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ADAPTIVE JOINT FORCE PACKAGING

BY

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ABSTRACT

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As we look to the future, a future of constrained resources, the mandate for interoperability, jointness, and adaptiveness is clear. Adaptive Joint Force Packaging is simply, the blending of packaged joint forces and adapting those forces to specific theater requirements. History has suggested that this is truly not a new concept, rather a concept that has and will require JTF Commanders to adapt joint forces to theater requirements. A few examples include--the 1942 Doolittle raid on Tokyo, Operation Torch in 1943, Operations Neptune/Overlord in 1944, Operation Earnest Will/Prime chance in 1987-1988, and Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994 and recent Atlantic Command Joint Training Exercises. As the United States continues to evolve as a CONUS based power projection nation, the requirements for ships and Amphibious Assault Aircraft Carriers will increase significantly to support joint force packages. The use of such platforms will become less relegated to a single service and will support flexible force packages tailored to specific theater requirements as directed by the respective CINCs.

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Adaptive Joint Force Packaging

*"Attack through voids, darkness, and over unknown routes from where the enemy does not expect you...and strike as swiftly as a falcon strikes its target. It surely breaks the back of its prey for the reason that it awaits the right moment to strike. Its movement is regulated."*¹

Sun Tzu--500 B.C.

At 0820 hours, April 18, 1942, the pilot pressed the power levers forward. The engines delayed for an instant-- then rumbled into an exhilarating roar. A roar that announced the radial engine's readiness to pull the aircraft forward. The pilot had to lean harder on the brakes as they creaked and moaned. As the aircraft inched forward in a barely restrained fashion, left side then the right, the pilot pressed harder on the brakes and the aircraft held steady. On the Flight Deck of the Aircraft Carrier USS Hornet, the Landing Signal Officer dipped his flags-- signaling the aircraft to go. Timing was critical, as the sea was quite rough and the deck was pitching in excess of 15 degrees. The aircraft had to clear the platform at its high point or it would most assuredly have not cleared the ocean surface.

With a deck run less than 150 feet the aircraft was airborne in a healthy ascent. Thus, LTC Jimmy Doolittle's B-25 Mitchell Bomber weighing in excess of 15 tons was enroute to its objective--military facilities in Tokyo Japan. He was followed by 15 additional B-25s to bomb military targets in Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe on the Island of Honshu, Japan.

The bombing of Japan was of little tactical significance. A mere 16 tons of bombs were dropped, and the resultant physical damage was minimal. But, strategically, it was a major psychological blow against the Empire of Japan and a psychological uplift for the United States. The Japanese High Command now had to commit additional Tactical Fighter Groups to the defense of the homeland. Additionally, a more aggressive commitment of sea pickets was required to assure that additional attacks were countered. Consequently, critical combat elements necessary for projecting the empire's aggressive offensive operations in the Pacific Theater had to be diverted from the fight.²

The only options for such a strike in 1942 involved the use of long range medium bombers. Naval strike aircraft did not have the range nor requisite ordnance carrying

capabilities. The only available means at our disposal for such a mission was the B-25 Mitchell Medium Bomber. The concept was envisioned shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor and during the ensuing three month period, Army Air Forces pilots were trained in excruciating detail for the mission.³

Thus, the concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packaging was born. Certainly, given the proper time, Naval Aviators could have been trained for the mission. But, the question was-- "which was easier, more efficient, and had a higher probability of success? . . . training pilots or adapting trained pilots for the mission?"

Blending and Adapting Tailored Force Packages to Theater Requirements

In this paper I will explore the concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packaging within the framework of emerging operational concepts contained in Joint Vision 2010-- Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Focused Logistics, and Full Dimensional Protection. The base parameter of Adaptive Joint Force Packaging is simply, a joint concept of interoperability. It underwrites the blending of tailored forces and their adaptation to specific theater requirements.

Additionally, I will explore future requirements for Amphibious Assault Aircraft Carriers to support Joint Force Packages in view of the Joint Vision 2010 tenets. Presently, the Department of Defense Modernization Plan is to provide amphibious lift for 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigade equivalents. This plan does not provide for sister service requirements and, consequently, leaves a significant shortfall for the future.

The entire amphibious fleet is currently composed of three classes of the big-deck amphibious ships and two amphibious command ships. The three classes of assault ships include the Iwo Jima Class Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH), the Tarawa Class Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA), and the Wasp Class Landing Helicopter Deck (LHD). The navy has three LPHs, five LHAs, and six LHDs.⁴ Of the fourteen ships suitable and appropriate for use by an aviation task force, only nine of the big-deck amphibious ships are allocated for planning against a major regional contingency.⁵

Historical Backdrop

Current Warfighting Doctrine of the Armed Services acknowledges that world political changes and affordability

have reduced US access to land bases in forward areas near the most likely crisis regions. This has increased the importance of military operations that can capitalize on sea bases and land lodgements that, once synchronized, project land and air combat power deep into the region.⁶ Not unlike the situation that great and innovative leaders that have preceded us faced, we are confronted with a period of constrained resources and continued reductions in the defense budget.

As the issues abutting the Quadrennial Defense Review continue to fester, debates attacking redundancy in capabilities continue to dominate discussions on Capitol Hill. The Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force must innovate. In order to assure the continued security of the United States, while continuing to execute a National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, the services must take every opportunity to work together to enhance our overall defensive posture. In an effort to work together, joint doctrine must continue to build on the collective knowledge and wisdom gained through recent operations, numerous exercises and a deliberate process of informed reasoning. Reams of service specific doctrinal discussions

reek of service parochialism and oneupsmanship in a time that we can ill afford it. But, Joint Vision 2010 is a guiding light for a coherent view of the future and outlines the implications for joint forces and joint operations. It articulates the holistic approach for prompt and sustained operations across the spectrum of conflict.

History is replete with examples whereby forces not normally trained for operations in the littoral region have executed missions very successfully. It is my belief that joint warfare draws upon the unique capabilities of each service while integrating them to reap the synergistic effects of their vested respective combat power.

Most recently, during Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994, this concept was underwritten with U.S. Army Forces operating from Navy Amphibious Ships. "The success of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti was due to joint training, which contributed to the readiness of our forces, and adaptive joint force packaging, which facilitated the flexibility of our overall planning."⁷ The Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander considered using other rotary wing lift and attack assets, but was faced with the same challenges that others faced prior to the Doolittle Raid. Which course of

action was easier, more efficient, and had a higher probability of success?

We cannot become embroiled in arguments when key decisions involving the National Will are at stake. Why argue about valid courses of action? Additional time should certainly be allocated to high risk joint operations where joint training has not been conducted. Discussion is warranted when operations are sophisticated and the only rationale for a decision involves "service parochialism."

During the hostage rescue attempt in Tehran, a decision was made to use pilots based solely on the fact that they knew how to fly from naval vessels. They had minimal training in the aircraft type and had virtually no experience conducting long range penetration missions in arid desert environments. A select group of pilots was originally selected for the mission. They were highly trained under all conditions of operations. Of particular importance, the Forward Support Base and Objective Areas were established in the same arid desert environments. Yet, the pilots were relieved of supporting the mission for questionable reasons and replaced by the pilots with no experience in the aircraft and environment in which they

were expected to operate.⁸ Again the results are of historical significance and had devastating results on the morale of the U.S. Military--not to mention National Will and prestige.

Consider the largest amphibious operation in history-- Operation Neptune/Overlord. Perhaps the greatest shortcoming in the planning phase was the lack of Landing Craft. The Allied Forces had Landing Craft at their disposal, but not enough nor were they of the right type. This issue was to stymie the planning phase of this mission for nearly two years. It was not until three shallow-draft oilers used on Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela were procured and converted to prototypes of the Landing Ship Tank (LST) that a valid concept of Landing Craft design was discovered. In this case, the naval vessels had to be adapted to the assault force. The requisite forces for the amphibious assault were predominately heavy joint and combined forces and the naval vessels had to accommodate these forces.⁹

Even prior to Neptune/Overlord, existing LSTs were modified with flight decks to facilitate light observation aircraft. During Operation Torch and subsequently the Sicilian Campaign, aerial observation aircraft supporting

both field commanders and artillery units had to operate from sea-based platforms. The first LST was converted in 36 hours. It had a runway 12 feet wide by 200 feet long. It carried 8 light planes--two on the flight deck, two on the main deck and four disassembled. The versatility of the flat-topped LST facilitated observation aircraft support effectively in the Mediterranean.¹⁰

Again during Operation Earnest Will/Operation Prime Chance in 1987-88, the JTF Commander had to select the most adaptive forces to perform low level reconnaissance operations to locate and interdict Iranian mine laying boats and ships in the Persian Gulf. He selected light Special Operations attack helicopters based upon requisite capabilities to perform the mission. They were adapted for maritime/shipboard operations. The mission was accomplished effectively and efficiently with no loss to U.S. Forces. During this operation, technological sophistication was outweighed by force adaptiveness. Essentially, Vietnam era aircraft were adapted to low level search, interdiction, and destruction missions.

Joint Force Package Dominant Maneuver

"A good plan violently executed NOW is better than a perfect plan executed next week..."

General George S. Patton
War as I Knew It

...the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea and space forces to accomplish assigned operational tasks. --Joint Vision 2010

Perhaps the Star Ship Enterprise under Captain Kirk's leadership served as a sterling example for deploying an Adaptive Joint Force Package--military wherewithal of the fourth millennium--in support of a National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. It was always evident that the Enterprise was on its own, there were other Starships, but, most often they were not in a posture to provide mutual support. As with Joint Vision 2010, the Enterprise was required to maneuver in terms of light years to precisely engage hostile forces, operate under a full spectrum of possibilities, sustain itself, and protect its forces.

With the efficacy of an Adaptive Joint Jorce Package whereby the JTF Commander employs a tailored force package composed of Navy, Army, Air Force and Marine combat forces aboard Amphibious Assault Ships the power projection force is perhaps the most responsive option. We will continue to

realize that Full Spectrum Dominance is predicated by timing and initiative. Adequate strategic air assets are simply too costly.

Amphibious lift forces provide perhaps the most flexible and adaptive combined response capability today. This is particularly important in littoral regions where theater logistical facilities are austere. Time and again, the American public has been left with the perception that strategic airlift is the workhorse of modern warfare, but we must remember that 90% of our combat power during Operation Desert Shield/Storm was delivered by ships.

Perhaps the 121 days that we used to prepare to execute the attack may have been optimal during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It has been debated extensively. The fact of the matter is that we faced a commander who neither had a viable strategic thought, nor a strategic plan. We probably will not face a similar threat in a similar scenario any time soon.

Most of the future threats to the United States and its vital interests are asymmetrical in nature. The continuum of threats will extend from deterring a third world country's ability to employ weapons of mass destruction to

fighting and winning major regional conflicts which are sponsored by nations like Iraq, Iran and North Korea. We will generally be militarily superior in all respects to each nation in question. However, the infrastructure of our modern combat power--large fuel and ammunition dumps, ships waiting for days to unload cargo and crowded assembly areas will present high value targets.¹¹ Force protection, while in a deployed status, is a key element and most certainly is one of national interest. Particularly during the information age where public opinion can be instantly changed by an unexpected event.

Precision Engagement

...a system of systems that enables joint forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess the level of success, and retain the flexibility to re-engage with precision when required.. Joint Vision 2010

Precisely engaging and defeating an enemy force is a mandate if we pursue Full Spectrum Dominance. Joint Vision 2010 embodies the elements for success on the modern battlefield and shaping that battlefield sets the

conditions. It is certainly a precursor for the JTF Commander's Intent.

Shaping the battlefield, particularly in a littoral region, will continue to be a challenge for the JTF Commander who is plagued with ambiguous intelligence. He or she will most assuredly will require the best and most timely means for command and control warfare (C2W), and the communications systems available aboard an Amphibious Assault Aircraft Carrier are certainly up to the task. Present and future command and control systems organic to the Amphibious Carrier fleet are state of the art. They will continue to provide for instantaneous communications and digital intelligence links.

Striking a hostile target via a littoral provides the Joint Task Force Commander with balance and the flexibility to attack over the most covered and concealed route with multiple available options. This is a necessity in applying high-intensity, precision strike offensive power at the time and place of our choosing.¹² A Joint Task Force deploying from Amphibious Assault Ships offers unlimited mobility and a means by which integrated joint operations can be

maintained at the requisite OPTEMPO to assure bold aggressive combat operations.

The scenario that I will use within this paper involves the evaluation, via computer simulation, of an independent operational maneuver of an Army Aviation Task Force operating from an Amphibious Assault Carrier. This scenario is an unclassified simulation that was conducted combining the effects of a fictitious but plausible threat against the capabilities of the AH-64D (Longbow) Attack Helicopter Battalion. The attack helicopter task force in this scenario is part of an adaptive joint force package.

SCENARIO

Following several days of heightened tension, the hostile country of Bursunto launches a coordinated full scale attack against the peace loving democratic country of Anuldi. Bursunto's decision to launch an unprovoked attack on the Republic of Anuldi (ROA) draws worldwide condemnation and alienates it from its traditional allies. Missile strikes against ROA/US airfields mark the initiation of hostilities. Minutes later, the first wave of Bursunto Air Force aircraft cross the border, followed by a massive artillery barrage.

Bursunto's attacks take a heavy toll during the early days of the war on both military personnel and civilians. The Bursunto National Army (BNA) ground advance is hampered by an inability to establish and maintain breach lanes through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and their inability to stabilize a bridgehead across the Green River. On D+4, the ROA commits the 111th Mech Corps into a breakthrough in the Central Approach. The 111th's lead brigades move fairly rapidly through the DMZ, but then stall 15 kilometers (KM) inside Anuldi. A combined counterattack by the ROA/US takes the BNA by surprise and destroys the bulk of their forces, causing the BNA to go into hasty defensive positions. One of Bursunto's operational centers of gravity is its reserve mechanized and armor units which have the flexibility to react to major penetrations across the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT). Destroying or fixing these units is essential to a successful advance into Bursunto. With no ability to counterattack against forward penetrations of its forward defensive belt, Bursunto will not be able to stop the momentum of a ROA/US attack and their defensive scheme is doomed.

The ROA is defending with three infantry corps deployed along the FLOT, one corps defending the southwestern coastal region and one corps defending the southeastern coastal region. Infantry divisions in the 1st tactical echelon are approximately 40-50% strength. The 212th Armor brigade remains in the Basonti area and is the only 2d echelon tank-heavy counterattack force available that can play an important role in the BNA's defense.

The 212th Armor brigade has not been committed into the fight, but is expected to begin movement within the next 24 hours. The brigade remains under limited air defense protection of the Army. Approximately 20% of the Bursunto Air Force's SA-2 and SA-3 sites remain operational, with very few sites functioning along either coast. Approximately 60% of the radar guided AAA sites (220) providing air defense for Bursunto remain operational. Although the ROA/US attrited the radar guided Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) sites in the Bursunto port areas, there are still significant numbers of these systems remaining. Optically guided AAA is still active throughout Bursunto and with ground force units. The number of operational

optically guided AAA decreases steadily as one moves towards the north.

The primary missions of the Bursunto Navy in the early stages of the war were to insert Special Operations Forces (SOF), interdict sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and protect the Bursunto coastline. In the days that followed, combat surface ships only attempted to gain local sea control for limited periods of time in support of specific missions. As the war progressed, mining of Bursunto Navy ports, ROA/US air superiority, and the influx of US Naval assets into theater quickly degraded the effectiveness of the Bursunto Navy. Combat losses of both Bursunto Navy surface and sub-surface vessels mounted rapidly as a result of ROA/US's effort to expand their control of the seas around the peninsula.

Bursunto continues to maintain its defensive posture across the entire front. The ROA and US National Command Authorities (NCA) have accepted the risk that Bursunto might employ their reserve operational echelon and sacrifice their homeland in order to unite Bursunto and Anuldi. It is therefore essential to destroy the 212th Armor Brigade

before conducting a counteroffensive in order to reduce the threat of Bursunto committing their operational reserve.

A Combat Aviation Brigade has been given the mission to conduct deep operations to destroy the 212th Armor Brigade in Engagement Area (EA) SPLASH during the night of D+5. Destruction is defined as rendering the force incapable of continuing any significant military mission. The aviation brigade commander will use one Longbow attack helicopter battalion for the mission. The battalion is based on the USS ESSEX (Wasp Class Amphibious Assault Ship) which will deploy into Bursunto waters. The ship will remain approximately 50 nautical miles (NM) off the coast and loiter until mission completion. In an effort to maximize the survivability of the battalions assets, confirm target resolution, and verify target specificity prior to committing the entire force, the Longbow battalion will conduct phased deep operations.

PENETRATION & MANEUVER

This ingress analysis examines the ability of a Longbow battalion to penetrate Bursunto first echelon divisions (Direct Approach) and maneuver 125 kilometers from the FLOT

to arrive with sufficient combat power to destroy the 212th Armor Brigade in EA SPLASH compared to employing a coastal penetration (Indirect Approach) to arrive with sufficient combat power to destroy the same threat in the same EA. This analysis also examines what effects threat air defense systems have on the Longbow attack helicopter battalion, and reports the results of the simulation.

Penetration of a coastline or FLOT requires detailed coordination and support from all joint and combined arms. For both deep attack simulations the Longbow attack helicopter battalion conducted a penetration using massed artillery fires, other attack helicopters, or USAF and Navy aircraft to create a gap in the enemy's defenses.

Considering the capabilities of the Bursunto Air Defense System, the fact that the attack is conducted at night, "anti-aircraft artillery and shoulder fired surface to air missiles along the coast are limited in their ability to acquire the aircraft visually."¹³


Based on the capabilities of the aircraft and the enemy, a single ingress route was chosen for both the direct approach and the coastal penetration. Additionally, the Longbow battalion used a single flight to penetrate the

FLOT/coast in both attacks. The flight mode used was low and fast in an effort to avoid enemy radars, enhance the battalion's survivability, and improve its prospects of maintaining stealth and surprise.

Two scenarios were evaluated for the conduct of this exercise. Scenario one involved a Longbow attack helicopter battalion penetrating Bursunto first echelon divisions (Direct Approach) by fire and maneuvering 125 kilometers to destroy the 212th Armor Brigade in EA SPLASH. The second scenario evaluated a coastal penetration (indirect approach) to destroy the same threat in the same EA.

In scenario one, the AH-64D losses were taken during the penetration and the initial occupation of the battle position. Use of the direct approach resulted in the lost of two AH-64Ds.

In scenario two, the Longbow battalion departed the ship and ingressed landfall by stealth. The difference in the number of AH-64Ds lost during the penetration was the result of the variation between the number of air defense systems. Thus, the Longbow battalion reaches the battle position with 19 AH-64Ds in scenario two as opposed to 17 AH-64Ds in scenario one.¹⁴



The JTF commander's decision to use an adaptive joint force package to execute an attack from the sea with Army Attack Helicopters facilitated mission accomplishment with fewer combat losses. Attacking enemy objectives via unexpected routes paid dividend through saved lives and resources.

Sustaining the Joint Force Package

The first relatively large scale adaptive joint force package used during the present millennium was undertaken by William of Normandy when he invaded England. The Normans

excelled in amphibious warfare, and were known to pay serious attention to their ability to transport an army and its provisions by sea. They epitomized their Viking heritage as warriors who knew the value of inserting a military force from the sea and provisioning it through the same.

On September 27, 1066, William of Normandy with approximately 10,000 warriors including heavy infantry, cavalry, archers, spearmen, grooms, camp followers, 3,000 animals, and the requisite supplies for the conquest of England were loaded aboard approximately 700 ships. They deployed from Normandy and landed successfully on a hostile shore ready to fight. William's ensuing victory over Harold of Wessex at Hastings on October 14, 1066 serves as testimony to the Norman's tactical and most certainly logistical prowess.

At Hastings as well as many other historical military operations the grooms and camp followers were key elements in the sustainment package. It was their responsibility to manage the camp as a base of sustainment. They oversaw the protection of supplies and much of the food items consumed by the warriors.¹⁵

Not unlike Williams's plan for logistical support, the primary vestige of sustaining the force contained in Joint Vision 2010 incorporates the concept of Focused Logistics. A tailored joint force package is sustained in the same fashion as underwritten by Joint Pub 4-0 with modular support packages tailored to support the operational commander the primary focus. The "fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations"¹⁶ is the primer of theater logistics for the future.

NDP 1, Naval Warfare, underwrites the logistic corollary to the principles of war--responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability, sustainability and survivability. An Adaptive Joint Force Package must adhere to each discipline, but it cannot always provide for an equal balance for each of the principles. For the vary nature of an Adaptive/Flexible Force Package is simply that--adaptable and flexible. It must remain

flexible to execute the Joint Task Force Commander's Intent without compromise to mission success.

Focused Logistics in the littoral battlespace dictates adherence to joint logistical precepts. Amphibious Assault Carriers support and operate to support attacks on airborne, afloat, and ashore targets which threaten our use of the sea.¹⁷ Within this regime, these platforms are able to function as self-contained attack units. This is due to the improved vehicle facilities and larger more comfortable crew spaces of our modernized amphibious fleet.¹⁸

The only major drawback to sustainment aboard ship is the joint forces limited access to limited critical spare parts for unscheduled maintenance. This would be a problem isolated to unique Adaptive Joint Force Packages whereby Army Attack Helicopters operate from Amphibious Assault Ships. However, the advanced communications ability contained aboard Amphibious Assault Ships provide for timely coordination and requisitioning of critical components and end items which can be prestaged.

The greatest advantage to sustaining an Adaptive Joint Force Package is the inherent connectivity to Combat Service Support (CSS) afloat. Forward deployed naval forces carry

initial sustainment stocks to support operations and they are "supported by an in-place, efficient functioning logistic system constantly flowing materiel and logistic support that needs only to expand its flow to accommodate increases in operating tempo and the assimilation of additional forces."¹⁹ The bottom line is that the pipeline is in place.

Full-Dimensional Protection

"The primary prerequisite for full-dimensional protection will be control of the battlespace to ensure our forces can maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver and engagement, while providing multi-layered defenses for our forces and facilities at all levels."²⁰ As we enter the next millennium, we enter the second chapter of the information age. An age whereby the American public is informed of tactical outcomes almost immediately, and perhaps almost as quickly as the Joint Force Commander. We can ill afford combat losses whereby American forces are placed unnecessarily in harm's way.

Consider the American casualties at Mogadishu International Airport in 1993. The airport was an easy target for insurgent Somalis. They routinely placed mortar

fire on American forces and critical equipment positioned within the perimeter of the airport. Several casualties resulted.²¹ These forces could have operated from an Amphibious Assault Carrier which would have provided greater force protection, protection that would most assuredly have averted the taking of unnecessary casualties.

The Navy is structured to project and sustain combat power around the globe. It is routinely and continuously deployed. The seven battle groups in each of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets as well as twelve amphibious ready groups are the right ships for the job and are positioned to react to any scenario.²² Within each fleet are the Amphibious Assault Ships which are the hallmarks of a relatively robust force entry and sustainment capability.

The Future

As we look to the future, a future of constrained resources, the mandate for interoperability, jointness, and adaptiveness is clear. History has suggested that Adaptive Joint Force Packaging is truly not a new concept, rather, a concept that has and will require JTF Commanders to adapt joint forces to theater requirements. Forward From the Sea, the Navy's Joint Vision for the future, advocates that "the

changing strategic landscape--away from having to deal with a global maritime threat and toward projecting power and influence across the sea in response to regional challenges...are ready and positioned to respond to the wide range of contingencies and are available to participate in allied exercises, which are the bedrock of interoperability."²³ Joint Vision 2010 underwrites "Flexible Force Packaging", a concept that embraces that "adaptation to this increasingly lethal battlespace will be warranted. These adaptations are likely to take forms of increased stealth, mobility, dispersion and pursuit of a higher tempo of operations among elements within the battlespace."²⁴

In summary, Adaptive Joint Force Packaging involves the blending of two ingredients--packaging forces and adapting those forces to specific theater requirements. It does not require major modifications to service organizations, and it does not inhibit the services' training and readiness prerogatives. "Future military success will depend on maintaining a system of joint warfare that draws upon the unique strengths of each service, while providing the means

for effectively integrating them to achieve the full combat potential of the Armed Forces."²⁵

"Even with all the changes in the world, some basic facts endure...We are a maritime nation...As long as these facts remain true, we need naval forces that can dominate the sea, project power, and protect our interest."

William J. Clinton

United States Commander in Chief

Projecting combat power within the "littoral regions" transcends service domains. Domain encroachment is a thing of the past. Joint and Combined Operations during the past five years have reinforced this concept. As we look to the future, why not use Adaptive Joint Force Packaging? History has proven that it is a viable course of action.

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²² Marie G. Johnston et al., eds., "U.S. Navy Owner's and Operator's Manual," All Hands no. 945 (January 1996): 14.

²³ Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint vision 2010, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 34.

²⁴ Ibid., 14.

²⁵ David P. Miller, "A New Mission for Atlantic Command," Joint Force Quarterly 1 (Summer 1993), 82-85.

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