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BEYOND NATO ENLARGEMENT: SECURITY FRAMEWORKS FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

BY

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NATO enlargement will most likely occur following the general outline established by the NATO ministers in 1994. Likewise, NATO will initiate and successfully conclude a security arrangement with Russia. Enlargement without strong complementary programs inadequately addresses the stability and security needs of Central and Eastern Europe. Since our stated vital interests are to maintain a stable Europe and to stabilize and democratize Russia it is imperative that we conceptualize and execute the complementing policies and programs necessary to achieve our stated interests. This study analyzes these complementing programs to determine what the framework for security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe should be. It assesses the current state of the elements of that framework. United States interests are compared to that framework. The expected outcomes of the initial phases of NATO enlargement are compared to our interests and desired outcomes of the strategy to determine potential shortfalls. Policy recommendations and adjustments complete the review.
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement without strong complementary programs inadequately addresses the stability and security needs of Central and Eastern Europe. Since our stated vital interests are to maintain a stable Europe and to stabilize and democratize Russia it is imperative that we conceptualize and execute the complementing policies and programs necessary to achieve our stated interests.¹

To determine these complementing programs this study analyzes what the framework for security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe should be. I assess the current state of the elements of that framework. Subsequently, I compare United States interests to that framework and the stated policies of engagement and enlargement. The expected outcomes of the initial phases of NATO enlargement are compared to our interests and desired outcomes of the strategy to determine potential shortfalls. Policy recommendations and adjustments complete the review.
Historical Context

In the past, Central and Eastern Europe existed in varying degrees -- depending largely on the strength of the bipolar power Austro-Hungary, then Germany -- within Russia's sphere of influence. Russia had influence, but certainly no control over the events that precipitated the wars of the late 19th and 20th centuries in Europe. That all changed with the political division of Europe following the summit at Yalta and the onset of the Cold War. The Soviet Union had achieved its goal of control.

As the Warsaw Pact unraveled, the United States initially supported President Gorbachev. With his departure from political relevance in post-Soviet Russia, we adopted the Russo-centric policy of the early years of the first Clinton Administration. After some initial wavering, the Administration realized that the geo-political scene in Central and Eastern Europe had altered significantly. The collapse of the Soviet Union left an important, albeit diminished role for Russia in the region. This realization produced the current policy of multi-lateralism with regional geo-political pluralism as the Administration's strategic objective.

It is in this context that I embark on this analysis. Russia is important to Central and Eastern European stability and security, but she is not the sole determining factor. Security and stability issues in the Central and Eastern European region are related to Russian stability, but are sufficiently different to warrant an independent policy appraisal. Success and progress in Russia does not assure the same for her western frontier and beyond.
Assumptions

For the purposes of this analysis several assumptions are necessary to focus on current and near term policies. First, that NATO enlargement will proceed generally as proposed with three nations -- Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic -- offered membership in the first round. Second, NATO under US leadership will come to a mutually acceptable compromise with the Russian Federation on the issue of NATO enlargement. A NATO-Russia charter or treaty will codify this effort. Russia will continue to harbor misgivings about NATO enlargement, but at a significantly diminished intensity.

Considerations Not Addressed in this Paper

The outcome of peacekeeping operations and success of the civil transformation effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other portions of the former Yugoslavia will directly affect the security structure of the region. European’s confidence in their ability to resolve regional issues will either be reinforced or severely diminished.
Essential Elements of Security and Stability

Five supporting elements provide a nation with the basis for security, stability and potential for continued growth. These elements are:

1. Governmental / Institutional
2. Foreign and Internal Security
3. Economic
4. Psychological
5. Strategic Leadership.

A secure and stable nation requires a government and its implementing institutions to be accountable to its people. An arrangement for some form of balance of power amongst the branches of government is necessary, preventing exploitation and the destructive ambitions of potential megalomaniacs. Transitions of power between elected leaders take place without extraordinary measures. The government provides effective leadership in crisis situations. The leaders and government adhere to the basic rights of all citizens, as outlined by the Helsinki Final Act, assuring an atmosphere conducive to change and tolerance. Of those basic rights, freedom of the press may be the most crucial in maintaining stability. A free and independent press keeps government accountable, preventing the curtailment or abuse of the other basic rights citizens expect in a free society. The country’s military supports the elected leaders of the nation, but does not interfere in the electoral process.

Foreign and internal security entails secure borders and freedom from aggressive intimidation by neighbors. Friendly or at least neutral relations with contiguous countries provide a certain level of protection. Freedom from oppression by organized criminal elements and controlled simple criminal activity affords a healthy environment for business and the citizenry. The nation is free of armed insurrection, violent separatist movements and revolution.
A healthy and successful economy is fundamental to a prospering nation. Growth in a market economy requires: stable currency (controlled inflation), manageable foreign and public debt, trade unobstructed by unnecessary restrictions, foreign and domestic investment, recapitalization of the industrial base and an improvement in the quality of life in real terms for the citizens.

The fourth category, the psychological or emotional dimension of a country’s makeup may be most difficult to define and quantify, but its importance cannot be underestimated. Aspirations of a better life, hope for the county’s future are essential to a positive spirit and the pursuit of challenging goals. Without hope there is only self-interest. A nation’s ability to withstand periods of hardship and trial depends on its national psyche.

Strategic leadership provides the unifying factor of the components listed above. The leaders of a nation must have a vision of their nation’s and people’s destiny. The vision defines the purpose of the nation-state.

Vision is a sense of the future. It is an imagined possibility, stretching beyond today’s capability, providing an intellectual bridge from today to tomorrow, and forming a basis for looking ahead....The power of a vision is that it gives leaders a basis for positive action, growth, and transformation. 4

A purposeless nation allows the pursuit of individual goals at the expense of the common good. 5

Without vision the people perish. -- Proverbs. 6

Given these rather idealistic parameters, we need to assess the current conditions in the region and measure them against the elements outlined above.
Current and Near Term Assessment of the Framework Elements

Few commonalities can be found in assessing the current state of Central and Eastern Europe. The only one may be -- uncertainty. Few changes are institutionalized or internalized by the peoples of these countries. The euphoria and optimism that followed the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and dissolution of the Soviet Union are gone. We are only a few years into this transformation process. Hard realities have set in. Opinions of the experts generally fall into the familiar grouping of idealists versus realists/ pragmatists.

Few governments and institutions can be called mature. Amongst the prime candidates for NATO enlargement the governments provide most civic functions. Hungary is most stable politically, with Poland and especially the Czech Republic suffering from political infighting between former Communists and reform parties.  

The non-candidate countries, those unlikely to receive initial invitations, the governmental situation varies from somewhat worse to simply atrocious. Shaky coalition governments plague Slovenia and Slovakia, limiting the ability of those governments to execute reform programs. Slovakia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Medcias recently took more authoritarian measures to control the country. Seven years of former Communist rule came to an end in 1996 as a center-right party assumed power in Romania. Only partial progress towards democratization has been achieved. The government in Bulgaria may fall due to lack of reform and long term stabilization programs, while Albania erupted into outright insurrection within the last two weeks due to lack of government controls over investment schemes.
In the Baltic states, weak coalitions in Estonia, plagued by intense personal rivalries, and Latvia restrict the rate of reform. Only the Lithuanian center-right coalition functions smoothly moderating the inclinations of nationalists.\textsuperscript{12} Political tensions between the parliament and the President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko continue, as the President openly seeks complete reintegration with the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{13} Moldovan government’s pro-Russian platform eased tensions with the Trans-Dniester separatists providing a modicum of stability.\textsuperscript{14} In the second largest of the Newly Independent States (NIS), the Ukrainian parliament -- the Rada -- retains a significant role in influencing the policies of the President Leonid Kuchma. With a substantial Communist Party representation (23%) in the Rada, reform has been slow and the political turmoil quiet frequent. A post-Soviet constitution was narrowly approved in June 1996 providing a basis for governmental functions.\textsuperscript{15}

Russia is a striking example of government gone awry. Increased consolidation of power in the executive branch has had little impact on reform. The Russian Duma, the lower house of the parliament, is virtually ineffective. “Government by the rule of law has virtually disappeared.”\textsuperscript{16} The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, LTG Hughes in testimony to Congress stated, “slow progress along the current path of reform” is the outlook for the next few years.\textsuperscript{17} Within the Russian Federation, critics of the government agree with outside analysts: The new ruling elite is neither democratic nor communist, neither conservative nor liberal. It is merely greedy and rapacious. -- Former Presidential candidate Grigory Yavlinsky, Yabloko Party.\textsuperscript{18}

Privatization schemes operate in the absence of effective laws inviting corruption and organized crime. Various sources estimate that between 10-20\% of all Russian companies pay their taxes in full, with 30-40\% failing to pay taxes altogether.\textsuperscript{19}
Fortunately, the second element -- foreign and internal security -- fares better than the previous category. By in large, the countries of the Former Warsaw Pact resolved or are in the process of resolving border and ethnic minority issues. This is certainly true of the first round candidates. Resolution of these issues is prerequisite to an invitation to NATO. The exceptional cases, like Slovakia with its Hungarian minority rights problems, delay their acceptance by West European organizations. All claim that their integration into the NATO defense structure will vastly improve their security situation, although no one claims to have a clearly defined foe.

This optimistic picture shifts drastically as we view the Former Soviet Union. Russia’s reluctance to complete border demarcation with the Baltic states causes serious tension with all concerned. Russia counters Baltic state’s complaints with its responsibility to protect the rights of significant Russian minority populations in the Baltic states. Estonia appears to be the lone state making progress in improving its foreign and trade relations with Russia.

Moving south, Belarus’ re-unification and military re-integration efforts reduce tensions with Russia. Interestingly, some in Russia want to keep Belarus at bay, their internal problems too costly for Russia to handle. The announced withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army from the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova in 1997 would settle tensions with that government, but Moscow is unlikely to stick to their timetable.

Although both Russia and Ukraine attempt to keep relations friendly, antagonism persists over a number of foreign security issues. Resolution of the most important issues: the division of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet, port rights in Sevastopol, ethnic rights of Russians in Crimea and the eastern provinces of Ukraine all wait for President Yeltsin’s health to improve.
Russian monopoly of the energy market and foreign debt limit Ukraine’s options. Statements from leaders of both countries illustrate their sentiments:

I think Russia still has the stereotype of seeing Ukraine as its integral part, or at least part of its sphere of dominance. -- Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma

[Referring to the future of Russia as an empire] Anyhow, everything will get back to its old place. -- Former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev

Russia’s foreign policy relating to Central and Eastern Europe will remain consistent. Russia will remain primarily focused internally or on the “near abroad”. Russia will attempt to reintegrate former republics into a tighter Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Strategic over-extension of her armed forces in border conflicts and near constant semi-combat conditions dealing with insurrections and separatist movements severely drain the resources of the Russian Federation. In military circles, some have suggested a tri-partite alliance of Russia, the USA and Germany to achieve stability.

Economic trends predictably follow the state of internal stability and progress of the conversion process to market economies. Economically, Europe is more interdependent than in any other realm. Any responsible assessment of Central and Eastern European economies recognizes the crucial linkages with West European markets. Western European economies are focused and will remain focused on the deepening of the European Union (EU), the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty provisions. Western nations’ fiscal and monetary policies are oriented on meeting the stringent criteria of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and introduction of the EMU’s currency, the Euro. Currently, only tiny Luxembourg meets all three parameters (inflation rate 2.6%, budget deficit 3.0% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), public sector debt 60% of GDP).
Laggard growth in EU countries, particularly in Germany, limits the development of markets for the Eastern European exports. With the combined difficulties of high unemployment, labor union demands, pension and tax reforms EU nations will remain inwardly focused. Comparatively slow growth in the EU, means slower growth in the East. Predictions for 1997 show:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>GDP %</th>
<th>Inflation %</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Among the world's 20 slowest growing economies --

- Russia: 1 % of GDP growth
- Bulgaria: 1
- Ukraine: 1
- Belarus: 2

Despite some positive indicators of economic and monetary reform, considerable uncertainty still permeates Eastern Europe's economies. Varying conditions in the individual countries that make up the region prohibit generalized deductions. For a more detailed analysis of the macroeconomic state of Eastern Europe refer to Appendix 1.

Economic concerns may continue to be prime. They affect the quality of life for the citizens of these counties. Hunger and fear of the future certainly affect the will of the people to continue the process of reform. 25% of the population in Russia lives below the bare subsistence level. Their willingness to sustain the hardship is questionable. The pain associated with market reforms is blamed on democratization. Many long for the stability the Soviet Union provided.

Generally, the leaders of the Former Warsaw Pact nations envision their nations' endstate as inclusion into NATO and the EU. Acceptance by these Western European institutions ensures
the security and economic strength required to maintain sovereign, prospering nations. Those within reach pursue their goal with confidence. The larger majority struggles with economic realities, political back-stabbing and perceived aloofness of the West. In the CIS, Belarus sees reunification with Russia as its salvation. Ukraine’s President Kuchma strives to achieve a civic state coexisting with both Russia and the West. Boris Yeltsin attempts simply to stay in power, while recognizing the need to concentrate efforts on the economy.
US National Interests and Policies

Our National Security Strategy remains one of “Engagement and Enlargement.” Three central objectives comprise the strategy: enhancing security, promoting American prosperity and promoting democracy abroad. The integrated regional approach to Europe and Eurasia reinforces these components:

European stability is vital to our own security... Our goal is an integrated, peaceful, democratic Europe that cooperates with the United States to strengthen security and promote prosperity.

As we look to Europe, the US has a vital security interest in the evolution of Russia, Ukraine and the other NIS into stable, modern democracies, peacefully and prosperously integrated into a world community where free and fair elections, free and fair trade and cooperative security are the norm.

The independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the twelve NIS, as well as of the three Baltic states, is especially important to American interests. So is their political and economic reform.

Our policy reiterates the primacy of our NATO commitment, but allows the establishment of a European Security and Defense Identity as an operating arrangement with the NATO structure. A strong dose of realism is injected with respect to our hopes and expectations for Russia:

Conditionality will remain a guiding principle: our economic and political support for the Russian government depends on its commitment to reform, including democratization, market economics and a foreign policy of comity, especially with respect to the other former Soviet republics.

NATO enlargement is the centerpiece of our security strategy for the region. Our expectations are to reduce the risks of instability or conflict in the eastern half of Europe, while building confidence and motivating the new democracies to follow through with the reforms they have initiated.
Expectations from NATO Expansion

As specified in the assumptions at the beginning of this analysis most observers expect that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will be the first tier of candidates for NATO membership. The remaining nations in the region can then be further categorized as: those that missed the mark by a little -- Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania; those that are a long way from meeting the required standards -- Albania and Bulgaria; those that aren't that far off the mark, but are geographically too close to Russia -- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; and finally the neutrals -- Ukraine and Moldova. From a purely quantitative perspective the first round yields three winners and eight losers. The nature and scope of the special relationship NATO establishes with Russia will determine her outlook on this first phase.

The governments of the candidate nations will receive a tremendous boost. Acceptance for candidacy into the NATO league of nations reinforces the wisdom of leadership's vision. Governmental processes which caused hardship will be vindicated. We can expect the converse in the non-candidate nations, both governmental leaders and society as a whole may feel some sense of setback and rejection. The potential for destabilization of weak coalition governments and call for the re-definition of achievable national goals may run counter to NATO's long term objectives.

Negative ramifications for the foreign and internal security structure in Europe are not likely. The implicit agreement amongst the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to maintain the Cold War geographic boundaries will remain in effect. Challenging these would open Pandora's box, so no nation is likely to take the first step. The only exception may be Russia, whose primary border disputes lie with the Baltic nations and Ukraine. The lack of a formal
border agreement between Russia and these nations coupled with the exclusion of the Baltic States from first-round candidacy may tempt Russia to make her move while these countries perceive themselves internationally weak. The leaders of all these nations have expressed grave concerns over the lack of an internationally recognized border agreement and the looming threats expressed by Russia. In addition to the possible border issues, some political elements in Russia will push for solidifying the mutual defense agreements within the CIS. Ukraine will resist this attempt to impose Russian primacy in defense matters. Both items will have a destabilizing effect in the region.

The international prestige of first-round candidate nation will significantly improve, providing them with an unique opportunity to become leaders in the resolution of regional issues. Properly employed these nations can provide a stabilizing effect in Central and Eastern Europe.

Perhaps the most significant consequence comes in the category of economics. The first-round nations will profit from the almost instant benefits of NATO stability. Entry into NATO is considered by most European economists as a stepping stone to inclusion to the EU.

Perceptions of improved political stability and eventual inclusion into the EU will result in large increases of investment capital. Foreign corporations contemplating joint ventures will feel safe in executing their intended plans. Improved domestic confidence leads to improved recapitalization by industry and private investment among the citizenry. Overall, we can expect a marked improvement in the percentage of GDP growth in each of these nations. This effect will encourage the non-candidate neighbors, but concurrently have some potentially destabilizing consequences.
Political leaders in the non-candidate nations can expect to face their greatest test of leadership in this period of time. Their relationships with the candidate nations are not completely a zero-sum game, but to some measure they are. Investment capital has a finite limit. Risk decisions always impact on allocations of investment capital. These countries can expect a flattening in the rate of foreign investment or a decrease. Without some type of improved access to Western European markets and an improved relationship with the EU, these countries stand to suffer setbacks in their economic growth.48

The irony of this situation is strikingly evident. Those in need of extraordinary incentives for continued economic reform won’t benefit from the first round of NATO expansion. Downturns in the economy and quality of life will make implementation of further change difficult. Since one of the measures of suitability is an assessment of the nation’s ability to bear the costs associated with NATO membership, downward or flat trends in the economy further reduce its desirability in this parameter. Overstatements of cost exacerbate this situation.49

The neutral nations will not suffer the same effects as the non-candidates. By in large their challenges are distant from the others. Certainly the rules of limited capital for investment apply, but the stability and business atmosphere in these countries will remain the determining factors. The same can be said for Russia. The scale of investment opportunities in Russia puts her in a different league, as with the neutrals. Internal stability and receptiveness for further investment will remain the predominant factors.

The overarching result is one of the NATO candidates increasing their rate of development in all parameters while the non-selected face the same challenges as before with new twists. Vision, perseverance and the ability to lead nations during times of uncertainty take
on a new importance. We can expect these conditions to re-occur with each subsequent round of announcements by the NATO ministers.
Additional Unresolved or Inadequately Addressed Issues

In addition to the negative implications outlined in the previous section, several major issues require further elaboration. Essentially these are issues that NATO expansion fails to address. Four areas remain unresolved. Three deal with our *vital* interest in maintaining stability in Europe, while the last relates to our *survival* as a nation. The three European areas include: an internal re-definition of the Russian state (admittedly this transcends the European only nature of this topic), the coordination of a security mechanism beyond the eastern boundary of NATO, and the coordination of efforts among the two major existing Western European entities -- the EU and NATO. Finally, there is an element of risk involved in expanding NATO, even with a NATO-Russia charter. We are not assured that the nuclear threshold will remain at its current low level.

Stability and democratization in Russia were specified as *vital* US interests. The viability of the Russian democratic state, the state of her economy and her relations with the nations of the former Soviet Union are largely internal issues. Our policies and those of NATO, only peripherally shape the course Russia takes in these areas. Russia must re-define her ideological foundation. The true source of stability in Russia is not a resurrected potential to intimidate and a capacity to destroy, but her vast human and natural resources. Development of these could provide a truly secure and influential place for Russia in the next century.

This change will not take place quickly. Embittered feelings over “losing” the Soviet Union remain. Most observers agree that one or two generations must pass before the change is truly inculcated into the society. This change starts with the government, the leadership that’s
charged with providing the direction for this transformation. It must move from the shadows of the new “nomenklatura,” and refute its controlling interests in newly privatized businesses -- then start governing. Accountable, steady leaders would provide the Russian society the emotional support it so desperately seeks.

Much of the younger generation in Russia wants Russia to evolve as a “normal country” -- a peaceful, prospering nation where they can make money and get on with their lives and not bother anyone else. But others, including many now in power, still mourn the demise of great-power status and look to traditional means of expansion and bullying to recapture it.

Russia is the true winner in making this conversion, not the West. Unfortunately, NATO expansion in itself doesn’t support our objectives in this area.

The somewhat vague notion of an “undivided Europe” requires further exploration. What does this new Europe look like? Where does Europe end and Asia begin? The Baltic nations and Ukraine are the crux of the issue here. Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University argues that these nations are in the greatest need of protection from Russia and get no improved security status with the initial NATO expansion efforts. Belarus and Moldova provide different problems. Belarus’ apparently voluntary steps towards re-unification with Russia, align her with the “greater Russia.” This aligns her destiny to that of the senior partner. Since Moldova is geographically shielded from Russia by Ukraine, its security is enhanced by that buffer as long as Ukraine remains an independent nation.

The negative economic effects on non-candidate nations and the continued challenge neutral Eastern Europe faces were introduced in the previous section. The lack of a synchronized effort between the NATO ministers and those of the EU makes economic recovery problematic.

The former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher calls for drastic changes in the
operation of the EU. His premise is that stability and security in Europe is achievable only by employing the additive effect of NATO expansion with EU expansion. This expansion would not occur symmetrically. Genscher proposes that non-candidate nations be preferentially offered associate membership in the EU. Special trade relationships would be established with Russia and Ukraine. This counter-balance effort to NATO’s first round sets the conditions for improved economies of the non-candidates and their candidacy for latter NATO expansion efforts.

Whether EU ministers have the foresight to employ such a novel approach while wrestling with the challenges of implementing the Maastricht and the EMU is to be seen.
Recommended Adjustments to United States Policy

Our current policy, prior to NATO expansion, with few exceptions is one of proportionality as we deal with the nations of the Former Warsaw Pact and the Former Soviet Union. Everybody gets a little of our help. With expansion, our policy needs to adapt to the new environment, that we -- the NATO members -- will create. Needs are no longer proportional. Those initially excluded need the attention and assistance on a priority basis. The type of need will also be disproportional. The Baltic States will require foreign security assurances; Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine further economic reform; while Slovakia will need to complete reforming her governmental systems.

The first areas requiring immediate attention are the psychological and leadership categories. Visits by the heads of state, defense and foreign ministers, commerce and trade secretaries to the non-candidate nations in late summer and fall of 1997 would provide a tremendous signal of support. The United States should set the example in this effort with scheduled visits by the US President and Vice-President, Department Secretaries, US European Command (EUCOM) General Officers and the like.

Similar efforts on the part of our NATO allies can significantly bolster this effort. Reinforcing the resolve of the leaders and improving the will of the people does not assure continued progress, but its the underpinning of what essentially is a struggle of wills and ideologies. We can reduce our hesitancy about expectations that we Americans will come "bearing gifts" by pre-planning the allocations for focus programs we intend to fund anyway.
Second, we must assist in the re-definition of the Russian state. Admittedly, this is a difficult and time consuming problem. An indirect approach utilizing historically neutral nations like Switzerland, Austria, Malta and Sweden may bear fruit where the NATO block cannot succeed. On our part, a concerted effort in the information element of policy may be of greatest benefit. Invigorated cultural, educational and athletic exchanges could provide a wider exposure to US values, traditions and beliefs. Perhaps the most attractive aspect of this proposal lies in the fact that non-governmental entities can greatly magnify the scope of such an effort. Enhancing the efforts of the United States Information Agency (USIA) would provide additional knowledge about the United States. Beyond the traditional mediums of radio and television, USIA’s WorldNet information service on the Internet provides a tremendous range of resources to the influential citizens of Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe.

NATO’s Secretary General Solana insists that NATO expansion is only one fourth of a larger overarching scheme to improve the security and stability in Europe.

There are four key component parts to this package: an enhanced Partnership for Peace and the establishment of an Atlantic Partnership Council; the accession of new members to NATO; a distinctive arrangement with Ukraine; and a strategic relationship with Russia. The enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP), sometimes referred to as PfP +, proposes enlarging the scope of PfP training beyond peacekeeping and to cover the whole spectrum of contingency operations. This leverages the current precedent of using PfP forces in Bosnia, where all 16 NATO nations and 17 PfP partners serve together as the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This expansion provides non-NATO states a de facto voice in planning and executing contingency operations during both training and actual deployment. The enhanced PfP can provide the
deepening of NATO’s relationship with the non-candidate nations to provide the improved
security mechanism, so sorely needed during this time of transition and reform.

The Atlantic Partnership Council (APC) would “provide a single political framework for
all our co-operation activities. It will provide the necessary forum where Allies and Partners can
meet and determine our future co-operation together.”60 Further, NATO proposals that the
NATO ministers coordinate their strategic plans with those of the EU would provide the
integrated effort that European politics now lack.61 We cannot underestimate the importance of
devising a coordinated strategy between the EU and NATO. Many Western leaders allude to
1997 as the year that parallels the decisive World War II years, when Allies cooperated to win
that war. Just as in that time, the United States can provide the leadership among friends in order
to provide a common course for two organizations caught between good intentions and practical
problems. Since the last two points of Secretary Solana’s proposal are common with US
declared policy, we should strongly support the ratification of the entire proposal by all NATO
members. Our NATO Allies recognize the importance of American leadership in this venue and
our ability to transcend European rivalries, fears and jealousies.62

Concurrent with the PfP + and APC initiatives, the United States should press for the
completion of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Flank Agreement.63 Our European
Allies and PfP partners can benefit from the adjustments proposed in this agreement by shedding
themselves of unnecessary and costly armor-heavy formations and applying scarce resources to a
mix of heavy, light and special operating forces. Not only does this mix cost less, it also
supports NATO’s orientation to crisis intervention and out-of-sector missions.
The last element deals with the strategic threat Russian nuclear power still posses to the United States, and also to our European Allies.64 This threat is truly a trans-Atlantic one. The Strategic Arms Control Treaty (START) II ratified by the US Senate in January 1996 appears to be permanently stalled in the Russian Duma. Even if the Duma approved START II, the Russian government probably has neither the resources or the flexibility to divert available assets to come into compliance with the provisions of the treaty.65

The recently concluded Helsinki Summit (20-21 March 1997) generated the required first step -- an agreement in principle to negotiate START III.66 The proposed modification of the START II timeline provides the Russians flexibility, removing the economic burden levied by the initial START II parameters.67 This agreement in principle offers long term security, requiring destruction of warheads and “transparency” of the plutonium extracted from de-commissioned weapons.68

The United States Senate should ratify the modified START II parameters and support further negotiations on START III. The key question remains: Will the Russian Duma ratify the revised START II even with the significantly beneficial changes offered it?
Conclusion

Achieving the goal of a stable and secure Europe will be neither quick nor easy. We know from history that Central and Eastern Europe fermented turmoil, dissension and war. Today we witness great strides in reform and progress interlaced with despair, lawlessness and misery. Our government, working in conjunction with our NATO Allies, has embarked on a mission to change the historic cycle of the region. NATO expansion, coupled with complementary and reinforcing programs, has the potential to succeed. Russia’s re-definition of herself into a prosperous, peaceful and meaningful nation is possible. Setbacks are bound to occur, frustrating all involved.

We may find insight and inspiration from a turbulent time in our own history. Writing in 1780, when our own independence and destiny were uncertain, an American patriot wrote:

These are times that try men’s souls .... the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly: it is dearness only that gives every thing its value. -- Thomas Paine

It will take generations to see the full transformation and democratization of Central and Eastern Europe. Our role as arbitrator, supporter and role model is indispensable. The rewards for our tenacity in this endeavor are great, the cost of failure potentially catastrophic.
Appendix 1 - Economic Analysis of Central and Eastern European Countries

Even the NATO candidate front runners face challenging times. The Czech Republic’s debt situation will worsen with an accompanying weaker GDP growth. Investors are likely to shift assets to safer locations. Restrictive monetary policies and a growing trade imbalance with the West confine Poland’s growth potential. Conversely, Hungary’s above average savings and investment rates, strong foreign investment and structured economic reform indicate a recovery in 1997 and years following.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP % *</th>
<th>Inflation %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* refers to GDP growth in real terms

The second group of hopefuls fare worse. Slovenia missed its International Monetary Fund (IMF) fiscal deficit target and is highly dependent on foreign loans and grants. Slovakia’s increased deficit and questionable government control of inflation causes investor concern. Romania’s adverse reform situation and unsatisfactory business environment coupled with her dependency on EU and Russian trade -- both stagnant -- paint an especially bleak picture. Bulgaria rivals Albania for last place. Absence of a long term stabilization program and failure to privatize provide a triple disadvantage: low foreign investment, high government debt and high unemployment. Default on the IMF loan is very possible with subsequent currency regulation by the IMF.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP %</th>
<th>Inflation %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.0 (questionable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>140.0²⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td></td>
<td>no confidence in data²⁵</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Baltic states reflect reforms in progress with good investment opportunities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP %</th>
<th>Inflation %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>15.0²⁶</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The former Soviet states trail most of Central Europe. Contradictory signals are the norm from these counties. Belarus, with one of the most regulated economies is on the threshold of a massive financial crisis.²⁷ Moldova’s agricultural sector may revive recovery, buffering the industrial stagnation.²⁸ Ukraine’s economy continues to decline as in previous years. Only piecemeal reform is likely as the President and the parliament compromise on methods. Some signs of recovery do appear, the IMF projects a reverse of the economic decline this year.²⁹

Confusion may well be the watchword of Russian economics. Reports of 60% gains in the Russian stock market in 2 months, the temporary nature of stagnation and “The days of free-fall statistics appear to be over...” are encouraging.³⁰ The IMF predicts improving conditions will cause 1997 to be the turn around year for Russia.³¹ Others see the situation differently. US Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers opined: “...economic policy in Russia has drifted off course..” Lack of effective government and legal protection for investors dooms Russia to stagnation.³² Some are even more pessimistic:

Efforts to recreate and maintain the empire by coercion and/or economic subsidy would condemn Russia not only to dictatorship, but to poverty. -- Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski³³
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP %</th>
<th>Inflation %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>20.0^84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES


6 Ibid., quoting Proverbs.


8 Ibid., 66 - 67, 131.

9 Ibid., 128 - 130.


11 EIU, 84.

12 Ibid., 93, 114 - 115.


17 Patrick M. Hughes, Lieutenant General, USA, “Global Threats and Challenges to the United States and Its Interests Abroad - Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 5 February 1997,” forwarded from Morris E. Price, Jr. Pricem@carlisle-emh1.army.mil 18 February 1997, Official e-mail (18 February 1997).


20 EIU, 93, 114 - 115.

21 Ibid., 93.


23 Ibid.


26 Hughes, “Global Threats and Challenges to the United States,” 9.

27 Blank, “Russia,” 30 - 32.


30 Ibid., 6.


32 EIU, 8.

33 Ibid.

34 IMF, 12.

35 Blank, "Russia," 29.


37 Ibid., 41.

38 Ibid., 43.

39 Ibid., 45.

40 Ibid., 42.

41 Ibid., 45 - 46.

42 Ibid., 42.


45 Hiatt, "Identity Crisis in Moscow," A-19.


48 Ibid.

The White House, A National Security Strategy, 43.


Ibid.

definition: nomenklatura - a select list of people from which appointees for top government positions are drawn up. Especially from in the Communist party. Random House Unabridged Dictionary (New York: Random house, 1993), 1305.

Hiatt, “identity Crisis in Moscow,” A-19.


“Secretary General’s Statement to the Press Following NAC Ministerial, Tuesday December 10th,” <gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/natodata/PRESS/SPEECHES/96/nac-prs.96>, 12 December 1996.

Ibid., 3.

Ibid.


Discussion of the US role in mitigating French - German disagreements and the lead nation role the US plays is found in “Chirac Bound for Russia after Talking with Clinton,” Washington Times, 31 January 1997, sec. A, p. 15. German General (retired) Gerd Schmuckeckle provides a perspective on the leadership role the US fulfills in keeping the United Kingdom, France and Germany in balance with each other and the US. “Schwankende Haltung,” Der
A further discussion of Germany’s struggle with limiting her growing power and the regulating role of the US in NATO is amplified in Gerald Livingstone, “Die Treue des Vasallen,” Der Spiegel, 17 February 1997, 144 - 147.


70 EIU, 88, 105 - 106, 124 - 126.

71 Blank, “Central and Eastern Europe,” 35.


73 IMF, 12.

74 EIU, 66 - 67, 128 - 131.

75 Although both the IMF and EIU present data, the author has no confidence in their predictions which were rendered prior to the March 1997 insurrection.

76 EIU, 93, 114 - 115.


IMF, 12.


EIU, 63, 67, 70, 73.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Hughes, Patrick M. Lieutenant General, USA. “Global Threats and Challenges to the United States and Its Interests Abroad - Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 5 February 1997,” forwarded from Morris E. Price, Jr. Pricem@carlisle-emh1.army.mil 18 February 1997, Official e-mail (18 February 1997).


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