big as calves. Further out a vehicle carrying clean water.

How could Tapa be freed of military pollution? Answers are being sought.

Over the years, untold amounts of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel and reactive fuels have been seeping, or released into the ground water from the military airfield. This is floating underground in every possible direction, and pushed to the surface whenever ground water starts moving more vigorously. The banks of the Rauakõrve creek are filled with signs of fuel burning. The flow of the effluent to the sea, via Valgejõe [river], is prevented only by the vigorous use of matches. Water is being hauled to 67 Tapa families with polluted wells, at a monthly cost of 3,000 to 6,000 kroons.

Raivo Vilu, professor at the Tallinn Technical University, proposes bacteria as a means of water purification. Since there are roughly 100,000 kinds of bacteria, there are also those among them that feed on fuels. R. Vilu visualizes small pumps activated by wind energy, for example, that would bring the water from polluted wells into the biological purification device. Then the bacteria get to feast on the oils.

Such home-based purification systems could not work very fast or intensively, but that should be compensated by their relative economy. "If the nature of Virumaa has been polluted for 50 years, then it will take at least 20 years to get rid of the pollution," Raivo Vilu is convinced.

Jaan Viktor, counsel for the Tapa city government, has heard nothing of bacteria, but is collaborating with the firm Maves and with Danish environmental specialists. Holes are still being drilled to get more data, but plans for the future call for building a mechanical water

purification plant, near the Rauakõrve creek, that would separate fuel from the water. The fuel can also be burned there.

The project will cost 130,000 kroons, and prime minister Mart Laar, during his Tapa visit, had promised to cover that amount from state funds. A total of 3,000 kroons is earmarked for tamponing the wells on the airfield site.

The other military source of environmental pollution was the clutter of barracks built in the 50's that encircles the town. People in the city government are convinced that it is there where 50 percent of the local criminals are hiding out. It is also there that you can pick up the trail of stolen copper.

One of the more conspicuous blocks of barracks is located around the former Tapa estate. Jaan Viktor is a bit distraught that Estonia's defense forces have, so far, shown no interest in the estate. Yet, historically, the mansion building had once been the property of Estonia's armored train command.

Here, too, matches have done their work and many of the sheds and buildings have been burnt down. Lives have also been lost. The rest has been carried away. The city government cannot restore order in the barracks at this time, because officially they are still under military housing authority.

Jaan Tamm, leader of Estonia's historical preservation said that both the historical preservation society and the society for military history, are thought to take an interest in old military buildings, too. Something should certainly be preserved of the barrack-culture of Tapa, for future generations, before it gets picked apart or burnt down. Perhaps, in the near future, we could talk about historic tours to the military district.

Lithuania Builds Up Armed Forces

934K0352B Moscow VEK in Russian
29 Jan 93-4 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by Nadezhda Popova under the rubric "The Big Game": "Will Neighbor Russia Help? Lithuania Steps Up the Creation of an Army"]

[Text] A young soldier in a fine mouse-colored overcoat paces around the center of the Lithuanian capital. He is tall and well-built with a frank manly face. It is as if Shtirlits himself came down from the television screen onto Gediminas Prospect.

"How good-looking he is," whisper the girls. And they add: "Our own officer, a Lithuanian."

In terms of creating their own army the Lithuanians long ago galloped past both the Latvians and the Estonians. Today it numbers more than 6,000 men. People say that is to the direct credit of the minister of the regional guard, Audrius Butkevicius. The war minister began to "mold" a domestic army right after the Act on Independence was adopted, that is back in the spring of 1990.

"Now we can easily pin our neighbors, the Latvians," joked the deputy war minister, Sarunas Vasiliauskas, in talking with me. Incidentally, in the recent past he was a physicist and the minister himself was a doctor.

In 1992 the republic's military budget totaled 1.3 billion rubles. And in the present 1993 budget it was not cut. The Lithuanian army is armed with AK-47 and AK-74 rifles. This is perhaps the only thing that Lithuanian soldiers and officers can boast about at present. True, they also have a well-tailored uniform, but as yet there is no money for heavy weapons.

It is assumed that in the near future Lithuania's professional army will have 20,000 men. Another 10,000 boys will be in voluntary service. But it is unlikely the republic will be able to provide its armed forces with fighter planes and tanks any time soon. The reason is the same—there is no money. A tank costs more than 2 million dollars and a plane—about 20 million.

In order to protect its air space the Lithuanian Republic needs 100 fighter planes, estimated the Ministry of Regional Defense. Will the West help? That is unlikely. But its neighbor Russia will most likely come to its aid in arming the Lithuanian army, and negotiations are already underway on that.

Potential Role of Army, Volunteer Units Examined

934K0419B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent Vladas Bikulcius, Vilnius: "The Gun Hangs on the Wall—And Let It Stay There"]

[Text] *The army and military service are a sacred cause and an inalienable attribute of any sovereign state. Lithuanian-Polish troops battled at Grünwald-Tannenberg in 1410 along with a Smolensk regiment (local historians, true, recently "discovered" that these were not Russians, but rather... a Lithuanian garrison from Smolensk). The Lithuanian regiment of the Russian Army spilled its blood on the field at Borodino, although it is true that there were also more than enough inhabitants of Lithuania on Napoleon's side as well...*

A delegation of highly placed officials from NATO that came to Vilnius not long ago declared that they admired the work that has been done here by the Ministry of Defense to create our own armed forces. There are actually about 10,000 servicemen now in the ranks of the infantry, aviation and the fleet. The Iron Wolf brigade of seven battalions makes up the foundation of the ground forces, and seven coastal-protection ships and craft are the basis of the navy. The volunteer defense service numbers more than 10,000 who have signed contracts and about 6,000 "sympathizers." Military figures in Lithuania feel that the mobilization capability of the country is 150,000 men.

The guns are hanging on the wall. The owners have the full right to them. The protection of the borders, the fight against smuggling and terrorists, the oversight of maritime areas, the protection of the airspace—all of that requires manpower and equipment. The Lithuanian Army needs 120,000 automatic weapons alone. They must, in the opinion of the defense agency, set themselves up with radar stations that would record the as-yet uncontrolled overflights of Russian military aircraft...

There is nonetheless somewhat of a difference in the scenario for the organizational development of the Lithuanian armed forces from, say, that of the Scandinavian countries that the military specialists here cite as an example (a small but highly professional army equipped with ultra-modern weapons, and a system of volunteers with their own weapons at home or nearby). One unfortunate feature of Lithuania is the domestic instability of the country and the high degree of politicization of the command cadres.

It was reported to the NATO generals that the function of the Lithuanian Army, in case of aggression, is to cause as much harm as possible to the "aggressor" and protect the most important state facilities for a certain time. All of that is offered up as an intelligent strategy proceeding from the capabilities of a small nation compared to the potential, God forbid, "aggressors" in the vicinity.

So then, reason, common sense, logic... So then why so much loud and bellicose rhetoric, in that case? It was recently announced at a congress of the "volunteers" that they are "armed," that they are ready to study the fundamentals of partisan tactics, that 1940—when the Lithuanian Army remained neutral under the change in power—will not be repeated. Calls to conduct a "purge" of the military ministry, too loyal to the new leadership of Lithuania in the opinion of the "volunteers," have also been heard. It remains to be hoped that the convincing victory of A. Brazauskas in the recent presidential elections will be able to stifle all of that hue and cry.

People at the rank-and-file level, as is well known, are sincere and guileless, and there is no burden of particular responsibility on their shoulders. And both Lithuanias, both sides of the split Lithuania, are talking in an undertone but candidly about the problem of the gun on the wall. The ultra-rightists are threatening that the departure of the last units of the Russian Army will untie their hands to make short work of the leftists. It is being let out that detachments of "volunteers" armed with weapons left over since the times of the postwar underground, they say, are being created in some places. And a resident of Kedaynyay asks in response, "Just who will these volunteer partisans be fighting against? It may be, apparently, that they will shoot an alien army departing Lithuania in the back when the opportunity presents itself? But most likely they will be routing their fellow countrymen who do not like the 'new patriots.' Do not be tempted, my fellow countrymen!"

The Russians have a saying, after all, that nature abhors a vacuum. The rural reader who recalled it writes that NATO will come right away when the Russian Army leaves. The laziest, beginning James Bond would get the highest grades for his work in Lithuania—the operations of the Western intelligence services are that easy in the Baltics today. The compass on the NATO emblem in no way points equally to all four corners of the world, and the visits of NATO generals and admirals, generous promises of technical and personnel assistance and invitations to participate in NATO maneuvers are becoming more and more regular. Military collaboration? If only it were.

Major A. Kanauka of the U.S. Air Force, a veteran of the Vietnam War and an emigrant from Lithuania, recently gave a lecture to his NATO colleagues in which he tried to convince them to expand their political outlook: "If we fear the Russian bogeyman, if we think that we cannot do anything, that we should give way in everything, then nothing will be worth anything. If Yeltsin is going to rule Russia, if the democratic forces win the upper hand there, then it could become a peaceful nation. But if Yeltsin loses, then the whole world will be in danger... But we should not sit with our arms folded in any case."

There have been many tragic pages in the history of the small country. It was thus during the time of the Northern War, when Charles XII chased Peter and his ally the Polish king Augustus across Lithuania, then when Peter was chasing Charles. There remained the burial mounds called the "Swedes" by the people, along with the burned castles and cities... Recalling that, you come to the sole acceptable conclusion—the guns, despite theatrical laws, should stay on the wall. There are enough civilized examples in the rest of Europe—only let the gun not become the main argument in the domestic political struggle of social forces or a method of resolving geopolitical disputes.

And Meanwhile...

Lithuanian President A. Brazauskas, speaking at the inauguration ceremony held on Thursday, emphasized that "...Lithuania is not an enemy to anyone, it has no territorial claims toward any nation and is filled with a firm resolve to develop mutually advantageous economic and cultural relations with all." Addressing the citizens of the Lithuanian state, he declared, "All of you—without distinction of your nationality, gender, language, origins, social status, faith and political views—all of you are

equally respected and necessary for the motherland, since it is you who are Lithuania..."

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Kazakhstan: Numbers of AWOLs from Taldykorgan Oblast

93UM0425 Alma-Ata KARAVAN in Russian
18 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by KARAVAN correspondent N. Yagur from Taldykorgan: "National Security is Not Divided in Half"]

[Text] *From March 1 through November 1 of 1992, according to data from the military command, some 1,129 conscript enlisted men and non-commissioned officers who had been drafted from Taldykorgan Oblast had deserted their units and were "on the run."*

Dozens of them are being hidden at the homes of relatives or at home, but many who have grown tired of their martial labors are living under their parents' roof quite freely and do not intend to return to their place of service even after being summoned to the procuracy, police or military commissariat.

The parents of the soldiers, frightened by the non-regulation relations mingled with hazing and national enmities, themselves frequently prod their sons into desertion and protect them against liability, or else even openly impede their return to the units. Demands are being made not only that the children serve in Kazakhstan, but in their own oblasts—closer to home—as well.

And the military commissariats, taking the circumstances into account, frequently meet the insistent demands of the parents halfway. But there are also cases where the soldiers do not want to serve even under their mother's skirt. Private Andrey Ch., for example, was transferred from Otar to Taldykorgan to a unit stationed literally next to his house. It was no help. In September Andrey took to his heels and is still being sought.

Evasions of the draft are becoming mass in nature. About 200 conscripts evaded it in the spring of this year under various pretexts, but only one was condemned to a year and a half of confinement.

The parents are displaying literally miracles of inventiveness in order to save their progeny from service. Having heard that shepherds receive a deferment from the draft, 16 youths from Taldykorgan brought certificates to the commissariat that they were working as—yes, shepherds or their assistants. The certificates were on company forms with the signatures of supervisors and state seals affixed.

One out of three draftees simply ignores the draft notice. They have had to create special operations groups and run down the "declinees" so as to send them to the places to fulfill their soldier's duty. Matters are no better with the fall call-up.

Cases are not infrequent where embittered fugitives resort to grave crimes. Criminal proceedings were instituted recently for thefts, malicious hooliganism, assault and even murder against just six of them. Hundreds of officers, leaving behind their official duties, have spread out across the republic in search of the deserters.

Basic military training has been abolished in the schools along with military-patriotic indoctrination under the hue and cry of parliamentary investigations and hysterical wailing about the "militarization of the youth," while youth organizations have become addicted to

commerce and searches for "enemies of the youth" and mass forms of work with the conscript youth have been consigned to oblivion.

The military commissariats feel that if the Law "Universal Military Obligation and Military (Alternative) Service" is not adopted promptly, Kazakhstan is risking the loss of the army, and its own independence along with it. Some national patriots are inflaming anti-army sentiments by declaring some "occupation nature of the army," having in mind the predominance of Russians among the officer corps.

The security of the republic can scarcely exist separately for Kazakhs and for Russians. This is not a topic that should be subjected to testing for strength, the more so turned into the object of political profiteering.

ARMS TRADE

Advisability of, Procedures for Arms Sales

*PM1902150993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Feb 93 First Edition pp 1, 3*

["Commentary" by observer Yevgeniy Panov: "It Is Possible To Trade in Arms. And Necessary"]

[Text] An international exhibition and sale of arms opened in the United Arab Emirates 13 February. Russia is participating in it. Among our exhibits, not to mention "ordinary" things, there is the latest S-300V surface-to-air missile complex for combating ballistic missiles, which is considered the most modern in the world for this class of weapon, and the latest T-80U tank, which is analogous to the ubiquitous U.S. M-1 Abrams tank but surpasses it in terms of armament and quality of armor.

To all appearances, the period of arguments and doubts—whether or not to trade in weapons—is over. The choice has been made. Russia intends actively to seek new arms sales markets and to expand its presence in the traditional ones on condition that deliveries are paid for in hard currency. In the opinion of Vice Premier Georgiy Khizha, the struggle for these markets is certainly not hopeless for Russia. Everything is determined by quality and price. Modern Russian weapons are far better than Western ones on a whole number of points, and are also less costly. We are inferior to the West only in drive and the ability to trade.

Today's level of arms exports is far from what is desired, however. According to expert assessments, their reduction in the states of the former USSR has become wholesale—a drop of 55 percent at once in 1991 alone. Whereas in 1988 the USSR accounted for 42.5 percent of world deliveries, in 1991 it accounted for just 20 percent (sixth place in the world). According to preliminary assessments, in 1992 exports from Russia, where eight-tenths of the former Union's military-industrial potential is concentrated, were almost halved.

Meanwhile, in a desire to sell weapons outside the state order, Russia's defense enterprises are sounding out markets independently. According to Defense Ministry information, more than 200 modern fighters and bombers that are fit for sale have piled up at aviation plants, approximately 1,000 tanks at tank plants, and hundreds of tonnes of diverse arms and ammunition at all the rest. Therefore it is perfectly understandable that defense enterprises are insisting on expanding arms sales quotas to 40-50 percent, if their capacities are not accounted for by the state order.

It is also understandable that these specific exports must be comprehensively thought through, organized, and regulated. It is up to the state to decide who is to trade in precisely which weapons and how.

This is what is defined in the government's decree no. 80 of 28 January 1993 "On the Procedure for Licensing

Exports and Imports of Output (Work, Services) of a Military Purpose on the Territory of the Russian Federation," whose aim, as stated in the preamble, is to create a unified mechanism of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries.

This mechanism is based on a list of military-use output (work, services) which is exported and imported under license and on a statute on the licensing procedure.

The list includes 23 points—ranging from "tanks and other armored vehicles, with and without armament, and parts and fixtures for them" to "military uniform and accessories." Plus "work and services of a military purpose." Plus "technical standards documentation (design and operational)." Plus "other output," whose product range can only be guessed at.

Practically everything is allowed to be sold—apart, of course, from nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and toxic chemical agents. Helicopters and aircraft of various classes, takeoff devices, and simulators. Warships. Small arms. Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, rockets, and cartridges. Powder and explosives. Instruments and equipment—laser, radar, radionavigational, and control equipment. Communications equipment. Parachutes. Means of protection against toxic chemical agents.

The statute on the licensing procedure lays down that a license is issued to subjects of economic activity which have received permission from the Russian Government to export and import military-use output. A license cannot be transferred to other legal and physical persons. The procedure for drawing one up is determined by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. Export applications are coordinated with the Russian Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry and the Russian Ministry of Defense. In addition, exports of military-use property that has been released are made by additional agreement with the Russian State Committee for the Management of State Property.

In order to draw up an export license it is necessary to have: a government decision; an application; the original certificate of the ultimate user issued by an authorized organ of the recipient country; a signed or initialed export contract; the original permit, or a certified copy, allowing a foreign firm to conduct operations with military-use output issued by an authorized organ of the country in which this firm is registered.

The grounds for issuing an import license are a government decision, an application, and a signed or initialed contract.

In the case of both exports and imports a license is issued for one type of output regardless of how many types are included in the contract. If exports and imports of a single commodity subgroup are made on the basis of Russia's agreements with foreign countries, a general license can be issued. It is valid for one calendar year and permits operations under one or several deals. A one-off license is issued for a period of up to 12 months and

permits operations under individual deals. A license's period of validity can be extended by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations—in writing.

The license, or the reason for refusing it, are sent to the applicant no later than 25 days after the application is received at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. If the ministry requests additional information (which it has a right to do), the period is calculated from the time this is received and shall be no more than 15 days.

Licenses are registered. They can be annulled on the grounds of decisions of the Russian Government or the Interdepartmental Commission for Russia's Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries. A license can also be suspended if its holder violates the established procedure. A suspension can be appealed to the interdepartmental commission, whose decision is final.

Defense Export Chief on Russian Participation in Abu-Dabi Arms Fair

93UM0414A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Feb 93 p 1

[Interview with S. Karaoglanov, chairman, Russian State Foreign Economic Association for Military Products and Services, VO [All-Russian Association] Oboroneksport; by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Oleg Falichev: "Arms Exhibition in Abu-Dabi: A Test for Russian Suppliers"; date and place not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] An international exhibition of arms and military equipment is to be held on 14 through 18 February of this year in Abu-Dabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates. The Russian exposition will be one of the most impressive. In this regard, our correspondent put several questions to S. Karaoglanov, chairman, Russian State Foreign Economic Association for Export of Military Products and Services, VO Oboroneksport.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Sergey Aleksandrovich, it seems to me that this kind of active and fairly complete participation of Russian weapons and military equipment manufacturers at the exhibition, especially in the Emirates, is unprecedented.

[Karaoglanov] A distinguishing feature of the INDEKS-93 exhibition in Abu-Dabi compared to previous ones that have been held is the high degree of impressiveness with respect to both makeup of the participants on the one hand, and the amount and types of items to be shown on the other. Participating in the exhibition will be as many as 400 of the world's leading companies involved with the manufacture of arms and military equipment. It is expected that about 25 official delegations from various countries will attend by invitation of the Emirates' side. This is not to mention that the program includes demonstration firing, including night firing, thus making it possible to provide a graphic

illustration of the features associated with the weapons systems to be shown. Hence the serious preparation for the event.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But do we not have long-term interests, so to speak, in that geographic area?

[Karaoglanov] Considering the great possibilities associated with the area's countries relative to their purchasing of modern armaments, Russian defense industry enterprises and Oboroneksport are of course interested not only in the demonstration of modern weapons and military equipment, but also in establishing business contacts with potential purchasers of these items. In addition, the exhibition affords us a real opportunity of demonstrating the latest models of domestic weapons, including those that offer tactical and technical characteristics which are every bit the equals of foreign models and even excel over their foreign counterparts. This being the case, the exhibition may also be considered as advertising, the value of which in any goods trade cannot be overestimated.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Who is representing the Russian delegation, and which items will you take there?

[Karaoglanov] Making up the delegation will be chiefs of the leading defense enterprises and design bureaus of our country, representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations], Roskomoboronprom [Russian Committee of the Defense Industry], and, as exhibition organizers, personnel of Oboroneksport. Broadly represented in the exhibition will be models of weapons and military equipment intended for the Ground Troops and Navy. The VVS [Air Force] and PVO [air defense] will be somewhat less represented. (Plans call for holding an exhibition of aerospace equipment in Dubai in November of 1993.) Weapons systems will include the T-80 tank; the Msta self-propelled artillery piece; the S-300PMU-1 antiaircraft missile system; the Tor-M1 antiaircraft missile system; Tochka-U missile system; Shturm-S self-propelled anti-tank system; Smerch multiple rocket launcher system; and other examples of modern armament.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Sergey Aleksandrovich, it until recently has not been customary to speak of our country's involvement in sales of weapons. This included the ethical aspect. In this regard, I submit a question which may not be easy to answer: How ethical is an arms trade, and, in your view, how does that relate to our present politics?

[Karaoglanov] It is unethical to watch our own people go hungry and do nothing about it. Speaking of politics, the latter cannot be separated from a weapons trade. However, every state, taking into account the interests of international cooperation, should at the same time have its own state interests and its own state politics. It should defend them and make them a reality.

I would ascribe dominance of ideological considerations over the commercial to the most serious shortcomings of the weapons trade as previously practiced. I stress the ideological over the political. Generally speaking, the export of weapons will never cease to be an instrument of foreign policy. Also, Russia's present policy in the area of weapons exports is based on strict observance of the interests of the world community. Governmental decisions relative to deliveries to a particular country are made with consideration of excluding the possibility of violating the stability in the particular geographic area. But the fact that for various reasons we have lost our traditional sales markets is a mistake, to put a label on it. It will not be easy to reestablish our priorities relative to those markets.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Can you say something about how profitable it is for our country to engage in the arms trade? I do know that this is a touchy subject, but the times are changing.

[Karaoglanov] We obviously must speak about the effectiveness of foreign exchange revenue resulting from weapons sales. Thus, in 1992 the effectiveness increased by a factor of 4 or 5. What is meant here? Last year's foreign exchange revenue were at the same level as in 1991. And this with a drop in volume of weapons deliveries by a factor of 3 or 4. Why? We lost partners such as Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The world weapons market always offered stiff competition. How is it now?

[Karaoglanov] The world weapons market is virtually entirely spread among the traditional producing countries, while the distribution of forces remains about the same. As far as our country is concerned, starting in 1990 we suffered an abrupt decrease - by a factor of 3 or 4 - in volume of arms and military equipment deliveries. The causes here are objective, of both an internal and external nature. I will not dwell on them. Interesting in this regard is the case of American arms exports. The weakening of Russia's positions in the international weapons market and coordinated efforts of American governmental and business circles have resulted in a situation whereby the USA in the last two years has increased its overseas sales of weapons by a factor greater than 2, with its present share amounting to more than half the weapons trade (25 percent in 1989). These conditions necessitate conducting a more active search for new markets and for more flexible and nontraditional methods of attracting customers. We at the same time are continuing to cooperate with our traditional partners: India, Syria, China.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Now for the last question. In past years we supplied our third-world ideological partners with mountains of weapons on credit. The money for those weapons was pulled out of the pockets of the Russian peasant, figuratively speaking. What about repayment of the debts? Can we entertain any hopes of this?

[Karaoglanov] The state credit system of weapons trade is employed by many countries, and it possesses many advantages from the standpoint of political priorities. Analysis of the dynamics of Russian arms deliveries made to foreign countries in the last 10 years indicates that the largest amounts were associated with the middle of the 1980s. Preferential and state credit deliveries commenced to decline starting with 1987 and have been virtually nonexistent since 1990.

Alas! It is difficult to speak of complete repayment of credits previously made available to friendly foreign partners. Many of them cite internal financial difficulties and pressure exerted by international banking organizations. Thus, we were unable to collect from Iran a sum on the order of 400 million U.S. dollars for weapons deliveries we made to that country in 1991. Since Russia had taken on the obligation of paying off the foreign debt contracted by the former USSR, that amount of money was used to settle a debt we owed Iran for deliveries of natural gas and other products it had made to Azerbaijan in previous years.

Nonetheless, the majority of our partners value their reputation and are making payments in accordance with the terms of the credit arrangements. Some of the debt is being repaid in the form of raw materials and consumer goods.

Russian Successes at Abu-Dabi Arms Exhibition
93UM0414B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondents Vladimir Kosaryev, Yuriy Mamchur, and Aleksandr Ivanov: "Abu-Dabi: Exhibition Over, Work Continues"]

[Text] The INDEKS-93 International Arms and Military Equipment Exhibition, which was held in the United Arab Emirates capital of Abu-Dabi, came to a close on 18 February. The last day was a "Russian day" in the true sense of the term. All the newspapers and bulletins received by the Press Center are enthusiastic in their praise of the firing results achieved by our weapons systems: the Tochka-U missile system; Smerch multiple rocket launcher; Shturm-S antitank missile system; T-80 tank; Msta-S self-propelled howitzer; and others.

The real "star of the show," in the opinion of foreign journalists, was the S-300PMU-1 antiaircraft missile system, which is in the inventory of PVO [Air Defense] Troops. Our crews destroyed two aerial targets with the first missiles they launched. Specialists from various countries were very favorably impressed with the system's performance and the professional training exhibited by the Russian rocketeers, who were led here by Colonel General Sergey Sapegin.

Incidentally, many headlines in the local newspapers and magazines were similar in their proclamations: "Russian 'Patriot' Star of the Show"; "Russian Version of 'Patriot'";

Displayed at Exhibition." It cannot be said that we do not take offense at that, but it is necessary to let it go. The Americans advertise their equipment so powerfully and ceaselessly that the names of the items enter into common usage, as we can see. The results of the demonstration firings raise hopes that, in time, the Western counterparts of our systems will be referred to as merely "versions" of the Russian S-300.

Now once more about our marketing and advertising. What was demonstrated in Abu-Dabi was the S-300PMU-1, not the S-300B. Well, just let that pass, this difficulty in keeping a name straight. Numerous visitors to the exhibition cannot understand which system this item constitutes. The pages of newspapers are replete with confusion. We stress here that we are speaking of the system known as the "PMU."

Visiting the Russian pavilion during the five days of the exhibition—with many coming a number of times—were high-level delegations from virtually all the Persian Gulf countries and from leading weapons-producing states. Eliciting most interest were our artillery systems, PVO systems, close-combat systems, engineer equipment, ammunition, and, of course, small arms.

Representatives of numerous foreign firms were very active relative to the Russian component. They have offered various kinds of cooperation and joint efforts. Specialists from a number of countries have declared their intention to submit proposals to their superiors for drawing up contracts for the procurement of certain kinds of arms. Inquiries are being made relative to purchasing lots of various items from us. However, as VO [All-Russian] Oboroneksport Chairman S. Karaoglanov stated in a discussion with our correspondent, they intend to purchase the equipment if an actual need develops, if purchase is economically feasible, and if the latter is advantageous politically. These three conditions are mandatory.

The exhibition has come to an end, but it is still too early to arrive at any conclusions. There is a large amount of information that must be analyzed, compared, and thought about. However, in our opinion, there is no doubt that the exhibition has served on the one hand to further our relations in the military area with the United Arab Emirates, which offered their guests a very warm welcome, and with other states on the other.

On the last day of the exhibition, Russian Federation Minister of Defense Army General Pavel Grachev met in the Russian Embassy with the heads of departments and defense enterprises who had participated in the event. He pointed out that our exhibition had elicited a great deal of interest on the part of representatives from many countries. Addressing his remarks to the scientists, designers, and production specialists, Pavel Grachev stressed that, in spite of the economic difficulties presently besetting Russia, we must regardless of circumstances retain the country's defense complex.

SECURITY SERVICES

Security Policy Concept Analyzed

934K0273D Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian,
2 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by Peeter Vares and Mare Haab: "What Kind of a Security Policy Concept Does Estonia Need?"]

[Text] In the Estonian media, there has been a lot of talk recently about state security, possible allies and dangers, and problems of defense forces. Thanks to the growing awareness of the public, the traditionally prevailing position that ensuring Estonia's security is mainly up to its own armed forces, has gradually been replaced with the understanding that the state's security problems are a lot more complex and complicated. Touching on this topic below are history doctor PEETER VARES and historian MARE HAAB, who specialize in the field of foreign and security policy, and who offer their view of the concept for Estonia's security policy.

Quote from history

"Personally, I prefer fifty thousand rifles to five million votes." *Benito Mussolini, 1920*

...What do Estonian politicians prefer?

The first thoughts regarding Estonia's security policy were expressed about a year and a half before the actual return to independence, in connection with taking the first serious steps in international relations. Help and protection was expected from the international community in general, even though the long-awaited white ship [of independence] had not yet landed. For the future of our security, we looked to the past.

Maybe neutrality?

During the period preceeding independence neutrality was viewed as a possible basis for a security policy by our party-oriented organizations (Heritage Society, People's Front, Estonia's Democratic Labor Union), primarily in a political context: Declaring a policy of neutrality and non-alliance has become a typical behavior pattern of the newly-formed states in the 20th century. In later discussions, however, this option was ruled out by recalling the sad experience of the neutral Republic of Estonia in the late thirties, and also by the increasing doubts of other neutral states of Europe about the basis of their security policy during the period following the cold war. Along with independent statehood came changes in the thinking of how to provide security, as some of the more immediate goals became more specific. The removal of Russian troops from Estonia, and a speedy formation of our own security forces became the necessary ingredients for guaranteeing state security.

Even more secure with NATO...

Half a century of occupation in Estonia and a shaky political and economic situation in the entire former

Soviet Union, along with deeply rooted prejudices regarding Russia, were the principal factors that lead our politicians to seek protection from the West. The continued presence of foreign forces in Estonia precipitated the need to call the attention of the international community to the fact that, in the case of Estonia, we are not dealing with a state "splitting-off" from the Soviet Union, but a small, sovereign state making a decidedly Western turn. The initial, idealistic image of a wide range of options for ensuring our security soon evaporated. Evaluating the actual state of affairs in Estonia, the politicians realized the need to get support for our state security from some of our closer neighbors, who had supported us in our quest for independence. These were the Nordic countries and other states along the Baltic seaboard and, above all, international organizations: The European Community, the Western European Alliance, CSCE and NATO.

The choice in favor of NATO seemed so obvious to the leading politicians of Estonia that they saw no need to discuss it with the people. Judging by the Estonia visits made by the leading NATO politicians, their participation at conferences dealing with the security of the Baltic states, and the visit of their naval vessels in the Summer of 1992, the interest seems to be mutual. However, the expectations of the two sides are somewhat different: On one side a hopeful wish to become a member of the Atlantic Alliance as soon as possible, and on the other—a reserved stance and a wish to limit its involvement, for the time being, to "offering political support in a situation of danger." Such a significant and basic difference in their respective positions, however, causes some misunderstanding and confusion among our people, who are left wondering why we only see NATO as a life preserver.

A Baltic Security Alliance?

A rapid succession of Estonian politicians holding leadership positions over a relatively short period have talked about cooperation among the Baltic states in matters of security, with different degrees of enthusiasm, and either have, or have not acted accordingly. The absence of Baltic cooperation, in all three states, has been attributed either to historical, ethnic or linguistic differences between them, or to similarities in their economies, which make them compete with each other. The result is a "non-united Baltic bloc of states"—a nominal, intrinsically non-viable entity, without any regional security guarantees.

Coordination in security matters has stayed at the level of the resolution passed on October 5, 1991 by the Baltic Council. However, Estonia's current government has formally declared coordination between the Baltic states to be one of its basic aims, at least for our foreign policy. (That was also declared at the meeting of Estonia's foreign ambassadors held from January 16 to 17 at our foreign ministry in Tallinn). Despite the historically ingrained prejudices, the importance of a regional security policy for the Baltic states should not be underestimated. This will give the weak states in their early stages

of development an opportunity to protect their statehood with security activity based on a coordinated set of basic principles. That much more so since, after the end of the cold war, opportunities for regional political activity have been more in demand and more effectively relied on. We can only hope that the resolution to form, as an adjunct to the Baltic Council, a committee between the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for the coordination of a joint defense policy, as it was passed at the meeting of the defense ministers of the three Baltic states on January 27 in Riga, will also materialize in practice.

150,000 rifles...

This was the number of weapons the Estonian army had immediately before the occupation, plus heavy weaponry such as airplanes, artillery and mortars. The vision of defense forces to be formed, as seen by our new military elite, is obviously much more extensive, and problems dealing with weaponry are actively being solved. Given that for a background, it is still hard to believe that Estonian politicians, in shoring up the power of the state, would rely more on weapons than they would on the votes of people, as was the case with Mussolini in his day. It should be clear to everyone that, with a state budget stretched to the limit, the support of people and their confidence in the central power contribute more to security than any arsenal of weapons, although having the latter may also be important.

Let's thumb through the security primer. **Looking at the state as a unit, its security consists of the following five basic aspects: Military, political, economic, social and environmental security.** The first of these deals with the effectiveness of defense forces, the second with the stability of legitimate institutions, the third is linked to resources, finances and the market supporting the state, the fourth deals with social security and conditions to guarantee the preservation of national identity, and the fifth with the whole biosphere or, taken more narrowly, the preservation of the specific living environment. Obviously, these five aspects do not function separately from each other, as they should also form a whole for Estonia.

Does Estonia need a security concept?

Considering the discussion reflected in the media about the concept of Estonia's foreign policy, it is quite logical to pose such a question also about Estonia's security policy. It may be quite sufficient for us to follow the principle of "flexible reaction" in our security policy. In the case of foreign policy, this has already been suggested, and the direction in which to "flex" and the line to follow in each particular case could be determined by the politicians currently in power. This, however, raises the question of how such a platform would be perceived by the international community, and by the citizens of our own state, and how that would affect Estonia's

image. It becomes obvious that Estonia, as a small state, cannot afford the luxury of remaining without a security concept.

Approaching Estonia's security concept What makes the state of Estonia weak? General factors:

1. The geopolitical location of the state—between several large and small states having different (not fully determined) paths of orientation.
2. Limited natural resources.
3. Low growth rate of the native population.
4. Political restrictions due to historically inevitable factors.
5. Peculiarities of the native population: Tendency to avoid contact, perpetual differences (sense of unity in crisis situations only), innate conservatism; elementary level of military traditions.

Additional dangers to state security

1. The continued presence of Russian troops in Estonia.
2. The elementary level of national defense forces (shortage of specialists and technology), a general deprecatory attitude toward military service because of negative experiences in the Soviet army.
3. Estonia's location in the Russian sphere of influence. Russia's attempts at subjugating Estonia to its influence ("Estonification" à la "Finlandization"); differences with Russia on border issues.
4. A flauntingly persistent Western orientation that could precipitate activity by Russian intelligence organs in Estonia, making Estonia the playground for special services between the West and the East.
5. Absence of a foreign and security policy concept.
6. Instability of Estonia's internal policy: Ethnic conflicts (significant anti-Estonian (statehood) attitudes among ethnic minorities, social conflicts (primarily due to growing unemployment).
7. Low level of the economy.
8. Brain drain.
9. An unreformed educational system.
10. An internationally poor human rights image.
11. Danger of becoming a transit country for the trade of narcotics, weapons and refugees.
12. General pollution level of the environment.
13. Possible disasters at the Paldiski, Sosnovy Bori or Ignalina nuclear reactors.

Thus, it is quite clear that Estonia's general weakness factors, and the additional hazards cited, place great demands on ensuring the security of the state.

What gives Estonia hope for becoming stronger?

1. Creating a state of justice.
2. Gradually regaining control over the state's territory.
3. Getting involved in international relations, developing a diplomatic network, ever-closer cooperation with international organizations, and participating in international agreements.
4. Activating a market economy, following economic priorities in domestic and foreign policies.

5. Forming national defense forces, formulating a defense concept.
6. Foreign loans and other assistance.
7. The growing number of youth obtaining world-level education.

How to ensure the state's security?

Acknowledging the fact that Estonia will, even into the future, remain a militarily weak small state, one realizes that security problems can, to a significant measure, be solved by becoming part of global, regional or sub-regional security systems. Considering the experience of other small states of Europe we, too, should reach the point where all national political forces in the parliament would approve of the state's security priorities and principles. In international relations, it is customary in these cases to proceed from certain principles.

1. To consider what would be the consequences of a decision made, both to the state itself, and also to the international community in the long run.
2. To avoid putting the state in a serious position of risk from which there is no escape without compromising its image.
3. To recognize that the state's defense forces are not the only means of ensuring a security policy: The threat to the state's security can also be reduced successfully by well deliberated political, diplomatic, economic and social measures.
4. Not to allow any allies, however large or small, to make decisions for us.

At the same time, it would be erroneous to think that becoming part of some international security system or structure would automatically, or with finality, solve our security problems. Such a step would have to be accompanied by daily flexible diplomacy to monitor the political compass at all times and adjust the course accordingly.

A "theoretical" security concept (one of many)

The Republic of Estonia is a small, unallied state with a Western orientation. The state's security priorities overlap with the basic aims of our foreign policy:

1. Estonia relies on the respective experience of the Nordic states. Being integrated into the Nordic-Baltic region would constitute a significant security guarantee for the state.
2. Estonia's active participation in the Baltic Council would offer additional support to its security in the form of its member states.
3. Implementation of the New Hanseatic league idea would secure Estonia not only the possible protection of Germany but also a lowering of tensions in our contacts with Russia.
4. Good-neighborly relations with Russia would be one of the basic guarantees for Estonia's security.
5. Integration of the three Baltic states would contribute to ensuring security not only in that particular region, but in the whole of Eastern Europe.

6. Our future membership in Europe's security institutions would provide international guarantees not only to Estonia's security because, within the framework of CSCE, Estonia would be capable of filling part of the overall security vacuum that followed the changes in Central and Eastern Europe.
7. In the more distant future (next century) Estonia could join the European community and its security structures.
8. Estonia will not aspire to NATO membership. Contacts with NATO will be maintained through its program of activities aimed at Eastern Europe, viewing the Atlantic Alliance as an example of successful military cooperation. After all, it did succeed in uniting states that used to be at war with each other. Patterned on the NATO experience, Estonia would like to promote closer cooperation for security between the Baltic states.
9. The United States of America constitute a base of moral support to Estonia's security.
10. Estonia's defense forces secure the inviolability of our borders, and the integrity of our territory.

The Republic of Estonia will make the international community aware of the priorities of its security policy and other principles.

Some prerequisites for a successful security policy

1. The State Assembly of the republic should pass the legislative acts regarding Estonia's security policy, which should include the concept for our security policy.

2. The Republic of Estonia should support the creation of any nuclear-free zone in Europe.
3. Estonia's security policy should be based on the principle of devising measures for promoting mutual trust.
4. Public disclosure of principles for non-violent resistance (also for Latvia and Lithuania).
5. The government of the republic should not allow citizens of the state to be in the military service of some other state.
6. After the defense forces are formed and a defense concept adopted, only a civilian could become Estonia's minister of defense.
7. The defense forces of the republic should not be used for solving internal conflicts.
8. Estonia's armed forces should participate in UN peace missions.
9. The government of the republic should support conversion in Estonia.
10. Estonia's diplomats and specialists should participate in international conferences for disarmament and environmental protection and initiate proposals for holding them in Estonia.
11. The Republic of Estonia should support conducting strategic research within the republic, including research on Estonia's security policy between the years of 1918 and 1940.
12. Estonian-language terms for security concepts should be established for use in Estonia.


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