



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**ARMY ROTC: A STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING
TOMORROW'S ARMY LEADERSHIP IN A
CLIMATE OF DIMINISHING RESOURCES**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES D. BETONEY
United States Army**

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

19971006 147

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.**

USAWC CLASS OF 1997



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

UNCLASSIFIED

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ARMY ROTC: A STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING TOMORROW'S ARMY
LEADERSHIP IN A CLIMATE OF DIMINISHING RESOURCES

by

Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Betoney
United States Army

Dr. Jerry Davis
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public
release. Distribution is
unlimited.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	iii
Introduction	1
Background	4
Assumptions	5
The Past	10
The Present	11
The Future	17
Integration	17
Innovation	22
Jointness	29
Other Potential Strategies.....	30
Conclusions and Recommendations	35
Bibliography.....	38
Endnotes.....	39

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Charles D. Betoney (LTC), USAR
TITLE: Army ROTC: A Strategy for Developing Tomorrow's Army
Leadership in an Era of Diminishing Resources
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 15 May 1997 PAGES: 40 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The end of the Cold War has caused a massive restructuring of the Armed Forces and has precipitated nearly unprecedented force structure downsizing based upon the perceived reduced threat to national security. In addition to reshaping the military forces to meet the warfighting and peacekeeping requirements, a new national strategy must include how to man, equip, and train those national defense organizations that remain. This study addresses the need to continue a viable Army ROTC program to produce high quality junior officers as well as maintain a positive, mutually beneficial presence on university and college campuses throughout the nation during what promises to be an era of severely restrained resources. The paper begins with a brief historical look at officer training and moves through the present to the future in how to reshape and refocus Army ROTC to continue a viable, successful on-campus program.

INTRODUCTION

The Evil Empire has been defeated. Yesterday's greatest adversary is just another fledgling democracy struggling with the challenges of newly-found freedoms and a market economy. Images of superpowers staring across an Iron Curtain built on fear and distrust, with each other in their nuclear sights, are but memories that many are busily trying to forget.

Now that peace has broken out and the thought of possible U.S. devastation from armed attack seems quite remote, the priorities at home are being redirected away from national defense to domestic and economic issues, which many feel have been neglected because of the attention and resources spent on building the preeminent international military force. The focus has turned to balancing the national budget, decreasing the national debt, and expanding the national economy through international engagement toward a goal of unparalleled times of uninterrupted prosperity.

Although the world shows signs of serious political instability and the chances for armed conflict are great in various "hotspots" around the globe, the conventional wisdom indicates that the threat of direct armed attack against U.S. territory by a major hostile power is very remote. Consequently, the major emphasis of the federal government has turned to domestic issues, many would say to the overall detriment of long-range national security.

This is certainly not the first time in our history that the focus of national policy has turned to the dramatic reduction of military forces. In fact, after every major conflict since the American Revolution, this country has rushed to dismantle the instruments of war. Such is the nature of democracies to distrust things military; history has proven that to be the case with ours.

The "Bottom-Up Review" of 1993 began the investigative thought process of reevaluating the basic structure of the national defense organization. The next step in this process of reshaping U.S. military forces came with the first "Quadrennial Strategy Review," a congressionally mandated reassessment of defense policy, which began formally in January 1997. Much of Washington's security policy community, both inside and outside the Pentagon, has devoted considerable attention to it. It is the beginning of an in-depth analysis of the nation's military needs for the next century and an attempt to develop a national consensus on what should be done for the future.¹ Whatever direction it eventually takes, political agenda items are most surely to weigh in as heavily as security issues as the competition for dollars in a constrained budgetary environment becomes increasingly fierce.

This paper begins with the premise that the defense review process will conclude that ever-increasing technological advances can be leveraged to replace force structure on the battlefield of the future. This conclusion will lead to further force reductions.

Historically, these reductions have had a significant negative impact on the training base. This brief study examines the effect that downsizing will have on the Army ROTC on-campus program. It addresses the need to continue a viable Army ROTC to produce high quality junior officers and maintain a mutually beneficial (to the military establishment and academia) presence on campuses throughout the nation. It does not examine all of the possibilities in restructuring the program, nor does it address the differing philosophies of the “best” commissioning sources (military academies, officer candidate schools, etc.). Those have been done in other studies, many with conclusions supporting an organization or philosophy whose cause the author(s) had championed.

This paper accepts the political reality that the Army ROTC on-campus program will continue on a significant number of college and university campuses and attempts to outline an education strategy for the future. Beginning with a historical perspective on the ups and downs of the Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, this study examines changes in organizational structure, integration of reserve components, adjunct faculty, and joint training, incorporation of distance learning technologies, and curriculum restructuring required in this era of diminishing resources to formulate an educational strategy for the future that will maintain the viability of the largest commissioning source of America’s Army.

BACKGROUND

Although a number of civilian educational institutions hosted military instruction on their campuses very early in the history of the United States, it is generally accepted that the passage of the Morrill Act on July 2, 1862 began the widespread inclusion of military instruction into college curricula across the nation. With the signing of that legislation, also known as the "Land Grant College Bill," land grant colleges became endowed with the stipulation that military tactics had to be taught on campus.²

Since that time, there has been an on-going debate about how well or how poorly the program has been presented. Limiting the discussion here to the comments made about the Army curriculum, it is fair to say that almost everybody with a particular ax to grind jumped into the fray. Senior university and college officials protested that too much time was spent on tactical training rather than college level education. Senior Army leaders complained that not enough time was devoted to the aspects of military training which developed military leaders. Various government auditors have continually questioned the efficacy and efficiency of how many campus programs were run. With all of the carping, complaining, and nit-picking that has persisted over the past 165 years, it is truly amazing that on-campus military programs have managed to produce the hundreds of thousands of commissioned officers that have served with distinction in service to the country. Those same arguments (and others) continue today, and as the competition for diminishing dollars intensifies, the assault on the resources needed to maintain viable Army ROTC programs will increase.

ASSUMPTIONS

As in any study, certain assumptions must be accepted if any of the arguments presented are to have any relevance. Although some studies make initial presumptions intended to strengthen their positions, the following reflect current conditions, accepted doctrinal concepts, and "best guesses" regarding the future resulting from decisions which will have to be made after the current defense review process is completed. Simply stated, the following assumptions are specifically the reasons Army ROTC training can be and must be changed to accommodate new missions and new organizational roles:

1. Available resources (\$) will continue to decrease. As the momentum for budget balancing, infrastructure rebuilding, and entitlement maintenance increases, defense dollars will be looked upon as "bill payers" for other underfunded programs. With the absence of armed conflict or a peer threat to national security, military funding becomes very vulnerable to attacks.
2. Force structure will be significantly reduced. As technology is looked upon to replace troop masses to neutralize or destroy the enemy, force numbers will be reduced to pay for those new systems of enhanced lethality that also provide increased protection for deployed friendly troops. Availability of funds weighs in heavily for this particular issue. The move away from Cold War staffing levels is viewed in many quarters as a cash cow for funding entitlement and infrastructure programs and/or helping to balance the federal budget.

3. Warfighting units will demand a higher percentage of available personnel.

Throughout this country's history of alternating military build-up during times of national crisis and rapid demobilization after the conclusion of major conflicts, the Army's emphasis has always focused on providing personnel and materiel to its warfighting forces. During eras of military build-up and sustained personnel staffing, it was necessary to establish and man a substantial training base to indoctrinate, train, and educate large numbers of soldiers and officers. During times of demilitarization, the training base has always suffered major cuts. With the increasing operational tempo that the Army is presently experiencing, combined with the calls for smaller defense spending, there is no reason to believe that we will not once again drastically reduce our training base. This has far-reaching implications for the continued success of Army ROTC battalions throughout the nation.

4. Interactive teaching technologies will expand dramatically. The nearly unimaginable advances in communications, multimedia, and computer technologies will continue to thrust the world faster and deeper into cyberspace. Accompanying these monumental advances are their increased applications in the areas of training and education. "Distance learning" is the wave of the future. While it may not be appropriate for every application, many organizations, both private and governmental, are rushing to embrace the concept. With the squeeze on funding to maintain the infrastructure necessary for traditional training and education classrooms, more companies and agencies are using distance learning technologies to reach their intended audiences. Most states already have shared

training networks, computer laboratories thrive at college campuses, outstanding products abound in computer-based learning platforms, and two-way video teleconferencing is fast becoming as commonplace as a singular telephone call once was. Be assured that there is significant resistance to the new technologies; in many cases, the resistance comes from those who might best leverage these new technologies to better instruct and train. Just as mechanization replaced many hand-made production operations, so too will new education capabilities replace traditional "seat time and credit hours."³ The Army ROTC program is not listed as a target of opportunity for distance learning in the recently published Army Distance Learning Program, even though the potential for application and shared resources are greatest on many college and university campuses across the nation.

5. Interservice "joint" training is possible and desirable. Historically, the various armed services have chosen to present their ROTC curricula unilaterally without assistance from or cooperation with other branches. The traditional argument has always been that the uniqueness of the individual programs precluded any joint endeavors in shaping common instructional material or philosophy. Joint warfighting doctrine, however, points to more common systems and strategies, increasing the reliance of services on each other. It would seem appropriate then, to explore the commonality of pre-commissioning education and training, and begin the joint indoctrination early in a potential officer's education.

6. Reserve components have a large role in the training base. Just as the Army Reserve and National Guard units play much larger roles in the deployments associated with today's Army, so too will they assume large roles in the training of tomorrow's Army. The evolution of the Total Army School System (TASS) is but a beginning of the potential for success in fully integrating the Reserve Components (RC) into the Army training base. Many educators throughout the nation serve their country part-time as Reservists and Guardsmen. They are professionals who make their living as teachers or education administrators at all levels. As the active training base is downsized along with the rest of the force structure, the Reserve Components have the great potential to fill in the shortfalls and maintain an excellent level of training competencies at considerably reduced costs. In former eras of demilitarization, the Army chose not to fully utilize available RC assets; today's operational tempo and the accompanying continuous training requirements dictate that we not make that same choice again.

7. Cooperative teaching with other institutional departments is appropriate. Historically, military departments have presented their programs to student cadets without teaching assistance from other on-campus departments. There are, however, facets of the Army curriculum which may be presented as effectively (perhaps more effectively) by another department. It is ironic, that in earlier times, professors of Military Science served as professors and sometimes chaired other departments when tactics and drill were the primary lessons taught to cadets on campus. As military science has included more academic topics, it is perhaps time to explore the other resources available on campus to

effectively present instructional material, especially now that there are fewer full-time military instructors.

8. Downsizing will diminish the professional officer corps as a career choice if current trends continue. This is a particularly unpopular thought among those who have chosen service to country as a military officer as a life's calling. After all, if this noble calling is as worthy to the present group of leaders as it was for the previous generation, how could future prospects not find it equally attractive as did their forebears? The historical facts paint a somewhat different picture. Throughout our brief history, it has always been a challenge to adequately procure personnel for military service in a timely and efficient manner. That same problem, in the wake of current military reductions, is particularly acute today.⁴ The nobility of the profession is not at question; it is rather the downsizing and the uncertainty it brings that causes our officers to leave service in search of other more stable vocations, and causes prospective officers to doubt whether a military career is the right option for them. Voluntary and involuntary separations are commonplace and should be expected without attaching unwarranted significance beyond factors involving supply and demand. Just as various civilian professions experience downturns in adverse economic times or when the market becomes saturated, so should the Army expect continued personnel turbulence until organizational structure and missions are stabilized.

Obviously, the thrust of this study will expand upon these assumptions and illustrate how they may be managed as part of an overall strategy to continue a successful on-campus Army pre-commissioning program.

THE PAST

As previously mentioned, military training has long been a tradition on college and universities throughout the history of our country. In addition to the military academies that have provided superb military leadership to the services, both private and public institutions of higher learning have produced distinguished officers from their military training programs.

To this day, the debate continues on the "best" method of educating potential officers. The academies argue that the intense, high quality education available there offers the best program for potential young officers to step directly into a professional military career. Backers of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps argue that military training offered as part of a traditional undergraduate education provides a more cost-efficient system while procuring officers from a cross section of American society. Proponents of Officer Candidate School argue that candidates can be trained quickly, already have knowledge of the military by virtue of their enlisted service, and have a better feel for soldiers they will lead by having served in the enlisted ranks. It should be clear from the examples of outstanding leaders that have come from each training program, that all are worthwhile and viable, and overall, have well served the national defense.

From the ROTC perspective, however, one thing is abundantly clear: the Army leadership has never been completely satisfied with the way on-campus training has been conducted throughout the years and has continually sought to alter the training process. Whether because of inadequate funding, disputes over methodology, or interference from external forces, it seems that Army training on college campuses has been in an almost constant state of change, and until recently, those changes rarely produced the intended results.

With the establishment of the U.S. Army Cadet Command in 1986, it appeared that the Army was well on its way to finally staffing and operating the program in a manner that it had always intended to do. With the military build-up experienced during the Reagan presidency, Army ROTC generally received a full complement of active component cadre. Additionally, 1984-86 were the years when significant increases in Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) officers were realized in host battalions across the nation. The results were dramatic. Recruiting improved significantly and the inertia of the successes carried through in the form of officer production into the initial phases of downsizing in the early 1990s.⁵

THE PRESENT

To chart a course for the future, one must first understand the environment today. The following discussion depicts the current state of Army ROTC, with brief comments regarding certain factors which have contributed to the present state and conditions which may further deteriorate if not addressed by intervention strategies.

At present, there are 274 Army ROTC units on campuses across the nation: 261 are host battalions and 13 are extension centers. Cadet Command had proposed a plan to lower the number of traditional units to as low as 220 with no additional cadre. That concept was approved for implementation by the Army Chief of Staff in March, 1994.⁶ As Cadet Command moved to execute the plan, however, political considerations overcame several of the intended closures. In several instances, congressional representatives interceded, institutional administrators appealed the closure decisions, and influential community leaders lobbied successfully against further downsizing. In spite of the effort to lessen unit numbers to more effectively align available cadre, Cadet Command will continue to operate more battalions and extension centers than planned with fewer instructors than needed to staff them.

There are fewer full-time cadre at ROTC units than in recent years. Overall numbers have been reduced by the concerted effort to eliminate detachments, but there is great potential to have more cut out of the organizational structure if more reductions are required by the impending QDR deliberations. Additionally, a significant percentage of AGR officer positions (both National Guard and Army Reserve) were pulled from the command authorizations in the early 1990s. Some efforts were made to reinstate a portion of the authorizations, but AGR positions still fall short of staffing levels during the relatively successful periods of the mid 1980s.

Cadre turbulence has negatively impacted on the organizational stability of several ROTC battalions. With the downsizing associated with the past few years, some ROTC units experienced instructor turnover at unprecedented levels. Lower promotion rates caused many instructors at the ranks of captain and major to explore other career options and accept voluntary separation incentives (VSI) rather than continue active service. Others fell victim to promotion passovers and involuntary separations. Neither were senior ROTC officials immune from the effects of personnel downsizing. Many battalion commanders were faced with annual selected early retirement boards (SERB). Rather than endure the constant uncertainty of continued service, many lieutenant colonels opted for retirement. In 1992, ninety-seven new battalion commanders reported for duty to colleges and universities throughout the nation. Within one year, many were no longer there.⁷ No organization, either private or public, can experience that level of personnel turnover and not expect significant impact on effectiveness, morale, and confidence. Presently, that turbulence has subsided, but certainly some of the effects persist.

As Cadet Command began to execute its CSA-approved downsizing concept, active component cadre members were not replaced in units identified for closure. As noted earlier, political influences caused many of them to remain open. The decision to pull personnel authorizations for units which will now remain open, at least for the immediate future, has led to the presence of many understaffed ROTC detachments nationwide. Under-resourced units have become a self-fulfilling prophecy for failure at worst, a recipe for less success at best. The effects of unrealized closures, with the resultant staff shortages, continue to impact on the overall program today.

With the continued personnel downsizing, there are fewer cadre available to recruit cadets for participation in the ROTC curriculum. Recruiting has never been a favored activity of officers assigned to ROTC duty. The official focus of ROTC has always been training. Whether or not it is realized in all quarters outside the ROTC structure, effective on-campus recruiting is the key success factor in maintaining a viable program. Obviously, scholarships play a large part in attracting highly qualified potential officers. Non-scholarship cadets, however, usually demand considerable recruiting and mentoring efforts. With increasing demands on fewer cadre, there are fewer assets and less time to devote to this critical task today.

To add to all of the challenges facing ROTC, available advertising dollars have been severely curtailed. Under normal circumstances, advertising is increased to enhance awareness when other marketing resources are reduced. These, however, are not normal times. While some might argue the overall value of advertising to the conduct of the program, it is irrefutable that any enterprise with a product must effectively present a sales message to an intended audience if it is to attract new buyers to build or retain market share. Such is also the case with the enterprise known as Army ROTC. Allocated advertising dollars are at the lowest level since 1980.⁸ With fewer cadre to conduct on-campus recruiting activities and a decreased budget for program awareness campaigns, maintaining viable recruiting missions has become more difficult.

As the armed forces move away from Cold War manning levels, fewer eligible high-quality prospects are stepping forward to join the U.S. military. Marketing research by recruiting organizations of all branches of service reveal a reduced propensity to join by young men and women in the target market. For the first time in many years, the Army has lowered mental category standards in order to meet recruiting objectives. Although the target audiences are different for officer and enlisted prospects, this country is experiencing a trend away from military service which, in the absence of a national or international crisis, is likely to continue. Without aggressive marketing techniques designed specifically for the contravention of this trend, ROTC will experience difficulties in achieving desired results.

Finally, the combination of these factors have led to less confidence by school officials. The following quotations by prominent college and university presidents are indicative of the sentiments of administrators grappling with the possibilities of closure of one of their departments. It should be noted that these quotations were chosen from an official Army historical publication, *U.S. Army Cadet Command: The 10 Year History*, and that they represent similar feelings by other school officials.

It baffles me to know that the Army can provide inadequate support and then threaten the college with the possibility of closure.

Hazo W. Carter
President, West Virginia State College⁹

This statement is particularly powerful in that it was made by the president of a historically black college (HBC); these institutions have previously enjoyed substantial support from an Army that looked to them to provide minority officers in a pool of diverse junior leaders, without the worry of detachment elimination.

The following quotation from the president of a high tech institution is even more condemning in its content:

Adequate staffing with quality cadre and continuity are critical elements which will have an immediate impact on the success of Michigan Tech's Army ROTC program. Despite manpower reductions in both services, the Air Force has been able to maintain a fully staffed ROTC cadre. Unfortunately, the Army has not done so.

Curtis J. Thompkins
President, Michigan Tech¹⁰

Dr. Curt Thompkins is a friend of Army ROTC. As a former dean of the College of Engineering at West Virginia University, he oversaw numerous research grants, including one from the Army Materiel Command. He knows the value of a well-run ROTC program. His comment directly addresses the choices made by senior leaders of both services toward resourcing for the future Army leadership. If Army friends are talking like this, imagine what detractors are saying.

THE FUTURE

Success belongs to those who are able to manage adversity and marshal available resources to produce meaningful results. Integration of non-traditional instructor assets, innovative use of new communications technology, and a move toward joint training will allow Army ROTC to continue its success as the largest source of junior officers for America's Army.

INTEGRATION

The future holds promise of success for integration of ROTC-related instruction by other departments at various universities. The trend in Military Science departments, and in other disciplines as well, has been to teach all curriculum modules by themselves. More and more, however, progressive educational institutions have been moving toward interdisciplinary approaches to material presentation. As disciplines overlap in the ever-increasing complexity of society and the competition for scarce resources increases, competitive educational institutions will pool resources when appropriate and leverage the combined abilities to provide a superior and cost-effective educational product.

The multi-disciplinary subject matter presented in the MQSI curriculum of Army ROTC is an obvious choice for interdisciplinary teaching strategies. Desired competencies in physical conditioning, computer literacy, and military history immediately come to mind when considering interdisciplinary presentation of the ROTC

curriculum. Most institutions have sizable physical education departments that provide general physical education classes as required courses or elective classes to the student population. A "military physical conditioning" or similarly-titled course, offering strength and endurance training, could well serve military department needs and expand facilities and the recruiting base in the process. Some forward thinking battalions have already capitalized on this strategy, but many more have yet to explore the possibilities. Computer science, engineering, and business departments are natural selections for teaching classes that fulfill the Army's desire to insure computer literacy in its future leadership. Most ROTC units take advantage of these class offerings, but few have entered into formal cooperative agreements with other departments. The military history requirement presents another opportunity for cooperative engagement of history departments to present materials as part of the Army curriculum. With a guarantee of students to attend the course, most history departments would be quite willing to design and present a class to serve ROTC cadets and the student body at large.

The advantages and benefits of the preceding integrating strategies are intuitively obvious. First, interdisciplinary presentation of material expands the instructor base and broadens the perspective of students receiving the instruction. In an era of fewer available military instructors, others can fill the void in appropriate areas. Additionally, teaching certain topics with instructors outside the military structure give them a universality that they might not otherwise enjoy. Second, teaching ROTC subjects in other classes has the potential to increase student contact hours which has implications for increased funding, especially in publicly funded institutions. Finally, interdisciplinary

presentation of ROTC-related subjects broadens both the recruiting and support bases for military departments on campus. The increased contact and communication that naturally results from this approach causes the market of available prospects to increase dramatically and develops advocates for military programs, directly or indirectly, that might otherwise not have appeared. This approach moves military and associated topics into the mainstream of academic discourse and out of a closed group that exists in detachments on some campuses.

Additionally, there are opportunities to integrate additional on-campus instructors from available Army personnel resources. As active component drawdowns impact negatively on the ability to prosecute an effective Army ROTC program on a number of campuses, Reserve Component personnel are available and capable of filling the voids which may be created.

During the early and mid-1980s, full-time Army Reserve and National Guard officers were posted at each host battalion and proved their great worth in adding to the overall success of the Army ROTC program during those years. The turbulence of the early 1990s, with contradictory language in successive National Defense Authorization Acts, sought to eliminate assignment of AGR officers to ROTC duty.¹¹ Fortunately cooler heads in Congress prevailed, and AGR officers remained on ROTC duty, but at significantly lower numbers. Perhaps it is time to revisit the possibility of assigning more Reserve Component officers, both as Assistant Professors and Professors of Military Science.

Reservists who are Troop Program Unit (TPU) members are available and capable of filling in as adjunct faculty to provide high quality instruction and leadership to Army ROTC cadets. Many of these officers and non-commissioned officers are professional educators and administrators in secondary or post-secondary educational institutions and have extensive experience as Army trainers.

To eliminate any additional burden to the PMS, administrative headquarters can be established in the existing USAR structure to handle assignments, scheduling, pay, and related tasks normally associated with TPU membership. RAND Corporation, in a current study investigating future staffing of ROTC battalions, has also considered the utilization of USAR instructors as an alternative staffing strategy.¹²

Perhaps the most direct way to implement these far-reaching changes would be to establish a portion of Cadet Command or a part of the USAR structure as a "reinvention laboratory" or "training center of excellence" as part of Vice-President Gore's initiative to reinvent government. In doing so, the turf battles that generally accompany change would most likely give way to allowing greater latitude to effect desired results with less cost.

These changes can be implemented quickly and inexpensively using established force structure. With minor modification, existing Training Division headquarters can provide administrative support for USAR adjunct faculty. The Army Reserve assigns

qualified instructors and provides the administrative platform to effect seamless integration into the educational structure. The instructors would drill weekly or as duties dictated at the ROTC battalion. Instead of the weekend or evening training assemblies, USAR adjunct faculty would perform instructor duties to match class schedules at supported institutions. Professors of Military Science would continue to provide direct oversight in maintaining the overall quality of the program.

The benefits of integrating full-time and TPU Reserve Component faculty into the Army ROTC structure are obvious and numerous. First, by taking advantage of the educational expertise that exists in the RC, instruction quality can be maintained, and in some cases, improved. With additional part-time instructor personnel, more time is available to devote to on-campus recruiting activities by full-time staff. In addition, the Professor of Military Science and key staff will be able to spend important time engaging University leaders. As a department chairman, the PMS is obligated to act in that capacity with academic peers. Successful ROTC programs have leaders who know the value of good relations with the president, provost, chancellor, registrar, financial aid advisers, college deans, and other academic and community leaders. This integrated approach will eventually lead to stability and increased confidence on campus; with RC faculty coming from many different disciplines and occupations, the support base is automatically and dramatically expanded. All of this leads to adequate instructor staffing in an era of personnel downsizing with enhanced cost effectiveness.

INNOVATION

The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new.

Niccolo Machiavelli¹³

These words, written in 1513, are an indictment of human nature. Sadly, they are as accurate today as they were then. For all of the lip service given to the virtues of change and the (mostly) positive experience of today's almost incomprehensible rate of technological advances, organizations are still resistant to moving away from status quo. Change eventually happens, but it is normally a difficult, inefficient, and painful process.

Such is the change that comes with Army downsizing and the accompanying decrease in overall resourcing. Innovation, i.e., capitalizing on new technologies to rapidly enhance effectiveness, must be vigorously pursued.

Innovation, as it applies to Army ROTC, as well as other Army training programs, must take the form of interactive training technologies. This was not originally part of this research project, but as investigation progressed on how best to utilize resources to build an ROTC strategy for the future, it was impossible to continue without including interactive learning as a key ingredient for future success.

As investigation proceeded on this particular topic, three potential interactive learning technologies emerged as the most appropriate candidates to carry a new strategy for ROTC instruction into the next century. They are CD-ROM, CD-R, and Internet/On-line instruction.

The alternative instruction method that is currently generally most associated with distance learning, two-way video teleconferencing, was not considered as a viable means to integrate easily into the Army ROTC program. Although two-way video has proven to be an effective means of communication for smaller and relatively homogenous groups, it does not appear to have cost-efficient utility for country-wide application for groups with dissimilar schedules. The need for special classrooms, expensive video equipment and control rooms, technical personnel, and special communications links make this type of instruction too expensive and inflexible to serve the needs of such diverse and widespread audiences.

Before proceeding further, the merits of distance learning versus conventional instruction must be addressed. First and foremost, education will come to depend more and more on alternative approaches to instruction as a replacement for conventional classroom presentation. Current literature reflects no significant difference in learning achievement by students receiving distance learning instruction. A study by Dr. Cissy A. Lennon of the Federal Aviation Administration's Interactive Teletraining Academy, which compared traditional presentation with distance learning, found that the interactive method equaled or exceeded the classroom setting in desired learning objectives.¹⁴

Second, the greatly increasing costs of infrastructure, physical plants, administration, and the other requirements of traditional education will soon force a large population segment out of the higher education market if lower cost alternatives are not available. So too will the costs of presenting Army ROTC classes continue to increase. As budgets decrease and the number of available instructors dwindles even further, it is imperative to explore technology that will fill the void.

The pool of students and their needs are changing. Student populations are older, their academic discipline requirements include more hours of instruction, and the average time to graduate has increased from the traditional four years to over five and a half.¹⁵ To reach this changing student body, distance learning courses are being developed throughout the country in institutions of higher learning to accommodate work schedules, resolve conflicting class schedules, and make more classes available at more locations with more scheduling options. Army ROTC must also strive to reach a changing pool of potential cadets through different learning technologies and strategies.

Of the three technologies investigated for application to Army ROTC distance learning, CD-ROM seems to have the best application to serve the widest array of needs. It is a stand alone technology that the user can access individually or in a group. It provides the greatest opportunity for scheduling flexibility and requires the least amount of additional technical support.

There are many benefits to be derived from selecting CD-ROM as the recommended technology for interactive learning in Army ROTC. It is economical, and as CD-ROM production technologies mature, the cost will continue to decrease while quality increases. The computer hardware required to run this particular software is presently widely available on campuses nearly everywhere. University computer laboratories and typical personal computers on the market today have the necessary compact disc drives and memory to easily operate these instructional programs.

College students expect this technology as part of their learning experience. To a generation that grew up playing evolving technology computer games, utilizing CD-ROM study guides to enhance performance, and had computer classes early in their school years, there is no reticence associated with taking a computer-based course.

Higher education is rapidly moving toward interactive learning platforms. While most formal distance learning classes use synchronous (direct link) television broadcast technologies, more and more training programs are using asynchronous platforms to disseminate information to a variety of locations and settings. It is reasonable to expect that more classes will be developed using CD-ROM to overcome many of the bureaucratic obstacles to teaching classes across state or country boundaries. Since Army ROTC is a federally promulgated course that has already overcome most of these obstacles, the next logical step is to incorporate the message into the new technology.

Obviously, standardized material presented in a interactive learning medium will improve the consistency of program presentation throughout the country. Even with the MQSI training support packages currently provided to ROTC departments, presentation of the curriculum varies greatly from campus to campus. A well-designed, pre-packaged course on an interactive platform would immediately remove disparities in material presentation.

Distance learning presentation maintains quality across the spectrum. Whereas nearly all studies show that learning objectives are achieved equally as well using distance learning technologies as with conventional classroom presentation, Dr. Jerald G. Shutte of California State University at Northridge, found that students who completed an interactive course fared better than their peers who received the same instruction in a typical classroom environment. His students were randomly selected and were similar in age and intellectual abilities. Students who received distance learning instruction scored 20% higher on examinations than those who attended conventional classes.¹⁶

Implementing new instructional technology on campus positions the Army in the forefront of educational innovation. Military departments on college campuses can be viewed as being on the cutting edge of technology with new and exciting ways to engage students, or can be lumped in with others who do not change or exploit opportunity when it presents itself. Army-sponsored research has led to the development of many of the products enjoyed today in the civilian community. The Army has been and will continue

to be looked upon as the premier institution in leader development and training. Being out front in education development can only enhance that reputation.

The introduction of computer-based learning allows the utilization of adjunct faculty to present Army ROTC curriculum. Whether they are RC instructors as previously discussed, retired military personnel, or other contractors, CD-ROM platforms provide for instruction at desirable levels. This technology makes it easier for Professors of Military Science to manage instructors other than full-time military officers and be assured of acceptable quality levels.

“High tech” instruction attracts “high tech” students. The Army must continue to vigorously recruit students in technical disciplines. As the time required to graduate increases for engineers, computer scientists, and others, it seems reasonable to offer an alternative method of completing ROTC instructional requirements that meet the needs of the Army as well as the student. As more technical disciplines find less room for ROTC credit, it seems logical to replace curriculum with distance learning applications to meet student needs.

Presenting appropriate material on CD-ROM permits more flexible scheduling. As available classes become harder to schedule for many students, having the choice of interactive learning classes reduces the number of conflicts. Additionally, if the CD-ROM is designed correctly, review sessions, quizzes, and examinations can be conducted interactively. With a simple click on an icon, the student can go on-line, take an

examination, and have it scored immediately, providing on-the-spot feedback for his efforts.

A major benefit of developing CD-ROM instruction is the amelioration of staffing shortfalls. Designed properly, fewer instructors are needed. Additionally, if examinations are conducted through the internet or similar network, the administration time required for developing quizzes and tests, grading them, and posting results is virtually eliminated.

Distance learning will improve the instruction quality of small programs where cadre is often in short supply. In cross enrollment schools, where students travel to host institutions to take Army ROTC classes, CD-ROM curriculum offers an alternative to some of the commuting and may even entice more students to give the program a try.

Finally, the integration of CD-ROM instruction into the Army ROTC curriculum supports the goals of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army. The Army Distance Learning Plan states that "distance learning allows student/leader/unit-centered access to essential information and training. It represents a powerful capability in which the proper balance of course content and delivery are provided when and where they will have the greatest impact on total force readiness."¹⁷

Certainly, the addition of a computer-based application into ROTC instruction will bring the Army closer to realizing yet unfulfilled objectives, and test their validity in an academic, low-risk, living laboratory.

JOINTNESS

Modern warfighting requires a common frame of reference within which operations on land and sea, undersea, and in the air and space are integrated and harmonized; that frame of reference is the joint campaign. As such, the joint campaign is a powerful concept that requires the fullest understanding by the leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces.

from *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*¹⁸

Obviously, as we construct warfighting doctrine focused more and more toward joint operations, it follows that training doctrine must necessarily pursue the same course. Pre-commissioning education and training classes are not too early to begin integrating the efficiencies of joint effort into the thought processes of future leaders.

Although the different services have historically argued the “uniqueness” of their programs, closer examination reveals that there are common subjects in all ROTC programs that could be taught as a joint block of instruction. Just as earlier discussion showed how faculty other than full-time Army instructors can be integrated into the organizational base, so too can any branch of service present topics which have relevance to all. History, military justice, leadership principles, and ethics are but a few of the examples that readily come to mind.

Teaching jointly follows Defense Department doctrine and expands the available training base for all services. By examining the possibilities of joint training subjects and joint presentations, the various services must evaluate the validity of current practices and explore other doctrinal programs which may have application to, and in some cases, improve their own. On campuses where there are multiple ROTC programs, there are opportunities for practical applications among departments where, in addition to joint doctrine, equipment and personnel resources can be shared for mutual benefit.

These efforts will surely be cost effective and reduce unnecessary repetition of effort. In areas where interactive technology can be utilized, the savings in effort and the movement toward jointness are magnified tremendously. Our future wars will require increased joint operations to defeat the enemy in a variety of battlefield scenarios. Joint training, even at the initiation level, just makes sense.

OTHER POTENTIAL STRATEGIES

A shrinking military budget requires that serious attempts be made to evaluate critically current and future training strategies to insure that maximum effectiveness is realized from shrinking resources. As available funding dwindles, organizations must scrutinize programs to determine how to continue quality with lower costs. "Do more with less" is not a concept that will soon go away.

In the area of ROTC summer training, the traditional Advanced Camp, usually performed by Army ROTC cadets between their junior and senior years, has a potential for cost savings. U.S. Army Cadet Command, already feeling the grip of downsizing, has made considerable strides in restructuring Advanced Camp while continuing to meet the Army's pre-commissioning training requirements and making the leadership experience a valuable one for tomorrow's officers.

The current "How To Fight Manual" for Advanced Camp 1997 is a detailed and comprehensive guide for cadre and cadets regarding the conduct of this year's summer training for Army ROTC cadets. The mission of Advanced Camp is "to train cadets to Army standards, to develop leadership, and evaluate officer potential."¹⁹ Cadet Command, already facing serious cuts and decreasing installation support, has begun the process of reorganizing and restructuring Advanced Camp to continue meeting its goals in this constrained resource environment. More reserve component personnel are being used to fill in where active component cadre and support personnel were previously tasked. Army ROTC Advanced Camp 1997 will have only one training site at Fort Lewis, Washington, in contrast to the two camp locations of the past few years (Forts Lewis and Bragg), and three locations in the preceding years (Lewis, Bragg, and Riley) before 3rd ROTC Region at Fort Riley, Kansas was inactivated. In addition, Advanced Camp '97 has been shortened to 35 days, reduced from the six weeks of summer training that has served as the standard for many years.

The following schedule depicts how Advanced Camp 1997 will be conducted at Fort Lewis this summer:

THE STANDARD 35-DAY ADVANCED CAMP

<u>DAY</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1-4	Inprocess/Height Weight/Physical Exam/Counsel
5	Army Physical Fitness Test 1
6-7	Field Leader's Reaction Course/Water Safety
8-9	Basic Rifle Marksmanship
10-13	Land Navigation/APFT 2
14-15	ITT/Fire Support/Mid-cycle Review/Counsel
16-17	Hand Grenade/NBC
18	Branch Orientation
19	Accessions Brief
20-24	Squad Training
25	Commander's Time/MILES
26-30	Platoon Training
31	RECONDO
32	Maintenance/Recovery
33-34	Outprocess/Counsel
35	Graduation ²⁰

In addition to these efforts, more can and will have to be done in the future to further economize and take fullest advantage of remaining available resources. First of all, coordination should be made with USAR Training Divisions to support Advanced Camp as part of scheduled unit annual training. Instead of using individual RC personnel to fill selected support positions, elements of Institutional Training Divisions can be utilized to run training committees, perform tactical evaluations, and other team-related activities. As USAR personnel are integrated more fully as adjunct faculty, so too can they be well utilized during the summer as cadre in an annual training status during Advanced Camp.

Although Advanced Camp has been redesigned at 35 days, more can be trimmed if necessary. With the remaining events currently scheduled, it would appear that an additional seven days could be deleted with little effect upon the stated mission of Advanced Camp. Four days of inprocessing to include weigh-ins, medical evaluations, and the like seem excessive when considering that all of these functions have already been performed on-campus during the academic year. The two days of basic rifle marksmanship, which are not scored as part of the performance evaluation, could be performed with a local Army Reserve or National Guard unit near campus. Army Physical Fitness Tests (APFT) are administered to cadets on campus throughout the year as part of battalion physical fitness programs. Professors of Military Science and their cadres should have a pretty good idea of the physical conditioning of their cadets before they send them to Advanced Camp. The value of two APFTs in a period of one week

administered to ROTC cadets appears somewhat elusive. A day for branch orientation, while worthwhile and informative, does not necessarily support the mission of Advanced Camp.

The purpose of the immediately preceding comments are not meant to detract from the excellent training that is conducted each year, but to illustrate that, if required, the summer training phase could be reduced even more without seriously impacting on the evaluative process. Trimming Advanced Camp to 28 days would yield more savings, if required. In addition, a 28-day Advanced Camp would allow support by RC units during two annual training increments. Perhaps this will not be needed, but it is certainly available as a viable option.

There is another potential avenue for increased success in the future: the urban university markets that are not producing nearly at full capacity. Although they are perhaps more challenging as recruiting markets because of the fast pace and student dispersion, they offer great promise as a source of future leaders. The advantages urban institutions offer are numerous. They have diverse student populations in a concentrated area. Urban universities offer significant opportunities to engage potential cross enrollment students at other nearby institutions. They are certainly appropriate for distance learning applications and there is generally a large RC population available to serve as adjunct faculty, as required. Probably most important is that effective and meaningful relations with urban institutions are imperatives to the survival of continued universal civilian support for the military in our society.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusions from this study are apparent and dramatic regarding the future of Army ROTC:

1. Resources will decrease dramatically.
2. Political pressures will cause more ROTC units to remain than recommended in the approved concept plan.
3. Interactive learning platforms must be developed.
4. USAR must be integrated as "Trainers of the Force."
5. Citizen-soldier faculty will strengthen ties with academia.
6. Economic strategies must be vigorously pursued.

The following specific recommendations serve as a beginning for the training strategy shift which must take place in the Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps of the future:

1. Incorporate USAR TPU instructors as adjunct faculty.
2. Establish a USAR Division (Institutional Training) as the RC support headquarters for integration of adjunct faculty. If proximity to Cadet Command headquarters for ease of communication and on-site planning is an issue, the 80th DIV (IT) is located in nearby Richmond, Virginia.
3. Assign more AGR Professors of Military Science and Assistant Professors of Military Science.
4. Develop an interactive Army ROTC curriculum.
5. Establish the USAR Training Division and/or U.S. Army Cadet Command as a "Reinvention Laboratory/Training Center of Excellence" to facilitate change.
6. Develop "joint" topics with other services where appropriate.

Perhaps the best way to end this paper is to summarize comments made by COL Roy F. Zinzer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Cadet Command, during an exchange of ideas following a 14 April 1997 briefing on the proposed contents of this study. COL Zinzer asked to imagine evaluating the performance of the Army ROTC program in a manner similar to evaluating a unit that had just completed a National Training Center (NTC) exercise at Fort Irwin, California. Regarding ROTC performance, Cadet

Command is shaping its force within the limits allowed, the quantities of officers produced meet Army needs, and quality gates achieved are at a very high level. This is tantamount to a unit at NTC being resourced appropriately, employing its forces well, and soundly defeating the opposing forces (OPFOR). COL Zinzer correctly stated that the logical conclusion in both cases would be to congratulate each, continue to resource at the same levels, and encourage both to continue on their present course.²¹

But these are different times.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baker, James R. "Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America's 21st Century Defense," *Progressive Policy Institute Defense Working Paper No. 3*. (January 1997):1-41.
- Coumbe, Arthur T., and Lee S. Harford. *U.S. Army Cadet Command: The Ten Year History*. Fort Monroe, Virginia: Office of the Command Historian, 1996.
- Goldman, Charles A., Michael G. Mattock, Bruce R. Orvis, and Dorothy A. Smith. "Staffing Alternatives for SROTC Battalions," RAND Annotated Briefing 122-1-A, January 1997.
- Leavitt, Michael A. "The Western Governors' University: A Learning Enterprise for the CyberCentury." *Teleconference* 16, no. 3 (1997): 7-8, 67-68.
- Lennon, Cissy A., and Hank Payne. "A Comparison between IVT and Resident Versions of FAA's Quality Assurance Course." *Teleconference* 16, no. 3 (1997): 50-52, 68.
- Lyle, Major General James M. "Alternatives to Current ROTC Program." U.S. Army Cadet Command Memorandum, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 26 April 1995.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Prince*. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1939.
- National Defense Act. U.S. Code*. Vol. 10, sec. 687 (1991).
- Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*. Joint Pub 1. Washington: National Defense University Press, 11 November 1991.
- Parker, William B. *The Life and Public Services of Justin Smith Morrill*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924.
- Schutte, Jerald G. "Virtual Teaching in Higher Education: The New Intellectual Superhighway or Just Another Traffic Jam?" Electronic Message to DISTANCE LEARNING (jschutte@csun.edu), 17 January 1997.
- U.S. Army Cadet Command. *Advanced Camp How to Fight Manual for Camp '97*. Fort Monroe, Virginia: U.S. Army Cadet Command, 17 January 1997.
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Distance Learning Plan*. Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 3 April 1996.
- Willis, Grant. "Young Men Continue to Lose Interest in Joining Military." *Army Times*. 1 March 1993, p. 26.
- Zinzer, Colonel Roy F., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Cadet Command. Post-briefing discussion with author, 14 April 1997, Fort Monroe, Virginia.

ENDNOTES

-
- ¹ James R. Blaker, "Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America's 21st Century Defense," *Progressive Policy Institute Defense Working Paper No. 3*, (January 1997): 1.
- ² William B. Parker, *The Life and Public Services of Justin Smith Morrill* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924), 259-75.
- ³ Michael A. Leavitt, "The Western Governors' University: A Learning Enterprise for the CyberCentury," *Teleconference 16*, no. 3 (1997): 8.
- ⁴ Grant Willis, "Young Men Continue to Lose Interest in Joining Military," *Army Times*, 1 March 1993, p. 3.
- ⁵ Arthur T. Coumbe and Lee S. Harford, *U.S. Army Cadet Command: The Ten Year History* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Cadet Command, 1996), 151.
- ⁶ Major General James M. Lyle, "Alternatives to Current ROTC Program," U.S. Army Cadet Command Memorandum, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 26 April 1995.
- ⁷ Coumbe, 173.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, 165.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, 170-171.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 171.
- ¹¹ *National Defense Act, U.S. Code*, vol. 10, sec. 687 (1991).
- ¹² Charles A. Goldman, Michael G. Mattock, Bruce R. Orvis, and Dorothy A. Smith, "Staffing Alternatives for SROTC Battalions," RAND Annotated Briefing 122-1-A, January 1997, 14-21.
- ¹³ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1939), 49-50.
- ¹⁴ Cissy A. Lennon and Hank Payne, "A Comparison between IVT and Resident Versions of FAA's Quality Assurance Course," *Teleconference 16*, no. 3 (1997): 68.
- ¹⁵ Coumbe, 166.

¹⁶ Jerald J. Schutte, "Virtual Teaching in Higher Education: The New Intellectual Superhighway or Just Another Traffic Jam?" electronic mail message to DISTANCE LEARNING (jschutte@csun.edu), 17 January 1997.

¹⁷ Department of the Army, Army Distance Learning Plan, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 3 April 1996), 4.

¹⁸ Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, Joint Pub 1 (Washington: National Defense University Press, 11 November 1991), 45.

¹⁹ U.S. Army Cadet Command, Advanced Camp How To Fight Manual for Camp '97 (Fort Monroe, Virginia: U.S. Army Cadet Command, 17 January 1997), 1-1.

²⁰ Ibid., 3-1, 3-2.

²¹ Colonel Roy F. Zinzer, Chief of Staff at U.S. Army Cadet Command, post-briefing discussion with author, 14 April 1997, Fort Monroe, Virginia.