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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

DENY FLIGHT AND DELIBERATE FORCE: AN EFFECTIVE USE OF AIRPOWER?
by MAJ Kurt F. Miller, U.S. Army, 113 pages.

In October 1992 the governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states agreed to assist the United Nations (UN) in monitoring a ban on all military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO's involvement in Bosnia expanded over the next three years both in the range of missions performed and the political objectives behind those missions. This thesis examines how NATO air operations were planned, coordinated, and conducted and what effects these operations achieved.

NATO's involvement can be grouped into four phases: (1) Passive monitoring of Bosnian airspace during Operation SKY MONITOR, October 1992 until April 1993; (2) Active patrolling of Bosnian airspace under Operation DENY FLIGHT, April 1993 until June 1993; (3) Continuation of DENY FLIGHT with the addition of NATO airstrikes in support of UNPROFOR, June 1993 to July 1995; (4) Limited air offensive against the Bosnian-Serbs executed as Operation DELIBERATE FORCE in August and September of 1995.

Using the criteria of the tenets of aerospace power and accomplishment of the stated mission, the thesis concludes that Operation DENY FLIGHT was not an effective use of airpower. While it did accomplish its stated mission, it failed to employ airpower in a concentrated and decisive manner. DELIBERATE FORCE was an effective use of airpower, accomplishing its stated mission and employing NATO air assets across the full range of capabilities in a concentrated fashion to achieve decisive results.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

General Thesis Statement

In October 1992 the governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states agreed to assist the United Nations (UN) in implementing Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 781. UNSCR 781 established a ban on all military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina and it gave the UN peacekeeping force stationed there, UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the responsibility for monitoring this "no-fly" zone. As with many UNSCRs, brave words and noble intent did not match the UN's capabilities. UNPROFOR had no aircraft or ground-based radars able to monitor Bosnian airspace.

NATO could fill this void because of the following passage from UNSCR 781:

[The Security Council] Decides to establish a ban on all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina....Requests UNPROFOR to monitor compliance with the ban on military flights....Calls upon States to take nationally or through *regional agencies or arrangements* all measures necessary to provide assistance to UNPROFOR.... (italics mine)

NATO was just such a regional agency. For the first time, NATO agreed to employ aircraft in support of an ongoing UN peacekeeping mission. From its beginnings as Operation SKY MONITOR, a passive search of Bosnian through Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, a brief, aggressively executed air campaign, NATO air operations evolved and developed a unique command and control system. This system was both internal to NATO and in coordination with the UN.

This thesis examines how NATO air operations were planned, coordinated, and conducted and what effects they achieved. A critical part of this inquiry is a thorough examination of the air command and control arrangements developed to link NATO capabilities with UN mandates and

its peacekeeping force. Some of the questions answered include: How effective were these operations in supporting UNPROFOR? What effects did they have on the overall situation in Bosnia? Were they a deterrent on Bosnian Serb aggression? Did they contribute to the eventual resolution of the conflict in Bosnia?

Historical Background

To have a difficult history makes, perhaps, a people who are bound to be difficult in any conditions.¹

Dame Rebecca West, Black Lamb, Grey Falcon

The Balkans have a history of war and turmoil stretching back over a thousand years. The most recent conflict began June 25, 1991, following Slovenia and Croatia's secession from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's three ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats, and Muslims) are related to ancient Slavic peoples who were forced westwards from their ancestral homes in Russia and Poland by barbarian Avars in the sixth century A.D. These Slavs settled in the Balkans and became known as the Southern Slavs.

The region that is now Serbia was then under the control of the Byzantine Empire, the eastern remnant of the Roman Empire. The Serbs adopted Eastern-Orthodox Christianity, the dominant religion in the Byzantine Empire. Early on they established strong ties with the nations and peoples of eastern and southeastern Europe. These ethnic and religious ties extended to Russia, another Eastern-Orthodox Slavic nation, especially after the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1492. The first Serbian kingdom in the region was founded in 1186, but for much of their history they were under the domination of the Ottoman Turks.

The region that is now Croatia fell within the bounds of the Western Roman Empire. This is an area where Roman Catholicism was strong. The Croats became a predominantly Roman Catholic people with close ties to the Germanic states and Hungary. The first Croatian kingdom was founded in 910. However, Croatia was under Austro-Hungarian rule for much of its history.

The Muslims are Slavs located mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia was once an independent kingdom like Croatia and Serbia, but fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1463. Unlike Yugoslavia's other regions, the presence of a heretical sect weakened the influence of Christianity on the Bosnia people. As a result many Bosnians converted to Islam during the Turks' 400-year occupation of the region.²

Until World War I a united Southern Slav state did not exist. While the region's inhabitants shared a common ethnic heritage and language, the long years of separate history and their different religions made the creation of such a state nearly impossible. It was not until the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was established on December 1, 1918, that the separate provinces of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia were finally united. In 1929 this kingdom was renamed Yugoslavia. However, a new name did not create national unity. It was only through an increasingly autocratic government that the struggling kingdom was held together. But external forces intervened before the growing internal frictions could rip the country apart. Despite Yugoslavia's efforts to remain neutral during World War Two, Nazi Germany invaded and conquered the country in April 1941.

Resistance to the Germans sprang up immediately. Josip Broz, known as Marshal Tito, led the ethnic Serbian fighters. Tito was an ardent communist of Croat-Slovene extraction. His troops were known as Partisans. A separate resistance group, loyal to the exiled King of Yugoslavia, was formed under Draza Mihailovich. This group was known as the Chetniks. Assisting the Germans was the Ustashe, the secret police of the Nazi-created Independent State of Croatia. The Ustashe were responsible for widespread atrocities against Serbs and Muslims. This further exacerbated existing ethnic hatreds. The Partisans, Chetniks, and Ustashe all battled each other in a fierce three-way conflict. These three groups also attacked Bosnian Muslims. The Muslims responded by forming self-defense units, with some even joining the 13th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division under direct Nazi control.

At war's end, Tito consolidated his hold on the country and executed up to 250,000 Ustashe, Chetniks and other elements opposed to his rule.³ He established a communist state, but soon fell out of favor with Stalin in 1947. Yugoslavia remained outside of the Soviet Bloc until its disintegration in 1991. Using draconian measures, Tito attempted to mold the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims into a single nation. He redrew provincial boundary lines within Yugoslavia and split up the Serb majority in the country. Tito did this to prevent Serb domination of the internal political arena.⁴ But Tito's communist regime did little to resolve underlying ethnic tensions. When he died on May 4, 1980, the fabric of governmental institutions that had held the country together for more than 30 years began to unravel.

The fall of the Soviet Union and the demise of European communism resulted in the dissolution of the Yugoslavian Communist Party, possibly the last link holding the country together. Political demagoguery, propaganda and rapidly worsening economic conditions inflamed ethnic passions. Attempting to gain control of the federal government, the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, resisted any move to weaken the central government. He used every opportunity to advance his idea of a 'Greater Serbia', a state which would include any area where Serbs lived or were buried.⁵ Given Milosevic's machinations, a collapsing economy and continuous ethnic hatreds, all attempts to hold the separate republics within a Yugoslavian confederation were doomed to failure. When Slovenia and Croatia seceded on June 25, 1991 it proved to be the spark that ignited the powder keg.⁶

To summarize the ensuing events, Slovenia quickly secured its independence. This was due to two reasons. First, the Slovenes resisted the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija - JNA) vigorously. Second, and perhaps more important, Serbs were not present in large numbers within Slovenia and Serbia had no historic claims to Slovenian lands. Therefore, the Serb leadership decided to concentrate their efforts in Croatia and Bosnia with their large Serb populations.

With peace in Slovenia in July 1991, Croatia became the next battleground. After bitter fighting and the loss of some 30 percent of its territory to ethnic Serbs, the Croats secured their independence in January 1992. President Milosevic then allowed the peaceful secession of the Republic of Macedonia, again an area with few ethnic Serbs. He then engineered the inclusion of Montenegro as part of the new, Serb-dominated Republic of Yugoslavia. So, by March 1992 only the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was left with its future undecided.

Located in the center of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina contained large populations of all three major ethnic groups: Muslims--44 percent, Serbs--31 percent and Croats--17 percent, out of a population of 4.6 million.⁷ A three-sided war erupted in March 1992 when a referendum for independence from Yugoslavia was passed. Seeking to extend and link their territories, the Serbs began a campaign to capture large sections of Bosnia and to "cleanse" them of non-Serbian populations. This involved the wholesale murder, rape, and forced relocation of Muslims and Croats. Bosnian Croats attempted to do much the same in areas they sought to hold. These ethnic cleansing campaigns led to some of the war's worst atrocities. The United Nations extended the mandate of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) located in Croatia and attempted to stop the fighting and restore peace.

During 1992 and 1993 the European Union (EU) had the lead in attempting to find a peaceful settlement for the conflict. The EU's efforts failed for a variety of reasons: lack of political will on the part of the EU countries, strength of the Bosnian Serb position, and lack of interest by the United States. The EU's inability to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina put increasing pressure on the United States to intervene. The Bush Administration successfully portrayed the issue as a "European problem".⁸ Elected on pledges to concentrate on domestic affairs, the new Clinton Administration kept the whole Bosnian issue at arms length. US foreign policy during 1993-94 was marked by:

...hesitation, uncertainty and caution. Retreats from announced positions on Somalia, China, Haiti, the UN and Bosnia all seemed to suggest that foreign affairs were not much of a US priority at all.⁹

In the fall of 1992 the Clinton Administration decided to work within the framework of NATO to assist the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The US would be able to act within a European framework along with the United Kingdom and France. And this strategy allowed for a sharing of risks by all NATO member states. It also presented a strong political front to the parties in Bosnia. Although the Bosnian Serbs were generally acknowledged to be the aggressors in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the use of overwhelming force against them was out of the question. Because of its close ties with Serbs and their fear of NATO dominating European affairs, Russia would not allow it. Acting within UN mandates and resolutions was the only way for NATO to maintain a posture of neutrality and still be able to effectively use its military power. These considerations led NATO to provide its air assets in support of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1992.

Scope and Delimitations

An in-depth description of the most recent years of war, ethnic cleansing and atrocities in Yugoslavia is outside the scope of this thesis. The paper examines only Operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE. The period was limited to October 9, 1992 until December 14, 1995, when UNSCR 1031 ended UNPROFOR's mandate and initiated the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). How did the NATO air command and control structure employ its air assets in support of UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina? How did the NATO command and control system interact with UNPROFOR? How did it conduct planning and actual operations? Finally, what effects did DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE achieve? The goal was to examine the effectiveness of these operations within the context of the political and diplomatic situation in which they were conducted.

Importance

The investigator attempted to review any lessons learned about the effectiveness of the command and control, planning, and conduct of air operations in support of multinational peace

operations. Since the UN does not have its own air force, any use of airpower by the UN in the future will involve some sort of ad hoc command and control structure between the UN and the nations that own the air assets. The current global political environment suggests that unilateral military action is on the decline. Nations will most likely work as part of long-standing or ad-hoc coalitions. As the world's last remaining superpower, the United States will almost certainly be involved in similar operations of this type in the future.

Research Questions

The primary question for this thesis is: How effective were NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE conducted in support of UNPROFOR? The subordinate questions are:

1. What was the air command and control structure developed for NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE?
2. How did the NATO air command and control structure developed for DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE interface with the existing UN and NATO command structures?
3. How did the NATO air command and control structure function on a day-to-day basis?
4. What were the physical and political effects of NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE?
5. What elements within the NATO air command and control structure developed for operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE could be modified in order to achieve greater effectiveness?

Assumptions

1. The current global political environment suggests that unilateral military action is on the decline. Nations working as part of a long-standing or ad hoc coalition will be employed to enforce UN mandates.

2. Since the UN does not have its own air force, any future UN use of airpower will involve some sort of ad hoc command and control structure and interface between the UN and the owning nations.

3. The United States will continue to actively participate in NATO and in the UN.

4. The United States will continue to support international peace operations either alone or with the UN.

5. NATO will continue to play an active part in peace operations not only in Europe but in other regions as well.

Definitions

Several terms require definition.

Airpower. The ability to use a platform operating in or passing through the aerospace environment for military purposes.¹⁰

Air Operations Center. The principal air operations installation from which aircraft and air warning functions of combat air operations are directed, controlled, and executed. It is the senior agency of the Air Force Component Commander from which command and control of air operations are coordinated with other components and Services. Also called AOC.¹¹ The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) used during NATO operations in support of UNPROFOR is an AOC that is multi-national, containing personnel from several nations and commanding military forces from those nations.

Airspace Control. A process used to increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. Airspace control is provided in order to prevent fratricide, enhance air defense operations, and permit greater flexibility of operations. Airspace control does

not infringe on the authority vested in commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations.¹²

Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2.¹³

Operational Command. The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy unit, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May be also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.¹⁴

Operational Control. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.¹⁵

Peace Operations. A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.¹⁶

Tactical Command. The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.¹⁷

Tactical Control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command.¹⁸

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The primary question of this thesis is: How effective were NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE conducted in support of UNPROFOR? The subordinate questions are:

1. What was the air command and control structure developed for NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE?
2. How did the NATO air command and control structure developed for DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE interface with the existing UN and NATO command structures?
3. How did the NATO air command and control structure function on a day-to-day basis?
4. What were the physical and political effects of NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE?
5. What elements within the NATO air command and control structure developed for operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE could be modified in order to achieve greater effectiveness?

Background Works

The following published works were important in establishing the historical context for the conflict in Bosnia, as well as in documenting current political events and considerations.

Noel Malcolm's Bosnia: A Short History is a thorough account of Bosnia-Herzegovina's interesting and troubled history. His history ends in 1993, but it was still useful for providing a

historical backdrop and providing background information on the personalities involved. For example, the investigator learned that Alia Izetbegovic, the current president of Bosnia, is a lawyer who served five years in jail (1983-88) for hostile and counterrevolutionary acts derived from Muslim nationalism. This information underscored the long-term, continuing nature of the conflict. Izetbegovic's imprisonment is a clear indicator that ethnic and religious tensions continued even under Yugoslavia's communist government.

The Access Issue Packet on Bosnia-Herzegovina is a short, concise grouping of essays and reference material concerning the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It includes a thorough timeline of events and a complete listing of UNSCRs, and Internet addresses to assist in further research.

Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse by Christopher Bennett, provides an overview of the history of the whole of Yugoslavia and traces events up until March 1994.

Balkan Tragedy by Susan L. Woodward, traces Yugoslavia's decline and dissolution from the death of Tito until the middle of 1995. It is a thorough, well-researched volume produced by the Brookings Institute.

Although written in the years prior to World War II, Dame Rebecca West's classic volume on the history and people of Yugoslavia, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, contains interesting insights and observations about the whole Balkan region.

NATO/UN Command and Control Sources

The following sources described the existing command and control structure for NATO and for UNPROFOR.

As a starting place in developing the NATO organizational structure the investigator selected NATO and The United States: The Enduring Alliance. It contains a concise history of NATO and some of the challenges it has faced over the years. It ends by addressing the challenges ahead, including NATO intervention in Yugoslavia.

The primary source for the UN organizational structure was The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, second edition, prepared by the United Nations Department of Publication. Published in 1990, this work is an interesting history with case studies of UN peacekeeping operations. It includes substantial information on the command and operational structure for such operations. FM 100-23 also has an up-to-date chapter on the UN in peacekeeping operations.

To supplement and broaden these works the investigator turned to several other sources. The Internet was a great help. The initial search located three important Web sites: The UN Home Page, the UNPROFOR Home Page, and the NATO Home Page. These sites, along with related linked sites, were invaluable.

The UN home page (www.un.org) is full of valuable information. It has an extensive search engine for all UN documents submitted. Additionally, all UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) are available on-line making it very easy to locate, read and use the important UNSCRs on this thesis area. The investigator also gleaned administrative structure and control information on the UN from this home page.

UNPROFOR has a home page (www.unprofor_un.html) which chronicles events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This home page is linked to the UNSCRs and related documents. However, this site was last updated in November 1994, leaving 1995 developments undocumented.

The NATO Home Page (www.nato.int) contains the latest version of the NATO Handbook. It has chronologies of events, the biographies of key NATO officials and other items of interest.

Outcomes and Operational Effectiveness

In order to determine the effectiveness of NATO air operations in Bosnia, the investigator used a wide range of published and unpublished works.

The Department of Defense Joint Staff commissioned the Institute for Defense Analyses to produce a study on air operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This study, "Lessons and Implications From U.S. Air Operations in the Former Yugoslavia 1992-1995" provided a wealth of information.

The investigator received a large packet of slides and briefing materials on NATO air operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina from Lieutenant-Colonel George Knutzon. His last assignment was on the NATO Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH) staff. This material was a key on-the-spot source on NATO air operations during DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE.

The Institute for Strategic Studies publishes many important reference works every year. Two of these were important sources. First is The Military Balance. This book provides an accurate assessment and explanation of the military forces of every country. It has insights on the political and economic factors behind a given nation's military power. The second work is the Strategic Survey. The Survey takes the political, diplomatic, and military events of the previous year and puts them in a regional context. This linkage of military actions and political results was especially useful in determining possible cause and effect relationships resulting from NATO air operations in Bosnia.

The researcher used United States Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 for several important definitions. AFM 1-1 also provided the Tenets of Aerospace Power which were used as an evaluative criteria in chapter five.

Summary

An adequate number of sources were available for use in the preparation of this thesis. Taken as a whole they provided a sufficient range and depth of information to answer the thesis question.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

In order to answer the question, how effective were NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE conducted in support of UNPROFOR, the investigator posed five subordinate questions:

1. What was the air command and control structure developed for NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE?
2. How did the NATO air command and control structure developed for DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE interface with the existing UN and NATO command structures?
3. How did the NATO air command and control structure function on a day-to-day basis?
4. What were the physical and political effects of NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE?
5. What elements within the NATO air command and control structure developed for operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE could be modified in order to achieve greater effectiveness?

The investigator then developed criteria which were applied to the data collected.

Subordinate Questions and Criteria used to Assess Data Collected

1. What was the air command and control structure developed for NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE?

Criteria:

- 1.1. What was the existing UN command structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

1.2. What was the existing NATO command structure, including the air command and control structure?

1.3. What NATO air assets were involved in these operations?

2. How did the NATO air command and control structure developed for DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE interface with the existing UN and NATO command structures?

Criterion:

2.1. At what levels of command were liaison officers exchanged and what were their main functions?

3. How did the NATO air command and control structure function on a day-to-day basis?

Criteria:

3.1. How did NATO develop and execute plans for Operations SKY MONITOR, DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE?

3.2. How did the system manage targeting?

3.3. How did the system respond to requests for air support?

4. What were the physical and political effects of NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE?

Criteria:

4.1. Did NATO respond to UNPROFOR requests for air support?

4.2. Were UN Safe Areas protected?

4.3. What percentage of Bosnian Serb military power was destroyed?

4.4. Did these operations have a positive effect on bringing peace to Bosnia?

5. What elements within the NATO air command and control structure developed for operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE could be modified in order to achieve greater effectiveness?

Criteria:

5.1. What were the key crisis and decision points in the master and command and control events?

5.2. Were any flaws within the command and control structure revealed by these events?

5.3. What modifications can be made to improve the effectiveness of this system?

By answering these questions I will be able to collect sufficient relevant data to answer the primary thesis question of how effective were NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE conducted in support of UNPROFOR.

Data sources and collection methods

The literature reviewed in chapter two identified the sources of data and collection methods employed. From this, the investigator was able to:

1. Examine overall political and historical context.
2. Develop a master events list for October 1992 - December 1995.
3. Document the existing UN and NATO command and control structure.
4. Describe what changes were made to these existing command and control structures in order to place NATO air assets in support of UN operations.
5. Describe the types, numbers, nationalities and weapons used by the NATO aircraft involved and where they operated from.
6. Describe the physical effects of the air operation.
7. Describe the political effects of the air operation.
8. Examine in more detail the crisis or decision points of the master event timeline that could provide greater insight into the effectiveness of the operations conducted.
9. Suggest modifications that would improve the effectiveness of future operations of this type.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH ANALYSIS

Restated Thesis Question

This investigation was conducted in order to answer the question: How effective were NATO air operations (DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE) conducted in support of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina? How did the situation evolve? How did the NATO command structure function to conduct and coordinate air operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina? How effective were those operations in assisting the implementation of UNSCRs and in protecting UNPROFOR forces?

The period of inquiry is from October 9, 1992 (the day that UNSCR 781 established a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina) and December 15, 1995 (when UNSCR 1031 which transferred UN operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina from UNPROFOR to the NATO IFOR). UN or NATO ground operations or ground command and control were not examined. The political and diplomatic situation was addressed only as it impacted air operations and command and control.

Research Results

The results of the research conducted will be presented within the framework of the Subordinate Questions and their associated criteria.

Subordinate Question 1. What was the air command and control structure developed for NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE?

Criteria: 1.1. What was the existing UN command structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

1.1.a. General Organization of the UN

The United Nations was founded on October 24, 1945 in the aftermath of World War II to:

Maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.¹

The UN Charter serves as its constitution. It is organized into 19 chapters composed of 111 separate articles. The Charter designates the United Nations Security Council as the executive body vested with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council consists of five permanent members: the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom. Ten other member states are elected to two-year terms by the General Assembly to two year terms on the Council.

Chapter VI of the Charter gives the Security Council the authority to call on belligerent nations to resolve their disputes peacefully. It allows the Security Council to recommend procedures and methods of adjustment to assist in the resolution of those disputes and to recommend terms for peace settlements. Chapter VI is generally cited as the authority for UN peacekeeping missions.² Security Council decisions and recommendations are formally published as United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs).

Chapter VII of the Charter allows the Security Council to call upon belligerent nations to comply with measures that the Council decides will assist in conflict resolution. Article 41 of Chapter VII specifies what measures, short of military force, can be employed by UN member nations in support of UNSCRs. Article 42 authorizes member nations to make military forces and facilities available to the UN to assist in maintaining and/or restoring peace and security by serving as UN peacekeepers under UN mandate. Chapter VII is generally cited as the authority for UN peace enforcement operations.

The Military Staff Committee of the Security Council is comprised of representatives from the armed forces of all Council members. It was originally intended to be an international joint military staff. A number of political factors have prevented the committee from functioning as such.³ It now serves as an advisory body to the Secretary-General.

The UN General Assembly consists of representatives from nearly every nation. The General Assembly is a forum for debate, discussion and the exchange of ideas. The measures it votes are not binding on the Security Council, the Secretary-General or even on its own members. Its role in peacekeeping operations has never been clearly defined.⁴

The United Nations Secretariat is the organization responsible for the UN's day-to-day operations. Due to the inability of the Military Staff Committee to perform this task, the Secretariat is also responsible for planning and conducting peacekeeping operations. The bulk of the Secretariat provides administrative support to a number of UN organizations.

The Secretary-General is the chief executive of the UN Secretariat. But he is much more than an administrative chief. Nominated by the Security Council and appointed by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General is the UN's chief spokesman and representative. He is often instrumental in dealing with national governments and in resolving conflicts, is usually seen as an "honest broker" by warring parties, and wields significant diplomatic prestige and influence. The Secretary-General works closely with the Security Council, providing advice, reports, and suggestions on resolving world crises.

The Secretary-General is also responsible for the organization and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations. A peacekeeping operation is:

....an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on the consent and cooperation.⁵

Traditionally, peacekeeping operations have not been enforcement actions as authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but something in between the provisions of that Chapter and Chapter VI. Most UNSCRs regarding UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina cite

Chapter VII as the authority for the mandates. Although the military forces deployed are the most visible part of peacekeeping, actually the diplomatic, political and administrative functions of the operation are keys to its success or failure. UN peacekeeping operations rely on the consent of the warring parties, and on the voluntary military and financial support of member states in support of those operations.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Secretariat, located in New York, is responsible for organizing and establishing peacekeeping operations in response to UNSCRs. It solicits and accepts military forces from member states. In conjunction with the Field Operations and Logistics Division (FOLD) of the UN Secretariat, it organizes transportation, financial and logistics support for peacekeeping forces.

The Secretary-General usually appoints a senior UN diplomat as his Special Representative for a given peacekeeping mission. The Special Representative is responsible for ensuring the success of the mission and in coordinating all mission aspects: political, economic and military. The Special Representative has executive authority over the entire peacekeeping mission.

A senior military officer from a member state contributing forces to a given peacekeeping operation is designated as the UN Force Commander. He has both a military and a UN civilian staff to assist in supporting, sustaining and directing the operation. The Force Commander has a number of tactical units, military observers and logistics units under his control. These are the actual peacekeepers for the operation.

1.1.b. The UN in the former Yugoslavia

Figure 1 shows the United Nations peacekeeping structure in the former Yugoslavia. As a peacemaking and peacekeeping organization the UN has been involved in Yugoslavia since 1991. In response to the widening conflict, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 743 on February 21,

UN COMMAND STRUCTURE
FOR PEACEKEEPING IN THE
FORMER REPUBLICS OF YUGOSLAVIA




FIGURE 1

1992 establishing the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNPROFOR was seen as an interim arrangement for a twelve-month period "to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis."⁶ Note an immediate difference in the mandate given to UNPROFOR from the definition of a peacekeeping force listed above. From its outset, UNPROFOR had an active, almost offensive posture in its mission statement--create conditions of peace and security. This led to difficult, dangerous and confusing times for all associated with UNPROFOR. They struggled to be peacekeepers in a land where there was no peace to keep.

Table 1 gives a complete list of key persons involved in UN operations during this time.

TABLE 1-- UN OFFICIALS

| POSITION | DATES | NAME |
|---|-----------------|--|
| UN SECRETARY-GENERAL | Jan 92 - Dec 96 | Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egypt |
| SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE SECRETARY- GENERAL | 1992 - Jan 94 | Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, Norway |
| | Jan 94 - Dec 95 | Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Japan |
| FORCE COMMANDER, UNPF (FCUNPF) | Mar 92 - Jun 93 | LTG Satish Nambiar, India |
| | Mar - Jun 93 | LTG Lars-Eric Wahlgren, Norway |
| | Jun 93 - Mar 94 | LTG Jean Cot, France |
| | Jun 94 - Jun 95 | GEN Bertrand de Sauville de La Presle, France |
| | Jun 95 - Dec 95 | GEN Bertrand Janvier, France |
| COMMANDER, UNPROFOR | Oct 93- Oct 94 | LTG Michael Rose, UK |
| | Oct 94 - Dec 95 | LTG Rupert Smith, UK |

In October 1993, UNPROFOR reorganized into four component parts: UN Peace Force (UNPF) Zagreb, Croatia, which was the headquarters for the other UN peacekeeping components in the former Yugoslavia; UN Force Croatia (UNCRO), working out of Zagreb, Croatia, and responsible for UN operations within that country; UN Preventive Deployment Force

(UNPREDEP), responsible for UN operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) based in Sarajevo and responsible for UN operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁸

The first 1,200 UNPROFOR peacekeepers arrived in Croatia April 4, 1992. UNPROFOR strength eventually peaked at 38,000 soldiers and civilians in November 1994. It was the largest UN peacekeeping operation in history.⁹ Thirty-five countries contributed major contingents to the operation including the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, the Ukraine, Sweden, Canada, Egypt, Spain, Norway and Denmark.

Additional UNSCRs extended UNPROFOR's mandate in duration and responsibility. These included UNSCR 781 (October 9, 1992), which created a ban on all military flights not connected with UN operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and UNSCR 836 (June 4, 1993) which gave UNPROFOR the mission of securing the UN-declared safe areas of Srebrenica, Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa, Bihac and Sarajevo. UNPROFOR did not possess the military forces to carry out either of these UNSCRs.

A key problem was the entire safe area concept. Safe areas were designed to protect civilian refugees, yet they had an unforeseen effect on the entire course of the conflict in Bosnia. Hard-pressed Bosnian Muslim troops gathered within the safe areas to rest, regroup and to launch attacks on the Bosnian Serbs. The lightly armed UNPROFOR troops did not interfere with the Muslim troops and concentrated instead on assisting in the distribution of humanitarian aid to the refugees. This arrangement only invited attacks on the safe areas by the Bosnian Serbs who felt justified in attacking the Bosnian Muslims regardless of the presence of UNPROFOR troops and refugees.

UNSCRs 781 and 836 authorized other UN member states acting alone or in the context of "regional agencies or arrangements"¹⁰ to provide assistance to UNPROFOR in accomplishing its missions. The "regional agency or arrangement" the UN had in mind was NATO.

1.2) What was the existing NATO command structure, including the air command and control structure?

1.2.a. General Organization

Figure 2 presents the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

NATO was formed on April 4, 1949 with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C. Twelve nations were the initial signatories: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and, Portugal. Since 1949, four other nations have joined NATO: Greece (1951), Turkey (1951), Germany (1954), and Spain (1982).

NATO provides for the security and defense of the member nations against outside aggression. The North Atlantic Treaty states that the signatory nations: "...are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."¹¹

To demonstrate the seriousness of the alliance, Article 5 of the treaty states that: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all..."¹²

NATO's initial role was as a defensive military alliance to deter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Despite numerous internal crises and disagreements, NATO has been a credible deterrent to that invasion for over 40 years. The Alliance survived to witness the reunification of Germany in 1991 and the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The heart of NATO is the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC is a permanent forum for political discussion and consultation for the member states. Each signatory nation provides a permanent ambassador who meets at least weekly with his counterparts from the other member states. Additionally, semi-annual meetings at the foreign minister-level are held to discuss major

NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE




FIGURE 2

items of interest and importance. The NAC is the only NATO agency formally established by the North Atlantic Treaty. It was given the power to create any other organizations and offices that it deemed necessary to implement the Treaty's conventions. The NAC is NATO's ultimate decision-making body.

As is usually the case with alliances, it is extremely difficult for the NATO member nations to reach a consensus on many of the issues confronting them. Each member state has its own interests and domestic concerns which restrict flexibility and compromise. However, "Decisions which may be politically difficult or which face competing demands on resources thus acquire added force and credibility."¹³ This means that when the NAC and hence, the member states, agree to a course of action it is with the force of the entire alliance that those decisions are received by the international community. It was this "added force and credibility" that NATO decided to employ in Bosnia on behalf of the UN.

The Secretary-General of NATO is a senior international statesman who serves its principal spokesman. He is elected by the member states and serves as the permanent chair of the NAC. He is a key player both in the relations of NATO with the rest of the world and between the member states themselves. The Secretary-General is also the chairman of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. The Secretary-General during most of the time period of this thesis was Mr. Manfred Woerner. He died in office on August 13, 1994 and was succeeded by Mr. Willy Claes of Belgium on October 17, 1994.¹⁴ Mr. Claes resigned due to a domestic political scandal on October 20, 1995. He was replaced by Mr. Javier Solana of Spain on December 5, 1995.¹⁵ The Secretary-General worked closely with the UN Secretary-General throughout the Bosnian crisis. Table 2 provides a complete list of NATO officials during the time period.

TABLE 2—NATO PERSONALITIES

| POSITION | DATES | NAME |
|------------------------|--|--|
| NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL | until 13 Aug 94 17 Oct 94 - 20 Oct 95 5 Dec 95 - Present | Mr. Manfred Woerner, Germany Mr. Willy Claes, Belgium Mr. Javier Solana, Spain |
| SACEUR | until 4 Oct 93 4 Oct 93 - Present | GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA GEN George A. Joulwan, USA |
| CINCSOUTH | until April 94 April 94 - April 96 | ADM Jeremy Boorda, USN ADM Leighton W. Smith, USN |
| COMAIRSOUTH | Dec 92 - Sep 94 Sep 94 - Sep 96 | LTG Joseph Ashy, USAF LTG Michael Ryan, USAF |
| COM5ATAF | | LTG Andrea Fornasiero, Italy |
| DIRECTOR, CAOC | Apr 93 - Nov 94 Nov 94 - Dec 96 | LTG Chambers, USAF MG Hal Hornburg, USAF |

The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) is NATO's forum for senior military discussions and coordination. Like the NAC, member states have permanent ambassadors to the DPC who meet weekly to pursue ongoing business. At least twice a year the Defense Ministers of member states meet for high-level discussions and decision making.

Under the DPC is the Military Committee, which is composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the member states. The Military Committee functions as the supreme military authority of NATO. It provides advice to the NAC and the DPC and provides day-to-day operational guidance to the major NATO commands. The Military Committee is manned by Permanent Military Representatives and their staffs, and meets twice a year at the Chief of Staff level.

1.2.b. NATO Military Command Organization

NATO military forces are organized into two major NATO commands: Allied Command Europe (ACE), and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). This thesis concerns operations in the ACE are and therefore will not address ACLANT. ACE is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) who is a General of the U.S. Army. His headquarters is at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) near Mons, Belgium. SACEUR is

responsible for maintaining the combat readiness of his forces and for preparing plans for combat and contingency operations. He makes recommendations and reports to the NAC, the DPC and the Military Committee. SACEUR has direct access to the member nations' Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff. SACEUR until October 4, 1993 was GEN John M. Shalikashvili. He was succeeded by GEN George A. Joulwan who is the present SACEUR.

ACE consists of three major subordinate commands: Allied Forces Northwest (AFNORTHWEST); Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT); and Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). AFSOUTH was the major subordinate command involved in operations in Bosnia. It was commanded by ADM Jeremy Boorda until April 1994. He was succeeded by ADM Leighton W. Smith, Jr., who served as CINCSOUTH until April 1996.

AFSOUTH is located in Naples, Italy, and consists of five principle subordinate commands: Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (LANDSOUTH); Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (NAVSOUTH); Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH); Allied Naval Strike Force Southern Europe (STRIKEFORSOUTH); and Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe (LANDSOUTHEAST). AIRSOUTH was the principle AFSOUTH headquarters involved in operations over Bosnia.

AIRSOUTH was commanded by LTG Joseph Ashy from December 1992 until September 1994. He was succeeded by LTG Michael Ryan who commanded through the end of DELIBERATE FORCE. AIRSOUTH headquarters is located in Naples, Italy. AIRSOUTH has two sub-principle subordinate commands: Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force (5ATAF) in Italy and Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force (6ATAF) in Turkey. 5ATAF was the sub-principle AIRSOUTH element involved in operations over Bosnia. 5ATAF is located at Dal Molin Airbase, outside of Vicenza, Italy and during DENY FLIGHT/DELIBERATE FORCE it was commanded by LTG Andrea Fornasiero of the Italian Air Force.

1.2.c. NATO in the former Yugoslavia

NATO's involvement with the UN in Bosnia can be grouped into four general phases:

(1) Passive monitoring of Bosnian airspace during Operation SKY MONITOR, October 1992 - April 1993; (2) Active patrolling of Bosnian airspace under Operation DENY FLIGHT, April 1993 - June 1993; (3) Continuation of DENY FLIGHT with the addition of NATO airstrikes and CAS in support of UNPROFOR peacekeepers, June 1993 - July 1995; (4) Continuation of DENY FLIGHT and airstrikes and CAS along with a comprehensive air campaign plan executed as DELIBERATE FORCE in August and September 1995.

In the Fall of 1992, the UN Security Council received numerous reports that military aircraft operating from Serb-held areas were bombing targets inside Bosnia-Herzegovina. In response to this threat the Security Council adopted UNSCR 781 of October 9, 1992 which reads in part:

Decides to establish a ban on all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina....Requests UNPROFOR to monitor compliance with the ban on military flights....Calls upon States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to provide assistance to UNPROFOR....¹⁶

The NAC agreed to provide NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) aircraft to monitor this initial no-fly mandate. This became Operation SKY MONITOR, the first phase of NATO support for UN operations in Bosnia. It consisted of NATO E-3 Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft of the NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) Force, based at Geilenkirchen, Germany. The E-3s flew surveillance orbits over the Adriatic Sea, and later Hungary, to provide radar coverage of Bosnian airspace. As UNSCR 781 contained no enforcement measures for implementing the ban, NATO operations at this point consisted of monitoring the airspace and reporting no-fly violations to UNPROFOR officials. No changes to the existing AIRSOUTH command structure were implemented during SKY MONITOR. Over 3,300 violations of the no-fly zone were reported from October 1992 to December 1994.¹⁷

In response to these continuing violations of Bosnian airspace, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 816 of March 31, 1993 which reads in part,

Authorizes Member States, seven days after the adoption of this resolution, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of further violations to ensure compliance with the ban on flights referred to in paragraph 1 above, and proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of the flights;¹⁸

The NAC decided to provide NATO military assistance to the UN to enforce this no-fly mandate. CINCSOUTH was directed to provide combat aircraft to patrol and enforce the no-fly zone. On April 9, 1993, Secretary-General Woerner reported to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali that NATO was prepared to begin operations in Bosnian airspace. This was the second step in the evolution of NATO involvement in Bosnia. The Operation DENY FLIGHT officially began on April 12, 1993 with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and the Netherlands providing aircraft.¹⁹

The start of a complex operation like DENY FLIGHT revealed the need for a more robust command, control, and coordination capability for aircraft operating in and around Bosnian airspace. Realizing this, LTG Ashy, COMAIRSOUTH, established a Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Dal Molin Airbase, outside of Vicenza, Italy, in April 1993.²⁰ LTG Chambers was the original CAOC Director. However, it proved to be an awkward command arrangement to have one LTG at the CAOC working for another LTG as COMAIRSOUTH so LTG Chambers was succeeded by MG Hal Hornburg as CAOC Director in November 1994.²¹ The development of the CAOC was a direct reflection of the increasing complexity of this operation. It also was an indicator of the increasing NATO commitment to supporting UN operations in Bosnia.

1.2.d. The Combined Air Operations Center

The CAOC could plan, execute, and support air operations involving the monitoring and enforcement of the no-fly zone. Major tasks included airspace control, AEW planning, refueling

operations planning, combat air control (CAP) planning, and coordination with the UN Air Operations Control Center(AOCC) at Kiseljak, Bosnia. The CAOC staff originally consisted of 73 personnel. Some of these came straight from 5ATAF Headquarters, but the majority were on temporary assignment from other NATO units. As the mission expanded, so did the CAOC. By the end of 1993 the CAOC had 364 personnel, and it was up to 531 by mid-1995.²²

The CAOC performed the functions of air operations planning, airspace coordination and some air operations control. Several other agencies assisted in these tasks. Figure 3 illustrates this C2 arrangement.²³ The 603rd Air Control Squadron deployed to Italy and set up a Control and Reporting Center (CRC) at Aviano Airbase, Italy and a Control and Reporting Element (CRE) at Jacotenente on the eastern Italian coast. These installations provided a critical link for voice and data communications between the CAOC and the airborne command and control elements and between the CAOC and the US Navy forces in the Adriatic Sea. The airborne command and control elements consisted of NATO E-3A and French E-3F AWACS aircraft, supplemented by US Navy E-2C's, orbiting Hungary and the Adriatic, and USAF EC-130 Airborne Battle Command Coordination and Control aircraft which fly only over the Adriatic. These aircraft provided real-time airspace coordination and aircraft mission control as NATO planes operated over Bosnia.

The control of aircraft in the Navy's zone and vital integration of Navy aircraft in DENY FLIGHT was provided by an Aegis class cruiser or destroyer, codenamed RED CROWN, located in the southern portion of the Adriatic.²⁴ This ship was the link between the aircraft carriers providing aircraft to NATO operations and the NATO C2 structure at the CAOC.

1.2.d. Expansion of NATO's Role and Implications

Despite the imposition of the no-fly zone, the war continued in Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNPROFOR was unable to perform a peacekeeping mission due to the ongoing conflict.




FIGURE 3

Therefore, it reverted to a humanitarian assistance role. The UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 819 (April 16, 1993) and UNSCR 824 (May 6, 1993) which designated the Bosnian towns of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Zepa, Bihac, and Tuzla as safe areas, where refugees could find food, shelter and other humanitarian assistance. UNSCR 836 (June 4, 1993) gave UNPROFOR the mandate to secure and protect those safe areas. It specifically authorized that member states,

....acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of airpower, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate...²⁵

This resolution was the third step in the evolution of NATO involvement in Bosnia. On June 10, 1993 the NAC agreed to provide NATO airpower in the form of CAS and airstrikes. CAS would be provided only at the request of UNPROFOR troops directly threatened by one of the warring factions. NATO aircraft were in place at Italian airfields and ready to conduct airstrikes by July 22, 1993. On August 2, 1993, the NAC directed the MPC to begin planning for stronger measures to break the ongoing siege of Sarajevo. AIRSOUTH, as directed by AFSOUTH, prepared a draft air campaign plan to achieve this aim. The NAC approved this plan, which involved an offensive use of NATO airpower, on August 9, 1993. Additionally, NATO agreed to train UNPROFOR personnel as Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs). This training was conducted by USAF personnel and provided UNPROFOR soldiers with the equipment and expertise to be able to function effectively in this critical ground-air coordination role.

The fourth phase of NATO involvement came in July 1995. Representatives from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and Germany along with European Union, NATO and the UN met in London on July 21, to discuss the rapidly worsening situation in Bosnia. This became known as the "London Conference" and it is considered a significant turning point in the attitudes of the western democracies towards the Bosnian conflict. One of the six UN safe areas in Bosnia, Srebrenica, had fallen to the Bosnian Serbs and other safe areas were threatened.

Widespread atrocities were reported as refugees streamed westward from Srebrenica. While agreeing that any attack on the safe area of Gorazde would be met with a decisive response, the conferees failed to agree on what that response would be.

NATO, however, led by the United States, France and the United Kingdom, was ready to act. During a meeting of the NAC on 25-26 July 1995, several important decisions were made. First, the previous dual-key arrangement was changed. The UN side of the system had proven particularly slow and unresponsive throughout DENY FLIGHT, most recently during the fall of Srebrenica. So the approval authority on the UN side would now rest with GEN Janvier, FCUNPF in Zagreb, and not with Mr. Akashi.²⁶ Second, NATO would plan for a limited air campaign against a wide array of Bosnian Serb targets. This campaign would be executed in its entirety until the Bosnian Serbs met specified UN demands. And last, the air campaign would be executed upon the Bosnian Serb's next serious provocation. This was known as the "incident threshold"²⁷ or the "trigger event". The NAC and the FCUNPF would decide when this threshold had been reached. Once this decision had been made, CINCSOUTH would execute the campaign until told to desist by both the NAC and FCUNPF. Gone were the isolated airstrikes and pin-prick CAS and airstrikes of the previous months. This was the fourth and final phase of the evolution of NATO's involvement in Bosnia.

1.3. What NATO air assets were involved in these operations?

Table 3 lists the aircraft involved in Operation DENY FLIGHT/DELIBERATE FORCE.²⁹ Over 230 aircraft of all types from eight NATO nations participated.

TABLE 3—PARTICIPATING NATO AIRCRAFT

| NATION | TYPE | # | ROLE | BASED |
|-----------------------|----------------|------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| France | Mirage F-1CR | 5 | Recce | Istrana, IT |
| | Mirage 2000C | 6 | CAP | Cervia, IT |
| | Mirage 2000K/D | 4 | CAS/Strike | Cervia, IT |
| | Super Etendard | 6 | CAS | CV at sea |
| | Mirage F-1CT | 3 | CAS | Istrana, IT |
| | C-135 | 1 | Refuel | Istres, FR |
| | Jaguar | 6 | CAS | Istrana, IT |
| | E-3F | 1 | AEW | Avord, FR |
| Germany | Tornado | 14 | CAS/Strike | Piacenza, IT |
| Italy | PA-200 Tornado | 8 | CAS/Strike | Gioia de Colle, IT |
| | AMX | 6 | CAS/Strike | Istrana, IT |
| | B707 | 1 | Refuel | Practica de Mare, IT |
| Netherlands | F-16A | 9 | CAP | Villafrancha, IT |
| | F-16R | 3 | Recce | Villafrancha, IT |
| Spain | EF-18 | 8 | CAS/CAP | Aviano, IT |
| | KC-130 | 2 | Refuel | Aviano, IT |
| Turkey | F-16C | 8 | CAP | Ghedi, IT |
| United Kingdom | FMK-3 Tornado | 6 | CAP | Gioia de Colle, IT |
| | GR-7 Harrier | 12 | CAS/Strike | Gioia de Colle, IT |
| | Sea Harrier | 6 | CAS/CAP | CV at sea |
| | L-1011 | 2 | Refuel | Palermo, IT |
| | E-3D | 2 | AEW | Aviano, IT |
| United States | F-15E | 8 | CAS/Strike | Aviano, IT |
| | F/A-18D | 12 | CAS/CAP | Aviano, IT |
| | F-16C/D | 12 | CAS/CAP | Aviano, IT |
| | O/A-10 | 12 | CAS | Aviano, IT |
| | EC-130 | 5 | ABCCC/EW | Aviano, IT |
| | AC-130 | 2 | CAS | Brindisi, IT |
| | KC-135 | 10 | Refuel | Pisa, IT & Istres, FR |
| | EA-6B | 10 | EW | Aviano, IT |
| | KC-10 | 5 | Refuel | Genova, IT |
| | F/A-18C | 18 | CAP/Strike | CV at sea |
| | EA-6B | 6 | EW | CV at sea |
| NATO | E-3A | 8 | AEW | GE, IT, GR |
| Other Spt A/C | | 12 | | |
| TOTAL | | 239 | | |

Subordinate Question 2. How did the NATO air command structure developed for DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE force interface with the existing UN and NATO command structures?

Criteria: 2.1. At what levels of command were liaison officers exchanged and what were their main functions?

With the establishment of Operation DENY FLIGHT in April, 1993, the UN and NATO command structures had to develop an interface to ensure their close, effective operation in support of UNSCRs and UNPROFOR. This interface is depicted in Figure 4.

Starting at the top, Secretary-Generals Woerner and Claes and Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali were in direct communication on a regular basis. This ensured NATO support for UNPROFOR was in line with what the UN was willing to receive and what NATO governments were willing to provide. While several NATO states contributed ground troops to UNPROFOR, these forces served as national representatives, not NATO. The only ground forces operating under NATO control were the various liaison officers exchanged with UNPROFOR headquarters. To maintain NATO's neutral posture the DENY FLIGHT area of operations included providing CAS and air strikes in Croatia, not just Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The second tier of command and control interface consisted of liaison officers between the upper echelon NATO headquarters (SACEUR, AFSOUTH, and AIRSOUTH) and the Headquarters of the UN Peace Force (UNPF) in Zagreb, Croatia. Liaison officers were first exchanged in April 1993, and were maintained throughout DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE.²⁸ This liaison had a dual function. First, it supported the achievement of political objectives through military operations. Second, it ensured integration of all military forces involved. Responsibilities at this level included the development of general plans for the conduct of

UN/NATO C2 INTERFACE **FOR OPERATIONS IN** **BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**




FIGURE 4

air operations, standard policies for integration and cooperation of the forces involved, and later, in DELIBERATE FORCE, bombing target selection and approval.

The third level of coordination was between the CAOC and UNPF in Zagreb and UNPROFOR in Sarajevo. This was the day-to-day, operations-level, of coordination where matters of airspace control, mission planning and execution, and the actual conduct of air operations occurred. Liaison officer cells were established at the CAOC, at UNPF headquarters in Zagreb, at UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo and at the UNPROFOR Air Operations Control Center (AOCC) at Kiseljak near Sarajevo.

When NATO aircraft were performing CAS and other missions in direct support of UNPROFOR troops, they were guided to targets by forty UN Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs). The TACPs were located throughout Bosnia wherever UNPROFOR troops were stationed. They ensured that NATO aircraft attacked the correct targets to minimize the risk to friendly forces and collateral damage.

Subordinate Question 3. How did the NATO air command and control structure function on a day-to-day basis?

Criteria: 3.1. How did NATO develop and execute plans for Operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE?

3.1.a. General Background

Due to the politically sensitive nature of the operating environment, NATO sought to keep very tight control of air operations, while retaining the flexibility and responsiveness needed to be effective.³⁰ COMAIRSOUTH's goal was to be able to communicate "directly to aircraft flying in Bosnian airspace".³¹ Although this was COMAIRSOUTH's intent, it was not achieved until close

to the end of DENY FLIGHT. Normally the CAOC Director had the command authority to approve the use of force by NATO aircraft under his control.

NATO had several reasons for seeking tight control of air operations: to maintain a position of neutrality--acting within UN mandates and not as another combatant; to limit collateral damage and subsequent negative media attention and loss of public support; and, to avoid unnecessary provocation or worsening of the situation.

NATO states did not wish to become involved as a combatant in Bosnia and strove to conform NATO's actions to UN mandates. NATO clearly recognized the UN as having the lead in promoting and protecting peace.³²

3.1.b. Command Responsibilities - NATO and UN

NATO nations placed their aircraft under the control of SACEUR. This is called the Transfer of Authority (TOA) and is a formal process of a nation placing designated units under NATO command. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Turkey and the Netherlands all provided aircraft for use in DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE. SACEUR delegated operational control (OPCON) of NATO aircraft to CINCSOUTH. CINCSOUTH's air component commander, COMAIRSOUTH, and his staff were responsible for the overall air strategy, for developing detailed plans and contingencies employing NATO air assets, for providing guidance to subordinate commanders and for setting directives for the different phases of the operation.³³ The 5ATAF CAOC was given tactical control (TACON) of aircraft that were assigned to NATO.³⁴ The CAOC published the daily air tasking order/air tasking message, provided CAS as requested by UNPROFOR, and conducted bomb damage assessment (BDA) for completed airstrikes. The CAOC Director reported directly to COMAIRSOUTH to receive guidance and ensure close coordination. 5ATAF was responsible for administrative and logistics support to air operations and did not have a command role.

UNPROFOR's responsibilities included defining the geographic boundaries of UN declared safe areas, identifying UN ground elements during CAS airstrikes and establishing an AOCC to coordinate CAS requests with the CAOC. It also provided the personnel for the TACPs to be stationed with all UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.

In April 1993, CINCSOUTH issued NATO OPLAN 40101 which described how NATO air operations would be conducted.³⁵ This plan covered all potential NATO operations in support of UNPROFOR. The air operations section was developed and written by AIRSOUTH. OPLAN 40101 was approved by the NAC in August 1993. It was modified several times during the operation, but remained the single most important document concerning NATO air operations.

NATO aircraft operated under a strict set of Special Instructions (SPINS) contained in OPLAN 40101. These SPINS designated the rules of engagement (ROE), operating routes, altitudes and corridors, radio frequencies, and the like--everything that aircraft would need to operate. For example, all aircraft were ordered to remain above 10,000 feet AGL (above ground level) during operations over Bosnia.³⁶ This height placed them out of the range of most small arms fire, light antiaircraft and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.

3.1.c Mission Types

Missions fell into nine general categories.³⁷ The first was combat air patrol (CAP). Fighter aircraft armed with air-to-air missiles were positioned over or near Bosnian airspace, ready to intercept, identify and if necessary, destroy aircraft operating there without UN consent. Second, was close air support (CAS). Aircraft armed with guided or unguided bombs, cannon, and guided missiles would be sent to attack targets that threatened UNPROFOR forces or UN safe areas. CAS aircraft were assisted by UN TACPs at the terminal end of their mission to ensure that the correct target was attacked. Third was battlefield air interdiction (BAI) or airstrike missions. The aircraft would also be loaded with ground attack ordnance, and conducted their missions without UN TACP assistance at targets deeper inside Bosnian Serb territory.

The fourth mission type was suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). The missions used antiradiation missiles (ARMs) and other munitions to target surface-to-air missile (SAM) radars and facilities. They were critical in preventing NATO aircraft from being shot down by the robust Bosnian Serb air defenses. Fifth, airborne command and control missions provided positive control of NATO aircraft at all times. Employing powerful radars they provided a complete air picture to the CAOC and passed that situational awareness onto to aircraft conducting missions. They directed intercept operations and coordinated all air activities as they occurred. The sixth mission type was aerial refueling. As demonstrated during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, aerial refuelers provided a great extension of aircraft operations in terms of range and/or flight duration. They were key to maintaining the NATO air presence over Bosnia.

The seventh mission type was maritime patrol. These aircraft assisted in NATO's Operation SHARP GUARD. This was a maritime blockade of the former Yugoslavia conducted under the mandate of UNSCR 713 (September 25, 1991) and UNSCR 727 (December 15, 1991). The eighth and ninth mission types were airlifting and airdropping operations. These were conducted chiefly as humanitarian relief as part of the United States' Operation PROVIDE PROMISE.

3.1.d The Air Tasking Order/Air Tasking Message

The assignment of aircraft to specific missions began with the development of a tasking spreadsheet developed by the CAOC plans cell. This spreadsheet covered planned operations for the next six weeks, indicating which units would provide which aircraft for which missions and when. It allowed for crew rest, aircraft maintenance and maintained a sufficient buffer of available aircraft to cover contingency missions. The spreadsheet was known as the "Gucci".³⁸

The "Gucci" was continuously updated, edited and amended. Special focus was applied as the planned operations appeared in the 72 hour window before they would appear on the ATO/ATM. Normally, the "Gucci" could be converted into an ATO/ATM in 6-8 hours of work.

The Air Tasking Message (ATM) for NATO units, and Air Tasking Order (ATO) for non-NATO units was 12-16 pages long and issued at 1300 hours the day before it went into effect. The ATO/ATM became effective at 0300 hours and remained in effect for 24 hours. The CAOC plans cell developed the "Gucci" and the ATO/ATM with the input of the CAOC director, COM5ATAF, COMAIRSOUTH, CINCSOUTH and the COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH who controlled the US Navy carrier battle group or groups operating in the Adriatic. The CAOC Director made it a key point to disseminate the ATO/ATM as rapidly as possible by whatever means necessary--electronic data transfer, computer floppy disk or hard copy. Delivery times were tracked and constantly improved on to ensure that aircraft crews had the maximum amount of pre-mission preparation time.

The ATM/ATO contained many pieces of information needed for successful air operations. First, it listed the air missions to be executed. The ATO/ATM told which aircraft from each unit were conducting which missions. Each mission was given a flight route, target or patrol location, and specific communications call signs and frequencies. Weapons loads for aircraft were also specified in most cases. The ATO/ATM listed what airspace control measures would be in use for the next 24 hour period. These included routes to and from Bosnia, orbits for tankers and AWACS aircraft, and any specific flight information for that day.

Crisis or short-notice mission requirements were handled in one of three ways: (1) by changing an unpublished ATO/ATM if time allowed; (2) by amending a published ATO/ATM; or, (3) by direct communication between the CAOC staff and the unit in question. These unplanned requirements caused a ripple effect throughout the "Gucci" as rest and maintenance periods had to be reshuffled and reallocated throughout the remainder of the spreadsheet.

3.1.e. Mission Control

NATO provided several different control agencies and methods for its aircraft depending on their mission and location.³⁹ Aircraft conducting combat air patrols (CAP) were controlled by

the E-3 AWACs orbiting Hungary and the Adriatic Sea. The AWACS provided situational awareness, vectoring to targets and minute-by-minute tactical control of these aircraft.

Once they entered Bosnian airspace, CAS and strike aircraft were controlled by orbiting AWACS assisted by EC-130 ABCCCs. As CAS aircraft approached the target, they were handed off to the UN TACPs. The TACPs ensured that friendly forces and civilian areas were not bombed, while assisting the aircraft to locate the intended target. Air strike aircraft were guided to target by the TACPs and by the aircraft's own target and navigational guidance systems.

Air refuel operations were controlled by the CRE at Jacotenete. The aerial tankers flew at high altitude over the Adriatic. CAP and strike aircraft would rendezvous with the tankers either enroute to or returning from missions. Aerial tanker operations were also controlled by AWACS.

The CAOC Director was the airspace control authority for DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE. The primary airspace control guidelines were promulgated in OPLAN 40101 and its subsequent changes. Referring to figure 5 subordinate NATO units, non-NATO units and headquarters and UNPROFOR could all make requests for specific airspace control measures or additional restrictions.

Criteria: 3.2. How did the air command and control system manage targeting?

A clear indication of the political sensitivity of NATO operations in Bosnia was the process used to develop lists of targets for airstrikes. Once the NAC decided to provide the capability for airstrikes on ground targets in August 1993, an initial list of possible targets was developed. The CAOC identified 444 targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina that would adversely affect the ability of the Bosnian Serbs to conduct offensive ground operations. The targets included C2 sites, communications facilities, air defense weapons and associated radars, bridges and lines of communications, and military units. The list also included Bosnian Muslim and Croat targets to attest to NATO's neutral role in the conflict. COMAIRSOUTH then held a Joint Targeting Board with the CAOC Director, the Director of the UN AOCC, and with senior military representative

from each of the NATO nations involved. This board went down the initial list of 444 targets line by line, and eliminated nearly 300 of them. Reasons for removal included the risk of incurring civilian casualties or damage and the risk of inflicting excessive casualties on the Bosnian Serbs.⁴⁰ As LTG Ryan (COMAIRSOUTH) noted, "Targeting will be joint, combined, political and on CNN."⁴¹ NATO sought to apply sufficient force to compel the Bosnian Serbs to come to the peace table, but not too much as to cause an all-out war. This master list of 151 targets was then sent to CINCSOUTH and FCUNPROFOR for their approval. The target list was revised in July 1995 following the NAC meeting of 25-26 July.⁴² Only 56 targets were actually attacked during DELIBERATE FORCE.

Criteria: 3.3. How did the system respond to requests for air support?

Figure 5 provides an illustration of the CAOC planning and air support request system. The diagram depicts the routine system for processing requested air operations. Once the ATM/ATO was published, however, missions were not locked in stone. In fact, on average approximately 25 percent of the ATM/ATO changed in one form or another, whether in timing, armaments carried, routes used, and the addition and deletion of missions.⁴³

Requests for support from UN forces in the field were handled under what was known as the dual-key policy.⁴⁴ This policy meant both the NATO and the UN designated a commander or senior official who had the authority to approve airstrikes in support of UNPROFOR. However, both UN and NATO authorities had to approve the strike before it could occur. For example, a request for NATO air support originated from an UNPROFOR unit in the field. This most often was a request for CAS against a ground target which was threatening a UN safe area. It was relayed by the tactical air control party (TACP) accompanying that unit to the UN AOCC. The AOCC verified the request, passed it up the UN chain of command starting with COMUNPROFOR and then relayed the request to the CAOC. The CAOC staff then verified the

CAOC PLANNING PROCESS




FIGURE 5

request and began passing it up the NATO chain of command. Normally, CINCSOUTH had the authority to approve an airstrike request for NATO.

On the UN side of this dual-key arrangement the Secretary-General of the UN had airstrike approval authority. This was later delegated to his Special Representative, Mr. Akashi. But following the May 7, 1995 incident, when Mr. Akashi turned down an UNPROFOR request for CAS, this arrangement was changed.⁴⁵ In late July 1995 the FCUNPF was given UN authority for approval of CAS/airstrikes, removing Mr. Akashi from the decision cycle.

Regardless of who was the approval authority, the dual-key system dramatically slowed the process, reducing its effectiveness.⁴⁶ It drastically reduced the responsiveness of airpower as requests for support wound their way up through the command channels to the decision makers and then back down through the NATO chain to the CAOC for execution.

Subordinate Question 4 What were the physical and political effects of NATO air operations

DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE?

Criteria: 4.1. Did NATO respond to UNPROFOR request for air support?

4.1.a. General Information

During forty-two months of air operations over Bosnia, NATO aircraft flew 109,000 sorties, roughly the same number as was flown during the thirty-nine days of Operation DESERT STORM. Only three aircraft were lost in combat: a British SeaHarrier on April 16, 1994; a USAF F-16 on June 2, 1995; and a French Mirage on August 30, 1995. NATO's efforts were most visible in two mission categories: CAS/Airstrike and CAP.

4.1.b CAS/ Airstrike

NATO's CAS/Airstrike and SEAD efforts can be split into two separate time periods. First is the period from when CAS was first authorized by the NAC on June 10, 1993 until the start of DELIBERATE FORCE on August 30, 1995. During this time NATO flew 19,708 CAS

or strike sorties over Bosnia.⁴⁷ The vast majority of these were for training purposes. There were only sixty-three sorties that actually dropped ordnance, all linked to ten separate incidents. Table 4 lists the NATO airstrikes that were actually conducted during DENY FLIGHT.

TABLE 4—NATO AIR STRIKES DURING DENY FLIGHT

| DATE | LOCATION | TARGET | NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT | RESULTS |
|-----------|---------------|----------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| 10 APR 94 | GORAZDE | Serb Positions | 2 | unknown |
| 11 APR 94 | GORAZDE | Serb Positions | 2 | unknown |
| 5 AUG 94 | vic. SARAJEVO | AFV | 2 | unknown |
| 22 SEP 94 | vic. SARAJEVO | AFV | 2 | unknown |
| 21 NOV 94 | UBDINA | Airfield | 39 | runway shut down |
| 23 NOV 94 | OTOKA/DVOR | SAM | est. 2 | SAM radar neutralized |
| 23 NOV 94 | OTOKA | SAM | est. 2 | SAM radar neutralized |
| 25 MAY 95 | PALE | Ammo Dump | est. 5 | heavy damage |
| 26 MAY 95 | PALE | Ammo Dump | est. 5 | heavy damage |
| 11 JUL 95 | SREBRENICA | Serb Positions | 2 | unknown |

Four of these were CAS called in by UNPROFOR. These airstrikes were against individual vehicles or other point targets and had a very limited effect. The SEAD airstrikes were successful in neutralizing the sites they were targeted against, but they did not substantially reduce the Bosnian Serbs air defense capability. The other airstrike sorties were also successful, but as isolated applications of force their effects were strictly limited. That judgment can be applied to the CAS/airstrike efforts of NATO as a whole during DENY FLIGHT. Hampered by the dual-key policy and by NATO's unwillingness to force a more aggressive policy on the UN, these airstrikes were mere pinpricks that were largely ineffective in promoting the success of UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

During DELIBERATE FORCE, this limited application of force was abandoned. As noted above, the original dual-key policy was modified in July 1995, giving airstrike approval

authority to FCUNPF in Zagreb. Additionally, NATO prepared extensive plans for a wide-ranging air campaign that would be executed when the Bosnian Serbs crossed the "incident threshold".

The shelling of a Sarajevo marketplace on August 28, 1995, which killed 38 and wounded dozens, was the incident that crossed that threshold and triggered NATO's coordinated air campaign.⁴⁸

The UN declared that the shell had been fired from a Bosnian Serb held position and DELIBERATE FORCE was initiated on August 30, 1995.

DELIBERATE FORCE was executed in two parts, from August 30 to September 1, 1995 and from September 5 until September 14, 1995. On September 2 GEN Janvier, FCUNPF, asked for a pause to allow the Bosnian Serbs a chance to comply with the three conditions he announced. These conditions were: (1) no further attacks on Sarajevo or other UN safe areas; (2) withdraw all heavy weapons 20 km from Sarajevo; and, (3) allow unrestricted access and freedom of movement for UN personnel and other humanitarian agencies. When the Serbs failed to respond fully, GEN Janvier asked for airstrikes to resume.⁴⁹

Table 5 summarizes the achievements of DELIBERATE FORCE.

TABLE 5 - OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE STATISTICS

| | |
|---|--|
| Duration | 11 Days |
| Total Sorties | 3515 |
| CAS/Airstrike/SEAD/Recce Sorties | 2470 |
| Support Sorties | 1045 |
| Munitions employed | 1026 |
| Precision-Guided Munitions | 708 |
| Unguided Munitions | 318 |
| Results | 76 percent of targets sustained moderate to heavy damage |
| Aircraft lost | 1 |

Fifty-six separate target groups were attacked. The targets were chosen to accomplish the following goals: (1) air defense - Protect NATO aircraft and allow freedom of operations by

striking Bosnian Serb SAM sites; (2) C2 - degrade and disrupt the Bosnian Serb command structure, chiefly by destroying communications sites and relay facilities; (3) Logistics - destroy key bridges, supply dumps and lines of communication to reduce the Bosnian Serbs ability to conduct offensive operations; and (4) Political Will - demonstrate NATO resolve to support UNPROFOR, prevent Bosnian Serb aggression and compel them to the peace table.

NATO achieved each of these objectives during this carefully planned and intensely executed air campaign. The use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) provided excellent results as 76 percent of the targets received moderate-to-heavy damage. Of the roughly 1,000 munitions used, 700 of them were PGMs. NATO air losses were limited to only one aircraft, a French Mirage 2000 shot down by a SAM on day one. This is a sortie loss rate of .03 percent, even better than that of DESERT STORM, which was .05 percent (63 planes lost for 115,000 sorties).⁵⁰

Coupled with the loss of support from Serbia and the successful Bosnian Muslim and Croat offensives of August and September, 1995, DELIBERATE FORCE provided a final, decisive push that forced the Bosnian Serbs to the peace table.

4.1.c. Combat Air Patrol

During SKY MONITOR NATO provided continuous surveillance of Bosnian airspace. However, due to the lack of an enforcement clause in UNSCR 781, illegal incursions into the area continued. Aircraft operating from Serb territory bombed targets on numerous occasions including April 4, 1992, March 13, 1994, and November 18-19, 1994.

During DENY FLIGHT air-to-air engagements occurred on one day only. On February 28, 1994, four USAF F-16's engaged and shot down four of six Yugoslav air force GALEB/JASTREB aircraft in two separate incidents over northern Bosnia. These aircraft were apparently returning from a bombing mission when they were engaged.

The vast majority (98 percent) of no-fly violations were low flying helicopters.⁵¹ Each of the warring factions operated helicopters. They were used for resupply, troop movements,

command and control and attack missions. Helicopters posed a unique challenge to NATO. Often these aircraft appeared only momentarily on NATO radar screens. By the time a CAP aircraft had been vectored to intercept it, the helicopters had usually dipped back under the abundant radar-masking terrain of Yugoslavia and disappeared. If the track persisted long enough and an intercept occurred, the offending helicopter would then be ordered to land. All such incidents were reported to the UN AOCC.

Given the superiority of NATO air assets compared to the Bosnian Serbs (see table 6) it is no wonder that NATO largely achieved its aim of controlling Bosnian airspace. Bosnian Serb aircraft operations were very limited in scope and did not have a decisive effect on the outcome of the fighting.

Criteria: 4.2. Were UN Safe Areas protected?

UNSCR 819 and 824 of April and May 1993 declared that the cities of Srebrenica, Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa, Bihac, and Sarajevo were now UN protected safe areas. Figure 6 provides the locations of these cities. These areas were designed as havens where refugees could find protection, food, and medical attention provided by the UN and other humanitarian agencies. All six of these areas are located deep within Serb-dominated regions of Bosnia. They quickly became the focus for intense Bosnian Serb attacks.

Although NATO executed five separate airstrikes in support of UNPROFOR forces in safe areas, these small-scale attacks failed to deter further Bosnian Serb offensives. The safe area of Srebrenica fell to the Serbs on July 11, 1995, triggering a massive refugee crisis and resulting in further atrocities. The safe area of Zepa fell two weeks later on July 25, 1995 with similar results. It was partially due to the fall of these safe areas, as well as increasing Bosnian Serb pressure on Gorazde and Sarajevo, that NATO reconsidered the dual-key policy and developed plans for DELIBERATE FORCE. Unfortunately, that was too late for those refugees caught up in the loss of Srebrenica and Zepa.




FIGURE 6

Criteria: 4.3. What Percentage of Bosnian Serb military power was destroyed?

Table 6 provides a summary of the regional military balance.

TABLE 6—MILITARY FORCES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA - 1995

| FACTION | ARMY | TANKS | APC/AFV | ARTILLERY | AIRCRAFT | HELO |
|------------------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Serbia | 90,000 | 639 | 629 | 1499 | 282 | 110 |
| Croatia | 99,000 | 176 | 230 | 949 | 28 | 25 |
| Bosnian Muslims | 92,000 | 31 | 35 | 100 | 3 | 0 |
| Bosnian Serbs | 75,000 | 370 | 295 | 700 | 20 | 24 |
| Bosnian Croats | 50,000 | 100 | 80 | 200 | 0 | 0 |

In 1995 Bosnian Serb military forces were estimated to be 75,000 soldiers, 370 tanks, 295 APC/AFV's, 700 artillery pieces, an unknown number of SAM's and AAA guns, 20 combat aircraft and 24 armed helicopters.⁵² During DENY FLIGHT CAS was used on only four occasions (see table 3). Additionally, two missions were classified as SEAD. Of the three other airstrike missions, two were against ammunition storage facilities near Pale, and one was against the Ubdina airbase. The airbase airstrike was specifically targeted against the runway to deny its use to Serb aircraft. From these airstrikes a maximum of ten armored vehicles (tank or APC/AFV) and four SAM's launchers and radars might have been destroyed. This would be less than 1 percent of the Bosnian Serbs military equipment holdings, a figure that in no way could be claimed to be decisive.

During DELIBERATE FORCE, NATO specifically avoided targeting military units and assemble areas to avoid inflicting unnecessary casualties on the Bosnian Serbs. Targets included bridges and lines of communications, communications sites, command and control facilities, and supply dumps.⁵³ 56 targets were hit with 76 percent suffering moderate to severe damage. Once again, however, the degradation to the actual combat forces of the Bosnian Serbs was minimal.

However, their ability to conduct offensive operations was severely degraded. More importantly, the political will of the Bosnian Serb leadership to continue the fighting was broken.

Criteria: 4.4. Did these operations have a positive effect on bringing peace to Bosnia?

By the summer of 1995, several different factors were working together to bring the war in Bosnia to at least a temporary conclusion. First, the Bosnian Serbs had lost President Milosevic's support in Serbia proper. The Serbian economy had suffered greatly because of the war and under the UN economic embargo. By August 1994 Milosevic felt he was losing more than he gained by continuing to support the Bosnian Serbs, who seemed unable to bring the war to a successful conclusion. He closed the border between the Bosnian Serb holdings and Serbia proper that same month. By September a UN commission reported that Serbia had indeed closed its borders and that the Security Council should consider lifting the trade embargo. UNSCR 943 of September 23, 1994, did just that. In June 1995, Milosevic used his influence to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to release UN hostages.⁵⁴ All this activity indicated a dwindling of support for the Bosnian Serbs by Serbia.

Second, the Bosnian Serbs lost their next most important ally, the Croatian Serbs. On May 1, 1995, the newly trained and equipped Croatian Army captured the Serb-held Croatian region of Western Slavonia in a matter of days.⁵⁵ It was a precursor of an even more stunning success. Confident in the capabilities of their forces and heartened by the lack of a strong Serbian or international response to their success in Western Slavonia, the Croatians invaded the Croat Serb Republic of Krajina. In less than a week the entire region was recaptured and 180,000 Serbs fled to Bosnia and Serbia.⁵⁶ The Krajina's fall left the Bosnian Serbs completely without support and isolated, just when they needed that support the most.

The third factor in pushing the Serbs to the peace table was undoubtedly DELIBERATE FORCE. By demonstrating NATO's resolve to support UNPROFOR and punish Serbian attacks, DELIBERATE FORCE made it clear to the Bosnian Serbs that they could hope for no further

successes on the battlefield. In fact, during the operation the Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces launched a ground offensive that resulted in the recapture of 20 percent of Bosnia from the Serbs.⁵⁷ This left the division of the country at about 50 percent for the Bosnian Muslims/Croats and 50 percent for the Bosnian Serbs. This was the same proportional split that was later agreed to during the Dayton Peace talks in October and November 1995. On September 14, 1995 the Bosnian Serbs agreed to GEN Janvier's conditions and began withdrawing their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo. On October 31, 1995 the Dayton Peace talks began, and the fighting in Bosnia finally came to end after three bloody years.

Subordinate Question 5. What elements within the NATO air command and control structure and the UN peacekeeping structure could be modified to achieve greater effectiveness?

Criteria: 5.1. What were the key crisis and decision points in the master events list?

Appendix A is the master events list compiled during this research. An analysis of the events list revealed several key decision points. First were the UNSCRs that led to the first three phases of NATO operations in Bosnia. UNSCR 781 led to Operation SKY MONITOR, October 1992 until April 1993. UNSCR 816 resulted in Operation DENY FLIGHT, April 1993 until June 1993. And finally, UNSCR 844 added NATO CAS and airstrikes in support of UNPROFOR troops on the ground, August 1993 to July 1995. At each point, the NAC decided to provide assets and capabilities to support UN mandates and UNPROFOR. These early decisions committed NATO forces and NATO prestige to resolving the conflict in Bosnia.

The second key decision, was July 25-26, 1995 when the NAC and the UN agreed to change the established dual-key approval authority from Mr. Akashi to GEN Janvier. This was critical in that GEN Janvier was much more willing to employ NATO airpower on support of UNPROFOR than Mr. Akashi had been. Originally the approval authority on the UN side was with Mr. Boutros-Ghali. This arrangement had proven to be completely unworkable as Mr.

Boutros-Ghali was rarely available for immediate approval of air strikes and CAS. Strike approval authority was later delegated to Mr. Akashi.

The modification of the dual-key arrangement was a slow and painful process. Throughout DENY FLIGHT the UN was extremely hesitant to use NATO airpower consistently for two basic reasons. First, because the use of airpower in support of UNPROFOR could be perceived by the warring factions and by the world as the UN abandoning its purely neutral role in Bosnia. Mr. Boutros-Ghali expressed this concern in his January 18, 1994 letter to the UN Security Council. This letter confirmed that airpower would be of value in implementing UN mandates in Bosnia, but stated that this would also indicate an offensive rather than defensive stance by the UN. Second, was the fear that the lightly armed UNPROFOR troops would be subject to attack and capture by the warring factions. UNPROFOR personnel were stationed in many areas of Bosnia, often in small detachments. Neither the UN nor those nations with troops in UNPROFOR believed that NATO airpower alone could protect these exposed troops. And indeed, on several occasions UNPROFOR troops were seized and held as hostages by the Bosnian Serbs in response to NATO airstrikes. The first incident was in November 1994 following the bombing of the Ubdina airbase. Over 350 UNPROFOR personnel were detained and held for several days until the UN and NATO announced a decision to suspend airstrikes in Bosnia. The second incident was in May 1995 following the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb ammunition bunkers near Pale. The peacekeepers were held for nearly three weeks until the UN agreed to hand over several heavy weapons storage sites near Sarajevo on June 18, 1995. Following this incident UNPROFOR withdrew its troops from the most exposed positions in Bosnian Serb territory. This reduction in UNPROFOR's vulnerability opened the door for a serious change to the dual-key policy. Commitment to modifying dual-key was also strengthened by a growing realization in NATO and on the military side of UNPROFOR that the Bosnian Serbs were completely out of control and that decisive military action would be necessary to bring them to the peace table.

The third key decision was the development by NATO of a comprehensive air strike plan in late July - early August 1995. This plan later became DELIBERATE FORCE. It was a radical departure from the pinprick, reactive employment of airpower in Bosnia up to that point. Past NATO airstrikes had been isolated and of limited effect. Two NATO attacks provide evidence of this. First, the airstrike on Ubdina airfield in November 1994 was made in response to repeated no-fly violations by aircraft operating from that Croatian Serb base. It was successful in closing that airfield for some time, but it did not radically reduce the Serb military ascendancy in Bosnia. Second, the airstrikes on Pale ammunition storage bunkers in May 1995 were made in response to Bosnian Serb shelling of UN safe areas. This resulted in UN peacekeepers being taken hostage and heavy weapons being turned over to the Bosnian Serbs in order to effect the release of the UNPROFOR troops. This is not to say that the airstrikes alone caused these negative effects. The exposed position of UNPROFOR and a lack of political will on the part of the UN prevented any effective, coordinated response to the Bosnian Serb hostage taking.

The final key decision was to execute DELIBERATE FORCE following the shelling of the Sarajevo market, August 28, 1995. NATO's political will, and hence the will of the NATO member nations, was clearly demonstrated by this decisive application of airpower. Along with other factors that weakened the Bosnian Serbs, the economic embargo, the Croatian offensives, and the strengthening of the Bosnian Government, DELIBERATE FORCE was a key component in pushing the Bosnian Serbs to the peace table.

Criteria: 5.2. Were any flaws within the command and control structure revealed by these events?

Clearly the idea of dual-key control of airstrikes was a hindrance to the effective use of airpower. There was a built-in malfunction in having NATO's key in military hands (CINCSOUTH), while the UN key was in civilian hands, that of Mr. Akashi. That problem was at least partially solved when the authority was passed from Mr. Akashi to GEN Janvier. Once

civilian authorities are committed to the use of force, then the execution authority should be passed to the level of military authority effectively placed to competently judge when such force is called for. Similar difficulties will no doubt be confronted in future multinational peace operations, especially those involving the UN.

Criteria: 5.3. What modifications can be made to improve the effectiveness of this system?

The CAOC itself was plagued with several deficiencies. First, it did not even exist before April 1993. There was no communications or support infrastructure for peace support and combat operations in the Balkan region for NATO forces. The stand-up of this capability was a painful and difficult process. One of the biggest problems was manning the CAOC with qualified personnel. As this was an ad hoc operations center, there was no personnel authorization within the NATO force structure. It was staffed by culling personnel from 5ATAF headquarters on Dal Molin Airbase, and by attaching personnel from other NATO units to the CAOC on a temporary basis. This proved a temporary fix, and it was the cause of related problems, personnel turnover and training. Temporary duty personnel were generally assigned for six months or less. All had to be trained in their particular duties and the specific operating procedures at the CAOC. This reduced their period of useful service. The monthly personnel turnover rate at the CAOC was on the average of 25 percent during 1992-1995. That is an indicator of an organization that is in incredible flux and turmoil. It also indicates an organization that is operating at a reduced level of efficiency.

The second problem was communications. First, many of the aircraft could not communicate by secure means with the CAOC or with the aircraft of other nations. This meant that most positive aircraft control communications had to use unsecure channels. This had obvious security drawbacks. It could have proved disastrous against a more aggressive and capable foe.

Second, the reliance on satellite communications for both tactical and strategic level traffic far outstripped the channels available. This was a hindrance in maintaining solid, reliable communications between the CAOC and the naval forces operating in the Adriatic, the NAEW and ABCCC's in various orbits, and even between the CAOC and the CRC and CRE.

A third problem area were the SPINS. Possibly due to the long duration of NATO operations in Bosnia, the air routes, altitudes, communications data and callsigns, as specified in the SPINS, were not changed with any regularity. This lent a measure of predictability to air operations. It may have contributed to the shooting down of CPT O'Grady and his F-16 June 2, 1995 by a recently repositioned Bosnian Serb SA-6.

A fourth limitation was the political environment which affected the types of ordnance used and under what conditions that ordnance could be delivered. Being extremely aware of the delicate position that NATO was taking--supporting the UN and its mandates in Bosnia, yet not acting as a belligerent--the national and higher military command authorities sought to employ airpower with a great degree of precision. Civilian casualties and damage were unacceptable. Excessive loss of life on the Bosnian Serb side was to be avoided. Munitions could not be dropped unless the target was clearly and positively identified, which was often difficult due to the weather. All these restrictions forced operations planners to rely heavily on precision-guided munitions for strike missions. Many of the participating aircraft were not equipped to employ PGMs. US aircraft were able to employ PGMs, and in fact delivered the vast majority of munitions during DELIBERATE FORCE.

Of these four deficiencies, the first three can be addressed to some extent. Organizing some sort of standing rapid deployment air operations center that was permanently manned and equipped would be an obvious answer. Given peacetime budgets restrictions that is unlikely to happen. Standardizing and ensuring the compatibility of aircraft communications equipment

would improve multinational air operations. Domestic political considerations and budget restrictions have slowed progress on NATO interoperability. The lack of a strong threat to NATO will probably exacerbate this tendency. And as to the SPINS, considering the number of missions flown, the tremendous personnel turnover at the CAOC and the political restrictions imposed on the operating environment it appears that planners did all they could to ensure the safety of NATO pilots. However, operations security can only be achieved through diligence and vigilance. Future operations of this type should plan for an active, aggressive, and intelligent enemy.

As to the fourth limitation, political restrictions and high sensitivity levels go hand in hand with peace operations. The limitations on the use of force in these operating environments are extreme while at the same time largely justified. A heavy reliance on PGMs and advanced target acquisition systems can be expected. In fact, aircraft equipped with these devices are much more capable and able to operate effectively in these restricted environments.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to answer the question how effective were NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE conducted in support of UNPROFOR, the investigator posed five subordinate questions. The following conclusions can be drawn from the research conducted and presented in chapter four:

1. What was the air command and control structure developed for NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE? The air command and control system was based on NATO's peacetime command and control system centered on AFSOUTH, AIRSOUTH and 5ATAF. An ad-hoc CAOC was established which controlled and coordinated all NATO air operations in support of UNPROFOR. This command and control system worked well and accomplished the missions which it was assigned.

2. How did the NATO air command and control structure developed for DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE interface with the existing UN and NATO command structures? NATO and the UN exchanged liaison officers at all command levels. These officers provided a rapid and efficient flow of information between the two command structures. The one interface area that proved problematic was the dual-key arrangement. This required the approval of both the UN and NATO commanders before CAS and BAI in support of UNPROFOR could be executed. The dual-key system reduced the effectiveness and responsiveness of direct NATO air support to UNPROFOR units in Bosnia.

3. How did the NATO air command and control structure function on a day-to-day basis?

The CAOC, in coordination with AIRSOUTH, AFSOUTH, the UN and national representatives, produced a daily ATO/ATM which directed NATO air operations over Bosnia. Key aircraft missions included CAP, CAS, BAI, airborne command and control, SEAD and aerial refueling. Positive control of NATO aircraft was provided by AWACS aircraft and UN TACPs. Targeting was initially done in response to UNPROFOR requests for CAS. Later, an extensive list of targets was drawn up and approved by the highest NATO and UN military authorities. This list was developed as NATO took a more offensive posture in the later stages of the conflict.

4. What were the physical and political effects of NATO air operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE? Operation DENY FLIGHT was effective in preventing the use of Bosnian airspace by the warring parties. However, it was less successful in employing CAS and BAI to protect UNPROFOR units and UN safe areas. This was largely due to the dual-key arrangement between NATO and the UN. Operation DELIBERATE FORCE provided a swift, powerful blow to the command and control structure of the Bosnian Serbs and to their willingness to continue the conflict. Along with several other factors it proved a key reason the Bosnian Serbs agreed to join the Dayton peace talks.

5. What elements within the NATO air command and control structure developed for operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE could be modified in order to achieve greater effectiveness? First of all, avoidance of an airstrike approval arrangement similar to dual-key would drastically increase effectiveness. But given the political situation of NATO working with the UN some sort of dual command setup was probably unavoidable. That being the case it is important to keep the approval authority at the lowest possible level of military command. Once the civilian authorities have approved the use of force tactical decision making must be left to the

military commanders competent to make such decisions. Second, the establishment of a permanent deployable air operations center that is adequately manned and equipped would decrease personnel turnover and provide for at least an initial air command and control capability to meet an emerging contingency. And last, continued emphasis on equipment interoperability in NATO should be maintained.

The final question to be answered is: Were NATO air operations in support of UNPROFOR effective? Did Operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE produce the intended or expected results? The investigator will examine this final question from two perspectives: (1) Did DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE accomplish their stated missions; and (2) Were DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE effective in the broader sense of the tenets of aerospace power?

Accomplishment of Stated Missions

The stated mission of Operation DENY FLIGHT was as follows:

1. To conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 816, which bans flights of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the "No-Fly Zone" (NFZ).
2. To provide close air support (CAS) to UN troops on the ground at the request of, and controlled by, United Nations forces under the provisions of UNSCRs 836, 958 and 981.
3. To conduct, after request by and in coordination with the UN, approved airstrikes against designated targets threatening the security of UN-declared safe areas.¹

As discussed in chapter four, subordinate question 4 and its accompanying criteria, NATO executed the above tasks completely within the context of the political environment.

1. The no-fly zone was monitored, offending aircraft challenged and on one occasion were even shot down. The warring factions in Bosnia were prevented from using the aircraft at their disposal in support of their military operations.

2. CAS was provided in a timely manner in support of UNPROFOR. That this CAS was used hesitantly and sparingly by the UN was not the fault of NATO. The aircraft and crews were available for CAS missions and on the few occasions where they were employed they achieved good effects.

3. Air strikes in defense of UN safe areas were also executed in a timely and competent manner. Once again, they were used irresolutely by the UN and did not, in fact, prevent the loss of the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa.

Overall then, DENY FLIGHT achieved its stated aims. Unfortunately, this was not enough to significantly influence the political and military situation in Bosnia.

The stated mission of Operation DELIBERATE FORCE was as follows:

Detering attacks on safe areas and respond, if necessary, through the timely use of airpower...until attacks on, or threats to, the safe areas have ceased.²

Clearly, the aggressive, coordinated and persistent air campaign of DELIBERATE FORCE was a radical change from DENY FLIGHT. The physical and psychological damage it inflicted on the Bosnian Serbs was concentrated in terms of time and space and had a direct impact on the removal of the threat to the remaining UN safe areas. Indeed, it was an important factor in inducing the Bosnian Serb leadership to come to the bargaining table and eventually to agree to the terms of the Dayton Peace Accords.

Effective Airpower?

To judge NATO operations in the broader terms of the effective use of airpower, this thesis will use the Tenets of Aerospace Power as listed in Air Force Manual 1-1:

Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution - Aerospace forces should be centrally controlled by an airman to achieve advantageous synergies, establish effective priorities, capitalize on unique strategic and operational flexibilities, ensure unity of purpose, and minimize the potential for conflicting objectives. Execution of aerospace missions should be decentralized to achieve effective spans of control, responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.

Flexibility/Versatility - The unique flexibility and versatility of aerospace power should be fully used and not compromised. The ability to concentrate force anywhere and attack any facet of the enemy's power is the outstanding strength of aerospace power.

Priority - Effective priorities for the use of aerospace forces flow from an informed dialogue between the joint or combined commander and the air component commander. The air commander should assess the possible uses as to their importance to (1) the war, (2) the campaign, and (3) the battle. Air commanders should be alert for the potential diversion of aerospace forces to missions of marginal importance.

Synergy - Internally, the missions of aerospace power, when applied in comprehensive and mutually supportive air campaigns, produce effects well beyond the proportion of each mission's individual contribution to the campaign. Externally, aerospace operations can be applied in coordinated joint campaigns with surface forces, either to enhance or be enhanced by surface forces.

Balance - The air commander should balance combat opportunity, necessity, effectiveness, and efficiency against the associated risk to friendly aerospace resources. Technologically sophisticated aerospace assets are not available in vast numbers and cannot be produced quickly.

Concentration - Aerospace power is most effective when it is focused in purpose and not needlessly dispersed.

Persistence - Aerospace power should be applied persistently. Destroyed targets may be rebuilt by resourceful enemies. Air commanders should plan for restrikes against important targets.³

Table 7 provides a comparison of Operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE to the tenets of aerospace power listed above.

TABLE 7 - OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

| TENET OF AEROSPACE POWER | DENY FLIGHT | DELIBERATE FORCE |
|---|--|---|
| CENTRALIZED CONTROL/ DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION | YES Control at CAOC Execution with individual air units. | YES Control at CAOC Execution with individual air units. |
| FLEXIBILITY/ VERSATILITY | NO Airpower employed in a defensive, single mission mode | YES Airpower employed offensively using all its capabilities |
| PRIORITY | NO Airpower not focused on decisively influencing conflict. Holding action only. | YES Airpower focused on commander's priorities to achieve decisive results. |
| SYNERGY | NO Single mission type with defensive focus. | YES All airpower capabilities used simultaneously and in concert. |
| BALANCE | YES Risks realized and force protection plans incorporated. | YES Risks realized and force protection plans incorporated. |
| CONCENTRATION | NO Piecemeal attacks inconsistently applied. | YES Violent application of focused effects and force in short duration. |
| PERSISTENCE | YES Operation sustained for over two years. | YES Airstrikes continue until objectives are achieved |

Clearly, DENY FLIGHT was not an effective use of airpower. This judgment does not in any way detract from the competence and professionalism of the NATO airmen and women who conducted this operation. The political situation and the restriction of operating rigidly within the mandates of the various UNSCRs prevented any decisive application of the airpower available.

DENY FLIGHT achieved limited results because it was given limited aims. The means for achieving decisive results were at hand. The political will to use those means was not.

DELIBERATE FORCE was almost the complete opposite of DENY FLIGHT. It was an excellent example of the effective use of airpower. It used all the capabilities of modern combat aircraft in a concentrated, aggressively executed and persistent air campaign to achieve decisive results. Yes, the Bosnian Serb position had been weakened by the Croatian offensives and by the withdrawal of Serb support. But it was DELIBERATE FORCE that broke their will to continue the fighting. It provided not only a sharp military defeat, but a clear demonstration of the determination of the NATO nations to bring the conflict in Bosnia to an end.

Final Remarks

The overriding picture drawn from an in-depth look at UN and NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina is of a gradual, reactive response to a crisis that no one really wanted to face but one that refused to go away.

"In essence, international policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina boiled down to a series of reactions to television pictures. Under intense pressure from the media, world leaders had to be seen to be doing something but remained unwilling to take any steps that which might have actually contributed to the resolution of the war. Reactions were typically hasty and designed to assuage domestic public opinion, not to do anything for the Bosnians themselves."⁴

At the highest levels, national leaders individually and collectively struggled with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia for over four years. The UN's initial attempts at mediation were only as successful as the combatants wished them to be. Serbia acquiesced to a cease-fire and to peace in Slovenia only when her leadership judged that they had nothing further to gain from continuing the conflict. She then fought a war with Croatia until 30 percent of Croatia was in ethnic Serb hands. Serbia continued to support the Bosnian Serbs until international economic

sanctions and internal political stresses threatened President Milosevic's hold on power. Support was then withdrawn from the Bosnian Serbs.

The EU was the next multinational agency to step up to the plate. The EU's efforts in Bosnia failed miserably. All sides blithely ignored signed agreements, cease-fires and empty threats as it suited their purposes. The various EU-sponsored peace plans were found lacking in substance and without international political support. As the EU faltered, NATO was next in line.

The military and civilian structures of NATO supported the UN in Bosnia largely through the influence of the United States, France and the United Kingdom. NATO operations initially followed the lead of UNSCRs. As the UNSCRs expanded UNPROFOR's mandate, NATO expanded its support of UNPROFOR. But all these actions and operations did not achieve peace in Bosnia. The summer of 1995 saw some of the bloodiest fighting and the worst atrocities of the entire war. The UN appeared unable to break the deadlock with additional UNSCRs or other initiatives. It took the leadership of NATO, specifically the United States, France and the United Kingdom to apply decisive military force when it was needed most. Military commanders and planners responded to these incremental changes in the UN policy in Bosnia. They could only expand their operations as policy makers committed their support and the national will to expand the scope and objectives of those operations.

NATO policy makers and warriors flew through dark, uncharted skies over Bosnia. They were guided by a spirit of multinational cooperation, sustained by faith in the professionalism with which they accomplished their mission, and worked selflessly to achieve peace in a broken and violated land. Their cooperation was not perfect. Their efforts and operations were not without their flaws. With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the pace of intervention and the attempts to stem the tide of aggression was incredibly slow and faltering. But none of that detracts from the

dedication and professional excellence demonstrated by NATO forces during those long, thankless and difficult years over Bosnia.

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Chapter 4

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APPENDIX A

MASTER EVENTS LIST FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 1991-1995

| DATE | EVENT TYPE | EVENT |
|--------------------|------------|--|
| 25 Jun 91 | Political | Croatia and Slovenia declare independence from Yugoslavia. Federal Government orders JNA to intervene to protect Yugoslavia's borders |
| 25 Jun - 18 Jul 91 | Military | Fighting erupts in Slovenia between Slovenian nationalists and the JNA. |
| 18 Jul 91 | Political | JNA withdraws from Slovenia. |
| 22 Jul 91 | Military | Fighting intensifies in Croatia. |
| 25 Aug 91 | Military | JNA launches full scale attack in Croatia. |
| 7 Sep 91 | Political | Slovenia and Croatia formally secede from Yugoslavia. EC peace talks begin. |
| 8 Sep 91 | Political | 95% of the population in the Republic of Macedonia vote for independence from Yugoslavia. |
| 12 Sep 91 | Military | Serb forces seize Bosnia town of Kostajnica - 1st Serb use of force in Bosnia. |
| 13 Sep 91 | Military | JNA/Serb forces now control 1/3 of Croatia. |
| 25 Sep 91 | UNSCR 713 | Imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment on Yugoslavia. |
| 7 Oct 91 | Military | JNA launches heavy air raid on Zagreb. |
| 8 Oct 91 | Political | UN Secretary-General begins an effort to broker peace in Yugoslavia with a delegation headed by former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. |
| 23 Oct 91 | Political | Serbia states that it wants to create a rump Yugoslavia encompassing all territory where Serbs live or have territorial claims - "Greater Serbia". |
| 8 Nov 91 | Political | EC implements economic sanctions against all of Yugoslavia following the failure of peace talks. |
| 27 Nov 91 | UNSCR 721 | Authorizes the deployment of 10,000 peacekeepers in Croatia. |
| 2 Dec 91 | Political | EC normalizes trade and economic relations with all Yugoslavian republics excepts Serbia and Montenegro. |
| 6 Dec 91 | Political | US suspends most trade with Yugoslavia. |

| | | |
|----------------------|-----------|--|
| 19 Dec 91 | Political | Serb Republic of Krajina formed from Serb-occupied territory in Croatia. |
| 23 Dec 91 | Political | GE, BE and DE formally recognize Croatia and Slovenia. |
| 31 Dec 91 | Political | Yugoslavia (Serbia) accepts the Vance peace plan. |
| 2 Jan 92 | Political | Croatia accepts the Vance peace plan. Croatian Serbs are left holding 30% of Croatian territory. |
| 15 Jan 92 | Political | EU formally recognizes Croatia and Slovenia. |
| 21 Feb 92 | UNSCR 743 | Established UNPROFOR for 12 months in Bosnia-Herzegovina, HQ at Sarajevo. |
| 29 Feb - 1 Mar 92 | Political | Two day referendum in Bosnia, which the Bosnian Serbs boycott(37% of the population), results in a 99.4% vote in favor of independence from Yugoslavia. The first fighting erupts in Sarajevo. |
| 3 Mar 92 | Political | Bosnian President Itzetbegovic announces Bosnia's independence. Bosnian Serbs begin attacks against the government. |
| 18 Mar 92 | Political | Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats agree to the Cutiheiro Plan for a three-way division of Bosnia along ethnic lines. |
| 22 Mar 92 | Military | First fighting between Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government near Gorazde. |
| 25 Mar 92 | Political | Bosnian President Itzetbegovic rejects the Cutiheiro Plan. |
| 27 Mar 92 | Political | Bosnian Serbs declare the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina". |
| 4 Apr 92 | Military | The Yugoslavian air force attacks Bosnian Muslim and Croat positions. The first 1200 UNPROFOR peacekeepers arrive in Croatia. |
| 7 Apr 92 | Political | The EU and the US formally recognize the independence of Bosnia, and the US also extends recognition to Croatia, Slovenia and Maacedonia. |
| 22 May 92 | Political | The UN formally admits Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia as member states. |
| Late May 92 | Military | The JNA withdraws from Bosnia, but leaves behind large quantities of heavy weapons and all Bosnian Serb officers and soldiers. |
| 30 May 92 | UNSCR 757 | Imposed economic embargo on Serbia and Montenegro and demanded the establishment of a security zone around Sarajevo airport. |
| 16 Jun 92 | Political | Bosnian President Itzetbegovic and Croatian President Tudjman sign and military alliance. |

| | | |
|-----------|-----------|--|
| 3 Jul 92 | Political | Humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo begins. Operation PROVIDE PROMISE involving USAF aircraft runs through January 1996. |
| Aug 92 | Political | First reports of Bosnian Serb detention camps hits the international news media. |
| 13 Aug 92 | UNSCR 770 | Called upon all States to take measure to facilitate, working with the UN, the delivery of humanitarian aid in Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia. |
| 3 Sep 92 | Political | UN peace negotiations begin to end the fighting in Bosnia. Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen act as UN mediators. |
| 9 Oct 92 | UNSCR 781 | Established a ban on all military flights in Bosnia. UNPROFOR will monitor this ban. |
| 16 Oct 92 | Military | NATO begins Operation SKY MONITOR in response to UNSCR 781. NAEW in place over the Adriatic Sea. |
| 31 Oct 92 | Military | NATO AEW extended over Hungary as part of SKY MONITOR. |
| 11 Dec 92 | Military | UN Peacekeeping forces arrive in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. |
| 19 Feb 93 | UNSCR 807 | Extended UNPROFOR's mandate in Bosnia. |
| Mar 93 | Military | Bosnian Croats and Muslims end their ad-hoc alliance against the Serbs and begin fighting each other. |
| 1 Mar 93 | Military | US planes begin high-altitude air drops of food and medical supplies to eastern Bosnian cities. |
| 11 Mar 93 | Political | UNHCR reports that 3.8 million people (15 percent of the 1991 population) are receiving aid in Yugoslavia. |
| 31 Mar 93 | UNSCR 816 | Renewed mandate for "no-fly" zone in Bosnia. |
| 2 Apr 93 | Political | Cyrus Vance resigns from UN peace negotiating team. |
| 12 Apr 93 | Military | NATO begins Operation DENY FLIGHT in response to UNSCR 816. CINCSOUTH issues OPLAN 40101. |
| 12 Apr 93 | Military | UN reports that more than 500 flights have violated the no-fly ban since 16 Oct 92. |
| 16 Apr 93 | UNSCR 819 | Created UN safe area in Srebrenica |
| 17 Apr 93 | UNSCR 820 | Established complete trade embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. |
| 6 May 93 | UNSCR 824 | Created UN safe areas at Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac. |
| 25 May 93 | UNSCR 827 | Establishes a War Crimes Tribunal to consider the evidence of widespread atrocities in Yugoslavia. |
| 4 Jun 93 | UNSCR 836 | Extends the UNPROFOR mandate to include the security of the previously declared safe areas (UNSCRs 819 and 824). |
| 10 Jun 93 | Political | NAC agrees to deploy NATO CAS aircraft in support of UNPROFOR enforcing UNSCR 836. |
| 18 Jun 93 | UNSCR 844 | Authorized the strengthening of UNPROFOR and reaffirmed the use of airpower over safe areas. |

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| 22 Jul 93 | Military | NATO CAS aircraft in place to support UNPROFOR. |
| 30 Jul 93 | Political | A tentative agreement to divide Bosnia into three ethnic states collapses when the Bosnian Serbs violate the cease-fire. |
| 2 Aug 93 | Political | NAC directs preparation of stronger measures to break the siege of Sarajevo. |
| 9 Aug 93 | Political | NAC approves the plans drawn up for air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. |
| 13 Aug 93 | Military | CINCSOUTH issued change to OPLAN 40101 to cover the use of airstrikes during DENY FLIGHT. |
| 18 Aug 93 | Political | Secretary General of the UN reports to the Security Council that following training exercises with NATO, the UN now has the capability to use airpower in support of UNPROFOR. |
| 4 Oct 93 | UNSCR 871 | Authorized division of UNPROFOR into three separate commands - Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia. Extended UNPROFOR mandate until 31 Mar 94. |
| 10-11 Jan 94 | Political | NATO Heads of State and Government meeting in Brussels, deplore the conflict in Bosnia and reaffirm NATO's willingness to "carry out airstrikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO also urged the UN to develop plans to implement these intentions |
| 12 Jan 94 | Political | Secretary General of the UN directs his Special Representative Mr. Yasushi Akashi to undertake a preparatory study of this proposal. |
| 17 Jan 94 | Political | Mr. Akashi confirms the usefulness of airpower in assisting in the rotation of the isolated UNPROFOR force at Srebrenica and in opening Tuzla airfield. |
| 18 Jan 94 | Political | The Secretary General of the UN conveys Mr. Akashi's findings to the Security Council, but notes that such a use of airpower would require more assets that were currently available to UNPROFOR, and that such an employment of airpower would imply an offensive rather than a defensive stance. |
| 4 Feb 94 | Military | Ten civilians are killed following a Bosnian-Serb mortar attack a Sarajevo suburb. |
| 5 Feb 94 | Military | A 120mm mortar round fired from Bosnian-Serb territory kills 58 and wounds 142 civilian in a Sarajevo marketplace. |
| 6 Feb 94 | Political | The Secretary General of the UN asks the Secretary General of NATO to obtain authorization for NATO air strikes against mortar and artillery positions around Sarajevo. |

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| 9 Feb 94 | Political | The warring parties sign a cease-fire agreement for the Sarajevo area, followed several hours later by a NAC ultimatum directing the removal of all heavy weapons 20 km outside of Sarajevo within 10 days. Failure to comply by 2400 GMT 19 Feb 94 would result in NATO airstrikes on artillery and mortar positions as requested by the UN. |
| 9 Feb 94 | Political | The Secretary General of the UN directs Mr. Akashi to finalize with CINC AFSOUTH detailed procedures for initiation and conduct of air strikes on Bosnia. He also delegated the approval for such strikes to Mr. Akashi. |
| 20 Feb 94 | Political | The UN Security Council decides not to ask for NATO airstrikes judging that all sides have largely complied with the NATO ultimatum of 9 Feb. |
| 23 Feb 94 | Political | A general cease-fire in Bosnia is signed by all parties. |
| 23 Feb 94 | Political | The Bosnian Croats and Muslims sign a US-brokered agreement. |
| 28 Feb 94 | Military | Four NATO (US) F-16's shoot down four of six Yugoslav Air Force Galeb/Jastreb aircraft in two separate incidents over northern Bosnia. |
| 1 Mar 94 | Political | Bosnian Serbs agree to allow the reopening of Tuzla airport. The first flights land on 22 Mar 94. |
| Early Mar 94 | Military | Bosnian Serbs launch an attack against Gorazde |
| 10 Mar 94 | Military | Dutch troops replace Canadians at Srebrenica. |
| 12 Mar 94 | Military | UNPROFOR request NATO CAS in support of threatened French peacekeepers near Bihac. Aircraft arrive on station but are not employed by the on-scene UNPROFOR TACP. |
| 13 Mar 94 | Military | Three aircraft, flying from bases in Yugoslavia (Serbia), bomb Bosnian Government positions near Gorazde. |
| 31 Mar 94 | UNSCR 908 | Authorized increase in UNPROFOR strength and authorized member States to provide CAS in defense of UNPROFOR. |
| 10 Apr 94 | Military | UNPROFOR request CAS for peacekeepers near Gorazde. NATO aircraft (2 x USAF F-16's) bomb Bosnian Serb positions near Gorazde. This is the first air strike ever conducted by NATO in combat. |
| 11 Apr 94 | Military | UNPROFOR request CAS for peacekeepers near Gorazde. NATO aircraft (2 x USMC F/A-18's) bomb Bosnian Serb positions near Gorazde. |
| 16 Apr 94 | Military | UK Sea Harrier aircraft shot down by Bosnian Serb SAM near Gorazde. |
| 18 Apr 94 | Political | Secretary General of the UN requests that the Secretary General of NATO obtain authorization for NATO airstrikes around all UN safe areas. |

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| 22 Apr 94 | Political | NAC authorizes airstrikes around Gorazde (and any other UN Safe Area) if the Bosnian Serbs do not cease attacks by 24 Apr 94 and withdraw heavy weapons 3 km from the city by 27 Apr 94. |
| 23 Apr 94 | Political | Bosnian Serbs sign a cease-fire and begin pulling back from around Gorazde. |
| 25 Apr 94 | Political | The foreign ministers of the US, UK, Germany, France, Russia and representatives from the EU and the UN form the Contact Group to further peace negotiations in Bosnia. |
| 26 Apr 94 | Political | The Secretary General of the UN reports that the Bosnian-Serbs have withdrawn their forces and heavy weapons from around Gorazde. |
| 10 May 94 | Political | The Washington Accords are signed, creating a Bosnian Croat-Muslim Federation. |
| 24-25 May 94 | Military | Following the failure of the Bosnian-Serbs to withdraw heavy weapons from around Sarajevo, NATO launches air strikes on Bosnian-Serb ammunition depots near Pale. In response the Serbs shell Tuzla, killing 71 people. |
| 8 Jun 94 | Political | Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims sign a cease-fire but both sides use the lull to consolidate their positions. |
| 6 Jul 94 | Political | The Contact Group proposes a peace plan stipulating a 51% (Muslim) 49% (Serb) division of Bosnia. Although the Bosnian Muslims accept it, the Serbs reject the plan. |
| 10 Jul 94 | Political | The cease-fire in Bosnia is extended for one month as agreed to. |
| Aug 94 | Political | Yugoslavia (Serbia) seeking an end to UN economic sanctions, severs all diplomatic and economic ties with the Bosnian Serbs. In September, the UN reports that Yugoslavia is indeed making a strenuous effort to seal off the border. |
| Aug-Sep 94 | Military | The situation in Bosnia deteriorates as heavy fighting erupts. |
| 5 Aug 94 | Military | In response to the Bosnian Serb seizure of heavy weapons under UN control near Sarajevo, UNPROFOR requests NATO CAS. USAF A-10's respond strafing a Bosnian Serb armored vehicle with unknown results. The Bosnian Serbs later return the weapons. |
| 22 Sep 94 | Military | Following a Bosnian Serb attack against French peacekeepers near Sarajevo, NATO jets (1xO/A-10, 2x Jaguar) strike Bosnian Serb armored vehicles with unknown results. Dual Key strike agreed to by GEN de Lapresle and ADM Smith. |

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| 23 Sep 94 | UNSCR 941 UNSCR 942 UNSCR 943 | 941 condemns ethnic cleansing by Bosnia Serbs and demands its cessation; 942 widens economic sanctions against Bosnian Serb-held areas; 943 suspends economic sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia) as a reward for its border-closing efforts. |
| Oct-Nov 94 | Military | Confused fighting erupts near Bihac, as Bosnian government troops battle a renegade Muslim leader, Fikret Abdic, and then the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian government, assisted by Bosnian Croats triumphs in late October. |
| 18 Nov 94 | Military | Bosnian Serb aircraft operating from the Krajina bomb Bihac. |
| 19 Nov 94 | Military | Bosnian Serb aircraft operating from the Krajina bomb near Bihac. |
| 19 Nov 94 | UNSCR 958 | Authorized member states to use airpower in Bosnia in support of UNPROFOR's mandate. |
| 21 Nov 94 | Military | 39 NATO aircraft attack Uzdina airbase in the Krajina. |
| 23 Nov 94 | Military | Bosnian Serbs fire two SAMS (SA-2's) at UK Harriers near Bosavska Krupa, Otoka and Dvor. |
| 23 Nov 94 | Military | NATO jets are illuminated by SAM radars near Otoka and Dvor in northern Bosnia. They respond by firing HARM missiles. Later in the day an airstrike hits still-active radar sites near Otoka. |
| 25 Nov 94 | Military | Bosnian Serbs shell Bihac. NATO aircraft are called in by UNPROFOR but are unable to initiate attacks. Bosnian Serbs detain UN personnel and halt humanitarian relief operations in retaliation for the attack on Uzdina airbase. |
| 26 Nov 94 | Political | Security Council condemns the continued Bosnian-Serb aggression around Bihac. |
| 27 Nov 94 | Political | Bosnian-Serbs refuse to agree to a cease-fire and kidnap an additional 350 UN peacekeepers. |
| 28 Nov 94 | Military | Bosnian Serbs install SAM's near Sarajevo airport. |
| 30 Nov 94 | Political | Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic refuses to meet with Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. 43 UN peacekeepers are released, but the rest are apparently being held as "human-shields" near Bosnian Serb facilities. |
| 2 Dec 94 | Military | The UN and NATO decide to suspend all air strikes in Bosnia. |
| 18-23 Dec 94 | Political | Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter negotiates a cease-fire in Bosnia, which all parties sign. It is due to last until 1 May 95. |
| 7 Jan 95 | Political | The humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo is suspended after relief planes are attacked. |

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| 25 Jan 95 | Political | The Contact Group breaks off peace talks accusing the Bosnian Serbs of being intractable. |
| 1 Feb 95 | Political | Bosnian Serbs allow UN relief trucks into Sarajevo for the first time since July 1994. |
| 20 Feb 95 | Political | Serbian President Milosevic refuses to recognize Bosnia and Croatia, thereby rejecting a UN offer to lift trade sanctions against his country. |
| 7 Mar 95 | Political | Bosnia and Croatia form a military alliance against Serb forces in their countries. By this time the Bosnian Serbs hold 70 percent of Bosnia. |
| 20 Mar 95 | Military | Bosnian government forces break the cease-fire by attacking Serbs near Tuzla. Bosnian Serbs respond by shelling Tuzla the next day. |
| 31 Mar 95 | Political | UNSC decides to split UNPROFOR into three components, one each in Croatia (UNCRO), Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and Macedonia (UNPREDEP). |
| 4 Apr 95 | Military | Bosnian Serb forces launch an attack on Bihac. |
| 26 Apr 95 | Military | Bosnian Serb forces close the Sarajevo airport. |
| 1 May 95 | Military | Upon the expiration of the cease-fire, the Bosnian Serbs renew the bombardment of Sarajevo and advance on the safe area of Srebrenica. |
| 1 May 95 | Military | Croatian forces attack the Croatian Serb-held area of Western Slavonia. The Croatian Serbs respond by seizing 115 UN peacekeepers, but Croatia continues the offensive and captures the entire region. |
| 2 May 95 | Military | Croatian Serbs shell Zagreb. |
| 7 May 95 | Military /Political | A shell kills eleven civilians in a suburb of Sarajevo. GEN Smith, UNPROFOR commander requests NATO airstrikes. Mr. Akashi turns down the request, citing the exposed position of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and the escalating conflict in Western Slavonia. This decision is criticized by the US and France. The UN Secretary-General orders a full review of UNPROFOR's involvement in Bosnia. |
| 16-24 May 95 | Military | Bosnian Muslim troops attack to break the Serb stranglehold on Sarajevo. The Serbs respond by heavily shelling Sarajevo. |
| 24 May 95 | Military | GEN Smith issues a three-part ultimatum to all sides to cease the fighting and return heavy weapons to collection points. Failure to do so by noon on 25 May 95 would result in NATO airstrikes. |
| 25-26 May 95 | Military | NATO conducts airstrikes against a Bosnian Serb ammunition dump near Pale. The Bosnian Serbs respond by shelling the five remaining UN safe areas. |
| 26 May 95 | Military | Bosnian Serbs seize UN peacekeepers as shields at Pale, and shell the safe area of Tuzla, killing 68 civilians. |

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| 30 May 95 | Political | The Bosnian Serbs declare the UN an enemy and annul all agreements with the UN. |
| 2 Jun 95 | Political | Bosnian Serbs release 120 of 325 kidnapped UN peacekeepers. |
| 2 Jun 95 | Military | USAF pilot CPT Scott O'Grady is shot down when his F-16 is hit by a Bosnian Serb SA-6 missile. |
| 5 Jun 95 | Military | The NAC agrees to set up a Rapid Reaction Force made up of French and British troops under UN command. This force, located outside of Sarajevo, would provide UNPROFOR with a strong ground combat force with which to respond to provocations. |
| 8 Jun 95 | Military | O'Grady is rescued by a USMC combat search and rescue team. |
| 14-15 Jun 95 | Military | Bosnian Muslim troops again attack to break the siege of Sarajevo. The Serbs hold their ground and respond by shelling Sarajevo. |
| 18 Jun 95 | Political | Bosnian Serbs, under pressure from President Milosevic, release the remaining UN peacekeepers in exchange for several heavy weapons storage sites near Sarajevo. These sites had been under UN control. |
| 18 Jun 95 | Political | UNPROFOR withdraws its forces from weapons collection points in Serb-held areas to reduce their vulnerability. |
| 22 Jun 95 | Political | President Tudjman of Croatia and President Izetbegovic of Bosnia meet in Split and agree to closer military cooperation. |
| 2 Jul 95 | Military | Bosnian Serb forces shell the US embassy and UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo. |
| 11 Jul 95 | Military | Bosnian Serbs seize the safe area of Srebrenica, triggering a massive refugee crisis. Widespread atrocities are reported. |
| 11 Jul 95 | Military | NATO aircraft strike Bosnian Serb positions near Srebrenica. |
| 20 Jul 95 | Political | The US announces that NATO will conduct airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs if they continue to attack UN safe areas. |
| 21 Jul 95 | Political | The Contact Group meeting in London along with officials from the EU, NATO and the UN, agreed that an attack on Gorazde would be met by a decisive response. Major disagreements between the parties leave the exact form of that decisive response undecided. |
| 25 Jul 95 | Military | Bosnian Serbs seize the safe area of Zepa, triggering a massive refugee crisis. Widespread atrocities are reported. |

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| 25-26 Jul 95 | Political | A critical meeting of the NAC leads to a change to the 'dual-key' control of air strikes in Bosnia. The UN's portion of the 'dual-key' airstrike approval process is shifted from Mr. Akashi to GEN Janvier, FCUNPF. A pre-planned series of strikes will be executed after a given threshold of Bosnian Serb provocation is reached. |
| 27 Jul 95 | Military | 10,000 Croatian government soldiers enter northern Bosnia and assist Bosnian government troops near Bihac. |
| 1 Aug 95 | Political | Following the London conference in late July, the NAC decides to implement a new strategy for employing air power in Bosnia. This decision leads to the 10 Aug 95 MOU signing with the UN. |
| 4 Aug 95 | Military | Croatia launches a surprise offensive against the Serb Republic of Krajina. The entire region is in Croatian hands by 6 Aug 95. The loss of Western Slavonia and the Krajina, dramatically weakens the Bosnian Serb position. The Bosnian Serbs had received significant manpower, weapons and economic support from these other Serb regions which was especially important after Serbia closed its border with Bosnia in August 1994. 180,000 Serbian refugees flee to Serbia and Bosnia. |
| 5 Aug 95 | Political | An internal dispute leads Bosnian Serb President Karadzic to name himself supreme commander, in effect firing the former chief General Ratko Mladic. |
| 10 Aug 95 | Political | NATO and UN commanders sign a Memorandum of Understanding regarding air operations in Bosnia. The aim is to "deter an attack on UN safe areas through the timely and effective use of airpower." |
| 18 Aug 95 | Military | The UN begins withdrawing peacekeepers from Gorazde |
| 28 Aug 95 | Military | Bosnian Serb forces shell a marketplace in Sarajevo, killing 38 people. |
| 30 Aug 95 | Military | Operation DELIBERATE FORCE begins, as NATO aircraft begin a coordinated series of strikes against Bosnian Serb C2, communications, AD and LOC assets. First strikes hit AD sites in southeastern Bosnia followed by five strike packages on targets in the Sarajevo area. |
| 30 Aug 95 | Military | A French Mirage aircraft is shot down by a SAM near Pale. |
| 31 Aug 95 | Military | Three strike packages hit targets in the Sarajevo area - AD sites, ammo dumps and equipment storage/maintenance sites. |
| 1 Sep 95 | Political | The US announces that Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia will meet to discuss a peace treaty. NATO halts air strikes in response. |

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| 1 Sep 95 | Political | Force Commander, UNPF, GEN Janvier, asks NATO for a 24 hour suspension of air attacks to aid in negotiation efforts. NATO agrees and DELIBERATE FORCE is suspended. |
| 2 Sep 95 | Political | GEN Janvier asks for an indefinite extension of the DELIBERATE FORCE suspension. NATO agrees. |
| 3 Sep 95 | Political | GEN Janvier announces three conditions to the Bosnian Serbs that must be met avoid further air strikes: 1) No further attacks on Sarajevo or other UN safe areas, 2) Withdraw all heavy weapons 20km from Sarajevo, 3) UN and other humanitarian relief organizations are to be given complete freedom of movement and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport. |
| 5 Sep 95 | Military | NATO resumes DELIBERATE FORCE when Bosnian Serbs refuse to withdraw heavy weapons from around Sarajevo. |
| 6 Sep 95 | Military | Six NATO strike packages hit bridges and LOC chokepoints. |
| 7 Sep 95 | Military | Eight NATO strike packages hit bridges and LOC chokepoints. |
| 8 Sep 95 | Political | Foreign ministers from Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia convene peace talks. |
| 8 Sep 95 | Military | Four strike packages hit previously bombed targets and 19 CAS aircraft hit eight separate fixed targets. |
| 9 Sep 95 | Military | Bad weather forces 2 of 5 strike packages to abort. Report of Bosnian Serb vehicles withdrawing from Sarajevo area. |
| 10 Sep 95 | Military | Thirteen US Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from the USS Normandy hit Bosnian Serb communications sites inflicting heavy damage. Air strikes continue. |
| 11 Sep 95 | Military | Four strike packages hit ten separate targets as weather conditions improve. |
| 12 Sep 95 | Military | Bosnian government forces, in cooperation with Croat and Bosnian Croat forces launch a major attack against Bosnian Serb territory in western and northern Bosnia. Bosnian Serb defenses crumble and they lose 20% Bosnia by the end of one week. |
| 12 Sep 95 | Military | As most of the approved targets for DELIBERATE FORCE have been successfully bombed, new targets are approved and struck - ammo sites near Tuzla. |
| 13 Sep 95 | Military | Bad weather grounds 40% of planned sorties. |
| 14 Sep 95 | Political | Bosnian Serbs agree to remove heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone and NATO suspends air strikes for seven days. |
| 20 Sep 95 | Political | GEN Janvier, judges that the Bosnian Serbs have complied to a large extent with his three conditions of 3 Sep 95, and asks NATO not to resume air strikes. |

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| 21 Sep 95 | Political | NATO permanently suspends DELIBERATE FORCE. following the Bosnian Serb compliance with FCUNPF's conditions. A total of 3515 sorties were flown over 11 days (2470 CAS/BAI/SEAD/RECCE and 1045 Support); 1026 bombs were dropped: 708 precision guided, 318 unguided; 56 target groups were hit with 238 individual aim points. |
| 26 Sep 95 | Political | Foreign ministers from Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia announce an agreement that Bosnia will be a unitary state comprised of a Muslim/Croat and Serbian substates. |
| 4 Oct 95 | Military | Three separate groups of NATO aircraft are illuminated by Bosnian Serb SAM fire control radars and respond by firing HARM missiles at the offending radars. |
| 5 Oct 95 | Political | All parties sign a US-brokered cease-fire in Bosnia, effective 12 Oct 95. However, the Bosnian Serbs use this pause to ethnically cleanse Banja Luka in northern Bosnia, and the Bosnian government continues attacks in northern and western zones. Fighting dies end of month. |
| 8 Oct 95 | Military | UNPROFOR asks for NATO CAS to protect threatened UN peacekeepers at Tuzla. Aircraft are dispatched but cannot be employed due to poor weather conditions. |
| 9 Oct 95 | Military | UNPROFOR once again asks for NATO CAS to protect threatened UN peacekeepers at Tuzla. Aircraft are dispatched and bomb a Bosnian Serb C2 bunker. |
| 31 Oct 95 | Political | The presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia (representing the Bosnian Serbs) begin US-sponsored peace talks in Dayton, Ohio. |
| 21 Nov 95 | Political | The presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia sign an initial peace agreement, stating that Bosnia will be a unitary state with a Muslim/Croat federation with 51% of the territory and a Serbian republic with 49% of the territory. NATO will deploy 60,000 troops as peacekeepers to Bosnia. |
| 4 Dec 95 | Military | First NATO troops arrive in Bosnia. |
| 14 Dec 95 | Political | Dayton Peace Accords are signed in Paris. |
| 15 Dec 95 | UNSCR 1031 | Authorized the formation of a multi-national Implementation Force (IFOR) to assume assist in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, assuming the mission of UNPROFOR. |

APPENDIX B

RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

This appendix contains the full text of several UNSCRs pertaining to NATO operations in Bosnia. They were obtained from the UN Homepage.

Contents

UNSCR 781 of October 9, 1992 - Established the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UNSCR 816 of March 31, 1993 - Renews no-fly zone mandate.

UNSCR 836 of June 4, 1993 - Extended UNPROFOR mandate to include the protection of the UN safe areas of Gorazde, Zepa, Tuzla, Srebrenica, Bihac and Sarajevo.

UNSCR 844 of June 18, 1993 - Strengthened UNPROFOR and reaffirmed use of airpower to assist in securing UN safe areas.

UNSCR 908 of March 31, 1994 - Strengthened UNPROFOR and authorized member states to provide CAS in defense of UNPROFOR.

RESOLUTION 781 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3122nd meeting, on 9 October 1992

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions,
Determined to ensure the safety of humanitarian flights to Bosnia, and Herzegovina,
Noting the readiness of the parties, expressed in the framework of the London Conference, to take appropriate steps in order to ensure the safety of humanitarian flights and their commitment at that Conference to a ban on military flights,
Recalling in this context the Joint Declaration signed at Geneva on 30 September 1992 by the Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and in particular paragraph 7 thereof,
Recalling also the agreement reached on air issues at Geneva on 15 September 1992 among all the parties concerned in the framework of the Working Group on Confidence and Security-building and Verification Measures of the London

Conference,
Alarmed at reports that military flights over the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina are none the less continuing,
Noting the letter of 4 October 1992 from the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council,
Considering that the establishment of a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Acting pursuant to the provisions of resolution 770 (1992) aimed at ensuring the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

1. Decides to establish a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this ban not to apply to United Nations Protection Force flights or to other flights in support of United Nations operations, including humanitarian assistance;
2. Requests the United Nations protection Force to monitor compliance with the ban on military flights, including the placement of observers where necessary at airfields in the territory of the former Yugoslavia;
3. Also requests the United Nations Protection Force to ensure, through an appropriate mechanism for approval and inspection, that the purpose of flights to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina other than those banned by paragraph 1 above is consistent with Security Council resolutions;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on a periodic basis on the implementation of the present resolution and to report immediately any evidence of violations;
5. Calls upon States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to provide assistance to United Nations Protection Force, based on technical monitoring and other capabilities, for the purposes of paragraph 2 above;
6. Undertakes to examine without delay all the information brought to its attention concerning the implementation of the ban on military flights in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in the case of violations, to consider urgently the further measures necessary to enforce this ban;
7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 816 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3191st meeting, on 31 March 1993

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992 and 786 (1992) of 10 November 1992,

Recalling paragraph 6 of resolution 781 (1992) and paragraph 6 of resolution 786 (1992) in which the Council undertook to consider urgently, in the case of violations of the ban on military flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the further measures necessary to enforce the ban,
Deploing the failure of some parties concerned to cooperate fully with United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) airfield monitors in the implementation of resolutions 781 (1992) and 786 (1992),
Deeply concerned by the various reports of the Secretary-General concerning violations of the ban on military flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/24783, S/24810, S/24840, S/24870, S/24900)
Deeply concerned in particular by the Secretary-General's letters to the President of the Security Council of 12 and 16 March (S/25443 and S/25444) concerning new blatant violations of the ban on military flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and recalling in this regard the statement by the President of the Security Council of 17 March 1993 (S/25426), and in particular the reference to the bombing of villages in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,
Determining that the grave situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides to extend the ban established by resolution 781 (1992) to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this ban not to apply to flights authorized by UNPROFOR in accordance with paragraph 2 below;
2. Requests UNPROFOR to modify the mechanism referred to in paragraph 3 of resolution 781 (1992) so as to provide for the authorization, in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of humanitarian flights and other flights consistent with relevant resolutions of the Council;
3. Requests UNPROFOR to continue to monitor compliance with the ban on flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and calls on all parties urgently to cooperate with UNPROFOR in making practical arrangements for the close monitoring of authorized flights and improving the notification procedures;
4. Authorizes Member States, seven days after the adoption of this resolution, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of further violations to ensure compliance with the ban on flights referred to in paragraph 1 above, and proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of the flights;
5. Requests the Member States concerned, the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to coordinate closely on the measures they are taking to implement paragraph 4 above, including the rules of engagement, and on the starting date of its implementation, which should be no later than

seven days from the date when the authority conferred by paragraph 4 above takes effect, and to report the starting date to the Council through the Secretary-General;

6. Decides that, in the event of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia notifying the Council that all the Bosnian parties have accepted their proposals on a settlement before the starting date referred to in paragraph 5 above, the measures set forth in the present resolution will be subsumed into the measures for implementing that settlement;

7. Also requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of any actions they take in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 4 above;

8. Requests further the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Council on the matter and to inform it immediately of any actions taken by the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 4 above;

9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 836 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3228th meeting, on 4 June 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Reaffirming in particular its resolutions 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993 and 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993, which demanded that certain towns and their surrounding areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be treated as safe areas,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the responsibility of the Security Council in this regard,

Condemning military attacks, and actions that do not respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, as a State Member of the United Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,

Reiterating its alarm at the grave and intolerable situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina arising from serious violations of international humanitarian law,

Reaffirming once again that any taking of territory by force or any practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful and totally unacceptable,

Commending the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat party for having signed the Vance-Owen Plan,

Gravely concerned at the persistent refusal of the Bosnian Serb party to accept the Vance-Owen Plan and calling upon that party to accept the Peace Plan for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in full,

Deeply concerned by the continuing armed hostilities in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which run totally counter to the Peace Plan,

Alarmed by the resulting plight of the civilian population in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular in Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Tuzla and Zepa,

Condemning the obstruction, primarily by the Bosnian Serb party, of the delivery of humanitarian assistance,

Determined to ensure the protection of the civilian population in safe areas and to promote a lasting political solution,

Confirming the ban on military flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, established by resolutions 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992, 786 (1992) of 10 November 1992 and 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993,

Affirming that the concept of safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as contained in resolutions 819 (1993) and 824 (1993) was adopted to respond to an emergency situation, and noting that the concept proposed by France in document S/25800 and by others could make a valuable contribution and should not in any way be taken as an end in itself, but as part of the Vance-Owen process and as a first step towards a just and lasting political solution,

Convinced that treating the towns and surrounding areas referred to above as safe areas will contribute to the early implementation of that objective,

Stressing that the lasting solution to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be based on the following principles: immediate and complete cessation of hostilities; withdrawal from territories seized by the use of force and "ethnic cleansing"; reversal of the consequences of "ethnic cleansing" and recognition of the right of all refugees to return to their homes; and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Noting also the crucial work being done throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and the importance of such work continuing,

Determining that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Calls for the full and immediate implementation of all its relevant resolutions;
2. Commends the Peace Plan for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as contained in document S/25479);
3. Reaffirms the unacceptability of the acquisition of territory by the use of force and the need to restore the full sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
4. Decides to ensure full respect for the safe areas referred to in resolution 824 (1993);

5. Decides to extend to that end the mandate of UNPROFOR in order to enable it, in the safe areas referred to in resolution 824 (1993), to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the population as provided for in resolution 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992,
6. Affirms that these safe areas are a temporary measure and that the primary objective remains to reverse the consequences of the use of force and to allow all persons displaced from their homes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to return to their homes in peace, beginning, inter-alia, with the prompt implementation of the provisions of the Vance-Owen Plan in areas where those have been agreed by the parties directly concerned;
7. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation, inter alia, with the Governments of the Member States contributing forces to UNPROFOR:
 - (a) To make the adjustments or reinforcement of UNPROFOR which might be required by the implementation of the present resolution, and to consider assigning UNPROFOR elements in support of the elements entrusted with protection of safe areas, with the agreement of the Governments contributing forces;
 - (b) To direct the UNPROFOR Force Commander to redeploy to the extent possible the forces under his command in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
8. Calls upon Member States to contribute forces, including logistic support, to facilitate the implementation of the provisions regarding the safe areas, expresses its gratitude to Members States already providing forces for that purpose and invites the Secretary-General to seek additional contingents from other Member States;
9. Authorizes UNPROFOR, in addition to the mandate defined in resolutions 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992 and 776 (1992), in carrying out the mandate defined in paragraph 5 above, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys;
10. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraph 1 of resolution 816 (1993), Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate set out in paragraph 5 and 9 above;
11. Request the Members States concerned, the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to coordinate closely on the measures they are taking to implement paragraph 10 above and to report to the Council through the Secretary-General;
12. Invites the Secretary-General to report to the Council, for decision, if possible within seven days of the adoption of the present resolution, on the modalities of its implementation, including its financial implications;

13. Further invites the Secretary-General to submit to the Council, not later than two months after the adoption of the present resolution, a report on the implementation of and compliance with the present resolution;

14. Emphasizes that it will keep open other options for new and tougher measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration;

15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter, and undertakes to take prompt action, as required.

RESOLUTION 844 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3241st meeting, on 18 June 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/25939 and Corr.1 and Add.1) pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 836 (1993) concerning the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reiterating once again its alarm at the grave and intolerable situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina arising from serious violations of international humanitarian law,

Recalling the overwhelming importance of seeking a comprehensive political solution to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Determined to implement fully the provisions of resolution 836 (1993),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General;
2. Decides to authorize the reinforcement of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to meet the additional force requirements mentioned in paragraph 6 of the report of the Secretary-General;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the consultations, inter alia, with the Governments of the Member States contributing forces to UNPROFOR, called for in resolution 836 (1993);
4. Reaffirms its decision in paragraph 10 of resolution 836 (1993) on the use of air power, in and around the safe areas, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate, and encourages Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to coordinate closely with the Secretary-General in this regard;

5. Calls upon Member States to contribute forces, including logistic support and equipment to facilitate the implementation of the provisions regarding the safe areas;
6. Invites the Secretary-General to report to the Council on a regular basis on the implementation of resolution 836 (1993) and this resolution;
7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 908 (1994)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3356th meeting, on 31 March 1994

The Security Council,

- Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and reaffirming in this context its resolution 871 (1993) on the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),
- Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 11 March 1994 (S/1994/291), 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300) and 24 March 1994 (S/1994/333 and Add.1), and his letter of 30 March 1994 (S/1994/367),
- Having also considered the letter of the President of the Republic of Croatia dated 16 March 1994 (S/1994/305),
- Emphasizing the need for a negotiated settlement accepted by all parties, and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,
- Welcoming also the cease-fire agreement between the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat party, and the signature of the Washington framework agreements between the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Bosnian Croat party, as steps towards an overall settlement,
- Underlining the importance of involving the Bosnian Serb party in further efforts to achieve an overall negotiated settlement,
- Welcoming the cease-fire agreement signed on 29 March 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), which was facilitated by the Russian Federation, the United States of America, the European Union and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,
- Welcoming also the discussions between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), pursuant to the joint statement of 19 January 1994,
- Welcoming further the recent significant progress achieved in and around Sarajevo and stressing that a strong and visible presence of UNPROFOR in this area, as well as in other areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, within the framework of its mandate, is essential to consolidate such progress,
- Recalling the statement by the President of the Security Council of 14 March 1994 (S/PRST/1994/11) and the joint letter of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia

dated 17 March 1994 (S/1994/308) and, in this context, taking note of the recent developments in Maglaj,
Determined to put an end to the suffering of the civilian population in and around Maglaj,
Welcoming the ongoing efforts aimed at the reopening of Tuzla airport for humanitarian purposes,
Welcoming also the work undertaken by the joint civil mission to Sarajevo of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,
Welcoming further the dispatch of the European Union fact-finding mission to Mostar with a view to helping improve living conditions in that city and contributing to the implementation of the agreements between the parties on it,
Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of UNPROFOR and its freedom of movement for all its missions, and to these ends, as regards UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Welcomes the reports of the Secretary-General of 11 March 1994 (S/1994/291), 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300) and 24 March 1994 (S/1994/333), and his letter of 30 March 1994 (S/1994/367);
2. Reaffirms its commitment to ensure respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where UNPROFOR is deployed;
3. Decides to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for an additional period terminating on 30 September 1994;
4. Recognizes the need, following recent progress, for increased resources for UNPROFOR described in the Secretary-General's reports of 11 March 1994 (S/1994/291) and 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300) and his letter of 30 March 1994 (S/1994/367); decides, as an initial step, to authorize an increase of UNPROFOR personnel by up to 3,500 additional troops; further decides to take action by 30 April 1994 at the latest on the further troop requirements recommended by the Secretary-General in the above-mentioned documents, with a view to providing UNPROFOR with the means necessary for implementation of its mandate;
5. Approves UNPROFOR's plans described in the Secretary-General's report of 24 March 1994 (S/1994/333), for the reopening of Tuzla airport for humanitarian purposes and authorizes additional resources requested in paragraph 14 of this report for these purposes;
6. Calls upon Member States to assist the Secretary-General to implement paragraphs 4 and 5 above by contributing personnel, equipment and training;
7. Urges that necessary arrangements be concluded, including, where appropriate, agreements on the status of forces and other personnel with the Republic of Croatia, the former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

8. Decides that Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures to extend close air support to the territory of the Republic of Croatia, in defence of UNPROFOR personnel in the performance of UNPROFOR's mandate, as recommended by the Secretary-General in paragraph 12 of his report of 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300);

9. Urges the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs to comply with the cease-fire agreement signed on 29 March 1994 (S/1994/367, annex); and welcomes the efforts undertaken by UNPROFOR towards implementing this agreement;

10. Urges also all the parties and others concerned to cooperate with UNPROFOR in reaching and implementing an agreement on confidence-building measures in all regions of the Republic of Croatia including the UNPAs; further urges the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs, inter alia, to revive the Joint Commission process with regard to communication links and economic issues; and recognizes, in this context, the importance of the immediate reopening of the Adriatic oil pipeline for the economies of the Republic of Croatia and of the other countries in the region;

11. Endorses the proposals in Part II of the report of the Secretary-General of 11 March 1994 (S/1994/291) on "arrangements relating to the cease-fire and ensuring the freedom of movement in and around Sarajevo", including the additional tasks set out in paragraph 14 thereof, emphasizes the need for UNPROFOR to deploy its resources in a flexible manner, in particular in and around the safe areas, and authorizes UNPROFOR to carry out these tasks in relation to the cease-fire entered into by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat party, and, following a report by the Secretary-General and within existing resources, in relation to any further cease-fire agreed between the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuit of the peace process;

12. Encourages the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia, in cooperation with the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to use his good offices as appropriate to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in that Republic;

13. Urges the parties to seize the opportunity provided by UNPROFOR's continuation to bring the peace process to successful conclusion;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed on progress towards implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions, taking into account the position of the Government of the Republic of Croatia as well as on the outcome of the negotiations within the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and decides to reconsider UNPROFOR's mandate at any time according to the developments on the ground and in the negotiations;

15. Welcomes the appointment by the Secretary-General of a senior civilian official for the restoration of essential public services in and around Sarajevo in accordance with the provisions of resolution 900 (1994) (S/1994/368);

16. Commends in this context the setting up of the Interim Coordination Board (ICBO) to assess the situation in Sarajevo in order to facilitate the task of this senior official;

17. Welcomes the establishment by the Secretary-General on 21 March 1994 of a voluntary trust fund for the restoration of essential public services in and around Sarajevo, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 900 (1994), and strongly appeals to the international community to take voluntary financial contributions to this trust fund;

18. Notes with appreciation the steps being taken by the Secretary-General, UNPROFOR and other United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations to restore normal life to all areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, encourages them to continue their efforts; and, in this context, requests the Secretary-General to consider ways and means of further enhancing the work of the civilian component of UNPROFOR;

19. Calls on the parties to honour their commitments to ensure UNHCR and UNPROFOR unimpeded access throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in performance of their mandate, and in particular calls upon the Bosnian Croat party to release infrastructure equipment and material urgently needed for humanitarian relief;

20. Welcomes the presence of UNPROFOR personnel and arrival of humanitarian convoys in Maglaj, but expresses however once again its deep concern at the situation there;

21. Welcomes also the contribution of UNPROFOR, within its available resources, to the restoration of safety and security to the area in and around Maglaj in order to promote the well-being of its inhabitants;

22. Demands that the Bosnian Serb party cease forthwith all military operations against the town of Maglaj and remove all obstacles to free access to it; condemns all such obstacles; and calls upon all parties to show restraint;

23. Takes note of the assessment by the Secretary-General on the feasibility of extending the safe area concept to Maglaj (S/1994/291), and requests him to keep the situation under review and to report to the Council as appropriate;

24. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed on developments in regard to the implementation of UNPROFOR's mandate;

25. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

APPENDIX C

SELECTED NATO COMMUNICATIONS

This appendix contains selected NATO news releases and speeches made during April 1993 to September 1995 regarding NATO support for the UN in Bosnia. These items were found on the NATO Homepage.

Contents

1. NATO press release (93)29 of 12th April 1993 NATO starts operation of no-fly zone enforcement.
2. Excerpt from the OPENING STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE NAC MINISTERIAL IN ATHENS of June 10, 1993 - The UN is the lead agency in Bosnia and NATO will support its efforts.
3. NATO PRESS RELEASE (93) 52 of August 9, 1993 - DECISIONS TAKEN AT THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON 9TH AUGUST 1993 - NATO will use airpower in support on the UN in Bosnia.
4. Excerpts of a SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO, MR. MANFRED WOERNER to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Brussels, September 10, 1993 - NATO will continue to support the UN in Bosnia but will retain the ability to act independently if it so chooses.
5. NATO press release (94)32 of April 22, 1994 DECISIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF SAFE AREAS TAKEN AT THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON 22ND APRIL 1994 - NATO will use airpower to protect UN safe areas. The Gorazde 20km heavy-weapons exclusion zone is announced and Bosnian-Serbs given 24 hours to withdraw. NATO airstrikes in response to aggression against safe areas will not be limited to the immediate area but may include strikes on a wider set of targets.
6. NATO press release (94)103 of October 28, 1994 PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED JOINTLY BY UN AND NATO - The UN and NATO have finalized procedures for using NATO airpower in support of UN operations in Bosnia. The Dual-Key arrangement remains in effect and offending parties will be given only general warning of impending attacks.
7. NATO press release (94)114 of November 24, 1994
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DECISIONS FROM ITS 24 NOVEMBER MEETING

Condemns Bosnian-Serb attacks on Bihac and reaffirm NATO's willingness to use airpower to ensure the safety of the region.

8. Excerpts of a SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO at the Pio Manzu "Big Millennium" Conference, Rimini, Italy on 13th November 1994 - NATO is working with the UN to establish peace in Bosnia and will use airpower to protect the UN safe areas.

9. Excerpt from the OPENING STATEMENT OF U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER AT THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, NATO HEADQUARTERS, BRUSSELS, of December 1, 1994. -NATO is working with the UN for peace in Bosnia.

10. NATO press statement by the Secretary General following North Atlantic Council Meeting on 25 July 1995 - NATO has finalized plans to launch airstrikes to protect Gorazde and is developing plans to conduct operations in support of other safe areas.

11. NATO press statement by the SECRETARY GENERAL FOLLOWING THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING ON 1ST AUGUST 1995 - The Bosnian Serbs have desisted in attacks on Gorazde so NATO air attacks will not occur. However, NATO is ready and willing to use airpower to support UNPROFOR and to protect any safe area in Bosnia.

12. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOLLOWING NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING - 2 SEPTEMBER 1995 - The Bosnian Serbs initial response to DELIBERATE FORCE has been inadequate and NATO airstrikes will resume immediately.

13. NATO press release (95)79 of September 5, 1995 STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO - NATO airstrikes under DELIBERATE FORCE have resumed and will continue until the Bosnian Serbs comply with FCUNPF's stated conditions.

1. NATO PRESS RELEASE(93)29 of 12th April 1993
NATO STARTS OPERATION OF NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT

NATO started its operation of the no-fly zone enforcement over Bosnia-Herzegovina at 12 o'clock GMT following the information which NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner sent last Friday in a letter to the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. NATO's action is being undertaken under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 816 and has been decided by the North Atlantic Council at its meeting on April 8th 1993.

SACEUR has directed the commanders concerned - CINCSOUTH and Commander 5 ATAF - to take the necessary action. In the initial phase aircraft of France, the Netherlands and the US are involved in the operation in addition to the NATO AWACS planes.

NATO's action in support of the UN follows NATO's decision - set out by the NAC Ministerials in Oslo in June 1992 and in Brussels in December 1992 - to support on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with NATO's own procedures peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN.

2. Excerpt from the OPENING STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE NAC MINISTERIAL IN ATHENS of June 10, 1993

...Foremost on our minds remains the bloody conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Today we will examine how NATO can further contribute beyond what it is doing already to support the efforts of the United Nations to arrive at a peaceful settlement and stop the fighting and suffering in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We should convey a clear and coherent position of our Alliance towards this conflict and our readiness to continue to play our part in support of the current and future resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

The United Nations has the lead and the responsibility for action in the former Yugoslavia. NATO has offered its support the United Nations, both politically and by contributing its capabilities to UN peacekeeping missions. Thus far the Alliance has done everything the UN has asked of it and it has done so effectively. We recognise the special responsibility our Alliance has for security in Europe. Therefore we have to be ready to contribute even more towards a solution. Our support will be of particular importance to prevent a spillover of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina to neighbouring territories.

3. NATO PRESS RELEASE (93) 52 of August 9, 1993 - DECISIONS TAKEN AT THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON 9TH AUGUST 1993

The COUNCIL takes note:

Of the report on the development of the Geneva negotiations presented today. It renews its firm support for the negotiations, reaffirms that any solution to the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict requires the implementation of the relevant UNSC resolutions, the conclusion of a lasting ceasefire and the implementation of a durable settlement, and confirms its willingness to participate in such implementation. The Council underlines again that the air strikes foreseen by the Council decisions of August 2 are limited to the support of humanitarian relief, and must not be interpreted as a decision to intervene militarily in the conflict. All parties should therefore resume without delay the negotiations.

Of the latest developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The situation for the population continues to be dramatic and unacceptable. There should be no doubt about the firm determination of NATO and its member nations to act against those responsible so that the resolutions of the UN Security Council are respected and the suffering brought to an end. In this context, it is essential that the Bosnian Serbs lift without delay the siege of Sarajevo and that the heights around the city and the means of access are placed under the control of UNPROFOR. Actions and provocations throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina jeopardizing the delivery of humanitarian assistance should cease.

Of the importance of taking into account the safety of UN and relief agency personnel.

Of the position set out by the UN Secretary General in his letter of August 4 and confirms that NATO's actions take place under the authority of the United Nations Security Council, within the framework of the relevant UNSC resolutions, including UN Security Council resolutions 770, 776 and 836, and in support of UNPROFOR as it carries out its overall mandate.

The COUNCIL decides:

1. To approve, recalling the assessments set forth in the covering memorandum, the "Operational Options for Air Strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina" forwarded by the Military Committee pursuant to the Council's August 2 decision, including the targeting identification process and NATO/UN command and control arrangements for air strikes. In particular, the Council agrees with the position of the UN Secretary-General that the first use of air power in the theatre shall be authorized by him. With respect to NATO, the NAC shall be the political authority that will decide on the conduct of airstrikes, which will be carried out in coordination with the UN.
2. To maintain a close, day-by-day review of the situation on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina and at the negotiations in Geneva, and to be prepared to re-convene at short notice to decide whether to implement air strikes in accordance with the Operational Options approved in paragraph 1 above. Such a meeting may be requested by any member of the Alliance or by SACEUR or in response to a request from the UN.
3. To authorize the Secretary General to respond to the UN Secretary-General's letter of August 4, informing him of the results of today's meeting and informing him that the essential elements of the Operational Options approved today by the NAC, which were developed in full cooperation with UNPROFOR and which ensure close NATO/UN coordination in the planning and implementation of air strikes in Bosnia, will be forwarded to him.
4. To authorize the Secretary General to announce publicly the results of today's meeting, stating that NATO has approved the Operational Options for air strikes as called for on August 2, and is prepared to act in coordination with the UN, when and if the situation demands.
5. To direct SACEUR, in coordination with UNPROFOR, to proceed on an urgent basis with the target identification and planning required to carry out the Operational Options approved today, including the associated detailed changes needed to the relevant operational plans.

4. Excerpts of a SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO, MR MANFRED WOERNER to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Brussels, September 10, 1993

...What is the consequence of the failure of the international community to deal successfully with a major crisis, such as ex-Yugoslavia? Shall we abandon our objective of building a new international order based on human rights, the rule of law and democracy? Shall we renounce our goal of a new, more democratic, just and peaceful European order? Shall we give up our concept of interlocking institutions before we have even had a chance to implement it fully? Shall we just leave the world to the forces of disorder and limit ourselves to safeguarding our own national borders and security, or at most, to attempting to contain the crisis spots so as to prevent them from spreading?

My answers are clearly no. We simply cannot afford such passivity, not only because it goes against our principles and morals, but also because it goes against our national self-interests. In the world of today you simply cannot live in security surrounded by chaos. We should draw the lessons of our failures and resolve to do better. Some of the lessons are obvious:

- First, political solutions and diplomatic efforts will only work if backed by the necessary military power and the credible resolve to use it against an aggressor;
- Second, if you cannot or do not want to help the victim of aggression, enable him to help himself;
- Third, the purpose of intervention is not necessarily to win a war, but to influence the behaviour of the party concerned. We need to have limited military options for limited political or diplomatic objectives. It is wrong to think only in categories of all or nothing;
- Fourth, threaten only if you are determined to implement the threat;
- Fifth, define the strategic objectives of your actions as early and as clearly as possible;
- Sixth, crisis prevention, like deterrence, will work only if your resolve to prevent conflict is credible and accompanied by firm action;
- Seventh, avoid situations in which your own troops become hostages;
- Finally, the most important lesson is, of course: that no international organisation can work efficiently without the political will and unity of its member nations. This is true as much for the United Nations as for the EC or NATO.

In the future, nevertheless, effective crisis management will also frequently depend on close cooperation between major international organisations -- especially the UN and NATO, at least for the wider European region. The UN and NATO can complement each other to the benefit of both. The United Nations lacks the forces, the infrastructure, the logistics, and the command and control facilities for major military operations. Only NATO can offer these assets. For NATO, in turn, cooperation with the UN facilitates the Alliance's new role in crisis management; it puts our efforts in a broad, internationally accepted context. Moreover, it also increases public awareness and acceptance of crisis management. So the future may well see frequent and close cooperation between the UN and NATO.

Of course, every institution keeps its specific and autonomous character. NATO cannot be regarded as an instrument or as a military sub-contractor to the United Nations. Nor do we expect that the United Nations should accept NATO's leadership. Both must retain the possibility to act independently. This is not only obvious for the United Nations, but it also applies to NATO, even in crisis management, acting, for example, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. We need to develop a true partnership between both organisations. We have successfully started to do so. That will help to chart a course that maximises the strengths of both organisations. Of course, an appreciation of the different structures, missions, approaches and memberships highlights that such a partnership will not be an easy one. NATO is not a global organisation and will not act as such. What counts is that both organisations cooperate more closely in trying to overcome the mismatch between the mandates and means of our security institutions.

It has become fashionable to blame NATO for the failure of the international community to solve the Bosnian conflict. This allegation is not borne out by the facts. When the Yugoslav crisis erupted, it was quickly declared the "Hour of Europe". When it was clear that the European Community's efforts would not stop the war, the responsibility was taken over by the United Nations and has remained there since. No one asked NATO to take over, certainly none of today's critics. Quite the contrary, any proposal to do so would have met with fierce resistance by non-NATO nations as well as some of our own members. And indeed there were very good reasons for turning to the United Nations: its renewed authority after the end of the Cold War stalemate; the need for broad international legitimacy under the UN Charter for any outside intervention; and

the prospect of gaining the support of the non-Western world, including Russia. By and large, these reasons still prevail. Even when NATO finally took the initiative to threaten air strikes to relieve the strangulation of Sarajevo and other safe areas, the final authorisation to employ air power was vested in the Secretary General of the United Nations. So, it is not a specious argument to state that NATO was and is not in charge.

It is true: NATO has offered its support to the United Nations and it has done everything the UN has asked, and has done so efficiently. We are enforcing the embargo at sea and the no-fly zone in the air. We have supplied UNPROFOR with command and control equipment and we have coordinated our military planning with the United Nations. We have also offered the UN our protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR and we are prepared to use air strikes, if necessary, to relieve strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas. All of these tasks are being performed with the professionalism and dedication you expect from this Alliance.

5. NATO PRESS RELEASE (94)32 of April 22, 1994 DECISIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF SAFE AREAS TAKEN AT THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON 22ND APRIL 1994

The COUNCIL:

- (1) Condemned the recent Bosnian Serb attacks against the UN-declared safe area of Gorazde and the threats to the other safe areas;
- (2) Reaffirmed the readiness of the Alliance, as stated in the January NATO Summit, to support the UN in its efforts to protect the safe areas, as authorized under UN Security Council Resolution 824, 836 and 844, noting also Security Council Resolution 913;
- (3) Reaffirmed its support for negotiated settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and called for the intensification of the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, and in this context, welcomed the coordination and close consultation between the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Nations and the European Union, with the aim of bringing together current diplomatic initiatives;
- (4) Reiterated its determination to carry out its previous decisions in support of UNPROFOR including its decisions of 9th February concerning Sarajevo;
- (5) Supported efforts underway to establish a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina and called for an immediate end to all Bosnian Serb attacks against the safe areas;
- (6) demanded strict respect for the safety of UNPROFOR and other UN and relief agency personnel throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the right of free access of all these personnel to UN-designated safe areas, and reaffirmed NATO's readiness to provide close air support in the event Bosnian Serb forces attack UNPROFOR or other UN and relief agency personnel throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina or forcibly interface with the conduct of their mandate;
- (7) agreed that a "military exclusion zone" (within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina) is established for 20 kilometres around Gorazde, which calls for all Bosnian Serb heavy weapons

(including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launches, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons) to be withdrawn by 0001 GMT on 27th April 1994;

(8) Agreed that if the safe areas of Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla or Zepa are attacked by heavy weapons from any range or if, in the common judgment of the NATO Military Commanders and UN Military Commanders, there is a concentration or movement of heavy weapons within a radius of 20 kilometres of these areas (within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina) which threatens those areas will, for the purposes of this decision and without further action of the Council, be designated, and due public notice to governments and to the parties will be given if and when this happens. The exact line of the perimeter of these areas will be established jointly by UNPROFOR and CINCSOUTH;

(9) In pursuit of these objectives, and in response to the request of the UN Secretary General of 18th April 1994, agreed:

(a) That, with immediate effect, if any Bosnian Serb attacks involving heavy weapons are carried out on the UN-designated safe areas of Gorazde, Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Zepa, these weapons and other Bosnian Serb Military assets, as well as their direct and essential military support facilities, including but not limited to fuel installations and munitions sites, will be subject to NATO air strikes, in accordance with the procedural arrangements worked out between NATO and UNPROFOR following the Council Decisions of the 2nd and 9th August 1993;

(b) That, after 0001 GMT on 27th April 1994, if any Bosnian Serb heavy weapons are within any designated military exclusion zone as described above, these weapons and other Bosnian Serb military assets, as well as their direct and essential military support facilities, including but not limited to fuel installations and munitions sites, will be subjected to NATO air strikes, in accordance with the procedural arrangements worked out between NATO and UNPROFOR following the Council's decisions of 2nd and 9th August 1993;

(c) That consistent with its decisions of 2nd and 9th August 1993, any violation of the above provisions of this decision will, without further action by the Council, constitute grounds for the NATO Military Authorities to initiate air attacks in conformity with targeting options as mentioned in 9 (a) and (b), including any other military assets directly related to the violation and located in the vicinity of the area concerned. Such attacks will be carried out in coordination with UNPROFOR;

(d) That the NATO Military Authorities, if they judge it necessary to respond effectively to a particular violation of the above provisions of this decisions, may recommend the initiation of additional air attacks, to be carried out in coordination with UNPROFOR. Such recommendations will be conveyed to the Secretary General through the NATO chain of command for Council decisions;

(e) That, once air attacks have been carried out against a specific target set pursuant to these decisions, the NATO Military Authorities may continue to carry out, in coordination with UNPROFOR, the attacks against that target set until NATO Military Authorities judge the mission to be accomplished;

(f) To reaffirm the Council's decision of 9th February 1994 authorizing the appropriate NATO Military Authorities to initiate air attacks to suppress air defence that would represent a direct threat to NATO aircraft in carrying out the above operations using the agreed coordination procedures with and prerogative to take all necessary and appropriate action for self-defence in the case of an observed hostile act;

(g) To instruct the NATO Military Authorities to delegate to CINCSOUTH the necessary authority to implement these decisions, in coordination with UNPROFOR in accordance with the relevant OPLAN, as prescribed by the Council on 2nd and 9th August 1993;

(10) Called upon the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina not to undertake offensive military action from within the safe areas and, to this end, to cooperate with any UNPROFOR monitoring of their heavy weapons;

(11) Invited the Secretary General to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations of these decisions.

6. NATO PRESS RELEASE (94)103 of October 28, 1994
PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED JOINTLY BY UN AND NATO

Following meetings in New York, the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have reached a series of understandings concerning the use of NATO airpower in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Based on these understandings, which have been transmitted to UNPROFOR and to NATO Military Authorities, NATO airstrikes will be conducted on a timely basis. While general warning may be given to an offending party, tactical warning of impending air strikes, in principle, will not. Under normal circumstances, several targets, where possible three or four, will be authorized for each air strike, which will be carried out by NATO in close coordination with UNPROFOR.

"Dual-key" arrangements remain in effect, ensuring that decisions on targeting and execution will be taken jointly by UN and NATO military commanders. The principle of proportionality in response to a violation will continue to be respected, as will the need to avoid unacceptable casualties.

The two Secretaries General confirm once again the excellent co-operation of the two organizations in the implementation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. They reaffirm their conviction that the prospect of the effective use of airpower, under the authority of the Security Council and in accordance with the relevant NAC decisions, should deter attacks against UNPROFOR and violations of Security Council resolutions.

7. NATO PRESS RELEASE (94)114 of November 24, 1994
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DECISIONS FROM ITS 24 NOVEMBER MEETING

The Council:

- (1) Condemns the recent attacks on the UN safe area of Bihac by Bosnian Serb and Krajina Serb forces; calls for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of these forces; and supports the ongoing UN negotiating efforts to this end;
- (2) Supports ongoing diplomatic efforts to create an effective stabilization in and around Bihac, and would be ready to consider how to assist the United Nations in implementing these objectives once they have been agreed;
- (3) Strongly supports diplomatic approaches to the parties by the Contact Group, which reflect the Alliance's firm commitment to a negotiated settlement;
- (4) Recalls its decision of 22nd April 1994 that if any Bosnian Serb attacks involving heavy weapons were carried out on UN designated safe areas, including Bihac, these weapons and other Bosnian Serb military assets, as well as their direct and essential support facilities, including but not limited to fuel installations and munitions sites, would be subject to NATO air strikes, in accordance with the procedural arrangements worked out between NATO and UNPROFOR following the Council decisions of 2nd and 9th August 1993;
- (5) Recalls also its decision of 19th November 1994 authorising air strikes in response to attacks against or which threaten the UN safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina launched from the UN protected areas in Croatia;
- (6) Decides that, in addition, attacks on the safe areas from within Bosnia involving heavy weapons of forces other than Bosnian Serbs will also be subject to NATO air strikes, in accordance with the existing arrangements for coordination with UNPROFOR;
- (7) Recalls its decision of 22nd April 1994 concerning the designation of military exclusion zones around UN safe areas, including Bihac; and declares its readiness to use NATO air power in support of that decision should the NATO and UNPROFOR commanders on the ground designate any further exclusion zones pursuant to it;
- (8) Declares its readiness to carry out air strikes in pursuit of these decisions, subject to agreement with UNPROFOR;
- (9) Decides that NATO air power may be used, under the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 958, against aircraft flying in Croatian air space which have been engaged in attacks on or which threaten UN safe areas, subject to making arrangements with the Croatian authorities;
- (10) Tasks the NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) to advise on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a no-fly zone in the UN protected areas of Croatia;
- (11) Tasks the NMAs to report as soon as possible on the means by which the Alliance with its member states can contribute to UNPROFOR in the performance of its mission.

8. Excerpts of a SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO at the Pio Manzu "Big Millennium" Conference, Rimini, Italy on 13th November 1994

President Bush, President Gorbachev, Minister Bernini, Minister Fisichella, other members of the Italian government, Mr. Pico, distinguished officials, ladies and gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to address the distinguished Pio Manzu forum, which has contributed so much to our understanding of global political and economic issues...

...NATO is currently playing, as you know, an important role in Bosnia. We are imposing a No-fly Zone, and have basically prevented the use of air power as an instrument of war. We are enforcing trade and weapons embargoes -- and let me make clear that, whatever the impact of Congressional legislation on US participation, NATO will continue to enforce fully and totally all the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, including both embargoes. We are also ready to authorise air strikes in response to attacks against safe areas or against UNPROFOR...One point should be clear about NATO's involvement in former Yugoslavia, and that is that we are not acting independently, but rather in support of the United Nations, in order to underpin the efforts of the international community to achieve a negotiated settlement. We do not have the lead in former Yugoslavia, but we are attempting to impress upon the UN the need to use NATO air power in credible and effective ways. I believe that, within the inherent limits of our mandate, we have accomplished a lot. The embargo has certainly encouraged Belgrade to accept the Contact Group's peace plan and isolate the Bosnian Serbs; and the threat - and occasional use - of our air power has provided virtually the only protection to the people of the Safe Areas, as well as help deter attacks against UNPROFOR. Of course, cooperation between NATO and the UN -- two very different organisations, with different structures and bureaucratic "cultures" -- has been a learning experience.

9. Excerpt from the OPENING STATEMENT OF U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER AT THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, NATO HEADQUARTERS, BRUSSELS, of December 1, 1994.

Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, and friends. I am privileged to serve as your President d'Honneur at our first formal meeting since we selected Willy Claes to succeed the brilliant and dedicated Manfred Woerner...

As we meet today to continue to adapt this great Alliance, we are keenly aware that the end of the Cold War has brought not only opportunities, but serious challenges. The terrible conflict in Bosnia continues to resist resolution. It has challenged NATO and all the institutions that have dealt with it. Frankly, when this conflict emerged from the ashes of the Cold War, the international community was insufficiently prepared. The world ultimately turned to the United Nations to shoulder the principal responsibility.

For its part, NATO has done whatever has been asked of it by the United Nations. It has established a no-fly zone and prevented the conflict from becoming an air war. It has maintained the sanctions pressure, and it has been instrumental in preventing the spread of the conflict. Contrary to some reports, NATO has not ruled out the use of air power. NATO stands ready to use air power, when requested, pursuant to United Nations resolutions. Now, our task

continues to be to seek a peaceful negotiated end to the conflict, one that will preserve Bosnia's territorial integrity. We should renew our efforts to seek an immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. We should pursue with the parties the terms for a settlement, building on the Contact Group plan.

10. NATO PRESS STATEMENT by the Secretary General following North Atlantic Council Meeting on 25 July 1995

Following the London Conference last Friday, a specific warning was issued that any attack by the Bosnian Serbs on Gorazde would be met with a substantial and decisive response. Last Saturday, the North Atlantic Council met and, in the light of the gravity of the situation, directed the NATO Military Authorities immediately to prepare plans to implement this warning.

Today, following intensive work by the NATO Military Authorities, the North Atlantic Council has approved the necessary planning to ensure that NATO air power would be used in a timely and effective way should the Bosnian Serbs threaten or attack Gorazde. We have also invited the NATO Military Authorities urgently to formulate proposals on how this planning could be applied to the other Safe Areas, in view particularly of the current very serious situation in Bihac. The planning we have undertaken is built upon the Council's decisions of August 1993 and April 1994 and falls under the authority of existing UN Security Council resolutions. Over the past few days, I have had contacts with Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and after the Council tonight I made the first reports over the phone regarding the decisions and I have immediately sent to Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali a detailed summary of our decisions so that he has the opportunity with his experts to study immediately the contents of the decisions made by the NAC. NATO will now be working urgently together with the UN to ensure the necessary coordination.

For reasons that I hope you will understand, I do not want to go into operational details. Suffice it to say that NATO's planning is designed to ensure that military preparations by the Bosnian Serbs which are judged to present a direct threat to Gorazde, or direct Bosnian Serb attacks on Gorazde, will be met with the firm and rapid response of NATO's air power. The planning provides for NATO and the UN to take the necessary decisions to launch significant air strikes in the event of such actions. There is a strong feeling among Allies that such operations, once they are launched, will not lightly be discontinued. In the face of the inherent risks, the Alliance is determined.

Let me underline once again NATO's strong support for the continued efforts of the international community, including those of the Contact Group, to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia through the diplomatic process. The ultimate aim of a negotiated, political settlement cannot be attained unless the current offensives against the UN safe areas cease and all sides desist from further military action. It is the hope of the North Atlantic Council that today's decisions will contribute to stopping the current offensives and restarting the peace process.

NATO continues to support the presence of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, which is essential to help relieve the human suffering and support the search for a peaceful settlement. Today's decisions are intended to underpin that presence.

11. NATO PRESS STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOLLOWING THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING ON 1ST AUGUST 1995

Last week, the North Atlantic Council approved the necessary planning to deter an attack by Bosnian Serbs against Gorazde. The warning we issued on that occasion has thus far been heeded - and we expect it to continue to be heeded. For any attack on Gorazde will be met with the firm and rapid response of NATO's airpower. Today NATO is ready to take the same robust action to defend the other Safe Areas in Bosnia - Bihac, Tuzla and Sarajevo.

The North Atlantic Council has reviewed the work of the NATO Military Authorities on how our planning for Gorazde can be applied to these three other Safe Areas. We have been particularly concerned by the very serious situation in Bihac. The Council has today approved the necessary planning to deter attacks by any party - I stress any party - on the Safe Areas of Bihac, Tuzla and Sarajevo. As is the case already with Gorazde, our planning will ensure that military preparations which are judged to represent a direct threat to the UN Safe Areas or direct attacks upon them will be met with the firm and rapid response of NATO's airpower. We will use this airpower under the procedures approved last week by the Council and which were subsequently agreed with the UN for Gorazde. Let me add that at the request of the UN we will use NATO airpower also to provide close air support to any UN personnel throughout Bosnia and the UN sectors of Croatia that come under attack.

Our decisions today therefore build on those that were taken with respect to Gorazde. At the same time, we recognize that the application of NATO's airpower must take the different characteristics of each Safe Area into account. Bihac, in particular, is a complex case because of the large number of different parties involved in the fighting. Because of its proximity to Croatia I will be informing President Tudjman of certain aspects of our decisions that relate to Bihac.

A few moments ago I informed the Secretary General of the United Nations of the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council today. I have asked him, if appropriate, to issue warnings to all the parties and to communicate to them that it is the intention of these decisions to protect safe areas and not to assist any of the parties to take action against another.

Finally, I wish to stress once again that NATO's actions are in support of the United Nations. We continue to support the presence of the UN forces in the Former Yugoslavia. Our actions are intended to underpin the search for a political settlement. In this respect, the Alliance is gravely preoccupied by the extremely dangerous situation both in Croatia and in Bosnia which carries the risk of an even wider, more explosive conflict. We urge all parties both in Croatia and in Bosnia to exercise restraint and to desist from further military action. We call on them to enter into serious negotiations to achieve a lasting peace throughout the former Yugoslavia.

12. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOLLOWING NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING - 2 SEPTEMBER 1995

The Council took note of a report by the NATO military commanders on Operation "Deliberate Force". The reply of General Mladic is not sufficient and does not constitute a basis

for terminating air strikes. We expect the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the conditions of the United Nations and in particular:

- No Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo or other Safe Areas;
- Bosnian Serbs withdrawal of heavy weapons from the 20 km total exclusion zone around Sarajevo without delay;
- Complete freedom of movement for UN forces and personnel and NGOs and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport.

The NATO military commanders are authorized to resume air strikes at any moment in conformity with the Council's decisions of 25th July and 1st August. The NATO military commanders are pursuing for a brief period the suspension of air strikes in order to determine if the conditions of the United Nations have begun to be implemented by the Bosnian Serbs. This period will be determined by joint agreement of the UN and NATO military commanders. Assuming Bosnian Serb compliance, Bosnian Government forces are expected to show restraint and not take advantage of the situation in and around Sarajevo. NATO air operations continue over Bosnia-Herzegovina and NATO aircraft will react immediately to any attack or display of hostile intent against them by Bosnian Serbs.

13. NATO PRESS RELEASE (95)79 of September 5, 1995
STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

NATO aircraft operating within the provisions of Operation "Deliberate Force", today (05 September 1995), at 13.08 LOCAL, resumed attacks on Bosnian-Serb military targets in Bosnia. The air operations were reinitiated after UN and NATO military commanders concluded that the Bosnian Serbs had failed to demonstrate their intent to comply with United Nations demands to remove military threats against Sarajevo.

The initial strikes, which began 30 August, were temporarily suspended 01 September to permit meetings between UN and Bosnian Serb officials. On 03 September, the North Atlantic Council, taking note of a report by the NATO military commanders on Operation "Deliberate Force", stated that the Bosnian-Serb reply to UN demands was not a sufficient basis for the termination of air strikes, and set out specific conditions.

Since 03 September, the Force Commander, UN Peace Forces and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe have conducted an extensive joint assessment to determine if the Bosnian-Serbs had begun to implement the UN conditions. While some movement of Bosnian-Serb military equipment was observed overnight 04 September, the NATO and UN commanders agreed that the movements were not significant, and therefore judged that the Bosnian-Serbs have failed to comply. The consequences of such a failure have been repeatedly made clear by the North Atlantic Council and the United Nations, and communicated directly to the Bosnian-Serbs by the UN Peace Force Commander. Accordingly, NATO aircraft were directed to recommence the Operation "Deliberate Force" air strike campaign.

Our objective remains attaining the compliance of the Bosnian Serbs to cease attacks on Sarajevo or other Safe Areas; the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the total

exclusion zone around Sarajevo, without delay; complete freedom of movement for UN forces and personnel and NGOs and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport.

We hope that this operation will make clear to the Bosnian Serbs the futility of further military actions and convince all parties of the determination of the Alliance to implement its decisions. We call again upon all parties to exercise restraint. No one should seek military benefit from our action. NATO remains strongly committed to the continued efforts of the international community, including those of the Contact Group, to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia through the diplomatic process. I regret that we again must resort to the use of military force to obtain compliance of the Bosnian Serbs. No one can doubt our resolve to see this matter through.

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