

Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking Under Yeltsin

F. Stephen Larrabee
Theodore W. Karasik

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PREFACE

This report examines the role of key institutions that influence Russian foreign and security policy decisionmaking under President Yeltsin. It argues that during his first term Yeltsin failed to set up a coherent and effective decisionmaking process on foreign and security policy. The Security Council was supposed to be the chief mechanism for integrating and coordinating security policy. But it failed to perform this function. As a result, Russian policy was often marked by improvisation and ad hoc responses. Since early 1996—and especially since his re-election in July—Yeltsin has taken several measures designed to rectify these weaknesses in policy decisionmaking. However, it is unclear how effective they will be.

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The report should be of interest to government officials and outside specialists dealing with Russian and Eurasian affairs. This report considers information available through mid March 1997.

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SUMMARY

Five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian national security decisionmaking—and Russian security policy in general—remains in a state of flux. The old centralized Soviet decisionmaking system, dominated by the Politburo and the Central Committee, has been abolished. But an effective new national security decisionmaking system is still in the process of being set up.

When the Security Council was first established in 1992, there was widespread fear that President Yeltsin was trying to recreate the Politburo and that the Security Council had too much power. These fears, however, proved to be exaggerated. Rather than becoming an all-powerful tool for dictating policy, the Security Council has proven to be relatively ineffective in coordinating security policy and in providing Yeltsin with concrete policy options.

There was a widespread expectation that the appointment of General Alexandr Lebed as secretary of the Security Council in June 1996 would lead to a significant increase in the body's power and influence. Lebed appears to have wanted to make the Security Council more operational and transform it into a powerful tool for coordinating and integrating foreign and security policy. However, he never really enjoyed Yeltsin's trust and was replaced before he had a chance to implement his plans.

Lebed's successor as secretary of the Security Council, Ivan Rybkin, is a Yeltsin loyalist with little experience in security affairs. He is likely to maintain a low profile and not to try to use the council to pursue his own independent agenda, as Lebed did. Indeed, he appears to have been appointed precisely because he could be counted on to

faithfully carry out Yeltsin's policies, rather than pursue bold new initiatives. Under Rybkin, the Security Council has primarily been preoccupied with Chechnya and internal security issues.

The institutional weaknesses that contributed to confusion and incoherence in foreign and security policy have been even more pronounced in the defense area. During his first term, Yeltsin failed to create a stable institutionalized framework for defense policy. Important decisions were made by a small circle of top officials, with no serious parliamentary oversight or public scrutiny. The lack of clear institutional lines of authority and overarching mechanisms to coordinate defense policy meant that defense policy often became a contest among rival factions who sought to appeal directly to Yeltsin over the heads of other bureaucratic actors.

During Yeltsin's first term, the lack of clear lines of authority and competence in the foreign and security field led to increased rivalry between the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry, particularly over policy toward NATO enlargement. At times, the Defense Ministry appeared to conduct a quasi-independent policy, often bypassing the Foreign Ministry. However, relations between the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry have been smoother under Defense Minister Igor Rodionov than they were under Rodionov's predecessor, Pavel Grachev. In contrast to Grachev, Rodionov has concentrated more heavily on military and defense issues, particularly military reform, and not engaged in the type of freelancing on foreign policy that Grachev did.

Rodionov has also been a much stronger advocate of military reform. He played a prominent role in writing Russia's new military doctrine, and since becoming defense minister in July 1996, he has begun weeding out many of Grachev's protégés and replacing them with his own men. These personnel changes appear designed to facilitate the introduction of a comprehensive system of military reform. The blueprint of this reform was broadly approved at the first meeting of the newly established Defense Council on October 4, 1996. Under the reform program, the size of the Russian Armed Forces is to be reduced to 1.2 million men. The main goal is to create a smaller, more flexible and more highly mobile force. In addition, work has begun on formulating a new military doctrine.

However, Rodionov faces an uphill battle to obtain the financing needed to carry out a comprehensive program of military reform, especially the professionalization of the armed forces envisaged in the decree signed by Yeltsin on May 16, 1996, which calls for an end to conscription by the year 2000. Given the current constraints on military spending, it is unlikely that the goal can be met by that date.

The Defense Council, established in July 1996, has emerged as the key bureaucratic mechanism for the formulation and coordination of defense policy, especially military reform. The Defense Council is part of the Presidential Apparatus and is charged with advising the president on important decisions on military policy. Initially set up to counterbalance the Security Council and limit Lebed's influence on military and defense matters, it has taken on a life of its own and eclipsed the Security Council in importance, which has primarily concerned itself with Chechnya and internal security issues.

The Defense Council has become the main mechanism for coordinating the implementation of military reform. In addition to the Defense Ministry, other ministries and bodies, such as the Interior Ministry and Border Guards, are represented. The Defense Council thus provides a forum where the broader aspects of military reform can be discussed and coordinated. Since it is chaired by Yeltsin—and since its secretary, Yuri Baturin, is a civilian—it also provides a means of exerting some civilian control over the military and the process of military reform.

At the same time, the appointment of Yevgeni Primakov as foreign minister in January 1996 has led to improvements on the foreign policy side. Primakov has proven to be a much more effective manager than his predecessor Andrei Kozyrev. Under his stewardship, the Foreign Ministry has regained some of the influence and control over foreign policy that it lost during Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister. Russian foreign policy has also begun to evince a coherence and consistency it lacked under Kozyrev.

In short, after a number of fits and false starts, there are signs that a more disciplined and effective national decisionmaking process is beginning to emerge. The creation of the Defense Council in particular has been a major improvement and has given Yeltsin a

powerful tool for pushing military reform, which is likely to be one of the top issues on the Kremlin's agenda in the coming years.

The uncertain state of Yeltsin's health, however, casts a dark shadow over Russian politics and U.S.-Russian relations. Yeltsin's continued illness or incapacitation could accentuate the behind-the-scenes jockeying and struggle for power, making it even more difficult for Russia to pursue a coherent and consistent foreign policy. But even if Yeltsin's health holds, he is unlikely to be able to exert the type of strong dynamic leadership that characterized his first several years in office.

Moreover, even with a relatively healthy Yeltsin, Russian politics—and policy—will be increasingly influenced by the succession issue. Russian politicians and bureaucrats are already looking beyond the Yeltsin era and beginning to shape their policies and behavior accordingly. The longer Yeltsin is in office, the more the succession issue will begin to intrude on Russian politics—and the more Yeltsin's power and ability to shape Russian policies will decline.

The uncertain state of Yeltsin's health also means that it may be difficult for Russia to achieve consensus on important issues such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the Conference on Forces in Europe (CFE), and NATO's offer of a partnership or charter with Russia. The burden of creative thinking therefore will fall on the United States. If there are new initiatives designed to break the current deadlocks, they will have to come from Washington not Moscow.

There are thus strong incentives for the United States to try to engage Russia sooner rather than later. The longer the United States waits, the more complicated and messy Russian politics is likely to become and the more Russian policy is likely to be influenced by domestic factors—above all the succession issue—over which the United States has little control. Even if the U.S. effort to engage the Russians fails, the United States would be in a better position to repair relations later if it tries to engage Russia now than if it does not try at all. Finally, without a visible effort to strengthen cooperation with Russia, it may be difficult to maintain allied support for NATO enlargement.

NATO's offer of a cooperative partnership—or charter—with Russia is important in this regard. It can provide a useful building block for expanding military ties to Moscow and can also help to defuse Russia's fears about being excluded and isolated. The trick will be to give Russia a larger role without giving it veto power. This can best be done by expanding the web of consultative mechanisms with Russia and allowing it to participate in some NATO working groups on an ad hoc basis.

At the same time, the United States and its allies should attempt to build on the Implementation Force (IFOR) experience. The more the Russian military engages in practical day-to-day cooperation with NATO, the easier it will be to break down the outdated cold-war stereotypes that many Russian military officers—and many Russians generally—continue to hold about the Western alliance. Moreover, with time they will develop a stronger vested stake in this cooperation.

The United States should also try to defuse the enlargement issue by embedding it in a larger cooperation package, which could include initiatives on START and CFE. Some of Russia's concerns about enlargement, for instance, may be able to be addressed through CFE—by substantial reductions in equipment ceilings and efforts to reduce the military imbalances between Russia and NATO that enlargement would entail. In addition, the United States could announce its readiness to work out an agreement on principles for START III, which could facilitate Duma ratification of START II. Such moves would help to keep Russia engaged in the arms control process as well as reduce the collateral damage from NATO enlargement on other aspects of bilateral relations.

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

During the cold war, Soviet foreign policy was highly centralized and hierarchical. Policy flowed from the top down. The Central Committee of the Communist Party was in charge of foreign policy. The Foreign Ministry and other bureaucracies largely carried out that policy. This is not to say that these bureaucracies never took any initiatives. But they were coordinated with and/or approved by the Central Committee and Politburo. This gave Soviet policy a highly predictable character and ensured that, on the whole, the Soviet government spoke with one voice.

The collapse of the Soviet Union created an entirely new situation. The Russian political elite was not only forced to develop a new "Russian" foreign policy but also to create new institutions to carry out that policy. This process has not proven easy. Russia has found it difficult to pursue a clear and consistent foreign policy. As one Western observer put it, "It is not at all clear what the goals of Russian policy are—or whether Russia has a coherent foreign policy at all."¹

Russian observers and analysts have been equally critical. For instance, Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada in Moscow, characterized the first three years of Russian foreign policy under President Yeltsin as "three years of problems

¹Scott Parrish, "Chaos in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," *Transition*, May 17, 1996, p. 30.

and mistakes.”² Writing at around the same time, Andranik Migranyan, a member of Yeltsin’s Presidential Council, termed the results of the previous three years of Russian foreign policy “catastrophic.”³ Another member of Yeltsin’s Presidential Council, Sergei Karaganov, deputy director of the Institute of Europe, criticized the drift and lack of coherence in Russian foreign policy.⁴

While much of the criticism for the failures of Russian foreign policy was directed at former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, a large part of the problem can be attributed to Yeltsin’s own foreign policy “style” and the decisionmaking process he established. Yeltsin has failed to set up a smooth-running and effective decisionmaking system to coordinate and integrate foreign and security policy. As Karaganov has noted,

Foreign Policy is called “presidential,” but neither the president nor anyone else has the bureaucratic possibilities of systematically shaping and directing it.⁵

Under the Russian constitution, adopted in December 1993, the president is charged with the responsibility for foreign policy. He is granted power to negotiate and sign treaties as well as accredit foreign diplomats. He also heads the Security Council, which is composed of high-ranking government officials involved in foreign and security policy. Moreover, the key ministries involved in foreign and security policy—the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Federal Intelligence Service, and the Federal Border Service—report directly to the president, not to the prime minister.

However, it is one thing to have legal authority over foreign and security policy and quite another to exercise that authority effectively. It is on the latter score that Yeltsin has failed most dramatically.

²See Sergei Rogov, “Tri goda prob i oshibok rossiiskoy diplomatii,” *Center for Problems on National Security and International Relations*, December 1994, and his “Rossiya i Zapad,” *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, March 1995, pp. 3–14.

³Andranik Migranyan, “Vneshnaya politika Rossii: katastroficheskyye itogi triokh let,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, December 10, 1995.

⁴See Sergei Karaganov, “Rudderless and Without Sails,” *Moscow News*, No. 66, December 25, 1994–January 1, 1995, p. 7.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 5.

Despite several attempts, Yeltsin failed to set up a well-organized and efficient system for foreign and security policy decisionmaking.

During Yeltsin's first term, several "alternative power structures" emerged within the government and presidential bureaucracy, which actively competed with one another in an effort to shape foreign and security policy. As one Russian analyst has noted:

In democratic Russia each branch of power considers itself a Politburo and thinks it has the right to pursue its own diplomacy. Moreover, several Politburos of this kind have appeared within the executive branch. They do not allow the foreign ministry to conduct a clear and consistent policy in world affairs.⁶

Bureaucratic rivalry and policy incoherence, of course, are not unique to Russia. The same problems can be found in many other countries—including the United States. But the problems have been more acute in Russia for three reasons:

- Russian politics and society are in a state of acute flux.
- The new decisionmaking structures are weak and do not have deep institutional roots.
- There is no clear consensus on Russia's national interests.

Yeltsin's health problems have aggravated these problems. His long absences have encouraged political infighting and jockeying for power among his chief aides. As a result, the decisionmaking process has been chaotic and confused, and various bureaucratic players have often been able to impose their own special interests on the foreign policy agenda.

Since the beginning of 1996, Yeltsin has taken a number of steps to give foreign and security policy greater coherence, replacing Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and appointing—then also replacing—General Alexandr Lebed as head of the Security Council. In addition, a number of other influential figures in Yeltsin's entourage, such as Alexandr Korzhakov, head of the

⁶Yevgeni Bazhanov, "Top Priorities for Russian Foreign Policy," *New Times*, October 1995, p. 33.

Presidential Security Service, have been dismissed or transferred to less important posts.

These changes have led to an important shift in the internal balance of power within the Presidential Apparatus and top echelons of the Russian government. At the same time, they raise important questions for Western policymakers. To what extent have the decision-making structures for foreign and security policy set up by Yeltsin been institutionalized? How stable are they? What impact will recent personnel and institutional changes have on Russian foreign and security policy and the U.S.–Russian security agenda?

This report examines foreign and security policy decisionmaking under Yeltsin. The initial chapters examine the role of the key institutions that influence Russian foreign and security policy decisionmaking. Specific attention is given to the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Presidential Protection Service, and the role played by the Presidential Apparatus. The final chapter examines the implications of recent changes in the foreign and the security decisionmaking process for U.S. policy.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Under the Russian constitution, the president has the main responsibility for making foreign policy. However, Yeltsin has delegated the responsibility for the day-to-day coordination and implementation of foreign policy to other bodies, primarily the Foreign Ministry. In November 1992, Yeltsin issued a decree—the first of several—directing the Foreign Ministry to “coordinate and monitor” the activities of other ministries to ensure a “unified policy line by the Russian Federation in relations with foreign states.” A second decree with almost the exact same wording was issued in March 1995.

However, under former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, the Foreign Ministry proved incapable of effectively coordinating foreign policy, a fact that led to growing criticism of Kozyrev, both within the Duma as well as within the Presidential Apparatus. Much of the criticism was aimed at Kozyrev’s alleged “pro-Western” policies and his failure to sufficiently defend “Russian national interests,” especially in Bosnia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). But the criticism went beyond specific policies to a more general critique of Kozyrev’s conduct of Russian foreign policy, which, one leading critic charged, was characterized by “bustle, incoherence, incompetence, and as a result, zig-zagging.”¹

The criticism came from a wide spectrum of sources, including prominent members of Yeltsin’s own political coalition who had played a significant role in the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, such as Sergei Stankevich, Yevgeni Ambartsumov, and

¹Migranyan, op. cit.

Vladimir Lukin.² Ambartsumov in particular used his position as chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet as a bully pulpit to attack the Foreign Ministry—and Kozyrev personally—for alleged disregard of Russia's national interests, particularly vis-à-vis the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. His successor, Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Duma, was no less sharp in his attacks on Kozyrev and the Foreign Ministry for their inability to stand up for Russia's national interests and pursue a coherent foreign policy.³

Kozyrev tried to assuage his critics by publicly adopting an increasingly nationalist line at home while taking a more conciliatory approach with his Western interlocutors. However, this "double game" undermined his credibility, both at home and abroad. At the same time, it did little to reduce the discontent with his conduct of foreign policy, either within the Duma or within the Presidential Apparatus. As a result, Kozyrev found himself increasingly on the defensive and the Foreign Ministry was often overshadowed or bypassed by other agencies, particularly the Defense Ministry and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

At times, the Defense Ministry often appeared to conduct its own quasi-independent foreign policy.⁴ Former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev consistently took a hard-line position against NATO enlargement, threatening countermeasures and the creation of an anti-NATO bloc, whereas Kozyrev pursued what amounted to a policy of

²For a detailed discussion, see Eugene B. Rumer, *Russian National Security and Foreign Policy in Transition*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-512-AF, 1995. On Ambartsumov's influence, see Suzanne Crow, "Ambartsumov's Influence on Russian Foreign Policy," *RFE/RL Research Report*, May 7, 1993, pp. 36–41.

³See Suzanne Crow, "Russia Debates Its National Interests," *RFE/RL Research Report*, July 10, 1992, pp. 43–46. See also Rumer, op. cit., pp. 17–30.

⁴Alexandr Zhilin and Sergei Strokan, "Diplomacy in Shoulder Straps Comes Out into the Open," *Moscow News*, No. 45, November 24–30, 1995, p. 5. See also "Kozyrev 'out of the Loop' on Ukraine and Bosnia Talks," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 229, November 27, 1995, and Georgiy Bovt, "Partnership with NATO Begins with 'European Beirut'," *Kommersant*, November 30, 1995, pp. 1, 4 (translated in FBIS-SOV-95-231, December 1, 1995, pp. 17–18).

damage limitation. Grachev also hinted at a possible alliance with Beijing in response to NATO enlargement.⁵

Kozyrev's inability to give firm direction to Russian foreign policy finally induced Yeltsin to replace him at the beginning of 1996 with Yevgeni Primakov, the former head of the SVR. Primakov has proven to be a much more effective manager than Kozyrev. Under his direction, Russian foreign policy has had a consistency and coherence that it lacked under Kozyrev.

In addition, the Foreign Ministry has become a much more important bureaucratic actor than it was under Kozyrev. Much of this is due to Primakov's political "weight" and prestige. He enjoys Yeltsin's confidence and has a solid base in the security agencies and the wider policy community that Kozyrev lacked. Moreover, he is much closer to the center of the political spectrum than Kozyrev and much more acceptable to the nationalists and communists in the Duma. This has enabled him to defuse the vociferous criticism from the Duma that characterized Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister. Moreover, his authority has been strengthened by a presidential decree issued in early 1996, which gives the Foreign Ministry overall responsibility for coordinating foreign policy.⁶

Primakov's appointment has also resulted in a shift in Russian foreign policy priorities. While Kozyrev saw his prime task as improving relations, with the West and largely neglected relations with the states of the former Soviet Union, Primakov made clear from the outset that he intended to give top priority to strengthening ties to the CIS.⁷ Under his stewardship, relations with the CIS have been given

⁵John Thornhill and Bruce Clark, "Russia Waves China Card in NATO's Face," *Financial Times*, November 16, 1995.

⁶OMRI *Daily Digest*, March 15, 1996. Presidential spokesman Sergei Medvedev said that the decree was designed to ensure that all government agencies "adhere to a single position." Previous presidential decrees had given the Foreign Ministry these powers, but the ministry had failed to carry out this task effectively.

⁷See the excerpts from his press conference on January 12, 1996, in "Primakov's First Move: The CIS," *Moscow News*, No. 2, January 19-25, 1996. See also Chrystia Freeland, "Russia Aims to Regain Status as Great Power," *Financial Times*, January 14, 1996.

higher priority in practice, not just in declaratory policy.⁸ In addition, Primakov has advocated a more “balanced” approach to relations with the West than Kozyrev did. In particular, he has sought to strengthen relations with China and pursue a more active policy in the Middle East as a means of counterbalancing Russia’s ties to the West.

However, while Primakov has proven to be a more skillful foreign minister than Kozyrev, he has not been entirely successful in ensuring that the Russian government speaks with one voice on foreign policy. There have been continued signs of bureaucratic infighting and differences over foreign policy, especially over NATO enlargement.

Lebed, in particular, directly challenged Primakov’s direction of foreign policy. As head of the Security Council, Lebed made a number of contradictory statements that undercut Primakov’s effort to maintain a clear and consistent line on NATO enlargement. In July, for instance, Lebed played down the impact of NATO enlargement, dismissing it as a waste of money and saying Russia could do little to prevent it.⁹ However, in September he described enlargement as a German plot to regain dominance over Eastern Europe and threatened that Russia would take economic sanctions against the West if enlargement was carried out.¹⁰ A few weeks later he seemed to reverse himself again during his visit to NATO headquarters, calling for more active cooperation with NATO and saying that Russia was not “going to go into hysterics” if NATO decided to enlarge.¹¹

Lebed’s remarks at NATO headquarters were at variance with the tougher line promoted by Primakov since coming to office in January 1996 and seemed to suggest that Moscow might be softening its op-

⁸The most important example of this has been the economic union with Belarus, signed on April 2, 1996, and the agreement on deeper integration signed between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan on March 29, 1996.

⁹See Chrystia Freeland, “Growth of NATO Poses No Threat Lebed Says,” *Financial Times*, July 25, 1996.

¹⁰See Lebed’s interview in the *London Daily Telegraph*, September 24, 1996.

¹¹See William Drozdiak, “Russian Fatalistic on NATO,” *Washington Post*, October 8, 1996. For a detailed discussion of Lebed’s views on NATO enlargement, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Warrior Who Would Rule Russia: A Profile of Aleksandr Lebed*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-805-AF, 1996, pp. 47–50.

position to NATO enlargement. Even though Lebed later backed away from his conciliatory statements in Brussels and returned to the tougher line articulated by Primakov,¹² his remarks undercut Primakov's effort to maintain a clear and consistent line on NATO enlargement and sowed confusion in the West as to what Russia's position on enlargement really was.

Lebed's ouster as head of the Security Council, however, did not end the internal differences over NATO enlargement. In early November Ivan Rybkin, Lebed's successor as head of the Security Council, called publicly for Russia to be admitted into NATO's political structures.¹³ This view was at variance with Primakov's view, articulated a few weeks earlier, that any talk of Russia's entry into NATO was "insidious" and seemed to suggest possible differences between the Foreign Ministry and the Presidential Apparatus over how to deal with NATO enlargement.¹⁴

Primakov later directly repudiated Rybkin's remark, saying that Russia was not interested in NATO membership, and pointedly reminded Rybkin that the Foreign Ministry, not the Security Council, was in charge of formulating foreign policy.¹⁵ Rybkin, however, was undeterred by Primakov's rebuke and a few days later repeated his suggestion that Russia join the political structure of NATO, adding that Moscow could join the military structures at a later date.¹⁶ It is unlikely that Rybkin would have made such a remark—and then repeated it—unless he felt he had some support in the Kremlin. Rybkin's suggestion was reiterated, moreover, by Yuri Baturin, the head of the Defense Council and Yeltsin's former aide on national security matters, who even suggested that Russia should enter the military wing of NATO as well. Baturin, however, conceded that such

¹²Martin Sieff, "Under Fire, Lebed Backpedals from Pro-NATO Comments," *Washington Times*, October 11, 1996. Also, "Lebed äussert sich entschieden gegen die NATO-Erweiterung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 11, 1996.

¹³*Jamestown Monitor*, No. 206, November 4, 1996. See also *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, November 1, 1996.

¹⁴See Primakov's article in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, October 22, 1996.

¹⁵*OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 215, November 6, 1996.

¹⁶*OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 221, November 14, 1996.

a move was not practical at the moment since NATO had not invited Russia to join.¹⁷

The remarks by Rybkin and Baturin suggest that beneath the surface a debate about how to manage the issue of NATO enlargement continues to rage between those like Primakov who believe Russia should not show any indication that it is willing to accept enlargement and others like Rybkin and Baturin who believe a more flexible approach is needed. At the same time, their remarks highlight the continued difficulties of managing and coordinating foreign policy that have plagued the Yeltsin team from the beginning. These problems have diminished under Primakov, but they have by no means disappeared, as the continued differences over NATO enlargement underscore.

These differences raise larger questions about the Foreign Ministry's role and influence in the foreign policy decisionmaking process more broadly. Primakov clearly has more influence on foreign policy than Kozyrev did, and the overall coordination of foreign policy has improved since he took over as foreign minister. However, it is not clear whether the Foreign Ministry's role in the policy process has been institutionalized or whether the more assertive role played by the ministry lately is simply a function of Primakov's own stature and good personal relations with Yeltsin.

Moreover, the Foreign Ministry's influence depends on the specific issue. On NATO enlargement, Primakov—and through him, the Foreign Ministry—has taken the lead in coordinating and articulating Russia's policy. However, on key arms control issues such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Conference on Forces in Europe (CFE), the Defense Ministry and General Staff continue to be important players. Similarly, on resource issues, such as oil exploration in the Caspian Sea region, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy as well as Lukoil, the Russian oil company, are major actors,

¹⁷See his interview with Ekho Moskvy, 12:39 GMT, November 13, 1996 (translated in FBIS-SOV-96-221, November 13, 1996). In an important article several weeks later, however, Baturin clarified his stance, arguing that NATO had to undergo a profound transformation—in effect, become a peacekeeping organization—before Russia could join and that no “compensatory” measures, such as non-deployment of nuclear weapons on new members' soil could make the idea of enlargement acceptable to Russia. See his article in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, November 28, 1996.

and their interests have at times conflicted with those of the Foreign Ministry.¹⁸

Regional actors are also becoming more important. Some of the regions in the Russian Far East, for instance, have begun to develop their own ties and contacts with China, many of which are only loosely, if at all, coordinated with the Foreign Ministry. This trend is likely to intensify as the process of regionalization in Russia gains momentum and highlights the degree to which nontraditional actors, especially regional actors, are increasingly beginning to influence Russian foreign policy.

¹⁸This was particularly clear in efforts by the Foreign Ministry to block the signing of the landmark \$8 billion agreement signed in September 1994, on the exploitation of three offshore Azeri oil fields, which promised to bring a massive influx of oil revenue and Western investments into Azerbaijan. For details, see Michael P. Croissant, "Oil and Russian Imperialism in the Transcaucasus," *Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 16-26. See also Ariel Cohen, "The New Great Game: Pipeline Politics in Eurasia," *Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 2-15; and Bess Brown, "Russia Refuses to Recognize Caspian Oil Deal," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 180, September 21, 1994.

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The institutional weakness that contributed to confusion in the foreign policy field has been even more pronounced in the defense area. During his first term, Yeltsin failed to create a stable, institutionalized framework for defense and security policy.¹ Important decisions are made by a small circle of the president's top officials, with almost no parliamentary oversight (except on the budget) or public scrutiny. The lack of clear institutional lines of authority and an overarching mechanism to coordinate defense and security policy has meant that policy in these areas often becomes a competition among factions and special interests who seek to appeal directly to Yeltsin over the heads of their rivals.

While this system is designed to enhance Yeltsin's personal control, in many instances, particularly in Chechnya, the military often appears to have operated independently with only very loose, or in some cases no, control from the president. The most significant example is the Russian military's unwillingness to follow Yeltsin's orders to stop the bombing of Chechen towns and villages at the end of 1994. Despite Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's assurance that the Russians were only flying reconnaissance missions, numerous witnesses, including military experts, confirmed that the bombings continued in full force.²

¹See Stephen Blank, "Yeltsin Fosters a Military Threat to Democracy," *Transition*, August 19, 1996, pp. 11–19.

²For details, see Emil A. Payin and Arkady Popov, "Chechnya" in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, *U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, CF-129-CRES, 1996, p. 29.

During Yeltsin's first term, the lack of clear lines of authority and competence in the foreign and security sphere contributed to increased rivalry between the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry in a number of areas, particularly over policy toward NATO and Bosnia. As noted earlier, at times the Ministry of Defense appeared to be conducting quasi-independent foreign policy, often bypassing the Foreign Ministry. In November 1995, then Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev complained that he and his ministry were "unaware" of the stance Grachev had taken in talks with the United States and NATO because the defense minister was taking orders directly from Yeltsin.³ Shortly thereafter, Kozyrev again complained that Grachev had not informed the Foreign Ministry of the results of his talks in Brussels concerning Russian deployments in Bosnia, lamenting that "we would like to know the details" other than "from newspapers."⁴

Similarly, Grachev's December 1995 visit to Israel appears to have occurred without coordination with the Foreign Ministry. The defense minister, who claimed that he had received his orders directly from Yeltsin, credited his visit to Tel Aviv with helping to restore a balance in Russia's relations with the countries in the region that would facilitate the achievement of peace—a role normally reserved for the Russian Foreign Ministry.⁵ These incidents underscore both the lack of coordination within the Yeltsin administration on key foreign policy issues as well as the growing marginalization of the Foreign Ministry under Kozyrev on many foreign policy issues.

These examples, however, do not mean that the military's overall influence on foreign and security policy is on the rise. Rather, they reflect the Foreign Ministry's bureaucratic weakness under Kozyrev and the general lack of coordination between key institutions involved in foreign and security policy that characterized much of

³ *Interfax*, November 24, 1995.

⁴ *Interfax*, December 1, 1995.

⁵ *Interfax*, December 5, 1995. In a rebuttal to Grachev's trip, former Ambassador Vasilii Safronchuk complained bitterly about the Defense Minister's role as "foreign minister." See Vasilii Safronchuk, "Pavel Grachev's Visit to Israel: Pies and Boots," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, December 9, 1995, p. 2 (translated in FBIS-SOV-95-238, pp. 24–25). Other sources reported that Grachev received a rebuke from Yeltsin upon his return to Moscow, but it was unclear whether the attack "was real or for show." See Michael S. Lelyveld, "Russian-Israeli Deal Hints at Mid-East Realignment," *Journal of Commerce*, December 22, 1995, p. 1.

Yeltsin's first term. In fact, overall, the influence of the military has declined, especially in comparison with the Soviet period. On critical resources issues such as the defense budget, pay, and military housing, the military has consistently been short-changed and failed to achieve its main goals.

During Yeltsin's first term, this led to persistent complaints by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and the top military brass that the army was being systematically decimated and destroyed.⁶ Grachev, moreover, openly politicized the military, undermining its professionalism. In an effort to influence the Duma's position on defense issues and increase its allocation for defense spending, Grachev encouraged active-duty officers to stand for election in the 1995 Duma elections. Some 188 military officers ran for office, many with the avowed purpose of lobbying for funds. While only 2 of the 188 candidates actually won office, Grachev's effort to encourage officers to run for office underscores the degree to which he was willing to politicize the military.⁷

Grachev was a competent combat general, but he proved to be a weak and inept defense minister. Despite a good deal of fanfare and many promises, he failed to implement a program of serious military reform.⁸ He was also embroiled in a series of scandals involving corruption that severely tarnished his image. In addition, he was seen as largely responsible for the Russian army's poor performance in Chechnya.

Grachev survived largely because of his loyalty and close ties to Yeltsin. However, beginning in late 1994 Yeltsin began to show increasing signs of dissatisfaction with Grachev's performance. In

⁶For a detailed discussion, see John W. R. Lepingwell, "A Sudden Fall from Grace," *Transition*, February 15, 1995, pp. 21-26.

⁷Despite these efforts, however, most military officers appear to be indifferent to politics and do not participate in political organizations. For a good discussion, see Andrei Tarsakanov, "The Rise of Russia's 'Military Opposition,'" *Transition*, August 9, 1996, pp. 6-10.

⁸Stanislav Lunev, "The Myth of Reform in the Russian Army," *Prism*, Vol. 1, No. 28, December 22, 1995. Also Alexandr Kostin, "A Military Coup Does Not Threaten Us As Yet: A Subjective Look at Military Reform and Other Problems of the Russian Army," *Novaya Yezhednevnyaya gazeta*, No. 36, September 28-October 4, 1995, p. 5 (translated in FBIS-SOV-95-202-S, October 19, 1995, pp. 57-60).

early 1995, in response to the army's disastrous performance in Chechnya, Yeltsin reportedly considered stripping Grachev of operational control of the military and bringing the General Staff directly under his personal control.⁹ While he later backed away from this plan, Yeltsin continued to express dissatisfaction with the army's performance in Chechnya and to call for greater military reform.¹⁰

The process of military reform remained stalled, in part because of differences between Grachev and General Mikhail Kolesnikov, the head of the General Staff at the time. Kolesnikov reportedly wanted the supreme military command to reside with the General Staff, which would have responsibility for developing and implementing Russia's long-range strategic plans for ensuring national security and for the administration of the military. Under this plan, the functions of the Defense Ministry would have been reduced to providing material and technical support and financing the coordination with the military industrial complex.

Grachev reportedly opposed this plan since it would have significantly reduced his authority. Instead, he pushed for an expansion of the Defense Ministry's authority, including placing other Russian armed formations, such as the border troops, the Interior Ministry troops, and the units of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense.¹¹ Grachev also vigorously opposed the appointment of a civilian defense minister, a reform reportedly favored by some members of Yeltsin's entourage, especially Yuri Baturin, his advisor on national security matters at the time and now secretary of the Defense Council.

Grachev managed to survive the purge of the "power ministries" following the Chechen hostage-taking incident at Budennovsk in June

⁹Alexander Stanley, "Yeltsin Weighs a Shake-Up of Russian Army Command," *New York Times*, January 12, 1995. Also Fred Hiatt, "Yeltsin May Act to Rein in Military," *Washington Post*, January 12, 1995, and John Thornhill and Steve Levine, "Yeltsin Moves to Boost Hold over Army Top Brass," *Financial Times*, January 12, 1995.

¹⁰John Thornhill, "Yeltsin 'Tough and Firm' on Army Reform," *Financial Times*, February 24, 1995.

¹¹Lunev, op. cit., p. 9. See also Kostin, op. cit., pp. 58–59. For a broader discussion, see Timothy L. Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions in the Russian Army," *Orbis*, Fall 1995, pp. 531–548.

1995—though just barely.¹² However, in the aftermath of the purge he came under increasing fire—including from Yeltsin himself—for his lackluster performance. In February 1996, during a visit to Yekaterinburg, Yeltsin openly criticized Grachev, complaining that reform in the armed forces “is going badly, though Defense Minister Pavel Grachev seems to consider it is going well.”¹³ Yeltsin’s open criticism underscored the Russian president’s increasing disenchantment with the lack of progress in military reform—and with Grachev’s own performance as defense minister.

Yeltsin’s decision to appoint General Alexandr Lebed as head of the Security Council (June 18, 1996) appears to have been the final nail in Grachev’s coffin. As commander of the Fourteenth Army in Moldova, Lebed had been a strong critic of Grachev’s performance as defense minister. Lebed’s outspoken criticism of Grachev eventually cost Lebed his job—he was forced to resign from the army in June 1995. But Lebed continued to attack Grachev after his resignation.¹⁴ It is not surprising, therefore, that Grachev was dismissed—probably at Lebed’s insistence—the same day that Lebed took over as head of the Security Council. Grachev’s removal was followed by the ouster of seven top generals with close ties to the former defense minister.¹⁵

Grachev’s replacement as defense minister, General Igor Rodionov, former commandant of the General Staff Academy, was Lebed’s personal candidate for the post. Both men served together in the Transcaucasian Military District in 1988–1989, and Lebed maintained close ties to Rodionov after he fell from grace as a result of his

¹²In an interview with NTV on July 9, (then) Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeiko, a member of the Security Council at the time, said that three members of the Security Council—himself, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, and Yeltsin—had all voted in favor of Grachev’s resignation, but Yeltsin decided to retain Grachev because a majority of non-voting members opposed Grachev’s ouster. See *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 132, July 10, 1995.

¹³*OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 33, February 15, 1996. See also *Monitor*, No. 33, February 16, 1996.

¹⁴For a detailed discussion of Lebed’s feud with Grachev, see Jacob W. Kipp, “The Political Ballet of General Alexandr Lebed,” *Problems of Post-Communism*, July–August 1996, pp. 43–53. See also Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Warrior Who Would Rule Russia: A Profile of Aleksandr Lebed*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-805-AF, 1996, pp. 61–63.

¹⁵Lee Hockstader, “Yeltsin Fires Seven More Top Generals,” *Washington Post*, June 26, 1996.

role in the suppression of the demonstrations in Tbilisi in April 1989, which resulted in 19 deaths and nearly 200 wounded.¹⁶ Like Lebed, Rodionov is well-respected by the officer corps and has a reputation for honesty and professionalism. The fact that he was out of favor and did not have close ties to Grachev was undoubtedly a positive point in his favor, influencing his selection, as was his reputation for professionalism and honesty.

Rodionov has a reputation as a strong proponent of military reform—an issue that is likely to be at the top of the defense agenda over the next few years. He played a prominent role in the writing of the 1992 Russian military doctrine. Also, as a candidate for the Duma for the Congress of Russian Committees (KRO)—which Lebed headed with Yuri Skokov, former head of the Security Council—Rodionov helped to formulate the KRO's military program. Rodionov favors a small, mobile army, a revitalized role for the general staff, and the creation of a special organ—or defense council—that would be responsible for the defense of the country, military security, and the conduct of military reform. He also advocates maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent force, including a prominent role for the strategic rocket forces.¹⁷

Since becoming defense minister, Rodionov has begun to put his own stamp on the Defense Ministry, weeding out Grachev's protégés and bringing in his own men. At the beginning of October 1996, six high-ranking generals—all reportedly opponents of defense cuts—were dismissed.¹⁸ A few weeks later, the chief of the General Staff,

¹⁶At the time of the demonstrations, Rodionov was commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, with headquarters in Tbilisi. He was forced to bear responsibility for the deaths in the demonstration and was relieved of his command of the Transcaucasian Military District. However, recently released documents exonerate Rodionov. They make clear that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee failed to heed Rodionov's recommendations not to use brute military force to suppress the demonstrations and that the Soviet leadership, not Rodionov, bears the real responsibility for the deaths. See Alexandr Zhilin, "General Turns His Back on the Past," *Moscow News*, No. 29, July 30–August 6, 1996, pp. 1, 3.

¹⁷Kipp, *op. cit.*, p. 51. For a detailed discussion of Rodionov's views on military reform, see his article "An Alternative: After Chechnya, A New Turning Point in the Reform of the Armed Forces or a Repeat of Past Mistakes," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, February 9, 1995 (translated in JPRS-UMA-95-007, February 21, 1996, pp. 10–16).

¹⁸Among those dismissed were Colonel General Yevgeni Podkolzin, the Airborne Forces Commander; Colonel General Vladimir Ivanov, the Space Forces Commander;

Mikhail Kolesnikov, was replaced by Army General Viktor Samsonov, the former head of the CIS Cooperation Staff. Kolesnikov was known to have little enthusiasm for military reform.

These moves appear to be designed to facilitate the introduction of a comprehensive system of military reform. The broad outlines of this reform were approved at the first meeting of the Defense Council on October 4, 1996, and have been discussed in the Russian press, including in a major article by Rodionov at the end of November 1996.¹⁹ The main elements include

- a reduction of the armed forces to 1.2 million men
- the creation of more flexible and highly mobile forces
- the redrawing of military districts and the amalgamation of various military services and structures
- a strengthening of the role of the General Staff
- a sharper division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Defense, which would deal with policy and management issues, and the General Staff, which would have operational command of the armed forces
- a reduction in the size of other military forces and structures currently not under the control of the Ministry of Defense
- a revision of Russia's military doctrine.

The exact details of the reform program are still to be worked out. The General Staff and the Defense Ministry are both working on drafts of the military reform program. While the contents of the various reform programs have not been revealed, the broad outlines of the Defense Council's draft reform program were published in the

and Colonel General Vladimir Zhurbenko, the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Their dismissals were officially attributed to the fact that the three generals had reached retirement age (60) for their rank, but the real reason appears to have been their resistance to Rodionov's decision to reduce the Airborne Forces from 63,000 to 48,000, a move that also prompted a strong protest from Lebed. See *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 193, October 4, 1996.

¹⁹See "Kakaya Oborona Nuzhna," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, November 29, 1996. See also Boris Yanishanov, "The Kind of Army We Need," *Rossiskaya gazeta*, October 5, 1996 (translated in FBIS-SOV-96-195, October 5, 1996) and *Izvestiya*, December 11, 1996.

Russian press in January.²⁰ The Defense Council's draft reportedly calls for military reform to proceed in two stages. The first stage, from 1997 to 2000, will optimize the size and organization of the military, taking into consideration the country's limited economic potential. In this stage the Defense Ministry will be reduced to 1.2 million men and the other power ministries will be cut by 30 percent. In the second stage, from 2001 to 2009, when the economy is expected to improve, the armed forces would reportedly grow to 1.7 million men. Resources in this stage would be focused on long-term weapons development.

The decision by Yeltsin in early December 1996 to retire Rodionov—who reached the mandatory retirement age of 60 on December 1, 1996—from the armed forces but retain him as defense minister should be seen against this background. While at first glance the move appears to be an artful sleight of hand—Rodionov remains defense minister but exchanges his uniform for a civilian suit and tie—it could have important long-term consequences for the process of military reform and pave the way for the appointment of a full-fledged civilian at a later date.

Some critics have argued that Yeltsin should have appointed a civilian as defense minister. However, replacing Rodionov with a civilian at this stage would have almost certainly provoked strong resistance from the High Command, which is already badly demoralized, and could have complicated, possibly even derailed, the implementation of the reform program. As a former general, Rodionov is widely respected within the officer corps and seen by the officers as “one of their own,” even if he now wears a suit and tie. It may, therefore, be easier for him to carry out many of the difficult decisions associated with the reform—especially the reduction of the size of the armed forces—than it would be for a civilian, who, whatever his competence, would have been viewed with mistrust and suspicion by the officer corps. At the same time, his new status as a “civilian” sets an important precedent and could make it easier to appoint a “real” civilian later on.

²⁰See *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, January 22, 1997.

The Defense Council, established in July 1996, has begun to play a key role in the process of military reform. The Defense Council is part of the presidential staff and is charged with advising the president on important decisions of the Security Council on strategic issues of defense policy.²¹ Initially set up to constrain and counter-balance Lebed's power, the Defense Council has gradually taken on a life of its own and become the main mechanism for coordinating military policy, especially military reform. Meetings of the Defense Council are chaired by Yeltsin (and in his absence, Chernomyrdin, who is deputy chairman). The secretary is Yuri Baturin, Yeltsin's former national security advisor, who is also a member of the Defense Council.

The council meets on an average of once a month and operates somewhat like the U.S. National Security Council, but with a much more limited and narrowly defined mandate. It has a small staff—about 53 members—which is composed of civilians, many of whom are drawn from the Foreign Ministry, and military officers. It also draws on outside experts and commissions outside studies, which are used as resource material in the preparation of its work.²²

The Defense Council has become the main mechanism for coordinating the implementation of military reform. In addition to the Defense Ministry, other ministries and bodies, such as the Interior Ministry and Border Guards, are represented. The Defense Council thus provides a forum where the broader aspects of military reform can be discussed and coordinated. Since it is chaired by Yeltsin—and since its secretary, Baturin, is a civilian—it also provides a means of exerting some civilian control over the military and the process of military reform.

Military reform, however, is still in its embryonic and conceptual stage. Many elements are likely to undergo modification and refinement as the discussion and work on the plan continue. Indeed, the recent reports in the Russian press—especially Rodionov's article

²¹For the text of the decree setting up the Defense Council, see *Rossiskaya gazeta*, July 27, 1996.

²²Based on discussions in Moscow with staff members of the Defense Council, December 19, 1996.

in *Nezavisimaya gazeta* at the end of November 1996²³—appear designed to raise public consciousness about the need for military reform and to create a broad public consensus behind it.²⁴

Finding the money to finance this reform plan, moreover, is likely to prove difficult. Rodionov has repeatedly warned that reform will cost money and that Russia's resurrection as a great power can be achieved only if the state's defense is maintained.²⁵ Such warnings, however, have largely fallen on deaf ears. The 1997 budget plans allow for defense spending of 104 trillion rubles (about \$18.9 billion), far short of the 230 trillion rubles initially requested by the Defense Ministry.

Thus, Rodionov faces an uphill battle to obtain the financing needed to carry out a comprehensive program of military reform, especially the full professionalization of the armed forces envisaged in the controversial decree signed by Yeltsin on May 16, 1996, which calls for an end to military conscription by the year 2000.²⁶ Given the current financial constraints on defense spending, it is highly doubtful that this goal can be attained in such a short time.²⁷ Rodionov and

²³"Kakaya oborona nuzhna," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, November 28, 1996.

²⁴A somewhat similar effort was undertaken just prior to the release of the "National Security Concept," worked out under Baturin's direction, in the spring of 1996. Key elements of the concept were leaked to the press prior to the publication of the document to test public reaction. The draft document was also discussed at a series of conferences and informal discussions to get feedback from the policy community. Critical comments were then incorporated into the final document. This helped to build a broad consensus for the document and avoid the impression that it was something "secretly cooked up in the Kremlin kitchen." The intention appears to be to follow a similar procedure with military reform. Based on discussions in Moscow with staff members of the Defense Council, December 19, 1996.

²⁵At a meeting of key representatives of the High Command and Defense Ministry at the end of July 1996, Rodionov warned that "quality cannot be achieved without a definite increase in expenditure. A good army is not cheap. Only cannon fodder is cheap." See Colonel Oleg Vlyadyakin, "Russian Federation Defense Minister Igor Rodionov: A Good Army Cannot Be Cheap," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, August 1, 1996, p. 1 (translated in FBIS-SOV-97-149, August 1, 1996, pp. 17-19).

²⁶"Boris Eltsine décrète le passage à une armée professionnelle d'ici à l'an 2000," *Le Monde*, May 18, 1996. For the text of the decree, see FBIS-SOV-96-097, May 17, 1996.

²⁷The military was clearly caught off guard by the decree and largely reacted negatively to it, fearing that it would have a negative impact on the army's readiness. See Igor Korotchenko, "Impractical Plans," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, May 18, 1996. Also

Baturin have both suggested that the target date may have to be postponed until at least the year 2005.

Moreover, Rodionov is likely to face considerable resistance to the reform within the military itself. Many officers are likely to balk at the large cuts that are required by the reform, which could result in the retirement of as many as 500 generals. As a result, Rodionov may find his relations with the officer corps, especially the General Staff, increasingly strained.

Rodionov's attempt in September 1996 to reduce the size of the airborne forces from 63,000 to 48,000 illustrates the difficulties that may be ahead. The move provoked strong opposition from Commander in Chief of the Airborne Forces Colonel General Vladimir Ivanov—who was later fired—and other senior commanders. Lebed also sharply criticized Rodionov's proposal, calling it a "criminal document, which was tantamount to the elimination of the airborne forces."²⁸ The dismissal of General Vladimir Semenov, the head of the Russian Ground Forces, in December 1996 also appears to have been related to Semenov's resistance to military reform.²⁹

In short, Rodionov faces a difficult choice. As Alexandr Goltz, the respected military correspondent for *Itogi* has noted, Rodionov can go ahead with reform and eventually find himself under increasing fire within the military for "destroying" the armed forces and leaving the country "defenseless" against military threats. Or he can follow the General Staff, who continue to draft unrealistic plans that exceed Russia's current economic means. This will inevitably bring him into

"Boris Yeltsin Opts for Contract Service," *Kommersant Daily*, May 18, 1996, pp. 1, 3 (translated in FBIS-SOV-96-098, May 20, 1996, pp. 26-27).

²⁸See *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 201, October 16, 1996.

²⁹For details, see *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 232, December 3, 1996. See also *Jamestown Monitor*, No. 225, December 3, 1996; "Ground Forces Chief Sacked," *Moscow News*, No. 48, December 5-11, 1996; and "Warum wurde Semjonov entlassen?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 5, 1996. As of mid-January 1997, however, Semenov's status remained unclear. The announcement of his dismissal by Rodionov was made on December 2, 1996, but was never approved by Yeltsin, who was hospitalized a short time later. This has left the ground forces bereft of leadership at a critical moment and attests to the turmoil within the military that the military reform effort has engendered. The delay may also reflect the Kremlin's disenchantment with Rodionov's performance.

conflict with Yeltsin and the advocates of far-reaching military reform and could cost him his job, sooner rather than later.³⁰

Indeed, there are growing signs within Yeltsin's entourage of disenchantment with Rodionov. Rodionov has repeatedly called for higher defense spending and warned that the armed forces face an imminent crisis due to shortfalls in funding. On February 6, 1997, he set off alarm bells, saying that due to insufficient funding the reliability of the Russian nuclear forces could not be guaranteed and that Russia might reach the point where its missiles and nuclear systems could not be controlled—a statement that was later denied by Baturin.³¹ In an inflammatory speech to Russian veterans a few weeks later, he also accused Russia's democrats (presumably including Baturin) of having deliberately understated the crisis in the Russian armed forces.³² While such statements appear to be part of a campaign to get more funds for the military, they have irritated the military reformers in Yeltsin's entourage and could eventually prompt Yeltsin to replace Rodionov with someone more willing to make the reductions required by Russia's current economic constraints.

Rodionov has also generally taken a tough line on NATO enlargement.³³ During his visit to NATO headquarters in mid-December 1996, he delivered a stern lecture on the dangers of NATO enlargement, warning that enlargement would jeopardize START ratification and prompt Russia to take countermeasures.³⁴ However, not all members of the High Command appear to share this view. For instance, at a press conference in Moscow in December 1996, General

³⁰Alexandr Goltz, "Defense: Next Intrigue," *Moscow Times*, December 20, 1996.

³¹Richard C. Paddock, "Russian Military in Dire Disarray, Officials Admit," *Los Angeles Times*, February 8, 1997. See also Igor Rodionov, "The Crisis in the Army Is a State Security Threat," *Moscow News*, January 23–29, 1997, and *Jamestown Monitor*, No. 29, February 11, 1997. For Baturin's rebuttal, see *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 40, February 26, 1997.

³²See *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 40, February 26, 1997. Also, *Jamestown Monitor*, No. 40, February 26, 1997.

³³See in particular, "Kakaya oborona nuzhna," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, November 28, 1996.

³⁴William Drozdiak, "Russian Defense Chief Blasts NATO Plans," *Washington Post*, December 19, 1996. See also Jonathan Clayton, "Rodionov: NATO Growth Will Upset Arms Control," *Moscow Times*, December 19, 1996.

Igor Sergeyev, the commander of Russia's strategic rocket forces, explicitly warned against linking START and NATO enlargement, arguing that the START agreement was in Russia's interest and assured a balance of forces.³⁵ The Russian navy also reportedly supports START II ratification.³⁶

There also appear to be differences of view within the military about cooperation with NATO. Some members of the Russian military, especially General Leonty Shetsov, the commander of the Russian troops in the Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR), appear to favor expanding cooperation with NATO. Shetsov has reportedly pushed quietly behind the scenes for closer ties with the alliance.³⁷ However, Rodionov's tough stance during his visit to NATO headquarters in December 1996 suggests that Moscow is unlikely to agree to any expansion of ties, including an exchange of liaison officers in Moscow and at NATO headquarters in Brussels, until the main outlines of the proposed charter between Russia and NATO have been clearly defined.

³⁵"General: No NATO Treaty Link," *Moscow Times*, December 17, 1996.

³⁶Based on discussions with members of the Defense Committee of the Duma, December 19, 1996.

³⁷Based on discussions at NATO headquarters in Brussels, December 3, 1996, and in Moscow, December 18-19, 1996.

THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

The Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki or SVR) is another important foreign policy actor. The SVR is the supplier of foreign intelligence to the Foreign Ministry and other bureaucracies, the Security Council, and the president. The SVR does not report to the prime minister but answers directly to Yeltsin. As SVR chief, Yevgeni Primakov was reportedly among the few top government officials with direct access to Yeltsin.

Under Primakov's direction, the SVR played an important role in foreign policy decisionmaking. It issued a number of reports that attracted the attention of government officials and specialists abroad. The most prominent was a report on NATO enlargement, issued with great fanfare in the fall of 1993, which emphasized the dangers of enlargement for Russian security interests.¹ According to Primakov, the conclusions of the report became the basis for the official Russian stand on enlargement.²

The influence of the SVR was in part due to Primakov's bureaucratic skills and good working relations with the president and the Presidential Apparatus. While head of the SVR, Primakov was reportedly on good terms with Yuri Baturin, President Yeltsin's na-

¹For the text of the report see *Izvestiya*, November 26, 1993. What was interesting about the report was that it did not limit itself solely to analysis but actually engaged in policy recommendations, a practice that in most Western governments would have been considered overstepping its bureaucratic mandate.

²See Primakov's interview in *Polityka*, March 16, 1996, pp. 16–17 (translated in FBIS-EEU-96-051, March 14, 1996).

tional security aide, as well as Dimitri Ryurikov, Yeltsin's advisor on foreign policy. But some critics also charged that the SVR's influence was due to the weakness of the Foreign Ministry and Security Council, which were supposed to shape Russia's foreign and security interests but in fact did not. This left a vacuum, which Primakov managed to exploit to increase the influence of the SVR on foreign policy.³

Primakov's transfer to the post of foreign minister in January 1996 appears to have led to a diminution of the influence of the SVR as an independent policy actor. The current head of the SVR, Colonel General Vyacheslav Trubnikov, Primakov's former deputy, is a member of both the Security Council and the Defense Council. However, he does not have Primakov's stature and close ties to Yeltsin. Moreover, Primakov appears to retain close contacts with—some argue, *de facto* control over—the SVR. As a result, the SVR's autonomy and ability to directly influence the policymaking process appear to have diminished.

³Migranyan, *op. cit.*

THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE

The role of the Presidential Security Service (SBP) during Yeltsin's first term is of interest because it illustrates two significant features of the foreign policy and security decisionmaking system under Yeltsin: (1) the lack of clear lines of authority and (2) the importance of informal channels of communication. Yeltsin tends to rely on a small circle of close aides who have direct access to him, and he often ignores or bypasses formal decisionmaking channels on many issues. Both factors enabled Alexandr Korzhakov, the former head of the SBP, to gradually expand his influence into areas in which he had no official mandate or competence.

A former KGB official, Korzhakov was officially responsible for ensuring the personal safety of the president. But his power and influence extended well beyond these functions. Korzhakov had a close personal relationship with Yeltsin going back over a decade. Until his dismissal in June 1996, he was Yeltsin's closest and most trusted aide.¹ This close personal relationship enabled Korzhakov gradually to involve himself in areas in which the president's bodyguard normally would have had little or no say, including some security-related issues.

¹Korzhakov was Yeltsin's bodyguard when he was a candidate member of the Politburo, and he continued to act as his bodyguard—without pay—after Yeltsin was dismissed from the Politburo. The two men were personally very close. As Yeltsin noted in his memoirs, "To this day Korzhakov never leaves my side and we even sit up at night during trips together." Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia*, New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1994, p. 142.

Korzhakov was deeply involved in the supervision of arms sales and military technology.² When the new arms trading company Rosvooruzheniye was created in November 1993, Korzhakov was given some supervisory powers over it. In April 1994, he succeeded in placing his deputy in the SBP, Georgii Rogozin, in the Interdepartmental Commission for Military-Technical Collaboration with Foreign Countries—at the time the top body overseeing arms sales. In December 1994, Yeltsin signed an edict creating a new State Committee on Military-Technology Policy, with overall supervision of the arms trade. Korzhakov apparently persuaded Yeltsin to name another of his protégés, Sergei Sverchnikov, as chairman of the new state committee. However, in June 1995, Yeltsin stripped the State Committee on Military-Technology Policy of much of its power. This was a political setback for Korzhakov because it diluted his control over arms sales policy.

Korzhakov was also deeply involved in a number of shady enterprises in the oil and energy field. According to some sources, he tried to raise slush funds for Yeltsin by setting up a company to export oil, gold, and diamonds.³ These funds were allegedly to be used in Yeltsin's presidential campaign bid and were deposited in an account to be monitored by Korzhakov.⁴ Korzhakov also played a role in personnel issues within the Presidential Apparatus.

The most dramatic example of Korzhakov's efforts to meddle in areas in which he had no clear authority was a letter—later leaked—that he sent to Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin regarding

²See Alexandr Budberg, "Korzhakov to Powder Yeltsin's Nose and Throw Dust in Russians' Eyes," *Moskovskii komsomolets*, October 21, 1995, p. 1 (translated in FBIS-SOV-95-208, October 27, 1995, p. 42). By February 1996, Korzhakov had engineered the appointment of one of his deputies—Vladimir Antipov—as deputy chief of staff responsible for cadres. See *RLA*, February 11, 1996.

³See Sergei Parkhomenko, "Modern Day Rasputin," *Moscow News*, No. 16, April 28–May 4, 1995, pp. 1, 6.

⁴"Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 2092: On the Presidential Programs Fund," *Rossiskaya gazeta*, November 26, 1994, p. 4, in "Yeltsin Edict on Presidential Programs Fund" (translated in FBIS-SOV-94-230, November 30, 1994, pp. 15–16). Created in early 1995, the Rostoplivo Open-Type Joint Stock Company is apparently an institution designed to fund the programs of the Russian Federation Presidential Staff's Administration of Affairs. See Yevgeni Albats, "Authorities Secretly Creating Their Own Black Economy," *Izvestiya*, February 1, 1995, pp. 1–2 (translated in FBIS-SOV-95-023, February 3, 1995, pp. 20–21).

changes to oil export rules at the end of 1994. In the letter Korzhakov protested the order of (then) Deputy Premier Alexandr Shokhin to lift oil export procedures that excluded foreign companies and argued that it would allow "foreign intervention" in the raw material branches of the economy.⁵ In effect, Korzhakov was instructing Chernomyrdin on how the prime minister should conduct economic policy—an area in which Korzhakov had no official responsibility. While Chernomyrdin ignored Korzhakov's "advice," the incident underscores the degree to which Korzhakov felt free to meddle in areas in which he had no competence or mandate.

Korzhakov also engaged in a running battle with Defense Minister Pavel Grachev over control of arms sales policy. In early 1995, Korzhakov launched an investigation into the activities of Rosvooruzheniye, the Russian foreign arms sales body, after losing a majority of his arms trade portfolio.⁶ Korzhakov "discovered" massive corruption and argued for additional rules to govern the export of Russian arms. In April 1995, Korzhakov also sharply criticized the Defense Ministry's arms sales company Voentekh, established by Grachev in 1992. Voentekh had accounted for up to 35 percent of arms exports but lost its right to sell arms when the State Committee on Military-Technology Policy was created in late 1994. Grachev, an opponent of subordinating all arms sales to the State Committee on Military-Technology Policy, pressed for restoration of his control over arms sales when the state committee's authority over arms sales was weakened in the spring of 1995. Korzhakov's attack appears to

⁵Irina Savvateyeva, "Kto upravliaet stranoi—Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, ili General Korzhakov?" *Izvestiya*, December 22, 1994, pp. 1–2. A little background is necessary to understand the issue at hand. The series of events appears to have been triggered by reformers' actions to end oil export quotas controlled by officials and to open access to oil pipelines to foreign investors. In May 1994, Yeltsin signed an edict approving proposals worked out by the head of the Presidential Administration Analysis Center, Yevgeni Yasin, to reduce export quotas, and in August the cabinet decided to end quotas as of January 1, 1995. With the quota system set to end on January 1, opponents mobilized, raising charges that Chernomyrdin and Anatoli Chubais had allowed abuses and corruption in the petroleum sector. Chernomyrdin, who was neither persuaded nor intimidated by Korzhakov, proceeded to carry out his reforms.

⁶Alexandr Zhilin, "Generals Battle over Arms Trade Monopoly," *Moscow News*, No. 18, May 12–18, 1995, p. 2.

have been intended to discredit Grachev and been part of the ongoing battle for control of the arms trade.⁷

In the following months, Korzhakov continued to undercut Grachev. In a December 1995 interview, he openly criticized Grachev, stating that Grachev was better at organizing parades than functioning as defense minister.⁸ Korzhakov is believed to have been among those pushing behind the scenes for Grachev's ouster as defense minister, using the army's poor performance in Chechnya as the pretext.⁹

Korzhakov's actual influence on foreign and security policy, however, is hard to measure since he operated behind the scenes in very shadowy ways. The duplication and lack of clear formal lines of authority, as well as his close personal ties to Yeltsin, allowed him to meddle in areas where he had no clear bureaucratic responsibility or mandate. But he also lost a number of important bureaucratic battles. His effort to influence petroleum export policy failed, and his influence over arms sales policy was significantly reduced when Yeltsin decided to return supervision of the body to the Presidential Apparatus in June 1995.

Korzhakov was forced to resign in June 1996, along with two other hard-liners, head of the Federal Security Service Mikhail Barsukov and First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets.¹⁰ The resignations

⁷Irina de Chikoff, "Russia: Arms Sales Out of Control," *Le Figaro*, April 7, 1995, p. 3 (translated in FBIS-SOV-95-068, April 10, 1995, pp. 6-7). Alexandr Minkin, "The Goats Want to Guard the Cabbage—It Is a Business They Love," *Moskovskii komsomolets*, April 21, 1995, pp. 1-2 (translated in JPRS-UMA-95-020, May 2, 1995, pp. 74-80).

⁸"Interview with Alexandr Korzhakov," *Russian Public Television*, December 14, 1995 (translated in FBIS-SOV-95-241, December 15, 1995, p. 31).

⁹See Dimitry Balbarov, "Grachev, Army Disgraced by Attack on Grozny," *Moscow News*, March 14-20, 1996, p. 1.

¹⁰The catalyst for the shakeup was the arrest and interrogation of two prominent members of Yeltsin's campaign staff, Arkady Estafyev and Sergei Lisovsky, by uniformed presidential guards because they were allegedly carrying \$500,000 in cash in a suitcase. Korzhakov and the others were apparently trying to obtain compromising material or information against Chernomyrdin and Chubais that could be used to discredit them. The reformist faction around Yeltsin, led by Chubais, feared that the arrests were a prelude to an effort by hard-liners to derail the second round of voting in the presidential elections and publicized the incident on nighttime television broadcasts. The affair might have been hushed up if it were not for the intervention of Lebed, who had been appointed head of the Security Council only a few days earlier. Lebed went public, charging that attempts were being made to wreck the second

culminated a long internal struggle within the Yeltsin entourage between the economic reformers, headed by Anatoli Chubais, Yeltsin's campaign manager and former first deputy prime minister, and the "power ministries," with whom Korzhakov was tactically allied. Chubais, in effect, used the arrest of two members of Yeltsin's campaign staff, Arkady Estafyev and Sergei Lisovsky, by Korzhakov's presidential guard to convince Yeltsin that Korzhakov, Barsukov, and Soskovets were trying to sabotage the elections and should be fired. Chubais managed to get his views to Yeltsin through Yeltsin's daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko, the only person besides Korzhakov who had unimpeded access to Yeltsin.

The ouster of Korzhakov, Barsukov, and Soskovets resulted in a significant shift in the internal balance of power within the Yeltsin team in favor of Chubais and the financial and banking interests supporting him.¹¹ In early July 1996, Chubais was appointed Yeltsin's chief of staff. Under his leadership, the Presidential Apparatus has been radically reorganized. As part of this reorganization, the SBP has been downgraded and integrated into the Federal Protection Service. Korzhakov's replacement, Anatoli Kuznetsov, Yeltsin's personal bodyguard, does not have the same type of close personal relationship with Yeltsin that Korzhakov enjoyed and is not likely to play a significant political role.

round of the elections. Yeltsin then acted decisively to sack the three hard-liners. Yeltsin's action appears to have been motivated by a desire to demonstrate decisiveness and show he was very much in charge. See David Hoffman, "Yeltsin Dismisses 3 Hard-line Aides from Key Positions," *Washington Post*, June 21, 1996. See also Chrystia Freeland and John Thornhill, "Yeltsin Fires Three Top Hardliners," *Financial Times*, June 21, 1996; Chrystia Freeland and John Thornhill, "Showdown in the Kremlin Dark," *Financial Times*, June 21, 1996; and Leonid Nikitsky, "Sackings: The Big Kiss Off," *Moscow News*, No. 25, July 4-10, 1996. For Korzhakov's interpretation of the incident, see "Korzhakov: Hit or Miss?" *Moscow News*, No. 47, November 28-December 4, 1996, p. 1.

¹¹The economic dimensions of this struggle have often been overlooked. Instead, the struggle has been portrayed largely as a fight between "liberals" and "hard-liners." In fact, the struggle was much deeper. Korzhakov, Barsukov, and Soskovets represented strong obstacles to the interests of the banking and financial circles supporting Chubais, who wanted to see a liberalization of the economy, which served their personal economic interests. They poured nearly 3 million dollars into Yeltsin's campaign and used their control of the media to give widespread coverage to Yeltsin while denying coverage to Gennadi Zyuganov, the communist party's candidate.

Korzhakov, however, has continued to make political waves. In October 1996, he announced plans to run for Lebed's seat in the Duma, which Lebed was forced to vacate when he became head of the Security Council. Indeed, the two men appear to have formed a tactical alliance, inspired largely by a common animosity toward Chubais.¹² Lebed actively campaigned for Korzhakov, and some commentators have suggested that Lebed may be interested in obtaining access to the extensive files that Korzhakov kept while head of the SBP, which reportedly contain compromising material on various figures in Yeltsin's entourage—especially Chernomyrdin and Chubais.¹³

However, even if he succeeds in winning Lebed's seat, Korzhakov is unlikely to play a major role in Russian politics. His power derived from his close personal association with Yeltsin. With that close relationship now irrevocably shattered, Korzhakov's political star is likely to fade. He may be capable of provoking an occasional minor scandal by leaking some potentially compromising material about members of Yeltsin's entourage, but he is unlikely to attain anywhere near the influence he had as head of the Presidential Security Service under Yeltsin.

¹²See "Russie: M. Lebed scelle son alliance avec M. Korjakov," *Le Monde*, October 15, 1996.

¹³*OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 199, October 14, 1996. See also Chrystia Freeland, "Korzhakov Threatens to Spill the Beans," *Financial Times*, October 12/13, 1996, and Jean-Baptiste Naudet, "L'ancien garde du corps de Boris Eltsine menace de dévoiler des dossiers compromettants," *Le Monde*, October 13/14, 1996. Chernomyrdin's role in corruption is documented in Peter Reddaway, "Is Chernomyrdin a Crook?" *Post Soviet Prospects*, Vol. III, No. 8, August 1995, pp. 1–4.

THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council was established by a presidential decree in June 1992.¹ The council's legal authority was reinforced by Article 83(g) of the Russian Federation's Constitution, which empowered the president to form and head the Security Council. The original decree 547, announced by Yeltsin in June 1992, called for two groups of members: five permanent members, who have voting rights, and a larger consultative group of ministers, who do not have voting rights.²

The permanent members were initially the president, the vice president, the prime minister, the first deputy speaker of the Supreme Soviet, and the Security Council secretary. In 1993, the posts of vice president and Supreme Soviet first deputy speakers were eliminated, reducing the council's membership to three. The total of five was restored only on January 10, 1995, when the chairman of the Federation Council (then Vladimir Shumeiko) and the speaker of the State Duma (then Ivan Rybkin) were made permanent members of the Security Council.³

¹For a useful discussion of the functioning of the Security Council in the initial period of Yeltsin's tenure, see Jan S. Adams, "Russia's Security Council Profiled," *RFE/RL Research*, October 6, 1994, pp. 1-13, and Jan S. Adams, "The Russian National Security Council," *Problems of Post-Communism*, January/February 1996, pp. 35-42. See also Michel Lesage, "L'organisation du pouvoir sous Boris Eltsine," *Le courrier des pays de l'Est*, No. 404, November 1995, especially p. 7, and Oleg Lobov, "Russia's Security Council and National Interests," *International Affairs*, October 1995, pp. 11-16.

²Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

³The latter two were dropped in February 1996 after the communist victory in the December 1995 parliamentary elections. Their places were left vacant because Yeltsin

To aid the Security Council's work, a number of interdepartmental commissions were set up, each with its own staff and chaired by ministers or deputy ministers. These bodies commission outside studies and forward specialized information to the council. They also play important roles in preparing the council's agenda and calling attention to a broad range of security issues needing presidential action.

At the end of 1995, the regular (non-voting) members of the Security Council were the ministers of the following ministries: Defense; Interior; Justice; Foreign Affairs; Finance; Civil Defense, Emergencies and Liquidation of Consequences of Natural Disasters; and Atomic Energy; the directors of the Federal Service of Border Guards, the External Intelligence Service, and the Federal Security Service; and the vice chairman of the government.⁴

Decisions of the Security Council are adopted at its sessions by a simple majority of the permanent members and enter into force after approval by the chairman of the Security Council. Thus, in practice, the Security Council acts as an advisory body. Its decisions enter into force only after the president, who is also chairman of the Security Council, signs a related decree or executive order.

When the Security Council was first set up in 1992, there was widespread fear that Yeltsin was trying to recreate the Politburo and that the Security Council had too much power. These fears, however, have not been borne out in practice. Rather than becoming an all-powerful tool for dictating policy, the Security Council has proved to be relatively ineffective in coordinating security policy and in providing Yeltsin with concrete policy options.

The high point of the council's influence was under Yuri Skokov, who served as secretary of the council from May 1992 to May 1993. Skokov oversaw the first major effort to define Russia's basic foreign policy goals and objectives, "Basic Provisions of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," published in 1993, which

did not want to appoint their successors, Yegor Stroyev and Gennadi Seleznev, to the Security Council.

⁴Lobov, "Russia's Security Council and National Interests," p. 13. Lobov was secretary of the Security Council.

stressed that foreign political work would be "directed by the president, relying on the Security Council." Skokov was dismissed in May 1993 as a result of apparent differences with Yeltsin over Yeltsin's attempt to enact emergency powers, which Skokov opposed.

After Skokov's departure, the Security Council declined in importance. Neither Air Marshal Yevgeni Shaposhnikov, Skokov's successor, nor Oleg Lobov, Lebed's predecessor, proved to be as effective managers as Skokov was. As a result, the influence of the Security Council on foreign and security policy diminished.

The Security Council has proven ineffective for several reasons. To begin, the council meets infrequently as a body. As a result, it has been unable to effectively coordinate the policymaking process. Second, the top leadership of the "power ministries" (i.e., the Federal Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Interior) report directly to the president, and on many key policy issues the Security Council has often been bypassed. Finally, the control and monitoring of the decisions have been weak and haphazard.⁵

The large size of the council has also hindered its effectiveness as an instrument for integrating and coordinating policy. This weakness has been reinforced by Yeltsin's tendency to rely on informal channels of communication. The Security Council appears to have played only a formalistic role, for instance, in the decision to intervene in Chechnya. Little effort was made to draw on the expertise of the Presidential Council or the Analytic Center in the President's Office.⁶ The General Staff also does not appear to have been involved in the preparations and was apparently caught by surprise by the decision. Indeed, the crucial November 29, 1994, Security Council meeting at which the decision to invade Chechnya was made appears to have

⁵According to a Security Council staffer: "In the nearly three-year history of the Security Council [one is] unlikely to find one of its decisions fulfilled from beginning to end." Roman Podoprighora, "Shannon Airport: Yeltsin Sleeps," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, February 17-20, 1995, p. 5 (translated in FBIS-SOV-95-035, February 22, 1995, p. 19).

⁶See Emil Payin and Arkady Popov, "The Russian Policy in Chechnya: How It Was Conceived, How It Led to War, and What Repercussions It Will Have for Tomorrow," *Izvestiya*, February 10, 1995, p. 4 (translated in FBIS-SOV-95-308, February 27, 1995, pp. 25-34).

been a carefully staged affair designed to rubber-stamp a decision that Yeltsin had already made.⁷

Yeltsin's decision in June 1996 to appoint Alexandr Lebed as head of the Security Council appears to have been motivated more by Yeltsin's desire to exploit Lebed's popularity for his own electoral purposes than by a desire to strengthen the Security Council. By bringing Lebed into the Presidential Apparatus, Yeltsin hoped to pick up a large portion of the 15 percent of the vote that Lebed had won in the first round of the election. At the same time, Yeltsin may have hoped to co-opt and muzzle an awkward opponent. As a sitting government official beholden to the president, Lebed would find it more difficult to openly attack Yeltsin's policy.

Lebed, however, tried to use the Security Council as an instrument to expand his power and further his own political ambitions. He appears to have wanted to transform the Security Council into some sort of "superministry" to which all the ministries—especially the power ministries—would be subordinate. Upon assuming his duties as council head, he made clear that he intended to involve himself in all aspects of security policy, including economic policy—a move that brought him into conflict with Chernomyrdin, who regarded economic policy as his own personal preserve.

Yeltsin was clearly uncomfortable with Lebed's brash style and undisguised political ambitions, and he took a number of steps designed to limit Lebed's power. The creation of the Defense Council appears to have been designed in large part to counterbalance Lebed's power and weaken his direct control over military and defense policy. Lebed suffered a further blow in early October 1996 when Yeltsin appointed Yuri Baturin, secretary of the Defense Council, to head a commission overseeing military promotions.⁸

⁷According to Yuri Kalmykov, the Minister of Justice and member of the council at the time, all the legal documents needed to apply the force option in Chechnya were presented to the council at the opening of the meeting, and members were simply asked to vote for or against that option. See Jan S. Adams, "The Russian National Security Council," *Problems of Post-Communism*, January/February 1996, p. 40.

⁸Lebed initially had claimed this responsibility for himself and reportedly threatened to resign in protest but was talked out of it by Yeltsin, who then publicly scolded Lebed, calling on him to stop quarreling with other ministers and get down to work.

Lebed, however, continued to pursue his own agenda, which conflicted with Yeltsin's in many areas. In addition, he proposed a number of initiatives that directly threatened vested interests of the key elites supporting the Yeltsin government. In September 1996, for instance, he criticized the government's budget and proposed taxing the gas and oil industry—Chernomyrdin's main constituency—to pay for a buildup of the military-industrial complex.⁹ He also clashed with Interior Minister Anatoli Kulikov, blaming him for the failures in Chechnya and demanding his resignation—a demand that Yeltsin pointedly ignored.

Moreover, at times Lebed seemed to conduct his own independent foreign policy. His conciliatory approach to cooperation with NATO during his trip to NATO headquarters in early October 1996 was at variance with Primakov's tougher line and created confusion in the West about what the Russian position on enlargement really was. Lebed also clashed with the Foreign Ministry over policy toward Ukraine. In October he sent a letter to the Black Sea Fleet newspaper *Flag Rodiny* stating that Sevastopol remained legally a Russian city—a position that conflicted with the official position of the Yeltsin government and that prompted an official repudiation by the Foreign Ministry.¹⁰

In short, Lebed managed to alienate many of the most powerful constituencies within the Yeltsin government. On October 17, he was discharged, after being accused by Interior Minister Kulikov of plotting a coup d'état, allegedly to be carried out by a 50,000-man "Russian Legion" and 1,500 Chechen guerrillas. Kulikov's charges had little substance and appear to have been dredged up largely as a pretext to carry out a decision that had been made some time earlier by those close to Yeltsin. Indeed, the dismissal had the air of a carefully planned and stage-managed affair.¹¹

See David Hoffman, "Yeltsin Tells Russians He's Still in Charge," *Washington Post*, October 4, 1996.

⁹"Lebed kritisiert den Haushaltsplan," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 14, 1996.

¹⁰See *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 199, October 14, 1996. See also *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, October 10, 1996, and *Segodnya*, October 10, 1996.

¹¹There is some evidence, for instance, that the decree removing Lebed had already been prepared several weeks before Lebed's actual removal. See Andrei Zhukov, "Self-

The Yeltsin team appears to have been particularly alarmed by the emerging political alliance between Lebed and Alexandr Korzhakov, the former head of the Presidential Security Service, whom Yeltsin had replaced in June 1996.¹² The Lebed-Korzhakov alliance was a double threat to the Kremlin elite, especially Chubais. As noted earlier, Korzhakov had been one of Chubais' most implacable opponents. In addition, Korzhakov offered Lebed three things he needed to further his political ambitions: a regional network of contacts, financial backing through Korzhakov's ties to the arms sales company Rosvooruzheniye, and access to inside "dirt" on Chubais and Chernomyrdin's alleged involvement in corruption.

Lebed's successor as secretary of the Security Council, Ivan Rybkin, former speaker of the Duma, is a Yeltsin loyalist with little experience in security affairs. As speaker of the Duma, he has pursued a moderate course and been deferential to Yeltsin. He is likely to maintain a low profile and not to use the Security Council as a base to pursue his own agenda, as Lebed did. Indeed, he appears to have been appointed precisely because he could be counted on to loyally carry out Yeltsin's policies rather than pursue bold new initiatives.

Since his appointment as secretary of the Security Council in mid-October, Rybkin has begun to reorganize the Security Council staff. At the end of October, Lieutenant General Leonid Maiorov, who had served as Rybkin's aide for military affairs from 1994–1996 when Rybkin was speaker of the Duma, was appointed deputy secretary. Two Lebed appointees, Vladimir Denisov and Sergei Khalamov, lost their posts as deputy secretaries and declined an invitation by Rybkin to work as his deputies in his capacity as presidential envoy to Chechnya.

Preservation: The Force Behind the Russian Political Process," *Prism*, Vol. II, November 1996.

¹²Yeltsin specifically mentioned Lebed's ties to Korzhakov in his brief televised address on October 17, 1996, firing Lebed, noting that Korzhakov and Lebed were "both alike—two generals." On the importance of the Korzhakov connection as a factor in Lebed's ouster, see in particular Sophie Shihab, "Le général Lebed, limogé, reste en course pour la succession de M. Eltsine," *Le Monde*, October 19, 1996; Jean-Baptiste Naudet, "Quarante-huit heures de sombres manoeuvres de couloir," *Le Monde*, October 19, 1996; and Chrystia Freeland, "Russia's Unfolding Drama," *Financial Times*, October 20, 1996.

Under Rybkin, the number of personnel has been reduced by 20 percent.¹³ As of January 1997, the number of persons working in the Security Council—including technical personnel—stood at 207. The council is divided into five departments: economic security, social and federal security, military security, informational security and prognosis, and international security.

The most important—and controversial—appointment by Rybkin has been that of Boris Berezovsky, a prominent financier and banking mogul, who was named deputy head of the Security Council at the end of October 1996. Berezovsky has close links to Chubais and was one of the strongest financial backers of Yeltsin's presidential campaign. His appointment strengthens the ties between the president's office and the Security Council and gives Chubais an indirect means of influencing security policy.

Berezovsky's appointment also illustrates the way in which the new financial elite is beginning to assume positions of increasing prominence and influence. In the past, members of the elite preferred to stay in the background and operate behind the scenes. However, since Yeltsin's reelection they have begun to come out of the shadows and assume prominent positions within the Yeltsin government.¹⁴

In addition, an informal division of labor seems to be gradually emerging between the Security Council and the Defense Council, with the Security Council concentrating on Chechnya and issues of internal security, such as crime and law enforcement, and the Defense Council focusing on military reform. As a result, the mandate and responsibilities of the two bodies have become more sharply delineated, reducing the potential for friction and duplication of effort.

¹³Igor Korotchenko, "Reorganizatsiia Soveta Bezopasnosti RF Zavershena," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, January 21, 1997.

¹⁴Another prominent banker and member of Moscow's financial elite, Vladimir Potanin, is currently first deputy prime minister in charge of the economy. On the growing political influence of Moscow's financial elite, see Chrystia Freeland, John Thornhill, and Andrew Gowers, "Moscow's Group of Seven," *Financial Times*, November 1, 1996.

THE PRESIDENTIAL APPARATUS

The Presidential Apparatus has not been a major actor in foreign policy decisionmaking. Since 1992 the Presidential Apparatus has undergone several important organizational and leadership changes. Up until February 1996, the Presidential Apparatus consisted of 15 *upravleniia* (administrations) and/or *otdely* (branch departments), which were under the direct supervision of Chief of the Presidential Apparatus Sergei Filatov.¹ Under Filatov the apparatus expanded to over 3,200 employees, prompting complaints that the Presidential Apparatus behaved more like the former CPSU Central Committee.² Filatov was replaced by former Russian Nationalities Minister Nikolai Yegorov in January 1996.

¹The Analysis Directorate; Cadres Directorate; Center for Presidential Programs; Directorate of Interaction with Political Parties, Public Associations, Factions, and Deputies of the Houses of the Federal Assembly; Directorate for Questions of Citizenship; Directorate for Supply of Information and Documents; Directorate for Work with Appeals of Citizens; Directorate for Work with Territories and Presidential Representatives; Expert-Analytical Council; Finance-Budget Directorate; Information Directorate; Organizational Department; and the State-Legal Directorate were all under Filatov's supervision.

²*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, November 10, 1994. According to a sociological study, almost 80 percent of Yeltsin's staff of Kremlin advisors and officials entered government service under Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev. Only 10.5 percent of the Russian president's entourage entered state service since Yeltsin's election as president. See *Associated Press*, May 18, 1994. In some ways, the Yeltsin administration has outdone its Soviet predecessors. In November 1994, Yeltsin ordered a major staff reduction in the Presidential Apparatus. Apparently, in the past few years the chief executive's administration had mushroomed, Soviet-style, until it reached 40,000 employees, a figure several times larger than the staff of the CPSU Central Committee. See *RFE/RL Daily Report*, November 2, 1994.

In the first half of 1994, the analytical, informational processing, and public relations departments became powerful components of the Presidential Apparatus. Three new bodies were formed: the Expert-Analytical Council, the Analytical Center, and the Information-Technical Center for Analytical Work. The Expert-Analytical Council, under Filatov's direction, was created as a coordination body to bring together leaders of all presidential analytical units and to feed information to other organs such as the Russian Security Council.³ Its statute defined the body as a "consultative" organ whose tasks are "analysis and forecasting" and whose members serve part time. Significantly, no foreign policy experts resided on the Expert-Analytical Council.

But in late 1994 and early 1995, Yeltsin ordered a reduction and streamlining of the Presidential Apparatus. A November 25, 1994, edict merged the analytical units and cut their staffs. It folded the Information-Technical Center of Analytical Work of the apparatus and the Group of Experts of the President into the apparatus's Analytical Center and ordered a cut in the staff of at least 20 percent.⁴

As a result of the reorganization, the Analytical Center became more important and received more staff. However, a certain degree of rivalry appears to have existed between the Analytical Center in the Presidential Apparatus and the Analytical Center established by Korzhakov in the Presidential Security Service. On more than one occasion, Filatov complained that Yeltsin had made decisions on recommendations from Korzhakov or others, bypassing the decisionmaking structures established in his office to prepare carefully worked-out policy options.⁵

³For an example of the Expert-Analytical Council being left outside of the policymaking process, see Emil Payin and Arkady Popov, "The Russian Policy in Chechnya: How It Was Conceived, How It Led to War, and What Repercussions It Will Have for Tomorrow," *Izvestiya*, 10 February 1995, p. 4 (translated in FBIS-SOV-95-038, February 27, 1995, p. 32).

⁴*Sobraniye*, November 28, 1994, p. 4455.

⁵Susan Thoenes and Alan Cooperman, "Yeltsin's Eyes and Ears," *U.S. News and World Report*, August 7, 1995, p. 36; Ariel Cohen, "The Purposes of Russian Aid: Supporting Democratic Capitalism," *The Heritage Foundation Background*, July 17, 1995, p. 4; and "Interview with Sergei Filatov," *Obshchaya gazeta*, No. 38, September 21-27, 1995 (translated in FBIS-SOV-95-184, September 22, 1995, p. 27).

In the wake of the December 1995 Duma elections, Yeltsin attempted to gain greater control over the foreign policy process by creating several new bodies and making a series of personnel appointments. In late December 1995, he announced the creation of the Council on Foreign Policy within the Presidential Apparatus. Sources reported that this council would include officials from the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Finance, the Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Federal Border Service as well as Presidential Assistant Dimitri Ryurikov.⁶

The Council on Foreign Policy was reportedly supposed to monitor the implementation of foreign policy decisions made by Yeltsin. However, the council was set up before Primakov's appointment as foreign minister. After he took over as foreign minister, it appears to have largely languished and had little, if any, significant role in foreign policy decisionmaking. However, Yeltsin has recently sought to reactivate the council. On November 1, 1996, he signed a decree establishing a Foreign Policy Council within the Presidential Apparatus, to be headed by Ryurikov.

The creation of this new Foreign Policy Council appears to be an effort by Yeltsin to strengthen presidential control of foreign policy. The council is supposed to work out differences between the different ministries and help prepare papers for presidential decisions. However, the council is just beginning to gear up and has not been very active to date. What impact the establishment of the new council will have on Primakov's role remains to be seen. But it is unlikely that Primakov, who is a skilled bureaucratic infighter and enjoys strong support among Moscow's foreign policy establishment, will allow his control over foreign policy to be significantly diminished. Moreover, the small size of the council staff—it has only about a half dozen staff members—also suggests that its influence is likely to remain limited.

At the beginning of 1996, Yeltsin also ordered a restructuring of the Presidential Apparatus under its new director, former Nationalities

⁶Yevgeni Bay and Gennadi Charodeev, "President Has Decided to Strengthen Foreign Policy With One More Council," *Izvestiya*, December 28, 1995, pp. 1, 3 (translated in FBIS-SOV-95-249, December 28, 1995, pp. 15-16).

minister and deputy prime minister, Nikolai Yegorov, a hard-liner, who replaced Filatov as chief of staff in January 1996. The reorganization called for a reduction in the number of units from 43 to 19 and a cut in employees by 20 percent. It also established the Department on State Domestic and Foreign Policy headed by Deputy Chief of the Presidential Staff Valentin Viktorov—an associate of Korzhakov.⁷

However, since Yeltsin's reelection, Anatoli Chubais, Yeltsin's dynamic and ambitious chief of staff, has reorganized the Presidential Apparatus.⁸ As chief of staff, Chubais is a key figure in the new power structure. He controls the access of information and people to the president. He has brought in with him a talented team of deputies, several of whom, like Chubais, are from St. Petersburg,⁹ and he has begun to play a major role in shaping policy in Yeltsin's second term.

Chubais has brought a much-needed sense of discipline and organization to the Presidential Apparatus, and under his direction the apparatus has become a much more efficient and effective instrument for the coordination and implementation of presidential policy. However, Chubais' effort to strengthen the Presidential Apparatus—and increase his own powers—have made him many enemies, both within and outside the apparatus, and prompted charges that too much power has been concentrated in his hands.

Chubais' power, moreover, appears to have been diminished somewhat by Yeltsin's decision in December 1996 to appoint Sergei Shakhrai as deputy head of the Presidential Apparatus—in effect, making him Chubais' deputy. Shakhrai, a former deputy prime minister and minister of the Nationalities Ministry, is a respected Kremlin insider and has often clashed with Chubais in the past. His appointment appears to be a classic effort by Yeltsin to create counterbalancing centers of power within the Presidential Apparatus and

⁷"New Appointments," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, February 1, 1996, p. 1.

⁸Chubais replaced Yegorov, who was appointed governor of Krasnodar Krai in Southern Russia, a post he held in 1992–1994. Yegorov's departure completed the rout of the hard-liners from Yeltsin's inner circle in the wake of the elections. Chubais also took over the post of first presidential advisor from Viktor Ilyushin, who was made first deputy prime minister.

⁹Three of Chubais' five deputies—Yuri Yarov, Alexandr Kazakov, and Alexei Kudrin—are from St. Petersburg. Several commentators have compared the Chubais team with Yeltsin's Sverdlovsk team, noting the trend toward "clans" in Kremlin politics.

ensure that no one aide becomes too powerful. However, rather than increasing the effectiveness of the Presidential Apparatus, the move could end up stimulating greater internal bickering and infighting within the top echelons of Yeltsin's entourage, especially if Yeltsin's health remains frail.

A rivalry between Chubais and Chernomyrdin could also emerge over control of economic policy. Initially, Chubais promised not to intrude in economic policy and to leave this area to Chernomyrdin. However, Chubais' staff has been gradually transforming itself into a center for economic decisionmaking, and it is likely that Chubais will become increasingly involved in economic policy—especially tax reform. This could lead to greater tension with Chernomyrdin, who considers economic policy his personal preserve.

There have been persistent rumors in Moscow that Chubais might be moved to a government post and perhaps be made first deputy prime minister. This would give Chernomyrdin a strong deputy in charge of economic reform. However, it could lead to a weakening of the Presidential Apparatus at a time when Yeltsin needs a well-disciplined staff.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

Five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian national security decisionmaking—and Russian security policy in general—remains in a state of flux. The old centralized Soviet system, dominated by the Politburo and the Central Committee, has been abolished. But, despite several attempts, an effective new decision-making system has not been established.

Some visible improvements have occurred, such as the creation of the Defense Council. But the decisionmaking system still depends largely on one man—President Yeltsin. When he is absent or incapacitated—as he has been for most of the time since July 1996—key decisions are postponed or delayed, leading to intense bureaucratic infighting and government paralysis, both in foreign and domestic policy.

The Security Council was supposed to be the main body for coordinating and integrating national security policy. But it rarely performed that task. Many important decisions were made without significant input from the Security Council. Indeed, in many instances, such as the decision to intervene in Chechnya, the Security Council simply rubber stamped, or carried out, decisions already made by Yeltsin.

Lebed's appointment as head of the Security Council in June 1996 initially held some promise that the Security Council would be strengthened and many of the past weaknesses would be overcome. Lebed appears to have wanted to make the Security Council more operational and transform it into a powerful tool for coordinating and integrating foreign and security policy. However, he quickly

alienated key figures in Yeltsin's entourage and was replaced before he had a chance to implement these plans.

Lebed's successor as head of the Security Council, Ivan Rybkin, has little experience in security affairs. He has maintained a low profile and has not tried to use the council to pursue his own independent agenda as Lebed did. Indeed, Rybkin appears to have been appointed precisely because he could be counted on to loyally carry out Yeltsin's policy, rather than pursue bold new initiatives. Under his leadership, the Security Council has primarily been preoccupied with Chechnya and internal security issues, such as crime and corruption, and has not been heavily involved in foreign and defense policy.

The Defense Council has emerged as the key bureaucratic mechanism for formulating and coordinating defense policy. Initially set up to counterbalance Lebed's power, it has taken on a life of its own and gradually eclipsed the Security Council in importance. Indeed, an informal division of labor appears to be emerging, with the Security Council focusing primarily on Chechnya and law enforcement issues and the Defense Council concentrating on coordinating military policy, especially military reform.

Military reform has emerged as a top priority for the Yeltsin administration. However, the implementation of a coherent program of military reform has been hindered by lack of funding as well as differences between Defense Minister Rodionov and Secretary of the Defense Council Yuri Baturin. The current deadlock can only be broken by decisive leadership at the very top—i.e., from Yeltsin himself. Without his intervention, military reform is likely to remain stalled.

The replacement of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev by Yevgeni Primakov in January 1996 has strengthened Russian foreign policy. Primakov has proven to be a much more effective manager than Kozyrev. Under Primakov's stewardship, the Foreign Ministry has regained some of the prestige and control over foreign policy that it lost during Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister. Russian foreign policy has also begun to have a coherence and consistency that it lacked under Kozyrev.

Primakov has emerged as the point man on NATO enlargement. While remaining strongly opposed to enlargement, he has shown an

interest in limiting the damage from enlargement to Russia's relations with the West. But here again the key decisions will have to be made by Yeltsin if the current deadlock is to be broken before the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997.

Thus, much depends on the state of Yeltsin's health. Yeltsin's continued illness or incapacitation could accentuate the behind-the-scenes jockeying and struggle for power, making it even more difficult for Russia to pursue a coherent and consistent foreign policy. His recovery, however, could give new impetus to Russian diplomacy and help to break the logjam on many critical foreign policy issues, especially NATO enlargement.

But even if Yeltsin fully recovers from his heart operation, he is unlikely to be able to exert the type of strong dynamic leadership that characterized his first several years in office. Moreover, the uncertain state of Yeltsin's health means that Russian politics—and policy—will be increasingly influenced by the succession issue. Russian politicians and bureaucrats are already looking beyond the Yeltsin era and beginning to shape their policies and behavior accordingly. The longer Yeltsin is in office, the more the succession issue will begin to intrude on Russian politics—and the more Yeltsin's power and ability to shape Russian policies will decline.

This has several implications for U.S. policy. First, the uncertainty surrounding Yeltsin's health means that the burden of creative thinking in U.S.-Russian relations will fall on the United States. If there are new initiatives designed to break the current deadlock, they will have to come from Washington not Moscow.

Second, the United States should try to engage Russia sooner rather than later. The longer the United States waits, the more complicated and messy Russian politics is likely to become and the more Russian policy is likely to be influenced by domestic factors—above all the succession issue—over which the United States has little control. There is a danger, moreover, that Yeltsin's health could suddenly deteriorate or that he could become incapacitated. This could result in a prolonged paralysis in U.S.-Russian relations. In the meantime, important arms control treaties such as START and CFE could collapse. By the time the Russians are in a position to reengage, it may be difficult—or too late—to repair the damage.

Finally, without a visible effort to strengthen cooperation with Russia, it may be difficult to maintain allied support for key U.S. foreign policy goals, especially NATO enlargement.

How the United States manages the enlargement issue will have a critical impact on the future of U.S.–Russian relations. There is a strong consensus against enlargement within the Russian elite. There are growing signs, however, that many members of the elite—especially Foreign Minister Primakov and Yeltsin himself—are looking for a way to defuse the enlargement issue and limit the damage to Russia's relations with the West.

The United States and its NATO allies need to devise a “cooperation package” that addresses Russia's key concerns without giving Moscow a veto over NATO's future transformations. This package should not be designed as “compensation” for enlargement. Rather, it should stand on its own merits and promote cooperative activities that the United States and its European allies would want to undertake with Russia regardless of enlargement. This package should contain the following elements.

NATO should pledge that the alliance will not deploy nuclear weapons or major combat troops on the soil of new members as long as there is no adverse change in the current security environment. This could help to defuse Russian fears that enlargement will bring the alliance military infrastructure and nuclear potential close to Russia's border, thereby posing a new threat to Russian security.

Such a pledge would not adversely affect NATO's security. Under current conditions there is no need to station nuclear weapons or large numbers of foreign combat troops on the soil of new members. NATO's commitments to new members under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty (collective defense) can be carried out by a strategy of power projection.¹ Moreover, such a pledge is consistent with NATO's own deployment practices. A number of NATO members, such as Norway and Denmark, do not have nuclear weapons or large contingents of foreign combat troops stationed on their soil in peacetime.

¹For a detailed discussion, see Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “NATO Expansion: The Next Steps,” *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 7–33.

The United States and its NATO allies should offer a NATO-Russian charter defining a new relationship between NATO and Russia. The charter should provide for the establishment of a new consultative mechanism that would allow Russia to discuss key security issues with NATO without giving it a veto over core NATO missions (i.e., Article 5 missions). Russia could also be invited to participate in select NATO working groups and political activities on an ad hoc basis.

In addition, the United States should try to defuse the enlargement issue by embedding it in a larger cooperation package, which could include initiatives on START and CFE. Some of Russia's concerns about enlargement, for instance, may be able to be addressed through CFE by substantial reductions in equipment ceilings and efforts to reduce the military imbalances between Russia and NATO that enlargement would entail.² The United States could also announce its readiness to work out an agreement on principles for START III. This could facilitate Duma ratification of START II. Such moves would help to keep Russia engaged in the arms control process as well as reduce the collateral damage of enlargement on other aspects of bilateral relations.

The United States and its allies should also attempt to build on the Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) experience. The more the Russian military engages in practical day-to-day cooperation with NATO, the easier it will be to break down the outdated cold war stereotypes that many Russian military officers—and many Russians generally—continue to hold about the Western alliance. Moreover, with time they will develop a stronger vested stake in this cooperation.

Finally, the United States should accelerate the internal reform of NATO. The more the alliance can show that it is no longer primarily oriented against Russia, the easier it will be to erode Russia's perception that NATO is an anti-Russian alliance and to defuse Russian concerns that enlargement is aimed against Russia. Most of the

²See Robert Blackwill, Arnold Horelick, and Sam Nunn, *Stopping the Decline in U.S.-Russian Relations*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, P-7986, 1996, pp. 7-8. For a thoughtful Russian view on how to break the current deadlock in U.S.-Russian relations, see Alexei Arbatov, "Eurasia Letter: A Russian-U.S. Security Agenda," No. 104, Fall 1996, pp. 102-117.

challenges to U.S. and European common interests in the future are likely to be on Europe's periphery or beyond its borders. Restructuring NATO to focus more heavily on crisis management (Article 4) than on territorial defense (Article 5)³ would not only put the alliance in a better position to deal with the most likely challenges to Western interests in the coming decade, but would also make it easier to develop a cooperative relationship with Russia over the long run.⁴

In a broader sense, given the uncertain state of Yeltsin's health, the United States needs to begin looking beyond the Yeltsin era and develop lines of communication to all major political forces. In particular, Washington needs to establish more intensive contacts with regional leaders. Many regions are already beginning to conduct their own foreign policy, especially in the economic field. This trend is likely to intensify, as the process of decentralization gains greater momentum, and means that Moscow will be less able to dominate both foreign and domestic politics. Hence developing good ties to regional centers of power in Russia will become more important.

³Article 5, however, should still remain a core NATO mission.

⁴See F. Stephen Larrabee, "Security Challenges in NATO's Eastern Periphery," in David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era*, Cambridge University Press: New York, 1997, pp. 166–190.