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
## PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF CONFLICT TERMINATION

A Research Paper

Presented To

The Directorate of Research

Air Command and Staff College



In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements of ACSC

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May 1995

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## *Preface*

Military institutions worldwide are in a dynamic period of transition as a result of the conclusion of the Cold War. The emerging world security environment, combined with shrinking defense budgets, demands that military professionals explore innovative ideas and challenge traditional service roles, missions and doctrine. This is necessary to ensure armed forces are embracing and practicing the most effective means of operating through the full spectrum of conflict.

One such area, conflict termination, stands out as an important concept necessary for definition and documentation. Properly implemented, conflict termination principles can help the United States and its allies achieve our military objectives and a more stable, lasting state of peace. Planning for a desired end state is important in establishing stability and lasting peace in regions around the world. In keeping with our military's tradition of planning, fighting and winning wars, successful conflict termination must become part of our tradition as well.

This Air Force Air Command and Staff College research project takes practical steps in the direction of incorporating termination planning and execution into our deliberate and crisis planning processes and offers recommendations for improved interagency cooperation.

We believe the debate on conflict termination planning and execution is only beginning. It is our hope that others will continue this research and offer additional solutions to this important area of the military and diplomatic professions.

We greatly appreciate the contributions of Mr. Randall Elliott, Deputy Director, Office of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; Dr. Jane Holl, Director, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; Colonel Lawrence Blount, USA(Reserve), Deputy Commander 354th Civil Affairs Brigade; and Lieutenant Colonel Alan Thompson, Joint Staff/J-5/WHEM. Their insights and comments to this research project challenged us to create a product of significance and usefulness to the military and diplomatic communities. We believe we have met this challenge.

Conflict Termination Research Team  
Air Command and Staff College  
May 1995

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*Abstract*

The expression "War Termination" has been received with an admixture of reactions ranging from idealism and acceptance, to skepticism and cynicism, to outright opposition. This is largely due to a lack of clear definition of terms. Conflict termination is a process that addresses and attempts to correct the fundamental root causes of dispute to lessen the likelihood of again resorting to armed conflict once a settlement is reached. This research paper analyzes both historic and current conflict termination planning and execution processes, draws conclusions and proposes an annex for DOD Joint Publication 5-03.1, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I: Planning Policies and Procedures*. The purpose of the annex is to make conflict termination an integral part of the campaign planning process. The annex underscores pertinent issues and planning strategies to ensure victory on the battlefield while creating a conducive post-hostilities environment to achieve political objectives.

Chapter 1 limits the scope of the study to interagency relationships and the development of DOD planning guidance for conflict termination. It also provides a review of the related literature used in this study. Chapter 2 establishes a common framework regarding conflict termination theories. Chapter 3 uses case studies to highlight the learning process and lessons learned in terminating previous conflicts. Chapter 4 provides insight into practical application of current and recommended termination concepts. Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of our research findings and suggestions for improved interagency coordination and incorporation of conflict termination in the deliberate and crisis planning processes.

# PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF CONFLICT TERMINATION

## Chapter 1: Background

### Introduction and Problem Definition

American Revolutionary War patriot Thomas Paine once said “war involves a train of unforeseen and unsusposed circumstances that no human wisdom could calculate the end.”<sup>1</sup> Over the past two hundred years, these circumstances have forged many types of wars. United States military doctrine has identified 16 types of wars and 17 general methods of warfare. Air Force Manual 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, also cites 34 examples of military activities short of war ranging from advisory assistance to unconventional warfare.<sup>2</sup>

Although much study has been devoted to the planning and conduct of warfare, it can be contended that not enough has been devoted to the planning and conduct of conflict termination. Military history also indicates that even wars in the late 1700’s were complex and difficult to end. In today’s context, implementing a successful termination of military operations certainly involves an increased scope and complexity due to a variety of political, technological and cultural reasons.

Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Fred Iklé, noted that wars are the most costly means to settle international disputes, and more so because their termination is elusive.<sup>3</sup> This is partly due to limited research and publications on conflict termination theory and doctrine. While the planning and conduct of war has been extensively studied,

very little work has been done on how to end a conflict. Most of the work to date has been done by political scientists for use, in a rather narrow sense, in diplomatic strategy.

### **Thesis Statement and Research Scope**

Throughout history, nations have concentrated their efforts and resources on implementing their political will through the application of military force. Only upon victory, stalemate, or the political realization of defeat, do nations submit to war termination—often under perilous or unsatisfactory conditions. These conditions have often resulted in inadequate peace arrangements with significant liabilities to all parties involved.

Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz stated, “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”<sup>4</sup> Wars, therefore, continue to be fought for political purposes as a means to implement a grand strategy. By nature of their unpredictability and expense, war is customarily employed as a last resort. The United States, as with so many other nations, has historically placed a great deal of emphasis on the planning and conduct of war and most professional military education programs still have this focus. However, it is also important to focus on the process of terminating war as well as terminating conflict. Such considerations will affect the manner in which a nation fights a war and the type of peace arrangement crafted. “Before the first shot is fired, the theater commander must have a clear sense of what he needs to see in order to know that his operations can end; he also needs to know whether (and how) ending the conflict at the point he has chosen will contribute to the overall policy goals.”<sup>5</sup> This foresight requires that we plan beyond

the cessation of hostilities, set our military objectives, and design our military operations to contribute to the attainment of the desired end state.

### **Review of the Related Literature**

The thesis of this research project is predicated upon the following premise: the ultimate goal of all military operations is to compel and enable key decision makers to take actions which contribute to terminating a conflict on terms most favorable to the nation, its allies and coalition partners. The literature related to this premise is primarily focused in two areas, conflict resolution and war termination. Conflict resolution provides a broad umbrella for discussing the settlement of disputes ranging from marital strife and civil disorder to world war and nuclear holocaust. In contrast, war termination is narrowly focused on the cessation of armed conflict, the definition and pursuit of a strategic end state, and the congruency of political and military objectives. Our goal is to create an intermediate approach built upon the relevant aspects of both these concepts as they relate to the planning and execution of military operations throughout the spectrum of conflict—war, military operations other than war, and contingency operations. We call this approach conflict termination. This novel approach requires the integration of many diverse fields of inquiry: International Law, Political Science, Sociology, Psychology, History, War Termination, Conflict Resolution, Military Science, and Operational Art.

Research and study of war termination and conflict resolution have been neglected by most scholars, politicians, and military professionals. While war termination has received more attention from the political and military communities recently, conflict resolution is still largely ignored. Similarly, many scholars devoted to conflict resolution

have, for the most part, overlooked the potential applications to military operations. Among the many factors responsible for this neglect, several stand out. First, most military scholars have focused their attention on the actual conduct of war—military strategy, tactics, and doctrine. This emphasis can be attributed to the consequences normally associated with military defeat and the resulting emphasis on achieving victory. Second, historical precedence seems to support and validate the use of the military forces for coercive and violent acts. The “normal” functions of the military are perceived to be war and deterrence. Military operations other than war—which play such a vital role in conflict termination—are often perceived as insignificant collateral functions. Third, institutional barriers exist between the political and military establishments. US law directs civilian control of the military and prohibits military commanders from political activism. At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that political leaders should not hobble the Armed Forces by unnecessarily interfering in the conduct of military operations. The resulting institutional barriers, while necessary, greatly complicate any analysis of the conflict resolution process and related topics. Finally, there is a perception—particularly by many in the military community—that conflict resolution is the realm of peace activists and anti-military reactionaries. This perception has inhibited the study of the relationship of military operations to the entire conflict resolution process.

Despite the intellectual obstacles, the body of related literature is slowly but steadily increasing. Among the authors who have attempted to categorize the literature related to conflict termination, Berenice Carroll’s work is the most relevant to this project. Berenice Carroll observed five general categories of questions related to termination research: (1) Definition and Classification, (2) Descriptive and Quantitative, (3)

Analytical, (4) Evaluative, and (5) Policy.<sup>6</sup> Although Carroll's work is beginning to become somewhat outdated, it provides an excellent overview of related concepts and sources. Following is a review of the most significant literature related to conflict termination using the categories identified by Carroll.

Definition and Classification. The literature related to this aspect of conflict termination addresses the following questions. How will the success or failure of a military operation be defined? In war, what constitutes victory or defeat? Another related issue has to do with how political and military objectives are derived. To what extent are strategic and operational objectives unlimited/limited? Finally, are near-term objectives congruent with long-term objectives? In other words, is there an end state which provides a strategic vision and enables the economic, political, military, and information instruments of power to be fully integrated for synergistic effect? Is the end state viable? *Strategy*, by B. H. Liddell Hart, is one of the best resources dealing with this aspect of conflict termination. He observes, "The experience of history brings ample evidence that the downfall of civilized States tends to come not from the direct assaults of foes but from internal decay, combined with the consequences of exhaustion in war . . . A state which expends its strength to the point of exhaustion bankrupts its own policy, and future."<sup>7</sup> Many of Liddell Hart's thoughts and concepts are woven throughout this research project.

Descriptive or Quantitative. This aspect of conflict termination is devoted to analyzing the types and numbers of war terminations. Trends are identified and inferences drawn on the probable success of different strategies in relation to varying contextual elements. The two most noteworthy publications on this aspect of conflict termination are *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process* by Paul R. Pillar, and



*Resort to Arms, International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* by Melvin Small and J. David Singer. These two resources provide the basis for a significant part of chapter 2.

Analytical. This aspect of conflict termination is devoted to the identification and analysis of the factors which influence termination. *Every War Must End*, by Fred Charles Iklé and *Fighting To A Finish*, by Leon V. Sigal are essential resources for those concerned with the influence of external factors on the conduct and termination of military operations. Analytical considerations are integrated throughout this project.

Evaluative. This aspect of conflict termination focuses on how termination affects future events. *From Lexington to Desert Storm*, by Donald M. Snow and Dennis M. Drew, and *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century*, by Larry H. Addington provide excellent insight into the factors which influence the outcome of military operations and their consequences. The concepts and insights provided by these publications were particularly useful for developing the case studies contained in chapter 3.

Policy. This aspect of conflict termination discusses considerations which contribute to a successful outcome. Virtually all of the literature related to conflict termination addresses policy issues. *Strategy*, by B. H. Liddell Hart and *Every War Must End*, by Fred Charles Iklé provide two of the most authoritative discussions involving these issues. Policy considerations are also integral to the entire paper.

Several additional sources require special recognition. As previously mentioned, analysis of the conflict resolution process as it relates to military operations has been overlooked by most scholars. *Patterns of Conflict*, by Richard E. Barringer, provided the initial concept used to develop the Conflict Resolution Framework presented in this paper.

The Conflict Resolution Framework is discussed in detail in chapter 2 and forms the basis for the analysis of the case studies in chapter 3. The Conflict Resolution Framework is one of the most significant contributions contained in this research project.

One of the primary conclusions contained in this project is the need to institutionalize conflict termination into US military Deliberate, Crisis Action, and Contingency planning and execution. This project owes much to the ground breaking efforts contained in *War Termination, Why Don't we Plan for It*, by Bruce C. Bade, *War Termination Criteria and JOPES*, by Robert Soucy, Kevin Shwedo, and John Haven, and *Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning*, by James W. Reed. These three publications are indispensable reading for anyone concerned with the effective use of military force.

The relative importance of military operations other than war has also been overlooked by scholars dedicated to the study of conflict resolution and war termination. It is the contention of this research project, contrary to the predominate paradigm, that military operations other than war are the essential catalysts facilitating conflict termination. Several Joint Publications, in particular Joint Publication 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, and Joint Test Publication 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs* provide valuable insight into this very important and neglected aspect of conflict termination.

History contains many invaluable lessons concerning the conduct of political and military affairs. However, we cannot rely solely upon the past to chart our future course. Every generation and every nation must continuously adapt to their own unique circumstances if they are to endure and prosper. As we proceed with this discussion, we

are mindful that tomorrow is certain to bring new challenges requiring fresh insight, creativity, flexibility, innovation, courage, commitment and perseverance.

## **Overview**

This research project will review the concept of conflict termination in the pre-hostility, hostility and post-hostility stages. A distinction will be drawn between war termination and conflict termination concepts. In addition, an annex to Joint Publication 5-03.1 is proposed (appendix A) to integrate conflict termination with the Department of Defense planning process. It is aimed at enabling military and civilian leaders to better plan and execute military operations so they may be terminated on terms most favorable to the US and its allies. This paper draws upon material from the diplomatic corps and academia while integrating concepts from the military planner's perspective to evolve a hybrid planning and execution process for conflict termination. It concludes with suggestions for enhancing interagency cooperation and provides some practical solutions to make up for the current deficiencies in the Department of Defense deliberate and crisis action planning processes.

To help readers through this complex subject, a glossary of terms, definitions and acronyms is included at Appendix C.

## **Chapter 2: Termination Concepts and Theories**

### **Introduction**

This chapter begins by establishing a common language and framework for war termination and conflict resolution, then explores the basic concepts and theory at the grand strategy and strategic level. The purpose of the first section in the chapter is to establish what war and conflict termination is, and identify the prerequisites for attaining a better state of peace. The last section of the chapter presents concepts and theory on the conduct of military operations in support of war and conflict termination. It addresses critical issues such as military strategy and concepts for terminating the war and conflict.

### **The Nature of War and Conflict Termination**

**Conflict Resolution Framework.** Although every conflict differs, most follow a similar pattern. This pattern, first recognized by Richard Barringer,<sup>8</sup> shows how a conflict may progress across the six phases depicted in Figure 1.<sup>9</sup>

The framework provides a model for understanding how conflicts develop and result in wars, how wars terminate without necessarily resolving the conflict, and how conflict resolution is required to achieve settlement and a lasting peace. Most conflicts are either resolved without hostilities or remain unresolved and do not progress into hostilities. But for those conflicts which do progress into hostilities, the framework provides some insight into the elusiveness of transitioning from hostilities to settlement and confirms the importance of termination planning in enabling nations to facilitate this




Figure 1. Conflict Resolution Framework

transition. If post-hostilities disputes are allowed to persist and fester, the conflict remains unresolved with a high likelihood of resuming hostilities.

To resolve a conflict at its various phases, each state will apply its instruments of power. Figure 1 indicates the relative importance the economic (E), political (P) and the military (M) instruments of power play in each phase. When a state uses its instruments of power to resolve a conflict, it should apply those instruments in a coherent and congruent strategy aimed at implementing its national objectives and attaining the state's desired end state. The end state should be defined as the political, economic and military environment at the end of settlement, assuming settlement is possible.

As the framework depicts, the dispute phase arises from a *conflict*—a clash of political or economic interest between two groups. These groups may be states in the international system or ethnic nations without international state recognition. Most of these conflicts do not effect a state or nation's vital interests at this point. If a state deems the conflict warrants resolution, it will begin to employ new political and economic instruments of power to resolve the dispute. No longer do we have an environment of mutual acceptance of national interests and objectives. For example, the economic instruments which might have been mutually supportive (e.g. most favored nation status, loans and efforts to stabilize exchange rates) in the peace phase may change to negative trade and capital sanctions designed to coerce the other country to resolve the conflict through political accommodation or treaty. If successful, settlement is achieved.

The conflict enters the pre-hostilities phase if the conflict continues and is viewed as affecting the state's vital interests. One or both of the states begins to perceive the conflict in military terms and introduces military options, such as a show of force. The

political instrument usually still dominates, but there is a significant increase in the use of the military instrument. The intent is usually not to trigger hostilities, but to coerce the other state to resolve the conflict through political accommodation or treaty. Sometimes one state predetermines the decision to go to war and pre-hostilities activities are used as bait or trip wires to justify escalation.

Occasionally, states find it necessary to protect their vital interests by war, thus moving the conflict into the hostilities phase marked by organized and systematic violence undertaken by the armed forces to impose their will and end state on the enemy state. During this phase, the military instrument dominates the other instruments of power, but does not exclude them.

When organized hostilities are terminated by all parties of the dispute, the states enter a period of post-hostilities. This phase is marked by a conflict still perceived in potential military terms and usually continues after organized fighting stops. This phase is dominated by war, civil-military, and military operations other than war such as security operations, occupation and transfer to civil authority, withdrawal or redeployment of troops, and civil affairs operations. As military operations decline, the political instrument of power will dominate. Negotiations will continue until a peace arrangement resolves the dispute. If negotiations fail, the states may resume hostilities or enter the post-hostilities dispute phase.

This post-hostilities dispute phase may include the original, unresolved dispute or any additional, unresolved disputes which arose from the hostilities or post-hostilities phases. This situation highlights the distinction between war termination and conflict termination. While the war may be terminated, the seeds of future hostilities persist

because the conflict remains unresolved. The significance of this phase becomes more important for unresolvable conflicts in which settlement is unlikely. For these conflicts, the post-hostilities phase will substitute for peace.

The means to mitigate these disputes lie in effective planning for both war and conflict termination. Yet, not all wars have provided the opportunity for settlement—settlement being the phase of progressive resolution of disputes resulting in the end of the conflict. The six Arab-Israeli wars are a testimony to that. But if we want to terminate the conflict, the development of military strategy, military objectives and military operations cannot be limited to cessation of hostilities, but must also be congruent with resolving the root causes of the conflict itself. In effect, our conflict resolution framework provides a useful model for both political strategists and military planners because it addresses the entire range of activities leading to conflict resolution.

**Difficulties in Terminating Wars.** War termination theorist Fred Iklé cites at least three reasons why nations find it much more difficult to terminate a war than to start one. First, it is difficult to back out of a war once committed because states often seek better conditions than those existing before the war. Not only are the disputes carried through the war, but the emotional and psychological effects of war require further compensation. Reducing one's losses in war is very difficult for governments to accomplish for victor and vanquished alike. The greater the belligerent's "effort and cost in fighting the war, the more he will become committed to his own conditions for peace."<sup>10</sup>

Second, war is more than a rational act. The decision to terminate a war is a difficult emotional and psychological process. A state's leadership can become so



committed to its course of action that it refuses to consider the risk and cost of continuing the war or the benefits of resolving the conflict. Fighting usually continues long after the outcome of the conflict has been decided. Often, the war is continued with hope of improving the outcome, the possibility of allied intervention, or the collapse of the opponent's will to continue the war. Iklé rightly observed that often "the weaker belligerent makes no attempt to seek peace while its military strength can still influence the enemy, but fights until it has lost all its power to bargain."<sup>11</sup>

Third, wars are fought for more than just defending vital interests or strategic objectives. Wars are directed by bureaucracies and individuals with their own aims and interests. While conducting the war, the civilian and military leadership and staffs work well together, even when the war goes badly. But when a state seeks an end to war, the leadership struggles between the state's priorities and their own self interests. While victory brings accolades, defeat brings change and even if the government survives the war, the leadership often does not.<sup>12</sup>

There are many theoretical reasons why states stop fighting. Some argue that there are winners and losers, but rarely does the loser stop fighting even after the outcome has been decided. Sometimes this leads to extermination, expulsion or capitulation of the loser, which is not a rational termination process from the loser's perspective. Others suggest war will stop when the belligerents exhaust their ability to continue to fight.<sup>13</sup> But often, equally matched belligerents find the means to continue fighting at a more protracted, lower intensity level. Still another commonly accepted view is that the state is a rational actor and "will pursue its objectives until it reaches a point where marginal costs of continuing the war are not worth the objective, then the state will decide to seek to

terminate the war.”<sup>14</sup> For the same reasons that a nation finds it difficult to terminate a war, they find it difficult to apply these costs models. Termination of a war because of cost is rarely a unilateral decision. Finally, another view is that the likelihood of terminating a war comes with a change in leadership, or a swing in political power from the “hawks” to the “doves.” Regardless of the reason why a state decides to end a war, it will find it a difficult decision process entangled with many intangibles and emotions.

When the decision to terminate is made, the question that remains is how? Generally, war will not end unless at least one of the belligerents “changes its objectives enough so that it appears that mutual satisfaction can occur without further violence.”<sup>15</sup> These changes can only occur when a state’s leaders are faced with a dramatic political decision which makes termination acceptable over an alternative option that will be realized if they continue war.

**Means by Which Wars are Terminated.** Wars are terminated by one of two means: through a negotiated settlement or through unilateral action. Paul Pillar allocated these two means into six more specific categories as shown in Table 1.<sup>16</sup> States may negotiate directly with each other or through a third party. A negotiated armistice or cease-fire may occur before or after the termination of hostilities. Unilateral action may take the form of capitulation, extermination/expulsion or withdrawal.

**Table 1. Means of Conflict Termination**

Means of Conflict Termination	Explicit Agreement	Status of Peace
Negotiated before Armistice (NB)	By both belligerents	Both parties remain
Negotiated after Armistice (NA)	By both belligerents	Both parties remain
Negotiated by Third Party (NIO)†	By both belligerents	Both parties remain
Unilateral - Capitulation (C)	Imposed by victor	Both parties remain
Unilateral - Extermination/Expulsion (E)	None	One party remains*
Unilateral - Withdrawal (W)	None	Both parties remain**

† Agreement drafted by third party (either another state or an International Organization like the UN)

\* Both parties remain at the end of the war, but conditions may impose removal of defeated govt.

\*\*The defeated political entity and force are destroyed or expelled as frequently occurs in civil wars

The type of war, the belligerents' desired end states, objectives and resolve, and who wins, all contribute to how the war will terminate. As a result, wars over the last two centuries have established termination patterns for interstate war, extra-systemic wars and civil wars.

**Interstate Wars.** Interstate wars are wars between two or more states of the international system. The objectives are usually limited to resolving a conflict of vital interests and rarely does one state attempt to destroy or absorb the other state. Usually the existence of the defeated state and government is required by the victor to facilitate settlement. Because these wars are generally limited in objectives, so is each state's resolve.<sup>17</sup>

The ratio between negotiated and unilateral settlements for interstate wars has remained constant over the last 195 years, with 66 percent of all interstate wars terminated through negotiations (reference Table 2 and appendix B). What has changed is how wars are settled through negotiations. Before the advent of electronic

**Table 2. Termination of Interstate Wars**

Means of Termination	1800-1919		1920-1934	1935-1949	1950-1964	1965-1979	1980-1994	1920-1994		1800-1994	
	Qty	Pct.						Qty	Pct.	Qty	Pct.
NB	24	55%	2	2	--	--	--	4	14%	28	39%
NA	5	12%	1	3	1	--	--	5	17%	10	14%
NIO	0	0%	--	1	1	6	1	9	31%	9	13%
C	8	19%	1	1	--	1	1	4	14%	12	17%
E	4	9%	--	1	1	1	1	4	14%	8	11%
W	2	5%	--	--	1	1	1	3	31%	5	7%
Total	43	100%	4	8	4	9	4	29	100%	72	100%

Note: one interstate war was absorbed by another war.

communications and air travel, wars were terminated through negotiations after the cease-fire. Modern capabilities, however, allow governments and militaries to coordinate combat and diplomacy, and come to an agreement on peace terms before accepting the cease-fire. A more recent trend is to exclusively depend on a third party, such as the UN, to either define the condition for cease-fire, or to mediate negotiation on behalf of the belligerents. Nine of the last thirteen interstate wars have been settled through negotiations by a third party.

**Extra-Systemic Wars.** Extra-systemic wars are colonial or imperial wars fought by one state of the international system against its colony or an ethnic nation not recognized as a state. The subjugated nation's end state is to attain independence and recognition as a state in the international system. While resolve of the subjugated nation's political movement may be high, the resolve of the people will be tied to the political success of the movement. The dominant state's strategic objective and end state is to

retain or attain political control of the subjugated nation. Their resolve is proportional to the degree to which political domination is a vital interest.<sup>18</sup>

The dominant state always seeks unilateral victory, preferring extermination or expulsion over capitulation (reference Table 3 and appendix B). Over the last 75 years,

**Table 3: Termination of Extra-Systemic Wars**

Means of Termination	1800-1919		1920-1934	1935-1949	1950-1964	1965-1979	1980-1994	1920-1994		1800-1994	
	Qty	Pct.						Qty	Pct.	Qty	Pct.
NB	7	20%	--	1	0	1	1	3	20%	10	20%
NA	0	0%	--	1	2	1	--	4	27%	4	8%
NIO	0	0%	--	--	--	--	--	0	0%	0	0%
C	18	51%	1	1	--	--	--	2	13%	20	40%
E	8	23%	2	1	1	--	2	6	40%	14	28%
W	2	6%	--	--	--	--	--	0	0%	2	4%
Total	35	100%	3	4	3	2	3	15	100%	50	100%

Note: Five extra-systemic wars were absorbed by other wars

the victorious state has defeated the subjugated nation four times by extermination of the political and military forces and sought capitulation twice. The only exception is the First Kashmir War, which was resolved through negotiation before cease-fire. For the subjugated nation, victory and independence has only occurred through a protracted war and negotiations. Over the last 75 years, the trend of attaining victory has begun to slightly favor the subjugated state. Interestingly, no third party has mediated a settlement of an extra-systemic war. Applying these observations to the Chechen War (1994-1995), it is no surprise that Russia's strategy is to achieve a quick, decisive victory through extermination of the Chechen rebels. The Chechens, meanwhile, have requested

negotiations and vowed, if defeated in Grozny, to continue the fight from the Caucasus mountains.

**Civil Wars.** Civil wars are unique in that they are fought to attain or retain political control of a single state or nation, or to politically partition a state. There are four categories of civil wars: revolutions, in which a change of government will result in subsequent social, political and economic changes; coups, in which change is limited to the top government authority; wars of political secession, in which the state is politically partitioned (wars which ethnically partition a state are usually extra-systemic wars); and wars of ethnic cleansing or unification. In civil wars, both political entities are usually fighting for a common end state—political control, and unless the state is partitioned, only one belligerent will politically and militarily survive the conflict.<sup>19</sup>

In civil wars, the trend is toward negotiating an armistice before the cease-fire (reference Table 4 and appendix B). Eight out of the last fifteen civil wars have been resolved through direct negotiations before the cease-fire, while capitulation has overtaken expulsion for unilateral terminations. The UN has had some success in its intervention in Cypress, Cambodia and Angola. Yet, third party negotiations have been predominately ineffective in mediating and resolving civil wars, as demonstrated in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Somalia. This could be due to the difficulties a third party has in resolving the deep political divisions and psychological scars characteristic of civil wars.

**Table 4. Termination of Civil Wars**

Means of Termination	1800-1919		1920-1934	1935-1949	1950-1964	1965-1979	1980-1994	1920-1994		1800-1994	
	Qty	Pct.						Qty	Pct.	Qty	Pct.
NB	0	0%	--	--	1	5	3	9	39%	9	33%
NA	0	0%	--	--	--	--	--	0	0%	0	0%
NIO	0	0%	--	--	1	--	1	2	9%	2	7%
C	1	25%	--	1	--	4	--	4	17%	5	19%
E	3	75%	1	3	1	1	1	7	30%	10	37%
W	0	0%	--	--	1	--	--	1	4%	1	4%
Total	4	100%	1	3	4	10	5	23	100%	27	100%

The patterns of war termination since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and especially in the last 75 years, imply that the best strategy for war termination should be based on the type of war and the desired end state. Table 5 shows that general trend, and except for some extreme cases, it is rarely violated. More importantly, this trend suggests that a nation will be unable to achieve its desired end state if it employs a termination strategy which imposes a solution incongruent with the type of war being fought.

**Table 5. Termination Patterns**

Type of War	Means of Termination
Interstate War	1. Negotiated by Third Party 2. Capitulation or Extermination
Extra-Systemic War - Dominant State	1. Extermination 2. Capitulation
Extra-Systemic War - Subjugated Nation	1. Direct Negotiations Before Armistice
Civil War	1. Direct Negotiations Before Armistice 2. Capitulation or Extermination

However, effective conflict resolution requires much more than simply determining the type of war and employing a preselected termination strategy. The underlying national strategy, the desired end state and objectives, the nature of the conflict and the resolve to attain the end state all impact selection of the best means for terminating a war.

**Conflict Termination—Difficulties in Achieving Settlement.** Stopping the fighting is only half the challenge. To prevent the reintroduction of hostilities and achieve a lasting peace, states need to continue working toward resolving the conflict. Occasionally, the outcome of a war will provide the conditions for conflict settlement, but many wars do not present this opportunity. The major difficulties in resolving a dispute lie in the ability to fulfill the conditions for settlement, the psychological implications of war and the nature of the conflict.

**Conditions for Settlement.** Settlement requires accommodation. The war ends when one or both belligerents change their war objectives enough so that mutual satisfaction can occur without further violence. Mutual satisfaction is usually an artificial condition brought about by the desire to terminate the war. For settlement, this mutual satisfaction must be genuine. In some wars, political or economic accommodation may be sufficient. An example of this form of accommodation occurred in the post-hostilities phase of the Second World War between the United States and Japan.

A lasting settlement also requires agreement or acceptance by both sides. Both belligerents must want to end the conflict and find a mutual understanding. This understanding can be negotiated and implemented or, in the extreme case, it can be taught by the occupying state and adopted by the occupied state in the form of new political, economic or cultural institutions. Acceptance can be formal or inferred, but both states'



civilian populations and their governments (assuming both survive the war) must accept the settlement without reservations or a desire to continue the conflict.

In most conflicts, how the military conducted itself during and especially after the war can significantly contribute to preventing the reintroduction of hostilities. War and post-hostilities activities provide the breeding ground for new, post-hostilities disputes stemming from military conduct. On the other hand, the military in an occupied country can be used to gain the confidence of the civilian population through appropriate behavior in security operations and its assistance in restoring and improving the infrastructure. From a Western perspective, the military can demonstrate a higher moral standard for countries which have not experienced the values of a democratic political system, human rights, and due process. The credibility the military brings may be the first, most visible step in reeducating a country and changing its political and economic institutions and values.

Many conflicts are not resolvable and settlement is unlikely. For these conflicts, the post-hostilities phase will substitute for peace, and the risk or the reintroduction of hostilities constantly remains.

**Psychological Implications on Achieving Settlement.** Wars also have psychological implications that effect how states make peace. The way states fight and terminate wars may determine the viability of peace. During war, the public is usually conditioned to dehumanize and hate the enemy, and consider the enemy as a target of military operations<sup>20</sup>. This manipulation of perceptions is used to help sustain support for the war effort, but it can also inhibit post-hostilities activities which should be geared toward resolving the conflict.

Another issue is the defeated nation's domestic political consequences as a result of defeat or failure to attain its strategic objectives. Depending on the victor's end state, this may inhibit or facilitate the settlement process. On one hand, the victor must lessen the loser's desires for revenge and diffuse the motives to pursue war objectives not yet achieved. On the other hand, the absence of victory may motivate the defeated public to pursue internal political changes which could minimize future conflict and indirectly satisfy the victor's end state.

**The Nature of the Conflict.** Much of the difficulty in resolving conflicts lies in the nature of the conflict. Conflicts usually fall into one or more of the following categories: ethnic, religious, nationalistic, political and economic. Ethnic and religious conflicts are less mutable and more difficult to compromise. Ethnic groups have different views of history, speak different languages, have different traditions and values, and may practice different religions which all provide justification to sustain the conflict. Resolution of ethnic conflicts is difficult because it requires cultural accommodation—an arduous educational and acceptance process which must convince combatants to exchange the memories, suspicions and ethnic biases of the past for the uncertain promise of future accommodation and prosperity.

Religious conflicts are similar to ethnic conflicts and may also contribute to ethnic conflicts. The difference is the fervor of religion that fuels the conflict. It can even split culturally similar groups. History is filled with clashes between groups practicing different forms of the same religion such as Catholicism and Protestantism, or different religions such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hindu and Sikh. The difficulties in resolving these conflicts is that both sides justify the conflict in their faith. Here the challenge is to attain

religious accommodation and acceptance of the "heathens" to co-exist. The alternative is that the victor will try to impose expulsion or extermination of the losing faith. Another form of religious conflict is the role religion should have in politics and in the state. Proponents of this type of conflict are often labeled fundamentalists, but it can be more correctly identified as a clash between secularism and traditional religious-based values. Regardless, if it is a clash between religious groups or an internal clash between politics and religion, religious conflicts are difficult to resolve.

Nationalistic conflicts may be the next most challenging to resolve. They take one of three forms. Imperialism is a form of expansionist nationalism in which a state desires to expand its territorial control for economic or political control.<sup>21</sup> Irredentism is another form of expansionistic nationalism in which a state claims cultural or historical rights to territory of which it has been deprived. Last, self-determinism or expressionistic nationalism is a desire of a group seeking independence from political control of an existing state.<sup>22</sup> Resolution of nationalistic conflicts usually requires political accommodation through negotiations, plebiscites or granting of independence, but often states attempt to impose solutions because they do not see viability in political accommodation. Such imposed solutions usually take the form of expelling or exterminating political movements and their forces.

The last two categories, political and economic, are usually interrelated. Political conflicts are usually based on conflicting ideologies whether they manifest themselves as civil war or interstate war. Sovereignty provides another source of political conflict between states such as issues of border disputes, freedom of navigation, refugees, environment, international organized crime and drug trafficking. Economic conflicts take

one of three forms: competition for scarce resources, differences in trade practices to include neomercantilism,<sup>23</sup> and deprivation or imbalance of resources (usually between social classes within a state). With the end of the Cold War and the ideological polarization of the world, most of the political and economic conflicts can be accommodated through negotiations. At times, resolution requires removal of a government's leadership or change of government. The most difficult challenges may lie with irrational or rogue states such as Libya, North Korea, Iraq and Iran.

In summary, there are two terminations which the state and military must plan for. First is the termination of the war, which usually does not settle the conflict. The second termination is of the conflict itself. Without resolving the conflict, we cannot achieve settlement and attain peace, and continuously risk the reintroduction of hostilities. The way in which a state conducts military operations may strongly influence the ability of a state to achieve settlement. War is a strongly emotional and psychological event; a state and its military conduct may provoke the next war or provide the avenues for peace. It is important to understand the nature of the conflict so that military operations can be tailored to support ultimate resolution of the conflict. It must be recognized that conflicts cannot be resolved solely by the military instrument of power. Rather, it is the skillful use of the military in concert with the economic, political, and information instruments of power, that is the key to successfully moving past hostilities to achieve conflict resolution.

### **Strategy for Termination**

The rest of the chapter presents the concepts and theory on the conduct of military operations in support of war and conflict termination. All strategy should consider the

type of war, the nature of conflict, the political wills and means, and be developed to support the desired end state—the desired political, economic and military environment at settlement.

**Strategy for War Termination.** Before a state enters into war, it should know its strategy on how to end the war and its termination options. Different termination possibilities will occur at different times in the course of the war and the termination means and timing is vital to achieving the end state. There are two ways a war will stop—through direct military action with a unilateral termination or through a negotiated settlement. The following section addresses the guiding principles for either means of termination and the viability of escalation as a method to shorten war.

**Deciding on Direct or Negotiated Victory.** Whether a government attempts to use armed force to achieve its objective directly, or through negotiated settlement depends on the type of war, the type of conflict, the nature of the objective, and its ability to attain the objective. Some objectives require the continued existence of the enemy and a willingness of the enemy to cooperate. Other objectives may require exterminating or expelling the enemy. In the Gulf War, the Coalition forces, especially Saudi Arabia, did not want a political and military vacuum in Iraq which Iran might exploit. Therefore, it was politically desirable to leave Saddam's regime in power. On the other hand, the further an objective is beyond a belligerent's capability, the greater the desire to negotiate a settlement. This is especially true for subjugated nations in extra-systemic wars such as in Chechnya or the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algeria. The keys to deciding on unilateral victory are the state's ability to achieve it through direct military action, and accurately determining whether or not it meets the desired end state.

When a warring state is incapable of attaining its objectives through direct military action, it may instead attempt to deny the enemy its objectives.<sup>24</sup>

**Negotiating Peace During Hostilities.** There are several reasons why nations dislike initiating or conducting negotiations while fighting. The most realistic and troubling reason is that an offer to negotiate is often perceived as a sign of weakness. As a result, most offers for negotiations come from third party mediators or from the “winner.” A second drawback is the realization that negotiations may result in failing to attain national objectives or the “desired” end state. This failing really lies in the state’s acceptance that it is unable to attain its objectives through direct military action, combined with the realization that negotiations will do no better. Last, negotiating itself may provide the opponent additional time to regroup, rearm and continue the war.

Despite these negative factors, the reasons to engage in negotiations for settlement of most types of war are compelling. War is continuing to lose its acceptability as a means to resolve disputes; this is especially true of prolonged or extremely violent wars. Negotiating during combat has become an internationally acceptable means of settling a war, and provides the only means of resolving a stalemated war. Most importantly, if negotiations are successful, they may significantly reduce casualties and the cost of prosecuting the war.

Negotiations will not be effective until the outcome of the war has been militarily determined and accepted by both belligerents.<sup>25</sup> Both China in the Korean War and North Vietnam in the Vietnam War believed they could still achieve their objectives through military operations and did not perceive a need to negotiate in good faith. It took two years to convince China that United Nations Combined (UNC) forces had the resolve and

military capability to deny a communist unification of Korea. Similarly, North Vietnam initially believed the United States would unilaterally withdraw and only concede to a negotiated settlement after the heavy bombing campaign conducted against them in Operation Linebacker II.

“It is possible to influence an opponent’s intentions by and during negotiations. But the chief means of doing this is to somehow drive for victory. Absent this, one is really negotiating one’s own defeat.”<sup>26</sup> This was one of the major problems in negotiating the settlements in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The lesson learned is that one does not fight a war to negotiate. A state fights a war to obtain its objectives and the state may use negotiations to assist itself in that aim. In addition, to support negotiations and enhance the state’s position, it is important to obtain bargaining chips, such as territory. But for bargaining chips to be truly valuable, they must have some intrinsic value to the state using them.<sup>27</sup>

Negotiations rarely take the simple form of responding to military events. It is important to ensure the intent of the military combat operations are clearly communicated and correctly interpreted by the enemy. The enemy’s confusion or misunderstanding of a state’s capabilities and intent may prolong the war. The disadvantageous position in which a state places the enemy through combat should not appear transitory, for the enemy may hold out in the hope of a change for the better. If there is to be any prospective change, it should be for the worse (in the mind of the enemy). This may be emphasized by applying the psychological shock of a decisive battle to bring the negotiations to a more rapid conclusion.

To make negotiations work, a state must isolate the enemy from outside support, whether it be international political support, outside sources of weapons and technical support, or direct military support. Some states will fight as long as there is hope of achieving their objectives or they are at least able to continue fighting. Fighting may replace the end state if the end state cannot be achieved until the leadership accepts the fact that they have lost their cause.

**Decision to Escalate.** States may decide not to escalate wars and choose to limit their war efforts for five reasons: (1) their escalation is matched and canceled by the enemy's escalation; (2) increase in the level of violence or the introduction of weapons of mass destruction will increase violence to an unacceptable level; (3) belligerents outside the theater of operations fear escalation may result in increasing the theater to include their nation; (4) belligerents may fear escalation may induce unacceptable war costs and social dislocation; and (5) belligerents wish to retain a military reserve for other contingencies.<sup>28</sup>

The advantage to escalating a war, as long as there is no intervention, is that it should shorten the war and bring about an earlier conclusion. The irony of so many wars is that untimely de-escalation and ineffective peacekeeping often extends them. The level of violence and casualty rates may be lower over a period of time, but as the conflict drags on indefinitely, the net results can be far worse. Another consideration for escalating war is to facilitate the progress of negotiations and improve the terms. Even if terms are not improved, it will hasten the agreement.<sup>29</sup>

When it is credible, threatening the use of escalation may be a better alternative than escalation itself. For example, President Eisenhower threatened to escalate the



Korean War against the People's Republic of China (PRC) by three means: by widening the theater, permitting the National Chinese to reenter their conflict, and considering the use of artillery delivered nuclear weapons. This escalation is credited with convincing the PRC to conclude negotiations and agree to a cease-fire.<sup>30</sup> The key to any threat is to make it believable and probable. If the promise of additional force fails to achieve the desired effect, a state may be forced to use it.

**Strategy for Conflict Termination.** Before a state enters war, it should have a strategy to end the conflict and attain peace. The strategy should be based on the desired end state with the goal of achieving a better state of peace. The strategy should and will be shaped by the type of war and the nature of the conflict. While it is desirable to attain a better state of peace, there may be obstacles to achieving it.

**Achieving a Better State of Peace.** For a better state of peace, all parties to the conflict must desire an end to the conflict and be willing to arrive at a mutual understanding. To create this mutual understanding requires some form of accommodation by at least one of the belligerents, and acceptance of that accommodation by all parties involved in the conflict. This acceptance may occur through implementation of a negotiated agreement, or through an occupation and reeducation process. In the termination of some civil and extra-systemic wars, acceptance is coerced through expulsion, imprisonment and extermination.

The strategy for a "better peace" is predicated on who is the victor, the type of war, the means of war termination and the nature of conflict. The strategy for more amicable settlements, such as those that may be found after interstate wars, may include: restoring order, humanitarian aid, resettlement of refugees, the development of democratic

and governmental institutions, reform of military and law enforcement institutions, economic reconstruction, and nation assistance. The end state usually includes development of a political, economic and military environment that facilitates the mutual acceptance of national interests and objectives. The strategy should re-integrate the defeated state into the world community and develop a relationship in which future disputes can be resolved without the application of military instrument of power. For example, a common US strategy is to encourage development of a stable, non-aggressive, democratic state.<sup>31</sup>

In extremely violent wars, especially those resolved through expulsion and extermination, the termination strategy can be brutally harsh. Common strategies for an imposed peace include eliminating or replacing the existing government, elimination or subordination of the defeated military, sanctions and war repatriation, long-term occupation, economic transformations, cultural and ideological reeducation, mass deportations, forced relocation, and possibly physical extermination. In interstate and extra-systemic wars, such harsh measures frequently become the source of new conflicts and future wars. In civil wars, such harsh strategies, when implemented as part of a well-defined end state, are often successful in unifying the country and consolidating political power. The following paragraphs on the Vietnam, Algerian and Falkland wars provide examples of termination strategies, both effective and ineffective, and the processes for attaining peace.

After the Vietnam civil war (1957-1975), the communist's initial strategy was "restoring order and stability of the war-torn South."<sup>32</sup> Then the strategy turned to eliminating "the comprador capitalist as a class" and replacing the South's political and

economic structure with Hanoi's new social order. The techniques included: party sponsored, mandatory indoctrination sessions; "reeducation camps" for the disposed leadership and elite; population resettlement used for social control by defusing tensions in cities and returning refugees to their villages; surveillance to repress and, if necessary, arrest counterrevolutionaries; and summary executions used to eliminate the greatest threats. The communists were largely successful in unifying their country and achieving peace within Vietnam, although they admit their goal of establishing a new socialist society remains elusive.<sup>33</sup>

The Algerian War was an extra-systemic war settled through negotiations. The 1962 negotiated Evian Agreement brought an end to the Algerian War, but it also led to a string of extremely violent terrorist attacks in the post-hostilities phase. The Evian Agreement between the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the French enacted a cease-fire on March 19, 1962. The agreement included provisions for prisoner release, recognition of Algerian territorial sovereignty, determination of citizenship, repatriation of French citizens, disposition of private property, economic and financial considerations, cultural and religious matters, an amnesty clause for war criminals and torturers, and a scheduled withdrawal of French forces.<sup>34</sup> What the agreement failed to adequately address was the transition of security and administration to the Algerians during the post-hostilities phase.

The cease-fire was not accepted by the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS)—the  *pied noir*  (Algerians of European ancestry) counter-terrorist organization. The OAS tried to nullify the agreements by any means—particularly by using terrorist acts to break down civil order, and pursuing a scorched-earth strategy to destroy the European-built

infrastructure. The OAS also exposed the failure of the French and FLN to plan for necessary post-hostilities security operations, and it was not until the French military forces crushed the OAS strongholds and police arrested the leadership that the OAS accepted a truce with the FLN.<sup>35</sup>

After the July 1, 1962 referendum in which the Algerians overwhelmingly adopted the Evian Agreement, about 97 percent or approximately 1,400,000 Europeans left Algeria. In addition, the Muslims forcibly expelled almost the whole Algerian Jewish community and massacred thousands of the loyal French Muslims. When the French turned over administration of the country to the Algerians, there was no plan for establishing a system of government and administration, and the combination of unanticipated mass exodus of Europeans, the excessive war losses among Algeria's elite, and the sacking of the native Algerian administrators from the French government left an ungovernable country.<sup>36</sup>

The last example is the 1982 interstate war between Britain and Argentina in which Britain expelled the Argentinean forces from the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. In the termination of the Falkland War, there was no settlement agreement between Britain and Argentina and yet peace was attained through the desire by both countries to return to the pre-hostilities status quo. Accommodation occurred through Argentina's reconciliation of the dispute by repressing their claim on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Other events also facilitated reconciliation. For example, Britain and Argentina conducted their military operations within the Laws of Armed Conflict and both countries limited their war objectives. The Argentina military junta dissolved over the following year allowing the

return of democracy. Lastly, the Argentinean public turned its political agenda inward to resolve its economic and political problems.<sup>37,38</sup>

In the first example, Vietnam planned for the unification of their country and was able to internally achieve their better state of peace. While the communists planned for that end state, they failed to define their long-term international political and economic environment. As a result, their conduct during the war and especially their violations of the Geneva Convention in the treatment of American POWs during the war has made reconciliation between Vietnam and the United States difficult.

In the second example, the FLN strategy during its fight for independence was brilliant. The FLN was able to achieve nearly all of their objectives they identified in their 1954 proclamation.<sup>39</sup> Where the FLN failed was in the planning for strategy beyond independence. The FLN did not plan for the transition of power nor the establishment and operations of government institutions, making the establishment of an independent Algeria difficult.

The last war also illustrated the difficulties of establishing a better state of peace. Although Britain was interested in resolving the conflict, Argentina would not support the talks. Political changes inside Argentina allowed for an informal reconciliation of the conflict by subordinating the disputed claim of the islands. The better state of peace was substituted with the peace of the status quo found before the war. Although by definition there is peace between Argentina and Britain, the root cause of the conflict remains.

**Obstacles to a Better Peace.** Often, the opportunity for a better peace is missed because of a poor understanding of the difference between cessation of military operations and achieving end state. In other cases it is the failure to define a workable

strategy or to conduct sufficient planning. For many wars, a "better peace" is not attainable.

First, not all conflicts are resolvable. Some parties may view continued conflict as the preferred means to further their cause and advance their objectives. This is the unconsummated war—a *bellum interruptum*—in which one party does not accept the outcome of war and fails to surrender its objectives. As long as the one party does not accept the outcome of war, there is a great risk that the party will attempt to resume hostilities if the other instruments of power fail to attain the objectives.<sup>40</sup> The Korean conflict and Arab-Israeli wars are classic examples of the unconsummated war.

Second, a better state of peace is not always achievable or even desirable. Sometimes a return to the status quo is acceptable. This is especially true for wealthier and more powerful nations that resist the risks that come with changing the world's economic or political structure. Other times the cost of a "better peace" is too high and a conflict stalemate ensues.

When the decision is not to continue the war and not to give up the war objectives, the conflict is continued. Instead of using war to resolve the conflict, the belligerents may rely on their political and economic instruments of power and may adopt a strategy of "containment and deterrence." Although a better state of peace may be unattainable, termination strategy must consider how to contain the conflict, support continued efforts to resolve or mitigate the conflict, and be prepared to resume hostilities.

**Conducting Termination Operations.** Attaining a better state of peace requires the military to conduct a multitude of operations other than war. The key to attaining the desired end state lies in the principles used in executing those operations. These principles

are adopted from the US military joint doctrine on military operations other than war (MOOTW).<sup>41</sup>

The first principle is understanding the termination objective that supports attaining the desired end state. The end state and termination objectives should be used to develop a suitable strategy and plan. Commanders must understand that war and conflict termination objectives differ considerably from combat objectives, but like combat objectives, the termination objectives need to be clearly defined to ensure military operations are effective and efficient.

Post-hostilities operations require unity of effort. The military will have to work congruently with the other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the host nation and possibly coalition military forces to attain the desired end state. To facilitate congruent operations, the military needs to develop and support a command and control structure that includes the other agencies and militaries. Eventually, as post-hostilities activities progress, the military's authority in theater will transfer to other government agencies, to the host nation or possibly to the UN.

The conduct of military operations—the way a state fights and conducts post-hostilities activities—will influence the peace. It is usually desirable to abide by the international agreements, treaties and customs governing the application of military force. Combat and security operations must be balanced by restraint. The military should avoid creating atrocities, mistreating interned civilians and enemy prisoners of war, using banned weapons and targeting civilians. Such conduct may inflame the enemy, domestic and world public opinion, and increase the enemy's will to fight. Developing rules of

engagement and targeting criteria and providing international law of armed conflict training are means of guiding the conduct of military operations to avoid these problems.

The security operations that restore order and provide stability may be the most important post-hostilities operation. The transition from hostilities to post-hostilities is usually highly confusing and volatile. Not all parties and opposing armed forces may accept the cessation of hostilities. The military must provide security for itself and for all elements of the civil population. Often, liberated people will use the transition from hostilities to post-hostilities as an opportunity for reprisal and revenge. Lastly, the military must be prepared for the possible resumption of hostilities by either regular or irregular forces.

Perseverance is rarely a problem in the outcome of civil wars, but democracies in interstate wars have often demonstrated difficulties in securing the peace before withdrawing their forces. Commanders should balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with a sensitivity to long term objectives. States should use the media to inform the public of the need to continue a military presence after a war. The military and other instruments of power must be assured of the logistical support and other resources required to preserve and accomplish the termination objectives and attain the end state.

Last, attaining legitimacy for the post-hostilities operations and for the government is strategically critical for attaining peace. Many conflicts are based on one side undermining legitimacy, while the other side attempts to establish or reestablish its legitimacy. The combination of security, restraint and perseverance will strongly support establishing legitimacy.



## **Summary**

This chapter opened by defining the conflict resolution framework and providing common war and conflict termination language. It continued by reviewing the difficulties in terminating war, the means by which wars are terminated and the difficulties in achieving settlement. The last section in the chapter focused on the strategy and guiding principles for terminating war and conflict. The intent of the chapter was to define the prerequisites for termination planning and execution. Having established this foundation, we now turn to examining some historical examples, both good and bad, of war and conflict termination practices.

### Chapter 3: Case Study Analyses

*The object in war is a better state of peace. . . . Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.*<sup>42</sup>

—Liddell Hart

With each military operation undertaken by the United States, whether in response to total war such as World Wars I and II, limited war such as Vietnam and the Gulf War, or operations other than war, such as Haiti, we are gaining a better appreciation for planning for termination. However, we still lack joint operational doctrine that clearly defines and provides practical planning guidance on the termination process—to include its principles, responsibilities and criteria—as it relates to each phase of the planning process, each level of war or conflict, and for each range of military operation. As US national military focus embraces increased involvement in a wider range of regional conflicts, the need for such comprehensive doctrine and planning guidance is even more critical.

The case studies that follow highlight the important termination issues spanning from WW I to Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti. We examine how effectively policymakers and military planners integrated war termination objectives into the planning process. These case studies demonstrate the importance of termination considerations for the grand strategist down to military field commanders. In these examples, we focus on lessons learned and draw conclusions as to the effect termination planning, or lack thereof, had on achieving US, allied, or coalition political and military objectives.

## World War I: The War To End All Wars?

*Often the seeds of the next conflict are sown in the present one.*<sup>43</sup>

—Bruce Bade

World War I was often referred to as the war to end all wars. Over 4.5 million combatants and approximately 15 million civilians were killed during the conflict between the Allied and Central Powers of Europe. In an effort characterized by attrition warfare and the unforeseen lethality of industrial age firepower, opposing nations threw their entire military manpower and economic reserves into the effort and continued the struggle until their resources were virtually exhausted. Examining World War I from a war termination perspective helps explain how the Great War was so quickly overshadowed by World War II, and also defines the historical point from which organizations dedicated to international conflict resolution gained a foothold on the world stage.

**Pre-Hostilities.** An important feature which influenced pre-World War I Europe was a complex set of alliances, most heavily driven by ethnic links between independent nations. At the core of the conflict lay the Balkans, which afforded access to the Mediterranean and became the object of competing international aspirations. Largely populated by Orthodox Christian Serbs, Bosnia and Herzegovina were militarily occupied by Austria in 1878 and annexed in 1908. Neighboring Serbia, also dominated by a Serbian and Orthodox population and closely linked to Russia, strongly objected to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. However, the ethnically based alliance of Germany and the Austrian Empire was militarily superior to the Serbian/Russian kinship and the annexation went militarily unopposed. The assassination by Serbian terrorists of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Francis

Ferdinand, during a summer visit to Sarajevo in June of 1914, provided the spark that ignited World War I.

Backed by a militarily strong Germany but led by a short-sighted monarchy in decline, Austria accused Serbia of complicity in the assassination and issued a 48 hour ultimatum which, if accepted, would have virtually eliminated Serbia's sovereignty. As Germany and Austria prepared for war on Serbia and Russia, a complex mix of secret alliances which linked all of Europe to one or more of the combatants, quickly locked in the remaining key nations on the continent. For example, taking no chances on the extent of Germany's intentions, France immediately mobilized. The British asked Berlin if the neutrality of Belgium would be guaranteed in accordance with the treaty of 1839 and received a negative response. In their view, this situation directly threatened the strategic port of Antwerp and induced the British to support both Belgium and France when hostilities commenced.

**Hostilities.** Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28 and bombarded Belgrade the next day. Ironically, the Serbian response to Austria's ultimatum, issued after Ferdinand's death, was interpreted by Germany as almost complete capitulation and William II, Germany's emperor, urged Austria to negotiate rather than go to war. However, by the time his remarks were relayed to Austria later that day, war on Serbia had already been declared. As the crisis increased in intensity, key decision making authorities were rapidly turned over to the military leadership on all sides of the conflict, and the possibilities for peaceful settlement were lost. The next four years demonstrated the difficulties nations face in trying to sustain a total war effort when costs continuously increase far beyond expectations and a clear victory remains unattainable.

During the war, there was little discussion on either side of any potential end state other than total annihilation of the enemy. Even as casualties and costs on both sides escalated, appeals for patriotism and national unity succeeded in maintaining popular support for the war effort. Further, the desire for additional territories, primarily those remaining in dispute from previous wars, induced the combatants to continue their efforts. Consequently, participants on both sides transformed their aims for significant territorial gains into preconditions for peace negotiations. Because these territorial goals were so overlapping and central to strategic interests on either side, peace talks were never seriously pursued until after the armistice of 1918. The Central Powers, driven to the point of political and military collapse, capitulated to the Allies, who were almost equally exhausted but buoyed by America's recent entrance into the war on their behalf.

**Post-Hostilities.** The major product of the war termination effort, the Treaty of Versailles, is often credited with sowing, rather than eradicating, the seeds of conflict which quickly grew again into World War II.<sup>44</sup> The treaty was negotiated by the victors in the absence of the key Central Power, Germany, who was ultimately forced to accept its punitive terms under threat of renewed military attack. The political representatives of the European allies went to Versailles to extract vengeance and compensation from Germany in terms of prestige, territory, and money. Severe restrictions on Germany's ability to equip and maintain its military forces relative to the European Allies were instituted. Territorial accessions to the allies on the continent were extensive. Additionally, all of Germany's foreign colonies and possessions were taken away and divided among the victors.

Despite President Wilson's desire for a more conciliatory peace settlement, a major insult to German national pride was also contained in the famous "war guilt" clause (Article 231), which ascribed responsibility for the war to them. The war guilt clause provided the basis for the Allies to present Germany with a monetary debt for war reparations which was well beyond its means to repay. In the post-war years, the widespread unpopularity and perceived injustice of the Treaty of Versailles within Germany, provided ample means for emerging leaders, such as Hitler, to garner popular support for the economic and military refurbishment necessary to restore Germany's national pride, integrity, and place among the powerful nations of the world.

Conversely, the formation of the League of Nations as part of the Treaty of Versailles provided contrast to the punitive war termination provisions dictated to Germany elsewhere in the document. The League of Nations recognized the territorial and sovereign rights of all legitimate nation states and established formal mechanisms, such as the World Court, through which nations could collectively attempt to maintain peace. According to Raymond D. Fosdick, former Under Secretary-General of the League of Nations, the concept of the league was rooted in the 18th century ideals of William Penn and the Quakers, but made essential by the growing need for international communication and cooperation brought about by the industrial age in the 19th century.<sup>45</sup> The League of Nations embodied the first sustained effort to preserve peace through an organization committed to international communication, cooperation, and collective defense.

President Woodrow Wilson was the chief proponent of forming the League of Nations covenant within the Treaty of Versailles, and it was adopted. However, political

support for it in the United States was lacking. Isolationism and fear of being bound to participate in future European conflicts resulted in the Senate's refusal to ratify the League's covenant, which was contained in the Treaty of Versailles. A separate American peace with Germany, which excluded the League of Nations, was accomplished. The US refusal to participate in the League, an ill-fated reliance on disarmament as a primary means of attaining peace, and continuous diplomatic and political problems, drastically limited the effectiveness of the League of Nations. It was officially dissolved in 1946. However, as maintained by historian George Scott, it is fallacious to blame the failure of the League of Nations on the organization itself, rather than on the commitment and willingness of its members to maintain the unity of purpose necessary to achieve its aims.<sup>46</sup>

**Lessons Learned.** The essential concepts of national self-determination, territorial integrity, and the right to freedom from invasion, transcended the short-lived history of the League of Nations and were reborn in the United Nations, which was formally established in 1946. Considering the legacy of World War I in terms of its impact on contemporary war termination issues, the League of Nations established a precedent which illustrated the potential of an international forum dedicated to conflict resolution and collective security.

Drew and Snow, in their book, *From Lexington to Desert Storm: War and Politics in the American Experience*, state: "The outcome of the settlement of World War I is generally considered the classic case of winning the war and losing the peace."<sup>47</sup> As they relate to war termination issues, the punitive aspects of the Treaty of Versailles and the lack of international support for the League of Nations lend support to this view. Current emphasis on conciliatory post-hostility settlements agreeable to (and preferably embraced by) all combatants, as well as steady gains in international support for the United Nations,

illustrate the additional effort many nations are now willing to make to avoid unnecessary reliance on military force as their conflict resolution tool of choice.

World War I is a case study which demonstrates the absence of war termination planning—policymakers and military planners gave no forethought to defining an end state or war termination objectives and conditions prior to military intervention. When the shooting stopped, Allied leaders opted for retribution from Germany rather than the more objective post-hostilities approach favored by President Wilson. By failing to achieve a mutually satisfactory settlement, the combatants, all too soon, found themselves again in the midst of an even greater global war.

### **World War II: Peace Through Partition**

*If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.*<sup>48</sup>

—Liddell Hart

**Pre-Hostilities.** In the simplest of terms, the Allied powers fought World War II to stop Nazi and Imperial Japanese expansionism. For many of the participants, the fight was one of survival which required the total commitment of resources. The fighting spanned every corner of the globe and resulted in a world partitioned by the Four Powers into two spheres of influence—East and West—which set the stage for the emergence of the Cold War. When examining World War II from a war termination perspective, most would conclude that the basis of World War II was evident in the settlement of World War I.



The Versailles Treaty set the stage for German nationalistic fervor to regain lost glory and reverse the humiliating results of defeat. As victors, the British and French on the other hand, desperately wanted to avoid confrontation of any kind due to enduring memories of the bloodbath of attrition warfare. As a result, throughout the 1930s, the British government appeased Nazi Germany at every turn. Stalin, who shared neither the values nor repugnance of the Allies with respect to the tremendous loss of life in WWI, tried without success on many occasions from 1936 to 1938 to rally the Allies into an anti-Hitler alliance.<sup>49</sup>

From the Allies' perspective, a heated arms race and bi-polar alliances were the primary causes of WWI. In contrast, post-WWI activities sought to play down the alliance factor. Since its inception, the League of Nations had existed in name only and was unable to rally any meaningful opposition to Hitler. The European Allies hoped to show, by their lack of participation in the arms build-up, that Hitler had nothing to fear from them; they were not a threat to him. Of course, these supposed "lessons learned" from WWI had the opposite effect and actually propelled history forward toward WWII.

**Hostilities.** Once WWII began, the British were determined to fight for the complete elimination of Hitler's regime. Upon America's formal entry into the war, the Allied powers agreed on the conditions for halting fighting: unconditional surrender on the part of all Axis powers. Although Stalin had earlier made at least two attempts to negotiate with Hitler, Roosevelt encouraged the adoption of unconditional surrender as the primary condition for peace.

**Post-Hostilities.** WWII termination involves two distinct, yet related results. First was the successful repatriation of the two major axis powers, Germany and Japan,

into peaceful alliance within the world community, and replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations as a framework organization for promoting and enforcing world peace. The second undesirable, and perhaps inevitable result, was the beginning of the "Cold War" with the Soviet Union.

According to Henry Kissinger, Churchill maintained the goal to restore the balance of power in Europe. He believed it was critical to rebuild Great Britain, France, and even Germany, which combined with America's substantial military strength, would help offset growing Soviet power in Europe. Roosevelt, on the other hand, saw a more optimistic world order, guarded by the "Four Policemen"—the US, Great Britain, China, and the USSR. "He rejected the idea that a total defeat of Germany might create a vacuum, which a victorious Soviet Union might then try to fill."<sup>50</sup> Roosevelt based his global security concept on the lessons he took from the failure, of the League of Nations which is attributed to lack of member nation resolve. For example, the League of Nations had failed to respond decisively when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931, when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, and when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland in 1936.<sup>51</sup>

From a European perspective, Churchill and Stalin had similar negotiating styles based on *Realpolitik*, almost a horsetrading approach to diplomacy. Roosevelt reviled this style of diplomacy which led to his reluctance to discuss terms until total victory was assured. According to Kissinger, Roosevelt preferred a distinct separation between the political and military instruments of power, with little or no overlap. The military was to complete its task, then make way for the diplomats to come up with the peace plan. The American interest in holding off post-war arrangements until victory was assured, may have led to the USSR's gaining much of its post-WWII strength in the form of territorial

occupation and "buffer zones." In fact, the USSR had been willing to negotiate territory with the Allies back in December 1941, when Stalin was desperate to gain relief against Hitler. However, once the tide began to turn against Germany, Stalin realized he had more to gain by keeping his mouth shut and letting his armies of occupation set the tone and the precedent. Kissinger said, "Nobody was more conscious than Stalin of the old adage that possession is nine-tenths of the law." Still desiring Stalin's help in 1944-45 to defeat Japan, the US did not make an issue of Soviet occupation of what would later comprise the Warsaw Pact countries.

Churchill met the goals of his agenda at Yalta in February 1945: to restore the balance of power by rebuilding France; to avoid partitioning Germany into four parts; and to reduce excessive Soviet reparation demands from Germany (all lessons learned from the settlement of WWI). Stalin's 1941 borders were recognized, expanding into Poland. In return Stalin signed a Joint Declaration on a Liberated Europe, which mandated free elections in Eastern European countries. However, negotiating with Stalin once he was in a position of strength did not work. Reflecting our ethnocentrism, we never realized that Stalin's own ideology prevented his understanding why we insisted on self-determination in countries where we held no strategic interest. Kissinger quotes Stalin: "... whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."<sup>52</sup> Stalin did not honor this document—his armies already occupied these countries; he was not about to relinquish the territory. Years later, when Truman led resistance to Soviet expansion, it was on the basis of Stalin's failure to live up to the Yalta agreement.

**Lessons Learned.** The US applied some lessons learned from the experience of the peace settlement of WWI. Follow-on occupation of West Germany and Japan accomplished the major feats of converting prior enemies into powerful allies. Under President Truman, the US finally realized what Churchill had espoused—the end of WWII had produced a great power vacuum, which the Soviet Union was ready and able to fill. America was forced by her position of strength to step in and provide a counterweight. For the first time, the US recognized the long-term advantages to be gained from helping to strengthen both Germany and Japan, adding two more democracies to the world order. The economic, humanitarian and political assistance the US provided an enduring peace with these nations. However, we overlooked the possibility that today's ally can become tomorrow's enemy. Having achieved the military objective of total victory and well on our way to forming a "better state of peace" with Germany and Japan, we nevertheless appeased Stalin in Eastern Europe, tacitly allowing the formation of the Warsaw Pact coalition of Soviet satellites.

We learned that appeasement and isolationism are completely ineffective with an enemy such as pre-WWII Germany, bent on world or regional domination. Indeed, these policies can encourage the enemy to consider us weak or lacking in resolve.

Reconciliation and early negotiations can be a step toward a more lasting peace. According to Kissinger, "As a general rule, countries striving for stability and equilibrium should do everything within their power to achieve their basic peace terms while still at war. . . . If this principle is neglected and the key issues are left unresolved until the peace conference, the most determined power ends up in possession of the prizes and can be

dislodged only by a major confrontation.”<sup>53</sup> As we learned in WWII, this idea applies not just to negotiations with the opposition, but also to agreements with partners.

Drew and Snow concur, stating that when compared with the Treaty of Versailles, the settlement of WWII was certainly successful; the vanquished powers did not rise again as enemies and there has been no World War III. However, they point out that the “inability of East and West to redraw the political map in a mutually satisfactory manner sowed the seeds for future conflict.”<sup>54</sup> At least as a partial result, we entered the “Cold War” and experienced the Berlin Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and other third-world conflicts.

An additional lesson we learned from the WWII and post-WWII experience is the danger of arbitrarily redesigning state borders, based only on how far an army proceeded before the whistle was blown. We see today the partial result of countries whose borders the USSR redrew without regard to nationality or culture. The iron fists of totalitarian countries such as Yugoslavia controlled disparate groups within these artificial borders for awhile. However, once the iron grip was relaxed, nationalistic concerns and years of suppressed rage quickly led to armed conflict.

### **Vietnam: Operational Success, Strategic Failure**

*If the decision to end a war were simply to spring from a rational calculation about gains and losses for the nation as a whole, it should be no harder to get out of a war than to get into one.*<sup>55</sup>

—Fred Iklé

**Pre-Hostilities.** Historically, the Vietnamese have fought invaders since 111 BC, and their children have fed on this strong tradition of resistance. The Vietnamese have

rarely known a state of peace. First, they resisted the Chinese; next, French colonialism; then Japanese occupation. In 1945 the French returned and ruled again, forcing the abdication of emperor Bao Dai, and refused to cede their independence.

Initially, the French recognized Ho Chi Minh's leadership. But, an inability to reach satisfactory political and economic agreements led to a war for independence by the Viet Minh against the French. Therefore, the French established a new capital in the south called Saigon and backed emperor Bao Dai. In the meantime, Ho Chi Minh's support and military supplies flowed in from China.

After eight years of fighting, the war-weary French agreed to negotiations in Geneva in 1954. This resulted in a cease-fire and a Vietnam divided at the 17th parallel. Ho's Viet Minh would exist north of this line and the Vietnamese supporters of France south of it. To avoid permanent partition, a political protocol was drawn. It called for elections in two years to determine the form of government for a reunited Vietnam.

During the first year, two states arose after the Geneva Accord was accomplished. The Communists in the North pursued socialism. The South Vietnamese became staunch anti-Communists for Ho Chi Minh's leadership had been ruthless throughout the French conflict. Ho exterminated 50,000 of his own people to achieve his quest for leadership. One out of every thirteen Vietnamese residents in the north moved south to escape this terror of assassination in just a sixty day period.<sup>56</sup> A small percentage of South Vietnamese also moved North, demonstrating that neither Vietnamese infrastructure was stable. This was the tenuous state of peace that existed before the United State's military entrance into armed conflict in Vietnam.

The United States' involvement in Vietnam actually started during France's conflict. In 1949, President Truman stated in his inaugural address, "all nations and all people are free to govern themselves as they see fit," and he committed our country to this objective.<sup>57</sup> He wanted Vietnam to be free of French colonialism. But, in reality, there was a larger concern than simply a pure interest in Vietnam's well being that caused him to financially support the French forces.

"Around the world, the Czech coup, Berlin blockade, testing of the Soviet atomic bomb, communist victory in China, and the communist attack on North Korea were all lumped together (*by western policy makers*) as a centrally controlled global conspiracy and threat."<sup>58</sup> "In 1952, the National Security Council formalized the Domino Theory . . . it argued that the loss of even a single Southeast Asian country would lead to relatively swift submission, to or an alignment with, communism."<sup>59</sup> Thus Truman established an annual military-assistance program to Indochina of over \$200 million dollars a year.<sup>60</sup> His envisioned end state was stability in the region and the world. Truman tried to achieve this stability by placing a financial finger in the leaking Vietnamese hole in the dike.

A new dispute surfaced in Vietnam. It involved violations of the Geneva Accord, which stated that Saigon and Hanoi were to hold elections for reunification in 1956. When Ngo Dinh Diem became South Vietnam's president, his first acts were to make his country a republic and to announce that his government would refuse to hold elections in violation of the accord. This was done due to concerns that Ho Chi Minh would win. This stance against Communism won United States backing.

**Hostilities.** Thus the Geneva Accord crumbled with armistice violations on both sides. In 1959, the North Vietnamese Communists launched guerrilla attacks against the

Diem government. They armed the South Vietnamese who had moved north right after the Geneva Convention, now called Viet Cong, to carry out these attacks. The United States failed to realize that these operations were the start of a civil war, not Communist instigated attacks as perceived by US leadership. In either case, the Vietnamese interests were so strong, that this was total war to them.

Prior to this, the United States had developed "Operations Plans for Vietnam" for the execution of US military options in the event of a Communist attempt to take control of South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese, in response, proclaimed their intention "to liberate South Vietnam from the ruling yoke of the United States imperialists and their henchmen."<sup>61</sup>

President Kennedy was the third President to support containment of Communism. In his inaugural address he stated, "we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the success and survival of liberty."<sup>62</sup> This statement was based on fear of a larger enemy rather than specific visions of a peaceful end state.

By 1962, a United States Military Assistance Command was formed in South Vietnam. And by the end of Kennedy's term he had sent 16,000 military advisors, as well as helicopters, to transport South Vietnamese troops and told the advisors they could return fire if fired upon. US Counterinsurgency commitments included civil affairs activities, the establishment of schools and public health systems, assistance to police, and other forms of civic action, (most lacking cultural sensitivity for the South Vietnamese). Covert military actions included intelligence gathering in North Vietnam and sending infiltration teams into Southeast Laos to sabotage the North Vietnamese infiltrating



south.<sup>63</sup> Each decision made to increase US involvement without clear objectives made it more difficult to get out of the situation. French President De Gaulle advised President Kennedy:

For you, intervention in this region will be an entanglement without end. From the moment that nations have awakened, no foreign authority, whatever it means, has any chance of imposing itself on them. You are going to see this. For, although you find officials who, by interest, agree to obey you, the people will consent and moreover not calling you. The ideology that you invoke will not change anything. Even more, the masses will confuse it with your will to exert power. This is why the more you commit yourself there against communism, the more the Communists will appear to be champions of national independence, the more they will receive help and, first of all, that which comes from desperation. We French have experienced this. You Americans wanted yesterday, to take our place in Indochina. You now want to assume our succession to rekindle a war that we ended. I predict to you that you will, step by step, become sucked into a bottomless military and political quagmire despite the losses and expenditure that you may squander.<sup>64</sup>

During President Kennedy's term, President Diem's US backed corrupt government became increasingly unpopular to various segments of his society. South Vietnamese generals put feelers out for a coup. When President Kennedy informed the United States Ambassador in Vietnam that he would no longer support Diem if he refused to remove his unpopular brother from power, the generals considered this a green light for the coup. Henry Kissinger wrote, "By encouraging Diem's overthrow, America cast its involvement in Vietnam in concrete."<sup>65</sup> The coup destroyed the government that had been built up for over a decade, leaving no stable leadership. President Kennedy was assassinated weeks later and Vice President Johnson was sworn in as the new US President.

In 1963, Secretary of Defense MacNamara reported to President Johnson that the security situation within South Vietnam was severe. A dramatic escalation of military

involvement was required or South Vietnam would collapse. Though he wanted to be known as the peace President, Johnson reluctantly accepted US involvement in Vietnam.

After North Vietnamese patrol boats fired on the USS Maddox in early August, 1964, Johnson requested passage of a Congressional resolution to protect our Armed Forces and assist nations covered by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) treaty. It came to be known as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. This resolution, gave the President power to commit forces. Thus, President Johnson made the decision to commit armed forces without declaring war and without overtly notifying the American public of his commitment of forces to Vietnam.

President Johnson's goal was to "deter and diminish the strength of the North Vietnamese aggressors and try to convince them to leave South Vietnam alone."<sup>66</sup> He established a three-point program to accomplish these goals: first, intensify the pacification program; second, carry out measured and limited air action below the 19th parallel jointly with South Vietnam; and finally, to detail the case against Hanoi's aggression to the UN Security Council.<sup>67</sup> The end state was to be "an independent South Vietnam that was securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships with all others, free from outside interference, tied to no alliance and not a military base for other countries."<sup>68</sup>

President Johnson was caught between increasingly divided views concerning the Vietnam War. He was caught between the hawkish military department and dovish state department. The public was just as divided. President Johnson's operandi strategy seemed to be to take the "middle course, neither to please all, nor to displease all, but to give some satisfaction to all."<sup>69</sup> By 1965, President Johnson's expectation of a short war had

been dashed; Defense Secretary Rusk wrote in a memo that, "the consequences of both escalation and withdrawal are so bad that we simply must find a way of making our present policy work."<sup>70</sup> The struggle will be long and there will be no short cuts. By 1967, a fatalism about the war had spread throughout the State Department. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Alain Enthoven, expressed this by noting that even an additional 200,000 US forces would fail to put North Vietnamese losses above their willingness/ability to accept.<sup>71</sup>

Despite all the lives lost, signs of progress in South Vietnam's infrastructure were evident. The South Vietnamese established a new leadership and constitution. Eventually, a clean national election was held. The United States held a conference at Guam to work through issues such as inflation control, black-marketing and corruption, land reform, food supplies, and long range economic development. In a sense, the US had been working conflict termination issues throughout. While these programs led towards a stable end state, the US hindered its war efforts by providing sanctuaries for the North Vietnamese.

The American military was also working with South Vietnamese to improve the effectiveness of their forces through training and by providing weapons and equipment. Just as prospects were looking better, the North Vietnamese swept south for an all-out attack on January 17, 1968, called the Tet Offensive. The North paid a high price for this nearly successful endeavor; they sustained heavier losses in one month than the United States had sustained in five years.<sup>72</sup> South Vietnam turned the enemy back; their government survived; and there was no popular uprising. The American and South

Vietnamese response to the Tet offensive was a military success. But, more importantly, the Tet offensive was a political success for the North.

North Vietnam gained a "psychological victory" over the United States. The American public had become war-weary and distrustful of its military leadership. Two months later Johnson announced his intention to not run for reelection. He attempted one new peace initiative before stepping down from office. He offered to halt bombing in the North in hopes that Hanoi would match the restraint, and begin formal negotiations. In response, the North Vietnamese agreed to meet at the ambassadorial level. However, their principle goal was to end the bombing of North Vietnam without curtailing their fighting in the South. In a calculated move, North Vietnam proposed unacceptable negotiation sites, hoping to give the American public the impression that the United States' leadership was not cooperating.

Negotiations finally started in Paris. During the talks, Hanoi sent thousands of men to attack South Vietnam. Any military response to this was seen as US escalation by critics. The negotiations were costing American lives and gaining nothing. We would never achieve peace unless the enemy was kept on the run and realized he could never win on the battle field.

President Nixon wrote in his autobiography that President Johnson never presented him with a plan for how we should end the war. So he created a five-point plan in his first months in office. His goal was to prevent North Vietnam from conquering South Vietnam. His plan included Vietnamization (building up South Vietnam's arms, etc.); pacification (protect and build up the South Vietnamese in the hamlets during North Vietnam's political vacuum following the Tet Offensive); diplomatic isolation (enlist the

help of the Soviet Union and China by establishing new diplomatic ties there); peace negotiations (bottom line was to get all POW's back and protect South Vietnam's right to determine their own future); and gradual withdrawal (tangible evidence that we are winding down the war).

President Nixon's plan was effective. By 1969, pacification successfully brought 90% of all hamlets under government control, with 50% having a higher degree of security prior to pacification. Over a million refugees were returned to their homes. More than 75% of South Vietnam's essential roads and waterways were safe for civilian travel. Life for most of South Vietnam returned to normal. The United States had won the political struggle for the allegiance of the South Vietnamese people. Four thousand Communist troops were also defecting each month.<sup>73</sup>

Pacification and Vietnamization strategies were successful. American policies had forced the North Vietnamese to change their warfighting strategy from guerrilla warfare to conventional war.<sup>74</sup> Our diplomacy with the Soviet Union and China unnerved the North Vietnamese. Our troops were winding down. The Linebacker II air offensive was the final straw that brought Hanoi to the negotiating table. Hanoi abandoned demands for a unilateral American withdrawal and agreed to a cease-fire in place.<sup>75</sup>

**Post-Hostilities and Resumption of Hostilities.** Hanoi bargained only when it was under severe pressure of bombing. Twice, President Nixon ordered heavy, sustained bombing in Hanoi to bring them back to the table. On October 8, 1972, Le Duc Tho agreed to Nixon's terms for the war's end. All American forces would leave in four months, while North Vietnam's troops could stay. In return, the United States secured the return of its Prisoners of War.

In 1973, North Vietnamese troops once again amassed on the border heading south. This time, however, US public support had dwindled and President Nixon was consumed in the Watergate political scandal. In June 1973, Congress denied further funding to support combat activities over Vietnam and withdrew its support for the negotiated economic-assistance program for Vietnam. In 1975, communist Vietnam secured their unilateral victory over South Vietnam through extermination and expulsion, attained their end state, and achieved their settlement. The United States' primary interest had been to prevent the fall of Indochina to communism. Now, this objective was lost.

**Lessons Learned.** From the beginning of hostilities, our government did not have the will to achieve unilateral victory by defeating North Vietnam or convincing North Vietnam their objectives were unattainable. American forces should not be sent to combat merely to demonstrate resolve and commitment.

The conflict objective should clearly state what the peace should look like—politically, socially, and militarily—after the conflict. We knew what we were fighting against, but failed to understand what we were fighting for. President Nixon said, “Policymakers based their decision on what was needed to prevent defeat rather than what it would take to achieve victory.”<sup>76</sup> There was no vision of the end state we were trying to build in South Vietnam, other than a vague picture of an independent country free of Communism.

The US also failed to know its enemy. Ethnocentricity prevented American leaders from recognizing the extraordinary motivation of the North Vietnamese leaders in pursuing their goals—this was total war the North Vietnamese. “They saw themselves as having the ‘mandate of heaven’; to give up their struggle would have been deemed

immoral.”<sup>77</sup> Their civil war was one of survival in their own land; a total war. Whereas the war, from the American perspective, was limited in objective and commitment.

“No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”<sup>78</sup> The long list of lessons learned from Vietnam highlights the cascading effect that ensues from failure to heed this Clausewitzian dictum. It is a classic case of the disastrous results of incongruencies between national aims and military means. To look beyond the battlefield to “a better state of peace” requires a strategic vision of the desired end state. Commanders must then be able to translate this into a set of attainable military objectives. As Clarke states, “One must be able to envision what is necessary to do to cause the opponent to change his political and resultant military objectives.”<sup>79</sup> If leaders more clearly understood the type of war, the opponent, the link between strategic and military objectives in the conflict, and the national treasure that will be expended in order to participate, they could make a more rational assessment of whether or not to get involved in the conflict in the first place.

Finally, we must ask the question if we can create peace where there is no history of peace or stability? US involvement in Vietnam teaches that the beginning state and end state are deeply intertwined. History reveals a nation that has resisted other nations’ involvement in their domain, and has known no peace in their presence. Now a very tenuous agreement determined its peace, and it was also divided within. We entered its affairs as another unwelcome outsider. We failed to recognize the futility of this situation when we started to pour our nation’s wealth into Vietnam’s peace.

## **Desert Storm: Easy War—Difficult Peace**

*Peace is a hell of a lot harder than war.*

—General Schwarzkopf<sup>80</sup>

Clausewitz tells us that the most important act in any war is the formulation of one's objectives. In Desert Storm, for perhaps the first time in American history, political and military leaders thoroughly coordinated and established clear, attainable strategic and military objectives before entering the war. They set limited objectives for a limited campaign and stuck to them with a fixed determination that would have made Clausewitz proud. So why do we have respected writers like Seabury and Codevilla, in their book, *"War Ends and Means,"* concluding that, "The Gulf War indeed was a desert storm: it blew around the sands but changed nothing."<sup>81</sup> Perhaps Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, written following the war, has the answer: "There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms."<sup>82</sup> In our haste to withdraw, the US may have undermined the negotiation and settlement phase of the war. By failing to resolve the issues leading to and arising from the war before leaving, the US may be destined to return.

The following case study illustrates that in the years following the Vietnam war, the United States incorporated war termination considerations into its collective war theory. This was a great step forward, particularly in the case of limited wars. However, several lessons learned point out the continuing need for institutionalized doctrine and planning guidance to improve the process. It further highlights the need to plan for war



termination throughout the entire spectrum, from the strategic all the way down to the tactical level. It demonstrates the critical nature of negotiations to achieve a final resolution and therefore, a lasting peace.

**Pre-Hostilities.** A look at the motives leading to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the American response provides further insight into the conflict. There was a long-standing dispute between Iraq and Kuwait regarding Kuwait's sovereignty and their common border. In addition, many consider that the eight-year stalemate struggle between Iran and Iraq, which ended in 1988, set up the chain of events which led to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Iraq emerged from that war with a considerably more developed military capability. Its regular army had quadrupled to a force of nearly one million men. Reintegrating them back into a shaky Iraqi economy was not an attractive proposition. Alternatively, the war had weakened Iran's military considerably. The fact that Iraq did not have to contend with a powerful Iran on its border probably made an invasion of Kuwait more plausible. Perhaps most importantly, the long war had devastated Iraq's economy and left them heavily indebted to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Estimates suggest that Iraq began the Iranian war with \$35 billion in reserve and ended \$80-100 billion in debt.<sup>83</sup> Iraq believed (despite the fact that they attacked Iran in 1980) that it had sacrificed its treasure to fight off the Iranian threat to the Arab Gulf States. For this reason, Iraq had asked Kuwait to cancel its debts. When Kuwait refused to comply, Iraq attempted to justify their invasion partly on economic terms. Iraq's foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, claimed shortly after the invasion that Iraq had to "resort to this method" because its economic situation had deteriorated and it had no alternative.<sup>84</sup> By invading

Kuwait, Iraq would erase its war debt, control Kuwait's oil wealth, and increase world oil prices.

The US not only failed to see the invasion coming, but may have actually encouraged the Iraqis in their boldness. American support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war made Iraq more self-assured and confident. Furthermore, two weeks before the invasion, April Glaspie, US Ambassador to Iraq, "assured Saddam that the US had no interest in oil negotiations among the Arabs or in boundary disputes."<sup>85</sup> By failing to see Iraq's overwhelming motives for the attack, the US failed to apply any diplomatic, economic, or military means to prevent it.

Contrary to Saddam's interpretation of Ambassador Glaspie's remarks, the US did react forcefully to his aggression. President Bush spelled out American intentions very clearly in his address to Congress on September 11, 1990:

Vital issues of principle are at stake. Saddam Hussein is literally trying to wipe a country off the face of the Earth. Vital economic interests are at risk as well. Iraq itself controls some 10 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait controls twice that. An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors—neighbors who control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless. And we won't.<sup>86</sup>

The United Nations passed numerous resolutions condemning Iraq. A coalition of diverse nations, sharing similar concerns, was formed to combat the invasion.

**Hostilities.** The political objectives of the United States mirrored those outlined in the United Nation's resolutions. They called for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and the release of all foreign nationals held hostage against their will. The coalition also believed that the

security and stability of the Persian Gulf region should be assured. CENTCOM developed an offensive plan to support this political strategy consisting of five objectives:

- Neutralize the Iraqi command capabilities
- Eject the Iraqis from Kuwait
- Destroy the Republican Guard
- Destroy Iraqi missile, nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities
- Assist in restoring the Kuwaiti government.<sup>87</sup>

According to Fishel: "In general, CENTCOM did well in developing its strategic objectives as end states. Interestingly, the principal national strategic objective of ejecting the Iraqis from Kuwait was the same as the theater strategic objective."<sup>88</sup> These clearly enunciated policies easily transformed into specific objectives, greatly enhancing congruence and facilitating war termination planning.

**Post-Hostilities.** Desert Storm was an interstate war, characterized by constraints (coalition warfare imposes its own limitations) and terminated short of complete victory. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 clearly defined the coalition's objectives and anything more would have exceeded the mandate in the UN Charter. The coalition existed for the purpose of restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty and nothing more. However, due to their overwhelming military success, broader objectives appeared easily attainable. Fortunately, unlike the previous US experience in Korea, a comprehensive strategic analysis as well as respect for cultural sensibilities kept objectives limited. Neither the US military nor America's political leaders wanted to occupy large chunks of Iraq indefinitely. None of the commanders wanted to follow the Iraqis into Basra or Baghdad and risk engaging in street fighting that would have cost many American soldiers and Iraqi civilians their lives. While many critics have argued that we stopped short of total victory,<sup>89</sup> General Schwarzkopf has stated publicly that had we gone further, it would

have been us and “maybe” Great Britain alone.<sup>90</sup> Because this philosophy goes against the traditional American experience of annihilation, it led to considerable controversy over termination in the Gulf War. For many, accomplishment of the limited objectives fell flat in comparison to total destruction of the enemy.

Yet another, even more dangerous aspect of limiting goals became apparent in Desert Storm. Politicians went beyond their strategic aims in their desire to drum up support for the conflict. When President Bush repeatedly compared Saddam to Hitler, he implied that his overthrow was a US goal, since Hitler would hardly have been permitted to remain Germany’s Fuhrrer after World War II. However, CENTCOM had already advised that a definition of the policy goal of regional stability required an Iraq that, while weakened, was not dismembered. Moreover, Bush’s exhortations to the Iraqis to rise up and overthrow Saddam did not support the desired end state. In fact, the administration wanted neither the Shiites or the Kurds to succeed, and therefore, failed to support them when they did revolt. The resulting relief operations may never have been required if the expectations of the two groups had not been raised by presidential rhetoric.

**Lessons Learned.** Several examples follow that illustrate the importance of applying war termination principles at the outset and at all levels in the planning process. It is important to note, however, that in many of the instances where thought was given to termination, it was not the result of any published doctrine or planning guidance. In many instances we were fortunate enough to have individuals in the right place at the right time who took it upon themselves to “make things work.” We may not always be so fortunate.

The example of Presidential rhetoric highlights an important aspect that planners in Desert Storm failed to take into account. Presidential public statements may become

policy whether well thought out or not. Campaign plans must be flexible enough to address the contingencies that may develop from such statements. The fact that President Bush was calling on the Iraqis to rise up against Saddam made the Shiite revolt and Kurdish rebellion predictable. As a result, the requirement for a major civil-military operation (CMO) became necessary. Earlier planning for this possibility may have lessened the subsequent humanitarian disaster and the ongoing relief effort it brought about.

While the objective of providing "stability in the region" implies a long-term commitment, this aspect was seemingly not anticipated nor planned for. It must be considered that forces will have to remain long after hostilities cease. Therefore, post-hostilities operations must be planned for.

When developing campaign plans, every aspect should be evaluated in terms of what effect it will have on the desired end state. In what was a significant step forward in conflict termination application, the plans developed by the Air Staff and by the CENTCOM planning staff for Operation Desert Storm generally looked as much toward the aftermath of the struggle as they did toward the current conflict. Unfortunately, a lack of thorough coordination and communication resulted in a lack of follow-through.

A "better state of peace" was considered when selecting targets for the air campaign; however, tactical flying units were not aware that operational planners in Riyadh were attempting to limit long-term damage. While air campaign planners coordinated attacks on targets to minimize long-term damage, fighter wings were often directed to attack targets without regard to long-term implications resulting in long-term destruction.<sup>91</sup>

Considering the stated objective of destroying the Republican Guard, the operational decision to give targeting priority to vehicles escaping Kuwait City, rather than the armor of the Republican Guard in the desert was questionable. The apparent slaughter along the "Highway of Death" reportedly had a profound effect all the way up the chain of command. This contributed to the decision to end the ground war several hours ahead of schedule, resulting in the escape of several Iraqi Republican Guard divisions through Basra.

Though civil affairs was much more effective in the Gulf than in previous conflicts, there are still lessons to be learned as well as procedures and doctrine to be developed. There was a lack of integration of civil affairs planning and operational planning from the earliest days of the conflict. For instance, though the ground war was planned to go through Southern Iraq, there was no occupation plan or provisions for civil affairs activities in the seized territory. There was considerable confusion between CENTCOM and ARCENT (who had been delegated Executive Agency for civil affairs) on the issue of US policy toward dislocated civilians. As Fishel states, "Although the issue was resolved satisfactorily in the end, it could have involved US and Allied forces in unintended human rights violations. The clear lesson is that commanders must be alert to their obligations toward civilian populations under international law."<sup>92</sup>

Planning for the restoration of Kuwait was done largely by the Kuwaiti Task Force (KTF), headed by Colonel Randall Elliott. The KTF was activated on December 1, 1990, in response to a request from the Emir of Kuwait requesting civil affairs support from the President of the United States. By chance, Colonel Elliott occupied two key positions in two key organizations, the US State Department and Civil Affairs Command, US Army

Reserve. By virtue of these positions, Col Elliott was able to develop a highly successful interagency group to coordinate civil-military operations (CMO) in Kuwait. However, it was not under the command or control of CENTCOM and had no access to CENTCOM plans. Therefore, the KTF was unaware of offensive plans until much later than necessary, hampering their restoration efforts significantly. The need for an organizational construct for CMO that views the entire task force as fully integrated under a clear chain of command to ensure unity of effort was evident in the Gulf. The KTF proved very successful, in large part due to the experience of key individuals and the considerable funding made available by the Kuwaiti government in exile. Because these circumstances are unlikely to be repeated in future conflicts, it is necessary to establish the framework that made their planning such a success.

Liddell Hart tells us that most satisfactory peace settlements have been those made by negotiation rather than decisive military issue.<sup>93</sup> Therefore, war termination aims should be directed at making negotiation both possible and likely. James Reed put it this way: "By manipulating the cost-versus-gain equation, a commander's operational decisions can influence an opponent's strategic decision making."<sup>94</sup> He goes on to point out that CENTCOM's sweeping envelopment was effective in that it "placed a significant allied force in position to threaten Baghdad, thus creating added incentive for Iraq to agree to an early cease-fire."<sup>95</sup>

United Nations Security Council Resolution 686, adopted on March 2, 1991, covered the initial terms for immediate political agreement. This resolution only required Iraq to rescind its attempt to annex Kuwait. It did not mention the boundary dispute or provide a detailed discussion of state responsibility or war reparations.

The following day, General Schwarzkopf met with Iraqi generals at Safwan to discuss the military conditions for a cease-fire. Much to Schwarzkopf's surprise, he had to accomplish the negotiations he had brought about. The CENTCOM staff quickly drafted a set of military conditions and faxed it to the CJCS. The General only received confirmation of the terms late the night before the talks. The draft had been approved with only one change: where CENTCOM had stated *negotiate*, the State Department had substituted *discuss*. "[The State Department's] position was that only the State Department was allowed to negotiate for the United States of America. The military was not."<sup>96</sup> This attitude only reinforced the commander's decision to attend the talks alone, without taking his political advisor with him. Schwarzkopf later admitted to being "suckered" by the Iraqis on the issue of flying armed helicopters.<sup>97</sup> Clearly the Iraqis took advantage of the political aspects of the negotiations, for which Schwarzkopf was not prepared. Political aspects of the agreement should have been addressed in CENTCOM's planning process. This will continue to be a critical issue for the military—though we may feel that it is out of our purview—experience shows that it can fall upon the military to perform negotiations.

It was not for another month that the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which served as the final settlement to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Iraqi National Assembly accepted the terms of the Resolution on April 6, 1991. However, the Iraqi foreign minister made it clear that they considered this resolution a threat to Iraq's sovereignty.<sup>98</sup> Thus, by dictating terms to Iraq, the UN lost the opportunity for meaningful negotiations that might have led to a better state of peace. Also, by this time coalition forces had withdrawn from Iraq, leaving only non-threatening UN observers to



oversee the terms of the "agreement." With no enforcement mechanism, the Iraqi's failure to comply with the terms of the agreement should have been expected. By leaving economic sanctions as the only threat to ensure compliance and not settling territorial issues, the UN was perpetuating the initial causes of the dispute. Hence the earlier comment: "The desert storm that blew around the sands yet changed nothing."

Detailed political negotiations to resolve the conflict in concert with a military threat would have better served our strategic aims. A longer-term commitment of military force not just through the completion of the hostilities, but the actual termination of the dispute may have been more effective. In the end, we committed forces for longer than if we had left them in place to work, in concert with negotiations in order to resolve the underlying issues of the conflict.

Historically, military leaders have focused on the campaign with little thought to its aftermath. Desert Storm clearly illustrates that post-hostilities planning must receive the same emphasis as operational planning to achieve the desired end state. Close coordination with other governmental and civilian agencies, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) and others is essential to restoring order and tranquility to a previously hostile environment. It further highlights the fact that limited wars pose a unique problem in war termination. Because these wars do not end with the total defeat of the enemy, determining the best time to negotiate to achieve the desired end state can be both difficult and challenging. Finally, understanding the circumstances under which termination efforts are initiated and carried out is an important aspect of peace negotiations. Commitment to the aftermath is critical to achieving the ends for which the war was fought.

## Haiti: A Step In The Right Direction

*When the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace.*<sup>99</sup>

—Liddell Hart

The US-led military mission in Haiti has been declared a success, and on January 11, 1995, the United Nations announced that Haiti was now a “secure and stable environment.” The US achieved its political and military intermediate objectives with support of the UN and the Organization of American States. Currently, the military mission is undergoing a transition to UN authority. Six thousand multinational troops (half of which will be US) and 900 police monitors will continue security and nation assistance operations as part of a long-term commitment to democracy in this fragile but determined Caribbean nation. Only time will tell if a lasting peace was achieved in Haiti. However, Haiti does provide the most recent example of how the Department of Defense consciously planned for conflict termination, developed a termination strategy, and how we implemented it to support our nation’s strategic objectives.

**Dispute.** Haiti’s problems are rooted in its history of colonialism, a succession of brutal tyrants, a marginal economy, and a struggle for survival against starvation, torture, and desperate poverty. Its problems were multi-dimensional; that is, economic, social, cultural, geopolitical, and environmental. The long-term solution to these problems also had to be multi-dimensional.

In the 18th Century, Haiti had been a thriving colony under France’s rule. However, its prosperity was founded on slavery. Haitian slaves, inspired by the French revolution, sought independence from France. However, the transition from colonialism

to independence was doomed from the start. Large plantations were broken up into tiny farms and distributed among the Haitian population; but the people had neither the expertise nor capital necessary to manage them. The new Haitian government was also burdened by a huge indemnity it had agreed to pay France as a price for independence. Socially and economically, Haiti was unable to compete with other nations in the Caribbean. Haitians suffered from wide-spread illiteracy and were isolated from their neighbors by language barriers. Unable to read and speak French, the primary language in the region, Haitians became the outcasts of the Caribbean. Worse yet was the emergence of an elite, French-speaking, mulatto ruling class which exploited the poor majority of Creole-speaking Haitian peasants.

A turning point in Haiti's history occurred in 1984 when starving Haitians began looting warehouses in search of food. In response, Baby Doc Duvalier, Haiti's military dictator, imposed martial law; but the violence increased. Subsequently, Duvalier departed Haiti with his fortune on February 7, 1986.

When General Namphy assumed power, he suspended the constitution, disbanded Parliament, restored freedom of expression, allowed political opponents to return from exile, and promised constitutional reform. The new constitution abolished the death penalty, reduced the power of the presidency, decentralized the government, banned the Duvalists from office, and recognized the Creole language. The Constitution allowed for the election that resulted in the emergence of Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide as Haiti's President in December 1990. Aristide was embraced by Haiti's impoverished majority. He introduced social welfare initiatives and agrarian reform policies that threatened to

reduce the political and economic power of the economic elite and of the Army, whose leadership were members of the ruling class.<sup>100</sup>

Haiti's French-speaking mulatto elite had always accommodated their dictators because they stood to gain the most. The upper class was not interested in political reforms and backed the military junta which overthrew Aristide in September 1991. After his departure, Haiti was ruled by the military junta led by Lt. General Raoul Cedras, Commander of the Haitian Army, Colonel Michel Francois, Haiti's Police Chief, and Brigadier General Philippe Biamby, Army Chief of Staff. President Aristide fled the country and eventually sought exile in the US. During the three years preceding OPERATION RESTORE DEMOCRACY, he pleaded for international support and assistance from the US in helping him to return to Haiti and assume his presidency.

**Pre-Hostilities.** In response to President Aristide's overthrow and his request for assistance, the US Government initially applied the instruments of economic, political and information power in order to achieve its strategic objectives:

- Remove the military junta
- Restore democracy
- Restore President Aristide to power
- Stop the Haitian refugee flow

The US implemented economic sanctions and encouraged the international community to pressure Haiti's military rulers to relinquish control of the government. The military junta was unaffected by the sanctions, perhaps in part due to an active black market and funds provided by the Andean Drug Lords, who ran a cocaine market, in exchange for safe haven in Haiti. Due to its extensive corruption and illegitimacy, the US government refused to negotiate or to hold direct talks with the military junta.

Efforts of the Organization of American States to resolve the crisis with the signing of the Governor's Accord initially held promise, but eventually failed when the military junta refused to honor its terms.

As tensions escalated with threats of a US-led invasion to forcefully remove the military junta from power, the NCA began to devise military and political strategies to resolve the crisis. The JCS was directed to initiate planning for possible employment of military forces.

On September 1, 1994, the Clinton Administration launched a deliberate propaganda campaign to persuade Haiti's dictators to leave and to convince the American public that the US should invade to force their departure should they refuse. With strong US support, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 940, calling for the restoration of Aristide as the legitimate President of Haiti. This application of the information instrument of power was an attempt to terminate the conflict and avert bloodshed.

During September, the Clinton administration made a series of public announcements referring to plans for an invasion to remove the Haitian military junta from power and its commitment to send troops to engineer a change of government, either peacefully or by force. The Pentagon made unprecedented public announcements concerning deployment of US forces. As part of this campaign, US Special Operation Forces (SOF) using military aircraft, dropped 3 million leaflets over Haiti with a picture of Aristide and hailing his return, SOF PSYOPS also supported increased radio broadcasts through Airborne Radio Democracy; US warships conducted maneuvers off the coast of

the island; and US bomber aircraft conducted flyovers—all in an attempt to prepare the Haitian populace and to pressure and panic Haiti's military rulers to step down.

On September 14, 1994, President Clinton warned of an impending invasion, but made a last minute offer to safely fly the military rulers and their families out of Haiti into one of several countries in South America or Europe offering safe haven. Later that evening, SOF PSYOPS airdropped transistor radios over Haiti in order for Haitians to listen to President Clinton's national address the following day. On September 15, President Clinton announced to the nation, Haitians, and the international community, that diplomatic efforts to end the crisis had been exhausted and he was ready to send US troops to force Haiti's military junta from power. He also explained his national strategic objectives and linked the deployment of forces to vital national interests.

Last ditch diplomatic negotiations by former President Jimmy Carter's defused the immediate crisis. After two days of meetings, an agreement was reached—but only after Cedras learned that C-130 aircraft carrying 82nd Airborne Division Paratroopers had been launched. Mr. Emile Jossaissant (the military installed President of Haiti) pressed his military commanders to step down to avoid a bloodbath. This negotiated settlement effectively averted combat operations and moved the situation directly into the post-hostilities phase.

President Clinton made it clear during his televised national address on September 15, 1994 that the US was prepared to send in forces as part of a UN multinational force to eject the military rulers whom he portrayed as armed thugs responsible for a reign of terror and atrocities. US troops would still be sent to Haiti, even if the military rulers agreed to step down. In this case, the NCA had decided that the

military instrument of power would still need to terminate the crisis and begin the transition to democracy necessary to achieve our strategic objectives in Haiti.

Phase I: Operation Restore Democracy. US forces, as part of a UN force, will enter Haiti—either opposed or unopposed to occupy the country and begin the restoration of democracy.

Phase II: Operation Uphold Democracy. United States turns operation over to the United Nations. “The UN operation is intended to keep peace, guide the reintroduction of democracy and oversee a legislative election. The United Nations has set a February 1996 deadline for completing phase two of the Haiti operation.”<sup>101</sup>

**Lessons Learned.** The US strategy for addressing the crisis, and planning for Operation Restore Democracy, clearly integrated objectives for conflict termination and deliberately planned for the aftermath of US military intervention. During the early planning process, policymakers and military planners focused on the fundamental causes of the problems in Haiti which led to the overthrow of President Aristide, and considered the historical, cultural, social, political, economic, environmental and military dynamics. Other international governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations were also involved in planning for the post-hostilities phase. Military planners developed parallel operations plans for combat assault operations for an opposed entry, as well as for the unopposed entry which occurred. Key aspects of the planning and execution of conflict termination in Haiti follow.

Dialogue between policymakers and military planners is critical in the early stages of the military planning process. Bruce C. Bade, highlights the significance of developing a dialogue between policymakers and military planners in the early stages of the planning

process “. . . aimed at reconciliation of political objectives and military strategies for war termination.”<sup>102</sup> James W. Reed, also refers to the importance of this dialogue in defining terminal military conditions that will achieve our strategic aims. This process “. . . requires careful dialogue between civilian (strategic) and military (operational) leadership which may, in turn, offer some greater assurance that the defined end state is both politically acceptable and militarily attainable.”<sup>103</sup> This dialogue played a significant part in the planning phase for Operation Restore Democracy.

Termination strategy and conditions should be multi-dimensional and consider the root causes of the conflict in order to achieve an enduring peace. As Mr. Ted Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Resources and Requirements points out:

The difficulties of ‘restoring’ democracy to a nation that has a highly polarized civil society and little experience with real elections daunts many officials. In Somalia, the US military ran headlong into a US strategy that substituted force for political sensitivity and creative diplomacy. One lesson of the Somalia experience is that the US needs an integrated political, military, and economic strategy. We have looked at [Haiti] over a substantial time horizon. Navigating the intricacies of Haitian politics will require much cultural sensitivity, especially considering that the US will be seizing control of a Black-led nation with a historical deep resentment of colonialism.<sup>104</sup>

In Haiti, the US is laying the groundwork for democracy to flourish by helping the host nation through civil-military operations. The conflict was not to terminate solely on the arrest or capture of the military junta, disarming the Haitian, or ending the violence among Haitians. Ultimately, it is still a Haitian problem and Haiti must play a role in securing a permanent peace. One particular area that the US considers a priority is restoration of civic law and order. According to General Wayne Downing, Chief of US Special Operations Command:



A crucial step toward re-establishing civic order in Haiti, and therefore toward withdrawing US troops from the country, will be the retraining of the Haitian police. The police are controlled by the Haitian military, which is blamed for many of the human rights abuses that have wracked the country in recent years. We've read about the 19 years the Marines spent in Haiti . . . that's why we are so interested in standing up a Haitian police force and sending them out into the countryside, so they can take over the law and order . . . and so we can have less, rather than more, US involvement. The training of the police force will not be handled by US troops, but rather by the US Department of Justice. But Army Special Forces teams will probably remain in the country to train specific units in the Haitian military.<sup>105</sup>

Although, combat operations were planned initially, military planners looked beyond the initial mission requirements to design a force package that included US Active and Reserve units and international forces that were specifically trained perform civil-military operations. Reserve forces activated by the President were mostly Civil Affairs, Military Police, Transportation, and PSYOPS. After initial entry of combat forces, Military Police units and international police monitors made it a priority to deal with the violence between the Haitian police and the Haitian society. Engineer units deployed to repair roads and bridges. In October 1994, “. . . command of the operation shifted from a US invasion task force to a task force designed to occupy and help rebuild the country.”<sup>106</sup>

The United States also trained infantry troops from Caribbean nations who assisted in the post-hostilities phase of the operation. This training was initiated prior to the entry of forces onto the island in anticipation of termination requirements for maintaining a secure and stable environment—crowd control, curfew enforcement, first aid, communications, roadblocks and weapons training.<sup>107</sup>

Civil-military operations are a key component in war termination. According to Admiral Paul D. Miller, Commander of US forces in Haiti:

Repairing schools, policing the streets and restoring water and electrical services may not be what most US troops joined the military to do, but it's the kind of work they will be performing more often in the foreseeable future. US troops helped reinstall Haiti's legitimate government, from President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the parliament to local mayors. Troops repaired water works and restored electrical service. And early in the operation, they repaired and reopened Haitian schools. Reopening the schools was a high priority because it was seen as a way to convince the Haitian people that things were returning to normal. Although the operation has turned out to be a demonstration of the military's expertise at civil affairs, early planning for it included a much more traditional military approach.<sup>108</sup>

The type of military equipment deployed with the troops also has an impact on a force's ability to end a conflict. In the case of an uncertain and "permissive" environment such as Haiti, even though the enemy force did not pose a significant threat, the type of equipment used during operations definitely influenced events during the transition period, by helping to decisively enforce the terms of the agreement with the military junta and deter violence against US and UN forces. The selection of military equipment and hardware should not only be part of warfighting planning, but also part of war termination planning.

Special Operations Forces played a key role in the pre-hostilities phase, but are playing a far greater role in achieving termination objectives during post-hostilities. Their unique skills are ideal for nation assistance and nation building operations. SOF can also facilitate the transition from US leadership to UN military authority. According to James W. Reed, war termination should be viewed "... not as the end of hostilities but as the transition to a new post-conflict phase characterized by both civil and military problems. This consideration implies an especially important role for various civil affairs functions."<sup>109</sup>

Special Operations Forces are concentrating their efforts in the countryside to perform critical civil affairs and security functions, which include establishing law and order, reinitiating legitimate civil functions—courts, police, representation, security of commercial and public activities, water, electricity, sanitation, medical, food, public information, town meetings, broadcasts, and monitoring the local Haitian Army and police units.<sup>110</sup>

Establishing Rules of Engagement (ROE) is a critical operational requirement that can significantly influence the outcome of military operations, particularly in permissive environments. During the course of an operation, the ROE may change as the situation evolves. It is often difficult for US military planners and commanders to anticipate the appropriate ROE for all environments in advance of a deployment, but it is imperative that this be accomplished in consonance with war termination planning and objectives. US military planners and commanders were aware of the violence being inflicted upon Haitians by the police; however, soldiers' ROE prevented them from intervening to stop Haitian police from beating peaceful civilians to death on 20 September.

The Commander of US Army troops, Lt. Gen. Shelton, revised the ROE within a day of the incident. Had the ROE not been changed, US troops would have more difficulty controlling the rampant acts of violence and lawlessness. According to General Shelton:

The new rules allow US troops to stop, detain and disarm Haitian security force members if they appear to threaten essential civic order. The rules also grant US troops broad police-style powers to detain and if necessary, kill people committing serious criminal acts. Non-lethal force is authorized to detain persons seen committing burglary or larceny. In addition, the rules authorize the use of necessary and proportional force to quell riots, stop civilian vehicles, and check their occupants' identities. Troops now

may fire to disable a vehicle if it does not stop as it approaches a checkpoint.<sup>111</sup>

Once the National Command Authority elects to become directly involved in a conflict or war, policymakers and military planners must jointly develop a strategy for terminating or resolving the conflict congruent with US national strategic objectives. This process begins with defining the end state, military strategy, and objectives. This planning must encompass a comprehensive assessment of the economic, military, political, social, environmental, and cultural dimensions of the problem nation. Additionally, the basic causes of the conflict and war must be examined.

At this point, warfighting and termination planning processes converge to design a force package trained and equipped to deter, avert or stop fighting, and deal with the post-hostilities aftermath. Also key to effective employment of military forces, is establishing ROEs linked to termination objectives and conditions. ROEs must be comprehensive, address the current situation and anticipate possible scenarios that may arise. Failure to achieve this synergistic integration of warfighting and conflict termination objectives can lead to a relapse of hostilities and expansion of the conflict.

## **Summary**

World Wars I and II, the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, and Operations in Haiti provide examples of the necessity to plan effectively for war termination in order to resolve the core issues and disputes which evolved into conflict. Failure to resolve the conflict; failure to accurately assess the social, cultural, political, military, economic, and environmental dimensions of the situation; as well as failure to plan for actions beyond the cessation of hostilities has continually led to further disputes and conflicts.

The punitive settlement imposed on Germany after the end of World War I did not resolve the dispute between the belligerents and only strengthened the animosity and hatred between them. Planners and policymakers had not planned beyond the cessation of the fighting and thus, did not secure a permanent peace. World War II was the result. Here again, no formal war termination planning took place. Fortunately, the victorious western Allied powers did recognize that a reconciliatory settlement and reconstruction policy would achieve a more secure peace, and limited Stalin's efforts to impose punitive measures against Germany. In their haste to end the war, Britain, the US, and France did not realize the full implication of their political partition of the post-war world, particularly in regards to Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Korea.

The Cold War emerged following the end of World War II and we saw the spread of communism as our greatest threat to democracy and freedom. When US policymakers opted to intervene in Southeast Asia to stop the spread of communism, they failed to adequately plan for the prosecution and termination of the Vietnam War. No clear end state was defined and military planners had no attainable strategic objectives upon which to focus their military objectives and efforts. US Policymakers and planners failed to recognize the total war aspects of the conflict. As a result of their ethnocentrism, they failed to understand the aims and objectives of North and South Vietnam.

Desert Storm represented a positive step in the evolution of the conflict termination process. US policymakers clearly defined end states, commanders established congruent military objectives, and strategists planned beyond the cessation of fighting. However, there was no doctrinal guidance to focus military post-hostilities planning resulting in ad hoc and frequently disjointed efforts.

In Haiti, we see that the emphasis placed on post-hostilities planning—establishing law and order, rebuilding the nation, and restoring its legitimate government—is helping to secure a “better state of peace.” Nothing more clearly demonstrates the importance of war termination considerations. Their inclusion into joint doctrine and planning guidance will ensure that in future conflicts, effective termination plans will “contribute to outcomes that serve the nation’s interests.”<sup>112</sup>

## Chapter 4: Planning and Execution of Termination Operations

### Introduction

Military operations are conducted for political aims and are only successful when those aims are achieved. Commanders must strive to plan and execute military operations so they may be terminated on terms most favorable to the nation, its allies, and coalition partners. The probability of successfully terminating military operations can be significantly improved by incorporating conflict termination considerations into the military planning and execution process. The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has increased emphasis on the need to address conflict termination issues. As a result, significant progress is underway. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which provides strategic guidance for military operational planning, is under revision. For the first time, the JSCP will contain guidance related to conflict termination issues. In addition, conflict termination doctrine has been incorporated into many Joint publications.

This research project provides a mechanism to further embed conflict termination considerations within the Joint operational planning system. To accomplish this objective, the authors have created a proposed annex to Joint Publication 5-03.1, JOPES Vol. I: *Planning Policies and Procedures* which provides more detailed guidance for conflict termination planning and execution. The annex (located at Appendix A) is intended to serve the needs of military planners responsible for the revision or development of annexes and appendices required by Joint Publication 5-03.2, JOPES Vol. II: *Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance*. Only by incorporating conflict termination considerations into all facets and all levels of the Joint operational planning system can

meaningful process improvements be achieved. This chapter contains recommended revisions to JOPES and an examination of the most significant considerations for the termination of military operations.

### **Joint Operational Planning and Execution**

The current version of Joint Publication 5-03.1 provides the principles and doctrine governing the joint activities of the Armed Forces of the United States. Although it gives comprehensive direction for planning military operations, it provides little guidance on how to effectively integrate termination considerations. Termination considerations are pertinent to all types of operational plans (OPLANS, CONPLANS, CONPLANS with TPFDD, Functional Plans, OPORDS, and Supporting Plans) and integral to all operational JOPES functions—threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, detailed planning, and implementation. The following discussion outlines these considerations and suggests how they might be further integrated into JOPES.

**Threat Identification and Assessment.** It is vital to ensure that the NCA provides a clear definition of the end state and specific termination criteria. The key steps necessary to shape an environment conducive to attainment of the desired end state cannot be made if this information is not available to military planners from the outset. The current JOPES planning format does not require inclusion of end state criteria. Intelligence assessments should evaluate termination considerations. As noted in chapter 3, the success of Operation Desert Storm dramatically underscored the value of clear communication of objectives from the NCA to military leaders.



**Strategy Determination.** Planning assumptions should be extended to include termination activities. The JSCP and CJCS Warning Orders should contain the desired end state and additional guidance related to termination operations. Additionally, most unified commanders with a geographic area of responsibility have a Political Advisor (POLAD) as a member of their personal staff. The CINC and his staff should benefit from his experience when developing the estimates. The POLAD's expertise is well-suited to working the many political, cultural and civil-military issues associated with termination activities. Additionally, the POLAD can provide a foundation from which military planners can expand the network of interagency communication and support essential to executing a successful conflict termination strategy.

**Course of Action Development.** The supported CINC's staff must look past any potential crisis or conflict and articulate a rationale for how a conflict should be terminated. In particular, each alternative COA should be analyzed in terms of its potential contribution toward the desired end state as well as its concept of how the military should engage and disengage from the situation within the conflict resolution framework. These findings should be included in the Planning Directive, as well as the Personnel, Intelligence, Logistics, Command/Control/Communications Systems, and Commander's Estimates. The JCS should also review and comment on the Commander's Estimate and the alternative COAs with reference to the desired end state. When the CJCS publishes an approved CONOPS, CJCS Alert Order, or CJCS Planning Order, the mission statements should include the end state and termination criteria.

**Detailed Planning.** The first step in the plan development phase is force planning. Here, it is critical that the correct mix of forces such as Civil Affairs, Engineers, Military

Police, PSYOPS, Medical and Chaplain units and Special Forces units is planned for to support civil-military operations. Often these support units are not afforded adequate priority when compared to combat units. However, they make a significant contribution to "winning the peace."

The next step is the detailed development of an Operation Plan and corresponding Supporting Plan, or an Operation Order. JOPES does refer to a limited number of termination support considerations in this area. However, additional emphasis is required to develop more realistic resource requirements for enemy prisoners of war, disarmament activities, treatment of civilian casualties, and infrastructure restoration in the post-hostilities phase.

**Implementation.** The CJCS Execute Order should also contain current termination criteria. Termination planning is an iterative process. Termination considerations must be continuously reexamined while operations are ongoing. The Joint Staff should monitor the situation for potential changes in either termination or end state criteria and communicate them up and down the chain of command as required.

### **Considerations for Termination of Military Operations**

Before a state enters war, it needs to understand how it will conduct combat and other operations in support of achieving the end state. How the military conducts itself, and how it supports termination operations during hostilities and post-hostilities may often determine if or how the root conflict is resolved. Planners need to consider termination factors related to address at least 9 critical areas of military operations: rules of

engagement (ROE), targeting criteria, security, intelligence, media, psychological operations, funding, force structure, and interagency coordination.

**Rules of Engagement and Targeting Criteria.** Establishing appropriate ROE in all phases of conflict and defining appropriate targeting criteria is essential. Striking inappropriate targets may draw negative media attention and additional political oversight. Military planning must also anticipate the effects that ill-conceived targeting criteria may have on the enemy. Such actions may become a source of new disputes or result in increased enemy resolve.

It is difficult for military planners and commanders to anticipate appropriate ROE during all phases reflected in the conflict resolution framework. During pre-hostilities, the ROE should encourage opportunities to de-escalate while minimizing the risk of further escalation. During hostilities and post-hostilities, ROE must be coordinated with coalition forces and distributed theater-wide. ROE must support the desired end state and avoid excess collateral damage and civilian casualties. Those who plan military operations must balance the necessities of the military situation against infrastructure degradation and civilian casualties.<sup>113</sup> For example, neutralizing a city's electrical power supply may appear militarily advantageous, but may also disrupt water and sewage treatment facilities, which could lead to cholera and dysentery epidemics.

**Security.** The transition from hostilities to post-hostilities is a volatile and uncertain process. It is essential to secure any occupied territories and minimize the reintroduction of hostilities. The military must be prepared to counter any threat, whether from enemy forces, insurgents, or criminal elements. To avert a resurgence of hostilities, the military should disarm enemy forces and demobilize friendly insurgent forces in the

occupied territories. The effectiveness of military operations will often be determined by the occupying force's ability to provide for their own security and ensure the safety of the civilian population.

**Intelligence.** The post-hostilities environment is volatile, with risks ranging from civil uprisings to the reintroduction of hostilities. Disenfranchised groups may seek to disrupt post-hostilities operations to further their objectives. Timely and accurate intelligence will aid the military and other agencies in mitigating these potential threats. In addition, intelligence operations should analyze humanitarian needs, the condition of the infrastructure, and other areas critical to aiding recovery from hostilities. Further, intelligence support can assist termination operations by assessing the effects politics, history, and culture may have on alternative courses of action. To do this, intelligence planners should integrate input from all available sources, including International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs).

**Media.** The media may have a significant influence on the eventual outcome of the conflict. A supportive portrayal of military operations can further the state's political aims by enhancing public support. Conversely, a negative spin may diminish the popular support necessary to sustain operations. The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) must develop a cooperative environment with the media which encourages respect for operational security, builds domestic and international support, and keeps the public informed of the military's progress toward the end state.

**Psychological Operations.** Effective psychological operations (PSYOPS) can also positively impact war and conflict termination efforts. PSYOPS influence the

emotions, motives and behavior of the enemy's leadership and civilian population.

PSYOPS can also be used to gain popular support for friendly military operations, isolate the enemy's leadership from its people, and reduce post-hostilities aggression.

**Funding.** As the role of the military in operations beyond traditional warfare continues to evolve, money will remain a central issue. Internally, military planners need to make realistic resource projections. Planners should also explore other sources of fiscal support such as coalition partners, IGOs, NGOs, and Multi-National Corporations (MNCs). Additionally, the military must be able to accurately identify and document expenditures in order to speed reimbursements agreed to by allied parties.

**Force Structure.** Military professionals must design force packages equipped to conduct both combat operations and termination activities. Considerations include: the use of dedicated forces to provide ordinance disposal and emergency infrastructure restoration. Also, an ample number of military forces will be necessary to provide security for the civilian population. In addition, Civil Affairs units should be allocated to communicate with the civilian population and the media. Medical units to provide emergency services for civilians, transportation units to move supplies and equipment, and logistical units to coordinate in-country support also demand attention while pursuing post-hostilities objectives.

**Interagency Coordination.** Successful conflict termination requires integration of all the instruments of power. By understanding U.S. policy, goals and considerations, military commanders can integrate external agency resources and strategies with their own. As the conflict enters the post-hostilities or settlement phase, its predominant role as the main contributor to the strategic objective transitions to an indirect role supporting

civilian authorities. The major challenge is to facilitate joint, combined, and interagency consensus building.

**Strategic Level.** At a minimum, the following organizations can execute actions required in this phase: US Agency for International Development (USAID), along with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), is the Special Coordinator (SC) for International Disaster Assistance. In this position, the SC chairs/co-chairs interagency working groups (IWGs) to recommend policy and actions to help coordinate assistance that IGOs, NGOs, and PVOs will provide to the region. In addition, USAID/OFDA will coordinate the supplies, services and transportation required for these organizations.<sup>114</sup> Cabinet level representation will include the CINC or his political advisor, the US Ambassador to the UN, and the US ambassador or chief of the mission representing the country team.<sup>115</sup> Other cabinet level involvement may include the Department of Agriculture, Transportation, Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget, and the US Information Agency depending on the nature of the operation.

Unfortunately, a key lesson learned from World War I (Chapter 3) continues to go unheeded in the critical area of interagency coordination at the strategic level. The robust infrastructure and wide-spread international participation in the United Nations could be used as a vehicle for speeding conflict resolution. However, US policy continues to favor isolationism over cooperation. In the current climate, additional interface with the UN may be the answer to developing international synergy that is clearly focused on conflict resolution at the strategic level.

**Operational Level/Tactical Level.** A number of new organizational concepts are evolving to help accommodate the termination concerns necessary to achieve

a better state of peace. For example, the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) provides a bridge between the military's robust Civil Affairs capabilities and additional assistance available from IGOs, NGOs, PVOs, and other actors.<sup>116</sup> The CMOC also orchestrates Civil Affairs theater-wide and direct humanitarian, security, and logistical support requirements that may often be critical to the success of the entire operation.

If a specific type of specialized support has been identified, CMOC efforts can be focused on specific mission requirements. For example, Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOCs), Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs), and Logistics Operations Centers (LOCs) have been utilized in recent operations such as Provide Comfort and Restore Democracy. Further development of these adaptations can only improve interagency cooperation at the theater and tactical levels.

For example, a HOC can focus all humanitarian efforts at a single point in theater. HOC leadership better matches military operations with host nation requirements. Additional resources and support from IGOs, NGOs, and PVOs, can be effectively brought to bear in prioritizing humanitarian affairs needs and developing a comprehensive relief strategy that better supports the desired end state.<sup>117</sup>

If safety becomes a concern, an SAO can quickly administer and manage security assistance operations. Again, close coordination with foreign civil and oversight military security personnel and other US security agencies (CIA, FBI) operating abroad, can greatly enhance security for all friendly forces engaged in an operation.<sup>118</sup>

Finally, an LOC can provide timely and flexible logistics support for an array of operations beyond traditional warfare. Its responsibilities may include identifying and managing equipment and supplies to remain in theater to support termination operations

after cessation of hostilities. The LOC can achieve this objective while interfacing with the military's logistics infrastructure for redeployment of non-essential troops, equipment, and supplies.

Additional flexibility can be achieved by establishing any or all of these organizations when military operations commence, rather than waiting until hostilities have ceased. For example during pre-hostilities or hostilities, it would be beneficial to have a cadre of CMOC personnel actively engaged in planning for expanded activities later on in the resolution of the conflict. When hostilities cease, the CMOC activities can rapidly expand to accomplish ordnance removal, infrastructure restoration, and humanitarian assistance on a scale commensurate with total theater requirements.

## **Summary**

Additional integration of conflict termination concerns into the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System is slowly beginning to gain momentum. We view the proposed Annex T to Joint Publication 5-03.1 (located at Appendix A) developed by our research team as an essential step in this process that will help military planners integrate termination objectives and understand the broader conflict resolution framework in which military activities occur.

By itself, the military instrument of power cannot achieve a nation's desired end state. Instead, military operations must be synchronized with the other instruments of power. When appropriate, employment of US military forces must be coordinated with domestic and international civilian and military organizations.



Interagency coordination is the linchpin of the conflict termination process. Military planners and commanders must strive to improve it. To enhance the likelihood of continued success, civilian and military leaders should advocate increased IGO participation to more aggressively pursue conflict resolution objectives in the international arena.

At the operational and tactical levels, training which includes adaptive concepts such as CMOC, HOC, SAO, and LOC operations in Joint training and exercises would be a progressive measure. Infusion of non-traditional actors such as IGOs, NGOs, PVOs, etc. into the current military infrastructure will build on our ability to respond to the wider range of scenarios currently calling for military involvement.

Additionally, a more robust and flexible civil affairs capability will be necessary to meet future needs. The value of these critical skills and capabilities must become more ingrained in our doctrine and operations. Currently, termination activities are rarely afforded a priority that parallels their usefulness, mainly because so much effort is expended on executing more traditional military operations which are largely focused on the hostilities phase identified in the conflict resolution framework. Based on our research, we view continued integration of conflict termination concepts as a preferred approach for increasing military effectiveness as it relates to achieving the desired strategic end state.

## **Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations**

The concept of conflict termination, as well as its relevance to our national strategy and all aspects of military operations, is evolving and maturing. Thus far, it has been incrementally defined, refined, and institutionalized, largely based on lessons learned in past conflicts. With each military operation undertaken by the United States, whether in response to total war such as World Wars I and II, limited wars such as Vietnam and the Gulf War, or operations other than war, such as Haiti, we are gaining a better appreciation for the need to identify, discuss, and achieve a greater integration of conflict termination concerns and more traditional military planning efforts. However, we still lack sufficient joint doctrine that clearly defines termination concepts and provides practical guidance for considering termination issues throughout DOD's deliberate and crisis action planning processes.

Additionally, we must focus on developing more "open" command, control, and communication architectures which can leverage the synergy afforded by IGO's, PVO's, noncombatants, and other actors who can help speed an effective transition from military to civilian control during post-hostilities. Given a national security strategy which demands military preparedness for scenarios ranging from humanitarian relief efforts to major regional contingencies, the need for greater integration of conflict termination doctrine, planning guidance, and operational expertise is more critical than ever.

In order to increase the likelihood of successful military operations in an environment characterized by a much wider range of options, the larger context in which military options are undertaken must be clearly understood. The conflict resolution

framework offered in chapter 2 of this paper can help military professionals better understand the dynamic relationships between the instruments of power and how they interrelate during the phases of the conflict termination process. It also illustrates the long term perspective needed to achieve conflict termination and underscores the need for close communication and cooperation between the nation's political and military leaders before, during, and after military operations are authorized.

This model was developed by this research team and used as part of the war termination curriculum at Air Command and Staff College during the 1994-1995 academic year. It was well received by both students and faculty. We hope our readers will also find it useful and they are encouraged to use it freely to further discussion and learning about conflict termination issues.

Many professional military writers who have focused on war termination issues have called for the Joint Publication System, and in particular the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to thoroughly integrate conflict termination principles. We concurred with that recommendation and, based on our research, developed a draft Annex T to Joint Publication 5-03.1, in order to provide a comprehensive source of termination planning and execution guidance. Our draft Annex T (see Appendix A) will be submitted through channels to the J-5 Directorate of the Joint Staff for their consideration. If adopted, it could soon be available in JOPES to assist military planners worldwide.

Concurrent with our studies, Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti provided an excellent opportunity to observe contemporary military operations other than war, and the extent to which termination considerations were integrated into both the planning and

execution processes. Based on our research, we recommend that the Joint Staff utilize the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) to capture both the positive and negative aspects of DOD's termination planning and execution experience in Haiti. Expansion of JULLS to include evaluation of termination-related planning and execution efforts should help improve their integration into future military operations and increase the likelihood of mission accomplishment.

Many positive signs indicate an increased appreciation of the integral relationship between effective military operations and achieving a better state of peace have been documented in this paper. However, none hold more potential than greater cooperation between the military and outside organizations.

At the strategic level, and especially when considering operations other than war, the Department of Defense must take a proactive role in seeking the assistance and expertise available throughout the Federal Government which can help minimize the amount of military resources necessary to stabilize a situation and return control to civil authorities as soon as practical. Additionally, encouraging greater dialogue and input from the top leadership from key organizations such as the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and others as required, can only help increase cooperation, reduce uncertainty, and increase the possibility of a successful outcome.

At the operational and tactical levels, theater commanders must continue to reach beyond the bounds of their organization and further embed termination considerations within their planning and operational strategies. Continuing use of the Civil-Military Operations Center concept to speed communications and cooperation with IOs, PVOs, and others will benefit the military by enhancing both mission accomplishment and

resource management. This arrangement is ideal for efficiently coordinating the return from military to civilian control, and it should be formally adopted as part of our joint doctrine and standard procedures.

Finally, as conflict resolution, termination planning and execution, and related “post-Cold War” terms and ideas continue to find greater understanding and acceptance within our doctrine and strategy, an electronic depository for practical research efforts in these areas would be beneficial. The Joint Publications Electronic Library (JPEL) on CD-ROM is an excellent medium which is readily accessible to all PME students. We plan to submit our research project for filing in JPEL and encourage others with similar interests to utilize the JPEL resource and help expand the body of knowledge in the conflict termination arena.

### **Bottom Line**

Factors far removed from the battlefield or theater of operation often determine the final outcome of the conflict. External factors, such as domestic and international factional rivalries, play a critical role. The military cannot control these external factors, but can analyze, plan for and react to them.

Adoption of the conflict resolution framework as a foundation for further study, analyzing historical conflicts from a termination perspective, and studying the extent of termination-related concepts already embedded in our military culture can help our leaders and planners meet tomorrow’s challenges.

Conflict termination is both a science and an art. Although the military instrument may be applied with the intent of ending hostilities or stabilizing a post-hostilities

environment, it must always be exercised within a larger context that recognizes the dynamic interrelationships among the political and economic instruments of power. Contemporary military professionals must realize that a conflict is not necessarily resolved once the shooting stops. Plans and preparation must be made to continue expending military resources in the post-hostilities phase.

Therefore, we must be able to develop and communicate realistic expectations of what the military instrument can accomplish, how long it may take, and how much it might cost. Once the NCA decides that use of the military instrument is appropriate, it is our task to engage, stabilize, and facilitate the involvement and return of civilian control as soon as practical. Understanding the role of the military within this broader conflict resolution, realistically assessing how we might impact these conflicts, and effectively contributing to their ultimate resolution is prerequisite to continued attainment of our national security objectives.

## Endnotes

### Chapter 1

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<sup>2</sup> AFM 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, March 1992.

<sup>3</sup> Fred Charles Iklé, *Every War Must End*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 42.

<sup>4</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 11.

<sup>5</sup> Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, 14 June 1993, 6-23.

<sup>6</sup> Berenice A. Carroll, "How Wars End; An Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses," *Journal Of Peace Research* 6, (1969): 296-297.

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### Chapter 2

<sup>8</sup> Richard E Barringer, *Patterns of Conflict*, (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1972), 17-31.

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- <sup>17</sup> Melvin Small, and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms, International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), 31-60.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 31-60.
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- <sup>20</sup> Paul R Pillar, "Ending Limited War: The Psychological Dynamics of the Termination Process," in *Psychological Dimensions of War*, ed. Betty Glad (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1990), 252.
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- <sup>23</sup> Barry B Hughes, *Continuity and Change in World Politics: The Clash of Perspectives*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1994), 307-308.
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- <sup>25</sup> Paul R Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 53, 245.
- <sup>26</sup> Seabury, 248.
- <sup>27</sup> Pillar, *Negotiating Peace*, 175.
- <sup>28</sup> Iklé, 40-41.
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- <sup>30</sup> Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1987), 319.
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- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 110-111.
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- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 523-530.
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<sup>37</sup> Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-73, *Argentina: A Country Study*, (Washington DC: GPO, 1989), 109.

<sup>38</sup> Wing Commander Michael Canavan, RAF, Air and Command Staff College, telephone interview with authors, 19 April 1995.

<sup>39</sup> Horne, 94-95, 520-521.

<sup>40</sup> Seabury, 272.

<sup>41</sup> Doctrine for Joint Operations, *Joint Publication 3-0*, 9 September 1993, V-2 - V-3.

### Chapter 3

<sup>42</sup> Hart, 338.

<sup>43</sup> Bruce C. Bade, "War Termination: Why Don't We Plan For It," (Unpublished Report, National War College, 1994), 28.

<sup>44</sup> Leonard Von Muralt, *From Versailles to Potsdam*, (Hinsdale, Illinois: Henry Regnery Co., 1948), 37.

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<sup>50</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 395.

<sup>51</sup> Seabury, 54.

<sup>52</sup> Kissinger, 417.

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<sup>54</sup> Snow and Drew, 179.

<sup>55</sup> Iklé, 16.

<sup>56</sup> Richard M. Nixon, *No More Vietnams*, (New York: Avon Books, 1985), 35.

<sup>57</sup> Kissinger, 622.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 624.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 625.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 628.

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- <sup>72</sup> Johnson, 383.
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<sup>108</sup> William Matthews, "Haiti Planner: Troops Ready to be Helpers," *Army Times*, 31 October, 1994.

<sup>109</sup> Reed, 50.

<sup>110</sup> LCDR Dave Courtney, "United States Special Operations Forces," lecture, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 16 December 1994.

<sup>111</sup> Sean D. Naylor, "Rules Change Gives Morale Shot in Arm," *Army Times*, 3 October 1994.

<sup>112</sup> Mario A. Garza, "Conflict Termination," in *Challenge and Response*, ed. Karl P. Magyar (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 426.

#### **Chapter 4**

<sup>113</sup> AFP 110-31, *International Law—The Law of Armed Conflict*, March 1993, 2.

<sup>114</sup> Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Final Draft, March 1994, 3-6.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-9.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 4-26.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 4-24,25.

<sup>118</sup> Draft Final Publication, Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, April 1993, II-13.

**Appendix A: Draft Annex T to Joint Publication 5-03.1**  
***Conflict Termination Planning And Execution Guidance***

1. Purpose. To provide formal guidance for conflict termination planning and execution: applicable to war, military operations other than war, and contingency operations.

2. Application. This annex applies to commanders at all levels and is to be used throughout the planning and execution phases of all military operations. This annex provides guidance for the revision or development of annexes and appendices required by Joint Publication 5-03.2. Incorporating termination considerations into all facets and levels of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System is essential to ensure congruency between political and military ends, ways, and means. Joint Publication 5-03.3 (ADP Support) will be used in the identification of requirements.

3. Scope. Termination considerations are pertinent to all types of operational plans (OPLANs, CONPLANs, CONPLANs with TPFDD, Functional Plans, OPORDs, and Supporting Plans), and are integral to all operational JOPES functions—threat assessment and identification, strategy development, course of action development, detailed planning, and implementation. This annex provides a general, though not exhaustive, checklist for planning and execution.

4. General. Military operations are conducted for political aims and are only successful when political aims are achieved. Commanders must plan and execute military operations so they may be terminated on terms most favorable to the US, its allies and coalition partners. It must be stressed that operational planning and execution is an iterative process, termination considerations must be continuously reexamined. Plans and operations must be flexible and responsive to changes in the contextual elements so that operational art elements may be coordinated with the other instruments of power to achieve maximum effectiveness.

a. The ultimate goal of all military operations is to compel and enable key decision makers to take actions which contribute to successfully terminating the conflict. Attacks against industry, infrastructure, or fielded forces are not conducted primarily because of the effect they might have on combat capability, although that may be an indispensable strategic, operational or tactical objective. Similarly, humanitarian operations are not primarily conducted to nurture the goodwill of the indigenous population, although that is usually an essential component of strategy. It is imperative to remember that all military actions are aimed against the mind of civilian leaders and military commanders.

(1) Although the opponent's leadership is the direct focus of military operations, the reactions of allied, third party, and domestic leadership must also be factored into strategy development. At both the national and international level, different factions are likely to present competing

interests. The impact of military actions on the leadership of all important factions must be evaluated, prioritized and integrated into the campaign plan.

(2) Key components of a nation's leadership may hold official governmental positions or they may reside outside of government. Unofficial decision makers—influential individuals, powerful interest groups, and the media—must not be overlooked.

b. Termination considerations form the foundation for the operational planning and execution process. These considerations should provide the framework for coordinating US, Allied and Coalition political, economic, military, and informational instruments of power by establishing objectives which reflect the desired end state. The end state and corresponding termination considerations are translated into strategic and operational objectives. These, in turn, are used to derive centers of gravity and courses of action.

c. Defining the end state—which may change as the operation progresses—and ensuring it supports the achievement of national objectives is the critical first step in the estimate and planning process. The desired end state should be clearly described by the NCA before US Armed Forces are committed to an action. If combat operations are required, planners should consider what may be necessary to end the armed conflict and the period of post-hostilities activities likely to follow. Commanders at all levels should have a common understanding of the end state before initiation of the operation.

d. Before forces are committed, commanders must know how the NCA intend to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure, and then determine how to achieve the strategic objective(s) at the operational level. Termination design is driven, in part, by the nature of the crisis itself. Underlying factors (i.e., historic, cultural, religious, economic, territorial), must influence the understanding of conditions necessary for termination.

e. Commanders must consider the conditions necessary to bring military operations to a favorable end. If the conditions have been properly set and met for terminating military operations, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent a renewed crisis. Moreover, the strategic aims for which the United States employed its Armed Forces should be secured.

f. The conflict resolution framework (Figure T-1) depicts the various components of the conflict resolution process: peace, dispute, pre-hostilities, hostilities, post-hostilities, settlement, and better state of peace. The goal of conflict resolution is to minimize hostilities and enhance long-term social, economic, political, and military stability.




Figure T-1. Conflict Resolution Framework

(1) Conflict resolution is not a linear process. Conflicts may be resolved in the dispute phase, never evolving into pre-hostilities or hostilities. Similarly, hostilities may not resolve the source of conflict. Instead, the outcome of post-hostilities may be a return to the dispute, pre-hostilities or hostilities phase of conflict.

(2) Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), such as Humanitarian Assistance, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations provide a valuable contribution to avoiding or minimizing hostilities and facilitate the transition from the dispute or pre-hostilities phase directly to the post-hostilities or settlement phase of conflict.

(3) MOOTW contribute to the transition from hostilities to post-hostilities. MOOTW are an essential component of the post-hostilities and settlement phases, as well, facilitating the transition to a "better state of peace."

(4) Military actions which do not actively support negotiations, or result in new or unresolved disputes may lead to continued or future conflict rather than contributing to long-term stability.

g. Special Operations (SO) play an important role in conflict termination. Within SO, Civil Affairs (CA) provide services vital to the successful execution and termination of military operations. Failure to use SO/CA assets may result in inadequate responses to the root causes of instability and the resulting initiation or prolongation of conflict. The manner in which civilians are treated and in which relationships between US forces and the different political, cultural, and religious groups are sustained can tip the scale toward civilian cooperation or active or covert opposition.

(1) SO/CA are conducted to support virtually all military operations. SO/CA activities help reduce hostility and violence by supporting political mobilization and developmental programs and by building positive relations between the host government, military, and civilian populace.

(2) SO/CA establish and maintain relations between military forces, civil authorities and the population in friendly, neutral, occupied, or recovered areas where military forces are stationed or employed. SO/CA operations obtain civil or indigenous support for military operations and reduce or minimize civilian interference with military operations.

(3) SO/CA provide the resources necessary to meet essential civil requirements, avoid property damage, and minimize loss of life and suffering. SO/CA reinforce the political and socio-economic viability or efficiency of public institutions and services of host forces and maintain or reestablish civil administration.

(4) SO/CA exploit hostile political, economic, and sociological vulnerabilities. SO/CA provide area assessments and other political, economic, and cultural estimates and background data required for mission planning and execution. Finally, SO/CA assist the supported US commander in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local population.

(5) SO/CA operations involve all instruments of national power and include those actions that ensure political objectives are achieved and sustained. The post-hostilities effort focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure and the conditions that precipitated the crisis do not recur. Commanders should identify post-hostilities requirements as early as possible in the planning and execution process.

h. Institutional, political, and cultural barriers greatly complicate and often impede effective coordination within and between military, civilian, domestic, international, governmental, and non-governmental organizations. To make the best use of available resources, effective interagency cooperation is a necessity. Several US organizations contribute significantly to improved civil-military coordination: the Agency for International Development (USAID), the Office of the Assistant



Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), and the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) or Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC).

(1) USAID is the US government focal point for interagency deliberations on international disaster assistance for natural and man-made disasters. When the NCA determines it necessary, USAID will be directed to convene an Interagency Working Group (IWG) of the National Security Council. The IWG merges information received from all appropriate cabinet level representatives, to include the US ambassador or chief of the mission. The Department of State facilitates the involvement of United Nations, non-governmental, private voluntary and other international organizations.

(2) ASD (SO/LIC) is the DOD focal point for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. SO/LIC missions include: Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Counterterrorism, Antiterrorism, and other designated activities across the spectrum of conflict. In addition, ASD (SO/LIC) directs transportation of excess non-lethal property and privately donated relief supplies in coordination with the Department of State. ASD (SO/LIC) also oversees the management of the Humanitarian Assistance Program and Foreign Disaster Relief.

(3) The CINC may establish a CMOC or HACC to assist with interagency planning and coordination. Staffing for the CMOC/HACC should include participants from the following organizations (as applicable): USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, Host nation, Country team, Unified Command, United Nations agencies, Multinational forces, Joint Task Force, US Government Agencies, and other international organizations.

i. References pertinent to this annex are:

- (1) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
- (2) Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)
- (3) National Security Strategy
- (4) National Military Strategy
- (5) Joint Doctrine Capstone And Keystone Primer

- (6) User's Guide For Joint Operation Planning
- (7) Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
- (8) Joint Publication 4-05 Mobilization
- (9) Joint Publication 3-00.1 Joint Doctrine For Contingency Operations
- (10) Joint Publication 3-05 Doctrine For Joint Special Operations
- (11) Joint Publication 3-07 Military Operations Other Than War
- (12) Joint Publication 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures For Peacekeeping Operations
- (13) Joint Test Publication 3-57 Joint Doctrine For Civil Affairs
- (14) Joint Publication 5-0 Doctrine For Planning Joint Operations
- (15) Joint Publication 5-00.1 Doctrine For Joint Campaign Planning
- (16) Joint Publication 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance And Procedures
- (17) Joint Publication 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning And Execution System, Vol. I: Planning Policies And Procedures
- (18) Joint Publication 5-03.2 Joint Operation Planning And Execution System Vol. II: Planning And Execution Formats And Guidance
- (19) Joint Publication 5-03.3 Joint Operation Planning And Execution System Vol. III: ADP Support

5. Considerations for Termination of Military Operations. The following considerations must be addressed during all phases of planning and execution (as applicable). The following list is not all inclusive, considerations are not listed in order of priority.

a. General.

- (1) Is the scope and nature of military force carefully matched to US national security strategy? Is there a clear, concise statement of termination objectives? Is the end state clearly defined?
- (2) Are US and allied objectives and desired end states in agreement?

- (3) Have criteria been established to determine when national objectives have been achieved?
- (4) Are all of the instruments of national power synchronized to achieve maximum effect (economic, military, political, information)?
- (5) Will there be support (moral and financial) from the American people and Congress until the end state is achieved. How can support be enhanced?
- (6) Is the end state achievable through military means? Is there a reason to believe that military operations will bring lasting improvement?
- (7) What are US strategies for conflict termination? Is early termination more desirable than continued military operations? Have alternative termination strategies been considered (negotiations, decisive unilateral action, escalation, and deterrence)?
- (8) Do plans and operations enhance future stability or sow the seeds for future conflict? Do plans and operations facilitate reconciliation or compromise?
- (9) Does the operation meet acceptable cost and feasibility criteria?
- (10) Have timelines and milestones been established and are they reviewed continuously to address the range of success or failure?
- (11) Have the consequences of military operations been analyzed and actions taken to avoid, control, assume, or transfer unnecessary risks and costs?
- (12) Are there any service specific training/equipment requirements impacting conflict termination operations?
- (13) What type of conflict termination is most likely; which is most desirable (negotiations by belligerents, negotiations through or by a third party, negotiations before or after a cease-fire, capitulation, withdrawal, expulsion, extermination, absorption into a larger conflict)?
- (14) What type of agreement is most likely; which is most desirable (treaty, armistice, truce, cease-fire, United Nations resolution)?

b. Diplomatic.

- (1) Is the US acting unilaterally or in coalition? Are other regional or multilateral actors better positioned to act than the US? To what extent should the US seek help from allies and relevant multinational institutions? Is there a proportional commitment by foreign nations?
- (2) What pre-existing agreements, laws, treaties, or policies will influence the successful termination of the conflict? What additional formal agreements are necessary?
- (3) What international support or opposition exists towards US objectives and military actions? Is the US effectively countering opponent's strategies?
- (4) What issues impact national boundaries (cultural, territorial, ethnic, racial, religious)?
- (5) What guidance has been given to the military to convey US intent to the media, indigenous population, and NGOs?
- (6) Who will be the senior American official in the country or theater and what are his responsibilities?
- (7) Has a draft "agreement" been written and communicated early in the planning process which identifies requirements for settlement? Is that draft continuously reviewed throughout the planning and execution phases?
- (8) How will negotiations be conducted, both during and after operations, to enhance achievement of strategic objectives (location, security, spokesperson, attendance, participation, media, etc.)? Are State Department personnel available and prepared to respond quickly for negotiations?
- (9) What type and amount of support can be expected from coalitions, alliances, host-nation, IGOs, NGOs, PVOs, and MNCs?
- (10) What is the relationship between the JFC and the Ambassador or Country Team? Who's in charge (military or civilian, US or foreign)? When and how will the transfer of authority occur?
- (11) What are the foreign and domestic command relationships?

c. Logistics.

- (1) Have logistics capabilities, facilities and resources in the area of operations been evaluated to maximize their potential benefit to Civil Affairs operations?
- (2) What material should be pre-positioned for Civil Affairs operations? If unavailable from pre-positioned stocks, has Civil Affairs equipment been integrated into the TPFDD or integrated into airlift requirements during contingency operations?
- (3) What are the requirements for replenishment of WRS and pre-positioned supplies?
- (4) What are re-deployment considerations (personnel, supplies, equipment)?
- (5) What are the transportation requirements for Civil Affairs personnel, equipment, and supplies? What are lift (air/sea) capabilities and limitations?
- (6) Has logistical support and security for domestic and international governmental and non-governmental organizations been identified and coordinated?

d. Interagency Coordination.

- (1) What interagency coordination will be required?
- (2) What is the communication architecture between the military, NCA, allies, and international organizations?
- (3) Will a CMOC or HACC be established?
- (4) How and when will CMOC be disbanded? How will the transition from CMOC to the UN or other authority occur?
- (5) Have requests from non-DOD personnel for transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies been coordinated?

e. Personnel.

- (1) Do we have the appropriate size and mix of forces for the termination phase?
- (2) When and how will CA and other reserves be mobilized?

f. Intelligence.

- (1) Are CA area studies current and adequate? Have intelligence inputs from NGOs, PVOs, and IGOs been solicited/integrated ?
- (2) How will historic and cultural contextual elements impact the successful conduct and termination of military operations?
- (3) To what extent are US, Allied, and Coalition interests at stake (security, economic, political)?
- (4) What are intelligence and reconnaissance requirements for space-based assets for conflict termination? Have they been coordinated/scheduled?

g. Humanitarian.

- (1) What essential emergency humanitarian services are required: water, food, shelter, sanitation, pest control, disease prevention, medical treatment, power, communication, transportation, security, public safety, and financial? When will services be required? Are facilities and assets adequate?
- (2) Is aid culturally acceptable?
- (3) What are refugee, noncombatant, and dislocated population issues (control and evacuation procedures)?

h. Civil Affairs.

- (1) What Civil Affairs functions are required (contracting, legal, labor, public administration, education, commerce)?
- (2) What are estimated reparation/reconstruction costs?
- (3) How can the indigenous population be used to support operations?
- (4) How will the transition from military to civilian administration occur?

i. Chaplain Services.

- (1) Do plans reflect specific requirements for religious support to combat forces, medical services, mortuary affairs, noncombatant evacuation operations, enemy prisoner of war ministry, inter-service chaplain support and war time host-nation religious support?
- (2) How will indigenous religious customs and practices influence plans and operations? Has coordination taken place with the host nation religious leaders?
- (3) Are the diversity of faith group requirements being covered?

j. Operations.

- (1) Have PSYOP, PAO, and CMO been coordinated to support termination objectives? Do PSYOP activities enhance successful termination?
- (2) What are the negative consequences of friendly/enemy propaganda and deception on termination operations, negotiations/settlement, and ability to de-escalate?
- (3) What specific guidance is required concerning captured enemy equipment?
- (4) What are the requirements for sensitive equipment to be evacuated or destroyed?
- (5) Are forces appropriately sized and equipped to achieve objectives? Are they continually reassessed and adjusted?
- (6) How can SOF contribute to successful termination of operations?
- (7) Are the ROEs clearly defined and do they match the situation?
- (8) Is each target considered in light of how it impacts termination (economic, political, legal, moral, psycho-social)?
- (9) Has CA been kept abreast of the battle damage assessment?
- (10) What special requirements for enhancing internal security exist within the nation or theater (disarming the indigenous population, training local police forces, establishment of a local judicial system)?

k. Planning.

- (1) Has the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) been used for assessing termination planning and execution?
- (2) Have constraints, limitations, or shortfalls that would adversely affect successful termination been identified and resolved?
- (3) What are the impacts of other military commitments by all applicable actors?
- (4) Has force structure planning provided for post-hostilities operations?
- (5) Have appropriate units been apportioned/allocated to address termination considerations?

l. Training.

- (1) Do joint exercises and training incorporate termination issues. Are other actors involved (DOS, IGOs, NGOs, PVOs, OGAs)?

m. Environmental.

- (1) What are the environmental issues (unexploded ordinance, water supplies, agricultural, forestry, pest control, fisheries, and veterinarian)?

n. Media.

- (1) Is PAO building domestic and international support for US involvement?
- (2) Is PAO keeping the public up to date with changes in objectives and progress towards an end state?
- (3) Is PAO maintaining credibility?

o. Prisoners of War, Missing/Killed in Action, and Hostages.

- (1) How will issues related to POWs, MIAs, KIAs, and hostages be handled (transportation, negotiations, repatriation of enemy)?
- (2) What role will the ICRC play?



p. Funding.

- (1) What types and kinds of funds are required/available for termination activities (O&M, Congressional appropriation, United Nations, Coalition, Host Nation)?
- (2) What should be done with any residual funds?
- (3) Are funding issues adequately addressed in plans?

## Appendix B: War Termination Data

Table 6 has the war termination data for the last 75 years used in chapter 2. Most of the data comes from Pillar's book, *Negotiating Peace*. The research group collected the war termination data for the last 15 years. The wars were selected based on Small and Singer's definition of war requiring a minimum of 1,000 combatant battle deaths per year. As Pillar pointed out, there were several multilateral wars such as World War II that are treated as single wars.

In extending the list of wars up to 1994, we found the same problems Pillar, Small and Singer found in compiling their lists—most states do not publish their battle deaths. In wars that we could not find documentation on battle deaths, and there was uncertainty whether the criterion was met, the decision to include the wars was based on the criteria that the war involved at least 50,000 combatants and that at least one of the belligerents conducted and sustained conventional operations to destroy a sizable enemy force or to take and retain territory, and the other belligerent successfully defended itself or was destroyed.

The research team used multiple sources to collect the data on each potential war. The principle sources were: the Army Area Handbooks (Department of the Army Pamphlets 550- series) produced by the Library of Congress Research Staff; *Prolonged Wars* edited by Karl Magyar and Constantine Danopoulos; *Facts on File*; *The Economist*, the *New York Times* and other periodicals; and interviews with international officers at ACSC. In total, the research team investigated 32 wars terminating in the period of 1980 to 1994, and 10 wars that did not terminate by 1994.

**Table 6. Wars Terminated from 1920 to 1994**

#	War	Duration	Type of War / Termination	Notes
1.	Russo-Polish	(1919-1920)	Interstate - Negotiated after	(a,s)
2.	Russian Revolution	(1917-1920)	Civil - Extermination	(p,s)
3.	Russian Nationalities	(1917-1922)	Extra-systemic - Extermination	
4.	Greco-Turkish	(1919-1922)	Interstate - Negotiated After	
5.	Riffian	(1921-1926)	Extra-systemic - Capitulation	
6.	Druze	(1925-1926)	Extra-systemic - Extermination	
7.	Sino-Soviet	(1929)	Interstate - Negotiated before	
8.	Manchurian	(1931-1933)	Interstate - Capitulation	
9.	Chaco	(1932-1935)	Interstate - Negotiated after	(i,p)
10.	Italo-Ethiopian	(1935-1936)	Interstate - Extermination	(u)
11.	Changkufeng	(1938)	Interstate - Negotiated before	
12.	Spain	(1936-1939)	Civil - Extermination	
13.	Nomohan	(1939)	Interstate - Negotiated before	(s)
14.	Franco-Thai	(1940-1941)	Interstate - Negotiated after	
15.	Sino-Japanese	(1937-1941)	Interstate - absorbed into WWII	(c)
16.	Russo-Finnish	(1939-1940)	Interstate - Negotiated before	(s)
17.	World War II	(1939-1945)	Interstate - Capitulation	(u,p)
18.	Indonesian	(1945-1946)	Extra-syst. - Negotiated after	(p)
19.	Paraguay	(1947)	Civil - Extermination	
20.	Hyderabad	(1948)	Extra-systemic - Capitulation	(p, s)
21.	Madagascan	(1947-1948)	Extra-systemic - Extermination	
22.	China	(1927-1949)	Civil - Exterm.(Expelled)	(p)
23.	1st Kashmir	(1947-1949)	Extra-syst. - Negotiated before	
24.	Palestine	(1948-1949)	Interstate - Negot. by 3rd Party	
25.	Bolivia	(1946-1952)	Civil - Capitulation	(p)
26.	Korean	(1950-1953)	Interstate - Negotiated before	
27.	Indochina	(1945-1954)	Extra-syst. - Negotiated before	
28.	Russo-Hungarian	(1956)	Interstate - Extermination	
29.	Sinai	(1956)	Interstate - Negot. by 3rd Party	
30.	Tibetan	(1956-1959)	Extra-systemic - Extermination	
31.	Algerian	(1954-1962)	Extra-syst. - Negotiated before	
32.	1st Laos	(1959-1962)	Civil - Negotiated after	
33.	Sino-Indian	(1962)	Interstate - Withdrawal	
34.	Colombia	(1948-1964)	Civil - Withdrawal	
35.	Cyprus	(1963-1964)	Civil - Negot. by Third Party	
36.	2nd Kashmir	(1965)	Interstate - Negot. by 3rd Party	(i,p)
37.	Six Days	(1967)	Interstate - Negot. by 3rd Party	(u)
38.	Football	(1969)	Interstate - Negot. by 3rd Party	
39.	1st Yemen	(1962-1970)	Civil- Negotiated before	
40.	Nigeria	(1967-1970)	Civil - Capitulation	

- Notes: (a) Modified or added to Pillar's list  
(c) Some experts consider this a capitulation  
(i) Indirect negotiations before armistice  
(p) Pillar includes explanatory notes  
(s) Small and Singer include explanatory notes  
(u) Attempts to negotiate before armistice failed

**Table 6 (continued). Wars Terminated from 1920 to 1994**

#	War	Duration	Type of War / Termination	Notes
41.	Israeli-Egyptian	(1969-1970)	Interstate - Negot. by 3rd Party	(p,s)
42.	Jordan	(1970)	Civil - Negotiated before	
43.	Sri Lanka	(1971)	Civil - Expulsion	
44.	Bangladesh	(1971)	Interstate - Capitulation	(p)
45.	2nd Laos	(1963-1973)	Civil - Negotiated before	
46.	Yom Kippur	(1973)	Interstate - Negot. by 3rd Party	(p)
47.	Angola	(1962-1974)	Extra-syst. - Negotiated after	
48.	Mozambique	(1964-1974)	Extra-syst. - Negotiated before	
49.	Turco-Cypriot	(1974)	Interstate - Negot. by 3rd Party	
50.	Cambodia	(1967-1975)	Civil - Capitulation	
51.	Vietnam	(1957-1975)	Civil - Capitulation	(p)
52.	Lebanon	(1975-1976)	Civil - Negotiated before	
53.	Sino-Vietnamese	(1979)	Interstate - Withdrawal	
54.	Ugandan-Tanzanian	(1978-1979)	Interstate - Extermination	
55.	Nicaragua	(1978-1979)	Civil - Capitulation	(i,u)
56.	Zimbabwe	(1972-1979)	Civil - Negotiated before	
57.	Southern Lebanon	(1982)	Extra-syst.-Exterm. (expelled)	(1)
58.	South Atlantic	(1982)	Interstate - Exterm. (expelled)	
59.	Sahara	(1975-1986)	Extra-syst. - Exterm.(expelled)	(2)
60.	Iran-Iraq	(1980-1988)	Interstate - Negot. by 3rd Party	
61.	Viet-Cambodian	(1978-1989)	Interstate - Withdrawal	(3)
62.	Second Lebanon	(1982-1990)	Civil - Negotiated before	
63.	Gulf	(1990-1991)	Interstate - Capitulation	
64.	Cambodia	(1989-1991)	Civil - Negotiated Third Party	
65.	El Salvador	(1979-1992)	Civil - Negotiated before	
66.	Mozambique	(1984-1992)	Civil - Negotiated before	
67.	Eritrea	(1974-1993)	Extra-syst. - Negotiated before	(4)
68.	Second Yemen	(1994)	Civil - Extermination	
69.	Sri Lanka	(1987-1995)	Extra-Syst. - Negotiated after	(5)
70.	Angola	(1974- )	Civil - Unresolved	
71.	Afghanistan	(1978- )	Civil - Unresolved	(6)
72.	Sudan	(1983- )	Civil - Unresolved	
73.	Somalia	(1989- )	Civil - Unresolved	
74.	Yugoslavia	(1991- )	Civil - Unresolved	
75.	Chechen	(1994- )	Extra-systemic - Unresolved	

- Notes: (a) Modified or added to Pillar's list  
(c) Some experts consider this a capitulation  
(i) Indirect negotiations before armistice  
(p) Pillar includes explanatory notes  
(s) Small and Singer include explanatory notes  
(u) Attempts to negotiate before armistice failed

(1) Israel's objective was to exterminate/expel the PLO from Lebanon

(2) The Polisario still exists in Algeria but is mostly an ineffective combat force.

Notes (continued from previous page):

- (3) Vietnam withdrew its forces without an agreement
- (4) The war was essentially over without an agreement in 1991 when the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) defeated President Mengistu's government forces. By then the Eritrea People's Liberation Front had consolidated most of Eritrea that the new government did not contest. Negotiations later settled the war with a plebiscite that the people of Eritrea overwhelming voted for independence.
- (5) In January, 1995, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam agreed to a ceasefire with the governments of Sri Lanka and India. It is still unsure if the on-going negotiations for a peace treaty will be successful, and if it is unsuccessful, most experts believe fighting will resume.
- (6) The Soviet Union's involvement was from 1979-1989, and their decisions to enter the war or withdrawal did not alter the nature of the civil war.

## Appendix C: Glossary

### Terms and Definitions

**Absorption**—a war which does not end but is absorbed by another war, or escalates into a larger war. (thesis definition)

**Capitulation**—war ends with the victor unilaterally imposing the terms of peace on the defeated state or nation. (thesis definition)

**Civil Affairs**—those phases of activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civilian authority and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area when military forces are present; to include (1) matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in country or area and civil authorities and people of that country or area usually involving performance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise of certain authority the responsibility of the local government. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency and is normally covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied; and (2) military government: the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory. (JSOAP Reference Manual)

**Civil-Military Operations**—the complex of activities in support of military operations embracing the interaction between the military force and civilian authorities fostering the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral, friendly or hostile groups. (FM 41-10)

**Civil War**—wars which are fought to attain or retain political control of a single state or nation or fought to politically partition a state. There are four categories of civil war: revolutions, coups, secession and unification. Revolution is a war to seek or prevent a change in government which will result in subsequent social, political and economic changes. A coup is an attempt to change only the top government authority. Secessionist wars are attempt to politically partition a state (war to ethnically partition a state is usually considered an extra-systemic war). Wars of unification are fought to politically unify ethnic, religious or political groups into one state or in the form of ethnic cleansing, to eliminate or exterminate an ethnic or religious group within a state (war in which one state invades another for territorial gain is usually viewed as an interstate war). (thesis definition)

**Conflict** - a clash of political or economic interest between two groups (thesis definition)

**Conflict Resolution** (also **conflict termination**) - the process of resolving the root causes of a conflict and attaining settlement between two groups. (thesis definition)

**Congruency**—the degree to which military objectives and actions successfully fulfill national objectives, policy and strategy. (thesis definition)

**Country Team**—senior members of US government agencies assigned to a US diplomatic mission overseas and subject to direction supervision of the Chief, US Mission (ambassador). Normally such members coordinate US government political, economic and military activities and policies in the host country. (JSOAP Reference Manual)

**Crisis**—an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a situation of such diplomatic, economic, political or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (AFSC Publication 1)

**Crisis Action Planning (CAP)** - the joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process involving time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. (Joint Publication 1.02)

**Deliberate Planning**—the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operations plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles and in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. (Joint Publication 1.02)

**Dispute**—a disagreement which develops from a clash of political or economic interest between two groups (see conflict). (thesis definition)

**Dispute Phase**—a phase in the conflict resolution framework where a conflict develops between two states, nations or groups, but neither party has perceived the conflict in military terms nor has introduced military options. (thesis definition)

**Dispute Phase (post-hostilities)**—a semi-stable post-hostilities phase where the conflict remains with the original dispute or new disputes which arose out of the hostilities or post-hostilities phases, and efforts to resolve of the conflict have failed to progress. This dispute phase may be viewed as the next pre-hostilities dispute (thesis definition)

**End State** - a clear and concise definition developed during a conflict which defines the desired political, economic and military environment at the end of the settlement

phase, or if settlement is not viewed as being attainable, it is the desired environment during the post-hostilities dispute phase. The end state should be defined by the NCA from the national strategy, and in essence describes the goals of the national strategy for that conflict. (thesis definition)

**Extra-Systemic War**—is a colonial or imperial war fought by one state of the international system against its colony or an ethnic nation not recognized as a state. (thesis definition)

**Extermination / Expulsion**—war ends without an explicit agreement with only one surviving belligerent; the defeated political body and military force is destroyed or expelled from the theater. (thesis definition)

**Grand Strategy**—see **national strategy**

**Interstate War**—is a war between two or more states of the international system. (thesis definition)

**Hostilities and Hostilities Phase**—a conflict resolution framework phase marked by: (1) organized and systemic violence undertaken by armed forces to impose their will and end state on the other state, nation or group; (2) organized combat operations or war by opposing belligerent states, nations or groups. (thesis definition)

**Instruments of Power**—the application of military, political, economic and information tools or actions used by states to influence other states. (thesis definition)

**Military End State**—the required conditions that, when achieved, attain the strategic objectives or pass the main effort to other instruments of national power to achieve the final strategic end state. (FM 100-5, pg. 6-1)

**Military Objectives**—the derived set of military actions to be taken to implement National Command Authority guidance in support of national objectives. (Joint Publication 1-02)

**Nation**—an ethnic community with a shared sense of self-identity such as a common history, language, traditions, values and religion. (thesis' definition)

**National Objectives**—the aims, derived from national goals and interest, toward which a national policy or strategy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied. (Joint Publication 5-03.1)

**National Policy**—a broad course of action or statement of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (Joint Publication 1-02)



**National Strategy**—the art and science of developing and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives. Also called the **national security strategy** or **grand strategy** (Joint Publication 1-02)

**Negotiated Settlement**—war ends with an explicit agreement negotiated between belligerents or by a third party and agreed on by both belligerents. (thesis definition)

**Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)**—refers to transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. NGOs may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). NGO is a term normally used by non-US organization. (JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace )

**Operational Level of War**—the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. (Joint Publication 1-02)

**Peace**—an environment of mutual acceptance of national interests and objectives. (thesis definition)

**Post-Hostilities Phase**—a phase in the conflict resolution framework marked by conflict still perceived in potential military terms and the phase usually follows hostilities. This phase is dominated by military operations other than war and marked by the transition from military control to political control of the theater of operations.

**Pre-Hostilities Phase**—a phase in the conflict resolution framework where a conflict continues and may be viewed as effecting at least one state's vital interest, and one or both states begin to perceive the conflict in military terms and introduces military options such as a show of force. The intent is usually not to trigger hostilities, but coerce the other state to resolve the conflict. (thesis' definition)

**Private Voluntary Organization (PVO)**—a private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. PVO is the equivalent term of NGO. (JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace)

**Settlement Phase**—a phase in the conflict resolution framework where progressive resolution of the disputes results in the end of the conflict. (thesis definition)

**State**—an internationally recognized political entity which exercises absolute sovereignty over a territory and its population; a country. (thesis definition)

**Strategic Level of War**—the level of war at which a nation, alliance or coalition determines national or multinational security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. (Joint Publication 1-02)

**Termination Objectives** - specific objectives that define the intended manner of conflict termination and the required military and diplomatic achievements to obtain it. (Joint Publication 5-00.1)

**War**—(1) hostilities (thesis' definition); (2) a state of undeclared or declared armed hostile action characterized by the sustained use of armed forces between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular or irregular forces in a series of connected military operations or campaigns to achieve vital national objectives. (Joint Publication 5-00.1)

**War Termination**—cessation of hostilities either through negotiated agreement such as cease-fire agreement or armistice, or through unilateral extermination or expulsion of the enemy political and military forces.

**Withdrawal**—war ends with the unilateral withdrawal of one belligerent without explicit agreement for the termination. (thesis definition)

## Acronyms

ACSC	Air Command and Staff College
ADP	Automated Data Processing
ARCENT	US Army Component Command of US Central Command
ATO	Air Tasking Order
BG	Brigadier General
C4	Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
CA	Civil Affairs
CENTCOM	Central Command (US)
CINC	Commander in Chief
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
CNN	Cable News Network
CONPLAN	Concept of Operations Plan
DOD	Department of Defense (US)
DOS	Department of State (US)
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual (US Army)
GWAPS	Gulf War Air Power Survey
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IO	International Organization
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	Joint Forces Component
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JPEL	Joint Publications Electronic Library
JTF	Joint Task Force
JULLS	Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
KIA	Killed in Action
KTF	Kuwaiti Task Force
MAJCOM	Major Command
MFP	Major Force Program
MIA	Missing in Action
MNC	Multi-National Corporation
NCA	National Command Authority
NGO	Non-Government Organization
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OASD (SO/LIC)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict)
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OGA	Other Government Agency

OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPORD	Operations Order
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PME	Professional Military Education
POC	Point of Contact
POW	Prisoner of War
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PVO	Private Volunteer Organization
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SE	South East (Asia)
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Combined
US	United States (of America)
USA	United States Army
USACOM	United States American Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USDOT	United States Department of Transportation
USPHS	United States Public Health Service
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republics
WRM	War Reserve Materiel
WW I	World War I
WW II	World War II

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