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Report to Congressional Committees

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GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS

Number Required Is Unclear Based on DOD's Draft Report



GAO

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National Security and
International Affairs Division

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June 16, 1997

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

Congress determines the maximum number of general and flag officers that the military services may have by specifying service-specific ceilings in title 10 of the U.S. Code. Congress authorized 12 new general officer positions for the Marine Corps as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997.[1] The act required the Department of Defense (DOD) to study general and flag officer requirements and recommend changes to the law, if necessary.[2] The act also required our office to evaluate DOD's study.[3]

DOD has delayed completion of its report, but as requested by the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee on National Security, we are issuing this interim report on DOD's progress to date in determining its general and flag officer requirements. Thus, we (1) reviewed DOD's draft recommendations, (2) estimated the cost to implement DOD's draft recommendations, (3) reviewed the criteria the services used in doing their studies, (4) compared troop strength to general and flag officer requirements, and (5) determined whether certain general or flag officer positions may be candidates for conversion to civilian status. This report discusses the draft DOD report and recommendations contained in a working draft provided to us in February 1997 and subsequently revised and provided to us on May 9,

[1]P.L. 104-201, section 405, Sept. 23, 1996.

[2]P.L. 104-201, section 1213.

[3]P.L. 104-201, section 1213 (e).

1997.[4] DOD has delayed completion and release of its report until after it has an opportunity to determine whether or not to adjust its draft general and flag officer requirements and recommendations or redo its study to take into account Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommendations.[5]

Background

Active duty general and flag officer authorizations fluctuated from over 2,000 in 1945 to about 1,000 in 1951. In 1967, DOD had about 1,300 authorized active duty general and flag officers, but that number was reduced to 1,073 by October 1, 1981. A number of studies of general and flag officer requirements have been done since the mid-1980s. The most recent DOD-wide study of active duty requirements was done in 1988 by a contractor, the Hay Group, Incorporated. The study concluded that the services needed 1,449 general and flag officers. The services adjusted the number to 1,475, which the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reduced to 1,436.

Congress left the authorizations at 1,073 until the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act mandated a reduction to 858 by October 1, 1995. Subsequently, the ceiling was increased to 865. In 1996, the DOD-wide ceiling had been further increased to 877.

DOD used a four-level structure to manage its 1997 statutorily mandated study of general and flag officer requirements. The structure consisted of the Secretary of Defense (the final approval authority) and the Executive, Steering, and Working Committees. The Executive Committee, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) and composed of senior civilian executives, including the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, was to provide oversight and guidance to the study teams. The Steering Committee, chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy and composed of the military service personnel chiefs and others, was to coordinate service and joint community study inputs. The Working Committee was established in OSD to coordinate service and joint community studies, consolidate the draft recommendations, and write DOD's draft report.

[4]The revised draft was provided after we testified on the initial draft before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee on National Security. General and Flag Officers: DOD's Draft Study Needs Adjustments (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-122, Apr. 8, 1997).

[5]The QDR was required by sections 922 and 923 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 1997 to study national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plans, and other issues in 1997 and at the start of each newly elected administration after 1997.

The study was designed to follow six steps. First, each service and the Joint Staff were to review all active and reserve general and flag officer positions (including those filled by colonels, Navy captains, and civilians), and except for the Army, other positions that did not then require a general or flag officer. Second, the service secretaries were to review their services' recommendations, adjust the study results, and forward their reports to the Working Committee. Third, the Working Committee was responsible for writing a draft report consolidating service and joint community study results and recommendations and providing it to the Steering Committee. Fourth, the Steering Committee was responsible for reviewing the consolidated draft report and providing it to the Executive Committee. Fifth, the Executive Committee was responsible for reviewing the consolidated draft report and forwarding it to the Secretary of Defense. The active and reserve components, Reserve Forces Policy Board, OSD (Reserve Affairs), and other officials either assisted in doing the study or commented on the study.

DOD has stopped its study process at this point to give itself time to determine the need to adjust its draft recommendations or redo its draft study to take QDR recommendations into account. The Secretary of Defense may approve the draft report or a revised report and submit it to Congress at some time in the future. As a result, the DOD draft study results and recommendations are considered preliminary and do not represent DOD's final position.

DOD's draft report recommends that Congress authorize 54 new active duty general and flag officers, to give the services 1,018. The draft report also recommends an increase of 32 reserve component general and flag officers.

Results in Brief

DOD's draft does not clearly identify requirements for general and flag officers and does not explain the basis for its recommendations to increase the number of general and flag officers by 54 active and 32 reserve positions. The draft recommends 1,018 active duty general and flag officers, the service studies recommended 1,096, and the service secretaries recommended only 995. To date, neither the actual number of general and flag officers needed nor the criteria used to arrive at the number have been explained by DOD, the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps. In trying to reconcile the different numbers, we found that some of the difference results from military judgment of the service chiefs, some from perceived political realities not to ask for too many general and flag

officers, and some from the conflicting draft recommendations from the services and OSD. In addition, DOD, the services, and the joint community did not effectively integrate their studies, and this led to different assumptions about how many general and flag officers will be provided by the services for joint duty. The draft also recommends an increase of 32 reserve component general and flag officers. Some reserve component study results and recommendations were also adjusted.

We estimate the cost of implementing DOD's draft recommendations would be at least $1.2 million annually, assuming the services reduce the number of colonels/Navy captains by the same amount as the increase in general and flag officers. However, if the services do not reduce their colonels/Navy captains, DOD's draft recommendations will exceed $1.2 million annually.

The criteria and methodology used in the services' studies are based on widely used job evaluation techniques that have highly subjective features. The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Joint Staff selected different methodologies for the studies. The different methodologies together created at least 24 different definitions of a general or flag officer. Therefore, some results are not comparable. Also, the data collected did not attempt to demonstrate the impact of the mandated reduction in general and flag officers between fiscal year 1991 and 1996.

Force structure changes and general and flag officer requirements have not always been linked. Since the early 1980s, in some years, troop strength dropped and in other years it increased while general and flag officer authorizations remained constant. In 1993, 3 years after Congress mandated the latest cut in general and flag officer positions, DOD completed its Bottom Up Review strategy that further changed the force structure. The requirements for general and flag officers may further change based on 1997 and subsequent QDRs.

DOD may be able to fill some new general and flag officer positions if it converts nonmilitary essential positions to civilian status and transfers the incumbent. For example, we identified a number of positions that currently require general or flag officers that may be candidates for conversion.

Current Legislative Limits on General and Flag Officers

Congress established four military ranks above the rank of colonel (for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and captain (for the Navy). Table 1 displays the pay grade designation, title of rank, and insignia worn by officers at general and flag officer ranks.

Table 1: Pay Grade, Title, and Insignia Worn at General and Flag Officer Ranks

	Title of rank		
Pay grade	Army, Air Force, Marine Corps	Navy	Insignia
O-10	General	Admiral	4 stars
O-9	Lieutenant general	Vice admiral	3 stars
O-8	Major general	Rear admiral (upper half)	2 stars
O-7	Brigadier general	Rear admiral (lower half)	1 star

Source: Title 10 U.S. Code and the services.

Congress requires each service to maintain at least 50 percent of its general or flag officers in the rank of brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half). Also, no more than 15 percent may serve above the rank of major general/rear admiral (upper half), and of that number, no more than 25 percent may be generals/admirals.[6] Finally, Congress provided up to (1) 3 exemptions from the general/admiral ceiling for officers serving as the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or the Chief of Staff to the President;[7] (2) 11 exemptions until September 30, 2000, from the general/admiral grade ceiling for officers in certain senior joint positions such as a commander in chief of a unified or specified command;[8] (3) 1 exemption from the admiral ceiling for the current Superintendent of the Naval Academy until the incumbent leaves the Navy;[9] and (4) 6 exemptions from the lieutenant general/vice admiral ceiling for officers in joint positions designated by the President.[10] Title 10 does not address the grade mix for reserve general and flag officers (although it did specify the grade that certain reserve component officers must hold).

Title 10 of the U.S. Code established service-specific ceilings for active duty general and flag officers that total 877. The law also authorized 12

[6]See 10 U.S.C. § 525.

[7]See 10 U.S.C. § 525(b)(3).

[8]See 10 U.S.C. §§ 525(b)(5) as amended by P.L. 104-201 § 404(b).

[9]See 10 U.S.C. § 525 note (P.L. 103-337, sec. 406).

[10]See 10 U.S.C. § 525(b)(4).

general and flag officer positions to be allocated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the services for joint duty positions. This authorization, which expires on October 1, 1998, is commonly called the "Chairman's 12."[11]

During fiscal years 1996 and 1997, the services can also allow up to 75 colonels/Navy captains to wear the insignia of brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half) prior to promotion, a practice known as "frocking."[12] Under 10 U.S.C. § 777, an officer may be frocked to brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half) only if he/she has been selected for promotion, the Senate has approved the promotion, and the officer is already serving in or has orders to serve in a position for which that grade is authorized. Frocked officers are not paid the salary of the higher rank until promoted. The number of officers that may be frocked to brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half) will drop to 55 during fiscal year 1998 and to 35 after fiscal year 1998.[13] Title 10 does not address frocking above the brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half) rank.

Finally, the law authorizes an exemption from both the grade and number ceiling if a general or flag officer is serving as either the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.[14]

As shown in table 2, the title 10 ceiling, Chairman's 12, and current frocking limits combine to authorize 964 general and flag officer positions, but that number is scheduled to drop by 52 to 912 by fiscal year 1999 due to the impending expiration of the law providing for the Chairman's 12 and the mandated reduction in frocking limits.

Table 2: Current and Planned Active Duty General and Flag Officer Authorization Ceilings

Ceiling	Fiscal year 1997	Fiscal year 1999	Net change
Title 10	877	877	0
Frocking	75	35	–40
Chairman's 12	12	0	–12
Total	**964**	**912**	**–52**

Source: Our analysis based on data provided by OSD and title 10 U.S.C. §§ 526, 777.

[11]See 10 U.S.C. § 526(c).

[12]See 10 U.S.C. § 777.

[13]See 10 U.S.C. § 777(d).

[14]See 50 U.S.C. § 403(c)(3)(C).

Title 10 U.S.C. § 12004(a) has authorized up to 422 reserve component general and flag officers in addition to those on active duty. However, the law exempted from the ceiling any general or flag officer serving as a state adjutant general or an assistant adjutant general or in the National Guard Bureau.[15] The exemption allows for an additional 178 general or flag officer positions in fiscal year 1997, for a total of 600. Title 10 does not address either the grade mix or the frocking authority for the reserve components.

DOD and the Service Draft Requirements Are Unclear

DOD's draft recommends an increase in active general and flag officer ceilings from 877 to 943 in title 10 and seeks to maintain the fiscal year 1997 frocking limit of 75 to avoid the loss of 40 authorizations by fiscal year 1999. DOD's draft report also recommends a new grade mix for active duty general and flag officers.[16]

The service studies concluded that a combined total of 1,096 general and flag officers were needed but the service secretaries' combined recommendations would only provide 995. Subsequently, OSD developed draft recommendations that provide for 1,018 positions, as shown in table 3.

Table 3: Differences Between Service Study Results and the DOD Draft Recommendations

Service	Current title 10 ceiling of 877 plus the Chairman's 12 and current frocking limit of 75	Study results	Service recommendations	Draft recommendation of the Secretary of Defense
Army	336	353	355	355
Navy	242	328	249	262
Air Force	299	297	308	314
Marine Corps	87	118	83	87
Total	**964**	**1,096**	**995**	**1,018**

Source: Our analysis based on data provided by OSD and the services.

The difference between the 995 authorizations recommended by the services and the 1,018 recommended by OSD's draft report is accounted for in the way the services handled recommendations on frocking. Only the

[15]See 10 U.S.C. § 12004(b).

[16]We discuss the draft recommendations on the grade mix in appendix I.

Army recommended maintaining the current frocking limit of 75 (of which its current share is 29) and did not add positions to its recommended title 10 ceiling to compensate for its loss of 17 Army-specific frocking authorizations by fiscal year 1999. On the other hand, the other services made no recommendations on frocking, which would lead to a combined drop of 23 for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps between fiscal year 1997 and 1999. At the same time, the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps developed their recommended new title 10 ceilings with the expected loss of frocking authority in mind and compensated themselves through higher title 10 ceilings.

In its May 8, 1997, draft, DOD stated that "all services had not built the loss of frocking into their analyses." However, this is inconsistent with the documentary evidence the services provided to us before the proposed freeze on frocking at the current level of 75 was made.

- In an August 23, 1996, point paper, the Marine Corps pointed out that it had recently completed an effort to increase its general officer ceiling by 14 to 82 (the law provided 12 for a total of 80). The paper also stated, "Within the 14 was included the ultimate loss of 6 frocking authorizations that resulted from the fiscal year 1996 Defense Authorization Bill."
- A June 18, 1996, memorandum signed by the Chief of Naval Operations was used to justify a request to increase the Navy's flag officer ceiling to 240. That memorandum stated that the "Navy must receive an increase in flag officer authorizations to counter the cumulative effect of the reduction in frocking and flag officers." In 1997, the Navy again recommended an increase in its flag officer ceiling to 240.
- A December 5, 1996, memorandum written by the Air Force General Officer Matters Office was used as part of the scoring process in the current study of general officer requirements. The memorandum stated that "we would subtract the 11 frocked brigadier generals we are allowed beginning in FY99, and request authorization for 221 plus 74 joint, for a total of 295." If DOD's draft recommendation to maintain frocking at 75 is put forward and adopted, the Air Force would have frocking authority of 17, not the 11 planned plus the new recommended title 10 ceiling that assumes frocking of 11 not 17.
- The Army's 1997 general officer requirements study recommended a title 10 ceiling of 319 (subsequently changed to 326). It also stated that "frocking is a very cost effective means to help close the gap between requirements and authorizations. If we apply the future frocking constraint of 12 to today's general officer requirements, the vacancies will increase

from 18 to 30. Therefore, recommend that frocking authorization be held at the FY 1997 levels."

Therefore, because DOD's draft report recommended maintaining the current frocking limit of 75 while accepting the services' recommended new title 10 ceilings, the overall OSD draft recommendations would lead to a total of 1,018, not the 995 recommended by the services, because 23 positions were counted twice.

Even 1,018 may not be the right number. The service studies concluded that 1,096 were needed, even though they only recommended 995. The Secretaries of the Army and the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps did not fully explain the criteria they used to adjust their recommendations from the study results, leaving unclear what the right number should be. For example, Kapos Associates, Incorporated, a job evaluation consultant, concluded that 328 Navy positions and 118 Marine Corps positions were general or flag officer positions. Neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps fully explained why they reduced their recommended positions to only 249 for the Navy and 83 for the Marine Corps. OSD, Navy, and Marine Corps officials whom we spoke with, and documents that we had access to, acknowledged that it would be difficult to convince Congress to authorize 1,096 general and flag officers.

The Distinction Between Requirements and Authorizations

The services' studies were conducted to identify those positions that required leadership at general or flag rank. The requirements process was aimed at determining how many general and flag officers the services believe are needed—not how many they can have. The next step was to determine general and flag officers (resources) to fill those positions identified as worthy of general or flag rank. Obtaining resources is done through the authorization process. Congress authorizes general and flag officers by providing them through (1) limited allotments specified for each service in title 10, (2) exemptions to title 10 limits such as the Chairman's 12, and (3) frocking. Congressional action deals only with authorizations by providing general and flag officers and frocking authority up to congressionally specified limits. The Air Force stated that nothing in law limits the number of general and flag officers that a service can say it needs, the law limits the number that are available. We agree. Table 2 of our report displays the number of general and flag officers authorized in law—the number available—not the number of positions the service says require general or flag rank. When we use the term "authorize," we are referring to the process of congressional action that

provides general and flag officers, not the process of determining requirements or permitting positions to be carried on the books as general or flag officer positions, whether or not enough general or flag officers are available to fill all positions.

The Air Force believed table 3 of our report inappropriately combines requirements (which we labeled as "Study results") with authorizations (which we labeled as "recommendations"). We combined them (as does the Air Force, as shown by the Air Force's December 5, 1996, memorandum that we quoted previously) within the table because the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps reports did not clearly state the number of general or flag officers that would exist if their recommendations were accepted by Congress. For example, as shown in table 3, the recommendations of the Secretary of the Air Force would produce more general officers than the Air Force study concluded were needed. In table 3, we clearly distinguish between requirements (determined by the service studies) and general and flag officers that would be available (if the recommendations of the service secretaries or OSD are adopted).

The service studies attempted to identify (determine requirements for) those jobs that require leadership at the general and flag officer level. But just identifying requirements does not equate to having the resources to fill them. Thus, OSD made draft recommendations that, if accepted by Congress, would provide the resources (general or flag officers) to meet requirements identified in the service studies. Among the draft recommendations made by OSD was one to maintain frocking at the current level of 75. That recommendation covers all of the services. The Marine Corps pointed out that its support of freezing frocking at 75 "was made to demonstrate our solidarity and support for our sister service needs." The Marine Corps also stated that it never intended to benefit from freezing frocking limits and pledged not to frock any more than three officers to the rank of brigadier general after October 1, 1997.

Joint Community and Service Requirements Are Not Well Integrated

The Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Joint Staff did not fully integrate their studies, even though joint community general and flag officers come from the services. As a result, the Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Joint Staff used different assumptions about service participation in the joint community, leading to incompatible sets of requirements. For example, the Joint Staff projected that the Army would nominate 78 general officers for joint duty, while the Army projected nominations of 70 to 75 and developed the service title 10 and frocking recommendations based on its

estimate of joint and Army-specific needs. Likewise, the Joint Staff projected that the Navy would nominate 66, but the Navy estimated 68 and developed the Navy recommendations with its own projections—not the Joint Staff's—in mind.

The Joint Staff does not need congressional approval to change its general or flag officer authorizations; it levies its requirements on the services with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. In the early 1990s, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unilaterally reduced general and flag officer positions in the joint community from 280 to 219 to help the services cope with the mandated reduction in the title 10 ceiling. However, that trend has been reversed. In 1996, the Joint Staff added 11 active duty general and flag officer positions, which increased the total number of joint community general and flag officers to 229. The Marine Corps indicated that it would increase its nominations to the joint community by 4 (and received the 12 new general officers to help them do that). The other services had to provide the other eight general and flag officers from existing authorizations. In 1997, the Joint Staff recommended adding 15 more active component general and flag officers, for a total of 244 in the joint community. The joint community also recommended adding 11 new reserve component general and flag officers for a total of 44 in the joint community. (See app. III for the list of joint general and flag officers.)

Reserve Component General and Flag Officers Would Increase If Congress Accepts DOD's Draft Recommendations

DOD concluded that current statutory limits do not adequately recognize the increased role of the reserve components in operations and the draft report recommended that reserve component general and flag officer positions be increased by 32, to 454 (632, including the 178 general officers serving as state adjutants general or assistant adjutants general or in the National Guard Bureau), as shown in table 4.

Table 4: Current and Draft Ceilings on Reserve Component General and Flag Officers

Service	Current ceiling	Proposed ceiling	Increase
Army	207	227	20
Navy	48	53	5
Air Force	157	161	4
Marine Corps	10	13	3
Total	**422**	**454**	**32**

Source: OSD and title 10.

The services and the joint community plan to use the 32 new reserve component general and flag officers as commanders or deputy commanders in a variety of operational and support positions in both the reserves and National Guard, if the recommendation is put forward and adopted by Congress. Some would command organizations such as the 81st Infantry Brigade in the Army Reserve. Others would serve as deputy commanders. For example, the Marine Corps would use two new reserve general officers as the Deputy Commanders of Marine Forces Atlantic and Marine Forces Pacific. Lastly, the services and the joint community would use the new reserve general and flag officers in organizations in the United States and in foreign locations. For example, the Joint Staff planned to use one as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations at United States Forces-Korea and the Army planned to assign one as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Planning at the Eighth Army, also in Korea.

We found no evidence of uncoordinated recommendations in the reserve component portion of the studies, although some study results and recommendations were adjusted as with the active component. DOD avoided the problems encountered in the active component studies at least partly because exemptions and frocking authorities available for active force management are not used in the reserve component and no service recommended any change to that.

DOD's Recommendations Will Cost at Least $1.2 Million Annually

We estimate that the cost increase will be about $1.2 million annually and another approximately $54,000 in one-time costs if Congress accepts all of DOD's draft recommendations. The cost of general or flag officers includes a total increase in military compensation of over $1 million annually over that paid to colonels/Navy captains and about $180,000 more for allowances associated with the higher rank such as aides, speechwriters, entertainment, and the purchase of new china (to which some but not all general or flag officers are entitled). As an example, the Joint Staff authorized an increase from colonel/Navy captain to brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half) for the J-5 of the Special Operations Command at an estimated annual cost of over $78,400. This cost includes about $14,200 per year more for military compensation (salary, allowances, and certain tax advantages) paid at the higher pay grade and annual military compensation of about $64,200 paid to an executive officer at the rank of major. While the major who will be assigned as an executive officer may already be in the service, that person is already doing something else and a replacement major will have to backfill as the first major transfers to the joint position. In addition, the Joint Staff plans to incur a one-time expense

of $24,000 for the purchase of new office furniture and equipment for the J-5 of the Special Operations Command. Our total estimate is conservative, however, because DOD provided incomplete information on the cost of the recommended new reserve general and flag officers.

Our cost estimate assumes that the services would reduce the number of colonels/Navy captains by the same number as those promoted to brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half). DOD's February 1997 draft report indicated that the services would decrease their colonel/Navy captain authorizations to account for the increases to brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half). However, the May 1997 revised draft pledged to identify officer reductions in accordance with the provisions of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act,[17] rather than automatically reducing the number of colonels/Navy captains. The act governs the number of officers who may be serving above the rank of captain (Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and lieutenant (Navy) and is related to the overall size of the officer corps, not the number of general and flag officers. If the services replace officers ranked lower than colonel/Navy captain, the cost of the draft recommended new general and flag officers could be much higher than we estimated.

The Marine Corps retained 12 colonel positions and deleted 6 first lieutenant's positions, 5 captain's positions, and 1 major's position to account for the new general officers it received in 1996. The Marine Corps will incur additional military compensation costs of about $713,000 per year with 12 new general officers over what it would have with the lower ranked officers.[18]

Permitting higher frocking limits, rather than increasing title 10 ceilings, would not cost additional money because frocked officers do not receive the pay of the higher grade until promoted. On the other hand, greater use of frocking could mean longer waits for promotion for frocked officers because more could be in line for promotion to relatively fewer slots.

[17]Public Law 96-513, December 12, 1980.

[18]If the additional cost of military compensation for the 12 new Marine Corps general officers is added to that of the draft recommended 54 new positions in the other services, the total additional cost to DOD would be about $1.9 million.

The Services Used Widely Accepted Job Evaluation Techniques

The services and the Joint Staff used modified versions of two widely accepted job evaluation techniques. These systems use criteria to evaluate jobs for ranking and determining compensation. Job evaluation attempts to bring objectivity into the inherently subjective process of determining the value of jobs. In our review of the scholarly literature, we found that subjectivity is commonly a part of job evaluation techniques. For example, the factors selected for measurement are based on subjective judgment and the factors chosen can influence the results. Also, the process of scoring jobs is subjective, as are management overrides of the study results.

Criteria and Methodology Used by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps used criteria developed in the 1950s and included in a 1986 Marine Corps order that characterizes the attributes of a general officer.[19] The criteria were expanded and used by Kapos Associates, Incorporated, in its studies of Navy and Marine Corps general and flag officer positions in the mid-1980s. These criteria deal with 25 attributes of general and flag officers that address such aspects of command as the rank of higher, lateral, and subordinate commands; the magnitude of personnel and resources controlled; the visibility of the position to the press, public, or Congress; and any unusual training or experiences required. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps each collected comparable information about both active and reserve component general and flag officer positions and used comparable methodologies to evaluate the positions.

For their recent studies, the Navy and the Marine Corps contracted with Kapos,[20] and the Army used a self-conducted version of the Kapos methodology. The Kapos methodology largely consists of identifying the presence of the general or flag officer attributes at a specified threshold in positions reviewed. Because some positions share common attributes, the methodology (1) groups positions into a set of sectors and subsectors (for example, operations, service headquarters, and combat development); (2) matches attributes relevant to each subsector and discards those not relevant; (3) reviews position descriptions for the presence of relevant attributes; (4) establishes thresholds above which a position is ranked as a general or flag officer; and (5) subjectively assesses positions that fall well above or below the threshold.

[19]See appendix II for a detailed description of the criteria and methodology the services used in doing their general and flag officer studies.

[20]Kapos did the Marine Corps study in 1996 and the Navy study in 1997.

Criteria and Methodology Used by the Air Force and Joint Staff

The Air Force and Joint Staff adopted criteria developed by the Hay Group, Incorporated, in the 1950s. These criteria are (1) know-how, (2) problem-solving, and (3) accountability of the positions evaluated.[21] To conduct its 1997 study on general and flag officer requirements, the joint community (1) accepted as still valid the 1994 and 1996 Hay studies of 229 general and flag officer positions and (2) scored 24 positions it reviewed on its own in 1997, using a variation from the Hay methodology. The Air Force conducted its own study of general officer requirements by using an approach based on the Hay methodology. The Joint Staff and the Air Force each collected comparable information about both active and reserve component general and flag officer positions and used comparable methodologies to evaluate the positions.

Different Methodologies Lead to Different Definitions of a General or Flag Officer and Incompatible Results

Differing methodologies make cross-service comparisons difficult, even when comparing similar positions from one service to another. For example, matching sectors and attributes has the effect of producing a different definition of a general or flag officer for each sector. Thus, the Navy and Marine Corps methodology produced at least 12 different definitions of a general or flag officer while the Army's groupings produced another 11. The Air Force and the Joint Staff added another definition by using the Hay methodology. As a result, the service studies together created at least 24 different definitions of a general or flag officer and may have led to inconsistent results that are difficult to compare. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency requested that its comptroller position be upgraded from a colonel/Navy captain to a brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half), but the Joint Staff denied that request. In contrast, the Air Force used four general officers in similar financial management positions in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force and at the Air Mobility Command. In addition, the Navy scored its Chief of the Naval Exchange Service as a rear admiral (lower half), but the Army and the Air Force concluded that their combined Exchange Service required two general officers (one major general and one brigadier general).

The Air Force believed that even though differing methodologies were used, the results were consistent. For example, the Air Force stated that it believes that the Comptroller of the Defense Logistics Agency (an O-6 position) is unlike the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (an O-8 position) and the Director, Budget Operations (an O-7) position (two of the four Air Force general officers serving in financial management

[21]The Hay Group evaluated active and reserve general and flag officer requirements DOD-wide in 1988 and 1992, respectively, and active duty general and flag officers in the joint community in 1994 and 1996.

positions and cited in our example above). While all of the positions involved overseeing budgets, the Air Force suggested the positions are dissimilar because the Defense Logistics Agency Comptroller oversees a budget of only about $14 billion versus budgets of about $75 billion (the entire Air Force budget) and about $36 billion (a component of the Air Force budget), respectively. We used that example to illustrate the point that differing methodologies can produce differing results. However, the size of the budget may not be sufficient criteria to justify a general or flag officer, or even a military person. For example, the DOD Comptroller (a civilian) oversees the entire fiscal year 1997 DOD budget of about $250 billion (more than 3 times the Air Force budget).

OSD permitted the services to use their own methodologies for three reasons. First, DOD's draft report stated that the methodology chosen had to recognize the unique mission and structure of each service. Second, according to DOD, there is no single definition of a general and flag officer and no one way to conduct job evaluations. Therefore,both methodologies were deemed valid. Finally, using existing methodologies and recently completed studies saved time, an important consideration because DOD would have had only about 6 months to complete its study, if it had delivered its report on time. The Hay Group conducted general and flag officer studies for the joint community in 1994 and 1996 and Kapos did a similar study for the Marine Corps in 1996. The results were deemed still valid, and each wanted to use the results in the 1997 study. OSD officials told us that selecting one of the methodologies and forcing the joint community and the Marine Corps to use it would have been duplicative of work already completed. Also, having off-the-shelf methodologies available for the Army, Navy, and Air Force saved time since they did not have to develop and test a methodology.

Changing National Security Environment Suggests the Need for Periodic Reevaluations

Since the late 1970s, DOD has completed a reduction in troop strength, implemented a defense buildup that peaked in fiscal year 1987, and begun an uninterrupted reduction in troop strength that has continued into fiscal year 1997. During the period, trends in force structure changes and general and flag officer authorizations have not always been linked, as shown in table 5.

Table 5: Troop Strength, Title 10 Active Duty General and Flag Officer Ceilings, and Troops to General or Flag Officers in Selected Fiscal Years (Troop Strength in Millions)

Fiscal year	Troop strength	Title 10 active duty general and flag officer ceiling	Number of troops for each general or flag officer
1978	2.06	1,119	1,800
1981	2.08	1,073	1,900
1987	2.17	1,073	2,000
1988	2.14	1,073	2,000
1992	1.77	1,030	1,700
1995	1.52	865	1,800
1996	1.49	877	1,700
1997	1.46	877	1,700

Source: DOD.

In October 1993, DOD issued its Bottom-Up Review strategy report that recommended changes to the force structure needed to implement the strategy. But that report did not recommend any changes to general and flag officer authorizations, even though the force structure was to undergo change. Other changes may also be forthcoming. In 1997 and at the start of every new administration thereafter, the QDRs could recommend further changes to force structure or mission that affect the need for general and flag officers.

Some Positions Could Be Candidates for Military to Civilian Conversion

The services did not fully evaluate the potential for military to civilian conversions. For example, the Air Force explained that it asked Air Force field commanders whether any existing general officer positions could be converted (as did the other services) and all the Air Force respondents said "no." However, just asking field commanders whether positions can be converted does not constitute full consideration of the potential for conversion. DOD has issued Directive 1100.4, which specifies policies for annual manpower programs including determining military essential positions by specifying the characteristics of such positions. None of the services' methodologies considered the contents of that directive as part of their studies of general and flag officer requirements.

The need for additional general and flag officers could be reduced by converting to civilian status general and flag officer positions that are not military essential. For example, the Navy uses an admiral to command the Naval Exchange Service, while DOD uses a civilian to manage the Defense Commissary Agency. Also, the Army uses a brigadier general as its

Director of the Center for Military History, while the other three services use civilians in similar positions. In addition, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense Finance and Accounting Service together use eight general and flag officers ranked as high as major general or rear admiral (upper half) in various financial management positions that are also candidates for conversion based on our criteria.[22] Other general or flag officer positions in the services and the joint community may also be candidates for conversion. On the other hand, the Army has identified three acquisition general officer positions and one infrastructure manager position for conversion to civilian status. If some positions can be converted, the services would need fewer new general and flag officer positions.

Conclusion

DOD's draft recommendation for more general and flag officers does not explain how many more are needed for active duty. Conflicting recommendations and unexplained adjustments of the study results leave unclear what DOD's requirements are for general and flag officers. On the other hand, job evaluation is essentially a subjective process and there is room for military judgment. The services' use of job evaluation methodologies is an attempt to bring some objectivity to an otherwise subjective process. However, DOD and the services did not document the reasons for subjective decisions and draft recommendations flowing from those decisions. In addition, double counts of some positions raise questions about the draft recommendations. Also, DOD did not fully consider military to civilian conversions as a means to free up some general and flag officers from nonmilitary essential positions and make them available to fill unmet needs. If positions can be converted, the number of new authorizations needed would be reduced.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense modify the draft report to include

- an explanation of the criteria used by the service secretaries to modify the results of the services' studies and a statement about whether the numbers represent the actual requirements for general and flag officers,
- an adjustment to the consolidated draft recommendations to eliminate double-counting,

[22]Our criteria were developed based on DOD's directive for an earlier report, DOD Force Mix Issues: Converting Some Support Officer Positions to Civilian Status Could Save Money (GAO/NSIAD-97-15, Oct. 23, 1996).

- an evaluation of the potential to convert nonmilitary essential general and flag officer positions to civilian status, and
- a mechanism to reduce the number of colonel's/Navy captain's positions by the number of general and flag officers added.

Matter for Congressional Consideration

Congress may wish to require DOD to revalidate its general and flag officer requirements as part of the periodic QDRs.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD indicated that it would take our recommendations under advisement, continue to evaluate its organizational structure and staffing patterns as a result of the QDR, and defer finalizing its general and flag officer report at this time. We agree that it is prudent to wait until after QDR-inspired organizational or staffing changes are fully considered or implemented before finalizing general and flag officer recommendations. DOD's response is printed in its entirety in appendix IV. DOD also provided some technical comments and we have incorporated them into the text where appropriate.

Scope and Methodology

We reviewed DOD's 1997 draft report on general or flag officer requirements; service and Joint Staff studies supporting the draft report; prior studies of general or flag officer requirements conducted by Kapos Associates, Incorporated, and the Hay Group, Incorporated; and other documents supporting some of these studies. In addition, we interviewed officials and obtained documents from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Officer/Enlisted Personnel Management), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), the General Officer Matters Office or its equivalent in the four services and the Joint Staff, the Reserve Forces Policy Board, and the National Guard Bureau.

To enhance our understanding of the two methodologies employed by the services and the Joint Staff, we met with officials of the Hay Group, Incorporated, and Kapos Associates, Incorporated, and obtained documents that explained their respective approaches. We also held discussions with an official of the Rand Corporation. We extensively searched scholarly literature to understand the basic approaches to job evaluation that have traditionally been used in the United States and to identify any analyses that had been conducted on the specific

methodologies employed by either the Hay Group, Incorporated, or Kapos Associates, Incorporated.

To determine the estimated cost associated with adding new active duty general and flag officers (who qualify for higher pay) to the number on duty, we used the estimated cost difference in military compensation between a colonel/Navy captain and brigadier general/rear admiral (lower half) provided by the service (for those services that provided this information) or we estimated the annual basic pay, allowances, and the tax advantage accruing by virtue of the nontaxability of the allowances for military personnel using military compensation data provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Directorate of Compensation). We then subtracted the annual compensation paid to a colonel/Navy captain to determine the incremental increase in salary for the new general and flag officers. Next, we asked each of the service and Joint Staff General Officer Matters Offices (or equivalent) to estimate the cost of any personnel assistance provided to new general or flag officers and any additional one-time costs (such as the purchase of new china). We could only obtain incomplete information for the new reserve general or flag officers. We added together all available cost estimates to obtain an estimated total cost.

Due to the mandated short time frame between the date that DOD was to have issued its report (Mar. 23, 1997) and the date that we were required to issue our report (30 days after DOD issued its report), DOD invited us to attend meetings of its Executive and Steering Committees.[23] We accepted that invitation with the understanding that we were acting as observers only—not as participants. When requested, we did provide DOD and service officials with our preliminary observations to the Executive, Steering, and Working Committees and the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Finally, at the invitation of a Rand Corporation official, we attended a meeting to explain the approaches that we would take in analyzing the methodology DOD and the services employed in their studies.

We conducted our work from October 1996 to June 1997 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps;

[23]DOD plans to issue its final general and flag officer report after considering the impact of QDR recommendations on general and flag officer requirements. We also plan to issue a final report that evaluates DOD's final report in accordance with the legislation that requires these two reports.

the Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board; the Rand Corporation; the Hay Group, Incorporated; and Kapos Associates, Incorporated. We will make copies available to others upon request.

The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. If you have any questions about this report, please contact me on (202) 512-5140.

Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations and
Capabilities Issues

Contents

Tables

Abbreviations

CINC	Commander-in-Chief
DOD	Department of Defense
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review

DOD's Draft Recommended Changes to the Grade Mix of General and Flag Officers

The mandate that required the Department of Defense (DOD) to study general and flag officer requirements also required that the study address any perceived need to change the grade distribution of general and flag officers. Because the services do not believe the current authorized grade mix permits them to assign general and flag officers with high enough grades to certain positions, DOD has drafted recommended changes to the title 10 active duty grade mix by replacing the current formula with set numbers of general and flag officers at each rank. Table I.1 displays the current general and flag officer grade distribution, by service.

Table I.1: Current Grade Distribution of General and Flag Officers, Including the Chairman's 12

		Grade distribution			
Service	**Authorized**	**O-7**	**O-8**	**O-9**	**O-10**
Army	307	154	106	35	12
Navy	220	110	77	25	8
Air Force	282	141	99	31	11
Marine Corps	80	40	28	10	2
Total	**889**	**445**	**310**	**101**	**33**

Note: This table includes the current title 10 ceiling of 877 plus the Chairman's 12. It excludes 1 exemption currently authorized for an admiral (O-10) who serves as the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, meaning the O-10 total was actually 34 and the O-9 total was actually 100, at the time of our review. The exemption will expire when the current incumbent leaves the service, at which time the position will revert to an O-9 position.

Source: Our analysis based on data provided by each of the services.

DOD's draft would create an authorization of 127 O-9s overall (with 28 in the joint community) and 34 O-10s overall (with 13 in the joint community), although all would come from the services. However, because most joint community general and flag officer positions are nominative,[1] and it is unknown how many positions would go to any one service at any given time, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would distribute the 28 O-9 and 13 O-10 authorizations to the services, thus permitting them to exceed O-9 and O-10 grade ceilings at the time their nominations are accepted for a given position. As a result, at any given time, a service may have more O-9s and O-10s serving on active duty than the limits specified in title 10 for that service. To avoid exceeding the title 10 ceiling of 943 for general and flag officers, a service that exceeds its O-9 or O-10 ceiling using the joint community authorizations would decrease its O-7 and/or O-8 numbers by a commensurate amount. Table I.2 displays

[1]About 66 percent of joint community general and flag officer positions are "nominative," that is, as a vacancy is projected, an announcement is issued and the services may nominate an officer to fill the position. Of the remaining 34 percent of positions, some are rotated among the services, some are reserved for one service, and some are reserved for one to three of the services.

the grade mix that would be authorized if DOD draft recommendations were approved.

Table I.2: Grade Distribution of General and Flag Officers If DOD's Draft Recommendations Are Adopted

		Grade distribution			
Service	**Authorized**	**O-7**	**O-8**	**O-9**	**O-10**
Army	326	172	114	34	6
Navy	240	127	84	23	6
Air Force	297	155	103	32	7
Marine Corps	80	41	27	10	2
Joint Staff	NA[a]	NA[a]	NA[a]	28[b]	13[b]
Total	**943[c]**	**495[d]**	**328[d]**	**127**	**34**

[a]Not applicable.

[b]DOD's draft did not recommend any authorizations in title 10 for joint community general or flag officers. The draft did recommend that 28 O-9s and 13 O-10s be authorized in title 10 above the grade ceilings for the services to use in nominating to the joint community at those grades.

[c]The 75 frocked O-7s, who would be available if the draft recommendations are put forward and accepted, are not represented in the table because they are not counted against the title 10 grade ceilings for general and flag officers.

[d]The totals for O-7 and O-8 would be reduced by a combined total of 41 to account for the 28 O-9 and 13 O-10 authorizations that the joint community would distribute to the services.

Source: Our analysis based on data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

DOD's draft report also identified the positions that would be filled with generals/admirals or lieutenant generals/vice admirals if its draft recommendations were adopted. Among the positions that would be upgraded to lieutenant general/vice admiral is the chief of the service reserve in each service and chief of the National Guard in the Army and the Air Force. Title 10 does not specify the reserve component grade mix, and DOD's draft did not recommend any grade mix changes to the law.

The Methodologies Used on the Studies of General and Flag Officer Requirements

The services and the Joint Staff used variations of one or the other of two job evaluation methodologies that had been used in past studies of general and flag officer requirements. In this appendix, we describe the two methodologies.

The Hay Group, Incorporated, Methodology

The Hay Group uses a proprietary job evaluation methodology conceived in the 1950s. An organization using this methodology evaluates the three factors deemed by its developers to be most significant in distinguishing jobs. The factors are "know-how," "problem-solving," and "accountability." The problem-solving factor includes two subfactors. The know-how and accountability factors include three subfactors. The company believes that an evaluation of these factors and subfactors permits an organization's jobs to be ranked based on difficulty of the position and importance to organizational goals. According to company literature, the methodology is most commonly used for studies of salary practices in organizations.

Application of the Methodology

The Hay methodology is applied in a multistep process. A separate matrix for each of the three factors is produced with semantic descriptions of levels of difficulty for each of the subfactors. Semantic descriptions are intended to correspond to degrees of difficulty of the subfactors and are tied to higher scores as the degree of difficulty increases.

Know-How

The three subfactors under know-how are "depth and breadth of specialized knowledge," "managerial know-how," and "human relations skills." Depth of knowledge has eight levels of difficulty, which range from "limited" to "specialized mastery" along one axis of the matrix. Managerial know-how has five levels of difficulty, which range from "task" to "total management of the company." The human relations skills subfactor has three levels of difficulty, which range from "basic" to "critical."

Problem-Solving

The two subfactors under problem-solving are "thinking environment" and "thinking challenge." Thinking environment has seven levels of difficulty, which range from "strict routine" to "generally defined," and thinking challenge has five degrees of difficulty, which range from "repetitive" to "uncharted."

Accountability

The three subfactors under accountability are "freedom to act," "job impact on end results," and "magnitude." Freedom to act has nine degrees of difficulty, which range from "limited" to "strategic guidance;" job impact has four degrees of difficulty, which range from "ancillary" to "primary;" and magnitude has five degrees of difficulty, which range from "nonquantifiable" to "medium-large."

Each degree of difficulty has a definition to help interpret the factors and subfactors. The matrices provide increasing scores for increasing degrees of difficulty, and the intersection of rows and columns of the semantic descriptions of the two subfactors becomes the score for that particular factor. Each position evaluated receives one score for each of the three factors.

Next, the organization (whose positions are to be evaluated) prepares position descriptions for a test sample of jobs to be reviewed. Then, an evaluation committee is selected from the organization whose positions are to be reviewed. The committee is generally made up of officials ranked higher than the positions evaluated. The committee receives training in applying the methodology and then scores the sample positions. When the Hay Group is executing the methodology, a Hay consultant leads the committee. The committee members individually score the positions on each of the three factors and add them together to produce a total score. To reach a consensus score for each position, the committee discusses any variations in the scores. The results of the sample scoring are reviewed by higher management and Hay consultants for acceptability. Once organizational management is satisfied with the results of the sample, the committee evaluates all other positions scheduled for analysis using the same process. Finally, the positions are ranked from highest to lowest based on the consensus score for each position.

Hay Group officials told us that natural cut points between ranks or grades become apparent based on the scores. DOD can then make a distinction between colonels/Navy captains and brigadier generals/rear admirals (lower half) as well as other ranks in the military.

Kapos Associates, Incorporated, Methodology

Kapos Associates, Incorporated, uses a multistep process to evaluate jobs. The methodology includes up to 25 attributes as criteria, and each position is evaluated for the presence or absence of these attributes, at a specified threshold. Our description that follows used the 1996 study of Marine Corps general officers as an example to make it easier to understand.

Application of the Methodology

First, the study team selected all existing service-specific general officer positions for analysis, regardless of the current incumbent's rank or whether the position was even filled at the time. The study team also selected a large enough sample of colonel positions for analysis to establish the threshold at which a position would be considered a general officer position. Next, the service was divided into five sectors that characterize the major types of organizations within the Marine Corps. The sectors consisted of (1) operations, (2) combat development, (3) material, (4) service headquarters, and (5) out of service. Within the Marine Corps, the five sectors were further subdivided into 15 subsectors that represent groupings of positions with similar functions and responsibilities. The subsectors follow.

Operations Sector

- Operational component commands
- Operational combatant commands
- Operational readiness commands
- Operational training commands

Combat Development Sector

- Headquarters
- Training installations

Material Sector

- Systems command
- Logistics bases[1]
- Bases and stations[2]

Service Headquarters Sector

- Office of the Secretary of the Navy[3]
- Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
- Headquarters of the Marine Corps

Out-Of-Service Sector

- Office of the Secretary of Defense and departmental offices
- Office of the Secretary of the Navy
- Joint commands[4]

[1]Logistics bases were defined as those that provide logistical support to the operating forces, including depot and prepositioned war reserves support.

[2]Bases and stations were defined as large, complex installations that support operating forces, excluding those that provide depot and prepositioned war reserve support.

[3]Kapos includes Marine Corps general officers in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy in both service headquarters and out-of-service sectors.

[4]Joint commands are those with representation by two or more U.S. services (such as the Atlantic Command).

- Combined commands[5]

The first four sectors were evaluated using this methodology. The out-of-service sector analysis consisted largely of (1) accepting the need for a general officer, (2) estimating the percentage of time that the Marine Corps would fill particular positions, and (3) deriving the number of general officers needed based on the amount of time that the Marine Corps would be estimated to fill positions.

For criteria, Kapos reviewed 16 attributes of a general officer developed in the 1950s and later included in a 1986 Marine Corps order. Kapos officials told us that the original set of 16 attributes had gaps and did not fully address all aspects of military leadership. They expanded the list to 25 items to provide clearer distinctions and to highlight aspects that could be readily quantified or categorized for analysis but subsequently used only 21 items in the study.[6] The attributes are divided into four groups.

Nature of Position

- Level or echelon of the military establishment at which duty is performed
- Rank of the official to whom the position reports
- Rank of the majority of lateral counterparts
- Span of control (rank, number, and diversity of direct subordinates)
- Special authority that goes with the position by legislation or regulation
- Independent decision-making authority

Magnitude of Responsibilities

- Number of personnel and commands under the position
- Operating budget of command, including subordinate commands
- Other money managed, such as military construction funds
- Other product throughput
- Value of equipment controlled
- Value of real estate in the form of land
- Value of facilities such as buildings and runways
- Value of inventories controlled

Significance of Duties

- Duties in the international arena entailing independent dealings with foreign audiences
- Duties at the seat of government having an impact on national defense
- Duties involving significant exposure to the public and media

[5]Combined commands are those made up of U.S. and allied forces (such as the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command).

[6]Kapos dropped (1) isolation of command or remoteness from direct supervision, (2) number of personnel in the position's immediate staff, (3) geographic extent of command, and (4) operating budget of immediate staff because they were deemed nondiscriminating between ranks.

- Duties entailing representation before Congress
- Duties entailing direct support to the operating forces

Special Qualifications

- Unusual breadth of experience required
- Special depth of skill or training in other than the primary combat specialty

Kapos convened four panels of Marine Corps officers to match attributes that defined a general officer in each subsector and discarded those attributes that did not. The selected attributes varied from one subsector to another based on whether the attributes were deemed applicable to general officer positions within the subsector and discriminated between colonels' and brigadier generals' positions. This produced a number of different definitions of a general officer.

Next, researchers collected data demonstrating the extent to which the selected attributes were present in each position reviewed. The information became a position description for each position. Researchers used statistical methods to determine the threshold for each attribute above which a position was deemed "general officer-worthy." For example, within the combat development sector and headquarters subsector, Kapos applied seven attributes. Among the seven was the attribute "equipment controlled," and Kapos determined the dollar-value threshold at which a position in that subsector would be deemed general officer-worthy. Similarly, Kapos developed thresholds for each of the other six attributes in the subsector. Taken together, the set of threshold values became known as the general officer profile. The profile establishes the number of attributes that must be present at the threshold level for positions in the subsector to be deemed general officer-worthy. For example, in the combat development sector and headquarters subsector, Kapos concluded that positions required at least six of the possible seven attributes to be deemed general officer-worthy. Next, researchers reviewed nine positions within the subsector to determine which had responsibilities at the general officer thresholds for each of the seven attributes. Kapos found (1) three positions had six or seven attributes at the general officer threshold, (2) one colonel's position had five attributes at the threshold and was considered potentially general officer-worthy, and (3) five colonels' positions had one to three attributes at the general officer threshold and were deemed properly ranked. Similar analyses were conducted of each position in each subsector using the subsector's unique set of attributes and general officer threshold.

Some existing general officer positions may have some attributes that fall below the position profile threshold, known as "outliers." Some colonel positions may be at the threshold, known as "upspikers." These positions were recommended for further evaluation by the Marine Corps to determine whether the positions should be changed to a higher or lower rank or maintained at their present rank.

The service could overrule the study's conclusion about a given position. For example, the President of Marine Corps University had only two attributes at the threshold level in a subsector that required at least six to be considered general officer-worthy. However, the Marine Corps decided to maintain the position as a brigadier general position, even though the study ranked it well within the colonel range.[7]

[7]At the time of the study, the Marine Corps had assigned a major general to the position, even though the position specified only brigadier general.

Joint Community General and Flag Officer Positions

Active Component

In 1996, the joint community had 229 active component general and flag officers. In 1997, the joint community recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the number be increased by 15 more, to 244. The existing and recommended 244 active component joint community positions are listed below.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.	Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Washington, D.C.	Director, Special Programs Director, Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office Director, Joint Advanced Strike Technology Deputy Director, Joint Advanced Strike Technology DOD Space Architect
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), Washington, D.C.	Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), Chief of Staff Director, Asia and Pacific Affairs Director, Inter-American Region Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Policy and Missions
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Washington, D.C.	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Personnel Policy) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Services Operations and Readiness) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness, Training, and Mobilization)

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.	Director Vice Director
J-1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate, Washington, D.C.	Director
J-2 Intelligence Directorate, Washington, D.C.	Director Vice Director
J-3 Directorate of Operations, Washington, D.C.	Director Vice Director Deputy Director, Current Operations Deputy Director, Current Readiness Deputy Director, Operations, National Systems Support Deputy Director, Operations, National Military Command Center Deputy Director, Operations, National Military Command Center Deputy Director, Operations, National Military Command Center Deputy Director, Operations, National Military Command Center Deputy Director, Operations, National Military Command Center Deputy Director, Combatting Terrorism (recommended)
J-4 Logistics Directorate, Washington, D.C.	Director Vice Director Deputy Director, Medical Readiness
J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Washington, D.C.	Director Vice Director Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy Deputy Director, International Negotiations Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative on Security and Cooperation in Europe

J-6 Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, Washington, D.C.	Director Vice Director
J-7 Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, Washington, D.C.	Director Vice Director
J-8 Force Structure Resource and Assessment Directorate, Washington, D.C.	Director Vice Director Deputy Director, Force Structure and Resources Deputy Director, Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments Director, Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (recommended) Deputy Director, Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (recommended)
Inter-American Defense Board	Chairman

Defense Agencies

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Washington, D.C.	Director Deputy for Acquisition/Theater Missile Defense Assistant Deputy for Theater Missile Defense Programs Director, National Missile Defense
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Arlington, Virginia	Deputy Director for Finance
Defense Information Systems Agency, Arlington, Virginia	Director Vice Director Commander, Western Hemisphere

	Deputy Director for Operations Deputy Director for Engineering and Interoperability
Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.	Director Director, National Military Intelligence Collection Center Defense Attache, Russia Defense Attache, China Defense Attache, Pakistan (recommended) Defense Attache, India (recommended) Defense Attache, Brazil (recommended) Defense Attache, Israel (recommended) Defense Attache, France (recommended)
Defense Logistics Agency, Alexandria, Virginia	Director Principal Deputy Director Deputy Director for Materiel Management Executive Director for Distribution Executive Director for Supply Management Deputy Director for Acquisition Management Commander, Defense Supply Center, Columbus, Ohio Commander, Defense Fuel Supply Center Commander, Defense Industrial Supply Center Commander, Defense Personnel Support Center
Defense Special Weapons Agency, Alexandria, Virginia	Director Director for Operations
Defense Security Assistance Agency, Arlington, Virginia	Director
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Chantilly, Virginia	Director Director, Customer Support Office

National Security Agency, Fort George Meade, Maryland	Director Deputy Director for Plans, Policy, and Programs Assistant Deputy Director for Operations Chief, Operations and Targeting Group
On-Site Inspection Agency, Chantilly, Virginia	Director

Unified Commands

Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia	Commander in Chief (CINC) Deputy CINC Director for Intelligence J-2 Director for Operations J-3 Director for Logistics J-4 Director for Plans, Policy, and Joint Exercises J-5 Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems J-6 (recommended) Director J-7 Commander, Special Operations Command Commander, U.S. Defense Forces-Iceland Director, Joint Interagency Task Force-East Commander, Joint Task Force-6
Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida	CINC Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff Director for Intelligence J-2 Director for Operations J-3 Deputy Director for Operations J-3 Director for Logistics J-4/J-7 Director for Plans and Policy J-5 Deputy Director for Plans, Policy, and Programs J-5 (recommended) Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems J-6 Commander, Forward Headquarters Element/Inspector General Commander, U.S. Military Training Mission (Saudi Arabia) Chief, Office of Military Cooperation (Egypt) Commander, Middle East Force (Bahrain)

	Commander, Special Operations Command Chief, Office of Military Cooperation (Kuwait) Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (Saudi Arabia) Joint Rear Area Coordinator (recommended)
European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany	CINC Deputy CINC Chief of Staff Director for Intelligence J-2 Director for Operations J-3 Deputy Director for Operations J-3 Director for Logistics and Security Assistance J-4/J-7 Director for Plans and Policy J-5 Deputy Director for Plans and Policy J-5 Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems J-6 Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation (Turkey) Commander, Special Operations Command-Europe Commanding General, Combined Task Force "Northern Watch" (Turkey)
Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii	CINC Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff/Inspector General Director for Intelligence J-2 Director for Operations J-3 Deputy Director for Operations J-3 Director for Logistics and Security Assistance J-4 Director for Plans and Policy J-5 Deputy Director for Plans and Policy J-5 Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems J-6 Commander, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting Pacific Command Representative-Guam Commander, United States Forces-Japan/Commander, 5th Air Force (Japan) Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Forces-Japan (Japan) Commander, Special Operations Forces-Pacific Commander, Alaskan Command/Headquarters Alaskan Air Command (Alaska)

Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama	CINC Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff Director for Intelligence J-2 Director for Operations J-3 Director for Logistics J-4 (recommended) Director for Plans and Policy J-5 Director for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems J-6 (recommended) Commander, Special Operations Command-South
Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado	CINC Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff Director for Intelligence J-2 Director for Operations J-3 Director for Plans and Policy J-5 Director for Command and Control Systems J-6 Commander, Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (Colorado Springs, Colorado) Deputy Commander, Canadian North American Air Defense (North Bay, Ontario, Canada) Director for Plans and Policy J-5, North American Air Defense
Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida	CINC Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff Director for Operations J-3 Director for Plans, Policy, and Strategic Assessments J-5/J-7 Director for Plans and Policy J-5 (recommended) Director for Resources J-8 Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command (Fort Bragg, North Carolina) Deputy Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command (Fort Bragg, North Carolina)
Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska	CINC Deputy CINC Director for Intelligence J-2 Director for Operations J-3/Director for Logistics J-4 Director, Combat Operations Staff Director for Plans and Policy J-5

	Director, Strategic Target Plans Director for Command, Control, and Communications Systems J-6
Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois	CINC Deputy CINC Director for Operations J-3/Director for Logistics J-4 Director for Plans J-5 Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems J-6

Combined Commands and Agencies

United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces-Korea, Seoul, Korea	CINC Deputy CINC/Commander, 7th Air Force Chief of Staff/Commander, 8th U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2 Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3 Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, J-4 Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe	Executive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Logistics Chief, Policy and Requirements Chief, Information Systems
Ace Rapid Reaction Corps	Deputy Chief of Staff
Ace Reaction Forces Planning Staff	Deputy Director
Allied Forces North Europe	Chief of Staff

Allied Forces North West Europe	Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations
Allied Forces Central Europe	Director for Operations Commander, Allied Land Forces Central Europe Commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe
Allied Forces Southern Europe	CINC Chief of Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans Deputy Commanding General, Allied Land Forces South Eastern Europe Deputy Chief of Staff for Support Commander, Strike Forces South Deputy Commander, Strike Forces South Commander, Allied Submarines-Mediterranean Commander, Marine Air Forces-Mediterranean Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe Chief of Staff, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe Deputy Commander, 5th Allied Tactical Air Forces Deputy Commander, 6th Allied Tactical Air Forces
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Early Warning Force	Commander
Ace Mobile Forces (Land)	Commander
Allied Command Atlantic	Chief of Staff Assistant Chief of Staff Commander, Strike Forces Atlantic Commander, Submarine Bases Atlantic Commander, Standing Naval Force Atlantic Deputy CINC, Iberian Atlantic Command
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee	U.S. Military Representative Deputy U.S. Military Representative Deputy Chairman

Special Activities/Joint Service Colleges

National Defense University	President Commandant, National War College Commandant, Industrial College of the Armed Forces Commandant, Armed Forces Staff College
Defense Systems Management College	Commandant
Office of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia	Associate Director for Military Support Associate Deputy Director for Operations
U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C.	Physician to Congress
U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Applications
National Security Council, Washington, D.C.	Director, National Security Council Staff (recommended)
Joint Command and Control Warfare Center	Director
Joint Warfighting Center	Commander
Joint Cruise Missile Project	Program Executive Officer, Cruise Missile/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

The Joint Staff scored another 9 positions as general and flag officer requirements, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided not to add those to the 244 positions.

Reserve Component

The joint community also has 33 reserve component general and flag officer positions. In 1997, the joint community recommended adding 11 reserve general and flag officer positions to the existing 33. The 44 existing and recommended positions are listed below.

OSD

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), Washington, D.C.	Assistant for Mobilization and Reserve Affairs
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Washington, D.C.	Military Advisor and Executive Officer, Reserve Forces Policy Board

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.	Mobilization Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff Assistant to the Director J-4 Logistics (Medical Readiness) Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Logistics J4 Special Assistant to the Director of Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (recommended) Assistant to the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy (recommended)
Defense Information Systems Agency, Arlington, Virginia	Mobilization Assistant to the Director
Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.	Mobilization Assistant to the Director
Defense Logistics Agency, Alexandria, Virginia	Mobilization Assistant to the Director Mobilization Assistant to the Deputy Director, Acquisition Management

National Security Agency, Fort George Meade, Maryland	Mobilization Assistant to the Chief, Central Security Service Mobilization Assistant to the Deputy Chief, Central Security Service

Unified Commands

Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia	Chief of Staff Vice Director of Intelligence Vice Director of Operations Vice Director for Logistics Vice Director for Plans and Policies Vice Director for Joint Training
European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany	Director of Mobilization and Reserve Component Affairs Crisis Action Team Director Assistant Political Advisor Assistant Director of Intelligence J-2
Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii	Deputy CINC Director for Operations (recommended) Director for Logistics and Security Assistance J-4 (recommended) Director for Strategic Planning and Policy J-5 (recommended) Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (recommended)
Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama	Deputy CINC for Mobilization and Reserve Affairs Vice Director for Operations (recommended) Deputy Director for Logistics (recommended)
Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado	CINC Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Intelligence Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Operations Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Command and Control Systems

Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida	Deputy CINC for Mobilization and Reserve Affairs Deputy Director of Operations
Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska	Mobilization Assistant to the CINC Mobilization Assistant to the CINC Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Intelligence
Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois	Mobilization Assistant to the Deputy CINC Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Plans and Policy (recommended) Deputy Director for Operations and Logistics (recommended)

Combined Commands and Agencies

United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces-Korea, Seoul, Korea	Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff J-3 (recommended)

The Joint Staff scored another 6 reserve component positions as general and flag officer requirements, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided not to add those to the 44 positions.

Comments From the Department of Defense

FORCE MANAGEMENT POLICY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

MAY 27 1997

Mr. Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
and Capabilities Issues
National Security and International
Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Gebicke:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) testimony, General and Flag Officers: DOD's Draft Study Needs Adjustments (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-122, April 8, 1997) and the draft report GAO/NSIAD-97-160, "GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS: DOD's Draft Requirements Are Unclear". The DoD has reviewed the recommendations presented in these two documents and will take them under advisement. The Department will continue to evaluate its organizational structures and staffing patterns as a result of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and believes it prudent to defer finalizing the report at this time.

Technical comments have been provided directly to the GAO staff for incorporation into the report.

Sincerely,

F. Pang

Major Contributors to This Report

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