

USAWC INTO THE FUTURE: SURVEY OF GENERAL OFFICERS

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DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

MARCH 1997

19970804 029

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY <i>(Leave blank)</i>	2. REPORT DATE Mar 1997	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final, Oct 95-Mar 96	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE USAWC Into the Future: Survey of General Officers		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Glenda Y. Nogami, Christopher D. Brander, Karen A. Slusser		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USAWC Directorate of Academic Affairs Curriculum Evaluation 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Unclassified/Unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT <i>(Maximum 200 words)</i> A survey of Army General Officers was conducted between October 1995 to March 1996. The purpose of the survey was to gather information on how well USAWC prepared its graduates on 25 broad educational objectives. The data indicated that the Generals felt USAWC graduates are well prepared for senior officer positions and responsibilities. They were also asked to envision the senior officer environment in the year 2010, and the skills/knowledge senior officers will need to function in that future strategic environment, as well as specific suggestions to improve the strategic arts curriculum and continuing education. The information the General Officers provided will be used in designing and tailoring USAWC curriculum in a proactive manner to ensure that USAWC graduates are well prepared to meet the requirements of the future.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Senior Officer Education, MEL-1, U.S. Army War College, Curriculum Evaluation, General Officer Skills			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 181
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified			16. PRICE CODE
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited	

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March 1997

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USAWC INTO THE FUTURE: SURVEY OF ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS

The mission of the U.S. Army War College is:

To prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders to assume strategic responsibilities in military and national security organizations; to educate students about the employment of the U.S. Army as part of a unified, joint, or multinational force in support of the national military strategy; to research operational and strategic issues; and to conduct outreach programs that benefit USAWC, the U.S. Army, and the Nation.

Curriculum Pamphlet: Academic Year 1997
Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College

How well does the USAWC accomplish its educational mission? How should an educational institution determine its effectiveness? What should be measured and how should it be measured? There are a number of program evaluation techniques that can be used. One can employ a process¹ or outcomes, formative or summative², goal-oriented or goal free, or a "to prove" or "to improve" focus. In its most effective form, the data from most evaluations should result in improvements to the program. In other words, it should be "utilization focused evaluation"³ which is designed to assist in policy and program decisionmaking. Utilization focused evaluations go beyond describing a program to providing information for making decisions to continue or discontinue a program, to determine a program's effectiveness against pre-determined criteria, for suggesting improvements/modifications to a program, or to answer specific questions.


The curriculum evaluation process at the USAWC utilizes a multi-faceted approach, collecting data in a combined process and outcomes research design. There are six unique groups that provide course and curriculum evaluation information: students, faculty,

graduates, general officers, other senior service colleges, and external agencies/sources. These six groups and their primary contributions are listed below. Data from all sources are used to augment and provide a degree of convergent validity to other sources.

CURRICULUM EVALUATION

FACULTY

STUDENTS



**GENERAL
OFFICERS**

**ACADEMIC
OVERSIGHT**

GRADUATES

**OTHER
SR SVC SCH**

o Students. Students provide evaluations about individual courses and an end-of-year overall assessment of the academic year. The quality of course materials and instruction is also rated, but primarily the data from students is indicative of what they think will be useful and what they enjoyed. Palatability is important because if students don't see the value of the materials or don't like a course, they are less likely to get the most out of it.

o Faculty. The faculty are best able to judge course content and effectiveness of different teaching methods. The faculty are responsible for selecting and preparing course materials, developing effective presentation methods, teaching and evaluating student performance. They are in the best position to evaluate all aspects of their individual courses.

- o Commandant/Academic Board. The Commandant has the final authority and responsibility for the curriculum at the U.S. Army War College. The Commandant, in consultation with the Academic Board, sets the final curriculum based on input from all sources. The Commandant's and the Academic Board's oversight and direction provide a smooth flow between courses and ensures that all curriculum topics and subjects are adequately addressed.

- o Graduates. The real test of whether USAWC is teaching the skills and knowledges necessary for senior leadership can best be determined by USAWC graduates and General Officers. Graduates should be better able to successfully perform their duties because of the skills and knowledges they received at USAWC. The input they give USAWC is really a validity check: did USAWC prepare them for their assignments?

- o General Officers. The separate groups of General Officers and graduates will overlap over time. General Officers have an overview of the many job related requirements of Colonels and GOs. They offer at least two important groups of information: consensual validation (to the Graduates' input) that USAWC is providing the appropriate education for senior leaders - i.e., evaluation of the USAWC curriculum, and a forward look into evolving needs and skill requirements. General Officers are in positions to provide a broader perspective of the future environment and to identify new senior leader skills that will be required in the near and intermediate future. This information will be helpful in the strategic planning of the USAWC curriculum - propelling the college to be more pro-active.

- o Other Senior Service Schools. With the emphasis on jointness and cooperation, it is imperative that USAWC have (at least) a comparable program with the other services. The level of instruction and the information presented should be appropriate and on a par with (or be better than) other senior service schools. This will help ensure that we can get the best officers as faculty and students.

- o External Boards of Inquiry or Evaluation. Input to the curriculum comes from various sources--Congress and interested individuals, the American Council on Education, DoD and DA Commissions and Panels, etc. These boards provide information on the comparability of the USAWC curriculum to other curricula--both military and civilian. Their primary contribution involves "how others see USAWC" and, in many cases, gives a perspective of USAWC in the context of total military (and civilian) education.

General Officer Survey

The purposes of the General Officer Survey were three-fold: a) to determine how well the USAWC prepares senior officers, i.e., outcomes assessment; b) to seek guidance in improving the USAWC curriculum; and c) to solicit the generals' visions of the future senior leader environment and senior leader skills that will be required. The information gleaned provides an evaluation of our past curricula and outcomes (graduates' performance), critiques and suggestions for near and midterm corrections to the present curriculum, and perspectives for strategic planning and development for the future (the next 10-15 years, i.e., 2005 to 2010).

The USAWC is the capstone educational experience in the Army, culminating the officers' formal professional military education that spans their entire career. The mission of the USAWC is to educate the senior officers to be effective in all positions following their graduation, not just for the next assignment⁴. Consequently, the scope of the evaluation system should also cover the continuing life cycle of the senior officers. The vast majority of USAWC graduates remains in the Army for 2 to 10 years following matriculation⁵. During their remaining years of service, each graduate will have a number of immediate and senior officer raters who will be in the General officer ranks. By surveying all Army Generals, USAWC gains a better understanding of the utility of the educational experience over the graduates' remaining Army career. In other words, the General Officer Survey provides a measure of validation of how well the USAWC prepares its graduates to perform in their various staff and leadership roles in the Army and the Department of Defense.

The USAWC INTO THE FUTURE SURVEY was sent to all Army, Active Duty, Generals and Colonel-Promotables (not on retired status) as of October 1995 to March 1996. This included 2 Reserve Component Generals who were on active duty during this timeframe. The following table delineates the 358 Generals by rank and the response rate by rank. Overall, 66% of all surveyed General officers responded to the survey. High response rate in each rank is an indicator that all ranks are well represented. Considering that the Generals are assigned all over the globe in critical and high stress positions, the response rate is extraordinarily high. It should be noted, however, that not all of them returned both the scantron answer sheet and the qualitative comment section of the survey.

RESPONSE RATE BY RANK OF GENERALS

RANK	SURVEYS SENT*	SURVEYS RECEIVED**	RESPONSE RATE
COL(P)	44	32	73%
BG	159	111	70
MG	106	63	59
LTG	38	25	66
GEN	11***	6	55
TOTAL	358	237	66%

* Ranks as of mailing dates (25 October 1995 and reminder 20 March 1996).

** 1 General Officer completed the survey, but also identified himself as "retired."

*** 12 Generals were sent a survey. One survey was returned unanswered because the General retired between the October and March timeframe, leaving a valid sample of 11.

Demographics

To put the data into perspective, one needs to know the composition of the survey respondents. The closer the survey respondents demographics reflect the overall population, the more confidence one has in the survey data and the more accurately one can generalize to the population. There were two questions which addressed this: source of original commission and branch of speciality. On both of these factors, the survey respondents were similar to the overall General Officer population.

The Generals were commissioned from all sources of commissioning. The distribution of the survey respondents mirrored the U.S. Army population of Generals. The plurality of the Generals were commissioned through the Army ROTC program, followed by the Military Academy and the Officer Candidate School systems. The majority of the respondents are in the Combat Arms - which is reflective of the Army. Although the Combat Support and Combat Service Support branches in our survey are slightly under- and overrepresented, respectively, the resulting distribution allows for generalization to the population.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL COMMISSIONING

	Survey	U.S.Army
U.S. Military Academy	27.2	25.5
Army ROTC	43.4	47.5
Army OCS	21.1	19.5
Direct Commission	7.0	7.4
Other	1.3	-.-
	100.0%	99.9%

PRIMARY BRANCH

	Survey	U.S. Army
Combat Arms	62.3%	58.9%
Combat Support	9.6	16.6
Combat Service Support	22.4	15.9
Health Services	4.8	6.0
Other	0.9	2.6
	100.0%	100.0%

More than 99% of the survey respondents are graduates of a senior service college (SSC). Slightly over 50% received their MEL-1 from the USAWC, 26% from the National Defense University (National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces). The remainder received their MEL-1's from sister service SSC's, and MEL-1 equivalents from SSC Fellowships and foreign service colleges. The Generals were serving in every level of the national and international security environment - from national Division to international Coalition/Combined offices. Slightly over 25% of the Generals were serving in Joint/Combined (sometimes referred to as "purple") assignments, i.e., working with officers of other services or allied countries.

SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE GRADUATION

USAWC	53.3%
SSC Fellowship	8.0
National War College	12.4
Industrial College of the Armed Forces	13.3
Naval War College	9.8
Air War College	0.9
Foreign Service College	1.3
Do not have MEL-1	0.9
	<hr/>
	100.0%

CURRENT LEVEL OF ASSIGNMENT

Coalition	3.6
Combined	1.4
Joint	20.0
Service Staff	15.0
Major Command (MACOM)	24.1
Corps	3.2
Division	12.3
Other	20.5
	<hr/>
	100.0%

Educational Objectives

The USAWC curriculum "is designed to support both the personal and the professional development"⁶ of senior leaders. USAWC graduates are expected to be:

- Service qualified through the study of strategic land power.
- Joint qualified through the study of strategic leadership and joint matters.
- Competent with emerging technology.
- Able to apply 'strategic art' while striving to master the art and science of strategy.⁷

Evolving from these general objectives are 25 discrete, specific educational objectives. The educational objectives are oriented towards both "process" and "content" - e.g., specific information. Graduates of the USAWC are expected to fill any of a number of different positions - from Brigade command to other service, joint and multinational billets. To best prepare officers for multiple senior leadership positions, the curriculum must provide the graduate with *skills* which are applicable across content areas and provide some breadth of *specific content knowledge*. To illustrate the differences, the ability to think strategically (a skill) is utilized when considering joint doctrine, regional political issues, and the impact of economics on national security (various specific content knowledge domains). In the era of rapid change, specific knowledge is highly perishable, i.e., information changes (perishes) as new 'facts' emerge. Skills are more durable and are applicable to existing, as well as emerging information; although the skills would hopefully evolve or increase over time.

While educational objectives relating to skills has been relatively constant, the objectives relating to content have evolved as the national security environment has changed⁸. The implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act, the downsizing of the military, the National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement, and the development and versatility of new technologies have all had significant impact on the USAWC curriculum. There is more emphasis on joint operations, effective functioning in coalition and multinational force, and resource and information managements than previously.

The intent of this section of questions is to help USAWC determine how well (poorly) it prepares officers to be able to perform the following objectives in senior leadership positions. The Generals were asked to rate how well the USAWC prepares senior officers on each of these objectives. These ratings are important to USAWC because they provide information on how

successful or unsuccessful USAWC has been in accomplishing its goals. The data indicate where USAWC has been successful, as well as where USAWC can improve its curriculum.

Although over 50% of the Generals are USAWC graduates, these questions were not intended to be self appraisals of their educational experience. The Generals were asked to rate how well USAWC prepares senior officers, generically. The Generals have worked with numerous USAWC graduates in varying capacities. In these roles, the Generals are similar to performance evaluators (raters), providing the equivalent of supervisory assessments of USAWC graduates. Their ratings are an effective method for getting an overall evaluation of the USAWC curriculum, and can be seen as providing valuable outcomes assessment and validation of the program.


The following table lists the 25 separate educational objectives and their arithmetic mean values. The objectives are not listed in any particular order of importance or merit. Each is considered to be as important as any other for effective senior officer functioning. How well USAWC accomplished each of the objectives was rated on a 5-point scale: 1 = very poorly, 2 = poorly, 3 = fair, 4 = well, and 5 = very well.

For all educational objectives, the mean is above the 3.0 mid-point of the scale indicating that the Generals felt USAWC accomplished each of its objectives. There were, however, differences in how successfully the objectives were accomplished. On 23 of 25 objectives, over 50% of the Generals felt USAWC had done "very well" or "well." There were no educational objectives on which more than 2% of the Generals felt USAWC was doing "very poorly." On the extremely positive side, USAWC was very successful in educating senior officers in setting "an ethical climate in [their] organization" (mean = 4.3), "understanding the role of the military in a democracy" (mean = 4.3), "mental fitness" (mean = 4.2), and "make informed decisions and give sound advice" (mean = 4.1). It did *relatively* less well in preparing senior officers to "serve in an organization involving multinational forces" (mean = 3.2) and to "write theater campaign plans using unified, joint or multinational forces" (mean = 3.3). In fact, USAWC does not teach the mechanics of writing a campaign plan, but rather the process of developing commander's estimates, and strategically thinking through the campaign planning process - from the Warning Order to execution. Based on this experience, however, many graduates are evaluated to be capable of writing appropriate theater campaign plans.

EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES

How well does USAWC prepare Senior Officers to:	MEAN
Work in Strategic Environment	4.0
Apply Landpower in Support of the U.S. National Military Strategy	4.0
Set an Ethical Climate in Your Service/Organization	4.3
Be Physically Fit	4.0
Be Mentally Fit	4.2
Deal with Problems Which Have No Clear Cut Solutions	3.9
Be an Innovator/Initiator of Policy	3.6
Succeed in Positions of Broad Scope & Responsibility	4.0
Assess/Plan for the Future while Executing in the Present	3.7
Think Conceptually	3.8
Think Critically	3.9
Think Strategically	4.0
Think Creatively	3.6
Understand the Role of the Military in a Democratic Society	4.3
Be Adept in the Employment of Military Forces Achieve National Objectives	4.0
Advise the National Command Authorities on the use of Military Forces to Achieve National Objectives	3.9
Make Informed Decisions and Give Sound Advice	4.1
Provide a Frame of Reference Which Recognizes the Complexity of the Issues Dealt With, But Also Provides the Perspective to Work Through Them to Find Solutions	4.0
Serve in an Organization Involving Joint Forces	3.5
Serve in an Organization Involving Multinational Forces	3.2
Write Theater Campaign Plans Using Unified, Joint or Multinational Forces	3.3
Apply Strategic Thought Process to the U.S. National Security Decisionmaking Process	3.8
Analyze Threats and Other Factors Which Affect U.S. Interests in Various Global Regions	3.8
Understand how Strategy is Translated into Force Requirements and How Those Requirements are Converted into Capabilities	3.7
Translate National Military Strategy into Theater Strategies to Accomplish National Security Objectives	3.7

Overall mean values for each of the objectives is effective as a measure of central tendency. It may, however, mask how well USAWC has done by averaging the highs and lows and present a misleading description. The two distributions below, for example, have the same arithmetic mean although one is a "normal," bell curve and the other is a bi-modal distribution. While the means are equivalent, this would not accurately describe the responses.



To provide a more complete description of the data, the following charts are presented. Figures 1 to 25 graphically display distribution of responses for each of the 25 educational objectives in a separate figure. The educational objective is listed at the top of the figure. The numbers on the vertical "y" axis are the percent of responses. Note that it goes from 0 - 70% on all figures. The numbers in the bar chart are the percent of responses (these correspond to the graphic). Summing all the percents on a chart will equal 100% of the responses for that objective.

Figure 1

Work in the Strategic Environment




Figure 2

Apply Landpower in Support of NMS




Figure 3

Set an Ethical Climate




Figure 4

Be Physically Fit




Figure 5

Be Mentally Fit




Figure 6

Deal with Problems Which Have No Clear Cut Solutions




Figure 7

Be an Innovator/Initiator of Policy




Figure 8

Succeed in Positions of Broad Scope and Responsibility




Figure 9

Assess/Plan for the Future While Executing in the Present




Figure 10

Think Conceptually




Figure 11

Think Critically




Figure 12

Think Strategically




Figure 13

Think Creatively




Figure 14

Understand the Role of the Military in a Democratic Society




Figure 15

Adept in the Employment of Military Forces to Achieve National Objectives




Figure 16

Advise NCA on the Use of Military Forces to Achieve National Objectives




Figure 17

Make Informed Decisions and Give Sound Advice




Figure 18

Provide a Frame of Reference to Find Solutions




Figure 19

Serve in a Joint Forces Organization




Figure 20

Serve With Multinational Forces




Figure 21

Write Theater Campaign Plans




Figure 22

Apply the Strategic Thought Process




Figure 23

Analyze Threats that Affect U.S. Interests




Figure 24

Understand How Strategy is Transformed into Force Capability





Figure 25

Translating Nat'l Military Strategy into Theater Strategy



Curriculum Focus


The above data and the 25 previous graphs indicate that the Generals felt USAWC has accomplished all of its educational objectives. It is not surprising, then, that 72% of the Generals agree (8% disagree) that that USAWC is offering "the right subjects for senior officer development."

Generalist vs. Specialist

There is, however, a continuing dialogue on whether the USAWC curriculum should produce graduates with a wide (but relatively shallow) breadth of knowledge or depth in one or a very few specialized fields. Whether through the 10-month resident or the

Figure 26

Curriculum Covers the Right Subjects





22-month corresponding course, there are more senior officer development topics than can be covered in depth. Topics must be prioritized to ensure that the most critical are always included in the curriculum.

In the early 1990's USAWC developed and utilized a "should, would, could" categorization. "Shoulds" were critical and necessary topics which must always be incorporated. "Woulds" were topics that were important and time in the curriculum would be devoted to them. Finally, "coulds" were those topics that could be offered if time and expertise permitted. In all cases, "should," "would," and "could," topics were those that were relevant to effective functioning at the senior level. The categories were necessary to prioritize time and faculty effort because the number of topics and the depth to which one aspired exceeded the amount of time available.

With time a "zero sum" variable, what topics should be included, more breadth or more depth, should USAWC promote a generalist or a specialist education? The charts below indicate that 90% of the Generals believe the curriculum at USAWC should produce graduates who are generalists rather than specialists. There are so many roles and levels in which a senior officer must function: service specific, joint, interagency, national security, and international environments. There are also multiple roles that the senior officer is expected fill - officer competent in his/her specialty, leader, resource manager, personnel manager, and civilian-military ombudsman, among others.

The overwhelming majority of Generals (96%) believe USAWC should produce officers who have a wide breadth of knowledge. On a related but oppositely anchored question, 60% disagreed and only 16% agreed that officers should






have a depth of knowledge in specialized areas. The overlap in percentages represent Generals who would like USAWC to produce officers who have both breadth of knowledge AND depth in specialized areas.



The curriculum at the USAWC tries to combine both breadth and depth. Approximately 60% of the curriculum consists of required courses (core courses, Regional Strategic Appraisals, and the Strategic Crisis Exercise), and the remaining 40% are in elective, advanced courses. The required courses are similar to "survey" or

"primers" with their emphasis on the broad brush, "one mile wide, one inch deep" coverage. This exposes the officer to many different topics and provides a "breadth of knowledge."

The elective advanced courses offer the opportunity for the student to specialize in specific areas and gain a "depth of knowledge." Each year, between 70 and 100 advanced courses are offered. Students can elect to go deep and concentrate their electives in one area or seek to add a moderate measure of depth in a number of specialities.



While academics are the focal point, should it be the only focus or should USAWC be more of a "total experience"? The academic year at the U.S. Army War College is viewed holistically. It encompasses the academic, spiritual, and emotional development of the officer. It is based on the premise that senior leaders who are physically, mentally, and emotionally fit are best prepared for the future challenges and greater responsibilities. USAWC "programs are designed to stimulate (the student) intellectually, physically, and spiritually."⁹ Professional and personal growth is encouraged and promoted. The Generals agree with this approach as the following graphs indicate. Ninety-three percent (93%) of the Generals agree that "USAWC should be a total experience," and the same proportion disagree with the concept that "Academics should be the only focus."



The Generals were also helpful in providing suggestions on what USAWC could do to best prepare senior Army officers. Their suggestions ranged from providing overall direction - as in whether the curriculum should provide a generalist or specialist approach - to specific courses that need to be emphasized or added/deleted to the curriculum. A synopsis of their suggestions are found on pages 57 to 60, and a complete listing of all their comments are in Appendix E.


Comparability with Other Senior Service Colleges

The U.S. Army War College is the SSC with a focus on both land and joint warfare. It is best encapsulated in the mission statement:

To prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders to assume strategic responsibilities in military and national security organizations; to educate students about the **employment of the U.S. Army as part of a unified, joint, or multinational force** in support of the national military strategy; to research operational and strategic issues; and to conduct outreach programs that benefit USAWC, the U.S. Army, and the Nation.


The USAWC is the senior service college with a primary focus on the strategic use of landpower. Other service colleges focus on their service specific doctrine and warfighting/sustaining issues. The USAWC received high marks for its ability to prepare senior officers for Army specific challenges. Over 90% of the surveyed Generals agreed or strongly

agreed that USAWC prepares officers well for Army assignments, only 7% were neutral, and less




than 2% disagreed (percentages do not equal 100% due to rounding).

In comparison with other Senior Service Colleges, again, the USAWC does very well in preparing officers for Army assignments. Seventy-seven percent (77%) of the Generals felt that USAWC graduates were best prepared for Army assignments. Nearly all of the remaining Generals (21%) felt that the SSCs were about the same in preparing senior officers for Army assignments.




According to DA FM 100-5 Operations, "The Army will not operate alone. The Army contributes a full range of unique capabilities for combat, CS, and CSS functions for sustained land combat operations as part of a joint, combined, or interagency team.¹⁰" In keeping with this doctrine, Army senior officers are being prepared for leadership roles in cooperative and non-Army-specific assignments. A well educated Army officer should be able to step into other military assignments



- joint, combined, coalition, and unified. The following chart indicates that the Generals felt

USAWC graduates are well prepared for joint assignments.





The best prepared, however, are judged to be graduates from the National War College. Fully 50% of the Generals felt Nat'l WC graduates were best, although 34% felt that all the Senior Service Colleges are about the same. USAWC, Navy, and ICAF were all perceived about the same in preparing joint officers (between 4-6% each).

The Goldwater-Nichols, DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, formalized the concept of joint operations (most often referred to as jointness) in the professional military education system. All five Senior Service Colleges (SSC's) are required to undergo periodic Joint Accreditation reviews which assess and evaluate the degree to which the learning objectives in the Program for Joint Education (PJE) is conducted.



This ensures that all SSC's provide comparable joint education for senior officers. If comparability exists, one would expect no differences between the quality of graduates between the schools. USAWC graduates do compare favorably. The data indicate that USAWC there are neither better nor less prepared for senior officer responsibilities than graduates from other SSC's.

One indicator of preparedness and quality of graduates is their evaluation of which graduates get the best career enhancing assignments. Over 70% of the Generals felt that graduates from all the SSC's are treated equally, but 16% and 11%, respectively, felt National War College and the Army War College graduates got the best career enhancing assignments.



Based on all the above data, it is not surprising that while 44% of the Generals favor the USAWC as the "best SSC for Army officers," and 50% would "recommend USAWC over other service war colleges to subordinates," a comparable percent were neutral or disagreed. These figures and graphs provide an indication that jointness is a reality; and that while USAWC may provide the best preparation for Army assignments, other SSC's - especially the National War College - may be as well for joint and other assignments.

One might have expected the proportions favoring the USAWC to be lower - since all SSC's are accredited to the same level. There are numerous possible explanations for this data. Although there are many "purple" billets in the military, there is a requirement for - and a realization that there are - numerous Army-specific senior level positions for which a strategic Army (or land warfighting) focus might be advantageous. In addition, the Generals favor the holistic approach - including both academic pursuits and personal development that the USAWC promotes.




The Generals were asked how USAWC graduates compare with other senior service college MEL-1 graduates with reference to their relative strengths and weaknesses. The majority indicated that there was no overall qualitative difference between the graduates. There were, however, differences that might be attributed to the different emphasis each curriculum placed on specific SSC focus. A synopsis of the Generals' descriptions of the different strengths of the senior service schools is provided on pages 54 to 56. A complete transcription of their full comments can be found in Appendix D.

Curriculum Domains

The current USAWC curriculum includes numerous domains of study required for senior officers - in accordance with Professional Military Education (PME) and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) standards, as well as befitting graduate-level education. Should USAWC include each of the following areas? If so, how should time be apportioned or where should the curriculum emphasis lie? The Generals were asked their opinions on the extent to which the USAWC curriculum should focus on the following broad areas. The data are presented in the figure and table below.

It is evident that the Generals perceived each of the above areas to be important in the education of the senior officer. On every topic, more than 50% of the Generals responded that felt the curriculum should have a "great" or "very great" focus. Interestingly, though, they felt most strongly about strategic thinking - as evidenced by the large percentage (38%) responding "very great" focus. There was no area for which more than 1% of the respondents felt USAWC should not emphasize.



CURRICULUM FOCUS


To What Extent Should the USAWC Curriculum Focus on the Following Areas?

	Very Great	Great	Moderate	Slight	Not At All
Strategic Thinking	38.1	43.8	16.4	1.8	0.0
Joint Warfighting Skills	27.0	58.8	13.3	0.9	0.0
Land Warfighting Skills	27.1	45.8	24.0	3.1	0.0
Combined/Coalition Warfighting Skills	19.5	54.9	22.6	3.1	0.0
Information Warfare Skills	14.2	42.9	37.2	5.3	0.4
Interagency Operations Skills	12.4	38.7	35.1	13.3	0.4
Political/Diplomatic Skills	11.1	41.2	38.9	8.4	0.4

Value of USAWC and MEL-1

From the above evaluative questions and responses, there is little doubt that USAWC is presenting the appropriate curriculum and is doing a good job preparing its graduates for senior leader positions. Educated officers are necessary for an efficient and effective force. The other side of the coin is that education is a costly enterprise. There are dollar, time and personnel costs associated with USAWC. Resident students are taken out of their careers, families are uprooted, and travel, PCS, and per diem for 10 months are part of the cost for the services and officers.

Corresponding students face a 2-year commitment of evening and weekend work at the cost of family time, and travel and per diem for two 2-week in-residence phases. Still, over 90% of the Generals agreed or strongly agreed (and less than 4% disagreed) that the USAWC is a worthwhile investment in people and money.



Focus on the Future: Where are we going and how are we going to get there?

Curriculum planning and development entails both evaluation and projections - to determine how well one has done or is doing, and how or in which direction the curriculum should evolve. Curriculum evaluation tends to focus on the past and present - i.e., how well did the earlier curriculum prepare graduates for their jobs, and how to improve/focus the present curriculum. For these purposes, closed-ended, scalar questions are appropriate and useful.

Strategic and long term curriculum planning are based on future projections¹¹. The curriculum development process at USAWC is premised on a vision of the future environment, a determination of the skills needed to be maximally effective in that environment, suggestions for improving the current curriculum, and methods that would best promote continued professional development.

To provide minimal parameters, an arbitrary 10-15 year time frame was adopted, and to allow the greatest freedom of thought in envisioning the future, these questions were open-ended questions. Generals were asked to respond to each question in narrative format. The following section are the synopses of their comments on each of the questions below. Complete comments are found in the Appendixes B to H.

- 1. What will the Army and the Total Force senior leader environment be in the year 2010?**
- 2. What skills/knowledge do you feel senior officers will need in the next 10-15 years?**
- 3. How do USAWC graduates compare with other senior service college MEL-1 graduates? What are their relative strengths and weaknesses?**
- 4. How do you think the USAWC could improve to best prepare senior Army officers?**
- 5. The USAWC Vision: ...the nation's preeminent center for strategic leadership and landpower ...a learning institution ...preparing today's leaders for tomorrow's challenges ...pursuing mastery of the strategic art through education, research, and outreach.**

What should the USAWC do to achieve this vision?

- 6. The USAWC is considering conducting a program of "continuing education" for graduates and senior military leaders. From your perspective, how should this program be implemented, i.e., what form should it take, what would be of most benefit to you?**
- 7. Strategic Art: What is it? How do you identify it?**

FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE, WHAT WILL THE ARMY AND THE TOTAL FORCE SENIOR LEADER ENVIRONMENT BE IN THE YEAR 2010?

Curriculum planning and development are continuing processes at the USAWC. The USAWC curriculum must be current - i.e., the courses and methods presented must be in consonance with the national security environment. This means that the curriculum must be constantly updated to reflect contemporary conditions, and curriculum planning for the next 10-15 years must also consider the environment of that future time. While no one can completely and accurately predict the future environment (and the farther into the future, the less accurate it becomes), curriculum planning requires at least a "best guess" conceptualization of the future.

Developing and executing significant curriculum changes takes approximately 3-5 years. While that may seem protracted, the process requires many separate steps to accomplish. Strategic curriculum planning starts with a vision of what the environment will be in the not too distant future (i.e., 15 years or around 2010 for this survey), identification of the requisite skills senior leaders will need to operate in that environment, and progresses to developing courses, recruiting faculty, and, finally, implementing educational methods and technology to support its teaching.

The Generals perspective of the future environment ranged from "not a clue" to multi-faceted, detailed answers. Content analysis of the qualitative data on the future environment indicates that there are at least four separate levels to the senior leader milieu. These categories are: the world environment, military roles and missions, the Army, and leadership. They are not mutually exclusive categories and it is clear that they are interrelated. For the purposes of trying to understand the separate entities and their dynamics, however, they will be reported separately.

World Environment

The world will be **more complex and continue to be "uncertain."** And, while the world will be different, there is no common vision, although there are definite parameters.

The Generals paint many different scenarios. There will be no clearly defined enemy, but a growing number of destabilizing elements: from "'have' vs. 'have not'" countries in confrontation with each other, to the *"emergence of Islamic fundamentalist threats,"* to *"Nationalism and right wing religious movements worldwide,"* *"terrorism,"* and even *"natural disasters."* These elements and their actions will not be limited within the boundaries of specific states, they will be more fluid (moving from one area to another), and have the potential of evolving and involving different nation-states at different times.

This will result in a confusing world with changing coalitions and changing enemies¹². It will be an environment with *"much instability,(and) ambiguous situations where US vital interests are not clear"* which may lead to *"fuzzy"* military objectives. Unclear objectives may lead to less than optimal strategic planning and mission execution with the increased risk of mistakes and missteps. An additional complication will be the concept that missions will be accomplished under intense media and public scrutiny. With instantaneous media coverage, *"with no room for mistakes because the media will capture it,"* how one approaches and solves problems (as portrayed by the media) becomes just as important as solving the problem. The following responses indicate how complex the generals envision the future will be.

- ° *World problems/crisis addressed from a coalition perspective.*
- ° *Military objectives will be "fuzzy". Political objectives will be "fuzzy".*
- ° *Issues will be "played" out on CNN. Leaders must make decisions in that environment.*
- ° *Process will be as important as achieving objectives.*
- ° *Classic vital interest no longer an acid text.*

- *Continued uncertain world - new problems, threats, emerging countries problems.*
- *Information flow - instantaneous media looking over Cdrs shoulders piped into living rooms.*
- *Advances in technology - touch screens, instant access, lethality of wpns.*
- *Quality of leaders & soldiers.*

Similar to today. Single super power, increasing gap between rich & poor nations. China on the rise. Korea unified. Europe not united. NATO in decline. ME volatile.

- ° *World of increased ethnic tensions with "have" vs "have not" confrontation*
- ° *Strategic environment with increased nuclear and WMD proliferation - to include WMD threat from terrorist organizations*
- ° *Information warfare capabilities providing unparallel understanding of friendly/enemy situations worldwide*
- ° *Emergence of Islamic Fundamentalist threat to western values/interests*
- ° *Decreasing resources for National Defense requirements.*

At the acme of Nationalism and right wing religious movements worldwide numerous peace operations/war prevention and low intensity combat situations; much of Africa reverting to tribal law and conflict; more conflicts developing along the "have" and "have not" lines. US military being asked to do more with less. Study our Indian campaign era also the 1930's. We're headed toward more isolation from our society.

National Security Environment

To meet these challenges, our national security will require **the integration of all elements of national power** (military, diplomatic/political, economic) into a unified strategy. For some, this means a national environment which is *"more political-military than present, with a larger, recognized role in national leadership."* For others, it means being *"less influential in ability to establish strategic direction for the Army."* The *"lines will blur between purely military and other issues,"* and will be accompanied by *"considerable political oversight"* and *"all in full media view."*

More complex, faster moving national and international environment where the military element of national power will be further integrated with growing economic and extant political national power. Increasing ethical complexity based upon perceived/real cultural/moral decline and the continuing press of technology upon the human machine.

A new world order which will require Sr. Ldrs. to possess skills to interface with National and global Political diplomatic and other Agencies such as CIA, FBI. To deal with terrorist, natural disaster, and contingency operations.

JOINT, HIGH TECH and confusing. It will be an environment where the separation between diplomatic, strategic, operational & tactical levels of war is nonexistent. We will operate in all levels at the same time.

Technology

Technology will play a major role in this world environment. Technology will have the capability to make *"greater amounts of information available much faster,"* and potentially lead to a "data/information overload environment." The positive side of this greater information is that it will also provide the military leadership with an *"unparalleled understanding of friendly/enemy situations worldwide"* by providing *"significantly improved situational awareness through battle space visualization systems."* There will be so much more information available that we will need additional technology to provide information management systems for decisionmaking.

It will be an environment where the *"successful leader will be the one who knows how/where to find appropriate information & use it faster than his opponent."* Technology will be used for information transmission which *"will allow more direct communication with the most senior leaders."* It will also mean that *"issues will be played out on CNN (and) leaders must make decisions in that environment."* Finally, technology will help to make weapons more lethal, and will allow us to put *"greater reliance on indirect fire smart munitions."* It must, however, be acknowledged that technology can enhance our enemies' abilities as well as our own. *"Technology and powerful weapons (will also be available) to politically extremist groups attempting to exert their will."*

Similar to today in terms of the importance of people issues but more complex in terms of technology, the strategic environment (which will not fit any neat models but require increased ability to analyze requirements, doctrine and be adaptable). Warfighting must be the first skill but we will face more complexity requiring a more rounded senior leader corps.

The Army - and its senior leader environment - will be smaller, more efficient, and heavily reliant on information age technology. The challenge for senior leaders with information age capabilities and the ability to reach down and touch subordinates at all levels will be to avoid interfering unnecessarily at subordinate levels, yet not allowing new technology to become too far removed from soldiers.

- *Continued uncertain world - new problems, threats, emerging country problems.*
- *Information flow - instantaneous media looking over Cdrs shoulders in planning rooms.*
- *Advances in technology - touch screens, instant access, lethality of wpns.*
- *Quality of leaders & soldiers.*

Not much different than it is now, but all enemies will be well equipped and the politicians and media will have more influence than uniformed leaders.

Roles and Missions

Joint. Combined. Coalition/Multinational. Interagency. The Goldwater-Nichols initiative, internal resource constraints, allocation of responsibilities and equipment among the services (active and reserve components, and sister services), and the national security policy of enlargement and engagement have all had (and will have) an impact on how the Army goes to war. The missions the Army shall undertake will cover the entire spectrum of conflict: from humanitarian actions, peace operations (peacekeeping, peace making, and peace enforcement), operations other than war (OOTW), to high intensity warfare. While senior Army leaders must have expertise in land warfare, they will probably not undertake missions as a separate service. Regardless of the mission, the Army will go as part of a larger force package, as a partner in a Joint, Combined, Coalition/Multi-national, and/or Interagency team.

- ° *Very Joint/Combined military planning an operations.*
- ° *Very broad focus--interagency.*
- ° *World wide scope--geographically*
 --politically
 --culturally
- ° *Broad range of operations--peacekeeping to war.*

Joint doctrine will become more detailed and directive. Operations will be joint, combined, and unified with interagency coordination and participation becoming increasingly pervasive and assuming a greater role in mission accomplishment. Military processes and procedures will be adopted by many PVOs, NGOs, and GOs, as they interact with military organizations in both domestic and foreign operations. The military will be increasingly involved in non-doctrinal missions spanning the spectrum of conflict and MOOTW.

Coordination of the multitude of agencies involved in complex non-doctrinal missions will fall to the military senior leadership.

Immersion into the joint world, where senior officers are comfortable w/working with each service assets.

Joint, combined, very lethal forces, ambiguous enemy forces, humanitarian/peacekeeping missions, diplomatic/political element large part of mission, extreme emphasis on force protection/casualty minimization.

- ° *Totally joint*
- ° *Heavy combined*
- ° *450k AC, constrained budget, OOTW focus*
- ° *Old equip w/MODs applied*
- ° *Functions consolidated at OSD/Joint Level especially log, acquisition, spec ops, etc.*

Army

Although the bulk of missions will be joint, combined, coalition, and/or interagency, there is a unique capability that each service, branch, country, agency brings to the effort. The **Army** brings an eminence in land warfare skills. It has been said that you can win a war by air and sea, but you can only keep it by land. The future is still envisioned to require a strong Army capable of deterring conflict, fighting to win when required, and keeping the peace. It will also be an Army capable of meeting non-traditional missions, i.e., drug enforcement and domestic disaster relief.

Land warfare will still be the primary means for culminating the world's armed conflicts. The U.S. Army must retain its edge in being the world's premier land power. Trained, read, and modernized heavy forces will be required for deterrence as well as for commitment through the complete range of military operations. Even during operations other than war, an ability to go over to conflict, and to win quickly and decisively, will be our greatest contribution.

Army Environment - About the same.

- > *Fight & Win our Nation's wars on LAND*
- > *Do anything else needed - PK/PE/Humanitarian/Drug Enforcement / Forest Fires/etc.*

Total Force Sr. Ldr. Environment

- > *More joint & combined operations*
- > *Greater flexibility/adaptability*

If this asks for characteristics, then:

- *Few in numbers: Total vis a vis now, and in number of combat arms background officers.*
- *Information mgmt smart...or else*
- *Compared to the present, less influential in ability to establish strategic direction for the Army.*
- *Inexperienced in sustained land combat*
- *Involved in internal actions to protect the security interests of the U.S.*

Warfighting must be the first skill but we will face more complexity requiring a more rounded senior leader corps.

This will also be an Army operating in a resource constrained environment. As one General saw it: "*Manpower and budget shortages will be more significant and present great challenges*". It will, therefore, be focused on "*scarce resources and stewardship of funds,*" requiring senior leaders who are adept in and understand "*business practices.*" Limited resources also applies to personnel. The Army will be in "*competition with industry for quality soldiers.*" It will, by necessity, be "*efficiency focused,*" and require senior officers who can also deal with "*bureaucracy.*"

High tempo of operations in a resource constrained environment. Several leaders will be required to balance the here and now (reality) with a very select number of visionary concepts for the future . . . "Since we can't afford everything, what do we need worse?"

- Service leaders Cbt Arms, Cbt Spt, and CSS must understand and integrate, to a much greater extent, the business aspects of running a peacetime army and how that differs from OOTW and warfighting and make that case forcefully.

Greater demands will be placed on officers to manage and deal with U.S. Government issues, joint operations and combined forces deployments. Manpower and budget shortages will be more significant and present great challenges.

- Management of resources (budgets) senior leaders need to know the "how to" as they move from BG-up; BDE-thru MACOM.

Leadership

The future will be an environment where **leadership** skills will be critical. In the Army, soldiers will always be the most important resource, i.e., the "*people equation (will) remain paramount.*" It will still take a soldier to operate the equipment. And, while technology will be an important force multiplier - it cannot replace the human force, merely enhance its capabilities. Senior leaders must guard against reliance on technology which could insulate and isolate them from their soldiers. One might respond that this leadership environment is already upon us. The difference for the future is that more than ever before, the future senior leader will be expected to operate and exhibit leadership and cooperation among the sister services, and with the non-military audience - in part to educate them, in part to work together as a team, and in part to promote and defend the case for resources. Further, the technology will have become so integrated into the unit's operation that one could lose perspective of what (technology) is in support of who (people) rather than vice versa.

The Army - and its senior leader environment - will be smaller, more efficient, and heavily reliant on information age technology. The challenge for senior leaders with information age capabilities and the ability to reach down and touch subordinates at all levels will be to avoid interfering unnecessarily at subordinate levels, yet not allowing new technology to become too far removed from soldiers.

° As political leadership tries (sic) to reestablish its moral compass and regain the public's confidence, the people of the Nation will continue to seek & respect our views as one of the institutions which works.

° Operations will be joint, combined and politically convoluted. We must be prepared to coach the elected leadership even more than now as to the consequences of alternative courses of action.

° More political-military than present, with a larger, recognized role in national leadership.

° More diverse-i.e. requiring more generalist than specialist skills-and more demanding.

° More flexible-a greater variety of positions for career development.

Dynamic, ever changing, success will be determined by information management skills, but the fundamental leadership skills will remain the foundation for success mission accomplishment . The soldier is still and will remain our most valuable resource.

WHAT SKILLS/KNOWLEDGE DO YOU FEEL SENIOR OFFICERS WILL NEED IN THE NEXT 10 TO 15 YEARS?

The senior leader environment described above is complex and multi-faceted. In the recent past, the senior leader environment was almost exclusively Army and/or Department of Defense. In the future, it will increasingly include other federal and non-government agencies, the United Nations, traditional Allies and alliances, and other countries in temporary, expedient coalition arrangements. The skills/knowledge that senior officers will need to match this complex environment will, likewise, be multi-dimensional. After reading this section, one might come to the conclusion that the General Officers must be all things to all people - e.g., *° Be able to play football with Dick Butkus during the day and dine with Maggie Thatcher that evening.*" While it may not be humanly possible for all General Officers to be so versatile, the information from this question highlights the need for general officers to have a broad breadth of skills which can be applied to all knowledge areas.

Political awareness

As noted earlier, the senior leader environment will be globally focused. Generals must therefore have a broad **understanding of the dynamics of geopolitics**. Countries/nation states will be *"interdependent"* economically, militarily, and politically/diplomatically. The military will be totally integrated into the national security arena. In the past, the military has sometimes been viewed as the instrument to implement national security strategy. In the future, it will truly function as an element in national security policymaking - where the lines between the diplomatic/political and military will blur and blend. It will be more difficult to separate national military strategy (NMS) from national security strategy (NSS). Issues and problems will reflect national interests (and U.S. interagency participation) but have multinational solutions - in the form of coalitions/alliances and international non-governmental agencies.

Senior leaders will be more effective, therefore, if they have an understanding of and a *"broad view of global security situation,"* and if they have the *"ability to work in different cultural settings and handle third world environment where bulk of "emergencies" will take*

place." The senior leader should have an understanding and perspective of the "*genesis of regional, ethnic, religious conflicts around the world and potential interagency responses or actions,*" and some "*insight into how culture drives the foreign policy of nations.*" Moreover, effectiveness in this environment will require:

Solid understanding of national strategic decision making process.

More ability to think geopolitical in order to better apply NMS into reqd capabilities.

Senior leaders will be required to function within joint, combined and interagency (unified) environments that rely on diplomacy, compromise, and consensus. Political sensitivities must be anticipated and accommodated while incrementally progressing toward U.S.-focused objectives.

They will need to be far more internationally astute. This will involve not only education in cultural peculiarities of nation's with whom they may have to deal, but more importantly the nature (operating skills, intelligence acquisitions and dissemination, concepts for combat support and service support, etc.) and national focus of the various nations. They will have to be better skilled in military-political nuances as well.

An ability to work equally well with U.S. and multinational political and military leaders.

- ° More geo/political understanding of the world.*
- ° Speak at least two languages*
- ° Joint/combined military capabilities/limitations*

Strategic Military Interface

In this global environment, the military senior leader must work effectively with sister services, other U.S. governmental and non-governmental agencies, private and public funded international organizations, and other nations. The strategic domain will be: **Joint, Combined, Coalition/Multinational, and/or Interagency oriented.** It stands to reason that the senior leader must have the requisite skills for that environment. Those competencies are not always given the same emphasis in a hierarchical military system. The senior leaders will need well honed "*ability to work equally well with U.S. and multinational political and military leaders*"

and be "politically adept and strategically competent," and utilize "skills of collaboration," "team building; pol-mil acuity or "statesmanship." This applies to sister services as well as other nation states, as evidenced in a number of the following General officer comments:

They will need to be far more internationally astute. This will involve not only education in cultural peculiarities of nation's with whom they may have to deal, but more importantly the nature (operating skills, intelligence acquisitions and dissemination, concepts for combat support and service support, etc.) and national focus of the various nations. They will have to be better skilled in military-political nuances as well.

- They should be multilingual to facilitate combined operations.

Will have to be able to function in a joint and combined environment. Must know details of capabilities and weaknesses of other services.

Appreciation of cultural differences between team members: AD, Reserves, NG, Civilians, etc, etc.

An acceptance of the Joint nature of our business and the ability to subordinate service interests to the good of the Armed Forces and National Security in their broadest sense, we will not be able to afford to do otherwise.

Conceptualizing: starting with a blank sheet of paper. Political guidance - esp. in coalition/UN ops will be scarce and late.

- Joint force capabilities and the contribution value each service brings.

- Ditto for coalition/combined-- and more difficult.

- Pol/mil/diplomatic skills invaluable.

Senior leaders will be required to function within joint, combined and interagency (unified) environments that rely on diplomacy, compromise, and consensus. Political sensitivities must be anticipated and accommodated while incrementally progressing toward U.S.-focused objectives. The division between tactical, operational, and strategic aspects of foreign policy and operational decisionmaking will be further blurred due to media access and information age technology. Mission success will depend increasingly on "how" the task is accomplished, as well as "what" is accomplished as every operational step is scrutinized and politicized.

Warfighting

The unique contribution that the Army - and the military - bring to the national security table is **warfighting**. While consensus building, compromise, and diplomacy are required for the military leader, these must be predicated upon a mastery of warfare and military power. General officers must have the *"skills to serve as joint and combined task force commanders."* In order to be *"adept at joint war-fighting"* the military officer should be *"firmly grounded in basic service combat skills."*

First and foremost - how to fight at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. All other tasks are simple functional skills if our officers possess these fundamentals. The best skill brought to a joint, combined or interagency position is the skill of the warfighter in his basic branch.

Must be solidly grounded in land warfare/land power.

Must understand the entire Army.

Must be able to contribute in joint/coalition environment.

- First & foremost, learned force warfighting skills, from tactical thru strategic.*
- Second, joint warfighting.*
- Third, combined/coalition warfighting.*
- Fourth, operations in general.*

Most will need in-depth knowledge of the skills represented in their Branch's sector of the military art. Further, they will need to understand the interlinkages of all aspects of making war or preserving peace

Many will answer this by listing coalition warfare, peacekeeping, OOTW, etc., but these will be only secondary requirements. All MEL 1s must be capable of organizing a campaign - they must understand conventional warfare. Without this strong foundation, the branches are useless.

Information Age Skills

The senior leader must be **technology literate**. This includes computers, information management, as well as high-tech, advanced weapon systems and equipment. One General indicated that *"nationalism is no longer the critical element in developing or maintaining international power in the information age, knowledge will be power."* There will be no

dearth of information available - resulting in potential information overload, if one is not careful. The effective senior leader must be able to "*define precisely true info requirements (PIR) to allow sorting thru volumes of data*" as well as having "*the ability or skill to get to the necessary info for the decision (Tact/Opns/Strategic)*" and the "*ability to manage overwhelming information.*" Information search and management are only a small part of advanced technologies senior leaders will need; they must also be "*capable of utilizing full spectrum of information age technologies (intel, cbt systems integration, C4I).*"

Technology is a fast moving train with upgrades and modifications coming almost faster than we can implement it¹³. Senior leaders must be constantly upgrading their skills "*to be able to exploit new technologies including information technology.*" To be effective, senior leaders should know "*how to operate info age systems - not get someone to do it for him (or her).*"

One must know what info he really needs to make decision because more info will be available than he will be able to utilize and could result in indecision.

*Understanding of information management in a complex environment.
Understanding of technology behind new, advanced weapons systems.
Education to know what we don't know about technology and to lead industry in the military application of the new technologies.*

Must develop the skill to think globally and quickly distill volumes of information into useful data. A disciplined mind with a total understanding of the Automation Architectures will be the most important skill & knowledge.

All must be information warriors. Must be computer literate and information managers of the highest order.

...the senior leader of 2010 will require a gamut of technical and cognitive skills to enable him to operate in the increasingly complex environment of the Information Age. Basic computer skills combined with a working knowledge of systems management will be key tools in the future Army leader's kitbag of critical skills. Technological advances in systems capabilities will drive increased reliance on completely integrated joint force packages, which, in turn, will drive a demand for leaders with Total Force, both joint and reserve, experience.

Cognitive Skills

Information is raw data. It must be analyzed and integrated to be useful for the senior leader. That process requires **thinking/cognitive skills**. Senior leaders should possess strategic, critical, multidimensional thinking abilities. They should be visionary, flexible in their styles, and be able to engage in "out of box thinking" or creative/innovative approaches to problem identification and solutions. These are skills that are applicable - and required - for every facet of the senior leader environment. Information is highly perishable. "Knowledge" of today rapidly becomes obsolete and "myth." Cognitive skills deal with "how to think," not with "what to think" which is dependent on what is known today. Thinking, however, is a necessary but not self-sufficient concept. It does not occur in a vacuum, but rather as a process transforming raw data to action. That is, the ability to think (cognitive skills) is the link between targeted information search to decisionmaking and action.

Must be able to "think outside the box" - be visionary. Today's solutions probably will not solve tomorrow's problems. Must be comfortable in the "Information Age."

An ability for creative, abstract thought that can translate into action.

Much more in-depth understanding of information mgt and ability to quickly synthesize relevant data for decision making.

- Information Skills
- Strategic Skills
- Creative Skills
- Visionary Skills
- Leadership and Managerial Skills

- ° Ability to visualize.
- ° Ability to connect disparate facts into a single logical thought.
- ° To think "outside the box."
- ° How to operate info age systems - not get someone to do it for him.
- ° Think in the long term - not just the POM years.

Able to absorb a mountain of data and pick out the 2 or 3 key items that will really make a difference.

- *Ability to garner critical info from rapid info mgt systems*
- *Neural networking*

- *Conceptual thinking in a non-linear mode*
- *Computer facile*
- *Imaginative solution-oriented*
- *Working knowledge of science and mathematics*

Communication Skills

Instant global communications is a reality today. In the future, it is anticipated that real time communications into the living rooms in the United States and around the world will continue or even intensify. As we have learned from the Vietnam through the Gulf wars, from Somalia to Los Angeles (video tapes of police brutality) and Chambersburg, PA (media footage of stockpiled military materials), the media can have a profound effect on our foreign and domestic policies. While it may not dictate policies, all forms of media can shape public opinion and affect deliberations and results in Congress. One General lamented that in the future, *"the politicians and media will have more influence than uniformed leaders."*

To be effective in the strategic environment, senior leaders should be *"skilled at all forms of communication and exploitation of media (as opposed to 'the media')"* - through the written, spoken and non-verbal modes. Television, newspapers, radio, public appearances, and Congressional testimonies can be strong vehicles to educate and persuade an audience if they are effectively utilized. When these engagements are planned, they are easier to conduct. With *"total visibility of the media,"* senior officers must be able to extemporaneously communicate and they *"must be able to think & speak with confidence and authority."*

Ability to think and act in a high tech, resource constrained environment taking into consideration the political climate and instant communications available to the media.

As the Congressional membership changes, senior officers must be more aware of making the Army more relevant to them. It is a skill to be able to "translate" what the Army does to Congressional members or staffers so they can "relate" to their briefers.

The division between tactical, operational, and strategic aspects of foreign policy and operational decisionmaking will be further blurred due to media access and information age technology. Mission success will depend increasingly on "how" the task is accomplished, as well as "what" is accomplished as every operational step is scrutinized and politicized.

° COMMUNICATION

° ABILITY TO PERSUADE

° DELEGATION

We will need to develop leaders who are as comfortable and adept at fighting a campaign on the Hill in Washington as a hill in Korea.

People Skills

"...Caring leadership - the human dimension" was what one General felt was the "cornerstone of every leader!" The basic building block of any organization is its people. As noted earlier, the future environment will demand strong leadership. Required will be the ability to use "technology, computer skills, management skills but leadership of soldiers will remain paramount." Technology and equipment are force multipliers - they make people more efficient and effective in what they do, they support people. Technology and equipment without operators are worth no more than the cost of the materials required to build them, and will never replace personnel resources.

Leadership skills which include "car(ing) for soldiers and families! (all levels)" and "the counselling and mentorship that leaders must do to build the next set of leaders," can be enhanced or diminished by technology depending on whether one uses it well, becomes a slave to it, or balances it with concern for the "human elements."

People management and communication skills, inherent requirements for leadership positions since organization of the first prehistoric hunting part, will remain the base prerequisites for future senior officers.

Leadership skills and abilities remain constant. The tools available to exercise good leadership may change, but the basic principles do not. Advanced automation and communication capabilities can multiply the positive benefits of good leadership. Similarly, the negative effects of poor leadership can be multiplied in the same way.

Managing in the information age - yet still providing LEADERSHIP. The vast amount of information, much of it relevant, will tend to keep the senior leader at the computer terminal - a not so good place to lead from.

A mentoring style to help subordinate leaders develop the same skills. A tough environment when in warfighting is a top priority but leaders are much more versatile - can handle a range of complexity.

- Must understand the enlisted soldiers and his family as well as nation security interest and how the military fits into the world situation.

We cannot continue to get smaller and do the same mission. We will burn out our young soldiers & leaders. In the next 10-15 years, our service leaders must maintain the proper balance between technology & the human elements of our Army.

Resource Management Skills

As noted above, the military will be faced with limited resources: it will be a smaller Army with accompanying "budget constraints." In this environment, the senior leader should have the "**business/economic/resource management**" skills to oversee and administer limited funds efficiently and effectively. "The ability to manage limited resources well" can reduce the amount of "productive time (senior leaders would otherwise spend) protecting or begging for resources just to survive as an institution."

They will need to gain increased skills not only in strategic warfighting and the operational art, but also better and more complete knowledge of PPBES, information warfare, media relations, strategic logistics and coalition warfare.

Senior officers will have to learn to monitor systems that enhance fiscal efficiencies in both TD&E organizations and installation operations. The days of the pure warfighter are gone due to fiscal constraints - senior officers must be multi-dimensional & conserve scarce training dollars or else readiness will suffer.

Resource management skills - particularly financial - will become increasingly important as the competition for funding - internal and external to the Army - becomes more and more intense....Choosing between competing requirements for shrinking dollars.

This environment will likely be very dynamic with unclear issues. Likely, it will continue to be resource constrained and will involve much pressure to use military forces and capabilities for non-traditional missions. It will be more joint than today and will continue to involve many physical dangers to our national security, although these dangers will probably be difficult to translate into justification for military resources.

High tempo of operations in a resource constrained environment. Several leaders will be required to balance the here and now (reality) with a very select number of visionary concepts for the future . . . "Since we can't afford everything, what do we need worse?"

Dynamic, ever changing, success will be determined by information management skills, but the fundamental leadership skills will remain the foundation for successful mission accomplishment. The soldier is still and will remain our most valuable resource.

Personal and Professional Ethics

The emerging vision of the future is one that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous - or VUCA. It is a dynamic environment, where policies and missions may be vague, and decisions must be made with incomplete or conflicting information. This situation would suggest that the senior leader should have great flexibility of action to take advantage of transient favorable conditions or limit damage (all within legal parameters). This would require that the senior leader must at times be a "risk taker." Yet, risk brings the possibility of honest error. With significant and instantaneous media oversight, however, any errors - regardless of how small or large - would become glaring evident and potentially career ending.

Senior leaders will always be called upon to make tough decisions that entail risks. Their responsibilities to their soldiers as well as to the nation may put them into ethical dilemmas. There is a continuing debate, for example, on whether the Gulf War should have been extended to allow Allied forces to seize Baghdad, how much information/access the media should have, etc. All sides can cite reasons for and against any action, and any decision/action will be questioned and scrutinized. With the unprecedented political, media, and public oversight in real time in the people's living rooms, these significant responsibilities

will be more evident and decisions will be even tougher to make. *"Senior leaders will continue to be held to a higher moral, ethical, behavioral standard than any other profession".* In this environment, innovative thought and action (which they call for above) and the conviction to carry through controversial actions can be very difficult without a **"strong ethical base."** Actions will less likely be examined and 'second guessed' if the public trusts that the senior officer exhibits **"complete honesty and unquestioned integrity."**

A firm foundation of moral and ethical values upon which to build the flexibility of thought and action.

A strong dose of moral and ethical fortitude to counter the climate described above. We need senior officers of vision and character to take our Army back from the "politicians" (not meant to be read "civilian leadership")

HOW DO USAWC GRADUATES COMPARE WITH OTHER SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE MEL-1 GRADUATES? WHAT ARE THEIR RELATIVE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES?

The intent of this question was to determine whether how well USAWC is producing and preparing officers for senior positions; not as a comparison with the other senior service colleges in a competitive atmosphere. All senior service colleges produce Military Education Level - 1 graduates (MEL-1), all capable of functioning at the strategic level. However, there are and should be differences between the senior service colleges: strategic airpower is the foundation and focal perspective of the Air War College, strategic naval power for the Navy War College, strategic landpower for the Army War College, national security strategy for the National War College, etc. This question was asked to determine how the USAWC could improve. On a general level, is the USAWC MEL-1 graduate able to function as well as MEL-1 graduates from other senior service colleges? Do we have the correct focus? Do USAWC MEL-1 graduates have a distinctive focus on landpower that makes them unique?

Overall, all SSC's prepare officers well for follow-on, higher level positions. Two general officers described SSC graduates thusly:

Graduates compare favorably (with other senior service college graduates). There seems to be no specific differences noted in performance of duty. What is clear, is that officers educated at any War College level institution are better prepared to serve at higher level staff jobs.

I see no appreciable differences. All SSCs follow a very similar curriculum of force development, military strategy, and campaign planning. There is more commonality than differences.

There are, however, differences in the strengths and weaknesses (relatively speaking) of graduates from the various schools. These differences may be due to more or less emphasis on specific topics in the curriculum and/or to the composition of the student body. The USAWC is composed of over 60% Regular Army officers, giving seminar discussions a distinctive Active Army flavor. With 200 Regular Army LTCs and COLs, networking among

the Army officers is enhanced. The curriculum also emphasizes landpower in relation to jointness in supporting and executing the national military strategy. In comparison, the National War College - which is primarily focused on national security strategy - is much stronger on jointness of the sister services. The student body composition is also more equally divided among the three (four - if one differentiates the Marines from the Naval component) services - encouraging more networking among the services.

USAWC graduates are better versed in "basic Army knowledge and role in land operations" (i.e., landwarfare, operational art). They are also rated to have strengths as "decision makers, focused leaders, disciplined," "make better generals," and a "good capacity to plan and think through an issue." The relatively large number of Army officers in the class fosters "network(ing) with other Army officers you will work in future with." Finally, the holistic emphasis on the total person is thought to provide a "broad base" which "does a better job on the 'whole leader'."

USAWC grads better equipped to deal w/Army as opposed to joint issues. Army contacts gained thru class networking is single most valuable benefit. Likewise NWC grads are better equipped for joint duty. Unavoidable, given the composition and nature of both schools.

While the education at all senior service college programs is outstanding, the environment at USAWC adds a positive dimension that is not replicated at any other school. ICAF and NWC students communicate and deal with the hassles of Washington, D.C. The Air and Naval War College programs push the academic side too sternly. The year at the Army War College was my best in the Army, personally and professionally, because service to nation, obligation to family, and spiritual needs were all put in perspective.

I have never observed an instance where the identity of the war college could be linked to a specific strength or weakness in a particular officer. I suspect that NWC/ICAF graduates are stronger in "jointness" because of the considerable networking across services whereas the AWC fosters a similar network primarily within the Army. My perception is that all of the war colleges are on a similar azimuth.

USAWC graduates make good Army senior leaders and others, especially, the National War College prepare graduates better for Joint and Interagency assignments.

- *Compare favorably.*
- *Weakness-too green-not enough familiarity with other services and what they bring to the total fight.*
- *Strengths-strategic and critical thinking; land force organization and deployment.*

Solid base for Army assignments. Perhaps less well prepared for acquisition assignments, Joint, & Combined. Other schools do some specializing more in these areas than AWC. I am not advocating a change - because I feel other schools may not provide as broad a base as AWC.

- *They are, as a general rule, not as broadly based as students in the Joint schools such as ICAF and NWC.*
- *They do not get the opportunity to travel as much and interact with senior personnel in other services, other theaters, and industry.*
- *Strength...They understand Army warfighting operations very well.*

Well prepared from the Army perspective. Need a better view and understanding of joint and coalition topics and interagency workings within the U.S. Government. Need to understand how long-range planning and budgeting are actually accomplished/influenced in DoD.

One of the key advantages I found from being a USAWC graduate is the friendships and contacts with my fellow classmates. They have grown to be the Army's senior leaders and I feel my job is somewhat easier when I am working issues with former classmates. I now do a lot of work with the Army Acquisition Corps officers. When selected for Senior Service College, I always recommend the USAWC because they will get to know the key leaders who will be their customers. I think USAWC grads are #1.

*Strengths - appreciation of Army policies, capabilities, and values.
Weaknesses (relatively) - understanding of joint/combined ops.*

USAWC graduates are well trained in almost every subject that the war colleges offer. USAWC does not provide the political insight and joint force understanding that students at the NWC receive. The issue is student population, not curriculum.

HOW DO YOU THINK THE USAWC COULD IMPROVE TO BEST PREPARE SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS?

General officers are often in the best position to offer guidance on how the USAWC can better prepare senior Army officers for post-USAWC assignments. First, LTC and COL graduates are likely to work directly for or closely with general officers. In this capacity, Generals are able to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of graduates and, therefore, able to suggest improvements for our curriculum. This assessment gives USAWC some information on how we did in the past - how we prepared the graduates for today. The second, and more important, piece of information from the Generals is on the future. Knowing the kinds of skills they need today and extrapolating into the future, the Generals can give us information on how to prepare leaders for tomorrow. This question (along with the questions above) are an attempt to get both types of information.

The data from the Generals fall into two categories: (a) what topics (content) to teach to best prepare Army officers, and (b) what methods are best to teach them. What improvements to the content can the USAWC pursue? A number of the Generals felt the USAWC was doing a good job *"by doing what you are doing...that is, thinking now about the 4th USAWC" or "evolving."* Still, there is *"always room for improvement (even if the bottomline is you're doing a lot of things right.)"* There is a recognition that the future is complex and *"because of the myriad changes in the Army & the world, I don't know if you can 'best' prepare anymore."* If that is the case, it is no wonder that a number of Generals felt that the USAWC should *"maintain the flexibility to adjust courses based on the demands of future assignments,"* and *"keep a healthy number of electives so we can continue to produce a broad spectrum of leaders."* Regardless of what changes occur, cognitive skills are going to be required. In fact, the more things change, the more cognitive skills (i.e., *"how to think"* and *"thinking out of the box"*) will be key to strategic effectiveness.

There were numerous additional General officer suggestions on this question. They ranged from having a reducing to increasing the number of students, from *"greater portion (of the curriculum) dedicated to developing character"* to a *"stronger RC focus including RC of the other services"* and *"installation management."* Each of the suggestions can be found

in Appendix D. The most frequently mentioned areas were (a) providing a "broad based" curriculum, (b) joint/combined/coalition warfighting, (c) general cognitive skills (i.e., how to think, thinking out of the box, decisionmaking), (d) utilization of technology and information management, and (e) global political-military issues.

Foster Strategic Thinking - FOCUS OUTSIDE MOTHER ARMY in International, Interagency, Joint Arena.

Maintain a general focus. Keep an integrated curriculum that includes military art, with political, world economics, cultural and historical perspectives. The senior officer must know how to use the above information to craft a plan to achieve a strategic objective.

Get all aspects of AWC focused more broadly; curriculum, faculty, outside speakers and visits. Must look at all elements of national power and its coordinated use by national leaders/leadership.

Make sure you are producing intellectually capable officers with a joint focus and able to be very effective for the Army and the joint staff in the interagency policy arena. Not diplomats but soldier-diplomats.

Continue to add jointness to the program without decreasing land power learning.

More emphasis on warfighting

- Land warfare*
- Joint warfighting*
- Multinational warfighting*

Allow them to think, understand and formulate logical solutions to abstract ideas.

Challenge student thinking/assumptions. Expose them to multiple view points, in the past we have been reluctant to deviate from main stream thinking.

I would not want to 'teach' ambiguity, but perhaps we could seek ways to leave issues open-ended on occasion, but rigorous analysis and bottom-line focus are strengths that should not be compromised.

Treating information as a key force multiplier - providing more knowledge on maximizing this key asset.

Focus on management of information in the digital and computer age. The Senior Army Commander in 2010 must be able to discuss the difference between what is important and what isn't, what is "real" and what isn't, and how to harness a decision making process in this environment.

- o More hands on joint & combined experience during course.*
- o More knowledge on preparation for operations in smaller third world countries with no infrastructure.*

Concentrate on studies and exercises dealing with multinational (deployments initially for warfighting then progressing to peacemaking) enforcement and nation building. Field trips for selected students and faculty should be considered.

The second broad category of General Officer suggestions falls into the area of learning or teaching methods. They suggested more lectures from experts, more TDY's, more writing/research, case studies, and exercises. Regardless of the topics they suggested, the common thread among the methods is that they are all forms of "experiential" learning. Learning from experts is a form of vicarious experiential learning - i.e., the students live the experience through the eyes of the "actor." TDY's, case studies and exercises/simulations provide hands-on lessons for the students. The key is that students would be able to apply what they learned.

Have them write...research papers...not 3 to 5 page "think" piece. There is a place for "think" pieces and should be used, but not at the expense of crowding out the time for fifteen to twenty-five thousand word papers that require students to think deeply about a subject area.

- o Lots of Case Studies--wide variety of topics -- Economic, political military -- more contemporary in nature.*
- o More exposure to the combined world -- guest lectures and seminars -- especially contemporary "hot spots"*
- o Teach seminar staff problem solving techniques*
- o Papers/write lots of papers*

- 1. Understand how recommendations we make to Congress must be relevant to their political interests - do some exercises on real issues with real staffers.*
- 2. Must improve on giving officer operational level warfighting experience in execution, not just planning.*

More of the same - Broaden students through reading, seminars, writing papers, guest speakers. Teaching application through exercises - pol-mil, national decision making, CINC -level joint warfighting. Continue to focus on graduates who have "balance" in their lives (fitness, family, spiritual as well as professional)

I must say that the WC must try to put the students into an application environment more where some level of experimental learning is achieved.

The USAWC Vision:
USAWC

...the nation's preeminent center for strategic leadership and landpower
...a learning institution
...preparing today's leaders for tomorrow's challenges
...pursuing mastery of the strategic art through education, research, and outreach.

**FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE, WHAT SHOULD THE USAWC
DO TO ACHIEVE THIS VISION?**

A vision "is the leader focused, organizational process which gives the organization its sense of purpose, direction, energy, and identity¹⁴." It is also "an image of a future state (and) a process the organization uses to guide future development¹⁵."

The USAWC vision (above) is, therefore, both a process and a goal. We are not yet there but this is the dynamic destination. While there is a strategic plan to achieve this vision, we welcome input from interested parties. There were numerous suggestions from the Generals. All of the suggestions are at Appendix E of this report. A number of the Generals felt the USAWC should "*Continue to do what you do so well.*" They believe that USAWC is "*on track*" to achieving the vision. They also advise, however, that while "*no major shifts*" are currently required, the USAWC should "*stay current and lean forward in the foxhole toward the future,*" "*continue to refine the curriculum to prepare graduates to meet the needs of the Army in the future operational environment. Do not remain static.*" They stressed the need for USAWC to keep evolving and adapting, to "*stay the course - make minor course corrections as conditions obviously change,*" and "*keep pace with the world in which we live!*"

Other actions that the General Officers feel will be needed to achieve this vision include: (a) teaching and thinking "joint;" (b) having the "best qualified staff and faculty" - to include guest speakers; (c) looking 'outside the Army' to gather and utilize ideas and information from Allies, industry, "*other learning centers, e.g., - Marshall & Nimitz Centers,*" and sister senior service colleges; (d) "*increas(ing) the challenge of the institution,*" and (e) utilizing technology in a distributive training program for continual education, exchange of

ideas and feedback from all sources. Much of this is already occurring as part of the current USAWC strategic plan, and this information provides the consensual validation that we are on the 'right' paths.

I think that is what this survey is about - USAWC needs to stay attuned to the environment and needs of the Army for its senior leaders and adapt accordingly. No major shifts required. You do this well now. Resist the notion of specialization - few senior leaders have that luxury but have instead ever increasing complexity to sort through.

- *Develop the finest professional faculty possible.*
- *Stay in touch with the changing world.*
- *Learn from our allies. America is a world leader, but we don't have a corner on the idea market*

- *Integrate efforts with those of other SSC,--perhaps trading instructors and specific courses.*
- *Insure integration of joint training with Army component instruction.*

Resist the natural tendency to reiterate Army doctrine as "the" solution. Encourage and even insist on looking outward across the international arena to compare and contrast our strengths and weaknesses. Teach the strategic value of marketing the advantages of a share, Army to the nation and political leaders..

I believe it is doing this today.

- *AWC might want to consider a "second year" course of research/study by a few hand selected colonels to publish various pieces on strategic leadership.*
- *To be the nation's preeminent center for military study, far greater emphasis on joint service operations is a must.*

- *Recognized quality in faculty.*
- *Curriculum that evolves/adapts to current and forecasted requirements.*
- *Attract national/international symposiums to pursue the tough issues.*
- *Continue Parameters and continue education initiatives.*

Ride the technological wave. Select quality officers for your faculty. Enforce demanding standards. Aim for sophisticated level of understanding - force students to reach.

- ° *Probably increase your percentage of civilian permanent faculty.*
- ° *Establish faculty chairs to target your outreach program, e.g. NGO chair.*
- ° *Rigorous academics.*
- ° *Be more joint.*

AWC graduates will be preparing options/advice for the national leadership on strategic matters and exercise of land power. Graduates need to know the Army's role, as well as the role of other DOD, other USG and NGOs in performing these missions in a coordinated way. AWC graduates should be the experts on the Army's role in these matters. Prepare for tomorrow's challenges--anticipate what changes may be--technically;--politically (externally) understand how long-term planning and budgeting today can affect/reduce challenges of tomorrow.

Think we should include operational art as practiced by corps commanders. Would incorporate leadership tools from several different venues. Would include what we're doing at LOTP at NTC, techniques employed in software firms like Bill Gates a Microsoft, etc.

I think you are right on target - continue to expose the students to the best possible guest speakers, integrate the media and other non-federal governmental agencies into the curriculum and stay flexible. Continue to pursue a broad-gauged graduate who is capable of meeting tomorrow's uncertain environment with confidence.

CONTINUING EDUCATION

The USAWC is considering conducting a program of "continuing education" for graduates and senior military leaders. From your perspective, how should this program be implemented, i.e., what form should it take, what would be of most benefit to you?

Few, if any, General Officers question the value of continuing their professional education and development throughout their careers. While On-the-Job Training (OJT) is a most effective form of continuing education, the Generals recognize that they may "*need a way to be exposed to broader, enduring, important subject matter.*" A program which would help them "*remain fresh and vital in conducting their duties*" or "*reinforce the senior service school educational experience*" would be valuable to these officers.

Education and professional development can come in many different forms: from formal educational systems ((i.e., another course) to self-development (i.e., recommended reading lists) to informal (i.e., chats and discussions on the electronic highway). The suggestions from the Generals were in all of the above categories. The three most frequently cited were: (1) short seminars, (2) exportable correspondence/distance learning programs - primarily through the electronic medium, and (3) recommended readings. Following are some of the verbatim suggestions.

Short Seminars

The best vehicle for continuing education would be through conferences or seminars. The best length would be 3-5 days in length or over a Friday, Saturday, Sunday. Center conference around a theme/idea and bring in experts or Army officers to present lessons learned, etc. Provide ample time to dialogue and debate the issues. Much is gained through discourse.

...weekend seminars...discussions with key leaders - in and out of uniform; update sessions on current issues from a strategic standpoint.

First, good. Needed. Probably a series of short courses/seminars with first class instructors-mentors. At least some will have to be done as a road show. They will have to be short (3 days?) and keyed to the issues of the day that appear to be shaping events for the next 1-5 years. Use retired community, senior officials from Govt, industry, academic, etc.

...3-5 day seminars on specific topics. Invite those most deeply involved and those who most need to learn.

A two-week seminar every other year to bring senior leaders up to speed on current issues with a focus on where we are going in the next 5 to 10 years - maybe run it four times a year to cover the GOs.

Best forum would be hosting 2-3 day topical seminars to bring people back every year or two.

Distance Education Through Correspondence/VTC

Series of correspondence courses from which an interested officer could select based upon personal, professional requirements.

A program of exportable packages, eventually evolving into interactive PC-based programs, would be a most effective method of keeping graduates "up to speed" on evolving strategic and doctrinal concepts.

CD ROMs - that have lectures, guest speakers and menu of subjects that can be chosen by the student.

Seminars on selected subjects with notices to the field. Hold them using VTC available at most installations. These could be one way informative (lectures) or interactive.

Hyper-linked, interdisciplinary database that is accessible through the Worldwide Web. Take advantage of technology to become a center for distance learning. Sr. commanders discussion page (on the Web).

Recommended Readings

Bi-monthly list of suggested readings mailed to enrollees. Bi-monthly "early-bird" type anthology of magazines, newspaper articles.

Monthly or quarterly readings on a variety of subjects. Need to ensure whatever program that is developed does not become burdensome. Our rucksacks are full!

Provide a quarterly "executive summary" of critical points made during the current block of instruction at USAWC. Include short section on books, articles, or published speeches that USAWC grads should try to read. Offer it in paper and via a USAWC Homepage on Internet.

Already "max'ed out" with reading material and "take home" work. Two areas would help: (1) access to an electronic bulletin board which permits entry to current reference data/articles at USAWC; (2) periodic seminars for general officers on Army core areas as prescribed by the CSA.

The reality is, however, that *"continuing education requires time,"* and that *"senior leaders have too much to do now."* Time is of the essence for General Officers. *"Senior officers are already overburdened with duty requirements; they will seek out the continuing education needed to remain fresh and vital in conducting their duties."* Any program, therefore, that USAWC might consider should be voluntary, of short duration (or requiring small chunks of General Officer time), and offer information on topics which are *"relevant to the next 1-5 years," "contemporary, current issues,"* and *"thought pieces."* The consensus among the officers is that if seminars, courses, symposia are offered, they should be no more than one week in duration (with shorter sessions preferable - i.e., over a weekend or 2-3 days); and readings should be short, *"summarized info"* (executive summaries or "Readers Digest type condensed versions of certain books"). Anything which would *"minimize the time requirements"* for the Generals would make a continuing education system more palatable.

There was a small number of officers (16) who questioned the need for another continuing education program. They felt that there are already a number of formal and informal continuing education programs currently available to the Generals. They cited on-the-job training (OJT) as one of the most effective programs, as well as courses offered through the *"Harvard program - Capstone,"* and professional journals which seek to update and broaden the Generals' horizons, even from the USAWC. Parameters, is described *"as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs."* From their perspective, continuing education is primarily an individual responsibility. Offering an additional program will only be effective if the officer chooses to avail him/herself of it.

After he departs AWC, the officer will have ample opportunity to keep current JFQ, Parameters, MR, plus a plethora of scholarly journals and articles are readily available. It's up to the individual to take advantage. The good ones will. The others will not and ignore what you provide them.

Senior officers are already overburdened with duty requirements; they will seek out the continuing education needed to remain fresh and vital in conducting their duties.

This is a need few would disagree with. The reality, though, is that we are all fully capable of continuing our own education - and those who wish to, do so quite well. Most senior officers spend so much time at their jobs, however, that they simply don't read as they should. Your proposal would establish another requirement on a long list of things we would all like to do.

STRATEGIC ART: What is it? How do you identify it?

One of the three purposes of the USAWC is: *"to educate Senior Leaders in the Strategic Art from a landpower perspective"* (Curriculum Pamphlet: Academic Year 1997). We have defined Strategic Art as *"the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to promote and defend the nation's interests"* (Leading and Managing in the Strategic Arena: A Reference Text, 1996-1997, p. 45). Therefore, *"masters of the strategic art are those alone who can competently integrate and combine the three roles performed by the complete strategist: the strategic leader, strategic practitioner, strategic theorist"* (Chilcoat, 1996).¹⁶

The consensus among the Generals is that "strategic art" is the complex, multi-dimensional PROCESS of the application of strategy to promote national interests. From their comments, it is evident that they view strategic art less as a "study of strategy", and more as the **application** of strategy to resolve problems, an area *"where theory meets a very messy reality, and intellect and ethics apply stuff and power to WIN decisively at least cost."* In their words, it is:

The ability to bridge national strategic objective into national military strategy and then into strategic plans. It takes strategic theory into practice. The "how to" apply strategic concepts by real world situations.

It is the ability to integrate National and/or Alliance resources towards a stated goal or objective. This brings into effect governmental, nongovernmental and privately owned organizations, as well as armed forces of the participating nations.

Understanding the political process, the National Military command process - our capabilities and limitations - and influencing it all so it makes sense and applies the right force at the right time to meet the strategic aims of the nation.

In its broadest sense, I believe that strategic art is the multidimensional development, synchronization and application of those ends, ways, and means required to support the national interests as determined by the national command authority."

There are several components in the above statement: first, it is conducted at the national 'strategic' level. Strategic arts are practiced at the higher levels in the national military security chain of command. In a continuum, the tactical level refers to Division and Corps level, Operational - Joint Task Force/Corps to Theater (CINC), and Strategic - Theater (CINC) through National Military Strategy (CJCS) to National Security Strategy (NSA). Those who execute the strategic art become the link which puts the military on an equal plane with the economic and diplomatic/political elements. In this context, the strategy goals are broader, have more implications, and integrate all elements of national power.

I believe additional analysis is needed to properly define and separate the strategic level from the operational and tactical levels. The levels of war could be better defined through the examination of a combination of three major factors: the context within which activities or operations are conducted, to include the consequences of success or failure; the level of authority or responsibility of the practitioner; and finally by the nature of tasks or activities performed, sequence or orchestrated. In general, the ends, ways, and means need to be better scoped and defined at each level to facilitate proper doctrinal development. The key aspect that separates operational art from strategic art is found in the ends, ways, and means. Only at the strategic level can the strategic artist have the freedom or authority to establish the "ends." At the operational and tactical level, the ends are specified and/or framed by the next higher level. Within our doctrine, "strategic" is the highest level and the strategic ends thus provide the rationale and purpose for all operational campaigns employing the national elements of power to achieve strategic objectives. The quintessential task of strategic art is the selection of the "ends" consistent with the "means" available and the devisal (sp) of feasible, politically palatable and nationally sustainable "ways."

First, it's not operational art, but it may be close to a complement. To me, it's the arrangement and coordination of all (applicable) forms of national power and influence to achieve strategic goals - strategic defined as overriding, even defining, national goals and interests.

Next level above "Operational Art" where there is more visible impact from the political/diplomatic factors than from the military factors of the situation.

Second, the process transcends the military. It requires that the master of the strategic art (strategic artist) be able to conceptually integrate (and plan for the utilization of) the

resources from the three instruments of national power: military, economic, and diplomatic/political.

The capability that encompasses the sense and feel for the application of military power in concert with other elements of national/coalition power toward some decisive goal or objective.

The process of bringing the national resources to bear effectively for an emergent crisis. More and more the resources involve political, economic, and military. Tomorrow leaders must have prowess with all.

The ability of the military practitioner to harness and harmonize the military contribution w/ that of the other USG (government) agencies to achieve America's Political goals. Apply this in general & in specific instances.

Third, the process requires that the strategic artist have the requisite cognitive skills (critical, conceptual, creative) that will enable him/her to effectively integrate all elements into one cohesive strategy. In order to understand the issues and the global situation, develop plans of action and implement/execute the plans requires the strategic artist to have vision, to think broadly and deeply about the issues, to understand the immediate, interactive, and ancillary effects of any action (or inaction), and to lead and motivate soldiers "from the foxhole to the NMS."

Knowing how to think and conceptualize globally and develop innovative solutions to national security challenges in the future.

The intellectual, practical, and leadership skills to develop strategies, formulate implementing programs/plans, assess/measure risk, and monitor execution/feedback. Additionally includes the capacity to work strategic branches/sequels in a parallel fashion.

Ability to view global issues holistically including political, economics, psychological and military and devise a planned effect, developed thru experience and education.

The ability to think creatively and critically, to conceptualize a plan in support of national objectives, and to take action to implement.

ENDNOTES

1. Scheirer, M.A. (1994). Designing and Using Process Evaluation. In J. S. Wholey, H. P. Hatry, and K. E. Newcomer (Eds.) Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation (pp. 40 -68). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Process evaluation techniques are aimed at "the delivery of programs." How well does the program do what it is intended to do? This is an assessment of how the "process" works. Measures of customer service and operations or procedures are some examples of process evaluation: How many people were serviced in a given time? Is the operation efficient and/or effective for producing 'x'?

2. Scriven, M. (1967). The Methodology of Evaluation. In R. W. Tyler, R. M. Gagne', and M. Scriven (Eds.), Perspectives of Curriculum Evaluation, AERA Monograph Series on Curriculum Evaluation, No. 1. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally & Co.

3. Patton, M. Q. (1986). Utilization-Focused Evaluation. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Press.

4. Some Defense schools gather effectiveness data by surveying their graduates' supervisors 6 to 12 months following graduation.

5. The average years of service for Army officers attending the USAWC is 19-20 years. Assuming an educational payback of 2 years and a mandatory retirement at 30 years of service, the officer can be expected to serve between 2 - 10 years after graduating from USAWC.

6. Curriculum Pamphlet, Academic Year 1997, Carlisle, PA: USAWC, p. 6.

7. Curriculum Pamphlet, Academic Year 1997, Carlisle, PA: USAWC, p. 6.

8. A history of the evolution of the U.S. Army War College can be found in: Ball, H.P. (1984). Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College. Carlisle, PA: The Alumni Association of the United States Army War College; and Pappas, G. S. (1967). Prudens Futuri: The U.S. Army War College 1901-1967. Carlisle, PA: The Alumni Association of the United States Army War College.


9. Curriculum Pamphlet: Academic Year 1997. USAWC: Carlisle, PA.

10. DA Pamphlet, FM 100-5. Operations. Page 2-2.

11. See Nogami, G. Y. (1996). What is this thing called strategic vision? In U.S. Army War College Selected REadings: Course 1: Strategic Leadership (Academic Year 1997) (pp.200-209). Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College.

12. *"We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and these interests it is our duty to follow."* Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston. Speech in the House of Commons on foreign policy (March 1, 1848).

13. Take, for example, the micro-processing chip: the Pentium. When the Pentium chip was available, many people and organizations ordered it. However, before it could even be delivered and installed, an upgrade was announced.
14. FM 22-103: Strategic Leadership (Draft). Chapter 3: Strategic Vision (p. 78).
15. FM 22-103: Strategic Leadership.(Draft) Chapter 3: Strategic Vision. 1996.
16. Chilcoat, R.A. (1995). "Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders" in Leading and Managing in the Strategic Arena: A Reference Text 1996-1997. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College (pp. 17-18).



**USAWC INTO THE FUTURE:
SURVEY OF GENERAL OFFICERS**

UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

OCTOBER 1995

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Indicate all answers to Questions 1 through 55 on the enclosed SCANTRON form by filling in the appropriate numbered space.
2. Select only ONE answer to each question.
3. Use a Number 2 pencil on the SCANTRON.
4. If you make a mistake, erase the mark completely before entering a new answer.
5. Questions A to H are for your comments and suggestions. Please write your responses on this questionnaire.
6. Your responses will be treated as confidential. Data will be aggregated into statistical summaries to ensure confidentiality of responses. There will be no identification by individual data.
7. Should you find any question objectionable, leave that answer space blank and go on to the next question.
8. Upon completion of survey, please return the entire questionnaire and scantron sheet in the self-addressed return envelope provided.

PART I. EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES

The educational objectives of the USAWC academic program are listed below. In your opinion, how well does USAWC accomplish the following for our graduates? Please use the scale below for this section (Questions 1 through 25).

Very Poorly A	Poorly B	Fair C	Well D	Very Well E
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HOW WELL DOES USAWC PREPARE SENIOR OFFICERS TO:

1. work in a strategic environment?
2. apply landpower in support of the U.S. national military strategy?
3. set an ethical climate in your service/organization?
4. be physically fit?
5. be mentally fit?
6. deal with problems which have no clear cut solutions?
7. be an innovator/initiator of policy?
8. succeed in positions of broad scope and responsibility?
9. assess/plan for the future while executing in the present?
10. think conceptually?
11. think critically?
12. think strategically?
13. think creatively?
14. understand the role of the military in a democratic society?
15. be adept in the employment of military forces to achieve national objectives?
16. advise the National Command Authorities on the use of military forces to achieve national objectives?
17. make informed decisions and give sound advice?
18. provide a frame of reference which recognizes the complexity of the issues dealt with, but also provides the perspective to work through them to find solutions?

Very Poorly	Poorly	Fair	Well	Very Well
A	B	C	D	E

HOW WELL DOES USAWC PREPARE SENIOR OFFICERS TO:

19. serve in an organization involving joint forces?
20. serve in an organization involving multinational forces?
21. write theater campaign plans using unified, joint, or multinational forces?
22. apply strategic thought process to the U.S. national security decisionmaking process?
23. analyze threats and other factors which affect U.S. interests in various global regions?
24. understand how strategy is translated into force requirements and how those requirements are converted into capabilities?
25. translate national military strategy into theater strategies to accomplish national security objectives?

=====

The following sections include attitudes about the U.S. Army War College curriculum. Using the scale below, indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
A	B	C	D	E

PART II: CURRICULUM AND FOCUS

26. USAWC curriculum covers the right subjects for senior officer development.
27. The USAWC should be a "total" experience, not just academics.
28. Academics should be the only focus at USAWC.
29. USAWC should produce officers who have a wide breadth of knowledge.
30. USAWC should produce officers who have depth of knowledge in specialized areas.

The following sections include attitudes about the U.S. Army War College curriculum. Using the scale below, indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements.

Strongly Disagree A	Disagree B	Neutral C	Agree D	Strongly Agree E
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- 31. USAWC should be producing generalists (and not specialists).
- 32. USAWC graduates are better prepared for senior officer responsibilities than other service war college graduates.
- 33. USAWC is the best senior service school for Army officers.
- 34. USAWC is a worthwhile investment in people and money.
- 35. USAWC prepares officers well for a joint assignment.
- 36. USAWC prepares officers well for an Army assignment.
- 37. I would recommend USAWC over other service war colleges to my subordinates.
- 38. All Army Colonels should be MEL-1.

=====

Use the following scale for this section.

Not at all A	Slight Extent B	Moderate Extent C	Great Extent D	Very Great Extent E
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To what extent should the USAWC curriculum focus on the following areas:

- 39. joint warfighting skills?
- 40. land warfighting skills?
- 41. political/diplomatic skills?
- 42. combined/coalition warfighting skills?
- 43. strategic thinking?
- 44. information warfare skills?
- 45. interagency operations skills?

PART III. OVERALL IMPRESSIONS

46. Based on current regulations and practices, which group of officers would benefit most from USAWC?
- A. LTC
 - B. LTC(P)
 - C. COL
 - D. COL(P)
 - E. BG
47. In your opinion, graduates of which senior service college get the best career enhancing assignments?
- A. Army War College (USAWC)
 - B. USAWC - Senior Service College Fellows
 - C. Air War College
 - D. Naval War College
 - E. National War College
 - F. Industrial College of the Armed Forces
 - G. All about the same
48. In your opinion, graduates of which senior service college are best prepared for joint assignments?
- A. Army War College (USAWC)
 - B. USAWC - Senior Service College Fellows
 - C. Air War College
 - D. Naval War College
 - E. National War College
 - F. Industrial College of the Armed Forces
 - G. All about the same
49. In your opinion, graduates of which senior service college are best prepared for Army assignments?
- A. Army War College (USAWC)
 - B. USAWC - Senior Service College Fellows
 - C. Air War College
 - D. Naval War College
 - E. National War College
 - F. Industrial College of the Armed Forces
 - G. All about the same

PART IV. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

50. What is your primary branch?

- A. Combat Arms
- B. Combat Support
- C. Combat Service Support
- D. Health Services
- E. Other

51. What is your status or component?

- A. Retired
- B. Regular Army
- C. Army National Guard
- D. Army Reserves

52. What is the source of your original commission?

- A. USMA
- B. Army ROTC
- C. Army Officer Candidate School
- D. Direct Commission
- E. Other

53. Through which program did you receive your MEL-1?

- A. Army War College
- B. Senior Service College Fellowship
- C. National War College
- D. Industrial College of the Armed Forces
- E. Naval War College
- F. Air War College
- G. Foreign Service College
- H. Do not have MEL-1

54. What is your current rank?

- A. COL(P)
- B. BG
- C. MG
- D. LTG
- E. GEN
- F. Retired

55. What is your current level of assignment?

- A. Coalition
- B. Combined
- C. Joint
- D. Service Staff
- E. MACOM
- F. Corps
- G. Division
- H. Other

This concludes the SCANTRON portion of the survey.

Part V may be answered directly on this survey.

D. How do you think the USAWC could be improved to BEST prepare senior Army officers?

E. The USAWC Vision:

USAWC

...the nation's preeminent center for strategic leadership and landpower

...a learning institution

...preparing today's leaders for tomorrow's challenges

...pursuing mastery of the strategic art through education, research, and outreach.

From your perspective, what should the USAWC do to achieve this vision?

F. The USAWC is considering conducting a program of "**Continuing Education**" for graduates and senior military leaders. From your perspective, how should this program be implemented, i.e., what form should it take, what would be of most benefit to you? Please explain.

G. From your perspective, what is "**Strategic Art**"?

H. Additional comments and suggestions.

Thank you for your participation.

Please send this entire questionnaire and the scantron back to:

U.S. Army War College
ATTN: DAA (General Officer Survey)
Carlisle, PA 17013-5050

GO SURVEY
PART V: FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND NEEDS

A. From your perspective, what will the Army and the Total Force senior leader environment be in the year 2010?

- ° World of increased ethnic tensions with "have" vs "have not" confrontation
- ° Strategic environment with increased nuclear and WMD proliferation - to include WMD threat from terrorist organizations
- ° Information warfare capabilities providing unparalleled understanding of friendly/enemy situations worldwide
- ° Emergence of Islamic Fundamentalist threat to western values/interests
- ° Decreasing resources for National Defense requirements.

- ° Totally joint
- ° Heavy combined
- ° 450k AC, constrained budget, OOTW focus
- ° Old equip w/MODs applied
- ° Functions consolidated at OSD/Joint Level especially log, acquisition, spec ops, etc.

Decision making based upon volumes of information available through desktop and portable computer systems. Sr. leaders will always be "plugged in" and immediately available for consult, discussion, decisions via internet.

Land warfare will still be the primary means for culminating the world's armed conflicts. The U.S. Army must retain its edge in being the world's premier land power. Trained, ready, and modernized heavy forces will be required for deterrence as well as for commitment through the complete range of military operations. Even during operations other than war, an ability to go over to conflict, and to win quickly and decisively, will be our greatest contribution.

Based upon my observations in the Far East, and the most recent deployments in Haiti, Africa and the Balkans we will find ourselves operating more frequently in a Joint and combined environment required to effectively execute missions in a "Peacetime Engagement" role. Coalition building and combined operations will not get easier.

Smaller, technologically challenged, and efficiency focused.

More complex, faster moving national and international environment where the military element of national power will be further integrated with growing economic and extant political national power. Increasing ethical complexity based upon perceived/real cultural/moral decline and the continuing press of technology upon the human machine.

Clearly an environment demanding that we do more with less. Ability to inactive in joint (?) capacity will be critical. Knowledge and expertise across service boundaries will be key.

Joint & multinational - techno focused.

The force will be more joint and will most likely operate in a combined or coalition environment.

Technology will allow more direct communication with the most senior leaders who will have more direct influence on day to day operations and action of less senior leaders. Senior leaders will have had less time with troops and more joint assignments due to requirements to become joint qualified to advance.

Senior leaders must be knowledgeable of all service warfighting capabilities, to include C² IW. The scope and reality of seeing the battlefield and applying all capabilities to achieve inconsistent and ill-defined objectives will continue to challenge senior leaders. To communicate commander's intent to the soldier will always be a challenge.

Require the officer to be more adept at joint and coalition warfighting.

Joint and Combined.

Smaller, joint/coalition warfare focus, greater dependence on information technology, working constantly within constrained resource environment, many OOTW challenges.

- Digital
- Operating in a virtual environment
- May be more stressful
- High optempo
- May be more impersonal

Many of the same skills with more emphasis on information management.

- ° Larger Battle spaces
- ° Greater amounts of information available much faster. Leaders must have a greater capability to cope with the "who, what, when, where and why" to effectively use this information.

An environment that places a premium on ability to fight joint & combined operations, dominating battle space in an information age. Further, peace operations around the globe will require mastery of supporting skills to support such operations.

Uncertainty & competing priorities will continue.

Our forces will be small and we will be engaged in more peace keeping and peace making operations. Humanitarian assistance will also be a significant aspect of our mission.

- Very Joint!
- JTFs
- Interagency important

Much greater requirement for diversity, jointness, combined operations and interagency operations.

Joint, combined, peacekeeping, high tech but limited resources, legalistic - heavy on rules and structure, limited flexibility, extreme accountability and oversight.

JOINT, HIGH TECH and confusing. It will be an environment where the separation between diplomatic, strategic, operational & tactical levels of war is nonexistent. We will operate in all levels at the same time.

Small more Lethal Force. Wide range of msns (missions) to include deterrence, warftg (warfighting), & OOTW. Very fast technological cycles of great impact on acqn (acquisition). People equation remain paramount.

Joint, combined, multinational and interagency. How senior leaders from US military respond in this environment is critical to success.

Dick - I'll come visit you and discuss in person...important project...I commend you for taking it on. I can't do it justice in this form... perhaps because my thoughts are too lengthy. This section, e.g.: = terrorism & nuclear war/WMD with increase micro-management by civilian and maybe a draft Army.

One of Peacekeeping and Peacemaking. Ambiguous with considerable political oversight with a zero defects approach to perceived mistakes.

1. Strategic Vision to make long term decisions.
2. Interpersonal relationships for international engagement.
3. Constrained resources where smart business practices must be used.
4. More Joint involvement to include BASOPS.
5. A smaller force spread over many bases.
6. A higher technology force.
7. More CINC involvement in everyday Army business.

At the acme of Nationalism and right wing religious movements worldwide. Numerous peace operations/war prevention and low intensity combat situations; much of Africa reverting to tribal law and conflict; more conflicts developing among the "have" and "have not" lines. US military being asked to do more with less. Study our Indian campaign era also the 1930's. We're headed toward more isolation from our society.

By the year 2010 Army senior leadership will operate in a completely integrated environment. The Total Force concept will not only reach maturity within the context of the Army family, but will expand to encompass all services in a greatly enhanced joint system. Maturation of the "Information Super Highway" distributive/interactive training capabilities will close the knowledge gap between the National Guard/ Reserve leader and his professional counterparts. Although warfighting operations may continue to become more complex, the enhanced capabilities to distribute and manage the requisite knowledge will more than compensate for the increased complexity. Training programs in local National Guard Armories and Army Reserve Centers such as those described by LTG (Ret.) Frederic J. Brown in his visionary work, The U.S. Army in Transition II: Landpower in the Information Age, will eventually obscure any qualitative differences between active and reserve leaders, resulting in a potential to fully actualize the militia concept as envisioned by the authors of the Constitution.

Complex, joint-focused missions across the continuum from humanitarian assistance to combat.

Not vastly different from today. Same leadership skills required. More technical expertise (computerize) required. Must analyze and act faster. Must have a better grip on joint and coalition ops.

- Leadership will face:
 - Smaller force structure
 - Technologically advanced equipment
 - Mature information warfare challenges
 - Militarily naive society
- More prominent joint issues/challenges
 - Frequent joint tours
 - Premium on joint experience
 - Need to maintain service focus, resources on service issues
- Land warfare will be critical, but will have to be defined as such.

- Smaller
- More hi-tech
- More lethal force
- Same or higher optempo

- There will be a need to understand Army, Joint and combined operations.
- The Army will need senior officers who are experienced in, and who are proficient in bureaucratic processes.
- The senior leader will need to be proficient in business practices.

Clearly-information management will drive a different Army. Information Warfare will take on a whole new dimension. Knowledge of operating in 3rd world, poor infrastructure areas will be critical. Staffs will be smaller. Leaders will need keen intuitive skills.

An era of overwhelming flow of information with a significant number of smart weapons and data (intell) mgt systems. Continued emphasis on joint and coalition warfare/peacekeeping opns.

Very similar to the present environment.

- Having read your article the "Fourth" Army War College. Think you have it about right.
- Other considerations:
 - Management of resources (budgets) senior leaders need to know the "how to" as they move from BG-up; BDE-thru MACOM.

Small army formations with joint support and coalition dependence.

Not much different than it is now, but all enemies will be well equipped and the politicians and media will have more influence than uniformed leaders.

◦ As political leadership tries (sic) to reestablish its moral compass and regain the public's confidence, the people of the Nation will continue to seek & respect our views as one of the institutions which works.

◦ Operations will be joint, combined and politically convoluted. We must be prepared to coach the elected leadership even more than now as to the consequences of alternative courses of action.

Similar to today in terms of the importance of people issues but more complex in terms of technology, the strategic environment (which will not fit any neat models but require increased ability to analyze requirements, doctrine and be adaptable). Warfighting must be the first skill but we will face more complexity requiring a more rounded senior leader corps.

Broad exposure to world pol/mil situations and less command experience. Senior leaders will not have large active forces so more CPX and simulation will be required - realism will be expensive to achieve so validity of info will be essential.

Joint doctrine will become more detailed and directive. Operations will be joint, combined, and unified with interagency coordination and participation becoming increasingly pervasive and assuming a greater role in mission accomplishment. Military processes and procedures will be adopted by many PVOs, NGOs, and GOs, as they interact with military organizations in both domestic and foreign operations. The military will be increasingly involved in non-doctrinal missions spanning the spectrum of conflict and MOOTW. Coordination of the multitude of agencies involved in complex non-doctrinal missions will fall to the military senior leadership.

Focus on contingency operations and force structure. Can we meet the requirement with existing force structure.

Resources - are resources adequate to produce ready force?

Organization - why did we not reshape TDA Army in 1993-1998?

- Joint
- Coalition
- Pol-Mil
- Constantly Changing

- More mature from a joint/combined perspective.
- Highly mobile force with lesser regional contingency focus.
- Probably a smaller, more capable force with very limited forward presence.

- Complexity will remain a major challenge.
- Mission specifics w/o cold war will be challenging.
- Professionalism must be practiced and encouraged by example.
- Quality will remain.

- Global
- Joint
- OOTW

- info central
- increased pressures exerted by scarce resources
- more stressful

Extremely high tech but resource constrained.

Unfortunately, very political and thus constrained to go with the flow rather than doing what's right and needed to defend our country. Most of our productive time will be spent protecting or begging for resources just to survive as an institution.

- More joint and combined.
- Decision making will be lightning fast, focused on real-time "pull down" information.
- Information of operations will be immediately available to civilian/military leaders from platoon to NMC.
- All in full media view.

- More Joint - & Coalition
- More "Other" Operations

Small, more joint focused, utilizing greater technology. Multinational coalition warfare.

Joint/combined, force package capability building/employing-all services, AC/RC.
Data/information overload environment.

Different! Complex - Like nothing we know/see today.

- frustrating
 - little support from the public
 - few resources
 - lack of appreciation
 - rising internal expectations that cannot be met
- Smaller in numbers of senior leaders
 - Senior leaders who have remained on active duty in a variety of assignments as opposed to retiring "early"..(i.e., prior to MRD).
 - A very capable senior corps of leaders; each with diverse management/leadership background.
 - Focus will be on the Nations new "peer competitor."

Unless we work on it ; "Zero Defect"/ "Joint Managers"

- Scarce resources
- Coalition (joint and combined)
- Total media visibility
- Driven not only by political goals, but by domestic political agendas.

Greater demands will be placed on officers to manage and deal with U.S. Government issues, joint operations and combined forces deployments. Manpower and budget shortages will be more significant and present great challenges.

Will require skills over a broad range of operations.

A fast-paced, high technology, digitized force capability that requires senior leaders to continue focusing on the Army as a "doctrine-based organization in a values-centered profession".

Not much change in environment.

Similar to today. Single super power, increasing gap between rich & poor nations. China on the rise. Korea unified. Europe not united. NATO in decline. ME volatile. Much instability, ambiguous situations where US vital interests are not clear.

Challenging - Intellectually, professionally and personally.

- More strategic - Info based decisions at the executive level.
 - Less analytical staff.
- World problems/crisis addressed from a coalition perspective.
 - Military objectives will be "fuzzy". Political objectives will be "fuzzy".
 - Issues will be "played" out on CNN. Leaders must make decisions in that environment.
 - Process will be as important as achieving objectives.
 - Classic vital interest no longer an acid test.

- Threat less defined
- Austere resources
- More technology
- More joint & combined
- More interaction w/civilians on the battlefield.

More demanding - scarce resources.

- More joint, combined
- More demanding for broad thinking and skills - need to have warriors who can also do other things.

Joint/combined/coalition - must think beyond service.

1. Small capable force that operates in a joint combined environment.
2. Will be in the information age.
3. Unknown is what current ROA program results will be in terms of modernization.
4. Two most likely adversaries - Iran/China.

I would not be surprised to see uniservice military; highly technical in nature. Streamlined command and control. Support and BASOPS functions resident in a combination of USAR and contact organizations/installations.

Army Environment - About the same.

- > Fight & Win our Nation's wars on LAND
- > Do anything else needed - PK/PE/Humanitarian/Drug Enforcement/ Forest Fires/etc.

Total Force Sr. Ldr. Environment

- > More joint & combined operations
- > Greater flexibility/adaptability

Complex, cybernetic, collaborative, contextual and circumstantial

Senior leaders will be responsible for more widely ranging issues. Lines will blur between purely military and other issues that they will be required to address.

- Armed Forces will be smaller.
- More coalition, joint assignments.
- More diverse background/requirements.
- Low tolerance for getting people hurt.
- Asia/South America more important.
- World more balanced/competitive.
- Pace will be faster.

Dynamic, evolutionary. Significant challenges in the interagency arena. Focus will still be on fighting and winning our nations conflicts but w/o a peer competitor envision the Armed Forces be routinely challenged to satisfy the "national and international conscience" - read, more Peace Support Operations.

- Constrained resources
- Smaller force - difficult to resource all missions

Dynamic, ever changing, success will be determined by information management skills, but the fundamental leadership skills will remain the foundation for success (sic) mission accomplishment . The soldier is still and will remain our most valuable resource.

Much the same with some technological advance in Force XXI.

- Continued uncertain world - new problems & threats
- Emerging countries problems.
- Information flow - instantaneous media looking over Cdrs shoulders piped into living rooms.
- Advances in technology - touch screens, instant access, lethality of wpns.
- Quality of leaders & soldiers.

More joint with senior leaders (COLs, GOs) commanding JTFs. Less emphasis on warfighting more on peace operations. Div HQs forming JTF HQs; Corps HQs - deemphasized. Bde of the core unit.

More multinational...punctuated by political & fiscal uncertainty...with less ability to rely on traditional sources and value systems as bastions of support from society.

More change w/political over-tones that have to be managed in a resource constrained environment.

Highly political, highly automated, highly technical. Diminished leadership roles (unfortunately).

The Army - and its senior leader environment - will be smaller, more efficient, and heavily reliant on information age technology. The challenge for senior leaders with information age capabilities and the ability to reach down and touch subordinates at all levels will be to avoid interfering unnecessarily at subordinate levels, yet not allowing new technology to become too far removed from soldiers.

- ° More austere requiring better business practices.
- ° More joint with less redundancy in capabilities.

It will demand flexible specialists operating in a general frame of reference.

Challenge of a more globalized economy within a more nationalized world. The availability of technology and powerful weapons to politically extremist groups attempting to exert their will. Understanding the divisive forces that are remodeling American society.

- ° Much more joint, multinational and interagency focused.
- ° Ease of situational awareness from anywhere in the world.

Information based organizations requiring experience and comfort in joint operations. Leaders must be adept in working flat, horizontal organizations.

Dick Chilcoat has it right in his recent Parameters article (enclosed in this packet).

- ° Unsteady.
- ° Rapidly changing.
- ° Demanding.

- Information rich.
- Highly integrated system.
- Still requirement for atomic vs. digital skills.
- Require total fitness:
 - Mental
 - Physical
 - Spiritual
- Combined/coalition operations
- Terrorist threats
- Socio/Economic issues driving many military concerns
- "Humanitarian" missions.

- ° Information based
- ° Global in conduct
- ° Joint/combined in nature
- ° More "politically" based missions
- ° Ethically sound

It will be an information based environment. The successful leader will be one who knows how/where to find appropriate information & use it faster than his opponent.

A joint environment operating in an OOTW environment more than we are today. Informational technology is & will be exploding around us, while are (our) equipment will remain stagnant due to lack of investment in R&D today.

High-tech with the capability to access tremendous amounts of information.

- Constrained resources.
- Multiple demands.
- Public ignorant of military service/value.

Not a clue.

Will require far broader knowledge base. Geopolitical knowledge will be much more critical in increasing jobs. Understanding of other agencies and ability to influence interagency process will be paramount. Look at what Bill Nash and Snuffy Smith are doing. That may be the future.

- ° More joint
- ° More coalition force oriented
- ° Significantly improved situational awareness through battle space visualization systems.
- ° Greater reliance on indirect fire smart munitions.
- ° More mature OOTW doctrine and TTP.

Highly technical, truly information based.

- An environment where senior leaders must understand, to a much greater degree than in the past, the advantages and limitations of technology in supporting land warfare. We must substitute technology for people to reduce casualties and maintain the required lethality levels. Technology in this can mean more than information technology.
- Service leaders Cbt Arms, Cbt Spt, and CSS must understand and integrate, to a much greater extent, the business aspects of running a peacetime army and how that differs from OOTW and warfighting and make that case forcefully.

- Multi polar vs previous Bi-polar world.
- Reduce military force structure and resources.
- Very Joint/Combined military planning an operations.
- Very broad focus--interagency.
- World wide scope--geographically
 - politically
 - culturally
- Broad range of operations--peacekeeping to war.
- CONUS based, force projection.
- Dependent on information from many sources and rapid information processing.
- A total force--Active, Guard, Reserve.
- Subordinate to a Congress and an Executive Branch that has had little or no military experience.

Especially with our current trend in downsizing, the future senior leaders will have to be multifunctional (generalists). I believe the Army War College emphasis on Strategic Thinking, Joint and Combined, Peacekeeping, etc. are right on track but will need updating as required. A key element for the future will have to be handling the vast amounts of information that flow to senior leaders.

- Army: Continued/increased coalition operations stabilized structure

Heavy into technology. Heavy into management of resources. Dealing with OOTW around the world while trying to maintain a trained and properly organized Army. Power projection will give way to additional forward basing as OPTEMPO drives more toward deployed units.

- Must be able to fight in a very complex battle space. Faster.
- Continue to require Washington skills.
- Must be able to adapt quickly.
- Must be a master of combined arms operations and joint operations.

Come see me in Bosnia and Naples--

- Information Age
- Coalition, and Joint
- Tie 2 and 3 uses of Military Power

Instantaneous info flow; rapid decisions made on better info (more clarity); values remain absolutely key to solid officer corps.

- Joint and combined.
- Focused on resourcing the force.

Joint/combined/political environment.

- Joint
- Combined
- Interagency

- Because of automation--flat organizations will eventually reach the military there will be fewer senior officers.
- The reserves will make up more of the force > 50%
- More products/equipment will be commercial
- Another Revolution in Military Affairs will take place to replace the information age

Army leaders will have to be able to operate more independently. BDE CDRs must be able to operate in joint and combined environments. Colonels and Generals will have to be more adept in getting what Army needs from OSD and Congress. Colonels will have to be given more responsibility and authority; too few Generals to go around.

Technology and global economics will continue to shrink the world. American civilian leadership will grow more distant from understanding the nature and capabilities of the military. Technology will not just enhance, but may dictate our options.

Joint & combined force employment for operations across the spectrum of conflict. Information warfare will be key to success. Ability to think creatively will be essential.

We will be smaller with no reduction in our missions and responsibilities. We will be partially digitized with a wonderful view of the battlefield. Technology will push us into the XXI century giving us capabilities heretofore unthought of.

The senior leader must be able to handle enormous volumes of information, make decisions on incomplete info using instinct--taking risks. Increasing direction and review of our work as defenders by civilianized support force that does not understand the essence of a military force. Need more civilians to attend schools with our uniformed leaders.

I think senior leaders in the year 2010 will have to deal with an increasingly complex environment that will challenge them with: reduced force structure worlds beyond what we currently envision; increasing involvement in an even broader range of OOTW, to include an increased domestic support role; a PERSTEMPO that will challenge our ability to retain quality mid-level officers and Os; slowed technological advances as we continue to experience funding levels that do not permit the modernization advances as rapidly as needed; and an erosion of our logistical sustainment ability as increased emphasis on privatization and joint organizations limit our flexibility.

As described in the enclosed article by MG Chilcoat. Excellent perspective & vision. Right on target!

There will be even more concern about scarce resources and stewardship of funds.

1. 3-3.5% of total USG budget
2. Very joint
3. Inter agency

Highly visible, totally committed to service due to size of GO Corps and the expanded role of the military in world affairs. Extremely high stress.

Joint and combined operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. Diplomatic skills will be necessary in conducting humanitarian relief/regional stability operations.

This environment will likely be very dynamic with unclear issues. Likely, it will continue to be resource constrained and will involve much pressure to use military forces and capabilities for non-traditional missions. It will be more joint than today and will continue to involve many physical dangers to our national security, although these dangers will probably be difficult to translate into justification for military resources.

Diverse, political, challenging

° Joint Arena Qualified

° Information Age Technology Based

Technical, global, joint and politically-attuned.

An environment of governmental, non-governmental, privately owned and multinational cooperation/coalitions working towards an overall solution defined by multinational operations.

The environment will be more "Joint" and "Allied" than the past, and there will be more "low intensity" peacekeeping operations.

The future senior leader will be much more detailed focused. As automated CI systems proliferate the trend will be to manage the eaches - the ability to communicate vertically and horizontally will ensure rapid reaction to every event no matter how insignificant.

A new world order which will require Sr. Ldrs. to possess skills to interface with National and global Political diplomatic and other Agencies such as CIA, FBI to deal with terrorist, natural disaster, and contingency operations.

The senior leader environment in the year 2010 will be characterized by a rapid flow of information, joint and combined operations, force projection, and increasingly constrained resources.

The environment will require technical skills, leadership ability, intelligence, education, and flexible minds. Unfortunately, most of our senior leaders will have been dissuaded from career tracks providing those skills. We will have mortgaged our future by creating an Army of warriors who lack the education, technical skills, and political skills to effectively manage the Army.

More joint and coalition minded than today.

Flexible leader able to assemble and lead multicultural teams on complex missions, in CONUS or abroad.

High technology weapons systems. Information age technology applied down to squad leader level. Smaller Army. More lethal, more survivable and operations at a higher TEMPO. Situational Awareness. Real time intelligence.

A disaster if we don't take the following steps:

- ° Reduce AC/RC burden
- ° Reduce joint burden
- ° Produce officers who are as good at divergent thinking as they are convergent.
- ° Reduce "Group Think" tendency extant today
- ° Teach senior officers about info operations and warfare.
- ° Eliminate the "zero defects" mentality currently developing.

One too focused on doing more with less, but one that is trying to eliminate the zero defects mentality that is currently growing.

- Based on current turbulence/assignment policies, the senior leader of 2010 will not be as well grounded as his/her predecessors.
- Competition with industry for quality soldiers will not fulfill our needs.
- The Army will be hollow.
- China will challenge our national interests.

Understand "Joint".

- Very complex
- Very joint
- Very interagency/combined
- Very different from now

If this asks for characteristics, then:

- Few in numbers: Total vis a vis now, and in number of combat arms background officers.
- Information mgmt smart...or else
- Compared to the present, less influential in ability to establish strategic direction for the Army.
- Inexperienced in sustained land combat
- Involved in internal actions to protect the security interests of the U.S.

Not much different from the current environment.

It will be framed by a vague threat, a "smaller world" and more interdependence among nations. The will of the people to support a force that requires integration of new technology and another major force modernization may not be there. Senior leaders will see the effects of an education system that does not prepare its citizens for a role in the military or an understanding of it or our political system. Hence a struggle will emerge on several fronts: with the people to convince them of the need for a capable force, with Congress/government to invest on such a force; and an effort within the Army to train and preserve the talent we will develop ourselves.

- Small Force to lead with broad "out of our usual Box" missions.
- Operating in a Technical/Automated environment.
- Have to rely on JT/Multinational forces.
- More Global in scope missions.
- Reduced Funding.

Senior military leaders will represent a smaller percentage of the armed forces in 2010. They will depend upon a vast array of technological innovations to provide information needed for critical decision making. They will play a much larger role in domestic policy-making and in enforcing order in a disorderly, fractured society marked by divisiveness, massive unemployment, and disaffection by an underclass.

Joint, combined and interagency.

Ability to apply new solutions to old problems, give credit to his/her subordinates and understand the power of training on the information age battlefield.

More multinational, more politico-military, more fiscally constrained.

Increasingly Joint. Departments of services will either be gone or greatly reduced. Joint chiefs and CINCs will drive the military train. The U.S. will have: (1) recognized its inability to police the world; (2) realized the dangers associated with being fully engaged in multiple operations other than war, and (3) begun to rebuild a robust military capable of defeating emerging threats.

2010 is too far out for me-

- Vying for limited resources.
- Dealing with a body political that is more and more removed from the military experience.

A leader potentially starving for the true feel of the battlefield as he tends to operate in a more sterile systematic information flow. We can lose that 6th sense of something is happening or about to happen.

- Information based
- Computer generated
- I.W. [Information warfare] oriented

Senior leader environment will be total/virtual information. Our biggest challenge will be time management and sorting thru the wheat/chaff of information we will be bombarded with. I predict it will slow our decision cycle at every level.

- Much smaller.
- More Joint.
- High Tech - Low in equipment amounts.

Exceedingly complex. Technology driven.

- Small Army Structure
- More-Joint/Combined
- More "Political"
- Constantly changing

Information age; highly competitive; highly stressful.

Barring a major war or a resurgent super power (China, Russia, ?), we will most likely continue to have relatively small forces in varying stages of modernization, still moving toward more joint exercises/operations, trying to apply info technology (as the (a) key 'RMA' factor). The pressure on the U.S. to lead coalition/combined operations will continue.

1. Military will continue to down size.
2. "Joint" environment will expand.
3. Coalition operations will dominate.

Increased separation from the American public in areas of values & selfless service. Senior leaders will continue to be held to a higher moral, ethical, behavioral standard than any other profession. Increased friction between active & reserve components and between services.

Smaller and more joint.

An environment wherein force will come from several nations in smaller increments and with a number of "national" strings attached regarding their employment. (Much as is being put in evidence today in Bosnia) This combined with vast disparity in their level of training and, in particular, this equipping (particularly in information age (or beyond) capability to move data, and "fight") and the degree that operate in split based environment will combine to create an inordinately complex environment.

- Smaller Army
- Reduced Resources
- Increasingly complex operational environment
- Continued/increased emphasis on Joint/Combined Operations.
- Continued emphasis on OOTW/LIC with possibility of an occasional MRC. Most likely in the CENTCOM AOR.

It will require leaders to be comfortably knowledgeable of information systems and their impact on leader operations. Information management will be an integral part of leader development.

More joint, combined, interagency. Less budget for Army. Information operations important.

Coalition warfare and UN Peace Enforcement operations.

Joint, combined, very lethal forces, ambiguous enemy forces, humanitarian/peacekeeping missions, diplomatic/political element large part of mission, extreme emphasis on force protection/casualty minimization.

- Hi-technology operated by highly skilled leaders.
- Ambiguous chains of command.
- Media overwatch
- Information overload unless managed closely.
- Little planning prior to execution
- Quick deployments
- Joint attack force packages
- Ultimate need for "situational awareness"
- No room for mistakes because the media will capture it.

Immersion into the joint world, where senior officers are comfortable w/working with each service assets.

Environment will be one of high technology, low budgets, lots of OOTW and reduced forces. Space Age Warfare!

High tempo of operations in a resource constrained environment. Several leaders will be required to balance the here and now (reality) with a very select number of visionary concepts for the future . . . "Since we can't afford everything, what do we need worse?"

It will be more technically oriented, particularly in communications and special operations involving high profile, high tech task forces with a mix of light, mechanized and special operations.

- More political-military than present, with a larger, recognized role in national leadership.
- More diverse-i.e. requiring more generalist than specialist skills-and more demanding.
- More flexible-a greater variety of positions for career development.

Difficult to predict - can see several futures for the force depending on internal and external factors. However, a common thread will be the need to balance the internal national drivers (with a high visibility to the American people) with the external environment. Consumption of critical resources will be under progressively increasing scrutiny. If urban decay continues unchecked and if the nation does not come to grips with the social ills, the internal threat has the potential to exceed our external threat.

The senior leader of 2010 may actually have it easier than today's leader. He will have grown up in an era where the polarization of U.S.-Soviet confrontation was not the major factor on his doctrine, training and equipment. He will, therefore, be more inclined to accept his environment with a realistic and open vision. His world will consist of relatively little order between nations and nation-states. Several nation-states will not be able to provide even social order or basic services within their borders. There will be more flags flying outside the U.N. but there will still be more factions fighting for sovereignty. His guidance from Washington will be ambiguous, as every new situation will be different from the last. By then we will have learned that no two people are alike and each one has to be treated differently. The world will have instant media access to whatever action is taken by the senior leader making OPSEC almost impossible, deception operations critical and rapidly linking tactical actions to strategic consequences. With a monstrous national debt, little decline in non-discretionary spending, and a foreign trade imbalance all choking fiscal resources even more than today, he will have more sophisticated but far fewer weapons at his disposal. I also doubt that by then we will have learned that expensive technology does not replace soldiers in the vast majority of confrontations U.S. troops will deploy. The Sea Wolf, F-22, and Crusader Howitzer do not patrol the streets of Mogadishu, Port-au-Prince, or Tula - soldiers and marines do. Of course this is the pessimistic view. National and world leadership in the upcoming years could negate some of the predictions.

GO SURVEY
PART V: FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND NEEDS

B. What skills/knowledges do you feel senior officers will need in the next 10 to 15 years?

- Joint warfare expert
 - Combined operations understanding
 - Broad view of global security situation
 - Ability to work in different cultural settings and handle third world environment where bulk of "emergencies" will take place
 - Solid understanding of national strategic decision making process
- ° More ability to think geopolitical in order to better apply NMS into reqd capabilities
 - ° Better appreciation of how domestic politics affects the DOD
 - ° More technology oriented, esp info processing.

Resource management skills - particularly financial - will become increasingly important as the competition for funding - internal and external to the Army - becomes more and more intense. Communication via computer/modem will be a critical personal skill required for senior leadership. Choosing between competing requirements for shrinking dollars.

This applies to the joint/opn's level as well as the tactical level. To think and act decisively with out boundaries. To maintain focus in ambiguous situations. To leverage information technology to free the commander from the burden of control (separate command from control) thereby giving the commander situational awareness (a common relevant picture) anywhere on the battlefield. Although a C.P. is a "command post" only when the commander is in it, it ought not to be a requirement for him to have a clear picture. The "TOC" should control while providing the commander a competent picture of the battlefield. Information technology can do this today if we demand it.

- ° Coalition/combined planning and operations
- ° Management of technology and information
- ° Media communications
- = Always leadership and care for soldiers and families! (all levels).

Broad understanding of joint and combined operations, training, and cooperation.

- = Information Age Skills: starting through technology interface to command climate amidst a dispersed flatten organizational structure where network realities work against an iron clad chain of command.
- = Ability to deal with ethical complexity
- = Visionary thinking and willingness to adapt.

The ability to write and communicate with computer prowess will be key.

Cognitive skills plus socio-political training to deal with multiethnic backgrounds of soldiers

The ability to operate in a Joint and Combined environment and work with other agencies of the U.S. DOD and allied interagency activities.

Senior officers will have to learn to monitor systems that enhance fiscal efficiencies in both TD&E organizations and installation operations. The days of the pure warfighter are gone due to fiscal constraints - senior officers must be multi-dimensional & conserve scarce training dollars or else readiness will suffer.

Basic leader skills will not change and are key to success. Interpersonal skills, to include adjusting to total visibility of the media, will challenge our Army. Today's soldiers will be seasoned in Peacekeeping operations, armed with the most lethal weaponry available to man.

Simulation and information management.

Information Age, expertise. Genesis of regional, ethnic, religious conflicts around the world and potential interagency responses or actions.

- ° information technology skills > greater demands on
- ° joint/coalition operations > greater demands on (other skills/knowledge of today continue)

- coping skills
- Automation
- Accept empowerment and the responsibilities and accountability associated with empowerment.

Information management.

- ° Joint & coalition warfighting skills
- ° Lead the digitized Army
- ° Greater understanding of the Cruise Theater and National Missile defense threats and responses.

Senior officers must be able to master the ability to build consensus, operate in a joint and combined environment in peace operations or war. Automation skills will also be key as will caring leadership - the human dimension - which I consider the cornerstone of every leader!

- The ability to make the tough decisions - focusing on mission requirements rather than parochial interests.
- Knowledge of other services in order to identify opportunities in improve/enhance interoperability.

Senior Officers will have to be comfortable in a highly technological information gathering environment. They must be equally adept in their leadership skills. We cannot forget about the human factor in our peace making and peace keeping endeavors.

- Need a much better knowledge of other services' capabilities and technology.
 - A better feel for the pol-mil aspects.
 - Acquisition skills; knowledge of procurement & budgeting.

1. Ability to deal with complexity and ambiguity.
2. Ability to work outside traditional military realms.

We will need to know how to operate in the joint world of the Pentagon. We do & will continue to do well in the operational environment, but we are getting killed on the Joint & OSD Staff. It will only become more imperative. If we do not improve we will be on the outside looking in.

Increased Joint, Interagency skills.

- ° Operational Art
- ° Multinational Threats, Techniques and procedures.
- ° How to give military advice before political/military masters think they need it.

- Strategic and operational level war planning
- Leadership skills to fit complex societies and operations.

Persuasive diplomatic, technical and tactical/operational/strategic.

- Warfighting
- Vision and ability to make it happen
- Deal with uncertainty and change
- Fix things
- Get most out of dwindling resources
- Understand act of smart business
- Strategic insights and leadership
- Balance
- Computer skills - Think out of box for unthinkable solutions.

First and foremost - how to fight at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. All other tasks are simple functional skills if our officers possess these fundamentals. The best skill brought to a joint, combined or interagency position is the skill of the warfighter in his basic branch.

People management and communication skills, inherent requirements for leadership positions since organization of the first prehistoric hunting part, will remain the base prerequisites for future senior officers. A broad foundation in history, philosophy, and strategic thinking will continue to provide a perspective from which to make strategic level decisions. In addition, the senior leader of 2010 will require a gamut of technical and cognitive skills to enable him to operate in the increasingly complex environment of the Information Age. Basic computer skills combined with a working knowledge of systems management will be key tools in the future Army leader's kitbag of critical skills. Technological advances in systems capabilities will drive increased reliance on completely integrated joint force packages, which, in turn, will drive a demand for leaders with Total Force, both joint and reserve, experience.

Working off a "blank page." Information technology. Operational/strategic level of war.

Same - but ability to rapidly consume data and make decisions. Don't walk away from today - simply transition to tomorrow - evolve!

- Leadership skills
 - ° accept, be comfortable with ambiguity
 - ° work with inter-agency entities PVOs, NGOs, IWGs, Study Gps, Track II)
 - ° verbal, written skills - means to convey intent with clarity.
- Knowledge
 - ° Technical, as always
 - ° Pol-Mil grasps essential - shrinking world, interdependence
 - ° Interagency processes

Same as now +
 More combined warfighting skills/knowledge
 More resource management skills

See A above.

- [- There will be a need to understand Army, Joint and combined operations.
- The Army will need senior officers who are experienced in, and who are proficient in bureaucratic processes.
- The senior leader will need to be proficient in business practices.]

- ° Information Management
- ° Computer
- ° Communication

Much more in-depth understanding of information mgt and ability to quickly synthesize relevant data for decision making.

Proficiency in svc skills.

Proficiency in other svc skills ability to coord & cooperate to best outcome for all.

With all the information age technology - we must not forget the counselling and mentorship that leaders must do to build the next set of leaders.

Skills of collaboration.

Not much different than now. Danger will be to focus more on political skills rather than warfighting skills and this will be a mistake.

Enhanced understanding and hands on experience in executing contingency operations at the JTF, CJTF level. We teach them planning & concepts now but we don't make the sweat throughout the responsibility of execution - making the tough calls with partial info and limited resources under the press of time & then living with the results.

- Warfighting
- Ability to handle political-military issues.
- Skills in policy development and implementation.
- A real joint perspective.
- Understanding of crisis management operations use.
- Ability to work in both NATO and ad hoc coalitions.
- A mentoring style to help subordinate leaders develop the same skills. A tough environment when in warfighting is a top priority but leaders are much more versatile - can handle a range of complexity.

As much command experience as possible - but lots of jointness (more maritime - ground and air ground training. Officers will need to work with simulated battlefield and low cost training surrogates - while still being primed for action at any moment. We must better understand our allies and potential partners/adversaries.

Senior leaders will be required to function within joint, combined and interagency (unified) environments that rely on diplomacy, compromise, and consensus. Political sensitivities must be anticipated and accommodated while incrementally progressing toward U.S.-focused objectives. The division between tactical, operational, and strategic aspects of foreign policy and operational decisionmaking will be further blurred due to media access and information age technology. Mission success will depend increasingly on "how" the task is accomplished, as well as "what" is accomplished as every operational step is scrutinized and politicized.

Knowledge and ability to operate in JOINT/INTER Agency WORLD. Army will continue to train and maintain, can we sell ourselves Interagency, Joint World, and Int'l audiences?

Must be solidly grounded in land warfare/land power.
Must understand the entire Army.
Must be able to contribute in joint/coalition environment.

More focus on joint and coalition knowledge/activities. Political-military affairs skills will also be very important.

- ° Communication skills
- ° Bedrock values inculcated in each
- ° Technical competency in their branch.
- ° Relatively wide read in world affairs

- Joint
- Negotiation
- Conflict resolution
- Political
- Public affairs

- Resource management
- Info technology
- Coalition warfare
- Geo economic/political

Ability to think and act in a high tech, resource constrained environment taking into consideration the political climate and instant communications available to the media.

A strong dose of moral and ethical fortitude to counter the climate described above. We need senior officers of vision and character to take our Army back from the "politicians" (not meant to be read "civilian leadership")

- Far more involvement with non-governmental agencies. Thus senior officers must understand how to deal with them & to integrate them into objectives.
- Information Mgt skills will be critical - but don't believe SSE is where these skills should be learned.

Joint, coalition, diplomatic.

Leadership remains #1.

Strategic thinking

- How to C²/manage from electronic data.
- Joint - capability of other services/allies.

All must be information warriors. Must be computer literate and information managers of the highest order. - Must also understand people and how they interact with systems to achieve the right balance.

- ° Broad vision
- ° Ability to think conceptually
- ° Understanding of other services

- Information dominance...
- Management in times of uncertainty and rapid change
- Know their warfighting/war-support craft
- Greater knowledge of societal/political matters at work within our own society.
- Ethics training
- Respect for cultural diversity

How to apply Army (or their service) combat power to battle.

- Keen political awareness
- The ability to manage limited resources well
- The ability to motivate an educate/aware fighting force
- The ability to manage information effectively

- Information Skills
- Strategic Skills
- Creative Skills
- Visionary Skills
- Leadership and Managerial Skills

- First & foremost, learned force warfighting skills, from tactical thru strategic.
- Second, joint warfighting.
- Third, combined/coalition warfighting.
- Fourth, operations in general.

A greater knowledge of how to insure the inculcation of caring and professional ethics of an individual basis to insure the collective value of trust is manifested as a key ingredient to all organizational outcomes.

- ° Breadth
- ° Patience

Information management/info warfare. C² of joint & combined opns. Use of land forces in non-traditional settings.

- Ability to garner critical info from rapid infor mgt systems
- Neural networking
- Political/economic drivers of military strategy/opns

- ° Flexible - understand political end game
- ° Perceptive - understand political realities
- ° Nontraditional military roles

- ° Continued emphasis on joint/combined/interagency operations.
- ° More development on how to think.

Knowledge of contracting - the tool we use more and more to accomplish our mission.

- Broad understanding of the Army and its relevance to joint formations.
- Knowledge of business practices and methods.
- Understanding of resources from the hill to the foxhole.

In depth knowledge of all services/capabilities.

- Information mgt. utilization
- Joint/combined Opns

Absolute requirement in addition to leader-manager skills will be techno-fluency.

- ° Be able to play football with Dick Butkus during the day and dine with Maggie Thatcher that evening.
- ° Know the Army - very well is a first
- ° Be flexible/agile/adaptable
- ° Understand the concept of "Battle Command."

- Conceptual thinking in a non-linear mode
- Computer facile
- Imaginative solution-oriented
- Working knowledge of science and mathematics
- Complete honesty and unquestioned integrity

Must have Information Age competencies- must be able to manage shifting priorities, and to receive, synthesize, and react to large amounts of varied information. Must be able to function effectively in numerous operational environments.

- ° Warfighting critical skill
- ° Managing information will be critical
- ° Better interpersonal skill
 - International
 - Joint
 - All genders/races

Must be comfortable at the operational and strategic level and understand how to leverage the interagency arena. Must be able to "think outside the box" - be visionary. Today's solutions probably will not solve tomorrow's problems. Must be comfortable in the "Information Age."

- Computer literate
- Deal with reduced funding
- Capable of building coalitions
- PEOPLE SKILLS

- Leadership as always.
- Communication skills in all media.
- Technically competent.
- At ease with ADPE/Information Age.

Use automation to work solutions, transmit, receive, world view of problems - cultures.

- ° Info Management
- ° Negotiation skills & diplomatic skills
- ° Able to work in the ambiguous world of peace operations.
- ° Needs: Vision, cognitive skills, ability to create positive, learning command climate.

1. An ability for creative, abstract thought that can translate into action.
2. Skills at all forms of communication and exploitation of media (as opposed to "the media")
3. An ability to work equally well with U.S. and multinational political and military leaders.

How to think "outside the box" - first one must know/define the right box!

Automation, analytical, political, and technical.

Leadership skills and abilities remain constant. The tools available to exercise good leadership may change, but the basic principles do not. Advanced automation and communication capabilities can multiply the positive benefits of good leadership. Similarly, the negative effects of poor leadership can be multiplied in the same way.

- ° More knowledge of installation management.
- ° A more complete understanding of joint operations and the capabilities of other services.

Most will need in-depth knowledge of the skills represented in their Branch's sector of the military art. Further, they will need to understand the interlinkages of all aspects of making war or preserving peace

Better understanding of the forces of a globalized economy. Insight into how culture drives the foreign policy of nations.

- They're required to understand and succeed in points under A.
- [° Much more joint, multinational and interagency focused.
 - ° Ease of situational awareness from anywhere in the world.]

Information operations is key element. Change to flat, horizontal organizations require new leadership techniques.

Same answer as A above. A super article. [Dick Chilcoat has it right in his recent Parameters article (enclosed in this packet).]

- ° COMMUNICATION
- ° ABILITY TO PERSUADE
- ° DELEGATION

Able to absorb a mountain of data and pick out the 2 or 3 key items that will really make a difference.

- Integrated information technological skills
- Depth of knowledge in specific vs. general management

Information technology

Business/economic/resource management

- ° More geo/political understanding of the world.
- ° Speak at least two languages
- ° Joint/combined military capabilities/limitations
- ° Information/communication skills
- ° Leader, leader, leader skills (people skills)

Don't have to be automators, but do need an understanding of what automation will bring to future battlefields and how to use the information automation will provide.

Jointness - understanding the strengths & weaknesses of our sister services. Ability to deal with future automation and be comfortable with it -- master it. Ability to grasp & understand data. How to manage it & package it.

Continued joint and coalition skills knowledge of information operations.

- Creativity
- Decisionmaking ability
- Flexibility
- Business acumen
- Interpersonal skills

Critical thinking, innovation, creativity.

Computer, geopolitics, flexibility, objectivity, critical thinking and analysis, interpersonal.

- ° Better understanding of joint capabilities and doctrine
- ° Battle space visualization computer proficiency
- ° Better appreciation for the economic, social, political aspects of any campaign plan.

Technological, technical and tactical---in that order.

- Understand technology and how to use it.
- Understand the integrated aspects of warfighting...especially including the logistics implications of deploying and sustaining large formation...corps to theater to joint to coalition.

- The Constitution
- Laws governing military; military force in coalition operations
- PPBES
- Joint staff process
- Communications:
 - interpersonal
 - interagency
 - international

Managing in the information age - yet still providing LEADERSHIP. The vast amount of information, much of it relevant, will tend to keep the senior leader at the computer terminal - a not so good place to lead from.

- Increased experiences/knowledge in PXO, United Nations operations
- Coalition operations
- Political astuteness
- Interpersonal skills

Technology, computer skills, management skills but leadership of soldiers will remain paramount.

- ° Ability to command and lead combined arms and joint forces.
- ° Inside the Beltway skills.

Come see me in Bosnia and Naples. As above. We will need the full gamut of military skills: Diplomatic Coalition JT and gunslingers.

Leveraging technology to improve our ability to fight & win decisively continues to gain importance. Teach strategic Armies/Intel/info sharing capabilities. Awareness of space based cap's will also become fundamental to future Sr. leaders.

- Joint/combined warfighting
- Acquisition
- Information Technology

See A above. [Joint/combined/political environment.]

Learn how to work effectively at the Interagency level.

- NSC, State, Customs, U.S. Aid (Good luck), DOJ, DEA, etc.

- Highly competent in branch related skills
- Computer literate
- Political awareness (domestic and international)
- Care for soldiers/families
- 100% ethical
- Risk taker
- Understand joint/combined ops

- ° Clearly more Joint/more combined
- ° Language skills are under subscribed -- Need to ensure every officer has at least one other language
- ° Use of info technology/important -- admin skills
- ° Use of training simulations -- wargames

Will have to be able to function in a joint and combined environment. Must know details of capabilities and weaknesses of other services.

We have to improve communications & understanding with the civilian/political leadership to ensure they understand capabilities & limitations. We cannot continue to get smaller and do the same mission. We will burn out our young soldiers & leaders. In the next 10-15 years, our service leaders must maintain the proper balance between technology & the human elements of our Army.

- Better understanding of international situation.
- Comfort with info age technology.
- Language ability (encourage all senior leaders to gain some competency in a foreign language)
- Ability to work in interagency process

Abilities to receive, assimilate, and distribute tremendous amounts of information will be critical.

- Budget resourcing and accountability systems -- we are currently faced with shrinking resources and are incapable of making critical and tough decisions to reprioritize and eliminate programs off their mark.
- Technology -- need to give them hard skills to work, quickly and originally in a technology environment of information and data.
- Those skills coupled with strategic warfighting skills and good leadership and in management will insure survivability of the force.

They will need to gain increased skills not only in strategic warfighting and the operational art, but also better and more complete knowledge of PPBES, information warfare, media relations, strategic logistics and coalition warfare. We will need to develop leaders who are as comfortable and adept at fighting a campaign on the Hill in Washington as a hill in Korea.

Must understand the enter agency process. Must understand the power of information (technology). Must be politically adept and strategically competent.

Leadership - Management
Automation - Technical warfighters

Same as above. [As described in the enclosed article by MG Chilcoat. Excellent perspective & vision. Right on target!] Plus better understanding of other services & combined/multinational/joint opns.

Coalition/Joint. Political Savvy, clearly responsible and ethical behavior.

As the Congressional membership changes, senior officers must be more aware of making the Army more relevant to them. It is a skill to be able to "translate" what the Army does to Congressional members or staffers so they can "relate" to their briefers.

- Political/military - global awareness
- Full application potentials of all services
- Inter-agency roles and capabilities

- Diplomatic as well as tactical/technological competence.
- Must be able to think & speak with confidence and authority.
- Must understand the enlisted soldiers and his family as well as nation security interest and how the military fits into the world situation.

Must be able to manage the massive amounts of information available - be able to separate the wheat from the chaff.

Believe senior leaders must increase their knowledge of the "broader" roles, missions, capabilities, and limitations of the Nation's armed forces and the Department of Defense, in general. This is especially true of DOD's agencies and the Reserve Components of each of the Services. Strategic thinking, complex problem solving, and computer skills will be very important.

Current base plus

- better joint warfighting skills
- better skills to command/manage (staff) other opns (in spectrum short of war)
- better info mgmt skills

- Computer Skills
- Politically Savvy
- Joint Experienced & Training
- Visionary

Computer literate, knowledgeable of other nationals/cultures, adept at joint war-fighting, firmly grounded in basic service combat skills.

Interagency & coalition skills

Better understanding of "HUMINT," and use of all intelligence.

Must develop the skill to think globally and quickly distill volumes of information into useful data. A disciplined mind with a total understanding of the Automation Architectures will be the most important skill & knowledge.

A firm foundation of moral and ethical values upon which to build the flexibility of thought and action.

Increased understanding of the emerging digital battlefield, the ability to manage tremendous amounts of information, and a team oriented perspective toward sister services.

i.e. VISION

Understanding of information management in a complex environment.

Understanding of technology behind new, advanced weapons systems

Education to know what we don't know about technology and to lead industry in the military application of the new technologies.

Better understanding our allies capabilities and coalition requirements.

- Info management
- Virtual team control via the resources & other hi tech systems
- Appreciation of cultural differences between team members: AD, Reserves, NG, Civilians, etc, etc.

- Senior leadership skills.
- Computers/Info technology
- Management skills
- Strategic Vision
- Joint warfighting. Operational Art.

- ° Ability to visualize.
- ° Ability to connect disparate facts into a single logical thought.
- ° To think "outside the box."
- ° How to operate info age systems - not get someone to do it for him.
- ° Think in the long term - not just the POM years.

Team building; pol-mil acuity or "statesmanship: in addition to branch competence.
Computer skills will be a must.

- Must still be a warfighter.
- Senior officers will have to be well-schooled in joint operations.
- They will have to be able to exploit new technologies including information technology.
- They should be multilingual to facilitate combined operations.
- Must have strong ethical base.
- Will be responsible for much larger battlespace.

- Understanding Political Systems.
- Understanding Joint Capabilities.
- Understanding Inter Agency work.

- More flexible
- Working knowledge of computers
- More language/cultural skills

- Ability to distribute efficiently shortages of resources
- Ability to manage overwhelming information
- Skills to serve as joint and combined task force commanders

Additional emphasis in information processing & warfare.

The ability to be innovative and the force of will to pursue creative solutions. An acceptance of the Joint nature of our business and the ability to subordinate service interests to the good of the Armed Forces and National Security in their broadest sense, we will not be able to afford to do otherwise. An understanding of the impact information flow will have on the permeability of national borders will be essential.

- Automation
- MultiNational
- Peacekeeping
- Political
- Joint
- Innovative Thinker
- Technical Competence - we are losing some as the result of so much emphasis on CMD

They must understand clearly that nationalism is no longer the critical element in developing or maintaining international power in the information age, knowledge will be power. Joint, interagency, and combined actions will be the norm as the U.S. struggles to maintain its relative position in the world economy.

Ability to analyze complex, non-traditional employment of military forces in variety of roles.

Same ones we have used only shaped by the power of information on the battlefield.

- Political skills in defending interests, programs and budgets.
- International relations for work inside and outside of alliances.
- More capability/willingness for personal decision making.

Full understanding of joint and combined capabilities and application of joint combat power. Capable of utilizing full spectrum of information age technologies (intel, cbt systems integration, C4I). Continued requirement for traditional officer attributes (interpersonal/leadership skills, integrity, tenacity, courage, fitness, etc.).

Understand the political environment which controls our soldiers - and know how to influence it.

One must know what info he really needs to make decision because more info will be available than he will be able to utilize and could result in indecision.

- ° Computer... > Equality!
- ° Leadership... > Equality!

- Joint
- Coalition
- InterAgency
- Diplomatic
- Information Management

Got to get on the WWW/info hwy! Also, the ability or skill to get to the necessary info for the decision (Tact/Opns/Strategic) will be paramount in an age of "INFO overload".

- Leadership
- How to use technology
- How to (JOINTLY) Fight & Win Wars

1. Coping
2. Information Management
3. Strategic Thinking

- Interpersonal
- Technical/tactical

- Warfighting at the Strategic/Operational Levels.
- Decisionmaking (Automation assisted)
- Analytical (Identify parameters of the problem)
- Ethical -- Values oriented
- Multinational diplomacy (consensus building)
- Foreign languages; cultural expansion

- Conceptualizing: starting with a blank sheet of paper. Political guidance - esp. in coalition/UN ops will be scarce and late.
- Joint force capabilities and the contribution value each service brings.
- Ditto for coalition/combined-- and more difficult.
- Pol/mil/diplomatic skills invaluable.

- Joint Experience
- Coalition Experience
- Continuous Technological Upgrade, i.e., information management upgrades

Increased skills in technical command and control. Continue emphasis required in joint and coalition warfare. Increased emphasis in media and political interface skills.

1. How to conduct multinational opns
2. Understanding of the interagency process

They will require skills to be developed to handle the environment described Part V a. [An environment wherein force will come from several nations in smaller increments and with a number of "national" strings attached regarding their employment. (Much as is being put in evidence today in Bosnia) This combined with vast disparity in their level of training and, in particular, this equipping (particularly in information age (or beyond) capability to move data, and "fight") and the degree that operate in split based environment will combine to create an inordinately complex environment.] They will need to be far more internationally astute. This will involve not only education in cultural peculiarities of nation's with whom they may have to deal, but more importantly the nature (operating skills, intelligence acquisitions and dissemination, concepts for combat support and service support, etc.) and national focus of the various nations. They will have to be better skilled in military-political nuances as well.

- Traditional warfighting skills
- Ability to operate in Joint & Combined environments
- Basic knowledge of the skill sets required to operate in a fast paced high technology environment.

- Understanding informational systems.
- Understanding peace support operations including coalition efforts.
- Understanding international security affairs

Joint, combined, interagency planning
Political. Military.
Information Operations

- An ability to plan, focus, and execute Haiti, Somalia, PK type ops.
- An ability to work with and lead coalition forces and the requisite understanding & compassion to do so, i.e., MG Kinser in Haiti.

Joint, combined, diplomatic, information technology, media relations, more world wide focus economics, religion.

- Automation
- Warfighters who are logisticians
- Political sensitivities
- Handling media
- Comfort with joint operations
- Knowledge of new technologies.
- World affairs
- VISION!!

Many will answer this by listing coalition warfare, peacekeeping, OOTW, etc., but these will be only secondary requirements. All MEL 1s must be capable of organizing a campaign - they must understand conventional warfare. Without this strong foundation, the branches are useless.

- Info management
- Simulation & Robotics
- Basic & fundamental warfighting.

- √ Situational Awareness (Strategic, Operational, Tactical)
- √ Ability to define precisely true info requirements (PIR) to allow sorting thru volumes of data.
- √ Ability to know and articulate organizational vision...and measure implementation.
- √ Exceptional tactical competency...to keep in touch with soldiers and their needs.

Rapid material movement, humanitarian peacemaking, peacekeeping with more demands on coordination of civic action, force projection for reinforcement of security control and rapid achievement of limited military objectives. Operations will heavily depend on advanced communications, automation and sophisticated logistical support.

- ° Ability to quickly process a great volume of information.
- ° A stronger mix of intuitive (or people) skills & information producing skills.
- ° Strong dispositions for creativity & innovation.

1. Ability to acquire, analyze, and react to increasing information flow.
2. Sensitivity to the needs of the American public.
3. Technical superiority within their lane.
4. Capacity to sacrifice for common good.

GO SURVEY
PART V: FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND NEEDS

C. How do USAWC graduates compare with other senior service college MEL-1 graduates? What are their relative strengths and weaknesses?

Graduates compare favorably. There seems to be no specific differences noted in performance of duty. What is clear, is that officers educated at any War College level institution are better prepared to serve at higher level staff jobs.

Strong:

- Knowledge of Army & Army role in NMS
- Ethics/integrity

Weak:

- Jointness

AWC graduates compare equally to other senior service college grads.

USAWC graduates appear to be better rounded. A successful land campaign requires a level of expertise in joint and coalition warfare at all levels. Not so with just an air or a sea campaign. Although the USAWC is not the best teacher of Joint Staff procedures, it is the best provider of commanders capable of conducting land warfare. Most other schools do a better job of providing specialists. The AWC provides the best strategic thinkers. Nevertheless, every AWC graduate should receive JPME qualification.

The breadth of my experience was captured during my most recent 20 months in Korea . . . USAWC graduates are as effective in this Joint environment as any other SSC graduate. (I am a NWC Graduate.)

Believe USAWC graduates are equally prepared to serve in high level assignments but could benefit from additional exposure to joint matters.

I do not have a good basis for evaluation. I have never observed an instance where the identity of the war college could be linked to a specific strength or weakness in particular officer. A suspect that NWC/ICAF graduates are stronger in "jointness" because of the considerable networking across services whereas the AWC fosters a similar network primarily within the Army. My perception is that all of the war colleges are on a similar azimuth.

I am not an AWC graduate and have limited knowledge of curriculum and background AWC grads. Those I've seen have been effective. Interoperability with sister services requires continued emphasis.

Stronger on emotional stability and more stable/secure

USAWC graduates make good Army senior leaders and others, especially, the National War College prepare graduates better for Joint and Interagency assignments.

NWC requires products that produce master degrees. It keeps the student focused and requires/provides better feedback. I cannot speak for the AWC curriculum since I did not attend AWC.

My perspective of the War College may differ from many. I still believe that a multi-disciplined curriculum, coupled with the opportunity to grow professionally and socially make the war college a success. Allow the freedom to access studies that bridge gaps in previous experiences. I would however, do more in the joint environment - many will find themselves in CINCDoms; not understanding their role.

I see no appreciable differences. All SSCs follow a very similar curriculum of force development, military strategy, and campaign planning. There is more commonality than differences.

Experts on the Army. Should know more about other services and government agencies.

No real advantage/disadvantages or skill differences. One unique feature to USAWC is greater potential to network with other Army officers you will work in future with.

- More versatile and flexible - Adaptable
- At times may be intimidated by members of other services.
- I rate USAWC graduates over other college MEL-1's.

About the same.

- ° About the same capability.
- ° USAWC graduates better understand the Army, the NWC better understand joint and coalition, and the ICAF better understands industrial base.

Believe AWC graduates hold their own when compared to other MEL 1's. AWC produces its fair share of strategic thinkers, dynamic senior leaders and I can think of no weakness of merit that I have observed.

The traditional and historical ambiance of the USAWC is unparalleled. I sincerely believe that no USAWC graduate incurs a weakness as a result of this unique experience. The USAWC enables all of its graduates actualize their potential. It introduces its graduates to the elements of power (military, economic & political) and provides them the rudiments to become global/strategic thinkers.

- Compare favorably.
- Weakness-too green-not enough familiarity with other services and what they bring to the total fight.
- Strengths-strategic and critical thinking; land force organization and deployment.

No definite opinion.

- ° Very well
- ° I would rank USAWC 2nd to NWC due to the joint nature of NWC, the flexibility of the curriculum and the guest speakers.

Comparable. Good quality. Overall, more of a Service focus than the other SVC SSCs.

- ° Hard for me to determine
- ° Do not believe our Senior Service Colleges are preparing graduates for the world as it is!
- ° Too much emphasis on 2 MRCs vice multiple LRCs - working with interagency, UN, etc.

I think the best...because they are more qualified. We should not be "purple for purple sake". I like AWC approach...land professionals in a joint environment.

I'm not sure this is even a proper question. One service college compared with another service college only drives us to one Joint Service College. All of the colleges should do the Joint stuff about the same. The value added, in the service unique which cannot & should not be compared with another senior service college is which institutionally has a different focus.

In the macro, it is difficult to make an objective comparison since these are all success oriented professionals. ICAF does specialize more on the business side of the Armed Forces. We shouldn't change the focus of AWC but try to project the curricula to the time these graduates will serve.

AWC does a relatively good job in preparing their graduates; perhaps better than all the other SSC institutions. Having said that, it is still not a very good job in providing the needed skills. Still too much emphasis on preparing everyone to be the Chairman or CSA. Too much on the political, economic environment and not enough on developing operational level and strategic level planners and thinkers.

The current limited selection process generally ensures that all individuals entering MEL-1 level studies are high quality, well prepared, and aggressive. Given these starting attributes, the quality of the end product, regardless of the specific course of study, varies only slightly based on individual personalities. Although specific curriculum may focus on one or more aspect of strategic study, each MEL-1 program in total is sufficiently varied to provide a broad range of similar strategic level experiences, thus making each graduate relatively indistinguishable from his peers.

Compare favorable. Probably less familiar with joint issues than NWC. Spin up quickly when given joint assignments.

Compare very well! There are no distinguishable strengths/weaknesses by school. A function of individual application and job experience.

- USAWC is the strongest

- Strengths

- Rigorous analysis
- Sense of structure and articulation
- Focus on endstate/answer/bottom line/etc.
- Open-minded
- Inquisitive

- Weaknesses

- Discomfort with ambiguity (not always a weakness)
- Occasional hesitancy to use what they have learned.

Not readily distinguishable.

I believe USAWC may be trying to duplicate NWC too much, and thus may be denying the Army senior leaders who are proficient in land operations and strategy.

Solid base for Army assignments. Perhaps less well prepared for acquisition assignments, Joint, & Combined. Other schools do some specializing more in these areas than AWC. I am not advocating a change - because I feel other schools may not provide as broad a base as AWC.

I can't discern any major differences in the various graduates as all are normally top notch. Some small differences in knowledge of jointness & acquisition management among the various schools.

- Too green!
- Too narrowly focused!
- Too unaware of political dimension.

Don't know enough about it to make a good judgement.

- ° More balanced in their attitudes about other services & value of Joint Doctrine; more adaptable to be truly purple on a joint staff.
- ° Not as skilled at marketing ideas/positions; less skilled at knowing how to network OSD & "The Hill" on behalf of Army &/or Defense issues.
- ° Much stronger sense of core (service) and ethical values and the "total person" concept.
- ° More committed to selfless service.

My current sample is too small for me to be this precise. I generally think they stack up very well but that Army officers are perhaps a little stronger in operational art. My normal opinion is that all MEL-1 officers are generally cut from very similar cloth.

War college graduates are best all-round! Both the Army and other service graduates have better vision of role of senior leadership and more competency in joint planning/strategic thinking. NWC is close second in this but graduates of NWC appear to be staff rather than command oriented. AWC grads make better generals!

They are outstanding officers well versed in strategic, Army, and joint doctrine. They are not well versed in capabilities and operational procedures of other services. They also need additional training in unified and combined operations although current unified and combined doctrine is still ill-defined and emerging. They receive excellent training at the strategic level and good training at the joint level, and their knowledge of Army doctrine is well reinforced in the curriculum.

Better focus on operational art of war.
Better focus on strategic views.
Weak in strategic deployments.
Weak in large unit operations logistics!

- + A little better grounded in landpower/land warfare.
- A little less prepared for Joint/Coalition opns.
- Tend to be parochial...identify with "the heavy force" or "the...force/branch", etc.
- + Good staff skills vice other svc grads.

They best (I believe) perceive sufficient knowledge of ways other services plan/program/budget for forces/capabilities. Would like to see more focus on air.

Strengths:

- ° Compare on equitable basis
- ° Army understanding of how it runs
- ° Strategic focus
- ° Self diagnosis (mental & physical)
- ° Communication training.

About the same.

- Compare favorably
- Differences tend to be more individual based vice institutional based.
- Generally strong in operational art.

About the same. Believe all MEL-1 schools simply refine the skills and knowledge developed over 20 plus years of experience.

Weak in joint and combined operations.
NWC and ICAF do it better.

Believe there is no great difference overall; but NDU grads have better joint perspective.

Army focus, not enough joint, etc.

If you lined up 100 senior officers, I challenge anyone to pick out AWC graduates from the rest of them.

About the same as other service SSCs in ability to serve in Joint environment. NDU/ICAF best prepared for joint.

Very favorably - I can't tell any difference.

Fairly well, although the NWC course seems to be getting better all the time. Think the NWC is now considered the "Premier SSC" - more resources; more quality guest speakers, trips, etc. AWC could be considered too inward focused-although it does a better job on the "whole leader."

They're green in the positive sense of the term; as in Army green. They leave USAWC with a renewed sense of purpose, improved leadership skills, a strategic focus, and strong institutional values.

Strength: Is the great focus on strategy, warfare and land opns - in a joint environment. Only land maneuver is decisive. People live on land - not in the air or at sea. Weakness: Slow to cut loose the RC structure borne of the "Mobilization Mentality" - we've only "tweaked" it to fit the "Total Army" model or (myth).

No noticeable differences. I have bde commanders from AWC, NWC, Naval WC, Fellowship - all are good cannot see any difference based on SSC attendance.

USAWC grads compare very favorable. Possess outstanding land force deployment skills for Army, joint and combined operations. Excellent understanding of how military resources can be used to support national objectives. No weaknesses come to mind.

Balance.

About the same, except AWC:
AWC - more depth in Army
Natl - more joint, interagency depth.

USAWC grads better equipped to deal w/Army as opposed to joint issues. Army contacts gained thru class networking is single most valuable benefit. Likewise NWC grads are better equipped for joint duty. Unavoidable, given the composition and nature of both schools.

I haven't had enough of an opportunity to compare to give you a meaningful answer.

- ° All SSCs produce a good product.
- ° The fellowship programs develop more independent thinking.
- ° The combination of grads from the various SSCs and fellowship programs give depth to the senior leadership of the services.

Compare - OK - All a bit too heady on being world's greatest warfighters - lots more, less famous, efforts required to run our Army and perform our role in this society!

USAWC are/should be strong in basic Army knowledge and role in land operations. USAWC graduates may be less skilled in "jointness" depending on their branches and ability to have had joint assignments.

Better than most:

Strong problem solving skills.

Joint/combined could be stronger although most are adequate.

About the same.

Don't have a lot of experience with others.

° About the same.

° Relative strengths:

NWC/ICAF - better understand other services.

AWC - better understand the Army institution.

- closer friendships due to geographic nature of the college.

Strengths: Good service knowledge and good capability to plan and think through an issue. Weaknesses: Lack of understanding (tolerance) for other services' approaches to problems or issues; inadequate knowledge of joint/combined method/doctrine.

Most MEL-1 graduates have comparable skills and strengths. USAWC graduates probably understand the Army piece of PPBS/PPBES better.

I don't see a difference; don't ask where people went to SSC.

Believe overall the USAWC produces the best MEL-1 graduates. Broader in scope, more focused, with better "staff skills" at the operational and strategic level. Believe the USAF and USN probably produce a graduate who is more aware of the geo-political realities and a better understanding of translating requirements to capabilities.

The most important strength of the Army War College is the people you associate with--and continue to maintain contact with throughout your career--I suspect it is much the same at the rest of the colleges.

There is no apparent difference in my judgement.

Dependent upon the individual not the MEL-1 source. MEL-1 "ring knocking" is not desirable in our Army.

About the same. Naval War College is accredited is AWC? Should be. Navy has been wargaming since before WWII we should pass them by. Not as much stress on research & critical writing & analysis

Strengths: Decision makers; focused leaders; disciplined.

Weaknesses: Ability to work in combined/joint battlefield.

I'm not sure that the differences show up in the Army setting. NWC & ICAF graduates sure to have a better understanding of Joint issues and national policy processes.

AWC grads compare well on a professional service basis. I think the AF better prepares its officers for the Congressional, Secretariat environment. They have better processes in total.

Strengths = Combat Arms bonding.

Weaknesses = Narrow.

While the education at all senior service college programs is outstanding, the environment at USAWC adds a positive dimension that is not replicated at any other school. ICAF and NWC students communicate and deal with the hassles of Washington, D.C. The Air and Naval War College programs push the academic side too sternly. The year at the Army War College was my best in the Army, personally and professionally, because service to nation, obligation to family, and spiritual needs were all put in perspective.

° Better

° Strengths

Better knowledge of joint operations

More staff experience

Able to operate under pressure.

They are generally shallow -- too much the generalist -- "inch deep-mile wide"

Cannot comfortably comment...insufficient knowledge to make a meaningful comparison.

I have not noted a difference in graduates of the different war colleges. Strong leadership skills and interpersonal skills, good perspective on problem solving and conceptual abilities.

a. Very favorably here on the Joint Staff.

b. Relative strengths:

- can make things happen -- are the best "staff officers" from any Service!

- understand better than most joint/multinational warfare!

- truly believe "Joint warfare Team warfare"!

- are super communicators.

- understand the "big picture" and its effects on individual actions

c. Relative weaknesses

- don't pay enough attention to detail.

- don't understand/think about 2d and 3d order effects of their recommendations.

- are too reactive and not proactive enough (but that's how we train and reward them)!

Being visionary and a creative thinker are not viewed as necessary to "get ahead/be recognized"!

Compare well.

Equivalent

Strength - Know their classmates and the Army.

Weakness - Don't understand how to fit Army (ground) capabilities w/Air and Naval Power.

A "good officer" in any of the SSC environments will excel.

Not enough knowledge on policy formulation/national security council workings, etc.
Knowledgeable on planning, force deployment.

No perceptible differences.

USAWC graduates seem to be more US/ground focused

- tactical/operational expertise is great.
- joint/combined needs work.
- strategic view needs work.

I believe all graduates of any senior service college are about the same.

Do well! Need more joint skills. Jointness is upon us!

USAWC graduates are the best and the brightest in every way.

No basis of comparison.

Have problems with this question. Suggests USAWC graduates are stamped-out in cookie cutter fashion. Strengths and weaknesses vary widely based on many factors and experiences. Would agree the USAWC grads know their Army contemporaries much better which is an advantage!

Strengths - relaxed, ready to return to service environment.

Weaknesses - ill prepared for joint or combined duty - academically totally unchallenged.

- They are, as a general rule, not as broadly based as students in the Joint schools such as ICAF and NWC.
- They do not get the opportunity to travel as much and interact with senior personnel in other services, other theaters, and industry.
- Strength...They understand Army warfighting operations very well.

Well prepared from the Army perspective. Need a better view and understanding of joint and coalition topics and interagency workings within the U.S. Government. Need to understand how long-range planning and budgeting are actually accomplished/influenced in DoD.

One of the key advantages I found from being a USAWC graduate is the friendships and contacts with my fellow classmates. They have grown to be the Army's senior leaders and I feel my job is somewhat easier when I am working issues with former classmates. I now do a lot of work with the Army Acquisition Corps officers. When selected for Senior Service College, I always recommend the USAWC because they will get to know the key leaders who will be their customers. I think USAWC grads are #1.

Believe USAWC graduates better prepared in Strategic Vision - Campaign Planning; otherwise, courses provide similar educational opportunities. USAWC provides Force XXI Focus - other schools do not.

Overall no differences. Because of the variety of backgrounds going into the war college there is no difference. NWC may be more joint staff capable and more comfortable in the Washington arena due to proximity.

° NWC + ICAF are better inside Beltway and for joint.

° AWC is a better all Army prep - but not teaching Bde & Div level command.

Much better prepared in all areas, except joint operations.

No comparisons made.

I believe NWC and ICAF grads have a stronger joint program, therefore, of more value to the future Army.

They compare favorably but don't have the international perspective nor the joint & combined perspective that grads of Nat'l War College have.

- OK
- Very Army oriented which is to be expected--team oriented which is good.
- In sum--all graduates are about the same from the various service schools.

Strengths - appreciation of Army policies, capabilities, and values.

Weaknesses (relatively) - understanding of joint/combined ops.

My experience with graduates--show that the National War College folks have a wider range of experience--principally because of the Syllabus and the make up of the class--more service mix--

- ° Strengths of USAWC--more focused on campaigns and execution of them.
- ° Strength of Natl War College--is also accessibility to the numerous folks in the Washington area...

They are about the same. Educational differences among SSCs are outweighed by personality differences among individuals. Think NWC provides more exposure to joint and combined operations.

I have not seen a discernable difference.

About the same. Some show lack of familiarization with interagency process that is gained from the traditional joint schools (NWC & ICAF).

About the same with one exception - The Navy graduates appear to get more jointness and are a little better prepared for that arena.

- We are about the same.
- Army officers understand training and large scale operations better than the others.
- Air Force and Navy officers seem less affected by political pressures and more astute in managing complex managerial process..

I think they generally have a broader perspective and view than the graduates of Naval WC and ICAF--probably a little less than NWC. From a landpower, joint/combined view USAWC grads are equal to any. Unable to provide a relative comparison of strengths/weaknesses.

USAWC graduates are well trained in almost every subject that the war colleges offer. USAWC does not provide the political insight and joint force understanding that students at the NWC receive. The issue is student population, not curriculum.

Not able to compare/contrast.

Equal or better in all assignments except joint duty. Biggest weakness is lack of prep for joint duty.

Can't compare - only attended USAWC.

I see a half dozen grads from ICAF as well as COLs from the AWC. I believe they are all comparable.

Generally seem to have greater confidence in the future of the U.S. Army and of the Armed Forces.

I think better than most. Broader basis of knowledge.

In general - the same.

Admitting to possible bias, my observation of USAWC graduates is that they usually exceed their MEL-1 contemporaries from the other SSC's in analytical ability and an appreciation/understanding of the broader issues of the national security environment. Believe the National College does a good job in the joint arena but that the other service SSC's are too technically oriented.

Great.

About the same except joint schools seem to be more joint focused.

Suffer from less exposure to the DC environment, less "jointness" and far less global awareness.

Do not have a broad enough basis to make this comparison. I am in a Joint HQs with only one AWC graduate.

USAWC stacks up the best. Their strengths are in flexibility, leadership, ethical responsibility and land warfare. Weaknesses are few...

USAWC grads are great strategic thinkers and employers of firepower. They organize and execute quickly. They lack understanding of combat service support integration and are weak in coalition building skills.

They hold their own. I have seen no discernable difference. It is not which SSC one attends, but the initiative one takes in seeking the opportunities to excel.

USAWC graduates are better prepared to serve in senior Army staff positions and command at the highest levels of the Army. The weakness of USAWC is a lack of emphasis on joint and combined operations found in other curriculums.

The worst. Most USAWC did not apply themselves seriously to the work at hand. They were not challenged academically and it shows.

Too green!

Great

Need more joint experience/exercise.

Need to understand the "culture" of other services.

Overall quality same. AWC grads have less Joint knowledge.

About equal. Perception is that NDU (NWC especially) has the "pick of the litter" officers. USAWC grads have a better awareness of Army issues and a better overall experience. USAWC grads are weaker in jointness.

USAWC graduates compete favorably with all other senior service college MEL-1 graduates. I believe that other SSCs, notably the Naval War College, provide a much better professional education.

Equally - except in the joint and combined areas.
Strength - Land Warfare.

Knowing and working with their fellow Army leaders is the key.

- Favorably.
- Stronger in Army-unique skills.

About the same!

I think USAWC grads fair very well compared to other SSC grads. I believe they are superior to grads from ICAF, Navy, and Air Force SSC's. The National War College is about on par, they may have an edge when it comes to the joint world, but are not as up to speed on Army systems and behind on operational subjects.

I have never done a comparative matrix. All are highly skilled and motivated. I don't judge their performance by what school they went to; just by what they do.

- Navy has a more JT Perspective.
- Army is more well rounded-less bureaucratic.
- We use our enlisted force much better.
- AF more technical/automation heavy.
- Army needs more JT/MultiNational experiences.

USAWC grads compare very favorable with NDU grads. USAWC grads have a significantly greater impact on the Army than do the relatively limited number of Army officers who attend Naval War College, Air War College, or fellowships. NDU students at both NWC and ICAF enjoy greater interface with key administration figures and are close enough to visit joint staff officers on a regular basis should they choose to do so. USAWC students have an unparalleled opportunity to meet the "best and brightest" from foreign armies and to develop strong, lasting attachments to their classmates--who they'll serve with for the next 10 years.

Same.

Frankly, I see no difference in graduates from any of the schools. That is either bad or good - not sure which. However, clearly the AWC must reshape and perhaps reform to have an effect on the future.

I do not have adequate experience with other source MEL-1 to judge.

I see very little difference. The Army culture seems to be more inward looking and less supportive of Jointness than other services. This is most visible in personnel and assignment policies and may result from having too many competing requirements and not having enough time in the typical career to do all that must be done.

Clearly - more Army focused. I am not against combining the War Colleges - we need to understand and practice JOINT!

All services have strong players and weak regardless as to where they go their SSC tng.

Generally equal.

We know our Army better, but all about the same in Joint environment.

About the same - weaker on joint staff. Good appreciation of landpower; role of military in implementing National Security Strategy. VERY WEAK on other service capabilities.

USAWC grads compare well with other SSC grads. However perception exists that ICAF grads receive assignment preference. USAWC is very good at culture building (Army culture), reinforcing value, building strategic thinking. Maybe less adept at teaching proficiency in the joint and combined environment. Perhaps there should be a SSC+ for all senior leaders to focus on joint and combined environments.

- NWC appears to be the "class" of the SSC because of high level of guest lecturers.
- USAWC students are as good as any of their contemporaries.

Very well. Depth and breadth of understanding how the Army works and fits within the U.S. Government. Refines patterns of analysis, decision-making, policy formulation.

Probably about the same in actual experience/qualification. I do believe NWC grads get best pick of jobs and there is a perception from in the force that NWC is a "step-up." In my experience, some USAF and USN officers (though certainly not all) have a broader view of complex issues. On the other hand, Army officers seem to have a better feel for how to make things work.

I am unaware of any significant differences.

I have no real basis for comparison. I've seen great leaders emerge from all programs.

Very well.

I don't have a great appreciation for the difference except that I believe the Naval W.C. graduate may be slightly better skilled in broader application of the military tool as an instrument of national power. Conversely, I have not seen the Naval W.C. graduate as overall well rounded on the Army. The W.C. "level" graduate I see with the broadest skills in dealing with the military-political environment of the future in the UK "Royal College of Defense Studies (RCDS)" which turns out a very astute officer. That program may be at least worthy of study if not emulation.

USAWC graduates compete on a par with other MEL 1 graduates. No particular strengths/weaknesses.

As a NWC graduate, my view is there isn't much difference in the quality of a graduate. Good officers that seriously apply themselves take away equally valuable strengths from all of the SSCs and fellowship programs.

Well prepared in Army issues.

Don't understand that we now operate in a joint environment.

Has not produced "think wave" thinking, talk the words but do not walk the walk.

I have had two joint assignments since graduation from USAWC in 87 - no question that our USAWC are clearly heads & shoulders above all others - the only service that comes close is the USMC.

Greater understanding of Army and land warfare, better networking within Army counterparts.

Senior service college graduates as a group are more knowledgeable; however, their leadership styles are not necessarily changed. The officers' strengths are what got them selected for SSC; therefore, no change in strengths is required.

Compare favorably.

Strengths are logical thought process, attention to details and initiative.

Weaknesses are intellectual thought process and joint concept understanding.

Difficult to differentiate among graduates. The competencies seem to be more individual than based on knowledge gained from a specific school experience.

No distinctive differences. Effectiveness as Brigade Commanders & Division G-3 is not directly related to Senior Service College. Other command & staff for O-6s are not service unique. They are all quality officers. All senior service colleges provide unique tools for them to contribute.

Little data to compare.

No real data to assess.

Being in a joint position at an Air Force headquarters gives me a fairly good perspective in this area. There is a marked difference not so much in where an officer graduated but when he graduated. Those who graduated within the last two years, from any of the colleges, are more "purple" and willing to accept concepts from other services. Recent graduates tend to focus on what is the best solution rather than roles and missions. Possibly that is only an observation in this theater, Korea.

Graduates I've seen seem to have a good grasp of joint policies and search for new doctrine as soon as it is published. USAWC grads are more physically fit. Another strength is that, at least the Class of 1995, stays together on internet and discusses issues and how we can help each other.

A weakness is probably dealing with a coalition. U.S. doctrine has to be put in context of other countries' technology, training, politics, history, and mindset.

GO SURVEY
PART V: FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND NEEDS

D. How do you think the USAWC could improve to BEST prepare senior Army officers?

Did not attend USAWC and would not want to suggest improvements to a system/institution that I'm not familiar with and which produces excellent graduates.

Do more toward conditions I listed in # B.

[° More ability to think geopolitical in order to better apply NMS into reqd capabilities.

° Better appreciation of how domestic politics affects the DOD.

° More technology oriented, esp info processing.]

More emphasis on joint, combined, and coalition operations (war, disaster relief, peace keeping, etc.).

I haven't been personally exposed to the USAWC curriculum but would recommend continued/(increased) emphasis on coalition/combined issues at the strategic level.

Maintain the flexibility to adjust courses based on the demands for future assignments.

Not familiar w/details of curriculum to comment. Perhaps in future you could provide a curriculum summary or war college curriculum comparison matrix to assist survey participants.

Joint experience and vision.

- More joint training.

- CINC visits - travel to Europe/South America.

Devote ample time for better combined and joint exercises during the academic year. During my tenure, joint and allied training was sparse.

Require testing (graded papers, - produce degree).

Allow them to think, understand and formulate logical solutions to abstract ideas.

More emphasis on Joint and Combined operations.

Establish baseline
strategic military
competencies ⇒

Exercise students
in "strategic art."

⇒

Link electives, cont'd
exercises to student's
specialty(s), next assgmt.

|

←

1 yr. curriculum

→

|

How to work & survive in the Joint/Combined environment.

Better focus on joint & coalition warfare.

- Continue to focus on the future!

- Use history to build upon the future focus - Information age could cause us to minimize the human dimension of our business as we digitize our systems.

- Much more joint training and coalition training and education.
- Better understanding of coalition forces and international organizations.
- ° More focus on strategic thinking.
- ° More focus on joint and combined operations.

Allow students the academic freedom to structure their studies both regionally and functionally during a 3 to 4 phased term such that each student can select electives to supplement a major core curriculum.

- Need to prepare officers to operate in the joint community.
- Need to make them skilled users of information technology.

Realistic appraisal of the world environment in the 21st Century. What is U.S. Army role in that environment?

Not current enough to know.

By doing what you are doing. That is thinking now about the 4th USAWC.

Provide the environment and resources to get a broad based educational experience. Force students to think out of box.

Focus on the strategic and operational level planning and operations skills. Don't talk too much about it - do it. Use your simulation center.

The USAWC experience should not be restricted to a select few who may, or may not, be chosen for senior level command. Knowledge is a commodity which must not be jealously husbanded but, rather, widely disseminated if the organization is to be infused with vitality and innovation. Obviously, the resident course, due to physical and budgetary limitations, must remain reserved for a select few. The corresponding studies course, however, can and should be opened to participation by all officers who meet some appropriate minimum requirements for rank, time in grade, education level, etc. The potential for future distributive/interactive training networks should alleviate what today may be viewed as a daunting administrative challenge.

Challenge student thinking/assumptions. Expose them to multiple view points, in the past we have been reluctant to deviate from main stream thinking.

Do what you are doing - evolve!

- We do well with the course, as is.
- I would not want to "teach" ambiguity, but perhaps we could seek ways to leave issues open-ended on occasion, but rigorous analysis and bottom-line focus are strengths that should not be compromised.
- Keep the current structure of multiple roads to graduation.
- Keep a healthy number of electives so we can continue to produce a broad spectrum of leaders.

- More hands on joint & combined experience during course.
- More knowledge on preparation for operations in smaller third world countries with no infrastructure.
- Treating information as a key force multiplier - providing more knowledge on maximizing this key asset.

Increase joint/coalition warfare training, and information mgt (decision making) skills.

- Aim for & prepare some of them for key joint jobs.
- We put our Army jobs before joint jobs. USAF & USMC & USN does not. Their top folks get promoted from joint jobs.

Not sure I can adequately answer since I have been away from the school for 15 years.

Bonding with international counterparts.

May be asking leading question here - I wouldn't fool around too much with what we're doing now.

1. Understand how recommendations we make to Congress must be relevant to their political interests - do some exercises on real issues with real staffers.
2. Must improve on giving officer operational level warfighting experience in execution, not just planning.

Make sure you are producing intellectually capable officers with a joint focus and able to be very effective for the Army and the joint staff in the interagency policy arena. Not diplomats but soldier-diplomats.

AWC is best academic/military training I've received. I would eliminate CGSC because it teaches "school solution" rather than "art of warfare". Do what we did in '80-81' and you'll be OK.

Additional training and exercises emphasizing other service capabilities and doctrine, combined operations, and unified action. Reserve component (RC) Presidential call-up requirements, RC employment considerations, and RC readiness and training issues need increased emphasis. More practical experience in devising theater architecture, defining theater functional requirements, and organizing theater echelons of command to optimize operations and logistical support.

Foster Strategic Thinking - FOCUS OUTSIDE MOTHER ARMY in International, Interagency, Joint Arena.

- All SSC need more reps from other svcs.
- Reduce total #/% of officer attending and concentrate on top folks.
- Expand opportunities for fellowships and distributed learnings.

Have strategic focus, to include political affairs orientation.

Unsure.

- Expand creative thinking.
- Expand strategic planning skills.
- More techno education.

Concentrate on studies and exercises dealing with multinational (deployments initially for warfighting then progressing to peace making) enforcement and nation building. Field trips for selected students and faculty should be considered.

More focus on academic work - reading, writing, etc. Less emphasis on "easy subjects."

- More foundation in thinking joint and combined.
- More focus in importance of operating in "CNN world".

Modify excellent curriculum to include more on Joint, Coalition & Diplomatic skills.

For Army/Landwarfare doing good. Would have to degrade this quality to improve in joint, strategic-so keep doing what you are. Use NDU/ICAF to selectively focus on joint, strat,...

Do more distance "on-line" learning/interaction. Put more officers on fellowships relevant to warfighting - like 2 yrs at NTC, JRTC, BCTP - writing, observing.

- ° Higher quality faculty.
- ° Continue to maintain the balance among academic and nonacademic subjects.

Education in: strategic decision making; their role in honestly supporting respect for cultural diversity; information dominance; and futurism (the ability to think outside the box).

More "field trips" e.g., a BCTP warfighter visit - Doctrinal "poop up" from CAC to level the battlefield of knowledge. i.e, know how we fight before you launch strategy.

- More emphasis on the budget process.
- More time on the Secretariat and the role of political appointees.

Continue to add jointness to the program without decreasing land power learning.

Prepare Army officers for Div and Corps operations at operational level of war in JTF.

Change the core curriculum from the preponderance of education committed to enhancing competence to a greater portion dedicated to developing character.

More travel.

Don't tinker too much. Single most important skills are ability to communicate well in writing and mastery of computers

- They are here.

Execute the Fourth Army War College Strategic Action Plan.

Always room for improvement but bottomline is you're doing a lot of things right.

- ° More joint training.
- ° More on how to think.

See C above. [Compare - OK - All a bit too heady on being world's greatest warfighters - lots more, less famous, efforts required to run our Army and perform our role in this society!]

Emphasize broadness in understanding of land operations and role they play in overall National strategy and joint operations.

Stronger RC focus including RC of the other services.

Selection process-we either need to change our culture, i.e., LTCs that don't get selected for O6 have a tough time getting an assignment that is joint/combined - Turn up OPTEMPO.

Not really familiar with current operations.

Natural growth - keep in touch with Force XXI, current operations-review and see if routine changes and updates are being incorporated.

- More focus on Joint/combined issues...
- More attendance to broad knowledge - less focus on detail.
- More interest in some key areas...intel/IW/technology/etc.

1. Doing well as is.
2. Don't stagnant.
3. Change faster.

More concentration on strategic thinking and the development of theater campaign plans.

I'm satisfied - been out 11 years not sure of all the changes.

Run series of complex joint interagency simulation problems interacted w/other war colleges & CSCs.

- ° Greater emphasis on Joint, Combined opns and learning diplomatic/political skills.
- ° More travel to Joint world.

I'm not sure. SSC students normally do not want too work to hard. I would try to make them stretch themselves academically but that would mean (1) overcoming the tradition that SSC is a "rest"; (2) DA supporting the quality you need in the faculty.

50 yrs. ago the military led industry in innovation and technology - no longer the case - WHY? This is where you can improve.

Get broader and more creative.

I know money is very tight, but some opportunity of international travel would enhance the program. I was one of a select few who had such an opportunity during my year, at AWC, and I found it invaluable.

- ° Add instruction on installation management.
- ° Expand knowledge of other services.

Consolidate with the other SSCs to provide strong foundation in "jointness".

Maintain a general focus. Keep sn Integrated curriculum that includes military art, with political, world economics, cultural and historical perspectives. The senior officer must know how to use the above information to craft a plan to achieve a strategic objective.

Increase the joint operations focus.

Haven't been there in 10 years - PASS.

Faculty content is current because they just completed "doing" a key assignment - No faculty member should stay more than 2 years - one year would be better and keep only the best for 2nd year of teaching.

Will need political clout to justify SSC and service academics.

Give them a better appreciation for resourcing our force: What DLA does - how they make sourcing decisions affecting Army Title 10 responsibilities, distribution/transportation roles in resourcing our force.

Provide more exposure to the political realm of our profession (i.e., Congress, OSD, et al).

As society & the Army move into the Information Age & once we figure out what that means, the curriculum needs to be reviewed to determine if it's meeting these needs.

Need more joint info. Work information technology.

More interaction with senior decision makers. Emphasis on Joint.

More focus on thinking skills.

- Greater participation by the other services.
- Force computer proficiency.
- Make it academically tough w/o detracting from the "total" experience.

- Academic intensity increased.

- Focus on joint, combined.

Have them write...research papers...not 3 to 5 page "think" piece. There is a place for "think" pieces and should be used, but not at the expense of crowding out the time for fifteen to twenty-five thousand word papers that require students to think deeply about a subject area.

Get all aspects of AWC focused more broadly; curriculum, faculty, outside speakers and visits. Must look at all elements of national power and its coordinated use by national leaders/leadership.

Again, keep up with the Information Age. It has been a long time since I graduated, but automation/computers and how to manage Information has got to be a big part of the course.

Continue on current azimuth.

Provide real world problems for work groups to solve, instead of hypothetical issues. Make the group produce a document to be provided to the Army staff with recommendations, for a problem.

Train & develop Bde & Div Cdrs.

Add a case study on Plans, Preparation, and Execution in Bosnia.

- More emphasis on Joint/Combined.

- More emphasis on resourcing the Army.

- More officers from other services.
- More faculty members from other services.
- Greater emphasis on the international arena and natl strategy within that context.
- Greater emphasis on joint & combined ops.

Better understanding of the Interagency Process; how country teams work; and better understanding of MOOTW.

AWC is already outstanding.

Increase instruction/exercises in joint & combined ops.

- ° Lots of Case Studies--wide variety of topics -- Economic, political military -- more contemporary in nature.
- ° More exposure to the combined world -- guest lectures and seminars -- especially contemporary "hot spots".
- ° Teach seminar staff problem solving techniques.
- ° Papers/write lots of papers.

Continue maximum access to senior military and civilian leaders.

Work on creativity - Use more exercises that require an individual and then a group to work on a solution. So leader learns synergy.

We need to widen our use of simulations and hold officers accountable for actions and decisions throughout the year.

Adopt a diagnostic based POI - Don't waste time sitting in a seminar where officers have basic knowledge and skills. Build your POI on the skills in the resident class, i.e., a logistician should not have to sit in a course on logistics in support, strategic.

I really think USAWC is on track - perhaps a bit more emphasis on the legislative liaison role, PPBES process and I think that is occurring.

Reduce reqt for all branches to send someone - Have low density MOS. GO selectees attend.

MG Chilcoat has correct vision in his article. Plus, strengthen joint duty preparation.

Fewer writing requests. More seminar time devoted to discussion of issues with SMEs, instructors, and fellow students.

Greater detailed understanding of the contribution of the other services to the war fight.

The emphasis on learning from others, those currently doing jobs grads will perform in the future, would enhance and improve the AWC.

Stay in tune with the Army and Military forces in general at the cutting edge of national security issues.

- More in-depth analyses by students of actual complex, dynamic national security case studies, e.g., Grenada, Just Cause, Desert Storm/Shield, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia.
- Small group discussion periods with the senior leader who participated in major cases such as those above, dealing primarily with the kinds of skills and knowledge useful in managing these matters.
- Small group discussions with senior political and business leaders dealing with the leadership skills important today and in the future.
- Small group discussions with graduates of the USAWC, focusing on skills they have found particularly useful in senior leadership positions.

More emphasis on warfighting

- Land warfare
- Joint warfighting
- Multinational warfighting

Major focus includes developing strategic thinkers, however, putting the focus on senior Army roles in a joint, strategic environment would be helpful.

Encourage creative writing, include trip to other countries, require papers of substance, critical thinking "Quality not quantity", write more shorter "think" pieces.

No basis for recommendations.

Better use of recent case studies, dealing with rules of engagement, ethics, "consideration of others" and strategic/tactical movements.

Offer more travel to warfighting CINCs. Have J-3s brief and explain CONPLANS - Show how CINC OPLANS support national strategy.

Teach how to overcome mindsets and to think out of the box.

Focus on management of information in the digital and computer age. The Senior Army Commander in 2010 must be able to discuss the difference between what is important and what isn't, what is "real" and what isn't, and how to harness a decision making process in this environment.

Rigorous academic program. The best strategic thinkers on the faculty. (civilian and military)

Think like a CINC - and then structure your academic portfolio around that mindset. My two years in a J-3 shop of a warfighting CINCs staff really opened my eyes. The "imperial service staffs" really reacted when the CINC said "I want this." He got it!

Expand leadership training to achieve an appreciation for "cultural" differences between people in and out of the Army. Senior officers do not integrate well with those outside their "mold"...future success will demand optimization of all input/resources.

More Joint emphasis

Implement program that deal with questions A & B.

[A: A disaster if we don't take the following steps:

- Reduce AC/RC burden.
- Reduce joint burden.
- Produce officers who are as good at divergent thinking as they are convergent.
- Reduce "Group Think" tendency extant today.
- Teach senior officers about info operations and warfare.
- Eliminate the "zero defects" mentality currently developing.]

[B: ◦ Ability to visualize.

- Ability to connect disparate facts into a single logical thought.
- To think "outside the box."
- How to operate info age systems - not get someone to do it for him.
- Think in the long term - not just the POM years.]

Start the year as always, but ask for "issues facing our Army" from the students. Have them research/provide recommendations on resolving those issues. Use their time productively.

Import the Strategy Department and POI from the Naval War College to USAWC. The same could be said of their ethics elective. Both develop intellectual abilities.

JOINT JOINT JOINT.

What's broken?

Pretty good program as is. Because of myriad changes in the Army & the world, I don't know if you can "best" prepare anymore.

I think in many ways less is better. I recall our seminars getting really involved and engaged only a few times because it was time to move on to some other discussion topic that might have less relevance or depth. Fls need latitude to extend discussion, debate and ignore other topics based on the learning energy on the seminar.

More Multinational/Joint - Have Sr officers in for several days & actually work issues with people who have the experience. Get students away from the schoolhouse more.

Whenever possible, conduct interactive dialogue with students at other SSCs on a critical issue (to sense how they are viewing it). Do everything possible to link the USAWC students with CGSOC students to execute simulations (likely to enhance the preparation completed by both sets of students).

Do not know enough about current curriculum to comment.

Create conditions to enable AWC graduates to self actualize.

More practice, less theory. Spend a week in Washington and at joint/combined HQ.

More of the same - Broaden students through reading, seminars, writing papers, guest speakers. Teaching application through exercises - pol-mil, national decision making, CI - level joint warfighting. Continue to focus on graduates who have "balance" in their lives (fitness, family, spiritual as well as professional).

When I was there, Joint was a separate track - should be integrated for all.

One must work to see this big picture from How his battlefield will be affected by National Political decision.

Add more academic rigor to course.

- ° More electives.
- ° Research requirements/MSP is necessary.
- ° Take only well grounded, quality, qualified instructors, and improve them constantly w/prof development.

- More Joint
- Much more MOOTW
- Embrace it

Greater incorporation of electives in information management for senior leaders.

- Higher level guest lecturers.
- More Joint/Combined/Interagency.

Continue present programs. BUT, send civilian execs, from gov't, industry, educational institutions, etc. to this year in far greater numbers.

Get USAWC approved as a Joint qualifying institution. (Even if you have to make it longer (the course) - now about 10 mos; make it 11).

Emphasize Joint procedures and operations.

I haven't been at USAWC for 5 years. Hard to say. Demand demonstrated competence in computer literacy in some applicable form. Make students focus on your curriculum - de-emphasize Shippensburg Masters program.

More on Joint & Combined opns and logistics necessary to support them. There are real Title X roadblocks here and our pace of OOTW could get us into a bind in this area.

Not really knowing the curriculum other than from GEN Chilcoat's article. I must say that the WC must try to put the students into an application environment more where some level of experiential learning is achieved.

Increased focus on the prods noted in Part V A&B on this survey.

- [A: - Smaller Army.
- Reduced Resources.
- Increasingly complex operational environment.
- Continued/increased emphasis on Joint/Combined Operations.
- Continued emphasis on OOTW/LIC with possibility of an occasional MRC. Most likely in the CENTCOM AOR.]
- [B: - Traditional warfighting skills.
- Ability to operate in Joint & Combined environments.
- Basic knowledge of the skill sets required operate in a fast paced high technology environment.]

Not familiar enough with present curriculum to comment.

Force joint warfighting focus.

Put a brighter focus on preparing our officer corp for service in UN and coalition warfare situations.

- Information technology.
- Defending Army programs.
- Peacekeeping.

- ° Make them prepare a thorough campaign plan from start to finish.
- ° Make them solve real problems/challenges facing the Army/Joint Community.
- ° Connect students to the MACOMs where they will be assigned after graduation.

Keep conventional warfighting as the focus of the curriculum. Do not be reluctant to measure skills with tough tests. Officer performance is critical in the field, so there is no reason to not use school performance as a means of selection.

Spend more time on warfighting at Div/Corps/EAC!!

Did not attend USAWC...unable to address, no frame of reference.

Not think so parochial.

- ° More "honest" discussion with information from "insiders" & real decision makers.
- ° Vigorous debate with leadership.

Again, too far out to know what is going on now so can't tell what to improve - Perhaps a 2-4 week Sr COL, COL(P) or BG course/updates may be of value.

Use the international fellows more. During the campaign planning exercise, the fellows went to South America. We could have used them by having the two IF's in each seminar be task force commanders from their country assigned to the coalition. They could then have a list of imperatives they wanted to negotiate such as command structure, C2, intelligence releaseability, support, media access, etc.

- Offer JPME to anyone who wants/needs it so they won't have to go two months TDY during their next assignment.
- Have two of the civilians in the class come from the media and two more come from non-governmental agencies such as the Red Cross or Doctors Without Borders. We need to learn to understand NGOs.
- Offer electives during first term.
- Move the Washington trip to first term.

GO SURVEY
PART V: FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND NEEDS

**E. The USAWC Vision:
USAWC**

- ...the nation's preeminent center for strategic leadership and landpower
- ...a learning institution
- ...preparing today's leaders for tomorrow's challenges
- ...pursuing mastery of the strategic art through education, research, and outreach.

From your perspective, what should the USAWC do to achieve this vision?

Focus officers on the broad view of strategic leadership for the nation. Prepare to fight/function in a joint/combined world. Challenge officers with frequent simulations that require their participation in strategic planning and decision making.

- ° Attract & keep world class faculty. Without it, won't attain the vision.
- ° Adjust to conditions in the world/DOD envisioned in B.
[° More ability to think geopolitical in order to better apply NMS into reqd capabilities.
- ° Better appreciation of how domestic politics affects the DOD.
- ° More technology oriented, esp info processing.]

I believe it is doing this today.

- AWC might want to consider a "second year" course of research/study by a few hand selected colonels to publish various pieces on strategic leadership.
- To be the nation's preeminent center for military study, far greater emphasis on joint service operations is a must.

- ° Recognized quality in faculty.
- ° Curriculum that evolves/adapts to current and forecasted requirements.
- ° Attract national/international symposiums to pursue the tough issues.
- ° Continue Parameters and continue education initiatives.

Primarily, do what you are doing. Secondly, continue adapting to new dynamics of information age. Thirdly, ensure graduates are equipped to nurture the human machine physically, mentally, and ethically/spiritually.

Same as D above. [Joint experience and vision.]

More industry involvement in curriculum.

Add joint and combined environment to that vision.

See D above. [Require testing (graded papers, - produce degree).]

Don't consume yourselves with overburdening academic. Apply the right mix of academics with opportunity to conceptualize. Officers will learn from each other as much as they will learn from the text book. Provide opportunities as you have done in the past.

- ° Retain "seminar" structure, cross fertilizing demographics.

- ° Leverage P.E./simulation to work strategic issues.
- ° Balance presentations/"teaching" with discussion/seminar X-talk (time).

Stay with the total concept. Be careful in allowing LTCs who will not make Colonel attend. Will the investment in a potential or nonselect to O-6 pay off.

Continue your tradition! Believe you are on track--

- Have a more "joint" attendance-
- Encourage more JTF education.

- Increase the challenge of the institution.
- Upgrade the faculty.

Make the Army strategically relevant!

- "Solid curriculum" in house.
- Best of speakers.
- Solid teachers.
- I'm not so much for fellowships and external R&D. That is "blind leading the blind."

Attract and utilize our best & brightest. An assignment to the staff & faculty for the AWC for a former Bde CDR/Project manager must be considered as attractive as the XO for a DCS or 4 Star. (Culture Chg Prod)

- More research.
- Direct projects on most contemporary and future issues.
- Deal @ strategic level with interplay w/joint & DOD staffs.

Don't just "talk the talk"; "walk the walk." The vision is fine, but you can't achieve that vision through talk alone; you must promote experience in these areas through doing in real, virtual or constructive simulation. Talk is the first step, not the only step.

A major effort should be made to develop and implement an interactive distributive training system based on PC networking technologies. If Bill Gates' vision of a totally interactive cybernet becomes a reality, those learning institutions not prepared to advantage the new communication capabilities will be as isolated as medieval monasteries of old. As the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) comes on-line, a PC-based network will be established linking every Armory and Reserve Center in the nation. This branch of the "Information Super Highway" will provide a ready-to-use infrastructure into which an USAWC distributive training program can be plugged.

Keep pace with the world in which we live!

I really believe USAWC should focus on the academic setting. The study, discussion, and research opportunities should be the informing venue. Resist the temptation to travel, offer AWC alternatives, and other approaches. Limited travel has a place, but rigor (self-induced as has been the tradition) is found in the seminar.

Carry on your present vector.

- More hands on experience.
- Continuous updates.
- Periodic publications.

Continue on present course, modified slightly with suggestion in D above.

- Missing a key point.
- Prepare Army leaders for joint & coalition leadership. That's the future.
- A perfect Army leader who does not meld at senior joint & coalition levels is not relevant.

With international collaborative processes, build internet collaborative exchanges with the world's Armies. Once enrolled, enrolled for life with continuous interaction.

May be asking leading question here - I wouldn't fool around too much with what we're doing now.

Vision emphasizes strategic level too much. Only a few will so serve - most will serve at the operational level and we don't prepare them well. Emphasis should be on Strategic interface with operational art & execution of campaigns - Now every time there is a contingency operation, CINC s with perfectly good staffs, call 911 for BCTP & Team "D" to come & bail them out. They need guys who can translate war plans into actions - relevant actions - do mission assessments at the operational level & organize the staff & resources for success.

I think that is what this survey is about - USAWC needs to stay attuned to the environment and needs of the Army for its senior leaders and adapt accordingly. No major shifts required. You do this well now. Resist the notion of specialization - few senior leaders have that luxury but have instead ever increasing complexity to sort through.

Go soft on research-especially if you mean thesis/independent study. The best part of AWC is the interaction of peers/faculty in group setting - Don't send students off by themselves.

USAWC is uniquely able to expand its student body to incorporate greater representation from other interagency and private organizations. If operations are increasingly becoming joint, combined and unified, our success will be dependent upon how well we operate with these other participating organizations. This requires an understanding of the PVOs, NGOs, and other GOs as well as their understanding of the military. Expanding and financing attendance at the War College of senior executives from critical PVOs, NGOs, and GOs will dramatically improve both our understanding and the effectiveness of unified action. Synchronizing unified action is tomorrow's challenge for today's senior leaders.

See D above.

[° All SSC need more reps from other svcs.

° Reduce total #/% of officer attending and concentrate on top folks.

° Expand opportunities for fellowships and distributed learnings.]

Maintain focus and momentum.

Unsure.

Concentrate on achieving the fourth bullet.

You do very little during the curriculum year to cross fertilize between the various MEL-1 schools. Consider initiating seminars dealing with various subjects, sponsored by the different schools and held in respective auditoriums.

Rewrite the vision to focus on specifics. Sounds like you really don't know what you want to do.

- Redesign curriculum to produce grads who are fully oriented on joint/combined operations.
- May want to have a common SSC curriculum with other Service SSCs...all with same 75% joint piece and a 25% Service unique piece.

Above. [Modify, excellent curriculum to include more on Joint, Coalition & Diplomatic skills.]

Do what you are doing & continuing education.

Become more open and interactive.

More focused discussions with our nation's leaders - continue the efforts.

- You're already doing it!
- Encourage students and faculty to challenge conventional wisdoms so as to prevent the curriculum from becoming stale.

Teach "how to think" - but pose it on our doctrinal imperatives.

- Rigorously delineate core competencies.
- Rigorously eliminate non-core competencies.

On track now. Keep the experience challenging without creating an environment where academic achievement becomes paramount.

- Concentrate on warfighting strategy in theater campaigns.
- Help students prepare for brigade command & higher level assignments.

The vision ought to be changed to a purpose statement that focuses on the product of Senior Service College which is each graduate who should internalize values, art, doctrine and a historical perspective that will enable each to continue to make a contribution to our nation.

More fellowships to joint, interagency, OSD.

Tinker at the margins but no major changes.

Work hard.

- ° Focused Curriculum.
- ° Top Notch, well qualified faculty.
- ° Great guest lectures program.

Appears to be on track.

See C above.

[Compare - OK - All a bit too heady on being world's greatest warfighters - lots more, less famous, efforts required to run our Army and perform our role in this society!]

- Continue to do what you do best.
- Encourage students to learn about things they do not know well.
- Build/work interactive exercises (UJC + +) with other SSCs.

Not qualified to answer this.

Do what you have planned.

From feedback from 3 or 4 LTCs I greatly respect who are in the current class, I think AWC is doing all the right things. Stay the course - make minor course corrections as conditions obviously change.

- Make the faculty into the very best you can get...
- Choose the best guest speakers you can get...regardless of their position/service/political connection.
- Consider another month or two of the academic "year" to account for the need to cover more (more complex) info...

Expand interfaces with other learning centers, e.g. - Marshall & Nimitz centers.

The USAWC is probably doing the right things now with some slight change to subject priorities.

Am satisfied - been out 11 years not sure of all the changes.

- Develop the finest professional faculty possible.
- Stay in touch with the changing world.
- Learn from our allies. America is a world leader, but we don't have a corner on the idea market.

Develop & write Army's doctrine on strategic & joint & combined & interagency opns - 100-5 Theater & Army Opns
Army in JTF
 ? Div ops
 ? Corp ops

Create an environment for leaders to exchange ideas, learn from others - socratic approach to learning. Balance during the year.

I'm not the one to say - I've only visited & was never a student.

Learn from American industry.

Make it shorter.

Continue to do what you do so well. Keep all the competing considerations (professional, personal, spiritual) in perspective, and keep up the candid self-evaluation and self-scrutiny to grow and improve the program.

- ° Keep up the good work.
- ° Survey the other War Colleges for their good ideas.

Concentrate on our business in a joint arena. Cut back on the "State Department Stuff".

Resist the natural tendency to reiterate Army doctrine as "the" solution. Encourage and even insist on looking outward across the international arena to compare and contrast our strengths and weaknesses. Teach the strategic value of marketing the advantages of a strong Army to the nation and political leaders..

Define "tomorrow's challenges" and stay focused.

Continue development and focus on interactive process. Make taking risk in thought a positive.

Be careful not to invest an inordinate amount of resources in the LAST BULLET!

Focus on coalition warfare using your international fellows as mentors for the U.S. students.

Need to better prepare Army officers to compete with other services in the political environment. We serve a civilian "political" master. It can work for or against us.

Be more than a place successful battalion commanders go as a reward for good performance. Share with (officially) the Army commands the results of your Fellows' works.

- Continue to focus on the joint & combined nature of warfare.
- Begin to change the "culture" to understand that.

Continue on your current path.

Focus on information technology--manage it--use it--package it. Produce decisions from it.

Challenge students more--allow for independent study and expression.

Ride the technological wave. Select quality officers for your faculty. Enforce demanding standards. Aim for sophisticated level of understanding - force students to reach.

- ° Probably increase your percentage of civilian permanent faculty.
- ° Establish faculty chairs to target your outreach program, e.g. NGO chair.
- ° Rigorous academics.
- ° Be more joint.
- ° Selective two year program for students interested in research.

Reduce your horrible overhead to a bare bones, lean mean adept, qualified, credible faculty.

Emphasize research and writing.

AWC graduates will be preparing options/advice for the national leadership on strategic matters and exercise of land power. Graduates need to know the Army's role, as well as the role of other DOD, other USG and NGOs in performing these missions in a coordinated way. AWC graduates should be the experts on the Army's role in these matters. Prepare for tomorrow's challenges--anticipate what changes may be--technically;--politically (externally) understand how long-term planning and budgeting today can affect/reduce challenges of tomorrow.

The key - stay current and lean forward in the foxhole toward the future. This is easier said than done.

- Continue current focus.
- Change course as our operational environment changes - ie, PKO - Lessons learned from ongoing operations.

The USAWC, based on the article by MG Chilcoat is well on its way to building the fundamentals that will achieve the vision. We need to build thinkers that don't take advanced technology and see it as a solution to today's problem but ones that realize that technology will solve today's problem but it will dramatically change the environment, i.e., Building an advanced tank will solve today's problems but in 2010 tanks may not survive on any battlefield. The half-life of today's technology is so great we cannot visualize its impact on our Army & our Nation's interest in 2010. How will the interest of America change if there is no need for oil in 2010?

- ° Recruit good faculty.
- ° Focus more on tactical/operational.

- To focus on Russia; NATO
- Enlargement: China
- To build an understanding of what truly happened as a Coalition PKO/warfighting instrument in Bosnia.

No major changes. Continue to grow on steady ways. Curriculum is sound.

Resourcing? See comments above.

See D above.

[- More officers from other services.

- More faculty members from other services.
- Greater emphasis on the international arena and natl strategy within that context.
- Greater emphasis on joint & combined ops.]

We are not preparing students to:

- Work interagency.
 - Work ambassadors.
 - Fully understand MOOTW/ask an Armor or FA ofcr what he knows about FID as it relates to MOOTW. Bottom line is--not much.
-
- More exchange between senior service schools.
 - Look at civilian executive development programs for ideas.

° A series of defining seminars should be undertaken with key staff and faculty -- culminating with a codifying session with the 4 Stars of the Army.

° Need to focus on the relevancy today/tomorrow of the USAWC experience.

Not sure what strategic leadership is really supposed to mean. Think we should include operational art as practiced by corps commanders. Would incorporate leadership tools from several different venues. Would include what we're doing at LOTP at NTC, techniques employed in software firms like Bill Gates at Microsoft, etc.

Maximum exposure to current and recent past leaders - political & military. ex. SECDEF, former CSA, CTCS.

Sounds like you're working it already - this questionnaire is proof.

Direct each of the goals into sub tasks/goals with obtainable/visible, fiscally responsible, and move out.

See D above.

[- Adopt a diagnostic based POI - Don't waste time sitting in a seminar where officers have basic knowledge and skills. Build your POI on the skills in the resident class, i.e., a logistician should not have to sit in a course on logistics in support, strategic.]

I think you are right on target - continue to expose the students to the best possible guest speakers, integrate the media and other non-federal governmental agencies into the curriculum and stay flexible. Continue to pursue a broad-gauged graduate who is capable of meeting tomorrow's uncertain environment with confidence.

More of the same.

Same as D above.

[MG Chilcoat has correct vision in his article. Plus, strengthen joint duty preparation.]

Take the time to read and reflect, discuss and decide, debate and disagree and finally challenge the system whenever possible.

The recent greater role as the facilitation of "current topics" type seminars is the right vector. USAWC can shape the Army and the nation while it teaches.

Continue what you are doing. Allow students time to relax and reflect. Don't overload.

Examine USAWCs curriculum to see how each element of the vision is promoted and institutional-need in each study area.

- ° Be more joint.
- ° Demand more innovative thinking.

Continue to teach our LTCs and COLs how to deal with managing change in our Country, Army and the world.

Form a think tank which looks at hard issues & offers insights. Cmd problems in a coalition composite corp, influencing Russia with military excellence, etc. Two MRCs?

More on research and outreach.

Sustain its current emphasis on landpower, learning institution, mastery of strategic art, and augment the preparation of tomorrow's challenges by focusing on the information age and the _____ of the Army.

Don't be shy about challenging the student body with a real academic program.

Get rid of our parochialism. Start breaking rice bowls. If it's good for the total effort, then it's good! This doesn't mean that the Army's view is always right or wrong - it's just one perspective.

Study recent missions intensively (Somalia, Haiti, Hugo, Bosnia) from the perspective of those who had to make operational & strategic decisions.

More emphasis on Joint and Combined Operations.

Thinking in strategic terms is useless if the officer hasn't learned to think in tactical terms. The greatest shortcoming I see that needs repair is to teach officers how to think about

tactics, strategy etc., not what to think!

Continue to stress strategic thinking.

More academic rigor is necessary to develop the capacity for critical thought.

Broad Curriculum

- Political
- Economic
- Social
- Joint Warfare.

Stay the course.

Maintain your distinguished faculty & physical plant. Broaden guest lecture program for inclusion of more international military & civilian leadership.

1. Attract and maintain a first-rate faculty. They must have bona fides with students and the academic world and OSD, inter-agency etc.
2. Maintain selective criteria for attendance.
3. Get articles, info published in non-military publications.
4. Don't be afraid to teach in a didactic sense when the topic fits, socratic method not always the best for education.
5. Figure out a better way to get more students to do relevant and meaningful research that has a real impact on the Army.

Keep faculty members who have recent experience in the joint/multinational arena. Bring in more guest instructors vs keeping a large faculty. Get the peacekeeping on the ground planners in to discuss the "Plan" vs what actually happens.

I think you are on the right track now. Don't try too hard to change. Just take advantage of Collins Hall to link your students through VTCs and simulations with OJCS, the ARSTAF, and joint/combined HQs around the world. Don't count as much on info developed in the seminar group for preparation for their next assignment.

Create manageable, objective, and realistic objectives under each element, then do exactly what you say you want to do. The elements of the vision are meaningless unless one can relate them to the 21st century Army through objectives - DON'T MAKE THE OBJECTIVES FUZZY!

See above. [More of the same - Broaden students through reading, seminars, writing papers, guest speakers. Teaching application through exercises - pol-mil, national decision making, CI - level joint warfighting. Continue to focus on graduates who have "balance" in their lives (fitness, family, spiritual as well as professional).] Also include use of modern technology in curriculum.

Keep on doing what you are now.

Develop measurable objectives in each area...then track & follow up...must evaluate.

Add more academic rigor to course.

From my perspective, I'd say you already have achieved it!

Question strategic leadership - What is it? Bill Gates certainly has it - shouldn't it relate to Nation's Military needs?

Continue to select and retain the best faculty. Possibly the addition of senior fellows (3 and 4 star retired officers) to faculty similar to Capstone.

Get world class faculty and be innovative.

Mix more civilians within the student body as attendees.

- Develop techniques that accurately establish the skills bank of students, develop curricula that improve skills - and expose students to new, often competing, frequently uncomfortable ideas.

- It's hard to do every thing in a year, but exposure to historic and current problems - what worked, what didn't would be useful. Case approach?

- Many Army officers are not appreciative of the geo-political, social, ethnic and religious forces in the world today.

- Do joint studies/qualification.

All senior service schools should be fully (equal) integrated.

Focus major writing requirements on topics that clearly support the Army/DOD needs on themes.

Include above with what we are doing now.

[More on Joint & Combined opns and logistics necessary to support them. There are real Title X roadblocks here and our pace of OOTW could get us into a bind in this area.]

Capture the distributed education technology and immerse the students in repeated application environments. While I still believe the WC experience should allow a little R&R environment (with regard to where most students have just come from and will soon go to!) and opportunity to rekindle family flames - it does need to crank up the heat a bit in learning through applications, albeit artificial.

Continue to refine the curriculum to prepare graduates to meet the needs of the Army in the future operational environment. Do not remain static.

- Insure assignment of best qualified staff & faculty.

- Integrate efforts with those of other SSC,--perhaps trading instructors and specific courses.

- Insure integration of joint training with Army component instruction.

Continue to provide a "total experience" aimed at developing "fully functioning" officers across the full spectrum of life-only then can you get at the strategic art.

Adequate time to most likely missions.

Have strategic leaders adopt officers during the school year (great mentorship program).

The key is mastery. Don't roll students out the door with a MEL1 stamp unless they have, indeed, mastered their profession.

Change it! We need to be competent warfighters before we worry about strategic art.

- Teach students the complexities of our military-political systems.

- Seminars and practical exercises in strategic thought.
- Study the lessons learned from historical examples & apply those lessons to theoretical problems of the present and future.

- Use more visiting professors for fresher ideas.
- Require more academic substance from students and professors, but keep notice of total person vice a harder academic grind.
- Stress need for measurable endstate solutions to civil-military strategic problems.

- ° Review & analysis of current strategic leadership-in Army & other national sectors.
- ° Expanded interaction with Army GOs to enhance AWC on learning instruction.
- ° Expanded continuing education of GOs-planned by AWC.

Closer contact with graduates - particularly those still on active duty. Should not just be a 1 year experience but the year in Carlisle should be the start of a 10-15 year growth experience.

DON'T LET GRADUATES GET STALE IN THEIR THINKING--KEEP THE VISION WIDE, LONG AND DEEP.

Follow up after graduation with professional readings, projects, etc. using the internet, publications and sending out CD with the latest doctrine. Use an internet bulletin board to exchange ideas.

Request input on research projects being conducted, articles being written, classes being established, etc. via the internet. Graduates are all over and can offer a lot.

Don't get side tracked with masters degrees or other requirements. The academic freedom coupled with outstanding faculty, course offerings and resources makes USAWC the great learning institution it is. If it's not broken, don't fix it.

GO SURVEY
PART V: FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND NEEDS

- F. The USAWC is considering conducting a program of "Continuing Education" for graduates and senior military leaders. From your perspective, how should this program be implemented, i.e., what form should it take, what would be of most benefit to you? Please explain.**

Continuing education requires time. In my opinion officers who graduate from War Colleges serve in positions where time simply is not available. In my current position I would be extremely hard pressed to devote any "extra" time to continuing education. It would be better to prepare useful studies for key leaders than spend time trying to continually educate graduates.

- Concise exec summaries to read on major developments/courses. Use e-mail
- Send recommended reading lists.
 - ° Readers Digest type condensed versions Of certain books.
- 1 week summer seminar for select grads to get field input and pass out current AWC thoughts.

It shouldn't - at least not from a "required" participation stand point. Senior officers are already over burdened with duty requirements; they will seek out the "continuing education" needed to remain fresh and vital in conducting their duties.

Series of correspondence courses from which an interested officer could select based upon personal, professional requirements. I don't necessarily feel that they should be tied to a "degree" producing program.

Distance learning using automation.

Keep senior leaders abreast of evolving thinking regarding strategy, vision, and unit production, particularly through a synthesis of new literature emerging from business, politics, military thinkers, et al. Most of us are caught in "tyranny of the urgent" and need a way to be exposed to broader, enduring, "important" subject matter.

This has merit, but nothing will replace actual work experience.

Return to Carlisle for 2 weeks every other year.

Great idea! We could use our E-mail system or take home course of learning. Routine visits to the campus. The most beneficial to use would be the latest info on strategic learning and interagency activities. Dos & Don'ts.

Since departing War College, I have had little time to continue my formal education. I would offer you this - within the 3-5 years after graduating from the War Colleges, many of our classmates leave the service. Our assistance in helping them transition to meaningful, supportive positions in the civil sector would be a great long term investment.

Implement via Worldwide Web.

- Include discussion groups on current, relevant issues.
- Provide papers and/or reading lists that clarify issues.

° Make it a voluntary self-development program...there really are enough "forums" currently that, in effect, do same

Should be done on-line to provide a system for advance warfighting concepts and strategic issues.

GOs get to go to Capstone. Have not been there yet, but first survey potential students. Find out their needs, then tailor based on, need, cost & other factors. Excellent idea as we move further into the information age!

I think the best follow-on training is OJT where you get a chance to practice what you've learned. Inevitably you must become an expert in some specialty areas. What I have learned in this joint job could not be taught in a school. It has to be experienced.

Recommended reading lists, other source material on topics of today. Not a lot, generally, this is an area of self education.

- Internet.
- Minimize time reqmts - but - provide summarized info.

Don't do it. After he departs AWC, the officer will have ample opportunity to keep current JFQ, Parameters, MR, plus a Plethora of Scholarly Journals and articles are readily available. It's up to the individual to take advantage. The good ones will. The others will not and ignore what you provide them.

Vision of the future - Not only no more TF Smith's but also no more Somalia! How do we apply our superb operational art doctrine to peacetime engagement missions?

- ° Tell me the most current books I should read.
- ° Give me a one week course as a 3 and 4 star to "update" latest things... e.g., management techniques of bustling businesses; strategic trends; evolving ethical problems, etc. etc. -- Maybe every other year for frequency. 3 & 4 stars only.

"Internet". I would get most benefit knowing what the students think about what's going on, how we are doing & what needs to be changed & what things we need to hold the line on.

Senior GOs on an on-call basis specifically dealing with those contemporary issues that require refreshing. We do not need another mandatory course.

Develop the strategic thinkers and planners that we need. We don't have any Weidemeyers right now nor are we developing any.

A program of exportable packages, eventually evolving into interactive PC-based programs, would be a most effective method of keeping graduates "up-to-speed" on evolving strategic and doctrinal concepts. Periodic (annual or semi-annual), seminars/symposiums expressly designed as mini-reunions would be valuable opportunities for face to face interaction

between the faculty and former students.

Tie to internet. Periodic return visits to Carlisle.

Go for an advanced degree program as a natural extension of MEL1. AWC certification as a post graduate university!

- One week seminars.
- Offered on a sign-up basis.
- CSA could designate certain officers to attend certain seminars.

- Reading.
- Some correspondence.
- Tele-training.
- Short TDY/seminar.

Be careful. You can't be everything to everyone. I try to read all SSI's publications, but can't keep up. Why not be ready to tailor small groups to their specific needs, rather than set up a new program?

- ° Continuous dissemination and publications as appropriate.
- ° Perhaps periodic 1 week courses & update to include more courses at private institutions.

We currently have several of these across the Army. Not sure we can afford another one without reducing somewhere else.

- Invite senior joint & Army staff members & leaders for seminars.
- Most people serve on staffs not as leaders. More money to be made addressing staffs than leaders. Sounds less flashy, but, it's true.

- Reading program combined with distance learning instruction VIA VTC!
- CD ROMs - that have lectures, guest speakers and menu of subjects that can be chosen by the student.

As above.

I wouldn't recommend doing this. Senior leaders have too much to do now. Experience is a better teacher than more schooling.

Reach out to CINCs w/an OJT Program per above.

Short, perhaps 1 week updates would be useful - maybe similar but not exactly like the Joint Warfighter course.

Parameter should serve this purpose. Additionally, grads should be invited to return to AWC periodically to interact w/students.

Continuing education is only "continued" if it is focused and relevant to the perspective student body, e.g., USAWC graduates. These graduates are dispersed throughout the military and the world decisively engaged in service, joint, or interagency activities. I recommend you establish a USAWC Bulletin Board that can be accessed on the Internet and is partitioned based upon the relevancy of the subject matter to specified target audiences. Post only clearly important doctrinal or policy papers and information in folders focused on DA, joint, MACOM, DOS, etc., senior leaders. Use your faculty to screen/nominate articles and papers. Based upon the relevance of your information to the target audiences...education will be continued.

- ° The Capstone course was the best experience I had in preparation for GO duties.
- ° The Harvard Seminars I attended were very useful also.
- ° The Joint Warfighter course was valuable so I think you have to reach outside the Army to benefit GOs greatly.

Would like to know more about program before I offer more comment. However, would like for consideration to be given to more fellowships - 6 months via 1 yr. Could be collocated with existing institutions, e.g., RAND, LUI, etc.

Several media:

- Colloquium for Active Duty grads on regional basis.
- Computer online conf for specific subjects.
- Computer online conf for general subj discussions.
- Readings mailed out (print on e-mail).

Seminars at various locations, pointpapers for distribution.

- Reading program.
- Periodic "video lectures".
- Biannual symposiums geared toward topical issues.

Seminars on selected subjects with notices to the field. Hold them using VTC available at most installations. These could be one way informative (lectures) or interactive.

Good idea. It would keep you in touch with "old" grads who are greater than five years from graduation. A correspondence course using electronic conference techniques would work.

- First - make it completely voluntary and don't tie it to promotions or other Boards. Our senior officers are far too busy to have another mandatory "check box".
- Secondly - design it from the outset to be computer/internet-based.

Weekend courses - VTC "distant" conf.

Written material with self-assessment segment or on disk.

Combination of correspondence, internet & periodic seminars at USAWC/VTC. Reading lists.

Use distance learning - more on-line discussions/interaction.

- ° Good idea.
- ° Weekend seminars
 - ..discussions with key leaders - in and out of uniform
 - ..update sessions on current issues from a strategic standpoint.
- Distance learning...
- Internet connectivity with College and its graduates.
- USAWC to send out computer discs with latest & greatest stuff.
- Homepage.

Be careful - Most COLs & above have trouble finding the time. Our current "model" for doing business is to "borrow" rank for the crisis points - e.g., BIG plus-ups for Ad-hoc staffs/units in Somalia, Haiti - BIG reinforcements to Korea, and now Europe for Bosnia - Oh by the way - the taskers for SOUTHCOM (JTF-B), CENTCOM and others are still there. DC/ADC course is a good example of "a course too far".

Bi-monthly list of suggested readings mailed to enrollees.
 Bi-monthly "early-bird" type anthology of magazines, newspaper articles.

Not sure there is a great need or much benefit for continuing education program for graduates. Providing updates for informational booklets annually may be more helpful. Current demands of GO jobs will conflict with participation in a correspondence-type course.

Must decide if "continuing education" is mandatory. If so, against what requirements/objectives? If not, how done, for whom & how do we justify resources. If so, what are the specific goals--general in nature; prep for specific assignments, etc. Good idea.

Networked E-mail, with thought pieces, occasional seminars, more outreach to grads to come back & participate in curriculum.

Best forum would be hosting 2-3 day topical seminars to bring people back every year or two.

One week seminars that we could take part in. Perhaps good to return to USAWC every two-three years.

Monthly or Quarterly readings on a variety of subjects. Need to ensure whatever program that is developed does not become burdensome. Our rucksacks are full!

Short readings on current issues.

Short, focused modules that can be exported by training teams on VTC/simulations.

Periodic seminars with a good reading program - i.e., pull the major issues then let us read the latest and attend a short 1-2 wk course every 2 years.

° Not necessary - I guess now is the time to show my true colors...I think between the 3 pillars of our Leader Development Process-the operational assignment pillar (experienced) is the most important. The progressive & sequential iterations between the school houses & our assignments are critical, but America's Army has enough schooling. Don't have any more programs that take leaders away from their operational assignments. I'd be glad to discuss this in greater detail.

Writings on contemporary issues should be distributed via hard copy or CD ROM. E-mail bulletin boards and interactive WEB pages can be used to exchange thoughts, etc.

1 week case study type courses which update old grads

- international flavor
- simulations
- computer skills
- POL-MIL.

At this stage of one's career this should be an informal program. Duty responsibilities and time make a formal program virtually impossible. Quarterly literature that "builds" in our approach. For example, "Information Warfare" is the buzz phrase now, but can we intelligently define it, describe its strategic value, explain the military's piece of it, etc. Our educational literature must support the CJCSs priorities.

Would like to see a Doctor level program.

- Professional readings.
- Periodic seminars at the Collins Leadership Center.
- Establishing an Information Network for all graduates.

- PCC for Div & above conf.
- Run BLTP Div & corps.

Share transcripts of lecture series with field.

No time out here in the trenches...don't bother...concentrate on your resident students.

Seminars; orient on the military in our society; fit of the military in our geo/political world.

An excellent idea. You might consider bringing back graduates on a select basis (not all GOs -- try to get a cross section of O-6s through the most senior) for a period comparable to National Security Week to give the in-house class the benefit of practical reflection of the War college experience on follow-on assignments and experiences.

° Tough to do. Must be short in duration and narrow in focus.

Drop the idea--too much of this as is, e.g., Harvard program - Capstone - etc.

The best vehicle for continuing education would be through conferences or seminars. The best length would be 3-5 days in length or over a Friday, Saturday, Sunday. Center conference around a theme/idea and bring in experts or Army officers to present lessons learned, etc. Provide ample time to dialogue and debate the issues. Much is gained through discourse.

Great idea to work the currency problem. Use MCO/PC based network to reach people rapidly.

Suggested readings and/or excerpts of them!

Frequent (once every two weeks) mailing of key articles/publications or think pieces - maybe circulate some student paper for critical thought about the Army of the future.

First to find time for Continuing Education, time in the workplace must be sorted out & better utilized. Working 12-14 hr. days, does not facilitate Continuing Education - 12-14 hr. days are truly counter productive except for very few positions.

Senior leader seminars - at AWC and "on the road" > oriented on the mission/geographical area of the world. Include Colonels as senior leaders. A "think and do" session, e.g., go PACOM and make the leaders develop a National Military Strategy for North Korea, Japan and China.

Great idea!! I would execute thru the chain of command. More specifically I would ask the "SSC graduates" to conduct seminars with their O6/GO bosses - USAWC would provide the "O6/GO Bosses" a lesson plan/discussion outline & would lead the continuing education lesson/discussion.

- Use CD-ROM.
- Not time consuming. Most of us are already working 12+ hr. days.
- Not mandatory.

Seminars - One week in duration. Cover Force XXI & the Army's role in future joint/coalition military operations.

Exportable learning utilizing videotapes.

All officers at all levels should be required to continue their education -- writing and testing should be a part of the program.

One and two week courses - on site now at various locations - but clearly one to employ technology later so that "deskside VTC" would facilitate participation. Focused subject to be addressed in detail during the course of the week - e.g. geopolitical in nature could include intense study off potentially critical area of world. (China-Taiwan) to bring detailed info to all senior leaders - historical background, economic, political factors, etc.

Nice thought but hard to implement. Your graduates go off to demanding jobs which don't offer much time for continuing education. "Parameters" is probably the best you can do. May want to do something with "Parameters" or the Internet.

No value here--

- Keep it affordable. Extensive TDY for former graduates to implement such a "Continuing Education" program is not affordable.
- Provide recommended reading lists on a periodic basis. Perhaps provide a subscription service at reduced rate for current material.
- Provision of summaries periodically of key issues in the military, political, and economic

domains to reinforce the Sr Svc School educational experience.

Be a part of the national information resource available to the nation's senior leaders (e.g., your students, your faculty, your library, etc.), and make those resources known and usable via the information internet to the senior leaders.

I believe providing key literature to graduates to keep them current would be helpful. Perhaps 2 to 3 day seminars would be good (more than that would be tough for key leaders to schedule). Perhaps the "key literature" could be sent electronically.

- Symposiums: Several days duration, CSA involvement to insure full support & involvement. Host at Carlisle-or detractors at installations will adversely affect.
- Continued publications

Strategy, Army issues and focus for the future - a one week (no longer) course at USAWC.

No reason to do this - GOs have lots of courses and schools.

1. Seminars
 - Field Trips.
2. Selection is key and focus essential.
3. Build around the Principle of the AAR -- informed self criticism of the organization.
4. Find ways to conduct "orientations" for GOs going to a new job.

Thru commanders and chain of command (What is the requirement?).

Same theme -- understand how the interagency process works/how country teams work/what's the future relative to MOOTW & finally the BUNGLT process.

Form - 3 ideas

- Short courses (3 days to 2 weeks long) on specific subjects.
- VTCs.
- Papers available through a BBS.

1. Personally, the environment is so busy--do not have time for continuing education---don't think it is unwise--but lots of thought needs to be given to value/how/when.
2. There are so many demands on your time in the field.

Would use video tapes, computer based instruction, reading program, with periodic VTCs. May want to hold infrequent seminars at Leavenworth, USAWC, etc.

Identify critical needs of the Army in specific disciplines - avoid soft areas, concentrate on more specific problem identification and problem solving.

Directed readings and then discussions via VTC, e.g., (C of S sends out electronically a text or assignment. - USAWC w/Command conducts a discussion over VTC.)

WWW - updates -- brief --- diagnostics for base knowledge and prescriptive readings--on the WWW-- See AOL - Education info.

I would support a series of seminars/programs throughout the year that would permit interactive and discussion with leaders in a wide variety of specialties/fields - face to face. Everyone and his uncle is pushing programs on the internet - I don't need to spend more time sitting in front of a damn CRT screen! Virtual symposiums will not replace real human interaction, particularly in a society that seems increasingly self-absorbed.

Parameters.

Already "max'ed out" with reading material and "take home" work. Two areas would help: (1) access to an electronic bulletin board which permits entry to current reference data/articles at USAWC; (2) periodic seminars for general officers on Army core areas as prescribed by the CSA.

A follow-up, post-graduation seminars might be able to keep the Colonels Corps current. Suggest an intensive weekend somewhere.

- Identify student areas of interest/expertise.
- Group/code these interests - enter into a data base.
- E-mail your "on case" seminar.
- Share results of issue investigation.

Hardly have time to read Parameters now. Get on the Internet.

It should be a mixture of self awareness development (ala Center for Creative Leadership) and problem solving skills development. Case studies are an excellent technique.

Short courses of 3-5 days at least annually--focused on warfighting.

- Annual notification of curriculum
- Opportunity to sign up for topical areas thru written or electronic correspondence.
- Electronic reference library

- ° Send us critical articles on controversial topics.
- ° Make Parameters more relevant.

I did not attend AWC, but through readings, video, symposiums or lectures on current or future challenges, senior leaders can best stay aware of the Army's perspective.

Make it part of the Advanced Studies Program. Allow students to take electives in subject areas that senior leaders can bring to the College---outside the assigned faculty.

I would like a symposium 3 to 4 days with maybe 6 to 10 hours reading prep - discuss strategic problems.

Great idea. Use the automation pipes to implement a professional developmental program to assist senior leaders in staying abreast of global, national, and service strategic thinking.

Hyper-linked, interdisciplinary database that is accessible through the Worldwide Web. Take advantage of technology to become a center for distance learning. Sr. commanders discussion page (on the Web).

I'm getting a world class "continuing education" in the day to day world.

Publish the how & why of recently past (or current missions and publish these - is told by those who had to decide -

- What TF elements and why
- What chain of command and why
- What control measures
- What ROE etc. etc.

Conferences, Symposiums, etc.

I personally don't have the time or mental energy at the end of the day to engage in continuing education programs of a formal nature. If you decide to do so, a CD ROM which can be used on existing computer systems.

Periodic seminars on strategic issues for senior personnel.

I believe this is a worthwhile program, and have always favored lecture series. Perhaps the new remote teaching technology could make such a program possible.

Symposium Program.

E-mail forum facilitated by strategic fellows, i.e., "Parameters" on the internet.

A great idea, would look at how legal profession does the same. Would offer it as part of "new GO" training. Would also offer 3 day sessions, even allow people to take permissive TDY to attend.

- I would like the Political side of our missions to be addressed by the SR members of the Cabinet, Congress, the White House, etc. Run through the decision making process of the Peacekeeping missions we have been supporting.
- I would like them to address how we can manage to fix the World's infrastructure but can't seem to manage domestic policy & programs.
- Have guest instructors who are actually doing New Army missions.

Provide a quarterly "Executive Summary" of critical points made during the current block of instruction at USAWC. Include short section on books, articles, or published speeches that USAWC grads should try to read. Offer it in paper and via a USAWC Homepage on Internet.

Masters Degree Authority - focus on National Security/International Relations.

The idea is great; however, unless the CSA et. al. are willing to cycle folks through a down time for the purpose of growth (a great idea) this idea is DOA. Soldiers simply don't have time to do their job, get time with the family and participate in continuing education. Tell me how serious the Army is and I can tell you how to create a meaningful experience. (e.g., Center for Creative Leadership)

3-5 day seminars on specific topics. Invite those most deeply involved and those who most need to learn.

Don't know if this is practical. I have been out of the War College for ten years and have not come up for air yet. Post War College continuing education has consisted of the workplace (4 Division assignments, Joint Staff assignment, 2 POL-MIL assignments), pre-command courses, and the General Officer education and training program. There is no time for anything else.

Not sure.

- The issue is \$, time & distance...
- Not worth the effort or expense...

Establish USAWC Web Site.

- Don't make it mandatory.
 - Use "KISS" refresher/update education.
 - Use practical examples/case studies as foundation so we can relate to it.
 - Put it on the WWW!
- a. Implement a corresponding studies and 1-2 week course "on campus".
 - b. The on campus portion should include guest experts followed by seminar discussions facilitated by very senior moderators.
 - c. Topics should be key strategic issue as identified by Chief of Staff and senior political leaders and political appointees.

Internet.

Educ modules should NEVER end. Try 1 week seminars for small groups off a mix of COL-LTCs and civilian executives. Seminars focus on mgmt/leadership at the top; crisis decisionmaking; consensus building in international settings; use of state-of-the-art, information age technology.

First, good. Needed. Probably a series of short courses/seminars with first class instructors-mentors. At least some will have to be done as a road show. They will have to be short (3 days?) and keyed to the issues of the day that appear to be shaping events for the next 1-5 years. Use retired community, senior officials from Govt, industry, academic, etc.

- Computer based.
 - Elective.
-
- Do it over WWW/Internet.
 - Perhaps establish small group or mentor relationships/courses on specific topics.
 - Have CSA tell senior leaders that it is important. Have senior officers participate (MACOM Cdrs, DA Staff, etc.).
1. Something on E-mail like "Random Thoughts While Running" by the CSA. Short, concise, current.
 2. Perhaps a one or two day forum.

As such simple things as computer software "evolve" on about a 90 day cycle, many of the skills of warfighting are evolving as well. In particular Army officers need to benefit from some "regreening" (depending on their AWC follow-on assignment) and for others new education as factors evolve. Though it may not be practical, a program that brings graduates in for 2-3 weeks every 2 assignments might be a worthwhile venture.

- Seminars on pertinent operational/strategic topics of interest. Could be periodically conducted at Carlisle or exported to the field.
- Quarterly publication focusing on national issues which impact/have the potential to impact on the military.

Executive seminars on specific issues:

- For example:
- Information Operations
 - Peace Support Operational
 - Coalition Warfare

Seminar based - could be very valuable - conduct seminars at various locations.

A two week seminar every other year to bring senior leaders up to speed on current issues with a focus on where we are going in the next 5 to 10 years - maybe run it four times a year to cover the GOs.

- Quarterly reading.
- Periodic videotapes.
- Annual guest lecture at major Army installations for MEL-1 graduates.

Have graduates and senior military leaders select study areas from a menu of topics.

This a need few would disagree with. The reality, though, is that we are all fully capable of continuing our own education - and those who wish to, do so quite well. Most senior officers spend so much time at their jobs, however, that they simply don't read as they should. Your proposal would establish another requirement on a long list of things we would all like to do.

Believe this is where you should teach political/military processes, strategic art, interagency activity, etc. Program could be built to meet individual or small group needs depending on current or future assignments.

Interactive reading and education programs using the power of computers/microprocessors. Enrollment and tracking of progress should be required.

Continuing education should be consistent with their assignment track. However, time available for most Senior College graduates is more and more limited. The demands of doing more with less, competition for preferred assignments and promotion is more and more keen. Areas that would be beneficial are POL/MIL strategy, budget management, foreign language training or refresher and computer/automation management/use of Internet.

- ° Survey all senior level courses - private & academic - available to GOs.
- ° Plan/consult to each GO on an individual development program.
- ° Conduct interactive, distributed senior level courses.

1. Should have read this before I answered E.
2. I think that several things would be of value sufficient to warrant costs:
 - a. Transcripts of selected lectures.
 - b. Periodic & selected references material sent to graduates still on active duty &/or all GOs.
 - c. Reading lists - would go so far as to acquire e-mail selected texts.
 - d. Host annual short courses/seminar discussions.
 - e. Use of e-mail.

See E above. **[DON'T LET GRADUATES GET STALE IN THEIR THINKING--KEEP THE VISION WIDE, LONG AND DEEP.**

Follow up after graduation with professional readings, projects, etc. using the internet, publications and sending out CD with the latest doctrine. Use an internet bulletin board to exchange ideas.

Request input on research projects being conducted, articles being written, classes being established, etc. via the internet. Graduates are all over and can offer a lot.

Don't get side tracked with masters degrees or other requirements. The academic freedom coupled with outstanding faculty, course offerings and resources makes USAWC the great learning institution it is. [If it's not broken, don't fix it.]

An internet home page is an excellent idea. I haven't been on AWC's yet. It should have a bulletin board. It would be beneficial if senior officers would make comments on the bulletin board on topics that interested them. The comments would be personal, not staffed. I think they could learn a great deal while offering a mentoring service to graduates. Once a year, the college should put a CD with papers, projects, classes, speakers notes, etc. from that year's class. We could also use the latest operational, strategic and joint manuals, either paper, disk, or CD.

GO SURVEY
PART V: FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND NEEDS

G. From your perspective, what is "Strategic Art"?

Understanding the Nation's strategic environment so as to be able to participate in the debate of shaping the nation's strategic future.

The ability to bridge Nat. strategic objectives into NMS and then into strategic plans. It takes strategic theory into practice. The "how to" apply strategic concepts by real world situations.

The pursuit of solutions to complex political/military problems which will bring about circumstances favorable to U.S. government forces.

Planning and management of the "Ends, Ways & Means" process.

Thinking beyond that which the average person is capable of addressing.

In the vernacular, the ability to see over the horizon, establish VISION, and marshal men and machines (ICW material, etc.) to move toward the vision. The "Art" is the ability to keep the big picture and move towards the vision despite worrying assumptions, complexities and near-term challenges -- An example was GEN Sullivan's Force XXI focus which was/is important of itself, but also drew the focus away from the concurrent drawdown of force structure. The British, on the other hand, were not as successful in creating a positive focus and are still laboring on more of the drawdown "negatives." (Note: My last assignment was Royal College of Defense Studies (RCDS) in the UK).

The process of bringing the national resources to bear effectively for an emergent crisis. More and more the resources involve political, economic, and military. Tomorrow leaders must have prowess with all.

Mastering multinational and coalition warfare.

Not sure--but I think it is a process whereby senior leaders layout a game plan to accomplish a certain mission and orchestrate that plans implementation by certain phases and branches and sequels.

The ability to synthesize all factors that impact on the nations ability to accomplish/perfect its said interest, then act in a coherent/prudent manner to effectively accomplish those factors.

The innate ability to conceptualize and see the potential end state of a confirmed set of actions on a larger playing field - hell if I know!

Not everyone has it; it is acquired, but founded on cognitive ability. Senior leaders must exhibit it as they must be able to relate from the foxhole to NMS. In SSC vernacular, one can link the means to an end in a macro sense.

Applying available resources, as efficiently as possible to achieve National Regional or Theater objectives.

The intellectual, practical, and leadership skills to develop strategies, formulate implementing programs/plans, assess/measure risk, and monitor execution/feedback. Additionally includes the capacity to work strategic branches/sequels in a parallel fashion.

Ability to learn and apply Nat. assets and visions to world issues/conflicts.

The ability to translate a vision into action through a myriad of skills.

Strategic art is directly connected to visioning and setting the macro direction.

The ability of the Military Practitioner to harness and harmonize the military contribution w/that of the other USG agencies to achieve America's Political goals. Apply this in general & in specific instances.

The employment of personnel, equipment and resources to achieve our Nation's strategic goals.

It's more than fighting. It applies as a style and action from leadership to warfighting...in the mastery of senior leadership performance.

Strategic art is being able to synchronize the reaches of the business of warfighting to solve a particular strategic level problem or issue.

Ability to view global issues holistically including political, economics, psychological and military and devise a planned effect, developed thru experience and education.

It's the ability to see the needed endstate; to see in your mind what "victory" looks like and then to plan the necessary operational task that will achieve victory. Included in this vision is the translation of political objectives into military objectives.

The ability to assimilate, analyze, prioritize and apply information and resources to the development of long range goals and objectives.

Application of military ways and mean when the ends are geo political in nature.

Strategic art is the understanding of strategy - political/military/economic - and its impact on the world environment!

The ability to translate national security goals and objectives into theater guidance, in the form of campaign plan or policy application.

Beats me.

To think strategically, be a visionary, be innovative in thought and action while leading an Army into the 21st Century. Know that the world is not perfect - nor are the solutions. It will take initiative and creative solutions to now unknown challenges.

Ability to plan and implement military strategy within boundaries of overall National security objectives & strategy.

A set of principles and methods which lead to the development of an effective strategy used to achieve an objective(s). It cannot be learned solely by study but requires a person to exercise the skills (principles and methods).

Long term vision, 15 yrs. or more. Understanding the complex interrelations of economic, social and cultural issues.

Haven't got a clue.

Translating National strategic purpose into a statement of a militarily relevant strategic objective or objectives.

Being able to think of the "Big Picture." To enable the AWC grad to fit anywhere in the warfighting or support structure and not be ignorant of how his action affects the political/strategic and/or tactical situation.

I do not disagree with what MG Chilcoat wrote on strategic art in his recently published SSI publication. However, I believe additional analysis is needed to properly define and separate the strategic level from the operational and tactical levels. The levels of war could be better defined through the examination of a combination of three major factors: the context within which activities or operations are conducted, to include the consequences of success or failure; the level of authority or responsibility of the practitioner; and finally by the nature of tasks or activities performed, sequence or orchestrated. In general, the ends, ways, and means need to be better scoped and defined at each level to facilitate proper doctrinal development. The key aspect that separates operational art from strategic art is found in the ends, ways, and means. Only at the strategic level can the strategic artist have the freedom or authority to establish the "ends." At the operational and tactical level, the ends are specified and/or framed by the next higher level. Within our doctrine, "strategic" is the highest level and the strategic ends thus provide the rationale and purpose for all operational campaigns employing the national elements of power to achieve strategic objectives. The quintessential task of strategic art is the selection of the "ends" consistent with the "means" available and the devisal of feasible, politically palatable and nationally sustainable "ways."

- ° What the elected/appointed civilian leadership ought to know but doesn't.
- ° What the CINCs (and CJCS/UCJCS) need to know and generally do know.
- ° What too many LTCs think they have to know because the schools tell them they need to know.

Not sure I know.

Thinking about macro matters matrixed across geo political, economic, military, cultural, scientific. How to apply such to influence national goals and objectives.

Don't know. Don't care. Too cloudy. Too fancy. Get to basics.

Knowing how to think and conceptualize globally and develop innovative solutions to national security challenges in the future.

Total process of looking at National/International/Goals & ways to achieve them.

Know when/where/how/with what to apply military capability. These take on different characteristics as we become CONUS based forces.

I have no idea - How about - A vision with a broad perspective based on the understanding of the technical and tactical aspects of warfighting and its relationship with the political, economic and scientific use of power.

The practice of that which we have learned as a strategic science.

1. Knowing the Enemy & figuring out how to defeat him.
2. Setting the conditions for Decisive Opns by shaping the battlefield w/fires - and shaping the will of the En.
3. Decisive maneuvers.
4. Re-cock, Re-load, Re-arm, Re-fit and do it again. Simultaneously. Deep, Close & Real.

The capability that encompasses the sense and feel for the application of military power in concert with other elements of national/coalition power toward some decisive goal or objective.

The ability to visualize at the highest level and then develop plans (Army, joint, combined) to execute/achieve objectives for our civilian leaders.

First, don't agree with "Strategic Art" terminology & so commented on the paper. Agree with Strategy & Strategist. Military Strategy is the military contribution to National Strategy. Can be worldwide and/or theater specific. Military means & ends to arrive at National/Political strategy.

Appreciation of major National issues, and understanding of tools available in the real strategic world.

The ability to translate national goals into workable military options to support those goals - selecting the proper mix of resources and phasing the application to achieve the goals.

Developing military strategy to support national objectives.

Process of defining & executing what needs to be done w/means available to get it done!

The ability to visualize the totality of the defense department contribution to the security of the American people and way of life: public opinion, politics, government, international relations.....

Being able to integrate the elements of National Power,(i.e., military, diplomatic, economic, political) and then balance ends with means and come out on top.

Obviously this is a test and I failed. I do know however after watching then COL. Marty Meigs as JCS J5 - Strategy Division Chief wrote 2 JSCPs & the new National Military Strategy - he can answer the question. His job was a little strategy and a lot of "ART".

The art (and science) of the formation and implementation of strategy (grand and lessor strategy) and the assessment of the strategic on sequences.

The training in, and practice of analyzing strategies geo-political factors and situations, and then devising plans to use military assets to influence the outcome.

Listen to a SECDEF Speech.

The skill required to properly and decisively plan, coordinate, and employ and control military power in conjunction with the other elements of power to achieve the nation's objectives.

The study of developing and making sound choices (policy) about the prioritization and allocation of constrained resources.

It's the process of crafting strategy (military or otherwise) by determining our national interests followed by developing objectives, concepts and resources to realize our national interests.

Being able to recognize and or develop NS & NMS & translate that into Army MACOM & theater objectives & mat'l.

Study of elements of power at strategic level understanding relationships between military element of power and economic, social and political elements at strategic level. Translating strategic goals into tactical objectives.

If it has any meaning, it must be analogous to operational art in the sense of being the ability to develop and execute strategic policy and operations at the national level.

Being able to envision things that never were and saying why not!?

The learned unscientific creative approach to war fighting.

Strategic Art is the ability to understand and appreciate the melding of the key elements of national power in a manner which is consistent with the nation's vision and purpose and to know one's role in achieving that end.

Ways of using the nation's resources, commercial, economic and military to protect national interests.

Understanding national strategic objective(s) and integrating the forces of culture, economy, politics, coalitions, history and military power to achieve them.

Strategic decision making is still an art, not a science. The linkage of the components of national strategy and power is strategic art.

The ability to translate national objectives into elements of focused national security actions.

Next level above "Operational Art" where there is more visible impact from the political/diplomatic factors than from the military factors of the situation.

The environment, the what of strategy, the relevant part to defined objectives.

The combination of social, economic and political facts and trends with potential and actual military threats to determine the most effective use of military force and capability at the regional /national level.

The ability to "see" and affect the execution of the National Military Strategy in joint & combined arenas--also to be aware of and respect for the political reality of peace & war.

The ability to conceptualize, focus, and provide guidance at the national level the direction in which a nation should move for the future.

Being able to construct a vision which addresses organizational survivability 20 years into the future.

The ability to understand, integrate, and deploy capabilities in military, political and economic environment to insure the protection of the national interest.

Study and practice of translating relational national leadership's interpretation of goals, objectives and interests of the U.S. into national and theater level planning, policy and actions.

The principles and methods employed to the overall planning and conduct of large scale operations.

- Education		
- Research	=	Full understanding &
- Vision		support of National interests -
- Strategic Leadership		promote & defend.
& Landpower Knowledge		

The use of the military as a portion of national power that when properly applied with other portions achieves the goals aims and objectives of the national will.

Only one small part of what AWC should be doing we need to develop good Bde/Div Cdrs.

Where theory meets a very messy reality, and intellect and ethics apply stuff and power to WIN decisively at least cost.

At the highest levels, figuring out how to do whatever needs to be done, when it needs to be done, and in politically acceptable manner.

Taking policy and operationally making it work.

Formulating broad policy objectives and pursuing them in a milieu of great turbulence and ambiguity. Requires clear understanding of available military, economic, and political tools and an ability to conceptualize, communicate, and lead in the face of unknowns and uncontrollable forces.

The ability to win decisively with the resources provided in a given environment.

Concerns JTF/CINC level thought. Large muscle movements of forces, logistics with volume and timing designed to influence military and political equation.

The proper amount of force at the proper location at the right point in time. A difficult & precise practice.

Being able to perceive a situation from a Historic and international (political) perspective and then think through creatively using all resources (people, info & technology) to develop solution sets for problems or contingencies.

In its broadest sense, I believe that "Strategic Art" is the multidimensional development, synchronization and application of those ends, ways and means required to support the national interests as determined by the national command authority.

Getting \$ from Congress.

The ability to envision, formulate & apply available resources to accomplish a desired end state.

Balanced insight which comes from detailed understanding of capabilities and limitation. It deals with conditions not standards - is formed by discovery not wisdom.

The ability to analyze a situation (POL-MIL), develop national security objectives, develop a strategic concept for accomplishing national security objectives, and then plan and execute successfully.

Broad based thinking of issues and their relative implication to strategies aimed at solving a complex problem.

Creative, innovative application of military power to achieve US interests.

It is the ability to integrate National and/or Alliance resources towards a stated goal or objective. This brings into effect governmental, nongovernmental and privately owned organizations, as well as armed forces of the participating nations.

The ability to plan for and execute contingency operations around the world, from low to high intensity, on short notice, with limited assets. Doing these quickly, safely and efficiently have always been the challenge.

STRATEGIC ART is the ability to visualize power projection from a base through a gateway to a center of gravity with all associated mobilization through demobilization.

The ability to think creatively and critically, to conceptualize a plan, in support of national objectives, and to take action to implement.

The orchestration of all the instruments of national power to serve our national interests.

Two words that get a lot more attention than they should. It seems that political correctness has forced or made us believe that "strategy" means more than it basically should. Think well into the future and on a broad perspective - a world perspective that includes actions before, during and after a problem.

The ability to visualize a mission and assemble a team to accomplish that task successfully.

The ability to translate loose, general instructions from the NAC or CINC into operational terms that can be easily understood and implemented and that achieve the desired endstate (which may be beyond military involvement)!

The ability to gather the facts and analyze strategically the factors bearing on our military-- and its ability to meet the challenges of the future.

Strategic art is the skill required to design and integrate the ends and means of national security, to achieve the strategic endstate. It is that insight gained through experience, study and creativity to achieve the same.

Understanding all the players and bringing them together to accomplish the National objectives. Military is only a small piece of it--economic, political, social.

The ability to envision an endstate and influence the ways and means to create the environment for the end state to be reached.

We talk a lot about strategic this & that but I haven't seen a lot of it actually being implemented. We somehow revert to kicking tires in the motor pool! Strategic thinkers don't get to the War College in enough numbers. We are so focused on Command & Commanders are often great doers vs thinkers, that we have lost some great minds-we see them exit at the LTC level and certainly retire as COLs when we could use their skills. The Army has made almost no room for those outside the Command track; or they are NOT selected for the jobs that move them to the positions requiring that strategic focus.

° We too frequently "Power Point" our way to failure, e.g., Lots of Pretty Charts; but a briefing does NOT a solid plan MAKE! The indepth analysis of details is lost to the Art of Chart making.

Understanding the interplay between politics, economics, and warfare.

The application of the tools of war to the geo political environment to your front, flanks, and rear.

Operational Art one level up.

Understanding US worldwide interests, elements of power (political, economic, military), the interrelationships of US government agencies and then the application of above to achieve US strategic objectives.

Understanding the political process, the National Military command process - our capabilities and limitations - and influencing it all so it makes sense and applies the right force at the right time to meet the strategic aims of the nation.

Seeing the National END state and envisioning campaigns or phases to meet the military requirements to reach the political aim.

Another name for STRATEGISTS!

The art of achieving something good for our Army and our soldiers in an information based environment bombarded every day by "VUCA"!

The ability to foresee the consequences, both intended and NOT, of a particular mil course of action and its effect on the policies established by the NCA.

The art of visioning the future and moving the organization from current status to that vision.

The ability to think/do at national/world level.

Policy translation and definition into milestone programs designed to institutionalize systems/values.

First, it's not operational art, but it may be close to a complement. To me, it's the arrangement and coordination of all (applicable) forms of national power and influence to achieve strategic goals - strategic defined as overriding, even defining, national goals and interests.

Making your strategy & vision living & dynamic to the masses.

You guys are the experts!

The ability to translate (or state) the US role in whatever operation is being considered. Define how the military aspect is balanced against the other elements of power, be able to rationalize all that as it relates to those aspects of the other nation involved and then roll it all up and make it work in an inordinately complex world where air, ground, sea, space and all the agencies that interoperate in it are in competition with one another. Pull it all together, give it a common aim and make it work. Understand what your mom will think of it and be able to make sense of it to her.

The intuitive ability to determine the essential objectives required for strategic victory and the operational ability to leverage available political, military, & economic resources to achieve that end.

The integration of politics and international security issues into military planning at the national and theater level.

The ability to use combat power or combat capability to further U.S. policy.

Beyond the details, matrices, and formulas lies a compassionate understanding and vision of world events/situations/etc. and their impact militarily, politically, and economically on the world and our country combined with this understanding & vision is an ability to translate into action plans that have a clear beginning and ending.

To have an intuitive sense for strategic thinking and understanding implications - 2d, 3d order effects.

-Art implies creativeness.

-Strategic implies national or international level of importance.

-Therefore, strategic art is the creative use of the military to achieve national and/or international objectives.

The application of resources to achieve a nation's objectives.

Thinking and conceptualizing at the National/International level. Building coalitions, etc.

The ability to identify and attack enemy vulnerabilities with multiple means, while controlling the tempo of operations and protecting the force.

The ability to clarify plan and visualize the employment of large scale military forces as they affect political, economic and psychological conditions of a country or region to gain a specified objective(s).

See Executive Leadership by Jaques and Clement.

° Ability to fashion a dynamic, changing vision with timeline of 5-10 years.

° Identify key projects (1-5) to pursue vision.

° Communicate to "people".

The conceptual ability to envision a future and to bring the required forces to bear to accomplish that future.

The planning, designing, resourcing and employment of the elements of national power, usually in conjunction with those of a multi-national coalition, to attain theater and strategic security objectives.

GO SURVEY
PART V: FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND NEEDS

H. Additional comments and suggestions.

Our GO corps has become too risk adverse vs risk takers. We need to instill a desire in senior ldrs to step out of the box and take prudent risks. Our progress is being constrained by restricted thinking and action.

As a National War College graduate some of the questions in this packet were a bit difficult to answer. In many cases I inferred the answers from contacts that I've had with USAWC graduates.

NDU coordinates curriculum matters with RCDS periodically. It may be worthwhile for AWC to do the same. RCDS, a post O6 command course, does some things extremely well, especially regional studies and international networking.

Questions were framed from "former AWC" grad perspective. Difficult to answer based on one or two AWC grads I've worked with.

Best school ever attended - Don't change a thing!

Keep doing what you are doing. USAWC was the most beneficial learning experience I've ever had. Just the right atmosphere for learning and no stress. Please do not add tests or class standings -- this is the hallmark of your institution.

I think the War College is truly the best year for leaders of our profession and their families, bar none. Keep up the great work. The benefits and rewards are only realized after we graduate and continue to cross paths with our classmates as we face the many challenges ahead.

The greatest benefit of the SSC is that it causes the emerging leaders to think more in a macro perspective. No longer can they confine their problems and solutions to one over the motorpool. The SSC jolts us into this reality.

USAWC was the best educational experience in my 20+ years of formal education! As we "downsize" DoD, we must be more efficient in use of resources--that is Joint, Combined, Interagency, Political/Diplomatic, etc. Hence, I believe we must emphasize greater understanding of all efficient application to our strategic interests and goals.

Good Survey.

-Great Work - RAVE REVIEWS!

- Continue to focus on "Leaders" in an everchanging world. In fact - prepare leaders who can effectively operate in the military dimension of power when able to effectively influence other dimensions as well. For example, the Army appeared, in my perspective to be out in front of other services as the Soviet Union crumbled before our eyes. As we become politically astute, we need to be able to analyze activities in these non-military directions - economic, political, social, etc.

The War College does a great service. As it grows into the 21st Century, must continue to look at the joint and political value of our profession. Tomorrow, as never before, landpower will be employed as a fully integrated element not as a single instrument of National power. The USAWC will be as vital then as today in preparing our senior leaders for operation in that new environment.

AWC is a good institution; it could be better but I am satisfied with the grads. AWC excels in a "total" learning experience. Continue to grant the students the freedom to pursue their interests--even if it is relaxing for a year. Keep looking at the whole person; don't overload the academics.

Make the Army relevant to our Nation's long term strategic interests. Able to operate across the entire conflict spectrum - with high standards and discipline. Throw out the phrase OOTW-operations are operations, missions are missions. AWC should lead the way! ONE TEAM - ONE FIGHT!

Again, Dick...I'll come see you.

Thanks.

I'd be glad to take part in any review of AWC for the future.

The best learning comes from having a strong foundation in the necessary theory and then put that theory to practice...several times. The unit that does the best night attacks is the unit that is not only steeped in the doctrine, but also the one that does lots of night attacks. MacArthur was confident he could do the Inchon Landing in spite of staff opposition at all levels, because he had done more than 20 major landings before. Build our strategic and operational leaders of the future, steeped in theory but well grounded in practice. Use the virtual, real, and constructive experiences to teach and coach them.

In answering this survey, I was struck by how little I knew about the AWC of the present. Enclosed article was helpful. Need to work to stay connected with your alumni/senior leadership.

You are doing good.

- Excellent questionnaire.
- Thanks for the chance to comment.
- USAWC is superb.
- ° Keep the fundamentals of this great institution in tact.
- ° More emphasis on joint & combined, hands on.
- ° Leverage Information management.
- ° You may want to consider more work & knowledge of the total Army, RCs & civilians. As we drawdown green suit jobs & the AC becomes smaller; AC officers & NCOs will work a lot more with Nat'l Guard, Reserves, and Civilians.

Do not get away from the concept of a "total experience" for the students. This should be a year to learn, reflect, making new friends, and gear up for the pressures ahead.

Do agree we must look to tomorrow but "don't throw the baby out with the bath water."

Maintain technical superiority with the ability for international collaboration.

Don't fix something that isn't broken.

- Would offer a base course at USAWC:
- Strategic Theory & Art
- Operational Art
- Campaigning - Mission Analysis & Planning
- Then half (or more) of course in two or three major fields of study - Each student must major in one.
 1. Advanced Campaigning w/Multiple Exercises
 2. Military Strategy in Practice
 3. Developing and Resourcing the Army (Title X) - How To.

Fight to keep AWC the outstanding experience it was for both my family and me. Don't turn AWC into an MOS course or an every-man-for-himself master's of military science program. Every officer/professional who attends AWC have already demonstrated he knows his business - your job is to let him ponder his future and develop more general skills as he moves into the highest levels of his military career.

I am a proud alumni of the USAWC and remain impressed with the quality of recent graduates. I applaud your efforts to continue evaluating the relevancy of USAWC's curriculum and the suitability of its mission.

- Reduce #'s/%'s...concentrate on the top folks. It's a real embarrassment when AWC students/grads are passed over in large numbers.
- Retain the focus on producing leaders.
- Emphasize problem solving.

Would like feedback on results of this survey so I know if I'm within the "shot group."
Thanks.

Win this year's Jim Thorpe competition!!

To my knowledge this survey is the only effort to keep in touch with senior graduates. The periodic association mailing doesn't get into substantive issues.

Don't destroy the great year of AWC; it's opportunity to renew family relationships; it's great social life. Many would have it turned into a "grindstone" academic year, to get the full pound of flesh for each tax dollar. It's great the way it is and badly needed in our high pressure work environment.

Keep doing good!

The strength of the AWC program is balance and meeting fellow students. The Army is far healthier a service because of this network and because it is founded on a core set of values-reinforced throughout our educational system and capped off by the AWC. Leaderships, values, ethics, etc. are key. Just look at the other services which do not have this common thread - They are businesses not professions of arms.

We've come too far in the jointness-goodness business. We need to remember that synergism in jointness is brought to the table by a mastery of one's own service. We're in danger of losing that. I have 135 months in command of Co's, Bns, Bde's, Div's EAD's, SOL's, etc. We're going the opposite direction - e.g., the next generation of Bn Cdr's will have 10.5 mo's Fld grade experience in like units. Education ≠ Experience. P.S. All of us think Dick Chilcoat & the Army Leadership is on track to keep USAWC on track for the future. HOOAA!

- AWC is a great institution.
- Applaud your efforts toward keeping it vital and current.

USAWC was a great experience for me. Learned a great deal about our Army, our nation, other services and allies. Had the opportunity to think creatively and perform research. Further, was able to bring into focus the competition for scarce resources. Also, was able to learn more about myself and the need for physical and mental wellness was reinforced. The environment at USAWC was conducive and handsome. Recommend that you not walk away from making it the best year of one's military career.

I would highly recommend consideration of a course similar to the 10 week elective course available when I was a student at the Naval War College (1978-79). It was entitled, "Foundations of Moral Obligation" taught by the College President, Admiral James B. Stockdale and a professor emeritus from Columbia University, Joseph G. Brennan. Joe Brennan has written a book about the course, same title, published by Presidio Press. In my view, this is a powerful course which should be a part of the core curriculum at every Senior Service College.

Get a survey that doesn't ask the same question 3 different ways.

I felt under qualified to respond to many questions because I did not attend AWC or know your current curriculum. So take my responses from that bias. Also - I think Goldwater/Nichols legislation gives such emphasis to NWC/ICAF for JDA/JSO assignments/qualifications it causes me to counsel our best & brightest to try to go to NWC. Please don't hesitate to call if my answers were confusing. Thanks for opportunity to participate.

If you don't have a segment, up front in the curriculum, on the Dynamic of War...Recommend you put one in...

Change is the only constant we can expect in the future.

Keep up the great work! You are a world class institution!

Pleased with your recent graduates.

I would like to see a tougher, more challenging SSC course of study...a Sr version of SAMs. But I am not sure the senior leadership of the Army are willing to pay the price in:

1. Quality & longevity of faculty.
2. Rigor for students who come from & go to back breaker jobs.
3. Necessity to enforce academic rigor with evaluation and flunking students - albeit ex. Bn COs who do not measure up.

I would happily volunteer for a program of "continuing education" at the AWC. You are doing a superb job. Thanks and please keep it up.

Our senior leaders in the future must be everything in your VISION and a manager of decreasing resources.

Believe the idea of consolidating the SSCs should be looked at again & offer a way to bring "real" jointness to our way of doing business.

I think continuous (continuing) education for senior leaders is a must do.

My perception is the Army is out flanked and out lobbied on the "HILL" by Navy, Marines, AF & other political groups. Need to explore Arms values - then learn to work political scene better. Key is we are beat up on dollar & manpower & service role by other services! Other services have retired officers, etc., working hill for their own service interests. Army value tends to down play this loyalty.

Business decisions, logistics, public affairs, pay ops and special ops will play more of a critical role in our future.

Believe DoD will need to reduce number of MEL 1 institutions. We should determine how this can best be done w/o damaging very positive effect of current SSC programs.

I believe your eight attributes for senior command & staff activities are right on track!

The USAWC was the top educational experience that I have had. The 86-87 course had the perfect balance. I recognize that our world and our Army has significantly changed since that time. The course needs to change also. A focus on the Information Age and managing information is essential. But, the course still needs to have a piece on history and be more than a pure academic experience. The balance is important. The caliber of officers/civilians attending is very high-they will read and do what is expected of them so we should stay away from "testing"--"honor graduate" staff. Keep it current, relevant, and balanced.

Keep the focus on the future-capture current lessons learned.

While I did not complete the mark sensing form, I would like to provide input for your curriculum development.

First, the AWC mission/goals/objectives should be: to produce officers schooled in joint, combined, and interdepartmental operations and aware of the interaction between the diplomatic strategic, operational and tactical spheres of operations within the context of the global environment and US national security interests. These officers and civilians must know how to garner resources and manage in a large bureaucracy. Students should receive education and training in contemporary issues and how to set/establish/contribute to an ethical and moral climate. Where we've been, where we are, and where we are going also are key elements of the curriculum; so is history and the future's forecasting/modeling. We should refine the select, train, and use model. That is, outline what we think we want graduates by name to do during the 7 to 10 year period after graduation; then offer electives that fit the pattern. There is not much utility going beyond the 7 to 10 year time frame. Also, we should not become preoccupied with preparing officers for what they hope we do at the expense of what the historical data tells us what they will do--a stiff challenge where we not only have a basic branch for many officers but additional specialties, branch immaterial and Joint/OSD assignment patterns to satisfy as well.

Better feedback mechanisms for the students are also required. While "grading" per se is not necessary, a more formalized method for evaluating achievement of school, course, and student objectives would be useful.

Apologize for not completing the questionnaire--not sure I know enough about the other school systems to provide informed responses anyway and the other mark sensing form answers can be found in my bio/ORB. Please feel free to contact me if you have any follow-up questions.

Thanks.

We have to emphasize warfighting more! Less airy fairy and more how to command/fight Bdes, Divs.

1. There is a goldmine on the Joint and Combined aspects of Joint/Decisive Endeavor yet to be mined.
2. We conducted a D + 60 Lsns Lrnd and will do so again at D + 180 in Naples.

Great effort--Lots to do here--wish I had time to sit down and work the issues.

Must achieve balance between depth and breadth of knowledge. Must have exposure to many things while ensuring we are relatively expert in some things.

None. I think this survey is very germane to the evolving national defense environment. Please keep up the good work and stay in touch with those of us who are often outside the Army mainstream.

USAWC is a great institution which produces great Army officers. That is its strength & those courses/training should be continued. Great Army officers also need to understand & be just as effective in Joint Opns/assignments. Expand the curriculum to do this. Lastly, believe MG Chilcoat's article really does capture the essence of the future challenge & offers a good roadmap. Good Luck!

USAWC simply must publish more - students, faculties, maybe seminars need to share and to engage in the debates of the time.

- ° Need a USAWC home page.
- ° Speeches made by guest speakers during the year might be enlightening and a way to stay current.
- ° Appreciate annual distribution of the textbook.

Keep the family focus - it's your strong point.

Don't change too much! You have the best program compared to all others I have seen.

Teach the Risk Management Process as it applies toward strategic thinking in which one identifies hazards and implements controls in order to mitigate risks. This all too often is an unconscious vs. a conscious process.

- I learned the most from reading Great Works in toto rather than bits and pieces of 50 articles per nite. Students should read a classic and present its contents and meaning or relevance to seminar mates...i.e., self learning rather than listening.
- Research papers are also good for in depth exploration.
- AWC currently tries to cover too much, too fast.
- Need more joint training.

The most important product of AWC continues to be associations with officers who collectively will occupy senior positions of authority. Except during a short period when I worked doctrine, I have not used any of the "Strategic" info taught at Carlisle. I have had hundreds of occasions to use the expertise and opinions of those whom I learned to know and trust while in the course!

Feel we need to seek out more of the "core" issues facing our Army from the population most in tune with those issues (generally speaking, most just left command as a LTC/Bn Cdr). Additionally, we should use them to develop the issues and recommended solutions for presentation to the Army for resolution.

Being a young BG and an ICAF grad my experience to answer this survey is limited. My experience in the Joint Staff though pushes me towards getting us all more into Joint Thinking.

I'm sure you won't be pleased with my response but it was the best I could do. Seems to me the emphasis is on combined/joint environments/operations. Granted, I'm in one now so maybe my opinion is colored a bit. However, I think we shouldn't ask a question like "USAWC is best SSC for Army officers." I hope the school system is trying to prepare all officers, regardless of Svc, for combined/joint duty. By the time you get to SSC you should already be pretty proficient in "service specific" duties and responsibilities.

The War College is a great place!

Keep pushing - crank our experiences into the classroom, send great leaders to the field. I am writing this sitting on the banks of the SAVA River in Croatia!

Please pass on to MG Chilcoat: Sir - Remember to keep your head down: winter rules in effect - can't improve your lie! "Every round of Golf is a lesson in life -- Try to always move forward, but learn from every mistake!" All the Best, Sir!

Don't underfund the Army Sr/Mid-level ldrship trng.

Of course, nearly everything that works well costs resources - time, money, talent. Some considerations:

- a. Do some sort of professional survey/assessment of USAWC students - strengths and "holes" in prof. background. Try to help fill the holes.
- b. Expose the class to competing ideas, agencies, agendas. Life 'ain't' simple, neither is public service once we leave the relatively structured unit environment.
- c. I had to 'learn the UN' OJT. Ditto NATO.
- d. I have long believed we can get great contribution from the retired community. Teachers-mentors-instructors. Look at BCTP model.

* Exception to dual-comp would open the door.

Keep in your program: Sports
Health Awareness.
Time for Reflection/Relaxation
Demand more: Out of Class Prep.

Greetings from Bosnia where all of the stuff is reality now!

My SSC graduates are high quality officers. SSC helped each one gain insights into areas that each had no previous exposure.

Convince Army leaderships to eliminate the plethora of fellowships to which we send officers in lieu of one of the service war colleges. With very few exceptions, such as the AOSF at Ft. Leavenworth, they are not servicing the needs of the officers or the Army. Going to Harvard to pursue an esoteric field of study looks great on someone's resume, but has nothing to do with being a MEL1. If there is merit in these programs, keep them, but don't call it SSC.

Appreciate opportunity to comment. Believe AWC resident course should focus on warfighting. Much of the other topics now taught as programmed should be part of continuing education program and tailored to meet needs. Much of current & my curriculum will never be utilized by most graduates.

The strength of the AWC program is more apparent 5 years after graduation than at the time.

I found this survey in my distribution. Nobody knows where it came from. Are there other parts to it? If so, send them if you need input. My card is attached with address and E-mail.

I gave my comments to an air force officer who use to teach at the Naval War College. He faxed them to the NWC to a friend of his. If I get any good feedback, I'll forward it to you. Note that I did not use "paradigm" in any sentence.