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WORLD VIEW:
The 1997 Strategic Assessment
from the Strategic Studies Institute

Edited by
Earl H. Tilford, Jr.


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
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13. ABSTRACT <i>(Maximum 200 words)</i> The analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) assess the strategic equation. They address those issues and factors that will affect U.S. national security strategy over the next 12-18 months. The strategic context in 1997 will be similar to that of 1996 in that it remains complex and uncertain. This year, the way the analysts assess the world of the 21st century is even more important because the Army, along with the other services, are engaged in the congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). These conceptions of the future have implications not only for Force XXI and Army XXI, but also for the kind of Army that will serve the nation when Army XXI systems near obsolescence in 15-20 years. Getting the strategic context about right is important because the Army After Next, although highly capable, will also be small by comparison to those forces of only a few years past. Furthermore, decisions made in 1997 as to weapons development and force structure will be evident in the Army of 2010-2015.				
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FOREWORD

In December of each year the analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) look to the year ahead to assess the strategic equation for their particular areas of interest. This is part of an effort to focus our priorities both corporately as well as individually.

As they address those issues and factors that will affect U.S. national security strategy over the next 12-18 months, our analysts are also forced to think about the next decade. The strategic context in 1997 will be quite similar to that of 1996 in that it remains complex and uncertain. This year, however, the way we assess the world of the 21st century is even more important because the Army, along with the other services, is engaged in the congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Beyond the QDR, our conceptions of the future have implications not only for Force XXI and Army XXI, but also for the kind of Army that will serve the nation when Army XXI systems near obsolescence in 15-20 years. Getting the strategic context about right is important because the Army After Next, although highly capable, will also be small by comparison to those forces of only a few years past. Furthermore, decisions made in 1997 as to weapons development and force structure will emerge in the Army of 2010-2015.

SSI offers this year's *World View* assessment in the hope that it will be of value to strategic planners in the Army and to others who share an interest in assuring that the Army of the 21st century will be then, as it is today, the world's best army.



RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

INTRODUCTION

Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

The Army and Society.

Each January the analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, assess domestic and global trends for the year ahead and beyond as part of a process for devising a strategic context that may be used by Army planners and other policymakers. At this writing, the Army's approach to the future, along with that of the other services, confront the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the outcome of which may establish entirely new directions. The global strategic assessments reached by SSI analysts, when considered in conjunction with the roles and missions the Army leadership proposes for the future, will shape SSI's study plan and focus the efforts of our Strategic Outreach Program.

The Army of the 21st century, from Force XXI through Army XXI to the Army After Next, will still be America's Army. Both the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Army will be defined, perhaps redefined, within the context of the domestic and strategic environment. The domestic environment will be largely determined by three general trends: perception of threats, declining defense budgets, and ever heightened expectations for technology. These will be linked, inexorably, to the strategic landscape where a multipolar world produces a proliferation of threats without giving rise to a significant peer competitor.

Army XXI will emerge from Force XXI at around the year 2000. While it truly will be an Information Age, digitized Army, it will not be radically different from the Army of today.

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Army XXI will be nearing obsolescence in terms of weapons and equipment designed in the 1980s and 1990s. Decisions made

before the turn of the century, some as a part of this year's QDR process, will determine the shape of the Army After Next, the force that will begin to evolve after 2010.

On the foreseeable strategic landscape, there seems very little possibility of a global war involving the United States or its allies. That does not, however, preclude the possibility of a regional war of considerable intensity. The strategic international environment, however, is likely to remain unsettled through the decade and the armed forces of the United States will remain engaged throughout the world. Even though it is highly unlikely that the United States will find itself threatened by a true global peer competitor, Russia, China, Japan and possibly India have the potential to become regional peer competitors and might very well threaten each other or their neighbors. The possibility of war with Iran, Iraq, or North Korea cannot be discounted. Before the year 2000 each of these nations will have missiles that can deliver chemical, biological, and quite possibly nuclear weapons, over great distances. While a war with any one of these countries would not be "major" in the classical sense, war with two or more of them would be quite challenging and the outcome might be problematic, especially if U.S. armed forces contract further or fail to attain key mobility and modernization objectives.

Russia's continuing descent into economic and political chaos will keep it from posing a major conventional military threat beyond its immediate borders. On the other hand, there are many nuclear weapons in Russia and, given the country's current state of quasi-anarchy, the kind of threat these weapons pose cannot be reliably deterred by traditional nuclear strategies. The Russian armed forces are, and will likely remain, virtually incapable of conducting sustained military operations on even a small scale. Russia's nuclear arsenal, however, is robust. Furthermore, it is not clear the degree to which these forces are under the command and control of responsible civilian and military authorities.

In Eastern Europe there are two important strategic issues. The first issue is threefold in nature: which countries

are admitted to NATO, how Russia accomodates NATO enlargement, and what happens with those nations who are not among the first to be admitted. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and quite possibly Slovenia will be accepted into NATO by the end of the century. Economic problems, a lack of sufficient progress toward democratic reforms, and various political and cultural issues complicate the question for other nations in Eastern Europe.

The second strategically important issue for Eastern Europe that could affect all of Europe and Russia is how the situation in Bosnia finally resolves. NATO, Russian, and other European troops will remain in Bosnia well into 1998, albeit at lower strength than in 1996. Old animosities are, however, very much alive and could resurface when the foreign troops are withdrawn. Reignited violence could foster an attempt to partition Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia and further test the resolve of the European community.

From the perspective of the Western European nations, NATO remains quite viable as the century draws to a close. Furthermore, the heavy involvement of American forces in Bosnia has emphasized the fundamental role of the United States in European security. But the United States and its allies, although seeking ways to strengthen their association, have to be sensitive to a more "engaged" France and the on-going antagonism between Greece and Turkey.

Ethnic conflict, economic disintegration, and disease threaten the security and socio-political viability of Sub-Saharan Africa. Civil war with accompanying famine and, in some cases, genocidal acts will be a feature of the African landscape well into the 21st century. Dysfunctional governments, some on the verge of collapse, add to the specter of periodic human disasters of the kind of proportions that will tax the will and resources of the international community. Meanwhile, the dominant issue in South Africa is how to face the world in the post-apartheid era. Ethnic violence, smuggling, and drug trafficking are among the problems that South Africa's new leadership must meet to sustain legitimacy and maintain order.

Across the Atlantic, the countries of Latin America will continue to face the challenges of expanding democratic forms of government amid continuing economic hardships and problems associated with increasing populations. Corruption, drug abuse, terrorism, insurgency, and the threat that the military may reassert control in a number of countries are among the problems facing a number of nations. Poverty and desperation will continue to drive many people into the United States with most of them entering the country illegally.

The Western Pacific and East Asia have overtaken Europe as the primary trading arena for the United States. In 1997, the United States and China will work hard toward forging a better relationship in the wake of the contentions that arose in 1996 over Taiwan, human rights abuses, proliferation problems, and trade issues. The Korean peninsula remains a sensitive area and U.S. forces are likely to remain there as a deterrent well into the 21st century. Japan and the United States seem to have clarified their relationship, and by doing so perhaps strengthened it, following the problems that arose after the rape of a 12-year-old girl by American servicemen last year.

In the Middle East, two problems could reach the crisis point in 1997. First, the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan is a part of the continuing confrontation between Iraq and the West, especially the United States. The Kurdish imbroglio has become a complicating and potentially explosive problem in an already dangerous situation. Second, continuing problems between the Israelis and Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza are impeding progress in the peace process. Even with some renewal of progress on Palestinian issues, terrorist acts, many likely originating in southern Lebanon, will probably foster retaliatory or preemptive strikes that always hold the potential for wider violence between Israel and Syria.

Major Strategic Determinants for 1997 and Beyond.

The analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute have identified the following 16 major determinants with a potential to affect U.S. vital or strategic interests, the Army, and the national military strategy for 1997 and into the first decade of the 21st century.

- As the Information Age unfolds, the way people relate to each other and to governments, corporations, and academic and other institutions will change fundamentally. This will have implications for how military forces are structured and employed.
- In 1997, the outcome of the QDR will have a major impact on the armed forces of the United States. As the year begins, the services are engaged in staking out their various positions. By March 15, when the Interim Report of the National Defense Panel is due, these positions should be clear. The real impact of the QDR will be felt in 1998.
- As the decade ends, Russia's labored journey toward democratization and a free market economy will continue despite challenges presented by lawlessness, official corruption, ecological degeneration, and a struggling economy.
- Russia will continue to act like a world power even though it lacks the conventional military forces, economic dynamism, and diplomatic authority to perform like a world power. Although Moscow views itself as being at one end of a bipolar world, Russia is likely to be increasingly marginalized in the years to come.
- When the NATO Ministerial Meeting is held in Madrid in July, a decision will be made as to which East European countries will be invited to join NATO in 1999. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are

leading candidates with Slovenia and possibly Romania as outside possibilities for early inclusion.

- NATO will remain the premier security organization in Europe even as the dominant political issue continues to be NATO enlargement and the adaptation of the Alliance's integrated military command structure.
- Bosnia remains a real concern among European policymakers. The ultimate resolution of events in Bosnia, especially after the 1998 pullout of foreign troops, will continue to affect the future of Europe.
- The relationship between China and the United States should improve in 1997 because it is in the strategic interests of both nations. While America's security policy for the region will remain focused on China and Japan, as China supplants Japan as the United State's primary Asian trade partner, Washington will be challenged to balance pragmatism against idealism in its human rights policies.
- The possibility for war on the Korean Peninsula cannot be discounted. Evidence of Pyongyang's brinkmanship policies include its sending saboteurs, spies, and assassin teams to the South. Look for North Korea to find ways around the Agreed Framework which is supposed to suspend nuclear weapons development.
- Technological proliferation will be a hallmark of Asia as it enters the Information Age. By the year 2007, a number of Asian nations will possess chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Digitized information systems will facilitate the movement of narcotics and drug money.
- Through 2007, Latin America's democracies, with their rapidly expanding urban population and problems associated with unrest and poverty, will face

subversion, terrorism, insurgencies, and *coups d'etat*. While some democratic governments will survive in Latin America, drug cartels, unreconstructed Marxists, and the armed forces can exploit these conditions. The United States will feel the impact in the form of drug trafficking and the massive, mostly illegal, migration of peoples into Texas, California, Arizona and Florida.

- Post-Castro Cuba and a fading peace process in Central America are likely to warrant U.S. attention over the next decade. The possibility of deployment of forces, either unilaterally or as part of a multinational peacekeeping force, cannot be ruled out.
- Brazil's internal stability bears close watching over the next decade. Poverty, crime, corruption, and the inequitable distribution of income, joined by a potential environmental disaster in the Amazon Basin, will present significant challenges.
- Throughout the Middle East, the disparity in the distribution of wealth will continue. A high birth rate ensures a youthful population subject to disillusion and primed for violence.
- In the Persian Gulf region, the House of Saud will be increasingly challenged by those who resent the presence of the United States.
- Israel and the Palestinians may find it increasingly difficult to reach common ground in the foreseeable future. The status of Jerusalem will be a prominent issue, and one not likely to be solved by initiatives from the Likud Party. Perhaps more problematic, Israel and Syria seem far from settling the Golan or other issues which stand between them.

THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

General Assessment.

Over the past 7 years, the outlines of the post-Cold War security environment have become sufficiently clear to allow DoD, or Congress, to define the U.S. armed forces' potential contributions to future national security. Whether that potential is realized depends less on threats and opportunities of its allies and enemies than on factors internal to the United States. The domestic environment within which DoD must define itself over the next decade will largely be determined by several continuing trends. Combined, these trends will present challenges to DoD similar in magnitude, scope, and complexity to those the military establishment faced at the conclusion of the Second World War.

The Department's ability to meet the challenges posed by domestic trends will be conditioned by the extent to which it is able to build and sustain internal consensus and cohesion concerning the future role the U.S. armed forces should play in providing national security. Divisiveness among the major components of DoD, on the other hand, will encourage legislative intrusion into departmental management prerogatives. Additionally, if DoD is unable to clearly establish its relevance to future national security issues, its preeminence in the national security arena may erode as other government agencies receive greater proportions of resources devoted to protecting and promoting the nation's interests.

Trends and Issues.

Over the next decade, domestic influences on the role DoD will play in providing for the nation's security will be just as, if not more, important than international

developments. The following brief summary of domestic trends and the effects they will have on the U.S. armed forces over the next decade is certainly not an exhaustive treatment of the national demands, expectations, and constraints DoD will face. Nor is it a complete survey of potential DoD responses. It does illuminate, however, the need for the department to clearly define the contributions the U.S. military can make to future national security.

- *Inaccurate Perception of Threats.* The most salient continuing trend will be the perception of reduced threats to U.S. vital and important interests. The replacement of the simplistic bipolar Cold War security environment by one which is increasingly diverse and complex makes it more difficult for the Secretary of Defense to explain the links between international events and U.S. interests. Equally troubling will be the difficulty of explaining that such links do not exist, or are tenuous at best, in many situations where instantaneous media coverage of international events inflame the passions of the American public. Thus, the Secretary of Defense and senior military leaders will be challenged to ensure the nation's military power is applied only where it is needed and only where it can have the desired effect.
- *Stricter Scrutiny of Defense Spending.* The second trend relates in part to the first. Domestic competition for federal revenues increasingly will place pressures on the DoD portion of the President's budget submissions. To the extent that a consensus on threats and purpose is lacking, DoD's bid for scarcer discretionary dollars will be harder to justify. Among the many insights one may glean from the national elections is that the American public and their elected representatives are becoming more aware of the potential future consequences of the large public debt. Just as the public has begun the painful process of retiring consumer debt accrued over the past decade, so will the Federal government be forced to address the national debt in a serious and meaningful way.

- *Continued Entitlement Expectations.* Another insight from the elections is that while the American people want the Federal government to begin a process to arrest the growth of the national debt, they are not willing to sacrifice government benefits they feel entitled to receive. Social Security and Medicare budgetary pressures alone will force radical reductions in other federal expenditures, if the federal deficit is to be reduced significantly. The same pressures are felt in DoD where, when it comes to active duty and reserve component compensation, quality of life matters, and veterans' benefits, a high priority on meeting entitlement expectations is always evident. These and other fiscal realities will result in the strictest scrutiny being applied to proposed defense expenditures.
- *Expectancy of Increased Military Effectiveness and Utility.* Ironically, the intense pressures to reduce defense spending will be accompanied by expectations of increased utility and efficacy of U.S. military forces. The public and the Congress will demand utility beyond the ability to win major wars, although that purpose will remain fundamental. The public will not sustain a large military establishment designed merely to react to threats. The nation will expect the positive application of the armed forces during periods of peace in ways which prevent the emergence of potential threats and further reduce the prospect of conflict, and mitigate human suffering.
- *The False Promises of Technology.* Related to the above trend is the public's increased expectancy that technology can be substituted for people in future military operations. Precision strikes, from a distance, with relative impunity are being proffered by some inside and outside DoD as a substitute for the spilling of American blood in some amorphous future international interventions. The high-tech weapons systems marketing campaign, undertaken by some

constituencies, began in earnest during the Persian Gulf War and continues today. Its false promise is that high-tech machines and weapons can be used to resolve human conflict putting few, if any, people at risk. Consequently, DoD helped create a conundrum where it must pursue increasingly expensive technologies to meet the false anticipations of a nation that expects the next war to be short, efficient, and casualty free and that is also less inclined to allocate national resources for defense.

Ramifications for the Department of Defense.

The challenge for DoD over the next decade will be to prove its relevance in the face of the aforementioned trends. This challenge will have external and internal dimensions. The dual thrust of the current National Security Strategy, to protect U.S. interests and to actively promote them, will remain valid. Threats, however, will continue to appear to be receding. The nation, therefore, will seek to reallocate resources devoted to national security from national defense to national promotion. Thus, DoD may be allocated a reduced share of the resources devoted to national security unless it can show its relevance to the promotion of U.S. interests. That discussion will be conducted largely within the framework of the interagency process but will involve Congress as well.

Improved Strategic and Interagency Planning. If DoD is to prove its relevance to future national security needs, it must reform its strategic planning processes to allow for better integration with the strategic planning of other governmental agencies. This will require modification of the compartmented nature of defense planning to better integrate the strategic planning conducted by DoD components with that conducted by their interagency counterparts. Warfighting has been, and remains, the province of the Department of Defense; however, DoD has yet to make its case and prove its worth in the active promotion of U.S. interests. The department must develop ways to compare its actual and potential contributions to

national security to those of other government agencies, and then must communicate its unique capabilities within the interagency process.

Balancing the Protection and Promotion of U.S. Interests. The department's internal dimension of the national security relevance debate will focus on balance, which will become the DoD watchword. The department will have to address balance within several contexts, and each promises to create divisiveness within DoD. The first balance issue that must be resolved will be the relative emphasis which should be placed on the development and acquisition of warfighting capabilities as opposed to those for promoting U.S. interests by shaping the international security environment. This is certainly not an either-or situation; military capabilities can be developed that provide a hedge against the need to fight and win wars while also providing utility for active promotion of U.S. interests. The Cold War paradigm of optimizing warfighting capabilities and merely assuming they also have sufficient utility for other purposes, however, will require reexamination.

Balancing Force Structure, Readiness, Recapitalization, and Modernization. A second, and perennial balance issue involves force structure, readiness, recapitalization, and modernization. The elements of this issue are interdependent and the manner in which they are balanced will turn, at least in part, on DoD's approach to the previous issue. It is difficult to imagine how DoD will be able to sustain present force levels into the next century given current fiscal, social, and political trends while maintaining adequate force readiness. Nonetheless, readiness will remain an absolute imperative. The challenge for DoD will be to design an affordable force structure given DoD's redefined contributions to national security. It is likely that new joint and service visions of the future application of military capabilities will cause force redesigns resulting in lower total numbers of forces. This may free resources needed to maintain readiness. On the other hand, as the military continues its evolution into a 21st century force, the

components of readiness may become inherently more expensive.

Closely linked to readiness is the requirement to recapitalize the U.S. armed forces. To some extent, the doomsday scenario of block obsolescence befalling the U.S. military early in the next century is overstated. Force readiness can be assured by a combination of measures such as overhauls of existing systems, service-life extensions, product improvement programs, and recapitalization expenditures. The recapitalization effort, however, must be tempered by the need to modernize forces. The DoD goal should not be to provide U.S. forces with the best possible technology, because it cannot afford the cost. Rather, the department's approach should be to maintain the measure of net technological superiority over potential adversaries that results in an acceptable level of risk.

In balancing recapitalization and modernization, therefore, DoD should extend or recapitalize those capabilities which, although still essential, are either in little jeopardy of being overtaken technologically by potential adversaries or are decreasing in relevance to the potential revolutionary transformations in military affairs. Conversely, DoD should modernize those capabilities which are technologically threatened by potential adversaries and which are in, or moving to the forefront of the future applications of military power.

Inter-Service Balance. To maximize its future contributions to national security, the department must achieve inter-service balance. Service capabilities need to be combined in correct proportions with different roles, missions, functions and core competencies blended for efficiency and effectiveness. The traditional practice of relative constancy in distribution of resources should have no place in future force planning.

Active Component/Reserve Component Balance. The extant Cold War AC/RC mix model cannot suffice for the 21st century. Two solutions may be possible.

(1) Retain in the AC the most vital forces while subordinating peripheral and add-on capabilities to the RC. The AC forces would be composed of heavy combat forces kept at a high state of readiness.

(2) Put the bulk of the nation's heavy forces in the RC and populate the AC with forces suitable for the currently more prevalent applications of military power.

There are, of course, problems with each of these approaches. If AC forces are kept ready to fight and win our nation's wars in the traditional sense, they will be less efficient and effective at the missions they are more likely to be called upon to perform: the range of operations short of war. Furthermore, RC forces cannot be counted on to perform the full range of operations short of war because they are not sufficiently responsive for short notice crises and the frequency of activations would burden RC members, families, and civilian employers. The second problem is that the bulk of DoD resources would be consumed by forces least likely to be needed. Finally, it can be argued that this would be the most expensive and least effective approach. It would be more costly to mobilize, employ, and then demobilize RC forces needed for operations short of war than it would be to maintain sufficient AC forces to accomplish those tasks. Notwithstanding the difficulties associated with this approach to AC/RC balance, it closely reflects the current practice.

The second possibility is much more radical and is likely to find few advocates in the Army establishment who will be quick to point out that the Reserve components cannot be counted on to defend the nation's vital interests in crisis situations. Proponents, however, will argue that the combined effect of the receding threat of large scale conflict, increased strategic warning, and more effective training methods will allow the RC forces to become sufficiently responsive to hedge against large scale conflict.

The proposals outlined above are rough, and many institutional prerogatives will be involved in the resolution of these issues. But the balance that must be achieved

between Active and Reserve forces over the next decade probably falls within the range framed by the two alternatives presented above. How the issue is ultimately resolved will depend upon the precise national security role DoD assumes.

ARMY ISSUES FOR 1997

Douglas V. Johnson

General Assessment.

The 1997 Army is evolving from the Cold War Army of the 1980s and early 1990s toward Army XXI—the information enhanced force of 2010. The Army XXI force will evolve from today's Army by incorporating many new technologies on the present familiar base. It will be a more responsive strategic projection force, capable of decisive victory on the battlefield through dominant maneuver and the effective application of precision fires as well as a host of other missions. Unless there is a dramatic change in the world situation, elements of the Army of the first decade of the 21st century will continue to be "forward deployed" in places like Korea, Japan, and Western Europe, although perhaps in fewer numbers than today.

At around 2010, despite digitization and the leveraging of technologies into what were, essentially, late 20th century weapon systems, portions of Army XXI will be nearing obsolescence in terms of age of equipment, although not necessarily in comparison to any competitor. If budget support holds, between 2010 and 2015, the Army After Next (AAN), the first true Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) force, will begin to emerge. This force will be the first RMA force, the first to truly capitalize on the RMA potential. The Army's immediate task is to maintain the world's most flexible, capable Army while transitioning to Army XXI and envisioning what that truly revolutionary army, the Army After Next, will be.

The AAN will evolve in a world where uncertainty is the only real certainty. At best, defense budgets will remain stable, but there is a real possibility they will decrease. During a period in which the budgetary and strategic challenges will not diminish, the Army will have to maintain an increased operational tempo, sustain readiness, and still

find resources to pursue those technologies most appropriate for the AAN.

In 1997, the principal struggle will be for budget share. Support for the Army's position in the Quadrennial Defense Review is beginning to solidify. There are indications that the imbalance of the last few years between the power of the joint and service staffs may have reached equilibrium, but that is not yet a certainty. Since foreign affairs played only a minor part in the 1996 presidential and congressional elections, it is unclear what future levels of overseas interventionism may be, except that it is almost certain that American soldiers are going to be in Bosnia for at least another 18 months. It is also possible that the Army will be part of a small but long-term United Nations presence in Haiti since events there are not nearly so sanguine as they were depicted a few short months ago.

The Army was already reviewing its leadership and training doctrine when sexual harassment scandals erupted in late 1996. These training reviews may be delayed if Congress pursues its current investigations. It is still probable that a new officer effectiveness report will be in place by the end of the fiscal year, but revision of leadership doctrine, especially training doctrine, will likely be affected by the ongoing harassment investigations.

Trends and Issues.

Despite the uncertainties new civilian leadership and the QDR may bring to policy and budgets, the following trends and issues are likely to develop.

- Major steps already taken along the road to a complete change in the relationship between the Active Component and Reserve Components (AC/RC) will continue. The infusion of AC commanders into RC units, the grouping of RC Enhanced Ready Brigades under a mixed AC/RC division headquarters, the OPTEMPO of RC units in peace and humanitarian operations as well as armed interventions have forced this unprecedented integration of components. In

1997, legal issues will arise, but substantial challenges to increased integration of AC and RC organizations and increased RC deployments are unlikely unless there are casualties.

- The Army will make a major effort in 1997 to convince Congress and the American people that defense dollars will be better spent on land rather than air or sea forces. The variety and tempo of current and projected operations strongly support this position. Working against it is the tiny Army portion of DoD's current investment budget, which translates into significant lobbying pressures on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress for other service programs.
- Current OPTEMPO has allayed earlier fears that the Army of the late 1990s would resemble the Army of the Potomac under Civil War Major General George McClellan: large and good at parades, but not to be risked in operations. But there is the possibility that civil-military issues will emerge as the armed forces continue to press for clearly defined missions and specified goals that allow for mission accomplishment and termination.
- The Army is already engaged in world-wide contingency deployments and that will continue. In 1997, it is likely that a reassessment of the Army's combat support and combat service support structures will take place because these are being seriously stretched by the extended support operations in Bosnia, Haiti and elsewhere. Should Arab-Israeli peace talks progress, it is possible that U.S troops will be deploying to the Golan Heights as well, and that is not likely to be a short-term mission.

The Army After Next.

The Army After Next Program, as outlined by the Chief of Staff, Army, is being developed by Headquarters,

Training and Doctrine Command. The Army After Next will be the first 21st century force to qualify as a genuine RMA force. The 1997 Army currently is committed to developing an evolutionary version of today's fine Army with digital information appliques. Army XXI will be a further improvement of the same basic structure, incorporating many of the new technologies currently being tested at Ft. Carson and Ft. Hood. This force will have significantly enhanced capabilities, but will continue to look comfortably familiar. The Army After Next, by comparison, will be radically different.

There is a myth that the application of high technology can make it possible for virtually any institution, from the Factory After Next, to the University After Next, to the Army After Next, to do more with less. The reality is, however, that after a certain point institutions must take one of two courses. They can seek efficiencies and downsize while retaining basically the same structure and culture. At some point these leaner and meaner versions of their former selves will maximize their efficiency/effectiveness ratio and then have to choose between doing more things less well or fewer things better. On the other hand, institutions may turn to visionaries for revolutionary new approaches, new structures, and new methods to accomplish a far different range of goals. That organization will be doing different things differently and may, indeed, accomplish a wider variety of tasks better.

For two decades, some in the Army have been arguing that it is time to move from a division- to a brigade-based force structure. This is similar in intent to what evolved in the late 1950s with the short-lived Pentomic Army and in the 1960s with the airmobile divisions so pronounced during the Vietnam War. Those efforts indicate a peculiarly American tendency to look to every advance in technology as a means of providing smaller units with significant increases in combat power, as a way of both limiting U.S. casualties and of bolstering battlefield effectiveness. So far, that hope has proven somewhat ephemeral. A U.S. division in World War I numbered about 28,000 soldiers. A

generation later, the typical division numbered closer to 16,000 until it went into combat. Then it was augmented until its size was much closer to that of its World War I predecessor. When all the extras were totaled, U.S. Army divisions in Operation DESERT STORM were just about as large. It may well be that 25,000 is the base line combat force size for sustained operations. This does not preclude the creation of smaller brigades or brigade-like structures, like airmobile units, which can be tailored or mixed and matched to meet specific operational requirements. The Army After Next, however, is likely to consist of radically restructured, smaller units, which have significantly enhanced capabilities. They must be able to move rapidly over a global battlefield to strike quickly and precisely and to do so without the huge iron mountains of combat support of the past. But there will still be requirements for soldier-intensive conflict prevention capabilities and peace operations, neither of which lend themselves to high tech, low manpower solutions.

The Army After Next Program being developed by HQ, TRADOC will be taking conceptual and organizational shape for the next decade or more. Various employment and organizational concepts are currently being examined and debated in conferences and seminars across the Army. The impact of emerging technologies is being wargamed even as the plausibility of a wide variety of global scenarios are being debated in academe and the media. The U.S. Army War College's Army After Next Special Academic Project functions in support of the TRADOC program except that it will keep its efforts focused 30 years in the future and will not be primarily concerned with the evolution of specific force structures and organizations. Both efforts are pursuing research under four broad azimuths:

- Probable geopolitical realities;
- Human and organizational behaviors;
- Evolving military art; and,

- Technology.

The USAWC Army After Next Special Academic Project is an innovative research initiative employing the talents of students, faculty and interested others to examine future national security issues. The intent of this effort is to produce selected USAWC graduates who have a well founded appreciation for the future, who bring a disciplined approach to long-range futures studies, and who are able to weigh futuristic claims in the balance of plausibility and advise their commanders of the results.

THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS: ORTHODOXY AND BEYOND

Steven Metz

Assessment.

Within the U.S. Department of Defense, the concept of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) is moving rapidly toward maturation. Only a few years ago, the RMA was a new and radical concept discussed mostly by defense intellectuals. Now it has entered the mainstream of thinking both in the uniformed services and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The core assumption is that there have been times throughout history when some combination of new technology, new organizations, and new concepts allowed a rapid and radical increase in the effectiveness of military units. For American defense planners, this holds the promise that if they can understand the RMA currently underway, they can build a future military that is both smaller and more effective than the existing one.

As the U.S. military has accepted the idea that a military revolution is underway, far-reaching changes have taken place. Institutions designed to develop, test, and refine RMA-related concepts have appeared throughout the Department of Defense. Government and civilian laboratories are busy exploring new technologies in areas such as information gathering, assessment and dissemination, nonlethal weapons, robotics and other unmanned military systems, and new materials and sources of energy. The military's intellectual breeding ground—the senior service schools, journals, concept development laboratories, and think tanks—have begun to assess and test RMA-related concepts and notional forces. And service programs like the Army XXI and the Army After Next, the Air Force's *Spacecast*, and the Marines' Project *Sea Dragon* seek to pull a range of RMA concepts together and translate them into practical programs.

In 1996, U.S. military thinking on the RMA was codified in General John M. Shalikashvili's *Joint Vision 2010*. This provided an overarching blueprint for force and concept development. As such, it captures the RMA orthodoxy within the U.S. military and Department of Defense. In simple terms, *Joint Vision 2010* projects no revolutionary change in the strategic environment, but only in the actual method by which military power is applied. The primary task of American armed forces, Shalikashvili contends, will still be to deter conflict and, if that fails, to fight and win the nation's wars. Power projection enabled by overseas presence will remain the fundamental strategic concept; the military forces of other nations will still be the primary foe.

In *Joint Vision 2010* and the mainstream view of the RMA held by the Department of Defense and the uniformed services, the thrust of the current revolution is operational and tactical rather than strategic. How the U.S. military fights will change dramatically. Technology will allow greater emphasis on long-range, precision strikes. New weapon types based on technologies such as directed energy will give military commanders greater flexibility. Advances in low observable technologies will augment the ability to mask friendly forces. And improvements in information and systems integration technologies will provide decision-makers with fast and accurate information. In combination, these technologies will allow increased stealth, mobility, dispersion, and a higher tempo of operations. Information superiority will be crucial and require both offensive and defensive information warfare. The most important operational concepts will be dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.

This orthodox approach to the revolution in military affairs may be right, but then again, it may not be. Throughout history, there were states which miscalculated the course of military revolutions. This often proved as dangerous as ignoring revolutionary change. Given this, the United States must continue to explore alternative forms and alternative dimensions of the revolution in military

affairs, even while institutionalizing the mainstream or orthodox approach. American thinking on the RMA must not become ossified, but must remain flexible and creative. The continued maturation of RMA thinking thus requires a broadening of the concept to look at implications and dimensions outside the realm of military operations, and an extension of analysis further into the future.

Strategic Issues.

- Despite widespread agreement that an operational or tactical-level RMA is underway, it is not clear whether the world is witnessing a true strategic revolution. In contrast to an operational/tactical RMA, a strategic revolution would entail radical and rapid change in why and who fights as well as how they fight. The ultimate impact of a true strategic revolution would be much greater than the limited revolution projected in *Joint Vision 2010* and other mainstream thinking. Given this, strategic planners and analysts must monitor macro-level changes in the wider strategic environment rather than simply assuming that the current global security system will persist.
- Orthodox thinking assumes that, in the long run, the RMA will lead to a more economical American military by allowing a numerically smaller future force to perform the same tasks as the existing one. According to this argument, since personnel costs are higher than the cost of technology, a small, robust force would be more affordable. This warrants careful analysis, yet so far there have been few detailed studies of the economic costs of various future military forces built on RMA concepts.
- The RMA orthodoxy retains many core concepts concerning organizational structure, career patterns, decisionmaking processes, and leader development from the pre-RMA military. To fully consolidate the RMA, the Army and the other services should

undertake a zero-based examination of their core concepts to assess which ones facilitate the required changes and which ones are anachronistic.

- Even though General Shalikashvili posited the need for the United States to attain information superiority in future warfare, it is not clear what sort of organizations this will require. Eventually, the existing service structure may prove inadequate. Until then, information warfare roles and missions will have to be assigned to the services. Currently the most sophisticated thinking on information warfare comes from the Air Force, making that service the best prepared to accept emerging information warfare roles and missions. The other services (and other agencies of the U.S. Government) must now decide whether they can contribute to information superiority. In particular, the Army should assess its role and the sort of force structure, doctrine and concepts that information warfare will demand.
- Much work remains to be done on the ethical framework implications of the RMA. As military capabilities change, the moral and legal framework associated with armed forces must also be updated. To take one example, nonlethal technologies are currently under development. While nonlethal weapons seem inherently more acceptable than traditional ones, there are hidden ethical issues or implications. Would political decisionmakers, for instance, be quicker to abandon diplomacy and resort to force if their military was equipped with nonlethal weapons? Under what conditions is a commander, or even an individual soldier, justified in resorting to lethal force if nonlethal weapons are available? Even thornier ethical problems could arise a few decades from now. The next stage of the RMA may be based on a biotechnical revolution rather than information processing (like the current one). It may even reflect the melding of a biotechnical revolution and continuing advancements in information processing.

As computers progress, nanotechnology becomes available, and as new materials and energy sources appear, brilliant systems, self-replicating machines, perhaps even cyborgs that have some characteristics of living organisms and some of machines may become feasible. These things would have immense ethical implications in the military arena. To prepare for this, ethicists should be consulted during planning for long-term military force development.

- The American military of the 21st century must seek both effectiveness and efficiency. Making use of cutting edge technology is one way to do this. But another way—and one that is fully symbiotic with the technological dimension of the RMA—is to craft more psychologically astute military operations. Sun Tzu—the master of the psychological dimension of warfare—should be the patron saint of a future U.S. military designed to capitalize on the RMA. After all, the ultimate objectives of military operations are psychological and political. It is impossible to kill every enemy soldier, so a military force seeks to impose its will by altering the perceptions and beliefs of enemies, their supporters, and other observers. Given this, American military strategists, commanders, and doctrine-writers should cultivate their understanding of mass psychology, particularly the psychology of anxiety. The military should make use of experts in these fields so that doctrine and operational planning can attain desired psychological effects as efficiently as possible.

RUSSIA

Stephen J. Blank

Regional Assessment.

The crisis of the Russian state, predicted in last year's *World View*, has become a reality. Currently some 25 percent of the population in Russia are living below the bare subsistence level. The economy's monetization is in disarray with firms increasingly resorting to barter and payments in kind to each other and to their workers. There are reports of famine in several provinces. Furthermore, while the economy continues to decline the government has neither a strategy nor the capital needed to recover and grow. Prospects for 1997 are no better than they were for 1996.

According to the Defense Minister, General Igor Rodionov, not one regiment in the Russian Army is combat ready. Furthermore, if operations in Chechnya are any indication, the entire chain of command has broken down, putting command and control beyond the capability of the Russian military and civilian leadership. At the level of strategic leadership, numerous convulsions in top administrative positions have battered the government and shaken the state. Political rivalries are being played out as various interests compete for primacy and position themselves for succession to President Boris Yeltsin. Meanwhile, Yeltsin keeps the national security and government apparatus in disarray by creating new and unnecessary councils and offices within the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry as a part of a political strategy of fracturing the power of various factions and keeping individuals who might rival him from forming alliances. Consequently, the institutions of state government have broken down.

Throughout the Russian Federation, the various oblasts and republics are in a constant battle with the central

government over taxation, subsidies, and issues attendant to federalism.

The Russian government is being “deinstitutionalized” by the privatization of security policy as individuals, factions, and lobbies (“clans” as they are known in Russian) appropriate key areas of foreign and defense policy to themselves. They are pursuing their own interests at the expense of indiscernible national interests while cloaking their self-serving activity in the rhetoric of nationalism. The result is that the hallmark of democracy, the rule of law and the accountability of public officials, has been subsumed by individuals, factions, and interest groups. What in the West is known as a government by the rule of state law (*Rechtsstaat* is the German term) has virtually disappeared.

Although the public voted freely, many inside and outside Russia believe that Yeltsin and his campaign team stole the presidential elections of September 1996. They contend that the Yeltsin campaign embezzled state funds to bribe the media and to support third party campaigns and candidates while violating campaign spending limits specified by their own government. Yeltsin’s opponents have threatened to postpone other elections if the results do not look promising and have enacted decrees to reverse those outcomes they find unappealing. These machinations suggest that democracy is not what drives the Russian political process. Furthermore, while communism may be dead, the fraud and authoritarian approaches that marked its governance in the old Soviet Union have taken firm root in the Russian Federation. It is unlikely that Russia will make meaningful progress toward further democratization.

Unrest is apparent throughout the country. Although Boris Yeltsin ordered Russian forces out of Chechnya in November 1996, the fighting there could reignite at any time. Fighting could spread throughout the northern Caucasus where Russian forces, acting in a peacekeeping role, are engaged in protracted civil and ethnic wars. Some might argue that this situation suits Russian interests because it allows Moscow to retain a military presence in

these zones. But that presence imposes costs that are increasingly beyond Moscow's ability to sustain.

The economic crisis is deepening across Russia. Shortages of currency recently led Edvard Rossel, the Governor of Ekaterinburg, a major industrial city in the central Urals, to issue a local script, the "Ural Franc," to meet the demand for money. There are reports that similar issues of script may be made in St. Petersburg for Leningrad Province. The issuing of local script is a further indication of the weakening of the central government as well as a deepening economic crisis.

In many areas, but most especially in the Far East, the only viable government is that of local gangsters whose sole motive is profit. They have no concern for anything other than their own interests and most certainly do not care about economic integration with foreign business interests beyond what bribes and cash they can extort. Hence, the future of the Russian Far East as a gateway for Russian influence in Asia is in jeopardy. Consequently, Russia will be unable to play a meaningful role in Asia, and Moscow's power and influence will be increasingly marginalized.

In the area of foreign policy, there is a consensus among officials in the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry that Russia should oppose NATO expansion unless it is given a veto over actions that would affect Russia in Central or Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Their aim would be to make the CIS a pillar of European security equal to NATO. Yet officials routinely contradict themselves and each other on European security issues. Consequently, there is no clear policy for Europe.

The other issue about which there is broad consensus is that of Russia's warming relations with China. This is viewed as a way to oppose U.S. global hegemony and unipolarity. References to an alliance are increasingly frequent in official and quasi-official publications and discussions. While better relations with China will get Russia back into Asia, its dependence on China will also force Moscow to adopt a role subordinate to that of Beijing.

Trends and Issues.

Given that Russian policy processes for national security and internal affairs are uncoordinated and incoherent, the following trends and issues are likely to persist through 1997 and into the 21st century.

- Russian efforts at reintegration of Russia into the world community as a major power will continue. That this is becoming increasingly unlikely is not evident to Foreign Minister Primakov who has proclaimed stabilization of the world and countering U.S. hegemonic tendencies as goals. While Russia will continue to view itself as at one end of a bipolar world, Moscow is more likely to be further marginalized in the years to come.
- The “privatization” of Russian security policy by interest groups and private agents operating outside state control will continue. These groups will undercut political interests and policies like opposition to NATO expansion, closer ties with China, and reintegration of the CIS.
- The Russian defense establishment remains committed to the principle of unifying the CIS and is opposed to NATO expansion. They will continue to push for an arrangement that immunizes Russia from NATO’s military expansion and that gives Moscow a veto over issues affecting Eastern and Central Europe and the CIS.
- The defense and foreign policy communities will continue to push for closer ties with China as a part of their opposition to what China and Russia are terming “U.S. unipolarity” and “hegemonism.”
- Further progress toward democratization is unlikely. Indeed, a government by unstably perched men and not of laws will continue. A possible takeover by the Russian military at some time in the next decade, and

possibly sooner rather than later, cannot be discounted.

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Stephen J. Blank

Regional Assessment.

In Central and Eastern Europe there are two fundamental issues. First is the issue of membership in NATO and, to a lesser degree only because it is a less imminent process, membership in the European Union. The second issue is the continuing effort to resolve the Bosnian crisis. The efforts being made to come to grips with these issues are driving governmental policies across the region.

It is now clear that only a few states will be invited to join NATO in a first round of expansion. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are solid, first round candidates with Slovenia a likely possibility. These states are obliged to continue efforts to conform, or at least appear to be conforming, to NATO standards and requirements for membership. These standards and requirements include movement toward democracy and market reforms, effective civilian control of the armed forces, and a cessation of inter-state and intra-state ethnic hostilities, such as that between the Serbians and Croats in the former Yugoslavia. The trend toward compliance in these states has inspired other states in Eastern Europe, most notably Romania, to launch intensive campaigns to enter NATO by proclaiming their good faith efforts at meeting NATO's standards for membership. Bucharest, for instance, recently signed a treaty with Hungary on the Hungarian minority in Romania. Furthermore, an adverse economic situation in Romania has made the institutionalization of free market reforms difficult and there has been only partial progress toward democratization. For their part, the Romanians have warned that if NATO does not accept it into membership sooner rather than later, there will be a domestic backlash against NATO. Romania's policy is quite

typical of the outlook of a number of states in the former Warsaw Pact.

However, there are regimes like Vladimir Meciar's government in Slovakia and, worse yet, the former Bulgarian government that are, or were, regressing in their commitments to democratic reform. Meciar's government has stated its intention to bring Russia into a European system. It has also abandoned any effort at solving its problems with a substantial Hungarian minority within its borders. In Bulgaria the situation is worse. There the economy is falling apart and democratic reform appears to be dead.

Fortunately, the recent elections in Bulgaria and Romania unseated both their respective governments. This has opened the door for more liberal regimes that may be decisively pro-NATO and EU and inclined to reform. While their orientation is toward the West, Bulgaria and Romania have a long way to go to meet those conditions necessary for NATO and EU membership.

How the West deals with those states that do not come into NATO on the first round, and with the Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus, will be a test of NATO's viability as a European security organization. Those states under consideration for early membership must conform to NATO's standards and requirements. Those states that do not make it on the first round could become discouraged. Complicating this issue is NATO's ongoing reform of its structure.

Trends and Issues.

Key trends and issues from now through the turn of the century are as follows.

- Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are most likely to begin accession negotiations with NATO in 1997. Slovenia may also be invited to negotiate possible membership with NATO. These countries must, however, meet the political, financial, and

military requirements imposed by membership and that may foster internal struggles among political and economic groups in each of them.

- Russia will remain largely outside this process, dealing, as it traditionally has, with the major Western powers rather than the second tier states. Although many will be suspicious that Russia has not accepted the new realities in Europe, Moscow's aloofness will prevent it from directly affecting regional trends.
- NATO troops will remain in Bosnia well into 1998. Ethno-political enmities have not abated and these could reignite when foreign troops are withdrawn. A relapse into violence could lead to a new partition of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia.
- If IFOR pulls out of Bosnia in 1998, a substantial Western political and economic presence will be required afterwards if a sustained peace is to have any chance of success. Well into the next century, Bosnia will test the resolve of Western states along with their established security institutions.

WESTERN EUROPE

Thomas-Durell Young

Regional Assessment.

Surely to most observers' surprise, 1996 was an unexpectedly quiet year in terms of European security and political developments. Most significantly, the Bosnian Peace Accords continue to be implemented and conflict has yet to spread elsewhere in the Balkans. NATO remains vibrant and relevant and its membership is likely to be increased by the end of the decade. And, notwithstanding periodic political disputes which regularly flare up between the West and Russia, those relations continue to be conducted in a progressively constructive and businesslike manner. Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude that the past year was trouble-free for U.S. policymakers. Nor do conditions portend an equally calm 1997.

As a result of a large international, NATO, and U.S. presence, Bosnia and the Balkans enjoyed a respite from war that has plagued the region for the past 5 years. The recent NATO decision to extend its participation in overseeing the Bosnian peace process guarantees that NATO and the United States will remain entwined in the Balkan conundrum through mid-1998. While events in Bosnia have been relatively peaceful during IFOR's current mission, millions of refugees and displaced persons long to return home. Yet, the freedom to return, along with freedom of movement, are far from a reality, war criminals remain at large, and implementing the civil portions of the Framework Agreement proceeds in fits and starts. The establishment of the rudiments of a national government and apparent fractures within the leadership of the Republika Srpska offer optimism that a lasting political settlement is possible. On the other hand, recent spasms of violence accompanying the attempted return of refugees threatens to spark a wider conflict that could overturn

progress to date. In any case, Bosnia will continue to preoccupy the United States and NATO for the foreseeable future, and will frequently divert the Alliance from other important tasks.

In Western Europe, the dominating political issue will continue to be the question of NATO's enlargement and the adaptation of the Alliance's integrated military command structure. The issue of enlargement appears to have become one of not if, but which, countries will be admitted to NATO and when. Although most officials and analysts see expansion, in some form, happening before the end of the century, one must recall that it will take both the approval of 16 governments, as well as ratification as stipulated by national laws of the treaties expanding Alliance's membership. In short, enlarged membership is likely to dominate Alliance, as well as national, political agendas as the search continues for consensus on this momentous issue.

The Alliance is also undertaking a potentially far-reaching review of its military structure, the Long Term Study (LTS). Initiated in 1994, the LTS seeks to rationalize the ponderous integrated military command structure, and better prepare the Alliance to respond to crises in the new security environment. Moreover, the structure needs reorganizing to better integrate new members. Given this ambitious undertaking, and the need to find agreement among 16 members, it is not surprising that progress continues to be slow.

Notwithstanding its recent admission of three new members, Sweden, Finland and Austria, the European Union appears to have reached a pause in its development. The Intergovernmental Conference has yet to find consensus on further integration, particularly in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policies. Discussions are expected to continue.

The United States and its allies are finding it difficult to deal with a more "engaged" France in both the European theater and the world. Paris continues to pursue its own national objectives and interests, particularly regarding its

new attitude toward NATO. What is different under the Chirac presidency, as opposed to that of his predecessor, Francois Mitterrand, is that Western European patience is wearing thin over France's inability to cooperate effectively with its allies. Whether France will be able to reintegrate itself into NATO military structures may well depend upon its ability to convince its European allies that it is capable of adopting the operative "NATO culture" it so singularly lacks.

Increasing frictions between Greece and Turkey have the potential for fracturing NATO. The Aegean shelf, air and sea space, the NATO command organization in South-eastern Europe, and Cyprus remain contentious points of discussion that almost defy resolution. While seemingly bilateral in nature, these frictions increasingly have a negative impact on the way business is conducted in the Alliance.

Trends and Issues.

- U.S. leadership in NATO will remain vital for achieving a lasting political settlement in Bosnia and the Balkans. The larger issue is U.S. leadership in Europe.
- The question of which countries will be formally invited to join NATO and the date of their accession will dominate Alliance business.
- The LTS will preoccupy planning and restructuring efforts within the military arena of NATO.
- Political disputes with Russia over the issue of NATO enlargement that includes former Warsaw Pact countries will continue.
- The European Union will search, without success, for consensus over the issue of greater integration, particularly as regards Common Foreign and Security Policy.

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- The United States and many of its European allies will remain frustrated with France over its new policy of engagement with NATO.
 - Tensions between Greece and Turkey will remain impediments to the effective conduct of business in NATO.

LATIN AMERICA

Donald E. Schulz

Regional Assessment.

At least through 2007, threats to peace, stability, progressive growth, and democracy in Latin America will come from political extremes and deeply-rooted economic, social and political problems. U.S. national interests in the region will remain basically the same over the next decade: promoting democracy, sustainable economic growth, a greater regard for human rights, higher living standards, curtailment of the drug trade, and stopping illegal migration into the United States. Most countries will maintain the gradual pace of democratization, with a few oscillating between democratic form and authoritarian substance. This trend will be especially apparent where democratically-elected governments lose legitimacy due to a failure to meet popular expectations.

A large urban population, with attendant socio-economic problems associated with decapitalization, corruption, violent crime, and drug abuse, will create conditions promoting emigration, subversion, terrorism, insurgency, and an enhanced role for the military in internal security. Assistance from the United States to reinforce democratic institutions and build strong economies will be important, in concert with that extended by other countries, in stemming authoritarian responses.

The coming decade may witness a significant decline in U.S. imports of Latin American heroin and cocaine, as these narcotics are displaced by synthetic drugs which can be manufactured in the United States. Nevertheless, tens of thousands of farmers will continue to engage in the coca growing business in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Especially in Colombia, narcotaffickers will continue to conduct cocaine-related processing activities. In Mexico, Central America and South America, poppy

cultivation will persist. Brazil will join the ranks of the narcostates. Increasingly, these activities, including the increased manufacture of synthetic drugs, will fuel growing use of illegal narcotics in Latin America itself.

Economic underdevelopment and wide gaps between rich and poor will continue to produce high levels of illegal migration into the United States, mostly from or through Mexico. Refugees from political persecution will join immigrants seeking economic opportunity. Caribbean migration will increase substantially and could very well reach crisis proportions, especially if the Castro regime comes to a violent end. Economic hardship in Cuba will continue to provide a strong incentive for emigration, and if relations with Washington remain poor, Castro may encourage further exoduses to release domestic political pressures or to retaliate against the United States. Economic hardship and political violence will continue to push Haitians toward the United States. Additionally, by the 21st century, immigration from the Dominican Republic will be recognized as the significant problem that it already is.

The policy answer to most of these concerns is the nurturing of democracy and sustainable economic growth leading to a higher standard of living for most Latin Americans. A viable counterdrug strategy is also needed. Some of these issues have been addressed in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Andean Drug Strategy. How to turn policy into strategy and executable programs will continue to be the real challenge for the United States.

Trends and Issues.

- Threats to democratic governments will increase as a result of urban overpopulation and unemployment, socio-economic inequalities, poverty, weak economies, an authoritarian political culture, corruption, human rights abuses, and civil-military conflicts. These elements may be exploited by drug cartels, radical

politicians from the right and left, unreconstructed Marxists, and the armed forces.

- Environmental degradation and exploitation of nonrenewable resources will continue. A major ecological disaster is in the making in the Amazon.
- Synthetic drugs will cut sharply into the heroin and cocaine markets, lowering the profits of some of the traditional cartels and weakening them politically. This will be of only limited benefit to the United States, however, since the overall U.S. market for drugs will likely grow.
- Illegal immigration will continue to pose major social, economic and political problems for the United States.
- Peru and Colombia will continue to be plagued by a chronic mix of insurgency and drug trafficking. The problem will be especially severe in Colombia and could lead to civil war.
- In the short run, the socio-economic crisis in Venezuela will continue. Economic hardship will undermine democracy, foster political instability, and possibly lead to a restoration of authoritarian rule. In the medium term, however, the economy should recover, enabling the Venezuelans to muddle through.
- A new modus vivendi will be reached in the Ecuador-Peru border dispute, but there will be no permanent solution to the problem.
- Under the leadership of President Abdala Bucaram, Ecuador will experience serious political and socio-economic crises, which will severely test the democratic commitment of the armed forces and the populace. Ecuador may well become the victim of a military coup.

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- A regional arms race could develop out of Chilean and Brazilian efforts to modernize their armed forces and ongoing tensions between Ecuador and Peru.
 - The Central American peace process will gradually fade, leaving unresolved socio-economic and political problems that will undermine democracy and cause political instability. Levels of criminal violence, already extremely high, will increase in the short term and remain a serious problem past 2007. A regression to large-scale political violence and/or authoritarian practices is likely in one or more countries.
 - Under the presidency of Arnaldo Aleman, Nicaraguan political violence will intensify. This has the potential to lead to an authoritarian restoration and/or renewed civil war.
 - The political crisis in Haiti will reemerge after the U.N. peacekeeping force withdraws. This could occur quickly, or it may take some time. Either way, political instability, violence and authoritarian rule seem likely to return.
 - The U.S. Southern Command will relocate to Miami in 1997. The U.S. military will probably not retain bases in Panama, though it might participate in an anti-drug center at Howard Air Force Base. Whether the Canal will run efficiently under Panamanian control will depend on the extent to which its management is undermined by political interference and corruption.
 - While there will be a gradual recovery in the Cuban economy, the country will still be in worse socio-economic shape in 2007 than it was in 1989, when the crisis began. The political situation will become increasingly uncertain because of Castro's advancing age and related health problems. Political violence and instability are likely if he dies or is removed from power.

- Puerto Ricans may, once again, have to choose among commonwealth, statehood and independence. If the U.S. Congress eliminates the tax subsidy and reduces transfer payments, commonwealth will lose its appeal, and statehood will become the most attractive option.
- The short-term outlook for Brazil is good, but fiscal and trade deficits persist. Major social and economic challenges include poverty, violent crime, corruption, inequitable distribution of income, landlessness, and environmental degradation, especially in the Amazon.
- The political and socio-economic crisis in Mexico will continue. The economy will eventually recover, but social recovery will take much longer. Neoliberal economic policies, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), will continue to pose major socio-economic adjustment problems, especially for rural areas. Political instability and violence will continue in the form of guerrilla activities, kidnappings, assassinations, and human rights abuses.
- The movement to expand NAFTA, stalled since the Mexican peso crisis, will gradually reemerge. Subregional integration efforts such as MERCOSUR, a Southern Common Market including Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay with Chile joining, will continue.
- The United States will continue to support democratization throughout the region. Though Washington will be less inclined to intervene militarily, continued political instability in the Caribbean Basin will probably lead to one or more such interventions during the next decade, with Haiti and Cuba being the prime candidates.

ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Dianne L. Smith

Regional Assessment.

East Asia and the Western Pacific remain a dynamic region of the world economically, having overtaken Europe as America's main trading arena. This shift in trade toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Southeast Asia will continue. The issues of Taiwan and North Korea, among other factors, will remain potential threats to the stability of the region and U.S. interests for the next several years. When Hong Kong reverts to the PRC later this year, the method and style by which it is absorbed will presage PRC attitudes towards free market economics, trade, and human rights. In the longer term, the proliferation of modern technologies, including those for weapons of mass destruction, will act as a major force affecting the security environment.

The People's Republic of China.

Beijing is witnessing its best security position in two centuries: no regional threats and the return of Hong Kong. However, the Soviet Union, formerly China's superpower rival, has been replaced by the Russian Federation, an unstable nuclear power. Furthermore, around its Central Asian periphery, China must now contend with a bevy of small republics which are open to influence by China's rivals and subject to Islamic fundamentalist ideology which might spill over into China's own Muslim border regions.

The succession crisis which is sure to follow Deng Xiaoping's death presages a power struggle between moderate reformers and ultra-nationalists who will take a more cautious or more adventurous course respectively in their claims on Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and other remnants of the Chinese empire. This struggle will occur

even as China confronts a decade of economic and social transformation, heightened by inflation, environmental degradation, depletion of finite energy resources, the increased political influence of the People's Liberation Army, decentralization of authority, and economic inequality among the provinces. Doomsayers who predict the fragmentation of China into several nations overstate the case, but the shock of the Soviet Union's demise prohibits outright dismissal of this scenario.

The United States does not want to replace the Soviet threat of the last half of the 20th century with a China threat for the first quarter-to-half of the 21st century. The best way to keep that from happening is to factor China into any approach to issues dealing with regional security rather than trying to exclude or "contain" Chinese policies. The United States also needs to pursue policies which will help stabilize the PRC during this period of further economic and political transformation.

Japan.

While the short-term fallout from the Okinawa school-girl incident was harsh, it may have resulted in a long-term improvement in U.S.-Japanese relations by forcing a public debate on the role the United States should be playing in Japan's security. That debate seemingly has reaffirmed the importance of the bilateral U.S.-Japanese relationship and the importance of the United States as the third leg in a triad among Tokyo, Beijing, and Washington.

America's growing trade deficit with China should take some of the pressure off Japan, which felt that Washington's trade bashing had emphasized trade issues to the exclusion of mutual security issues. Unless China should act in an excessively provocative manner, Japan will seek regional stability through its relationship with the United States over the next decade.

North and South Korea.

Even now Pyongyang threatens to renege on the suspension of its nuclear program and suspected weapons development program, as promised in the U.S.-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework. Pyongyang continues to practice brinkmanship to gain concessions and weaken the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance. Despite the threats of famine and mass starvation, North Korea has not released its strategic wartime food supplies. Pyongyang continues to send sabotage and assassination teams into South Korea.

Despite the continuing confrontation between North and South Korea, the next decade may bring significant changes in their relationship. There is the possibility of reunification. That would entail fundamental structural economic and political reforms in North Korea. If the two Koreas are not reunified, a reconciliation is certainly possible and that would almost surely involve warmer relations and a softening of Pyongyang's policies both at home and abroad. Regardless of the scenario, the United States will remain engaged in this struggle as a result of the bilateral security arrangements with the ROK and its responsibilities under the Agreed Framework.

ASEAN.

The perceived withdrawal of the United States from the region and fears that a resurgent China (or even Japan or India) would fill the vacuum gave impetus to the concept of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) security cooperation and produced the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. Because it is the only multilateral organization dealing with security problems in Southeast Asia, the United States continues to support the ARF by attending its annual meetings as a "dialogue partner." Rather than serving as a security architecture, the ARF remains devoted to confidence-building measures. It has not forestalled some impressive investments in defense by member states, perceived by some analysts as a way to

discourage Chinese aggression, but defended by the ASEAN states as normal military modernization designed to keep pace with rapid technological advances in weaponry.

The 1996 ARF meeting in Jakarta resulted in Burma being admitted as an observer. This was in part to counter the influence exerted by the PRC and as a rebuff to U.S. human rights concerns. At this meeting of the forum, it was stated that the ARF would focus on security, transparency, confidence-building measures, and conflict resolution. These should remain the primary areas of interest in the decade to come as new states (each with their own agenda) are admitted as observers, dialogue partners, or full members.

Economic fora, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization, designed to promote trade and investment in the Pacific basin, will continue to provide a means of promoting economic and political stability to the region. Strong economies promote politically stable regimes better able to assuage ethnic and religious strife.

U.S. Engagement and Military Presence.

The *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, issued in February 1995, pledges that U.S. military presence will be maintained indefinitely in South Korea and Japan, the only remaining hosts for the U.S. military in the region. However, increasingly vocal opposition to the presence of American forces in Okinawa and demands for their realignment within Japan have caused shifts in troop levels. The North Korean threat keeps Seoul from pressing for any troop cuts on the part of the United States, but popular dissatisfaction with the presence of foreign troops on Korean soil remains as well.

In the next decade, a number of challenges to the U.S. presence in South Korea and Japan are likely. Security reassessments, like that leading to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines, and future budgetary constraints make it unlikely that the current level of

deployments in South Korea and Japan will continue much longer. If that presence is to endure through another decade, U.S. leaders have to articulate a rationale that will be accepted both overseas and at home. Ironically, even as the PRC attempts to increase its hegemony in the region, Beijing tacitly (if not publicly) supports a U.S. presence in Asia as a stabilizing factor for the entire region.

Trends and Issues.

- Proliferation of the technology for weapons of mass destruction will continue. By 2007, most Asia-Pacific nations will possess the technology, and many will have the capability, to produce chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons.
- The Asia-Pacific region will remain the world's most economically dynamic well into the 21st century. Asia will continue to be the United States' most active trading partner. Wall Street will continue to shift its focus from Europe to the Pacific Rim.
- The Information Age has reached Asia and the diffusion of communications technology will have profound effects on business, industry, education, and politics. Those nations which do not begin an aggressive program to link into the Internet will be irretrievably left behind the more advanced nations of the 21st century. Information control exercised by the more authoritarian regimes will become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to maintain.
- America's security policy for the region will remain focused on the U.S.-China-Japan strategic triangle. As China overtakes Japan as a trading partner with the United States, and as it continues its extensive military modernization programs, its actions will become increasingly vital to U.S. security concerns. While the United States will continue to support the cause of human rights throughout Asia, Washington has to balance those concerns with more pragmatic

political and economic issues concerning its relationship with the PRC.

- Implementation of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework will be held hostage to Pyongyang's continued attempts at brinkmanship. The United States will remain a central player in this dispute until it is finally resolved.
- Multinational security consultations in the Asia-Pacific region such as ARF will continue to mature while they stress dialogue over infrastructure and security commitments.
- Transnational security threats, like the drug trade, international crime, the rise of a culture of violence, and terrorism will influence all the states of the region.
- Disputes over Taiwan and the Spratly Islands will remain imbroglios involving not only China, but also its regional neighbors and the United States. The manner in which they are addressed, and their resolution, will affect U.S. regional interests.

AFRICA

Steven Metz

Regional Assessment.

Ethnic conflict continues to threaten security across Sub-Saharan Africa. In Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, vicious civil wars with ethnic dimensions stand in remission, but are likely to escalate again. Similar dangers linger in dozens of African states. Other security problems vary in intensity from sub-region to sub-region. In West Africa, adversarial civil-military relations continue to pose a major obstacle to reform and democratization. "If the military coup has faded out of fashion in other parts of the continent," writes Howard W. French, "it is enjoying a strong resurgence in West Africa, where soldier-politicians all seem to be reading from the same tightly-written script."¹

The most dangerous example of dysfunctional civil-military relations in West Africa (and perhaps the world) is Nigeria. General Sani Abacha, who seized power in 1994 after the annulment of elections by the country's previous military dictator, is repressive and corrupt. Abacha claims to be leading his country back to civilian government, but is unable or unwilling to transcend the greed and ethnic antagonism that destroyed previous Nigerian democracies. In the face of pervasive corruption, mismanagement, and a cutoff of most foreign aid and investment, the Nigerian economy is in shambles. The country has fallen from being one of Africa's richest nations to one of its poorest. Ethnic tensions remain high. Meanwhile, Nigeria faces international pressure and diplomatic isolation for human rights abuses. Today it is a powderkeg. If Nigeria explodes, the result is likely to be one of the greatest human disasters of recent decades.

In Southern Africa, the dominant issue is the changing nature of national security. Until recently, the strategic geography of southern Africa was shaped by two problems:

apartheid in the Republic of South Africa and Cold War-related conflicts in Mozambique and Angola. Now these have subsided and international tensions are the lowest they have been for some time. This has allowed the governments of the area to reconsider their approach to national security. According to South Africa's draft defense white paper of 1995, "Security policy is no longer a predominantly military problem but has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters."² While ethnic violence in South Africa could explode again, organized crime based on smuggling and drug trafficking is rapidly moving to the top of the security agenda. Between the expanding role of Nigerian cartels in the global movement of illegal drugs and South Africa's transformation into a trafficking and drug consumption center, Africa is joining Latin America and Southeast Asia as regions of the world where narcotics pose a major threat to national security.

In Central and East Africa, ethnic conflict remains the preeminent issue, endangering not only democracy, reform, and stability, but also the very integrity of states. The most dangerous, complex, and vexing ethnic conflict involves the Tutsi and Hutu. This centuries-old strife sparked genocide in Rwanda 2 years ago and has kept Burundi hovering on the edge of disaster. In late 1996, it engulfed Zaire and may ignite the disintegration of that precarious giant. More than a million Hutu refugees from Rwanda and Burundi have lived in camps in eastern Zaire for several years. While the Zairian government demanded the repatriation of these people, most of the refugees refused to return to their homelands out of fear of retribution from Tutsi-dominated governments. International pressure and opposition from Zairian officials profiting from the international aid flows prevented the forced repatriation of the refugees. The fact that the refugee camps were dominated by Hutu militias who had instigated the 1994 massacres created severe tension among Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi.

In September 1996, ethnic Tutsi Zairians, fearing that they would face the same sort of repression and violence

their Rwandan kinsmen saw 2 years earlier, launched an attack on government forces. A rebel coalition centered on the Tutsi group (with at least tacit support from Rwanda) quickly gained the upper hand over incompetent Zairian government troops and their allies, the Hutu militias in the refugee camps. In the midst of chaotic violence and an interruption of relief flows, the refugees fled from Rwanda into Zaire, briefly returned, and then streamed back toward Rwanda and Burundi when the rebels attacked the camps. While the rebels routed the Hutu militias, ultimate resolution of the Tutsi-Hutu conflict is a long, bloody way off.

With the rebels in Zaire crushing government troops more interested in looting than fighting and talking of a march on the national capital, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that this crisis will be the death blow to the tottering Zairian state. A government of national unity led by Etienne Tshisekedi is unlikely to solve the nation's deep and long-standing political crisis. The imminent death of Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire's dictator since the 1960s, is likely to unleash many decades worth of pent-up frustration. The result will be violence. While the disintegration of Zaire would bring many years of violence and disaster to Central Africa, it may be beyond prevention.

Trends and Issues.

Four broad issues continue to dominate the African security environment. All warrant careful analysis as the United States searches for ways to encourage reform and progress in Africa given the limits on the economic, political, and military resources which Washington can devote to that region.

- The sustainment of democracy in those parts of Sub-Saharan Africa where it has survived depends on continued reform of civil-military relations, including institutionalization of civilian control of the military. Such reform will depend, in part, on the ability of African nations to develop effective police forces to

minimize the military role in domestic law and order, and to build mechanisms for civilian control of national security. Increasing cooperation among the armed forces of Africa's democracies and movement toward reserve-based armed forces could contribute to the reform of civil-military relations. The United States must develop programs to encourage it.

- Conditions in Zaire, Nigeria, and South Africa will determine Africa's future. Zaire is likely to disintegrate, perhaps challenging Africa's long-standing opposition to the re-drawing of colonial borders. Nigeria could follow. In South Africa, crime has reached epidemic proportions and could endanger the economic growth that supports ethnic and racial reconciliation. Together, these crises represent the greatest security challenge Africa has ever faced. The lives of millions of Africans will depend on how effectively the world community responds to the humanitarian problems caused by them, contains the violence that they generate, and encourages their ultimate resolution.
- African leaders are attempting to create effective mechanisms for regional solutions to regional conflicts. Many recognize that the interest of outsiders in preserving security and stability in their region declined precipitously with the end of the Cold War. As a result, they are seeking to improve the capability of African states and the Organization of African Unity to prevent, contain, and solve conflicts and to break the culture of violence that has developed during the past two decades. If African leaders are able to build a system for regional conflict prevention and resolution, it could radically transform the African security environment. If they fail, Africa will remain dependent on the transitory interest of outsiders. The United States is committed to assisting attempts to create effective regional methods and institutions for conflict resolution but is unable to devote extensive economic or military resources to the

process. Finding the most economical and effective way to use limited American strategic resources to create the African Crisis Response Force proposed by Secretary of State Warren Christopher in an October 1996 trip to Africa is, therefore, a pressing challenge.

- During most of their history, African militaries were configured for defense against external enemies and for internal security against political insurgents and separatists. Now the preeminent threats to national security are things like organized crime, narco-trafficking, poaching and smuggling, refugee and population flows, and ecological decay. In response to this, African militaries must reorganize and reform their basic concepts, doctrine, and approaches to leadership and training. The United States and other friends in Africa must find ways to assist.

ENDNOTES

1. Howard W. French, "In West Africa, Wave of Strongmen Weaken Democracy," *New York Times*, October 24, 1996, p. 1 of electronic download.

2. *Defence in a Democracy*, draft white paper on national defence of the Republic of South Africa, 21 June 1965, chapter 2.

MIDDLE EAST

Stephen C Pelletiere

Regional Assessment.

Two impending crises face the United States in the next year. First, Washington's position in Iraqi Kurdistan has been virtually eliminated in the wake of Mosoud Barzani's appeal to Saddam Hussein for protection against his enemy, Jalal Talabani. The second crisis that may have almost immediate and perhaps catastrophic consequences is what will happen among Israel, the Palestinians, Syria, and Egypt as prospects for the peace process seem dimmed.

Looking first at Iraqi Kurdistan, Barzani claimed that Talabani had enlisted the support of Tehran in an effort to make himself the master of the Iraqi Kurdish region. While this was, indeed, most likely the case, by going over to the side of Saddam, Barzani put Britain and the United States, who were supposedly protecting the Kurds against Saddam, in a very difficult position. The Allies now have no basis for maintaining a military presence in Iraq, or even enforcing the no-fly zone over the northern part of the country. In fact, while the air mission persists at a reduced size, the ground presence is gone.

The most dismaying aspect of the whole Kurdish imbroglio was the behavior of U.S. allies. Virtually none of those who previously had supported Washington's position stood by the United States when it came to a crisis. With little international support for its self-assumed humanitarian mission in the Northern Gulf, Washington now must reassess its strategy for this whole region.

For the time being, the Talabani forces, with Tehran's support, will be able to hold on to their enclave around Sulaimaniya. Barzani, correspondingly, will be able to retain control of Irbil if he maintains his ties to Saddam. As for the Turks, they will remain watchful, lest Iran attempt

further intervention in the north. Ideally, Ankara would like to see an Iraqi military presence return to Kurdistan, but before that can happen, Barzani has to turn his back completely on Washington; something he is unlikely to do.

The economic sanctions against Iraq will not end precipitously nor will they endure. Because no one country will break the embargo overtly, the economic sanctions will be eroded slowly as ways are devised to subvert them. Washington, with no way of enforcing its will upon Baghdad, will be forced to look the other way as illicit trade with Iraq increases over time.

At this time, the United States will find it increasingly difficult to implement Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, the no-fly zone over southern Iraq. Zealous Muslims view the American military presence with disfavor and the threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. installations and personnel will increase. There may well be more Khobar Towers-type attacks as part of an effort to discredit Arab governments friendly to the United States and to compel an end to, or a substantial reduction in, the American presence in the Persian Gulf area. Accordingly, if as some contend, King Faud is forced from power this year, and if the succession is not smooth, the United States may find that its already vulnerable position in the Gulf will become even more precarious.

The second impending crisis in the Middle East has the United States suffering an almost painful reversal in Israel. After supporting the Labor Party government of Shimon Peres, Washington saw it defeated in last year's elections. The victory of the Likud Party over Labor doubly dismayed Washington because the new government repudiated virtually all the peace initiatives of its predecessor.

Spurred on by anti-Palestinian forces in his cabinet, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is maneuvering to increase the settler population in Gaza and on the West Bank. This threatens to collapse what is left of the entire architecture of the peace process built over the past few years. Furthermore, if the Likud government continues on

its present provocative course, violence will be the inevitable result. Internationally, Israel will find itself increasingly isolated.

There is very little reason to be overly sanguine about the Hebron Agreement. All Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to was the implementation of the provisions negotiated between his predecessor, Yitzak Rabin, and the Palestinians. In effect, the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians remain stalled. The really difficult issues, to include the future of Jerusalem and statehood for the Palestinians, are still to be resolved.

Attempts by the Clinton administration to bring pressure on the Likud government will be resisted by Israel's supporters in the United States. When the administration eases its pressure on Likud, it will feel pressure from its Arab allies in the Middle East and an increasingly vociferous pro-Arab constituency within the United States. This will be a difficult year for U.S. Middle East policy.

Syria is in no condition to provoke Israel militarily. But at the same time, Damascus will not restrain Hizbollah from carrying out attacks from southern Lebanon. Netanyahu will have to find some way of answering these attacks since invading Lebanon is not an option with the Israeli public. If the frustration level grows, Israel may try to mobilize the Christian community in Lebanon against Syria, a very dangerous escalation which could reignite the terror war.

Trends and Issues.

- France will continue to provide an alternative to American leadership in the Middle East. Paris, working through the European Union, will attempt to exert greater influence on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Israel will condemn such activity; the Arabs will applaud it.

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- Acts of terror inside the Middle East will escalate. The Arabs will blame these attacks on the Mossad while the Israelis will cite renegade Palestinian groups.
 - The status of Jerusalem will be a prominent issue in 1997. Given the current climate in relations between Israel and the Palestinians, it is unlikely that the Arab nations are going to be any more accommodating than the Israelis. The Arabs may push Washington for an unambiguous policy statement on the future of the Holy City.
 - European nations and Canada will be increasingly opposed to Helms-Burton in 1997. Many countries are going to insist on doing business with Iran, perhaps even Iraq. Any attempt by the United States to prevent them from doing so is likely to invite retaliation against American business interests overseas.

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW AND THE ALTERNATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT

William T. Johnsen

While overwhelmingly for the good, the dramatic shifts in the international security environment over the last decade have not eliminated all threats to U.S. national interests. Although there is general agreement on that point, less consensus exists on what defense policies and force structures are necessary to meet the demands of the post-Cold War era. The Base Force and the Bottom Up Review (BUR) notwithstanding, critics have claimed that U.S. defense planning lacks a coherent thread and needs further revision. Increasingly, strategic analysts have called for periodic reviews to assess the state of U.S. defense policy. Responding to these recommendations, the latest being from the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (May 1995), Secretary of Defense William J. Perry initiated the first Quadrennial Defense Review.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

The QDR process received additional impetus from the Armed Forces Force Structures Review Act of 1996 (known familiarly as the Lieberman Amendment). The act requires the Secretary of Defense to complete the QDR within 1997. It also stipulates that the QDR must include:

... a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a revised defense program through the year 2005.

The Act also requires the Secretary of Defense to submit the QDR results to Congress not later than May 15, 1997. Moreover, it specifies that the report include:

(1) The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the defense strategy of the United States and the force structure best suited to implement the strategy.

(2) The threats examined for purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in the examination of such threats.

(3) The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions related to the cooperation of allies and mission-sharing, levels of acceptable risk, warning times, and intensity and duration of conflict.

(4) The effect on the force structure of preparations for and participation in peace operations and military operations other than war.

(5) The effect on the force structure of the utilization by the Armed Forces of technologies anticipated to be available by the year 2005, including precision guided munitions, stealth, night vision, digitization, communications, and the changes in doctrine and operational concepts that would result from the utilization of such technologies.

(6) The manpower and sustainment policies required under the defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting more than 120 days.

(7) The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably discharge such roles and missions.

(8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly referred to as "tooth to tail" ratio) under the defense strategy including, in particular, the appropriate size and number of headquarter units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.

(9) The air-lift and sea-lift capabilities required to support the defense strategy.

(10) The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory deployments necessary under the defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.

(11) The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.

(12) The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the defense strategy.

To assist DoD in the QDR process, the act requires the Secretary of Defense to establish a nonpartisan, independent National Defense Panel (NDP). The NDP will consist of a chairman and eight members. They will be selected by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the leadership of the Senate Armed Services and House National Security committees. The prospective members of the NDP, who are to be drawn from the private sector, must be recognized experts in matters relating to national security. The NDP will be apprised of all ongoing work within the QDR and will submit an independent assessment along with their recommendations for improvements to the Secretary of Defense not later than March 14, 1997.

Upon completion of the review, the Chairman of the NDP and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit independent assessments of the QDR to the Secretary of Defense. The report must be transmitted to the Secretary in time for his consideration and inclusion in the final report that is due to the Senate Armed Services and House National Security committees not later than May 15, 1997.

Alternative Force Structure Assessment.

Besides its work on the QDR, the Lieberman Amendment charges the NDP to conduct an Alternative Force Structure Assessment. The NDP is to examine a "... variety of possible force structures of the Armed Forces through the year 2010 and beyond." In developing such alternatives the NDP is to analyze and assess a range of

potential threats (conventional threats across the conflict spectrum; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means; non-traditional threats, such as information warfare; domestic and international terrorism; and possible major challengers possessing military capabilities similar to the United States) and scenarios (derived from threats identified, as well as scenarios of lesser and greater magnitude than those used in the BUR).

The Alternative Force Structure Assessment is intended to:

- “develop recommendations regarding a variety of force structures for the Armed Forces that permit the forward deployment of sufficient land- and sea-based forces to provide an effective deterrent to conflict and to permit a military response by the United States to the scenarios developed . . .”
- “to the extent practicable, estimate the funding required by fiscal year, in constant fiscal year 1997 dollars, to organize, equip, and support the forces contemplated under the force structures assessed in the assessment.”

The NDP will transmit its assessment to the Secretary of Defense not later than December 1, 1997. After consultation with the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary will submit a copy of the NDP assessment with his comments to the appropriate congressional committees not later than December 15, 1997.

Potential Consequences.

The comprehensive requirements and constrained time limits contained in the Lieberman Amendment set a difficult task before DoD and the NDP. As a result, the QDR and Alternative Force Structure Assessment will preoccupy DoD policymakers for most of 1997. The eventual results of this prodigious undertaking cannot be forecast with any certainty, but, certainly, the potential exists for significant

change, with attendant consequences, to emerge from the QDR process.

Whether such significant change will occur remains to be seen. President Clinton's reelection makes unlikely major changes in the basic principles that guide U.S. defense policy. The current tenets are well-established and revisions are more likely on the margins than at the core. That having been said, shifts in how those principles are applied or in the emphasis placed on specific strategic implementing concepts could have significant ramifications for defense policy.

Changes in National Security Strategy.

President Clinton's reelection also makes major changes in the existing national security strategy unlikely. Engagement and enlargement undoubtedly will remain as guiding principles. Nor are undergirding strategic implementing concepts likely to undergo substantial change. Detering and, if necessary, defeating regional aggressors; providing a credible overseas presence; countering weapons of mass destruction; contributing to multilateral peace operations; combating terrorism; and fighting drug trafficking are likely to remain in effect.

On the other hand, the decision to delay publication of the President's legally mandated annual national security report to Congress until after the QDR has been completed may indicate a willingness to adjust portions of the national security strategy to conform to recommendations that might result from the QDR. And, President Clinton's nomination of a new "national security team" may herald shifts in the administration's emphasis on a number of strategic implementing concepts. For example, recent pronouncements indicate that the "two MRC strategy" (the ability to fight and win two major regional conflicts) will be retained for the foreseeable future as a means of deterring, and if necessary defeating, regional aggressors. One key difference, however, is the elimination of the "nearly simultaneous" planning criteria from the two MRC

formulation. This change could have significant consequences for future force structures, almost as significant as reverting to a "one MRC strategy."

How much and what type of overseas U.S. presence also may change. Will overseas force levels be increased, decreased, or remain the same? Will forces remain permanently stationed or will rotating units from the continental United States take on a larger role? Which types of forces best represent U.S. commitment? Will exercises become the primary vehicle for maintaining overseas presence?

Another critical issue surrounds the degree of emphasis and balance between protecting and promoting national interests. In the past, much emphasis was placed on protecting U.S. national interests. This made sense given the extent of the threat in the Cold War. But, absent such a threat, it may now be possible to devote greater attention and resources toward activities that seize the strategic initiative actively to promote U.S. interests. The degree to which the military may participate in such activities and the subsequent effect on budgets and force structures could be considerable.

Changes in National Military Strategy.

Dramatic shifts in U.S. national military strategy are unlikely to occur. Promoting stability and thwarting aggression through peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning major regional conflicts will remain applicable. Nor are overseas presence and power projection likely to be fundamentally altered.

While the overarching principles may remain largely the same, the manner in which they are implemented and the degree of emphasis placed on specific elements may undergo considerable change. For instance, the strategic concept of preventive defense recently emphasized three lines of action: prevent the emergence of threats to U.S. national interests and security; deter any threats that might emerge;

and, if necessary, defeat an aggressor. Under this concept, greater emphasis would be placed on preventing threats. Whether Secretary of Defense William Cohen will continue to stress preventive defense remains to be seen. But the consequences, especially for the Army which would carry out much of the preventive defense mission, could be considerable.

The balance between overseas presence and power projection may also be altered. If, for example, preventive defense and peacetime engagement take on greater importance, then overseas presence—whether through permanent stationing or rotation of units—may grow. If, on the other hand, budget constraints drive down personnel levels and forces available, then greater reliance on power projection of forces from the continental United States may be more the norm.

Because of the breadth and scope of the tasks laid down in the Lieberman Amendment, DoD and the NDP will have to examine a large number of consequential issues that could alter the implementing concepts of the national military strategy. To identify but a few of the critical issues offers some insight into the potential consequences of the QDR. For example, to achieve an appropriate balance between:

- Promoting and protecting national interests;
- Preventive defense measures and other activities;
- Technology and people;
- Modernization and recapitalization;
- Budget allocations to the Services;
- Roles and Missions of the Services;
- The Active and Reserve Components;

- Interests of congressional constituents and base closings that reduce excess infrastructure; and,
- Current readiness, force structure, and modernization.

Changes in Force Structures.

While it is too early to forecast outcomes of the QDR force structure review and Alternative Force Structure Assessment, some key battle lines have been drawn. Four brief examples indicate the scope and potential consequences of the debates. The first instance is the degree to which forces will be optimized for major conflicts—fighting and winning America’s wars—or whether some forces will be designed to focus on other operations. If, for instance, preventive defense receives increased priority, then the nation will need forces able to operate effectively in that milieu. In a constrained fiscal environment, the necessity of fielding forces to perform the warfighting and preventive defense roles may require considerable trade-offs with other requirements.

Second, striking an appropriate balance between precision engagement and dominant maneuver will significantly influence force structures. Stand-off, precision strike weapons systems will provide critical capabilities on future battlefields. Over-reliance on such weapons, however, may leave the U.S. Armed Forces vulnerable to asymmetric responses. Moreover, while precision strike weapons systems lend themselves to compelling or deterring potential adversaries, they are less suitable for peacetime engagement tasks that may take on increasing importance in the near future. Dominant maneuver forces, on the other hand, are capable of performing across the full range of operations, provide significant operational flexibility to respond to asymmetric challenges throughout the spectrum of conflict, and lend themselves to peacetime engagement activities. Both capabilities will be essential to meet the demands of the anticipated international security

environment. But achieving an appropriate balance within increasingly constrained fiscal resources will not be easy.

Third, the role of the Reserve Components—especially within the Army—is likely to generate considerable debate. A key issue will center on using Reserve Component forces to conduct operations other than war (with attendant frequent mobilizations and consequent stress on Reserve Component personnel and units) versus serving as a primary deterrent to a second MRC and providing a significant combat component to fight in a second MRC, if required. The potential effects of these decisions on the structure of Active Component forces, the Active Component/Reserve Component mix, and the organization within the respective Reserve Components will be significant.

Lastly, future force structures hinge to a large degree on the research, development, and acquisition of modern equipment. The long-standing, but rising, tension between current readiness requirements (largely dictated by increasing numbers and duration of deployments) and long-term modernization needs requires resolution. This may only be possible if there is a break in the historical DoD budget apportionment paradigm. If such a break occurs, the ramifications for future force structures will be consequential.

Congressional Activity.

While there may be considerable congressional discussion of defense policy issues in 1997, one should not anticipate significant legislative action. As the recent election campaign demonstrated, the nation lacks keen interest in or awareness of defense issues. Time will be required to forge a bipartisan consensus on defense issues that the Executive and Legislative branches say they seek. The Clinton administration's new national security team also will require time to grasp these nettlesome issues, and Congress undoubtedly will grant a brief "honeymoon period." Further, Congress may be willing to adopt a "wait

and see attitude” that allows the QDR process to play out before taking definitive action. Nonetheless, the conduct of the QDR and Alternative Force Structure Assessment will generate considerable congressional interest in defense issues in 1997.

Similarly, the defense budget should not undergo significant change in 1997. Subsequent years, however, are likely to see calls for defense cuts in tandem with renewed focus on balancing the overall budget. This does not argue that decreases in the defense budget are inevitable. The American public and its elected representatives have long demonstrated a willingness to underwrite a substantial defense commitment, so long as they perceived that they were receiving a fair return on their investment. This trend could continue into the future, if DoD is able to articulate a rationale that garners adequate support.

During 1998, however, Congress can be expected to undertake considerable action—whether as a result of recommendations stemming from the QDR or because Congress perceives that the QDR fell short of expectations. In either case, considerable legislative and programmatic policy changes could occur. But it will be far better for all concerned if Congress is responding to QDR recommendations rather than because the Legislative Branch feels compelled (a la Goldwater-Nichols) to spur DoD to action. As the Lieberman Amendment indicates, Congress may be losing patience with what it perceives to be a slow DoD response to the changing international environment.

Conclusions.

In carrying out the mandate of the Lieberman Amendment, DoD and the National Defense Panel face a daunting task that would be difficult to accomplish in a stable security environment. But such stability is not likely to occur in the foreseeable future. Simply because U.S. policymakers had roughly 50 years of relative planning constancy during the Cold War does not mean that the post-Cold War era will lead to a similar period of stability.

To the contrary, the planning constants that characterized East-West confrontation may have been atypical, and the United States may be facing a period of prolonged uncertainty in defense planning issues.

The United States may be best served, therefore, by preserving a high degree of flexibility in its defense policy over the next decade. At the same time, the QDR and the Alternative Force Structure Assessment should focus on providing the United States with a balanced force capable of operating effectively throughout the spectrum of conflict, at all levels of warfare, and across the range of military operations.

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