AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

STONEWALL JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN

By

Stewart L. Gingrich

Commander, USCG

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

Advisor: DR. Howard Hensel

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

February 24, 1995
19 AUGUST 97

This paper was downloaded from the Internet.

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

POC:

AIR WAR COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112
Disclaimer

This study represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

Loan copies of this document may be obtained through the interlibrary loan desk of Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5564 (telephone [205] 953-7223 or DSN 493-7223).
Abstract

Title: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign
Author: Stewart L. Gingrich, Commander, USCG

The purpose of this paper is to describe the events of youth and early adulthood of Thomas J. Jackson, leading to his appointment to West Point and service in the Army. A brief account of his early Army career and teaching career precedes the main theme of this paper, a detailed portrayal of the famous Valley Campaign planned and executed by General Jackson. The conclusion will include a report of the leadership and tactics employed by General Jackson and the effects of the Valley Campaign on the war waged on the Peninsula.
Biographical Sketch

Commander Stewart L. Gingrich is a 1967 graduate of Michigan State University. He entered Naval Flight training at Pensacola, FL in 1967 and received his Navy wings in November 1968. After eight years in the Navy, Commander Gingrich entered the Coast Guard in 1975. During his career as a Coast Guard aviator he has flown several rotary wing aircraft. Obtaining an Aeronautical Engineering specialty in 1978, Commander Gingrich also holds a Masters in Engineering Management from George Washington University. Commander Gingrich is a 1995 graduate of the Air War College.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISCLAIMER ii

ABSTRACT iii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH iv

THOMAS J. JACKSON 1
  Ancestry 1
  Childhood 2
  Appointment to West Point 4
  Conflict in Mexico 5

JACKSON THE PROFESSOR 7

MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 8

APRIL 17, 1861 VIRGINIA SECEDES 9

PROMOTION TO BRIGADIER 12
  Command of West Virginia 18

THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN BEGINS 19
  Organization and Training 19
  Bath and Romney 21
  Valley Campaign Strategy 22
  Withdrawal from Winchester 23
  Kernstown 23
  Leadership Problems 27
  Secret Moves 29
  Confederate confusion 34
  The Battle of Front Royal 36
  Banks escapes Jackson 39
  Retreat Down the Valley 43
  Cross Keys 46
  Port Republic 51

JACKSON’S FIELD LEADERSHIP 54
Battle of Bull Run, July 21st 1861 55
Battle of Kernstown, March 23rd 1862 55
Battle of McDowell, May 8th 1862 56
Battle of Winchester, May 25th 1862 56
Battle of Cross Keys, June 8th 1862 / Battle of Port Republic, June 9th 1862 57

VALLEY CAMPAIGN RESULTS 58
Confederate Objective 58
Jackson's Aim In the Valley Campaign 58
   Economy of Force 59
   Surprise 59
   Mobility 60

CONCLUSION 60

REFERENCES 62

BIBLIOGRAPHY 63
Thomas J. Jackson

Thomas J. Jackson experienced a difficult and broken childhood, subject to a variety of philosophies from very diverse relatives. Throughout his youth and early manhood, Tom worked hard to achieve his goals and then after thirty seven years in which his character was molded, Thomas J. Jackson came to the zenith of his career, the Civil War. It was during this period that Jackson attained the fame and glory which he so desperately sought.

This paper will provide a brief historical account of the life of Thomas J. Jackson before the Civil War began, then proceed in more detail through the Civil War operations leading up to and including the Valley Campaign commanded by General Jackson. It will finish with a brief description of the leadership and tactics employed by Jackson and the effect of the Valley Campaign on the war waged on the Peninsula.

Ancestry

Thomas J. Jackson's first ancestor of record was an Irish immigrant named John Jackson who immigrated to Cecil county, MD in 1748. By 1769, John had staked a claim along the Buckhannon River in Turkey Run, not far from what was to become the town of Weston, WV. With two sons, John fought in the revolution, helped clear the Indian tribes and left large tracks of land to his heirs. Edward, son of John, was the grandfather of General Thomas J. Jackson. It was in Edward's time that the family began to prosper. The Jackson men were congressmen, judges and tax collectors. Edward sat in the Virginia legislature; while brother John G. Jackson married Mary Payne, the sister of Dolly Madison. Edward Jackson's son, Jonathon, a young lawyer of Clarksburg, WV, was a
man of promise. Jonathon’s basic education began at Randolph Academy in Clarksburg and he read law in the office of his uncle, the judge who had married into the Madison administration. Admitted to the bar at the age of twenty, Jonathon’s first position was that of federal tax collector. Four children were born to Jonathon and his wife Julia: Elizabeth, Warren, Thomas and Laura. Thomas was born Jan 21, 1824 in Clarksburg, WV. First named by his mother Thomas Neil, he was to reach manhood before adding the name of his own father. Thomas’s sister Elizabeth died of an undiagnosed fever when he was three. His father, having tended to Elizabeth, contracted the disease and died within two weeks, leaving his family penniless because of his unfortunate way with money and property. Thomas’s mother clung to her cottage home in Clarksburg by operating a little private school and local sewing. After two years, Mrs. Jackson remarried Captain Blake Woodson, another lawyer. The children were scattered due to their mother’s health. Warren went to her brother Alfred Neil near Parkersburg, where he prepared for a brief life teaching. Thomas and Laura went to the country home of their grandmother, Edward Jackson’s widow. Grandmother lived near the village of Jane Lew, close to the original site where old John Jackson had fought the Indians. The departure for this home marks the beginning of the T.J. Jackson legend. (1:88-90; 7:37-44; 9:21-29)

Childhood

Six year old Tom, displaying the fearless spirit of an incipient lieutenant general, would run into the woods and hide from his bachelor uncle and return only at night. Only after days of bribery and persuasion did the children agree to leave their mother and go to the
grandmother's big home on the west fork of the Monongahela River. There they would spend many happy years with the grandmother and a couple of maiden aunts and high spirited bachelor uncles. Shortly after departing to his grandmothers, Tom's mother Julia Jackson died while he was still in his seventh year. The children were carried to her death bed for a scene of prayer and blessing that made a deep impression on Tom. (1:90-92; 9:30-31)

Five years later, in 1835, his grandmother died and Tom was sent to the home of a cousin, William Brake, near Clarksburg. Spirited Tom could not bear his new home for long and ran away back to Clarksburg telling relatives in a firm, young voice “I have disagreed with Uncle Brake. I have left him, and I’m not going back.” From that point, Tom lived in the home of his bachelor Uncle Cummins, the head of a horse loving, fox hunting, race crazy clan. This ample farm provided Tom with an opportunity to perfect his horsemanship and leadership as he directed the crews of Negroes working at the farm. At approximately the age of twelve, Tom and his brother Warren drifted down the Ohio in a log canoe, spending time with relatives and then striking out for themselves. They passed the winter and spring on an island in the Mississippi far down in Kentucky. They survived by cutting fire wood for passing boats but returned by steamer with nothing to show for their labors. Warren developed tuberculosis and died at the age of nineteen. (1:91; 9:32-33; 7:45-47)

Tom developed a devotion to learning and would lie on the floor to study while a slave held a blazing pine know over his head. The bargain being that as Tom learned and the slave held the light the boy would pass on the knowledge and both would become
educated. In 1938, at the age of fourteen, Tom got his first job and his first contact with the church, which was to mean so much to him. He worked on the Parkersburg-Staunton Turnpike and would walk three miles each Sunday to listen to a neighborhood minister. There was no hint during his life why he did this, but perhaps it was an unconscious protest to the godless home of his uncles. In any event, this and other signs of strong character so impressed the local squire that at the age of seventeen Tom was assigned a constables post. His duties were minor, serving legal papers for the most part. It was at this time in Jackson’s life that his concern for his health was to develop and he experienced his first attacks of dyspepsia. (1:91; 9: 34-41)

Appointment to West Point

In 1842, Tom had the accidental good fortune which was to mold his life. A boy from his district withdrew from West Point, thus creating a vacancy for West Virginia. Tom, although he had never shown evidence that he yearned to be a soldier, learned of the glories of the academy and military life and bent every effort toward going there. Uncle Cummins was a major help, for he knew Samuel S. Hays, the District Congressman who promised to provide all possible help. Hays took Tom to the Secretary of War, who approved his candidacy despite Tom’s shortcomings. On July 1st, 1842, Tom arrived at West Point. (1:92; 3:51; 7:50-52; 9:49-55) Tom’s entrance was observed by a small group of cadets which included three future Confederate Generals: A.P. Hill, George Pickett and Dabney H. Maury. For some reason, Jackson’s appearance impressed this group and they concluded that that fellow has come here to stay. Jackson did stay at West Point but he was uncomfortable and the butt of many cadet pranks because of an
irresistible combination of country in elegance and grave earnestness to which he gave his studies. Jackson soon won the sympathy of all instructors because of his frank approach to his ignorance. He often confessed that he could not recite the day’s lesson since he was months behind and had not mastered earlier assignments. Jackson began with the most lowly group of his class, which the Point called the ‘Immortals.’ His struggles in his studies were valiant and endless. His grade standing at the end of his first year was in the bottom ten percent. By the end of his second year he had improved to the bottom thirty percent. He wrote to his sister Laura during this period and said:

“I am enjoying myself very well, considering that I am deprived of the blessings of a home...I have before me two courses. The first would be to follow the profession of arms; the second, that of a civil pursuit, as law.”

(1:95)

He expected to adopt the second course after a few years in pursuing the former. In July, 1846, Tom graduated with a distinguished class that dwindled from seventy-two to sixty members. Overall, he finished in the top quarter of his class but made his lowest rank in the study of infantry tactics. He got a brevet lieutenants commision in artillery, and left West Point with a reputation as a shy, young soldier of sound mind “but not quickf;96; 7:54-56; 9:60-76)

**Conflict in Mexico**

On March 9, 1847, at the age of twenty-three, Jackson joined General Winfield Scott as he readied to storm Vera Cruz. Jackson commanded a light battery and his were among the first guns fired as Scott assaulted Vera Cruz. For five days he maintained his
bombardment of the city and was later promoted to the permanent rank of second lieutenant, “for gallant and meritorious conduct at the siege of Vera Cruz.” (1:97; 9:90)

During this battle, Jackson exhibited his attitude as he wrote to his sister Laura:

“...I approve of all except allowing the enemy to retire; that I cannot approve of... We had them secure, and could have taken them unconditionally.” (1:98; 9:90)

This attitude was to characterise Jackson’s action throughout his military career. On April 17th, Jackson joined the army in the attack at Cerro Gordo. Here he had his first lesson in a flank assault from one of Scott’s engineers, Captain Robert E. Lee. It was during this period of time that Jackson began his first religious expression. He wrote to Laura: “...I throw myself into the hands of an all-wise God, and hope that it may yet be for the better. It may have been one of his means of diminishing my excessive ambition...” The mention of God linked with a confession of his ambitions seemed to set a pattern for the future in which Jackson would intermingle God, war and ambition. (1:100; 9:91-95)

On September 5th, Scott attacked at Chapultepec, the citadel of Mexico. Here, a dramatic scene of the war unfolded and it seemed as if it had been staged to display Jackson’s talents. The Lieutenant took his guns up the hill and drew the concentrated fire of the whole section of the Mexican line. The guns, obviously trained on his path, killed Jackson’s horses and fifteen of his men. Soon there was only Jackson and a Sergeant remaining, with the Lieutenant handling the sponge-staff and the Sergeant firing the single surviving gun against the enemy. A messenger told Jackson that he was to pull off his gun and come to the rear. Jackson refused to obey the order. Magruder, Jackson’s immediate
superior, appeared and Jackson turned on him in blazing anger. He asked for fifty more men and said that he could hold the position. He argued that it was more dangerous to withdraw than to push ahead. Magruder agreed. The Lieutenant hitched his guns to wagons and rushed into the center of the city. Magruder followed closely with his ammunition caissons. Jackson was sited for devotion, industry, talent and gallantry of the highest quality, and was promoted to the rank of Major for his efforts at Chapultepec.

(3:51; 7:66-68; 9:112-116) When friends asked him if he was afraid, Jackson confessed that his only fear would be not to be able to get enough of the dangerous action to draw the attention of his superior officers so that he might not be able to make his conduct under fire as notable as he would like. He expounded on the beauties of battle: “I seem to have a more perfect command of my faculties, in the midst of fighting.” (1:106; 5:102; 9:119)

Jackson the Professor

Fourteen years of peace now lay ahead of Jackson after the Mexican War. In March, 1851, Jackson was appointed Professor of Natural and Experimental Philosophy - and Artillery Tactics at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia. (3:51; 9:206-208) At the age of twenty-seven Jackson had become very set in his ways - some of them quite telling as to his future. One afternoon, the Commandant, Colonel Francis H. Smith, called Jackson into his office and asked him to be seated in an anteroom while he attended to another matter. Colonel Smith completely forgot about his appointment with Jackson and went home for the night. To his astonishment, the superintendent found Jackson sitting in
the anteroom the next morning. Jackson explained: “It never occurred to me to leave the spot of duty, where my superior told me to stay.” (1:116; 7:29)

Marriage and Family

In April of 1853, Tom stunned his sister Laura with a letter explaining that after a brief courtship with a lady named Elinor Junkin, he, in fact, was now married. (9:248-250) Tom, Elinor and Elinor’s older sister Margaret went on a honeymoon to New York City and Niagara Falls. Margaret left the only glimpse into Tom’s nature when he revealed his military enthusiasm to her and Elinor. While standing on the plains of Abraham at the foot of a monument erected to General Wolfe, he removed his cap as if he were in the presence of a sacred shrine and faced the setting sun, exclaiming Wolfe’s dying words: ‘I die content!’ “To die as he died who would not die content.” (1:119; 7:78-84; 9:251-252)

Seventeen months after their marriage, in October 1854, Elinor died in childbirth. The child was stillborn, and Jackson announced her death to his family. (1:120; 7:86; 9:258)

After a tour of Europe in 1856, (9: 263) Jackson returned to Lexington and requested a leave of absence to travel to North Carolina to court Anna Morrison, a young lady that he had met before marrying Elinor. After tender letters and an engagement, they were married in July of 1857 at Cottage Home, North Carolina. In April, 1858, Anna bore Tom a daughter whom they named Mary Graham. The baby died after a few weeks. (7:88-91; 9:273-283)
Jackson remained at the Institute until winter of 1859 when he was ordered to Charleston to command the troops at the hanging of John Brown. (3:28, 51; 9:292-295) He returned to the Institute knowing full well that war was coming closer to them. On the 17th of April, 1861, Virginia seceded. (9:308)

April 17, 1861 Virginia Secedes

It was late on a Saturday night, April 20th, and Thomas was alone with Anna. He hoped that he would have at least tomorrow for rest and church affairs but it was not to be. Early the next morning a messenger hammered on the door delivering orders to move to Richmond. He went to the campus and worked most of the morning preparing his young men to take to the road. After a brief devotional service Jackson announced that all was ready and that the corps should move. At precisely 1:00 p.m. April 21st they started on their way to Staunton and the railroad. Jackson was to return only in death. (1:135; 9:312)

As Jackson reached Richmond he led his cadets into camp at the fairgrounds. He was well known among the leaders of Virginia’s war effort. Jackson reminisced as he wrote to Anna: “Colonel Robert E. Lee...has been made a Major General. This I regard as of more value to us than to have General Scott as Commander...I regard him as a better officer than General Scott.” In the meantime, Winfield Scott was presiding over a similar scene in Washington. He too had agreed:
"If I were on my death bed and the President should tell me that a great battle was to be fought for the liberty or slavery of the country and asked my judgment as to the ability of a commander I would say with my dying breath let it be Robert E. Lee." (1:136)

It was not Lee, however, that was first to reach Jackson in Richmond, but John Letcher, a professional politician and now governor, who without hesitation proposed Jackson for the rank of Colonel to command the Virginia infantry. Jackson met Lee, who gave him a sincere welcome. Lee told Jackson in the most basic terms of their strategic situation and approved Letcher's suggestion that Jackson be sent to Harpers Ferry where Virginians had just burned the Federal armory. (3:31; 9:316) Lee and Jackson discussed the strategy surrounding this Potomac post and Lee asked that it be held as long as possible to secure the river line against Federal invasion. Jackson was to hold the town, train troops, and transport to Richmond the guns and arms-making machinery found there. (1:137; 9:317-318)

Jackson was soon in Winchester on his way to Harpers Ferry wearing the drab, worn institute uniform with no mark of rank. He received little reception upon his arrival. Virginia, having banished the favorite volunteer officers of Colonel and General rank, now found in their place only this stern and uninspiring officer. Colonel Jackson, without a fleck of gold on his shoulder nor a plume on his hat, put his two thousand ill-assorted Virginia soldiers to work as if they were laborers or slaves. He kept the rails and roads filled with cars of machinery and captured guns going back to Richmond. (1:138; 2:14; 9:322-325)
Jackson soon brought discipline to his garrison, and more than that he found some able men and old friends: John Imboden, a gifted artilleryman; Colonel W. N. Pendleton, an Episcopal rector, another artilleryman who had christened his guns Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. During these times, Jackson always found time to write to Anna, even if it was a mere few sentences. Anna seemed to be his shoulder to lean on during times of concern. (3:31)

One of Jackson’s chief works at Harpers Ferry was perhaps the most devious ruse of his career - the virtual kidnapping of a railroad. The Baltimore and Ohio tracks lay through his lines and though Lee had forbade him to tear up the railroad for fear of repercussions, Jackson plodded to capture its priceless rolling stock. Jackson complained to the President of the railroad John W. Garrett of Baltimore that trains disturbed his men at night and must be routed through Harpers Ferry at about noon. The railroad agreed. Garrett was hardly in a position to argue with a Confederate soldier who controlled the big bridge over the Potomac. Jackson also complained that since the “empties” were sent up at night the nuisance was a great as ever and that the west bound trains should pass during the same hour as those going east. Jackson then set the trap. He sent Imboden to Point of Rocks across the Potomac with orders to halt all eastbound trains and pass all those heading west. At Martinsburg, a few miles upriver, he reversed the order. At twelve o’clock precisely as Jackson had ordered, the lines were closed at each end of the double track area and the Confederacy had netted fifty-six locomotives and more than three hundred cars. (1:139; 9:338-339)
Although Jackson was unable to transport all of his captured locomotives south, he destroyed those that he was forced to leave. Richmond newspapers were the first to salute Jackson's fame and he was temporarily nicknamed 'Old Hickory.' A brother officer said of him when interviewed, "[Jackson]...does not know fear! Above all he is a devoted Christian and the strongest becomes stronger when his heart is pure and his hands are clean." In the glow of this tribute, Jackson lost his command to Joseph E. Johnston. Jackson, unbelieving, declined to surrender the post until Johnston found the order from Lee which satisfied Jackson that the transfer was proper. (1:140-142)

Promotion to Brigadier

Jackson was given five regiments of Virginia troops from Shenandoah country, tough mountain men. Although discouraged and without a command as he left Harpers Ferry, this wounded pride was to be short lived. For three days later, on June 17th, he was promoted to Brigadier General. (3:33) Jackson soon wrote to Lee,

“I am of the opinion that this place should be defended with the spirit which actuated the defenders of thermopylae...The fall of this place would...result in the loss of the northwestern part of the state and who can estimate the moral power thus gained by the enemy and lost to ourselves?” (1:142)

Jackson wrote this to Lee as if in a plea that Harpers Ferry be held in an unspoken contempt for the timid General Johnston. Lee agreed, but did not relieve General
Johnston. Johnston’s force patrolled south of the Potomac in the western quarter, waiting for war to come while Jackson went through marches and counter marches between Charleston and the enemy camp at Martinsburg. Jackson felt that Johnston moved with no purpose and was frightened by shadows. It was during this time that Jackson appointed Sandy Pendleton (the son of the rector) who became the real, even though untitled, chief of staff to Jackson. It was also during this time that Jackson met a fascinating comrade in arms, a warrior so irrepressibly gay that Jackson could not keep his eyes off him: James Ewell Brown Stuart, Lieutenant Colonel of cavalry. His appearance was enough to stun Jackson. Stuart dismounted from one of his punishing rides sweeping back a soiled cloak to reveal a faultless Confederate gray coat lined in scarlet silk; he wore tiny golden spurs, and there was a floppy black ostrich plume in his big hat. His French saber was hooked over a golden silk sachet. There was a red rose in his lapel, and he wore white buckskin gloves. Jackson understood Stuart immediately, for the horsemen devined the true meaning of orders and carried them out like a military artisan with creative movements of his own. Stuart was perpetually inspired and, like Jackson, was a stern Sabbath keeper if the enemy permitted. Stuart, also like Jackson, did not ask the troopers to ride where he dared not go himself. Jackson remembered the ring of Stuarts words; “If we oppose force to force we cannot win for their resources are greater than ours...we must substitute esprit for numbers, therefore I will strive to inculcate in my men the spirit of the chase.” (1:143)

Stuart accompanied Jackson in their first formal meeting with the enemy at a place called Falling Waters on July 2nd, 1861. (See Fig. 1) (1:cover) General Robert Patterson of the
Union Army began to probe the rebel lines by pushing across the Potomac. Patterson was still crossing the river when Stuart advised Jackson of the move. Although Jackson had timid orders from Johnston to feel out the enemy and fall back under cavalry cover, he rushed forward with one regiment and a few artillery pieces. As the Federals cleared the river and advanced over open fields they met staggering musket fire and then Jackson charged them. Jackson was taking a heavy toll on the Federals when superior numbers forced him to fall back. The Federals mistook this move as a rout. The Union volunteers took chase along an open highway in column, a perfect target for the Reverend Pendleton.
and Matthew, Mark, Luke & John. The Reverend was heard to say: “Lord have mercy on
their souls,” before he tore the Union formation apart. (1:144)

Early on July 18th, General Johnston received a message while in his Winchester
headquarters. The Federal Army was approaching Manassas Junction and he was to rush
his men east while eluding the enemy in his region. Leaving General Stuart behind to
protect the rear, General Jackson and his infantry started south through Winchester. The
troops reached the Blue Ridge at dark after eighteen hours on the move and during the
night forded the Shenandoah River. Their first rest came at two a.m. after traveling
twenty miles. General Jackson refused to have exhausted men aroused for sentry duty and
he alone stood guard over the sleeping brigade. Just prior to dawn Jackson watched as
Stuart’s cavalry passed reporting the enemy quiet in the rear. By mid afternoon Jackson
and his men were on the field at Bull Run. Across the stream lay the Federals and General
McDowell with thirty-five thousand men. No one had ever seen such an army. During
the early morning hours of the next day, July 21st, General McDowell pushed his men
toward the waiting force of twenty-six thousand Confederates. This did not begin as a
day of significance for Jackson. His troops lay in reserve on a hot hillside called Henry
House Hill as the opening scenes of the battle began. By mid-morning the Federals
emerged from the dust opposite the stream and the first of the Union charges came. All
up and down Bull Run strings of battle exploded. As noon approached General Johnston,
who had originally left the assault to General Beauregard, told Beauregard to throw his
reserves into action. “The battle is there, and I am going” Johnston said, and he pointed
to Henry House Hill. Just behind the crest of the hill, out of fire and superbly placed, were
Jackson's troops lying at ease. Jackson waited as calmly as if he had been through thousands of such battles. As two South Carolina brigades under General Bee and Colonel Evans were falling back to the slope under lines of blue infantry. As the battle came nearer, Jackson readied his artillery. As he raised a hand directing Captain Imboden he jerked his hand down and saw that blood was streaming from it - his first battle wound. The enemy appeared on the crest of the hill and were clearly outlined against the sky for Jackson's prone marksmen. As his brigade fired, the Yankees were "literally blown into oblivion." (1:148)

As Jackson's artillery drove the survivors back down the Hill, the Federal Commanders Heintzelman, Hunter, and Tyler threw their regiments against the Hill - all told, twenty-five thousand troops. The Hill was being defended with the ninety-eight hundred troops of Jackson's brigades. The Federals pushed over a rise called Matthews Hill and now passed the Henry House. Into the battle General Stuart came at the head of his reckless riders. As Stuart spread panic among the Union troops one of Jackson's infantry regiments, the thirty-third Virginia, stormed from cover. Near three o'clock, the combined weight of Stuarts charge and Jackson's move began to tell on the Federal troops. They fell back under the weight of numbers already having fought beyond their limits of endurance. Colonel Arnold Elzey at the head of the Marylanders led the pursuit of the Federals. It was at this time, during the heaviest fighting, that Jackson was to win the sobriquet which was to become more famous than any other event of his life. During the heaviest of the fighting General Bee yelled to his South Carolinians pointing to Jackson's men who awaited the next attack: "Look, there stands Jackson like a stone wall.
Rally behind the Virginians, men!” (1:149; 3:35; 5:100) General Bee was fatally wounded but the name spread: Stone Wall. The silent officer who had commanded on Henry House Hill became a legend in the army overnight. (1:150; 9:375-378)

It had not been Jackson’s fight, but he had said things in battle which men now magnified. An officer had dashed up to him when things looked worse shouting, “General, the day is going against us,” Jackson had replied calmly, “If you think so Sir, don’t say anything about it.” During the night Jackson went to a surgeon for treatment of his finger. He was quoted as saying “Give me ten thousand men, and I would be in Washington tomorrow.” (1:152) The next day he wrote to Anna:

“Yesterday we fought a great battle and gained a glorious victory, for which all the glory is due to God alone. Although under heavy fire for several hours...I received only one wound, the breaking of the longest finger on my left hand...while great credit is due to other parts of our gallant army, God made my brigade more instrumental than any other in repulsing the main attack. This is for your information only - say nothing about it. Let others speak praise, not myself.” (1:153)

Jackson believed in God, country and family in that order. Shortly after his first battle he made a mortal enemy when an officer who had received word that his wife was on her death bed, asked Jackson for leave so that he could be with his wife during her last hours. Jackson stared at him, saying only “Man, man, do you love your wife more than your country?” The officer did not understand this emotion; the wife died and the officer never forgave Jackson. (1:154)
Bull Run gave the Confederacy a false view of the months ahead and the worth of the Federal troops. General Beauregard gave high praise to General Jackson who, with the remnants of three other brigades, had incredibly held the center of his line. Jackson, too, was able to essay the contributions of his officers during the battle of Bull Run. Arnold Elzey had taken over the reinforcements when a superior was shot down and was soon promoted to Brigadier General. Others who proved themselves were Major Wheat, the Commander of the Louisiana Tigers, whose ranks were reputed to be filled with felons from New Orleans prisons, and his chief surgeon Dr. Hunter McGuire, who was to become a professor of surgery at the University of Pennsylvania and the President of the American Medical Association. (1:155)

Command of West Virginia

On the 7th of October Jackson was promoted to Major General. He also received orders to command in Western Virginia, a move which was to mean very much to him. Jackson worked night and day to prepare for his new post on the frontier with but one last chore - to say farewell to the Stonewall Brigade. He drew the men up in ranks:

"Officers and men of the First Brigade, I am not here to make a speech, but simply to say farewell. I met you at Harpers Ferry in the commencement of the war...you have already gained a brilliant and deservedly high reputation...and I trust in the future...you will gain more victories. You have already gained a proud position in the history of this, our second war of independence. I trust whenever I hear of the First Brigade on the field
of battle it will be of still nobler deeds...in the army of the Shenandoah you were the First Brigade; in the Army of the Potomac you were the First Brigade; in the second corps of this Army you are the First Brigade; you are the First Brigade in the affections of your General; and I hope by your future deeds and bearing you will be handed down as the First Brigade in our second war of independence. Farewell!” (1:157)

The Valley Campaign Begins

Organization and Training

Jackson took over his command in Winchester which consisted of three little brigades and a handful of militia, some armed only with flintlocks. (2:17) In mid-November he called for reinforcements for the Valley. He was sent the Stonewall Brigade. During the first weeks General Jackson was not affected by strategy but training as he drilled men and tried to develop a staff. (2:3) His first attempts at discipline of officers brought mutiny. Some wrote in passioned protest at this “unwarranted assumption of authority” which “disparaged their dignity.” Jackson’s reply was calm but unrelenting. He accused the officers of neglect of duty, incompetence and subversion. They submitted to his strict discipline. Soon more reinforcements arrived some under the command of General W.W. Loring; these were in a notable state of indiscipline. (1:159; 2:18; 6:216; 9:408-410)

General Jackson’s first campaign opened on January 1st as Turner Ashby led his cavalry in an attack on Bath and Romney, enemy outposts in the mountains. (See Fig. 2) (5:48)
There was scarcely a skirmish as the army moved on Bath in the morning and the Federal garrison fled toward Hancock, Maryland. (2:18; 3:44) Although a modest engagement, the Generals aims were not modest on this expedition. It was at this point that General Jackson’s ultimate strategy was uncovered. He proposed through Congressman Boteler that he be allowed to recruit twenty thousand mountain men and sweep down on Pittsburgh and Harrisonburg. The army of Johnston was to cross the Potomac and meet
with him in the north. Boteler found no support for such a daring assault as he consulted his fellow politicians in Richmond. It was considered only a wild scheme by an officer with an unimpressive reputation. (1:161)

**Bath and Romney**

General Jackson pushed toward Romney, where he left General Loring and his troops. (2:19) He was aware that Lorings men had opposed his campaign and were rebellious, but he was not prepared for the storm that followed. Loring and his officers had appealed to Richmond for relief of the orders of this madman. (3:73) They asked to be withdrawn citing that they were dangerously exposed to the enemy for no purpose. Jackson was unaware of this and had just claimed that he had saved Western Virginia for the South. He was soon to receive two shocks. The first was when he found out that the people of this region had voted overwhelmingly for separation from Virginia and created the loyal state of West Virginia. The second shock was closer to home, a telegram from the Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin. Jackson read with astonishment: “Our news indicates that a movement is being made to cut off General Lorings command. Order him back to Winchester immediately.” (1:162; 2:19; 3:84) Jackson was unprepared for this. He had never dreamed that his authority might be challenged by civilians in Richmond. He wrote back to Benjamin on January 31st, 1862:

“Sir, - your order requiring me to direct General Loring to return...has been received and promptly complied with. With such interference in my command, I cannot expect to be of much service in the field, and I accordingly request to be ordered to report for duty to the Superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington. Should this application not
be granted, I respectively request that the President will accept my resignation from the Army.” (1:163; 3:85)

General Johnston, to whom the letter was forwarded, recognized the talent at stake. He wrote on the back of the dispatch: “Respectively forwarded with great regret.” Johnston also chided Benjamin for his orders to Jackson. General Jackson continued his appeal. He wrote Governor Letcher, denouncing Benjamins “attempt to control military operation in detail from the Secretaries desk at a distance,” and added: “as a single order like that...may destroy the entire fruits of a campaign, I can not reasonably expect, if my operations are thus interfered with, to be of much service in the field. I desire to say nothing against the Secretary of War. I take it for granted that he has done what he believes to be the best, but I regard such a policy as ruinous.” (1:163; 3:86; 9:430-436)

Letcher challenged Benjamin, too. The Secretary backed down and made no issue of the matter with the aroused Stonewall. Letcher sent Jackson an assurance that he would no longer feel interference from Richmond. Jackson had rendered invaluable service in protecting field commanders from interference. He had also revealed his grim, single-mindedness of purpose. Stonewall thought Loring “should be cashiered” for his part in the affair, for starting trouble over danger that “did not exist.” Richmond transferred Loring within a few days - and promoted him to Major General.

Valley Campaign Strategy

In March, the grand strategy of the valley began to take shape. Jackson had four thousand men, and the greatly superior armies of General Banks and General Shields lay north of him near the Potomac. (2:20) Richmond was watching a vast Federal Army under
General McClellan pushing up the peninsula between the York and the James rivers.

General Johnston, facing what promised to be a disaster, told Jackson:

"Remain in the Valley if possible; hold the enemy, but expose yourself little, and take no chance of defeat; stay near enough to the enemy to prevent reinforcement of McClellan by those Federal troops in the Valley. In short, threaten, but do not fight." (1:161)

These orders were the foundation of the Valley campaign and Jackson was to give them his most liberal interpretation.

**Withdrawal from Winchester**

In early March Jackson deserted Winchester. He began a series of moves against General Banks who was moving slowly down the Valley toward Winchester in such a force that he could not be halted. According to Jackson’s spies, however, his regiments were scattered and quick attacks were possible. Jackson had many informants, especially in the clergy at Martinsburg. In leaving Winchester, he ordered his wagons left just outside the town so that he could feed and supply his troops then strike the Union advance. After a supper meeting with his officers he found that the wagons, contrary to his plan, had been dragged many miles away and that his cleverly planned attack was impossible. That was the last council of war Jackson ever held. (1:167; 3:109; 9:451-458)

**Kernstown**

Jackson traveled southward approximately forty miles below Winchester. On March 21st, he received word that the enemy was moving in his direction. He sent his cavalry out with Ashby, to look for opportunities to attack. Ashby soon called for Jackson and the
infantry. The General replied with a long, hard march by his little corps which was to acquire a legendary legs; some regiments made twenty-seven miles the first day and sixteen the second. On a Sunday afternoon, March 23rd, (See Fig. 3) (5:49) Jackson came to the village of Kernstown. (2:22; 3:118) He had little choice as to whether he should give battle for his columns were within sight of the enemy. Ashby’s guns were already engaged, and Stonewall’s strict observance of the Sabbath was broken. (3:119) This was the opening of the first battle of his career as an independent Commander. Jackson had no more than three thousand men for battle, but he had able Lieutenants; Brigadier General Richard Garnett led Jackson’s old brigade. No one knew how many Federals were in Winchester, though Ashby’s report led General Jackson to believe that it was an isolated segment of the Union Army and would be soon cut to pieces. Enemy troops moved into the open, but were beaten off. Jackson had thirty artillery pieces in action and was forming a flank attack. He threw in the reserves but the enemy line did not waiver. Some of his men began to stumble backward from one position to another and Jackson heard somebody shout out “ammunition giving out.” (1:168; 3:125) The General shouted, “Go back and give’em the bayonet,” but he could not stop the retreat. Jackson galloped to Garnett ordering a halt to the withdrawal, but had to watch as two hundred men of his rear guard and a couple of guns were captured by the enemy. The line of
retreat continued to fall back slowly until after dark. The Federals did not follow, for there was considerable confusion and disorder in the Federal camp. Ashby had lead Jackson into the repulse, for he had been seriously misinformed as to the Federal strength; the cavalryman was misled by a stratagem of General Shields, who had hidden his main body of troops. (2:24; 3:127) Jackson wrote to Anna:

"Yesterday important considerations, in my opinion, rendered it necessary to attack the enemy near Winchester...Our men fought bravely but superior numbers of the enemy repulsed me. God has been my shield..."

Jackson understood, though, that his defeat had nonetheless been a blow to the Federals who were now obliged to regard Jackson's force as a potential offensive army and not a mere observation party in the Valley. Washington could not consider removing Federal troops from the Valley to aid in the siege of Richmond. Instead, reinforcements were being sent to General Shields. The rebel Jackson appeared to be dangerous. (1:171; 3:128)

Jackson's thoughts of his defeat in his first valley battle plagued him. Within a couple of days he accused General Garnett with a long list of failures at Kernstown, removed him from command and put him under arrest. (3:132) The army was stunned, and most officers openly rebelled. General Garnett was a brave, aggressive officer who did not deserve Jackson's charges. In fact, General Taylor wrote: "I have never met an officer or soldier, present at Kernstown, who failed to condemn the harsh treatment of Garnett after that action." (1:171) It was almost as if Jackson was unable to bear the defeat and needed a scape goat. Richmond agreed with the troops, for Jackson was ordered to
release Garnett from arrest and assign him to duty. Jackson was uncompromising and refused to reinstate General Garnett. (Garnett eventually returned to duty and died later in the war, leading a brigade in Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, just weeks after he had been a ballbearer at Jackson’s funeral.) (3:134) Jackson also wrestled with his conscience on whether he had properly attacked the enemy on Sunday, the Sabbath, rather than on Monday. Jackson wrote several times to Anna relaying these concerns.

General Jackson continued to ask Richmond for reinforcements and finally received the tiny command of General Edward Johnson. While Jackson rested in camp with Colonel Ashby’s cavalry screening him, the Federal command questioned itself on whether they were mistaken as to the threat of Stonewall. On April 1st, General McClellan wired General Banks:

“I doubt whether Johnston will now reinforce Jackson with a view to offensive operations. The time has probably passed when he could gain anything by doing so...in regard to your movements the most important thing is to throw Jackson well back.” (1:173)

General Banks wired President Lincoln: “The rebel Jackson has abandoned the valley of Virginia permanently...” (3:160) But retreat was far from Jackson’s mind. He had spent his last days in a ceaseless effort to prepare for attack. He had at last found one of the necessities he needed for a swift campaign. A young topographical engineer named Jed Hotchkiss became an indispensable aid to Jackson. General Jackson ordered him to:

“...Make me a map of the valley from Harper’s Ferry to Lexington, showing all the points of offense and defense between those points.” Hotchkiss completed this work and
delivered it to Jackson who put these charts of distances in the valley to memory. These would become critical to him in the future campaigns. (2:8-9; 3:25, 112)

**Leadership Problems**

General Jackson was to continue to have leadership problems. Although an inspirational leader, he was quick to blame his defeats or lack of complete success on his troops and they began to rebel. Several officers including Colonel A.C. Cummings of the 33rd Virginia refused their post and resigned. Jackson blamed these results on Richmond and their failure to send the right men to replace lost officers. The only good news that Jackson would receive was the addition of General Ewell and his seven thousand fine troops. (2:25) While the Valley army waited and reinforced, Colonel Turner Ashby performed one of the feats of daring that made him the hero of the countryside. As the army watched from a hillside during a day in April, Colonel Ashby appeared on a white horse at the front of a Union cavalry driving at top speed. Ashby, firing at his pursuers, was himself under heavy fire and it was clear that he would not have time to burn the covered bridge in front of him as Jackson had ordered him to do in the case of an enemy advance. Nevertheless, he reigned at the bridge as if to set fire to the brush piled against its timbers. The Yankees were upon him, one enemy bullet narrowly missing Ashby and striking his stallion in the side. Ashby cut the soldier from the saddle with his saber and disappeared into the bridge. (3:145)
This effort was not enough to save Ashby from the wrath of Jackson. The cavalry companies had now grown to twenty-one, were scattered all over the countryside, and were completely out of control. Jackson chose this event to impose discipline on Ashby. He divided the cavalry into regiments and assigned Ashby to command only the advance regiments which were to guard the army. Ashby and his next in command offered their immediate resignations. General Wilder, a close friend of Colonel Ashby, became a mediator. He went to Jackson, and soon Jackson ordered Ashby to his camp. Hours passed. An order went out detaching all cavalry to Ashby’s command as before. John Harman, the Quarter Master, had said: “The army is in great danger from our cracked brain General.” But he soon wrote: “The difficulty has been settled for the present by General Jackson backing square down.” (1:175; 3:148-149) Jackson explained to General Lee:

“Such was Colonel Ashby’s influence over his command that I became well satisfied that if I persisted in my attempt to increase the efficiency of the cavalry it would produce the contrary effect, as Colonel Ashby’s influence, who is very popular with his men, would be thrown against me.” (1:176)

In short, Jackson saw that he was whipped and saved face the best that he could.

Jackson continued to test his staff. He was now joined by a young lawyer named Kyd Douglass. On a rainy night as Jackson camped near Harrisonburg, Douglass was casually handed a dispatch for General Ewell who was camped across the Massanuttons and the Blue Ridge near Culpepper. (2:25) Douglass was to deliver the paper by daylight and the paper was too precious to be entrusted to an ordinary courier. Douglass, leading a series
of weary horses, traveled the 105 miles through the storm and fell almost fainting as he delivered the message. He spent the day in bed recuperating, then once again rode through the rain to rejoin the army. Little did he know that this vital message was to set the Valley campaign in motion. Although dissatisfied with the General’s cool reception upon his return, he was pleasantly surprised when Jackson offered him a permanent place on his staff as his Assistant Inspector General. Jackson, thus, acquired one of the most faithful and discerning observers of his campaign. (1:177)

**Secret Moves**

That day Jackson began the secret moves of the Valley campaign. Leaving the Federal General Banks mystified behind him, and his own General Ewell in the same state, Jackson disappeared with his little command down the road toward Staunton. The army took two and a half days to go sixteen miles taking a river road, incredibly rough and deep in mud, but much more remote than the good road. Jackson would now attempt to clear the enemy from the Valley. Union General Fremont, with his force divided into three segments was moving to the west of him. General R.H. Milroy and General Robert C. Schenck commanded the other two divisions. Jackson thought that by moving quickly he could prevent the integration of these soldiers. On May 7th he marched westward from Staunton to make an attempt. (2:26) He placed General Edward Johnson and his men forward as his vanguard. General Winder of Jackson’s command was troubled about the march but did as Jackson had instructed him and forbid his men from bringing their napsacks. Eighteen miles out of Staunton, the army, hungry and in ill humor, ran into the first Federal outpost. General Milroy was camped before them with thirty-seven hundred
troops at the foot of Bull Pasture Mountain in a strong position. His reinforcements were some distance away. Milroy had no idea of Jackson’s coming. General Banks had reassured Milroy that Jackson, bound for Richmond, was on half rations and his supplies had been cut-off by Union advances. On the morning of May 8th, (See Fig. 4) (5:50) with the sight of Confederates swarming on Sitlington Hill, General Milroy discovered the gravity of Banks’ error. Jackson commanded a fine position but was still cautious. Federals filled the village and by ten a.m. reinforcements arrived from General Schenck after a day and night march of thirty-four miles. Jackson and his Confederates lay on their hillside studying the ugly task of storming over this landscape cut by hills and ravines and assaulting a bridge dominated by Union canon. Scouts had reported to Jackson a track over the mountain by which the enemy might be taken from the rear. While Jackson was contemplating this move the Federals astounded him by charging his front. The Battle of McDowell formed on the slope in front of Jackson’s lines. (2:27; 3:171) The Yankee infantry stormed the precipitous hill and did not pause. Jackson’s three thousand troops fired away at the twenty-five hundred attacking Federals. The Federals were western troops who were veterans accustomed to heavy fire and Jackson was almost driven from his position. Even Jackson’s superior numbers and fine position did not suffice and the rebel line needed reserves. One regiment did not wait to be called. The forty-fourth Virginia charged without orders as the fire swelled. Other reinforcements were called up before driving off the enemy. After fighting with skill and vigor for over four hours the
Federals retired in good order. In the morning, they had disappeared. Jackson had struck at an exposed portion of the invading army but his losses were heavy. Questionably, after Jackson found General Milroy gone, he sent a brief message to Richmond: “God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday.” (1:180; 3:174)

Jackson now moved to New Market and called General Ewell to meet him. He studied maps in the night and searched for a means of using the great parallelogram of roads in the Valley which surrounded the Massanutton range. He did not lose sight of the strategic value of the lone road crossing the Massanutton’s near the center of the parallelogram. He was ready for the campaign to free his Valley.

Early May found Jackson on the outskirts of the village of New Market, Virginia. Jackson, thirty-eight years old now, was continually bothered by the horrors of his dyspepsia. Sustenance was gained through curious meals; raspberries, milk and bread and continually sucking on lemons. The General would not eat his nightly meal until a treatment of cold towels was placed across his naked chest and abdomen and when he took his simple food he remained standing until he had eaten. (1:26)

While awaiting General Ewell's reinforcements, Jackson had his engineers and cavalry tearing down bridges, destroying culverts, rolling boulders down into and felling trees across roads for miles at a stretch. His troops were unable to discern that their Commander had already effectively blocked a junction of the three Federal armies in the region and set the stage for an assault on General N.P. Banks and his army. (1:14; 3:175)
The General remained alone as he studied these situations. He had a staff but none were Assistant Generals. They were more errand boys - not consulted about the decision of war nor given more than glimpses of the plans in Jackson’s mind. The staff was seldom enlightened until the driving marches were over and the army of the Valley looked down upon it’s thunderstruck victims. The General left few details for others to attend to in the management of his army. (1:14)

With the arrival of General Ewell, Jackson’s army was seventeen thousand strong. Although the soldiers were much like other regiments of north and south, their leader was very different. His talents had not yet become apparent but he was molding them in his way. They were a lean army and becoming leaner. They carried little - no canteens, no revolvers, they marched only with a thin blanket roll and a little soap. They were ragged, vermin infested, thin and pestered by the itch - but durable and of unbreakable morale. (1:18; 2:28)

As Jackson reconnoitered what lay ahead himself, he received a dispatch from General Lee. The dispatch was what Jackson had waited for:

“Whatever movement you make against Banks do it speedily and if successful, drive him back towards the Potomac and create the impression as far as possible that you design threatening that line…”

Lee’s selection of the victim for Jackson referred to General Nathaniel Prentiss Banks. (3:195) Banks now lay at the town of Strasburg, his forces entrenched and cut in
half by the transfer of General Shields to Fredericksburg. General Fre'mont, his army already once defeated by Jackson, was reorganizing to the west. If the armies could concentrate the enemy count would be fifty to sixty thousand men. (1:19)

This situation came during a week in which it seemed that Federal armies were invincible. New Orleans had just fallen, the line of the Mississippi had crumbled along most of its length, and in addition to the Confederate defeat at Shiloh General Johnston was now dead too. The huge Federal army was creeping up the tide-water rivers toward Richmond and Federal war ships could actually be seen from the city. Jefferson Davis had decided to abandon the capitol and the records of the Confederacy were being packed for retreat. Lee’s only forelong hope was that Jackson, if reinforced, might menace Washington so as to panic Lincoln and Stanton and induce them to relax their strangling coils. There was not an officer in Jackson’s command who had any idea of the stakes for which the army of the Valley were about to play. (1:20)

Jackson’s troops lay at a cross-roads vital in the Shenandoah Valley terrain. The road which lead eastward from New Market headed toward Warrenton and Culpepper, the other northward toward Strasburg and Winchester. Jackson’s troops understood that their Commander intended to keep them guessing. Federal intelligence still placed him near Harrisonburg. The Union high command was so confident of this fact that General McDowell was ordered to take his forty thousand troops and launch a drive southward to join McClellan in the assault at Richmond. That move would be fatal to the Confederacy. (1:20)
Confederate confusion

Jackson was confusing his own people as well as the enemy. Jackson had called General Ewell over the Blue Ridge from his camp near Culpepper and arranged a rendezvous at a place called Conrad’s Store. When Ewell arrived, he burst into profanities as he was told that Jackson was gone and no one knew where. One of Jackson’s Colonels, James A. Walker of the 13th Virginia, rode into Ewell’s headquarters at Conrad’s Store. General Ewell was in such a state that he could not transact his business and caught Colonel Walker:

“Colonel Walker, did it ever occur to you that General Jackson is crazy? He has gone away, I don’t know where, and left me here with some instructions to stay until he returns, but Banks’ whole army is advancing on me and I haven’t the most remote idea where to communicate with General Jackson.” (1:23)

General Ewell also found out by questioning a Federal prisoner that General Shields with eight thousand troops was on the march east to join General McDowell at Fredericksburg and would pass so near that he could be struck. Jackson’s orders for General Ewell remained unchanged: “Hold your position. Don’t move.” (1:23)

For three days Ewell held his position until Colonel Ashby arrived. Ashby had reports of a Jackson victory and orders from Jackson telling Ewell to stay where he was. Ewell, in the meantime, had received orders to move back to the east and face the threat to Richmond. Jackson relieved Ewell’s distress with an appeal to Lee who agreed to leave Ewell in the Valley and once more proposed an attack on Banks. Ewell was ready to bring all of his
troops to Jackson and, though the war plans were secret, he had a fair idea of what lay ahead. (1:25; 3:190)

General Jackson was committing to memory a chart of the Valley geography and the road mileage separating any two towns in the area. (See Fig. 5) (5:51) It was now May 21st. General Jackson sent General Taylor's columns northward on the pike in the vanguard of the army. After less than a mile Jackson countermanded his orders. He turned Taylor's men to their right heading east. The men who assumed they were to assault the town of Strasburg now found themselves on a road which climbed the lone passable gap over the fifty-mile barrier over the Massanutton mountains. Within two hours, the army had disappeared from the Valley people who could not imagine the army's destination. The troops were driven from dawn to dusk for two days in succession while passing over the mountain road. The soldiers cursed Jackson. He marched their legs off to get them from one side evading the enemy and then he marched them back again. The men wished they were down on the peninsula facing McClellan where there was a war. As the column reached the Luray Valley they turned north once again. Ahead of them lay the town of
Front Royal. There, by special edict of Lincoln's Secretary of War, one Union regiment held the bridges of the Shenandoah. (1:28; 3:203)

The Battle of Front Royal

It was May 23rd and General Ewell's division led the army north just as before. Jackson was busy recalling Ashby's cavalry back from Strasburg in the northwest where he had been blinding General Banks for days. Jackson's orders to Ashby were to cut the road and telegraph between Front Royal and Strasburg. Colonel Munford with the Second Virginia was to cut the railroad bridges to the east of Front Royal while another cavalry patrol was cutting the wires linking the town with Washington. Jackson had soon ensured the isolation of Front Royal from the world. The army, still undetected by the enemy, whose latest information placed Jackson sixty miles to the southwest lying quietly in front of Banks, received their final orders: "Napsacks to be left behind - no tents allowed."

(1:30) Ewell had spent the night just ten miles from Front Royal and now got orders from Jackson as to the Commanders intentions. (3:205) The column was abruptly wheeled off the main road into town which was exposed at the foot of the river cliffs to Union guns. The army went eastward over rough country to another road which entered Front Royal from the south. At 1:00 p.m. the Confederate advance appeared on the heights south of Front Royal, still hidden from the Federals. A Federal picket line spread the alarm as Jackson, some distance away, was riding toward the scene with Kyd Douglas and others of his staff. A woman in a white dress ran out of the town and called Jackson by name.
She was Belle Boyd, a young Mt. Washington college student and Confederate spy. She panted, red faced:

“I knew it must be Stonewall when I heard the guns. Their force is small - just the Maryland boys and some guns and cavalry. Their guns cover the railroad bridge but not the wagon bridge. Charge now and you will get them all.” (1:33)

General Taylor watched the meeting in surprise. His Valley education had commenced in earnest. He wrote of the scene:

“Jackson was possessed of these facts before he left New Market; but, as he never told anything it was news to me and gave me an idea of the strategic value of the Massanutton, as pointed out indeed by Washington before the revolution.” (1:33; 3:210-215)

The Confederate vanguard was now under heavy fire in Front Royal, but Jackson was reassured by what he saw: the position was clearly indefensible before a determined attack. The Federal regiment under Colonel Kenly began to retreat and fired two bridges before Jackson’s men’s assault. The Sixth Virginia cavalry went up with Jackson. They outdistanced the infantry and rode toward the long blue column of Kenly running toward safety on the Winchester Road. The Sixth Virginian dashed toward the enemy as Ewell and Jackson watched the clash of the horsemen and well-armed infantry. The Virginians brushed aside a screen of New York cavalry, who were actually strapped to their saddles and wore breast plates. Jackson and Ewell shouted lavish praise for the charge of their cavalry. The battle concluded with more than six hundred Union captives including all the artillerymen on the post. (1:39; 2:28-29)
General Jackson now made clear his thinking in one of his rare records:

“In the event of Banks leaving Strasburg he might escape toward the Potomac, or, if we move directly to Winchester, he might move via Front Royal toward Washington. In order to watch both directions, and at the same time advance upon him if he remained at Strasburg I determined, with the main body of the army, to strike the turnpike near Middletown.” (1:37; 3:215)

Just twelve miles to the west at Strasburg, Banks received the first report of the attack at Front Royal. He did little about it other than push out a regiment with two guns to make and investigation. He still entertained the thought that Front Royal had been struck by a small raiding party, since he knew Jackson to be far away from that spot. By nightfall, Banks was persuaded that something more serious was afoot. General G.H. Gordon, a veteran who had been at Westpoint with Jackson, pleaded in vane to Banks to retreat toward Winchester. Banks refused, but Gordon took steps to save his own troops and was soon on the road to Winchester and safety. By midnight the situation became unmistakable even to Banks. One of the survivors of Front Royal arrived in camp with the news: “Kenly was dead, his command cut to pieces, the First Maryland decimated, the cavalry vanished. The rebels were from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand strong - and already well on their way to Strasburg.” Banks hustled his command northward toward Winchester, aware that Jackson was somewhere in his path. (1:39; 2:29)
Banks escapes Jackson

Soon after midnight Jackson ordered the troops to prepare for the march once more. The men whom Jackson drove in pursuit of the enemy were still under his strict discipline, willing, orderly, and ready to fight. But, worn by yesterday’s exertions and the long marches of the month, they were beginning to tire. Jackson had iron clad rules about the marching of his men but today he could not put them into effect. In the bad weather and confusion and the weariness of the men it was absurd to think of marching fifty minutes in each hour. On most marching days, Jackson sought to hurry the troops up. General A.R Lawton described Jackson’s state of mind as he rode past his lean columns:

“He had small sympathy with human infirmity. He was a one-idea man. He looked upon the broken-down men and stragglers as the same thing. He classed all who were weak and weary, who fainted by the wayside, as men wanting inpatriotism. He was the true type of all soldiers...he did not value human life when he had an object to accomplish. He could order men to their death as a matter of course.” (1:42)

Once Jackson had determined to march, he puzzled the moves he must make with as little help as possible from his staff. Just before daylight, Jackson held a brief conference with Ewell whose forces were to continue as the army’s vanguard. Ashby, with his cavalry, was to strike for Middletown at daybreak. Ewell was to place two of his cavalry regiments under General Steuart and they were to depart after Ashby for Newton, a point just above Middletown. General Taylor was to follow to his brigade and Jackson’s main force coming close behind. Jackson went with the vanguard, curiously impatient. At
about nine o’clock Jackson had word from Steuart: “Banks was preparing to leave Strasburg.” (1:44; 3:220)

Jackson rode within sound of the firing and soon could see the stone fences of Middletown. For as far as he could see north and south along the pike a dark column of the enemy flowed in full retreat toward Winchester. Jackson thought that Banks was already ahead of him. How far, he did not know, but he did not hesitate. Ashby’s cavalry cut the procession at the right and drove the enemy to the north ahead of him. Jackson could not know that there was already failure in the road to the north of him and that General Steuart was not working out as he should. Toward noon Federal cavalry numbering two thousand strong thundered into Middletown. Jackson was in a nearby field placing artillery pieces so as to cut off the Federals at the north. The artillery trained their batteries on the solid blue column of horsemen. The Union riders dashed into storms of flying metal and at close quarters none would miss the targets. The Federal cavalry disintegrated. The rear guard of the cavalry, now frightened and confused, milled in the roadway, turning as if to go back to Strasburg. Colonel Ashby rode past Jackson on his black stallion with his saber drawn and charged alone up the road toward the two hundred or more enemy cavalrymen. Jackson thought he rode to certain death, but the sight of the reckless horseman demoralized the Federals and they fled in many directions. Ashby trotted back to Jackson with a squad of prisoners herded before him. Jackson turned on Ashby, a sheepish grin on his face, and said in an attempt at reprimand. “Ashby, you risk the success of the army with such foolish exposure - you must remember who you are man.” (1:46)
General Jackson now questioned where Banks' infantry was. Throughout the afternoon he continued a slow push to the north until he was less than twelve miles from Winchester. A fresh disappointment met him at the village of Newton. There he found two of his guns engaging the enemy at the village but without infantry support. When Ashby's cavalry had fallen upon Banks' wagon train the undisciplined troopers took to looting the wagons after driving the enemy away. (2:30; 3:223) The looting continued until the force was completely dissipated. It would be weeks before some of them returned from their homes where they had taken stolen horses. There was little time for Jackson to deal with undisciplined men but he made a mental note to have these troops punished in one of his strange, moral-building ways. They were no longer to march in the vanguard of the army of the Valley. (1:48)

The approach of the Stonewall Brigade drove the Federal artillery from Newton but the Federals fought the rear-guard action with skill. The way became easier until the army reached Kernstown. Offers came frequently to Jackson now, asking for respite but Jackson refused to halt the column for the night. Jackson sought to reach the line of hills just south of Winchester. There, he promised that the army would be given two hours rest. (3:225) When the order was passed the men fell into the road and dropped in their tracks. Jackson changed his mind as the entire army fell asleep. Jackson quickly dashed off a note to Ewell who was on a parallel road in sight of Federal pickets. The note was simple: "Attack at daylight." (1:50; 3:226) After about an hour, Jackson could bear it no longer and he woke his officers and passed the word to march. It was scarcely daylight
when they approached the hills south of Winchester. The timing was perfect, Ewell with his one brigade and ten thousand troops swept down on the Federal positions just as Jackson gave the orders to occupy the hill. Ewell struck and held on the right and, although he encountered serious losses, the enemy began to panic. By seven-thirty a.m. the enemy was in full retreat and Jackson went into a frenzy organizing the last chase of Banks. (2:30; 3:232) The enemy, going back in order at first, had broken the ranks as they passed through the town. Jackson chased them five miles north of Winchester until his horses were even falling in their harnesses. It was only in this moment, after three days of the most punishing grind, that Jackson seemed to take into account the condition of his army which he had worn to the limits of it’s endurance. Just two hours after resigning from the pursuit of Banks, General Steuart came pounding up on the trail of the enemy. Had Steuart been on time Jackson would have wiped-out, rather than defeated, the army of Banks. One of Jackson’s officers had found Steuart and his cavalrrymen at ease just a little over two miles away. Steuart was standing on army regulations that he would take orders only from his immediate superior and that Jackson would have no cavalry until General Ewell ordered him forward. After a short time the astonished Ewell ordered his advance. (1:55; 3:233)

Although Banks belittled his own losses reports show they were severe. Approximately forty percent of his force including the loss of three thousand prisoners. The Confederate losses were insignificant. Jackson did not know the reactions he had set off in the north. Even as Banks issued victory bulletins as he crossed the Potomac, he did not deceive Washington. President Lincoln recalled General McDowell and instead ordered a
detachment of twenty-thousand into the Valley to trap Jackson. The public screamed of the defeat of Banks as headlines warned that Jackson was about to fall on Washington.

(1:56; 3:239-243)

Retreat Down the Valley

On the night of May 27th, near midnight, an orderly interrupted Jackson’s staff with word from a civilian coming to warn General Jackson. He spoke of traveling fifty miles that day to warn the General that he had passed Federals on the mountain road. They were General McDowell’s men, fresh troops out of Fredericksburg, and he had passed the troops of General Shields with ten thousand in the vanguard alone. The civilian claimed they are already less than a day’s march from Front Royal behind you in the Valley.

(3:264) Jackson, after questioning the man, calmly ordered to put the troops in marching array. He intended to strike toward the Potomac and Harper’s Ferry. The Yankees were gathering behind him: Shields from the eastern flank and Fre’mont from the west. Within a few days they could be cut-off along the Valley Pike by as many as fifty thousand Union troops. But Jackson plunged northward on a raid. Jackson was in close touch with Richmond now and he sensed a vastly increased interest in his little army by headquarters strategists. He had had suggestive orders to make a show of strength toward the Potomac if the chance arose. General Joseph E. Johnston had said:

“If you can threaten Baltimore and Washington, do so...it may produce an important diversion. ...Your movements of course, depend upon the enemy’s strength in your neighborhood.” (1:61; 2:30; 3:234)
While discussing this movement with General Elzey, Elzey passed to Jackson the report that the enemy had placed big naval Dahlgren guns on the heights at Harper's Ferry. After a brief skirmish at Harper's Ferry the Yankees were driven off and the army at last turned south for the retreat down the Shenandoah Valley. (3:265)

While his army traveled down the pike toward Winchester, Jackson met with Boteler, his chief link with Richmond.

"I want you to go to Richmond for me, for more men. Banks is across the river at Williamsport, being reinforced from Pennsylvania. Saxton is in front of me, getting reinforcements from the railroad. I have just learned that Shields is near Front Royal, and Fre'mont is moving. You can see, I am nearly surrounded by a large force." (1:62; 3:266)

Jackson explained the disposition of his fifteen thousand men. "If they will send me more men to bring my force to forty thousand, I can cross the Potomac, lift the siege of Richmond, and change the fighting front from the Potomac to the Susquehenna." (1:63; 3:266)

As Jackson approached Winchester, (See Fig. 6) (5:52) he received the disturbing news that the troops he had left at Front Royal, the Twelfth Georgia, had been attacked by General Shields. After setting fire to three hundred thousand dollars worth of captured stores, the Twelfth Georgia had safely retreated from the overwhelming Federal advance. (3:268)Shields had now cut the Valley Pike at Front Royal and that escape route was gone. This also placed the Federal force only twelve miles from Strasburg, while
Jackson’s troops were forty four miles from that point. Jackson’s rear guard, in fact, was almost sixty miles from Strasburg where safety lay, because of sixteen miles of captured wagons and stores. Jackson sent Ashby out with orders:

“Cut-off the Federal view at every roadway, every lane, every ford; engage the pickets, drive off the cavalry, do all possible to confuse Shields and Fre’mont and to delay their junction.” (1:64)

In the flying horsemen and their guns, Jackson put his faith that his infantry could outmarch the enemy five miles to one. Jackson insisted on his characteristic marching style as his army passed through Winchester, forcing them to rest ten minutes out of every hour lying flat on the road, for he would not permit sitting or standing. By midnight the Stonewall Brigade had made thirty-five miles and the troops fell to the ground exhausted. Jackson spoke to General Taylor and said: “Fre’mont was three miles to the west, and must be defeated in the morning. Shields was moving up the Luray Valley, and might cross Massanutton to New Market...” (1:65) The importance of preserving these captured stores would take all of Jackson’s personal attention while he relied on the army under Ewell’s direction to deal with Fre’mont.
On Sunday, June 1st, Ewell's men skirmished with Fremont's troops, but no serious enemy intentions evolved. Jackson put General Taylor's men to cover the rear after nightfall. He had just received word from Winchester that Banks had crept back into that town but it was impossible for the Federals to attack the rear of Jackson's force that night.

(2:31)

It looked as if Jackson, only because he had gauged the enemy General so well, had managed to drive down the Valley between two armies of Federals. Late that day, Jackson knew he was safe as General Winder's men, having covered thirty-six miles that day, brought up the rear guard. Jackson did not rest. He sent out orders to press on to New Market. (3:274)

The rear guard was charged by the enemy repeatedly as Jackson's trailing regiments brushed across Fremont's front. For hours General Winder, with the Stonewall Brigade, had fought for his life against swarms of Union horsemen. It was only when Ashby came to his aid that the threat ended.

Cross Keys

Jackson burned the only bridge on the main north-south road after crossing the north fork of the Shenandoah near the village of Mount Jackson. (3:278) The river was running rapidly and, although the pursuing Fremont arrived with a pontoon train, his troops could
not cross enmass. Jackson’s troops had a full day of rest for the first time since Front Royal. While his army rested, the General took out a map of Virginia. He circled the tiny town of Port Republic, just south of the Massanutton’s, a position very much to his liking. (See Fig. 7) (5:53) This was the finest spot lying between the routes of Shields and Fremont. It commanded the only nearby bridge and was a strong fortress. From the hills Jackson could force Shields to move up so the latter would be open to attack. The position also gave the Confederates’ inner lines of communication and a good route of retreat into hill country in case of disaster. (1:71; 2:10)

Stonewall now received some welcome news from his engineer Hotchkiss, a genius for terrain. From a mountaintop, Hotchkiss had seen the column of General Shields bogged down in muddy roads. They were still miles away so it was probable that Jackson would have time to fight off Fremont’s force before Shields could arrive. This would be a matter of delicate timing because the two enemy Generals would be within the sound of each other’s guns. On the sixth of June, just as Jackson was ready to clash with Fremont, he was deprived of his most dashing Commander. (2:32) General Ashby’s troops, resting near a roadside at Harrisonburg were surprised by the first New Jersey cavalry who had crossed the river undetected. Ashby, in his usual fashion, had ordered men into saddles and charged the Federals. The charge netted him sixty-four of the enemy, but, as the skirmishing went on, Ashby caught sight of a party of Federal infantry and persuaded General Ewell to loan him three regiments of infantry. They met a crack outfit called the Pennsylvania Bucktails and captured their Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Cane.
He told his captors: "Today I saved the life of one of the most gallant men of either army - General Ashby - a man I admire as much as you do." (1:73; 3:280) Cane said he had seen Ashby within fifty yards of his line during the afternoon and had knocked aside the rifles of his men as they were raised to shoot the unsuspecting Confederate. But, within the hour, Ashby was dead. He had led Ewell's men into the stubborn Federal troops whose volley's had broken the Federal charge time after time. Ashby's horse tumbled and he went ahead on foot, leading the infantrymen. He died under a volley at point blank range. Jackson was so shocked at the news he could hardly accept it. The cavalry screen of the army in the Valley had fought endlessly under Ashby. He had recorded a record thirty five battles within the last twenty eight days. His death at age thirty-four gave the Valley army it's first lesson in mourning a hero. Jackson put the memory of him into records:

"An official report is not an appropriate place for more than a passing notice of the distinguished dead, but the close relations which General Ashby bore to my command, for most of the previous twelve months, will justify me in saying that as a partisan officer I never knew his superior. His daring was proverbial, his tone of character heroic, his power of endurance almost incredible, and his sagacity almost intuitive in devining the purposes and movements of the enemy." (1:74; 3:282; 9:565-570)

Another casualty placed new implications on Jackson's force in the greater Confederate scheme. General Joseph E. Johnston had been wounded in a battle near Richmond and his replacement was General Lee.
Events now pressed Jackson as he moved his troops toward Port Republic after Ashby's death. General Ewell was in place at Cross Keys, about four miles northwest of Port Republic, on Saturday, June 7th. Jackson had placed Ewell there with his five thousand men and he was told to wait on his high ground. Jackson, with the balance of the force, camped on a dominating ridge at Port Republic. All day, Jackson sought to lure Fremont to attack Ewell's exposed men at Cross Keys but the Federals were timid. Jackson longed for an opportunity for action. (3:286) The situation changed swiftly. Federals poured into Port Republic from the east, crossing the lower ford of the South river. General Jackson barely escaped, but reached his lines and within the hour his men had cleared the Federals from Port Republic and the reinforcements were halted. (3:288-292) The days formal action would be limited to Cross Keys. Soon, the General heard the big guns of Ewell going into action. He sent reinforcements but did not go to Cross Keys himself. He would leave that phase to Ewell and remain in Port Republic to guard against the second enemy army. (3:293-294)

Fremont attacked the ridge held by Ewell's veterans early in the morning and, although they made slow progress, the Federal lines finally fell back down the hill. (2:32) Fremont turned to his artillery and the guns raked the Confederate front doing great damage. General's Elzey and Steuart were wounded but the lines held. As the afternoon drew on, Ewell stubbornly held to his ridge. Jackson had given him orders forbidding an attack in view of the situation in Port Republic where a new battle might develop at any moment. Ewell still would not sit quietly. In the late hours of the day he ordered his skirmish line
forward until he was in the position that the enemy had occupied earlier. Ewell held there and did not go further. (1:79; 3:294)

Jackson studied the situation. His thoughts concentrated on his predicament and why General Fre’mont had withdrawn so gingerly when smashed on one flank. He dwelt on the situation of the approaching General Shields. If he could concentrate the army tomorrow by hurriedly withdrawing Ewell across the river, he might be able to whip Shields here at Port Republic. (1:80; 3:295-296; 9:584-588)

Port Republic

On June 9th, Jackson sent word to Ewell to begin shifting his men at the first light of day from Cross Keys across the bridge of the North river, through Port Republic, and then over a temporary bridge on South river so that they could be used against Shields who approached from the east. Ewell was to check Fre’mont in Jackson’s rear by leaving a small force at Cross Keys with the direction that, if pushed by Fre’mont, they should burn the North river bridge behind them and retreat slowly into Port Republic. (2:33; 3:297)

The leading force against Shields would be the Stonewall Brigade under General Winder. If all went well, Jackson would defeat Shields in the morning and by afternoon could wheel about and once more fall upon Fre’mont and, thus, destroy the two Union armies. He had hoped to do this by ten o’clock in the morning. (3:298) As Jackson started traversing the mile and a half toward Shields, he sent Colonel Imboden and Jackson’s
experimental mountain artillery unit, a mule battery, to take the Luray road and situate overlooking a spot where the enemy might pass if forced back. In that event, Imboden could tear the Federal lines with shell where Jackson would otherwise be unable to reach them.

Jackson’s army moved into assault position with their Commander riding in their midst. He refused to give General Winder specific directions and only said: “I will lead you.”

As they came into sight of the Federal center commanded by General E.B. Tyler, they knew that they confronted a fierce battle. Tyler’s men held dominating ground on all parts of the line. His flanks were well covered and on the left a six gun battery placed on a terrace awaited the rebels. At first glance, Jackson’s troops knew that bloody work was ahead. The army drove off the first of the Union skirmishers but then met the men on the hills who were not over-awed by the appearance of Jackson. In the first serious rush, they tore apart the lines of the Stonewall Brigade. Although this was as fierce a fire as any the army of the Valley had ever faced, Jackson held on, giving no signs of regret that he had not waited until his support was at hand. The fresh brigades of Ewell were still not within sight. From the mountain, Federal lines advanced steadily with banners flying and gleaming in the sun. They came on and on and Jackson’s force suffered cruelly. Jackson met General Taylor and sent him and his men up the slopes so they might take the Union guns on the flank. The General then returned to his old brigade which was in serious trouble. He went into the ranks as if the enemy did not exist, shouting “The Stonewall Brigade never retreats. Follow me!”

It was hand-to-hand fighting as the blue and gray lines surged back and forth. For the first time, Jackson’s men found themselves
out-numbered at the crucial point of the battlefield. Dozens of rebels were falling under
the fire of the guns on the terrace. Jackson had to silence those guns and sent two
Virginia regiments up the hillside in a second effort. Reinforcements were called for
again, but the advance was slow. For a half hour they fought on and Jackson had still hot
heard from his flanking parties on the hill. Winder and the Stonewall Brigade was being
driven back. The Federals were on the point of victory. It was already ten thirty in the
morning and too late to carry out Jackson's design of battle. He could no longer hope to
overcome Shields and then fall back on Fre'mont - in fact, only good fortune would save
his army this morning. Taylor was the lone hope. (3: 299-306)

Taylor and his Louisianans reached the terrace and attacked. They were thrown back
twice but attacked again. Taylor used the last of his reserves and captured the guns,
attempting to turn them down on the blue lines which now lay exposed to him. At that
time, General Ewell came galloping up from the rear at the head of the reinforcements.
Before Taylor could draw the guns on the Federals, he was thrown back once more. It
seemed like there was nothing left for Taylor to do but set his back to the mountain and
die hard. (2:34; 3:305; 6:326-332; 9:584-588)

Jackson and Winder, though, were alert to the change in the situation and threw all the
men on the field against the Federal flank. It was then that Ewell emerged, bringing with
him the 34th and 58th Virginia regiments. In this instance, with coordination as precise as
if it had been planned, three assaults fell on the Federals. The fierce, skillful fight of the
men of Shields over the last five hours went for naught. Within ten minutes Jackson’s defeat became an overwhelming victory. (1:87)

Despite heavy casualties, Jackson was delighted. Behind him lay Fre´mont, baffled and beated, with the scantiest of fighting and in front of him was Shields, the most formidable of his Valley opponents, going into retreat. Not only had Jackson escaped a trap that the Union had built for him; he had severely mauled the two hunters. What he had planned had been impossible, but his army, after all, had accomplished miracles. (1:87)

June 17, 1862, General Lee sent for Jackson to join him in Richmond. The Valley Campaign had ended. (2:35)

**Jackson’s field leadership**

Through perseverance, study and aggressiveness, General Jackson learned and followed the principles of the art of war. A clear objective, offensive action, power concentration, economy of force, mobility, surprise and cooperation are all principles demonstrated by the leadership of Stonewall Jackson during his Valley Campaign. Although nearly all of General Jackson’s operations repeatedly proved how effectively mobility and surprise may be used to gain strategic objectives, each of the major Valley battles will be examined separately. (8:Introduction; 2:36-57)
Battle of Bull Run, July 21st 1861

Jackson's value in this action was displayed in his reaction to the Union offensive action. The Federal right advanced against the Confederate left, southwest down the Bull Run River and outflanked Beauregard. While Stuart's cavalry took the offensive and checked the advance, Jackson's brigade took up the position on Henry House Hill and, by vigorous resistance, stopped the progress of the Union offensive. It was during this action that Jackson was nicknamed Stonewall. (2:56)

Battle of Kernstown, March 23rd 1862

In the Battle of Kernstown, Jackson, with only three infantry brigades, took on the Union forces double his strength under Shields. Despite this inferiority in numbers, Jackson was determined to create a diversion and achieve his general objective of the campaign, that being to detain the Federals in the Valley to prevent further reinforcements being sent to McClellan. Although tactically defeated during this battle, it wound up to be a strategic victory because of the consequence that McClellan's main army could not be reinforced in the Yorktown peninsula. Jackson may not have executed this battle as he did except for the information brought to him by Colonel Ashby. Colonel Ashby's information proved to be inaccurate, for he believed that they were attacking only Shields' rear guard, about three thousand strong. This inaccurate information, complicated by the fact that on the 22nd and 23rd his army had completed extended marches, caused him considerable risk. Only an organized withdrawal prevented this battle from being a complete disaster for the
Confederates. Using Ashby to cover the rear in combination with a disorganized Federal infantry allowed Jackson to march southward to Newton. (2:57)

Battle of McDowell, May 8th 1862

Jackson properly used geography in this battle to provide an advantage as he occupied Sitlington’s Hill overlooking a superior Federal force. With six battalion’s and his cavalry supporting on the west, Jackson successfully defended a four hour frontal attack. Although Jackson’s army was successful in repulsing the Federal attack, they were not able to gain a complete victory for the Federal retreat was organized and aided through the use of fires and darkness. (2:59)

Battle of Winchester, May 25th 1862

The Battle of Winchester was successful for Jackson in large part due to the timidity and ignorance of the Federal Commander, General Banks. The Union detached force at Front Royal had no cavalry and was completely surprised by Jackson’s attack. Also, the Union Commander relied on aged, faulty information to make decisions and completely ignored reports of the action to his east. Jackson’s advance from Front Royal toward Winchester was superiorly planned. His advance guard contained the troops southwest of Winchester, while Ewell’s divisions attacked those south of Winchester on the north bank of the creek. Campbell’s, Taliaferro’s and Taylor’s brigades turned Banks’ right flank on the west. Although the Federals had successfully resisted Ewell’s initial attacks, these active operations forced the Federal’s to give way on their entire front. With Taylor’s brigade
turning the Federal right, Jackson took the offensive and forced Banks to retire. This was one of the few times where Ashby’s cavalry failed Jackson. If the cavalry would have carried out their role vigorously instead of pillaging, the retreating Federal’s could have been slaughtered. The effect of this battle forced President Lincoln to order McDowell to send twenty thousand additional men to the Shenandoah Valley to operate with Fre’mont against Jackson. (2:60)

**Battle of Cross Keys, June 8th 1862 / Battle of Port Republic, June 9th 1862**

These battles were a classic example of mobility and operating on interior lines. Jackson, with thirteen thousand men, grossly inferior numerically to the combined forces of Fre’mont and Shields, defeated two armies in detail. The distance between the two battlefields was only two and a half miles so Jackson could not disregard one opponent while attacking the other. Jackson used Ewell’s division to attack Fre’mont at Cross Keys while blocking Shield’s advancing troops with his own. When Fre’mont showed little aggressiveness, Jackson recalled three brigades from Cross Keys to support his battle at Port Republic. Using his remaining forces at Cross Keys to retreat slowly, he used his supplemented division to oppose Shields. Although the Union was tactically well placed, Jackson was able to use valuable flank attacks to drive Tyler’s force of twenty-five hundred men back along the Lurray Road. (1:62)
Valley Campaign Results

Confederate Objective

The overall objective of the Southern states in passing the ordinance of secession was to create an independent government and, thus, for political reasons the Confederates adopted a defensive plan. Their object was to show that they had no wish to be aggressive, but rather only wished to be independent. The leaders desired to impress upon the northern population that keeping the south in the Union would not be worth the cost in men and money. The military strategy born from this political strategy was that of the strategic defensive.

Jackson’s Aim In the Valley Campaign

All of Jackson’s operations in the Shenandoah Valley were carried out for the purpose of containing as many Federals as possible there and, thus, preventing them from augmenting McClellan’s main army. During this campaign, Jackson, with approximately seventeen thousand men, contained the armies of Bank’s with twenty thousand, McDowell with forty thousand and Fre’mont with fourteen thousand. Additionally, he forced seven thousand to be kept at Harper’s Ferry. He studied and used the geography of the Valley, one hundred and twenty miles long with an average width of twenty-four miles and enclosed on either side by steep, rocky mountains, as an obstacle to screen his movements against the divided Federal forces. (2:10)

Unlike the Union side, the early successes of Jackson can be contributed to the autonomous leadership allowed him by Lee. Under the guidelines of his main objective,
Jackson used liberty in his strategic movements against the Federals. The Federal Generals that opposed him were not so fortunate. President Lincoln's interference in the strategy and operations did not allow the Federal Generals to concentrate strength at decisive points and to attack with the greatest possible strength. Lincoln's anxiety for the safety of Washington caused him to withdraw troops from McClellan no less than five times and depart from his original plan. He did not realize that it is best to defeat the enemy's main army and then the capital would no longer be in danger from it. (2:37)

Economy of Force

Jackson's three month operation in the Shenandoah Valley repeatedly caused the Federals to dissipate their forces. His secret and rapid marches neutralized the disparity between his own force and that of his enemies. He continually used economy of force, a maximum of sixteen thousand men, to occupy sixty thousand Federals. (2:39)

Surprise

Jackson was always endeavoring to out-wit his adversary. In spite of the fact that his total forces were inferior numerically, short on ammunition, without proper equipment, he was eminently successful in his operations. Between May 5th and June 7th, Jackson fought and won four important battles, marching two hundred and forty-five miles. Banks, at Strassburg, was so completely surprised by Jackson's action at Front Royal, that he refused to believe that it was Jackson's force that had been attacking. The result of this surprise was a disastrous defeat to Banks. (2:42)
Mobility

Jackson’s mobility in the Valley campaign was most effective, enabling him to strike at the Federals or escape from them. He drove his troops to unbelievable feats. Although the army did not necessarily like Jackson as a leader, they all admired him and sought to obey his orders, for they had confidence that Jackson would not desert them. Jackson’s use and ability with his cavalry, General Ashby, gave him an unbelievable advantage over inferior Federal cavalry. He used his cavalry to flank the enemy, to provide reconnoissance, to strike as his vanguard, to defend as he retreated and to demonstrate as he used interior lines of communication to concentrate his forces while facing superior numerical numbers. (2:45)

Conclusion

The Valley Campaign illustrates vividly how a general strategy objective can be transformed through the efforts of an independent commander into a battle plan, conceived and executed in relationship to the enemy’s intentions, strength and location. General Thomas J. Jackson appears to have been the perfect leader to accomplish the task set before him. General Jackson displayed the personal characteristics that legends are made of: tenacity, courage, vision, God and country first, risk-taking and perhaps in many situations luck.

To his men, General Jackson was a great leader. Although disliked by many due to his methods, he was admired by all for his ability to out-soldier his opponent. Maybe it was
his hard up-bringing or the amount of time that he spent studying during his academy days, but Jackson was extremely well schooled in the principles of war. One cannot read this description of Jackson in the Valley without thinking 'What might have happened if Jackson had survived until the end of the war' or 'What would have happened if Jackson had replaced Lee at Gettysburg.'

On May 2nd, 1863, at Chancellorsville General Jackson was fired upon by the 18th North Carolina. As a barrage of musket balls ripped into Jackson and his staff, Jackson fell hard to the ground. He was struck in the palm of his right hand and in his left arm, three inches below the shoulder joint. Jackson’s pain was intense as he requested a skilled surgeon to tend to his broken left arm. As they reached the site of Dr. McGuire’s field hospital, Jackson said to him: “I am badly wounded, Doctor. I fear I am dying.” (6:508-512)

On Sunday the 10th of May, 1863, with Anna at his side, General Thomas J. Jackson died. (6:525)
References


