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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE ARMY'S DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR: NEW FORCE STRUCTURE AND MISSIONS FOR THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MELVIN A. ROBERSON United States Army

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ABSTRACT

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This Strategy Research Project (SRP) recommends a new Army National Guard (ARNG) force structure which will successfully accomplish current missions and serve the Total Army's requirements for the future.

This study begins with a review of our current National Security Strategy (NSS), which sets forth goals and missions of the Department of Defense (DOD). The study then addresses these related questions: First, what is the readiness status of the Total Army today? Second, what is the basis of the Army's current force structure? And third, is the ARNG currently combat - ready?

Analysis of these issues supports a recommendation for a new ARNG force structure.

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The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is under way and Congress is scheduled to receive the Department of Defense (DOD) report by May 1997. While all facets of the defense structure will be examined, the QDR will report out on five areas: strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and readiness. Subsequent to Congress' review, a team of civilian and former military experts, known as the National Defense Panel (NDP) will perform an independent review of the QDR report and make final recommendations regarding the future of the Armed Forces. Though a wealth of uncertainty surrounds the QDR, there is one certainty - the QDR/NDP's findings will have long-term effects on the entire DOD.

There has already been much speculation about the outcome of the QDR. For example, will it recommend a change to the two Major Regional Conflicts (MRC) strategy? Will it address the under-funding of modernization efforts? Will it reduce the force structure? Might it also include an assessment of impacts of future defense budget reductions, a follow-on to the warning in the "Bottom-Up Review" (BUR)?

As was the case in the BUR, recommendations of the QDR will most likely focus on the *bottom line - money*! The President's effort to balance the federal budget, combined

with DOD's requirements to organize a post Cold War military, will have a direct impact on the QDR's recommendations.

Although the QDR is focusing on five areas, I believe force structure will receive the most attention and will be subject to the most dramatic recommendations. Without a doubt, within the Total Army organization, the one component that will attract the most attention is the Army National Guard (ARNG).

Purpose

In that light, this Strategy Research Project (SRP) will propose a new ARNG force structure and recommend complementary missions that will enhance the Total Army, permit successful accomplishment of missions, and enable the Army to meet the nations' requirements.

The study begins with a brief review of the National Security Strategy (NSS), the *foundation* for the rebuilding of our Total Army force structure, and leads to three critical questions: First, what is the readiness status of the Total Army today? Second, what is the basis of the Army's current force structure? And finally, what is the role of the ARNG and does the current structure support the

NSS? Analysis of these issues leads to a detailed recommendation to restructure the ARNG.

CURRENT SITUATION - CHALLENGES

Over the past few years, U.S. soldiers have executed an inordinate number of diverse tasks and missions at home and abroad. In addition to the demands of duty in Bosnia, Somalia, Southwest Asia and the like, our soldiers have been engaged in the evacuation of noncombatants in Liberia and in supporting emerging democracies within our own hemisphere. Additionally, at home, soldiers have been supporting our nation. They have been fighting fires in the West, providing security for the Olympics in Atlanta, and responding to natural disasters throughout the U.S. Furthermore, our Army remains forward deployed in Southwest Asia, Europe, and South Korea to ensure regional stability.¹

Only the Total Force of America's Army could have routinely and successfully responded to these massive, difficult, and diverse demands.² However, such success has not been without a price. Our most important resource, soldiers, paid the price - they were deployed and apart from their families nearly <u>140 days</u> last year.³ Additionally, their individual and collective combat skills have eroded accordingly. What impact will this high operational rate,

known as OPTEMPO, have on our overall readiness? What impact will these extensive "deployments" have on future enlistments and reenlistments?

In a statement to the House of Representative's National Security Committee on March 6, 1996: General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted, "A major challenge to near-term readiness is how to use the unique capabilities of the armed forces to advance our national interests in peacetime while maintaining our readiness to fight and win this nation's wars. To that end, we are incorporating better the significant capabilities that reside in our reserve forces. We are closely managing those low density, high leverage capabilities - including intelligence, mobility and support assets - needed to execute the full range of our military missions. I must point out, however, that readiness is a fragile commodity. Once the intricate processes of manning with quality personnel, and equipping and training units are disrupted, recovery often requires significant time and resources."4

Although the Army's primary mission remains fighting and winning the nation's wars, our National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement brings with it many challenging responsibilities. To meet these challenges, the Army must adapt its priorities to ensure it is maintaining forces capable of operating decisively across the entire spectrum of conflict. Whether peacekeeping, peacemaking, contingencies or conflict, the Army's forces must accommodate and support the National Military Strategy (NMS) and NSS.⁵

Strategists and planners are challenged to address uncertain requirements daily. Typical tasks include conducting major regional contingency operations, performing peace enforcement missions, supporting large-scale disaster relief, conducting humanitarian assistance operations, and/or countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁶

U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer spoke of the higher levels of uncertainty, when he recently advised: "Today's global security environment remains complex and full of unknowns. No longer are we confronted with a clear and present danger. Instead, we find ourselves facing a wide spectrum of unpredictable dangers and threats."⁷

Preparations for these "unpredictable dangers" are intensified by the execution costs - not only the dollar costs, but more importantly, the cost of combat readiness.

The dedication of U.S. forces to international peacekeeping chores at the expense of more conventional missions is the single most contentious National Security policy issue related to future force structure planning.⁸

National Security Strategy (NSS) - The Foundation

To accomplish the objectives and goals established in the NSS we must clearly understand the desired "ends" before we can develop "ways and means". Once we have established

this foundation, then we can begin to build a force structure which will provide the Army the ways and means to accomplish its missions.

Our NSS sets the goal of enlarging the community of market democracies, while deterring and limiting a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interest.⁹ President Clinton has stressed that the military's capability must be appropriately sized and postured to meet the diverse needs of that strategy, including the ability, in concert with regional allies, to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.¹⁰

The NSS asserts that (since the conclusion of the Cold War) our national security has been faced with a different set of threats. To protect and advance our national interest in the face of these threats, the United States requires a rapid deployable, robust, and flexible military force that can accomplish the following tasks:¹¹

 Deter and defeat aggression in major regional conflicts.

2) Provide a credible overseas presence, forwarddeployed or stationed in key overseas regions.

 Counter weapons of mass destruction: by deterring, defending against, and preventing use of such weapons.

Contribute to multilateral peace operations
 (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and related operations).

- 5) Support counter terrorism efforts.
- 6) Fight drug trafficking.

7) Support other national security objectives, including humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

These seven tasks must guide the redevelopment of our force structure. In my opinion, our Army (ways and means) is not presently capable of achieving the desired ends of our NSS.

What is the Status of the Total Army Today?

Current Force Structure and Organization

The Total Army consists of the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) force structure. Within the RC is the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR).¹² The ARNG consists of various units detachments, companies, battalions, brigades, and divisions - that have both state and federal missions. As the primary federal military reserve, the ARNG's mission is to "maintain properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency or as otherwise needed."¹³ This mission is usually accomplished with the full complement of ARNG units.

The ARNG's state mission is to "provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise required by state laws."¹⁴ This mission is normally supported by engineers and military police.¹⁵ During peacetime, the ARNG is commanded by the governors of 54 states, territories, and the District of Columbia. Although the National Guard Bureau has no command authority over the state ARNGs, it does have force structure, federal funding, and budget authority.

In contrast, the USAR does not have a state role; it is a federal reserve which provides trained units and individuals, as needed and required to augment the AC. Most USAR units are in the peacetime command of the United States Army Reserve Command, a subordinate command of the United States Forces Command (FORSCOM).

Currently, the Army has <u>only</u> ten AC divisions and eight ARNG (strategic reserve) divisions to execute and support the NMS and NSS. In addition, the ARNG has fifteen enhanced brigades, three separate combat units (consisting of two brigades and a scout group), and combat support units: such as engineers, military police, military intelligence, and transportation.¹⁶

Since 1989, eight AC and two ARNG divisions have been eliminated from the Total Army force structure. Additionally, total combat brigades have been reduced by 37

percent and end strength is down 35 and 26 percent respectively in the active and reserve components.¹⁷

Presently, there are 495,000 soldiers in the AC component and 575,000 in the reserve components (367,000 in the ARNG and 208,000 in the USAR). Of the 495,000 AC soldiers, only 435,000 fill force structure positions. A floating group of 60,000 are never available because they are trainees, in transit between jobs, in the hospital or in confinement. Approximately 125,000 soldiers are committed to fill infrastructure positions in schools, medical facilities, training centers, laboratories, installations, and headquarters staffs and agencies. That leaves <u>only</u> 310,000 soldiers to fill the combat, combat support, and combat service support requirements that can be deployed immediately to fulfill operational needs.¹⁸

These statistics, coupled with the approximate 138,000 AC soldiers either forward deployed (in Europe, Korea, and other overseas areas) or involved in one of the many multiple operations, presents a major challenge. In essence, over 40 percent of the Army's fighting forces are committed overseas. In Bosnia alone, the Army has committed about 30,000 soldiers in support of peacekeeping operations.¹⁹

No doubt, our Army is spread thin. And, given the proposed current reorganization and distribution of

capabilities among components, the ARNG vice the AC will have the bulk of the Army's operational capacity. They will have 50 percent of all combat units (including, almost 70 percent of all field artillery by FY 99), 40 percent of all combat support units, and 37 percent of all combat service support.²⁰ While in and of itself this structure may appear to be conducive to a post Cold War environment, I am not fully convinced it is the best mix - especially in light of the current NMS and NSS.

Threats

The United States currently faces an array of threats ranging from regional war to lesser conflicts. Given ongoing downsizing, this presents a major challenge, both in force structure and readiness.

As Lieutenant General James R. Clapper Jr., USAF, stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 17, 1995, "First, we face a high degree of uncertainty regarding the nature of the threats that will confront U.S. interests in the early 21st century, and second, the world's major militaries are in a decade of transition, the end points of which are not entirely clear."²¹

Current strategy is based on a two nearly simultaneous MRC scenarios, one in Korea and the other in the Persian Gulf. As such, we must maintain a combat ready force structure to successfully satisfy this strategy. The speed

and decisiveness with which Iraq's forces overwhelmed Kuwait and threatened derangement of the world's oil resources demands our preparedness to deploy at a moments notice and maintain a credible presence.²²

The U.S. challenge in the Persian Gulf, is to ensure regional stability, and thus ensure the unimpeded flow of oil to the industrialized democracies, and to defend our allies against the ideologically hostile and anti-Western regimes in Iran and Iraq.

In Korea, and generally throughout the Pacific, the U.S. has a long-standing security commitment that supports a wide range of military, political, and economic interests. Forces along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) serve to deter North Korea from future aggression and provide the "forward presence" needed to assure stability in that region.²³

Several other regimes in developing Third World nations are acquiring increasingly sophisticated weaponry, such as tanks, artillery systems, ballistic missiles, submarines, and weapons of mass destruction. These acquisitions, combined with changing political boundaries, enduring regional animosities, ethic rivalries, and religious intolerance, create a volatile situation that could endanger the vital interests of the United States.²⁴

If conflict prevails, it is more than likely that potential and future adversaries will not choose to fight

conventionally.²⁵ Rather, having learned from the Gulf War, future adversaries will adopt an indirect or asymmetric approach. Thus, the U.S. needs to be prepared for the full spectrum of scenarios, such as a protracted terrorist campaigns evoked by non-state actors, geo-economic blockades directed by an emerging peer competitor, and the introduction of weapons of mass destruction wielded by a rogue state.²⁶

Notwithstanding the number of potential threats, the <u>foremost</u> threat to the United States is our failure to provide the right force structure mix to support our current strategy. Without an adequate force structure, the U.S. will be unable to accomplish the missions outlined within our National Security Strategy. We will lack the capability to counter the threats described above!

Missions

The authority for all U.S. military missions is established in Title 10 of the Unites States Code. This federal code specifies that our military forces are charged with fighting as necessary to achieve decisive results, using appropriate force to win quickly with minimal casualties.

Title 10 further stipulates that the Army must be capable of "prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land" whenever and wherever committed.²⁷ In other words our Army must be capable of rapid reaction across a full spectrum of operations and be able to defeat the ground forces of potential adversaries.²⁸

What impact has Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and peacekeeping operations had on the Army's Title 10 responsibilities? More importantly, what impact should these operations have on force structure development?

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili stated in 1994, "My fear is we're becoming mesmerized by operations other than war, and we'll take our mind off what we're all about, to fight and win our nation's wars."²⁹

To reduce confusion between OOTW and peacekeeping operations, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has mandated the specific definition of these missions, thereby eliminating OOTW from the Army's doctrinal terminology. Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations defines:

a) Peace Operations as an umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two complementary,

predominately military activities (peacekeeping and peace enforcement).

b) Peacekeeping as military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach long term political settlement.

c) Peace Enforcement as the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

The vagueness and restraints inherent in peace operations runs counter to decisiveness and timely action. Peacekeeping requires specialized training, which is distinct from those skills that combat units must maintain to fight and win. Units prepared for peacekeeping are intrinsically less prepared for combat.³⁰

A report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) highlights the effects of peace operations on unit capabilities. Overall, the GAO discovered that it can take up to six months "for a ground combat unit to recover from a peace operation and become combat ready."³¹ This additional "train-up" time will undoubtedly impact a unit's readiness

and will assuredly effect the Army's ability to fulfill its Title 10 roles and missions.

A clear understanding of the negative aspects of peace operations upon combat readiness and a thorough understanding of peace operations is a must, if we are to develop the right force structure mix to carry out these missions.

What is the Basis for the Army's Current Force Structure?

Lessons Learned - Desert Shield/Storm

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, thousands of ARNG members were sent to the Persian Gulf area to perform both combat and support missions. However, none of the three ARNG "round-out" combat (armor and infantry) brigades that were activated, deployed. Instead of deploying these brigades with their assigned AC divisions, the Army "rounded -out" the AC divisions with other AC brigades.³² Why? Readiness!

At the time of mobilization, these ARNG "round-out" brigades estimated that they would need 28 to 42 days of post-mobilization training to be ready. In actuality, it took two brigades 91 and 106 days to complete required

training; however, an additional 24 days of post training activities would have been needed before deploying.³³

In September 1991, the GAO reported the Army had not adequately prepared the ARNG "round-out" brigades for deployment. Fact of the matter is that when these brigades were activated, many soldiers were not completely trained to do their jobs.³⁴ A number of noncommissioned officers were not adequately trained in leadership skills and had difficulty adjusting to the AC administrative systems for supply and personnel management. In addition, many ARNG soldiers had serious medical or dental conditions, which further delayed or prevented their deployment.³⁵

Following Desert Storm, Congress, DOD, and the Army mandated several programs to redress the "lessons learned" from the war regarding the ARNG. Among these programs was a new training strategy, developed by the Army - "Bold Shift" - refocused peacetime ARNG training goals <u>only</u> on mission essential tasks and gunnery at the platoon level and below. Congress also mandated the Active Army to Reserve Component (AC/RC) advisor program. This program required the AC to provide 5000 officers and noncommissioned officers to advise ARNG units. Finally, DOD announced the concept of enhanced brigades, which eliminated the "round-out" roles of the ARNG brigades to AC divisions.³⁶

Impact of the "Bottom-Up Review" (BUR)

In addition to Desert Shield/Storm lessons learned, the 1993 BUR also molded our current force structure. It outlined an overall defense strategy for the new era, cited specific threats to U.S. interest, set forth strategies for dealing with each potential threat, and specified force requirements. The BUR also identified the threat of largescale aggression posed simultaneously by two major regional powers.³⁷

On 14 September 1993, while testifying before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin summarized the BUR decisions into four groups:³⁸

Draw-down the force structure, to reduce our
 FY 1995-1999 budget requirements by a net \$24
 billion.

 Reduce infrastructure by cuts in headquarters and civilian personnel levels to realize an estimated savings of \$19 billion.

3) Reduce the modernization and investment programs by realigning the ballistic missile defense program (FY 95-99 savings of \$21 billion) and eliminating or "stretching-out" other modernization efforts (savings of another \$32 billion).

 Based on a reduced threat, save \$5 billion by expanding cooperation with the former Soviet Union.

The BUR concluded that the Total Army's force requirement would consist of 10 AC divisions, eight ARNG divisions, and 15 ARNG enhanced readiness combat brigades. DOD also envisioned the eight ARNG divisions <u>not being used</u> in the two MRC scenario, but rather, being used for rotational forces during extended crises and protracted peace operations. Furthermore, these forces could also be called upon to meet domestic requirements, such as natural disasters and civil unrest.³⁹

In 1996 the GAO revealed that the justification for 15 ARNG enhanced brigades, required by the BUR and supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were questionable - especially in light of identified requirements (by planners) for <u>less than</u> 10 enhanced brigades.⁴⁰ The report further stated that the eight ARNG combat divisions and three separate combat units were also <u>not required</u> to accomplish the two-conflict strategy, according to Army war planning documents.⁴¹

However, an analysis of these same war plans revealed that the Army still had shortfalls in support units (combat support and combat service support) to sustain the combat forces.⁴² The largest shortfall consisted of medical, engineer, quartermaster, transportation, and military police

units.⁴³ This same finding was revealed in the Desert Storm lessons learned!

Is the National Guard Currently Combat Ready?

CURRENT SITUATION

Based on the "Bold Shift" initiatives, there remains some question as to whether the ARNG is combat ready. First, most of the ARNG enhanced brigades have not come close to achieving the training proficiency established by the "Bold Shift" strategy.⁴⁴ These brigades have been unable to recruit and retain enough personnel to meet staffing goals, and many personnel are not sufficiently trained in their individual job and leadership skills. Even if the brigades make improvements in individual training, their 23 percent personnel loss rate would quickly obliterate such gains.⁴⁵ ARNG officials explain that many training problems are the result of the hundreds of missionessential tasks and sub-tasks for which soldiers should train during peacetime.⁴⁶

In response to such concerns, the Army revised the "Bold Shift" strategy and goals in January 1995. The ARNG (armor and infantry) brigade mission essential task list, which previously listed between 6 and 19 tasks, was reduced

to 3 - attack, defend, and movement to contact. The definition of platoon proficiency was changed from "fully trained in all critical tasks" to "fully or partially trained in at least 70 percent of the critical tasks." A minimum annual training attendance of <u>only</u> 75 percent is now required before a unit can be evaluated at the fully or partially trained level.⁴⁷

Second, the Active Component to Reserve Component (AC/RC) advisor program has been hindered by several factors:⁴⁸

a) an ambiguous definition of the advisers' role.

b) poor communication between the AC advisers, ARNG brigades, and other ARNG officials, causing confusion and disagreement over training goals.

c) difficult working relationships.

The relationship between the AC advisers and the ARNG continues to be characterized by a "we/they" environment. If not improved, this situation could undermine prospects for significant improvement in the ARNG brigades' ability to conduct successful combat operations.⁴⁹ For example, when AC advisers attempt to correct training problems, ARNG units are not responsive. Since ARNG units are commanded by their respective state governors, they are not obligated to adopt AC advisers' suggestions. According to some AC officials,

the advisers' effectiveness is driven primarily by their working relationship with the brigades.⁵⁰

Third, it is highly uncertain whether the ARNG mechanized infantry and armor brigades can be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization. One study conducted by the RAND Corporation and the Army Inspector General estimated that as many as 154 days could be required to prepare the brigades to deploy.

The RAND Corporation reported that nationally, state demands on the ARNG Guard are not significant. Furthermore, they concluded that even in a peak use year, state missions would not require a large portion of the ARNG and therefore should not be used as a basis for sizing the ARNG force structure.⁵¹

The GAO concludes that most of the deficiencies are management problems that are not likely to be corrected by a change in strategy. Although the ARNG has downsized, the GAO's analysis shows that the combat forces may still be too large for projected war requirements.⁵²

Analysis Summary

This analysis highlights the facts that our <u>ways and</u> <u>means</u> (our Army) is not optimally structured to achieve the desired <u>ends</u> of our NSS. The dedication of U.S. forces to

international peacekeeping chores has reduced our combat readiness and increased our personnel OPTEMPO. Our current force structure is *broken* and not capable of meeting all our nation's demands; and, the ARNG's combat readiness and role appears to be still questionable. Recommendations by the QDR will provide us the catalyst to change the Total Army force structure and allow us the opportunity to better execute our Title 10 responsibilities. However, we need to go that "extra mile". We need to make some major shifts in force structure mix to maximize our force. The following recommendations will provide a balance between AC and ARNG forces, near-term and future readiness, and provide our nation a combat ready organization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Total Army:

1) Must be sized and shaped to meet the military requirements of the National Security Strategy.

2) Must maintain the capability to devastate an aggressor should it threaten either our national interests or those of our allies.

3) Must ensure that ARNG units are fully incorporated into all relevant operational war plans and actually used in the execution of those plans.

4) Must reduce ARNG forces and redesign the Total Force in response to new global realities.

Active Component:

1) The United States interest will always be challenged by terrorists, unconventional forces, and weapons of mass destruction. Overwhelming conventional forces cannot counter this spectrum of threats. The AC should increase the unconventional force structure to respond to a new range of threats, such as, increase counter-terrorist forces and a Special Forces Group.

2) Include peace enforcement as a mission essential task.

Army National Guard:

 Eliminate <u>all</u> eight ARNG divisions, which permits the "buy back" of two AC units. Justification:

a. These ARNG divisions are not required for any current war plans.

b. The ARNG divisions are not combat ready. Given fiscal realities, train-up time, and rapid deployment criteria, they may never be. Consider the <u>failures</u> of the "Bold Shift" training program, the AC/RC advisor program, and the investigations by the GAO!

c. DOD does not envision using ARNG divisions during the two-MRC scenario; however, skilled support .

personnel and equipment can be used to fill non-divisional support needs.

d. The annual operating cost ratio between ARNG and AC divisions is about 4 to 1.⁵³ "Buying back" two AC units (one Special Forces Group and one Armored Division) meets the NSS requirements of having robust and flexible forces. These two new AC units will provide a <u>credible</u> <u>overseas presence, will be forward deployed</u> (Special Forces Group in Germany), and <u>stationed in key overseas regions</u> (Armored Division in Kuwait). This increased AC force could also reduce the current very high soldier deployment rate, and possibly improve reenlistment goals for the AC and for the ARNG!

2) Continue TRADOC's assessment of a proposal to form two AC/RC <u>combat</u> divisions by putting six enhanced brigades under two AC division headquarters. This integrated division concept will assign AC officers to key leadership and staff positions in ARNG divisions and brigades. This superb initiative would:

a. Improve and enhance the relationship between the AC and ARNG, and fix the management problems cited by the GAO.

b. Improve understanding and ensure proper training for mission essential task.

c. Functionally align and fix the ARNG "civilian" administrative, supply, and personnel problems, which were discovered during mobilization for Desert Shield.

d. Reduce the AC overall manpower requirements for the AC/RC advisor program.

3) The remaining 12 ARNG units (9 enhanced brigades, 2 separate brigades, and scout group) should be given the <u>primary</u> mission essential task of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping requires specialized training distinct from combat skills. Assigning this mission to the ARNG will eliminate duplication of capabilities and facilitate a more precise delineation of roles and functions between the AC and ARNG.

Organize these units as separate independent brigades, each containing one battalion of:

- a. Quartermaster
- b. Transportation
- c. Military Police
- d. Engineers
- e. Service Support (including medical)

This ARNG force structure would provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies, would functionally align unit capabilities to respond appropriately and effectively to peacekeeping missions

abroad, and, most importantly, would fill the force structure shortages recognized during the Persian Gulf War.

Additionally, this ARNG force structure will provide "citizen soldiers" the opportunity to enlist into occupations, such as military police, which could greatly enhance their civilian employment opportunities. This employment benefit could alleviate the current low ARNG enlistment rate and reduce the 23 percent personnel loss rate. This ARNG personnel loss rate is directly linked to civilian job security. By federal law, employers cannot jeopardize ARNG soldiers' civilian jobs. However, there are other ways, such as missed promotion opportunities, which allows employers the ability to effect their ARNG employees job security and potential.

4) The ARNG must maintain contact with local citizens by continuing the federal government's program that has added several domestic initiatives to the ARNG federally funded state missions. For example, newly acquired initiatives include drug interdiction and counter-drug activities, drug demand reduction programs, medical assistance in under served areas, and the Civilian Youth Opportunities program.⁵⁴

CONCLUSION

The Army's requirement to accomplish its mission is "non-negotiable". The President, Congress, and the American people do not question the Army's readiness to deploy when crisis erupts. It is an expectation borne of past performances.

The <u>Total Army</u> must be capable of rapid reaction across a full spectrum of operations: from general war to limited war, to the engagement of paramilitary forces, to peace operations, and to disaster relief. This recommended force structure maintains sufficient conventional military strength to continue deterrence of interstate conventional war and regional powers, while simultaneously incorporating new capabilities that can prevent and defeat asymmetrical threats.

Though peacekeeping operations can be justified as a means of keeping wars from starting, they must be balanced against capability. The Army must be capable of decisively winning in combat and maintaining a credible force.

The end of the Cold War and resultant budgetary pressures have provided both the opportunity and the incentive to reassess defense needs through processes like the QDR. Because the ARNG's combat forces exceed projected war requirements and DOD's analysis indicates a shortage of

support forces, it is appropriate for the Army to convert ARNG combat forces to peacekeeping and support roles.

Finally, this recommended force structure will accomplish the goals set forth in our <u>foundation</u> - the National Security Strategy. It allows the Army to achieve balance among AC and ARNG forces, near-term and future readiness, and a better quality of life for our soldiers and their families.

End Notes

¹Eric K. Shinseki, LTG, "The Army's Unique Contribution to the Nation and the Joint Team," Army (October 1996): 120.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴John M. Shalikashivili, General, "The Force Is As Lean As Risk Allows," Defense Issues Volume 11, no.38: 13.

⁵Shinseki, 122.

⁶William W. Mendel and Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Planning For a New Threat Environment," <u>Landpower Essay Series</u>, no. 96-6 (July 1996): 3.

⁷Dennis J. Reimer, General, "U.S. Army Maintaining a Solid Framework While Building for the Future," <u>Army</u> (October 1995): 24.

⁸Robert P. Haffa, Jr., "A New Look At the Bottom-Up Review: Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces for a New Century," <u>Strategic</u> Review (Winter 1996): 25.

⁹A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. (Washington: The White House), 2.

¹⁰Ibid., 11.

¹¹Ibid., 13.

¹²Department of Defense civilian employees working for the Army are also considered part of the Total Army, however, for purposes of this SRP discussion will include military only.

¹³National Guard Bureau, <u>1996 Posture Statement</u> (Washington D.C., 1996), 1.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 1995), 3.

¹⁶General Accounting Office, <u>Army National Guard: Validate</u> <u>Requirements for Combat Forces and Size Those Forces Accordingly</u> (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 1996), 2.

¹⁷Association of the United States Army (AUSA), "Have We Drawn the Army Down Too Far?" Defense Report (1996):3.

¹⁸AUSA, 3.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Reimer, 1.

²¹Brian J. Dunn, "Peace Enforcement: The Mythical Mission," <u>Army</u> Volume 46, no. 11 (AUSA: Nov 1996), 12. ²²Frederick J. Kroesen, "The United States Army - Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," <u>Land Power Essay Series</u>, No. 96-3 (AUSA: April 1996): 2. ²³Haffa, 29. ²⁴Shinseki, 122. ²⁵Ibid. ²⁶Ibid., 24. ²⁷Kroesen, 2. ²⁸Ibid. ²⁹Dunn, 12.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹GAO March 1996, 9.

³²General Accounting Office, <u>National Guard: Peacetime Training</u> <u>Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War</u> (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1991), 2.

³³General Accounting Office, <u>Army National Guard: Combat Brigades'</u> <u>Ability to Be Ready for War In 90 days Is Uncertain</u> (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, June 1995), 2.

³⁴GAO September 1991., 3. Large numbers of soldiers in the three ARNG "roundout" brigades had not been completely trained during peacetime to do their assigned jobs. After they were activated, about 8 percent in two of the brigades had to attend formal schooling in over 42 different military occupation specialties.

³⁵Ibid., 4. When these three ARNG "roundout" brigades reported to their mobilization stations, more than 4,000 (about 33 percent) of them had either dental conditions or incomplete dental records that under Army regulations prevented them from being deployed. Others, most of whom were over age 40, suffered from medical conditions such as ulcers and chronic asthma that likewise made them nondeployable.

³⁶GAO June 1995, 2.

³⁷Ibid., 1.

³⁸Les Aspin, "Restructuring Forces for a New Era," <u>Defense Issues</u> Volume 8, no. 57 (Washington: American Forces Information Service, September 1993): 4.

³⁹GAO March 1996., 1. ⁴⁰GAO March 1996, 4. ⁴¹Ibid.
⁴²GAO March 1995, 2.
⁴³Ibid., 5.

⁴⁴GAO June 1995, 4. During 1993 the brigades achieved fully trained status in about 14 percent of platoon level mission essential tasks. Only 31 percent met the gunnery standard (tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles). The brigades reported that 67 percent met gunnery standards for 1994, but other goals were the same as 1993. This trend had continued through 1996.

⁴⁵GAO March 1996, 3.
⁴⁶Ibid., 4.
⁴⁷Ibid.
⁴⁸Ibid., 3.
⁴⁹Ibid., 3.
⁵⁰Ibid., 5.
⁵¹Ibid., 7.
⁵²Ibid.

⁵³In 1996, operational costs for the eight ARNG divisions was approximately \$1.5 billion, less than \$200 million per division. In comparison, operating costs for AC divisions ranged from \$950 - \$975 million per division, more than four times the cost of a ARNG division. Cost estimates were provided by the National Guard Bureau Research and Staff Support Office and were derived from the Cost and Economic Analysis Center model.

⁵⁴Ibid., 6.

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