

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California



THESIS

**URBANIZATION IN THE THIRD WORLD:
IMPLICATIONS FOR ARSOF IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

by
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December, 1996

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THE 21ST CENTURY**

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

Special Operation Forces (SOF) have historically operated in the rural environment of less-developed countries of the world. The premise of this thesis is that current demographics, which indicates a shift of the population to the cities, socioeconomic trends, geopolitical factors, as well as strategic, operational, and tactical considerations, suggest that the "urban jungle" will be the dominant battlefield as we move into the next century. Current *MOUT* and *Stability and Support Operations* doctrine, as well as training, is inadequate to prepare SOF operators for the conduct of operations in the urban environment.

Three specific case studies - the French in Algiers, the Uruguayan Army in Montevideo, and the British in Northern Ireland - are analyzed to demonstrate the problems, and the consequences, which occur when a force is thrust into "conflict" in an urban environment with inadequate doctrine and training.

This thesis concludes that without updated, coherent, and integrated doctrine, the U.S. military will take an *ad hoc* approach to the planning of urban stability and support operations. This could very well lead to the misutilization of SOF and ultimately the failure of the mission. Why? Because the tactical and operational strengths of U.S. forces become liabilities in the urban terrain. This thesis concludes by recommending the development of an amplifying manual for stability and support operations in the urban environment. This would assist not only in planning future urban campaigns in conflict, but address roles and missions of SOF in this environment. This may also help in finding a proper urban/rural balance in SOF training.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
A. BACKGROUND.....	1
1. Scope of the Study.....	3
B. METHODOLOGY.....	8
1. Case Selection.....	9
2. Cases.....	10
C. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.....	12
II. WHY MORE URBAN OPERATIONS?.....	17
A. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS.....	18
1. Population Growth.....	18
2. Urbanization Patterns.....	20
B. SOCIOECONOMICS TRENDS.....	22
C. GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT.....	24
D. STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.....	26
III. DOCTRINE AND TRAINING	31
A. URBAN DOCTRINE.....	32
B. STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS DOCTRINE.....	36
C. TRAINING.....	39
1. Leader Training.....	40
D. CONCLUSION.....	41
IV. THE FRENCH IN ALGIERS.....	43
A. BACKGROUND.....	43
B. THE INSURGENCY.....	44
1. History.....	44
2. Ideology and Goals.....	45
3. Strategy.....	46
4. Tactics.....	47

C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY.....	48
1. Forces Available.....	48
2. Battle of Algiers.....	50
3. New Tactics and Organization.....	55
4. Doctrine.....	58
5. Training.....	60
D. CONCLUSIONS.....	63
V. THE URUGUAYANS IN MONTEVIDEO.....	67
A. BACKGROUND.....	67
B. INSURGENCY.....	67
1. History.....	67
2. Ideology and Goals.....	68
3. Strategy.....	69
4. Tactics.....	73
C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY.....	76
1. History and Nature of the Regime.....	76
2. Forces Available and Initial Response.....	76
a. Police.....	76
b. Military.....	78
D. CONCLUSIONS.....	83
VI. THE BRITISH IN NORTHERN IRELAND.....	87
A. BACKGROUND.....	87
B. THE INSURGENCY.....	88
1. History.....	88
2. Ideology and Goals.....	89
3. Strategy.....	89
4. Tactics.....	91
C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY.....	92
1. Police.....	92
2. Military.....	93
3. Doctrine.....	97
4. Training.....	99

D. CONCLUSIONS.....	101
VII. CONCLUSIONS.....	103
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	111
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	119

I. INTRODUCTION

[on urbanization trends in lesser developed countries] ...It seems prudent for us in the special operations community to monitor and study these developments to ensure that our training, modernization, organization, doctrine, and leader development sustain their excellence and relevance.¹

Major General Sidney Shachnow

A. BACKGROUND

The premise of this thesis is that urban warfare, or military operations on urban terrain (MOUT), should gain an increasing amount of attention among military commanders and policy makers as we enter in the 21st Century. A number of recent articles in military journals, national security publications, and periodicals, which attempt to address the challenges of urban warfare suggest a growing interest in the realization of the importance of the urban battlefield.² The increased number of urban military operations that have been carried out in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union has contributed to the concern for operations in the urban environment. Panama City, Mogadishu, Monrovia, Sarajevo, and Port-au-Prince, to name a few, suggest that urban terrain will be a prominent, perhaps even predominant, feature in post-Cold War conflicts.

¹ Sidney Shachnow, "From the Commandant," Special Warfare 6, no. 2 (May 1993).

² A cursory list of recent articles include: Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996).; Sean Naylor, "The Urban Warfare Challenge," Army Times, no. 38 (April 15, 1996).; Major General John W. Hendrix, "A Perspective on Military Operations on Urban Terrain," Infantry, 85 no. 6 (November-December 1995); LTC T. R. Milton Jr., "Urban Operations: Future War," Military Review, 74, no. 2 (February 1994).; John Boatman and Barbara Starr, "USA Looks for Answers to the Ugliness of Urban Warfare," Jane's Defence Weekly, 20, no.6 (October 16,1993); and Brian R. Sullivan, "Special Operations and LIC in the 21st Century: The Joint Strategic Perspective," Special Warfare, 9, no. 2 (May 1996).

The corollary of the main premise of this paper is that current U.S. doctrine and training for both urban warfare and stability and support operations,³ are inadequate to meet the challenges of urban military operations. This neglect of urban operations has already had very serious consequences, not only for conventional forces, but for Army Special Operation Forces (ARSOF).⁴ Mogadishu in early October of 1993 bears sad testimony to this fact. This thesis will argue that the Mogadishu debacle was in part the result of a divergence between *MOUT* and *Stability and Support Operations* doctrine. The absence of any doctrinal discussion of integrated or synchronized operations in the urban environment between conventional and ARSOF units has resulted in a lack of preparedness to undertake MOUT operations. Concurrently, the lack of a coherent urban doctrine will result in an *ad hoc* approach to planning for future urban stability and support operations, which in turn, could lead to the neglect or misutilization of ARSOF by conventional forces.⁵

³ Stability and support operations are defined in Field Manual 100-20 *Stability and Support Operations* (1996 Draft) as those "...operations that provide the United States government an alternative to war. They are a way to achieve national policy objectives without entanglement in an unplanned, undesired, and unnecessary war. They are used in peacetime and in the political-military state of conflict, a middle ground that is neither peace nor war, either because no other means will work or because the values threatened, while important, do not justify the high cost of war."

⁴ Joint Pub 3.05 (February 1995 Draft) defines Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) as "...active and reserve component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations." They include Special Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Army Special Operations Aviation.

⁵ Major General William F. Garrison, "The USSOCOM View of Doctrine as an Engine of Change," in Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and W. Bradley Stock eds., Special Operations Forces: Roles and Missions in the Aftermath of the Cold War, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996) 176.

This thesis will argue that changing demographics, i.e. the movement of the populations to the urban environment, especially in those areas where U.S. intervention is likely to occur, requires that the ARSOF community give serious consideration to the implications of urbanization on ARSOF in stability and support operations.

1. Scope of the Study

This thesis will address urban operations that fall within the realm of conflict and the doctrine and training that prepares ARSOF to operate in this environment. FM 100-20 *Stability and Support Operations* defines conflict as:

...a range of political conditions that are neither peace nor war. Conflict is characterized by the introduction of organized violence into the political process; yet groups in conflict remain willing to resolve their problems primarily by political means, with limited military support. The lower range of conflict is peaceful, punctuated by occasional acts of political violence. At the upper levels, conflict is very close to war except for its combination of political and military means.⁶

Counterinsurgency, counter-terror, psychological action/warfare, civil affairs, and intelligence collection are the types of activities to be carried out in the urban environment. Particular attention will be given to the integration of conventional and ARSOF operations, something that is lacking in current urban doctrine.

⁶ This current definition of conflict is substantially the same as low-intensity conflict. The term low-intensity conflict is no longer used in doctrine. The three states of environment used in current doctrine is peacetime, conflict, and war. The term "low-intensity conflict" is still used in some contexts, as it is prescribed in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, PL 99-443, Oct 1, 1986, 10 USC 111. See the glossary in FM 100-20 (1996), for the complete former definition of low-intensity conflict.

The decision to study the relationship between doctrine, training, and urban operations was triggered by my experience as a Special Forces detachment commander in Haiti in 1994. Upon notification that our area of operations would be the city of Port-au-Prince, a port and capital city as well as the most populated city in Haiti, I immediately reviewed current U.S. urban doctrine. I was stunned to discover that practically every urban doctrinal publication available to us that dealt with urban operations was written in the context of a conventional conflict in Central Europe. This scenario of conventional conflict in an urban environment in the context of Central Europe has been rendered less likely for U.S. forces with the end of the Cold War. But also, the historical cases selected for study in this thesis will show that our approach to urban operations was inadequate even at the height of the Cold War. In other words, if doctrine guides military units in training and operations, then we should make our urban doctrine reflect the types of missions U.S. forces are currently undertaking, and are likely to undertake in the future. In the near term post-Cold War environment, no competitor has emerged strong enough to challenge the United States on the conventional battlefield, but have, and may well continue to confront us in the street and shantytowns of developing parts of the world.

As I reflected upon time spent training for urban operations, I realized how minimal it was. In my experience, any urban training we conducted consisted of clearing a few empty rooms and patrolling an empty street with a few block style buildings. This training bore no relationship to the conditions that ARSOF discovered in Panama City, Mogadishu, or Port-au-Prince.

Current urban doctrine is desperately out of date because it focuses on conventional urban warfare, reflective of the World War II urban campaigns, and does not address those combat and noncombat operations during "conflict." Also, any discussion of integrated operations and how to employ SOF in an urban environment is absent from FM 90-10. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III.

Second, current doctrine in stability and support operations pays little attention to the urban environment. Much of the doctrine and training was formulated during the Cold War, specifically during the sixties and seventies, when the major challenge came from rural insurgencies. Again, this will be discussed in detail in Chapter III.

The Army's keystone doctrine, FM 100-5 *Operations*, classifies urban operations together with mountain, jungle, desert, and cold weather operations under the physical dimension of geography. The description of urban operations as a geographical area "with a unique set of characteristics" is a good start, but it is the Army's amplifying doctrinal manuals that are lacking, along with shortcomings in the training environment. In this respect, ARSOF is no different and little consideration is given to urban operations as evidenced by doctrinal manuals and training.

The persistence of this state of affairs has left us inadequately prepared to deal with an important operational environment, one which will in all likelihood grow in importance in the next century. Conducting operations in the urban environment is significantly different than operations in one of the other unique geographic areas. City fighting presents unique and complex challenges not only to conventional forces, but also to ARSOF. Urban warfare combines all four major elements of the environment of

combat: geography and weather, while intensely magnifying the elements of terrain and infrastructure, not to mention the human dimension of combat.⁷ “A city is more than a change in terrain on which to apply conventional [or unconventional] tactics...” writes Major Richard Francey. “A city is composed of a system of systems that supports the total functioning of an urban area.”⁸ Each one of these systems are interdependent and adds to the operational challenges. The decreased distances (both human and structural), of the urban environment add serious constraints and challenges to meet and overcome.

ARSOF has the potential to be a very effective instrument in meeting the challenges brought on by the urban environment. But first we should ask some basic questions. What should be the role of ARSOF in the urban environment? What are ARSOF’s strengths and weaknesses in this environment? Will ARSOF severely have to alter its modus operandi in the city? Is the U.S. military prepared to properly conduct integrated urban campaigns?

The premise of this thesis is that the United States is increasingly likely to find itself engaged and operating in urban environments in lesser developed regions of the world and that Army doctrine, to include ARSOF, has inadequately addressed this likelihood. Also, ARSOF’s emphasis on urban training is inadequate to prepare ARSOF operators for the urban environment. To better understand the challenges faced by

⁷ See FM 100-5, Chapter 14, for a more complete discussion on the environment of combat.

⁸ Richard Francey, “The Urban Anatomy: The Fundamentals of a City,” (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, 1995)1. This thesis analyzes the complex systems and sub-subsystems within the urban environment and offers doctrinal modifications for conventional operations.

ARSOF in the urban environment, this thesis will examine three cases of armies and their SOF, or their elite component in the conduct of urban operations--the French in Algiers, the Uruguayan-Tupumaros conflict, and finally the on-going operations of the British Army in Northern Ireland.

The use of non-U.S. examples requires one to define what is meant by special operation forces. What we in the United States consider special operations⁹ and special operation forces will look quite different than those of other countries. Perhaps a broader definition of special operations or special operation forces is needed when doing a latitudinal case study analysis. To many in the U.S. special operations community, the French *Paras* would not be considered a special operation force. To the French, they certainly were and are. The same is true for Uruguay. Professor John Arquilla's definition of special operations as "...military (or paramilitary) actions that fall outside the realm of conventional warfare during their respective time period"¹⁰ may be a trifle too broad for this case analysis. Professor Eliot Cohen, noted political scientist from

⁹ The Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Pub 3-05 (Draft) defines special operation forces as "...those specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces that conduct Special Operations to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by generally unconventional means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. Special Operation Forces conduct a full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of general purpose forces. Political-military considerations frequently cast Special Operation Forces into clandestine, covert, or low visibility environments that require oversight at the national level. Special Operations differ from operations by general purpose forces by their degree of acceptable physical risk and political risk; their modes of employment and operational techniques; their relative independence from friendly support; and their dynamic interdependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets."

¹⁰ See John Arquilla's From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996) Introductory Chapter for his definition of Special Operations.

Johns Hopkins University suggests that three criteria define elite units rendering better parameters for these cases. According to Cohen, units are elite when they are "...assigned a special or unusual mission...only a few men are required to conduct the mission and meet high standards of training and physical toughness...and when it achieves a reputation."¹¹ Where the Joint Pub 3.05 definition of SOF suffices for the U.S. case, it is probably not applicable to many foreign armies. Hence, Cohen's definition will be applied to the French, Uruguayan, and British cases.

B. METHODOLOGY

To better understand the problems facing today's military, particularly ARSOF, in conducting operations in an urban environment, I will use the case study methodology. I will look at three historical cases and conduct an analysis of each. History is rich with examples of urban warfare and fighting in what we would categorize as total war. However, the focus of the cases in this thesis will be on urban fighting that falls within the "conflict" state of environment. The cases were selected both because of the type of geographical environment in which fighting took place, and the nature of the threat.

The thesis will seek to analyze the elements which led to the success or failure of urban operations during "conflict."

¹¹ Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, (Harvard: Center for International Affairs Harvard University, 1978) 17.

1. Case Selection

When using the comparative case method of analysis, there will always be questions raised as to the case selection and whether the cases presented offer a tough and proper test for the analysis being done. My preference would have been to analyze those cases of urban operations in low-intensity conflict since the end of the Cold War. But as many of the conflicts and operations are ongoing, data is incomplete and outcomes uncertain. Although the Northern Ireland conflict is far from resolved, its long duration allows one to gain a perspective on the effectiveness of operations there. Therefore, more distant examples allow one to draw more complete conclusions based on the post-Cold war historical cases of urban operations in low-intensity conflict.

This thesis does not aim to provide exhaustive historical narratives of the three urban operations analyzed. Rather, it seeks to use them as a framework to examine the variables of doctrine and training. Each case begins with a brief historical perspective of the confrontation, followed by the background information which focuses the reader on the specific conditions of urban operations. The two variables of doctrine and training will then be examined in detail--the doctrine which guided the country's military for dealing with the problem, and how the forces trained prior to the confrontation. Adaptations of doctrine or strategies and changes in training in response to the evolving conditions during the conflict will be addressed. To achieve this one has to look at modus operandi of the insurgents or terrorists and the operations of the counterinsurgent force. Therefore since doctrine tells us how an army "...intends to conduct war and

operations other than war...,"¹² it is necessary to examine the operations and any changes in the operations during the conflict. As Clausewitz notes, war is an interactive process. Doctrine, like war plans, may not survive the first encounter with the enemy. Finally there will be a conclusion for each case that suggest inductive lessons for urban operations.

2. Cases

The French, Uruguayan, and British cases were selected for some broader overarching reasons, as well as some unique individual case qualities, that will be relevant to ARSOF in urban operations. Each case falls within the spectrum of "conflict" and contains elements of urban insurgency and urban terrorism. The cases differ in both duration and intensity. Each supplies different national experiences that provide us with unique perspectives and approaches to urban warfare in "conflict." In each case, one could question the validity of their doctrine and training in preparing for operating in the urban environment. All the cases show that each nation had to wrestle with the question of ARSOF and conventional integrated operations and the roles and missions of each. In each case, the urban campaign was only part of a larger struggle which also had a rural dimension. But it was the urban operations that became crucial to the outcomes. Each is a case that falls between the states of peacetime and conflict and contains elements of urban insurgency, urban terrorism, and criminal activity. All the cases reflect a difference in both duration and intensity.

¹² FM 100-5 *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 1-1.

Chapter IV deals with the "Battle of Algiers" which represents only a small, although critical, urban portion of a much larger insurgency. The French case offers an example of a conventional European force operating in a Muslim environment with all the inherent problems of language and cultural differences. At the tactical level, the French proved very effective in dismantling the insurgent infrastructure in Algiers. Politically, however, the operation was a disaster, because it helped to alienate both Muslim and French opinion, as well as lower France's credibility in the international arena. The battle against the insurgents in Algiers points up the dilemma of choosing between tactical military effectiveness and political sensitivity. In fact, the two cannot be separated. The "Battle of Algiers" offers a brilliant example of how winning the battle contributed to losing the war.

Chapter V examines the Uruguayan fight against the Tupamaros. Like the FLN in Algeria, the Tupamaros chose to fight in the city, and indeed developed a strategy for revolution which was almost exclusively urban based. The case of the Tupamaros is highly relevant because Uruguay in 1960 was experiencing many of the problems present in developing countries today: rural flight, rapid urbanization, and a regime which lacked the expertise, foresight, or will to cope with the resulting consequences. Unlike the Algerian conflict, however, which was fought in the cities, the countryside, and even beyond the borders of Algeria, the ten year Uruguayan insurgency was almost exclusively an urban conflict. The Uruguayan case also underscores the point security in urban areas requires a tight cooperation between the military and police forces. It was precisely the

breakdown of police functions which led to the arguably disastrous interventions of the French *Paras* in Algiers, as well as the Uruguayan Army in Montevideo.

Chapter VI addresses the British presence in Northern Ireland. Although Ireland itself is not a Third World country and does not replicate the conditions found in urban areas in less developed countries, the “Troubles” there have taken root in a relatively disadvantaged segment of the population. Northern Ireland also replicates those conditions and characteristics found in “conflict:” urban insurgency, urban terror, sabotage, and assassination. This conflict’s long duration shows how the British were able to alter their military operations and tactics to reflect its changing political strategies. The British emphasis on specialized urban training and technological advancements demonstrate the importance of these in an urban environment.

C. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

From the earliest times, the city has not been considered a preferred place for armies to conduct military operations. It was done so only out of necessity, for the challenge of combat in an urban environment are many. As early as 1400 B.C., Joshua was perplexed by the nature of the urban environment and how to conduct military operations against the city of Jericho. The strategic importance of cities has long been recognized, and one’s ability to fight in urban areas has often determined the outcomes of wars. The three year siege of the city of Syracuse (415-412 B.C.) “became a ‘siege

within a siege' as attackers and defenders changed status, and led directly to the defeat of the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War."¹³

The Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu, recognized the difficulties of urban warfare and emphasized the necessity to avoid it due to the high expense in manpower, time, and materiel. "The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative."¹⁴ British Historian, G.J. Ashworth suggests that although Clausewitz did consider the city as another environment in which wars could be fought, he spent very little time discussing the characteristics of this unique environment. Ashworth suggests that Clausewitz's neglect is an implication that the city is:

...unsuitable and should be avoided...and that...the deeply entrenched military opinion, that goes back many centuries, that cities are places where battles should not be fought. Consequently, when it occurs in urban areas, conflict tended to be regarded as an unfortunate aberration to be avoided in the future, rather than an example to be analysed so that lessons for the future could be drawn.¹⁵

These attitudes have greatly influenced current urban doctrine and the attitudes of the military leadership today. Although history is replete with examples of urban fighting, there are "remarkably few examples of the urban battlefield as a deliberate choice."¹⁶ More often than not, urban fighting was inadvertent or unintentional due to miscalculations on the part of commanders.¹⁷

¹³ G. J. Ashworth, War and the City, (London, England: Routledge, 1991) p. 19

¹⁴ Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963) p. 78.

¹⁵ Ashworth, War and the City, 3, 112.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

The World War II experience provides the United States the legacy on which its current urban doctrine is based. The United States' own experience in the European theater in conducting military operations in towns and cities was substantial. But it was the Soviet-German experience in cities like Stalingrad and Warsaw that had an even greater impact.

The dominant premise of Soviet urban doctrine, which evolved out of the World War II experience, is to avoid urban or built-up areas and to bypass if possible. If the city cannot be bypassed, then forward echelons should move in quickly to attack the city before strong defenses are emplaced. U.S. urban doctrine replicates the Soviet doctrine and has essentially remained unchanged during the 45 years of the Cold War. Even now, seven years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. urban doctrine remains the same.¹⁸ Author Andrew Krepinevich pointed out in *The Army in Vietnam*, that the United States Army as an organization did little to prepare for the type of conflict it would find itself in Vietnam.¹⁹ Are we moving along that same path today by not preparing for future engagements in the urban environment in stability and support operations?

The United States Army and the Marine Corps have a long history in "small" or unconventional wars dating from the American Revolution and the nineteenth century Indian Wars. Modern U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was developed largely from the

¹⁸ For a more detailed description of Soviet urban doctrine, see John F. Meehan III, "Urban Combat: The Soviet View," *Military Review* 54, no. 9 (September 1974): 41-47.; and G. J. Ashworth, *War and the City*, 122-3.

¹⁹ Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

British experience in Malaya (1948-60) and the American experience in the Philippines (1946-54) against the Hukbalahaps. These insurgencies, as well as others in the twentieth century, are closely associated with communist revolutionary strategies, particularly those of Mao Tse-tung. Mao's revolutionary strategy emphasized creating insurgent bases in the countryside which would "ultimately surround the cities." Mao's success in China gave new impetus to other revolutions in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America where revolutionaries like Fidel Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and Regis Debray preached that the fundamental discontent of the rural population would sustain the revolution. Because revolutionaries usually preferred to fight in the countryside, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was and continues to be designed to combat rural insurgencies.

The Special Forces, created in 1952, revived the U.S. Army's unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency capability that had been abandoned after World War II. This revival was prompted by wars of national liberation, often communist directed which began to occur especially in the jungles of Latin and South America and Southeast Asia. Hence, Special Forces, operating almost exclusively in jungle environments came to regard themselves as "jungle warfare experts," a specialty reinforced during the Vietnam Era and one which defines the ARSOF "image" even today.

A new millennium promises to bring a new battlefield in which the triple canopy jungles are replaced by the three dimensional city, jungle trails replaced by streets and alleys, the small rural village and hamlets by the sprawling megalopolis'. While the

ARSOF community must continue to prepare for combat in rural environments, we ignore the urban environment at our peril.

II. WHY MORE URBAN OPERATIONS?

Recent literature on the future of military urban operations resides almost exclusively on the premise that population growth and urbanization patterns by themselves explain why we are now more likely to fight in urban areas. That urban operations loom large in the future of U.S. forces seems certain. But to argue that the U.S. military will operate more and more in the urban environment simply because of demographic trends appears a trifle simplistic. Together with demographic trends, one must also consider socioeconomic conditions, the geopolitical environment, and the strategic, operational, and tactical factors to understand what makes urban areas a more likely combat zone, and why U.S. may be at a particular disadvantage against sub-state actors who chose to fight there. Socioeconomic trends suggest that increased numbers of people in Third World cities continues to strain a regime's ability to provide for the populace. Hence, the likelihood of social tension and political instability will increase. The geopolitical constraints imposed by the two superpowers has been lifted with the end of the Cold War. Religious, ethnic, and factional rivalries, once hidden in the shadow of the superpower rivalry, have already emerged to cause regional instability. There are also strategic, operational, and tactical reasons that a sub-state actor must consider during conflict, particularly with the threat of a possible intervention, from a power like the United States. An asymmetrical enemy will not only choose the "nature of the war," but also seek to fight on the terrain that he feels will give him the strategic, operational, and tactical advantage against more proficient U.S. forces. In today's world, the city environment may provide him with that advantage at all three levels of war.

A. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Demographic trends offer the most visible evidence for the likely increase of urban operations. It is true that more people are occupying the cities in less-developed countries of the world through natural growth and by migration. But this, while important, is insufficient to explain why U.S. forces could, and should, anticipate more urban operations.

1. Population Growth

What is the city but the people?
Shakespeare

“The 1993 global population of 5.57 billion is projected to increase to 6.25 billion people in the year 2000, 8.5 billion in 2025 and 10 billion in 2050; significant growth will probably continue until about 2150 and a level off at about 11.6 billion.”²⁰ (See Table 2.1) This population growth is, and will continue to be, most pronounced in less developed areas of the world.

Population (millions)					
	1950	1970	1990	2000	2025
World Total	2,516	3,698	5,292	6,261	8,504
Industrialized Country	832 (33.1)	1,049 (28.4)	1,207 (22.8)	1,264 (20.2)	1,354 (15.9)
Developing Country	1,684 (66.9)	2,649 (71.6)	4,086 (77.2)	4,997 (79.8)	7,150 (84.1)

Table 2.1. Estimated and Projected Population 1950-2025 After Ref. [United Nations Division, World Population Prospects 1990, United Nations, New York 1991].

²⁰ The State of the World Population 1993, *United Nations Population Fund* (New York: United Nations, 1991) 1.

The timespan required for the world to add one billion people has shortened. The thirty-five years it once took to add one billion people has been reduced to twelve years between 1987 and 1999. Although population growth has failed to reach projections, *population momentum*²¹ will ensure high absolute increases for decades to come.²² It is projected that one billion people will be added to the world's population every twelve years until the year 2023.

Less developed countries²³ have accounted for the largest portion of population growth since the early 1950s and will continue to do so in the future. In the forty years between 1950 and 1990, developing countries increased their portion of population growth 16 percent to account for 93 percent of the world's population growth. It is expected that by the end of the century developing countries will account for 95 percent

²¹ *Population momentum* is a term that demographers use to describe the phenomenon where absolute numbers of population increase remain high even after fertility rates have declined. Population momentum is usually a result of a youthful age structure found in the population of developing countries.

²² Eduard Bos, My T. Vu, Ernest Massiah, and Rodolfo A. Bulatao, *World Population Projections 1994-95 Edition*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) 4.

²³ Less developed countries or regions as defined by the United Nations are comprised of Africa, Latin America, Asia (excluding Japan), and Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. The United Nations defines more-developed regions as Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. The United Nations General Assembly has a sub-category called least-developed countries which include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierre Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zaire, and Zambia.

of the world's population growth. The poorer the country, the faster the population grows.

2. Urbanization Patterns

This population growth is swelling the size of cities, as the world experiences rapid urbanization. According to the United Nation's *World Urbanization Prospects 1994*, 45 percent of the world's population currently lives in urban areas. By the beginning of the 21st Century, over 50 percent of the world's population will live in an urban environment. By the year 2025, an estimated three-fifths of the world population will reside in urban areas (See Table 2.2).²⁴




Table 2.2 Urban and Rural Population Percentage After Ref. [World Urbanization Prospects: 1994 Revision. United Nations].

Developing countries are steadily becoming more and more urbanized while in developed countries, urbanization figures have leveled off in recent years. The

²⁴ World Urbanization Prospects: The 1994 Revision, (New York: Population Information Network Gopher of the United Nations Population Division, 1995) 1.

proportion of the population of less-developed countries living in urban areas will reach 61 percent by the end of the first quarter of the next century. Of course, the rate of urbanization will vary from country to country, but the overall trend is irrefutable (See Table 2.3).




Table 2.3 Urban and Rural Population Percentage, 1994 and 2025 After Ref. [World Population Prospects: 1994 Revision]. Prepared by the Population Division of the Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis (DESPIA).

ARSOF have been, in different capacities, a part of past urban operations in some less-developed regions of Latin America and the Caribbean Region, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. All of these areas supply operation rich environments for ARSOF, whether in past operations in such places like Panama City, Santo Domingo, Port au

Prince, Beirut, Mogadishu, and Liberia or in future operations as part of an intervening force or in a foreign internal defense (FID) mission advising government forces in such places as Mexico City, Karachi, Lima, Bogota, Manila, Calcutta, or Khartoum.

B. SOCIOECONOMIC TRENDS

Socioeconomic factors also help to explain why the United States and ARSOF will increasingly operate in the urban areas of developing countries. Although the ideas of economist and demographic theorist Thomas Malthus have long linked population growth and conflict,²⁵ there are other dynamics at work that suggest why the city will become more volatile with increased chances to be the focus of conflict.

Cities have always had strategic importance in conflict and war: But as we enter into the next century, cities are more likely to become the *center of gravity*²⁶ in less developed countries as they shift from rural to urban based economies. Where cities were once subservient to the countryside, in that they provided a market place and low-tech manufacturing for the dominant agricultural economy, cities are now the dominant feature in a developing country's economy. The rural sector's importance is in decline in its contribution to national economies.²⁷ As this happens, populations migrate to the cities.

²⁵ Sam C. Sarkesian, "The Demographic Component of Strategy," *Survival*, 31, no. 6 (November/December, 1989) 550.

²⁶ *Center of gravity* is defined in FM 100-5 (1993) as "...the hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends; that characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight."

Because of this rural to urban shift in market economies, cities have increased in their "strategic importance...because they are communication, economic and political centers...they are also the political nerve centers. Greater urbanization will only increase the tendency for military forces to find themselves located in cities."²⁸ Paul Bracken's assessment of NATO's urban trends in the mid-1970s is applicable to the current situation in countries of the less developed world. Where Mao once saw the conquest of the countryside as the key to the seizure of power, revolutions today are more likely to directly target the cities as the key center of gravity.

Many developing country's cities are facing severe problems that will lead to political instability and disorder. Unemployment and underemployment exacerbates the extreme poverty which characterizes these Third World cities. As urban populations increase by both migration and natural population growth, labor demands become increasingly in short supply. Those who migrate to the city find that their expectations of improved living conditions remain unfulfilled. The populace that was raised in the city find it extremely difficult to compete for the scarce jobs.²⁹

Financial constraints along with the rapid population growth make it extremely difficult for regimes or national governments to provide the jobs, services, and security needed to help alleviate the problems linked to poverty, poor health, and limited

²⁷ The State of the World Population 1993, United Nations Population Fund (New York: 1993) I.

²⁸ Paul Bracken, "Urban Sprawl and NATO Defense," Survival, 18, no. 6 (November/December 1976): 254.

²⁹ A.S. Oberai, Population Growth, Employment and Poverty in Third-World Mega-Cities: Analytical and Policy Issues, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) 10-14.

education. The upkeep and improvement of urban infrastructure cannot keep pace with the population growth. Because of this, squatter settlements are rapidly encircling Third World cities, creating zones of social unrest and disorder.

Political scientist Samuel Huntington argued, in the late sixties, that the empirical evidence did not support the premise that urban revolt and political disorder would be increased by new migrants to the city, who would become the slum dwellers. He does suggest that political and criminal urban violence "...is due to the rise as the proportion of natives to immigrants in the city rises."³⁰ It is the urban native who has lived under these squalid conditions for a prolonged period and who has no hope of improving them who is prone to political radicalism. Individuals who have lived in the city for long periods of time are more apt to rebel against authority.³¹

C. GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

*Through all of its five acts drama has run its course; the light of history is switched off, the world stage dims, the actors shrivel, the chorus sinks. The war of the giants has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun.*³²

Winston Churchill

The current geopolitical environment also explains why U.S. forces are likely to intervene in Third World urban environments. Most prominent among them is the decline of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The Cold War bipolar

³⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968) 283.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 282.

³² Winston Churchill, The Aftermath, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929) 17.

world viewed conflicts in the Third World as merely an extension of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Both Washington and Moscow had an interest in preventing or controlling conflicts which might escalate. As United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) intelligence analyst John Jandora states, "conflicts would be generated, enlarged, reduced, or extinguished largely in accordance with the policies and capabilities of the two superpowers."³³ Additionally, the U.S. and Soviet disdain for urban operations, as mentioned earlier, frequently influenced how Third World conflict was to be fought. The tactics and training exported to Third World forces by both superpowers also mirrored their attitudes about fighting in the urban environment.

The collapse of the former Soviet Union removed one element of restraint on the growth of conflict. In turn, the evolving U.S. National Strategy has expanded missions for the military, especially for ARSOF. The United States has moved from a Cold War strategy of containment, in which ARSOF focused primarily on direct action and strategic reconnaissance, to the new National Security Strategy of "engagement and enlargement."³⁴ This strategy is a direct result of the "...radically transformed security environment facing the United States and our allies."³⁵

³³ John Jandora, "Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War," Parameters 25, no. 1, (Spring 1995) 55-56.

³⁴ William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," The National Security Strategy, (Washington D.C.: The White House, 1995). This strategy is "...based on enlarging market democracies, while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests." The three central components of this strategy is a strong defense capability, opening foreign markets, and promoting democracy.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

To support the National Security Strategy of “engagement and enlargement,” the military has designed a strategy of flexible and selective engagement. This strategy includes nation assistance, security assistance, humanitarian operations, and peacekeeping under peacetime engagement. The second component of the military strategy is deterrence and conflict resolution which encompasses a host of activities to include crisis response, noncombatant evacuation operations and peace enforcement.³⁶

A large number of these activities, now doctrinally called stability and support operations, fall somewhere between peacetime and conflict. ARSOF has played an integral part in providing the National Command Authority (NCA) with numerous options in this environment. As suggested, this is precisely the type of mission which will be more prevalent in the future. Operations like Panama City, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Liberia do not belong to the past. They point to the future of ARSOF missions.

D. STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are a number of strategic, operational, and tactical reasons why sub-state actors would choose to fight in today’s urban environment. The enemy will choose the terrain that offers him a decided advantage and one in which can put a much larger, conventional ruling regime or intervening force at a disadvantage. On a strategic level, the political stakes are much higher in the city. Access to media coverage helps to

³⁶ John M. Shalikashvili, “A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement,” The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington D.C.: The Pentagon, 1995). The third component of the strategy is to fight and win.

promote the cause of the insurgent.³⁷ It can quickly create the impression of insurgent success, by visible and disruptive attacks against important political and communication targets. Either this will show the security forces to be weak and ineffective. Or, it can goad and provoke them into repression and overreaction which can demonstrate the abuses and repressive nature of the regime. This can immediately bring attention and scrutiny of the international community to bear on both the regime and sub-state actor. The resulting publicity for the incumbent power is likely to be unfavorable, while the revolution will gain international attention and hence leverage to advance their political goals. The aversion to casualties by the United States, particularly in stability and support operations, suggest that that sub-state actors would try to carry the conflict to the city in to more easily inflict casualties and attract media attention in order to influence U.S. domestic policy. The objective would be to cause a withdrawal of forces, as in Mogadishu, or to discourage U.S. intervention in the first place. It took eighteen dead soldiers in Mogadishu to completely reverse our foreign policy in Somalia.

From an operational perspective, the creation of "sanctuary" in the squatter settlements, that surround Third World cities, places the insurgent in close proximity to political, economic, and cultural targets. Where the dense jungle or border areas once provided a safe haven for insurgents or guerrillas in this century, squatter settlements increasingly may serve this purpose in the next century. In many less-developed countries, police or security forces simply do not operate in these sections of cities,

³⁷ See Jennifer M. Taw and Bruce Hoffman, The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations, MR-398-A (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994) 12, for similar arguments.

leaving a virtual sanctuary within immediate striking distance to the capital and commercial areas.

Anonymity is another operational advantage of insurgents for operating in urban areas. Swelling populations in urban areas added to a decreased presence of police and security forces allow for the sub-state actor to blend into the population even more effectively than in the countryside, where rural communities are close knit and an outsider is quickly identified.

By operating in the city, the insurgent may be better able to shorten the length of the conflict. Mao's call for a strategy of "protracted struggle" in the countryside required more patience than many revolutionaries were prepared to endure. Today's insurgents may lack the patience for a protracted struggle. The city is a target which offers the benefits of rapid conquest of power. At the same time, insurgents may prepare a "fallback" plan and alternate between an urban and a rural dominant strategy in the event of a lengthy war.

Insurgents or guerrillas are more likely to chose urban areas if they believe that they can use the urban environment to negate the operational and tactical strengths of a more technologically advanced army, such as that of the United States. The United States' aggressive forty-five year pursuit of a technologically superior army that could destroy another large conventional army finds limited application in the less developed world urban "conflict." In fact, our powerful conventional forces may be a disadvantage. Stability and support operations in an urban environment severely limits some of the major elements of U.S. combat power such as maneuver, firepower, and protection. FM

100-5 states that maneuver and firepower are inseparable. (Although one might think that this would only be considered in war, and not for stability and support operations, the link between maneuver, firepower, and protection becomes very important as the level of conflict intensifies, as was witnessed in Somalia). Our superior firepower is rendered less effective in an urban environment, if not counterproductive, during stability and support operations. The threat of collateral damage limits, even eliminates, the use of artillery, close air support, and naval gunfire.³⁸ Many of the standard weapons of the infantryman were not designed for urban fighting and are less effective in this environment. Not only are soldiers constrained by very restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) in stability and support operations, but ROEs become even more restrictive in an urban environment.

Since firepower is negated, maneuver inherently becomes restricted. We are unable to offer the protection through firepower needed to move forces to a position of advantage around the city. For instance, in Mogadishu, the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) had an extremely difficult time trying to reach the Rangers by ground transport while helicopters providing air support unable to fire into the town for fear of causing civilian casualties, were brought down by small arms fire.

Another element of combat power that is degraded in the urban environment is that of protection. There are four components of protection: operational security, health, safety, and the avoidance of fratricide. Operating in an urban environment means that one operates in one large danger area or choke point, normally avoided by soldiers in

³⁸ This point is also made in Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," p.47.

other combat environments. Because of the spatial differences, it is more difficult for ARSOF operators to infiltrate clandestinely and operate in the urban areas. In the urban environment, soldiers are under constant observation, particularly soldiers of a foreign force. Concealing movement becomes extremely difficult.

Fratricide becomes an even larger issue in the urban environment because of the human spatial distance between friend and foe. If not already nullified by rules of engagement, any indirect fire mission would inherently be a "danger close" mission, threatening U.S. lives, creating our own casualties. There is also the problem of shooting through flimsy, poorly constructed shacks and buildings, as well as, ricocheting that causes fratricide or collateral damage.

As one can see, there are more than just the simple demographic explanations that suggest that the urban environment will likely be the primary environment in which the United States Army is likely to operate during the next century. Socioeconomic trends, the geopolitical environment, and strategic, operational, and tactical considerations all sustain to the argument that the city is where conventional and ARSOF forces will find themselves predominantly operating. It will be of the utmost importance to have an updated, forward looking, and coherent doctrine that will guide the army and ARSOF in urban stability and support operations, as well as provide direction for training.

III. DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

The U.S. Army's *MOUT* (FM 90-10, 1979) and *Stability and Support Operations* (FM 100-20, 1996 Draft) doctrine has developed over the years independently of one another. Current U.S. *MOUT* doctrine was deeply influenced by our World War II experiences and has continued to evolve over the years under a conventional, total war scenario. On the other hand, *Stability and Support Operation's* doctrinal lineage can be traced to the U.S. "small wars" experience of the United States in the Philippines and the British in Malaya. This doctrine was further refined during the Vietnam conflict. Since that time, "stability and support" operations have taken a backseat to Airland doctrine, as the military continued to focus on the potential for a conventional war with the Soviets. As Professor Steven Metz notes, "...the importance of counterinsurgency in American national security strategy has ebbed and flowed."³⁹ However, with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, "stability and support" operations have received increased attention in the U.S. military. As previously stated, a premise of this thesis is that the U.S. Army and ARSOF will find itself operating increasingly in urban environments of less-developed countries performing "stability and support" operations with inadequate doctrine. The lack of coordination between *MOUT* and *Stability and Support Operations* has brought the U.S. military to the doorstep of a new century with an inadequate and disjointed doctrine. The U.S. and ARSOF is doctrinally unprepared for "stability and

³⁹ Steven Metz, "A Flame Kept Burning: Counterinsurgency Support After the Cold War," *Parameters* 25, no. 3, (Autumn, 1995) 31. Counterinsurgency operations fall under the Internal Defense and Development strategy in stability and support operations.

support” operations in the physical environment that will likely be predominant in the coming decades - that of the city.

Field Manual (FM)100-5 *Operations* (1993), the army’s keystone warfighting doctrine, states that “doctrine...is the authoritative guide to how Army forces fight wars and conduct operations other than war.”⁴⁰ Closer scrutiny of the two manuals, FM 90-10 and FM 100-5, will demonstrate the inadequacies of Army doctrine to operate in an urban environment. *MOU* doctrine fails to address all states of the conflict, focusing only on conventional war, while *Stability and Support Operations* inadequately addresses the urban question. *Stability and Support Operations* manual theorizes more about conditions that lead to the conduct of these operations rather than address the conduct of the operations.

A. URBAN DOCTRINE

The Army’s urban doctrine, FM 90-10 *Military Operations on Urban Terrain*, was published in 1979 at the height of the Cold War. Although it states in the preface that:

...*Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain* include all [my italics] military actions that are planned and conducted on a terrain complex where manmade construction impacts on the tactical options available to the commander...,⁴¹

⁴⁰ Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1983) v.

⁴¹ Field Manual 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1979), i.

a survey of the manual indicates something quite different. The focus of FM 90-10 is clearly on conventional combat in total war and emphasizes the United States military's strengths of firepower and maneuver. To that extent, FM 90-10 is not relevant to *all* "military actions," particularly "stability and support" operations that are characterized by restraint and minimal force. In fact, one may even question the continued relevance of FM 90-10 in contemporary conventional urban war given the changes in the world's security environment.⁴²

This manual's shortcomings include the assumption that the enemy is a conventional force defending a city. As a result, the rules of engagement are those of the application of the full force of conventional weaponry. The effects of conventional military operations in an urban environment on the civilian population is barely discussed. Indeed, immense collateral damage is accepted as a given. Finally, with the exception of Civil Affairs, FM 90-10 contains no discussion of special operations. Needless to say, shortcomings of these dimensions mean that FM 90-10 is limited in its use in stability and support operations to conventional forces and ARSOF in its current form.

The Army vision of the future battlefield will greatly impact how we plan, prepare, and train for war. The current FM 90-10 portrays an urban environment that

⁴² Steven P. Goligowski, "Future Combat in Urban Terrain: Is FM 90-10 Still Relevant?" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, 1995). This monograph provides an excellent examination of current MOUT doctrine and illustrates how MOUT doctrine is outdated and irrelevant given our changing threats. Many of the thoughts and ideas in the urban doctrine section of this thesis are addressed in Goligowski's work and the author acknowledges and gives credit to him.

does not replicate those characteristics found in many Third World cities. FM 90-10, “...uses the central European setting to describe the[se] aspects of urbanization.”⁴³ A cursory examination of the pictures and diagrams throughout the manual testifies to this fact. FM 90-10 boldly asserts that, “...with minor modifications, it is applicable to other urban areas throughout the world.”⁴⁴ The problem is that urban conditions found in Europe are quite different from many Third World countries.

The threat, as described in FM 90-10 is a conventional army modeled on a Cold War Soviet order of battle (OB). This manual explains the tactics the enemy would employ in the conduct of conventional offensive and the defensive operations, from the motorized rifle division down to the motorized rifle battalion. Current *MOUT* doctrine excludes other types of threats that U.S. forces will likely face in future urban stability and support operations: insurgent or factional forces, terrorists, criminal organizations, regime forces, or an armed populace.⁴⁵

Along with the lack of any significant discussion of civilians in the urban environment is the lack of discussion of collateral damage or ROE. Again, these aspects become very significant in stability and support operations in urban environments. FM 90-10 talks of “...concentrating overwhelming combat power...shock, overwhelm and destroy the enemy...and attacking the enemy from the rear...”⁴⁶ Again, concepts that

⁴³ Field Manual 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, 1-2.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

⁴⁵ See John Jandora’s, “Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War,” for a detailed discussion of these threats.

⁴⁶ Field Manual 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, 2-10 and 2-11.

were applicable when speaking about conventional urban operations in World War II, are utterly disastrous if used today in current stability and support operations. What is more difficult to do, and what should be addressed in doctrinal manuals, is the conduct of military operations under restrictive ROE and with the intent to do as little collateral damage as possible.

FM 90-10 fails to examine in-depth one of the most important considerations in any type of urban operations, but especially stability and support operations--the population. Civilians are seen, at best as a nuisance; and at worst, an impediment to effective operations. "The presence of a large concentration of civilians confined within a comparatively small area can inhibit significantly inhibit tactical operations," states FM 90-10.⁴⁷ Chapter V describes civilians either as refugees, exiting the city in droves, or staying within the city, cowering in corners of buildings until the operations are over. Both depictions bear little resemblance to reality. One only had to participate in a U.S. operation like Panama City, Mogadishu, or Port au Prince, or watch televised broadcasts from Sarajevo, Grozny, or Monrovia to understand that the population does not always intend to leave or hide away--they may continue to go to and from work, sell goods in the street, and carry on with day-to-day life. FM 90-10 trivializes the population, factors them out of the operational equation, when in fact, as far as ARSOF is concerned, could be the most important part of the equation.

⁴⁷ Field Manual 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, 5-5.

The final glaring shortcoming of FM 90-10 is the complete neglect of ARSOF.⁴⁸ With no discussion of ARSOF in the urban doctrine, a valuable asset is left unaddressed to conventional commanders. This force is not discussed at all. The only mention of any ARSOF element is Civil Affairs. There is no discussion of Special Forces or Psychological Operations. Again, this dates back to World War II, when there were only *ad hoc* ARSOF units and ideas of “winning hearts and minds” was just a glimmer in Edward Lansdale’s eyes

These urban doctrinal inadequacies reflect combat fifty years ago, but does little to prepare us for the future, much less guide us in the problems of today. As Major Steven Goligowski points out in his School of Advanced Military Studies thesis, “the goal of the army must be a viable doctrine with sufficient adaptability to meet the diverse conditions of the post-Cold War.”⁴⁹ This capstone doctrinal manual does not do this.

B. STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

Stability and Support Operations, FM 100-20 (Draft 1996), is the capstone doctrine that amplifies Chapter XIII of FM 100-5 entitled *Operations Other Than War*. The manual is designed to be “...conceptual...and broad...and is the foundation on which other combined arms and branch doctrine and TTP [tactics, techniques, and procedures] should be based.”⁵⁰ FM 100-20 *Stability and Support Operations* replaces FM 100-20

⁴⁸ It should be noted that at the time of publication for FM 90-10 (1979), SF was not a combat arms branch of the army. At that time, SF was considered a functional area.

⁴⁹ Steven Goligowski, “Future Combat in Urban Terrain: Is FM 90-10 Still Relevant?” 1.

(1993) *Operations Other Than War*. FM 100-20 (Draft 1996) is a virtually unchanged version of its predecessor with the exception of its title. It discusses the same aspects and describes the same missions as the 1993 version: counterinsurgency, support for insurgency, combating terrorism, counterdrug operations. FM 100-20 provides a better theoretical framework and updates the current world security environment. However, its treatment of urban operations remains inadequate.

Appendix E, "Executing the IDAD Strategy," describes "special" environments in which stability and support operations take place as either remote, border, or urban areas. These "broad and conceptual" qualities are certainly applicable to urban operations. It acknowledges that "an urban environment requires different emphasis and techniques than those in rural areas."⁵¹ The gap between the two doctrinal manuals is clearly established when FM 100-20 states that "operations in urban areas are executed in accordance with *MOUT* doctrine."⁵² As established earlier, FM 90-10 addresses conventional combat operations in war and not on stability and support operations in conflict and peacetime. FM 100-20 again addresses the urban environment in Chapter VI, "Foreign Internal Conflict." This chapter discusses the urban versus rural aspects of

⁵⁰ Field Manual 100-20, Stability and Support Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1996 Draft) 1.

⁵¹ Field Manual 100-20, Stability and Support Operations, 153.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 154.

a strategy and offers reasons why insurgents would want to choose the city, but does not address “how” one might conduct such operations.⁵³

Despite a long history of “stability and support” operations, the U.S. Army has never readily accepted low-intensity conflict as anything other than a distraction from its primary mission of conventional war. As RAND researchers Jennifer Morrison Taw and Robert Leicht write, “[the] doctrinal treatment of operations in that environment [low intensity conflict] in the latter half of this century has been sporadic and its acceptance by the post-WW II Army has been lukewarm.”⁵⁴ By continuing to treat urban operations in “stability and support” operations doctrine as if it were part of conventional war, military commanders and planners are left rudderless when they approach future urban stability and support operations. This is not to suggest that we should be compelled to create a rigid doctrinal manual that does not offer flexibility. There should be a base document which can be applied to many situations and provides for doctrinal flexibility.

ARSOF is affected both directly and indirectly by these doctrinal shortcomings. First, ARSOF is directly affected because the doctrine is either completely lacking (FM 90-10) or vague (FM 100-20) in its treatment of how to get the maximum utilization of ARSOF in this unique and complex environment. By not having a clear understanding of

⁵³ Robert A. Rosenwald, “Avenues Embattled: Urban Operations in Low Intensity Conflict,” (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, USCGSC, 1990) 6. This thesis addresses the weakness of low-intensity conflict (LIC) doctrine as applied to the urban environment.

⁵⁴ Jennifer Morrison Taw and Robert C. Leicht, The New World Order and Army Doctrine: The Doctrinal Renaissance of Operations Short of War?, R-4201-A (Santa Monica: RAND 1992) 11. See this work for a complete discussion on historical evolution “operations short of war” doctrine. The authors also discuss the army’s resistance to these types of operations.

the capabilities, roles, and missions, a valuable strategic asset and force multiplier is likely to be omitted or misused.

The lack of any coherent urban and stability and support doctrine also affects ARSOF indirectly. One of Special Forces' primary missions is foreign internal defense (FID). In their advisory capacity, SF is called upon "...to train, advise, and otherwise assist host nation military and paramilitary forces with the goal of host nation being able, unilaterally, to assume responsibility to eliminate internal instability."⁵⁵ When SF trains and advises foreign forces, it bases its methods on U.S. doctrine. As many of these host nation governments ask for U.S. assistance in addressing this emerging urban problem, SF will be tasked to assist these countries and to export U.S. doctrine to adapt and fit each country's case. Without a doctrinal base from which to develop training, SF is left with little guidance other than its own initiative, any personal experiences, and what little training it may have received in these types of operations.

C. TRAINING

Training is the vehicle through which soldiers prepare for future combat. Training must be realistic, challenging, and reflect the environment in which soldiers will be fighting. There are two aspects of training when considering urban operations: quantity and the quality. Many have argued that these are so closely intertwined that they are impossible to separate. Unfortunately, our training falls short in both categories.

⁵⁵ Joint Pub 3.05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Draft) 28.

Based on informal interviews of group and battalion commanders and operations officers, the general consensus is that ARSOF is inadequately trained in urban operations. All cite lack of doctrine and lack of realistic training areas and facilities as contributing factors. Special Operations Training (SOT) teams practice on individual and small unit collective skills in room clearing and close quarters combat. This training in effective, discriminate shooting skills is essential to urban operations, particularly in stability and support operations in the urban environment. But it is not enough. More than discriminate shooting or room clearing skills are needed.

1. Leader Training

The Special Forces Officer's Qualification Course (SFOQC) is the course designed to prepare future Special Forces officers for future assignments. The emphasis of this course is on mission planning. Officers conduct planning exercises in each of the primary missions. All of these missions focus operations in the rural environment. These exercises are planned in the jungles, or rural areas of Latin America. The culminating exercise for officers and NCOs is "Robin Sage." This event is an Unconventional Warfare (UW) exercise in a rural environment. This is not to suggest that the such an exercise is unnecessary, but that it offers yet another illustration of the disproportionate amount of emphasis placed on planning and executing operations in a rural environment. ARSOF's own FM 100-25 states that, "...because of increasing global

urbanization, SOF must now address *all* [my emphasis] aspects of clandestine resistance.”⁵⁶

Quantity of training may be a direct reflection of the amount of quality training. Ralph Peters argues that the training facilities currently in the army inventory do not train soldiers in city fighting, but in small town or village fighting.⁵⁷ Others have argued the point that operating in an urban environment is squad and platoon size elements doing nothing more than room and building clearing, thereby making these MOUT villages adequate.⁵⁸ Both are right to a certain degree. Current MOUT facilities for the most part are what we would classify as a village or hamlet. Also, operations in an urban environment is very decentralized and focused at the squad and platoon level. The point that is being missed is that the most difficult aspect of Third World urban areas to replicate is the mass of people or the concrete jungle. We have failed to reproduce anything in training that comes close to the people looking like a Mogadishu or Port au Prince.

D. CONCLUSION

This inadequacy in doctrine and the division between urban and stability operations has potentially serious consequences. Operations conducted in peacetime and conflict in this environment, that is not based on doctrine, will mean that the military

⁵⁶ FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, 3-6.

⁵⁷ Ralph Peters, “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” Parameters, 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996) 50.

⁵⁸ See Sean Naylor’s, “The Urban Warfare Challenge,” for the argument by LTC Steve Scholtz, from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, that U.S. MOUT training facilities are adequate.

must to plan operations in a doctrinal vacuum. This is dangerous when tactical actions may actually undermine strategic objectives, as they did in Somalia. It is at the operational level that provides the vital link between strategic objectives and tactical employment of forces.

IV. THE FRENCH IN ALGIERS

A. BACKGROUND

The Algerian war erupted in 1954 and terminated with the Evian Accords of 1962. France first became involved in Algeria in the 1830's when a military expedition of 35,000 troops landed on the shores of North Africa and captured the city of Algiers.⁵⁹ After fifteen years of brutal military operations, Abd-el-Kader surrendered in 1847 to Marshall Thomas Bugeaud. The declaration "of Algeria as an integral part of France" in 1848 would mark the beginning of a long resentment of the tribes toward the French.⁶⁰ The same city that provided the French with its first military victory on the North African coast would again give the French another tactical victory 125 years later--but with disastrous strategic and political consequences.

On November 1, 1954, a mere handful of Algerian rebels simultaneously attacked and detonated a series of bombs which announced that, for the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN), Algeria was a French colony yearning for independence. French forces, sent to quell the uprising, were forced to improvise operations in a situation which had been given almost no forethought. The French *paras*,⁶¹ many of them already veterans of the Indochina war, initially discovered that they were in their element in the Algerian *bled*, as the hinterland was known. But the very success of the *paras* in the field caused their opponents to alter their strategy. During the Soumamm Conference of 1956,

⁵⁹ Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961), 17.

⁶⁰ Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace (New York: Viking Press, 1978), 30.

⁶¹ *Paras* is a French expression used to identify soldiers in airborne units.

the FLN opted to carry the conflict to an environment unfamiliar to the seasoned *paras*--the city streets of Algiers.

The principal area of operations was a section of Algiers known as the Casbah--a city within a city that is characteristic of many urban areas in today's less developed countries, "...a teeming labyrinth of torturous alleys, stairways and cul-de-sacs that smelled of dung and urine, which outsiders found both disorienting and intimidating."⁶²

B. THE INSURGENCY

1. History

In May of 1945, a group of Muslims interrupted V-E day celebrations with attacks on the European town of Sétif in Eastern Algeria. French forces launched brutal retaliatory strikes on the villages of the Constantinois. The uprising was put down at the cost of around 1000 Muslim lives.⁶³ Although the Sétif uprising was suppressed, an ever expanding economic rift between the European "*pied noir*" and the Muslim community after World War II aggravated tensions in Algeria. The new wave of Algerian nationalists, many of whom were veterans of French colonial forces, traced their inspiration to May, 1945.

The FLN was born out of the merger of the *Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité d'Action* (CRUA) and the *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques*

⁶² Douglas Porch, The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force, (New York: Harper Collins, 1991) 580.

⁶³ Behr, The Algerian Problem, 54. Estimates say that approximately a thousand Muslims died.

(MTLD). Like the MTLD, the FLN's goal was full independence for Algeria from France. Unlike the MLTD, however, the FLN resolved to achieve this by violent means. The FLN was the political arm of the revolution whose strength was somewhere between two and three thousand members in 1954. Of that, two or three hundred were members of the *Armée de Libération Nationale* (ALN), the military arm of the FLN. By 1956, their numbers increased dramatically with over eight thousand armed guerrillas and close to twenty one thousand in the supporting underground.

2. Ideology and Goals

The FLN's ideology and goals were simple, straightforward, and easily summed up in one word: nationalism. Algerian nationalism began to rise in the vacuum left by the defeat of France in 1940. Muslims wanted an increased voice in the governance of Algeria, which administratively considered an integral part of France. The FLN, however sought complete independence of Algeria. Their proclamation of October 31, 1954, called for independence of Algeria through "the restoration of sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles...[and] respect of the basic liberties without distinction as to race or religion."⁶⁴ The inability of the French government to devolve power to Muslim Algerians encouraged radical elements to resort to violent methods.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation, (Bloomington, IL: Indiana Univ. Press, 1992) 159.

⁶⁵ Dorothy Pickles, Algeria and France: From Colonialism to Cooperation, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963) 25.

3. Strategy

The FLN combined a political, diplomatic, and military strategy designed to protract the conflict in an attempt to force the French government to abandon Algeria. The FLN's strategy not only sought to take advantage of discrimination against Algerian Muslims but also understood the importance of influencing external conditions as well. The internationalization of their struggle would bring the Algerian situation to the notice of the rest of the world. By internationalizing the problem, the Algerian Muslims hoped to gain support from a sympathetic Islamic world, especially of Egypt.

Between 1954 and 1956, the FLN followed a rural guerrilla warfare strategy which sought to build up bases in the countryside. Activities by the FLN resulted in overreaction by the French forces. It was at the Soummam Conference of 1956 when the internal FLN leadership decided to implement an urban strategy. The absence of the external leadership from the conference resulted in the primacy of the internal leadership.⁶⁶ The internal leadership decided to transfer the main focus of the struggle to Algiers. What influenced the rebel leadership to move the emphasis of the insurgency from the rural areas to the urban environment? There are conflicting arguments as to why this happened.

Some argue that the rural insurgency was failing. By the fall of 1956, the French had stifled much of the initiative of the insurgency in the countryside, which increased terrorist activities in the city and provided relief for the ALN and their operations in the

⁶⁶ The internal leadership directed operations within Algeria, while the external leadership directed operations outside of Algeria. The external leadership organized logistical support, as well as, ensuring that internal operations maintained the support of the Muslim world.

countryside. Political scientist Martha Crenshaw counters that although it is true that the French had taken some of the initiative from the rural insurgency, the FLN leadership saw victory as imminent. Urban terrorism, they calculated, would mobilize the population of Algiers and supply the final impetus to victory.⁶⁷

4. Tactics

Throughout the conflict, the FLN used guerrilla tactics to achieve their strategic goals. The FLN used a decentralized command structure. They divided areas up into provinces called *wilayas*, each with its own commander. Commanders controlled the insurgent activities such as terror, assassination, and sabotage. As they changed from a rural to an urban strategy, the FLN began emphasizing urban terrorism as a means to achieve their goals. Bombings in public places in Algiers would surely bring the desired international attention, as well as spark further excessive and repressive measures by the French, further polarizing and alienating the population.

Terrorism is used to discredit the incumbent while at the same time demonstrating the strength of the insurgents. Terrorism in Algiers was used with many target audiences in mind. First, terrorism was used to bring fear to European population in Algiers, to reinforce the notion that the French government could not protect them. Terrorism would be used to show the Algerian population that there was a strong organization that would protect their interests. The world community was another target

⁶⁷ Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, 488.

audience. Terrorist acts in public places in Algiers was designed to attract the international community to their cause.

C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY

No sooner had the French Army closed the chapter on its involvement in the First Indochina War, when trouble erupted in North Africa, demanding the military's attention in the French colonial possession of Algeria. The military was not completely disengaged from Indochina, as some "...80,000 troops remained in Indochina as permitted under the Geneva Agreement."⁶⁸ France began to shift its efforts to a crisis much closer to its own shores. The May 1955 agreement which pulled the last French troops out of Indochina now allowed for the French military to refocus on Algeria. At the beginning of the insurgency in 1955, there were approximately 55,000 troops stationed in Algeria. By 1956, those numbers increased to 200,000 and by August of the same year, 400,000 troops had deployed to Algeria. At one point, three-fifths of French Army was committed in Algiers.⁶⁹

1. Forces Available

The French Army in Algeria was organized as they had normally been in peacetime. The 10th Military District was divided into three corps sectors with the corps

⁶⁸ Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), 354.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 176

headquarters at Oran, Algiers and Constantine. The corps areas were subdivided in zones, sectors, and sub-sectors.⁷⁰ The boundaries of the military zones did not correspond to those of the Algerian civil administration. This would eventually lead to conflicts of overlapping authority .

Below division level, tables of organization and equipment were altered to meet the Algerian contingency. Formations of new units were developed to fight this irregular form of warfare. Most of the changes resulted to meet the needs of conducting counterinsurgency operations in the rural areas. Some changes did carry over when the French started urban operations.⁷¹

The *Reserve Generale* was a collection of units made up of paratroops, Foreign Legion and Marine commandos based in Algiers. These units deployed to the rural parts of Algiers only to reinforce regular troops for *bouclage* operations.⁷² The *paras* and the Legion performed the direct action strike mission while the rest of the Army, composed of French conscripts, concentrated on pacification and static garrison duty. There were 20,000 French Foreign Legion stationed in Algeria. The elite green beret *Paras* of the 1st R.E.P. were stationed west of Algiers.⁷³

⁷⁰ George Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962, (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965) 175.

⁷¹ Ibid., 182.

⁷² Ibid., 178. *Bouclage* was a counterguerrilla technique where one unit would seal off an area and act as a blocking force, while a mobile force would drive the guerrillas to them.

⁷³ Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 169.

2. Battle of Algiers

The "Battle of Algiers" began in January, 1957 when General Massu of the 10th Parachute Division was given military control of Algiers by Robert Lacoste, the Resident Minister of Algiers. The 10th *Paras* maintained operational control of the city until September 1957. This nine month battle pitted the 10th Parachute Division against the FLN underground, the *Zone Autonome d'Alger (ZAA)*.

The origins of the "Battle of Algiers" can be traced to the fall of 1956 when a combination of violent acts against the Muslim population by French extremists, extremists blew up a house in the Casbah, causing one hundred Muslim deaths⁷⁴ and the public execution of Algerian nationalist prisoners by the government, which set off a series of brutal and indiscriminate killings by the FLN.

The FLN decided it was time to bring more international attention to their cause. They believed that by moving the emphasis of insurgency to the capital city, the increased press coverage would justify their quest for independence within the international community. The timing of the move coincided with a meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. A national strike on January 28, 1957 was to last eight days to publicize their cause to the world and the UN. The strike was to take place in the capital city-Algiers. As British historian G.J. Ashworth notes, "capital cities are the self conscious show-cases of the country and thus of the governing regime. The city presents

⁷⁴ Martha Crenshaw, "The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War," in Martha Crenshaw, eds., Terrorism in Context, (University Park, Penna.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 485.

a range of targets not only by their physical density but also by their practical and symbolic importance.”⁷⁵

From 1954 on, the French did not fight a war, but became engaged in a police operation, then pacification.⁷⁶ The Governor General of Algeria was in overall responsibility for the security of Algeria. The national police had total responsibility of the security in major urban areas to include the city of Algiers. From 1954 until January 1957, random violence and terrorism continued to rise. The police became less and less effective, not only in the eyes of the population but more importantly to the government. The massive wave of violence in Algiers in the fall of 1956 saw the end of police primacy in security operations in Algiers. Robert Lacoste ordered the 10th Parachute Division into Algiers under Authority of the Special Powers Law. The 10th *Paras*' mission was "...the re-establishment of order, the protection of persons and property and the safeguard of the territory.”⁷⁷

Up until this time, the military had control of the rural area in the southern sector of Algeria while the northern sector was under the urban police civil administration. This proved to have some significant consequences for the military in terms of intelligence gathering. By this time the FLN had become well entrenched in the Casbah,

⁷⁵ Ashworth, War in the City, 88.

⁷⁶ Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, 93.

⁷⁷ "Programm et action du gouvernement en Algerie; mesures de pacification et reformes," (Algiers, 1956) cited in Talbott, The War Without A Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962, 79.

and the delayed employment of the military meant that they had no established contacts with the civilians.⁷⁸

It did not take long for General Massu and the 10th *Paras* to transition from the rural to the urban environment. Operations in Algiers were swift and ruthless from the start. Strikebreaking became their first test. On evening of the 27th, shops closed, students stayed away from schools, and government workers failed to report for work. Massu began his strikebreaking operation along with a PSYOP campaign. He used helicopters to drop leaflets while loudspeakers appealed to Muslims to return to work. After only one day, Massu employed harsher tactics. The *paras* used armored cars to tear the steel shutters from shop fronts. To secure their goods against looting, shop owners had to stay in their stores. On the 28th, the *paras* provided a “collection service” rounding up truant kids in trucks and taking them back to school.⁷⁹ The strike had been broken in forty-eight hours. But, as British historian Alistair Horne points out, “the main benefit for the FLN, was to be derived, unexpectedly and indirectly, rather from the methods used in breaking the strike than from anything achieved by it.”⁸⁰

Although the 10th *Paras* achieved what they perceived as an initial tactical victory, the urban environment would quickly begin to take its toll on the soldier.

⁷⁸ Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, 93.

⁷⁹ Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 191.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 192.

Colonel Roger Trinquier aptly characterized the effects which the urban environment had on French soldiers:

Patrolling the Casbah's narrow streets, the paratroopers could not distinguish a member of the terrorist network from a harmless old lady, a shoeshine boy from an FLN courier. They found themselves in the position of the Germans in occupied France, the British in colonial Boston, the French in the Vendée, the Americans in Saigon. The virtual sanctuary offered by the Casbah, the silence of the Muslim population, the elaborate structure of the terrorist network--withal, the paratroopers had scarcely the slightest idea for whom they were looking.

The paratroops liked to contrast the purity of fighting in the countryside with the disagreeableness of their work in the city. The desert chase, the mountain hunt conformed to their idea of the soldier's vocation. Combing a city for persons unknown, they complained, was *un boulot de flic*, a cop's job.⁸¹

Another example of the frustrations felt by the soldiers during urban operations is seen

where a soldier noted in his journal:

...as the war went on, what became almost worse than hatred was the indifference that grew in the army towards the hunting-down and killing of *fellaghas*; it was an indifference experienced by troops of many another nation in similar situations, that also spread to embrace the all-too-frequent cases where innocent civilians were shot down in error by frightened, angry or trigger-happy soldiers.⁸²

Quadrillage, a tactical concept that proved successful in the rural areas and was utilized in Algiers by the 10th *Paras*.⁸³ The French adapted *quadrillage* for use in urban areas.

⁸¹ "Une Note du colonel Trinquier et du R.P. Delarue," in Vidal-Naquet, *Raison d'état*, 118, cited in John Talbott, *The War Without A Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962*, 85.

⁸² Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 173.

⁸³ *Quadrillage* is that the country is gridded into small units or districts with French garrisons put up to protect the populace. Out of the *quadrillage* concept developed the regroupment policy which moved the local population into villages near the garrisons for protection.

The city of Algiers was divided into four sections with each section under the command of a regiment of the 10th *Para* Division. Each area was cordoned off with checkpoints controlling the movement in and out of the Casbah. The 3rd R.P.C. under Col. Bigeard, had control of the Muslim dominated Casbah.

Border operations were a very effective measure in the counterinsurgency program that had a large impact once the FLN began their campaign in Algiers. The French had cut off most support to the ALN through the Morice Line ran which along the Algerian/Tunisian border. This barrier consisted of electric fence, mine fields, radar and block houses, recon planes, flood lights, and mechanized patrols. This was very effective in disrupting command and supply problems for the insurgents from external support and cut off any sanctuary they once enjoyed. Due to lack of weapons, the ALN resorted to homemade bombs.

Psychological operations became one of the key elements in the counterinsurgency effort of the French in Algeria. In March of 1955, the 10th Military District created the *bureaux psychologiques*. This agency was created to use on indigenous and for counter propaganda with their own soldiers.⁸⁴

It was not until July of 1956 that France created four Loudspeaker and Leaflet Companies and the *cinquièmes bureaux*, three of which went to the 10th Military District. These loudspeaker units were used almost exclusively in the countryside. The latter provided staff officers trained in psychological operations to major Army commands. Officers of the *cinquièmes bureaux* did not arrive in Algeria until November

⁸⁴ Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962, 184.

1957. They were assigned to each of the corps headquarters in Oran, Algiers, and Constantine as well as headquarters in all operational zones and sectors. Officers of the *cinquièmes bureaux* who were not attached to organic units were used to conduct psychological operations in urban areas.⁸⁵

Psychological operations as an integral part of the military effort was a fairly new concept for the French. Only after the Battle of Algiers did officers arrive in country to coordinate the psychological effort. To decide whether psychological operations would have influenced the tactical outcome of the battle is mute since the French opted for force over persuasion in the "Battle of Algiers." But psychological operations might have been effective on the population or altered the commander's approach to tactical operations.

3. New Tactics and Organization

The French developed new organizations to help the counterinsurgent effort. The *Dispositif de Protection Urbaine* (D.P.U.) was developed by Colonel Roger Trinquier, one of France's most famous practitioners of counterinsurgency warfare. Colonel Trinquier divided the city into sectors, sub-sectors, and blocks. He then recruited a Muslim who lived in the area and gave him responsibility to monitor and report all suspicious activities. This organization produced great results and allowed access and close ties to the urban Muslim community. This proved to be one of the greatest threats to the FLN. This organization had its downside also. These Muslim "wardens" were threatened by the FLN on the one hand and by the French on the other.

⁸⁵ Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962, 184-186.

Intelligence collection was one of biggest efforts for the French in Algiers. Intelligence organizations were not large enough to do all that was required and quickly became overtaxed. They realized that operations would be ineffective without current intelligence. The French responded with a number of *ad hoc* organizations and tactical responses to aid in their collection effort. The Documentation and Counterespionage Service (SDECE), a French intelligence organization, created a "special operations" group called the "11th Shock." This organization worked extensively with the *paras* in Algiers, specializing in intelligence-connected clandestine military operations. It was the "11th Shock" that confiscated the police files and dossiers prior to the assumption of control of Algiers by the 10th *Paras*. Another organization developed out of this was called the *bleus*. The *bleus* were former FLN members now serving as double agents.⁸⁶

Torture became a controversial technique in as a collection method. The use of torture was not new to the French military, but it has been said that it became institutionalized during the "Battle of Algiers." The paradoxical success of this technique has been widely debated. There is no question to impact that this technique had on the success of the tactical operations in Algiers. The *paras* effectively quelled the insurgency in Algiers in less than nine months. What the *paras* failed to understand was the political impact this *ad hoc* solution would have on, not only the Algerian population, but the French domestic political situation.

⁸⁶ R.D. McLaurin and R. Miller, "Urban Counterinsurgency: Case Studies and Implications for U. S. Military Forces," (Springfield, VA: Human Engineering Laboratory, 1990) 114.

The *Section Administrative Urbaines* (SAU) was developed in 1957 during the Battle of Algiers. The SAU was patterned after the *Section Administrative Speciale* (SAS).⁸⁷ Whereas the SAS operated in the countryside, the SAU was designed specifically for the urban environment. The SAUs spent less time on education and food distribution than the SAS, and focused more on control, protection, and counterpropaganda.⁸⁸ The SAU served as the link between civil servants and military and intermediary between military and locals. They spent most of their time working largely in the slums (*bidonvilles*) to improve social services and mobilize the population. The French Army recruited for the SAS and SAU with the highest standards in personal and professional attributes in mind. The high standards limited selection. There were never enough personnel to do a complete and thorough job. "That many of their duties lay in building, teaching, and healing appealed to the idealistic and the unconventional soldier. A military elite was fostered in the Sections, whose members evinced an exceptionally intense personal involvement in their work."⁸⁹ This was quite different from how the rest of the army was looked upon for the methods they used in the conduct of operations. The SAU worked with the civil administration to find work and housing in the slums, build up social services, mobilize the population to provide intelligence against insurgent terrorists. SAU's emphasis was on social reform at the community

⁸⁷ The *Section Administrative Speciale* (SAS) formed in September of 1955. These units were three to five man teams whose primary charter was to "to reestablish contact with the population." and to oversee local government and programs to assist in giving Algerians more local autonomy.

⁸⁸ Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962*, 182.

⁸⁹ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare From Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, 50.

level and control of the populace.⁹⁰ This organization worked extremely well at first while under control of the Minister of the Interior. After 1958, these organizations lost much of their effectiveness once they fell under control of the army. The army used these organizations as a dumping ground for undesirable officers.

4. Doctrine

The French Army had very little time to digest the experience of the First Indochinese War before they were plunged in the Algerian conflict, one which the officers who had served in Indochina were determined to win.⁹¹ Colonel Charles Lacheroy, a veteran of Indochina, developed a doctrine that became known as *la guerre revolutionnaire*, a counterrevolutionary doctrine based on Mao's and Giap's version of revolutionary doctrine,⁹² which the latter believed allowed a conventionally inferior force to defeat a modern, well trained army.

The doctrine of *la guerre revolutionnaire* focused on two areas of revolutionary conflict. First, it looked at the nature of the conflict to discern what is uniquely characteristic of the conflict, and what tactics are being used by the insurgents. It should be noted that the French were perceptive enough to re-evaluate the doctrine as the

⁹⁰ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Internal Defense Operations: A Case History, Algeria 1954-62," (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: CGSC Press, 1966), 51-55 cited in Shea, French Military Thought 1946-1966, 241.

⁹¹ Anthony J. Joes, From the Barrel of a Gun: Armies and Revolutions, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey, 1986) 140.

⁹² Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975) 912.

Algerian conflict evolved. The early doctrine focused mainly on military reaction to the insurgency. Lacheroy began to look further into the psychological aspects of warfare and how the loyalty of the population could be maintained by the government. Many officers who served in the Indochinese conflict perceived Algerian conflict by its true nature. They understood that the FLN's goal was to win the support of the population before it would gain any territory. Many of them read the French colonial strategist, Lyautey, who emphasized pacification programs and tied together military, administrative and psychological functions.⁹³

La guerre revolutionnaire is the doctrinal framework which would serve as the guide for the French in the Algerian war.⁹⁴ It was an attempt to break from the shackles of conventional thought and put forth a cogent doctrine to counter the insurgent threat.

La Guerre revolutionnaire was "doctrine," but not how we might envision it today--that is, a guide to operations. It was really more of a vision of insurgency and sought as much understand the nature of revolution, as well as applying principles and techniques against it. One downfall of *la guerre revolutionnaire* was that it understood insurgency as part of an international communist conspiracy. With their recent experience in Indochina, many officers studied the teachings of Mao, hence their lack of forethought on the urban area as a medium to conduct war.

⁹³ Alf A.Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 1972) 92.

⁹⁴ Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare From Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine 5.

5. Training

If armies exist to deter war, or in case of deterrence failure, to win in combat, then training is the vehicle by which this is done. Training, from the individual soldiers to senior leaders should be focused on meeting the most probable scenario for the next conflict. The French were unprepared for the type of conflict they would encounter in Algeria in 1954, but took steps to adapt their training and education to meet the new situation.

In Algeria there were two distinct armies within the French force--one made up of elite professional forces and a second composed largely of short-service French conscripts. The former a highly seasoned army with extensive combat experience, and the latter a poorly trained army of conscripts. But both professional and conscript alike were unprepared for the conditions they would encounter. It was the professional officers and soldiers of the elite units that that reflected upon their Algerian experience and were most critical of their inadequate training. Historian John Shea comments on the French operations in Algiers and notes that "...most of these young men had become totally committed to their missions--without adequate preparation, without thorough, reasoned instruction, without time to become experienced...."⁹⁵

Further evidence of the frustration felt in regard to inadequate training for the urban environment was given of this during the trial of a Captain of the 1st R.E.P. He reflected on his preparatory training for Algiers:

⁹⁵ John J. Shea, "French Military Thought 1946-1966" (PH.D. diss., Boston University, Boston, 1973) 386.

I was never taught at Saint-Cyr to do the work of a police inspector. In February 1959, in September and October, I received the order to do so. I was never taught at Saint-Cyr how to exercise the functions of Prefect of Police for a population of about 30,000 inhabitants. In January, February, March, 1957, I received the order to do so. I was never taught at Saint-Cyr to set up the embryo of a municipality, to open schools, to open a market. In the Fall of 1959, I received the order to do so. I was never taught at Saint-Cyr to disperse insurgent citizens by political means. In February 1960, I received the order to do so.⁹⁶

Colonel Trinquier remarked that France had become a "...slave to its training and traditions [and] our army has not succeeded in adapting itself to a form of warfare the military schools do not yet teach."⁹⁷

The French *paras*, like their officers had no training in urban operations, although a large portion of their operations were conducted in the city of Algiers in 1957 and 1958. The 3rd R.P.C. had complete responsibility for all operations in the Casbah. A commander of the 3rd Regiment of Colonial Parachutists (R.P.C.), disgusted with the training of his men, marched them "...into the *bled*, for two months of back-breaking training...,"⁹⁸ only to return to the urban environment to conduct operations. Even knowing the *paras* would return to Algiers to conduct operations, the commander choose to train his soldiers in an environment he was accustomed.

The soldiers of the *paras* and the Legion in Algiers were no longer chasing the enemy in the hinterland, but now doing standard police operations in the Casbah. These

⁹⁶ Maurice Cottaz, Les Proces du putsch d'avril et du complot de Paris (Paris: Nouvelles Edition Latines, 1962), 80 cited in Shea, French Military Thought, 1946-1966, 387.

⁹⁷ Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, 61.

⁹⁸ Horne, A Savage War of Peace 168.

soldiers were now conducting a mission that they had not trained for, nor did they want to be. John Talbott observes that:

...for all their likening of themselves to the police, the paratroops wanted no lessons from them. One police official noted that the army protested its own inexperience and then ignored the advice the police offered. Army officers complained that police officials did nothing but duck their own responsibilities and criticize the military's methods.⁹⁹

It was not until two years after the start of the insurgency that the senior leaders recognized the deficiency in training for the preparation of their commanders in Algeria. In March of 1956, the French opened the Center for the Teaching of Pacification and Counter-Guerrilla in Arzew, Oran province. This school was a twelve day "pre-command" course designed to prepare officers for command positions in Algeria. As it was originally set up 1956, the curriculum focused only on the operational aspects of the ongoing situation in Algeria. By only studying the empirical data, the future commanders were learning to be reactive to the situation as opposed to proactive.¹⁰⁰

Another change came about in the center's curriculum with another change of directors. In late 1959, a new director, with a good portion of his career and vast experience in Northern Africa, saw serious flaws in the program at the center. He noted that there were few classes on Islamic culture or Algerian life.¹⁰¹ It was during this period when the military leadership started to take a hard look at their own capacity and understand that it would take more than just the military, or "mere combat" to win the

⁹⁹ John Talbott, The War Without A Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1980) 85.

¹⁰⁰ Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, 176.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 177.

war. Therefore, the center restructured the curriculum and divided the training period into three phases; the Algerian problem, population protection, and pacification.

The second phase of training consisted of population protection. This served as an introductory course on the how to use intelligence. Intelligence officers were trained separately in counterinsurgency techniques at the territorial level.¹⁰² Some of this training focused on urban operations. The military officers learned how best to utilize *police-secours*, or police help, during urban operations. It should be noted that the military would usually use the police only in a defensive role after an attack or bombing took place.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The French ended the urban campaign in a relatively short period of time. Tactically, French operations were a huge success. Nine months after the ALN began their campaign of urban terror, the French *Paras* had effectively ended the urban uprising. The FLN infrastructure in Algiers was rendered ineffective throughout the rest of the campaign. But how could the French be so successful tactically and operationally, and lose the conflict at the political level?

The French *Paras* dismissed Clausewitz's dictum that war is but an extension of politics, and the inherent link between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. The memory of defeat in Indochina made them determined to "win" in Algeria. They would do what they new best--fight the enemy. The French *paras* clearly

¹⁰² Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, 180.

understood how to fight the enemy--what they didn't understand was how to beat him. Tactics utilized in Algiers polarized the Algerian population, as well as the French population.

As the *paras* tried to come to grips with insurgency, many officers tried to capture its essence in *la guerre revolutionnaire*--a theoretical framework for this type of war. Of all their searches, inquisitiveness, and questioning to find solutions to alleviate future problems, they continued to view the conflict through the prism of Indochina. They framed the problem from the rural perspective. They neglected to think about the effects of the enemy carrying this type of warfare into the city, with all of its inherent challenges and complexities-- that is until they found themselves tasked to do the mission. Needless to say, the *paras* had no doctrine to guide their future actions so they relied on past experiences.

The *paras* did make operational adjustments as the conflict progressed, particularly as the emphasis moved to Algiers. They created new organizations and placed emphasis on concepts that had been given little consideration in the past such as psychological operations. Many of these *ad hoc* organizations and extemporaneous methods did meet some measure of success, but in many instances proved to be too little, too late, or even disastrous, like the use of torture.

Intelligence was another area in which the *paras* understood its importance, but made faulty tactical decisions on how to acquire it. The French understood that intelligence collection is most vital to the success of an insurgency war. More importantly, an intelligence war not against another conventional force, but against an

asymmetrical enemy deeply rooted in the population. The French quickly learned that their high-tech equipment like telephone taps and signal intercept equipment was negated in the urban environment against a low-tech enemy that used runners and dead drops to communicate. Operations in Algiers quickly pointed to the need for an expanded human intelligence requirement.

The *paras* entered Algiers as a seasoned combat fighting force. They quickly found that all of their training and combat experience did little to prepare them for the urban environment. They had focused their training on what they knew best—chasing and fighting the enemy in the *bled*. The French officers failed in preparing their soldiers to operate in the extremely taxing environment of the city.

V. THE URUGUAYANS IN MONTEVIDEO

A. BACKGROUND

The Tupamaros' insurgency in Uruguay between 1962 and 1972 attacked one of the most liberal democracies in South America. Uruguay was a prosperous democracy which had experienced little civil violence. However, as economic conditions worsened in the 1950s, the Uruguayan government found it extremely difficult to meet the needs of its people. Leftist organizations acknowledged that it was time for a change and sought to capitalize on the growing economic distress of the population. If power could not be won through the electoral process they concluded, then more violent methods were needed. The Tupamaros resorted to assassination, political kidnapping, attacks against the government, and terror.

B. INSURGENCY

1. History

The war between the Tupamaros,¹⁰³ officially known as the *Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional* (MLN), and the Uruguayan police and military, serves as a classic example of the problems faced by a government confronted with an insurgency that chose to fight in the city.

¹⁰³ The Tupamaros derive this name from Tupac Amaru, the famous Incan rebel who led a rebellion against the Spanish. The Spanish defeated the rebellion and he was executed. The Spanish then called all members of rebel groups throughout South America, "Tupamaros," particularly those involved in independence movements.

Although the conflict only erupted in 1962, the Tupamaros traced their origins to the 1950s when Uruguay's economic conditions worsened and the country witnessed a rise in social discontent. Uruguay's economy was based almost exclusively on a meat and wool export industry. The end Korean War in 1953 brought a collapse in prices for both commodities on the world market. The subsequent inflation, rising unemployment and underemployment, and mass immigration from the countryside into the cities, especially Montevideo, created conditions which the MLN believed were ripe for revolution.

The MLN developed out of the Artigas Sugar Workers Union (UTAA) and was organized by former lawyer Raul Sendic Antonaccio, to respond to violations of social laws designed to protect the workers from the abuses of the large rice and sugar companies. When the UTAA met with minimal success, the worker's union joined ranks with political leftist from the Socialist Party in Uruguay to form the MLN in 1962.¹⁰⁴

2. Ideology and Goals

For several reasons, the Tupamaros never put forth an ideological platform in any communiqué or dissertation. First, they believed that their actions would bring attention to their cause. Second, they did not want to lock themselves into an ideological position that they might have to modify later on in response to a changed political

¹⁰⁴ Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay," Problems of Communism, 20 (September/October 1971) 15.

situation. Finally, they sought to appeal across a broad spectrum of the population. They did not want to limit themselves to any distinct social class or group.¹⁰⁵

Although Uruguay had been an independent nation for almost 150 years, the Tupamaros argued that Uruguay and its ruling elites were nothing more than mere puppets of the United States, Great Britain, and the Brazil-Argentina axis. The primary goal of the Tupamaros was to create a strong Uruguayan nationalist identity. Their second goal was to establish a more equitable socioeconomic system. This they believed, could be more effectively accomplished under a socialist system. The total liberation of Uruguay from foreign domination, and the influence of economic classes subservient, in their view, to foreign interests was a necessary pre-condition for their socialistic society. Only through socialism would total liberation from the imperialistic powers take place.

3. Strategy

Uruguayan geography largely dictated the Tupamaros' urban-based strategy. Uruguay has no remote mountains or dense jungles to provide the insurgents with safe refuge. More importantly, Uruguay's population was highly urbanized. Almost eighty-seven percent of the population lived in the cities. Fifty percent of the nation's population lived in Montevideo. The MLN leadership recognized that to be near the "masses," they had to focus on the city. This strategic consideration was made out of necessity, not by choice:

¹⁰⁵ Arthur C. Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, (New York: Praeger, 1973) 1.

The choice of battleground in Uruguay was probably determined first and foremost by metropolitan area of Montevideo, which contains about one-half of the country's 2.9 million inhabitants, [and] provides....vulnerable targets and invulnerable hideouts.¹⁰⁶

As pointed out in an interview of a Tupamaros member:

...we do not have unassailable strongholds in our country where a lasting guerrilla nucleus can be installed...on the other hand, we have a large city with buildings covering more than three hundred square kilometers and that allows for the development of an urban struggle.¹⁰⁷

The Tupamaros were quick to realize that the urban battlefield offered other positive advantages, the most obvious being access to the news media. If the Tupamaros calculated their acts of violence to capture maximum publicity, then the government could not hide the fact that a revolutionary war was taking place in its capital city, either from the local populace or the international community.

Another assumption upon which the Tupamaros based their strategy was that the masses were ripe for revolution. However, they were apathetic and without leadership. What was required to stir the people to action were acts of political violence.

Political violence was the means and strategy in which the Tupamaros attempted to reach their goals and objectives. Two revolutionary theorists who proved to be the most influential on the MLN were Abraham Guillen and Carlos Marighela. Both theorists espoused the urban guerrilla strategy and believed that it was possible to raise

¹⁰⁶ Jack Davis, Political Violence in Latin America, Adelphi Paper no. 85 (London: IISS, 1972) 18.

¹⁰⁷ Brian M. Jenkins, An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments (Santa Monica: RAND, 1972) 2.

an army of liberation in the city.¹⁰⁸ It was only through the use of violence that they felt they could create the conditions for change. They adopted Carlos Marighella's view that:

...it becomes necessary to turn the political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the country into a military situation that will alienate the masses, who from then on, will revolt against the army and the police."¹⁰⁹

The Tupamaros quickly summarized that Uruguayan authorities enjoyed little popular support, and were propped up by a narrow base of military forces. "The three forces [Army, Navy, and Air Force] together comprised a bare 17,000 badly trained and equipped men."¹¹⁰ It was the MLN's view that violent actions on their part would do one of two things: If the government failed to react or failed to be effective in their reaction, or revolutionary violence would force the government to overreact with excessive and repressive measures, giving legitimacy to the Tupamaros cause. Then this would demonstrate to the people the weakness of the regime.

The Tupamaros justified their use of violence as a sort of "revolutionary legality."

That is it was legal for the government to use violent methods to stay in power, then the

¹⁰⁸ Spanish born Abraham Guillen was one of first revolutionary theorists of the urban guerrilla strategy. After he emigrated to Latin America, his writings provided the greatest influence on Carlos Marighella. Both theorists were firm believers in "Che" Guevara and Regis Debray's *foco* theory. They believed that a dedicated armed guerrilla force could initiate a struggle without waiting for any particular set of conditions to exist. Where Guillen and Marighella differed from Guevara and Debray is that the former believed that this could take place in the city while the latter believed that the emphasis had to be in rural areas.

¹⁰⁹ Carlos Marighella, "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," Appendix to Moss, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, 26.

¹¹⁰ Alain Labrousse, The Tupamaros: Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1973) 20.

Tupamaros were within their moral rights to employ violence to overthrow an unjust government. Although the Tupamaros recognized weaknesses in the regime's security forces, they also recognized that, in the short term, they lacked the power to defeat the government by conventional military means. Guerrilla war, in their estimation, was the way to enlist the masses in their cause. In essence, the Tupamaros' "theory of victory:"

...meant that a military and political struggle spearheaded by the Tupamaro urban guerrillas would be turned into a popular uprising, and insurrection of the masses, and a true revolutionary experience. Power would be seized, and the necessary foundations for the attainment of nationalism and socialism, could at long last be built.¹¹¹

Needless to say, this Tupamaro "theory of victory" required a revolutionary leap of faith in the willingness of the population to take the streets in revolt.

Also included in the MLN's "theory of victory" was the belief that outside forces would intervene to tip the war in their favor. The Tupamaros leadership counted on international intervention from two sources. Regionally, Argentina and Brazil agreed to invade Uruguay if the Tupamaros came to power. Internationally, the possibility of intervention came from the United States. The Tupamaros were encouraged by this possibility because "the struggle would take on one of national character against an invading army."¹¹² This introduction of an outside intervening force would allow the Tupamaros to portray themselves as the standard of national liberation.

In the event of foreign military intervention, the Tupamaros would use the city to their advantage. Their strategy called for retreating deep within Montevideo, luring the

¹¹¹ Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 25.

¹¹² Donald C. Hodges and Robert Shanab, "Interview with a Leader of Uruguay's MLN," National Liberation Fronts 1960/1970, (New York: William Morrow, 1972) 284.

intervention force deep into the city, then waging their urban guerrilla war. They realized the great possibility of suffering some immediate tactical defeats, but clearly understood the long term gains of fighting in Montevideo. The movement maintained that:

...foreign intervention can bring a temporary defeat but it will result in a political progress which will bring us victory in due course. Imagine the city of Montevideo occupied by foreign troops, humiliating our national pride and imposing restrictions on the population, and imagine, on the other hand, a revolutionary group solidly rooted in the city.¹¹³

4. Tactics

Tactics offer the means and tools to achieve strategic and political goals. Tactics, in a revolutionary sense, are not so much a question of defeating the regime's security forces in a conventional sense, as they are meant to weaken the legitimacy of the regime and its security forces in the eyes of the populace. In "stability and support operations," "perceived" reduction in the regime's power by the populace, or by outside powers, is as important as any real reduction in strength. They create the impression that the government is losing control which encourages the revolution, undermines the faith in victory of government supporters, and sways the neutral middle ground.

Between 1963 and 1968, the Tupamaros conducted robberies and raids on banks and storehouses to secure money, arms, and supplies while developing the infrastructure of their organization. The MLN had a compartmentalized organization divided into the cell, column, Executive Committee, and the National Convention. The cell consisted of two to six individuals that served either as the action arm or an administrative and

¹¹³ Labrouse, The Tupamaros: Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay, 141.

logistical function. Several cells were grouped into columns and were responsible for coordinating the activities of those cells within a geographical area. The Executive Committee, whose members were selected by the National Convention, was the decision making body of the organization and provided the overall direction of the military and political campaign. The National Convention was the overall governing body of the MLN. The National Committee was eventually phased out and the Executive Committee took over the exclusive direction of the revolution.¹¹⁴ The compartmentalization of the cells and the columns allowed for tight security at the lower level of the organization. Security was more lax at the top of the organization, a serious flaw which would eventually lead to the breakup of the Tupamaros.

The Tupamaros received very little external support. They believed that the insurgency should be financed by excesses of the rich in Uruguay. The Tupamaros hijacked trucks carrying food, and delivered them to the poor and needy in the slums of Montevideo.¹¹⁵ The publicity they reaped from these types of actions did much to build their "Robin Hood" image as friends to the poor and added credibility to their cause in the eyes of the population. The majority of arms were stolen from private gun collectors and gun shops. Raids on military installations also provided arms, ammunition, and explosives. Some cross-border smuggling of arms did take place from neighboring Argentina and Brazil.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 32-34,

¹¹⁵ James A. Miller, "Urban Terrorism in Uruguay: The Tupamaros," in Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts eds., Insurgency in the Modern World (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980) 139.

¹¹⁶ Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 41.

In 1968, the Tupamaros moved to a new phase by directly attacking the government. Their main techniques were propaganda, terror, and sabotage. The Tupamaros effectively used two types of propaganda: "armed propaganda" and "countermedia." "Armed propaganda" was an idea espoused by French revolutionary theorist Regis Debray, and implemented with great success by the MLN. "Armed propaganda" consisted of actions intended to demonstrate weakness and lack of credibility in the government and its security forces, and to demonstrate the strength of the guerrilla forces and prove that the Tupamaros were a viable force. Political kidnapping was the most effective form of armed propaganda for the Tupamaros. Although ransoms were collected most of the time, that was not the primary intent. They used political kidnappings as a form of propaganda to demonstrate how powerful the MLN was and to show the weakness of the regime. Victims were held in what became known as "people's jails" in and around Montevideo. As government forces were seldom able to find these victims, they resorted to harsher methods of searches. As the Tupamaros calculated, these searches alienated the population. "Counter-media" was simply conveying the Tupamaros message to the public through speeches, lectures, and demonstrations. It was during many of these speeches that the MLN leadership were able to denounce the corruption of government officials.¹¹⁷

Terror was used by the MLN. The MLN used terror to "directly" affect the person who it was aimed at, or they would employ it "indirectly" at friends and family of the intended recipient. The idea was to make it dangerous to serve the government,

¹¹⁷ Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 43-46.

hence driving people into neutrality. Apathy and neutrality favored the Tupamaros by further undermining the legitimacy of the government. Finally, sabotage was seldom employed by the MLN, for fear of hurting the population and hence losing their support.

C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY

1. History and Nature of the Regime

The Uruguayan Government faced the same problem in the early sixties that many countries may have to face in the future in terms of urban counterinsurgent strategies. What is the correct mix of police and conventional/SOF military forces? Should the police spearhead the main effort of the overall counterinsurgent urban campaign with the military supporting or vice versa? The Uruguayan Government had no previous experience with counterinsurgent operations. They had neither to think about nor deal with the urban aspects of counterinsurgent operations. This inexperience was evident in the early years of the conflict, so much so that the Uruguayan government was forced to change strategies midway from a failed "police first-military support" to a "military first-police support" strategy.

2. Forces Available and Initial Response

a. Police

For the Uruguayan government, the logical choice to counter the urban insurgency was the National Police which fell under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. Between 1962 and 1970, the National Police were given primary responsibility

for carrying out the counterinsurgent campaign against the MLN, although they were ill-equipped and ill-trained for such operations.¹¹⁸ "Very few army officers or policemen had received specialised training on counter-insurgency techniques."¹¹⁹ Because of the police unpreparedness, the Tupamaros were able to expand their urban base of support. Additionally, the way in which the National Police conducted operations seriously eroded much of the support they had from the population. Their lack of preparation handed the Tupamaros successes which their lack of organization would not normally have allowed them. Frustrated by their lack of success, the police responded with ever more extreme and repressive measures.

One consequence of the ineffectiveness of police tactics was the decision to create the Metropolitan Guard in 1968. The Metropolitan Guard, which numbered 600 men led by army officers, was considered Uruguay's "elite" police unit. The placing of regular army officers in charge of this unit provided the first step toward the militarization of the conflict. The Metropolitan Guard was a highly trained paramilitary unit that received specialized training from both the United States and Brazil in all types of light weapons and crowd control techniques.¹²⁰ They normally played a supporting role in the police counterinsurgency campaign and served as the reserve or a quick reactionary force (QRF) to the National Police. When the National Police came into

¹¹⁸ See Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 53. The National Police were the logical choice because of the high numbers of police that operate in the urban environment. Forty percent of the 17,000 police were assigned to urban areas. Twenty percent of the total force were assigned to Montevideo, the base of MLN operations.

¹¹⁹ Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political Violence, (London: Temple Smith, 1972) 219.

¹²⁰ Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 55.

contact with the Tupamaros, the Metropolitan Guard was called in to provide back-up. The Metropolitan Guard gained the reputation as a repressive force using such techniques as torture and citywide searches.¹²¹

b. Military

Throughout the period from 1962 through 1971, the Uruguayan military limited its role in the counterinsurgent operations to civic action programs. On September 9, 1971, President Bordaberry transferred primary responsibility of the counterinsurgency effort from the police to the military. The police had proven ineffective in previous years in quelling the insurgents in Montevideo. In fact, the Tupamaros were probably at their strongest when the military took control of operations.

The military fell under the Ministry of Defense and numbered only about 17,000 officers and soldiers in 1970. Of that, 12,000 made up the army consisting of "nine horse and mechanized calvary squadrons (with light and medium tanks), six infantry battalions, six field artillery battalions, and six engineer battalions."¹²² All air assets fell under the Air Force, but the army had control over the two air force UH-12 transport helicopters for their QRF. The military, like the police, had little experience and training in counterinsurgency operations in the urban environment when it took over operations.

¹²¹ Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 55.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 170

The Ministry of Defense immediately saw the need to increase readily available resources for the counterinsurgency campaign. The creation of a joint staff aimed primarily to coordinate the military intelligence efforts by combining the resources of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the those of the police. This joint staff was an innovative idea for the Uruguayan military, resulting in "better quality and quantity intelligence inputs."¹²³

The Minister of Defense mandated the creation of additional organizations that were to be focused wholly on the counterinsurgency effort. These organizations were the Board of Commanders in Chief (JCJ), Joint Staff (ESMACO), Coordinating organizations for Antisubversive Operations (OCOA), Intelligence Coordination Meeting (RI), and the Joint Forces Press Bureau (OPFC).

The JCJ and ESMACO were created in December of 1971, three months after the military took over operations. JCJ's purpose was to serve as advisory board to the President on joint counterinsurgent activities. ESMACO's role was to study, plan, coordinate and advise the JCJ counterinsurgency effort. The creation of these organizations allowed for a high level centralized agency that oversaw the whole national effort, not just the military or the police.¹²⁴

The OCOA was the joint staff within each of the Military Regions that planned and coordinated counterinsurgency efforts within that region. OCOA was actually the forerunner for ESMACO. OCOA began operations in June of 1971 with

¹²³ Miller, "Urban Terrorism in Uruguay: The Tupamaros," 171.

¹²⁴ Sergio L. d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review, 53, no.4 (April, 1973) 36.

immediate results. They coordinated the operational intelligence at the tactical level as well as the logistical support for the counterinsurgency effort. The RI was the intelligence community's meeting in which information and intelligence assets were shared between the services and the police, resulting in more complete information.. In addition to the valuable exchange of information, coordination imposed a much needed doctrinal unity within the intelligence community.¹²⁵

The OPFC was main agency of the military's psychological effort against the Tupamaros. The agency used national radio and television stations to publicize the government's position and keep the public abreast of the success against the MLN. This organization was created very late in counterinsurgency effort. The impact of an effective psychological effort was demonstrated in the seventies when the military captured MLN documents. These documents were "...expertly exploited, and public support for...the Tupamaros plunged precipitously."¹²⁶

The Uruguayan army had little in the way of counterinsurgency¹²⁷ or urban doctrine when the MLN began operations in Montevideo. They had doctrine for combat operations, but they rarely practiced or used it. In the sixties:

¹²⁵ d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," 36.

¹²⁶ R. D. McLaurin and R. Miller, Urban Insurgency: Case Studies and Implications for U.S. Military Forces, (Springfield, Va: Abbott Associates 1989) 131.

¹²⁷ Counterinsurgency doctrine falls under what the United States now calls the IDAD strategy in "stability and support operations."

...the Uruguayan military increasingly found itself involved in law enforcement activities and becoming an active rather than passive back-up forces to the country's National Police. Soldiers were often called to patrol Montevideo streets and guard communications centers, power facilities, commercial banks, and government buildings.¹²⁸

This caused a division among the military officers between those who rejected the role of law enforcement for the military and others who welcomed it as a necessary and important mission.¹²⁹

The National Police intelligence collection effort, both in the gathering and the collation, was almost non-existent, and what Robert Moss identified "as the "crux" of the problem in dealing with the Tupamaros."¹³⁰ The military created *ad hoc* organizations to facilitate intelligence collection needs, which as it turned out, was the military's primary role during the conflict. To their advantage, the military learned many lessons from the National Police experiences in the sixties. During a Tupamaros cease fire from September 1971 to April 1972, the Army Intelligence Service (AIS) began planning and making preparations for the military's counterinsurgency effort. They were quick to assess that past police operational failures were really intelligence failures. Previously, the police had little intelligence on the MLN to conduct effective

¹²⁸ Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p.55.

¹²⁹ See Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p.67. The commander-in-chief of the Military Region no. 1, which includes Montivideo, resigned in 1968 because he felt his soldiers were being misutilized.

¹³⁰ See James A. Miller, "Urban Terrorism in Uruguay: The Tupamaros," in Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts eds., Insurgency in the Modern World (Boulder, CO.: Westview, 1980) 168-9. See also Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political Violence, 232.

counterinsurgent operations against them. Therefore, the police relied heavily on sweeping citywide searches to find kidnap victims and MLN members. Not only were these broad sweeps ineffective, they had a detrimental political impact. For instance, in August of 1970, the police conducted 20,000 house searches at all hours of the night and without warrants. This caused resentment against the authorities and aided the Tupamaros in gaining at least the tacit support of the population. With more precise intelligence, the AIS was able to use "...information provided the police's Information and Intelligence Directorate" to locate Tupamaros as well as targeting MLN infrastructure.¹³¹

The Uruguayan Government took measures to assist the National Police by seeking financial and training aid internationally. The primary assistance came from the United States through the Agency of International Development (AID). Financial assistance was used primarily to upgrade transportation and communications. Training focused on patrolling capabilities, investigative procedures, and riot control. Much of training of the police took place in Uruguay, although some officers were sent to the United States for training.¹³² Although the Uruguayan National Police received vast amounts financial support and training aid, there was a severe lack of training in such areas as intelligence, counterintelligence, and psychological warfare.

The Uruguayan Army received its biggest break in its attempt to defeat the Tupamaros in 1972 when it captured H. Amodio Pérez, a Tupamaros leader. It was

¹³¹ Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 67.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 53.

Pérez's collaboration that proved to be the striking blow leading to the defeat of the Tupamaros. He provided information about other personnel, weapon caches, documentation centers, and locations of hostages.¹³³ This proved to be the culminating event which led to the defeat of the Tupamaros.

D. CONCLUSIONS

To suggest that either a change in tactics by the Uruguayan security forces or that tactical or operational failures on the part of the Tupamaros led to their defeat is simplistic. War is an interactive process. There were a number of reasons from both perspectives which account for the Tupamaros defeat.

From the Tupamaros perspective, tactical advantage was squandered and transformed into strategic defeat. For example, the kidnap and brutal murders of U.S. advisor Dan Mitrione and British Ambassador Sir Geoffrey Jackson began in a shift of public support away from the Tupamaros. This tactical success in the abduction and hostage phase was undermined once they resorted to murder. The MLN's execution of Operation *Hot Summer* in 1971, which aimed to inflict damage on the Uruguayan summer tourist industry, proved to be a tactical success. The Tupamaros again miscalculated the strategic consequences because of a significant percentage of the labor force engaged in the tourist industry that was laid off, which hardly served to popularize the Tupamaros cause among the segment of the "masses."

¹³³ Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 69.

The entrance of the military in the counterinsurgency effort demonstrated a shift of emphasis in government strategy. The army had no urban or counterinsurgency doctrine as a basis from which to plan a campaign against the Tupamaros. Even during the time the police were in charge of the campaign, the military did little to plan for such operations in the event they should be asked to take over. In the years leading up to the military's assumption of the primary role in fighting the Tupamaros were characterized by extraordinary complacency. Their lack of doctrine and training for this type of war in this environment was evidence in the way they conducted operations; large scale searches, roadblocks, and checkpoints that appeared to be an excessive use of force which disturbed daily life. It was not until the military was given full control of the operations that organizational and doctrinal changes were made. To the military's credit, they quickly understood that this was above all an intelligence war. The Minister of Defense was quick to make organizational changes to support this.

Psychological operations was not a part of the government's response until near the end of the counterinsurgency campaign. Once the military learned how effectively to employ them, they ultimately helped to win support for the government.

The military was very involved in Civil Affairs during the period from 1962 through 1971. Once the army assumed full responsibility for the counterinsurgency campaign, the civic action programs dwindled. Psychological operations on the military's part were neglected and no attempt was made to portray the military as the ally and protector of the population.

Lack of training in urban counterinsurgency was clearly demonstrated by their *ad hoc* approach to operations. Their immediate response was to quell the situation as quickly as possible. This led to conduct large scale conventional operations that were considered repressive by the population--large scale sweeps of the city, searches of homes at all hours of the night, and interruption of the daily routine of the urban populace.

The army's use of large numbers of conventional units as the primary counterinsurgent force gave the government a repressive image. "Elite" units served in a supporting role and were the reserve or QRF. Had the Uruguayan Army reversed this, and used smaller elite forces in its search for the MLN leadership, with conventional forces in the reserve role, the populace might have been more receptive.

VI. THE BRITISH IN NORTHERN IRELAND

A. BACKGROUND

Violence has long been an inherent part of the political fabric of Northern Ireland. In 1969, a new wave of civil violence broke out in Northern Ireland. This violence, a result of rising unemployment and discrimination against the Catholic population, started in the city streets of Londonderry, and quickly spread to Belfast, Northern Ireland's major city. The British Army, already garrisoned in Northern Ireland, were called on to assist the police in protecting the Catholic population from Protestant violence. However, within six months, the army and the police had become objects of attack by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

Both Catholics and Protestants alike initially welcomed the military intervention. The Catholics saw the British Army as an impartial force that would apply justice equally to both parties. The Protestants viewed British presence as support for their policies against the Catholic population and a force that would help their police units put an end to Catholic demonstrations and rioting in the streets. As British forces became more deeply entrenched in operations, the appearance of favoring the Protestants added fuel to the Irish fire for their quest for a free and independent Ireland.

B. THE INSURGENCY

1. History

Conflict in Ireland is hardly a new phenomena. The traditional English-Irish conflict was complicated by religious divisions within Ireland between Protestants who remain fiercely loyal to Britain, and Catholics whose attitudes toward Irish independence were more complex. The IRA emerged as the most militant representative of Catholic emancipation within a united, independent Ireland. The origins of the IRA dates back to the mid-nineteenth century but it was not until the struggle for independence from 1916 to 1921 that the IRA emerged as an organization capable of carrying on the Irish Nationalist fight. In 1921, Ireland was partitioned into two separate states: the three counties in the south forming the Irish Free State, and the six northern counties forming Northern Ireland with a Protestant majority and Catholic minority. Throughout the twentieth century, the strength of the IRA has risen and receded numerous times. In the early 1960s, the IRA began to adopt a Marxist philosophy and economic and political action became more important than violent action.¹³⁴ As the civil rights movement of the late 1960s turned increasingly violent, however, many within the IRA became disenchanted with the organization and its ability to protect the Catholic community.

Members who split from the Official IRA in 1969 became known as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The PIRA has led the insurgency against British presence in Northern Ireland.

¹³⁴ The Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC), Northern Ireland: Reappraising Republican Violence, (London: ISC, 1982) 3.

2. Ideology and Goals

The PIRA's ideology and political goals stated in their official manual, the Green Book, is to establish "...an Irish Socialist Republic based on the 1916 Proclamation."¹³⁵ The 1916 Proclamation, a document resulting from the "Easter Rising" in Dublin, lends credence to the PIRA claim to be the true protector of the nationalist struggle in Northern Ireland, whose purpose is to unite Ulster to the three provinces which form the Irish Republic.

3. Strategy

To attain their goals, the PIRA has followed a strategy of political violence. The strategy as outlined in the PIRA's "Green Book" consists of: a campaign of bombing which seeks to make Northern Ireland ungovernable, extend PIRA control over the Catholic community, and inflict unacceptable casualties on the British which will cause them to tire of the conflict and leave. Finally, the hope to attract support for their insurgency abroad.

The bombing campaign was designed for a dual purpose. First, to make it appear as though the six northern counties of Ulster are ungovernable except by colonial rule. This promotes feelings in the populace of Northern Ireland that the British government cannot protect them and that the vanguard of Irish security is only through the PIRA. Secondly, it is aimed at the country's economic interests, as well as bringing terror to Irish Loyalists and to the population of Great Britain. This would make it unprofitable

¹³⁵ ISC, Northern Ireland: Reappraising Republican Violence, 6.

for Irish businessmen from displaying any public support for the British, and to curb any future British long term investment.

The second pillar of their strategy is to expand support within the Catholic community. Prior to 1981, the PIRA carried on an intense terrorist campaign, believing that terrorism by itself, would be enough to achieve its objectives. The PIRA altered this strategy in 1981, after Bobby Sands, a convicted PIRA terrorist, won a seat in the House of Commons. That political win gave the Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF), the political wing of the PIRA, the realization of the importance of the political wing and its ability to expand a base of support. This new strategy became known as the "ballot box and the Armalite." The "ballot box and the Armalite" strategy is reinforced by terror. This form of terror, using such infamous methods as "kneecapping," is employed against the very same population the PIRA claims to protect.

The war of attrition was aimed at the British government, causing the withdrawal of the British occupation forces. In the context of the attrition of British resolve, the PIRA has used a combination of urban and rural strategies, but its focus has been on the urban areas, not only in own country, but in Britain and on the European Continent. London has been an especially favorite target for the PIRA. It has been said that, "one bomb in London is worth ten in Belfast." By taking the bombing campaign to Great Britain and the Continent, the PIRA leadership hopes to capitalize on publicity and weaken British resolve without threatening their supporters. This campaign outside of Northern Ireland was designed to make up for the mistakes and accidental deaths of innocent Catholics within Ulster.

Internationalization of the PIRA's war, as in any sub-state actor's war, is to gain moral and financial support for their cause through propaganda and publicity. This internationalization is intended to have the international Irish Catholic community apply pressure to Britain for its withdrawal and to receive money and weapons from countries like Libya.

4. Tactics

Northern Ireland has been "...a veritable laboratory for the development of tactics and techniques of terrorism..." for the PIRA.¹³⁶ Tactics employed to achieve their strategic goals have primarily targeted the British Army, the Ulster Security Forces, prison and judicial officials and Loyalist political party members .

Shootings, bombings, and mortar attacks are the favorite weapons used in the PIRA's tactical inventory. Against British government and its security forces, the PIRA has become very adept in the use of radio-controlled and time delay bombs, as well as booby-traps, car bombs, improvised grenades, and mortars. When bombing public places, the PIRA's modus operandi has been to make a call ahead of time to allow people a chance to get out. If innocents are killed, the PIRA blames the government for not reacting in a timely manner.

During the early 1970s, the PIRA was modeled and organized after a conventional army structure with brigades, battalions, and companies as its operational units. As the PIRA shifted its operations to the urban areas, the organization became

¹³⁶ ISC, Northern Ireland: Reappraising Republican Violence, 8.

susceptible to infiltration by British security forces. These operational units were well known to the local populace, which was also a threat to their security. Therefore, in the late 1970s, the PIRA switched to a clandestine, cellular organization that provide more security and was more difficult to penetrate by the security forces. The operational units of the cells are called Active Service Units (ASU), which carry out the actual attacks against the British. These ASUs consist of five to twelve members and represent the hare-core terrorist. The ASUs are supported by a volunteer force that takes care of logistics and an auxiliary force that support tasks such as drivers, lookouts, and weapon disposal.

The PIRA is one of the most heavily armed terrorist organizations in the world today. In the past it has received financial support through the North American Irish National Aid Committee (NORCID), and support from Libya's Muammar Qaddafi in the form of finances and weapons. The Libyans provided the PIRA with an extensive arsenal of Armalite and AK47 assault rifles. The PIRA has become extremely adept at producing improvised munitions. Although the PIRA has received some financial support from Libya, most financial support is raised internally through racketeering, extortion, and taxfraud, as well as legitimate businesses.

C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY

1. Police

The police were unable to cope with the situation that erupted in the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), established in 1922

after partition, proved to be ineffective. The RUC was a Protestant force, hence they were distrusted by the Catholic community. The Catholics barricaded streets leading into heavily Catholic populated areas, denying access to the security forces. These “no-go” areas were off-limits to the police as well as the military when they took over operations. In the mid-1970s, that the RUC was capable of having primacy in urban security operations after overhauling the entire police administration and establishing a criminal intelligence system.

2. Military

The British Army began operations on the streets of Belfast in Northern Ireland on August 15, 1969, in response to the sectarian violence that erupted in the town of Londonderry during Civil Rights protest marches, and eventually spread to the streets of Belfast. What initially started as a mission sent in to supplement the police to restore order quickly turned primarily into a military mission.¹³⁷

By 1969, the British had twenty-five years of “small wars” experience in defending the ever-shrinking British empire in places like Malaya, Kenya, and Rhodesia. Most of these operations were rural in nature, but the British were offered some exposure to urban operations in Jerusalem, Cyprus, and Aden. Still they failed to institutionalize the many lessons learned and relied on passing this knowledge through its personnel. Their training and doctrinal emphasis was still on fighting the Soviets in the northern plains of Germany.

¹³⁷ J. Boyer Bell, The Gun in Politics, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1987) 150.

In 1969, the British Army was deployed to Northern Ireland to maintain law and order. On August 14, 1969, eighty British soldiers from the Prince of Wales Own Regiment were posted to the city of Londonderry as reinforcements for the RUC. As the army moved in to assist the police in providing security, the police quickly turned over control of operations to the military. The next day, the British government made the decision to use troops in Belfast to quell spreading violence. Although the British government and military foresaw the possibility of increased participation in Northern Ireland, little planning and forethought had gone into the possibility of extended urban operations. No city maps were produced because the assumption was that the police would spearhead the main effort and the military would be in a supporting role. This immediately led to problems. As historian Desmond Hamill notes:

...the Army knew nothing of the rigid sectarian geography of the city with its myriad little side streets wandering haphazardly through sensitive Catholic and Protestant areas. The idea had always been that if the Army were out on the ground, the civil power would always be there to guide it.¹³⁸

What little planning there was produced *as hoc* measures. . . There was no coordinated civil/military approach. The plan was that the Army would control certain areas of the city while the police controlled other areas. The first full weekend of operations:

...showed how ill-prepared the Army was to deal with such violence...[since] the Army's experience had always been in colonial situations where the rules were simple, the chain of command direct and the objective clear. Just what were the soldiers supposed to be doing as they moved in some confusion through the streets of Belfast and Londonderry?"¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984, (London: Methuen, 1985) 15.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 21.

By June of 1970, the PIRA launched a full-scale terrorist campaign targeting Protestant officials as well as the British Army. The question now at the forefront of the British military was whether they were in Northern Ireland to fight urban guerrillas and terrorists or to aid in the maintenance of law and order. The British increasingly intensified operations against the PIRA. In July, 1970, the British Army conducted sweeps of the Catholic areas aimed at rooting out PIRA members. In one month's time, 20,000 homes were recklessly searched, alienating even further, the Catholic population from the British Army.

In August, 1971, the British government enacted a "policy of internment." This policy allowed the security forces to pick up individuals and hold them on suspicion only, without any due process of law. On August 9th, the army launched Operation "Demetrius" to enforce the "policy of internment." In the four years this operation took place, the British army arrested over 2,000 individuals. The British Army initially saw this as a tactical success and a curtailment to PIRA operations. This was an illusion, however. This policy, enforced by the British Army, was responsible for two of the most violent years in Ireland. Like the FLN in Algiers, the PIRA were very effective in exploiting these operations that arrested and held many innocent civilians. Additionally, the PIRA made accusations of torture and was able to link it to the internment of individuals.

On January 30, 1972, thirteen civilians were killed by British paratroopers during a demonstration in Derry, in what became known as "Bloody Sunday." This action marked the beginning of the unconventional war for the British Army. Two months later,

the British government announced it would “officially” take total control of the security situation in Northern Ireland. July 21, 1979, witnessed “Bloody Friday” in which the PIRA detonated nineteen bombs across Belfast killing and injuring innocent civilians. Ten days later the British Army launched Operation “Motorman” with the purpose of removing the barricades and the opening up of the “no-go” areas.¹⁴⁰ The British announced their operation in advance in hopes of little resistance. The British conducted the operation with eleven infantry battalions. This was the largest troop concentration so far used in Northern Ireland with 21,800 soldiers. The same year, British force numbers peaked to meet what was Northern Ireland’s worst year of violence. Since that time violence has periodically risen and receded.

Like the French *Paras* in Algiers and the Uruguayan Army in Montevideo, a major problem faced by the British Army in Northern Ireland was the absence of adequate intelligence. When the army took over from the undermanned and overworked RUC, police files and dossiers on suspects were out of date and their intelligence network had been neglected.¹⁴¹ As in the Algerian and Uruguayan case, information collection and intelligence gathering became the military’s most formidable task. Canadian Author David Charters explains that, “...the [British] army had to rebuild the intelligence apparatus from scratch in a hostile and deteriorating environment.”¹⁴² The

¹⁴⁰ These “no-go” areas were Catholic dominated sections of towns in which Loyalist Security Forces were at peril if they entered.

¹⁴¹ David A. Charters, “Intelligence and Psychological Warfare Operations in Northern Ireland,” in Alan O’Day ed. Dimensions of Irish Terrorism, (New York: G. K. Hall & Co., 1994) 378.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 378.

consensus among military analysts was that the British Army was slow to realize the importance of intelligence. "...[T]hey should have gone flat out to build up intelligence-- something that was not done satisfactorily for years."¹⁴³ Once the decision to emphasize intelligence was taken, however, the British Army discovered that an adequate intelligence system could not be created overnight:

“...the Army now started to build up the intelligence system and poured in huge sums of money, men, and effort. It would be a long time, however, before the full effects were to be appreciated.”¹⁴⁴

Psychological operations was another aspect in which the British Army placed little emphasis in the initial years of the conflict. “The [British] army’s psyops resources were insignificant at the outbreak of the war, so its efforts tended to be *ad hoc*.”¹⁴⁵ The PIRA held the initiative in psychological operations until mid-1970s. The PIRA were effective in the use of propaganda by turning British military operations like “Demetrius” and “Motorman” into a psychological defeats, while turning their own tactical actions into psychological wins.

3. Doctrine

After World War II, the British underwent serious budget and personnel cutbacks in the military. As RAND researchers Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw suggest the emphasis of British doctrinal development went to conventional and nuclear deterrent

¹⁴³ Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984, 34.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 52.

¹⁴⁵ Charters, Dimensions of Irish Terrorism, 381.

forces. It was not until the Suez Crisis in 1956 "...that the British fully realized the extent to which they had gutted their low-intensity conflict (LIC) capabilities."¹⁴⁶

During the period between the end of World War II and operations in Northern Ireland in 1969, the British Army conducted numerous stability and support operations as part of their imperial policing of their possessions. During the early phases of each one of these operations, "...there was little coordination of intelligence and no existing doctrine to guide action."¹⁴⁷ The British were continually "relearning" the lessons from each previous effort. British author Desmond Hammill tries to further isolate the problem by stating that:

Over the years...the Army had developed a counterinsurgency doctrine...that had worked to great effect in the rural areas of Oman, Borneo, Malaya and, particularly Kenya. The task was found to be much more difficult when these gangs moved into urban areas such as Aden, Nicosia, Ismailia and Jerusalem. In these towns and cities soldiers found themselves fighting an enemy in plain clothes, indistinguishable from the local population and under the gaze of an interested and often adversely critical world press.¹⁴⁸

Commenting on the doctrine used in Northern Ireland, one senior officer that commanded British units in Belfast wrote that, "we based our training on the Internal Security Pamphlets. They are good but writing with hindsight, they need a new section on internal duties in a sophisticated city...."¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s, R-4015-A (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991) v.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, v.

¹⁴⁸ Hammill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984, 33.

¹⁴⁹ Norman L. Dodd, "The Corporals' War: Internal Security Operations in Northern Ireland," Military Review, 56, no. 7 (July 1976) 62.

Many British conventional force commanders were not comfortable with using SOF units in Northern Ireland. In fact, many commanders made it known that they did not want any Special Air Service (SAS) units in Ulster at all. Although little is written about SAS operations in Northern Ireland, it is known that they only were involved in one and two man operations until 1976. Part of the reason for the limited use of a SOF unit by British conventional forces in Northern Ireland is "...owing to a misunderstanding of its role, the SAS was misused at first, its special skills wasted because ordinary infantry commanders did not know how to use them."¹⁵⁰ This is not a new phenomena for the British Army. Throughout their numerous post-World War II counterinsurgency efforts, the British always opted for "large-scale formal operations...in lieu of [the] early use of special forces."¹⁵¹

4. Training

The British Army, as an institution, had a vast experience in stability and support operations but the emphasis of their training remained in conventional operations in support of their NATO mission. Even with some urban experiences in Jerusalem, Cyprus, and Aden, and the exposure to the challenges and complexities of operating in the urban environment, there was little emphasis place on training for urban operations.

¹⁵⁰ Charters, Dimensions of Irish Terrorism, 379.

¹⁵¹ Hoffman and Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s, vi.

Some units were given basic instruction in handling crowds and riot control techniques. British Officer Colonel Norman Dodd observed that the:

...first units that arrived in Northern Ireland were able to effectively deal with riot control duties...but, when the shooting started, it became apparent that the situation was deadly serious and would require special and concentrated training.¹⁵²

Another British Officer that commanded a battalion in Belfast:

...felt, after he had been there for some time, that the training had been wrong. His men had been trained to be reactive, to patrol and to shoot, which he began to think had little relevance to the outcome of an urban guerrilla campaign."¹⁵³

Many of the British officers complained that their soldiers arrived in Northern Ireland with "little or no specialist training."¹⁵⁴ This would change over time. In 1972, the British developed training teams called NITATs. These teams were located in both England and Germany to prepare units for rotation into Northern Ireland. The NITATs were experienced in operations in Northern Ireland and would conduct training courses for units prior to deployment. During the course, soldiers were taught about extremist organizations, given detailed intelligence about their specific area of operations, run through situational training exercises (STX) that mirrored past incidents that were common in their sector, training on ROE, and close quarters firing as well as urban patrolling.

¹⁵² Dodd, "The Corporals' War: Internal Security Operations in Northern Ireland," 62.

¹⁵³ Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984, 118.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 74.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The conflict is on-going in Northern Ireland, although today the level of violence has greatly subsided. Part of the reason for this has been by decisions of the PSF to seek more gains through a political strategy. But the growing effectiveness of the British Army and its adaptation of operations in the urban areas is also responsible.

When the operation evolved from a mission of "aiding" civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order to fighting an urban insurgency, they relied on their "institutional knowledge" from previous stability and support operations. There was no written doctrine to guide their actions, particularly in urban operations. This lack of urban doctrine necessitated *ad hoc* urban tactics and operations which did not coincide with the strategic and political objectives. Many of these "off-the-cuff" operations were complete disasters and actually promoted increased violence as opposed to its intended curbing of violence

The British military had control of security operations in the urban areas of Ulster for almost eight years until primacy was turned back to the RUC. Prior to 1969, the British Army assumed that the police would always be in charge of security operations in the urban areas, so little thought was put into how forces might best be utilized and what approaches could best serve the political goals.

As in the Uruguayan and the French case, intelligence was the driving force in the campaign. As in the other two cases, the British lacked the training and doctrine for well coordinated intelligence gathering between the military, police, and civilian intelligence agencies.

VII. CONCLUSION

As we prepare for the 21st century, the military establishment must begin to think seriously about urban operations, particularly in a stability and support operations scenario. Demographics, socioeconomic trends, geopolitical factors, as well as strategic, operational, and tactical considerations point to the urban environment as a significant, perhaps the dominant, battlefield as we transition into the new millennium. Operating in the urban environment poses new challenges for the U.S. Army that for the past half century has devoted most of its energies and resources, preparing through doctrine and training to fight a conventional enemy on topography that favors our technological advantage in firepower and maneuver.

The three cases studies examined in this thesis demonstrate the problems faced by military forces suddenly confronted with the complexities fighting in a stability and support operation scenario of an urban environment lacking adequate doctrine and training for stability and support operations. The U.S. Army today is in a situation similar to that of the French, Uruguayan, and British forces studied herein. This should be of concern not only for conventional force commanders, but also for ARSOF. In each case presented, the military establishment was adopted an *ad hoc* or "make up as we go along" approach, both to the overall conduct of the urban campaign, and with its employment of its SOF or "elite" units. The SOF or "elite" units experienced their own internal problems, and were either misutilized or neglected altogether during crucial periods in a campaign. The price each army, and each nation, paid for the lack of

adequate urban doctrine and training was large. The heavy-handed methods of the French *Paras* in the “Battle of Algiers” lost the Algerian war for the French. Arguably, the Uruguayan Army won the ten year struggle against the Tupamaros, but the price was the overthrow of a democratic government. The jury is still out in Northern Ireland, but the lack of preparation of the British Army certainly contributed to the escalating terrorist violence there.

The three case studies point to the need for self evaluation by ARSOF as it considers its role in future urban operations. Defense personnel and fiscal constraints, together with the increased optempo in stability and support operations, suggest that ARSOF will be used more extensively in urban operations in the future than it has in the past. If this assumption is true, then it is of utmost importance to begin to think seriously about the roles and missions of ARSOF in urban areas. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) or U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)¹⁵⁵ should write an amplifying doctrinal manual for urban stability and support operations, or we should expand our current *MOUT* doctrine to include stability and support operations. Without such a manual, military planners can only resort to *ad hoc* approaches and solutions to urban operations and the employment of ARSOF. This may very well lead to conducting tactical operations that actually undermine the overall strategic and political objectives of a campaign. This phenomena was clearly evident in all three case studies. Some argue that the United States may have already witnessed this in our own post-Cold War experience in Somalia. Even if such a manual is developed, it will be critical not to

¹⁵⁵ USSOCOM is legislatively mandated authority and responsibility to develop joint special operations doctrine.

become locked into doctrinal dogma, but to maintain doctrinal flexibility. Afterall, each urban complex, enemy threat, and culture in which we operate will provide different and unique challenges which will call for imagination and inventiveness on the part of commanders. As these case studies demonstrate, those who fell back on firepower and brute force, traditional staples of conventional operations, only complicated and even compromised their missions in urban stability and support operations.

What does ARSOF, particularly SF, bring to the table when considering stability and support operations in an urban environment? First and foremost, it affords a “small presence” force in an already confined and overcrowded city, with a language capability and extensive training in cross-cultural communication skills. ARSOF will want to expand its thinking on cross-cultural communication to urban versus rural cultures. Within any one culture, there are a number of sub-cultures that will have an impact on Civil Military Operations (CMO). These skills are critical in working with the populace, host nation military and police forces, and in the case of a multi-national operation, liaison with foreign forces.

SF are more thoroughly trained on close quarters combat (CQC) techniques than conventional units. These discriminate and precise firing techniques are essential in urban operations, with their restrictive ROE, to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties. Not only are these skills important in conducting a unilateral direct action missions, but also they will become critical in the training of foreign military and police forces, which in many cases are inclined to use excessive force in achieving their aims.

SF will have to consider seriously the effects of urbanization and the impact urbanization will have on its missions and collateral activities. For example, the approach to special reconnaissance (SR) operations in urban areas will differ significantly from those in a rural setting in which SF is accustomed to operating. The current SR manual, FM 31-20-5 dedicates a single page to urban operations. This clearly is insufficient in addressing the constraints the urban area poses which includes different modes and methods of infiltration and exfiltration, communications, resupply, and equipment.

The FID mission takes on a different character in an urbanizing world. We can expect host nations to increasingly ask for more assistance in dealing with urban problems. This means that SF teams will be asked to train foreign armies and police forces on CQC type skills. The countries will need more training than shooting and room clearing skills. They will need training and assistance in planning and coordinating an integrated urban campaign--an area which the U.S. Army is also lacking.

The intelligence war was the most important aspect of urban operations in each of the previous case studies. In all three situations, the military faced the problem of trying to distinguish the enemy from the population. Each army in these case studies began operations after a weak and inefficient police failed to achieve dominance in the intelligence war. The police had failed to establish adequate intelligence networks within the populace. All three armies carried out little intelligence planning prior to assumption of control of the urban areas. The French, Uruguayan, and British militaries were forced to create *ad hoc* intelligence organizations to meet their needs. Some armies

adapted better than others. The French in Algiers tried to employ technology to offset their inability to collect needed information. They soon learned that their new "signals" technology did very little against a low-tech enemy like the FLN. The coordinated efforts of the various branches of the Uruguayan military, as well as the police, greatly enhanced their tactical effectiveness. Like the French, the Uruguayan and British Army all out quest for intelligence led them to questionable tactics and methods for acquiring information that undermined the political goals.

The United States is experiencing many of the same phenomena that the armies in the case studies experienced. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army is undergoing fiscal and personnel constraints that have adversely affected the intelligence community, much like the French and British armies did at the time of the outbreak of their respective conflicts. Just as the French and British did, the United States is searching for answers to many of these type problems through advancements in technology.

In the area of intelligence collection in an urban environment, SF could be utilized as a force multiplier. There is an expanded need for information and intelligence in an urban environment that technology cannot fill, particularly when operating against a "low-tech" or asymmetrical enemy. SF provides the potential to expand the human intelligence (HUMINT) collection capability. Each case demonstrated that intelligence collection worked best when it is part of a coordinated intelligence effort between the military and the police. As previously mentioned, SF offers the potential to expand the capability but that would require a restructuring of Operations and Intelligence (O&I)

type courses SF soldiers currently attend as well as investigating of any current legal limitations.

Although there was only a cursory examination of psychological operations (PSYOPS) in this study, it was evident that each army increased its consideration of it at some point in the conflict. It was not until after the "Battle of Algiers" that PSYOP units began arriving in Algeria. The PSYOP campaign started late in both Uruguay and in the conflict in Northern Ireland, but most analysts agree that its impact was substantial. This is certainly worthy of further research and follow-on study.

U.S. PSYOP forces will increasingly be called upon in urban areas and will have complex issues to address. To its advantage, urban areas offer PSYOP force the "concentration effect" with access to large numbers of people in a confined area with the added benefit of increased mediums through which to conduct operations. Paradoxically, the concentration of diverse ethnic and religious groups that compose a Third World city may provide additional problems as well. PSYOP themes that work on one segment of the population, may have unwanted effects on another. Overlapping of target audiences may lead to more generic themes, making them less effective. Also, the "concentration effect" can work to the enemy's advantage, particularly if they can get the media involved. There is likely to be more media in the cities than in rural areas. It likely to become harder to enforce press pools there.

Civil Affairs was important in the French and the Uruguayan cases. The development of the SAUs in Algiers provided a vital link to the civil population but found out quickly that much of their effectiveness was lost because it was not integrated

into other aspects of the urban campaign. In Uruguay, the CA functions that the army performed prior to assuming full control of the mission were important in maintaining relations between the Uruguayan military and the population of Montevideo. As CA functions fell to the wayside upon taking over the mission, so did their relationship with the people.

Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers will also be increasingly important in future urban campaigns. Urban areas, with its more complex sub-systems necessitates an increased capacity for CA assets to carry out CMO. CA has many of the same considerations as that of PSYOPS in regard to "concentration." The concentration of the masses can provide an advantage in that actions conducted by CA personnel and host nation personnel can be observed by many, enhancing the effectiveness of showing that the regime is attempting to look after the needs of the population: assisting in providing food, shelter, sanitation, and potable water. Paradoxically, this concentration of people will complicate the solutions of providing the basic necessities to the populace. This could present a logistical problem in which the regime is incapable of supporting, or that United States is unwilling to support.

In all three cases, training to prepare soldiers for the urban environment was inadequate. Much like Krepinevich's "Army Concept" argument, each nation had a "...perception of how wars out to be waged and is reflected in the way it organizes and trains...."¹⁵⁶ ARSOF training for future urban operations will have to see an increased emphasis if we are thoroughly to prepare soldiers to meet conditions of future conflict.

¹⁵⁶ Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) 5.

Not only should ARSOF courses taught at the JFKSWCS focus more on urban operations, but training should emphasize more urban operations. Providing for a realistic training environment is one of the most immediate challenges, because replicating the crowded conditions of today's Third World cities is extremely difficult. The sheer crush of humanity on an urban street is one of the most disorienting aspects for an ARSOF soldier trained to fight in rural areas. Technology may have its most immediate impact on urban operations in the area of training. Virtual reality simulation devices under development can simulate urban environments while interacting with the populace. Ralph Peters suggestion for an Urban National Training Center should also be looked at more closely. Although this thesis does not attempt to provide all the solutions, it has attempted to identify serious shortcomings in U.S. *MOUT* and *Stability and Support Operations* doctrine and training and to illustrate the potentially serious consequences of these shortcomings.

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