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IMPROVING NATIONAL CAPACITIES FOR RESPONSE TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

BY

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This paper results from a project conducted under the auspices of the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Senior Service College fellowship program of the U.S. Army War College. The views herein are those of the author alone and are not official policy of the U.S. Department of Defense or the Department of the Army.

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ABSTRACT

This paper evaluates how the U.S. government coordinates its responses to post-Cold War complex emergencies. Given that the U.S. may choose to be involved in future responses, it argues that the U.S. must adapt its bureaucratic procedures to take account of the new reality of internal conflicts. This adaptation will entail changing the policy-making process to permit timely anticipation of and effective response to humanitarian crises. The aim is to improve policy planning and implementation, increasing US policy coherence and effectiveness while avoiding the pitfalls that have come to typify these operations in practice.

The paper begins at the root of the coordination problem: the tasks required on the ground and the actors who can perform these tasks. This assessment highlights the complexity of these emergencies and points out the formidable challenges of coordination at the national policy level. This analysis illuminates four requirements for improved policy coordination. The paper next considers three cases -- Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia -- to compare how the U.S. government coped with unfolding events. The paper concludes with specific recommendations for improving coordination within the U.S. government.

What Is The Problem?

Today, concepts such as failed states, intrastate conflict, and transnational threats have gained importance even as old Cold War standbys such as strategic deterrence, conventional stalemate, and superpower proxies have diminished in importance rapidly. Today's conflicts are different from their Cold War predecessors in several dimensions, including size, frequency, and degree of danger. Moreover, much of the current violence occurs within states, but attracts the attention of international actors. The largest of these internal conflicts cause destruction and dislocation on a magnitude far beyond the ability of any single state to handle.

Since 1975, the demand for humanitarian and other assistance to respond to internal conflict has risen steadily.[1] Yet, the capacity to manage these multilateral operations -- especially at the national level -- has not changed markedly from the days of the Cold War.[2] Few national innovations are evident, and international mechanisms to coordinate the diverse array of services necessary to limit the effects of violence are too often ad hoc and prey to changeable interests. The resulting operations are at best inefficient and at worst contributing factors to a worsened situation.

This paper evaluates how the U.S. government coordinates its responses to post-Cold War complex emergencies.[3] Given that the U.S. may choose to be involved in future responses, it argues that the U.S. must reform its bureaucratic procedures to address effectively the new reality of internal conflicts. Ultimately, such reform would be wide ranging. But marginal improvements are possible now that could yield dramatic benefits in the way the U.S. government anticipates, plans for and responds to complex

emergencies. The aim is to improve policy planning and implementation, increasing US policy coherence and effectiveness while avoiding the pitfalls that have come to typify these operations.

> Complex emergencies combine internal conflicts with large-scale displacements of people, mass famine and fragile or failing economic, political, and social institutions. Some complex emergencies are exacerbated by natural disasters and severely inadequate transport networks.
>
> Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1995
> U.S. Mission to the UN, January 1995

This report begins at the root of the coordination problem: the tasks required on the ground and the actors who can perform these tasks. It highlights the complexity of these emergencies and points out the formidable challenges to effective coordination at the national policy level. Three cases -- Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia -- will be used to examine how the U.S. government responded to unfolding events. The paper concludes with specific recommendations for improving coordination within the U.S. government.

What Are The Tasks?

The multiple causes of complex emergencies can be described as the entanglement of "four scourges": war, disease, hunger and displacement.[4] The fabric of society -- including economic, political and social institutions -- is frayed or torn. These conditions may emerge initially from natural or manipulated causes, but their effects are often magnified by the politicization of the crisis. The crises often occur where conditions of scarcity predominate. A mix of fighters and non-fighters usually exists, with migration between these categories common. Existing state governmental structures are overwhelmed and lend little control over the situation, sometimes deliberately. Regional

and global intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental actors may generate assistance, but this generally arrives late, after a deteriorating situation has gained momentum.[5] These characteristics suggest the tasks inherent in a response effort aimed at stopping a downward spiral, restoring stability and promoting recovery.

The tasks fall into five major categories: humanitarian, security, political, social, and economic.[6] Humanitarian assistance aims to meet the basic subsistence needs of the population: food, water, shelter, and health care. Such assistance must be delivered to besieged cities or remote enclaves, often across difficult terrain, enduring tough weather, and relying on staging areas near the crisis that often are nearly as remote and hostile. Human tragedy is usually the catalyst for external involvement in complex emergencies; these humanitarian tasks, therefore, are often the first to draw the attention of outside actors. By definition, however, the dimensions of complex emergencies extend far beyond the demands of humanitarian aid.

Often accompanying the urgent need for humanitarian relief is the need for security. Security tasks vary widely. Important immediate tasks typically include ensuring access and security for relief workers, monitoring adherence to agreements, and separating former warring parties. Longer term security tasks can include demobilizing armed factions, supporting implementation of arms control agreements, enforcing sanctions, and assisting demining programs. In addition, steps must be taken to restore all the elements of a law and order system, including police, judiciary and penal components.[7] Three variables play an important role in determining the nature of the security mission: the

nature of the violence, the level of consent of the parties, the proximity and interest of a dominant regional or global actor.[8]

Perhaps overlooked initially in the face of crisis demands for humanitarian relief and associated security, political, social and economic tasks address some of the underlying causes of the emergency. Restoring a state in crisis to self-sufficiency requires a long-term perspective and involves a range of tasks. Setting the conditions for democratic government by encouraging free and fair elections, and building or strengthening governmental institutions -- executive, legislative and judicial -- are fundamental to developing the state's capacity to cope with its internal problems. Inherent in these tasks are many others such as founding governmental legitimacy on an approved constitution, developing political rules for all political parties, and promoting equal access to the media essential for fair campaigning.[9]

Social engagement helps broaden the basis for self-sufficiency beyond the government to the roots of society, and can include opening access to the media, resettling refugees and reconciling opposed parties. Reconciliation itself is a broad task that could include resolving property disputes, setting up truth commissions, and supporting the prosecution of war criminals. Longer term social tasks could involve supporting education and developing civic organizations that complement domestic political structures.[10]

Economic tasks, too, are extensive in scope and duration. Initially, reconstruction of vital infrastructure -- public utilities, transportation networks, health facilities -- will take priority in order to complement the humanitarian relief effort. Conducting broader

reconstruction -- especially providing housing, generating jobs, and promoting commerce and trade -- are longer term tasks. The development of institutions for finance, customs and taxes is, of course, also necessary to support new governmental structures.

From this overview of tasks, several characteristics emerge -- tasks are multi-dimensional and interdependent; response operations are dynamic and require long-term effort -- that illustrate the complexity of coordinating national policy in response to a complex emergency. Policy coordination mechanisms must contend with these defining characteristics or risk being overwhelmed by the sheer complexity of the crisis.

✓ Response tasks are multi-dimensional and interdependent. Response operations require a broad effort which draws upon a range of expertise. Such operations are expensive and demand multiple contributors. Further, the tasks are interdependent; they will be either mutually supporting or mutually defeating. For example, the provision of humanitarian assistance relies on sufficient security. Effective elections may depend on freedom of movement, access to the media, refugee resettlement, and a secure environment. In addition, tasks compete for resources from potential contributors; funds committed to one category are not available for another. The implication for policy is that these crises must be managed in the aggregate, as an integrated whole addressing all dimensions of the problem. The temptation to simplify policy by disaggregating the interrelated dimensions of the crisis will lead to inadequate coordination and ineffective response on the ground.

✓ Response operations are dynamic. The "life cycle" of a response operation is analogous to treatment of a trauma patient: initial triage is followed by emergency life support and stabilization, leading to recovery in an intensive care unit, eventually followed by rehabilitation. As the operation moves from one phase to another -- often, but not always, responding to changing circumstances on the ground -- the relative priority of tasks can change. Initial emphasis on humanitarian assistance and security will shift as the situation improves to focus increasingly on political, economic and social tasks. Often too as tasks change, so will contributors; as the operation moves from phase to phase, responsibility passes among actors. For example, those providing humanitarian assistance will pass off to others specializing in economic development, or those providing military security will pass off to those reforming the police. Further, the phases of the operation will likely not be defined precisely, but rather transitions will occur awkwardly, with responsibilities either overlapping or overlooked. Rather than a clean, linear progression, "two steps forward and one step back" may be more the pattern.[11]

All these factors complicate response coordination at the policy level. Governments must therefore take account of these factors and establish internal and external coordination mechanisms to provide continuity across the phases of the operation and have the flexibility to adapt means employed to attain policy objectives as the situation on the ground changes.

✓ Response operations require cognizance of long-term efforts. The causes that define complex humanitarian emergencies demand a comprehensive response extending well beyond initial humanitarian aid. All the categories of tasks mentioned above -- but particularly the political, social and economic tasks -- require extended recovery and rehabilitation efforts measured in years or even generations rather than months. The longer the duration of the required response, the greater the need for effective coordination to ensure sufficient resources are committed throughout the life cycle of the operation. The policy implication is that coordination must be sustained over the entire life cycle of the response; and, it must be structured for a long-term effect.

Who Are The Actors?

The staggering scope and complexity of the tasks involved in responding to complex emergencies demand the coordinated action of a wide array of contributors. The cast of potential actors is large and diverse, including the state where the emergency occurs, other states, global and regional international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), business, the media, and the people and leaders affected by the crisis. The experiences of the past half dozen years have resulted in new relationships among many of these actors, but these relationships are largely informal and exist below the policy level. By any measure, the potential contributors remain a loose, unintegrated set of actors not surprisingly holding fast to different perspectives, goals, capabilities, structures and cultures.[12] To illustrate these differences and the effects on crisis response,

it is worth a brief examination of two actors -- the humanitarian NGO community and the U.S. military.

While accepting the hazard of over-generalization, it is possible to sketch the broad characteristics of this set of NGOs.[13] Their core competency is to provide humanitarian aid, especially under emergency conditions. Most aim to be neutral in conflicts, impartial regarding the recipients of their aid, and independent of political interests. Many also strive to empower local authorities to provide for the needs of the affected population. These NGOs engage in problem regions for extended periods, often long before crisis conditions emerge as issues of international concern, and therefore they frequently have first-hand knowledge of the problems and an ability to respond quickly. They also often have a long-term view of the problem and remain engaged beyond the initial phases of the response operation. They are often decentralized and relatively less burdened by bureaucracy, giving them a degree of operational flexibility. Their relief resources are usually substantial and tailorable to the needs of complex emergencies.[14] These attributes create several distinct comparative advantages of NGOs relative to other potential contributors: sounding the alarm of impending crisis, conducting initial needs assessments, providing relief, and legitimacy in interacting with local officials.

Despite these general strengths, NGOs can suffer from several shortcomings.[15] They often have coordination problems within and between themselves. They frequently compete for resources, opening the possibility that competition will impede cooperation. They are not homogeneous; many are specialized by function and geographical area. Few are large enough to take on multiple functions or to develop a full perspective on all

aspects of the crisis. Finally, their capacity for providing humanitarian assistance can be overwhelmed by very large, sustained, or simultaneous emergencies.

The U.S. military can expect to be deployed alongside NGOs, but with distinctly different institutional baggage; its objectives, capabilities and perspectives of the problem could hardly be more unlike those of NGOs. The military's core competency, of course, is war-fighting; humanitarian assistance missions are far from the organizational mainstream. The substantial capabilities the military could lend to complex emergencies -- manpower, equipment, supplies -- exist primarily to support its war-fighting missions and are designed to ensure self-sufficiency of combat forces in all possible environments. Since military capabilities committed in response to complex humanitarian emergencies are not available for combat missions, such response operations can detract from the military's combat readiness.[16]

The organizational focus on combat operations is the basis for the US. military's perspective that its primary role in complex emergencies is to help ensure the effectiveness of other contributors and permit the rapid transition of responsibility to local authorities. Military leaders see this role as limited in both scope and duration.[17] The military's organizational structure is hierarchical, stretching from field operators all the way back to political authorities in Washington. This chain of command both generates and relies on robust command and control mechanisms that emphasize unity of command, worldwide communications, well-trained staffs adept at planning, and standard procedures that are codified in written doctrine.

The U.S. military has considerable comparative advantages in complex crisis scenarios.[18] It can arrive on the scene of a crisis within hours with key logistics capabilities needed early in a complex crisis: large stockpiles of supplies, transportation of masses of cargo worldwide, and a well-rehearsed organizational structure linking the two. The U.S. military's command and control mechanisms can coordinate diverse tasks, especially at regional and local levels. When the military deploys it comes as a robust, self-sufficient package, able to operate in the most austere conditions and support other organizations such as NGOs.

These advantages are constrained, however, by the military's view that relief operations detract from its central mission of war fighting. In practical terms this means that the U.S. military plans for relief operations that will be limited in scope and duration.[19] Reinforcing this view is the challenge faced by political authorities to generate Congressional and public support for military deployments that are seen as not vital to U.S. national security. Further, if the U.S. military were to remain engaged for an extended period, the risk increases that unrealistic expectations and even dependency could develop within the crisis country and among the other contributors. The military's tendency to take charge increases this risk.

The net effect of these factors is that the U.S. military may be among the first to arrive and among the first to depart, creating early transition challenges among the varied contributors on the ground.[20]

Yet despite the sharp organizational contrasts between NGOs and the U.S. military, they have managed to cooperate to a significant degree, especially in the field.[21]

Division of labor based on comparative advantage has been practiced; for example, in 1994, NGOs in Rwanda focused on "retail" aid distribution while the U.S. military performed "wholesale" logistics functions. Civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) were born of necessity in Northern Iraq and Somalia and are now considered standard operating procedure. Both NGO documents and U.S. military doctrinal manuals reflect appreciation of the other actor and address the need for mutual cooperation. The Army's Joint Readiness Training Center routinely conducts training exercises that involve NGOs. After-action reviews for recent operations are attended by both parties. This level of cooperation, however, is not apparent at the policy level.

This overview of only two actors illustrates a fundamental challenge of coordinating an effective response: transforming an unintegrated network of diverse potential contributors into an effective team that draws on comparative advantages and accommodates the limitations of individual actors. Considering the complete cast of potential contributors to a response operation makes the problem more complex. For example, it is possible that other key actors in a response operation could include such a diverse array as UNHCR to manage refugees; the UN, OSCE or other international organization or group to organize elections; the World Bank to lead reconstruction; and any number of other states, international organizations and NGOs. Each brings to the response operation a unique blend of perspectives, goals, capabilities, structures and organizational culture. They will likely not agree entirely on what is required. Some will focus on the short term, others on the long term. They will focus on different dimensions of the operation; few will take a comprehensive view. In some cases, operational

procedures may conflict: the military may focus on operational security (maintaining confidentiality to enhance force protection) while others share information more willingly. And again, international engagement often changes over the life cycle of the response operation as a result of competing priorities, exhaustion, over-extension, renewed violence, or other demands elsewhere, further complicating the coordination challenge.

The importance of effective coordination of potential contributors, however, extends well beyond the fundamental requirement to match contributors with tasks over time. A partnership of contributors offers important advantages. The burden of hugely expensive operations can be shared among the partners, increasing support for long-term contributions. The overall efficiency of the response effort can be optimized by drawing on comparative advantages of various actors and avoiding duplication of effort. A wide cast of contributors can enhance the legitimacy of the response, guarding against perceptions that any single actor is gaining too much influence in the sovereign affairs of the host state. The net effect of coordinating a team of actors is a coherent multilateral response that is both effective and enduring.

Accepting the Challenge: What is Required?

This assessment of tasks and actors points to the essence of the coordination challenge at the policy level: bringing coherence to the actions of a large number of diverse contributors in a multi-dimensional, dynamic situation. More specifically, the assessment illustrates three "policy coordination pitfalls" -- gaps, seams, and myopia -- that must be avoided if the response is to be effective.

Gaps. "Gaps" occur when an essential task in a multilateral response to a complex crisis is not accomplished for one or more of the following reasons: either the requirement is not recognized, no actor has the capability to perform the task required, no actor accepts responsibility for the task, or the responsibility for the task is not clearly assigned among several competing actors.[22] Tasks are interdependent, so a gap adversely affects other dimensions of the operation and inhibits overall progress.

A prominent gap that has plagued several recent operations is the public security or police gap.[23] Currently, the capacity of international actors to address effectively the need for local law and order during complex emergencies is quite low. Local police are frequently part of the crisis problem, not readily part of the solution. While international military forces can provide a generally secure environment by protecting against larger scale military conflict, they are not optimally organized, trained, or equipped to perform civil police functions. A gap, then, develops -- as in Bosnia today -- between the need for local security from crime and civil unrest and the broad security provided by military forces. In Bosnia, the attempt to fill this gap with the International Police Task Force has met with little success, inhibiting progress in several other dimensions of the operation including freedom of movement and return of refugees.[24] Other gaps that have appeared in the Bosnia operation include apprehension of indicted war criminals and promotion of access to the media.

Apprehending War Criminals: A Gap in Bosnia

"I think a way must be found where a police force can be constituted that would take care of those instances where the signatories to the (Dayton) agreement continue to refuse to turn over those war criminals."

General Shalikashvili, quoted in The Washington Post, December 18, 1996, page A25.

"We ought to consider whether there should be a permanent international war crimes tribunal, which, of course, would require some sort of way of carrying out its mandate."

President Clinton, addressing the question of how to apprehend indicted war criminals in Bosnia, quoted in The Washington Post, January 30, 1997, page A8.

Seams. A "seam" reflects an ineffective transition from one phase of an operation to the next. Here the policy challenge is to ensure smooth, effective adjustments as priorities, tasks, actors and responsibilities change over the operation's life cycle. Hand-offs between actors are common, especially after the crisis response phase, as actors with comparative advantages in rapid response pass responsibility to others. In Somalia, seams developed as the operation transitioned from UNOSOM to UNITAF, and then to UNOSOM II. In contrast, the operation in Haiti featured relatively seamless transitions between the MNF, UNMIH, and successor operations.[25]

U.S.-UN Transition in Somalia: A Seam

"Why expect a seamless transition to UN-led peacekeeping to flow from a rancorous argument between Washington and UN Headquarters about whether the transfer should even take place and whether the United States had completed its initial task?"

Chester A. Crocker
"The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong," in Foreign Affairs, 74, No.3, May/June 1995, pp. 4-5.

Myopia. "Myopia" -- shortsightedness -- is the tendency to focus on the initial crisis response and then pay insufficient attention to the long-term requirements. Such impatience or short attention span traces its prominence in relief operations to several roots: limited resources for response operations, donor fatigue, or failure to sustain public support for long-term international efforts. Myopia often contributes to the problems of gaps and seams. For example, in Somalia the initial international effort focused narrowly on providing humanitarian assistance and this led to problems later as the effort ineffectively coped with the political, economic and social roots of the crisis that demanded a broader perspective, additional capabilities, and transitions among contributors. Again, effective responses to complex emergencies require a long-term perspective, providing continuity throughout the life cycle of the operation. If myopia exists at the policy level, the prospects for effective response are largely confined to the emergency stage, leaving the underlying causes of the crisis unaddressed and setting the stage for recurrences. In the United States, sustained involvement hinges on ensuring public (and Congressional) support; a difficult challenge when these expensive response operations are viewed as only marginally important to national interests.[26]

Avoiding Myopia

"UN agencies and NGOs should plan their actions from the outset with a view to promoting long-term solutions."

Recommendation 91, Oslo Plan of Action, June 1994

The need to generate and sustain public support points to the importance of achieving early and repeated success in a response operation. Success breeds momentum,

a perception of legitimacy, and support for continuing, while failure suggests these operations are futile and not among vital national interests.

Meeting the Coordination Challenge

In light of such challenges, how can greater coherence and unity of effort be achieved in responses to complex emergencies? Perhaps not surprisingly, the experience of the last several years has yielded a number of operational innovations such as civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) and multi-agency training exercises. But, progress at the field and operational levels has not been matched at the strategic level. Governments, particularly the U.S., continue to respond in an ad hoc manner when confronting complex emergencies. What are the specific requirements for effective coordination at the national level?

In general terms, this paper suggests four requirements for a more effective policy response to complex emergencies:

- ✓ leadership;
- ✓ a comprehensive plan;
- ✓ adequate resources;
- ✓ a mechanism to monitor implementation.

Leadership. Strategic leadership is key to an effective international response. This is not, however, a call for U.S. leadership of every international response to complex emergencies. Other states, the UN, and regional organizations are all capable of leading a multilateral international effort. Nonetheless, even if the U.S. does not assume responsibility as lead state, it will likely play a prominent role in most engagements of this

scale. In Haiti, for example and perhaps not surprisingly, the U.S. dominated: it led the initial military intervention, crafted the follow-on UN mission, and was the single largest contributor to the overall operation. In Bosnia, on the other hand, the U.S. did not take the clear lead until 1995 when it spearheaded the diplomatic effort that resulted in the Dayton Peace Agreement, although it remained influential through its roles in the UN Security Council, NATO, and as a member of the five-nation Contact Group.[27] Either way, this paper makes the cases that it is no less important to select the right leader within the U.S. government. Internal U.S. leadership is key whether the U.S. is leading the international effort or joins as one among other nations.[28] In either case, the experiences of Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia illustrate that how the U.S. configures itself to formulate policy will either promote or thwart the overall international response.

A Plan. A comprehensive plan is at the center of a coordinated response. It is the glue that binds the multiple requirements with the diverse contributors across the life cycle of the response effort. It is the primary means to avoid the policy pitfalls described above.

The plan begins with a full assessment of the specific needs of the crisis. Clear objectives are established for initial and follow-on phases. A strategic concept for attaining the objectives links means to ends and includes milestones and plans for transitions between phases. The plan also assigns tasks to actors based on comparative advantage, setting responsibilities and establishing accountability. Finally, the plan must be flexible enough to allow for the unexpected by developing multiple paths capable of meeting the objectives.

A sophisticated policy planning regime develops contingency plans based on hypothetical complex emergencies, thus moving beyond planning only in the face of an imminent crisis. Such plans highlight potential policy coordination problems and thus contribute to improving the responsiveness of national efforts once a crisis occurs.[29]

Adequate Resources. Assembling adequate resources to implement the plan poses special coordination challenges. Fitting actors to tasks and forging a partnership focused on a common objective will help close gaps, smooth seams, and resist myopia. A key preliminary step is to develop a comprehensive database of potential contributors and their comparative advantages by function and geographic region; results from initial efforts at this task are not yet adequate.[30] The requirement to assemble resources throughout the response operation is among the most important roles of the leader of an international effort. Further, since resources are expensive and require political commitment, this may also be the leader's most difficult role.

A Mechanism to Monitor Implementation. A mechanism to monitor responsibilities and milestones is essential. While the plan is the starting point for implementation, the coordination challenge includes adapting the plan as required by the situation on the ground. Circumstances unforeseen may require adjustments in the plan to sustain the relationship of means to ends (i.e., tasks to actors to objectives). For example, as the situation develops, the role of the recipient state, one of the most important actors, must be continually strengthened to promote transition to a "local cure" and return to normalcy. Such adjustments require continuous monitoring and follow-up once the operation is underway.

Some Progress

Some progress has already been made to improve policy coordination at the strategic level. The UN designed the Department of Humanitarian Affairs specifically to coordinate complex emergencies. Innovations such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the Central Emergency Relief Fund, and the Consolidated Appeals Process are evidence that the challenges of policy coordination are recognized at the UN.[31] Within the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, enhancements to the mission planning staff and establishment of a lessons learned office are steps in the right direction. UNHCR, too, has advanced its coordination processes, especially with other UN agencies and NGOs.[32] The World Conference on Religion and Peace has addressed coordination and strategic planning for complex emergencies.[33]

Within the U.S. government there are also examples. In the domestic context, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Federal Response Plan for domestic disasters addresses authorities, relationships and responsibilities among actors contributing to a response within the U.S.[34] Mandated by federal legislation and coordinated across 28 federal and state agencies, this plan establishes the framework to meet the four policy coordination requirements discussed above and offers an example of the sort of work required for coordinating international crises.

Changing U.S. military doctrine reflects the military's acknowledgment of the need to adapt to the challenges posed by complex emergencies. This doctrinal work focuses on levels below national policy -- the operational (or theater) level and the tactical (or field) level. An important exception to this lower level focus is the draft Joint Publication 3-08,

Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, which addresses the challenges of policy coordination from the perspective of the military as one of the participants. While it is more descriptive than prescriptive, this manual reflects the appreciation within the military of the complexity of such operations and the need for enhanced coordination.

Despite such progress, however, the U.S. government still confronts unfolding crises in time worn ways. Some small improvements have been made regarding the way the various agencies of U.S. foreign policy operate internally and relate to each other as the U.S. confronts, plans for, and responds to complex emergencies. Three cases illustrate how the U.S. has adapted thus far. This paper concludes with some modest recommendations for next steps within the U.S. government.

Somalia: A First Attempt[35]

On December 9, 1992, U.S. Marines seized the port and airfield in Mogadishu as the first wave of forces in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) arrived in Somalia with a mandate to secure the UN's ongoing humanitarian relief effort that had begun in April but had proved insufficient. Somalia was in chaos: anarchy, violence and starvation combined to create one of the first complex emergencies of the post-Cold War era. Sixteen months later, U.S. forces completed their withdrawal from Somalia and the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). These two milestones mark the period of the first attempt by the U.S. to participate as a principal actor in response to such an international emergency. UN operations continued for another year, but with little effect on overall results. Famine was largely defeated, but chaos persisted in Somalia. Thirty American troops and 106 more from other national contingents were killed and UN credibility suffered a severe

blow. In the years ahead, Somalia would serve as the formative case for U.S. policy toward such crises.

The UN's operation in Somalia, largely shaped by the United States, was a shaky start to the unfolding pattern of international responses to complex emergencies in the 1990s. An experienced observer summarized the Somalia operation:

> ". . . the United Nations was on a binge of humanitarian relief and military foolhardiness, a roller coaster of complex and confused multilateral, unilateral and quasi-lateral activity, attempting to integrate security, political and economic strategies, suffering the consequences of herky-jerky behavior of the international community, and saving an estimated quarter million lives through its humanitarian relief efforts."[36]

While the UN led the international response in Somalia, the U.S. was the single most important outside party, playing a prominent role in UN Security Council deliberations and on the ground. The effect was that policy in the UN and operational matters in Somalia were largely driven by Washington.

In Washington, the policy-making process was flawed from the outset and remained that way largely throughout U.S. involvement. Despite Somalia moving to the front of the foreign policy agenda, with the deployment of 28,000 U.S. troops, no clear bureaucratic leader emerged, no strategic plan existed, insufficient resources were marshaled, and no effective follow-up mechanism was established.

Leadership. The absence of leadership within the U.S. government hampered policy. At the outset, in early 1992, the governmental "interagency" process addressed the growing crisis as a purely humanitarian issue.[37] The result of this narrow definition of the problem was policy focused on only one dimension that drew nearly exclusively on

agency representation from the humanitarian bureaus concerned with relief. No overall policy leader -- most naturally from the State Department -- was established and the process meandered in search of consensus. As the crisis worsened in the Fall of 1992, President Bush twice took the lead and broke the U.S. policy logjam.[38] First, in August, he announced a significant increase in U.S. relief aid. Then, in November, he decided to deploy a strong U.S. military force to lead UNITAF and secure the relief effort. By November, Somalia was a full crisis and U.S. policy was being run from the White House with the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) meeting regularly to develop options for the president.[39]

As U.S. troops deployed as part of UNITAF, an interagency task force was set up by Department of State to coordinate U.S. policy. This task force, however, was too weak and too late in formation to withstand the understandable loss of continuity during the Bush-Clinton transition from December 1992 to January 1993. For its part, the new administration -- like its predecessor -- did not assign an agency leader for Somalia policy, in part because it was new and in part because it was distracted with other policy crises in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. The administration's first ten months saw the success of UNITAF become overwhelmed by the shoddy transition to UNOSOM II, the new expansive nation-building mission mandated by the UN Security Council, and the disastrous hunt for Aideed.

Within one week of the tragic raid on October 3, a policy review was launched in Washington and a new interagency structure was established to formulate and implement U.S. policy toward Somalia.[40] An Executive Committee (EXCOMM) of the NSC was

formed, co-chaired by the NSC staff and the Somalia Coordinator of the State Department. Thereafter, senior representatives from the interagency met regularly and reported to the Deputies Committee. The EXCOMM took a number of steps toward policy coordination, such as paying increased attention to the police gap and conditioning further U.S. aid on cooperation of Somali factions, but its primary focus was on developing a plan to bring to a close the U.S. military involvement -- a goal that was achieved on March 25, 1994.

The formation and operation of the EXCOMM can be summarized as too little, too late. Only when the crisis became overwhelming did Somalia receive the attention it deserved, and only then did the interagency organize itself to handle the crisis in a comprehensive way. By then, however, the political cost of continuing in the crisis was too high. Yet, the Somalia EXCOMM featured strong personalities as leaders, access to decision-makers, and broad interagency representation. While it was formed too late to make a significant difference in the outcome in Somalia, the EXCOMM did represent a model for future handling of complex emergencies.

A Plan. The U.S. government produced no comprehensive strategic plan for its response to the Somalia emergency. This failure in Washington reverberated widely and contributed to the lack of integration among the various dimensions -- humanitarian, security, political -- of the international response. In the absence of an integrated plan, U.S. policy and hence the international response developed sequentially, focusing first on one dimension and then on another while largely neglecting others altogether. Initially, U.S. policy was almost entirely humanitarian; then the focus shifted to security as U.S.

troops were deployed; never taken adequately into account were the political, economic and social aspects of the problem. Moreover, U.S. strategic objectives were not spelled out, a fact that contributed to lack of clarity and incremental shifts over time.

One analyst reflects:

> "It seems self-evident that conditions conducive to the desired political settlement might have followed the establishment of the secure environment needed for humanitarian activities. That they did not is no indication of failure on the part of the forces sent to Somalia to ensure that humanitarian aid could be distributed to the starving citizens and refugees in that country. Those forces did what they were asked to do. What was missing was a strategic vision for Somalia, one that could have integrated political goals with the missions assigned to the military. The failure of the United Nations to foster from the outset such an integrated strategy for Somalia may have reversed the gains made by the military in at least part of the country."[41]

In a review of its experience in Somalia, the UN recognized the need for "a coherent vision, strategy and plan of action which integrate all the relevant dimensions of the problem, including humanitarian, political and security."[42] That the U.S. -- the single most influential state involved -- produced no such plan for its own policy undoubtedly contributed to the overall strategic problems in Somalia. In particular, a comprehensive U.S. plan could have illuminated the fallacy of focusing too much on the military dimension, pointed to the problem of transitioning UNITAF to UNOSOM II when the U.S. and the UN disagreed on hand-off conditions, and highlighted the challenge of supporting the UN's first-ever peace enforcement effort.

<u>Adequate Resources</u>. A persistent gap between ends -- such as any were defined clearly -- and means existed throughout the Somalia operation. This gap is partly attributable to setting unrealistic goals but it also resulted from the simple fact that the U.S. was unwilling to assemble the resources necessary to restore Somalia to any sense of

normalcy. But the problem was actually much worse than a mere unwillingness to resource plans properly. In fact, the U.S. continually supported broader mandates -- like that for UNOSOM II -- while consistently failing to generate corresponding resources. In addition, Washington focused on military tools at the expense of other means, especially those needed for political, economic and police requirements.

A Follow-up Mechanism. Within the U.S. government, absence of leadership and a strategic plan led to ad hoc policy formed in reaction to the latest crisis on the ground. In this situation, there could be no effective follow-up. And in fact there was none.

If the EXCOMM had been placed in charge of monitoring implementation of an integrated plan, U.S. policy might have looked quite different. For example, the focus on military means might have been put in a broader perspective of U.S. policy to address the underlying sources of Somalia's crisis. Absent a leader or a plan, however, assessment of a follow-up mechanism is not meaningful.

Summary. The U.S. government's response to the crisis in Somalia was its first real post-Cold War attempt to cope with a complex emergency. Acting largely through the UN, the U.S. contributed significantly to both the successes and failures of the international effort. Despite the undeniable humanitarian accomplishments, the Somalia experience remains perceived as overwhelming negative. The operation will be remembered for the staggering complexity of the problems, the tragic loss of U.S. and other UN troops, and the substantial loss of UN credibility in leading an international response. No less memorable, however, is the lingering dissatisfaction with a U.S. policy that lacked leadership, had no comprehensive plan, focused too much on military

resources, and failed to anticipate or develop a follow-on strategy to cope with longer term issues.

Haiti: One Step Forward[43]

In the aftermath of Somalia, the Clinton administration developed a policy on how to handle such operations. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), "Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations", emerged in May 1994 and set out the general conditions for U.S. participation in peace operations and how such operations would be managed in Washington. For example, PDD-25 states that when U.S. combat troops are committed the Department of Defense will take the interagency lead, and when they are not the State Department will lead.

By the time PDD-25 was signed, the U.S. was confronting its next complex emergency, one which featured both distinct differences from Somalia and remarkable similarities. Unlike Somalia, Haiti was physically much closer to the U.S. and developments in 1993-94 affected its direct interests. Further, the crisis in Haiti was not of the same scale as in Somalia: civil war was not ongoing, tens of thousands were not dying, and a central government did exist. Nonetheless, the complexity of the crisis in Haiti was still substantial: all the dimensions of a complex emergency existed.

Haiti is broadly viewed in U.S. policy circles as a success story. The military intervention stabilized the situation and led quickly to the reinstallment of the duly elected Aristide regime. Repressive military and police structures were replaced and democratic government systems given a chance to develop. While poverty still plagues Haiti and criminal -- perhaps political -- violence remains a problem, there is no question that Haiti

is better off today than in September 1994 when the US-led multinational force landed. How did the US respond to this scaled-down complex emergency in its own backyard to produce such relatively positive results?

Leadership. In late Spring 1994 as conditions in Haiti deteriorated and a political solution seemed unlikely, the U.S. government established an EXCOMM to handle the crisis.[44] This body provided the interagency leadership throughout the planning and implementation phases of the operation. The Haiti EXCOMM included officials from State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, CIA, and USAID and was chaired by two interagency veterans of the Somalia experience. On occasion, the EXCOMM broadened its cast by including operational level military commanders, UN officials and NGO representatives. The two principal players -- State and Defense -- also established internal task forces to cope with day-to-day matters and respond to the EXCOMM. The EXCOMM, however, was the authoritative leader of the interagency policy-making process.

The Haiti EXCOMM was not a panacea. For example, even with this leadership arrangement in place in May, some guidance from Washington to operational level planners was delayed until August, just one month before the military intervention.[45] Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the EXCOMM as the interagency leader contributed significantly to the coherence of U.S. policy in response to the crisis in Haiti.

A Plan. The most important product of the EXCOMM was a comprehensive political-military plan -- the first of its kind for a complex emergency. Planning began in late Spring 1994 independently within the Department of Defense and USAID. The EXCOMM plan brought these efforts together and integrated other key actors as well,

such as the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), NGOs, and the UN's Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The result was a comprehensive roadmap for U.S. policy that was approved by the Deputies Committee of the NSC. The Haiti plan established clear policy objectives, assigned responsibilities within the Interagency, set milestones for implementation, and focused on transition of the initial U.S.-led intervention to the UN's follow-on mission.

The Haiti plan proved flexible as the situation on the ground changed. The U.S. military adapted its operation from invasion to unopposed entry when the Haitian military regime agreed to depart peacefully within hours of the beginning of the planned invasion. Later, adjustments were made when the Haitian public security system suddenly disintegrated, threatening a serious public security gap. Throughout the operation, draft resolutions for the UN Security Council were crafted to sustain the coherence set out in the EXCOMM's plan. Most impressive is the fact that the Haiti plan -- now in its third version -- is still in use today, nearly three years after it began to bring together the disparate elements of U.S. policy.

Building a comprehensive plan went a long way toward avoiding the pitfalls typical of these operations. Potential gaps such as reforming Haitian police, controlling weapons and supporting elections were anticipated. The plan helped to prevent seams during the U.S.-to-UN transition by addressing the details of the hand-off early and including UN officials. The plan took a long-term perspective -- avoiding myopia -- by addressing the underlying roots of the Haiti crisis.

The plan had an important secondary effect: it served as a catalyst for further detailed coordination to manage key junctures of the operation. For example, just one week before the military landed in Haiti, an interagency "rehearsal" was held in Washington to fine tune the coordination called for in the plan. This event highlighted numerous misunderstandings and requirements to coordinate further. Later that Fall, the plan served as the basis for an all-day conference in Washington with UN officials to coordinate the U.S.-UN hand-off, an important step in assuring a smooth transition.

Despite the well-developed strategic plan, interagency problems existed.[46] Many of these problems arose at the operational level and late or inadequate policy guidance may have contributed. Without doubt, however, the plan for Haiti was a vast improvement over that for Somalia.

Adequate Resources. Adequate resources -- both US and international -- were marshaled to address the wide scope of problems in Haiti. In keeping with the basic concept for the operation, the U.S. accepted responsibility to provide resources for the initial operation, then passed responsibility to the UN while remaining the dominant actor. For example, in the 28-nation, 21,000-soldier multinational force that conducted the initiated the operation, the U.S. provided all but about 2000 of the troops and all the support. Once the UN took over, the U.S. provided 2400 of the 6000 troops. Further, the U.S. demonstrated its commitment to the operation by taking the lead in recruiting international contributors of troops and police, and donors for humanitarian aid and development funds. The U.S. trained and supplied troop contingents for the multinational force and later provided the force commander and a significant number of key staff

officers for the UN force. The U.S. sponsored a unique training session for the UNMIH military and civilian staff just prior to their assuming the mission in Haiti -- an initiative that greatly facilitated the transition.[47]

Aside from the military effort, resources were marshaled for the justice system, public works, schools, economic assistance, infrastructure repair, the legislative system, and elections. Illustrative is the major effort committed to reforming the Haitian police. This U.S.-led effort to avoid a public security gap included recruiting, training and managing the up to 900 international police monitors (IPM) authorized by the UN mandate. These IPM were to overwatch Haiti's "interim public security force" while ICITAP ran a police academy to develop the Haitian National Police. This reform effort continues today, largely funded by the U.S.

Follow-up Mechanism. From the outset, the plan for Haiti included two essential follow-up features: hand-offs first to UNMIH and ultimately to elected Haitian authorities; and the retaining the EXCOMM to monitor U.S. implementation of the plan. These mechanisms have been largely successful.

In particular, the transition from the U.S.-led multinational force to UNMIH was seamless, smooth and efficient; a sharp contrast to the troubled hand-off in Somalia from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Key to the successful transition in Haiti is that the hand-off was integral to the original concept and imbedded in the strategic plan. All participants recognized where the operation was intended to head and could direct their efforts toward that common goal. Illustrative of the early steps taken to promote a smooth transition is the 60-person UNMIH advance team that began to arrive in Haiti only one week after the

multinational force to prepare for the deployment of the UN force six months later. Similar coordination took place at the strategic level with EXCOMM members in frequent contact with their UN counterparts. The gradual transition to Haitian authorities continues as UNMIH has been replaced with the smaller UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH).

In Washington, the EXCOMM shifted its focus from planning to implementation. The strategic plan was revised as needed to keep up with the situation on the ground. Resources were adjusted to address needs. Milestones and measures of effectiveness were tracked and responsible agencies held accountable for progress. Successful implementation in Haiti was founded on the EXCOMM's strong leadership and the integrated plan.

Summary. Despite these vast improvements compared to the Somalia experience, problems arose in Haiti during implementation. For example, promoting economic development, sustaining progress in public security, reforming the justice system, and bolstering the fragile democratic process have proven difficult.[48] These persistent problems call for continued international engagement while patiently requiring Haitian authorities to assume full responsibility. The continuing problems also underscore the enormous effort involved in responding to complex emergencies: effective governmental structures cannot be built quickly, especially where there are no democratic traditions upon which to build. Even in light of these problems, however, the improvement within the U.S. government in responding to Haiti as compared to Somalia was dramatic. The Interagency demonstrated that it could organize itself at the strategic level to contribute to

a successful response operation. While UNMIH was still deployed and before the U.S. government could absorb the lessons of Haiti, however, the U.S. faced participation in response to another complex emergency: Bosnia.

Bosnia: Two Steps Back[49]

As Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1991, the aftermath of the Gulf War and the break-up of the former Soviet Union preoccupied the U.S. Somalia and Haiti had not yet drawn the world's attention. While playing a key diplomatic role from the outset, the U.S. did not engage in substantial operational ways as its European allies deployed troops to support the UN-led effort to respond to unfolding war in former Yugoslavia. From the beginning and for the next four years, the UN's response suffered from a mismatch between mandate and resources.

By the summer of 1995 this situation shifted dramatically as the U.S. assumed leadership in defining a solution for the crisis in Bosnia. Numerous factors combined to produce a cease-fire in October 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement in November and the commitment of about 60,000 NATO troops to Bosnia in December. Today a smaller NATO force including U.S. troops remains in Bosnia as the military arm of the international effort to implement the peace accord.

But substantial success in the military tasks has not been matched in the other dimensions of implementation, leading many observers to dismal long term forecasts for Bosnia. In April 1997 -- nearly a year and a half after Dayton -- during a visit to Washington, Bosnian President Izetbegovic stated: "If the international community under

strong U.S. leadership does not undertake immediate and resolute action, the Dayton Accords will be remembered in history as a very expensive cease-fire."[50]

Leadership. As the U.S. asserted itself as the leader of the international response to the crisis in Bosnia in the summer of 1995, a bureaucratic leader emerged as well. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke took charge of Bosnia policy. His diplomatic team -- including representatives from NSC staff and Department of Defense -- conducted shuttle diplomacy from August through October 1995, orchestrated the talks in Dayton, and launched immediate tasks leading to the commitment of NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in late December. Holbrooke's unmistakable leadership within the U.S. interagency during this period had several shortcomings. First, Holbrooke was necessarily focused on the near-term requirements of attaining a cease-fire backed up by a comprehensive peace agreement, but this focus constrained the interagency planning for the longer term. The result was that the myopic focus on attaining a peace agreement meant little attention on implementing one. Second, the demands of his peace mission kept Holbrooke and his team out of Washington. In their absence, and given the fluid nature of the ongoing negotiations with multiple parties, the interagency became passive, awaiting reports from the team.

When Holbrooke left the government in early 1996, leadership within the U.S. interagency on Bosnia was never effectively reestablished. A succession of Department of State officials held the position of special coordinator for Bosnia, but for a variety of reasons none really directed the U.S. effort. Just before U.S. troops deployed as part of IFOR, a Bosnia EXCOMM was established, jointly chaired by NSC staff and State. This

organ, however, remains immersed in day-to-day issues and has not addressed the deeper issues guiding U.S. policy. This lack of leadership results in a U.S. policy that remains internally inconsistent and focuses too much on the military dimension of the response effort.[51]

A Plan. Today there exists no comprehensive political-military plan for the U.S. effort in Bosnia. The Dayton peace agreement is the starting point for any plan to integrate the dimensions of the international response effort, but it alone is insufficient to synchronize U.S. policy. An attempt was made between the Dayton negotiations and the deployment of IFOR to construct such a plan, but it remains incomplete eighteen months later.

The international response -- led by the U.S. since the summer of 1995 -- predictably reflects the lack of integrated planning within the U.S. government. There is no plan that brings together the responsibilities assigned in the Dayton accords to diverse actors. The array of contributors in Bosnia is quite broad, reflecting the enormity and complexity of the task, and includes the Bosnian parties and neighboring states, NATO and its civilian counter-part Office of the High Representative, the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the World Bank. This varied cast increases the importance of an integrating plan, yet none exists. As an exception, NATO produced a series of detailed plans that address the military dimension of the international response and its relationship to other actors; U.S. military planners played a key role in this planning. No such plan exists for the non-military aspects, however, and -- equally important -- no plan exists integrating the military and non-military components of the

international response. The discontinuities existing between the political, economic, social and military aspects of the international effort in Bosnia -- for example, the fundamental tension between ethnic partition and integration -- are partly the result of the absence of coherent, comprehensive planning to implement the Dayton accords. The absence of such planning within the U.S. was a prime factor that contributed to the unsatisfactory situation at the international level.

An expert on the situation writes:

> "The lack of coordination between military and civilian aspects of the peace process, the delay in funding and conditioning of funds to enforce specific Dayton provisions, and the related absence of an overall grand strategy for sustainable peace and a secure environment during the transition have lost the peace process valuable time and threaten to perpetuate a stalemate rather than end the Bosnian war."[52]

<u>Adequate Resources</u>. The generation of resources by the U.S. for the international effort in Bosnia has been uneven. The U.S. leads the international military effort and continues to exert political pressure on the Bosnian parties to comply with Dayton. The U.S. committed more troops to IFOR and its successor -- stabilization force (SFOR) -- than any other nation. Due to the existing NATO command structure, U.S. officers lead the international forces both in NATO headquarters and on the ground in Bosnia. On the political front, U.S. diplomats tirelessly continue to shuttle through the Balkans pressing for implementation of the Dayton accords. But without clear leadership in Washington and a comprehensive plan to guide the effort, these resources may prove squandered.

Further, adequate resources to support the other dimensions of the response have not been generated. For example, the international police task force run by the UN and

aimed at filling the public security gap lacks qualified manpower, transportation and communications equipment.[53] Only 30% of economic reconstruction funds pledged for 1996 were available late in the year, including only 33% of the U.S. pledge.[54]

Absence of an overall strategy to address the Bosnian crisis and provide an operational context for the U.S. role in the Balkans, support lags in the U.S. Congress. Worse, attention shifted early to a focus on the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the contribution of European allies relative to the U.S. effort.[55]

Follow-up Mechanism. Without strong leadership in Washington and an integrated strategic plan, effective follow-up is not possible. Current U.S. policy to withdraw U.S. troops from the NATO mission on a particular date regardless of the conditions on the ground illustrates the lack of integration across the dimensions of the U.S. response. Not only does this stance disaggregate the military element from the overall strategy, but it also causes all the other relevant parties -- those in Bosnia and in the international community -- to wait and see what will happen when the date for U.S. withdrawal arrives. Such absolute milestones promote discontinuities within the overall policy and disharmony among the actors. There is little point in formulating or undertaking independent approaches when so much rest on the U.S. and NATO.

Summary. The U.S. interagency response to Bosnia is closer to the incoherence of Somalia policy than the relative success in Haiti. Aspects of this regression include a lack of interagency leadership, the failure to develop a comprehensive strategic plan, uneven generation of resources, and -- given these conditions -- predictably poor follow-up. Accepting the unique character of each case, the three cases taken together reveal a

disturbing pattern of inconsistency in U.S. policy-making and highlight the importance of the four ingredients of successful policy coordination.

Conclusions: Three Steps to Better Policy

What can be done to reverse the pattern of Somalia-Haiti-Bosnia and reform U.S. policy-making to improve U.S. capacity to respond to complex emergencies? [note previous works: Miller for reforms within the US government; Moore, within the UN; Chayes/Chayes/Raach apply modern business approaches to policy-making] These cases suggest that three steps can lead to substantial improvement:

- institutionalize the EXCOMM,
- prepare contingency plans,
- engage others early.

Institutionalize the EXCOMM. The president should mandate that an executive committee be established to handle future complex emergencies. [note: The author understands that there is an ongoing initiative within the US government to establish such a structure for complex emergencies. The recommendations of this paper, however, are the results of an independent assessment of the policy challenges and requirements for reform.] EXCOMM members should be assistant secretaries of the executive departments and agencies involved in the response, with flexibility to tailor membership as needed for specific cases. The role of the EXCOMM should be to link the executive branch bureaucracies to the policy decision-makers sitting on the Deputies and Principals Committees of the NSC.

The EXCOMM is responsible for meeting the four requirements of policy coordination throughout the entire life cycle of the response operation: it leads the interagency response effort, oversees the development of the comprehensive strategic plan, it assembles adequate resources, and monitors implementation of the plan.

The experiences of Somalia and Bosnia demonstrate that there is no substitute for starting the policy process early. It is important to create the EXCOMM early before U.S. policy options are foreclosed by decisions of other contributors or before changes in the situation on the ground make the problem more difficult. An EXCOMM should be created as soon as the government assesses that a complex emergency is likely to arise and the senior decision-makers begin their assessment of potential U.S. involvement.

Prepare Contingency Plans. The U.S. government should undertake as a matter of priority the preparation of contingency plans that outline the coordination requirements of U.S. policy options in potential complex emergencies. [In the U.S. military, contingency planning is conducted routinely by the regional commanders-in-chief and reviewed by the Joint Staff. This process presents a model for development of the civilian-military plans recommended here.] These plans should be based on intelligence assessments of potential crises, produced by the executive departments with input from their experts in the regions, and address the full range of coordination required in response operations. The process of producing these plans can be as important as the plan itself. The planning will promote interagency dialogue and the generation of policy options which avoid gaps, seams and myopia.

The contingency plan becomes the EXCOMM's starting point when an actual crisis arises. Armed with a preliminary plan on which to base its comprehensive strategy, the EXCOMM will have the benefit of initiative early in a response operation when viable policy options are most broad. The time saved early in the policy process pays dividends later as agencies contributing to the response operation gain time to prepare. This preparation time is especially important for civilian agencies that -- unlike their military counterparts -- do not maintain in-place capabilities for rapid crisis response.

Engage Others Early. Today's complex emergencies pose problems that are simply beyond the capacity of the U.S. to respond alone. The U.S. must engage other potential international contributors -- states, international organizations, NGOs -- with the aim of including them in the U.S. contingency planning process. Planning for complex emergencies should be a regular item on the agenda for bilateral meetings with key U.S. allies. Further, the U.S. should use its leadership standing to promote contingency planning within the international organizations likely to play a role in future response operations.

The benefits of engaging other actors go beyond burden sharing. One objective of such planning should be to enhance the specialization of particular organizations. Specifying roles can lead to improved preparation, shared expectations, and more efficient division of responsibility among all the key players when a crisis arises.

In sum, there is no end in sight to the pattern of complex emergencies that has developed in the 1990s. None of the cases discussed in this paper have come to a definitive end, yet others already loom on the horizon; North Korea, Albania/Kosovo, and

Zaire are examples. While the U.S. role in future operations can vary widely -- as it did across the three cases considered here, some U.S. role in response to future complex emergencies is likely. Improving U.S. capacity to respond begins with reforms at the policy level in Washington where conducting "business as usual" has proven insufficient.

NOTES

[1] For example, in 1975 UNHCR contended with 2.4 million refugees by expending $69 million; by 1995, 14.5 million refugees and an additional 12.9 million 'other persons of concern to UNHCR (for a total of 27.4 million persons)resulted in expenditures of $1,140 million. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *The State of the World s Refugees 1995* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 19-20, 36, 247-248.

[2] Operations can be viewed as having three levels: the strategic (or international and national policy) level, the operational (or theater) level, and the tactical (or field) level. Coordination in response to complex emergencies tends to be most effective at the tactical level and least at strategic. Consider, for example, the emergence of the civil-military operations center (CMOC) to coordinate multilateral efforts in the field or theater. See John Mackinlay, ed., *A Guide to Peace Support Operations* (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1996), pp. 231-243; Field Manual No. 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army), pp. 20-30; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vol. I, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, forthcoming), pp. III-1 to -26.

[3] UNHCR defines a complex emergency as "a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme". Also see, Andrew S. Natsios, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse* (Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers, 1997), pp. 6-7.

[4] Raimo Väyrynen, *The Age of Humanitarian Emergencies* (Helsinki, Finland: United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research), p. 42; "Global Humanitarian Emergencies 1996," Released by the United States Mission to the United Nations, 1996, p. 1; see also, *A Guide to Peace Support Operations*, p. 14.

[5] See, for example, Francis Mading Deng, "State Collapse: The Humanitarian Challenge to the United Nations," in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, I. William Zartman, ed., (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 215; Ted Robert Gurr, "Early-Warning Systems: From Surveillance to Assessment to Action," in *Preventive Diplomacy*, Kevin M. Cahill, ed., (New York: Basic Books, 1996), p. 130.

[6] See *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vol. I, pp. D-2 to 4; *A Guide to Peace Support Operations*, p. 15.

[7] See Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic, "Policing the New World Disorder," in *Strategic Forum* 84 (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1996), p. 4.

[8] U.S. Army doctrine is spelled out in *Peace Operations*. See especially the definitions of types of operations, pp. 2-12, and the discussion of variables, pp. 12-13. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995); Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, Joint Pub 3-07.3 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1994); and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995). Also useful is *A Guide to Peace Support Operations*, pp. 160-173.

[9] See, for example, Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1995).

[10] See, for example, The International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX), "Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina After Dayton: An Assessment," undated, pp. 2-13.

[11] Andrew J. Goodpaster, "When Diplomacy is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions" (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, July 1996), pp. 20-21.

[12] Chris Seiple, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College), p. 6; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,* vol. II, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, forthcoming), Appendix B; *A Guide to Peace Support Operations*, p. 231.

[13] Several sources exist that serve to catalogue NGOs by specialty. For example, see *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vol. II, Annex B; ACCESS, a Washington, DC project of the Fund for Peace, maintains a comprehensive worldwide database of organizations working on international issues for information and to encourage collaboration. It has proposed to adapt its existing capabilities and database to facilitate international networking among NGOs and between NGOs and government policymakers. Associations such as InterAction and the International Council on Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) maintain information on their membership. Coordination efforts include: the *Oslo Declaration and Plan of Action* (1994); the "Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief," (1994) sponsored by Caritas Internationalis, Catholic Relief Services, The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Save the Children Alliance, Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam, The World Council of Churches, and The International Committee of the Red Cross, in *A Guide to Peace Support Operations,* Annex 6, pp. 106-111; "Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies: The Mohonk Criteria," in *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vol. II, Appendix J; ReliefWeb, located at http://www.reliefweb.int:80/ on the World Wide Web, is a project of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) designed to strengthen the response capacity of the humanitarian relief community through the timely dissemination of reliable information on prevention, preparedness, and disaster response.

[14] The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs is developing a Central Register of Disaster Management Capacities. Included within this register will be a Directory of International Search and Rescue Teams; a Directory of National Emergency Response Offices; National Emergency Relief Services (NERS) - Major Donor Governments; a Register of Emergency Stockpiles of Disaster Relief Items available for International Assistance; a Directory of National Focal Points for Customs Facilitation in International Emergency Humanitarian Assistance; a Register of Military, Civil Defence and Civil Protection Assets available for International Assistance; and a Register of Rosters of Disaster Management Expertise available for International Assistance. Although this register maintains information on some of the larger non-governmental humanitarian organizations, it predominantly monitors governmental capacities.

[15] NGOs are independent and even competitive organizations for funding and media attention. InterAction, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), and the Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response -- a coalition of seven of the largest international NGOs which respond to humanitarian disasters -- are the primary associations of NGOs which serve to unify support behind certain policies or programs. Together, they advise the UN's Inter-Agency Standing Committee as it coordinates UN action in complex emergencies. Also, *A Guide to Peace Support Operations*, pp. 104-106, 110-111.

[16] Nonetheless, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996) and the *National Military Strategy of the United States 1995*,

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995) account for such military operations other than war (MOOTW). The doctrine is well developed and training is conducted.

[17] See, for example, William Cohen in Susanne M. Schafer, "Cohen Issues Caution on Peacekeeping," in *The Washington Post,* January 25, 1997, p. A8.

[18] *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vol. I, pp. I-8 - I-9.

[19] See "Cohen Issues Caution on Peacekeeping."

[20] In addition, the presence of U.S. military in the crisis area leaves an indelible mark that can be perceived as jeopardizing the political impartiality of the operation on which other contributors rely. See *Peace Operations*, pp. 12-14.

[21] See, for example, *A Guide to Peace Support Operations*, p. 114; Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Warfighting Center, 1995), p. 5.

[22] The concept of gaps is not new. See Sadako Ogata, "Towards Healing the Wounds: Conflict-torn States and the Return of Refugees," in *The United Nations: The Next Fifty Years,* Han Sung-Joo, ed., (Seoul: Ilmin International Relations Institute, Korea University, 1996), pp. 73-83.

[23] See "Policing the New World Disorder," pp. 1-4.

[24] "Bosnia's Security and US Policy in the Next Phase," A Policy Paper of the Joint Policy Forum of The Atlantic Council of the United States, the East European Studies program of The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX), December 1996, p. 7.

[25] In Recommendation 106 of the *Oslo Declaration and Plan of Action*, UNHCR and many NGOs called for smooth transitions from relief assistance to rehabilitation and development. Regarding transitions in Haiti, see Robert B. Oakley, "Developing a Strategy for Troubled States," in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1996, p. 85; also, *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti -- A Case Study*, Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, eds., (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Washington, DC, 1996); Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, *Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer UN Military Force* (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Committee on International Security Studies, 1995), p. 39; Gabriel Marcella, *Haiti Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Handoffs, and Exit* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 1994).

[26] Secretary of Defense William J. Perry identified three categories of operations for the U.S. military in his March 1996 *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*: vital; important; and humanitarian. Vital operations occur when U.S. interests are at risk or an ally is threatened by conventional military force, economic strangulation, or by the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Important operations, including military intervention in ethnic conflicts or civil wars, require the consideration of a number of critical factors including: whether the intervention advances U.S. interests; whether the intervention is likely to accomplish U.S. objectives; whether the risks and costs are commensurate with the U.S. interests at stake; and whether all other means of achieving U.S. objectives have been exhausted. Humanitarian operations occur even in the absence of a direct threat to U.S. national interests and military force may be appropriate in these operations when: a humanitarian crisis dwarfs the ability of civilian agencies to respond; the need for relief is urgent, and only the military can initiate a quick response; the response requires resources unique to the military; and the risk to members of the U.S. service members is minimal. See also "Cohen Issues Caution on Peacekeeping."

[27] The United States' initial reluctance to commit troops to Bosnia limited its influence mainly to international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO and the *ad hoc* Contact Group. See Elaine Sciolino, "Bosnia Policy Shaped by U.S. Military Role," *New York Times*, July 29, 1996, p. A17; Saadia Touval, "Lessons of Preventive Diplomacy in Yugoslavia," in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict,* Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, eds., (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 408-410; David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995), p. 121.

[28] According to Presidential Decision Directive 25, the U.S. Department of Defense will have lead responsibility for the oversight and management of peacekeeping operations which involve U.S. combat units while the U.S. Department of State will oversee and manage traditional peacekeeping operations in which U.S. combat units are not participating. The White House, Presidential Decision Directive 25, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" (Washington, DC: The White House, 1994).

[29] Further, contingency plans could then become the starting point for a comprehensive approach to coordinating future operations. A sequence employed typically at operational and tactical levels -- plan, train, execute, and learn -- should be adopted at the policy level. This model accounts for the importance to coordination of adequate preparation (plan and train) as well as for the value of translating lessons from one operation to the next. See *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, pp. I-12, I-14.

[30] Although no list currently ranks comparative advantage of NGOs depending on area or situation, a number of organizations monitor some NGO capabilities and strengths including ACCESS at the Fund for Peace, InterAction, and DHA.

[31] See UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, *The MCDA Reference Manual* (New York: United Nations, 1995), Chapter 2.3. In December 1996, the General Assembly called upon the Secretary-General to ensure that the Inter-Agency Standing Committee "develop options and proposals to further define operational responsibilities between its members, drawing on their respective mandates, expertise, respective strengths and available capabilities, to identify cooperative arrangements to strengthen their joint capacities and to strengthen its work in priority setting and formulation of coherent humanitarian strategies." UN Press Release GA/9207, December 17, 1996.

[32] See, for example, Oslo Declaration and Plan of Action, June 1994. Also, High Commissioner Sadako Ogata's concept of "predictable complementarity" defines well the interrelationship required for effective coordination; see Sadako Ogata, "Towards Healing the Wounds: Conflict-Torn States and the Return of Refugees," in *The United Nations: The Next Fifty Years*, Han Sung-Joo, ed. (Seoul: Ilmin International Relations Institute, Korea University, 1996), p. 87.

[33] *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, Appendix J.

[34] Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), "Federal Response Plan," April 1992.

[35] The best single source for the various operations in Somalia from the UN s perspective is *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996). A view from the U.S. is provided in John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).

[36] Jonathan Moore, *The UN and Complex Emergencies* (Geneva: UN Research Institute for Social Development, 1996), p. 12.

[37] The term "interagency" is used in Washington to describe the group of bureaucratic actors relevant to a particular policy issue.

[38] Don Oberdorfer, "The Path to Intervention," *The Washington Post*, December 6, 1992, p. A1.

[39] *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, p. 42.

[40] *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, p. 133.

[41] Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," *Parameters*, 23.4, (Winter 1993-94), p. 44.

[42] *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*, p. 85.

[43] For a good summary of the Haiti case, see United Nations, Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1996). For insights to U.S. policy making, see Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti -- A Case Study* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996).

[44] *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations*, p. 33.

[45] *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations*, pp. 34, 51.

[46] *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations*, pp. 29-48.

[47] U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, *Success in Peacekeeping, United Nations Mission in Haiti: The Military Perspective* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute), pp. 3-4.

[48] See, for example, Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic, "Sustaining Success in Haiti", in *Strategic Forum*, no. 77 (Washington, DC: Institute for National Security Studies, June 1996); John Sweeney, "Stuck in Haiti", *Foreign Policy*, no. 102 (Spring 1996), pp. 143-151; Donald E. Schultz, *Haiti Update* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College) January 29, 1997; Douglas Farah, "Haitians to Vote, but Poverty, The Top Issue, Is Not on Ballot", in *The Washington Post*, April 6, 1997, p. A23.

[49] For an overview of the Bosnia case see *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*. For assessment of the situation since the Dayton Peace Agreement, see Susan L. Woodward, "America's Bosnia Policy: The Work Ahead", *Brookings Policy Brief*, No. 2, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, July 1996); and, Susan L. Woodward, "Implementing Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Post-Dayton Primer and Memorandum of Warning", Brookings Discussion Paper, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, May 1996). Assessment of interagency actions is based on author's numerous interviews with National Security Council, Department of Defense, and Department of State officials, November 1995 through April 1997.

[50] Georgie Anne Geyer, "Lacking Strategy to Exit Bosnia", *The Washington Times*, April 4, 1997, p. 14.

[51] "Implementing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," pp. ii, 26, 40.

[52] "Implementing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," p. i.

[53] "Policing the New World Disorder," p. 3.

[54] John Pomfret, "Gorazde's Water Woes Typify Obstacles Facing Nation", *The Washington Post*, October 13, 1996, p. A1, A44.

[55] For example, see Van Hilleary, "A New Bosnia Policy," in *The Washington Times*, May 31, 1997, p. A19.