STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Informing the Debate:
The Impact of Operations Other Than War on Combat Training Readiness

by

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ABSTRACT

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Under a National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, the US Army is likely to deploy more frequently in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) while the post-Cold War drawdown enters its final phases. This study explores the impacts of OOTW on the training readiness of these units to conduct combat operations. It is based on a survey instrument distributed to students and faculty members of the US Army War College. The unique density of War College students with OOTW experience in leadership positions provides a fertile basis to explore both benefits and costs associated with OOTW. Respondents answered questions in three distinct categories: (1) predeployment training readiness; (2) training readiness during OOTW, and (3) post deployment training readiness. The core findings of this project are that there are significant, but largely predictable, costs associated with OOTW; that units recovering from OOTW are frequently not afforded adequate time for recovery; and that standard reporting and evaluation means are frequently not used to identify, track and resolve training readiness shortfalls. Resulting "pockets of unreadiness" are thus more likely to occur as frequency of OOTW deployments increases and force structure and other resources decrease. Specific recommendations are offered to mitigate many of these negative impacts so that such pockets of unreadiness can be prevented.

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Geostrategic Setting

In 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Empire, the United States won the Cold War, but lost its monolithic enemy. Within months, a global drawdown of military forces began as national constituencies each sought the elusive "peace dividend." Interrupted momentarily by OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990-1991, the United States nonetheless reduced its military forces by 33% between FY 1987 and FY 1997. This was accompanied by deep and continuing reductions in defense outlays relative to gross domestic product, from over 6% in 1985 to 3.2% in FY 97, well below any level since before World War II.[1] The 1992 election of Bill Clinton as US President affirmed a domestic, inward focus as the nation's top priority, sustaining this general course. Over the next four years, a new world order began to emerge, complete with its own challenges and opportunities. In response, the Clinton Administration evolved a National Security Strategy which emphasized global leadership, preventive diplomacy and selective engagement.[2] That strategy of Engagement and Enlargement rests upon three tiers of defense for national security: (1) preventing threats from emerging; (2) deterring threats that do emerge; and (3) defeating threats with military force after prevention and deterrence have failed.[3] Seeking to take advantage of the unique opportunities of this Post-Cold War World, the President emphasized the first tier, preventive defense, over deterrence - a fundamental reversal of cold war defense policies.[4]

The challenge of this national security strategy to the military is significant: it must complete the drawdown while maintaining robust and versatile military forces that can accomplish a wide variety of directed missions to include:

-- credible deterrence and, if required, defeating aggression in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts
-- forward deployment to deter aggression, demonstrate commitment to allies, underwrite regional stability, and provide initial capabilities to respond to crises

-- preparation for a wide variety of contingency operations in support of US interests including smaller-scale combat operations, peace operations, noncombatant evacuations, and humanitarian and disaster relief operations
-- deterring use of, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and fighting more effectively if such weapons are used.[5]

Of these missions, only the first falls under the traditional rubric of war - the remainder are classified as Operations Other Than War (OOTW).[6] The Army tasked to perform these full spectrum operations has been reduced from a Cold War strength (FY 1990) of 18 active duty divisions and 54 reserve component brigades to 10 active divisions and 42 reserve brigades in FY 1997.[7] Engagement and Enlargement will thus be undertaken by an Army reduced in strength 37% since 1987, from 781,000 to 495,000.[8] The convergence of this strategy, the drawdown, and the changing geostrategic landscape leads to certain conclusions: (1) the Army will likely play an expanded role in national security policy; (2) this role will emphasize preventive defense with increased employment in OOTW while still requiring robust deterrence capability; and (3) fewer, perhaps significantly fewer, resources will be available.

Against this background, this project explores the central issue of how OOTW affect the readiness of Army units to fight and win the nation's wars. Its central thesis is that OOTW generally degrade the combat readiness of participating units; that these effects vary by type of unit and OOTW; that they are largely predictable and can thus be managed; and that the readiness of any unit to successfully perform combat operations after an OOTW is directly related to a fully protected recovery period validated through a formal training evaluation.

The central issues embedded in these assertions have recently been raised by claims that the deployment of the 1st Armored Division to Bosnia for a year improved, rather than degraded combat readiness.[9] Taken only slightly out of the context in which they were likely intended, such statements can undermine the foundations upon which training readiness, force structure,

and rotation decisions are made. If true, one might conclude that OOTW are inherently good for the Army, contributing to, rather than detracting from, its ability to prosecute war. Recovery becomes an unnecessary luxury rather than a requirement, and force structure can be reduced because units should be capable of flowing directly from OOTW to a Major Regional Contingency (MRC). Since OOTW, as the argument might go, can enhance combat training while meeting valid national security objectives, we should employ our forces in OOTW as often as possible. While these extensions of the basic comments were not likely intended, a review of the basic issues embedded in the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) attests to this central tension between the dual requirements of sustaining a credible warfighting force while executing OOTW required by the National Security Strategy.[10] This is a serious matter worthy of informed debate.

Because I believed this readiness issue to be central to important national security questions, I wanted to inform my own opinion, providing something of larger value to the Army in the process. The collective OOTW experiences of Army leaders at the US Army War College represented a unique and valuable source of data. To give voice to those experiences, I developed a survey tool comprising 27 core questions designed to capture predeployment training readiness, readiness during OOTW, and post deployment readiness **(Appendix A: Sample Survey)**.[11] The findings which emerge from this unique body of data inform the debate. It is a story worth listening to, thinking about, and acting upon.

Methodology: Survey Basics

The survey tool was divided into four sections: (1) **Population data** providing branch, component, type and location of unit; type OOTW, duration, and position of the respondent during the OOTW; (2) **Predeployment questions** to explore the state of training readiness for both OOTW and normal warfighting skills; (3) Questions relating to **training readiness during the**

OOTW; and (4) Questions relating to **post deployment training readiness**. My intent was to investigate how units prepared for OOTW, how they sustained and tracked training readiness, and how they recovered to full combat readiness after redeployment.

The survey instrument was delivered to 221 Army officers attending the resident US Army War College Class of 1997. Of these, 187 are active Army, 14 Army Reserve, and 20 Army National Guard.[12] An additional 40 surveys were distributed to Army USAWC faculty members. Of the 261 survey instruments distributed to Army officers, 97 were returned with responses. These were further divided into two categories: 63 respondents with OOTW experience, and 34 respondents without OOTW experience. This first category was further divided into 57 active duty officers and 6 reserve officers; the former serving as the primary target population based on their direct involvement in pre-, during-, and post-deployment training opportunities. Data from each anonymous survey was transferred to a single, very large Microsoft© EXCEL spreadsheet (**Appendix B**). Separate worksheets were then constructed for unique subgroups based on unit type or unique responses to selected questions. The master spreadsheet and associated worksheets served as the basic tools for data consolidation and critical analysis.

The Core Group
Active Duty Army Officers With OOTW Experience

This group consisted of 57 active duty Army officers with experience in OOTW. Because one officer had experience in two OOTW, two surveys were turned in, generating 58 total responses. This group provided 81 responses to the question regarding type of OOTW experience: 34 (42%) reported experience in **humanitarian assistance**; 18 (22%) in **peacekeeping operations**; 14 (17%) in **domestic support**; 12 (15%) in **peace enforcement**; and 4 (5%) in **other types** of OOTW. The largest segment of these respondents (37 representing 65% of this

group) served as **battalion commander** (or equivalent) during the OOTW. These 57 respondents represented 13 **combat support** units (22%), 12 **combat service support** units (21%), 11 **light combat** units (19%), 10 **heavy combat** units (17%), 7 **special operations** units (12%), and 5 higher level, interagency, and multi-national **staffs** (9%) **(Figure 1).**



Figure 1: Unit Type Representation

Section I: Predeployment

These questions focused on predeployment training readiness in both routine Mission Essential Task List (METL) and OOTW tasks. The first question asked whether the unit METL included tasks that were required by the OOTW. Sixty-four percent reported that "most" or "all" of the tasks required by the OOTW were in their unit METL. This is a significant finding. It supports the assertion that for many units, normal METL training does, in fact, prepare them for OOTW. Thirty-six percent reported that "few" to "none" of the OOTW-required tasks were included in their current unit METL. This sustains the alternate view that for a considerable number of units, routine training does not prepare them for OOTW. Of greater importance, the next question attempted to identify whether there were any critical OOTW tasks not included in unit METL. Fifty-six respondents answered this question with 60% (35) stating that no critical tasks

were required by the OOTW that were not already listed in unit METL. This further supports the contention that predeployment METL training provides a reasonably good OOTW training base. That said, the 21 respondents who stated that the OOTW did require critical tasks not included in their METL represent nearly 37% of this population; this seems to indicate that improvements upon that training base are possible. That is a significant finding; however, greater utility lay in the 33 specific tasks identified by these respondents (**Appendix C: Critical OOTW Tasks**). Commanders preparing for an OOTW would do well to consider these tasks in designing their predeployment training program.

To train for OOTW, 60% of the respondents used "normal METL training," 33% used a "special training ramp up" directed at OOTW tasks, and 17% used "OJT" as the primary means to prepare. The great majority of respondents (55 of 58) reported that their unit's predeployment training readiness on normal METL skills was either "fully combat ready," or "combat ready with minor limitations." Only two respondents stated that their unit was "not combat ready" on METL tasks. This data clearly illuminates the success of the Army's leadership in sustaining a high level of training readiness in spite of the drawdown.

These same percentages generally held for predeployment training readiness in OOTW skills, with 26% reporting their unit as "fully trained" in OOTW tasks, 64% reporting "trained with minor shortfalls," and only 7% reporting "significant training shortfalls" (5%), or "untrained" (2%). Significantly, for 44% of this population, predeployment readiness was either "not assessed" (22%), or only "assessed internally" by an informal commander's assessment (22%). For the remaining 32 respondents, a combination of ARTEPs (21%), CTC rotations (26%), and other type exercises (22%) were employed. [NOTE: The total exceeds 100% because some units combined ARTEP with CTC rotation]

In general, this initial section provides compelling evidence that unit commanders believed that their units were largely prepared for both wartime and OOTW mission tasks. For many units, significant OOTW tasks were already a part of the unit METL. Where critical tasks were not included in unit METLs, the units either trained for them during a special OOTW training ramp up, or they apparently trained on the job. The list of critical OOTW tasks missing from unit METLs provided by these officers is a valuable tool for commanders developing pre-deployment readiness training programs. The most disturbing data reported in this section was the lack of formal benchmark in training readiness for 44% of the units surveyed. Internal command assessments are a routine and important part of unit training assessment; however, they are no substitute for formal external evaluations. It is likely that some of these units deployed with little or no warning and were therefore unable to undergo a formal training evaluation. Even so, failure to establish this benchmark prior to deployment could mask significant training deficiencies impacting on the OOTW mission, and deny the commander the critical start point for post-deployment combat training readiness recovery. You cannot assess how far you have to go unless you know from where you have come.

Section II: During OOTW Deployment

In this section, respondents were asked seven questions relating to training readiness during the deployment. The first of these was designed to measure METL task training opportunities during the OOTW. Only 15 (26%) reported METL training opportunities "equal to," or "greater than" those at home station. Given that most METL skills, especially collective tasks, are inherently volatile, reduced training opportunity during OOTW is a critical factor in post-deployment combat readiness. In fact, 48% of the respondents reported METL training opportunities in the two lowest categories: "non-existent" (26%), or "much less than" (22%). An ad-

ditional 22% reported these opportunities as "somewhat less than." Figure 2 illustrates the roll up of this data with 72% reporting opportunities between "non-existent" to "less than".



Figure 2: METL Training Opportunities During OOTW

The second question was directed toward other than METL training opportunities; the numbers are similar: 64% reported that their unit was able to train to these tasks "not at all" (26%) or "to a small degree" (38%), while only 3% reported that they were able to train "to a great degree." Thirty-one percent reported that they were able to train "to some degree."

The central message is clear: OOTW do not appear to offer many opportunities for training in either OOTW or METL tasks. This has profound predeployment and post deployment implications. OJT, by inference, would entail considerable risk, and therefore, should not be relied upon as the principal tool for preparing a unit for OOTW. Similarly, because units were largely denied the opportunity to train to METL skills during the OOTW, recovery operations become critical to restoring predeployment training readiness.

In the next question, respondents were asked to assess the overall impact of the OOTW on the unit's combat training readiness. This was perhaps the most interesting response in the

survey, with 19 respondents (32%) stating that the OOTW actually "improved" combat training readiness. Although this group represents a minority view, their perspectives are worthy of full exploration; this is provided in **Section IV.** Still, the majority of respondents (65%) assessed that participation in OOTW degraded combat training readiness. While 27 (46%) reported "minimal" degradation, 11 (19%) reported "substantial" degradation. Three percent reported "no impact." This data is illustrated in **Figure 3;** it is somewhat surprising given the slightly higher percentage (72%) reporting reduced training opportunities discussed in the previous section. However, it largely substantiates the assertion that reduced training opportunities leads to reduced combat training readiness.



Figure 3: OOTW Impact on Combat Training Readiness

The next questions asked respondents to identify specific type tasks significantly enhanced or degraded by the OOTW. As might be expected by the intensely individual nature of many OOTW tasks, the highest marks for "significant enhancement" were given to individual skills (53%), followed by crew skills (45%), squad skills (28%), platoon skills (31%), company

skills (14%), and battalion skills (14%). Six respondents (10%) stated that no skills were improved by the OOTW, while five respondents (9%) reported improvements in Task Force/Joint Staff coordination.

To assess skills degraded by OOTW, the total number of responses for each unit type and in each skill category is provided in **TABLE 1**. Although the table is detailed and appears complex, it is worthy of study. To read the table, simply note that the left hand column identifies unit type and lists total number of respondents in that category. Skills degraded are listed in red at the top of the table; they are read left to right, with the numbers in each column corresponding to the actual number of respondents in that unit type who identified that task as seriously degraded by the OOTW. [Note that because respondents were allowed to identify multiple task categories, if the numbers in each row are added, the sum may exceed the total number of respondents.] By adding the total "hits" in each column, we note that the greatest skill degradation was reported for battalion level tasks (40%), followed by company tasks (36%), platoon tasks (31%), individual tasks (29%), crew tasks (21%), and squad tasks (17%) (see **TABLE 1,** bottom row).

However, the data in this table appeared further to break out into distinct sets based on type of unit. For example, 67% (14 of 21) of the respondents of the combined heavy and light combat units reported degradation to battalion skills, 62% reported degradation to company skills and 42% reported degradation to platoon skills. This stands in sharp contrast to only 28% of the combined SOF, CSS and CS population reporting battalion skill degradation, 24% reporting company skill degradation, and 28% reporting platoon skill degradation. Conversely, 48% of the aggregate SOF, CSS and CS population listed individual skills as most severely degraded, with 28% reporting degradation in platoon and battalion skills, and 25% reporting degradation in squad and company skills. Individual skill degradation was scarcely noted by the combat units

(9%). Special mention should also be made of the dominating influence of the CS numbers in the SOF/ CSS/CS grouping. Nine of 13 respondents in the CS category (69%) reported serious skill degradation to individual skills; this accounts for 60% of the combined responses of the CS/CSS/SOF group.

TABLE 1: SKILL DEGRADATION

Skills: Unit type (# of respondents):	individual	crew	squad	platoon	company	battalion	daily ops
SOF (7)	4	3	5 (71%)	3	3	3	0
CSS (12)	2	1	1	2	3 (25%)	3 (25%)	0
CS (13)	9 (69%)	3	2	4	2	3	0
OTHER (5)	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 (40%)
CBT HVY (10)	0	3	1	5	6 (60%)	5	0
CBT LT (11)	2	2	1	4	7	9 (82%)	0
total responses/ total respondents (58):	17 (29%)	12 (21%)	10 (17%)	18 (31%)	21 (36%)	23 (40%)	2 (3%)

Table 1: Skills Significantly Degraded by OOTW (most significant degradation highlighted for each type unit with % of respondents indicated)

A number of key points emerge. Combat and combat support units appear to suffer the greatest skill degradation (albeit at different ends of the training spectrum) and CSS units suffer the least degradation during OOTW. CS/SOF units regard individual and squad skill degradation as most serious; while CSS units report generally low levels of skill degradation across the board. Perhaps the greatest value of this data is that it provides a rough means to type-cast OOTW skill degradation by unit type, thus allowing commanders and trainers to predict OOTW impacts and plan recovery operations accordingly. (**Appendix E**).

The final question of this section was intended to determine whether standard unit status reporting criteria and procedures were followed during the deployment. Only 53% of respon-

dents reported that standard USR reporting was used. Thirty-eight percent stated that standard readiness reporting procedures were not followed. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the underlying reasons behind this, standard readiness reporting is an indispensable link connecting predeployment training readiness with post deployment training readiness. Failure to track unit readiness during OOTW eliminates the most important tool a subordinate commander has to inform the chain of command that shortfalls exist. It also creates discontinuities in readiness reporting that can mask serious training deficiencies upon redeployment. This is especially important given the low incidence of formal predeployment training evaluation.

Section III: Post Deployment

These questions were designed to assess unit readiness upon return from OOTW. Their primary focus is on recovery, the final phase of any operation. Too often, this phase is truncated in the press of home station requirements. Yet, perhaps no question is more central to the ability of a unit to deploy to war or to another OOTW mission than the question of how completely it has recovered from its last operation. As this section illustrates, recovery operations may be one of the first casualties of "winning the peace" through OOTW.

The first question asked respondents to describe how much time their unit was allowed to recover following the OOTW. Responses must be considered in light of the overwhelming number of respondents (70%) who reported reduced ability to train to METL tasks during the OOTW. We also learned in the previous section that while OOTW generally tended to enhance individual and smaller unit (section, squad, platoon) skills, they also tended to degrade collective skills at the company and battalion level most significantly. In this context, recovery operations become indispensable to rebuilding unit collective skills. From a trainer's perspective, these skills are the most time and resource intensive skills of any unit training program.[13]

Recovery time provided ranged from a low of one week (10%) to a high of greater than five months (3%). The greatest number of responses was received for one month recovery (24%), followed by 2 weeks (19%), 3 weeks (10%), 6 weeks (3%) and 2 months (2 %). Significantly, 12% did not answer the question and 16% of the respondents reported "no recovery" period at all. Lack of dedicated recovery for over half of this latter sub-group (5 of 9) can be attributed to administrative reasons such as: "returned before unit redeployed," "served on higher level staff," or "extremely short deployment (4 days)." One unit was not allowed to recover because it "went right into alert cycle" after a three month deployment to Haiti. The other three respondents did not specify the reason why recovery was not possible.

The next question asked respondents to assess the effectiveness of recovery time relative to restoring the unit to full combat readiness in three separate categories: personnel, equipment and training. Results are indicated in **Figure 4**:



Figure 4: Recovery Time Sufficiency

Analysis of the survey data reveals that almost half of the 58 respondents (28 or 48%) indicated a "no" response in at least one of the three categories. On the positive side, 33% (19) felt that their unit was afforded adequate recovery time in all three categories. Eleven respondents (19%) did not answer this question. As the chart above makes clear, 45% (26 respondents) reported insuf-

ficiency in training recovery time. When coupled with lack of formal predeployment training assessment, significantly reduced METL training opportunities, and lack of standard USR reporting during OOTW, insufficient recovery time assumes much greater significance. Post deployment training readiness remains a significant challenge for many units. This survey illustrates that this challenge is likely to be even more complex and difficult for those units deployed to lengthy OOTW requiring skills significantly different from normal combat requirements.

Respondents were also asked to list the main training distracters which degraded unit training readiness after return: 79 entries were provided (**Appendix D**). Some represent distracters controlled by higher headquarters; others merely training shortfalls. For commanders seeking to improve the training readiness of recovering units, these responses provide a helpful perspective.

The next question in this section takes post-deployment readiness out of the realm of conjecture. Respondents were asked if, and how, their post-OOTW training readiness was assessed. For 29% of this group (17 respondents), post deployment training readiness was "not assessed." "ARTEPs/EXEVALs" were reported by 23% and 13% respectively, while 18% curiously provided no answer. The lack of a response from so large a group is problematic. It is difficult to read anything positive from the answer, and while I have not included this number in the "not assessed" category, many of these respondents likely fit this category.

Interestingly enough, only 19 respondents total (33%) reported training readiness assessed through either ARTEP or CTC or combination of both. The remainder reported a variety of means including "internal assessment" by the commander (5%), "exercises" (4%), BCTP (2%), IG inspection (2%) and gunnery (2%). This data is depicted in the following figure:



Figure 5: Post-OOTW Training Readiness Assessment Means

With only 38% of the respondents reporting that post-deployment training readiness was assessed through one of the Army's formal training assessment means (ARTEP/EXEVAL, CTC, BCTP), significant training deficiencies can remain hidden.

Next, respondents were asked to estimate how soon after the unit returned from its OOTW would it have been able to successfully execute an ARTEP, a CTC rotation, or deploy to an MRC. This question was intended to provide yet another vantage point from which to view the perceived impact of OOTW on combat training readiness. The response to time required to prepare for an ARTEP was provided by 40 respondents (69%) and averaged 82 days. The second question, time required to prepare for a CTC rotation, was answered by 36 respondents (62%) and averaged 88 days preparation time. The final category, time required to prepare the unit for successful deployment to an MRC, was answered by 38 respondents (66%) and ranged from a low average of 81 days to a high average of 91 days **(Figure 6)**.



Figure 6: Required Preparation Time

This data seems to counter any general assertion that OOTW renders participating units more, rather than less, combat ready, or by extension, that such units could be safely redeployed from OOTW to MRC without extensive recovery. This conclusion is further supported by the next responses regarding the likely impact of deploying the unit to an MRC before the required preparation time was complete. Forty-three percent of respondents (25 of 58) assessed that the consequence of early deployment would range from "mission failure" (2%) or "mission success with significant casualties" (5%), to "mission success with moderate casualties" (36%). Fifteen percent of the respondents (9) did not answer the question. Forty-one percent (24) stated that the effect would be "mission success with few casualties." Thus, slightly more than half of those who answered this question (25 of 49) believe that training readiness shortfalls would result in at least a moderate number of casualties if the unit were required to employ to an MRC prior to completing OOTW recovery.

The next questions focused on whether OOTW tasks should be incorporated in unit METLs. There are strong feelings on both sides of this issue. The debate is framed on one end

by those who argue that preparing to win the nation's wars is the Army's priority mission, that there is already too little time to train to combat requirements, and that incorporating OOTW tasks must necessarily come at the expense of more important warfighting tasks. Proponents of this position generally believe that if you train a unit to go to war, it can easily transition to OOTW requirements with a short training ramp-up. The other side of the argument is based on assertions that OOTW have assumed a pre-eminent role in US National Security Strategy, that OOTW are far more likely to occur than MRCs, and that the requirements of OOTW are much too complex and individual skill intensive to rely on limited training ramp ups. Proponents of this position believe that at least critical OOTW tasks should be included in the METL of any unit which might be called upon to execute an OOTW operation.

The survey data reflects an unequal split. Of the 58 respondents, 17 (29%) answered "no" to the question of incorporating OOTW tasks into METLs. Just over 60% (35 respondents) believe that OOTW tasks should be included in unit METLs. Ten percent (6 respondents) did not answer the question. Based on a recognition that unit training programs are already time constrained, respondents were further asked to state what percent of warfighting tasks they were willing to neglect in order to add OOTW tasks. For the 52 respondents who answered this question (both "yes" and "no" responses considered in the average), the average was 11% of warfighting tasks. For the 35 "yes" responses only, the average was 15% of these tasks. The data confirms that the majority of the members of this population group believe that OOTW should be included in unit METLs, and they appear to be willing to accept some risk to combat skill training in order to accomplish that end.

The final question of the survey asked respondents to identify any other training readiness issues: 27 comments were provided; they are included at **Appendix E.**

Section IV: Improved Combat Readiness

Of the 19 respondents who reported that their "combat readiness was improved" by the OOTW (question 14), 8 were from CSS units, 3 from CS units, 2 from light combat, 2 from heavy combat, 1 from SOF, and 3 from other unit types (higher staffs). Nearly three-fourths (73.6%) of these 19 were battalion commanders or equivalent. Only 7 (37%) respondents reported that unit readiness was formally assessed through either a CTC rotation, ARTEP, external evaluation, or external inspection prior to deployment. Nine of the 19 (47%) reported that their unit had "less METL training opportunities" during the OOTW, and 12 of the 19 (63%) stated that their unit's ability to perform non-METL training during the OOTW was "small" to "non-existent." Just over 50% of this population (10 of 19) stated that their unit used standard USR reporting criteria and procedures. This unique population of 19 respondents reporting improved combat readiness overwhelmingly reported (74%) that their unit OOTW tasks complemented or replicated critical go to war tasks "to a great degree," with the remainder reporting "some" compliance between the two categories of tasks. This dramatically compares with a survey average of 29%. This task correlation is probably the single most significant indicator of why this sub-group believed the OOTW improved their combat readiness. In fact, only 17 of the total population of 58 survey respondents stated that their OOTW tasks complemented their go to war tasks "to a great degree." Fourteen (82%) belong to this unique subgroup. Task correlation is clearly related to leader assessment of whether the OOTW improved or degraded combat readiness. The importance of this finding is that OOTW and METL task correlation can be assessed before the OOTW, and risk assessments made regarding potential combat skill degradation. This data can then be used in development of a holistic unit training program which (1) mitigates the

negative impacts of the OOTW, (2) takes advantage of the training opportunities it represents, and (3) incorporates critical neglected skill training during unit recovery.

Section V: Conclusions

Based on the survey data, a composite unit "picture" can be constructed which captures the core experiences of these respondents: (1) unit is selected/notified of OOTW; (2) there is about a 50% likelihood that predeployment readiness will not be formally assessed; (3) unit deploys to OOTW; (4) there is about a 70% chance that the unit will have "reduced" to "non-existent" opportunities to train to METL tasks during the deployment; (5) there is a better than 50% chance that the unit will sustain some degree of combat training readiness degradation ranging from minimal to substantial; (6) if the unit is a combat unit, there is a better than 60% chance that battalion and company level collective skills will be seriously eroded. If the unit is a combat support unit, there is a better than 60% chance that it will suffer serious degradation to its individual skills; (7) there is only a slightly better than 50% chance that readiness during the OOTW will be reported using standard USR standards and criteria; (8) unit redeploys; (9) the unit stands almost a 50% chance of not fully recovering from the deployment (especially in training readiness); (10) it is highly likely (about 65%) that there will not be a formal evaluation to expose that lack of readiness; (11) on average, the unit will need 82 days to prepare for an ARTEP, 88 days to prepare for a CTC rotation, and between 81 and 91 days to prepare for a commitment to combat; and finally, (12) there is about a 50% chance that if deployed to significant combat operations before that recovery is complete, the unit will accomplish the mission, but at a "moderate" to "high" cost in casualties resulting from training readiness shortfalls.

While this composite "picture" is entirely fictional, it is informed by the collective real world experiences of 58 senior officers. Thus, it is more meaningful than individual experience

or speculation. The compelling logic which resonates through this data is that it captures the essence of the direct experiences of a significant number of senior leaders who were personally responsible for readiness through all phases of OOTW, predeployment through recovery. The central message derived from this composite "picture" seems simple: deploy Army units on OOTW, as required, but be selective in unit selection to minimize combat readiness degradation; allow proper train up for both OOTW and war tasks; assess readiness properly throughout all phases of the operation; allow full recovery upon return; then validate training readiness when recovery is complete. By these measures, the real costs of OOTW can be documented and funded.

With this analysis done, we can now assess the announcement that the 1st Armored Division's year long deployment to Bosnia "improved" combat readiness. Although this survey does not include the recovery of the 1st Armored Division from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR because none of the survey participants has been involved in that recovery, it is highly improbable that the division emerged combat ready. This is particularly true for key collective warfighting tasks which appear to suffer the greatest degradation in OOTW for combat units. Although this assessment is supported by the data in this research project, readiness facts, not conjecture, must inform the debate. Training readiness is far too important to the nation, to the Army, and to our soldiers, to base on anything but formal training evaluations; conjectures of readiness without such validation set dangerous precedent and can mask true recovery requirements.

We can conclude from this survey that OOTW have predictable and measurable costs associated with them. These costs will vary widely based on unit type and OOTW, but in general, combat training readiness will be one of them. Even when extraordinary measures are taken, it will be degraded and can be restored only though protected recovery. Preserving that recovery is

leader's business; but once back in the crucible of home station requirements, recovery appears to be an early casualty of "winning the peace."

Section VI: Recommendations

OOTW are here to stay. This survey has presented evidence that such operations can affect the readiness of units to fight and win the nation's wars even as they preserve the peace. Yet the survey data suggests that the real threat to national security is not the "fact of" participation in OOTW so much as the inability of many units to execute full recovery upon return. In such a fashion, pockets of "low readiness" become inevitable. Preventing such readiness shortfalls is the primary objective of this project. To that end, the following specific recommendations are offered:

1. **Expand this survey's population** to incorporate a broader sampling of the "Total Army." Make this a "living" data base; update for each new OOTW (See **Appendix A** for sample survey) and maintain it at Ft. Leavenworth's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Capture and disseminate recovery operation lessons learned Army wide.

2. **Protect and validate recovery as the top priority for units recovering from OOTW**. Provide command guidance to insulate such units from non-recovery operations indicated in **Appendix D.** Require fully recovered units to rotate to CTC to validate combat readiness. Do not cycle a recovering unit to another military operation without this formal training readiness validation.

3. Require Major Commands to **scrub Mission Training Plans (MTPs)** in conjunction with TRADOC; **incorporate select critical OOTW tasks** in all MTPs for units with previous OOTW experience or likelihood of future OOTW involvement (**Appendix C** proposes critical tasks). Incorporate leader OOTW skills in formal institutional training in all schools and at all levels, entry through executive, emphasizing Non-governmental Organization (NGO)/Private Volunteer Organization (PVO)/ Interagency coordination and negotiation skills. Continue to incorporate OOTW tasks in CTC rotations to the maximum extent possible.

4. Demand **standard readiness reporting** for all units through all phases of the OOTW to ensure METL and OOTW deficiencies are transparent.

Through these measures, the Army's leadership can better communicate, and mitigate, any real negative effects of OOTW on combat readiness across the force. Moreover, these steps will ensure that pockets of "low readiness" are prevented as the Army meets its dual obligations of preparing for war while winning the peace. Armed with this data, let the real debate begin.

ENDNOTES

[1]William J. Perry, **Annual Report to the President and the Congress** (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1996), 254-255.

[2] William J. Clinton, **A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement** (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1996), 11.

[3] **Perry**, viii.

[4] Ibid.

[5] **Perry**, 4-5.

[6] Department of the Army, **FM 100-5: Operations** (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 2-0, 2-1.

[7] Perry, 254.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Both sides of this debate can be examined by recent articles such as Tom Breen's "Bosnia Mission Improves Army Readiness, Joulwan Says" in **Defense Daily**, October 16, 1996, page 85, and John Hillen's "Playing Politics With The Military," in the **Wall Street Journal**, December 5, 1996, page 20. See also Mike O'Conner's "Does Keeping the Peace Spoil G.I.'s for War," in the **New York Times**, 13 December 1996, pages 1-3.

[10] Elaine M. Grossman, "JCS Chief May Tweak Joint Strategy Review After Getting Political Input," **Inside The Pentagon**, January 9, 1997, page 1. See also Vago Muradian's article, "Defense Study Will Boost Army Funding, Top Officer Says," in **Defense Daily**, October 29, 1996, p. 159, and Harry Summers excellent article, "Perry's Defense Priorities in Peril," **Washington Times**, December 19, 1996, page 16 for the parameters of this core issue.

[11] The survey was developed over the period November 1996 - January 1997. Draft surveys were reviewed by Professor Doug Campbell, Director for the USAWC's Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), Colonel Charles Ware and Colonel Jim Bessler from the CSL Strategic Crisis Exercise Team, and the students and faculty members of Seminar 5, USAWC Class of 1997. I remain indebted to these great soldiers for their assistance in this effort.

[12] USAWC AY 97 Statistical Data obtained from LTC Chris Holladay, Chief, Admin Division, USAWC Student Operations.

[13] See Department of the Army, **FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training**, September 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army), page C-2 and accompanying discussion on page C-3 for graphic portrayal of the relationship between complexity of task, resourcing and realism.

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Appendix A: Sample Survey

Dear Classmates: **9 January 1997**

I am preparing an SRP on the effect of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) on training readiness. As part of my research, I am surveying the members of our class for those with personal experiences in this area. Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability; feel free to attach additional information if you desire. This issue is critical to a number of ongoing strategic debates such as force structure, force size, training, OOTW rotations, OOTW recovery operations, and reallocation of forces from OOTW to a MRC. Please return to BOX 178 NLT 24 January 1997. For additional information, you may contact me via ccmail (landrya) or at 258-1402. Thanks in advance for your help.

Al Landry

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1. What is your **branch** of Service: **[ ] Army [ ] Navy [ ] Air Force [ ] USMC [ ] Other (specify)**_____

2. What is your **component**: **[ ] Active [ ] Reserve**

3. Have you ever **participated in an OOTW** (if " no" please go to question __) :
[ ] Yes (list type below) **[ ] No**
[ ] humanitarian assistance [ ] peacekeeping [ ] peace enforcement [ ] domestic support [ ] other
_____

4. If "Yes" please detail below (please fill out a separate survey form for each):
Operation (name): **Duration (MM/YY- MM/YY):** **Position (i.e., Bn Cdr):**
_____ _____ _____

5. What type of unit did you serve with during the OOTW deployment (mark all that apply):
[ ] Combat (heavy) [ ] Combat (light) [ ] Combat Support [ ] Combat Service Support [ ] SOF
[ ] CONUS based [ ] Europe based [ ] other location (specify)_____

PREDEPLOYMENT QUESTIONS:

6. Did your unit METL include **tasks** required for the OOTW? **[ ] None [ ] Few [ ] Most [ ] All**

7. Did the OOTW require **critical tasks** not listed in your unit METL? **[ ] No [ ] Yes (list below)**
(a)_____**(b)**_____**(c)**_____

8. How did your unit **primarily** train for **critical OOTW** tasks :
[ ] Normal METL training program **[ ] Special ramp up: ___ weeks** **[ ] OJT**

9. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's **training readiness** on **normal METL skills**:
[ ] combat ready **[ ] combat ready with minor limitations** **[ ] not combat ready**

10. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's **training readiness** in critical **OOTW Skills**:
[ ] Fully trained [ ] Trained (minor shortfalls) [ ] Significant shortfalls [ ] Untrained

11. How was your pre-deployment **training readiness assessed:** **[ ] ARTEP [ ] CTC rotation**
[ ] other (specify)_____ [ ] not assessed

DURING OOTW DEPLOYMENT

12. Compared to home station, **METL task training opportunities during the OOTW** were:
[ ] Greater [ ] Same [ ] Somewhat less than [ ] Much less than [ ] Non-existent

13. Did your unit conduct **other training (such as non-METL OOTW task training)** during the OOTW:
[ ] Not at all [ ] To a small degree [ ] To some degree [ ] To a great degree

14. Assess the overall **impact of the OOTW** on your unit's **combat training readiness:**
[ ] no impact
[ ] improved overall combat training readiness
[ ] minimally degraded combat training readiness
[ ] substantially degraded combat training readiness

15. Which **skills were significantly enhanced** by the OOTW: **[ ] Individual [ ] Crew [ ] Squad [ ] Platoon**
[ ] Company [ ] Battalion [ ] other _____

16. Which **skills were significantly degraded** by the OOTW: **[ ] Individual [ ] Crew [ ] Squad [ ] Platoon**
[ ] Company [ ] Battalion [ ] other _____

17. To what extent did your **OOTW tasks complement or replicate** your critical go-to-war tasks:
[ ] Not at all [ ] To a small degree [ ] To some degree [ ] To a great degree

18. During the OOTW, **were normal Unit Status Report reporting standards and criteria used to report readiness:**
[ ] No [ ] Yes (specify):_____

POST DEPLOYMENT

These questions apply to those who either deployed, or joined a unit in post-deployment recovery:

19. After your unit returned, how long was your unit's **dedicated recovery period**:
[ ] no recovery [ ] 1 week [ ] 2 weeks [ ] 3 weeks [ ] 1 month [ ] 2 months [ ] _____months

20. Was the **time allotted sufficient** to restore your unit to **full combat readiness in the following categories:**
Personnel: [ ] Yes [ ] No
Equipment: [ ] Yes [ ] No
Training: [ ] Yes [ ] No

21. What were the main factors which **degraded unit training readiness** after the OOTW (please list):
(a)_____ **(b)**_____ **(c)**_____

22. How was your unit's **training readiness assessed** after recovery:
[ ] ARTEP [ ] CTC rotation [ ] other (specify)_____ [ ] not assessed

23. How soon after the return of your unit do you believe it would have been able **to successfully execute** a(n):

a. ARTEP: _____
b. CTC Rotation (NTC/CMTC/JRTC): _____
c. MRC: _____

24. Had your unit been called upon to deploy to an MRC **prior** to the time you listed above, do you think the impact of **training readiness shortfalls** would have resulted in:
[ ] mission failure [ ] mission success with significant casualties [ ] mission success with moderate casualties [ ] mission success with few casualties

25. Do you believe that **OOTW tasks should be included in unit METLs**: **[ ] No [ ] Yes**

26. Given realistic time constraints, what **percent of your warfighting METL tasks are you willing to neglect in order to train to these OOTW tasks** (circle below):
0_____10_____20_____30_____40_____50_____60_____70

27. Are there any other **OOTW training readiness issues** you would like to comment on?

_____
_____

(Appendix B: Spreadsheet Data)

1. What is your **branch** of Service: **[58] Army [ ] Navy [ ] Air Force [ ] USMC [ ] Other (specify)_____**

2. What is your **component**: **[58] Active [ ] Reserve**

3. Have you ever **participated in an OOTW** (if " no" please go to question __) :
[x] Yes (list type below) [ ] No
[34] humanitarian assistance [18] peacekeeping [12] peace enforcement [14] domestic support
[4] other _____

4. If "Yes" please detail below (please fill out a separate survey form for each):

Operation (name):	**Duration (MM/YY- MM/YY):**	**Position (i.e., Bn Cdr):**
_____	_____	**37 BN CDR Equivalents**

5. What type of unit did you serve with during the OOTW deployment (mark all that apply):
[10] Combat (heavy) [11] Combat (light) [13] Combat Support [12] Combat Service Support [7] SOF
[12] CONUS based [7] Europe based [3] other location (specify)_____[5] Other

PREDEPLOYMENT QUESTIONS:

6. Did your unit METL include **tasks** required for the OOTW? **[7] None [14] Few [32] Most [5] All [1] NA**

7. Did the OOTW require **critical tasks** not listed in your unit METL? **[35] No [21] Yes (list below)**
(a) see Appendix C (b)_____(c)_____

8. How did your unit **primarily** train for **critical OOTW** tasks **:**
[35] Normal METL training program [19] Special ramp up [10] OJT

9. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's **training readiness** on **normal METL skills**:
[37] combat ready [18] combat ready with minor limitations [2] not combat ready [1] NA

10. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's **training readiness** in critical **OOTW Skills**:
[15] Fully trained [37] Trained (minor shortfalls) [3] Significant shortfalls [1] Untrained [2] NA

11. How was your pre-deployment **training readiness assessed:** **[12] ARTEP [15] CTC rotation**
[13] not assessed [1] computer simulation [13] exercises [13] int cdr assessment [1] prev OOTW

DURING OOTW DEPLOYMENT

12. Compared to home station, **METL task training opportunities during the OOTW** were:
[10] Greater [5] Same [13] Somewhat less than [13] Much less than [15] Non-existent [1] NA
[1] less than

13. Did your unit conduct **other training** (such as non-METL OOTW task training) during the OOTW:
[15] Not at all [22] To a small degree [18] To some degree [2] To a great degree [1] NA

14. Assess the overall **impact of the OOTW** on your unit's **combat training readiness:**
[2] no impact
[19] improved overall combat training readiness
[27] minimally degraded combat training readiness
[11] substantially degraded combat training readiness

15. Which **skills were significantly enhanced** by the OOTW: **[31] Individual [26] Crew [16] Squad [18] Platoon [8] Company [8] Battalion [5] other: TF/Joint staff [6] none**

16. Which **skills were significantly degraded** by the OOTW: **[17] Individual [12] Crew [10] Squad [18] Platoon [21] Company [23] Battalion [7] none [1] higher [4] gunnery [8] na [2] everyday ops**

17. To what extent did your **OOTW tasks complement or replicate** your critical go-to-war tasks:
[1] Not at all [18] To a small degree [20] To some degree [17] To a great degree [2] na

18. During the OOTW, **were normal Unit Status Report reporting standards and criteria used to report readiness:**
[22] No [31] Yes [3] na [2] ?

POST DEPLOYMENT

These questions apply to those who either deployed, or joined a unit in post-deployment recovery:

19. After your unit returned, how long was your unit's **dedicated recovery period**:
[9] no recovery [6] 1 week [11] 2 weeks [6] 3 weeks [14] 1 month [1] 2 months [2] 6 weeks [2] > 5 months [7] na

20. Was the **time allotted sufficient** to restore your unit to **full combat readiness in the following categories:**
Personnel: [31] Yes [15] No [12] na
Equipment: [31] Yes [16] No [11] na
Training: [21] Yes [26] No [11] na

21. What were the main factors which **degraded unit training readiness** after the OOTW (please list):
(a)see Appendix D

22. How was your unit's **training readiness assessed** after recovery:
[14] ARTEP [8] CTC rotation [11] na [17] not assessed
[3] cdrs eval [1] BCTP [4] exercises [1] IG inspection [1] gunnery

23. How soon after the return of your unit do you believe it would have been able **to successfully execute** a(n):

a. ARTEP:	**82 days @40 respondents**
b. CTC Rotation (NTC/CMTC/JRTC):	**88 days @ 36 respondents**
c. MRC:	**81 day low avg - 91 day high avg @ 38 respondents**

24. Had your unit been called upon to deploy to an MRC **prior** to the time you listed above, do you think the impact of **training readiness shortfalls** would have resulted in:
[1] mission failure [3] mission success with significant casualties [21] mission success with moderate casualties [24] mission success with few casualties

25. Do you believe that **OOTW tasks should be included in unit METLs**: **[17] No [35] Yes [6] na**

26. Given realistic time constraints, what **percent of your warfighting METL tasks are you willing to neglect in order to train to these OOTW tasks** (circle below):
0_____10____(11-15%)_____20_____30_____40_____50_____60_____70

27. Are there any other **OOTW training readiness issues** you would like to comment on? see **Appendix E**

(Appendix C: Critical Missing OOTW tasks)

Question 7 on the survey asked respondents to answer the following question:

7. Did the OOTW require critical tasks not included in your unit METL? [ ] No [ ] Yes (list below)

Specific tasks listed on the survey forms were:

1. crowd control
2. captain-level negotiating skills
3. dealing with complex practical issues
4. route clearing
5. riot control
6. Presidential security
7. cordon and search operations
8. establish civilian police force
9. providing humanitarian assistance
10. use of graduated force
11. very small unit movement (2-3 vehicle convoys)
12. mine warfare
13. mounted vehicle operations
14. law enforcement
15. civil affairs
16. vertical construction
17. strict ROE
18. medical assistance
19. security operations
20. movement control
21. CSS MACOM level planning
22. MHE maintenance (non-MTOE equipment)
23. negotiations
24. peacekeeping skills
25. screening for individual deployments from USAR/USANG
26. logistics coordination with Ft. Bragg for special supplies
27. emergency messages impacting on deployed personnel
28. coordinating with NGOs
29. coordinating with PVOs
30. forest fire fighting skills
31. health protection measures
32. civilian government interactions
33. augmentation of FEMA

(Appendix D: Training Distracters)

The following responses were provided to question 21: **"What were the main factors which degraded unit training readiness after the OOTW (please list):"** The responses are a curious mix of distracters and deficient training areas:

1. maintenance
2. marksmanship
3. mounted operations
4. small unit collective tasks
5. peacetime operations
6. guards
7. brigade taskings
8. post support
9. change in personnel
10. NCOES
11. PCSs
12. maintenance
13. waiting for equipment to return
14. 24 hour operations
15. non-mission related activities
16. no language training
17. marksmanship
18. live fire exercise
19. battalion integration
20. inability to train crews
21. UCOFTs unavailable
22. ranges not available
23. equipment not available
24. equipment left behind not maintained
25. no training facilities
26. lack of resources, ranges, ammunition
27. no time allotted
28. no support from division
29. lack of combined arms training opportunities
30. lack of adequate maintenance opportunities
31. personnel recovery
32. lack of training in heavy combat force operations
33. lack of time
34. peacetime missions

35. support to other deployed units
36. personnel and equipment sacrifices in the rear
37. personnel shortages
38. perishable skills
39. personnel losses
40. leader training
41. no ability to qualify on live fire operations
42. loss of training time
43. personnel turbulence
44. maintenance
45. limited training time
46. peacetime mission support
47. post/peacetime mission requirements for law enforcement
48. equipment took time to return
49. personnel turbulence
50. lack of equipment
51. personnel replacements
52. complete TI
53. inability to train
54. loss of live fire expertise
55. loss of combat infiltration expertise
56. lack of dedicated range time to qualify on major weapons
57. not enough time allotted
58. personnel availability
59. medical problems
60. equipment not returned
61. competing post support
62. personnel turmoil
63. overlapping and continuous operations
64. normal training distracters
65. deployment not conducive to METL related training
66. no live fire training
67. no large unit training
68. maintenance
69. individual training
70. equipment certification in Somalia
71. support for other unit rotations
72. company and higher collective tasks
73. other post missions

74. subsequent deployments
75. concern over dollars for repair parts
76. deployment OPTEMPO
77. law and order requirements
78. peacetime mission
79. personnel shortages

(Appendix E: Additional Readiness Training Issues)

The following responses were provided to question 27: **"Are there any other OOTW training readiness issues you would like to comment on?"**

1. Battle staffs get a solid team building experience which will carry over to combat skills.
2. Taskings from higher are greater distracters than OOTW.
3. OOTW was based on warfighting skills; we went as a display of commitment to Kuwait; was nothing like Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti, etc.
4. There is a lot of potential overlap; focus must remain on warfighting.
5. For tactical signal forces there happens to be significant commonality between METL, ARTEP and OOTW; however, some common tasks such as weapons qualification, PT, and NBC training do receive less training during OOTW in my experience.
6. Intelligence collection is basically the same in any environment. The key to me is adding culture training to help troops better understand the environment they are entering
7. As a finance officer, most wartime tasks are applicable in OOTW.
8. Leader task!
9. Most units already push past 7 METL tasks; adding OOTW increases this. Deployed to OOTW as a heavy unit. These missions seem more appropriate for light forces; however, heavy forces need to be prepared to take part in OOTW missions.
10. Unit was split MP battalion with 6 units in Germany and Italy. Two composite units deployed with platoons from all 4 units and fillers from the other two. Battalion ran split operations with 2/3rds conducting missions from the rear.
11. ROE, PAO, crowd control, convoy escort, VIP security were all important areas that needed STX and additional training.
12. OOTW tasks must be consolidated into regular training.
13. OOTW is the mission of MPs to a great extent; these missions have less impact on us than on mech/arty/ADA units given the fact that we never have enough time anyway, it's still hard for us to block time to train up or recover lost training upon ENDEX.
14. For MPs, OOTW missions are varied. Some OOTW tasks do complement our METL (i.e., EPW vs refugee operations), but the variety of tasks are extensive and we cannot train for all. Due to post MP missions, training time is very limited, so primitive collective training is rare.
15. A number of tasks were not prepared for in Haiti; ever-changing ROE, constant 360 degree perimeter, working in HIV environment, disposal of bio HAZMAT. Before deploying to St. Thomas, ran FTX with Haiti-deployed troops; results were poor.
16. SF is in pretty good shape to face OOTW mission; we may not adequately be used as a benchmark for conventional units.
17. OOTW missions too diverse to give part now; a unit operating in the band of excellence can quickly adapt to many OOTW missions with a small transition period. Keep combat units manned, equipped and trained to standard, they can make most missions happen.

18. OOTW is here to stay. The key to success is adequate train-up time and post deployment time.
19. OOTW are often successful based on combat readiness image of soldier; soldiers equal respect, capable, armed. Send soldiers disarmed or without combat equipment puts them at risk.
20. Light divisions are suited for this mission.
21. We need to recognize that a great many CSS units are very likely to conduct OOTW and may be the only ones deployed. We need to resource and train for it.
22. Consider an OOTW unit/division that becomes the force of choice.
23. The Andrew deployment gave the 82nd ABN division rear CP (newly created) the chance to gel into a cohesive team under stressful conditions. Mission did not effect combat readiness below battalion HQ level; may have degraded battalion level command and control skills for deployed forces.
24. Never train for OOTW; train for war.
25. It's the wave of the present - and the future - training for this most likely event is a must; this is what we are going to do.
26. For FSB, believe skills are in METL to support OOTW.
27. Because of law and order and security missions in peacetime/deployment OPTEMPO, MP units get little training time. Peacetime missions complement some wartime tasks; there are many other METL tasks which must be trained and need to be trained as units.

(Appendix F: Proposed OOTW Training Readiness Risk Assessment Model)

The following model is proposed to assist planners and commanders in the selection of units for OOTW and the assessment of likely degradation to combat training readiness due to the OOTW. To use the model, identify the best fit answer for each "risk factor" category. Read across to select the best fit answer, then read up to determine degree of potential risk. Record in last column on right; for each low risk assessment, assign a value of "1." For each moderate rating, assign a value of "5." For each high risk rating, assign a value of "10." Since factors are related but of unequal impact on training readiness, averaging would not provide an accurate risk assessment. Once ratings in each factor are listed, the general risk to the unit should be assessed, considered, and mitigated where possible.

Risk Factors to Post-deployment Combat Training Readiness

\RISK: FACTOR:	*LOW (1)*	*MODERATE (5)*	*HIGH (10)*	*RATING:*
Type Unit	CSS	CS	CBT LT/HVY	
Type OOTW	PE	PK	HA/DOM SPT	
Task correlation	excellent	good	poor	
Duration	Short (1-2 months)	Medium (6 months)	Long (1 year)	
Predeployment readiness: METL	ARTEP/CTC assessed	other exercise; internal evaluation	not assessed	
Predeployment Readiness: OOTW tasks	included in METL; routine training	not included in METL;special ramp up used	not included in METL; OJT required	
Training Opportunities	extensive for METL tasks	moderate opportunities	limited to no opportunities	
Recovery period	adequate and protected	adequate; limited protection	inadequate; not protected	
Formal Training Assessment	CTC/ARTEP post recovery	other exercise or internal evaluation	not assessed	
Personnel	stable; full and timely reconstitution	some turbulence; crews rebuilt in timely fashion	significant turbulence; unable to rebuild combat crews/teams	
Equipment	fully available	available; some maintenance required	not available during recovery period or poorly maintained during deployment	
Training Resource availability	ranges, ammunition facilities available	limited availability	not available	